

Olli-Pekka Moisio

Essays on Radical  
Educational Philosophy



Olli-Pekka Moisio

Essays on Radical  
Educational Philosophy

Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston yhteiskuntatieteellisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella  
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi Mattilanniemessä salissa MaA 211  
tammikuun 30. päivänä 2009 kello 12.

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of  
the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä,  
in Mattilanniemi, MaA 211, on January 30, 2009 at 12 o'clock noon.



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2009

Essays on Radical  
Educational Philosophy

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN EDUCATION, PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH 353

Olli-Pekka Moisio

Essays on Radical  
Educational Philosophy



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 2009

Editors

Jussi Kotkavirta

Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy / philosophy, University of Jyväskylä

Pekka Olsbo, Marja-Leena Tynkkynen

Publishing Unit, University Library of Jyväskylä

URN:ISBN:978-951-39-7763-4

ISBN 978-951-39-7763-4 (PDF)

ISSN 0075-4625

ISBN 978-951-39-3464-4 (nid.)

ISSN 0075-4625

Copyright © 2009, by University of Jyväskylä

Jyväskylä University Printing House, Jyväskylä 2009

## ABSTRACT

Moisio, Olli-Pekka

Essays on Radical Educational Philosophy

Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 2009, 151 p.

(Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research

ISSN 0075-4625; 353)

ISBN 978-951-39-3464-4

DISS.

Dissertation consists of six internationally published articles which were originally published as book chapters and journal articles. Three articles were written by the author of the dissertation (*Max Horkheimer on the Mimetic Element in Education, What it means to be a Stranger to Oneself, and As Heard in Silence - Listening and to-be-heard in Education*) and two (*Hope and Education in the Era of Globalization, Critical Pedagogy and Ideology Critique as Zeitgeist Analysis*) were joint articles with professor Juha Suoranta (University of Tampere) and one (*Don't You See, How the Wind Blows?*) with Suoranta and lecturer Robert FitzSimmons (University of Lapland). In each joint article, Moisio was the first author. To frame the point of reference in this dissertation we can use the concept of critical analysis of our times (critical Zeitgeist analysis). It is argued that in education we need an attitude that is sufficiently open to the given historical situation. One question that educational sciences should address is the question of the potential of education in addressing various social maladies of the present era. Methodologically, critical Zeitgeist analysis is argued to be of value in demonstrating how to both utilize and expand the possibilities of writing normative social and educational theory. One of the central themes in critical analysis of the given times is to reflect critically on the state of the present historical world. In this task it has always combined analytical, political and moral languages, as well as the languages of critique and hope. It is argued that education should be aimed at change and this is methodologically done in the form of critical knowledge of the present age. This means that the relationship between teacher and student should be seen from the viewpoint of care and respect of student's person and corporeal being. Also teaching material becomes practical when teaching and learning are seen as fundamentally cooperative processes. With these we are able to promote autonomous and critical thinking. But as the articles show this aim of critical educational philosophy is filled with paradoxes that must be met when thinking about the possibility to promote the autonomy and full development of an individual human being.

Keywords: radical pedagogy, critical pedagogy, philosophy of education, critical theory, pedagogical paradox, zeitgeist analysis, concept of hope, Theodor W. Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer.

**Author's address** Olli-Pekka Moisio  
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy  
University of Jyväskylä  
Email: olmoisio@yfi.jyu.fi

**Supervisors** Docent Rauno Huttunen,  
University of Jyväskylä

Professor Juha Suoranta,  
University of Tampere

**Reviewers** Professor Helmut Dubiel,  
Justus-Liebig Universität, Germany

Professor Douglas Kellner,  
University of California Los Angeles, USA

**Opponent** Professor Michael A. Peters,  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This collection of essays would not have come into being without the help of several people, whom I would like to thank on this occasion. I would like to thank my supervisors docent Rauno Huttunen, who has supported my work since the years of my undergraduate studies in philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, and professor Juha Suoranta, who also was a co-author of three articles collected in this work. I would also express my gratitude to reviewers professor Helmut Dubiel from the Justus-Liebig Universität and professor Douglas Kellner from the University of California Los Angeles for their insightful comments in the final part of this venture. I also want to express my gratitude to professor Michael A. Peters from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who kindly engaged to be opponent at the ceremony.

I have been able to be a part of the very stimulating international group of researchers and intellectuals in the field of critical study of education and philosophy of education. I have given talks in the meetings of this group at the University of Oslo, University of Madrid, and University of Oxford which were based on the early versions of these articles. Especially I would like to thank the organizer of the group, professor Ilan Gur-Ze'ev from the University of Haifa, for his support and friendship over the years.

I would also like to thank several international scholars who have supported my work for the past 10 years: Professor Martin Jay (University of California at Berkeley), Professor Richard Wolin (City University of New York), and Professor Zygmund Bauman (Emeritus University of Leeds). All these great scholars of our times have been able to teach me a very important lesson of being a researcher and teacher. I am grateful for their support and open heartedness of their personality.

In addition, there is the fundamental connection and substantial interaction, solidarity, and support from the many colleagues of the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä which has become part of my scholarly identity. Especially I would like to thank my colleagues Leena Kakkori, Ilkka Kauppinen, Jussi Kotkavirta, Mikko Mäntysaari, Petteri Niemi, Sami Pihlström, and Mikko Yrjönsuuri.

I would like to thank all my students who have participated in my lectures and seminars since 2001. You all have made your mark to the pages of this work, as without education and teaching there would be very little scientific work.

I have also been able to enjoy financial support from Eemil Aaltonen Fund which made possible my visits to the Horkheimer-Pollock and Herbert Marcuse Archives in Frankfurt am Main and also Erich Fromm Archive in Tübingen. These visits have also contributed to the articles collected here.

I would like to address my gratitude to Greg Griffiths, Lari Tapola, and Catherine Preus for the checking of the language of the articles and introduction of this work.



My deepest gratitude goes to my family, Päivi, Linnea, Ulpu, Armas, and Sulo for their unfailing support and faith in whatever I am doing and whatever I am gaining at. Without you the life would only be “a timeless succession of shocks, interspaced with empty, paralyzed intervals” as Theodor W. Adorno writes in *Minima Moralia*. My mother has never failed to believe in me, and I thank her for that and all the support she has shown.

I have dedicated this collection to the loving memory of my father, who was not able to witness the completion of this task. But there is always a hope in my heart that he is sitting at the best seats.

In my office, autumn 2008, still in hope for snow to fall.

*Olli-Pekka Moisio*

# CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CONTENTS

|   |  |     |
|---|--|-----|
| 1 | INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION.....   | 9   |
| 2 | MAX HORKHEIMER ON THE MIMETIC ELEMENT<br>IN EDUCATION.....   | 40  |
|   | In Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (ed.) <i>Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy Today</i> .<br>Special Issue of the Journal <i>Iyyunim Bechinuch</i> (Studies in Education)<br>Israel: University of Haifa. 2005  |     |
| 3 | WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A STRANGER TO ONESELF .....  | 57  |
|   | In <i>Journal of Educational Philosophy and Theory</i> . 2007  |     |
| 4 | AS HEARD IN SILENCE – LISTENING AND TO-BE-HEARD IN<br>EDUCATION .....  | 75  |
|   | In Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (ed.), <i>Possibility/Impossibility of a New Critical<br/>Language in Education</i> . Rotterdam: Sense. 2009.  |     |
| 5 | HOPE AND EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION .....   | 94  |
|   | Moisio, O-P & Suoranta J.. In Klas Roth & Ilan Gur-Ze'ev<br>(eds.), <i>Education in the Era of Globalizing Capitalism</i> . London:<br>Springer Publishers   |     |
| 6 | CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE AS<br>ZEITGEIST ANALYSIS .....   | 110 |
|   | Moisio, O-P & Suoranta J.. In Olli-Pekka Moisio & Juha<br>Suoranta (eds.), <i>Education and the Spirit of Time. Historical,<br/>Global, and Critical Reflections</i> . Rotterdam: Sense Publishers   |     |
| 7 | DON'T YOU SEE, HOW THE WIND BLOWS? .....   | 124 |
|   | Moisio, O-P, FrizSimmons, R. & Suoranta, J. In Donna Houston, Gregory<br>Martin, Peter McLaren & Juha Suoranta (Eds.). <i>The Havoc of Capitalism:<br/>Educating for Social and Environmental Justice</i> . Rotterdam:<br>Sense Publishers |     |
|   | TIIVISTELMÄ (FINNISH SUMMARY) .....  | 149 |

# 1 INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION

*At the time when everybody is busy erecting new Fatherlands, the Fatherland of the man who thinks without prejudice and can rise above his time is nowhere and everywhere.*

- Goethe 1790

*You do not know where you are. You cannot identify your location on the map. So you use triangulation. You find the position of two salient fixed points on the ground, which are a distance apart. You locate them on the map. You draw imaginary lines connecting these two points (say mountain peaks) and yourself. The meeting point – the apex of the imaginary triangle – is where you are. In short, you know where you are by knowing where other things are.*

- Avishai Margalit

## 1.1 At the beginning

To frame the point of reference in this dissertation we can use the concept of critical analysis of our times (critical Zeitgeist analysis). It is argued that in education we need an attitude that is sufficiently open to the given historical situation. One question that educational sciences should address is the question of the potential of education in addressing various social maladies of the present era. Methodologically, critical Zeitgeist analysis is argued to be of value in demonstrating how to both utilize and expand the possibilities of writing normative social and educational theory. One of the central themes in critical analysis of the given times is to reflect critically on the state of the present historical world. In this task it has always combined analytical, political and moral languages, as well as the languages of critique and hope.

Our experience of our times is entwined with the development of the age of communication. The technological means of keeping in touch with people are becoming a main part of organizing our daily lives. Technological devices are coming nearer to our body and in fact to our inner life as well. What is paradoxical in this situation is that even though we have these easy to use ways of being in contact with each other, it seems as if we were drawn further away

from each other in the very same process. From the point of view critical theory human beings have drifted further away from each other, and they cannot recognize the other and the other in themselves. This dialectical otherness that is hidden under the mobiles, emails, instant messages, would, however, be a radical and necessary moral attitude in these times of unlimited instrumental reason.

It is very important to get a clear view on those structural and economical processes that are beneath or underlying the information technologies as such. It is almost obvious that they do not exist on their own but are connected to the very core of capital's accumulation itself. As critical theorists in new technologies often put it, new information technologies are primary tools for capitalist accumulation and as such indistinguishable from it. Karl Marx would of course say in this connection that informal technologies makes as what we are. In this sense we may want to argue that today's neoliberalism which is reaching all aspects of human life seems to be morally even tougher and indifferent than "old days" liberalism.

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it. (Smith 1759, p. 3.)

The withering away of pity, empathy, and compassion as truly humane categories of human action, along with the empty formal embroidery of words, is something that is used to conceal the fear of dropping out of the present survival game. This process takes place in the educational settings, be it in the elementary level or in high schools or even in the universities and polytechnic universities. We all are set against each other by the whole ethos of neoliberalism, fighting over what ever is still there waiting for us to gain. This primacy of the individualistic needs goes through the whole experience of life and the totality on life as it is for us. In a very paradoxical sense the new communality is born out as a total divorce of the relationships between individuals, individuals and society and society and the world - individual psyche becomes social in a very limited sense. It contains almost only the imperatives of economy. But still in every human being there is a sentiment that rebels against this world; be it Kantian *summum bonum*, humanity inside of us or love for one's neighbor. This is within reach in the early stages of human development just before the societal regulation enters the world of a child.

There is at least two ways to interpret these technological innovations and their input for the societies and education. First we might want to focus on bureaucratic dross that is hidden in the ideology of over-technologization of life and education. This could be read out from the ideas about life-long learning

and the whole variety of promises that are connected to the emancipating potentials of internet. Life-long learning and different web-based learning ideologies are increasingly used as a total administration of human beings. It seems like there is no life outside the system of production as we are constantly preparing ourselves to be more valuable more needed for the productive system. The other point of departure would be to read out the innovation more neutrally as a tool that could be used both for liberation and domination. This way the importance of the knowledge of current situation and the connections of different tendencies within the society comes forth as a main focus for education. This way the importance of education of critical and autonomous human beings might be read as an imperative for education.

Most of the countries in the world are at the moment facing a far, deep reaching and substantial reform of the educational system. In the past ten years these reforms were implemented and they followed a very detailed, technocratic and neoliberal design that are used in the corporate businesses and general political and social institutions and organizations. This logic is that of commercialism and it is used without any problematization in the field of education. In this situation the production and distribution of knowledge is shifted from the sphere of civilization and education (*Bildung*) to be a fundamental part of the market. This process can be seen in the recent developments in patent law (cf. Kauppinen 2008), the “joint ventures” between mostly publicly financed universities and TNC’s<sup>1</sup> and the evaluation of academic expertise by national audition processes and privately owned firms. Many others might be raised as examples of the historical change in the system of education, but all these examples point to what degree an “academic capitalism” (cf. Rhoades & Slaughter 1997; 2004<sup>2</sup>) has become hegemonic practice in the system of education in most parts of the world.

In the cultural setting where an overall coldness that is bedecked with friendly “smilies” has taken hold of the world, it might be asked can the tradition of critical theory be read as “a splinter in the eye” that magnifies the problematic of our times. Critical philosophy of education or better still radical educational philosophy should ask: is there a way to read out from the current situation some trace that is pointing a way out? Can the fundamental ideas of critical theory be used as a critique of present educational theory both in internal and external sense of the word? Internal critique meaning, the critical evaluation of the principles and guidelines of the production of knowledge. External critique aiming at the critical analysis of the connection of the process nature of the production of knowledge, and the relations of production and exploitation of this knowledge. Further more, can concepts like non-identity, completely other, stranger, metaphysical experience without metaphysics, despair and hope be integrated to form a proposal for the moral philosophy of coming critical philosophy of education?

---

<sup>1</sup> Transnational corporations or multinational corporations (MNC).

<sup>2</sup> More on academic capitalism please see Slaughter & Rhoades 2004.

As we face the historical situation described above, we might seriously pose the question, can these concepts and themes point a way out of the tragic dilemma that we are facing in the system of education? It can be argued that in stark contrast to 1968, which inspired the intellectual discourse far beyond the scholars' republic, most of the critical theorists of our days prefer to stay silent. This silence can be attributed to the fact that there is no conceptual framework, no public sensitivity anymore or simply no language to scandalize this tendency of a seemingly total commodification of human life. In this context one can speak of a tragic dilemma, the dilemma of the European University caught in a trap between a past irretrievably lost and a commercialized future, which most of us working in the universities deem outright unacceptable. (cf. Robins & Webster 2004.)<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2 Theoretical orientations

It is obvious that many of the questions posed in previous paragraphs cannot be fully dealt here. The articles collected in this dissertation will deal with the question of radical learning and education by focusing to the concepts of non-identity, hope, strangeness to ourselves and the question of pedagogical starting points of radical learning. In this introduction I will elaborate more about the background assumptions and the used terminologies of the articles collected here and also open up visions that might be articulated from the specific arguments that have been developed in the dissertation. In this sense this chapter of the dissertation can be read at the same time as an introduction but also as a discussion of the findings of the different articles at hand. I will start with the concepts of dignity, humiliation, mimesis, hope and end up to the practical concept of collective social expertise that will point out practical conclusions that might be drawn from the theoretical discussion presented here in the introduction and also in the collected articles.

The starting point of the theoretical formulations in this study is a certain view of teaching and education which comes from different sources (Critical theory, John Dewey, Paolo Freire, and Peter Elbow) but can be articulated with Stephen Brookfield's magisterial books *Becoming Critically Reflective Teacher* and *Power of Critical Theory*. Brookfield (2006) has differentiated between three R's that give a possibility to see what kind of teaching and education practices are productive in humanistic sense of the word. Respect, research, responsiveness are the key points of good teaching in Brookfield's mind because they help to stimulate *self-activity* in learners. With this self-activity learners are at best able to venture beyond their own limited viewpoints but still without losing this point of reference. In this sense if we see that we will make use of the three R's then we might gain our negative goal from different ways of teaching or educating human beings. This negative goal is teaching which does not see and

---

<sup>3</sup> I thank Helmut Dubiel for pointing this out for me.

treat students or other human beings as objects and with this reification put students in the already made boxes of knowledge society. In this sense education is in fundamental sense an ethical or moral project. To be able to do justice to this ethical or moral goal, it is very important to keep the social-political contexts in mind while trying to understand what we mean by the concept of and practice in education. Without these practical aspects and in the end political questions the description of the concept of education becomes only conceptual poetry and that is something to which we surely need to keep our distance.

Before going into the concepts outlined above I will make a brief survey of the basic theoretical assumptions made in this dissertation. In this study *by education I mean a process in which we are in contact with others and ourselves in a meaningful activity pregnant of hope that is directed towards the change*. We as educators hope that our actions with this other will help her to learn to act towards other people with the same compassion, understanding and fairness that we as an educators are showing in our actions. Like Freire (1998, 69) wrote "hope is a natural, possible, and necessary impetus in the context of our unfinishedness [...] without it, instead of history we would have pure determinism." It is from this perspective that it can be argued that in some fundamental sense by education we are trying to change the world – i.e. we are trying to increase the amount of love and justice in the world (cf. Brookfield 1995).

This very abstract idea can be translated into the practical educational settings even though it is not an easy adventure. One way to do just this is to see education not as "banking" of some given factual knowledge but as *a constant dialogue between subjects of "problem-posing" education*. But this dialogue does not mean only naively and structurally based talk-shops and discussion groups etc. where usually the monological attitude still prevails. This kind of education is a kind practical way to promote students way of "learning the possibilities of their own power through sharing knowledge, experiences, tactics, strategies, successes, and failures" (Brookfield 2005, 48). In the context of critical education critical thinking does not refer to isolated cognitive faculties, or new business liturgies found in management textbooks, but to social reality, in that its focus is on "common interests, rejecting the privatized, competitive ethic of capitalism, and preventing the emergence of inherited privilege" (ibid., 351).

Love is the most crucial aspect of a dialogue. Freire (1993, 70) once argued that without profound love for the world and for people real dialogue would not exist. But this love can also change into opposite as a self-love. This is almost always the case in distorted dialogue. Self-love changes the world and the other into itself; it consumes other as a fertiliser of its own distorted self image. When authentic dialogical love opens up the self to the other, this kind of narcissistic love refutes the other and turns its eyes and heart away from the world and humanity.

The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to others. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause – the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental: as an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world – if I do not love life – if I do not love people – I cannot enter into dialogue. (Freire 1993, pp. 70-71)

Freire sees this act of love as a political project which is pointing towards liberation and emancipation. Indeed love which does not promote liberation is not love at all but a kind of necrophilia. It does not want to create and re-create but to break apart and feed off from its casualties.

In the Table 1 I have given a list of central aspects of radical teaching and learning in contrast to traditional teaching and learning.

TABLE 1 Two Models of Teaching and Learning<sup>4</sup>

|                             | <b>RADICAL<br/>TEACHING AND LEARNING</b>         | <b>TRADITIONAL<br/>TEACHING AND LEARNING</b>  |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| <b>CONCEPT OF REALITY</b>   | Changing and negotiated                          | Static and given                              |
| <b>CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE</b> | Dialectical, constructed knowledge               | Bird's eye view, encyclopaedic knowledge      |
| <b>LEARNER</b>              | Agent (students and teachers as subjects)        | Receiver (teacher as subject)                 |
| <b>RANGE OF STUDIES</b>     | Relatively open                                  | Relatively closed                             |
| <b>FORM OF QUESTIONS</b>    | Authentic and open-ended (answers are not known) | Unauthentic and closed (answers are known)    |
| <b>GROUP INTERACTION</b>    | Subject-oriented                                 | Performance-oriented                          |
| <b>AIMS OF STUDY</b>        | Conflict, new questions and insights             | Consensus, reproduction of existing knowledge |
| <b>SUBJECT OF STUDY</b>     | Students and teachers                            | Teachers                                      |

One way to start articulate the aspects of radical teaching and learning as stated in the Table 1 is to remember what John Dewey (1927, 244-45; 314) about the conceptual difference between *interests* and *interest* in his book *Public and its Problems*. In this book he was further trying to understand what might be the springboard for public action. This public action can be read as a goal of radical teaching and learning be it in the schools or in the realm of society at large. Public is not a static but an always emergent and evolving entity. There are two points that must be met when the public comes into being. Firstly, the consequences of human activity in any particular group or different association

<sup>4</sup> Table can be found also in Suoranta & Moisiö 2008, 67.



spill out beyond local settings. Secondly, the affected people take into a consideration i.e. take note of these consequences and seek to respond to them. This process where the public emerges is essentially a learning process that takes place within natural learning theory that Dewey was developing throughout his whole life.

Dewey always saw that the whole life of human being must be seen as an educational endeavour. This is obviously one of the key elements of the natural learning theory. In the concluding sentence of the *Democracy and Education* Dewey (1916, 418) writes that "interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest". I think that we can read from this sentence a critical dimension of the Dewey's philosophy of education. Interests in the plural are like possessions. We all have interests you have yours and I have mine. All different association and groups of people have their own interests. Human beings seek others with the same interests, so to say. This kind of idea is useful while we are trying to understand social world: in politics, business, science etc. various groups with comparable interests come together to advance their specific interests in face of other competing interests. In contrast to this Dewey develops interest in singular. With this concepts Dewey is trying to articulate a motivation, attitude, orientation, perspective, or disposition which is bound up with the completion of specific activity or undertaking at hand. We can try to articulate the difference by saying that while *interests* denote separate objects or possessions which we can articulate by referring their name, *interest* constitutes a movement.

Dewey (1920, 194-195) writes in various texts that specific meaning of *interest* is that which stands between otherwise distant entities. To put it differently interest is something between beginning and the completion of some specific undertaking. Interest is not the starting point or precondition of activity. It tries to capture a process that is always forward-looking, prospective, uncertain, and yet also potentially generative in meaning and consequence as persons try to bring activity to fruition.

Issues above bring us to the problems formulated by Karl Marx when he wrote about social scientific research. Among his notes very important is the idea that reality is not formed as a collection of things but as a set of processes and their relations. This is what Marx meant when he said that capital is not an object but a relation. We as researchers are not only describing and understanding these relations but are at the same time changing these relations and being a part of these processes and relations. To understand and describe something is at the same time changing it. As Brookfield (2005, 5) states in his *Power of Critical Theory* sometimes "just getting a better sense of why things are the way they are, is often helpful." With this in mind researchers are trying to help to boost the self-consciousness of human beings and social change via their research practices. Marx (1843, 144) articulated this in one of his early letters by saying that "the reform of consciousness consists only in enabling the world to clarify its consciousness, in waking it from its dream about itself, in *explaining* to it the meaning of its own actions."

Hence, our motto must be: reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but by analysing the mystical consciousness that is unintelligible to itself, whether it manifests itself in a religious or a political form. It will then become evident that the world has long dreamed of possessing something of which it has only to be conscious in order to possess it in reality. It will become evident that it is not a question of drawing a great mental dividing line between past and future, but of realising the thoughts of the past. Lastly, it will become evident that mankind is not beginning a new work, but is consciously carrying into effect its old work. (Marx 1843, 144.)

But how we are able to gain access to this critical consciousness? Much of what has been argued in the Finnish literature previously on education is based on an assumption that the students or children particularly are socialized quite homogeneously. But as we have grown to recognize this is not the case in the new social settings anymore -- if it has ever been. Even within same society when two or more classes or status groups maintain different lifestyles, it can be expected that they have been socialized differently from each other in a manner that is conducive to the maintenance of their roles. As a consequence from this even if they speak same language, they will understand the import of what is said quite differently from each other. This point that Erich Fromm (1942) underlined in his studies on social character further alerts the need for the responsive and research based practices on teacher's behalf.

Thus it is highly relevant to ask the painful question how critical consciousness can be brought up in educational settings if we cannot be sure that the students are responsive to our call for autonomy and self-positioning. Hegel (1807, §207–230) wrote about *unhappy consciousness* in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Unhappy consciousness meant for him a form of consciousness which was because of its inner-structuring forced to produce, evaluate and comparing itself to the standards which it can never totally fulfill. Unhappy consciousness was thus divided in two and it was conscious of this division. This consciousness drives itself to unpleasurable movement because it recognizes its own failure to attain its own standards. This failure leads consciousness to recognize its own worthlessness and unessential nature.

Adorno (1973, 53; 200–201) writes in *Negative Dialectics* that radical critique in capitalistic societies is based mostly on highly differentiated human individuals. But as Hegel saw in previous paragraph, Adorno also sees that human consciousness is eventually an instance of unhappy consciousness. Contrary to Adorno Hegel saw that this unhappiness is only an intermediate phase in the development spirit. The argument that Hegel develops around this idea was in Adorno's eyes highly conservative. Its goal would be the total acknowledgement of the surrounding world, be it social or natural world. Hegel shudders in front of unhappy consciousness because he wants to mute the critical element that is contained in the individual unhappiness (Adorno 1973, 53). This individual is unhappy and in this sense suffers when she sees the world that does not fulfill its own standards.

One way to be able to gain access to this process in philosophy and educational philosophy is to try to disconnect concepts from their regular contexts and rearrange them as montage pictures that form around some

specific issue (Adorno 1973, 162-166). Adorno thought that philosophy can with this method of constellations to unfold historical dynamism that is hidden in objects. The tension between different parts of the constellation show that the identity of the objects goes well beyond the forced categorization of them. (Adorno 1973, 52-53.) The concepts of non-identity (*das Nichtidentische*) and the primacy of the object (*Vorrang des Objekts*) try to capture this idea. They can also be used in educational philosophy as a way to articulate the moral philosophy of education and the process of learning as will be seen in this study.

Traditionally it has been common to differentiate between two different forms of theory in social and educational sciences. First there are grounded theories, which are inductively constructed on empirical findings, and second there are those theories which are built the other way round, that is, by applying the standards of deduction and the coherence theory of truth to empirical data. In addition to these two theoretical orientations we might want to argue for a third form of social theorizing. Critical analysis of a given times is a central part of social science and sociological theory in reflecting upon the world. In a sense this third kind of theory has always been a central part of what ever kind of social theory someone has tried to develop as the scholar cannot escape the fact that she has a dual character as a person living in the human world and in theoretical world that are constantly interacting. This interaction and the knowledge and understanding connected to it is the main motor in critical analysis of a given times.<sup>5</sup>

Zygmunt Bauman (2000) has stated that middle-ground, neutral social theories are practical impossibilities, and it is hard to see them as having any further relevance. Especially from the point of the view of a just world that is the goal of all education in general, there is reason to differentiate between participatory and objective social theories. In the final instance, all social and educational theory and research is about social justice. Therefore, various forms of critical analysis of given times, as part of social theory, can bring forth an awareness of the mechanisms of oppression; mechanisms which make life difficult and often painful. Undoubtedly, *Zeitgeist* analysis hardly neutralizes the oppression, let alone makes it disappear or resolves it, but, as Pierre Bourdieu (1999, 629) argues, the sociological message can lead to change:

But, as skeptical as one may be about the social efficacy of the sociological message, one has to acknowledge the effects it can have in allowing those who suffer to find out that their suffering can be imputed to social causes and thus to feel exonerated; and in making generally known the social origin, collectively hidden, of unhappiness in all its forms, including the most intimate, the most secret. Contrary to appearances, this observation is not cause for despair: what the social world has done, it can, armed with this knowledge, undo.

---

<sup>5</sup> In this connection we might argue that “in recent years there have been several debates about the role and function of social theory in various branches of the social sciences. Judging by those debates, it is difficult to know which is the major paradigm or movement in current social theory. Instead, we are tempted to argue that there is presently a plethora of small or middle range theories and approaches within the field (structuralist as well as post-structuralist theories, various theories of reproduction, gender, and identity-based theories, interactionism, Marxist and neo-Marxist theories, and so forth)”. (Moisio & Suoranta (2006, 1.)

### 1.3 Human Dignity and the question of Radical Learning

The question of educating autonomous human beings is connected to the question of human dignity in general. What are the ethical limitations of the teacher while she is trying to help student to develop and use her autonomous thinking? As I will argue in the article "What it means to be stranger to oneself" it is usually the case that the learner has already developed certain amount of rigidity to her thinking and it might be the case that even though it might seem that her thinking is matured to autonomy it is still impossible for her to step out side her usual frame work. This situation that is the part and parcel in every context of critical pedagogy and radical learning that is the goal will need something more than only better arguments and lively discussion. It will need a knowledge based emotional and practical setting where student will be able to question her identity.

While teacher might be forced to "gentle shatter the identities" of the students to be able to open up space for radical learning – in fact something new to emerge – we as philosophers should be very careful to prevent the promotion of the imperialism of the teacher. The student as human being has her own dignity and teacher should not enter beyond the realm defined by teaching situation. She should not downplay student dignity by humiliating her. But what if education and human development in general result from a certain history and it is via this historical dimension that the whole ethos of a given historical situation has an effect on both education and human development. Then humiliating practices might be too often used in educational practices if we live in a culture that has institutionalized humiliation as a part of ordinary way of acting in the society.

Avishai Margalit (1996) has elaborated interestingly on the concept of humiliation in his book *The Decent Society*. As will be seen in articles "As Heard in Silence" and "Don't You See, How the Wind Blows?" this concept is valuable in the context of critical philosophy of education. We might reformulate Margalit's book title as concerning the question what might be the dimensions of decent education.

Margalit's argument can be used as a negative description what ought to be striven in education. This means that we should focus on the question what should *not* be done – i.e. the *minima moralia* for the education. We should not be so much interested in describing what good education is, but much more on what is bad. This means that we should for example focus on the problems of rejection and humiliation much more that on the for example recognition and respect of students. The real problem in education, society and world as a whole is that human beings are treated as non-humans. This factual problem of reification is much clearer than what might count as respecting them. As Margalit (1996, 4) writes: "it is more urgent to remove painful evils than to create enjoyable benefits".

Margalit (ibid, 9) sees that there are reasons for us to feel humiliated like there are obvious reasons for us to be afraid if we come against free-roaming tiger in some part of the world. What Margalit means here is that feelings have causes but also reasons. He is interested in the reasons for feeling of, for example, humiliation as a result of other's behaviours and conditions of life. It is obvious that some person might act as intending to humiliate other persons. Conditions of life in general for example as a form of institutions (i.e. law, school etc.) or as nature in general cannot be said to act as an agent of humiliation. Then we are using the concept in a metaphorical sense of a word. In Margalit's (ibid, 10) view only human beings can act as humiliators. So institutions and organizations can be said to be humiliative, if human beings working in such contexts are producing humiliation even though they are not always intending to do so. School can be seen as a good example of this.

If teacher is degrading her students and in that sense students feel humiliated, it is not always be the case the she sees her students as nonhuman. In Margalit's (ibid, 100) eyes human beings always see human and in this sense teacher might see students as humans but her seeing act might be described as nonhumanitarian seeing. To be able to see other in a humanitarian way is to be able to see and react to the facial expressions and eyes of the other. But as there are people who are colour-blind so there are people who are blind to the different aspects of other. This kind of impossibility to see other is very exceptional and in we might argue that the person who is capable to act in such a manner is very sick, but to overlook the other is much more common and easy. Overlooking human being's in common sense of the word might be articulated as a way of seeing others as objects. We are accustomed to say that when someone is take so fully granted we easily begun to see that person as furniture so to speak. People are turning into common part of our surroundings, be it students in our teaching environment, so that we start to see through them. But Margalit (ibid. 103) is pointing out that usually it is much more connected to the act where we do not see others fully and precisely - we are not paying attention to them -- not to the act where we start to see others as objects.

What is almost obvious in Margalit's argument is that to be able to see other's in detail and in that sense to be able to give them the possibility to be what they are is the issue of caring one and another. But caring is very demanding attitude because we usually mix up caring with liking. But caring does not always mean that you have to like for example your students. Sometimes, and in fact quite regularly the opposite is the case. We might argue that Margalit (2002, 34) sees that caring could be seen as a fight against banality of indifference. If seen in the context of schooling and education in general this idea might be rearticulated as a coming moral philosophy of education. Teachers should be able to care for the wellbeing of students in a sense that their sense of belonging could be strengthened. From this viewpoint it is quite obvious that this kind of moral philosophy is a definite negation of profit oriented regulation of educational institutions. As Margalit (ibid.) writes caring "gives the other the feeling of being secure in having our attention and concern, irrespective of their achievements".

## 1.4 Mimetic Element in Education<sup>6</sup>

The discussion in the previous chapter unfolds one of the key concepts or ideas in this dissertation. The mimetic element of every educational situation tries to evade rational control and unfolds the social ties of education as a constellation of the educational situation. But as Margalit (*ibid.*, 102) has argued, even in some sense of the word no paying attention to others detailed is voluntary issue as the reverse case of deciding to do things differently and starting to see others in detail. It is therefore highly relevant to take into consideration the whole spectrum of the social relations that are at work in educational situations; we should understand the educational situation as a constellation of different force fields that are constantly shifting within a given historical reality. I want to ask the following question: how are the socially unwanted tendencies produced, renewed, and strengthened in the educational relationship? And what might be done to escape these unwanted tendencies with educational means?

*The New Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1989, 109) defines mimicry as “a biologic phenomenon characterized by the superficial resemblance of two or more organisms that are not closely related taxonomically”. By this resemblance one or both of the organisms gain advantage, for example protection from predation. The agent of selection is deceived by the similarity of the organisms because it interacts directly with a similar organism. My main interest here is in the biological foundation of mimetic reactions and relationships in human interaction. I maintain that these biological factors are forcefully at work in extreme situations and that they can be used as an evidence of their continuous role in human actions. We can rightfully say that even if situation evolves in a much more rational and co-ordinated way these irrational impulses do not fade away completely. This argument is highlighted, for example, in the testimonies of the former prisoners and guards of the concentration camps in the Second World War.

In most of the studied mimetic relationships the advantage is usually one-sided. One organism (*mimic*) gains advantage from a resemblance to the other (*model*). The key element in the mimetic situation is *deception*. A third party is deceived by the mimic. This is how the mimetic situation can be differentiated from camouflage. If we do not take into account the receiver and investigate only the model and the mimic, we are not able to see the difference, but when we know the receiver and understand its reactions, the distinction is reasonably clear: “in mimicry the signals have special significance for the receiver and for the sender, which has evolved the signals in order to be perceived by the receiver. In camouflage the sender seeks to avoid the detection by the receiver through the imitation of what is natural background to the receiver.” (NEB 1989, 109)

---

<sup>6</sup> Parts of the chapters 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 are developed out from the article Moisiu 2006a which is not included to this dissertation.

But is it might be too naïve to think that what happens for example in a classroom situation, where children take roles unconsciously and teachers like or dislike pupils without really understanding why, could be viewed as a solely biological event? I most certainly agree this to be the case. Nevertheless, the concept of mimicry helps us understand certain tendencies that we, as living organisms, contain in our process of self-preservation. It helps us understand the primitive basis for the identification with power as it happens in sadomasochistic submission.

But when we speak of mimicry, we have to be careful not to make mimesis the synonym for imitation, as all too often has been done. When we say that something or someone is imitating something or someone else, we only state that some person or animal acts in the same manner as another, like it happens in biological mimicry. What I hope to make clear in this dissertation, however, is that in mimesis the attitude of the person whose actions are copied is of significance too, and needs to be taken into consideration to the same extent as the person who copies. In a sense, in the mimesis that I have in mind here, the person who responds to someone's actions mimetically actually assimilates and becomes this other in her submission to this it.

Following this, I will elaborate in this introduction on the connection of this biological concept of mimicry, and the concept of identification, which is widely used in different schools of psychology. Here I begin with the original meaning of identification as it was understood by Sigmund Freud. I maintain that it is essential to stress the difference between mimesis and imitation. The concept of identification brings us closer to the philosophical discussion of mimesis. With philosophical arguments the cognitive import in mimesis is highlighted, along with biological and emotional factors. The first article "Max Horkheimer on the Mimetic Element of Education" will deal with the thesis concerning the end of personality that Max Horkheimer developed together with the other Frankfurt School members. It will be also the development which tries to answer the question, what is the role of mimetic impulses and identifications in the process where individuality and personality are withering away?

## 1.5 Mimesis and Identification

Identification is one of the most widely used concepts in psychoanalysis. It has gained its place in notably different schools of psychology, including those outside the psychoanalytical framework, as well as in social scientific literature of wide range. Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, in their *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, define identification as a "psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides. It is by

means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified." (Laplanche & Pontalis 1974, 211.)

It has been argued that Freud occasionally uses identification as a synonym for *introjection* (see Sandford 1974). Because of this, it is not clear precisely what Freud means by identification in different parts of his writing. The concept of *introjection* which was used first by Melanie Klein (1932) is associated with fantasies. *Introjection* is a fantasy of taking an external object or scenario into oneself. In *introjection* the object disappears inside, as it were. There is no actual relation between subject and object. This process is parallel to that of *incorporation* which corresponds to the oral phase of psychosexual development. In *introjection*, however, there does not necessarily exist a physical or bodily basis for the fantasy, whereas in *incorporation* the subject aggressively takes the object into its own body – ingests it. (Laplanche & Pontalis 1974, 211-212.)

Something considerably different happens in identification. Freud (SE 22, 86) once argued that “if one has lost a love object or has had to give it up, one often compensates oneself by identifying oneself with it; one sets it up again inside one’s ego, so that in this case object-choice regresses, as it were, to identification.” Freud defined identification as the first emotional tie to the object, before he finalized it as preceding abandoned object cathexes (see Freud 1962, 45). The main point in identification is its being a relationship between subject and object and not a purely internal process like introjection. A continuing relationship with the object is therefore a distinctive feature of identification. Furthermore, we have to assume a rudimentary form of self to exist in order for the identification to take place. This is not the case in introjection.

The key concept in understanding what Freud means by identification is *Oedipus complex*, in which the role of identification is crucially emphasised. While developing his theory of Oedipus complex, Freud mentions the felt rivalry of the boy with his father over the mother’s love, as well as the boy's fear of punishment. The same identificatory processes are of course happening in the female child even though Freud did not take it in to account (cf. Benjamin 1995, 115-141.) But to go on, here we find the ground for and the dynamic nature of identification. It is a means to prevent the threat of the boy's own primitive impulses to retaliate when subjected to hostility on the father’s part. The logic behind this is: if you can’t beat the father, you might as well join him.

In identification the boy is able to take part in the father’s strength. The boy therefore through identification takes on aspects of the father’s character. He takes over some of his father’s demands and expectations as well as some of his ways of thinking and moral beliefs. Crucial here is the balance of the boy’s feelings towards his father. If the balance moves towards hostility, the identification is mostly defensive and the super-ego that develops along the Oedipus complex is mainly characterized by reaction-formation. According to Freud, feelings in Oedipus circle are always ambivalent, and this is the reason hostility has a major role in the formation of the super-ego.



The question poses itself, however, of whether identification is sufficient for moral development, as Freud is suggesting. Does identification create genuine autonomy? One could further argue that acquiring moral values involves more than the taking over of someone else's moral attitudes. I stress that we must take into consideration the complex process of learning, where every acquired value, and every response that the actions of the individual create, develops new sentiments along with new ways of criticizing actions. I am nevertheless of the opinion that Freud is reasonably correct to conceptualize super-ego as a "tyrant". In fact, many psychoanalysts have followed his example and made a distinction between super-ego and for example conscience (see. Jones 1955, 40; Fromm 1947, 143-158).

While writing with respect to group-psychology, Freud (1988) notes, that identification generally operates along two different axes, horizontal and vertical. There is a certain degree of mutual identification to begin with between the members of a group. This form of identification resembles that between siblings. On the other hand, there exists a qualitatively different identification, one between the individual group members and their leader, teacher, God, or abstract ideal, the father figure. Identification between group members, however, is strictly subordinate to their identification with the leader, which in a more sublimated form may be replaced by an abstract ideology.

Freud (1988, 56-61) additionally speaks of the so-called herd instinct of the group, which is derived from the mutually aggressive desire of its members to replace one another in their desire for their leader. From the ontogenetic viewpoint, siblings are jealous of each other for the love they receive from their parents, they want to kill each other but their father won't let them. Their response to this is to repress their aggression and defend themselves against its subsequent irruption by developing the opposite affect, love. Moreover, this love is not allowed to be erotic either, so it becomes inhibited in its aim. This love consequently regresses to the level of a narcissistic identification, something facilitated by the similarity between siblings-comrades, and their shared attachment to the father-leader. In addition, this defensive reaction provides a secondary gain, as the identification with the other permits the vicarious enjoyment of the love and approval received by them from the leader or parent. In Freud's terms, "social feeling is based upon the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into a positively-toned tie in the nature of an identification [...] under the influence of a common affectionate tie with a person outside the group" (1988, 60). The development of this narcissistic identification, then, accounts for such phenomena as group hysteria, and mass hallucination, referred to as "group contagion". However, it does so only by appeal to the relation of each group member to the leader; group contagion is subordinate to the vertical axis of identification, between the father and the child.

## 1.6 Mimesis: Subject, Object and Fear

After the elaboration on the biological mimicry and psychological theory of identification it is needed to open up the philosophical discussions on the concept of mimesis. The philosophical discussion regarding mimesis begins with the Greeks. Their concept of mimesis covers two distinct meanings. The first one is imitation and the second is that of artistic representation. Some hints concerning mimesis can be found in certain Pythagorean fragments pertaining to how music imitates numbers. The concept, however, won the major role for the first time in Plato. Plato argued that particulars resemble or imitate the Forms which are their ground, and this way, he came to the conclusion about the inferiority of the phenomenal world. In *The Republic* Plato developed a view that art corrupts the consumer because it stands in relation to the phenomenal world as the latter stands to the Forms. As art is an imitation of an imitation, it is still further away from the truth than the world that it imitates. French modern philosophy<sup>7</sup> has taken this Platonic negative insight of the concept of mimesis as its starting point and developed anti-representational aesthetic theory (cf. Jay 1998).

