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**PERSONIFICATION IN  
*NEWSWEEK* COVERAGE OF THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS  
A content analysis**

**A Pro Gradu Thesis  
by**

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Tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää miten paljon Persianlahden kriisi henkilöityi George Bushiin ja Saddam Husseinin amerikkalaisen viikkolehden *Newsweekin* raportoinnissa. Tutkimusmateriaali koostuu yhteensä 157 artikkelista ajalta 6. elokuuta 1990 – 4. maaliskuuta 1991. Materiaalin runsauden takia tutkimukseen valittiin vain sellaiset artikkelit, jotka käsitelivät Persianlahden sotaa joko Yhdysvaltojen tai Irakin tai molempien näkökulmasta. Joitakin poisjätettyjä artikkeleita on tosin käytetty lähdemateriaalina taustatapahtumien selvittämiseksi. Taustamateriaalia saatiin myös muusta konfliktia koskevasta kirjallisuudesta. Lisäksi taustatutkimuksessa käsitellään olennaisimpia mediatutkimusmenetelmiä ja lehdistön historiaa. Jotta materiaalia olisi helpompi käsitellä, tutkimus koostuu kahdesta ajallisesta osiosta: 1) kehitys kohti varsinaisia sotatoimia (Desert Shield) ja 2) varsinaiset sotatoimet (Desert Storm).

Tutkimusmenetelmänä käytettiin sisältöanalyysia. Menetelmän mukaisesti ensimmäisessä vaiheessa kaikki valittu materiaali käytiin läpi siten, että saatiin selville minkälaisia sisällöllisiä kategorioita teksteistä voisi muodostaa eli mihin kielellisiin elementteihin tutkimuksessa keskityttäisiin. Toisessa vaiheessa muodostettiin näitä elementtejä kuvaava kategoriointi, jonka jälkeen materiaali käytiin uudelleen läpi. Sen jälkeen konfliktin eri osapuoliin tehdyt viittaukset tilastoitiin kyseisten kategorioiden alle. Saatuja kvantitatiivisia tuloksia verrattiin ensisijaisesti toisen puolen vastaaviin mutta myös oman puolen eri alakategorioihin. Kvantitatiivisia tuloksia täydennettiin jonkin verran kvalitatiivisella tulkinnalla, jossa hyödynnettiin aikaisempia vastaavia tutkimuksia sopivilta osin. Kvalitatiivisessa vaiheessa pyrittiin myös perinteisen sisältöanalyysin mukaisesti tuomaan esiin tekstiesimerkkejä *Newsweek* -lehdestä, jotka osoittavat miten Persianlahden kriisin eri elementteihin on artikkeleissa viitattu. Erityispiirteitä tutkittiin lisäksi propagandistisia piirteitä, joita teksteissä ilmeni.

Tuloksista käy selkeästi ilmi, että etenkin Irakin puoli henkilöityi *Newsweekin* Persianlahden sotaa koskevassa raportoinnissa hyvinkin selvästi presidenttiinsä, Saddam Husseinin. Yhdysvaltojenkin puolella henkilöitymistä on havaittavissa, mutta ei niin suuressa määrin eikä yhtä selkeästi kuin Irakin puolella. Yhdysvaltojen puolesta *Newsweek* antaa monipuolisemman ja yksityiskohtaisemman kuvauksen mikä ei sinällään ole yllättävää, koska kyseessä on amerikkalainen viikkolehti. Irakin poliittiset toimet ja sodankäynti kuvaillaan lehdessä pintapuolisesti ja Saddam Hussein kuvataan lähes ainoana aktiivisena toimijana eri ryhmien ja instituutioiden sijasta. Tutkimustuloksista käy myös selkeästi ilmi se tosiasia, että vaikka lehdistöä nykyään pidetäänkin poliittisista ideologioista riippumattomana, propagandistisia piirteitä ja tehokeinoja käytetään varsinkin sotaa koskevassa raportoinnissa. Näitä propagandistisia piirteitä voisi käsitellä laajemmaltikin mahdollisissa jatkotutkimuksissa samoin kuin kvalitatiivisen tutkimuksen osuutta voisi lisätä.

Asiasanat: personification, Saddam Hussein, George Bush, the Persian Gulf crisis, content analysis, propaganda, media research

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Early in the morning of 2 August 1990, the world was shocked by the news of Iraq's attack to Kuwait. Only two days earlier the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had assured world leaders that he had no intention of invading his small neighbor. The United States' President George Bush led the international community's condemnation of the attack. With great speed one of the biggest and most complex military operation in history started. The United Nations Security Council also condemned the invasion immediately and organized a multinational coalition. (Morse 1991:10-11.) Many countries took part in these allied forces but the United States had undoubtedly the leading role. "With the unprecedented agreement of almost every member of the United Nations, the USA responded to Saudi Arabia's appeal for support by sending scores of thousands of her best troops half way round the world" (Micheletti and Debay 1991:5). Despite the United Nations' involvement, the conflict was a showdown of two strong men, George Bush and Saddam Hussein. The American president George Bush was the leader of the only remaining superpower in the post-cold war world because the Soviet-led Communist world was gradually losing its unity and falling apart, and the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was known in the West as a 'ruthless dictator'. (Stanwood, Allen and Peacock 1991.)

According to Graber (1989:328-330), a special case where the public has to rely almost totally on the information given by the mass media, are foreign affairs such as the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991. These kinds of topics are more thoroughly discussed in the so-called prestigious press, like the magazine *Newsweek*. Although the American public is commonly assumed not to be interested in events abroad, foreign news receive a considerable amount of coverage, especially during crises. Still, foreign topics are often oversimplified and told from an American perspective. Although other media have become the primary source for the citizens'

knowledge of the world, newspapers and magazines still have a major role in giving additional and more detailed information. (Graber 1989:348.) From the very beginning the media followed the development of the Persian Gulf crisis as closely as possible. Among others, the American magazine *Newsweek* published extensive reports of the subject.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine *Newsweek's* coverage of the crisis in order to find out to what extent the magazine personified the situation to George Bush and Saddam Hussein. The analysis of the coverage will be done in two main sections: the events before the outbreak of the war (*Newsweek* 6 August 1990 – 14 January 1991) and the actual warfare (21 January – 11 March 1991). We will give an overall picture of the studied articles and events, and then focus on how often the above mentioned leaders are referred to. We will also pay some attention to what these references are like. In connection with this, we will examine if the coverage includes indirect propagandist features often found in wartime reporting, but the main emphasis will clearly be on the personification of the coverage to the two above mentioned presidents. Our hypothesis is that the reporting of the Persian Gulf crisis concentrated mainly on the two leaders.

To find out how frequently *Newsweek* refers to the two presidents, we have studied the material with the help of content analysis. We have examined how much the reporters use the leaders' names or titles in comparison to all the other specific units involved. To get as reliable and as extensive results as possible we have used two methods that supplement each other. The quantitative method gives the results numerically, based on a set of systematic categories which have been made in advance. Its results simply tell how many times a particular unit is mentioned. The qualitative method describes the units in their contexts and clarifies what kind of referring expressions have been used in the original texts. (Brannen 1992:10-17.) In our study, the quantitative method is clearly the primary tool for analysis

whereas the qualitative method is used mainly to give additional information on and examples of the data.

As a background to the analysis we will introduce the general development of mass media, in particular the printed press, and create a theoretical basis for analyzing media content. In addition, this first part of the thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) includes the study of mass media and its relationship to politics. The second part (Chapters 4 and 5) deals with the different approaches to mass media research and especially to content analysis. This kind of background information is necessary because it is obvious that "[more] balanced evaluations of the media and their effects can be made if we know something about the way they developed, ..., [and] what forces determine the nature of their content", as Davison, Boylan and Yu (1976:v) point out. The third part of the thesis (Chapters 6 and 7) introduces the studied data and its categorization. The fourth part (Chapters 8 and 9) includes both the history of the Persian Gulf crisis and the actual content analysis of the data concerning it in *Newsweek*. The last part (Chapters 10 and 11) contains the discussion and results of the analysis.

Our primary sources are the articles in *Newsweek* that are directly connected with the crisis in the Persian Gulf. For our research purposes we have limited the data in two respects. We have studied only the articles between 6 August 1990 and 11 March 1991, which covers the actual crisis. We have also excluded articles that do not directly concern the active participants in the warfare: the United States, the United Nations' multinational coalition or Iraq. However, to gain better understanding of all the complicated issues related to the crisis (eg. the Palestinian question), we have used both the studied and the excluded articles from *Newsweek* as secondary sources. In order to get a better perspective and more detailed information on the situation we have used two books, one by Stanwood, Allen and Peacock (1991), the other by Morse (1991). They both describe the crisis day by day

and discuss the background and the possible consequences of the war. For the same purpose, we have studied Braybrook's (1991) and Micheletti and Debay's (1991) and Micheletti's (1991) books about the war.

Most of our secondary sources deal with mass media but from slightly differing perspectives. Leonard (1986) and Davison, Boylan and Yu (1976) present the historical facts from the early development of the printed press to our days. In Davison et al. (1976) the political systems and effects of the mass media are introduced but they are discussed in more detail in Berkman and Kitch (1986), Graber (1989) and Entman (1989), which also provide us with more up-to-date information. All four books give information about communication research as well, and they give examples and suggestions of how to approach this field of study.

As sources and guides for an appropriate research method we have used four books that discuss the methods and processes of content analysis: Andersson (1974), Brannen (1992), Holsti (1969) and Pietilä (1973). Other sources that give insights to using content analysis include an article by Jalbert (1995) as well as Gianos' (1982) and Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) books on metaphors. In addition, we have used two cases of content analysis Rikardsson (1978) and Rojo (1995) as examples to support our thesis. The study of the possibly occurring propagandist features is based on books by Golding, Murdock and Schlesinger (1986), Combs and Nimmo (1993) and Lee and Lee (1979).

## 2 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AMERICAN PRESS AND POLITICS

As early as in the Egyptian and Roman empires, the central government used the papyrus to control and stabilize the nation. Similarly, the first American printed press used their publications to publicize different political opinions. This was the case because the newspapers were very dependent economically on the political parties or individuals representing them. (Davison et al. 1976:7-11.) It was not until the 1830s that there was a change from a political press to a slightly more independent one that only reported political issues without necessarily taking a stand. At this point, journalists and politicians began to cooperate. (Leonard 1986:56-63.) Still, politics did not explicitly make it to the front page until yellow journalism with its strong propagandist features was born. It made news more like entertainment because it added sensationalism and crusading into the factual reporting of politics. (Berkman and Kitch 1986:22.) Politically more independent journalism really began in the 1870s with President Jefferson's strong support for the freedom of press (Berkman and Kitch 1986:312). The political commitment of the press did not need to be automatic but had to be earned, and support for a political party did not necessarily require one-sided reporting. As a result the interest moved from government and its policy to individual politicians and their opinions about politics. (Leonard 1986:173, 203.)

Davison et al. (1976:4) explain that the reason for the close relationship between the press and politics is that the "operation of the American political system, even the very ability of the government to govern effectively, depends in part on the printed media and broadcasting". The absorption of political ideas through mass media begins in childhood. Mass media together with parents and school take part in this political socialization, which according to Graber (1989:150) is "the learning and

internalizing of customs, rules, structures and environmental factors governing political life [which] is important because it affects the quality of interactions between citizens and their government". Graber (1989:3,101) also suggests that the process of teaching the so-called 'American way' continues even more effectively in later life. Thus, the media are involved in integrating and homogenizing American society, which includes the shaping of political opinions as well (see also Davison et al. 1976:166).

"Information is essential in a society where citizens are expected to participate in political decision making. Good information represents an important step in the direction to a healthy democracy" (Berkman and Kitch 1986:311). Because people do not have the time or resources to form independent opinions, they have to rely on the mass media to give them this essential information as honestly and objectively as possible (Berkman and Kitch 1986:317). It is true that something that is printed in a magazine or a newspaper is usually considered more prestigious and reliable. Iyengar and Kinder (in Entman 1989:83) point out that the media affect us in two ways: firstly "by providing much of the information people think about and [secondly] by shaping how they think about it".

As mentioned above (p.4), one special case where the public has to rely almost totally on the information given by the mass media is foreign affairs. Topics related with foreign news are usually more thoroughly discussed in the so-called prestigious press, like the newspaper *New York Times* and in magazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek*. Although the American public is commonly assumed not to be too interested in foreign news, it receives a remarkable amount of coverage, especially during crises, like the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-1991. (Graber 1989:328-330.) According to sociologist Herbert Gans (in Graber 1989:342-343), the seven most frequent topics are 1) American activities in foreign countries; 2) events with major effect directly on Americans; 3) relations of the U.S. with the former Communist

countries; 4) foreign elections if they involve a change in the head of state; 5) dramatic political conflicts, 6) largely destructive disasters; and 7) the cruelties of foreign dictators. The reporting of the Persian Gulf crisis covers all of these topics with the exception of the ones mentioned in points number four and six. Despite the fairly large amount of coverage and variety in topics, the reported foreign news is often oversimplified and told from an American perspective (Graber 1989:348). In addition, the press naturally presents and discusses the official statements from Washington concerning U.S. foreign policy.

The relationship between the press and the president is a special one, because the media are the only force that are able to challenge his power (Berkman and Kitch 1986:212). Graber (1989:237-238) names four major functions that media perform for the president. First, the media inform him of current events, which sets the political scene for his policy. Second, they keep him attuned to the major concerns of the American public. Third, the media enable him to convey his messages to the general public as well as to political élite within and outside of government. Fourth, they allow the president to remain in full public view on the political stage, keeping his human qualities and professional skills on almost constant display. According to Berkman and Kitch (1986:185), in order to survive and prosper politically, the president must find a way to harness the power of the press, to neutralize it or control its possible negative effects. During the years of mass media, presidents have realized this and a large organization has developed to help and teach the presidents to act in an appropriate manner in front of the media.

The news media and the world of politics, particularly the White House, have developed a system that is beneficial and essential to both. For the press, politics is an important topic which also brings responsibility with it. For politics, media are a channel to send messages to the public but at the

same time media are a governor of its actions. Graber (1989:329) points out that the people within the executive branch use the media not only to influence the public but also to gain information from it. For example, a State Department official once commented that one cannot work there without the *New York Times*, one of the highly appreciated newspapers. "Media coverage is the very lifeblood of politics" (Graber 1989:238).

Ever since the beginning, the media and politics have been inseparable in the United States, even though this relationship has changed over the years. The style of political journalism, which concentrates on the individuals, developed during the Civil War when yellow journalism was born and it has survived to our days. Since the 1870s the printed press has been quite independent politically but most papers still seem to support the government and the ideology it represents. (Berkman and Kitch 1986:22, see also Leonard 1986:203.) For politics, mass media are vital. They socialize citizens to the dominant political system in question from childhood. Later they provide the executive branch the channel through which to influence the public opinion about themselves. (Graber 1989:84.) As can be seen, the relationship is a two-way-street: both benefit from each other. In this relationship the printed press, especially the prestigious publications, play an important role. That is why it is highly unlikely that the printed press will totally vanish in the future even though other means of media are also gaining ground in today's information society.

