


THE DOMINOES RISE

*Official and unofficial foreign policies of Finland with regard
to the restoration of independence of the Baltic States*

Viro tukee Uuden Suomen itsenäisyyttä.



"Suomen lehdistä Uusi Suomi on selkeimmin tukenut Viron
ja muiden Baltian maiden itsenäisyyttä.
Sellaista lehteä älkää lopettako, te tarvitsette sitä."

**UUDEN SUOMEN PUOLESTA
ERI KLAS**

Kapellimestari, Viro

JOS HALUAA VALITA, YKSI EI RIITÄ

UUSI SUOMI

Andres Perendi

Andres Perendi

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to the restoration of independence of the Baltic States**

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ABSTRACT

The three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were independent republics in the inter-war period, to be absorbed into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1940, during World War II. Finland, a neighbour, remained independent.

By the 1980s, the USSR was under-going considerable problems in its economy, problems that President Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to address through economic reform and human rights reform. The three Baltic States took the opportunity of addressing these issues from their own perspective, that of states that had lost their independence.

Centrally, this research addresses the issue of the visible predictability of independence re-established, on the basis of daily collected newspaper articles from a politically wide spectrum of Finnish newspapers, from right-wing Kokoomus/Coalition Party newspapers (*Uusi Suomi*, *Aamulehti*), through non-aligned (Centre Party) papers (e.g. *Keskisuomalainen*, *Savon Sanomat*) to the extreme left-wing communist *Tiedonantaja*.

There was a distinct dichotomy to be observed in Finland in the official and unofficial versions of policy towards the Baltic States, the press being most supportive, while the official policy was indifferent.

No previous research has been done on any larger scale along a timeline demonstrating the seemingly inevitable momentum of the process. The goal for the research has been to show the inevitability of the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to the re-establishment of the independent Baltic States. Methodologically, the study applies text linguistics to the area of the social sciences.

The findings were that the final result was predictable: the re-establishment of Baltic independence was inevitable. The use of a comprehensive volume of data can be used to predict important future developments. The Finnish press has had a significant role in the re-establishment of the independence of the Baltic States, so significant it merits recognition on a national scale in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Preface

On his appointment to the post of First Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev embarked on a series of radical steps to reform the economy of the USSR. The key words of his reforms, terms soon to come into overall use, were *perestroika*, the restructuring of Soviet society, and the associated opening up of Soviet media, *glasnost*, openness. The Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were very prompt in taking the opportunity of voicing their concerns regarding the ongoing forced industrialization of their countries. In Estonia, this took the form of organized protest against the Moscow proposals to embark on extensive mining operations for phosphate rock in the environs of Toolese in North-eastern Estonia. The process of industrial development in the Baltic States was being implemented **by and for the benefit of the central government in Moscow**, at the cost of the environment for the original inhabitants. In the process, large numbers of new Russian-speaking inhabitants were imported, especially into Latvia and Estonia, putting the indigenous populations in danger of becoming a minority in their own countries.

The reforms instituted by Gorbachev led to an inevitable collision between dogmatic Soviet communism and Gorbachev's realization of the need for real practical measures. In this situation, all three Baltic States saw their only opportunity of regaining their independence as having come. Indeed, it was the Baltic need to assure their continued existence. Aleksander Warma (1890-1970), the last ambassador of the

Republic of Estonia to Finland before its incorporation into the USSR, had published his memoirs (Warma 1971/1993). The content of the book had struck the current writer as a series of falling Dominoes.

The events in the USSR and the Baltic republics of the 1980s seemed to be repeating a similar irreversible motion, but in the opposite direction – toward a re-established independence. **The process inspired the writer to the emotionally foolhardy task of documenting the course of events in the Baltic States** during this period. The Soviet Union was facing a badly needed reform of its economy. This reform, in turn, was to lead to an increase in civil liberties unforeseen in the Soviet Union. There *was* a chance for the Baltic States to achieve their independence lost in the Second World War.

The Dominoes were rising!

The rest of the process is the history that the writer has attempted to reproduce and explain from the viewpoint of social and societal policy. The study is to be seen as an inter-disciplinary study, lying in between the areas of Social Policy, Journalism, History and Sociology. Each area has made its contribution to the study. The major focus is on the role of **the press as an instrument of Social Policy and Political Science**. The material comes from the domain of Journalism. The processes involved lie in the realms of Social Policy and History.

The current work focuses on the Baltic States, as seen through Finnish eyes. Estonia, especially, has occupied a special role in Finnish thinking through the ethnic relationship between the two nations. The emphasis on Estonia is perhaps at the centre of the study, partly at the expense of Latvia and Lithuania. Notwithstanding this, it must be realised that **all three countries had a common aim at this point of time – the restoration of their independence**. In Australia where the writer grew up, all three Baltic States co-operated closely on the political front. An annual event, to this day, is the commemoration, on 14th June each year, of the deportations to Siberia of large numbers of the Baltic populations by the Soviet authorities, in 1941 as well as in March, 1949.

In Finland the writer, to his astonishment, observed that there was

almost complete ignorance of Latvia and Lithuania, to the extent of frequent confusion of the two. This observation may perhaps be observed in the nature of the corpus, with a large proportion of the articles concentrating on Estonia.

The writer is deeply grateful to his late parents, *Arnold* and *Serafima Perendi*, for instilling in him the love for Estonia and the interest in the Baltic States that was to lead to this work. Since it was politically impossible to return to Estonia in the Soviet era, it was the writer's parents' nationally-minded upbringing that first led him to Finland in 1970, as a near-miss substitute for their beloved Estonia. Here he was to begin to observe Estonia from a closer range than from Australia, subsequently to embark on the collection of the data leading to this study (some thirty files of clippings of articles on the Baltic States), also entered into the Jyväskylä University Library as a collection of microfiches. The initial yield of research by undergraduate students of the university from the writer's material was one History proseminar paper and one actual Master of Social Science thesis in Sociology, subsequently to be complemented with one further Master of Arts thesis in History. A case of academic midwifery!

An unsung hero in the social history of the University of Jyväskylä is the regular assembly of coffee-drinkers at a table in the Department of Musicology cafeteria, mostly from the Department of History, from professors to junior research assistants, as well as a choice selection of staff from the other humanities, discussing the whole range of Life. The group was truly an enjoyable scholarly forum.

Of this group, members of the History department, indeed, were instrumental in referring the writers of the seminar papers and theses above to the present writer and his corpus. His sincere thanks to them, Professor Seppo Zetterberg, Dr. Heikki Rantatupa and Dr. Heikki Roiko-Jokela, in particular. A source of general inspiration was provided by Professor Erkki Lehtinen. My sincere thanks to him, too.

A draft of the research shown to the Department of History was referred to Professor Kari Palonen, the Department of Political Science, for advice on how to proceed with the research plan. Linguist outsider though he was, the author was cordially accepted into the group of scholars in the field of Social and Public Policy, on the recom-

mentation of the Faculty of Social Sciences. Thanks are due to Professor Teppo Kröger and Dr. Raija Julkunen, my mentors in the Department of Social Policy, Professors Marja Järvelä and Risto Heiskala of the same department, as well as the participants in the departmental research seminar, for their kind comments and support in this endeavour.

Ms Emilia Leinonen, a doctoral student of Social and Public Policy at the University of Jyväskylä provided exceptional help in the latter stages of the project in editing the text. My sincere thanks to her.

A heartfelt “Thank you!” to Ms. Maija Reuter of the University of Jyväskylä Library, *custodian emerita* of special collections. In the writer’s systematic collection of newspaper clippings on the Baltic, Ms Reuter had seen the seed of a worthwhile corpus for use by scholars in the Library.

A source of scholarly thrill for the writer was in the monthly trips to Helsinki to consult his mentor, Dr. Ilmari Susiluoto. These trips were truly inspirational. In addition to a regular dose of academic advice and friendship, the trips also provided a tangibly historical atmosphere in the physical environment of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

An expression of thanks is due to the writer’s late Estonian fraternity brother Andres Niitepõld of Järvenpää. His extensive library of Estoniana, from the Middle Ages to the 1980s, inspired the writer to begin his own collection, in a slightly different area, eventually to lead to this project.

Finally, my heartfelt thanks is due to my dear wife, Arja, for ever spurring me on. It was she who, before I ever began my study, said to me:

*“Why are you just letting others do research on the material you have collected? **Why don’t you write something yourself?**”*

The Dominoes Rise is the result.

1. Introduction

This study aims to document, based on material from Finnish newspapers, the events and foreign policies of Finland in the post-war period, especially the 1980s, leading to the regaining of independence by the Baltic countries, lost in the Second World War. This introduction raises some issues that have been central in this process.

1.1 Ethnic engineering in the post-war Baltic States

Ethnic issues, in the face of russification pressures, were an essential feature in the national aspirations of the Baltic States, Estonia Latvia and Lithuania in the five post-World War II decades. These have been the prime motives in the movement for national independence.

The history of Finland, as a Grand Duchy of the Russian empire, forms an eminent backdrop to the history of Estonia. Finland had experienced a similar period of ethnic oppression in its own history at the end of the 19th century, the so-called *sortovuodet*, in Finnish. However, the issue of *ethnic engineering*, of *russification*, during the recent post-World War II era in the countries occupied by the Soviet Union, specifically in Estonia and Latvia, is one entirely unfamiliar to the Finnish way of thinking. The country had not had the experience of such pressure, apart from the two eras of oppression in the 19th century.

The rights enjoyed by the Grand Duchy of Finland had been a bone of contention for the Russian nationalists, Finland enjoying the status of a state within a state, to the extent of having its own borders. This excessively liberal state of affairs resulted in **the first era of Russian oppression, from 1899-1905**, as a consequence of the imperial manifest of Czar Nicholas II, **abrogating the rights of Finland hitherto existing**. A period of russification followed. The second period of oppression lasted from 1905, after the Revolution, to the First World War. These had apparently been forgotten, with Finland no longer being aware of the similarities between their experiences and those of the Balts.

The concept of the *Russian ideal/identity* (*russkaya ideya*), put forward by the Russian religious philosopher Vladimir Solovyov in 1888, regarded Russia as duty-bound, by way of Christianity, to emphasize the roles of the different peoples of the world as part of the one human organism (Karppinen 1999). The Russians saw their role in the world in like manner to that of the Russian Orthodox Church: the body of Christ. (Karppinen 1999:18) In the light of the danger from Turkey and the desire to free the Balkan peoples from the Turkish bond, Solovyov, regarded as **the highest value to which Russia and the Slavic world could aspire to be the denial of particularism of all sorts, including the denial of particularism of any kind. The latter denial also subsumed separatism from Russian culture.**

Truth was to be found in neither the individualism preached by Western civilization nor in the strict tradition of uniformity characteristic of the Eastern Islamic world. Solovyov thus called on the Slavic world, especially Russia, to form “a Third Power”, a synthesis of the above two philosophies.

The Russian writer **Fyodor Dostoyevski** held future Russians as being able to understand the meaning of “the true Russian identity in an attempt to find the ultimate agreement to European conflicts” and to embrace in their “Russian souls” a brotherly love for all peoples, according to the Christian gospel. (Karppinen 1999,19). While **Nikolai Berdyayev**, post-revolutionary Russian émigré philosopher, regarded Russia as a country where nationalism was stressed less than anywhere else, it was still a **country where nationalism went to the absolute extremes.**

Russia experienced itself as a messiah among nations (Karppinen 1999, 25). An example of this self-concept was most recently to be seen in the 50th anniversary celebrations of the end of World War II. Reports on the end of World War II in the 10th May, 2005 issues of *Kansan Uutiset* and *Tiedonantaja* quoted President Putin as saying: “It was a good victory. We (the Russians) do not differentiate between ‘our’ victory and ‘your’ victory“. *Kansan Uutiset* regarded the post-World War II Poles as being bitter at the new slavery imposed on them by the Soviet Union. While, for them, 9th May was not a Victory Day, *Tiedonantaja* of 13th May 2005 accused Estonia and Lithuania of wanting to declare null and void **the meaning of the victory achieved by the Soviet Union over fascism.**

Putin had claimed that Russia would always remember *the help given by the allies to the USSR* in its fight against Nazi Germany, mentioning especially the US, Great Britain, France and the German and Italian resistances (*Itä-Savo* 10.5.2005). The messianic *Russian idea* was still very much alive in the mind of the Russians, *dogmatically* guiding all of their relations with their neighbours.

1.2 The Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)

In the immediate post-war era, as early as 1954, the USSR proposed a conference with the aim of:

1. preventing German rearmament and promoting the non-alignment of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Western military bloc NATO (Küng 1977, 73),

and, most importantly,

2. *gaining Western recognition of the post-war borders (primarily of those of the Soviet Union, including the Baltic States as part of the Soviet Union)*

Finland announced its participation in such a conference to be conditional on participation by all the other states of Europe. (Küing 1977, 73) With the inception of the new Eastern policies of West Germany in May, 1969, Finland began laying the path for the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, to be held in Helsinki, capital of a neutral state. Contrary to the Soviet conception of the Conference, however, *on the initiative of Finland*, the United States of America were also invited to participate. This invitation was, after all, in accordance with the aforementioned concept of Finnish neutrality. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, at the level of Heads of State, was eventually convened in Helsinki in 1975, with a preparatory meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers in Helsinki two years earlier.

1.3 The basis for Finnish foreign policy

The political doctrine known as the *Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line*, pursued by all the major political parties of the country, **was the cornerstone of Finland's foreign policy**. The primary aim was to win the confidence of the Soviet Union as regards Finland's official foreign policy, its politicians *and its people* (my bold italics, AP). (Küing 1977, 77)

A means to winning the confidence of the Soviet Union were the frequent visits to the Soviet Union by President Kekkonen, even though these visits possibly gave the West the impression of Finland's close dependence on the Soviet Union. These visits might be regarded as latter-day manifestations of Finnish russification in the 19th century.

Kekkonen had often experienced criticism for exercising personal contacts in the relations with the Soviet Union. The reasons given for these was the close Finnish-Soviet co-operation created as a result of the FCMA Treaty, giving rise to hundreds of talks at various levels. (Kekkonen 1980, 31.) Finland had long understood the great value put on personal negotiations by the Soviet Union. It was for this reason that Finland had chosen these frequent visits. (Kekkonen 1980, 32). The maintenance of foreign relations had demanded more flexibility than ever from all states. **Today Finland can freely choose its own social order, without outside interference.** This has been made possible

by the post-war foreign policy chosen by the country. Finland belongs to the few countries in the world with perfect, stable relations with its neighbours, unlike the situation elsewhere at the end of the war. The basis of Finnish policy toward the Soviet Union was uncompromised honesty. **Finland would not claim to be doing something, while doing the opposite.**

A situation with the Soviet Union nursing no doubts regarding Finland was seen to be a vital feature of the country's well-being (Kekkonen 1980, 46). The manner in which Finland had seen to Soviet security interests was something that the USSR could be quite satisfied with. The Soviet Union had never forced Finland to adopt its political system, though there were many in both states who would have liked this to eventuate (Kekkonen 1980, 53). **A capitalist Finland, maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union was incompatible with the black-and-white Cold War-era view of the world** (Kekkonen, 1980:57). Finland's policies regarding the Soviet Union (termed *idänpolitiikka*/policies regarding the East), built on a solid foundation of mutual trust between Finland and the Soviet Union, independent of changes in international politics (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 69). Kekkonen could not see Finland resting on its laurels as far as relations with the Soviet Union were concerned. The past was something to be learned from actively. The youth of the country had a healthy self-esteem, needing no hate of their neighbour, jingoism, war or blood to boost it. (Kekkonen 1980, 60-61.)

The basis of the healthy Finnish-Soviet relationship was seen to be in the FCMA Treaty. While the Treaty allowed for negotiations to be called by either side, it was Finland that had taken the initiative throughout the existence of the Treaty. All military co-operation, according to the Treaty, was to occur *at the initiative of Finland and on Finnish territory.*

Kekkonen saw no grounds for the abandonment of the FCMA Treaty, as some would have it, on the basis of the new existing Finnish-German relationships. The unchanged text of the treaty was a sign of the fact that **Finnish foreign policy had been a success, independent of any foreign influence.**

It was difficult to reconcile the conscience of the world and the

Finnish role of socio-political critic with a policy of neutrality credible in the West. The only valid object of criticism was US imperialism and Western colonialism. (Küing 1977, 79.)

A stable Scandinavia was in the interests of Finland, the Soviet Union and the whole of Northern Europe. Yet despite President Paasikivi's firm belief in Nordic co-operation, membership of the Nordic Council was out of the question. Such membership would raise doubts in the mind of the Soviet Union regarding Finland's political orientation. **Similar restrictions seemed to apply to the Finnish plan to join Nordek, the Council for Nordic Economic Co-operation** (Kekkonen 1980, 99). **The Soviet press had, indeed, published articles warning Finland against such alliances** (Kekkonen 1980, 95). General de Gaulle had defined the concept of Europe as the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. There was to be peace among the peoples in this area, and Finland had become a part of this Western cultural area (Kekkonen 1980, 107).

Despite Kekkonen's claims to the contrary, Finland had had to balance out its relationships with East and West. The better the neutral, good-neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and Finland, the better the Finns could co-operate with Europe. Kekkonen did not experience this situation as one of Finlandization (Kekkonen 1980, 107, 109). He firmly believed Finnish foreign policy to be staunchly anchored in the CSCE policy.

Kekkonen had cause to remember that security could not be assured in a changing world without concern for traditional security issues, without détente and an end to the arms race. **The geographical location of Finland was to be part of the security configuration of post-CSCE Europe** (Kekkonen 1980, 115). Finnish foreign policy had not only remained intact for the past 35 years as a reasonable alternative for the other European nations to emulate. It had become a permanent part of the balance of power in Europe. It was Finland's aim to keep it so. (Kekkonen 1980, 117.)

Finnish security was seen as all the stronger the more peaceful and prosperous Europe was. For Kekkonen, security was not to be achieved through the arms race. Finland was to align itself with international politics. (Kekkonen 1980, 119.) Finland had remained politically and

militarily unaligned, while promoting the CSCE process. Disarmament was a desire to resolve conflicts without resorting to force, threats or sabre-rattling, using peaceful means to achieve this end. Another definition of *détente* was a political situation where the probability of a major war between the United States and the Soviet Union was continually decreasing.

Kekkonen did not see mature patriotism as under-valuing the values and achievements of other nations. Kekkonen quotes 19th century Fenoman philosopher J.V. Snellman as saying that the good of the people is the same as that of the whole human race (Kekkonen 1980, 124).

1.4 The Baltic States within Finnish foreign policy

A primary object of interest in the framework of this study is the dichotomy of the *official* and the *unofficial* foreign policies of Finland with regard to the Baltic States. **It would be opportune here to define this official foreign policy, diffuse though it might be.** In the 1970s, the time point at which the current observation commences, Soviet economic growth was extremely low. The arms race with the West in the 1970s and 1980s had over-burdened the USSR economy, sufficient cause for the proposals for disarmament made by the Soviet Union to the United States. (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 32.)

The Warsaw Pact countries, terming themselves the *peace camp*, had, in fact a hidden agenda, as regards the political future of Western Europe. During the post-World War II years, the only visible signs of a relaxation in East-West tensions was the first SALT agreement (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) of 1972, the same year as preliminary negotiations for the CSCE were launched (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 32).

The economic and demographic fulcrum of the Soviet Union was shifting from the west of the Urals to Siberia and Central Asia, especially with the need for Russia to be able to maintain a hold on these areas, in the face of China.

By the beginning of the central period under examination in this study, the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic States, were in a position to exert their influence and make their voice

heard on the world forum. A major problem in this regard were the Red Army troops in the Baltic. On their removal, who was to be responsible for the construction of accommodation in the Russian Federation? The whole issue was very much one of the manner in which the two blocs of nations concerned (the USSR, the Baltic States) interpreted their history. History as experienced by the Baltic States saw in the latter the result of engineered situations, social policy *par excellence*. **The Baltic States had been coerced into a situation where they were forced to allow the establishment of Soviet military bases on their soil.** The Russian Federation still cherished **the Soviet-era interpretation, according to which the Baltic States had voluntarily joined the Soviet Union.** This understanding, indeed, was still being expressed in the Russian Federation as late as the 60th anniversary of the ending of the Second World War in 2005, 14 years after the the USSR had met its end.

On 9th May, 2005, the day celebrated as Victory Day in the Soviet Union (over Nazi Germany in 1945), the *Savon Sanomat* column *Nimellä/By name* aired some controversy. Was it meet for the Baltic heads of state to go to Moscow or not? President Rützel of Estonia and Lithuanian president Brazauskas decided against going, while Latvian president Vaira Vike-Friberga decided to go, perhaps bearing in mind the proportionally larger Russian minority in her country. *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat* in its article for the day, *Moskova muistaa mennyttä mahtiaan/Moscow remembers its bygone glory*, writes that **Russia had not (yet) drawn up its balance sheet for the Second World War.** The signs were, indeed, pointing in the opposite direction. Stalin and his statues were being erected again.

Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, history was again being interpreted in the style of Soviet historiography. The Winter War against Finland was again being seen in Russia as a side-issue of the Second World War. Russia had no intention of apologizing to the again-independent Baltic States for having occupied them for over fifty years. *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat*, of the same day, reiterated the fact that none of the Baltic States had joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. Sergei Yastrzhembski, President Putin's EU representative claimed the opposite, that the Balts had joined the Soviet Union on the

basis of a mutual agreement. In actual fact, the threatened violence in 1940 was so great that the Balts were forced to yield before it for half a century. According to Laar, Ott and Endre, when the Riigikogu (parliament) convened, newly “elected” from one-party lists, according to the dictates of Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s emissary in Tallinn, the deputies were warned that, during the first session of parliament, they would be required to vote to join the Soviet Union. All possible protest and hesitation would be met with reprisals. (Laar, Ott & Endre 2000, 26.)

2. A historical background: the Dominoes fall

2.1 The Estonian Dominoes fall

In light of the heading of this study, some words are in place here on the outdated, possibly discredited, **Domino Theory** of the Eisenhower-era United States. Bearing in mind the *rising* Dominoes of the heading, it would be in place to outline the *fall* of the Baltic Dominoes during the Second World War. Events in Estonia reaffirming the right of the nation to independence in themselves bore no hostile implications as far as the Estonian attitude to the USSR were concerned. They were seen merely as events setting aright previous wrongs but were, nevertheless, interpreted as negative incidents by the USSR. The events of the era of perestroika and glasnost, were, however, such as to lead to hopes of the restoration of Baltic independence. The fall and rise of the Dominoes will be outlined in light of these hopes.

In the first place, it should be remembered that, according to the terms of the peace treaty of 2.2.1920 between Estonia and the Soviet Union, the Treaty establishing the Republic of Estonia,

-- *the Soviet Union recognized the independence of Estonia, **renouncing for all time all sovereign claims by Russia over Estonia.** All property of the Russian government on Estonian territory was to be relinquished to Estonia **as from 15th November, 1917.** In other words, Soviet Russia*

recognized, in the decision of the Diet to assume supreme power over Estonia, the birth of the Republic of Estonia. (Uustalu 1968, 65.)

The ensuing twenty years were characterized by a period of growth and development, when *in the autumn of 1939, Estonia's Dominoes started falling.*

2.2 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania lose their independence

Estonia had attained its independence in the aftermath of World War I after its 1918-1920 War of Independence against Russia, a Russia weakened by the 1917 Revolution. During the subsequent two decades, despite the Great Depression of the 1930s, Estonia had managed to build up a flourishing republic, right up to the outbreak of the Second World War. The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany, also known as **the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed on 23.8.1939** by the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and of Germany. A secret codicil to this pact consigned the Baltic States to the Soviet sphere of influence.

The events in all three Baltic States, both in the attainment of independence after World War I and, especially, in the loss of this independence, in 1940, followed broadly the same pattern. For this reason, the process of the loss of independence is briefly outlined here as it was to be seen in the case of Estonia. A succinct version of the process is to be found in an article by Roiko-Jokela (1997).

2.3 The secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The first reactions to the Pact, in the comments on 31st August, 1939 by Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Lithuanian Consul Dymal in Königsberg, was a reassurance that the Baltic States could now breathe more freely as a result of the Pact. This reassurance was confirmed by the United States Ambassador in Poland to August Schmidt (later Torma), Estonian Ambassador in the United Kingdom. Yet just a day before the

signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, on 22nd August 1939, information had been received by the Estonian government in Tallinn of **rumours circulating in London to the effect that the talks had dealt not only with German-Soviet relations but also with a division of Europe into German and Soviet spheres of interest.** The story was confirmed by the Estonian Legation in London the next day, and the Paris embassy on 25th August. (Hyytiä 1992, 113-114.)

The rumours were, nevertheless, denied by the USA Ambassador who stated that the Agreement was to the benefit of the Baltic States. The German Embassy also dismissed the rumours as absurd, the Ambassador paying a visit to Foreign Minister Selter to this express end yet. Hermann Göring, head of the Luftwaffe, had stated that the Germans were robbed of their manors at the end of World War I, and that Germany had no obligations to the Estonians and Latvians.

By 26th August 1939 President Päts and General Laidoner were aware of the alternatives before Estonia: either a non-aggression pact, or war with the USSR.

Estonia had come to the conclusion that its hands were tied. How had this situation come about?

2.4 The Orzel and the Metallist: Dominoes 1 and 2

At the outset of the war, Estonia had been the subject of two unfortunate coincidences in connection with Estonian-Soviet relations, events with direct consequences for them. **On 15th September, 1939**, two weeks after Germany had attacked Poland, the Soviet Union requested that Estonia intern the *Orzel*, a Polish submarine. The submarine had entered Tallinn harbour for repairs, and also because the captain had fallen ill. On the night before 18th September, the *Orzel* escaped from Tallinn harbour without the captain, its crew having overpowered the Estonian sentries guarding it. (Uustalu 1968, 217; Warma 1971, 17.)

The *Metallist*, a Soviet steamer, had allegedly been sunk, near the Bay of Narva. It was further implied that the *Orzel* was responsible for the deed. The Soviet Union put the ultimate responsibility for the sink-

ing with the Estonian government, the submarine having escaped the Estonian authorities. (Oras 1932/1989, 25.) Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov stated that since Estonia was unable to guarantee the neutrality of its waters, the naval forces of the Soviet Union would take it upon themselves to defend Estonia. Estonia denied all responsibility for both the escape of the *Orzel* and the sinking of the *Metallist*. (Rei 1970, 264)

2.5 The fall of the Dominoes continues, to final incorporation into the USSR

In consequence of the first two falling Dominoes, in the parlance of the title, **the process was to continue**, beyond all control by Estonia. Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter had been invited to a meeting in Moscow on 27th September, 1939 *ostensibly for the signing of a new trade agreement*. At the first meeting the following evening, without any warning, Estonia was presented with *an ultimatum demanding the signing of a Treaty of Mutual Aid, known in Estonian as the Bases Treaty, with 35,000 Soviet personnel arriving in Estonia* to man the military bases demanded by the Soviet Union. The official Soviet spokesman at the meeting, Foreign Minister Molotov, was joined during the course of the talks by Marshal Joseph Stalin himself. For the USSR, the justification for the Treaty of Mutual Aid was in the escape of the *Orzel* and in the alleged sinking of the *Metallist*, outlined above. A telegram to the effect had been received by Selter, that one or more submarines, allegedly the *Orzel*, had torpedoed the Soviet steamer. This had ostensibly occurred in the Bay of Narva. (Rei 1970, 265). The *Metallist* had, in fact, been observed in the Gulf of Finland some weeks later. (Mamers 1958, 96; Oras 1932/1989, 25.)

On the same evening as Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter's flight landed in Moscow airport, Radio Moscow announced that the Russian freight vessel, the *Metallist*, had been torpedoed by an unknown submarine in the Bay of Narva, off the Estonian coast.

Analogous pacts with the Soviet Union were also signed by Latvia and Lithuania in October, 1939. Invitations had been sent

to the Latvian and Lithuanian governments for a re-evaluation of their relations with the Soviet Union, when negotiations with Estonia were still under consideration. Negotiations with the Latvian Foreign Minister V. Munters were begun on the morning of 2nd October and with the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbys that same evening. By 10th October, all three states had signed the Treaties of Mutual Aid. (Rei 1970, 268.)

October saw the arrival of Soviet military bases in Estonia, with some 25,000 personnel. Despite the all-apparent threat from the USSR, Estonia was still officially optimistic, hoping that the establishment of the bases would settle the disagreements that seemed to have arisen. Soviet reassurances to this effect were issued by Foreign Minister Molotov in the preamble to the Bases Treaty:

“The enforcement of the present Pact shall in no way compromise the sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties nor, more especially, their economic system or political structure. The areas allotted for the bases and aerodromes shall remain the territory of the Republic of Estonia.”

A further article invoked to dispel fears of the Baltic States being engulfed in the Soviet Union read as follows: *“The two Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude alliances nor to take part in coalitions directed against either of the Contracting Parties.”*

Attention is here drawn to the secret protocols of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, between the Soviet Union and Germany, already in existence.

16th June, 1940 saw the “demonstrations of the working people” in Tallinn. The participants in the demonstrations had been co-opted from the personnel of the military bases brought in from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the demonstrations were under the guard of the Soviet military from the bases. (Oras, 1932/1989, 46.)

As a further consequence of the two alleged incidents, the Soviet Union insisted on elections for a parliament and government more amenable to its neighbour. These elections were held on 14th-15th July, 1940. On 19th June, 1940, Joseph Stalin sent his personal emissaries to the three Baltic States: Andrei Zhdanov to Esto-

nia, Andrei Vyshinski to Latvia and Vladimir Dekanosov to Lithuania, to oversee the elections outlined below, elections insisted upon by Stalin. The demand for these elections had been transmitted to President Päts by Zhdanov. (Uustalu 1968, 244.) All three presidents were supplied with lists of new candidates for the respective parliaments, just one candidate for each electorate. These lists had been drawn up in Moscow. No alternative candidates were permitted. (Rei 1970, 297.) The annexation process for all three Baltic States followed the same formula. The current study follows the process for Estonia.

The 1938 constitution of the Republic of Estonia had set out conditions regarding the minimum period between the calling of the elections and the elections themselves. The constitution stipulated that elections were to be proclaimed **not less than 35 days before the first day of voting**. The forced elections were called by the Latvian and Lithuanian governments on **5th July** and by the Estonian government on **6th July**. The elections were held on **15th July** in all three Baltic States, in other words, at intervals of **10 days and 9 days** respectively. The Soviet government refused to abide by the conditions of the existing Baltic constitutions, presenting the dates of the election to the government as a *fait accompli, as the will of the people*.

In Tallinn, the president of the Republic was forced to appoint a government dictated by the Soviet Union. **Estonia, as an independent state, had ceased to exist.** (Mägi 1979, 198–199.)

There were no members of the Communist Party in the new government. The government proposed by Johannes Vares, having been persuaded to head a Soviet-sympathetic administration, was as follows (Table 1, the list includes the political background of the new ministers).

On 21st June, 1940, demonstrations by *the working people* (my bold italics, AP), on behalf of the pro-Soviet government, were organized in Tallinn. The demonstrators were largely people brought over the Soviet border for this very purpose, or people employed on the Soviet. The NKVD, the Soviet secret police, began their activities in Estonia. The same process was repeated in Latvia and Lithuania, with Lithuanian President Smetona managing to go into exile to avoid lending a semblance of legality to the annihilation of the independence of his country.

Table 1. Members of Johannes Vares’ cabinet, appointed June 21, 1940.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Cabinet post</i>	<i>Political sympathies</i>
1. Johannes Vares	Prime Minister	Non-aligned; nominated by Zhdanov
2. Hans Kruus	Deputy Prime Minister	Non-communist; a condition stipulated by Vares to stand as PM
3. Nigol Andresen	Foreign Minister	Social democrat, left-wing
4. Johannes Semper	Minister for Education	Former Social democrat, left party due to leaving political activity
5. Boris Sepp	Minister for Justice	Some suspicions as regards possible communist sympathies
6. Juhan Nichtig	Treasurer	Independent/Non-aligned
7. Aleksander Joeäär	Minister for Agriculture	Social democrat
8. Maksim Unt	Minister for the Interior	Social democrat
9. Neeme Ruus	Minister for Social Affairs	Social democrat
10. Tõnis Rotberg	Minister for War	Independent/ Non-aligned
11. Orest Kärm	Minister for Transport	Independent/ Non-aligned

As a consequence of a staged “workers’ uprising”, the new parliaments were forced to ask permission to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (Mägi 1984, 196.)

The subsequent incorporation process by the USSR of the Baltic States is succinctly presented by Mägi (1979, 203–204):

- Participation in political meetings, officially organized by the Communist Party, and in courses in the theory of Marxism-Leninism was made compulsory.
- The rouble was made the currency unit of the country, henceforth to be known as the Estonian SSR.
- Industry and enterprises were nationalized.

- A new Rental Act was enacted, the normal living space per person being designated as 9 sq. m.
- The political police expanded its network of agents, leading to the arrests of thousands of citizens, although no charges had been laid.
- Passive observance of regulations was not permitted, the citizenry being obliged to adopt an active positive stance to the new order.

The occupying authorities arrested and deported to Russia included the Head of State, President Konstantin Päts, the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian armed forces, General Johan Laidoner, numerous prominent politicians, such as Jaan Tõnisson.

There were some fellow travellers with the new regime, but these were not numerous. **All the procedures associated with the occupation were carried out under the direct supervision of the Red Army forces in Estonia.**

The same incorporation procedure was observed in the case of Latvia and Lithuania. On 17th July, 1940, the three emissaries appointed by Stalin arrived in the Baltic States to oversee the elections, **Andrei Zhdanov** in Estonia, **Andrei Vyshinski** in Latvia and **Vladimir Dekanosov** in Lithuania. (Uustalu 1968, 65.)

Subsequent to the elections, all three new parliaments of the Baltic States **voted to ask the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to admit the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, under Soviet military guard**, and with the support of representatives of the working people, transported for this specific purpose from the Russian side of the border. (Mägi 1979, 203.)

These organized votes were subsequently (1945–1988) to be presented in Soviet (and Soviet Estonian) historiography as an expression of the will of the Baltic peoples.

2.6 Estonian history – the Soviet view

Nõukogude Eesti, entsüklopeediline teatmeteteos (Estonia: an encyclo-

paedic source of information, 1978) reports the topic of the incorporation of Estonia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as follows (English translation by the author):

*“Väljendades töörahva tahet, võttis Riigivolikogu 21. juulil vastu deklaratsiooni Eesti kuulutamise eest nõukogude sotsialistlikuks vabariigiks. Samal Riigivolikogu istungjärgul võeti vastu deklaratsioon Eesti astumisest NSV Liitu. “/“**In expression of the will of the working people, the Riigivolikogu (the lower house of the Estonian parliament) on 21st July declared Estonia a Soviet Socialist Republic.**“ (my bold italics, AP)*

The same session of the parliament passed a resolution on Estonian membership of the USSR.

At the very same hour (my bold italics, AP), the parliaments of Latvia and Lithuania met to pass the same four motions and declarations:

1. To declare the states Soviet republics in which all power was alleged to belong to the working people, represented by the Soviet of workers' deputies,
2. To petition the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union for the admission of these new Soviet republics to the Soviet Union as constituent republics,
3. To declare all large industrial and transportation enterprises, as well as all banks and mines nationalized, the property of the state,
4. To declare all land the property of the state. Nobody was to own land as property, a maximum land area of 30 hectares being allocated to each “working peasant”.

The wordings of these regulations were such as to indicate that they had all originated from the same source, a central source in the Soviet Union.

2.7 The Soviet annexation of the Baltic States with its associated features

The chain of events in the subordination of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union was as follows:

1. In June, 1941, Germany attacks the Soviet Union, war breaks out.
2. Organized demonstrations by personnel of the Soviet buses against the government of Estonia receive the approval of the Soviet Union.
3. A government sympathetic to the Soviet Union is appointed after illegally organized elections.

Subsequent to the above moves, the Soviet Union was to organize mass deportations of the Baltic population on the night 13th-14th June, 1941.

Soviet literature was subsequently to liken the deportations of the Baltic peoples to “throwing out weeds from the garden over the fence”. There is not one Soviet politician or historian to have condemned the deportations committed by Stalinist policies as a crime against humanity. Soviet historiography records this tragedy as follows:

*Due to the danger of military attack by Germany, the Soviet regime was forced to employ exceptional measures to counteract anti-revolutionary activity. To this end, in June, 1941 hostile elements were forcibly resettled from the border areas to deep into the interior of the Soviet Union [...] **As the subsequent course of events was to show, the resettling of elements actively involved in deeds supporting the enemy was fully justified.** (Mägi 1979, 207, quoting a Soviet history from 1971 (Eesti NSV ajalugu I-III, Tallinn 1955-71), my **bold italics** in the quotation, AP).*

Soviet historiography (Naan 1957, 533) recorded the 1941 deportations from Estonia as follows:

*“In the spring of 1941, the organs of the State security discovered some **hotbeds of Hitlerist (sic!) spies and saboteurs** (Soviet terminology). The Soviet regime was forced to employ measures to terminate such hostile activity. One week before the attack on the Soviet Union by fascist Germany, a section of the former reactionary public figures, capitalists and other elements hostile to Soviet power were deported from the Estonian SSR.”*

It is to be noted that the above Soviet justification of the deportations was published as late as 1957, **4 years after the death of Stalin, and 3 years after the condemnation of the regime of the latter by Nikita Khrushchey, Stalin's successor as First Secretary of the Party.**

The same process was replicated in Latvia and Lithuania.

2.8 The subsequent German occupation reverts into a new Soviet occupation

The advent of the German Army, in July, 1941, had been greeted warmly in the Baltic States. The soldiers were regarded as liberators, due to the preceding Soviet occupation. The German influence was present despite the Soviet occupation. Professor Ants Oras of the University of Florida writes in his memoirs *Baltic Eclipse* (originally written in English, my translation from the Finnish translation *Viron kohtalon vuodet*, AP): "Not all traces of the old, real German culture and its developing influence on man had disappeared during the eight years of Hitler's regime." (Oras 1989, 207.) The German re-education process had not had as long as the equivalent Russian period 1917-1991.

Many men, forcibly mobilized into the Red Army, deserted, to join the German army. This they considered the lesser of two evils. The Germans were, however, soon to let the Baltic populations know that they were not there as liberators from the Soviet occupation, but as the new masters, representing Greater Germany. The German plan, indeed, was that the indigenous populations were to be deported to the east of Lake Peipus, to be replaced by Germans. (Mägi 1979, 209.)

While practising persecution of the populations occupied, Germany, however, made no effort to indoctrinate them into Nazism. The countries were governed nominally by governments of their own peoples. Subsequent to the armistice with Finland in the Continuation War in 1944, the Red Army managed to break the German front, eventually to re-conquer the Baltic States. The new conquest was associated with killing, robbing and rape, as well as a new wave of deportations. Some 13,000 Estonians, mobilized into the Red Army, were killed, with some

38,000 taken into Russia and 70,000 fleeing to exile in Sweden or Germany.

The Baltic peoples were at the outset of their occupation by the Soviet Union.

2.9 The individual wartime falling Dominoes for Estonia

(W-T) Domino 1: On 10th March, 1939 Stalin had alleged a new imperialist war to be going on. Germany was expanding its influence, while England and France were standing by passively. (Uustalu, 1968) Stalin was not going to see the Soviet Union turned against Germany (sic!) (Rei 1970, 247-248).

(W-T) Domino 2: On 17th August, 1939 Stalin consented to German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop coming to Moscow for negotiations.

(W-T) Domino 3: On 20th August, 1939 Estonian Ambassador Rei met with Foreign Minister Molotov, to declare that Estonia had no sympathies with Poland as opposed to the Soviet Union. Estonia merely wished to protect its own interests, not damage those of the Soviet Union.

(W-T) Domino 4: Three days later, on 23rd August 1939, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov signed a non-aggression and co-operation pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, including a secret codicil on the respective spheres of interest in Europe.

(W-T) Domino 5: At the end of August 1939, Estonian Military Headquarters received intelligence on a Soviet military concentration, on the Estonian borders, of some 160,000 troops, 600 tanks and 600 aircraft, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

(W-T) Domino 6: Estonia decided, in 1939, to negotiate with the USSR, and not to mobilize. It had taken the decision alone, without

consultation with its neighbours. The advice from Germany had been to accede to the Soviet demands.

(W-T) Domino 7: On 1st September 1939, war broke out between Germany and Poland, leading to...:

- **(W-T) Domino 7.1: The *Orzel*, a Polish submarine seeking refuge in Tallinn harbour being interned in Tallinn on 15th September,** in accordance with the law on neutrality. In fear of being handed over to the Soviet Union, the crew of the *Orzel* overpowered its guards two days later during the night 17th -18th September, escaping from Tallinn. They released their guards into a rowing boat near the Swedish island of Gotland.
- **(W-T) Domino 7.2:** With Estonia allegedly not being able to exercise control over its own territorial waters (the *Orzel* incident), the Soviet Union took Estonian territorial waters under its control, Soviet aircraft circling the Bay of Tallinn.

(W-T) Domino 8: On 19th September 1939, Molotov informed August Rei, the Estonian Ambassador in Moscow, that the Soviet Navy would commence a search for the submarine in Estonian territorial waters, while taking full control of the latter.

(W-T) Domino 9: On 24th September 1939, Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter arrived in Moscow to sign a trade agreement, as well as to clarify the *Orzel* crisis. The latter was a pretext for a **Mutual Assistance Pact** between Estonia and the USSR. The pact, signed four days later, was the actual reason for Selter being called to Moscow. Latvia and Lithuania were also forced to sign their Mutual Assistance Pacts with the USSR on the same day, 28th September.

Molotov regarded the current geopolitical situation as unnatural, the Soviet Union being expected to make do with the innermost extremity of the Gulf of Finland. **Twenty years ago Estonia had forced the Soviet Union to sit here in the puddle of the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet Union was weak then, now it was strong and Estonia was to take this into account.** (Raun 2001).

In talks with the Soviet Union on a military pact against Hitler, Great Britain and France were presented with a demand for the right by the Soviet Union to use the territories of the Baltic States and Poland for its military operations. The demands would stand, even though Britain and France were to refuse.

While initially Britain did refuse, it subsequently acceded to Soviet demands. (Mägi 1979, 197-198.)

NOTE: The air bases in Estonia were used as takeoff points for air attacks against southern Finland, as President Koivisto pointedly reminded the reader in his memoirs:

The pacts forced on the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union in 1939, with the military bases involved, did not prevent the use of Estonian territory for acts of war against Finland during the Winter War. Southern Finland was bombed from bases in Estonia. The use of the latter enabled the planes to take less fuel and therefore greater loads of bombs, making several sorties a day. (Koivisto 1997, 120.)

(W-T) Domino 10: On 25th and 26th September 1939 discussions were held between the parliamentary sub-commissions and the government.

Germany had, a month prior to this, advised Estonia to submit to the Soviet demands. At the talks, the Estonian government did indeed decide to submit to the demands.

(W-T) Domino 11: Negotiations between Estonia and the USSR, on 27th September 1939 gave the USSR the opportunity to present Estonia with additional demands: 35,000 Red Army troops to protect the Soviet bases. In the agreement, signed on 28th September, the two parties agreed on 25,000 troops, with the stipulation that the agreement not jeopardize Estonian independence in any way.

In the course of the German-Soviet negotiations, both Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov had reassured Estonia that it would never have reason to regret the Non-aggression pact: “*You will see how unfailingly we Bolsheviks abide by what we have signed. Our dependable Bolshevik word vouches for this. Our words and signatures are something quite different from those of bourgeois statesmen.*” (Vizulis 1985, 28.)

Molotov did not explain the identity of the enemy against whom the Red Army was protecting its bases with the help of its troops.

(W-T) Domino 12: Estonian territorial waters were placed under the **protection**, in Soviet terms, of the Soviet Union, with Soviet aeroplanes circling Tallinn (Zetterberg 1995, 119; Ott, Laar & Endre 2000, 21).

(W-T) Domino 13: Molotov, in his speech on 31st October 1939, denied the Soviet Union ever having any desire to violate Estonian sovereignty **or to change its political system**. Even so, there were troops in the bases exerting their own pressure, although they did stay within their barracks.

(W-T) Domino 14: 2nd-10th October 1939:

- **(W-T) Domino 14.1.:** Military negotiations on the location of Red Army troops to Estonian soil were proceeding. Moscow was beginning to make new demands on Estonia, demands for **bases all over Estonia**.
- **(W-T) Domino 14.2:** Estonian protests were met with intimidation by the Red Army.
- **(W-T) Domino 14.3:** The network of bases was expanded to Lihula and Haapsalu, that of airports to Haapsalu, the vicinity of Paldiski, Kuusiku and Kehtna.

(W-T) Domino 15: 15th October 1939: A report was signed repatriating the German-born population of Estonia to Germany, on a command from Germany. The move did not meet with the approval of those concerned. Their families had, after all, been in the Baltic States since the 13th century, first as *landed gentry*, subsequently as *loyal citizens of the Republic of Estonia*.

In addition to the German-born population, some 8000 people of Estonian background left for Germany in fear of future developments.

(W-T) Domino 16: from 18th October 1939 onwards: The signs were ominous. From 1270 until 1920, Old Livonia (Southern Estonia and Northern Latvia) had been under the rule of the Order of the Knights of the Cross.

German fiefdom prevailed in rural Estonia, independent of who had the supreme hegemony in Estonia, be it Denmark, Sweden, Poland or Russia.

Note: The original status of the Germans had been that of a landed gentry. After the post-World War I redistribution of land to Estonian-born farmers, a large number of the former gentry still chose to stay on in what they termed their *Heimat*, their **home country**, as opposed to *Vaterland* (Germany), until the outset of the Second World War.

A large emigration, after a period of over 650 years, in response to Hitler's call to the ethnic German minority groups to repatriate to Germany, was to be regarded as likely to arouse a sense of panic within the ethnically Estonian population, both in the fields of domestic and of foreign policy.

The long German presence in Estonia had been associated, for the whole of its existence, with the suffering and oppression of the native population in past centuries, to the extent of its being incorporated into folk music and folklore. Even so, during the inter-war period, the Baltic Germans had integrated into Estonian society. In this connection, in the long run, **Germany** had been instrumental in creating a **Western European** identity among the **Estonians and Latvians. Much as the Baltic peoples had had feelings of antagonism toward the Germans, this Western identity was important in tiding the two Baltic peoples across the Soviet period. They belonged to the sphere of Western Europe, as represented by German culture, not to the Slavic.**

Lithuania was a slightly different matter, its long-term foreign influence having been Poland and Polish culture. **Its link to the West was in the Roman Catholic Church and in the joint monarchy**

between Poland and Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian union lasting until 1629 when Lithuania became a Russian province. (Rei 1970, 23, 24.)

There had been considerable reconciliation between the national groups in Estonia after achievement of independence in 1920. All minorities in Estonia, including the Germans, had been granted cultural autonomy with the passing of the Minorities Cultural Self-Government Act of 12.2.1925. (Uustalu 1968, 259.) The German population, nevertheless, acceded to Hitler's invitation, with 12,660 people leaving the country by mid-November. In this connection, **President Päts**, foreseeing the possibility of a Soviet-German war, **felt very wary of provoking the Soviet Union in any way.**

In *May, 1940*, indeed, Germany embarked on its attack on the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Soviet reactions were to be expected.

(W-T) Domino 17: On **18th October 1939**, the Red Army began its march into Estonia. Attempts were made by the Soviet Union to make the situation seem as natural as possible. The national anthems of both countries were played, Estonia opened its border gates, and **column after column of Red Army troops marched into the country.**

The Red Army stationed 25,000 troops in naval and air force bases on the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, off the Estonian mainland, as well as in Haapsalu and Paldiski, small towns west of Tallinn.

(W-T) Domino 18: **While Foreign Minister Selter was still in Moscow, invitations were sent by the Soviet Union to Latvia and Lithuania**, for them to send *their* Foreign Ministers to Moscow, "for the reconsideration of their relations with the Soviet Union." Negotiations with Latvia began on 2nd October 1939, and with Lithuania the same evening. The Pact was signed on 5th October with Latvia and on 10th October with Lithuania. (Rei 1970, 268.)

Lithuanian Foreign Minister J. Urbsys was given barely ten hours to deliberate on the Treaty, either alone or with his government. No

extension of time was given. According to Foreign Minister Molotov, **“Irrespective of what answer the Lithuanian government may give, the Soviet troops will enter Lithuania.”** (Rei 1970, 286, my bold, AP.) Vilnius was returned by Moscow to Lithuania from Polish jurisdiction in the Lithuanian version of the Bases Treaty, bearing the title *Pact for the Transfer of the City of Vilnius and the Vilnius Region by the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian Republic and of Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Lithuania.*

The Soviet arguments for these Treaties were outlined in Rei’s book (1970), as quoted above. The Pact opened the way for Soviet military bases in all three Baltic States, these being established within a week of the signing of the agreement. While the same fate had been planned for Finland, this country was strong enough to refuse to comply. Subsequently the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30th November, starting the Winter War.

The whole Domino was in agreement with the secret codicils of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement.

(W-T) Domino 19: An article in *Pravda* attacked the Estonian intelligentsia for its pro-British orientation.

(W-T) Domino 20: With the beginning of Hitler’s major assault on Western Europe – France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg – in May, 1940, Stalin’s assault on the Baltic States was a step closer. The bases received more men, with further air provocations. **By June, Estonia was isolated from the rest of the world.**

(W-T) Domino 21: On 16th June 1940, August Rei, Estonian Ambassador to Moscow, received an ultimatum from Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, accusing Estonia of **“policies hostile to the USSR”** (my bold italics). The said policies had taken the form of military negotiations between Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania, respectively.

The Molotov ultimatum demanded both the formation of a government sympathetic toward the USSR and sufficient access to Estonian territory by the Red Army. The demands were to be met within

a matter of 8½ hours, by 11 p.m. on 16th June. Latvia and Lithuania received similar ultimatums.

The aspects outlined in **Domino 9** must be constantly borne in mind. For Molotov, the current geopolitical situation was unnatural, the Soviet Union being expected to make do with the innermost extremity of the Gulf of Finland. Twenty years ago Estonia had forced the Soviet Union to sit here in the puddle of the Gulf of Finland with Leningrad the only access to the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea. The Soviet Union was weak then, now it was strong. Estonia was to take this into account. Estonia had no choice but to accede to Soviet demands.

(W-T) Domino 22: Professor Jüri Uluots' government, the last of the independent Republic of Estonia, resigned.

(W-T) Domino 23: On 17th June 1940, General Meretskov, chief of the Leningrad Military District, informed General Laidoner of the arrival of five Soviet divisions in Estonia.

(W-T) Domino 24: On 19th June 1940, General Andrei Zhdanov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, arrived in Tallinn to oversee the formation of a new **government of the working people** in Estonia, according to a list compiled by the embassy of the Soviet Union in Tallinn. This government comprised people of left-wing socialist or apolitical persuasions. Several of the members of the government were appointed against their will. None of the government belonged to the Communist Party, the Prime Minister Johannes Vares-Barbarus being a left-wing radical, but not a communist, the Vice-Prime Minister Hans Kruus not belonging to any party. Zetterberg (1995) held the members of the government to be either Estonian left-wing socialists or politically unaffiliated.

(W-T) Domino 25: On 21st June 1940, **General Zhdanov, emissary of the government of the Soviet Union,** ordered **Minister of the Interior Maksim Unt,** still of the Republic of Estonia, **to organize the appropriate pro-Soviet demonstrations and strikes.** The mobilized demonstration crowd comprised Red Army soldiers in civil-

ian attire or Russian workers from the military bases. (The first bases had been established on Baltic soil in 1939.) While these demonstrations were held only in Tallinn and Tartu, on the following days, similar demonstrations were to be held in north-eastern Estonia, in Rakvere, Kiviõli and Kohtla-Järve, as well as in Kuressaare, the capital of Saaremaa (Uustalu 1968, 244). The demands made by the demonstrators included the resignation of the Uluots government and the formation of the government outlined above. Soviet historiography was to record these demonstrations as the expression of the free will of the Estonian people.

The Finnish press of the day, *Helsingin Sanomat*, for instance, reported various incidents organized in Latvia and Lithuania (April, 1940), underground communist cells in Lithuania provoking incidents in the country, including strikes of workers involved in building the military bases. (Rei 1970, 282.)

(W-T) Domino 26: 21st June 1940 saw an exchange of fire between an Estonian military unit and the (communist) People's militia. To keep the peace, the Soviet embassy began keeping their demonstrators in check.

(W-T) Domino 27: On 22nd June 1940, the Vares-Barbarus government was sworn in *promising to maintain the independence of Estonia*. Zetterberg (1995, 124) reports the ministers of the new government as affirming that it was not their intention to establish a Soviet system. There would, instead, be wide-ranging positive reforms to the lives of the citizens.

(W-T) Domino 28: On 5th July 1940, President Päts dissolved parliament by decree, calling early parliamentary elections. The platform of the Estonian Working People's Front promised a flourishing workers' state with a solution to all its problems. **No mention was made of Estonia joining the Soviet Union.**

(W-T) Domino 29: Before the elections on 14th-15th July, organized pressure groups came to intimidate non-communist candidates into withdrawing their candidatures. Failure to vote was regarded as a dem-

onstration of hostility toward the working classes.

(W-T) Domino 30: The parliament, meeting on 21st July 1940, was briefed before the session that they would be required to vote for admission to the Soviet Union. Protest and vacillation would be dealt with severely.

The vote to be accepted into the Soviet Union was passed. President Konstantin Päts was dismissed on the initiative of Andrei Zhdanov, and Prime Minister Johannes Vares-Barbarus appointed Acting President. Six years later, on 29th November, 1946, Vares-Barbarus was to take his own life. One version of history has it that he was totally overcome by the consequences of the Soviet takeover and by his part in it. In his *The Drama of the Baltic People*, August Rei (1970:360), last ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to Moscow, claims that it was Vares-Barbarus' utter helplessness, in the face of policies that he could not approve, that led him to commit suicide.

The Soviet power brought terminological changes. Terms such as *kodusõda* /civil war replaced *vabadussõda* /War of Independence, the era of the Republic of Estonia. The ideologically correct term for the period *Eesti aeg* /the Estonian era (independence), was *kodanlik aeg* /the bourgeois era. Furthermore, in Soviet historiography, Vares-Barbarus' suicide was to be presented as (death) *after a serious bout of illness*. (Laar, Ott & Endre 2000, 106.)

Finnish historian Osmo Hyytä (1992) held the whole incorporation scenario to have been directed from the Soviet embassy. The comment attributed to Nigol Andresen, left-wing Social Democrat, who had been persuaded to join the coup as Foreign Minister, sums up the attitude of most of the puppet government:

“Kes kurat oleks võinud ette teada, et niimoodi läheb!” / “Who the hell could have known that it would come to this!” (Hyytiä 1992, 253.)

2.10 The Latvian and Lithuanian Dominoes

On 2nd October 1939, Latvian Foreign Minister V. Munters arrived in Moscow for “reconsideration of the country’s relations with the Soviet Union” in the form of discussions with Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. On the evening of the same day, negotiations were begun between Lithuanian Foreign Minister J. Urbsys and Molotov. Lacking authorization to sign the treaty proposed by Molotov, Urbsys was to return to Kaunas to consult with his president and government on the new turn of events.

The demands on Latvia included naval bases in Liepaja and Ventpils, numerous airfields, as well as a base for coastal artillery on the coast between Ventpils and Pitragi. The maximum number of troops was fixed at 30,000. A condition not included in the treaty with Estonia, was that if the Pact was not revoked by one of the parties one year prior to its termination, the validity would be extended automatically to a period of 10 years.

The case of Lithuania differed, the Soviet Union promising Lithuania the return of its traditional capital Vilnius, under Polish rule, and a bone of contention between the two countries for the whole of the inter-war period. (Rei 1979, 268.) In Lithuania, the government received a note from the Soviet government regarding the disappearance of two soldiers from a Red Army base in the country. The Lithuanian government was alleged to have drugged the soldiers to help them desert from the Red Army. These were termed “provocative measures” that were to cease.

Rei (1979, 283) quotes further examples of Soviet policy. The Kremlin wished to take possession of the areas leased to the USSR to convert them into Red Army bases. The Soviet Union was not satisfied with the bases allowed it by the treaty, namely the town of Paldiski as well as the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa. It further demanded bases in Paide in Central Estonia for a tank brigade and in Valga, on the Latvian border for a motorized infantry regiment, as well as two airfields. These demands were based on the alleged needs for organizing defence against sudden attacks.

All the above instances would tend to cast considerable

doubt on the Soviet insistence for legitimacy in secession from the Soviet Union, considering the fact that the Soviet Union had not abided by the initial agreement from the very outset. It is fit to remember the declaration of 31st October, 1939, made by Foreign Minister Molotov before the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, where he stated:

*“The Pacts with the Baltic States in no way imply the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, **as some foreign interests would have the world believe** (my bold italics, AP). These pacts are inspired by mutual respect for the governmental, social and economic system of each of the contracting parties. We stand for a correct and honest fulfilment of the agreements which we have signed on a reciprocal basis and declare that foolish talk of the sovietization of the Baltic States is useful only to our common enemies and to anti-Soviet provocateurs.” (Rei 1979, 277.)*

Just prior to this, almost immediately upon Selter’s arrival in Moscow, Molotov had stated that...

”[...] the Soviet Union needs naval and air bases on the Baltic Sea to enable it to organize an efficient defence of Leningrad and the area behind it. Suitable places for such bases are to be found on Estonian territory, and Estonia must cede them to the Soviet Union. Were the Estonian government to fail to concede to these necessary alterations, the Soviet Union would be forced to resort to more radical measures...and I ask the Estonian government not to force the Soviet Union to the other course hinted at, a course to which the Soviet government does not want to resort, and which would doubtless be even less desirable to Estonia.” (Rei 1979, 260.)

The Baltic States were in no position to embark on a Winter War with the Soviet Union in the style of Finland.

2.11 The Communists and the Governments of the Baltic States in 1940

The fact that all three Baltic States were occupied by the Soviet Union in just three days, from 15th to 17th June, 1940, would cast some doubt on belief in the genuine nature of the incorporation. All three governments had been selected by the Soviet Union, with no members of the Baltic Communist Parties on the lists. To be true, there had been some left-wing socialists, but the Soviet Union was in the position to point out that there were no *Communists* involved in the takeover, only members of the *people*.

Since the Estonian Communist Party in 1940 had but 133 members, it was important for Commissar Andrei Zhdanov to involve Estonian left-wing socialist intellectuals in the takeover, as willing fellow-travellers (Raun 1989, 182). The alleged demonstrations in favour of Soviet power on 21st June, 1940, were cordially greeted at the Embassy of the Soviet Union by officials of latter, together with Andrei Zhdanov, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, who had arrived in Tallinn two days earlier.

On 24th August, 1940, the three Baltic parliaments reassembled to create the new Soviet form of government. There were no members of the hitherto clandestine Communist Party in the proposed government of Estonia presented to the President, there were, instead, an army general and a businessman. In Latvia, one minister out of seven on the list was a communist. In Lithuania only two ministers out of seven belonged to the Communist Party in the new government, these were appointed Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. Within the next two weeks three more communists were appointed to the government.

2.12 The deportations of Baltic population to Siberia

Further measures in the Sovietization of the Baltic involved **mass deportations of the Baltic population to Siberia** on the night between 13th and 14th June, 1941 in sealed railway carriages for trans-

port of cattle. The orders for these deportations originated long before the establishment of the Baltic Soviet Republics. Stalin had been promised a free hand by Hitler in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. **The orders for the deportations had been signed eight months before the “spontaneous uprising” of the Baltic peoples in June, 1940,** and twenty months before the cattle trains with their human cargo began to roll eastwards from the occupied Baltic States. (Küing 1975, 52.)

The Soviet version of the deportations states, according to Naan (1957), that the new government regarded as its most important foreign policy goal **the honest fulfilment of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and the restoration of good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.** In domestic policy, the government proposed the dissolution of the Riigikogu, the Parliament of the Republic of Estonia, “since it did not represent the will of the people”, to quote Naan (1957, 522). The state apparatus was to be cleansed of the fascist elements in it, for instance through deportations (my addition, AP).

The above-mentioned Estonian histories by Rei (1970), Raun (1989) and Küing (1975), on the one hand, for the Republic of Estonia, and Naan (1957), on the other, for the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, depict the two main existing concepts of Estonian history. It will be up to the current study to balance these up. **Did the declaration of independence by the Supreme Soviet of Estonia on 20th August, 1991 constitute a right-wing coup, or was it the justified restoration of the Republic of Estonia, interrupted in 1940?**

3. Newspaper data studied

3.1 Choice of newspapers to be studied

Numerous articles on the Baltic States were published in the Finnish press of the 1970s, in papers such as *Uusi Suomi*, *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Kaleva*. The tenor of these articles was sufficient motivation for the writer to shore up the image of Finland as a country sympathetic to the cause of the independence of the Baltic States. In concrete form, the writer's activity comprised the initiation of a comprehensive collection of newspaper articles on the topic, from 1988 to 1991 (see, Appendix 1 and its detailed description of the Dominoes identified).