Aristotle adopted Plato's concept of mimesis but tended not to regard art as inferior, because his universals were immanent, in contrast to Plato's. In *Poetics* (6.1450a15) Aristotle states that "Tragedy is essentially imitation [*mimesis*] not of persons but of actions and life, of happiness and misery". He understood mimesis to be natural to human beings from early childhood on. We all like to imitate and imitation shapes the primitive form of learning. In the beginning all learning is imitation of actions in a form of a play. (*Poetics* 4.1448b 5-15.) This Aristotelian concept of mimesis has played its major role in Frankfurt Schools critical theory whose concept I will elaborate later on little bit more.

Developing on Aristotle's ideas on mimesis Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989, 113) maintains that a play as an imitation is a way in which a child affirms what she knows and also affirms her own being. As outlined in *Truth and Method*, "when person imitates something, he allows what he knows to exist and to exist in the way he knows it" (Gadamer 1989, 113). Gadamer attempts to highlight the cognitive import in imitation. When a child dresses up as someone else, she is not trying to hide herself as in biological camouflage, pretending to be someone else in hope to be discovered behind the disguise. In Gadamer's (1989, 113) terms "they intend a representation of such a kind that only what is represented exists".

We are expected to recognise that something "is", and this recognition is the cognitive element in imitation. This however implies that we already know this something because it is familiar to us (*anamnesis*). Gadamer (1989, 114) argues that "in recognition what we know emerges, as if illuminated, from all the contingent and variable circumstances that condition it; it is grasped in its

---

<sup>7</sup> See for example Ronald Barthes (1974), Jacques Derrida (2004), Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (2004), Jean-Francois Lyotard (1999), Paul de Man (1986).

essence". Imitation is not only repetition but the knowledge of the essence. It brings forth something, and in this it implies a spectator. Imitation contains in it a relationship to everyone for whom the representation exists. (Gadamer 1989, 115.)

Freud (1955, 219-252) in his article "Das Unheimliche" argues that in everything we feel uncanny [*Unheimliche*] there is something fundamentally familiar [*heimlich*]. This familiar is the prohibited part in us which we project onto the world outside of us. Max Horkheimer follows Freud's line of thought when he argues that the Anti-Semitic subject, in an extremity of her projection, falls into paranoid thought patterns where she attributes "[i]mpulses which are not acknowledged by the subject and yet are his [...] to the object: the prospective victim" (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, 154). In this false projection and its totality, people who are "blinded by civilization have contact with their own tabooed mimetic traits only through certain gestures and forms of behaviour they encounter in others, as isolated, shameful residues in their rationalized environment" (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, 149).

In contrast to the Platonic and in that sense modern French philosophy Frankfurt School critical theory has valued and used extensively the concept of mimesis in their theoretical formulations. Even though, as we saw in the previous paragraph, critical theory was well aware of the negative sides of the mimetic relationships, they still valued mimesis as a valuable resource to the struggle against instrumental rationality. Horkheimer and Adorno were sad to see that the human capacity to imitate nature was withering away in the historical process of strengthening of instrumental rationality that they called dialectic of enlightenment. In *Aesthetic Theory* Adorno (1997, 330, 339) wrote that mimetic behaviour was "what has been belligerently excised from civilization and repressed, as well as the human suffering under the loss, a suffering already expressed in the earliest forms of mimesis" -- "the happiness of producing the world once over".

Frankfurt School's concept of mimesis developed out of the certain ideas of Walter Benjamin and Roger Caillois's book from 1938 *Le Mythe Et L'Homme* (see Jay 1998). Benjamin (1978), in his "On the Mimetic Faculty", wrote about nature's tendency to produce similarity. According to Benjamin, human beings have the highest faculty to grasp similarity which is nothing more than the age old necessity to act like someone or something else. In his "Doctrine of the Similar", Benjamin (1991a, 205) reflects on a child's ability to imitate during her plays not only human beings but also objects, for example trains and windmills. His examples demonstrate that all need for knowledge is in fact based in fear, as Freud attempted to underscore with his concept of *Unheimliche*. Fear, when we are faced with something unfamiliar, forces us to seek the similarity, something familiar in this otherness. All knowledge acquisition therefore is a process of identification through which we aspire to overcome the separation from the object by making it familiar (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997, 37-38).

Particularly in German Idealism we find a long and substantial tradition of philosophy of the primacy of the subject. It might be argued that in this tradition subject as an individual constitutes herself and the world. In this

constituting act or process object has in a sense no otherness. Kant and Edmund Husserl might be seen as a prime example of this kind of idealism. Even though Husserl starts from in a fundamental sense from the critique of idealism and what he in his later part of his life calls “lifeworld” he finally ends up with difficult reductions to the position where the other (object) is reduced to the experience of the transcendental ego (see Adorno 1940; 1982, 3-5). As Adorno (1940, 17) writes in his article *Husserl and the problem of idealism*: “he [Husserl] rebels against idealist thinking while attempting to break through the walls of idealism with purely idealist instruments, namely, by exclusive analysis of the structure of thought and of consciousness”.

In idealism only one side (i.e. subject) is hypostatized even though this side is incomprehensible if not seen in connection with the other. This is why Adorno (1969, 501) sees that “datum, the irremovable *skandalon* of idealism” will show again and again the complete failure of this hypostasis. But idealism is true in that it reflects abstraction of the subject from a world in which it might be constitutively immersed, but false in that its very hypostatization masks its real lack of freedom. Thus Adorno argues that the dialectical primacy of the object will show for example in that subjectivity is not private achievement, but the result of the engagement with the objects. The very reality of the subject as a socially engaged entity is possible only in that the subject is in some sense also an object of certain kind. But this object has also subjective qualities, its meaning, and this is important also for its being as an object.

## 1.7 Hope as a Fundamental Element of Education<sup>8</sup>

In the article “Education and Hope in the era of Globalizing Capitalism” I am interested to articulate the fundamental dimension of all human activity that is focused on change. In a best possible sense education should be seen as this kind of human activity and this is the reason that the question on hope is one of key aspects of educational theory and practice. The concept of hope is set in the article to the context globalizing capitalism. It is argued that at the same time this globalization is affecting this fundamental dimension of human activity by reducing the possibilities of articulating hopes in cultural settings. But also it is seen that this dimension is the needed antidote to the ever increasing real-political one-dimensional mentality of the *Fachmenschen*. Against this Freire (1997, 30, 40) once wrote that “I am a totality and not a dichotomy [...] I know with my entire body, with feelings, with passion, and also with reason” and this breaths that “Hope is an ontological requirement for human beings.”

Jiri Weil (1998) wrote a famous book *Life with the Star*, where he used his own experiences as a survivor of the Holocaust. In this visionary book, Weil is drawing to us with gentle sweeps a political and social void. In this manner

---

<sup>8</sup> Themes from this chapter I have previously elaborated in my article Moisio 2006b which is not included to this dissertation.

Weil is taking a step outwards from the dimension of the modern life that Kafka analysed in his introspection of bureaucratic individuality. The book tells us the ground work of genocide. The progressive retraction of the rights of citizenship and humanity from a people, and neither Roubicek who is the main character of the book, nor anyone around him does much to resist it. For example in one scene which is quite revealing Roubicek is thrown off a streetcar and roughed up by soldiers in front of large crowd. The other passengers "were looking at the floor, as if they were searching for a coin that had rolled under the wooden slats. Nobody spoke."

Eventually, the book moves back from this existential null point, and Roubicek begins to reclaim his humanity. He is assigned a job growing vegetables in a graveyard, the only land the Jews are allowed to cultivate, and he begins a process of reflection on death. When the Nazis build a center for the processing of the deportees, and tell everyone they are building a circus, Roubicek remembers his childhood. "When I watched the seals pushing a ball with their snouts I didn't know it was a bad thing to be an animal in the circus. It did not occur to me that it was something that seals did not usually do....But when I myself was to perform in the circus, I didn't like to remember the sound of the whip and the cries of the tamers." But even animals, a farmer tells him, will not do certain things. Why then, wonders Roubicek, will humans do anything; even participate in their own destruction, in a desperate attempt to cling to life? He sees it is not just death which awaits him, but a faceless, nameless death. He makes a decision which gives him hope, not so much for survival as for a life and death which escapes the regimented extinction the Nazis have proscribed for him.

So Roubicek is drawn to the conclusion that the real struggle for the hope starts only when there is no hope left at all. We must decide to cling on to the hope even though we might know that this hope is in vain. In a remarkable passage, Roubicek rakes the graveyard and imagines a fable where the prayers for the dead rise up to heaven in a song, and then "as the song flew off with the leaves and the leaves fell into the mud and dirt, they were raised up again by the wind, and they fell on plowed fields and flew about garbage dumps. The song became trite, the kind played on accordions in dance halls; drunks wept when they heard it... But the tears of the angel of death, falling as pebbles, had always been in it...the song had always flown through the land with the blood of the martyrs."

Like Weil in his literature, Ernst Bloch (1995, 2000) was interested in his philosophical work on the subjective and objective dimensions of hope, which receives its content from the subjective dimension of human experience as it is articulated in human culture in general. He tries to decipher and articulate the hidden texture of the human drive and hunger for a better future. This drive keeps the humanity alive; it gives reason for its existence, and it also contains the possibilities for improvement of life in general. This orientation forward can be seen in the individual as the intentionality of a subjective consciousness, as it relentlessly and continuously reaches out for an adequate object. The object that it seeks is not yet given in the present, and it has not been present in the past,

but it gives breath for tomorrow, for the future. This subject-object relationship is a dynamic that strives ultimately towards its final goal, towards what is hoped for.

But before the distinction between subject and object there exists the basic and fundamental human drive that Bloch (1995, 45) names "hunger". This hunger lives off that which is "Not-Yet". Its form is searching, a desire for something, through a goal-directed drive. Bloch argues that hunger gives rise to dreams, daydreams, wishes, planning, and a longing for something better, for something that is different than the given, for the new. By defining human nature with one fundamental drive and one fundamental attitude, Bloch is able to explain human beings as being open towards the future and, what is even more, that human beings are driven towards this unseen future by a force within them (Bloch 1995, 13). This is how hunger and hope intervene as a motivational force behind humanity and education in general.

Human beings are able to actively generate images of that which they hunger and hope for. In this sense, Bloch (1995, 85) is in agreement with Freud when he writes that "every dream is a wish fulfilment". He goes on and writes that "the daydream is not a stepping-stone to the night-dream and is not disposed of by the latter. Not even with respect to its clinical content, let alone its artistic, pre-appearing [...] anticipatory content. For night-dreams mostly cannibalize the former life of the drives, they feed on the past if not archaic image-material, and nothing new happens under their bare moon" (Bloch 1995, 87). In this quote, Bloch gives weight to daydreams over night-dreams as a vehicle of wishes. As fantasies, daydreams are a fundamental key to understanding how human beings align their imagination with their needs. In the daydream "the ego starts a journey into the blue, but ends it whenever it wants" (Bloch 1995, 88). The daydream remains under the conscious control of the will because the ego of the daydream is active in the context of its waking life.

We cannot escape a daydream when it occurs, while we are able to, for example, pause the high tempo life that we are leading. In this stillness of the now there opens a way to articulate the "Not-Yet-Conscious" as a mode of consciousness of what is coming to be, "the psychological birthplace of the new" (Bloch 1995, 116). If this dreaming while awake starts being critical towards the given, it becomes more authentic. This is inevitable, because the daydream recognizes that everything in reality is pregnant with possibilities waiting to burst into wide-open spaces. In this sense, the human desire that finds its expression in daydreams leads to hoping for a new and always possible future.

This utopian imagination is touched by what is actually real. This "real tendency forward" is an objectively real possibility that is present in time. While fantasizing results in an abstract, theoretical and in a sense remote vision of the future, the utopian consciousness is completely attuned to the concrete and its real and actual possibilities. This is why imaginative ideas or wishful images are anticipatory; they extend reality beyond its definite limits. They always try to reach "into the future possibilities of its being different and

better" (Bloch 1995, 144). Bloch (ibid) goes on and writes that "Not-Yet Conscious itself must become *conscious* in its act *known* in its content".

Our present world is not static; it is not fully determined. What is real is practically and actually being transformed into the "Possible". This is why it is a concrete aspect of utopia as a "*process-reality*" which has a corresponding element "of the mediated Novum" (Bloch 1995, 197). The real is actually and always in a process of becoming. As Bloch (1991, 132) writes in his *Heritage of Our Times*, "everything flows, but the river comes from a source every time. It takes matter with it from the regions through which it has run, this colour its waters for a long time". Utopia is already and always a synthesis that tries to articulate how the subjective is translated into the objective, how a dream tries to picture a concrete relation to the future, and how hope is the source of the history that human beings individually or collectively create.

Hope is not given but it is learnt. In this sense, the ontology of hope is the ontology of a real possibility. We learn and silently become aware of the dimension of the possible. In this process, wishful thinking is transformed into a wish-ful and effective action. This why hope connects and forms an alliance between theory and practice, which become a world-changing energy that is based to a primary hunger for what is not yet present. (Bloch 1995, 73.) Bloch (1970, 92) writes that "action will release available transitional tendencies into active freedom only if the utopian goal is clearly visible, unadulterated and unrenounced. Even though the utopias have at best promised their still so palpable optima, but have promised them as *objectively* and *really* possible". In this sense, utopia is a blue horizon in which every reality is grasped with its hidden possibilities.

Bloch argues that future is the mode of time which provides the needed space for the realization of the possibilities of history, or more accurately, in history. What is already and what is not-yet belong to human activity that is actualized in world history. This is why Bloch sees that as human yearning and venturing beyond appear in a variety of forms, it follows that utopia will be conceived in various different ways. But only concrete utopias can generate hope and action that will open the passage to a new future. That is why hope is connected to that which is not yet realized be it in individual or cultural level and it is a part and parcel of all forms of education.

Hope in education is connected to the two other human qualities: faith and fortitude. Fromm said that without hope there would be no life and we can make a further statement that no education either. Education is connected to hope and it lives in the faith and trust of something other than what is. But it is never certain. This forms a *dynamic concept of hope* that takes into a consideration its counterpart hopelessness or despair. In fact, as Fromm (1966, 201-223) has shown to us, without genuine despair there would be no hope. These two are internally connected. Fromm (1966, 208) writes that "only when the frightened, despairing person experiences the full depth of his despair can he 'return', can he liberate himself from despair and achieve hope." The faith in education is "certainty of uncertainty" – lighthouse in the darkness that surrounds humanity. But hope should be something else in education than mere subjective longing

for this or that thing that we desire at the moment. It should be fortitude and love of life; ability to yell “no!” even though the whole world around you is yelling “yes!”

## 1.8 Question of Practice<sup>9</sup>

Henry Giroux (1991, 47-52) writes in his article “Modernism, Postmodernism and Feminism: Rethinking the boundaries of Educational Discourse” that education does not produce solely individuals with the certain skills and knowledge’s but also political subjects. In this way education is always ethical activity involving the questions of justice and human rights. Even though it is true that culture arises from the complex interaction of individual human actions it is very rare that these individual human beings could reach the freedom of action and thought on their own. To be able to be conscious of their activity the human being needs someone else, the significant other, who can activate and emancipate them.

Giroux (1996) sees that one way for the arrangement of educational situation for this purpose of creating autonomous individuals is found if we understand educators not a people who discipline children but as “border intellectuals”. They tear down the curtains for the new ideas, lifestyles, thoughts and actions. The human capacity for the venturing beyond now is highlighted in this idea about border intellectuals. Giroux sees like for example Herbert Marcuse saw in his more utopian moments that the realisation of autonomous activity is able to free human beings from the tutelage of coercive power structures and thought patterns.

But are we able to escape the pedagogical paradox with these ideas? This question is one of the key questions in the articles collected in this dissertation. If we take into full consideration Immanuel Kant’s (1803) ideas in his “Über Pädagogik” and what Sigmund Freud wrote about the development of personality, we can hardly cling to this idea about the possible way out of educational paradox that Giroux has proposed to us in the form of border intellectuals. I have elaborated this problematic in my article “What it means to be stranger to Oneself”.

But still I want to argue that critical education aims at facilitating human beings as capable of thinking autonomously within the social and educational settings that aim at collectively, co-operatively structured process of learning and acting. This is done in solidarity with their fellow human beings and often adopts an eco-critical perspective with respect to the biosphere or nature. This is one of the practical conclusions to be drawn from the theoretical work done here. Critical education fosters critical and analytical skills to comprehend the world, to read the world, and to act within and upon the world in ways that

---

<sup>9</sup> Parts of this chapter have been developed out from the joint article with Juha Suoranta. (Suoranta & Moisio 2008)



build the conditions necessary for a critical society. In the context of critical education critical thinking does not refer to isolated cognitive faculties, or new business liturgies found in management textbooks, but to social reality, in that its focus is on “common interests, rejecting the privatized, competitive ethic of capitalism, and preventing the emergence of inherited privilege” (Brookfield, 2005, 351). These ideals of collective and shared work are operationalized in various group-based, or collaborative teaching and study methods. I have developed one practical example of these together with my distinguished colleague Juha Suoranta in “Critical Pedagogy as Collective Social Expertise in Higher Education” (Suoranta & Moisio 2006).

Different collaborative study methods are part of the larger idea of what can be called “collective social expertise”. This idea develops from the fact of the information overload and also the ever increasing difficulties of really getting in to the grips with the decisive problematic of our times. I think that there cannot be any possibilities to increase our human abilities to handle and form knowledge. To acquire and thoroughly analyze the knowledge that we are getting from diverse sources is getting all the more difficult due to rapidly increasing pace of information production.

One factor seems to be the common experience of the intensification of time. As it seems time has become luxury commodity that most of us do not have anymore in the age of hyper-capitalism. Bloch (1993) spoke in his *Heritage of our times* about experience of time that he called non-contemporaneity (*Ungleichzeitigkeit*). This experience was a signal of problematic character of the past that was not “disposed of” (*unerledigte Vergangenheit*) which was articulated by persistence of archaic, outmoded mentalities in the context of the economic rationalization of modern society. Bloch (1993, 106) developed this argument in the specific context of the rising power of the fascist political movement in the Weimar Germany which he termed as a “classic land of non-contemporaneity”. In his mind this non-contemporaneity became manifest in the large sectors of German population who in response to the multiple contemporary crises tended to slide into the myths, frustrated expectations, and irrational explanations what was the cause of these crises.

Even though Bloch developed his idea about contemporaneity, non-contemporaneity and the different layers of time in a very specific historical situation of the rise of Nazism, I think that there is something that can be learned out of it in our times and especially in connection of philosophy of education. Bloch expanded Marx’s (1859) discussion in the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* on “unequal rate of development” to be able to articulate broader conception of material production. In this conception he is able to elaborate the dynamical character of the contradictory force of different dimensions of historical situation (contemporaneity and non-contemporaneity). This he sees having subjective and objective side, i.e, internal and external dimension. In its subjective manifestation this contradictory element is a “muffled remnant” which appears objectively as non-contemporaneous “alien and surviving” anachronism and subjectively as “accumulated rage” (Bloch 1993, 108).

Corresponding to this is the *objectively* non-contemporaneous element as a continuing influence of older circumstances and forms of production, however much they may have been crossed through, as well as of older superstructures. The *objectively* non-contemporaneous element is that which is distant from and alien to the present; it thus embraces *declining remnants* and above all an *unrefurbished past* which is not yet 'resolved' in capitalist terms. (Bloch 1993, 108.)

This dynamism evolves in to the very explosive situation when subjectively and objectively non-contemporaneous elements meet so that the "rebelliously crooked one of accumulating rage and objectively alien one of surviving being and consciousness" reinforce each other (Bloch 1993, 109). But this non-contemporaneous element can only thrive as a compensatory gesture for the dissatisfactions and frustrations experienced by the people that are living in the Now.

The subjectively non-contemporaneous contradictions would never be so sharp, nor the objectively non-contemporaneous one so visible, if an objectively contemporaneous one did not exist, namely that posited and growing in and with modern capitalism itself. The anachronistic degeneration and memory is released only through the crisis and replies to its objectively revolutionary contradiction with subjectively and objectively reactionary one, namely non-contemporaneously in fact. [...] It uses the antagonism of a still living past as a means of separation and combat against the future dialectically giving birth to itself in the capitalist antagonism. (Bloch 1993, 109.)

In the sidelines of the larger cultural and in most cases economical process, it seems that fields of power/knowledge are differentiating, and, in turn, fields of expertise increasing exponentially. Resulting from these elementally politico-economical and social processes the concept of expert is going through fundamental changes. This situation in which different fields of knowledge have become more specialized and furthered away from each other both linguistically and conceptually has brought forth a deep challenge to education: how can these experts share their expertise with, and understand each others, to mediate their knowledge and evaluate each others' viewpoints?

Although the amount of information has steadily been increasing for the past several hundred years, and especially after the Second World War, the quantity of information has exploded since the Information Revolution of the 1960's. In the constant flow of new scientific information, the concept of expertise has been in the processes of re-definition and re-evaluation. One hand expertise has enjoyed high social status, and it has been distanced from the ordinary knowledge into the real of professional knowledge as the phenomenon of expertise has become more complex and wide. It seems as if there was no limits of what is required of the individual expert. On the other hand the idea of expertise have been devalued primarily for two reasons. Firstly experts are turning into, if not already are, parts of working class, and losing their formerly high social status and respect. Secondly, experts' specialized knowledge has tended to become so narrow in scope that in many practical fields - particularly in human and social sector -- it has lost its practical relevance.

Thus it is vitally important in this situation for the theory of radical educational philosophy to develop a concept of open collective social expertise along with student- and discussion-centered study methods as well as tutoring practices. However, in the present context of modern university-factory it is not clear if these methods and procedures alone are enough. There is in fact present the dynamism of non-contemporaneous elements that was brought up previously in this chapter. What would be needed are methods of deconstructing the prior 'bad' habits of learning such as rote learning, and replacing them with innovative learning, organic learning, creative learning, aesthetic learning, and collaborative learning. By these I refer to constructing, creating, formatting, sharing, elaborating and connecting of knowledge with two or more people so that the combination of these individual fields of expertise would be more than a sum of different parts. It is obvious for many different organizations that one human being alone cannot – no matter how skilful she is – gain the same amount and quality of knowledge as she would if combined with a group of experts from various fields proper.

Open collective social expertise consists of interdisciplinary research and teaching based on interdisciplinary elaborations of the themes involved. It is obvious that in universities all these methods should be connected to the actual research done. In the current condition of information overload, and capitalist exploitation of the individual worker (or an expert) it is imperative that teaching and research can be brought together in the fruitful manner. When done learning can be seen as a joint venture based on the problems that have been produced together as experts, and with the people involved and touched by the problems. Paolo Freire talked in this connection about “generative themes” which could be re-articulated as multidimensional activity of defining the decisive problems at hand.

Collective social expertise can firstly offer a certain problem or a field of problems, and start to tackle with. Collective social expert can work together with teachers who can open doors for them to the sources of the problem. From there on they can utilize their theoretical and methodological knowledge in solving the problem, and simultaneously gaining deeper knowledge of it. But it is obvious that problem solving and deeper understanding take time -- there are no shortcuts. The process of understanding can employ teachers' and students' perspectives alike. An apt example of this mutual process is studying history of philosophy or history of education together by breaking up the chronological exposé that is usually carried out in these instances.

The students are at the centre of educating to collective social expertise. Their individual needs should be addressed in the personal counseling situations. One way to arrange this is to assign a group of students a teacher tutor who interacts with them in different parts of their studies giving advices and also problematizes their personal and collective imaginary. This is based on a sentiment that it is imperative to get rid of the business-as-usual understanding of expertise of which the university system as a current diploma mill is founded.

This rigid profit-driven system as such is among the very reasons why people are drawn further away from each other; the capital-oriented university system of the survival of the fittest works almost like a hidden curriculum: everyone knows it, but won't care less. Both in academia and in various expert organizations specialist expertise is usually seen as a top know-how, something that is closely knitted to an individual, and her individually acquired special abilities. As the world is changing radically multi-faced, and harder to control with former means and technologies, the old way to understand expertise must also vanish if technological and social 'progress' will be maintained and carried on.

Thus today, against the hyper individual top know-how character, an expert should be open, reciprocal, and trustful. Trust especially means that an expert does not cling to a wishful hope that she could, based on her expertise, gain control over the social totality that is constantly changing in ever-increasing speed. When trying to produce a meaningful image from this totality, she should be able to trust the knowledge that is produced by other experts, and critically proportion her own know-how to it. This is perhaps the only way to act meaningfully as collective social expert. But this trust is not to be understood as a blind dependency of the knowledge produced by others, but understood as critical trust. Critical literacy is part and parcel of this critical trust as a core part of expertise. Critical literacy means both internal and external criticism as argued before in this introduction.

The idea of collective social expertise can be seen as part of the debate on the direction of higher education in a quite paradoxical situation (see Aronowitz 2000; Giroux & Searls Giroux 2004). On the one hand many universities are lacking both material and intellectual resources, and are increasingly defined in the language of corporate culture. In consequence universities in the US and elsewhere seem to have become "less interested in higher learning than in becoming licensed storefronts for brand name corporations -- selling off space, buildings, and endowed chairs to rich corporate donors" (Giroux 2004). On the other hand for the first time in human history everyone can pursue her own educational ends at any age, and for the goal of individual and collective development (Aronowitz et al. 1998). This is the paradox that all critical educational philosophy should address.

\*\*\*\*

In the following I will give a short description of the main arguments and discussions in the articles collected to this study.

The first article in this dissertation will be *Max Horkheimer on the Mimetic Element in Education*. In this article I will elaborate Horkheimer's view about education as a human activity which is concerned with supporting the realisation of individual autonomy. In this context Horkheimer stresses the mimetic element of education. As was previously argued in this chapter this mimetic element of education unfolds the social ties of education. Education and human development in general result from a certain history, and via this

historical dimension the whole ethos of a given historical situation has an effect on both of them. To fully understand what Horkheimer means by this dimension of educational relationships it is necessary to open it up in the context of *Dialectics of Enlightenment*. The argument developed in this context raises critical questions that should be taken up both in theoretical discussion about education in critical pedagogy and conventional pedagogies and also in practical issues while planning curricula and educational situations. Main question is can we hope critical change to materialize in the culture of instrumentalization of reason.

In *What it means to be a Stranger to Oneself* I will further elaborate the problematic that were raised up in the previous article. I will argue that in adult education there is always a problem of a prefabricated and in many respect fixed opinions and views of the world. In this sense we might say that the starting point of radical education should be in the destruction of these walls of belief that people build around themselves in order to feel safe. In this connection I will talk about gentle shattering of identities as a problem and a method of radical education. To elaborate this problem field I will write a discussion about the so called paradox of education by focusing on Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel. When we as adult educators are trying to gently shatter these solidified identities and pre-packed ways of being and acting in the world, we are moving in the field of questions that Sigmund Freud tackled with the concepts of “de-personalization” and “de-realization”. These concepts raise the question about the possibility of at the same time believing that something is and at the same time having a fundamental skeptical attitude towards this given. In my article I will ask, can we integrate to the idea of learning in general the idea of strangeness to oneself as a legitimate and sensible experiential point of departure for radical learning?

The article *As Heard in Silence – Listening and to-be-heard in Education* I will tackle with Erich Fromm’s discussion about therapy as an art of listening. I will ask can we use Fromm’s writings about therapy as an art of listening, as a way to articulate more carefully the usually hidden dimensions of the relationship between student and teacher. With these texts in mind, I will elaborate the question how are listening, to-be-heard, trust, responsibility and obligation connected together in a teaching environment and counseling sessions. Especially I am interested in the theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of active listening, and the connection of it to the education aimed to change. In this context I will elaborate Margalit’s discussions about the caring and respect of student’s person and corporeal being. Active listening is the vessel of hope, which is within every human act directed at change.

The next article in this dissertation *Hope and Education in the Era of Globalization* will focus on the concept of hope in the context of education. In this article it is argued that the individual’s lonely act in silence and isolation can have in the end social effects. In a very naive sense this might be argued that we need to change ourselves if we want to change the world. But this naïve idea is the fundamental dimension in the ethics of education as it is argued in this article and many parts of this dissertation. Article will also elaborate that

education should encompass a comprehensive concept of hope. This is important in the context of radical philosophy of education if it is to restrain itself not to fall into the total despair, pessimism, cynicism or passive waiting. This idea is articulated as a dynamic and critical hope. The discussion will focus particularly on Erich Fromm's discussion of hope. It will be argued that faith and fortitude and the realization of the autonomous activity in interaction with the environment and other people are fundamental for the radical education. In the end of the article there are very general principles or suggestions for the teaching and planning of curricula which might be seen as building blocks of hopeful education in the globalized capitalism.

After the elaboration of the concept of hope in the context of globalized capitalism the *Critical Pedagogy and Ideology Critique as Zeitgeist Analysis* asks what can be done in the context of education if education is seen in a fundamental sense as a political endeavor. Article brings forth the need for the critical insight to the given historical situation in the practical and theoretical contexts of education. Critical *Zeitgeist* analysis is argued in connection to the Marxian ideology critique to be able to bring this viewpoint to education.

Dissertation will end with the article *Don't You See, How the Wind Blows?* In this article we will see how the student movement and the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960's can be read as a pedagogical activity. If critical pedagogy is to help the possibility of emergence of autonomous thinking and acting as it is outlined in every article in this dissertation, its idea of teaching material should become practical. This practical activity is critical collaborative production of knowledge in a sense that it teaches to re-read the given situation critically. In this sense it might be argued that critique is to be seen as fundamentally pedagogical enterprise. At the same time we will see how this idea can be connected to certain ideas of the Frankfurt School critical theory as a view from the below. In this sense critical theory can be seen as an educational project.

## LITERATURE

- Adorno, T. W. (1940). "Husserl and the Problem of Idealism." *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 37, No. 1. (Jan. 4, 1940), pp. 5-18.
- Adorno, T. W. (1969). "Subject and Object." In *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*. Edited by Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt. New York: Continuum. Pp. 497-511.
- Adorno, T. W. (1973). *Negative Dialectics*. New York: Routledge.
- Adorno, T. W. (1982). *Against Epistemology: A Metacritique*. Trans. W. Domingo. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Adorno, T. W. (1997). *Aesthetic Theory*. Trans. Hullot-Kentor.
- Aronowitz, Stanley, Esposito, Dawn, DiFazio, William & Yard, Margaret. (1998). "The Post-Work Manifesto". In Aronowitz, Stanley & Cutler, Jonathan (Eds.). *Post-Work: The Wages of Cybernation*. New York: Routledge.
- Aronowitz, Stanley (2000). *The Knowledge Factory*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Aristoteles. *Runousoppi ja retoriikka (Poetics)*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Barthes, R. (1974). *S/Z. An Essay*. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill & Wang.
- Bauman, Z. (2000). "On Writing: On Writing Sociology". In *Theory, Culture, and Society* 17 (1), 79-90.
- Bourdieu, P. et al. (Eds.) (1999). *The Weight of the World. Social Suffering in Contemporary Society*. Translated by Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Benjamin, J. (1995). *Like Subjects, Love Objects*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bloch, E. (1970). *A Philosophy of the Future*. New York: Herder & Herder.
- Bloch, E. (1988). *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature*. Cambridge: MIT.
- Bloch, E. (1991). *The Heritage of Our Times*. Cambridge: MIT.
- Bloch, E. (1995). *The Principle of Hope. Vol 1, 2, 3*. Cambridge: MIT.
- Bloch, E. (2000). *The Spirit of Utopia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Brookfield, S. D. (1995). *Becoming a Critically Reflective Teacher*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Brookfield, S. D. (2005). *The Power of Critical Theory: Liberating Adult Learning and Teaching*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Brookfield, S.D. (2006). *The Skillful Teacher: On Technique, Trust and Responsiveness in the Classroom*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass (2nd. ed.).
- Derrida, J. (2004). *Dissemination*. Trans. Barbara Johnson. New York: Continuum.
- Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (2004). *Thousand Plateaus*. Trans. Brian Massumi. New York: Continuum.
- Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and Education*. New York: Cosimo Books.
- Dewey, J. (1920). *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Dewey, J. (1927). *Public and its Problems*. Athens, Ohio: Swallow Press.
- Freire, P. (1993). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Continuum.
- Freire, P. (1997). *Pedagogy of the Heart*. New York: Continuum.
- Freire, P. (1998). *Pedagogy of the Freedom*. Boulder, CO: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers.

- Freud, S. (19??). "The New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis". In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XXII. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis.
- Freud, S. (1955). "Uncanny." In *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. XVII. Lontoo: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 219–256.
- Freud, S. (1962). *The Ego and the Id*. London: The Hogarth Press.
- Freud, S. (1988). *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
- Fromm, E. 1942. *The Fear of Freedom*. London: ARK.
- Fromm, E. 1947. *Man for Himself*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Fromm, E. (1966). *You Shall be as Gods*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Gadamer, H-G. (1989). *Truth and Method*. London: Sheed & Ward.
- Giroux, H. (1991). "Modernism, Postmodernism and Feminism: Rethinking the boundaries of Educational Discourse." In *Postmodernism, Feminism, and Cultural Politics: Redrawing Educational Boundaries*, edited by Henry A. Giroux. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press. Pp. 1-59.
- Giroux, H. (1996). "Is there a place for cultural studies in colleges of education?" In H. Giroux, C. Lankshear, P. McLaren & M. Peters, *Counternarratives: Cultural Studies and Critical Pedagogies in Postmodern Spaces*. New York: Routledge.
- Giroux, Henry & Searls Giroux, Susan (2004). *Take Back Higher Education*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1807). *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horkheimer, M & Adorno, T. W. 1997, "Dialektik der Aufklärung." In Max Horkheimer *Gesammelte Schriften Band 5*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 13-290.
- Horkheimer, M & Adorno, T. W. 2002, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. trans. Edmund Jephcott. California: Stanford University Press.
- Jay, M. (1998). "Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe." In Martin Jay, *Cultural Semantics. The Keywords of our Times*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Jones, E. (1955). *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. A Modern Library Book.
- Kauppinen, I. (2008). *Tiedon omistaminen on valtaa. Globalisoituvan patenttijärjestelmän poliittinen moraalitalous ja globaali kapitalismi. (Owning knowledge is power. Political moral economy of the globalizing patent system and global capitalism.)* Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä.
- Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J.-B. (1973). *The Language of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Norton.
- Lyotard, J-F. (1999). *Toward the Postmodern*. Ed. Robert Harvey & Mark S. Roberts. New York: Humanities Books.
- de Man. P. (1986). *The Resistance to Theory*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Margalit, A. (1996). *The Decent Society*. Trans. Goldblum. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Margalit, A. (2002). *The Ethics of Memory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.



- Marx, K. (1843). Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. In *Collected Works*, Vol. 3. Moscow: Progress.
- Marx, K. (1859). Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. In *Collected Works*, Vol. 29. Moscow: Progress.
- Moisio, O-P (2006a). "Society and the Individual: the Problem of Mimesis in Education." In *Russian Journal of Philosophy of Education*. 2006. Vol. 15. No.1.
- Moisio, O-P (2006b). "Human beings do not eat in order to live, but because they live. Ernst Bloch on wishful imagination, hope and hunger." In Itkonen, Backhaus, Heikkinen, Nagel & Inkinen (eds.), *The Culture of Food. The Dialectic of Material conditions, Art, and Leisure*. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä & Haaga University of Applied Sciences.
- The New Encyclopaedia Britannica* [NEB] (1989). 15th edition. Volume 24. Chicago: The University of Chicago.
- Platon Valtio (*Politics*). Helsinki: Wsoy.
- Rhoades, G. & Slaughter, S. (1997). "Academic Capitalism, Managed Professionals, and Supply-Side Higher Education." *Social Text* 51, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1997.
- Rhoades, G. & Slaughter, S. (2004). "Academic Capitalism in the New Economy: Challenges and Choices." *American Academic: Academic Values, Market Values: The Shifting Balance*. Volume 1, Number 1, June 2004.
- Robins, K. & Webster, F. (eds.) (2004). *The Virtual University? Knowledge, Markets and Management*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Sandford, N. (1974). "The Dynamics of Identification." In *Sociologica I*. Frankfurt am Main: EVA.
- Slaughter, S. & Rhoades, G. (2004). *Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Markets, State, and Higher Education*. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Smith, A. (1759). *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, vol. I of the *Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 1982.
- Suoranta, J. & Moisio, O.-P. (2008). "Critical Pedagogy as Collective Social Expertise in Higher Education." In M. Y. Eryaman (ed.), *Peter McLaren, Education, and the Struggle for Liberation: Revolution as Education*. NJ: Hampton Press.
- Weil, J. (1998). *Life with the Star*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

## 2 MAX HORKHEIMER ON THE MIMETIC ELEMENT IN EDUCATION

*Originally published in Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (ed.), Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy Today. Toward a New Critical Language in Education. Studies in Education, Haifa: University of Haifa. 2005. Pp. 261-279.*

A big dog stands on the highway. He walks on confidently and is run over by car. His peaceful expression shows that he is usually better looked after – a domestic animal to whom no harm is done. But do the sons of the rich bourgeois families who also suffer no harm have the same peaceful expression? They were cared for just as lovingly as the dog which is now run over.

Max Horkheimer

Max Horkheimer gave a presentation in Ingelheim, Germany on 5<sup>th</sup> of May 1960 titled "Sozialpsychologische Forschungen zum Problem des Autoritarismus, Nationalismus und Antisemitismus"<sup>1</sup>. In this lecture, Horkheimer sketches education as an activity which is concerned with supporting the realisation of individual autonomy. Horkheimer stresses the mimetic element of education, which evades rational control. This mimetic element of education unfolds the social ties of education. Education and human development in general result from a certain history, and via this historical dimension the whole ethos of a given historical situation has an effect on both of them. In his lecture, Hork-

---

<sup>1</sup> Max Horkheimer -Archiv X 77.1. Vortrag gehalten am 5.5.1960 in Ingelheim am Rein Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst; veröffentlicht in: Politische Psychologie, Bd. 2: "Autoritarismus und Nationalismus - ein deutsches Problem?" Frankfurt a.M. 1963. 1. Nachschrift des Vortrags. MH "Sozialpsychologische Forschung zum Problem des Autoritarismus, Nationalismus und Antisemitismus". s.1-7. Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek. Frankfurt am Main. This lecture has been published also in Horkheimer's *Gesammelte Schriften Band 8* and in *Gesellschaft im Übergang* with the title "Gedanken zur Politischen Erziehung." In my article I have used the original manuscript but I have specified the page number in Horkheimer's *Gesammelte Schriften* edition of the article.

heimer asks a question that is very important even today: how the socially unwanted tendencies can be overcome by education?

At the foundation of Horkheimer's lecture lies a view which the Frankfurt School adopted in the forties. They were convinced of the social process drifting to final irrationality, and of the hermetic encapsulation of this same process. From 1942 to 1944, Horkheimer, together with his close friend Theodor W. Adorno, worked in Montagnola in the United States, writing the joint work *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, published in Amsterdam in 1947<sup>2</sup>. In this now very famous work, Horkheimer and Adorno profoundly criticised the western civilisation, coming to the conclusion that modernisation had lost the potential for a genuine development and rationality that was inherent in it. In the 1930's, critical theory could still explicate the objective conditions for change, as based on Karl Marx's critique of political economy. Now critical theory saw that there were no objective conditions left for change: the iron cage of progress was closed definitively.

In their book, Horkheimer and Adorno give a detailed analysis of the overall crisis that was developed as an effect of modernisation. They hold that the process of enlightenment lies behind – or influences at the basis of – modernisation, to which thus it is primary. In this view, modernisation takes the shape of a radical realisation of “archaeological” examples. The crisis that has developed via modernisation almost found its total manifestation in the irrationality and inhumanity of the Second World War. Characteristic of this overall social crisis is the unawareness of the people living in the middle of it of the fact that they live in a constant state of crisis. This ignorance is the reason for the inability of people to do anything in order to solve the crisis.

Modernisation is the triumph of instrumentalisation. In Horkheimer's writings of the 1940's, instrumentalisation seemed almost total and final. But the advancement of instrumental reason in the society did not mean the increase of genuine rationality. On the contrary, this development has led to the birth of authoritarian barbarity, instrumentalisation, and in its extreme, to the end of reason. (Horkheimer 1997a, 26–48.) The objective of a totally administered society, which was an inherent part of the project of modernisation, was not reached, only to be totalised in the end, eventually producing barbarity.

---

<sup>2</sup> The book was published as a facsimile edition in 1944, when the *Institut für Sozialforschung* was in exile in the United States. The official publication for the wider audience took place in 1947. The book received very little attention until the 1960's, and it was re-issued in 1969. When I refer to *Dialektik der Aufklärung* in this article, I use the edition of the text that has been published in Horkheimer's *Gesammelte Schriften band 5*. I have decided to take the citations from the John Cummings translation, even though there are major problems with the translation.

*Objective and subjective reason*

In his book *Eclipse of Reason*<sup>3</sup>, Horkheimer differentiates between objective and subjective reason. Objective reason is connected with the philosophical tradition in which reason is supposed to produce an extensive theory of nature, society and the human being. Objective reason is also the foundation of values, goals and the meaning of life. It is possible to criticise the inadequate social conditions with reason. Subjective reason, on the other hand, limits itself to calculation of means within a preordained system in which ends and values are taken for granted and are not criticised. (Horkheimer 1996, 3-12.)

It is essentially concerned with means and ends, with the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for granted and supposedly self-explanatory. It attaches little importance to the question whether the purposes as such are reasonable. If it concerns itself at all with ends, it takes for granted that they too are reasonable in the subjective sense, i.e. that they serve the subject's interest in relation to self-preservation. (Horkheimer 1996, 2-3.)

