

JYU DISSERTATIONS 400

Yan Liu

Development of the Concept of Governance in China



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES

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ABSTRACT

Yan Liu

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This doctoral dissertation is a study of development of the concept of governance in China. In the 21st century, governance has become a meaningful political discourse in the international community, while it is also a constantly changing concept. The study analyses different meanings related to the concept of governance in China and what kind of purpose it serves. It considers the concept of governance in different periods of China in a historical context of ancient Chinese governance theory where the vocabulary comes from, but concentrates mostly on socialist China. The evolution of the concept is related to the changing situations at home and abroad. Different governance ideas have been produced at different stages, while different governance characteristics and effects have been formed accordingly. In China, state governance has undergone a process of development from rule to management, and then from management to governance. The relationship among the Party leadership, government, market, and society is constantly changing, and the concept of governance also changes accordingly.

The research method has been inspired by conceptual historians, especially by Quentin Skinner and Kari Palonen. The research material consists mostly of speeches and writings of Chinese leaders, supported by academic monographs, government reports, articles in various journals, doctoral dissertations both in China and abroad. A high proportion of the research material is in Chinese. The structure of the study consists of eight main chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion. From chapter three to chapter seven, this study analyses the development of ideas on governance under five Chinese supreme leaders, namely Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

The study attempts to bring together three related political concepts in the Chinese context: democracy, rule of law, and governance. The concept of governance is a broad term that develops within the horizon of democracy. Democracy runs through the political development history of modern countries in the world, sometimes in practice, sometimes more as a goal or ideal, but it certainly coexists in different degrees with the concept of national governance. The process of China's state governance is also a process of advancing gradually the political democratization of a socialist society.

Keywords: China, governance, conceptual history, democracy, rule of law

TIIVISTELMÄ

Yan Liu

Hallinnan käsitteen kehitys Kiinassa

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Tämä tohtorinväitöskirja on tutkimus hallinnan käsitteen kehityksestä Kiinassa. 2000-luvulla hallinnasta on tullut tärkeä poliittinen diskurssi kansainvälisessä yhteisössä. Se on jatkuvasti muuttuva ja elävä käsite. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan hallinnan käsitteen erilaisia merkityksiä Kiinassa sekä millaisiin tarkoituksiin sitä on käytetty. Hallinnan käsitettä tarkastellaan osin muinaisen Kiinan historiallisessa horisontissa. Painotus tutkimuksessa on kuitenkin modernissa sosialistisessa Kiinassa. Käsitteen kehitys on sidoksissa yhteiskunnan muutoksiin niin Kiinassa kuin muualla maailmassa. Erilaisia ajatusmalleja hallinnasta on syntynyt historian eri vaiheissa. Samalla niiden tyypilliset piirteet ovat muotoutuneet oman aikansa tarpeiden mukaan. Modernissa Kiinassa Kommunistisen puolueen johdon, hallituksen, talouden ja yhteiskunnan välinen suhde on ollut jatkuvassa muutoksessa ja tämä heijastuu luonnollisesti hallinnan käsitteen kehityshistoriaan.

Tutkimusmenetelmänä käytetään käsitehistorian tulkintatapoja, erityisesti Quentin Skinnerin ja Kari Palosen tutkimusten innoittamana. Tutkimusmateriaalin perustana ovat Kiinan johtajien puheet ja kirjoitukset. Niiden tukena on käytetty akateemisia monografioita, hallituksen raportteja, tieteellisiä artikkeleita ja väitöskirjoja niin Kiinasta kuin muista maistakin. Suuri osa materiaalista on kirjoitettu kiinaksi. Väitöskirja koostuu kahdeksasta pääluvusta, joihin kuuluvat johdanto ja päätäntö. Luvut kolmesta seitsemään käsittelevät sitä, miten käsitykset hallinnasta ovat kehittyneet viiden suuren kiinalaisen johtajan eli Mao Zedongin, Deng Xiaopingin, Jiang Zeminin, Hu Jintaon ja Xi Jinpingin aikana.

Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee kolmea yhteenkietoutunutta poliittista käsitettä kiinalaisessa kontekstissa: hallintaa, demokratiaa ja laillisuusperiaatetta. Hallinnan käsite on hyvin laaja ja se on erottamattomasti kytköksissä demokratiaan. Demokratia on Kiinassakin osa poliittista kehityshistoriaa. Joskus se on käytäntöä, joskus se on määränpää tai ihanne, mutta se on erottamattomasti läsnä valtiollisen hallinnan käsitteessä. Kiinan hallinnan kehitys on sosialistisen yhteiskunnan vaiheittaista poliittista demokratisoitumista.

Avainsanat: Kiina, hallinta, käsitehistoria, demokratia, laillisuusperiaate

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parents. But I know they will always be my strongest backing. Thanks to my cousins Dadi Liu and Wei Zhou; because of China's one child policy, almost every family of our generation has only one child, but they supported me all the time just like my own sisters. Many thanks to my grandpa and grandma who are already in heaven, they were all well-educated senior intellectuals. Without their guidance and influence, I would not have gone so far on the academic road, I miss them so much.

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If the academic atmosphere in Finland fits any ancient Chinese thought, I believe it is Laozi's *governance by doing nothing*. Recalling my nearly four-year study career, I am full of gratitude. Due to the limited space, these words cannot fully express my gratitude.

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Jyväskylä 21 June 2021
Yan Liu

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TIIVISTELMÄ

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India, and China
CCCCPC = Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
CMA = China Meteorological Administration
COVID 19 = Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPC = the Communist Party of China
CPPCC = Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
GDP = Gross Domestic Product
GMD = Guomindang, Kuomintang of China, Chinese Nationalist Party
HGI = Human Governance Indicators
IEA = International Energy Agency
NGO = Non-Governmental Organizations
NPC = National People's Congress
OECD = Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRC = People's Republic of China
SARS = Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus
SEPA = the State Environmental Protection Administration
SEZ = Special Economic Zone
SOE = State-owned enterprise
UN = United Nations
UNDP = the United Nations Development Programme
WD = World Bank
WTO = World Trade Organization
WGI = World Governance Indicators

FIGURES

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1 INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, *governance* has become a prevalent political discourse in the international community. In political theory, the concept of *governance* has a long history, appearing in Greek,¹ Indian² and Chinese ancient texts. As a specific discussion genre in international politics, it emerged in the 1990s.³ Governance is a constantly changing concept, because its empirical background is constantly changing.⁴ Concepts such as governance—as well as democracy with which it is eminently related—have been used with relatively different meanings during different historical times in various countries because of contextual peculiarities. This study sets out to examine the history and development of the concept of governance in the Chinese context. The main research question is simple: what does the concept of governance mean in China? The focus is on post-1949 China, but, to some extent, earlier periods are also considered. China is an old civilization, which comprises about a fifth of humankind, and which during the past century started to develop rapidly into a modern nation-state with an internationalized culture and economy. The development of Chinese thought on national governance reflects this history. It has proceeded with a complex mix of different vocabularies of domestic and foreign origin.

Studies on the political use of concepts are important because the world is constituted by concepts. They help us to evaluate the linguistic and political environment in different historical contexts, and beyond this, the transformation of concepts reflects changes in social existence.⁵ If one wishes to understand a certain concept and its development, it is important to understand the reason why it has been put forward. It is precisely the circular interaction between concepts and practice that make studying concepts interesting and practical. This study is dedicated to

¹ *The Republic of Plato*. Translated with introduction and notes by Francis Macdonald Cornford. Oxford, London, New York: Oxford University Press. 1970. As Lin comments, democracy in Greece was a limited institution, concerned only a small number of elite citizens. The main population of subordinated classes and slaves did not have a share. See Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4. December 2018, p. 303. Also see Bryan, G. A. *A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage*. Beijing: Law Press. Vol. 264, 2001.

² *Kautilya's Arthashastra*. Translated into English by Shamasastri, R. Bangalore: Government Press. 1915. This classic book discusses political concepts such as power, order, and morality in ruling an ancient kingdom.

³ See Jessop, Bob. “The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development”. *International Social Science Journal*, 1998. Vol. 50, pp. 29-45. Also see Stoker, Gerry. “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions”. *International Social Science*. 1998, 50 (155), pp. 17-29. Also see Hyden, G. and Bratton, M. (eds). *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 1-26. Also see Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995, p. 2. Also see OECD (1995), *Participatory Development and Good Governance*. Development Co-Operation Guidelines Series. Paris: OECD, p. 2. Also see Rhodes, R.A.W. *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Buckingham: Open University Press. 1997, p. 15. Also see Francois-Xavier, Merrien. “Governance and modern welfare states”. *International Social Science*. March 1998, Vol. 50 (155), pp. 57-67.

⁴ Korhonen, Pekka. “What Is Asia? International Studies as Political Linguistics”. *Global and Regional Problems: Towards an Interdisciplinary Study*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 131-149.

⁵ Skinner, Quentin. 1988a. *A Reply to My Critics*. In James Tully (ed.). *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 276, pp. 286-287. Cited from Haapanen, Jarkko. *Adaptation to World Trends: A Rereading of the May Fourth Movement Radicalization*. Doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä, 2013, pp. 42-43.

abstracting and generalizing the essential characteristics of governance during a long historical period, which is different from studies focusing on only one or two stages in the development of China. The central argument put forward in this study is that since the founding of New China in 1949, state governance has undergone a process of development from rule to management, and then from management to governance.

This dissertation is motivated by an interest in Chinese governance, since the concept of governance is an influential argument nowadays and is being heatedly discussed in China. For example, from 2011 to 2020, the number of papers and articles on governance on China National Knowledge Infrastructure, which is the most comprehensive academic research registry, increased from approximately 39,700 to 83,600.⁶ The main purpose of this doctoral study is to summarize and improve the current understanding of the development process, experience and lessons of China's governance, and to learn from elements of foreign governance discourse available nowadays. The goal also is to promote China's governance research to study the characteristics of Chinese governance from the perspective of political science, so that the international academic community can recognize and accept the specific characteristics in Chinese governance. It approaches the subject from the angle of conceptual history. The University of Jyväskylä has a sound reputation on the research method of conceptual history. It is the reason why I study here, and which helps me to use an internationally recognized methodology in analysing practical Chinese issues. At present, China's governance theory has become fairly complex, resulting on one hand from the introduction of western governance theory and on the other hand from reflections on China's own governance experience. This process has of course been researched from various points of view, but thus far either in China or abroad not from the systematic point of view of conceptual history. Therefore, this research is devoted to analyzing the historical context of Chinese governance theory from the perspective of conceptual history, situating the development of the Chinese concept of governance to its historical background, and analyzing its rationality in the successive time periods. This is the main academic contribution of this study.

The development of productive forces is the fundamental driving force for the development of human society. With the ongoing industrial revolution, the Chinese society is transforming from an agricultural society to an industrial one, becoming progressively more complex. Each historical stage has its specific system of governance. A specific governance mode encounters crisis, is challenged and remodelled. This study aims to understand the changes of Chinese governance theory from ancient times to modern Chinese governance concepts. The historical process of the Chinese people's exploration of the development path of socialism with Chinese characteristics is actually a process of exploring the modernization of governance in socialist China. The evolution of this process is related to the shifting situations at home and abroad simultaneously. Different governance modes have been produced at different stages.

⁶ Source: China National Knowledge Infrastructure. 中国知网, *zhōngguó zhī wǎng*. Initiated by Tsinghua University and Tsinghua Tongfang, it was founded in June 1999, and represents the industrial strategic development direction of CNKI to serve knowledge innovation and support of scientific decision-making. <https://kns.cnki.net>

This study takes the speeches of national leaders and government reports since the founding of New China as its central research material. My interest is in the general outline of the development of governance thinking in China, rather than local administration or business governance, and the national leaders during subsequent periods have defined the general outlines of these changes. When illuminating their arguments, I have used various government reports of different periods. I have added also a deep historical dimension by using important classical treatises related with premodern Chinese governance thought, as Chinese thought on governance has evolved both by importing ideas from abroad and by using and reinterpreting classical domestic ideas. In interpreting all these materials, I have benefited from both Chinese and foreign scholarship. As research literature I have also used various academic monographs, government reports, articles in various journals, and doctoral dissertations written both in China and abroad. A high proportion of the literature is in the Chinese language. Most of the speeches of Chinese leaders have been officially translated and published in English, and the English translations I present are from these sources. The exception is Hu Jintao, whose quotations I have translated myself. Many Chinese classics have no English versions, in those cases I have done the translation.

From the point of view of source criticism I consider this literature sufficient for my research. This is not to say that different analyses of the phenomenon could not have been obtained by using other types of research material. China has a vast territory. Local governance is an important part of China's national governance and the conditions of each province and region are different. Likewise, local histories differ greatly. However, the overall policies have always been contained in the laws and directives of the central government of the state, and to a large extent, local developments are adhered to the national pattern. Through extensive collection of relevant international and domestic research, as well as party documents, literature from different leaders' periods, this research sorts out the theoretical basis and political ideas of China's governance.

Understanding of historical events as well as historical, political and economic situations are a significant perspective in the analysis. Political usage of a concept and its transferring possibility to new contexts have also been observed.⁷ The research method is motivated by the core ideas of conceptual historians, which includes not only the thinkers of what is commonly referred to as the Cambridge school of intellectual history, especially Quentin Skinner, but also Finnish conceptual history scholars, such as Jarkko Haapanen and Kari Palonen. Although the thinkers have different emphases, their ideas are supportive and complementary to each other. Conceptual studies can help to provide insights into changing social theories, perceptions, values and attitudes, to provide insights to understand conceptual controversies and changes in broader contexts than those of meaning. Therefore, the basic research method followed here is to summarize China's governance theory in light of historical experience. Skinner turns the use of historical information into a normative argument in political research: investigate the historical context by

⁷ Palonen, Kari. *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p. 69.

analysing it as social activity at a given time.⁸ According to Skinner, a political concept ought to be analysed as an element of political practice and action.

This study is divided into eight parts including the introduction and the conclusion. The second chapter provides an introduction to the general idea of governance. The following chapters from the third to the seventh analyse the development of the Chinese concept of governance during the Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras. The final chapter is the conclusion and discussion.

The second chapter of this dissertation is an overview, which deals with the related international concepts of governance and their definitions, looking also at analyses of the ancient understanding of governance. Although there was no governance concept of the western modern sense in Chinese traditional culture, the meaning of governance in ancient traditional culture was understood in terms of a monarch ruling the country. Its basic meaning is that the ruler manages the country and handles government affairs. In modern China, the concept of governance shows diverse usage. The Chinese concept of governance has become an amalgamation of historical Chinese and modern transnational elements. I also analyse international scholars' definitions of governance as well as the assessments of governance using both Chinese and foreign standards.

As Lampton comments, the governing capacities and motivations of Chinese leaders have played an imperative role in the process of governing the country.⁹ Therefore, from chapter three to chapter seven, this study analyses the development of governance under five Chinese leaders, more precisely, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

The third chapter illustrates the characteristics of governance under Mao Zedong. In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the first generation of central collective leadership with Mao Zedong as the core initiated a series of actions that provided a strong central authority in China, consolidating the new regime step by step. Mao Zedong did not explicitly use a specific concept of governance. Mao's governance thought mainly borrowed from that of the Soviet Union as well as from China's imperial and Guomindang eras and base-area experiences. He shaped China by wielding the Chinese people as a powerful tool, also strengthening his own standing along the way. To understand China under Mao requires the understanding of Mao's own revolutionary ideas to run the country. The planned economic system and party state integration strengthened the state's all-round control over the economy and society. All social affairs, including the individuals in the society, were brought into the orbit of the planned economy, which at that time really was adapted to China's level of development, especially in consolidating the new regime and initializing the stabilization of the Chinese society. However, with the passage of time, the creativity of individuals was limited by the planned economy, and the whole economic system displayed a lack of stimulation mechanisms, which

⁸ Skinner, Quentin. "Hobbes: Leviathan". Review article. *The Historical Journal*. Iss.7. 1964, p. 333. Cited from Palonen, Kari. *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p. 19.

⁹ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2014, p. 14.

affected the development of the macro-economy. Before long, this mode of governance ran into a dilemma, as it could not promote the further improvement of people's living standards.

The fourth chapter discusses China's governance under Deng Xiaoping. The second generation of central collective leadership with Deng Xiaoping as the core raised people's living standards and allowed the establishment of partial market economy, which inferred the stage of state governance thought in the economic field. As Lieberthal argues, under Deng's leadership, China began a most systematic reform effort.¹⁰ Since 1978, China's socialist construction took economy as the centre, and in the development since then, the national social governance mechanism also constantly improved. With the continuous development of the socialist market economy, the relationship between the government, the market and the society underwent changes. At this stage, China's state governance model was a strong government with weak market governance. However, the Party and government were not separated, and the Party practically equalled the government. At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC, Deng Xiaoping put forward suggestions on improving the Party's democratic centralism and inner laws and regulations of the Party. Government functions and management methods changed significantly, which activated individual initiative and private economy. Lieberthal opines that the core of China's reform is highly effective economic reform.¹¹ Deng shifted the focus of government policy from class struggle to economic development, which was the beginning of modern Chinese governance theory. Lieberthal also argues that only under Deng Xiaoping, "did China finally move fully from revolutionary upheaval to straightforward governance".¹²

The fifth chapter discusses the third generation of central collective leadership with Jiang Zemin as the core, which continued to explore China's governance. In September 1997, at the 15th National Congress of the CPC, the Party put forward the idea of "ruling the country according to law, 依法治国, *yīfǎ zhìguó*", implying the goal of building a socialist country ruled by law. After the formal establishment of the socialist market economic system in 1992, China's economy achieved rapid development. However, with the continuous diversification of the market and society in the process of development, the subject of governance was gradually broadened. While maintaining public order and promoting public interests, the status and role of the market and society should also be respected. Due to the consideration of its own social development, China joined the WTO in 2001. The function of the government was not only to serve the domestic market entities, but also to actively participate in the formulation of international rules. In this period, China's governance mode continued to be dominated by the Party.

The sixth chapter discusses Hu Jintao, as the fourth generation leader of the Party Central Committee, who further innovated the national governance thought. Much attention had been paid to the rapid development of the national economy, which

¹⁰ Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: from revolution through reform*. New York and London: W.W. Norton. Second edition. 2004, p. 127.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 245.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 83.

inevitably ignored the maintenance of social equity. Many social problems appeared in this process, the income gap was widening, and environmental problems were increasing. Therefore, Hu Jintao put forward the “scientific outlook on development, 科学发展观, *kēxué fāzhǎn guān*” after the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2002. Through the improvement of a series of governance mechanisms, such as the “western development, 西部大开发, *xībù dà kāifā*”, the revitalization of the northeast old industrial base and the rise of the central part of the country, was a way to realize social fairness and justice and respect the fair development of the whole country. In October 2007, the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China formally put major measures such as “sustainable development, 可持续发展, *kě chíxù fāzhǎn*” into the Party’s report, which reflected the great importance attached to environmental protection. Furthermore, in terms of maintaining social harmony, the report of the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward the construction of a “harmonious society, 和谐社会, *héxié shèhuì*” as an important goal for the first time. With Hu, China’s national governance thought developed the four directions of socialist market economy, democratic politics, advanced culture and harmonious society.

The seventh chapter discusses governance during the current Xi Jinping era. The central leadership with Xi Jinping as general secretary has formed new concepts. Xi Jinping also put forward his own thoughts of “modernization of state governance, 国家治理现代化, *guójiā zhilǐ xiàndàihuà*”. In November 2012, since the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the thought of governance in China has undergone a major change. The main idea is changing government functions, building a service-oriented government, and carrying out social construction and social governance. A series of reforms require the government to play a decisive role in the allocation of resources. In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee issued *the Decision of the CPC Central Committee On Several Major Issues of Comprehensively Deepening Reform*, 《中共中央关于全面深化改革的若干重大问题的决定》, *zhōnggòng zhōngyāng guānyú quánmiàn shēnhuà gǎigé de ruògān zhòngdà wèntí de juédìng*. This was a distillation of China’s national governance concept. This chapter takes the Wenling democratic discussion as a case study to analyse the applicability and limitations of governance theory in China. The local government must coordinate all participants by giving citizens and stakeholders the right to express themselves in order to seek more extensive cooperation and choose an appropriate governance model according to the change of social environment. Xi also proposed the “One Belt, One Road, 一带一路, *yīdài yīlù*”, which is a response to China’s internal development and expansion of the external environment following the integration into the international community.

The process of China’s state governance is also the process of realizing the political democratization of a socialist society. One should understand how these two concepts have been blended in modern China. The development of democracy also

has a certain temporal structure.¹³ Therefore, the analysis of democracy in China is presented in the same five chapters as analysis of the concept of governance. In ancient times, the word “democracy, 民主, *mínzhǔ*” referred to the supreme ruler. It was interpreted as “lord of the slaves”; i.e., ruler or monarch. The expression “democratic dictatorship, 民主专政, *mínzhǔ zhuānzhèng*” came into common use in the 1930s. It became the most important element in the twentieth-century Chinese socialist concept of democracy. Mao Zedong thought that the subject of democracy was a dynamic concept that was constantly moving because in different periods, *the people* had different scopes. Therefore, also the concept of “people’s democratic dictatorship, 人民民主专政, *rénmín mínzhǔ zhuānzhèng*” had great adaptability in different historical situations. Palonen points out that: “The depth of the description or analysis of a definite theory or the clear use of a concept in an author’s work should be considered as related to their political point. The actual transfer of theories and conceptions from one context to another signifies, then, that the political role of theories should not be understood too narrowly.”¹⁴ It can be said that although Mao Zedong attached great importance to democracy in his thought, the concept itself remained very narrow. Deng Xiaoping summed up the experience and lessons on the path of democratic political development since the founding of the country, advocating the concept of “democratic centralism, 民主集中制, *mínzhǔ jízhōng zhì*”. As Lieberthal writes: “Democratic centralism is an attempt to enjoy the advantages of disciplined dictatorship without sacrificing free discussion and the airing of views.”¹⁵ Deng Xiaoping’s idea of democracy can be understood as a form of governance, where the Chinese people, local organizations and enterprises engaged in mainly economic reforms making the livelihood of people better and the Chinese economic system more efficient but staying firmly under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. On the issue of democracy, Jiang Zemin inherited Mao Zedong’s and Deng Xiaoping’s idea of people’s democratic dictatorship, and stressed that democracy should not be treated uniformly, but should be developed in accordance with the specific national conditions of each country. Hu Jintao attached great importance to the development of “intra-Party democracy, 党内民主, *dǎng nèi mínzhǔ*”. Intra-Party democracy has important significance for overall political reform. Xi Jinping has given it his own additions, promoting the concept of “socialist consultative democracy, 社会主义协商民主, *shèhuì zhǔyì xiéshāng mínzhǔ*”, which is a form of thought that falls under the category of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, is to carry out extensive discussion and consultation within the whole society with major issues concerning the future and destiny of the country and practical issues concerning the vital interests of the people, so as to make the state governance more orderly. Democracy in China is regarded as a process, not as a state; that is, it goes gradually from imperfect and immature to more perfect and more mature, and there are

¹³ Haapanen, Jarkko. *Adaptation to World Trends: A Rereading of the May Fourth Movement Radicalization*. Doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä, 2013, p. 54.

¹⁴ Palonen, Kari. *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p. 69.

¹⁵ Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: from revolution through reform*. New York and London: W.W. Norton. Second edition. 2004, p. 193.

differences in degree at different times.

Democracy is always combined with a legal system, and the type of democracy a country employs is reflected in and guaranteed by its legal system. Socialist democracy is combined with the socialist legal system. Establishing the rule of law and building a socialist country under the rule of law are the Party's basic strategies for leading the people in governing the country. In the early days of the founding of New China, the Party attached importance to the construction of democracy and legal system. In 1954, the first National People's Congress (NPC) established China's fundamental political system through the constitution of the People's Republic of China. However, with the expansion of the anti-rightist struggle, the Party's legal construction was seriously damaged. Due to the high concentration of power, inner-party democracy and social democracy were not fixed in the form of institutionalization and legalization. Even if a law was formed, the authority of law had not been realized in the true sense because the rule of man was greater than the rule of law. Fukuyama says: law nearly disappeared during Mao era, which made China become "an arbitrary despotism".¹⁶ Chapters the fourth and the fifth also provide an initial comparison of rule of law and rule of man. The bitter lessons drawn from the Cultural Revolution made Deng and the Chinese leadership realize the necessity of establishing a sound legal system so as to avoid political and social disasters happening again in China. The movement from "legal system" towards "rule of law" is reflected in the gradual establishment of systematic legal provisions on the Chinese legal regime and adjusting the operation of the judicial system. Jiang Zemin caused the creation of expressions: "governing the country according to law, 依法治国, *yīfǎ zhìguó*" and "administering the Party strictly, 从严治党, *cóng yán zhì dǎng*". During the era of Hu Jintao continued emphasis on the important role of law for promoting the institutionalization, standardization and procedure of socialist democratic politics. Xi Jinping also stressed the close connection between rule of law and governance: "The rule of law is a fundamental principle by which the Party leads the people in running the country; the rule of law is the basic way to run the country; we should give greater scope to the important role the rule of law plays in the country's governance and social management; and we should promote law-based governance of the country in an all-round way."¹⁷ Democracy and the rule of law have systematically been considered as important aspects of the Chinese governance thought as well and also they have been in a process of continuous development.

Nowadays, under the background of economic globalization, China is also facing new development opportunities and challenges. It is necessary to constantly upgrade state governance, coordinate the relationship among the government, the market and society, as well as handle the relationship between the Party and the three. The Party's leadership remains the core of Chinese national governance.

¹⁶ Fukuyama, Francis. *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*. London: Profile Books, 2014, p. 357.

¹⁷ Xi Jinping. "Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Promulgation and Implementation of the Current Constitution". 4 December 2012. Speech at the Meeting of the People from All Walks of Life in Beijing to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Promulgation and Implementation of the Current Constitution. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 152.

Structurally this dissertation is a combination between a monograph and articles-based study. During the research process, three independent research articles were published in Chinese journals: “昆汀·斯金纳历史语境主义研究：政治的视界第1卷” [Analysis about Historical Contextualism of Skinner, Quentin: Visions of Politics Volume I], published in 《祖国》, December 2019, pp. 81-82. “德治视域下的善政与善治” [Good Government and Good Governance in the Vision of Virtue], published in 《知识文库》, February 2019, pp. 40-41. “以唐朝为例探析法治与善治的逻辑关系” [Taking the Tang Dynasty as an Example to Analyse the Logical Relationship between Rule of Law and Good Governance], published in 《法治与社会》, October 2019, pp. 14-15.

2 THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNANCE

2.1 Understanding concepts from the perspective of conceptual history

The concept of governance is widely used in various research fields such as politics, economics, and sociology, and its meanings have been augmented by qualifying words such as “good governance”, “global governance”, “meta-governance”, “social governance”, “state governance”, “local governance”, “community governance”, “corporate governance”, “financial governance”, “multi-level governance”, “multi-center governance”, the emerging “network governance”, and so on. The openness and ambiguity of this kind of academic research has inspired many scholars to go back to the etymology of words used, and I have also been inspired by these approaches.

The concept of governance has also become widely discussed by Chinese academic scholars in recent years, so there its history appears short, but in the international community wide discussion has a longer history, and because all societies have needed some kind of governance system, it is actually very old everywhere. The vocabulary for expressing governance has varied in different cultures and historical periods, but governance there has been. Skinner holds the same opinion: each concept has its “own historical evolution process”.¹⁸ Therefore, in order to understand a particular concept in its location, one must not only know the meaning of the term used to express the idea, but also contemplate on who is using the concept and what kind of argument she wants to achieve. In Skinner’s view, the field of connotations of a particular concept used by different thinkers in different historical periods is vastly different. All political philosophy has a specific historical background, and all political issues and all answers to these questions are also subject to historical conditions. In other words, each concept can only be effective under a particular historical situation. Skinner proposed to study not the formal meaning of the concepts as such but the meanings they acquire when they are used.¹⁹ Human thoughts are bound by the historical environment in which people live and the historical conditions at that time. No thought can transcend the limitations of its environment.

2.1.1 Previous research and the origin of the concept of governance in China

Good governance has been an ideal in all ancient Chinese political theories, irrespective of the place, time and culture. However, classical theorizing tends to be

¹⁸ Skinner, Quentin. *Visions of Politics*. Volume I, *Regarding Method*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 80.

¹⁹ Skinner, Quentin. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”. *History and Theory*, pp. 3-53. Reprinted in *Meaning and Context*. James Tully. (ed.). Cambridge: Polity, 1988, pp. 29-67. Abbreviated and revised version in Skinner, Quentin, 2002. *Visions of Politics*. Volume I: *Regarding Method*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-89.

more prescriptive than descriptive. In traditional China the most important meaning of good governance was to bring clear and majestic authority to officials, who at all levels were exhorted to treat the subjects they ruled as if being their parents. The main characteristics of this type of thinking were: strict laws, honest officials, high administrative efficiency, and good administrative services.

China, being an old civilization with various organized state-like formations throughout the millennia, also has a long tradition of concepts associated with governance. The word 治, *zhì* has for long been a central element in expressions related with administration. One of its denotations is “to cure”, thus, whether there is a problem in a physical body or in a society, it is cured by administering correct action. Combined with 理, *lǐ*, which here can be interpreted as “to put in order”, we get the concept of 治理, *zhìlǐ*, which can be understood as the Chinese concept of governance. It has appeared in Chinese literature for a long time. Its surface meaning refers to management, control, and rectification. It is mostly used in literature dealing with ruling of a country and the actions of the administrative bureaucracy.²⁰

In *Cihǎi* 《辞海》, the most authoritative large-scale comprehensive dictionary in contemporary China, sixth edition, the word 治, *zhì* is explained as “governance, 治理, *zhìlǐ*” and “management, 管理, *guǎnlǐ*”.²¹ It takes the example from *Shang Jun Shu*:²² “治世不一道, 便国不法古”,²³ which means there is not only one way to govern the country. As long as it is beneficial to the country, it is not necessary to stick to the old laws and systems.

In the period of Yao and Shun, 4000-3000 BC, there was reflexion about governing the country. In line with the natural economy, the concept of harnessing the Yellow River by dredging had emerged. Xu Yong likewise points out that in Chinese history, 治理, *zhìlǐ* refers to dealing with public issues, for example, governing the Yellow River. As a collection of agricultural societies, sometimes unified into empires, sometimes dispersed again, the economic basis of ancient China required continuous organization of common activities. China’s economy was based on farming, which was characterized by repeated annual cycles of activity on fixed land.²⁴ An important condition for farming is water conservancy. The more a country depends on agriculture, the more it depends on regular supply and channelling of water. In order to avoid competition for water resources between residents upstream and downstream of a river, ideally the national scale must include the entire river basin, and the length of the territory must not be shorter than the length of the river.²⁵ Although the Yellow

²⁰ Wang Haidong. 王海东。《道、认同与善治：治理范式略论》，《云南行政学院学报》。2017年第5期，第118-120页。

²¹ Xia Zhengnong, Chen Lizhi (eds). 夏征农, 陈立志主编。《辞海》第六版。A *Collection of Words*. It is a well-known Chinese lexicon and character dictionary, first published in 1936. The sixth edition. 上海：上海辞书出版社。2009年，第四卷。第2952-2953页。

²² Shang Yang. 商鞅。There are 26 existing articles, focusing on the theories and specific measures of law reforms carried out by the law school represented by Shang Yang in Qin dynasty at that time. 《商君书·更法》。北京：中华书局出版社。2004年。

²³ Sima Qian. 司马迁。 *Records of the Historian (Shi Ji)*. 《史记》. Sima Qian (145 or 135-? BC) was a historian and writer in the Western Han Dynasty. The book, China’s first biographical-style history, covers more than 3,000 years from the Yellow Emperor to Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty. 北京：中华书局出版社。2013年。

²⁴ Xu Yong. 徐勇。《国家治理的中国底色与路径》。北京：中国社会科学出版社。2018年，第12页。

²⁵ Wu Jiaxiang. 吴稼祥。《公天下：中国历代治理之得失》。贵阳：贵州人民出版社。2020年，第34页。

River and the Yangtze River have brought superior conditions to agriculture, they have also brought disaster to people because of floods. In the course of history, it was the necessity of governing the water that pushed Chinese ancestors to transcend the limits of blood and geography and form larger national communities.²⁶ The legend of Da Yu 大禹 tells about this situation. He was the founding monarch of Xia Dynasty and made great contributions not only in harnessing floods, developing national production and making people live and work in peace and contentment, but also in ending the social organization form of tribal alliances and creating the new social and political form of “state, 国家, *guójiā*”. He was followed by Qi, who continued to control the waters while completing the establishment of the state, replacing the primitive society with a class structure, and started the historical emergence of Chinese emperors.²⁷

Later governments set up special public institutions for water control, such as the Ministry of Works of the Qing Dynasty. Whether it is the construction of public works or military defence, the government must have displayed strong mobilization and organization ability, because without it the stability of the ruling class regime would have been jeopardized. Wittfogel believes that where a hydraulic society exists, despotism will also exist: “Hydraulic institutions are the genesis of all historically significant zones of agrarian despotism.”²⁸ However, Wittfogel’s theory of oriental despotism is only a generalization of traditional oriental politics, but it cannot be used as the only explanation for despotic governance models. For example, Russia’s despotism has a deep historical foundation, but it is not a hydraulic society.

It can be seen from the records of governance in various historical periods above that in China, the etymology of the term “governance, 治理, *zhilǐ*” emphasizes the way of taking care of the various matters of the country. The governance of traditional Chinese society is through a top-down centralized authoritarian system with the monarch as the centre to establish a set of vertical bureaucratic system, and the governance is implemented by officials.

2.1.2 The concept of governance in modern China

Regarding the use of the term “governance” in modern Chinese academia, one can find the expression “comprehensive governance, 综合治理, *zōnghé zhilǐ*” of social security in 1981. For example, in the 4th issue of *Journal of Law* in 1981 Hu Shiyu published an article “Promoting Social Security Comprehensive Governance”.²⁹ It is clearly a concept of the Deng Xiaoping era and reflects the changes Deng initiated in the Chinese state regime. There was also comprehensive governance in the field of criminal justice. For example, in the fourth issue of *Modern Law* in 1983 there was published “Severe Punishment of Criminals and Comprehensive Management are

²⁶ Wu Jiexiang. 吴稼祥。《公天下：中国历代治理之得失》。贵阳：贵州人民出版社。2020年，第34页。

²⁷ Shui Xiaojie. 税晓洁。《汉水四源考》，《中国三峡》。2015年7月，第96-98页。

²⁸ Wittfogel, Karl A. *Oriental despotism: a comparative study of total power*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1957, pp. 120-122.

²⁹ Hu Shiyu. 胡石友。《搞好社会治安的“综合治理”》，《法学杂志》。第4期，1981年，第39-41页。

Dialectical Unity” by Sheng Zuyi.³⁰ In 1990, the expression “fiscal governance rectification, 财政治理整顿, *cáizhèng zhìlǐ zhěngdùn*” appeared. The first issue of *Financial Research* published the then Minister of Finance Wang Bingqian’s “Implementing the Spirit of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Committee and Achieving Financial Governance Rectification Goals”.³¹ In 1994, there were discourses on “corporate governance, 公司治理, *gōngsī zhìlǐ*”, such as “Some Thoughts on China’s Corporate Governance Reform” recorded by Masahiko Aoki during his trip to Beijing, published in *Comparison of Economic and Social Systems*, Issue 6, 1994.³² In these journals, the concept of governance is widely used in political, economic and social disciplines. The focus of governance in this period was to optimize the economy and promote reform and development.

In the book *Public Essays: Market Logic and the Concept of the State*, Liu Junning ed. in 1995, there was published a long translated article “Governance: 现代治道新概念”.³³ The author adopted Li Shenzhi’s suggestion and translated the term “governance” into Chinese as “治道, *zhìdào*”, thinking that “governance, 治道” means: in order to realize economic development, the way is using public power in the process of managing a country’s economic and social resources.³⁴ In 1997, Xu Yong published an article “Governance: 治理的阐释” in *Political Research*. He believed that “道, *dào*” generally refers to the internal basis and law of affairs. However, governance was the control, influence and regulation of society through the handling of public affairs. Therefore, he argued that “治道, *zhìdào*” was more appropriately translated as “治理, *zhìlǐ*”.³⁵ He defined the concept of “governance” in this way: rulers or managers manage public affairs through the allocation and operation of public power, so as to dominate, influence and regulate the society. He understood governance from the perspective of the allocation and operation of public power, and pointed out that it not only has the function of governance, but also contains the spirit of people’s common management. The expression of “state governance, 国家治理, *guójiā zhìlǐ*” also appeared. In the fourth issue of *Jianghai Academic Journal* in 2000 there was published “National Governance, Governance Cost and Governance Performance”, by Liu Xinyuan of Wuhan University Law School.³⁶ In the fourth issue of 2000 there was published “The Concept of Legal System and the Transformation of State Governance: China’s Criminal Practice (1976-1982)” in *Strategy and Management* by Qiang Shigong, Department of Law,

³⁰ Sheng Zuyi. 盛祖贻。《严惩犯罪分子与综合治理是辩证的统一》，《现代法学》。第4期，1983年，第4-6页。

³¹ Wang Bingqian. 王丙乾。《贯彻五中全会精神实现财政治理整顿目标》，《财政研究》。第1期，1990年，第1-8页。

³² Aoki, Masahiko and Yin Wenjia. 青木昌彦，银温家。《关于中国公司治理改革的几点思考》，《经济社会体制比较》。1994年第6期，第22-27页。

³³ Liu Junning. 刘军宁。《Governance:现代“治道”新概念》，《公共论丛：市场逻辑与国家观念》。北京：三联书店出版社。1995年，第55-78页。

³⁴ Xu Yong and Lyu Nan. 徐勇，吕楠。《热话题与冷思考：关于国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的对话》，《当代世界与社会主义》。2014年第1期，第4-10页。

³⁵ Xu Yong. 徐勇。《Governance:治理的阐释》，《政治学研究》。1997年第1期，第63-67页。

³⁶ Liu Xinyuan. 柳新元。《国家的治理方式、治理成本与治理绩效》，《江海学刊》。2000年第4期，第96-102页。

Peking University.³⁷ These publications begun to turn to the perspective of state, since the state is the core and key to the study of political science. Faced with major discussions, they eventually converged into an exploration of China's state building.

There were also books and articles in the context of globalization, proposing to reform the government governance model at the macro level and enhance the governance capacity of the government. The first type of them was to study the reform of the government in western countries, explicating clearly the inflow of international governance discussions to China. The typical representative work was *The Change of Governance in Western Governments*, Mao Shoulong ed. in 1998.³⁸ The second type was to analyse the reform of state governance, see Qiang Shigong: *Legal System and Governance: Law in National Transition*, in 2003.³⁹ In 2003, domestic academic circles also published a series of articles guided by Marxist historical materialism, based on China's national conditions and not blindly copying western governance models. Examples are Liu Jianjun: "Governance Slowly: Jumping out of the Trap of State Power Returning to Society", *Exploration and Contending*. Issue 3, 2003.⁴⁰ Li Chuncheng: "Governance: Social Autonomous Governance or Government Governance?", *Exploration and Contending*. Issue 3, 2003.⁴¹ Li Feng: "Governance: Instrumental Reason or Value Rationality?", *Exploration and Contending*. Issue 3, 2003.⁴² The Marxist and domestic angle notwithstanding, this school also was inspired by the idea of governance. The governance by the government was widely discussed by Chinese scholars including the government's internal governance, the government's governance of the market and the society. Its basic characteristics were: the multi governance structure dominated by the Party organization; the core value of stability overriding everything; and the governance mode where the rule of law and the rule of man play an important role at the same time.⁴³

In 2009, Tang Huangfeng wrote an article "The Changes and Rational Review of the National Governance System in New China in 60 Years" and proposed that national governance should mean an effective party system combined with the state system, having in a supporting role other political parties, using the market and social organizations to expand governance space.⁴⁴ Tang Yalin summed up governance as the requirement of people to re-understand the role of the government and to scientifically and reasonably define the relationship between the government, the

³⁷ Qiang Shigong. 强世功。《法制的观念与国家治理的转型：中国的刑事实践（1976-1982年）》，《战略与管理》。2000年第4期。第76-79页。

³⁸ Mao Shoulong. 毛寿龙。《西方政府的治道变革》。北京：中国人民大学出版社。1998年。

³⁹ Qiang Shigong. 强世功。《法制与治理：国家转型中的法律》。北京：中国政法大学出版社。2003年。

⁴⁰ Liu Jianjun. 刘建军。《治理缓行：跳出国家权力回归社会的陷阱》，《探索与争鸣》。2003年第3期。第22-24页。

⁴¹ Li Chuncheng. 李春成。《治理：社会自主治理还是政府治理？》，《探索与争鸣》。2003年第3期，第14-19页。

⁴² Li Feng. 李峰。《治理：工具理性还是价值理性？》，《探索与争鸣》。2003年第3期，第79-84页。

⁴³ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《中国治理变迁30年（1978-2008）》，《吉林大学社会科学学报》。2008年第6期，第5-17页。

⁴⁴ Tang Huangfeng. 唐皇凤。《新中国60年国家治理体系的变迁及理性审视》，《经济社会体制比较》。2009年第5期，第24-32页。

market, social organizations and citizens.⁴⁵ Wang Puqu believed that the national governance of the Chinese Communists is essentially different from traditional Chinese governance but differs also from western governance views. China follows the logic of Marxist state theory, combining both approaches organically with the market and society.⁴⁶

In the literature of the Chinese Communist Party, state governance is usually understood as the Party leading the people and governing the country in this way. In 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made the *Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform*.⁴⁷ The term “governance” was mentioned many times in the full text, including: national governance, corporate governance, global economic governance, legal person governance, state governance, community-level self-governance, urban and rural community governance, internal governance, social governance, system governance, the Party’s leadership and governance.⁴⁸ These concepts involved many aspects of governance system and its structural levels, methods and organizational personnel, and so the concept of “governance” gradually extended to the concept of national governance. The concept had really been widely used in China.

Since 2000, a team led by Yu Keping from Compilation and Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee has carried out a large number of studies on governance and especially good governance, including the establishment of the journal *China Governance Review* in 2012, which is China’s first series of publications on the research of governance. At present, seven volumes have been published, including themes on national governance, social governance, global governance, community governance, urban governance, and so on, written by Chinese and foreign political scholars.⁴⁹ Yu Keping carried out relevant research on the basis of distinguishing the concepts of “governance”, and “management”. He believes that there are obvious differences between governance and management in terms of the subject of power, the nature of power, the source of power, the role and scope of governance and so on. He also believes that it is an inevitable trend of history to move from rule to governance: in social and political life, governance is a kind of political behaviour that focuses on instrumentality. No matter what kind of social and political system, no matter which class exercises the rule and who comes to power, they all hope to have higher administrative efficiency, lower administrative cost, better public

⁴⁵ Tang Yalin. 唐亚林。《国家治理在中国的登场及其方法论价值》，《复旦大学学报（社会科学版）》。2014年2月，第15-27页。

⁴⁶ Wang Puqu. 王浦劬。《国家治理、政府治理和社会治理的基本含义及其相互关系辨析》，《社会学评论》。2014年第3期，第78-88页。

⁴⁷ CCCPC: 中国共产党中央委员会。Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

⁴⁸ Source: China National Knowledge Infrastructure. 中国知网, *zhōngguó zhī wǎng*. Initiated by Tsinghua University and Tsinghua Tongfang, it was founded in June 1999, it represents the industrial strategic development direction of CNKI to serve knowledge innovation and knowledge learning and support scientific decision-making. 中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定。Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on several major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reform. 15 November 2013. <http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-ZGGH201311004.htm>

⁴⁹ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《中国治理评论发刊词》，《中国治理评论（第1辑）》。北京：中央编译出版社。2012年，第1-9页。

service and more citizen support. In other words, they all want good governance in their countries.⁵⁰

On this basis, he put forward the concepts of state governance and good governance: the ideal state of state governance is good governance. Good governance is different from the traditional political ideal of good government. Good government is the requirement of state organization. Good governance is the requirement of the whole society. To achieve good governance, a state must first achieve good government.⁵¹

However, there are different views on the applicability of the concept of governance in China, and some scholars hold sceptical attitude towards Chinese practice of governance. In 2003, Zang Zhijun pointed out that governance cannot be separated from two premises: One is the existence of mature multi-management subjects and their partnership; the other is the spirit of democracy, cooperation and compromise. However, China's current social development does not fully have these two premises.⁵² Also in 2003, Li Chuncheng stated: We endow governance with the aura of progress and reform, at the same time, we regard the government as the leader of governance, and place great hopes on its performance. This kind of thinking idealizes governance as a perfect thing, while ignoring feasibility conditions and risks of the promotion of governance theory in China, which is likely to turn the concept of governance into an empty slogan.⁵³ Earlier in 2002, Yang Xuedong opined that when the construction of a modern state was far from complete, it was problematic to talk about the failure of governance. In the absence of a modern social and political order as the basis of the system, if demand for the effectiveness of governance was exaggerated excessively, it may lead to three problems: firstly, government agencies with unclear functional divisions would fight for their interests; secondly, strong groups in the civil society and the market could use their resources to control public power; finally, in the process of the operation of public power, efficiency would outweigh fairness, thus sacrificing vulnerable groups.⁵⁴ This kind of doubts are rarely mentioned positively by scholars who support the application of governance theory to China. It is difficult to say that they do not have similar doubts, but they express them in a more positive way.

2.2 Definitions

2.2.1 Governance

Although my research concentrates on the post-1949 period in China, my methodological conceptual history approach necessitates also looking at the wider historical phenomena of state organization in China. For this reason, I have not

⁵⁰ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化》，《前线》。2014年第1期。第1-36页。

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Zang Zhijun. 臧志军。《治理：乌托邦还是现实？》，《理论文萃》。2003年4月，第10-12页。

⁵³ Li Chuncheng. 李春成。《治理：社会自主治理还是政府治理》，《理论文萃》。2003年4月，第14-16页。

⁵⁴ Yang Xuedong. 杨雪冬。《论治理的制度基础》，《天津社会科学》。2002年2月，第43-46页。

adopted a tight text-book definition of the concept of governance but use it flexibly so that I can cover also etymological roots of words and practices, cover the specific elements that the Chinese language brings into the concept, and look also at important sister concepts that form essential ingredients in Chinese discussion of governance. Thus, my history conscious understanding of governance covers direct rule, government, and management with whatever vocabulary they have been expressed, as well as the explicit concept used in discussions of modern governance (治理, *zhilǐ*). My purpose is to understand the concepts with which collective life has been arranged in the national organization in different time periods and diverse forms of leadership in the sense of “taking care of the various matters of the country”. I also focus on two important sister concepts, namely democracy and law, because they have been elementally connected with the emergence of the thought on governance in modern China. To some extent I follow also conceptual developments in international discussions, because Chinese discussion has displayed both reinterpretations of historical Chinese concepts and influences of international thought. The Chinese concept of governance is thus an amalgamation of historical Chinese and modern transnational elements.

Etymologically the English word “governance” is derived from ancient Greek κυβερνάω, whose original meaning is steering, control, guidance and manipulation. As argued before, the meaning of the Chinese concept of 治理, *zhilǐ* is roughly similar. It is mainly used for activities related to the public affairs of the country, and has long been used in conjunction with the word “government, 政府, *zhèngfǔ*”. However, governance discourse is certainly not a recent phenomenon.⁵⁵ In the 1980s, the concept of “governance” emerged in international relations in a diffuse form. Sometimes it was associated with the concept of regime, sometimes with the concept of world order. International financial institutions continue to use the term with various meanings. Ruhanen et al. point out that after 1980, “the literature of governance developed rapidly”.⁵⁶ Windsor argues the concept of governance is characterised by “confusion and controversy”.⁵⁷ Bevir and Rhodes also opine definitions of governance are “constructed from different narratives”.⁵⁸

In 1989, the World Bank first proposed the existence of a “governance crisis” in a survey report on African countries. A report from the World Bank (1989) focused on reforming the public sector so that countries could be governed more effectively and transparently.⁵⁹ The World Bank defined governance as: “Governance consists of the

⁵⁵ Bhimani, A. “Risk management, corporate governance and management accounting: emerging interdependencies”, *Management Accounting Research*, Vol. 20, 2008, pp. 2-5. Also see Jessop, Bob. “The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development”. *International Social Science Journal*, 1998. Vol. 50, pp. 29-45. Also see Stoker, Gerry. “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions”. *International Social Science*. 1998, 50 (155), pp. 17-29.

⁵⁶ World Bank (1989), *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Ruhanen, Lisa; Scott, Noel; Ritchie, Brent and Tkaczynski, Aaron. “Governance: a review and synthesis of the literature”. *Tourism Review of AIEST - International Association of Scientific Experts in Tourism*, Vol. 65, Iss. 4, 2010, pp. 4-21.

⁵⁷ Windsor, D. “Tightening corporate governance”. *Journal of International Management*, Vol. 15, 2009, pp. 306-316.

⁵⁸ Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. “Decentralizing British governance: from bureaucracy to networks”, *Governance as Social and Political Communication*, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2000, pp. 71-99.

⁵⁹ World Bank (1989), *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.”⁶⁰

Since the 1990s, “governance” has acquired new meanings, not only because it covers fields far beyond the traditional classical governmental meaning, but also because its meaning is far from “government”. It is no longer confined to the political arena, but is widely used in the socio-economic field, not only in the English-speaking world, but also in the other languages in Europe. Various scholars and organizations have defined governance from different angles. Especially during the 1990s, governance was given broader meanings in the fields of political science, public administration, and sociology. Hyden gave the definition as: “conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm”.⁶¹ The theories of governance have been an attempt to make up for the difficult combination of the government and the market. Modern governance negates the older statist model of governance, trying to refresh the field with a model of joint management by society, the private sector and the state.

Among the various definitions of governance, the definition of the Commission on Global Governance⁶² is highly representative and authoritative. In 1995, it defined governance as: “the sum of the many individuals and institutions”.⁶³ In its 1995 Guidelines the OECD uses the term “governance” in accordance with a World Bank definition: “the use of political authority and exercise of control in society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development”.⁶⁴

The founder of governance theory, Rhodes defines governance as: “the self-organizing inter-organizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and autonomy from the state”.⁶⁵ He believes that governance means that the meaning of domination has changed. A new process of domination means that the conditions of orderly domination are different from before, or that there is a new way to rule society.⁶⁶ He cites six different definitions of governance: First, governance as the smallest of a country’s management activities, which refers to the state’s reduction of public spending to achieve maximum benefits at minimal cost. Second, as corporate governance, it refers to the organizational system that guides, controls, and supervises the operation of the enterprise. Third, as the new public management, it refers to the introduction of market incentives and private sector management to government’s public service. Fourth, good governance refers to a public service system that emphasizes efficiency, the rule of law and

Ruhanen, Lisa; Scott, Noel; Ritchie, Brent; Tkaczynski, Aaron. “Governance: a review and synthesis of the literature”. *Tourism Review of AIEST*-International Association of Scientific Experts in Tourism; Bingley Vol. 65, Iss. 4, 2010, p. 6.

⁶⁰ Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project.

<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>

⁶¹ Hyden, G. and Bratton, M. (eds). *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 1-26.

⁶² Commission on Global Governance. *Our Global Neighbourhood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995, p. 2.

⁶³ Weiss, T. “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and actual challenges”. *Third World Quarterly*. Vol. 21 (5). 2000, pp. 795-796.

⁶⁴ OECD (1995), *Participatory Development and Good Governance*, Development Co-Operation Guidelines Series. Paris: OECD, p. 2.

⁶⁵ Rhodes, R.A.W. *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Buckingham: Open University Press. 1997, p. 15.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 206-235.

responsibility. Fifth, as a governance of the social-control system, it refers to the cooperation and interaction between the government and the people, or in other words between the private and the public sectors. Sixth, as the governance of self-organizing networks, it refers to a social coordination network based on trust and mutual benefit.⁶⁷

Gerry Stoker sorted out the various popular governance concepts and pointed out that so far scholars from various countries have put forward five main ideas on governance:⁶⁸ First, “Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government.”⁶⁹ Governance is different from the traditional view on state administration because public and private sectors are both involved. Second, “Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues.”⁷⁰ It shows that in modern societies the responsibility that was originally assumed by the state is being transferred to the civil society. Third, “Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action.”⁷¹ Organizations exchange goals not only depending on the participants but also on the exchange environment. Fourth, “Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors.”⁷² Governance needs the cooperation with the government to share administrative responsibility. Fifth, “Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority.”⁷³ Government has the responsibility to use the new management methods and technologies to better control and guide public affairs. He also claimed that in 1995 governance was “seen as part of the wider issue related to the efficiency and effectiveness of state action”.⁷⁴

Francois-Xavier believes that: “The notion of governance rests on three theoretical principles or premises: the existence of a crisis of governability; that this crisis reflects the exhaustion of the traditional forms of state intervention; the emergence of a tendency or of a convergent political trend in all the ‘developed’ countries that is giving rise to a new form of governance better adapted to the context. [...] For a number of years the notion of governance has tended to be seen as part of the question of the loss of the state’s central authority, the diminished efficiency and effectiveness of state action and the importance of mixed, that is, public/private, governance networks.”⁷⁵ Moran claims that: “‘governance’ is not only fashionable and challenging; it is promiscuous, embedding itself in all sorts of settings, and losing most of its analytical sharpness in the process.”⁷⁶

⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 15. Also see Rhodes, R.A.W. “The new governance: governing without government”. *Political Studies*, Vol. xiv, 1996, pp. 652-667.

⁶⁸ Stoker, Gerry. “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions”. *International Social Science*. 1998, 50 (155), pp. 17-29.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Stoker, Gerry. “Urban Governance in Britain”. *Sociologie du travail*, 2, 1995, pp. 301-316.

⁷⁵ Francois-Xavier, Merrien. “Governance and modern welfare states”. *International Social Science*. March 1998, Vol. 50 (155), pp. 57-67.

⁷⁶ Moran, Michael. “Governance and Practice: A cross-disciplinary approach—by Vasudha Chhotray and Stoker,

Czempiel gives the meaning of governance: “the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to command that they be done”.⁷⁷ For him, the international system is a typical system of governance.⁷⁸ Kaufmann defines governance as “The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, which includes: (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”⁷⁹ Court defines governance as: “Formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions.”⁸⁰ Marie-Claude Smouts proposed that: “Governance refers to a set of rules, principles and procedures that come into play in the regulation of overlapping activities. There too, the difference is not one of nature, but of scope.”⁸¹ She also identifies four elements of governance: “Governance is neither a rule system nor an activity but a process, governance is not founded upon domination but upon accommodation, governance involves public and private actors at the same time, governance is not a formal institution, but is reliant on continual interaction.”⁸² Oran believes governance is “A system of rule that is as dependent on intersubjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and charters”.⁸³ Many scholars hold the opinion that “Governance involves multiple stakeholders who have an interest in the specified task.”⁸⁴ Ruhanen et al. also think that: “Governance includes an element of stakeholder relationship management.”⁸⁵ These different definitions of governance are based on different contexts and they are influenced by

Gerry”. *Public administration* (London), December 2009, Vol. 87 (4), pp. 982-983.

⁷⁷ Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. “Governance and Democratization”. *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*. Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992, p. 250.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1999), “Aggregating Governance Indicators”. *Policy Research Working Paper*. No. 2195, Washington D. C.: World Bank. Cited from Landman, Todd. *Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance*. University of Essex: Human Rights Centre. 2003, p. 86.

⁸⁰ Court, J. “Opportunities and Challenges in Assessing Governance and Human Rights: Findings from a Survey of 16 Developing and Transition Countries”. Paper prepared for the Seminar on *Human Rights and Statistics*. Brussels. 27-29 November 2002, pp. 1-14. Cited from Landman, Todd. *Map-Making and Analysis of the Main International Initiatives on Developing Indicators on Democracy and Good Governance*. University of Essex: Human Rights Centre. 2003, p. 86.

⁸¹ Smouts, Marie-Claude. “The proper use of governance in international relations”. *International Social Science Journal*. March 1998, Vol. 50 (155), pp. 81-89.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Rosenau, James N. “Governance, order and change in world politics”. *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*. Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992, p. 5.

⁸⁴ Kjaer, Anne Mette. *Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2004. Also see Beritelli, P.; Bieger, T. and Laesser, C. “Destination governance: using corporate governance theories as a foundation for effective destination management”, *Journal of Travel Research*, Vol. 46, 2007, pp. 96-107. Also see Kooiman, J. “Findings, speculations and recommendations”, in Kooiman, J. (ed.). *Modern Governance*. London: Sage. 1993, pp. 6-10. Also see Rhodes, R.A.W. *Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability*. Buckingham: Open University Press. 1997. Also see Stoker, Gerry. “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions”. *International Social Science*. 1998, 50 (155), pp. 17-29.

⁸⁵ Ruhanen, Lisa; Scott, Noel; Ritchie, Brent and Tkaczynski, Aaron. “Governance: a review and synthesis of the literature”. *Tourism Review of AIEST - International Association of Scientific Experts in Tourism*, Vol. 65, Iss. 4, 2010, pp. 4-21.

the scholar's "disciplinary perspective".⁸⁶

Governance has its advantages such as inclusiveness, diversification and networking, and it goes beyond the shortcomings of traditional rule, but governance is still not always effective. What governance ultimately seeks is to create conditions to ensure social order and collective action. Governance is a new development of the ruling style, in which the internal boundaries between the public and private sectors tend to become blurred. The structure or order that governance seeks to create cannot be imposed by the outside. It plays its role in relying on the interaction of multiple informants and actors who influence each other.⁸⁷

2.2.2 The assessments of governance

In the 1990s, with the rise of governance theory, the theoretical research and practical application of governance assessment have also attracted widespread attention. Some famous international organizations, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank (WB), first established complete governance standards and conducted an overall assessment of the governance status of sovereign states. According to the statistics of relevant departments of the World Bank, there are about 140 kinds of governance evaluation index systems that are often used at present. Among them, the World Bank's "World Governance Indicators (WGI)" and the United Nations Centre for Human Development's "Human Governance Indicators (HGI)" are of great influence. The WGI system of the World Bank was developed earlier and is widely used.


