This is a self-archived version of an original article. This version may differ from the original in pagination and typographic details.

**Author(s):** Jardine, James

**Title:** Edmund Husserl

**Year:** 2020

**Version:** Accepted version (Final draft)

**Copyright:** © 2020 Taylor & Francis

**Rights:** In Copyright

**Rights url:** http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=en

**Please cite the original version:**

While Husserl is widely recognised as the founder of the phenomenological movement, and as responsible for important positions on a number of central philosophical topics (such as, for instance, perception, intentionality, self-consciousness, and the tenability of naturalism), he is frequently regarded, even within phenomenological circles, as having a fairly impoverished understanding of the emotions. And indeed, there is some validity to the observation that, while essential roles are accorded to emotion in Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of personhood, (axiological) reason, value-theory, and ethics (to name just a few examples), it emerges less frequently in his writings as a central theme of inquiry. The following chapter offers the reader an opportunity to reconsider such an assessment, by highlighting and explicating a number of key claims that emerge in those writings where Husserl deals directly and thematically with the phenomenology of emotional life. Focussing mainly on his most productive and significant period as a phenomenologist of the emotions—dating between the publication of *Logical Investigations* in 1900 and *Ideas I* in 1913—I hope to indicate that Husserl’s published and unpublished writings contain important contributions to the phenomenological study of emotional life, and to our understanding of the emotions more broadly.

**Intentional and non-intentional feelings in *Logical Investigations***

While attempts to describe the peculiar character of emotional experience can already be found in manuscripts dating from the early 1890s (cf. Husserl 2004, 163–7), it was not until the turn of the century that Husserl first offered the reading public a sketch of his phenomenology of the emotions. In the second volume of *Logical Investigations*, Husserl briefly takes up the question of whether the phenomenologist ought to class feelings (*Gefühle*) as intentional experiences (Husserl 2001, 106–11). In living through an occurrent feeling, are we thereby experientially directed to an object or situation that is, in some way, consciously given or referred to? Husserl argues that there is indeed a (broad and internally differentiated) class of feelings which are experientially related to objects in this way, while at the same time acknowledging that not everything typically described as a ‘feeling’ falls under this description, and he accordingly distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional feelings.

Non-intentional feelings are exclusively confined to what Husserl calls sensory feelings (*sinnliche Gefühle*) or affective sensations (*Gefühlsempfindungen*). He focuses here on those feelings which are located somewhere on a spectrum between pain (*Schmerz*) and pleasure (*Lust*), encompassing not only the pain felt in a burnt hand but also the pleasure frequented by the scent of a rose or the taste of a delicious meal, or the displeasure of “a pang in the heart” (Husserl 2001,
109, 111 [transl. modified]). Husserl’s characterisation of such feelings as akin to sensations has a twofold motivation. On the one hand, as the fusion of pleasure and olfactory sense in smelling a rose nicely illustrates, such sensory pains and pleasures are always blended with various (exteroceptive or interoceptive) forms of sensory awareness. On the other, such feelings exhibit a degree of homogeneity or similarity (Gleichförmigkeit) with the sensations involved with sensory perception, and with touch in particular. In illustrating this similarity, Husserl notes that tactile sensations are not yet intentional acts, only involving a non-objectifying awareness of certain sensory contents (such as ‘rough’ or ‘smooth’). Nevertheless, such sensations constitute a form of bodily self-awareness, in that they are experientially related to a “touching member” of the subject’s lived body (Leib). Moreover, tactile sensations are able to function as presentative contents (darstellende Inhalte) in intentional acts: it is through their undergoing perceptual apprehension or construal (Auffassung) that the surface of a touched object appears (tactually) as rough or smooth. Like tactual sensations, the sensory feelings are nothing more than an inarticulate awareness of certain non-intentional contents (e.g., the non-objectified ‘pain’ felt in touching a hot pan). But through their ‘blending’ with interoceptive and exteroceptive sensations, sensory feelings also permit a more-or-less definite localisation in the lived body of the feeling subject (such that, e.g., the pain is felt ‘in’ the burnt finger). And crucially, such feelings may themselves provide presentative contents for intentional acts. For instance, if we now perceive or imagine the event which has elicited an occurrent feeling of pleasure, then this act of presentation (Vorstellung) will contain an additional intentional character which passes through and animates the pleasure-sensations, such that the event now appears, not only as bearing certain perceivable features, but also “as if bathed in a rosy gleam” (Husserl 2001, 109–110 [406–8], transl. modified).