Horkheimer maintained that instrumental rationality sealed the iron cage of modernisation. Administrative control was spreading to all areas of life, extending to the smallest details of individual life and solidifying slowly into a mechanical apparatus. If an individual wanted to survive, it was necessary for him to adapt himself to the machinery and to become a part of it. Freedom disappeared without notice. When control was internalised as a part of subjectivity, and when it thus became more immediate, it was very difficult to recognise it as control at all. Horkheimer diagnoses this kind of rationalisation as reification, as instrumentalisation of social life (cf. Lukács 1990, 83-110). Instrumentalisation of reason for Horkheimer means that "justice, equality, happiness, tolerance, all the concepts that [...] were in preceding centuries supposed to be inherent in or sanctioned by reason, have lost their intellectual root" (Horkheimer 1996, 23).

Along with the instrumentalisation of reason, people lost their absolute value as human beings. They became mere tools, and at worst mere material to be handled. The only criterion of rationality was, and still is, that goals are reached as efficiently as possible without any extra "waste-energy" which would be consumed when, for example, reflecting on moral problems of certain actions. The price paid for efficiency, when measured in human suffering, loses completely its meaning in the calculation of expenses. Auschwitz is one example of the extremity of instrumentalisation of reason. The destruction of Jewish people, homosexuals, communists, handicapped people, confessional priests, and so on, was refined to be almost phenomenal when measured in the scale of technical efficiency. In his Ingelmeim-lecture, Horkheimer places on education

---

<sup>3</sup> *Eclipse of Reason* was published for the first time in 1947. It is based on the series of lectures that Horkheimer gave in the University of Columbia in the spring of 1944. In these lectures Horkheimer tried to present in a popular fashion the fundamental ideas from *Dialektik der Aufklärung*. It is not totally wrong to say that the book is an illustration of Horkheimer's own position on the conclusion of *Dialektik der Aufklärung*.

the mission of developing the kinds of educational practices that enable the education of critical and active subjects. It is possible for these subjects to resist instrumentalisation of reason and the inclination to authoritarianism that is inherent in it (Horkheimer 1981, 126-133).

How can we outline education, considering the overall instrumentalisation of society? It is obvious that Horkheimer's analysis of modernisation as an instrumentalisation of rational elements makes the possibility of education questionable in general. This analysis also questions the idea of rectilinear development of modernity towards a technological paradise. In Horkheimer's analysis, education is revealed as manipulation in which the conditions of instrumental rationality are handed over to the generations to come. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997, 209-210.) "Social and individual education confirms men in the objectivizing behavior of workers and protects them from reincorporation into variety of circumambient nature." (Horkheimer & Adorno 1979, 181; 1997, 210.)

Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the possibilities for educational practices oriented towards emancipation are vanishing slowly, because the extensive system does not leave them room to realise themselves. This is a consequence of the fact that "since the real emancipation of mankind did not take place with the enlightenment of mind, education itself became diseased. The greater the distance between the educated consciousness and social reality, the more it was itself exposed to the process of reification." (Horkheimer & Adorno 1979, 197; 1997, 227.) Thus the questions to be asked are: how wide is the effect of the process of instrumentalisation on educational practices, and do they have any possibility to change this deeply rooted tendency in the western civilisation? For Horkheimer, it is obvious that the only possibility of the survival of humanity is to realise moral and political aims that are inherent in *enlightenment* without the logic of domination (see Horkheimer 1996, vi).

The trend toward the emancipation of men resulted from this [O-P Moisio: i.e. individuality], but it is also a consequence of the mechanisms from which mankind must be emancipated. The independence and incomparability of the individual crystallize resistance to the blind, repressive force of the irrational whole. But, historically, this resistance was only made possible by the blindness and irrationality of each independent and incomparable individual. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1979, 241; 1997, 273)

### *The dialectical paradox of enlightenment*

Horkheimer outlines enlightenment from a specific perspective. Enlightenment indicates enlightened thinking, or the mode of thinking which posits itself to resist the mythological world-relation and tries to overthrow mythological explanations with a logic of controlling domination. It is aiming at freeing people from the might of myths and at helping them to control the nature. Horkheimer distinguishes his concept of enlightenment from a specific historical era of enlightenment. The dialectic of enlightenment indicates how enlightened rational thinking includes a mythical and irrational basis which includes a rational core. Enlightenment fights against myths, without understanding that it

at the same time constructs new myths. When enlightenment gnawed off myths on its way, it at the same time gnawed off its own feet. Enlightenment fought from the beginning against beliefs, but it did not realise that enlightenment itself was founded on the greatest belief, the belief in continuous progress. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997, 25-35.)

At the core of the dialectic of enlightenment there is, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, a fundamental choice that man had to make in the beginning of times. He had to choose between submitting himself to nature's might and the emancipation from its domination by controlling the nature. Man chose to control the nature, and the modes of action that were developed as tools to further this control have gradually moved to areas of social life via the development of modernisation. This is how the society fell back to the myth which it was supposed to be liberated from by the control of nature. Things have come full circle. In the society, the myth becomes a delusion that control, and the massive machinery created to aid it, are necessary. (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997, 62-66.)

The systems that man has created begin to live on their own, and eventually they begin to subordinate people. In this situation, the oppressors and the oppressed become parts of the all-devouring machinery. This domination is based on instrumental rationality and restricts the freedom of action. Domination leads indisputably to social retrogression, in which the progress - supposed to emancipate the humanity from the fear the might of nature inflicts on it - leads into gradually increasing violence against the human being. When we reflect on humanity as it has developed in the western world we can easily see that we have advanced in technological terms, but when we take the moral point of view we see that we have retrogressed ever deeply into primitivism. "Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their power. Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator toward men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate them." (Horkheimer & Adorno 1979, 9; 1997, 31.)

According to *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, enlightenment has brought progress with it if progress is measured in the mass of material goods, utility, and achievements in science and technology. Enlightenment has also been successful in disenchanting the world and subjugating it under rational control. Enlightenment !!!has also successfully raised the human being from the ignorance of primitivism. A dialectical paradox lies in the fact that even though enlightenment has made progress possible in some fields of life, it has at the same time brought retrogression into other fields. Horkheimer holds that enlightenment will eventually destroy itself and its achievements, because its internal logic is based on the principle of destruction.

Oswald Spengler arrives at the same kind of result in his book *The Decline of the West*. He maintains that in every civilisation there exists a certain inner logic which becomes realised in history. According to Spengler, it is inevitable that every civilisation meets its end in destruction because of this principle inherent in it. (cf. Spengler 1923.) At this point, the peculiarity of modernity

comes forth. In modernity, destruction loses its nature as a "cycle" and turns into something total, final. However, it is very important to note here that we should not conclude from these reflections that Horkheimer and Adorno were committed to a conservative critique of civilisation which interprets the world history as a series of inevitable catastrophes and destructions (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997, 200). I would like to point out that Horkheimer and Adorno clearly detached themselves from the kind of tradition of thinking that Spengler was operating in. Horkheimer and Adorno try instead to connect these kinds of reactionary arguments directed against the western civilisation and to put them into service of progressive enlightenment. Their aim is to enlighten the enlightenment.

### *Education as mimesis*

According to Horkheimer, it is natural that a child looks for an authority or a person whom she can identify with and who can help her in the first years of her life. In this way Horkheimer conceptualises a positive account of authority. In this context we can refer to it with Erich Fromm's concept of rational authority<sup>4</sup>. The lack of this kind of rational authority brings about the all-embracing, chaotic rebellion among the young people. This groundless action is connected, according to Horkheimer, to the enormous changes in the society that children cannot handle on their own. In his lecture "Sozialpsychologische Forschungen zum Problem des Autoritarismus, Nationalismus und Antisemitismus", Horkheimer reflects on the first generation that was born after the First World War, and he recognises that it lacked a rational authority. The lack of rational authority made authoritarian education possible, and the authoritarian personality was created through education. Characteristic to the authoritarian personality is the endless desire for power and the constant pursuit of power. (Horkheimer 1981, 126-127; 1985g, 354-357.) It is these character traits we need to get rid of with education – but how?

Horkheimer is talking about the mimetic element of education. In his book *Eclipse of Reason*, he conceptualises the learning process in early childhood as imitation (Horkheimer 1996, 114). Through the socialisation made possible by this imitation, the child learns to imitate rational and goal-oriented action (Horkheimer 1997a, 37). As we have noted earlier, an analogous element of individual development on the level of the development of the species is a central structure of the dialectic of enlightenment: the whole civilisation identifies with the instrumentalisation of reason. Western civilisation began with mimesis and tried in the end to overcome it by control.

---

<sup>4</sup> Fromm defines rational authority as the opposite of irrational authority. Irrational authority is based on power and fear. It serves the purpose of the authority and it is a hindrance to the growth of the individual. On the contrary, rational authority serves the attempts of the growing person to open up and develop. It is based on the equality of the educator and the person being educated. The only difference between them is the superior skill of the educator in a certain field. (Fromm 1971, 105-107)

Conscious adaptation and eventually domination replace various forms of mimesis. [...] the formula supplants the image, the calculating machine the ritual dance. To adapt oneself means to make oneself like the world of objects for the sake of self-preservation. (Horkheimer 1996, 115.)

But mimesis did not vanish completely in this development. Horkheimer thus warns us that "if the final renunciation of the mimetic impulse does not promise to lead to the fulfilment of man's potentialities, this impulse will always lie in wait, ready to break out as a destructive force. That is, if there is no other norm than the *status quo*, if all the hope of happiness that reason can offer is that it preserves the existing as it is and even increases its pressure, the mimetic impulse is never really overcome. Men revert to it in a regressive and distorted form." (Horkheimer 1996, 116.)

We have to remember that mimesis is not only the source of evil that we have to control in every way possible. Horkheimer points out that mimesis, as imitation of the aspects of nature that are sustaining life, is necessary from the viewpoint of humanity. This way we identify with maternal warmth and shelter, against paternal punishment and resignation. The task of philosophy is to help us to recall the mimetic memories of childhood, which socialisation has almost completely managed to shatter. One of the reasons for the shattering is the crisis of the family, which, according to Horkheimer, must be brought to a stop. The family must be given back the central role in the socialisation of the child. Through this manoeuvre, it would be possible to turn the mimetic impulse back to the family from the socialisation instances outside the family. (Jay 1996, 270.) By this argument, Horkheimer was reaching for the state which is closely related to the unity of word and object that is experienced in pure language.

Language reflects the longings of the oppressed and the plight of nature; it releases the mimetic impulse. The transformation of this impulse into the universal medium of language rather than into destructive action means that potentially nihilistic energies work for reconciliation. (Horkheimer 1996, 179.)

From the perspective of the individual, this state already exists in the consciousness of every child before the formation of thinking characterised by the compulsion for categorising - the state in which every noun is like a proper noun.

When Horkheimer talked about the decline of the family, he meant that the family does not have a decisive role in the socialisation of the child in modern capitalistic societies. Today, according to Horkheimer, the society socialises the child much more directly than before. This metamorphosis of socialisation, which moves the fundamental role of socialisation to the instances outside the family, will eventually lead to the decline of the family and the school. In Horkheimer's interpretation, the result of this is ever-strengthening social conformity and the decline of the individual: "Today the child imitates only performances and achievements; he accepts not ideas, but matters of fact" (Horkheimer 1970, 377). If previously the authority of the family, teachers and religious figures was essential, it now has been supplanted by "the authority of the omnipotent stan-



dards of mass society. The qualities which the child needs in this society are imposed upon him by the collectivity of the school class, and the latter is but a segment of the strictly organised society itself [...] Education is no longer a process taking place between individuals, as it was when the father prepared his son to take over his property, and the teacher supported him. Present day education is directly carried out by society itself and takes place behind the back of the family." (Horkheimer 1970, 380.) In this process, authority loses its personality and becomes anonymous. When authority is anonymous, it is almost impossible to fight against it. Life becomes completely analogous to military professionalism – life equates with preparation (Horkheimer 1970, 379). In this kind of society, adaptation and uniformity have the central role Horkheimer says that "previously, men were mere appendages to the machines, today they are appendages as such. Reflective thought and theory lose their meaning in the struggle for self-preservation" (Horkheimer 1970, 378). This way, the change in the nature of the socialisation is contributing to the vanishing of critical activity and thinking.

With the decline of the ego and its reflective reason, human relationships tend to a point wherein the rule of economy over all personal relationships, the universal control of commodities over the totality of life, turns into a new naked form of command and obedience. No longer buttressed by small scale property, the school and the home are losing their educational function of preparing men for life in society. (Horkheimer 1997a, 39.)

*Dialektik der Aufklärung* (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997, 67-103) contains an allegorical interpretation of Homer's *Odyssey* as a history of the evolution of the western subject. Odysseus's goal-oriented or end-rational journey to reach home makes him sacrifice his senses, instincts and body for the sake of the return. He makes his men fasten himself to the mast of his ship. He does this in order to be able to hear the beautiful and seductive singing of the Sirens, but at the same time he with the ropes prevents himself from the exposure to the secondary deviation in contrast to the goal of the journey.

He listens, but while bound impotently to the mast; the greater the temptation the more he has his bonds tightened – just as later the burghers would deny themselves happiness all the more doggedly as it drew closer to them with the growth of their own power. What Odysseus hears is without consequence for him; he is able only to nod his head as a sign to be set free from his bonds; but it is too late; his men, who do not listen, know only the song's danger but nothing of its beauty, and leave him at the mast in order to save him and themselves. [...] The prisoner is present at a concert, an inactive eavesdropper like the later concertgoers, and his spirited call for liberation fades like applause. (Adorno & Horkheimer 1979, 34; 1997, 57.)

A process of denial of the same kind is in the end at stake in the overall development of civilisation. The human being is forced to repress his inner nature and everything that tries to break the borders of the reticent subject that has evolved in this process. Mimesis is one of these areas of experience that break the borders of the subject. It is a concept which tries to describe the primitive and undifferentiated relation to nature. More generally, the concept of mimesis

also describes the swaying relationship between the subject and the object. The relationship with the other, which is based on mimesis, means gradual vanishing of the limits of the subject. In this process, otherness settles down for a moment as a part of the self. Only through this fusion it is possible to take the place of the other and feel empathy and compassion.

Education is basically this kind of mimetic fusion with the other. When analysed from the viewpoint of the growing child, it is experimentation with the developing, potentially present abilities that are to actualise a step further, with the help of the other. When we take the point of view of the educator, it is a capacity to take the perspective of the child, or more accurately, feel, see and experience with the eyes of the child. It is the ability to recognise the potentialities that are waiting for their realisation. As Alice Balint says, "the question is not so much about learning new things, which we hope the educators possess, than about remembering something forgotten. The fundamental presumption of solicitous upbringing is the remembrance of that which we all knew when we were children." (Balint 1973, 112.) This is what Horkheimer means when he talks about "instinctual love" (see Horkheimer 1996, 110-111). Instrumental enlightenment has also produced the destruction of instinctual love by means of the scientification of the educational situation. Through this scientification, the element in the educational situation which escapes rationality is lost behind the sham of rational control.

When we conceptualise education as mimesis, we have to reject every attempt by educational technology at determining the "right" educational practices that are based on conscious, rational action. When we accept Horkheimer's view on education, we try to create with education a vast experiential horizon for the child. By mimesis, the child identifies herself unconsciously with the person who can produce these experiences (*Erlebnis*). This significant other becomes a bridge builder between the child and the world. (Horkheimer 1981, 126-129; cf. 1985a, 442-443.)

These ideas of the mimetic element of education are closely linked with the basis of moral and compassion. Horkheimer calls this basis "the moral feeling" (cf. Horkheimer 1988). In the moral feeling, love realises Immanuel Kant's fundamental principle, by which we ought to see the other as an end in itself. If moral does not have its basis in pure practical reason, as Kant thought, we have to appeal to the motivational foundation in the process of the development of an individual consciousness, a subjectivity. According to Horkheimer, the mother-child-relationship is founded on this kind of interaction which is not tied up with means and ends. In this relationship, and in the meaning complexes of early childhood that are formed in it, lies the basis for the pre-linguistic motives which, as they encounter the social reality, form the foundation for critique and productive objectifications of imagination.

The overcoming of the chaotic element in man – which contains not only not-guided bodily impulses but also purposeless spiritual impulses – is replaced by the mere suppression and disgust for all those who let these impulses to act more freely [...] To become forming form of the self and consciousness the background of autonomous life, the motive of moral sensitivity, needs a secure childhood, the ability to ex-

perience differentially, the ability to identify with the cruelly treated happiness. (Horkheimer 1985b, 94-95.)

Horkheimer sees the mother<sup>5</sup> not only as an object of desire (when seen in the perspective of the child) but as a successful intersubjectivity and as a principle of a critical society. (cf. Fromm 1989.) The relationship between the mother and the child forms a meaning that precedes language. This relationship is essential for experiencing the world and the forms of relations between the world, the others and oneself.<sup>6</sup>

Maternal love does not consist simply in feeling or even in attitude; it must also express itself properly. The wellbeing of the little child and the trust he has in people and objects around him depend very largely on the peaceful but dynamic friendliness, warmth, and smile of the mother or her substitute. Coldness and indifference, abrupt gestures, restlessness and displeasure in the one who attends the child can introduce a permanent distortion into his relationship to objects, men, and the world, and produce a cold character that is lacking in spontaneous impulses. This was recognized, of course, as far back as Rousseau's *Emile* and John Locke, and even earlier. Only today, however, are people beginning to grasp the factors involved in the connection of which we are speaking. It does not take a sociologist to recognize that a mother who is pressed by other cares and occupations has a different effect than the one she wants. (Horkheimer 1974, 8; 1985c, 60.)

The possibility for intimate relationships of this kind has been narrowed by the dialectical process of enlightenment. The decline of the family, which I pointed out earlier, has led to the situation in which the family is no longer "a kind of second womb, in whose warmth the individual gathered the strength necessary to stand alone outside it." (Horkheimer 1995, 276.) The family does not socialise the child anymore - instead he is being directly manipulated by the mass-culture whose aim is the "disappearance of the innerlife" (Horkheimer 1995, 277). The society has turned into a mass-society whose primary goal is economical and technological, instead of cultural and spiritual, development. This will eventually lead to the mutilation of the forms of sensing and thinking. Horkheimer talks about this under the title of "the crisis of experience". "Experience is replaced by clichés, and the imagination active in experience by eager acceptance" (Horkheimer & Adorno 1997, 232). The mass-human, who has lost all his individuality, has been born by the changes in the social environment. The mass-human reacts according to predestined patterns to different stimuli. She lacks the ability to make spontaneous judgements of her own and

---

<sup>5</sup> Horkheimer is talking more about the function of the mother, that is the maternal role in the development of the child, than the actual biological mother. We have to bear in mind also the latest research about the maternal role of the father in child rearing. In the context of this article, it is not possible to value critically Horkheimer's analysis, but it is important to pay attention to different feminist critiques of this theme.

<sup>6</sup> Horkheimer rightly criticised the scientification of education. By this scientification, enlightenment destroyed the "instinctual love" that was contained in maternal love. When he saw mothers as instruments of social power, he did not reflect enough on the objective conditions of their actions or even on their subjective motivations or emotions. We have to always keep in mind the difference between the ideological stressing of maternal love and the real practices of maternal love. (cf. Benjamin 1978; Rumpf 1993.)

to have actual or real experiences. The result at the end is that "man has lost his power to conceive a world different from that in which he lives. This other world was that of art. Today it survives only in those works which uncompromisingly express the gulf between the monadic individual and his barbarous surroundings - prose like Joyce's and paintings like Picasso's *Guernica*." (Horkheimer 1995, 278.) Horkheimer thus declares that "the substance of individuality itself, to which the idea of autonomy was bound, did not survive the process of industrialization" (Horkheimer 1970, 376).

### *Authoritarianism, democracy, education*

In his essay "Autorität und Familie in der Gegenwart", Horkheimer tries to clarify the birth of the most barbarian embodiment of instrumental reason: the structuring of the fascist, or authoritarian, character. According to Horkheimer, almost a total lack of interactive situations among family members forms "the connection between servility and coldness which is characteristic for the potential fascist" (Horkheimer 1997b, 388). Obedience for the paternal authority of the family has become abstract as the foundation of the family has been gnawed away by the process of enlightenment. Submissiveness arises from the suppressed rebellion against the father, which is revealed in "the incompetence to feel empathy - empathy which is more than anything else a sign of mother's love for her child" (Horkheimer 1997b, 389.) Horkheimer interprets the coldness which is characteristic for fascist and authoritarian character as an emotional result of abandonment by the mother, of being left without motherly love, which is revealed at the end as general social hostility against everything feminine.

The I is the end-result of a long biologicopsychological development in mankind, repeated in shortened form by each individual. If this repetition of the process takes place in an abrupt way and in an overly cold and impersonal atmosphere, then a sense of separateness from others and an unapproachableness remain characteristic of the individual until the end. Love too, in its true form (the kind that embraces everyone, even the enemy), shows traces of the phase prior to the formation of the ego [...] The closer a civilization approaches the point at which the interaction in men of childlike and adult traits is disturbed in the one or the other direction, the more freedom is threatened, for freedom is expanded by the possibilities opened up by identification and love. (Horkheimer 1974b, 152.)

If we take seriously the mimetic element that is contained in education, it is necessary for us as educators to aim at a genuine tolerance, which we can make possible by freeing ourselves from prejudice. This is extremely important because, according to Horkheimer, the educator's "conscious and unconscious reactions have a central role in the education of children. They mould the child perhaps more than any specific instructions [...] of course these kinds of processes can not be reversed." (Horkheimer 1985d, 356.)

Being unprejudiced should not mean being "rigid unprejudiced", which Adorno revealed in *Authoritarian Personality*. It is characteristic for rigid unpre-

justice that the individual is tolerant on the level of phrases. She might reject a mode of thinking which is seen generally as problematic, for example against a specific group of people, but might then aim it against another minority. (Adorno 1950, 771-773.)

With tolerance, which we are talking about, we try to lay a foundation for democracy, which is a union of autonomous individuals. The fundamental interest of these individuals is to look after the mutual interests of the community. This kind of democracy has been problematised, because in a large scale it has turned into mass-democracy. Mass-democracy produces massive machine-like bureaucracies in which the individual's possibilities of acting are constantly limited. Horkheimer reminds us that the concept of democracy can be used dangerously if it is used to cover the lack of real democracy. (Horkheimer 1981, 126-131.) If this kind of situation were uncovered, the ideological character of democracy would be revealed, that is "the veil before the conflictual nature of reality." (Horkheimer 1985e, 218.)

Horkheimer (1981, 129-131) saw the modern education of his time mostly as manipulation in which the methods of controlling the nature are passed along. This is something we can say is happening more thoroughly today. In education the cognitive element of education is stressed. This means that the methods of technological knowledge and control are handed over to the next generation. Technological handling covers up the duty of bringing up autonomous and internally independent individuals. This human quality is a necessary presupposition of democracy. According to Horkheimer, power should not be exercised by nameless organisations. It should be exercised by people.

Along with the family, the school has a central role in education aimed at democracy. Horkheimer saw that schools should be formed in such a way that the teacher-pupil relation is not formed as domination, in which the teacher uses her power over and against the pupil. (Horkheimer 1981, 129-131.) But we should also be careful not to swing into the other extreme, in which the rational authority of the institution of the teacher would disappear, and chaos would enter the scene. Horkheimer stresses the task of the teacher as providing mimetic experiences. Behind this idea, we might see a glimmer of the traditional Jewish relation of the rabbi and the pupil studying the Talmud. However, in the present situation in the development of the schooling system - for example the sizes of classes are constantly growing - this kind of intimate teacher-pupil-relationship remains only a distant fantasy. We should, of course, keep this ideal relation in our minds only as the determinate negation of the present development, not as a utopic *topos* whose shores it might be possible, or even reasonable, to try to reach.

As we have seen, in Horkheimer's view the concept of education is closely linked with the concept of *Bildung*. In the mimetic element of education, the whole society, we might say, moulds the growing individual. In this process, *Bildung* as extensive human development, which is contrary to the prevailing progress of technical rationality, has a central role in discussions about education. When Horkheimer reflects on *Bildung*, he is faithful to his style and avoids

simple and uncontradictory definitions because “the reality, in which we are living and which the definition is trying to reach, is full of contradictions. Knowledge which does not provide evidence for this does not also do justice to the object.” (Horkheimer 1985f, 409-410.)

Horkheimer is not satisfied with the modern concept of *Bildung*, in which *Bildung* has become to mean “preparation” (Horkheimer 1985f, 411). The disproportion between the low level of mental abilities and the high level of technology, which is apparent in our culture, implies that *Bildung* is still needed. But the problem of the concept of *Bildung* should not be, according to Horkheimer, solved by differentiating genuine and false *Bildung* from each other. To him, *Bildung* does not mean only the activity “where a human being is trying to mould himself like a work of art” (Horkheimer 1985f, 414)<sup>7</sup>, but also the activity of “turning towards the things, in intellectual work and also in practices that are conscious of themselves. Only by attending to objectified work can an individual overcome his mere existence, which the old educational belief clung on to and in which, without this objectifying process, the individual’s sheer limited interest and thus bad, accidental universality materialises” (Horkheimer 1985f, 415)<sup>8</sup>.

Usually, *Bildung* and the civilised human being are set in contrast to lack of culture and the uncultured human being. Lack of culture is used to refer to the kind of state that is not socially mediated. To *Bildung*, and in conformity with it, to the socially mediated nature, belongs work, the human community and reason. Civilisation is defined as exclusion of everything natural, or as Sigmund Freud says, as sublimation of it. Horkheimer agrees with Freud’s analysis and argues that in the process of civilisation, the sublimated and repressed nature strikes back more strongly than ever in violent instinctive energies. (Horkheimer 1990, 132-143; 1996, 92-127.) Or as Adorno says: “That who is severing against himself redeems a right to be severing against others.” (Adorno 1995, 238.)

### Conclusion

In concluding remarks I would like to briefly reflect on the prospects and obstacles in the ideas developed here. Horkheimer’s views are more or less strictly connected with Freud’s theory of human development. This theory has been rightly criticised, and it is not appropriate to state again the already stated criticism here. The situation is the same with Freud’s views on the family. The blind spot in Horkheimer’s analysis lies in fact in his application of the conclusions of Freud’s theory. This is true even though Horkheimer was critical of certain aspects of Freud’s theory. (cf. Rumpf 1993.) Horkheimer’s own childhood experi-

<sup>7</sup> cf. the romantic view of education (*Bildung*) in idealism. The best examples of this are Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834).

<sup>8</sup> cf. Hegel’s views on *Bildung*

ences (see for example Horkheimer 1985a, 442-443.) may have influenced his view on the decline of the family. Horkheimer's childhood home was an *archetype* of the bourgeois family in which the father was a successful businessman and the mother an open-hearted human being. Judaism, which Horkheimer's childhood family was practicing, influenced on its part his idealisation of the bourgeoisie family. These experiences in the end made it impossible for Horkheimer to see past the patriarchal family, and this is the point where we should be critical about his analysis. But I would like to maintain that we should take Horkheimer's analysis seriously as a warning, not so much of the disappearance of a certain kind of form of family, but of the withering away of the content of the family as such: the disappearance or the fading of the family's - be its form whatever - role and the stronger hold that the mass-society has on the growing individual.

Today there are many different modes of critique that try to influence educational practices. If we reflect on this at the much generalised level, in almost all of the critical pedagogy the aim is to form education as a symmetrical, dialogical, discursive and communicative relationship. But do these catchwords give us any more hope than the conventional educational practices? I am afraid not. When we look at it from the basis of Horkheimer's analysis, this kind of thinking is seen as hopelessly one-sided. We might argue that the relationship between the teacher and the pupil is asymmetrical at a fundamental level. This is based on the fact that the situation is structured according to two human beings that are at a different level of development. But the conscious aim should be of course to produce a symmetrical relationship between the teacher and the pupil, through socialisation. In this picture, the educator is seen as a certain kind of suicide who presupposes that the child should overcome the rational authority of the educator and should set herself as an acting and autonomous subject. Seen this way, there is a constant balancing in education between the elements of support towards individuality and socialisation.

We should not get tired of stressing the fundamental connection between education and the social process as a whole. I do not see any possibility of formulating tricks which could be written down to curricula and to the "how to be a good teacher" -books, and which would prevent the situation from developing further. In the mimetic element of education, the whole society sneaks into the educational situation through unconscious reactions of the teacher and the pupil. Seen from this angle, the condition for a change in education is a change in the society and in its different dimensions. To the question how this could be achieved, Horkheimer does not provide an answer.

Horkheimer's theoretical views on education are almost completely negative. They do not show any way to salvation, but instead settle with criticising existing educational practices. They contain only Walter Benjamin's now famous dictum, "hope of the hopeless". Nevertheless, Horkheimer's ideas open doors for us to formulate critical tools for education. With these tools, we are able to approach critically both conventional and critical pedagogies. One of the most important aspects is that we should not overstress handing down the

methods of cognitive collection of knowledge and control of nature. Instead, we should see the specific aspects of feeling and practice in education. These aspects have a central role in the search for emancipatory educational practices.

In spite of all of their negativity, Horkheimer's ideas about education found a practical form in projects of re-education he was directing in post-war Germany with the help of the American Jewish Committee. In the Horkheimer-Pollock Archives in Frankfurt am Main there is a vast amount of documents that show how deeply Horkheimer was involved in these projects. The aim of the projects was to educate professionals of education in such a way that the authoritarian dimension of their character would be erased. Leo Löwenthal, a member of the *Institut für Sozialforschung*, remembered in one of his interviews that it was much earlier, while he was in United States editing the *Studies of Prejudice* series, that Horkheimer had this practical side to his thoughts. Löwenthal says that "Horkheimer's dream, which was never fulfilled, was that each of these books in the series *Studies in Prejudice* should be rewritten in the form of small booklets in popular format for distribution in a given situation of anti-Semitic political outbreaks or the like in America – namely, to teachers, students, politicians, that is, to so-called multipliers. That was sort of the idea of a political-educational mass inoculation program [...]" (Löwenthal 1987, 136). Maybe the hope of trying to build an educationally better tomorrow lies in this – in the education of the educators themselves<sup>9</sup>.

---

<sup>9</sup> We should not think today that this would be enough. That would be far too optimistic. Why Horkheimer participated in re-education of the post-war-Germany teachers and educators is a practical reaction to the historical experience that his generation had. After Horkheimer returned to the Germany in the 1950'ies he lived in a constant fear. We might say as Jürgen Habermas once formulated that he lived "as if he were sitting on unopened suitcases" (Habermas 1986, 218). He was sure that either nazis or communists would gain eventually power and plant their totalitarian order to the Europe. So he had to participate in the re-education that much he had a true pragmatist in him as Löwenthal pointed out.



## REFERENCES

- Adorno, T. W. 1950, "Types and Syndromes." In Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, Sanford *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Norton, 744-783.
- Adorno, T. W. 1995, „Kasvatus Auschwitzin jälkeen.“ In Juha Koivisto, Markku Mäki & Juha Koivistoinen (eds.), *Mitä on valistus?* Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Balint, A. 1973, *Psychanalyse der frühe Lebensjahre*. München.
- Benjamin, J. 1978, "Authority and the Family revisited: or, A World without Fathers." In *New German Critique*, talvi 1978, 13:35-57.
- Fromm, E. 1989, "Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung das Mutterrechtstheorie." In Erich Fromm, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band.I, Stuttgart: dtv. 85-109.
- Habermas, J. 1986, „Critical Theory and the Frankfurt University.“ In Peter Dews (eds.), *Habermas: Autonomy and solidarity. Interviews with Jürgen Habermas*. London: Verso. 211-222.
- Horkheimer, M & Adorno, T. W. 1997, "Dialektik der Aufklärung." In Max Horkheimer *Gesammelte Schriften* Band 5, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 13-290.
- Horkheimer, M. 1974, "Threats to Freedom." In *Critique of Instrumental Reason*, New York: Continuum.
- Horkheimer, M. 1981, "Gedanken zur Politischen Erziehung." In Max Horkheimer *Gesellschaft im Übergang. Aufsätze, Reden und Vorträge 1942-1970*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 126-133.
- Horkheimer, M. 1985a, "Das Schlimme erwarten und doch das Gute versuchen. [Gespräch mit Gerhard Rein]." In Max Horkheimer *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 7, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 442-479.
- Horkheimer, M. 1985b, "Philosophie als Kultur Kritik." In Max Horkheimer *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 7, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. 81-103.
- Horkheimer, M. 1985c, "Zum Begriff des Menschen." In Max Horkheimer *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 7, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 55-80
- Horkheimer, M. 1985d, "Was wir 'Sinn' nennen, wird verschwinden. [Gespräch mit Georg Wolff und Helmut Gumnior]." In Max Horkheimer *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 7, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 345-357.
- Horkheimer, M. 1985e, "[Über Sinn und Grenzen einer soziologischen Behandlung der Philosophie]." In Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* Band 11. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 209-220.
- Horkheimer, M. 1985f, "Begriff der Bildung." In Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* Band 8. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 409-419.
- Horkheimer, M. 1985g, "Die Situation des junge Menschen heute." In Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften* Band 8. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 354-357.
- Horkheimer, M. 1988, "Materialismus und Moral." In Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 3, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 111-149.

- Horkheimer, M. 1995, "Art and Mass Culture." In *Critical Theory. Selected Essays*. New York: Continuum. 273-290.
- Horkheimer, M. 1996, *Eclipse of Reason*. New York: Continuum.
- Horkheimer, M. 1997, "Autorität und Familie in der Gegenwart." In Max Horkheimer *Gesammelte Schriften* Band 5, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 377-395.
- Jay, M. 1996, *The Dialectical Imagination*. Lontoo: University of California Press.
- Lowenthal, L. 1987, "Scholarly Biography." In Lowenthal, *An Unmastered Past*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 111-138.
- Lukács, G. 1990, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat." In Georg Lukács *History and Class Consciousness*. Lontoo: Merlin Press, 83-222.
- Rumpf, M. 1993, "'Mystical Aura': Imagination and the Reality of the 'Maternal' in Horkheimer's Writings." In Benhabib, Bonß, McCole (toim.), *On Max Horkheimer. New Perspectives*. Cambridge: MIT. 309-334. Laajempi versio on julkaistu aikaisemmin teoksessa Rumpf, *Spuren des Mütterlichen*. Frankfurt am Main: Materialis Verlag. 1989, 15-51.
- Spengler, O. 1923, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*. München.

### 3 WHAT IT MEANS TO BE A STRANGER TO ONESELF

*Will be published in Journal of Educational Philosophy and Theory. DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI) 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00386.x.*

Individuation is not that you become an ego; you would then be an individualist [ ... ] a person who did not succeed at individuating. [ ... ] Individuating is becoming that which is not the ego, and that is very strange. Nobody understands what the self is, because the self is just what you are not [ ... ] if you function through your self, you are not yourself - that is what you feel [ ... ] as if you were a stranger. (C-G. Jung, 1954)

In adult education we continually run up against the problem of prefabricated and in many respects fixed views of the actors. As we think about the possibility of radical learning in adult education, these hardened worldviews and inflexible thinking put serious constraints on critical pedagogy and its hope of liberating individuals. I will argue in connection to this possibility of liberation that the starting point of radical or critical adult education should be the destruction of the walls of belief that people build around themselves in the course of their lives. I will use the term *gentle shattering of identities*, as usually these identities, which have developed in constant interaction with the whole cultural ethos of a given time, are constant and not fully articulated even by the individual in question.

In a fundamental sense, we are - or our personality is structured - as a stranger within us. This was one of the insights that led Sigmund Freud to formulate his psychoanalytical theory of the human psyche. Being a stranger to oneself is what the Unconscious is all about, but this insight lays one open to the passion which led Narcissus not only to egoism but to amnesia and death. This estrangement is something that poses serious ethical issues to the teacher who is engaged in promoting radical learning. What right have we to break down the world that an individual has laboriously produced for herself? Can we articulate a fundamental reason to legitimate the use of such an imperialistic method?

When we, as adult educators, are trying to *gently shatter* these solidified identities and prepackaged ways of being and acting in the world, we are moving in the field of questions that Sigmund Freud (1936) tried to elaborate in his letter to Romain Rolland that was published as *Brief an Roman Rolland (Eine Erinnerungsstörung auf der Akropolis)*. In this letter, Freud uses the concepts of 'de-personalization' and 'de-realization' to make a distinction between two distinct processes in a certain experience that he has undergone. At the same time, he raises the question of the possibility of believing that something is, and simultaneously having a fundamental skeptical attitude towards this given or towards the cognitive argument that we use to communicate it to ourselves and others.

In this article, I will ask if it would be fruitful to see the starting point of radical adult education from the viewpoint of depersonalization. Can we integrate the idea of learning in general, and radical adult education in particular, with the idea of being a stranger to oneself as a legitimate and sensible experiential point of departure? I know that some serious reservations have to be acknowledged here, as there is a possible and plausible way of seeing the issues involved. This alternative viewpoint to the question I have raised can be formulated as Ann Morrow Lindbergh did in 1955:

It is not physical solitude that actually separates one from others; not physical isolation, but spiritual isolation. It is not the desert island nor the stony wilderness that cuts you from the people you love. It is the wilderness in the mind, the desert wastes in the heart through which one wanders lost and a stranger. When one is a stranger to oneself then one is estranged from others too. If one is out of touch with oneself, then one cannot touch others. How often in a large city, shaking hands with my friends, I have felt the wilderness stretching between us. Both of us were wandering in arid wastes, having lost the springs that nourished us - or having found them dry. Only when one is connected to one's own core is one connected to others, I am beginning to discover. And, for me, the core, the inner spring, can best be refound through solitude. (Lindbergh, 1955, p. 44)

In this citation from the book *Gift from the Sea*, the use of the phrase 'stranger to oneself' is markedly different from my use of these words. I will try to articulate the problem of fixed and more or less solidified personalities. We can argue by generalizing that this kind of person knows herself and the world in a rigid sense. Usually she cannot see, understand or even tolerate other, alternative ways of being in the situation in which she finds herself. In fact, she has a megalomaniac or oceanic feeling of being the centre of the situation or the whole world.

What Ann Morrow Lindbergh tries to capture in her text must be seen against the background of fixed and solidified personalities. In this way, we can say that her argument, 'When one is a stranger to oneself then one is estranged from others' could be read as an opportunity for the start of radical learning. In a sense, if one is able to sense or understand what Lindbergh is articulating, one has actually moved further away from the real problem, i.e. the problem of people drifting further away from each other. In this case, one has stepped out

from the competitive attitude of marketing orientation that Erich Fromm elaborated in his various works.

In Lindbergh's argument, there is also obviously present one of the central dimensions of the Buddhist notion of *Tat twam asi* (this is you) – the idea that we as living beings are in some fundamental way interconnected. In fact, 'we are the *same*' is a general starting point of Buddhism, as the famous story about a Buddhist novice and the Great Spirit tells us. In this story, we hear how one beautiful day a Buddhist novice and the Great Spirit were standing by the side of a road that wandered through the countryside. The Great Spirit had caused the people, animals, plants etc. to go past them, and every time one of them was passing by, the Spirit pointed towards it and said *Tat twam asi*, this is you. In a (adjectival) sense, as Avishai Margalit (2005) has elaborated, we all deserve respect because we are icons of one another. We all are part of humanity. This attitude has nothing to do with individualism but is in a fundamental sense the idea of an ethical individual – the ethical individual who is able to stand against the currents of the given time, if these currents are against the best interests of humanity.

The starting point of radical education should be that we all have dignity as human beings. This dignity of a person should not be violated. The problem is: In what sense can we say that human dignity is an intrinsic value inherent in every human being? If human dignity belongs to every human being, then it is obvious that it transcends any social order as the basis for rights, and it is neither granted by society nor can it be legitimately violated by society. Learning this requires a special kind of educational setting usually absent from the current profit-oriented university. Students must be able to articulate their own life-worlds as definite parts of the educational situation. One of the hardest questions is: How can we promote the need for a different kind of learning if this need is not organically present in the students?

We all want to be part of a meaningful whole, even if this whole is only a fiction. This is also one reason we usually get used to whatever situation we find ourselves in. We try to find a meaning or, better still, we want to tell the meaning of this or that situation to be able to feel safe and at home and to fit in. If I feel my self as a stranger inside, then I see everyone as a stranger, too, and cannot find my way back to fruitful interaction with others. I have become estranged from myself as well as others living in me and through me. But to be able to value this notion is to be able to see the world and oneself differently from this hyper, self-centred, narcissistically oriented lifestyle of ours. It is a hard fact that the educational system is producing and moulding characters for society, and society is oriented towards marketing. In this situation, it is imperative that in pedagogical elaborations we start to think through the limits of truly emancipating humans through educational means. By this kind of theoretical and empirical work, we might be able to see the points that truly matter when we try to envision the kind of education that could do the job of liberation and show the way back to fruitful interaction with oneself, others, and the world.

Horkheimer and Adorno (2002, p. 11) argued that the fundamental aspect of Western thought is that 'nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the "outside" is the real source of fear'. This is the safe haven for the human being who is confronted with the alien world or herself as something non-recognizable to herself – as being outside of herself. Adorno (1973, p. 22) wrote in his *Negative Dialectics* that idealism was a rage against the world too alien to be dominated. In the same manner we might argue that identity is a reduction of the other to the same. Against this Adorno (1973, p. 43) argues that we must try to let the object be and help it to become what it is.

Martin Jay (1984, p. 68) wrote in his beautiful little book on Adorno, that letting the object be means 'the restoration of difference and non-identity to their proper place in the non-hierarchical constellation of subjective and objective forces he called peace.' In a sense the object needs the subject to get it wrong and this is what I understand by the *gentle shattering of identities*. With concepts thinking tries to evade the nausea produced by the fact that something repels us as alien. This thinking in rage tries to get a hold on the object that keeps slipping away with the help of identity between subject and object. In helping the object be what it is, we might at the same time find a starting point for all radical learning. The concepts that we use as we try to cover the object are only shadows and never can cover the object, and the humane subject understands this.