The WGI project reports governance indicators for more than 200 countries and territories from 1996 to 2019, in includes six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption.⁸⁸ These indicators include the opinions of enterprises, citizens and expert survey respondents in various countries.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 5.

⁸⁷ Jessop, Bob. "The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development". *International Social Science Journal*, 1998. Vol. 50, pp. 29-45.

⁸⁸ Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project.
<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>

Figure 1: China Governance Indicators from 1996-2019 by WGI⁸⁹



Source: World Bank.

In the WGI indicators, China is clearly high on state efficiency but low on people’s voice, reflecting its historical top-heavy governance structure. The other indicators are in-between, China in that sense being a rather normal country. Therefore, China’s governance index evaluation system also includes similar contents. The research team led by Yu Keping summed up the specific details of China’s governance assessment. It is the first draft of the final report on China governance assessment framework commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme and the Ministry of Commerce in 2008. The report concludes the research results of He Zengke, Chen Jiagang, Zhou Hongyun, Bao Yajun, Yan Jian, and others. The key evaluation dimensions are: citizen participation, human rights and civil rights, intra-Party democracy, rule of law, legitimacy, social justice, social stability, open government affairs, administrative efficiency, government responsibility, public service, incorrupt government.

⁸⁹ Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators from 1996 to 2019 (except year of 1997, 1999, 2001). <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports> Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

Figure 2: The evaluation dimension of China's Governance⁹⁰

Evaluation dimension	Key areas
citizen participation	Electoral laws and regulations; the scope of direct elections; the degree of competitive elections; villagers' autonomy; residents' autonomy; the role of workers' Congress; public hearings and consultations on major decisions; the status of social organizations or non-governmental organizations; the institutional environment of social organizations; the impact of social organizations on national political life; citizens' participation in public life through the Internet and mobile phones.
Human rights and civil rights	The protection of civil rights by law; the degree of realization of citizens' legal rights; the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups such as women, children and poor residents; the protection and tolerance of minorities and dissidents; the awareness of human rights of citizens and officials; the legitimate demonstration of citizens; the ability of citizens to protect themselves; the protection of citizens' rights; and the legal assistance to citizens.
Intra-Party democracy	Laws and regulations on election, decision-making and supervision within the Party; the way of selecting leaders of Party committees at all levels; the degree of democracy of cadres recommended and appointed by the Party committee; the role of the Party Congress; the decision-making and discussion procedures of the Party committee; the power supervision within the Party; the degree of openness of party affairs; the direct election of party representatives; and the consultation between the executive party and other democratic parties.
Rule of law	The legislative status of the country; the authority of the Constitution and law; the degree of the Party and the government in power and administration according to law; the understanding and respect of law by citizens and officials; the role of law in actual political life; the autonomy and authority of legislative and judicial activities; the role of lawyers; the legal consciousness of officials and citizens; the legal review of government policies; and the implementation of judicial trial.
Legitimacy	Citizens' identification with the constitution; citizens' identification with the Party and the government; the authority and applicability of law; the authority of the Party and government; citizens' trust in the grass-roots government;

⁹⁰ Source: Yu Keping. 俞可平。《中国治理评估框架》，《经济社会体制比较》。2008年第6期。第6-12页。
Figure drawn and translated by Liu Yan.

	citizens' trust in the officials around them; citizens' satisfaction with the political situation; citizens' recognition of the mainstream ideology; and citizens' attitude towards the development prospect of the country.
Social justice	Gini coefficient; Engel coefficient; urban-rural difference; regional development difference; education equity; medical and health care equity; employment equity; the proportion of women in party and government cadres; the representativeness of party and government officials; the representativeness of deputies to the National People's Congress and CPPCC members; and the degree of equalization of basic public services.
Social stability	The government's ability to deal with emergencies; citizens' sense of social security; policy continuity; social security situation; inflation rate; conflicts in ethnic regions; the number of mass incidents; the number and proportion of petitions; domestic violence; public violence.
Open government affairs	The regulations and effects of government affairs publicity; the quantity and quality of political communication channels; the openness degree of decision-making process; the openness system of administrative organs, courts, procuratorates and other activities; citizens' understanding of political affairs; the autonomy of news media; citizens' rights and channels to obtain political information; the declaration of party and government cadres' income and property.
Administrative efficiency	The administrative cost of the government; the administrative ability of the Party and government cadres; the administrative efficiency of the government; the coordination degree of the Party and government organs; the probability of decision-making mistakes; the input-output rate of public projects; e-government; the government's rapid response and handling ability; citizens' satisfaction with the government's decision-making and handling efficiency.
Government responsibility	The degree of responsibility of officials for their behaviours; the punishment for dereliction of duty; the communication channels between officials and citizens; the respect of citizens' opinions by officials; the mechanism for the Party and government to receive and deal with citizens' demands; the decision-making consultation mechanism of the Party and the government; policy feedback and the revision of policies by the decision-making departments; the degree to which policies reflect or represent citizens' demands; the influence of citizens' opinions on government decision-making; The number and consequences of administrative litigation.

Public service	The proportion of government budget expenditure on public services; the status of basic social security; the popularization rate of nine-year compulsory education; the coverage rate of basic medical insurance; the government's help to the poor; the popularization rate of government one-stop service; the strength of the state to provide public infrastructure; the satisfaction of the public to government services; the ecological governance of the government and its effect.
Incorrupt government	Anti-corruption laws and regulations and their effects; the number and punishment of corrupt officials; economic audit of the government and party and government cadres; public budget supervision; mutual restriction of power; citizens' restriction on government power; supervision of news and public opinion; self-discipline of the Party and government.

Source: Combined from Yu Keping's information and translated by Liu Yan.

Comparing the two evaluation index systems, the same contents mainly include: voice and responsibility, political stability, government efficiency, rule of law, and control of corruption. First, voice and responsibility can be seen as participation of the citizens. Yu Keping illustrates in this report: "There are two most important standards to measure the participation of Chinese citizens, that is, electoral democracy and consultative democracy. The former concerns whether government officials represent the people, while the latter concerns whether government policies fully reflect public opinion."⁹¹ Therefore, citizen participation is the basis of democratic governance. The system of people's Congress, political consultation, community residents' autonomy and regional ethnic autonomy constitute the institutional framework of China's current democratic politics. The higher the degree of citizen participation, the higher the degree of democratic governance. Second, political stability, which is closely related to social stability, as Huntington says: "Stability is a central dimension in the analysis of any political system."⁹² Sang and Yuan also hold the same opinion: "For China, political development and political stability are of equal importance. Thus, stability refers to the goal of pursuing a balanced and harmonious path of reform and development. Gradual progress indicates the necessity of pursuing political development in a steady and orderly manner."⁹³ Stable social order and stable political situation are directly related to citizens' life and social development, being one of the basic objectives of democratic governance. China is a developing country in the process of great transformation, facing serious challenges in social stability. Maintaining social stability is one of the core values of the Chinese government.

⁹¹ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《中国治理评估框架》，《经济社会体制比较》。2008年第6期。第6-12页。

⁹² Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman; London: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991, p. 11.

⁹³ Sang Yucheng and Yuan Feng. 桑玉成, 袁峰。"China's Political Development at the Turn of the Century". 《政治学研究》 *Studies in Political Science*. Volume 3, 1998, pp. 7-10. Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 54.

Third, government efficiency. As Yu states: “The factors that affect the administrative efficiency of the government include: the administrative cost of the government, the administrative ability of the Party and government cadres, the administrative efficiency of the government, the coordination degree of the Party and government organs, the probability of making mistakes, the input-output rate of public projects, e-government, the government’s quick response and handling ability, and the citizens’ satisfaction with the government’s decision-making and handling efficiency.”⁹⁴ All these factors should be considered to improve the efficiency of the government. Fourth, rule of law. There can be no good governance without the rule of law, as the realization of the rule of law directly reflects the degree of democratic governance. Fifth, anti-corruption. Yu also figures: “The escalation of political corruption since China’s reform and opening-up has, to some extent, resulted from the failure to establish an effective mechanism of power restriction both within the Party and the greater political structure. Experiences in political development clearly leads to the conclusion that power must be restricted, for power unrestricted inevitably produces corruption.”⁹⁵ Corruption not only greatly increases transaction costs, but also seriously damages the credibility of the government.

There is a common assessment system for each country and a common set of international standards for governance. However, this assessment also has its own deficiency. First, there are huge differences in history, culture, political system and economic development level among different states, which is difficult to measure by a universal standard. Second, the basic data and survey materials necessary for these assessments are often difficult to obtain. Even if the relevant data can be obtained, they are often neither comprehensive nor accurate. If the assessed countries do not cooperate, even the most basic data will not be available. Without comprehensive and reliable data, it is impossible for any assessment to draw correct conclusions. Third, the operation and evaluation subject of the WGI evaluation index system is not the World Bank organization, and its operating body is mainly composed of other international organizations, research institutions and some well-known scholars, and then the database is established according to the survey and statistics made by these subjects. These data are not objective indicators, but are based on the respondents’ subjective feelings of the relevant fields. In other words, compared with the so-called scientific objective indicators, these survey results are more subjective.

However, most of China’s statistical data come from government departments. Whether these data can be understood as a set of social governance system evaluation indicators based on government management is worth exploring. The framework of the governance system only puts forward the participants and the overall objectives of the governance system, but it does not reflect the current degree, so it still has limitations.

⁹⁴ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《中国治理评估框架》，《经济社会体制比较》。2008年第6期。第6-12页。

⁹⁵ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 117.

2.2.3 Good governance

Khan states: “China’s development model emphasizes the use of economic stability and good governance to improve society.”⁹⁶ Many scholars have given their definitions of good governance. Mações thinks that: “A modern political system of good governance should be able to guarantee that there be an equilibrium of the political, social and capital powers to act in favour of the interests of the majority.”⁹⁷ Yu argues that good governance includes good government, and sometimes it can even be equated with good government. He points out: The contents of good governance are basically similar in China or foreign countries, in ancient times and in modern times, and generally includes the following elements: strict law, honest and clean officials, high administrative efficiency and good administrative service [...] Good governance is good cooperation between the state and society, or between the government and civil society.⁹⁸

The reason why Western political and management scientists have proposed the concept of governance and advocated the use of governance instead of government is that they see both the failure of the market and the failure of the state in the allocation of social resources. For example, Bob Jessop attributes the failure of governance to disagreements between the parties on the original common goals while also new ones emerge.⁹⁹ Similarly, as has been observed in the history of socialist countries, only relying on national plans and orders is impossible to optimize the allocation of resources and ultimately the state cannot promote and protect the political and economic interests of citizens by itself. Jessop argues that the main point of governance is that the goal is set in the process of negotiation and reflection, and it needs to be adjusted through negotiation and reflection.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the failure of governance can be understood as the failure of the parties concerned to redefine the target whether the original target is still valid or controversial.

The modern concept of governance is based on the experiences and lessons of Western countries summing up their long-term domination in global affairs during the recent decades. The concept of modern governance is related to different classical concepts of rule and authority, but modern governance is a more sophisticated and often a more generally acceptable rule, exhibiting more productive and mature management.

To sum up, the background of the rise of governance lies in the fact that the functions of modern government, the role of the state, and even the legitimacy of administration has been deeply challenged by practice, and this challenge is

⁹⁶ Khan, Muhammad Khalil; Sandano, Imran Ali; Pratt, Cornelius B. and Farid, Tahir (eds). “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Global Model for an Evolving Approach to Sustainable Regional Development”. *Sustainability* (Basel, Switzerland), October 2018. Vol. 10 (11), pp. 4222-4251.

⁹⁷ Mações, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company, 2018, p. 182.

⁹⁸ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《治理与善治》。北京：社会科学文献出版社。2000年，第1-15页。

⁹⁹ Jessop, Bob. “The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development”. *International Social Science Journal*, 1998. Vol. 50, pp. 29-45.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

multi-dimensional and dynamic.¹⁰¹ Due to different levels of governance in different countries, it is impossible to have the same effectiveness at all levels, which leads to the failure to find a unified political system in the concept of governance of each country, but the concept of governance still implies a political process. As governance emphasizes negotiation and reflection among people, organizations, forces and mechanisms, it means a diversification and decentralization of power. Therefore, governance may imply a withdrawal of the state, which is clearly demonstrated by the idea of “governance without government”.¹⁰² However, some scholars argue that even under the impact of globalization, the state will not die out, but it needs to be reconstructed.¹⁰³ Yu Jianxing argues: The rise of governance is not only a verbal and institutional opposition to government authority and state rule, but also a reflection and substitution for market failure and state failure.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the state needs governance in the era of globalization, and the state itself also needs to play an important role in governance, which requires a high degree of integration of the government system and people’s needs.

2.3 Conclusion

When we think of the relationship between the concepts of rule, management, and governance in China, a sensible conclusion appears to be the following. Rule means a reign where the leadership exercises power in a state by command and other forms of direct leadership. Social management “社会管理, *shèhuì guǎnlǐ*” first appeared in the Chinese policymaking lexicon in the early 1980s during the Deng Xiaoping era,¹⁰⁵ and has been shaping the concept of governance of China ever since.¹⁰⁶ The first time the concept appeared in a CPC National Congress Report came in 2002, and by 2005, was linked with the harmonious society concept.¹⁰⁷ Since 2010, social management has been increasingly linked to the theory and practice of managing rising social tensions in Chinese society.¹⁰⁸

Management is a process in which an authoritative subject systematically influences its objects and the whole organization. “Governance” is the deepening of “management”, further away from direct rule. Governance emphasizes the diversification of governance subjects, and many governance subjects focus on the activities of influencing their objects around a central endeavour. State governance

¹⁰¹ Wang Shizong. 王诗宗。《治理理论及其中国适用性》。杭州：浙江大学出版社。2009年，第12页。

¹⁰² Rosenau, James N. “Governance, order and change in world politics”. *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*. Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992, p. 5.

¹⁰³ Wang Shizong. 王诗宗。《治理理论及其中国适用性》。杭州：浙江大学出版社。2009年，第24页。

¹⁰⁴ Yu Jianxing. 郁建兴。《治理与国家建构的张力》，《马克思主义与现实》。2008年第1期，第86-93页。

¹⁰⁵ Liu Rui. 刘瑞。《社会发展的宏观管理》。北京：中国物价出版社。1998年。

¹⁰⁶ Ding Yuanzhu. 丁元竹。《中国社会管理的理论建构》，《学术月刊》。2008年第6期，第6-12页。

¹⁰⁷ Source: National Energy Administration. 国家能源局。《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展的第十一个五年计划的决议》。“Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Formulating the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development”. 3 November 2005.

http://www.nea.gov.cn/2005-11/03/c_131215099.htm

¹⁰⁸ Guo, Sujian. *State-society Relations and Governance in China*. Lanham, MA; London: Lexington Books, 2014, p. 142.

means that the state, society, market and individual citizens participate in all aspects of national political life. Governance is more suitable for the needs of modern societies than rule and management. It is conducive to the benign interaction between government, market and society, and also helps to avoid their respective weaknesses, thus reducing their offsites, misplacement and possible failures.

Thomas Kuhn says: “You cannot understand a new paradigm by using the vocabulary of the old paradigm.”¹⁰⁹ However, you can understand the difference when you know both vocabularies. With the progress of time, the old way of rule is withdrawing from the stage, new concepts are gradually emerging, and more appropriate definitions follow. The historical Chinese ruling system has changed to a modern governance system, helped by the introduction of concepts of western governance. Governance is a dynamic and developing concept, which includes not only the formal organizational structure of governments, but also the cooperative action of society, market and citizens.

¹⁰⁹ Naisbitt, Doris and Naisbitt, John. *China's Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society*. New York: Harper Business. 2010, p. 13.

3 GOVERNANCE OF CHINA DURING MAO ZEDONG ERA

3.1 The concept of governance during Mao Zedong era

Wider discussion of the concept of governance erupted in the West in the 1990s and was only then introduced to China, while Mao Zedong died as early as 1976, so this international concept did not appear in Mao Zedong's works. However, whether Mao Zedong had a conception of governance and what kind of conception it was cannot simply be based on the vocabulary in his works. To understand an author's work, it is not enough to analyse the content of the text using contemporary understanding of the meaning of its concepts. Skinner proposed to "Return the specific texts we study to the precise cultural contexts in which they were originally formed".¹¹⁰ It is also necessary to try to grasp what the author meant when writing the text. In Skinner's view, if the reader wants to gain a historical understanding of an author's work, they not only need to grasp the meaning of what he has written, but also need to understand the intention of the author, both of which are indispensable. Ringen also advised to pay attention on "the more general discourse of their times".¹¹¹

Mao of course did not use the vocabulary of "governance" of the current millennium. However, as long as there is a functioning state, there is governance practice, and as long as there is governance practice, there is governance also as a concept, expressed with some kind of vocabulary.

The modern Chinese system of governance is officially based on the practical and conceptual basis established by Mao. The development of the modern Chinese concept of governance is seen as starting with Mao and Soviet influences. After the founding of "New China, 新中国, *xīn zhōngguó*" in 1949, the "Communist Party of China (CPC), 中国共产党, *zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng*" led by Mao Zedong began learning how to do governance along the way. Wu claims that: "The establishment of the PRC in 1949 marked China's emergence as a unified, modern nation-state. In the euphoric moment of victory, the CPC faced a daunting array of new challenges, such as meeting the basic welfare needs of China's impoverished population, strengthening the country's position in the interstate system through accelerated economic accumulation, and bringing about radical social transformations in accordance with its stated socialist objectives. The prolonged war experiences deeply shaped social and political relations in the PRC."¹¹² Mao Zedong's concept of state governance of socialism is different from that of western capitalism. In his way of thinking, there is no essential difference between state governance and governance of a rebel organization possessing a specific territory. State governance is the concrete

¹¹⁰ Skinner, Quentin. *Visions of Politics: Volume I, Regarding Method*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002, p. 125.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 118.

¹¹² Wu Yiching. *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2014, p. 23.

manifestation of a successful revolution. From a structural perspective, Mao Zedong's thoughts on governance include political governance, economic governance, cultural governance, society governance, and Party governance—continuing in the form of thoughts on a rebel organization incessantly carrying on the revolution.

Mao Zedong, as the supreme leader led the Party and the state, carried out socialist revolution and construction through arduous exploration. In Chinese thinking, he made great achievements, especially the successful completion of the “Three Great Remoulding, 三大改造, *sān dà gǎi zào*”¹¹³ and the establishment of a relatively complete national economic system. At the same time, there were some serious challenges, such as the Cultural Revolution, but the reasons for its formation are complex and multiple rather than simple. Any state governance has its political attribution and serves its ruling ideology.¹¹⁴ There were important governance systems established at that time, such as the planned economy system and the corresponding administrative mechanism, though they are no longer suitable for today's national conditions.

Upon the founding of New China, China's governance model had a distinctive Soviet colour, also called the Stalin model. Oksenberg asserts the principal features are: “Enormous power resides in the pre-eminent leader, the Standing Committee, and Politburo of the Party Central Committee who basically are not accountable to any other agency or to any judicial restraints.”¹¹⁵ In the same book, Dittmer claims: “Soviet-style organizations and techniques provided the country's new rulers with ready-made models, albeit with Chinese characteristics.”¹¹⁶ Its essence lay in the highly centralized control of the country's politics, economy, ideology, culture and social life. In terms of political governance, it reflected the One-Party leadership and highly centralized system; in terms of economic governance, it echoed the planned economy system; in terms of culture governance, it emulated the highly personal worship. Mao Zedong was the core leader of the first generation of the CPC. China's governance model was most pronounced in political governance, which was an important part of state governance and played a central role in the governance of the whole country.

In Mao Zedong's political discourse, the consolidation and stability of political power was the most important goal of governance. Unifying and pacifying the

¹¹³ From 1953 to the end of 1956, the private ownership of means of production turned to socialist public ownership. The Three Great Remoulding were the socialist transformation of agriculture, capitalist industry and commerce. Also see Mao Zedong. “The Only Road for the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce”. 7 September 1953. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, pp. 112-114. See Mao Zedong. “The relationship Between Agricultural Co-operative Transformation of Agriculture and the Current Class Struggle”. 11 October 1955. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, pp. 212-215. Also see Mao Zedong. “Speed up the Socialist Transformation of Handicrafts”. 5 March 1956. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, pp. 281-283.

¹¹⁴ Liu Zhenjiang. 刘振江。《毛泽东国家治理的思想研究》。武汉：武汉大学。博士毕业论文。2015年，第30页。

¹¹⁵ Oksenberg, Michel. “China's Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-First Century”. *The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang*. Unger, Jonathan and Dittmer, Lowell (eds). Armonk; London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p. 194.

¹¹⁶ Dittmer, Lowell. “Modernizing Chinese Informal Politics”. *The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang*. Unger, Jonathan and Dittmer, Lowell (eds). Armonk; London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002, p. 23.

country after decades of organizational collapse and violence was the pre-eminent necessity. The realization of this goal not only had important significance for people's lives and property but also facilitated the orderly conduct of other national tasks. At the same time, it also reflected belief in the superiority of socialism and demonstrated the Communist Party's ability to govern the state. After the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the governance situation was far from being stable. It did not mean the arrival of domestic or international peace. The governance of China after October 1949 was a strong and direct continuation of the revolutionary and military campaigns, where Mao's practical concept of governance had developed. The domestic situation was complicated. First, the remnant forces of Guomindang and other counter-revolutionary and hostile forces launched counterattacks. The national organizational collapse had created groups of armed bandits, which had to be dealt with. The newly liberated areas had not yet carried out agrarian reform, and the landlord class, as defined by the CPC, had not been overthrown. Finally, the Korean War broke out, concretely showing that the hostility, economic blockade and possibility of military suppression by the emerging capitalist block of countries headed by the United States seriously threatened the security of China's new regime.

Faced with such a complex and dangerous domestic and international environment, Mao Zedong began to consolidate the new people's political power with the primary tasks being to eliminate the remnants of Guomindang and banditry, thus preventing possibilities for counter-revolution. From July 1950 to October 1951, the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries was launched nationwide, which included the counterrevolutionaries hidden in society, among old and new intellectuals, in the military and among Party members.

如果我们优柔寡断，姑息养奸，则将遗祸人民，脱离群众。所谓打得稳，就是要注意策略。打得准，就是不要杀错。打得狠，就是要坚决地杀掉一切应杀的反动分子(不应杀者，当然不杀)。¹¹⁷

If we are weak and irresolute, if we are tolerant and indulgent, it will bring harm to the people and alienate us from the mass. To strike surely means to pay attention to tactics. To strike accurately means to avoid wrong executions. To strike relentlessly means resolutely to kill all such reactionary elements as deserve the death penalty (of course, those who don't will not be executed). So long as we avoid wrong executions, we don't have to worry even if the bourgeoisie raises an outcry.¹¹⁸

The suppression of the counter revolutionary movement, which lasted for more than a year, covered almost all parts of the country, basically eradicating the remaining forces of Guomindang and a number of suspected imperialist spies. Banditry was

¹¹⁷ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第42页。

¹¹⁸ Mao Zedong. "Important Directives Concerning the Movement to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries Drafted for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party". 19 December 1950. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 53.

basically extinguished, which brought unprecedented stability to the social order of the country, strongly supporting the agrarian reform movement and the war of resistance against U.S. aggression in Korea. Agrarian reform was the most thorough and largest reform of the land system in China for thousands of years. The feudal land ownership was completely eliminated, and collective ownership implemented.¹¹⁹ Collective ownership was a concept deliberately created by the state, being subject to the state's political transformation, and it created a "deliberate institutional ambiguity"¹²⁰ of farmers' land ownership. The original purpose of collective ownership of land was to cooperate with state power, to eliminate peasants' land ownership, to break the hostile economic and social units within the state, and to force peasants to wear the tight clothes designed by the state.¹²¹

Amidst all this, the Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid North Korea campaign was carried out. On 25 June 1950, the three-year Korean War broke out. On 15 September, the United Nations Army, which consisted of 15 countries led by the United States, landed in Incheon and expanded the war to the Yalu River on the Chinese border. On 8 October 1950, Mao Zedong made a major historical decision to resist U.S. aggression and aid North Korea and defend the country according to the request by the North Korean government. Mao Zedong issued an order to appoint Peng Dehuai (彭德怀 1898-1974) as the commander and political commissar and decided to send troops to North Korea in the name of the Chinese people's volunteer force to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea.

为了援助朝鲜人民解放战争，反对美国帝国主义及其走狗们的进攻，借以保卫朝鲜人民、中国人民及东方各国人民的利益，着中国人民志愿军迅即向朝鲜境内出动，协同朝鲜同志向侵略者作战并争取光荣的胜利。¹²²

In order to support the Korean people's war of liberation and to resist the attacks of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, thereby safeguarding the interests of the people of Korea, China and all the other countries in the East, I herewith order the Chinese People's Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join the Korean comrades in fighting the aggressors and winning a glorious victory.¹²³

After long negotiations, on 27 July 1953, China, North Korea and the United States finally signed the Korean Armistice Agreement. Chinese and North Korean forces had stood firm against American power, implying the strength of China. Suppression of counter-revolution, agrarian reform, as well as resisting U.S. aggression and aiding

¹¹⁹ Liu Chengshi, 刘承魁。《产权与政治：中国农村土地制度变迁研究》。北京：法律出版社。2012年，第32页。

¹²⁰ Ho, Peter. "Who Owns China's Land? Policies, Property Rights and Deliberate Institutional Ambiguity". *The China Quarterly*. 2001. No.166, June, pp. 387-414.

¹²¹ Chen Yiyuan. 陈益元。《人民公社制度研究述评》，《中共党史研究》。2012年第2期。第31-36页。

¹²² Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《给中国人民志愿军的命令》。1950年10月8日，毛泽东给中国人民志愿军的命令的节录。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第32页。

¹²³ Mao Zedong. "Order to the Chinese People's Volunteers". Experts from an order issued by Comrade Mao Zedong to the Chinese People's Volunteers. 8 October 1950. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 43.

North Korea are known as the three major endeavours in the early days of the founding of New China led by Mao Zedong. This effectively consolidated the new people's democratic dictatorship.

3.2 Counter-revolutionary movement

During this period of Chinese history, the concept of governance has to be read from the practical measures taken to unify and defend the country. Its adversarial aspect, namely the existence of enemies within and without the state, was pronounced. From the founding of New China until the abolition of “counter-revolutionary crime, 反革命犯罪, *fǎngémìng fànzui*” in 1997,¹²⁴ the suppression of counter-revolutionary movement has always existed in the discourse system of the CPC. In terms of the nationwide suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement, there are two main components: the first was the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement during 1950 to 1951, and the second during 1955 to 1957.¹²⁵

3.2.1 Suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement

According to Chinese understanding of history, after the founding of People's Republic of China, Guomindang fled to Taiwan, leaving behind numerous spies, bullies and counter-revolutionaries on the mainland. They tried to subvert the new people's political regime and carried out all kinds of sabotage activities, such as blowing up factories, mines, railways, bridges, burning warehouses, murdering Communist Party cadres and so on.¹²⁶ Especially after the Korean War broke out in June 1950, it was believed that the Third World War was about to break out and Chiang Kaishek was about to attack the mainland. Chiang Kaishek's military orientation was a result of his education: he was a professional soldier¹²⁷ with military experience before he entered into Sun Yat-sen's¹²⁸ service in the early 1920s.¹²⁹ Trampedach claims that: “Chiang's periods of cooperation and breaking

¹²⁴ Wang Min. 王敏。《规范与价值：近代中国刑事法制的转型》。南京：南京师范大学。博士毕业论文。2006年，第151页。Before the amendment of the criminal law of People's Republic of China in 1997, counter-revolution was one of the crimes stipulated in the criminal law. With the stability of political power and social development during the 1990s, the term “revolution” was not in line with the national conditions, so in the criminal law it was replaced with “crime of endangering national security”.

¹²⁵ Shen Yumei. 谌玉梅。《1955年开始的镇反运动的背景与原因分析》，《重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版)》。2013年03月15日。第91-96页。

¹²⁶ Cai Shaoqing (ed.). 蔡少卿主编。《民国时期的土匪》。北京：中国人民大学出版社。1993年，第54-79页。

¹²⁷ Tien Chen-ya. *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern*. Ontario: Mosaic Press. 1992, p. 194.

¹²⁸ Sun Yat-sen. 孙中山 (1866-1925), also known as Sun Wen and Sun Zhongshan, created the political philosophy known as the “Three Principles of the People 三民主义”, meaning nationalism 民族 *mínzú*, democracy 民权 *mínquán* and the people's livelihood 民生 *mínshēng*. He was a revolutionary, influential in the Revolution of 1911. Later, with the help of the CPC, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich; Sun Yat-sen reorganized the Guomindang, adopted the “New Three Principles of the People 新三民主义”, which consisted of an alliance with the Soviets and the Communist Party of China and organizing farmers and workers for cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communists. Xi Jinping. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 265.

¹²⁹ Trampedach, Tim. “Chiang Kaishek between revolution and militarism. 1926/27”. In Leutner, Mechthild;

with the communists may be legitimized as being consistent with Sun Yat-sen's way of thinking."¹³⁰ After the establishment of GMD¹³¹ rule in 1927, the military remained the most important instrument of politics. The same was true for the CPC which after the defeat of 1927 also used the military as the central means of implementing the concept of a communist revolution and considered politics and military force to be inseparably entwined. While Sun Yat-sen had stated: "One cannot help but go to war in order to stop war."¹³² Mao Zedong similarly pronounced: "War can only be abolished through war: in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hand."¹³³

The suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement was a political movement initiated by Mao Zedong to uncover possible counter-revolutionaries in China from July 1950 to October 1951. On 23 July 1950, in accordance with the spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, the Administrative Council and the Supreme People's Court promulgated the instruction on suppressing counter-revolutionary activities, and the movement began. On 10 October 1950, the CPC Central Committee, in response to the perceived rightist tendency, made the *Instruction on correcting the rightist tendency in the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement*, 《关于纠正镇压反革命活动中的右倾偏向的指示》, *guānyú jiūzhèng zhènyā fǎngémìng huódòng zhōng de yòuqīng piānxiàng de zhīshì*.¹³⁴ Party committees at all levels were required to correct their preference for leniency of counter-revolutionaries. In October 1951, the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement came to an end. It basically eliminated the remaining forces left by Guomindang on the mainland, as well as banditry that had been rampant for a while, including the bandits in west Hunan and Guangxi that the previous Chinese governments had failed to eradicate, and the underworld forces in many cities. Since the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement focused on killing local bullies and punishing those who had harmed the people, striking down the evil forces, mobilizing the activists in the society and forming joint defence and residents' public security groups, it strengthened the public security forces in the society and reduced the incidence of criminal cases.¹³⁵ This made China's social order obtain unprecedented stability, which supported the agrarian reform allowing China both to resist U.S. aggression and aid North Korea.

On 8 October 1950, the CPC Central Committee officially decided to send troops to North Korea. Two days later on 10 October Mao Zedong adopted the "Instruction on correcting the rightist tendency in the suppression of the counter-revolutionary

Felber, Roland; Titarenko, M. L. and Grigoriev, A.M (eds). *The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster*. London and New York: Routledge. 2002, pp. 125-138.

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 133.

¹³¹ GMD: Guomindang, Kuomintang of China, Chinese Nationalist Party.

¹³² Tien Chen-ya. *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern*. Ontario: Mosaic Press. 1992, p. 143.

¹³³ Trampedach, Tim. "Chiang Kaishek between revolution and militarism. 1926/27". In Leutner, Mechthild; Felber, Roland; Titarenko, M. L. and Grigoriev, A.M (eds). *The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster*. London and New York: Routledge. 2002, pp. 125-138.

¹³⁴ Yang Kuisong. 杨奎松。《新中国镇压反革命运动研究》，《史学月刊》。2006年1月，第52-56页。

¹³⁵ Ibid.

movement”.¹³⁶ This implied that he was ready to fight simultaneously on two fronts, though perhaps the enemies on the domestic front were no longer very strong. The key reason was not that the enemy situation was suddenly more severe than before, or even that to resist foreign aggression the enemy within the country must first be eliminated. For Mao Zedong, the suppression of counter-revolution was one of the major steps that the Party had decided to launch after the establishment of its government. The only consideration was the suitable time to launch it. In this regard, Mao Zedong had a clear explanation to the Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing¹³⁷ (罗瑞卿 1906-1978). Mao Zedong said:

Why couldn't we suppress the counter-revolution before? Because the timing was not mature, our financial and economic problems had not been resolved, and the relationship with the bourgeoisie was still relatively tense. It would not be appropriate if we put forward a lot of suppression of the counter-revolution at that time. Now that the situation was different, the financial and economic problems had been basically solved, and the war of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea had started. Therefore, don't waste this opportunity. It was the only time to suppress counter-revolution, and there would be no more. We should make good use of this opportunity, not only to kill several counter-revolutionaries, but also to arouse the masses to action.¹³⁸

Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇 1898-1969) accepted that the key reason for the suppressing counter-revolutionary movement lay in the war on the Korean Peninsula, because the war psychology made many things easier, such as the agrarian reform, patriotic conventions, production competitions, and counter-revolution suppression.

因为抗美援朝的锣鼓响起来，响得很厉害，土改的锣鼓、镇反的锣鼓就不大听见了，就好搞了。¹³⁹

Because the gongs and drums of the resist U.S. war and aid Korea started to sound very loud, the gongs and drums of land reform and counter-revolution were not heard much, and they were easy to carry out.¹⁴⁰

Obviously, based on the experience of the revolution in the past, Mao Zedong understood that such a large-scale crackdown would not only have a strong deterrent to the old forces against the Communist Party but also played a role in political education for the grassroots people and greatly established the political authority of

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Source: *People's daily*. Founded on 1 January 1997, is a large-scale online information interaction platform based on news built by people's daily, one of the top ten newspapers in the world. It is also one of the largest comprehensive network media on the Internet. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/83461/83465/index.html>

¹³⁸ *Report of Comrade Luo Ruiqing at the first national publicity conference*, 19 May 1951.

¹³⁹ 《刘少奇在第一次全国宣传工作会议上的报告》，1951年5月7日。

¹⁴⁰ Liu Shaoqi's report on the first national publicity conference, 7 May 1951. Edited by Party History Association of the Communist Party of China. 中国中共党史学会编。《中国共产党历史系列辞典》。北京：中共党史出版社，2019年，第267页。

the new regime. This was particularly important for the communists who had just gained national power.

对待反革命分子的办法是：杀、关、管、放。杀，大家都知道是什么一回事。关，就是关起来劳动改造。管，就是放在社会上由群众监督改造。放，就是可捉可不捉的一般不捉，或者捉起来以后表现好的，把他放掉。按照不同情况，给反革命分子不同的处理，是必要的。¹⁴¹

Counter-revolutionaries may be dealt with in these ways: execution, imprisonment, supervision and leaving at large. Execution—everybody knows what that means. By imprisonment we mean putting counter-revolutionaries in jail and reforming them through labour. By supervision we mean leaving them in society to be reformed under the supervision of the masses. By leaving at large we mean that generally no arrest is made in those cases where it is marginal whether to make an arrest, or that those arrested are set free for good behaviour. It is essential that different counter-revolutionaries should be dealt with differently on the merits of each case.¹⁴²

As Strauss argues the main purpose to suppress counterrevolutionaries was “the expansion and strengthening of bureaucratic state power under CPC control”.¹⁴³ However, the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement undoubtedly expanded too much. As a result of the vigorous suppression of the counter-revolution, a large number of people were executed, put in jail and reformed through labour, which greatly broke through the original assumptions and plans. An extremely serious consequence was that a large number of participants in historical Guomindang uprisings were considered as counter-revolutionaries. During the just-ended war between Guomindang and the Communist Party in the 1940s, the Communist Party largely used the preferential policy of no blame for the past for Guomindang uprising and the defectors, which destroyed the fighting capacity of millions of Guomindang troops. However, in the process of suppressing the counter-revolutionary movement, a lot of people who once committed to Guomindang uprisings were arrested and killed, which brought social unrest and distrust of the government.¹⁴⁴

By the middle of 1951, an extreme upsurge of more arrests and more killings characterized the campaign. In addition, the grassroots leaders did not strictly command the situation in some areas. Local cadres were controlled by the masses and practicalities were handed over to the masses, which led to some people taking the opportunity to revenge personal grievances in the name of the public, which caused false accusations.¹⁴⁵ Abandoning specific legal standards and relying solely on the

¹⁴¹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第280页。

¹⁴² Mao Zedong. “On the Ten Major Relationships: the Relationship Between Revolution and Counter-revolution”. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 298.

¹⁴³ Strauss, Julia. C. 2002. “Paternalist terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in The People’s Republic of China, 1950-1953”. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 44, (1): pp. 92-97.

¹⁴⁴ Yang Kuisong. 杨奎松。《新中国镇压反革命运动研究》，《史学月刊》。2006年1月，第52-56页。

¹⁴⁵ Yang Kuisong. 杨奎松。《新中国镇反运动始末(下)》，《江淮文史》。2011年3月，第46-53页。

subjective thinking of cadres at all levels to judge who were the counter-revolutionaries was to some extent overly severe. To complete the task of suppressing the counter-revolution, many people who were considered as counter-revolutionaries without even having committed specific crimes, were killed hastily only because they were considered to belong to that category. These activities caused a long-term adverse impact on China's legal system construction.¹⁴⁶

The phenomenon of uncontrolled execution of criminals nationwide cannot be separated from Mao Zedong's decision and promotion of the policy. Because the Party and government were not separated, the organizational structure was highly centralized from top to bottom, forming a pyramid-type cadre appointment and supervision system. Tasks to be carried through and indicators for evaluating the activity proposed by Mao Zedong were inevitably distributed from the top to bottom at all levels. It was necessary for cadres at all levels to show their abilities and achievements by striving to complete the tasks put forward by the leaders at the higher level. In addition, many local cadres who only recently had been revolutionary soldiers attached great importance to promptly completing tasks and were used to using force to eliminate obstacles. As Mao Zedong himself was accustomed to using figures to quantify his task and policy requirements, cadres at all levels were particularly enthusiastic about completing or even overfulfilling the numerical indicators assigned by their superiors. In the later period of the anti-rightist movement, various units in various regions allocated the number of rightists to be dealt with, and during the Great Leap Forward period cadres were prone to over-report the quantity of grain and steel production. As a continuum of that practice, many local cadres still use inflated figures as their promotion capital. This method of assessing cadres' achievements by figures has a long history. To a large extent, the increasing number of criminals executed was closely related to the mentality of local cadres who were eager to show their achievements to their superiors.¹⁴⁷

According to the requirements of the *Instruction on correcting the rightist tendency in the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement*, 《关于纠正镇压反革命活动中的右倾偏向的指示》, *guānyú jiūzhèng zhènyā fǎngémìng huódòng zhōng de yòuqīng piānxiàng de zhǐshì*, the increasing number of executions caused concern at the CPC Central Committee. This is because in the history of the CPC, such expansion of the anti-revolutionary activities had happened earlier.¹⁴⁸ In 1947, during northern China's agrarian reform and 1949 after the founding of People's Republic of China, there had been the phenomenon of arbitrary killings in some places. Therefore, Liu Shaoqi began to deploy moderate cooling into the situation. Liu Shaoqi believed that there was a limit to the suppression of counter-revolution in the large scale. Special attention should be paid to control and discretion, not only in propaganda but also in the killings.

After the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement, the public security

¹⁴⁶ Yang Kuisong. 杨奎松。《新中国镇压反革命运动研究》，《史学月刊》。2006年1月，第52-56页。

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

situation in China greatly improved. Mao was satisfied.

为了正确地估计中国的肃反工作，我们不妨看一看匈牙利事件对我们国家的影响。匈牙利事件发生以后，在中国一部分知识分子中有些动荡，但是没有引起什么风浪。这是什么原因呢？应该说原因之一，就是我们相当彻底地肃清了反革命。¹⁴⁹

To form a correct evaluation of our work in eliminating counter-revolutionaries, let us see what repercussions the Hungarian incident has had in China. After its occurrence there was some unrest among a section of our intellectuals, but there were no squalls. Why? One reason, it must be said, was our success in eliminating counter-revolutionaries thoroughly.¹⁵⁰

The suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement was carried out on a large scale throughout the country, which inevitably gave Guomindang's possible latent forces a devastating blow. At the same time, the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement achieved Mao Zedong's goal of mobilizing the masses. Through extensive publicity and various forms of assembly mobilization, not only was the people's political power consolidated, but also the support and trust of the masses to the people's political power was greatly enhanced, thus providing for the leadership a guarantee of stable political power and a broad mass basis for the upcoming large-scale socialist construction. The authority of the Communist Party and the new government was firmly established.

In short, the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement, although it existed only for a short time, stabilized the social environment and promoted production, restored the economy, supported and ensured the smooth progress of agrarian reform and the war to resist U.S. aggression in Korea. It created a stable social environment for China's large-scale socialist economic construction in the future. It not only improved China's financial and economic situation, but also ensured the full implementation and completion of China's first five-year plan.¹⁵¹ Simultaneously, considering the development of the Chinese concept of governance, policy initiatives commenced at the top and carried through the whole society, partly as a bureaucratic-military operation and partly as a mass movement, also proved themselves as a viable and efficient form of governing the country during the subsequent existence of the socialist republic.

¹⁴⁹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第376页。

¹⁵⁰ Mao Zedong. "On the Correction Handling of Contradictions Among the People". Speech at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference. Comrade Mao Zedong checked the verbatim record and made additions before its publication in the *People's Daily* on 19 June 1957. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 396.

¹⁵¹ Yang Kuisong. 杨奎松。《新中国巩固城市政权的最初尝试:以上海镇反运动为中心的历史考察》，《华东师范大学学报》。2004年第9期，第16-21页。

3.2.2 Eliminate the counter-revolutionary movement

On the basis of the decisive victory in suppressing the counter-revolutionary movement, the CPC Central Committee decided to digest and consolidate the achievements from the second half of 1952 to the end of 1953. This meant, first, organizing large-scale reform of criminals through labour; second, organizing grass-roots security and protection committees; third, strengthening the education and transformation of economically idle personnel.¹⁵² Through these three steps, China formed a unique public security system based on the grassroots masses, which has continued to the present. As an important practice of the people's democratic dictatorship, the suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement promoted the construction of the state machinery of the new people's political power, on the basis of which were formulated initial laws and regulations to guarantee the implementation of the dictatorship.

After the first suppression of the counter-revolutionary movement, the Central Committee of the CPC began to turn towards a conventional stage of struggle.¹⁵³ As for counter-revolutionary activities, the general understanding of the CPC Central Committee at that time was that the struggle to eliminate counter-revolutionary sabotage was long-term and arduous, which could not be completed by suppressing the counter-revolutionary movement at one time. A high degree of revolutionary vigilance should be maintained at any time. However, with the emergence of events such as criticism of Hu Feng's literature and art counter-revolutionary proposal, Mao Zedong's opinion sharpened also in the art field. To Mao, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie were two opposing classes that maintained fundamentally different interests. Their conflict was irreconcilable; therefore, the ideological struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie would never end. For an artist or a writer, class status and consciousness would not change unless the artist remoulded his or her thinking and feelings to align with the workers and peasants.¹⁵⁴

In the specific context of Chinese revolution, Mao Zedong varied his discourse according to the changing situations in Chinese politics. As far as the continuity of Mao Zedong's discourse is concerned, there are also inevitable ideological fractures. The occurrence of Hu Feng event had an important effect on Mao Zedong and the CPC Central Committee's estimation on the situation of class struggle in China. Mao Zedong identified Hu Feng and some people acquainted with him as Hu Feng's anti-Party group:

这个反革命派别和地下王国，是以推翻中华人民共和国和恢复帝国主义国民党的统治为任务的。¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Yang Kuisong. 杨奎松。《新中国镇反运动始末(上)》，《江淮文史》。2011年1月1日，第19-24页。

¹⁵³ Shen Yumei. 谌玉梅。《1955年开始的镇反运动的背景与原因分析》，《重庆科技学院学报(社会科学版)》。2013年03月15日。第91-96页。

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 107.

¹⁵⁵ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《关于胡风反革命集团的材料》的按语（选辑）。1955年五月、六月。《毛泽东选

This counter-revolutionary faction, this underground kingdom, has set itself the task of overthrowing People's Republic of China and restoring imperialist and Guomindang rule.¹⁵⁶

Mao Zedong called on the people to unite and suppress these resistance forces. As a result of this series of events and influenced by Stalin's view that the deeper the socialist revolution goes the sharper the class struggle becomes, the CPC Central Committee intensified class struggle in China. In the history of the international communist movement, in the 1930s, Stalin held that in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the trend of class struggle was becoming more and more acute. He maintained that because of the victory of the proletariat, the exploiting class was closer to death and thus more desperate to resist. As a result, the class struggle becomes more and more acute.¹⁵⁷ In the mid-1950s, when summarizing the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the CPC publicly disagreed with Stalin's view that class struggle should be emphasized after the elimination of the exploiting class.¹⁵⁸ However, also in China the process went towards increasing levels of repression against dissenting voices. From 1957 onwards all the way to the Cultural Revolution, class struggle, from the society in general to the internal organs of the state and the Party, from the masses to the cadres, went deeper, wider and more acute. During the Cultural Revolution, it was unexpectedly proposed that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, a political revolution should be carried out in which one class overthrows the other, and this revolution must be carried out many times, otherwise the restoration of capitalism will be possible at any time, forming the so-called theory of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. It had serious consequences in China, similar to those Stalin had in the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹

During the Cultural Revolution, the rhetoric of class struggle destroyed traditional Chinese relationship values. Mao used it as "a rhetorical strategy for accomplishing his revolutionary goals".¹⁶⁰

我们的肃清反革命工作，成绩是主要的，但是也有错误。过火的，漏掉的，都有。我们的方针是：有反必肃，有错必纠。我们在肃反工作中的路线是群众肃反的路线。采取了群众路线，工作中当然也会发生毛病，但是毛病会比较少一些，错误会比较容易纠正些。群众在斗争中得到了经验。做得

集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第163页。

¹⁵⁶ Mao Zedong. "Preface and Editor's Notes to Material on The Counter-revolutionary Hu Feng Clique". May and June 1955. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 179.

¹⁵⁷ Stalin, Iosif. *Collected Works of Stalin*. Vol. 12. 《斯大林选集》第12卷。Chinese Version. 北京：人民出版社。1956年，第32-35页。

¹⁵⁸ 《关于无产阶级专政的历史经验》，1956年4月5日，《人民日报》。 *People's Daily*. This is one of several paragraphs added by Mao Zedong when reviewing the article "historical experience of proletarian dictatorship" by the editorial department of the *People's Daily*.

¹⁵⁹ Shen Yumei. 谌玉梅。《1955年镇反运动的历史进程分析》，《河北青年干部管理学院学报》。2016年3月第4期，第85-87页。

¹⁶⁰ Lu Xing. *The Rhetoric of Mao Zedong: Transforming China and Its People*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. 2017, p. 95.

正确，得到了做得正确的经验。犯了错误，也得了犯错误的经验。¹⁶¹

In our work of eliminating counterrevolutionaries successes were the main thing, but there were also mistakes. In some cases, there were excesses and in others counter-revolutionaries slipped through our net. Our policy is: counter-revolutionaries must be eliminated wherever found, mistakes must be corrected whenever discovered. Our line in the work of eliminating counter-revolutionaries is the mass line. Of course, even with the mass line mistakes may still occur, but they will be fewer and easier to correct. The masses gain experience through struggle. From the things done correctly they gain the experience of how mistakes are made.¹⁶²

Despite the Party's "mass-line" policy, the absence of effective popular oversight produced many pathologies characteristic of China's state-socialist regime. The CPC leadership had long been aware of the unwholesome problems associated with the process of socialist state formation. The consolidation and expansion of Party and state bureaucracies, as Deng Xiaoping—then the CPC's general secretary—pointed out in several reports in the mid-1950s, had created numerous problems, such as bureaucratism, authoritarianism, conceit and complacency.¹⁶³

On the whole, this vigorous eliminating of the counter-revolutionaries greatly deterred all kinds of hostile forces in the society and improved the prestige of the new regime, a process that had an historical rationality. However, there were inevitably shortcomings in this process. Due to the overestimation of the number of counter-revolutionaries and the lack of clear and specific policy boundaries, there were deviations in some places and measures overdone for the struggle. The battle was fought against people who, despite perhaps having ideological shortcomings, having made mistakes or harboured reactionary ideas, were not able to fight. Good people were arrested by mistake. A number of security personnel, under the political pressure from public security organs, committed illegal acts of extorting confessions by torture. This movement once again applied the practically proved successful governance method of class struggle, mass movement and waging revolutionary war. In Mao's view, as long as classes existed in society, and were formed anew, the class struggle never ended. The class enemy—the bourgeois class, including the petite bourgeoisie—would take over the power they had lost and would exploit the proletarian class. To Mao, class struggle was the law of society and history.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第377页。

¹⁶² Mao Zedong. "On the correct handling of contradictions among the people". 27 February 1957. Speech at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 397.

¹⁶³ Wu Yiching. *The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2014, p. 29.

¹⁶⁴ Lu Xing. *The Rhetoric of Mao Zedong: Transforming China and Its People*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. 2017, p. 105.

3.3 Agrarian reform

Throughout the period, much of Mao's thought of governance meant the invention and reinterpretation of a large number of social concepts with which to practically carry out revolutionary policies at the grass-roots level. One important example is the conceptual problems the communists encounter when dealing with land reform. In old China, the land system was very unreasonable. The peasants accounted for more than approximately 80% of the country's population, but only about 25% of the country's land was owned by them. The remaining 75% of the land was owned by feudal landlords.¹⁶⁵ This feudal land system for a long period seriously hindered the development of urban and rural economy in the Chinese society. Mao Zedong opined that the important mass basis for the existence of the red regime were the peasants, who were oppressed by the landlords and capitalists and had the desire for revolution. Under the influence of the revolution, many peasants had class consciousness. Mao Zedong, who was born among the peasants, was very clear about this. Therefore, he attached great importance to the peasants and advocated launching them to participate in the revolution:

因为半殖民地中国的革命，只有农民斗争得不到工人的领导而失败，没有农民斗争的发展超过工人的势力而不利于革命本身的。¹⁶⁶

For in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers.¹⁶⁷

Mao Zedong relied on the peasants to do the mass work, so that the revolutionary base areas were constantly consolidated and expanded, and this proved to be an efficient way for the Communist Party of China to encircle the cities from the countryside and seize power by armed forces. Therefore, as peasants were the basis of the agrarian economy that had lasted for millennia, the problem of peasants was the fundamental problem of the Chinese revolution, and the core of the problem of peasants was the land issue. Whether the land problem could be solved correctly depended on whether a correct land revolution policy could be formulated and implemented. With the development of the revolution, it was inevitable to tackle feudal land ownership. Only through achieving the nationalization of rural land was the way out for Chinese peasants. The agrarian reform in Mao Zedong period can be divided into three stages: the stage of the nationalist War of Resistance Against Japan, the stage of the people's Liberation War, and the stage of the consolidation of political power after the

¹⁶⁵ Jiang Haixi, Jiang Ying. 蒋海曦, 蒋瑛。《毛泽东在中国土地革命时期的经济学贡献》，《政治经济学评论》。2014年3期。第17-27页。

¹⁶⁶ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《星星之火，可以燎原》。《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第99页。

¹⁶⁷ Mao Zedong. "A Single Spark Can Start A Prairie Fire". 5 January 1930. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 123.

founding of New China.¹⁶⁸

3.3.1 The stage of the nationalist War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression

On 10 February 1937, the CPC Central Committee made a call to the Third Plenary Session of the Chinese Guomindang and put forward the request to stop all civil wars, concentrating national strength towards resisting Japanese.¹⁶⁹

由于中日矛盾成为主要的矛盾、国内矛盾降到次要和服从的地位、而产生的国际关系和国内阶级关系的变化，形成了目前形势的新的发展阶段。¹⁷⁰
As the contradiction between China and Japan has become the principal one and China's internal contradictions have dropped into a secondary and subordinate place, changes have occurred in China's international relations and internal class relations, giving rise to a new stage of development in the current situation.¹⁷¹

At this stage, the ethnic contradiction between China and Japan became the main contradiction. The call concluded with approval of the emphasis on the War of Resistance Against Japan. This included implementing a land policy of landlords reducing rent and interest rates for peasants. This helped to alleviate economic hardships during the War of Resistance Against Japan.¹⁷²

The communists also experimented with land reform including distributing of land from large landowners to poor peasants. However, this was not conceptually easy. The method of class analysis was Mao Zedong's basic implement to analyse the rural social and economic conditions in old China. In 1926 he wrote:

我们要分辨真正的敌友，不可不将中国社会各界及的经济地位及其对于革命的态度，做一个大概分析。¹⁷³

To distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their

¹⁶⁸ Li Peng. 李朋。《中国共产党局部执政时期进行利益整合的历史考察》，《宁夏党校学报》。2012年1月10日，第9-12页。

¹⁶⁹ The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression refers to a war against Japan's invasion that lasted from the September Eighteenth Incident in 1931 until September 1945. Through the advocacy of the Communist Party of China, the war was waged under the banner of the Chinese united front against Japanese aggression, and involved KMT-CPC cooperation. It was an important battlefield during World War II. The war meant the first victory achieved by the Chinese people against foreign aggression since the Opium Wars in the mid-19th century. It also made a significant contribution to overall victory in World War II (known in China as the World Anti-Fascist War). Xi Jinping. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 276.

¹⁷⁰ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《中国共产党在抗日时期的任务》，1937年5月3日，《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第232页。

¹⁷¹ Mao Zedong. "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan". 3 May 1937. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p. 263.

¹⁷² Liu Geng. 刘耕。《解放战争时期土地改革的作用分析》，《才智》。2019年4月25日，第27-32页。

¹⁷³ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《中国社会各阶级的分析》，1926年3月，《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第3页。

respective attitudes towards the revolution.¹⁷⁴

Mao Zedong thought that the relationship of land ownership in old China's rural areas rather directly determined the class relationship. The landlords were against the revolution, and the main forces of the revolution were the poor peasants, the farm labourers and the middle peasants. The main conceptual problem was determining the dividing line between the classes. In terms of the Chinese class theory, the bourgeoisie in the countryside, meaning the rich peasants, had two characteristics. They were the revolutionary characteristic against feudal exploitation and the characteristic of feudal exploitation itself. This category implied a weaker revolutionary character than the poor peasant and the middle peasant, while it also meant a less exploitative character than the actual landlord. This feature determined the complexity of making the policy to rich peasant, that was, neither blindly fighting nor blindly uniting, but a combination of both. If the struggling character was too emphasized, the rich peasant would be overstretched, which would not only impact the middle peasants but also cause the rich peasant to move toward the side of the feudal landlord, thus damaging the unity of the rural revolutionary base. However, if unity of all peasants was too strongly emphasized, there would be a compromise on the rich peasant, which would hamper the revolutionary enthusiasm of poor peasant and middle peasant. Therefore, the CPC gradually realized the importance of solving the problem of rich peasants, Mao Zedong explored the issue of rich peasants in a report to the Central Committee of the CPC on 25 November 1928, when he was one of the regional commanders in Hunan:

向自耕农让步问题：尚未详细讨论。此间仍按照中央办法执行。但此问题，仍当讨论，候得结论再作报告。¹⁷⁵

The question of concessions to the owner-peasants, this has not yet been discussed in detail. Land distribution here is still being carried out in the way laid down by the Central Committee. But this question deserves further discussion, and a report will be submitted when conclusions are reached.¹⁷⁶

Mao thus was considering the problem. He himself came from a rich peasant family.¹⁷⁷ His understanding of the problem of rich peasants was still at an indecisive level, and he had not put forward methods to solve the problem.

In mid-January 1935, the historic “Zunyi Conference, 遵义会议, *Zūnyì huìyì*” was held and Mao Zedong returned to the leadership position of the CPC Central Committee. This was an important turning point in the agrarian reform. At that time,

¹⁷⁴ Mao Zedong. “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society”. March 1926. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p. 13.

¹⁷⁵ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《井冈山的斗争》，《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第70页。

¹⁷⁶ Mao Zedong. “The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains”. 25 November 1928. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. 1977. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p. 90.

¹⁷⁷ 《毛泽东年谱（1893-1949）》上卷。北京：中共中央文献研究室编。1993年，第19页。

the ethnic feature between China and Japan was very sharp and gradually rose to the main contradiction of the Chinese revolution. The rich peasant was already part of the War of Resistance Against Japan united front. According to the changing of the revolutionary situation, Mao Zedong believed that the rich peasants had the possibility of participating in the revolution, at least they would remain neutral. Under the impetus of Mao Zedong, on 15 December 1935, the Central Committee of the CPC promulgated “the Decision on Changing the Strategy for the Rich Peasant”,¹⁷⁸ so that the rich peasants had the right to share the same land as the poor peasant, no additional special donations and taxes were placed on them, and the existence of rich peasant economy was allowed.