### 3 PROPAGANDIST FEATURES IN THE AMERICAN PRESS

The ideal in the United States, and in the whole Western world, is that the press is free and independent. The freedom of the American press is protected by the Constitution of the United States. However, according to



Schiller (in Golding, Murdock and Schlesinger 1986:19-20) in the modern world this ideal has "been steadily eroded and undermined by the political and economic realities" in which the press operates. Blumler and Gurevitch (in Golding et al. 1986:88) claim that in reality, the press is nearly a puppet of business and government élites. Especially in politics, the press usually reflects the dominant political system. This kind of commitment can, and often does, function as propaganda to strengthen the government's policy.

The term *propaganda* is not used in this study in its traditional meaning: "frequently exaggerated or false information, which is spread by political groups" (Collins COBUILD English language dictionary 1987:1151). People usually connect such propaganda with ideas of dictatorship and unscrupulous manipulation. But, as Combs and Nimmo (1993:1) point out, propaganda is present in every aspect of our everyday lives. Lee and Lee (1979:15) define propaganda as any "opinion expressed for the purpose of influencing actions of individuals or groups". It is not just persuasion but actually an art form that has developed into more delicate and less self-evident forms. All major social activities - business, law, politics, culture, and academia - use propaganda in order to communicate successfully. (Combs and Nimmo 1993:xi, 35.)

In people's minds propaganda is most commonly connected with politics. It is true that politicians around the world use propaganda to influence the public. For example, according to Graber (1989:328-330), in the United States the mass public consists mainly of people who are not so interested in politics. Therefore, the American printed press and other means of media are used as vehicles for political propaganda as much as for public information and entertainment. (Combs and Nimmo 1993:15, 18-19.) The so-called prestigious press differs from the mainstream commercial press because of its highly informative role. One of these few popular magazines is *Newsweek*. It also uses propaganda but the style is usually very indirect and

hard to notice. It mainly represents the conservative values of the upper class Americans, who traditionally support the government and its ideology. (Schiller, Herman in Golding et al. 1972:20,175-176.)

During a national crisis or a war, the reporting in the prestigious press changes and propaganda becomes more visible and intensified. The role of the government as the main source of information increases and the press may become very loyal to it when the nation is facing a conflict; the media serve the 'national interest'. (Herman in Golding et al. 1972:176.) Despite the clear change in style, it is easy for the masses to believe such propaganda because it supports their general worldview, 'the truth'. They usually consider it just as information, not as propaganda. (Combs and Nimmo 1993:97.)

Much research has been done in the field of propaganda. A frequently used method of analyzing propagandist features is the so-called "ABCs of Propaganda Analysis", introduced by Alfred McClung Lee as early as in 1939. Later this method has been criticized, for instance for being guilty of oversimplifying. (Combs and Nimmo 1993:193-194.) Because our research material consists of wartime reporting with its more straightforward and simplified propaganda, we believe that Lee and Lee's method is at least to some extent applicable to our thesis.

Lee and Lee (1979:22-24) name seven devices frequently used by propagandists:

- 1) *Name calling*: giving an idea a bad label to make us reject and condemn the idea without examining the evidence
- 2) *Glittering generality*: associating something with a 'virtue word' to make us accept and approve the thing without examining the evidence
- 3) *Transfer*: carrying the authority, sanction, and prestige of

something respected and revered over to something else

4) *Testimonial*: having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or product or person is good or bad

5) *Plain Folks*: a speaker attempts to convince his audience that he and his ideas are good because they are 'of the people'

6) *Card Stacking*: the selection and use of facts or falsehoods and logical or illogical statements in order to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea or program or product or person

7) *Band Wagon*: trying to convince us that our group accepts the propagandist's idea and we must follow.

Even a superficial glance through our selected material shows that most of the above mentioned propagandist devices do occur in *Newsweek*'s texts concerning the Persian Gulf crisis. We will not apply this method systematically but give some textual examples of each case in the analysis.

#### 4 MEDIA RESEARCH

Several scientists of various fields have studied mass media. Davison et al. (1976:4-6) list some frequently used approaches to media: 1) communication researchers study the sources, content, channels, audiences and effects of mass media; 2) physicists, chemists and engineers study the development of new technologies in mass media; 3) mathematicians and physicists study, for example the different channels' capacity and the volume and quality of signals; 4) journalists study professional standards like thoroughness and independence of the material; 5) psychologists study eg. the ways people learn from the media and how it changes their attitudes; 6) sociologists study the structure of media and the ways that it and various

outside pressures influence media content; 7) political scientists study the role that the mass media play in the political process.

As can be seen, media research is a vast and complex area, which can be studied using many viewpoints. Our interests in the material were mainly of political and sociological nature, and therefore the approach to the study material is communication research from the viewpoint of sociology, political science and, to some extent, psychology. The fact that the studied material deals with a political conflict and its numerous components, naturally affected the choice of the approach. Our study is carried out as a case study, which is a typical form of investigating media, especially in media sociology. The treatment of the material is mostly technical, that is, we will study the surface structure and typical phenomena in the text with the help of content analysis. The process of this research method is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

Teun A. van Dijk (1988:2) points out that media discourses are particular types of language use in the sense that every reporting of news is "a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context". By this he means that the reporter's and reader's shared knowledge of the language and the world, as well as their beliefs and values, must be taken into account when analyzing any piece of news. Furthermore, van Dijk (1988:1-2) says that although the media and its contents can be studied by describing different language structures, this is not enough. He does not condemn the traditional content analysis but criticizes its quantitiveness and the fact that the results rely too strongly on the reliability of the categories that are used to quantify the data. The danger that must be recognized in the categorization is that the researchers as well as reporters and readers, are also members of a certain culture and can never be purely objective when using content analysis as a research method. Van Dijk (1988:33) validly claims that "both news reporting and scholarly discourse [never] are, or

should be, objective in the sense of neutral or apolitical". The researchers must accept some degree of subjectivity because no media research is independent of the surrounding world or culture. However, this does not necessarily make the analysis itself biased. (van Dijk 1988:12, 33.)

Davison et al. (1976:73-88) divide the factors influencing the content of media coverage into two groups. First, the environmental factors like the political and social atmosphere which, for example in the United States, permit each publication much freedom to discuss a variety of topics from many viewpoints. Second, the internal factors such as the owners and managers of mass media with their responsibility for economical success and public interest can affect what gets printed and in what style. The difficulty of analyzing mass media content is, according to Entman (1989:35), "the lack of detailed knowledge about the influence of news on public opinion". That is why content analysis is mostly based on technical elements used to convey a message.

Entman (1989:42-43) suggests four possible features and devices in content that can be taken into consideration:

- 1) *importance* is shown by the significance, repetition, length, and duplication of news stories: publicly unimportant stories do not receive important treatment,
- 2) *criticism* is shown through the amount and types of negative evaluation of the news topic: the negative writing is based on the general beliefs of how a proper leader or interest group should act,
- 3) *linkage* is shown in connections between the topic and aspects not strictly connected with the news event: eg. one person can be made responsible for the actions of a whole group in the eyes of the public by linking his/her name to it more often,
- 4) *perspective* is shown by the reporters' use of sources: the more diverse the sources are, the more valid the interpretation of the topic is.

The first three of these features, or their absence, are fairly easy to recognize in the surface structure of most texts based on our general knowledge of the world. That is why the features of importance, criticism and linkage have a place in our study of *Newsweek's* reporting. The study of the fourth feature, perspective, calls for specific knowledge of both the reporters and of their actual sources, to which we do not have access.

Harold D. Lasswell, who was one of the first modern communication researchers, defined communication as "Who says What, in which Channel, to Whom, with what Effect?" (in Davison et al. 1976:4). This means that, evaluations of mass media are accurate only if we know what are the forces shaping the content and how they intentionally or unintentionally affect the people. Entman (1989:71) emphasizes that in content study it should be acknowledged "that media messages are complex and multilayered". Note that we have no means or intentions to study the subject comprehensively nor take into account all the factors that have affected the studied texts. Our educational, sociological and even geographical restrictions have meant that we have had to settle for the surface meaning only.

## 5 CONTENT ANALYSIS AS A RESEARCH METHOD

Content analysis is a difficult research method because so many factors affect the content of any message and there is a severe lack of detailed information on how the contents affect the receiver (Jalbert 1995:11). Still, it has been a popular method in communication research from the beginning of the twentieth century. However, there were some studies made as early as in the 1740s. (Holsti 1969:20.) According to Berelson's definition (in Andersson 1974:9), the classical content analysis is "a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest

content of communication". Such classical content analysis concentrates on counting the frequency of specified textual units. This approach deals with only the existing text and concrete word units and pays no attention to the underlying meanings. The presumption is that the most interesting units are mentioned most often. (Andersson 1974:7-10.)

Since the 1950s the definition and the field of content analysis have somewhat broadened. Holsti (1969:14) defines content analysis as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages". This means that the textual context can also be taken into consideration; not only words but also meanings can be classified and put into specific categories. The main requirement is that the classification of the studied elements must be systematic and motivated. (Andersson 1974:10; see also Pietilä 1973:52.) In his studies on media discourse, van Dijk (1988:18) has also paid attention to the limitations of describing different linguistic structures in detail. He does not argue against the relevance of the quantitative method but suggests that "what cannot be read from the statistics is the way events are covered and described and how actors are qualified" (van Dijk 1988:44).

In spite of the criticism, content analysis is most often done by using the quantitative method. It consists of the division of the selected content into categories that reflect such features in it that are relevant to the research problem. In other words, the final categories are directly based on the studied texts. This categorization has to be developed by the researcher(s) because there are no standard categories that would cover the vast field of communication analysis. There is, of course, a danger that the researcher's attitudes or opinions may cause excessive subjectivity in the choice of categories. However, he/she has to be so familiar with the data that he/she knows which elements are relevant and logical for the study. (Andersson 1974:14-15.) The quantitative method gives statistical results that are "a

powerful set of tools not only for precise and parsimonious summary of findings, but also for improving the quality of interpretation and inference" (Holsti 1969:9).

With content analysis, the often mentioned opposite to the quantitative method is the qualitative one. It draws conclusions on the basis of appearance or nonappearance of attributes in connection with the studied units. This method makes also the context of each word or phrase important; the frequency by which they appear is not as significant as in the quantitative analysis. (Andersson 1974:14,18, Holsti 1969:10.) Even among the experts of content analysis there is confusion about the distinction between these methods (Rikardsson 1978:42). In this study we will use the quantitative method purely as a categorizing tool and in giving the results numerically. The qualitative method is used to give examples of the material and to describe its contents. In our study the quantitative method is useful because as Brannen (1992:61) explains

...some quantitative evidence may help to mitigate the fact that it is often not possible to generalize (in a statistical sense) the findings deriving from qualitative research [...] Quantitative research readily allows the researcher to establish relationships among variables, but is often weak when it comes to exploring the reasons for those relationships. A qualitative study can be used to help explain the factors underlying the broad relationships that are established.

Holsti (1969:11) explains that the two methods supplement each other and the combination of them is most likely to give the researchers insight into the meaning of the data. We will use this combined method here but the quantitative method is clearly in the main role. The qualitative method is used to give some text examples and to show the possible occurrence of propagandist features in the coverage.



At the beginning of a content analysis, the research problem rarely is, or can be very specific. It becomes specified only after the researcher has glanced through the available material. In our case, the study of *Newsweek's* coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis gave the impression that all major events were acts of the American and Iraqi presidents rather than the actual military forces. This impression formed our research hypothesis which now had to be systematically tested. At this point the researcher using content analysis has to decide *what* the units of analysis are and *how* they will be analyzed. In our study, these units are expressions referring to the actors in the events during this conflict. For our research problem the most important units are phrases referring to George Bush and Saddam Hussein.

In order to numerically classify these units, the researcher creates a *set of categories*. In our study, the main categories became the two opposite sides of the Persian Gulf crisis, the United States and Iraq (see Appendix 1). The important thing at this stage is that the categories describe the research problem. To get an answer to our hypothesis, ie. to find out how much the reporting of *Newsweek* personified the crisis in George Bush and Saddam Hussein, we also formed certain subcategories. These subcategories reflected the main actors on both sides, such as the above mentioned leaders, the governments, the national armies. It is important that each category and its content is clearly limited and motivated (see Chapter 7). Only this can assure reasonable *objectivity*. (Pietilä 1973:59-61, 94.) "A good [research] design ensures that theory, data gathering, analysis, and interpretation are integrated" (Holsti 1969:27).

In our study we could not ignore that one term could refer to several things and different terms could refer to the same thing depending on the context (see Andersson 1974:11). This forced us to focus on both the actual words or phrases and their contextual meanings. An important linguistic element in our study is therefore the concept of reference, "the concept which mediates

between the word or expression and the referent ... the individual in question” (Lyons 1977:175,177). In addition, Lyons (1977:176-177) points out that reference is a context-dependent notion and an act of referring happens by means of a referring expression. For example, in our research material, the reporters referred to the American president with referring expressions such as ‘President Bush’, ‘George Bush’ and ‘Bush’. These referring expressions were classified as related to this person as an individual. Furthermore, the expression ‘the president’ could refer to either George Bush or Saddam Hussein depending on the context. That is why the expression ‘the president’ was counted on both sides, the United States and Iraq, to belong to the subcategory of personal references to their leaders. (see Appendix 2.)

Pietilä (1973:61) suggests that the practical phase begins with the collection of information, that is carefully *studying the material* on the basis of the categorization. If it seems to be impossible to *systematically* classify the data, the researcher must check the limits and motivations of the categories, and possibly modify them. After classification comes the actual *analysis* which tightens and organizes the data so that conclusions can be drawn. These are the *results* used to answer the research problem.

## 6 THE DATA AND METHODS

The data consists of articles concerning the Persian Gulf crisis in the American magazine *Newsweek*. The coverage is divided into two major parts. In the first part, from 6 August 1990 to 14 January 1991, the articles cover the time between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the outbreak of the actual Persian Gulf War on 16 January 1991. During this time, the amount of pages is 128,5 which consists of 77 articles. The second

part, 21 January to 11 March 1991, includes the time of the actual war, from 16 January to 28 February 1991, and the coverage consists of 119 pages and 80 articles. In total, the amount of pages is 247,5 consisting of 157 articles. We were forced to limit the studied period to keep the quantity of data within reasonable limits. Furthermore, we have selected only such articles that discuss the active participants, that is the U.S.-led coalition and/or Iraq. There were several reasons for doing this. Firstly, if we had taken all the different political, economical and historical views into consideration, it would have widened and complicated the issue enormously. Secondly, since we are studying the personification of the crisis to George Bush and Saddam Hussein, it is relevant to focus primarily on the parties these persons directly represent. This kind of pre-considered limitation is often regarded more adequate than a random selection which easily falsifies the results (Pietilä 1973:71-72). We have divided both the above-mentioned parts into three periods according to the events and the intensity of reporting, and we will compare these different periods within *Newsweek*. This comparing "messages from a single source in differing situations" (Holsti 1969:29) is typical for analyzing text content.

In this context the term 'personification' is not used in its traditional, dictionary meaning. 'Personification' is a commonly used linguistic term in studying metaphors that impute "human qualities to things that are not human" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:35). We use the term to describe how much two individual persons, George Bush and Saddam Hussein, are referred to as actors in every aspect of the crisis. In linguistic terms this is actually a case of metonymy. Lakoff and Johnson (1980:35) describe metonymy as "using one entity to refer to another that is related to it". An example of one type of metonymy is naming an institution instead of the people responsible for an action as in 'the CIA was warning the White House' (*Newsweek*, 13 August 1990, p.13). An opposite example is naming an individual responsible for the actions of an institution as in '[people]

want Bush to wait longer before attacking Iraq?" (*Newsweek*, 21 January 1991, p.12).