At this stage, one might expect Husserl to identify the intentional feelings with such “affectively determined” (gefühlsbestimmt) apprehensions of objects and situations, in which the affective sensations provide an additional source of contents for the (cognitive) acts of presentation to assimilate. Indeed, to his evident frustration, a view of this kind was occasionally attributed to Husserl by his contemporaries (cf. Geiger 1911, 139; Husserl 2018, 149). And yet, in the Investigations, Husserl explicitly distances himself from such a move (which he associates with Brentano), suggesting that the classification of such presentative acts as ‘feelings’ is an error only made understandable by their essential intertwinement with affective sensations (Husserl 2001, 110–1). Rather, intentional feelings in the strict sense encompass that class of conscious acts in which, to adopt a more familiar parlance, we first undergo emotional experience proper.

The key examples Husserl offers of intentional feelings in the Investigations are joy and sorrow felt about an object or situation already consciously presented (vorgestellt) in some way (Husserl 2001, 107 [402–3], transl. modified). In explicating the intentional structure of such feelings, Husserl sides with the Brentanian thesis that emotional acts are founded upon acts of presentation (cf., e.g., Brentano 1995, 61–3; see Montague in this volume; Drummond 2013). In order to live through joy or sadness, in the sense of an intentional feeling that responds to and targets a ‘joyous’ or ‘saddening’ situation, that situation must first be concurrently presented to consciousness (by way of, for example, perception, memory or imagination), and in some cases also conceptually and predicatively articulated in judgement (Husserl 2001, 107–9). This is not to say that the intentional feeling is reducible to its underlying presentation, for the latter is not yet a specifically emotional experience, but merely involves an apprehension of the situation which the feeling responds to and, in some cases, of those features of the situation by virtue of which it ‘demands’ such a response from us (Husserl 2001, 109). Moreover, Husserl maintains that
intentional feelings must be regarded not merely as additional layers built upon underlying foundations but as “complex and eo ipso concrete” lived experiences which “have” or incorporate within themselves the presentations to which they owe their intentional object. In fact, the feeling of joy concerning some happy event includes or appropriates not merely the base-level presentation of the event and its ‘factual’ features but also the affectively determined mode of this presentation mentioned above: “The event coloured by pleasure as such serves as the first fundament for our turning to the object in joy, our being pleased or charmed by it” (Husserl 2001, 110, 108 [408, 404], transl. modified). Consequently, we can locate emotional intentionality, at least in its most primitive instance, in a multi-layered experiential act that includes (a) an underlying presentation of the factual object or situation to which the emotion responds, this ‘factual’ awareness being, in some cases, augmented and articulated through attention and thought, (b) an affectively determined modality of this presentation which draws upon the non-intentional feelings elicited by the object or situation, and (c) a higher-order component of intentional feeling, that is directed towards and responds to, and in this sense intentionally appropriates, the object as presented in (b).

**Emotion and value in *Ideas I***

While the brief analysis of emotional life in the *Investigations* contains a number of important claims concerning the phenomenology of emotion, one question left unanswered there is whether emotive acts, rather than merely being directed towards and responding to worldly objects and situations, might also disclose the latter in novel ways. This deceptively simple question animates much of Husserl’s work on the emotions, and he explicitly grapples with it in the book that announced his mature phenomenological project, *Ideas I*. With the newly introduced methodology of epoché and reduction, Husserl is now able to furnish phenomenology with a delimited but demanding task: that of investigating the relations of correlation and motivation holding between the manifold acts and act-strata of intentional consciousness (or ‘noeses’) and the worldly matters just as they are intended and experienced in such acts (or ‘noemata’). It is within this context that he attempts to clarify the noematic correlates of the noes specific to the emotive sphere, that is, the worldly objects and situations disclosed in emotional experience *just as so disclosed*. Husserl focuses here on that specific kind of affective experience in which the subject is emotionally “turned towards” the matter to which it responds, such that the emotive act is not a mere “stirring” in the obscure background of consciousness (which will already have its own unimplemented noeses and unthematic noemata), but an intentionality in which the experiencing subject pre-eminently “lives,” or in which its thematic interest primarily lies (Husserl 2014, 64–5, 226–7). Developing the account of the *Investigations*, Husserl maintains that such “implemented” (vollzogen) emotive acts necessarily include, as a fundamental component, an attentive “grasp” (Erfassung) of the matter to which the emotion relates (Husserl 2014, 65 [76], transl. modified). To vividly and explicitly live through a joyful emotive response *as such*, it is necessary that the event to which I respond joyfully is both presented to consciousness in some way, and “noticed.” However, what I thereby have in “focus” experientially, as the “full intentional correlate” of my thematic emotive consciousness, is not “the mere subject matter” which I grasp attentively, but something more: what Husserl simply terms “the value” (Husserl 2014, 64–5).