依靠贫农、雇农，联合中农，限制富农，保护中小工商业者，消灭地主阶级，变封建半封建土地所有制为农民的土地所有制。¹⁷⁹

Relying on the poor peasant, farm labourer, uniting the middle peasant, restricting the rich peasant, protecting the small and medium-sized industrial and commercial workers, eliminating the landlord class, changing the feudal and semi-feudal system of land ownership into that of peasants.¹⁸⁰

This policy was an important conceptual basis for solving the land problem in the liberated areas during the War of Resistance Against Japan and the liberation war. However, the relatively clear conceptual division was difficult to maintain in practical situations. Some people put the rich middle peasants in the category of rich peasant, some people put the middle peasant in the category of landlord or rich peasant, and even treated the poor peasant who owned some property as landlord or rich peasant. Over time, with the Long March of the main “Red Army, 红军, *hóngjūn*” and the loss of the rural revolutionary bases, the results of the agrarian reform were difficult to consolidate. When Guomindang occupied and ruled the Red Army’s base areas, the landlords and gentry regained their power. The peasants once again lost the land they depended on to survive and had to endure the political oppression and economic exploitation of the landlord. From this point of view, the agrarian reform was a process in constant turmoil.¹⁸¹ However, this was eminently a deep learning process,

¹⁷⁸ Mao Zedong. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. 1977. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 137-139.

¹⁷⁹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第113-115页。

¹⁸⁰ The division of the various classes of rural society in the Chinese Communist Party theory was preliminarily formed during the National Revolution. Mao Zedong’s “Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society” in March 1926 concentrated on the level of understanding of the Chinese Communist Party at that time. (1) The landlord. A landlord is a person who owns land, does not engage in labour himself, or does only to a very small extent, and lives by exploiting the peasants. (2) The rich peasant. The rich peasant as a rule owns land. But some rich peasants own only part of their land and rent the remainder. Others have no land of their own at all and rent all their land. (3) The middle peasant. A middle peasant derives his income wholly or mainly from his own labour. As a rule he does not exploit others and in many cases he himself is exploited by others, having to pay land rent and interest in loans. (4) The poor peasant. Among the poor peasants some own part of their land and have a few odd farm implements, others own no land at all but may own a few odd farm implements. (5) The worker (including the farm labourer) as a rule owns no land or farm implements, though some do own a very small amount of land and very few farm implements. This is the crux of Mao’s division of agrarian classes in *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. 1977. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 137-139.

¹⁸¹ Wang Lingjin. 王令金。《试评土地革命的成与败》，《山东教育学院学报》。2010年2月1日，第14-19页。

as Mao wrote in July 1937:

根据于一定的思想理论、计划、方案以从事于变革客观现实的实践，一次又一次地向前，人们对于客观现实的认识也就一次又一次地深化。¹⁸²

As man's practice which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper.¹⁸³

Concepts and thought forms of governance were not settled and their development, like that of the Chinese revolution, was proceeding.

3.3.2 The stage of the people's Liberation War

The contradiction between the CPC led forces and Guomindang rose to the main contradiction after Japan was defeated. The stage of the people's liberation war was from August 1945 to September 1949. In 1947, the CPC held a national land conference, decided to carry out agrarian reform in the liberated areas, and formulated *The Outline of China's Land Law*, 《中国土地法大纲》, *zhōngguó tǔdì fǎ dàgāng*. The problem of defining classes and interpreting differences between categories were often present in Mao's discourse. As Mahoney figures: "Mao Zedong's observations of the peasant movement in Hunan in 1927, where Mao essentially detailed the capacity of the peasantry to function and meet their own governance and government needs"¹⁸⁴ were essential here. Mao Zedong wrote many articles devoted to the problem, such as "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, Production is Also Possible in the Guerrilla Zones",¹⁸⁵ "Rent Reduction and Production Are Two Important Matters for the Defence of the Liberated Areas",¹⁸⁶ "Different Tactics for Carrying Out the Land Law in Different Areas",¹⁸⁷ "Correct the 'Left' Errors in Agrarian Reform Propaganda",¹⁸⁸ "Essential Points in Agrarian Reform in the New Liberated Areas",¹⁸⁹ "The Work of Agrarian Reform and of Party Consolidation in 1948", and

¹⁸² Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《实践论：论认识和实践的关系》，1937年7月，《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第272页。

¹⁸³ Mao Zedong. "On Practice: On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing". July 1937. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 307.

¹⁸⁴ Mahoney, Josef Gregory. "The Development of Chinese Governance". *State-society Relations and Governance in China*. In Guo Sujian (ed.). Lanham, MA; London: Lexington Books, 2014, p. 131.

¹⁸⁵ Mao Zedong. "Production is Also Possible in the Guerrilla Zones". 31 January 1945. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume III. 1975. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p. 197.

¹⁸⁶ Mao Zedong. "Rent Reduction and Production Are Two Important Matters for the Defence of the Liberated Areas". 7 November 1945. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 71.

¹⁸⁷ Mao Zedong. "Different Tactics for Carrying Out the Land Law in Different Areas". 3 February 1948. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 193.

¹⁸⁸ Mao Zedong. "Correct the 'left' Errors in Agrarian reform Propaganda". Essential Points in Agrarian reform in the New Liberated Areas. 15 February 1948. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 197.

¹⁸⁹ Mao Zedong. "Correct the 'left' Errors in Agrarian reform Propaganda". Essential Points in Agrarian reform in the New Liberated Areas. 15 February 1948. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign

so on.¹⁹⁰ However, there was no actual change in basic concepts in these works. During this period, the main problem rather became administrative. In January 1948 Mao wrote about the administrative interpretative problems in land reform:

土地改革在群众尚未认真发动和尚未展开斗争的地方，必须反对右倾；在群众已经认真发动和已经展开斗争的地方，必须防止“左”倾。¹⁹¹

In agrarian reform, Right deviations must be combated where the masses have not yet been aroused in earnest and the struggle has not yet unfolded, and Left deviations must be guarded against where the masses have been aroused in earnest and the struggle has already unfolded.¹⁹²

The agrarian reform movement basically eliminated the feudal land system and changed the old production relations in the countryside.¹⁹³ Such an earth-shaking change had far-reaching effects in the life of hundreds of millions of peasants politically and economically. Peasants participated in the war on large scale on the Communist side, shouldered huge war services, and supported the army with food, grass, clothing and other materials. The agrarian reform movement provided a steady stream of human and material resources to win the national victory.

3.3.3 The stage of struggle to consolidate power after the founding of New China

In June 1950, the Central People's Government promulgated *The Agrarian reform Law of People's Republic of China*, 《中华人民共和国土地改革法》, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó tǔdì gǎigé fǎ*. On 10 October of the same year the Central Committee of the CPC announced the policy to abolish feudal land ownership and implement the land ownership of the peasantry throughout China. The differences between this stage and the former stages were three. First, the scope was wider. In the past, reform was carried out in the base areas or liberated areas. This time, it was carried out in the whole country, including ethnic minority areas. Second, there was a change in the goal of reform. In the past, it was to win the victory of the revolution by making allies of the peasants. This time, it was to liberate the productive forces in the countryside and open up the way for the industrialization of New China. Third, new policies were adopted for the rich peasants by Mao:

在今年冬天开始的南方几省及西北某些地区的土地改革运动中，不但不
动资本主义富农，而且不动半封建富农。¹⁹⁴

Languages Press. 1975, p. 201.

¹⁹⁰ Mao Zedong. "The Work of Agrarian reform and of Party Consolidation in 1948". 25 May 1948. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 253.

¹⁹¹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《关于目前党的政策中的几个重要问题》，1948年1月18日，《毛泽东选集》第四卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第1211页。

¹⁹² Mao Zedong. "On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy". 18 January 1948. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 181.

¹⁹³ Ou Rui, Zhang Bo. 欧瑞, 张波。《论解放战争时期中共土地政策的变化及其原因》，《延安党校学报》。2012年12月20日，第14-17页。

¹⁹⁴ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《征询对待富农策略问题的意见》，1950年3月12日，《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北

The tactics in question are to leave untouched not only the capitalist rich peasants but also the semi-feudal ones in the agrarian reform scheduled for this winter in southern provinces and some regions in the northwest and to defer the solution of the problem of the semi-feudal rich peasant for several years.¹⁹⁵

In the past in many locations, it had often been expedient to crack down on or restrict the rich peasants. This time, the policy of economic preservation and political neutrality was adopted, which reduced the resistance in the process of product development and provided a stable guarantee for economic recovery and construction. The agrarian reform at this stage had a far-reaching impact. By September 1952, except for the Xinjiang national minority autonomous region, Tibet national minority autonomous region and other minority areas, as well as Taiwan Province, which was not controlled by the CPC government, agrarian reform had been carried out throughout the whole country. It established the rural land system of the integration of peasants' family land ownership and management rights, and the main position of peasants' fair possession of land was initially shaped. The agrarian reform improved the basic conditions for the peasants who had lacked land by giving them land ownership and various land rights and interests.¹⁹⁶ The peasants became the main body of production and management of the land, promoting their active and creative role, and initially brought about tremendous institutional performance.¹⁹⁷ At that time, the co-operative transformation of agriculture was not only a way to effectively mobilize and organize peasants, develop agriculture and recover national economy as soon as possible, but it also laid a foundation for the later transition to a higher level of agricultural cooperation and even the people's commune. This is where Mao turned, taking the agrarian reform process to a completely new direction. Indicating people's communes, he wrote:

这是在一切已经完成了土地改革的地区都要解释和实行的，请你们当作一件大事去做。¹⁹⁸

This is to be done in all areas where the agrarian reform has been completed, and please take it as a major task.¹⁹⁹

The basic idea of the people's communes was to increase efficiency and well-being.

京：人民出版社。1977年，第13页。

¹⁹⁵ Mao Zedong. "Request for Opinions on the Tactics for Dealing with Rich Peasants". 12 March 1950. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 24.

¹⁹⁶ Xia Xuehua, Tan Mingjun. 夏雪花，谭明军。《关系资本财务：一个新的理论探讨》，《财经科学》。2010年12月1日，第96-101页。

¹⁹⁷ Li Zhengtu. 李正图。《论毛泽东土地制度和土地革命思想对当代中国发展的战略价值》，《上海经济研究》。2011年8月15日，第29-34页。

¹⁹⁸ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《把农业互助合作当作一件大事去做》，1951年12月15日，《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第59页。

¹⁹⁹ Mao Zedong. "Take Mutual Aid and Co-operation in Agriculture as a Major Task". 15 December 1951. Inner-Party circular to rebuff Liu Shao-chi's opposition to the co-operative transformations of agriculture. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 71.

Through mutual assistance and production cooperation among peasants, the agricultural production efficiency was to be improved and the income of peasants was to be increased. It was supposed to improve individual productivity through collaboration, but also total productivity was understood as a collective force.²⁰⁰

The process of agrarian reform in China is tortuous and includes periods of suffering and drawback, but from the perspective of state governance, the positive aspects of agrarian reform are also obvious. First of all, the peasants were politically attached to the policies of the Communist Party and the new state. Second, the agrarian reform effectively promoted better utilization of the labour force and improved the level of rural productivity. Third, the leadership of the CPC was further consolidated. The CPC needed to establish and maintain its political power nationwide, thus the support of the overwhelming majority of the people was a necessity. For Chinese society at that time, the overwhelming majority of the people were peasants. Therefore, the CPC started early on with the agrarian reform, maintained the interests of the peasants, handed over the land to them, consolidating and legitimizing its own leadership.²⁰¹

3.4 Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid North Korea

Resist U.S. aggression and aid North Korea is a part of the Korean War that involved Chinese forces during 1950-1953. It also included the mass mobilization of Chinese people to support the Korean people.²⁰² Whitney states: “Mao did not decide to intervene directly on the peninsula until well after 15 September in 1950 [...] The initial Chinese decision to intervene came on 2 October.”²⁰³ Mao claimed that it would be “a disgrace not to assist their neighbour in its time of mortal peril [...] a direct clash with the United States was inevitable at some point.”²⁰⁴ In 15 July 1951, Mao Zedong pointed out in his reply to Huang Yanpei that it was wisest: 能战然后能和²⁰⁵ to fight and then achieve peace.²⁰⁶ It meant that peace can only be achieved through the war at that time, as negotiations appeared futile.²⁰⁷ As Edwards says: “War, we are often told, is the ultimate political act.”²⁰⁸

In the Korean battlefield, the United States had a powerful air force and navy, which controlled the air and sea power of the whole battlefield. When the Chinese

²⁰⁰ Wang Fengming. 王峰明。《“一个活生生的矛盾”：马克思论资本的文明面及其悖论》，《天津社会科学》。2010年11月23日，第104-109页。

²⁰¹ Yan Shunling. 阎顺玲。《解放区女性文学论析》，《西南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》。2011年10月15日，第57-61页。

²⁰² Feng Jun. 冯俊。《中华人民共和国国情词典》。北京：中国人民大学出版社。2011年，第194页。

²⁰³ Ibid. p. 98.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Edited by Research Office of the CPC Central Committee. 中共中央研究室。《毛泽东年谱(1949-1976)》第1卷。中共中央文献研究室。北京：中央文献出版社。2013，第377页。

²⁰⁶ *Mao Zedong chronology (1949-1976)*. The Party Literature Research Centre of the CPC Central Committee, Volume I. Beijing: Central Literature Press. 2013, p. 377.

²⁰⁷ Xi Wei. 习伟。《抗美援朝战争的历史意义和当代价值-纪念抗美援朝战争胜利六十周年》，《前线》。2013年8月15日，第87-92页。

²⁰⁸ Edwards, Paul M. *The Korean War*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2006, p. 2.

volunteers entered the Korean War, they had neither air force nor navy but faced the most modern army in the world. Although the role of weapons and equipment is becoming more and more prominent in the war, it has not changed the basic rule that people are the decisive factor in the victory of a war. The commanders and fighters of the Chinese volunteers showed great bravery and tenacity in the battle. Mao Zedong's eldest son, Mao Anying, also died in this war. In the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, China defeated the most powerful army in the world at that time.²⁰⁹ The Peoples' Republic of China emerged as the one undisputed winner from this war. Mao Zedong had proclaimed that "China has stood up!" in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1949. But internationally, China really "stood up" in this war against the super-power, the United States. It had meant considerable human losses, about 360,000 casualties, but China was a very populous country.²¹⁰ This war greatly increased the international prestige of the new People's Republic of China.²¹¹ America lost the Korean War. Such a conclusion is political; militarily it was a stalemate, but the political aspect is more important here.²¹² This was politically significant also in China, because it changed the historical pattern of losing every war with foreign powers beginning with the Opium War—even counting the war against Japan, because the role of the United States in Japan's defeat was so great. This war changed the world's view of China. As Stanley argues: "Never again could Chinese military or political power in the world arena be ignored, patronized, or disparaged."²¹³

While arguing for participation in the war, Mao Zedong had used the concept of maximum benevolence policy, which is a governance related concept.

所谓仁政有两种：一种是为人民当前的利益，另一种是为人民长远的利益，例如抗美援朝，建设重工业。前一种是小仁政，后一种是大仁政。两者必须兼顾，不兼顾是错误的。那么重点放在什么地方呢？重点应当放在大仁政上。²¹⁴

Policies of benevolence are of two kinds. One is concerned with people's immediate interests. The other is concerned with their long-term interests, such as resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea and building heavy industry. The first is a policy of lesser benevolence and the second a policy of greater benevolence. Both must be taken into consideration and it is wrong not to do so. Where then is the emphasis to be placed? On the policy of greater benevolence. People's livelihood needed to be improved, but at that stage it couldn't be done too much, to make allowance for the policy of lesser benevolence at the expense of the policy of greater benevolence is to go off the right track.²¹⁵

²⁰⁹ Jiang Yong. 江涌。《发扬抗美援朝精神，赢得中美博弈新胜利》，《世界社会主义研究》。2019年7月1日，第16-24页。

²¹⁰ Sandler, Stanley. *Korean War: An Interpretative History*. London: UCL Press. 1999, p. 18.

²¹¹ Ibid. p. 8

²¹² Edwards, Paul M. *The Korean War*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2006, p. 186.

²¹³ Sandler, Stanley. *Korean War: An Interpretative History*. London: UCL Press. 1999, p. 19.

²¹⁴ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《抗美援朝的伟大胜利和今后的任务》，1953年9月12日，《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第105页。

²¹⁵ Mao Zedong. "Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks".

Even though Mao did not use the words that nowadays denote governance, he occasionally employed words like “善政, shànzhèng” and “仁政, rénzhèng”. The former can be translated as good, virtuous or charitable policy, the latter humane or kind policy. Both have here been translated as benevolent policy. It is perhaps characteristic of Mao’s thinking of governance that he used this kind of vocabulary very seldom. Good governance in terms of making people’s life nicer and happier was not his main interest, as he called that kind of policy as implying less benevolence. Struggle with mass arousal was his idea of governance. Preparing for a long-term struggle and unifying the people behind it was considered the greater benevolence. Good life existed somewhere in the distant future, but the groundwork for it had to be created in the present involving more struggle.

3.5 The relationship between rule by man and rule by law

After the founding of People’s Republic of China, in the face of extraordinary complex and precipitous environment at home and abroad, Mao Zedong governed China on the basis of class analysis and the idea of continuing struggle and revolution. He successfully built up a unified state on this basis, carrying out far-reaching reforms. As much of what was being done was experimental, learning by doing activity, Mao Zedong also made some mistakes in political governance.

Mao Zedong didn’t effectively stop the occurrence and development of extreme events; he had this ability at that time. Mao claimed himself as the representative of the proletarian camp. At the individual level, a person’s class background became the sole criterion for identifying friends and enemies, good and evil.²¹⁶ State leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were overthrown without legal procedures, which deviated from Mao Zedong’s own ideological style of seeking truth from facts, more over deviated from the inner-Party democracy he had always stressed, and were far from the collective leadership and the leadership principle of individual responsibility that he often espoused.²¹⁷ Therefore, to see Mao Zedong’s political governance comprehensively, it must be said that it was efficient, but also contained a lot that the Chinese nowadays call mistakes.

In some ways, Mao’s actions reflect old Chinese intellectual traditions. In ancient Chinese classic works, there are some theories of the rule of man: “为政在人, wéi zhèng zài rén”²¹⁸ which means that man is the performer of politics.

For Xunzi, “法者,治之端也;君子者,法之原也”,²¹⁹ which means law is the

12 September 1953. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 119.

²¹⁶ Lu Xing. *The Rhetoric of Mao Zedong: Transforming China and Its People*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. 2017, p. 109.

²¹⁷ Liu Zhenjiang. 刘振江.《毛泽东国家治理的思想研究》。武汉: 武汉大学。博士毕业论文。2015年, 第97页。

²¹⁸ *The Analects of Confucius (Lun Yu)* is one of the Confucian classics. 《论语·为政》。长沙: 湖南大学出版社。2013年, 第107页。

²¹⁹ Xun Zi (325-238 BC) was a philosopher of the late Warring States Period. He thought that human nature was evil. His book *Xun Zi* 《荀子·君道》 develops the philosophy of Confucianism, Taoism and Mohism in the pre-Qin

beginning of governance, while man is the original source of law. Laws depend on paradigmatic individuals “君子, *jūnzǐ*” who embody benevolence and righteousness to carry them out.²²⁰ For Xunzi, there are no rules or laws that can establish their own efficacy without men to carry them out.²²¹ In short, Xunzi’s political thought held law to be non-essential, and regarded the human element as essential.²²²

Mao’s words reflect thoughts similar to Xunzi. Although the first constitution of People’s Republic of China was promulgated in 1954, in fact, it played a very weak role in the governance of the country. As Mao Zedong said at a meeting held in Beidaihe in 1958:²²³

能靠法律治理多数人。到底是法治还是人治?看来实际靠人, 法律只能作为办事的参考。

Most people can be governed by law. Should it be the rule of law or the rule of man? It seems that in practice, rule of man is more important, the law can only be used as a reference for handling affairs.²²⁴

It can be said that this early period in the existence of the People’s Republic was a period of all-round leader control with political action as the core.²²⁵ In terms of operational mechanism, Mao attached importance to his own ultimate control of policy, which made it difficult to avoid randomness and frequent changes.

When the Fifth Session of the CPPCC conference was held in 1978, many members had just been liberated from prison. Liang Shuming, who as a non-Communist intellectual had faced many waves of persecution, raised the issue of the rule of man and the rule of law: “I want to point out seriously that, with the development of China’s history, the rule of man may have come to an end. When Chairman Mao died, there will be no leaders with such prestige as Chairman Mao, and they will not be there soon—at least in the foreseeable decades, even if some people are used to rule of man, the difficulties will be much greater. We should respect the constitution, rely more on the constitution and less on people.”²²⁶ In fact, a state cannot eliminate laws. The people in the world who, though being exposed to education, are not brought under moral influence thereby, probably are not a minority.

Dynasty period. 《荀子·君道》 *Xunzi. The regulations of a King*. 南京: 南京大学出版社。2015年, 第64页。

²²⁰ Cua, Antonio S. “Human Nature, Ritual, and History—studies in Xunzi and Chinese Philosophy”. *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*. Volume 43. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press. 2005, p. 107.

²²¹ Ibid. pp. 130-131.

²²² Hsiao, Kung-chuan. “History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume 1: From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century, AD”. *A History of Chinese Political Thought*. Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press. 1979, pp. 194-207.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ In August 1958, the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau in Beidaihe. It formulated all the major plans of the Great Leap Forward Movement and developed the Party’s “left” guiding ideology. After the meeting, the movement of Great Leap Forward reached a climax, with the major symbols of national steel smelting and the establishment of people’s communes. The Great Leap Forward Movement lasted from 1958 to 1960.

²²⁵ Gong Pixiang. 公丕祥。《东方社会主义的法律发展: 从马克思到邓小平的理论探索》, 《法制与社会发展》。2003年6月21日, 第78-92页。

²²⁶ Shi Fengrui. 史锋锐。《刚直不阿的梁漱溟》, 《文史精华》。2000年10月6日。第4-9页。

Laws are prominent,²²⁷ even if they do not necessarily guarantee talent and ability, at least they assure maintenance of the system.²²⁸ The law is something that the ruler and his citizens must jointly maintain.²²⁹

Due to Mao Zedong's prestige, which reached its peak during the 1960s in the Party, the army and the whole nation, the phenomenon of personal worship extremely expanded. Badges, busts, and posters with Mao's image became ubiquitous. This increased greatly the possibility for arbitrariness, while the requirements of democratization and legalization were seriously ignored, which made it difficult to limit the initiatives made by the leader. After his era ended, there indeed was a strong wish in China to increase the share of law and democracy in the governance of China, and to diminish that of man.

3.6 Mao Zedong's view of democracy

Mao considered democracy as a central form of governance in New China. At least he did so in 1945, but there is no doubt that democracy played a strong role in his thought. He mentioned the concept often, and already before him it was a very important concept in radical, progressive and reformist Chinese thought. The practical history of institutional democracy in China is fairly short and narrow. Consequently, understanding of the various meanings that the concept of democracy can get has always been specific in China, and requires specific attention. Democracy is not only an ideal concept, but also a collection of historical and specific political forms. A suitable social structure and national organizational system are beneficial for the growth of democracy.²³⁰ For any country, democratization is a specific development path that can be chosen. Therefore, it is not the understanding of the general theoretical democratic principles that determines the success of democratization in any specific state, but the interplay of the concept of democracy with the soil of the national culture.²³¹ This requires tracing the conceptual history of democracy in a country.

3.6.1 The concept of 民主 in ancient China

China's traditional culture, established over several thousand years of history, both positively and negatively impacts China's advancement toward democracy. Among the positive influences are the notion of people as fundamental forces in historical development, the notion of social cohesion, the ideal of the perfect society—or “Great Harmony, 大同, *dàtóng*”—all of which are deeply rooted in Chinese traditions.

²²⁷ Kohn, Livia and Michael La Fargue. *Lao-Tzu and the Tao-Te-Ching*. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press. 1998, pp. 224-225.

²²⁸ Ibid. p. 177.

²²⁹ Ibid. p. 211.

²³⁰ Hao Yifeng. 郝一峰。《统一战线与新中国初期民主政治建设研究（1949-1956）》。广州：华南理工大学。硕士毕业论文。2018年，第96页。

²³¹ Ibid. p. 119.

Negative factors include the tendencies toward absolutism, patriarchy, elitism, hierarchical thinking, and the neglect of human and individual rights and freedoms.²³² The word that is nowadays used for denoting “democracy, 民主, *mínzhǔ*” in China has existed since ancient times, but its meaning has been different. One understanding refers to the ancient officials, such as the Western Jin Dynasty *Records of the Three Kingdoms*²³³ and Song Dynasty *Taiping Yulan*.²³⁴

仆为民主，当以法率下。²³⁵

Officials should govern their subordinates by law.

Mín zhǔ here refers to the local people in charge, that is, local officials.

Shang Shu 《尚书·多方》²³⁶ written in the Tenth century BCE, is the earliest compilation of historical documents in China. In it were written this kind of expressions:

天命文王，使为民主。

Lord Wen was destined by the Heaven to be *mínzhǔ* (the chief of his people).²³⁷

天惟时求民主，乃大降显休命于成汤。

Heaven was pursuing a chief of the people and then descended the status to Lord Cheng and Lord Tang.²³⁸

Here, *mínzhǔ* clearly means the ruler, the lord of the people. The meaning of 民主 in other classics such as *Zuo Zhuan* 《左传》²³⁹ was similar:

臧文仲有言曰：民主偷必死。

²³² Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 228.

²³³ Chen Shou. 陈寿。(233 to 297) 《三国志·吴书·钟离牧传》。北京：中华书局出版社。1959年，第607页。One of *Twenty-Four Histories*, written by Chen Shou, a historian of Jin Dynasty and Western Jin Dynasty, records the Three Kingdoms period of China.

²³⁴ Li Fang. (eds). 李昉等。《太平御览》。Written by Li Fang etc., the book is divided into fifty-five parts, covering all aspects of ancient and modern times. There are more than 1000 ancient books cited in the book, and a large number of documents before the Song Dynasty are preserved. However, 78 of them have been lost, which makes this book more precious and a precious heritage of Chinese traditional culture. The book began in March in the 2nd year of Taiping Xingguo (AD 977) in the Northern Song Dynasty and was completed in October in the 8th year of Taiping Xingguo (AD 983).

²³⁵ Li Fang. (eds). 李昉等。《太平御览》第1000卷。上海：商务印书馆，四部丛刊三编。1936年，第14681页。

²³⁶ *Book of Documents*. 《尚书》。The Tenth century (Zhou Dynasty). 王世舜，王翠叶译注。Translated and edited by Wang Shishun and Wang Cuiye. 北京：中华书局出版社。2012年，第54页。

²³⁷ Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4. December 2018, pp. 297-312. S. Shu, *Shang Hu* (The Book of History), Jinan: Shandong Friendship Press, p. 230, 1993.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ *Zuo's Biography of the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chun Qiu Zuo Zhuan)*. 《春秋左传》。(Around 722-454 BC.) Translated and edited by Liang Kuan and Zhuang Shi. 梁宽，庄适译注。北京：商务印书馆。2014年，第17-89页。

Zang Wenzhong said: if the monarch of the people fails to keep his word, he will surely perish.

Furthermore, in the *Anthology*, also known as the *Ban Gu Anthology*, which is the earliest extant collection of poems and essays in China, and was compiled by Xiao Tong, the eldest son of Emperor Wu of Liang Dynasty, is written:

肇命民主，五德初始。汉蔡邕注：“民主，天子也。”

The monarch of the people needs to have five virtues. Cai Yong in Han Dynasty noted: What is so called “*mínzhǔ*” is meant the son of heaven.²⁴⁰

As Lin says: Clearly, the original meaning of *mínzhǔ* in Chinese specified an emperor, which was quite opposite to “democracy”.²⁴¹

In *Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government*,²⁴² written by Sima Guang, a multi-volume chronological history book started in 403 BCE and ended in 959, was written:

当有圣人出为民主。

The son of heaven will be the ruler of the country.

In these passages, the word 民主, *mínzhǔ* refers to the supreme ruler. Jin and Liu have investigated the term *mínzhǔ* in classical texts and found that it had one meaning: “the emperor”.²⁴³ It is composed of two elements, where 民, *mín* nowadays means “citizen” or “the people”, but which during the ancient slave society referred to common people without any specific political rights. 主, *zhǔ* on its turn refers to “owner”, “master” and “lord”. Thus, while the characters nowadays are interpreted democratically as “citizens are the master”, during the ancient times they were interpreted in the opposite way as “lord of the slaves”; i.e., ruler or monarch.

3.6.2 The concept of democracy in modern China

Korhonen claims: “Concepts are teleological entities. Their origin is in practice, and they have real meaning only when put to work in practice.”²⁴⁴ Democracy, as a kind

²⁴⁰ Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4. December 2018, pp. 297-312.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Sima Guang. 司马光 (1019-1086) was a minister and historian in the Northern Song Dynasty. His massive study was China’s first comprehensive history in a chronicle form. *Historical Events Retold as a Mirror for Government (Zi Zhi Tong Jian)* 《资治通鉴》。《资治通鉴·晋惠帝太安二年》第 294 卷。上海：四部丛刊初编。1919 年，第 3180 页。

²⁴³ Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy’: China’s Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924)”. *History of Political Thought*. Autumn 2005, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 472-497.

²⁴⁴ Korhonen, Pekka. “What Is Asia? International Studies as Political Linguistics”. *Global and Regional Problems: Towards an Interdisciplinary Study*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 131-149.

of value ideal, certainly has the characteristics of universality, but the realization of democracy is a process and result of practice. It depends on the real political movement, political life and political revolution to forge, experience and strive for, which means that the way to realize democracy often has nationality and cultural diversity.²⁴⁵ However, Huntington says: “Rapid economic and social development further weakened the influence of traditional Confucianism.”²⁴⁶ Transformation of the meaning of the concept may have occurred by some influence of foreigners. Federico Masini noticed that the concept 民主 *mínzhǔ* is to be found in *Wanguo gongfa*, namely Presbyterian missionary William Alexander Parsons Martin’s Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton’s 1839 book *Elements of International Law*, published in Beijing in 1864, and reprinted in Japan in 1865 with the title *Bankoku koho*. However, it is here no more used in the meaning of a ruler, but as a translation of the concept of “republic”. Where Wheaton makes a distinction between a monarchical and a republican government, Masini translates the latter as 民主之国 *mínzhǔ zhī guó*.²⁴⁷ The premise for the generation of democratic demands generally stems from dissatisfaction with the current situation, and one of the major reasons for this dissatisfaction is that the current political system has brought serious political or social crisis.²⁴⁸ However, Chinese democracy is not the result of simple western democratic ideas and general models moving to China and operating mechanically. It is the result of the political forces since China’s modernization under the guidance of the thinking of democratic values, based on China’s national conditions at that time, recognizing the decay of China’s traditional political civilization, which is a political practice.

In the middle and late 19th century, due to the extensive development of imperialism, Western civilization became felt sharply in China. As Lin reviews: Until the 1860s, there were no established words for translating “democracy”. William Lobscheid translated “democracy” as *mínzhèng*, “民政, 众人管辖, 百姓弄权, people govern and populace wield the right”.²⁴⁹ He also comments that *mínzhǔ* with its modern connotation firstly appeared in 1864 when W.A.P. Martin translated *Elements of International Law* written by Henry Wheaton. There “democracy”, “democratic character”, “democratic republic”, and similar expressions were all given as *mínzhǔ*.²⁵⁰ It had a lasting effect on the translation of this concept.²⁵¹

The early reformers, such as Wang Tao, Xue Fucheng and Zheng Guanying, witnessed the progress of the Western society and the decline of Qing Dynasty. They

²⁴⁵ Wang Shizhu, Li Dong. 王世柱, 李栋。《政法学刊》,《从“民主”到“人民民主”: 中国近代民主观念嬗变的考察》。2015年6月15日,第32卷。第3期,第8页。

²⁴⁶ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman; London: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991, p. 303.

²⁴⁷ Masini, Federico. “The Formation of Chinese Lexicon and its Evolution Toward a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898”. *Journal of Chinese Linguistics*. Monograph Series Number 6. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. 1993, pp. 404-407.

²⁴⁸ Wang Shizhu, Li Dong. 王世柱, 李栋。《从“民主”到“人民民主”: 中国近代民主观念嬗变的考察》,《政法学刊》。2015年6月15日,第32卷。第3期,第7-26页。

²⁴⁹ Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4. December 2018, pp. 297-312.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

had more contact with the western world. Xue Fucheng served as the ambassador to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium from 1890 to 1894. The material and spiritual civilization of the West broadened his vision. To a large extent, they were the representatives of the emerging national bourgeoisie. They proposed increasing civil rights and advocated the idea of “the monarch and the people become the master of the country together, 君民共主, *jūn mǐn gòng zhǔ*”,²⁵² which certainly was a radical idea in its day. At least in terms of terminology “the people, 民, *mín*” now rises to the conceptual position of being able to rule something. Obviously, the “people” here mainly refers to the emerging bourgeoisie. The civil rights they demanded meant only expanding the participation in decision making to existing officials and local powerful gentry, not the participation of the broad masses of the people. The system they advocated corresponds most with an aristocratic, rather than a solely monarchic political system. Even so, they put forward different political forms than the traditional feudal autocratic system, laying a cornerstone in the development history of modern Chinese democratic thought.²⁵³ In terms of the status and relationship between the monarch and the people, they did not change the people’s attachment to the monarch and the concept of the supremacy of the monarch:

治国者，惟有君主，民主以及君民共主而已，质而言之，虽君主仍是民主。何则？政者民之事而君办之者也，非君之事而民办之者也…民有性命恐不能保，则赖君以保之，民有物业恐不能护，则借君以护之。则民自知之，民自明之，而惟恐其法令之不能行也，于是乎奉一人以为之主，故民主即君主也，君主亦民主也。²⁵⁴

There are three ways to govern a country: monarchy, democracy, the monarch and the people together become the master of the country. In essence, the monarch is equal to democracy. Why? Because the monarch handles civil affairs, not the people handle the monarch’s affairs. The lives of the people need to be protected by the monarch, and the people’s property also needs the protection of the monarch. The people understand this well, and fear that the law cannot protect their lives and property, thus they would rather have a monarch governing the country. Therefore, democracy is the monarch, and the monarch is also democracy.

However, they advocate that the people are the foundation of the state, and this is the way where the idea of co-rulership comes from:

君犹舟也，民犹水也，水能载舟，亦能覆舟，伊古以来，盛衰治乱之机总此也。²⁵⁵

The monarch is like a boat, and the people are like water. The water can carry a

²⁵² Zhu Shouming. 朱寿明。《光绪朝东华录》（四）。北京：中华书局。1958年，第7页。

²⁵³ Meng Xiangcai, Wang Yongzhen. 孟祥才，王永贞。《中国近代民主思想发展的艰难历程》，《三峡学刊（四川三峡学院社会科学学报）》。1995年第2期。第71-79页。

²⁵⁴ He Qi, Hu Lihuan. 何启，胡礼垣。《新政真诠》。桂林：广西师范大学出版社。2015年，第73页。

²⁵⁵ Zheng Guanying. 郑观应。《盛世危言》。上海：古籍出版社。2002年，第98页。

boat and it can also overturn it.

The ideological basis for the early Chinese reformers was western and mainly European political ideas of constitutional monarchy, with a degree of participatory popular representation in the form of parliamentarism in Britain and occasionally in France, and with fairly wide demands by the bourgeoisie for more representative possibilities. In the 1890s, Tan Sitong, another reformer, pointed out:

非君择民，而民择君也，民对君可以共举之，也可以共废之。²⁵⁶

It is not the monarch who chooses the people, but the people who choose the monarch. The people can support the monarch together or abolish the monarch together.

This may signal the arrival of the idea of popular sovereignty to China. The people are regarded here as the ultimate source of political power. Another idea at that time was that “If all laws in the world are equal, everyone has the right to autonomy. 世法平等，则人人不失自主之权。”²⁵⁷ This slogan combines the ideas of laws, equality, and personal autonomy.

The transformation of the concept of democracy “meant also the reconstruction of Chinese understanding of Western political thought”.²⁵⁸ In 1905, Sun Yat-sen wrote in *People's Daily*, “There are three principles in the evolution of Europe and America: the nation, the civil rights and the people's livelihood, which are all based on the people. 余维欧美之进化，凡以此三大主义：曰民族，曰民权，曰民生。是三大主义皆基本于民，递嬗变易。”²⁵⁹ [...] The political core of this argument is civil rights. Sun Yat-sen studied western history and political ideas in Hawaii and Hong Kong, creating a combination of Chinese traditions and Western civil rights doctrines. He believed that democracy in China “has its own ideas but no system 有其思想而无其制度”.²⁶⁰ In Chen Duxiu and Kang Youwei's essays before the 1911 revolution,²⁶¹ *mínzhǔ* was used to refer to “the opposite of monarchy, 君主, *jūnzǔ*”.²⁶²

Lin analyses: “Statistically, the frequency of *mínzhǔ* used in the media has fluctuated with the development of China's political thought and movements.”²⁶³

²⁵⁶ Zhu Shouming. 朱寿明。《光绪朝东华录》（四）。北京：中华书局出版社。1958年，第9页。

²⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 10.

²⁵⁸ Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy’: China's Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924)”. *History of Political Thought*. Autumn 2005, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 472-497.

²⁵⁹ Sun Yat-sen. 孙中山。《三民主义》卷二。北京：中华书局出版社。2011年，第291页。

²⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 692.

²⁶¹ The Xinhai Revolution, named for the Chinese year of Xinhai (1911), was the overthrow of China's ruling Qing Dynasty, sometimes known as the Manchu Dynasty, and the establishment of the Republic of China.

²⁶² Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy’: China's Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924)”. *History of Political Thought*. Autumn 2005, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 472-497.

²⁶³ Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4. December 2018, pp. 297-312.

Although both the reform movement of 1898²⁶⁴ and the revolution of 1911 failed, it was precisely because of the accumulation of attempts of seeking democratic change that the demand for democracy was put forward during the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and the process of the Chinese nation's pursuit of democratic politics and democratic spirit turned a new page. After 1919 new developments for democracy were the "linguistic manifestation of the concept of democracy".²⁶⁵ From the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century the Chinese concept of democracy had the following three meanings, according to Liu and Jin, "A modern political system that was opposed to hereditary monarchy, rule by the people and popularly elected rulers."²⁶⁶

Jarkko Haapanen shows in his study of the history of Chinese political language structures, it was the May Fourth Movement that established the concept of democracy within the intellectual discussion of Chinese politics,²⁶⁷ but it did this largely with a language that Haapanen calls "the language of mutual aid and democracy".²⁶⁸ The argumentative structure of this language did not favour violence; instead, it was expressly used against a large assortment of entities considered violent, such as militarism, imperialism, big powers, warlords and military leaders, extreme forms of nationalism and patriotism, aristocracy, traditional society, capitalism and the power of money.²⁶⁹ Many types of social, economic, political and international ills were thus considered to be solved with the help of democracy in a non-violent way—though of course this concept of democracy tended to remain at a fairly abstract level. It was a highly idealistic discussion about people's power and local autonomy, not a practical argument involving political parties, electoral campaigns and parliamentarism.²⁷⁰ From around 1920 onwards, this language was replaced with what Haapanen calls "language of class struggle". It was more narrowly inspired by the example of the Soviet Union, and started to advocate a violent fight against the above mentioned ills, clearly aiming for a thorough revolution in all aspects of Chinese society and economy.²⁷¹ It also inherited the earlier concept of democracy in its rather idealistic and abstract form, and its expressed enmity against electoral types of democracy was even more pronounced.²⁷² Its core idea focused on creating a society with more socio-economic equality and making the life of people better in a comprehensive manner. This was an ideal, which did not need much contemplating about institutional arrangements.²⁷³ In addition, because the violent fight was

²⁶⁴ The Reform Movement, also known as the Hundred Days' Reform, was a political reform movement of the Qing Dynasty (11 June to 21 September 1898). Emperor Guangxu carried out the movement, hoping that China would embark on a modern road of constitutional monarchy. However, the change was opposed by conservative forces and eventually failed. Reformers were killed, and Empress Dowager Cixi gained real power.

²⁶⁵ Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. "From 'Republicanism' to 'Democracy': China's Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924)". *History of Political Thought*. Autumn 2005, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 472-497.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Sun Yat-sen. 孙中山。《建国方略》。Founding Strategy. 北京：中国长安出版社。2011年，第182页。

²⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 75.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. pp. 107-110.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 144.

²⁷¹ Ibid. p. 113.

²⁷² Ibid. p. 130.

²⁷³ Ibid. p. 185.

continuously another core element of this language, local autonomy and similar elements of anarchistic political theory had no role in its concept of democracy; discipline and reverence towards the leaders of the revolution were essential elements of this language.²⁷⁴ Thus, the element of popular representation, which is rather central in the concept of electoral democracy prevalent in the West, was from the beginning on a side role in the modern Chinese concept of democracy. The Chinese concept, and especially the Chinese socialist concept of democracy, has developed more as an idea of co-rulership by the citizens and the leadership, with strong vertical educative, organizing and coordinating elements.

In the Jingtangshan period,²⁷⁵ October 1927 to February 1930 at the Jingtangshan Revolutionary Base Area, the young Chinese Communists promulgated the first people's democratic constitution in Chinese history: *The Outline of the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China*, in order to promote the democratization and socialization of the Soviet grass-roots political power. They mobilized and organized the illiterate and semi-illiterate poor peasants who were considered by the general public to be the most unqualified to implement democracy, and led them to set up many mass organizations, so that the democratic voting rate in most of the base areas reached over 85%.²⁷⁶ Thus, in this kind of experiments there indeed was rapid increase in people's participation, but it was inherently participation guided by those who were educationally and ideologically more enlightened than the simple people.

This is the kind of language of politics and concept of democracy that Mao inherited from his intellectual predecessors, and what he himself carried on and developed in his writings. For him, it was a concept of socio-economic equality, but with little institutional meaning on the national scale. He even called Western type parliamentary systems "ultra-democracy, 极端民主, *jíduān mǐnzhǔ*", considering it a threat to the revolution.²⁷⁷ Dictatorship was needed to firmly carry out the fight against the enemy. Democracy and the people thus were both concepts that needed an actually or potentially violent antagonist in order to be understood correctly. Kelliher claims: "China has had no experience with democratic government, and democracy of the Western variety has been supported over the years only by relatively small groups of radical dissidents."²⁷⁸

3.6.3 Mao's view of democracy

Democracy was always one of the main goals of the Chinese revolution. Mao appears to have first used the concept of "people's democracy, 人民民主, *rénmín mǐnzhǔ*" in

²⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 144.

²⁷⁵ Jingtangshan period, October 1927 to February 1930, Jingtangshan Revolutionary Base Area opened up a revolutionary road with Chinese characteristics of encircling cities with rural areas and seizing power by armed forces.

²⁷⁶ Hu Xianzhong. 胡献忠。《从民本走向民主：中国政治思想和政治制度的演变历史》，《哈尔滨市委党校学报》。2003年1月，第25期，41-47页。

²⁷⁷ Sun Yat-sen. 孙中山。《建国方略》。Founding Strategy. 北京：中国长安出版社。2011年，第190页。

²⁷⁸ See Kelliher, Daniel. "The Political Consequences of China's Reforms". *Comparative Politics*. 18 July 1986, pp. 488-490. Cited from Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman; London: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991, p. 301.

his “The Orientation of the Youth Movement” in May 1939:

这个革命要达到的目的是什么呢？目的就是打倒帝国主义和封建主义，建立一个人民民主的共和国。²⁷⁹

What is the goal of this revolution? To overthrow imperialism and feudalism and to establish a people’s democratic republic.²⁸⁰

“On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” is an important work written by Mao Zedong to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. It was first broadcasted by Xinhua News Agency on 30 June 1949 and published in *People’s Daily* on 1 July 1949. It presented a systematic theory of people’s democratic dictatorship, and publicly expounded the CPC’s positive intention for the establishment of a new political status to the Chinese people. In classic political philosophy, democracy means rule by the majority.²⁸¹ However, people’s democratic dictatorship did not cover the whole Chinese population. “The people, 人民, *rénmín*” is a vague concept, because in Mao’s socialist theory its meaning is to a large extent derived from its antonym. As Jarkko Haapanen comments: “Counter concepts are relevant, because they help us to piece together the argumentative structures of the concepts”.²⁸² The opposite of the people is the enemy of the people, i.e., the reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries. In Mao’s sense, those who were not in the category of the enemy, could be understood as the Chinese people. This kind of conceptual antagonism was characteristic in Mao’s thinking.

Democracy has been a vague ideal during modern Chinese history, remaining in popular usage irrespective of ruler or regime. The Communist Party of China used the ideal as a means for overthrowing the Guomindang during the Communist Revolution, which culminated in the founding of the PRC. In 1940, Mao Zedong authored a pamphlet “On New Democracy”²⁸³ which was one of his most influential works after the CPC came to power and throughout the Cultural Revolution, though neither of these historical movements were democratic in nature.²⁸⁴ In the “On New Democracy”, Mao Zedong pointed out:

中国无产阶级、农民、知识分子和其他小资产阶级，乃是决定国家命运的基本势力，这些阶级，或者已经觉悟，或者正在觉悟起来，他们必然要成为中华民主共和国的国家构成和政权构成的基本部分，而无产阶级则是领

²⁷⁹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。1966年，第527页。

²⁸⁰ Mao Zedong. “The orientation of the youth movement”. 4 May 1939. This speech was delivered by Mao Zedong at a mass meeting of youth in Yenan to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 242.

²⁸¹ Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy’: China’s Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924)”. *History of Political Thought*. Autumn 2005, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 472-497.

²⁸² Haapanen, Jarkko. *Adaptation to World Trends: A Rereading of the May Fourth Movement Radicalization*. Doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä University Printing House. 2013, p. 71.

²⁸³ Mao Zedong. “On New Democracy”. January 1940, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 242.

²⁸⁴ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 3.

导的力量。²⁸⁵

The proletariat, the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie undoubtedly constitute the basic forces determining China's fate. These classes, some already awakened and others in the process of awakening, will necessarily become the basic components of the state and governmental structure in the democratic republic of China, with the proletariat as the leading force.²⁸⁶

The united front “统一战线, *tǒngyī zhànxiàn*” is an essential concept for understanding this expansion and contraction of the scope of the concepts of people and democracy. It simply means an alliance of suitably like-minded groups against a common enemy; from Mao's point of view preferably under the leadership of the CPC. During the Anti-Japanese War in 1937, Mao Zedong also linked the idea of democracy with that of the united front:²⁸⁷

对于抗日任务，民主也是新阶段中最本质的东西，为民主即是抗日。抗日与民主互为条件，同抗日与和平、民主与和平互为条件一样。民主是抗日的保证，抗日能给予民主运动发展以有利条件。新阶段中，我们希望能有许多直接的间接的反日斗争，这些将推动对日抗战，也大有助于民主运动。然而历史给予我们的革命任务，中心的本质的东西是争取民主。²⁸⁸

In the new stage, democracy is the most essential thing for resistance to Japan, and to work for democracy is to work for resistance to Japan. Resistance and democracy are interdependent, just as are resistance and internal peace, democracy and internal peace. Democracy is the guarantee of resistance, while resistance can provide favourable conditions for developing the movement for democracy. We hope there may be and indeed there will be many direct and indirect struggles against Japan in the new stage, and these will give an impetus to the war of resistance and greatly assist the movement for democracy. But the core and essence of the revolutionary task history has set us is the winning of democracy.²⁸⁹

This has no formal definition of the meaning democracy, but as that stage in China's history meant a new start for cooperation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party against Japan in the form of the second united front of these parties,

²⁸⁵ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《新民主主义论》，1940年1月，《毛泽东选集》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。1966年，第635页。

²⁸⁶ Mao Zedong. “On New Democracy”. January 1940. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 350.

²⁸⁷ Mao Zedong. “The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan”. 3 May 1937. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 267.

²⁸⁸ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《为争取千百万群众进入抗日民族统一战线而斗争》，1937年5月7日，《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第252页。

²⁸⁹ Mao Zedong. “Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front”. 7 May 1937. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 288.

this situation probably provides the clue for the meaning. It meant going back to the language of the May Fourth Movement and its abstract concept of democracy as a verbal common denominator between the CPC and Guomindang. The Guomindang of course was older than the May Fourth Movement, but all these movements grew from the same radical intellectual base. Simultaneously, this move also demanded that the Guomindang treats the Communists equally, or in other words democratically.²⁹⁰ Anti-Japanese resistance was not something that a single political Party could accomplish. It was necessary to form a nationwide anti-Japanese united front for such a great task. At that time, the name “Democratic Republic, 民主共和国, *mínzhǔ gònghéguó*” referred to the national government composed by the Guomindang.²⁹¹ The Communist Party was nominally under the leadership of the national government. Furthermore, Mao also recommended continuing Communists’ own revolutionary struggle and solidification of its base areas in order to increase its legitimacy among the population:

中国必须实行人民的言论、集会、结社自由。没有这种自由，就不能实现政治制度的民主改革，就不能动员人民进入抗战，取得保卫祖国和收复失地的胜利。政治制度的民主改革和人民的自由权利，是抗日民族统一战线纲领上的重要部分，同时也是建立真正的坚实的抗日民族统一战线的必要条件。²⁹²

China must at once start democratic changes in the freedom of speech, assembly and association for the people. Without such freedom, it will be impossible to carry out the democratic reconstruction of the political system, mobilize the people for the war of resistance and victoriously defend the motherland and recover the lost territories. Democratic reconstruction of the political system and freedom and rights for the people constitute an important part of the programme of the anti-Japanese national united front; at the same time they are prerequisites for the establishment of a genuine and solid anti-Japanese national united front.²⁹³

Increasing democracy in China was in principle a common goal of both the Communists and the Guomindang, so this kind of activity was not against the united front. Simultaneously, it was a way to strengthen the position of the CPC in view of the possible collapse of the united front, which eventually happened. After the wars against Japan and then against the Guomindang ended, the united front as a political tool was not abolished. In the People’s Republic of China there was established a new united front based formally on cooperation and consultation among a number of leftist

²⁹⁰ Mao Zedong. “The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan”. 3 May 1937. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 268.

²⁹¹ Zhou Weidong. 周伟东。《建立一个新民主主义的中国》。北京：中共中央党校。博士学位论文。2016年7月，第47页。

²⁹² Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《中国共产党在抗日战争时期的任务》。1937年5月3日，《毛泽东选集》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第237页。

²⁹³ Mao Zedong. “The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan”. 3 May 1937. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 268.

parties, but all this activity took place definitely under the leadership by the CPC.²⁹⁴

In 1940's the Guomindang no longer belonged to the Maoist concept of the people. The usual formula was “workers, peasants, soldiers and urban petty bourgeoisie”,²⁹⁵ which meant a narrowing down of the concept.²⁹⁶ The concept of petty bourgeoisie is in Marxist theory associated with the lower middle strata that does not clearly belong either to the proletariat or the capitalist class, such as small shopkeepers and various kinds of managers of business or public organizations. Theoretically, professional revolutionaries might often be included in this category, but socialist theory does not argue in that way. During the 1950s, the category of petty bourgeoisie tended to disappear²⁹⁷ probably not because it disappeared as an empirical phenomenon—a stabilizing polity and economy needs managers—but because the conceptual development of Chinese socialism no longer needed such an element. In different periods, *the people* had different scopes. Mao Zedong thought that the subject of democracy was a dynamic concept that was constantly moving; sometimes expanding, sometimes contracting: in the period of the National Revolution, the people included workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie; in the period of the agrarian revolution, the people were only workers, peasants and soldiers; in the period of the Anti-Japanese War, the scope of the people was extended to all anti-Japanese classes including landlords, national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. In 1957 Mao illumined the changes in the concept of people:

人民这个概念在不同的国家和各个国家的不同的历史时期，有着不同的内容。拿我国的情况来说，在抗日战争时期，一切抗日的阶级、阶层和社会集团都属于人民的范围，日本帝国主义、汉奸、亲日派都是人民的敌人。在解放战争时期，美帝国主义和它的走狗即官僚资产阶级、地主阶级以及代表这些的国民党反动派，都是人民的敌人；一切反对这些敌人的阶级、阶层和社会集团，都属于人民的范围。在现阶段，在建设社会主义的时期，一切赞成、拥护和参加社会主义建设事业的阶层和社会集团，都属于人民的范围；一切反抗社会主义革命和敌视、破坏社会主义建设的社会势力和社会集团，都是人民的敌人。²⁹⁸

The concept of “the people” varies in content in different countries and in different periods of history in a given country. Take our own country for example. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, all those classes, strata and social groups opposing Japanese aggression came within the category of

²⁹⁴ Zhou Weidong. 周伟东。《建立一个新民主主义的中国》。北京：中共中央党校。博士毕业论文。2016年7月，第217页。

²⁹⁵ Mao Zedong. “Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art”. May 1942. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 76. Also see “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”. 30 June 1949. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 417. “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”. 30 June 1949. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 421.

²⁹⁶ Mao Zedong. “On the Draft Constitution of People’s Republic of China”. 14 June 1954. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 143.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题》。1957年2月27日。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。北京：人民出版社。1977年，第364页。

the people, while the Japanese imperialists, their Chinese collaborators and the pro-Japanese elements were all enemies of the people. During the War of Liberation, the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs—the bureaucrat-capitalists, the landlords and the Guomindang reactionaries who represented these two classes—were the enemies of the people, while the other classes, strata and social groups, which opposed them, all came within the category of the people. At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata and social groups which favour, support, and work for the cause of socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people.²⁹⁹

In this way the Maoist concept of “the people, 人民, *rénmín*” is a highly politicized concept with strong changes over time. It must be understood together with its counter concept “the enemy, 敌人, *dírén*”, because only understanding this relationship makes it possible to compose in a specific historical constellation the category of the people from suitable elements in alliance with each other, whether then called a united front or with other names, such as socialist construction. Haapanen says: “Political languages are flexible and they do overlap each other.”³⁰⁰ Palonen also holds a similar opinion: “Only an examination of the social and political context at that time can enable us to truly understand the intent of the author to make certain remarks in order to achieve an understanding of the true meaning of the author’s text. It is not past thoughts in themselves, their content or validity that interests us, but rather their political role in the struggles of the era and the possibility of transferring them to new contexts as politically valuable instruments.”³⁰¹ It is necessary to examine the research object as a whole. It is not possible to examine only a single sentence or to separate the research object into isolated parts. That would only lead to erroneous results, and understanding the diversity of intentions is very important for a proper understanding of the text. The people is a political, not an ethnic or legal concept. Likewise, because the concepts of the people and democracy are overlapping concepts, democracy also has to be seen as an organizational element assisting struggle against some enemy, and it is employed only among the current understanding of the people in a given historical situation. Therefore, also the concept of “people’s democratic dictatorship, 人民民主专政, *rénmín mínzhǔ zhuānzhèng*” has great adaptability in different historical situations, and is inherently logical within this type of theoretical thought. It means struggle of the people against an enemy. What is also implied, though not said explicitly, is that the struggle should be guided by a leader. This is implicit in the idea of struggle, which demands unified organization, whether military or otherwise.

In Jin and Liu’s opinion, the transformation of the meaning of “民主, *mínzhǔ*”

²⁹⁹ Mao Zedong. “Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People”. 17 February 1957. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume V. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1977, p. 385.

³⁰⁰ Haapanen, Jarkko. *Adaptation to World Trends: A Rereading of the May Fourth Movement Radicalization*. Doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä: Jyväskylä University Printing House. 2013, p. 117.

³⁰¹ Palonen, Kari. *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p. 69.

from “democracy” to “the democratic dictatorship of the people” led to a significant result in China.³⁰² As the national political system of New China, people’s democratic dictatorship system includes two aspects: Democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries. Although the relationship with the enemy appears to be the overriding meaning of the concept of democracy, it also had a practical and institutional meaning, though within the antagonistic situation:

对于人民内部，则实行民主制度，人民有言论集会结社等项的自由权。选举权，只给人民，不给反动派。这两方面，对人民内部的民主方面和对反动派的专政方面，互相结合起来，就是人民民主专政。³⁰³

Democracy is practiced within the ranks of the people, who enjoy the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, association and so on. The right to vote belongs only to the people, not to the reactionaries. The combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people’s democratic dictatorship.³⁰⁴

Yu claimed: “Democracy and dictatorship were viewed as complementary, with democracy serving the proletariat and dictatorship curbing the excesses of the bourgeoisie.”³⁰⁵ Thus, democratic practices were composed of the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, the freedom to form associations, and the freedom to vote, but this all took place under the conditions of an antagonistic situation with its limitations on the autonomy of the people to handle these matters by themselves alone. Someone has to take care of the duties of the dictator in a people’s democratic dictatorship.

However, the problem of this view on democracy is that democracy is regarded more as a means for alliance creation and a style of work in the struggle, rather than as a definite goal in itself and as a legally established institutionalized system. Because of the complexity of the concept of the people’s democratic dictatorship, after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the fate of the Chinese people and its new socialist rulers tended to continue being fairly rough and volatile. Chinese leadership under Mao took the imaginary imperialist hostile forces as its enemies in the outside world and constantly launched waves of class struggle against the inside. As a result, elements of the people’s democratic dictatorship were easily and forcefully mobilized whenever the supreme leader wished, resulting in the tragedy of

³⁰² Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng. “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy’: China’s Selective Adoption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts (1840-1924)”. *History of Political Thought*. Autumn 2005, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 472-497.

³⁰³ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《论人民民主专政》，1946年6月30日，《毛泽东选集》第四卷。北京：人民出版社。1967年，第1412页。

³⁰⁴ Mao Zedong. “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship”. 30 June 1949. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Volume IV. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1975, p. 418.