At the outset, the collection process was quite haphazard by nature. The articles were collected and stored only when actually encountered in the newspapers. The collection amounted to a ring-binderful of clippings over a period of 15 years. The collection process continued, especially in connection with the inception of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, particularly from 1988 on. In the system adopted, the same papers were perused daily and the appropriate articles filed. The collection ultimately comprised 34 thick Mercantil-type files.

Frequent observation of the reporting on the Baltic States in the above, led to the writer studying, in the late 1980s, a selection of daily newspapers covering **the political spectrum from conservative**

to **left-wing socialist**, as well as a former daily, now weekly Communist Party publication. **After the evening papers, the obvious first choice** was *Keskisuomalainen*, the local daily newspaper of the Jyväskylä region. The next natural candidate was *Helsingin Sanomat*, **the present-day doyen**, of sorts, **of the Finnish press**. Since the political orientation of Finnish society was the ultimate object of interest, the writer considered it necessary to have a full representation of the Finnish political spectrum in his choices. Two of the papers chosen represented, or were associated with, the right-wing Coalition Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus), *Uusi Suomi* and *Aamulehti*, with the Oulu daily, *Kaleva*, also having some inclinations in this direction.

Three papers represented the political left, *Demari* the Finnish Social Democratic Party, *Kansan Uutiset* the Left Alliance and *Tiedonantaja* the extreme left minority of the Finnish Communist Party, appearing once a week. The remainder, *Keskisuomalainen* (Jyväskylä), *Savon Sanomat* (Kuopio), *Itä-Savo* (Savonlinna) and *Kaleva* (Oulu) represented the non-aligned (though Centre Party – oriented) papers.

Two newspapers of importance, *Suomenmaa* (Helsinki), allied to the Centre Party, and *Hufvudstadsbladet* (Helsinki), the primary Swedish-language newspaper were initially omitted from the selection. The first two years of the collection, did however include clippings from *Hufvudstadsbladet*, provided by the writer's superior at the University of Jyväskylä, a lecturer in Swedish.

The motive for the choice of papers was to demonstrate the breadth of political support for Baltic independence.

In order to gauge the extent to which the Finnish press sympathized with Baltic independence aspirations, the writer deemed it necessary to outline official Finnish foreign policy with regard to the Baltic States and to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3.2 The evening press: content and style of reporting on the Baltic States and/or the USSR

A characterization would be in place for the articles on the Baltic States in the two tabloid (evening) papers, *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Ilta-lehti* pub-

lished in Finland, in comparison with the reporting in the daily newspapers. Dr. Philip Dell of the University of New South Wales School of Media and Communication, in an interview carried out by the writer on 12.2.04, saw the aim of the tabloid newspaper in Australia as being to speak *to* the people, *about* the people, *for* the people.

A common classification of the people in the tabloid news is into the dichotomies of the *villains*, as opposed to the *heroes*, the *victims*, as opposed to the *helpers*. This type of dichotomy is what the average reader wants and needs (see, Appendix 2).

There is always also the dichotomy of the *elitist* versus the *populist* reader, an issue also addressed by the press, with different choices made by daily newspapers and tabloids, respectively. In defining the function of the tabloids, it is apparently a characteristic of the evening paper to emphasise the aspect of *speaking about the people and for the people* into account. One side of the news is always the *human interest aspect*, which is covered by the populist papers.

The observations made on the articles in *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Iltalehti* lead to the same conclusions.

The aim of the Appendix 2 is to establish in visual fashion the interest shown by the tabloid press in the Baltic States during the period under study. From the outset, the interest was consistent, though limited, with an enormous increase during August, 1991.

3.3 Radicality Index and newspaper attitudes to the Baltics

In order to evaluate the degree of support expressed by the news item for the aspirations of the Baltic States, the writer has counted the number and share of Finnish newspaper editorials that are positive and negative towards the Baltics in the period from 9 July 1988 to 27 August 1991 (Table 2). The absolute majority of the editorials proved to be positive, Tiedonantaja being the only exception.

Table 2. Distribution of positive and negative attitudes to the Baltics in the editorials of the corpus for 9.7.1988 – 27.8.1991, n (%)

Newspaper	Positive	Negative	Total
Aamulehti	14 (100)	0 (0)	14 (100)
Kaleva	5 (100)	0 (0)	5 (100)
Itä-Savo	2 (100)	0 (0)	2 (100)
Uusi Suomi	26 (96)	1 (4)	27 (100)
Ilta-Savo	25 (96)	1 (4)	26 (100)
Etelä-Suomen Sanomat	24 (96)	1 (4)	25 (100)
Helsingin Sanomat	52 (93)	4 (7)	56 (100)
Savon Sanomat	27 (93)	2 (7)	29 (100)
Kansan Uutiset	21 (91)	2 (9)	23 (100)
Demari	19 (86)	3 (14)	22 (100)
Ilta-Sanomat	10 (77)	3 (23)	13 (100)
Keskisuomalainen	17 (74)	6 (26)	23 (100)
Tiedonantaja	5 (28)	13 (72)	18 (100)
Total	247 (87)	36 (13)	283 (100)

The author has also assigned a term deemed **the radicality index** for the item. In order to gauge the degree of support by the newspaper in question, the story has been assigned a three-point value depending on the degree of support expressed by the article. On the basis of the evidence that the official attitude to the Baltic aspirations was reserved, to say the least, a figure has been assigned to the item with regard to the support shown the Baltic States.

The values:

3 indicated full support for the independence aspirations

2 indicated a moderate degree of support

1 indicated opposition to the aspirations

The results show that media interest in the Baltic States increased dramatically from 15 news items in 1988 and 18 item in 1989 to 48 in 1990 (Table 3). The radicality jumped already in 1989: while in 1988, almost a half (47%) of the items were opposing Baltic aspirations in

1989, three quarters (78%) were fully supporting independence aspirations. In 1990 there was a slight backlash as slightly less than half (44%) of items gave them full support to independence aspirations. However, only a quarter (27%) were opposed to them in 1990.

Table 3. Allocation of Radicality Indices year by year, 1988-1991, n (%)

Year	Radicality index value			Total
	1	2	3	
1988	7 (47)	2 (13)	6 (40)	15 (100)
1989	3 (17)	1 (6)	14 (78)	18 (100)
1990	13 (27)	14 (29)	21 (44)	48 (100)
Total	23 (28)	17 (21)	41 (51)	81 (100)

4. Finnish policy regarding the Baltic States in the 1960s and the 1970s

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to characterize Finnish foreign policy regarding the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to events occurring in its constituent republics. One feature of this policy has been the obvious discrepancy between the **officially propagated foreign policy** with regard to the Baltic States and the **unofficial attitude**, as expressed in the press. Official Finnish policy has been one of sympathy and encouragement for the *status quo* regarding events occurring in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its constituent republics. Public opinion, on the other hand, has nursed an equal but opposite attitude, one of genuine criticism for the central administration and of sympathy for the peoples of the Baltic States. Most obviously this is exemplified in the daily newspapers and the two major evening tabloids *Ilta-Sanomat* (non-aligned, published by Sanomat Oy, the publisher of *Helsingin Sanomat*) and *Iltalehti* (right-wing, formerly published by the now defunct *Uusi Suomi* (affiliated with the right-wing Coalition Party), at the present by *Aamulehti*, also affiliated with the Coalition Party).

4.2 Delineation of Finnish foreign policy

The official foreign policy of Finland, with regard to the Baltic States, was found to be an area difficult to formulate in any comprehensive form. According to the country's constitution of the time, the responsibility for **foreign policy, its formulation and implementation was in the hands of the head of state, the president**. This fact was outlined in the basic provision, included in **Chapter IV of the Constitution**, on Government and Administration, §33 of the original form reading:

”Suomen suhteista ulkovaltioihin määrää presidentti, kuitenkin niin, että sopimukset ulkovaltojen kanssa ovat eduskunnan hyväksyttävissä, mikäli ne sisältävät säännöksiä, jotka kuuluvat lainsäädännön alaan tai valtiosäännön mukaan muuten vaativat eduskunnan suostumusta. Sodasta ja rauhasta presidentti päättää eduskunnan suostumuksella. ”

with the English translation:

*„**The relations between Finland and foreign powers shall be determined by the president**, insofar as the agreements with foreign powers are subject to parliamentary approval, in the event of their including regulations subject to legislation or in the case of their being otherwise subject to parliamentary approval as outlined in the constitution. Matters of war and peace shall be decided by the president subject to the consent of the parliament.“ (Nousiainen 1992, 387, translation AP, my large-font bold, for the appropriate emphasis, AP)*

The most important aspects of the president's responsibilities included legal acts centrally affecting good international relations as well as the everyday routine administrative decisions. Perhaps the most important part of activities outside the official decision-making process involve planning, contacting and negotiations, the guidance process and public speaking and communications. (Nousiainen 1992, 388) Foreign affairs were considered to be among the most important administrative areas delegated to the responsibilities

of the head of state, with the contribution of the Valtioneuvosto/Council of State (the Cabinet) being relegated to “assisting” (using the term of the Constitution) in the president’s decision-making.

On the basis of this fact, it was logical that a good source of the basic tenets of foreign policy of the country of the period under observation was to be found in memoirs of the president, the source used here being *Witness to History, The Memoirs of Mauno Koivisto* (Koivisto 1997), who was President of Finland 1982–1994. From the text the writer has extracted quotes of relevance to the attitude taken by “official Finland” to the Baltic States and their struggle for independence.

These opinions have been compared against those in the studied press.

There was a simple reason for considering the thoughts of just the one president to suffice as the basis to outline the official Finnish policy with regard to the Baltic States. It was during Koivisto’s terms of office that the issues being studied came to the fore. It was largely also his attitudes that formed the backdrop for the study.

4.3 The foreign policy status of Finland in Europe

In order to evaluate Finnish foreign policy with regard to the country’s stance toward the Baltic States during the period 1988–1991, the years under examination, there would be cause to examine Finnish foreign policy during the post-war period leading up to this: 1945–1988, particularly from 1970 on. It should be stated here that any presentation of the country’s foreign policy is diffuse, to say the least. This applies even more so as regards the policy regarding the Baltic States.

During the period of the cold war between the West (under the aegis of the USA) and the Socialist bloc (under the leadership of the USSR), Finland played its own role as a part of European strategy of the time. Even though formally part of the West, the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR was a concrete indication of the fact that Finland was forced more than ever to take its neighbour into account.

The geography of both the Baltic States and of Finland had played a

significant role in the fortunes of these countries. The term very often used in this regard is *reuna-alue*, a border area of Europe, referring to the border between the two major cultural areas of Europe, the Western and the Eastern, the Catholic and the Orthodox, the Western democracies and the communist countries, indeed the European and the Asian.

Finland regarded the independence process of the Baltic countries aspiring to this status from the perspective of its own independence process, where the view was held that independence was the result of Leninist border area policy. It is, however, a most disputable argument, that the Baltic States should follow the process of Finland in 1917 in *negotiating for independence with the Soviet Union*, as Finland had done with Lenin.

It is false logic to compare the process of 1917 in Finland and that of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Baltic States. The latter had been successful in their Wars of Independence at the same time as Finland, though these were in fact fought *against imperial Russia and the Russian Bolsheviks*, and *not as a civil war* as was the case in Finland. Independence had been won, and also recognized by the Soviet Union in the peace treaty of Tartu in 1920, where the Soviet Union promised to recognize **for all time** the independence of Estonia. (Apunen 1991, 14–17)

In his hurry to get his hands free to attack Poland, Hitler engineered a surprise non-aggression pact with the USSR (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), giving Germany freedom to act in Poland and Lithuania, while the USSR had free play in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, eastern Poland and Bessarabia (23.8.39). One month later Hitler was to relinquish Lithuania, too, to the USSR.

4.4 Post-war background for Finnish foreign policy

Finlandization was a term used by many Western observers during the Cold War period to intimidate foreign parties, as well as the Finns themselves, as far as the country's relations with the Soviet Union was concerned. As a people, the Finns themselves did not approve of the term. (Koivisto 1997, xi, xii.) Nor was the country as subservient to

the USSR as was often thought. Indeed it remained firmly anchored to both Scandinavia geographically and the West politically.

During his terms as Prime Minister of Finland (1950-1956) and President (1956-1981), Kekkonen had managed to persuade the Soviet Union that Finland did not harbour any unfriendly feelings toward it (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia Standard 2003). Indeed Finland proved to display so finely-tuned a sensitivity to the Soviet Union, that the country instinctively avoided any activities the president and government deemed contrary to the Soviet Union's wishes.

In 1982, for newly-elected First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, the object of attention in the bilateral discussions with President Koivisto were the areas of foreign policy most important for Finland:

- Finnish-Soviet relations
- the Soviet-US power struggle
- the associated Soviet-US arms race

In 1982, ongoing talks touched on the medium-range missiles deployed in Europe, or subject to deployment there. The Soviet Union was experiencing great economic straits, exacerbated by the Soviet-US arms race. For this reason alone, the USSR was anxious to achieve disarmament extensive enough to have a satisfactory effect on its economy.

An important field of reform was to be seen in the work places all over the USSR, where the morale of the workers was so low that the leadership became convinced that something should be done to improve it. In Estonia, attempts were made to implement such reforms with German efficiency. Attempts were made to keep a check on work-place attendance, yet this did not yield any significant results. The important *rising Domino* at this early stage was the military intervention in Afghanistan by the USSR, (Laar, Ott & Endre 2000, 115), a foray of which the new First Secretary was an eager protagonist.

The new policies of the post-Brezhnev era suffered a short setback in the form of the deaths of both Andropov (9.2.1984) and his successor Konstantin Chernenko (10.3.1985). The advent of the third First Secretary of the CPSU within a space of 18 months proved to be a most important Domino.

For post-war Finland, the border between domestic and foreign policy was very vague, *a line drawn on the surface of the water* (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 12). Foreign policy measures are often motivated by domestic policy. For Finland, the central issue for foreign policy was national security. Foreign policy was most often formulated on an *ad hoc* basis, there being no comprehensively accepted theory of foreign policy. (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 15.) The central issues for the country's foreign policy were its relationships with the East (the USSR) and the issue of the integration of Finland into Europe (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 17). The bulk of Finnish foreign policy has been based on the assumptions of *the rational model*, a model aiming at maintaining Finland as an independent nation (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 18).

The foreign policy of every nation may be characterized by certain theoretical assumptions. According to Harto Hakovirta (1975), the central features are the resources at the disposal of the state, the social system, the economic structure, geopolitical status and political alignment. The factors influencing Finnish foreign policy are as follows:

On the world scene, Finland is regarded as a small state. *In other words, international developments have a larger impact on the country than is the case for larger states. (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 19). An industrialized market economy, Finnish society has been democratic and open. This stand has been an influence in the stand taken by Finland to other countries. (Hakovirta 1993, 19.)*

The geopolitical location of the country on the periphery of Europe, as the neighbour of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, imparts its own special characteristics to Finnish foreign policy, Finland maintaining a strict policy of neutrality since the beginning of the 1960s to the end of the cold war. A feature central to the historical tradition of Finnish foreign policy has been the alternation of policies of appeasement and resistance in its relationships with its eastern neighbour. (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 19–20.)

International policy has been governed by the constant need to reaffirm external security and internal stability, while the

1990s were characterized by a new geopolitical transfer in power (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 29, Note the date of this publication). The financial burden of the arms race was clearly higher for the Soviet Union than for the Western bloc. This was a major factor leading to the initiation of perestroika and glasnost by Mikhail Gorbachov. A consequence of these policies was that Eastern Europe and the Baltic States were actually able to implement their independence campaigns.

Post-war Finnish foreign policy might be characterized as determined by geopolitics and the structure of the international world. The official foreign policy stayed within established, fixed borders, the aim being to maintain and increase the stability of international relations. This was designed to reinforce Finland's own position. (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 36, 43.) The CSCE process, as a social institution, had a significant role in the implementation of the principles of liberalism. The 1990 Paris summit document saw "the free will of the individual, implemented in democracy and upheld by the constitutional state as the *sine qua non* of successful economic and social activity". It was indeed possible that, in the future, Finland would still have to live side by side with a Russia under authoritarian rule and living in the context of its own history. For this reason it made sense for Finland not to allow interruptions to its historical continuity in its relation with Russias. (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 45.)

The Finnish Foreign Ministry Internet newsletter OTTO of 10.12.2001 had published an article on President Kekkonen's 1964 visit to Tallinn. During the immediate post-war years, it is surprising that President Kekkonen's request to visit Estonia, tendered to the powers in Moscow in 1958, was refused, that year as well as the next. In 1963, however, Aleksei Müürisepp (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR from 1961 to 1970) arrived in Finland on a surprise visit, airing the possibility of a return visit by Kekkonen to Estonia. The invitation was indeed to come in the autumn.

In Finland, Kekkonen's proposed visit brought up the problem of relations between Finland and what the Finns called the *emigrant Estonians*. The latter was a term in use in the USSR as a **derogatory term** for the Estonians who *found themselves in other countries, as a result of the turmoil of war*, as the alternative Soviet terminology would have

it. In these countries the emigrants then set the aim of their lives to be an increase in their levels of prosperity, again according to the Soviet understanding. According to Vaino Väljas, cited in the 30.9.1972 edition of the Estonian fortnightly newspaper *Teataja*, published in Stockholm, „the Estonian emigrants were actively involved in aiding the imperialist circles in their struggle against communist theory and practice. They persisted in spreading in all possible ways disinformation on the situation in the Baltic republics.“ In all probability, the Finns were not aware of this negative connotation. The Estonians outside the Soviet Union called themselves *refugees*, the point being that *they had, of their own free will and often in fear of their lives, fled their country* ahead of the influx of the Red Army in 1944.

There were, to be true, groups of what might be termed genuine emigrants from the pre-war period, Estonians who had left Estonia for Russia, Australia, the USA, Canada and South America. The first wave of such emigration occurred after the 1905 Russian revolution, principally to the Novgorod, Samara, Ufa, Tver administrative districts, termed *guberniyas*, as well as to Siberia and Caucasia. The second wave occurred in the 1920s, climaxing in 1925–1927, primarily in search of a better standard of life than was to be had in Estonia. Due to the immigration quotas imposed by the USA, allowing only 115 Estonians per annum to immigrate, the emigration took the direction of South America, primarily Brazil. (Raag 1999, 8.) Raag (1999) saw the post-war period as very much more tumultuous compared with the inter-war era. Thousands of Estonians took refuge initially in Sweden and Germany, subsequently moving, especially from Germany, to the USA, Canada, and Australia.

The *refugee* Estonians were deemed by the Soviet authorities to be problematic, in that they refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet regime in Estonia, up to the 1960s or even the 1970s. This was so, refugees refused to have dealings with Soviet Estonia. The reason for this was not in the Estonians in Estonia, but in the fact that they had to apply for permission to visit their native country from authorities of the occupying power (the USSR Embassy), with which the refugees did not wish to have dealings. An application for a visa, indeed, was long regarded as recognition of the regime.

Relations with Estonia were regarded as all the more nega-

tive in cases where the visits were under the auspices of VEKSA, Väliseestlastega Kultuurisidemete Arendamise Komitee (Committee for the Development of Cultural Ties with Expatriate Estonians). This organization was a subsidiary of the KGB-sponsored organization *Rodina/Homeland*.

Other parties felt the need to foster contacts between Estonia and the outside world. The refugee Estonians, indeed all Balts, were actively involved in making their presence felt in their new countries of residence. In the United States, for instance, this made itself felt in the annual Captive Nations' Week, proclaimed by the President of the USA. Furthermore, the Balts passed on their stance regarding the Soviet Union to all they had dealings with, with parties in Finland, in this case. To be true, the stance mollified during the 1970s.

4.5 The Finnish stand on Estonia

In July, 1963, two Soviet diplomats were deported from Finland for espionage, a matter reported with some satisfaction by the exile Estonian press in Stockholm (OTTO, Finnish Foreign Ministry Internet newsletter, 10.12.2001). The fact that Finland had recognized (though only *de facto*, as it later turned out) the incorporation of Estonia in the Soviet Union was deemed to be to the detriment of the refugee Estonians. President Kekkonen, through his friend Professor Kustaa Vilkuna, head of the Finnish State Censorship Office, had warned the Estonian refugee community not to interfere in the internal affairs of Finland.

This notwithstanding, in November, 1963, V. J. Sukselainen, former Prime Minister and chairman of the Finnish Agrarian Union Party, visited a meeting of the Estonian fraternity *Sakala*, an organization of students and alumni, one of a dozen or so fraternities and sororities, organized at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, for the purpose of academic and cultural fellowship. Many of the latter organizations had formed so-called twinning treaties with Finnish student organizations, inviting each other to their anniversaries, granting each other's students scholarships to study in Finland/Estonia respectively. Sukselainen's visit caused much annoyance in Finnish

political circles, even though the alleged interference in Finnish politics amounted to a simple invitation to a Finnish politician to attend a function organized by parties abroad not enjoying the political sympathies of the Finnish powers-that-be.

4.6 The 1964 Visit to Estonia by President Kekkonen

According to the OTTO newsletter (10.12.2001), during his first visit to Tartu in March 1964, President Kekkonen had expressed the position that the only true Estonians were those living in Estonia. In other words, he cut off Finnish relationships with the refugee communities in Sweden.

Helsingin Sanomat reacted negatively to Kekkonen's visit, as did the weekly business newspaper *Kauppalehti*, published by *Aamulehti*. Both *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Kauppalehti* stated that the visit was tantamount to political recognition of Estonia as part of the USSR. It might, indeed, be asked whether the motive for Kekkonen's visit was actually an attempt at appeasing the USSR, after the Sukselainen incident had been felt by the Finnish political establishment to be embarrassing.

Kekkonen, however, did remember the Estonians positively. He gained much popularity among them by addressing the assembled audience in the Great Hall of Tartu University in Estonian. It must be remembered that at this period of Estonian history (twenty years after the end of the war) there was a marked campaign of russification going on in the Soviet republics under the guise of internatsionalism and the friendship of the peoples, and the speech markedly underscored his Estonian sympathies. A tragicomic incident of secondary importance, in this regard, was a question posed by the then First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, Johannes Käbin, an Estonian born in Russia, almost fully incapable of speaking Estonian. Kekkonen, on the other hand, as President of the Finland-Estonia Society, was fully fluent in the language. During Kekkonen's speech to the gathering, in Estonian, Käbin is reported to have asked in Russian (transliterated):

- *Shto on skazal?* / *What did he say?*

Later, indeed, Käbin made concerted efforts to learn Estonian.

Kekkonen's visit to the Estonian SSR signified an official abrogation of relations with the Estonian refugee communities, his attitude being that Estonia and its people could survive *in Estonia*, but not with the help of the refugees. His view was that they would disappear within two generations.

Even so, today, in Australia, the North American continent and Sweden there is still extensive activity amongst young people of Estonian descent. To be true, the activities are partly carried on in English/Swedish, but there is still a proficiency existing in the language, rudimentary though it might be. Additionally there are increasing contacts between the local Estonians and those of Estonia proper. It would seem that Kekkonen underestimated the refugee/emigré community.

It was, however, to the credit of President Kekkonen that the Estonians in Soviet Estonia realized that they had an ethnic "big brother" to the north, one to whom they could turn in search of moral, if not direct political support. Unfortunately Kekkonen did not realise the importance of the mere existence the refugee community to the Estonians in Estonia.

4.7 "What republic?", asked Koivisto

Koivisto's first visit to Estonia dated back to 1965 to the Estonian Song Festival, a quadrennial event in Estonia ever since 1869, and the official reason given for the festival, on this occasion, was "*to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Estonian republic*", in other words, the 25th anniversary of the absorption of Estonia into the Soviet Union, in Republican Estonian terminology.

Koivisto's question in reply to the above: "*Estonian republic?*", (on the basis of text analysis, the theoretical basis for this research), was apparently posed in full awareness of the existence of the Estonian Republic in the inter-war period. To the understanding of the writer, there was a considerable amount of provocation in the above question by Koivisto.

In reply, Toivo Karvonen, Secretary-General of the Finland-USSR

Association (Suomi-Neuvostoliitto-Seura, a semi-governmental civic organization), supplied the answer, “The Estonian *Soviet Socialist Republic*”. (Koivisto 1997, 119.)

For the writer, the question betrays the existence of an alternative answer for Koivisto, to his honour. The question had, in all probability been prompted by this alternative answer: the independent *Republic of Estonia*, proclaimed in 1918, and subjected to Soviet rule in 1940. From this time on, the country was officially known as the *Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic*.

At the end of the final concert of the same Estonian Song Festival, the massed choirs spontaneously began to sing *Mu isamaa on minu arm*/ *My fatherland is my love*, the popularly acclaimed unofficial Estonian national anthem, starting with the same two words as the official national anthem of the Estonian Republic, *Mu isamaa, mu õnn ja rõõm*/ *My fatherland, my pride and joy*, sung to the same melody as the Finnish national anthem, *Maamme*/ *Our country*. The latter anthem had been forbidden with the proclamation of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940. The crowd of 120,000 in the audience stood up to sing. Since Koivisto was sitting in the official podium together with Anastas Mikoyan, the then President of the Soviet Union (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), he could not follow suit, **experiencing a feeling of great embarrassment**. The singers took note of this, responding pointedly during the official march-past of the festival, when **Koivisto was sitting in the official podium together with Valter Klauson, chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic**. The president and the chairman were acknowledging the march-past, but **many singers marching pointedly turned their heads and looked away**, Koivisto notes, with embarrassment. (Koivisto 1997, 119, my bold, AP)

The Finnish president was caught between two strong currents, one official, as observed by Finnish foreign policy, but alien to the Estonian people, and the other characterized by extremely strong national feelings, with positive undertones of sympathy for the Estonians. It would be meet, here, to assume that this sympathy was at the base of his embarrassment. In the mid-1970s,

Koivisto, was attending, in purely civilian capacity, a volley-ball match in Estonia, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic officially. During the match, the referee told him that during the (Finnish Continuation) war he had been in Finland fighting “for the freedom of Finland and the honour of Estonia” in the ranks of the military contingent of volunteers from Estonia, the *Soomepoisid/Finland lads*, fighting in the ranks of the Finnish army against the Soviet Union.

Koivisto reported *having felt distinctly startled, wondering whether the exchange had been overheard*. (Koivisto 1997, 119, my bold italics, AP). The reaction was clearly an indication of shock at a different version of foreign policy, one not in accord with that in the Paasikivi-Kekkonen policy.

4.8 Finnish foreign policy as a policy of “good-weather conditions”

For Finland, its policy of neutrality in the conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs was a policy of “good-weather conditions”. With the toughening Soviet foreign policy line in the 1970s, neutrality was the policy to keep Finland an independent nation. (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1993, 142.)

A resume of the status of the Baltic States in the context of post-World War II Finnish foreign policy is to be found in *Lännettymisen lyhyt historia/ Occidentalization, a short history* (Hämäläinen & Ovaska 1998). The text is a chronological statement of events touching on Finland, also including the status of the Baltic States within Finnish foreign policy. The structure of the book by Unto Hämäläinen, illustrated by cartoonist Terho Ovaska, in *Uusi Suomi* up to 1991, and in *Helsingin Sanomat* from 1991 on. There is reason to present selected quotes from the text.

The Greens Federation and the Finnish People’s Democratic Federation (SKDL), the cover organization for the Finnish Communist Party and other left-wing socialists, were the first parties to seek contacts with Estonia. **The nationalist movement south of the Gulf of Finland had for some time, already, interested Finnish papers.**

Indeed, Osmo Soininvaara, Finnish Greens MP, brought the question up in Question Time in parliament, asking the Foreign Minister Kalevi Sorsa what Finland would do in the event of a request by Estonia for diplomatic recognition. (Hämäläinen & Ovaska 1998, 33.) Sorsa's reply reflected **the established Finnish foreign policy liturgy: The internal division of power within the USSR at the time, between Moscow and the Soviet republics, was not a matter for a foreign power** (Finland) to take a stand on. The press was not so friendly to the powers-that-be, the official Finnish foreign policy. The president and the government were severely criticized for their coldness. The press photos from Rumania, those from Czechoslovakia had no effect on Koivisto. Indeed he encouraged the Czechoslovak government not to cede, predicting that the status quo in Europe would not change in the near future.

In Sweden, likewise, Foreign Minister Sten Andersson was of the opinion, at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, that the Baltic States were not occupied countries, that it was just a small minority who wished to secede from the USSR.

In the TV1 newscast transmission on 28.11.89 of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's suggestion for the reunification of Germany, Finnish Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio warned his nation not to speculate too freely on the dismantling of the military alliances in East and West (Hämäläinen & Ovaska 1998, 43).

4.9 The preparatory CSCE session and the delegation of Baltic refugees from the USA

The official Finnish attitude to the Baltic States was to be seen in the events associated with the preparatory meeting of the foreign ministers of the participant countries of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki. This gathering was considered the centre-point of post-World War II Finnish foreign policy. The meeting witnessed the first post-World War II collision of Baltic and Soviet policies in a premature *glasnost* atmosphere.

While on a six-week-long holiday in Australia (July–August, 1973), the writer read in the Sydney Estonian weekly *Meie Kodu* and in *Teataja*, a similar bi-monthly newspaper in the Estonian language, published in Stockholm, of the arrests of some Balts in Helsinki. On his return to Finland, the reply to enquiries of his friends and acquaintances, regarding the incident, was general ignorance. The incident had been passed over in silence by the Finnish media.

According to Esko Salminen (1996, 196), on 5th July, 1973 nine refugees of Baltic origin, three of them members of the World-wide Baltic Council (*Meie kodu*, 1.8.1973) were held in custody by the Finnish state police for one day for dissemination of anti-Soviet propaganda at the preparatory conference of foreign ministers of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki. The nine were released as a result of intervention by Secretary of State William Rogers. Two of the refugees were being escorted from their hotel room by the police, when they met Secretary of State Rogers, in the lift. One of them, knowing Rogers more closely, was able to explain the situation of his party, with a plea for their release. The office premises of the delegation were emptied, literature was confiscated and telephone communications were cut. The police taking the Balts into custody were very embarrassed, intimating that the order for the arrests had come from higher quarters.

A DDR representative in the company of the Finnish police, was looking into the alleged crime committed by Uldis Grava, President of the Central Federation of Latvian Organisations in the United States, in “harrassing” Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. The previous evening, the East German delegation had organized a press conference for the delegates. Grava had gone to the conference, duly accredited, to be received in the same manner as the other delegates. In the presence of the latter, Grava had asked Gromyko about the reasons for the Soviet Union not granting the Baltic States their independence. Gromyko replied that the Baltic States were satisfied with their current status and were not desirous of applying for independence.

The East German delegate subsequently made attempts to characterize the Baltic delegation as terrorists, while Finnish authorities alleged

that the Balts had distributed pamphlets without due permission from the authorities. The Balts refused to sign any statements to the effect that they had been involved in illegal activities. The Finnish interrogators of the detainees did not speak English (not an exceptionally rare occurrence in 1973). Considering the fact that the majority of the delegation members were United States citizens, this factor was a further reason for the illegality of the detention of the delegation.

After the interrogation, the Balts were transported to a prison outside Helsinki, where they were each put in separate rooms, where they went on a hunger strike. In the meantime, a demand was made by United States Secretary of State William Rogers, together with the United States ambassador and the Canadian foreign minister for the release of the delegation. Initially the four US citizens and subsequently also the Swedish, British and Canadian citizens in the group were released. Despite the fact that the detainees were taken from the prison to Hotel Marski, they were denied contact with the press. They were also denied permission to communicate with their relatives enquiring after them. Upon their release, the Balts were still shadowed by the Finnish State Police officials. On their departure from Finland, too, they were accompanied by the State Police.

In Finland, the issue, crucially important as it was to the Baltic delegation in Helsinki and to the Baltic community at large, was so sensitive an area to the Conference host, that it was almost denied an existence, as far as press reports were concerned.

4.10 Journalistic coverage of the 1973 incident in the principal daily newspapers

An item in the Sydney Estonian weekly *Meie Kodu* of 1.8.1973 reported the Swedish daily *Svenska Dagbladet* as saying that the Finnish officials were doing their utmost to cover up the incident, an incident threatening to turn into a scandal of international proportions. Comments, to the effect that many of the Balts were either under house arrest or in police detention, were not forthcoming from the Finnish authorities. The issue was not one concerning only the Balts, with also Polish and

Czechoslovak refugee organizations being involved. In Finland, according to Salminen (1996, 196), *Helsingin Sanomat* covered the incident adequately in four articles, giving the pertinent background information. The editorial coverage did demonstrate Baltic sympathies, though more often siding with the police who made the arrests.

News regarding the incident appeared in *Helsingin Sanomat* a day after *Hufvudstadsbladet*. The matter was an awkward one for the authorities. (*Poliisin piinaviikko, A week of torture for the police*). **The issue was apparently still a delicate one for Helsingin Sanomat.** *Hufvudstadsbladet* had carried out comprehensive research on the background for the demonstration, and took a critical stand to the arrest of the delegation. *Uusi Suomi* also reacted critically to the arrests and the actions of the state police. The background for the demonstrations was also presented.

The newspapers representing the government coalition parties of the time, *Suomen Sosiaalidemokraatti* (Social Democrats), *Kansan Uutiset* (People's Democrats) and *Suomenmaa* (Centre Party), on the other hand, made little of the demonstrations, disparaging the foreign citizens involved.

4.11 The post-war russification of the Baltic States and Finnish reactions

The impending plans for the russification of the Estonian SSR, harboured by the ECP, had been released through the Finnish television news, even though they were based on rumour. Official publication of russification plans would not have been possible. The new First Secretary of the ECP was furious. Henceforth he was to withhold access to certain documents from his subordinates to avoid further situations permitting "Estonian nationalists who had elbowed their way into the Central Committee to betray the sacred efforts of the Party". (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 113.)

At a **Soviet Union-wide conference of ideological functionaries** in Moscow on 16.10.1979, organized by the CPSU Central Committee, Ideology Secretary Mikhail Suslov **insisted on an esca-**

lation of ideological war against the West. During the course of his speech **Suslov warned the republics on the periphery of the Soviet Union to abstain from independent action with regard to the USSR.** When this warning was released to the public, functionaries such as the russophile First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, Karl Vaino, as well as the KGB of the Estonian SSR were furious at the release. According to the latter two parties, the blame for the leakage could only have come from the nationalistically-minded Estonian Communist Party.

The Estonian SSR regarded Finland as a nation loyal and friendly to the Soviet Union. Even so, **both the ECP and the Estonian KGB held the Finnish state and its citizens to be in the grip of the Western intelligence organizations.** Both Vaino and the KGB harboured grave suspicions regarding Finnish scholars of the Soviet Union, such as Seppo Zetterberg. The Soviet organs found it difficult to understand why Zetterberg, in this instance, wished to meet Estonian scholars as often as he did. For the KGB, the only logical reason for these meetings was to pass on information to certain parties in the Estonian SSR, deleterious to the Soviet Union. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 113.)

The KGB held the Finnish mass media, especially television, to be a major negative influence on the Estonian SSR, in general, and on Tallinn in particular. The matter was deemed to be worthy of special deliberation in the Television and Radio Committee of the Soviet Union in January of 1984, and again in November, 1985. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 144.) A phenomenon experienced as problematic in this area by the Soviet authorities was the advent of a corpulent chef Vainö Purje (1928-2012), known as Väiski, on small-goods commercials on Finnish television, displaying a wide variety of hams and sausages. These advertisements were visible in Tallinn, where the displayed goods were not available, arousing anger in the minds of the Estonians, whose own products were being exported to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 145.) According to Jaak Kilmi and Kiur Aarma's 2009 Estonian documentary shown on Finnish TV1, *Disko ja ydinsota/Disco and Nuclear War*, local Soviet Estonian authorities claimed that Purje and his television deli-

cacies were agents of the US secret service. (Uusi Suomi 23.7.2013.)

While the Estonian SSR was willing to have foreign tourists on its territory, the Central Committee of the ECP was concerned at the pro-Western propaganda being unwittingly spread through this avenue. These visitors included Finns, as well as Estonian refugees from the West. Furthermore, the central government of the USSR looked askance at the numerous expatriates from the Estonian SSR, who had, for instance, married outside the Soviet Union from the 1970s on. These were all regarded as potential threats to the Soviet state.

By 1983, concern regarding the quantity and nature of the printed material coming into the country had prompted the Foreign Ministry of the Estonian SSR to publish an account of the limitations placed on Estonian-Finnish contacts “On the Official Channels for the Spread of Socio-political Information to Soviet Estonia from Finland”.

The report, indeed, went so far as to present proposals regarding the manners in which Soviet-Estonian – Finnish relations were to be developed. Estonia was allegedly being exposed to the negative influence of Finnish television, foreign tourism, Finnish church organisations. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 145.) All Finnish newspapers were censored in Soviet Estonia, with the exception of the Communist Party’s *Tiedonantaja*/*The Courier*. The People’s Democrats’/Left Alliance’s *Kansan Utiset*/*The People’s News* was apparently considered too independently-minded for the Estonian SSR and was thus not available for Finnish tourists in Hotel Viru, in Tallinn, for instance. According to the Finnish Foreign Ministry, the USSR embassy was unwilling to send news of a political nature from Finland to the Estonian SSR for publication there.

4.12 Political refuge in Finland

It was difficult for political fugitives from the Estonian SSR to find asylum in Finland. According to its peace treaty with the USSR, Finland was obliged to surrender all such fugitives to the USSR. All other Western countries that had been the destinations of Estonian asylum-seekers had granted them asylum, with a very small number of

exceptions. The same applied to refugees from Latvia and Lithuania.

With regard to Finnish-Soviet relations, it should be stated that **it was the aim of the USSR of the early 1980s to screen the citizens of the Baltic republics from peoples and nations termed “immoral”** (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 151). It was naturally the aim of the ECP, under the leadership of the russophile First Secretary Karl Vaino, to keep the Estonian population at a distance from foreign influences.

While it was seen to be in place to proclaim that there were no problems at all in Soviet-Finnish relations, even so, in confidential directions from Moscow to the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, Moscow revealed a lack of understanding for the nature of the Estonian-Finnish ethnic kinship. According to the Russian Party functionaries and KGB officials, the Estonians were insufficiently resistant to capitalism and bourgeois ideology.

The KGB regarded the Finnish tourists to Estonia as a provocative influence on the local population. An exception was a Finnish visitor who had lodged a complaint with the USSR Consulate-General. An Estonian Intourist guide had criticized the level of Russian culture, the quality of Soviet goods, as well as proposing the establishment of a bourgeois Estonian republic. The complaint was further dealt with in the USSR Bureau of Foreign Tourism. The guide was ordered to write up a report on the incident. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 154.) Intourist guides were charged with the responsibility of providing counter-propaganda to instances such as the above to tourists. Finnish tourists in the USSR, however, showed no interest whatever in pro-USSR propaganda. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 159.)

In this connection, two examples of the Finnish attitude to Soviet propaganda, from Moscow, to be true, were as follows:

The summer of 1978 saw the writer on an excursion to Moscow with a group of editors of local newspapers from Central Finland. One of the events in the itinerary was a proposed visit to the Exhibition of the Achievements of the National Economy of the Soviet Union. There was not one member of the group interested in taking part, to the vocal disappointment of the official guide.

A second event in the itinerary of the same tour was a visit to the

offices of *Pravda*, under the guidance of a representative of the newspaper. At the end of the tour, there was an opportunity for the group to ask questions. The questions were quite acidic by nature, journalists as people in the group were. The guide, however, showed great skill in parrying these questions. One example of this skill was as follows:

Q: If something radical was to happen on the world political scene today, the matter would be on the front pages of the newspapers in London, New York and Paris, for instance tomorrow morning. In Moscow, the item would not be reported until the following week. How can you explain this?

A: Well, was the reply, **we understand the paper to have a responsibility toward its readers. We cannot just publish anything without checking the background of the news item. This might well take a week. Once we have ascertained the truth value of the item, we can publish it.**

Foreign influences were a source of conflict for the Soviet authorities. The KGB often regarded Finns visiting the Estonian SSR as provocateurs. Yet they were important factors in the local economy, providing, besides Western foreign currency, Western-quality construction know-how in the construction of the hotels Viru and Olümpia in Tallinn, the Port of Muuga and the Rakvere Meat Processing Factory, for instance.

For the Politbureau of the CPSU, Finnish television, visible in Tallinn and northern Estonia, was an agent of extremely subversive bourgeois stands in the society of the Estonian SSR. The matter was regarded as sufficiently serious for the KGB of the Estonian SSR to send Karl Vaino, First Secretary of the Estonian CP, a memorandum to the effect. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 163.)

In the area of anti-Soviet mentality, Estonia was on the front lines, with Latvia and Lithuania following a long way behind Estonia. The large number of tourists from Estonia to Finland made their supervision by the KGB very difficult. According to the KGB, all the Estonian “traitors of the homeland” who had sought asylum in the West, had

been actively involved with Western tourists. Furthermore, Estonian exile organizations had allegedly established bases in Finland to exploit the active tourism between the latter and the Estonian SSR. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 163.)

With numerous transgressions ascribed to alcohol among the Finns visiting Tal-linn, it was also possible that the concern felt by the Soviet authorities was an attempt by them to limit the numbers visiting Tal-linn. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 167.)

It may well be asked whether official Finnish foreign policy with regard to the Baltic States was merely a deliberate smoke-screen for the benefit of the Soviet Union, while, in essence, the country pursued its own independent foreign policy through the printed word.

4.13 The Finnish media and Estonia

The Finnish stands on the Soviet Union were radically changing in the reporting on the Prague Spring of 1968. The changes persisted in the decades to follow. **The USSR held the new attitude of the Finnish press to be hostile.** Officially the USSR expressed its confidence in Finnish foreign policy, while the Finnish and Estonian populations had their confidence in Finnish television. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 169.) The dichotomy of the **official Finnish foreign policy** regarding the Soviet bloc and the **unofficial foreign policy** continued.

In the 1970s, the Finnish media, especially the Finnish Broadcasting Service, aimed to take Soviet sensibilities into account. It broadcasted educational television courses, such as the Russian course *Raz-dva-tri* in the 1970s. The radio aired programs in line with the policy of friendship with the Soviet Union, such as *Naapurineljännes/A quarter of an hour with the neighbours* and *Näin naapurissa/The way they live next door.*

Official quarters in Finland, not to mention the equivalent Soviet quarters, still assumed that the Finns were interested in the details of everyday life in the Soviet Union.

From December, 1978, the situation changed. In February, 1979, Finnish TV2 screened the series *Sodan ja rauhan miehet/Men of war and*

peace, a docu-mentary presentation of war-time Finland. The program was to provoke a com-mentary from the Soviet ambassador Vladimir Stepanov, where he asked how a program with such an interpretation of history was screened in the first place. The objection was made, despite the fact that the program had been sent to Moscow for prior approval. Due to the negative reactions there, presentation of the program was postponed for some years. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 179.)

According to the **Central Committee of the Estonian CP** the influence of **Finnish television** on the population of the Estonian SSR was to stop. Hardliners were insisting on “extreme measures” to combat the “*principal disseminator of the bourgeois ideology creeping into Soviet Estonia*”. While the Party stalwarts in Tallinn were known to have been watching Finnish television themselves, in the privacy of their own homes (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 184), due to the low-quality programs airing in Estonia, Rein Ristlaan, ECP CC Ideological Secretary maintained that the interest of the Finnish commercial television company MTV3 was ever on the increase in dealing with **domestic problems of the Soviet Union**, especially **of the Estonian SSR**. The ongoing process of russification in the Estonian SSR appeared to be a particular object of interest to Finnish television. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 179.)

5. The Baltic States in the Koivisto Era 1981-1991: the Dominoes begin to rise

5.1. The Koivisto Era and the Baltic States

The advent of the Koivisto era signalled a new beginning to the histories of the Baltic States as independent entities outside the Soviet Union. The preceding Kekkonen presidency (1956-1981) had widely been regarded as accommodation, if not outright grovelling, to the Soviet Union. This claim applied to both Finland and outside. The aforementioned grovelling was often the topic of discussion in the Estonian weekly *Meie Kodu/Our home*, published in Sydney, Australia. The data of this study was gathered from the press, with the express purpose of countering the above claim.

The end of the latter era was seen, perhaps even *hailed*, as a new beginning to Finnish society, a society characterized by a new openness, a *Finnish glasnost*, if you will. Seppo Lindblom, political secretary to Koivisto in the 1960s, reported **the KGB representative in the Soviet embassy in Helsinki regarding Koivisto as lacking in leftist ideology, to the very extent of his being regarded as right-wing.** (Lindblom 2009, 281). Such developments were reflected in the newspaper clippings here being studied.

The Soviet Union was undergoing changes totally beyond its control.

Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, elected president of Finland in 1956, had vowed to continue Paasikivi's foreign policy, now renamed the **Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line**. Accommodation to the USSR went to the extent where a concept unpleasant to the Finns, *finlandization*, was created. Kekkonen had been prepared to accept the treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, suggested by the USSR and signed in 1948, an agreement regulating Finnish-Russian relations up to the demise of the USSR. (Turun maakuntamuseo 2009.)

The outset of Koivisto's presidency was marked by the trials of Estonian human rights activists **Jüri Kukk**, Chemistry docent at Tartu University and **Mart Niklus**, a young post-graduate student, on **5.1.1981**. Upon the expression of his wish to leave the Soviet Union with his family, having completed post-graduate studies in Paris, **Kukk** was imprisoned and sentenced to several years in the Vologda forced labour camp, dying under mysterious circumstances on 27.3.1981.

In the autumn of 1956, a Swedish language club of the University of Tartu was visited by a delegation of Finnish students. In the manner characteristic of the time, locals surreptitiously gave the guests letters to deliver abroad, letters containing censorable material. Mart Niklus had given some Finns a collection of photographs for a certain person in the West. They were later published in a refugee Estonian newspaper, these were seen as a hostile gesture by the Soviet authorities. As a result, Niklus was sentenced to 25 years forced labour. (Küng, 1975, 202, 203.) Finland ignored the Niklus case completely.

5.2 The post-Brezhnev era

The death, on 10th November, 1982, of conservative First Secretary of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev raised hopes of an increased level of liberalization in the regime in the USSR. What had been termed the **Soviet era of stagnation** (1964-85) was coming to an end.

On 10.11.1982, Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, the Soviet secret police from 1967 to 1982, succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, serving in the post from 1982 until his death in 1984 (Microsoft Encarta Encyclo-

pedia 2003). Bilateral negotiations between President Koivisto of Finland and First Secretary Andropov were continued on the same basis as before, the main emphasis being on the areas of foreign policy most important for Finland: Finnish-Soviet relations, the Soviet-US power struggle, the associated Soviet-US arms race. In 1982, for instance, ongoing talks touched on the medium-range missiles deployed in Europe, or subject to deployment there.

The Soviet Union was experiencing dire economic straits, aggravated by the Soviet-US arms race. The USSR was anxious to achieve East-West disarmament, extensive enough for it to have a satisfactory effect on its economy. This was the general background existing at the beginning of reforms in the Soviet Union. During his period as First Secretary of the CPSU (12.11.82 - 9.2.1984), **Andropov attempted to liberalize the Soviet system, while still aiming to keep the opposition in check with a hard hand.** Andropov regarded a series of drastic economic measures to be the only way to save the USSR. Absenteeism from work-places was to be severely policed and disciplined. (Laar, Ott & Endr 2000, 114.) The new First Secretary was also known to have been one of the strongest proponents of Moscow's Afghanistan campaign.

Lavrenti Beria, People's Commissar on Domestic Affairs, had, in the 1950s, harboured designs on upgrading the Baltic States to the status of People's Republics, on the model of Hungary and Poland. In like manner to Beria, and similarly in the manner of his next-but-one successor Gorbachev, **Andropov still aimed to save and preserve the Soviet Union.** In his domestic policy, he aimed at a new cadre policy in the new Soviet areas (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine), preferring local state officials instead of the Russian-speaking cadre politicians from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic employed hitherto. Furthermore he began developing plans for emphasizing the national characteristics of each republic, to entice the population to accept the Soviet order.

At this late stage of the history of the USSR, a campaign for more efficiency in labour seemed indicative of impending change. With the whole post-war period having been characterized by a lack of efficiency, a lack of discipline in industry, the crackdown was to be interpreted as a sign of coming reform.

A certain measure of influence for the developments in the USSR was to be seen in the Solidarity trade union movement in the Poland of 1980. Andropov had become convinced that something was to be done to reform the financial and political systems of the Soviet Union, along the Polish lines.

This was especially so, considering the invasion of Afghanistan by almost 100,000 Red Army troops on 27th December, 1979. The numbers were to increase to 200,000. Poland and Afghanistan inevitably had their effects on developments in the Baltic States. A reason of not little importance was the fact that many Balts doing their military service in the Red Army in the period 1980-88 were sent to fight in Afghanistan.

An important field of reform was to be seen in the level of *work morale* all over the USSR. This was so low that the leadership became convinced that something should be done to improve it. In Estonia, attempts were made to implement such reforms, for instance checking up during the working days to see that staffs *were* actually at work, where they should be. Often they were not, since the work was unrewarding. Furthermore, the workers found it necessary to take time off during the day to purchase things in short supply that had become available for a short while. Now officials, equipped with special authorization cards, would check trams, shops, cinemas and cafes to see why people were there during working hours. While the campaign was short-lived, the writer saw in these doomed reforms the rudiments of perestroika, glasnost, and, eventually of the demise of the Soviet Union. **A Domino seemed to be rising whereby the myth of the USSR as the state of the workers was being dismantled.**

5.3 Developments in the 1980s

As early as 17th January, 1980, an appeal was sent by the **peoples of the Baltic States to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United Nations and the people of Afghanistan, in protest against Soviet activities in the latter country.** As a result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Baltic refugees were also subsequently involved in calling for a boycott of the Olympic Games, both

in Moscow and in Tallinn, where the sailing events were to take place.

While Baltic action was doubtless justified, the intervention was a double-edged sword, in a positive sense, this time. The Olympics were to bring to Tallinn an influx of tourists from the West hitherto unseen, together with the *insidious Western influences*, as Soviet propaganda would have put it.

Tallinn was the venue for the sailing events of the XIX Olympic Games in Moscow from 19.7. to 3.8.1980. This was a major impetus to the Estonians to promote their national self-awareness, despite the widespread boycott of the Games in Moscow, as a result of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the previous Christmas.

In association with the Olympic sailing events scheduled to be held, there were a number of associated auxiliary events in Tallinn. On 22nd September, 1980, the Estonian Broadcasting Company organized a football match, featuring sideline entertainment by a popular Estonian pop group Propeller. For some reason, this performance was banned, resulting in a wide-spread protest by the annoyed young Estonians gathered there, first at the Kadriorg Stadium, subsequently in the city centre. During the demonstration, the young people were chanting “*Russians out!*”, “*Long live the Republic of Estonia*”, “*No more Russian in Estonian schools*”, “*Down with Minister of Education Elsa Grechkina.*”

The consequences of these demonstrations in the city centre were young demonstrators being beaten with police truncheons and arrested. The head of police Marko Tibar treated the incident as *hooliganism*, a Soviet term designating *public disorder*. In response, Estonian cultural leaders turned to the public in a general appeal, all over Estonia as well as abroad. As a result **there were many arrests, including those, mentioned above, of a young researcher Mart Niklus, sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and 3 years exile for allegedly “photographing non-existent facts”, and Chemistry professor Jüri Kukk, the latter dying in the Vologda prison camp on 27th March, 1981.** (Ott, Laar & Endre 2000, 77.)

In addition to the influence of the Olympic sailing events in Tallinn, the independence movement also received support outside the Soviet Union. This took the form of the **Esto 80** world-wide festival of exile Estonians in Stockholm in the beginning of July 1980. The week-

long function was the third in a row of festivals held every four years since 1972 in the major centres of Estonian communities around the Western world. The week was to climax in a demonstration procession through Stockholm, demanding independence for Estonia and protesting against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan half a year previously.

Koivisto attributed Finland's good relations with the Soviet Union on a constant relationship of stability with the latter, unlike that of Norway (Koivisto 1997, 26). One reason for this difference, the need for a constant relationship of stability between Finland and the USSR, was to be seen in a comparison of the lengths of the two countries' respective borders with the USSR: while Finland shared 1269 km of land border with the Soviet Union, Norway had but 125 km.

The implications to the respective foreign policies were obvious. Hence, logically, according to Koivisto (1997, 26), Finnish domestic policy was dictated by foreign policy, in this order of importance.

The basis for Finnish foreign policy, in turn, were amicable relations with the Soviet Union. The great powers lacked morals, President Paasikivi had claimed (Koivisto 1997, 24), and this was something the small nations had to recognize, a fact also directly associated with the above comparison of border lengths.

In the Author's Preface to his *Witness to History*, Koivisto (1997, xii) writes:

"I could not imagine anything other than that the Soviet Union would remain whole and Germany divided. Great changes began in the Soviet Union just as my first six-year term was nearing its end [...] three of my visits to Moscow had been to attend funerals. (Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, AP) Gorbachev was chosen as the Soviet leader in the spring of 1985."

Koivisto cited Kekkonen as believing that Finland and the Western world in general should place their trust in the agreements already made between the major world powers, basing their foreign policies on these agreements. (Koivisto 1997, 8). Norwegian Prime Minister Kåre Willoch, again, in response to Koivisto while discussing the Soviet Union, claimed **all great powers to be unreliable treaty partners** (Koivisto 1997, 26). It was Finland's wish

that the country not rely on any one political grouping of countries, but rather that it enjoy relations on an equal footing with all.

During his terms of office (1956–1981), **President Urho Kekkonen held the opinion that Finland’s position in the West was all the stronger with East-West relations in good shape.** Kekkonen also held Finland capable of guaranteeing its own security, despite the fact that it had the USSR as a neighbour. Finland was to be viewed in the world as a neutral nation that looked after its own affairs. (Koivisto 1997, 21.)

Even though, in the Western world, Finland was widely regarded as living under constant pressure from the Soviet Union, *Finland itself refused to live with perceived potential threats.* (my bold italics, AP) The only option available was to try to maintain the appearance of a nation in a stable situation in the Nordic region. (Koivisto 1997, 25.)

5.4 Finnish neutrality – a characterization

In discussion with President Koivisto during the latter’s visit to Moscow on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the USSR in 1982, First Secretary Andropov, in reference to Finnish-Soviet relationships, made the comment: “Why, **you are a neutral country!**” The super-power at least paid lip-service to the professed Finnish foreign policy, while, nevertheless, having refused for a long time to thus depict the country.

During his visit to the United States, Koivisto had described the foreign policy of his country as “**attempting to formulate new, positive policies toward its neighbour, instead of perceiving the current bilateral relations as threats.**”

The USA, on the other hand, in the words of General Bernard W. Rogers, supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe, in an interview given to *Helsingin Sanomat* on 4th January, 1983, **was not convinced that Finland would defend itself wholeheartedly against the USSR, should she be attacked.** (Koivisto 1997, 20, 21, 25.) To be true, Rogers later retracted his statement, pleading ignorance of the true facts.

The above attitude, even so, largely supported the belief held in the West, that Finland was, if not officially in the Soviet bloc, part of it, at

least in practice. The current work aims at dispelling this misunderstanding.

In 1961, during a major foreign policy crisis debacle known as the Diplomatic Note crisis, the USSR had sent Finland a diplomatic note demanding joint military exercises with Finland as allowed in the FCMA. In this note, First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev had said:

We do not interfere, nor do we want to do so, in the domestic affairs of Finland or any other country. *But we would be poor politicians were we not to follow the political developments in our near neighbours. It is no secret that it is the persons in power in Finland that direct the foreign policy of the country. For this reason it is not a matter of indifference what the policies pursued by one person or another are and who the forces behind them are, trying to achieve power. (Hrustsev 1964, my translation, my bolds in the quotation, as expressing the main content of the statement, AP.)*

All through the post-war period, **Finland was regarded in the Western world as a repository, of sorts, of expertise on the USSR.** This alleged expertise was largely mistaken. In actual fact, Finland knew very little about its neighbour, not even so elementary a fact as to whether First Secretary Yuri Andropov was married or not. The general nature of the USSR was, at this time, so secretive that allegedly **not even the KGB representative in the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, Minister-Counsellor Viktor Vladimirov, had any personal details about Andropov.** (Koivisto 1997, 29.) The apparently innocuous situation belies an extensive lack of internal communication within the USSR as a whole or, at least, within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, demonstrating the need for the *glasnost* to be espoused by First Secretary Gorbachev.

5.5 The submarine incident off Karlskrona in October, 1981

In October, 1981, a Soviet 'Whisky' class submarine ran aground in Sweden, off Karlskrona. Koivisto's initial reaction was one of amusement, discounting the incident as having any significance to the perspective of international relations: "**...military interest in the Baltic has grown considerably. How could a Baltic coastal state have any reason to upset the situation currently prevailing in the region?**" (Koivisto 1997, 31.)

The Swedish daily *Svenska Dagbladet* commented on the incident, writing:

"It is very difficult to understand how the president of Finland can condescend to speak in so slippery a fashion. The president believes that much of what is regarded as quite evident is actually not so at all. Unless Koivisto has information at his disposal that the Swedish submarine commission withheld from the Swedish public, he should refrain from making this kind of statement. The only people to react gratefully to what he says are those who hold power in Moscow." (Koivisto 1997, 32.)

The reaction was a source of offence to the Finnish president. Indeed, Koivisto regarded the reaction not as one of protest against infringement of Swedish territorial integrity but as one of *the arrogance of a past great power*, as if the Swedes were trying to impose their own opinions on the Finns. (Koivisto 1997, 33.) Finland discounted all possibility of threat to its national security from the Soviet Union.

Much as Finland felt itself to be independent of the Soviet Union, as it actually was, the general impression abroad that there was some degree of dependence on the Soviet Union, were it only dependence in trade.

5.6 Finnish-Soviet relations in the eyes of the West, specifically the USA

Despite Finland's claims to the contrary, there were genuine doubts held abroad regarding the country's neutrality toward the Soviet Union. At a press conference in Washington on 21st June, 1983, US Vice-President George Bush had termed Finland a country neutral "*in a certain sense*". Despite Bush's comment to the effect that by this italicized term he was referring only to Finland's geographical location and the inferences other nations might draw from this, Bush could have been expressing doubts regarding the country's professed neutrality in major power politics. (Koivisto 1997, 33.)

Koivisto still rightly regarded the very word *neutral*, in reference to his country, to be an achievement in itself. Yet he recognized the fact that a serious east-west confrontation could have rendered Finland very vulnerable. (Koivisto 1997, 34.)

While the overall status of Finland in world politics was *not to be regarded purely as negative* or *dubious*, it could not be subjected to any risk. The working relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland had led to the *latter* finding herself monitoring developments in the *former*. On the world scene, this had resulted in a reputation, perhaps unjustified, of wide expertise in the Soviet Union. The reason for this doubt in the Finnish expertise, is caused by the fact that it was very difficult, even by the terms of the Peace Treaty between the Soviet Union and Finland, to write *anything* about the Soviet Union in a negative vein.

5.7 The advent of perestroika and glasnost

The economy of the Soviet Union was not functioning. Its financial difficulties were making themselves felt in the arms race against the United States. Financing military expenditure was proving a great burden on the country's civilian economy. The state of the economy was dangerous, to say the least. Consumer goods were hard to come by. (Koivisto 1997, 39.) The situation was such that Gorbachev real-

ized that something was to be done regarding the state of the economy, The system had, in some manner, to be reformed. Long-term planning, in the Marxist style, with its Five- and Ten-Year Plans, had proved to be ineffective. A radical change in the way of thinking in Soviet society was imperative. In April 1985, on the understanding that Brezhnev's period had led the country into crisis, Gorbachev launched his ideas on the **restructuring** of Soviet industry and of Soviet society in general, a phenomenon that came to be known in the West by its Russian term, **perestroika**. (Made 1991, 14.)

To date, **Soviet society had been characterized by a large degree of secrecy**. In order, however, to effect some material improvements that could make themselves concretely felt, i.e. that the concept of **perestroika** could be implemented, a radical change in another field of social policy had to occur. It was hoped that the solution lay in a greater degree of **transparency** in Soviet society. This was to be implemented in what was termed in Russian **glasnost**, often translated as **openness**, **openness as a policy** (*esp. since 1985*) in the USSR in reporting news etc. (Godfrey-Smith et al. 1992; Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2003.)

By the mid-1980s, the centralized Soviet economy had reached the limits of its extensive period of development. The ever-growing shortage of cheap oil, gas and other natural resources, the inability to redirect labour from primary industry to secondary industry, the artificially expanded defence budget and the bureaucratic apparatus running riot – all rendered further economic growth in the USSR impossible. **As soon as Moscow attempted to extricate itself from this situation by offering its constituent republics a greater amount of autonomy, the USSR began disintegrating.**

The latter half of the 1980s had seen the introduction of obscure reforms in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wished to reorganize the economy, while also accelerating its development. Initially all income not derived from work was forbidden, but after some time almost any deals were permitted. The state embarked on an anti-alcoholism campaign, this decreasing national income. In the agricultural sector large agro-industrial conglomerates were being created, resulting in the decentralization of agricultural production and the rehabilitation of private

farming. **The most radical and most efficient of Gorbachev's reforms was *glasnost***, the liberalization of journalism and the mass media. **The Estonian consequence of this move** was the opportunity to embark on **a campaign against the proposed extensive mining of phosphate rock, which would have resulted in an environmental catastrophe**. By the year 1987, ever more radical ideas were being mooted regarding the economic independence of the Baltic States. (Kahk & Tarvel, no date)

Glasnost was a key aspect of Gorbachev's policies in the USSR, coupled with the above-mentioned ***perestroika***. The phenomenon of ***glasnost***, allowing, as it did, the open expression of a variety of opinion, had both a symbolic and a practical significance. In the sense of "speaking out" or "giving voice to", ***glasnost*** was evident in the more open debate and discussion that existed in the final years of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2003.)