Since we have used the magazine *Newsweek* as both the primary and secondary source (see p.6), one remark must be made here. The single quotation marks are used mainly for text examples such as 'Saddam's missiles' while analyzing *Newsweek's* content as a primary source. These examples may include both single words and longer phrases. The double quotation marks are used only for direct quotations of reporting when *Newsweek* is used as a secondary source, ie. as one of the sources of background information on the events. The use of italics is limited to the names of the main categories, the subcategories and the names of the groups of the referring expressions within each category in the running text. The different propagandist features defined by Lee and Lee (1979) and Entman (1989) are also in italics to show that we mean the names of these terms. Otherwise the general editorial mechanics naturally apply through the whole thesis.

The actual research process started with a very superficial glance through *Newsweek* magazines covering the period of the whole crisis, starting from the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and ending at the provisional truce on 3 March 1991. At this point it became clear that the material for the research would have to be limited because of the vast amount of reports written from many different perspectives during the conflict. Therefore we decided to use only such articles that discussed the crisis itself and not those connected with any side phenomena such as the Paléstinian question or the international oil market. When glancing through the selected magazines we noticed that the reports seemed to concentrate on certain persons rather than on the nations and organizations involved. For example, George Bush, the president of the United States, seemed to get a lot more attention in the coverage than the whole United Nations' coalition. We decided to focus on

this feature of personification and to find out how much the magazine personified the situation to George Bush and Saddam Hussein.

Next we acquainted ourselves with media research in general and it proved to be a complex area of research. Since we wanted to concentrate mainly on the surface structure of the articles, we chose content analysis as our research method to be able to study the contents of the relevant texts systematically. The method is very technical because it usually gives only the quantitative results and pays no attention to the related social, political or psychological contexts. However, it is a frequently used method in analyzing media content, especially in case studies like ours where the amount of studied material is too large to be comprehensively analyzed qualitatively. This being the case, we decided to combine the traditional quantitative content analysis with some more descriptive qualitative analysis, which is becoming a common combination when analyzing media content.

After deciding on the method, the next step was to go through the material more carefully in order to create a set of categories, which is the basis of the quantitative content analysis (see Appendix 1). This phase involved the final choice of features to be studied so that they reflect the whole research problem. In our case this meant the collection of the most typical referring expressions that were used in the coverage to refer to different participants and elements in the Persian Gulf crisis (see Appendix 2). The two main sides in the categorization were the United States and Iraq, and within them the main emphasis was on the countries' leaders' and their role in the coverage. After this the most laborious phase began: studying the material carefully, magazine by magazine, article by article so that each referring item could be categorized. As can be seen in the next chapter, for the purpose of analysis we had to reorganize the original categories into main

and subcategories to ease the process and to clarify the amount of personification.

## 7 THE CATEGORIZATION OF THE DATA

As mentioned in Chapter 5, clearly limited and motivated categories must be created to make a valid quantitative content analysis. The main division in our study is made between the references to the United States and to Iraq as the most active sides in the conflict. We do not treat these two countries only in the lexicographical meaning of the word state, "a country, usually when it is considered in terms of its political organization and structure" (Collins COBUILD English language dictionary 1987:1424). The United States and Iraq are naturally also referred to as functional units by using the names of the countries, or by references to each nation as a whole. In the latter case they are subcategories to the above mentioned main categories. (see Appendix 1.)

We have then classified the data into various subcategories in order to find out how much the reporting personifies the situation to George Bush and Saddam Hussein. Within both sides, we have compared how much the journalists refer to these actual leaders and to what extent they mention other institutions and people involved instead. The referring expressions relevant to our study are those referring to the numerous different actors in the conflict. (see Appendix 2.) The most important subcategories on both sides are those which include the references to George Bush and Saddam Hussein as individual persons. Other important subcategories are the state, the military and the administrative branch. The only category that is not included on either side is *The World* because it includes the references that are actually neither to the United States nor to Iraq.

Naturally, all the above-mentioned subcategories and elements within them are referred to in numerous ways in the actual studied articles (see Appendix 2). When studying the material we have kept certain types of referring expressions separate within the subcategories because of the different emotional associations we consider them to create in a reader. As an example, expressions 'President Bush', 'George Bush' and 'Bush' do not have the same prestige eventhough they have the same referent, in other words, they all refer to the same individual. The same is true with 'President Saddam Hussein', 'Saddam Hussein' and 'Saddam'. Two special cases of referring expressions on the Iraqi side are the one for the possible nicknaming and the other for genitive expressions like 'Saddam's missiles' because such expressions occurred only in reference to Saddam Hussein.

**Subcategory 1: reference to person**

President Bush: \_\_\_\_\_ The Iraqi President: \_\_\_\_\_  
 George Bush: \_\_\_\_\_ Saddam Hussein: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Bush: \_\_\_\_\_ Saddam: \_\_\_\_\_  
 The Bush administration: \_\_\_\_\_ Saddam's government: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Bush's allies: \_\_\_\_\_ Saddam's: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nicknames: \_\_\_\_\_

**Subcategory 2: reference to state**

The United States: \_\_\_\_\_ Iraq: \_\_\_\_\_

Since the United States was not alone in fighting Iraq but was one participant in the United Nations' coalition, it is very likely that numerous articles mention the UN and the allied forces. To clarify the vast topic, we have collected all the different units of the UN operation under one heading. However, in the analysis of the data such referring expressions are counted as part of the U.S. side but as a separate subcategory. The United States was undoubtedly the most powerful country within the coalition and the U.S. President George Bush its leading person. Therefore we find it appropriate to distinguish referring expressions like 'Bush's allies' from the subcategory

concerning the United Nations' coalition. Instead, 'Bush's allies' is counted as a part of the subcategory of *reference to person*.

**Subcategory 3: reference to the United Nations**

United Nations' coalition: \_\_\_\_\_

During a crisis situation many parts of a society naturally get involved. In addition to the presidential administration, institutions like the government play an important role in the decision-making. The press realizes their significance in the reporting and that is why we have included such institutions in the categorization. There is a distinction between the presidents' administration and the rest of the legislative branch. The Bush administration is referred to for example by 'White House', 'Washington' and 'Bush's close men', the other part consisting of the Senate and the Congress. In the reporting about the Iraqi side the most frequently used expression is 'Saddam's government' but 'the Iraqi government' and 'Baghdad', which give a more democratic picture, are also used. (see Appendix 2.) In addition to the above mentioned references to institutions, there are probably a lot of politicians, experts and official sources that have commented on the situation or played some part for example in the negotiations.

**Subcategory 4: reference to administrative branch**

Senate & Congress: \_\_\_\_\_ The Iraqi government: \_\_\_\_\_

Politicians: \_\_\_\_\_ Politicians: \_\_\_\_\_

Experts & analysts: \_\_\_\_\_ Experts & analysts: \_\_\_\_\_

Official sources: \_\_\_\_\_ Official sources: \_\_\_\_\_

Another institution recognized as an actor in the conflict is naturally the army. Expressions referring to this institution comprise a separate subcategory on both sides (see Appendix 1). As groups of referring expressions within this subcategory we have separated the military troops, individual soldiers and officers from the army institution because all these



have different emphasis and they possibly create dissimilar images. It is not the same to read about 'the U.S. forces' as about 'our boys'. The expressions which refer to the individual soldiers also include some references to hostages and civilians who are affected by the crisis because of their presence in the area.

**Subcategory 5: reference to military**

U.S. Army & Intelligence: \_\_\_\_\_ Iraqi Army & Intelligence: \_\_\_\_\_

U.S. troops: \_\_\_\_\_ Iraqi troops: \_\_\_\_\_

U.S. soldiers: \_\_\_\_\_ Iraqi soldiers: \_\_\_\_\_

Military officials: \_\_\_\_\_ Military officials: \_\_\_\_\_

Since the variation of topics in the *Newsweek* coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis is so multidimensional, also the range of expressions used to refer to all the different actors is extremely large (see Appendix 2). Many of these expressions do not have any common denominator and therefore they are collected under the subcategory called 'Others'. In this subcategory there are, however, a few separate groups of referring expressions so that the different features within this group become clearer. For instance, the public opinion and the ordinary people of both sides, eg. the soldiers' families at home, cannot be ignored as an influential factor. That is why we have separated expressions like 'U.S. public' and 'Iraqi people' as special cases. A typical feature in direct quotations is the use of 'we', which we have also classified as a special case. Therefore every occurrence of 'we' as opposed to 'they' is put into this group of reference. As mentioned above, we have left out articles irrelevant to our study. Possible references in the studied articles to, for example, supportive but non-active countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union are gathered together in the "wastebasket", under the heading 'The World'. Other than American or Iraqi diplomats, politicians and experts are put under this heading as well. (see Appendix 2.)

**Subcategory 6: reference to others**

U.S. public: \_\_\_\_\_ Iraqi people: \_\_\_\_\_

"We": \_\_\_\_\_ "We": \_\_\_\_\_

The World: \_\_\_\_\_

**8 THE DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS THE PERSIAN GULF WAR IN  
*NEWSWEEK***

The Iraqi attack to and the invasion of Kuwait had its roots way back in the history of the Middle East. The situation in the area had been extremely flammable for years due to several reasons. The most important of them was perhaps the Palestinian question. The creation of Israel on the Arabian peninsula in 1948 was achieved by outsiders: the West forced Arabs, namely the Palestinians, to give some of their area to Jews, who were scattered around the world after World War II. This created tension and confrontations for decades. The Palestinians wanted the area back for themselves and it was an important factor in uniting the Arab countries against the Western world, and especially the United States that supported the Israelis in almost all of their actions. Naturally, the Israeli people were also discriminated by the strongly Islamic Arab world because of their Jewish religion. (Stanwood et al. 1991, see also *Newsweek*, 14 January 1991, p.20-21.) Another clear and more specific reason for Iraq attacking Kuwait dates back to 1961 when the British government granted independence to the Sheikdom of Kuwait. The Iraqi government never recognized this new state. (Morse 1991:6.)

The most concrete reason for Iraq attacking Kuwait, however, was clearly oil-related. Iraq namely accused Kuwait of pumping oil from a neutral area at the border between the countries and claimed that Kuwait's over-

production of oil was lowering the oil prices. Iraq's economy had been devastated by the long war with Iran (1980-1988) and now it hoped to benefit from the vast oil resources of Kuwait. (Stanwood et al. 1991.) Braybrook (1991:4) states that Saddam Hussein, whose reputation had not gained from the war with Iran, might have wanted "a quick and easy conquest to enhance his personal reputation, and effectively stake his claim for leadership of the Arab world". In addition, Iraq demanded that Kuwait should give two islands, Bubiyan and Warba, to Iraq because they had allegedly belonged to it in the past. Saddam Hussein had warned that Iraq could use force unless Kuwait agreed to its demands. (Morse 1991:8; Braybrook 1991:3,4.)

Just a few weeks earlier, April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, had told Saddam Hussein that the United States would not interfere with these area disputes. She had, however, added that the United States would be ready to use force if its friends in the area were threatened, but for some reason this warning was not announced in public. Iraq had also another reason for believing that the United States would keep away, and that was the fact that the Americans had supported Iraq during the war against Iran only two years earlier. Furthermore, in the past the United States had relied on the Arab countries to keep the balance in the area by themselves, and it did not usually want to get involved in the Arab conflicts. (Stanwood et al 1991, see also *Newsweek*, 6 August 1990, p.31, *Newsweek*, 10 December 1990, p.14.)

For the Arab countries the situation was by no means simple. At the beginning, many of them supported Iraq in its actions against Kuwait because they felt the latter country was too close to the West. Because of its very successful cooperation with Western oil companies "Kuwait's wealth made it a target of resentment" (*Newsweek*, 13 August 1990, p.17). Eventually, however, the fear of further Iraqi aggression in the area broke

the strong front of Arab unity and anti-Americanism and many Arab countries joined the U.S.-led coalition. The only supporter of Iraq throughout the whole crisis was the Palestine Liberation Organization. (Stanwood et al. 1991.) So, "slightly dumbfounded and vaguely uneasy, the Arab world was getting its first look at the soldiers of the New World who had come ... to help defend the black gold of the Gulf" (Micheletti and Debay 1991:6).

## 8.1 *Newsweek* from 6 August to 10 September 1990

### 8.1.1 The events

The Persian Gulf crisis began to develop in mid-July 1990 when Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border. He threatened to attack if Kuwait did not stop the over-production of oil and meet Iraq's other demands (see p.30). Negotiations to solve the situation peacefully failed and on 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait. The attack was extremely fast and powerful. Within a few days 100,000 Iraqi soldiers had been transported to the Kuwaiti boarder and in less than a day they took over the most important parts of the country. (Morse 1991:6,10; Stanwood et al. 1991.)

According to Stanwood et al. (1991), after the actual invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, in fear of Iraq's attack, asked the United States for help. The western world and most of the Arab countries immediately condemned Iraq's actions. Within a week the United Nations' Security Council declared the invasion illegal and ordered economic sanctions against Iraq. For example Resolution 660, passed on 2 August 1990, condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces immediately and unconditionally. The European Community also declared a boycott of both the Iraqi and the Kuwaiti oil. (Morse 1991:10.)

Stanwood et al. (1991) explain that after the UN resolutions several countries, with the United States taking the lead, began sending troops to the Gulf. The United States contributed by far the biggest amount of both troops and artillery by sending almost 400,000 men and women to the area before the beginning of the actual ground war. An American general, Norman Schwarzkopf was also appointed the commander-in-chief of the multinational allied forces. "One of General Schwarzkopf's most crucial tasks was to keep intact the fragile coalition of nations – many of them Arabs having more in common with Saddam than their Western battle partners" (Morse 1991:22). The principal aim of this operation, known as Desert Shield, was to prevent further territorial conquests in the area by Iraq, to liberate Kuwait, and to provide a stable peace throughout the Gulf region (Braybrook 1991:14). But as one of the soldiers explained when asked about the coalition's mission in the Gulf: "Ultimately, of course, we are soldiers and we obey orders: if we are so ordered, we will move on to Kuwait City" (Micheletti and Debay 1991:43). In practice, the most important goal for the United Nations became the rescuing of the foreign hostages in Kuwait and Iraq and enforcing the economical sanctions (Stanwood et al. 1991). To achieve these aims, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 644 on 18 August 1990, demanding that the Iraqi government allow all foreign nationals both in Iraq and Kuwait to leave these countries; and Resolution 661 imposing trade sanctions on 6 August (Morse 1991:16).

In less than 24 hours after the invasion nearly all pieces of the Persian Gulf War were together, the complex diplomacy which tested the firmness of the new American-Soviet world order, the relations between the Arab League and the European Community and the ability of the United Nations to work as the peace keeper of the world in the way its instrument of foundation suggested (Stanwood et al. 1991).

### 8.1.2 The coverage in *Newsweek*

The first month was a time of intensive reporting. The coverage includes 34 articles, which total up to 58 pages. Actually the first issue has only one article titled 'Playing the Bully Again' (*Newsweek*, 6 August 1990, p.31) and it does not acknowledge the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It merely describes Saddam Hussein's actions in the Middle East before it. There are hardly any references to the United States or any other country than Iraq. On the Iraqi side most of the references are to Saddam Hussein personally. This article is somewhat different because it uses the form 'Hussein', which does not appear in the texts after this.