³⁰⁵ The General Provisions of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China stipulate that “we should abide by the principle of democratic centralism, which is the combination of centralization on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized guidance.” Article 3 of the General Provisions of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that “the state organs of the People’s Republic of China should exercise democratic centralism.” Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 4.

the Cultural Revolution.³⁰⁶ Korhonen argues:

We should not focus only on the classic text, but we should also focus on the overall social and political vocabulary of a particular historical period. Only by placing the text in its proper context of thought, examining the relationship between the argument in the text and the broader context we can reveal the basic intent of the author's argument. The context refers to the specific environment, background and conditions of the concept. It is subject to a certain time and space and is the product of history. Any statement is inescapably the embodiment of a particular intention on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and is thus specific to its context in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend.³⁰⁷

This exploration is an indispensable part of the thought historian's attempt to grasp the doctrine and theory, and their meaning in their own time. If a text is examined in isolation from the context, it will be difficult to determine the extent to which a particular speech is original, and the originality of the thinker's speech can only be more convincing when compared with the contemporary context of other authors and societal goals. The depth of the description or analysis of a definite theory or the clear use of a concept in an author's work should be considered as related to their political point. The actual transfer of theories and conceptions from one context to another signifies, that the political role of theories should not be understood too narrowly.³⁰⁸ It can be said that although Mao Zedong attached great importance to democracy in his theory, the concept itself remained very narrow. Too narrow to conduct very good governance with it, as at least the elements of stability and predictability were missing.

Yet, the concept of democracy is at the core of Mao's concept of governance. He did not use the current vocabulary of governance, but when he wrote and spoke about democracy, he explicated his idea of governance. The long revolutionary experience brought up two outstanding governance characteristics of the Communist Party of China: one is a highly centralized system of power, and the other is a powerful social mobilization and organization ability. These two characteristics of the CPC have had and continue to have a profound impact on the formation and development of the basic political and economic system of New China. They form the basis of the socialist Chinese concept of governance as developed by Mao Zedong during the first formative decades of the movement and the republic.

³⁰⁶ Wang Shizhu, Li Dong. 王世柱, 李栋。《从“民主”到“人民民主”：中国近代民主观念嬗变的考察》，《政法学刊》。2015年6月18日，第7-26页。

³⁰⁷ Korhonen, Pekka. "What Is Asia? International Studies as Political Linguistics". *Global and Regional Problems: Towards an Interdisciplinary Study*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 131-149.

³⁰⁸ Palonen, Kari. *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric*. Cambridge: Polity, 2003, p. 69.

3.7 Conclusion

In the early days of the founding of China, China's governance revolved around the core leadership of the CPC, which occupied an absolute advantage in the allocation of state power. To a great extent, it overlapped with the function of government. The administrative organs of the government were basically replaced by the permanent organs of the Party. The Central Committee of the Party became the highest authority, forming a unified management system all the way down to the local government. With this system and under Mao Zedong's leadership, the Chinese people eliminated the residual power of the Guomindang, suppressed anti-revolutionary elements, abolished the feudal land system, won the victory in Korea, established the People's Congress system, and maintained the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new nation. After the completion of the socialist transformation, China implemented the planned economic system based on a strong government and a weak market. This governance system was conducive to consolidating the new regime and maintaining the stable development of society. In spite of its inherent problem of being at times a one-man rule with corresponding problems for the society, it was a rational and understandable governance system in its time.

4 DENG XIAOPING'S ENHANCEMENT OF STATE GOVERNANCE

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, China has experienced three stages of state development: "domination and rule, 统治, *tǒngzhì*", "management, 管理, *guǎnlǐ*", and "governance, 治理, *zhilǐ*".³⁰⁹ Domination refers to the political tradition of "great unification, 大一统, *dà yītǒng*", which has been attempted in China for thousands of years by different dynasties. It does not only refer to a high degree of political centralization rule, but also more deeply to attempts to achieve a high degree of economic and cultural integration. When the People's Republic of China had just been founded after nearly two decades of warfare, the economic conditions were extremely backward and the material situation was scarce. Due to the planned economy and the highly politicized society, citizens did not have the right to choose and were more dominated by the central state organs in the fields of economy, politics and society, as seen in the previous main chapter. The era of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening up took China to a process in which the government gradually relaxed restrictions and reduced its control over citizens, moving China into a state managed phase of its organizational development.

Deng Xiaoping's personal history was tumultuous, but also reflected the history of whole China during his lifetime. He was a senior CPC and government official and vice-chairman of the CPC under the post-Mao administration of Hua Guofeng. During the period before 1949 he was military commander and political commissar of the Second Field Army. After Liberation he held important military and administrative positions with particular responsibility for south-west China. In 1953 he became Minister of Finance and in 1954 he was vice-premier of the State Council. From 1956 he occupied the vitally important administrative post of General Secretary to the Central Committee of the CPC and was also a member of the Politburo. During the Cultural Revolution he was associated with the "moderates" and denounced as the "Number Two Person in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road", Liu Shaoqi being the number one. In 1973 he was reinstated as vice-premier and re-elected to the Central Committee and became vice-chairman of the CPC and chief-of-staff of the People's Liberation Army. However, in early 1976 he was dismissed from all his official positions in the period when, it is said, the Gang of Four was in control. After the downfall of the Gang, Deng rose to power once again to become the vice-chairman of the CPC under Hua Guofeng and a member of the crucial Standing Committee of the Politburo.³¹⁰

In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC is generally regarded as the cornerstone of China's reform and opening up.³¹¹ The plenary session put an end to the Cultural Revolution and shifted the

³⁰⁹ Yin Yirong. 殷一榕.《邓小平国家治理思想及其当代价值》.扬州:扬州大学.硕士毕业论文.2018年,第22页。

³¹⁰ Dillon, Michael. *The Dictionary of Chinese History*. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1979, p. 206.

³¹¹ Launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, the Reform and Opening-Up Policy initiated China's transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based system. Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 6.

principal focus of the Party from class struggle to economic development.³¹² It was during this plenary session that Deng Xiaoping was elected to the top position of power within the Party and state, and over the course of the five-day session, a number of historically significant resolutions were passed.

Deng himself did not explicitly put forward the concept of state governance. He used fairly traditional Chinese socialist vocabulary. Nevertheless, the viewpoints he put forward in the process of exploring China's reform, opening up and building a socialist road with Chinese characteristics formed important elements in the development of the Chinese concept of state governance. Emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts are the basic slogans of Deng Xiaoping's style of state governance. He carried out the overall design and governance of China's socialist construction from economic, political, social and other aspects, and gradually formed a unique state modernization thinking. This system is centred on economic construction, promotes a socialist political system and socially coordinated reform around economic governance, and attaches importance to the governance of socialist cultural undertakings.³¹³ Wong believes: "Deng was interested in whether or not a particular development strategy could produce the intended results, and he would not be encumbered by ideological taboos."³¹⁴ This reform of leadership has opened the door to diversification of state management and governance, and has provided a wealth of experience for later forms of state governance.

In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping's reform of state governance carried on from the situation reached during the Mao Zedong era. Marti pointed out: "Upon his return to power, Deng began the process of reversing Mao's disastrous economic, political, and social policies, opened China to the outside world, launched an economic modernization campaign, and reformed the Party."³¹⁵ In addition, Deng Xiaoping believed that the experience of contemporary western countries in the modernization of national governance was worthy of learning and referencing, and in his speeches he repeatedly emphasized that China needs to learn from them.³¹⁶ He did not mean only industrial equipment, technology and various sciences,³¹⁷ but was very conscious of the managerial and administrative aspects of the task. For instance, in 1992 he formulated the idea in the following way:

总之，社会主义要赢得与资本主义相比较的优势，就必须大胆吸收和借鉴

³¹² Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, pp. 6-9.

³¹³ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014, p. 60.

³¹⁴ Wong, John. "The Economics of the Nanxun". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 36.

³¹⁵ Marti, Michael E. *China and the Legacy of Deng Xiaoping: From Communist Revolution to Capitalist Evolution*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2002, p. xi.

³¹⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "We Should Draw on the Experience of Other Countries". 3 June 1988. Excerpt from a talk with President EI Hadj Omar Bongo of the Gabon Republic. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III (second edition), 1994, p. 261.

³¹⁷ Deng Xiaoping. "Emancipate the Mind, seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future". 13 December 1978. Speech at the closing session of the Central Working Conference which made preparations for the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that immediately followed. This speech served as the keynote address for the Third Plenary Session. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1984 (first edition), p. 150.

人类社会创造的一切文明成果，吸收和借鉴当今世界各国包括资本主义发达国家的一切反映现代化生产规律的先进经营方式、管理方法。³¹⁸

In short, if we want socialism to achieve superiority over capitalism, we should not hesitate to draw on the achievements of all cultures and to learn from other countries, including the developed capitalist countries, all advanced methods of operation and techniques of management that reflect the laws governing modern socialized production.³¹⁹

Even though the expression was about all cultures of the world, the main idea was to learn from developed capitalistic countries, simply because they were more developed, more efficient and richer. Economically, militarily, and organizationally they were better than China overall, not only in some industrial respects, and therefore very diversified aspects of culture needed to be imported from them. However, it certainly did not mean changing the political system of China. China was to remain socialist, and thus guarding against harmful capitalistic elements should be done.

Deng's idea was not only to show the superiority of socialism over capitalism, which was a usual cliché at the time, but also a more nationalistic one, namely to show that the Chinese system was “the best in the world, 世界上最好的制度, *shìjiè shàng zuì hǎo de zhìdù*”.³²⁰ Mao's governance style had kept China poor, thus, becoming the best in the world implied profound changes in the Chinese form of national organization. They were not minutely spelled out, because nobody could be sure in practice what exactly should be done. What was clear was that this reform certainly involved learning from the capitalistic developed countries, and the learning included aspects of administration and governance. This was Deng's central argument, which he repeated in several speeches.³²¹

4.1 Reform and opening up

China's attitude to the world outside has always been, and still is, of particular interest

³¹⁸ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。1993年，第373页。

³¹⁹ Deng Xiaoping. “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai”. 18 January -21 February 1992. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, pp. 361-362.

³²⁰ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。1994年，第337页。Deng Xiaoping. “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership”. 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1984 (first edition), p. 320.

³²¹ See Deng Xiaoping. “Carry Out the Policy of Opening to the outside World and Learn Advanced Science and Technology from Other Countries”. 10 October 1978. Excerpt from a talk with a press delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 143-144. Also see Deng Xiaoping. “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai”. 18 January -21 February 1992. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, pp. 361-362. Also see Deng Xiaoping. “We Must Continue to Emancipate Our Minds and Accelerate the Reform”. 25 May 1988. Excerpt from a talk with Milos Jakes, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Volume III, 1994, p. 259. Also see Deng Xiaoping. “We Shall Draw on Historical Experience and Guard Against Wrong Tendencies”. 30 April 1987. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 327. Also see Deng Xiaoping. “We Should Draw on the Experience of Other Countries”. 3 June 1988. Excerpt from a talk with Zbigniew Messner, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the United Workers' Party of Poland and Chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 262.

to the non-Chinese observer.³²² Mao Zedong's representation of the outside world came into being during the external and internal wars, tending as a result to be very closed towards the outside. Although Deng Xiaoping also experienced the era of the same wars, his way of thinking about opening up to the outside world was mainly formed during an era of peace and development.

Years of overseas experience is an important difference between Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. Deng had lived, studied and worked abroad both in France and in the Soviet Union from 1920 to 1927, which can be regarded as the birth of his revolutionary spirit. In France, Deng discovered the West, Marxism, the working class, the Party, the place of China in the world, and his own role in all this.³²³ He learned about capitalism and imperialism in France, which gave a provoking impression to his revolutionary thought in the future. Vogel states: "In Moscow, Deng attended classes eight hours a day, six days a week. He took a full schedule of courses that included the study of works by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, as well as classes on historical materialism, economic geography, the history of the Soviet Communist Party, and the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement".³²⁴ By those courses, he accumulated an advanced knowledge frame and student movement experience, which laid a solid foundation for his actions and thought after he came back to China. Deng thus represented his era as an exceptionally international and, in terms of socialist theory, a well-educated Chinese revolutionary.

Engels wrote: "The theoretical thinking of each era is a product of history, it has very different forms in different eras, and therefore has very different contents."³²⁵ In other words, in addition to the personal differences of the leaders, in a larger social and political sense the way of thinking of opening up to the outside world is a product of difference between the "war and revolution" era and the "peace and development" era respectively.³²⁶ Similarly, Lenin pointed out: "Only by recognizing the basic characteristics of this era can we use this as a basis to estimate more detailed characteristics of this country or that country."³²⁷ These are the ways understood in Chinese discussions, which are largely based on the type of argumentation found in socialist literature.

The organizational developments of the Mao Zedong era laid the foundation for the Deng Xiaoping era, but also left problems that needed urgent solution. Under Mao's leadership, China had made fundamental reforms: completed the agrarian reform as well as socialized handicrafts, capitalist industry and commerce, thus establishing the socialist economic base. All these took more than three decades,

³²² Wiethoff, Bodo. *Introduction to Chinese History from Ancient Times to 1912*. Translated by Whittall, Mary. London: Thames and Hudson, 1975, p. 134.

³²³ Vogel, Ezra F. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2011, p. 49.

³²⁴ *Ibid.* p. 51.

³²⁵ Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. 马克思, 恩格斯。《马克思恩格斯选集》第三卷。 *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*. Vol. III, Chinese version. 北京: 人民出版社。1995, p. 465.

³²⁶ Lu Changjun. 卢昌军。《邓小平毛泽东对外开放思想比较研究》。武汉: 华中师范大学。博士毕业论文。2008年,第27页。

³²⁷ Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. 列宁。《列宁全集》第21卷。 *The Complete Works of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin*. Vol. 21, Chinese version. 北京: 人民出版社。1989, pp. 123-124.

which meant a great revolution in the history of China.

Deng pointed out: “Notwithstanding, in the many years following the establishment of the socialist economic base, the Chinese had failed to work out policies that would create favourable conditions for the development of the productive forces.”³²⁸ Deng said that the leadership had been wasting time during the recent period.³²⁹ On this foundation, he engaged in a very important rhetorical redescription of the meaning of the concept of revolution as understood before him in China:

革命是要搞阶级斗争，但革命不只是搞阶级斗争。生产力方面的革命也是革命，而且是很重要的革命，从历史的发展来讲是最根本的革命。³³⁰

Revolution means carrying out class struggle, but it does not merely mean that. The development of the productive forces is also a kind of revolution—a very important one. It is the most fundamental revolution from the viewpoint of historical development.³³¹

Deng started to tone down the importance of class struggle. China had not yet attained true communism, the stage where class struggle was supposed to come to a natural end, but according to his judgement emphasis on it in 1980 was already misplaced. He nevertheless often used the concept of revolution, but also it involved reinterpretation. His concept was very different from the way it was used during the Cultural Revolution. Deng’s revolution was not a qualitatively drastic and fast upheaval of the current situation:

改革是社会主义制度的自我完善，在一定的范围内也发生了某种程度的革命性变革。³³²

Reform is part of the self-perfecting process of the socialist system, and in certain areas and to a certain extent it is also a revolutionary change.³³³

Deng’s ultimate goal certainly was drastic in terms of elevating Chinese living standards and China’s position in the world, but his means were patient and cautious. Carefully orchestrated successful reform adds up to a revolution over a long period of time. It is also worth noticing his use of the term “self-perfecting”, which implied understanding reform as a long process of prudently adjusting multi-level local interests with fundamental national interests. This way of conceptualizing revolution certainly was different from violent revolution.

³²⁸ Deng Xiaoping. “Two Kinds of Comments About China’s Reform”. 21 August 1985. Excerpt from a talk with Julius Kambarage Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 138.

³²⁹ Deng Xiaoping. “To Build Socialism We Must First Develop the Productive Forces”. 12 April 1980. Talk with Kenneth David Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 310.

³³⁰ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第311页。

³³¹ Deng Xiaoping. “To Build Socialism We Must First Develop the Productive Forces”. 1 April 1980. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 310.

³³² Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第142页。

³³³ Deng Xiaoping. “Speech at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China”. 23 September 1985. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994, p. 145.

Productivity became the new key concept that Deng attached to the established concept of socialism. Because of this conceptual innovation, both productivity and opening up became intrinsic characteristics of the socialist system itself, because they appeared to be the most efficient ways to enhance productivity. Compared with Mao's "continuous revolution",³³⁴ economic productivity and opening up made China "stronger and increasingly influential in the modern world."³³⁵ Nevertheless, it only meant a change from one "continuous revolution" to another, because increasing productivity is a continuous revolutionary undertaking.

Deng Xiaoping implied that one of the reasons for China's long-term stagnation was its isolation. He summarized this period of history: "China remained isolated for more than 300 years counting from the middle of the Ming Dynasty to the Opium War, or for nearly 200 years counting from the reign of Emperor Kangxi (1661-1722). Because the rest of the world and especially European powers advanced, China declined into relative poverty and ignorance."³³⁶ Then followed the decades of internal and external turbulence. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, China opened towards the outside world, but at that time it could be done only to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There was development, but compared with the rapidly advancing capitalistic countries, this development was fairly slow and at a low level. One reason was the blockade of China by the capitalistic countries, but in addition under the guidance of the leftist thinking, the Chinese had begun to regard seclusion as independence and opening up as worshipping foreign countries. Thus, a mental and political blockade against economic productivity increases had been formed. Deng discussed this in his speeches.³³⁷

Under a highly centralized planned economic system, market competition is not required. This leads to quality problems. The specifications of products do not follow international standards and thus possible exporters find it difficult to enter the international market. This closed-door economic system not only severely hindered the development of the socialist economy, but also further widened the gap with economically developed countries. So, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the present world is characterized by openness, a closed-door and isolated policy would hinder social construction and development. China itself was not an integrated common market, but an economic patchwork composed of a multitude of small national markets. This was not efficient. Both kinds of exclusions were harmful.³³⁸ This is Deng Xiaoping's theoretical argument on the necessity of economic openness in the contemporary world.

³³⁴ Clark, Paul. *The Chinese Cultural Revolution—a history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2008, p. i.

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China". 22 October 1984. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 96.

³³⁷ Deng Xiaoping. "Reform is the Only Way for China to Develop Its Productive Forces". 28 August 1985. Excerpt from a talk with Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and President of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front). *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 140.

³³⁸ Deng Xiaoping. "Building A Socialism with A Specifically Chinese Character". 30 June 1984. Excerpt from a talk with the Japanese Delegation to the second session of the Council of Sino-Japanese Non-Governmental Persons. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 74. Also see Deng Xiaoping. "Our Magnificent Goal and Basic Policies". 6 October 1984. An interview with Chinese and foreign delegates to a symposium on China's economic cooperation with foreign countries. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 86.

China must be seen as an ordinary part of the world. When China is closely connected with the rest of the world, China's society will develop and even gradually advance to the forefront of nations. When China is isolated from the world, the development of China's society will slow down or even stagnate. The growing interdependence of the whole world is not determined by people's subjective will, but by their objective necessity. The decisive factors are the development of a commodity economy with mass production and the promotion of scientific and technological progress.³³⁹ Thus, in Deng's reinterpretation of socialism revolution, China should be an open society, at least in terms of the flow of economic inputs and outputs, and the socialist economy should be understood as a commodity economy. This kind of economy requires the development of a broader raw material base and sales market. China should enter the global international division of labour. Deng concluded the argument simply: "We must act in accordance with economic laws."³⁴⁰ 我们现在强调要按经济规律办事"³⁴¹ On the basis of this kind of political ethos in 1978, initiated by Deng Xiaoping and marked by the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, China began the historical journey of reform and opening up.³⁴²

The process of reform was understood to include both economic system reform and political system reform. Among them, the economic system was fundamental. Reform of the economic system was the means to realize the development of the productive forces and enhance economic strength, so as to improve the life of the Chinese people and augment China's international status. Improved economic performance was the basis to promote improvement and development of the political system reform, which was necessary to guarantee the achievements of the economic system reform. However, Deng and his contemporaries tended to be rather obscure about this element, compared with emphatic arguments about economic reform.

If China was to achieve rapid economic growth, its governance mode had to be reformed. Zheng figures: "This was the motivation behind the decision of the leadership to implement economic reforms."³⁴³ The reform started from the rural areas, first through experimenting and soon through the implementation of the household contract responsibility system during 1979-1982. These experiments were necessitated by serious shortages of agricultural produce during the late 1970s, the collectivized farming system being unable to cope satisfactorily with the situation. As the experiments in remote rural areas were successful, the system was soon implemented in more central areas with equally triumphant results. There was a rapid growth in agricultural production, a corresponding sharp rise in incomes of farmers,

³³⁹ Lu Changjun. 卢昌军。《邓小平毛泽东对外开放思想比较研究》。2008年9月。第49页。

³⁴⁰ Deng Xiaoping. "To Build Socialism We Must First Develop the Productive Forces". 5 May 1980. Talk with Aimed Ceca Toure, President of the Republic of Guinea. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 313.

³⁴¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，北京：人民出版社。第314页。

³⁴² Ou Jian. 欧健。《毛泽东邓小平社会主义观比较研究》。天津：天津师范大学。博士毕业论文。2010年4月，第66页。

³⁴³ Zheng Yongnian. "Ideological Decline, the Rise of an Interest-based Social Order, and the Demise of Communism in China". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 179.

and finally in agricultural productivity.³⁴⁴ This instant success in agriculture then enabled Deng to convey economic reform also to cities and the industrial sector.³⁴⁵

On the basis of the gradual advance of the economic system reform, the reform involving the political level, the educational level, the scientific and technological level and other levels was also gradually moving forward. For example, the overall recovery of the college entrance examination, the reform of the scientific and technological system, and the management of enterprises. A couple of concrete examples follow.

4.1.1 Enterprise reform

Wong analysed: “As agricultural productivity increased, more surplus labour was released for non-farm activities. This in turn led to the mushrooming of township and village enterprises, which later became the driving force for China’s economic growth.”³⁴⁶ Vogel pointed out: “With Deng at the helm, the Chinese people were willing to swallow some of their national pride, admit their backwardness, and keep learning everything they could from abroad.”³⁴⁷ Deng emphasised the necessity to modernize enterprises to employ advanced technology and managerial expertise. Consider Anshan Iron and Steel³⁴⁸ as an example. Deng Xiaoping inspected Anshan Iron and Steel five times in succession,³⁴⁹ and made important instructions on production and construction, management, technological innovation, and ideological style.

引进先进技术设备后，一定要按照国际先进的管理方法、先进的经营方法、先进的定额来管理，也就是按照经济管理规律管理经济。一句话，就是要革命，不要改良，不要修修补补。³⁵⁰

When advanced technology and equipment are imported, we must run enterprises with advanced management and operation techniques and set attainable quotas. In other words, we should manage the economy in

³⁴⁴ Wong, John. *The Political Economy of Deng's Nanxun: Breakthrough in China's Reform and Development*. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2014, p. 20.

³⁴⁵ Deng Xiaoping. “Reform and Opening to the Outside World Are A Great Experiment”. 29 June 1985. Excerpt from a talk with a delegation from the Party of the National Liberation Front of Algeria. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 134. Also see Deng Xiaoping. “Reform is the Only Way for China to Develop Its Productive Forces”. 28 August 1985. Excerpt from a talk with Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and President of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front). *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, pp. 141-142.

³⁴⁶ Wong, John. *The Political Economy of Deng's Nanxun: Breakthrough in China's Reform and Development*. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2014, p. 25.

³⁴⁷ Vogel, Ezra F. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2011, p. 476.

³⁴⁸ Anshan Iron and Steel was founded in 1917. It is the world’s largest ironmaking plant with a single plant. From the founding of New China to the present, the iron-making plant has produced more than 380 million tons of qualified crude iron for the country. In different historical periods, the leaders of the Party and the state paid close attention to the development of Anshan Iron and Steel. The Ironmaking General Plant has trained a large number of leading cadres, management experts, technical talents and labour models, and delivered them to various industries across the country. In China it is known as the cradle of steel talents. See official website of Ansteel Group: <http://www.ansteelgroup.com/a/news.php?pcid=16&cid=18&cid1=18&id=26>

³⁴⁹ Jiang Yongqing. 蒋永清。《邓小平与调查研究》，《学习时报》。2018年3月。第19-26页。

³⁵⁰ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第129-130页。

accordance with the laws governing economic development. In a word, we need a revolution instead of just reforming the economy.³⁵¹

Moreover, Deng urged that enterprises must have qualified managerial staff and workers. More power should be given to the local authorities, and enterprises should be given the right act independently according to market possibilities.³⁵² Zhao states: “Too much control rather than weak governance that had stifled China’s economic growth. When more autonomy and incentives were given to local governments, the Chinese economy quickly took off.”³⁵³ Deng Xiaoping thus systematically pushed for adopting more capitalistic forms of management and technology at the enterprise level. Accordingly, Anshan Iron and Steel has made gratifying achievements in transformation, strengthening its management, and achieved leapfrog development. In July 2019, it ranked 385th on the Fortune Global 500 list.³⁵⁴

4.1.2 Education reform

In 1966, shortly after the Cultural Revolution began, the first thing to be abolished was the college entrance examination system. From 1966 to 1969, all tertiary institutions in mainland China stopped enrolling students; teachers and students were decentralized into physical labour, and higher education was completely paralyzed.³⁵⁵ During the Cultural Revolution, political censorship and targeting based on family background and social relations as the main content had halted many promising young people’s studying process. Therefore, the restoration of the college entrance examination system was a major decision made by Deng Xiaoping in 1977 after re-entering the leadership positions of the Party and the state, which had a strong response in the whole society.³⁵⁶

要经过严格的考试，把最优秀的人集中在重点中学和大学。³⁵⁷

It is necessary to bring together, through stiff examinations, the outstanding people in the key secondary schools and the key colleges and universities.³⁵⁸

In the process of restoring the college entrance examination for decision-making, Deng Xiaoping started from the overall situation of cultivating talents as soon as possible, caring for the intellectual youth. He corrected the Cultural Revolution

³⁵¹ Deng Xiaoping. “Update Enterprises with Advanced Technology and Managerial Expertise”. 18 September 1978. Excerpt from remarks made when hearing a report from the leading comrades of the Anshan Municipal Party Committee. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 140.

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 141.

³⁵³ Zhao Litao. “Social Transformation, Stability and Governance”. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds). *China: development and governance*. Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific Pub. 2013, p. 278.

³⁵⁴ See the statistics on Fortune official website. <https://fortune.com/global500/2019/search/?rank=desc>

³⁵⁵ Long Pingping, Zhangshu, 龙平平, 张曙。《邓小平与恢复高考》，《实践》。2014年5月。第65-72页。

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.* p. 65.

³⁵⁷ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，北京：人民出版社。第40页。

³⁵⁸ Deng Xiaoping. “Respect Knowledge, Respect Trained Personnel”. 24 May 1977. Excerpt from a talk with two leading comrades of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 53-54.

mistakes and changed the fate of a generation of intellectual youth. This decision has trained a group of high-quality talents for China. These people later became the backbone of reform and opening up in various fields.

4.1.3 Similarities with Mao Zedong's opening policy

It is often thought that because Mao Zedong's and Deng Xiaoping's foreign policies were different, also their thinking should have been different, but this is not necessarily so. The two leaders have many similarities regarding their thoughts on opening China towards cooperation with the rest of the world. They both advocated that in the process of opening to the outside world, China should be as open to all countries as possible and in all fields. In other words, China's opening to the outside world was seen as a comprehensive and wide-ranging opening up. In 1956 when Mao Zedong talked about China's foreign relations in his speech "On the Ten Major Relations", he not only put forward the slogan "learn from foreign countries", but also clearly stated:

我们的方针是，一切民族、一切国家的长处都要学，政治、经济、科学、技术、文学、艺术的一切真正好的东西都要学。³⁵⁹

Our policy is to learn from the strong points of all nations and all countries, learn all that is genuinely good in the political, economic, scientific and technological fields and in literature and art.³⁶⁰

Later, he emphasized in his Correctly Handling of Contradictions Among the People:

一切国家的好经验我们都要学，不管是社会主义国家的，还是资本主义国家的，这一点是肯定的。³⁶¹

We should learn from the good experience of all countries, socialist or capitalist, about this there is no argument.³⁶²

However, there was a clear gap between Mao Zedong's words and concrete practice of opening to the outside world. The opening up advocated by Mao Zedong not only had a strong political colour, but also in economic terms was restricted to doing a limited amount of business, accepting loans and conducting technical exchanges. On a controlled scale, regarding how China's economy developed after the Second World War, Mao Zedong envisaged economic cooperation between China and the United States in many conversations with John Stewart Service, a member of the U.S. Army Observer Group, in 1944: "Less developed China could use industrial raw

³⁵⁹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。1977年，第285页。

³⁶⁰ Mao Zedong. "On the Ten Relationships". Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. 25 April 1956. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V, 1977, p. 303.

³⁶¹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第五卷。1977年，第401页。

³⁶² Mao Zedong. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People". 27 February 1957. Speech at the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V, 1977, p. 420.

materials and agricultural products as compensation for the investment and trade of the United States.”³⁶³ Although there were some plans, Mao’s practical policy did not imply a multi-level and all-round opening up. Mao Zedong had to develop his policy under the international political constraints of the times. In the Cold War situation, under the influence of Stalin, Mao Zedong accepted the spread of the international political opposition of the two camps to the economic field. He regarded the world economy as two separate markets, stating that they were opposite, parallel and could exist independently.

Yet, times change. Tao as the editor of *History of Sino U.S. relations*, wrote the history that: “In the early 1970s, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai proceeded from the need to adjust the diplomatic strategy of the relationship between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. They invited the American writer Edgar Snow to interview Mao and invited the American table tennis team to visit China, which expressed the willingness to strengthen ties with the US and strive to open up a stalemate in Sino-US relations. On 9-11 July 1971, Henry Kissinger secretly visited China. He reached an agreement on Richard Nixon’s visit to China. On 21-28 February 1972, U.S. President Nixon arrived at Beijing and started negotiations with Chinese leaders. On 28 February, the China-US Shanghai Joint Communiqué was published, announcing the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations.”³⁶⁴ The Joint Communiqué emphasized that the two sides agreed to use the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 和平共处五项原则, *héping gòngchǔ wǔ xiàng yuánzé*”³⁶⁵ to deal with relations between countries. After that, China and the United States gradually established a cordial relationship. This change strengthened China’s ties with the capitalistic part of the world and created a favourable external environment for future opening up. Nixon’s and Kissinger’s policy of moving China politically closer to the Western camp in the beginning of the 1970s, as well as Mao’s willingness to move with it, within a decade made way for the combined political and economic conditions to become more favourable for the kind of actions contemplated by Deng.

Mao Zedong had advocated vigorously developing the interior and balancing the distribution of productive forces throughout the state. Most Chinese industries existing during the early decades of modern China, both light and heavy, had been built in the coastal areas, not in the interior provinces. Mao was determined to build industries especially in the interior.³⁶⁶ Geopolitically it also was sensible because industries were safer inland in case of foreign aggression.

³⁶³ Dong Zhikai, Mao Liyan, Wu Li. 董志凯, 毛立言, 武力。《延安时期毛泽东的经济思想》。西安: 陕西人民出版社。1993年, 第114-115页。

³⁶⁴ Tao Wenzhao (ed.). 陶文钊主编。《中美关系史》。上海: 上海人民出版社。1999年, 第101-103页。

³⁶⁵ In December 1953, China and India negotiated on the relationship between the two countries in Tibet. Premier Zhou Enlai proposed the five principles of peaceful coexistence, namely mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Source: Web Portal of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng*. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-09/27/content_5434223.htm

³⁶⁶ Mao Zedong. “On the Ten Major Relationships”. 25 April 1956. Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V, 1977, pp. 286-287.

Deng Xiaoping advocated the development of coastal areas first, because his policy relied on increased interactions with the outside world and the cold war situation had receded. Also, the coastal regions already were the most suitable for that kind of activity, and because Mao's industrial policies had not greatly changed the existing situation. In 1988, Deng Xiaoping expounded the thought of "two overall situations, 两个大局, *liǎng gè dàjú*", through which the coastal areas should be developed first, and then, the coastal areas should help the inland in development to achieve common prosperity.³⁶⁷ Wong and Zheng claim that: "The coastal region, led by Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and other open economic areas, developed much faster than the interior and became the main contributor to China's economic miracle over the period."³⁶⁸ Eventually this region of the maritime frontier was to become an arena for a cultural confrontation, for it was along the coast that China came face to face with foreign cultures that did not conform to hers. Here, China faced not only the industrial civilization of the West as such, but also the extremely successful amalgamations of East Asian and Western cultures, namely Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.


Deng moved on an experimental basis. The initial household responsibility system was an experiment, and as it succeeded, the Chinese leadership shifted their attention to reform the industrial sector in urban areas. The industrial reform was facilitated by the operation of Special Economic Zones in the coastal region, which were initially set up for experimental purposes. Similar zones had been successfully used previously also in other East and Southeast Asian countries. As the combination of foreign capital and industrial know-how with Chinese labour was successful there, the recipe was reproduced in wider areas. Wong opines: The Chinese economic reform with all its "Dengist characteristics" has been eminently successful.³⁶⁹ This is fully evident in China's dynamic economic growth since 1978, as shown in Figure 3.

³⁶⁷ Deng Xiaoping. "The Central Leadership Must Have Authority". 12 September 1988. An interview with Chinese and foreign delegates to a symposium on China's economic cooperation with foreign countries. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, pp. 271-272.

³⁶⁸ Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. "The Political Economy of China's Post-Nanxun Development". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 8.

³⁶⁹ Wong, John. "The Economics of the Nanxun". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific. 2001, pp. 36-37.

Figure 3: China Economic Growth from 1978-1997³⁷⁰



Note: GDP is expressed by current price. Growth rate is calculated on constant price.

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

On 13 December 1978, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech at the closing session of the Central Working Conference, which made preparation for the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that immediately followed, he advocated that some people and some regions should get rich first, other people and other regions following, so as to promote the country towards common prosperity. Deng Xiaoping's discussion on China's economic policy was as follows:

要允许一部分地区、一部分企业、一部分工人农民，由于辛勤努力成绩大而收入先多一些，生活先好起来，一部分人生活先好起来，就必然产生极大的示范力量，影响左邻右舍，带动其他地区、其他单位的人们向他们学习。这样，就会使整个国民经济不断地波浪式地向前发展，使全国各族人民都能比较快地富裕起来。³⁷¹

We should allow some regions and enterprises and some workers and peasants to earn more and enjoy more benefits sooner than others, in accordance with their hard work and greater contributions to society. If the standard of living of some people is raised first, this will inevitably be an impressive example to their neighbours, and people in other regions and units will want to learn from them. This will help the whole national economy to advance wave upon wave and help the people of all our nationalities to become prosperous in a comparatively short period.³⁷²

³⁷⁰ Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 中国国家统计局, *zhōngguó guójiā tǒngjì jú*. China statistical yearbook of 1997. <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/> Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

³⁷¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平. 《邓小平文选》第二卷. 1994年, 第152页。

³⁷² Deng Xiaoping. "Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future". 13 December 1978. Speech at the closing session of the Central Working Conference which made preparations for the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party that immediately

The long period of political struggles during the Cultural Revolution had alienated the general population, making them highly cynical about the slogans of class struggle and absolute egalitarianism.³⁷³ In modern China, the first cities to open ports, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin and other places, were all concentrated in the eastern coastal areas of China, which earlier introduced the advanced technology and culture of the west at that time. Influenced by the western culture, people were more open-minded, and their ability to accept and recognize new things tended to be at the forefront. The advanced technology and cultural basis also made China's modern industry and commerce more concentrated in the eastern coastal cities. Due to its geographical and traffic constraints, the central and western regions of China were not able to realize the synchronous development with the eastern regions, Therefore, from the perspective of national economic development strategy, taking the lead in developing the eastern coastal areas became the shortcut to promote the rapid development of China's economy. First the coasts, then the inland. Especially during the early 1990s this became a strong argument in Deng's speeches.³⁷⁴ This is the meaning of Deng Xiaoping's "two overall situations" strategic conception. Some areas with especially rapid development, such as Shanghai, Guangdong and Jiangsu, should develop faster than the national average.³⁷⁵

In 1992, Deng Xiaoping made predictions on the timing of the implementation of the second overall strategic plan. Wong and Zheng wrote: "Deng boldly called for more radical economic reform and the further opening up of China."³⁷⁶ Deng Xiaoping believed that when people's lives reached a moderately prosperous level at the end of the 20th century, it was the right time to implement the second overall strategic plan:

可以设想，在本世纪末达到小康水平的时候，就要突出地提出和解决这个问题。³⁷⁷

I can imagine that the right time might be the end of this century, when our people are living a fairly comfortable life.³⁷⁸

followed. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 161.

³⁷³ So, Alvin Y. *China's Developmental Miracle: Origins, Transformations, and Challenges*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, p. 4.

³⁷⁴ Deng Xiaoping. "Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai". 18 January-21 February 1992. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, pp. 362-63. Also see Deng Xiaoping. "Seize the Opportune moment to Advance the Reform". 11 July 1985. Excerpt from a talk with leading members of the Central Committee of the CPC who were reporting on the current economic situation. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 136. Also see Deng Xiaoping. "Review Your Experience and Use Professionalism Trained People". Excerpt from a talk with leading members of the CPC Central Committee. 20 August 1991. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 357. Also see Deng Xiaoping. "The Reform of the System for Managing Science and Technology is designed to Liberate the Productive Forces". 7 March 1985. Speech at a National Conference on Work in Science and Technology. *Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, pp. 114-115.

³⁷⁵ Ge Ning. 葛宁。《邓小平“两个大局”战略构想及其当代价值研究》。沈阳：沈阳理工大学。硕士毕业论文。2019年3月，第16页。

³⁷⁶ Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. "The Political Economy of China's Post-Nanxun Development". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 3.

³⁷⁷ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第374页。

³⁷⁸ Deng Xiaoping. "Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai". 18 January-21 February 1992. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 362.

This horizon implied that at the end of the 20th century, under the guidance of the first overall situation, China's eastern region would be developing rapidly, and its economic strength continuously enhanced. At the same time, the economic strength of the whole country would become increasingly strong under the impetus of the eastern region, which would by then met the conditions for vigorously supporting the development of the central and western regions. Under the guidance of the second overall situation in Deng Xiaoping's "two overall situations" strategic conception, the Party and the state in the post-Deng era made a decision to implement the strategy of the western development and began to build the central and western regions with all strength.

This also amounted to a problem of how to understand Chinese socialism in the middle of such drastic changes. Was China becoming a capitalistic country? On 6 February 1987, Deng Xiaoping pointed out:

为什么一谈市场就说是资本主义，只有计划才是社会主义呢？计划和市场都是方法嘛。只要对发展生产力有好处，就可以利用。它为社会主义服务，就是社会主义的；为资本主义服务，就是资本主义的。好像一谈计划就是社会主义，这也是不对的，日本就有一个企划厅嘛，美国也有计划嘛。我们以前是学苏联的，搞计划经济。后来又讲计划经济为主，现在不要再讲这个了。³⁷⁹

Why do some people always insist that the market is capitalist and only planning is socialist? Actually they are both means of developing the productive forces. So long as they serve that purpose, we should make use of them. If they serve socialism they are socialist; if they serve capitalism they are capitalist. It is not correct to say that planning is only socialist, because there is a planning department in Japan and there is also planning in the United States. At one time we copied the Soviet model of economic development and had a planned economy. Later we said that in a socialist economy planning was primary. We should not say that any longer.³⁸⁰

Thus, it is not the means of development that define essential characteristic of the system, but its ideological ethos. A socialist country can adopt anything useful from other systems. If they work and make the socialist country better, they are good, but do not change the characteristics of the system. Deng consistently held the same views in many of his speeches over the years.³⁸¹ Such a pragmatic approach is best

³⁷⁹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第203页。

³⁸⁰ Deng Xiaoping. "Planning and the Market Are Both Means of Developing the Productive Forces". 6 February 1987. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 361.

³⁸¹ Deng Xiaoping. "We Can Develop a Market Economy Under Socialism". 26 November 1979. Excerpt from a talk with Frank B. Gibney, Vice-chairman of the Compilation Committee of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. of the United States, Paul T.K. Lin, Director of the Institute of East Asia at McGill University of Canada, and others. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Volume II, 1995 (second edition), p. 239. Also see Deng Xiaoping. "Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai". 18 January-21 February 1992. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 361. Also See Deng Xiaoping. "There is no Fundamental Contradiction Between Socialism and a Market Economy". 23 October 1985. Excerpt from an interview with a delegation, including senior American entrepreneurs, organized by Time Inc. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Volume III, 1994, p. 151.

epitomized in his oft-stated Two-Cat Theory:

黄猫、黑猫、只要捉住老鼠就是好猫。³⁸²

It does not matter if it is a yellow cat or a black cat, as long as it catches mice.³⁸³

4.2 Political reform

4.2.1 Objectives and criteria of political system reform

After the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping himself repeatedly emphasized that political reforms needed to be introduced in order to pave the way for further economic reforms.³⁸⁴ He nevertheless wished to maintain the current system of the CPC rule.³⁸⁵ He was not a capitalist, nor a political liberalist in the Western sense. What was the goal of political system reform then?

On the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1980, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that the reform of various systems of the Party and the state must be measured by whether it is conducive to the realization of the following three objectives:

我们进行社会主义现代化建设，是要在经济上赶上发达的资本主义国家，在政治上创造比资本主义国家的民主更高更切实的民主，并且造就比这些国家更优秀的人才。达到上述三个要求，时间有的可以短些，有的要长些，但是作为一个社会主义大国，我们能够也必须达到。所以，党和国家的各种制度究竟好不好，完善不完善，必须用是否有利于实现这三条来检验。³⁸⁶

In the drive for modernization, our objectives are: economically, to catch up with the developed capitalist countries; and politically, to create a higher level of democracy with more substance than that of capitalist countries. We also aim to produce more and better-trained professionals than they do. It may take us different lengths of time to attain these three objectives. But as a vast socialist country, we can and must attain them. The merits of our Party and state institutions should be judged on the basis of whether or not they help us

Also see Deng Xiaoping. "Planning and the Market Are Both Means of Developing the Productive Forces". 6 February 1987. Excerpt from a talk with leading members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Volume III, 1994, p. 203.

³⁸² Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。1994年，第323页。

³⁸³ Deng Xiaoping. "Restore Agricultural Production". 7 July 1962. Excerpt from a talk to all the comrades attending the Seventh Plenary Session of the Third Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. I, 1995 (second edition), p. 318.

³⁸⁴ Zheng Yongnian. "Ideological Decline, the Rise of an Interest-based Social Order, and the Demise of Communism in China". Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Singapore: Singapore University Press & World Scientific, 2001, p. 181.

³⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 13.

³⁸⁶ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第322页。

advance towards our objectives.³⁸⁷

In 1987, Deng Xiaoping presented principles on how to judge the soundness of a country's political system:

关键看三条:第一是看国家的政局是否稳定;第二是看是能否增进人民的团结,改善人民的生活;第三是看生产力能否得到持续发展。³⁸⁸

There are three important criteria for judging the soundness of a country's political system or structure and of its policies. First, whether the country is politically stable; second, whether the system and policies help to strengthen unity among the people and to raise their living standards; and third, whether the productive forces keep developing.³⁸⁹

The first criterion is that a good political system should have the most basic function of maintaining political stability. Political stability means that the political life of a country can be carried out smoothly and orderly. If a country's political situation is in turmoil for a long time, then one of the most important reasons is that the country's political system has disadvantages. China had generations long history of internal wars and external interventions and attacks. Huntington pointed out: Stability is a central dimension in the analysis of any political system.³⁹⁰ So, stability was thus the most important criteria for evaluating the general political system. Lately China appeared to have achieved good scores on that aspect. China's reform strategy has been successful, especially compared to that of the former Soviet Union, where radical political reform caused its total collapse. In the case of China, the state has provided a stable ground for economic growth to take place. Wong and Zheng figure that: "Without such stability, China could not have achieved such impressive economic progress."³⁹¹ The second criterion is a curious combination, because Deng focused simultaneously on people's unity and raising of their living standards. This looks like two criteria, but Deng treated them as one. It appears that the weight of the first criteria, stability, flowed also here, or was stated here again with different words. As a country with unbalanced development, China must have a political system that can take into account the interests of all parties, coordinate the contradictions of all parties and in this way promote the unity of the people. This unity is a necessary condition to improving people's lives. People's awareness of the legitimacy of a country's political system is the key to its stability. The most important thing for the

³⁸⁷ Deng Xiaoping, "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership". 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 321-322.

³⁸⁸ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年,第213页。

³⁸⁹ Deng Xiaoping, "How to Judge the soundness of A Country's Political System". 27 March 1987. Excerpt from a talk with President Paul Biya of the Republic of Cameroon. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 213.

³⁹⁰ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman; London: University of Oklahoma Press. 1991, p. 11.

³⁹¹ Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. "The Political Economy of China's Post-Nanxun Development". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 15.

government to win the support of the people is to improve the people's lives, which is also the direction of a mature political system.³⁹² The third criterion is the increase in productive capacities. Only when they constantly expand it is possible to improve the living standard of the people.³⁹³ Deng's order of things appeared clear: systemic stability, leading to legitimacy and in itself to a raise in people's living conditions, which then released the productive forces of the people. Of course, also various kinds of international exchanges were needed as discussed above, but they were a means to speed up production, not its ultimate source.

4.2.2 Principles of political system reform

In China's political system reform, the overriding emphasis on political stability necessitates adhering to four cardinal principles. For decades they formed the bottom line that cannot be crossed.³⁹⁴

坚持四项基本原则，第一，必须坚持社会主义道路；第二，必须坚持无产阶级专政；第三，必须坚持共产党的领导；第四，必须坚持马列主义、毛泽东思想。³⁹⁵

The four principles are: (1) We must keep to the socialist road. (2) We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat. (3) We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party. (4) We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.³⁹⁶

Deng formulated these principles in March 1979 after the Democracy Wall incidents since November 1978 lead into deep disagreements in the Party and in Chinese society at large about the degree of liberty that should be allowed in public discussions. Deng set limits to open criticism of the Party-led system.

The purpose of the reform was not to change socialism, but to give it a new interpretation. With hindsight it could be seen that Chinese reforms were extremely successful, but this could not be known in 1979 and Deng wanted to proceed carefully. He elaborated the principles:

³⁹² Zhang Tao. 张涛。《改革开放 30 年中国政治体制改革成就分析》，《社会主义研究》。2008 年第 4 期，第 14-17 页。

³⁹³ In spring 1992 Deng Xiaoping made a historic tour popularly known as Nanxun or "Southern Tour". Nanxun refers to Deng Xiaoping's visit to Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai and other places from 18 January-21 February 1992, and his important talks there. See Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. "The Political Economy of China's Post-Nanxun Development". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 3. Also see Deng Xiaoping. *We Should Maintain Moderately Rapid Growth of Production*. 7 June 1988. Excerpt from a talk with Zbigniew Messner, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the United Workers' Party of Poland and Chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 263. Also see Deng Xiaoping. "Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai". 18 January-21 February 1992. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 360.

³⁹⁴ Chen Kaiju. 陈开菊。《邓小平政治体制改革思想研究》。北京：中共中央党校。博士毕业论文。2018 年 6 月。第 132 页。

³⁹⁵ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994 年，第 164 页。

³⁹⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "Uphold the Four Cardinal principles". 30 March 1979. A speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 174.

如果离开四项基本原则，抽象地空谈民主，那就必然会造成极端民主化和无政府主义的严重泛滥，造成四个现代化的彻底失败。那样我们同林彪、四人帮的十年斗争就等于白费，中国就将重新陷入混乱、分裂、倒退和黑暗，中国人民就将失去一切希望。³⁹⁷

Departure from the four cardinal principles and talk about democracy in the abstract will inevitably lead to the unchecked spread of ultra-democracy and anarchism, to the complete disruption of political stability and unity, and to the total failure of our modernization programme. If this happens, the decade of struggle against Lin Biao³⁹⁸ and the Gang of Four³⁹⁹ will have been in vain, China will once again be plunged into chaos, division, retrogression and darkness, and Chinese people will be deprived of all hope.⁴⁰⁰

Deng's elucidation was not purely theoretical. He reasoned in very practical terms, and his temporal horizon was in recent political history, which he clearly did not wish to be repeated. From this perspective the Four Cardinal Principles make sense. Public criticism of the Party was not acceptable. It was acceptable to see that Mao had made some mistakes because he was a human being, and humans make mistakes, but his thought was closely linked with the development of the Party, and public criticism of the Party itself was not acceptable. Deng made great changes in the way the Party considered the Chinese economy, society and politics, but he carefully refrained from positioning himself as someone who attacked Mao's thought. Instead, he positioned himself as an ideologist that defended it. Nevertheless, although Deng set limits to public discussion, the general public atmosphere during the 1980s was relatively liberal, as seen against the background of the 1960s and the 1970s. There was a relative opening up, both towards the world and domestically.⁴⁰¹ Seen from the outside, it never went very far, though. As Deng Xiaoping said when he met with former U.S. President James Carter in 1987:

中国如果照搬你们的多党竞选、三权鼎立那一套，肯定是动乱局面。如果今天这部分人上街，明天那部分人上街，中国十亿人口，一年三百六十五

³⁹⁷ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第176页。

³⁹⁸ Lin Biao (1907-1971) was an important Chinese leader. During the Cultural Revolution he rose to exceptional prominence. He possibly attempted a coup, and when it was exposed, he fled in 13 September 1971, but died when his plane crashed in Ondorhan, Mongolia. In August 1973 the Central Committee of the CPC decided to expel him posthumously from the Party. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 410.

³⁹⁹ Gang of Four. Name given to Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, all prominent members of the Shanghai radical group during the Cultural Revolution. After the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 they tried to assert their political power nationally but were thwarted by Hua Guofeng, and other Party members conventionally termed "moderates". A campaign against the Gang of Four started on 21 October 1976 in which they were accused of trying to usurp the leadership of the Party, of sabotaging the economy, dictating to literary and art articles, disrupting the army and isolating Mao from the Party and leadership. Chiang Ch'ing was singled out for particularly venomous attacks and accused of all kinds of personal faults as well as political ones. Dillon, Michael. *The Dictionary of Chinese History*. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1979, p. 68.

⁴⁰⁰ Deng Xiaoping. "Uphold the Four Cardinal principles". 30 March 1979. A speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 184.

⁴⁰¹ Vogel, Ezra F. *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2011, pp. 262-264.

天，天天都会有事，日子还能过吗？还有什么精力搞建设？⁴⁰²

If China adopted your system, with multi-Party elections and separation of the three powers, there would be chaos. If one group of people took to the streets today and another group did so tomorrow, with a population of one billion, there would be trouble 365 days a year, and then how could we carry on? Where would we find the energy for development?⁴⁰³

On the other hand, Western forms of organizing their societies contained intriguing elements in addition to possessing tangible dangers. Deng Xiaoping actively advocated drawing lessons from the rational factors of capitalist political civilization. He was positive about the experience of paying attention to the construction of the legal system in capitalist democratic systems. Deng Xiaoping pointed out that Stalin in the Soviet Union had seriously damaged socialist legality, adding to his observation the legitimating element of Mao Zedong, who had said that Stalin's type of behaviour could not have happened in such western countries as Britain, France and the United States.⁴⁰⁴ The same of course had happened also in China, and for that reason strengthening the legal structure and practice of the Chinese society was necessary. He also affirmed the shortcomings of China's political system in terms of overall efficiency. For instance, in 1979 he pointed out that:

我们说资本主义社会不好，但它在发现人才、使用人才方面是非常大胆的。它有个特点，不论资排辈，凡是合格的人就用，并且认为这是理所当然的。从这方面看，我们选拔干部的制度是落后的。⁴⁰⁵

We say that capitalist society is bad, but it doesn't hesitate to discover and utilize talent. One of its traits is that it makes use of anyone who is qualified, regardless of seniority, and this is considered natural. In this respect, our system of selecting cadres is outmoded.⁴⁰⁶

He systematically maintained this attitude, and for instance in 1987 he declared:

至于经济管理、行政管理的效率，资本主义国家在许多方面比我们好一些。⁴⁰⁷

In terms of administration and economic management, the capitalist countries are more efficient than we in many respects.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰² Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第244页。

⁴⁰³ Deng Xiaoping. "Nothing Can Be Accomplished Without a Stable Political Environment". 29 June 1987. Excerpt from a talk with James Carter, former President of the United States. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 241.

⁴⁰⁴ Deng Xiaoping. "Reform System of Party and State Leadership". 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau. *Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995, p. 332.

⁴⁰⁵ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第225页。

⁴⁰⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "Senior Cadres Should Take the Lead in Maintaining and Enriching the Party's Fine Traditions". 2 November 1979. Speech at a meeting of cadres of the rank of vice-minister and above from the central Party, government and army organizations. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 229.

⁴⁰⁷ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第240页。

⁴⁰⁸ Deng Xiaoping. "We Shall Speed Up Reform". 12 June 1987. Excerpt from a talk with Stefan Korosec,

Political reform, which also includes administration and legal structure, was thus a complex undertaking. It was necessary as it allowed the CPC to proceed with economic efficiency and to maintain its base of political legitimacy.⁴⁰⁹ Nevertheless, reform of China's political system was a process of gradual improvement, which proceeds much more carefully than economic reforms, and is not a continuous trend, but can also backtrack decisively. After the relatively liberalizing 1980s the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 and the failed spectacle of the political system reform of the Soviet Union up till 1991 have provided profound lessons for the Party: no hurry in changing the political structure. What the leadership is doing, is allowing certain levels of public discussion, though the acceptable levels change according to situations. It is also systematically and carefully monitoring the development of people's opinions. Political system reform can be done in many ways. It does not necessarily mean the institutions; it can also mean norms and practices, as well as the legal regulations. The China that Deng created is certainly more liberal than the one where Mao ruled. But it continues along this road very carefully.

For Deng, perhaps the main content of political reform was the devolution of power in practical level decision making downwards, although maintaining the Party in general control of the country. As Zhao outlines: "Decentralisation profoundly changed the incentives and behaviours of individuals and organisations within the public domain."⁴¹⁰ Deng Xiaoping pointed out that:

政治体制改革包括什么内容，应该议一下，理出个头绪。我想政治体制改革的目的是调动群众的积极性，提高效率，克服官僚主义。改革的内容，首先是党政要分开，解决党如何善于领导的问题。这是关键，要放在第一位。第二个内容是权力要下放，解决中央和地方的关系，同时地方各级也都有一个权力下放问题。第三个内容是精简机构，这和权力下放有关。⁴¹¹ We have to discuss what the content of political reform should be and work out the details. In my opinion, its purposes are to bring the initiative of the masses into play, to increase efficiency and to overcome bureaucratism. Its content should be as follows. First, we should separate the Party and the government and decide how the Party can exercise leadership most effectively. This is the key and should be given top priority. Second, we should transfer some of the powers of the central authorities to local authorities in order to straighten our relations between the two. At the same time, local authorities should likewise transfer some of their powers to lower levels. Third, we should streamline the administrative structure, and this is related to the devolution of powers.⁴¹²

member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 238.

⁴⁰⁹ Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. "The Political Economy of China's Post-Nanxun Development". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 16.

⁴¹⁰ Zhao Litao. "Social Transformation, Stability and Governance". Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds). *China: development and governance*. Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific Pub. 2013, p. 278.

⁴¹¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第177页。

⁴¹² Deng Xiaoping. "On Reform of the Political Structure". September-November 1986. A speech at a forum on

Deng apparently had great faith in the talents of the Chinese people. If the Chinese administrative system was reformed to the extent that it would allow this talent to act on its own initiative, Chinese political structure would move in terms of efficiency a long step closer to the capitalistic states, without adopting harmful elements like electoral democracy and critical demonstrations on streets. Power over practical decisions should be handed to the lower levels throughout the administrative structure. Separation of the Party and the government probably should be understood here as making the system less ideological and more professional in a technocratic manner. It did not mean releasing control by the Party over the general situation. This is Deng Xiaoping's general statement on the content of political system reform.⁴¹³

He also made quite concrete comments on the evils emerging in Chinese administrative practices.⁴¹⁴ Power has a tendency to become centralized, rising on the surface aspect of behaviour that Deng considered hailing from China's long feudalistic past. Patriarchal practices, excessive concentration of power on the hands of bosses in institutions, coupled with the weak awareness of the principles of socialist democracy and the rule of law in the case of many leading cadres, has created ugly examples of behaviour that are not conducive to efficiency and proving the superiority of socialism:

官僚主义现象是我们党和国家政治生活中广泛存在的一个大问题。它的主要表现和危害是：高高在上，滥用权力，脱离实际，脱离群众，好摆门面，好说空话，思想僵化，默守陈规，机构臃肿，人浮于事，办事拖拉，不讲效率，不负责任，不守信用，公文旅行，互相推诿，以至官气十足，动辄训人，打击报复，压制民主，欺上瞒下，专横跋扈，徇私行贿，贪赃枉法，等等。这无论在我们的内部事务中，或是在国际交往中，都已达到令人无法容忍的地步。⁴¹⁵

Bureaucracy remains a major and widespread problem in the political life of our Party and state. Its harmful manifestations include the following: standing high above the masses; abusing power; divorcing oneself from reality and the masses; spending a lot of time and effort to put up an impressive front; indulging in empty talk; sticking to a rigid way of thinking; being hidebound by convention; overstaffing administrative organs; being dilatory, inefficient and irresponsible; failing to keep one's word; circulating documents endlessly without solving problems; shifting responsibility to others; and even assuming the airs of a mandarin, reprimanding other people at every turn, vindictively attacking others, suppressing democracy, deceiving superiors and subordinates, being arbitrary and despotic, practicing favouritism, offering bribes,

the principles for the Party's theoretical work. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 179.

⁴¹³ Wang Guixiu. 王贵秀。《全面把握邓小平政治体制改革思想》，《当代世界与社会主义》。2004年第4期，第36-39页。

⁴¹⁴ Deng Xiaoping. "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership". 18 August 1980. A speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 320-327.