To date, **the official version of Soviet history read that the three Baltic peoples themselves had voted for parliaments friendly to the USSR. These subsequently voted unanimously to join the USSR**. The existence of documentation in evidence to the contrary had simply been denied by the Soviet authorities in particular, and by Soviet historiography, in general. NSV liidu ajalugu lüh-iülevaade (A brief history of the USSR) (1983, 220) writes:

In the new circumstances, with a government sympathetic to the Soviet Union in each of the Baltic States, elections were carried out in the three countries. Instead of bankers, entrepreneurs, fish wholesalers and kulaks, the newly elected members of parliament comprised workers, farm labourers, teachers and underground revolutionary activists, many of whom had till recently been prisoners of the fascist governments. All three parliaments unanimously declared Soviet power and passed a resolution to join the Soviet Union. (my bold, AP)

The publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with its secret protocols in 1989 demolished the principal pillar on which the Soviet Baltic Socialist republics stood. Claims to the effect that legal procedures in the Soviet Constitution had to be fol-

lowed in their secession from the USSR had simply ceased to be valid. The Balts could now foster their own independence aspirations in the knowledge that, from the purely financial angle, the Red Army could not afford military reaction to all anti-Soviet developments in the periphery of the USSR. Moscow's problems lay closer to home.

The symptom of *glasnost*, allowed matters hitherto unseen and undiscussed in the USSR, such as the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, to come out into the open. This led inevitably to the publication of certain documents. The most dramatic of these were detailed reports on the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union in June, 1940.

5.8 Baltic independence aspirations in Gorbachev's eyes

A useful source regarding the attitudes of the Soviet Union to the Baltic independence aspirations is Gorbachev's book *Perestrojka* (Gorbatjov 1989). Gorbachev viewed the USSR as having realized its situation, presenting the reasons for the reforms undertaken. He had started his preface to the book stating that he has written it since he wished to turn directly to the people in the Soviet Union, **in the United States and in other countries.** Even though the book was written by the author of perestroika, it was written **for the West**, as a collection of thoughts and reflections on perestroika, the problems faced by the Soviet Union, the concept of the ongoing changes and the complicated, responsibility-demanding and unique nature of our time. (Gorbatjov 1989, 7.) The world was concerned over the future of the Soviet Union, looking to Gorbachev to implement the required reforms to the Soviet society and economy.

Soviet society required perestroika as an indispensable necessity. While this society was **"ripe for change"** (my bold, AP), Gorbachev still saw Lenin as the source of his reforms, indeed he saw his reforms as a way back to the original Lenin. (Gorbatjov 1989, 23.) In order to implement his plans, Gorbachev considered that the people's right to knowledge of what was good and what was bad, in order to increase the good and limit the bad. Democratization was the way to achieve these

aims, and thanks to glasnost they were achieved. (Gorbatjov 1989, 71.) The use of interviews instead of official reports was one way of achieving these aims, as were campaigns of criticism and self-criticism. (Gorbatjov 1989, 73.)

One aspect attractive to the West was the new rise of the intelligentsia in Soviet society. During the *period of stagnation* prior to perestroika and glasnost, the intelligentsia found itself suppressed in favour of the working classes. Society could not tap its intellectual resources for fear of political repression. (Gorbatjov 1989, 77.) During the period of perestroika, the intelligentsia was freely accepted as part of the on-going industrial and social reform process. Industry, again, was given leave to express unhappiness with the prevailing conditions, lack of organization, work morale, malpractices. It was possible now to reason with the socialist purists to whom any changes were anathema. Propaganda had lost its importance. (Gorbatjov 1989, 92.)

Democracy was the catchword of perestroika. It was this feature that the Western world was basically attracted to in the Soviet reforms, even though it did not understand that the concept of *democracy* did not imply the same things for Soviet society as it did for Western thinking. In Western thinking, the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), defines *democracy* as „**government by the people; that form of government in which the sovereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them (as in the small republics of antiquity) or by officers elected by them. In modern use, the term more often vaguely denotes a social state in which all have equal rights, without heritage or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege.**“

For the Soviet Union, the definition of *democracy* is limited to (Florinsky 1961):

Democratic centralism: the guiding principle of the organizational structure of the Communist Party (and is) defined in the party rules as follows:

1. the election of all leading party bodies, from the lowest to the highest
2. periodic reports of the party bodies to their party organizations

3. strict party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority
4. the absolutely binding character of the decision of higher bodies upon lower bodies.

Respect for law was something lost to Soviet society. The personal losses sustained under the system, loss of private property, of ownership of means of production were among the problems that Gorbachev wished to address with his perestroika (Gorbatjov 1989, 101). Other issues addressed by perestroika were legislation regarding state enterprises, the agro-industrial complex, school reform, *the private labour sector* (my italics, AP), environmental legislation. **Decrees had been passed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to make suppression of criticism a punishable offence.** Work morale was a major target of Gorbachev's reforms. In a nation governed by administrative decrees, with no right of appeal by the population, there can be no progress. (Gorbatjov 1989, 106.)

The new liberal atmosphere, now allowed artists to express themselves far more freely than had hitherto been the case (Gorbatjov 1989, 78). The trade unions were given new rights in the face of management. They were no longer to be the mere social service institutions that they were during the Soviet era. In the area of social policy, families were to be given new status, with women especially being given new consideration. (Gorbatjov 1989, 111.) Issues such as alcoholism, family health and reinforcement of the status of the family in society were to be addressed.

Gorbachev saw the West viewing the ongoing reforms in the Soviet Union with optimism, and with a hope that they would succeed. These principles had no application in the Baltic States, as evidenced in the corpus. In fact all these hopes were misplaced.

5.9 The Soviet Union and Finnish relations with the West

All through the post-war era, the United States had advocated an immediate, unconditional blanket recognition of the independent Baltic

States. The Soviet Union, again, regarded them as a constituent part of the Union. Independence was not regarded by the Soviet Union an existing right of the countries concerned.

In the presence of Vice-President George Bush, President Koivisto had defined Finland's foreign policy as aiming at good relations with neighbouring countries, while good relations with all other countries were equally important. This was quite acceptable to Bush, and would call for no comments from the American side. (Koivisto 1997, 38.) From this definition, it could be inferred that **Finland was aiming at good relations with the Soviet Union, the United States and the Baltic States**. The problem with Finland's relations with the independent Baltic States was in the fact that the United States was in favour of their immediate, unconditional recognition as independent states, while the Soviet Union regarded them, as well as the other parts of the USSR, to be constituent parts of the Union. Independence was not an existing right but something to be negotiated *with* and *through* the central government in Moscow.

Suomen Kuvalehti columnist Jukka Tarkka, in his column, *Tarkat*, in the causerie *Euroopa/Europe*, in issue 21/1989 of the magazine, held matters of nationality to be more difficult than those of human rights. Nationality issues touched on the domestic structure of states, and also their geographical boundaries.

A positive trend in national politics organically included the seeds of unrest and crises.

The Soviet delegation had walked out of the 1983 Geneva euro-missile negotiations in Helsinki. Their actions were perhaps motivated more by their nation's own economic demands rather than concern regarding the armaments themselves. The ultimate issue was that of the degree to which this disarmament was to be taken. In this dispute Finland was deemed a suitable negotiator (Koivisto 1997, 49).

Finnish geopolitics, in other words, relations with the USSR and its central government in Moscow had been the central issue in every election since the war, in every government, all parties vying to demonstrate this. Perceived ignorances of geopolitics by some political parties were commonly used as a stick in election campaigns. The numerous uninvited Soviet incursions into Finnish air space

were merely acknowledged as accidental occurrences, with the USSR apologizing. (Koivisto 1997, 68.)

On 11th March, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko, who died at the age of **74** (my bolds, AP), having held the position for 13 months, from 10th February, 1984 to 10th March, 1985. The fact that Gorbachev was the youngest leader of the Soviet Union at the outset of his reign, after Lenin (47) and Stalin (45), upon his appointment (54 years of age), was a cause for optimism on the world political scene. Brezhnev had been 58, Andropov 68 and Chernenko 73 years of age on taking office.

5.10 Finnish TV and Finnish tourists in Estonia in the 1980s

Two opposing points of view on the above subject were to be seen in *Viro ja Venäjä/Estonia and Russia* (Sinilind 1984), representing the Estonian perspective, and *Kaksi rantaa – kaksi elämäntapaa/Two shores – two ways of life* (Petrov 1984), respectively. Sinilind's critical view of Soviet Estonia was overwhelmingly positively received in Finland, with the only negative review being in *Tiedonantaja*, while Petrov's book presented the Estonian SSR in a positive light. (It is to be noted here that the people behind the pseudonym Sinilind were Estonian by birth, and Petrov Russian.)

Ever since the early 1980s, the Finnish press especially the journals *Nootti*, *Kanava* and *Parnasso* had been publishing articles on the Baltic States, pointing out where history had been falsified. Conservative quarters in the Estonian SSR, including the pro-Soviet Estonian historian Juhan Kahk expressed their satisfaction in the concern voiced by President Mauno Koivisto regarding the spread of anti-Soviet sentiment in Finland. (Nordisk Kontakt 1985, nr. 7: 481-492, in Graf – Roiko-Jokela 2004, 187)

In 1985, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary session of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ristlaan expressed his concern regarding a proposed Baltic exile demonstra-

tion against the Soviet Union. Arrangements had been made for the Copenhagen Tribunal to judge the Soviet Union for its breaches of human rights in the war-time and post-war Baltic States. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 187.)

The SNS, the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society, had by 1987 been forced to concede to the CC of the ECP that **there was much more interest among the Finns for the Estonian people, the country, the culture than for the prevailing political system and the associated official propaganda.** (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 203.)

Groups of tourists from the Estonian SSR visiting Finland were given the task of counter-propaganda to Estonian matters treated in the Finnish media. **To the surprise of the CPSU officials, the Finns demonstrated a total lack of interest in the topics of concern to the Soviet politicians, such as the class struggle, unemployment, worker exploitation, bourgeois ideology.**

The majority of Finnish tourists went to Estonia purely in search of entertainment and were largely unaware of the history and culture of the country, expressing little interest in it.

5.11 Basic Soviet theses shaking

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, in his speech of 3rd November, 1987, Gorbachev went as far as to give a new, positive appraisal of the roles of Trotsky and Bukharin in the revolution. In the 1930s, they had been relegated to the role of non-persons. It was not until February, 1988, fifty years after Bukharin's execution as a traitor to the Soviet Union, that the verdict was reversed and his name cleared by the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2003.)

The importance of this move was in Gorbachev's rehabilitation of **other versions of history, not only the current (official) Marxist-Leninist version (Koivisto 1997, 106). This was a significant development in the area of glasnost.** In accordance with the same line of thinking, serious doubts had been cast on the ideological foundations of the Soviet Union. The very basis for the incorporation of

the Baltic States into the Soviet Union was shaking. The existence of the secret protocols to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, assigning the Estonia and Latvia to the Soviet and Lithuania and Poland to the German sphere of influence, had finally been acknowledged by Gorbachev. (Koivisto 1997, 107.)

5.12 Finnish awareness of the Baltic issue

Finnish foreign policy with regard to the Baltic issue had received positive feedback from the Swedish *Svenska Dagbladet*. Finnish followers of Soviet foreign policy, however, harboured serious doubts regarding Gorbachev's ability to implement his intended reforms to the Soviet economy. (Koivisto 1997, 112.)

Finland and the Finns had shown keen interest in the fate of the Baltic States all through the 1970s, with sympathetic articles appearing from time to time in the press. Now there was a dramatic change in the attention paid to the region, with the daily papers, indeed, **daily publishing reports on developments there, and not just in the evening papers**. Among the first of these was an article by Seppo Kuusisto in the 13.1.1988 edition of *Uusi Suomi*, ***Kamppailu glasnostin rönsyjä vastaan***/*A struggle against the offshoots of glasnost*, reporting on an Estonian Communist Party campaign to meet demands by the Moscow leadership to strike back at foreign propaganda (Kuusisto 1991, 84). First Secretary Gorbachev had signed a Politbureau resolution deploring the activation of the extremist nationalist element in the Baltic republics.

A second article in the 26.5.1988 edition of the same paper, bearing the title ***Muinaismuistot Viron perestroikan silmäteräksi***/*Memories of antiquity have become the darling of perestroika* reports on the activities of the newly-established Estonian Antiquities Society, with the aim of reviving the collective memory of the Republic of Estonia in the minds of the people. **Old manor houses** were in danger of ruination, as well as **churches, mills and buildings belong-ing to societies of the Estonian cultural renaissance** of the late 19th century. One major object of interest was in the restoration of the Estonian national

museum that had been destroyed at the beginning of the communist regime. On the more abstract level, **statues to the War of Independence** had been destroyed, and these were being restored. Similarly **the blue-black-and-white Estonian national flag** was brought to light, after having been banned for almost fifty years. Radical reform was on the way in Estonia, beginning with the dismissal, in June 1988, of Karl Vaino, the Soviet-minded purely russophone First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, *the veteran first secretary* of the Estonian Communist Party, in the words of President Mauno Koivisto in favour of Estonian-speaking Vaino Väljas. (my bold italics, AP)

The 28th February, 1988 edition of *Aamulehti* carried a full page article under the title 24. veebruar, 1918/24th February, 1918, the most significant date in the Estonian mind, the day on which the Republic of Estonia was proclaimed.

Page One of the 24th August, 1988 issue of *Iltalehiti* sported a photograph of a banner EESTIVABAKS!/FREEDOM FOR ESTONIA!, with the headline:

"Neuvostohistorioitsija Ribbentrop-päivänä/Soviet historian on Ribbentrop Day:

VIRO ON YHÄ MIEHITETTY/ESTONIA STILL UNDER OCCUPATION"

Such political terminology had never been used in all the years of post-war Estonia. Now it was on the front page of a Finnish newspaper. Further headlines read: ***Itsenäisyys innosti Baltian/Balts enthusiastic about independence, "Valehtelum on loputtava"/The lies must end***

October 1988 saw the establishment of the Estonian National Front, the predecessor to the democratic, pluralistic party system in the country, this National Front giving rise to several of the political parties of the new pluralistic Estonia.

The official party for **Gorbachev's 1989 visit to Finland** included Vaino Väljas, the First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party. At the official level, Finland was still observing a very cautious policy as far as Estonia was concerned. Koivisto held discussions with Väljas. A three-hour meeting was held in January at the president's rural resi-

dence, Tähtelä, in Inkoo, near Turku. The ideological secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, Mikk Titma was present, but not the Soviet Ambassador Boris Aristov, despite the fact that the ambassador would have liked to attend. (25.10.1989 Mihail Gorbatshev kävi valtiovierailulla ja tunnusti Suomen puolueettomuuden./Mikhail Gorbachev pays a state visit to Finland and recognizes Finnish neutrality)

5.13 The Estonian Declaration of Sovereignty 1988

On 16th November, 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic passed a declaration of sovereignty. This document demanded a regularization of relations with the Soviet Union by a union agreement. In other words, the Soviet Union was to be regarded as a foreign state. According to the proclamation, **Soviet laws would be valid only if they did not violate the rights of the Estonians.** The Estonian Supreme Soviet declared itself the seat of sovereign legislative power within the borders of the republic. This act was indeed a Domino of note.

Popular support for the declaration of sovereignty was increased by an article in the 23rd November, 1988 issue of *Pravda* by the very pro-Soviet Estonian academician Gustav Naan “*Kõik pea peale*” “*Everything topsy-turvy*”. The declaration had immediate political effects on Finland. Less than a week later, on 22nd November, the Soviet ambassador, Boris Aristov, on a call to President Koivisto, hoped that Finland not intervene in matters associated with Estonia, *expressing, on behalf of the USSR, the wish that outside countries not interfere in the course of events (i.e. in the internal affairs of the USSR).*

Koivisto’s reaction in this regard was to concede that while the events in these regions *touched the souls of the Finnish people closely*, Koivisto stated his concern and sympathy regarding the developments in Estonia (Koivisto 1997, 120). He could, however, not bring himself to realize that these developments were *not* a matter of Soviet domestic policy, as the Soviet Union would have it. Evidence for this claim is to be seen in the existence of diplomatic representation of the Republic of Estonia in the West, above all in the New York Consulate-General.

Ott, Laar and Endre in their *Teine Eesti* (2000, 71), write as follows:

The diplomats of the Republic of Estonia continued their activities after the war in several Western countries. *In the course of time, the only actual diplomatic post to survive was that in the United States, under the leadership of Consul-General Ernst Jaakson, whose consulate was recognized as the continuance of the Embassy of the Republic of Estonia. (Even so, the Estonian Legation in London continued into the 1970s.)*

Koivisto's expressions of concern with respect to the relations between the Estonians and the Russians on Estonian territories showed a lack of all understanding of the very essence of the problem. Faced with constant immigration of Russian-speaking population, the Estonians felt that they were in danger of ethnic extinction, bearing in mind the fact that the people had had a low birth-rate for a long time. The extent of Koivisto's lack of knowledge regarding the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic was to be seen in the fact that **it was not until his meeting with Estonian sociologist Erki Rannik in 1989 that the president realized that the majority of the members of the Estonian Communist Party were Russians, and that especially in the major cities, such as Tallinn, the party organization was in their hands** -- and if the Russians were to demand the dismissal of the party leadership this would present a very real danger to stability. (Koivisto 1997, 121.)

From at least the beginning of the 1950s, the Second Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party was always a Russian. Indeed, in 1952 the Estonian government did not have one member who was Estonian.

The Soviet view of this fact is expressed in the Estonian Academy of Sciences publication edited by Gustav Naan, *Eesti NSV ajalugu kõige vanemast ajast tänapäevani* (1957, 589-590), as follows:

The people nominates and elects the best workers from among them into all organs of power, including the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. –The overwhelming majority (my bold italics, AP) of delegates to the organs of governmental power are Estonian by nationality. In 1951 the Supreme Soviet

of the Estonian SSR comprised 93 Estonians (83%) and 22 representatives of nationalities other than Estonians living in the country (17%).

For all purposes, it was the *minority* that was the decision-maker, *not* the majority. According to Koivisto, Finnish relations with the Soviet Union came before everything else, but *if the reforms in Estonia succeeded and were kept within bounds* (to the satisfaction of Moscow, AP) „*our relations* (Finnish-Estonian?) *could be enriched*“ (my bold italics, AP) (Zetterberg, 1995, 141). There is an almost irreconcilable contradiction within the above text in italics. Reference is made here to the Russian protests at the change to the Estonian Constitution of 7th December, 1989, confirmed in the Estonian language legislation of 18th January, 1989, making Estonian the official language of the republic. (Zetterberg, 1995, 141.) The Russian population went on strike for ten days, before conceding to a compromise. Associated with the language legislation, limitations were put on the right to vote in the elections of the Estonian SSR to inhabitants who had resided in the country for a prescribed minimum period of time.

According to Gorbachev, ”reforms to such effect by extremists and nationalist demagogues were considered *strangers to our society and our values*“ (HS 28.11.88 *Moskova tuomitsi Viron “seikkailupolitiikan”/ Moscow condemns Estonian adventurism*”).

Events in Estonia had greatly troubled Moscow.

As far as the relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland and Estonia, respectively, was concerned, Koivisto drew comparisons between the measures taken by the two small countries, respectively, in the face of their large neighbour. It seems that Koivisto did not realize the manner in which the Baltic States were absorbed into the Soviet Union, as well as all the implications of this, when writing:

(With regard to a comparative analysis of the respective situations of Finland and the Baltic States in 1939)... it was clear that the Baltic States had made different choices from Finland (perhaps because) in those countries the governments did not trust the people. (Koivisto 1997, 120.)

Reference is to be made here to the fact that the newly elected gov-

ernments of the Baltic States in 1940 were, in all respects, puppet governments of the Communist Party, put in place by the three emissaries sent by Stalin. The people had nothing to do with the formation of the governments. In the political constellation prevailing at the time, **trust** was not the issue. **Pressure by a larger neighbour** was.

We shall scrupulously and with precision abide by the agreements made, agreements based on complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsense about the sovietization of the Baltic States is nothing but talk serving the interests of our common enemies and the anti-Soviet provocateurs.“ (*Polpredii soobtsayot:392-393 semi-official communiqué in Zetterberg 1995*)

On 29th March 1940, Molotov issued a statement according to which:

... after the experience of the half-year ... since the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts with Estonia, it is possible to draw fully definite, positive conclusions concerning the treaties with the Baltic countries. The execution of the pacts with these countries is proceeding satisfactorily and creating the requisite bases for a further improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and these states.“ (*Rei 1970,277.*)

During this period the Soviet Union was preoccupied with its Winter War against Finland, with all its resources being taken up there. There was no time to devote to the Baltic States. Since Finland had not taken up the suggestion for a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in a manner similar to those of the Baltic States, the Soviet Union declared war on Finland. In this war, the Soviet Union used the bases in Estonia for its air attacks on Finland.

This very issue was to be taken up by Koivisto. He blamed Estonia for allowing the Soviet bases on its territory: „*When the Baltic countries made military agreements with the Soviet Union, the agreements did not prevent the use of Estonian territory for acts of war against Finland during the Winter War. Southern Finland was bombed from bases in Estonia: from there planes could take less fuel and therefore greater loads of bombs, making several sorties a day.*“ (Koivisto 1997, 120.)

In accordance with the 1939 non-aggression pact, **while the bases were to be let to the Soviet Union, they were not to be used for warfare** (against Finland, for example). The Baltic States, however, were unable to do anything about the use to which the USSR put the bases. There was no aid to be expected from the Allies, occupied as they were in Western Europe, with the struggle against Germany.

Taking advantage of the Gorbachev reform policies, associated with his realization that reform and revitalization was of paramount importance to Soviet society and its economy, the Estonians expanded their activities to an extent unforeseen in the post-war Soviet Union, serving to expand their elbow room. Koivisto believed these activities, all outlined in the foreign news article and editorial sections, to have aroused in the Finns a **feeling that it was important for the process to remain well under control**.

On 15th November, 1988, *Savon Sanomat* had carried an article *Baltian maat vaativat: Itsemääräämisoikeudesta takuu perustuslakiin/ Demand by Baltic States: Guarantee for self-determination to be included in the constitution*. The following day, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic passed a **declaration of sovereignty (Note: This declaration was not a declaration of independence)**, but a demand for a regularization of relations with the Soviet Union by a union agreement. In other words, Estonia was demanding relations with the Soviet Union as a foreign state. Soviet laws would be valid only if they did not violate the rights of the Estonians. The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic regarded itself as possessing sovereign legislative power within the borders of the republic within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The declaration was, naturally, to have an immediate reaction from Moscow. The 29.11.1988 edition of *Wärkauden Lehti* carried the article *Gorbatshov vaatii kurinpalautusta Virolle/ Gorbachev demands disciplinary action against Estonia*. In his televised speech, Gorbachev demanded sanctions against “demagogues resorting to political speculation by exploiting the ongoing democratization and glasnost”. The changes in the Estonian Constitution and its demands for independence he called “misguided and invalid”.

5.14 The ideal Finnish foreign policy regarding the USSR

Koivisto held the wise policy to be followed by the Baltic States now in their new quest for independence, fifty years on, to be for them *to acquiesce in solutions that the Soviet Union could still accept* (Koivisto 1997, 121, my bold italics, AP.) One might also ask *whether it was not precisely this that the Baltic States had done*, relinquishing land for Soviet bases in 1939, as a matter of sensible policy, and not in defiance of the Soviet Union. In the event of the Baltic States acquiescing (in solutions that the Soviet Union could still accept) Finland was also prepared to offer them help, writes Koivisto. Was this also the case in 1939? In any case, the nature of the proposed help was not specified. If, however, the Balts intended to play their cards to the bitter end, writes Koivisto, the Finns should prepare for that contingency, while maintaining a certain distance. **However, the Baltic States had no choice in 1939 but to cede land to the Soviet Union for bases, thus losing out in the end.**

In his book *The Drama of the Baltic Peoples*, August Rei (1970, 289–290), statesman and last ambassador to Moscow before the war, writes that with heavily armed Red Army units immediately behind the Estonian border, there was nothing to be done. The Soviet demand was to be answered within 8½ hours on pain of orders to the Red Army units stationed on the borders with Estonia and Latvia to advance and crush all resistance. Within a few days of the Red Army crossing the border, the whole territory was occupied.

The first open instance of the Baltic peoples pursuing their only options of self-assertion, **to guarantee the continuation of some sort of physical existence**, was in the demonstrations on 23rd August 1987 in Tallinn. **It should be reiterated here that it was primarily on ecological grounds that Estonia began to move towards self-assertion in the mid-1980s, as a result of industrial developments on the territory of the Estonian, planned in Moscow and for Moscow.** Moscow was planning large-scale excavations of phosphate rock in North-Eastern Estonia, an operation that would

have rendered the whole north-eastern corner of the country (Estonia) uninhabitable.

Towards the end of 1986, President Gorbachev announced in Moscow that the central government was planning to exploit the wide phosphate rock deposits in north-eastern Estonia. These plans would have involved the immigration of tens of thousands more Russians into Estonia as well as the mining of these deposits situated at a depth of 50–200 metres below ground level. The surface earth would not have been restored to the original status. **Yuri Yampol, Production Manager of the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production Mining Chemistry**, had been involved in the planning of the new mines. He **was**, to all effects, **surprised at the extent of opposition to Ministerial plans in Estonia**. According to Yampol, the extensive mineral resources (in north-eastern Estonia) was to be exploited in the interests of the people.

For all intents and purposes, it was clear to the Estonians that it was not in *their* interests that these projects were being pursued. The report on this meeting led to widespread protests among the people, especially through *Panda*, a nature program on Estonian Television.

Whereas in 1948, before collectivization and industrialization, there were 2,542,000 ha of land under cultivation, by 1985 there were only 1,478,800 ha. Part of the land was reforested, the rest was designated for military and industrial use. (Laar, Ott & Endre 2000, 149.) The situation would not have been presented in this light by Moscow, and it is not very likely that even environmentally-aware parties in Finland could have influenced developments in the area in any manner.

Koivisto would seem to have some misconceptions with regard to the Russian population, writing „**Some 40% of the population of Estonia were Russians who had come to Estonia after World War II, including about half the inhabitants in Tallinn** (my bold AP), and Moscow could surely influence developments in Estonia by other means“. (Koivisto 1997, 21.) The aspect of the matter left unmentioned by the president was that a large portion of the Russians had been **seconded to Estonia for the purposes of mineral exploitation, as described above**. Their interests were largely in the employment guaranteed them by the pan-Soviet industrial plants. **For these Russians, the interests of Estonia were of no**

importance, those of their fatherland were of paramount significance. The immigration to Estonia, as well as to Latvia, was largely voluntary, since the standard of living in the Baltic Soviet Socialist Republics was much higher than that in the rest of the Soviet Union. According to the writer Andres Küng, an Estonian born in Sweden, an expert in Baltic affairs, writing in his most recent book *Ett liv för Baltikum/A Life for the Baltic States* (2002), Estonia had been forced during the 51 years of Soviet occupation, to accept some 7 million immigrants, primarily Russians. The deliberate russification policy was advertised as a process of *friendship among the peoples*. This process naturally included the deportation of ethnic Estonian population from Estonia to other parts of the Soviet Union.

It would seem to the writer that Moscow had no interest in *influencing developments in Estonia by other means*, as Koivisto (1997, 21) would have it above. Furthermore, it was hard to envisage any possible other forms of Muscovite reaction to Baltic independence aspirations than the extreme forms witnessed in Vilnius and Riga in January of 1991. It had been seen in Budapest in 1956, in Prague in 1968 and in Afghanistan in the period following the Soviet occupation in 1980.

5.15 Ten sub-theses of Finnish foreign policy

Thesis 1

The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), better known in Finland as the YYA agreement (= the Finnish equivalent, Ystävyys, Yhteistyö ja Avunanto) was the ultimate basis for Finnish-Soviet relations. The final peace treaty with the USSR was signed in 1947. Reparations, in the form of commodities, were fully paid by 1952, and three years later the Porkkala Peninsula was returned to Finland. The new relationship with the USSR necessitated the legalization of the Communist Party and a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (1948; voided in January 1992). (Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003.) In the West, this treaty called into question the neutrality, indeed, even the status of Finland as an independent state.

Thesis 2

The USSR was not willing to recognize Finland as a neutral state, while the nations in the West did so. President Koivisto resolved this conflict by depicting the Finnish–Soviet relations as relations of good neighbourliness (Koivisto, 1997, 37).

The problem of Finnish neutrality cropped up also in connection with the 1971 election of the Secretary–General of the United Nations in the secret ballot for the post, when Finnish Max Jakobsson received the support of the USA, while the USSR decision to veto his appointment ultimately resulted in the election of Kurt Waldheim to the post (Jutikkala & Pirinen 1996).

Thesis 3

In the negotiations on the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Third Basket, dealing with free movement of people and ideas across the borders of the signatory nations, proved to be the most controversial. The accusations levelled by Western leaders at the governments of Communist countries, including the Soviet Union, of violating the human rights of their citizens, proved eventually to be an important rising Domino. The Communist leaders, in turn, however, rejected Western criticism as interference in their internal affairs, totally underestimating the future role of the “third Basket”. The humanitarian issues could be mentioned in the USSR but vaguely, without much publicity. Gorbachev mistakenly underestimated the Third Basket’s effect on the USSR. While the condition of Soviet dissidents did not change overnight, they were definitely encouraged. Its very publication in *Pravda* gave it the weight of an official document. It gradually became a manifesto of the dissident and liberal movement, a development totally beyond the imagination of the Soviet leadership.

In its most direct form, the Third Basket was an important factor leading to the development of dissident (opposition) groups and movements in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia (Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003).

Thesis 4

There was a hidden agenda in Soviet policy, with the USSR agreeing to

have the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki in 1975 (Jutikkala & Pirinen 1996, 470).

For all intents and purposes, the Soviet Union wished to have the CSCE as an instrument to:

sanctify the post-World War II arrangements appending the Baltic States, among others, to its territories

its assuming predominance in eastern Europe. (Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropedia 1989).

Yet, apparently, it was this decision to hold the Helsinki conference that, with the Third Basket of its Final Accord, insisted on by the United States, belittled by the Soviet Union, was to open up finally the borders of the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to lead to its demise. In the presence of Vice-President George Bush, **Koivisto defined Finland's foreign policy as aiming at good relations with neighbouring countries**, while good relations with all other countries were important too. This was quite acceptable to Bush, and would call for no comments from the American side. (Koivisto 1997, 38.)

From this definition, it could be inferred that Finland was aiming at good relations with all three parties involved – the Soviet Union, the United States and the Baltic States.

The problem with relations with the independent Baltic States was in the fact that...

Thesis 5

...the United States was in favour of immediate, unconditional recognition of the Baltic States, while the Soviet Union regarded them as a constituent part of the Union, with independence not an existing right but something to be negotiated through the central government in Moscow, on terms to be set by the latter.

- It would seem logical to assume that, if Koivisto's claims as expressed at the beginning of this section were true, that...
- Finland desired to have good relations with all nations, whatever their political systems, this should surely also mean that...
- the Baltic States would have to be recognized.

This claim was countered by General Viktor Tatarnik, military adviser to the Soviet delegation to the Stockholm conference on confidence-building and disarmament in Europe. According to him, an official policy of neutrality, such as the one practised in Sweden during the Second World War, would not be feasible in the 1980s.

If an American (resp. Soviet) missile were to fly over Sweden on the way to the USSR (resp. the USA), Sweden would be party to the conflict. Neither of the two conflicting nations would respect the neutrality of a state that had declared itself neutral unless its neutrality could be defended militarily. (Koivisto 1997, 44.) In this regard, one might ask whether Finland's neutrality would be a neutrality according to the Soviet definition of the word.

The above issue had definite implications for the attitude adopted by Finland toward the Baltic States and to the relations the Baltic States had to the Soviet Union.

In the 1983 Geneva euromissile negotiations in Helsinki, the Soviet delegation walked out of the meeting, their actions being motivated more, perhaps, by the nation's own economic demands than concern regarding the armaments themselves. The ultimate issue was that of the degree to which this disarmament was to be taken. In this dispute Finland was deemed a suitable negotiator. (Koivisto, 1997, 49.)

Thesis 6

Finland's principal aim in its foreign policy was to maintain open relations with both the Soviet Union and the West. With reference to Finland's relationships with the Soviet Union, there was always the issue of what came to be mooted as *glasnost*, *openness*, with the world being informed of all matters occurring within the Soviet Union that affected the world at large. When the First Secretary of the CPSU, Yuri Andropov fell ill before his death, the information was kept well away from publicity. A variety of precautionary measures had been taken in the Soviet Union – postponements of meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union – with no reason being given for such postponements. Neither the USSR nor the world were informed, in a manner accepted in the critique of Western journalistic tradition, of the state of health of the Soviet head of state.

In response to the US boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of the previous year, the USSR announced its boycott of the following Games in Los Angeles in 1984. The Moscow Games were boycotted by 64 countries, while at the Los Angeles Games, besides the USSR, another 15 countries followed suit in applying a boycott in return. (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2003.) **Finland maintained its neutrality by participating in both Games.**

Thesis 7

Finland had based its foreign policy on the geographical position of the country, on its location neighbouring on the USSR (Koivisto 1997, 64), with the consequence of a very conservative policy regarding the USSR and its central government in Moscow. This was the central issue in every election, in every government, all parties vying to demonstrate faithful adherence to this policy. **Good relations between Koivisto and Gorbachev** dated back to 1984, with a request for Koivisto to write a letter of introduction to Gorbachev, who, as chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Supreme Soviet, was about to visit the United Kingdom. The letter achieved its aim, Koivisto having put into it his familiarity with Britain. (Koivisto 1997, 65.) Indeed, Koivisto was one of the first heads of state to meet Gorbachev shortly after the latter's appointment as First Secretary of the CPSU.

Uninvited Soviet incursions into Finnish air space that had been taking place not infrequently were merely acknowledged as accidental occurrences, with the USSR subsequently apologizing. Such incursions took place in cases where unidentified missiles flew over Lapland in 1984, the excuse being a deviation from course, with the appropriate apologies being given. When such missiles also entered Norway by way of Finland, Norway asked for Soviet explanations by way of Finland. (Koivisto 1997, 68.)

Thesis 8

The 10th anniversary of the CSCE in Helsinki was a foreign policy success for Finland as far as its policy on Europe was concerned. For Koivisto the effort of the Soviet delegation was a special contribution to international security. (Koivisto 1997, 71.)

A figure of particular significance to the CSCE was the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The reforms that he stood for were so radical from the point of view of foreign policy that, in 1990, the conservative forces in the CPSU ultimately forced Shevardnadze to resign, with his forecast of imminent dictatorship. After the realization of the latter, in the form of the abortive coup of August 1991, Shevardnadze was reappointed Foreign Minister in November 1991, remaining in office until the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December of the same year. (Koivisto 1997, 71.)

Thesis 9

In the spirit of Finno-Soviet détente, Koivisto again deemed it necessary to reassert Finland's fidelity to the USSR: "*Finland would never go against the vital important interests of the Soviet Union, because our vital interests did not contradict each other.*" (Koivisto 1997, 72.)

The implication of the above comment could well be extrapolated to mean that Finland could never support the independence of the Baltic States from the Soviet Union, on terms set down by the Baltic States themselves. The concept of neutrality for Finland implied at least active sympathy for the Soviet Union and its allies.

Thesis 10

In the light of ongoing developments in the Soviet Union, the concept of Finnish neutrality was also undergoing considerable change – both within Finland and without. *There had, according to Koivisto, been changes in Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, changes that allowed it now to enter the EEC.* (Koivisto, 1997, 75.) Finnish membership of this hitherto Western European organisation was no longer regarded as a breach of the country's neutral status with regard to the Soviet Union.

The various political parties in Finland had also undergone changes as far as their stance toward the Soviet Union was concerned. Up to the 1960s, the Social Democratic Party had, as the representative of non-Marxist ideology, attracted the animosity of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, under the leadership of K.A. Fagerholm. Under the latter's government, communists were removed from key positions, the protective function of the law was restored and public order was maintained against a series of wildcat strikes called by the communists to bring down the government. Leaders convicted of war crimes (against the Soviet Union) were released before their terms had run out. The war-time **president, Risto Ryti**, for example, **elected to the presidency on promises to see to good Finno-German relations** and to see the Winter War to the end, **was imprisoned at the demand of the USSR upon the latter's victory over Finland in 1944.** Ryti was, however, released by President Paasikivi in 1949, due to his ill health, to die 7 years later. (Jutikkala & Pirinen 1996, 463.)

By 1985, the Social Democratic Party had reversed its policy of radical anti-communism of the war-time years and the immediate post-war period to favour a policy of détente with the USSR (Koivisto 1997, 75).

All through the 1980s, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was constantly on the Western agenda. In 1987, Dr. Keijo Korhonen, the Finnish UN delegate proposed a UN group of 50 representatives to oversee the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The idea was followed up with one of the leaders of the UN troops in Afghanistan, Colonel Rauli Helminen, a Finnish Russian-speaking military man. When the withdrawal met with some difficulties, Koivisto, as an impartial party, was asked by Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, foreign policy adviser to President Gorbachev, to do something about this. The appeal was addressed to Koivisto on behalf of the government of the USSR. (Koivisto 1997, 99.)

5.16 The ecological front: the phosphate rock crisis

The indigenous population of the Estonian SSR was harbouring the most extreme concerns *for its continued existence as a people and a nation*, indeed for *the continued physical existence of their homeland as a habitable territory*. Ecological disaster was being wrought there through large-scale mining of phosphate rock and oil-shale in the north-eastern part of the country starting from 1956. Plans for even more extensive mining were in the offing, plans that were initially denied on an official level. (Laar, Ott & Endre 2000, 147, 165.)

The other side of the argument was expressed in the mid-1980s, in the reactions of **Vladimir Kão**, the then **Secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party**. During a press conference he had lost his temper when asked by Vladimir Raudsepp, a journalist of the older generation (1907–1998), whether the mining in the Virumaa province of Estonia was not being taken too far. Kão’s angry reaction possibly betrayed the ultimate goal of Moscow policy: “Were the interests of the Soviet Union to require it, we should dig up the whole of Estonia.” (Laar, Ott & Endre 2000, 151.)

Since Estonia was lacking in population for the exploitation of these natural resources in the proportions planned by the Soviet Union, **labour was imported from outside Estonia**. These labourers were settled mostly in Tallinn and in the mining areas in North-east Estonia. The mined resources were already being sent in the direction of Moscow. The planned wholesale exploitation of the phosphate rock in the region would have left an ecologically devastated, uninhabitable landscape behind. This matter was of no concern to Moscow. In 1989, the level of phenols 1907–1998 in the Purtse River near Kiviõli in north-eastern Estonia exceeded the permissible level 780-fold.

By 1987, shortly before the volume of writings on Estonia appearing in the Finnish press attracted the writer’s attention, the Estonian population began to stir against the mining propositions. One important source of dissident thinking was a nature conservation program **Panda** on Estonian television, an avenue for protest against the project. The various tertiary institutions in Estonia joined forces with the conservationists.

For all intents and purposes, the imported labour force for this project and for other similar ventures were colonizers. In fact three large new suburbs of low-cost mass-produced high-rise accommodation, Mustamäe, Lasnamäe and Õismäe were built in Tallinn, specifically for the immigrant labourers. It would seem highly unlikely that the Estonians should consider these newcomers **unconditionally** as new local population and welcome them into the fold. The standard of living offered the immigrants by the central government was considerably higher than that they had enjoyed in Russia proper. The victors were taking advantage of their status.

The situation was a consequence of World War II, according to rules set by the victor, and it would seem meet to treat it in the framework of the war. After all, the same rules were applied to matters pertaining to post-war Germany.

Subsequent to the cease-fire, the German troops were withdrawn from all the territories they had occupied in Europe. A restoration of the recognition of the Baltic States as independent nations should have involved a similar withdraw-al by troops from the Red army upon recognition of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union/the Russian Federation.

The issue of the rehabilitation of polluted and uninhabitable land by the legal successor to the USSR is a further issue. Estonian demands for compensation will remain unheeded, while demands by the Russian Federation for cessation of discrimination against its citizens will persist.

The Balts had no other option but 'to play their cards to the bitter end', as Koivisto would have it. (Koivisto 1997, 121.)

When the plans to mine the phosphate rock deposits were revealed to the Estonians, there had already been releases of 3,226m³ of effluents into the Estonian land surface, of which only 61% had been satisfactorily cleaned. Although the process resulted in extensive pollution, this was no cause for concern for the officials involved.

The source of the nationalist movement in the 1980s, the movement leading ultimately to independence, was in a big phosphate plant in Maardu, near Tallinn, operating for the benefit of Soviet agriculture outside Estonia (Rei 1970, 175).

A typical scenario for what one might term the *misindustrialization* of Estonia during the post-war era of the Estonian Soviet Socialist

Republic is as follows: **A plant is built by authorities in Moscow on the north coast of Estonia**, in a small place called Loksa, for the construction of barges for the Volga River, thousands of kilometres away. **The plant is financed from Moscow, the labour force brought in from outside Estonia, as are the raw materials. The finished products are re-exported to Russia proper.** The labour force remain in Estonia, in their custom-built accommodation, occupied in the housing queues ahead of the native Estonian population. The industrial waste remains in Estonia.

The gigantic Dvigatel military equipment factory in Tallinn, together with the associated accommodation facilities in the adjoining suburb of Lasnamäe, had been specifically designed for labour imported from the Soviet Union outside Estonia. The express purpose of this policy was to reduce the Estonians to the position of a minority within their own country. (Sarv 1997, 81.) There was a dense veil of secrecy around the factory, with few actually knowing what was being produced there. The original Dvigatel factory, a railway carriage factory, was built in St. Petersburg in 1898-1899.

5.17 Population policy

The imported labour force, presented in the above section, were to be given precedence by the appropriate central government housing authorities in Moscow over the local population in queues for accommodation, a commodity relatively limited in availability. In such circumstances, it was not to be expected that the original population would cordially welcome the newcomers. (Küing 2002, 250.)

Subsequent to the war, the Soviet authorities forbade the return home of the Estonian population of pre-war Narva, **as well as of the Russian-speaking pre-war population of the city.** The area was to be entirely repopulated. Instead of promoting the reconstruction of the city bombed out by the USSR, the central government replaced the pre-war Kreenholm Cotton Fabric Mills with a much larger factory, the largest in the Estonian SSR. Once again, the labour force was imported from Russia and elsewhere in the Soviet Union into Esto-

nia. As far as Narva was concerned, in 1950 **the mayor, an import from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic**, ordered that **the ruins of the city not be reconstructed in their original form, medieval fortress city much as it was**. This *had* been suggested by a commission of Estonian architects. Furthermore, this mayor issued an edict whereby **the city could be re-populated only with honest Soviet patriots from Pskov, Leningrad and Novgorod**. (Sarv 1997.) (my bold, AP) The population of Narva in 1989 was **96%** ethnic Russians, while even in Tallinn the immigrants outnumbered the indigenous population **53% to 47%**.

Policies implemented by the Soviet government against the population of Estonia during the occupation had included measures such as those outlined in the paragraph above.

Gustav Naan (1957) saw the ethnic changes as a positive feature judging by the inclusion of Section 5 of Chapter XV, *Eesti sotsialistliku rahvuse* kujunemine/The development of the *Estonian socialist nationality* (my bold italics, AP). Naan was one of the leading proponents in Estonia of Soviet nationality during the Soviet period, writing:

Under the bourgeois system, the Estonian people had comprised social classes hostile to each other: the exploiters and the exploited labour classes. The bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties attempted to suffocate this struggle, affirming continually that the Estonian people had its own national interests, while fanning hostility to other peoples, especially the Russian people, the most populous of the Soviet peoples (my bold italics, AP). After the liquidation of the bourgeois classes, the Estonian people comprised the free workers of a socialist society. The Estonian nation was also participating in the building up of communism in the unanimous family of peoples in the Soviet Union. In the consciousness of the socialist peoples, there reigned the ideology of equality among all races and peoples, the ideology of the friendship among the Soviet peoples, the ideology of proletarian internationalism. (Naan 1957, 589.)

According to August Rei (1970:122), the Estonian and Lithuanian constitutions listed the abundant fundamental rights of the citizens, including the rights of national minorities to education in their mother tongue and their right to form autonomous institutions for the promo-

tion of their national culture and welfare. In Latvia these freedoms and rights were legislated in various laws, although they were not included in the constitution. Latvia was the first state in Europe to legislate cultural autonomy for its national minorities. It would seem quite unreasonable, both in the 1990s and as late as ten years on, at the outset of the 21st century, for either the Russian Federation, or, indeed, the international community at large, to require the newly independent Estonia, or the other two Baltic States, Latvia and Lithuania, to go to great efforts to accommodate the Russian population there.

Table 4. Share of native population of whole population in Baltic countries 1923–1970 (% , year)

Year	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
1923-1935	92.4% (1934)	75.5% (1935)	83.9% (1923)
1959	74.6% (1959)	62.0% (1959)	79.3% (1959)
1970	68.2% (1970)	56.8% (1970)	80.1% (1970)

Source: Küng 1975, 165.

At the beginning of the 1990s, there were almost 100,000 fewer Latvians than there were before the war. The proportion of ethnic Latvians in the Soviet republic's population decreased from **82%** to **52%**. (my large bold, AP) (Küng 2002, 250.)

The situation in Estonia was similar, though not quite as drastic as can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. From 92% in 1934 the share of native population in Estonia dropped to 68% in 1970 and further down to 59% in 1988. In Lithuania the development was slower than in Estonia and Latvia.

Table 5. Composition of population in Estonia 1938–1988 (%)

Year	Estonians	Other nationalities	Total
1938	97	3	100
1959	74	26	100
1988	59	41	100

One of the conditions set by Russia regarding the repatriation to Russia of former Red Army personnel stationed in the Baltic States was that the latter fund the construction of living quarters for this personnel in the Russian Federation. It would seem pertinent, here, transposing the situation to an immediate post-World War II situation, to ask whether France or Belgium would have constructed living quarters in, for instance, West Germany for soldiers leaving these countries, had the German government so demanded. Or, one might ask, was the making of such demands merely to be regarded as the **victor's prerogative** upon cessation of warfare, even though this be demanded 50 years on?

5.18 The ethnic makeup of the Estonian SSR

Koivisto saw the wisest policy to be followed by the Baltic States to be for them *to acquiesce in solutions that the Soviet Union could still accept* (Koivisto 1997, 121, my bold italics, AP). Were they to do so, states Koivisto, Finland was also prepared to offer the Baltic States help. If, however, they intended to play their cards to the bitter end, the Finns should prepare for that contingency, while still maintaining a certain distance. Koivisto was unaware of the fact that because of the impending ethnic and ecological disasters, the Estonians, or any of the Baltic peoples had no choice but to pursue their chosen courses.

The Russian illusion of her having a civilizing mission is most clearly exemplified in the term *Great Patriotic War* (Russian: *Великая Отчественная война* *Velikaya Otchestvennaya voyná*[1]) is used in Russia and some former republics of the Soviet Union to describe the period from 22nd June 1941 to 9th May 1945 on the many fronts of the eastern campaign of World War II. In addition to its mission of defending its nation against the aggressor, Russia saw it her duty to free all of humanity from fascim. This claim is one of the number of basic axioms of Russian history, the basis for interpreting all the events associated with World War II. This is the interpretation for the incorporation of the Baltic States in the USSR. The process of incorporation of these states also involved a number of apparently unfortunate matters, the Baltic

deportations of 1941 and 1949, for instance. Within the frame of reference of the events, they were granted a sufficing contextual justification. The Soviet Union saw its struggle as one of life and death, and of the liberation of Europe. In this struggle, such sacrifices of lives in small nations were acknowledged as an unfortunate necessity. The noble aim was of the supreme importance. (Vetik 2007.)

The situation above, **reminiscent of the situation in the relinquished Finnish Karelia, with a population of about 794,200 (1994 estimate)**, of which almost three quarters classified as Russians according to the census in 1989, **and only a tenth as Karelians**. The other major ethnic groups in the Autonomous Republic comprised the Belorussians (7 per cent) and the Ukrainians (3.6 per cent). Karelians are a Finnish people who speak a Finno-Ugric language with three major dialects: Karelian (closest to Finnish), Livonian, and Lude. (Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003.)

5.19 The Issue of the Baltic States becomes an issue of Finno-Soviet relations

In connection with **the reunification of East and West Germany in 1989**, the peoples of the Baltic States were reinforced in their belief that the re-establishment of independence for their countries was not beyond reality. **Another Domino had risen**, in the terminology of the title of this study. The Berlin Wall, a fortified wall between West and East Berlin, had been erected in 1961 as an anti-fascist measure against West Germany. It was demolished, at the same time by both official personnel and enthusiastic citizens, on 9th November 1989 as a preliminary to the Baltic Dominoes. The Wall is now commemorated by its few remaining sections and by a privately owned museum and shop near the site of one of the crossing points, Checkpoint Charlie. (Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003.) Travel restrictions between the two Germanies were lifted. The prospects for the Baltic States were seeming brighter. (Koivisto 1997, 128.)

5.20 Presidential attitudes to events in the Baltic States

The first of Gorbachev's slogans was *uskorenie*/speeding up regarding Soviet society, especially due to the fear of falling behind the West in the world of computer technology (Karppinen 1999, 32). In November, 1988, Nina Andreyevna, a representative of the hard-line communists, had criticized the new philosophies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the newspaper *Sovyetskaya Rossiya*, demanding a return to orthodox Soviet ideology. By this stage, however, Gorbachev had consolidated his status in the Communist Party to the extent where this stand was rejected in *Pravda*. (Karppinen 1999, 41.)

At a banquet in Gorbachev's honour in October 1989, in discussions with CPSU Politburo member Alexandr Yakovlev, a close associate of President Gorbachev, Koivisto spoke of *his concern for developments in Estonia, as far as the radical program of economic reform IME* (an acronym standing for *Isemajandav Eesti*/Economically Self-sufficient Estonia) *was concerned*.

Estonia was in the process of implementing this program, the Estonian word *ime* literally meaning *miracle*, to come into force in January, 1990, *with or without the approval of Moscow*. The economic situation in Estonia by this time was such that the country was being exploited fully by the central government, as far as natural resources, foreign labour force and the environment were concerned (the phosphate crisis). These developments were being carried out by the central Moscow administration for the benefit of the central administration, *at the expense and to the detriment of the local population*. Yakovlev's response to the Estonian proposals was nonchalant, to say the least, his response being to offer alternative Soviet systems that the Balts could join. (Koivisto 1997, 129.) To Koivisto's credit, it must be said that he went on, in the same sentence, to say that he had decided not to note them since few of them were likely to be realized.

For Moscow, the issue of pure independence for the Baltic States, outside the Soviet Union, seemed to be beyond the comprehension of the central administration. According to Anatoli Chernyayev, Georgi Shakhnazarov and Aleksandr Yakovlev, all close associates of Gorbachev, the Soviet leader **merely meant to improve**

on the Soviet system, without understanding the implications for the Baltic States.

It was Gorbachev's aim to achieve this by means of arms reduction agreements. By 1989, he had come to the understanding that the urgently-needed reforms to the Soviet economy implicitly required profound changes to the political power structure of the country. Yakovlev was most likely flattered by Koivisto's comment to him that the Estonians apparently put great trust in him and Gorbachev. (The claim was probably not true.) Jaak Allik, First Secretary of the regional Communist Party in the Viljandi region of Estonia, reported the same type of reforms as having been planned in the Soviet Union at the time of the Prague Spring in 1968, but these had come to nothing (Hion 1990, 22).

A man of particular note in the reform process in the Soviet Union was **Eduard Shevardnadze**, Gorbachev's new Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was widely acclaimed abroad for his transformation of Soviet international relations, improving relations with the West, while reducing support for Communism within the Warsaw Pact. (Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003.) Even so, his reforms were regarded within the conservative wing of the CPSU as too radical. One instance of his contribution to the Baltic effort is quoted by Matti Lukkari (1995, 165), citing Shevardnadze as having helped the Yakovlev Commission of the Soviet parliament in gaining access to Molotov's archives.

In 1990, indeed, the conservatives were to force Shevardnadze to resign as Foreign Minister. In his resignation statement, he left a warning to the world, of the danger of an imminent dictatorship in the Soviet Union. Another Domino, in the terms of the heading, was rising.

The question was arising as to how far the reformers could go before the more conservative sectors of the CPSU would react to the reforms. A further question was the willingness of the population to return to the strict political and economic control of society by the Communist Party existing before the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev. It was not until November of 1991 that Shevardnadze was reappointed by Boris Yeltsin to the position of Foreign Minister of the USSR for the last month of its existence. (Koivisto 1997, 7.) **In his memoirs, Koivisto writes that** in its efforts to act in favour of détente, "Finland will from time

to time take positions that might seem unfriendly towards the Soviet Union. However, **Finland's policy will never go against the vitally important interests of the Soviet Union** (my bold, AP), because our vital interests do not contradict each other." (Koivisto 1997, 72.)

It may be inferred from the above that **Finland could never support the secession of independent Baltic States from the Soviet Union, since the central powers within the Soviet Union could not abide by its disintegration.** The Baltic States themselves represented such a **vitally important interest of the Soviet Union.** There were, however, signs of a Finnish rapprochement with the West. As early as in 1982, Finland had started negotiations with other EFTA states with a view to changing its status in the organization from that of associate member to full member. (Koivisto 1997, 72.) The concept of neutrality as far as Finland was concerned, implying at least active sympathy for the USSR and its allies, was in the midst of a considerable change. In a letter to Koivisto dated 23rd January, 1990, Bush had expressed interest in Koivisto's opinions on whether the Soviet Union was undergoing a process of introversion.

During his visit to Lithuania, Gorbachev became involved in a vehement argument with the local population regarding their desire to secede from the USSR. Indeed, according to Koivisto, Gorbachev went so far as to ask: "Who would have dreamed there would be even talk about autonomy or independence of the Baltic states, **without drawing Soviet threats of force?**" (my bold, AP) (Koivisto 1997, 135.) This proposition might lead us to the following assumption: *The status of all Republics within the Soviet Union was such that any talk of life outside the Soviet would automatically attract justified use of force by the central authority.*

The writer seriously questions such an assessment as feasible official policy.

5.21 The Baltic States – a burning issue in Finnish foreign policy 1989-1991

In December, 1989, The Lithuanian Communist Party had seceded from the CPSU, declaring itself an independent party. With such secession out of the question, as far as Moscow was concerned, Gorbachev found himself in a position where he was forced to go to Vilnius himself, in an attempt to persuade the Lithuanians to rescind their unilateral decision to secede. According to his thinking, the Soviet Union and the CPSU were, respectively, an “indispensable state” and a monolithic organization. (Koivisto 1997, 136.)

Gorbachev was unaware of the real political sentiments in the country. Unfortunately, however, it also appeared that this unawareness largely applied to President Koivisto. Official Finnish belief in the official history of the Soviet Union was hard to shake off.

The credo was apparently in accordance with the historiography presented in *Nõukogude Eesti/Soviet Estonia* (1978):

The high level of activity of the working people in the building up of socialism and the help and experiences of the fraternal republics enabled Estonia within a relatively short period of time to change into a socialist state.

The will of the Estonian people had been annulled.

On 9th January, 1991, speaking to a meeting of the cabinet foreign relations committee, Koivisto **expressed his grave concern at the situation in the Baltic**. In his words, this „*had assumed some very strange features in Helsinki*“, at a meeting between Prime Minister Harri Holkeri and Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio from Finland and Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar (the latter had originally been invited to Finland by a consultant group of retired business managers). (my bold and bold italics, AP)

Koivisto revealed his stand toward the Baltic States in his conclusion that the important thing for the Balts in coming to Finland was not *the topic of discussion in their meeting* with the Finnish leaders but *the opportunity for them to say that they had had discussions with them*. Apparently the urgency of the Balts' case, as far as their ethnic survival

in their own country and their concern for the ecological survival of their environment, was simply not within comprehension by outside political powers. The influx of Russians into their country, in addition to their low rate of birth, was a real source of danger as far as ethnic extinction was concerned.

The issues of the Balts' concern (pan-Soviet agriculture and Soviet regional policies) were, by their very nature, outside the range of negotiation between the Balts and the central government in Moscow. Furthermore, the accusation of ethnic discrimination by the Balts against the Russians seems, indeed, to be sadly misdirected. Was it this area that comprised *the very strange features in Helsinki* mentioned two paragraphs ago?

5.22 The Lithuanian Republic - reactions in Finnish Foreign Policy

On 15th January 1990, Algirdas Brazauskas, First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, was elected President of Lithuania for an extremely short term. The new elections of 1st March 1990 had given Sajudis, the Lithuanian National Front, a parliamentary majority. Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the movement, had been appointed president.

On 11th March 1990, the Lithuanian parliament declared the country independent, and the 1938 constitution of Lithuania to be in force. Gorbachev replied by giving Lithuania three days to annul the declaration. (Koivisto 1997, 136.) Although Lithuania did not fully comply with this demand, it did agree to *freeze* the declaration for 100 days. On 19th March, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolved to order the government to protect Soviet interests in Lithuania, through the dispatch of new troops on Lithuanian territory, through the departure of foreign diplomats from Vilnius and through reinforcement of border guards.

On 27th March, Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio, speaking for the Finnish government, stated that **for Finland, it was of the utmost importance for the Baltic situation to remain peaceful, with all conflicts being resolved by way of negotiation and not by force.** Peace in the region was the prime aim for Finland *and* for Lith-

uania. This aim was aided by Lithuania agreeing on a postponement of implementation of the declaration of independence, together with a subsequent lifting of the Soviet blockade on Lithuania. (Koivisto 1997, 137.)

Independence for the Baltic States from the Soviet Union posed a very difficult issue for Koivisto. The interests of the USSR, associated with the Soviet President's concepts of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, were seen to carry far greater weight than the destinies of three small nations. For the world at large, this independence was allegedly of relatively little significance. Indeed, in the light of a proposed joint Nordic foreign policy on the Baltic States, Koivisto regarded as problematic *the Danish attitude of not having recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union*. According to Koivisto, the reason for *Denmark's* stand was the fact that at the time, in 1940, it, *like Norway, was occupied by Germany* and that thus neither country was free to act, to recognize the Baltic States as part of the USSR. *Finland*, on the other hand, *as an independent nation at that time*, was in the position to extend *de facto* recognition to the incorporation. In other words it was in the realm of independent nations, such as Finland, to recognize the incorporation of other independent nations into a colonial empire. Fifty years on, on the other hand, *Norway* and *Denmark*, nations who had been under German occupation in 1940, were the only Scandinavian nations *not* to have recognized this incorporation. Indeed, *Sweden*, neutral though it was all through the war, had gone as far as to recognize the incorporation *de jure*, in addition to accepting the incorporation *de facto*.

Iceland, having been granted independence from Denmark in 1944, was not in a position to be included in this comparison. The recognition by Iceland of what was termed by the Soviet Union as *Lithuania's unilateral declaration of independence* was allegedly materially insignificant, due to the fact that Iceland was **not in official existence in 1940**, when the Baltic States were annexed. (Before becoming an independent state in 1944, Iceland had been under Norwegian sovereignty from 1262 to 1387, and from then until 1944 under Danish rule.)

In answer to a question put to Prime Minister Harri Holkeri by Edgar Savisaar whether Finland could support the Icelandic proposal

that Finland act as mediator between Moscow and the Baltic States, the Finnish government stated a felt need for a clear statement revealing crudely, if necessary, the truth of the matter to the Finnish people.

Finland was assiduously guarding its back, with regard to the Soviet Union, in a situation where the Baltic States felt that they were being wronged.

How did Finland and the other Scandinavian countries look upon the recognition of the Baltic States as part of the Soviet Union? Official Finland was very diffident regarding the independent Baltic States. For Denmark and Norway the matter was basically a non-issue, since they had been under German occupation when the Soviet occupation began. In 1991, when the time was right, Finland simply resumed its previous recognition.

The matter is presented in the Table 6 below.

Table 6. Comparison of Scandinavian attitudes to incorporation of Baltic States into the Soviet Union in 1940

Country	<i>de jure</i> recognition	<i>de facto</i> recognition
Finland	No	Yes: in connection with new Finnish attitudes to USSR
Denmark	No	No: under German occupation
Norway	No	No: under German occupation
Sweden	Yes	Yes: <i>neutral</i> throughout war
Iceland	No in 1990	Up to 1944, Iceland had been under Danish domination

In the matter of the Baltic States, Koivisto was cautious from the start. He wanted to co-ordinate any possible recognition with that of the other Scandinavian countries, and preferably also with that of the United States (Note: The USA had never recognized the annexation of the Baltic States either *de facto* or *de jure*, nor had Norway or Denmark.) **Koivisto did not wish to abet the dissolution of the USSR**, nor, for that matter, of the Federation of Russia – a process he regarded as

dangerous. During the whole year 1990-1991, he had emphasized his reserved stand, if not his *opposition*, to Finnish solidarity to the Balts' aspirations. It was, said Koivisto, not politically correct for outsiders to encourage the Balts to take a path to possible bloodshed, if they were not ready for it themselves. (Koivisto et al. 2003, 190.)