The starting point of the articulation of meaningful and fruitful interaction with oneself, others, and the world is narrated by us to ourselves. Hannah Arendt (1958) once argued that as we tell stories of our lives we engage in the process of creating a common world. In a way, Arendt is correct in arguing that the act of telling stories forms – or tries to form – our articulated, commonly shared, meaningful world and our part in this meaningful whole. But if we carefully analyse these stories in which people are trying to share the world, i.e. national, political, and religious myths, we do not actually see the essential nature of the reality as a narratively constructed shared entity. In fact, we find out instead that our world is not shared. This analysis unfolds the conflictual and oppositional nature of the stories themselves. The feeling of de-personalisation or de-realisation is a knot that, when opened, reveals this conflictual dimension of our world and ourselves.

### **Critical Pedagogy or the Invitation to See the World in a Different Light**

A great deal of adult education – be it critical, radical or conventional – has to do with proposing or inviting people to see things from a new, unusual viewpoint compared to that of the students' ordinary lives. If we take a glance at history, this invitation to see the world from an extraordinary viewpoint has been executed mostly by symbolic violence. People were forced or coerced to accept this or that opinion, which the teacher or the institution happened to accept as a true statement of the issues involved. In this setting, teachers and pupils are working hard as they try to develop a collective or individual identity that would guard against the possible challenges to their own

hegemonic viewpoint. The other is crushed in the stages of symbolic violence, and sometimes in concrete physical existence as well (cf. Gur-Ze'ev, 2004).

To capture the problems of such schoolmaster-based teaching, critical pedagogy has reached out for the theory of indoctrination (cf. White, 1972; Snook, 1972). Historically, most teachers were indoctrinating pupils to accept their general world-views. In relation to this, it is obvious that if education in general and schooling in particular should reach its goal of helping to promote the birth of autonomous individuality, we have to get rid of teaching that is imposing truth. But to correct that way of teaching with the manoeuvre that has been proposed over the last four decades is something I hesitate to accept as such. Communicative or dialogical pedagogy, which is being produced in academia these days, is something that I do not see as a final solution to the problem which I am trying to articulate more carefully in this article.

I might argue that the Gadamerian fusion of horizons of experience, which is the fundamental dimension, for example, in dialogical pedagogy or most of the so-called hermeneutical pedagogy, is not dialectical enough (cf. Gallagher, 1995). For example, what if the world-view of the pupil is absolutely wrong? It would be quite easy to dismiss her arguments if her skills in rational and rhetorical argumentation were not as good as those of most university graduates. But what if she is able to argue rationally and dialogically that there are people who are not human beings? Or that the holocaust never actually took place – that it is only a sham produced by the victorious powers to undermine the positive sides of the Third Reich? I might argue that in these kinds of extreme situations the dialogical synthesis is out of reach – the centre cannot hold, as William Butler Yeats said in his *The Second Coming*. Communicative and dialogical pedagogy can be used without a problem as a way to organize the educational situation with so-called normal, quite well socialized persons who have the required communicative and linguistic skills and are formed, as the liberal ideal might suggest, as self-directed persons. They also must have the ability to step out of their own way of seeing things and to evaluate the legitimacy of arguments of others as well as their own. In this case, we must seriously ask how many of us have these competencies.

The limits of our possibilities as teachers to liberate, to emancipate and to free critical thought begin to emerge when we try to reach persons that are not socialized according to the desired liberal ideal. We can find many good examples of this in history. For example, in post Second World War Germany the true and acute problem of authoritarian personality was faced inside the educational system. Large re-education programs were carried out, and the plan was to get rid of the authoritarian personality structure that the Nazi educational system had produced for the teachers and officials alike. Also post-Apartheid South Africa can be seen as an example of this, as the old ideology has been demolished but people and institutions still tend to act in accordance with the old maxims. The Israeli philosopher of education Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (2004) has also described vividly how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict bears many similarities to these.

One way to open up the problematic is to make use of the concept of *social character* developed by Erich Fromm in the 1930's. The concept can be seen as an answer to the problem that Friedrich Engels formulated in 1893 in a letter to Franz Mehring when he wrote that:

... there is only one other point lacking, which, however, Marx and I always failed to stress enough in our writings and in regard to which we are all equally guilty. That is to say, we all lay, and were bound to lay, the main emphasis, in the first place, on the derivation of political, juridical and other ideological notions, and of actions arising through the medium of these notions, from basic economic facts. But in so doing we neglected the formal side – the ways and means by which these notions, etc., come about – for the sake of the content. (Engels, 1893, p. 161)

In Fromm's view the basic problem of Marx and Engels was that they did not yet have adequate psychological concepts to articulate the answer that he was able to develop via a fusion of psychoanalysis and Marxian arguments.

Fromm started to use the term *social character* at the end of the 1930's. The first systematic description of it can be found in the appendix of the book *Escape from Freedom* in 1941, but the idea behind the concept had already taken shape in Fromm's mind much earlier. In a short but essential text, 'Psychoanalyse und Soziologie' of 1928, he writes that 'the subject of sociology, society, in reality consists of individuals [ ... ] Human beings do not have one "individual psyche", which functions when a person performs as an individual and so becomes the object of psychoanalysis, contrasted to a completely separate "mass psyche" with all sorts of mass instincts, as well as vague feelings of community and solidarity, which spring into action whenever a person performs as part of a mass' (Fromm, 1929, p. 3). Rather, the individual must be understood as socialized a priori, and thus the psyche is to be understood as being 'developed and determined through the relationship of the individual to society' (ibid., p. 5).

Following certain insights of Freud in *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*, Fromm developed a social psychology that tries to comprehend the psychic structure through the individual's life experiences. So in a sense, Fromm's social psychology proceeds according to the same methods as his psychology of the individual. Fromm (1930a, p. 17) writes that 'social psychology wishes to investigate how certain psychic attitudes common to members of a group are related to their common life experiences'. Here Fromm writes about 'common life experience', which must be distinguished from 'individual life experience'. When we are interested in 'individual life experience', we must take into consideration the sibling order or whether the individual is the only child in the family. We must also understand the possible illnesses and 'chance' occurrences of an individual, because they have a strong influence on the libidinal structure. On the other hand, the 'common life experience' of a group mainly refers to the economic, social and political conditions that determine the way of life for the group.

Fromm was part of the group that at the end of the 1920's was already becoming strongly critical towards Freud's original theory. Through the 1930's, he developed his concepts so that in 1941 he could write in the end of *Escape*



from *Freedom* that 'we believe that man is primarily a social being, and not, as Freud assumes, primarily self-sufficient and only secondarily in need of others in order to satisfy his instinctual needs. In this sense, we believe that individual psychology is fundamentally social psychology or, in Sullivan's terms, the psychology of interpersonal relationships; the key problem of psychology is that of the particular kind of relatedness of the individual toward the world, not that of satisfaction or frustration of single instinctual desires' (1941, p. 290).

Fromm's main interest in looking at the individual is always what he calls the 'social character'. The point is that if you look at any particular person, you are primarily confronted with those psychic strivings and impulses, both conscious and unconscious, which this specific person has in common with other persons living under the same socio-economic circumstances. Fromm wrote in 1937:

... individual life practice is necessarily determined by the life practice of his society or class and in the last analysis, by the manner of production of his society that means, by how this society produces, how it is organized to satisfy the needs of its members. The differences in the manner of production and life of various societies or classes lead to the development of different character structures typical of the particular society. Various societies differ from each other not only in differences in their manner of production and their social and political organization but also in that their people exhibit a typical character structure despite all individual differences. We call this the 'socially typical character'. (Fromm, 1937, p. 222)

Of course, these character orientations and traits are mediated by the parents and other 'objects' to which the person was and is related. But these object relations are to be understood as representatives of socially given and moulded orientations, expectations and frame of reference.

The radical learning that I have in mind is a process of becoming aware of the frame of reference within which we think, feel, and act. This frame of reference contains not only an individual life history but also the whole life-process of a given society. That is why I have argued that - if this referential background of thought processes can be opened up - critical pedagogy should also contain the critical analysis of the given time and not only the so-called grounded theories or general more or less theoretically based theories of society, etc. (see Moisio & Suoranta, 2006).

Max Horkheimer wrote 'That all our thoughts, true or false, depend on conditions that can change ... . It is not clear to me why the fact of *seinsgebundenheit* (being historically conditioned) should affect the truth of a judgement - why shouldn't insight be just as *seinsgebunden* as error?' (Horkheimer, 1993, pp. 140-141). Horkheimer criticised, in his article 'On the Problem of Truth', the equation of fallibility and relativity. To grant that there is no final theory of reality is not to abandon the distinction between truth and error. This is something that needs to be clearly articulated today. We tend to make this distinction in relation to the 'available means of knowledge,' as Horkheimer puts it. The claim that a belief is true must stand the test of experience and practice in the present. Karl Marx has pointed this out many times, most notably in his *Theses on Feuerbach*. Knowing that we are fallible, that

what stands the test today may well fail to do so tomorrow or in the next century, does not prevent us, or even exempt us, from making and defending claims to truth here and now.

Radical learning consists of becoming critical of the adequacy of the frame of reference, being aware of its origins both in one's own individual life history and in the broader cultural and social setting, actively developing more adequate and inclusive ways to be, to judge and to act, learning to discriminate experience, and finally, taking active part in the world. Various theoreticians have described this idea in different words. Paulo Freire (1972) calls it *conscientization*, Jack Mezirow (1990) calls it *transformative learning*, Jane Thompson speaks of *critical intelligence* and *really useful knowledge* (Mayo & Thompson, 1996), and Stephen Brookfield calls it *critical reflection* (1995). All of them are interested in the processes that have to do with examining personal and social frames of reference within which we think, feel, and act.

Attempts to link classroom instruction to community contexts are nowhere more important than during teachers' clinical experiences. On these occasions, prospective teachers should be assisted in making connections with progressive community organizations, especially those affiliated with local governmental council meetings, and in interviewing community leaders and workers in various community agencies linked to the school. This enhances the possibility that progressive teachers will make critically reflective links between classroom practices and the ethos of and needs of the surrounding social and cultural milieu. (Giroux, 2005, p. 244)

Analysis of the surrounding cultural context and the ethos of the given time is the fundamental part of self-understanding and the praxis of critical teaching, as Giroux argues in the previous quote. The civil society provides contexts in which some of the most difficult philosophical concepts come alive. They materialize as concrete practical action – be it the concept of freedom, respect, human dignity, inequality – and students have an opportunity to take a stand on the problematics of the given time. As Herbert Marcuse wrote in 1967:

... education today is more than discussion, more than teaching and learning and writing. Unless and until it goes beyond the classroom, until and unless it goes beyond the college, the school, the university, it will remain powerless. Education today must involve the mind and the body, reason and imagination, the intellectual and the instinctual needs, because our entire existence has become the subject/object of politics, of social engineering. I emphasize, it is not a question of making the schools and universities, of making the educational system political. The educational system is political already. (Marcuse, 2005, p. 85)

The question remains how to open up the forum or the medium through which teachers and pupils alike can become aware of this political dimension of teaching and learning. One obvious way would be the road that Marcuse, Freire, and Giroux among others have proposed. This road would be a total bringing down of the walls between the educational system and the actors of civil society. Would it not be productive for a student of philosophy to be able to take part in some civic action? As she faces the concrete problematic of people living in the commonplaceness of social justice and injustice, she might be able to form a political question that entwines round the conceptual question. This kind of

experiential dimension of education would open up a forum where the teacher could articulate more accurately the connections between her own way of being a teacher – its practical dimensions and theoretical tools – and the surrounding social setting. At the same time, the theoretical and the real material world can be brought to a fruitful interaction. Concepts are living material principles in our commonly shared lifeworld – be it consciously or unconsciously.

### **The Other in Me or Can We Break the Dialectic of the Lord and the Bondsman?**

G. W. F. Hegel (1807) also develops in his *Phenomenologie des Geistes* – while describing the development of self-consciousness – a way to describe the development of individual and collective identities, as I have been elaborating above. As is well known, in the so-called dialectics of the lord and the bondsman he sees that the dialectical movement seems to have reached a standstill. Both parties require the other for their self-consciousness. Hegel describes how self-consciousness develops via the other's self-consciousness and how, in fact, individual consciousness is purely empty. If we think of the dynamics of people forming their views of the world, we see that these identity projects have been caught up in a situation of the same kind. In this situation, both parties construct and promote their own identity by denying the otherness of the other and her legitimacy to it. But the case is, in fact, that their identities develop exactly in this denied other that they try to fend off.

Hegel (1807, §§178–186) starts his elaboration by writing that consciousness exists only when it is acknowledged or recognized. At first, self-consciousness is already outside of itself – it has lost itself. It externalizes itself as another to itself in order to be, but when it recognizes only itself in the other, which is created at the same time, it supersedes this otherness. Transcendence of the self is for Hegel the return to the self, which, at the same time, enables the otherness of the other. The movement of self-consciousness is, in fact, movement of two separate self-consciousnesses in which the other shows itself not only as an object of desire but also as a separate independent being. In this movement, the acts of both self-consciousnesses entwine with each other. To the self-consciousness that is for itself and is as such individual, the other shows itself only as negativity.

Where two self-conscious individuals meet each other, there begins a struggle for life and death. Both want the other's self to disappear and their own self to continue its existence. This struggle is an essential condition for the development of the certainty of the self. The life and death struggle unveils to the two self-consciousnesses that life is as essential to them as consciousness itself. They both have to stay alive, because the death of one or the other in this struggle will not resolve the tension between them. In this situation, the depreciation of the other takes a new form. The goal here is to make the other thing-like and dependent. Hegel names this a relationship between the lord and the bondsman (Hegel, 1807, §§187–189).

When the relationship is formed this way, the lord is able to enjoy the things that the bondman prepares for him. The self-consciousness of the lord takes place in the self-consciousness of the bondman. The relation of the two self-consciousnesses is also revealed in several punitive, constraining, and rewarding instruments that the lord uses to keep the bondman in line. The bondman is not able to overcome the thingness of things because the lord has the power over the things and also reaps all the enjoyment of these things. The situation is essentially unbalanced because the bondman's work does not serve himself, and he gives up his being-for-self in favour of the lord. The lord uses him as an instrument of manipulation and mastering of the things for his own purposes (Hegel, 1807, §§190–191).

What is paradoxical in this situation, though, is that the lord does not receive the needed reciprocal recognition for her self-consciousness in order to develop further. The bondman is part and parcel of the total objective situation. The lord is dependent on the bondman's self-consciousness and therefore cannot develop the fully realised independence that his self-consciousness demands. If we are looking for the truth of the independent self-consciousness, Hegel writes, we have to look for it in the bondman and not in the lord. By working on things, the bondman develops a genuine self-consciousness because he is able to overcome the otherness and existence of material thinghood more thoroughly than the lord (Hegel, 1807, §§191–195).

Here the dialectics come to a standstill. This is the point in Hegel's argument from which Karl Marx took off. He showed how this situation can be overcome and how the true liberation of the bondman can be reached. Hegel saw only the freedom that the bondman is able to grasp in his self-consciousness, but this was not true freedom for Marx, as we all know. We might argue like Axel Honneth (1995, p. 20) that Marx's theory of the proletarian consciousness can be seen as a kind of 'empirical-historical application' of the developmental theory of consciousness as outlined by Hegel above. Honneth criticises the Marx of the *Paris Manuscripts* in that he was never able to bridge the gap between the anthropologically grounded status of work as an act of self-objectification and alienated social labour (Honneth, 1995, p. 21). He argues that Hegel's dialectic 'provides Marx a philosophical-historical background theme, but not an interpretative key to the empirical analysis of capitalist social relations'.

In another sense, we can read Hegel's story as a great metaphor of education. Immanuel Kant (1803, p. 697) wrote in his 'Über Pädagogik' that 'Man is the only being who needs education. For by education we must understand nurture (the tending and feeding of the child), discipline (Zucht), and teaching, together with culture. ( ... ) Man can only become man by education. He is merely what education makes of him.' For Kant, education is a tool that can be used to realize the potentiality for freedom and autonomous use of reason in every human being. But because of this, education also inevitably includes compulsion. Kant (1803, pp. 712–713) writes in his 'Über Pädagogik' about discipline, coercion, and cultivation, and he thinks that these educational tools change an animal into a man. What he means is that a human being does

not have instincts that steer the actions of animals and this is why he needs a faculty for the autonomous use of reason. A human being is not immediately able to use her reason in an autonomous way, and this is why human interaction at a symbolic level should be arranged in a way that enables this autonomy. Thus, the pedagogical paradox is that we need to be coerced to be free.

This same paradox is visible in Hegel's theory of the dialectics of the lord and the bondsman. He writes that 'without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at a formal stage, and does not extend to the known real world of existence. Without formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not become explicitly *for itself*' (Hegel, 1807, §196). By manipulating the world of things, the bondsman finds a way to overcome his own mere existence of thinghood. At the same time, he overcomes his own fear when faced with the absolute otherness of the lord. In connection to education, it seems that Hegel is proposing that if the upbringing is lacking discipline, then self-consciousness is trivialized and is 'only an empty self-centred attitude'. In a sense, some amount of colonialism over the pupils' consciousness at certain stages of development is justified here.

Hegel's ideas about education are conservative in the modern sense of the word. But I must say that it is very far from the political sense of the word, as Hegel's ideas were quite radical in their own time. It would be better to link conservative education more or less to the idea of 'conservation', of preserving the world as it is with the help of education. By introducing children to our common world as it is, the educator gives them the basis that constitutes necessary preparation for starting something new - which is the political task of their adult life (Arendt, 1993, p. 189).

Arendt proposed this kind of connection with her concepts of conservative education and conservation of the world (cf. Gordon, 2001). Her ideas were actually quite controversial as she connected this idea of conservation with her views on authority, but her views still left open the need for democratic education (cf. Schutz, 2001). In Arendt's mind, the teacher as an authority simply means primarily that the teacher has a responsibility toward the world as it is, on the one hand, and towards the children's possibility of renewal and creativity, on the other. In a paradoxical sense, Arendt was promoting the idea that conservation of the old is needed for the sake of something new to emerge.

### **Experience on Acropolis or I Have Finally Been Caught by the Presence of the Other in Me**

I think that Sigmund Freud in his letter to Romain Rolland was trying to capture a similar situation as Hegel with the exception that it occurs inside one person's psyche. In the letter, Freud writes about his own experience when he finally visited his childhood dream, the Acropolis.

When, finally [ ... ] I stood on the Acropolis and cast my eyes around upon the landscape, a surprising thought suddenly entered my mind: 'So all this really does

exist, just as we learnt at school!' To describe the situation more accurately, the person who gave expression to the remark was divided, far more sharply than was usually noticeable, from another person who took cognizance of the remark; and both were astonished, though not by the same thing. The first behaved as though he were obliged, under the impact of an unequivocal observation, to believe in something the reality of which had hitherto seemed doubtful. If I may make a slight exaggeration, it was as if someone, walking beside Loch Ness, suddenly caught sight of the form of the famous Monster stranded upon the shore and found himself driven to the admission: 'So it really does exist - the sea-serpent we've never believed in!' The second person, on the other hand, was justifiably astonished, because he had been unaware that the real existence of Athens, the Acropolis, and the landscape around it had ever been objects of doubt. What he had been expecting was rather some expression of delight or admiration. (Freud, 1936, pp. 240-241)

Freud describes how, in his experience on the Acropolis, there happens something approximating the division of personality when he is finally facing this long anticipated ancient place. Freud argues that these kinds of estrangements are quite usual in a normal personality but in certain disorders they are far more frequent. In the previous quote, Freud tells about the kind of experience that, in the latter part of his essay, he conceptualizes as *de-realization*. In *de-realization*, a part of reality is strange to a person who is having the experience. But what is even more, what Freud calls *de-personalization* is internally connected with *de-realization*. Freud (1936, p. 245) argues that these processes are two distinct developments, but I think we can heuristically read something valuable in his letter. What I have in mind is that when we question some part of or even the whole reality, we are in fact at the same time feeling a central part of our own self as a stranger to ourselves.

Freud sees that different kinds of disturbances of memory, *déjà-vu* experiences etc., are connected to this dynamic of *de-realization* and *de-personalization*. With this mechanism of the psyche, the subject tries to ward off the feeling of derealization, in a sense to push it further away from the ego, but it is done at the price of making false pronouncements, for example, about the past. In a sense we can argue that when we are able to see, we forget ourselves, but by forgetting ourselves we stop seeing. In short, in radical adult education we need dialectical understanding of the dynamic of the personality as constant interaction between psychic strivings and impulses, both conscious and unconscious, of an individual and the socio-economic circumstances of a given time. What I have in mind here is the obvious question why people do not want to or cannot change their opinions even if they are obviously wrong and there are valid and legitimate arguments against these opinions. The answer to this question is that these opinions are a fundamental part of the person's personality structure, and as they are questioning their view of the world, they are in fact questioning themselves.

Freud's experience brings to mind an interesting question of how particular places shape our memory of a particular time. When Freud tries to understand his own self-doubt as he stands on the Acropolis, he is suddenly drawn to question his own past. In a sense, our development, through which we try to form a stable identity, is based on constantly reworked and almost canonical stories of our past that supplant our 'direct' memory of it. When a

radical break occurs, these almost ideological ways of relating to the past – and via the past to ourselves and others – are questioned.

James Joyce tries to articulate in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* his own dynamical process of becoming an artist, or to be more exact, his way of becoming aware of his innermost desires and hopes – who he thinks he is. The main character of the story, Stephen, starts as a young child, remembering his parents and family and his father telling him stories. As the novel reaches its end, Stephen has made a firm decision via the crises that he has encountered in his life: He will become an artist whose task will be to articulate the ‘reality of experience’ in his work. But even more, with his art he will try to ‘forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race’ (Joyce, 1960, p. 253). This search for the answer to the question of ‘who I really am’ is never achieved, and it is always to be constructed anew at each stage of our lives, as Erik H. Eriksson has shown to us. I think that this endless and mostly painful search is one of the reasons why people usually want to end this process by fending off the whole question, and by this denial they try to form fixed, and in many senses immovable, identities. These identities are formed in order to silence the call that exists in all of us.

Freud developed the idea of *negation* (*Verneinung*) to show how our psyche operates with repressed material. In fact, in the negation of the value of the question *who am I* we find ‘a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed’ (Freud, 1923, pp. 235–236). In a sense, negation is ‘the intellectual substitution for repression’; a linguistically articulated way of handling uncomfortable psychical material. The thinking subject frees itself ‘from the restrictions of repression and enriches itself with material that is indispensable for its proper functioning’. At the same time, the subject affirms and disaffirms something and actually questions the existence in reality of this something it presents to itself. As Freud (1923, p. 237) argues, ‘the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, identical’.

Freud (1919, pp. 219–252) once argued in his article ‘Das Unheimliche’ that in everything which we feel to be uncanny [*Unheimliche*] there is something fundamentally familiar [*heimlich*]. This familiar is the prohibited part in us that we project to the world outside us. Max Horkheimer follows Freud’s line of thought as he argues that the anti-Semitic subject, or in general the authoritarian personality, falls in the extremity of her projection into paranoid thought patterns in which she attributes ‘[i]mpulses which are not acknowledged by the subject and yet are his [ ... ] to the object: the prospective victim’ (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 154). In this false projection and its totality, people who are ‘blinded by civilization have contact with their own tabooed mimetic traits only through certain gestures and forms of behaviour they encounter in others, as isolated, shameful residues in their rationalized environment’ (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 149). As Freud argued: When something repels us as alien, it is in fact something all too familiar.

Walter Benjamin (1978) wrote in his 'On the Mimetic Faculty' about nature's tendency to produce similarity. In his view, human beings have the highest faculty to grasp similarity, which is nothing more than the age-old necessity to act like someone or something else. In his 'Doctrine of the Similar', Benjamin (1991, p. 205) reflected on children's ability to imitate during their play not only human beings but also objects, for example trains and windmills. His examples show us that in fact all need for knowledge is based on fear, like Freud tried to highlight with his concept of the *Unheimliche*. Fear, when we are faced with something unfamiliar, forces us to seek for similarity, something familiar in this otherness. All knowledge acquisition is thus a process of identification in which we try to overcome the separation from the object by making it familiar (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997, pp. 37-38). In this sense, knowledge acquisition is based on primitive fear.

Characteristic of the authoritarian personality is the endless desire for and the constant pursuit of power by which it tries to overcome its fear of otherness by taking control over it. But the process in which this desire is formed is quite paradoxical. The masochistic character trait that unveils itself as passivity to the faith that the individual holds, as well as the factuality and duties that are imposed on the individual, are the leitmotiv in this development. On the one hand, people have to actively deny their own desires, needs, and hopes, and on the other, via this denial and repression, they can identify with and be part of the power that is subordinating them (Fromm, 1936, pp. 173-174). This sadomasochistic tendency is a formative process in the developmental scheme of modern capitalistic societies. The process also takes place in classroom situations, and it is moreover something that critical pedagogy must be aware of (see Moisiso, 2005).

In this situation the *letting the object be and helping it to become what it is* might have a radical potential for education. The point is to help the process of *unlearning* the complex set of reactions and thought patterns that the students and educators have received in their process of becoming the members of society. It is obvious that the critical education of teachers plays a crucial role in this. The tragedy of our time is 'the erroneous idea that one's own particular way of being [ ... ] is nature, an unalterable given, and not a historical evolution. [ ... ] If this coercive mechanism were once ruptured, then, I think, something would indeed be gained' (Adorno, 1998, p. 200). Against this we need to think through education politically or make politics more pedagogical. To be able 'to do this, education must transform itself into sociology, that is, it must teach about the societal play of forces that operates beneath the surface of political forms' (Adorno, 1998, p. 203). As Giroux argues:

Education as a critical practice could provide the means for disconnecting commonsense learning from the narrowly ideological impact of mass media, the regressive tendencies associated with hyper-masculinity, the rituals of everyday violence, the inability to identify with others as well as from the pervasive ideologies of state repression and its illusions of empire. (Giroux, 2004, p. 11)



## In the End

The idea that we could find a positive dimension for radical adult education in the radical questioning of the self raises a highly problematic question of *how*? What kinds of methods should the teacher involved use as a way to produce a situation in which the pupil could have the proposed kind of experience? I am afraid I do not have a practical answer to this question but only the theoretical formulation of *letting the object be*. But I do believe that in certain kinds of situations the feeling of de-personalization and de-realization could be productive for radical learning – that a person could look upon herself and radically feel the old self and all the beliefs and values as strange to herself. In a sense, in this kind of situation one is not able to recognize oneself and the world that one held so dear before. These kinds of situations could be produced when the borders between schools and lifeworlds would be diminished and learning understood as an engagement with the world and other beings would form the focal point of the educational situation.

I think we can begin to understand how this thing could be done by way of negation. The teacher should be careful not to leave the students or pupils alone with the feeling of loneliness and emptiness. In a very limited sense, critical pedagogy also has a kind of therapeutic role, if therapy is understood as some kind of liberation from ignorance, incomprehension, and compulsion: ‘all therapy today is political theory and practice’ (Marcuse, 2005, p. 86). If a teacher’s aim is to produce the feeling of strangeness to oneself, then a sudden break that distorts the routines of everyday life can do the trick. This forces a redirection of one’s attention, a breakage that sets learning in motion (Malinen, 2000, pp. 134–140). For example, when one morning you step outside your office and find that road works have cut off your usual way to your home, you are forced by the situation to take a new, more attentive relationship to your surroundings.

But usually when the protection fails, the learner can reject this experience by shock denial; that is, the incident is shown in one’s consciousness as ‘a precise point in time [ ... ] at the cost of the integrity of its content’ (Benjamin, 1969, p. 163). I think that the most difficult part of radical adult education is to disassemble the shock denial in connection with the total social-economical situation of the given time. In socially conscious radical learning, such a situation or event may prove to be a fruitful starting point through which it is possible to problematize or dismantle the viewpoints that follow the so-called natural attitude and the self-evident facts of everyday life, such as daily interactions, relationships between the sexes, going to school, or issues linked with the capitalist division of labour. The dismantling can also be aimed at broader questions, such as the nation-state or the future of the public sector, or to the principles through which the global order is maintained. The problematization of such questions can lead to the demystification of phenomena – to the revealing of regularities and meanings that are invisible but still influence life.

## REFERENCES

- Adorno, T. W. (1973) *Negative Dialectics* (New York, Routledge).
- Adorno, T. W. (1998) Education After Auschwitz, in: T.W. Adorno, *Critical Models: Interventions and catchwords* (New York, Columbia University Press).
- Arendt, H. (1958) *The Human Condition* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
- Arendt, H. (1993) *Between Past and Future* (New York, Penguin Books).
- Benjamin, W. (1969) On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, in: H. Arendt (ed.), *Illuminations. Walter Benjamin: Essays and reflections*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, Schocken Books).
- Benjamin, W. (1978) On the Mimetic Faculty, in: P. Demetz (ed.), *Reflections: Essays, aphorisms, autobiographical writings*, trans. E. Jephcott (New York, Schocken Books).
- Benjamin, W. (1991) Lehre von Ähnlichen, in: *Gesammelte Schriften* II.1 (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp).
- Brookfield, S. (1995) *Becoming a Critically Reflective Teacher* (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass).
- Engels, F. (1893) Engels to Franz Mehring London, July 14, 1893, in: *Marx Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 50 (Moscow, International Publishers).
- Freire, P. (1972) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York, Herder and Herder).
- Freud, S. (1919) The 'Uncanny' [Das Unheimliche], in: *The Standard Edition*, Vol. XVII, pp. 217–256.
- Freud, S. (1923) Negation, in: SE, Vol. XIX, pp. 235–239.
- Freud, S. (1936) A Disturbance of Memory of the Acropolis: An open letter to Romain Rolland on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, in: SE, Vol. XXII, pp. 302–312.
- Fromm, E. (1929) [1981] Psychoanalyse und Soziologie, in: *Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe*, Band I (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).
- Fromm, E. (1930a) [1981] Die Entwicklung des Christuskonzepts, in: *Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe*, Band VI *Religion* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).
- Fromm, E. (1936) [1978] Studien über Autorität und Familie. Sozialpsychologische Teil, in: *Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe*, Band I. *Analytische Sozialpsychologie* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).
- Fromm, E. (1937) [1999] Die Determiniertheit der psychischen Struktur durch die Gesellschaft, in: *Erich Fromm Gesamtausgabe*, Band XI. *Politische Psychoanalyse* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).
- Fromm, E. (1941) *Escape from Freedom* (New York, Routledge).
- Gallagher, S. (1995) *Hermeneutics and Education* (New York, SUNY).
- Giroux, H. (2004) What Might Education Mean After Abu Ghraib: Revisiting Adorno's politics of education, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 24:1.
- Giroux, H. (2005) *Schooling and the Struggle for Public Life*. 2nd, updated edn. (Boulder & London, Paradigm).

- Gordon, M. (2001) Hannah Arendt on Authority: Conservatism in Education Reconsidered, in: M. Gordon (ed.), *Hannah Arendt and Education* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press).
- Gur-Ze'ev, I. (2004) *Destroying the Other's Collective Memory* (New York, Peter Lang).
- Hegel, G.W. F. (1807) *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- Honneth, A. (1995) Work and Instrumental Action: On the Normative Basis of Critical Theory, in: C. Wright (ed.), *The Fragmented World of the Social: Essays in social and political philosophy* (New York, SUNY).
- Horkheimer, M. (1993) On the Problem of Truth, in: *Between Philosophy and Social Sciences: Selected early writings* (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press).
- Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, T. W. (2002) *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press).
- Jay, M. (1984) *Adorno* (London, Fontana Modern Masters Series; Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).
- Joyce, J. A. (1960) *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, ed. C. G. Anderson (New York, Viking).
- Jung, C. G. (1954) The Development of Personality, in: *Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 17, The Development of Personality*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Kant, I. (1803) Über Pedagogik, in: *Immanuel Kant, Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 2. Werkausgabe Band XII* (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp).
- Lindbergh, A. (1955) *Gift from the Sea* (London, Chatto and Windus).
- Malinen, A. (2000) *Towards the Essence of Adult Experiential Learning* (Jyväskylä, SoPhi).
- Marcuse, H. (2005) Liberation from Affluent Society (1967), in: D. Kellner (ed.), *The New Left and the 1960s. Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Vol. 3* (New York and London: Routledge) pp. 76-86.
- Margalit, A. (2005) Human Dignity: Between kitsch and deification, *Dean's Lecture Series, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University* (Feb. 17, 2005) (video available at <http://www.radcliffe.edu/events/video.php>).
- Mayo, M. & Thompson, J. (1996) *Adult Learning, Critical Intelligence and Social Change* (Leicester, National Institute of Adult and Continuing Education).
- Mezirow, J. (1990) *Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and Emancipatory Learning* (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass).
- Moisio, O-P. (2005) Max Horkheimer on the Mimetic Element in Education, in: I. Gur-Ze'ev (ed.), *Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy Today* (Haifa, University of Haifa).
- Moisio, O-P. & Suoranta, J. (2006) Critical Pedagogy and Ideology Critique as Zeitgeist Analysis, in: O-P. Moisio & J. Suoranta (eds), *Education and the Spirit of Time* (Amsterdam, Sense Publishers).
- Snook, I. (1972) *Indoctrination and Education* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul).

- Schutz, A. (2001) Contesting Utopianism: Hannah Arendt and the tensions of democratic education, in: M. Gordon (ed.), *Hannah Arendt and Education* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press).
- White, J. P. (1973) Indoctrination, in: R. S. Peters (ed.), *The Concept of Education* (London, Routledge Kegan Paul).

## 4 AS HEARD IN SILENCE – ERICH FROMM, LISTENING AND TO-BE-HEARD IN EDUCATION

Will be published in Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (ed.) *Possibility/Impossibility of a New Critical Language in Education*. Rotterdam: Sense. 2009.

*What I liked in anthropology was its inexhaustible faculty of negation, its relentless definition of man, as though he were no better than God, in terms of what he is not.*

-Samuel Beckett 1955, 52

*People learn nothing and have succeeded in nothing unless they think this is the most important thing to do.*

-Erich Fromm 1994, 76

The Talmud tells us how God told Moses, when Hebrews were trying to get across the red sea, that he should raise his staff, and after that the waters would open. Moses did raise his staff but the waters did not open. The sea was silent and the Hebrews had no way to go. Not until the first person jumped to the water, on that very moment waters gave way for the Hebrews to go. This story tells us at least two things. On the other hand nothing will happen if we are not ready to work together (i.e. to jump) for the goals that each of us sees the most important thing to do in the current situation. We have to have faith and fortitude in order to succeed. But on the other hand I think that this is also the source of the substantial pessimism that the real critic must face. In fact this pessimism should be a part and parcel of the criticism and evaluation of the real possibilities. The point would be to learn to listen for the call of the moment, to hope in face of despair. But how exactly we might learn this in a world that has almost lost the ability for this? What kind of education might give room for the existence of hope that discloses how “the world itself, just as it is in a mess, is also in a state of unfinishedness and in experimental process out of that mess” (Bloch 1986, 221).

Fear has made us stop while facing the sea of time and opportunity, our given historical moment. African-American Nobel Prize-winning author, editor, and professor Toni Morrison described our time with two traits in 2004. She said that our time is characterized by fear and melancholy. She has grown to fear her country – the United States of America. Millions share her fear but they also fear for their own concrete and personal lives. This fear, which springs all around the world, especially in the countries that form the so called axis of evil, show where Morrison's melancholy springs. Its fountain is the knowledge about what United States of America has become. Fear and melancholy are very much a part of everyone's' lives, if not consciously, then at least subconsciously.

But we can also claim that in addition to Morrison's two characteristics there are at least four other characteristics to describe our historical moment: risk, uncertainty, human invisibility and instrumentality of human self-relation and the relations to others. Taken together these six characteristics are the constellation that forms the individual, ordinary human beings view point to the globalization as they are the effects of and reactions to this same process. This is why we need to listen more carefully the experiential dimension of globalization in everyday life world and this also should mean something in the field of education. These characteristics might help us to understand the role of emotional processes in the process of learning and teaching.

Famous social critic and psychoanalyst Erich Fromm (1900-1980) wrote about therapy as an art of listening. But this art of listening was connected as a central part to a larger idea of change from having orientation to a productive orientation – to be as a full human being. This is as I see the fundamental question that we must face today as we face the global ecological, economical and human catastrophe. In the 1960s Fromm began to deepen his idea of the orientations present in western societies that he had already found in the 1930's and 40's. He was able to articulate the fundamental and macabre fascination with death and things that we have in Western-world. Fromm believed that the central driving force behind this was the desire to make up for a lack of authentic being and selfhood. This was done in identifying with the lifeless when enjoying things as long as they are reified and without life.

To describe this orientation toward death Fromm used the concept of necrophilia. He was concerned to go beyond the popular usage of the term that made reference to a sexual contact with the dead; and/or the desire to be near bodily or visually to corpses. Fromm wanted to open up necrophilia as a character-rooted passion: the passion to transform and to see living as something non-living (Fromm 1973, 332). He writes that "Man is biologically endowed with the capacity for biophilia, but psychologically he has the potential for necrophilia as an alternative solution" (Ibid., 366). As Sigmund Freud did earlier in individual level, Fromm set this passion to "tear apart living structures" within a proper social and political contexts.

With the increasing production and division of labor, the formation of a large surplus, and the building of states with hierarchies and elites [...] large-scale human

destructiveness and cruelty came into existence and grew as civilization and the role of power grew. (Fromm 1973, 435.)

In his famous book *To Have or To Be* (1976) Fromm argues that two ways of existence were competing for “the spirit of mankind”. The having mode looks to things and material possessions and is based on aggression and greed. The being mode is rooted in love and is concerned with shared experience and productive activity. Fromm (1976, 165) argued that only a fundamental change in human character “from a preponderance of the having mode to a preponderance of the being mode of existence can save us from a psychological and economic catastrophe” and set out some ways forward.

In this article I want to ask can we use Fromm’s (1994) writings about therapy as an art of listening, as a way to articulate more carefully the usually hidden dimensions of the relationship between student and teacher – the scream and whisper. With these texts in mind among others, I want to probe little bit the question how are listening, to-be-heard, trust, responsibility and obligation connected together in a teaching environment and educational counselling sessions in the era of globalizing capitalism. Especially I am interested in the theoretical and practical dimensions of the concept of active listening, and the connection of it to the education aimed to change. Active listening is the vessel of hope, which is the fundamental dimension of every human act directed at change.

If we would practically adopt the idea in the previously told Talmudic story then we would have to ask quite frankly, what would be the starting point of learning that would make it possible for the students to see the common goal and interest within their individuality? I think that this goal cannot be brought outside but has to be developed from the shared historically situated life experiences. By posing this question we see how difficult it would be to formulate such a starting point. Unless we would be able to formulate a kind of norm that every person has a right to full birth as an individual, full growth to her individual potentialities, full aliveness regardless her actual personality.

### *Active listening as a model of radical counselling/teaching*

I think that the best way to start to understand what Fromm meant with his idea of active listening is to open the discussion with a quote from interview that was done by R. I. Evans in the 1960’s. In this part of the interview that was published as a book *Dialogue with Erich Fromm* in 1966 Fromm is describing his work as a practising therapist. Fromm (Evans 1966, 35) says “now I listen you, and while *I’m listening, I have responses* which are the responses of a trained instrument. [...] I’ll tell you what I hear. This will often be quite different from what you are telling me or intended to tell me. Then you tell me how you feel about my interpretation [...] We move along this way freely. I am not claiming

that what *I hear* is necessarily correct, but it deserves attention because of the fact that your words produce this reaction in me"<sup>1</sup>.

Fromm (1994, 98) argued that the fundamental point in this relationship is to listen and to say what is heard and not to interpret. Only this way the relationship can be formed as an active interaction between two human beings where different responses are the key element. With these different responses the practical goal of therapy can be reached. Fromm sees that the main practical goal of therapist is to seek a way to penetrate behind the patient's "official goals". This is imperative if it is intended that the therapeutic relationship should produce real improvement or change in the patient's behaviour. Behind these official goals Fromm sees a "secret plot" that is motivating self-defeating behaviour. With this idea it is intended to activate dialectic between these two aspects of patient's personality as they bear upon an issue that has an immediate significance in the patient's life.

It is easy to see the importance of these ideas within educational philosophy if we want to promote radical learning and change. Quite many recent developments in the field are pointing to same kind of understanding of the teacher-pupil relationship but they lack the idea that what education is primarily interested in doing is not so much to make persons more suited to the social environment, than to make them radically self-aware of their situation and their own resources to act in these situations. What is quite unique in Fromm's ideas, and in fact was unique in the field of therapy also, is an idea, that the person that produces the dialectic -- be it teacher or therapist -- does not stay outside the dialectic. Once the process has begun teacher is inevitably part and parcel of the same process and must act accordingly.

But it is obvious that we do not have to encourage or force teachers in a full autobiographical self-disclosure but we do not have to necessarily deny it either. Actually there is nothing harmful doing just that, but at the same time it is not actually quite clear what we can gain from full self-disclosure. But what is needed is a certain kind of self-revelation that is fundamental part of the radical learning. What I have in mind is that this self-revelation requires teacher to expose their own strengths and limitations of understanding and their own value systems far more openly and directly than occurs in usual, teacher centred neutrality. The reading of Fromm's texts on therapy reveals us that this was something that he saw also fundamental for therapeutical cure.

LaPlanche and Potanlis (1973, 93) famously described that there are three ways to understand counter transference in psychoanalysis. In fact they saw a term as a cross-road where therapist should decide which of the three roads she should follow. First road is the classical road of striving neutrality so that the possible treatment can be "structured exclusively by the patient's transference". Second road is the road of therapeutics private scrutiny of their counter transference reactions. From these personal reactions they can "interpret utterances of the unconsciousness in other people". Third road is for the analyst to disclose to the patient "the actual emotions felt" - i.e. the personal emotions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.