From 13 August to 10 September the number of articles and pages is at its highest during the development towards war, as can be seen in Appendix 3. Articles concerning the United States deal with many subjects, varying from the administrative branch and diplomacy to the artillery needed in the Gulf, and also descriptions of personalities including everything from top military officials to soldiers' families. There are articles discussing the impact of the crisis on the whole world and particularly the U.S. economy, and some attention is given to the public opinion in the United States which is mainly supportive at this point.

Of all the 34 articles only six are directly connected with Iraq. One of them discusses the terrorist threat and five concentrate on Saddam Hussein and his policy, for example 'King, Beggarman, Hero and Thief' (*Newsweek*, 27 August 1990, p.20-21). This in itself shows that in *Newsweek's* coverage power and responsibility in Iraq focus on its leader, making Saddam Hussein the most visible person in the reports of Iraq. There are 23 articles in *Newsweek* directly concerned with the United States, but only three concentrate on important American figures and only one of them deals with the president: 'The Code of the WASP Warrior' (20 August 1990, p.18)

which gives a portrait of George Bush. The article 'Bush's General: Maximum Force' (3 September 1990, p.20-21) describes General Colin Powell and 'Stormin' Norman' Takes Command' (10 September 1990, p.21) tells about General Norman Schwarzkopf.

*Newsweek* also covers such topics as terrorists and the Palestinian question because Israel, especially, was afraid of possible Iraqi bombings if the war broke out. The position of numerous foreign hostages and civilians trapped in Iraq and Kuwait is reported in several articles. For example 'The Wrong Place, the Wrong Time' (*Newsweek*, 3 September 1990, p.22-23) is written in an emotive style with photographs of hostages aging from 2,5 to 69 years from various countries.

### 8.1.3 The content analysis of data

The total amount of referring expressions relevant to our study and research problem in the 34 articles is divided so that there are 1518 referring expressions connected with the U.S. side and 880 referring expressions connected with the Iraqi side. The difference in the division of power is easily noticed by using the quantitative method of content analysis. In all the articles from this period, there are 173 direct referring expressions of the type 'President Bush', 'George Bush' or 'Bush' as opposed to 375 referring expressions of the type 'the Iraqi President', 'Saddam Hussein' or 'Saddam'. Within these groups the most frequently used referring expressions are 'Bush' (7,5% of all the references to the U.S. side) and 'Saddam' (32% of all the references to the Iraqi side). In addition, 'the Bush administration' is named 77 times whereas 'Saddam's government' is mentioned only four times. (see Table 1, p.45.)

The two special cases of direct personification on the Iraqi side, *Saddam's* and *Nicknames*, occur relatively frequently. On 33 occasions, the Iraqi institutions and actions are referred to as owned or performed by Saddam Hussein, for example 'Saddam's army', and 'forces' (*Newsweek*, 3 September 1990, p.8-10) and 'his conquest of Kuwait' (*Newsweek*, 10 September 1990, p.10). Saddam Hussein is referred to by a nickname 37 times (see Table 1, p.45). The most common one is clearly 'dictator' and its variations. The more radical ones include 'the Arab Hitler' and 'the Devil' (*Newsweek*, 27 August 1990, p.21).

The United States is referred to 165 and Iraq 236 times (see Table 1, p.45). One reason for this is that many other elements and institutions within the American society are named instead of the president, whereas the whole Iraqi nation is usually represented by the country's name or its leader. For example, Iraqi people are mentioned only 20 times in comparison to the American public, which is referred to 103 times. In percentages the difference is also quite significant (2,2% of all the referring items in the main category of *Iraq* vs. 6,8% of all the referring items in the main category of *the United States*).

During this period there is wide discussion in *Newsweek* about the background and the international impact of the crisis (see eg. 10 September 1990, p.10-16). For the first time in the post-cold war world, the United States and the Soviet Union were tested for their abilities to cooperate. The Arab countries also had difficulties in trusting the United States due to its close relations with Israel, the lifelong thorn in their flesh. Because of this complicated and wide discussion about the subject there are tens of referring expressions in the group *The World* in each issue. In total Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union and several other countries are mentioned 424 times. As Morse (1991:22) explains, "the building of a bridge of mutual trust between very different cultures was a difficult process...[and that the]



participation of Arab forces was essential to what may be crudely described as the ‘public relations’ aspect of Desert Storm.”

Towards the end of this period the references to the U.S. military increase in number. Articles give specified information about the different services within the Army, including technical data about the artillery. The continuous build-up is described by reporting about the American troops located in the Gulf, for example ‘With the Marines: ‘We’ll Stop Them Here’ (Newsweek, 3 September 1990, p.17). However, there are quite few references to the individual soldiers. Naturally, the institutions responsible for foreign policy and warfare (the State Department, Pentagon and CIA) are also named in this connection. References to the American army and intelligence and the U.S. troops add up to 24,4% of all the referring items on the U.S. side.

On the Iraqi side there are also quite many references to the Iraqi troops (11,0% of all the referring items in the main category of *Iraq*) but all the other groups within the subcategory of *reference to military*, including *Iraqi Army & Intelligence* are rarely mentioned. If the subcategory *Iraq* is excluded, the remaining ones added together do not come to even near the amount of references to Saddam Hussein personally. The special cases *Saddam's* and *Nicknames* are fairly frequent.

## 8.2 Newsweek from 17 September to 29 October 1990

### 8.2.1 The events

During this period the diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis continued. The close cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union became particularly noteworthy as the ‘Superpowers [worked] as Superpartners’ (Newsweek, 17 September 1990, p.13). On 10 September George Bush and

Mikhail Gorbachev met in a mini-summit in Helsinki and agreed that they both wanted Iraq out of Kuwait. The U.S. Secretary of State James Baker also had an important role in negotiating with the allies and with other supportive countries. (Morse 1991:30, Stanwood et al 1991.)

Some European countries were uncertain of their role and intervention in the situation. This was mainly because of the drastic changes in the political balance of Europe, for example the reunification of the two Germanys. The European leaders were naturally more concerned with their own territory than some distant crisis in the Third World. (*Newsweek*, 17 September 1990, pp.7-9, 17.) The only exception was Great Britain, 'The Staunchest Ally', (*Newsweek*, 8 October, p.15) which was in fact the first European nation to send troops to the Gulf. Simultaneously with the diplomatic negotiations the whole United Nations' coalition became more united and the military build-up continued. For example, approximately 300 U.S. Marine helicopters and aircraft were transported to the Gulf area between August and November 1990. (Stanwood et al. 1991.) But as *Newsweek* (24 September 1990, p.14) described it: "Even if the sanctions hold firm, there is no guarantee that by the end of the year Saddam Hussein or his long-suffering people will show signs of giving up".

### 8.2.2 The coverage in *Newsweek*

In late September and October both the number of articles and of pages per issue are somewhat smaller than earlier. There is even one issue of the magazine (22 October 1990) which does not include any articles relevant to this study, that is articles concerning the two opposite sides in the Persian Gulf crisis directly. The coverage consists of 17 articles with 32 pages. (see Appendix 3.) The topics are approximately the same as during the first period: war scenarios, the cost of the war and negotiations. The reports of

the negotiations include both the diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis peacefully and the final formation of the coalition forces. *Newsweek* also offers more detailed information on the role of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the possible warfare.

In addition, the U.S.-Soviet cooperation is the topic in three articles. The 17 September issue is almost totally dedicated to this topic. During this period there are no portraits of individuals, instead the articles are mostly speculations about the future and reports of the ongoing events. Two quite different angles are given by special reports from Iraq and Kuwait in 'Inside Iraq' (*Newsweek*, 8 October 1990, p.10-13) and 'Wiping Kuwait off the Map' (*Newsweek*, 1 October 1990, p.14). They describe the situation in these countries from a more non-military viewpoint.

### 8.2.3 The content analysis of data

Again references to Saddam Hussein are most common. He is directly referred to 286 times, which includes 256 referring expressions belonging either to the group *the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein* or *Saddam*, and 30 belonging either to *Saddam's* or *Nicknames*. All the other groups on the Iraqi side add up to only 286 referring items and out of these last mentioned ones, 175 refer to Iraq as a state. Again this shows how the issue is simplified into the Iraqi state and its leader in *Newsweek*. On the U.S. side, 161 referring items out of the total 1030 refer to George Bush personally either as 'President Bush', 'George Bush' or 'Bush'. The United States is mentioned 112 times as a state. (see Table 2, p.45.) Surprisingly, the public opinion and average citizens are mentioned as often and in as many articles on both main sides, Iraq and the United States.

There are noticeably more references to *Politicians* on the U.S. side than earlier. The reasons for this are mostly the ongoing negotiations, and the American Secretary of State James Baker's important role in them is also visible in the texts. Most of the 110 references to politicians are to him, but other politicians are also mentioned. The reports of the worldwide negotiations result in there being 486 referring expressions in the category *The World*. For example, in 'Shared Goals', 'The Moscow Connection' and 'Superpowers as Superpartners' (*Newsweek*, 17 September 1990, p.6-13), the Soviet Union or Mikhail Gorbachev is mentioned 185 times. It is remarkable that although Iraq takes part in most negotiations, Iraqi politicians are very rarely mentioned. The 15 references to politicians are all to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.

Because of the speculative reporting about the possible war, two groups become more significant. The American experts and analysts are quoted very often, which partly increases the amount of references in the group "*We*". The threat of war has shifted the attention in *Newsweek* from the U.S. troops to 'America's sons and daughters' (29 October 1990, p.12) in the Gulf. This way the reports of the military have become more affectionate and personal, and therefore such referring expressions within the subcategory of *reference to military* are included in the group *U.S. soldiers* instead of *U.S. troops*. Also, the American civilians who were held as hostages in Iraq and Kuwait belong to the former group. As mentioned above (pp.32, 34), foreign hostages played an important and dramatic role in the crisis because Saddam Hussein used them as a weapon in the negotiations and as human shields in the military bases.

### 8.3 *Newsweek* from 5 November 1990 to 14 January 1991

#### 8.3.1 The events

During the last two months of 1990 until mid-January 1991 the diplomatic negotiations to resolve the crisis peacefully continued. The UN Security Council's resolution 678 on 29 November 1990 gave the allies permission to use military force if Iraq did not withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. This was a crucial step in hardening the U.S.-led coalition's policy towards Iraq. (Stanwood et al. 1991; Braybrook 1991:31.) Or as Morse (1991:40) explains: "In effect, the Resolution was a countdown to war." However, even among the American military analysts there was no clear agreement on whether the sanctions would work or whether it was necessary to get more involved by using force. The administration's offensive policy with its strict time limits was criticized because it "would deepen our [the U.S.] involvement in the region and require a long stay to restore the balance of power." (*Newsweek*, 10 December 1990, p.14.)

Although Iraq insisted that the incorporation of Kuwait into Iraq was a non-negotiable issue, it still used the diplomacy of offering and bargaining. One tactic was the releasing of hostages, from late-October onwards. Then again, the fact that Saddam Hussein declared the Iraqi army to be under his personal command sent the negotiators quite a contradictory message. That was partially why the allies and eventually the rest of the world decided to maintain their demand that Kuwait must be freed. Finally, when Iraq did not respond to the United Nations' ultimatum by withdrawing, the allied forces acted. On 16 January 1991 the allied planes began bombing the Iraqi bases. Operation Desert Storm had started. (Morse 1991:48, Stanwood et al. 1991, see also Braybrook 1991:31,32.)

### 8.3.2 The coverage in *Newsweek*

The total amount of articles during this last period of the first part of analysis is 26 and they consist of 38,5 pages (see Appendix 3). This two and a half months is a relatively quiet time in reporting, which is surprising because now the possibility of the crisis turning into an actual warfare was bigger than ever. Then again, the articles discuss the military resources and troops more deeply. At this point stories about the individual soldiers and the possible U.S. casualties are also clearly more frequent than previously. The situation is even compared with the war in Vietnam, which at its time aroused a lot of public criticism. Reports of the negotiations, war scenarios, and articles about Saddam Hussein and his tactics are the most common ones. In a way, the balancing between the negotiations and the ongoing deployment of troops in the Gulf area shows in *Newsweek's* articles like 'Just How Much Is Enough?' (5 November 1990, p.24-26), and 'Still Searching For a Way to Avoid War' (19 November 1990, p.12). The important issues in the negotiations, like the Palestinian question and the hostages' situation, are also covered.

In the United States the public support for President George Bush's actions was becoming less uniform. This shows fairly directly in *Newsweek's* topics. The culmination of trying to convince the American people is the letter 'Why We Are in the Gulf' (*Newsweek*, 26 November 1990, p.30-31), written by President George Bush. There is a contrast between George Bush's strongly emotional style and the more formal texts in *Newsweek*. A good example of a diplomatic and formal way of writing is ex-president Jimmy Carter's letter (*Newsweek*, 17 December 1990, p.25). Yet, the overall tone is affectionate and emphasizes the 'we, the world police' -belief in the United States.

### 8.3.3 The content analysis of data

At this point, the contents of the articles become more and more simplified. There is a clear difference between the total amounts of referring expressions between the two sides. The U.S. side consists of 1528 and the Iraqi side of 793 referring items. In addition, the Iraqi side concentrates on Saddam Hussein or the Iraqi state even more intensively than before. The U.S. side shows an almost opposite phenomenon. The portion of personal references to George Bush is noticeably smaller than earlier (see Tables 1-3, p.45-46). As the United Nations' deadline comes closer, the role of the UN coalition grows in the texts (9,9% of all the referring items in the main category of *the United States*). Earlier there were more items in the group *The World* but now the focus is clearly on the United Nations and its efforts to solve the crisis peacefully. But obviously the American politicians still get a lot of attention, 12,8% of all the referring items on the U.S. side.

The above-mentioned letter by Bush represents the general attitude of 'we/the world against Saddam' in the coverage, but naturally in a more propagandist way than in *Newsweek's* own reporting, for example 'Can the world afford to allow Saddam Hussein a stranglehold around the world's economic lifeline?' (26 November 1990, p.31). Because of this somewhat provocative and simplifying style, the use of nicknames and the genitive expression 'Saddam's' increases. (see Table 3, p.46) Two nicknames are used most often, that is 'the dictator' and 'the Iraqi strongman'. The group *Saddam's* includes phrases such as 'Saddam's...confrontation with the West' (*Newsweek*, 14 January 1991, p.18) and 'his nuclear weapon' (*Newsweek*, 17 December 1990, p.21).

#### 8.4 Discussion

It is quite natural that *Newsweek* was pro-coalition because the United States immediately played a major role in the Persian Gulf crisis. Ever since the beginning the general opinion in the West was extremely critical of Saddam Hussein's actions and the media reflected this. It is also natural that there were more perspectives on the American side, because the magazine had better access to the information about the various domestic elements. Another reason for the simplified negative image is that Iraq offered the coalition a clear common enemy, which personified to its leader Saddam Hussein. "A sense of "them" and "us" develops, a sense which is heightened by reducing the enemy to "frightful and even subhuman status"" (Wilson in Gianos 1982:219).