With this talk of ‘values,’ Husserl does not mean to suggest that emotional experiences are intentionally correlated with ideal entities (e.g., ‘goodness’ or ‘beauty’ as such), or even with specific
axiological properties of the worldly matters to which they relate (e.g., their concrete goodness or beauty). Rather, a value in this (somewhat idiosyncratic) sense is simply the concrete object as disclosed in the underlying act, but now also furnished with “new, inherent noematic aspects” (Husserl 2014, 229). In occurrently fearing someone upon noticing their aggressive glare, my cognizance of their testy demeanour needn’t be accompanied by any consideration of the ideal, nor by a separate act that simply intuits ‘threateningness’ as a pure axiological property; rather, when frightened by someone’s behaviour as grasped in this concrete situation, the person simply stands there for me experientially as threatening. While we can legitimately speak of noeses specific to the emotive sphere that are uniquely correlated with the ‘threateningness’ of the person’s behaviour, these are merely non-independent moments or “inherent aspects” (Momente) of the concrete emotive experience, such that the “valuing (...) encompasses the presenting” (Husserl 2014, 229–30, 65). And correlative, the other’s threateningness is not felt as a free-floating feature, but as “a new layer of the object,” in that “the full’ sense’ of valuing includes What (das Was) it values, with the complete fullness in which there is consciousness of it in the relevant experience of value” (Husserl 2014, 190–1). While we may be able to single out specific features of the other’s behaviour which particularly strike us as threatening (say, their stony glare, furrowed brows, and clenched fists), such “value-features” (Werteigenschaften) are features of the concrete value itself and accordingly share its internal complexity, being experienced simultaneously as factually present features of the person before us, and as threatening or frightening (Husserl 2014, 190–1 [221], transl. modified).¹

In claiming that emotive acts are not only ‘related’ to presented objects but also intentionally ‘correlated’ with concrete values, one might suspect that Husserl has now abandoned his earlier emphasis on the difference between emotional experience and presentative acts. Indeed, the account of emotive acts offered in Ideas I might initially recall those affectively determined acts of presentation, in which objects and situations appear bathed in an affective colouration, that were explicitly distinguished from emotional intentionality proper in the Investigations. And yet a closer look at Husserl’s analyses reveals a more complex picture. To begin with, and even with regard to explicit and thematic emotive consciousness, Husserl maintains that the moment of evaluation operative here is not a form of attentive grasping, or an apprehension or presentation of any kind. As he puts it, concrete values are only properly presented to consciousness in an attentive and objectifying modification of emotive experience; but since such an objectification must occur if we are to bring felt values to expression in thought and speech, we tend to overlook the non-objectifying way in which they are first (emotionally) experienced (Husserl 2014, 65, 64). Rather than being a presentational act, emotive evaluation is best characterised as a form of “position-taking,” and it is, in this sense, analogous to the element of doxic positing or “belief” contained, for instance, in all “normal perception,” and the modifications of such belief in conjecture and doubt (Husserl 2014, 231–2, 205–6). To this extent, the noematic characters of ‘threatening,’ ‘beloved,’ or ‘joyful’ that worldly matters evince in emotive experience are non-identical, but structurally similar, to the noematic characters of ‘being,’ ‘possibly being,’ or ‘doubtfully and questionably being,’ which are correlated with doxic positionality and its modal modifications (Husserl 2014, 230, 207). Such noematic characters are not first experienced as apprehended properties of a presented object: feeling joyful about an event does not involve apprehending it as ‘joyful,’ just as perceiving the event does not involve apprehending it as ‘existing.’