Reference is made here to the newspaper clippings around 11.4.90. *Etelä-Suomen Sanomat* carries an article *Presidentti Koivisto historian antamista opeista: Viisas löytää ystävät läheltä/President Koivisto on lessons taught by history: The wise man finds his friends close by*. According to Koivisto, the policy followed by Finland did not differ largely from that of other countries.

Koivisto did not realize that **it was imperative for the Balts to choose this possible path**. The alternative choice was **slow strangulation through Soviet environmental policies** allowing for rape of the landscape, making it uninhabitable (a visit to the Kohtla-Järve region of north-eastern Estonia is suggested for this purpose). Furthermore, **the ethnic policies in practice in Estonia and Latvia, in particular, were in the process of reducing the original populations to the state of minorities in their own countries**.

6. The August 1991 coup, the restoration of Baltic independence and Finland

6.1 The headlines

In August 1991 conservatives of the old elite, opposed to Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, attempted a military coup in the ailing Soviet Union. A military junta, led by Vice President Gennady Yanayev, placed Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, under house arrest in his dacha in Crimea where he was having his holiday. The junta included, for example, the head of the KGB as well as Ministers of Interior and Defence. The Russian national government, headed by Boris Yeltsin, and Muscovites resisted the coup. (Nenni 2005.)

The conservative forces in the Soviet Union having taken power overnight, Estonia's Dominoes were again almost upstanding. The official platform of **the Finnish Coalition Party had not been very adamant in its demand for Estonia's independence during the years 1988 to 1991**. Even so, **a number of its mem-bers**, especially war veterans among them, **were very much in favour of a persistent positive policy in this regard**.

The 21.8.1991 issue of *Ilta-Sanomat*, in its report on the coup, conveyed a warning from the Coalition Party to those involved: "*Heimoveljiin ei kosketa*" / *Hands off our ethnic kinsmen!* In the same issue, a double-spread article in the supplement *POIKKEUSTILA NEU-*

VOSTOLIITOSSA/STATE OF EMERGENCY IN THE SOVIET UNION carries the story of the declaration of Estonian independence:

Viro julistautui viime yönä itsenäiseksi/Estonian independence declared last night.

The members of parliament attending regarded the occasion as equivalent in significance to that on 24th February 1918, when the Republic of Estonia was proclaimed. In Tallinn, President Arnold Rüütel had stated that the Red Army would not be occupying radio and television transmitters. On the basis of information provided by representatives of the Baltic military region, the situation was so serious that Moscow had ordained that the extra troops brought into Estonia be forbidden to watch all television programs other than those of the official Moscow Radio and Television, for fear of their being indoctrinated.

Lt.-Gen. Fyodor Melnichuk, second-in-charge of the Baltic military region, **had insisted that the Estonians abide by the orders issued by the revolutionary committee**, including a prohibition on demonstrations and mass meetings. He urged President Rüütel to abide by the orders of the new regime, on pain of the imposition by Moscow of martial law.

The Estonian authorities announced that the declaration of independence would be followed by a transitional period under Estonian law, while Soviet currency and a variety of elements of Soviet administration and policy would still be in force temporarily.

Claes Andersson, chairman of the Left Alliance in Finland, on ringing his fellow party members regarding the coup, described them as very upset. Heikki Haapavaara, the writer of the *Ilta-Sanomat* article, interpreted **the declaration of independence** in one of two ways, **firstly** as *a cry for help addressed to the West*, or at least a gesture of distress from a city invaded a few hours earlier by tanks. **On the other hand** it could also be seen as either *a kick in Yanayev's shins* or *a plea for a thrashing*.

For Estonia, this was its once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. A major point of Soviet policy in the Baltic States had been the russification of the population, presented under the guise of the *friendship of the peoples*, with *Russian* as **the international language**. Of the

member states of the United Nations, there were a fair number who had not recognized the annexation of the Baltic States 51 years previously, neither *de jure* nor *de facto*. **The possibility of the declaration being a plea for a thrashing**, as described by Haapavaara above, **may well be ruled out**. From the Estonian perspective, the declaration was the only possibility to secure any future at all for the Estonian people. The planned economic exploitation of phosphate rock in north-eastern Estonia described above, was putting the very physical existence of the Estonian people under dire threat.

The abortive coup in Moscow created an opportunity that the Estonians (and Latvians) had to take. *Not* to declare independence was tantamount to opting for certain extinction, both ethnic and ecological. Considering the covert manner in which Moscow's russification policy had been carried out – mis-industrialization, wanton destruction of the environment, importation of non-indigenous population, exploiting the low birth rates, at least in Estonia and Latvia – there would have been very little reaction of significance on the world forums such as the United Nations, had these been brought to their attention.

The 21.8.1991 edition of *Kaleva* quoted the *Le Monde* article *Viron parlamenti pohti itsenäistymistä/The Estonian parliament deliberating on declaration of independence*, appealing to all states who had not acknowledged the absorption of Estonia into the USSR during World War II to recognize Estonia.

Italehti of the same day, in its article **TOISTAKAAMME ITSEÄMME/Let us reiterate**, criticized President Koivisto's USSR expertise, which, in practice, did not stand the test of time. The government's position on the coup, a collection of political platitudes, was simply that **Things would return to normal**. The following day, 22.8.91, the *Keskisuomalainen* editorial, however, encouraged the Baltic States to confirm their will for independence as emphatically as possible.

A further article in the supplement VALLANKAAPPAUS NEUVOSTOLIITOSSA/ USSR COUP, under the title *Panssarit ja väkijoukko taistelivat barrikadeilla/ Tanks and crowds battle it out at the barricades*, **describes the conflict between the conservative army and the revolutionary Yeltsin**. Furthermore, it covers the interne-

cine fighting amongst the coup members themselves. The troubles within the coup had been denied, using the alleged illness of those involved as a screen.

The *Iltalehdi* editorial *Uusia arvioita*/New assessments, pondered the effect of the events in the USSR on Finnish domestic policy. Koivisto was again the object of abundant criticism regarding his attitude to the Baltic States, to the point of relief at the fact that the incumbent had not yet declared his candidature for the next presidential elections.

The 22.8.1991 cartoon by Jouko, appearing on the same page, depicted a hammer and sickle, the point of the sickle stabbing an olive branch-bearing dove through the heart. The cartoon depicted a distinct contradiction between official Soviet peace propaganda and Soviet political pragmatics.

While a double-spread article in *Iltalehdi* of Wed 21.8.91, *VIRO VAHVISTI ITSE-NÄISYYDEN*/Estonia affirms its independence, reported on the declaration of independence, the ignorance of the course of events among the Red Army soldiers in Tallinn contrasted with a demonstration of national awareness in the Moskva Café in Tallinn, with the flying of an Estonian flag there. In a second article on the page, *Kansaa ei murreta panssareilla*/Tanks cannot break the spirit of a nation, Mati Eliste, editor-in-chief of *Spordileht*/The Sports Gazette reports on sentiments in Tallinn (my bold print in the following quotation), emphasizing manners of thinking, „...whereby a people was not to be broken with the use of tanks. **The army does not understand the reasons for its dispatch to Tallinn.**“

The following pages reported on attempts to break Gorbachev out of his detention, with a possible exile. In his commentary on the coup, *Toveri Janajev, historian pyörää ei taaksepäin voi kääntää*/Comrade Yanayev, the wheel of history cannot be reversed, Veli-Antti Savolainen, Editor-in-chief of *Iltalehdi*, took the stand that developments in Moscow were irreversible.

„*The Soviet people has had a taste of the fruits of the tree of liberty, a taste that can no longer be relinquished. The Estonians may be forcibly crushed, but there is no-one, nothing that can suffocate their song of liberty [...]* So, *Comrade Yanayev*, remember this elementary fact: **the wheel of history cannot be reversed.**“

6.2 PM Esko Aho and Gennadi Yanayev: An alleviation of Finnish concern?

YrjöViitasaari, Head of the Intelligence Division of the Finnish Defence Forces, held that Finnish military intelligence could not claim *to have predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union*. He was, however, able to brief the Prime Minister on the morning after (the August 1991) coup attempt that the junta fronted by **Gennadi Yanayev** would not be able to seize power. The military forces stationed in Moscow did not support the coup. The analysis proved quite correct. (*Helsingin Sanomat*, Home edition, 5.6.2001.)

On Thursday 22nd August, 1991, Iltalehti reported the stand of the government on the coup in the Soviet Union. The Special Edition Supplement **VALLANKAAP-PAUS NEUVOSTOLIITTOSSA/COUP IN USSR**, reported the stand of the government as follows:

*Ahon kabinetti perinteisellä linjalla: **Välta on aina oikeassa**/(PM) Aho's cabinet pursuing traditional policy lines: **Might is always right***

Helsingin Sanomat (20th August,1991) carries an article **Janajev on Suomen eturivin poliitikkojen vanha tuttu**/*Yanayev an old friend of top-ranking Finnish politicians*, painting a positive picture of Yanayev, an acquaintance of Centre Party PM Esko Aho, SDP Chairman Pertti Paasio, Left Alliance Party Secretary Matti Viialainen and of the communist splinter group Deva (Democratic Alternative), extremist dissident followers of Communist Party minority leader Taisto Sinisalo and Esko-Juhani Tennilä MP.

6.3 News items on unravelling of the coup

On Tuesday, 21.8.1991, **President Gorbachev was still reported as being held prisoner by the KGB in his summer residence in Crimea.** Since Gorbachev had been dismissed by the junta, ostensibly for reasons of health, Russian president Yeltsin demanded an examination of Gorbachev. Medical officers from the World Health Organiza-

tion, however, were unable to carry out an examination of Gorbachev at Russia's request, since Russia was not a member of this UN organization.

Yeltsin was being considered a possible second sacrifice for the KGB and the military junta (*Ilta-lehti* 21.8.1991 **Gorba yritettiin vapauttaa yllätysiskulla/ Attempts to free Gorbachev in a surprise strike**). **On the second day of martial law, the people of Moscow were walking with a new decisiveness** as they made their way to the Russian House of Parliament. Arrogance seemed the hallmark of the military. When asked by a middle-aged woman whether he was going to shoot her and her children, the major in charge of the soldiers coldly replied that they were just obeying orders, and would shoot IF they were told to. (*Ilta-lehti* 21.8.91 Moskovalaiset huusivat tankkien edessä **“Me voitamme, me voitamme”/People in Moscow calling out in the face of the tanks “We shall win, we shall win.”**)

The 21.8.1991 edition of *Ilta-lehti* reported the **USA as still concerned at the military destructive potential of the USSR**. Of the presidents, Gorbachev was under arrest, and Yeltsin under imminent danger of arrest. A further story in the same day's *Ilta-lehti* presented a clear stand by the Leftist Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto). While an **invitation to a reception** marking the departure of a senior diplomat **had been issued to the party by the Soviet Embassy, the Alliance had refused the invitation**, regarding the raising of glasses as an unfitting gesture in the light of the day's events.

The summer conference of the Leftist Alliance had stood in strong condemnation of the coup, the party unanimously calling on the suspension of relationships with the USSR. **The Alliance was against visiting Moscow**. A further article, *Pesäero vanhaan linjaan/A break from the former policy*, claimed embarrassment on the part of the Left Alliance. It wanted to make it clear that the measures taken in the Baltic States had nothing to do with the Alliance or its ideals.

A further article, Keijo Korhonen, Editor-in-Chief of *Kainuun Sanomat*, former Centre Party Foreign Minister (1976-1977), attempted to **dissuade the Finns from telling the Soviet Union what it should or should not do**, (*Ei pitäisi neuvoa idän suurvaltaa/ Our big eastern neighbour needs no words of advice from us*) with the change of government

just one possible course of action. The new concentration of troops in Tallinn were of no concern to Korhonen: „**There had been troops in Tallinn for over fifty years, so there was nothing new in the situation. The people should simply calm down. Koivisto’s reserved Baltic policy had been the right policy. The government was just attempting to accommodate public opinion.**“

Keijo Korhonen was here noting the *official* Finnish foreign policy, surprisingly issuing *carte blanche* to those in power in Moscow. The length of time under Soviet occupation was used as a convenient justification.

In an interview of Raul Kuutma, an Estonian veteran of the infantry regiment 200 (JR200), the *Soomepoisid/Finland Lads*, Jari Kaaliko-ski assured the Finns that the Estonians’ strength lay in their suffering. The group of 500 veterans was visiting Finland for the unveiling of a memorial in Taavetti, in South-Eastern Finland, where they originally assembled on their arrival in Finland.

6.4 Finnish newspapers on Estonia

The 22.8.1991 edition of *Kaleva* gave a minute-by-minute account of the coup and its disbanding. The same edition of *Kaleva* reported on the relief felt in Estonia on the failure of the putsch, *Viron piinapäivä päättyi juhlaan/Estonia’s day of torture ends in celebrations*. This was the day on which Estonia regained her independence, together with Russian recognition. The Latvian process was presented on material deriving from the Latvian Information Bureau in Stockholm, an important source of information. The article *Miehityksen kahleet katkesivat Virossa Baltian itsenäisyystoiveet kohosivat korkeammalle/The shackles of occupation in Estonia broken Baltic independence aspirations rise high*, reported the Soviet troops ceding the city to the Estonians after a blanket strike by the city.

The editorial of the 22.8.1991 edition of *Ilta-lehti* demanded immediate recognition of Estonian independence, a demand supported by the statement of Galina Starovoitova, Yeltsin’s Nationalities Policy adviser. This course of action was seen as the best support

for Russian democracy. **Finnish Members of Parliament claimed that the independence of the Baltic States was a difficult pill to swallow.** Only two MPs out of six were of the opinion that they should be recognized immediately. Obstacles in the path of recognition were, for instance, the presence of Red Army troops on the territories concerned. The Red Army withdrew from the buildings in Tallinn and Vilnius occupied during the abortive coup. In the wake of the confusion ensuing from the coup, **independent Estonia aimed at purging the nation of all conservative communists. (23.8.1991, *Iltalehti Itsenäinen Viro aloittaa puhdistukset/Independent Estonia beginning its purges*)**

At this stage, the strength of the Estonian government was not felt to be sufficient for ordering the dismissal of the Red Army officers supporting the putsch. A note to this effect went from the Estonian government to Moscow, listing officers such as General Yarovoi of the Dvigatel Factory and the conservative manager of the Port of Tallinn for indictment. **The regional governments in North-Eastern Estonia were listed for dismissal due to their support for the putsch.**

A factor supporting all the above measures, extreme from the Soviet point of view, was the Estonian government's anxious desire to bring to justice all the conservative protagonists of the putsch. Yet, according to the page 2 article in the 24.8.1991 edition of *Aamulehti*, **Moscow did not surrender.** The paper was uncertain of the attitude to be taken regarding the coup. **Tyry welcomed the Baltic States back into the fold of independent nations.**

On 24.8.1991, *Ilta-Sanomat*, in its editorial *Viron realiteetit/Estonian realities*, admitted the sympathies of the Finnish people for the aspirations of the Baltic peoples. The Russian minority, though born of illegalities, was a real fact to be reckoned with in the arrangements for the future. The editorial for 25.8.1991, *Vallankaappausyritys hyödytti Baltiaa/Attempted coup benefits Baltic States* maintained the claim in the heading, while the *Keskisuomalainen* editorial had accused the Balts of premature action, without any clear agreements with Moscow.

The question still stands, after 51 years, of whether the Treaty of Tartu between Estonia and Russia, a **clear international agreement**, to quote

Keskisuomalainen, recognizing the independence of Estonia, **does not still stand. The Treaty** had given Estonia its first international recognition, followed, some time later, by that of the Western powers. The treaty set a firm legal basis to successful existence of the Estonian state as a member of the European family of nations since World War II and after the restoration of Estonian independence in 1991. (Eesti Post)

President Koivisto regarded Finland as being favourably disposed to the Baltic independence aspirations. The crucial question was in *the relations between the Baltic States and Russia*.

The foreign news section of the same paper, in an article titled *Party subservient to Moscow to be outlawed in Estonia too*, reported outlawing, in Estonia, of the Estonian Communist Party subservient to Moscow. The independent Estonian Communist Party received the praise of Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar for its stand during the coup d'état.

The Keskisuomalainen 25.8.91 editorial *Vallankaappausyritys hyödytti Baltiaa/The abortive coup useful to the Baltic States*) **regarded the unilateral declarations of independence by Estonia and Latvia as problematic**, to say the least. While the states did have a right to these, **the moves were termed over-hasty**.

One might ask, in the history of the world, be it that of the United States, of Indonesia in 1945, of Estonia in 1918, when has the declaration of independence been made with the consent of the previous motherland/occupying power? **The United States declared its independence unilaterally in 1776, yet it was not until seven years later that the Treaty of Paris, signed on 3rd September, 1783 by Britain and the United States, concluded the American War of Independence, when Britain recognized its former 13 colonies as the free and sovereign United States of America.** (RPT Factbox.)

Was the unilateral American Declaration of Independence over-hasty? Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, while this independence was finally recognized by the Netherlands on December 27, 1949, with Sukarno as the country's first president. (Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2003.)

Over-hastiness was never an issue then, nor was it one in connection with the Estonian declaration of independence in 1991.

6.5 The illegal loss of independence as legitimization of restoration of the Republic of Estonia

The mere precision timing of the process during the same month of June, 1940 would lead one to suspect the legitimacy of the incorporation of the three states into the USSR. The alleged popular demonstrations against the government were carried out by groups of workers from the Soviet bases established the previous year. **Evidence of this was in the Soviet Russian songs sung in Russian by the demonstrators**, ostensibly Estonian workers. **The songs were unknown even to the ethnic Russians living in Estonia.** The procession was accompanied by light armoured vehicles. When the procession marched on to the presidential palace to demand that a new government, sympathetic to the USSR be instated, **the president was not permitted to reply to the demonstrators, while pro-Soviet agitation speeches were permitted.** (Uustalu 1968, 242.)

Baltic elections of 1940 has become a concept of sorts in international politics. The lists of candidates submitted by the Baltic States were ruled inadmissible by the Soviet emissaries. Elections were then organized, in which **only Soviet-supported candidates were permitted to run.** (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2003.) The implication was that **the elections had already been decided in advance, by Moscow.**

In Estonia, these elections were called at a Cabinet meeting on 4th July 1940, to be held on 14th – 15th July, with similar elections held in Latvia and Lithuania within days of the Estonian elections. **The process was supervised, in each of the Baltic States, by a personal emissary of Stalin:** Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Politbureau member Andrei Zhdanov in Estonia, First Deputy Chairman of the People's Commissars Soviet Andrei Vyshinski in Latvia and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vladimir Dekanov in Lithuania, in order **to ensure that the elections provided the results desired by the USSR.**

From the constitutional point of view, according to the Electoral Act of the Republic of Estonia, **elections were to be called not**

less than 35 days before the first day of voting. (Rei 1970, 295-296.) In fact, **the period between the calling of the elections on 4th July, 1940 and 14th July, 1940, the day of the elections themselves, was just ten days.** Thus even from the point of view of the 1938 constitution, still in force, *the parliament that voted to join the Soviet Union had been illegally elected, and the vote to join was thus null and void from the outset.*

6.6 Soviet legalism and Baltic independence 1990-1991

The demands made by Moscow in 1990/1991 for the Baltic States to secede *legitimately* from the Soviet Union in the light of demands coming from the Soviet Socialist Republics themselves, with a comparison being made of the Baltic relationship to the Soviet Union to marriage and divorce, thus simply lacks both a legal and a logical basis. **The Soviet thinking on Baltic secession** was to be seen in President Gorbachev's decisions of 28.2.1990, in discussions on the Baltic States' formal secession from the USSR:

- 1. The motion was to be debated by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR**, then the extended parliament and **the Congress of Deputies**, representing all the Union republics, **the latter taking the final decision on secession.**
2. The Supreme Soviet, the extended parliament and the Congress of Deputies would evaluate **the domestic and foreign political consequences of the secession**, making an initial proposal.

NOTE: These deputies represented all the republics of the USSR, and did not represent the individual republics' interests.

- 3. Any secession required a 2/3 majority in the Congress of Deputies.**
- 4. A transition period of at least five years would follow**, during which further discussions would take place regarding issues of defence and security, as well as proposed borders.
5. Subsequently **issues of economics and property would be debated.** Establishments of the Soviet government could be

bought or rented by the seceding republic, or they could be transferred to the USSR or a separate agreement entered into.

6. Upon the above agreements being reached, **the final decision for secession was to be taken by the Congress of Deputies in Moscow.** (*Savon Sanomat* 1.3.1990 *Gorbatshev suostuu Baltian eroneuvotteluun / Gorbachev agrees to secession talks with the Baltic States*)

The Baltic States regarded the above process as flagrantly contradictory to the rights they regarded as possessing, by virtue of the 1920 Treaty of Tartu, the right to sovereignty in their own countries, the right to decisions regarding their own destinies. (Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 2003; Zetterberg 2007, 510.)

For the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the territorial successor of the Russian Empire, **the Treaty of Tartu was the first peace treaty between the former mother country and a border state that had separated from it.** The treaty had pierced a hole in the front opposing secession from Soviet administration. Even according to Lenin, the Treaty of Tartu was a window to Western Europe, opened by the Russian Workers. In the Estonian weekly *Vaba Eesti Sõna*/Free Estonian Word, established in 1949 and published in New York, Endel Pool writes:

The peace treaty of 1920 was to guarantee “for all time” the right to self-determination. We have seen how little meaning agreements entered into with the Russians had. The paper may easily be torn in two and the agreements abrogated. Do not believe a communist, a Russian or, today, a Putin. I believe the Estonian leaders of the time, with Johan Laidoner, Konstantin Päts and others, were the right men in the right position. (Endel Pool “Vaba Eesti Sõna” Toronto, 21.12.2007, my translation AP)

Most countries had not recognized the 1940 incorporation of Estonia and, even if they had, only *de facto*, not *de jure*. A number of these countries continued to recognize Estonian diplomats and consuls still functioning during the post-war era, in the name of their former governments. (McHugh & Pacy 2001, 2.) This policy of non-recognition gave rise to the principle of legal continuity, which held that *de*

jure, Estonia remained an independent state under illegal occupation throughout the period 1940-91 (Smith 2001).

The Baltic objections to the Soviet process of secession from the USSR were as follows (Note: The numbering of objections 1-6 corresponds to steps 1-6 of the secession process as outlined above):

1. **The elections for the Congress of Deputies did not represent the Baltic peoples.**
2. **The independence of the Baltic peoples was not an issue to be resolved by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or its other organs.**
3. **The required 2/3 majority was in no way associated with the wills of the Baltic peoples.**
4. **The issues involved were in no way associated with decisions to be taken in Moscow.**
5. **The issues of property were brought about by no incentive from the Baltic States themselves. They were merely implementations of Moscow-oriented policy.**
6. **The USSR Congress of Deputies was in no way associated with the wills of the Baltic Peoples.**

From an *ex post facto* perspective, had the Balts agreed to the Moscow proposals, it would not have been until 1995 that any concrete steps could have been taken on their way to independence. (HS 1.3.1990 Kremlissä sanaharkkaa Baltian itsenäisyydestä/Bitter war of words in Kremlin on Baltic independence)

In reference to the independent Baltic States, Gorbachev is reported as having snapped: "That's your business." According to Estonian sources, Gorbachev and his deputy Anatoli Lukyanov were "extremely angry" with the Baltic representatives. Gorbachev and Lukashenko held the secession of individual republics from the USSR to be subject to a mandatory ratification by the USSR parliament.

On the world scene, the identity of the Baltic States as an integral part of the USSR remained unchanged until 1988, when they began exerting their claims to independence. No new Republics were established. One Soviet republic, the Karelo-Finnish SSR, was disbanded in

1956, to become a nominally autonomous region of the main Soviet republics, an **Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic**, or **ASSR**. At the time of the 1991 collapse of the Union, the republics became independent countries, with some still loosely organized under the heading Commonwealth of Independent States. **Membership of this Commonwealth of Independent States did not apply to the Baltic States, their having boycotted any and all plans for the new federation.**

The democratization of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the period had irreparably undermined the power of the CPSU and Gorbachev himself. The relaxation of censorship and attempts to create more political openness had the unintended effect of re-awakening long-suppressed nationalist and anti-Russian feelings in the Soviet republics.

6.7 Finland and de jure and de facto recognition of Estonian independence

Estonia found itself having to protest against its subordinate position with respect to Moscow. This took the form of protest against the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. The confidential codicils of the latter agreement had assigned the Baltic States to the Soviet sphere of influence. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 205.) In connection with the establishment of the first political party apart from the Communist Party, post-war Estonia saw its first legal protest against the political status quo. Despite the budding reform in the Communist Party, the KGB of the Estonian SSR remained intact.

Graf and Roiko-Jokela (2004, 212-215) give a concise summary of Finland's policy regarding the Baltic States policy:

1. Finland had recognized the annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union *de facto* but not *de jure*.
2. Finland regarded the Baltic independence issue as a matter of Soviet domestic policy.
3. Finland objected to the manner in which the Baltic States were presenting their case for independence.

According to the January 1991 statement by President Koivisto, Finland had recognized the independent Baltic States in 1920, **but it had also recognized their incorporation into the USSR in 1940.**

The only thing Finland could offer the Baltic States was realism, sympathy, caution.

4. From 1990 on, Finland had begun talking about the ***Baltic States***, not about the ***Baltic Soviet Republics***. (*Baltian maat, Baltian neuvostotasaval-lat*, respectively, in Finnish)
5. Clearer stands were also being taken by Finland on the Lithuanian Declaration of Independence in March, 1990, despite the tense situation, leading to the massacres in Vilnius and Riga in January, 1991.
6. Finland was demonstrating an ever greater degree of support for the independence of the Baltic States, on the basis of both the 1975 CSCE Final Accord **and** the Constitution of the USSR.

The Balts had refused to secede in accordance to the new constitution of the USSR because this secession process was dependent on:

1. the views of the other Soviet republics,
2. the views of the non-Baltic military personnel stationed on Baltic territory,
3. a vote by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

It was also for these reasons that the Balts had refused to organise the official Soviet referendum.

7. Finland followed the developments in the Baltic States ***with sympathy*** (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 213). (my bold italics, AP)
8. Finland was ready to assist the Baltic States, but not at the expense of Finnish-Soviet relations.
9. For Finland the developments in the Baltic States were ***part of/a consequence of*** perestroika in the USSR. (my bold italics, AP)
10. Finland was of the opinion that the ongoing reforms in the Soviet Union were not to affect relations between Finland and the Soviet Union (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 213).
11. The leaders of Finnish foreign policy had held the abortive coup

of August, 1991 to have increased the possibilities for the Baltic States attaining their independence.

The above comment remains unexplained. **No stand had been taken officially on the matter** in a manner that could be quoted for the purpose of this study. It is to the great credit of President Koivisto, however, that there was no objection to the press writing as it did during the whole period under study, 1988-1991. The same indeed applies to President Urho Kekkonen during the years 1970-1988, as well. The latter period merits further investigation. **The independence of the Baltic States in 1991 was recognized by Finland in a very deft manner.** After some deliberation, it was realized that, due to the country's involvement in the Winter War at the time the Baltic States were annexed (June, 1940), Finland had actually never recognized their annexation *de jure*. There was a certain dichotomy in the style of the recognition process of the once-again-independent Baltic States. All that was needed was a reiteration of the *de facto* recognition.

The realities of Finnish foreign relations were slow to change, connected, as they were, to the Finnish stands to the Baltic States. These stands were inextricably connected to traditional Finnish foreign policy toward its neighbour the Soviet Union. The latter is now in conflict with the historical relations of Finland with its Baltic neighbours. (Graf & Roiko-Jokela 2004, 215.) The issue of policy towards the Baltic States might be characterized as cautious, Finland describing its stands as **corresponding to those of other states.** This characterization might be an idealization on the level of principle. Finland was not desirous of taking a clear stand on the matter, in a manner expressed in black and white, in the form of a written document.

6.8 The Finnish recognition of Baltic independence

According to President Paasikivi and Foreign Minister Carl Enckell (lastly 1944-1950), Finland had “expressly not recognized the annexation of the Baltic States through political measures, but (we) cannot deny the fact that they belong to the Soviet Union.” **The principal foreign policy aim for Finland was to have a government sym-**

pathetic to the USSR. In this regard, the situation faced by post-war Finland was equivalent to that of the Baltic States in 1940, despite the two wars fought against the USSR, the Winter War and the Continuation War. It was for this reason that, while Finland was firmly in support of the independent Baltic States, especially on the level of civic organizations, there **was always the attitude of the USSR and its idea of the strategic role of the Baltic States with regard to the USSR, to be considered.**

The Finnish attitude to the Baltic States might be summarized in three words: *sympathy, caution, realism.* In this light, the leaders of Finnish foreign policy made the following revelation on 28th August, 1991:

Since Finland had not recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union *de jure*, but only *de facto*, the original *de jure* recognition was still in force. The reinstatement of the *de facto* recognition of the Baltic States required no more than a presidential communiqué to the effect.

Finland decided to re-enforce its decision of the 1920s to recognize Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian independence on 25th August, 1991.

6.9 Citizenship legislation in the Baltic States

At the outset of their newly restored independence, the Baltic States were criticized for discrimination against their Russian-speaking populations by instances as high-ranking as the European Union. In response, as it were, and in defence of the Balts, Swedish-Estonian journalist Andres Küng (2002, 253) expressed the view that, from the perspective of international law, **occupying powers did not have the right to settle its population in the countries they occupied.** Consequently, upon termination of the occupation, the inhabitants settled there under the aegis of the occupying nation did not have the right to stay, not to mention to acquire automatically the citizenship of the country.

When Western Sahara gained its independence in 1991, the people entitled to vote were limited to **those who had been living there**

for 17 years, since before the beginning of the occupation. There is no reason why a similar condition should not apply to the Baltic States. (Küing 2002, 253.) In other words, **the immigrants who had come there from the Russian side of the borders of the Baltic States during the post-war years** should not be afforded the same rights as the indigenous population. **A group even less entitled to permanent residency or citizenship was active personnel from the units of the Red Army from all over the Soviet Union, stationed in the Baltic States, and their families, as well as retired officers** (most of these in their forties or fifties). These retired officers had been granted permission in the Soviet Union to stay on in the socialist republics where they had been stationed.

The Baltic States of the pre-war period had legislated **a system of cultural autonomy for the minorities living there, in the case of Estonia, for instance, the Germans, Russians, Swedes and Jews.** In Latvia there was a German-speaking tertiary institution, as well as seven German-speaking, five Russian-speaking, two Polish-speaking and a Lithuanian secondary school. In Lithuania, in 1938, there were fourteen Jewish, three Polish-, one German- and one Russian-speaking secondary schools. (Küing 2002, 254.) Further, there were cultural councils for the organization of schools, theatre, libraries, societies of the cultural minorities. Likewise the ethnic minorities received subsidies from the state and local councils, as did the schools. This cultural autonomy received much attention, even long after the incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet Union. (Uustalu 1968, 97.)

Several Swedish journalists were claiming that Estonia and Latvia were intending to make the Russians into second-class citizens, into people without any rights. **The crux of the issue was in the stands adopted by the Baltic populations to immigrants originally brought *en masse* to the Baltic States by the Soviet authorities.** They had been brought in without heed to the indigenous population, to replace the indigenous population deported to Siberia (75,000 from Estonia, 136,000 from Latvia, 245,000 from Lithuania). Subsequent to World War II, immigration had taken place principally between Estonia and the other Soviet republics. At the end of the war there was an especially large wave of emigration and immigration (the deportations

of the Estonians to Siberia, the immigration of military personnel, for instance). The first wave of immigration was followed by a decrease of new population in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, to be followed by a second expansion in immigration, though this was to abate gradually. During the period 1944 – 1990, a total of 1.4 million people born outside Estonia came into or left the country. (Eesti, no date.) These people were by no means long-standing residents of the Baltic States, as some pro-Russian advocates in the West would advocate. The Soviet Union, at that stage, had no intention of granting independence to the Baltic States. It was in a state of recovery from the war, and industry, also in the newly conquered regions, was the means to this recovery. The Russians were needed in the latter to meet the central government's planning targets, unrealistic though they might have been.

There is a distinct difference between the objects of Baltic cultural autonomy and the post-war ethnic influx, equivalent to the post-war ethnic cleansing process in Serbia. The Soviet immigration influx into Estonia and Latvia might itself be regarded as comparable to ethnic cleansing. It may very well be that the Soviet authorities did not realize the damage their policies were doing to the Baltic countries. This does not, however, excuse the russification policies.

7. Conclusions

7.1 Some words on the title: the Domino Theory reversed

The **Domino theory** of the United States of America had been coined by President Eisenhower at a press conference on 7th April, 1954, in connection with the communist take-overs in Indo-China. The theory, later to be discredited, largely due to its over-simplified character, was based on the phenomenon of Dominoes placed on end, one next to the other. If one was to be pushed over, the motion would carry on throughout the whole line. In like manner, it was assumed that one state after another, in the vicinity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the People's Republic of China, would fall prey to the Communist system, the whole world ultimately being subject to the USSR and the People's Republic of China. **After World War II, the theory had, indeed, seemed to apply in post-war Eastern Europe and East Asia.**

By the end of the 1980s, however, it seemed as if the fallen Dominoes of the theory from World War II were indeed *rising: to independence from the USSR*. The issue was not so much the Domino theory *in itself*. It was rather the use of the term as a metaphorical depiction of the two chains of events, one leading inevitably to the loss of the independence for the Baltic States and the other to its inevitable reinstatement.

The issue is the claim that the press of the period under study could be read as a continuous text, involving a predictability characteristic of all written text. It is this process that this study wishes to examine.

7.2 The first Dominoes rise

The process of the recognition of the independence of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union in 1920 involved the following aspects:

1. Lenin, speaking on 5th February, 1920, reported Soviet Russia having signed a peace treaty with Estonia – the first peace treaty enabling new peace treaties leading to new trade openings with Europe and America.
2. In this armistice with Russia, Estonia came to an agreement with Russia regarding the most important political issues, such as recognition of independence, proposed state borders and military guarantees. (*Eesti Vabadussõda 1918-1920 II 1951, 406*).
3. In accordance with Marxist ideology, Soviet Russia/the USSR had hoped that the workers in Estonia would overthrow the republican government at its very outset, to establish a Soviet republic in its place, while also signing a peace treaty with the USSR.

This was not to be. In making territorial concessions to Estonia regarding territory with mixed Estonian-Russian population after the Estonian War of Independence (1918-1920), concerning territory beyond the east coast of the Narva River and portions of south-east Estonia, Soviet Russia was hoping for a pro-Russian revolution there—the workers would understand the alleged depravity of the leaders of their Diet (*Asutav Kogu*), who, they claimed, had robbed the trade unions to the core while...

1. ...the Estonian Bolsheviks were also hoping for victory over Estonia. A peace treaty with a capitalist country/regime was against the very essence of their philosophy. Yet when the Estonian Bolsheviks requested support from Russia, the reply was as follows:

“The working people of Russia is not obliged to redeem the working classes of the whole world with its blood, since this is the responsibility of the working class of each respective country. A working class unable to cast off the yoke of their oppressors will be unable to construct their own state in a country won for them by others.” (Laaman 1964, 720-721.)

2. Post-1940 Soviet policy, regarding its small neighbours, was against all promises made by the USSR that the Baltic States would retain their full identity as independent nations.

7.3 The rising Dominoes

The rising Dominoes derive from the news items cited dealing with the Baltic States. In the Appendix these items are quoted directly from the source texts, in chronological order, supplemented with the writer’s interpretations of cohesive factors, the socio-political background, termed *connectors*.

It is the theory of this study that, from almost each Domino, the subsequent Domino can be predicted, in the same manner that applies to ordinary texts. With this purpose in mind, the connectors, in the form of questions raised by the Dominoes, will also serve to do so. Of course the course of events was not axiomatic. Another course, one for the worse, could have been just as possible. In this event, another history would have been written.

Even so, the optimistic choices proved to prevail.

The data for testing this assumption comprises **the headlines for articles from the two evening papers *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Ilta-lehti*** for the period 1988-1991, together with their connectors. At the conclusion of the exercise, when the articles of August 1991 have been treated, the Dominoes and connectors will be juxtaposed to see whether the hypothesis of the continuity of the text, discrete articles though they be, form the proposed integrated text. In the event of this being the case, the hypothesis of the predictability of political developments will find support. Journalism might be defined as ***astute observation of political developments, beyond the immediately obvious surface value of the daily news items.***

Although the exercise is being carried out, in this instance, with *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Ilta-lehti*, the writer is convinced that the same exercise could be applied to any other of the newspapers in the corpus.

7.4 The Treaty of Tartu reaffirmed

In connection with the 55th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia, the 21.2.1973 issue of the Australian–Estonian weekly *Meie Kodu/Our home*, published in Australia, presented the **Treaty of Tartu, signed in Tartu on 2nd February, 1920 between the Republic of Estonia and Soviet Russia.**

The second article of the peace treaty was as follows:

*Based on the premiss proclaimed for all peoples by the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic regarding the right to self-determination for all peoples, to the extent of complete secession from the state to which they belong, **Russia unconditionally recognises the independence of the Republic of Estonia, declining voluntarily and for all time all sovereign rights claimed by Russia towards the Estonian territory and people, based on the applying legal status and the international agreements, which henceforth lose their significance in the said meaning.** The Estonian people and country will not be obliged in any way towards Russia on the basis of the previously existing status. (translation from the Estonian, italics and emphases by AP)*

The Treaty of Tartu is the basis for the independence of the Republic of Estonia. Even though this was promulgated and signed in 1920, what is said here still stood in 1991. Legally nothing had changed. This study wants to affirm the fact that nothing had changed between the Treaty of Tartu and the declaration of independence in 1991. The basis is the same. The facts of the Treaty of Tartu still applied in 1991. Regarding the recognition of the Republic of Estonia by Finland there was no need for a new recognition because the *de jure* recognition of 1920 still stood in 1991.

7.5 The title of the work revisited

The unofficial foreign policy of Finland prevailed. The dominoes did rise, to the re-establishment of the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The independence of the Baltic States was logically to be expected as the end of the chain of news events. The same process could be applied to any other comprehensive social process to predict a probable outcome.

7.6 Due recognition

The Finnish press has had a significant role in the re-establishment of the independence of the Baltic States, so significant it merits recognition on a national scale in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

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Appendix 1: The rising Dominoes

Domino 1: *The great economic difficulties in the USSR in the past few years had given rise to the policies of perestroika and glasnost under the leadership of First Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. This, in turn, had led to open anti-Soviet sentiment in the Soviet Republics, revolt that seemed to be proceeding unpunished. The republic concerned in this instance was Armenia. The administration was preoccupied with the difficulties concerning the Soviet economy.* (02.2.88 Kansallistunto hyydyttä Jerevanin hymyn Armenia uhmaa Gorbatshovia/Nationalism stifling the smile in Yerevan Armenia defying Gorbachev)

The situation raises the question of whether it was permissible for any Soviet republic to indicate feelings of revolt against Moscow. (compare Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1980) Was today's Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in a fit state at all to react to the developments in its 'constituent republics'? (1) 02.2.88 Kansallistunto hyydyttä Jerevanin hymyn Armenia uhmaa Gorbatshovia/Nationalism stifling the smile in Yerevan Armenia defying Gorbachev Yet, on 11.9.88, 300,000 people at the *Eestimaa Laul/Song of Estonia* happening at the Song Festival Grounds in Tallinn demanded economic self-determination and an official status for the Estonian language. (MMM 1990:17)

Connector to 4: There were actual demonstrations going on in Tallinn without sanction, raising the question of what this was boding for the Baltic States.

The Armenians living in Azerbaidzhan had been demonstrating in Yerevan, and there had also been unrest in other areas of the Soviet Union. (25.2.88 s.10 Kansallislevotto-muudet Tallinnassa/Nationalism-related unrest in Tallinn 2 columns à 70mm)

Domino 2: *This revolt is present from the Baltic republics in the West as far as Armenia in the Caucasus.* (25.2.88)

Connector to 6: The celebration of Independence Day in Estonia, for the first time since 1944, had led to unrest there. There were

no hindrances to the celebrations, though one might have expected such measures from the Soviet authorities.

The first news of the purported restlessness in Estonia was “officially” confirmed when *Sovyetskaya Estonia* (the principal Russian-language daily published in Estonia), in the edition that arrived yesterday, reported demonstrations held on 24th February., the 70th anniversary of the country’s declaration of independence. (IL 29.2.88 **Kremlillä aikaa kuukausi/A month’s time for Kremlin to act**)

Domino 3: Bourgeois-era (Soviet terminology) commemorations in Estonia, hitherto forbidden, are again being celebrated and are proceeding unpunished. (IL 29.2.88) Such commemorations included both **religious festivals, such as Christmas and Easter, and secular holidays, such as Independence Day.**

The re-instituting of the above Christian holidays may be regarded as a measure of social policy by the central administration, aiming at the promotion of national cohesion.

Connector to 7: Due to the preoccupation of the central administration in Moscow with other more acute issues, activities previously forbidden in the Soviet Union are being practised more and more openly. **Ecology**, in addition to ethnic, religious and cultural identity, **was one of the principal areas of political pro-independence activity in the Baltic States.**

Domino 4: Estonia had been involved in a long-term struggle (1944–1988) to maintain its national identity, in the face of Soviet Russian chauvinism, masked as ‘socialist internationalism’ or the ‘friendship of the peoples’. In this struggle, ecology was being mobilized as a weapon. (IL 29.2.88 p.11 Kuituuko NI:n ekologia kansallisuusmellakoihin/Will the Soviet ecology wither with the ethnic unrest?)

Estonian nationalism was taking the role of *reaction to pan-Soviet (Russian) over-industrialization on its territory.*(4.3.88)

Connector to 9: Ecology, ethnic unrest and cultural identity were to be seen as sources of threat to the political status

enjoyed internationally by First Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev as a major reformer. There was a radical difference in the views on the situation in the Soviet in the eyes, respectively, of the Baltic States and of the Kremlin. **Phosphate rock mining was for the sole benefit of the central Government**, to the ecological detriment of Estonia. **To the central government in Moscow, the environmental fate of Estonia was a mere triviality.**

Connector 5: Negative reaction by Moscow to Baltic independence aspirations was to be expected. There was cause for follow-up, by Moscow, on the nationalist aspirations in the Baltic States. (1) IL 9.3.88 Mihail Gorbatshev kohta totuuden edessä **Kreml pelkää jo nationalismin ketjureaktiota** (my larger font and bold, AP) /Mikhail Gorbachev soon to face the truth **Fears rising in the Kremlin of a nationalist chain reaction** (in the Soviet periphery, my addition, AP)

The Soviet Union was indeed tightening its grip on the nationalities question, no longer tolerating any demonstrations *The Centre Party in Finland*, in general, *was avoiding taking any clear stand on the Baltic.* (IL 28.3.88 approx. 2 full-page columns **VIROSSA VIISI PIDÄTETTIIN/ FIVE ARRESTED IN ESTONIA**)

Dominoes 5 and 6: *At this stage of developments in the USSR, fuelled by ecological issues, there were clear signs that nationalism and independence aspirations were on the rise, a grave source of fear for the Kremlin. These would be among the issues Gorbachev would be forced to face.* (4.3.88)

(Connector to W-T Domino 23 : With injustices committed on the Baltic States by the USSR being brought to light, **the Centre Party of Finland was facing accusations of ignoring historical data, in favour of politically expedient doctrine regarding the USSR.** The party was thus avoiding taking a stand on the Baltic States (13.5.88) The above accusation was a substantive reason for the inclusion of the party's paper *Suomenmaa* in the corpus, as suggested by President Kekkonen's biographer Dr. Juhani Suomi. An article in *Ilta-lehti* reports on

the rise in interest in Western fashion in Tallinn, behind the Iron Curtain as it is. (IL 4.6.88 Tallinnan neuvostomuoti on itse ommeltava/Women in Tallinn must themselves sew their Soviet fashion/0.5 pp)

Domino 7: *Breaths of the winds of the Western world of fashion were being taken from Finnish television and German fashion magazines. Fashion-conscious women in Tallinn were welcoming the arrival of the German fashion magazine **Burda** on the Soviet newsstands..(4.6.88)*

Connector to 8: **The Baltic peoples were reassuming their national identities as nations of Western Europe**, fifty years after their incorporation into the USSR, These identities had been purposefully suppressed by Moscow, in favour of a pan-Soviet identity. International contacts, frozen throughout the whole post-war era, were now being spontaneously resumed.

Domino 8: *The Latvian Communist Party leader russophone Boris Pugo was still regar-ding the ‘revisionist’ period, i.e. the non-communist period of the Republic of Latvia, as the cause of the problems between the nationalities.* Discussions in the Kremlin, on the previous Wednesday, had dealt with the acute question of nationalities policy. This was an area that had been completely swept under the carpet, an attitude officially subsumed under the title of **socialist internationalism**. The illusion, in the official sectors of the Soviet Union, as well as in some portions of the West, was that the republics of the Soviet nation were *tied together in bonds of socialist fraternity* In terms of everyday life, the latter term was a euphemism for the pressure of russification. The Russian language was touted in the occupied nations as **the international language**. (IL 30.6.88 Gorbatshov puolusti lehdistön vapautta/Gorbachev defends freedom of the press)

Connector to 24: Thanks to the policies of perestroika and glasnost, **politically sensitive areas such a ethnic relations, work morale** under the Soviet system, indeed **the whole ethos of work in the USSR**, the workers’ state, **had been subjected to unforeseen scrutiny**. So far, the inhabitants of Tallinn had received only official media

reports from the Party conference, with no mention of background skirmishes.

Mart Tarmak, reporter with *Sirp ja Vasar*, foresaw **no changes in Moscow. Party discip-line was so strict that nothing short of a 100% show of hands was to be expected from there in meetings of the Party.** (IL 30.6.88 Tallinna elää epävarmuuden aikaa/Tallinn living a period of uncertainty 1 full page) **The name of the cultural journal *Sirp ja Vasar* (*Hammer and sickle*) was misleading.** The journal was originally (1940-1990) a publication of the *Federation of Creative Artists of Soviet Estonia* (*Loomeliidud*), closely associated with the Communist Party. By the 1980s, however, both the journal and the Federation had developed into very radically-minded organs regarding cultural affairs, both of them lending their open support to the independence aspirations of the Estonian people. The name of the journal was changed to *Reede/Friday* and *Kultuurileht/Cultural magazine*, in line with the changes in the political line, but eventually it reverted to *Sirp*, the name by which it was popularly known.)

Domino 9: The Estonian National Front had been established as an organization supporting Gorbachev's policies of perestroika. Its official status within the official socialist economy is evidenced in a two-day project, where a group of volunteer workers installed a cable system for the National Library, donating the 30,000 roubles for the job to the National Front's account. (The object of the exercise was to demonstrate the flaws in the Soviet economy, in general, and work morale, in particular. The capitalist work ethos was shown to be much more efficient. (IL 30.6.88)

Connector to 25: The Soviet ethos of work was being proved an illusion through a practical demonstration by the Estonian population of efficient work, for the benefit of the Estonian nation, albeit voluntary and unpaid.

The church numbered rank-and-file members of the National Front among its congregations. Also unofficial groups had been founded in the church. In 1940, the church had been sepa-

rated from the state and the school system, coming under ideological and economic pressure from the State (i.e. the USSR, AP). (30.6.88) **Human rights had not been respected in Soviet Estonia in the matter of religious convictions.** Religious beliefs, indeed, were disadvantageous to the professional advancement of church-goers. It was a great personal challenge for people to profess their Christian faith openly while living in Soviet society. (IL 30.6.88 **Viron kirkko tukee perestroikaa ja Mihail Gorbatshovia/ Gorbachev and perestroika supported by the Estonian church**)

Connector to 26: (discrete item) Cultural organizations in Estonia had been joined by the church in the national renaissance.

While the Estonia of 1988 had become surprisingly open and liberated, **the older generation of Estonians**, who had experienced much hardship, were apprehensive, **fearing a return to the cold era of brezhnevism.** (1.7.88) **A stormy period was expected for the autumn of 1988, with the impending official registration of the National Front.** (IL 1.7.88 **Kansan-rintama johtaja Edgar Savisaar ennustaa: “Syksy on Virossa myrskyistä aikaa”/National front leader Edgar Savisaar predicts: “Autumn to be a turbulent season in Estonia”**)

Domino 10: *According to Savisaar, the coming autumn would be a period for reformist processes in Estonia to gather momentum and take a huge step forward.* (IL 1.7.88) The Communist Party would also be changing its leadership at an extra plenary session.

Domino 11: *The Estonian media had broken the traditional image of the Soviet press, from instrument of social stability to that of social change. It had been accorded an independent role in society. One example of this was in the press coverage of popular opposition to the phosphate mining in North-Eastern Estonia. Attempts were made by Moscow to stifle the media, to no avail.* (IL 1.7.88)

Estonia had risen to the forefront of perestroika. The cultural

and national oppression experienced by its people all through the post-war period had been a motive force for this.

Connector to 27, 28

With the decline in respect for the militia and the KGB, Estonian rock had burst into publicity. Concert halls were now daring to open up to people who just a few years ago were classified as “parasites” or “hooligans”. (IL 2.7.88 Hulluja, rikollisia - vai taiteilijoita? **VIRON LAULAVAT RUNOILIJAT**/Are they mad, are they criminal - or are they artists? **ESTONIA'S SINGING POETS** 2-page spread) (*Note: the Russian **huligan** denotes **some-one not respecting the accepted norms of society**. It does not have the connotations of the English cognate **hooligan**, a rough lawless young person* (Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Edition 1979).The Russian/Soviet Estonian term is an issue of *social*, not *legal* sanctions.)

The cause of Estonian independence had been taken up by various rock groups, a factor supporting the aforementioned Soviet Russian interpretation of rock as an expression of delinquency.

In the Russian-speaking film industry almost all production comprised war films. In these, **Estonians were always cast in the roles of fascists**, a term used in the Soviet Union as a derogatory cover term for all those professing anti-Soviet ideologies, while still being identified with Nazi Germany.

Estonians and Finns had been separated throughly by World War II, firstly as a result of the unfortunate post-war historical situation (the Iron Curtain), subsequently by the political climate of the 1960s and 1970s (the era of Brezhnevian stagnation). Even at the beginning of the 1980s, **the Finn arriving in Tallinn received some sort of shock when he realized he was not in Russia.** In British terminology, the term *Russia(n)* had often been substituted for *Soviet*. Thus, for the average Britisher, even though he might have been going to the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, or anywhere else in the Soviet Union, for that matter, he would of-ten say he was going to Russia. The

same, to some extent, unfortunately also applied to the Finns. Indeed, the *Collins English Dictionary*, Collins London & Glasgow 1980, cites as one of the meanings for the entry *Russia* : *another name for the Soviet Union*.

Even official artistic invitation visas were subject to processing by the KGB. (My bold, AP). One such instance was that of **the Urb Brothers**, an Estonian vocalist duo, who had been invited to Finland, **were subject to KGB screening.** (My bold, AP). The ubiquitous presence of the latter organization in the everyday life of the citizenry was one of the causes of Estonian opposition to the system.

Domino 12: *Estonian rock music was expressing the Estonian identity and desire for independence from the USSR.*

Connector to 28: The West-oriented Estonian identity was asserting itself, in forms not quite acceptable to the Soviet authorities. (IL 7.7.88 Viro juhlii vanhan lipun uutta tulemistä "**Tämä on meille sanomaton ilo**")/Estonia celebrating the new coming of her old flag "**This is an incredible joy for us**" (½ page:4 columns, 3-column photo)

Domino 13: *The Estonian National Front, rising from the social apathy existing hitherto in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, had for several weeks been using the old blue, black and white Estonian national flag in its functions and in its symbols, but now the flag was also official.* (7.7.88) --- *The Estonians had played an open hand in the flame represented by Gorbachev's perestroika. In a short period of time, the Estonian government had granted the population liberties unimaginable some years ago. At the moment, the prime demand was the economic independence of the country. The following demand, implicitly present, will be full political independence.*

Connector to 29: This self-assertion is taking its most concrete form in the use of the hitherto banned flag of the Republic of Estonia, first on an unofficial level, subsequently also officially. The KGB, mentioned in Text 27, had, under the influence of glas-

nost, lost its former hold over Soviet society.

Activist Vello Väärtnõu *was arrested on fabricated charges of aiming to escape the Soviet Union.* On gaining his freedom he became an artist, to be arrested again. Upon his subsequent release, he founded a Buddhist order in Estonia, only to be arrested a third time in January 1988 as one of the founders of the ERSP, the Estonian National Independence Party. Väärtnõu issued a prophecy of the coming coup d'état. (Bud-dhalainen Vello, 36, sai lähteä Virosta. Onko hän turmiollinen mies nyky-Neuvostoliitolle? “PERESTROIKA PÄÄTTY Y VEREN-VUODATUKSEEN”/Vello, 36, Buddhist, expelled from Estonia. Is he a ruinous influence on the Soviet Union of today? “PERESTROIKA WILL END UP IN BLOODSHED”(IL 9.7.88 pp18-19 Double spread article)

Connector to 30: Underground pro-independence movements had been active among deportees in Arctic Siberia, with several levels of contact between parties advocating independence for the various parts of the USSR incorporated into the latter during the course of World War II.

The ethnic kinfolk of the Finns, the Estonians and the Hungarians were stepping into a new future. A question raised in this regard was *whether the Finns should demonstrate some special understanding or support.* (11.7.88) There had been voices from Estonia from the new popular movement, voices accusing the Finns of forgetting Estonia during the hard post-war years. The criticism was undoubtedly justified. **Finland did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, in accordance with its official foreign policy, as well as the terms of the Treaty of Paris, between Finland and the Soviet Union.**

Now, however, Estonia had grabbed the headlines and its events were being followed in Finland with unflinching interest. While the Finns certainly wished the Estonians more civic rights and more freedom, **the Finnish position was such that the people could not, for their**

part, directly assist these aspirations. Even so, **(the Finns) had dared to speak about these openly.** (my bold print, AP) It was a fact, that Finnish radio and television were widely followed in Estonia. (IL 11.7.88 p.2 Editorial Veljeskansat uuden edessä/Ethnic kinfolk facing something new)

Domino 14: *The Finnish media were being followed avidly in Estonia, these being regarded there as a vanguard of political reform.*

Connector to 31: In addition to Hungary and Estonia, Lithuania was also seething with aspirations towards independence.

A crowd numbering around a thousand demonstrators managed to force their way through a double chain of police onto the Cathedral Square, another thousand demonstrating outside the square, *demanding Soviet recognition of the 1920 agreement guaranteeing Lithuania its independence.* The demonstrators were insisting that Lithuanian-Soviet relations be based on justice. Independence had been recognized by Lenin himself, but, even so, Lithuania was annexed by the Soviet Union at the outset of the Second World War. (IL 14.7.88 p.10 Tuhansia mielenosoittajia **Myös Liettua kuohui kansallistunteista/** Thousands of demonstrators **Lithuania, too, seething with nationalist sentiment**)

Domino 15: *The Soviet police yesterday was unable to prevent nationalist demonstrations in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius. (14.7.88)*

Connector to 32:

In addition to the Baltic States and Hungary, also the Caucasian republics and the Crimean Tartars were moving resolutely towards independence from Moscow. Independence demands were spreading over the whole Soviet Union.

Overall turmoil abounded. Estonia, Latvia, the whole Baltic area and the Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan, were boiling. The Crimean Tartars, exiled from the area by Stalin in 1944, in retribution for their cooperation with Germany, were demonstrating on the streets of Moscow, expressing a wish to return to their lands. The Soviet Union was boiling

internally, more vehemently than at any time in its history. There was no point in predicting any major armed conflict, but the Kremlin did not appear to have much time to make crucial decisions **on whether to let the border states go or to prevent secession by armed force or by employing its other traditional methods:** strong censorship, arrests, threats. --Any solution would arouse russophobia which in turn would again accelerate the end of the state. **The area of greatest interest to the Finns was, of course, Estonia.** For the first time in a long, long period, history was turning, or, at least strongly squirming. (IL 16.7.88 **Kiehuuko Gorbatshovin kaalikeitto yli äyräiden/Is Gorbachev's cabbage soup** (the Russians' national dish) boiling over?)

Domino 16: *There was reason to believe that the Prague spring of 1968 was to get as a partner - the Tallinn autumn of 1988.* The difference here was that rebellion was occurring *within the Soviet Union*, and, apparently, *with the support of the party leader.*

Was Gorbachev more afraid than he was making out? Did he honestly believe that the Soviet Union would stay intact without force, were the questions being asked. (16.7.88) The tenets applying to the Soviet system hitherto had lost their relevance.

Domino 17: *Just before the Party congress, Estonia presented its most radical demands, to which Gorbachev, in his fear, acceded.*

Connector to Domino 17: **Gorbachev was facing the most radical demands in his career.** The Soviet Union was suddenly wanting peace in Afghanistan. THE OPEN QUESTION IS "WHY?" (**Gorbachev had, with a rapid slash, cut open the boil that was gradually being rubbed open. The pus was flying in his face.**)

Italehti assumed Gorbachev to have been asked for permission for the use of the blue-black-and-white flag, yet the article expressed concern for *what the old Red Army veterans* (non-Estonian, mostly Russian, AP) *thought.*

The article raised the question of why, in the first place, should Finland be concerned at the reactions of old Red Army veterans

in Estonia to the reassertion of a national identity not theirs. **The flag of the non-communist Republic of Estonia had immense symbolic and sentimental value to the Estonians.** Was the move to make it official a tactical move by Gorbachev to quieten possible rebellion in the republic? Or was it to result in ever more unrest?)

Connector to Domino 18:

Gorbachev was expected to move in the direction of dictatorship in the USSR as a result of developments in the Baltic States. Even so, there seemed to be *a felt need by Finland* (my bold italics, AP) to placate Russian World War II veterans in the Baltic States for fear that they (the veterans, AP) would feel themselves betrayed by the dissolution of the USSR.

The negative aspect of the delicate Finnish relationship with Moscow, alleged by the leaders of the country to be one of solid friendship, is eminently illuminated by the above Finnish fears.

Domino 18: The reaction from Moscow was interpreted in Estonia as signifying that Gorbachev would be governing dictatorially in Moscow for the next ten years as president. Whatever happened in Moscow, it would spell danger for Estonia. (16.7.88) There was little danger of the population rising up actively, in the military sense. **The primary cause for Estonian action was the prevailing Russian chauvinism.**

Connector to Domino 19:

Estonia is seeking its identity on all fronts, political, ethnic and cultural.

Whereas *in the 1930s Tallinn was in the artistic sense Finland's window to Europe, the tables had now turned. Eyes south of the Gulf of Finland had turned to Finland: world art was present in Estonia largely by way of Finland.* According to artist Tõnis Vint, the artists had always been in opposition. First they had trouble with the official authorities, and now they were in trouble probably because of their neo-expressionism. (10) IL 20.7.88 *Viron taide etsii idetiteettiään: MAALAAAN, OLEN SIIS*

OLEMASSA / Estonian art in a search for itself: I PAINT, THEREFORE I AM) (DOUBLE SPREAD ARTICLE)

Domino 19: *The influence of Finland on Estonia, in mutual existence since the 19th century, in the fields of art and culture, had made itself strongly felt in Estonia as a breath of influence from the continent is in the process of being broken.*

Cultural-political progress was the Estonians' prime aim, in the form of short steps. **The first aim was economic autonomy**, with possible full independence, but there was no reason to hurry with this, according to Tiit T. Nõu. **The misleading use of the official English transcription of Estonian names written in the Cyrillic alphabet was an instance of the imposed cultural hegemony of Russia within all areas of the USSR.** (the Russian /ы/ (as in Косыгин) is rendered in Estonian as /õ/ as in Kossõgin) and as /y/ in English, Kosygin. Nõu was spelt Nyu.) (IL 26.7.88 *Virolaiset Maarianhaminassa: "Kukaan ei tiedä NL:n ideologiaa"/Estonians in Mariehamn: "No-one knows what the Soviets' ideology is"*)

In the Tall Ships Race, the Estonians had attracted attention with their high Estonian profile, as well as with their success in the race. The campaigns by the boats the "Tormilind" and the "Linda" had made it clear to the audience that the boats had come specifically from **Estonia**. The boats were flying the country's old blue-black-and-white flag, that of the independent Republic of Estonia, not the red flag. The list of participants names the boats as being from Estonia, not from the USSR. (26.7.88)

We are Estonians first, and only then from the USSR, the sailors had said. It was quite the correct thing to emphasize the nationality of the boat. Even Lenin's principles had recommended autonomy for the national states. According to Tiit Nõu, Estonians did not have much cause for complaint regarding their standard of living. "Financially we are better off than we were. So much so, that in the rest of the USSR we are regarded as capitalist, a belief leading to a desire to emigrate here

(from elsewhere in the USSR, AP), since life here is so much better.” Estonia did not however view immigrants from the rest of the Soviet Union favourably. Nõu had dug up some statistics according to which, **in 1938, 97% of the population of Estonia was Estonian. In 1959, the corresponding figure was only 74% and now, in 1988, a mere 59%.** It had been the Estonians futile hope and belief that this trend would cease with the implementation of perestroika.

Domino 20: *National awareness was rising, this time in the field of sailing.*

Domino 21: *The Domino of Afghanistan, invaded by the USSR, in 1979 had risen. Soviet troops were being withdrawn.*

On the international scene, Estonia was beginning to participate in a large variety of pan-European events **as a country in its own right.** (IL 20.5.88 **Old Toomas ralli haaveilee EM-arvosta/Old Toomas rally (in Estonia) dreaming of being part of the European Cham-pion-ship rallies)**

Domino 22: *Estonian identity, independent of the Soviet Union, was again being under-scored.*

Observers, would not have credited Yeltsin with such direct statements as a demand for the resignation of one of the leaders of the conservative faction of the CPSU, had Gorbachev and other reformists not suggested that they not directly oppose such steps. The ultimate opposition between Yeltsin and Ligachev, to be seen at the barricades in 1991, was already making itself felt. (IL 31.5.88 **Todellinen pommi Moskovasta Jeltsin vaatii Ligatshevin eroa/ A real bombshell from Moscow Yeltsin calling for Ligachev's resignation)**

Domino 23: *IL 31.5.88: Yeltsin was already seeing the conservative forces as a threat to political reform in the USSR, Ligachev being one of the men ultimately to be involved in the abortive 1991 coup.*

A Connector to the events of August 1991 and the abortive coup against President Gor-bachev

The national movement was attaining new dimensions south of the Gulf of Finland. **Over 100,000 Estonians participated with impunity in a mass meeting in Tallinn.** (IL 18.6.88 Front-page story: Yli 100 000 kokootui Tallinnassa VIRO VAATII VAPAUTTA/Over 100 000 assemble in Tallinn ESTONIA DEMANDING ITS FREEDOM)

Domino 24: On 18.6.88, Finland was noting the rising national sentiment in Estonia, all of Tallinn gathered on the Song Festival field, under blue-black-white flags, with half of Estonia joining them. The most ardent proponent of glasnost and perestroika in Estonia, the unofficial National Front, was celebrating with its activists in Tallinn, in a peaceful assembly of 100,000 people to hear what its representatives were to say - and what the people wanted them to say - at the Party conference convening in Moscow the following month. The resignation of party leader Karl Vaino on 17.6. had saved the day: People were spontaneously singing Estonian songs. The Prime Minister Indrek Toome was demanding an economically independent Estonia, with over 100,000 people joining him, in the name of perestroika and its honour.: (1) IL 18.6.88 p.9: Tallinna kokeili glasnostin rajoja rauhallisesti yli 100 000 ihmisen voimalla: "OMA RUPLA, OMA ULKOMAANKAUPPA!"/Tallinn putting glasnost limits to the test peacefully, with over 100,000 people:/"OUR OWN ROUBLE, OUR OWN FOREIGN TRADE" Full page)

On 28th June, Tallinn saw a 400-person demonstration before the Estonian Planning Committee building, organized by the National Front and Green activists, demanding independence for Estonia in their placards. The Estonian National Front leaders reported **Gorbachev and Vaino Väljas**, new First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, **as being friends. having studied together for a year in Party School.** It is feasible that **this fact had its part to play in allowing the Estonian Communist Party to pursue its reforms without fear of retribution from the CPSU.**

The non-Estonian population of the Estonian SSR, the purposely imported military and labour forces from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (Russia proper) arrived (180,000) during 1946-7, the first two post-World War II years, This section of the population did not comprehend the Estonian aspirations for independence outside the USSR. (Zetterberg, 2007:675) The immigration process was to continue at an accelerating rate.

Kalju Mätlik, Assistant at the Department of Automation of the Tallinn Polytechnic Institute and one of the leading figures in the national renaissance, **deemed the most important aspect of the Estonian reforms to be financial independence.** The Estonian government was more aware of what Estonia needed than was Moscow. Mätlik did regard **Gorbachev as the right man for the job, surrounded, though he was, by conservatives.**

Estonian sources reported Moscow having refused to accredit Estonian press representatives to the 1988 Party Conference in Moscow. The latter would allegedly provide all necessary details in time. Estonia refused to accept this offer. **Upon intervention by the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party to the Conference, some representatives of the Estonian press were admitted.** The people of Tallinn were very proud of **their National Front**, stressing at all times that it **was in the forefront of Soviet reforms, of perestroika.** It was largely because of this fact, apparently, that it had been possible for the National Front to pursue its aims so openly. (IL 29.6.88 p.10, 0.5 pp Tallinnalai-nen keskiaasialainen mili-isi: “VIROLAISSET TULLEET HULLUIKSI” Central Asian-born militiaman (= policeman) from Tallinn: **“THE ESTONIANS HAVE GONE CRAZY”**) In retrospect (2005) it might be conjectured that **the Estonians deliberately created the National Front** as a support organization for perestroika. **It was believed that the state would not intervene against an ostensibly pro-Soviet movement.** Demographic and environmental issues were, nevertheless, the central issues at the root of the Estonians' movement.

Domino 25: *The new leader of the Estonian Communist Party Vaino Väljas, at the head of Estonian political reform, was a long-time acquaintance, even friend, of Mikhail Gorba-chev. It is partly on this friendship that the Estonians base their hopes for their reforms to succeed.*

Up to now, the people of Tallinn had had to satisfy themselves with official communiques from the Moscow Party conference. Mart Tarmak, editor of the newspaper *Sirp ja Vasar*, a publication close to the National Front, saw no policy changes to be expected in Moscow. While some weeks ago, the National Front was not allowed to open its own bank account, this too was now in order. People could now give their contributions to the Front.-- We have suggested that Russian repatriation should be subsidized if the people were to go back to their places of origin. (1) IL 30.6.88 1 whole page Tallinna elää epävarmuuden aikaa/Tallinn living a period of uncertainty)

Domino 26: *Contrary to feelings expressed in the Letters to the Editor sections of the Russian-language press in Estonia, the Estonians had not demanded the eviction of the Russian population from Estonia. Western news bureaux would, of course, like blood and violence in their headlines, but we are not going to provide them with that pleasure, they (the Estonians) say. (direct quote from text)*

Domino 27: *The Church, hitherto a factor of minor importance in Soviet society, was raising its profile to that of a major source of influence. (IL 9.8.89 p.11 0.25 pp. Ribbentrop-sopimus julkaistaan - Baltian kuohunta jatkuu Viron vaalilaki uusiksi - venäläiset tänään lakkoon?/Ribbentrop Agreement out in public Continued restlessness in the Baltics New Estonian Electoral Act - Will the Russians go on strike today?; (IL 30.6.88 0.5 pp.(Viron kirkko tukee perestroikaa ja Mihail Gorbatshovia/Support from the Estonian church for perestroika and Mikhail Gorbachev)*

Domino 28: *The Estonian parliament yesterday passed a new Electoral Act, with representatives of the Russian Interfront movement threatening to begin a strike about the issue on Wednesday.*

Further grist to the Estonian mill was in the announcement that ---

Domino 29: *A Soviet parliamentary commission was to publish the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the document that was seen as the very foundations of the current political status of Estonia. Relations between the sections of population in Estonia were threatening to explode, for there were plans afoot to organise anti-Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact demonstrations on 23.8., the 50th anniversary of the Pact, in all three republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.*

Historian and Soviet parliamentarian **Yuri Afanasyev** had caused a news sensation on Tuesday, with his announcemet of the commission to publish the Ribbentrop Agree-ment before 23rd August, together with the inferences to be drawn from this. (IL 9.8.89 Ribbentrop Treaty broke the law)

Domino 30:

Mikhail Gorbachev had a special committee formed to look into the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in May, 1989, despite the vehement opposition of many members of the parliament of the Soviet Union. The agreement was deemed invalid from the beginning, the transfer of Soviet troops to the Baltic could be regarded as direct occupation. Even so, the above fact had, in the opinion of Moscow, no bearing on the status of the Baltic States as constituent republics of the Soviet Union.

Estonia had been presented with its first new political party other than the Communist Party. (IL 22.8.88 p.5 /approx. 1 column: Viron oppositiolle viikonloppuna uusi puolue: Täysi itse-näisyys Eestiin/ New opposition party for Estonia during the coming weekend **Full in-dependence for Estonia**)

Domino 31: *In comparison to the Communist Party's demand for limited self-government within the Soviet Union, the new National Independence Party (Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltuma-tuse Partei) was on 23.8.88 to present a declaration demanding no more and no less than full independence for Estonia.*

The delegates represented non-communist groups or organizations,

including the Christian Democratic Union. There were no representatives of the approved opposition grouping, the National Front. The leader of the new party is Tiit Madisson, who has been leader of the so-called **MRP-AEG (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pakt Avalikustamise Eesti Grupp/ MRP-EDG Molotov-Ribbentrop Pakt Estonian Disclosure Group)**.

President Koivisto presented his claim of the Finnish stand, **regarding the Soviet coup d'état as more critical than anywhere else in the world**, as follows:

Mon 19.8.91: *According to its critical stand, the Finnish government regrets (my bold italics, AP) the interruption to the democratic development of the Soviet Union as a result of the declaration of the state of emergency. A stand more critical than this is hard to find.* (IL 23.8.91)

In actual fact, the Finnish government had, in August 1991, refused to call the coup a coup, for fear of arousing the ire of the new powers-that-be. Furthermore, the illegality of the coup received no censure.

The Baltic declarations of independence will find the support of Finland **in the event of such declarations being supported by a democratic Russia!!!!** (my bold, my exclamation marks, AP)) (1)
IL 23.8.88 Editorial: Mikään ei muutu, eikö?/Nothing will change, will it?)

Domino 32: IL 24.8.88 Front page headlines: A procession banner reading "EESTIVABAKS!; Sadat tuhannet liikkeellä Baltiassa "VIRO VAPAAKSI!"/"FREEDOM FOR ESTONIA!; Hundreds of thousands on the move in the Baltic States" (Text headline: Neu-vostohistorioitsija Ribbentrop-päivänä **VIRO ON YHÄ MIEHITETTY/ Soviet historian on Ribbentrop day ESTONIA STILL OCCUPIED)**

Hundreds of thousands of people, in demonstrations held throughout the Baltic States yesterday, had demanded their independence on the 49th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.. In Tallinn alone, there were over ten thousand demonstrators, with large masses on the move also in Tartu, Võru, Pärnu and Viljandi. (2/3 page

Sadat tuhannet marssivat Ribbentrop-päivänä: **Itsenäisyys in-nosti Baltian**/Hundreds of thousands march on Ribbentrop Day: **Baltic States enthusiastic for independence**)

The events in the article were again surprising, bearing in mind the extreme sensitivity of the Soviet authorities to expressions of opposition. The inference is that there was so much going on in the Russian Federation itself, that the powers-that-be in Moscow, the CPSU and the KGB, were powerless to act. The further question thus arising is *Why?* and *What then?*.

It is these questions that the current study is attempting to answer.

Hundreds of thousands of people, in demonstrations organized in the Baltic States on 23rd August, the 49th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, were demanding their independence. (*IL 24.8.88 Sadat tuhannet marssivat Ribbentrop-päivänä: **Itsenäisyys innosti Baltian**/Hundreds of thousands march on Ribbentrop Day **Independence rouses Baltic States***) In these demonstrations, Stalin's victims were remembered in posters bearing slogans such as:
Down with the KGB!, Estonia is occupied territory!

(*IL 24.8.88 „Valehtelun on loputtava“/“The Lies must cease“*)

A further article reported on the stands on Estonian independence among the ERSP (Estonian National Independence Party), the EKP (Estonian Communist Party), the National Front, all positive (almost the double-spread), and the Internationalist movement, under the leadership of Yevgeni Kogan, who demonstrated (with a group of some hundred Russians behind the Tallinn Political Indoc-trination Building) against the Estonian national fervour that had risen to high heavens.

The stance of the Inter movement toward the independence movement in Estonia was expressed as follows, in quotes from an interview of Kogan. Kogan attributed the bad reputation he enjoyed to the media, and also, perhaps, to local chauvinism. (my bold, AP) But we will show the clearly-thinking Estonians (my bold, AP)

that there is nothing to fear in us (the russophones)

It is to be noted that, to Russian nationalist extremists, any aspirations to secession or even smaller deviations from centralized power in Moscow, such as ensuring the rights of the local languages, were classified as local chauvinism, an aspiration to be condemned.

The National Front did not share Kogan's views: **Were the National Front sincerely to criticize nationalism, wrote Kogan, we would have no differences of opinion. We are seeking the same stand on the nationality issue. Should we find such a stand, and the two strong organisations say their word, there will be nothing much for the others to say.** It is to be noted here the National Front stands *for* Estonian nationalism, the Inter movement for Russia nationalism, called *internationalism* by the movement! (AP) Kogan regarded all other Estonian parties, such as the ERSP (Estonian Party for Nationalist Independence) to be aiming at the compartmentalization of people according to their nationality. A person such as he, with a Jewish father and a Russian mother, was a problem

Domino 33: IL 27.8.88 pp. 12-13 Harri Sirolan raportti Tallinnan mielenosoituksista Virolainen konsensus: kohteliasta kenkää Moskovaan/Harri Sirola's report on the Tallinn demonstrations Estonian consensus politely gives the boot to Moscow) It is to be noted here that the Estonian aspiration to maintain their national identity, in the face of a policy of deliberate russification, did not find understanding with the representative of the Inter movement.

The nationalist spirit newly awake in Estonia, with its mass meetings was also reflected in the Rocksummer, a festival of the late 1980s and early 1990s, without in any way endangering the festival, on the contrary. The Estonians, themselves, most powerfully vented their feelings in the performances by Alo Mattiisen and the In Spe group. The message sent by Alo, composer of a suite of five possible national anthems was clear: "I am an Estonian, and an Estonian I will remain." (also the name of one of his songs)

Background support, though of quite a rough kind, was provided by

the Finnish group *Sleepy Sleepers*, disguised as the *Leningrad Cowboys*, another celebrated Finnish pop group, when Saku Kuosmanen, one of the singers, recited to the Russians just strolling about on the streets of Tallinn, noses in the air, and filling the country full of tractor collective farms.

Domino 34: IL 29.8.88 pp16-17 Double page spread “200 000 koki perestroikin”/200,00 experience perestroick

The 1949 deportations to Siberia as an aftermath of collectivization found expression in the play *Lahkumine/The Departure*. by Rein Saluri. (IS 17.9.88 Viro ei enää vaikene Mati Unt ohjaa näytelmän pakkosiirtoista Siperiaan/Estonia quiet no longer Mati Unt directing play on deportations to Siberia in the Finnish National Theatre. The treatment of issues such as the above had led to questions being asked in Estonia on its future, for instance **whether Estonia was going to secede from the USSR**. According to Juhan Aare, Estonian Greens leader, perestroika would lead to neither socialism nor capitalism. The aim was for something in between the two.

Alcohol was being experienced as a panacea for the problems existing in the Soviet Union. (1) IS 24.9.88 Vanha talouspolitiikka käyttöön Neuvostoliitto kurittaa inflaatiota votkalla/Old economic policies applied USSR disciplines inflation with vodka)

Panu Toivonen, forester and Secretary-General of Perustuslainen Oikeistopuolue, the Constitutional Right-Wing Party, **was appealing to Suomalaisuuden Liitto**, the Association for the Preservation of Finnish Culture and Identity, **to remember their kinsfolk south of the Gulf of Finland**, asking why Finland was showing so little interest in Estonia. 2) (IS 29.9.88 Letter to the editor Suomalaisuuden liitto ja virolaisveljemme/The Association for the Preservation of Finnish Culture and our Estonian kinsmen)

In contrast, **Heikki Rinne**, Social Democratic MP, held **Toivonen to have gone to extremes in his aid to Estonia**, in claiming that Estonia was lacking in paper, videotapes and empty sound cassettes.

Such an attitude, according to Rinne, was condescending to the Estonians. **Rinne held the official truth published by the USSR on the USSR in general, and Estonia in particular, to be of high credibility.** (3) IS 29.9.88 Letters to Editor Pienempi-kin into riittäisi hyvin/A little less enthusiasm would be in order)

Protagonists of Estonian independence had been imprisoned in the Estonia SSR. One of the more prominent of these was being released. (IS 1.10.88 Keskuskomitea vapauttaa mielipidevängin Enn Tar-to istui uudistusten puolesta/Central Committee frees dissenter Enn Tar-to imprisoned fighting for reform;IL 3.10.88 Viron kansanrintama vaatii itsemääräämisoikeutta „Kremlin kuunneltava kansamme mielipidettä“/Estonian National Front demanding self-determination “Kremlin must listen to opinions of our people” (IS 4.10.88 Kääntäjä Piret Saluri:VIROSSA ON NYT SANANVAPAAUS/Piret Saluri, translator: NOW ESTONIA HAS FREEDOM OF SPEECH)) For Saluri, Estonians now had freedom of speech, although the ingrained self-censorship would be difficult to eradicate. Saluri, together with her husband Rein, were in Finland for the premiere of Rein Saluri's play *Minnek/Lähtö* (The departure), dealing with the deportations from Estonia in 1949, implemented by the Soviet Union. Censorship was still in existence, with all manuscripts being read by the *Glavlit* censorship authorities.

Domino 35: *The Estonian Federation of Writers Secretary for Foreign Relations, Ülo Tuulik held censorship to have lost its significance, as had socialist realism, to date the prevailing literary stream in the USSR.* In previous years, the publication of a literary work might have depended on the choice of one word. **A work banned for the past 10 years, Maria Siberimaal/Maria in Siberia, by Heino Kiik, depicting the author's experiences as a deportee in Siberia, had now been released for publication.** (IS 4.10.88)

While there was still work to be done in the evaluation of *the role of literature as an agent in cultural awareness* during the whole of its existence, **had been liberated.** The forces behind the process had been the **Finnish Society of Estonia** and the Tartu branch of the Communist Party of Estonia. (2. IS 4.10.88 Napakympistä tuli Tv mäng vallaliste

Viro vapautta Suomen television/Estonia frees Finnish television/
ca 1 column)

With the ranks of the pro-Estonian groupings being organized in Finland, Erkki Pihkala, president of Suomalaisuuden Liitto, the Association of Finnish Culture and Identity, wished to dissociate his organization from matters dealing with Estonia. The primary objective was to be the defence of the Finnish-speaking population against the onslaught of the Swedish-speakers. (2.IS 4.10.88 Letter to the editor Tukea virolaisille harkittava tarkkaan/ Support for Estonians should be weighed carefully)

At age 7, playwright Rein Saluri and his mother had been deported to Siberia in 1946 (the *departure* of the title of the play *The departure*, AP). His father had been imprisoned and killed. It was not until 1951 that mother and son were permitted to return to Estonia, only to find that their house had been appropriated by the state. *Saluri regarded it a historical lie to claim that Estonia had voluntarily joined the USSR.* For him, literature was the only way to lead an active political life.

Domino 36: IS 6.10.88 Kirjailija Rein Saluri:Virolaisten pakkosiirrot olivat nimetöntä väkivaltaa/The deportation of Estonians was a process of blind, anonymous use of force, says writer Rein Saluri whose play *Lähtö* (*The Departure*) is celebrating its premiere in the National Theatre in Helsinki.

Hitherto, the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic had been inextricably linked with the Soviet economy. The country desperately needed its own currency to make any reform, even Gorbachev's perestroika, work. The first opportunity for this was to come in 1990. The rouble had lost its value. Estonia began implementing its own economic reform program termed *IME*, an acronym for *Isemajandav Eesti/Estonia, under own management*. In Estonian, the word *ime* also means *miracle*.

Domino 37: IS 12.10.88 Moskovalaisfirmat kansallistetaan 1990 Viro vaatii omaa rahaa/ Moscow-owned firms (in Estonia) to be nationalized in 1990 Estonia demanding its own currency. The implication in the latter meaning is *the manner in which the Estonians experienced the economic reforms in the country*, reforms separate from the events in Moscow. **It was, indeed, a miracle that the circumstances in Moscow were conducive to such reforms.** IME was also to involve a transition to progressive taxation of Estonians by Estonians and the country's responsibility for its own natural resources and labour, hitherto regulated by Moscow. It was a source for surprise for the writer of the current letter that **the Estonian cause had been taken up by the left-wing socialists in Finland.** (IS 12.10 Letter to editor Viroon demokratia/Democracy for Estonia, Jorma E. Taivainen, Vantaa)

The Seoul Olympic Games had become a forum for the Estonian sportsmen again. The Estonians won six medals, whereas Finland brought only four. The waves of nationalism had received new impetus. Erika Salumäe, the cyclist, won a gold medal. In the results as reported in the press, the victory was reported as: Gold medal: **Erika Salumäe (Estonia), NOT: Erika Salumäe (USSR)**

Domino 38: IS 15.10.88 1 page Suomenlahden takana juhlistan kuutta mitalistia Voittiko Viro Suomen Soulin kisoissa?/Six medalists feted on the opposite shore of the Gulf of Finland Did Estonia take a victory over Finland in the Seoul Olympic Games? The results were published in a double spread under the title **Soulin kultavyöry yli koko Neuvostoliiton/ All USSR flooded under Seoul gold medal avalanche**
Lithuania (10)

Latvia (3)

Estonia (2) Erika Salumäe and Tiit Sökk, basketball

This was the first such post-war report to come to the writer's notice, *where Estonia was not presented officially in the Finnish press as a mere appendage of the Soviet Union.*

Estonia now had its new heroes, the most charismatic being

Heinz Valk, artist, cartoonist and politician, who gave a patriotic speech on Finnish TV news, in a report on the first meeting of the National Front. (46)

Domino 39: IS 15.10.88 Glasnost värjää Viron kadut ja kujat / Glasnost colours the streets and lanes of Estonia

Domino 40 (in detail): *Here Valk was presenting the Tallinn street scene. Newspapers were in short supply, with everyone buying them for the news. Valk was widely being quoted by the Estonians. In his speeches he was thankful for the patriotism still alive in the Estonians, a feeling the stalinists were unable to smother. Speaking to the youth of Estonia Valk disavowed revenge, but also reconciliation.*

The press also expressed some scepticism. **Heikki Rinne, Social Democratic Finnish MP**, regarded aid to Estonia, with donations of a technical nature, such as paper, videotapes and empty audio cassettes (as suggested by Panu Toivonen), as condescending to the Estonians. **Rinne held the official truth published by the USSR, on the USSR in general, and Estonia in particular, to be of high credibility.** (61. IS 22.10.88 Letter to the editor: Rin-teelle Virosta/To Rinne re:Estonia/Panu Toivonen, Forester, (in reply to No.52 Pienempikin into riittäisi hyvin/A little less enthusiasm wouldn't go astray)

In reply to Rinne, **Panu Toivonen**, of the **Constitutional Party**, expressed his objections to the above attack on Finnish-Estonian friendship. Toivonen reminded Rinne that **Trivimi Velliste, President of the Estonian Antiquities Conservation Society had asked for gifts of paper, radio- and video cassettes to record samples of Estonian culture in danger of extinction** (at the hands of pan-Soviet ideology). Toivonen cited an extreme form of cultural animosity to Estonia in the matter of the site of **the ruins of the Estonian National Museum, the Raadi manor house near Tartu**. Destroyed by the USSR during the war, the ruins were surrounded with barbed wire, **with a sign to the effect that trespassers would be shot**. The Soviet authorities seemed to regard Estonian interest in

the ruins as a threat to the central administration, symbolic as they were of Estonian culture, endangered under Soviet domination.

Columnist Markus Leikola perceived two attitudes to Estonia in Finland: **firstly, hiding one's head in the bush**, with extreme concern, **to see to it that the Estonians would not spoil everything brought along by glasnost and perestroika** (i.e. for the good of Finland) (the Koivisto attitude) The destinies of states (the USSR) were seen to be more important than the destinies of peoples (the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians). This were seen to be more importas a mercilessly hard attitude. **Secondly, one could adopt a mild form of ecstasy** - be enthusiastic about everything occur-ring there, without making too much fuss about it.

Thirdly, Leikola thought **the Estonians should be grateful to the Russian imports, the labour force that had enabled it to attain its current standard of living**. For every kilogram of raw materials dug from the Estonian soil, there was a Russian sweeping the streets of Tallinn - a situation fraught with seeds of discontent. Consequently, Markus Leikola, the writer, draws the conclusion that it would be undemocratic to legislate a Language Act making Estonian the only official language. (IL 27.10.88 NÄIN ON -palsta/Column THAT'S THE WAY IT IS Markus Leikola)

The irony inherent in the text was indeed food for thought for the average Finn ignorant of the ethnic situation in Estonia. The statement referring to the mining of raw materials from Estonian soil did not take into account the environmental damage wrought by the mining activities to the Estonian landscape, the fact that the proceeds from the mining did not remain in Estonia and thirdly the fact that the labour for this environmentally harmful activity had been imported for the sole purpose of mining. The social benefits for the imported labour force were at the expense of the indigenous population. While Leikola claimed that it would be undemocratic to make Estonian the only official language of the country, he would have no scruples retarding the import of Russian labour for sweeping the streets,

as he claims to be the case.

Seppo Zetterberg, renowned Baltic affairs scholar, **discussed this week's first public stand taken by President Mauno Koivisto on developments in the Baltic and on the National Fronts.** (63. IL 28.10.88 Viron tutkija Seppo Zetterberg: "**Jokainen perestroikan päivä on kuin henkivakuutus Baltialle**" / Estonia specialist S.Z.: Every day of perestroika is like a life insurance policy for the Baltic States)

Koivisto had expressed *considerable unease at what was happening in the Baltics*. The president claimed that we (the Finnish state, AP) had official foreign relations **with foreign states, not popular movements** (my bold, AP). Regarding this last statement, it must be stated that **Finland enjoyed official relationships with the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), fighting for an independent Palestine, with the ANC (African National Council) and SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization, founded in 1960.** The fact that the United Nations had not recognized the South-African regime in Namibia are, no doubt, the grounds for the diplomatic status accorded to SWAPO. Likewise, during the Pinochet era in Chile, Finland did not maintain official relations with the Pinochet regime, but, instead, with the adherents of Salvador Allende, the legally elected president, overthrown by General Augusto Pinochet.

It is to be noted that the United States had not recognized the incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet Union, a fact evidenced by the existence of the BATUN organization (Baltic Appeal to the United Nations), operating from the United States. Even so, this fact did not lead to official adoption by Finland of a conciliatory, let alone a sympathetic, attitude to the Baltic aspirations. According to Zetterberg, for the first time since the Russian revolution, it happened that in Estonia the *Estonian* Communist Party and the nationalists in the Popular Front were jointly involved in the struggle for independence.

In like manner to Zetterberg, the writer sees Finland as the prime model for Estonia.

Osmo Jussila, Professor of Finnish history, specializing in Finnish-Russian relations, saw the television documentary on the Estonian National Front as simply a display of colourful language, otherwise disappointing, just a reading of the Estonian Foreign Minister's memoirs and a quote from (Estonian Commander-in-Chief) General Laidoner, dated 1939. Why not 1940?, asks Jussila. June 1940 would have been much more interesting, in connection with the incorporation of Estonia into the USSR. (64. [IS 3.11.88 Osmo Jussila katsoi Viron Kansanrintama-dokumentin "Olin pettynyt ohjelman historialliseen osaan" /](#)

[Osmo Jussila watched the documentary on the Estonian National Front "I was disappointed with the historical part"\)](#)

Domino 41: *The mere fact of Finnish television screening such programs on Baltic nationalism in the Soviet Union was a positive rising Domino. Professor Osmo Jussila, a renowned scholar in the area of the Baltic region, was expressing the positive attitudes of Finnish academia to the Baltic independence campaign.*

In the Baltic States, politicians who had made mistakes were currently being deposed, in Finland, old conceptions were still retaining their force, the men in power taking the side of those involved in illegal actions. Estonia was living a time no-one expected would ever come. It was time (for the Finns) to learn from the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Russians. Their civic courage and determination to intervene in the errors committed by themselves and their leader was to be admired. (65. [IS 3.11.88 Letter to the editor, Riskiryhmä:Suomessa yhä vain kyyristellään / Group at risk: Finns still cowering](#)).

Domino 42: *The Finnish public was rising to oppose the conservative stands of its politicians regarding the Baltic.*

The Estonian National Front's reforms had received a setback in the form of the **Inter-front movement founded in 1989 by Russians living in Estonia.** At least 20 Russians had joined. In Tallinn,

the 71st anniversary of the October revolution. consisted of a wreath laid at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Not one Estonian resident of Tallinn attended the festivities. Instead, **Estonia issued a demand, in an appeal of over 200,000 names to the leadership of the Party, for:**

- a. *the right to the Estonian language*
- b. *the right to separate legislation for Estonia*
- c. *the right to the Estonian national identity*

The Soviet press had reported **opposition to the new Soviet constitution in the Baltic States.**

Domino 43: IL 9.11.88 1/3 pp: Viro kaivaa esiin kapinalippua vastarinasta huolimatta “Haluamme oman kielen, omat lait ja oman identiteetin”/Estonia digs up its flag of insurrection despite the opposition “We want our own language, our own laws and our own identity.”

Panu Toivonen, M.Sc. (Forestry), staunch friend of the Estonians, **reminded Rinne of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement which had sold the Baltic States to the Soviet sphere of influence.** Toivonen claimed the Finns to be most vociferous regarding the political liberties of countries located at a great distance from Finland, while overlooking injustices in its immediate neighbours. (67. IS 11.11.88 Letter to the Editor: **Heikki Rinteelle/To Heikki Rinne** (ref.52))

The Tallinn high-rise suburbs of Mustamäe, Õismäe, Lasnamäe, termed *commieblocks* by Wikipedia, were largely built to house labour imported into Estonia from Russia. A certain **Enn Põldre** of Lasnamäe **had a sticker, bought in Sweden, bearing the Estonian national tricolors.** He did not, however, dare to stick it onto the windscreen of his 20-year old Mercedes, for fear of the Russians breaking his windows and slashing his tyres.

Alo Mattiisen, one of the foremost composers of the Estonian Singing Revolution, had written a song to lyrics by Henno Kää titled ***Peatage Lasnamäe/Stop Lasnamäe***, demanding the demolition of the ugly sub-

urbs (Mustamäe, Lasnamäe, Õismäe) built at the command of Moscow, specifically for the Russian population imported to Estonia in the post-war period. (68. IS 16.11.88 Tallinnan Lasnamäessä ei kansalliskiihkoilla/No chauvinism in the Tallinn suburb of Lasnamäe)

Domino 44: The Russian-speaking workers in post-war industrial suburbs of Tallinn such as Lasnamäe and Õismäe were employed by the Dvigatel and Pöögelman factories, under the direct control of Moscow. The factories were reputed to manufacture arms, though this fact was officially a state secret.

The workers were staunch supporters of the regime in Moscow, one of them quoted as saying: "I am not interested in the National Front, since what they stand for does not concern me. **Estonia cannot become independent because it belongs so closely to the Soviet Union.**"

This was the stand the Balts were facing in their own country. It was such attitudes that had forced the Estonians to aspire to national independence, together with the public use of the symbols of the Republic of Estonia.

The presidium of the Estonian parliament was to meet that day to discuss the Estonian attitude to the proposed new Soviet constitution, with the included right to secede.

Domino 45: 17.11.88 the Estonian Supreme Soviet passed a declaration of national sovereignty, recognizing the process of restoring this sovereignty as difficult, due to the fifty years of communism. Marju Lauristin held the Estonian decision to be important not only for Estonia but for the whole Soviet Union, as far as its remaining intact was concerned. The persons involved in this decision also included Indrek Toome, Prime Minister of the Estonian SSR, member of the Estonian Communist Party. The decision was passed without the intervention of the black berets who were apparently under the impression that the declaration had been approved by the governing organs of the Soviet Union. (68. IS 17.11.88 p.14 Pääministeri Indrek Toome: Teimme aitoa politiikkaa/Prime Minister Indrek Toome: We practised pure politics)

A two-page spread on the new beauty queens of Finland and Estonia, in conjunction with the reinstatement of the Miss Estonia contest in 1988, had given a traditional presentation of the thoughts across the Gulf of Finland. **Nina Björnström, Miss Finland, did not know much about Estonia, or about Finland for that matter.**

While **Heli Mets, Miss Estonia, was aware of Finland's history**, she did not know much about the country's current problems. Finnish television had been her source of information regarding the Chernobyl explosion. (69. IS 17.11.88 Suomen ja Viron kaunein IS:n tentissä NÄIN AJATTELVAT NINA JA HELI!/The beauty queens of Finland and Estonia examined by IS **THESE ARE NINA AND HELI'S THOUGHTS**)

Domino 46: Heli Mets, the first post-war Miss Estonia, was shown as an intelligent young woman, widely aware of both her country's situation and its problems. Miss Finland was not aware of such matters, not even as far as her own country was concerned. Estonia meant a lot to Heli Mets, who would like to have it given self-determination in culture and trade. She would not like to live anywhere else. (IS 17.11.88 Miss Finland 1988 Nina Björnström: „Kaikilla mailla on oikeus itsenäisyyteen“/All countries have a right to independence“ Miss Viro 1988 Heli Mets: „Omalla maalla on kylliksi ongelmia/Miss Estonia 1988 **“My own country has its fair share of problems“**)

The Estonians were grateful for their parliament's decision to oppose the new Soviet constitution. Gorbachev's reputation had suffered in this connection. The question, indeed, was being raised of whether he was actually aiming to become a dictator. (cf. IL 16.1.91, p.948; 70. IL 17.11.88 0.5 columns Monet virolaiset hämmentyneitä Pyrkiikö Gorbatshov diktaattoriksi?/Many Estonians bewildered **Is it Gorbachev's aim to become a dictator?**) The Estonians were relieved at the result of the referendum on the new constitution, but they were also apprehensive regarding the stand to be taken by the session of the Soviet Union Supreme Soviet at the end of the month. (72. IL 17.11.88 Viro sanoi EI Moskovalle/Estonia says NO to Moscow)

The people wanted to make their own decisions regarding their future. (73. Viron presidentti arvosteli Moskovaa **Kansa vaati vallan hajautusta**/Estonian president criticizes Moscow **People demanding decentralization of power** (0.5 col.) Kansa on puhunut/The people have spoken (0.5 col.)

Domino 47: *The (Estonian, AP) Supreme Soviet voted 99% against the new Soviet constitution.*

Domino 48: *The language conflict issue of the Association for the Preservation of Finnish culture/Suomalaisuuden Liitto (Finnish vs Swedish) may be considered to have no bearing on Finland. In Estonia, however, the people did have cause for concern in that soon they might not be able to manage their affairs in their own language in their country in which their ancestor Moscovites have been living for generations.*

Unless the Finns were also speaking of injustice and human rights violations in the Soviet Union, they were seen as having no right to open their mouths continuously regarding Chile and South Africa, for instance. (72. IS 18.11.88 **Eesti, hellästi rakastettu**/Estonia, the object of my tender love, a Letter to the editor by Mauri Virtanen)

*The first messages from Moscow had arrived, condemning Estonia's move to give precedence to the Estonian constitution over that of the USSR. Moscow regarded the move as illegal. On being asked what they were afraid of, the Russian MPs' answer was that they were afraid they would subsequently be treated in the same manner as the Estonians were being treated (by the Russians). (73. IL 18.11.88 **Pallo on nyt Moskovalla Viro toivoo ja odottaa**/The ball is in Moscow's court **Estonia hoping and waiting**)*

Domino 49: *Some Russians in Estonia were beginning to realize what their people had been doing to the indigenous population for the past 40 years. It was a hard thing to acknowledge, let alone consider measures to attempt to redress the offences.*

Legislation reform was possible in the Soviet Union, if only there was the will. The previous day, the Estonians had noticed that Supreme Soviet legislation required a period of 10 days to come into force after being published in the Party newspapers. The Party papers *Rahva Hääl* and *Sovjetskaja Estonija* joined forces, publishing a joint two-page paper. (74. IS) 19.11.88 p.22 1 page **Viron vallankumoukselle tuli kiire** Lait olivat unohtua lehdistä/ **Sudden hurry for the Estonian revolution** Legislation almost forgotten from the press)

Domino 50:

The Estonian Parliament's decision on the new constitution was rejected by Moscow, with a summons issued to President Arnold Rüütel to come to Moscow.

*The main point in the Estonian constitution was that Soviet law did not apply in Estonia until passed by Estonian parliament. **The Estonian parliament asserted its supreme authority in Estonia.***

With satire being directed at the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the KGB, (75. IS 19.11.88 **Sensuuri on valppaana Virossa Satiiriohjelmaa tehdään rajoja koetellen/**

Censor on alert in Estonia Satire programs made risking the boundaries), the Estonians were not indifferent to Finnish attitudes toward them. (76. IL 22.11.88 Virolaiset kiittävät henkisestä tuesta **Veljeskansan kohtalo liikuttaa suomalaisia/Estonians say "Thank you" for the moral support Finns moved by the fate of their ethnic brothers** 0.5 pp) **Last night's current affairs seminar on the topic *What is going on in Estonia?***, did not come up with an answer, although the attitude was one of deep understanding. In the program, Hannu Taanila criticized Harri Holkeri's Baltic policy, quoting Holkeri expressly as having *criticized* the Estonian issue as a *one-item agenda*, something he wished to avoid.

Domino 51: *In Finland, the hitherto radical larger left-wing party was criticizing the government (right-wing) for its stand on the Baltic, with the demonstrated lack of official sympathy. The sympathy was coming from the Left Alliance.*

Consular representation of Estonia in Helsinki was again on the agenda. Publicist Tiit Made, in Finland on a promotion campaign for his new book *“Mu isamaa” / “My native land”*, **was interested in seeing Finland open its consulate in Tallinn.** In the pre-World War II years, Finland had had eight consulates in Estonia: in Tallinn, Haapsalu, Kuressaare, Narva, Pärnu, Tartu, Valga and Paldiski, the last-mentioned town today being a closely guarded military base, Estonia, in turn, had nine: in Helsinki, Hanko, Kotka, Loviisa, Oulu, Tampere, Turku, Vaasa and Viipuri.

While Made understood Finland wanting Estonia to be quiet, he felt the Finns had always let the Estonians down. The people's only support had been from the exile-Estonian community. (76. IS 23.11.88 **Viron “kolmas mies” toivoo Tallinaan Suomen konsulaattia/ Estonia’s “third man” would like to see a Finnish consulate in Tallinn** (Made, AP))

Domino 52: *Estonia felt a need for Finnish consular representation in Estonia. There was some response to this feeling in Finland, despite official caution exercised regarding the Baltic States.*

Prime Minister Harri Holkeri had found cause in his Paasikivi Society address in Hämeenlinna **to censure single-item agendas**, which, he claimed, were trying to capture power not accorded them by the Finnish democratic system. (77. IS 23.11.88 **Editorial Yhden asian liikkeit herättäjänä/ One-item agendas as a wake-up call**)

Domino 53: *Would other single-item agendas such as Greenpeace, anti-apartheid policies, the Outokumpu Chile copper mines be more suitable agendas?*

Ittalehti saw this warning of single-item agendas as a stuffy puff of air from the 1960's or 1970's, with their hermetically-sealed Kekkonen-era foreign policy.

Holkeri did not explain what he meant by single-item agendas. Possibly Greenpeace was one. President Koivisto's unease at the events in the Baltic States seemed to confirm the impression that official for-

eign policy, in other words, the President and the government, was united in their concern for interest in the Baltic States. (78. **IL 23.11.88** Editorial: **Käsittämätön puhe**/An unfathomable speech)

Domino 54: *The cause of Baltic independence was just as reasonable a cause as that of Chilean independence, a stand reflected by the Iltalehti editorial.*

Despite Holkeri's warning against single-item agendas, support groups were being established for the Baltic national fronts. Active groups in this area were the Green movements, (Johanna Suurpää) and the Swedish Communal and Social Tertiary Institution (Terhikki Mäkelä). No empire lasts for ever, was their stand, while many would have liked to make an exception, with regard to the Soviet Union. (possibly for fear of the results of a possible disintegration) (79. **IS 25.11.88** **Baltian kansanrintamille tukijärjestö Suomeen**/Support group established in Finland for Baltic national fronts 1 column)

Domino 55: *The Finns had been wondering whether Estonia was really going to secede from the Soviet Union, Estonia was afraid that not only the people but the very earth beneath its feet was in danger. Independence was not a law, it was a process.*

One possible scenario during the previous autumn had been the IME (Isemajandav Eesti) program, a **self-sufficient Estonia within the USSR**. The new constitution, however, with its stringent stipulations regarding secession, led the Estonians to their plan for complete independence. (IS 26.11.88 Kansanrintama isolla, komsomol pienellä/National Front, spelt with capital letters, the communist youth league spelt with small letters)

It is this process that the current study is following.

Domino 56: *The Estonians regarded the events of the past year as logical and inexorable. The central issue was that of national identity. The Moscow plan for phosphate mining would have rendered a large portion of Estonia desolate.*

A radical change had occurred in Finnish student circles compared to the 1960s, in a diametrically opposite direction. In the area of official foreign policy, President Koivisto's comment on a possible Estonian consulate in Helsinki was **"It is not of current importance."** For the students, the crucial issue for Finnish foreign policy was **whether the Soviet Union**, whose needs Finnish foreign policy had been tailored to accommodate, in the 1950s and -60s, **was the same Soviet Union that was currently in existence.**

Self-criticism in areas concerning the Soviet Union was much more powerful in Finland than in Estonia. (81. IS 26.11.88 Viro ja virallinen Suomi Vesa-Pekka Koljonen, Editor-in-chief, column)

The pseudonym *Oi niitä aikoja* (*Those were the days*), **surprised the writer with the positive attitude to the Baltic States in the left-wing radicals of the 1960s and 1970s.** Now they are competing to show their support for the Baltic aspirations. (82. IS 26.11.88 Letters to the editor 60- ja 70-lukujen suurisuulle/For the loudmouths of the 1960s and 1970s)

Domino 57: *The stand of an ordinary Finn on the Baltic States, as expressed in his letter to the editor, was that his morals say one can't do something or leave something undone just because it happened to be to (his) best advantage. Radio Estonia commented on the Prime Minister's comments on 22.11. as follows: "The Finnish Prime Minister can freely curry political favour with Moscow, since Finland is, after all, a democracy. The Finnish People's Democratic League and the Greens have expressed their sympathy. When will the Coalition Party show the voters that it has backbone?* (82. IS 26.11.88 Letters to the editor *Hävettää/I am ashamed*)

The arrival of Estonian Foreign Minister Arnold Green in Finland on a private visit, came as a complete surprise to the Finnish government. While the issues discussed in the TV interview of Green were quite political – the opening of an Estonian consulate in Finland, for instance, the Foreign Ministry knew nothing about the visit. (83.

IS 28.11.88 Vaikka Estin neuvostotasavallan ulkoministeri vierailee Suomessa, niin **Ulkoministeriö ei tiedä asiasta yhtään mitään**/ Even though the Estonian SSR Foreign Minister is visiting Finland, **the (Finnish) Foreign Ministry knows nothing of the matter (1 column)**

Vaino Väljas, the Estonian Communist Party First Secretary, **was reported leaving for Moscow**, with assurances that the Estonians would not be backing down on the reforms that they had embarked on. They would be resolutely pursuing their policy of *Now is not the time for demonstrations or manifests. We will continue perestroika and not back down.* While **Gorbachev termed the Estonian moves illegal, warning the Estonians of political recklessness**, Väljas referred to Gorbachev's speech in India, where he had presented Estonia as a paragon of perestroika. Now, *according to Gorbachev, Estonia was straying onto illegal paths as a result of agitation by demagogues.* (65. IL 28.11.88 Jännitys Virossa tiivisty: **Puoluejohtaja matkusti yllättäen Moskovaan**/Suspense increasing in Estonia: Party leader on surprise visit to Moscow)

Domino 58: Tiit Made claimed discrepancies between Moscow's words and actions as far as the democracy claims were concerned. Estonia was striking out on its own interpretation of responsible policy. The CPSU Central Committee was insisting on Party discipline for the Estonian leaders, Vaino Väljas, Arnold Rüütel and Indrek Toome. The declaration of self-determination was seen as recklessness (seikkailupolitiikka) (85. IL 29.11.88 Kapinalliset tasavallat tuomittiin **Keskuskomitea löi Viron maan rakoon**/ Rebel republics condemned **Central Committee gives Estonia a thorough dressing-down**)

The Central Committee was also demanding disciplinary measures for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The official newsagency Tass, on the other hand, had, on the previous day, attempted to soothe the Baltic countries by claiming that the Central Committee of the CPSU had promised further rights to the republics in Monday's meeting. Estonia had threatened to use its right of veto with regard to the laws passed by the central government.

Domino 59: *Estonia was asserting itself against Moscow, with threats of its own veto against plans put forward by the latter. According to these plans, decisions concerning the future of Estonia and other Soviet republics were to be taken in Moscow.*

Domino 60: *The constitutional reform in the USSR was regarded as a basic error, a serious setback to Gorbachev's authority and popularity. The moderation shown by the Estonians showed their aims to be not a matter of flippant bravado but one of serious national intent.*

The situation could also be regarded as a confrontation of the national good of Estonia and that of the Soviet Union. The editorial was fully understanding of the Estonian aspirations. (86. IL 30.11.88 *Editorial: Gorbatshovin poliittinen virhe/ Gorbachev's political error*)

Cartoonist Jouko Innanen had depicted a frustrated Finn, listening to a transistor radio, the caption reading: - *Nothing! Perhaps they're on strike, or then there is a program with (Finnish) politicians deciding on the stand to be taken on the Estonian situation.* The Finnish people, or at least the political decision-makers, were extremely confused regarding this stand, with a marked contrast between the official stance of the Finnish state and the more unofficial positions expressed by the press. (87. IL 30.11.88 Cartoon by Jouko Innanen) On Estonia's declaration of sovereignty in 1988, **the Finnish government decided to accord maximum support to Estonian aspirations, while not attributing this support to the Finnish state.** In this manner, Finnish-Soviet relations would not be endangered. (Heikki Rausmaa, *Suomen tuki Viron itsenäistymiselle 1988-1991, ei sanoin vaan teoin*, Tuglas-seuran Viro-seminaari Tietojen talo 9.3.2013)

Domino 61: *Iltalehti was taking a firm stand against the official Finnish government policy on the Baltic States.*

Party leader Gorbachev was attempting to build a new con-

sensus in the Kremlin on Tuesday, having accused the Balts of political adventurism. The Lithuanian and Latvian presidents were, in turn, accusing Moscow of not taking the wishes of the Baltic republics into consideration. (88. IL 30.11.88 Itsenäisyys tulee vasta myöhemmin...)

Domino 62: *The negative attitude taken by the central government toward the wishes of the Baltic republics had led to Moscow's accusations of political adventurism. In response, the Lithuanian and Latvian presidents accused Moscow of not taking the wishes of the Baltic republics into consideration.*

The Estonian National Front youth section were very disappointed at Gorbachev's speech, likening it to Brezhnev's oratory. Gorbachev was contradicting himself, speaking at first of freedom, national self-determination, yet now regarding Moscow as the centre of the world, determining everything that happened there.

The much-vaunted *glasnost* was **Brezhnev-style nonsense.** Estonia had been spoken for by (Estonian President) Rüütel, (Estonian Communist Party First Secretary) Väljas and writer Vladimir Beekman, who would not betray the people. (89. IL 30.11.88 Hän puhui kuin Brezhnev/He (Gorbachev) spoke in the style of Brezhnev)

Domino 63: *While the much-vaunted glasnost had been nullified, erst-while communist leaders of the Estonian SSR - Estonian President Arnold Rüütel, Estonian Communist Party First Secretary Vaino Väljas and leading cultural figures, such as writer Vladimir Beekman - had opted to stand for the interests of the people, not for those of the central government.*

Great Britain and the People's Republic of China had agreed over ten years ago to return Hong Kong to China, while still maintaining capitalism there.

It was also possible to establish a transition period of 10-20 years to organize relations between them. This raised the question of the dif-

ference between the statuses, past and present, of Hong Kong, on the one hand, and of the Baltic States, on the other. Hong Kong **had been leased by China to Great Britain in 1898 for 99 years**. This agreement was modified in 1984, for Hong Kong to be transferred to China in 1997, with the capitalist system to be maintained for another 50 years.

The incorporation of the Baltic States, on the other hand, was, in effect, purely unilateral, on conditions set by Moscow, with no return to any former status in sight. (90. IL 30.11.88 Lännen malli/The Western model)

Domino 64: *The question arises of whether there was a similar process, as for Britain and China regarding Hong Kong, to be expected in the Soviet Union and the Baltic States.*

Estonian MPs in the USSR Supreme Soviet were overflooded *in a vote on the new constitution*. The claim by Latvian president Anatolijs Gorbunovs, that individual republics had the right to protest against illegal government resolutions, was met by the Supreme Soviet statement this to have been taken into account. Estonian president Arnold Rüütel's proposal for each republic to have the right to determine its own form of parliament was not even considered. (91. IL 2.12.88 *Oppositio nousi Nl:n parlamentissa, mutta: Viro jätettiin täysin huomiotta*/Opposition rises in Soviet parliament, but ***Estonia left all on its own***)

Domino 65:

A Latvian representative to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposed that proposals made by small republics would be considered, without being rejected by a mass majority of the large republics. (The futures of the small republics lay fully outside the concern of the large republics, the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, Ukraine, Byelorussia. AP) In the final address to the Supreme Soviet, President Gorbachev stated that both the central government in Moscow and the governments of the small republics should rid themselves of mutual suspicion.

The independence aspirations of the Baltic republics were regarded a danger to the whole Soviet Union.

The small republics should not accept the aspects of the new constitution detrimental to their interests.

While the world at large was standing up for the attempts by Gorbachev to reform the USSR, it should be surmised that the Western world, proponent of democracy that it was, should stand up for the endeavours of small nations.

Juhan Aare would not be discouraged by Finnish PM Holk-eri's admonition not to over-do enthusiasm for Estonia. Holk-eri's views were not shared by the Greens, or any other Finns, for that matter. (92. IS 12.12.1988 *Katastrofit varjostivat Viron vihreiden kokous-ta/Catastrophes overshadow Estonian Greens Conference*)

Peter Tallberg, Finnish member of International Olympic Committee, regarded it an impossible situation if every Soviet republic, or every state of the USA, wanted to become a member of the IOC. (93. IS 16.12.1988 Baltiasta ja Palestiinasta ongelmia KOK:lle/Baltic States and Palestine a problem for the IOC)

An article in *Ilta-Sanomat* described the university town **Tartu, intellectual capital of Estonia**, while another treats **the Finnish-speaking Ingermanlanders, who had been displaced from their home regions around Leningrad by Stalin, resettling in Estonia.** (94. IS 16.12.1988 Tartto on Viron pääkaupunki/Tartu is the (intellectual) capital of Estonia; 95. IS.23.12.88 "Emme ole inkeriläisiä, olemme suomalaisia!"/"We are not Ingermanlanders, we are Finns")

After the dismissal of the Moscow-minded First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Estonian SSR Karl Vaino, there was more news crossing the border. (96. IS 23.12.88 Uutisia Virosta/News from Estonia). **the initial effects of glasnost were to be seen.**

The older Ingermanlanders, Finnish people, Votes and the Orthodox Ingermanlanders, would not forget being dragged around the USSR. The Siberians knew nothing about Christmas. (97. "Siperiassa ei tiedetty joulusta mitään!" Vanhat inkeriläiset eivät unohda riepottelua ympäri Neuvostoliiton/"In Siberia they

knew nothing about Christmas!”) The Church was being seen as a driving force in perestroika and glasnost. The State was no longer striving to decrease the role of the Church. In Lithuania 20,000 children a year were being confirmed. (98. IL 4.1.89 Papeista ja kirkosta perestroikan veturi? Kirkko tunkeutuu politiikkaan NL:ssa/ Are the clergy and the Church a perestroika locomotive? Church forcing its way into politics in the USSR; 99. IL 4.1.1989 1 p. Valtataistelu vankileirien saaris-tossa/Power struggle in the Gulag Archipelago.)

There was a serious struggle going on in the prison archipelago of the Soviet Union, with the authorities humiliating the prisoners. Prisoners were also being shot while trying to escape. Glasnost was, however, attaining these camps. **In the area of political and humanitarian foreign aid, Finland was seen as ever ready to help Angola or Chile, but if it was a matter of helping Estonia (not to mention Latvia or Lithuania), the Finns were quiet.** The Finns were helping the russification process by building hotels, meat processing plants and so on, for which the required labour force was imported from Russia.

In Narva, by 1989, the Russian-speaking population numbered 85,000, with only 3,000 Estonians. These were now building themselves an Estonian House along the lines of Sweden, a place where they could meet each other. (97. IL 9.1.1989 0.75pp. Karkotettu toisinajattelija Rein Sepp: ”Suomesta ei ole koskaan ollut apua Virolle”/Exiled dissident Rein Sepp: ”Finland never of any help to Estonia”)

The destiny of the Ingermanlander population of Estonia was at risk. (98. IS 26.1.89 Arvo Survoa uhkaa siirto Viron kirkon johto ennustaa inkeriläisille taantumusta/Arvo Survo under threat of transfer) Estonian church leaders predict a decline for Ingermanlanders; 99. IS 18.1.89 Virolaisten ja suomalaisten kanssakäyminen luontevaa 1930-luvulla Heimoveljeys yhdisti/Estonian-Finnish interaction natural and unaffected during the 1930's Common ethnic background a uniting factor)

Estonia was on the verge of an Olympic comeback, after over 50 years' absence, yet it was not yet ready to apply for this officially.

(100. IS 18.1.89 Viro ei vielä hae tunnustusta olympiakomitealleen/ Estonia not yet applying for recognition for its Olympic Committee; IL 30.3.1989 Omalla joukolla Barcelonaan 1992 **OVATKO VIROLAISET MENETTÄNEET JÄRKENSÄ?**/To Barcelona with a team of their own **HAVE THE ESTONIANS LOST THEIR MIND?**)

The Independence Day of the Republic of Estonia was again being officially celebrated, even though the regime was still officially the Soviet system. (101. IS 24.2.89 **VIRON HULLU VUOSI** Vanhaa itsenäisyyspäivää juhlittiin lipunnostolla/ESTONIA'S CRAZY YEAR Old independence day celebrated with hoisting of the flag) With 800,000 people having protested against the proposed new constitution, even more restrictive than the old Soviet constitution, arrests were still being made and the press was being restricted. (102. IS 8.3.89 Latvian miliisi jatkoi pidätyksiä Puoluejohto vaati rangaistuksia tiedotusvälineille/ Latvian militia continues arrests Party leadership demands punishment for media)...for trying to drive a wedge between the Latvians and the Russians.

With the Russians protesting against the reforms, Vaino Väljas rejected outright the Russian demands (103. IS 8.3.89 Vaino Väljas tyrmäsi venäläisten vaatimukset)

Further Estonian actions involve **the filling in of the so-called white blotches in the nation's history** omitted during the Soviet period – deportations to Siberia, destruction of Estonian villages, factories managed from outside Estonia. (104. IS 13.3.89 Virossa kuvite-taan kilpaa historian mustia aukkoja/Estonians racing to fill in the black holes of history)

Finnish pop star Heikki Harma, a.k.a. Hector, was reminded of his Estonian roots, via his grandmother, on visiting Tallinn. (108. 17.4.89 1p. Hector satumammansa mailla - “Tunnistin osan alkuperästäni”/Hector in Tallinn, the territory of his story-telling grandmother “I recognized part of my heritage.”)

Persecution on political grounds was still being practised as late as the end of the 1980s. Grounds given for such action on the part of the Soviet government were:

1. Remembering war heroes of Estonian War of Independence,
2. Re-establishment of Estonian Boy Scout movement
3. Attempting to create relations with the Finnish scouting movement (108. IL 18.4.89 Viron viimeisin poliittinen karkotettu Ain Saar ”Maasta pois tai kahdeksan vuotta vanki-laa/Last political exile from Estonia, Ain Saar ”Exile or eight years’ gaol.”

In an effort to contain the threatening environmental disaster in Estonia, the Estonian Green Movement was mobilizing the Finns with the Moscow central government totally indifferent. (IL 18.4.89 1 col. Suomen vihreät koollekutsujina Idän ja lännen vihreät, liit-tykää yhteen!/Finnish Greens movement as convenors Greens East and West – unite!) Estonia is opposed to Moscow establishing a new power plant in Rakvere, Estonia. (109. IL

The consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster were still making themselves felt in Estonia. (27.4.89 0.5 pp. Vammaisia veteraaneja ja kaljupäisiä lapsia Tshernobylin seuraukset askarruttavat yhä Viroa/Invalid war veterans and bald children The results of Chernobyl still a cause for concern in Estonia)

Polls in spring of 1989 were indicating a huge decrease in support for the Communist Party in Estonia. (119.IS 3.5.89 2pp Viron kommunistien kannatus romahtaisi vapaissa vaalessa Yli puolet Viron virolaisista uskoo itsenäistymiseen/Support for Estonia’s commu-nists would crash in free elections Over half of the Estoni-ans in Estonia believe in indepen-dence . (110. IS 4.5.89 Editorial Virolaisten utopia/Estonian Utopia (--of independence, with the admonition against getting their hopes up too high); 119. IS 4.5.89 Kansanrinta-ma hajoaisi Viron vaaleissa/National Front expected to split at next elections – into several parties, at the expense of the Communist Party.):

The Balts were getting their voice heard in Moscow. (111. IL 12.5.90 Kansanrintamilla ratkaiseva kokous viikonloppuna Tallin-

nassa **KELLO LYÖ BALTIASSA/National Fronts in decisive meeting in Tallinn during the weekend **CLOCK STRIKING IN THE BALTIC**; 112. IL 18.5.89 Tätä pelkää Mihail Gorbatshev – Voiko tämä tapahtua Punaisella torilla? Viron kansanrintama tyytymätön etenemiseen **Korkein neuvosto käsittelee IME:ä/ This is what Mikhail Gorbachev fears Could this happen on the Red Square Estonian National Front dissatisfied with progress made **Supreme Soviet to debate IME******

Pre-war festivities were being revived, both ethnic and ethnopolitical. This summer Estonia was celebrating Midsummer officially for the first time since the 1930s. Real bonfires will be burning on both sides of the Gulf of Finland. (119. IS 18.5.89 Moskova armahti Vi-ron ja Suomen radioyhteistyön Suuri yhteislähetys nyky-Viron ensimmäisenä juhannuksena)

Finland was considering concrete help for Estonia in rebuilding its society. This was particularly needed in the wake of the centralized Soviet economy. Estonia was facing constant opposition from Moscow. (120. IL 18.5.89 Turun kaupunki harkitsee **Konttorikoneita lahjaksi Baltiaan**/City of Turku considering office machinery as a present for Baltic States; IL 19.5.89 Tallinna ja Moskova yhteentörmäyskurssilla **Viro antoi taloudellisen itsenäisyysjulistuksen/Tallinn and Moscow on collision course Estonia declares economic independence**)

Estonia's courage may be explained by her seizing the unique opportunity to regain her independence and self-sufficiency. Unfortunately Finnish businesses had not matched the support given by Swedish and West German businesses. (121.IL 20.5.89 Editorial **Viron ihme etenee**/Estonian miracle progressing)

Organized crime in Estonia evolved from the shadow economy in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (Leps, A., Organized crime in Estonia: Its historical conditions, Europe-an Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 1996:82-87) **There were clear indications of this in Tallinn.** Security guards were being hired by the Viru hotel in

Tallinn, in order to safe-guard the security of Finnish tourists. Often the Finns themselves were to blame, considering their drinking habits. (122. IL 9.6.89 0.5pp. Yhä useampi suomalainen kolhitaan Tallinnassa **Järjestäytynyt rikollisuus nostaa päätään**/More and more Finns being bashed in Tallinn **Organized crime raising its head**)

Domino 66: *While nationalism was booming in Estonia, crime was also increasing, often at the expense of inebriated Finnish tourists.* (121. IL 2.7.89 1p. Latviassa arvostellaan Moskovan ylivaltaa **“Meidän on tultava toimeen kopeekoilla”**/Latvia criticizes supremacy of Moscow **“We must make do with mere kopecks”**)

Domino 67: *Latvia was experiencing its third national renaissance. There would not be a fourth.* “We cannot go on living as we have been,” was the Latvian stand. Moscow had been trying to purge the Latvian press of nationalist-minded editorial staff.

Domino 68: *The Latvian National Front had been a thorn in the flesh of the CPSU. The Latvian Communist Party had been much closer to the National Front than to the CPSU. The CPSU was losing its hold over the parties in the various Soviet republics.*

One of the foremost aims of the National Front had been to advance economic reforms. *Moscow had maintained that the Baltic countries could not manage without Moscow, although the National Front was initially founded specifically in association with Soviet mismanagement of the economies of the Baltic republics. Indeed it was Moscow that was responsible for chemical time-bombs, such as outdated chemical plants, oil harbours, constructed in the Soviet republics with labour from the Russian SFSR, at the peril of the local environment, with mountains of waste remaining in the Baltic republics while the products were exported back to Moscow.* North-eastern Estonia had been the object of untrammelled exploitation by the authorities of the central administration in Moscow (Yuri Yampol, the USSR Ministry for Fertilizer Production) in conjunction with the policy statement *“the extensive (fertilizer) treasures were to be exploited in the interest of the people”*) (Lukkari, Matti Viron

itsenäistyminen, Otava, 1996:141)

It was this type of investment that the Baltic States could do without. (cf. Cartoon by Priit Pärn p.161 above)

During Stalin's lifetime, Soviet society had held writers to be writers to be dangerous. Elsa Sterse, poetess, grandmother of future Latvian ambassador to Finland, Anna Žigure, was deported to Siberia in 1950 at the advanced age of 65. Now Latvia has started to publish Sweden-, Canada- and USA-based exile Latvian writers, writers hitherto banned in the Soviet Union. Žigure believed Latvia, as well as Estonia and Lithuania, would regain their independence. They had deserved it. (IS 17.7.89 Latvian kielletyt kirjailijat arvioidaan nyt uudestaan/ Forbidden Latvian writers being re-evaluated)

Domino 69: *After over 40 years of censorship and censure by the cultural authorities in the Soviet republics, Baltic refugee writers living in the West were being published again in Latvia and the other two Baltic States.*

The proponents of perestroika in the province of Virumaa in North-eastern Estonia had suggested the use of the islands in the Gulf of Finland, lost by Finland to the USSR in the Second World War --- either for agriculture or for tourism. These islands were the scene of a number of skirmishes between Finland and the USSR. (95. IS 25.7.89 p.10,0.5 pp.Virolaiset halusivat Suomenlahden saaret käyttöön/ The Estonians would like to have use of the islands in the Gulf of Finland)

The aim of national activist Pastor Illar Hallaste, and the other activists in the Estonian Antiquities Conservation Society and the Estonian National Independence Party, was full independence for Estonia. 150,000 people had registered for membership of the above two organizations.

“Our aim is independence. is a country from which Soviet power has departed can be independent,” was Hallaste's stand. (96. IS 25.7.89 p.10,0.25 pp Kirkkoherra Illar Hallaste: Päämääränä Viron itsenäisyys/Rev.Illar Hallaste, Rector of the Kadrina parish: *Estonian independence the aim*)

Hallaste was hopeful of his country's avoiding serious conflict between the Estonian and Russian nationalities in Estonia.

Domino 70: *The activists for Estonian independence are coming to the fore again under the aegis of political and cultural independence movements.*

Representatives of the Baltic States had demanded their independence in the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. At the same time there was a strike by Russian workers against the pro-posed Estonian language and nationality legislation, with thousands of Russians on strike in Tallinn against the above laws in Moscow. Dainis Ivans, Latvian journalist and politician, held the most fundamental problem in the Soviet Union to be the fact that it was a state born through use of force and violence. (97. IL 7.7.89 Neuvostoparlamentin erimielisyydet talousuudistuksista julkisiksi **Baltit vaativat itsenäisyyttä/Soviet parliament disagreement regarding economic reforms made public **Balts demand independence****)

Domino 71: *The activists for Estonian independence are demanding independence in Moscow, in the Supreme Soviet, too.*

The radicals, led by Boris Yeltsin, outweighed the influence of the Communist Party reactionaries. Furthermore, the Lithuanian National Front had gathered names onto a petition for the removal of the Soviet army from Lithuania. The collection of names was to end on 23.8. the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Vytautas Landsbergis reported 1.8 million signatures as having been collected in protest against Soviet measures. (98. IL 5.8.89 0.5 col. Kansanrintama kerää nimilistaa **Liettua vaatii neuvostoarmeijan poistumista/ National Front petitioning **Lithuania demands removal of Soviet army****)

Domino 72: *The Lithuanian independence activists were petitioning for removal of the Red Army from Lithuania.*

The occupation of the Baltic States in 1940 was a crime that

could be made good only through the full restoration of their independence, according to the Chairman of the Estonian Christian Democratic Party. The party was not sufficiently satisfied with the recently adopted Estonian economic independence. (99. IL 5.8.89 0.5 col. *Viron kristillisten johtaja: "Vuoden 1940 miehitys rikos"/Leader of Estonia's Christian Democrat party: "The 1940 occupation was a crime"*)

Domino 73: *Up to 1988, official Soviet and official Soviet Estonian history had claimed Estonia to have entered the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics voluntarily. The Estonian Christian Democratic Party had held the incorporation of the Baltic States in 1940 to have been illegal. Restoration of their lost independence was the only means of redressing this injustice. (100. IL 10.8.89 p.12, 0.5pp, 7 columns *Viron venäläisten raivo purkautui vaalilaista Tallinnan lakkoalto uhkaa levitä tänään/ Estonian Russian rage vented in connection with the new Electoral Act Tallinn strikes threatening to spread today**

Russian protest strikes against the new Electoral Act had lamed tens of businesses in Tallinn the previous day. " Unless the new Electoral Act was repealed, we will take power as they did in the 1917 revolution," threatened Interfront founder Yuri Rudyak.

Yevgeni Kogan, Member of Parliament and protagonist of Russian rights, saw the Electoral Act as part of an Estonian conspiracy to drive all Russians out of the Soviet republic. *With the Estonian Electoral Act passed on Tuesday, the suffrage of the Russian population and their possibilities to stand as candidates in local elections had been drastically limited.* The qualification for suffrage was a residence period of two years, and for potential candidates five years. *Previously the Russians had been upset by the 1989 Estonian language law requiring fluency in spoken Estonian for public servants* and the widespread anti-Russian demonstrations promised in all the Baltic republics.

The former chairman of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov insisted on new principles in the maintenance of uniformity in the Soviet State, *demanding the rectification of previous mistakes and the treatment of*

the 15 Soviet Republics as independent states of a kind. Now Chebrikov was advocating some kind of federation, with the central government being responsible only for foreign affairs and defence. Nationalists had too often been accused of hunger for power and of irresponsibility.

Domino 74:

The Estonians were taking action to protect their identity and their very existence.

Military personnel from elsewhere in the USSR, but stationed in Estonia, were eligible to stand for election to the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. This was untenable for the indigenous population.

Chebrikov was advocating similar changes to the Soviet Union as were to be advocated by Gorbachev in March, 1991, in a plebiscite boycotted by the Baltic States. Indeed Chebrikov was advocating a state along the lines of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Tass reported 20 factories in Tallinn yesterday and 13 factories in Kohtla-Järve having gone on strike. The strikers did not intend to resume work before the laws limiting the vote of people recently moved to Estonia, mostly Russians, were repealed. (101. *IS 11.8.89 0.5pp Viron parlamentti kielsi lakkoilun/ Estonian parliament prohibits strike action*)

Domino 75: *Up to the advent of Gorbachev and his policy of perestroika, strikes had been forbidden. Now it was the Russian-speaking population of Estonia who was striking for the maintenance of their privileged status. The prohibition of strike action was now coming from the opposite side of the political divide – the proponents of independence.*

The National Front in Estonia had achieved the unbelievable.

The immediate urgent question was the manner in which the Estonians were going to cope with the apparent impending constitutional crisis. The Soviets regarded the new Estonian electoral law as unconstitutional, with the Russian population of Estonia now demanding the repealing of the language and electoral law. A further object of partial

repeal was the financial independence of Estonia, a law already passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Yet while Moscow would not be able to get the Estonians to back down on their electoral law, allowing this deviation on the constitution was seen as a possible precedent encouraging the other Soviet republics to go their own way. (102. IL 14.8.89 Editorial: Perustuslaillinen kriisi Virossa/Constitutional crisis in Estonia)

Domino 76: *While the Estonians were preparing to defend their national identity through the Electoral and Language Acts, the Russian-speaking population was aiming to maintain their privileged status quo through strike action. The Estonians were abiding by their adopted principle that the Estonian people's needs were the crucial factor in all policy decisions affecting Estonia.*

The Estonians had found that the only way to survive as a nation was to limit the functions of state to the Estonian-speaking population. Sunday's edition of the Party newspaper *Pravda*, regarded the new Estonian electoral law to be in conflict with the Soviet constitution. 40,000 Russians were protesting against the law. The ensuing strikes were also demanding the repeal of Estonian economic independence. At the beginning of January Estonia had assumed control of the state enterprises, where most of the workers were Russian. Of the Estonian ethnic composition, some 40% are Russians, Belorussian or Ukrainian.

The CPSU weekly *Argumenty i Fakty* published the text of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The national fronts of the Baltic States had demanded a reassessment of their own position. in the light of the agreement that had now been made public in the USSR. There were wide demonstrations to be expected on the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. (103. IL 14.8.89 p.11 1 column *Pravda puolusteli venäläisten lakkoja: Viron vaalilaki perustuslain vastainen/ Pravda defends strikes by Russians: Estonian Electoral Act anti-constitutional*)

Domino 77: *The Russian-speaking population of Estonia was claiming dis-*

*crimination, in association with the new language legislation of Estonia. With the publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement **and its secret protocols**, the Estonians were establishing a legal basis for an abrogation of their incorporation into the USSR.*

A number of developments crucial in the maintenance of the unity of the USSR had emerged:

The Estonian National Front had been credited with remarkable achievements during the past year. Outside observers could but admire the bold resolution with which the Estonians had gathered the trump cards dealt to them all of a sudden by history.

Estonia had come to a border line, a border line where one was forced to ask in wonderment as to how they planned to proceed. The constitutional crisis had come to a head when Viktor Yakovlev, Soviet Minister of Justice, speaking on television, deemed the new Estonian electoral law to be in conflict with the Soviet constitution.

The striking Russians in Estonia were given additional support from Moscow. They were no longer satisfied with demanding the repealing of language and citizenship legislation, demanding in addition the partial repealing of the law on Estonian economic independence, a law that had indeed already been ratified by the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. (104. IL 14.8.89 p.2 Editorial *Perustuslaillinen kriisi Virossa/Constitutional Crisis in Estonia*)

A definite source of anxiety for Moscow was in *the possibility of a deviation from the USSR constitution in Estonia during the past year*, amounting to a notable precedent as far as the integrity of the Union was concerned. Subsequently, other Soviet Republics, as well, would find encouragement to go their own way.

In just over a week, the Balts would be remembering the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement. Even now it could be seen that this anniversary would be held in an explosive atmosphere in Estonia, volatile as the situation is.

Domino 78: *The Soviet Union was accusing Estonia of acting in conflict with the USSR Constitution in its citizenship legislation. Esto-*

nia will be celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement, accusing Moscow of illegal annexation of the country.

A documentary by Mark Soosaar dealt with Miss Saaremaa, 1931, Ljuba Hermann. During World War II, classified as an enemy of the people by the Soviet authorities, she was sent to the Kirov prison in the Kirov oblast north of Kazan. Before this she had managed to serve dinners to Soviet leaders and state visitors. (105. IS 15.8.89 p.50 0.5pp Miss Saarenmaasta “Stalinin piiksi”/The path from Miss Saaremaa to “Stalin’s handmaiden”(1 col. + photograph.))

Domino 79: *The victims of Soviet oppression in the post-war period were coming forward with their accusations against the Soviet Union.*

In the post-war years, Estonians had learnt Finnish by way of Finnish television. It was quite difficult for Finns to learn Estonian this way, since the visibility of TV Tallinn was quite limited. Finnish TV should sometimes screen Estonian films, was the suggestion. (106. IS 15.8.89 150mm Viroa tv:hen/Estonia and Estonian on TV)

Domino 80: *The effect of the existence of Finnish television in Northern Estonia during the post-war period is not to be over-estimated as a means of maintaining contact with the outside world.* (107. IL 15.8.89 p.10 0.75 pp. Poliitikot syyttävät Riikan radiota liian kriittiseksi Radio on Latvian muutoksen forumi Politicians accuse Radio Riga of excessive criticism Radio is the forum for change in Latvia)

The presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was to meet under president Mikhail Gorbachev. The meeting was preceded by a vicious attack on the Estonian electoral law in Pravda ---written by the politbureau. The leaders of all three Baltic countries were accused of surrendering their power to ‘anti-Soviet groups demanding independence and fanning nationalist hysterics’. Pravda, - as well as the Soviet Minister of Justice - condemned the Estonian Electoral Act as unconstitutional. The Russian strikes yesterday had spread to over 50 factories, involving over 50,000 workers.

A high-level Kremlin delegation investigated the Estonian situation, **also talking with the representatives of the Internationalist Movement.** Interestingly enough, the delegation did **not** have talks with the Estonians and the National Front.

The Estonian party leader Vaino Väljas yesterday appealed in vain for dialogue and consensus between the two sections of the population. The Soviet Union seems to be especially concerned with the approach of the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement. (108. IL 16.8.89 p.11 0.25 pp, 4 columns Viron presidentti kalmankalpeanaMosko-vaan Kaataako Kreml tänään Viron uuden vaalilain?/Estonian president to Moscow, deathly pale Will the Kremlin repeal Estonia's new electoral act today?)

Domino 81: *As a result of the radical policies pursued in Estonia, the Estonian president and the First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party were summoned to Moscow to give an account of themselves. They maintained their stands and returned with dignity.*

Paavo Väyrynen, ex-Foreign Minister, leader of the Centre Party, insisted that there was nothing in sight to force the Finns to re-evaluate their foreign policy. ---(Väyrynen) condemned opinions expressed this summer regarding the relaxations to the Finnish concept of neutrality and to the stand that the YYA agreement was out of date. (109. IL 18.8.89 s.3 Väyrynen oppi-isänä Ulkopoliitiikan pohja kunnossa/Väyrynen as the sage: Foreign policy on a sound base)

Domino 82 (negative): *In Finland, the leader of the Centre Party, a major power broker in post-war Finland, has no stand on a Finnish policy on the Baltic States, one of these a close ethnic relative of Finland. Finnish-Soviet relations are all-important, Finnish-Estonian relations lack all importance.*

The text of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was published in *Osteuropa*, a Berlin journal concentrating on events in East Europe. There were to be demonstrations all through the Baltic States on the 50th anniversary of the Pact. The page 1 article of *Helsingin Sanomat* of the day dealt with

the consternation caused throughout the world by the pact between the USSR and Germany. (110. IS 19.8.89 Molotov-Ribbentrop -sopimus ja Suomen lehdet elokuussa 1939 “Sodanpelko Euroopan yllä”/Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Finnish press in August 1939 “Fear of war hovering over Europe”)

The *Ilta-Sanomat* article of 19.8.89 includes the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact:

In the event of there being territorial changes in the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the northern border of Lithuania will form the border between the German and Soviet spheres of influence. both parties recognise Lithuanian claims on Vilnius. (110. IS 19.8.89 Molotov-Ribbentropin sopimus, 50/Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 50 years)

Domino 83: *The text of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was published, allowing for the record to be set straight on the restoration of the independence of the Baltic States. The implications of this publication for the restoration of independence were unclear.*

(Now,) for the first time since the end of the 1940s, a socialist country in Eastern Europe was getting a government led by non-communists. (111. IS 19.8.89 Editorial: Puola raivaa tietä/Poland the vanguard)

Domino 84: *Poland was the first East European country to get a non-communist-led government. Will the process continue throughout the Soviet bloc, was the question.*

Ilta-lehti of 21.8.89 carried a cartoon interesting in itself, though not worth copying, Gorbachev is sitting in the open mouth of the Russian bear, holding its mouth open with his right hand, while fishing with perestroika worms with his left. The cartoon implies an obvious credibility gap between perestroika principles and practice. The Finnish term *matokuuri* (literally *dose of medicine against worms*) denotes an unpleasant course of action needed to achieve something positive. This is the point of the cartoon. (115. *IL 21.8.89*)

Domino 85: *In connection with the concept of economies of scale, what may be suitable for a large entity, a large state, is not necessarily suitable for a small nation*

The visit by light aircraft from Espoo and Hanko to Estonia scored a bull's eye in the opinion of the fliers. (2/3 pp) The significance of the news item was in the recognition of *Estonia* as the target of the visit, not the *Soviet Union*. (116. IL 21.8.89 Viron vierailusta täysosuma)

Suomalaiset lensivät ohjusasemankin yllä/Estonian visit a resounding success **Finns fly over missile base**)

On 23.8.39, the Soviet Union and Germany had signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow, with a secret codicil included dividing Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union. According to the agreement, Hitler's Germany was to receive the western and central parts of Poland, while the USSR was to receive Eastern Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland. (117. IL 23.8.89 whole page article Neuvostoliitto ja Saksa jakoivat Itä-Euroopan salaisella sopimuksella Baltian ja Puola kohtalon päivä 50 vuotta sitten/The USSR and Germany divide Eastern Europe with their secret agreement **50 years since the fateful day for the Baltic States and Poland**)

Domino 86: *Recognition was being given to the secret codicils of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact whereby the Baltic States were surrendered to the Soviet Union.*

Domino 87: *Over 600,000 Balts to form a human chain 620 km long today from Tallinn to Vilnius, in protest against the Ribbentrop Agreement, 50 years old today.* (118. IL 23.8.89 1 whole page Neuvosto-liiton imperiumi natisee Ribbentrop-päivänä 600 000 ihmisen ketju halkaisee tänään Baltian Soviet empire creaking on Ribbentrop day **A chain of 600,000 people stretching through the Baltic States today**);119. Source unclear) 22.8.89) ½ page Moskovan tukimielinilmaus hajoitettiin pampuin Baltian yli 600km pitkä ihmisketju

oli NL:n historian suurin mielenosoitus/Moscow demonstration in favour of the Balts forcibly dispersed with police batons)

This human chain was the largest demonstration ever in the history of the USSR. Some 2 million people made up a peaceful demonstration last night in the three Baltic States in commemoration of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact which relegated the Baltic States to the USSR.

Domino 88:

*The main news of USSR television showed the human chain and reported the demonstration as peaceful. Yesterday's **Pravda**, on the other hand, criticized Sajudis as being too eager in its demands for independence. The national fronts of the Baltic States understood the MRP to have led to their incorporation in the USSR. The USSR recognizes the codicil to the MRP but not the fact that it led to the incorporation.*

Several hundred Muscovites demonstrated in favour of the Baltic aspirations. East Germany conceded for the first time yesterday that the MRP involved the incorporation of the Baltic States.

A moving and devout feeling reigned on Wednesday on the bleak and windy Toompea hill (Cathedral Hill) in Tallinn, where over 300,000 Estonians listened with earnest expressions to the Estonian national anthem "Mu isamaa, mu õnn ja rõõm..." (the national anthem of the Republic of Estonia from 1918 to 1940, forbidden during the Soviet era, AP), familiar to us as the melody of the Finnish national anthem, to words by Johann Voldemar Jannsen.

Tears were streaming down the cheeks of the people before they had got to the end of the anthem. Hand in hand, the human chain proceeded from the base of the Pikk Hermann tower through Tallinn, stopping traffic in the city. The chain, over 600 km long stretched from Tallinn through Latvia to Vilnius in Lithuania. (120. IL 24.8.89 2/3 page Puoli miljoona ihmistä, 600 km:n ketju Tallinnasta Vilnaan, vaatimuksenä **Vapaus, Vapaus, Vapaus!**/ Half a million people, a 600 km. long human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius, demanding: "**Freedom, Freedom, Freedom!**"; IL 24.8.89 **Kansanrintama vaikenee rikok-**

sista/ Natio-nal Front silent about crimes against it 0.125p)

The Communist Youth League paper “Noorte hääl” published the results of an opinion poll carried out by the research institute “Mainor”. Of a random sample of 739 individuals, 60% were Estonian, 33% Russian and 7% were emigrants from elsewhere in the USSR. The sample corresponds to the current nationalities proportions. (122. 24.8.89 Virolaislehti tutki asenteet – Molotov-Ribbentrop sopimus oli Rikos Viroa vastaan/Estonian paper studying attitudes – Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was **A Crime against Estonia** (ca.0.25pp 5 columns)

The 24.8. edition of *Italehti* devoted one whole page to a report on the freedom chain. Representatives of the Estonian National Front had affirmed to *Italehti* that (they would) “not do the slightest thing to create any incident in Tallinn tonight.”The front has kept quiet about the crimes committed by the Soviet state against it. (for instance, the death last year of the 5-year-old daughter of freedom fighter Enn Tarto, in doubtful circumstances in prison camp). (124. IL 24.8.89 Kansanrintama vaikenee rikoksista/National front quiet on crimes against the Estonian people)

The National Front was also keeping its mouth tightly shut about the kidnapping of the daughter of one of their Tartu leaders yesterday. The KGB was suspected of participation in the kidnap.

The editorial in *Italehti* of 25.8.91 reported a powerful and impressive message to the world on Wednesday from the Baltic peoples. A human chain over 600 km long stretching through the three republics conveyed the message that the Baltic people had not been crushed and that they wanted their independence.

The Estonians' peaceful, serious demonstration cannot but affect Soviet understandings in Moscow, was the conclusion. By now, at the latest, it should be clear to Moscow that it was not a question of a small group of fanatics, but of a united decisive people who desired what *they* regarded as their independence. (125. IL 25.8.89 Viro lisää painetta/

Estonia upping the pressure)

During the past few years, there had been unbelievable changes in Estonia. Things were changing all the time, events and demands following upon each other in inevitable fashion. Only a short while ago it was only possible to express wishes regarding economic independence. National independence was something one talked about only in whispered tones. On the 50th anniversary of the MRP it was said out aloud for the first time: **Estonia wants its independence.**

Added influence is in the fact that behind this demand there was also the Estonian Prime Minister Indrek Toome, National Front leader, who, though a communist himself, was in favour of an immediate referendum on independence.

There is reason for the Estonians to remember what made their independence campaign possible: *perestroika*. Estonian independence is dependent on whether *perestroika* stands or falls.

Gorbachev and the Estonian National Front share a common destiny. Gorbachev needs Estonia and the other Baltic States as a laboratory for his economic reforms, and as a showcase for them for the world at large.

According to Gorbachev, **if Moscow were to cave in to Baltic independence demands, the Ukraine would be next in line, and this would be fatal to the Soviet Union. The Estonians' hearts are beating furiously at the moment. We can but hope they keep a cool head.**

Domino 89: Now national independence is a topic for public discussion, with the Freedom Chain from Tallinn to Vilnius gathering public attention.

The Baltic party leaders yesterday affirmed the Kremlin of their support, in order to placate the Kremlin. The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Central Committees organized an emergency session

in connection with their stand on Moscow's new attitudes. Vaino Väljas, First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, criticized the anti-Soviet attitudes prevalent in Estonia.

The Latvian politbureau admitted yesterday to the existence of anti-Soviet forces as well as ultra-patriotic sentiments afoot in the republic. Tass was maintaining that the Party still aimed to make Latvia an independent Soviet republic within a qualitatively reformed Soviet Union. (126. IL 29.8.89 **Kremlin lausunto kuohutti Baltiaa/Apprehension grips Baltic States as a result of Kremlin comment**)

Domino 90 (negative): *Saturday's CPSU Central Committee statement issued a direct threat against the Baltic States, putting their very existence at stake.*

To all intents and purposes, **the Baltic demonstrations and the self-determination aims of their peoples had led to the new stands by the Soviets.** According to a representative of the Estonian National Front, the movement had received numerous messages condemning the Central Committee stand. (127. IL 29.8.89 **Perestroika the object of the strikes in the Baltic republics**)

Domino 91 (negative):

The statement by Mr Sinyakov, in the writer's opinion, representative as it is of middle-class Soviet thinking, shows a clear lack of understanding of the relationship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its individual Soviet republics

The fact that the Baltic States were independent nations in the inter-war period seems to be something beyond the comprehension of the average Soviet citizen with an education either of a low level, or then one oriented solely along Soviet doctrinal lines.

The fact that Sinyakov is a teacher makes it even more obvious that the average Soviet citizen could not imagine life outside the Soviet camp, let alone condone this for other peoples within it.

In setting Baltic independence aspirations against Soviet perestroika, Sinyakov demonstrates a Russian/Byelorussian?(my question mark, AP) ignorance of the national-political aspirations of the Baltic nations. Sinyakov seems to be

unaware of the pre-war independence of the Baltic States, and of the fact that they regard the Soviet Union as having deprived them of this independence.

The USA was hoping for understanding by the Soviet leadership in the demands by the Baltic Soviet Republics for reforms, and that the Soviets would refrain from any violence. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the object last weekend of severe criticism by the Central Committee of the CPSU. (128. IL 29.8.89 Bush demands understanding by Moscow)

The Baltic peoples yesterday set a powerful message to the world about their desire for freedom. The impact of the demand was all the greater for the support given it by the Estonian Communist Prime Minister Indrek Toome. It was still imperative for the Estonians to remember that it was perestroika that needed Estonia and the other two Baltic States as a laboratory for his economic experiment. It was also possible that they would become a liability for the USSR. **After the Baltic States, Ukraine might wish to secede and that would be the end of the USSR.** *Let us hope the Estonians can carry the day,* was the wish of the editorial. (129. IL 25.8.89 Editorial Viro lisää painetta/Estonia adding to the pressure)

Domino 92: *The world has been made aware of the Baltic aspirations for independence.*

Finland with its lack of labour had a large reserve in the Baltic States across the Gulf of Finland. Eccoimpex, a firm dealing with trade between Finland and the Eastern bloc, was recruiting workers from these countries. The Soviet Union was keeping a close watch on the associated Finnish discussions. (130. IL 25.8.89 Balteja tyrkyllä Suomeen/Balts rushing to Finland 0.5+ pp)

Domino 93: *Finland had been observed to be a supporter of Baltic demands; for this reason the people of the Baltic States were interested in coming to Finland, at least for the purpose of working there on a temporary basis.*

Something like a note from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Baltic States was to be expected, according to Moscow. Estonia had openly defied the Soviet Union. Party leader Väljas had balanced between the national front and the EKP, denying that Estonia was intent on seceding from the USSR. (131. IS 30.8.89 Editorial Nootti ja Baltian pattitilan-ne/The diplomatic note and the Baltic stalemate)

***Domino 94:** The Central Committe of the CPSU in Moscow had sent a note to the Baltic republics as its most serious gesture so far. Estonia especially had been as open and as concrete as possible in its insubordination, with its expressly pro-Estonian legislation, and discussion regarding various ways of seceding from the Soviet Union. Party leader Vaino Väljas had balanced skilfully between the ECP and the National Front policies. Väljas claimed that Estonia did not wish to secede, but that it did require development to occur in the direction desired by the people.*

The Moscow leadership was well aware of the support given to it by the Baltic parties, it therefore being very difficult to act directly against the Baltic countries. Gorbachev had staked his future on perestroika, this applying especially to the Baltic countries.

The central government had been so involved in its economic and political problems that it had been unable to react in the manner characteristic of the post-World War II USSR. (131. IS 30.8.89 Editorial Nootti ja Baltian pattitilanne/The diplomatic note and the Baltic stalemate)

Nominees cited for the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize included 77 individuals and 20 organizations, including the **Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian national fronts** and the **International Olympic Committee**. (132. IS 30.8.89 50mm Kansanrintamille esitetty Nobelia/Nobel Prize proposed for National fronts; 133. IL 30.8.89 Gorbatshov laatii Baltian julkilausuman/ Gorbachev draws up Baltic communique/0.5 col.)

Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev had given his approval to a **CPSU Central Committee communique in the drawing up of which**

he had participated. The communique condemned the excessive desire of the Balts to secede from the Soviet Union. The Baltic nationalists were of the opinion that the conservative wing of the CPSU was behind the communique.

All three Baltic communist parties condemned the movements advocating secession from the USSR, though Vaino Väljas, First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, regarded his country as a fully independent country, as did his counterpart in Latvia his own country.

Domino 95: *Gorbachev still opposed independence for the Baltic States, unlike the First Secretaries of both the Estonian and the Latvian Communist Parties.*

Klara Hallik, member of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union and of the Congress of Nationalities, was convinced that the stand of the CPSU Central Committee as regards the Baltic situation bore the mark of the internal revisionists. These forces were again on the attack, aiming at the destruction of perestroika. A social scientist academic at the Tallinn Polytechnical Institute, Hallik was a member of the Estonian Communist Party and a Party expert on nationalities policy. She was surprised by the terse stand taken by the CPSU in its extremist elements and separatists. Even so, it was still surprising. Most surprising was the fact that a document as authoritative as the comments by the Central Committee of the CPSU termed the Estonians fascists.

Hallik reminded the reader that the Russian Internationalist movement in Estonia employed the same terminology as the CPSU Central Committee. Perhaps the Internationalist movement has been the Party adviser in this affair. Hallik was shocked by the language of the statement because it was in no way in line with the recent CPSU theses on nationalism.

She held the Internationalist movement as a power not to be overestimated. Certain Party sections and the movement were allegedly in dubious co-operation. For instance the Leningrad party cell in Tallinn gave financial support to the Russian strikes.

In opposition to the Internationalist movement there was a small

number of rightist groups and individuals who would have Estonia secede immediately from the Soviet Union, although they by no means represented the majority of the National Front and the general policy line of the Estonians. (134. IL 31.8.89 Kansanedustaja Klara Hallik “NKP:n Baltia-kannanotto taantumusvoimien käsialaa”/Klara Hallik, Member of Supreme Soviet **CPSU Stand on Baltic States bears hallmark of reactionary forces**”)

Domino 96: *The majority of the Estonian Communist Party is behind the independence aspirations.*

Nominees for the Nobel Peace Prize include, for the second time, Soviet President Gorbachev and US ex-president Ronald Reagan. Nominees for this year include 77 persons and 20 organizations, including the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian national fronts (135. 10 cm. Kansanrintamille esitetty Nobelia/Nobel nomination for Baltic National Fronts)

Domino 97: *The efforts of the Baltic National Fronts are receiving international support for their efforts to restore national independence.*

In the light of the developments in the Baltic States, the topic of Eastern Karelia had been raised by the Federation for Finnish culture. (135. IS 30.8.89 p.13 Suomalaisuuden Liitto kaivoi Itä-Karjalan lipun esiin/The Federation for Finnish culture digs up the flag of Eastern Karelia 0.5pp)

The renowned causerie writer Bisquit (Seppo Ahti) was satirizing the CPSU Central Committee attitude to the Baltic nationalist movement, saying that this had gone too far. The Central Committee felt a responsibility to the Baltic peoples and to the whole Soviet Union. **Let us put it in plain Russian** (sic!, AP), wrote Bisquit: Baltic peoples! Show the extremist-imperialist-separatist-nationalist-destructivist-hysteric-hooliganist leaders their place! (136. IS 31.8.89 Column by Bisquit **Latviasta laho** / A play on words *latva* and *Latvia*.. *Latvasta laho* literally *Rotten from the top* (of the tree), i.e. *This Riga (= reeks!) of decay.*)

Domino 98: *The stand by the Central Committee of the CPSU against the National Fronts lacks foundation.*

Domino 99: *Moldavia yesterday decided to water down its new Language Act, while Lithuania had postponed the parliamentary session planned for Tuesday, where the new Nationalities Act was to be passed. While both republics wanted to avoid a showdown with the Kremlin, over 80,000 Russians had been striking in Moldavia for the past week and also the Lithuanian Russians had threatened to strike. Had the new Nationalities Act been passed, Lithuania would have been the first Soviet republic to have its own citizenship, in addition to Soviet citizenship (137. IL 31.8.89 Lietua ja Moldavia nöyrtiyvät/Lithuania and Moldavia eat humble pie)*

Language reform was on the way, meeting opposition from the conservatives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as of the Soviet Republics.

Mannerheim had been a kindred spirit of the Balts in the autumn of 1939. As a former Russian army officer, he understood all too well the Balts' security needs. When the Balts were forced to sign their Bases agreements with the Soviet Union, (President Kyösti Kallio, (Prime Minister Paavo) Cajander and Erkkö came to the same conclusion: Finland was a *Nordic* country, it had no parallel with the Balts. (138. IS 1.9.89 Talvisota-tutkija Lauri Haataja: **Mannerheim oli syksyllä 1939 sielultaan baltti**/Winter War researcher Lauri Haataja: **In autumn 1939, Mannerheim was a kindred spirit to the Balts**)

Italehti equated Communism and Nazism, unlike the common post-war stand, in both East and West, which set communism and nazism apart as separate entities, with nazism being the ultimate evil. (139. IL 4.9.89 Cartoon MRP statue with swastika and hammer and sickle detonated, Stalin's head crashes into Kremlin tower.)

The Kremlin hardliner conservatives had begun a campaign against the renegade nationalist-minded Soviet republics. A representative of the Ministry of the Interior, Anatoli Anikyevev had

complained in Sunday 's *Pravda* on the confusion reigning in the special forces of the Ministry, **with nationalist demagogues being allowed to rant unpunished.** (my bold, AP)

In the Red Army paper *Red Star*, Arkadi Volski, the man in charge of the pacification of Nagorno-Karabakh, declared the situation in the area to be reminiscent of 'civil war'. All measures against the nationalist movements were ultimately in Gorbachev's hands, his policy in the past few days having become tougher. Amongst other things, he had twice threatened the leader of the Lithuanian nationalist movement.

Domino 100: *The most ominous threats have come from the alleged head of the hard-liners, Yegor Ligachev. On Saturday he saw it as the Kremlin's 'constitutional obligation' to put a damper on the nationalist movements.--All measures at suppressing national movement activities were ultimately in Gorbachev's hands, his attitude having changed for the tougher in recent days.*

Domino 101: *The Estonian Party executive dismissed two conservatives on Friday, in its aim of an ever more moderate profile. (140. IL 4.9.89 Kansal-lisliikkeet kuriin kovin ottein **Krem-lin konservatiivit aloittivat hyökkäyksen**/Nationalist movements brought under control using severe measures **Kremlin conservatives begin onslaught**)*

The availability of groceries in Soviet Estonia was appalling. A young Finnish woman, visiting a self-service store in the Tallinn suburb of Mustamäe, claimed she would burst into tears if she had to do her family grocery shopping in the store in question. From what was available, one wouldn't believe one was in a suburb of 100,000 in Tallinn. A better selection of potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes, apples, pears etc. was available in the collective farm markets in Tallinn, but the prices were much higher than in the state stores. *Estonia needed to be in charge of her own affairs to have food and money. For instance only 2% of tourism revenue stayed in Estonia, the rest went to Moscow.* (my bold italics, AP) (141. IL 4.9.89 p.12, 0.75 pp. *Elintarvikkeet yksi tärkeä peruste Viron vaateille*/Foodstuffs one important ground for Estonian demands)

Domino 102: *The Estonian aim was economic independence, meaning, amongst other things that decisions on what groceries they sold, how much and for what price, rested with the Estonians themselves. The Estonians were raising their voices in this matter, protesting against their forced subvention of the Moscow economy.*

According to the writer of the letter in question, the Finnish press was currently over-enthusiastic about the Baltic, all news being dug up purposefully. Estonian chauvinism, in particular, was at the forefront. The writer reports on his experiences of the Estonian superiority complex, reproaching the Finns for encouraging the Estonians to battle for Estonia when they themselves had failed in Karelia. (142. IS 5.9.89 Letter to editor Karjalan männi-köstä Viroon/From butting one's head against the Karelian pine to Estonia 0.5 col.)

Political as well as environmental matters in the Baltic States had made themselves felt in the Finnish press as well, with a sense that there was concern for them.

The cartoon in question had two men, talking on a park bench:

A: In environmental matters we could take a leaf out of Estonia's book! If the environment is destroyed, we still have the deputy environment.. (relieving environment)

B: What deputy environment?

A: Sure thing! They have this Minister for the **Deputy Environment**, haven't they?

(In Finnish, the title *Varaympäristöministeri*, the *Deputy (Relieving) Minister for the Environment*, may be construed as the *Minister for the Deputy (Relieving) Environment*, should the fancy take the reader, as it did the cartoonist.) (143. IL 6.9.89 Cartoons (Jouko) (143. IL 6.9.89 Cartoons (Jouko))

The attitude of the central government in Moscow to the environmental disaster in Estonia, for instance, was cavalier, to say the least. The issue was one of the central areas of protest in their campaign. Iltalehti had done Estonia a service by bringing the environmental issues to general attention.

According to the Lithuanian Communist Party leader, his party was to consider secession from the CPSU in order to restore its own reputation before the elections at the beginning of next year. In Moscow, the conservative leader Yegor Ligachev, had threatened severe measures on Saturday against any such action.

In return, the Latvian National Front yesterday came to the forefront of the internal activities in the Soviet Union, demanding full independence. The new policy would be published next week. **Int Upmatsich**, one of the leaders of the movement, affirmed in Riga that next week would see demands for independence, while another leader **Dainis Ivans** said that the new policy would demand full economic and political independence for Latvia.

Another demand by the Latvian National Front was for Moscow to renounce the claim that it was the Latvian people's desire to join the Soviet Union in 1940. This was not the case then, nor was it the case now. This was a matter for the Soviets to realise as a basis for Latvian secession from the Soviet Union..

In demonstration of the strength of the movement, the Latvian National Front numbered some 300 000 members out of a national population of 2.7m.

The Latvian National Front made up some 40,000 members of the Communist Party, an indication of its strength, since in the republic there were 'only' some 170,000 communists, the Front claims.

One possible inference from these figures is that the National Front proportionally attracted a far wider proportion of the population than did the Communist Party. (144. IL 6.9.89 Liettua pelkää Nl:n aselista väliintuloa **Latviassa vaaditaan jo täyttä riippumattomuutta/ Lithuania fears armed Soviet intervention **Latvia has gone as far as to demand full independence****)

Domino 103: The Latvian Communist Party and the National Front are joining forces in the struggle for independence.

Plans for joint markets were being made without the knowledge of the central government in Moscow. A particular point of interest was in the Moscow-controlled plants in the Baltic States. The latter were planning

to subject these to their own control. (146. IL 12.9.89 p.17 Talousuudistuksilla kiire **Baltian maille yhteismarkkinat 1993/ Economic reform in a hurry A common market for the Baltic States by 1993**)

Domino 104: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were planning far-reaching economic co-operation, for mutual trade and foreign trade both inside and outside the Soviet Union.

The national fronts had been active in advocating human rights for Baltic national service conscripts in the Red Army, who were allegedly being persecuted there. These human rights included the right to serve in their own country. Boris Yeltsin had given Gorbachev a year, at most, to get his perestroika model going, at the risk of a grass-roots revolution. The revolution, says Yeltsin, has already commenced, in the form of strike action. (my bold font 14, AP)

Two days ago, Gorbachev himself had accused certain parties of intimidating the people with talk of confusion and a possible coup d'état. (my bolds and italics, AP)

The above text was a prime example of the tone of the articles prompting the writer to collect his data.

The Ukrainian National Front, the RUK, saw no difference between bolshevism and fascism. Russia became the first constitutional dictatorship together with the associated political and administrative terror system. Adopting all the features of the total state, it thus became the model for those other countries which were forced to do away with the democratic state system and to change to dictatorial rule. Russia had been the example for fascism. (**Otto Rühle, The Struggle Against Fascism Begins with the Struggle Against Bolshevism (1939)**; also **Living Marxism (American Councillist journal Vol. 4, No. 8, 1939; reprinted as a pamphlet in the UK by Bratach Dubh editions)**)

Domino 105: Upon a call by RUK, candles were lit in the win-

dows of thousands of homes in memory of the 50th anniversary of the occupation of Ukraine. In Western Ukraine, formerly part of Poland, and also in Poland proper, tens of thousands of people protested against the Soviet presence and for the removal of Red Army troops. The war was, after all, over. Tens of thousands demonstrated in the Lenin Square of the city of Lvov in the form of a human chain, waving the blue-gold flag of Ukraine. (147. IL 18.9.89 Ukraina vaati itsenäisyyttä/ Ukraine demanding independence)

This was an important milestone in the demise of the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the status of Ukraine as a central node in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With an area of over 600,000 square kilometres of fertile land and a population of over fifty million, Ukraine ranked with the larger countries of Europe.

Alexandr Gelman, cultural policy adviser to Gorbachev, writer, MP, regarded Gorbachev's position as more solid than ever. Gelman wanted to correct the misconception according to which Boris Yeltsin was leader of the radical wing. Gelman regarded the (Russian) people as being offended by Estonian electoral law, holding the Soviet republics according to Gelman, as having full rights to independence. The objective possibilities for realizing this, however, were another matter altogether. **The Russians living in the Baltic socialist republics did not accept responsibility for the terrible things had happened there during the war and after it.** No one wanted them (the Russians in the Baltic States) anywhere else, either, says Gelman. **It was the extremist elements who were for secession at all costs, even though this might result in an undemocratic system.** In the event of the Soviet Union becoming a fascist-type country, said Gelman, the Estonian situation would be particularly miserable. Should it revert to a stalinist system, also Finnish independence could be at risk. (148. IL Wed 20.9.89: Neuvostoliitossa fasistisen vallankaappauksen vaara/Danger of fascist coup in Soviet Union)

Domino 106: Alexandr Gelman, reformist though he was, dem-

onstrated the Soviet lack of awareness of the reasons behind the Balts' aspirations. Gelman, indeed, held an Estonian-led Estonia to be against the principles of democracy.

One might ask here whether the USSR was in a position to evaluate the possible implications for the Soviet republics of striking out on their own. The premisses in these conjectures were, after all, fully those of Marxism-Leninism. These premisses did not apply to the thinking of the parties directly involved, such as the Baltic States, parties whose very survival as peoples was at stake.

In the post-war years, Moscow policy was aimed deliberately at the russification of the formerly independent countries incorporated into the Soviet Union during the Second World War. At the CPSU Congress of 1971, Leonid Brezhnev had postulated the development of a new people, the Soviet people, in the USSR. As a result the Russian language assumed a far greater importance than any of the smaller languages. (Zetterberg, 2007:683) A corollary to this policy, under the guise of the *brotherhood of nations*, was the creation of a sizeable Russian minority in the Soviet republics with the ultimate intention of gradually forcing the indigenous peoples into the status of a minority within their own countries. This social engineering became a forgotten chapter in Soviet policy in the memory of the world at large. Indeed even today, (as late as this year of 2004!) the international community is deliberating on equal rights for the Russian minorities in the Baltic states. The fact that the Latvians, for instance, were in danger of becoming a minority in their own country, as a result of the untrammelled immigration into their country, from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, is something conveniently forgotten by the Russians in general and Gelman in particular, and something of which the international community at large is unaware.

Gorbachev at yesterday's Central Committee meeting condemned demands made by the national fronts in the various

Soviet Republics for full independence *demanding measures to curb anarchy.* In the whole process, the only interpretation allowed the policies of the Baltic republics by the Soviet Union, as far as their demand for independence is concerned, was their *aspirations toward anarchy.* (149. IL 21.9.89 Gorbatshev potkaisu viisi konservatiivia politbyroosta **Suuri luuta lakaisi Kremlin/Gorbachev sacks five conservatives from politbureau **Big broom sweeps through Kremlin****)

Mikhail Gorbachev yesterday reinforced his hold on the Central Committee, sacking all the most important opponents apart from Yegor Ligachev, the best-known of them being the Ukrainian party leader Vladimir Shcherbitsky and Viktor Chebrikov, former head of the KGB.

Chebrikov was replaced on the politbureau by the new head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, 65, known as a workaholic, the second full member being the new head of the state planning organ Gosplan, Yuri Maslyukov, 52. New members were **Yevgeni Primakov**, 60 and **Boris Pugo**, a 52-year-old Latvian, known as a financial genius and a protagonist of perestroika.

Domino 107 (negative): It is to be noted that **the men Gorbachev had appointed included Kryuchkov and Pugo, in addition to Ligachev, central instruments of the coup against him in August 1991**, in the false hope that they would be crucial in the maintenance of his system of perestroika.

The Central Committee of the CPSU approved a program giving the constituent republics more power. **Gorbachev**, on the other hand, **strictly rejected all efforts by the Baltic Parties to sever connections with the CPSU and to set out as independent parties.** Gorbachev spoke in connection with Defence Minister Dmitri Yazov's warning that nationalist movements were having a deleterious effect on the Red Army as well. The Central Committee had been convened to deal with nationalist dissension within the USSR, from the northernmost Baltic republics to the southern Transcaucasian areas. The strict understanding was that borders remain unchanged. The Party empha-

sized the uniformity of the CPSU, thus neutralizing the Baltic parties attempts at declaring their parties independent of the CPSU.

The Russian population had been criticizing the newly-passed Electoral Act in Estonia for its anti-Russian discrimination. (The Act stipulated a minimum residence period in Estonia of 2 years before qualifying for electoral status.) The Speaker of the Soviet Parliament claimed this law was in contravention of the Soviet constitution.

Parliament decided not to enforce residential requirements in the elections next December. (150. IL 6.10.89 p.10 **Viron parlamentti siirsi vaalilain voimaanastumista/Estonian par-liament postpones implementation of Electoral Act**)

In Latvia, the direct aim was to organize democratic elections, to transfer all power to the republic's own organs and to disarm. Further, the National Front aimed at terminating the communist party's monopoly on power, while assisting a transfer to a multi-party system. This period saw the rise of the Citizens' Committees in the Baltic States, aiming to register all those born in the Baltic Republics during the inter-war period as well as their offspring number hundreds of thousands, with the church visibly present in the protest movements of the Eastern European countries.

In Estonia, by 29.10.89, a total of 314,521 people, Estonian citizens by birth, had registered themselves with the Citizens' Committees. There was thus, in the form of people who had been citizens of the Republic of Estonia, a visible opposition body to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (151. IL 9.10.89 **Latvian kansanrintama tähtää itsenäisyyteen/Latvi-an National Front aiming at independence**)

Domino 108:The Latvian National Front decided on Sunday to work clearly for the independence of the country employing democratic and parliamentary methods. The Front approved its new policy continuing the democratic traditions followed in Latvia between the World Wars. The new aim was an independent Latvia, with equal rights for Latvian citizens, regardless

of social status, nationality, religion or party membership.
A like movement rose in Estonia as well.

Domino 109: Estonia was gradually resuming direct contacts with the outside world, while becoming less dependent on Moscow. Airline connections to the West were again operating through Tallinn. Prior to this date, there were no air connections to the West from Tallinn – all international air traffic for Estonia operated through Moscow. (152. IS 10.10.89 Finnair lentää Tallinnaan jo ensi kesänä Murmanskin lennot alkavat, Riiaista ja Petroskoista neuvotellaan/**Finnair beginning Tallinn flights next summer** Flights to Murmansk beginning. Riga and Petroskoi still subject to negotiation, 0.5pp)

Domino 110: The Latvian National Front on Monday at the end of its official meeting declared its intention of heading towards independence, even though it avoided irritating Moscow. Amongst its direct aims was the status of a multi-party state with no nuclear armaments or foreign troops. The weekend meeting did not approve the most radical plans aiming against the Communist Party. Nor did it give its blessing to the separatist national democratic candidate's nomination for presidency of the cover organisation.

The Latvian platform was more radical than Estonia's or Lithuania's, while softened by the announcement of a "transition period" to independence. The purpose of this platform was believed to be the avoidance of direct confrontation with Moscow, especially since the length of the transition period was not mentioned.

The socialist political system placed much stock on such concepts as the *fraternal (socialist) republic*, presuming the automatic existence of such warm fraternal sentiments between the constituent Soviet republics and the republics of the Socialist bloc in Eastern Europe. (153. IL 10.10.89 Veljesmaista lisää päänsärkyä Neuvostoliitolle Itä-Saksa horjuu, Latvia kuohuu, Unkari uudistuu Further headaches for the Soviet Union from the fraternal republics **East Germany tottering, Latvia seething, Hungary reforming**)

Parallel to the developments in the Baltic States, though not directly connected to the Baltic States, **were those of the two Germanies**. (154. [IL 16.10.89 DDR Central Committee to sack Honecker?](#))

This item was considered merely a fact reported, no further background reference being made. **It is listed as a Domino since it forms part of the wholeness constituting the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe.**

Domino 111: As an expert in the problems associated with nationalities, Galina Starovoitova believed that the Soviet Republics should decide themselves as to whether they wished to stay in the Soviet Union or not. To quote:

-The peoples should be able to be the subjects of their own development. I think the Baltic peoples will decide for themselves before long. Independence aspirations are very strong there and they have, in my opinion, very good potential for independence. (155. [19.10.89 Kansanedustaja Galina Starovoitova: "Sosialismin kokeilu tullut kansallemme liian kalliiksi"](#))/Socialism experiment at too high a price for our people; "Baltia päättäköön itse tiestään"/Let the Balts decide their own way) ([HISTORIA JA PERESTROIKA 0.5pp.](#); (156. [15.10.89 KANSALLISUUSKYSYMYS/Issue of nationalities VIRON TILANNE/THE ESTONIAN SITUATION \(25+% of page\)](#))

The nationalities question had assumed a scale beyond all proportions as far as Soviet thinking was concerned. First the Estonian national front and then the parliament gave a convincing demonstration that clearly-thinking people in Estonia were aiming at avoiding showdowns and everything that was liable to increase tensions and pile obstacles in front of perestroika. As part of their specific nationalism-bound policy, the national fronts had made the following decisions:

to refrain from all demonstrations
to help the farmers bring in their crops as a joint National Front venture

October saw a **period of suspense in the wait for the Supreme Soviet to co-ordinate the Estonian language law and constitution with those of the Soviet Union. The stumbling block in the electoral law was the residence requirement for the electoral roll** and also for candidature. The purpose of this requirement was to safeguard the interests of the local population. Prior to this stipulation, Soviet law had permitted free migration within the USSR.

The right to vote and to stand for election in the governing organs had followed on from this free migration. This was not in the interest of the peoples of the Baltic States, attached as they were to their own countries. The objects of this law, mainly **representatives of Soviet-wide industry and the armed forces**, in search of a better standard of living as they were, with the associated move to the Soviet republics with the highest standard of living in the USSR, **talked about the infringement of their civic rights when the Baltic populations began insisting on their own rights to their own countries.**

A compromise came from the president: According to this, no residence requirement would be imposed for the right to vote, while such a requirement did remain in force for candidature. (Grant Gukasov, Moskovskiye Novost representative in Tallinn)

Domino 112: The Baltic national fronts had decided to pursue their aims with determination, albeit not through a show-down with Moscow.

Even during Lenin's lifetime, the peoples of Russia/the Soviet Union had the right of self-determination, including the right to secede. These rights were still nominally in force today. But right was right, strength was strength. No one had tried to put this right into practice during the Soviet era. The reason for this had been the systematic subdual and destruction of all nationalist elements in the Party. (157.IL.25.10.89 HISTORIA JA PERESTROIKA/ HISTORY AND PERESTROIKA)

Grant Gukasov, Moskovskiye Novosti correspondent, Tallinn, held that **rationally thinking people in Estonia wanted to avoid conflict**

and anything standing in the way of perestroika. **The Electoral Act, limiting the vote to Estonians alone was a stumbling block. The government was ready to negotiate with the Inter movement, although conflict was brewing between the nationalists and the Inter movement,** according to Viktor Kiemets of the Inter movement. (158. VIRON TILANNE/THE ESTONIAN SITUATION)

President Gorbachev had become the first Soviet leader to talk about a ‘neutral Finland’. It may well now be said that the wishes of Finland and the Finns had been fulfilled. *The post-war foreign policy followed by Finland has been observed to be one of wisdom.* (157. IL 26.10.89 Editorial Historiallinen tunnustus/Historical confession) In the article *Suomi kääntää selkänsä Baltialle/Finland turns her back on the Balts*, **President Koivisto of Finland demonstrated the degree of sensitivity to the USSR appreciated by the Kremlin in the relations between these countries,** noted (NY Times reporter Bill) Keller. (158. IL Supplement 27.10.89, on the occasion of Gorbachev’s visit to Finland, *Brezhnev’in oppi haudattiin Suomessa/Brezhnev doctrine buried in Finland*)

In his dinner speech Koivisto gave an indirect though very clear message that Finland would lend no support to the independence (separatist) movements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the long-term, bonds between Finland and especially Estonia would become ever deeper, involving a furious growth in co-operative ventures.

In Keller’s estimation, Finnish businessmen saw promising potential investments in the event of Estonia increasing its economic independence from Moscow.

At least **officially, Finland did not lend its support to Baltic independence,** since long-term hopes had been placed on peaceful co-operation, in order to maintain trade relations with Moscow. Furthermore, **conservative Soviet parliamentarian Malkovski questioned the allegation of the Baltic States having been illegally**

annexed on the basis of the fact that scholarly research had been done on the issue. (159. IL 13.11.89 Tallinnan parlamentti äänesti *Neuvostoliitto liitti Viron laittomasti itseensä*/Parliamentary vote in Tallinn: *The USSR annexed Estonia illegally*)

Sociology Professor Marju Lauristin, a leading figure in the Estonian political renaissance, questioned the claim that Estonia was moving too quickly with its claims for independence, saying that her country had been exploiting every opportunity available to regain its freedom. The Estonians held that their country had never joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. Estonia was not attempting to leave the Union, it was asking why it was there in the first place. It had never *joined* it, why should it be *leaving* it? Estonia, however, was important as an idea bank for the development of the Soviet Union. The 1940 events had been declared illegal, even though Gorbachev insisted that Estonia had joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. (160. IL 17.11.89 p.8 Professori Marju Lauristin Viro on vapauden ideapankki NL:ssa/ Professori Marju Lauristin *Estonia is the idea bank of the USSR*)

Domino 113: Lauristin saw Estonia as having exploited every opportunity available to re-establish its independence. Estonia had not joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. The process of joining the USSR has been declared illegal. There should thus be no need for any formal secession process.

The Politbureau of the CPSU had been attempting to convince the Lithuanian Communist Party to withdraw its declaration of secession. **Thousands of Russians had demonstrated in Tallinn against the new electoral law. Moscow was concerned about the erosion of centralized power, fearing the Lithuanian protest would prove contagious to the other Soviet republics.** (160. IL 17.11.89 p.11 Moskova joutuu harkitsemaan voimatoimia? *Kremlin maraton-haukuilla ei ollut tehoa Liettuaan*/Moscow forced to consider force? *Marathon verbal abuse by Kremlin ineffective on Lithuania*)

A double-spread *Italehti* article on Lithuania, reported on a futile request by Gorba-chev for Brazauskas to postpone the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress from 19th December to the following spring. A refusal was considered as liable to raise tensions to the extreme. Yet, claimed the article, the process was one that could not be stopped. (161. IL 18.11.89 p.2 LIETTUAN TUSK-IEN TAIVAL Askel itsenäisyyteen vai takapakkia vanhaan kuriin/LITHUANIA'S VIA DOLOROSA A step toward independence or a step backward to the old order) **Leaders of the nationalist organizations of the Baltic countries had written to the leaders of both super-powers, asking them to discuss their issue during the meeting.** (162. IL 20.11.89 p.12 Avoin kirje supervaltaisen johtajille “Baltian itsenäisyys Helsingin hengen mukaista”/Open letter to the leaders of the super-powers “Baltic independence in the spirit of Helsinki”)

Domino 114: The Baltic national fronts saw the Baltic issue not an internal matter of the Soviet Union, but as *an issue, indeed, of the spirit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act. The Baltic States had never accepted their occupation and incorporation in the Soviet Union.*

With Estonian crowns already being printed in Sweden, **the Kremlin was willing to let Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have control over their own territory, budget, banking system. Moscow was to retain control of half the centrally-controlled industrial complexes located there.** Further, it would retain control over *the war industry, energy, chemical industry, long-distance haulage.* (areas of defence strategy!) (163. IL 28.11.89 Kreml hyväksyi Baltian talouden itsenäisyyteen/Kremlin approves Baltic economic independence)

Domino 115: The process towards independence was proceeding, with the Baltic States instituting their respective signs of an independent state: territory, budget, currency.

The *Italehti* editorialist was very diffident. **The Baltic States were**

compared to the boy who wanted a violin. Once he had it, the only problem was how to play it. According to the Supreme Soviet decision, the Baltic countries were free to plan and implement production, indulge in international trade to a certain limit and exploit their own natural resources.

The problem here was the fact that the production structure had been let run down during the post-war period, leaving Estonia with the problem of what it could sell abroad. Western investment was needed. ***The editorial seems to have taken the Soviet stand on Baltic independence.*** (164. IL 9.11.89 Editorial: Baltia sai tilaisuuden/The Baltic countries get their chance)

Domino 116 (negative): Doubt was being cast on Estonia's potential for its own economy due to its lack of infrastructure and of its export potential.

The Estonian local elections in December were to see new political grouping running, new parties rising and dying. There was fierce competition for supporters. (165. IS 30.11.89 **Virossa puolueita pian kuin Suomessa**/Number of political parties in Estonia soon to match that in Finland)

Domino 117: There were currently 10 groupings from the Estonian Communist party to the Fatherland Union:

EKP, the Estonian Communist Party, the only permitted party after 1940 to the present; First Secretary Vaino Väljas

RR, the National Front, a movement created to advance the ideals of perestroika, currently nationalist Estonian left-wing movement.

EMS, Society for the Conservation of Antiquities, protagonist of Estonian traditions and symbols; Chairman: Trivimi Velliste

ERL, Estonian Green Movement, standing for nature and environmental conservation; Chairman: Toomas Frey

ERP, Estonian Green Party, protagonist of environmental issues. Also stresses nationalism questions. Slightly further to the right of the Green Movement.

EDTE, Estonian Democratic Labour party, roughly equivalent of the

Western Social Democratic Parties.

EKDE, Estonian Christian Democratic Party founded in July, 1988, with the aim of a parliamentary republic with its own economy.

EKDL, Estonian Christian Democratic Union, founded in December, 1988, based on Christian activities, defence of the rights of the Church. Organization has split into religious and political factions.

ERSP, Estonian National Independence party on the extreme right

IL, the Inter(nationalist) Movement, founded in protest against the National Front, a leftist organisation led by Russian-speaking Moscow-minded communists in Estonia. The party was strongest among the Russian-speaking population, with Viktor Kiemets and Yevgeni Kogan the most visible protagonists.

In addition to the above, there were groupings in work places, and the Agrarian Union standing for the rural areas and the newly independent farmers.

Domino 118: Estonia had asked for tenders, both from Finland and Sweden, for the printing of its own currency.

The decision had not been officially approved in Moscow, but neither had it been refused, according to the Estonians. Andres Küng, an Estonian political scientist living in Sweden, wrote that the Swedish government would have a good opportunity of paying its debt to Estonia by printing the Estonian currency. Sweden namely paid over Estonian bank assets to the Soviet Union subsequent to the Second World War, assets belonging to the Republic of Estonia. (166. [IL 30.11.89 Virolaisten oma raha jo painatusvaiheessa/Estonian own currency now being printed](#))

Domino 119: Andrei Sakharov suggested at a meeting of 400 radical MP's that the USSR be declared a collection of independent states. Subsequently each state would decide separately whether it wished to belong to the USSR or not. (167. [IL 11.12.89 Andrei Saharov: NL hajoitettava pieniin osiin/USSR to be divided up into small parts](#))

With Christmas making inroads into Estonia again, after a ban of half a century, the high prices of Christmas trees in Finland have forced two Finns to look for trees outside Finland. On Sunday two semitrailers arrived in Helsinki from Estonia, one was detained in the Vaalimaa customs. Three more loads were to be expected on Saturday. (168. [IL 11.12.89](#) **Joulubisnesta naapurin metsillä Neuvostorekat toivat 4000 virolaista joulukuusta Helsinkiin** Soviet semitrailers bring 4000 Estonian Christmas trees to Helsinki)

Domino 120: Official holiday

1989 is seeing Christmas being celebrated officially in Estonia, with a public holiday being granted by the government. Previously the official holiday was New Year. Although always celebrated in the Estonian homes, Christmas in the Soviet Union was an ordinary working day, in accordance with the status of Christianity in the USSR.

The ongoing arson in the rural areas of Estonia seems mainly to be agricultural sabotage, the local anger rising all through the first winter months. The main objects had been barns, with over 2000 tonnes of hay being destroyed. Private farms had been the most worried, since they could not afford security guards. Government support had been promised but the victims were demanding that the perpetrators be brought to trial. (169. [IL 15.12.89](#) **Maataloutta sabotoidaan systemaattisesti** **Outo tuhopolttosarja askarruttaa virolaisia/** **Agriculture being systematically sabotaged** **Strange series of arson cases puzzling Estonians**)

Some 60,000 people had been demonstrating in Vilnius, in support of the Lithuanian Communist Party's decision to disaffiliate with the CPSU. According to principal ideologist of the CPSU Vadim Medvedjev, this was putting Moscow's nerves on edge. Gorbachev was being sent to Vilnius to dissuade Lithuania. His chances in this regard were considered non-existent. Moscow was waiting for the outcome before publishing its own final stand. (170. [IL 28.12.89](#) **Liettua uhmaa Gorbatshovia/Lithuania defies Gorbachev**)

Domino 121: The Lithuanian Communist Party was disaffiliating from

the CPSU, with a crowd of 60,000 Lithuanians supporting this move.

Falling Domino 122: Gorbachev was expected in Vilnius on 6-7.1. to carry out a disciplinary action, trying to influence the Lithuanian people, while by-passing their leaders. Sajudis was predicting his failure in this seeing Lithuania as no longer having perestroika. The term comprised nothing but a set of props for the West. (171. IL 29.12.89 Gorbatshev 6.-7.1. Vilnius 6.-7-1. to the accompaniment of threats **“Perestroika now is but a mere set of props for the West to see”**/0.5pp.)

The Latvian independence movement was full of resolve, with only the military in a po-sition to stop it. This, too was improbable The Lithuanian popular movement did not believe in help from the European community, but “possibly from Finland, Sweden and the USA”. **With Estonia having adopted its own, old currency,** economic independence was well on its way.

The Balts were in a hurry to achieve both economic and political independence. The se-cession of their respective Communist Parties from the CPSU was a source of worry to the Kremlin. While, in the near future, a ”disciplinary visit” from Gorbachev was to be expected in Lithuania, it was still a good sign: it was the “boss” who was afoot, not the tanks.

On entering Tallinn, the traveller could see the senselessness of the Soviet system in the frightening signs of destruction resulting from heedless industrialization. The Estonian capital was surrounded by drab suburbs poisoned by factory smog. 150,000 people lived in these cramped small-windowed colossi. 100,000 of them ‘migrants’ from the other Soviet republics.

Even so, on entering Estonia coming from Leningrad, immediately upon passing through two medieval gates on the old border, one found oneself in a different world: everything was better taken care of, cleaner. The roads were in order, the houses pretty, there were goods for sale in the shops. A good road led straight to Tallinn passing through immense birch and pine forests, here and there there were clean timber houses. One got the powerful impression of being outside the Soviet Union.

(172. IL 5.1.90 3 pages Muuttuva Baltia eurooppalaisin silmin **“Hyvinvointivaltiot väistämättömällä tiellä”** The Changing Baltic region through European eyes **“Welfare states on inevitable path”**)

Fallen Domino leading to rise 123:

Pollution destruction

Entry to Tallinn still revealed frightening signs of destruction, resulting from mindless industrialization in the big city, its drab suburbs poisoned by factory smog. 150,000 people were living in these cramped small-windowed colossi. Of them, 100,000 were ‘immigrants’ from the other Soviet Republics.

Domino 124: Resuscitation of the past

The resuscitation of the past was one of the large ventures the Balts had embarked on. All **memories suppressed by communism were now being uncovered** everywhere.

ii. Churches were being restored to their use, old areas of the towns were being renovated, evidence was being published. **The culture and history of the countries were being employed as peaceful weaponry.** The 45-year-long Soviet occupation had not been able to destroy this culture.

--The University of Tartu was one of the oldest seats of learning in the Soviet Union. It was founded by the Swedish King Gustav II Adolf in 1632, and has maintained its doctoral promotion ceremonies intact: costumes, songs, exchanges of torches, oaths on the Bible, purging in fire.. a magical enthralling spectacle, all the more significant for its being in a communist country.

iii. **All three Baltic countries had kept their own distinctive features,** though the inhabitants demonstrated their deep-felt sense of common belonging and aspirations for independence in their 560km human chain between their capitals --

During my time there it was very difficult to meet the leaders ---- They had been invited everywhere, even to meet George Bush. They had set out on a true diplomatic attack.

iv. **All the Baltic countries had an organized independence movement.**

v. **Self-sufficiency was the aim.**

vi. **The three countries were on the way to a Western way of life.**

vii. **Television was reforming itself**

viii. **The Lithuanian soul was to be found in her culture.**

ix. **Bloody memories**

Instrument of Freedom (on Lithuanian current affairs program “Mirror”)

Domino 125: Estonia was receiving support from Finland, Sweden and the United States, but not from the EEC countries...

Post-war Europe was in many respects unjust, but stable. Now this stability was being lost, in favour of justice. Mikhail Gorbachev, as he was preparing to visit Lithuania, would have to decide whether to sacrifice the principles of liberty he has been declaring for the demands of stability. (173. IL 8.1.90 p.2 Editorial **Kansan tahto**/The Will of the People)

Domino 126: There has been a return to the norms of justice, at the cost of stability.

Vadim Medvedev, first ideologist of the Kremlin was alarmed at the potential destruction of the USSR: Lithuania was allegedly endangering the whole concept of perestroika, putting at risk the reform program initiated by the Soviet leader. Medvedev’s speech was interpreted as a sign that Moscow no longer believed that the Lithuanian Communist Party would reverse its decision to secede from the CPSU.

During the three-day visit, the Lithuanian People’s Front Sajudis was planning to organize demonstrations demanding *Freedom for Lithuania*. A more radical group had already de-signed posters with the English text *Gorbie, go home!* (174. IL 9.1.90 p.9 Kremlin pääide-ologi jyrisi Nl:n hajoamisesta: **Liettua vaarantaa koko perestroikan**)

Domino 127 (negative): Lithuanian independence aspirations were being seen as a risk to Gorbachev’s reformation, with

possible consequences from Moscow.)

Lithuanian Communist Party Number 2 man, Eduardas Beryozov's comment to *Iltalehti* yesterday revealed his fears that there would be serious demonstrations awaiting Mikhail Gorbachev in Vilnius. (Note: in the Baltic States, it was Moscow policy to appoint the First Secretary of the Baltic States from the local populations and the Second Secretary from the Russian-speaking population of the republic, or from elsewhere in the Soviet Union. It is possible that the Christian name of the Second Secretary has been presented in the Lithuanian form Eduardas, instead of the more Russian form Eduard. The chief ideologist of the CPSU, Vadim Medvedev seems to have reversed his comments that the Lithuanian party was imperilling perestroika as a whole with its demands for independence.

The Lithuanian Communist Party had appealed to the people's moderation. Beryozov saw peaceful, European-style behaviour to be the way to give Gorbachev a normal impression of the country. The most important slogan was to be "Freedom for Lithuania", with the associated demand for total withdrawal of Soviet forces from the republic. (175. IL 10.1.90 p.8 0.5 pp Liettuan puolue pelkää mammuttiprotestia Gorbatshov varautuu kuumaan vastaanottoon Lithuanian Party fears mammoth protest Gorbachev prepares for hot reception)

Domino 128 (negative): Lithuanian independence aspirations seen as risk to Gorbachev's reformation) The unfortunate feature here is in the fact that any opposition to Moscow's professed aims is seen by Beryozov as uncivilized.

The Lithuanian nationalists were calling on the people to join their mass demonstrations on Wednesday and Thursday when Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev arrived to discuss the area's problems. Sajudis also planned to demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania and the payment of compensation for "genocide and environmental destruction in Lithuania".

Further, the Lithuanian government was prepared to enter discussions

with the Soviet government on friendly relations between the countries, based on the Moscow Peace Treaty signed by Lithuania in 1920. (176. IL 10.1.90 2 columns, à 10 cm Gorbatshev tulee - Sajudis ei anna periksi “Tavoitteenamme on itsenäinen Liettua” Gorbachev coming - Sajudis not yielding “Our aim is an independent Lithuania”)

Domino 129 (negative): Lithuanian independence aspirations are being seen in Moscow as a risk to Gorbachev’s reformation.

While the most fervent opposition was preparing to give Gorbachev a hot welcome, **Lithuanian Party leader Algirdas Brazauskas spoke to the people on television, admonishing them to moderation.** (177. IL 11.1.90 2/3 pp Liettua vaatii itsenäisyyttä 100 000 miele-nosoittajaa vastaanottamassa Gorbatshovia/Lithuania demands independence 100 000 demonstrators meet Gorbachev)

Despite his independent policies, Brazauskas was still in favour of supporting Gorbachev, as Lithuania’s most important ally, also needing his help. **Several meetings had convinced Brazauskas of Gorbachev’s understanding for Lithuania’s aspirations.** (176. IL 10.1.90 2 columns, à 10 cm Gorbatshev tulee - Sajudis ei anna periksi “Tavoitteenamme on itsenäinen Liettua” Gorbachev coming - Sajudis not yielding “Our aim is an independent Lithuania”)

Hundreds of thousands of people demanding a free Lithuania on the streets protested when Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had stated that the independence aspirations of the republic were not to be taken seriously. While Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to visit Lithuania, the reason for his visit was the Lithuanian Communist Party decision to disaffiliate with the CPSU. (178. IL 12.1.90 p.12 Liettua raivostui kun Gorbatshev julisti “Eihän teitä voi ottaa vakavasti!”/Lithuania furious at Gorbachev declaration: “You’re just not to be taken seriously!”)

Gorbachev again came out for minority rights for the Russians in the Baltics. Whether peoples are small or big, their rights cannot be

ignored. The Russian leader seemed unable to see the national interests of the small nations as opposed to the small nations. The logic behind his suggestion to form an autonomous region for non-Estonians seems to be motivated by Russian nationalism which refuses to see the rights of small peoples to exist.

During the Soviet period, the rights of the Baltic peoples were not observed in comparison to those of the Russian-speaking minority.

Domino 130: Gorbachev seems to lack the capacity to realise that the Baltic States are in a similar position to that of the satellites such as Poland and Hungary, who had been allowed to distance themselves from the USSR.

The article *Historian taistelukenttä*/The battlefield of history discusses the ethnic make-up of Lithuania, together with the Russian influx and its dangers to the original population, as well as the decline in indigenous population due to the mass deportations to Siberia from all three nations. The industrialization of the Soviet period had been at the expense of the nation, no heed being taken of the interests of the Lithuanian population, who regarded themselves as having been forcibly sovietized, as do the other two Baltic nations. (179. IL 12.1.90 approx.1 column *Historian taistelukenttä*/The battlefield of history)

President Gorbachev, on his Lithuanian visit, had been confronted by a worker demanding Lithuanian independence. Gorbachev could not understand that a worker could not want to be part of the Soviet Union. The raising of the issue of the deportations to Siberia was something unacceptable to the president. (180. IL 12.1.90 approx.0.5 col. Kun presidentin pinna petti. "Suu kiinni Raisa"/When the president lost his temper.."Shut up, Raisa")

Domino 131: Official holiday

This year Estonia is being allowed to celebrate Christmas officially, with a public holiday being granted by the government. In the post-war period, the official holiday was New Year, though Christmas was always celebrated in the Estonian homes.)

Vilnius had recently been the focus of all Baltic attention, at the expense of Tallinn and Riga. The Estonian Social Democratic Party had been holding its meeting. There were two parallel social democratic parties of different origin, one successor to the pre-war Social Democrats, the other consisting of former members of the Estonian Communist Party, such as Marju Lauristin and Rein Veidemann. (181. IL 12.1.90 1 col. Demareiden foorumi/Social democratic forum)

Domino 132: According to the article **Estonia was showing promise of becoming the van-guard of Social Democracy in the USSR.**

Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev appealed on Friday to the Lithuanians to *negotiate* on independence and to avoid antagonism. On Thursday he had reported the Soviet parliament to be drafting a law on secession from the Soviet Union. the first time the Soviet leader had mentioned the possibility of secession in Soviet law.)

Gorby's strange thoughts in Vilnius/Hardi Tiido

Gorbachev was of the opinion that if Russia were to secede from the Soviet Union, it would become the most flourishing nation in the world within four years.

Were Lithuania to secede, it would face disaster and chaos in ten years. (182. IL 13.1.90 Sajudis syytti NL:n presidenttiä halpahintaisten valheid
den esittämisestä **Gorbatshev pelaa aikaa** Sajudis accuses Soviet president of presenting cheap lies **Gorbachev playing for time** (appr.2 cols.)

Domino 133:

I. In meetings of the Soviet Defence Committee, Gorbachev had on some occasions taken up the role of the Baltic republics in the defence of the Soviet Union. Large investments would have to be made for the foundation of military bases in the Baltics. There were, however, no threats around warranting such bases.

II. Gorbachev let slip some genuine thoughts, perhaps unawares.

We cannot, he said, compare the United States with the Soviet Union. Almost all the United States population consisted of immigrants.

In the Soviet Union all peoples had their own territory. **On their own territory these peoples should have all rights to it.**

This is precisely what the Baltic peoples felt. The roots of the Russians were in Russia, and, apparently, this is what Gorbachev ignored.

Gorbachev's speeches during his visit had given ammunition to both the Baltic peoples-- --and to the advocates of the Russians' rights.

The disintegration process of the Soviet empire was really and truly on the way. President Mikhail Gorbachev had hardly managed to survive the most difficult task of his career so far, the persuasion trip to Lithuania when even more problems were in store for him in the Caucasus. There the problems were so serious that next to them, the peaceful departure of the Baltic States was an idyll.

There had been hopes in the Baltics that the escalation of nationalism-related problems in the USSR would help the Baltic cause, the Kremlin's attention being fixed on the Caucasus. The opposite was also possible. **Moscow was led astray by the fact that the relaxed discipline in the Baltics might have encouraged the more hot-blooded Central Asian republics onto the road of nationalism.** If Gorbachev was unclear about the strength of the Lithuanians' desire for independence, this cannot be the case any more after his 3-day visit.

Now his only solution was to play for time, and try to postpone Lithuanian independence to give perestroika time to work. Gorbachev's announcement of legislation for secession from the USSR was a final desperate attempt to play for time.

The attempt was so transparent that the Lithuanians did not for a moment consider taking up the offer. Should they have done so, the Lithuanians would have admitted to belonging legally to the USSR. Sajudis policy was the diametric opposite - Lithuania was illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union. (183. IL 15.1.90 Editorial **Liettu-asta Kaukasukselle** From Lithuania to the Caucasus)

Domino 134:

While Moscow would like to instigate a divorce process, one which, it says, would be long, messy and painful, **the Lithuanians were saying: "No divorce is needed**, since there was never any marriage. We were raped."

According to Vaino Väljas Estonia was trying to gain independence within the Soviet Union, unlike Lithuania. Estonian foreign policy rested on three pillars:
Estonian national interests,
the national interests of the Soviet Union and
the interests of the CSCE.

It was Väljas' wish that Estonia be considered as an international subject, both *de facto* and *de jure*. (184. IL 16.1.90 Suorapuheinen mutta taitava Vaino Väljas: "Eesti sillanraken-tajaksi idän ja lännen välille" / Frank yet skilful Vaino Väljas: **Estonia as potential bridge-builder between East and West**)

Nina Andreyeva, chemistry teacher from Leningrad and **a paragon of reactionary politics**, was unashamedly supportive of Stalin. For her, the period of Soviet stagnation began from 1953, the year of Stalin's death. To her, the epithet of *reign of terror* with reference to Stalin's era was mere scandalous sensationalism.

Andreyeva conceded the Balts the right to secede, while not noticing any wish among them to do so. She regarded the force behind Baltic nationalism to be class conflict, instigated. There was a powerful new bourgeoisie in the Baltic. The media, in anti-socialist hands, was speculating with the nation's emotions.

With the removal of class conflict, the nationalist daydreams would also disappear. In order to achieve this, **the leaders of the Baltic national fronts should be arrested immediately.** **The whole Baltic situation was purely a domestic affair of the Soviet Union.** The opinion is a continuation of the official Soviet post-war

propaganda. (185. IL 10.2.90 Nina Andrejeva perusti stalinistisen puolueen NL:oon **Perestroikan** kuoleman **enkeli**/Nina Andrejeva founds Stalinist party in Soviet Union/**Angel of death for perestroika**)

President Mikhail Gorbachev had given Lithuania three days to answer the Soviet Congress of Deputies declaration nullifying Lithuania's declaration of independence. (187. IS 7.3.90 p.15 **Liettualle kolme päivää vastausaikaa** Gorbatshov vaati luopumista laittomasta itsenäisyyshulluksesta/**Lithuania given three days to reply** Gorbachev demands Lithuania give up its declaration of independence. 0.75 pp)

Domino 135:

For Lithuanian president Vytautas Landsbergis, the declaration of independence was irrevocable.

Landsbergis believed the USSR would negotiate.

Soviet troops and tanks were reported as having held military manoeuvres on Sunday on Lithuanian territory, aeroplanes flying over several cities. No military ultimatums had been issued, no Red Army troops had been deployed.

The *Sovjetskaya Rossiya* newspaper **had reported Letters to the Editor opposing Lithuanian independence**, claiming the situation in Lithuania to be worse than in Stalin's day. The opponents of independence were allegedly being persecuted. (188. IL 19.3.90 0.75 pp Landsbergis tapasi NL:n sotilaskomentajia **Gorbatshov uudisti neuvottelutarjouksensa**/ Landsbergis meets Soviet military command **Gorbachev renews negotiation offer**)

while

Domino 136: Estonia elected its new parliament in the first multi-party elections after being occupied, the Soviet era persisted in the name of the elected legislative body, *the Supreme Soviet*. It was not until the first post-independence restoration elections that the *Riigikogu* of the Republic of Estonia was elected to office. (189. IL 19.3.90 0.25 pp Virolaiset valitsivat uutta parlamenttia/Estonians electing new parliament)

The USSR was planning to take measures against Lithuania for its disregarding the demands of the Moscow parliament. Lithuania had taken over Soviet-controlled plants in Lithuania. The USSR in turn was declaring the declaration of independence null and void. Gorbachev refused official negotiations with Lithuania, while still agreeing to informal discussions.

In Estonia and Latvia, radical, pro-independence groups had won electoral victories. An exception to the trend in Estonia and Lithuania was the victory in Latvia of the Communist Party. (190. IL 19.3.90 0.5 pp Liettua ja N-liitto törmäyskurssilla Gorbatschov uhkaa “erityistomilla”/Lithuania and USSR on collision course Gorbachev threatening “special measures”)

Domino 137: Radical national groups had won free elections in Estonia and Lithuania, while the nationally-minded Communist Party was victorious in Latvia.

Olev Laanjärv, anti-crime campaign chief with the Estonian police, reported the prob-lem of a crime wave as already evident in October-November 1988. The initial problem was with the immigrants from the rest of the USSR, now Estonians themselves accounted for some 40% of the crimes.

Estonia was being filled with arms. The Estonian militia would be disbanded, to be re-instituted with new personnel. (191. IL 22.3.90 p.12 Double spread article:Viron poliisi kaipaa yhteistyötä Rikosaalto tulee Virosta Suomeen/Estonian police wants co-operation Crime wave coming from Estonia to Finland)

Domino 138: The Soviet *militia* in Estonia (*militis*, in Estonian) was to be disbanded and re-staffed. The name for the new law enforcement agency would again be *politsei* (*the police*), as it was in the pre-war Republic of Estonia.

Lithuanian deserters from the Red Army had volunteered for the Lithuanian own militia.

Domino 139: The Soviet militia in Lithuania was to be disbanded and restaffed from deserters from the Red army. (192. IL 22.3.90 p.13, 1+ col. Liettualaiset karkaavat N-liiton armeijasta/Lithuanians deserting from Soviet army)

A violent future was in store for Lithuania with the news that the USSR had sent its terror specialist Spetznaz troops to the country. A possible scenario was a staged uprising, for Moscow to take charge of the country in the manner of 1940. (193. IL 23.3.90 p.12 1 p. N-liiton terrorijoukot saapuivat Liettuaan **Sisällissodan uhka leijuu Vilnan yllä**/Soviet terror troops arrive in Lithuania/**Threat of civil war over Vilnius**)

Domino 140: Lithuanian national servicemen had informed the Red Army that they were interrupting their national service. No Lithuanian army was as yet being established.

Lithuania has been upset by the Moscow claim that Lithuania had territorial demands on the USSR.

Arms were being relinquished to the Red Army after a presidential order by Gorbachev for the Lithuanians to give them up. Gennadi Gerasimov, Foreign Ministry spokesman, affirmed that the USSR would refrain from violence in Lithuania. (194. IL 23.3.90 p.13 0.5 pp. Liettualaiset vapaaehtoisjoukot luovuttivat aseensa/Lithuanian volunteer troops relinquish their arms)

There was an ironic hypocrisy, in the Lithuanians' mind, in the Finnish attitude to Namibia's struggle for independence against South Africa and Lithuania's struggle against the Soviet Union. The criterion for independence - that the country is in full control of its territory - does not apply in the case of El Salvador or of Nicaragua. (195. IL 23.3.90 p.13 0.25 pp. Liettualaiset katkerina: "Suomen asenne tuntuu tekopyhältä"/Lithuanians bitter: "Finnish attitude seems hypocritical")

The Finnish foreign policy line had been blatantly exposed in the events of the past few weeks in the Baltic region. On

Friday Lithuania asked the states of the world, Finland included, for help against the blatant oppression by the Soviet Union.

The Finnish foreign minister could not read this request, since he was on his way home from the Namibian independence celebrations. (196. IL 24.3.90 Editorial: *Tukea Liettualle/Support for Lithuania*)

Finnish foreign policy had not shown the slightest understanding for the Baltic independence aspirations. Even so, through various channels, *the Finnish people* had demonstrated its support.

Domino 141: The Finnish Foreign Minister was stating his priorities, with Namibia high and the Baltic low.

An article by Seppo Hyrkäs and Ilpo Lukus reported on the **Lithuanians fears of a bloody Soviet intervention** in their campaign for independence. (197. IL 24.3.90 LIETTUAN KEVÄT/LITHUANIAN SPRING SUPPLEMENT p.7, 1.p. 1 large photo, 1 small photo, ingress LIETTUA PELKÄÄ VERILÖYLYÄ/LITHUANIA FEARS BLOODBATH)

Domino 142: The Finnish press, nevertheless, feared the worst for Lithuania, despite the official government attitude.

The Red Army was carrying on a campaigns to hunt down young Lithuanian Red Army deserters. While the Lithuanians held the men to be innocent of any crime, the army had its own interpretation. The deserters were afraid to go home, a haven having been established for them. Some deserters had been captured by the Red Army, with a sentence of 3-5 years forced labour, possibly in Siberia, awaiting them. (198. IL 24.3.90 Liettuan sotilaskarkurit pakenevat turvakotiin **Pelon ja epätoivon tuulenpesä**/Lithuanian military deserters take re-fuge in haven **Centre for fear and despair**)

Domino 143: Young Lithuanian men were refusing to serve in the Red Army. The Red Army was too occupied with other affairs to do anything about this.

Tanks and helicopters had been showering intimidating pamphlets over the Lithuanian parliament house, with the apparent aim of shutting off all contact to the outside world. **Lithuania was refusing to comply.** (199. IL 24.3.90 1 col. Liettua pelkää veristä kurinpalau-tusta/Lithuania fears a bloody disciplining)

Domino 144: Lithuania was refusing to bow down to a show of military strength from the Red Army. Young men doing their national service were deserting from the Red Army.

Professor Seppo Zetterberg regarded the events in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as part of his daily bread. In Finnish foreign policy, for a long time, there was a politically correct definition for this area, but now times had changed.

The treatment in the press of the Baltic problem has been of a high standard. We are aware of the situation prevailing there and we do know what the people think there. (200. IL 24.3.90 1p. Seppo Zetterbergin mukaan Baltia käy nyt omaa talvisotaansa “LIETTUA on muurinsärkijä”/According to Seppo Zetterberg, Baltic currently waging its own Winter War/”LITHUANIA a wall-breaker”)

Lithuania not backing down

The leader of the Lithuanian National Front, Professor Vytautas Landsbergis had been elected president of Lithuania. The country was being seen as a wall-breaker, a vanguard of progress. All over the USSR people were watching to see what was happening in Lithuania. Even so, there was a measure of cold calculation in the actions of the people. **There was a realization in the ranks of the Lithuanian people that this was the one chance for independence that they had been given.** There was nothing remaining of the fifty years of Soviet propaganda that the peoples had been fed.

When the Balts, through perestroika, were given the opportunity of national awakening and when a return to independence was becoming a realistic goal, official policy rolled off the Balts like water off a duck's back. It must have been a bitter surprise for Moscow.

Zetterberg regarded the Soviet arguments of the lack of economic via-

bility for Baltic independence as not standing up to criticism. In connection with the official foreign policy stand on the Baltic, he understood Finland wanting to keep a low profile, but was surprised by the lack of warmth and understanding at the official level.

Domino 145: US president George Bush had warned the USSR that all measures against Lithuania might have serious repercussions, with a reminder that the USA supported the Lithuanian independence aspirations. Poland, too, expressed support for the justified aspirations of Lithuania. (201. IL 24.3.90 Ingress of 0.25pp Suomi ei ota kantaa **Liettualle tukea maailmalta/Finland not taking a stand** **World-wide support for Lithuania**)

Domino 146 (negative): Finland had taken no stand on Lithuanian independence, while support *had* been declared elsewhere, across the political board.

The Lithuanian appeal for recognition received no response from Finland apart from a statement that the appeal would be studied. According to Markus Aaltonen, Chairman of the Foreign Policy sub-committee of Finnish parliament, Finland was concerned about the fate of the Baltic States but finds it difficult to identify the sanctions and violence committed against Lithuania as alleged by President Landsbergis. (202. IL 24.3.90 0.25pp Ulkoministeriö: **Liettuan vetoomukseen tutustutaan tarkasti/Foreign ministry: Lithuanian appeal to be closely examined**)

Domino 147 (negative): The critics of Soviet policy seemed to have forgotten the strategic significance of the Baltic to the USSR, says Aaltonen. **Finland is supporting the strategic interests of the USSR.**

Finland must understand the USSR's unwillingness to give up its strategic positions. The (Finnish) Greens, however, were demanding the recognition of the Baltic States.

Writer-publisher Paavo Haavikko was not surprised at the eva-

sive Finnish attitude towards the Baltic independence aspirations. Indeed Finland lacked all attitude. No logical explanation was given, the president repeating the mantra that we cannot help our geogra-phy. No other country can help theirs either. (203. IL 24.3.90 0.25pp Paavo Haavikko Suo-men suhtautumisesta: “Matala profii-likin liian kaunis ilmaisu”/Paavo Haavikko on Finnish attitude: “Low profile too refined a term”)

Domino 148: Finland *can* help its history. The Balts are showing admirable reserve in their independence aspirations.

The Domino has three codicils to it:

Finland today has an attitude regarding all who have it well.

The Baltic peoples do not have it well.

Finland has no attitude regarding the Baltic peoples.

Hannu Majamäki, Secretary-General of the Helsinki Students’ Union believed the Union would support the Baltic independence aspirations. The Union had been active in independence demands for Namibia, in anti-Vietnam protests, in the demands for democracy for East Timor. In other manners, too, it had supported the “small and the oppressed”. Yet it had not taken a stand on the Baltic peoples for tens of years, the most recent occasion being in 1919. Now there was a move for student exchange with Estonia, it is also possible that the Union will support Lithuanian independence. (204. IL 24.3.90 0.5. col. Ylioppilaaat liikkuvat jälkijunassa Baltia esityslistalla ensi viikolla/Students had missed the train The Baltic on next week’s agenda)

Domino 149: University students, traditionally the radical (leftist) element in society, are here, in Finland, now expressing their support for the Baltic peoples.

According to a Lithuanian parliamentary press release of 23.3.90, the Soviet-oriented Lithuanian Communist Party had taken over two Party buildings in Vilnius, with the support of Red Army troops, while a Soviet general accused Sajudis of estab-

lishing its own army. (205. IL 24.3.90 1.5 pp.**Neuvostoarmeija iski puoluerakennuksiin** Psykologinen sota kiihtyi Liettuassa/Red Army strikes Party buildings Psychological warfare on the up in Lithuania)

Domino 150 (negative): The Lithuanian Communist Party (Soviet-oriented faction) had taken over two party buildings. Centralism was still functioning in the Soviet Union.

The Lithuanians were in fear of an invasion by Soviet troops of strategically important buildings in Vilnius during the next 24 hours, according to Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas. (206. IL 26.3.90 1.0 page(0.5pp photo, 0.5pp text) Sotilaat suojelevat jo kahta rakennusta Vilnassa **Liettua odottaa armeijan iskua/Two buildings in Vilnius already being protected by soldiers** **Lithuania expecting army incursion**)

Domino 151 (negative): The Red Army was interfering in the Lithuanian independence process. The Red Army in the Soviet republics was the instrument of Soviet centralism.

To date, the capitals of the individual Soviet republics were, in principle, were physically separated from the Western world, served only by the Soviet airline Aeroflot. **The advent of a Western airline such as Finnair to Tallinn may be regarded as a rising Domino.** (207. IS 26.3.90 0.5 pp Finnairin ensilento Tallinnaan tänään/First Finnair flight to Tallinn today)

Domino 152: The Baltic States were establishing their own transport contacts with the outside world. Contacts with the world at large were no longer by way of Moscow.

Romualdas Ozolas, Deputy Prime Minister of Lithuania, expressed the Lithuanians' fear that the Red Army would occupy strategic buildings in Vilnius. They had already taken the Vilnius Institute of Marxism. President Landsbergis had warned his

compatriots against provoking the Russians.

The Red Army had accused Sajudis of forming its own army. Deserters from the Red Army were given extended time to report back to barracks, though none had done so. (208. IL 26.3.90 1.0 pp **Sotilaat suojelevat jo kahta rakennusta Vilnassa **Liettua odottaa armeijan iskua**** Soldiers protecting two Vilnius buildings **Lithuania waiting for army strike**)

Domino 153: Confrontation was increasing between the Lithuanian people and the resident Red Army units.

The Finns saw **Finnish foreign policy as determined by the country's geography**, Presidents Paasikivi and Kekkonen emphasizing this understanding to the full.

Accordingly, official **Finland had adopted a reserved attitude in its foreign policy, accepting the injustice and ecological disaster on its doorstep. The plight of the Baltic nations had been forgotten.** It was not until the Soviet Union itself admitted that things were wrong there, did Finland admit to these. Even so, the Estonians did not hold a grudge against the Finns. (209. IL 26.3.90 Editorial: **Moraalimme Baltiassa/Our (Finland's) morality in the Baltic States**)

Domino 154: Lithuania was currently living fateful days and Finland was still silent. and, asks *Iltalehti*, are the consequences of the national selfishness of Finland to be seen in its condoning all activities of the Soviet Union on its very doorstep?

The joint organ of the Baltic National Fronts, the Baltic Council, was demanding independence negotiations between the Baltic States and the USSR. (210. IL 26.3.90 Insert in text ca 1 col. **Kansanrintamat yhteistyöhön itsenäisyyden puolesta/National fronts to co-operate for independence**)

Domino 155: The Baltic States were demanding that the USSR treat them as independent partners in negotiations regarding their future.

An *Iltalehti* cartoon shows a Finn listening to the radio, saying: *It's been quite quiet for a few hours. I wonder if something has been happening there?*, the reference is to the prevailing situation where...

Domino 156:...the Finnish media were broadcasting news happenings from the Soviet Union in general and the Baltic States in particular, constantly, every day. (Indeed there were so many current affairs programs with topics connected with the latter that the writer originally considered collecting videotapes of all such programs. This idea, however, fell victim to the volume of newspaper articles. It would have been nigh on impossible to pursue the study of both media. The area would still be a rewarding venture.) (ref. (211. IL 29.12.90 p.2 Cartoon/Jouko)

Estonian Communist Party Chairman Vaino Väljas intimated in the Paasikivi Society yesterday that his party would not be following the example of the Lithuanians, but would be vying for independence within the Soviet Union. (212. IL 16.1.91 Suorapuheinen mutta taitava Vaino Väljas: "Eesti sillanrakentajaksi idän ja lännen välille")

Estonian foreign policy was to be based on three conditions:

Estonia's national interests

Soviet national interests

The interests of Western European co-operation security and peace.

Domino 157: Estonia was openly declaring its intention to establish an independent state, adopting the role of bridge builder between East and West. Estonia, indeed, had had such a role ever since the Hanseatic League. The further existence of Estonia was contingent upon these conditions, **in the order presented above.**

Leena Sokero, Secretary of the Aid Committee to Murmansk, held that aid to the city and the events in the Baltic could not be juxtaposed in decisions concerning aid. In Murmansk, the aid would be going to ordinary people who had nothing to do with the

Baltic States. (213. IL 16.1.91 1 column Murmanskin apu vastatuudessa Baltian tapahtumien vuoksi/Murmansk aid in difficulties due to events in the Baltic)

The question was held to be theoretical, but in the event of Estonia regaining its independence, it would be in Finland's interests to recognize this. Hovi believed the official stand and civic opinion to meet somewhere along the line, said Hovi. He did not believe the events in the Baltic would affect US-Soviet relations adversely, reminding us that pro-independence forces had gained strength in the USSR too. (214. IL 16.1.91 0.5 pp. Professori Kalervo Hovi ennustaa: **“Suomi tunnustaa Viron itsenäiyyden ensimmäisenä”**/ Professor Kalervo Hovi predicts: **“Finland will be the first to recognize Estonian independence”**)

Domino 158: A noted Finnish historian was openly lending his support for the pursuit of independence by Estonia.

The sending to Estonia of lacking office equipment was the best way to aid the development of parliamentary and democratic government. (215. IL 16.1.91 0.5 columns **Kokoomusnuoret keräävät Viroon toimistolaitteita** Coalition Party youth collecting office equipment for Estonia)

Domino 159: Aid of a practical kind is being given Estonia and the other Baltic States by sections of Finnish political parties.

The Soviet president had, in a 20-minute speech to parliament, sternly warned the Baltic States with use of force, to coerce the Baltic republics back into line. He warned the Latvian leaders that the troops there might *make some clumsy moves*, unless the government agreed to certain compromises.

Gorbachev had allegedly received thousands of letters from Latvians requesting the declaration of government by presidential decree in Latvia. Vehemently attacking Russian president Boris Yeltsin's stands on the Baltic states, Gorbachev intimated Yeltsin was losing his mental balance.

Domino 160: (216. IL 16.1.91 Aika poliittiselta ratkaisulta loppumassa Baltiassa **Gorbatshev uhkasi voimankäytöllä**/Time running out for political solutions in the Baltics **Gorbachev threatens use of force**)

15,000 Riga Russians had demonstrated on the Red Army sport stadium for strong government by presidential decree throughout the Baltic. Demands were made to replace the present government by the National Salvation Council consisting of military and civilians, to be headed by Alfreds Rubiks, First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party. **Russian labourer Juri Agapov**, who had moved to Riga in 1979, **accused the Latvian government of unnecessary meetings and song festivals**, leading to the previous summer's harvest being left to rot on the fields.

Strutting around in her fur, angry Red Army officer's wife **Mrs Valentina Ivanovna identi-fied herself as a supporter of pure marxism-leninism, promising to do all in her power to oppose Latvian "nationalism and separatism"**, with doctors refusing to understand Russian, telling her to buy herself a Latvian dictionary! They don't understand Russian in the shops any more!

- After all I have lived here for 40 years, and now the rights of the Russians are being so grossly violated.

Latvian Minister for the Interior Alisz Vaznis was reporting on the previous day's black beret attacks on the central heating plant in Riga, cutting distribution for some time, while pro-independence forces barricaded the houses of parliament, where the majority of the Members of Parliament were behind the Government. The conservative (Russian-speaking) Committee of Salvation had gone into hiding. (217. IL 16.1.91 0.5+ pp Riian venäläiset vaativat Latvian hallituksen eroa/Riga Russians demand resignation of Latvian government)

Domino 161: The Russian population is rising in defence of what it regards as its own rights.

A demonstration by members of **the Russian-speaking conserva-**

tive Internationalist movement before the parliament called for the resignation of the Estonian government for its having demanded Estonian independence. (218. IL 16.1.91 p.12 Moskovamieliset uhkasivat lakoilla Viron hallitukselle uhkavaatimus/Threat of strike by Moscow sympathizers Estonian government presented with ultimatum)

Domino 162: Marju Lauristin, deputy speaker of the Estonian parliament and spokesman for the Estonian government, **affirmed that Estonians would not comply with demands by the Internationalist Movement to abrogate their demands for Estonian independence.**

Indeed, the protests against the Soviet actions in the Baltic had carried over into the area of sport. (219. IL 16.1.91 p.28 Ruotsin jääkiekkoliitto reagoi voimakkaasti Baltian tapahtumiin Neuvostoliittoa uhkaa boikotti/Strong reaction by Swedish Ice Hockey Federation to events in Baltic States USSR under threat of boycott)

Yesterday's demonstration by the Russian-sympathising Internationalist movement did not lead to bloodshed in Tallinn. An armed Home Guard batallion had been stationed around the parliament building. Even as the building was surrounded, parliament was debating Russian president Boris Yeltsin's proposal for a treaty of friendship. **For Moscow-minded Pavel Panfilov** of the Moscow-sympathising Estonian Communist Party, **Yeltsin was a traitor to the Russians.**

Estonian authorities claimed there to be a Red Army contingent 200 km east of Tallinn, near Narva, waiting to intervene, with perhaps 4000 troops.

Koivisto's attitude had irritated the Estonian man in the street. You have a shitty govern-ment, a shitty president. I'm sorry, I'm very sorry says a Home Guard soldier. (sic! AP)- We expected support, political and moral, from Finland. Our neighbours has let us down.

Panfilov, on the other hand, regarded Koivisto as having a realistic stand. (220. IS 16.1.91 p.A19 Koivisto on epäsuosiossa Tallinnassa Moskovamieliset jättivät tiukan uhkavaati-muksen Viron parlamentilla/Koivisto unpopular in Tallinn Moscow-sympathisers issue stern ultimatum to Estonian parliament)

A group of Moscow-minded Lithuanians demanded Gorbachev take direct control of Lithuania. A further 1000 troops were sent to Lithuania yesterday. The national Salvation Committee, in whose name the television tower attack was staged, alleged the Lithuanian leaders to be demanding punishment for the communists and their families. (220. IL 17.1.91 p.24 Moskovamieliset vaativat: **Liettua suoraan presidentinhallintoon**/Moscow-sympathizers demand: **Lithuania to be subjected to direct presidential decree/full page picture, 1 column story**)

Russian-minded Latvian Colonel **Viktor Alksnis** regarded his life as **being in constant danger**, no longer being able to live at home, with the Latvian KGB taking care of his security. According to the colonel, an under-ground Latvian organization was planning his murder. Chaos was allegedly threatening Finland more than it did in the years of Stalin and Brezhnev after 1945. (221. IL 17.1.91 p.25 Kapinaeversti Alksnisille tullut murhauhkauksia **“Suomi vaarassa, jos mellakoita puhkeaa Leningradissa”**/ Rebel colonel Alksnis gets further murder threats**“Finland in danger if riots break out in Leningrad”**)

Domino 163 (negative): The outspoken opponent of Latvian independence in Latvia was concerned for his safety, depicting protagonists of independence as the danger. (222. IL 17.1.91 1 column Lietuan verilöylystä “uusi” versio **TV-suosikin tilaustyö Liettua**sta/ New version of Lithuanian bloodbath **Popular TV compere’s custom-made program on Lithuania**)

Compere of popular Leningrad TV program “600 seconds”, Aleksandr Nevzorov was at the centre of a scandal regarding his Lithuania documentary shown on TV Leningrad on Tuesday night. The program aroused immediate reactions in people who had received objective information on the events. **He was aiming to prove the black berets to be heroes** while it was allegedly **the national front Sajudis that gave orders to commence the execution of the Russians.** According to one soldier, the Lithuanians were going to kill all who were not Lithuanian citizens.

Domino 164 (negative): Aleksandr Nevzorov, an erstwhile protagonist of reform in the USSR, has turned against the Baltic independence movements.

In addition to their hard measures, the Russians in Estonia had adopted soft methods. Two MPs had announced they were going on hunger strike because their motions were not passed in parliament. (223. [IL 17.1.91 1 column Nyrkki vaihtui nälkälakkoon/The fist replaced by hunger strike](#) [Viron Inter-liike siirsi lakkouhkaa/Estonian Inter-movement post-pones strike threat](#))

President Koivisto saw the colour pictures of the Lithuanian bloodbath as designed to cause as large a scandal as possible “with the use of perspective and colour film”. Were the mass media to be accused by the president of exaggerating the news of the events in the Baltic, *Iltalehti* would regard Koivisto as holding the world championship in playing down a tragedy. Isn't the death of 13 people at the hands of a military attack and a toll of 100 injured scandal enough already?, was the question to be asked.

While Koivisto had not retracted anything he had said, the people, on the other hand, were surprised when, just a few days after the president's announcement that “as far as he knew there was no special danger of blood flowing”, blood *did* flow in Vilnius. It was natural that there was surprise at the president's words. (224. [IL 17.1.91 Editorial Skandaali värifilmil-lä?/Scandal on colour film?](#))

Domino 165: While Koivisto alleged that he was led astray by misinformation regarding Lithuania, the excuse lacked validity. **There was at least one inference that could be drawn from Koivisto's words: He was not intending to run for a third term. (Iltalehti)** In this connection, amongst other things, **a protest march of 700 university students proceeded from the Old Student Union of the University of Helsinki (Vanha ylioppilastalo) to the Soviet Embassy.** (225. [IL 17.1.91 Uutislista/News items: 1 small item, photo of placard of Koivisto, with Hitler-type moustache, text: “Murderer”](#))

Domino 166: Students, traditionally the radical opposition to the establishment, were siding with the Baltic States against the Finnish government.

The Baltic situation was rising to the position of principal election issue, with the Left Alliance taking the initiative. The aim was to remove the left-wing from preselection. (226. IL 17.1.91 p.12 Tavoitteena kaseerata stalinistiehdokkaat Vasemmistoliitto nostaa Baltian päävaaliteemaksi/Aim to disqualify Stalinist candidates Left alliance elevates the Baltic to principal election issue)

Koivisto, again, suspected journalists of wanting to blow the Lithuanian bloodbath into proportions of scandal. He was clearly upset and offended when journalists tried to get him to take a stand on the matter, stating that the chief editors could be courteous enough not to make him comment on all and sundry news items in the world. The newspaper quoted Koivisto's comment to the press on Thursday 10.1.: "I see no particular danger of bloodshed." (227. IL 17.1.91 p.13 Presidentti Koivisto moitti Vilnan verilöylyn värivalokuvia "Asiasta haluttiin saada skandaali"/President Koivisto criticizes colour pictures of Vilnius bloodbath "They wanted to blow this into a scandal ") The president had stated on Wednesday 16.1. that he had a variety of news sources, with no indication to the effect that matters were to take the course they did in Vilnius."

Domino 167: Finnish president Mauno Koivisto was incriminating himself in the light of the Vilnius massacre.

The Baltic situation was becoming a central issue in the Finnish elections. The Left Alliance was taking the first initiative, demanding that all its candidates support its Baltic stand, with the aim of stigmatizing the stalinists who agreed with the Soviet steps in the Baltic region. On the extreme left, Ensio Laine, the representative of the Communist Party faction termed *taistolaiset*, after its leader Taisto Sinisalo, directly stated the aim of the Left Alliance campaign to

be clearly the stigmatization of certain MPs, thus affecting their electoral chances. Indeed, should the election of a candidate be based on his attitude to the Baltics, asks Coalition Party deputy Jalmari Torikka. (228. IL 17.1.91 p.28 Vasemmistoliitto nostaa Baltian päävaaliteemaksi/Left Alliance raising the Baltic question to the status of the main issue in the elections)

A correspondent *Suomalainen* defended President Koivisto's statements on the Baltic situation as those of a statesman, not of a choir conductor. For him, feeling ashamed of Koivisto was tantamount to feeling ashamed of being Finnish. (229. IS 18.1.91 p.A3 Letter to editor Presidentin arvostelijat/Presidential critics)

Jukka Tennilä, again, in his column *Tartteeks sitä informoitua/ D'you really have to be informed?*, criticized Koivisto for his lack of information regarding the Baltic States, as well as for his lack of desire to inform himself. Prime Minister Holkeri, at least admitted he had been wrongly informed. Tennilä feels that apparently the president would like the people to share his own beliefs on the Baltic States, without informing themselves any further.

Domino 168: The President of the USSR was acting as if the situation in the USSR was un-changed, without any awareness of what was happening there. (230. IS 18.1.91 p.A20 Inter-liike aloitti eilen lakon Virossa Radioasema kutsui venäläisiä aseisiin/The Inter movement went on strike yesterday in Estonia Radio station calls Russians to arms)

Despite placatory political statements, Russian-Estonian relations in Tallinn took a turn for the worse, with a strike in the Internationalist movement headquarters, the Dvigatel armaments factory. The aim, to all accounts, was to promote the dismissal of the Estonian government and parliament.

Estonia was organizing its own military call-up, regarded as illegal by Moscow. **A message to President Rüütel was brought to him by Enn-Arno Sillari, First Secretary of Estonian minded Com-**

munist Party. Gorbachev had made a clumsy effort at humour, asking Sil-lari whether Röötel had become too proud to pay him a visit himself.

Domino 169: The same unawareness regarding the plight of the Baltic peoples persists in the comments made by President Gorbachev. (231. IL 18.1.91 Editorial: Mutta älkää unohtako Baltiaa/..but don't forget the Baltic)

The representatives of the old guard in the USSR had calculated the eyes of the world to be so focussed on the Persian Gulf, that the Baltic region was spared its attention. For this reason it was imperative that Finland monitor the course of events in the latter especially carefully. **The impending disciplinary action against the Baltic States was given a preliminary warning in Lithuania.** Ominous rumbles in Latvia and Estonia were not heard until events took a turn for the worse in the Persian Gulf.

In Latvia the black berets were more provocative than ever, the first Latvian being killed on the day Iraq attacked. **In Estonia**, the Interfront was mobilizing an armed military guard, where in accordance with Stalinist tradition, it would probably request Red Army aid.

According to *Iltalehti*, while **Finland had tried to maintain that the Baltic republics were unwilling to negotiate, this was not true.** Estonia began negotiations in August, the USSR broke them off in September. (232. IL 18.1.91 Editorial: ...Mutta älkää unohtako Baltiaa/..but don't forget the Baltic)

While Lithuania had postponed its declaration of independence for 100 days to no avail, it must be remembered that the USSR had set impossible terms for independence. **According to Moscow requirements, a referendum was to be held, where secession would require a 67% majority.** In the event of 10% of the population requiring a new referendum, this was to be carried out. **The final decision still lay with the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.**

Subsequent to this phase, there would be a five-year transition period,

upon which the occupied country would be obliged to pay the occupier a billion roubles in compensation.

It was no wonder the Baltic peoples were not willing to negotiate.

Domino 170: The Soviet Union was reckoning on the events in Iraq diverting the attention of the world at large from its actions in the Baltic States. The attention was not, however, waning. In the hypothetical event of Koivisto being under siege with the government and parliament in parliament house, with tanks threatening to break in, and Koivisto asking the people to form a human wall around the building, reporter Seija Nummijoki would say “Go out yourself.” The Soviet Union had accustomed the population to waiting. The good was always located in the future.

While the Balts were emphasizing their own nationalities in favour of a blanket Soviet nationality, the tanks were running over the protestors. According to Koivisto, as Nummijoki sees it, the leaders of the Baltic states were putting the interests of their regions selfishly before the interests of the composite state at large. The leaders were **genuine, but also power-hungry politicians.** (232. Seija Nummijoki: Column NÄIN ON/THAT’S THE WAY IT IS: **Baltian marttyrit**/Baltic martyrs)

Over 300 had been reported killed in Sunday’s massacre in Lithuania. Viktor, a 25-year-old lieutenant in the special KGB forces, reported at least 50 soldiers shot dead. Though a Russian, Viktor had lived all his life in Latvia. The orders for the use of force allegedly bore the signatures of President Mikhail Gorbachev, Minister of Defence Dmitri Yazov and Minister for the Interior Boris Pugo. (233. **p.27 18.1.91 Liettuan verilöylyä kaunisteltu “Sotilaat tappoivat yli 300”/The Lithuanian bloodbath underplayed “Soldiers kill over 300”**)

Domino 171: Support for Latvian independence is also expressed by a Latvian Russian.

The Riga militia would probably have had to use force against the Ministry for the Interior forces, the Black Berets, who were making surprise attacks on the bridges leading to Riga, where National Front forces were on guard in tractors and trucks. The commander-in-chief of the Black Berets was the First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party, Alfreds Rubiks, who reportedly intended to establish a fascist dictatorship with the aid of his forces. The Ministry of the Interior in Moscow did not regard the Red Army units in the Baltic States as having acted illegally. Yet the constitution forbade the armed forces from directing arms against their own people. (234. p.28 Latvian sisäministeri Vaznis: Miliisi aseisiin mustia baretteja vastaan/Militia to be armed against the black berets)

Domino 172: There is conflict in the comments by officials regarding the events in Riga.

Further Dominoes:

While the Latvian National Front was guarding bridges against possible attack by the Red Army or the Ministry of the Interior (173), tractors and trucks were blocking all approaches against attacks by armoured units. (174) To this end, a first aid point in cathedral. (175), and a kitchen in church museum. (176) Furthermore, a prayer meeting was held there at night. (177) The Latvians' patience and determination was to be admired. (235. p.29 A night on the barricades)

A personal aide to Mikhail Gorbachev intimated possible talks between Lithuania and the Kremlin. Gorbachev had planned a coup during the Persian Gulf crisis. With Western aid to Lithuania, these plans had changed. The Red Army was taking Lithuanian deserters from the streets of Vilnius, since only 12.5% of the intake had reported. (236. p.29 Liettuan ja NL:n neuvottelutie aukeamassa?/Talks possibly between Lithuania and the USSR?/ 1 col.)

Domino 178: Gorbachev was beginning to consider independence for Lithuania.

Domino 179: Indrek Toome, chairman of Foreign Affairs subcommittee of the Estonian parliament, believed the immediate danger of the Red Army to be past for Estonia. The

The Persian Gulf war had made the Balts nervous with a fear of distraction of world attention. The Inter movement was tightening up its campaign. On Wednesday, its representatives promised President Rüütel a respite of 9 days before their strike. In the arms factory Dvigatel, managed by the Interfront leader General Vladimir Jarovoi, there was a mass meeting and demonstration on Thursday. According to Estonian sources, there had been rhythmic shouts: "Let's grab our weapons, let's grab our weapons." (238. p.30 Gorbatshev ja Rüütel tapaavat **Viro saanee hetken aikaa** Gorbachev and Rüütel meeting **A breathing space for Estonia**)

The writer of this letter was urging all Finns to show their true colours. A small nation's very existence was at stake, admonished the writer. Koivisto should not reiterate old lies and let the Terijoki government (the Finnish equivalent of the Vichy government, in the Winter War) carry on peacefully. And if someone should ask where this Terijoki is, the writer should say he has not received any information in this regard. (the excuse presented by Koivisto for his lack of comment on Lithuania, AP). (239. IS 19.1.91 p.A2 Letters to the Editor LUKIJAN ÄÄNI: 1 whole page on the Baltic: Hämeen residentin lausunto/Comment by resident of the province of Häme)

Since **the powers-that-be, the President and the Prime Minister, were refusing to take responsibility for their decisions on the Baltic,** the writer felt she would have to bear her responsibility by voting them out at the next elections for the shame they had brought on the electorate. (Vastuu on kannettava/The responsibility is to be borne (Merja Ahlström, Espoo))

Domino 180: The president should shoulder the responsibility for his comments.

An ex-serviceman rose up in defence of **Koivisto**, who, he says, was

fully active in the struggle against the USSR, but who, **in the recent case of Lithuania committed a human error.** (240. Aseveli Manu/ Social Democrat war veteran Mauno Koivisto)

While Soviet ambassador Boris Aristov had expressed his sympathy for Lithuania, the basis for all action should be realism. According to the official state truth, confirmed by the president, **peaceable (Red Army) troops sometimes had to defend themselves when the Lithuanian bounders attacked them.** The president knew nothing about this, but even so, **the heroic (Red Army, AP) soldiers deserved praise from their president.** (241. IS 19.1.91 p.A4:Editor-in-chief's column Mitäs me realistit/ Carry on, realists 3 columns, ca.0.25 pp)

Domino 181 (negative): This view held the press to be misguiding the readers, **with its emphasis on scandal with colour pictures of the bloodbath in Vilnius.** Yet, according to the Chief Editor, the picture of the Baltic States, as seen by the Western media, was more realistic than that of the Kremlin. **Gorbachev had taken off his friendly mask, to show his real features.**

Domino 182: A member of the Lithuanian politbureau had predicted the secession of the country from the Soviet Union by the end of the year. A new Supreme Soviet was being elected by the country the following Saturday. Legally the country was independent now. Lithuania's having been illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, her parliament had declared this incorporation null and void in 1991. (242. IS 19.1.91 1 p.16 "Liettua irrottautuu N-liitosta tänä vuonna"/Kommunistijohtaja uskoo nopeaan itsenäistymiseen/ "Lithuania will secede from the USSR this year"/Communist leader believes in rapid independencw e)

With the Estonians barricading their parliament, the Russians were being assembled to attack. (243. IS 19.1.91 1 p. Panssariesteet ympäriävät Viron parlamenttitaloa Inter-liik-keen radio-asema kutsuu venäläisiä joukkoja viimeiseen taisteluun/Tank barri-

cedes around Estonian Parliament House Inter movement radio station summoning Russian troops to the last battle)

Domino 183: *The Estonian Supreme Soviet* was making a last stand against the Red Army.

It was always necessary to recall the process of the incorporation of Estonia into the USSR when considering the options for secession. (244. IS 19.1.91 Näin Viro, Latvia ja Liettua sovjetisoitiin 1939-40 Suursota hautasi Baltian kriisin/This was how Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were sovietized in 1939-40 The World War buried the Baltic crisis under it) The 1½-page article describes in detail the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. A ½-page article: Baltian historiaa ei enää voida väärentää/No more falsification in Baltic history

Domino 184: In the Baltic States, the histories of the countries were now being written as they were, **not according to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism.**

Seppo Sännälä, in his column **MUSTIEN AUTOJEN VIIKKO/***The week of the black cars*, takes **a critical stand on the enthusiasm shown regarding Gorbachev.**

Domino 185: Gorbachev's popularity in Vilnius was non-existent. (245. IS 19.1.91 p.B19 Baltian kabulisti)

The reactions in Finland to both the Baltic and the Persian Gulf had been muted, with only some hundreds of people demonstrating, while ten years ago there were tens of thousands demonstrating against missiles. (246. IL 19.1.91 Editorial: Tappotyöstä rauhan-työhön/From killing duties to peace duties)

Heikki Männikkö, Secretary-General of the Finnish Communist Workers' Party was expressing his approval of the black berets' measures leading to bloodshed in Lithuania last Sunday,

claiming that capitalism had just wanted to hi-jack the Baltic States for itself from the Soviet Union. This was so, even though (Männistö claims) they had attained a high standard of living as parts of the USSR. They would just be losing the real independence they already have. (247. IL 19.1.91 p.16. Kommunistinen työväenpuolue ei horju sosialismissaan “**Baltia ei ymmärrä omaa parastaan**”/Communist Workers’ Party unswerving in its socialism “**The Baltic states do not know what is best for them.**”) An interview of Heikki Männikkö by *Iltalehti*, expressed the following thoughts (bold texts signify contradictions to the facts, as seen by AP):

Männikkö believed *a priori* **that the Baltic States belonged to the USSR, regarding the 1940 fixed elections as an expression of the free will of the people. Männikkö believed the Balts to have prospered under the Soviet Union.** The blood shed in their incorporation into the Soviet Union was, for Männikkö, a defence of the legal status as part of the Soviet Union. The fact that the USSR remained intact was regarded as holy.

Domino 186 (negative): There was political opinion in Finland supporting stalinist measures.

Koivisto had exceeded his authority too many times. While some excesses might be forgiven, the Baltic affair was hard to forgive. Our leaders had avoided taking a stand on the Baltic and had not admitted that their independence was in Finnish interests. This was the result of regression and restlessness. It seems that Yeltsin was the only one who realized what was going on. The fact that he had supported Baltic independence showed foreign policy skills. (248. p.22 2pp Jouko Tyyrin mielestä Koiviston syntitaakka on jollian raskas: “**Kymmenessä vuodessa presidentistä tulee jumala**”/ Jouko Tyyri regards Koivis-to’s burden of sin as too heavy “Ten years makes a god of the president”)

Domino 187:

While writer Jouko Tyyri estimated Koivisto to be very intelligent, this was not the case in all things. The Baltic affair was one of his worst *faux pas*.

Savisaar had assured the audience that Gorbachev was present when decisions were taken before the turn of the year in the **matter of the Vilnius and Riga disciplinary actions**. Apparently Gorbachev had allied himself with the arms industry and the CPSU.

As Savisaar was speaking, a Jewish-born imitator imitated Gorbachev, making statements in his name. Koivisto was addressed as Comrade Koivisto, in association with Koivisto's claim that the Baltic issue was an internal issue of the Soviet Union. (249. [IS 21.1.91 p.A12 **Savi-saar lölyytti kovin sanoin Gorbatshovia** Kansanrintama arvosteli myös presidentti Koivis-toa/**Savisaar gives Gorbachev a good piece of his mind**](#) National front also criticizes President Koivisto 0.75 pp.)

Domino 188: Through his stands on the Baltic States, Koivisto has lost face there.

There was a threat of a break in shipping communications between Estonia and Finland due to the crisis in the Baltic region. (250. [IS 21.1.91 0.25.pp Laivaliikenne Virosta Suomeen keskeytymässä](#))

Domino 189 (negative): The pro-Russian population was assembling its own militia. Gennadi Kulkov, member of the pro-Moscow Estonian Communist Party strike committee accused the Estonian Kodukaitse/Home Guard of hostility towards the Russians. Andrus Öövel, its Commander, denied this vehemently.

[Mustat baretit tulittivat rajusti Riiassa **LUOTISADE SURMASI AINAKIN NELJÄ**/ Intensive gunfire in Riga from Black berets **HAIL OF BULLETS KILL AT LEAST FOUR**](#) (251. [IS 21.1.91 p.1 large full-page headline](#)) **Tuula Kuisma refers to her experience seeing the Red Army in Budapest in 1956, shooting school-children, then her reading of Prague in 1968, Poland (in 1980) Isn't anything enough**, she asked. (252. [IS 21.1.91 p.2 LUKIJAN ÄÄNI/](#)Letters to editor: Tuula Kuisma, Hki Eikö mikään riitä? [Is nothing enough?](#))

A strange interpretation of the Baltic aspirations, by a T.J. Malin

of Helsinki) **was to compare the Soviet Union to the husband in an adultery case.** The issue was seen as **(Finland's) right not to interfere in the husband next door** (the Soviet Union) **disciplining his wife** (Latvia, Lithuania) **who was/were messing about with other men** (the West). In other words, not knowing the background of the Baltic problem, he adopts the officially sanctioned Soviet version of the situation, regarding the Baltic States as an internal, domestic affair of the Soviet Union. According to Malin, the Baltic States would seem to have no right to go their own way.

While support had been given to the Balts, one Letter to the Editor regarded the Baltic States as a purely domestic matter for the Soviet Union.

Latvian independence aspirations had led to the Latvian Militia Headquarters in Riga being attacked on Sunday by the Ministry of the Interior special forces, the Black Berets. The firing lasted two hours, being directly telecast to Finland. A Finnish TV reporter Hannu Väisänen, was injured in the attack. The attack was fully armed, with machine guns and handgranades. The Latvians had mere handguns. At the moment of the attack, Alois Vaiznis, Latvian Minister of the Interior, was in Moscow meeting the Soviet Union Minister of the Interior, the Latvian-born Boris Pugo. (253. IS 21.1.91 **Mustat baretit hyökkäsivät miliisiin päämajaan Riian keskustassa/Black berets attack militia HQ in down-town Riga**)

Domino 190 (negative): On Saturday, the Committee for National Salvation, headed by Alfreds Rubiks, head of the Moscow-oriented Latvian Communist Party, announced it had taken over Latvia, dissolved parliament and dismissed the government. The announcement was widely announced in Moscow - it was a mere bluff.

A Finnish Broadcasting Corporation reporter was assaulted together with several others in last night's unrest on the streets of Riga. Reporter Hannu Väisänen was speaking into his tape-recorder when three men stepped out of a car, one starting to

kick his arms and legs. The tape recorder was confiscated. (254. IS 21.1.91 Neuvostosotilaat pahoinpitelivat Ylen toimittajaa Latvialaiset suojelivat toimittajaa luodeista piitta-matta/**Soviet soldiers assault Finnish Broadcasting Corporation reporter** Latvians protect reporter despite hail of bullets, 1 col.)

Professor Anto Leikola, chairman of the Finnish-Latvian Friendship Society regarded the black berets occupying the parliament as bands of robbers. A Gorbachev unable to manage them was seen as no better than them. (255. IS 21.1.91 Latvian ystävyysseuran puheenjohtaja Anto Leikola: Rosvot kiinni! /Anto Leikola, chairman of Latvian Friendship Society: **Catch the crooks!**)

Domino 191: Professor Leikola saw the activities of the black berets as tantamount to crime.

Black-bereted soldiers had killed five people on breaking into the Latvian Ministry for the Interior. The Latvians suspected that those responsible were KGB, disguised as Ministry for the Interior forces. (256. IL 21.1.91 Viisi ammuttiin yöllä. Moskova esittää taas tietämä-töntä. YLE:n toimittajaa mukiloitiin/KGB surmatöissä Riissa Five shot at night. Moscow again pleads ignorance. FBC reporter assaulted. **KGB in Riga killings**)

Domino 192: The illegalities of the KGB and the Ministry for the Interior were paving the way for changes. **During the weekend, politicians in their speeches were preoccupied with the crises in the Baltic region and the Persian Gulf.** The events in the Baltic might possibly turn to the disadvantage of the principal political parties in Finland. On the official plane, Finland had not supported the Baltic peoples as much as the Finnish people would have needed. (257. p.5 Vaalipuheissa sisäpolitiikka jää kakkoseksi Poliitikkojen katseet nyt ulkomaille/33 Domestic policy takes back seat in election speeches **Politicians now looking abroad**)

Domino 193: The chasm between the official foreign and unof-

official foreign policies of Finland on the Baltic States was widening.

At least four died in Riga in the attack by Soviet special forces, shooting blindly at the Latvian Ministry for the Interior. (258. 21.1.91 p.1 Mustabaretit hyökkäsivät Riissa/ Black berets attack in Riga)

The family of Veli-Antti Savolainen, editor-in-chief of *Iltalehti*, had spent the summer in Estonia **during the previous Song Festival. On passing the Toompea castle, with the Tall Hermann tower, the six-year old daughter of the family commented on the Estonian flag flying there: Estonia is still free, Daddy. I know, for the flag is still flying.**

With Savolainen commenting on the demonstrations in *Iltalehti*, his six-year old had taught other children in her kindergarten:- The Estonians are wiser than other people, they don't use guns in their revolutions, they use song.

The evening prayer also included a prayer for Estonia and the family of a friend there.

Domino 194: The struggle for independence was seen by a six-year old the way it was experienced by the Estonian people.

Around a hundred black berets (Soviet Ministry of the Interior (OMON) troops) **attacked the Latvian Ministry of the Interior, taking part of it, with at least four casualties. Prime Minister Godmanis had warned the residents of Riga to stay inside.** On his calling Minister for Defence Dmitri Yazov, Godmanis was told Yazov knew nothing. The telephone was subsequently hung up.

The Latvian National Salvation Committee, under pro-Moscow Latvian CP chief Alfreds Rubiks, falsely declared it had assumed all power in Latvia, dissolving parliament and dismissing the government.

While the Kremlin denied any knowledge of the incidence, the Latvians had no intention of stopping their pursuit of inde-

pendence. (260. IL 21.1.91 p.12 Myös panssarit ampuivat talon puolustajia **Erikoisjoukot hyökkäsivät Latvian sisäministeriöön** Tanks shoot at defenders of building **Special forces attack Latvian Ministry for the Interior** 0.5 pp photo, 0.5pp text)

Domino 195: The same applies to the Latvians as to the Estonians in Domino 184.

President Landsbergis had transmitted a call to the Finns for help, from the besieged Parliament House in Vilnius. A Russian soldier there, speaking to *Iltalehti*, declared there were enough tanks in Kaliningrad, 250 kilometres away, to take the Lithuanian parliament. Local Russians engaged in argument with the troops. The inhabitants wished to erect a tall cross in memory of the victims of the television tower, though the shadow government had not given permission for its erection.

“Totuus on puolellamme”/We have the truth is on our side

One kindergarten teacher, in the television tower on the night it was attacked, claimed that **the massacre would not have happened, had just one Western country recognised Lithuania.** Now everybody in the Western world was out for the defence of Kuwait against Iraq, just because it had oil.

With tens of injured people transported to hospitals in Vilnius, Antonas Zamoshkis, (a Lithuanian) engineer, sent the following message to the Finns:

We are no more part of the Soviet Union than is Finland. I hope your people understands us.

Further headlines, reporting on Soviet military action in Lithuania, reflected sympathy and understanding.

Panssarit vartioivat tv-tornia/Tanks guard the television transmission tower

Kymmeniä haavoittuneita sairaaloissa/Tens of casualties in the hospitals

He löivät rautapampuilla päähän/They hit us on the head with their iron batons

Eläimetkään eivät ole niin raakoja/Not even animals are that cruel.
(261. IL 21.1.91 p.13 Vytautas Landsbergis IL:ile/Vytautas Landsbergis to IL: “Lähetäkää tänne vapaaehtoisia!”/“Send us volunteers!”)

Domino 196: The Lithuanians, as a people, were involved in a struggle for life and death.

With others, Loreta was singing and chanting:”Lithuania, Lithuania – freedom!” The victims of the OMON massacres were being remembered, with Russian Communist Party leader Boris Yeltsin expressing his opposition to the increasing conservatism in the Party. *Vilnius today, Moscow tomorrow*, warned the procession through the streets of Moscow. The demonstration ended in demands for Gorbachev’s resignation. (262. IL 21.1.91 p.14 0.25 pp Järkyttynyt vilnalaisäiti tyttärensä haudalla:”Hän oli aina lähelläni”/Shocked mother from Vilnius at her daughter’s grave: “She was always close to me”; p.14 1 col. Jeltsin: diktatuuri on tullut totta Moskova marssi Liettuan puolesta/ Yeltsin: Dictatorship has been reincarnated Moscow marching for Lithuanian liberty)

The Finns and the Estonians were both realists. In terms of the Estonian foreign policy, Savisaar would have expected more condemnatory comments from the rest of the world. According to Savisaar, the manuscript would have read the exchange of the Lithuanian government with the help of the army and the opposition, the next step being a mass meeting of Russians demanding the return of the Soviet order, in the style of 1940. Estonia would have been next in line.

The people prevented this scenario, the Kremlin having consequently to change its views. Savisaar felt that Moscow was playing it by ear, without any clear manuscript. Koivisto was no surprise to Savisaar. He just repeated the stand Finland had long been taking. Estonians, too, were realists, with no disappointment felt. (p.14 1.5 col. Viron pääministeri ei yllätynyt Koiviston puheista Savisaar pitää suomalaisia ulkopolitiikan realisteina/Estonian PM not surprised at Koivisto’s

speeches **Savisaar regards Finns as foreign policy realists**)

Domino 197: For Savisaar, Estonia was moving towards independence, be it slowly or quickly.

Domino 198: The demands for Lithuanian independence had extended as far as Russian demonstrators in Moscow.

An appeal was issued by Finland to the Soviet Union, against the use of force in Riga. These attacks were compared to the 1989 tragedy in Tbilisi, Georgia. When the black berets attacked the militia headquarters in Riga, there was no-one in **Moscow** to assume responsibility for the action. According to **Professor Anto Leikola, President of the Finnish-Latvian Friendship Association**, unless the perpetrators were caught, the Soviet leadership, including President Gorbachev, were no better than the black berets. (264. IS 22.1.91 p.A2 Editorial ***Onko Baltia rosvojen armoilla? / Is the Baltic at the mercy of robbers?***)

Domino 199: Jaakko Iloniemi, specialist in international affairs, held all attempts to secede from the USSR according to its own (Soviet) legislation to be doomed to failure. **According to Professor Leikola, too, such secession would not work.**

The clipping ***Pugoa selkään*** was set aside primarily for the play on words based on the name Pugo. *Puukolla selkään* means:

1. *to stab (someone) in the back*,
 2. *to perform a cowardly deed.* (puukko = traditional Finnish knife)
- (265. IS 22.1.91 p.A2 ***Pugoa selkään***) The heading thus reflects ***Ilta-Sanomien***'s attitude regarding Moscow-minded communist leader Boris Pugo as a danger to future reform.

The people's first question is why the forces of the Soviet Ministry for the Interior attacked the Latvian Ministry the previous night, leading to five deaths and ten people injured. The attack took the Latvian government completely by surprise, Moscow

apparently having decided to subdue the country completely. According to Gorbachev, the official reason for the melee was a scuffle between opposing factions of the Latvian militia (police) (pro-Russian against pro-Latvian?, AP). (266. IS 22.1.91 p.A12 Whole page **Latvialaiset elävät pelon vallassa** Kaduilla ihmiseet kyselevät toisiltaan miksi/**Latvians living in fear** People on the streets asking each other “Why?)

Domino 200 (negative): The Ministry of the Interior massacre in Riga was seen as a severe setback to Gorbachev’s reforms.

The USSR TV news reported the skirmish (= bloodbath, AP) in Riga occurred as having occurred as a result of the rape of the wife of a black beret officer by an unknown Latvian. This version was spread in Latvia, too.

Reportedly fruitful talks between Presidents Rützel and Gorbachev discussed the question of a federal state. This was considered but a minor news item.

The most prominent news item of the day was the anniversary of Lenin’s death. (267. IS 22.1.91 p.A13 150 mm Riika sivuutettiin lyhyesti N-liiton tv:ssa/Just a brief mention of Riga on USSR TV)

Domino 201 (negative): Moscow dismissed the Riga bloodbath as a provocation by the Latvians. The Soviet powers were presenting accusations against them.

The night of 21.1. saw skirmishes in Tallinn, attributed by the Russians to a bomb allegedly laid by *Kodukaitse*, the Estonian militia. According to the Prime Minister, Edgar Savi-saar, judging by these accusations, it was difficult for the USSR to back down in the conflict. (268. IS 22.1.91 p.A13 30 mm Tallinna pysyi yön rauhallisena/Tallinn peaceful during the night)

Domino 202: The refusal by Moscow to accept responsibility for the Tallinn skirmish led to the latter being presented as a provocation by the Estonians. Further developments *were* to be expected.

A man-in-the street in Riga, talking to the IS reporter, compared the Latvians to the much-admired Finns in the Winter War against the Soviet Union in facing the same odds. Moscow has not wanted real negotiations. A participant in the fight in Vilnius was the paratrooper unit sent to force the Balts into the Red Army. Latvian Minister for the Interior stated that the Latvians would disarm the terrorists if the Soviet leadership did not discipline them.

The Latvians believed the special paramilitary units of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior, the *black berets*, to be **under the direct command of Alfreds Rubiks, leader of the Moscow-oriented Latvian Communist Party and the ultimate command of the USSR Minister for the Interior Boris Pugo**, also a Moscow-oriented Latvian. In Latvia itself, the whole incident had only a small minority of Russians behind it, while the majority was behind the legitimate government represented by the majority Latvian Communist Party.

The Balts had been most upset by the well-known Leningrad reporter Alexandr Nevzorov changing camps, praising the black berets for their role in the suppression of the Lithuanians. Moscow reporting on the Vilnius events aimed at keeping the federation intact. (269. IS 22.1.91 p.A14 Full-page article “Nyt on Latvian vuoro taistella”/”Now it is Latvia’s turn to fight”)

Domino 203: Latvian resolve is affirmed by the events in Vilnius, despite the change in camps by the erstwhile supporter of Baltic aspirations, Alexandr Nevzorov.

According to the President’s office, the President was annoyed at the manner in which the Baltic affairs were being reported. A particular reason for this was the terminology used in a Finnish Broadcasting Company newscast, where the Red Army units in the Baltic States were called *occupying forces*. President Mauno Koivisto stated his opinion that the aim of the media was to make as large a scandal as possible of the Baltic. (270. IS 22.1.91 0.5 col. Linna närkästy Ylen Baltia-raportoinnista/President annoyed at Finnish Broadcasting Company reports on the Baltic)

Reino Paasilinna, Director of the FBC, held the media to be possibly giving too much preference to the viewpoints of the Balts rather than also giving voice to Moscow opinion.

Domino 204: The Finnish President's office was annoyed at the emphasis given the Baltic in-dependence aspirations at the expense of Moscow's interests. (Cross-reference for Paasilinna: Cartoon on page100)

The *Iltalehti* editorial for 22.1.91 raised the question of the aim of the rambos terrori-zing the Baltic, in attacking the Ministry of the Interior, killing five people, destroying a few tables in the process, and then leaving the building. The only aim of the move was to spread terror. According to the editorial, the attack lacked all logical reason. The centre of these activities, seen to be within the Kremlin, was facing conflict with Moscow and Leningrad, the centres of the democratic movement in Russia. (271. IL 22.1.91 Editorial **Tänään Baltia, huomenna Venäjä!**/The Baltic today, Russia tomorrow!)

Spontaneous demonstrations by Baltic activists had led to scuffles with passers-by in front of the Soviet Embassy on Tehtaankatu, Helsinki the previous day.

The most prominent participant in the demonstration, Pertti Suuronen of the executive committee of the Kallio (Helsinki suburb) branch of the Left Alliance had no fellow party-members in the demonstration. The others were apparently satisfied with Koivisto. "I think I'll resign from the party," Suuronen said.

An older man said that the demonstration could be about anything at all, but the demonstrators should say nothing bad about the president, so as not to frighten the older people. The Bible, indeed, admonishes us not to curse the prince of our people. (272. IL 22.1.91 0.75 pp Baltia-mielenosoittajat ja "kadunmiehet" sodan partaalla Tehtaankadulla **"Gorba puhuu, tankit laulaa, säveltänyt KGB!"**/Baltic demonstrations and "the man in the street" on the verge of war in front of the Soviet embassy **"Gorby is speaking, the tanks are singing, composed by the KGB!"**)

Domino 205: The Finnish Left Alliance was reacting to the events of the Baltic through one representative. A fact arising from the text was the political establishment's fear of changes to the political configuration of post-war Finland, no matter how called-for this might be.

Domino 206: Ulpu Iivari, MP, a representative of the Social Democrats, the main party in the government coalition, wished to see the issue of the status of the Baltic States on the agenda of the CSCE, even though the USSR held the Baltic problem to be a domestic issue in the USSR.

The Black Berets' comment regarding Lithuania and Latvia was very curt: "We are ready. We are under the protection of the Soviet constitution." Upon the question of who gave the orders for the attack on the Latvian Ministry of the Interior, the local Omon commander replied: "The Red Army and the Ministry for the Interior (MVD)."

Domino 207 (negative): The black berets were ready to do their utmost to maintain their status. (274. IL 22.1.91 p.16 Mustabarettien komentaja IL:lle "Olemme valmiina uuteen hyökkäykseen")

Latvian independence movement leaders were summoned to Moscow to be admonished by Gorbachev and to hear that Latvia was to be put under direct presidential control. Gorbachev has, reportedly, several alternatives to choose from – presidential control, the re-establishment of Soviet legislation or changes in the political leadership of Latvia. Latvia has announced it would be forming its own national armed forces, to defend and protect the lives, the rights and the freedom of the citizens of the country and to protect Latvian society and its government against external threats. The attack has been condemned by the European Community. ((275. Taisteluväsymys iski Latviaan/Weariness hits Latvian fighters;); IL 22.1.91 p.16 1 page Gorbatshov ottaa Latvian suoraan hallintoonsa/Gorbachev taking Latvia directly under his control)

Domino 208 (negative): Moscow had no alternative but to resort to Soviet-type measures.

Riga was getting desperate. No one knew who was giving the orders or why. Armed militia were guarding parliament and government buildings together with civilian volunteers. It was Russian against Russian now. (276. p.17 IL 22.1.91 Riika vaipui epätoivoon **“Täällä on veli veljeä vastaan”/ Riga lapses into despair**”**It’s brother against brother here now”** 0.5pp)

Comment 1: Was there any role for the Latvians in their own independence process? The militia (the police) were in a schizophrenic situation, having sworn to uphold the Soviet Union. Now they were pitted against the black berets who were under the command of either the Soviet go-vernment, Gorbachev **or someone else.**

Comment 2: The seat of power, at any given time, in the USSR was at best diffuse. The population, to whom the government should be responsible, even under the USSR constitution, was not aware of the power to which the military and the militia were answerable.)

A committee representing the Latvian Russian-speakers Intermovement had de-clared a railway strike to start from the previous Tuesday morning. Alfreds Rubiks, the leader of the Moscow-oriented Latvian Communist Party was confident that the strike this time would be effective. According to Rubiks, the black berets behind Sunday’s massacre did not belong to the Communist Party. (277. p.17 IL 22.1.91 Rautatiet lakkoon tänään/Railways striking today 0.5 col.)

Domino 209 (negative): The leader of the Moscow-oriented Latvian Communist Party, Alfreds Rubiks, was planning industrial action to sabotage the Latvian independence cam-paign.

Presidents Rütel and Gorbachev, in talks yesterday, discussed the differences between the Estonian and Kremlin stands as well as plans to set up a working group to iron out these differences. Grounds were thus being established for Estonian-Soviet talks on Estonian independence.**The Red Army**, through its spokesmen, Minister for Defence Dmitri Yazov and Army Chief-of-Staff Mikhail Moi-

seyev, **had given guarantees that there would be no use of force in Estonia.** Gorbachev and Rüütel had agreed that Estonia was to be informed directly of the possibilities of such action. (278. p.17 IL 22.1.91 Rüütel ja Gorbatsšov sopuun neuvotteluista/ Rüütel and Gorbachev agree on talks 0.5 col.)

Domino 210: **The events in Latvia and Lithuania had led to the need for Moscow to reiterate guarantees to Estonia,** to the effect that such measures would not be employed there too.

The black berets were strong enough to take over Riga, **taking orders only from the president,** according to First Lieutenant Vilhelm Mihailovich. **Now the orders had apparently come.** The **Omon (the Ministry for the Interior special forces)** were wreaking havoc in Riga, subject only to the Soviet constitution, They were beyond the need to obey Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic law or the local militia. **Many black berets had long criminal records. They had, however, not been brought to justice, since they had been regarded as defending the Soviet constitution.** (279. p.18 Whole page IL 22.1.91 Mustat baretit vannovat Gorbatshovin nimeen “Täytämme presidentin jokaisen käskyn” Black berets swear by Gorbachev’s name “We will obey the president’s every order.”)

Domino 211: Civil law crime in the USSR was balanced out by service in the Ministry of the Interior forces in suppressing intransigence within the USSR.

President George Bush had been expressing his growing concern at the increasing use of force in the Baltic. The USA had threatened to postpone the February summit and the delivery of economic aid to the Soviet Union. (280. IL 22.1.91 0.5 col. Bush vaati voiman-käytön lopettamista/ Bush demands cessation of violence)

Domino 212: President Bush was threatening the Soviet Union with sanctions in the case of use of force continuing in the Baltic States.

Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his leading role in the peace process which today characterizes important parts of the international community . While he *was* interested in going to Oslo in May to give his Nobel Peace Prize address, he was not certain whether he would be welcome any more after the bloodbath in the Baltic. **The award had been gravely compromised.** Indeed, he was not there personally to receive it, having a deputy receive it for him. (281. IL 22.1.91 Gorbatshovilla uusi ongelma: Huolitaanko nobelsankaria enää Osloon/Gorbachev facing a new problem: **Will they still welcome the Nobel hero in Oslo?**)

Domino 213: The conferring of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mikhail Gorbachev was in gla-ring contrast to the news from Vilnius. The West was again seen as putting too much trust in Gorbachev, who, despite his extensive reforms, seemed unable or unwilling to show consistency with regard to them. (Baltimore Sun 5.6.1991) The conferring of the Nobel Peace Prize on Gorbachev after the events in Vilnius was making a mockery of the award.

Official Finland had been struck dumb by the events in the Baltic. President Koivisto had accused the press of over-reacting, even of unfortunate choice of colour in its photography. (282. IL 23.1.91 p.7 Huomio kiinnittyy liikaa Persianlahdelle Baltian tilanne Per-sianlahtea vakavampi uhka / Attention focusing too much on the Gulf Baltic situation a greater threat than the Persian Gulf)

Domino 214: The discrepancy between the official and the unofficial Baltic policies was ever growing.

Moscow was promising a stop to the use of force in Latvia. Soviet Minister for the Interior, Boris Pugo, had signed an agreement on Monday, **whereby the black berets would withdraw from Latvia, the Omons being disarmed.** (283. p.11 1 page Mustat baretit hää-detään Riista Moskova lupaillee rauhaa Latviaan/Black

berets to be evicted from Riga **Moscow promising peace in Latvia**)

Domino 215: Moscow was showing signs of relenting.

The people of Riga were still preparing for an all-out attack by Moscow, by building bunkers, collecting food stores, mobilizing a militia to protect their printing house. (284. 0.25 pp Riikalaiset varautuvat sotaan/Riga inhabitants preparing for war) **The Russian Federation**, in contrast to the Soviet Union, **was siding with Latvia**. Under-Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Andrei Fyodorov, warned that there would be civil war should Latvia be put under presidential jurisdiction. (285. 0.5 pp Fjodorov varoitti sisällissodasta/ Fyodorov warns of civil war)

According to Gorbachev the central essence of Soviet power was to maintain order. Gorbachev did wish to disassociate himself from use of force, while not abiding by the CSCE methods of conflict resolution. (286. IS 24.1.91 **Editorial** Gorbatshov yrittää tasapainoilla/Gorbachev attempting to do the balancing act)

The majority of the Finnish people viewed the activities of and the stands taken by Prime Minister Harri Holkeri's government and President Koivisto on the Baltic crisis as unsatisfactory. (In the style adopted in Finland in evaluating a public authority, the school mark, out of a maximum of ten, awarded the government and the President was a mere 6 (Barely satisfactory). In the south of the country, dissatisfaction was at its greatest among the younger people.

The Baltic crisis was to assume a bloody character first in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius on 13th January. Shortly prior to this, President Mauno Koivisto, in a press conference had claimed the status of the Baltic to be an internal affair of the Soviet Union. (287. IS 24.1.91 Suomen Gallup selvitti IS:lle **Presidentti ja hallitus selvivät Baltia-kriisistä vain välttävästi** /Finnish Gallup for IS **President and government performance in Baltic crisis barely satisfactory**)

Koivisto's stands on the Baltic attracted a variety of comments from the man-in-the street:

- Orienteering, but in the dark! (i.e. acting without awareness of direction)

Domino 216: According to the Finnish Gallup poll, men were giving both government and the president higher marks than were women. In Southern Finland people were more dissatisfied with the Baltic attitudes than were those in Central Finland,

The 1-ruble banknote reform was a cause of irritation to the man-in-the-street, according to Andrus Villem, member of the presidium of the Estonian Christian Democrats. (288. Ruplaurudistus kismittää neuvostoihmistä/Rouble reform irritates Soviet citizens 0.5 col. on Estonia)

Domino 217: The Soviet monetary system was undergoing a crisis, from which recovery was remote.

Three young Estonian tourists had a valid Finnish visa, but Sweden would not accept them. They **did not want to stay in Finland for fear of repatriation to the Soviet Union.** Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson had promised the men asylum in Sweden until the Baltic States were independent. (289. IS 24.1.91 p.A12 0.5 col. Ruotsi palautti kolme virolaisnuortaa Suomeen/Sweden returns three young Estonians to Finland) **Each of the young men had been drafted into the Red Army. the men say they were not opposed to national service, just to the Red Army.** (289. IS 24.1.91 p.A12 0.5 col. Ruotsi palautti kolme virolaisnuortaa Suomeen/Sweden returns three young Estonians to Finland)

Domino 218: The official attitude of Finland to Estonian conscientious objectors was meeting popular opposition there.

Limits were being put on freedom of expression while attempting to determine what might be said about the events in the Baltic region in the mass media and what might not. The Broadcasting Company seemed to be acceding to the president's demands, **even though the Company was a public amenity, 99.8% state-**

owned, responsible to parliament, not the president. (290. IL 24.1.91 p.2 Editorial **Koivisto painostaa Yleisradiota**/Koivisto pressuring the Finnish Broadcasting Company))

Domino 219: The press was insisting on its freedom of expression regarding anything it considered important: e.g. the Baltic States.

Finland was portrayed by cartoonist Jouko as a man sitting dazed, having been hit on the head with a saucepan bomb, with text flying through the air in the form of a missile trajectory passing through the *Baltic States* and *Iraq*. (291. IL 24.1.91 p.2. Jouko Cartoon)

Domino 220: Finland as a state was unaware of what measures to take regarding the Baltic States and Iraq.

In Riga, one bank refused to change large banknotes for small, the government policy allegedly being to prevent currency speculation. The measures came entirely without warning. (292. IL p.15. 0.5+ pp. Latvian pankit eivät vaihtaneet seteleitä **NL:n rahanuudistus suututti**/Latvian banks refuse to change notes **Anger at Soviet monetary reform**))

Moves were announced on 23.1.91, by the USSR Central Bank to withdraw 50 and 100 rouble notes from circulation. (293. IL p.15 0.5- pp. Uudistus yllätti Viron pankit/ Reform takes Estonian banks by surprise)

Leningrad mayor Anatoli Sobchak yesterday joined the critics of Gorbachev's Baltic policies. Sobchak held troops to have acted illegally in Lithuania. The chairman of the constitutional sub-committee of the Soviet parliament saw the Army as having broken constitutional law in attacking the Vilnius television tower on 13th January. (294. IL 24.1.91 0.5 col. Sobtshak arvosteli Gorbatshovia/Gorbachev criticized by Sobchak)

On Tuesday Interior Minister Pugo had promised to withdraw the black berets from Latvian territory, with the Soviet Union demanding a repeal of the declarations of independence and the enforcement of Soviet law throughout the area. Latvia was planning to defy this demand. (295. IL 24.1.91 0.5 pp Pettymys valtasi Baltian **Neuvottelut ajautuivat umpikujaan/Disap-**
pointment all through the Baltic **Talks lead up a blind alley**) **The black berets who had been terrorizing Riga had set up camp some 15 km from central Riga, refusing to leave, despite Pugo's promise that they would.**

To the Latvians **the black berets symbolized the evil of the state, otherwise personified by Gorbachev and Pugo.** (297. IL 24.1.91 0.25pp **Baretit eivät antaudu/Berets refuse to surrender**)

In the Latvian parliament, National Front MP Vilnis Eglats demanded to see the contents of Interfront MP Anatoli Alekseyev's briefcase, suspecting a bomb, a case Alekseyev was intending to leave under a seat. Alekseyev refused to open the briefcase, this resulting in a scuffle, with neither apologizing. (296. IL 24.1.91 0.25pp **Tunteet kuumenivat Riian parlamentissa/Tempers flare in Riga Parliament **Kansanedustajien kina päättyi nyrkkitappeluun/MP squabble ends in fist fight****)

Domino 221 (negative): The black berets were still in Latvia.

While USSR Minister for the Interior, Boris Pugo gave his word that the black berets would be transferred out of Latvia or the unit disbanded and disarmed, the people do not believe his word. (298. **Baretit eivät antaudu** Pugon sanaan ei luoteta/ **Black berets not surrendering** People do not believe in Pugo's word)

Domino 222 (negative): **Red Army soldiers captured a newsprint warehouse in Vilnius,** the local news bureau Elta. (299. 0.25pp **Neuvostosotilaat valtasivat paperivaraston Vlnassa/Soviet soldiers take paper storage depot in Vilnius**)

The Soviet withdrawal from the Baltic and the disarming of the troops there was seen as an essential part of **the summit on 11-13.2.91 between Presidents Gor-bachev and Bush.** (300. 0.125pp Huippukokous kiinni Baltian tapahtumista/Summit dependent on events in Baltic)

Domino 223: US President Bush was insisting on a satisfactory outcome in the Baltic as a precondition for his summit negotiations with Gorbachev.

Gorbachev had given the population two days to change their 50 and 100 rouble notes that were being withdrawn from circulation for notes of smaller denominations. The maximum amount to be changed, was however, only a month's wages or 1000 roubles at most. **The people felt they were being cheated.** (301. IL 24.1.91 p.15 0.75pp Latvian pankit eivät vaihtaneet seteleitä NL:n rahauudistus suututti/ Notes not changed by Latvian banks Anger at Soviet monetary reform)

Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar interpreted the change as having a momentary effect on the economy while not affecting the speculators. (302. IL 24.1.91 p.15 0.25pp Uudistus yllätti Viron pankit/Estonian banks surprised by reform)

Domino 224: Gorbachev had been criticized by Anatoli Sobchak, radical mayor of Leningrad.

His Baltic policies had led to his losing the trust of the population and to increased support from Sobchak in the Balts' struggle for independence.

The **Finnish Gallup poll** had brought out the **discrepancies between the thinking of the people and that of the government.** The school mark given the government for its Baltic policy was barely satisfactory. (303. IS 25.1.91 Editorial: Baltian asiat koskettavat/ Baltic affairs touch the heart)

Domino 225: The Finnish opinion polls indicated a **considerable**

gap in the respective stands on the Baltic in Finland between the president and the government, those voted into office, on the one hand, **and the people**, the voters, on the other. (304. [IL 25.1.91 p.2 Cartoon \(Jouko\)](#) In a current affairs program on TV, one floor manager asks another whether they had enough experts yet or whether they had to invite the president and the prime minister too?)

The government had asked the Soviet Union for an explanation of the events in Vilnius and Riga, based on the human dimension in the Final Accord of the CSCE, and on the exchange of information. (305. [IL 25.1.91 p.6 1 col. Suomi pyysi Neuvostoliitolta selvitystä Baltian tapahtumista/Finland asks for Soviet explanation on the Baltic](#)) In response, **the Soviet Union had transferred extra troops**, from the Kaliningrad blue beret units, **to the Lithuanian-Polish border, with more searchlights and barbed wire fences**. Poland was also reinforcing the border “in case of emergency” . A car travelling between Vilnius and Klaipeda was shot at, with the claim that the first shots had been fired from the car. (306. [IL 25.1.91 p.14 NI varautui Liettuan rajojen sulkemiseen ca 0.25.pp /USSR prepared to close Lithuanian borders](#))

Domino 226: The Soviet Union was prepared to seal off the Lithuanian-Polish border to isolate the independence movement from the rest of the world.

The President's departmental office did not confirm who conveyed his displeasure on the reporting of events in the Baltic, the president believing there was purposeful reporting of the Baltic affairs to cause as big a scandal as possible “on colour film”. He was particularly displeased at the FBC calling the Soviets “occupying powers”. (307. [IL 25.1.91 p.5 0.5pp Rahanpuute uhkana Ylen Baltia-uutisille/News on the Baltic threatened by FBU lack of funding Who conveyed president's annoyance on the FBC Baltic news reports?](#))

Domino 227 (negative): The Finnish state did still not recognize the legitimate claims of the Baltic States to independ-

ence on their own terms. Nor did it acknowledge the Soviet occupation of the three countries, with concern regarding the observation of human rights there, in accordance with the CSCE Final Accord. (308. IL 25.1.91 p.6, 1 col. Suomi pyysi NL:lta selvitystä Baltian tapahtumista/Finland demands an explanation regarding the Baltic from the USSR)

Domino 228: Finland was seemingly hedging its bets regarding recognition of the rights of the Baltic peoples.

According to information received by *Iltalehti*, **two Swedish trade union bosses had left the Viru hotel** in Tallinn, together with two Russian women. **They were found in a notorious Russian area, beaten to death.** They had previously spent the night in the Viru hotel. (309. IL 25.1.91 p.14 ca 1 col Ruotsalaiset ay-pomot hengiltä Tallinnassa/Swedish trade union bosses killed in Tallinn)

Black Beret corporal Alexander Kuzmin, deployed to Riga, **declared he was prepared to shoot any armed civilian**, any armed military. According to Kuzmin the shooting was started by the civilians. Reports to the contrary he labelled as lies. (310. IL 25.1.91 p.14-15 double-spread Mustabaretti Kuzmin on valmiina kaiken aikaa/Kuzmin the black beret ready all the time)

Domino 229: Do the Red Army and the black berets have a conflict of interests?

Domino 230: (311. IL 25.1.91 p.14 Riika purkaa barrikadit/Riga was dismantling its barricades)

Finland had requested that the USSR reveal how it was abiding by the CSCE human rights clauses. (my bold, AP) It was to be hoped that international attention would help achieve a positive outcome. Since nominally legal means had been used in introducing the minorities into the Baltics, the latter could not just be removed from there. (312. IS 26.1.91, 1 column, whole-page Editorial Ihmisoikeudet/ Human rights)

Domino 231: Finland was finally appealing to the CSCE with regard to Soviet infringements to human rights in the Baltic States.

A Nordic trade union delegation in Tallinn did not believe the murder of two TU leaders to have been an ordinary crime incident. One of the men, Bertil Whinberg, was a seasoned traveller who would not just leave his hotel putting himself at risk. The men were fit, there must have been a large number of assailants. (313. IS 26.1.91, Hyökkääjiä on pitänyt olla suuri joukko/There must have been a large number of assailants)

President Koivisto was annoyed at the graphic nature of the colour photographs of the Vilnius tragedy. Director Paasilinna was photographed in colour as his journalists were reporting the Persian Gulf, to show in the annual report that the highest management was present in the true reporting of the Baltic, the reporters on their own transmitting erroneous news.

Domino 232 (negative): The negative stand of the Finnish leaders to the Baltic States was being demonstrated by the conflict between the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation and the government, raising questions in the minds of the readers. (314. IS 26.1.91 Onnettomia unelmia menestyksestä /Unfortunate dreams of success)

The actions of the USSR in the Baltic had been severely criticized by the press, **especially the newspaper of the Finnish People's Democratic League and the Communist Party, *Kansan Uutiset***, under its editor **Yrjö Rautio**. The paper had not spared the government in its criticism, openly expressing its doubts regarding Gorbachev's ignorance of the Vilnius massacre. **Arvo Aalto**, former chairman of the Finnish Communist Party, saw hope disappearing. Perestroika was not to bring new perspectives for the creation of socialism. **Yrjö Rautio** expressed his surprise at being labelled right-wing for writing what he regarded as the truth. The criticism had come from

the old ranks no longer active in the party, party rank-and-file of the era when there was solidarity with the USSR.

This was not the first time *Kansan Uutiset* had criticized Soviet authorities. The first time was in connection with the suppression of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Currently *Kansan Uutiset* was presenting itself as a non-aligned left-wing newspaper. (315. IS 26.1.91, 1.0pp Vanhat järjestöjyrät hiiltyneet *Kansan Uutisten* Baltia-linjasta/Old party hacks annoyed at the Baltic policies of *Kansan Uutiset*)

Domino 233: There is conflict within the Left Alliance regarding the line adopted by *Kansan Uutiset* on the Baltic. Over 100,000 Latvians were mourning the victims of last Sunday's massacre. (316. IS 26.1.91 0.5 col. Latvialaiset surivat uhrejaan/Latvians mourn their dead)

Domino 234: The tragedy of the massacre in Riga was being brought to public attention. **The image of Finland among the Balts had been tarnished.** Sweden was overtaking Finland on the Baltic markets. Finnish neutrality did not signify that Finland could stand at a distance from the peaceful development of the European economy. (317. IS 26.1.91 0.25 col. Kauppapoliittisista syistä terävöitettävä Baltia-kananottoja/Firmer stands to be taken on the Baltic for the sake of trade policy)

Latvian-born Colonel Viktor Alksnis of the Black Berets, who had come to be known as a hard-liner, was accusing Gorbachev of treachery against his allies. **He (Alksnis) was seeing civil war as the inevitable outcome of the Baltic situation.** According to Alksnis, Gorbachev had approved the actions of the Committee for National Salvation in Lithuania, the Red Army deeming the latter the legal government of Lithuania. **Alksnis had issued an ultimatum for Gorbachev to resign unless he resorted to action in Lithuania.** Otherwise the Red Army could split. (318. IL 28.1.91 0.3pp Musta eversti Alksnis varoitti taas:Armeija saattaa nousta kapinaan/Black colonel Alksnis warns again:Army may mutiny); 28.1.91, Los Angeles Times, Elizabeth Shogren, Times Staff Writer)

Domino 235: Alksnis was predicting the August coup.

When asked regarding the possibilities of an armed coup d'état by the hard-line conservatives, Alksnis did not discount possible independent action by the army. Lithuania had, after all, rejected a negotiation offer by the Kremlin in return for reversion to the Soviet status quo.

The Nordic Council was sending observers for the referendum on 4.- 9.2. Openings for the same in Latvia and Estonia were also being studied. President Landsbergis had invited the Nordic Council to send observers to the Lithuanian referendum regarding membership of the USSR. (319. IL 28.1.91 0.3pp Liettua torjui Kremlin neuvottelutarjouksen/Lithuania rejects Kremlin offer of talks)

On 1.8.91, when Presidents Bush and Gorbachev had signed a far-reaching treaty aiming at scaling down their nations' stocks of long-range nuclear weapons, **Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar regarded the US-Soviet talks as an effort to overturn the Estonian government, cause confusion and enable the Red Army to be called in to restore order.** The Estonian Communist Party was supporting Baltic independence aspirations on condition that these take place as a result of negotiations with Moscow. (320. IL 28.1.91 0.5 col.Viron hallitus vaa-rassa huippukokouksen jälkeen/Estonian government in danger after summit)

Domino 236 (negative): After the experience of the Yalta Conference, the Baltic peoples were sceptical of any joint talks at all between the Allies of World War II, the West and the USSR.

Lithuanian ex-Prime Minister Prunskiene had left Lithuania about a week after allegedly receiving threats from nationalist-minded groups. She had resigned from the post of Prime Minister a week prior to this. (321. IL 28.1.91 0.5pp. Prunskiene kiistää hakevansa tur-vapaikkaa/Prunskiene denies seeking asylum)

The threat of direct Soviet intervention in the Baltic was to be seen in the following measures:

On 14.11.90 **Marshal Akhromeyev, Gorbachev's military adviser military had issued a warning of the imminent disintegration** of the USSR, Gorbachev appointing **glasnost op-hev's military adponent Leonid Kravchenko a director of national television and radio.** In this connection, on 17.11.90, **Col. Viktor Alk-snis**, Latvian MP for the conservative Soyuz coalition had issued Gorbachev a month's ultimatum to improve the economy. By 23.11.90, Gorbachev had been granted almost dictatorial rights. Gorbachev with a warning that the republics of going too far: **belonging to the USSR was the Baltic destiny.** 2.1.91, the Black berets took the Riga Press building and other public buildings.

13.1. MVD troops, using tanks and arms, took the Vilnius TV centre, killing at least 13.

20.1. Five died in Riga in a black beret attack on the Latvian Minister of the Interior building. (322. IS 26.1.91Näin otteet kovenivat/This is how measures toughened)

Domino 237 (negative): Within a space of two months, Nov.1990-Jan.1991, the regime in the USSR had become ever more oppressive. The previous liberalism was being re-placed by conservative communism.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was becoming ever more imminent. (323. IS 26.1.91 p.B1, 1p. Picture of Gorbachev, Mikään ei tunnu estävän NL:n hajoamista KUKA ENÄÄ USKOO GORBATSHOVIIN?/Nothing seems to be preventing the disintegration of the USSR WHO STILL BELIEVES IN GORBACHEV?; 324. IS 26.1.91 p.B2-3: NL:n järjestelmä on keinulauta, jolla presidentti tasapainoilee"Kenen joukoissa seisot,Gorbatshev?/ Soviet system is a seesaw on which the president is doing a balancing act" Whose camp are you in, Gorbachev?)

The erstwhile progressive president Gorbachev seemed, to all appearances, to have transferred to the conservative camp. "Psychological uncertainty" and "the wish to regain (the Soviet Union's, AP) lost dignity" (original quotation marks, my bold italics (AP)) had

now borne a bloody harvest in the Baltic, with a distinct conflict in the air between a democratically elected parliament and the conservative Communist parties with their bureaucracy, including the KGB.

Gorbachev had constantly regarded the USSR's financial foundations as sound. His teachers' ideas were beyond him. His lack of performance led to the use of force in the Baltic. **The conservative press had seen the problem in the Baltic as a class conflict,** not a struggle for national identity. According to this press, the Baltic press and Yeltsin were protagonists of the return of capitalism and "bourgeois terror". (1 col. Pekka Sutela: **Gorbatshov ei ole koskaan ymmärtänyt talousasioita!/Gorbachev has never understood matters economic!**)

Domino 238 (negative): The reformer Mikhail Gorbachev had become a victim of his reforms, and a virtual prisoner of his opponents.

Gorbachev had been compared to Czar Alexander II on several occasions, on the following grounds:

1. Glasnost had come into use during the Czar's reign. Alexander II had abolished serfdom in 1861. During his reign, there was first the Crimean war.

2. During Gorbachev's reign the Afghanistan crisis and the arms race, to Western advantage. The KGB had been waiting to see the outcome of perestroika, the outcome of which greatly interested it. **Finland had not understood the fact that till now, the USSR had been a KGB state.**

3. Gorbachev's (geographical, AP) concept of the USSR was largely that of Stalin. Indeed, the Soviet Union was the same as Czarist Russia, together with its autonomous regions. Consequently, the Baltic States formed part of the Soviet Union, while Poland and Eastern Europe did not. President Gromyko had characterized Gorbachev as having "a pleasant smile and iron teeth". Andrei Gromyko, speaking to CPSU central committee, Washington Post 17.3.1985) Gorbachev had more often than has been the custom, lately been called by the title of *First Secretary of the Communist Party*. (325. IS 26.1.91 1

col. Gorbatshev sai virkaansa vahvat suositukset: Miellyttävä hymy, rau-
taiset hampaat/Gorbachev given strong references for the job: Pleasant
smile, teeth of iron)

Domino 239 (negative): Gorbachev was acquiring ever more nega-
tive aspects.

***Ilta-Sanomat* had conducted an interview of the Holkeri gov-
ernment on its record to date**, according to which the citizens
in opinion polls had given a barely satisfactory mark for the Finnish
government's Baltic policies and actions. There was definite evidence
of such a big difference between official policy and unofficial policy
before this, too, in Paasikivi's time.

**The criminal deaths of two Swedish trade union officials in
Tallinn** revealed the uncertainty at the heart of the social situation
in the Estonian SSR. The question of whether the Finns should avoid
going to the Baltic States was not clear-cut, one issue involved being
that of human rights. The use of arms against defenceless civilians
was something one could not face with an unfeeling attitude.

While **Soviet: Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had
issued a warning of dictatorship when he resigned, Gorbachev
strongly dissociated himself from such evaluations.** (326. IS
26.1.91 1p.Holkerin tilinpäätös sinipunasta: Hallituksen ei tarvitse
hävetä!-Holkeri's balance sheet on the red-blue (Social Democrat-
Conservative) coalition: **The government need not be ashamed!**)

Domino 240 (negative): The Finnish Prime Minister was absolving
himself of blame regarding his diffident attitude to the events in the
Baltic States. The answers to the reporter's questions could be construed
as simple circumlocution. The claim regarding the Finnish Prime Min-
ister applied equally to the President of the Soviet Union.

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**Generally it was from the media, TV, the press or radio, or from
other people that one acquired one's information. These other
people influence the manner in which one interpreted the news.**

Views such as the following were to be seen these mediating the person's own "image" of things:

- *Saddam Hussein is the villain,- The Cubans are villains,*

Mikhail Gorbachev knew his media. Getting out of his armoured car on a state visit to shake hands, he was quoted saying: "I am one of you. I trust you, so you will trust me." His wife Raisa was part of his image. Bloody Sunday in Vilnius changed everything. **After the fact, he grew (Stalin's) whiskers.**

Domino 241 (negative): Gorbachev, the reformer much admired in the West, had assumed suspect characteristics, reminiscent of Stalin.

At one point in Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, the main character, **Ivan Denisovich Shukhov**, a prisoner in Camp HQ had heard someone refer to Stalin as "**Old Whiskers**" (1054), **actually a reference**, in a letter to a friend, **that got Solzhenitsyn arrested** he had referred to Stalin as "the whiskered one". Subsequently he was charged with anti-government sentiments and sentenced to the gulag in 1945. (327. IS 26.1.91 1p. **Kun Gorbatschoville kasvoi viikset** eli mitä tapahtui tarinan sankarille?/When Gorbachev grew a moustache/**When Gorbachev grew whiskers** or "Whatever happened to the hero of our story?)

The article in hand (Long live the brotherly friendship between the two fraternal nations (328. IS 26.1.91) gives a truly satiric presentation of the Finnish attitude toward the Baltic States. The Estonian Republic's foreign policy, based on the *Vares-Müürissepp* line (cf. the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line) in principle **condemns all separatist and nationalist phenomena.** Even so, Estonia **supports the independence aspirations of all peoples - particularly in Africa.**

The international situation is difficult, the given advice to be followed being:

Don't rock Gorbachev's boat. - Don't jeopardize the good relationship between the Republic of Estonia and Moscow. Our government

cannot approve the supportive stands on Finnish independence taken by Latvia and Lithuania.

The key to Finnish independence was seen to be in Moscow, under the slogan :

Long live the brotherly friendship between the two fraternal nations.
(328. IS 26.1.91 1p. Entäpä jos Viro olisi vapaa maa ja Suomi itsenäisyyttä tavoitteleva neuvostotasavalta **“Itsehillintää, suomalaiset!”**/What if Estonia were a free country and Finland a Soviet republic vying for independence **“Self-discipline, Finns!”**)

Domino 242: Despite the cold official attitude, there were some Finns who understood Estonia's situation.

In reply to the article on 22.1.91 Linna närkästyi Ylen Baltia-raportoinnista/President annoyed by reporting of Baltic affairs by Finnish Broadcasting Company, the latter replied that problems with programs on the Baltic were caused by the flood of news from there. The head of state was ordering the media to desist, curbing the freedom of the press. .

Domino 243: A grave conflict had developed between the head of state and the media, with the former attempting to impose restrictions on the latter. (329. IS 26.1.91 Approx.1 col. Ylen Moskovan miehet/Finnish Broadcasting Corporation men in Moscow; 330. 26.1.91 IS 26.1.91 Mustat baretit käyttävät aseissaan silpovia luoteja/Black berets use dum-dum bullets in their weapons)

Editor Yrjö Rautio was surprised at the accusations of right-wing tendencies levelled at him for his support for the Baltic States, even though he was involved in writing the Finnish Communist Party platform. (331. IS 26.1.91 Vanhat järjestöjyrät hiiltyneet **Kansan Utisten** Baltia-linjasta/Old party stalwarts annoyed at the stand taken on the Baltic States by **Kansan Utiset**)+

Former prime minister Kazimiera Prunskiene had asked for political asylum in Switzerland, because her life was in danger. Prunskiene had had to resign earlier this month having come out with her support for the Russian minority. (332. IL 26.1.91 p.5 *Prunskiene haluaa turvapaikan Sveitsistä/Prunskiene wants asylum in Switzerland*)

Appendix 2: Dichotomies of villains vs heroes in the data

A large proportion of the articles carry dichotomies of the *villains* versus the *heroes* or the *victims* versus the *helpers*. The target of the dailies compared to that of the tabloids might be characterized as the *elitist* versus the *populist* reader. The following table will aim to characterize the types of articles in *Iltalehti* and *Ilta-Sanomat*, with the article loading, the event concerned and the dichotomies involved.

Date	Number of articles	Associated event	Target of articles	Dichotomy
19.8.89	4	50 th anniversary of MRP	Finnish people	Finland/Baltic States
21.8.89	5	50 th anniversary of MRP	Finnish people	Vs Soviet Union
24.8.89	7	50 th anniversary of MRP	Finnish people	(heroes Vs villains)
30.8.89	7	Soviet note to Baltic govts.	Call for Balts to come to order	Heroes Vs Villains Balts Vs Soviet
12.1.90	4	Gorbachev's appeal to Lithuania to stay in USSR	Lithuanian population	Heroes Vs Villains Lithuanian understanding Vs Soviet
26.3.90	5	1. Secession of ECP from CPSU 2. Split in ECP 3. Lithuanian crisis (2) 5. KU commentary	Baltic populations	Heroes Vs Villains Baltic aspirations Vs Soviet understandings
4.2.91	5	1. Inter-movement critique of perestroika 2. Hunt for Baltic conscientious objectors in Finland 3. Icelandic recognition of Lithuania 4. Alleged shooting incident of Aleksandr Nevzorov in Riga: Tass accusations 5. Icelandic recognition	Finnish state Baltic independence proponents	Villains Vs Heroes
	5	1. Limit to presidential powers 2. Icelandic recognition of Lithuania	Public opinion: to be turned in	Balts Vs Central government

		3. Balts have unrealistic expectations of the world	Gorbachev's favour
		4. Latvians voting the same day as Estonia	
		5. Finnish party leaders on the Baltic situation	
14.2.91	8	1. Allar Levandi, ski champion is an Estonian	
		2. Vilnius massacre investigators arrested	Scandinavia: Balts (Finnish) Vs official policy on Baltic independence
		3. Uniform Scandinavian stand on Baltic	Finnish public opinion to be turned in favour of Balts
		4. Situation tenses in Vilnius	
		5. Unconditional reasons for Estonian independence	
		6. Prunskiene returning to Lithuania	
		7. Landsbergis suggests exchange of parliamentary delegations	
		8. Credits gained by politicians' stands on Baltic	
4.3.91	10	1. Estonia and Latvia vote	Ethnic majorities Vs minorities
		2. Estonians enthusiastically vote on independence	
		3. Russian ranks crumble in Latvia	
		4. Estonia and Latvia vote enthusiastically	
		5. Nordic Council a shop window for the Balts	
		6. Peaceful Estonian plebiscite	
		7. 50 years is enough Landslide victory for pro-independence opinion	
		8. Estonian president gives Koivisto absolutism "The	

		people's will is our trump card in Moscow."		
		9. Estonia and Latvia defy Moscow		
		10. Choir's hands rise for Estonia		
19.3.91	5	1. Head of Lithuanian Defence Department arrested	Lithuanian Defence Department	Lithuanian Defence Department and Red Army
		2. Minorities protected in Estonia	Ment	Estonians Vs
		3. Lithuanian Defence Minister arrested		Russians
		4. Military authority arrested for a short period in Lithuania		Lithuanians Vs
		5. Ülo Tuulik, guest of readers week:		Red Army
		Finland is Estonia's channel to the world		
17.4.91	11	1. Violinist Arvo Leibur in Kuopio	Estonian culture	1. Estonian culture
		2. Rush by Neste Oy into the Baltic		Vs Soviet culture
		3. Incident on Lithuanian border		2. Finnish petroleum industry and Soviet petroleum industry in the Baltic
20.8.91	25			
		THE COUP		
21.8.91	19	1. Gorbachev in control again, Yeltsin praised		
		2. Baltic States on the way to independence		
		3. President Gorbachev back at his job grateful to Yeltsin		
		4. Doors open to opportunities:		

The central authorities owe
Balts thanks: it was they who
taught non-violent resistance

5. Tanks are on our side now

22.8.91	36	Reactions to the coup	The World at	Dichotomy
		Independence process	Large	ceases to exist

Appendix 3: Radicality Index

In order to evaluate the degree of support expressed by the news item for the aspirations of the Baltic States, the writer has assigned what he terms a *radicality index* for the item. In order to gauge the degree of support by the newspaper in question, the story has been assigned a three-point value depending on the degree of support expressed by the article.

On the basis of the evidence that the official attitude to the Baltic aspirations was reserved, to say the least, a figure has been assigned to the item with regard to the support shown the Baltic States.

The values:

3 indicated full support for the independence aspirations

2 indicated a moderate degree of support

1 indicated opposition to the aspirations

No & Date	Value	Paper	For/ Against	HEADING
1: 9.7.88	3	HS	+	Kohti selkeämpää liittovaltiota/Toward a clearer federal state
2: 10.10.88	3	US	+	Viron toivo kokeilussa/Estonian hope in experimentation
3: 11.10.88	3	HS	+	Baltian demokratiakokeilu/Experimental democracy in the Baltic
4: 25.10.88	3	HS	+	Baltiaan kolmen maan kansanrintama
5: 26.10.88	1		-	Muodollisuus jäykisti presidentin kyselytunnin/ Formality rigidifies presidential question time
6: 18.11.88	2	Aam	+	Nyt malttia/Patience, now
7: 18.11.88	1		+	Baltian ja Kremlin eripura voimistuu/Baltic-Kremlin conflict increasing in intensity
8: 18.11.88	2	US	+	Mallillista edistystä toivottava Baltiassa/Moderate Developments to be hoped for in Baltic
9: 23.11.88	3	IL	+	Käsittämätön puhe/Unfathomable speech
10: 23.11.88	1	IS	+	One-issue movements a wake-up
11: 24.11.88	2	HS	+	Viron kysymyksiä Suomelle/ Questions from Estonia to Finland
12: 24.11.88	1	Tied	-	Baltian tasavallat ja Suomi/Baltic republics and Finland
13: 29.11.88	2	Aam	+	Törmäyskurssi/Collision course
14: 30.11.88	1	IL	+	Gorbatshovin poliittinen virhe/G's political error
15: 4.12.88	1	HS	+	Moskovan vauhdikas viikko/ Moscow's spirited week
16: 29.11.88	3	Uusi Tie	+	Itsenäisyyden lahja/The gift of independence
17: 6.2.89	3	HS	+	Vihreää valoa Viron konsulaa-teille/Green light for Estonian consulates
18: 5.3.89	1	SavSan	-	Baltia ja PN/The Baltic States and the Nordic Council
19: 16.3.89	1	KSML	-	Viron kansanryhmöt ajavat törmäyskurssilla/Estonia's national groups on collision course
20: 4.5.89	2	IS	+	Viroilaisten utopia/The Estonians' Utopia
21: 17.5.89	3	US	+	Baltiassa entistä rohkeampia askeleita/Ever more courageous steps being taken in Baltic
22: 17.5.89	3	Uusi Tie	+	Yhteyttä yli Suomenlahden/Contacts across the Gulf of Finland
23: 26.7.89	3	KSML	+	Tiedetystä tosiasiaista virallista historiaa/Official history from known facts
24: 29.7.89	3	KSML	+	Baltian maista perestroikan koealue/Baltic into perestroika test area
25: 13.8.89	3	HS	+	Venäjä ja baltit vastakkain/Russia and Balts at loggerheads
26: 14.8.89	3	IL	+	Perustuslaillinen kriisi Virossa/Constitutional crisis in Estonia
27: 22.8.89	3	HS	+	Itä-Euroopan mielenosoituspäivä/Demonstration day for Eastern Europe
28: 25.8.89	3	EtSu- San	+	Baltian kysymysmerkit/Baltic question marks

29: 25.8.89	3	IL	+	Viro lisää painetta/Estonia puts on the pressure
30: 30.8.89	2?	HS	+	Tuulta piestiin Kremlissä/ Idle chatter in the Kremlin
31: 21.9.89	2?	KU	+	Gorbatshev pelaa aikaa Kädevääntö NKP:n huipulla
			US	jatkuu /Gorbachev playing for time Continuing arm-wrestling at CPSU summit
32: 22.9.89		US	±	Editorial: Kädevääntö NKP:n huipulla/Arm-wrestling in the top echelons of the CPSU: Conservatives resigning but successors not eager to reform
33: 22.9.89	2?	HS	+	Tuulta piestiin Kremlissä./ Mouths were being moved in the Kremlin.
34: 25.11.89	2	HS	+	Baltit kiirehtivät Moskovaa/Balts hurry Moscow up
35: 24.12.89	3	HS	+	Sukulaiskansojen erilainen joulu
36: 28.12.89	1	HS	+	Gorbatshev ja Liettua/Gorbachev and Lithuania
37: 29.12.89	3	Aamul	+	Pravda varoitti tasavaltojen irtautumishankkeista Liet-tuan eropäätös huolenaihe/Pravda warning to republics not to secede Lithuanian decision a cause for concern
38: 29.12.89	3	Aam	+	Kremlin kaksi ääntä/Two voices from the Kremlin
39: 29.12.89		EtSu-San	+	Gorbatshevin aikalisä/Time-out for Gorbachev
40: 4.1.90	3	Aamul.	+	Supervallan rajoilla kuohuu/Turmoil on the borders of the super-state.
41: 10.1.90	1	Tied	-	Perestroikan koetinkivi/Touchstone of perestroika
42: 12.1.90	2	KU	+	Gorbatshevin kohtalonkysymys/Fateful question for Gorbachev
43: 13.1.90		11		
44: 15.1.90	3	Aam	+	Liekkiä ei enää sammuteta/The flame is no longer to be put out
45: 16.1.90	2	HS	+	Imperiumin kriisi syvenee/Imperial crisis ever deeper
46: 16.1.90	2	US	+	6 kansakuntaa etsii vallanpitä-jää/ 6 nations in search of a ruler
47: 18.1.90	2	Dem	+	USSR in crisis feelings
48: 21.1.90	2	HS	+	Kreml ja Kaukasia/The Kremlin and the Caucasus
49: 21.2.90	2	HS	+	Baltia neuvottelee itsenäisyydestä/Baltic States to negotiate on independence
50: 24.2.90	2	IL	±	Elections for Estonian congress. and for Lithuanian independence parliament today are to decide on stand on independence procedures..
51: 2.3.90	1	IL	+	Gorbatshevin Suomi-kortti/Gorbachev's Finland card
52: 4.3.90	2	KS ML		New emphasis on strategic significance of Baltic States
53: 11.3.90	1	US	+	Malttia Euroopan kartan piirtämiseen/Patience in redrawing the map of Europe
54: 12.3.90	3	Aam.	+	Balttien eroa ei saa estää/There is no stopping Baltic independence
55: 13.3.90	2	KU	+	Liettualla edessä vaikeita aikoja/Hard times ahead of Lithuania
56: 13.3.90	2	Sav San	+	Liettuan rohkea veto/Courageous veto by Lithuania

57: 13.3.90	2	ItäS	+	Liettuasta vakava pulma NI:lle/Lithuania a serious problem for USSR
58: 14.3.90	2	HS	+	Liettua muurinsärkijänä/Lithuania, the wall-breaker
59: 15.3.90	2	Dem	+	Gorbatshev ja Baltia/Gorbachev and the Baltic
60: 16.3.90	1	IL	+	Taika-Jim vai Super-Stalin/A Mandrake the Magician or a Super-Stalin?
61: 18.3.90	3	US	+	Toivojen ja pelkojen vaalit/Elections marked by hopes and fears.
62: 21.3.90	3	HS	+	Liettuan tunnustaminen/Recognition of Lithuania
63: 24.3.90	3	IL	+	Tukea Liettualle/Support for Lithuania
64: 26.3.90	1	IL	+	Moraalimme Baltiassa/Our morality in the Baltic
65: 27.3.90	3	HS	+	Viro seuraaLiettua/Estonia follows Lithuania's example
66: 27.3.90	3	Dem	+	Hermosota Baltiassa/War of nerves in the Baltic
67: 27.3.90	1	Sav San	+	Hermojen sota Baltiassa/War of nerves in the Baltic
68: 30.3.90	1	Tied.	-	Baltia/Baltic States
69: 1.4.90	2	Sav San	+	Baltian tilanne kiristyy/Baltic situation becoming increasingly strained
70: 5.4.90	3	HS	+	Hägglundin virhearvio/Hägglund's miscalculation
71: 5.4.90	1	Tied.	-	Kuka pelkää kansanäänestystä?/Who is afraid of the referendum?
72: 6.4.90	3	KS ML	-	Siirtoväen toiveet epärealistisia/Karelian evacuee/refugee hopes unrealistic
73: 8.4.90	3	HS	±	Sanasotaa Baltiasta/War of words on the Baltic
74: 11.4.90	3	IS	+	Liettua rasittaa Gorbatshevin suosiota/Lithuania straining Gorbachev's popularity
75: 11.4.90	3	IL	+	Imperiumin takapiha/Back yard of the empire
76: 12.4.90	2	Sav San	+	Moskova lisää painetta/Moscow adding to pressure
77: 17.4.90	2	IS	+	Virolaiset rakentavat tulevaisuutta/Estonians building future
78: 18.4.90	2	US	+	Moskova ja Vilna juuttuneet asemasotaan/ Moscow and Vilnius stuck in a situation of position warfare
79: 19.4.90	2	Aam.	+	Liettua ei aio alistua/Lithuania does not intend to cave in
80: 19.4.90	2	Dem	+	Liettuan umpisolmu/The Gordian knot of Lithuania
81: 19.4.90	2	KU		Moskova vaatii Vilnaa polvilleen/Moscow insisting Vilnius go on knees
82: 19.4.90	2	Sav San	+	Miten auttaa Liettuaa?/How to help Lithuania?
83: 20.4.90	1	SK	-	Vihdoinkin selkeä linjaus/Finally a distinct policy
84: 21.4.90	2	HS	+	Liettualle pelkkää lämmintä kättä/Sympathy for Lithuania, but no more
85: 23.4.90	3	IL	+	Liettua pettyi länteen/Lithuania experiences disappointment in West
86: 24.4.90	3	Sav San	+	Pohjola ja Liettua/Scandinavia and Lithuania
87: 25.4.90	3	IL	+	Suomettumisen syöpä/The canker of Finlandization

88: 28.4.90	1	KS ML	+	.Foreign Minister Paasio thought he was signing a demand for complete independence for the Baltic States, when it came out that the paper was meant to read self-determination, not independence.
89: 3.5.90	2	EtSuS an	+	Liettuassa tasaantuu/Things calming down in Lithuania West not willing to risk peace process for Lithuania.
90: 7.5.90	3	Sav San	+	Eri teitä itsenäisyyteen/Different paths to independence
91: 8.5.90	3	Dem	±	Latvia liittyi seuraan/Latvia joins the fray
92: 8.5.90	3	KU	+	Baltian rintama yhtenäinen/Baltic front is united
93: 10.5.90	3	US	+	Baltian näännyttäminen jatkuu/Exhaustion tactics against the Balts continuing
94: 11.5.90	2	US	+	Ulkopoliittinen keskustelu viriää vihdoin/Foreign policy finally being discussed openly
95: 11.5.90	2	Tied.	-	Ystävät haettava läheltä/Friends to be sought from close at hand
	2	HS		Baltia ja Moskova yhä törmäyskurssilla/The Baltic and Moscow still on collision course
97: 16.5.90	1	Tied.	-	Baltia-kiistan uusi vaihe/The new phase of the Baltic dispute
98: 17.5.90	2	Sav San	+	Baltiassa kiristyy/Tension increasing in the Baltic
99: 19.5.90	2	HS	+	Neuvottelujen aika Moskovassa/Time for negotiations in Moscow
100: 31.5.90	2	HS	+	Moskova ja Pohjoismaiden neuvosto/Moscow and the Nordic Council
101: 1.6.90	2	IL	+	Jeltsin ja Baltia/ Yeltsin and the Baltic
102: 4.6.90	2	Sav San	±	Ulkopoliittinen kriittisyys kasvaa/Foreign policy critique growing
103: 10.6.90	3	HS	+	Etyk vallankumouksen jälkeen/Post-revolutionary CSCE
104: 14.6.90	1	Tied.	±	