⁴¹⁵ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第327页。

participating in corrupt practices in violation of the law, and so on. Such things have reached intolerable dimensions both in our domestic affairs and in our contacts with other countries.⁴¹⁶

Deng Xiaoping inherited Mao Zedong's problem of opposing bureaucratization and simplifying the structure of the Party and government,⁴¹⁷ though he did it with a different ethos. China has always been densely populated and during Deng's leadership period it crossed over the one billion people mark. This itself makes controlling its administrative aspects difficult. This is then exacerbated by multiple factors, including the traditional unitary leadership system of the Party, influence of the Soviet model, autocratic style of leaders in the period of the Communist International, feudal autocracy, and the highly centralized planned economic model.⁴¹⁸ During the revolutionary war, the Party naturally had a highly centralized and unified leadership system to meet the conditions of war. After the victory of the revolution, the Party and the state turned to the task of socialist construction, but the leadership system under the first leader did not improve with the change of the situation. What's more, China copied the highly centralized political system of the Soviet Union, which was the external reason for the style of concentration of power. The highly centralized planned economic system objectively results in a high concentration of political power, because that is the location where the plans are made and the activity later controlled and results calculated. Finally, the highly centralized system under the feudal autocracy, which had lasted for more than 2000 years in China is the historical reason for the phenomenon that power is concentrated in a few people in the leadership system. On this Deng Xiaoping said:

革命队伍内的家长制作风，除了使个人高度集权以外，还使个人凌驾于组织之上，组织成为个人的工具。家长制是历史非常悠久的一种陈旧社会现象，它的影响在党的历史上产生过很大危害。⁴¹⁹

Besides leading to over-concentration of power in the hands of individuals, patriarchal ways within the revolutionary ranks place individuals above the organization, which then becomes a tool in their hands. Patriarchal ways are an antiquated social phenomenon which has existed from time immemorial and has had a very damaging influence on the Party.⁴²⁰

Deng was very serious about the strength of this historical cultural element in

⁴¹⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership". 18 August 1980. A speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 326.

⁴¹⁷ Mao Zedong. "On the Ten Major Relationships". 25 April 1956. Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V, 1977, p. 292.

⁴¹⁸ Chi Fulin. 迟福林。《政治体制改革基本问题探讨》。北京：春秋出版社。1988年，第47页。

⁴¹⁹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第329-330页。

⁴²⁰ Deng Xiaoping. "On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership". 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 328.

nullifying the efforts of reformers to make the Chinese system more efficient.

不少地方和单位，都有家长式的人物，他们的权力不受限制，别人都要惟命是从，甚至形成对他们的人身依附关系[...]一些同志犯严重错误，同这种家长制作风有关[...]总之，不彻底消灭这种家长制作风，就根本谈不上什么党内民主，什么社会主义民主。⁴²¹

Many places and units have their patriarchal personages with unlimited power. Everyone else has to be absolutely obedient and even personally attached to them [...] The patriarchal ways I have described are partly responsible for the grave mistakes some comrades make [...] In a word, unless such ways are eliminated once for all, the practice of inner-Party democracy in particular and of socialist democracy in general is out of the question.⁴²²

Beyond this, Deng also suppressed the Democracy Wall Movement⁴²³ out of strategic considerations, as Paltemaa figures: “The beginning of the contemporary Chinese Democracy Movement is usually located with the Democracy Wall Movement (民主墙运动, *mínzhù qiáng yùndòng*) that erupted in the middle of November 1978 and lasted until the spring of 1981.”⁴²⁴ However, democracy on the streets was not favoured by Deng, and its influence in Chinese political thought was quite limited. To a large extent, the movement was actually inspired by the Cultural Revolution, as many of its participants had grown up at that period and took its radical ideas seriously.⁴²⁵

Deng Xiaoping diverged from Mao’s view of “great democracy under the leadership of the proletariat”.⁴²⁶ Yu described that history: During that “revolution”, “democracy” was overtly used by some politicians (such as the Gang of Four) to suppress their opponents. People’s rights were not guaranteed under the so-called “great democracy” of the Cultural Revolution, which promoted the freedom of

⁴²¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第329-330页。

⁴²² Deng Xiaoping. “On the Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership”. 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 329-320.

⁴²³ Democracy Wall, also known as “Xidan Democracy Wall”, appeared after the smashing of the gang of four. A large number of big character newspapers appeared in Xidan, Beijing, some of which involved attacking the Communist Party and the current system, including the leaders of the Communist Party.

⁴²⁴ Paltemaa, Lauri. “The Democracy Wall Movement, Marxist Revisionism, and the Various on Socialist Democracy”. *Journal of Contemporary China*. Vol. 16 (53). November 2007, pp. 601-625.

⁴²⁵ Ibid. The actual dates of the duration of the Beijing Democracy Movement are debatable. For different views, see He, Henry Yuhuai. *Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China*. London: M. E. Sharpe, 2001. Also see Garside, Roger. *Coming Alive: China after Mao*. New York: McGraw-Hill. 1981. The author considers mid-November 1978 as the starting point and spring of 1981 at the end of the movement, when most of the editors of the still existing journals were arrested. Also see Seymour, James D. *The Fifth Modernization: China’s Human Rights Movement 1978-1979*. New York: Human Rights Publishing Group. 1980. Also see Harrison, James P. “The problem of the Fifth Modernization: a review article”, *Journal of Asian Studies*. 13 (4), 1983, pp. 869-878. Also see Svensson, Marina. *Debating Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. 2002. Also see Nathan, Andrew J. *Chinese Democracy*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1985. Also see Goldman, Merle. “The reassertion of political citizenship in the post-Mao era: the Democracy Wall Movement”. In Goldman, Merle and Perry, Elizabeth J. (eds). *Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2002, pp. 159-186.

⁴²⁶ Mao Zedong. “Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China”. 15 November 1956. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. V, 1977, p. 342.

speech. Even the president of the state and the minister of defence were subject to this great democracy: both were arrested during the Cultural Revolution and died in prison without trial.⁴²⁷ This instrumentalist approach to democracy was devastating to the country's political development, and upon the death of Mao Zedong, it was speedily renounced. Deng Xiaoping pointed out:

大民主我们并不提倡，搞大民主并不好。⁴²⁸

We do not advocate great democracy, for it is not a good thing.⁴²⁹

Deng thought that a great democracy of the type of the Cultural Revolution was essentially anarchist, and there was nothing worth emulating in it. Therefore, he expounded his quite different definition of an ideal democracy:

我们是不赞成搞大民主的，大民主是可以避免的，这就是要有小民主。⁴³⁰

We are not in favour of having greater democracy. It can be prevented, provided there is lesser democracy.⁴³¹

In 1980, at a Central Working Conference, Deng Xiaoping put forward the general objective of political system reform, which he stated meant ensuring democracy and developing it both inside of the Party and among the people.⁴³² Deng continued to contemplate on the topic and in September 1986, he formulated the goals of reform as consolidating the socialist system, developing socialist productive forces and expanding socialist democracy.⁴³³

What does the concept of lesser democracy mean? Deng never gave a textbook definition of the concept, but democracy nevertheless was an important idea for him, as he often referred to it. In his mind socialism without democracy was not socialism in the true sense.⁴³⁴ For him, the concept was closely tied up with the idea of a socialist revolution and its view of class relationships, which made it possible to achieve a truer democracy than in capitalistic countries, where capitalistic monopoly made electoral democracy only a form. The key concept here is “democratic centralism, 民主集中制, *mínzhǔ jízhōng zhì*”:

⁴²⁷ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 6.

⁴²⁸ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第一卷。1994年，第273页。

⁴²⁹ Deng Xiaoping. “The Communist Party Must Accept Supervision”. 8 April 1957. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. I, 1995 (second edition), p. 270.

⁴³⁰ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第一卷。1994年，第273页。

⁴³¹ Deng Xiaoping. “The Communist Party Must Accept Supervision”. 8 April 1957. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. I, 1995 (second edition), p. 270.

⁴³² Deng Xiaoping. “Implement the Policy of Readjustment, Ensure Stability and Unity”. 25 December 1980. Speech at a Central Working Conference. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 367.

⁴³³ Deng Xiaoping. “On Reform of the Political Structure”. September-November 1986. From a talk on 29 September 1986, with Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Poland. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 180.

⁴³⁴ Deng Xiaoping. “Uphold the Four Cardinal principles”. 30 March 1979. A speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 177. Also see Deng Xiaoping. “Reform System of Party and State Leadership”. 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau. *Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995, p. 331.

什么是中国人民今天所需要的民主呢？中国人民今天所需要的民主，只能是社会主义民主或称人民民主，而不是资产阶级的个人主义的民主。人民的民主同对敌人的专政分不开，同民主基础上的集中也分不开。我们实行的是民主集中制，这就是民主基础上的集中和集中指导下的民主相结合。

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What kind of democracy do the Chinese people need today? It can only be socialist democracy, people's democracy, and not bourgeois democracy, individualist democracy. People's democracy is inseparable from dictatorship over the enemy and from centralism based on democracy. We practice democratic centralism, which is the integration of centralism based on democracy with democracy under the guidance of centralism.⁴³⁶

Like in the case of Mao Zedong's concept of democracy, Deng's concept also clearly combines the leadership and the people acting together, but the nuance is different, as well as some of the vocabulary. As is fitting with Deng's education in the Soviet Union, he understood democracy in the Leninist sense of masses liberated from capitalistic domination but guided by revolutionary professionals like himself. Vladimir Lenin formulated his thoughts on a democratic revolutionary organization in his 1902 pamphlet named *What is to be Done?*⁴³⁷ Also in that work there was no definition of the concept, though Lenin clearly based his ideas on German Social Democratic organizations, whose activities relied on public debate and elections, because they were able to do that without repression.⁴³⁸ In a revolutionary situation, like in Russia at the time, that kind of publicly visible discursive democracy was not possible, and thus in organizational terms the meaning of the concept became drastically reinterpreted. Democratic centralism began to mean a situation where the grass-roots level displayed lots of energy and initiative, but the movement itself was guided by professionally trained trusted revolutionaries. What made the organization democratic was the movement of information not only from the top downwards, but also from the bottom levels to the top, all this unified by a strong ethos of comradeship.⁴³⁹ Thus, Deng Xiaoping's idea of democracy to be a form of governance, where the Chinese people, local organizations and enterprises engaged in mainly economic reforms making the livelihood of people better and the Chinese economic system more efficient but staying firmly under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Simultaneously, information spread rapidly through the different levels of organization, and the ethos of national comradeship was kept strong. As long as the system develops and discipline is maintained, democracy increases. This kind

⁴³⁵ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第175页。

⁴³⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "On Reform of the Political Structure". September-November 1986. From a talk on 29 September 1986, with Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Poland. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 183

⁴³⁷ Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. 列宁。《列宁全集》第5卷。《The Complete Works of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin》. Vol. 5, Chinese version. 北京：人民出版社。1961, pp. 347-530.

⁴³⁸ Ibid. p. 88.

⁴³⁹ Ibid. p. 90, 113.

of understanding of democracy is quite different from Western electoral democracy, but very different also from the great democracy of the Cultural Revolution. This is something that Deng thought would work for China.

As his criticism of the overconcentration of power in the hands of some organs and the patriarchal tendencies presented above shows, Deng was aware of the various problems in the current Chinese model of governance and pointed out its roots. Democratic centralism is a system difficult to keep in equilibrium, because the tendencies towards simple centralism in it are strong. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Committee has paid attention to this issue and tried to promote decentralization by expanding the autonomy of local and grass-roots units. However, from the perspective of implementation effect, it can be carried out smoothly in some places, but it has encountered obstacles in other places—the phenomenon of excessive concentration of new power in decentralized units, and the phenomenon of excessive concentration of local power. This is a rather difficult problem of governance and will require many small steps for China to solve.

From a theoretical perspective, much potential for democratic development exists both within the contemporary Chinese political system and within the internal mechanisms of the CPC. As the fundamental principle and model of China's political system, democratic centralism constitutes the structural foundation and leadership philosophy of not only the CPC but also the organs of state power and is the defining principle of the political regime.⁴⁴⁰ Deng advocated that democratic centralism should be determined and implemented by law,⁴⁴¹ because he saw democratic centralism not only as the fundamental system of the Party and country, but also as the most reasonable and convenient system.⁴⁴² Under the conditions of reform, opening up and creating a socialist market economy, facing the complex internal and external environment, democratic centralism was the conceptual tool with which to move forward.⁴⁴³

The so-called decentralization means that organs and institutions at all levels are guided by the needs of the development of market economy and realize the rational distribution of government functions at all levels. The Party committee and the government should devolve power. Enterprises and corresponding institutions under the market economy should have the power to make the decisions. The autonomy and independent responsibility of enterprises are of great significance to the development of enterprises. If the power is not decentralized, it will lead to the responsibility of the upper-level departments for the success of enterprises. Therefore, the Party and the

⁴⁴⁰ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 103.

⁴⁴¹ Deng Xiaoping. "Speech Delivered at an Enlarged Working Conference of the Party Central Committee". 6 February 1962. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. I, 1995 (second edition), p. 306.

⁴⁴² 中共中央办公厅调研室。Edited by Research Office of the general office of the CPC Central Committee.《马克思主义经典文献关于民主集中制、基层党建设、培养选拔干部的论述》。北京：中共中央党校出版社。1994年5月。Also see Deng Xiaoping. "Speech Delivered at an Enlarged Working Conference of the Party Central Committee". 6 February 1962. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. I, 1995 (second edition), pp. 299-306. Also see 《邓小平思想年谱 (1975-1997)》。北京：人民出版社。1998年，第98页。

⁴⁴³ Xu Qingpu, Li Aihua. 许庆朴，李爱华。《中国特色社会主义理论探源》。北京：人民出版社。2002年，第62页。

national government should decentralize their power, and let enterprises and institutions take responsibility and shoulder the burden, so as to really improve their driving force for progress.⁴⁴⁴

But then again, it had its limits. Or perhaps it should rather be seen as a relative phenomenon, as everything in Deng's programme. Not too much power should be delegated, and not too much was. Theoretically, political democratization could be considered a precondition for economic justice that the Chinese people seriously needed, although the Party-state leadership in Beijing tends to show a different perspective that a strong authoritarian leadership is needed to curb politically induced economic injustice.⁴⁴⁵ This is where the element of centralism in democratic centralism comes forward. The authority of the central government needed to be preserved at all times.⁴⁴⁶ It was to maintain its ultimate authority in leading the country.⁴⁴⁷ In essence, the theory of democracy espoused by Deng is consistent with that proposed by Mao, as Yu analysed: "Both lay particular stress on the class characteristic of democracy, reject the Western multiparty system, and advocate the exclusive leadership of the CPC in overseeing the system of the people's congresses. Deng, however, made a crucial revision to Mao's theory of democracy in defining democracy as a goal of the CPC and stressing the institutionalization of democracy, economic democratization, and the establishment of law. As a result of this revision, significant developments have occurred in Chinese democratic theory and practice since the reform and opening up."⁴⁴⁸

In rhetorical theory, the concept of democratic centralism is an oxymoron, as it combines two apparently contradictory conceptual elements, but this does not mean that it cannot be an element of a sensible political theory. China has long emphasized centralism at the expense of democracy, making democracy an empty slogan backed by few concrete actions. Consequently, centralism far exceeds democracy in practical implementation. Moreover, "centralism" is so often used to refer to a single individual as opposed to the structure of the organization that Party history has been marred by authoritarianism and the domination of individual agendas in policy formulation. However, we should not, based on the aforementioned observations, reach the conclusion that democratic elements are altogether absent from the Party structure, nor should we assume that the identification of new areas of democratic growth within the Party is impossible.⁴⁴⁹ It can perhaps be seen as a conceptual guide for cultivating Chinese culture of governance so that essential and efficiency inducing elements of liberal culture and democratic norms were combined with the necessarily

⁴⁴⁴ Xu Qingpu, Li Aihua. 许庆朴, 李爱华。《中国特色社会主义理论探源》。北京: 人民出版社。2002年, 第65页。

⁴⁴⁵ So, Alvin Y. *China's Developmental Miracle: Origins, Transformations, and Challenges*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2015, p. 266.

⁴⁴⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "Adhere to the Party Line and Improve Methods of Work". 29 February 1980. Speech at the third meeting of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 280.

⁴⁴⁷ Deng Xiaoping. "The Central Leadership Must Have Authority". 12 September 1988. Excerpt from remarks made after hearing a report on a proposed programme for the reform of prices and wages. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 271.

⁴⁴⁸ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 9.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 111.

heavy demands for national stability, unity and centralized setting of general goals.

4.3 Legal System

4.3.1 Rule of man and the rule of law

Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, China has formulated many administrative laws and regulations, which have played an important role in further regulating the government's behaviour. At this session the strategic task of "To ensure People's democracy, we must strengthen our legal system."⁴⁵⁰ 为了保障人民民主, 必须加强法制"⁴⁵¹ was put forward. The principles that: "There are laws to go by, that they are observed and strictly enforced, and that violators are brought to book."⁴⁵² 有法可依, 有法必依, 执法必严, 违法必究"⁴⁵³ were also set forth. The lessons drawn from the Cultural Revolution made Deng and the Chinese leadership realized the necessity of establishing a sound legal system.⁴⁵⁴ There were problems in the construction of administrative laws and regulations, such as the legislative process lagging behind the needs of the changing society, resulting in the lack of necessary standards for administration according to law; the legislative content excessively strengthened the power of departments, resulting in unfair administration; some laws and regulations were too broad, lacking pertinence and operability, and so on.⁴⁵⁵ Deng Xiaoping had the socialist theoretical conceptual understanding that law was an instrument of the ruling class. The ruler in any country needs to use the legal system as an instrument to consolidate his ruling status and his exercise of the ruling rights. Zou figures: "That is why law is emphasized in capitalist countries."⁴⁵⁶ However, laws are also equally important in a stabilized socialist country. The ruling Party needs a legal basis to rule, while both the administration and the citizens need clear and relatively enduring legal norms for their conduct under this rule. Therefore, among other sectors, Deng faced the task to improve the administrative legislation. It was necessary to strengthen the law enforcement mechanism. People's concept of the formal legal system was relatively weak, and even the consciousness of the administrative organs of systematically performing according to the legal rules was not high.⁴⁵⁷ Deng

⁴⁵⁰ Deng Xiaoping. "Emancipate the Mind, seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future". 13 December 1978. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1994, p. 156.

⁴⁵¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年, 第146页。

⁴⁵² Deng Xiaoping. "Emancipate the Mind, seek Truth from Facts and Unite as One in Looking to the Future". 13 December 1978. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1994, p. 156.

⁴⁵³ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年, 第146页。

⁴⁵⁴ Zou Keyuan. "China's Constitutional Changes and Deng Xiaoping's Legacy". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 292.

⁴⁵⁵ Li Shexue. 李申学。《落实邓小平依法行政思想提高依法行政水平》。北京: 国家行政学院出版社。1998年, 第343页。

⁴⁵⁶ Zou Keyuan. "China's Constitutional Changes and Deng Xiaoping's Legacy". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 293.

⁴⁵⁷ Li Shexue. 李申学。《落实邓小平依法行政思想提高依法行政水平》。北京: 国家行政学院出版社。1998

Xiaoping formulated the idea simply:

党的干预太多，不利于在人民中树立法制观念。⁴⁵⁸

If the Party intervenes in everything, it will not help the people understand the importance of the rule of law.⁴⁵⁹

Reform of the legal system therefore was an important leg in the over-all reform of the system, especially of the move to devolve power towards the people, move the Party to a more distant controlling role from practical day-to-day matters, and create stability and predictability in the total system. Chen opined: “A functioning legal system was understood to be a key factor that determines the success of economic and political reform.”⁴⁶⁰ Deng set the basic terms and the goal of the reform in this way:

要通过改革，处理好法治和人治的关系。⁴⁶¹

Through the reform, we intend to straighten out the relationship between the rule of law and the rule of man and between the Party and the government.⁴⁶²

The important dichotomy here thus were the concepts of “rule of man, 人治, *rénzhì*” and “rule of law, 法治, *fǎzhì*”. In China the philosophy rule of man is deeply rooted in China’s long time feudal tradition, as noted by historians.⁴⁶³ Xie Chuntao points out: “It means to rely on leaders or rulers to govern the country and society, and handle official affairs in line with their will and ability [...] rule of law enables a more stable, definite and reliable way for the country to maintain long-term peace and foster the values of democracy, freedom and human rights.”⁴⁶⁴ However, The first reforms during the early decades of the new republic did not change the tradition, as the one-party authoritarian governance was topped by authoritarian rule. Zou figures: “The task in China thus became to eliminate the established tendency of rule by man.”⁴⁶⁵ These are the historical roots of the problem that Deng himself pointed out:

旧中国留给我们的，封建专制传统比较多，民主法制传统很少。解放以后，我们也没有自觉地、系统地建立保障人民民主权利的各项制度，法制很不

年，第 346 页。

⁴⁵⁸ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993 年，第 163 页。

⁴⁵⁹ Deng Xiaoping. “Help the People Understand the Importance of the Rule of Law”. 28 June 1986. Talk at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, p. 166.

⁴⁶⁰ Chen Kaiju. 陈开菊。《邓小平政治体制改革思想研究》。2018 年 6 月。第 125 页。

⁴⁶¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993 年，第 177 页。

⁴⁶² Deng Xiaoping. “On Reform of the Political Structure”. 3 September 1986. From a talk with Yoshikatsu Takeiri, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Komei Party of Japan. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III, 1994, pp. 178-179.

⁴⁶³ Wiethoff, Bodo. *Introduction to Chinese History from Ancient Times to 1912*. Translated by Whittall, Mary. London: Thames and Hudson. 1975, p. 112.

⁴⁶⁴ Xie Chuntao. *Governing China: How the CPC Works*. Beijing: New World Press. 2013, p. 232.

⁴⁶⁵ Zou Keyuan. “China’s Constitutional Changes and Deng Xiaoping’s Legacy”. *The Nanxun Legacy and China’s Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 297.

完备，也很不受重视。⁴⁶⁶

From old China we inherited a strong tradition of feudal autocracy and a weak tradition of democratic legality. Moreover, in the post-liberation years we did not consciously draw up systematic rules and regulations to safeguard the people's democratic rights.⁴⁶⁷

Deng Xiaoping opposed personal worship and excessive concentration of power. His thoughts on democracy and the legal system were formed as early as 1956 in the report on the revision of the Party's constitution.⁴⁶⁸ From the early 1980s to 1992, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly stressed that the legal system was an important means for the long-term stability of the country and society. One problem in China was that the collection of existing law was incomplete, and many necessary laws had not yet been formulated. Often the leader's words were regarded as "law", and words that did not agree with the leader's words were conceived as "illegal". When the leader's words change, the "law" changes accordingly.⁴⁶⁹ In 1980, Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his reply to a question by Oriana Fallaci, an Italian journalist, about "how to avoid or prevent such things as the Cultural Revolution":

这要从制度方面解决问题。我们过去的一些制度，实际上受了封建主义的影响，包括个人迷信、家长制或家长作风，甚至包括干部职务终身制。我们现在正在研究避免重复这种现象，准备从改革制度着手。我们这个国家有几千年封建社会的历史，缺乏社会主义的民主和社会主义的法制。现在我们要认真建立社会主义的民主制度和社会主义法制。只有这样，才能解决问题。⁴⁷⁰

This issue has to be addressed by tackling the problems in our institutions. Some of those we established in the past were, in fact, tainted by feudalism, as manifested in such things as the personality cult, the patriarchal ways or styles of work, and the life tenure of cadres in leading posts. We are now looking into ways to prevent such things from recurring and we are preparing to start with the restructuring of our institutions. Our country has a history of thousands of years of feudalism and is still lacking in socialist democracy and socialist legality. We are now earnestly to cultivate socialist democracy and socialist legality. Only in this way can we solve the problem.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁶ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第332页。

⁴⁶⁷ Deng Xiaoping. "On the Reform of the System of Party and Stable Leadership". 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau on 31 August 1980. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 331.

⁴⁶⁸ Jiang Guohai. 蒋国海。《邓小平的社会主义观》。北京：人民出版社。2014年，第67页。

⁴⁶⁹ Deng Xiaoping. "On the Reform of the System of Party and Stable Leadership". 18 August 1980. This speech to an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was discussed and endorsed by the Political Bureau on 31 August 1980. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 331-322.

⁴⁷⁰ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第348页。

⁴⁷¹ Deng Xiaoping. "Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci". 21 and 23 August 1980. Excerpts concerning domestic issues Cited from the Chinese transcript of a two-part interview. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 345-346.

As can be seen in the tone of Deng's words, this aspect of China's governance was seen as one of the most underdeveloped ones. There was only a narrow historical ground on which to build a functioning legal system. This aspect was also conceptually extremely delicate to formulate, because, in a legal sense, it demanded facing the nihilistic legacy of Mao Zedong.⁴⁷² In 1979 Deng had already answered in this way:

毛泽东同志同任何别人一样，也有他的缺点和错误。但是，在他的伟大的一生中的这些错误，怎么能够同他对人民的不朽贡献相比拟呢？在分析他的缺点和错误的时候，我们当然要承认个人的责任，但是更重要的是分析历史的复杂的背景。只有这样，我们才是公正地、科学地、也就是马克思主义地对待历史，对待历史人物。⁴⁷³

Comrade Mao, like any other man, had his defects and made errors. But how can these errors in his illustrious life be put on a par with his immortal contributions to the people? In analysing his defects and errors, we certainly should recognize his personal responsibility, but what is more important is to analyse their complicated historical background. This is the only just and scientific—that is, Marxist—way to access history and historical figures.⁴⁷⁴

China has undergone fundamental political and economic change since the initiation of the reform and opening up policy in 1978, and the terminology generated by this transition has replaced that of the revolutionary generation. Only democracy has endured, bridging the political generations. However, while the term democracy has continued to be used in political discourse, it is clear that both the Chinese understanding and practice of democracy have undergone great changes.⁴⁷⁵ When formulated in this way, there was no real conceptual problem. Mao was a human being who mostly made immortal contributions, against which a few mistakes could not be considered important. Moreover, like his comrades, he was simply influenced by traditional institutions and established forms of behaviour that pushed them towards the rule of man type order. Deng stated this argument many times.⁴⁷⁶ Deng Xiaoping's negative comments about the wrong practices of individual leaders or the sabotage of counter revolutionaries placed the reason on the shortcomings of the political system. Thus, criticizing the roots of the existing problems in the legal system was conceptually and politically possible, and attention was focused directly on the solutions.

⁴⁷² Zou Keyuan. "China's Constitutional Changes and Deng Xiaoping's Legacy". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 293.

⁴⁷³ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第172页。

⁴⁷⁴ Deng Xiaoping. "Uphold the Four Cardinal principles". 30 March 1979. A speech at a forum on the principles for the Party's theoretical work. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 180-181.

⁴⁷⁵ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 4.

⁴⁷⁶ Deng Xiaoping. "Remarks on Successive Drafts of the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China". 27 June 1980. Talk with leading comrades of the Central Committee. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 296. Also see Deng Xiaoping. "On the Reform of the System of Party and Stable Leadership". 18 August 1980. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), pp. 331-332.

In 1982, the Constitution adopted at the fifth session of the Fifth National People's Congress stipulated for the first time in the preamble that "We should constantly improve socialist systems, develop socialist democracy and improve socialist legal system."⁴⁷⁷ The 1982 Constitution was thus hailed as the best Constitution ever in the PRC history. The 1982 Constitution can also be named as the "Deng Xiaoping Constitution".⁴⁷⁸ The Fifteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly proposed that "The development of democracy must be closely combined with the improvement of the legal system, and the rule of law must be implemented. The rule of law means that under the leadership of the Party and in accordance with the Constitution and the law, the masses of the people manage state affairs, economic and cultural undertakings and social affairs through various ways and forms, so as to ensure that all work of the state is carried out in accordance with the law and gradually realize the institutionalization and legalization of socialist democracy."⁴⁷⁹ This indicates that China's democratic and legal construction had entered a new stage of development. In 1999, the amendment to the Constitution adopted at the second session of the Ninth National People's Congress pointed out that "The People's Republic of China implements the rule of law and builds a socialist country ruled by law."⁴⁸⁰ In order to further realize the leap from "legal system" to "rule of law", the Party and the state have made a lot of exploration and efforts. In March 2018, the first session of the 13th National People's Congress voted to adopt a further amendment to the constitution. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble of the constitution, "improve the socialist legal system" was revised to "improve the socialist rule of law",⁴⁸¹ reflecting the new development of the Party and the state's concept and mode of rule of law. Progress is slow, but the work continues.

4.3.2 Deng Xiaoping's Legacy

Deng Xiaoping attached great importance on education. He has repeatedly stressed that it is important to carry out education to strengthen the legal system, and the fundamental problem is to educate people. In January 1980, he pointed that:

要讲法制，真正使人人懂得法律，是越来越多的人不仅懂法，而且能积极维护法律。⁴⁸²

We must publicize the legal system and make everyone really understand the law, so that more and more people will not only refrain from breaking it but actively hold it.⁴⁸³

⁴⁷⁷ 中共中央文献研究室。The Party Literature Research Centre of the CPC Central Committee.《建国以来重要文献选编(第十四册)》。北京：中央文献出版社。1997，第97页。

⁴⁷⁸ Zou Keyuan. "China's Constitutional Changes and Deng Xiaoping's Legacy". *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*. Wong, John and Zheng Yongnian. Singapore: Singapore University Press: World Scientific, 2001, p. 291.

⁴⁷⁹ 中共中央党史研究室。《建国以来重要文献选编(第四册)》。北京：中央文献出版社。1993年，第197页。

⁴⁸⁰ Pu Xingzu. 浦兴祖。《中华人民共和国：政治制度》。上海：上海人民出版社。2005年，第197页。

⁴⁸¹ 中共中央党史研究室。《建国以来重要文献选编(第四册)》。北京：中央文献出版社。1993年，第204页。

⁴⁸² Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第二卷。1994年，第254页。

⁴⁸³ Deng Xiaoping. "The Present Situation and the Tasks Before Us". 16 January 1980. Speech at a meeting of

If people do not know the law, and cannot read what exactly is written there, all they can rely on are only pronouncements. Legal education was a large-scale civilizational undertaking. Deng Xiaoping especially emphasized the necessity of the legal education for teenagers. In June 1986, in his speech to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, he pointed out that:

法制观念与人们的文化素质有关。现在这么多青年人犯罪，无法无天，没有顾忌，一个原因是文化素质太低。所以，加强法制重要的是要进行教育，根本问题是教育人。法制教育要从娃娃抓起，小学、中学都要进行这个教育，社会上也要进行这个教育。⁴⁸⁴

People's understanding of the rule of the law is related to their education level. One reason for the high crime rate among young people who are simply lawless and have no scruples about committing crimes is that their level of general education is too low. To strengthen the rule of law, therefore, the most important thing is to educate people. Education about the law should begin at an early age and be carried out in all our primary and secondary schools and in the society at large.⁴⁸⁵

Although economics is important, good governance also plays a critical role. Fewsmith believes: "The rule of law becomes increasingly important over time, both to resolve economic and civil disputes and to better define the relations between state and society."⁴⁸⁶ Thus, Deng initiated a profound civilizational transformation in Chinese society, economy and polity, aiming for considerably higher levels of well-being for the population and strength for the state, implying also improvements of the good governance of the totality.

As Lampton commented in 2014: "China is moving from the transformational and charismatic leadership of Mao Zedong and the strongman leadership of Deng Xiaoping to a more transactional, system-maintenance type of leader. China has moved from a strongman system to a collective system of leadership, albeit one with fissures."⁴⁸⁷ Despite problems of national unification, war, and civil war, there was the development not only of industry and capitalist enterprises, but also of a modern state and many of the institutions associated with those processes, including schools, health services, postal services, financial institutions, and a state administration. Goodman writes: "Though social differentiation was limited in scope and scale, and highly concentrated spatially, these years saw the emergence of a bourgeoisie, as well as professional and managerial middle classes, including intellectuals associated with

cadres called by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 254.

⁴⁸⁴ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。1993年，第163页。

⁴⁸⁵ Deng Xiaoping. "Help the People Understand the Importance of the Rule of Law". 28 June 1986. Talk at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. II, 1995 (second edition), p. 166.

⁴⁸⁶ Fewsmith, Joseph. "Governance in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective". *State-society Relations and Governance in China*. Guo Sujian (ed.). Lanham, MA; London: Lexington Books, 2014, p. 120.

⁴⁸⁷ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2014, p. 62.

the new education system and mass media of communication.”⁴⁸⁸

The huge scale of the changes notwithstanding, the modifications were not reflected in Deng’s vocabulary, but rather in the new interpretations that he gave to various Mao era concepts and ideas, and in the practical reformist policies that he initiated. At the beginning of the reform, Deng Xiaoping had a clear idea of governing the country, that is, taking the development of economy and the improvement of people’s living standards as the core. Deng implemented bold reforms in the economic field, which directly promoted economic development and constantly improving people’s living standards. What’s more, he continuously implemented reforms in the fields of politics, science and technology, education, national defence, foreign affairs, and so on.

Sørensen points out: “The reforms could not have been implemented without a strong leadership bent on pushing such policies, perhaps even to the point of using coercion against opponents.”⁴⁸⁹ China’s reform and opening up had no specific model to follow. It involved digesting lots of cultural influences from abroad, as well as lots of experimentation within China, resulting in a governance mode which is different from the Soviet Union and the west. Simultaneously with the conceptual changes, China was experiencing a critical period of transformation from an agricultural society to an industrial society, from a traditional society to a modern society. Fewsmith believes: “Much of the effort to improve governance and grow economies was internally generated, not only something thought up by Deng personally [...]”⁴⁹⁰ In the same book, Mahoney figures: “Reform and opening up exposed China increasingly also to international standards and practices, which likewise have had an effect on Chinese governance, especially as China increasingly has become part of global governance.”⁴⁹¹

4.4 Conclusion

During the Deng Xiaoping period, China’s governance mode changed from rule to management, but it still maintained the style of keeping the Party in a central role, and power continued to be rather concentrated at the top. Nevertheless, through the formal establishment of the socialist market economic system, China’s society started to become more complicated and gradually lots of practical decision-making shifted to the lower levels: to local administration; public and private companies; and other types of organizations. From 1978 to 2002, China mainly focused on economic construction, which became the main theme of national governance at this stage.

For Deng Xiaoping, the key was not whether socialism or capitalism were more suitable for China, but which kind of system could make China develop to its

⁴⁸⁸ Goodman, David S. G. “New Economic Elites: Family Histories and Social Change”. *State-society Relations and Governance in China*. Guo Sujian (ed.). Lanham, MA; London: Lexington Books, 2014, p. 31.

⁴⁸⁹ Sørensen, Georg. *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 2008, p. 112.

⁴⁹⁰ Fewsmith, Joseph. “Governance in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective”. *State-society Relations and Governance in China*. Guo Sujian (ed.). Lanham, MA; London: Lexington Books, 2014, p. 121.

⁴⁹¹ Mahoney, Josef Gregory. “The Development of Chinese Governance”. *State-society Relations and Governance in China*. In Guo Sujian (eds). Lanham, MA; London: Lexington Books, 2014, p. 142.

greatest potential. Gideon Rachman, chief commentator on foreign affairs for the *Financial Times*, quoted Deng Xiaoping's translator, Zhang Weiwei, who remarked, "The Chinese believe in performance legitimacy. If the government governs well, it is perceived as legitimate."⁴⁹² As the chief designer of China's socialist reform, opening up and modernization, Deng Xiaoping inherited and developed Mao Zedong's thought under the new historical conditions and very successfully answered a series of basic questions about how to develop a country with a backward economy and culture. Deng Xiaoping scientifically evaluated Mao Zedong's thought, shifted the focus of the work of the Party and the state to economic construction, and put forward the principles of reform and opening-up, as well as the policy of one country two systems, which definitely shaped the structure of modern China.

⁴⁹² Naisbitt, Doris and Naisbitt, John. *China's Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society*. New York: Harper Business. 2010, p. 13.

5 JIANG ZEMIN'S THOUGHTS ON GOVERNANCE

5.1 The concept of governance in the period of Jiang Zemin

Jiang Zemin commented: “The term ‘governance’ has become popular in contemporary China, reflecting its assimilation with the dominant discourse on globalization.”⁴⁹³ During Jiang Zemin’s tenure 1989-2002, the concept of governance is expressed as: govern, governance, rectify, run, harness, manage, rule, and so on. He guided the overall professionalization of the planning and organizing of the Chinese state, society and economy into a well-functioning administrative system, though not developing a specific theory of governance. He perhaps was not a great innovator, but a great continuator, who carried on the style of his predecessor. He also was a step away from a single leader model to a collective leadership:

遇到很重大的问题，我们还是可以随时向邓小平同志请教，听取其他老一辈革命家的意见。他们在长期革命斗争和建设实践中积累起来的治党治国治军的丰富经验，形成的崇高威望，是党的宝贵财富，对我们新的领导集体的工作仍然十分重要。⁴⁹⁴

When we encounter major issues, we can solicit Comrade Deng’s advice and listen to the recommendations of the other older revolutionaries at any time. The rich experience governing the Party, the country and the army they accumulated and the great prestige they acquired in the long years of revolutionary struggle and national construction constitute a precious asset of the Party and are still of signal importance for the work of our new collective leadership.⁴⁹⁵

This practice of sharing rights and soliciting opinions is a symbol of the operation of China’s collective leadership system, and also a miniature of the normal operation of the Communist Party style democracy and the system of checks and balances at the highest level.⁴⁹⁶ The third generation of leading collective with Jiang Zemin as the core continued to carry out theoretical and practical innovation. It lasted eight years from the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 1992 to the Fifth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2000, covering almost the entire 1990s. Jiang had become the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China already in 1989 and in that

⁴⁹³ Jiang Zemin. On the “Three Represents”, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p. 59. Cited from Mohanty, Manoranjan. “CPC’s Fourth Generation Ideology”. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 5-11 April 2003, Vol. 38, No. 14, pp. 1365-1371.

⁴⁹⁴ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第58页。

⁴⁹⁵ Jiang Zemin. “Speech at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China”. 24 June 1989. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Vol. I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, p. 55.

⁴⁹⁶ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。《The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin》. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第169页。

position had been taking care of the practical policies of Deng's reformist ideas. The 1992 Congress did not actually mean any changes in his official posts, but it meant a consolidation of the Party consensus behind his role as a de facto successor to Deng.

An NPC (the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, also known as CNNPC) was usually an occasion for intense behind-the-scene politicking among different factions in order to exert their influence on high-level appointments “人事安排, *rénshì ānpái*, literally, personnel arrangements” and on the Party's major policy lines. This was particularly the case during the Fifteenth Party Congress, which was the first post-Deng meeting without the domination of a single strong personality. Accordingly, Jiang had spared no efforts in mobilizing all his personal and institutional resources, firstly, to extol the economic and social achievements of Deng Xiaoping, secondly, to feature himself as the legitimate heir to Deng's main policy legacies, and thirdly, to use the label of “primary stage of socialism” to prompt leftist critique.⁴⁹⁷ “It was Comrade Deng Xiaoping's decision to make me the core of the third generation of the central collective leadership.⁴⁹⁸ 把我作为第三代中央领导集体的核心, 是邓小平同志决定的。”⁴⁹⁹ He also said, “A collective leadership must have a core, without a core, no leadership can be strong enough.⁵⁰⁰ 任何一个领导集体都要有一个核心, 没有核心的领导是靠不住的。”⁵⁰¹ At this stage, the third generation of central collective leadership with Jiang Zemin as the core realized a smooth transition from the second generation to the third generation.

By the end of the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin had succeeded in establishing a general consensus about his position as the core. Or, more accurately, Deng Xiaoping had helped him to establish this position: First, Deng's famous southern tour earlier that year had prompted Jiang Zemin to speed up market reform; second, a more reform minded Standing Committee of the Politburo was established, including Vice Premier Zhu Rongji and forty-nine years old Hu Jintao, the relatively young ambitious politician who later he became the head of state. Jiang Zemin had an efficient group backing him.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁷ The “People's Daily”, the Party's main propaganda organ, had carried many articles and commentaries extolling Deng's economic reform and open-door policies, and China's past economic and social achievements since the reform, as well as Jiang's speech at the Central Party School on 29 May, expounding the theme that China was only at the transitional “primary stage of socialism”. These documents were issued for Party cadres to study as their ideological preparation for the upcoming Party Congress. Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China's Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 71.

⁴⁹⁸ Jiang Zemin. “Speech on the Participation in the ‘Three Stresses’ by the Standing Committees of Political Bureau”. 20 January 2000. Speech delivered at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Vol. II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 569.

⁴⁹⁹ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第576页。

⁵⁰⁰ Deng Xiaoping. “Urgent Tasks of China's Third Generation of Collective Leadership”. 16 June 1989. Excerpt from a talk with leading members of the Central Committee of the CPC. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 300-301.

⁵⁰¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。1993，第310页。

⁵⁰² Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。 *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第184-185页。

5.1.1 Stability is the important objective

For developing countries, political stability is the first priority. Without a stable political environment, economic, political, and cultural development is out of the question. Political stability has been the overriding objective of Jiang Zemin's leadership circle.⁵⁰³ Jiang himself emphasized the matter:

任何一个国家，如果一天到晚政局不稳，不可能把经济搞上去。兵荒马乱，怎么搞经济？稳定是发展的根本前提。现在，全世界都在注视着我们，认为中国是稳定的。外国投资者看重我们这个大市场，首先就是因为我国社会政治稳定。⁵⁰⁴

No country can develop economically if it is in a constant state of political upheaval. How can a country's economy thrive in the turmoil of war? Stability is a fundamental prerequisite for development. The whole world is turning its gaze on us now in the belief that China is stable. The main reason foreign investors value our huge market so highly is because our country is socially and politically stable.⁵⁰⁵

The argument that stability is the premise of economic development and accelerating economic development can provide good material conditions for political stability. Poverty is the most profound source of instability. Only by eliminating poverty and realizing economic modernization can Chinese people provide conditions for political modernization and create political development, social development and cultural development. Kuhn believes that Jiang Zemin's political framework was formed during the period of turmoil in the country in the 1960s, and it was based on urgent understanding of social stability. In this he shared the outlook of Deng. In this he shared the outlook of Deng: "If he made mistakes in decision-making, he made mistakes in the direction of social stability."⁵⁰⁶

稳定是发展和改革的前提，发展和改革必须要有稳定的政治和社会环境[...] 没有稳定的政治和社会环境，一切无从谈起，多么好的规划、方案都将难以实现。⁵⁰⁷

Stability is a prerequisite for development and reform, and they require a stable political and social environment [...] Without a stable political and social environment, nothing further can be discussed, and it would be very difficult to

⁵⁰³ Pye, Lucian W. "Jiang Zemin's Style of Rule: Go for Stability, Monopolize Power and Settle for Limited Effectiveness". *The China Journal* (Canberra, A.C.T.), 1 January 2001, Vol.45 (45), pp. 45-51.

⁵⁰⁴ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《实施“引进来”和“走出去”相结合的开放战略》，1997年12月24日。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第94页。

⁵⁰⁵ Jiang Zemin. "Implement the Opening Up Strategy of Integrating 'Bringing in' with 'Going Global'". 24 December 1997. Speech to delegates at a national conference on utilizing foreign capital. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 93.

⁵⁰⁶ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。 *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第459页。

⁵⁰⁷ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年。第461页。

carry out our plans no matter how good they were.⁵⁰⁸

Moreover, the Chinese public is strongly supportive of stability, for a key feature of the Chinese political culture is a deep-seated and historical fear of “chaos, 乱, *luàn*”. Governing on that agenda therefore should be easy.⁵⁰⁹ Maintaining the authority of the ruling Party and the central government, correctly handling the relationship between the central and local governments, and preventing the emergence of local divisions can promote social and political stability. At the same time, political stability needs a clean, authoritative and efficient ruling party and government to promote the construction of market economy and political modernization, to realize the national unified political, economic and cultural changes, and to concentrate the national human, material and financial resources to promote the realization of modernization. Thus, the governance of China requires constant vigilance and careful reforms at all levels of the state. This kind of multilevel management characterized the Jiang period.

5.2 Rule of law

Rule of law was one of Jiang Zemin’s important concepts of governance:

发展民主，健全法制，建设社会主义法治国家。⁵¹⁰

Promote democracy, improve the legal system and build a socialist country under the rule of law.⁵¹¹

Deng Xiaoping did not directly use the concept of “rule of law”, but mostly used such expressions as “strengthening the legal system”, “improving the legal system” or “strengthening the socialist legal system”. Only once, in 1986, did Deng Xiaoping refer to the concept of “rule of law”:

要通过改革，处理好法治和人治的关系。⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁸ See Jiang Zemin. “Correctly Handle Certain Major Relationships in the Socialist Modernization Drive”. 28 September 1995. Excerpt from a speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, p. 450. Also see Jiang Zemin. “Build A Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Initiate A New Phase in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. 8 November 2002. Report at the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 518. Also see Jiang Zemin. “Accelerate Reform, Opening Up and Modernization and Achieve Greater Success in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. 12 October 1992. Report at the Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Vol. I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, p. 212. Also see Jiang Zemin. “Our Tibet Work Must Effectively Ensure the Region’s Stability and Development”. 20 July 1994. Speech at the Third Forum on Tibet Work held by the Central Committee and the State Council. Its original title was “Safeguard Stability, Accelerate Development and Inaugurate a New Phase in Our Tibet Work”. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, pp. 377-391.

⁵⁰⁹ Pye, Lucian W. “Jiang Zemin’s Style of Rule: Go for Stability, Monopolize Power and Settle for Limited Effectiveness”. *The China Journal* (Canberra, A.C.T.), 1 January 2001, Vol.45 (45), pp. 45-51.

⁵¹⁰ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第17页。

⁵¹¹ Jiang Zemin. “Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory and Comprehensively Advance the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century”. 12 September 1997. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 17.

⁵¹² Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。1993，第177页。

Through the reform, we intend to straighten out the relationship between the rule of law and the rule of man.⁵¹³

It can be seen that although Deng Xiaoping's thought of democracy and legal system included the basic content and thought of rule of law, it usually was not expressed in direct language form.

On the basis of inheriting, developing and innovating Deng Xiaoping's general plan of governing the country, Jiang Zemin actively shifted his vocabulary indicating that ruling the country according to law is the basic strategy for the Party to lead the people in governing the country:

加强社会主义法治建设，依法治国，是邓小平建设有中国特色社会主义理论的重要组成部分，是我们党和政府管理国家和社会事务的重要方针。⁵¹⁴ Strengthening development of the socialist legal system and following the rule of law are an important component of Deng Xiaoping's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and an important principle guiding our Party and government's administration of state and social affairs.⁵¹⁵

Jiang Zemin, with the new generation of leaders, caused the expressions: “governing the country according to law, 依法治国, *yīfǎ zhìguó*” and “administering the Party strictly, 从严治党, *cóng yán zhì dǎng*”. China's state governance model from the way of governance in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, to the management methods in the early stage of reform and opening up, and then to the governance objectives embodied in the basic strategy of governing the country according to law are the products of innovative development and specific national conditions.

The governance of the state and society needs to provide mandatory constraints on the activities of all social and political elements according to the legislation, so as to reasonably regulate the relationship among the society, market, and the government. The legal system is the weapon that makes a democratic political system of a country more perfect, more legitimate and stable. It requires the Party to lead the people to formulate and improve the relevant laws and regulations within the scope of the Constitution and laws. This activity fundamentally solves the problem of the people as the master of the country. Jiang further pointed the details of the rule of law:

依法治国，就是广大人民群众在党的领导下，依照宪法和法律规定，通过各种途径和形式管理国家事务，管理经济文化事业，管理社会事务，保证国家各项工作都依法进行，逐步实现社会主义民主的制度化、法律化，使这种制度和法律不因领导人的改变而改变，不因领导人的看法和注意力的

⁵¹³ Deng Xiaoping. “On Reform of the Political Structure”. September-November 1986. Excerpts from four talks. *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1994, p. 179.

⁵¹⁴ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《坚持依法治国》，1996年2月8日。《江泽民文选》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第511页。

⁵¹⁵ Jiang Zemin. “Uphold the Rule of Law”. 8 February 1996. Speech at a lecture on the legal system held by the Central Committee. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, p. 500.

改变而改变。⁵¹⁶

Establishing the rule of law means that the broad masses of the people, under the leadership of the Party and in accordance with the Constitution and the laws, participate in different ways through various channels in managing state affairs, economic and cultural undertakings, and social matters. In this way, they can ensure that all the state's work proceeds lawfully, and that socialist democracy is gradually institutionalized and written into law, so as to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes, or whenever the leaders change their views or shift the focus of their attentions.⁵¹⁷

Jiang Zemin held the opinion that it takes a long time to establish a political concept and cultivate its understanding. An important task in strengthening the socialist legal system and upholding the rule of law is to constantly raise awareness and understanding of the law and the legal system among cadres and the masses.⁵¹⁸ As Wong said, Jiang Zemin's principle of state governance is based on the experience that "An effective and functioning legal framework is simply indispensable for good governance, which in turn holds the key to the successful implementation of various reforms."⁵¹⁹

Nevertheless, Lucian Pye's interpretation of the change was that it was not revolutionary. In modern societies the legitimate realm for the political play of interest groups is the law-making process in the belief that if the law damages one's interest, one should seek to change the law. Under the rule of law there is an absolute taboo against tampering with the law-enforcement process, for to do so is by definition corruption. However, despite the talk of the rule of law, the Chinese leadership was happy to preserve the traditional Chinese view that it is taboo to try to influence the law-making authority, for that is the domain that they were the most anxious to preserve for themselves.⁵²⁰

Democracy and the rule of law are inextricably linked.⁵²¹ Yu Keping believes that the "legal system, 法制, *fǎzhì*" mainly emphasizes strict compliance with the law, while the "rule of law, 法治, *fǎzhì*" emphasizes that the constitution and law of the country are the supreme authority of public governance, that everyone is equal before the law, including the ruling Party, which must also act within the framework of the law.⁵²² There is a rise up from "rule by law" to "rule of law". Although there is only one-word difference, it brings about a qualitative leap, which contains new and

⁵¹⁶ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第28-29页。

⁵¹⁷ Jiang Zemin. "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory and Comprehensively Advance the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the 21st Century". 12 September 1997. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 29.

⁵¹⁸ Jiang Zemin. "Uphold the Rule of Law". 8 February 1996. Speech at a lecture on the legal system held by the Central Committee. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, pp. 501-502.

⁵¹⁹ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China's Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 27.

⁵²⁰ Pye, Lucian W. "Jiang Zemin's Style of Rule: Go for Stability, Monopolize Power and Settle for Limited Effectiveness". *The China Journal* (Canberra, A.C.T.), 1 January 2001, Vol.45 (45), pp. 45-51.

⁵²¹ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 35.

⁵²² Yu Keping. 俞可平。《走向善治》。北京：中国文史出版社。2016年，第72页。

higher-level theoretical connotation and great practical significance.

5.2.1 The combination of rule of law and rule of virtue

There has been a tradition of “rule by virtue” in Chinese history. Since the Duke of Zhou in the Western Zhou Dynasty 1047-772 BC, Confucius, Mencius and their successors attached great importance to the role of “morality or virtue, 德, *dé*” and “propriety or ritual, 礼, *lǐ*” in governing the country. Laozi wrote:

治人事天，莫若嗇。夫唯嗇，是谓早服。早服谓之重积德。重积德，则无不克。⁵²³

In governing a people and in serving Heaven, there is nothing like frugality. To be frugal is to return before straying. To return before straying is to have a double reserve of virtue. To have a double reserve of virtue is to overcome everything.⁵²⁴

立德深矣远矣。与物反矣。然后乃至大顺。⁵²⁵

Deep and far-reaching is mystical virtue, it leads all things to return, till they come back to great harmony.⁵²⁶

Since the Han and Tang Dynasties, “morality as the principle and punishment as the supplement” has become the ideal governing strategy pursued by the rulers of all dynasties. Confucianism advocated the rule of virtue, but does not exclude the role of law in governing the country. Legalists advocated the rule by law, but did not completely exclude the role of morality. Jiang Zemin’s tenure was, among others, a period when small references to old Chinese political thinking started to appear in public pronouncements. In terms of ideas, China started to become more nationalistic and more traditional, while also developing and internationalizing at the same time.

China’s economy and society had become more complex, with ever-greater functional specialization and social differentiation creating an ever-richer diversity of interests. The traditional Chinese social order was relatively simple and could be held together by the integrating nature of Confucianism. Social gradations existed, but they were easily legitimized by the moral of Confucian orthodoxy. At the end of the millennium, the advancement of specialization in modern China had resulted in the emergence of increasing numbers of strong and competing special interests.⁵²⁷

Also, in modern China, the law must be supported by morality to play an

⁵²³ Laozi. 老子. Laozi (dates unknown), also known as Li Dan and Li Er, was a philosopher and the founder of philosophical Taosim in the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476BC). His ideas include: “The Tao follows Nature 道法自然”, “existence and non-existence give birth to each other 有无相生” and “governance by doing nothing 无为而治”. It was said that he wrote *Laozi* or *Dao De Jing*. Laozi. Translated by Wu, John C. H. Boston: Shambhala Publications. 1989, p. 120.

⁵²⁴ Ibid. p. 121.

⁵²⁵ Ibid. p. 132.

⁵²⁶ Ibid. p. 133.

⁵²⁷ Pye, Lucian W. “Jiang Zemin’s Style of Rule: Go for Stability, Monopolize Power and Settle for Limited Effectiveness”. *The China Journal* (Canberra, A.C.T.), 1 January 2001, Vol.45 (45), pp. 45-51.

important role in regulating people's social behaviour and maintaining social order, both of which are indispensable. Jiang Zemin pointed:

一个社会治理的好不好，既与法制是否完备有关，也与人们的思想道德文化素质有很大关系。我国历史上历来就有德刑相辅、儒法并用的思想，从中可以得到有益的启发。总之，法是他律，德是自律，需要二者并用。⁵²⁸ How well a society is regulated is closely related to how comprehensive the legal system is, as well as how high people's ideological, moral and cultural standards are. The ideas of complementing morality with punishment and ensuring proper behaviour through a combination of Confucian and legal means have a long history in China, and they can positively inspire us. In general, laws work through punishment, while morality works through self-discipline, and we need to use both in combination.⁵²⁹

Jiang Zemin further pointed out:

我们在建设有中国特色社会主义，发展社会主义市场经济的过程中，要坚持不懈地加强社会主义法制建设，依法治国，同时也要坚持不懈地加强社会主义道德建设，以德治国。对一个国家的治理来说，法治和德治，从来都是相辅相成、相互促进的。二者缺一不可，也不可偏废的。法治属于政治建设，属于政治文明，德治属于思想建设，属于精神文明。二者范畴不同，但其地位和功能都是非常重要的，我们要把法制建设与道德建设紧密结合起来，把依法治国与以德治国紧密结合起来。⁵³⁰

In the process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and developing a socialist market economy, we need to unremittingly improve the socialist legal system and implement the rule of law. At the same time, we need to unremittingly improve socialist moral education and implement the rule of virtue. In terms of the governance of a country, the rule of law and the rule of virtue always complement and further each other. Both are indispensable and neither can be neglected. The rule of law belongs to the political arena or political culture, whereas the rule of virtue belongs to the ideological arena or cultural and ethical progress. Although they differ in category, their positions and roles are both very important. We need to closely integrate building the legal system with building morality, while also closely integrating the rule of law with the rule of virtue.⁵³¹

The rule of law and the rule of virtue complement each other, promote each other,

⁵²⁸ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第643页。

⁵²⁹ Jiang Zemin. "Improve Socialist Democracy and the Socialist Legal System". 27 February 1997. Excerpt from a speech at a meeting of leading Party members attending the Fifth Session of the Eighth NPC and the Fifth Session of the Eighth National Committee of the CPPCC. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, p. 627.

⁵³⁰ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第200页。

⁵³¹ Jiang Zemin. "Vigorously Promote the Spirit of Unremitting Struggle". 10 January 2001. Excerpt from a speech at a national conference of directors of the CPC publicity departments. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, pp. 195-196.

and bring out the best of each other. With the external constraints provided by the rule of law, citizens can have laws to follow, and more clearly define which behaviours are unreasonable, illegal, and which are reasonable and feasible.⁵³² With the internal norms provided by the rule of virtue, people can better carry out the legal provisions, not let the laws and regulations become empty words, leading to people's civilized behaviour, and effectively prevent the emergence of problems in the marginal areas of law. The rule of law is a part of political construction, while the rule of virtue is a part of ideological construction. They belong to different categories, but they all play a unique role and value in their categories. The rule of law is the rule of procedure. The enforcement of law by the state is mandatory to people's behaviour norms. Ruling the country by virtue is the rule of human feelings. Relying on the power of education and public opinion, it implies exhortation to people's behaviour. Therefore, only by combining the construction of the rule of law with the construction of the rule of virtue, can give full play to the power of both.

A modern market economy system is based on a corresponding moral consciousness, moral habits and values. These concepts regulate people's behaviour and value orientation, and become a kind of social order and self-discipline norms recognized by the majority of the society, and play an important role in ensuring the operation of the market. Morality is the basis of law-abiding life.