However, Husserl significantly complicates matters by emphasizing that “new kinds of ‘apprehensions’ are also combined” with the new noematic characters that surface in emotional

¹
experience, and that it is only by means of such apprehensions that the emotions are able to function in the disclosure of “a totally new dimension of sense” (Husserl 2014, 227–8 [266–7], transl. modified). Husserl’s claim here is that the objectification of concrete values through which they become available for expression in thought and speech is not, after all, something wholly alien to emotional experience. Fearfully experiencing a person as threatening does not involve a presently actualized apprehension of their behaviour as ‘threatening,’ nor the actual doxic positing of their ‘being threatening’. Nevertheless, Husserl maintains that such doxic objectifications are essentially “prefigured as ideal possibilities” in all evaluating consciousness. In this way, all emotive acts are implicitly objectifying, and harbour an implicit doxic or logical component that is merely explicitly implemented when, for instance, we occurrently apprehend and judge as ‘threatening’ a person previously merely feared (Husserl 2014, 234). One can detect two motivations for this move in *Ideas I*. First, Husserl claims that all founded acts of emotional position-taking involve a tacit sense of certainty, uncertainty, or doubt; while we are often (pre-reflectively) confident in our emotive attitudes, sometimes this confidence slips away: “We are conscious of the value in valuing, the pleasing in being pleased, the joyful in enjoying, but at times in such a way that, in valuing this or that, we are simply not entirely “sure’” (Husserl 2001, 233). Husserl takes this to be direct phenomenological evidence for an implicit doxic component in all emotive acts. A further motivation for this thought is that it allows us to understand how the mode of value-consciousness specific to emotive experience can be non-objectifying in character, while simultaneously enabling the disclosure of a richly meaningful world that permits expression in logical thought and speech (Husserl 2001, 65–6, 252). That is, Husserl regards such a fusion of explicit valuing and implicit belief in emotional experience as a necessary precondition for our recognising worldly matters as personally (and ultimately interpersonally and culturally) significant, rather than as mere ‘things.’ Or as Levinas succinctly formulates Husserl’s view: “The intentionality that runs through our affective and active lives confers the dignity of objective experience upon all our concrete engagements; values belong to the real just as do ideal structures. The real is human and inhabitable” (Levinas 1998, 132).

**Themes from Husserl’s Manuscripts: Pleasure, Value-reception, and Reactive Emotions**

In the intermediary period between the publication of *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*, Husserl set aside time and effort to carefully reflect upon the life of the emotions. His thoughts from this productive era were recorded and, one suspects, actively developed in a series of five long manuscripts dating from 1909 to 1911, and in a significant body of shorter texts written in those years and the preceding decade (Husserl 2018, 1–190, 263–507; cf. Melle 2012). These rich and somewhat experimental texts move far beyond the relatively narrow focus on the generic intentional structure of emotive acts found in his published writings, and in the following I can only offer a hint of some of their more dominant and, to my mind, especially promising themes.

In his published writings, Husserl only inadequately addresses a central issue for the phenomenology of emotion: namely, the role played by non-intentional feelings within emotional intentionality itself. We saw earlier that Husserl raises this matter in the *Investigations*, and responds by claiming that sensory feelings function in emotional experience merely indirectly. On this view, sensory feelings can only participate in emotional intentionality by undergoing apprehension through a presentational act which is not itself a feeling of any kind. In his manuscripts, Husserl attempts to sharpen his earlier position by contrasting the intentional function of sensory feelings
with the primary functional role of other kinds of sensation, that is, their undergoing empirical apperception or apprehension (Husserl 2018, 4f.). Empirical apperception, in this sense, is a structural feature of sensuous perception that configures sensibility in such a way that, at any given point in time, the currently appearing profile of the perceptual object is taken to be accompanied by a horizon of profiles which do not so appear at present. Husserl maintains that this configuration, rather than being an inexplicable event, has a “motivational” structure or norm-governed intelligibility, and he emphasises two kinds of “motivational circumstance” that determine, in a law-governed fashion, how empirical apperception functions in concrete perceptual situations. On the one hand, empirical apperception is motivationally tied to the bodily motility of the perceiving subject. The spatial profiles of the thing which do not currently meet the eye, being merely “apperceived,” are delineated perceptually as what would appear, if I were to enact the relevant course of movement. On the other hand, empirical apperception is also motivationally conditioned by “associative” ties with earlier perceptual encounters. When walking past something whose kind we are already familiar with perceptually, we anticipate that the thing will progressively reveal certain perceptible aspects and properties that are currently invisible. Husserl maintains that such an anticipation of perceptual reality, which can of course be confirmed or frustrated by the actual course of experience, is configured by the associative links to past perceptual episodes operative in empirical apperception itself (see, e.g., Husserl 1997, 186, 252–3, 257–8, 319f.). The question now is whether non-intentional feelings serve to disclose objects in new ways merely by providing an additional field of sensory material for such empirical apperception.