The relative amount of references to the two leaders in the following tables (p.45-46) shows that the articles more strongly personify Iraq through Saddam Hussein than the United States through George Bush. In Tables 1-3 (p.45-46) we have at first put together all the groups of all the types of personal references to George Bush (*President Bush, George Bush, Bush, The Bush administration* and *Bush's allies*) and those related to the state, *The United States*. Similarly in the other part of each table we have the names of the groups including the referring expressions related to Saddam Hussein as a person (*The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, Saddam, Saddam's government, Saddam's* and *Nicknames*) and to the state, *Iraq*. The percentages in the tables show the relative amount of referring items in each group that is mentioned. The above mentioned state-subcategories (*the United States* and *Iraq*) are included in the following tables (p.45-46) for the sake of comparison.

The percentages have been counted by comparing the amount of references to George Bush and Saddam Hussein with the total amount of referring



items in the two main categories, *the United States* and *Iraq*. In the same way, the percentages for the comparative subcategories, *the United States* and *Iraq* have been counted by comparing them with the two main categories. The percentages have been calculated for each side per one issue, not per article. In other words, the percentages in Tables 1-3 (p.45-46) are the average amounts of referring expressions in each group in the studied articles, and the results are shown issue by issue. For example, on 13 August 1990 there were 133 referring items on the U.S. side in *Newsweek*. Six of them were of the type 'Bush', which is 4,5 % of the total amount of referring expressions on the U.S. side, as can be seen in Table 1 (p.45). It is worth mentioning that not all of the counted percentages are visible in a form of a table because the purpose was to concentrate on the amount and quality of personification, not all the different elements involved, and also because there would have been too many tables.

When we say that a subcategory is large, we mean that there are many expressions in the analyzed material which belong to the group of referring expressions within that subcategory. It can also be the case that one group of referring expressions is noticeably bigger than any other group within the same subcategory, or even within one of the main categories. For example, on the Iraqi side (the main category) the subcategory of references to military could be bigger than the subcategory of references to person. The big size of the subcategory could consist of many referring expressions in the group of *Iraqi troops* in the analyzed texts.

Table 1. Personification in percentages (%), *Newsweek*, 6 August-10 September 1990.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Date</u>					
	6.8.	13.8.	20.8.	27.8.	3.9.	10.9.
President Bush	10,0		2,6	3,3	2,7	1,2
George Bush	10,0	0,8	3,5	2,2	1,9	0,8
Bush		4,5	11,3	9,3	7,3	5,9
Bush Administration	10,0	12,8	6,5	4,1	3,5	4,2
Bush's allies		0,8	0,9		0,3	0,2
TOTAL	30,0	18,8	24,8	18,9	15,7	12,3
The United States	20,0	18,0	14,3	16,7	6,2	7,7

The Iraqi President	3,1	0,9	0,6	3,0	1,4	0,7
Saddam Hussein	50,0	8,0	5,6	7,9	10,9	8,6
Saddam		32,4	36,6	30,5	27,2	37,1
Saddam's Government		0,4	0,6	0,6		0,7
Saddam's Nicknames	3,1	4,4	3,1	1,8	4,1	6,0
TOTAL	65,6	50,2	52,2	47,0	49,7	56,3
Iraq	15,6	29,3	30,4	34,1	19,7	23,8

Table 2. Personification in percentages (%), *Newsweek*, 17 September-29 October 1990.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Date</u>					
	17.9.	24.9.	1.10.	8.10.	15.10.	29.10.
President Bush	1,7		5,5	3,0	4,7	3,7
George Bush	1,4	2,0	1,5			2,3
Bush	10,3	7,9	9,5	6,1	10,9	16,3
Bush Administration	21,1	10,9	13,9	10,1	14,1	9,8
Bush's allies		1,0	1,0			0,9
TOTAL	34,6	25,7	31,3	19,2	29,7	33,0
The United States	12,9	3,0	12,9	10,1	6,3	11,2

The Iraqi President	3,1		0,7	3,7		0,7
Saddam Hussein	12,5	11,1	4,7	3,7	5,8	8,0
Saddam	29,7	35,6	38,0	19,6	37,7	49,6
Saddam's Government				2,8	1,4	0,7
Saddam's Nicknames		4,4	1,3	2,8	10,1	0,7
TOTAL	46,9	53,3	48,7	34,6	56,5	62,8
Iraq	32,8	28,9	33,3	36,4	18,8	28,5

Table 3. Personification in percentages (%), *Newsweek*, 5 November 1990-14 January 1991.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Date</u>									
	5.11.	12.11.	19.11.	26.11.	3.12.	10.12.	17.12.	24.12.	7.1.	14.1.
<b>President Bush</b>		6,0	9,1	4,6	6,7	4,2	4,8	4,9	4,0	5,0
<b>George Bush</b>		0,6		4,6	3,4	2,5	1,8	1,4	1,0	1,3
<b>Bush</b>	4,1	11,9	7,3	21,3	15,7	17,5	7,5	2,8	11,1	9,3
<b>Bush Administration</b>	4,1	1,2	27,3	1,9	2,2	6,3	13,2	7,7	8,1	7,0
<b>Bush's allies</b>					2,2	0,4				
<b>TOTAL</b>	8,2	19,6	43,6	32,4	30,3	30,8	27,2	16,8	24,2	22,7
<b>The United States</b>	7,1	3,0	9,1	17,6	2,2	11,3	9,6	12,6	4,0	6,0
<b>The Iraqi President</b>		3,2	3,4	2,4		1,5			4,3	1,1
<b>Saddam Hussein</b>	9,3	6,5	5,2	17,1	24,4	4,4	4,5	13,6	6,4	7,1
<b>Saddam</b>	24,1	22,6	58,6	26,8	13,3	53,3	42,4	36,4	53,2	45,7
<b>Saddam's Government</b>						0,7	0,8			
<b>Saddam's</b>	5,6		3,4	14,6	2,2	6,7	3,8	9,1		4,3
<b>Nicknames</b>	1,9	6,5	1,7	2,4	2,2	1,5	3,0	1,5	2,1	1,6
<b>TOTAL</b>	40,7	38,7	72,4	63,4	42,2	68,1	54,5	60,6	66,0	59,8
<b>Iraq</b>	22,2	22,6	10,3	29,3	42,2	11,1	29,5	25,8	17,0	15,2

As Tables 1-3 clearly show, the Iraqi side is almost totally represented by two units: the state and the leader. When counted up, the total percentage adds up to 70 or even more throughout the first part of analysis, whereas on the U.S. side, *the state* and *the person* together constitute only a fraction of all the referring expressions in the main category *the United States*, which vary from 15,3% (5 November) to 61,2% (26 November). Despite the variety in *Newsweek's* topics, this feature is still the most obvious one.

On both sides, the forms 'Bush' and 'Saddam' are, with few exceptions, the most frequently used referring expressions. There are several logical explanations for this. First, the language of the printed press favors short dynamic forms. Second, *Saddam* is the name by which Saddam Hussein is commonly known all over the world and it has a special meaning "One Who Confronts" (*Newsweek*, 13 August 1990, p.16). Third, the use of his last name Hussein might confuse him with the Jordanian head of state, King Hussein. The authoritative title 'the President' is used a little but continuously on the U.S. side, whereas 'the Iraqi President' is very

uncommon. A similar but somewhat less prestigious term for Saddam Hussein is 'the Iraqi leader'.

The concentration of responsibility and power on the leaders can easily be noticed when the reporters use the personified expressions instead of the names of the countries. Especially on the Iraqi side, almost all the different units are described as if they were just Saddam Hussein's marionettes. Expressions of the type 'Saddam's army' or 'Saddam's oil' rarely occur on the U.S. side. These metonymies have a referential function of making the readers hold Saddam Hussein responsible for the crisis. These are examples of the so called ""CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED"" metonymy, where responsibility is what is focused on" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980:39). Expressions of the type 'Bush's coalition against Iraq' do occur, but they are notably rare. Typical metonymies on the U.S. side reduce the responsibility of individuals. The name of an institution or place is used instead of the persons responsible. (Lakoff and Johnson 1982:38-39.) For example, 'the Pentagon has theoretically been preparing to defend the Persian Gulf' (*Newsweek*, 13 August 1990, p.19) or 'those countries...want to destroy Saddam, while Washington might settle for thwarting him' (*Newsweek*, 1 October 1990, p.9).

It is important to note that the two special cases *Saddam's* and *Nicknames* are also included in Tables 1-3 (p.45-46) because there were numerous referring items in them and because their function is similar to the other direct personal references to Saddam Hussein. However, we consider them to be more direct propaganda due to the stronger personifying effect since they are not the most neutral expressions used to refer to Saddam Hussein. Because of their possibly negative associations we kept them separate from the other groups in the subcategory of *reference to person*.

When following the situation from the outside, it seemed that the media focused most of their interest on presidents Bush and Hussein during the Persian Gulf crisis. The same seems to be true in *Newsweek* during the first five and half months of the crisis although towards January 1991 the reporting about the situation became less intense. In practice the Western attitude was very anti-Saddam Hussein from day one, which partly explains the somewhat negative style of writing about him. In addition, the fact that the magazine is American naturally caused some bias in the reporting.

## 9 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR IN *NEWSWEEK*

”With the failure of the Geneva talks between James Baker and Tariq Aziz, the room for diplomacy became painfully small. President Bush told Saddam Hussein he would pay ”a terrible price” for not leaving Kuwait, and asked Congress to support him. Both House and Senate authorized force without further congressional deliberation, and the administration seemed inclined to push for an attack soon after the Jan. 15 deadline.” (*Newsweek*, 21 January 1991, p.1.) Thus, on 16 January 1991 the first war actions for liberating Kuwait were taken. The allied coalition launched the massive war operation called Desert Storm, which lasted until the cease-fire on 28 February and the provisional truce became effective on 3 March. (Stanwood et al. 1991, Morse 1991:48, see also Braybrook 1991:50.)

The coverage of this second part of the conflict in *Newsweek*, 21 January - 11 March 1991, includes 80 articles and the total number of pages is 119. Although the number of the issues only eight, the reporting is so great that we divided the part into three periods according to the major military actions similarly to the previous part. The first period (21 January - 4 February) discusses the beginning of the air battle; the second (11-25 February) the

occasional ground confrontations; and the third (4-11 March) the actual ground war. In addition, we have used the 18 March issue of *Newsweek* as a source of background information because it contains a comprehensive article 'The Secret History of the War' (p.18-26) which covers the whole conflict.

## 9.1 *Newsweek* from 21 January to 4 February 1991

### 9.1.1 The events

On 16 January 1991 at 05.00 Greenwich time the United Nations time limit for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was reached. And since the Iraqi occupational forces were showing no signs of retreat, the coalition unanimously agreed on using military force. President Bush gave the order to the American troops to begin the attack against Iraq and on 17 January at 02.30 Iraqi time the first missiles were launched to Baghdad. (Braybrook 1991:50, Micheletti 1991:4.) At the same time the United Nations' Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar was still organizing some last-minute negotiations to prevent a full-scale war. One important and very difficult issue in these negotiations was the Palestinian question. (Stanwood et al. 1991.)

When the actual allied attack began, a large force of multinational troops were moving to battle stations in the Persian Gulf. In fact, never had "such force been assembled on so small a battlefield" (*Newsweek*, 21 January 1991, p.20). As can be seen in Appendix 4, there were more than one million soldiers and approximately 370,000 of them were American. In addition, there were military personnel and artillery from seventeen other countries. All in all, the coalition had 15,000 armored vehicles, 4,000 artillery pieces and 2,500 combat aircraft ready in the Gulf. In total as many

as 38 countries gave some kind of a contribution to the war effort. The help varied from soldiers and artillery to medical and financial aid. (*Newsweek*, 4 March 1991, p.25.)

Despite the fact that the artillery was stationed in the battlefield, the readiness of the ground forces was questionable because the preparations were still continuing. Then again, perfect readiness was impossible since the fighting skills among the forces from many different countries varied widely. Furthermore, the estimates of the duration of the war differed from several days to months. (*Newsweek*, 21 January 1991, p.20-21.) Although the ground forces were only at the preparatory stage, the air battle was already relatively hard. The allies claimed to be using 'smart bombs', which were pointed at strategically important targets: Iraqi command and control networks, airports, military bases, factories, laboratories and roads. In addition, the aim was to destroy the Republican Guard which was the most important part of the Iraqi Army and consisted of Saddam Hussein's closest men. The United States, especially, wanted to eliminate Saddam Hussein as well, since they regarded him personally responsible for the whole war. (*Newsweek*, 18 March 1991, p.19, Morse 1991:84, Micheletti 1991:5-6, Braybrook 1991:59.)

On the opposite side, the Iraqis bombed mainly Israel and Saudi Arabia in effort to get Israel involved in the war. This way Iraq wanted to break the Arab unity that had developed against it but at the same time it took a big risk of possibly having to fight on two fronts. Israel answered this provocation by declaring a state of war but it never took part in the actual fighting. Because the coalition air forces clearly outnumbered the Iraqis, Saddam Hussein employed extreme strategies such as ecoterrorism and the use of prisoners of war as human shields. These actions were immediately condemned by the world. (Stanwood et al. 1991.) As an example, Morse (1991:80) tells how on 22 January 1991, "five captured coalition airmen

were forced to appear on Iraqi television and made to denounce the war. This move raised an international outcry on the misuse of prisoners”.

During this period there were some small-scale ground war activities along the borders. In air battles and in these occasional confrontations both sides suffered some casualties but on the Iraqi side they were much heavier and included civilians as well. (Braybrook 1991:57.) Outside the Gulf, public opinion was slowly turning against the war. For example in Great Britain there were some anti-war demonstrations (Micheletti 1991:50.) Negotiations for a solution to end the hostilities continued. However, they were unsuccessful and on 31 January the Iraqi ground forces made a surprise attack on Saudi Arabia. Now the ”long-distance, high-tech war shifted to a new phase” (*Newsweek*, 11 February 1991, p.1) because Iraq began to employ its ground forces. This can be regarded as the beginning of the second period of the Desert Storm (Morse 1991:84).

#### 9.1.2 The coverage in *Newsweek*

During the period of 21 January-4 February the reporting consists of 27 articles which total up to 48 pages. The first issue (21 January 1991) does not yet cover the actual outbreak of war, which had taken place five days earlier. The articles only speculate about the possibility of going into war. The next two issues (28 January and 4 February 1991) include almost no other themes but the situation in the Persian Gulf. The crisis is discussed from many viewpoints but only twenty of the 27 articles are relevant to this study (see Appendix 3).

The coverage discusses such topics as diplomatic negotiations that were arranged in order to solve the crisis peacefully and the deployment of the allied troops. *Newsweek* also gives technical description of the artillery and



reports of the events in the air battle, the actual topics varying from tactics to prisoners of war. There is also one article 'The road to War' (*Newsweek*, 28 January 1991, p.34-45) which deals with these themes comprehensively. The important figures in the situation, for example General Norman Schwarzkopf, George Bush and Saddam Hussein are also discussed in some articles. The articles about General Schwarzkopf concentrate more on him as a person, whereas President Bush is discussed in relation to the domestic issues such as public opinion and the administrative branch. The articles concerning Saddam Hussein are written from several viewpoints, varying from ecoterrorism and propaganda to more personal issues.

Stylistically, one article stands out clearly because of its humorous tone. This article 'Saddam and Bush: The Words of War' (*Newsweek*, 21 January 1991, p.29) is about the rhetoric used by these two leaders. Special topics outside the battlefield are the power balance in the Gulf region and especially the Palestinian question. The possibility of terrorism around the world by Iraqi sympathizers is covered in 'Terror: Iraq's Second Front' (*Newsweek*, 28 January 1991, p.32-33).

### 9.1.3 The content analysis of data

During the first period there are a lot more referring expressions in the main category of *the United States* than in the main category of *Iraq*. In fact, the number is almost exactly twice as large in all three issues as can be seen in Table 4 (p.65). On the U.S. side the focus is clearly on the different groups within the subcategory of *reference to military: U.S. Army & Intelligence, U.S. troops, U.S. soldiers* and *Military officials*. The amount of items in all these groups added together varies between 27,2% and 36,0% (of all the referring items in the main category of *the United States*). The amount of these kinds of referring expressions on the Iraqi side also increases but not

quite as significantly. The percentages vary between 17,5% and 25,3% (of all the referring items in the main category of *Iraq*). *Iraqi Army & Intelligence* and especially *Iraqi troops* have most of the referring items in them, whereas Iraqi soldiers and military officials are rarely mentioned. The increasing role of the military in the reporting is naturally connected with the more intensified situation in the Persian Gulf (see chapter 9.1.1).

There is not any noticeable change in the relative amount of references to Saddam Hussein from the earlier parts (see Tables 1-4, pp.45-46, 65). During this period the total amount of referring items in the subcategory of *reference to person* is 574 in comparison to 1168 items in the main category of *Iraq*. When all five groups of referring items (*The Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, Saddam, Saddam's* and *Nicknames*) are added up, the referring expressions related to him vary from 45,1% to 51,2% (see Table 4, p.65). The form 'Saddam' is still the most common term used of him. The next commonest is the s-genitive form in constructions like 'Saddam's chief targets' and 'his enemies'. On the U.S. side the amount of references to George Bush personally (*President Bush, George Bush, Bush*) is getting smaller in relation to the other subcategories (7,7-14,9%). For example in the studied articles of 28 January *Newsweek* there are just as many referring items in the groups *President Bush* and *Bush*, but in the other two issues the form 'Bush' is the most common one. In addition, on both sides the relative amount of references to the states is remarkable which can be noticed in Table 4 (p.65).

Since the multinational coalition forces are at this point preparing themselves for the ground war more than ever, their role in the coverage becomes more important. The relative amount of referring items in the subcategory *United Nations' coalition* increases issue by issue (11,3%, 13,0%, 18,1%). The separate subcategory of *reference to others*, and within it the group *The World*, are also rather big. *The World* includes references to

countries from all around the world, but especially to the Arab countries. In the three issues from this period there are 780 items in this group, which is a fairly large number when compared either to the total amount of referring expressions on the U.S. side (2317) or those on the Iraqi side (1168). As was pointed out above (p.22), we have studied only such articles whose topics are directly connected with the United States and/or Iraq.

One group of referring expressions that is somewhat bigger than earlier is the *U.S. public*. This can be noticed especially in the 4 February issue where almost 18 per cent of the referring expressions are in this group. The reason for this can be the wide discussion in the home front about all the different aspects of the crisis and its impact on the domestic politics. This also shows in *Newsweek's* reporting, where the Bush administration and American politicians in general are mentioned frequently. When compared to the *U.S. public*, also the *Iraqi people* has some referring items but relatively not as many.

## 9.2 *Newsweek* from 11 to 25 February 1991

### 9.2.1 The events

On 31 January 1991 the "allies went eyeball to eyeball with the enemy...confronting the grinding realities of ground combat. U.S. Marines were bloodied when Iraqis swept across the Saudi border into the seaside town of Khafji" (*Newsweek*, 11 February 1991, p.8). However, this was merely a minor confrontation between the Arabs and the Iraqis that lasted only 36 hours and it did not start the actual ground war. The Iraqi attack was a total surprise and it was generally regarded as crazy by the western world. It still proved that the allies had not been mentally ready for Iraq's actions. (Stanwood et al. 1991, Morse 1991:106.) It also "served Saddam Hussein's

political purpose: to remind the world that the coming ground war would be costly and bloody” (*Newsweek*, 11 February 1991, p.1).

The main fighting, however, still took place in the air. Also Iraq continued its missile attacks, especially on Israel. Diplomatically, Iraq went as far as cutting off its relations with all the allied countries. Saddam Hussein suffered a clear setback on his home front when a considerable number of the Iraqi troops began to surrender without much resistance. By February, also the ordinary Iraqi people were becoming critical of the situation. Despite all this, on 10 February Saddam Hussein gave a public speech on the Iraqi television without a word of withdrawal or surrender. (Stanwood et al. 1991.)

On 4 February 1991 the foreign ministers of the European Community met for the first time since the Persian Gulf crisis began to discuss their policy on the matter (Stanwood et al. 1991). This shows rather clearly how the European countries considered the situation and its conciliation to be the responsibility of the United Nations and especially the United States. In fact, many European leaders thought that the European performance in the war had been too insignificant and therefore they supported the United States’ effort to resolve the crisis (*Newsweek*, 11 February 1991, p.26). This support was somewhat questioned, at least among the public, when failures in the allied so called ‘smart bombings’ were revealed. Some of the targets that were initially reported to be important military objects turned out to be civilian settlements. For example, on 14 February the world was shocked by the news that the U.S. bombers had hit a bomb shelter full of civilians. (Morse 1991:123.) This serious mistake by the American intelligence service, which caused approximately 400 Iraqi people to die, ended the allied air attacks on Baghdad for a few days (Stanwood et al. 1991).

During this period negotiations continued but so did the deployment of ground troops. On one hand, it seemed that Saddam Hussein was only 'playing for time' with his terms of peace, which the coalition found impossible to meet. On the other hand, the coalition was clearly trying to exhaust the Iraqi Army by prolonging the situation. On the surface, everything appeared to be quite stable but the tension in the Gulf area was gradually growing. (Stanwood et al. 1991.) Now the question was "[not] if, but when" (*Newsweek*, 18 February 1991, p.3).

Then, on 11 February 1991 the United States publicly admitted that the full-scale ground war would soon begin. Particularly the Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev, the world leader most obviously in favor of a diplomatic solution, arranged some last-minute peace negotiations. There was even an announcement on 15 February on Baghdad Radio saying that the Iraqis were prepared to withdraw from Kuwait. But when the details of this offer became known, the coalition governments judged that it did not form a basis for a settlement since it included so many conditions and did not fulfill the various United Nations' resolutions. (Morse 1991:148.) So, Gorbachev's and other efforts failed, and on 24 February the allied forces launched a massive ground attack against Iraq (Stanwood et al. 1991, Morse 1991:158). "While the action may have been all but inevitable, it represented a breakdown of diplomacy. The Soviet Union's attempts to broken an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait failed under the pressure of the allied deadline". (*Newsweek*, 4 March 1991, p.1.)

### 9.2.2 The coverage in *Newsweek*

During the second period the reporting was not so intense. This can be explained by the relatively stable phase in the warfare. Eventhough there are again 27 articles, there are only 33 pages which is 15 pages less than during

the first period (see Appendix 3). It must be noted that all the issues also include other articles connected with the crisis, but they concentrate on other countries than the most active participants, the United States and Iraq. For example, articles such as 'Will Israel Hit Back?' (*Newsweek*, 11 February 1991, p.23) and 'Iceland: A Case of War Fever' (*Newsweek*, 18 February 1991, p.35) expand the field of discussion further than is necessary for this study. Major topics during this period are Iraq's first small-scale ground attack on Saudi Arabia and, naturally, the warfare in general. There are many reports of the artillery and the role of specified troops in the area. Varying future scenarios are also common. In every issue the effects of the crisis on the neighboring countries are also covered. Now even the Iraqi civilians, their position in the situation and the casualties they have suffered are discussed. Again, Saddam Hussein's actions get more coverage than those of any other individual.

Some special themes appear in the reporting about the United States. In 'The President's 'Spin' Patrol' (11 February 1991, p.21), and 'What is There to Hide?' (25 February 1991, p.29), *Newsweek* shows healthy objectivity when it critically reports the government's press tactics and censorship in particular. There are also a few articles which compare the current situation to earlier wars and other military conflicts in which the United States has been involved. Similarly to the first period of the second part of analysis, now one article also stands out, namely that written by the former secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. The tone of 'A Scenario for the Endgame' (*Newsweek*, 25 February 1991, p.21) is extremely pro-American and pro-Bush, and it is very much like a speech intended to remind the readers of the mistakes made in the past and to justify the use of force in the Gulf.

### 9.2.3 The content analysis of data

Because the intensity of the reporting has decreased (see Appendix 3), the total amount of referring items relevant to our study is naturally also smaller. In addition, neither main category, *the United States* nor *Iraq* is now much bigger than the other. In the three issues, the total amount of referring expressions on the U.S. side is 960 and the corresponding number on the Iraqi side is 762. The state and its leader get almost the same amount of attention on the U.S. side whereas on the Iraqi side the different references to the leader are nearly twice, in one issue even four times, as frequent as those to the state. It is noteworthy that nine articles out of 27 have no references to George Bush at all. Expressions 'Bush' and 'Saddam' and its genitive form 'Saddam's' are the most frequently used. (see Table 4, p.65.)

All the groups of referring expressions on the U.S. side have a substantial amount of items with the exceptions of *Bush's allies* and *U.S. & allies*. The *United Nations' coalition* is one of the biggest individual groups, varying from 12,8 % to 23,2% of all the referring items in the main category of *the United States*. In the last two issues it is clearly the biggest group, which is understandable because of the accelerating deployment of the allied troops in the Gulf. As a part of the coalition, the U.S. troops are also often referred to (11,6% of all the referring expressions during this period) but the subcategory of *reference to military* on the U.S. side becomes even more significant when all the related groups are added together (22,7-53,1%). Of the remaining groups on the U.S. side, "We" is the biggest and surprisingly it even exceeds the groups *Experts & analysts*, *Official sources* and *Politicians*. Even the group *U.S. public* has more referring items in it than these last mentioned ones.

The expression 'Saddam' in itself is the most common of all the referring items on the Iraqi side but the personification also shows and intensifies in the many items in the special group *Saddam's*, the amount varying between 2,9% and 8,4% (see Table 4, p.65). Since the Iraqi military is now more active, it is natural that there are lots of references to the Iraqi army and intelligence and the Iraqi troops. Still, there are very few references to individual Iraqi soldiers or military officials. The articles studied in the last two issues show a new phenomenon in that there are relatively many referring items in the group *Iraqi people* (13,1% and 7,1% of all the referring items in the main category of *Iraq*). In the 18 February issue the "We"-group has some referring expressions in it, too.

Within the subcategory of *reference to others*, *The World* is again noticeably large. These types of referring items add up to 390 when the total amount on the U.S. side is 960 and 762 on the Iraqi side. Most of the references are at this point to the neighboring Arab countries (eg. Jordan and Iran), whereas earlier they were to various different countries from the Arab world and the West as well. Surprisingly, the Palestinian question and Israel get fairly little attention in the studied articles.

### 9.3 *Newsweek* from 4 to 11 March 1991

#### 9.3.1 The events

"High Noon came and went with no word from Baghdad. Eight hours later, the full fury of Operation Desert Storm broke over Kuwait, opening the long-awaited land phase of what Saddam Hussein called 'the mother of all battles'... Allied forces moved on several fronts to envelop Iraqi troops in hope of a speedy surrender". (*Newsweek*, 4 March 1991, p.1.) Frustrated by the unsuccessful negotiations with Iraq, the allied forces attacked on 24



February at 01.00 Greenwich time. There were several reasons for the severity of the attack. Firstly, the allies considered Saddam Hussein's contribution in the negotiations only as bullying and playing for time, and they wanted to end it. Secondly, they were very worried about the continuously accelerating destruction of Kuwait and its people by the Iraqi troops. (Stanwood et al. 1991, Morse 1991:158, Braybrook 1991:60.)

Probably nobody believed that the ground war could be so easy for the coalition. In fact, it lasted only 100 hours and there was hardly any resistance from the Iraqi troops, which caused few allied casualties. On the third day of the actual ground war, 26 February 1991, Baghdad radio announced that President Saddam Hussein had ordered the Iraqi troops to withdraw from Kuwait. By that same afternoon, Kuwait City was free. (Morse 1991:172.) The next day, in addition to a complete withdrawal, Iraq announced its willingness to accept the other United Nations' resolutions which it had rejected earlier (Stanwood et al. 1991, Morse 1991:182).

On 26-27 February the United Nations Security Council met at the Soviet Union's request. The purpose of the meeting was to clarify the UN and allied terms for peace. They settled that a complete withdrawal was inadequate. Instead, the allied forces were to destroy the Iraqi Army and especially the Republican Guard as completely as possible in the hope of provoking internal revolts in Iraq. By doing this, the coalition removed the responsibility of forcing Saddam Hussein out of power, from itself to the Iraqi people. The issue was no longer how to destroy Saddam Hussein personally but how to diminish his political power in Iraq in the future. The Security Council was also uncompromising in its demand that Iraq had to be totally committed to all UN resolutions in order to achieve a cease-fire. (Stanwood et al. 1991.)

On 28 February 1991, when President Bush announced the temporary cease-fire based on Iraq's acceptance of all the UN resolutions and the coalition's conditions, the warfare in the Persian Gulf was officially over. The allied forces were still in position and President Bush declared that Kuwait was now freed. In other words, the coalition had reached its primary goal. But to many participants' disappointment Saddam remained the president of Iraq. However, Iraq had lost the war and the country was in ruins both financially and mentally. The cease-fire lasted and, after negotiations, on 3 March 1991 the Iraqi representatives accepted the terms for a provisional truce. On 6 April final peace was declared. Among other things, Iraq agreed to pay reparations to Kuwait which had been severely damaged by the crisis. Iraq's ecoterroristic acts during the war had caused a lot of destruction in the whole Persian Gulf area, too. (Stanwood et al. 1991, Morse 1991:182, Braybrook 1991:60-61.)

### 9.3.2 The coverage in *Newsweek*

The third period consists of only two issues (4 and 11 March 1991). However, there are as many as 27 articles which total up to 38 pages (see Appendix 3). This can be explained by the new phase in the crisis, the long-awaited ground war. The issues contain few but war-related articles. The first issue (4 March) is mostly about the reasons for starting the ground attack and about the actual events that took place. The second issue (11 March) deals with the allied victory and the significance of this conflict globally.

At this point, it is natural that there are many reports in *Newsweek* of the war tactics and actions of both the coalition and Iraq. Some texts give detailed information on the course of the war but some texts clearly try to glorify all the allied and especially American actions which led to 'A Textbook

Victory' (*Newsweek*, 11 March 1991, p. 22-24). This glorification is somewhat understandable because many Americans felt that the victory finally erased the bitter memories of the military failure in Vietnam in the 1960's. However, some articles take a more realistic and critical approach to the allied tactics in the war and discuss what can be learned from them. Furthermore, the issues include articles about the contributions of each allied country in the war, for example 'One Army, 38 Flags' (*Newsweek*, 4 March 1991, p. 22-26). The future of the allied countries and the whole world order is the topic in some articles. The role of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in trying to solve the crisis peacefully is widely discussed, because this was the first time since the end of the cold war that the United States and the Soviet Union worked side by side.

Topics after the victory also cover the 'war heroes', especially General Norman Schwarzkopf and President George Bush. Articles such as 'A Soldier of Conscience' (*Newsweek*, 11 March 1991, p.18-20), and 'The Rewards of Leadership' (*Newsweek*, 11 March 1991, p.21) are almost of a biographical nature. The overall tone in such articles is sometimes very patriotic and *Newsweek's* reporting seems to go along with the government's efforts to gain domestically as much as possible from the victory. In fact, opinion polls published in *Newsweek* also show that President Bush's public support rose remarkably, due to the military success. *Newsweek* deals with Iraq's future from various viewpoints. The economic sanctions and other costs of war are discussed, especially in connection with Saddam Hussein's role in Iraq. The articles reflect the international opinion that Saddam Hussein was personally responsible for the whole crisis. The fact that the United Nations connected the economic sanctions directly to his staying in power, was the most concrete outcome of this opinion. Associated with this, there are articles such as 'Kuwait: Rape of a Nation' (*Newsweek*, 11 March, 1991, p.32-33) that describe how the

Iraqi troops destroyed and terrorized the country during the occupation and withdrawal.

### 9.3.3 The content analysis of data

Considering that there are only two issues in this period, the total amount of referring items is very high. Then again, the two issues have so many articles and pages about the war (see Appendix 3) that the total amount of 2832 items is understandable. Of these, 1628 are on the U.S. side, 727 on the Iraqi side and 477 in the subcategory *reference to others*, mainly under the heading *The World*. This shows an emphasis in *Newsweek's* reporting on the United States and the coalition. An interesting point is that eventhough the coverage is almost as big in both issues, the amount of references to each side is two times bigger in the 11 March issue than in the 4 March issue (see Table 4, p.65).

There are references to George Bush in all five groups connected with him. The form 'Bush' is clearly the most common one (10,0% and 5,8%) and the expression 'Bush's allies' the least common (0,2% in both issues). In addition, the Bush administration has unusually many references to it. If all the groups of referring items related to George Bush personally are counted together per issue, references to him count for 20,2% and 13,1% of all the references to the U.S. side. This is clearly more than the portion of the state, *The United States*, which is the third biggest individual group in the latter issue. (see Table 4, p.65.) On the Iraqi side there are references to Saddam Hussein in all the six categories related to him. The biggest group is *Saddam* (31,7% and 27,1% of all the referring items in the main category of *Iraq*), the second biggest *Saddam's* (7,1% and 10,1%) and the third biggest *Saddam Hussein* (5,3% and 2,9%). There are exceptionally many referring items in the group *Nicknames* as well. When compared to the U.S. side, the

difference between the state and its leader on the Iraqi side is even greater in percentages. The leader is referred to approximately three times more often than the state. (see Table 4, p.65.)

On both sides, the important role of the military shows in the many referring expressions under the subcategory *reference to military*. On the Iraqi side, the emphasis is on the *Iraqi troops* (19,6% and 16,6%) but all the other groups are covered as well. The Iraqi soldiers, in particular, are referred to more than previously. On the U.S. side, however, the emphasis is shifting from the *U.S. Army & Intelligence* and *U.S. troops* towards *U.S. soldiers* and *Military officials*. In fact, in the 11 March issue *Military officials* is obviously the biggest individual group of referring expressions (17,9%). The allied victory shows in *Newsweek's* reporting through the increasing amount of references to the U.S. military. Surprisingly, at the same time the amount of references to the United Nations' coalition decreases drastically from 28,6% to 10,3% of all the references to the U.S. side. Simultaneously, for example, the group "*We*" gets bigger than earlier. At least quantitatively it appears that the reporting is giving the most credit of the victory to the United States instead of the whole coalition.

#### 9.4 Discussion

During operation Desert Storm, the whole number of items referring to the U.S. side (4905) is noticeably bigger than to the Iraqi side (2657). In fact, at the beginning of the war (*Newsweek* 21 January-4 February 1991) as well as in the last two studied issues (*Newsweek* 4 March-11 March 1991), the number on the U.S. side is approximately twice as large as on the Iraqi side (see Table 4, p.65). This is partly explained by the reality that *Newsweek* naturally received plenty of information about the U.S. and UN operations. As Morse (1991:7) points out, surprisingly little information was available

on, for example, the Iraqi air force and its military competence in general. Another reason for the above-mentioned phenomenon is undoubtedly the victorious warfare of the coalition and especially the American forces within it. The final outcome, a 'Total Victory' (*Newsweek's* cover 11 March 1991) naturally also caused the difference in the total amount of the categorized expressions on each side, Iraq and the United States (see Table 4, p.65). Table 4 below has been constructed according to the same method as Tables 1-3 above (see p.44-45).

Table 4. Personification in percentages (%), *Newsweek*, 21 January-11 March 1991.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Date</u>								
	21.1.	28.1.	4.2.	11.2.	18.2.	25.2.	4.3.	11.3.	
<b>President Bush</b>	2,1	7,4	2,1	1,4	1,9	1,0	3,8	1,7	
<b>George Bush</b>	0,7	0,4	1,3		2,4	1,3	1,1	1,2	
<b>Bush</b>	9,4	7,2	4,3	2,8	5,7	2,3	10,0	5,8	
<b>Bush Administration</b>	2,8	4,6	5,3	4,7	5,2	9,0	5,2	4,2	
<b>Bush's allies</b>	0,5				0,9		0,2	0,2	
<b>TOTAL</b>	15,6	19,5	13,0	8,9	16,1	13,6	20,2	13,1	
<b>The United States</b>	6,6	8,0	5,6	2,8	5,7	5,9	6,4	9,8	
<b>The Iraqi President</b>	0,7	0,2	0,9		0,6	1,2	0,7	0,4	
<b>Saddam Hussein</b>	7,4	3,0	6,3	3,6	4,0	0,9	5,3	2,9	
<b>Saddam</b>	29,3	37,1	33,5	26,4	34,9	37,7	31,7	27,1	
<b>Saddam's Government</b>	1,3	0,7	0,3		1,1	2,7	0,4	0,4	
<b>Saddam's</b>	6,1	6,0	8,4	8,4	6,3	8,0	7,1	10,1	
<b>Nicknames</b>	1,7	2,2	2,1	0,8	1,7	0,9	2,8	2,7	
<b>TOTAL</b>	46,5	49,2	51,5	39,2	48,6	51,3	48,0	43,7	
<b>Iraq</b>	18,9	18,8	19,5	22,8	13,1	17,2	13,5	18,4	

As Table 4 above shows, the same tendency of personifying the Iraqi side into Saddam Hussein continues (see Chapter 8.4). Other studies, for example Luisa Martín Rojo's (1995:52), have come to the same conclusion that "the conflict was embodied in Saddam Hussein". She explains that this phenomenon justified the war by simplifying it and by creating an easily identifiable common enemy, "the personification of evil" (Martín Rojo 1995:49-52). Eventhough the U.S. side as a whole is discussed more in *Newsweek* than the Iraqi side, the relative amount of the references to the

two leaders, George Bush and Saddam Hussein, shows the exact opposite. Throughout the entire Desert Storm coverage, personal references to Saddam Hussein comprise almost or over a half (39,2-51,5%) of all the references to the elements on the Iraqi side. On the U.S. side, however, personal references to George Bush remain remarkably low, varying from 8,9 to 20,2 percent. (see Table 4, p.65.)

In the case of personal references to George Bush, the referring expression 'Bush' is used a lot but 'the Bush administration' is also quite frequent. With the exception of *Newsweek* of 28 January 1991, the form 'President Bush' is rarely used. Another exception is the issue of 11 March where most references are to the state, the United States. This subcategory of *reference to state* is almost as big as all the groups of the subcategory of *reference to person* added together. (see Table 4, p.65.) In general, during this period there is again more variation between all the different groups in the main category of *the United States* than between those in the main category of *Iraq*.

When referring to Saddam Hussein, the referring expressions 'Saddam' and 'Saddam's' are clearly the most common. Occasionally there are also relatively many references to Iraq as a state. For example, in the issue of 11 February the amount of references to the state is 22,8% compared with the expressions referring to Saddam Hussein, which is 39,2% in total. (see Table 4, p.65.) A significant difference to the previous part, the development towards the war (*Newsweek* 6 August 1990-14 January 1991), is that also all the other expressions referring to the person of Saddam Hussein have been used in the articles fairly often (see Tables 1-4, pp.45-46, 65). Somewhat surprisingly, Iraq as a state has been referred to more (13,1-22,8% of all the referring items in the main category) than the United States (2,8-9,8% of all the referring items in the main category). This can be interpreted by the fact that on the U.S. side there are more different referents. On the Iraqi side,

however, almost all the referring expressions used in *Newsweek* refer to either Saddam Hussein or the state of Iraq instead of other persons or other administrative bodies of the Iraqi government.

Outside the groups and figures shown in Table 4 (p.65), it is surprising that the role of the Iraqi army is so insignificant in *Newsweek*'s coverage. It could have been expected that during the actual warfare the Iraqi soldiers and armed forces would have received more attention. The subcategory of *reference to military* actually gets bigger but not considerably, and Saddam Hussein is undoubtedly still the main actor on the Iraqi side in the articles. In comparison with the U.S. side, for example the role of the United Nations' coalition grows as the war operations are in progress. However, in the last analyzed issue (*Newsweek* 11 March 1991) the number of references to the coalition drops fairly low. It appears that *Newsweek*'s coverage gives most of the credit for the victory to the American military officials (17,9%), to the individual soldiers (10,8%) and to the rest of the military.

As mentioned above (p.22), we have not analyzed articles that are not directly connected with the United States or Iraq. Yet, there are many references to events and participants outside the actual conflict in the coverage we studied. For example, diplomatic negotiations and neighboring countries are referred to so often that they increase the amount of referring expressions in the subcategory of *reference to others* remarkably. The group *the World* in itself has 17,9% of all the referring items when the main category of *the United States* has 53,3% and the main category of *Iraq* has 28,9% of the items during the last period of analysis.



## 10 PROPAGANDIST FEATURES IN THE DATA

In addition to the general quantitative and qualitative content analysis discussed above, we wanted to find out whether these studied articles show any propagandist features. Lee and Lee (1979:22-25) point out that propaganda is present in many aspects of our everyday lives and it is not necessarily bad. The important thing is to recognize it and to find the underlying message and intentions behind it. *Newsweek* (25 February 1991, p.30) itself realizes the existence of propaganda in wartime reporting in stating that "In theory, reporters in democratic societies work independent of propaganda. In practice they are treated during war as simply more pieces of military hardware to be deployed".

Eventhough the term *propaganda* is not used here in its traditional meaning (see p.12), we were interested to know if any traditional type of propaganda was used in the coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis in *Newsweek*. As mentioned earlier, the nature of political propaganda and its means have become more diverse and less obvious during the last few decades. On examining the data, however, even the most traditional devices of propaganda defined by Lee and Lee as early as in 1939 can be recognized in the style of the reporting. Although their method, "the ABCs of Propaganda Analysis", has been criticized for being oversimplifying by eg. Combs and Nimmo (1993:193-194), it still applies to this type of wartime reporting amazingly well.

There are many examples of Lee and Lee's propaganda features in the analyzed texts. When talking about Saddam Hussein, *name calling*, *card stacking* and *testimonial* are the most common ones. The clearest cases of *name calling* are naturally expressions like 'the enemy', 'the dictator' or even 'Hitler', which are used throughout the whole coverage, but this feature is also apparent when Saddam Hussein's actions are reported in

*Newsweek*. These actions are given a bad label, which makes the reader condemn them without examining the evidence (Lee and Lee 1979:26-27). For example, Saddam Hussein's actions are referred to as being 'brutality' or 'barbarism' (*Newsweek*, 12 November 1990, p.10) and very often as different types of 'terrorism' (eg. *Newsweek*, 4 February 1991, p.10-12). Another quite similar feature is *card stacking*, which means using facts or falsehoods and logical or illogical statements to give the best or the worst possible scenario for an idea (Lee and Lee 1979:95-97). An example of giving such a one-sided picture of the events was published in *Newsweek* on 15 October 1990: "Saddam's Mukhabarat [holy war] has transformed Kuwait into a chilling horror story of beatings, torture and killings" (p.20).

One feature that applies to the reporting of both leaders, George Bush and Saddam Hussein, is the case of *testimonial*. It means having some respected or hated person say that a given idea is good or bad and convincing the reader before he/she becomes critical and examines the evidence in the case (Lee and Lee 1979:74-75). During the Persian Gulf crisis, *Newsweek* naturally takes the western perspective by, for example, quoting George Bush and other respected figures in the American political life to report the events. These quotations and the magazine's comments on them are positive and pro-coalition. An extreme example is in an article written by Henry A. Kissinger where it is said that "President Bush has earned the nation's gratitude for his fortitude in holding the coalition together during the months of buildup, gaining Congressional backing and steering the country to the point where allied and domestic support coincided" (*Newsweek*, 28 January 1991, p.26). The opposite phenomenon shows when *Newsweek* reports Saddam Hussein's sayings and doings. His comments in the negotiations are described with expressions like 'boasting' and 'threatening' and nearly all his actions are belittled or judged. Even the release of hostages is described as "a stunning ploy" (*Newsweek*, 17 December 1990, p.20). It is, however,

remarkable that the reporting of the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz is noticeably more matter-of-fact and neutral.

Lee and Lee's (1979:92-94, 105-106) two features, *plain folks* and *band wagon*, are used when 'we', in this case the American people, is considered the opposite to 'they', in this case the Iraqi people. By using 'we' *Newsweek* attempts to convince the reader that the presented ideas are good because they are of the people or that all members of his/her group accept them. An obvious case of *plain folks* is the publishing of opinion polls which show support for the American government and George Bush, for example "Americans are ready for war if diplomacy fails" (*Newsweek*, 17 December 1990, p.22). In the texts there are many incidents where the whole American nation appears to be involved in the crisis. The American people are "deeply worried about Saddam's efforts" (*Newsweek*, 28 January 1991, p.44) or they "stand shoulder to shoulder with [their] president" (*Newsweek*, 21 January 1991, p.15). *Band wagon* connects the reader with groups held together by common ties. During this crisis such groups for the *Newsweek's* reader were the American nation and the UN coalition. In addition to the above-mentioned 'we', expressions like 'American policy' are common. One special case of this feature is seeing the crisis as a "chance to exorcise the ghosts of defeat in Vietnam" (*Newsweek*, 28 January 1991, p.25), which is commonly known to be a touchy subject for the American nation. Sometimes the reference group is extended to include the whole world: "If the world shows enough backbone, the crusade against Saddam won't take long" (*Newsweek*, 13 August 1990, p.15).

An opposite phenomenon to the above mentioned *card stacking* (p.69-70) is *glittering generality*, which means associating something with a virtue word to make the reader approve of the idea without examining the evidence (Lee and Lee 1979:47-49). The warfare against Iraq is described as a 'crusade' where "American warriors [are] in a higher state of readiness [than ever]"

(*Newsweek*, 21 January 1991, p.21). However, this feature was not as frequent as the others discussed above.

Part of the propagandist features in the studied material naturally reflect the general disapproval of the Iraqi actions by the western world. It is difficult to know if this image of Saddam Hussein as a 'ruthless dictator' is originally created by the media or whether the media, in this case *Newsweek*, reflect the public opinion based on the western values. Then again, it may not even be necessary to answer this question. As pointed out in Chapter 4, all reporting and every individual reporter is a part of the surrounding culture. A certain amount of subjectivity in the reporting is a natural result of the social context in question (see eg. van Dijk 1988:1-30). The same connection between the media and prevailing culture is supported by Entman's (1989:42-43) four typical features and devices to be considered in analyzing media content. These are easier to notice than the actual propagandist features because they can be recognized in the surface structure of the text. The fact that this conflict was significant for the United States is clear, based on the vast amount of reporting alone (see p.22), which falls into Entman's (1989:42) category of *importance*. The categories of *criticism* and *linkage* direct the public opinion in a more propagandist way. The critical style of writing about Iraq and especially Saddam Hussein is based on the general beliefs of the western cultures. *Newsweek*, however, clearly emphasizes the negative evaluation of the topic. The creation of such a negative image of Iraq is even strengthened by what Entman (1989:43) refers to as *linkage*, making one person responsible for the whole group. The personification of Iraq to Saddam Hussein makes the criticism towards the topic simpler and more intensified.

## 11 CONCLUSIONS

The Persian Gulf crisis in August 1990 - April 1991 was a serious international conflict including many complicated issues. On the one hand, it disrupted the old balance of power in the Middle East, and, on the other hand, it tested the new world order by being the first major confrontation where the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not merely a territorial dispute, but also involved were matters connected with religion and the world economy. Due to its diversity the topic also received a lot of coverage in the world media. We, the researchers, followed the events during the conflict through various means of media and wanted to examine it more closely in our thesis. In the information age even the political reporting in the media is considered a source of information and its correctness and objectivity are rarely questioned. That is why we wanted to examine if the reporting of the events and parties involved in the Persian Gulf crisis really was so accurate and unbiased as it seemed to be.

We chose *Newsweek*, an American weekly magazine, as our primary source for research material because it represents the so-called prestigious press that also covers foreign affairs more thoroughly and perhaps more objectively than the rest of the media in the United States. In addition, we had very easy access to the magazines needed for the research. To avoid considering the American perspective too much, we selected for example Finnish, Swedish and British material as our secondary sources. Although this only brings the western viewpoints under discussion, this was the only possible approach since the material from, for example, Iraq was not available.

As a research method, content analysis was laborious but still it proved to be appropriate since our primary goal was to find out how much the reporting

concentrated on George Bush and Saddam Hussein, ie. how much the Persian Gulf crisis personified to those presidents in *Newsweek's* coverage. We could have studied the data more qualitatively but because of the vastness of the material, we thought it more sensible to use the more traditional content analysis in which the qualitative method is used to give textual examples. Therefore, in our study, the qualitative analysis worked basically just as a helpful tool to gain more insight into *Newsweek's* style of reporting. We found that the combination of the two methods, the quantitative and the qualitative, was very useful because that way we got both the valid numerical information on the personification, and the more descriptive information on how these two persons were referred to in practice. The proportion of the qualitative analysis was remarkably smaller but still it gave us interesting information in addition to the quantitative results.

The quantitative study of the material clearly showed that George Bush and Saddam Hussein were the two main actors who the reporters of *Newsweek* concentrated on. Especially on the Iraqi side it seemed almost as if there was only one man fighting the whole United Nations' coalition and the multinational armed forces in the Persian Gulf crisis. Throughout the coverage, the United States' side is mentioned more often than the Iraqi side, which is to be expected in an American magazine. The reporters referred to the many different elements that were active on the U.S. side but on the Iraqi side 'Saddam' was always one of the most frequently used separate referring expressions.

On the basis of the quantitative results alone, it can be said that the more critical and difficult the situation got in the Persian Gulf, the more the Iraqi side was personified to Saddam Hussein and the less the U.S. side to George Bush. On the basis of the qualitative interpretation of the quantitative results the reporting preferred using the short and dynamic forms 'Bush' and

'Saddam' when referring to the presidents. However, references to George Bush were far more diverse, varying stylistically from 'President Bush' to 'Bush'. The frequency of the form 'Saddam' was overwhelming and it was even used to refer to institutions and groups. The extensive use of the two referring expressions, 'Saddam' and 'Saddam's' showed how *Newsweek* made the Iraqi president responsible for all the actions on the Iraqi side. This kind of reporting strongly simplified the image of the enemy because it focused on one person and his actions, his purposes and his personal qualities.

When examining the material by using the quantitative method it became obvious that there also were some propagandist devices used in *Newsweek's* reports. Even the personification in itself seemed to be somewhat propagandist by nature. The Iraqi side and the actions of its leader were strongly and unquestionably labeled as bad and offensive. Such labeling of Iraq turned a complex situation into hatred towards a person whose actions did not seem rational or acceptable. The United States' side was automatically represented in better light by combining all the elements on that side with positive vocabulary. Because of the special relationship which the American president has with the national media, and the enormous role he has in the international politics, it is understandable that George Bush was given a lot of attention in the reporting of such crisis. It has to be kept in mind that the media are a channel for the president and the government to express their views on a specific topic and quite often the public considers their statements as the truth. This kind of simplification and over-generalization are somewhat dangerous because, when repeated over and over again, the reader accepts them as the truth without even examining the evidence.

Today's press and media in general are considered to be politically rather independent, they naturally cannot be totally objective because the

surrounding social context always affects the choice of topics, the representation, and even the style. The prevailing political atmosphere causes some subjectivity, which again allows some propagandist features to get into the text. It is true, however, that in *Newsweek's* coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis the propaganda is not so self-evident. As a member of western culture, one might easily approve of the reporting as strictly objective and truthful because it reflects one's own worldview. Yet, *Newsweek* fails in its attempt to be the reliable and unbiased source of information that it is expected to be as a member of the so-called prestigious press. It does not only give information but also represents the participants in a certain way, giving them different characteristics. This is rather natural since it reflects the ideology and values of the surrounding culture, in this case the United States. However, in the case of reporting about Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein, *Newsweek's* approach is very strongly colored by negative images and attitudes. In this way the magazine shapes the reader's opinions or at least strengthens his/her attitudes towards the topic. For the reader, the most important thing is to recognize the propagandist features and accept their existence. By recognizing this, the reader can understand the underlying message, whether it is intentional or not. In this way the reader is more capable of forming his/her own opinions and is not necessarily so influenced by the values that the reporting represents.

All in all, *Newsweek* offered a lot of coverage on the Persian Gulf crisis, but it happened only from the American viewpoint. The variety showed more in the choice of topics than in the way the magazine handled them. The topics varied from the general description of the events in the Gulf to more detailed technical information and discussion about the matters on the background of the crisis. Therefore, in addition to the strong personification of the crisis to Saddam Hussein, the magazine gave the reader the opportunity to familiarize him/herself with the subject in more detail only from the American perspective. A more critical reader would have wished for less



one-sided reporting to be able to form his/her own opinion. Here again it can be noticed how even the more respected media reflect the prominent culture and its values. In other words, the media tell the reader what they think he/she wants to read and believe in. In our opinion, *Newsweek* fails to show objectivity in its reporting since it leaves the Iraqi perspective almost without notice. It should be reminded that we excluded such articles that were not directly connected with the United States and/or Iraq, which ruled out a lot of such articles that concentrated on the events in the background.

Eventhough the Persian Gulf crisis officially ended on 6 April 1991, which is more than seven years ago, the topic still comes up from time to time. For example, Iraq's possible nuclear program and Saddam Hussein's actions almost started a new conflict in the summer of 1998. In November 1998 a major international conflict was close when Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate with the United Nations. Also this time, the United States was ready to get involved. Some of the political decisions made in 1990-1991 are still effective, and Iraq's relations to the United States and the United Nations are far from normal. The United Nations continues to have political control over Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein by maintaining the economical sanctions, in particular the embargo on oil trade, firm. Another interesting point is that Saddam Hussein is still the Iraqi president whereas George Bush has left the presidential office in the United States, and at the same time he stepped down from the international scene of politics.

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## APPENDIX 1. Referring expressions: the original form for categorization

President Bush: _____	The Iraqi President: _____
George Bush: _____	Saddam Hussein: _____
Bush: _____	Saddam: _____
The United States: _____	Iraq: _____
The Bush administration: _____	Saddam's government: _____
Senate & Congress: _____	The Iraqi government: _____
U.S. Army & Intelligence: _____	Iraqi Army & Intelligence: _____
U.S. troops: _____	Iraqi troops: _____
U.S. soldiers: _____	Iraqi soldiers: _____
Military officials: _____	Military officials: _____
Experts & analysts: _____	Experts & analysts: _____
Official sources: _____	Official sources: _____
Politicians: _____	Politicians: _____
U.S. public: _____	Iraqi people: _____
"We": _____	"We": _____
Bush's allies: _____	Saddam's: _____
U.S. & allies: _____	Nicknames: _____
United Nations' coalition: _____	
The World: _____	

## APPENDIX 2. Examples of referring expressions included in the categories

- The United States/ Iraq: the country as a functional unit
- The Bush administration: White House, Washington, Bush's men, Bush's political aides and advisors, unidentified sources within the government
- Senate & Congress: the legislative branch, executives, both parties (Democrats and Republicans)
- U.S. Army & Intelligence: Pentagon, CIA, State Department, Army as the institution and the information on the artillery in general
- U.S. troops: military units as masses on the spot, not individuals
- U.S. soldiers: individual soldiers, hostages and civilians in Kuwait and Iraq, affectionate expressions
- Military officials: army staff, active officers
- Experts & analysts: mostly unnamed military, political and diplomatic persons
- Official sources: unidentified or unclassified persons outside the government
- Politicians: identified political persons
- U.S. public: American people, voters, taxpayers, public opinion, soldiers' families
- "We": used in direct quotations, emotional pep-speeches and –articles
- United Nations' coalition: UN, UN Security Council, coalition, allied forces
- The World: non-active countries (eg. Israel, Egypt, Russia)
- The Iraqi President: the Iraqi leader
- The Iraqi government: Baghdad
- Saddam's: expressions which emphasize Saddam Hussein's autocracy (eg. Saddam's oil, Saddam's army)
- Nicknames: descriptive expressions of the type Hitler revisited, the Iraqi dictator etc.

APPENDIX 3. Amount of articles and pages in *Newsweek* period by period**PART 1: Development towards war** (6 August 1990 - 14 January 1991)

DATE		ARTICLES	PAGE(S)
<b>Period 1:</b>			
August	6, 1990	1	1,0
	13	5	10,0
	20	6	14,0
	27	6	10,0
September	3, 1990	8	13,5
	10	8	9,5
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>34</b>	<b>58,0</b>
<b>Period 2:</b>			
September	17, 1990	4	5,5
	24	2	4,5
October	1, 1990	4	6,0
	8	2	4,0
	15	2	3,5
	22	0	0
	29	3	8,5
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>17</b>	<b>32,0</b>
<b>Period 3:</b>			
November	5, 1990	2	3,0
	12	2	3,0
	19	2	3,5
	26	2	2,5
December	3, 1990	2	3,0
	10	4	5,5
	17	4	6,0
January	24	3	3,0
	7, 1991	2	2,0
	14	3	7,0
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>26</b>	<b>38,5</b>

**PART 2: The Persian Gulf War** (21 January - 11 March 1991)

DATE		ARTICLES	PAGE(S)
<b>Period 1:</b>			
January	21, 1991	7	10,0
	28	7	23,0
February	4	13	15,0
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>Period 2:</b>			
February	11, 1991	10	11,5
	18	6	6,5
	25	11	15,0
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>27</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>Period 3:</b>			
March	4, 1991	13	17
	11	13	21
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>26</b>	<b>38</b>

APPENDIX 4. The structure of the allied coalition  
(*Newsweek*, 4 March 1991, p.25)

## Helping the War Effort

**W**ith more than half a million troops in the gulf, the United States is easily the biggest force battling Iraq. But it's by no means alone: 37 other countries plus one multinational group (the Gulf Cooperation Council) have sent everything from soldiers to socks in support of the gargantuan war effort. Here's a broad look at what the coalition has contributed.

### Major Military Force

**Egypt:** Roughly 30,000 ground troops, including 2 armored divisions and more than 400 tanks.

**France:** 16,000 military personnel, including artillery, cavalry and helicopter regiments; 40 combat aircraft; 9-10 warships.

**Saudi Arabia:** 45,000 troops, 500 tanks and 300 combat aircraft. Pledged

**Italy:** 10 Tornado combat jets; 3 frigates, 4 minesweepers and a supply ship.

**Kuwait:** 11,500 military personnel, including 30-40 tanks; 15 Mirage fighters, 34 helicopters. Pledged \$16 billion.

**Pakistan:** 11,000-strong infantry force under Saudi command.

**Spain:** Use of 2 air bases by U.S. aircraft; logistical support for U.S. F-16 squadrons in Turkey; 3 frigates.

**Syria:** 20,000 troops and some 300 tanks.

**Turkey:** Allowing some 100 U.S. combat aircraft to base at Incirlik; 3 destroyers, 2 subs and a minesweeper.

### Token Military Force

**Afghanistan:** 2,000 mujahedin.

**Argentina:** 100-man ground force; 2 warships, 2 planes.

**Australia:** 1 destroyer, 1 frigate, 1 supply ship.

**Bangladesh:** 2,230 troops for defensive purposes.

**Belgium:** 6 C-130 aircraft; 1 minesweeper, landing and supply ships.

**Bulgaria:** A unit of Army engineers.

**Denmark:** 1 corvette warship and transport ships.

**Greece:** 2 frigates.

**Honduras:** 150 troops.

**Morocco:** 1,300 troops.

**Netherlands:** A few frigates, a supply ship and a 40-member medical unit.


**New Zealand:** 3 transport planes; 100-man support team and a medical unit.

**Niger:** 500-man detachment.

**Norway:** 1 navy cutter and some troop ships.

**Senegal:** 500 troops.

**Sierra Leone:** Pledged 200 troops.



MARCEL MOCHET—AFP

### A French soldier aims a Milan missile

\$16.8 billion to the U.S. plus \$1.7 billion for fuel costs.

**United Kingdom:** More than 40,000 military personnel, including 25,000 ground troops and hundreds of tanks; more than 80 combat aircraft; 26 ships.

### Significant Military Aid

**Canada:** 2,200 military personnel; 2 destroyers; 24 CF-18 combat jets, a CC-137 tanker and 12 C-130 transport planes.

**Germany:** 71 chemical-biological scout vehicles for U.S. and U.K. forces and 200 men to operate them; 5 minesweepers; 18 military jets in Turkey. Pledged \$6.6 billion to the U.S.

**Gulf Cooperation Council:**\* Some 10,000 military personnel in northern Saudi Arabia under joint U.S.-Saudi command. Squadron of Mirage F-1E fighters from Qatar.



PASCAL GUYOT—AFP

### Members of a Swedish medical unit

### Nonmilitary Aid

**Czechoslovakia:** A chemical-decontamination unit.

**Japan:** Hundreds of off-road vehicles; generators, medical supplies, computers and other equipment. Pledged \$13 billion to multinational forces.

**Hungary:** Pledged a medical unit.

**Poland:** 17-person medical team and a hospital ship.


**Portugal:** A logistical ship.

**Singapore:** A 35-person medical unit has been assigned to a British Army hospital.

**South Korea:** 154-person medical team. Pledged \$400 million to allies.

**Sri Lanka:** Use of airports and territorial waters for refueling ships and planes carrying nonlethal material.

**Sweden:** An army field hospital with 525 personnel and 350 beds.



The Italian frigate Libeccio

\*GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL INCLUDES KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, BAHRAIN, QATAR, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND OMAN. JAPAN'S \$13 BILLION PLEDGE IS FOR NONCOMBAT PURPOSES OF THAT AMOUNT, \$2 BILLION IS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO FRONTLINE ARAB COUNTRIES.