LaPlanche and Potanlis add that “this approach is on the tenet that, resonance from the unconscious to the unconscious constitutes the only authentically psychoanalytic form of communication”.

Fromm took LaPlanche’s and Potanlis’s third road even further than they have expected because he saw that this form of therapeutic communication was intended to convey not only a message but a model. It was a vehicle for the patient to experience what Fromm called “authenticity” in human relationship. This kind of “authenticity” should be seen not as in a strict sense of the word, i.e. as something that we truly in a fundamental sense are but as an attitude to be there and actually listen what other human being is saying to us -- to be open to other and let her words reach us as a whole human being. In a sense we might argue that in this kind of relationship teacher is taught by the pupil given that they do not treat each other as an object; i.e. teachers have to try to see her as taking part in a same process as her pupil. As Karl Marx (1844, 326) wrote in his so called Paris-manuscripts from the 1844 describing the same experience that Fromm called authentic human relationship:

Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a human one: then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc. If you want to enjoy art, you must be an artistically cultivated person; if you want to exercise influence over other people, you must be a person with a stimulating and encouraging effect on other people. Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. If you love without evoking love in return — that is, if your loving as loving does not produce reciprocal love; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you do not make yourself a beloved one, then your love is impotent — a misfortune.

I think that some sort of authentic human relationship is also necessary in educational settings. I mean that there must be a way to articulate what it means that we could have an authentic human relationship also to the themes and issues that are in the centre of particular educational situation. This re-articulation may be done from the perspectives of both teacher and pupil as a new shared sensibility. Fromm (1955, 347-352) wrote about “collective art” as a way to rearticulate meaningful relationship with the issues at hand. In Fromm’s mind it means for art to be collective that we “*respond to the world with our senses in a meaningful, skilled, productive, active, shared way*”. I think that this formulation can be transported to education and learning in general without enormous difficulties. In this kind of activity teacher and learner can together be one with others in “a meaningful, rich and productive way” (Fromm 1955, 348).

The need to this kind of shared sensibility may be seen when we start by pointing out that in fact all learning or acquisition of knowledge is based on fear. With this idea we gain access to the emotional work that is going on all the time in the different stages of educational process in general. This fear may be seen from two different angles. Firstly, it is the minimal structuring dimension of all knowledge acquisition as stated above. All not known is something that we are afraid of. As Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (2002, 11) write in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, “nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the

mere idea of 'outside' is the real source of fear". But at the same time fear is also the fundamental dimension of knowledge thus grown out of fear. By this I mean that when we have certain knowledge we might be afraid if something or someone is threatening this knowledge and identity that we have formed from and for it (cf. *ibid.* 23-24).

Is it too much to hope for that for example regular teacher in her teaching environment with its normal hardships and problematic could form an authentic human relationship that Fromm envisioned? Can we say that this kind of relationship could be taught or is it more the case that it can only be learnt, or more clearly stated, mimetically acquired from the social environment? The premise for this relationship to actualize is that the whole person has a productive character orientation towards others and the world. What if our character orientation is non-authentic, sadomasochistic, non-productive, having-orientation that Fromm diagnosed? Can this kind of person – as teachers are after all human beings – stimulate the needed creative and productive relationship? Can she ever serve as an example of authentic human relationship? The answer is obvious: no.

There is something strange going on when we look at the teacher education in general. The same strange process where the original goal of education vanishes to thin air happens in the education of doctors. What happens is that these students gradually loose from their sights the fact that they are in contact with human beings while practising medicine. When these doctoral candidates are asked in the beginning of their education that why they want to become doctors the answer is that they want to help other human beings. The reason for this altruist impulse to vanish might be that the education on doctors is long and the problems that they tackle with are enormously difficult so that they have to develop a technical rationality<sup>2</sup>. This way they can solve the problems without any distracting emotional elements. But what is strange is that this same process goes through in every level of occupations where other human beings are trying to help others in need of help be it teachers, social workers etc.<sup>3</sup>

The most debatable and problematic dimension of this method be it in education or in therapy lies here. But I think it is safe to say that the same problems are lurking behind the other roads that can be followed in the field of education because the fruitful interaction is based on the idea that teacher or analyst "is not afraid of his *own* unconscious for then he will not be afraid or embarrassed by opening up the patient's unconscious" (Evans 1966, 55).

---

<sup>2</sup> There are obviously exceptions in this: for example doctors working in the *Medecins Sans Frontieres* and a like. There is quite interesting article by Glannon & Ross (2002) where they argue that when seen from the global scale the real altruists in medicine are still the patients.

<sup>3</sup> I have developed this theme more systematically in connection to moral sentiments (especially pity, compassion, empathy, sympathy) in Moisio 2004.

*Am I driven or pushed towards something?*

Fromm (1932) articulated in his work how capitalism fosters anal character with all their special pathologies. He unified social and individual characteristics with his concepts of authoritarian character, hoarding character and marketing character (Fromm 1941; 1945). Fromm (1973, 349) then understood sadistic character and the necrophilous character as a progressively more malignant forms of a "normal anal character". These extreme forms are produced by any conditions that increase the force that underlay normal anality: narcissism, unrelatedness and destructiveness.

Fromm distinguishes between benign aggression, which mainly take place in self-defence, and malignant aggression, as the urge to be cruel, to exercise power over others, or simply to destroy. This arises, according to Fromm, when person finds it impossible to satisfy his existential needs, i.e. roughly his need to do something significant, in a way that is creative and constructive; and so tries to fulfill him by destroying rather than creating. This may come about of person's own character, or family relationships; but it may also be caused or encouraged by social conditions. "There are specific environmental conditions conducive to ... the development of the life-furthering syndrome ... to the extent these conditions are lacking; he will become ... characterized by the presence of the life-thwarting syndrome." (Fromm 1973, Chapter 10, section 4, part 2.)

These conditions are named as "freedom, activating stimuli, the absence of exploitative control, and the presence of 'man-centered' modes of production" (Ibid.). "Activating stimuli" such as "a novel, a poem, an idea, a landscape, music, a loved person" invite a response of active interest and mental or psychical activity, and do not produce satiation or boredom when repeated. Passive stimuli produces immediate thrill, followed by release of tension, followed by boredom and the need for a new stimulus of different kind, since there is no novelty created by response. Hence in the society in which passive rather than active stimuli are the most easily available, there will be a growing tendency to gain easy excitement by arousing malice and destructiveness: "It is much easier to get excited by anger, rage, cruelty or the passion to destroy than by love and productive and active interest." (Fromm 1973, 10, 3, 4.) This is not determined inevitably by social circumstances, but is heavily influenced by them: "man is never so determined that a basic change ... is not possible ... environment inclines, but does not determine" (Fromm 1973, 10, 4, 5).

We might see teacher in an ideal sense as "the activating stimuli" - she produces a strive towards something. This striving is something more than a mere being-driven-towards something that simple stimulus produces. But the teacher needs some intervention or mediation to do just this. In Fromm's eyes activating stimuli "requires a 'touchable' stimulee in order to have an effect -- touchable not in the sense of being educated, but of being humanly responsive. On the other hand, the person who is fully alive does not necessarily need any particular outside stimulus to be activated; in fact, he creates his own stimuli." (Fromm 1973, 270.)

What Fromm was articulating in the previous paragraphs from the psychological viewpoint might be re-articulated in the concrete educational setting by using the concept of “experiential learning” that John Dewey has famously developed in his *Democracy and Education*. Dewey (1916, 141) argues that

To “learn from experience” is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes instruction -- discovery of the connection of things.

Learning by *doing* becomes in this sense learning by *trying*. Students become active agents of their learning process. This does not mean that the teacher’s role diminishes but even though teachers still has a definite role in this process their role is fundamentally changed. It is obvious that teacher cannot be seen as a sole actor of the situation anymore. Knowledge is not given above but seen as shared in some specific context.

Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-students and student-teachers. The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. [...] Men teach each other, mediated by the world, by the cognizable objects which in banking education are “owned” by the teacher. (Freire 2003, 67)

Freire (2004, 74) argued that these frame of references are “generative themes” and the role of teacher is to see and articulate those themes together with students. These themes are usually scattered and not fully articulated and it is left to teacher to reframe them into meaningful wholes. But teacher does not do this alone as students will give in this reframing and reorganization work important experiential impulses to serve as a material index.

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, views, and conception, in one word, man’s consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life? (Marx & Engels 1848, 26.)

Dewey (ibid. 160) saw that “no thought, no idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person to another”. The only way to do just this is through practice of testing and experiencing. This can be too easily be read as promoting self-centered narcissism but Dewey connected to his idea of experience the must to develop communicative, collaborative and deliberative skills. As Myles Horton<sup>4</sup> (1990, 57) writes:

I knew that it was necessary [...] to draw out of people their experience, and help them value group experiences and learn from them. It was essential that people

---

<sup>4</sup> Myles Horton (1905-1990) was an American educator, socialist and cofounder of the Highlander Folk School, famous for its role in the Civil Rights Movement.

learned to make decisions on the basis of analyzing and trusting their own experience, and learning from what was good and bad. [...] I believed then and still believe that you learn from your experience of doing something and from your analysis of that experience.

This collaboration within learning practices should be seen not as collectivization of individuals. We might argue that in an inescapable climate of neoliberalism, that “removing ourselves from the influence of others is a revolutionary act” (Brookfield 2005, p. 196). But this kind of removal of oneself should not be seen as an identity political act of self-articulation. Like Peter McLaren put it in his opening lecture of the Paulo Freire Research Center-Finland in the University of Tampere (20.11.2007): in the dark times of neoliberal terror, it is not important to ask, as researchers in “cultural” critical pedagogy and other domesticated forms of critical pedagogy, Who am I (identity political positioning). But instead to ask the fundamental question, where are you - and to reply: I am here! Even though I have certain reservations of specific ideas of McLaren (i.e. the leader role of teachers, straightforward use of Marxian economical theory) I find it very useful this idea of the need for ethical and real political positioning within educational practices (McLaren & Farahmandpur 2005; McLaren & Jaramillo 2007). This positioning might help students to form better picture of the times where they are living and also help them to develop insight to the role of information production and consumption.

As we have seen in previous paragraphs, the decisions and goals that the specific teaching situation should address are based not only on tacit knowledge of the students but on knowledge gained from shared experience via discussions and collaborative reflection and active doing. For example as a teacher Horton “realized for the first time that he could lead a discussion without knowing all the answers. He sharpened their questions, got them to talk about their own experiences, and found that they already had many answers” (Parker & Parker, 1991, p. 2). I think that such experience plays a central role in education.

We might want to argue that group collaboration and problem solving involve people’s shared experiences that are often solutions that may have already existed in some sense. These solutions were unseen or were pieced together through reflection from the apparent synergy of engaging one others ideas, experiences and knowledge in discussions (Peters & Bell, 2001). Participants “get much more out of what they didn’t come for than what they came for, because they start exchanging experiences” (Kennedy, 1981, p. 107). As Dewey, Horton believed that the best way of learning is by actually doing, which provides substance for reflection and growth. This is something that Hegel already understood while articulating the development of self-consciousness in *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a necessary self-objectification and return and I think that it might have a productive impact even in different fields of theoretical subjects. This brings about the dichotomy of learning that Dewey brought up in his *Democracy and Education*.

On the one hand, learning is the sum total of what is known, as that is handed down by books and learned men. It is something external, an accumulation of cognitions as one might store material commodities in a warehouse. Truth exists ready-made somewhere. Study is then the process by which an individual draws on what is in storage. On the other hand, learning means something which the individual does when he studies. It is an active, personally conducted affair. The dualism here is between knowledge as something external, or, as it is often called, objective, and knowing as something purely internal, subjective, psychical. There is, on one side, a body of truth, ready-made, and, on the other, a ready-made mind equipped with a faculty of knowing -- if it only wills to exercise it, which it is often strangely loath to do. The separation, often touched upon, between subject matter and method is the educational equivalent of this dualism. Socially the distinction has to do with the part of life which is dependent upon authority and that where individuals are free to advance. (Dewey 1916, 389-390.)

### *How to motivate learners to learn and to change*

Adam Smith wrote in his magisterial *Wealth of Nations* in 1776 about a not welcomed side effects of the division of labour which he saw fundamental dimension of the well organized and productive societies. The most devastating side-effect was that the division of labour produced stupidity or more generally we might argue that it produced one-dimensionality persons. Smith (1776, 987-994) saw that since the common people are engaged in simple and uniform tasks in the productive system in order to maintain their lives, it is necessary to provoke their minds with mental stimuli which would encourage them to speculate about their own otherwise dull occupations. With this they can gain much wider and richer viewpoint to the world, themselves and the relationship that they have to each other. Smith thought that this overcoming of one dimensionality is needed because otherwise people would start to act socially rebellious and plan upheavals. This was something that Smith despised.

But what drives human being to get used to one-dimensionality? I think that Smith was wrong in that he thought that if living becomes enough estranged, one-dimensional and improvised then people would almost automatically start to do something to improve their lives. Marx shared this optimism in some elementary form. With this problem in mind it might be useful to have a look on Fromm's argument in his book *Escape from Freedom*. We might want to redirect the central thesis of the book towards our question and argue that fear is one of the central motivators that have taught human beings to learn to love their particular fate. Fromm thought that this fear was specific fear of taking charge of one's life. As Dewey (1989, 44) once argued "the serious threat to our democracy is not the existence of foreign totalitarian states. It is the existence within our own personal attitudes and within our own institutions of conditions which have given a victory to external authority. The battlefield is also accordingly here - within ourselves and our institutions." Thus it is imperative that education starts by acknowledging the shared social and experiential world and tries to meaningfully incorporate this into topics at hand in schools and education in general.

Social and economical conditions shape emotionally and psychologically conditioned needs. As Marx (1859, 28-29) argued in his *Grundrisse*:

Hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth. Production thus produces not only the object but also the manner of consumption, not only objectively but also subjectively. Production thus creates the consumer. (3) Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it also supplies a need for the material. As soon as consumption emerges from its initial state of natural crudity and immediacy – and, if it remained at that stage, this would be because production itself had been arrested there – it becomes itself mediated as a drive by the object. The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The object of art – like every other product – creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. Production thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object. Thus production produces consumption (1) by creating the material for it; (2) by determining the manner of consumption; and (3) by creating the products, initially posited by it as objects, in the form of a need felt by the consumer. It thus produces the object of consumption, the manner of consumption and the motive of consumption.

Fromm (1941, 15) argued that within different needs there is also a strong and fundamental human need “to be related to the world outside oneself, the need to avoid aloneness”. If human being is forced to be without experience of belonging, it will have an effect of psychical disintegration. In a sense you can live among human beings and have in this sense physical communion with them but still be deprived from psychical communion with them or ideas, symbols and social patterns. This kind of spiritual aloneness Fromm (*ibid.*) called moral aloneness.

The more man gains freedom in the sense of emerging from the original oneness with man and nature and the more he becomes an ‘individual’, he has no choice but to unite himself with the world in the spontaneity of love and productive work or else to seek a kind of integrity of his individual self. (Fromm 1942, 18.)

In education it is imperative that this kind of possibility for spontaneity and productive work is maintained even though it is a brute fact that in schools many different structural and personal dimensions work against this goal. One way to see the problematic is to make a distinction between different authorities that are present in educational situations: rational, irrational, and anonymous authority.

Fromm (1941, 225) thought that “*self is as strong as it is active*”. Different authorities promote or hinder this activity. Irrational authority is working to promote the actualization of the interest of authority in question. It does not see any particular use or need for the activity of the subjected person if not the active self-repression of that particular individual or groups of individuals. Whereas irrational authority is working for the authority, rational authority works to promote the actualization of the developmental potentials of the person in question. As Fromm (1957, 176-177) argues “by irrational authority I mean authority which is based on force, either physical or emotional, and the function which is the exploitation of other person, materially, emotionally, or

otherwise. Rational authority is authority which is based on competence, and the function which is to help another person accomplish a certain task”.

Rational authority is part and parcel of the real education because in real education educational activity is concerned in nurturing the developmental goals of the persons who are educated. In this sense real education is upbringing in some fundamental sense while education which is based in irrational authority is not education at all but more handling of the things – the total instrumentality of delicate educational relationship between two persons. Education is “identical with helping the child realize his potentialities” (Fromm 1947, 207). But this kind of real education does not mean that this educational relationship is in some sense biologically based natural relationship and does not need rational control. This would lead to a certain kind of *laissez-faire* where we could not recognize any principle, would not state any value and would obscure hierarchy. This would lead to a much more thorough intervention from society and its regulative imperatives it would give foothold to anonymous authority.

By anonymous authority Fromm (1955, 99) understood “the authority of public opinion and the market”. This kind of authority fosters the need to adjust and to be approved by the some commonly approved value. It produces always present unconscious sense of fundamental powerlessness. As Fromm (*ibid*, 102) states “there is no overt authority [i.e. irrational and rational authority] which intimidates us, but we are governed by fear of the anonymous authority of conformity. We do not submit to anyone personally; we do not go through conflicts with authority, but we have also no convictions of our own, almost no individuality, almost no sense of self.”

It is obvious that education that is based on rational authority would need much more rational evaluation and control from teachers part than handling of thing which is much more non-rational and based on impulses and regulations coming outside of human relationship in this sense. The critical question in this is, that how can we find out what could be the most productive course of development for the person that is being educated. In face of this question it is imperative that we focus not so much on the positive, regulative principles than on the minimal terms and try to picture what might be most harmful for the growth of individual person.

Education should aim to the goal where human being is able to “give birth to himself, to become what he potentially is” (Fromm 1947, 237). With this idea Fromm is moving quite near what Theodor W. Adorno meant while he used the concept of non-identity. In Fromm’s mind the education is in some fundamental sense self-education. Only individual person is able to actualize the potentials if the surrounding settings do not hinder that effort. In education we usually think that we are able to form a clear picture of all the aspects of educational situation via mostly empirical research.

Adorno tried to articulate with his concept of non-identity that we are unable to disclose reality fully. We have a strong drive for identifying or even reducing educational reality. This is done nowadays for example in evidence-



based educational research that is strongly determined by a causal perspective linking professional intervention and educational outcome (Biesta 2007, pp. 6-8). This has furthered the process that has taken place in western countries where the focus in education (among many other fields of human activity) has fundamentally shifted from the process of creative activity to the end result of that process.

Immanuel Kant famously wrote about legislation of reason most notably in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. Adorno argued in *Negative Dialectics* that this legislation of reason is bound to a separation of mental and physical labor. After Kant all human existence was judged in relation to the mental realm. Enlightened thought tried to show that this realm was the sphere of universal reason, i.e. it is detached from the concrete conditions of social existence.

The transcendental generality is no mere narcissist self-exaltation of the I, not the hubris of an autonomy of the I. Its reality lies in the domination that prevails and perpetuates itself by means of the principle of equivalence. The process of abstraction - which philosophy transfigures, and which it ascribes to the knowing subject alone - is taking place in the factual barter society (Adorno 1973, 178.)

Individuals learn to abstract from their social conditions when judging their specific situations. This is done possible with transcendental subject and the realm of pure reason. Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1985) argued in this connection that the reference to a general subject and pure reason is an objectification that works as a complement to the capitalist principle of exchange.

Beyond the magic circle of identitarian philosophy, the transcendental subject can be deciphered as a society unaware of itself. Such unawareness is deducible. Ever since mental and physical labor were separated in the sign of the dominant mind, the sign of justified privilege, the separated mind has been obliged, with the exaggeration due to a bad conscience, to vindicate the very claim to dominate which it derives from the thesis that it is primary and original - and to make every effort to forget the source of its claim, lest the claim lapse. (Adorno 1973, 177.)

But Adorno's concept says more than only criticize the methods of educational sciences. It tries to articulate to us that the technologically based educational science and some of us who believe in the products of these sciences forget that in education we are dealing with human beings who are trying to articulate what they are experiencing and what they are doing in particular situations (Thompson 2005).

*Education is not therapy but because it is not therapy it can provide therapeutic effect*

It is obvious that we need to keep in mind that education or counselling is not a form or practice of therapy - its main function is *Vergesellschaftlichung* i.e. preparing people to a life in *a specific society*. The goal of therapy in general is also socialization to the given society. Mostly this is done by restoring the work ability of a human being. And with this function we see also one of the main problems that beset education, i.e. what if the whole society is sick, what then is

the role of education, in the process where this socially structured sickness is moved into the individual level? But still we might argue that even though they are not therapy they still can produce a therapeutic effect in student i.e. the need to find a new way of being and acting in the world more responsible way. This is possible when we articulate the process and goal of education from the radical point of view. Then we are able to withstand the goal of therapies in whatever form as fundamentally oriented to cure a person only so that she can function normally within the "pathology of normalcy".

"Pathology of normalcy" means that we see as normal behaviour the statistically normal ways of being and acting in the world. Education as radical education is oriented in curing human beings from the "pathology of normalcy". The real cure is outlined as a realisation of possibility to gain self-knowledge as becoming aware of myself as part of "pathology of normalcy". In the age of globalizing capitalism we need this therapeutic effect that education at best can produce. With it we can face the ever increasing division of the world into a well off part and the part that is pushed into evermore deeper poverty driven by the promise of the increase of prosperity. With it we might be able to make counter effect to fear, melancholy, risk, uncertainty, and human invisibility.

The closer I am to reality the more am I capable to live my life adequately. The less close am I to reality, the more illusions I have, the am I capable to deal with life in an adequate way. (Fromm 1994, 168.)

To be invisible is when people refuse to recognize that you are a human being. To be invisible is when you lose your sense of human dignity. To be invisible is to realize that people no longer recognize your existence and your struggle to live in harmony inside the social world. As Ralph Ellison (1980, 3) wrote in his novel *Invisible Man*: "I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me." And this invisibility has become a sad fact of life for millions of inhabitants across the globe. When we look at the global situation, we can write without hesitation that today families are invisible, children are invisible, women are invisible and men are invisible. As we awake each morning to a consumer ideology, what is not invisible is the commodity itself. We have become a commodity of flesh and bone - a commodity to be bought and sold on the open market.

Within this objectified commodity fetish, there is uncertainty and life risk. When the human being becomes an objectified form, she becomes a disembodied commodity and as such, becomes a 'person' without substance. No longer possessing a human body we become unseen and unfelt not only in the workplace but also inside the social. And here lies the risk and uncertainty. Every commodity relationship runs the risk of being discarded or being placed in a pile of garbage. A commodity has an uncertain future. Its value is determined by its usefulness. When the human being has a commodity form, her usefulness always comes into question and hence, the uncertainty of life and risk.

But what this means for the thinking and acting in the world? This kind of commodification runs through the whole culture. It leaves nothing untouched. We might still criticize the school system same as we can criticize the whole society because it emphasizes too much the issues of knowledge and intelligence. In fact when the new capitalism production has taken hold of the production and selling of knowledge in the large scale this process will accelerate even more. Fromm (1975, 30) saw that this kind of culture where even the acquiring the knowledge about the surrounding world is seen as a commodity production produces a kind of brain-human-being. This kind of being is in touch with her environment, be it natural or social in nature, only with his intellect. Emotional reactions are missing from her intellectual operations which gradually become one dimensional and dull.

It is obvious that in critical attitude we need certain amount of critical distance from what is given but this does not mean that we have to detach ourselves from issues involved in order to for critical attitude. Like Marcuse once wrote while describing Bertolt Brecht's answer to the problem how theatre could in the present situation bring forth truth:

To teach what the contemporary world really is behind the ideological and material veil, and how it can be changed, the theater must break the spectator's identification with the events on the stage. Not empathy and feeling, but distance and reflection are required. The "estrangement-effect" (*Verfremdungseffekt*) is to produce this dissociation in which the world can be recognised as what it is. "The things of everyday life are lifted out of the realm of the self-evident... That which is 'natural' must assume the features of the extraordinary. Only in this manner can the laws of cause and effect reveal themselves" (Brecht, 1957). (Marcuse, 1964, p. 67.)

Marcuse is talking here about *artistic alienation*. Artistic alienation is a conscious alienation of the alienated existence and hence its meaning is different than Marx's use of the concept of alienation. Marx is pointing out the relationship that human beings have towards themselves, others and the things that they produce in the scheme of capitalistic production. Practical human activity is seen as the formation of the self-conscious humanity. The purpose of which is for the collective assertion in social development on behalf of individual and humanity.

The problematic of artistic alienation brings us to the question concerning the aspects of reason, reasoning, intelligence and experience. To be educated in a fundamental sense human beings have to be in contact with the world as a whole human being i.e. with all of their senses and potentials as Hegel described in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Learning seen as a creative process is very important in this connection as then we are able to shift our focus back to the "only satisfaction that can give [...] real happiness - the experience of the activity of the present moment" (Fromm 1942, 226). Without this viewpoint we are only chasing phantoms in a constant dissatisfaction.

There is something fundamentally right when Fromm criticized the division between intellect, emotions and the will. This division highlights the difference between reason and intelligence. Intelligence is connected with the immediate goals and it searches the tools of acquiring these goals. It is

something that Horkheimer (1938) called instrumental reason or subjective aspect of reason. Here reason takes the form of tool and it operates with the already given set of rules, regulations, and identitarian thought. There is no way to see beyond what is given as all that is recognized is the already familiar. It is as if the world is something that we know as same and everything that lies beyond it is not recognizable at all. This kind of reason “proves to be the ability to [...] co-ordinate the right means with a given end” (Horkheimer 1947, 5). Horkheimer asserts moreover that “however naive or superficial this definition of reasoning may seem,” it springs from the “profound change of outlook that has taken place in Western thinking in the course of the last centuries” (ibid. 4).

We need upbringing and education that is versatile in the nurturing of the feeling, willing, creativity and experiencing. It seems that this kind of support is diminishing while the greater part of education is connected with streamlining the intellectual operations of the students to fulfill the regulation and goals of the educational system. Reason in proper sense goes beyond the immediate needs and goals, be it that they are set by the system or individual.

#### *A scream heard in silence*

There is the fundamental need to be silent while others talk -- to let the silence be heard. Without this silence we are not able to get a hint from the non-identical in the given. But at the same time this silence must be seen as a hidden scream that is written to the very texture of modern life as it articulates the desperation of the individual human being. This is a dialectical nature of silence. As Samuel Beckett (1952, 32) once wrote, in his *Waiting for Godot*, when we “stopped crying. You have replaced him as it were. The tears of the world are a constant quantity. For each one who begins to weep somewhere else another stops. The same is true of the laugh.” This is horrifyingly true in global capitalism. This experiential dimension should be brought up in education against the language of profit and personal gain because it is the only way to be able to reach the inner workings of globalized capitalism. Like Holloway once wrote: “When we talk or write, it is all too easy to forget that the beginning was not the word, but the scream. Faced with the destruction of human lives by capitalism, a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, above all a scream of anger, of refusal: NO.” (Holloway 2003, 15.)

Finnish novelist and critic Christer Kihlman (1971) introduced the vertical and horizontal screams that articulate out positioning towards the world in the capitalistic society. The vertical scream comes from inside us. It is “a lonely scream of individualism, a scream that stems from the wealth of the unbearable riot of the market and scam, a helpless scream in front of the facade of conflicts, a scream through the superficial” (Kihlman 1971, 17). Kihlman calls this vertical scream of individualism also ‘bourgeois scream’.

The horizontal scream is a ‘proletarian scream’. It is heard as a distress “from the depths of desperation, poverty and sadness, from the endlessly painful reality of the people who have been cheated, trampled, and humiliated,

from the bottom of the well of the final defeat." The horizontal scream of unprecedented human misery refers to the growth of global injustice and the polarization between the rich and the poor, and wounds also those who try to maintain a decent living in the midst of terrible economic over-development.

The screams of refusal are ethically demanding. Yet the power of the horizontal scream is about how to drown the vertical, for, as Kihlman (ibid.) writes, the horizontal scream "is a scream, which we must listen to, for it is getting louder around us all the time, all over the world, from the throats of millions of starving people, listen, it comes behind the horizon, it is here so close, it goes horizontally into the very ground in which we stand, and hits us at a right angle, challenging like the sound of a storm bell, the scream of an unfulfilled promise, the scream of anger of those from whom both a robe and a rice cup have been stolen, a scream that demands solidarity and justice, the only scream, which really judges." (Ibid. 18)

It is very important to attain the ability of people to come together to reshape and remold the world in their own image and collective interest in teaching environments. In this sense radical pedagogy is shot through with the firm belief that as human beings, we can change the world into a more humane place for the majority, and not just for the privilege minority. In this the ethically demanding screams are important because with them it might be possible to open up theoretical discussions to the experiential registry of each human being involved.

We are afraid of letting out a scream of sadness, a scream of horror, above all a scream of anger, of refusal because it opens up the possibility that we lose the struggle of self-preservation both intellectually and physically. Grown ups and children alike might be seen as a rope dancers, like those in Friedrich Nietzsche's *Thus spoke Zarathustra*. We are afraid of falling down, but not only because we might get hurt, or that it might be fatal to us, but because we long for this fall. In connection to learning, the mass that swells beneath us is seen as opposite to autonomous thinking, and the force of our own experiences. It is a merge of us into something bigger than us, renunciation of adulthood or the aloofness that development has brought about, our integrity.

## LITERATURE

- Adorno, T. W. (1973). *Negative Dialectics*. New York: Routledge.
- Beckett, S. (1952). *Waiting for Godot*. New York: Grove Press.
- Beckett, S. (1955). *Molloy*. New York: Grove Press.
- Biesta, Gert (2007) "Why 'What Works' Won't Work: Evidence-Based Practice and the Democratic Deficit in Educational Research", in *Educational Theory* 57, no. 1, pp. 1-22
- Bloch, E. (1995). *The Principle of Hope. Vol 1*. Cambridge: MIT.
- Ellison, R. (1980). *The Invisible Man*. New York: Random House.
- Evans, R. I. (1966). *Dialogue with Erich Fromm*
- Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. New York: Cosmo.
- Dewey, J. (1989). *Freedom and Culture*. New York: Prometheus Books.
- Fromm, E. (1932). "Psychoanalytic Characterology and its Relevance for Social Psychology." In *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Henry Holt. 164-187.
- Fromm, E. (1941). *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Fromm, E. (1945). *Man for Himself*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Fromm, E. (1955). *The Sane Society*. New York: Henry Holt.
- Fromm, E. (1957). "Medicine and the Ethical Problem of Modern Man." In *The Dogma of Christ*. New York: Henry Holt. 169-187.
- Fromm, E. (1973). *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Fromm, E. (1976). *To Have or To Be?* New York: Continuum.
- Fromm, E. (1994). *The Art of Listening*. New York: Continuum.
- Glannon, W. & Ross, L. F. (2002) "Are doctors altruistic?" In *Journal of Medical Ethics*, 2002; 28:68-69.
- Holloway, J. (2003). "In the Beginning was the Scream". In W. Bonefeld (Ed.). *Revolutionary Writing*. New York: Autonomedia.
- Horkheimer, M. (1938). "The End of Reason." In A. Arato & E. Gebhardt, *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*. New York: Continuum.
- Horkheimer, M. (1947). *Eclipse of Reason*. New York: Continuum.
- Horkheimer, M & Adorno, T. W. (2002). *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. trans. Edmund Jephcott. California: Stanford University Press.
- Horton, M. (1990). *The Long Haul*. New York: Doubleday.
- Kihlman, C. (1971). *Ihminen joka järkkyyi*. [The Human who Trembled] Helsinki: Tammi.
- Marcuse, H. (1964). *One dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Marx, K. (1844). *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. In K. Marx & F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol 3. Moscow: Progress.
- Marx, K. (1859). *Grundrisse*. In K. Marx & F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol 28. Moscow: Progress.

- McLaren, P. & Farahmandpur, R. (2005). *Teaching Against Global Capitalism and the New Imperialism*. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield.
- McLaren, P. & Jaramillo, N. (2007). *Pedagogy and Praxis in the Age of Empire*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
- Moisio, O.-P. (2004). "Sääli sosiaalisena siteenä - uudesta solidaarisuudesta." [Pity as a Social bond - notes on a new solidarity]. In T. Helne, S. Hänninen & J. Karjalainen, *Seis yhteiskunta - tahdon sisään*. Jyväskylä: SoPhi.
- Smith, A. (1776). *The Wealth of Nations*. New York: Bentham.
- Sohn-Rethel, A. (1985). *Soziologische Theorie der Erkenntnis*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Thompson, C. (2005). "The Non-transparency of Self and the Ethical Value of Bildung", in: *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 39, no. 3, pp. 519-533.

## 5 HOPE AND EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

*Originally published in Klas Roth & Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (eds.), Education in the Era of Globalization. Amsterdam: Springer. 2007. Pp. 231-245.*

*The chance is that, in this period, the historical extremes may meet again: the most advanced consciousness of humanity and its most exploited force. It is nothing but a chance – Herbert Marcuse (2002, p. 257)*

In 1954, the magazine Vogue published French novelist Jean Giono's short story entitled *The Man Who Planted Hope and Grew Happiness* (Giono, 1993). It was a story about the most unforgettable person Giono could imagine. In our view, this wonderful little novella, more than anything, is a story about hope, faith and fortitude and how these are connected to individual human actions that can enter life in the most concrete ways.

The main character of the fictional story, which is also known as *The Man Who Planted Trees*, is a shepherd named Elzéard Bouffier. Bouffier devoted his long life to planting trees in the most remote and poorest part of Provence in France. The story can be read as a description of both the individual and the social outcomes of learning. It demonstrates how purely individual deeds can have great social consequences. Bouffier's lonely work in planting trees spanned over three decades, and in that time, his fortitude, faith and love made Provence once again a place worth living in. Thousands of people moved into the region because of Bouffier's unselfish and generous labour. He left his marks on the earth in thousands of trees, which grew to become forests. Without any thought of reward, he brought – quite literally – life back to the previously deserted region.

Furthermore, the story reminds us that learning has always its individual side, too. From his long day's work, Bouffier learned the individual wisdom of silence. In the first years, he occasionally chatted with strangers, but, eventually,



as the years went by, he learned the secret of silence. Words lost their meaning for him. They did not capture the essential. They were useless and less important than the remorse earth he was trying to make fertile through his hard labour. Giono's story finishes with the following words:

When I consider that a single man, relying only on his own simple physical and moral resources, was able to transform a desert into this land of Canaan, I am convinced that despite everything, the human condition is truly admirable. But when I take into account the constancy, the greatness of soul, and the selfless dedication that was needed to bring.

The philosopher Franz Rosenzweig has articulated this active and admirable side of silence. In his words, silence is "unlike the muteness [*Stummheit*] of the protocosmos [*Vorwelt*], which had no words yet" (Rosenzweig, 1985, p. 295). It is "a silence which no longer has any need of the word" (ibid., p. 295). This kind of silence is the silence of the complete understanding, the situation where only one glance says everything. The dignity of silence has been also the interest of Martin Heidegger (1962, p. 318), when he writes that "the tendency of the call [... ] calls Dasein forth (and forward) into its own most possibilities [... ] The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite". In a sense, this road from words to the glance is not some substitute for the linguistic communication but says something more than words could ever say. With the blink of an eye, the glance surpasses language, and yet at the same time, it is "the other which constitutes language because comprehension depends on the sharing of language" (Düttman, 2000, p. 25).

In Giono's story, this glance was articulated in the scene where Bouffier and Giono were walking in the young forest that Bouffier had planted. The sight of one person's work struck Giono

speechless and, as he didn't speak himself, we passed the whole day in silence, walking through his forest. It was in three sections, eleven kilometers long overall and, at its widest point, three kilometers wide. When I considered that this had all sprung from the hands and from the soul of this one man - without technical aids - it struck me that men could be as effective as God in domains other than destruction.

The character that Giono created shows that the possibility of hope and education can be connected not only to the virtue of silence but also to the actions and thoughts of one individual. One lonely act carried out in silence and isolation can in some paradoxical sense become universal. But the ever-enduring problem will be how we can reach each other. What are the limits of each individual and their lives? Are words enough, or do we also need small acts of silence? In this way, if we want to change the world, we first need to change ourselves, and then perhaps the people, through their own actions, can make the change. In this regard, Karl Marx's words from his "Ad Feuerbach" are worth quoting:

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed

upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice (Marx, 1845, p. 4).

But at the same time, this intertwining of hope and an individual's lonely actions signals the hidden pessimistic conclusion. As individuals are always and already socialized by the given era, and the prospects for fundamental changes in the 'social mentality' are always slow to catch on, the question we wish to address in the present article is whether hope is possible in the desperate era of globalization. In making our response, first we give an overall view of various definitions of 'globalization' and then investigate the conditions of the present times and the paradoxes of learning by using Erich Fromm's concept of hope.

But we would also have to ask whether this hope is more often connected to impatience and a wish for the quick improvement of the situation than to any sober critical attitude towards the world as it is given to us. In raising this question, however, we do not want to imply that this impatience is not justified, especially if we think, for instance, of all the hardships that teachers face when working with children and adults alike. What we want to argue is simply this: although hope is an active state of doing things, it is not merely a matter of wanting this or that at a given moment. Instead, it is connected to the theoretically articulated diagnosis of the time we are living in, and in this sense, it is part of the virtues of patience and tolerance (see Moisio and Suoranta, 2006).

### *What is globalization?*

The era of globalization has meant dramatic cultural, economic, social and educational changes and distinctions. The effect of these on people has depended largely on where in the world a person is located. We cannot sufficiently stress the fact that people are growing up in economically, culturally and socially different and differently timed worlds.

As Douglas Kellner (2000, p. 305) states, before the era of globalization, culture was a "particularizing, localizing force that distinguished societies and people from each other. Culture provided forms of local identities, practices, and modes of everyday life that could serve as a bulwark against the invasion of ideas, identities, and forms of life extraneous to the specific local region in question". Nowadays, however, the status and meaning of culture has changed: it "is an especially complex and contested terrain today as global cultures permeate local ones and new configurations emerge that synthesize both poles, providing contradictory forces of colonization *and* resistance, global homogenization *and* new local hybrid forms and identities" (italics in original, *ibid.*, p. 305).

But what is actually meant by globalization? The concept itself should be questioned and deconstructed because it is much too easy to claim that, in

contrast to this immense variety of living environments, there would exist a grand narrative of globalization: an unprecedented and unifying educational power, which challenges and surpasses such traditional forms of socialization as the family and the school. Is there such a dramatic phenomenon? Or is it, as Kellner (*ibid.*, p. 301) has observed, that the concept of globalization is often used 'as a cover concept for a heterogeneity of processes that need to be spelled out and articulated. The term is neither innocent nor neutral in many of its uses, and often serves to replace older critical discourses like "imperialism".' In the same tone, Peter McLaren and Ramin Farahmandpur (2005, p. 39) have stated that "the concept of globalization has effectively replaced the term 'imperialism' in the lexicon of privileged class for the purpose of exaggerating the global character of capitalism – as an all-encompassing and indefatigable power that apparently no nation-state has the means to resist or oppose". Instead of globalization as a sort of totalizing concept, in their lexicon of critical revolutionary pedagogy, McLaren and Farahmandpur prefer to use such terms as "capitalist globalization" or "globalization of capital".

Various different names have been given to this new and unprecedented complex cultural-political situation, where people are forced to struggle for their lives, their living conditions and their identities. Some have called it the information or informational age, others have termed it techno-culture (Robins and Webster, 1999), techno-capitalism or global media culture, referring to the dialectic process in which the global and the local exist as "combined and mutually implicating principles" (Beck, 2002, p. 17). A number of other labels, such as post-industrial, virtual or cybersociety, are also in use (see Hand and Sandywell, 2002), but the notion behind these descriptions is that across the globe media, information and communication technologies (ICTs) and capital economic relations form a "captive triangle" that plays a central role in people's lives, as well as in society at large.

The first assumption behind these terms is that the 'captive triangle' is causing a rapid transformation in all aspects of life. The second is that the triangle functions to unify and standardize culture. Manuel Castells has analysed some of the demands that have characterized the transformation from the industrial to the informational era:

The needs of the economy for management flexibility and for the globalization of capital, production, and trade; the demands of society in which the values of individual freedom and open communication became paramount; and the extraordinary advances in computing and telecommunications made possible by the micro-electronics revolution (Castells, 2001, p. 2).

What is noteworthy is that the grand narrative of globalization is rarely told from the standpoint of ordinary people. The processes behind globalization and the functions and effects of the captive triangle would deserve a more thorough analysis from the point of view of people's life-world in different parts of the world, because the critique of the totalizing aspect of globalization must include the fact that the whole discourse of globalization is largely affected by Western values.

Typically, the debate about the meaning of globalization moves between two polarities: utopias and dystopias. Pessimists and cynics, who believe that the core meaning of globalization is one of cultural barbarism, challenge economic determinists and technology enthusiasts, who believe that ICTs will revolutionize every aspect of the world. Somewhere in-between these two polarities are those who collect statistics about the diverse aspects of "globalization", with little emphasis on ethical or normative matters. Thus, they often forget the fact that the very act of statistical calculation is value-laden in itself. Furthermore, the media is keen to information. Those more or less autonomous researchers who are doing their best to gain a better understanding of the current situation provide another vantage point. Unfortunately, critical and analytical thinkers with the capacity and willingness to put forward ideas that go beyond technological determinism remain few.

Economic and technological determinism foster assumptions about globalization and free trade having the power to overcome the current maladies of the world, including poverty, hunger and deprivation, and the conflicts arising from them. Our own stance in these issues could be described as a critical yet cautiously hopeful and optimistic one. From the people's point of view, the main question is, what are the terms on which global hope can be sustained in the age of technological cynicism and capitalist barbarism? Our approach here emphasizes the dialectical relationship between material reality and cultural terrain. It is at the crossroads of the tangible concreteness of the world and the various cultural discourses, where different meanings of globalization continue to be built and re-built, contested and struggled over within the sphere of a negative dialectic which also contains a glimpse of hope.

Wide ranges of definitions and characterizations have sprung up around global media and information culture. Generally, the concept "media culture" refers to the socio-cultural condition where most of people's daily perceptions and experiences are indirect and transmitted through various ICTs, whether more traditional (radio, television and newspaper) or relatively new (mobile phone, computer). Some of the definitions emphasize the significance of information and information technology that have emerged around it. Manuel Castells' three-volume opus magnum, *The Information Age* (Castells, 1996-1998), is a paramount example of this emphasis. Castells' account of the network society, the economic and social dynamics of the new informational age, is strongly reminiscent of the analysis once conducted by Marx on the industrial society. The most fundamental difference between the two is that where Marx emphasized industrial labour as the basis for all productivity, Castells stresses the meaning of information and information flows:

In the industrial mode of development, the main source of productivity lies in the introduction of new energy sources, and in the ability to decentralize the use of energy throughout the production and circulation processes. In the new, informational mode of development the source of productivity lies in the technology of knowledge generation, information processing, and symbol communication (Castells, 1996, p. 17).

In the footsteps of Marshall McLuhan, Castells (2001) has further argued that the Internet is the message of our times; that is, the medium that forms the fabric of our very lives. For Castells, the network represents the leading idea of our era and functions as a metaphor, extending its influence to various aspects of human activity: “Core economic, social, political, and cultural activities throughout the planet are being structured by and around the Internet, and other computer networks”, he contends (*ibid.*, p. 3) and continues: “exclusion from these networks is one of the most damaging forms of exclusion in our economy and in our society”. He goes on to compare the meaning of information technology to that of electricity in the industrial era, likening the Internet to the electrical grid or the electric engine: the Internet can distribute the power of information throughout the entire realm of human activity. The central position of information also dictates the type of competencies required from the labour force in the future. Perhaps the most central capabilities are those of learning and re-learning and managing information. Yet, Castells’ accounts of the matter are not one dimensional, but do justice to the versatile and contradictory character of the global media and information culture. For instance, he is well aware of the fact that ICTs can be used both as the accelerator of immaterial flows of value, such as money and free trade, and as the information channel for various social movements and anti-corporate activism.

The crux of Castells’ analysis, as well as his conception of the essence of the information society, rests on economic activity. In fact, the term “information economy” is highly appropriate for the model of society constructed in Castells’ theories. More than technological determinism, Castells’ thinking seems to be guided and motivated by the ICT imperative. The following quote from Hand and Sandywell illustrates well this type of thinking:

Where information technologies have been singled out as key causes of progressive change and democratic enlightenment, we not only have an instance of ideological simplification but also an advanced form of technological fetishism (Hand and Sandywell, 2002, p. 198).

Where Castells emphasizes access to information as a factor to global and macroeconomic success, others (e.g. Kellner, 1995; Webster, 2000; Norris, 2001; May, 2002) highlight the importance of surrounding cultural, political and social factors in the construction of the global media and information culture. In these critical texts, global media culture has often been associated with the substitution of the national by the global: “The logic of manufacturing is displaced by the logic of information; and the logic of the social is displaced by that of the cultural” (Lash, 2002, p. 26). The sovereignty of nation states – economic, political and cultural relationships between independent states – is being replaced by global flows such as finance, technology, information, communication, images, ideas or people. The logic of manufacturing is giving way to the logic of information. This means that a vast array of products is becoming more informationalized: for instance, toys and mechanical devices such as cameras – not to mention money and “policing society” – are becoming

increasingly digitalized. Moreover, work and production processes are no longer labour intensive, but information, knowledge and design intensive. Furthermore, the social is being displaced by the cultural: where the social constituted action tied to place and tradition, in the world of wired connections, the cultural flows freely as money, ideas and popular images (*ibid.*, p. 26).

In his largely skeptical take on the information society, Christopher May (2002, pp. 12–17) has located four central, yet problematic, claims about current media culture. The first claim is that, above all, the meaning of media culture is that of a social revolution induced by the manifestations of information technology, such as computers, mobile phones and the Internet. As observed by May, such a claim represents technological determinism and forgets that the meaning of technology is not to be found in technology itself but arises from its usage and the cultural–political context. May (2002, p. 14) goes on to contend: “Once we recognize that there has been a long gestation of the relevant technologies and of their interaction with societies across the globe, then the claims for revolution start to look a little strained”. The second claim foresees a replacement of the rigid social, political and judicial institutions by a new ICT-based economy and “Californian” ideology. The global development of “Californization” is about autonomous individuals who communicate with other autonomous individuals with the primary aim of finding new ways to make money. The new economy offers no hope for longstanding or permanent jobs that would create stability and social security in people’s lives. In the weightless economy of the future, people in the North work primarily in flexible, part-time, low-pay service-sector jobs, whereas the youth of the South work long hours, with minimal wages and no job security in back-street sweatshops or in fenced-off industrial zones where the workers’ performance is strictly monitored by the overseers and where the workers are housed in cramped on-site dormitories.

The third claim suggests that in the pre-Internet world, many writers stressed the significance of expert power afforded by the management, control, ownership and distribution of information. The age of the Internet has witnessed the spread of what one might call a do-it-yourself ideology. Its central assumption is that people automatically mobilize into small and efficient interest groups and social movements and no longer require traditional political parties or social institutions to forward their aims. The final claim argues that nation states are slowly disappearing from the political scene. According to this view, “The information revolution has undermined the state’s ability to control information for its own ends, with fatal consequences for its overall authority” (May, 2002, p. 16). Of course, such a claim is exaggerated, for in many senses, the nation state remains a powerful category in the scene of global politics and there are no signs of its disappearance.

In global-mediated culture, it can be difficult for people to know whose representations are closest to the truth, which representations to believe and whose images matter. This is partly because the emergence of digitalized communication, and the commoditization of culture have significantly altered the conditions of experiencing life and culture. Many people perhaps still feel

attached to the romantic image of the old organic communities, where people would converse with each other face-to-face and live in a close-knit local environment. Digital communication, however, is gradually wiping out the romantic image:

Most of the ways in which we make meanings, most of our communications to other people, are not directly human and expressive, but interactions in one way or another worked through commodities and commodity relations: TV, radio, film, magazines, music, commercial dance, style, fashion, commercial leisure venues. These are major realignments. (Willis, 2000, p. 48.)

The object character of global media culture is visible in many ways. Media culture is produced and reproduced by diverse ICTs. Thus, it would be imperative to update the teaching and training of knowledge and skills central to the agrarian and industrial societies with an education in digital literacy. A similar point is made by Kellner (1998, p. 122), who contends that, in a media culture, it is important to learn multiple ways of interacting with social reality. People must be provided with opportunities to develop skills in multiple literacies, in order for them to be able to better work on their identities, social relationships and communities, and most importantly maintain hope in their lives.

### *Hope and education*

Erich Fromm, famous psychoanalyst and culture critic, made a thorough analysis of the notion of hope. His conception of hope referred to a concrete emotional response that is a fundamental and active dimension of the human way of being in the world. In his book *You Shall be as Gods* (1966), he studied the notion of hope by making what he called “radical interpretations” of the Old Testament and its traditions, and in his book *Revolution of Hope* (1968), he returned to the analysis of hope from a more radical viewpoint.

Hope is the most fundamental dimension of any human activity – especially education – that is connected to change (see Fromm, 1968), and it almost always has two sides to it: the individual and the social. Individual and social changes are the heart of education, or at least the hope for change. Although education is one of the main vehicles in the socialization [Vergesellschaftlichung] process, and it is always connected in some way or other to the maintenance of an established system of prefashioned ways of being and acting in the world, we can still see glimmers of hope for change in the actual educational situation.

Human beings have always longed for something “totally other”, as for instance Max Horkheimer (1970) has shown in his late work. In Fromm’s analysis, the Old Testament is one of the major works that is shot through by this longing, but he also sees in the New Testament the same dynamics of longing. Sometimes this longing for change has promoted impatience and wishful thinking, as the hopes were connected to some person or idea, as in the

case of false Messiahs (e.g. Sabbatai Zevi). Fromm (1966, pp. 138–146) shows how the Jewish community has never lost its hope for the coming of the Messiah, even though the long list of false messiahs, from the destruction of the Temple to the eighteenth century, shattered their hope and left them in a state of shock and despair. But this shock and despair, he argues, is in fact an integral part of hope.

Fromm (1966, p. 153) argues that rabbinical literature warns again and again ‘against trying to “force the Messiah”.’ Against this kind of attitude, Fromm places a different attitude that is neither impatience nor passive waiting. He called this attitude “dynamic hope”. Dynamic hope longs for the salvation to happen right at this very moment and yet is ‘ready to accept the fact that salvation may not come in one’s own lifetime’ (Fromm, 1966, p. 154). Fromm sees a certain danger in this. Hope can deteriorate into passive waiting when the desired goal is moved into the distant future. Hope can lose its force when it is seen not as a tension waiting to be released but as a passive hope, in the sense of infantile waiting for coming improvements. This is why Fromm (1966, p. 154) writes “when hope loses its immediacy, it tends to become alienated. The future is transformed into a goddess whom I worship, and to whom I submit”.

This paradoxical nature of hope is the reason why we need faith. Faith, in the sense of certainty, is “based on the inner experience of the goal, even though it has not yet been reached, and no proof exists that it ever will be” Fromm (1966, p. 157). Teachers, educators or persons living in the age of globalization wanting to retain a critical attitude must have faith and fortitude. They must with all their energy be prepared for the goal of improvement, even though it is only a potentiality. For such a person, “defeat is no proof invalidating his faith, while victory will always be looked upon with suspicion, since it might turn out to be the mask for defeat” Fromm (1966, p. 157).

Giono’s character did not lose his faith, although war, hate, and destruction were raging around him. He worked towards his goal, even though the world was against him and made his life miserable. After Bouffier’s death, Giono visited the place and saw the following:

[Everything] had changed, even the air itself. In place of the dry, brutal gusts that had greeted me long ago, a gentle breeze whispered to me, bearing sweet odors. A sound like that of running water came from the heights above: it was the sound of the wind in the trees. And most astonishing of all, I heard the sound of real water running into a pool. I saw that they had built a fountain, that it was full of water, and what touched me most, that next to it they had planted a lime-tree that must be at least four years old, already grown thick, an incontestable symbol of resurrection.

Although Fromm argued about the dynamic concept of hope, Ernst Bloch wrote of hope in terms of the concept of “radical optimism”. Hope is for Bloch a subjective-objective feeling that he divides into filled and expectant emotions. He writes in his *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* about “filled emotions” (such as envy, greed and admiration), which “are those whose drive-intention is short-term, whose drive-object lies ready, if not in respective individual attainability, then in the already available world” (Bloch, 1995, p. 74). This is in a sense impatient



hope, hope that is connected to the given state of affairs. But the critical concept of hope is open to the horizon of time; it has a real living future as the Not-yet. Subjective hope, the hope that is hoping, presupposes an objective correlate that Bloch terms objective hope, that is a hope that is hoped for. This objective hope needs to be found and worked on, so that the true liberation of human beings could materialize. In this sense, hope is a cognitive act that shows the way to “where” we should go – where something is intended and should be experienced.

Bloch stressed that hope is not a certainty. There is nothing in the world that would guarantee hope. This is why he sees that hope can only be based on a militant optimism, which recognizes the prospect of success but also the prospect of destruction. Moreover, the existence of objective hope does not even guarantee that the real opportunities would ever materialize. Hope is never satisfied when it is in motion towards whatever is hoped for. Hopelessness is written inside the concept of hope, in the fact that what is hoped for is never reached as it is hoped for – it is always in some way or another incomplete. But for Bloch, this is adequate because hope unfolds in the Now, the trend that could lead to the improvement of the conditions of humanity. Hope is all that we are left with. As he writes at the end of the first volume of *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, “Mankind and the world carry enough good future; no plan is itself good without this fundamental belief within it” (Bloch, 1995, p. 447).

Hope summons us to our “own most potentiality-for-Being”. It is a call that touches the limit of language and at the same time has to be articulated in the manner that it is understood. Sometimes, only the gesture is needed, as Rosenzweig believes, but sometimes it is not enough. In a sense, educational situations are quite literally the places where much of what happens, happens behind the backs of conscious actors. In these situations, one gesture says more than a thousand words could ever articulate. This rational non-rational dimension of education opens up the ideological function of education and also articulates the limits of hope in the concrete educational practices (Moisio, 2005).

### *Pedagogical Paradox and Hope*

Education does not produce solely individuals with certain skills and knowledge but also political subjects. In this way, education is always an ethical activity involving the questions of justice and human rights at both the local and the global levels. Even though it is true that culture arises from the complex interactions of individual human actions, it is very rare for these individual human beings to reach the freedom of action and thought on their own. To be able to be conscious of their activity, the human being needs someone else, the significant Other, who can activate and emancipate them.

Immanuel Kant (1803, pp. 697–699) highlights this idea in his “Über Pädagogik”:

Man is the only being who needs education. For by education we must understand nurture (the tending and feeding of the child), discipline [Zucht], and teaching, together with culture. (...) Man can only become man by education. He is merely what education makes of him.<sup>1</sup>

Kant (1803, p. 699) also states that: "It is noticeable that man is only educated by man – that is, by men who have themselves been educated". For Kant education is a tool which can be used to realize the potentiality for freedom and the autonomous use of reason in every human being. But because of this, education also includes inevitably compulsion. Kant writes in his "Über Pädagogik" about discipline, coercion and cultivation. He thinks that these educational tools turn an animal into a man. What he means by this is that a human being does not have instincts that steer the actions of animals, and this is why he needs a faculty for the autonomous use of reason. A human being is not immediately able to use her reason in an autonomous way, and this is why human interaction in a symbolist level should be arranged in such a way that this autonomy could be reached. The pedagogical paradox is thus that we need to be coerced to be free. These ideas also pose a serious and ever-enduring problem for education, which Kant sees but never articulates as a negative effect.

There have been many attempts to try to avoid the pedagogical paradox fundamentally connected to the emergence of self-conscious action. Giroux (1997) sees that one way of arranging the educational situation for the purpose of creating autonomous individuals is to understand educators not as people who discipline children but as "border intellectuals". These intellectuals, who resemble Antonio Gramsci's organic and engaged intellectuals, tear down the curtains for new ideas, lifestyles, thoughts and actions to appear. The human capacity for venturing beyond the immediate is highlighted in this idea about border intellectuals. Giroux sees – like, for example, Herbert Marcuse in his more utopian moments – that the realization of autonomous activity is able to free human beings from the tutelage of coercive power structures and thought patterns. But what is particularly interesting here is that this hope for the realization of autonomous activity is in fact internally linked to the pedagogical paradox.

What we have been arguing so far can also be articulated in the language of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic theory is especially helpful in trying to understand the complex development of individual autonomy in the changing contexts of actual educational practices. According to psychoanalytic theory, to become self-conscious and autonomous, an individual needs a community of primary socialization. This community contains a set of shared values that are essential for the development of a self-conscious person. In this respect, we do not find or select values as much as they find us.

Furthermore, when seen from the viewpoint of education, there are three dimensions to autonomy. The first is an organic dimension, which is connected to the developing individual and her internal drive to autonomy. This drive to autonomy can be seen in a compulsive need to produce and, moreover, to

---

<sup>1</sup> Translation taken from Kant, 1960, pp. 1-3.

solidify the ego. In its early stages, the ego is through mental imagery connected to the maintenance of internal impulses, such as needs and tensions. These images, in turn, are connected to the earlier experiences in which some object or event has relieved the tension. In this vein, Freud (1964, p. 193) once wrote that "If one has lost a love object, the most obvious reaction is to identify oneself with it, to replace it from within, as it were, by identification". Freud thus defines identification as the first emotional tie to the object before he finalized its place as a precipitate of abandoned object cathexes (Freud, 1963). The main point in identification is that it is a relationship between a subject and a object, and not a purely internal process, as in introjections. The continuing relationship to the object is thus the distinctive feature of identification. We also need to assume the existence of a rudimentary form of self for the identification to take place.

The second dimension of autonomy is the social context of the developing ego, for it is already in multiple interactions with the surrounding community and its members. Interactions take place in a world full of diverse meanings produced in the sociocultural process of "structuration" (Giddens, 1984). Structuration is a distinctive form of socialization, which refers to the both learning of rules and norms and structures of behavior and communication (Giddens, 1984, pp. 203–204). In this sense, structuration is an integral and necessary part of becoming an autonomous human being. In the view of Berger and Luckmann (1966), individuals try to be competent members of a given community with the implicit goal of being identified as individuals. This reflects a paradoxical process: to be an autonomous person means internalizing the socio-historic rule structures and through this internalization to be an authentic member of a community. And what is even more striking is that individuals interpret their feelings in a manner prestructured by the community.

Giono's character Bouffier worked and hoped on a local plane. His was the concrete hope, and the fruits of his work were at hand for him. But today, when we are living in a globalized world and the consciousness of our actions should be in a sense global, we are forced to wonder how this locality and globality of hope can be reconciled. Following on from what we have been arguing so far, one may ask: What happens to the idea of individual actions in a world where morality equals individuality? This is a crucial question in a world where individuality is defined by the globalized commodity markets. But can we still hope for the change that is promoted by genuine autonomy? Giono offers an answer, for his story is a marvelous example of the virtues needed in the time of globalization. Bouffier's deeds are an example of a genuine universal act and demonstrate what it means to be a human and to act as human. His lonely, silent work carries in it also a paradox: being universal, the planting of trees can only be exercised in isolation, and from a partisan position. The planting of trees is a universal act in the same sense that various "globalization discourses" and endless postmodern points of view are particular and often mere nonsense. One could think of, for instance, international summits and meetings on various issues such as globalization and the environment: they are perfect examples of super-sized particular acts with

minor effects. In a few words, the planting of trees is a metaphor for educational ethics in the era of globalization.

*What can be hoped for in the era of globalization?*

Let us conclude by stating a few hopeful yet – as we see them – necessary principles that should be taken into account when planning curricula and teaching in the era of globalization. All the following ideas share the ideas of wholeness and critical reflection as cornerstones of hopeful education in the global world. In connection with these sketch-like proposals, or directions, we need to keep in mind some serious reservations connected to the formation of personality as a constant interaction of society and individual (cf. Moisió, 2004, 2005).

Human beings, especially teacher educators and students, need to recognize their conditioning and their own situatedness in the world. If the world is in constant change, as it is argued to be, it is imperative to begin to know yourself and your neighbors. This strengthening of consciousness is connected to the individual's overall ability for critical reflection. This is what is meant by such concepts as self-reflection and "autodidaktik". But as we have seen, self-reflection, "autodidaktik", critical reflection and so on are part and parcel of the world we are living in, and its system of self-preservation. So, at the same time as we emphasize the idea of critical self-reflection, we have to ask seriously whether it is at all possible to develop as an autonomous person in the conditions of "liquid modernity", although this would be the most fundamental dimension of critical education.

If we still want to promote critical reflection in a concrete educational world we have to understand that human beings – parents, workers, cultural workers, students, adult educators and teacher educators – need more time and "thinking-space". This clearing of spaces for serious reading and dialog should be done not only inside academia, or unofficially and informally among "the bright ones", but also in people's life-world, as part of their everyday life. This process might eventually and hopefully promote the development of critical understanding.

If we are to take a further step and try to understand the concrete ways to open up these "thinking-spaces" as places of hope, we need to understand how professional identities are formed. Students and their teachers need adequate possibilities to choose their own readings and to make their own paths towards becoming critical and engaged intellectuals, as well as professionals with high ethical standards. Educators of all sorts need to have more freedom to teach in accordance with their own interests and to maintain their autonomy to study. This means, for example, that we should get rid of the closed and didactic-oriented (read: cook book-like) teacher education systems, which have traditionally been isolated into separate Faculties of Education. This is often a very concrete problem, which effectively prevents serious co-operation and

multi-disciplinary approaches with other fields such as cultural studies, sociology, political sciences and media studies.

Even though it is obvious that this choosing of your own substance is very limited if we look at the curricula issues and the legally sanctioned dimensions of the teaching of professionals (i.e. teachers, doctors, etc.), we think that the broadening of the view of how and what it means to be a professional is something that needs serious discussion. A way to do this is to give students more possibilities to participate in the planning processes of teacher education programs. They also need spaces other than lecture halls and classrooms to practice and use their own distinct voice. This informal learning includes student associations, newspapers, radio stations and various forms of independent media, as well as possibilities for voluntary work. It is obvious that students need a chance to “go public” to grow up as public and transformative intellectuals with critical and hopeful minds.

Students also need opportunities to be able to call for co-operation and to share their study interests with fellow students and teacher educators. They should be allowed to learn from each other. This requires two things. First, teaching should not be based only on traditional methods, where the teacher teaches and the students are supposed to learn, but rather on dialogue and collaborative learning projects where everyone is allowed to have a word if not an argument. This does not mean that traditional methods should be demolished but simply that within the traditional way of teaching some opportunities for dialog and independent thought should be opened. In addition, we should remember that there are always some issues that touch the borders of the possibility of dialogue. Second, it would be better if the present mosaic structure of the teacher education program (where different subjects, such as math, geography, literature, etc., are taught separately) were changed into broader themes, or at least connected to these themes. This allows – or even forces – teacher educators to co-operate, to think, and to decide what they are doing both individually and together.

And last but not least, we should keep reminding ourselves that education is a deeply political endeavor. Thus, we need to deny capitalist-driven globalization and profit-driven competition as the only options for the world and humanity. Instead, we ought to focus on the needs of the world’s population.

These needs include ensuring that the majority have access to the benefits currently only available to the few; ensuring survival of the planet, ecosystems and humanity; the creation of a society based on co-operation, satisfying need and not profit; the substantial reduction of working hours; overcoming the alienation of people from their work, what is produced, and society as a whole; employing an abundance of products to alleviate poverty and need world-wide; allowing people to fulfill their potential and aspirations; and making health and well-being the single dominant social objective for the global population (Suoranta et al. 2004, pp. 257–258).

## REFERENCES

- Beck, U. (2002) "The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies", *Theory, Culture & Society* 19(1-2): 17-44.
- Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1966) *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York, Garden City).
- Bloch, E. (1995) *The Principle of Hope Vol. 1* (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press).
- Castells, M. (1996-1998) *The Information Age, 3 Volumes* (Oxford, Blackwell).
- Castells, M. (2001) *The Internet Galaxy. Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- Düttmann, A.G. (2000) *The Gift of Language* (London, Athlon Press).
- Freud, S. (1963) "New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis", In: *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychoanalytical Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXII* (London, The Hogarth Press), pp. 5-182. Freud, S. (1964) "An Outline of Psychoanalysis", In: *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychoanalytical Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXIII* (London, The Hogarth Press), pp. 144-207.
- Fromm, E. (1966) *You Shall be as Gods* (New York, Henry Holt).
- Fromm, E. (1968) *Revolution of Hope* (New York, Harper & Row).
- Giddens, A. (1984) *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. (Cambridge, Polity Press).
- Giono, J. (1993) *The Man Who Planted Trees*, translated by Doyle, P. [http://home.infomaniak.ch/arboretum/Man\\_Tree.htm](http://home.infomaniak.ch/arboretum/Man_Tree.htm)
- Giroux, H. (1997) *Pedagogy and Politics of Hope* (Boulder, Westview).
- Hand, M. and Sandywell, B. (2002) "E-topia as Cosmopolis or Citadel. On the Democratizing and De-democratizing Logics of the Internet, or, Toward a Critique of the New Technological Fetishism", *Theory, Culture & Society* 19(1-2): 197-225.
- Heidegger, M. (1962) *Being and Time* (Oxford, Blackwell).
- Horkheimer, M. (1970) *Die Sehnsucht nach dem ganz Anderen* [Gespräch mit Helmut Gumnior]. In: *Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften Band 7* (Frankfurt am Main, Fischer), pp. 385-404.
- Kant, I. (ed.) (1803) "Über Pädagogik", In: *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 2. Werkausgabe Band XII* (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp), pp. 695-761.
- Kant, I. (1960) *Education* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press).
- Kellner, D. (1995) *Media Culture. Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics Between the Modern and the Postmodern* (New York and London: Routledge).
- Kellner, D. (1998) "Multiple Literacies and Critical Pedagogy in a Multicultural Society", *Educational Theory* 48(1): 102-122.
- Kellner, D. (2000) "Globalization and New Social Movements: Lessons for Critical Theory and Pedagogy", In: *Burbules, N. and Torres, C. (eds)*

- Globalization and Education: Critical Perspectives (New York and London, Routledge), pp. 299–321.
- Lash, S. (2002) *Critique of Information* (London, Sage).
- Marcuse, H. (2002) *One-Dimensional Man* (New York, Routledge).
- Marx, K. (1845) “[Theses on Feuerbach] 1) ad Feuerbach”, In: Marx and Engels, *Collected Works Vol 5* (Moscow, Progress Publishers), pp. 3–5.
- May, C. (2002) *The Information Society. The Sceptical View* (Cambridge, Polity Press).
- McLaren, P. and Farahmandpur, R. (2005) *Teaching Against Global Capitalism and the New Imperialism* (Boulder, Rowman & Littlefield).
- Moisio, O.-P. (2004) “The End of Person”, In: Ikäheimo, H., Kotkavirta, J., Laitinen, A. and Lyyra, P. (eds) *Personhood* (Jyväskylä, University of Jyväskylä, Publications in Philosophy), pp. 171–177.
- Moisio, O.-P. (2005) “Max Horkheimer on the Mimetic Element in Education” In: Gur-Ze’ev, I. (ed.) *Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy Today – Toward a New Language in Education* (Haifa, Iyyunim Bachinuch), pp. 261–277.
- Moisio, O.-P. and Suoranta, J. (eds) (2006) *Education and the Spirit of Time: Historical, Global and Critical Reflections* (Rotterdam/Taipei, Sense Publishers).
- Norris, P. (2001) *Digital Divide. Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
- Robins, K. and Webster, K. (1999) *Times of Technoculture* (New York and London, Routledge).
- Rosenzweig, F. (1985) *The Star of Redemption* (London, University of Notre Dame Press).
- Suoranta, J., FitSimmons, R., Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, V. and McLaren, P. (2004) “The Ethics of Insanity: Making Our Way Through the Swamp”, *Lifelong Learning in Europe* 9(4): 252–259.
- Webster, F. (2000) *Theories of the Information Society* (New York and London, Routledge).
- Willis, P. (2000) *The Ethnographic Imagination* (Cambridge, Polity Press).

## 6 CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE AS ZEITGEIST ANALYSIS

*Originally published in Olli-Pekka Moisio & Juha Suoranta (eds.), Education and the Spirit of Time. Rotterdam: Sense. 2005. Pp. 243-255.*

The educational system is political, so it is not we who want to politicize the educational system. What we want is a counter-policy against the established policy. And in this sense we must meet this society on its own ground of total mobilization. We must confront indoctrination in servitude with indoctrination in freedom. We must each of us generate in ourselves, and try to generate in others, the instinctual need for a life without fear, without brutality, and without stupidity. And we must see that we can generate instinctual and intellectual revulsion against the values of an affluence which spreads aggressiveness and suppression throughout the world. (Marcuse 2005 [1967], 85)

Among scholars of critical pedagogy there is no shared conception of the role of theory or the proper research methods in conducting critical studies. Thus it is necessary to try to sketch basic conceptions for an approach that adds to critical researchers' methodological tools in the field of critical pedagogy. In this chapter we put forward ideology critique as one such approach, and define it as a specific form of Zeitgeist analysis. We call this approach ideology critique as Zeitgeist analysis, and place it among those critical social theories which try to conceptualize the structures of domination and resistance at the same time as they illuminate "the possibilities of social transformation and progress" (Kellner 1995, 25).

Critical social theories have at least three different functions. They can be 1. theoretical and cognitive maps; 2. instruments of practice; and 3. tools for social, cultural, and political critique (Kellner 1995, 25). Ideology critique as Zeitgeist analysis shares the third function, for it is a primary objective of intellectual work to question and criticize the ruling ideas of capitalism and to reveal their inner contradictions. Furthermore, ideology critique as Zeitgeist analysis can "aid in the construction of better societies by showing what needs to be transformed, what agencies might carry out the transformation, and what strategies and tactics might be successful in promoting progressive social



change" (ibid. 25). However, as we are approaching our theme primarily from the point of the view of critical theory, one must remember that ideology critique as *Zeitgeist* analysis, cannot suggest "its own recipes to the society it is criticising" (Pongratz 2005, 155).

### **Ideology Critique as *Zeitgeist* Analysis**

Ideology critique has been defined as a cornerstone of critical inquiry for a long time, and its relationship to *zeitgeist* analysis has been rather intense. At least since Marx, ideologue critique has been a primer research tool for critical thinkers, who have used it in their studies aimed towards overcoming repressive social conditions and forms of oppression. Marx applied ideologue critique in his work, although the concept itself was invented only later (Leist 1986):

It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition (...) However, on closer examination this proves false. (...) The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence a unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception. (...) (In this method) the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought. (...) the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. (Marx 1857, 38)

In one sense ideology critique refers to the awakening of social and political consciousness in such shared activities which include working, thinking, and studying together. As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1972) states, forms of repression hidden in economic and political power relations are exposed through ideologue critique and emancipatory reflections. Although we agree with Gadamer, it seems to us that he does not go far enough, and forgets that ideologies as social facts determine also the economic-political sphere.

At the same time as ideologue critique as *Zeitgeist* analysis aims at revealing various forms of domination, and traditional authorities, it wants to emphasize the forms of practical wisdom and the richness of historically cumulative human experience which characterizes people's being in the world, and their relation to the arts, philosophy, history, and education. In this sense ideologue critique as *Zeitgeist* analysis forces us to acknowledge the specific historical context of critical theory and its theoretical language, and prevents us from thinking that theory, and the words we use as scholars in critical pedagogy, would be reality itself.

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. (Marx & Engels 1976, 447)

Cultural theorist and social psychologist Erich Fromm placed such figures as Spinoza, Marx, and Freud on the long historical line of ideologue critique. All of them thought that the bulk of conscious thought is false and disoriented, and represents reality upside down, as in a camera obscura. According to these thinkers, the origins of action and thinking are usually unknown to people. Whereas Freud attributed the reason for this to unconscious drives, Marx explained it by referring to the world of economics and other social structures which make possible or prevent the full development of humanity (Fromm 2004, 19).

It is exactly the blindness of man's conscious thought which prevents him from being aware of his true human needs, and of ideals which are rooted in them. Only if false consciousness is transformed into true consciousness, that is, only if we are aware of reality, rather than distorting it by rationalizations and fictions, can we also become aware of our real and true human needs. (Ibid., 19)

Whereas Fromm concentrated in his thinking on the relationship between individuals and social processes, Max Horkheimer – Fromm's first employer and the founder of the Frankfurt School – maintained the importance of a unified human science as a condition for a critical and conscious understanding of life. According to Horkheimer (1952), it was necessary to "remove the curtain from individual disciplines and specific national and school traditions". Thus Horkheimer wanted to turn political and social transformation into an ethical imperative for social researchers.

When I speak of the broader points of view that must be linked to individual studies, what I mean is that in every question that arises, indeed in the sociological attitude itself, there is always an implicit intention to transcend existing society. Without this intention, although it is hardly possible to describe it in detail, questions will neither be put in the correct way, nor will sociological thinking arise at all. One becomes a victim either of the abundance of evidence or of mere construct. A certain critical attitude to what exists is, so to speak, part of the job for the social theorist, and it is precisely this critical element, which develops from the most positive thing there is – from hope – which makes sociologists unpopular. To educate students to endure this tension towards what exists, which is part of the very essence of our discipline, to make them 'social' in the true sense – which also includes being able to endure standing alone – this is perhaps the most important, an ultimate, goal of education as we see it. (Horkheimer 1952, 12; Wiggershaus 1994, 445-446.)

In his *Diagnosis of Our Time* social theorist Karl Mannheim sketched a version of Zeitgeist analysis, according to which society was sick, but that the quality of sickness was not known (Mannheim 1947, 1). Therefore a methodology was to be invented which could be used to further understanding of the given era (Mannheim 1960, 83). Mannheim's methodology, following a typology postulated by sociologist Arto Noro (2000, 321-329), can be described as Zeitgeist analysis, as compared to Zeitgeist diagnosis. The difference between them is that whereas the former type of inquiry does not include any cure, the latter type of inquiry tries to offer 'medicine' – in the manner of medical practice – to the social and cultural problems of the era. In Mannheim these cures were excluded from the sociologists' tool-box, although they are vital

from the point of view of critical pedagogy. The same denial of practical judgments and political suggestions holds true for the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.

One thing common to these variations, in both *Zeitgeist* analysis and diagnosis, is the idea of the ideological construction of social reality. In Horkheimer's words this is based on the idea that "the perceived fact is [...] co-determined by human ideas and concepts, even before its conscious theoretical elaboration by the knowing individual" (Horkheimer 1972, 200-201). Also, the objects of observation are often the products of social practices. Even the products of nature are determined by their relations to the social world, and are thus dependent upon it (Marx & Engels 1976, 40). Marx (1847, 165) stated that "the same men who establish their social relations in conformity with the material productivity, produce also principles, ideas, and categories in conformity with their social relations. Thus the ideas, these categories, are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and transitory products." (original emphasis)

Without pretending to offer ready-made practical solutions to social problems, critical theory aims to question the common, "business-as-usual" thinking, and to produce theoretical insights that can help in acting towards critical social change (Pongratz 2005, 155). Indeed, as Horkheimer (1971, 229) maintains, "every part of the theory presupposes the critique of the existing order and the struggle against it along lines determined by theory itself." Essential to this strategy is to rearrange the economic system based on the production and exchange of commodities so that people could become conscious of their being, humanity, and actual freedom (Horkheimer 1995, 247). At present, the dominant capitalist ideology, with its exchange values, effectively prevents opportunities to live a conscious life. As theorist in adult education Stephen Brookfield puts it, this same tendency penetrates into all spheres of education:

Hence, in adult education, we talk of the teaching-learning relationship and the development of adult educational procedures or curricula, as if these existed as objects in a world located outside our emotions or being. The role of the adult educator engaged in good practices becomes detached from who we are as people, our histories and experiences. The exchange dynamic of capitalism even invades our emotional lives. We talk of making emotional investments, as if emotions were things we could float on the stock market of significant personal relationships. Attention and tenderness are exchanged for sex, affection for support. Parental concern toward children is exchanged for the promise of being looked after in old age (Brookfield 2001, 11).

### **The Concept of Ideology as a Tool of Interpretation**

The notion of the alienation of intimate and parental relationships is hardly a recent one, but is above all linked with the birth of industrialization, capitalism and the modern lifestyle. At the same time as modern capitalism took a great leap forward, social theory developed the tools of analysis for it, one of these

being the concept of ideology. Its history dates to France of the Enlightenment, where in 1795 a national institute was founded to promote the reform of education. In the department of the institute dealing with morality and politics there was a discussion, for instance, on what would be the appropriate name to describe the science that lay behind the department.

Based on a suggestion by Citoyen (former Count) Antoine-Louis-Claude Destutt de Tracy, they ended up with the neologism ideology, which referred to the science of ideas. For its originator it represented the basis for all sciences, the aim of which was to become a universal method of analysis. Through the method of ideology, every idea, no matter how complex, could be dismantled into its basic components. Because Tracy believed that his notion of ideology was the guarantee for all essential knowledge, he wanted to make it the basis for education and upbringing as well as morality and legislation. This, however, did not suit either the royalists or the Catholic Church, and the concept of ideology became the target of severe criticism. During the Napoleonic era the term ideology became a political slander with which the worst political opponents were labelled as daydreamers alienated from reality (Barth 1976, 1-10).

From the point of view of critical pedagogy, Karl Marx (1818-1883) is a central thinker, who was aware of the colloquial use of the word ideology, and initially used it in this meaning. When exiled in Paris (1844-45) Marx made extensive notes from Tracy's main work *Eléments d'Idéologie*. In the same city he also experienced the contradictory nature of the concept of ideology. Even though Marx, when young, used the concept of ideology in order to slander the philosophers he thought were empty-headed, he already then had a theory of ideology which responded to the most important problematics of the science of ideology created by Tracy.

The theoretical importance of the concept could be seen in Marx and Engels' *Deutsche Ideologie*, in which the idealistic philosophy developed by the young Hegelians was the target of critique. In their work Marx and Engels claimed that in the German idealistic philosophy one descends from heaven to Earth, though the direction should be the opposite. In other words, one was not to care about what people think or believe, or care about supposed or imaginary people, but rather to pay attention to real people in their real actions and life processes, as well as the ideological reflections of these. Marx's view of ideology was thus formed as something materialistic and structural, and ideology in this view was represented, for instance, by morality, religion, science and idealistic philosophies, which participated in the formation of contemporary consciousness.

*Deutsche Ideologie* also presented a negative critical basis for the ideology-critical approach. According to such an approach, ideological institutions (or state machinery), as well as the thoughts and ideals corresponding to these, distort reality, almost turning it upside down. Marx and Engels (1978, 78) indeed write that "in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down, as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their

historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process." For them, ideology is "a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness" (Engels 1893, 163).

According to a more neutral description, ideology refers to any given organized thought, belief or value system which carries the assumption that it hides nothing. Ideology here refers to that framework of thought and action by which order and meanings are created within the social and political reality (Darder 2003, 13). Also Marx understood the descriptive meaning of ideology and its juxtaposition as a part of the internal "metabolic processes" of society, when he wrote how it is "necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out" (Marx 1859, 262). Later this idea was picked up by Louis Althusser who wrote in his work *Pour Marx* (1996) about how "ideology is [akin to economic and political activity] an organic part of every societal totality". Althusser, however, did not accept Marx's idea of ideology being a means to free itself.

Other critical thinkers have not considered ideology as something only negative. Lenin (1902, 374), for instance, recognized also the positive dimension of ideology when writing how "there could not have been Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without" (original emphasis). Even though Lenin (*ibid.*, 375) writes about "the spontaneous awakening of the working masses", this does not, according to him, suffice for the revolutionary movement. There must be a revolutionary theory, because without it "there cannot be a revolutionary movement" (*Ibid.*, 360). For this reason, the vanguard of the workers' movement was meant to create an ideology for the working class by applying the ideologies of the bourgeoisie. For Lenin, ideology was both a description of social conflicts and a whole formed by the genuine appreciation for, and attitudes arising from, the interests of the working class.

In all these interpretations it is thought that ideology creates a selective view of the world, one that seems self evident and taken as given (McLaren 2003, 205). In this sense, ideology is always "a curtain before the conflicting nature of reality" (Horkheimer 1985, 218). In critical pedagogy, the notion of ideology has usually been negative-critical. On this basis, for instance, the hidden ideological nature of school practices and school curricula have been studied ideology-critically, and likewise the school power or the ideological conflict between the values represented by the school and those represented by pupils. In the same way, ideology critique has been used to reveal the distortions of the world view offered by the media. Ideology critique has been offered as the teachers' radical tool with which they can study the ideological value-laden assumptions that guide their pedagogical actions and which are conveyed in their teaching (Darder et al. 2003, 13).

In all these tasks the meaning of ideology critique in critical pedagogy is a matter of emancipation. In this sense, critical pedagogy also has a kind of therapeutic role, where one attempts to liberate people from a society in which they become monsters, even though they would not notice it themselves (Marcuse 2005, 86). If therapy is understood as some kind of liberation from ignorance, incomprehension and compulsion, "all therapy today is political theory and practice" (Ibid., 86).

### **Contemporary Analytical Ideology Critique in Practice**

Approaching critical pedagogy through contemporary analytical ideology critique means research where it is possible to become aware of how different ideological formations mould life and social relationships and uphold economic and political injustice. Furthermore, the contemporary analytical ideology critique strives to make visible the processes of the production of interpretation and renewal, as well as those influences that possibly interfere with such processes. Understood in this way, it can be said to have similar goals as psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis aims to reveal mystified and subconscious matter and psychological defence mechanisms in a similar way as ideology critique aims to show the conflicts in the social reality. In such a programmatic attitude, one aims to transcend the natural attitude and to move to a critical-theoretical attitude – and parallel to which the natural and positive relationship to that practical life, on which everybody's existence is based, is maintained. Without the horizon of practical life, critical pedagogy is in danger of becoming over-theoretical and arrogant in relation to the phenomena it studies.

One way to perceive ideology critique in the sense it is understood in the present context is to see it as a cycle of conscious learning, in which the stages of problematization, resistance and hope can be discerned (Suoranta 2005). It is, of course, interesting to ask what causes this cycle and why man feels the need to question the central assumptions of his everyday existence – a task that critical pedagogy is ultimately concerned with. One reason could be a sudden break that distorts the routines of everyday life. This forces a redirection of one's attention; like a breakage that sets learning in motion (Malinen 2000, 134-140). When the protection fails, the learner can reject this experience by shock denial; that is, where the incident is shown in one's consciousness as "a precise point in time ... at the cost of the integrity of its content." (Benjamin 1969, 163). Dismantling this shock denial, which prevents conscious radical learning, is the central and perhaps most difficult challenge of critical pedagogy.

In socially conscious radical learning, such a situation or event may prove to be a fruitful starting point through which it is possible to problematise or dismantle those viewpoints that follow the so-called natural attitude and the self-evident facts of everyday life, such as daily interactions, relationships between the sexes, going to school or issues linked with the capitalist division

of labour. The dismantling can also be aimed at broader questions, such as the nation-state or the future of the public sector or those principles through which global order is maintained. The problematization of such questions can lead to the demystification of phenomena, that is, the revealing of regularities and meanings which are invisible yet still influence life.

Problematization is followed by the pedagogy of resistance, in which previous and other questions are studied theoretically and where one learns to see the conceptual and practical connections. In resistance it is emphasised that experience of the world is always transmitted: ideological state machineries, multinational companies and the media act as transmitters (see Althusser 1985; Kellner 2002). Such a notion also includes the view that knowledge is always selective; that is, told from someone's viewpoint and comprising a selected view of humanity and reality, as well as a political viewpoint. In the stage of resistance it is possible to present alternative solutions for existing practices, which in the best-case scenario can lead to the pedagogy of hope.

In the pedagogy of hope, solutions that have been outlined through critique and conceptual reflection are tested in practice – and with the demand that they are given political recognition at the state level. Hope, which is one of the basic concepts of critical pedagogy, can be sought for by looking at history and reality as a part of a more extensive strive to redefine power and the way it is used (see Moisio & Suoranta 2005). This search for hope can occur in many ways: for instance, by consciously bringing into the discussion the voices of marginalised groups, and by creating and testing new forms of local activity and education which break traditional educational and pedagogical methods. The search for hope can also occur by taking into account the different ways of upbringing and formation of identity in different cultures and communities, by studying the realities of upbringing from multi-disciplinary and multiple viewpoints, particularly the viewpoints of social class, gender, geographical location and ethnicity, and by emphasising the primariness of the question of ethics when defining those methods of action and speech which are part of the work carried out with other people.

In the contemporary analytical ideology critique one should aim for topicality, both from the point of view of the recentness of the data as well as the social importance of the problems. Topicality is not, however, obligatory. Often the data may receive new nuances when the bright light of topicality is refracted into the shadows of temporal distance. Furthermore, ideology-critical research should be meaningful from the point of view of the oppressed. Paulo Freire (1972, chapter 3) postulated that real freedom from both oppression and a hireling mentality can be promoted by educational practices based on dialogue, in other words equal reciprocity, mutual acknowledgement and respect.

Freire thought that dialogical pedagogy enables what G. W. F. Hegel (1807, §197-230) called transcending limited self-centredness. Furthermore, it prepares people to be actors in a democratic and just society. According to some thinkers, including Freire, the dialectic of the master and servant would describe the general model of interpretation of the history of mankind. Thus the battle for

recognition must be interpreted as widely as possible, both as a psychoanalytical and developmental-psychological work of identity, as well as a political battle for social equality. Furthermore, it could be understood as the interpretational tool of social philosophy.

If one wants to ascertain the viewpoint of the oppressed, it is usually reasonable to pick up on questions which are left in the shadow of scientific (or other) publicity. This requires concentrating on phenomena (and on their conceptualization) that perhaps seem small and insignificant. No data speaks as such from the viewpoint of the oppressed, but they must be consciously thematised from that point of view. Here it is helpful if one consciously strives to adapt multi-disciplinary and all-round reading and study methods.

### **Research Methods and Zeitgeist Analysis**

Critical researchers who interpret ideology critique as Zeitgeist analysis use various data and methods in their research work, varying from traditional empirical data and its methods of analysis to works of arts, literature or cinema. The function of data is to help one orientate oneself within the realm of theory, for one of the core assumptions in critical pedagogy is that the researcher can have a clearly explicated relationship to the research question. As a consequence, the researcher needs to take a personal standpoint, and to have an openly normative, political, and transformative style of writing. In writing this sort of text, the researcher must use not only affective and evocative language but also critical and straightforward language.

These rhetorical choices do not represent artificial stylistic snobbery but refer to critical pedagogy's basic orientation: it demands that the researcher is committed to the issues in question. Sometimes this means that boundaries between private and public matters get blurred, for one's own personal history, values, deeds, and social status are almost always evidently in play in doing ideologue critique as Zeitgeist analysis, and they have an impact on the social reality in which people debate about war, freedom, and justice (Said 1994). In doing critical pedagogy – whether in the form of teaching or research – there are always personal preferences and affections involved, which give meaning to what is said or written, although the purpose of the words is to disturb, oppose, and shake the very foundations of the common thinking and acting. Maybe the most important feature of ideologue critique as Zeitgeist analysis is good judgment (*Urteilkraft*), by which critical researchers can gain an understanding of various social and political, as well as cultural and economic, issues. Good judgment breaks the common barriers between art and science, and it questions the wall between science and aesthetics, as well as between reflection and activism. Good judgment helps critical researchers to develop conceptual tools, which can be used to enrich critical praxis. This sort of critical praxis can include various forms of arts as ideologue critique, but it demands that researchers are prepared to cross the border between pure and political art, and



to understand art and their own research work and writing as 'open texts'. Thus, in this way it is possible to see that more important than gate keeping is to realize the essential link between art and the full development into humanity. Art is not a luxury, but a commonality belonging to all people and part of human rights, and thus it is also a crucial part of critical pedagogy's agenda. Art is a form of bringing people together, and educating them to be conscious of their shared ideas, hopes, and struggles. Furthermore, forms of art (e.g. prose and poetry) can sometimes be better than abstract academic terminology in transforming and describing human experience and its relations to larger wholes (Fromm 1969, 25).

In order to grow out of the receptive into a productive orientation, he [the individual] must relate himself to the world artistically and not only philosophically or scientifically. If a culture does not offer such a realization, the average person does not develop beyond his receptive or marketing orientation. [...] Undoubtedly a relatively primitive village in which there are still real feasts, common artistic shared expressions, and no literacy at all – is more advanced culturally and more healthy mentally than our educated, newspaper-reading, radio-listening culture. (Fromm 1960, 348)

Works of art are not only forms of *Zeitgeist* and political messages, but can be interpreted as participatory and transformative research that has long-term effects in the common culture. It would be imperative, from the point of the view of critical pedagogy, that artistic *Zeitgeist* analysis could be a part of people's everyday lives, of popular culture, and of the flow of commercial visions. In addition, it would be important that various art performances could be collated for scientific purposes in order to reflect upon their deeper meanings, which go beyond the temporality of performances. This means two things: first, art should be brought into people's lives, into the streets and public institutions (day-care centres, schools, hospitals, asylums, prisons, etc.), and secondly public debate should be arranged, with panels to discuss its meanings.

From an aesthetic point of view, this would not be art for art's sake but art as public pedagogy for social change. From an educational point of view, it would mean a more expanded notion of pedagogy as a form of critical work that takes place in multiple sites of living and learning. As Henry Giroux (1996, 153) puts it:

The workplace, day-care centre, local church, youth centre, hospitals, movie studios, and TV programs are not empty cultural places defined only in abstract economic or social terms, but pedagogical sites in which cultural workers engage in social practices that produce, circulate, and distribute knowledge. For progressives, the important issue here might be: How can we come to understand these different sites through the transformative learning practices used by different cultural workers? How might we formulate through a common political and pedagogical project the current assault on public life as part of a larger struggle to extend the principles and practices of democracy for future generations?

One answer to this, and a way to enrich these socio-pedagogical activities, is document-based research (Lankshear & Knobel 2004, 54-62). At best it can help

to view the world from a fresh angle, and create new educational and artistic insights.

All and all, ideology critique as *Zeitgeist* analysis is a way to develop a multiple web of understanding that grasps the roots of the matter and to create even dream-like horizons of liberation. Whether the form of ideology critique was a scientific text, a work of art, social activism or something else, it is a hermeneutic frame of reference or resource which assists our thinking and acting in the world, and its insights will always be better than the old blindness.

## **Conclusion**

The conception of theory in *Zeitgeist* analysis is dialectical, which refers to the idea that the world is in constant change, and is changed by the pressures of contradictory forces. Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1982, 56) wrote that the present and the past can be seen as movement, and with the intellectual necessity to perceive the constants in that movement as sharply as possible. This intellectual work is not to be seen as objective, but as a manifestation of a strong participative will. Dialectical theory thus motivates people to participate and collaborate with other people. On the one hand it provides conceptual tools to understand and change diverse pedagogical practices, and on the other hand it enables interaction with those practices. In this sense, a critical educator is a creative person, but does not create in a social vacuum but in a social interaction with others.

In ideology critique as *Zeitgeist* analysis a special emphasis is put on the issue of knowledge and power. Here knowledge is seen as something in someone's possession, contextually produced, and reproduced. Thus study can be focused on these processes of knowledge production, its birth, and its function and legitimation in diverse social practices. The first task for the critical educator is to evaluate the given body of research methods, and their applicability in critical research. Only by knowing the ontological and epistemological as well as ethical assumptions of the research methods can the critical educator use them for emancipatory purposes, and avoid their hidden objectivism and conceptual elitism. The critical educator must learn to see beyond the evident, the given 'objective' reality, and make a distinction between important and unimportant knowledge without underestimating the value of (sometimes necessary) vain desires and cheap amusements.

Patrick Slattery and Dana Rapp (2003, 186) have pointed out that critical educators should be aware of the fact that at present they are "forced to manufacture consent for global capitalism and the ravaging of the environment that it requires, as well as domesticating possible sites, passions, and imaginations of resistance". In fighting against this tendency, critical educators are encouraged to participate in building people's capacity to dream and to create both their aesthetic and political powers for the better future.

Critical educators have a sort of preparatory role in making a political, social and educational change. On the one hand, critical educators should know their limits and possibilities for making a change, but on the other hand they should not disappoint or get frightened, and give up their critical task in front of today's problems. Although they cannot force virtue in the world or persuade people to behave virtuously, at least they must try. As Bauman has put it, one of the most reasonable ways to do it "is to shelter children from the poisonous effluvia of a world tainted and corrupted by human humiliation and indignity" (Bauman 2003, 84).

In the spirit of ideology critique as *Zeitgeist* analysis, it is imperative that critical educators join forces, begin to develop critical forms of education, participate both in methodological and politico-ethical conversations in transforming the world, and protect the most precious of values, people's dignity. As Marcuse (2005, 85) wrote in 1967:

Education is our job, but education in a new sense. Being theory as well as practice, political practice, education today is more than discussion, more than teaching and learning and writing. Unless and until it goes beyond the classroom, until and unless it goes beyond the college, the school, the university, it will remain powerless. Education today must involve the mind and the body, reason and imagination, the intellectual and the instinctual needs, because our entire existence has become the subject/object of politics, of social engineering. I emphasize, it is not a question of making the schools and universities, of making the educational system political. The educational system is political already.

## REFERENCES

- Althusser, L. (1996). *For Marx*. Translated by Ben Brewster. New York: Verso.
- Althusser, L. (1971). "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)". In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Translated by Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Barth, H. (1976). *Truth and Ideology*. Translated by Fredric Lilge. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press.
- Bauman, Z. (2003). *Liquid Love*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Benjamin, W. (1969). "On some motifs in Baudelaire." In *Illuminations*, edited by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Book.
- Brookfield, S. (2001). "Repositioning Ideology Critique in a Critical Theory of Adult Learning". *Adult Education Quarterly* 52 (1), 7-22.
- Darder, A., Baltodano, M. & Torres, R. D. (2003). "Critical Pedagogy: An Introduction". In Darder, A., Baltodano, M. & Torres, R. D. (Eds.). *The Critical Pedagogy Reader*. New York & London: Routledge, 1-21.
- Engels, F. (1893). "Engels to Franz Mehring". In *Marx & Engels: Collected works*. Moscow: Progress.
- Freire, P. (1972). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: Penguin Books.
- Fromm, E. (1960). *The Sane Society*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Fromm, E. (1969). *Revolution of Hope*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Fromm, E. (2004). *Marx's Concept of Man*. London & New York: Continuum.
- Gadamer, H-G. (1972). "Theorie, Technik, Praxis". In H.-G. Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke*. Bd. 4. Frankfurt am Main: Shurkamp.
- Giroux, H. (1996). *Fugitive Cultures Race, Violence and Youth*. New York & London: Routledge.
- Gramsci, A. (1982). *Vankilavihkot. Valikoima 2*. Edited by Mikael Böök, translated by Matti Berger et al. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1807). *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horkheimer, M. (1952). "Ansprache zur Wiedereröffnung des Instituts für Sozialforschung". Archive reference: Max Horkheimer Archive, Frankfurt am Main. Ref.: MHA XII.
- Horkheimer, M. (1985). "Über Sinn und Grenzen einer soziologischen Behandlung der Philosophie". In *Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften Band 11*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
- Horkheimer, M. (1971). "Traditional and Critical Theory". In *Max Horkheimer. Critical Theory*. Translated by M. J. Connell and Others. New York: Continuum.
- Horkheimer, M. (1996). "A New Concept of Ideology?" In *Max Horkheimer: Between Philosophy and Social Science*. Translated by G. F. Hunter, M. S. Kramer and J. Torpey. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.

- Horkheimer, M. (1995). "Postscript". In Horkheimer, M: *Critical Theory*. Translated by M. J. Connell and Others. New York: Continuum.
- Kellner, D. (1998). *Media Culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Kellner, D. (2002). "Theorizing Globalization". *Sociological Theory* 20 (3), 285-305.
- Lankshear, C. & Knobel, M. (2004). *New Literacies. Changing Knowledge and Classroom Learning*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Leist, A. (1986). "Schwierigkeiten mit der Ideologiekritik". In Angehrn, E. & Lohmann, G. (Eds.) *Ethik und Marx*. Königstein: Athenäum Verlag.
- Lenin, V. I. (1902). "What is to be done?" In Lenin, V.I. *Collected Works*, Vol. 5. Moscow: Progress.
- Malinen, A. (2000). *Towards the Essence of Adult Experiential Learning*. Jyväskylä: SoPhi.
- Mannheim, K. (1947). *Diagnosis of Our Time*. New York & London: Routledge.
- Mannheim, K. (1960). *Ideology and Utopia*. New York & London: Routledge.
- Marcuse, H. (2005). "Liberation from Affluent Society" (1967). In Marcuse, H. *The New Left and the 1960s. Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*, Vol. 3. Edited by Douglas Kellner. New York and London: Routledge, 76-86.
- Marx, K. (1847). "The Poverty of Philosophy". In Marx, K. & Engels, F.: *Collected Works*. Vol. 6. Moscow: Progress.
- Marx, K. (1857). "Outline of the Critique of Political Economy (Grundrisse)". In Marx, K. & Engels, F.: *Collected Works*. Vol. 28. Moscow: Progress.
- Marx, K. (1859). "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part I". In Marx, K. & Engels, F.: *Collected Works* Vol. 29. Moscow: Progress.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1976). "German Ideology". In Marx, K. & Engels, F.: *Collected Works*. Vol. 5. Moscow: Progress.
- McLaren, P. 2003. *Life in Schools. An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education*. Boston (Mass.): Allyn & Bacon.
- Moisio, O-P. & Suoranta, J. (2005). "Hope and Education in the Era of Globalization". In Gur-Ze'ev, I. & Roth, K. (Eds.). *Challenges to Education in a Global World*. Springer Verlag.
- Noro, A. (2000). "Aikalaisdiagnoosi sosiologisen teorian kolmantena lajityyppinä". *Sociologia* 37 (4), 321-328.
- Pongratz, L. (2005). "Critical Theory and Pedagogy: Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer's Contemporary Significance for a Critical Pedagogy". In Fischman, G., McLaren, P., Sünker, H. & Lankshear, C. (Eds.). *Critical Theories, Radical Pedagogies, and Global Conflicts*. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 154-163.
- Said, E. (1994). *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Slattery, P. & Rapp, D. 2003. *Ethics and the Foundations of Education*. Boston (Mass.): Allyn & Bacon.
- Suoranta, J. 2005. *Radikaali kasvatus (Radical Education)*. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
- Wiggershaus, R. 1994. *Frankfurt School*. Translated by M. Robertson. New York: Polity.

## 7 DON'T YOU SEE, HOW THE WIND BLOWS?

*Originally published in Donna Houston, Gregory Martin, Peter McLaren & Juha Suoranta (eds.). The Havoc of Capitalism: Educating for Social and Environmental Justice. Amsterdam: Sense. 2009.*

The process of revolutionary social transformation must begin in the hearts, minds and social relations of people, and in that sense it has already begun. Individuals and groups, in various locations throughout the world, have begun to challenge capitalism. (Allman, 2001a, p. 2)

The matrix of hope is the same as that of education – becoming conscious of themselves as unfinished beings. It would be a flagrant contradiction if human beings, while unfinished beings and ones conscious of their unfinished nature, did not insert themselves into a permanent process of hope-filled search. Education is that process. (Freire, 2004, p. 100)

We have affluence, but we do not have amenity. We are wealthier, but we have less freedom. We consume more, but we are emptier. We have more atomic weapons, but we are more defenseless. We have more education, but we have less critical judgment and convictions." (Fromm, 1981, p. 61)

Watchman, what of the night?  
The watchman says:  
Morning comes and also the night  
If you will inquire, inquire:  
Return, come back again. (Isaiah 21:11-12)

### **Introduction**

Part of the legacy of critical revolutionary pedagogy goes back to the upheavals of the 1960's, although the meaning of the legacy is by no means clear. Mark Kurlansky (2005) belongs to those, who have tried to search the meaning of that era by pointing out that there were four distinctive historic factors creating the overall atmosphere and the special mood of the 1960's. First there was the civil rights movement which gave a general idea of what political dissent can be; then there was a generation of young people who, at least partly through that

idea, tried to get rid of all possible and impossible authorities; thirdly there was a war in Vietnam that was hated all over the world; and finally there was television which, as a rather new technological invention, was coming of age. With it came a special feature of sameday broadcasting which made a world as a global village. All these elements brought people together in an unprecedented way for a short moment; as Kurlansky puts it:

1968 was a time of shocking modernism, and modernism always fascinates the young and perplexes the old, yet in retrospect it was a time of an almost quaint innocence. Imagine Columbia students in New York and University of Paris students discovering from a distance that their experiences were similar and then meeting, gingerly approaching one another to find out what, if anything, they had in common. With amazement and excitement, people learned that they were using the same tactics in Prague, in Paris, in Rome, in Mexico, in New York. With new tools such as communication satellites and inexpensive erasable videotape, television was making everyone very aware of what everyone else was doing, and it was thrilling because for the first time in human experience the important, distant events of the day were immediate. (2005, p. xvii)

In this article we want to argue that the revolutionary spirit of 1960 lasted only few moments, and was over after the heydays of 1968. Its victories were turned into postmodern politics of difference, and its critical, and revolutionary praxis into postmodern "speaking of tongues," and a retreat into local narratives (Sanboumatsu, 2004, p. 49). We want to point out that the spirit of 1960's is needed now more than ever, although it is hard to imagine that a common language of radical politics could be developed. As Kurlansky reminds us, the common experience of "the world found as new," as it was in the 1960's, might not happen ever again, for in some deep sense of the word, the whole idea of "new" has become more or less banal (p. xvii). This is partly due to the fact that the experience of the present has been saturated by the media industry, and its commercial messages, and by the uses of the new information technologies. As Kurlansky writes: "We now live in a world in which we wait a new breakthrough every day" (p. xvii) – and we might add: we are living in a world which is ever more hungry for new catastrophes every minute – whether they are new tsunamis, hurricanes, wars, terrorist attacks or yet another sniper or a school shooting. These kinds of events have been changed from the catastrophes involving individual human beings into the raw material of the production apparatus.

The problem of the new is acute in the context of radical pedagogy as we want to promote new ways of seeing and acting in the world. But we must ask, in what sense is critical pedagogy producing or helping to promote the emergence of the new in the overall context of any given society? How can teachers recognize that something new has emerged as this recognition is obviously based on the tradition, concepts and ways of doing things in some specific culture? Theodor W. Adorno (1997) wrote in his *Aesthetic Theory* that "the relation to the new is modeled on a child at the piano searching for a chord never previously heard. This chord, however, was always there; the possible combinations are limited and actually everything that can be played on it is

implicitly given in the keyboard. The new is longing for the new, not the new itself: that is what everything new suffers from" (p. 32).

Ernst Bloch (1986, pp. 195-222) wrote in his *Principle of Hope* how the new can be articulated as the horizon of the real possibilities. These real possibilities are not invented longings or abstract constructions of ideal worlds but products of shared culture created thorough knowledge that is focused on the historically given and re-reading it as the cipher that is pointing the way beyond. In these concrete utopias, as Bloch named these programs based on real possibilities, hope is the driving force of knowledge. Hope whispers to us the new contained in the given and our hunger drives us to fill the emptiness of the current situation. In this sense the new is a dynamical interaction of different dimensions of the now. It is not a view from somewhere but the view within the given. If we think of the role of critical emancipatory pedagogy in this process, it is obvious that serious enactments should be made to pedagogical theory be it critical or conventional.

One possible way is to articulate teaching as a constant critical analysis of the given time. With this the idea of teaching material becomes challenged and it loses its usual inertness and becomes fluid – but not fluid in the sense of relativism. The process of production of knowledge becomes dynamic in the historical sense. Karl Marx wrote in his *Theses on Feuerbach*, that “the question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question” (p. 3).

If critical pedagogy is to help foster the emergence of autonomous thinking and acting its idea of teaching material should become practical in the sense Marx outlined above. This practical activity is critical collaborative production of knowledge in a sense that it teaches to re-read the given situation critically. This practical critical activity means both internal and external criticism. “Internal critique involves the critical evaluation of the principles and guidelines of the production of knowledge. External critique aims at critical analysis of the connections of the knowledge produced in social processes and its interpretations and exploitations in other social processes” (Suoranta & Moisio, 2006, p. 10).

In this article we will see how the student movement and the civil rights movement in the United States can be read as a pedagogical activity in a sense articulated above. Critique is to be seen as a fundamentally pedagogical enterprise. At the same time we will articulate, as a side project, how this idea can be connected to certain ideas of the Frankfurt School of critical theory as a view from below. In this sense critical theory can be seen as an educational project. We will argue that critical theory can be seen as a critical analysis of time and theoretical activity which has a practical content. As Max Horkheimer (1937) once wrote that critical theory is an “intellectual side of the historical process of proletarian emancipation” (p. 215). And, as we want to think, critical



pedagogy driven by critical theory can be an ethico-intellectual side of human liberation.

### *The Summer of 69*

It was summer of 1969 when a group of young US citizens came together to write an essay entitled 'You Don't Need A Weatherman To Know Which Way The Wind Blows'. In that essay young people from different classes, sexes, groups and ethnic backgrounds showed that they did not want guidance in knowing where the political wind was blowing. For them it was a radical wind raging across the soil of the United States, and other countries; and it was blowing toward revolutionary change. In the wind, there was a genuine struggle underway against capitalism, racism, imperialism, and monopolistic media power. Among others, writer and filmmaker Tariq Ali (2005) has captured in vivid detail the mood and energy of those formative years as he tracks the growing significance of the nascent protest movement.

One of the central focuses for these young revolutionaries was the violence perpetrated by the Vietnam War – not just in Vietnam but also in “the mother countries” – like the US, and France. The guiding impulse was placed on social justice, and the various national liberation struggles throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Radical educational voices, especially Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, had their firm places in these struggles for people's autonomy, and political transformation.

The boundaries set by these young people were rather plain in context. Taking their cue from Mao, for example, they defined quite naively who their friends were and who their enemies were based on the relationship that one had with United States imperialism. There was no middle ground in the political choices made. The ultimate goal of this oppositional setting was quite simple: to build a mass socialist political consciousness among the population, and to get people to understand the necessity of political revolution in which all working people would be involved (Ashley et. al. 1970, p. 73). Even if there was an obvious ideological distortion that we now know, this is actually a true Gramscian theme, and an idea of humanist socialism in general. All efforts in challenging capitalism or other coercive social settings and structures, and their repressive conditions have to be educational in nature, and very social relation formed in the struggle against capitalism needs to be an educative relation (Allman, 2001a).

Erich Fromm discussed humanist socialism at length which he saw primarily as an educational project. In fact in his eyes the basis of this educational praxis was the self-education of individuals which was produced via the idea of life long learning as an adult education. For example it was “especially important to give each person the possibility of changing his occupation or profession at any time of life” (Fromm, 1981, p. 83). It is obvious from the previous quote that Fromm (1997, p. 6) was critical towards the

collectivized discussion of the emancipatory critique of the established socialist movements as he saw that they (i.e. the Russian communist party etc.) had contempt for individual dignity and humanistic values. Fromm (1981) understood that the principle that underlines socialist humanism is that “every social and economic system is not only a specific system of relations between things and institutions, but a system of human relations” (p. 75). This he saw was the fundamental departure point of Marx’s critique of bourgeoisie society not the goal of leveling down of individual differences.

He also criticized the usual rhetoric of the leaders of communist and capitalist regimes. He saw that in both sides of the cold-war front people and governments showed in their reasoning what he called pathology on normalcy. The idea is that what is to be seen as normal is the statistically normal way of being, acting and judging in the world (Fromm 1951, pp. 12-21). How this pathology could have been cured is obviously educational in nature as what was needed was a fundamental change in individual capacities of judgment and also in her overall emotional attitude towards the world and other human beings. This change called for an education that did not educate only some part of the human being but the human being as a whole; education whose aim was not only to produce new laborers for the production apparatus or new consumers for consumer society but education that changed the situation, Fromm (1981) diagnosed:

Education, from primary to higher education, has reached a peak. Yet, while people get more education, they have less reason, judgment, and conviction. At best their intelligence is improved, but their reason – that is, their capacity to penetrate through the surface and to understand the underlying forces in individual and social life – is impoverished more and more. Thinking is increasingly split from feeling, and [...] modern man has come to a point where his sanity must be questioned. (pp. 66-67)

If we look at the situation of radical movements in the 1960’s it is quite easy to say post festum that socialism was a distant dream for youth participating in the movements, perhaps even an abstract utopia. But it was important for them to actively enlist the support of the “masses” for the socialist agenda. The endeavor for mass support was to be one of education—an education of the street, where social ills would be actively discussed, where such ills would turn into a people’s struggle, and where this struggle would build not just a “political consciousness” but a “revolutionary consciousness”, which would be both “active” and “conscious” in opposing imperialist aims (See Ashley et. al., 1970, p. 74). This idea connects critical pedagogy to certain basic ideas in Frankfurt School critical theory and also to Marx’s ideas about how to arrange education promoting political change. We will come to these issues in the later parts of this article.

The very same questions these young people asked in 1969 are still very much pertinent, and need to be answered: How do we reach the people, what kinds of struggles do we build, and how do we make a revolution of mind? But now we can include one more critical question: How to reach the mainstream, and majority of societies, those working men and women who are in the

struggle for survival, a survival for their daily life, and a survival for a less killing work life? How is it possible to turn their struggle for survival into a struggle for a more humane way of life where each person's conditions are humanly formed not by capitalistic market but by the values of critical humanism? This is one of the core issues which needs to be incorporated into the lexicon of critical pedagogies.

For the revolutionary youth of the 1960's, such phrases as 'critical humanism' and 'socialism in practice' referred to the actual seizure of power. The process entailed local engagement, commitment, and struggle in people to people initiatives in their communities. The bigger wind behind these initiatives was to create a base for a mass revolutionary movement to challenge the capitalist ruling class. It was a movement that put a lot of faith "in the masses of people", but also recognized their role as vanguards (Ashley et al., 1970, p. 90.). More importantly, it was to be a movement engaged in educating people toward a transformative consciousness. The critical mind was to be focused on "revolution as power struggle" between the masses, and the capitalist state. To quote these youth:

On the one hand, if we, as revolutionaries, are capable of understanding the necessity to smash imperialism and build socialism, then the masses of people who we want to fight along with us are capable of that understanding. On the other hand, people are brainwashed and at present don't understand it; if revolution is not raised at every opportunity, then how can we expect people to see it in their interest, or to undertake the burdens of revolution? We need to make it clear from the beginning that we are about revolution. ... We have to develop some sense of how to relate each particular issue to the revolution. (Ashley et al., 1970, p. 75)

It has become evident that during the present stage of capitalism—one that is mean and lean cut as well as blatantly focused on profit for profit's sake with total disregard to human well being—we do need weathermen to tell us which way the wind blows. This being said, we are most certain that violence is not the answer in any form. Rather we must remind ourselves of the fact that capitalism itself represents a brutal form of structural violence, and needs to be resisted by critical praxis focused in popular education, and anti-capitalist education against the ruling class ideology (see Crowther, Galloway & Martin 2005). In this critical pedagogy is following the basic tenets of humanist socialism envisioned by Fromm. As he wrote, "humanistic socialism is radically opposed to war and violence in all and any forms. [...] It considers peace to be not only the absence of war, but a positive principle of human relations based on free cooperation of all men for the common good" (Fromm, 1981, p. 76).

Writing from the perspective of the Black community, and the Black Power movement, Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton (1967) once wrote: We "must raise hard questions, questions which challenge the very nature of the society itself: its long standing values, beliefs and institutions" (p. 34). In the same way, in critical pedagogy we need educators, teachers, academics, and otherwise revolutionary minded individuals who are willing, and able to problematize the world, that is to raise difficult, and silenced questions that are directly linked to and challenge the very foundations of

capitalist society, and before all, and make these questions as public issues. To be able to actualize this educational system a fundamental re-orientation is required. For example the idea of expertise in academic education needs to be redefined as a collective social expertise (see Suoranta & Moio, 2006). As Carmichael and Hamilton (1967) stated, this demands that radical educators themselves become self-critical and -reflexive: "To do this, we must first redefine ourselves. Our basic need is to reclaim our history, and our identity ... We shall have to struggle for the right to create our own terms through which to define ourselves, and our relationship to society, and to have these terms recognized" (34-35). In order for a critical strategy to succeed, it must focus on transforming the basic assumptions of what it means to be human. And we also need to change the definition of the capitalist social formation, and our role in its "psychological control" over the daily life (see Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967, p. 35).

### *Critical Pedagogy as a Theory-Praxis Problem*

What becomes perfectly clear in this state of events is the central role of critical pedagogy: to confront the psychological control at its root, and to allow human beings to bring forth alternative definitions, and descriptions for an alternative way of living. For this to happen, we will need to confront our idea of capitalism as a pro-active ideology inside our own life-worlds and in fact our psychological structure. This will entail a process of dissection – a breaking apart of illusion, and myth that are pivotally centered in the experience of capitalism.

In the sphere of education, the main aims are those of helping to develop the critical powers of the individual and to provide a basis for the creative expression of his personality – in other words, to nurture free men who will be immune to manipulation and to the exploitation of their suggestibility for the pleasure and profit of others. Knowledge should not be a mere mass of information, but the rational means of understanding the underlying forces that determine material and human processes. Education should embrace not only reason but the arts. Capitalism, as it has produced alienation, has divorced and debased both man's scientific understanding and his aesthetic perception. The aim of socialist education is to restore man to the full and free exercise of both. It seeks to make man not only an intelligent spectator but a well-equipped participant, not only in the production of material goods, but in the enjoyment of life. (Fromm, 1981, p. 82.)

How this can be accomplished is one of the core issues in the theory and practice of critical pedagogy. Let us make some preliminary suggestions. Firstly, one of the most essential ingredients for a capitalist free, conscious and critical life is the ability to dream. It is crucial in realizing fundamental change towards humanly formed conditions. Abolishing the predatory rule of capital would be impossible without the ability to dream of a concretely better life, and an alternative social existence. In fact even this demolition might produce a new barbarism if it did not contain the self critical movement and the possibility to envision the sights beyond the given power settings. Even Marx did not believe

in abstract negation but only in an *aufhebung* of the given processes; i.e. in changing these processes into qualitatively new, more fulfilling processes.

Ernst Bloch (1986) argued that history is the container full of living options and possibilities for the action that can be carried out in the future. That is why Bloch speaks about the tendency-latency of the now. All the unrealized potentialities that are sediment and latent in the present and the signs and foreshadows that indicate the tendency of the direction and movement of the present into the future must be grasped and activated by an anticipatory consciousness that at once perceives the unrealized emancipatory potential in the past, the latencies and tendencies of the present, and the realizable hopes of the future. To bring these ideas into pedagogical settings we want to argue that adult educators, and other cultural workers need to ask students to recollect the past, to situate the present socially, politically and economically, and to strive toward a future built upon a utopian universality that creates the conditions for groups to liberate themselves in their own contextually specific ways from all forms of oppression, domination, alienation and degradation.

The ability to dream is a necessary component in any circumstance. When people have the ability to dream they may begin to mentally project the necessary course of action in conceiving a more humane reality for all. But we must ask is there place for critical dreaming anymore? In this respect the following words by the Nobel-prize winner Günter Grass (2005) are to be taken seriously, for those who still want to dream, hope, and criticize are “ridiculed by slick young journalists as ‘social romantics’, but usually vilified as ‘Dogooders’. Questions asked as to the reasons for the growing gap between rich and poor are dismissed as ‘the politics of envy’. The desire for justice is ridiculed as utopian. The concept of ‘solidarity’ is relegated to the dictionary’s list of ‘foreign words’” (p. 5).

Secondly, critical pedagogy needs to address – within the educational framework – people’s ecological, material and cultural poverty. With the term “poverty” we are not referring to the lack of all sorts of goods, but to material abundance and ecological devastation epitomized in consumer culture. In a sense if we look at the amount of goods produced in the consumer culture we are wealthier than ever but at the same time our life outside the productive activity is in many senses poorer than ever before. If we look into the history of capitalism, we easily see the drastic change that has happened in the ownership ideology of the past. In *Liquid Life* Zygmunt Bauman (2005) argues that the logic of continuously accelerating consumption places an increasing emphasis on disposal even more than on acquisition. This emphasis is obviously in contradiction to long-term ownership of previous capitalisms. Indeed, Bauman sees long-term ownership as having become a burden rather than a mark of success. It is obvious that this logic is devastating to the environment and human beings in the countries that form the production basis for the global capitalism.

We might also want to argue that this logic of continuously accelerating consumption has changed important factors that once produced so called social

capitalism that Richard Sennett (2006) portrays in his *Culture of the New Capitalism*. In the beginning of 1970 the Bretton Woods-contracts expired and the massive cultural change in the workings of capitalism started to happen. In this process the long term ownership ideology of the previous capitalism was gradually displaced and its place was taken by “the forces of impatient capital” that worked for short term profits. Sennett argues that when early capitalism and its modern versions of social capitalism still depended on the face-to-face ownership and strict bureaucratic line of command this new capitalism is much more like a MP3-player. Even though there is a central core that handles all the processes the linear system of information is displaced with the jumping around. In this sense we need to be careful when using the word capitalist as there are no capitalists in a sense Marx used the term or at least not many of them anymore. The real problem is that most of the well to do western people are connected to the global productive system via different retirement allowance funds that roam freely across the globe trying to find best places to breed more money.

Thirdly, critical pedagogy needs to bridge the gap between the objectives of the pedagogy, and the cultural, material and ecological poverty of the population. This bridge will need to be strong, firm, and built on a good theoretical and practical foundation if it is to succeed as a transforming pedagogical force. What needs to be considered is the ability of people to problematize the current capitalist-consumer culture in its totality, and not just parts of a whole. We need to show connection and not fragmentation. This will be an extremely difficult yet not impossible task to accomplish for critical educators within the capitalist entity. Rather than erasing students’ cultural formations, critical pedagogy unearths the debris of the dialectically fashioned self of capital from the oppressive strongholds of the empire of capital and re-articulates what it means to be the subject rather than the object of history. All this needs the development of critical perception; in Paula Allman’s words,

It enables people to know what needs changing, but it has also two other very essential functions. This critical, dialectical, perception together with an engagement in creating our conditions of existence is what it means to be fully human, and it is the right of every person, not of some privileged few. Furthermore, it is this perception of reality that creates the will or the motivation in people to risk themselves in revolutionary struggle (Allman, 2001, p. 93).

To develop such a critical perception of our lived reality is a prime task for critical pedagogy but at the same time it forms a fundamental problem for all activity that is focused on such a task. One easy way is to put the task on the shoulders of teachers and start to develop certain ideas about what kind of personality structure or way of living human beings should have if they want to make change happen. But this answer is far too easy compared with the task we are facing. It is obvious that a strong conviction is needed from teachers but this conviction is not enough by itself. World history has shown to us in too much detail what might emerge from our naive individual acts of good will, if we forget this fact. But at the same time without such a stand and life perception,

the process of social change will be extremely difficult to implement both in school practice and also in life practice.

Fourthly, the critical educator needs the ability to bring people out of their material and cultural poverty, and into an action-mode in which they, as a collective force, can take charge in creating their own “conditions of existence”. To move people away from doing capitalism, they will need to possess the skills not just to comprehend lived reality but also to tackle that reality and to change that reality. Those skills are seen in one’s pedagogical practices, as one art teacher has noticed so aptly:

A major aspect of my teaching is awakening and fostering some kind of analytical process among students. Calling into question certain ways of doing things is a process that every art students have to go through for themselves. It does not necessarily come from art theory. But in any case, it is very closely linked with being aware of your relationship with the surrounding world, both the world at large and the art world. And also what you yourself do in relation to the history of contemporary art and the making of contemporary art. (Rastenberger, 2002, 27)

Although she focuses on her own subject-related practice, her teaching philosophy can also be incorporated into other disciplines. We need to begin to call into question the way we are doing things and also to question the way and in whose interest this life process is being conducted. Human beings will need to know what needs to be changed in their own life-world through their own experience in that life-world. In other words, we need a critical pedagogy which touches our souls, and senses. But how to do exactly this is quite a difficult question to answer. What is the starting point of radical learning where human beings begin to understand that there is a need to change the way they have previously done things. It is quite obvious that the starting point should contain something else other than only cognitive material (i.e. knowledge) as we have in our world enough of it but too little change (see Moio, 2008).

If there is to be found a valid point of departure to radical learning the critical education formed around it can create “weather persons.” They have the skills to dissect and to explain the direction in which the wind is actually blowing. They also have the skills to make people understand and comprehend the wind in all its strength, force and tranquility. They predict the direction of the wind, and create the atmosphere for seeing specific possibilities from the inner movements of the wind. A pedagogy built upon these perspectives and practices seeks to understand the underlying motives, interests, desires and fears of draconian shifts in education policy and it contests ascribed methods of producing knowledge.

The aim of weather persons is to raise new productive ideas through conscientious, creative thinking toward a more conscious way of doing life. A major focus needs to be located in ideological work as educative praxis. But this movement is paradoxical as the point is not to debase the individual but quite the opposite. Critical pedagogy must put as its key component the goal of promoting the individual, autonomous thinking and her knowledge of the ethical implication of her thought and action. As this is the main point that

capitalism is trying to abolish from every aspect of our life world. In this sense the concept of real education cannot be separated from real life and political struggles. Through political struggle, humankind can begin to dig deep into practical human activity.

*Where the storm front is forming?*

Today we need a new offensive as we need to be on the attack against capitalist tyranny in all aspects of our collective and individual lives. This struggle is about human bonding against a capitalist ideology that has a pit bull mentality that people are experiencing across the globe. Pit bull capitalism attacks labor, seeks cuts in social expenditure, hurts the working people through draconian practices of wage reductions, longer working hours, pension reforms, and forces greater productivity and worker compliance in numerous work place practices. It throws aside workers and places the workers into the dustbin of life without conscience or guilt; it has a psychopathic disposition in its attempt to delete the human from her own being.

Regardless of capitalist ferocity, we need to discuss a new educational strategy that not only puts hope and dreams on the active agenda, but also has the hurricane wind force to usurp the rabid saliva of capitalist accumulation spreading across the globe. We want to claim that we need our own educational pit bulls. But we also know that critical pedagogy is no traditional pit bull. It has teeth but they are in the heartbeat of humanity. And if the pit bull of critical pedagogy is ferocious, it's ferocious is in the defense of humanity, and not in destroying the human essence located in the flesh and bone of the human species, and in the human spirit. Thus it is necessary for radical thinkers and teachers to boldly declare that by coming closer together they can discover and know who they are, and what is wrong, and ugly in the world. They must hold the belief that only by working together people can read the world in a dialectical manner. This is one of the starting points of all genuine critical pedagogy.

Toward this end, teachers in critical pedagogy will need to reflect how children are educated in a corporate sponsored society. But this thinking will need to go beyond reinterpreting interpretations that may reinvent the role of capital in our life-world. Rather, a genuine critical pedagogy creates a new vision for education – a vision that embraces more holistic learning possibilities focusing on the human potentiality for creating more life affirming communities. This requires active movements away from capital, and into a movement of social and economic transformation that recognizes human being's innate ability for collective aspirations that maximizes the ethics of caring, commitment and social responsibility. It will also require a thorough analysis of the role of education in the support of corporate interests. It is not enough to naively suppose that knowledge or enlightenment would do the trick. It is obvious that there are vast amounts of knowledge in the world but not



enough perspectives and will to see and act differently. This is obviously the question of the political aspects of education known as reproduction, and students' possibilities to rise above their circumstances and earlier forms of consciousness.

Marx's answer to the problem of new ways of schooling that would promote the emergence of knowledge about the possibilities of individual persons acquiring the needed abilities to act responsibly was a polytechnic principle of education (see Small, 2005). In this he followed his basic ideas that theory and praxis should not be separated from each other. This separation was a product of the division of labor between mental and physical work. In his theory of education he focused on the education of the working class in capitalist society. Marx's (CW6) point was not that there was no education for this class but that there actually was "elements of political and general education" by the middle class but only to their own special interests (p. 493). What was lacking was education that was focused on the needs of proletarian class.

It is obvious who the targets were. Adam Smith wrote in his magisterial book *The Wealth of Nations* about the need for general education. Previously in his book he had diagnosed the problem that was introduced by the division of labor. The division of labor produced one dimensional human beings who were obviously needed in terms of the overall specialization of people in their own field of expertise. The dilemma which he confronted was that he had found that his great discovery - the division of labor - was now inducing a state of torpor in the minds of workers which was stupefying their intellects. Smith (1776) wrote that "in the progress of the division of labor [...] the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations, frequently to one or two. [...] [People] naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion [i.e. understanding, invention], and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become" (p. 987). To prevent this from happening Smith argued that the government should take pains for it by producing general education of the common people. In his mind "the education of the common people requires attention from the state more than that of people of rank and fortune, whose parents can look after their interests, and who spend their lives in varied occupation chiefly intellectual" (Smith, 1776, 989).

Smith argued that common people cannot educate themselves as they do not have the required time for this. Since common people are engaged in simple and uniform tasks in order to maintain their lives, it is necessary to provoke their minds with mental stimuli which would encourage them to speculate about their own otherwise dull occupations. Latin, Smith (1776, 991) thought, was useless for this purpose but geometry and mechanics would be an ideal addition to reading, writing and arithmetic.

It was an obvious fact for Smith that poor parents could not afford to buy their education so the state should intervene to help them. State sponsorship in his eyes, as in the eyes of most classical economists, should not cover everything because teachers would start to duck out from their occupation

(West, 1964). This idea is distinctive to Adam Smith's views on public education. While he believed in achieving education for all, his solution did not lie in abolishing school fees and making education free at the point of use. Instead fees should be subsidized "so that even a common laborer can afford it", and the teachers should only partly be paid from public funds, "because if he was wholly or even principally paid by it, he would soon learn to neglect his business" (Smith, 1776, p. 991).

But this was not Smith's main argument in support for state intervention in education. As E. G. West writes in an unpublished article: "even when parents had become rich enough through their productivity increases associated with the division of labor, they would be so stupid as to spend their money unwisely and neglect the education of their children". Public education was for Smith (1776) the necessary part of a well ordered and productive society as it provided the means to promote people's "martial spirit", of keeping people "more decent and orderly" and "less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government" (p. 994). Education would be in this sense a measure against alienation produced by the division of labor.

Marx saw through Smith's fatalistic vision, the main goal of which was the protection of private property via the protection of the state. He argued, that "Smith recommends education of the people by the state, but prudently, and in homeopathic doses" (CW35: p. 368). Marx saw that the government was a reactionary force itself but for Smith it or the law was a key of removing the basic imperfections that result from social-economic life. In this sense Smith might be connected with Rousseau as they both saw that the basic alienation of human beings was a result of social interaction (see Rousseau 1754). In Smith's system the socialist revolution that was the aim of Marx would have been "the dreadful disorder." According to Smith avoiding "enthusiasm" was among the main goals of education.

In *Critique of Gotha Program* Marx (CW 24) writes skeptically: "Equal elementary education"? What idea lies behind these words? Is it believed that in presentday society (and it is only with this one has to deal) education can be equal for all classes? Or is it demanded that the upper classes also shall be compulsorily reduced to the modicum of education – the elementary school – that alone is compatible with the economic conditions not only of the wageworkers but of the peasants as well?" (p. 94). Behind these questions lies a fundamental disbelief that Marx had towards the re-organization of education in his own times as a way of emancipatory activity. Education was already free in some parts of Europe and the United States at the time, but "if in some states of the latter country higher education institutions are also 'free', that only means in fact defraying the cost of education of the upper classes from the general tax receipts" (CW 24, p. 94). In the Gotha program the heavy thrust was put upon the role of the State in the education of individuals. This Marx found out absolutely objectionable.

Defining by a general law the expenditures on the elementary schools, the qualifications of the teaching staff, the branches of instruction, etc., and, as is done in the United States, supervising the fulfillment of these legal specifications by state inspectors, is a very different thing from appointing the state as the educator of the people! Government and church should rather be equally excluded from any influence on the school. Particularly, indeed, in the Prusso-German Empire (and one should not take refuge in the rotten subterfuge that one is speaking of a "state of the future"; we have seen how matters stand in this respect) the state has need, on the contrary, of a very stern education by the people. (CW 24, p. 95.)

It was obvious for Marx that Smith articulated the fundamental dilemma of the dominant class. In the course of history it had become aware of the fact that the more it gives to the education of the laboring poor the more it gives them the tools to stand against their own social status and power. Like he wrote in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon* "The bourgeoisie had a true insight into the fact that all the weapons it had forged against feudalism turned their points against it-self, that all the means of education it had produced rebelled against its own civilization, that all the gods it had created had fallen away from it" (CW11, p. 142); or the quote in *Capital*: "As far as I can see, the greater amount of education which a part of the working-class has enjoyed for some years past is an evil. It is dangerous, because it makes them independent" (CW35, p. 405 note 59).

In Marx's (CW 20) eyes public education would as the combination "of paid productive labour, mental education bodily exercise and polytechnic training, [...] raise the working class far above the level of the higher and middle classes (p. 189)" Marx (CW 20) is not interested in the problematic of other classes in society as he documents it quite forthrightly: "If the middle and higher classes neglect their duties toward their offspring, it is their own fault. Sharing the privileges of these classes, the child is condemned to suffer from their prejudices" (pp. 188-189). It is quite clear that this is something that needs to be kept in mind as Marx is not talking about general education but the general education of a specific class in a specific historical and social-economical situation.

There are also obvious discrepancies in the arguments concerning "industry education". In the earliest formulation of this topic Marx (CW 6, pp. 427-428) uses quite pessimistic and ironic rhetoric and argues for the provision of a measure of education by the workers if looked from the viewpoint of their own possible ad-vantages. This is what he means by the purely economic view to education. From this angle the productive system has always used industry education as a means to improve the possibilities of production. This is the point of the division of labour as seen from the development of different expertise in the various fields of industry. This does not mean that this kind of education would not be beneficial for the workers, quite on the contrary, but what is relevant here is the fundamental warning that Marx gives for the naïve overestimation of what can be achieved with re-formed education in the overall context of the given society.

The previous negative and pessimistic tone changes to a much more positive tone in *Capital*. Here Marx points to the positive effects resulting from

the education of the working people in their work life. Education within modern industry encourages the universal mobility of the labourers and in this way benefits workers by developing their various capacities in a way which overcomes the harm done by the division of labour. Marx's argument from *Capital* is worth quoting at this point in length:

But if Modern Industry, by its very nature, therefore necessitates variation of labour, fluency of function, universal mobility of the labourer, on the other hand, in its capitalistic form, it reproduces the old division of labour with its ossified particularisations. We have seen how this absolute contradiction between the technical necessities of Modern Industry, and the social character inherent in its capitalistic form, dispels all fixity and security in the situation of the labourer; how it constantly threatens, by taking away the instruments of labour, to snatch from his hands his means of subsistence, and, by suppressing his detail-function, to make him superfluous, We have seen, too, how this antagonism vents its rage in the creation of that monstrosity, an industrial reserve army, kept in misery in order to be always at the disposal of capital; in the incessant human sacrifices from among the working-class, in the most reckless squandering of labour-power and in the devastation caused by a social anarchy which turns every economic progress into a social calamity. This is the negative side. But if, on the one hand, variation of work at present imposes itself after the manner of an overpowering natural law, and with the blindly destructive action of a natural law that meets with resistance at all points, Modern Industry, on the other hand, through its catastrophes imposes the necessity of recognising, as a fundamental law of production, variation of work, consequently fitness of the labourer for varied work, consequently the greatest possible development of his varied aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society to adapt the mode of production to the normal functioning of this law. Modern Industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of to-day, grappled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers. (CW 35, p. 489.)

With these two arguments made by Marx we should bear in mind that we should not attach too much significance to the possibility of reforming the educational system in the established society. To change circumstances in the present society is too complex a task and needs other perspectives than the educator can provide by herself. It is a collaborative task where educators are invited to interact with other perspectives to our life world. It is obvious that within educational settings this broadening of perspectives can be reached most easily by interacting with the perspectives of students and inviting them to contribute to the elaboration of the education practices.

#### *Students moving from re-action to action*

Radical pedagogy starts from the premise that the goal of education is not to achieve the highest productivity in the form of economic productivity. The goal is that as a group of individuals we would promote the highest human productivity. This means in the context of practical education that students spend most of their energy doing things that are meaningful and interesting to them. This does not mean that the general goals of different fields of study are

forgotten or thrown away, but that simply, that students are allowed to reach this content from the view point of their own experiences. As Fromm (1981) writes "it must stimulate and help to develop all his human powers - his intellectual as well as his emotional and artistic ones" (p. 77). This is the point where the movement from re-action to action could start. This movement forms a knot where the different aspects of learning come together as a constellation of thought, emotion and action.

In this connection it might be useful to introduce a concept of "the activating stimuli" that Fromm develops in his *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*. The activating stimuli incites the student to strive towards something. This striving is something more than a mere being-driven-towards something that simple stimulus produces. In a sense we might see the teacher as an activating stimuli. But the teacher needs some intervention or mediation to do just this. In Fromm's (1973) eyes activating stimuli "requires a 'touchable' stimulee in order to have an effect - touchable not in the sense of being educated, but of being humanly responsive. On the other hand, the person who is fully alive does not necessarily need any particular outside stimulus to be activated; in fact, he creates his own stimuli." (p. 270.)

To be able to promote this kind of individual human productivity, educational practices and settings need to become centers committed to the elaboration of radical pedagogy. If we argue for example that there is a deep need for school curricula that place emphasis on the relationship between ecological awareness and human existence it is obvious that we need much more than only paper to do just this. We need practical settings that promote this goal. Michael Albert tries to elaborate a new kind of concept of activism in the following long quote. It tells us something valuable if we want to promote the role of students in re-reading educational practices.

Imagine students asking why their curriculum produce ignorance about international relations, ignorance about market competition's violations of solidarity, sagacity, and sustainability.

Imagine students deciding enough is enough. Maybe one particular student who wears a funny hat and has a history of being aloof, or perhaps one who looks straight as a commercial and was high school class most likely to have a million friends, will write a song about masters of the universe - and unseating them. Maybe another student will write about floods drowning people's hopes, and about a rising tide of our own compassionate creation lifting people's prospects. Maybe another student will write about resurgent racism and sullyng sexism, and then about combative communalism and feminism and their time finally coming. And maybe students will hum the new tunes and sing the new lyrics - and rally, march, sit in, occupy, all while waving a big, solid fist.

Imagine students not just sending out emails to their friends and allies, but entering dorms and knocking on every door, initiating long talks, communicating carefully collected information and debating patiently-constructed arguments that address not only war and poverty, but also positive prospects we prefer.

Imagine students earmarking fraternity and sorority members, athletes, and scholars, for conversation, debate, incitement, and recruitment. Imagine students come to see their campuses as places that should be churning out activists and dissent and come to see themselves as having no higher calling than making that campus-wide dissent happen.

Imagine students schooling themselves outside the narrow bounds of their colleges, learning that there is an alternative to cutthroat competition and teaching

themselves to describe that alternative and to inspire others with it, to refine it, and especially to formulate and implement paths by which to attain it.

Imagine students, now sharing many views and much spirit, angry and also hopeful, sober and also laughing, sitting in dorms and dining areas forming campus organizations, or even campus chapters of a larger encompassing national community of organizations – perhaps something called students for a participatory society this time around – or even students for a participatory world – and maybe even having each chapter choose its own local name. Dave Dellinger SPS. Emma Goldman SPS. Malcolm X SPS. And for that matter, Rosa Luxembourg SPS, Emiliano Zapata SPS, Che Guevara SPS. And so on.

Imagine, in short, students rising up with information, relentless focus, and some abandon too, becoming angry, militant, and aggressive, but keeping foremost mutual concern and outreaching compassion.

Imagine all this pumping into the already nationally growing U.S. dissent against war and injustice, pumping into the neighborhood associations and union gatherings and church cells and GI resistance, a youth branch willing to break the laws of the land and to push thoughts and deeds even into revolutionary zones. Imagine students singing, dancing, marching, and law breaking up a storm.

That is something the antiwar movement, the anti corporate globalization movement, the movement for civil rights and against racism and sexism, the movements for local rights against environmental degradation, the movements for consumer rights against corporate commercialism, and the labor movement too, all need.

Radical educators may have a role in promoting such an action. To be one step closer to achieving this role they need to set forth curricula for new possibilities, and actions that actively involve people in transforming their social and ecological environments with a firm belief in the possibility to effect change by their own direct intervention in social and economic settings and practices. This being said, a critical pedagogy that is an alternative pedagogy tries to help students to articulate new possibilities that would unleash a differing way of living life. The result would hopefully allow human beings to lead a new way of life by increasing the level of passion against injustice, oppression, and exploitation found not just in human resources but also within the confines of the capitalist socio-economic formation.

The most important form of struggle is through practical experience. The role that education will play in generating the experience through practical struggle is formed inside pedagogy. The focus needs to be clear. Since we are dealing with pedagogy, the main thrust is on the next generation.

Critical pedagogy needs to be generational if it is to be successful in building new ethics through educational practice. But this is not all. The future orientation of critical pedagogy is self-evident. It is not a one-off pedagogy in educating the “masses.” The process is continuous and relentless in stressing not just a new ethical outlook but also in emphasizing a new morality in building a new social formation with and by the hands of the human beings. In other words, radical pedagogy is predicated upon uplifting human beings so that they can discover their own power and develop the ethical criteria to achieve a critical humanist morality to replace the moral degeneracy of the capitalist ideology of continuous economical growth.

One way to interpret this idea is to understand it from the perspective of common people. Education is always an ideological act in that it can either co-

opt the populace into a social structure that is in contradiction to peoples' own interests or it can give the population the necessary moral fiber and skills necessary to combat a capitalist social order. For the end result is not only to create a new social practice but also a new ideological framework for this social practice to succeed.

Today the message that emanates from the capitalist superstructure is that of flexibility and adaptability to the society's status quo that in turn becomes an avenue for corporate oppression. Right-wing protocol demands more and more from ordinary workers in all branches of production. People sacrifice their flesh and blood to the business enterprise, which reaps the reward in value-added profit. The overall socio-political ethos is directed away from critical social awareness and into a "community" of greed, self-interest and blind competition. What the right-wing protocol demands is total subservience to the dominant mode of production. There is no debate outside the boundaries set by the economic and political elite of the capitalist state. The message is ideological brute force from the standpoint of corporate interests. Opposition to these corporate interests is usurped and placed into one of contradiction, conflict and antagonism on behalf of a hegemonic corporate state.

Nowhere is the maxim of adaptability more clear than in the manner empire states are treating their youth. Dreams are sold by any means necessary. A U.S. Army Special Forces advertisement asks: "Are you tough enough for Special Forces?" Toughness sells among low-income kids, especially those on the edge. Along with other good citizens they want to reach for the "American dream." Besides the dream (not coming true), "there is no higher calling than service in the US armed forces," proclaims President Bush.

The military's recruiting strategies are copious. Earlier recruiters had open access to college campuses, and high school corridors. Now they are knocking on the doors of public schools, wanting to get student's names, and addresses straight from the school office, selling their after school military programs to 10-12 year old "cadets" drilling with wooden rifles and chanting time-honored marching cadences. "New Junior ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) programs are being introduced in high schools across the country, and lately kids as young as 11 are being invited to join pre-ROTC at their elementary and middle schools" (Houppert, 2005, p. 17).

The youth of the world who were supposed to be the future and promise of humanity - 'apples of our eyes' - are foot soldiers of raging state terror, "the prolific father of all terrorisms" (Galeano, 2005). State terror, says Eduardo Galeano, "finds the perfect alibi in the terrorisms that it generates. It sheds crocodile tears each time the shit hits the fan, then feigns innocence of the consequences of its actions." And it pays to cry and lie for a good cause like democracy. "The world spends \$2.2 billion per day - yes, per day - on the military industry of death" (...) There is no more lucrative business on the face of the earth than this practice of industrial-scale assassination" (Ibid.).

In addition to military-economic wars across the globe, the corporate class has declared a class war against the working class. The political ideology of the

capitalist state has been strategically tied to instituting drastic change inside the life-world of the working class. This has had a detrimental effect on the human being's physical and spiritual well-being. No longer can people feel secure in their work (if they have a job), or their daily life practices. The corporate state juggernaut strangles the welfare state through "made for destruction" initiatives that create the core idea of risk invention into the social community. As Alan Freeman (2004) has stated: "Every apparently economic choice is, in reality, social. We can choose a society of basic rights - education, health, housing, child support and a dignified pension - or greed, pandemic inequality, ecological vandalism, civic chaos, and social despair" (p. 2). It would not be an understatement to declare that the corporate beast has chosen the latter. What we are now witnessing is a declaration of war against the social. It is not uncommon to experience the intensification of life as corporate spin masters call for longer working days, slashes in social spending, tax cuts for the rich, wage reductions, increasing the pension age, and a slash and burn attempt to transform the planet into a made for profit ball of wax (see McLaren, 2004). The plan of attack is fierce in its aim of derailing working class gains forged in struggle for social and economic emancipation.

### *Tragedy of our times*

We live in tragic times and no country is immune to this tragedy. Our planet is now overflowing with many personal tragedies and although these tragedies seem to be both visible and invisible, these tragedies certainly exist. To list the misfortunes that are now infesting our planet like a swarm of locusts would be a momentous undertaking. We would need to list country after country, continent after continent. Nothing has been untouched - AIDS, HIV, poverty, human displacement, human hopelessness and malaise, social alienation, injustice and exploitation have all taken the life giving blood from people's veins. We have become victims of privatization and deprivation. These and other current ills that infect our societies have had a direct impact on the human condition, and on the human species.

In March 2004, during a discussion at the New York Society for Ethical Culture, Cornel West asked Toni Morrison, an African-American writer the following question: "How would you characterize our historical moment?" Morrison gave two traits for our current epoch: fear and melancholy. She fears for her own country - the United States of America. Millions share her fear but they also fear for their own personal lives. Her melancholy springs from what the US has become. Fear and melancholy are very much a part of everyone's lives, if not consciously, then at least subconsciously. But we can also claim that there are three other characteristics to describe our historical moment: risk, uncertainty and human invisibility.

To be invisible is when people refuse to recognize that you are a human being. To be invisible is when you lose your sense of human dignity. As Ralph



Ellison (1995) wrote in the opening page of his novel *Invisible Man*: “I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me (p. 3).” To be invisible is to realize that people no longer recognize your existence and your struggle to live in harmony inside the social world. And this invisibility has become a sad fact of life for millions of inhabitants across the globe. This invisibility does not concern only the social honour of individual human beings but also an individual’s sense of her own intrinsic value. Human dignity is a part and parcel of the decent society that Avishai Margalit (1996) sees as a countermovement against what he calls shame and guilt societies. In these kinds of societies social life is based on constant humiliation of individual human beings; their hopes, needs, longings and moral demands stay unheard. Their human dignity is systematically violated. In this respect a decent society would be a non-humiliating society. One of the main questions in Margalit’s book *The Decent Society* is why should institutions respect humans as humans? According to Margalit there are at least three possible grounds on which we can base our possible answer to the previous question. First, a Kantian oriented “positive justification” according to which respect can be justified by identifying some specific human traits. Secondly, a “skeptical solution” based either on a factual practice of respect or wide acceptance of an “idea of respect.” As a third possibility, Margalit introduces his own preference, a “negative justification” of respect. This mode of justifying respect is grounded on the avoidance of physical and symbolic cruelty that social institutions can impose on people. (Margalit 1996, pp. 62-84.)

When we look at the global situation, we can argue that today families are invisible, children are invisible, women are invisible and men are invisible. As we awake each morning to a consumer ideology, what is not invisible is the commodity itself. We have become a commodity of flesh and bone – a commodity to be bought and sold on the open market. But what is even more alarming is that in the western world we have grown into this self-sacrifice. Capitalists, whoever they may be, do not have to force us to do what is against our better understanding. We are ready and willing to sell our selves to whatever and whoever may give us the promise of the stability and improvement of livelihood.

We want to propose the following draft hypothesis. Transformations in economic conditions that have been going on for the past 30 or so decades have generated a breakdown in the existential viability of the previous social character based on industrial society. This has produced a kind of existential vacuum. Like Victor Frankl (1959) once argued in his *From Death-Camp to Existentialism*, the will to meaning is the most basic factor if we want to understand human motivation. When this will is not met there emerges an existential vacuum that is filled up in Frankl’s observations by the will to power or the will to pleasure. Because in our new form of social and economical practices there was yet no viable social character the deeper level needs of the individual were addressed by the system imperatives operating on the level of power and pleasure.

German psychoanalyst Rainer Funk (2006) has proposed that this new orientation that answer to our deep psychic needs can be called post-modern I-am-me orientation (pp. 52-61). This new orientation fits best in the total scheme of corporate life.

the psychoanalytic understanding of the post-modern I-am-me orientation unquestionably shows that what is good for an economy and a society, namely, the offering and selling of "fabricated" ability, is not good for human being and his mental health. Like all nonproductive social character orientations the postmodern I-am-me orientation also supplies each individual with the "medications" enabling him or her to avoid perceiving his or her socially produced illness. The medication for the I-am-me oriented person is called "made" ability. As long as he or she has this at his or her disposal, he or she can function relatively symptomless and without distress in daily life. He or she only suffers from a "pathology of normalcy." Neither he nor she must sense his or her existential dependence on the medication of "fabricated" ability as long as everyone else lives the same way and does not feel "addicted" to the medication. (Funk, 2006, p. 60.)

In a similar sense Lauren Langman (2001) has proposed a new character type which she calls "carnival character." This character type brings to the foreground the fundamental principles of selfhood in global capitalistic settings which are "underpinned by narcissistic pathologies." Langman (2001) argues that "the most typical expressions of the carnival character as the "social character of our age" are an intertwining of self esteem based on ambition/accomplishment expressed in work and self indulgent privatized hedonism in the realms of leisure as a means to glean recognition and/or establish relationships." In these relationships other human beings, and the self among them, are seen as a "self objects." These flexible objects are easily replaced and this all happened in the change taking place in capitalism.

Whereas repression among the bourgeois traders was a critical moment in the transition from feudalism to modernity, once industrialization and mass production reached a certain point in which there were likely to produce a crisis of overproduction, capital needed to invent or colonize new realms. It was in this context that capitalism began to move from the production and transportation of basic goods and raw materials to the mass production of consumer goods ranging from home appliances and cars to prepared foods, fashions, cosmetics and entertainment. It is at this point that the "captains of consciousness" begin to insinuate the desire to spend (on consumer goods) into the psyche and colonize desire (Ewen 1976). But the critical thrust of advertizing and public relations was to "buy now"-meaning to erode the internalized restraints on savings and thrift. While this process began in the 1920, perhaps the emblematic shift in consciousness took place in the 60's when Playboy magazine heralded the sexual revolution as another moment of the consumer society. While it encouraged occupational success, the sign of that success was consumer sophistication. Knowing which wine went best with Ramsey Lewis and Oysters Rockefeller got the aspiring young (male) executive laid. (Langman 2001.)

Within this objectified commodity fetish, there is uncertainty and life risk. When the human being becomes an objectified form, she becomes a

disembodied commodity and as such, becomes a 'person' without substance. No longer possessing a human body we become unseen and unfelt not only in the workplace but also inside the social. And here lies the risk and uncertainty. Every commodity relationship runs the risk of being discarded or being placed in a pile of garbage. A commodity has an uncertain future. Its value is determined by its usefulness. When a human being is reduced to the commodity form, her usefulness always comes into question and hence, the uncertainty of life and risk.

In order to see this condition, we will need to confront the world and help students to do so also. No longer can we tolerate the human being becoming a disembodied object to be abused at will by global corporate capitalism. The reaction of the corporate state to a person's humanity is one of appropriation and humiliation. In its worst form, our humanity is appropriated into a 'junk' commodity in a throw away society. At its best, we are a mere appendage to a machine that strips our mind away from a collective existence and a collective resistance. As a community, we are numbed and dumped into an acting role on reality television where the aim is the planned obsolescence of a human life.

Within this context, a critical pedagogy can, in its best forms, confront the narrow, selfish and covetous ideology of the neo-liberal order as represented by the capitalist social formation. This it can achieve by venturing to the generative themes of the students and see them as active participants in the communal life of their surrounding social settings. As neo-liberal ideology confronts its own inner beast, the radical pedagogical task will need to become more confrontational with corporate reality. There can be no gray zone here. When human suffering produced by social settings becomes the norm, the response to such suffering needs to be strong and fierce not only in its condemnation but also in its confrontation. The pedagogical task is to bring to the forefront the concept of social non-humiliating humanity as a way of life. This need to create a social presence in the life-world becomes a prime mover toward a more humane formation to inhabit. Our problem, however, is how to attack the neo-liberal ideology of exploitation and capital accumulation without surrendering ourselves to the same logic that we are accusing it in the first place.

To confront it, we need a pedagogy that helps people to defend themselves against an enemy that is backed by a political, economic, and military machine. It is obvious that the viewpoint starts from below, from the eyes of the one individual and her needs, longings and moral demands. Corporate capitalism treats us as a mass by promising to us the fulfillment of our individuality. What is the real problematic is that the mass is needed to stand against the current global settings but at the same time the real problem is the lack of individuality. We already are the mass as our inner life has been standardized quite thoroughly as global capitalism is based on that. What becomes imperative is to form pedagogical settings that enable individuals to articulate their own needs, and their own experiences in a social and collective plane without the need to fit these experiences in to a seamless totality. What is furthermore needed is not an

action for the sake of action, but action that is promoted by a strong theoretical point of view that starts from the non-synchronous elements in our societies.

When we speak of oppression we refer to the daily practice of our everyday lives. Hundreds of thousands of workers are in fear of losing their livelihoods throughout the world while others are struggling through the garbage to feed themselves. We are also witnessing skyrocketing drug addiction and a general sense of malaise as we confront our worst realities of mental exhaustion and illness. The level of illicit drug intake is also spiraling upward as is the level of alcohol consumption. But what needs to be stressed is the importance to have a pedagogy that emphasizes moral outrage about the state of our social commons and our planet. We need to be passionate about people and the state of our world. We need to feel with our hearts the grief, the fear and the hope that is a part of our life-world. Critical pedagogy is not just academic research; it is much more than as pedagogy of the heart and senses. It attempts to humanize the world through struggle and hope as an educational part of the political aim to change repressive economical and social as well as cultural and spiritual conditions. Hope must include the understanding of the inner soul of capitalism as an economic and political formation in its entirety, and yet it also means the following: "Thinking, speaking, feeling, apprehending, giving a destiny to liberated hands different from just supporting body movement, creating intelligence and communicating it, comparing, valuating, opting, breaking away, deciding, ideating, living socially" (Freire, 2004, p. 98.)

## REFERENCES

- Adorno, T. W. (1997). *Aesthetic theory*. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Albert, M. (2005). Embark now. Retrieved September 4, 2005, from [www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=8631](http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=1&ItemID=8631)
- Allman, P. (2001). *Revolutionary social transformation*. Westport, CT.: Bergin & Garvey.
- Allman, P. (2001a). *Critical education against global capitalism*. Westport, CT.: Bergin & Garvey.
- Ali, T. (2005). *Street-fighting years*. London & New York: Verso.
- Ashley K., Avers, B., Dohrn, B., Jacobs, J., Jones, J., Long, G., Machtinger, H., Mellen, J., Robbins, T., Rudd, M., & Tappis, S. (1970). You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows. In Jacobs, H. (Ed.). *Weatherman*. Berkeley, CA: Ramparts Press.
- Bauman, Z. (2005). *Liquid life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bloch, E. (1986). *The principle of hope*, vol. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT.
- Carmichael, S., & Hamilton, C. V. (1967). *Black power: The politics of liberation in America*. Vintage Books: New York.
- Crowther, J., Galloway, V., & Martin, I. (2005). *Popular education: Engaging the academy*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Ellison, R. (1995). *Invisible man*. International Vintage Publishers.
- Evans, L. (1970). Letter to the movement. In Jacobs, H. (Ed.). *Weatherman*. Berkeley, CA: Ramparts Press.
- Foster, J. B. (2004). Empire of barbarism. *Monthly Review*, 56(7), 1-15.
- Frankl, V. (1959). *From Death-Camp to Existentialism. A Psychiatrist's Path to a New Therapy*. Beacon Press, Boston.
- Freire, P. (2004). *Pedagogy of indignation*. Boulder & London: Paradigm.
- Freeman, A. (2004, October 12). Why not eat children. *The Guardian*. Retrieved September 3, 2005, from [www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1324934,00.html](http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1324934,00.html) (3. 9. 2005)
- Fromm, E. (1955). *The sane society*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Fromm, E. (1973). *The anatomy of human destructiveness*. New York: Owl Books.
- Fromm, E. (1981). *On disobedience and other essays*. New York: Seabury Press.
- Fromm, E. (1997). *Marx's concept of man*. New York: Continuum.
- Funk, R. (2006). The psychodynamics of the postmodern "I-am-me" orientation. *Fromm Forum*, 10/2006. pp. 52-61.
- Galeano, E. (2005). When Maxims mislead. *The Progressive*, 69(9), 22-23. Retrieved September 3, 2005, from [progressive.org/?q=mag\\_galeano0905](http://progressive.org/?q=mag_galeano0905)
- Houppert, K. (2005). Who's next? *The Nation*, 281(7), 15-20. Retrieved September 3, 2005, from [www.thenation.com/doc/20050912/houppert](http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050912/houppert)
- Grass, G. (2005). The high prize of freedom. *The Guardian*, 7.5.2005), 4-5.

- Guevara, E. (1968). *Ideology of the Cuban Revolution*. In *Che Speaks* (pp. 18-23). New York: Grove Press.
- Kurlansky, M. (2004). *1968: The year that rocked the world*. New York: Random House.
- Langman, L. (2001). The "Carnival Character" of the present age. Paper originally presented at the 2000 Socialist Scholars Conference, March 31 - April 2, 2000. Retrieved September 3, 2005, from <http://www.angelfire.com/or/sociologyshop/langfr1.html>
- McLaren, P. (2004). *Discussing hope and strategy through education: The opening of the fundacion Peter McLaren de pedagogia critica at the Universidad Tijuana*. Retrieved September 22, 2004 from [www.dissidentvoice.org](http://www.dissidentvoice.org)
- Marx, K. (CW 5a). *Theses on Feuerbach*. Collected works, Vol. 5. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (CW 5b). *The german ideology*. Collected works, Vol. 5. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (CW 6). *Wages*. Collected works, Vol. 6. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (CW 11) *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*. Collected Works, Vol. 11. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (CW 20). *The International Workingmen's Association, 1866 Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council The Different Questions*. Collected Works, Vol. 20. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (CW 24) *Critique of Gotha Program*. Collected Works, Vol. 24. New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (CW 35) *The Capital Vol. 1*. Collected Works, Vol. 35. New York: International Publishers.
- Moisio, O-P (2008). What it means to be stranger to oneself. *Journal of Educational Philosophy and Theory*. (forthcoming)
- Rastenberger, A-K. (2002). Making thinking. *Frame News*, 2, 27-28.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1754). *A discourse on a subject proposed by the academy of Dijon: What is the origin of inequality among men, and is it authorised by natural law?* Retrieved January 25, 2008 from <http://www.constitution.org/jjr/ineq.htm>
- Sanbonmatsu, J. (2004). *The postmodern prince: Critical theory, left strategy, and the making of a new political subject*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Sennett, R. (2006). *The culture of the new capitalism*. London: Yale University Press.
- Smith, A. (1904). *The wealth of nations*. New York: Bantam Books.
- West, C. (2004). *Cornell West & Toni Morrison converse on race and politics in America at the New York Society for Ethical Culture*. Interview video. Retrieved September 3, 2005, from [www.freespeech.org](http://www.freespeech.org) March 24, 2004.

## TIIVISTELMÄ

Filosofia ei voi asettua aikakautensa ulkopuolelle. Sen käsitteelliset hahmot ovat osittain tulosta historiallisesta tilanteesta, joka kattaa yksilöllisen näkökulman lisäksi niin taloudellisen kuin poliittis-ideologisen kokonaisuuden, ja sen käsitteelliseen ruumiiseen vaikuttaa koko aikakauden yleinen ilmapiiri. Tämän aikakauden salakirjoituksen purkamiseksi tarvitaan erityisen tyyppistä tieteellisen kirjoittamisen tapaa, jota ihmistä, kulttuuria ja yhteiskuntaa tutkivien tieteiden parissa on aina hyödynnetty niiden alkujuurilta lähtien. Tässä väitöskirjassa olen yrittänyt soveltaa tätä historiallisesti herkkää filosofian tekemisen tapaa.

Väitöskirjassa tarkastelen kasvatustieteiden alaan liittyviä kysymyksiä. Asetan nämä kysymykset osaksi aikakauden analyysiä, jonka keskeisiksi nimitäjäiksi määritän uusliberalismin, teknologisen vallankumouksen laajenemisen, akateemisen kapitalismin, vieraantumisen, välineellistymisen ja esineellistymisen. Asetun väitöskirjassa aikakauden henkeä vastaan kriittisesti kuitenkin hyödyntäen filosofia, yhteiskuntatieteellisiä, psykologisia ja kasvatustieteellisiä keskusteluja niin ihmisestä, yhteiskunnasta, kulttuurista kuin kasvatuksesta.

Pedagogisen näkökulmani keskeisiä teoreettisia lähtökohtia voidaan avata muiden muassa John Deweyn, Paolo Freiren ja Frankfurtin koulun kriittisen teorian edustajien näkökulmista. Johdannossa taustoitan, erittelen ja asetan suhteeseen väitöskirjan artikkeleiden keskeisiä käsitteitä ja teemakokonaisuuksia. Erityisesti nostan esille aikakauden luonteen kuvauksen, siis työn kontekstualisoinnin, lisäksi kasvatustieteiden ja pedagogiikan kannalta olennaisina käsitteinä ihmisen arvokkuuden, radikaalin oppimisen, mimesiksen, samaistumisen ja toivon. Näiden käsitteiden avulla käsittelen ongelmakeskeistä oppimista, joka perustuu dialogiin, myötätuntoon, rakkauteen ja arvostukseen. Johdannon lopussa esitän myös muutamia huomioita koskien avauksia käytännön kasvatusta ja koulutustyön suuntaan käsittelemällä niin sanottua kollektiivista sosiaalista asiantuntijuutta opetuksellisena toimintana.

Väitöskirjan ensimmäisessä artikkelissa, *Max Horkheimer on the Mimetic Element in Education*, käsittelen Horkheimerin käsityksiä kasvatuksesta ja opetuksesta inhimillisenä toimintana, jonka päämääränä on yksilöllisen autonomian synnyn tukeminen. Tässä yhteydessä Horkheimer painottaa kasvatuksen mimeettistä elementtiä. Tämä kasvatuksen mimeettinen elementti paljastaa tai avaa kasvatuksen ja koulutuksen yhteiskunnalliset kiinnikkeet. Kasvatus, koulutus ja inhimillinen kehitys ovat yleisesti tulosta erityisestä historiasta, ja tämän historiallisen dimension välityksellä koko annetun historiallisen tilanteen eetos vaikuttaa näihin kaikkiin. Tämän kasvatuksellisen ulottuvuuden käsittämiseksi sitä käsitellään artikkelissa *Valistuksen dialektiikan* yhteydessä. Tällaisen kysymyksenasettelun avulla nostetaan esille lukuisia kriittisiä kysymyksiä, jotka tulisi ottaa huomioon sekä kasvatukseen liittyvissä kriittisissä ja konventionaalisisissa teoreettisissa keskusteluissa että käytännöllisessä opetussuunnitelmassa ja opetustilanteita koskevassa suunnittelutyössä. Keskeinen kysymys kos-

kee sitä, voimmeko toivoa kriittistä muutoksen tapahtumista kulttuurissa, jota määrittää järjen välineellistyminen.

*What it means to be a Stranger to Oneself* artikkelissa jatkan edellisessä artikkelissa esiin nostamani ongelmakentän kehittelyä. Väitän, että erityisesti aikuiskasvatuksessa joudumme työskentelemään ennalta määräytyneiden ja monessa mielessä kohtalaisen jäykkien ja muuntumattomien maailmaa koskevien kantojen ja näkemysten kanssa. Tässä mielessä ajattelen, että radikaalin kasvatuksen lähtökohdaksi muodostuu ihmisen itselleen rakentamien uskomusmuurien purkaminen. Nämä muurit, joiden suojassa hän voi kohdata maailman jonakin tiedettynä ja samana luovat ihmiselle turvaa. Tässä yhteydessä puhun näiden suojamuurien perustana olevan identiteetin lempeästä rikkomisesta (*gentle shattering of identities*) radikaalin kasvatuksen ongelmana ja menetelmänä. Käsitteellistäkseni tätä ongelmaa käsittelen niin sanottua pedagogista paradoksia keskittymällä Immanuel Kantiin ja G. W. F. Hegeliin. Kun yritämme aikuiskasvattajina tai opettajina ylipäänsä rikkoa lempeästi näitä jähmettyneitä identiteettejä ja edeltä käsin muodostuneita maailmassa olemisen ja toimimisen muotoja liikumme kiinnostavalla tavalla samankaltaisessa kokemuksellisessa tilassa kuin mistä Sigmund Freud kirjoitti käsitteillä "de-personalisaatio" ja "de-realisaatio". Nämä käsitteet nostavat esiin kysymyksen siitä, kuinka meillä on kokemuksellisesti selvää, että voimme uskoa jonkin asian olevan niin kuin se on ja samanaikaisesti kokea perustavanlaatuisia epäilyä tätä asiantilaa kohtaan. Kysyn tässä artikkelissa voimmeko liittää tämän kokemuksellisen tosiasian eräänlaisesta vieraudesta, jota koemme itsessämme, osaksi radikaalin oppimisen teoriaa sen legitimiinä ja järjellisenä lähtökohtana.

Kokoelman seuraavassa artikkelissa *As Heard in Silence – Listening and to-be-heard in Education* tarkastelen Erich Frommin käsityksiä terapiasta kuuntelemisen taitona (*therapy as an art of listening*). Kysymyksenäni on, voimmeko käyttää Frommin kirjoitukset terapiasta kuuntelemisen taitona yrityksessämme käsitteellä entistä syvemmin opettajan ja oppilaan yleensä piiloon jääviä suhteissa olon muotoja. Nämä Frommin tekstit mielessäni tarkastelen, kuinka kuunteleminen, kuulluksi tuleminen, luottamus, vastuu ja velvollisuus kietoutuvat yhteen opetus-, oppimis- ja ohjauksellisissa tilanteissa. Erityisesti olen kiinnostunut aktiivisen kuuntelemisen teoreettisista ja käytännöllisistä ulottuvuuksista sekä niiden mahdollisesta roolista kasvatuksessa, joka on suuntautunut muutokseen. Tähän liittyen käsittelen Avishai Margalitin käsityksiä ihmisen (oppilaan) henkilön (persoonan) ja ruumiillisen olemisen huolehtimisesta ja kunnioittamisesta. Aktiivinen kuunteleminen on toivon astia, joka on kätkeytyneenä ihmellisissä teoissa, jotka ovat suuntautuneet muutokseen.

Artikkeli *Hope and Education in the Era of Globalization* keskittyy toivon käsitteeseen kasvatuksen puitteissa. Artikkelissa väitetään, että yksilön hiljaisuudessa ja erityksissä tekemät yksinäiset teot saattavat saada loppujen lopuksi yhteiskunnallisen lopputuloksen. Hyvin naiivissa mielessä voimme väittää, että meidän tulee muuttaa itsemme, jotta voisimme muuttaa maailman. Tämä naiivi ajatus sisältää kasvatuseetiikan kannalta erittäin olennaisen ulottuvuuden, kuten tässä väitöskirjassa koottujen artikkeleiden kokonaisuus pyrkii osoittamaan: yrityksenä on pelastaa ihminen (opettaja) alati monimutkaistuvassa globaalissa



maailmassa vajoamasta kyynisyyteen, epätoivoon, syvään pessimismiin tai passiiviseen paremman odottamiseen. Tähän tarvitaan syvällistä ja kattavaa toivon käsitettä, joka on dynaaminen ja kriittinen. Tällaista käsitystapaa kehitellään erityisesti tarkastelemalla Erich Frommin toivon käsitteen kehittelyjä. Väitteeksi nousee, että usko ja luottamus sekä yksilöllisen autonomisen aktiivisuuden keskeisyys muodostavat tällaisen toivon ytimen, kun kasvatus määrittyy nimenomaan laaja-alaisena suhteessa olona ympäristön ja muiden ihmisten kanssa. Artikkelin lopussa nostetaan myös hyvin yleisiä periaatteita tai ehdotuksia opetukselle ja opetussuunnitelmien suunnittelulle, joita voidaan pitää toiveikkaan kasvatuksen ja koulutuksen rakennuspalikoina globalisoituneessa kapitalismissa.

Globalisoituneen kapitalismin puitteissa käsitetyn toivon käsitteen tarkastelun jälkeen artikkeli *Critical Pedagogy and Ideology Critique as Zeitgeist Analysis* kysyy, mitä voimme tehdä koulutuksen (kasvatuksen) piirissä, jos koulutus (kasvatus) nähdään perustavassa mielessä poliittisena tapahtumana. Artikkelissa nostetaan esille olemassa olevan annetun historiallisen tilanteen kriittinen analyysi sekä käytännöllisessä että teoreettisessa mielessä. Kriittisen aikalaisanalyysin (*Critical Zeitgeist analysis*) väitetään tuovan tämän ulottuvuuden koulutuksen ja kasvatuksen piiriin erityisesti liittyneenä marxilaiseen ideologiakritiikkiin.

Väitöskirjan päättävä artikkeli *Don't You See, How the Wind Blows?* osoittaa kuinka opiskelijaliike ja kansalaisoikeusliike 1960-luvun Yhdysvalloissa voidaan ymmärtää pedagogisena toimintana. Jos kriittisen pedagogiikan väitetään edistävän autonomisen ajattelun toteutumista, kuten tässä väitöskirjassa väitetään, niin silloin opetettavan aineksen tulisi niin pitkälle kuin se suinkin on mahdollista muuttua käytännölliseksi. Tämä käytännöllinen toiminta olisi kriittistä yhteistoiminnallista tiedon tuottamista erityisesti siinä mielessä, että tämän prosessin kautta tulee mahdolliseksi oppia uudelleen lukemaan annettua tilannetta kriittisesti. Tässä mielessä voimme väittää, että kritiikki tulisi nähdä hyvin syvässä mielessä pedagogisena tapahtumana. Samanaikaisesti tätä teemaa kehitellessämme näemme, kuinka tämä ajatus voidaan liittää tiettyihin Frankfurtin koulun kriittisen teorian ajatuksiin. Tässä mielessä kriittinen teoria voidaan nähdä kasvatuksellisenä projektina.