Husserl acknowledges that, under specific circumstances, sensory feelings do enter into empirical apperception in this way. For instance, the sensory pain lived through in touching the metal handle of a hot pan informs our comprehension of this handle as not merely hot but ‘burning hot,’ and our prior familiarity with burning pans motivates an apperception of the entire surface of the pan as infused with the same quality. Sensory pain is drawn upon in an (associatively and kinaesthetically motivated) empirical apprehension of the pan as burning hot, and in such a case we may even say that affectively disclosed qualities are experienced as properties which “belong to the object in the same way that colour and warmth do” (Husserl 2018, 5, transl. mine). However, Husserl now distinguishes between the ability of sensory feelings to provide additional sensory materials for empirical apperception, and what he maintains is their primary experiential function, namely that of suffusing the sensuously given with an “affective colouration” (Gefühlsfärbung, Gemütsfärbung). Importantly, Husserl characterises such affective colouration as a primordial form of “valuing” (Wertung), and he maintains that apperception can only legitimately be spoken of here if one recognises a non-empirical kind of “affective apperception” that is oriented not towards mere things but towards concrete values (Gefühlappерception, Wertappereception) (Husserl 2018, 4–5, 9–10, 38–9). The most basic instance of such colouration occurs in the “tonation by affective sensations” (Gefühlsempfindungsbetonung) of other sensory fields, a wholly passive and embodied form of valuing that takes place irrespective of any form of intentional construal which the sensations might undergo (Husserl 2018, 59, 61–2). For instance, the rhythm of flavours lived through when chewing on a morsel of food involves, on the one hand, the processual emergence and fading away of diverse sensory contents belonging strictly to gustatory sense, and on the other hand, the affective tonation of such contents through which they acquire the characters of ‘pleasant’ or ‘unpleasant,’ and perhaps even ‘indifferent’ (Husserl 2018, 63–4). As Husserl notes, these two aspects of the unitary impressional episode are so intimately fused that any talk of discrete “layers” is not appropriate (Husserl 2018, 63). In a brief manuscript likely written in 1909
or 1910, he even proposes that, rather than being bestowed by a distinct class of affective sensations, affective tones belong intrinsically to the content of all (first-order) sensations, such that episodes of sensory experience are always and already experiential processes, not merely of ‘sensing,’ but also and simultaneously of ‘feeling’ (Husserl 2018, 420).

However, in these writings Husserl extends the function of sensory feelings far beyond such a pre-intentional tonation of the senses, emphasising that feelings of pleasure and pain can also be oriented towards, and affectively colour or value, the transcendent objects and situations of the world of experience. A particularly vivid example of this can be found in a text from 1910, which describes the manner in which a passive form of “liking” or “being pleased” (Gefallen) can be experientially intertwined with the progressive perception of a beautiful rug, a form of affective experience which he also characterises as “‘[d]irect’ pleasure (Lust), pleasure in an object for the sake of the object itself.” In entering an unfamiliar home and seeing a radiant velvet rug, we may well have a ‘pleasant impression’ of the rug that is irreducible to any complex of affectively toned sensations. What we are pleased with here is the rug itself, and it is no mere sensory content but the “colour and pattern” of the appearing thing which first “awaken” our liking. Moreover, this liking may even be responsive to features of the rug that have not yet been originally perceived. The surface of the rug, seen but not yet caressed, pleases us in part because it looks pleasant to touch (it is as if the velvet fabric invites us to genuinely ‘feel’ it), just as its striking pattern inclines us to adopt a spatial orientation in which it would look even more appealing (Husserl 2018, 395, transl. mine). ‘Being pleased’ or ‘liking’ thus designates, in this context, an affective orientation towards a perceived worldly matter that unfolds and develops over time. It is a pre-predicative form of felt valuation that is, at any moment, motivationally responsive to the (apperceptively configured) perceptual sense we have of the object as a whole.