There is a dispute between the rule of law and the rule of virtue in the legal field. Jiang Zemin's emphasis on "morality" and "law" complementing each other—a statement that clearly bears the colour of Confucianism—was seen as a change in ideological direction, which has aroused the speculation of Chinese intellectuals. For decades, the thought of ancient China was regarded as "feudal legacy" by the Communist Party. Although Jiang Zemin was deliberately vague, people still asked the question: "Is he trying to create a new system combining Marxist political theory with Confucian moral thought?"⁵³³ In the traditional society, the rule of virtue is usually expressed as the rule of rites, but it can also be understood as the rule of man. Because the concept of "virtue" is defined by people, the premise of rule of virtue is to judge good and evil, and this standard is judged by people. If the rule of virtue is not handled well, it will become the rule of man.⁵³⁴ The rule of virtue is to regulate and restrict the inner order, while the rule of law is to regulate and restrict the external order. Moral norms and legal norms complement each other and are indispensable elements in regulating human behaviour.⁵³⁵ The essence of the Confucianists and Legalists in ancient China is just the different emphases of the ruling means under the rule of man, because they all take "respecting the monarch" as the premise and "governing the people" as the object.⁵³⁶ Confucianism attaches great importance to the role of moral education, advocates that politicians should take the lead in setting an example, while Legalists advocate the law, and emphasize the equality in the

⁵³² Yu Keping. 俞可平。《走向善治》。北京：中国文史出版社。2016年，第75-77页。

⁵³³ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。《The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin. Chinese Version. 他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第288-289页。

⁵³⁴ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《走向善治》。北京：中国文史出版社。2016年，第77-79页。

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

application of law. In a larger picture, the Confucian and the Legalist positions have been amalgamated in Chinese thought, so that, moral education and legal punishment, as two means of governing the country mix together. In this sense, Jiang Zemin's strategy of "ruling the country by virtue" is an inheritance of the traditional "rule by virtue".⁵³⁷

5.3 The Three Represents

Concept is the basic element of a theoretical system. The emergence of a new scientific concept often means the birth of a new theory. A specific concept reflects the development process of things, and the development process contains many connections, transitions, and contradictions. Therefore, a specific concept also contains a lot of connections, transitions, and contradictions; therefore, a specific concept is dynamic, not static.⁵³⁸ The core concept of Jiang Zemin's thought of "Three Represents, 三个代表, *sān gè dài biǎo*" is composed of three components: advanced social productivity, advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the people. "Represent, 代表, *dài biǎo*" means performing tasks, exercising rights on behalf of someone or some mechanism.⁵³⁹ At the same time, each aspect is not isolated, but a theoretical whole that is interrelated, interconnected and internally unified. The birth of the concept of "Three Represents" marks the formation of the third theoretical leap of the Communist Party of China. Like any theory that can be called a "system", the concept system of "Three Represents" has its own distinctive characteristics. In Chinese thought, because socialism is a scientific theory, also the conceptual constructs of the governance of the Chinese polity are considered as scientific theories.

In 2000, the "Three Represents" was put forward for the first time. In July 2001, at the celebration meeting of the eightieth birthday of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin expounded the theoretical basis, scientific connotation and spiritual essence of the important thought of "Three Represents". In 2002, Jiang Zemin placed the theory to the report of the sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, and thus it became part of the official canon of Chinese ideological thought.⁵⁴⁰

Many Western comments on Jiang's ideas have not been positive. Bruce Gilley said that individual freedoms and democratic government are the usual response to the complicated nature of the world. But Jiang's response was a new slogan called the "Three Represents" an empty and irrelevant response—a focus on who to represent that entirely ignores the issue of what to represent.⁵⁴¹ However, the contents of

⁵³⁷ Jiang Zemin. "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles". April 2001. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 217.

⁵³⁸ Zhou Liqun. 周礼全。《周礼全集》。北京：中国社会科学出版社。2000年，第45页。

⁵³⁹ Xia Zhengnong, Chen Lizhi (eds). 夏征农, 陈立志主编。《辞海》。上海：上海辞书出版社。2009年，第684页。

⁵⁴⁰ Jiang Zemin. "Explicitly Set the Objective of Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects". 14 January 2002. Excerpt from a speech at a drafting group meeting for the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Vol. III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 400-404.

⁵⁴¹ Gilley, Bruce. "Review: The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin". *The China Quarterly*, March 2005, No. 181, March 2005, pp. 168-189.

“Three Represents” are:

总是代表着中国先进生产力的发展要求，代表着中国先进文化的发展方向，代表着中国最广大人民的根本利益。⁵⁴²

Always represent the requirements for developing China’s advanced productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people.⁵⁴³

It shows clearly not only who to represent, but also what to represent. The idea is continuously on enhancing China’s multilevel and multisector development. As Faison’s comment: “Gilley may have been obliged to rely heavily on second hand accounts of Chinese politics, and his approach has major drawbacks. He mixes straightforward, largely reliable versions of events recounted by Xinhua (China’s official news agency) with less trustworthy material culled from gossipy Hong Kong magazines like Zheng Ming.”⁵⁴⁴ Foreign critics often describe the appearance of Chinese politics only superficially. When looking into the inside, they focus on friction, emphasize internal strife and political struggle, and intentionally or unintentionally, the main working mode of Chinese leaders seems to be debate and confrontation. Western and Hong Kong media reports like political cartoonists’ graffiti.⁵⁴⁵ Jiang greatly contributed to the change in China.⁵⁴⁶

5.3.1 Representing advanced productive forces

Jiang Zemin emphasized the importance of developing advanced productive forces. “The fundamental task of socialism is to develop the productive forces. In the primary stage of socialism, it is particularly important to focus on the development of socialist productive forces.”⁵⁴⁷ “Socialist modernization must be built on the basis of developed productive forces. The most fundamental thing for us to strive for modernization is to form a developed productive force in our country through reform and development.”⁵⁴⁸ In terms of socialist theory, Jiang’s actions could be legitimized with pronouncements of his predecessors. Mao Zedong had stated:

中国一切政党的政策及其实践在中国人民中所表现的作用的好坏、大小，归根到底，看它对于中国人民的生产力的发展是否有帮助及其帮助大小，

⁵⁴² Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第2页。

⁵⁴³ Jiang Zemin. “Better Effectuate the Three Represents Under the New Historical Conditions”. 25 February 2000. Excerpt from a speech during an inspection tour of Guangdong Province. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁴⁴ Faison, Seth. “Review: Eye of the Tiger: What Jiang Zemin Tells Us about China”. *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 1999, Vol. 78, No. 1, p. 145.

⁵⁴⁵ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。《The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin》. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第396页。

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 12.

⁵⁴⁷ Jiang Zemin. “Implement the Strategy of Reinvigorating China Through Science and Education”. 26 May 1995. Speech at a national conference on science and technology. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Vol. I. 2010. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 413-428.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid.

看它是束缚生产力的，还是解放生产力的。⁵⁴⁹

In the last analysis, the impact, good or bad, great or small, of the policy and the practice of any Chinese political Party upon the people depends on whether and how much it helps to develop their productive forces, and on whether it fetters or liberates these forces.⁵⁵⁰

Deng Xiaoping also pointed out:

在社会主义国家，一个真正的马克思主义政党在执政以后，一定要致力于发展生产力，并在这个基础上逐步提高人民的生活。⁵⁵¹

In a socialist country, a genuinely Marxist ruling Party must devote itself to developing the productive forces and, on that basis, gradually raise the people's living standards.⁵⁵²

The ideational innovation and the burgeoning capitalistic reality of the Chinese economy could be reconciled with the prevailing socialist ideology and language was Jiang's emphasis on the primary stage of socialism. This made it possible to rely even on Marx and Engels, who had written: "The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together."⁵⁵³ Similarly Jiang could claim that the productive forces that the whole world had created during the past 100 years were more gigantic than what all preceding generations had created.⁵⁵⁴ Most of that had been done by the capitalist countries. According to this interpretation, what was happening in China was only a rational process. Chinese capitalists in history had not been able to increase Chinese productivity much, but now the Chinese socialist leadership was taking a necessary step that had been neglected before. After Chinese productivity had risen to a high level, the socialist project could continue.

⁵⁴⁹ Mao Zedong. 毛泽东。《毛泽东选集》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。1991年，第1028页。

⁵⁵⁰ Mao Zedong. "On Coalition Government". 24 April 1945. This was the political report made by Comrade Mao Zedong to the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*. Vol. III. 1975, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p. 251.

⁵⁵¹ Deng Xiaoping. 邓小平。《邓小平文选》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。1993年，第28页。

⁵⁵² Deng Xiaoping. "We Are Building a Socialist Society with Both High Material Standards and High Cultural and Ethical Standards". 29 April 1983. Excerpt from a talk with a delegation from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 1994, p. 38.

⁵⁵³ Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. 马克思，恩格斯。"The Communist Manifesto". *Collected Works*. Vol. 6. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 489. Also see Jiang Zemin. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. 2013. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Vol. III, p. 132. Also see Jiang Zemin. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. 2012. Vol. II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, p. 298

⁵⁵⁴ Jiang Zemin. "Continue to Advance the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Century". 11 October 2000. Speech at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. 2013. Vol. III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, pp. 117-118.

5.3.2 Representing the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people

During Jiang's tenure, references to Chinese classical literature became usual. Respect for human dignity and value is a traditional element in it. Various ancient Chinese sages declared things like:

天地之间，莫贵于人。⁵⁵⁵

Nothing is more valuable in the universe than human beings.⁵⁵⁶

仁者莫大于爱人。⁵⁵⁷

There is no greater goodwill than loving your fellows.⁵⁵⁸

民为贵。⁵⁵⁹

People are the most important element in a nation.⁵⁶⁰

天生万物，唯人为贵。⁵⁶¹

Man is the most valuable among all the things that heaven fosters.⁵⁶²

These kinds of references started to appear in Jiang's argumentation.⁵⁶³ Jiang Zemin also pointed out: Development must rely on the people, who are the driving force for the advancement of history:⁵⁶⁴

⁵⁵⁵ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第56页。

⁵⁵⁶ Jiang Zemin. "Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare, The Moon and Warfare". *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 57.

⁵⁵⁷ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第56页。

⁵⁵⁸ *Elder Dai's Book of Rites*, "Royal Speeches." The original passage reads, "There is no greater goodwill than loving your fellows, no greater knowledge than recognizing virtue and talent in others, and no better practice of government than appointing the virtuous and talented to positions of authority. If the ruler of a state masters these three principles, then people everywhere will bow in obeisance and await the ruler's command. Then he can take action." *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 57.

⁵⁵⁹ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第56页。

⁵⁶⁰ *Mencius*, Book XIV, "Jin Xin", Part II. The original passage read, "People are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; and the sovereign is the lightest." *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 57. Mencius (372-289 BC), also known as Meng Ke and Ziyu, was a philosopher during the mid-Warring States Period (475-221 BC). He believed that "man is an integral part of Nature 天人合一", advocated a theory that man is born good, and named the four virtues as benevolence 仁, justice 义, propriety 礼 and wisdom 智. He developed the ideas of benevolence and the rule of virtue promulgated by Confucius. He also formulated the new idea that "the people are more important than the ruler 民贵君轻". He has been venerated as the "second sage" after Confucius. Hucker, Charles O. *China to 1850: A Short History*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1978, p. 45.

⁵⁶¹ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第56页。

⁵⁶² *Liezi*, "Tianrui". This chapter records a conversation Confucius had with Rong Qi, who was playing the zither and singing at the time: Confucius asked, "Why are you so happy?" Rong replied, "There are many reasons for my being happy. Man is the most valuable among all the things that heaven fosters. And I am a man. This is one of the reasons for my being happy." *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 57.

⁵⁶³ Jiang Zemin. "Fully Guarantee the People Enjoy Human Rights in Accordance with the Law". October 1997-October 1999. Excerpts on human rights from four articles. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 56.

⁵⁶⁴ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《全面建设小康社会：开创中国特色社会主义事业新局面》。北京：人民出版社。

人民是我们国家的主人，是决定我国前途命运的根本力量。⁵⁶⁵

The people are the masters of this country and the fundamental force determining its fate.⁵⁶⁶

In the process of building democratic politics, the Communist Party of China has always maintained a leading position, representing the fundamental interests of the people. Here, “the overwhelming majority of the people, 绝大多数人民, *jué dà duōshù rénmin*” is in fact a new definition of the subject scope of “the people, 人民, *rénmín*”. As Jiang Zemin pointed out, democracy should be adapted to the actual situation of its own development.⁵⁶⁷ The democracy that China strives to realize in the process of multilevel development is democracy based on the interests of the people. The report of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China emphasizes that the most important feature of socialism is socialist democracy:

人民民主是社会主义的本质要求和内在属性。没有民主和法制就没有社会主义，就没有社会主义的现代化。⁵⁶⁸

People’s democracy is an essential requirement for socialism and one of its intrinsic attributes. Without democracy and a legal system, there can be no socialism and thus no socialist modernization.⁵⁶⁹

On the issue of democracy, Jiang Zemin inherited Mao Zedong’s and Deng Xiaoping’s idea of people’s democratic dictatorship, and stressed that democracy should not be treated uniformly, but should be developed in accordance with the specific national conditions of each country:

在民主问题上，我一直强调两项原则。第一，民主是相对的、具体的，不是绝对的、抽象的。发展民主，必须与一定社会的具体条件结合起来。第二，世界是丰富多彩的，各国有各国的政治体制模式，不可能千篇一律。⁵⁷⁰

I have always emphasized two principles concerning democracy. First, democracy is relative and specific, not absolute and abstract. In developing democracy, we must take the specific conditions of a given society into consideration. Second, the world is rich and varied, all countries have their own political system and they cannot all follow the same pattern.⁵⁷¹

2001年，第14页。

⁵⁶⁵ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第261-262页。

⁵⁶⁶ Jiang Zemin. “Our Party’s Main Historical Experiences Over the Last 20 Years”. 18 December 1998. Excerpt from a speech at a conference to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 256.

⁵⁶⁷ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《论党的建设》。北京：中央文献出版社。2001年，第215页。

⁵⁶⁸ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第一卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第235页。

⁵⁶⁹ Jiang Zemin. “Accelerate Reform, Opening Up and Modernization and Achieve Greater Success in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. 12 October 1992. Report at the Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Vol. I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, p. 225.

⁵⁷⁰ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第236页。

⁵⁷¹ Jiang Zemin. “The Objective of Political Restructuring is to Improve the Socialist Political System”. 2 April

Political reform is the most sensitive area in China's reform. Jiang Zemin tried to adopt a cautious method to limit the abuse of power, such as establishing the regular meeting system of Party and government departments, gradually expanding the scope of reform, and making it strictly monitored. Jiang Zemin believed that his primary task was to provide the necessities of life for many Chinese people. As a matter of fact, most urban residents in China enjoy the same practical personal and social freedoms as Westerners, except voting in formal multiparty elections. What is more valuable than elections is that over one billion people can finally be free from hunger, disease, displacement, illiteracy, and other social disasters. This was Deng Xiaoping's idea, and its realization was carried further during Jiang Zemin's tenure.⁵⁷²

Mohanty claims that: "The idea of Three Represents can be seen either as a rationalisation of the policies which unfolded in China during the 13 years under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, or as a creative development of the CPC's ideological line carrying the stamp of the retiring leader. It could also be seen as a combination of both."⁵⁷³ He also points out that: "The political significance of the Three Represents lies in the fact that the idea is expected to maintain continuity between the present set of policies and the future while at the same time enabling the new leadership to evolve new policies as it advances with the times, as Jiang did in his time and Deng did before him in innovating new policies."⁵⁷⁴

5.4 The large-scale development of the western region

西北地区是中华民族和中华文明的重要发祥地。西北地区也是古代中华文明与世界闻名的重要交汇处。古丝绸之路作为中外经济文化交流的重要渠道，对中华文明和世界闻名的发展都曾做出了重要贡献。⁵⁷⁵

Northwest China is an important cradle of the Chinese nation and civilization. It was also important in ancient times as a meeting point for Chinese and world civilizations. The ancient Silk Road was an important conduit for economic and cultural exchanges between China and other lands, and contributed greatly to developing Chinese and world civilization.⁵⁷⁶

Mohanty claims: "The overall interests of the people are composed of specific interests of people from different quarters and therefore the interests of different

2001. Excerpt from a speech at a national conference on public security work. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 231.

⁵⁷² Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。《The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin》. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第458页。

⁵⁷³ Mohanty, Manoranjan. "CPC's Fourth Generation Ideology". *Economic and Political Weekly*, 5-11 April 2003, Vol. 38, No. 14, pp. 1365-1371.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第三卷。2006。北京：人民出版社。第58页。

⁵⁷⁶ Jiang Zemin. "Effectively Carry Out the Century Project to Develop Western China on a Large Scale". 20 June 2000. Excerpt from a speech at a forum Comrade Jiang Zemin chaired in Lanzhou on Party-building work in northwest China and on the development of western China. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 57.

classes and ethnic groups have to be fulfilled.”⁵⁷⁷ However, this cannot be done simultaneously for all Chinese because of the size of the country and its endowment of resources. Deng Xiaoping’s policy of letting the eastern coastal areas to develop first and later use the resources to develop the western areas followed from this. Jiang inherited this policy:

我理解，邓小平同志提出通过一部分地区、一部分人先富起来，然后逐步达到共同富裕，还不是终点。到了一个比较高的水平时，先进地区一定还要往前走。平衡是相对的，不平衡是绝对的，这是事物发展的客观规律。在发展战略布局上，必须有全盘的构想。邓小平同志的这个战略设想是，根据生产力发展水平和各方面条件，东部地区先加快发展，然后带动和支持中西部地区发展，最终实现全国各地共同繁荣、共同富裕。实践证明，这是完全正确的。⁵⁷⁸

As I understood, Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s idea of allowing some regions and some people to prosper first, and then gradually achieving common prosperity, is not the end. Even at a relatively high level of development, the more developed regions will continue to move forward. Balance is relative, while unbalance is absolute: This is the objective law of development. Our development strategy must be guided by an overall plan. Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s strategic plan is that, based on the development level of the productive forces and other factors, the eastern region should accelerate development first and then promote and support the development of the central and western regions until common prosperity across the country is eventually achieved. Practice has proved this to be absolutely correct.⁵⁷⁹

The implementation of the western development is a long-term task. Jiang Zemin attached great importance to this major issue and made several speeches on solving the regional development gap.⁵⁸⁰ The difficulty of China’s modernization lies not in the East with its relative historical wealth and easy access to world markets, but in the West. This is what Jiang started to implement.

⁵⁷⁷ Mohanty, Manoranjan. “CPC’s Fourth Generation Ideology”. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 5-11 April 2003, Vol. 38, No. 14, pp. 1365-1371.

⁵⁷⁸ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《不失时机地实施西部开发战略》，1999年6月17日。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第341页。

⁵⁷⁹ Jiang Zemin. “Seize the Opportunity to Implement the Strategy of Large-scale Development of the West”. 17 June 1999. Excerpt from a speech in Xi’an at a forum on SOE reform and development in northwest China, over which Comrade Jiang Zemin presided. Speech to delegates at a national conference on utilizing foreign capital. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 332.

⁵⁸⁰ See Jiang Zemin. “Seize the Opportunity to Implement the Strategy of Large-scale Development of the West”. 17 June 1999. Excerpt from a speech in Xi’an at a forum on SOE reform and development in northwest China, over which Comrade Jiang Zemin presided. Speech to delegates at a national conference on utilizing foreign capital. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 331. Also see Jiang Zemin. “Effectively Carry Out the Century Project to Develop Western China on a Large Scale”. 20 June 2000. Excerpt from a speech at a forum Comrade Jiang Zemin chaired in Lanzhou on Party-building work in northwest China and on the development of western China. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 57. Also see Jiang Zemin. “Take the Masses as Our Foundation”. 1 January 1994. Excerpt from a speech at a New Year’s reception held by the CPPCC National Committee. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

实施西部地区大开发，是全国发展的一个大战略、大思路。⁵⁸¹

Carrying out the large-scale development of the western region⁵⁸² is a major strategy and a grand idea for our national development.⁵⁸³

实施西部大开发，对于推进全国的改革和建设，对于国家的长治久安，具有重大的经济意义和社会政治意义。⁵⁸⁴

Carrying out the large-scale development of the western region is of great economic, social and political significance for promoting nationwide reform and development, and maintaining the long-term political stability of the country.⁵⁸⁵

Yu points out: “Pursuing a balanced regional development serves three important purposes. First, narrowing regional disparities is essential to regain political loyalty of the western region. Second, reducing disparities is essential to social stability in the underdeveloped western region, which is home to many ethnic minorities. Third, pursuing a more balanced regional development is crucial to boost domestic consumption and investment, and reduce the overdependence of China’s economy on foreign trade and investment.”⁵⁸⁶ Yu also analyses: “China’s uneven development strategy contributed to the widening of economic disparity among its regions, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s.”⁵⁸⁷ To take six regions of western China as example, since the implementation of the western development strategy, the GDP of these regions increased significantly.

⁵⁸¹ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《不失时机地实施西部发开发战略》，1999年6月17日。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第341页。

⁵⁸² The western region geographically refers to Shanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai provinces and the Ningxia and Xinjiang autonomous regions in northwest China and Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces, Chongqing Municipality and the Tibet Autonomous Region in the southwest. After the CPC central Committee made the policy decision to develop the western region on a large scale, the State Council issued the Notice of Policies and Measures for Carrying Out Large-Scale Development of the Western Region on 26 October 2000, articulating that the policies for developing the western region apply to the ten provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in the northwest and southwest, and also to the Inner Mongolia and Guangxi autonomous regions. Later, the State Council successively approved preferences given in practical work in accordance with the policies and measures on the western areas to the Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture in Hunan Province, Enshi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture in Hubei Province and Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 337. Also see Jiang Zemin. “Our Tibet Work Must Effectively Ensure the Region’s Stability and Development”. 20 July 1994. Speech at the Third Forum on Tibet Work held by the Central Committee and the State Council. Its original tile was “Safeguard Stability, Accelerate Development and Inaugurate a New Phase in Our Tibet Work.” *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2010, pp. 377-391.

⁵⁸³ Jiang Zemin. “Seize the Opportunity to Implement the Strategy of Large-scale Development of the West”. 17 June 1999. Excerpt from a speech in Xi’an at a forum on SOE reform and development in northwest China, over which Comrade Jiang Zemin presided. Speech to delegates at a national conference on utilizing foreign capital. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 332.

⁵⁸⁴ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《不失时机地实施西部发开发战略》，1999年6月17日。《江泽民文选》第二卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第342页。


⁵⁸⁵ Jiang Zemin. “Seize the Opportunity to Implement the Strategy of Large-scale Development of the West”. 17 June 1999. Excerpt from a speech in Xi’an at a forum on SOE reform and development in northwest China, over which Comrade Jiang Zemin presided. Speech to delegates at a national conference on utilizing foreign capital. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 333.

⁵⁸⁶ Yu Hong. “China’s Regional Development Policies”. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds).

China: development and governance. Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific Pub. 2013, p. 141.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 140-141.

Figure 4: Regional Change of China’s GDP from 1993-2003⁵⁸⁸



Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China. Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

The western region has a vast territory and rich natural resources, but its development level is relatively low. It also contains huge investment opportunities, huge market potential and development potential. The implementation of the strategy of developing the western region and speeding up the development of the central and eastern regions can improve people’s living standards and expand domestic consumption and investment.

As Faison wrote: “The transformation has been overwhelming: China at the close of the twentieth century barely resembled the country a decade earlier.”⁵⁸⁹ A prominent feature of the world economy is that national economic restructuring is being carried out profoundly in the global scope, enabling very fast transformations, though thus far in China mainly in the East. This period, however, was the time when the western areas rose strongly on the Chinese agenda of development planning.⁵⁹⁰ It was an important issue related to China’s overall cross-century development.⁵⁹¹ The western development strategy exerted a profound influence on the later “One Belt One Road” initiative in the era of Xi Jinping.

⁵⁸⁸ Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 中国国家统计局, *zhōngguó guójiā tǒngjì jú*. <https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103> Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

⁵⁸⁹ Faison, Seth. “Review: Eye of the Tiger: What Jiang Zemin Tells Us about China”. *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 1999, Vol. 78, No. 1, p. 141.


⁵⁹⁰ 《国家发改委官员解读西部大开发十二五规划》。Officials of the national development and Reform Commission interpret the 12th Five Year Plan of the western development. 《人民日报》。 *People’s Daily*. 21 February 2012.

⁵⁹¹ Jiang Zemin. “Seize the Opportunity to Implement the Strategy of Large-scale Development of the West”. 17 June 1999. Excerpt from a speech in Xi’an at a forum on SOE reform and development in northwest China, over which Comrade Jiang Zemin presided. Speech to delegates at a national conference on utilizing foreign capital. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2012, p. 331.

5.5 Zhu Rongji's role in economic governance

The Chinese economy had, since the introduction of reform and the opening up policy by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, experienced phenomenal growth with an annual growth rate of 9.4%.⁵⁹² Its growth did not suffer much from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and China led the global economy to recovery. Lieberthal pointed: “Most fundamental, China’s overall economic growth averaged about 9 percent per year in real terms from 1978 through 2002, giving the PRC the fastest-growing major industrial economy in the world over this entire period. This overall economic growth has stayed far ahead of population increase and has produced real improvements in the standard of living for most citizens. This is an impressive record, especially because it was achieved during a period when the national leaders were forcing significant changes in the way the economic system operates.”⁵⁹³ As the IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said, “The global economic situation might have been even more calamitous had it not been for the impetus that China provided to growth and stability.” China’s long streak of spectacular growth performance was simply historically unprecedented.⁵⁹⁴

Figure 5: China’s GDP, CPI and economic growth from 1979-2014⁵⁹⁵



Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China.

As Deng had successfully introduced economic reform and open-door policy in 1979 that had transformed China’s economy leading to a successful economic take-off, who

⁵⁹² Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 131.

⁵⁹³ Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: from revolution through reform*. New York and London: W.W. Norton. Second edition. 2004, p. 265.

⁵⁹⁴ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, pp. 4-5. Also see Galenson, W. and Liu Ta-Chung. *Economic Trends in Communist China*. London: Aldine Publishing Company, 1968, p. 196.

⁵⁹⁵ Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 中国国家统计局, *zhōngguó guójiā tǒngjì jú*. <https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01&zb=A0201&sj=1979> Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

was the person to manage such a dazzling take-off? That Zhu Rongji⁵⁹⁶ was such a person seems much like a self-evident truth. Deng considered Zhu as the only person in high position who “understands economics”.⁵⁹⁷ He is regarded as China’s most popular premier after Zhou Enlai.⁵⁹⁸

The process of “marketization” itself is capitalism in action. But there are also a lot of semantic complications. For Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, the difference between capitalism and socialism lies not in the existence of market economy or planned economy, but in the ownership nature of assets and enterprises and the ultimate goal of social development.⁵⁹⁹ Specifically for Zhu, his whole career in economic reform was basically a process of managing marketization by combining the tools of both free markets and state control. In implementation, he often mixed these tools in a highly flexible manner.⁶⁰⁰

Prime Minister Zhu Rongji is considered as a liberal in the Chinese environment, due to his frank style of talking and his intrepid declarations.⁶⁰¹ Zhu was an open-minded but also a pragmatic premier.⁶⁰² Zhu Rongji was a firm reformer who was known for his “iron face”. He was determined to reform China’s bureaucracy and improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises. Zhu Rongji’s promotion was the result of Jiang Zemin’s strong support.⁶⁰³ Zhu’s remarkable achievements in macroeconomic management strengthened Jiang’s core leadership.⁶⁰⁴

Deng’s Nanxun or Southern Tour in 1992, by embracing more daring market reforms and the further opening up of the Chinese economy, had sparked off an unprecedented economic upsurge with double-digit rates of growth. But the post-Nanxun period was also marked by economic chaos, overheating and runaway inflation, partly because the operation of the market forces was not in harmony with the existing socialist institutional structure.⁶⁰⁵ Zhu succeeded in stabilizing the overheated economy by applying a combination of tough administrative measures and some aspects of conventional monetary and fiscal policies meant for the market economy.⁶⁰⁶ He also pushed for the reform of the government structure at the same time to improve governance.⁶⁰⁷

State-owned enterprises “SOEs, 国有企业, *guóyǒu qīyè*” are essentially products of socialism. In China, SOEs used to function primarily as socio-economic

⁵⁹⁶ Zhu Rongji. 朱镕基。1928-。 He was a member of the Political Bureau and Standing Committee of the 14th and 15th CPC Central Committee and Premier of the State Council.

⁵⁹⁷ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 53.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid. p. 59.

⁵⁹⁹ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。 *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第169页。

⁶⁰⁰ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 312.

⁶⁰¹ Faison, Seth. “Review: Eye of the Tiger: What Jiang Zemin Tells Us about China”. *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 1999, Vol. 78, No. 1, p. 141.

⁶⁰² Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 200.

⁶⁰³ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。 *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第288-289页。

⁶⁰⁴ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 71.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 66.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid. pp. 54-55. Also see Zhu Rongji. *Zhu Rongji on the Record: The Road to Reform 1991–1997*. Washington. DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 418-436. 2013.

⁶⁰⁷ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 94.

entities rather than as purely production units.⁶⁰⁸ SOE reform was an enormously difficult undertaking as it went beyond simple economics while involving many larger political and social issues.⁶⁰⁹ Zhu Rongji proposed the specific ways to develop SOEs at a state council meeting: Firstly, strengthen macroeconomic controls. Secondly, increase investments, speed up the technical transformation of enterprises, and adjust the industrial structure.⁶¹⁰ To achieve this, he also suggested to handle four relationships well: The first is the relationship between centralization and decentralization. The second relationship is that between the coastal areas and the interior. The third relationship is that between scientific research and production. The fourth relationship is that between importing and developing technology.⁶¹¹

Wong, John held the opinion that how China faced WTO challenges depended in large part on its success in the SOE reform and in overhauling its banking system—the two being closely interrelated. A great deal of progress had been made, but much more was still needed to be done. The WTO membership might provide both the government and the banks just the needed impetus to speed up the whole reform process. The final outcome would then be a win-win situation.⁶¹² The SOE reform was not a one-off solution.⁶¹³ SOE reform in China is destined to be a continuing process.⁶¹⁴

First, Zhu streamlined China's unwieldy government structure by eliminating 11 out of 40 government ministries. Second, he pushed forward an even more vigorous plan to downsize the entrenched and overstaffed government departments, which were themselves often obstacles of reform. Third, he hand-picked a team of younger, professionally qualified technocrats, including a number of well-tested state entrepreneurs to help him push through his reform plans.⁶¹⁵ Under the present political system, SOEs will remain an important pillar of the economy, and they will continue to evolve. There will also be new problems and new issues. But the evolution of SOEs in China, as elsewhere, cannot be divorced from the complex political and economic contexts in which SOEs are operating.⁶¹⁶

In many ways, China's economy was still at an underdeveloped stage.⁶¹⁷ Zhu had developed his unique brand of macroeconomic management that was henceforth officially called “macroeconomic control, 宏观调控, *hóngguān tiáokòng*”, which was highly effective for China's transitional economy at that time. It was essentially a delicate combination of direct administrative control measures characteristic of a

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 183. The Anshan Steel used to be the case where only about one-third of those on its pay roll were the “production people” directly linked to steel making, about one-third were service workers and the other one-third were pensioners.

⁶⁰⁹ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China's Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 183.

⁶¹⁰ Zhu Rongji. *Zhu Rongji on the Record: The Road to Reform 1991-1997*. Translated by June Y. Mei. *Speed Up Technical Improvements and Do a Good Job at Large and Medium SOEs*. 10 October 1991. This is the main part of a speech made by Zhu Rongji at a State Council meeting of leading officials. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, pp. 34-53.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China's Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 216.

⁶¹³ Ibid. p. 217.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid. p. 181.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid. p. 86.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid. p. 181.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid. p. 162.

centrally planned economy with some indirect levers associated with the conventional monetary and fiscal policies of the market economy. He had subsequently perfected this specific policy tool that may be called “macroeconomic control with Zhu Rongji’s characteristics”.⁶¹⁸

Most Chinese people would not regard Zhu as a “people’s premier”. He is more like a modern technocrat or perhaps a legendary mandarin. He is also like Deng Xiaoping for being practical, pragmatic and blunt. That is perhaps why Deng had picked Zhu to work with him in the first place, and they had been complementary with each other in ability and aspirations for reform. But Deng was also a national leader and a politician. If Deng was the political leader to prepare the political and institutional precondition for China’s economic take-off by launching the market reform, Zhu was the person to carry it through and manage the take-off with great success.⁶¹⁹ Zhu must have been very pleased with himself that he was handing over a sound economy—high growth with low inflation, to his successor Wen Jiabao.⁶²⁰ “You have had such great success in controlling inflation [...] Through your efforts, you and your colleagues have made China the world’s most dynamic economy.”⁶²¹ Especially in response to the Asian financial crisis, Zhu Rongji implemented a proactive fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy, which greatly reduced the adverse impact of the financial crisis on China and achieved sustained growth in the national economy. What Zhu had done in the area of economic reform is by far more significant. This is where his long-term legacies lie.⁶²²

Under Jiang Zemin’s leadership, the living standards of most Chinese people have considerably improved, and the country’s strength and vitality have also been greatly enhanced. These changes are obvious in almost every town. In 2001, China won the honour to host the 2008 Olympic Games.⁶²³ Western analysts point out that Beijing’s successful bid for the Olympics marks a culmination in Jiang Zemin’s tenure. Winning the right to host the Olympic Games not only improved his status abroad, but also at home.⁶²⁴ As Greenspan said: “In our United States, views of China’s reforms have also gone through a process of evolution. Shifting from a centrally-planned economy that has been in place for many years to a market economy is a complex and difficult process, and China has already achieved tremendous results through a variety of workable methods.”⁶²⁵ A series of reforms including finance led by Zhu Rongji, who was in charge of economic work, not only resolved the financial risks in

⁶¹⁸ Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 54.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid. p. 60.

⁶²⁰ Ibid. p. 273.

⁶²¹ Zhu Rongji. *Zhu Rongji on the Record: The Road to Reform 1991-1997*. Translated by June Y. Mei. *A Conversation with Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve*. 5 May 1997. This conversation between Zhu Rongji and Alan Greenspan took place at the Hall of Purple Light in Zhongnanhai, Beijing. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, pp. 449-450.

⁶²² Wong, John. *Zhu Rongji and China’s Economic Take-Off*. London: Imperial College Press. 2015, p. 56.

⁶²³ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。 *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第11页。

⁶²⁴ Ibid. p. 337.

⁶²⁵ Zhu Rongji. *Zhu Rongji on the Record: The Road to Reform 1991-1997*. Translated by June Y. Mei. *A Conversation with Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board*. 24 October 1994. This conversation took place at the Diaoyutai State Guest House in Beijing, where Zhu Rongji met with Chairman Greenspan and hosted a dinner in his honour. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 299.

economic development at that time, but also effectively responded to the crises and challenges that occurred during the transition from the planned economic system to the socialist market economy, the national economy achieved rapid, sustained and healthy development.

5.6 Conclusion

Jiang Zemin expounded the idea of the “Three Represents” against the background of major changes at home and abroad. During this historical period, the trends of world multi-polarization and economic globalization accelerated. At the same time, there emerged serious problems in the ideology, organization and style of work of the Communist Party of China’s cadres. All of these matters forced the Communist Party of China to think about its modes of governing the country. Jiang Zemin’s continued efforts at increasing the governing the country according to law. The government’s functions should not only serve the various market actors, but also help to improve the legal regime, achieving “more governance and less control”. The governance mode continued evolving from “rule of man” to “rule of law”.

Jiang’s achievement has been to create a reformist, middle-of-the-road consensus at the centre of Chinese elite politics.⁶²⁶ Mohanty comments on Jiang’s leadership: “There is an element of historical recognition of Jiang’s performance for guiding China’s successful strides in economic growth, political stability and global prestige. As he passed on the baton of leadership to Hu Jintao, Jiang made sure that Three Represents entered the Party Constitution and common people’s vocabulary.”⁶²⁷ Under the leadership of President Hu Jintao, some of Jiang Zemin’s policies were changed in the process. Changes are inevitable, Jiang Zemin himself said so. Jiang Zemin predicted that just as their generation surpassed their predecessors, his successors will also surpass him.⁶²⁸

⁶²⁶ Dittmer, Lowell. “Chinese Factional Politics Under Jiang Zemin”. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, January-April 2003, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 125.

⁶²⁷ Mohanty, Manoranjan. “CPC’s Fourth Generation Ideology”. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 5-11 April 2003, Vol. 38, No. 14, pp. 1365-1371.

⁶²⁸ Kuhn, Robert Lawrence. 罗伯特·劳伦斯·库恩。 *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*. Chinese Version. 《他改变了中国》。上海：上海译文出版社。2005年2月。第467页。

6 IDEAS ON GOVERNANCE DURING HU JINTAO PERIOD

Held in November 2002, the Sixteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress elevated China's fourth generation of leadership headed by Hu Jintao,⁶²⁹ the new general secretary.⁶³⁰ The power handover from Jiang to Hu was a milestone in Chinese politics, since the change occurred without any kind of political crisis. It was an unprecedented peaceful transition of power.⁶³¹ The fourth-generation leadership, including Premier Wen Jiabao,⁶³² pursued a richer governance method to ensure that the People's Republic of China meets its goal of sustainable development.

Economic growth and stability are the central preoccupations of Chinese leaders.⁶³³ In November 2002, at the Sixteenth Congress, Jiang Zemin affirmed the Party's goal for the 21st century: to maintain its ruling status, according to the proverbial ideal of "long reign and perennial stability".⁶³⁴ However, during Hu Jintao's period, on the basis of pursuing economic development and stability, the evaluation criteria for national governance differed from those of previous state leaders. They were no longer just based on the level of economic development as a measurement standard, but consisted of more comprehensive considerations. Wang pointed out: "Much of the criticism levelled at Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin was that for these second-and third-generation leaders, economic growth and GDP figures

⁶²⁹ Hu Jintao. 1942-. Served as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, President of the People's Republic of China, chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China, and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. Source: Web Portal of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng*. 16 March 2008. http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2008-03/16/content_783658.htm

⁶³⁰ For a designation of leadership generations, see Cheng Li, *China's New Leaders: The New Generation* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). The "third generation" leadership, such as Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and their contemporaries were born at the 1930s, and grew up during the Civil War. Members of the new "fourth generation" leadership were born during the Civil War and grew to adulthood during the Cultural Revolution. Tun-Jen Cheng; deLisle, Jacques and Brown, Deborah (eds). *China Under Hu Jintao: Opportunities, Dangers and Dilemmas*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2006, p. 1. Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (hereafter referred to as "member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee") are members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and elected by the plenary session of the CPC Central Committee. The Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing from 8-14 November 2002. The first plenary session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing on 15 November 2002. The plenary session elected members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee: Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun and Luo Gan.

⁶³¹ Huang, Cary. "From Strong Man to Consensus Rule". Jonathan Sharp (eds). *The Chinese renaissance: the rise of Xi Jinping and the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress*. Hackensack NJ: World Scientific, 2013, p. 5.

⁶³² Wen Jiabao. 1942-. Served as premier of the State Council, Secretary of the Party group and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Source: Web Portal of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng*. 16 March 2008. http://www.gov.cn/gjjg/2008-03/16/content_784746.htm

⁶³³ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013, p. 158.

⁶³⁴ Jiang Zemin. "Build A Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Initiate A New Phase in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics". Report at the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2013, pp. 511-561.

were the be-all and end-all of statecraft.”⁶³⁵ Zhao further mentioned: “When Hu Jintao came to power in late 2002, his administration decided to shift the focus in an effort to garner social support and consolidate political power. In many ways his pro-people approach is in sharp contrast with Deng’s call for getting rich first and Jiang’s proposal to co-opt private entrepreneurs.”⁶³⁶ According to Hu, economic development should not be the only standard for evaluating regional officials.⁶³⁷ This means that state governance should not take the GDP growth rate as the only goal, but also take a scientific approach to raise the standard of living of ordinary masses. For example, Dr. Zhong Nanshan pointed out in 2003: “The degree of a country’s modernization shouldn’t be reflected just by GDP growth.”⁶³⁸ During the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) breakout in 2003, Hu stated that gross domestic product (GDP) growth did not solve all problems. There should to be a shift to more balanced development.⁶³⁹ Hu declared: “Social development is just as important.”⁶⁴⁰ Premier Wen Jiabao argued likewise: “China has always paid a lot of attention to economic development [...] yet social development is lagging behind.”⁶⁴¹ The SARS disaster had driven home the point of “the harmonious and well-coordinated development of the economy and society”.⁶⁴² Pursuing sustainability and balance were critical in order to build a harmonious society.⁶⁴³ The new criteria included lowering the rich-poor gap, striving for environmental cleanliness, ensuring social stability, strengthening rule of law, and governing the country by the constitution. The factors were embodied in the theoretical formulation on “scientific outlook on development”. The key buzzwords of the Hu era were “scientific outlook, 科学发展观, *kēxué fāzhǎn guān*” and “harmonious society, 和谐社会, *héxié shèhuì*”.⁶⁴⁴

6.1 Scientific outlook on development

In 2003, Hu Jintao declared:

⁶³⁵ For an analysis of different leaders’ approaches to development, see Wang Yongzhi. “Between the pursuit of GDP growth and the goal of putting people first”. CNS, 29 June 2003. Cited from Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 72.

⁶³⁶ Zhao Litao and Lim Tin Seng. *China’s New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society*. Zhao Litao and Tin Seng Lim (eds). Singapore; Hackensack: World Scientific, 2010, p. 2.

⁶³⁷ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 44.

⁶³⁸ 2003年7月13日。钟南山答记者问：现代化的国家不光看GDP。13 July 2003. Zhong Nanshan answered a reporter’s question: “a modern country does not only look at GDP”. Cited from Zhao Litao and Lim Tin Seng. *China’s New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society*. Zhao Litao and Tin Seng Lim (eds). Singapore; Hackensack: World Scientific, 2010, p. 96.

⁶³⁹ Zhao Litao and Lim Tin Seng. *China’s New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society*. Zhao Litao and Tin Seng Lim (eds). Singapore; Hackensack: World Scientific, 2010, p. 2.

⁶⁴⁰ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 72.

⁶⁴¹ Cited in Lam, Willy Wo-Lap, “China focuses on social well-being,” www.cnn.com, 29 July 2003. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 72.

⁶⁴² For a discussion of the significance of the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, see, for example, Fewsmith, Joseph. “The Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee,” *China Leadership Monitor*, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, no. 9 (Winter 2004). In *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 72.

⁶⁴³ Brown, Kerry. *Hu Jintao: China’s silent ruler*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2012, p. 158.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 152.

坚持以人为本，树立全面、协调、可持续的发展观，促进经济和人的全面发展的科学发展观。⁶⁴⁵

Adhere to the people-oriented concept, establish a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development concept, and promote the comprehensive development of economic society and human beings.

按照统筹城乡发展、统筹区域发展、统筹经济社会发展、统筹人与自然和谐发展、统筹国内发展和对外开放的要求推进各项事业的改革和发展。⁶⁴⁶

Promote the reform and development of various undertakings in accordance with the requirements of “balancing urban and rural development, regional development, economic and social development, harmonious development between man and nature, domestic development and opening up.

Formulations such as “putting people first, 以人为本, *yǐrénwéiběn*”, “building a harmonious society, 构建和谐社会, *gòujiàn héxié shèhuì*” were based on that theoretical line. The seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China wrote the scientific outlook on development into the Party Constitution, and the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China included the *scientific outlook on development* into the guiding ideology of the Party.⁶⁴⁷ This concept was added to the theoretical set consisting of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents. This pronounced “scientific outlook, 科学发展观, *kēxué fāzhǎn guān*” was added to the existing Marxist world view—which in itself also professed a scientific element—and it embodied “what kind of development should China achieve in a new environment and how”.⁶⁴⁸ It implied more sophisticated development of Chinese thinking on national governance.

6.2 Put people first

In October 2007 the seventeenth National Congress of the CPC presented the concrete

⁶⁴⁵ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《树立和落实科学发展观》。这是胡锦涛在中共十六届三中全会第二次会议上讲话的一部分。2003年10月14日。北京：人民出版社。2016年，第104-105页。Hu Jintao. “Establishing and implementing the scientific outlook on development”. This is part of Hu Jintao’s speech at the second session of the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee. 14 October 2003. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 2016.

⁶⁴⁶ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《把促进经济社会协调发展摆到更加突出的位置》。这是胡锦涛在全国防治非典型肺炎工作会议上讲话的一部分。2003年7月28日。北京：人民出版社。2016年，第65-77页。Hu Jintao. “Put the promotion of coordinated economic and social development in a more prominent position”. This is part of Hu Jintao’s speech at the National Working Conference on prevention and control of atypical pneumonia. 28 July 2003. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 2016.

⁶⁴⁷ 十八大秘书处负责人就党章修改答记者问：把科学发展观写入党章是最大亮点。《人民日报》，2012年11月19日。The person in charge of the Secretariat of the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China answered a reporter’s question on the revision of the Party Constitution: “writing the scientific outlook on development into the Party constitution is the biggest highlight.” *People’s daily*, 19 November 2012.

⁶⁴⁸ Constitution of the Communist Party of China (Revised and Adopted at the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 14 November 2012 China.org.cn, 16 November 2012, para 7 in General Programme. Mohanty, Manoranjan. “Harmonious Society: Hu Jintao’s Vision and the Chinese Party Congress”. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 15 December 2012, Vol. 47, No. 50, p. 13.

forms of putting the people first:

必须坚持以人为本。全心全意为人民服务是党的根本宗旨，党的一切奋斗和工作都是为了造福人民。要始终把实现好、维护好、发展好最广大人民的根本利益作为党和国家一切工作的出发点和落脚点，尊重人民主体地位，发挥人民首创精神，保障人民各项权益，走共同富裕道路，促进人的全面发展，做到发展为了人民、发展依靠人民、发展成果由人民共享。⁶⁴⁹ We must always put people first. Serving the people wholeheartedly is the fundamental purpose of the Party, and its every endeavour is for the well-being of the people. We must always make sure that the aim and outcome of all the work of the Party and the state is to realize, safeguard and expand the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. We must respect the principal position of the people in the country's political life, give play to their creativity, protect their rights and interests, take the path of prosperity for all and promote their all-round development, to ensure that development is for the people, by the people and with the people sharing in its fruits.⁶⁵⁰

Chinese traditional culture, especially the people-oriented thought represented by Confucianism, is an important intellectual source of Hu Jintao's "put people first, 以人为本, *yǐrénwéiběn*" thought. The "socialist harmonious society, 社会主义和谐社会, *shèhuì zhǔyì héxié shèhuì*" includes various elements from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents.⁶⁵¹ Since the Hu Jintao—Wen Jiabao leadership came into power in 2002, China's reform focus turned towards social issues. In China's context, Zheng claims: "Social reforms are responses to the negative social consequences resulting from the country's economic boom."⁶⁵² Hu carried out systematic reform of the social security system,⁶⁵³ made profound adjustments to the medical insurance system of urban residents, began to pay attention to the ecological environment protection work, and conducted four

⁶⁴⁹ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，为夺取全面建设小康社会而奋斗》。2007年10月15日。这是胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告。Hu Jintao. "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects". Speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People's Publishing House. 2016. pp. 613-652.

⁶⁵⁰ Source: *China Daily*. 31 October 2007.

http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/content_6220592_3.htm

⁶⁵¹ Choukroune, Leïla and Garapon, Antoine. "The norms of Chinese harmony Disciplinary rules as social stabilizer: A harmonious society is one in which the rule of law is given greater strength and authority". *China Perspectives*. Iss. 3, 2007, pp. 36-49.

⁶⁵² Zheng Yongnian. "Economic Reform, Social Policy and Political Transition in China". *China's New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society*. Zhao Litao and Tin Seng Lim (eds). Singapore; Hackensack: World Scientific, 2010, p. 14.

⁶⁵³ When Hu Jintao presided over the 30th collective study of the Political Bureau of the sixteenth CPC Central Committee, he pointed out that development should not be at the expense of the environment and human life, but should fully implement the policy of safety first, prevention first and comprehensive management. Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《坚持以人为本，实现安全发展》。2006年3月27日。北京：人民出版社。2016年，第431-432页。Hu Jintao. "Adhere to people-oriented and realize safe development". 27 March 2006. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People's Publishing House. 2016.

consecutive pollution source surveys.⁶⁵⁴ Hu Jintao indicated that with the continuous development of China's socialist market economy, the acceleration of China's industrialization, urbanization and economic structure adjustment, and the acceleration of the reform of China's social organization form, employment structure and social structure, China was facing and will face for a long time contradictions and problems that urgently need to be solved. The shortage of resources and energy increased the pressure on economic and social development. As Hu Jintao pointed out: "The bottleneck constraints are increasingly prominent, and it is urgent to change the mode of economic growth; the contradictions between urban and rural development, regional development and economic and social development are more prominent, and the task of narrowing the development gap and promoting coordinated economic and social development is arduous."⁶⁵⁵ Solving the livelihood problem is an important standard to test the governing ability of the ruling Party. As the society became wealthier and more mobile, the stability of the ruling foundation began to depend on the living standard of the people. Political power must pay attention to people's livelihood to maintain social stability.

6.3 Building a harmonious society

6.3.1 The ancient theoretical origin of harmonious society

Most of classic Chinese philosophy was not militaristic, but even demographic increase by way of births and immigration implied expansion. Only Taoism favoured a small scale in everything. Laozi proposed that the ideal human society was the natural state of a small country with a small population, where no actual state government was needed. People maintained a certain natural order by themselves, living harmoniously with each other and nature. In a simple small state, inaction of the administrators was the key to manage people. Riches were not the goal of either the state or the people in this kind of political theory, and expansion was not an ideal.

Confucianism thought in more grandiose terms, picturing the whole world, or at least the sphere of Chinese culture, as one community under the concept of "大同 *dàtóng*, great harmony society". This expression is recorded in *Book of Rites and Liyun*:

大道之行也，天下为公，选贤与能，讲信修睦。故人不独亲其亲，不独子其子。使老有所终，壮有所用，幼有所长，矜寡孤独废疾者皆有所养，男

⁶⁵⁴ Liu Xinli. 刘新力。《现代化进程中党的领导制度与执政方式新论》。北京：中央编译出版社。2008，第 91-102 页。Zhang Xiaoyan. 张晓燕。《依法治国条件下中国共产党执政方式研究》。北京：中共中央党校出版社。2006，第 54-79 页。Zhang Yuesong. 章越松。《中国共产党执政理念研究》。北京：中国社会科学出版社。2010，第 37-62 页。

⁶⁵⁵ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《构建社会主义和谐社会》。2005 年 2 月 19 日。这是胡锦涛在省部级主要领导干部提高构建社会主义和谐社会能力专题研讨班上的讲话。北京：人民出版社。2016 年，第 279-285 页。Hu Jintao. "Building a harmonious socialist society". 19 February 2005. This is Hu Jintao's speech at the special seminar for the provincial and ministerial leading cadres to improve their ability to build a harmonious socialist society. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People's Publishing House. 2016.

有分，女有归。货恶其弃于地也，不必藏于己；力恶其不出于身也，不必为己，是故谋闭而不兴，盗窃乱贼而不作，故外户而不闭。是谓大同。⁶⁵⁶
 At the time of the implementation of Tao, the world is shared by all people. The people of high moral character and capability are selected, and they are honest, cultivated and ambiguous. Therefore, people not only support their own parents, raise their own children, but regard other people's family as their own, so that the senior people can enjoy their rest lives, middle-aged people can work for the society, young children can grow up healthy, and everybody can all be supported. Men have jobs and women have home. For the fortunes, people don't hide them; people are willing to do their best for the public and not for their own interests. Therefore, the unsafe things such as theft, rebellion and harm will not happen, the door does not need to be closed. This is called an ideal society.⁶⁵⁷

It can be seen that the objective of the Confucian “Great Harmony” society of “the whole world as one community” is to try to establish a society without oppression and exploitation, which would be just for all. This idea is basically hypothetical, while also being a theoretical bow towards the thought of Laozi. In this society everyone works together, lives together, and enjoys the achievements of their labour. People are simple and live simply, there is no fraud and people's behaviour is naturally ethical. The great harmony society of “the whole world as one community, 天下为公, *tiānxià wèi gōng*” is the highest goal of social management in Confucianism. Great harmony society is the theoretical ideal of governing the country developed in ancient China. Its goal is to pursue social harmony, and everyone can realize self-interest and value in life.⁶⁵⁸ This kind of society on the world scale would not be easy to construct.

6.3.2 The formation of the modern thought of harmonious society

As Stein argues: “It was Hu and Wen who made ‘harmonious society’ official Party terminology. But the concept and idea sit deeper in the Chinese tradition. At the beginning of the revolutionary period, Mao articulated a vague goal of the ‘great harmony’ which he again drew from Confucian ideas. The socialist tradition came into it in Mao's view that harmony would be the eventual outcome of a painful interim. The specifically Chinese tradition comes into it from the Confucian idea that it is the state—then the emperor, now the Party—that is to be the giver of harmony to all living things.”⁶⁵⁹

⁶⁵⁶ *The Book of Rites (Li Ji)* 《礼记》 is one of the “Four Classics of Confucianism”, the other three being *The Analects of Confucius*, *The Mencius* and *The Doctrine of the Mean*. *Book of Rites and Liyun*. 《礼记·礼运·十三经注疏》。Notes on the thirteen classics. It is an important collection of ancient Chinese laws and regulations. It was written in the Han Dynasty and compiled by Dai Sheng, a scholar of rites in the Western Han Dynasty, 202 BC-9 AD. 北京：中华书局出版社。2007年，第124页。

⁶⁵⁷ Translated by Liu Yan.

⁶⁵⁸ Zhang Dexiu (ed.). 张德修主编。《平天下：中国古典治理智慧》。北京：人民出版社。2015年，第232页。

⁶⁵⁹ Ringen, Stein. *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 2016, p. 53.

From the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC in 2002 to the end of 2004 was the beginning period of the thought of a harmonious society. At the Sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin had said:

完成改革和发展的繁重任务，必须保持长期和谐稳定的社会环境。⁶⁶⁰

To accomplish the difficult tasks of reform and development, we must have a harmonious and stable social climate for a long time to come.⁶⁶¹

He put forward the requirement to “foster social harmony”.⁶⁶² This practical and verbal task was taken up by his follower. At the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2003, Hu Jintao put forward that:

坚持在开发利用自然中实现人与自然的和谐相处。⁶⁶³

The harmonious coexistence between man and nature should be realized in the development and utilization of nature.

In this form harmonious development was put on the national agenda. After this, Hu Jintao’s thought of harmonious society was gradually enriched. In September 2004, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Hu Jintao stressed that the formation of a harmonious society in which all the people do their best, get what they want and live in harmony was the inevitable requirement of consolidating the social foundation of the Party’s ruling.⁶⁶⁴ In December 2004, at the central economic work conference, Hu Jintao proposed that from the current point of view, to actively expand employment, strive to improve the social security system, gradually straighten out the distribution relationship, and accelerate the development of social undertakings were important tasks to safeguard the interests of the masses, promote social equity, and build a socialist harmonious society.⁶⁶⁵ The general requirements for building a harmonious socialist society are: democracy and law; fairness and justice; integrity and friendship; vigour and vitality; stability and order; and the harmonious coexistence of man and nature.⁶⁶⁶ At the

⁶⁶⁰ Jiang Zemin. 江泽民。《江泽民文选》第三卷。北京：人民出版社。2006年，第558页。

⁶⁶¹ Jiang Zemin. “Build A Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Initiate a New Phase in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. Report at the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin*. Volume III. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2013, p. 543.

⁶⁶² Ibid. p. 526.

⁶⁶³ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《树立和落实科学发展观》。2003年10月14日。这是胡锦涛在中共十六届三中全会第二次全体会议上讲话的一部分。北京：人民出版社。2016年，第104页。Hu Jintao. “Establishing and implementing the scientific outlook on development”. 14 October 2003. This is part of Hu Jintao’s speech at the second plenary session of the Third Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 2016.

⁶⁶⁴ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《论构建社会主义和谐社会》。北京：中央文献出版社。2013年，第36页。This book contains 40 important manuscripts of Hu Jintao on building a harmonious socialist society from July 2003 to November 2012.

⁶⁶⁵ Wang Guanzhong. 王冠中。《社会资源与中国共产党执政：以资源权威化执政机制为路径》。北京：首都师范大学出版社。2011年，第96页。

⁶⁶⁶ Source: *China Daily*. 16 September 2010.
http://cpcChina.Chinadaily.com.cn/2010-09/16/content_13918117.htm

beginning of 2005, Hu Jintao made several speeches on “building a harmonious socialist society”. On 19 February, Hu Jintao spoke about the general objectives and requirements of building a harmonious society for the first time in a special seminar held by the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to improve the ability of major leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial levels to orient to the new policy. Zhang believes: “The overall conceptual structure of building socialism with Chinese characteristics was expanded from the trinity of socialist economic construction, political construction and cultural construction to the quaternity of socialist economic construction, political construction, cultural construction and social construction.”⁶⁶⁷ On 21 February, Hu Jintao stressed that it was necessary to strengthen research on social structure, social interest relations and social stability, as well as theoretical and historical research on these subjects in China’s history and abroad.⁶⁶⁸ The Chinese thought of national governance thus acquired a distinct social science element, reflecting the increasing complexity of the Chinese society.

In 2005, Hu Jintao announced that: “In a harmonious society, the political environment is stable, the economy is prosperous, people live in peace and work in comfort and social welfare improves.”⁶⁶⁹ In the same year, Hu Jintao told Central Party School students that “A harmonious society will feature socialist democracy, rule by law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity, and vitality.”⁶⁷⁰ According to Renmin University professor Zheng Gongcheng, the slogan of harmonious society implied that China had entered the “late reform-and open-door era”.⁶⁷¹ As sociologist Li Qiang commented: “If the first twenty years of China’s reform era were concerned with economic problems, the priority for the second twenty years would be social issues.”⁶⁷² From this time onwards, Hu Jintao and other Chinese leaders often used the concept of “socialist harmonious society, 社会主义和谐社会, *shèhuì zhǔyì héxié shèhuì*”.⁶⁷³

International scholars have some doubts about China’s development model. Lam argued in 2007: “While there is a near consensus that the strength of the nation and

⁶⁶⁷ Zhang Ruimin. 张瑞敏。《执政新理念：从阶层和谐走向社会和谐》。北京：人民出版社。2010年，第78页。

⁶⁶⁸ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《构建社会主义和谐社会》。2005年2月19日。这是胡锦涛在省部级主要领导干部提高构建社会主义和谐社会能力专题研讨班上的讲话。北京：人民出版社。2016年，第279-285页。Hu Jintao. “Building a harmonious socialist society”. 19 February 2005. This is Hu Jintao’s speech at the special seminar for the provincial and ministerial leading cadres to improve their ability to build a harmonious socialist society. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II.

⁶⁶⁹ Source: *China Daily*. 16 September 2010.

http://cpcChina.Chinadaily.com.cn/2010-09/16/content_13918117.htm

⁶⁷⁰ Staff reporter, “One million netizens put down their names to seek war-time compensation from Japan,” Ming Pao, (a neutral Hong Kong newspaper), 15 September 2003. Also see Gries, Peter. “China’s “New Thinking” on Japan,” *China Quarterly* (London), Spring 2005. Cited in Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 252.

⁶⁷¹ Cited from Sun Yuting, “China has entered the ‘post-GDP era’”. CNS, 6 March 2005. Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 252.

⁶⁷² “Mayor fears Olympics expectations too high,” originally in *China Daily*, 12 November 2004. Cited from Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 252.

⁶⁷³ Choukroune, Leïla and Garapon, Antoine. “The norms of Chinese harmony Disciplinary rules as social stabilizer: A harmonious society is one in which the rule of law is given greater strength and authority”. *China Perspectives*. Iss. 3, 2007, pp. 36-49.

the standard of living of large sectors of Chinese have increased in the past twenty-five years, China's approach to economic development and modernization in general have bred ill effects galore. These include unprecedented environmental degradation and the rise of the incidence of different types of cancer and epidemics.”⁶⁷⁴ Ringen Stein holds the similar opinion that: “We do not need a precise definition of ‘harmony’ to know that the Chinese society today is not a harmonious one and that the absence of harmony neatly captures the strains of Chinese life and the challenges to the regime. But this does not negate the theory. Socialism means harmony at the outcome of the interim, not harmony during the process.”⁶⁷⁵ Zhao also proposed that: “While policies are being put in place to build a harmonious society, it is important not to take policy statements at face value. As is well known, law enforcement and policy implementation can be serious problems in China.”⁶⁷⁶ Indeed, many of China's policies remain superficial and are not implemented in depth.⁶⁷⁷ However, there have been some changes. During the period from July 2003 to November 2012, Hu Jintao discussed the operation path and promotion method of building a harmonious society from different angles in many speeches,⁶⁷⁸ and from

⁶⁷⁴ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 248.

⁶⁷⁵ Ringen, Stein. *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 2016, p. 54.

⁶⁷⁶ Zhao Litao and Lim Tin Seng. *China's New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society*. Zhao Litao and Tin Seng Lim (eds). Singapore; Hackensack: World Scientific, 2010, p. 4.

⁶⁷⁷ Huang Hong, Wang Shoulin (eds). 黄宏, 王寿林主编。《中国共产党执政规律和执政能力研究》。北京: 人民出版社。2006年。第98页。

⁶⁷⁸ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《论构建社会主义和谐社会》。北京: 中央文献出版社。2013年。This book contains 40 important manuscripts of Hu Jintao on building a harmonious socialist society from July 2003 to November 2012. See “Putting the promotion of coordinated economic and social development in a more prominent position”, Hu Jintao's speech at the national SARS prevention and Control Conference on 28 July 2003. See “Correctly handling contradictions among the people and properly handling mass incidents”, Hu Jintao's speech at the Twentieth National Public Security Conference on 22 November 2003. See “Doing a good job in mass work in depth”, Hu Jintao's speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee on 19 September 2004. See “Earnestly maintaining social stability”, Hu Jintao's speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee on 19 September 2004. See “Speech at the seminar on improving the ability of building a harmonious socialist society for leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial level”, speech by Hu Jintao on 19 February 2005. See “Strengthening investigation and theoretical research, striving to improve the ability of building a harmonious socialist society”, Hu Jintao's speech at the Twentieth collective study of the Sixteenth Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on 21 February 2005. See “Some opinions on building a harmonious socialist society”, Hu Jintao's speech at the third session of the Tenth National People's Congress (NPC) Zhejiang delegation on 6 March 2005. See “The construction of a harmonious society should start from solving the most concerned, most direct and realistic interests of the people”, Hu Jintao's speech at the end of his inspection work in Qinghai on 15 December 2005. See “Adhere to people-oriented and realize safe development”, Hu Jintao's speech at the 30th collective study of the Sixteenth Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee on 27 March 2006. Hu Jintao's speech at the National United Front Work Conference on 10 July 2006. See “Running a good education to satisfy the people”, Hu Jintao's speech at the Thirty-fourth collective study of the Sixteenth Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, 29 August 2006. See “Do a good job in building a harmonious socialist society and push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics”, speech by Comrade Hu Jintao at the second plenary session of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee on 11 October 2006. See “Taking the road of medical and health reform and development with Chinese characteristics”, Hu Jintao's speech at the Thirty-fifth collective study of the Political Bureau of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee on 23 October 2006. See “Vigorously building a harmonious culture”, Hu Jintao's speech at the Eighth National Congress of the China Federation of literary and art circles and the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese writers' Association on 10 November 2006. See “To thoroughly implement the scientific outlook on development and actively build a harmonious socialist society”, Hu Jintao's report at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 15 October 2007. See “Accelerating social construction focusing on improving People's livelihood”, a report delivered by Hu Jintao at the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 15 October 2007. See “Protecting the rights and interests of workers and developing harmonious labour relations”, excerpts from Hu

different dimensions answered the questions of who should build, who to rely on and how to build a socialist harmonious society, and pointed out what principles should be used to coordinate the overall situation, what requirements should be adopted to promote development, and what methods should be used to ensure harmony. Although the emphasis of each speech was different, the overall idea was basically formed.

6.3.3 Environmental governance

China's economic growth has created many environmental problems, caused by growing energy consumption, with high reliance on coal for energy source, because of the country's limited resources. It has resulted in high levels of air and water pollution, together with severe desertification and other environmental degradation, which are threatening both people's health and the sustainable future. In the beginning of the current millennium, China was home to 16 of the world's 20 most polluted cities.⁶⁷⁹ Only one percent of the 560 million residents in cities breathed air that was considered safe by international standards.⁶⁸⁰ Furthermore, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China became the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2007, bringing the country under closer international scrutiny. Besides, China is unable to provide clean water to all citizens even though it has the world's fourth largest freshwater reserves. Increasing demand, over-usage, inefficiencies, pollution and unequal distribution are causing severe water shortages in 110 of the country's 660 cities and straining water supplies in two-thirds of the

Jintao's speech at a discussion with members of the new leading group of the China Federation of trade unions on 21 October 2008 and at the National Conference for the commendation of model workers and advanced workers on 27 April 2010. See "We must combine improving efficiency with promoting social equity", Hu Jintao's speech at the 30th anniversary of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee on 18 December 2008. See "Accelerating the establishment of a social security system covering urban and rural residents", Hu Jintao's speech at the Thirteenth collective learning session of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee, 22 May 2009. See "Accelerating the coordinated development of economy and society", part of Hu Jintao's speech at the seminar on deepening the implementation of the scientific outlook on development and accelerating the transformation of the mode of economic development by major leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial level on 3 February 2010. See "Establishing and improving the basic medical and health system covering urban and rural residents", Hu Jintao's speech at the Twentieth collective learning session of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee, 28 May 2010. See "Promoting the scientific development of education", part of Hu Jintao's speech at the National Education Work Conference on 13 July 2010. See "Correctly handling contradictions among the people in the new period", Hu Jintao's speech at the 23rd collective study of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee, 29 September 2010. See "Strengthening and improving mass work under the new situation", part of Hu Jintao's speech at the second plenary session of the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee on 18 October 2010. Speech at the seminar on social management and innovation for major leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial level, Hu Jintao's speech on 19 February 2011. See "Do a good job in population work under the new situation", Hu Jintao's speech at the twenty-eighth collective study of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee on 26 April 2011. See "Deeply understand the great significance of doing a good job in poverty alleviation and development in the new stage", part of Hu Jintao's speech at the central poverty alleviation and development work conference on 29 November 2011. See "Giving priority to promoting employment in economic and social development", speech by Comrade Hu Jintao at the thirty-second collective study of the Political Bureau of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee on 20 February 2012. See "Strengthening social construction in improving People's livelihood and innovating management", part of the report delivered by Hu Jintao at the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 8 November 2012.

⁶⁷⁹ Economy, E. C. "The Great Leap Backward: The Costs of China's Environmental Crisis". *Foreign Affairs*, 86 (5), 2007, pp. 38-59.

⁶⁸⁰ Joseph Kahn and Jim Yardley. Source: *New York Times*. "As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes". 26 August 2007. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/world/asia/26china.html>

remaining cities.⁶⁸¹ It is testing the ability of the government to balance economic growth with environmental issues. Apparently, if the government neglected the deteriorating environment, it would bring an acute political challenge to the governance of the Party.

Since the early 1990s, economic growth was the most important evaluation criterion and top priority for officials from local leaders to state councils,⁶⁸² local governments were incentivized to pursue economic growth as their main source of revenue, being then unwilling to see the economy and new investment blocked by environmental regulations. Because high-speed economic growth served as an important index to measure local officials' performances and determine their future promotion, China's officials recognized GDP growth as the main indicator of administrative chiefs' performances. Day indicated: "Party politics, political directives, and China's powerful bureaucratic infrastructure have had an enormously detrimental impact on the country's environment."⁶⁸³ China's "development first" strategy also allowed the economic departments to play a dominant role in inter-agency and decision-making processes. This further undermined the influence of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and other "non-economic" government organizations such as the China Meteorological Administration (CMA).⁶⁸⁴ Environmental pollution is a global issue that both developing and developed countries have to face and address. However, it is no easy task because it brings huge effects to the economic structure, governance capacity and technological advancement. Li stated the key factor that: "Chinese officials have long argued that as a developing country, in the middle of industrialisation and urbanisation, it could not adopt the strictest standards applied in developed nations. However, lax environmental standards would only encourage local governments to shirk their responsibility to address public health problems and continue in their blind pursuit of economic growth."⁶⁸⁵ The conflicts of interests should be addressed by improving the coordination of the existing institutions and mechanisms. Beyond this, the lack of relevant environment protection regulations and laws is also a major cause for the pollution. During the period of 1996-2000,⁶⁸⁶ Wu points out: "Due to the large amount of resource consumption, while manufacturing activities will create value, they will also result in environmental pollution. Reliance on an extensive mode of growth will result in less time for the environment to recover and adjust. As environmental destruction and ecological damage accumulates, and air pollution accumulates, perhaps one-third of China's atmosphere would become like that of

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² Xu Xin. 徐昕。《执政资源论》。北京：中共中央党校出版社。2009年，第14页。

⁶⁸³ Day, Kristen A. *China's Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, p. xxi.

⁶⁸⁴ Chen Gang. "A Long Way to Go Green: Rethinking China's Environmental Policy, Laws and Governance". *China's New Social Policy: Initiatives for a Harmonious Society*. Zhao Litao and Tin Seng Lim (eds). Singapore; Hackensack: World Scientific, 2010, p. 148.

⁶⁸⁵ Li Jing. "Bleak Outlook for Tough Pollution Laws". Jonathan Sharp (eds). *The Chinese renaissance: the rise of Xi Jinping and the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress*. Hackensack NJ: World Scientific, 2013, p. 273.

⁶⁸⁶ The five-year plan mainly plans the major national construction projects, the distribution of productive forces and main elements of the national economy, but its idea is to establish directions for the long-term development of the national economy. The ninth five-year plan covers the period from 1996 to 2000.

Beijing.”⁶⁸⁷

The Hu Jintao government understood that environmental degradation would affect not only economic growth itself, but also social stability. If the pollution problem was addressed resolved effectively, it would be a great enhancement to the legitimacy of the CPC’s leadership and help the country improve towards building a harmonious society. Therefore, Hu began to direct China’s economic growth in a more sustainable direction. In March 2006, the Eleventh Five Year Plan for national economic and social development of the People’s Republic of China announced the goal of “energy conservation and emission reduction, 节能减排, *jié néng jiǎn pái*”, during 2006-2010.⁶⁸⁸ China became committed to advancing toward a green and low-carbon economy to promote the overall development. One year later in 2007, to protect the environment became the new policy goal of “building a harmonious society, 构建和谐社会, *gòujiàn héxié shèhuì*”. The new approach of “scientific outlook, 科学发展观, *kēxué fāzhǎn guān*” meant to “strike a balance, 取得平衡, *qǔdé pínghéng*”.⁶⁸⁹ From 15-21 October 2007, the Seventeenth CPC National Congress proposed a strategic objective of “ecological civilization, 生态文明, *shēngtài wénmíng*” to promote ecologic rehabilitation. President Hu Jintao explicitly highlighted the importance of addressing environmental problems in order to sustain economic growth: the construction of conservation culture was the foundation of harmonious society in China.⁶⁹⁰

On 17 November 2007, the State Council released a circular that featured the environmental-centred green figures per unit GDP energy consumption and major pollutants reduction as the comprehensive evaluation criteria of local government leaders’ performances.⁶⁹¹ Linking the achievement of reduction and the completion of pollution forecasts and the comprehensive evaluation system of local economic and social development was an unprecedented policy. It shows the trend that Chinese government is assessing the provincial officials and business leaders’ performance through environmental green indexes instead of solely relying on GDP figures. The provincial people’s governments that had completed or exceeded the assessment level

⁶⁸⁷ Wu Jinglian. “How to Reboot China’s Reform”. *China Under Xi Jinping: Its Economic Challenges and Foreign Policy Initiatives*. Shao Binhong, and Zheng Bijian (eds). Leiden, Netherlands; Boston, Massachusetts: Brill, 2015, p. 25.

⁶⁸⁸ Source: Web Portal of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng*. 中华人民共和国中央政府 2006 年第 12 号国务院公报。State Council Bulletin No. 12, 2006 of the central government of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_268766.htm

⁶⁸⁹ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，为夺取全面建设小康社会而奋斗》。2007 年 10 月 15 日。这是胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告。Hu Jintao. “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects”. Speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 2016. pp. 613-652.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ Source: The state council information office of the People’s Republic of China. 中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó guówùyüàn xīnwén bàngōngshì*. 国务院批转节能减排统计监测及考核实施方案和办法的通知。“Notice of the State Council on approval and transmission of the implementation plan and measures for statistical monitoring and assessment of energy conservation and emission reduction”. State Council Bulletin No. 36, 2007 of the central government of the People’s Republic of China. 4 June 2014. <http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwfbh/wqfbh/2014/20140604/xgzc30956/Document/1372008/1372008.htm>

would be commended and rewarded. For the provincial people's governments whose assessment level was not completed, the leading cadres were not allowed to participate in annual awards and conferring of honorary titles, and so on. and the state was to suspend the approval of new high energy consumption projects in the region.⁶⁹² These kinds of governance innovations would give improvements in the long run.

Fortunately, the Chinese government has moved environmental quality upon its list of priorities and is actively investigating and implementing novel solutions. As a positive indication that it recognizes the severity of the problem, the Chinese government has welcomed input on environmental solutions from other countries, and a number of projects and collaborations have begun to be successfully applied in China.⁶⁹³ At the UN conference on climate change in Copenhagen in January 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China was determined to "do its share in solving the problem of climate change".⁶⁹⁴ He also clarified: "The 2010 World Exposition in Shanghai provided evidence that the Chinese government views environmental problems as a priority; the green construction of the facilities for the Expo and particularly of the Chinese Pavilion reflected the emphasis the government had placed on protecting and improving the environment."⁶⁹⁵ Whether China develops in a sustainable way depends on the current governance policies and practices.

6.3.4 Equality and justice

Since entering the 21st century, China's economy has developed rapidly, the socialist market economic system has been improved, but profound changes have taken place in the social structure. Since the 1980s inequality in China has increased markedly.⁶⁹⁶ Economic growth has triggered and accumulated social contradictions, and the urban and rural, regional, economic and social development is very unbalanced. Some particular sectors and regions' economy took-off, making them pull ahead of other regions, which caused income distribution to become increasingly uneven. As Lampton figures: "There are structural problems in China's economy which cause unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development."⁶⁹⁷ This echoes Wen Jiabao's statement in 2003 that "The level of relative affluence that China has now attained is not comprehensive or balanced."⁶⁹⁸

In mid-2004, Lan Pingyi warned that if the gap between haves and have-nots, the

⁶⁹² Ibid.

⁶⁹³ Turner, Jennifer (ed.). "Inventory of Environmental and Energy Projects in China". *China Environment*. Series 6, 2003, p. 199, which contains a more comprehensive inventory of environmental and energy projects in China.

⁶⁹⁴ Chow, Gregory C. "China's Environmental Policy". *China's Environmental Policy and Urban Development*. Man, Joyce Yanyun (ed.). Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2013, p. 4.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁶ Li Shi; Sato, Hiroshi and Sicular, Terry. "Rising Inequality in China". *Rising Inequality in China: Challenges to a Harmonious Society*. Li, S., Sato, H., and Sicular, T. (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2013, p. 1.

⁶⁹⁷ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2013, p. 160.

⁶⁹⁸ Fewsmith, Joseph. *China since Tiananmen*. Second edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2008, p. 244. Also see Brown, Kerry. *Hu Jintao: China's silent ruler*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2012, p. 152.

powerful and the dispossessed, continue to widen, the country will be heading toward Latin-Americanization. This means “The situation of a fortress of unequal distribution where capital is monopolized by a small minority.” He added: “While the upper classes have integrated themselves with the global economy, at least 50 percent of the people are mired in the abyss of perennial poverty.”⁶⁹⁹ Many Chinese fear that their nation’s polarization is also a cause of social instability, a force pitting advanced regions against laggards.⁷⁰⁰ To some extent, income inequality is inevitable for the growth in China because it is a source of capital accumulation with high investment. However, the solution to achieve stability lies in narrowing the rich-poor gap, which could defuse social contradictions by boosting social equality and justice. In 2007, Hu Jintao pointed out:

城乡和区域、经济社会发展仍然不平衡[...]人民生活总体上达到小康水平，同时收入分配差距拉大趋势还未根本扭转，城乡贫困人口和低收入人口还有相当数量，统筹兼顾各方面利益难度加大；协调发展取得显著成绩，同时农业基础薄弱、农村发展滞后的局面尚未改变，缩小城乡、区域发展差距和促进经济社会协调发展任务艰巨。⁷⁰¹

There remains an imbalance in development between urban and rural areas, among regions, and between the economy and society [...] A relatively comfortable standard of living has been achieved for the people as a whole, but the trend of a growing gap in income distribution has not been thoroughly reversed, there are still a considerable number of impoverished and low-income people in both urban and rural areas, and it has become more difficult to accommodate the interests of all sides. Efforts to balance development have yielded remarkable results, but the foundation of agriculture remains weak, the rural areas still lag behind in development, and we face an arduous task to narrow the urban-rural and interregional gaps in development and need to promote balanced economic and social development.⁷⁰²

The keywords such as “people’s welfare, 民生, *mínshēng*”, “integrated and balanced urban-rural development, 统筹城乡, *tǒngchóu chéngxiāng*”, “equity and justice, 公平和正义, *gōngpíng hé zhèngyì*”, “raising efficiency with promoting social equity, 把

⁶⁹⁹ Cited in “Hu Jintao meets old Soviet soldiers”. NCNA, 9 May 2005. For a discussion of Sino-Soviet relations, see Lam, Willy Wo-Lap, “Hu wants alliance with Russia to fight the U.S. and Japan”. *Apple Daily*, 12 May 2005. 25. Ren Bingqiang, “The waves of nationalism since the 1990s: Criticizing the nationalist views of Wang Xiaodong”. in *Undercurrents: Criticisms and Reflections on Narrowminded Nationalism*. Le Shan (ed.). Shanghai: Huadong Normal University Press. 2004. Also see Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 256.

⁷⁰⁰ Friedman, Edward. “Jiang Zemin’s Successors and China’s Growing Rich-Poor Gap”. *China Under Hu Jintao: Opportunities, Danger, and Dilemmas*. Tun-Jen Cheng; deLisle, Jacques and Brown, Deborah (eds). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2006, p. 119.

⁷⁰¹ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，为夺取全面建设小康社会而奋斗》。2007年10月15日。这是胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告。Hu Jintao. “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects”. Speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 2016, pp. 613-652.

⁷⁰² Source: *China Daily*. 31 October 2007.
http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/content_6220592_3.htm

提高效率同促进社会公平结合起来, *bǎ tígāo xiàolù tóng cùjìn shèhuì gōngpíng jiéhé qílái*” and “agricultural, rural, and peasant problems, 农业, 农村, 农民, 三农问题, *nóngyè, nóngcūn, nóngmín, sān nóng wèntí*” reflected the direction of the new policies.⁷⁰³ Hu Jintao also gave specific measures of sustainable and equitable growth to reduce regional unequal development:

推动区域协调发展, 优化国土开发格局。缩小区域发展差距, 必须注重实现基本公共服务均等化, 引导生产要素跨区域合理流动[...]更好发挥经济特区、上海浦东新区、天津滨海新区在改革开放和自主创新中的重要作用。走中国特色城镇化道路, 按照统筹城乡、布局合理、节约土地、功能完善、以大带小的原则, 促进大中小城市和小城镇协调发展。⁷⁰⁴

We should promote balanced development among regions and improve the pattern of land development. To narrow the gap in development among regions, we must ensure their equal access to basic public services and guide a rational flow of factors of production between regions [...] We will help transform the economies of areas where natural resources are exhausted. We will have the special economic zones, the Pudong New Area in Shanghai and the Binhai New Area in Tianjin to play a major role in reform, opening up and independent innovation. Taking a path of urbanization with Chinese characteristics, we will promote balanced development of large, medium-sized and small cities and towns on the principle of balancing urban and rural development, ensuring rational distribution, saving land, providing a full range of functions and getting larger cities to help smaller ones.⁷⁰⁵

In this report, Hu Jintao used the word “协调, *xiétiáo*” twenty-six times. In the Chinese lexicon of governance, “协调, *xiétiáo*” means “to coordinate, to balance” or, more loosely translated: “to resolve conflicts among bureaucracies, localities, organizations, and others”. *xiétiáo* is the job of “the supreme leader, 最高领导人, *zuìgāo lǐngdǎo rén*”, vice-premiers, state councillors, and everyone in a position of political authority.⁷⁰⁶ It can be seen that in China, social governance is about trade-offs.

In *the Elements and De Cive*, the most important thing according to Hobbes is the virtue of justice.⁷⁰⁷ During Hu Jintao period, equality with justice were mentioned

⁷⁰³ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜, 为夺取全面建设小康社会而奋斗》。2007年10月15日。这是胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告。Hu Jintao. “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects”. Speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 2016, pp. 613-652.

⁷⁰⁴ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜, 为夺取全面建设小康社会而奋斗》。2007年10月15日。Hu Jintao. “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects”. Speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. 2016, pp. 613-652.

⁷⁰⁵ Source: *China Daily*. 31 October 2007.

http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/content_6220592_3.htm

⁷⁰⁶ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2013, pp. 60-76.

⁷⁰⁷ Skinner, Quentin. *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

frequently, as they had to be taken seriously by the Party and the government organization.⁷⁰⁸ For example, in a speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC, it was proposed eight times.⁷⁰⁹

The Hu-Wen era from late 2002 to early 2013 has been characterized as a “golden era, 黄金时代, *huángjīn shídài*” in terms of economic growth and political stability.⁷¹⁰ Liu figures: “They abolished agricultural taxes, extended health insurance, pensions and income support to almost all rural as well as urban residents, and built a civic welfare infrastructure to address migrants’ grievances [...] Beyond all these efforts, they also established for the first-time entitlements to social security and safety nets for all China’s population in order to achieve social equality and justice.”⁷¹¹

6.4 The Party’s governance capability

Hu Jintao’s Party governance theory is a continuation of thoughts advanced by Mao and Lenin. At a CPC Central Committee plenum in September 2004, Hu called for a no-holds-barred effort to raise “the CPC’s governance ability, 执政能力, *zhízhèng nénglì*”, also translated as “ruling ability” so as to sustain the Party’s legitimacy.⁷¹²

Lam stated: “Many of the relatively liberal measures introduced by the Hu-Wen group, ranging from promoting rule by law and curbing corruption to boosting government transparency and cadre responsibility, are meant to subserve the larger goal of raising the ruling Party’s governance ability.”⁷¹³ During Hu Jintao’s reign, improving the Party’s governing capability was mentioned many times, implying that the leadership acutely sensed the need to carefully reflect on the position of the Party in view of the increasing complexity of the Chinese society.

“The Party’s governance capability, 党的执政能力, *dǎng de zhízhèng nénglì*” was the most frequent directly mentioned concept of governance by Hu Jintao. In the report of the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, it was mentioned twenty-two times. He also pointed out how to improve the Party’s capability of governance:

深入贯彻落实科学发展观，要求我们切实加强和改进党的建设。要站在完成党执政兴国使命的高度，把提高党的执政能力、保持和发展党的先进性，体现到领导科学发展、促进社会和谐上来，落实到引领中国发展进步、更好代表和实现最广大人民的根本利益上来，使党的工作和党的建设更加符

1996, p. 309.

⁷⁰⁸ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 74.

⁷⁰⁹ Source: *China Daily*. 31 October 2007.

http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/content_6220592_3.htm

⁷¹⁰ Liu Zhenhua. 刘振华。《论党的执政能力建设》。南京：江苏人民出版社。2004年，第97-121页。

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

⁷¹² Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 249.

⁷¹³ Ibid. p. 152.

合科学发展观的要求，为科学发展提供可靠的政治和组织保障。⁷¹⁴

To thoroughly apply the scientific outlook on development, we must strengthen our efforts to build the Party in earnest. As is required by the Party's lofty mission of governing and rejuvenating the nation, our efforts to improve the Party's governance capability and maintain and develop its vanguard nature must serve our task of directing scientific development, promoting social harmony, guiding development and progress in China amid better representing and realizing the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people. In this way, the Party's work and our efforts to build the Party will better meet the requirement of the scientific outlook on development and provide a reliable political and organizational guarantee for scientific development.⁷¹⁵

The concept of scientific development requires the Communist Party to strengthen the construction of the Party's ruling ability, and pay more attention to the realization of people's comprehensive development.⁷¹⁶ With the development of society, CPC's understanding of the governance mode of the state should gradually mature.

6.4.1 Intra-Party democracy

China continued to be a country in transformation in the Hu era, but the Party itself has also been going through changes.⁷¹⁷ Yu pointed out: "The Sixteenth Party Congress identified the strategy of first developing intra-party democracy and then moving on to build social democracy as the model for developing overall Chinese democracy. The Seventeenth Party Congress reaffirmed this strategy."⁷¹⁸ President Hu Jintao made a pillar of his second five-year term the development of "intra-Party democracy", implying more democratic processes within the Chinese Communist Party itself. Hu Jintao stated in the report to the Seventeenth National Congress:

人民民主是社会主义的生命，党内民主是党的生命。⁷¹⁹

People's democracy is the lifeblood of socialism, intra-democracy is the lifeblood of the Party.

⁷¹⁴ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，为夺取全面建设小康社会而奋斗》。2007年10月15日。这是胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告。Hu Jintao. "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects". Speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People's Publishing House. 2016, pp. 613-652.

⁷¹⁵ Source: *China Daily*. 31 October 2007.

http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/content_6220592_3.htm

⁷¹⁶ Gao Jinhua. 高金华。《从毛泽东到胡锦涛：中国共产党的执政理论研究》。武汉：华中师范大学。博士学位论文。2015年，第91页。

⁷¹⁷ Brown, Kerry. *Hu Jintao: China's silent ruler*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2012, p. 211.

⁷¹⁸ Yu Keping. *Democracy Is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 2009, p. 29.

⁷¹⁹ Yang Xuedong, Chen Jiagang. 杨雪冬，陈家刚。《人民民主是社会主义的生命》。北京：人民出版社。2008年，第4页。

Hu Jintao attached great importance to the development of intra-Party democracy and put forward a series of measures to develop it:

尊重党员主体地位，保障党员民主权利，推进党务公开，营造党内民主讨论环境。⁷²⁰

We need to respect the principal position of Party members, guarantee their democratic rights, increase transparency in Party affairs and create favourable conditions for democratic discussions within the Party.⁷²¹

In different historical periods, according to the changes of situation and tasks, the Communist Party of China has constantly expanded its foundation and absorbed outstanding elements from other classes and strata of society to join the Party, thus diversifying the composition of Party members present. On 23 July 1921, the Communist Party of China held its first National Congress in Shanghai. At that time, there were only fifty-three Party members in the country, and they were almost all intellectuals.⁷²² During the Agrarian Revolutionary period, due to the revolutionary road of encircling the city with the countryside and seizing the political power by arms, the peasants become the key development objects of the Party organization. In 1929, only 7% of Party members came from workers' backgrounds, while those from peasants rose to over 78%.⁷²³ In December 1935, the Central Committee held a meeting in Wayaobu. It was held that the main criterion for the Party to absorb new members was whether or not they fought resolutely for the Party's goals. Social background should be noted, but it was not the main criterion. During the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation, the Communist Party of China absorbed advanced elements from all walks of life, and the ranks of Party members grew and expanded, becoming the largest Party in China.⁷²⁴ After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC in 1978, the CPC shifted its focus to economic construction, and gradually restored the qualification of intellectuals and advanced elements of other social strata to join the Party.⁷²⁵ Since the reform and opening up, the Party organizations have gradually absorbed advanced elements from non-public economic organizations and social organizations. By the time the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC was held, the number of Party members from non-public economic organizations had reached 2.863 million, accounting for 3.95% of the total number of Party members in that year. In 2010 alone,

⁷²⁰ Hu Jintao. 胡锦涛。《胡锦涛文选》第二卷。《高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，为夺取全面建设小康社会而奋斗》。2007年10月15日。这是胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告。Hu Jintao. "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects". Speech by Hu Jintao to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. *Selected works of Hu Jintao*. Volume II. Beijing: People's Publishing House. 2016, pp. 613-652.

⁷²¹ Source: *China Daily*. 31 October 2007.

http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-10/31/content_6220592_3.htm

⁷²² Ma Ben. 马奔。《试论中国现代化进程与共产党党员成分变化》，《安徽教育学院学报》。2003年1月，第21卷第1期。第25-27页。

⁷²³ Suo Yanwen. 索延文。《关于党的阶级基础与群众基础问题》，《党建研究内参》。2001年第9期，第14-21页。

⁷²⁴ 《中共中央文件选集：1934-1935》。北京：中共中央党校出版社，1991年，第4页。

⁷²⁵ 《中国共产党章程汇编（一大-十八大）》。北京：中共中央党校出版社。2013年，第99页。

131,000 new Party members were recruited from non-public economic organizations, accounting for 4.3% of the total; 83,000 were recruited from social organizations, accounting for 2.7% of the total; and 16,000 were recruited from the new social strata, accounting for 0.5% of the total.⁷²⁶

After decades of development, great changes have taken place in the number and structure of CPC members. It had grown from a small party with some 50 people at the beginning to a big party with more than 80 million members. As Lance points out: “By any measure, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the largest political party in the world. At the end of 2010, its membership reached 80.27 million, more than double the 37 million in 1978 when the post-Mao reform era began. It rivals the population of a major nation. Membership-wise, today’s CCP is very much a product of the reform era.”⁷²⁷


According to statistics of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee,⁷²⁸ at the end of 2013, the total number of CPC members was 86.686 million. In terms of occupations of the Party members, there were 7.343 million workers, 25.703 million farmers, herders and fishermen, 5.091 million corporate technical personnel, 5.069 million corporate management personnel, 7.303 million Party and government staff, 2.604 million students, 15.891 million retirees, and 17.754 million other professional personnel.

⁷²⁶ Sun Yingshuai. 孙应帅。《史诗般的辉煌巨变：90年来中国共产党党员数量与结构的变化与发展》，《光明日报》。2011年7月5日，第15版。

⁷²⁷ Gore, Lance L. P. “The Impact of Market on the Grassroots Organizations of the Chinese Communist Party”. Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (ed.). *China: development and governance*. Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific Pub. 2013, p. 47.

⁷²⁸ Source: 中国共产党新闻网, *zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng xīnwén wǎng*. www.cpcnews.cn is the most systematic and comprehensive website of the Communist Party of China on the Internet. 2013年中国共产党党内统计公报。Inner party statistics bulletin of the Communist Party of China in 2013. 30 June 2014. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0630/c64387-25219830.html>

Figure 6: Professional distribution of CPC members by the end of 2013 and 2019⁷²⁹



Source: Inner party statistics bulletin of the Communist Party of China in 2013 and 2019.

As of 31 December 2019, the total number of members of the Communist Party of China was 91.914 million. Among them, there are 6.445 million workers (skilled workers), 25.561 million farmers, herders and fishermen, this portion is almost the similar with that in 2013. There are 14.403 million professional and technical personnel in enterprises, public institutions and social organizations, this is the most significant increasing group during these years. Additionally, there are 10.104 million management personnel of enterprises, institutions and social organizations. There are 7.678 million personnel of Party and government organs, 1.960 million students, 7.104 million other professionals, and 18.661 million retirees.⁷³⁰

In Lam’s opinion: “Intra-Party democracy is the equivalent of the president and Party chief’s quest for constitutional and legal reform: there must be well-established institutions, rules, and procedures within the CPC—and they must be followed.”⁷³¹ The balance of power between the Party, the government, and the People’s Congress will not be accomplished overnight, but rather will require a process of maturation and the establishment of certain preconditions; above all, the guarantee of intra-party democracy is imperative. Because the high-level positions within the People’s

⁷²⁹ Ibid. Source: Xinhua News Agency, China’s state news agency. 新华社, *xīnhuá shè*. 2019 年中国共产党党内统计公报。Inner party statistics bulletin of the Communist Party of China in 2019. 30 June 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-06/30/c_1210683845.htm Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

⁷³⁰ Source: Xinhua News Agency, China’s state news agency. 2019 年中国共产党党内统计公报。Inner party statistics bulletin of the Communist Party of China in 2019. 30 June 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-06/30/c_1210683845.htm

⁷³¹ Lam, Willy Wo-Lap. *Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 2006, p. 127.

Congress are held by Party leaders, including that of the head of state, it is impossible to establish an effective system of checks and balances between the Party, the government, and the NPC if intra-party democracy is dysfunctional, the collective leadership of the Party organization is inadequately implemented, the Party committee system becomes ineffectual, or authoritarianism and dictatorship prevail. Thus, it is apparent that the democratization of national politics and the creation of a uniquely Chinese mechanism for the regulation of state power must be compelled by the democratization of the Party.⁷³²

Hu Jintao maintained a low profile. On 28 March 2003, he said that Chinese media should focus on the people, not the leader.⁷³³ Almost no collected works were published by his personal name. There is no Hu Jintao Thought as there was for Deng and Jiang, no talk by the CPC of “Hu as the core of the fourth generation of leadership” and no hefty investment in anything approaching a personality cult.⁷³⁴ However, during Hu Jintao period, despite the challenges from SARS (2003), the Olympic Games and the Wenchuan earthquake (2008), China continuously achieved social stability and economic growth. It was under Hu that China became the world’s largest holder of foreign reserves (overtaking Japan in 2006), the world’s largest exporter (overtaking Germany in 2009) and the second largest economy (overtaking, again, Japan in 2010). Hu’s China is a place of dazzling statistics and bewildering, rapid growth.⁷³⁵


⁷³² Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 121.

⁷³³ Guo Qiongli. 郭琼丽。《胡锦涛执政周年大事记》，《青年参考》。2003年11月19日，第1版。

⁷³⁴ Brown, Kerry. *Hu Jintao: China’s silent ruler*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2012, p. 24.


⁷³⁵ This came out in the National People’s Congress in 2010. The figure for the first is assessed as USD75 billion and USD80 billion for the second. Brown, Kerry. *Hu Jintao: China’s silent ruler*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2012, p. xxi.

Figure 7: Real GDP Growth from 2003-2013⁷³⁶



Source: The International Monetary Fund.

Figure 8: Gross Domestic Product (Billions of U.S. dollars) from 2003-2013⁷³⁷



Source: The International Monetary Fund.

The greatest achievement of the Hu era was the maintenance of stability and economic growth. “Nothing could detract from this achievement.”⁷³⁸ Hu Jintao, general secretary and president until 2012, as Ringen figured, “Hu used the slogans of ‘harmonious society’ and ‘scientific development’ to try to temper China’s obsession with GDP growth with more concern for social justice and regional balance.”⁷³⁹ Hu also strove to eliminate the imbalance between regions and urban and rural areas, and started to lay the groundwork for more ecologically sustainable development. On the

⁷³⁶ Source: International Monetary Fund. <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/CHN> <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/JPN> <https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/DEU> Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

⁷³⁸ Brown, Kerry. *Hu Jintao: China’s silent ruler*. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 2012, p. 201.

⁷³⁹ Ringen, Stein. *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 2016, p. 72.

basis of people's democracy, he stressed the importance of intra-Party democracy. During the Hu era Chinese state-level thought on governance was developing, becoming more nuanced along with being less and less leader-based.

Ferdinand pointed out that under Hu Jintao, "China had begun to contribute more to UN activities such as peacekeeping. It had taken the lead in setting up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, and from 2006 it was a key player in the emerging BRIC (later BRICS) group of emerging powers, along with Brazil, Russia, India and since 2010 South Africa."⁷⁴⁰ China had clearly become active also internationally, experimenting with the governance of the international system. At the same time, it indicated that its domestic governance system was functioning, because only a well-functioning state is able to act meaningfully in foreign politics on a sustainable basis.

6.5 Conclusion

During Hu Jintao's tenure, China's economy developed rapidly, but a series of social problems also became increasingly visible, such as the contradiction between the environment and economic development, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, and the relative lagging of political reforms. Hu Jintao put forward the thought of scientific outlook and harmonious society, which reflected the importance of environmental and social protection. With this, China's governance structure upgraded from the original "trinity" of socialist market economy, democratic politics and advanced culture to the "quaternity" with the inclusion of the harmonious society. The governance by the government, especially macro-control, was constantly improving, the role of society in national governance was more obvious, and the Party moved somewhat to the background, although maintaining ultimate control.

⁷⁴⁰ Ferdinand, Peter. "Westward ho—the China dream and one belt, one road: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping". *International Affairs*. 92 (4), 2016, pp. 942-956.

7 GOVERNANCE IN XI JINPING ERA

The Xi Jinping era began in 2013, when Xi rose to the position of the President of the People's Republic of China. It has been marked by several organizational and policy changes. In the *Decision of the CPC Central Committee on several major issues of comprehensively deepening reform* adopted by the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 9-12 November 2013, "governance" was a key concept, which was explicitly mentioned twenty-four times. For instance, Xi Jinping pointed out:

一个国家选择什么样的治理体系，是由这个国家的历史传承、文化传统、经济社会发展水平决定的，是由这个国家的人民决定的。⁷⁴¹

The kind of governance system best suited for a country is determined by that country's historical heritage and cultural traditions, and its level of social and economic development, and it is ultimately decided by that country's people.⁷⁴²

The overall goal of China at present and in the coming decades is to realize modernization, that is, to realize modernization by 2049, at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China.⁷⁴³ Modernization refers not only to industry, agriculture, science and technology, but also system and capacity. On the modernization of national governance, some Chinese scholars from the perspective of system theory attribute the modernization of national governance to many aspects, such as system, efficiency and participation. For example, Yu attributed the modernization of national governance to five aspects: the standardization of public power operation, democratization, legalization, efficiency improvement of public governance processes, and coordination between the central and local governments.⁷⁴⁴ Jiang Bixin summarised the modernization of national governance into four standards: institutionalization, scientification, standardization and routinization.⁷⁴⁵ The core content about capability of national governance modernization is for a pluralistic governance body to provide public services and address public issues by establishing cooperation mechanisms. Therefore, cooperation is the fundamental aspect and core element to realize the modernization of national governance.⁷⁴⁶ This requires developing a set of legitimating ideas that move beyond growth, materialism, and global status and building a set of institutions that can manage this pluralism—institutions anchored in popular support that transcends simple

⁷⁴¹ Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第一卷。北京：外文出版社。2018年，第105页。

⁷⁴² Xi Jinping. "Improve Governance Capacity Through the socialist System with Chinese Characteristics". 17 February 2014. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 117.

⁷⁴³ Xu Yong. 徐勇。《国家治理的中国底色与路径》。北京：中国社会科学出版社。2018年，第142页。

⁷⁴⁴ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《衡量国家治理体系现代化的基本标准》，《北京日报》。2013年12月9日，第5版。

⁷⁴⁵ Jiang Bixin. 江必新。《推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化》，《光明日报》。2013年11月15日，第3版。

⁷⁴⁶ Zhong Lin. 钟林。《国家治理能力现代化：背景、内涵与生成》。武汉：华中科技大学。博士毕业论文。2015, p. 9.

economic-oriented performance-based legitimacy. There needs to be a transition toward reform-based legitimacy.⁷⁴⁷ Xi Jinping pointed out:

国家治理体系和治理能力是一个国家制度和制度执行能力的集中体现。国家治理体系是在党领导下管理国家的制度体系，包括经济、政治、文化、社会、生态文明和党的建设等各领域体制机制、法律法规安排，也就是一整套紧密相连、相互协调的国家制度；国家治理能力则是运用国家制度管理社会各方面事务的能力，包括改革发展稳定、内政外交国防、治党治国治军等各个方面。国家治理体系和治理能力是一个有机整体，相辅相成，有了好的国家治理体系才能提高治理能力，提高国家治理能力才能充分发挥国家治理体系的效能。⁷⁴⁸

The national governance system and capacity of a country epitomize not only its many systems but also how well it can enforce them. Our national governance system is a system of institutions within which the country is governed with the leadership of the Party. It comprises economic, political, cultural, social and ecological as well as Party-building systems and mechanisms, laws and regulations. This is a complete set of closely connected and coordinated systems of the state. Our national governance capacity is the ability to use these systems to manage social affairs, including reform, development and stability, domestic and foreign affairs, national defence, and the running of the Party, state and military. Our national governance system and capacity complement each other and form an organic whole. An effective governance system will lead to greater governance capacity, while greater governance capacity can make the governance system more effective.⁷⁴⁹

The overriding importance of the idea of governance has indeed permeated in Chinese top-level thought and vocabulary. Effective state governance involves three basic issues: who governs, how to govern and how well. These three issues are the three basic elements of a national governance system: governance subject, governance mechanism and governance effect.⁷⁵⁰ A modern governance system is characterized by diversification. The Party organizations and government organizations at all levels are the most important governance subjects. As the core force of leading various undertakings, the Communist Party of China must play the role of commanding the overall situation and coordinating all parties under any circumstances. The leading force of state governance is the Communist Party of China. Although the Party is strongly emphasized, the system is far more important than that. The national governance system emphasizes the diversity of subjects, including social participation, and it stresses negotiation and interaction between the government and society.

⁷⁴⁷ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2013, p. 86.

⁷⁴⁸ Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第一卷。北京：外文出版社。2018年，第91页。

⁷⁴⁹ Xi Jinping. "Align Our Thinking with the Guidelines of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee". 12 November 2013. Part of the speech at the second full assembly of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, pp. 101-102.

⁷⁵⁰ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化》，《前线》。2014年1月，第1-36页。

Governance has been on the agenda of Xi Jinping since the beginning of his presidency.⁷⁵¹ Considering how to improve the governance ability, he states:

国家治理体系和治理能力是一个国家的制度和制度执行能力的集中体现，两者相辅相成[...]只有以提高党的执政能力为重点，尽快把我们各级干部、各方面管理者的思想政治素质、科学文化素质、工作本领都提高起来，尽快把党和国家机关、企事业单位、人民团体、社会组织等的工作能力都提高起来，国家治理能力体系才能更加有效运转。⁷⁵²

A country's governance system and capacity are the major barometers of its system and that system's governing efficiency. The two are complementary [...] Our governance system will become more efficient as long as we focus on improving the Party's governance capacity while raising the moral and political standards, scientific and cultural levels, and professional abilities of officials at all levels and administrators of all areas, and as long as we make Party and government agencies, enterprises, public administrators, and social organizations more efficient.⁷⁵³

7.1 Xi Jinping's view on socialist democracy


In the current Xi Jinping era, the concept of governance is frequently accompanied by the concepts of democracy and the rule of law, while the use of concepts of dictatorship and legal system is gradually eliminated. Reports of the Party Congress display the key changes as follows. Through the statistics of the key words of governance in these reports the historical changes of the concept of governance can be seen.

⁷⁵¹ Xi Jinping, "Align Our Thinking with the Guidelines of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee". 12 November 2013. Part of the speech at the second full assembly of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 103.

⁷⁵² Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第一卷。北京：外文出版社。2018年，第105页。

⁷⁵³ Xi Jinping, "Improve Governance Capacity Through the socialist System with Chinese Characteristics". 17 February 2014. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 117.

Figure 9: Statistics of key words in the reports of China’s Party Congresses from 1956-2017⁷⁵⁴



Source: Reports of Party Congress from 1956 to 2017.

From the above figure, it can be seen that before the reform and opening up, especially in 1956, the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China attached great importance to democracy, which was needed for the Party to maintain the new regime based on the international and domestic situation at that time. Since the reform and opening up, the administration of state affairs has paid more attention to the accurate framework of democracy. From the past combination of “democracy and dictatorship” China has moved to the combination of “democracy and rule of law”. Especially during the Hu Jintao era, the concept of democracy was mentioned with high frequency, reflecting the direction towards increasing governance through state institutions, but the frequency is rather high also during the Xi Jinping era.

7.1.1 Liberal democracy and consultative democracy

Giddens argued: “Democracy has become universally popular in the present day simply because it is the best political system that humanity can come up with. And most nations and peoples now see this.”⁷⁵⁵ Lin contests: “According to Marxist

⁷⁵⁴ Source: Web Portal of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng*. <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengcewenjianku/index.htm> The first National Congress (NC) of CPC in 1921, the second NC of CPC in 1922, the third NC of CPC in 1923, the fourth NC of CPC in 1925, the fifth NC of CPC in 1927, and the sixth NC of CPC in 1928 NC of CPC, the seventh NC of CPC in 1945, due to historical conditions, there is no complete report that can be used as a comparative analysis material. Figure drawn by Antti Pihlajamäki.

⁷⁵⁵ Giddens, Anthony. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: T. J. Press. 1994, p. 105.

orthodoxy, liberal democracy should be completely opposed because of its individualized nature characterized by the political elitism in capitalism.”⁷⁵⁶ Democracy is one of the most widely used concepts in modern political theory. In practice, it has a wide variety of practical meanings, just like there is a wide variety of states in the current world system. Some of them are poor and people’s life can be harsh in them; some of them are rich and life can be comfortable in them, but at an abstract level their essential political structure is always the same: there is a leadership consisting of a small number of individuals, surrounded by political, economic, cultural and military elites, supervising the large majority of common people, who to a varying extent participate in their own supervision. Practically all of these states profess some kind of democratic elements in their governance structure. Sometimes democracy appears in the name of the state, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Most states organize periodic elections and plebiscites, or less ceremonial hearings and discussions under the idea of deliberative democracy in order to display their democratic characteristics. Is the essence of democracy in multiparty elections, or is it in acting together formulating common goals? A widely used historical concept is a field of meanings, and in the case of democracy the field is rather expansive.⁷⁵⁷

After the cold war, Fukuyama put forward the “end of history” thesis.⁷⁵⁸ In his opinion, Western liberal democracy has become the best choice for human politics: “Liberal democracy was determined to prevail”.⁷⁵⁹ Giddens also held the opinion that: “Liberal democratic political theory is based on the idea that a strict separation must be maintained between state and civil society.”⁷⁶⁰ For Fukuyama, liberal democracy marks the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government”:⁷⁶¹

From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong governments have been failing over the last two decades. And while they have not given way in all cases to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe.⁷⁶²

The “End of History” is by no means to be celebrated in Fukuyama’s estimation; in fact, given the inevitability of humanity’s continuing search for recognition, Deneen argues, “The end of history may simply result in a condition of such overarching discontent that human beings will once again struggle—this time against equality

⁷⁵⁶ Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4. December 2018, pp. 297-312.

⁷⁵⁷ Korhonen, Pekka. “What Is Asia? International Studies as Political Linguistics”. *Global and Regional Problems: Towards an Interdisciplinary Study*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 131-149.

⁷⁵⁸ Fukuyama, Francis. *The end of history and the last man*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992, p. xxiii.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁰ Giddens, Anthony. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: T. J. Press. 1994, p. 116.

⁷⁶¹ Fukuyama, Francis. *The end of history and the last man*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992, p. xiii, xxiii, 21, 43, 200, 206, 332, 283. Also see Giddens, Anthony. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: T. J. Press. 1994, p. 106.

⁷⁶² Ibid.

itself—thereby jeopardizing the stability of liberal democracy and starting the march of history anew.”⁷⁶³ If, as Fukuyama said, liberal democracy is the end of human history, it should be a perfect form of system that can meet the needs of all people. But the fact is: with the increasing complexity of state functions, liberal democracy is facing more and more challenges. “The limitations of liberal democratic systems are well enough known by now”.⁷⁶⁴ Discontent with liberal democratic institutions mounts at the very same time as those institutions become generalized. Giddens claims that: “People become disillusioned with ‘politics’ because key areas of social life—some of the areas they are able reflexively to master, others remain as sources of threat—no longer correspond to any accessible domains of political authority.”⁷⁶⁵ It can be seen that in western political theory the true democratic governance depends solely on liberal democracy, which nevertheless seems to be difficult to achieve effectively. The deficiency of liberal democracy has been the starting point of the development of the theory of deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy emphasizes that citizens’ participation in decision-making should be regarded as the core of democracy, and citizens should form political consensus through equal dialogue, so as to stimulate their enthusiasm for political participation. Obviously, this is the theoretical correction of the liberal democratic system based on individualism and self-interest morality. Kahane figures: “Liberal democracy is a set of representative institutions, guided by certain values; deliberative democracy is a way of getting, or trying to get, agreement about policies in the political arena.”⁷⁶⁶

Kahane believes: “The justificatory claims made by deliberative democrats are an extension of the liberal project. Many theorists embrace deliberative democracy because it fills a lacuna in liberal theory and have incorporated a number of recognizably liberal substantive norms into their conceptions of deliberation.”⁷⁶⁷ In deliberative democracy, accord might be reached by various means. Those involved might agree on a norm or norms, which guide the assessment of particular policy decisions, or they might agree on a procedure which can be applied to contentious cases. Yu believes: “Deliberative politics is a system in which deliberation is a basic principle of political life and regulates political relationships, processes, and behaviour.”⁷⁶⁸ Giddens opines that: “Emphasis in the deliberative conception is on the way in which a process of open discussion where all points of view can be heard may legitimate the outcome when this is seen to reflect the discussion that has preceded it, not on deliberation as a discovery procedure in search of a correct answer. Democracy in this conception is not defined by whether or not everyone participates in it, but by public deliberation over policy issues.”⁷⁶⁹ Deliberative democratization

⁷⁶³ Deneen, Patrick J. “It isn’t Over till it’s Over-- The End of History and the Last Man by Fukuyama, Francis”. *Commonweal*. New York. Vol. 119, Issue. 12, 19 June 1992, p. 25.

⁷⁶⁴ Giddens, Anthony. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: T. J. Press. 1994, p. 112.

⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 116.

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 113.

⁷⁶⁷ Weinstock, Daniel and Kahane, David. “Introduction”. In Kahane, Joshua David; Daniel Weinstock, Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams (eds). *Deliberative Democracy in Practice*. Vancouver: UBC Press. 2010, pp. 3-7.

⁷⁶⁸ Yu Keping. “Toward Good Governance in China: Perspective of Chinese and American Scholars”. Lieberthal, Kenneth; Cheng Li, Yu Keping (eds). *China’s Political Development: Chinese and American perspectives*. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution Press. 2014, p. 12.

⁷⁶⁹ Giddens, Anthony. *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Cambridge: T. J. Press. 1994, pp.

would mean greater transparency in many areas of government—not least important, in the sphere of resource generation.⁷⁷⁰ However, “Deliberative democracy has yet to achieve full theoretical maturity.”⁷⁷¹

In the traditional governance mode, the political state is superior to the society, and the rulers use public power from top to bottom and one-way, realizing the management and control of the society through the allocation of resources, without systematic consent and participation of social members. With the reform of China’s economic system and the change of social structure, the imperfections of the original political system became gradually highlighted, such as the lack of channels for citizens to participate in policy making, and the unclear powers and responsibilities of government agencies, which restrict the exertion of the advantages of the socialist political system and hinder the smooth progress of the modernization of political governance. This requires deepening the reform of the political system and realizing the modernization of national governance.

Kahane writes: “Deliberative democracy is seen by proponents of both the liberal and Habermasian traditions as motivated by value pluralism.”⁷⁷² Milot, in the same book, believes: “Deliberation, despite its intrinsic limits, still seems to be one of the best routes to peaceful social interaction in a context of value pluralism.”⁷⁷³ In the face of complex social contradictions and interests, the governance mode of a unitary structure of government cannot adapt to the changes of society. All governance subjects should communicate with each other, cooperate with each other, supervise each other, and make democratic decisions within the legal procedures, so as to achieve the balance of social public interests. In Weinstock and Kahane’s opinion: “Deliberative democracy has emerged in recent years as one of the dominant research paradigms in normative political philosophy.”⁷⁷⁴ Deliberative democracy is a necessary addition to China’s social development. It especially emphasizes that citizens and their representatives should directly participate in the national political life, so as to find a balance between the interests of individuals and groups, social strata and public interests, then achieve effective national governance. Lin comments: “One of the debated concepts in Chinese publicity has been ‘deliberative democracy with Chinese style’, which may be considered as a hybrid from Confucianism based ‘harmony theory’ and modern democracy, characterized by the combination of centralized decision-making with popular consultation, one party leadership with multi-social structure, collectivism with individualism, independent personality with the characters of responsibility, obligation and commitment and so on.”⁷⁷⁵

113-114.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid. pp. 114-115.

⁷⁷¹ Weinstock, Daniel and Kahane, “Introduction”. In Kahane, Joshua David; Daniel Weinstock, Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams (eds). *Deliberative Democracy in Practice*. Vancouver: UBC Press. 2010, pp. 3-7.

⁷⁷² Ibid. p. 7.

⁷⁷³ Milot, Micheline. “Concepts of the Good: Challenging the Premises of Deliberative Democracy”. In Kahane, Joshua David; Daniel Weinstock, Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams (eds). *Deliberative Democracy in Practice*. Vancouver: UBC Press. 2010, p. 25.

⁷⁷⁴ Weinstock, Daniel and Kahane, David. “Introduction”. In Kahane, Joshua David; Daniel Weinstock, Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams (eds). *Deliberative Democracy in Practice*. Vancouver: UBC Press. 2010, pp. 3-7.

⁷⁷⁵ Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4.

Discussion is thus taking place in China, especially during the Xi Jinping era, both under the concepts of deliberative democracy, “协商民主, *xiéshāng mínzhǔ*” and consultative democracy, “协商民主, *xiéshāng mínzhǔ*”, which have the same translation in Chinese. Consultative democracy with Chinese characteristics is developing with the advancement of the modernization of national governance.⁷⁷⁶ Socialist consultative democracy means inclusive politics. Representatives and masses of all walks of life can participate in the discussion of major social issues in an equal capacity and seek consensus on the basis of extensive consultation. When making decisions, the ruling Party and government should listen to citizens’ opinions, respond to the people’s queries, and fully absorb the wisdom of the people through democratic consultation. To participate in political and social affairs, citizens must abide by the rules of democratic politics on the rule of law, offer advice and suggestions through the mechanism of deliberative democracy, and actively participate in social management.⁷⁷⁷ Xi Jinping declares:

协商民主是我国社会主义民主政治的特有形式和独特优势，是党的群众路线在政治领域的重要体现。推进协商民主，有利于完善人民有序政治参与、密切党同人民群众的关系、促进决策科学化民主化。⁷⁷⁸

Consultative democracy is a unique form and distinctive advantage of China’s socialist democracy, and an important embodiment of the Party’s mass line in the political field. Promoting consultative democracy is conducive to improving the people’s orderly participation in political affairs, strengthening the ties between the Party and the people, and promoting scientific and democratic decision-making.⁷⁷⁹

What Xi calls socialist consultative democracy is a form of thought that falls under the category of deliberative democracy. He inherited the Chinese socialist ideas of democracy from his predecessors and proposed his own additions:

人民群众是社会主义协商民主的重点。涉及人民群众利益的大量决策和工作，主要发生在基层。要按照协商于民、协商为民的要求，大力发展基层协商民主，重点在基层群众中开展协商。凡是涉及群众切身利益的决策都要充分听取群众意见，通过各种方式、在各个层级、各个方面同群众进行协商。要完善基层组织联系群众制度，加强议事协商，做好上情下达、下

December 2018, pp. 297-312.

⁷⁷⁶ Ling Ruiyan. 凌锐燕。《国家治理现代化进程中的协商民主问题研究》。北京：中共中央党校。博士毕业论文。2015年，第91页。

⁷⁷⁷ Source: Web Portal of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng*. Opinions of the CPC Central Committee on strengthening the construction of socialist consultative democracy 《中共中央关于加强社会主义协商民主建设的意见》。9 February 2015. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-02/09/content_2816784.htm

⁷⁷⁸ Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第一卷。北京：外文出版社。2018年，第82页。

⁷⁷⁹ Xi Jinping. “Explanatory Notes to the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform”. 9 November 2013. Explanatory notes made to the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 91.

情上传工作，保证人民依法管理好自己的事务。要推进权力运行公开化、规范化，完善党务公开、政务公开、司法公开和各领域办事公开制度，让人民监督权力，让权力在阳光下运行。⁷⁸⁰

The key element of socialist consultative democracy lies with the people. A great number of decisions and work affecting people's interests happen mainly at the community level. In line with the principle of consultation among the people and for the people, we need to redouble our efforts in developing consultative democracy at the community level, with a focus on conducting consultations among community members. All decisions that affect people's immediate interests must be made on the basis of soliciting the people's opinions, as well as consultations conducted with them through various means, on different levels, and from different sectors. We should improve the system by which community-level organizations maintain contact with the people, strengthen consultation on community affairs, do a sound job of two-way communication of information from the top down and the bottom up, and make sure the people manage their own affairs well in accordance with the law. We must make the exercise of power more open and standardized, and increase transparency in the operations of the Party, the government, and the judiciary, as well as in the administration of other areas. We must ensure that the people oversee the exercise of power and that power is exercised in ways that are open to scrutiny.⁷⁸¹

A series of new concepts have been put forward in terms of the nature of socialist democracy, the standards of democratic judgment, and socialist consultative democracy. Regarding the nature of socialist democracy, Xi Jinping emphasized the dominant position of the people and proposed:

找到全社会意愿和要求的最大公约数，是人民民主的真谛。⁷⁸²

To reach consensus on the wishes and needs of the whole society is the essence of people's democracy.⁷⁸³

民主不是装饰品，不是用来做摆设的，而是要用来解决人民要解决的问题的。⁷⁸⁴

Democracy is not an ornament to be used for decoration; it is to be used to solve the problems that the people want to solve.⁷⁸⁵

From this viewpoint, evaluating whether a country's system is democratic or not

⁷⁸⁰ Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第二卷。北京：外文出版社。2017年，第297-298页。

⁷⁸¹ Xi Jinping. "Broad, Multilevel, and Institutionalized Consultative Democracy". 21 September 2014. *The Governance of China*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2017, pp. 325-326.

⁷⁸² Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第二卷。北京：外文出版社。2017年，第292页。

⁷⁸³ Xi Jinping. "Broad, Multilevel, and Institutionalized Consultative Democracy". 21 September 2014. *The Governance of China*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2017, p. 319.

⁷⁸⁴ Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第二卷。北京：外文出版社。2017年，第296页。

⁷⁸⁵ Xi Jinping. "Broad, Multilevel, and Institutionalized Consultative Democracy". 21 September 2014. *The Governance of China*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2017, p. 323.

depends on whether the country's governance measures ensure the most fundamental interests of the people. During the current COVID-19 pandemic, many foreign media tend to criticize the Chinese government for disrespecting human rights and forcing people to stay home in very strict quarantine. This has been presented as signs of undemocracy. From the perspective of China's epidemic prevention measures, the Chinese government has taken people's life first as its goal.⁷⁸⁶

The COVID-19 pandemic is the most serious infectious disease in the world since several decades. It is the most serious public health event that China has suffered with a fast spread and extensive infection rate, being the most difficult to control and prevent since the founding of New China.⁷⁸⁷ The Chinese government has taken strict counter measures.⁷⁸⁸ "The speed of China's response was the crucial factor. They moved very quickly to stop transmission. Chinese government set up an effective national system of contact tracing", explains Gregory Poland, director of the Vaccine Research Group at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, USA.⁷⁸⁹ From this point of view, the Chinese socialist democracy during the Xi Jinping era has been functioning very well. People have been carefully protected, and excepting the very early stages, when the properties of the disease were not yet well known, the mortality and infection rates in China have been very low, one of the lowest in the world, in view of its population of 1.4 billion people.⁷⁹⁰ According to the German Statista.com figures, protecting the people has also meant good protection of the economy.⁷⁹¹ In this sense, the functioning of Chinese socialist democracy can be measured even numerically. There are also criteria related with the functioning of the organization of governance:

评价一个国家政治制度是不是民主的、有效的，主要看国家领导层能否依法有序更替，全体人民能否依法管理国家事务和社会事务、管理经济和文化事业，人民群众能否畅通表达利益要求，社会各方面能否有效参与国家政治生活，国家决策能否实现科学化、民主化，各方面人才能否通过公平竞争进入国家领导和管理体系，执政党能否依照宪法法律规定实现对国家事务的领导，权力运用能否得到有效制约和监督。⁷⁹²

The best way to evaluate whether a country's political system is democratic and efficient is to observe whether the succession of its leading body is orderly and

⁷⁸⁶ "The China-related Lies and Facts about the New Coronary Pneumonia Epidemic". 13 May 2020. Source: Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Croatia.

<http://hr.China-embassy.org/eng/zt/KLDY2020/t1778673.htm>

⁷⁸⁷ Xie Chuntao. 谢春涛。《疫情防控体现党的人民情怀与历史担当》，《学习时报》。2020年9月4日。第65-72页。

⁷⁸⁸ "The China-related Lies and Facts about the New Coronary Pneumonia Epidemic". 13 May 2020. Source: Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Croatia.

<http://hr.China-embassy.org/eng/zt/KLDY2020/t1778673.htm>

⁷⁸⁹ Burki, Talha. "China's successful control of COVID-19". *The Lancet*. Vol. 20, Issue. 11, 1 November 2020, pp. 1240-1241.

⁷⁹⁰ European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 21 October 2020, "COVID-19 situation update worldwide, as of 21 October 2020", <https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases>

⁷⁹¹ Source: "Median forecast for China's GDP growth rate due to coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 as of 19 October 2020",

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1102691/China-estimated-coronavirus-covid-19-impact-on-gdp-growth/>

⁷⁹² Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第二卷。北京：外文出版社。2017年，第287页。

in line with the law, whether all people can manage state affairs and social, economic and cultural affairs in conformity with legal provisions, whether the public can express their requirements without hindrance, whether all sectors can efficiently participate in the country's political affairs, whether national decisions can be made in a rational, democratic way, whether professionals in all fields can be part of the team of the national leadership and administrative systems through fair competition, whether the ruling Party can serve as a leader in state affairs in accordance with the Constitution and laws, and whether the exercise of power can be kept under effective restraint and supervision.⁷⁹³

Xi Jinping thus continues to emphasize the importance of the legal basis of the governance system, like Deng Xiaoping started to push for it, and his followers in the leadership have continued to build it. Ringen asserts: “The Chinese state is not just a state; it is a Party-state. The state controls the society, and the Party controls the state.”⁷⁹⁴ The ultimate authority of the CPC and its individual leaders, overseeing every aspect of the operations of subsidiary power organs, renders the establishment of an authentic system of checks and balances and a mechanism for the restriction of state power almost impossible.⁷⁹⁵ As Li Cheng says: “With few exceptions, top leadership posts in both the Party and the government have a term limit of five years. An individual leader cannot hold the same position for more than two terms, and no leader can remain at the same level of leadership for more than fifteen years.” He also argues: “Collective leadership is a uniquely Chinese form of governance [...] Xi can modify and improve the system of collective leadership.”⁷⁹⁶ The fact that Xi has departed somewhat from the collective leadership system practiced by Jiang and Hu, centralizing power on various Leading Groups and Commissions where he is the chairman, as well as in 2018 ending the presidential two-term limit practiced by his two predecessors, goes not against the idea of legality. These changes have been made within the existing legal procedures, and thus there is nothing illegal in them. Consultative democracy anyway is the governance idea of the Xi Jinping administration:

社会主义协商民主，是中国社会主义民主政治的特有形式和独特优势，是中国共产党的群众路线在政治领域的重要体现。中共十八大提出，在发展我国社会主义民主政治的进程中，要完善协商民主制度和工作机制，推进协商民主广泛多层制度化发展。中共十八届三中全会强调，在党的领导下，以经济社会发展重大问题和涉及群众切身利益的实际问题为内容，在全社会开展广泛协商，坚持协商于决策之前和决策实施之中。这些重要论述和部署，为中国社会主义协商民主发展指明了方向。⁷⁹⁷

⁷⁹³ Xi Jinping, “Confidence in the Political System of Chinese Socialism”. 5 September 2014. *The Governance of China*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2017, p. 313.

⁷⁹⁴ Ringen, Stein. *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 2016, p. 1.

⁷⁹⁵ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 117.

⁷⁹⁶ Cheng Li. *Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 2016, p. 83, 30, 26.

⁷⁹⁷ Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第二卷。北京：外文出版社。2017年，第291页。

Consultative democracy is a unique form and a distinctive strength of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is an important embodiment of the Party's mass line. It was stated at the Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC that as China's socialist democracy progresses, we need to improve the institutions and mechanisms for consultative democracy and promote its broad-based, multilevel, and institutionalized development. It was emphasized at the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee that with a focus on the major issues that affect people's immediate interests, the Party should lead extensive consultations throughout the whole of society and ensure that they take place both before decisions are made and during their implementation. These important statements and plans have shown what the way forward will be for China's socialist consultative democracy.⁷⁹⁸

It can even be thought that increased authoritarianism at the top level and increased consultative democracy in the rest of the society go together in the current Chinese leadership. The governance system moves simultaneously in two directions but strives to maintain a balance between them.

7.1.2 Problems in socialist consultative democracy

7.1.2.1 The relevant laws and regulations are not perfect

The legalization of the governance system can improve the authority of the law, realize the proceduralization and standardization of the system and mechanism, and then resolve the relationship between the various subjects in the governance system, and form legal norms among the subjects. This provides legal guarantee for the enrichment and development of the governance system. The rule of law is an important support for the national governance system and governance capabilities. Weinstock and Kahane pointed out: "Deliberative democracy, whatever its precise form, places new and greater demands on citizens than traditional liberal democracy, which between elections mainly required citizens to be generally law abiding."⁷⁹⁹

In China, the central government actually enforces more than 80% of the legal system.⁸⁰⁰ This shows that the government's ability to administer according to law will to a large extent directly reflect the ability to govern the country according to law. During 9-12 November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee started to promote the development of institutionalized consultative democracy.⁸⁰¹ From 20-23 October 2014, the Fourth Plenary Session of

⁷⁹⁸ Xi Jinping. "Broad, Multilevel, and Institutionalized Consultative Democracy". 21 September 2014. *The Governance of China*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2017, p. 318.

⁷⁹⁹ Weinstock, Daniel and Kahane, David. "Introduction". In Kahane, Joshua David; Daniel Weinstock, Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams (eds). *Deliberative Democracy in Practice*. Vancouver: UBC Press. 2010, pp. 3-7.

⁸⁰⁰ Zhu Jingwen. 朱景文。《我国立法监督制度之反思》，《群言》。2015年1月，第14-21页。

⁸⁰¹ Xi Jinping. "Explanatory Notes to the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform". 9 November 2013. Explanatory notes

the Eighteenth Central Committee of the CPC made *The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on several major issues concerning comprehensively promoting the rule of law*.⁸⁰² It was the first time to conduct special research and deployment of the rule of law in the form of a plenary meeting. The ability to govern the country according to law is actually the ability to manage the public affairs of the state and society so as to ensure that all the work of the state is carried out in accordance with the law. However, the difficulty of developing consultative democracy is how to promote the institutionalization and standardization of the channels of consultative democracy.⁸⁰³

In the emergence and development of China's deliberative democracy, the Party and government have successively issued a series of legal documents to ensure the development and operation of consultative democracy in compliance with the development requirements of the times. The Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC, in November 2012 issued two special documents including *The Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Construction of Socialist Consultative Democracy*⁸⁰⁴ and *The Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Implementation of Party Consultation*.⁸⁰⁵ However, these are administrative documents rather than legal documents. The Chinese Constitution only affirmed the historical status and important role of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and the multi-Party cooperation and political consultation system led by the CPC in its preamble. There is neither a special clause in the body of the Constitution that clearly states the nature, powers, and functions of the CPPCC, which is thought to act as an important carrier of consultative democracy.

If consultative democracy lacks a definite legal basis, and there are no relevant legal norms on the subject, content and procedure of consultative democracy, the expansion of power will not be effectively restricted, and the right of free and equal consultation among the discussing subjects will lack the necessary support and guarantee. There may emerge a situation that is democratic in form but undemocratic in substance, and consultative democracy only exists on the surface, and a truly broad consensus cannot be formed. There is thus ample scope for further improving the Chinese legal system.

made to the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 91.

⁸⁰² Source: Xinhua News Agency, China's state news agency. 新华社, *xīnhuá shè*. 中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定。 *The Decision of the CPC Central Committee on several major issues concerning comprehensively promoting the rule of law*. 28 October 2014. http://www.xinhuanet.com/photo/2014-10/28/c_127151800.htm

⁸⁰³ Wang Yang. 汪洋。《论中国式国家治理体系现代化的法治维度》。长沙：湖南大学。博士毕业论文。2016年，第96页。

⁸⁰⁴ Source: Web Portal of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng* 中共中央关于加强社会主义协商民主建设的意见。 *The Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Construction of Socialist Consultative Democracy*. 9 February 2015. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-02/09/content_2816784.htm

⁸⁰⁵ Source: Web Portal of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, State Council Policy Document Database. 中华人民共和国中央人民政府网, *zhōnghuá rénmin gònghéguó zhōngyāng rénmin zhèngfǔ wǎng*. 中共中央关于加强政党协商的实施意见。 *The Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Strengthening the Implementation of Party Consultation*. 10 December 2015. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-12/10/content_5022453.htm

7.1.2.2 The vitality of grassroots consultative democracy is insufficient

Grassroots consultative democracy is an integral part of China's consultative democracy system. Its development and improvement are expected to stimulate the vitality of grassroots organizations, and serve grassroots governance.⁸⁰⁶ However, in practice, there is still a big gap between grassroots consultative democracy and its mission in the modernization of national governance, which seriously affects the effective play of its functions.

China is a vast and multi-ethnic country. Due to the natural geographical environment, national tradition and cultural atmosphere, there are obvious differences in economic development levels, politics and openness between different regions and between urban and rural areas. In addition, due to the influence of leaders' ability and quality, local people's awareness of political participation and other factors, the development of grassroots consultative democracy is uneven. In some places, deliberative democracy has been actively carried out, with a high degree of public participation and obvious results in consultation. In some places, deliberative democracy activities are less developed and limited in form, and deliberative democracy has even become a decoration and burden.

There is a widespread awareness that the quality of the negotiating subjects often cannot quickly adapt to the needs of grassroots deliberations.⁸⁰⁷ First, some local leading cadres and staff have weak democratic awareness and are not very enthusiastic about developing deliberative democracy, or even if procedures are implemented, they do not adopt administrative action. This easily makes grassroots deliberative democracy a mere formality. Second, the level of political participation and educational quality in Chinese localities is uneven. Generally speaking, the level of subject awareness and the degree of participation is low. These issues have suppressed the vitality of the development of grassroots consultation democracy. In addition, not only in China but all over the world deliberation subsists with the question of individual "aptitude." That is, it cannot be normatively demanded.⁸⁰⁸

7.1.3 A Case study

As Tan says: "Local governance in China has taken on different countenance in recent years, particularly at the township level, largely in response to local government restructuring and reorientation. The central government has been promoting township reform that redefines government functions and responsibilities in order to improve government services and governance of local affairs."⁸⁰⁹ Since the reform and opening up, Zhejiang has been in the forefront in the process of developing a socialist

⁸⁰⁶ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《基层协商民主》。北京：中央文献出版社。2015年1月。第9页。

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 56.

⁸⁰⁸ Milot, Micheline. "Concepts of the Good: Challenging the Premises of Deliberative Democracy". In Kahane, Joshua David; Daniel Weinstock, Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams (eds). *Deliberative Democracy in Practice*. Vancouver: UBC Press. 2010, p. 26.

⁸⁰⁹ Tan Qingshan. "Township Government Reform: Improving Local Governance?". Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds). *China: development and governance*. Singapore; Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific 2013, p. 30.

market economy. Its main economic indicators have long maintained a leading position in the country, and it has become one of the fastest and most dynamic provinces in the country.⁸¹⁰ The rapid development of market economy has promoted the development of democratic politics to a certain extent. In the practice of grassroots deliberative democracy in China, a new form of grassroots deliberative democracy such as the “democratic consultative meetings, 民主恳谈会, *mínzhǔ kěntán huì*” in Wenling City, Zhejiang Province has emerged. After more than ten years of development, it has gradually matured and become a model of national deliberative democracy.⁸¹¹

In June 1999, an agricultural and rural modernization education forum was successfully held in Songmen Town, Wenling City, Zhejiang Province.⁸¹² The original intention of the forum was to educate the grassroots and publicize relevant policies. However, the forum achieved unexpected results because it designed a way for people to speak.⁸¹³ This forum became the embryonic form of Wenling’s “democratic consultative meetings” and derived other similar forms of practice, such as democratic communication meetings, village councils, decision-making hearings and so on.⁸¹⁴ In May 2001, the Wenling Municipal Party Committee unified the names and all these practices as “democratic consultative meetings”. If at the beginning the focus was on the word “discussion”, later the democratic meetings began to turn to “democracy”. On 25-26 December 2000, the Wenling Municipal Party Committee, the Propaganda Department of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee and *Zhejiang Daily* jointly held the “Symposium on Strengthening and Improving Rural Ideological and Political Work with Democratic Methods.”⁸¹⁵ The improved democratic talks retained the initial form of dialogue, focusing on exploring how to expand grassroots democracy and organize and guide the masses to participate in the decision-making, management, and supervision of public affairs.⁸¹⁶ As a democratic form in villages, “democratic consultative meetings” is mainly due to the growing popular demand for democracy and the local officials who on behalf of the state promote democracy and innovation efforts. It is the essential example of Chinese practice of deliberative democracy in the countryside.⁸¹⁷

From Wenling democratic practice, all participants affected by the decision-making system, such as NPC deputies, CPPCC members, private

⁸¹⁰ Zhang Lihua. 张利华。《市场经济与民主政治》。北京：民主与建设出版社。2002年，第39页。

⁸¹¹ Wu Xingzhi. 吴兴智。《公民参与、协商民主与乡村公共秩序的重构：基于浙江温岭协商式治理模式的研究》。杭州：浙江大学。博士毕业论文。2008年6月。第48页。

⁸¹² Source: Party committee and government of Songmen town. 松门镇党委、政府。《民主恳谈：温岭市松门镇扎实推进民主建设的探索与实践》，2002年8月。

⁸¹³ Wu Xingzhi. 吴兴智。《公民参与、协商民主与乡村公共秩序的重构：基于浙江温岭协商式治理模式的研究》。杭州：浙江大学。博士毕业论文。2008年6月。第62页。

⁸¹⁴ Chen Jiagang. 陈家刚。《协商民主与国家治理：中国深化改革的新路向新解读》。北京：中央编译出版社。2014年，第142页。

⁸¹⁵ Wu Xingzhi. 吴兴智。《公民参与、协商民主与乡村公共秩序的重构：基于浙江温岭协商式治理模式的研究》。杭州：浙江大学。博士毕业论文。2008年6月。第48页。

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁸¹⁷ Jiang Zhaohua, He Baogang. 蒋兆华、何包钢。《协商民主恳谈：参与式重大公共事项的决策机制—温岭市泽国镇公共参与2005年城镇建设资金使用安排决策过程的个案报告》，《学习时报》。2005年10月25日。第5-12页。

entrepreneurs and other rural elites, as well as ordinary villagers, interact with Party and government officials as far as possible on issues of common interest.⁸¹⁸ It is an example of growing cooperative democracy in China's rural areas.⁸¹⁹ So far, Wenling's "democratic consultative meetings" have gone through four stages of development: The main purpose of the first stage was to ease the tension between cadres and the masses, so it was largely a political and ideological work. The main purpose of the second stage was to answer and solve the problems raised by the masses, so it began to have the function of decision-making consultation. The third stage of "democratic consultative meetings" was to a large extent close to a democratic hearing; the fourth stage of "democratic discussion" was integrated with inner-Party democracy and people's congress at the basic level.⁸²⁰ The core reason why Wenling's "democratic consultative meetings" has been transformed from an innovative attempt of ideological and political work to a practical form of deliberative democracy is that the core motivation comes from dealing with many governance problems brought about by the economic and social transformation of Wenling area.⁸²¹

Wenling's "democratic consultative meetings" showed the following four characteristics: First, the extensiveness of participation. There is no restriction on status. As long as the people have time and interest, they can voluntarily sign up to participate, express their opinions and make suggestions. Secondly, the topics of the talks are diverse. Wenling's "democratic consultative meetings" involves politics, economy, society, education and many other fields. For example, in June 2002, Wenjiao Town, Wenling City, held fifteen "democratic discussions" with different themes. The topics of the negotiations included "committed service" and "water improvement projects" as well as "foundation and implementation of collective bonus arrangements".⁸²² Third, the leadership of the Party committee and the local government. All towns in Wenling set up a leading group for democratic talks centred on the Party secretary, and the government set up a regular democratic talks system, and a feedback and supervision system.⁸²³ The procedures in various towns in Wenling were conducted under the leadership of the town Party committee and the town government. Fourth, strong operability. Various democratic conferences in Wenling have corresponding operating procedures, so they are highly transferable.

The procedures generally go through the following steps: The first step is to collect relevant information by the town Party committee, town people's congress,

⁸¹⁸ Chen Peng. 陈朋。《国家推动与社会发育：生长在中国乡村的协商民主实践——基于浙江温岭民主恳谈的案例分析》。武汉：华东师范大学。博士毕业论文。2010年，第vi页。

⁸¹⁹ Qi Weiping. 齐卫平。《中国特色协商民主的内生源简论》，《中央社会主义学院学报》。2008年第2期，第19-24页。Also see Qi Weiping, Chen Peng. 齐卫平，陈朋。《协商民主研究在中国：现实景观与理论提升》，《学术月刊》，2008年第5期，第21-27页。

⁸²⁰ Lang Youxing. 郎友兴。《中国式的公民会议：浙江温岭民主恳谈会的过程和功能》，《公共行政评论》。2009年第4期。第42-45页。

⁸²¹ Chen Jiagang. 陈家刚。《协商民主与国家治理：中国深化改革的新路向新解读》。北京：中央编译出版社。2014年，第161页。

⁸²² Lang Youxing. 郎友兴。《中国式的公民会议：浙江温岭民主恳谈会的过程和功能》，《公共行政评论》。2009年第4期。第42-45页。

⁸²³ Ibid.

town government, town CPPCC and other departments. The second step is that the town Party and government determine the theme of the talks and formulate relevant implementation plans for the talks. The third step is to announce the meeting time, place, and theme, as well as the relevant participating departments. It is also necessary to prepare the layout of the venue, the division of labour, and the preparation of materials. The fourth step is that at the democratic discussion, the organizers report the subject content first, and then let the negotiating body conduct its deliberation on the subject, and record the proceedings. The fifth step is to send the minutes of the meeting to the leaders for research, and then publish the final decision-making plan to the general public in time. The sixth step is to let the government officer announce the implementation of the plan, while the Party committee and the people's Congress supervise and solicit feedback from the masses.⁸²⁴ Through these detailed steps, deliberative democracy is not only conducive to the peaceful settlement of social contradictions and group conflicts, but also carries out improving the mechanisms of grassroots election, deliberation, openness, duty reporting and accountability. In the process of participating in consultative democracy, the participants develop a sense of overall consciousness of social responsibility, and when it comes to interest issues, it can consider problems from various perspectives, and put forward demands more rationally.⁸²⁵

In the development of grassroots democracy in China, there are only a few cases such as Wenling's democratic consultative meetings. From the practice of various localities, the development of deliberative democracy is insufficient in some areas where the economy is underdeveloped and local leaders lack democratic awareness and innovation consciousness. Due to the weak democratic consciousness of the local people, the offside of the Party and government organs' power and the deviation in the implementation of policies, at the national level the autonomous component is relatively low, and the scope of government taking the place of the people is relatively wide.⁸²⁶ The unbalanced development of grassroots deliberative democracy restricts the coordinated development of grassroots governance.⁸²⁷

The practice of deliberative governance hardly brought a fundamental change for the rural public order, but with its further development, it could accelerate the transformation of civil culture.⁸²⁸ The deliberative governance model in Wenling shows that the true significance of the reconstruction of grassroots democracy requires structural balance and coordinated interaction between all relevant actors. The rural public sphere can be expanded by democratic elections, democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision by both government and citizens.⁸²⁹ In this local democratic experiment, the state and society in interaction

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

⁸²⁵ Xu Yong. 徐勇。《乡村治理与中国政治》。北京：中国社会科学出版社。2003年，第104页。

⁸²⁶ Yu Keping. 俞可平。《中国公民社会的兴起与治理的变迁》。北京：社会科学文献出版社。2002年，第97页。

⁸²⁷ Li Fan (ed.). 李凡主编。《中国基层民主发展报告：2008》。北京：知识产权出版社。2008年，第14页。

⁸²⁸ Mu Yifei, Chen Minyi (eds). 慕毅飞, 陈奕敏主编。《民主恳谈：温岭人的创造》。北京：中央编译出版社。2005年，第98页。

⁸²⁹ He Baogang. 何包钢。《协商民主：理论、方法和实践》。北京：中国社会科学出版社。2008年，第158页。

contributed to the development of the practice displaying clear win-win results.⁸³⁰ Stromseth points: “These changes—namely, a turn towards administrative reforms focusing on government transparency and consultative decision-making—are instrumental in nature and are primarily designed to monitor subordinate officials and secure information about citizen preferences concerning government decisions. The reforms are resulting in significant governance outcomes, notably lower corruption and enhanced legal compliance.”⁸³¹

7.2 The Belt and Road Initiative

During the past decade, a series of multilateral diplomatic activities have marked China’s active participation in the governance of international affairs on the basis of steady economic development. In 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the creation of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.⁸³² In 2014 in Beijing, China hosted the second APEC summit,⁸³³ In 2016 in Hangzhou, China hosted the G20 Summit.⁸³⁴ International interdependence is a concept that strongly marked Xi Jinping’s early period, with “win-win cooperation” as its practical expression in diplomatic speeches. There is a high level of interdependence among economies of different cultural and social systems.⁸³⁵ Interdependence today is deepening against the backdrop of globalization, with the gain of one country benefiting others and the loss of one hurting other as well.⁸³⁶ China’s big economy now requires a more active political approach towards the international situation.⁸³⁷

The concept of “One Belt, One Road, 一带一路, *yīdài yīlù*” assumes its predecessor to be the ancient Silk Road connecting the eastern and western ends of the Eurasian continent. The Land Silk Road started to take shape during the Han Dynasty. Around 130 BC, Emperor Wu sent Zhang Qian to explore the western regions. The Land Silk Road played a major role in silk trade and was also a channel for cultural exchanges between China and Western Asia. Xi gave a speech in 2017: “Centuries later, during the Tang, Song and Yuan dynasties, the Silk Road, by both land and sea, became increasingly busy. Great adventurers, including Du Huan of China, Marco Polo of Italy and Ibn Battuta of Morocco, left their footprints along these ancient routes. In the early 15th century, Zheng He, the famous Chinese

⁸³⁰ Zhu Shengming. 朱圣明.《民主恳谈：中国基层协商民主的温岭实践》。上海：复旦大学出版社。2017年，第96页。

⁸³¹ Stromseth, Jonathan R. *China’s Governance Puzzle: Enabling Transparency and Participation in a Single-Party State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 2017, p. 1.

⁸³² Source: *China Daily*. 15 April 2017. https://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/China/2017-04/15/content_28940829.htm

⁸³³ Source: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a regional economic forum established in 1989 to leverage the growing interdependence of the Asia-Pacific. https://www.apec.org/Meeting-Papers/Annual-Ministerial-Meetings/2014/2014_amm

⁸³⁴ Source: website of G20. The G20 is the international forum that brings together the world’s major economies. Its members account for more than 80% of world GDP, 75% of global trade and 60% of the population of the planet. <https://www.g20.org/>

⁸³⁵ Qin Yaqing. “Global Governance Failure and Ideational Reconstruction for a Sustainable World Order”. *China Under Xi Jinping: Its Economic Challenges and Foreign Policy Initiatives*. Shao Binhong, and Zheng Bijian (eds). Leiden, Netherlands; Boston, Massachusetts: Brill, 2015, p. 101.

⁸³⁶ Ibid.

⁸³⁷ Maçães, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company. 2018, p. 73.

navigator of the Ming Dynasty, made seven voyages to the Western Seas.”⁸³⁸ The Silk Road was not only a transportation network for ancient China to trade with overseas countries, but also an important way for China to contact the world and carry out cultural and social exchanges with other countries. Mações comments: “The modern Belt and Road produces a vision of a number of new, significant developments: China’s growing international clout, its need to reshape the international economic system in its image and the growing reactions and responses to that project.”⁸³⁹ Khan and colleagues wrote: “The initiative aims to improve the connectivity among Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America by constructing multitier and composite connectivity networks as well as rationalized, diversified, independent, and sustainable development projects on those continents. It is intended to be based on a new logic of shared interests and common development, rather than on the conventional logic of the balance of power.”⁸⁴⁰

China’s official statements is contained in *Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road*, a document authorized by China’s State Council and issued jointly by the country’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce in March, 2015. According to this document, the initiative was first proposed by President Xi Jinping visiting Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October 2013, respectively. It is “Aimed at promoting an orderly and free flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of markets; encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to achieve economic policy coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth regional cooperation of higher standards; and jointly creating an open, inclusive and balanced regional economic cooperation architecture that benefits all.”⁸⁴¹ Ever since then, the work of building the “Belt and Road” has been in full swing.⁸⁴² In July 2017, China and Russia reached an agreement on the construction of the “Ice Silk Road” plan. At the end of July 2019, China has signed 195 government cooperation agreements with 136 countries and 30 international organizations.⁸⁴³ After the collision with the west for over a hundred years, now, for the first time, China is standing at the same starting line in many aspects, facing similar problems, such as sustainable

⁸³⁸ Xi Jinping, “Work Together to Build the Belt and Road”. 14 May 2017. Speech at the opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. *The Governance of China*. Volume II. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2017, p. 554.

⁸³⁹ Mações, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company. 2018, p. 30.

⁸⁴⁰ Khan, Muhammad Khalil; Sandano, Imran Ali; Pratt, Cornelius B. and Farid, Tahir (eds). “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Global Model for an Evolving Approach to Sustainable Regional Development”. *Sustainability* (Basel, Switzerland), October 2018. Vol. 10 (11), pp. 4222-4251.

⁸⁴¹ National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (2015). “Vision and actions on jointly building silk road economic belt and 21st-century maritime silk road”. 28 March. Cheng, Leonard K. “Three questions on China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’”. *China Economic Review*. 28 July 2016, p. 310.

⁸⁴² Liu Zuokui. *Europe and the “Belt and Road Initiative”: Respects and Risks*. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. 2017, p. 1.

⁸⁴³ Source: 中国一带一路网, *zhōngguó yīdài yīlù wǎng*. yidaiyilu.gov.cn is the Belt and Road web portal whose host is the National Information Center of China. 已同中国签订共建“一带一路”合作文件的国家一览。A list of countries that have signed cooperation documents with China to jointly build the “Belt and Road”. <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/roll/77298.htm>

development, the environment and so on.⁸⁴⁴

McCully wrote: “The Belt and Road Initiative is one of the most influential recent economic policies for China. Its operation will thus require a massive amount of resources and support from various stakeholders from both the state and company levels.”⁸⁴⁵ Chen et al. further explained: “It aims to promote connectivity between China and the Belt and Road countries with five core elements, namely policy coordination, facility connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds, known as the “five connectives, 五通 wǔ tōng” for short.”⁸⁴⁶ It attempts to create a new pattern of systematic networking and humane connectivity.⁸⁴⁷ Yu figured: “It also supports the free trade regime and the world economy in the spirit of open regional cooperation.”⁸⁴⁸ The BRI is a huge challenge and educational opportunity for China in the field of international governance. How it will succeed, will be seen in due time.

7.2.1 Doubts and misunderstandings

Along with rapid growth, China has been facing severe social problems: Firstly, China’s industry and infrastructure are concentrated in the coastal areas, and the economic development in the central and western regions has been uneven. A crucial challenge is the uneven distribution of growth among the different provinces, resulting in large regional economic disparities.⁸⁴⁹ There is a difference in the economic level of China’s southeast coastal and western regions. Even though the central and western regions have abundant mineral resources, the development of the industrial chain is not perfect, and some of the mineral output is restricted by environmental protection considerations.⁸⁵⁰ Under such conditions, it is necessary to ensure the country’s overall annual stable economic growth level and complete the fight against poverty. It is also necessary to adjust the domestic economic and industrial structure and develop high-tech industries. This is one reason why the Belt and Road Initiative was proposed. Secondly, China has industrial overcapacity and large foreign exchange resources.⁸⁵¹ As the former Australian foreign minister Carr put it, a working definition of the Belt and Road is that China is exporting a surplus in

⁸⁴⁴ Wang Yiwei. “The Belt and Road Initiative”. In Wang Linggui, Zhao Jianglin (eds). *The Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Context*. Volume 6. New Jersey: World Scientific. 2019, pp. 6-19.

⁸⁴⁵ McCully, James. “Does ‘One Belt, One Road’ mean ‘One Country, One System?’: An analysis of Hong Kong’s Vanishing Autonomy Through an ‘One Belt, One Road’ Influence”. *Educational Scholarship. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce*. 2017. Vol. 44:2, pp. 400-410.

⁸⁴⁶ Chen Yaowen; Fan Zuojun; Zhang Jie; Mo Min. “Does the Connectivity of the Belt and Road Initiative Contribute to the Economic Growth of the Belt and Road Countries?”. *Emerging Markets Finance and Trade*, 55:14, October 2019, p. 3227.

⁸⁴⁷ Wang Yiwei. “The Belt and Road Initiative”. *The Belt and Road Initiative in the global context*. Volume 6. Wang Linggui, Zhao Jianglin (eds). New Jersey: World Scientific. 2019, pp. 6-19.

⁸⁴⁸ Yu Linhui, et al. “Does the belt and road initiative expand China’s export potential to countries along the belt and road?”. *China Economic Review*. Vol. 60. April 2020, pp. 1-9.

⁸⁴⁹ Maçães, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company. 2018, p. 20.

⁸⁵⁰ Zhu Xiongguan. 朱雄关.《一带一路背景下中国与沿线国家能源合作问题研究》。昆明：云南大学。博士毕业论文。2016年，第74-97页。

⁸⁵¹ Ibid.

infrastructure construction to its neighbours.⁸⁵² China hopes the Belt and Road will alleviate the imbalance of regional economic development from macro perspective, enhance the country's economic development power and achieve win-win results with the countries along the road.

At present, the international community still has many doubts and misunderstandings about the Belt and Road Initiative. China has emerged as a threat to a Western rules-based global order and the Belt and Road is now often described as a dagger aimed at the heart of Western economies and societies.⁸⁵³ The land route between China and Europe faces an array of difficulties and challenges. There are different regulations and a lack of mutual trust between China and Europe.⁸⁵⁴ Russia is adamant on its own regionalist construction the Eurasian Economic Union, and it worries that China's may pose a threat to its position.⁸⁵⁵ At the same time, trust within the BRI is currently somewhat in doubt, as China is holding all important management positions, deploying "chef leaders" to oversee operations abroad.⁸⁵⁶

Rechberg and Guo assert that: "Sharing, transfer, and exchange of knowledge among different nations may be difficult."⁸⁵⁷ For example, as Zhang and Peltokorpi wrote: "Language differences can lead to out-group and in-group categorizations, which will negatively impact international interaction."⁸⁵⁸ Niu finds that language differences between China and its trade partners "block the trade of cultural creative products and services".⁸⁵⁹ Cultural diversity is known to lead to hindering knowledge sharing among participating partners.⁸⁶⁰ Chinese people prefer simple hierarchical organizational structures, but cooperative partners do not necessarily share the preference.⁸⁶¹ Michailova and Hutchings found that Chinese individuals were willing to share knowledge between other Chinese in the name of the interest of the group,⁸⁶² while Russians tended to share knowledge only if doing so served their

⁸⁵² Maçães, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company. 2018, p. 122.

⁸⁵³ Ibid. p. 11.

⁸⁵⁴ Liu Zuokui. *Europe and the "Belt and Road Initiative": Respects and Risks*. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press. 2017, p. 3.

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 57.

⁸⁵⁶ Rechberg, Isabel and Guo Shuojia. "The Interpersonal Challenges of BRI: Developing People-to-People Bonds". Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 190.

⁸⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 178.

⁸⁵⁸ Zhang, L. E., and Peltokorpi, V. (2015). "Multifaceted Effects of Host Country Language Proficiency". *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 27 (13), pp. 1448-1469. Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 188.

⁸⁵⁹ See Niu, J. "A Study of the Influencing Factors of the Export Trade of Beijing's Cultural Creativity Industry". *American Journal of Industrial and Business Management*, 7, 2017, pp. 69-77. Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 188.

⁸⁶⁰ See Alvesson, M. and Kärreman, D. "Odd Couple: Making Sense of the Curious Concept of Knowledge Management". *Journal of Management Studies*, 38 (7), 2001, pp. 995-1018. Also see Inkpen, A. C. and Tsang, E. W. K. "Social Capital, Networks and Knowledge Transfer". *Academy of Management Review*, 30 (1), 2005, pp. 146-165. Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 189.

⁸⁶¹ Swaine, M. D. "Chinese Views and Commentary on the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative". *China Leadership Monitor*, 47 (2). 2015, pp. 1-24. Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 186.

⁸⁶² Michailova, S. and Hutchings, K. "National Cultural Influences on Knowledge Sharing: A Comparison of China and Russia". *Journal of Management Studies*, 43 (3), 2006, pp. 383-405. Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying,

own interest. Li, Barner-Rasmussen, and Björkman found that Finnish subsidiaries actively transferred knowledge between different parties, but their Chinese colleagues did that less often.⁸⁶³ Chinese employees thought of their own inner group harmony more than the Finnish colleagues.⁸⁶⁴

China has been accused that the Belt and Road is only for China's own interests: "The Belt and Road is the name for a global order infused with Chinese political principles and placing China at its heart. In economic terms this means that China will be organizing and leading an increasing share of global supply chains, reserving for itself the most valuable segments of production and creating strong links of collaboration and infrastructure with other countries, whose main role in the system will be to occupy lower value segments. Politically, Beijing hopes to put in place the same kind of feedback mechanism that the West has benefited from: deeper links of investment, infrastructure and trade can be used as leverage to shape relations with other countries even more in its favour."⁸⁶⁵ However, it is a universal principle that the starting point of formulating economic and cooperative policies must be to maximize national interests. As Cheng said: Consideration of both self-interests and justice in business decisions is a behaviour that is not only appropriate for governments, but also for firms.⁸⁶⁶ Only future history can tell whether China's effort in promoting the initiative is productive for itself and the regions.⁸⁶⁷

While presenting a report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Beijing on 18 October 2017, President Xi Jinping asserted that: "No country can handle the various challenges facing human beings on their own, while no country can retreat to an isolated island [...] The world should stick together through thick and thin and engage in more efforts to liberalize and facilitate global trade and investments, so as to make economic globalization "more open, inclusive, and balanced so that its benefits are shared by all."⁸⁶⁸

The proposal of BRI marks China's entering into a new stage of opening up and reform.⁸⁶⁹ BRI is proposed by China but not intended merely to serve the needs of China. It is very likely that the Belt and Road will grow more decentralized—less

Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 184.

⁸⁶³ Li L., Barner-Rasmussen, W. and Björkman, I. "What Difference Does the Location Make? A Social Capital Perspective on Transfer of Knowledge from Multinational Corporation Subsidiaries Located in China and Finland". *Asia Pacific Business Review*, 13 (2), 2007, pp. 233-249. Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 184.

⁸⁶⁴ Rechberg, Isabel and Guo Shuojia. "The Interpersonal Challenges of BRI: Developing People-to-People Bonds". Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China's Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 184.

⁸⁶⁵ Maçães, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company. 2018, p. 30.

⁸⁶⁶ Cheng, Leonard K. "Three questions on China's 'Belt and Road Initiative'". *China Economic Review*. 28 July 2016, p. 312.

⁸⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁸ Source: *China Daily*. 18 October 2017. Xi Jinping delivers report to CPC congress.

http://www.Chinadaily.com.cn/China/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/18/content_33398037_5.htm

⁸⁶⁹ Zhang Youwen. "The Belt and Road" Initiative: International Development Synergy and Global Governance Innovation. *SASS Studies*. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press. Spring 2018, Vol. 9, pp. 1-42.

Sinocentric—over time,⁸⁷⁰ though the time-scale is a long one.⁸⁷¹

Judging from the current level of social development of China, China does not have the strength to dominate the world. Chinese policymakers and intellectuals maintain that it has no intention of competing for hegemony with other countries and respects the existing international order.⁸⁷² China is interested in maintaining open free trade, infrastructural construction, e-commerce, poverty reduction, and so on. China could not yet shoulder the heavy responsibility of a world leader.⁸⁷³ China also is not able to legitimate any ambitions for global governance.⁸⁷⁴ The BRI only involves economic cooperation, and the claim is that it has no political or military content, nor does it imply such intentions.⁸⁷⁵

Professor Hu Angang, in discussing the BRI, affirms that, “The most distinct difference from colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony is that the former is injustice, while the latter integrative; the former is discriminatory, while the latter is equal; the former is exclusive, while the latter is inclusive.”⁸⁷⁶ The BRI is a China Solution to promote all-win cooperation and solve development problems facing today’s world.⁸⁷⁷ Overall, the Xi Jinping era has extended the horizon of Chinese style governance, enlarging it through careful steps towards participating actively in the governance of the rest of the world. This cautiousness notwithstanding, the horizon has been opened, and can be experimented on during the following decades.

Xi Jinping has formulated the necessity of the development of governance like this:

实际上，怎么样治理社会主义社会这样全新的社会，在以往的世界社会主义中没有解决得很好。马克思、恩格斯没有遇到全面治理一个社会主义国家的实践，他们关于未来社会的原理很多是预测性的；列宁在俄国十月革命后不久就过世了，没来得及深入探索这个问题；苏联在这个问题上进行了探索，取得了一些实践经验，但也犯下了严重的错误，没有解决这个问题。我们党在全国执政后，不断探索这个问题，虽然也发生了严重曲折，但在国家治理体系和治理能力上积累了丰富经验、取得了重大成果，改革开放以来的进展尤为显著。我国政治稳定、经济发展、社会和谐、民族团结，同世界上一些地区和国家不断出现乱局形成了鲜明对照。这说明，我们的国家治理体系和治理能力总体上是好的，是适应我国国情和发展要求

⁸⁷⁰ Mações, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company. 2018, p. 161.

⁸⁷¹ Ferdinand, Peter. “Westward ho—the China dream and one belt, one road: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping”. *International Affairs*. 92 (4), 2016, pp. 942-956.

⁸⁷² Jiang Peng. 姜鹏。《虚幻的小相容与想象的安全困境：权力转移进程中敌意身份的互主性建构》，《国际安全研究》。2017年第1期，第47-67页。

⁸⁷³ Zheng Zhenqing. “The Changing Asian Perception of China’s Rising: A BRI Context”. Cited from Syed, Jawad and Ying, Yung-Hsiang (eds). *China’s Belt and Road Initiative in a Global Context*. Volume I: A Business and Management Perspective. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 50.

⁸⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 56.

⁸⁷⁵ Jiang Peng. 姜鹏。《虚幻的小相容与想象的安全困境：权力转移进程中敌意身份的互主性建构》，《国际安全研究》。2017年第1期，第47-67页。

⁸⁷⁶ Wang Yiwei. “The Belt and Road Initiative”. In Wang Lingui, Zhao Jianglin (eds). *The Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Context*. Volume 6. New Jersey: World Scientific. 2019, pp. 6-19.

⁸⁷⁷ Zhang Youwen. “The Belt and Road Initiative: International Development Synergy and Global Governance Innovation”. *SASS Studies*. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press. Spring 2018, Vol. 9, pp. 1-42.

的。⁸⁷⁸

How to govern a socialist society, a completely new society, has not been clearly addressed by world socialism so far. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had no practical experience in the comprehensive governance of a socialist country, as their theories about a future society were mostly predictive. Vladimir Lenin, who passed away a few years after the October Revolution (1917) in Russia, was thus unable to explore this question in depth. The Soviet Union tackled this question and gained some experience, but it made serious mistakes and failed to solve the problem. Our Party has worked on the same question steadily ever since it came to national power, and, in spite of serious setbacks, has accumulated rich experience and achieved great success in improving our governance system and enhancing our governance capacity. The success has been particularly resounding since we adopted the policy of reform and opening up. Enjoying political stability, economic growth, social harmony and ethnic unity, today's China poses a striking contrast to many regions and countries that suffer constant chaos. This shows that our national governance system and capacity are on the whole quite sound and suited to our national conditions and development needs.⁸⁷⁹

The situation is permeated by a demand for national unity, increasingly necessary in the face of the increasingly hostile attitude of the United States in international politics, but also by a necessity for international cooperation and conciliation.

7.3 Conclusion

By the Xi Jinping's era, the Chinese society and its international relations have become very complex. Ringen calls China a "perfect dictatorship",⁸⁸⁰ but perhaps one should rather say that China is a sophisticated authoritarian state, where citizens are allowed many freedoms but there also are serious limitations, especially in respect to the Party and its leading position. A large, though still a minor part of the population has become fairly affluent, forming a sizable middle class, while large tracts of the country still remain at a less developed stage. The educational levels and the rate of urbanization of the population has risen rapidly, and the economy demands the smooth functioning of a multitude of details domestically and internationally.

This chapter also illustrated a typical democratic discussion. Both socialist deliberative democracy and state governance aim to effectively solve people's problems and achieve good governance, which embodies the integration and development of the two concepts. At the same time, deliberative democracy also

⁸⁷⁸ Xi Jinping. 习近平。《习近平谈治国理政》。第一卷。北京：外文出版社。2018年，第91页。

⁸⁷⁹ Xi Jinping, "Align our thinking with the guidelines of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth the CPC Central Committee". Part of the speech at the second full assembly of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth the CPC Central Committee, 12 November 2013. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 102.

⁸⁸⁰ Ringen, Stein. *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 2016, p. 1.

provides a broad space for the development of the conception of governance. From rule to governance, especially from single leader management to cooperative governance employing negotiations among large sectors and groups of the society, reflects the transformation of governance mode from state control to interaction between state and society. Deliberative democracy advocates the absorption of people from all walks of life into the governance of state and social affairs. This is no longer a society that can be governed by simple decrees from the top but requires constant multilevel and multisector consultations and discussions among many kinds of actors, though supervised and controlled by the Party.

8 CONCLUSION

My research task was to understand the Chinese concept of governance and its developmental history. This study situated the concept and practice of Chinese governance within its historical contexts. It analysed the different meanings of the concept and related vocabulary from the perspective of conceptual history.

Haapanen holds the opinion: “Conceptual changes are not only changes which tell us what kind of changes took place in intellectual atmosphere and language as a result of political struggles, but these changes can also have, and often do have, a lasting impact on later developments within societies.”⁸⁸¹ The history conscious understanding of governance covers rule, management and the explicit concept of governance, being thus a collection of sister concepts with related meanings, all explicating how things are done in the national organization in different time periods and forms of leadership. We can thus understand that there is a wide historical concept of governance with many practical forms and a modern concept expressed with the character 治理, *zhilǐ*. The modern Chinese concept of governance makes the Party and the state the main subjects of national governance, but it also gives the market and the society important roles in the whole construct, requiring multilevel interaction through negotiation and consultation, the ultimate goal being to maximize the public interest.

As Lieberthal claims: traditional China had “the most advanced such governing body in the world”,⁸⁸² and thus this tradition must not be overlooked. China’s traditional governance theory mainly takes Confucianism as the orthodox basis, but also integrates the views of Legalists and Taoists with it, forming a unique traditional governance theory. Confucianism advocates benevolent government, rule by virtue and people-oriented thought. Confucian thinkers represented by Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi believed that national governance should conform to the people’s will and take the people as the foundation, expressed by the Confucian concept of benevolent government “仁政, *rénzhèng*”. “Benevolence” and “propriety” were the most important ideas of Confucian governance concepts. They advocated that a series of rules of propriety should be adopted to maintain the stability of the country centered on the monarchy. Confucian scholars believed that the monarch should improve his moral quality and rule the country by ritual “礼治, *lǐzhì*”, so as to maintain social stability and establish an orderly social structure. At the same time, they paid attention to the rule of virtue, which reflected the ideological characteristics of Confucian rule of man. Legalist thought, the foremost representative being Han Feizi,⁸⁸³ advocated using severe punishments and strict laws to govern the country, specifically directed

⁸⁸¹ Haapanen, Jarkko. *Adaptation to World Trends: A Rereading of the May Fourth Movement Radicalization*. Doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä, 2013, p. 44.

⁸⁸² Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: from revolution through reform*. New York and London: W.W. Norton. Second edition. 2004, p. 5.

⁸⁸³ Han Feizi. 韩非子。Han Feizi (280-233 BC) was the major representative of the Legalist school in the late Warring States Period. His works were collected in the book *Han Feizi*《韩非子》. Han Fei was his name, while -Zi (子, lit. Tzu. “Master”) was often added to philosophers’ names as an honorific.

towards the ruling class, which should be controlled by the monarch. Legalists' legal governance thought played an important role in ancient Chinese society and promoted the development of the traditional theory of rule by law. Taoism advocated governing by doing nothing “无为而治, wúwéi ér zhì” and put forward the important governance thought of “people-orientation”, which still has its mark in today's society. On one hand, it emphasized the naturalness of society, and argued that all things in the universe have their own internal laws. The human society cannot violate the natural laws. On the other hand, it emphasized that governing by doing nothing was the highest state of governance. The monarch should reduce the interference of state power in people's lives and ensure the people's freedom to take care of themselves. Through thousands of years the above-mentioned governance ideas, despite the limitations of the times, social class and political system, the traditional governance thought constituted the field of political theory in China.

China's development method is a process in which China explores the path of modern governance while realizing national rejuvenation. It also constitutes an important part of the development experience of the humankind. All the central leading groups of the Communist Party of China have actively explored the issue of national governance and have made contributions to the construction of the national system, people's democracy and socialist rule of law. From “rule” to “management” to “governance”, the changes in these concepts contain major theoretical innovations in the national governance system and major changes of the political value system.

Through different historical periods, China's governance model has come down in one continuous line. Nothing much has been abandoned, except the style of centralizing leadership to one person, and even there still are echoes of the ancient past. Lin believes: “The key element in the transformation of democracy is various notions of ‘the people’, identified mostly by political advocators and scholars in different historical stages.”⁸⁸⁴ Chinese style democracy does not mean that China has a completely different understanding and interpretation of the values and principles of democracy from the existing models in the West. It only means that China has different ways and means to realize democratization. This difference may be shown in the sequence, time, and method of solving problems and completing tasks in the development process. Democracy in China is understood as a process, not as a state.

The goal of the reform led by the Party is most of all to realize the transformation of the governance model. This transformation has promoted China's economic prosperity and social change, which is in line with the development direction of democracy. Rosenau figures that: “A perfect democracy would not privilege certain groups; instead, it would distribute the values equally to all. Obviously, democracies of this degree of perfection do not exist today.”⁸⁸⁵ China's experience shows that social development and political progress are not necessarily achieved by designing new democratic programs, carrying out democratic reform openly, transplanting

⁸⁸⁴ Lin Wei. “The Translated and Transformed Concept of Min Zhu (Democracy and Republic): A Political Cultural Influence on Translation”. *International Journal of Languages, Literature and Linguistics*. Vol 4, No. 4. December 2018, pp. 297-312.

⁸⁸⁵ Rosenau, James N. and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds). *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992, p. 263.

ready-made democratic systems, and making a democratic revolution, but more importantly through government innovation in the process of interaction between the government and civil society. Therefore, it is important to maintain the rational and benign interaction among the international community, civil society and the Chinese government, and to urge the government to maintain the momentum of positive governance innovation. Yu believes: “The legitimacy of legal authority stems primarily from the operation of the democratic rule of law and the rational choice of the people, rather than from reliance on personality or charisma. Thus, China’s political authorities must increasingly focus their energies on the development of democracy and the rule of law. It is only in this way that China’s authorities will build a firm legal foundation to effectively lead and integrate an increasingly stratified society with increasingly divergent interests.”⁸⁸⁶

Guarding Chinese characteristics often becomes synonymous with protecting China’s backwardness. However, China’s choice of its development path depends on the interaction of many factors, including economic prospects, social and political forces, organizational development, legal reform, dissemination of cultural knowledge, demographic trends, diplomatic relations and the international environment. China has developed a more transparent, efficient and dynamic governance system with Chinese characteristics in many aspects. Lieberthal states: “Information is more widely available, opinions are more freely offered, and the statistical tools and models employed are more sophisticated. In addition, the government has sharply reduced the array of outcomes it seeks to control, ceding many issues to individual choice, market force, or other determinants.”⁸⁸⁷

Differently from the concept of rule, which cares about the class interests of the ruling class, the concept of governance pays more attention to the ability to provide high-quality public services, so that its legitimacy foundation is more solid. Different from the concept of management, governance pays more attention to scientific development and social harmony. From the perspective of the goal of state governance, the transition from rule to governance is accompanied by a change from class rule to scientific development and social harmony. In short, the historical development of the concept of governance is the evolution from the ability of class ruling, overall control, and public management to the ability to achieve overall development. Therefore, the concept of governance in China is not unchangeable, but is constantly changing and being revised.

China’s governance not only has the general characteristics of the foreign concept of governance as displayed in international scholarly discussion, but also has Chinese characteristics. Due to China’s historical development context and realistic development needs, China’s national governance must be carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Although the number of governance subjects is increasing, the most important subject of governance is still the government, which embodies the public interests and the interests of the people. So’s

⁸⁸⁶ Yu Keping. *Democracy and the Rule of Law in China*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010, p. 126.

⁸⁸⁷ Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: from revolution through reform*. New York and London: W.W. Norton. Second edition. 2004, pp. 201-202.

opinion is the same: “Given the successful record of the Chinese state in handling challenges from below and from outside, the Chinese state should have the capacity to hold on to power and to promote economic development.”⁸⁸⁸

Many international scholars have made predictions on China’s development, Mações opines that: “There are a number of possible scenarios for China’s future place in the world system. In the first, the country would become a prosperous and successful economy, at the same time converging to a Western political and social model.”⁸⁸⁹ Lampton believes that: “The pluralization of Chinese society and governing structures has become pronounced [...] China’s current pluralization might become increasingly embedded in rule of law, regulatory structures, and shared ethical values. As such, governance might become increasingly participatory and cooperative in character.”⁸⁹⁰ Shao and Zheng think that: “China will play an increasingly important role in world affairs and have a profound influence on the changing global economic, political, and strategic configuration [...] a strong, democratic, prosperous, and stable China will provide an even larger market and more opportunities for the rest of the world and make a greater contribution to world peace and development.”⁸⁹¹ Li argues that: “With China emerging as a global economic powerhouse, PRC government policies—relating to the domestic economy, trade, taxation, industry, the environment, and energy—will continue to have a major impact on the global economy. The Chinese political structure and leadership, including the decision-making process and personal characteristics of leaders, will be among the most important factors that shape these policies.”⁸⁹² It is the wide-spread interest in the various scenarios of China’s possible role in terms of global governance that makes studying the Chinese understandings of governance so pressing.

Xi Jinping points out the problems in the development of Chinese society in this way:

As extensive and profound changes are taking place domestically and internationally, China’s development faces a series of prominent dilemmas and challenges, and there are quite a number of problems and difficulties on its path of development: Unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable development remains a big problem. Still weak in scientific and technological innovation. The industrial structure is unbalanced and the growth mode remains inefficient. The development gap between urban and rural areas and between regions is still large, and so are income disparities. Social problems are markedly on the rise. There are many problems affecting the people’s immediate interests in education, employment, social security, health care, housing, the ecological

⁸⁸⁸ So, A. Y. *China’s developmental miracle: Origins, transformations, and challenges*. Abingdon: Routledge. 2015, p. 25.

⁸⁸⁹ Mações, Bruno. *Belt and road: a Chinese world order*. London: Hurst and Company, 2018, p. 166.

⁸⁹⁰ Lampton, David M. *Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2014, pp. 84-85.

⁸⁹¹ Shao Binhong, and Zheng Bijian. *China Under Xi Jinping: Its Economic Challenges and Foreign Policy Initiatives* (eds). Leiden, Netherlands; Boston, [Massachusetts]: Brill, 2015, pp. 20-21.

⁸⁹² Li, Cheng. *Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 2016, p. 27.

environment, food and drug safety, workplace safety, public security, law enforcement, administration of justice, and so on. Some people still lead hard lives. Going through the motions, excessive bureaucracy, self-indulgence, and extravagance are serious problems. Some sectors are prone to corruption and other types of misconduct, and the fight against corruption remains a serious challenge for us. To solve these problems, the key lies in continuing the reform.⁸⁹³

To solve these problems, just developing the economy is not enough, governance methods such as democracy and the rule of law should promote the construction of a modern country and transform a development-oriented government into a public service-oriented government.

China's governance model has experienced the change of the relationship between the central and local governments. The government has changed from the control model to the service-oriented model, as well as from the rule of man to the rule of law. Political information has changed from closed to open, and the government has begun to emphasize democratic governance. All these are changes of the governance mode, and are full of Chinese characteristics, i.e., they are limited. Nevertheless, they are real changes, and even the Chinese concept of governance belongs to a common general discourse system among all countries.

In order to realize good governance, China's governance system should include three aspects: First, the leading force of governance is the Communist Party of China. The development history of modern China, especially since the founding of the People's Republic of China, shows that China's independence and development cannot be separated from the leadership of the Communist Party of China. China's national governance should be carried out on the premise of adhering to the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, which determines that China's governance is different from that of the West. China's governance should proceed under the leadership of the CPC, with the government as the main body of administration and the market and society as the organic supplements to jointly realize the cooperative governance of social affairs. Second, the fundamental starting point of governance is the interests of the people. Third, all parties follow the basic strategy of governing the country according to law. China is facing numerous challenges domestic and abroad, having many predictable and unpredictable difficulties. However, the development of governance is on its way improving vigorously and sustainably.

⁸⁹³ Xi Jinping. *Explanatory Notes to the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Continuing the Reform"*. 9 November 2013. Explanatory notes made to the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth CPC Central Committee. *The Governance of China*. Volume I. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 2018, p. 78.

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