But what role do feelings of pleasure play in such a dynamic experience of something as ‘pleasant’? Is being pleased with a perceived object simply a matter of (non-intentional) pleasure-sensations undergoing objectification, or are we rather dealing here with pleasure as an intrinsically intentional feeling? Husserl’s response is unambiguous: “It is clear that the feeling has its intentionality here, that is, its transcendence or transience, in total analogy with the act of perception” (Husserl 2018, 396; cf. 16, transl. mine). In the process of being pleased with the velvet rug, we live through “individual feelings of pleasure and displeasure,” each specifically “founded” upon an “inherent aspect” of the perceptual object (say, its purple hue, velvety touch, or slightly stale odour). These individual feelings increase or diminish in intensity as certain aspects of the object are given more or less optimally or emerge from merely anticipatory to actual perceptual givenness. Accordingly, one can say that the concrete experiential episode involves a specific “rhythm of feeling” whose contours map onto the particular way that the object is temporally disclosed (Husserl 2018, 396, transl. mine; cf. 71, 176, 278). Now, the liking of the object which imubes every moment of this episode is not reducible to the unfolding of this specific and actualised rhythm of feeling, since it also involves the delineation of other possible affective rhythms as motivationally tied to the pleasing object’s other possible courses of perceptual exhibition. As Husserl emphasises, however, this “anticipatory” configuration of pleasure is not an achievement of the intellect, and nor can it be found in the underlying perceptual presentation qua empirical apperception. Such configuration rather belongs to being pleased itself, which shows itself here as an integrated totality of actual and potential individual feelings of pleasure that, at any point in time, functions as an affective valuation of the (ap)perceived object: “the “anticipation of pleasure,” the pleasure-interpretation, is not “presentation” but feeling, and feeling fulfils itself as feeling. The interpretation peculiar to the feeling
is itself something affective, something that belongs specifically to the feeling” (Husserl 2018, 397, 400; cf. 128, transl. mine). Husserl repeatedly highlights the close analogy with perception (Wahrnehmung) exhibited here, describing such passively and dynamically object-responsive and object-oriented feelings as instances of value-reception (Wertnehmung), and employing terms such as value-givenness (Wertgegebenheit), value-apperception (Wertappерception), and even value-perception (Wertwahrnehmung). Just as an object increasingly reveals its true nature as we bring to direct givenness those of its aspects and features that were previously merely apperceived, so do we acquire a gradual and intuitive acquaintance with a concrete value (e.g., the rug as pleasing) through bringing more of its (perceptible and valuable) features explicitly into our affective focus (cf. e.g., Husserl 2018, 28–9, 100–1, 400–1).

While feelings of pleasure and pain are relatively passive affective experiences that may even be characterised as forms of sensibility—insofar as the latter is understood as affording receptivity to the world of values and not merely to nature—Husserl acknowledges that many emotions are more active and self-involving modes of comportment, in that they manifest a kind of spontaneity or position-taking peculiar to the emotive sphere (Gefühlsstellungnahme, Gefühls spontaneität). This is not to say that such emotions are acts of judgement, nor that they stand under our volitional control, but simply that anger, joy, fear, and the like are lived as ways that we respond or react to experienced objects, rather than merely as new kinds of affective receptivity (Husserl 2018, 101–2, 120–1). Such reactive emotions correspond to what Husserl had earlier termed ‘intentional feelings,’ and he now reinterprets a central claim of the Investigations by noting that they are typically motivational feelings to worldly matters, not merely as perceived, but also as felt in value-reception. For instance, our “delight” over a beautiful picture will typically be motivated by and responsive to its very beauty, while our recognition of such beauty already involves (occurrent or anticipated) aesthetic feelings. In this sense, the “emotional position-taking recons with the object in, and ‘for the sake of,’ its value-character” (Husserl 2018, 121–2, transl. mine; cf. 55). As his research manuscripts document, Husserl became gradually convinced that the most vivid, passionate, and explicitly intentional emotional reactions involve two intimately intertwined experiential components. Firstly, an emotional response will only be lived as having an explicit intentionality if it, as a “totality of feeling,” has as its “core” an intentional feeling of liking or disliking (Husserl 2018, 113–5, transl. mine). Liking or being pleased, in this context, is something more than the more receptive form of liking discussed above; it is not simply a matter of pleasure but is rather an intentional feeling of, say, “appreciation” (Wohlgefallen) or “joy” (Freude), while examples of reactive disliking include “concern (Besorgnit) over an imminent disaster” or “the displeased feeling of being disgusted (Abgestoßensein) by a suffered insult” (Husserl 2018, 110, 115, transl. mine). However, Husserl ranks both kinds of intentional feeling under the generic heading of being pleased, simply because they are both occurrent experiences in which we are “conscious of something pleasing” (Husserl 2018, 23, transl. mine). While feelings of this kind are motivated by the objects of sensory and affective receptivity, and are lived most vividly when we attend to such objects, the rich variety of value-characters that surface in their noematic correlates goes far beyond what the sensory feelings alone are able to disclose. The second component of reactive emotions resides in the ‘streams of feeling’ that flow through the embodied self and manifest its passionate emotional arousal, such as a specific rhythm of more-or-less localisable bodily feelings or a general ambience of corporeal arousal (Husserl 2018, 111–2).

Husserl regards it necessary to distinguish between these two components of reactive emotions, if only because they frequently come apart. We sometimes experience an object as
agreeable without finding ourselves passionately moved by it, and equally a residue of the feelings elicited in a passionate emotional arousal will remain, as a mere “affective state” (Gemützustand), even when the arousing object or situation is no longer attended to or presented in any way (Husserl 2018, 104–5, 121–3). However, in cases where we turn towards some matter in appreciation or concern and simultaneously feel ourselves moved by it, these two aspects function together as integrated components of a single emotional reaction. In such optimally manifest cases of emotive intentionality, the “stream of aroused feelings” is lived as a corporeal “expansion” (Verbreitung) and further articulation of the core act of liking or disliking; and in correlation with this ‘fleshing out’ of the evaluative stance, so to speak, the object as emotively experienced already acquires a richer axiological significance. As Husserl puts it: “It is the delight, and not the liking without arousal, that directs itself to the object, and the object does not merely stand there as pleasing, but rather (corresponding to the modification of the act) as delightful” (Husserl 2018, 123, transl. mine).

In his research manuscripts, then, Husserl supplements and sharpens the basic conception of emotive intentionality found in Logical Investigations, and works out (while abundantly transcending) the noematically-oriented account of Ideas I. The overview here has highlighted one important strand of these probing analyses, tracing Husserl’s efforts to further clarify the function of sensory feelings in emotional experience. While the Investigations had understood this function merely in terms of the ability of sensory feelings to undergo objectification in (non-affective) presentational acts, Husserl now locates their primary role in directly affording an intuitive consciousness of value. While this already takes place in the affective tonation of other sensory fields, integrated totalities of sensory feeling also enable the objects and situations of the perceptual world to passively affect us as pleasing or displeasing. Finally, sensory feelings contribute to the reactive emotions insofar as the latter contain a dimension of sensory arousal, a dimension that “expands” our core emotive stance towards the matter concerned and “modifies” or enriches its affective and evaluative character (ibid.). Indeed, Husserl suggests that this intertwining of ‘active’ position-taking and ‘passive’ sensory arousal is precisely what enables the reactive emotions to function both as manifestations of the distinctive personality of the subject (see Drummond in this volume), and as (higher-order) ways in which concrete values are intuitively given: “When I am angry, when I am passionately aroused over the baseness of someone’s way of acting, then the seeing of this baseness will reside in the emotional arousals themselves” (Husserl 2018, 128, transl. mine; cf. 62–3, 115, 130–1, 507f.).

References


Raw Text:


Further Reading


For an alternative reading of Husserl’s account of the intentional correlation between emotion and value, see Mulligan (2010, 227–37).

On the other hand, if the concept of ‘expression’ is understood as also encompassing bodily comportment that is ‘expressive’ in a non-linguistic fashion, then the expression of emotional acts and states without such a detour through objectifying belief and ideal meaning may be possible after all. This possibility may well have captured Husserl’s attention during this period, since he explicitly thematises non-linguistic forms of bodily expressivity in texts from Ideas II that he began writing in 1913 (e.g., Husserl 1989, 248–59; cf. Heinämaa 2010; Jardine and Szanto 2017, 90–1).

I owe thanks to the Irish Research Council and Academy of Finland for supporting the research undertaken in writing this chapter, and to Ullrich Melle, Director of the Husserl Archives, who kindly granted me permission to study and refer to Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts.