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ROBERT E. LEE IN *LOVE AND WAR* WRITTEN BY JOHN JAKES: Comparison with accounts by historians Foote, Catton and McPherson

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Tutkielman tarkoitus on ensisijaisesti selvittää, millaiseksi Robert E. Lee on kuvattu kirjailija John Jakesin historiallista fiktiota sisältävässä teoksessa *Love and War* (1984). Toissijaisesti tutkielmassa selvitetään, miten uushistoristinen kirjallisuuskritiikin suuntaus soveltuu itse teoksen, Leen hahmon sekä tutkielman vertailuosassa käytettyjen historiallisten lähteiden tutkimukseen. Tutkielma on luonteeltaan vertaileva. Tutkielmassa vastataan ensisijaisesti kysymykseen: 1) Miten näkemys Leestä fiktiivisessä teoksessa *Love and War* (1984) vertautuu kolmen johtavan historioitsijan näkemyksiin? Toissijaisesti tutkielma vastaa kysymykseen: 2) Millaisen tulkinnan uushistoristinen analyysi antaa kirjalle, Leen hahmolle sekä historiallisille tutkimuksille? Lähtökohtana tutkielmassa on, että kirjailijan päämääränä on kertoa historiasta mitä suurimmassa määrin autenttisesti lukijoilleen historiallisen fiktion kontekstissa. Näin ollen hänen oletetaan perehtyneen historialliseen aihepiiriinsä varsin kattavasti ja tarkoin, ja pyrkineen välittämään lukijalle mahdollisimman todenmukaisen kuvan 1800-luvun USA:n aikakaudesta.

Materiaalina tutkielmassa käytetään teosta ja kolmea kokonaisvaltaista historiantutkimusta Yhdysvaltain sisällissodasta. Kaikki ne teoksen katkelmat, joissa Lee mainitaan, yhteensä yli 80 kappaletta, analysoidaan kronologisessa järjestyksessä vertaamalla niitä kolmen historiantutkimuksen kanssa. Katkelmat jaetaan kerronnallisesti neljään kategoriaan: 1) Leen vuorosanat teoksessa 2) Lee teoksen muiden hahmojen näkemänä tai kuvaamana 3) kirjailijan omat näkemykset Leestä teoksessa 4) teoksen vuorosanat, joissa Lee esiintyy. Kohta 4) jaetaan edelleen semanttisesti positiivisiin, negatiivisiin ja neutraaleihin konnotaatioihin, konteksteihin ja tapoihin, joilla Leen hahmo vuorosanoissa esiintyy. Vertailun osin fenomenologisen luonteen vuoksi uushistoristinen kirjallisuuskriittinen analyysi sekä argumentit sen puolesta käsitellään tutkielmassa omana lukunaan.

Tutkielmassa kävi ilmi, että kirjailija on tehnyt useita historiallisia asiavirheitä liittyen Leen hahmoon Yhdysvaltain sisällissodan kontekstissa sekä myös kyseenalaisia historiantulkintoja, joista monet eivät saaneet vahvistusta käytetyltä kolmelta historialliselta lähteeltä. Kuvaus Leestä huomattiin yleissävyltään varsin negatiiviseksi, paikoin sarkastiseksi, ironiseksi, korostuneen realistiseksi ja kyyniseksi. Kuvausta voi kaikkiaan pitää varsin revisionistisena tulkintana Leen hahmosta. Uushistoristisen kirjallisuuskritiikin suuntauksen havaittiin olevan varsin yhteensopiva tarkastelemaan sekä Leen hahmoa, teosta että historiallisia lähteitä, mutta samalla ristiriitainen tutkielman lähtökohtaisten olettamusten kanssa.

Asiasanat: Literary studies. Robert E. Lee. American history. American Civil War. New Historicism. comparative study.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Civil War that took place in the United States between years 1861 – 1865 was an event of paramount importance in the history of the nation. It has been argued that the war was a turning point for the United States, with several historians (e.g. Foote 1974:1042, McPherson 1988:859) even arguing that after the war the United States started to be referred to as "the United States *has*" rather than "the United States *is*," a form previously used in connection with the country. According to Roland (1960:194), it was "the 'most harrowing' war of the century in the western world". Nolan (as quoted in Trulock 1992:xiii) calls it simply "the American holocaust". McPherson (1988:viii) states bluntly that the Civil War "is still with us". General Grant, both a contemporary and also Commander-in-Chief of all the armies of the Northern states[1] as of March, 1864, with two terms as President of the United States, summarised the war as "a very bloody and a very costly affair" (Grant 1885:640). With more than 620,000 dead soldiers (Foote 1974, McPherson 1988, Millett and Maslowski 1984), not counting wounded, civilians et cetera, direct or indirect casualties of four years of slaughter, the war remains one of the most brutal in the modern history of the Western world. It has also captivated, and still does, the interest of numerous authors and scholars, and today

> Hundreds of Civil War Round Tables and Lincoln Associations flourish . . . Every year thousands of Americans dress up in blue or gray uniforms and take up their replica Springfield muskets to re-enact Civil War battles. A half-dozen popular and professional history magazines continue to chronicle every conceivable aspect of the war. Hundreds of books about the conflict pour off the presses every year, adding to the more than 50,000 titles on the subject . . . The Civil War [is] by a large margin the most written-about event in American history. (McPherson 1988:ix)

The death toll in the American Civil War exceeds the casualties of all the other American wars combined, before or since (Woodward 1988 (ed.), as quoted in McPherson 1988:xviii). The single day of battle near Antietam Creek (also called Sharpsburg) in September, 1862, cost four times the American casualties in Normandy June 6th, 1944 and more than twice as many as had died in the War of 1812 against Britain, the Mexican War (1846 – 1848) and the Spanish-American War (1898) (McPherson 1988:544).

[1] According to Catton (1961), the Northern states in the war were: California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin.

According to Foote (1974:1040), it left roughly a quarter of white Southern male population between ages 17-50 dead or incapacitated for life.

This is the time period in American history the volume used in this study, titled *Love and War* (1984, from now on abbreviated as LaW), focuses on. LaW is a middle (second) volume in a trilogy of three books, together referred to as the North and South Trilogy and written by American author John Jakes. The trilogy tells a story of two well-off families and their fortunes, one living in South Carolina, the other in Pennsylvania. The story is historical fiction (more accurately, historical family saga) in genre and the time period it takes place in is 19th century America. The years 1842 – 1861, 1861 – 1865 and 1865 – 1883 are covered by *North and South* (1982), *Love and War* (1984) and *Heaven and Hell* (1987), respectively. In other words, as maintained also by Jones (1996), the first volume covers the years preceding the Civil War, the second, the object of this study, the war years and the third the Reconstruction Period (1865 – 1877) and slightly beyond.

This study is a comparison between how a title of historical fiction, LaW, covers the historical character of Robert E. Lee and how he is portrayed in the three, supposedly factual, leading general studies about the war. The reason I chose Lee for investigation is that he was one of the generals of arguably most merit, fame and also achievement the war produced. Thus, he is a most central figure in the historical context of the novel. The three studies referred to are period studies written by widely-acclaimed historians Foote (1958, 1963, 1974), Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) and McPherson (1988). These three were chosen both for the obvious reason of them enjoying popularity and appreciation in the field and in order to minimise, or balance, bias hinted at by McPherson (1988:873) that could result were there only one source. Also, through three sources the historical insights grow more multidimensional. McPherson, with the Pulitzer Price-winning volume *Battle cry of freedom: The Civil War era* (1988), constitutes perhaps the most widely read single piece of work about the war.

The methodology employed in the study is previously unused as far as I can determine, even though a study by Kerr (1989) makes somewhat similar comparisons, if with a different approach and method, between history and fiction. I have extracted from the novel each and every line in which Lee appears as an agent in a given way and then

compared it with the historians' studies. The reason for ending up with this kind of a method was primarily to give to the reader a most thorough account of characterisation of Lee. Secondarily, this was decided upon to ensure that nothing the author has written about Lee in the volume has been left out, distorted or otherwise ignored. For organisation and clarity, the emerging data I have then divided into four narrative vehicles of storytelling in which Lee may appear. These are: (1) Lee as active element in the story, i.e. involved in dialogue himself, (2) Lee as perceived and referred to by other characters in the story excluding dialogue, i.e. all references made to Lee except in speech, (3) Lee as perceived and referred to by the author, i.e. sections where he is referred to by the narrator and (4) Lee as perceived and referred to in the lines of other characters, i.e. all references made to Lee particularly in speech. The fourth perspective I have further subdivided into the following sections: i) positive, i.e. Lee mentioned in a seemingly positive light/fashion/context, ii) negative, i.e. Lee mentioned in a seemingly negative light/fashion/context and iii) neutral, i.e. Lee mentioned in a seemingly neutral light/fashion/context or merely in passing. The criterion has been that the semantic structure of a line and the context within which it is spoken has been weighted and then placed into its proper category. Also, a school of literary criticism titled New Historicism is introduced, with the focus being primarily on LaW and secondarily on the three principal source studies.

A most notable suggestion to place the volume in its proper place in the field of literary criticism derives from Jones (1996). Jones, being to my knowledge the only person actually having previously analysed LaW academically, suggests New Historicism as a useful literary theoretical framework. Jones (1996:164) claims that, in the case of the North and South books in general, "it is hard not to suggest the possibility of a New Historicist treatment". In the study, this suggestion is weighed and discussed.

The reasons why I wanted to do this study on this particular book are numerous. Firstly, America, as we know it today, is the undisputed, omnipotent superpower that dominates the world politics, culture, thinking and wealth in today's modern world. However, this would possibly not be the case had the outcome of the Civil War been different. Thus, as suggested by McPherson (as quoted in Jakes 1984:1012), the war "preserved . . .[the] nation from destruction and determined, in a large measure, what sort of nation it would be." Thus, the entire fate of the United States hung in balance in the war. So, given an

alternate path of history, i.e. one in which the United States would not emerge united, the country, in my view, would necessarily not be such a powerful element as it is today. The ultimate outcome of the war gave birth to a new, stronger America and in fact made possible its powerful existence among nations.

Secondly, the impact the American Civil War made has, in my view, greatly influenced Anglo-American culture, heritage and even world history, from the relationship between different ethnic groups to conduct of warfare. The United States was the last Western nation to terminate slavery and the various inventions in warfare brought about by the war changed the way in which wars were fought.

Thirdly, the interest in the American Civil War does extend beyond the borders of America. Eaton (1954:viii) comments that, of all of American history, the British universities possess "the strongest interest" in this particular time period. One field in which this observation may be regarded accurate is entertainment.

To conclude, my primary research question is: How does the portrayal of Robert E. Lee in this book of historical fiction compare with what the arguably leading historians say about him? My secondary research question is: What avenues of interpretation does New Historicism open concerning LaW, Robert E. Lee in it and studies by Foote (1958, 1963, 1974), Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) and McPherson (1988)?

The study consists of the following: In the theoretical background, there is a chapter about North and South books and a section about the author, John Jakes. This is followed by a review of some of the previous literary studies and other alternative methodology into literary analysis, with somewhat but not quite similar settings. Next is a chapter that discusses history writing, the relationship between fact and fiction and philosophy of history and Historicism, focusing on Karl Popper. This is followed by an introduction into New Historicism. Next comes the historical background chapter to LaW, with focus on the so-called Antebellum[2] Period, with a short biography on Lee and Lee in the war. The study part consists mainly of a comparison between Lee in LaW and what the historians say about him. This is followed by a concluding section in which the findings

[2] i.e. approximately the forty years in the 19th century preceding the American Civil War (1861 - 1865).

are discussed. In the next chapter New Historicism is speculated about, primarily in connection with LaW and the portrayal of Robert E. Lee in it, secondarily in relation to the aforementioned period studies. Finally, there is a concluding chapter with a discussion of the study and suggestions for possible further studies.

2. NORTH AND SOUTH BOOKS

According to Jones (1996:9), the theme of idealism and rediscovering a more positive America seemed to be very much his focus in John Jakes's North and South books of the 1980s (*North and South* (1982), *Love and War* (1984) and *Heaven and Hell* (1987)). Jakes claims that historical fiction "permits you to comment on the past, and, by indirection, the present" (*Writer*, November 1979, p. 46, as quoted in Jones 1996:9).

Jones (1996:9) remarks that Jakes knows his responsibility, and he should, since "for many [Americans], he is their only source of history". Further, he supposedly spends about 50 per cent of his time doing research when writing a novel. Critics Salvatore and Sullivan (*Radical History Review*, 26, 1982:141-142, as quoted in Jones 1996:26-27), contend, however, that "Predisposed merely to celebrate the success of the American people, Jakes never fulfills his promise of serious historical analysis within the form of fiction". They downright claim that Jakes writes "celebratory pap".

According to Jones (1996:3, 11), the author has written over 70 books, 200 short stories, articles and has more than 50 million copies of his books in print. He is also referred to as "godfather of the historical novel," "the people's author" and "America's history teacher". Moreover, the television miniseries based on North and South Trilogy has been ranked among ten highest "Nielson rated" miniseries of all time.

The story of North and South books focuses on two influential families. Two families are used to create a, Jones (1996:145) argues, "historical reality". First, there are the Hazards of Pennsylvania, with parents William and Maude, oldest brother Stanley and his wife, Isabel Truscott, middle brother George and his wife Constance and youngest brother Billy with his wife Brett Main together with a sister, Virgilia. They own an ironworks and are comparatively well-off. The main protagonist in this family is George. Second, there are the Mains, with parents Clarissa and Tillet, eldest son Cooper and his wife Judith, his younger brother Orry and his wife Madeline, and two younger sisters, Ashton and her husband James Huntoon and Brett. Finally, there is Tillet's nephew, Cousin Charles. Orry is the main figure in this family. They own a large rice plantation named Mont Royal. Jones (1996:146) contends that the families form a metaphor for the United

States and it is in fact the Civil War handled in LaW that binds all these three books together.

The families meet when George and Orry, attend the Military Academy at West Point. There they also meet their arch-enemy, Elkanah Bent. The tensions between various members of the families start to build, with strong caricatures and sweeping, dramatic subplots and confrontations.

In LaW, all the parents are dead. In the Hazard family, George works in the Ordnance Department in Washington. In April, 1864, he starts constructing and supervising railroads for Grant's army in Virginia. Constance starts protecting and educating orphaned African-American children. Stanley and his manipulative wife Isabel are at the center of Washington politics, meeting such historical figures as Stanton, Wade, Lincoln and Cameron. Billy is separated from his wife Brett, who lives with the Hazard family in Pennsylvania, and serves as an engineer in the Engineer Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Virgilia acts as a nurse in the Virginia front. In the Main family, Orry works in the Confederate War Department until transferred to field duty at the end of 1864, where he dies. Cooper is in Britain, returning to America. Ashton and her husband spend much of the book near the power figures of the Confederacy, the former meddling with a conspiracy to kill President Davis. Charles functions as a scout in Wade Hampton's cavalry, meeting Augusta Barclay in the process. She dies after giving birth to their son.

2.1 The author

John Jakes was born 31 March in Chicago in 1932. His parents were John Adrian and Bertha Retz Jakes. He has said that his inspiration was born watching "the swashbuckling films of the 1930s and 1940s" (Jones 1996:4). Because of this, a critic (Watkins 1982:24, as quoted in Jones 1996:4), commenting the North and South books, has stated that Jakes writes in a very cinematic manner.

He has written several plays and also lyrics for musical comedies. In 1951, after enrolling to De Pauw University, Ohio, he married Rachel Anne Payne, his zoology lab instructor. He graduated in 1953 from a literary program. In 1954 he earned his Master of Arts

decree from Ohio State University, but quit the Ph.D. program out of financial necessity (Jones 1996:5-6).

He began his career as a copywriter, rising ultimately to the position of product promotion manager. From the early 60s to the early 70s he worked at various advertising agencies. He had a chance to relieve his theatrical passions by writing sales meetings between various corporations. At this period, he wrote nearly a hundred books, many under pseudonyms because his editor rejected the name John Jakes. In this early part of his career he wanted to write historical novels but was discouraged by his publisher. He wrote in various genres: science fiction, mystery/suspense, fantasy, and a detective series, short stories and novels, children's fiction and nonfiction (Jones 1996:6-8).

In 1973 he had a chance to novelize *Conquest of the Planet of the Apes*, his first major work (Jones 1996:8). The final breakthrough came when Jakes was approached about a series of historical novels, timed to be published at the same time as the American Bicentennial was celebrated. Thus was born *The Kent Family Chronicles*, originally planned as five novels but actually ending with eight and still some 90 years short of its goal, i.e. 1976 (Jones 1996:8-9). Importantly, the genre family saga was born in American literature.

One of Jakes's goals also in *The Kent Family Chronicles* was to pour out positive, optimistic thinking to his readers. He aimed, arguably, to distract the American readers from the sorry state their country was in and to prepare for them a road of escapism to a different, less tarnished time and age in American history. As said by Jakes himself (*Writer*, November 1979, p. 9 as quoted in Jones 1996:25), searching the past for "values and a sense of continuity" helps in dealing with problems about the present. Because many families and, it can be argued, human relationships, are disintegrating under social and economic pressure, "idealized families that manage to survive . . . harrowing test[s]" can function in a comforting manner.

With the second volume of a work enjoying such popularity, to examine the portrayal of one of the major contemporary figures is quite interesting. To my knowledge LaW, in spite of its success, has not been analysed in an academic manner previously. Now there certainly has come a time for such a study to be undertaken.

3. PREVIOUS STUDIES ON FICTION AND OTHER METHODS OF LITERARY ANALYSIS

Even though no other literary study I have come across uses a similar method in comparing fact and historical fiction as I do, let alone limit the sources which to compare the findings, there still are some studies worth mentioning.

Perhaps closest to my study in setting comes Kerr (1989), who has compared some of Sir Walter Scott's novels of historical fiction in terms of how they interact with historical facts. Kerr (1989:introduction) notes that at times Scott is very truthful to history while occasionally, the two are "radically different" and according to him, this was what the author aimed at.[3] However, as has been established in section 2.1, Jakes, unlike Scott, has supposedly attempted to remain as truthful to the past as possible, taking pains to achieve that goal. Further, Kerr does not employ any explicit principal sources.

McHoul and Wills (1990) have taken a somewhat more philosophical approach in their study of novels by Thomas Pynchon labelled Postmodern, using Jacques Derrida's "grammatological theory" of literary criticism[4] in particular as a framework for the analysis. They also explore different storytelling devices, focusing on Pynchon and the use of author's voice. The study is not so much an application of the said theory than unreserved exploration between literary theory and fiction.

Gale (1965, 1968, 1969) has taken yet another different approach into analysing fiction. He has investigated the literary productions of James, Hawthorne and Melville, respectively. Gale has complied a chronological reference book of each novelist, with lists of characters and short synopsis of plots each author has written, with sketches and poetry added in cases of Hawthorne and Melville.

There are a few MA theses that have attempted at least something similar, i.e. studied historical fiction, even though not all of them have compared them with factual data and

[3] Also, as in Kerr's (1989) study, I have decided to include chapter number in references to the text because that seemed to clarify where in the book the quotation is located.

[4] In short, McHoul and Wills (1990:112) maintain that "grammatological theory " tests "the borders between literary criticism and its object, by challenging the criteria by which the one circumscribes the other", for instance, criteria for authorial intention, thematic unity and coherence in discourse.

none of them have compared factual data in a way similar to this study. Studies meeting this criteria have been written by, for instance, Lintunen (1993), Mielonen (1996), Naapanki (1997), Tuomainen (2000) and Ruunaniemi (2001). Of these, Mielonen (1996) and Tuomainen (2000) have conducted studies of most relevance to the study at hand.

The MA thesis by Mielonen (1996) attempted to find possible apologies regarding slavery in the famous Margaret Mitchell novel *Gone With The Wind*. The methodology employed by her was also a comparison between the novel and historical sources, which, states Mielonen (1996:6), "help me to show what slavery was like in reality." However, she did not go into any further detail in her study about further explaining why she chose the specific lines from her novel to meet the research question(s) of her study. Quite possibly, relevance was her only guidance. Further, she did not choose a literary framework from which to analyse the novel as this study does. Thirdly, she did not approach the research question in a similar systematic fashion, nor attempted to compare what is written in the novel with any "principal" sources. Still, similar in method and theme if not in purpose and execution, Mielonen used quite a lot of extracts from the book to illustrate her findings.

Tuomainen (2000) investigated Shakespeare's depiction of socio-political issues in *Henry IV* plays. She based her analysis on literary criticism and New Historicism, a trend in the field of literary criticism. Similarly, in the theoretical background of my study I offer New Historicism as a viewpoint for my analysis, since it seems both plausible and is recommended by Jones (1996). But again, there are obvious differences in theme and methodology: this study analyses a novel situated in American history and employs New Historicism in a separate chapter while otherwise making a comparative study.

Lintunen (1993) studied Joseph Heller's *Catch 22* the novel and its dramatisation. The goal he chose was such that he attempted to "place the works within literary tradition and their own genres in order to create an objective basis for further analysis" (Lintunen 1993:1). Further, he claimed to base his analytical framework on views on literary criticism that derive from specific essay collections. Unlike this study, Lintunen also used a play made from the novel. But the study is similar to mine in a sense that he compared them with each other. Lintunen subdivided his analysis into elements which

were theme, structure, language and characters. This study, in contrast, is more concerned with various narrative vehicles and how Lee is pictured within each.

The last two studies, conducted by Naapanki (1997) and Ruunaniemi (2001), are more sociological in their approach and are consequently less related to this study, even though they analyse fiction as well.

Naapanki (1997) investigated the differences between Chinese and American cultures in two novels by authors Hong Kingston and Tan. Her focus was on a large scale, on Chinese-American culture and, more specifically, "conflicts faced by fictional characters of ethnic families living in a multiethnic environment" (Naapanki 1997:3) and on two American-Chinese daughters. For her study she provided selected cultural background from the United States and China and partly their history. Naapanki did this because, according to her, it then becomes less problematic to analyse fictive material. For her analysis, she chose events from the books that represent cultural-bound conflicts.

Finally, Ruunaniemi (2001) examined the role of women in the fiction of F. Scott Fitzgerald. She established as her thesis statement that Fitzgerald's women were multi-dimensional and that they are accurately portrayed. The study, together with the one conducted by Naapanki (1997), has more sociological emphasis, not being actual comparisons between (historical) fact and fiction.

4. ANALYSING A HISTORICAL WORK

This chapter introduces a formal theory of history writing suggested by White (1973), discusses the relationship between fact and fiction and examines both of these issues against a trend in the philosophy of history known as Historicism, with its relevant themes and observations. Finally, a form of literary criticism called New Historicism is introduced.

To define LaW as a historical work, we need to take a look at how it is written, its setting and other such elements fundamental to a literary work. Simplified by Voltaire in the 18th century (1901:61, as quoted in White 1973:50), "history is the recital of facts represented as true. Fable, on the contrary, is the recital of facts represented as fiction". Most likely, the issue has since then become slightly more complicated as it can be shown. First of all, to assure that LaW is considered a historical novel we only have to look at the definition the genre entails. Nikander (Nikander and Tuhkanen (eds.) 1996:15) define a historical novel as "a novel that takes place in the past and attempts to authentically describe the past".

White (1973) has created a seemingly plausible formal theory of writing history in the context of 19th century Europe which, in my view, basically holds true as a paradigm to writing history today in general and in reference to LaW in particular. White (1973:5), argues that "chronicle" and "story" are the fundamental, basic elements of a historical work[5] without which it cannot function. However, selections have to be made and data has to be arranged from what White (1973:5) calls "unprocessed historical record" and he further claims that any type of historical work, situated in a historical field is a delicate balance between "the unprocessed historical record, other historical accounts, and an audience".

White (1973:5, 6, 7) begins the process with organising elements in a given historical field into a chronicle in a chronological order of occurrence. The next step is to further arrange these events "into the components of a 'spectacle' or process of happening" with

[5] Others being "mode of emplotment", providing meaning to a story by identifying its genre, "mode of argument", used in order to highlight and explain the message in a story and "mode of ideological implication", the ethical element(s) in a story and the ideological stand it takes (1973:5, 7, 11, 22).

a clear beginning, middle and end phases. Thus a chronicle becomes a story, with inaugural, transitional and terminating motifs, not required of a chronicle. Where the "processes of happening" are situated in this typology depends on the way in which an event is characterised. The same event may have different functions, defined by the role assigned to it in its motific characterisation.

White (1973:6, fn) points out that the distinction between factual, i.e. historical, and fictional writing is that historical writing consists of, or at least ought to, events outside the writer's consciousness and this, he argues, makes it problematic to distinguish between a chronicle of events and a fictional story. It is a division between finding a story out of a historical corpus that has already been constituted and inventing one. However, it appears to me that a clear-cut division of the two cannot be made, especially in connection with this study. To be sure, LaW has a fictional plot with fictional main characters, but it is not by all means free from historical writing, with a supposedly realistic and believable historical background. Further, the author has a method of writing that, as Jones (1996:9) contends, starts from reading a general historical work and then moving on to biographies and social histories and finally period diaries. The genre is not just fiction but *historical* fiction, containing an implicit premise to represent fiction within history. Thus, obviously the same formal theory of approach is applicable to both LaW and studies by Foote (1958, 1963, 1974), Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) and McPherson (1988) and certainly to the way in which a historical character appears in the first.

Nikander and Tuhkanen (1996) concur with this argument of mine. As they note,

> It is sometimes thought that historical research attempts to represent an objective truth about the past solely based on historical facts, while prose is the product of a subjective imagination. According to this view, writing history and creating verbal art are mutually exclusive. If, however, history and fiction actually were simply opposites, fictional writing would not be able to act as a supplier of information about the past . . . Creative imagination has its important place also in the work of a historian; on the other hand, a work of verbal art may act as a source of historical information – even in verbally rich ways. (1996:3, 4)

Nikander (1996:10) also agrees with White (1973) that in fiction an author has a freedom of consciousness to invent characters, even events, but he also claims that fiction often has some kind of a relationship to the time period described and it contains elements of fact and fiction "entwined" to each other. He cites *Roots* (1976) by Alex Haley as a good

example. Haley conducted massive research to write his book about his ancestral roots to slavery. In distinction from Jakes, that story was based on factual characters. Still, the method with which it was approached was similar. According to Nikander (1996:10), Haley himself classified the mixture between fact and fiction as "faction".

In addition, Nikander (1996:10, 11) postulates that an author of fiction generally illustrates a factual time period through fictional characters and their relatives. Further, the relationship between individual fictional characters serves as a mirror from which the time period is reflected. This is precisely the approach LaW takes.

Finally, Nikander (1996:12, 13) presents a few more critical observations in connection with this study. He maintains that a work of (historical) fiction, even though taking place in a different time period, may offer viewpoints that derive from the time period of writing, social constructions, conventions, moral values, etc. that are in place then. This practice of authors to project phenomena and problems of their time into the past and discuss them there is, writes Nikander (1996:13), "very common". In this sense Mika Waltari's *Sinuhe, Egyptian* is a good example, he argues. Even though the setting of the novel is historical, it also reflects contemporary world views that reigned then both in the author's mind and in the society he was living in. It also has aimed at creating a historically realistic atmosphere, a goal toward which LaW and Jakes as a writer apparently also strive for. Even though "a pure objectivity in representing the past is not possible", Nikander argues (1996:13), he attaches a responsibility to a writer of historical fiction to "create a notion of the historical reality". From this it can be derived that even though viewpoints at history differ, the image of history presented ought to be realistic, at least to an extent.

An interesting and quite intriguing angle to the theses and arguments represented above about history, fiction, their relationship and writing of both can be discovered by what D'Amico (1989) puts forth. In his study of Historicism[6], D'Amico (1989:ix-x) makes an analogy about a piece of classical music and a debate that rose from it. One critic, Forte, was of the opinion that the musical object of study would be separable from "the

[6] Historicism is defined by *The Penguin Encyclopedia* (2004:722) as follows: "Either of two rather different theories about historical understanding. (1) The view that ideas and systems of thought can be understood only from within the historical contexts that produced them. (2) The view that there are general laws of historical development which permit long-term social forecasts."

contingencies of historical context" (1989:ix), approaching the piece in a purely scientific way and requiring that "a rigorous musical scholar" ignore cultural and historical variation. His opponent, Taruskin, replied that any attempt to disregard the above mistakes cultural objects, such as music, for natural objects. He further argued that mere "physical properties" are not sufficient to enable understanding of a musical piece. This view was countered by the former with arguments that the study of music would then be reduced to "destructive relativism", futile search of hidden meanings, purposes and messages. Forte contended that science requires that no assumptions beyond the present in experience be had. Music is "a natural process" and that natural-scientific approach "must model the study of culture". These are, in short, the two paths that Historicism, a quite central part of critical thinking, offers. D'Amico (1989:x, xi) establishes that "human understanding is always 'captive' of its historical situation" and that "investigating a world beyond is an elaborate cultural practice". In his study, bearing these broadly defined arguments in mind, D'Amico (1989) examines the viewpoints of several philosophers such as Popper, Foucault and Lakatos[7], with Popper's arguments as a basis for further speculation for anti-historicist views. As summarised by Popper himself,

> . . . there can be no history of "the past as it actually did happen"; there can only be historical interpretations, and none of them final; and every generation has a right to frame its own . . . But am I justified in refusing to the historicist the right to interpret history in his [/her] own way? . . . My answer to this question is that historicist interpretations are of a peculiar kind . . . the historicist does not recognize that *it is we who select and order the facts of history*, but he [/she] believes that "history itself," or the "history of mankind," determines, by its inherent laws, ourselves, our problems, our future, and even our point of view. (Popper 1945:268.269, as quoted in D'Amico 1989:26, emphasis added)

[7] The following briefly addresses Karl Popper's ideas. A realist and attracted to metaphysics, Popper holds that scientific methods are merely conventions and rules established in the society and thus does not subscribe to the view that the best scientific theory represents reality (1989:8). In his critique of Marx (1989:11), Popper argues that historicism and essentialism, i.e. that there are certain necessary conditions for things in order for them to exist, are related, since Historicism believes in "patterns, laws and prediction" in socio-cultural history. A critical rationalist and fallibilist, he (1989:12) opposes essentialism because it "weakens the role of criticism of theories" and makes standards of science dogmatic, a journey to a "final truth". Still, he (1989:20) is considered one of the key figures in the field of Historicism. Popper's two central arguments (1989:20, 21) in terms of Historicism are that "history obeys a lawful order or logic", making "history predictions" possible. The second argument establishes that the present context, either internally or retrospectively, holds the key for reasoning. Thus, there are no correct accounts, no "automatic rationality". D'Amico (1989:21; emphasis added) argues that interpretations in history can be assessed "in terms of their practicality, utility, simplicity, or theoretical fertility, but *not as representations of reality*". The latter is, in other words, an investigation at how different frameworks make it possible to understand history, not an effort to determine the "true" or "correct" framework.

Bearing all this in mind, the form in the field of literary theory suitable into analysing the message in LaW, according to Jones (1996), is called New Historicism. Jones (1996:164, 165) contends that New Historicism fits as a literary theory in the context of LaW. For a more in-depth analysis, see chapter 7. In the following section, this form of literary criticism is briefly introduced.

4.1 New Historicist school of literary criticism

New Historicism is both a relatively far-reaching[8] and comparatively recent form of literary criticism. In essence born in the 1980s as a formal theory more out of an accident than determined willpower to create one it remains, according to its fundamental key figure Stephen Greenblatt "a practice rather than doctrine" (1989:1). Greenblatt, in his work *Renaissance self-fashioning: from More to Shakespeare* (1980:4), called "the flagship of the New Historicism" by Tuomainen (2000:34), claims to have attempted "a more cultural or anthropological criticism" in his analysis of More, Marlowe, Spenser and Shakespeare, among other writers. Greenblatt (1980) holds that "men are born 'unfinished animals'" and that what is to be avoided at all costs in art in general and in literature in particular is a

> drift back toward a conception of art as addressed to a timeless, cultureless, unversal human essence or, alternatively [toward] a self-regarding, autonomous, closed system – in either case, art as oposed [*sic*] to social life. (Greenblatt 1980:4)

Greenblatt (1980:4, 5; emphasis original) further postulates that the status of literary criticism is "understanding literature as a part of the system of signs that constitutes a given culture", with its goal "*poetics of culture*".

Greenblatt's (1980:1-4) logic more or less follows a path like this: during the Renaissance Period and beyond in the Western culture, persons generally possessed less autonomy, i.e. individuality than today. They were more controlled by, at least, "family, state, and religious institutions" (1980:1). However, in the early modern period, a change in the society took place. This change was *dialectical* in nature, a given shift or change in power relations, social status, psychological organization etc. generated countershift(s) and counterchanges, adaptations to the circumstances. That a person's identity could be

[8] Tuomainen (2000:36) places the practice in such fields as "ethnography, anthropology and art history".

fashioned in "a manipulative, artful process" (1980:2) and also that self-consciousness increased and personality was, to an extent, born only then is, contends Greenblatt, Christianity's fault. Thus, "self-fashioning" was created, ultimately rendering "representation of one's nature or intention in speech or actions" (1980:3) possible. Thus, literature has no choice but to function "without regard for a sharp distinction" (1980:3) between it and social life. If we try to do this, we pretend as if humans were not, in Geertz's (1973:51, as quoted in Greenblatt 1980:3) phrase, "cultural artifacts". Obviously, this can be read as a counterstrike aimed at both Formalism and New Criticism[9] even though Greenblatt himself (1989:1) denies situating New Historicism firmly on any position in the field of literary theory. Still, he confesses (1989:1) that "positivist historical scholarship [of the early-20th century]" varies quite a lot from his approach.

It is this process that, according to Greenblatt (1980:4), has made human nature irretrievably dependent on culture and ensured that not only are we bound by it psychologically, it also controls our behaviour. Human nature has travelled from abstract mass lacking individuality to a "concrete historical embodiment" (1980:4).

In this setting, Greenblatt (1980:4) imposes on literature three functions: first, literature is a manifestation of the concrete behaviour of a given author. Second, it is in itself the expression of the codes by which behaviour is shaped. Finally, it serves as a reflection upon those codes. All of these have to be used together.[10] Since language is "a collective construction" (1980:5), it follows that the outer social world is present and affects within as well as outside a literary text. To conclude (1980:5), literature is an "extremely sensitive register" of diachronism/dialogue in/with the world (and also with literature), forming complex, struggling and harmonious resonances in interpretation. In other words, a work of art "is a product of negotiation between a creator . . . equipped with a

[9] Formalism was born in Russia in early-20th century (*Penguin Encyclopedia* 2004:579), out of which New Criticism emerged. New Criticism, defined by Tuomainen (2000:34), insists that the author's behaviour, mind, the surrounding history and a work's socio-political messages cannot be factors in analysing literary texts.

[10] Greenblatt (1980:4) contends that if interpretation of a text only focuses on the author's behavior, it becomes "in either a conventionally historical or psychoanalytic mode", a literary biography. If the focus is only on the expression of prevailing socio-political codes/habits, "it risks being absorbed entirely into an ideological superstructure". For a third, if only reflection of said codes are investigated, the concrete function and relationship between concrete (literary) art and individuals and institutions shrink into "'historical background'" that does not add to understanding.

complex, communally shared repertoire of conventions, and the institutions and practices of society" (Greenblatt 1989:12). Veeser (1989 (ed.):xi) concludes that New Historicism describes "culture in action".

5. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, DECADES PRECEDING THE CIVIL WAR AND THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD

This chapter begins with a brief introduction to American history prior to the 19th century. Since LaW tells about the Civil War, taking place in the 19th century, that period has been examined more thoroughly in this study. Consequently, less investigation, apart from a few historically significant observations (e.g. birth of slavery, American independence), has been directed to the centuries preceding 19th century. Some of the crucial events and occurrences in the decades of the 19th century America preceding the Civil War are observed and examined. The chapter goes on to account a short biography on Robert E. Lee[11], offering a brief account about Lee's achievements in the war. Logically, the focus is on the developments in the Eastern theater[12], since Robert E. Lee mainly spent his war years there.

In the 17th century, crossing the Atlantic Ocean to America was very dangerous. In 1607, the first settlement was planted at Jamestown by the British. English society, heritage and culture in all fields conceivable were still very much in the minds of these people. They fortunately landed on patches of land recently left empty by the Indians, many of whom soon obtained smallpox, measles and other European ailments as a result. Fighting broke between the English and other colonial settlers, e.g. Spanish and French. The most enduring opponents were, however, Indians who, after a period of hospitality turned into hostile as a result of want of land and incompatibility of cultures. This produced a lot of savage fighting between the populations in the 1600s.

The number of slaves, the existence of whom probably was the most decisive but not the only cause for the Civil War, began to rise. In 1619, the first slave ship arrived in

[11] The chapter provides information from studies by and publications by Grant (1885), Freeman (1934), Randall (1937), Sydnor (1948), Craven (1953), Roland (1960), Abernethy (1961), Bailyn (Bailyn and Fleming 1967), Escott (1978), Thomas (1979), Millett and Maslowski (1984), McPherson (1988), Brinkley et al. (1991), Levine (1992), Berlin, Davis, Fogel, Foner and Morgan (Goodheart et al. (eds.) 1993).

[12] Millett and Maslowski (1984:160-161) divide the war into four main theaters. First, there was the eastern theater, between Chesapeake Bay and the Appalachians, with two subtheaters, i.e. the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, a strategically and logistically vital area providing for the South both provisions and an invasion route to the North. The second eastern subtheater was the area to the east of Blue Ridge, with its several rivers and streams. Between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River, there was the large western theater with two subtheaters also, i.e. middle and east Tennessee and the Mississippi River line. Third theater, though arguably strategically of less importance, was the area to the west of the Mississippi, titled Trans-Mississippi. The sea constituted the fourth theater, operated in by the naval forces.

Virginia. Still, for the remainder of the century, the number of slaves in Virginia came to just 16,000, while in all the other colonies, 11,000 more were counted. The reason for this relatively small increase was mainly that slaves were not delivered quantitatively in such large numbers as they later were. Following the legalisation of the slave trade in 1660, African slaves started to replace white indentured servants as a chief source of labor in the plantation, with the change complete in Virginia by 1700.[13, 14]

Americans at the beginning of the 18th century had more or less a century of their own history behind them, but that they still were British, not Americans yet, nor Europeans. As the century progressed, however, colonists in America began to absorb ideas from the British opposition very quickly, especially protest literature. But it was the message and its interpretation that mattered the most.[15]

The turbulent times and also the relatively widespread opposition to the British Government, even though considered the model of freedom in some quarters, caused a stir in America. One other factor was the more stringent laws, policies and control established by the British government concerning the colonies. These policies rather created than solved problems and sparked colonial resistance. Ultimately, this lead into the American Revolution in 1775[16], in which thirteen colonies rebelled and ultimately won the war against the British. As a result, America gained its independence.

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13 From 1620 to 1808 (Fogel 1993:32), when slave import was made illegal in America, the number of slave imports increased. Berlin (1993:35, 36) distinguishes between a "Northern nonplantation and two Southern plantation systems", situated in Chesapeake Bay and Carolina and Georgia respectfully, with vast practical and sociological differences separating the two, leading to, it can be argued, two different concepts of slavery.

14 For timeline about slavery in America, see (Goodheart et al. 1993:xxiii-xxvi).

15 This development of thinking is elaborated by Bailyn (Bailyn and Fleming 1967) as follows: "The opposition vision of English politics, conveyed through these popular opposition writers, was determinative of the political understanding of eighteenth-century Americans. The colonists universally agreed that man was by nature lustful, that he was utterly untrustworthy of power, unable to control his passion for domination. The antimony of power and liberty was accepted as the central fact of politics . . . power was aggressive, liberty passive . . . the duty of free men was to protect the latter and constrain the former. Threats to free government . . . lurked everywhere, [most dangerously] in the designs of ministers to aggrandize power by the corrupt use of influence, [ultimately leading to the destruction of] the balance of the constitution [*sic*]. Corruption . . . was as universal a cry in the colonies as it was in England, and that . . . tyranny . . . was continuing to spread its menace . . ." (Bailyn 1967:45-46).

16 Interestingly, Morgan (1993:82) points out that there was a "paradox" between slavery and the concept of freedom in America, contending that it was, ironically in fact, the existence of the former that made possible the ultimate meaning of the latter. Davis (1993:83) claims that the founders of the United States "did not resolve the paradox", illustrating this claim with Thomas Jefferson, who was torn over the issue.

During the first two decades of the 19th century, America lived the so-called Jeffersonian Era. Education, in accordance with Enlightenment ideas, and independence from Europe were emphasised. Nationalism grew to very high proportions, with demands that children were to be educated as patriots and even American spelling would have to be different from the British. While in England an industrial revolution had begun, few signs of it were found in America between 1800 – 1820. The paradox of freedom in the form of slavery was heightened by the fact that Jefferson's native Virginia owned most of the slaves.[17] Some slaveowners expressed a desire, inspired by newly-gained freedom and Enlightenment thoughts, to abolish slavery. However, the emancipatory thoughts were not fully embraced by the South in the first decades of the 19th century, with the regions continuing to evolve differently. By 1860, the South was responsible for producing two-thirds of all cotton in the world, with the population of slavery grown to four million in America.

The years preceding the war also were years of American expansion to the West. Chronologically, of the Southern states Louisiana was bought from France in 1803, and admitted a state in 1812. Mississippi was admitted in 1817, Alabama in 1819, Missouri in 1821[18], Arkansas in 1836 and Florida in 1845, multiplying the Southern population five times. Texas was gained in 1845 through a war with Mexico[19], an affair heavily criticised by general Grant. As for the Northern States, Ohio was added to the Union in 1803, Indiana in 1816, Maine in 1820, Illinois in 1821 and Michigan, Iowa and Wisconsin in 1837, 1846 and 1848 respectively. A disorganised war against Britain was fought between 1812 – 1815, largely owing to land disputes, fear of Indians and naval power. Commercial restrictions by the British, their continued support of Indians and expansionist thoughts aimed at Canada and Florida were the primary causes. Importantly, that the war against Britain set off the industrial expansion.

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[17] Jefferson marvelled how the American could both "'endure toil, famine, stripes, imprisonment or death itself in vindication of his own liberty'" while "'inflict[ing] on his fellow men a bondage, one hour of which is fraught with more misery than ages of that which he rose in rebellion to oppose.'" (as quoted in Levine 1992:6)

[18] The Missouri Compromise ultimately ruled that the Federal government would not interfere with slavery but the practice was forbidden to the north of Missouri's Southern border (Levine 1992:138)

[19] As Randall (1937:115, 116) reports, as early as 1836 Sam Houston, a leader of American settlers in Texas, established independence from Mexico. There were, however, "loud complaints" that the Mexican War, ending in 1848, was a war of slavery expansion. McPherson (1988:4) remarks ironically that the competence of the American rank and file in the war "foreshadowed the ultimate irony" of it, since "many of the best men would fight against each other in the next war". This is a theme also found in the North and South Trilogy.

The growth of sectionalism[20] took a drastic turn for the worse in the years following 1819. The very first true wedges of separation between North and South emerged that time. By 1820, the South had a minority in the Congress. This situation was made worse because by 1805, slavery had begun to disappear from the Northern states, the Northern population grew and its interests were diverging from those of the South. This was a period when Missouri applied for statehood and the resulting debate aggravated when New York Representative James Tallmadge Jr. proposed that no additional slaves be brought to Missouri and that all current slaves made free when they turned 25.[21]

The attack on slavery surprised the Southerners and many agreed that it be abolished. However, Northern states were arguably suffering from a kind of inferiority complex, with more than ethics at stake. They were afraid of losing political power to the South. In other words, on this basis, they cared less about the status of the African-American than power on the governmental level. Before the controversy, there were no more cries for the abolition of the slave in the North than there were in the South.[22, 23]

As Andrew Jackson of Virginia was elected president in 1828, he both emphasised states' rights and the influence of the centralised Federal government. States' rights became an acute issue when John Calhoun's Nullification Doctrine was adopted in South Carolina in 1832 (see fn), an ominous sign for what would happen less than 30 years afterwards. The 1830s also saw slavery as becoming a more and more central issue in the mind of the public, with a slave revolt organised by Nat Turner in 1831 in Virginia,

[20] Levine (1992:135, 136) attaches the following reasons for a change in viewpoint regarding slavery, from an evil running counter to ideas of Enlightenment and freedom to one that had to get rid of: 1. The invention of the cotton gin that tremendously expanded the demand of cotton, having a great impact on the profitable aspect of slavery. 2. "A range of ideological and practical challenges to bondage" 3. Developments outside of America.

[21] Sydnor (1948:121) narrates that "The debate which had begun in Congress was continued with much vehemence in newspapers, state legislatures, public meetings, and pamphlets . . . A more important point was the assertion . . . that slavery was wrong, whether viewed under the laws of morality, the dictates of humanity, the teachings of the Scripture, or the principles of democracy . . ."

[22] A historian (as quoted in Foner 1993:263) notes that "'if there had been a civil war in 1819 – 1821 it would have been between the members of Congress, with the rest of the country looking on in amazement.'"

[23] The second large question were the tariffs that the South greatly disapproved, because they had to pay more for articles and goods they could not produce or manufacture themselves (Brinkley et al. 1991:284). Brinkley et al. (1991:284) point out that the disapproval helped create the so-called Nullification Doctrine of John Calhoun, vice president during the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1828 – 1836). The doctrine stipulated that an individual state had the right to, by means of state convention, "interpose" itself to announce an unconstitutional law passed by the Congress "null and void" within that state. If a state was not willing to submit to a law even though three-quarters of the states had ratified amendment to the Constitution assigning said authority to the Congress, it could secede from the Union.

killing about 60 whites[24] and the founding of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1833.[25] In the political arena some of Jackson's policies helped create a new opposition party to the Democrats called the Whig party. While the Democrats emphasised that in order for simple, sincere and honest workers to succeed and find opportunities, the Federal Government must not be too powerful. The Whigs, in contrast, strove for a tight, industrialised, commercial economic system, also welcoming new technological innovations such as railroads and telegraphs.

Abolitionists, with their fanaticism and passionate crusader-like mentality, were opposed by the majorities in both North and South.[26, 27, 28] In spite of the strong vocabulary, the issue was not one-dimensional: Not everyone in the South agreed with proslavery arguments such as these while on the other hand, northern labour movement leaders formed alliances with rhetoric of this kind. American Antislavery Society still managed to distribute its message via pamphlets and other literature to an exceedingly wider audience.[29]

As the 1840s came, passion was growing in strength and number. In the North, aggressive rhetoric concerning "Slave Power" expanded while unpopular, politically controversial elements were left out, e.g. the rights of free African-Americans. Regardless, the northerners remained by and large uncommitted to the abolitionist cause for the slaves. The opposition to the *expansion* of slavery nevertheless grew steadily in the North. Northerners wanted more Western land for themselves and consequently, they

[24] This caused Virginia legislature to debate on the abolition of slavery, but the measure was defeated by a vote of 73 to 58. Henceforward, Virginians were less in favour of abolition (Sydnor 1948:228).

[25] American Anti-Slavery Society had a radical key figure, William Lloyd Garrison (1805 – 1879). To illustrate, he wrote in his newspaper the *Liberator*: "I am aware that many object to the severity of my language; but is there not cause for severity? I *will* be as harsh as truth, and as uncompromising as justice . . . I am in earnest-I will not equivocate-I will not excuse-I will not retreat a single inch-AND I WILL BE HEARD." After the Civil War, however, Garrison cared little about the slaves (Brinkley et al. 1991:364).

[26] Sydnor (1948:243) reveals that some passionate Southerners "threatened to lynch" abolitionists should they venture south of the Potomac River and offered thousands of dollars in reward to any who would "put them in reach of Southern vengeance".

[27] Calhoun fired back that Northern "manual laborers and operatives [were] essentially slaves. . . [while] our slaves are hired for life and are well compensated, - yours are hired by the day and not cared for." (as quoted in Levine 1992:158).

[28] Calhoun's argument (Sydnor 1948:244) was that, when entering the Union, a state had not renounced its power to decide over its own institutions and thus "'any intermeddling . . . with the domestic institutions . . . on any ground . . . is an assumption of superiority not warranted by the Constitution [and] subversive of the objects for which the Constitution was formed'" (as quoted in Sydnor 1948:244-245).

[29] The most notable works include *American Slavery as It Is: Testimony of a Thousand Witnesses* (1839) by Weld and Grimké and *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe (Brinkley et al. 1991:367).

did not want to live nor compete with slaves or slave labour, nor be locally governed by slaveholders. To this end, Wilmot Proviso during the Mexican War, never adopted, was introduced in 1846.[30] Populist politicians in the North secretly opposed but publicly supported it. This angered planters in the South who feared isolation, internal slave revolt and loss of power.[31] By the late 1840s, there were those who wanted to secede from the Union.

The decade preceding the war saw many developments: with the nation expanding rapidly to the West, the slavery question gained more momentum. Ironically, the very nationalism that both helped to expand America and keep it together would eventually tear the nation apart. The role slavery became the object of political wrestling. Texas was added as a slave state in 1845 and California, experiencing a gold rush in 1849, as a free state in 1850. Phrases such as "star of empire" and "manifest destiny" started to appear as evidence for American nationalism.

Because the balance between free and slave territories was broken with California, Southerners were afraid the territories of New Mexico, Oregon and Utah were to prohibit slavery as well and in 1850 considered secession.[32] In 1850, a compromise was made by Senator Henry Clay that tried to solve all the problems. It ruled that California be admitted as a free state, that in areas besides Texas gained from Mexico the slavery question be decided by the settlers, that the boundary issue between Texas and New Mexico be compensated by the Federal government, that slave trade be banned from District of Columbia and that a new, more effective fugitive slave law be passed.[33] These

[30] It ruled that "'neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist'" in the territory acquired from Mexico in the war of 1845 – 1848 (as quoted in Levine 1992:180).

[31] Sydnor (1948:331, 332) recounts that between the 1820s and 1840s, the South had lost more political power, "the strong and nationally respected leadership of Virginia" had disappeared and "the cotton-kingdom politicians" were too aggressive and sectional. Further, even though the South had its share of the national development, their society became "an obstacle to American social and economic progress and . . . a moral pariah".

[32] Among other issues causing tension were, as Brinkley et al. (1991:386) point out, whether slavery should be abolished from District of Columbia and fugitive slaves which Northern laws forbade to send back South.

[33] Calhoun (as quoted in Craven 1953:75) commented that "'the agitation of the subject of slavery would . . . end in disunion'" and that this agitation was responsible for much of discontent and disunion. According to him, the South had fallen behind because the North had now more states and population and were thus able to dominate. Slavery, he argued, was vital to the existence of the South and the growing number of fanatics in the North considered it a sin and a crime. Calhoun wanted justice the Constitution gave and an equal chance for slavery. Seward, future Secretary of War to Lincoln, (1953:79) countered that States had surrendered their equality as States "'and submitted themselves to the sway of the numerical majority'". America was not "'a joint stock association" but "'a political state . . . [an] organized society, whose end . .

measures were grudgingly accepted in the South. An uneasy truce settled the tension for a while, partly as a result of the economic boom experienced by the country.

In 1854, another territorial controversy broke when Democrat Senator Stephen Douglas introduced a bill concerning the status of Nebraska territory. In the bill, Kansas territory was also carved out from Nebraska. It upheld that, like in the Compromise of 1850, the people residing in the territories had the power to decide, through dialogue with their representatives and United States Supreme Court, whether slavery be allowed or not. All depended on the constitution and legislation of a territory. This also meant that the Missouri Compromise restricting slavery was repealed in the name of "popular sovereignity". The reaction was an immediate uproar. Curiously, this has been many times interpreted as a "Southern move" even though it did not originate there. To many, this was proof that Southern gain of power had to stop. The whole North was furious since the Missouri Compromise had been an important gain.[34] The South immediately reacted with indifference and uncertainty.[35] Whig party was virtually destroyed in the South, Democratic party gaining many new members. Most importantly, the Northern Democrats split and a new party called "Republicans" was formed, consisting of former Northern Democrats, Whigs and also a former party named "Know-Nothings" with its initial objective to halt the spread of slavery.

Republican party was founded on a sectional basis.[36] Obviously, slavery had become such a heated topic that Douglas's rationale became difficult to view calmly. Abolitionist propaganda had produced "a fixed stereotype" of the South which horribly exploded and expanded in the fertile ground of religious awakening in the North.[37]

. was government.'" Calhoun was sided by Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, future president of the Confederacy (Rowland (ed.) 1923:290-291, as quoted in Escott 1978:3), who thought the South deserved "'an experiment'". If slavery proved unprofitable in a given territory, the said territory would be free and vice versa.

[34] For reactions in the North caused by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill see Craven (1953:186-192).

[35] Randall (1937:132) sees the following behind the proposal: There was pressure directed at him from a Pacific railway undertaking, constituents in Chicago, the South and his own party.

[36] Foner (1993:269-271) contends that in 1858, when Republican Abraham Lincoln and Douglas held a series of debates, it was a question of national or sectional basis for policy-making. Douglas held that only local autonomy would solve national issues while Lincoln insisted on sectional solution on the entire Union. Douglas maintained that whatever a majority of the people in a state decided to do with slavery was right while Lincoln insisted, using the sectional morality of his party, that slavery was immoral and that this fact came first on both national and local levels.

[37] Arguably, among the few people capable of viewing slavery calmly was Douglas himself. He insisted that politics had to be separated from moral judgement. Consequently the North had to refrain from imposing their sectional morals upon the South. In summary, he told in 1858 (Foner 1993:270), "I deny the

Tensions mounted: in 1855, fighting broke out in Kansas as a result of antislavery settlers unwilling to accept a proslavery legislation. There, John Brown, self-titled "instrument of God's will to destroy slavery" and his band murdered five slaveholders. In 1857, United States Supreme Court essentially ruled the Compromise of 1850 unconstitutional for barring a slave, Dred Scott, rights as a citizen. Scott, had been encouraged by the abolitionists to file a suit demanding freedom on the grounds that he had resided for a time in a free state.[38] In the previous year, Republicans narrowly lost the presidential election to Democrat James Buchanan, proof of the immense gain of influence by the Republican party.[39]

In 1858, Abraham Lincoln, a Republican from Illinois, emerged to the public's attention when he debated with Douglas as a part of senatorial election campaign. Lincoln was opposed to slavery in theory but a moderate on termination of it; he did not advocate for Federal government's interference of it, but did not favour expansionism of it, nor Dred Scott decision. Lincoln lost but became prominent enough to contend as a Republican candidate for presidency in 1860.

In 1859, a violent outburst occurred in Virginia that well illustrated the gravity and emotionality of the situation. John Brown of Kansas, financed by abolitionists, captured Harpers Ferry garrison in Virginia, his purpose to "stir and arm" nearby slaves and

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right of Congress to force a slave-holding state upon an unwilling people. I deny their right to force a free state upon an unwilling people. I deny their right to force a good thing upon a people who are unwilling to receive it . . . It is no answer to this argument to say that slavery is an evil and hence should not be tolerated. You must allow the people to decide for themselves whether it is a good or an evil."

[38] According to Brinkley et al. (1991:398), Chief Justice Taney ruled that since Scott was property, not a citizen, he could not bring a suit. The Constitution did not give an African American any rights. In addition, since the Constitution ruled that property may not be confiscated by the Congress without due process of law, slavery cannot be restricted. Thus, "the highest tribunal in the land had sanctioned the extreme Southern argument".

[39] Foner (1993:271-273) reflects that by the late 1850s, the Republicans had formed an ideology which suited the majority of the northerners. Its cornerstones were northern social order, based on dignity and opportunity of free labor, social mobility, enterprise and "progress". It "glorified" materialism, social fluidity, individualism. South was "a backward, stagnant, aristocratic" society, a stumbling block to an egalitarian society and progress. The idea of "Slave Power" combined antislavery ideas with threats to free labor and egalitarian, anti-aristocratic values that were appealing in the North. It was possible to represent the idea as a "conservative reform", a return to the principles of the Founding Fathers, a counterforce to Southern usurpation of power. These issues of self-interest sold much more effectively than arguments based on the plight of the slaves. Slave Power had long transgressed northern rights, they said, and had to be checked. At the same time, from this rhetoric originated and further strengthened the Southern "paranoia" of "black Republicans. The view is wholly concurred to by Brinkley et al. (1991:394-395) who also maintain that "relatively few" Northerners, inside the party and out, were sincerely concerned about slavery as much as their own standing.

launch a movement that would serve the cause of "freedom". He was stopped cold by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee and his expedition force, captured, tried for treason in Virginia and hanged.[40]

Indignation, hatred, and fear swept the South when it discovered that the North entertained a favourable opinion of Brown and had financed the scheme.[41] South believed it had to ensure safety, be it in the Union or out of it. The South concluded the Republicans had advocated and given birth to the violence exemplified by Brown.[42]

Within six weeks after Abraham Lincoln was elected president in 1860, South Carolina seceded from the Union on December 20.[43] In February, 1861, Jefferson Davis was elected provisional president and the Civil War, long seen in the horizon, began when a Federal garrison at Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina was fired upon on April 12, 1861.[44]

5.1 A biography of Robert E. Lee[45]

Robert E. Lee was born in a huge Stratford plantation in the Potomac valley on January 19, 1807. He was the son of Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee, a distinguished officer during the Revolution, governor of Virginia but a failure in subsequent private financial life. His mother was Ann Hill Carter Lee, from the richest family in Virginia after George Washington, whose family included three signers of the Declaration of Independence, three governors and two Presidents. In 1829 he graduated from West Point second in his class, marrying Mary Custis, daughter of Washington's adopted son in 1831. After various duties in the Corps of Engineers, he fought in the Mexican War

[40] As concluded by Roland (1960:10): "Ironically, Brown alive failed in his desperate mission; Brown 'a-mouldering in the grave' became the sainted martyr of the abolitionist crusade and thus succeeded beyond his maddest dream."
[41] Secession from the Union started to sound plausible even among "men who had refused to recognize the existence of an 'irrepressible conflict'" (Craven 1953:307, 308).
[42] This was untrue, since both Lincoln and Seward had condemned the raid (Brinkley et al. 1991:401). Still, the logic went that since the Republicans had opposed to expansion of slavery and abolitionists such as Philips and Emerson lend material and moral support, "the triumph of the Republican party in 1860 would seal the fate of slavery and with it the Southern way of life" (Craven 1953:309).
[43] It was followed in early 1861 by Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas and shortly later by Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas and Tennessee (Levine 1992:225).
[44] For a timeline of events in the United States, 1800–1861, see Brinkley et al. (1991:187, 216, 242, 276, 307, 344, 367, 402, 443).
[45] The biographical information derives from Freeman (1934), Randall (1937), Coulter (1950), Eaton (1954), Foote (1958), Catton (1965), Foote (1974) McPherson (1988) and Trulock (1992).

(1846 – 1848) with distinction, serving as a captain of engineers. After the war, he assumed his engineering undertakings. In 1852, he became superintendent at West Point. Three years later, in 1855, then Secretary of War Jefferson Davis ordered Lee, as lieutenant colonel, to act as second in command in the newly-founded 2nd Cavalry. After domestic difficulties in the late 1850s, Lee in October, 1859 took command of forces organised to stop an insurrection by abolitionist John Brown staged at Harpers Ferry.[46]

Lee was in the spring of 1861 offered to command the Union army but declined. On April 20, though very sad about the impending war, he resigned from the United States Army. At first, as Major General in the volunteer (titled "provisional") army of the Confederate States, he was responsible for the mobilisation and defence of Virginia, commanding all the forces operating there and acting as a military adviser to President Davis, general-in-chief. In May, he was promoted full general. After a failed campaign in Western Virginia and Kanawha Valley between June and October, Lee was assigned to command and supervise the coastal defenses in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida in November. In March, 1862, Lee was returned to his former place as Davis's assistant in Virginia. On June 1st, Lee took command of the principal army of the Confederacy in the Eastern front after its former commander, General Johnston, had been wounded after the Battle of Seven Pines (Fair Oaks). Lee renamed the unit the Army of Northern Virginia. In this post he remained until the end of the war, becoming Commander-in-Chief of all the Confederate armies in February, 1865, at the last legs of the war. On April 9th, Lee surrendered to General Grant at Appomattox Court House, ending the war in Virginia.

After the war, Lee's spirit became "a power and a guide" for the South, seeking to unite the country, and, since he was nearly worshipped in the South, his example proved valuable. Lee's final vocation was that as a president of Washington College (today Washington and Lee University) before his death, of a heart attack, in 1870.

5.1.1 Robert E. Lee in the Eastern Theater of the Civil War (1861 – 1865)

The war lasted approximately four years and had numerous campaigns, ten thousand battle actions, twists and turns that were both military, political, economical and social.

[46] The insurrection was put down and Brown, a religious fanatic who with his sons tried to lead the slaves in Virginia in a revolution against their masters (see chapter 5), executed.

The space does not allow to examine, or even mention, but slight proportion here and it is not necessary for the purpose of this study since the focus is on Lee.[47] In connection with this study, most of the major armies'[48] most significant operations in the east, specifically Virginia front, are briefly reviewed, because Lee, the object of this study, made his mark there.[49]

The following is a broad, rather general, non-argumentative description of the war between principal eastern armies, one of whose head Lee was nearly three years. Since the summary has materialised from several overlapping sources and is very general in nature, it is impossible, apart from contemporary sources that have also been used, to pinpoint one, or even several, sources of information pertaining to a given portion in the text.[50]

After a few minor clashes, the first major land battle in the East occurred in July, 1861, at Bull Run, Virginia, in which Northern army under General McDowell was defeated by combined Southern forces of Johnston and Beauregard. The Federal army withdrew to Washington and General McClellan, lately successful against Robert E. Lee in today's West Virginia, was appointed the head of the principal Eastern army, the Army of the Potomac (hence: AotP), and commander-in-chief later in the year. At this point, Lee functioned as an organiser of Virginia forces and military adviser to president Jefferson Davis. In November, 1861, Lee, returning from what today is West Virginia, was sent to supervise the construction of coastal defenses in South Carolina, Florida and Georgia. In March, 1862, McClellan, demoted to the mere command of AotP with General Halleck assuming command of all the Union forces, landed to the east of Richmond with his army. At the same time, Davis recalled Lee by his side. In subsequent operations in the Peninsula, McClellan inched his way toward the capital. After a Confederate counterattack at the Battle of Fair Oaks (Seven Pines), Johnston was wounded and replaced by Robert E. Lee on June 1, 1862. Lee renamed this principal eastern

[47] The latest research on the causes of the war can be found in Ayers (2005). Appendix A analyses, and provides statistics to, all the Lee's battles discussed by LaW.
[48] It is to be noted that these armies, although principal, were by all means not the only forces operating in the Eastern theater.
[49] Geographically, the theater of operations extended from the Atlantic Coast to Arkansas, with some fighting in Texas and New Mexico (e.g. Brinkley et al. 1991)
[50] The summary employs information shared by e.g. Tate (1929), Coulter (1950), Eaton (1954), Foote (1958, 1963, 1974), Roland (1960), Catton (1961, 1963, 1965), Escott (1978), Millett and Maslowski (1984), McPherson (1988), Brinkley et al. (1991), Trulock (1992), and Power (1998).

Confederate army Army of Northern Virginia (hence: AoNV) and forced McClellan to withdraw in a series of battles known as the Seven Days.

In August, 1862, Lincoln assembled a new major army to the north of Richmond, commanded by General Pope of western merit, to which AotP was to join. Before the juncture could be fully effected, however, Lee had defeated Pope, along with elements of AotP, in the same battlefield where the first Manassas battle occurred. In September Lee, with the initiative, invaded Maryland. McClellan, restored to command, marched from Washington to meet him. This campaign saw a strange twist of faith when Lee's written general order accidentally ended in McClellan's hands. The campaign culminated with the Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), ending in a tactical Federal victory in a sense that Lee ultimately withdrew, allowing Lincoln to issue the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. It abolished slavery from territories under Confederate control, taking effect on January 1, 1863. In December, 1862, Lee defeated AotP, now under General Burnside, in the Battle of Fredericksburg, in Virginia in one of the most one-sided victories he achieved in the war.

In January, 1863, Lincoln relieved Burnside of command and placed General Hooker at the head of AotP. In May Lee, together with General Jackson, his corps commander, defeated Hooker at the Battle of Chancellorsville in Virginia. Again given the initiative as a result, he marched into Pennsylvania in June. This second invasion culminated in July, 1863 with the battle of Gettysburg in which AotP, now under General Meade, was successful in repulsing the Confederate onslaught. Lee once again retreated into Virginia. The rest of 1863 saw a few less prominent campaigns and maneuvres in the Virginia front.

In March, 1864, Ulysses S. Grant, after gaining major successes in the Western theater was promoted commander-in-chief of all the Union armies. Grant, travelling personally with Meade's AotP, launched an all-out offensive in various theaters of the war titled Overland Campaign. What occurred among other developments was a series of major battles between AotP and AoNV (the largest were the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor) that resulted in great loss of life and which all were either inconclusive or tactical victories for Lee. Grant, still gaining territory, in June managed to put Lee under siege at Petersburg, a strategically vital city to Richmond, the capital.

After various strategic and siege operations of almost ten months, Grant in April, 1865, succeeded in breaking the siege. A little earlier, in February, 1865, Lee had been promoted general-in-chief of all the Confederate armies. Lee withdrew to the west but was stopped at Appomattox. On April 9, Lee surrendered AoNV to Grant, largely ending hostilities in Virginia. [51] Table 1 shows the most significant events in the Civil War.

Table 1. Timeline of the most significant events in the Civil War (1861 – 1865).

1861	Secession of Southern states; Mississippi (January 9); Florida (January 10); Alabama (January 11); Georgia (January 19); Louisiana (January 26); Texas (February 1); Ft. Sumter fired upon in Charleston, SC (April 12th); Civil War starts. Virginia (April 17); Arkansas (May 6); Tennessee (May 7); North Carolina (May 20). Union blockades Confederate coast (May). First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas) (July 21); George B. McClellan appointed commander of Army of the Potomac (July).
1862	Garrisons Fort Henry and Fort Donelson surrender to General Grant in Tennessee (February). McClellan initiates Peninsular Campaign (March). Battle of Shiloh, Tennessee (April 6–7); Confederacy enacts military draft (April). Union forces capture New Orleans (May); Jackson's Valley Campaign (May). Robert E. Lee named commander of Army of Northern Virginia (June 1); Seven Days Battles (June–July). Second Battle of Bull Run (Manassas) (August 29–30), Lee invades MD. Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg) (September 17); Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation (September 22). McClellan removed from command (November). Battle of Fredericksburg (December 13); Battle of Murfeesboro (Stones River) (December).
1863	Lincoln issues Emancipation Proclamation (January 1). Union enacts draft (March). Battle of Chancellorsville (May 1–5). Lee invades PA (June). Battle of Gettysburg (July 1–3); Vicksburg surrenders (July 4); Antidraft riots break out in New York City (July). Battle of Chickamauga (September). Battle of Chattanooga (November 23–25).
1864	Battle of the Wilderness (May 5-7); Battles of Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor (May-June). Petersburg, Virginia besieged (June). General Sherman captures Atlanta (September 2). General Early defeated in the Battle of Cedar Creek (October). Sherman's "March to the Sea" begins (November 15); Lincoln reelected president (November). General Hood defeated in the Battle of Nashville (December 15-16); General Sherman occupies Savannah, GA (December 22).
1865	Grant achieves a breakthrough at Petersburg (April 2); Lee surrenders to Grant at Appomattox (April 9); Lincoln assassinated (April 15); Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery, ratified.

[51] For closer summaries of Lee's battles discussed by LaW, see Appendix A.

6. ROBERT E. LEE IN *LOVE AND WAR* WRITTEN BY JOHN JAKES: COMPARISON WITH ACCOUNTS BY HISTORIANS FOOTE, CATTON AND MCPHERSON

This chapter is the research part proper of this study. All references in LaW to General Robert E. Lee are examined and compared with studies by Foote (1958, 1963, 1974), Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) and McPherson (1988), with the research question being: How does the portrayal of Lee in this book of historical fiction compare with what the three arguably leading historians say about him? The order in which references have been examined is chronological, because that seemed to be the logical path into discovering the development of Lee against the novel's historical background. In order to avoid questions of distortion or emission of data, each reference to Lee in the book, more than 80 instances in total, has been included in the study.

The references are divided into four storytelling categories: Lee speaking dialogue, Lee as perceived and referred to by other characters in the story excluding dialogue, i.e. all references made to Lee except in speech, Lee as perceived and referred to by the author, i.e. sections where he is referred to by the narrator, and Lee as perceived and referred to by other characters in dialogue, i.e. all references made to Lee exclusively in dialogue. Finally, the "references in dialogue" part of the analysis has been further divided into comments made in either positive, negative or neutral context. The criterion has been a semantic assessment of a given line by the researcher and its placement into one of the three categories as a result. This approach was chosen in order to observe and highlight the fashion in which Lee is mentioned in the dialogue of the novel.

Events in LaW occur – as has been shown to be typical for a historical novel (see chapter 4) – in a chronological order, and LaW is divided into six smaller units (titled "books"). These are: 1. "A Vision from Scott" (April 1861 – July 1861), 2. "The Downward Road" (July 1861 – December 1861) 3. "A Worse Place Than Hell" (January 1862 – December 1862) 4. "'Let Us Die to Make Men Free'" (December 1862 – August 1863) 5. "The Butcher's Bill" (January 1864 – December 1864) and 6. "The Judgements of the Lord" (January 1865 – May 1865). These have been used as chronological markers in the study. Excerpts related to Lee's war campaigns covered in LaW are marked at the end of each relevant excerpt together with a running number marking their order of appearance in the

study. The campaigns are: Lee's Western Virginia Campaign (June 1861 – October 1861), Seven Days Battles (July 1862), Maryland Campaign (September 1862), Chancellorsville Campaign (April 1863 – May 1863), Gettysburg Campaign (June 1863 – July 1863), Overland Campaign (May 1864 – June 1864), Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (June 1864 – March 1865) and Appomattox Campaign (March-April 1865). For a more detailed analysis on the battles associated with the campaigns, see Appendix A.

Robert E. Lee was a character at whom lots of praise and admiration was generally directed in the United States of the mid-19th century. He was considered the "Marble Model", the nation's finest soldier and also a gentleman of highest decree. For instance, at the very first stages of the war, just as Lee was appointed and had accepted the command of all the forces in Virginia, a newspaper lauded him in the following manner:

> Of him it was said before his appointment, and of him it may be well said, no man is superior in all that constitutes the soldier and the gentleman-no man more worthy to head our forces and lead our army. There is no[-]one who would command more of the confidence of the people of Virginia than this distinguished officer, and no[-]one under whom the volunteers and militia would more gladly rally. His reputation, his acknowledged ability, his chivalric character, his probity, honor, and – may we add to his eternal praise – his Christian life and conduct make his very name a "tower of strength". (*Richmond Dispatch* May 1 1861, p. 2, as quoted in Freeman 1934:469)

So, let us start with R. E. Lee as himself a speaker of dialogue.

6.1 Robert E. Lee as a speaker of dialogue

1861, November: Book Two: "The Downward Road"

There is only one instance, and a rather minor one at that, running less than two pages in length, in LaW in which Lee actually is an active element in the story, i.e. a speaker of dialogue. That occurs in Book Two, "The Downward Road". Of that brief encounter, however, during which Lee comes to visit Orry Main, the head of Mont Royal, who still resides the family plantation in South Carolina, a few quite crucial observations can be made. It is November, 1861. At first, the following lines are spoken by Lee in this instance:

> "[in reference to his newly-grown beard] Oh, I brought this back from the Cheat Mountain campaign, along with a portfolio of nicknames I'd be happier to discard. How is your cousin, young

> Charles? . . . Impossible to forget him. While I was superintendent [at West Point], he was the best rider I saw at the Academy . . .” (LaW: 240, 241, Ch. 40) Relates to Lee’s West Virginia Campaign (1)

In the course of LaW, Jakes seems to want to attract special notice to both Lee’s physical fragility and his first military campaign which was less than a success. Without commenting on Lee’s praise of a fictional character, it seems that according to Foote (1958:130), Lee’s appearance at this time did change, saying, “At fifty-four he had grown a beard; it came out gray, and people looked at him in awe”. The “portfolio of nicknames” referred to by Lee is confirmed by Foote as well, with people calling him Granny Lee and Evacuating Lee (1958:130). McPherson (1988:302) agrees about the beard and points out that in October, people used these same names in reference to him, while Catton (1963) makes no explicit reference on the matter.

Lee continues:

> “You can be of great service to the War Department, however. It isn’t true, as the backbiters would have it, that President Davis constantly interferes or that he’s the person who actually runs the department. It’s not completely true, I mean to say. [after Orry announces he’s planning to accept the commission][52] Good news. Splendid! You and every West Point man like you are of infinite value to the army and the conduct of the war. The great failing of Mr. Davis, if I may in confidence suggest one, is his belief that there’s nothing wrong with secession. Perhaps in the South there is not. In Washington, I assure you, they consider it a treason. I am not enough of a constitutionalist to state positively that the act was illegal, but I consider it a blunder whose magnitude is only now being perceived. But no matter what personal feelings you or any of us have about secession, one of its consequences is immutable. We shall have to win our right to it – our right to exist as a separate nation. When I say win, I am speaking of military victory. Mr. Davis, regrettably, believes the right will be awarded us if we merely press our claim rhetorically. That is the dream of an idealist. Laudable, perhaps, but a dream. What we did was heinous to a majority of our former countrymen. Only force of arms will gain and hold independence. Academy men will understand and fight the war as it must be fought, unless we plan to quit or be defeated. [on fighting] That’s the proper spirit.” (LaW:241, Ch.40)

Curiously, it seems to come across very clearly that the relationship between Lee and President Jefferson Davis is lukewarm at best. It can be suggested that Jakes makes a case that, after the operations in Western Virginia in the autumn of 1861, Lee became unpopular with the Davis Administration. Now he is venting some of that frustration to Orry and also, of course, to the reader with a few quite interesting sentences.

[52] This was added in order to clarify the context.

To conclude, Jakes argues, firstly, that Lee expresses very much criticism towards the Davis Administration, even to a virtual stranger[53]), secondly, that according to Lee's private view, secession was morally wrong and lastly, that war has to be run by professional officers and that it can be won only on battlefield, the last contrary to views held, in Lee's opinion, by Davis.

Jakes' first claim, i.e. that Lee was being openly critical of Davis at this stage of war, is falsified by Foote (1958). According to Foote (1958:131, 469), Lee was one of the numerous high-ranking Confederate officers who found that "loyalty to Davis repaid in kind" and that Davis, by standing by the men in whose hands he had placed his loyalty, sometimes risked and even lost his popularity among the public. Further, Foote (1958:469) points out that when this was the case, "no man . . . ever had to glance back over his shoulder" and that during the summer of 1862, for instance, Lee not only "knew how to get along" with Davis, he also sought the president's advice and kept Davis posted, "even from hour to hour". Given this light, Lee's somewhat bitter remarks, criticism and complaint do sound strange and unconvincing, especially directed at a mere stranger. In fact, very little in Foote's study even hints at the direction that the relationship between Lee and Davis was somehow unfavourable, disloyal or based on discontent, as Jakes seems to argue. McPherson (1988), using a language more reportive than analytic, does not comment the relationship explicitly, nor does Catton (1961, 1963, 1965).

The second implicit statement by Jakes, i.e. that Lee thought privately that secession is wrong, even though he is not "enough of a constitutionalist to state positively that the act was illegal" (1984:241), is not discussed by Foote (1958) at all. McPherson (1988:281), however, says, quite interestingly, that in 1856 Lee had described slavery as "a moral and political evil", and that he did speak against secession until Virginia joined the Confederacy. After that occurred, Lee sided with his state, rather than joined the Federal cause out of loyalty for Virginia. Catton quotes Lee as saying in a letter to his sister at the start of 1861 that "if the bond of the Union can only be maintained by the sword & bayonet . . . its existence will lose all interest with me" (1961:203) and after the Battle of Manassas he writes: "They may destroy but I trust [*sic*] will never conquer us"

[53] The two men had allegedly met only once before, in Mexico during the Mexican War (1846 – 1848).

(1961:472). Similarly, in the spring of 1861 he had written that "secession is nothing but revolution" but that he did not like "a Union that can only be maintained by swords and bayonets" (1961:227). Catton (1961:334-335) also makes a case that Lee strongly hoped for peace but placed his native Virginia, and the will of God, ahead of all other things. Still, his private thoughts of secession being right or wrong during the war itself are open to speculation, while LaW pictures Lee as a man deeply troubled by the issue. Most likely, he was not ambivalent about it during the war, and it certainly seems odd that an officer placed as highly as Lee would convey to a stranger: "In Washington, they consider [secession] a treason" (LaW:241).

Third, Lee seemed to disagree with Davis over the policy of war. In Lee's view, the latter in November 1861 believed that words only would be needed for the Confederate States to achieve its independence, while Lee himself realised both that only armed forces would settle the matter and that professional soldiers were needed to lead them. Foote maintains (1958:83) that after the first major battle, the Battle of First Manassas (or, to the North, First Bull Run) in Virginia in July, 1861, Davis readily agreed with General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson in his assessment that 10,000 fresh troops would be enough to capture Washington. McPherson (1988:346) points out, in slight contrast, that the practical inability to capture Washington "was an illusion, as [was] recognized at the time", while Catton (1961:464, 465) tells that Davis dictated an order of immediate pursuit as a response to Jackson, then called it off. As a matter of fact, Lee himself, together with Davis, opposed the idea of attacking the Federals at a council of war before the battle (Foote 1958:58).

Foote (1958:121) argues very convincingly that, after the battle, in September, as General P. G. T. Beauregard made plans to capture Washington, Davis "could see its advantages" but rejected it because of practical necessity, the current military situation[54] and lack of resources. Thus, Foote makes a strong case for the impracticability of not attacking. This is echoed by McPherson (1988:337) and Catton (1963:133, 134) makes it implicitly clear that Davis was worried that continuing the war would be an impossibility if the governors behaved like this. This caused Attourney General Bragg to write in his diary: "I wish he was dictator". Jakes, in strong contrast, puts Lee as saying: "'Mr. Davis,

[54] Due to threatening Federal coastline operations, the Confederate state governors did not want to spare troops acting in defense of individual states for the Government service (Foote 1958:121).

regrettably, believes the right will be awarded us if we *merely* press our claim rhetorically'" (LaW:241, emphasis added) and that Lee both recognised and criticised the claim that Davis both did not want to fight and also accused him of behaving in a dictator-like manner. This interpretation of history does not seem to be valid.[55] As observed by McPherson (1988:317), the South mobilized earlier than the North and that Davis's own military experience "helped speed" mobilization. Further, according to Catton (1961:212), before the war even commenced in actuality, Davis believed that there would be "a long and costly" war and he firmly believed "there would be work for the armies".

I claim that a man as close to Davis as Lee was could not have spoken like this. True enough, Foote (1958:124) reveals that the public had been misled by a rumour that Davis halted the pursuit of the Northern (Federal) army after the defeat at Manassas. Davis publicly asked to cut wings from this rumour. However, the ambitious Beauregard's report of the battle leaked to the press before it arrived on Davis's desk. In it, he implicitly hinted that if his plan of attack, proposed before the battle, had been carried out, Washington would have been taken. This caused some, especially those in the South who held radical and aggressive views, to stamp Davis with a claim that he was content to fight a war of rhetoric. But, as remarked by McPherson (1988:428), "so long as the South seemed to be winning the war, Jefferson Davis was an esteemed leader", and he also makes it obvious that until the spring of 1862, Davis was well-liked by almost everyone. Catton's study (1961, 1963, 1965) does not make an explicit comment on this issue. The remarks from Lee about Davis's unwillingness to fight hinted at by him seem even more strange at the face of McPherson's (1988) study. Catton (1963:52) even calls the period as one of "unbroken Confederate successes".

On the other hand, Foote (1958:134) does say that Davis put a lot of emphasis on a possibility for a foreign recognition of the Confederate States at this point and thus

[55] To me, Lee's implications of Davis's dictatorship in LaW hold even less water when contrasted to Freeman's four-volume biography on Lee (1934:465). In it, Freeman claims that Lee, like Davis, understood that a united Southern defense, at the cost of an individual state's wishes and rights strictly held on to by some governors and other "hotheaded" individuals speaking against a strong Confederate (central) government, would be needed. Not only for Virginia's sake, but for the entire Confederacy. In the LaW scene, Lee seems to be talking like he would not agree with this, and in fact using critical remarks against the administration both at a time when few were heard and with a voice that accuses Davis of assigning too much power for himself. In short, Lee is behaving like a disagreeing, doubtful hothead, and also at the wrong time historically.

viewed a large-scale invasion, in addition to impractical reasons above, "unnecessarily risky", with a possibility that the war would be both quickly won but also quickly lost. McPherson (1988:337) suggests the same by comparing Davis's defensive strategy with that of George Washington during the American Revolution, who had avoided risky battles. But this does not mean that Davis wanted to win the war by speaking.

Surely an officer in the higher echelons of command such as Lee was aware of this, and it seems that Jakes (1984) is voicing the public opinion through Lee's mouth, which is not at all credible historically. And, as supported by Foote's (1958) study, Davis in no instance believed in gaining success by "merely press[ing] [the goal of disunion from the United States] rhetorically". Davis had been trained at West Point and fought a war with Mexico as well. His policy at the outset of the war was militarily defensive, but it was never founded on mere rhetoric. It can be argued that this runs counter with Lee's view of Davis in Jakes' LaW. Foote makes no explicit commentary on Lee's strong view and reliance on professional soldiers, and especially West Point men. However, Lee's remark that "[West Point Military] Academy men will understand and fight the war as it must be fought" (LaW:241) is possibly a bit simplistic; as McPherson (1988:328) notes, there was a total of eight military "colleges" in the United States, of which seven were situated in the South. Thus, the South was usually able to choose men with military training at the head of its regiments more often than the North. Freeman (1934:479, 489) admits, however, in accordance with LaW, that Lee placed great emphasis on finding men with military experience and training.

To conclude briefly, Lee in this scene has been made to appear historically quite unrealistic in terms of his opinions: at any rate, most of them go unsupported by the historians.

6.2 Robert E. Lee as perceived and referred to by other characters in the story

1861, June: Book One: A Vision from Scott

In LaW, there are, excluding dialogue, a total of more than fifty instances in which Lee is either described, thought about or reported by other characters, all of whom are fictional.

The first appears rather early, in Book One, "A Vision from Scott", when George Hazard's brother Stanley, who at the beginning of the book works for Secretary of War Simon Cameron in the Lincoln Administration, observes in June, 1861, that

> George McClellan had whipped Robert Lee [in western Virginia] early in June (LaW:28, ch.4). Relates to Lee's West Virginia Campaign (2)

True enough, the event was a Confederate defeat but, as told by McPherson (1988:299-300), McClellan was not personally in command in the region until June 21. Foote (1958:69) does speak of a night attack on June 3 that sent "the rebels . . . demoralized and retreating" but importantly, Lee was not in command there yet. Also, to speak of a hasty retreat (dubbed by the press as "The Philippi Races") as a complete defeat seems exaggerating. McPherson (1988:299) even talks, without elaborating, of "miscarriage" of the planned pincers attack on June 3. Catton (1961:406) does speak of an attack, but considers it largely "a propaganda victory of some magnitude".

The next mention of Lee comes from Orry Main during that same summer of 1861:

> His thoughts had turned from the papers to the commission that had been offered to him – staff duty in the Richmond office of Bob Lee, the veteran officer whose loyalty to his native Virginia had forced him to leave the federal army. Lee was presently the special military adviser to Jefferson Davis (LaW:90, ch. 17).

That Lee was forced to leave the Federal service out of loyalty for Virginia and that at the time he acted as a military adviser to Davis are confirmed by the historians. Foote (1958:128) refers to Lee as "Virginia's first soldier", while Catton (1961:231) remarks that Lee thought that "Virginia ought to come ahead of his loyalty to the Federal government" and that Lee's course would be Virginia's. McPherson (Freeman 1934:437, as quoted in McPherson 1988:281) quotes Lee as saying: "'Save in defense of my native State, I never desire again to draw my sword.'"

1861, September: Book Two: The Downward Road

George Hazard's wife Constance provides us with the next mention of Lee, in Book Two, "The Downward Road", dating from autumn of 1861:

> Men around Constance thumped their newspapers and crowed over the superiority of Yankee soldiers. At a place called Cheat Mountain in rugged western Virginia, the enemy general once

> considered America's best soldier had taken a drubbing (LaW:231-232, ch. 38). Relates to Lee's West Virginia Campaign (3)

Curiously Jakes, either intentionally or not, talks about a "drubbing" even though both Foote (1958:129), Catton (1963:48) and McPherson (1988:303) cite poor logistics, bad leadership under Lee and a complicated plan of attack as reasons for Lee's withdrawal, not a military defeat of Lee's doing.

A little later, in late October of 1861 we are allowed the rare viewpoint of Mrs. Burdetta Halloran of Richmond, an ex-lover to Lamar Powell:

> Bob Lee, finest of the fine, was being mocked with the name "Granny" because of his military failures; she had heard he would soon be shipped to one of the benighted districts of the Cotton South (LaW:237, ch.39). Relates to Lee's West Virginia Campaign (4)

Here starts the perpetuation of one of Jakes' most controversial views, unsupported by any of the three historians, that after the campaign in western Virginia Lee was punished by sending him to other duties by Davis.

Indeed, according to Foote (1958:128), the campaign in Western Virginia proved a failure in the eyes of the public, who now saw Lee as a "theorist, an engineer, a desk soldier, one who must fight by the book if he fought at all". McPherson (1988:302) agrees that Lee left "a damaged reputation" behind and Catton (1963:51) states that "most of the blame was ascribed to Lee [by the public]". This reaction stemmed from the fact that the public saw that Lee had not engaged the enemy in battle but merely maneuvered defensively and, at the coming of the winter, retreated. In defense, Catton (1963:52) says bluntly that this criticism, curiously enough supported by Foote at least to an extent (1958:130), was the most undeserving piece of criticism aimed at Lee.

Foote (1958:130) implicitly suggests that the South at this period wanted a fight, not fancy military maneuvers and Catton (1963:52) defends Lee against such criticism. However, very importantly, Foote states that not only was Lee sent to Department of South Carolina, Georgia and East Florida to advise, not to command, as Jakes allows us to assume and as was perceived by the public, but Davis also had, in private, learned the details of the campaign that were not accessible to the public (Foote 1958:128, 130). Thus, Foote (1958) in no way argues that Davis was punishing Lee by sending him to other duties or that Davis shared a negative opinion about Lee with the public, as is

seemingly put forth by Jakes in LaW. He seems to implicitly claim that Davis was sympathetic to Lee's shortcomings. McPherson (1988:302), in slight contrast, talks about Lee "in overall command of the Confederate forces in western Virginia". But, while he does not make a commentary on why the campaign was so unpopular, he acknowledges that logistical difficulties and internal dispute prevented an effective use of troops, a view echoed by Catton (1963:50). Foote (1958:130, 131) merely contends to remark, in a very neutral fashion, that Davis "found use" for Lee and "sent" him to take charge of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and East Florida. McPherson (1988) uses the same language in his account, certainly not suggesting a "shipping" or other such negative measure. Catton (1963:104) goes even a step further: according to him, the Confederacy positively "called on General Robert E. Lee" for help at the coastline defenses. This contrasts indeed sharply with LaW's view that Lee was sent there by Davis as a punishment and put "out of sight, out of mind".

This view is echoed in the next mentioning of Lee, in November, when he comes to visit Orry (see section 6.1). In chapter 40, Lee comes to visit Orry in November of 1861:

> . . . for failure in Western Virginia, Lee had been banished to command the new Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and East Florida . . . Unexpectedly, the famous soldier and three of his senior staff appeared on horseback in the lane of Mont Royal one twilight. They spent an hour with Orry before riding on to Yemassee. Orry had met Lee once, in Mexico; yet because of the man's reputation, both military and personal, he felt he knew him well. What a jolt, then, to confront the visitor and find he no longer resembled his published portraits. Lee was fifty-four or fifty-five, but his seamed face, shadowed eyes, white-streaked beard, and general air of strain made him appear much older. Orry had never seen a picture of Lee with a beard, and said so . . . Lee fell to discussing the point of his visit. He wanted Orry to accept the commission in Richmond, even though he was no longer headquartered there and could not employ him directly . . . rising, [Lee's] knees creaked. He shook Orry's hand, passed a social moment on the piazza with Madeline, then rode away to the duties of his obscure command. (LaW:240, 241, ch. 40) Relates to Lee's West Virginia Campaign (5)

Apart from the once again negative logic employed concerning the reasons for Lee's transfer, and the emphasis laid on Lee's weakness ("seamed face . . . white-streaked beard . . . general air of strain . . . [creaking] knees") , information given here seems historically credible. As has been seen (see section 6.1), Lee had indeed grown older and started to grow a beard.

1862, July: Book Three: A Worse Place Than Hell

Next the book moves on more than half a year regarding Lee. George Hazard observes the aftermath of the so-called Seven Days Campaign in Virginia in July of 1862 in Book Three, "A Worse Place Than Hell":

> Despite mistakes and minor successes on both sides, at the end of the seven days, the Richmond defense perimeter, which Bob Lee had worked a month to set and strengthen, still held. Old Bob had outthought and outfought Little Mac and his commanders at every turn. He had slipped and slid in the early months of the war, and suffered for it. But the seven days wiped out all that. George feared for the Union's fate if Lee took charge (LaW:366, ch. 56) Relates to Seven Days Battles (1)

This seems a rather simplistic account of the events, suggesting that Lee fought from the Richmond defenses, when in actuality he did not do such a thing, even though at the start he did reinforce the defenses themselves. In McPherson's (1988:462) words, "it soon became clear that Lee's purpose was not to hunker down for a siege". Before the campaign commenced, Foote (1958:469) comments that Lee realized he had to "strike before his opponent got rolling", and this is precisely what he did, though gambling greatly in the process. In his analysis, Catton (1963:325) is more critical, saying that Lee made mistakes that were not realized by General McClellan, with him making mistakes of his own. Also, he writes that, in accordance with LaW, there was no doubt in Richmond that Lee had won a great victory (1963:338). Of this, Foote (1958:585) agrees, saying that to soldiers, "the credit went to the general who had been placed at their head in their darkest hour" and McPherson (1988:490) states that, in short, "Lee became the hero of the hour".

Lee is mentioned next during the Maryland Campaign, which was Lee's first of two large-scale invasions to the North. This action is seen mainly through the character Charles Main, Orry Main's cousin, and Billy Hazard. Charles is serving with General Wade Hampton's cavalry while Billy, George Hazard's younger brother, shortly afterwards provides his own viewpoint, serving in the Corps of Engineers.[56] In the excerpt, the campaign has just begun[57]:

[56] Due to the brief nature of some commentaries, I have combined more than one reference into one paragraph. Also, this is the section of LaW in which Lee is most talked about.

[57] "[in crossing the Potomac River to Maryland] they must 'keep the powder dry' whether they trusted in God or not. I fear many trusted in 'Massa Bob Lee.'" Private Otis D. Smith (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996a:16).

> The cavalry strung out a line nearly twenty miles long. Behind it, Lee's divisions maneuvered, ready to strike clear into Pennsylvania, some said . . . Twelfth of September. Westward, Lee boldly, crazily split his army . . . Old Bob wanted his supply line down to Winchester open and secure before he struck fiercely north to Hagerstown; hell, maybe even to Philadelphia. That meant nullifying the Harpers Ferry garrison. That meant dividing his forces (LaW:383, 384, ch. 57). Relates to Maryland Campaign (1)

As can be seen, Charles, whose rank is only a captain's, seems to possess a great amount of information concerning the movements of the army. Of course, this is a technique employed by Jakes to inform the reader about the events. Interestingly, it is suggested that Lee has to be mentally unbalanced to divide his army and take the garrison of Harpers Ferry to his rear. Foote (1958:667) affirms that Lee did want his supply line kept secure but he also wanted to capture the 11,000 man garrison, even though Catton (1963:447) only speaks of communications problems. McPherson (1988:536) agrees that the garrison blocked his supply route. Also, as suggested by Foote (1958), it did not seem "crazy" to split the army after Lee had defeated the Federal army in the Battle of Second Bull Run by dividing before this campaign commenced. The issue of dividing the army is defended in a similar fashion by Catton (1963:447), who still does admit that the affair was very risky, while McPherson (1988) does not comment the matter explicitly. LaW has but a few sentences of the Battle of Second Bull Run (or Manassas), and thus Lee possibly comes across "more crazy" to the average reader than he actually was. Also, the first objective of Lee was, according to Foote (1958:663, 668), Frederick, Maryland, but, true enough, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, was the main objective.

Next, Lee is further observed through Charles and his actions narrated by him as the campaign proceeds[58]:

> [Charles] had met Lee in Texas, dined with him, talked with him at length . . . Lee had been away a lot, leaving the command to subordinates . . . Old Bob was universally acknowledged as a polite fellow, slow to anger – and who had ever heard him curse or seen him do a discourteous or ungentlemanly deed? But the sound of guns got his blood up, and when he was making military bets, he sometimes pushed in all the chips he had, like a flash gambler on a Mississippi boat. Charles and Ab decided he had done it again. He had figured he could split his forces – the very idea of which would produce foam on the mouths of writers of strategy texts – and put them back together with time to spare . . . The general had also politely, eloquently asked Marylanders to rise up and embrace their deliverers. Nobody paid attention to that, unfortunately. Stuart went west out of Frederick, behind Lee, the morning of the twelfth (LaW:384-385, ch. 57). Relates to Maryland Campaign (2)

[58] "General Lee come to the house early the next morning. He was a fine-lookin' man, and he was the head general of 'em all in the Rebel army, you know." Anonymous resident of Sharpsburg (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996a:56)

It seems as if Jakes is somehow slow to recognise the immense adoration many in the army felt for Lee. That Lee was "a polite fellow" to many is quite drastic an understatement and it seems to come across that Jakes is almost mocking Lee. Also, Foote (1958:665) reveals that the proclamation to the people of Maryland referred to was actually Davis's idea and Lee only complied with his instructions, though McPherson (1988:535) does agree that the Unionist part of Maryland did not listen to the proclamation and swell the Confederate ranks. He was a gambler, "risking everything to win everything", in Catton's (1963:447) words, but these comments seem to me a bit too much like hindsight views, views of a historian rather than a cavalry captain.

Finally, we are still allowed Charles's viewpoint as the campaign approaches its climax, i.e. Battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam):

> Thirteenth of September. Old Marse Bob's men moving swiftly through the cuts in the beautiful heights of the northern spur of the Blue Ridge, which the locals called the South Mountain . . . Who left [Special Orders 191] nobody knew. Who read it was soon clear. McClellan read it and knew Lee had split his army . . . [McClellan] began to move like a blue storm. Surprise, initiative, time all began to run like water between Old Bob's fingers . . . Fourteenth of September . . . Lee [was] in desperate need of time to reassemble the split army lest Little Mac eradicate its separate parts with hardly any effort . . . all [holding the passes] gained Lee was a day[59] . . . The passes were lost, surely. The advantage, too. Could Lee save anything now, including his army? (LaW:385, 386, ch. 57) Relates to Maryland Campaign (3)

The above extracts describe the Maryland Campaign, with emphasis on accidental discovery of Lee's strategic order. It is slightly cynical and panicky in tone and contains a slight historical error discussed at the end of the paragraph. Still, this extract is in relative accordance with the historians' views. After Lee's orders were lost and found wrapped around cigars by Union troops, which to McPherson (1988:536) proved that "truth can indeed be stranger than fiction", he was in a haste to bring the separate army units together again. As Foote (1958:670) puts it, it "dispelled in a flash the fog of war". However, Lee did not "panic" at the news, nor did he immediately begin to reassemble the army even though General Longstreet (Foote 1958:676) urged him to. As told by Foote (1958:678), "he was not only no less audacious in retreat than in advance, but he was also considerably more pugnacious, like an old gray wolf wanting nothing more than half a chance to turn on whoever or whatever tried to crowd him as he fell back". So, far

[59] Woodhead (1996a (ed.):12) counters with exactly the opposite view: ". . . in fact the stubborn Rebel defense had purchased crucial time for Lee's scattered forces."

from panic, especially after hearing that the Harpers Ferry garrison had surrendered, Lee wanted to stand and fight. As Catton (1963:452) observes, Lee fought simply because he thought he could win. Finally, McPherson (1988:537) points out that General McClellan wasted eighteen crucial hours before starting to move, hardly the "blue storm" suggested in LaW. Further, he postponed the attack a day (Foote 1958:683).

Lee is one last time mentioned during and after the consequent Battle of Antietam (or Sharpsburg) by Charles[60]:

> Old Bob's officers and men were not just scrapping to save the army now but maybe the whole Confederacy, too . . . Eighteenth of September. In the dark of the night, Bob Lee's army went back over the Potomac to Virginia. (LaW:390,392, ch. 57) Relates to Maryland Campaign (4)

Again, it is strange how Jakes seems to underrate Lee and belittle the battle that assumed nearly epic proportions. Far from "a scrap", the Battle of Antietam remains, as also reminded by the three scholars, the day during which more American lives were lost than on any other day. The register of writing regarding Lee during the Maryland Campaign strikes me as a blend of cynical omniscience, sarcasm and an attitude of belittling. But yes, according to Foote (1958:698) who does not offer an in-depth analysis of the battle, the Confederate situation became so bad that demoralized men and Union blue flags were clearly visible. Catton (1963:455) asserts that "Lee's army could have been broken" but still he thinks that Lee narrowly won the battle. McPherson (1988:539) gives full credit to Lee and men in the ranks for staving off disaster. Also, despite the fact that Lee dared McClellan the entire next day, this action is not mentioned in LaW at all. Catton (1963:458) even says that Lee was planning an offensive.

After the battle, Billy Hazard thinks that

> Little Mac had failed to pursue and destroy Lee's army when he had the opportunity, and the Original Gorilla [Lincoln] would not like that. (LaW:397, ch.58) Relates to Maryland Campaign (5)

In other words, it is claimed that McClellan had failed to exploit Lee's withdrawal and president Lincoln "would not like that". Actually, this seems a bit inaccurate since

[60] "As we marched back to our position Gen Lee met us and sayed 'Go in cheerfull boys they are driving them back on the right and left and we need a little help in the center.'" Private Calvin Leach (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996a:83)

General McClellan did give, in McPherson's (1988:544) phrase, "feeble" pursuit. As reported by Foote (1958:703), he undertook it with a portion of two divisions held in reserve, but it was easily thrown back. Catton (1963:460) symphatises with McClellan for not giving pursuit, "a reasonable idea, in view of his abiding conviction that Lee's army was always larger than his".

1863, January: Book Four: "Let Us Die to Make Men Free"

Somewhat strangely, the following mention of Lee (or reference to him) comes only about four months later, mid-January, 1863, in Book Four, "'Let Us Die to Make Men Free'". In other words, in connection of the Battle of Fredericksburg, a huge victory for Lee fought before Christmas of 1862, Lee is not referred to at all, nor commented on. In this chapter, we see George Hazard defending West Point in Senate. The Academy became under attack because many of the officers trained there had resigned and joined the Confederate cause. George observes that

> Lee was an engineer but brilliant as a tactician. (LaW:469, ch. 67)

Again, George seems to admire Lee as he did after the Seven Days battles. The matter is not explicitly commented by the three historians, though McPherson (1988:554) does state, among other things, that "Lee . . . became [an] instant [legend] in Britain".

Chronologically not long afterwards, George's brother Stanley, by now working as an aide to Secretary of War Stanton, is distressed together with his chief because

> . . . General Burnside had begun a movement against Lee on January 20, only to be balked two days later by pouring rains that changed the Virginia roads to bogs. (LaW:471, ch. 67)

In short, in this instance Jakes puts bad weather as chief cause for the failure of General Burnside to advance. Indeed, reported by Foote (1963:129, 130), "broad-tired wagons loaded with big pontoons . . . churned the roads to near impassability" and entire regiments were needed to haul artillery and still the toil was more than could be borne. Eventually, on January 22nd, Burnside saw the hopelessness of the situation and called off the advance. Catton (1965:66) emphasises the fractions and grudges within the Army of the Potomac and remarks that Burnside's "scheme was not bad" militarily. However,

his army had become "unusable" by this time and General George Meade, future commander of the army, wrote his wife: "I am sorry to say there were many men, and among them generals high in command, who openly rejoiced at the storm and the obstacle it presented" (as quoted in Catton 1965:67). McPherson (1988:584) remarks that "even God seemed to be against Burnside" and also mentions the serious disputes and mass desertions within the army. These internal conflicts are discussed quite little by Jakes, it can be observed. Indeed, through his narrative, it comes across as if bad weather had been the *only* cause of failure.

Again we skip a few months in the story and also more than a few pages. Now it is April, 1863. Charles is visiting Orry and his wife Madeline at Richmond at the eve of the Chancellorsville Campaign.[61] Orry reflects that:

> Lee was crouched at Fredericksburg with Jackson, but Hooker [the new army commander after Burnside was relieved] was just across the river with twice as many men. (LaW:520, ch. 74) Relates to Chancellorsville Campaign (1)

The excerpt very briefly, slightly inaccurately as the analysis shows, reviews the military situation in the East, but doing so in word choices that can, arguably, be interpreted as signs of weakness. Actually, as supported by Foote (1963:249) and Catton (1965:143), Lee was not "crouched", if one takes the word semantically to mean "cowering", at all. Instead, he was in early April planning an offensive to take place sometime in near future, even though at present it was impossible logistically. But, because General Longstreet had been detached in mid-January to fade off a Federal threat to the south and also to supply the army in dire need, Lee in April had roughly half the troops General Hooker had. Catton (1965:142) also mentions that the army under Hooker was much better equipped, but to Lee, writes Catton (1965:142), the real problem was supplies, not Hooker. Also, as McPherson (1988:639) confirms, Lee was not precisely "at Fredericksburg" but rather dispersed in trenches along the Rappahannock River, at the bank of which Fredericksburg was situated.

A few weeks later, on April 28, Billy Hazard writes in his journal[62]:

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[61] "Often seated by my window, I saw General Lee ride by like a crusader of old . . ." Roberta Cary Corbin (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996b:22)

> We march upstream tomorrow. Some suspect a great sweep around Lee and a strike at his rear . . . [most of the new volunteers] are . . . much happier to march forward than stay behind with those corps which will apparently demonstrate against Lee's works in Fredericksburg, or below the town . . . [Lije Farmer, captain of Billy's company] replied [when Billy asked why he had prayed so long], Do not forget who is over in Fredericksburg. Two of the best – Bob Lee and Old Jack [General Jackson]. Lije said he had implored the Almighty to confuse their minds and impair their judgement, though he stated this was done with regret, as both generals are staunch Christians. (LaW:529, ch. 76) Relates to Chancellorsville Campaign (2)

General Hooker's plan is quickly reviewed. It is also implied that Lee and Jackson were respected by the Northern officers as well and that religion played a significant role in the war. True enough, Hooker's plan, according to Foote (1963), Catton (1965) and McPherson (1988), was precisely this, in short. However, the date suggested for the advance (April 29) in LaW is false. As Foote (1963:266, 267) contends, on April 26 Hooker issued orders to that part of the army doing the "sweep around Lee" to commence the march on sunrise, April 27, and this was executed according to his plan. Of Lee's character, and that of Jackson for that matter, it is true, most scholars agree (e.g. Freeman (1934), Robertson (1997)), that both were very religious and that religious awakenings played a role during the war (e.g. Power 1998:4-6). Still, specifically religion, or the admiration of Lee and Jackson by Northern troops, is not discussed at length by the historians.

A few days later, at Chancellorsville crossing near the Battle of Chancellorsville that resulted, Billy despairs that

> Hooker had gained his planned position in the Wilderness, been poised to smash Lee from the rear – and had thrown away the advantage. Why? Billy thought, timing the ax blows to reinforce the raging repetition of the question. *Why?* (LaW:532, ch. 76, emphasis original) Relates to Chancellorsville Campaign (3)

And also:

> Yesterday, while Hooker shilly-shallied and lost his chance at a superior position, Bob Lee and Old Jack had been busy outfoxing him. (LaW:532, ch. 76) Relates to Chancellorsville Campaign (4)

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[62] "With such a cause and with such troops, commanded by our noble Genl. Lee, with such associates in command as Jackson, Longstreet, Ewell, Hill & Hood there is not the slightest chance of failure; there is not a man in this army who is at all familiar with its numbers, and organization, who feels the slightest doubt of our ultimate triumph." Captain James K. Boswell (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996b:32)

Jakes seems to propose, accurately enough, that everything had looked fantastic until Hooker, the commanding general, failed. Consequently, Lee and Jackson took the initiative and won the battle.[63] However, the date is wrong. As Foote (1963:276) mentions, Hooker "shilly-shallied" on May 1st, while LaW mistakenly refers to May 2nd. On May 2nd, General Jackson, after a conference with Lee, marched his army corps on Hooker's right flank unnoticed and the flank attack was executed, in the words of Foote (1963:292) with "explosive force", was a "practically complete surprise" and had "rapid gathering of momentum". This was the "outfoxing" referred to in LaW. In response to Billy Hazard's question, Catton (1965:149) contends that the responsibility of command became too much for Hooker at a critical moment while Foote (1963:279, 280), somewhat more apologetically to "Fighting Joe", acknowledges that misinformation intentionally given to Hooker by Confederates pretending to be deserters may have played its part, as well as fear. McPherson (1988:640), in his speculation, leaves the answer to the question open, merely concluding that "Hooker mysteriously lost his nerve".

In the aftermath of the Battle of Chancellorsville, General Jackson was mortally wounded, and the following mention of Lee comes through Orry at General Jackson's funeral:

> [Secretary of War] Seddon had whispered to Orry as they stood beside the bier yesterday that Lee was almost beyond consolation. (LaW:551, ch. 79)

The argument of Jakes's of Lee being "almost beyond consolation" at the funeral is not explicitly discussed by the historians.

The next three mentions of Lee speculate on his second invasion of the North in June. The first viewpoint is that of Ashton Main Huntoon, Orry's sister in Richmond:

[63] ". . . [General Lee] rode into their midst. The scene is one that can never be effaced from the minds of those who witnessed it . . . His presence was the signal for one of those outbursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have not witnessed them . . . One long, unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, rose high above the roar of battle, and hailed the presence of the victorious chief . . . as I looked upon him in the complete fruition of the success which his genius, courage, and confidence in his army had won, I thought that it must have been from such a scene that men in ancient days rose to the dignity of gods." Major Charles Marshall (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996b:121)

> It was June, muggy, the town astir with rumors of an impending invasion of the North by General Lee. (LaW:568, ch. 80) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (1)

At the same time, Elkanah Bent, the main antagonist in the story, observes that

> . . . while Lee had lost a mighty ally when Jackson fell, he had won not only a splendid victory at Chancellorsville but an ominous supremacy over the minds of many Northerners in and out of the army. There were now daily rumors and alarms out of Virginia. Lee was moving again, but in which direction, no one knew. (LaW:570, ch.81) Relates to both Chancellorsville Campaign (5) and Gettysburg Campaign (2)

Thirdly, Charles Main, in camp, thinks by himself:

> Charles knew nothing of the army's destination, but lately there had been much talk of a second invasion of the North. Somewhere above the river there were certain to be Yanks. Yanks who would want to know the whereabouts of Lee's army. (LaW:574, ch. 82) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (3)

Jakes acknowledges that Lee had won a great victory, that Jackson's death was a severe blow to him and that Lee had established himself in the minds of many Northerners. However, his emphasis seems to be more on that rumours flew as to Lee's whereabouts. [64]What is common to all these three vantage points is that they are all uncertain, lacking information of what precisely is happening. Indeed, Foote (1963:433, 437) writes that early June, "it was rumored that Lee had expressed a willingness to 'swap queens,' Richmond for Washington, in case Hooker plunged south while his back was turned" and that by the end of May, the Battle of Chancellorsville was already being referred to as "Lee's masterpiece". In regard to Bent's observation, in Washington, Catton (1965:165) affirms that Washington had been "a windy cave of rumors, growing windier as Lee's army moved north" while McPherson (1988:648) comments that not only was morale high in the Southern ranks and the men clod and shod better, the invasion also caused "panic" in the North. Curiously, in LaW, very little of this morale boost, downright elation inside Lee's army is present, with Charles, ever the cynic, even observing that "[the] army was not in the best of condition" (LaW:575, ch. 82). This is very strange,

[64] "Genl Lee is doing it all his own way, & is almost adored by his troops, which I believe would follow him to Boston. His army is in fine spirits, well armed, horses & mules fat, & everything ready to try to whip out Yankeedom . . . Only this morning he issued an order congratulating the troops on their good behavior, and told them that while Providence would certainly smile on such conduct, He would as certainly frustrate our movements if conducted in the manner the Vandals conducted their warfare in Virg. He told them he had come here to fight armed men & not to plunder & frighten women & children." Colonel David W. Aiken (in Woodhead (ed.) 1995:29)

because according to the three historians, the army was much better-equipped than, for instance, the last time Lee invaded North.

Lee is mentioned next in connection with his nephew, General Fitzhugh Lee by Charles:

> [General Wade] Hampton's partisans . . . sneered at Fitz, saying he had risen rapidly solely because he was Old Bob's nephew. Might be something to it. Two of the five brigades of horse were led by Lees – Fitz and the general's son, Rooney. (LaW:576, ch. 82)

This indirect accusation of Jakes about favouritism on Lee's part in regard to his kin, clearly advanced in LaW in a few instances, is not discussed, one way or the other, by Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) nor McPherson (1988) but is implicitly denied by Foote (1974:309; emphasis added) who remarks that after the Battle of Trevilian Station on June 11-12, 1864, Lee was "so pleased . . . that he at last named Hampton, *rather than* his nephew Fitz, as his new chief of cavalry".

Next, in a review arranged in honor of General Lee shortly afterwards, Lee is again perceived as physically weak:

> He [Charles] . . . rode directly from the review field, where [he] had glimpsed Bob Lee, handsome as ever but graying rapidly, to Hampton's encampment. (LaW:580, ch. 82)

Again, Lee's physical condition is commented on in a negative sense. To be sure, Foote (1963:444) does mention that, as the invasion was under way a few weeks after the review took place, Lee appeared to have been "aged considerably" to Marylanders. Catton (1965) or McPherson (1988) do not comment the matter. Again, however, Lee's rapidly aging condition becomes very obvious to the reader.

At the end of June, Brett Main Hazard, Billy Hazard's wife and Orry's sister residing with the Hazards in Lehigh Station, Pennsylvania, adds one more viewpoint to the rumors and panic that circulated in the North, as has been seen:

> On Saturday [June 28], [Lee's] invasion had been confirmed. Terrified officials surrendered the town of York to [General] Jubal Early, and Lee's host was sighted at Chambersburg. The whole lower border was afire with panic and rumor, and the smoke blew to every part of the state. (LaW:591, ch. 83) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (4)

Interestingly, Jakes paints a picture of great panic and terror among civilians, using the metaphor "afire" in connection with Lee's advance.[65] This excerpt and wording seem to wake, in the mind of a general reader, a cruel, wanton warfare prosecuted by Lee, while this was precisely, according to Foote (1963) and Catton (1965) what Lee did not want. Foote (1963:444) remarks that Lee "impressed" Marylanders and that civilians observed that his troops behaved well. Catton (1965:168) concurs that some farmers in Pennsylvania "said openly that they did not care who won as long as they themselves were left alone". Catton (1965) also goes, at this point, a long way to demonstrate that not all Northern people were strong Unionists and that peace had its own candidates and advocates who gained momentum at this point. In other words, Catton sees things a bit less black-and-white than Jakes. However, McPherson (1988:652) insists that the Federal army was "cheer[ed] as friends" by the Pennsylvania residents, noting that many Federal troops found strength in the fact that the Confederates were now invading their home soil.

Lee is mentioned, a few pages later, indirectly by Orry, in Richmond:

> Orry knew that Hampton's horse had gone into Pennsylvania with Lee, but beyond that, he could provide no information [about Charles to Augusta Barclay, a woman Charles falls in love with in the story]. (LaW:595, ch. 84) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (5)

Jakes seems to further emphasise the clouds of mystery he has chosen to surround the invasion in, making a slightly erroneous choice of words. That Hampton's cavalry took part in the offensive is in accordance with views of the historians. However, General Stuart, the overall commander of the Confederate cavalry, was not in Pennsylvania, as pointed out by Foote (1963:460), until June 30th. A more accurate way would be to say that the cavalry had gone *north* with Lee, since it still was not in Pennsylvania at this time, yet Orry supposedly "knew" it was.[66]

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[65] "While passing through [Chambersburg] Gen'l Lee rode up the column speaking kindly to acquaintances and passed on. The boys never cheer him, but pull off their hats and worship." Corporal Edmund D. Patterson (in Woodhead (ed.) 1995:28)

[66] "As General Lee rode out of the water, one of the ladies, with a face like a door-knocker, stepped forward and said: 'This is General Lee, I presume?' General Lee gave an affirmative reply, and the lady continued: 'General Lee, allow me to bid you welcome to Maryland, and allow me to present you these ladies who were determined to give you this reception . . .' one of the ladies had an enormous wreath which she was anxious to place on the neck of General Lee's charger . . . The next morning we went to Hagerstown, where more ladies were waiting . . . One fair lady asked General Lee for a lock of his hair." Lieutenant Francis W. Dawson (in Woodhead (ed.) 1995:33)

Next, we are provided a somewhat sketchy narrative of the Gettysburg Campaign and its aftermath through Charles:

> Three brigades – Hampton's, Fitz Lee's, and that of the wounded Rooney Lee under the command of Colonel Chambliss – had crossed the Potomac on the night of June 27. Their route took them almost due north, east of the mountain ranges, under rather vague orders from General Lee. They could, at Stuart's discretion, pass around the Union army, wherever it might be, collecting information and provisions en route . . . They rode into Pennsylvania on the thirtieth of June. Hunting for Lee, they found the Yanks at Hanover, and after a sharp little fight, read local newspapers for their first solid information about the invasion of the state by Lee and Longstreet . . . It was said this [unwanted engagement at Gettysburg between Lee and General Meade, the new commander of the Federal army] happened because Stuart was off gallivanting – following his vague orders – and was thus unable to provide Lee with accurate reports of the enemy's whereabouts . . . In some quarters Stuart was being blamed openly for the Gettysburg debacle. Critics continued to say his long ride away from Lee had deprived the army of its eyes and ears. (LaW:606, 607, 609: ch. 85) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (6)

Jakes, while narrating the events and completely omitting the roles of Hill and Ewell (speaking only of "Lee and Longstreet"), appears to take a stand that Lee's orders to Stuart during the invasion were vague and he demonstrates this belief through the eyes of Charles in these three different instances. Foote (1963:441) makes a strong case against what is seemingly an apologetic treatment of Stuart in LaW. He writes that "Aware of [Stuart's] fondness for adventure at any price, Lee sent him written instructions on June 22, repeating that he must not allow himself to be delayed in joining the rest of the column when the time came". Previously, according to Foote (1963:441), he had issued a similar warning to Stuart orally and this specific warning he followed with yet another written instruction, at the end of which he cautioned: "Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements" (as quoted in Foote 1963:441). Far from vague, as advanced in LaW, Lee seemed to emphasise keeping in touch with the main body. Historically, Stuart did cross the Potomac on June 27 (Foote 1963:458, 460) and indeed, Stuart learned of Lee's whereabouts by reading a newspaper. Curiously, Jakes says that men behind the invasion are "Lee and Longstreet", and thus does not provide the average reader a single hint that before the invasion, Lee had reorganized his command and now it consisted of General Ewell's Second Corps and General A. P. Hill's Third Corps in addition to that of Longstreet's First (Foote 1963:434, Catton 1965:161, McPherson 1988:648). Thus it scarcely was an invasion between Lee and Longstreet, as an average reader may gather as a result. Catton (1965:163) remarks that Stuart was under orders to protect the army's front and flank but that he, as also Foote claims, did get permission to ride "around" Hooker. However, this was not the same as "vague orders", since Lee left this option open to Stuart's own good judgement (Foote 1963:441). Certainly Lee did not want this

kind of a maneuver to endanger contact with the army, because he so much emphasised the importance of keeping close. Catton assigns blame to Stuart for "[getting] crowded off the roads", after deciding to ride around Hooker. Thus, Lee had little responsibility in the matter, the two imply. McPherson (1988:649) seems to agree with this view. He asserts that Stuart's decision to attach less priority on Lee's warning not to detach himself from the main body and more to his desire to perform spectacular rides "deprived Lee of intelligence about enemy movements at a crucial time". To conclude, the three arguably leading historians in the field do not agree with the view presented by Jakes.

The aftermath of the battle, fought between July 1 – July 3, is seen from two Northern vantage points, those of Jasper Dills, a lawyer in Washington and an influential protector to Elkanah Bent and also a rather minor character in the story, and George Hazard. First, Dills observes that

> . . . the news got better and better. Lee whipped; Vicksburg taken [in Mississippi by General Grant]; Grant and Sherman and Meade heroes . . . [Meade] appeared to falter and lose nerve. He failed to pursue Lee aggressively, throwing away the chance to destroy the main Confederate army. (LaW:611-612, ch. 85) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (7)

And George Hazard, visiting the War Department in Washington, figures that

> [there was a gloom in the War Department because] Meade had dallied; Lee had gotten clean away . . . (LaW:617, ch. 85) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (8)

Jakes seems to criticise Meade quite heavily for not pursuing Lee after the fight. Once again, Jakes uses hindsight to justify criticism. This time it seems slightly unfair. It is agreed by the historians that Gettysburg was a Confederate defeat. Foote (1963:587, 588, 589) points out, in contrast, that there were very valid reasons for Meade to be cautious. First, Meade's own army had suffered heavily also. Second, he wanted to avoid risks. Third, Lee was known to be "foxy", to use Foote's (1963:587) phrase, especially in retreat. Fourth, one of his generals had overheard that Lee intended to give battle after retreating. Finally, bad weather hindered an immediate aggressive pursuit. To claim that Lincoln and General-in-Chief Halleck did not sympathise with this, eventually, is false because, as Foote (1963:590) establishes, when Meade did begin to move, it was Washington, namely General Halleck, that urged caution. Catton, however, does point out that Lincoln was frustrated because Lee was allowed to escape, even exploding to his secretary: "'Will our generals never get that idea [that there were 'our soil' and that of

the Confederacy] out of their heads? The whole country is our soil'" and he wanted to wipe out Lee's army (Catton 1965:210, as quoted in Catton 1965:211). Jakes tells that the president "had been plunged . . . into . . . one of his depressions" (LaW:617, ch. 85) but as McPherson (1988:667) points out, Lincoln's estimation was "not quite accurate" and his temper soon improved. This mood did not last for more than a few weeks.

1864, January: Book Five: The Butcher's Bill

After this, we are thrown approximately half a year forward in time. In the winter of 1864, Charles already begins to strongly feel that the South is losing the war. Charles and General Hampton discuss together in camp:

> They gossiped a while . . . About the . . . demands from certain newspapers that Mr. Davis be removed in favor of a military dictator; Lee was mentioned. (LaW:648, ch. 89)

This complaining is quite interesting and the desire communicated by Jakes, i.e. that Lee take the helm as a despot quite incredible given the historians' views. It seems palatable that Jakes has confused the last days of the Confederacy, more than a year afterwards, with this date. McPherson (1988:821) writes that in their agony, "some congressmen even called on Davis to step down in favor of Robert E. Lee as dictator". This development of defeatism that begins far too early in LaW gains further momentum in time. The first powerful signs start here in Book Five, "The Butcher's Bill". However, as can be seen (see section 6.4, I, page 74), even as early as spring of 1863 the character of Charles starts to worry about the war. The remark about a military dictator is very curious since, according to Foote (1963:955) Davis was at this time accused of behaving like a dictator. Davis was forced, in order to receive more men to the ranks, to increase the draft age to cover men aged from seventeen to fifty and also to abolish all industrial exemptions to enlist. The latter measure created more opposition and Davis was accused of powermongering. Lee is not mentioned in this connection by Foote (1963), nor by Catton (1965) or McPherson (1988). It seems very much out of place that Davis was wanted removed and a military despot take his place, since more stringent measures employed by the Davis Administration were in fact criticised a lot.

In early March, 1864, Burdetta Halloran, in Richmond, comments the so-called Dahlgren Raid against Richmond:

> . . . [a] frightening raid [was] conducted by two bodies of Union horse, led by Brigadier Judson Kilpatrick and Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, son of the Yankee admiral of the same name . . . home guards under Bob Lee's boy Custis drove them back, with assistance from Wade Hampton. (LaW:694, ch. 96)

Again, this can be interpreted as Jakes' implicit criticism of Lee's favouritism of his son. Foote (1974:105) writes that "old men and boys" repulsed the offensive. A bit strangely, neither Catton (1965) nor McPherson (1988) comment the incident.

Lee is mentioned a few months later, in May, by George, who by now has requested and received a transfer to quite a different assignment from that of War Department work. He is repairing military railroads in Virginia. This was also the month in which Grant, after being elected commander-in-chief of all the Union armies in March, launched his Overland Campaign across various theaters of war, including Virginia.[67] Thus, Lee in connection with this campaign is referred to by many characters in a time span between May and December total of nine times. First, there is the view of George Hazard on May 10:

> The butcher's bill from the [Battle of] Wilderness had been staggering. Now Lee had entrenched at or near Spotsylvania, and presumably the Union Army was shifting that way to engage. (LaW:742, ch. 103) Relates to Overland Campaign (1)

And, a few days later, obviously in mid-May[68]:

> [Grant's policy was to] Ignore Ricmond. Destroy Lee's army. Then the card house would fall . . . The dispatches [from the front] took on a sameness as the decimated [Federal] army refilled its ranks and marched by night in pursuit of the retreating Lee. (LaW:745, ch. 103) Relates to Overland Campaign (2)

In early May as well, Virgilia Hazard, George Hazard's sister and acting as a nurse, remembers that

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[67] "We wanted to see Grant introduced to Gen. Lee & the Army of Northern Virginia, & to let him have a smell of our powder. For we knew that we simply could never be driven off a battle field, & that whatever force Grant brought, his luck would have to accommodate itself to that fact . . . Lee honored our return to his command with a review . . . For sudden as a wind, a wave of sentiment, such as can only come to large crowds in full sympathy . . . seemed to sweep over the field. Each man seemed to feel the bond which held us all to Lee. There was no speaking, but the effect was that of a military sacrament, in which we pledged anew out lives. Dr. Boggs, a chaplain in Jenkins's brigade, said to Col. Venable, Lee['s] aid, 'Does it not make the general proud to see how these men love him?' Venable answered, 'Not proud, it awes him.' Brigadier General E. Porter Alexander (in Mathless (ed.) 1998b:18-19)

[68] Specific date is not given in the novel.

> Whenever the need to quit overwhelmed her, she fought it by remembering . . . that Lee, then still a Union officer, had led the detachment that put an end to John Brown's brave struggle. (LaW:748, ch. 104)

Next, sometime at the end of May, Salem Jones, former overseer at Mont Royal discharged because of cruel treatment of slaves and now a bounty jumper in the Union army, entertains the following opinion:

> The war had grown too savage. Lee had withstood Butcher Grant in the Wilderness and bloodied him at Spotsylvania. – during the latter action, Jones kept busy straggling or dodging to the safest sectors . . . (LaW:754, ch. 105) Relates to Overland Campaign (3)

I maintain that at this point, Jakes commits a few notably controversial interpretations of history which do not quite measure up to the views held by the historians. Let us see how I arrive at this conclusion.

First, according to LaW, on May 10 the Union army "was shifting" to Spotsylvania, while in fact the very last elements arrived on the field that day. Second, it is suggested in LaW that sometime between May 13 and May 20[69] Lee was "retreating" and the Federal army marched "by night in pursuit". Third, it is established that Lee led the detachment against John Brown in 1859.

Only the last claim proves true. To be sure, it is confirmed by the historians that it was indeed Colonel Robert E. Lee who was responsible for capturing John Brown of Kansas who in 1859, with his sons, wanted to free the slaves in Virginia and start a slave revolt there (see chapter 5). But the focus is now on Lee during the Overland Campaign. The second claim is most in need of correction: Lee did not retreat to Spotsylvania, nor did he "retreat" anywhere, nor did Grant "pursue" Lee. First, as evidenced by Foote (1974:187, 189), on May 7, after the two-day Battle of Wilderness[70], Lee's army was "content, it

[69] Since a bit previously the reader is informed that Stuart had died "day before yesterday" (LaW:743, ch. 103) and Virgilia notes a bit later that "casualties were pouring in from the contested ground around Spotsylvania" (LaW:747, ch.104).

[70] "Scarce had we moved a step, when Gen. Lee, in front of the whole command, raised himself in his stirrups . . . exclaimed above the din and confusion of the hour, *'Texans always move them.'* . . . never before in my lifetime or since, did I ever witness such a scene as was enacted when Lee pronounced these words, with the appealing look that he gave. A yell rent the air that must have been heard for miles around, and but few eyes in that old brigade of veterans and heroes of many a bloody field was undimmed by honest, heart-felt tears. Leonard Gee . . . with tears coursing down his cheeks and yells issuing from his throat exclaimed, 'I would charge hell itself for that old man.' . . . we all saw that Gen. Lee was following us into battle . . . Seeing that we would do all that men could do to retrieve the misfortunes of the hour,

seemed, to stay tightly buttoned up in the breastworks they had built or improved since yesterday", that it was Grant who would "shift his ground". So it was not so much Lee who retreated, it was Grant who advanced. As Foote (1974:191) contends, Lee "divined" Grant's next objective, which was Spotsylvania Court House, and in fact it was Grant who started to move there first. Still, Lee was quicker to arrive there, using, in Catton's (1965:359) words "great skill". Catton (1965:359) comments that Lee had "proved that the Federal host could neither slip past him nor overpower him" and McPherson (1988:726) adds that, far from Grant's pursuit or Lee's retreat, on May 7 Grant "prepared to march around Lee's right". Moreover, no such operation ever took place in history as a Confederate withdrawal between May 13 and May 20. As stated by Foote (1974), Catton (1965) and McPherson (1988), Lee stood his ground till May 20, until Grant again disengaged from the series of battles around Spotsylvania[71] and moved by the left flank, in a similar manner than after the Battle of Wilderness.

Next, a few weeks later Charles, on his way to rejoin the army, contemplates who would succeed General Stuart in the overall command of the cavalry. Stuart had been killed on May 11:

> As senior brigadier, Hampton [after General Stuart's death] stood next in line to command the cavalry. He immediately got a large part of the responsibility, but not the promotion. Charles . . . and every other veteran knew why. Lee distrusted Hampton's age . . . Charles thought it a ridiculous issue . . . Still, those high up seemed determined to test him further. Charles felt bad because he suspected the delay also had something to do with Fitz Lee wanting the promotion for himself. (LaW:763, ch. 106)

Jakes again criticises Lee of disfavouring Hampton through Charles, which is not discussed, one way or the other, by Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) nor McPherson (1988) but, as has been seen, is implicitly denied by Foote (1974:309).

In the same scene, Charles ponders the following:

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accepting the advise of his staff, and hearkening to the protest of his advancing soldiers, he at last turned round and rode back to a position on the hill." Private Robert Campbell (in Mathless (ed.) 1998b:67)

[71] "It was when he turned face towards us and with a silent gesture of extended arm pointed towards the enemy we recognized our idolized Lee. Already the bullets were zipping past . . . What if one should kill Lee? 'Get in front of him, keep the bullets off,' was the instinctive feeling of each man. Just then General John B. Gordon came dashing down the line . . . It was a picture never to be forgotten. 'General Lee, this is no place for you. Go back, General; we will drive them back. These men are Virginians and they have never failed me; they will not fail me; will you boys?' Then rose the oft-quoted shout: 'General Lee to the rear! Lee to the rear!' 'Go back, General, we can't charge until you go back.' 'We will drive them back, General.'" Private William W. Smith (in Mathless (ed.) 1998b:128)

> Grant's army reeled past its own dead at Cold Harbor, apparently investing the strategic rail junction at Petersburg. Phil Sheridan's cavalry feinted toward Charlottesville; Lee was forced to send Hampton in pursuit. (LaW:763, ch. 106) Relates to Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (1)

In other words, Jakes reveals that Grant is shifting towards Petersburg and other strategic events, making a total of three rather major errors, to judge by the standard set by the previous writing in LaW, in this excerpt as well. Or, at any rate, the three arguably leading historians do not agree with what is written. First concerns Grant and is not the focus of this study. Two others concern Lee.

First, it is historically speaking unlikely and not credible in the extreme that Charles, a major in cavalry, realises that "apparently [Grant is] investing the strategic rail junction at Peterburg". As Foote (1974:317) admits, Lee was "left with nothing but guesses as to the whereabouts of Union infantry and artillery", while Catton (1965:366) maintains that it was difficult for Lee to know for sure what Grant was up to, writing: "Lee was in the dark". Lastly, McPherson (1988:740) adds that Lee "remained puzzled for several days". That a cavalry major knew what was happening is a downright impossibility. Second, General Sheridan did not "feint" towards Charlottesville, it was his objective to link up with General Hunter's force, as Foote (1974:302), Catton (1965:365) and McPherson (1988:737) point out, even though only Foote mentions the place by name.

Still in June, Lee is mentioned and the Confederate cause despaired about by Orry, in Richmond:

> Cold Harbor rattled the windowpanes of Richmond again . . . [Orry and Madeline] heard [the guns] again on the stifling June nights in the wake of Cold Harbor . . . Cold Harbor had brought déjá vu – scenes of panic like those of the Peninsular campaign [of which Seven Days Battles were a part]. But this time there was little heart or martial courage to sustain the resistance. The mighty generals had fallen: Orry's classmate Old Jack; Stuart, the singing cavalier. And the greatest of them all, Marse Bob, couldn't win. (LaW:765, ch. 106) Relates to Overland Campaign (4)

According to Jakes, there was gunfire from Cold Harbor after the battle, panic among citizens with low morale and, last but not least, Lee could not win. Astonishingly, at this point Jakes starts to paint a very bleak picture for the Southern point of view, an attitude of defeatism. I find no support at all to the view clearly maintained by Jakes, i.e. by June, 1864, the moral backbone of the Confederate soldiers and civilians in the Virginia front was starting to seriously crack.

The section contains errors, once again. First, there was no artillery fire at Cold Harbor after June 3, i.e. "in the wake of Cold Harbor", since there was no Federal army there. As narrated by Foote (1974:293-296), the next several days were spent negotiating between Lee and Grant over by what means the Federal dead and wounded were to be removed from the front. After this, Grant made plans and on June 12 shifted his army across the James and stole a march on Lee (see above). Second, I fail to see what is implied in LaW when referred to "little heart or martial courage to sustain the resistance [in the South]". As a matter of fact, as argued and demonstrated by McPherson (1988:742, 743), it was the North whose morale hit the rocky bottom at this period, writing: ". . . Spartan call for a fight to the finish [by Lincoln] must have offered cold comfort to many . . ." Lee had beaten Grant at Cold Harbor, in words of Catton (1965:364) by "a resounding defeat – the most unrelieved and tragically costly one the Army of the Potomac had suffered since it crossed the Rapidan". It seems both a lie and distortion of fact to claim that "[Lee] couldn't win". Of morale issues, McPherson (1988:719) remarks also that in the spring of 1864, morale within Lee's army remained high, as did the confidence of the men regarding him.

The same continues at the end of June, again viewed by Orry:

> . . . at the end of June . . . the war news continued to worsen . . . Davis tried to persuade journalists and the public that because Grant had neither crushed Lee nor captured Richmond, the Virginia situation was improving. No one believed him. (LaW:793, ch. 110) Relates to Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (2)

And also, Lee is mentioned by Charles on July 11, visiting Augusta Barclay:

> [Charles] said he was sure the war was lost. He spoke of the high rate of desertion and Lee's failure to demonstrate faith in Wade Hampton by promoting him to commander of the cavalry. (LaW:822, ch. 114)

In these excerpts Jakes continues his defeatist attitude regarding Lee, the military situation, the unpopularity of Davis and the war in general. In these instances, the attitude of defeatism continues with very little historical evidence to support it. Again, McPherson (1988:760) counters that "the months of July and August 1864 brought a greater crisis of northern morale than the same months of 1862" and that in the North, "defeatism and a desire for peace spread". Catton (1965:368) adds to this statement by claiming that "[when Grant settled for a siege at Petersburg in June] the Federals [had]

lost between 60,000 and 70,000 men, Lee's army was still undefeated, and it seemed – in the North, and also in the South – that Grant's massive campaign had been wasted effort".[72] Also, none in the trio supports the idea of a "high rate of desertion" in Lee's army at this point. Foote (1974:640) implies that not until mid-December, nearly half a year later, did desertion significantly increase. Finally, the extract contains one more historical error that suggests that Jakes is mistaken in the favouritism issue brought up here for the fourth time in connection with Lee: while neither Catton (1965) nor McPherson (1988) discuss the matter, Foote (1974:309) denies the charges implicitly (see above). So, in actuality Hampton had been "demonstrated faith" by Lee a month earlier, i.e. in June.

Four months later in November, Ashton is now on board a ship and on her way to Montreal with her husband James Huntoon and lover Lamar Powell. Previously, they were caught by Orry planning a scheme to overthrow Jefferson Davis. She briefly reviews the situation:

> The need [for a new Confederacy] was more desperate than ever; that had become clear since the weeks since their flight from Richmond. Lee was stalemated, Sherman was driving to the sea, the old Confederacy was going down. (LaW:841, ch. 117) Relates to Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (3)

Jakes proceeds with the bad news, with the Siege of Petersburg continuing and Sherman cutting through Georgia. These observations are fitting by this time, since Atlanta had fallen to General Sherman in September. In addition, Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, a most crucial supply centre for the Confederate armies, had been occupied and largely destroyed by General Sheridan. Moreover, Abraham Lincoln had been re-elected president of the United States at the beginning of November (Foote:1974, Catton:1965, McPherson:1988). However, Foote (1974:630) argues that it was Grant, not Lee, who was stalemated, at the cost of "a hundred thousand casualties". Again, LaW seemingly paints a picture a few shades darker than was the case, according to the historians.

A month later, in December, Orry, who has been transferred to field duty to Petersburg at his own request thinks of Lee:

[72] "Distance does not lent enchantment to the old fellows greatness I assure you. The nearer [General Lee] comes the higher he looms up. It is plain, simple, unaffected greatness. It is just as natural and easy for him to be great as it is for me to be ordinary, and there is probably less affectation about it." John Bratton (Power 1998:203)

> Bob Lee, stooped and gray and, it was said, atypically grumpy of late, had only sixty-five thousand hungry, worn-out men to defend a line stretching thirty-five miles from the Williamsburg road . . . to Hatcher's run southwest of Petersburg. No one spoke seriously of winning anymore, only of holding on and ending the sad business without dishonor. (LaW:848, ch. 118) Relates to Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (4)

Thus, Jakes wants to emphasise extreme desperation, writing that Lee was "stooped, gray and . . . atypically grumpy", that he had "only sixty-five thousand" badly demoralised troops and that no-one thought of winning anymore. Again, the style in which Lee is described seems to be that of cynical mockery and bringing up his physical weakness on the author's part, which is strange. The issue of Lee's appearance and character is not wholly confirmed by Foote (1974) and it is difficult to determine what does the author refer to by being "grumpy". True enough, he was gray at the time, but a contemporary observer does not support this view of Lee's appearance at all, noting that Lee "'had rather gained than lost in physical vigor'" and that "'his hair had grown gray, but his face had the ruddy hue of health and his eyes were as clear and bright as ever'" (as quoted in Foote 1974:630). It is the fourth time that Lee's physical appearance is commented negatively in reference to Lee.

It is also noted by Foote (1974:630) that men still fought, and they fought for Lee even more than their country. Catton (1965) makes no explicit comment on the matter and McPherson (1988:803) merely notes that the Confederates were "war-weary" and that they wildly hoped that Lincoln would not be elected. Still, it is in my view too strong a statement that "no one" entertained hopes of winning, since, as, for instance, General Gordon puts it, "everything was exhausted except devotion and valor" (Gordon 1904:397, as quoted in Catton 1965:436). Besides, the three historians all point out that the mass desertions in Lee's army did not come until February, 1865. Thus, in December, 1864, there must have been those who still believed in a Confederate victory.[73]

1865, April: Book Six: Judgements of the Lord

The last few references concerning Lee start with his abandonment of his Petersburg lines on April 2nd, 1865. A series of historical events occur which are testified by various characters in the story. Thus, the following four references to Lee examine his retreat

[73] My argument that some of Lee's men still had high hopes in December, 1864, is confirmed by e.g. Power (1998) and Carmichael (2005:38-48).

from his lines and following pursuit and surrender from various viewpoints. First, in Book Six, "Judgements of the Lord", postal clerk Lonzo Perdue, a very minor character in the story, attends the same church service during which President Davis is informed of Lee's retreat. Later, he notes that

> As night came, rumors flew. Lee had pulled out of the Petersburg and Richmond defense lines. He was in wild and confused retreat to the west. (LaW:917, ch. 128) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (1)

Essentially, the event of Lee's withdrawal is confirmed by the historians. However, as Foote (1974:880, 881, 883) clearly explains, Lee was not in "a wild and confused retreat" but rather had planned the routes and various objective points well, also managing to warn the authorities in Richmond in time for its evacuation. McPherson (1988:845) also does not speak of a panic-like retreat, noting that Lee's army "fought desperately" when the lines were broken while Catton (1965) makes no explicit comment on the nature of retreat.

A day later in the home of the Hazards in Pennsylvania, Madeline, who had been sent there by Orry to feel more safe, thinks that

> [thankfully] the end seemed near. The dispatches [from Virginia] did not say positively that General Lee had abandoned his hopeless position in front of Petersburg and the Richmond lines as well, but that presumption was being accepted throughout the mansion . . . (LaW:920, ch. 129) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (2)

In other words, Jakes contends, news of Lee's withdrawal had reached the North a day later. It can also be remarked that Lee's position is described as "hopeless", while for instance Foote's (1974:919, 924) study suggests otherwise. While a civilian may have thought so, Lee and some of his men apparently did not think the position *entirely* "hopeless". The issues brought up here are not otherwise discussed. Still, it is credible historically that Madeline expresses relief at the hearing of Lee's retreat, since people in general were very tired of the war.

On the same day Charles, back in South Carolina by now, engages in speculation, mentioning Lee:

> If the copy of Lee's order had not been found wrapped around the cigars before Sharpsburg. (LaW:927, ch. 130) Relates to Maryland Campaign (6)

The historians do not engage in speculation on what would have happened had Lee's orders not been discovered as he invaded Maryland.[74]

Finally George Hazard, still repairing railroads to supply the Army of the Potomac, on April 9th, the day Lee surrendered, informs the reader that

> The Petersburg&Lynchburg [railroad] line that ran west from town was under repair to supply the army pursuing Lee. (LaW:932, ch. 131) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (3)

During this scene, George receives the news of Lee's surrender. However, As Catton (1965:441) remarks, no such railroad as "Petersburg&Lynchburg" existed, the correct name for the structure was Southside Railroad. The role of the Southside Railroad as a supplier for Grant's army is not explicitly discussed.

The last mention of Lee through others comes from Charles in May. He notes that

> Lee – imagine how he must have felt, once the superintendent of West Point and the country's finest soldier, forced to ask a fellow Academy graduate [Grant] for terms. They said Old Marse Bob had conducted himself with dignity, rebuffing a few hotheads who wanted to continue guerilla war from the hills and woodlands. (LaW:987, ch. 142)

One last time, Jakes seems in the first sentence to engage in curious delight when Lee, "the superintendent of West Point . . . the country's finest soldier", has finally been "forced" to give in. The course described taken by Lee, i.e. to seize hostilities entirely, is confirmed by the historians, even though at first, as Foote (1974:952-953) brings up, Lee refused to advise other Confederate armies still in the field to surrender without permission from Jefferson Davis. However, as stated by Foote (1974), Lee himself set an example to the South by asking for a parole from the Federal authorities, which he did not receive until the 1970s.

The findings of this lengthy section are summed and discussed, among other observations, in section 6.5.

[74] I believe it is possible that the invasion would, at the very least, been more costly to the Union in terms of casualties, supplies lost, prisoners taken etc.

6.3 Robert E. Lee as perceived and referred to by the narrator

There are a total of nine mentions of Lee told clearly from the narrator's point of view. All of them are clarifications or merely short commentaries on events except in one instance, during the Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg) in September, 1862 where Jakes offers a more in-depth analysis of the battle.

1861, August: Book Two: The Downward Road

First, in August, 1861, in Book Two, "The Downward Road", Charles attends to a ball in Richmond, during which two references to Lee are made by the author:

> Fitzhugh Lee, nephew of Robert E., had been a close friend [to Charles] at West Point and in Texas . . . The three were soon chatting about Fitz's uncle, who had been superintendent at West Point for a time; Lee was scrapping with the Federals in the western reaches of the state. (LaW:206, 207, ch. 35) Relates to Lee's West Virginia Campaign (6)

Indeed, Lee had been superintendent of the Military Academy for a time. The discussion of the West Virginia Campaign referred to here, once again in a bit belittling manner in my view, has been discussed already (see sections 6.1 and 6.2).

1862, June: Book Three: A Worse Place Than Hell

Next, Jakes' perpetuation of the "exile argument" concerning Lee[75] commences almost a year later chronologically, in June, 1862, in Book Three, "A Worse Place Than Hell", slightly before the Seven Days Battles begin. Orry in Richmond seems worried:

> [the Battle of Fair Oaks saw General Johnston] replaced in twenty-four hours by the President's former military adviser [i.e. Lee], back from exile. Granny Lee took charge of the Army of Northern Virginia for the first time. Confidence in him was not high. [in Richmond] boxes were packed with even greater haste, and a special train kept steam up around the clock to haul off Treasury gold if the final assault broke through Lee's lines. (LaW:358, ch. 55) Relates to both Lee's West Virginia Campaign (7) and Seven Days Battles (2)

In other words, Lee is ridiculed by the author as once "exiled" "Granny Lee". Further, he is described as being unpopular at the time and it is implied that people did not trust him. Moreover, there was panic in Richmond and even a special train that somehow

[75] (see sections 6.1 and 6.2).

seemingly came about due to Lee and that "Lee took charge of Army of Northern Virginia . . ."

First, Lee was the one who named that particular army the Army of Northern Virginia (Foote 1958:451, Catton 1963:314), ignored in LaW. Second, as Foote (1958:468) counters, the men in the ranks generally greatly appreciated Lee as a general, with the morale improving almost from the moment he took charge. There is no evidence in Foote's study of the, once again apparent, description of panic among Southern citizens, nor of lack of confidence in Lee suggested in LaW. Catton (1963:314) contends that Lee "rode . . . into legend almost at once" and makes no mention whatsoever about Richmond citizenry distrusting Lee. However, McPherson (1988:462) does accede that "few shared" Davis's high opinion of Lee when he took command, but nevertheless reminds that by June, pressure against Richmond had been relieved by General Jackson's operations in the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. The full impact of Jackson's maneuvers, still studied today[76], seems, to an extent, to be missed in LaW. McPherson (1988) does not mention panic in Richmond either.

Jakes moves on to discuss the Maryland Campaign, culminating in September to the Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg). As has been seen (see section 6.2), Charles took part in that[77]:

> Lee's headquarters was Oak Grove, a short distance southwest of town [of Sharpsburg]. His main line, nearly three miles long and attenuated, ran north from the center of Sharpsburg, roughly following the Hagerstown Pike . . . At dark Lee's army lay quietly along the Sharpsburg Ridge . . . Lee had been unable to seize the initiative, was forced instead to rush masses of men from danger point to danger point, all over the field. He had in effect conducted a series of hasty and relatively disorganized rescue operations, rather than an offensive based on a grand strategic design. The desperate defense efforts had been carried out at enormous cost; a massed frontal assault on Union positions could hardly have been less bloody. There were moments when everything looked lost . . . the Yankees had been within half a mile from Sharpsburg, half a mile from swinging around and cutting Lee's escape route. There were moments to be proud of . . . Presented with an opportunity to destroy Lee's army, [General McClellan] merely stopped the invasion. Lee hadn't been whipped, but neither had he won. He had simply rushed his defensive units from one place to another . . . Reinforced during the early hours of the eighteenth, McClellan chose to stand fast. [Lee] chose to withdraw. (LaW:388, 389, 392, 393, ch. 57) Relates to Maryland Campaign (7)

[76] See e.g. Robertson (1997).

[77] "With that wonderful power which he possessed of divining the plans and purposes of his antagonist, General Lee had decided that the Union commander's next heavy blow would fall upon our centre, and those of us who held that important position were notified of this conclusion." Colonel John B. Gordon (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996a:107)

It is, in other words, established that Lee established his headquarters to the southwest of Sharpsburg and that his nearly three-mile-long line followed roughly the Hagerstown Pike and was situated to the north of the center of Sharpsburg. Further, his army lay in wait along Sharpsburg Ridge. The argumentative part maintains that first, Lee had no initiative at any point of the battle, second, that he had made both rushed and disorganized rescue operations "rather than an offensive based on grand strategic design", and this is repeated twice, third, that the effort was carried out at enormous cost and fourth, disaster had loomed for Lee. There is sharp criticism aimed at General McClellan for failing to "destroy Lee's army". Nevertheless, "McClellan chose to stand fast" while Lee "chose to withdraw". Jakes' verdict: Lee had not been beaten, but he had not won either. In addition, Jakes seems to give a very one-sided view of the action, largely ignoring McClellan's shortcomings[78] and even more ignoring the fact that Lee also chose to stand fast after the battle. Of course it is true that his army suffered terribly and at one moment was on the brink of disaster. Still, Jakes uses words painting McClellan as the brave victor standing fast, on the edge of destroying Lee's army and Lee the loser who after chaotic and disorganized defense operations withdrew, which surely was not the whole truth.

The non-argumentative part seem to be roughly in unison with the historians' views. Lee had indeed established his headquarters near Sharpsburg, even though none of the historians explicitly mention Oak Grove and Foote (1958:701) comments that the headquarters was situated to the west of the town.[79] In addition they agree that his line approximately followed the Hagerstown Pike and the main force was situated along the Sharpsburg Ridge in the night preceding the battle.

However, this all seems to paint quite bleak and simplistic a picture of Lee's performance. As reported by Foote (1958:676), General Longstreet was the first to propose that "[in Sharpsburg the army] could organize a position for defense while awaiting the arrival of the rest of the army". So, in other words, criticising Lee for a lack of "an offensive based on a grand strategic design" is about the same as to criticise someone who plans to go shopping for not going to the post office. Thus, the defense was

[78] Not the least of which was that McClellan gave Lee an entire day to prepare for the battle and assemble his forces, of which LaW is silent.
[79] Woodhead (1996a:55 m) reveals that west is possibly more accurate.

planned, risky business though it was. In Catton's (1963:451, 452) words, "for more than a century men have been trying to understand Lee's willingness to stand and fight at Sharpsburg" and as an explanation he offers that Lee simply believed he could win. Notably, it is McPherson (1988:539) who disagrees with Jakes' view quite strongly. He blames McClellan for badly co-ordinating the battle, allowing Lee time to respond, "to shift troops from the quiet sectors". He also criticises him for not sending in reserves when a breakthrough did occur in the center and praises Lee for "skilful generalship", his subordinates and his men for "desperate courage". Catton (1963:456) concludes that "in a narrow tactical sense" Lee had won, since his lines still held. Also, it is difficult to see how Lee could have seized the initiative, as LaW requires, when he was fighting on the defensive.

Regarding the line "[Lee] chose to withdraw": To quote Catton (1963:456): "Incredibly, [Lee] remained in position all of the next day . . . and he and Jackson even planned to take the offensive". This is completely ignored in LaW. In contrast, McClellan, as Catton (1963:456) reports, "had had all the fighting he wanted". McPherson (1988:544) also talks of Lee "yielding" to the fact that his army had suffered, even though he was very willing to resume the fight. Interestingly, in contrast to Catton (1963) McPherson (1988:545) does mention that the battle was "a strategic Union success", since Lee's invasion was stopped. This allowed President Lincoln to issue his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, freeing all the slaves in the areas occupied by the Confederate forces.

To conclude, to me it seems that all the positive, aggressive and skilful parts of Lee's conduct are missing from LaW while some of the McClellan's profound failures are completely ignored. Overall, the picture is somewhat simplistic and overly gloomy and critical of Lee and the analysis itself handling the battle is somewhat in error, according to the three historians. Jakes gives quite a chaotic description of the battle while notably McPherson (1988) thinks it a masterpiece of generalship and Catton (1963) calls it a slight victory for Lee.

1863, June: Book Four: "Let Us Die to Make Men Free"

Next, Lee is mentioned by the author chronologically more than half a year later. In June, 1863, in Book Four, "'Let Us Die to Make Men Free'", Charles has just fought the Battle of Brandy Station, the war's largest cavalry engagement:

> In the end the Southerners won and held the hill. But the Union reconnaissance in force had achieved its objective. Lee's army was found. (LaW:584, ch. 82) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (9)

In other words, even though the cavalrymen succeeded in maintaining position, the objective of the Union cavalry was achieved. Foote (1963:437, 438) agrees. General Pleasonton, commander of Federal cavalry, was to find out "what Lee was up to" and in it he succeeded. This view is confirmed by Catton (1965:162) and McPherson (1988:649), with former contending that ". . . Pleasonton . . . had discovered what was going on, and he was able to tell Hooker that Lee's army was going north", while the latter narrates that ". . . the blue troopers learned that the enemy had begun to move north."

A few weeks later, during Lee's second invasion of the North[80], the author tells, in a scene seen through Orry, that

> Lee had disappeared into enemy country. A city, a government, a land held its breath in hope of good news. (LaW:595, ch. 84) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (10)

This is the last instance in which Lee is clearly referred to by the author. That the Confederacy generally entertained high hopes regarding the invasion seems obvious but is not explicitly discussed by the historians, with Catton (1965:206) only remarking that "Richmond lived on rumors" and McPherson (1988:648) stating that the invasion "heightened southern euphoria".

Again, major findings are discussed in section 6.5.

[80] Or, to be more precise, "raid".

6.4 Robert E. Lee as seen in the lines of other characters

In LaW, there are a total of twenty-seven spoken lines, pieces of dialogue, in which Robert E. Lee is mentioned in some way. For the sake of clarity, I have decided to divide these into three categories, separated from each other by notable differences in tone or context that are obvious to a casual reader: the lines that are positive remarks about Lee, those that are negative and finally those that are neutral in character or in which Lee is mentioned only in passing. With thus classifying the utterances into three, the quality of the whole picture given about Lee by different figures, and what shades of color the picture consists of in the story, can better be understood; whether positive, negative or somewhere between the extremes.

I Lines mentioning Robert E. Lee in a positive light/fashion/context

Astonishingly, there are very few lines in which anything positive in a positive context is said specifically about Lee. As a matter of fact, the entire book has only three speech lines which can be interpreted to mention Lee in a manner even approaching anything postive[81], out of more than many thousand pieces of dialogue in total. And even in these cases, Lee is not downright admired nor praised.

1863, April: Book Four: "Let Us Die to Make Men Free"

The first positive comment concerning Lee, if only in a very implicit way, comes from Charles in the spring of 1863 in Book Four, "'Let Us Die to Make Men Free'". Together with Augusta, he ponders that

> "The superstitious boys say our luck's turned bad. Sharpsburg might have been a victory instead of a stand-off if the Yankees hadn't found those cigars wrapped in a copy of Lee's order. Courage doesn't count for much against bad luck – or the numbers the other side can muster." (LaW:522, ch. 74) Relates to Maryland Campaign (8)[82]

[81] What is more, in all of them indirectly.

[82] Remarkably, this scene with Charles, along with a scene with Orry a few dozen pages previously, constitute the first true signs of defeatist attitude in the South. Jakes proposes, in other words, that the first larger cracks in Southern morale appeared in March-April, 1863. Through Orry, Jakes contends that graffiti such as "DEATH TO DAVIS . . . [was] a not uncommon one these days" (LaW:496) and that ". . . an unspoken truth seemed to hover. The war was not going well for the Confederacy. Soldier and civilian alike felt the stirrings of a poisonous doubt about the outcome" (LaW:497). Through Charles Jakes comments on the improved Federal cavalry (LaW:520) and puts him as saying to Augusta a bit previous to

Thus, it seems that Jakes does admit that the soldiers under Lee were courageous, that they faced formidable odds in numbers and even that Lee might have won the battle had the order revealing Lee's plans and the position of various units not been found in September, 1862. Although none of the historians engage in this kind of speculation, it is possibly false to say the outcome of the battle itself could have been a victory, since the odds against Lee in any case were almost three to one in manpower.[83] Discussion on Maryland Campaign has been focused on elsewhere (see sections 6.2 and 6.3).

1864, November: Book Five: The Butcher's Bill

The second and perhaps closest the author ever comes in speech of his characters giving a favourable impression about Lee does not appear until November, 1864, in Book Five, "The Butcher's Bill". During the Siege of Petersburg. Billy and his brother George are discussing possibilities on what to do after the war:

> "[George:] The last time I saw [General] Herman Haupt [George's superior, in charge of constructing and repairing Federal railroads], he talked about the West. He predicts a boom in rail construction out there after the war. The idea of a transcontinental line will undoubtedly be revived. He said there would be great opportunities for capable engineers." [Billy:] "Something to think about. Provided we ever get Bob Lee to surrender." [George:] "The siege surely does drag on. It's grim . . . I know [the Confederate army under Lee has] to be whipped till they quit." (LaW:838, ch. 116) Relates to Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (5)

In other words, George and Billy express doubt about Lee surrendering, implicitly crediting Lee for determination. Of course, it is difficult to determine on the basis of the three historians how common this view was in November, 1864. At any rate, McPherson (1988:780) is of the polar opinion that veterans in Grant's army scented victory at the time.

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the quoted scene: "It's going badly, Gus. The whole damn war. Vicksburg's threatened-Grant's in charge there . . . Orry wouldn't say it to anyone else, but he thinks Grant will have Vicksburg by the autumn . . . Davis [is] still coddling second-rate generals like [Braxton] Bragg . . . the cavalry can't find enough horses, let alone the grain to feed them" (LaW:521, 522). Foote (1963:17, 18, 19, 167, 193 m,) counters that when 1862 became 1863, the Confederacy was *successful* in all theaters: at Fredericksburg, Lee had defeated Burnside in December. In Mississippi, Grant's two-pronged offensive had been frustrated near Vicksburg, Federal General Banks was turned back in Port Hudson. Generals Forrest and Morgan played havoc in the Federal rear in Tennessee and Confederate General Magruder retook Galveston, Texas. McPherson (1988:590) adds to this argument that "at the end of March 1863 the northern public could see only the failures of the past four months".

[83] However, I think the campaign itself could have been different, with possibly a more positive outcome for Lee.

1865, May: Book Six: Judgements of the Lord

The third line that can be interpreted as a positive remark, though even less so, comes after Lee had surrendered his army to Grant in May, 1865, in Book Six, "Judgements of the Lord". Charles visits the War Department in Washington in order to obtain information about a Northern general. After causing some consternation, he is helped and defended by an acquaintance from West Point, a fictional Federal officer named Prevo, who was met earlier in the story:

> "[clerk:] Sir . . . I explained – This man's a reb. Look at him. Arrogant, dirty- [Prevo:] "Shut your mouth . . . The war's over. It's time to quit fighting. Generals Grant and Lee seem to have assimilated that fact, even if you can't." (LaW:993, ch. 143) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (4)

Thus, in conclusion with the last two lines specifically it can be interpreted that, through speech of his characters, the author yields only to give Lee credit for his determination to fight and his wisdom to surrender, quite astounding a discovery. For instance, in the course of the 1,000-plus-page book, there is not one line from a Southern viewpoint in which anything genuinely, sincerely positive or even pleasing is said about Lee in a positive context.

II Lines mentioning Robert E. Lee in a negative light/fashion/context

In contrast to the mere three instances in which Lee is spoken about with a tone even suggesting anything positive, there are a total of seventeen instances which mention Lee in, arguably, a negative context or tone of speech. Some of these occurrences take place, true enough, because of historical events unfavourable to Lee. Nevertheless, while, curiously, none of the book's dialogue praise his victories or vast positive accomplishments, in any manner, his defeats and shortcomings do get mentioned several times.

1861, July: Book One: A Vision from Scott

The very first line in this category comes from the viewpoint of Ashton Main, during a ball held in Richmond in July, 1861, in Book One, "A Vision from Scott". The line is

spoken by Mrs. Mary Chestnut, a historical character, who kept quite a famous diary during the war:

> "Everyone's crushed that General and Mrs. Lee are absent – and without explanation. A domestic spat, do you suppose? I know they are a model couple – they say he never curses or loses his temper. But surely even a man of his high moral character occasionally lets down. If he were here, we'd probably have an impromptu West Point reunion. Poor old Bob – flogged by the Yankee press when he resigned and joined our side . . . You'd think that would make him popular with the troops, wouldn't you? . . . Hardly. Privates and corporals from fine families call him the King of Spades because he sent down orders that they must dig and sweat like the commonest field hands." (LaW:114, 115, ch. 19) Relates to Lee's West Virginia Campaign (8)

Again, Jakes does not seem to be willing to let the reader forget Lee's failures and bring forth the negative commentary while the tone of speech in connection with Lee is, perhaps here more than ever, at its mocking best. Snide remarks and sarcastic, mean-spirited, at times almost tongue-in-cheek hints at Lee's imperfection and character is one of the ways the author has, apparently, decided to describe him. This can well be illustrated, again, by looking at this excerpt.

Perhaps a bit embarrassingly, Jakes commits quite a notable historical error at this point: In July, 1861, Lee was not called "King of Spades", nor had he "sent down orders" that the troops entrench. As testified by Foote (1958:131), Lee acquired the nickname "King of Spades" only after he was transferred from West Virginia to the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and East Florida to advise the construction of coastal defenses in November, 1861. Catton (1963:315) mentions these complaints of "digging and sweating" under Lee occurring only almost a year later, in June, 1862, when Lee took command of the army thereafter known as Army of Northern Virginia. McPherson (1988:462; emphasis added) states in his usual matter-of-fact style: "[strengthening and enforcing the Richmond defenses as his first duty as the commander of Army of Northern Virginia in June, 1862] earned him *new* derision as 'the king of spades'". Thus, the account in LaW is somewhat in error.

1861, September: Book Two: The Downward Road

Yet one more mention is made about Lee concerning the West Virginia Campaign already discussed at length (see sections 6.1 and 6.2). This occurs in the same scene in which George Hazard's wife Constance is on a train and observes men "thumping their

newspapers", in Book Two, "The Downward Road", in autumn of 1861 (see section 6.2). She overhears a passenger comment:

> "It says down in Richmond folks call him Evacuating Lee. There's one reb star that's sinking mighty fast." (LaW:232, ch. 38) Relates to West Virginia Campaign (9)

Thus, the reader is yet again informed that Lee had failed in West Virginia and that Lee's popularity was on the decline. Altogether, there are a total of nine different direct or indirect mentions of this campaign in West Virginia and its consequences in connection with Lee. I fail to understand why does the author want to emphasize this, admittedly possibly the least successful of Lee's campaigns, so much. As has been discovered (see sections 6.1 and 6.2) the reason the campaign was a failure was not only not Lee's fault, President Davis also did not condemn Lee for the failure, only the public did. It seems that Jakes wants to rejoice in what little failure he can find about Lee and his actions while at times engaging in making implicitly sarcastic remarks about him along the way.

1862, July: Book Three: A Worse Place Than Hell

The next reference to Lee that can be interpreted somewhat negatively occurs on the Fourth of July, 1862. During Book Three, "A Worse Place Than Hell", in the home of George and Constance Hazard General McClellan's recent defeat after the Seven Days Battles is discussed:

> "[Constance:] It's really over?" [George:] "Nearly. The departmental telegraph reports the army's withdrawing to the James. McClellan almost had Richmond in his hand and couldn't take it." [their son William:] "Because Lee brought Stonewall [General Jackson] marching to help him." (LaW:365, ch.56) Relates to Seven Days Battles (3)

This mention of Lee fails Jakes in his own game, so to speak, i.e. telling about events through historical hindsight (for a most striking example of this, see section 6.2, page 62). Actually, in my view LaW does much injustice to Lee when the reader is lead to interpret from this that Jackson helped Lee in a crucial manner in the campaign, and Lee would have been helpless without him. A careful study of the Seven Days Battles indicates this message is by no means true to history. Because of that, it seems odd that Jakes puts a character as saying something without being equipped with a historical hindsight while usually the reverse is true.

As narrated by Foote (1958:585), the credit for the Seven Days went to Lee "who had been placed at their head in their darkest hour" and welded the troops "into a single striking force, the Army of Northern Virginia" and towards whom "distrust had yielded to enthusiasm, which in turn was giving way to awe". On Jackson, Foote (1958:587) comments that his poor performance throughout the campaign was subject of much debate and that, after the campaign and reorganisation of the army, General Longstreet commanded four times as many brigades as did Jackson. Catton (1963:327) contends that Jackson was the actor in the play "who put on such a poor performance that the entire production almost failed" while McPherson (1988:471) claims that Jackson's behaviour was "dismal". The reader is, however, lead to believe that Jackson was the key without which Lee would have lost when in fact that key, metaphorically, did not fit itself into the lock. All three historians agree that it was Lee, not Jackson, who was in the spotlight at this time.

The following instance during which Lee is mentioned in a negative fashion simply repeats what happened in history but, importantly, does once again highlight Lee's failure. During the Maryland Campaign, in September, 1862, Charles and his friend Ab are scouting for information in Frederick, Maryland:

> "Charlie, they ain't a damn bit interested in bein' liberated. You think Bob Lee got the wrong information? I was told we could expect a big uprisin' of locals to help us out when we invaded this here state." [Charles:] "I was told the same thing." (LaW:378-379, ch. 56) Relates to Maryland Campaign (9)

Jakes is here arguing that the soldiers in Lee's invading army were told that many people in Maryland would support the Confederate cause. It is agreed by the historians that Lee, or more appropriately President Davis whose scheme it was, thought more Marylanders would join the Army of Northern Virginia since "thousands of her sons", to quote Foote (1958:662), already served in the army. While Catton (1963) makes no explicit comment on the matter, McPherson (1988:535, 536) admits that it constituted the first error of the invasion, since that part of Maryland was unionist. The campaign itself is already discussed (see sections 6.2 and 6.3).

In September, 1862, in Book Three, "A Worse Place Than Hell", during the same Maryland Campaign, Charles and Ab have a conversation:

> "[Charles, on Jackson's troopers:] They look like old men." [Ab:] "So do we . . . Taken notice of the gray in your beard lately? They say Bob Lee's is almost white." (LaW:382, ch. 56) Relates to Maryland Campaign (10)

In other words, Jakes again reminds the reader of Lee's elderly physique. Lee's age, and weakness connected with it has, as has been seen (see sections 6.1 and 6.2) been emphasised in LaW quite a lot. Thus, one more mention is made in this regard. The three historians all stay silent on this topic in this context.

A few days later during the same campaign[84], Charles remarks to Ab:

> "When Old Jack won, I guess Old Bob decided to dig in and fight." (LaW:388, ch. 57) Relates to Maryland Campaign (11)

Thus, Lee is again implied to be dependent on Jackson by Jakes. As already has been seen (see section 6.2), it was General Longstreet's plan to "make a stand" on Sharpsburg's hills. Further, according to Foote (1958:678), Jackson reported being successful "thus far" (as quoted in Foote 1958:678), not that he had "won", when Lee "saw a chance to retrieve the situation" (1958:678) by concentrating north of the Potomac River. Moreover, Foote (1958:686) implies that the primary reason for Lee to fight at Sharpsburg was not so much Jackson's success as his own ambition and determination not to close the campaign, result of which could have been decisive, by suffering a defeat[85] and then withdrawing. Catton (1961:450), on the other hand, agrees with the view presented in LaW that Jackson's success was the factor that made Lee fight. McPherson (1988:538) more or less agrees with Foote, saying that Lee changed his mind about retreating when hearing about the anticipated success of Jackson. However, McPherson also offers the possibly more weighty reasons to fight. Not to do so would mean "loss of face . . . endanger diplomatic efforts to win foreign recognition . . . [and] depress southern morale" (1988:538). To ignore these factors completely and base Lee's decision solely on Jackson, as made in LaW, does not seem fully justified.

[84] "As [Captain] Poague turned to go, I went to speak to my father [i.e. Lee]. When he found out who I was he congratulated me on being well and unhurt. I then said, 'General, are you going to send us in again?' 'Yes, my son,' he replied, with a smile, 'you must all do what you can to help drive those people back.'" Private Robert E. Lee Jr. (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996a:124)

[85] At South Mountain.

1863, July: Book Four: "Let Us Die to Make Men Free"

Similarly, the next negative comment about Lee is connected with history. Almost a year later, in July, 1863, in Richmond in Book Four, "'Let Us Die to Make Men Free'", Orry and Madeline ponder the news of Lee's defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg:

> "[Orry:] Some of the fools in the [war] department are trying to say Lee was successful – that he did what he set out to do: reprovision the army off the enemy's land . . . The truth is, Lee's in retreat. His casualties may have run as high as thirty percent." (LaW:610-611, ch. 85) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (11)

Here is a typical example of a character equipped with historical hindsight. Here is Orry, a lieutenant-colonel in the War Department, only a few days after the battle correctly guessing, in approximate figures, the percentage of casualties. Further, it can be drawn from this that, in Jakes's view, to summarise Lee's campaign as anything but a failure is "foolish".

According to Foote (1963:641), the full negative impact of Gettysburg was not revealed to the public until "the last week of the month". Foote (1963) makes no mention of the argument that according to some Lee succeeded, but Catton (1965:213) strongly attacks this implication in LaW that one had to be "a fool" to call the campaign a success. In fact, Lee himself, in a letter to President Davis, opined that the army "achieved under the guidance of the Most High a general success, though it did not win a victory" (as quoted in Catton 1965:213) and Catton (1965:213) himself agrees that Lee "had done about what he expected to do", quite the opposite from LaW.[86] McPherson (1988:665) makes no comment about the success of Lee's objectives but admits that "perceptive southerners sadly recognised" that the twin blows of Vicksburg and Gettysburg were hard for the Confederacy.

[86] A study supporting this view has been very recently done by Brown (2005) who, according to McPherson (2005:16), maintains that "Lee did achieve a key purpose of his raid into Pennsylvania", i.e. supply his army.

1864, January: Book Five: The Butcher's Bill

Then there is a scene in Book Five, "Butcher's Bill" dating from January, 1864. In Libby Prison in Richmond, Billy Hazard is being held captive. The superior of the guards, a villain named Clyde Vesey, is constantly harassing Billy, saying at one point:

> "Confess . . . By now you must be cognizant of your inferiority. Your heathen nature. Your wrong thinking. Confess that you admire President Davis and consider General Lee the greatest soldier in Christendom." [Billy:] "Fuck you." (LaW:658, ch. 90)

Thus, Lee is also put in an extremely negative context by Jakes. A cruel character has been put to force another character into praising Lee. Consequently, a casual reader of LaW is, possibly, more inclined to disagree when he discovers that this unstable and heinous character is the only one who actually thinks so aloud in the course of the whole book. In other words, that particular view is arguably painted more negative when spoken by Vesey. To be sure, as evidenced generally by the historians, Lee was for many "the greatest soldier in Christendom" during the war and after it.

One of the numerous Southern defeatist lines mentioning Lee comes from Orry, this time containing an apparent historical error. In June, 1864, in Book Five, "The Butcher's Bill", when the Siege of Petersburg starts, Orry remarks to Madeline:

> "Lee always said that once the siege starts, we're finished . . . We'll have to capitulate." (LaW:765, ch. 106) Relates to Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (6)

Thus, again the South is on the verge of collapse, Jakes communicates. According to him, Lee "always" said that the end comes when the siege starts. As has been discussed (see section 6.2), the image of profound Southern defeatism by the summer of -64 is, frankly, false. To further testify against this argument, McPherson (1988:750, 756) counters that "Grant's siege of Petersburg seemed even less successful during those dog days of summer than Sherman's operations against Atlanta" and in July, "Union armies seemed little if any closer to winning the war than when they started". "Who shall revive the withered hopes that bloomed at the opening of Grant's campaign?" asked *New York World* (July 12, 1864, as quoted in McPherson 1988:750).

Also, Lee did not "always" say anything of the sort. As remarked by Foote (1974:279, 317), he told this to two of his generals but few others were, apparently, aware of this. The message that Lee kept saying this is not supported by Catton (1965) nor McPherson (1988) either.[87]

During the same Overland Campaign, in June 1864, Orry and Madeline, in Richmond, are discussing whether Madeline should be evacuated from Richmond amidst all the defeatism:

> "[Madeline:] I'd have to cross enemy lines-" [Orry:] "The country north of Richmond is a no-man's land. When Grant chased Lee to Petersburg, he took most of his army with him." (LaW:790, ch. 110) Relates to Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (6)

This piece of dialogue confirms what was first discovered in section 6.2, i.e. that very likely Jakes himself genuinely held or still holds a misunderstood picture of the Overland Campaign. It is a mistake to argue, as LaW does, that the campaign ending at Petersburg was "a chase", as is implied here. Jakes may sincerely have believed, at least at the time of writing, that Lee moved *before* Grant to Petersburg.

As has been previously discussed (see section 6.2), Lee, firstly, did not withdraw on his own initiative, as LaW suggests, nor did Grant "chase" Lee. Grant simply tried to bypass Lee and Lee was compelled to respond. If, analogously, someone plans to get behind my back in a football game against my will, I am forced to move so as he does not succeed in the attempt by, for instance, taking a few steps, changing my line of sight or putting the man under guard. To me, this does not constitute "chasing", it is rather "grappling for a position". "Chase" is a very one-sided view of the action with unsound implications, Lee's maneuvres were counterstrokes prompted by necessity to protect Richmond and other objectives, not retreats per se, nor a chase.

My view is echoed by Foote (1974:437), according to whom Grant simply "exchanged one stalemate for another" while Catton (1965:368) adds that "The stroke that had taken

[87] I claim that that Lee supposedly "always" said this is only a means for the author to justify his defeatist attitude. Into the same category falls the most absurd claim of "high rate of desertion" (LaW:822) occurring as early as mid-July, 1864.

the Federal army across the James, brilliantly begun, ended in fumbling futility". [88] McPherson (1988:743) gives no explicit comment, though he does remind that Lee had also suffered heavy losses, had been forced to withdraw south eighty miles and had been pinned down with part of his communications cut.

In July, 1864, George's older brother Stanley is visited by Jasper Dills, patron of the main antagonist in the story, Elkanah Bent. Dills is interested in Bent's whereabouts. On the way to see Stanley, he remarks,

> "I must say, passing through that mob [a group of African-Americans], I wondered whether I was in the District or the palace gardens of Haiti." [Stanley:] "What about a West African village? Did you happen to notice what the darkies are serving down there? I'm guessing it's barbecued effigy of Bob Lee." (LaW:808, ch. 112)

Jakes again reverts back to his fashion of making fun or snide comments about Lee. The combination of "effigy" and "barbecued" in connection with this sentence again form together the favourite theme of Jakes' to forcefully bring Lee down from his pedestal by means of sarcasm. Needless to say, the historians do not take a stand on issues like these.

1865, January: Book Six: The Judgements of the Lord

Lastly, there are six more excerpts that mention Lee in a negative light, fashion, context or all the above, though in these, as with some of the quotes examined above, historical events are to blame for the negativity. Still, it can be argued that, as we have seen, events in history positive to Lee are all but silenced in the book's dialogue while negative events and the role of his lieutenants, particularly Jackson's, are even emphasised. First, there is Charles with his everlasting defeatist attitude in Book Six, "The Judgements of the Lord", in January, 1865. In camp, his friend Jim plans to desert the army:

> "[Charles:] . . . You can't go." [Jim:] "Makes no difference if I stay, either . . . We're whipped, Gypsy [Charles' nickname]. Done for! Jeff Davis knows it, Bob Lee knows it, General Hampton – everybody but you." (LaW:859, ch.120)

[88] "Gen. Lee looms up grandly & more grandly still. May God preserve him & grant him the great blessing of the living to see a country free, whose children will call him blessed." R. A. Stiles (Power 1998:203)

Then, in early April, as the first news of Lee's evacuation emerged, Billy, on leave at home and recuperating from a wound, exchanges a few words with Pinckney Herbert, a local shopkeeper:

> "[Herbert:] No more slavery–and soon no more war, doesn't it seem so, Captain?" [Billy:] "Yes, there's every indication that Lee is on the run . . ." (LaW:922, ch. 129) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (5)

In the same scene, Billy witnesses harassment directed at an African-American man on his way to recruit to the army. The gang is lead by Lute Fessenden, who had assaulted Billy's wife Brett earlier in the story:

> "[Fessenden:] Yeh, get on back up to the mill and go to work . . . Bob Lee's on the run. War's nearly over. We don't want colored boys fighting for us." (LaW:923, ch. 129) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (6)

Less than a week later, on the same day Lee surrendered his army, Brett and Billy talk about when would it be safe for Orry's wife Madeline to travel back to South Carolina:

> "[Billy:] They say there's almost nothing left of Lee's army . . . I can't imagine that [he] can hold out more than a few weeks longer. I guess [Madeline] could start home sometime in May, if not sooner." (LaW:930, ch. 131) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (7)

On the same day, George, in the field repairing railroads, witnesses the actual news of Lee's surrender. A large crowd of men chat chaotically about the surrender and he can only hear bits and pieces:

> "-sometime today-" "–old Gray Fox [Lee's nickname] asked Ulysses [Grant] for terms-" "-out by Appomattox Court House someplace-" (LaW:932, ch.131) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (8)

Finally, there is Charles, now searching for Augusta Barclay, returning to Virginia from his home in South Carolina without having learned about the news of Lee's surrender. On his way, he meets a Colonel Talcott, former artillery officer in the amy:

> "[Charles:] Major Main, Hampton's cavalry scouts. Where's the army? [Talcott:] "The Army of Northern Virginia? . . . Then you haven't heard?" [Charles:] "Heard what? I've been down on the Ashley [River], finding this remount." [Talcott:] "General Lee requested terms from General Grant more than three weeks ago. At Appomattox Court House, in Virginia." (LaW:947, ch. 134) Relates to Appomattox Campaign (9)

To conclude with all these final six considered negative mentions of Lee in dialogue, it may quickly be discerned that all of them are placed on a historical context and as within that context are truthful accounts of what happened. However, there seems to be no doubt in Jakes' mind that men in Lee's army in January 1865 were nearly all of the opinion that they would lose. Secondly, LaW again seems to treat Lee's evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond as a chaotic, panicky event with no general plan made by Lee. Finally, LaW emphasises that it was Lee who asked, i.e. who was *active*, in the progress of ending the fighting and surrendering the army to Grant. Also, nothing at all in LaW is mentioned about Lee's frequent and acute appeals to the Confederate War Department at this period to furnish more provisions for his troops.

However, in January, 1865, according to Foote (1974:756), the morale of Lee's army was "said to be high despite short rations and the bone-numbing chill" though he does admit that "many by now had reached their limit of endurance". Foote (1974:763, 764) further comments that "hope died hard in Lee" and that there were still those who in January were high on morale. This view counters Jakes' profound defeatism.[89] From comments made by Catton (1965:435), it may be gathered that February, not January, was the month during which desertion started to become a real problem, i.e. later than in LaW in which, as has been seen (see section 6.2), starts referring to desertions much too early by all accounts. McPherson (1988:821) concurs by citing February as the month during which most substantial desertions began to occur. As has been discussed elsewhere (see section 6.2), Lee was not "on the run" if one takes it to mean in a purely chaotic sense, something that one may, again, assume from these sentences. But true enough, Lee's army by April 9th had suffered notably. To quote McPherson (1988:848), it was "almost surrounded, outnumbered by five or six to one in effective troops".

Remarkably, LaW completely ignores the fact that it was Grant who made the first move about surrendering. It is implied in LaW that Lee submissively asked for terms while in reality he even contemplated continuing the resistance, prompting Grant to declare: "It looks as if Lee meant to fight" (Catton 1969:460, as quoted in McPherson 1988:848). Foote (as quoted in Foote 1974:919) narrates that Lee thought there still were "some true

[89] "[the peace commissioners] were accompanied to our lines by Genl. Lee, in full uniform; also Genl. Hill & others. Great cheering on their passage. May our Heavenly Father speed and favour their mission with an *honorable peace* [i.e. recognition of the independence of the Confederacy] as a result." Captain F. M. Coker (Power 1998:241; emphasis original)

men left" and Foote (1974:924) even declares that "there still was fight" in Lee's army and a Virginian soldier reported, "a part of the army still trudged on, with their faith still strong, only waiting for General Lee to say whether they were to face about and fight" (as quoted in Foote 1974:932). Lee also implicitly turned down Grant's first proposal of surrender (1974:932). Thus, to say "there is almost nothing left" of Lee's army is, again, seemingly too bleak, simplistic, one-sided an utterance. Catton (1965:449), on the other hand, does state frankly that Lee's scheme to continue the fight was "never much more than a flight from the inevitable". Lee's appeals for provisions have been exemplified in Foote (1974:761).

To summarise briefly, then, there seems to be quite a few comments made in various shades of negativism about Lee in dialogue that outnumber the positive ones more than five to one. To be sure, some are made possible by events in history, but the nearly omnipresent cynicism and negativity residing in LaW in connection with Lee still does not compare smoothly with the three historians' views of Lee.

III Lines mentioning Robert E. Lee in a neutral light/fashion/context

The remaining seven mentions of Lee in dialogue are, for the most part, less significant regarding this study. These are sentences that many times mention Lee only in passing, making him less an object suitable for a comparative analysis in this respect, or in which nothing particularly positive nor negative about him is said. Still, there are a few scenes about which some observations can be made.

1861, August: Book Two: The Downward Road

The first mention of Lee to fall into this category comes from Augusta Barclay who after a ball with Charles in August, 1861, in Book Two, "The Downward Road", says to him that

> "This evening we have talked about everything from my crops to General Lee's character . . ." (LaW:210, ch.35)

In other words, Charles and Augusta had talked about what Lee is like. Again, it may be drawn from this that Lee's character was somehow very peculiar to others and nothing in

the remark suggests the conversation was positive. In fact, considering the previous "talk" about Lee, analysed in section 6.4, II and Charles' own thoughts (see section 6.2, page 47), it can be speculated that Lee was talked about as if he was some exotic bird, rather than admired or praised.

1863, May: Book Four: "Let Us Die to Make Men Free"

This is followed by a mention of Lee from a very minor character, Mr. Tate. During the Chancellorsville Campaign[90] in May, 1863, in Book Four, "'Let Us Die to Make Men Free'", Billy and his engineers demolish Tate's home for want of lumber and siding:

> "[Tate's wife]: General Hooker's men who came by said we'd be shot if we stepped one foot in the open." [Tate:] "It's a bluff . . . They're afraid we'll slip over the Rapidan and warn Bob Lee. I wouldn't do that. I have to protect this place." (LaW:530-531, ch.76) Relates to Chancellorsville Campaign (6)

None of the historians comment whether General Hooker issued such orders. What is notable is that even though the couple is, apparently, Virginian, they do not seem to be willing to sympathise with Lee.

The following four supposedly neutral mentions of Lee in speech are made in connection with his Gettysburg Campaign in the summer of 1863. In the beginning of June, Elkanah Bent, aspiring to become a secret agent for the Union, meets the chief of National Detective Bureau (FBI's precedent), the historical figure Lafayette Baker:

> "[Baker:] [O'Dell] saw large masses of troops moving west of Fredericksburg, by the way. There's truth in those rumors. Lee's up to something . . ." (LaW:571, ch.81) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (12)

Jakes claims one of Baker's spies, O'Dell, had seen Lee's army move. But, those were still rumours.

[90] "Here an incident occurred which I shall never forget. As the [Federal] prisoners fell to one side an exciting murmur ran through them of: 'That's him! that's Lee! Hats off, boy's!' As [Lee] came up the prisoners, to a man, faced him and uncovered, and he looking, as I thought, sadly at them, raised his hat and bowing his head acknowledged their salute . . . Lee was then at the zenith of his fame, and their recognition of his greatness seemed so fitting and graceful it called forth cheers from our troops." Captain Peter S. McGlashan (in Woodhead (ed.) 1996b:129)

About a week later, before invading Pennsylvania the Confederate cavalry prepared for a review and a ball in Virginia. Charles is having a discussion with Lee's nephew Fitzhugh:

> "[Fitzhugh Lee:] Sorry to hurry you, but I must make an attempt to get to the ball. By the way, General Lee has announced himself available on Monday. General Stuart has ordered a review." (LaW:579, ch. 82) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (13)

In this manner Charles becomes informed of the review in honour of Lee.

In mid-June, as Lee had commenced his invasion of the north, Stanley urges his wife Isabel and their sons to leave Washington with him:

> "''Washington in danger.' I've heard Lee is in Hagerstown – I've heard he's in Pennsylvania – the rebs might have the town encircled by morning. I decided it's time for a vacation. If you don't care to go, that's your affair." (LaW:586, ch.83) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (14)

Thus, Jakes seems to continue the emphasis on rumours about Lee's intentions, with a frightened Stanley moving out from Washington.

Finally, in the field near the battle of Gettysburg, on July 2nd, Charles captures a prisoner:

> "[Charles:] What unit are you?" "General – Kilpatrick's – Third Division" [Charles:] "Bound where?" . . . "Lee's left flank – wherever that is." (LaW:608, ch. 85) Relates to Gettysburg Campaign (15)

To put it differently, Charles was informed that a Federal cavalry brigade was searching for Lee's left flank.

To conclude, as has been established (see section 6.2), Jakes emphasised in his narrative of the Gettysburg Campaign that many rumours that were afloat in the North about Lee's intentions. And, true enough, a review was arranged in honor of General Lee (see section 6.2) before the campaign started.

The source of some puzzlement to me is the last scene, with Charles and the prisoner. According to Foote (1963:522), on July 2nd two of Stuart's cavalry brigades had arrived by sundown and third brigade was expected before sunrise, July 3rd. McPherson (1988:660) contends that all of Stuart's horse had "rejoined the army during [July 2nd]"

while Catton (1963) does not comment the matter at all. The scene depicted takes place on the evening of July 2nd five miles north of the battlefield. Of course, Charles was a scout, riding ahead of the main body.

However, none of the historians mention this operation of General Kilpatrick's to find Lee's left flank. Foote (1963:569, 572) notes that on July 3rd Kilpatrick's two brigades saw action, one "three miles east of Gettysburg", the other "just west of [Big] Round Top", i.e. about three miles south of it. McPherson (1988:663) places the latter action "south of the Round Tops". Stuart's orders were to operate in the Federal rear, i.e. to the east of the town, in case of a breakthrough of an attack ordered by Lee on July 3rd. The breakthrough never materialised. The other brigade was sent by Kilpatrick in a failed task to close Lee's escape route after the attack.[91] I find no evidence from these sources of either of the brigades operating five miles north of Gettysburg on the evening of July 2nd, attempting to find Lee's left flank, as claimed in LaW.[92]

1864, June: Book Five: The Butcher's Bill

The last supposedly neutral reference to Lee comes from Stanley. In June, 1864, in Book Five, "The Butcher's Bill", he compares Grant's losses with those of Lee so far in the campaign to his lover, Jeannie Canary:

> "[Grant] has lost something like fifty thousand men . . . almost the same number you'll find in Lee's entire army." (LaW:762, ch. 106) Relates to Overland Campaign (6)

Thus, Lee is merely used by Jakes in comparison with Grant, perhaps not so much to imply something about Lee as to highlight Grant's casualties sustained in the present campaign. Foote (1974:316) tabulates Grant's casualties at this point at 54,000 men while McPherson (1988:742) puts the figure at 65,000, including losses from expired enlistments and those suffered by initial attacks against Petersburg after the comment was made while Catton (1965:368), by the same routine of calculation, arrives at the figure of "between 60,000 and 70,000 men".

[91] The famous "Pickett's Charge"
[92] However, Harman (2005:62) does recognise the action, so it probably did take place.

To conclude, the majority of this last collection of spoken lines handle Lee's campaign in the North culminating with the Battle of Gettysburg while a few are completely off-hand comments with little to analyse. In addition, while Jakes reminds us of Lee's, according to him, gossiped-about character, there is also the event at Gettysburg not located by any of the three historians.

6.5 Summary of the comparative analysis

In this section, the results of the comparative analysis are drawn together. The findings that emerged in the course of the analysis have been touched upon. These are divided into conclusions about Lee's character and being and how his campaigns are described in the novel. Also, the most apparent historical errors are mentioned.

Lee's being and character in LaW

A few quite central observations can be made about Lee's character and being as LaW describes them. First, of his being it can be concluded that Lee is almost invariably seen as old and weak. In only one instance is he described "handsome", and even then, "graying rapidly". Otherwise, Lee has "a seamed face, shadowed eyes, white-streaked beard and a general air of strain" with creaking knees at the end of 1861. During the Maryland Campaign in the autumn of 1862 his beard is "almost white" and before Gettysburg, in the summer of 1863 he is "graying rapidly". In January, 1865, he is described as "stooped [and] gray". These adjectives do not give a particularly admiring or even a positive depiction of Lee.

His character is, seemingly, ridiculed at quite a many times. While he is described as "famous" and given credit for "assimilating the fact" that the war was over[93], along with a few implicit remarks about his determination, the negative and sly implications and descriptions far outnumber these. It is quite telling that the strongest praise for Lee comes from one of the villains in the novel, calling Lee "the greatest soldier in Christendom", to which one of the main characters responds, "fuck you".

[93] Though it was not over in all America when Lee surrendered.

Lee is mentioned to have "boldly, crazily" split his army like "a gambler" during the Maryland Campaign. In addition, Lee supposedly had "been away a lot, leaving command to subordinates" in Texas in the 1850s, curiously implying that Lee shirked duty.

Lee is characterised "a polite fellow, slow to anger – and who had ever heard him curse or seen him do a discourteous or ungentlemanly deed?" This has obviously been meant as a sarcasm, along with a remark that ". . . General and Mrs. Lee are absent . . . A domestic spat, do you suppose? I know they are a model couple – they say he never curses or loses his temper. But surely even a man of his high moral character occasionally lets down." In the same scene, Lee is spoken of in a very condescending manner as "poor old Bob", "flogged" by Northern press. When the character of Ashton wonders if that does not make Lee "popular with the troops", the answer is "hardly". In the same vein, Lee is pictured as "atypically grumpy of late" in the last winter of the war.

Lee is likewise accused, quite controversially[94], of being partial to his nephew Fitz Lee in these excerpts:

- ". . . [Fitz] had risen rapidly solely because he was Old Bob's nephew. Might be something to it . . ."

- "Lee distrusted Hampton's age . . . Charles thought it a ridiculous issue . . . Still, those high up [i.e. Lee] seemed determined to test him further. Charles felt bad because he suspected the delay also had something to do with Fitz Lee wanting the promotion for himself."

- "[Charles spoke of] Lee's failure to demonstrate faith in Wade Hampton by promoting him to commander of the cavalry."

Further, Lee is, not convincingly, implied to have bad relations with president Davis and personally considering secession a folly "whose magnitude is only now being perceived" at the end of 1861, yet another controversial implication. He is also made fun of: For

[94] Mathless (ed.) 1998a:24) comments that General Stuart, "impressed with Lee's conduct", was responsible for, at least, promoting Fitz Lee a brigadier in June, 1862.

instance, in July, 1864, African-Americans were supposedly eating "a barbecued effigy" of Lee.

As it has been seen, this image of Lee's character and being largely does not do justice for the image found in contemporary sources and history writing. He is generally pictured in a lot more favourable terms by the vast majority of both contemporaries and historians. Very few studies or body of literature used in this study concur with some of Jakes's ideas. Some examples of the contemporary views can be found in the footnotes relating to specific campaigns. While it is true that Lee's health took its toll during the war, he is seldom described in such graphical terms.

I also noticed that very few contemporaries and historians refer to Lee as "Bob Lee" that can, in itself, be interpreted as a disparaging nickname. "General Lee" is the way he is referred to almost universally in e.g. Power's (1998) relatively large study.[95] Curiously enough, in LaW "General Lee" is used only seven times while "Bob Lee", rarely found in other sources, has been employed sixteen times.

Of great interest is the observation that nobody apparently thought very high of Lee, since nobody, not even in the South, throughout the book manages to sincerely say a single pleasing or even positive line directly about him in dialogue.

Lee's campaigns in LaW

If possible, the description of the campaigns of Lee and references to them come across as even more negative in total. While there are a few comments that describe Lee "brilliant as a tactician", "[one] of the best", and a few implicit, between-the-lines comments that he is dangerous to his opponent and a determined fighter, the cynical, negative implications again prevail.

The verb "to scrap" is quite surprising a word choice from Jakes in relation to Lee, since its connotations imply to a quarrel between children, for instance. Yet it is used twice in connection with West Virginia Campaign and once with Maryland Campaign. Of

[95] Power (1998) investigated the written records of more than 400 soldiers and officers serving under Lee in the last year of the war.

particular peculiarity is the fact that defensive tactics relating to the deadliest single day in American warfare, Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), are referred to as "scrapping".
To begin, there is Lee's first campaign in West Virginia that gets a lot of attention from the author. It is interesting to note the verbs and other phrases used in connection with the campaign and its after-effects. Lee is described having been "defeated"[96] and "taken a drubbing" and the campaign twice pronounced a "failure". Lee's was "one reb star that's sinking mighty fast". As a result, Lee, "once considered America's best soldier", "finest of the fine," acquired "a portfolio of nicknames [he'd] be happier to discard", such as "Granny" Lee, "Evacuating Lee" and "King of Spades". Further, he was "banished" and "shipped" to "one of the benighted districts" to take "obscure" command. When he assumed command of the Confederate army at the eve of Seven Days in June, 1862, he was "back from exile". To conclude, Lee had "slipped and slid" and "suffered", Jakes concludes.

In the Seven Days Battles in June, 1862, Jakes gives, implicitly, the somewhat misguided view that the battles were fought in the immediate vicinity of the Richmond defenses. He also brings up a great panic in Richmond and apparently general lack of confidence in Lee. Still, he goes on to mention that Lee had "outthought and outfought" his opponents there. The strange remark is that "'. . . Lee brought Stonewall marching to help him'". In fact, a closer study of the battles (see Appendix A) indicates that this was arguably the poorest campaign of Jackson. He provided very little concrete assistance to Lee.

Jakes spends a lot of time handling Lee's Maryland Campaign., mentioning the Battle of Second Manassas, a great victory for Lee that enabled him to invade Maryland, in just one very brief paragraph. He emphasises that few new recruits were found in Maryland and makes it obvious that Lee was in charge of the recruiting scheme even though the idea was Davis's. A reminder of Jakes's sarcastic quips is administered to the reader, with Lee's "bold, crazy" maneuver of splitting his army described as the idea that "would produce foam on the mouths of writers of strategy texts". The dependency on Jackson is again flashed. The battle itself is described with possibly a bit too much despair and wild panic, both of which are Jakes's favourite tools. Moreover, a metaphor of "blue storm" is perhaps a bit too strong one in connection with McClellan, as is the word choice "to

[96] In that connection, Jakes speaks of a "defeat" when the actual casualties have been estimated at 30 total and principal commanders were not McClellan and Lee as Jakes states (see Appendix A).

stand fast". McClellan's performance is seemingly made stand out slightly better than it actually was. Consequently, Lee's actions are slightly too dark and panicky to what the historians say happened. Further, the tactical analysis of the battle is arguably in error.

The tremendous victory for Lee at Fredericksburg and the great collapse of Northern morale in the winter of 1862-1863 are largely ignored. In a great contrast, we are cynically told that at this time, "the war was not going well for the Confederacy". The Battle of Chancellorsville in May, 1863 is seen through the eyes of a frustrated Billy Hazard and more focus is paid to the shortcomings of Federal general Hooker than brilliance of Lee.

In connection with Gettysburg Campaign, the third great vocal point in the campaign analyses besides those in West Virginia and Maryland, Jakes makes it very clear that rumours flew about Lee's intentions. General Stuart's performance is seemingly treated in an unnecessarily apologetic manner. Firmly, Jakes suggests the campaign was a disaster beyond any doubt. The image of words in the campaign emphasise panic once again and also violence, with lower border "afire with panic and rumor", for instance. Jakes apparently decided to colour the affair in this manner in spite of Lee's careful orders not to plunder and pillage.

The Overland Campaign in 1864 by Grant is possibly the most erroneously written historically. Grant "chased" Lee into Petersburg and Lee "couldn't win" serve as examples of oversimplification. Further, there are a few military operations narrated that did not exist in history, such as Lee's retreat in mid-May and Federal cannon fire after the Battle of Cold Harbor. Notably, an attitude of profound defeatism conquers the hearts of Southern cynics Orry and Charles, a quite unlikely scenario historically. At the same time, virtually not a word is written about the exasperation in the North, broken only when General Sherman captured Atlanta in September. Very cursory details of the complex operations are given.[97]

[97] To illustrate, General Early's raid on Washington is ignored altogether, as well as Grant's "pendulum strikes" during the siege aimed at stretching Lee's lines and cutting his railroad. General Butler's fate in the Bermuda Hundred is not even mentioned either, nor is Banks's Red River Campaign in Texas or operations in e.g. Alabama. Operations in the Shenandoah Valley, along with the fact that the Confederacy was victorious there for a considerable time, are rarely mentioned. Nowhere is it apparent, even suggested, that in terms of morale and military success, South was initially relatively successful specifically in the Shenandoah during the campaign.

Finally, the Siege of Petersburg and the resulting breakthrough over Lee's lines are presented as quite desperate, dark efforts from the Southern point of view. By December, 1864, "no-one spoke seriously about winning anymore" and Lee was "stooped, gray and . . . atypically grumpy of late". Further, as early as summer –64, with the siege slightly more than a month old, Charles speaks of "high rate of desertion". By looking at a sample of what the participants actually did think and write at the time (e.g. Power:1998), this information is simply not valid. When the breakthrough does occur in April, 1865, once again it is described as a panicky, confused event from Lee's part. Evidently, it is argued that Lee lacked a cohesive, rational plan of action when the breakthrough came. Also, the slightly mockery phrase "Lee is on the run" is employed twice. Lee's surrender is described as a great relief and a wise decision.

Historical mistakes

The following represents the arguably clearest factual mistakes made by the author concerning Lee found in the study. Numbering eleven excerpts, the section consists of apparently erroneous dates and historical events that beyond all reasonable doubt contain a factual error.

"George McClellan had whipped Robert Lee [in western Virginia] early in June [1861]."

Actually, not Lee nor McClellan were directly in charge of these forces at the time.

"We march upstream tomorrow [April 29, 1863]."

Actually, General Hooker's orders, followed to the letter, were to march on April 27.

"Yesterday [on May 2, 1863], while Hooker shilly-shallied and lost his chance at a superior position, Bob Lee and Old Jack had been busy outfoxing him."

Actually, these happened on separate days. Hooker "lost his chance" on May 1st while the "oufoxing" occurred on May 2nd.

"[Charles and General Hampton] gossiped a while . . . About the . . . demands from certain newspapers that Mr. Davis be removed in favor of a military dictator; Lee was mentioned."

Actually, these demands materialised in 1865, not in January, 1864.

"[Between May 13 and May 20, 1864] the decimated [Federal] army refilled its ranks and marched by night in pursuit of the retreating Lee."

Actually, no such operation took place, with Lee standing his ground until May 20.

"Phil Sheridan's cavalry feinted toward Charlottesville."

Actually, it was no feint but a real military objective.

"[Orry and Madeline] heard [the guns] again on the stifling June nights in the wake of Cold Harbor."

Actually, there was no prominent artillery fire for several days after the battle.

"'Lee always said that once the siege starts, we're finished.'"

Actually, he did not publicly voice this opinion till June, 1864, and then only to two generals in private correspondence.

"[On July 11, 1864, Charles] spoke of the high rate of desertion and Lee's failure to demonstrate faith in Wade Hampton by promoting him to commander of the cavalry."

Actually, Hampton had been promoted chief of Lee's cavalry a month earlier. The argument telling of significant desertions at this point is not valid either, as has been demonstrated.

“The Petersburg&Lynchburg [railroad] line that ran west from town was under repair to supply the army pursuing Lee.”

Actually, the name of the structure was Southside Railroad.

“’Privates and corporals from fine families call [Lee] the King of Spades because he sent down orders that they must dig and sweat like the commonest field hands.’”

Actually, this nickname of Lee’s was created during the summer of 1862, almost a year later, when he took command of the army and named it Army of Northern Virginia.

It is puzzling to fathom the purpose of Jakes when he describes Lee in a manner so obviously robbed of admiration, idealism or even a positive attitude. Why the all-saturating sarcasm and cynicism? Quite possibly, one kind of answer is offered by Jones (1996), which we will investigate in the next and final chapter of the study.

7. NEW HISTORICISM AS A SCHOOL OF LITERARY CRITICISM IN CONNECTION WITH *LOVE AND WAR* (1984)

As has been established, the key hypothesis of this study is that New Historicism is a critical literary theory that fits well into the analysis of LaW. This notion comes from Jones (1996). In this chapter, her arguments in favour of New Historicism are firstly introduced and discussed and then blended and put into the context of this study. Primarily, the focus is on LaW and Robert E. Lee in it as interpreted through this critical theory, but a few observations have also been made about the studies by Foote (1958, 1963, 1974), Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) and McPherson (1988) and the writing of history in general, using the context of New Historicism.

Jones (1996:164-167) argues for the suitability of New Historicism using the following three arguments: Firstly, even though LaW takes place in the past, going back more that a hundred years, Jakes was "clearly influenced" by the Vietnam War. As evidence, Jones (1996:164, 165) cites her interview with him in which the author reveals having a Vietnam veteran in mind when he created the character of Charles Main. Jones (1996:165, 166, 167) elaborates this point by maintaining that an analogy between Vietnam War and the Civil War is possible. Both had plenty of poor individuals in the front lines; in both, African-Americans tried to "be all you can be", in the former, out of money, in the latter, out of freedom from slavery; both were the result of and acted as catalysts for divisions in the public opinion; in both, soldiers suffered from PTSD, the symptoms of which fit, by definition[98], very well into the character of Charles. That both the author and reader are mere products of our era, in accordance with one of the cornerstones in New Historicism, is well evidenced in this case, observes Jones (1996:167).

Secondly, Jones (1996:164) claims that the symbiotic relationship between literature and history, which "mutually reflect and reciprocally influence" each other as New Historicism establishes, is evident in North and South books and thus in LaW as well. Within the novel, a reader may find various written material dating from the era. Jones

[98] Moss (1994:384, as quoted in Jones 1996:167) lists the following clinical symptoms of PTSD: (1) Drug and alcohol abuse, (2) recurring nightmares, (3) chronic depression, (4) psychic numbing, (5) guilt feelings about the war or survival of it, (6) the inability to experience intimacy and (7) unpredictable outbursts of aggression.

(1996:164-165) cites "literature . . . Negro folk songs, Civil War diaries, government documents, recipes, ladies' fashion books . . . newspaper stories and advertisements". According to her, all these serve to reflect the American society back then. Further evidence can be found in the beginning of LaW, with Book One, fittingly titled, Jones suggests, "A Vision from [Sir Walter] Scott". Jones (1996:165) makes a case that contemporary literature, i.e. Scott, ably interwove with the expectations of the Confederate soldiers and influenced, to an extent, the whole Southern society.

Thirdly, and most interestingly perhaps in connection with this study, Jones (1996:165) argues that, since Jakes has decided not to continue "to mythologize historical figures such as Lincoln and Lee", it serves as an argument for New Historicism. Mentioning Abrams (1993:249, as quoted in Jones 1996:165), Jones argues that one of the aims of New Historicism is not to treat history as "a set of fixed, objective facts". On the contrary, it ought to be interpreted alongside literature with which it interacts.

While the first and second reasons justifying New Historicism seem quite valid, the third argument is something that may not prove as enduring and is somewhat problematic. What Jones (1996:165) is suggesting is that since history-writing occurs together with other literature-writing, it follows that history is not a collection of objective, static facts. In itself, at a general level, the argument sounds plausible in a sense that time period, socio-political circumstances and co-existing literature, to name but a few variables, affect history-writing, as New Historicism contends.

To be sure, implicit commentary of the present is all well and good, even inevitable to an extent, but I believe implicit ought not to become explicit. Specifically this is the case when an author supposedly aims for reviving optimism, hope and idealism in the minds and hearts of his audience and also when his expected role is that of an (by and large) objective teacher. The era the book depicts and, generally, historical fiction as a genre, ought to transport a reader to a wholly different time and space. It ought not to project modern times in ways that crush the contemporary idealism under its weight, because if this is overtly done, 19th century history becomes post-Vietnam War history in theme, shade and message.

Of course, there is plenty of hope, idealism and values offered in LaW. The loving, supporting relationship between George and Constance may serve as an example, or the enduring loyalty and love between Orry and Madeline who overcome vast difficulties, only to be separated forever by the war. Orry's death seems to underscore Jakes's message, pronounced elsewhere regarding Lee, that the Southern struggle during the final months of the war was extremely futile. War also claims the relationship of Charles and Augusta while with Billy and Brett, the war unites them together even stronger and made them both, arguably among the first "common" people historically, to gradually accept the status of African-Americans as their equals against a backdrop of racism. Other relationships, such as those of Ashton and James and Stanley and Isabel, are destroyed by the war in different ways. Both are defeated by greed for power and wealth. In the former case, the idealistic principles of James are suffocated by the lust of power and wealth of Ashton. In the latter, exuberant, undeserved wealth acquired by immoral means is ruining Stanley and, consequently, his already platonic marriage to Isabel. Jakes's message seems to be that love and "high" normative principles are mightier and produce a more stable happiness than lust, wealth immorally acquired and greed. However, just as important a message is that sometimes idealism is destroyed, wiped out. War and being immoral can accomplish that. It is evident that in connection with Lee, and even with the whole South to an extent, that idealism, though undeniably historical, is still never even allowed to exist in Jakes's writing.

In quite a many instances war is the ultimate evil, as New Historicism allows. One fashion to illustrate this is by following the storyline of Cooper Main, Orry's older brother, and his family. An idealist, modern-thinking, pacifist man turns into a bloodthirsty, obsessed workaholic wanting revenge as a result of his son's death caused by the war and unprincipled greed. The arch concludes with a brief return to pacifism, only to revert back to silent hatred and cynicism at the violent changes the war produced.

In the following, Robert E. Lee's character in LaW is assessed against the backdrop of New Historicism.

7.1 New Historicism as a school of literary criticism regarding the portrayal of Robert E. Lee in *Love and War*

I believe the acknowledged diachronic relationship of New Historicism, examined above, will not justify that a historical character is completely mauled from the safety of a different time period. That is, if the assumed goal is to provide representations of history as viewed by contemporary people, not modern people. To violently break this maxim constitutes what is called revisionist history and I believe it has affected the characterisation of Lee. I argue that while Jakes has clearly been influenced by the Vietnam War and other surroundings, as Jones (1996) contends, it is irresponsible to allow this influence to seriously contaminate an actual character in history. Why not create the same idealistic, optimistic, positive halo, if even at intervals, around Lee which so clearly embraces many non-historical characters? Since, it can be argued, numerous, even the majority of, contemporary soldiers and civilians perceived that halo, I believe that Jakes exceeds his authority and duty as a history teacher by erasing nearly all signs of it in his imagery of Lee. I treat the admiration of Lee not as a concept of "mythologisation" as Jones (1996:165) contends but as an actual set of emotions really prevailing and truly felt at the time, before the war was even over.

I earnestly think that it constitutes a disfavour to the audience, especially from someone titled "America's history teacher", a writer of historical fiction, to let the surrounding societal structure and values seriously bend and distort the depiction of a historical character. Millions of people, whose only alleged source to history is Jakes, will not be able to subtract that Lee possibly was not conventionally viewed like he is viewed here, nor that the Confederacy generally was not on such a low morale starting from the spring of 1863. Still, Jakes lets it be understood this was the case. The cynicism and sarcasm, sarcastic irony[99] pointed at Lee, maybe as a result of the Vietnam War and time period, the author's mood, beliefs and ideology, are strongly "alive and kicking".

[99] To illustrate, consider these bipolar juxtapositions: ". . . general *once* considered America's *greatest soldier* had taken *a drubbing*", ". . . *finest of the fine* . . . was *mocked* with the name Granny because of his *military failures* . . . [and would soon be] *shipped* to one of the *benighted regions* . . .", ". . . *the greatest of them all* . . . *couldn't win*", "Lee–imagine how he must have felt, *once the superintendent* of West Point and *the country's finest soldier*, *forced* to ask . . . for terms."

How can it be derived from heretofore presented that Jakes has somehow decided "correctly", as Jones (1996) at least implies when, as a teacher, he has decided to so powerfully project these post-Vietnam attitudes on Lee? Do cynical observations and sarcastic remarks, minimising admiration and maximising failures, pessimism and weaknesses, serve as a well-needed antidote to "mythologising"? Are they historically more authentic? Hardly, I would say, since many other historical sources tell a different story. Much more logical, not to say historically accurate and in tune with the spirit and purpose of the book series, would be to describe Lee more positively and admiringly. But then, New Historicism would not fit into the picture so smoothly as a literary theory.

The only other option available is that the majority of the other sources have been, in turn, contaminated by "mythology" of Lee and Jakes's view is closer to "real". This is, however, quite unlikely statistically. Or, perhaps Jakes's logic was that since he holds that warfare is destructive, there must not be anything positive associated with it. Thus, as Charles and many others are already cynical pessimists in mindset, they observe the world, even Lee, in those terms, in that light. However, I believe there is too much artistic license if a collection of cynic individuals are allowed to colour a historical character to an audience expecting an account and imagery free from historically less than credible emotions.

An illustrative example of Jakes's objective at maximum historical accuracy in historical fiction is offered by Jones (1996:9). Jakes, in a "fanatic search for accuracy", once went through twelve books before determining which eye of Jefferson Davis's was bad. If, consequently, the objective is assumed to be history book-like precision and attention to detail, why stray radically away from the path offered by the historians regarding Lee? To be sure, the decision can be read as New Historicist, but a different question is whether it is purposeful, whether it fulfils the objectiveness assigned to a "history teacher". As it has been shown, both the societal defeatism in the South and cynicism and sarcasm regarding Lee *do not* represent a historical account agreed by the leading historians. And, arguably, as chapter 4 argues (see chapter 4), "a notion of historical reality" is what is essentially required from historical fiction. If the audience is lead, and wanted to, conclude that "so this was the way Lee was perceived and thought about then", I believe it misleading to present him in a significantly different manner from historians' views.

Of course, as New Historicist Montrose (1989:22, 23) maintains, "all texts are ideologically marked" as a result of constant converging and interaction, in short, diachronic relationship between texts and cultural codes. Thus, a coherent, static ideology is not possible. The poetics of culture, the ultimate aim of New Historicism, is created and maintained by the constantly shifting conjectures inside the ideological field. Ideology is a continuous battlefield for dominant views, with attacks and defences, and hence necessarily dynamic in nature. Thus, "versions of the Real, of History, are instantiated, deployed reproduced; and by such means, they may also be appropriated, contested, transformed" (1989:23). Montrose contends further that everyone analyses and understands from an individual vantage point shaped by historical, social, and institutional factors. Everyone is a historical subject in a sea of history. Both present, past and diachronic relationship between them are historical.

To conclude, it is apparent that, in New Historicist tones, Jakes has decided to ideologically contest and transform the way Lee is traditionally and contemporarily perceived. It can be questioned, however, if this "ideological crusade" serves the purpose and task implicitly laid on "America's history teacher". The only explanation to the phenomenon that can be perceived, by this study and Jones (1996:165), is that to Jakes, Lee was mythologised too much in literature. It probably constitutes an escapist attitude to history, since the majority of other sources tell a different story.

7.2 New Historicism as a school of literary criticism regarding studies by Foote, Catton and McPherson

In this study, it is impossible to examine fully the individual, very comprehensive studies by these historians and the role of New Historicism in them. Therefore, a few more general remarks are offered regarding history and its writing proposed by the New Historicists. Nevertheless, it can be argued that these observations also fit to these particular studies. After all, what all three have in common is that they are historical, written by historians.

Montrose (1989:16) mentions that ideology is undoubtedly a factor in formulating a theory and that they act in a symbiotic relationship. Thus, all historical studies are products of not only theory but ideology. Ideology "actively instantinates . . . values,

beliefs and experiences" (1989:16) and language itself is produced from a position "*within* 'history, culture, society, politics, institutions, class and gender conditions'" (1989:17; emphasis original). These conditions have, of course, varied greatly between the thirty years of Foote (1958) and McPherson (1988). However, the scholars are relatively uniform in the way they treat Lee in their studies. It is curious that while Jakes has taken the obvious privilege to write Lee anew, treated history not as a fixed set of facts as New Historicism would have it, the same rules of conduct have not been followed by these historians, at least. If both share the same objective, i.e. to educate, and this has been shown to be the case, it is arguably more risky to write about Lee so much through the present-day lens.

The second crucial concept of New Historicism, associated with the ideological structure described in the previous section, is power. A few critics (e.g. Pechter 1987:292-303; emphasis original, as quoted in Montrose 1989:17) have observed that New Historicism is a Marxist criticism since it sees "history . . . as determined, wholly or in essence, by struggle, contestation, power relations, *libido dominandi*". From this criticism it is possible to suggest for instance that, as even McPherson (1988:873) hints, Foote's study, being for the most part the oldest and created by a Southern writer, has been influenced by the prevailing historical conditions in the early-20th century America. At the turn of the 20th century and later, the so-called "Lost Cause Myth" was at its height. According to this view of history (Gray 1986), the South was constitutionally right to secede from the Union and the North became the aggressor, the party that had initiated the war and attacked the South. Since the institution of slavery and a whole way of living disappeared with the war, it was safe and comforting to return to nostalgia and the past. Thus, as stated by Gray (1986:76), "respect could be paid to the past, vindication could be achieved for the present, and an example established for future generations". Lee was often seen as the defender of the South (Gray 1986:82) who, like George Washington, had chivalrously fought for passive feminine liberty against aggressive masculine tyranny. An entire branch of literature was born in which the South was glorified. This was mainly because, according to Gray (1986:75), the Southerners thought their side of the historical events was ignored. This kind of "inferiority complex" may well be

perceived as a struggle against a prevailing ideology and power.[100] Even though Foote does not go this far, there may be an element of truth in McPherson's suggestion that his study leans slightly South.

Finally, New Historicist Foxe-Genovese (1989:216-217) establishes that "what we know of the past" depends on interpretations of what things and persons have significance that are found on the imperfect records and also the way those records have been written about and interpreted by humans. Further, history is not just interpreting texts, but also mediation between knowledge about the past and what actually did happen there. Text is a media of context, because the latter puts certain conditions on the former. Politics influence texts greatly, she argues: In fact, the concept of a novel emerged "in tandem with the emergence of the bourgeoisie" (1989:221) and was a tool in political struggles between classes. This was "all the more true for the United States" (1989:221) where the novel was used as a weapon between different lifestyles and cultures.[101] Good history is, to her, structural (1989:217-218). It has to detect and rebuild the conditions of social relations and action. These operate in relation to a dominant tendency that presents them with a structure. This structure determines, through writing and reading, which properties in history matter and which do not.[102]

To conclude, New Historicism in relation to history writing offers many plausible-sounding viewpoints. Of course, it remains debatable whether Jakes's radically New Historicist approach, in his obvious counter-reaction to stop "mythologising" Lee, is actually a disservice to his assumed "pupils" who possibly expect a less passionate attack, if any, on a historical character.

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[100] While Foote's (1958, 1963, 1974) study may have a hint of this struggle against power and prevailing ideology incorporated to New Historicism, McPherson (1988), in my view, has himself used slightly partial remarks in favour of General Grant, possibly in response to some historians' decidedly negative opinion of him. For instance, there is McPherson's (1988:4) claim that Grant was the "foremost hero" of the Civil War. On the question of Grant's drinking, one of the most disputed shadows in his soldier career, McPherson (1988:589) even states that if it was a problem, and it reportedly was not a crucial one, it "may have made him a better general". Thus, McPherson (1988) can be seen to engage in a similar power struggle for dominant theory and ideology as does Foote (1958, 1963, 1974). All of which is compatible with New Historicism.

[101] As also this study has shown.

[102] Thus, "No more than the author can the text escape history, although history herself assures some texts the power to speak compellingly to more than one historical moment. No more than the author can the text claim political innocence, although a sophisticated politics invariably represents itself as comprehensive world view" (Fox-Genovese 1989:222).

8. CONCLUSION

This study has, primarily, systematically compared the image of a historical figure Robert E. Lee in author John Jakes's book of historical fiction titled *Love and War* (1984) with the selected period studies by Foote (1958, 1963, 1974), Catton (1961, 1963, 1965) and McPherson (1988). Secondarily, this study has investigated how New Historicism, a form of literary criticism suggested by Jones (1996), at a general level fits into analysing the novel, the depiction of Lee and, at a general level, the aforementioned historical period studies.

For the primary research question, the emerging result is, quite clearly, that Jakes has committed at least eleven major errors in connection with Lee, if we assume the term "error" to imply a factual, non-arguable mistake. Moreover, he has pictured Lee in a cynical, sarcastic way that, by and large, does not correspond to the three historians' views. Many of his arguments have also not been confirmed and some of his analysis of campaigns and individual battles regarding Lee go unsupported. In fact, some arguments about Lee, his campaigns and the South in the Civil War seem to be quite easily falsifiable.

In all, the picture is decidedly negative, with few positive tendencies, spots of light. If there is anything positive to say about Lee, it seldom appears without sarcasm or irony or both. One further point to note is that no-one of the Southern main characters thinks particularly highly of Lee. In fact, not one figure, be it North or South, says anything explicitly positive about him in the course of thousands of pieces of dialogue. His errors and weaknesses have been magnified while some of his strengths are minimised and some of his major victories in the war even almost completely ignored. The findings are relatively cohesive and systematic. This much can be said confidently since every line mentioning Lee has been analysed and compared. The analysis part has been further discussed in section 6.5. The reasons for this kind of depiction can be explained by looking at New Historicism.

Regarding the secondary research question, it has been found that New Historicism admittedly emerges as a very plausible critical literary theory through which to interpret the message of LaW, Lee's depiction in it and the period studies. Obviously, Jakes has

made a few interpretations from history that almost constitute a revisionist treatment of Lee. While Jakes's interpretations are fresh in their uniqueness, they seem one-sided, at times ignoring the Federal view while agonising a lot over the plight and despair of the Confederacy. They also, as a whole, come across slightly misleading, because casual readers who have not studied the Civil War any further may get quite bleak a picture about Lee. They may also conclude from the novel that Southern morale started to seriously decrease two years before the war ended, an argument not confirmed by this study.

Of Jones's (1996) three arguments for New Historicist analysis in the novel, i.e. Vietnam War influence, the intertextuality found in the novel and Jakes's decision not to treat history as a set of facts, the first and second seem very convincing. I agree with her in that New Historicism clearly makes for a reasonable background to literary analysis. However, the third argument comes across as more problematic and contains a logical disagreement. In the heart of the matter may lay the thinking of Jones (1996:165), possibly also of Jakes himself, that Lee has been "mythologized" too much previously. Perhaps to counter the hypothetical over-glorifying of Lee, Jakes has embarked on a mission to methodologically push Lee down from his pedestal. This attitude is justified in that after the war there was indeed a rich branch of Lee-glorifying literature in the South. However, I do not think that contemporary research has written anything of the kind. Thus, Jakes may have overreacted to, perhaps even been annoyed by, the Lee-glorifying movement in America. New Historicist observations and its arguments seem valid from this perspective as well.

The resulting decisions made by Jakes are not without their difficulties. Because Jakes reportedly conducts a thorough historical research, going from general to specific, and has a role of a "history teacher" for millions, it is presumably an unwise decision to write unorthodox, even Quixotic views about a historical character, i.e. Lee. Further, even though the novel, and the book series, has a task set by Jakes to inspire idealism and hope, very little of this has apparently rubbed off on Lee's character. This seems to be the case even though, to my knowledge Lee actually *was* viewed in those terms by many contemporaries and other historians, past and present. It is peculiar that "America's history teacher" can so completely bypass, or at any rate minimise, this state of affairs. New Historicism has also been found to contain some basic, normative assumptions that

make it a fitting framework into discussing the period studies and history writing in general.

The impact of this single study cannot be overly great in the vast field of literary analyses since the novel is not among the classics of literature canon, nor has it been, to my knowledge, investigated academically but once previously. Still, hopefully the study can be of help to an individual interested in American history, American Civil War, New Historicism and Robert E. Lee. Furthermore, the method employed by this study may prove to be useful to researchers doing a comparative analysis of historical fiction or other literary material, fictive or otherwise. The method of using three principal sources in a comparative fashion instead of merely one is, in my view, better than just employing one source. There are always slight differences between different writers, historians and other researchers. By enlarging the viewpoints into three, the objective truth about the past, while never completely attained, is at least approached a few more steps. Analogously, in surveying, mathematically determining a given position is the more accurate the more numerous the points used to calculate the exact location of that position.

This study succeeded in exhaustively compounding the various references to Lee and his character in LaW with a theory of literary criticism and creating a rather cohesive, systematic methodology for analysis. The study also offered a rather well-researched historical background to the historical era surrounding Lee. The fact that the entire material concerning Lee could be used for analysis, instead of merely selecting a few pieces and illustrations to respond to the primary research question, enabled to present a comprehensive account of Lee's role in LaW. Further, the results received from the analysis were notable in a sense that in America, the author enjoys great prestige for his alleged historical precision, yet the results pointed out numerous historical mistakes regarding Lee. The issue of New Historicism was dealt with about as thoroughly as one could expect in a study of this magnitude.

The study possibly might have achieved more for looking more thoroughly at various New Historicism-related theories for literary criticism and various theories about comparing literary data. Unfortunately, the resources at hand did not allow for extensive research into alternative analysis methods in the context of historical fiction. This fact

was emphasised by the discovery that there did not seem to be many previous studies conducted with a similar methodology. In addition, to a reader with very little knowledge of American history, this study may prove somewhat demanding to follow.

The results of this study may be used as an argument for New Historicism "at work" in literature and its suitability for literary analysis. Robert E. Lee's portrayal in the ever-growing historical literature gains one more, if quite rare, even unexpected, shade of colour. One possibility for conducting further research could be to compare Lee in various books, or other literary material, with his image found in this book. Or, alternatively, to investigate other historical characters in novels of historical fiction in a similar method. A third way to more directly expand this particular study would be to compare and contrast a character in a historically polar position to Lee, such as Federal general Grant, with Lee's image found in this thesis.

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10. LIST OF APPENDICES

10.1 APPENDIX A

Summaries of the battles of Robert E. Lee in Love and War *(1984) (http://americancivilwar.com/statepic/alpha.html, visited 26.9. 2005)*

Philippi (Philippi Races), West Virginia

June 3, 1861

Col. Thomas A. Morris, temporarily in command of Union forces in western Virginia, mounted a two-prong advance under E. Dumont and B.F. Kelley against a small Confederate occupation force at Philippi under Porterfield. Kelley marched on back roads from near Crafton on June 2 to reach the rear of the town, while Dumont moved south from Webster. Both columns arrived at Philippi before dawn on the 3rd. The resulting surprise attack routed the Confederate troops, forcing them to retreat to Huttonsville. Although a small affair, this was considered the first major land action in the Eastern Theater.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Operations in Western Virginia (June-December 1861)

Principal commanders: Col. Thomas A. Morris [US]; Col. George A. Porterfield [CS]

Forces Engaged: Brigades

Estimated Casualties: 30 total (US 4; CS 26)

Rich Mountain, West Virginia

July 11, 1861

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan assumed command of Union forces in western Virginia in June 1861. On June 27, he moved his divisions from Clarksburg south against Lt. Col. John Pegram's Confederates, reaching the vicinity of Rich Mountain on July 9. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. T.A. Morris's Union brigade marched from Philippi to confront Brig. Gen. R.S. Garnett's command at Laurel Hill. On July 11, Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans led a reinforced brigade by a mountain path to seize the Staunton-Parkersburg Turnpike in Pegram's rear. A sharp two-hour fight ensued in which the Confederates were split in two. Half escaped to Beverly, but Pegram and the others surrendered on July 13. Hearing of Pegram's defeat, Garnett abandoned Laurel Hill. The Federals pursued, and, during fighting at Corrick's Ford on July 13, Garnett was killed. On July 22, McClellan was ordered to Washington, and Rosecrans assumed command of Union forces in western Virginia. Union victory at Rich Mountain was instrumental in propelling McClellan to command of the Army of the Potomac.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Operations in Western Virginia (June-December 1861)

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan and Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans [US];Lt. Col. John Pegram and Brig. Gen. Robert S. Garnett [CS]

Forces Engaged: Brigades

Estimated Casualties: 346 total (US 46; CS 300)

Cheat Mountain Summit, West Virginia

September 12-15 1861

Gen. Robert E. Lee directed his first offensive of the war against Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds's entrenchments on the summit of Cheat Mountain and in the Tygart Valley. The Confederate attacks were uncoordinated, however, and the Federal defense was so stubborn that Col. Albert Rust (leading the attacks) was convinced that he confronted an overwhelming force. He actually faced only about 300 determined Federals. Lee called off the attack and, after maneuvering in the vicinity, withdrew to Valley Head on September 17. In October, Lee renewed operations against Laurel Mountain with the troops of Floyd and Loring, but the operation was called off because of poor communication and lack of supplies. Lee was recalled to Richmond on October 30 after achieving little in western Virginia.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Operations in Western Virginia (June-December 1861)

Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee and Col. Albert Rust [CS]

Forces Engaged: Brigades

Estimated Casualties: 170 total (US 80; CS 90)

Carnifex Ferry, West Virginia

September 10, 1861

Learning of Col. Erastus Tyler's rout at Kessler's Cross Lanes, Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans moved three brigades south from Clarksburg to support him. On the afternoon of September 10, he advanced against Brig. Gen. John Floyd's camps at Carnifex Ferry. Darkness halted several hours' fighting. The strength of the Union artillery convinced Floyd to retreat during the night. Floyd blamed his defeat on his co-commander Brig. Gen. Henry Wise, contributing to further dissension in the Confederate ranks.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Operations in Western Virginia (June-December 1861)

Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans [US]; Brig. Gen. John Floyd [CS]

Forces Engaged: Brigades

Estimated Casualties: 250 total

Greenbrier River (Camp Bartow), West Virginia

October 3, 1861

During the night of October 2-3, Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds with two brigades advanced from Cheat Mountain to reconnoiter the Confederate position at Camp Bartow on the Greenbrier River. Reynolds drove in the Confederate pickets and opened fire with his artillery. After sporadic fighting and an abortive attempt to turn his enemy's right flank, Reynolds withdrew to Cheat Mountain.

Result(s): Inconclusive

Campaign: Operations in Western Virginia (June-December 1861)

Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Joseph Reynolds [US]; Brig. Gen. Henry R. Jackson [CS]

Forces Engaged: Brigades

Estimated Casualties: 80 total (US 40; CS 40)

Oak Grove (French's Field, King's School House), Virginia

June 25, 1862

Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days' battles. On June 25, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan advanced his lines along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of bringing Richmond within range of his siege guns. Union forces attacked over swampy ground with inconclusive results, and darkness halted the fighting. McClellan's attack was not strong enough to derail the Confederate offensive that already had been set in motion. The next day, Lee seized the initiative by attacking at Beaver Dam Creek north of the Chickahominy.

Result(s): Inconclusive (Union forces withdrew to their lines.)

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: Corps

Estimated Casualties: 1,057 total (US 516; CS 541)

Beaver Dam Creek (Mechanicsville, Ellerson's Mill), Virginia

June 26, 1862

Second of the Seven Days' Battles. Gen. Robert E. Lee initiated his offensive against McClellan's right flank north of the Chickahominy River. A.P. Hill threw his division, reinforced by one of D.H. Hill's brigades, into a series of futile assaults against Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps, which was drawn up behind Beaver Dam Creek. Confederate attacks were driven back with heavy casualties. Jackson's Shenandoah Valley divisions, however, were approaching from the northwest, forcing Porter to withdraw the next morning to a position behind Boatswain Creek just beyond Gaines' Mill.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: 31,987 total (US 15,631; CS 16,356)

Estimated Casualties: 1,700 total (US 400; CS 1,300)

Gaines' Mill (First Cold Harbor), Virginia

June 27, 1862

This was the third of the Seven Days' Battles. On June 27, 1862, Gen. Robert E. Lee renewed his attacks against Porter's V Corps, which had established a strong defensive line behind Boatswain's Swamp north of the Chickahominy River. Porter's reinforced V Corps held fast for the afternoon against disjointed Confederate attacks, inflicting heavy casualties. At dusk, the Confederates finally mounted a coordinated assault that broke Porter's line and drove his soldiers back toward the river. The Federals retreated across

the river during the night. Defeat at Gaines' Mill convinced McClellan to abandon his advance on Richmond and begin the retreat to James River. Gaines' Mill saved Richmond for the Confederacy in 1862.

Result(s): Confederate victory

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: 91,232 total (US 34,214; CS 57,018)

Estimated Casualties: 15,500 total (US 6,800; CS 8,700)

Garnett's Farm (Golding's Farm), Virginia

June 27-28, 1862

While battle raged north of the Chickahominy River at Gaines' Mill on June 27, Magruder demonstrated against the Union line south of the river at Garnett's Farm. To escape an artillery crossfire, the Federal defenders from Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman's III Corps refused their line along the river. The Confederates attacked again near Golding's Farm on the morning of June 28 but were easily repulsed. These "fixing" actions heightened the fear in the Union high command that an all out attack would be launched against them south of the river.

Result(s): Inconclusive

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan [US]; Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder [CS]

Forces Engaged: Divisions

Estimated Casualties: 830 total

Savage's Station, Virginia

June 29, 1862

Fourth of the Seven Days' Battles. On June 29, the main body of the Union army began a general withdrawal toward the James River. Magruder pursued along the railroad and the Williamsburg Road and struck Sumner's Corps (the Union rearguard) with three brigades near Savage's Station. Confederate Brig. Gen. Richard Giffith [*sic*] was mortally wounded during the fight. Jackson's divisions were stalled north of the Chickahominy. Union forces continued to withdraw across White Oak Swamp, abandoning supplies and more than 2,500 wounded soldiers in a field hospital.

Result(s): Inconclusive

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner [US]; Maj. Gen. John Magruder [CS]
Forces Engaged: Divisions

Estimated Casualties: 4,700 total (US 2,500 wounded were captured)

White Oak Swamp, Virginia

June 30, 1862

The Union rearguard under Maj. Gen. William Franklin stopped Jackson's divisions at the White Oak Bridge crossing, resulting in an artillery duel, while the main battle raged two miles farther south at Glendale or Frayser's Farm. White Oak Swamp can be considered part of the Glendale engagement.

Result(s): Inconclusive

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. William Franklin [US]; Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson [CS]

Forces Engaged: Armies

Estimated Casualties: 500 total

Glendale (Nelson's Farm, Frayser's Farm, Charles City Crossroads, White Oak Swamp, New Market Road, Riddell's Shop), Virginia

June 30, 1862

This is the fifth of the Seven Days' Battles. On June 30, Huger's, Longstreet's, and A.P. Hill's divisions converged on the retreating Union army in the vicinity of Glendale or Frayser's Farm. Longstreet's and Hill's attacks penetrated the Union defense near Willis Church, routing McCall's division. McCall was captured. Union counterattacks by Hooker's and Kearny's divisions sealed the break and saved their line of retreat along the Willis Church Road. Huger's advance was stopped on the Charles City Road. "Stonewall" Jackson's divisions were delayed by Franklin at White Oak Swamp. Confederate Maj. Gen. T.H. Holmes made a feeble attempt to turn the Union left flank at Turkey Bridge but was driven back by Federal gunboats in James River. Union generals Meade and Sumner and Confederate generals Anderson, Pender, and Featherston were wounded. This was Lee's best chance to cut off the Union army from the James River. That night, McClellan established a strong position on Malvern Hill.

Result(s): Inconclusive (Union withdrawal continued.)

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Date(s): June 30, 1862

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: Armies

Estimated Casualties: 6,500 total

Malvern Hill (Poindexter's Farm), Virginia

July 1, 1862

This was the sixth and last of the Seven Days' Battles. On July 1, 1862, Gen. Robert E. Lee launched a series of disjointed assaults on the nearly impregnable Union position on Malvern Hill. The Confederates suffered more than 5,300 casualties without gaining an inch of ground. Despite his victory, McClellan withdrew to entrench at Harrison's Landing on James River, where his army was protected by gunboats. This ended the Peninsula Campaign. When McClellan's army ceased to threaten Richmond, Lee sent Jackson to operate against Maj. Gen. John Pope's army along the Rapidan River, thus initiating the Northern Virginia Campaign.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: Armies

Estimated Casualties: 8,500 total

Antietam (Sharpsburg), Maryland

September 16-18, 1862

On September 16, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan confronted Lee's Army of Northern Virginia at Sharpsburg, Maryland. At dawn September 17, Hooker's corps mounted a powerful assault on Lee's left flank that began the single bloodiest day in American military history. Attacks and counterattacks swept across Miller's cornfield and fighting swirled around the Dunker Church. Union assaults against the Sunken Road eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not followed up. Late in the day, Burnside's corps finally got into action, crossing the stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolling up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside and saving the day. Although outnumbered two-to-one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in less than three-quarters of his army, enabling Lee to fight the Federals to a standstill. During the night, both armies consolidated their lines. In spite of crippling casualties, Lee continued to skirmish with McClellan throughout the 18th, while removing his wounded south of the river. McClellan did not renew the assaults. After dark, Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley.

Result(s): Inconclusive (Union strategic victory.)

Campaign: Maryland Campaign (September 1862)

Principal Commanders: Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: Armies

Estimated Casualties: 23,100 total

Chancellorsville, Virginia

April 30-May 6, 1863

On April 27, Maj. General Joseph Hooker led the V, IX, and XII Corps on a campaign to turn the Confederate left flank by crossing the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers above Fredericksburg. Passing the Rapidan via Germanna and Ely's Fords, the Federals concentrated near Chancellorsville on April 30 and May 1. The III Corps was ordered to join the army via United States Ford. Sedgwick's VI Corps and Gibbon's division remained to demonstrate against the Confederates at Fredericksburg.

In the meantime, Lee left a covering force under Maj. General Jubal Early in Fredericksburg and marched with the rest of the army to confront the Federals. As Hooker's army moved toward Fredericksburg on the Orange Turnpike, they encountered increasing Confederate resistance. Hearing reports of overwhelming Confederate force, Hooker ordered his army to suspend the advance and to concentrate again at Chancellorsville.

Pressed closely by Lee's advance, Hooker adopted a defensive posture, thus giving Lee the initiative. On the morning of May 2, Lt. General T.J. Jackson directed his corps on a march against the Federal left flank, which was reported to be "hanging in the air." Fighting was sporadic on other portions of the field throughout the day, as Jackson's column reached its jump-off point.

At 5:20 pm, Jackson's line surged forward in an overwhelming attack that crushed the Union XI Corps. Federal troops rallied, resisted the advance, and counterattacked. Disorganization on both sides and darkness ended the fighting. While making a night reconnaissance, Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men and carried from the field.

J.E.B. Stuart took temporary command of Jackson's Corps. On May 3, the Confederates attacked with both wings of the army and massed their artillery at Hazel Grove. This finally broke the Federal line at Chancellorsville. Hooker withdrew a mile and entrenched in a defensive "U" with his back to the river at United States Ford. Union generals Berry and Whipple and Confederate general Paxton were killed; Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded.

On the night of May 5-6, after Union reverses at Salem Church, Hooker recrossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock. This battle was considered by many historians to be Lee's greatest victory.

Result(s): Confederate victory

Campaign: Chancellorsville Campaign (April-May 1863)

Principal Commanders: Maj. General Joseph Hooker [US]; General Robert E. Lee and Maj. General Thomas J. Jackson [CS]

Forces Engaged: 154,734 total (US 97,382; CS 57,352)

Estimated Casualties: 24,000 total (US 14,000; CS 10,000)

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

July 1-3, 1863

Gen. Robert E. Lee concentrated his full strength against Maj. Gen. George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac at the crossroads county seat of Gettysburg. On July 1, Confederate forces converged on the town from west and north, driving Union defenders back through the streets to Cemetery Hill. During the night, reinforcements arrived for both sides. On July 2, Lee attempted to envelop the Federals, first striking the Union left flank at the Peach Orchard, Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Round Tops with Longstreet's and Hill's divisions, and then attacking the Union right at Culp's and East Cemetery Hills with Ewell's divisions.

By evening, the Federals retained Little Round Top and had repulsed most of Ewell's men. During the morning of July 3, the Confederate infantry were driven from their last toe-hold on Culp's Hill. In the afternoon, after a preliminary artillery bombardment, Lee attacked the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. The Pickett-Pettigrew assault (more popularly, Pickett's Charge) momentarily pierced the Union line but was driven back with severe casualties. Stuart's cavalry attempted to gain the Union rear but was repulsed. On July 4, Lee began withdrawing his army toward Williamsport on the Potomac River. His train of wounded stretched more than fourteen miles.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Gettysburg Campaign (June-August 1863)

Principal Commanders: Major General George G. Meade [US]; General Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: 158,300 total (US 83,289; CS 75,054)

Estimated Casualties: 51,000 total (US 23,000; CS 28,000)

Wilderness (Todd's Tavern, Brock Road, Combats at Parker's Store, Craig's Meeting House, the Furnaces), Virginia

May 5-7, 1864

The opening battle of Grant's sustained offensive against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, known as the Overland Campaign, was fought at the Wilderness, May 5-7. On the morning of May 5, 1864, the Union V Corps attacked Ewell's Corps on the Orange Turnpike, while A.P. Hill's corps during the afternoon encountered Getty's Division (VI Corps) and Hancock's II Corps on the Plank Road. Fighting was fierce but inconclusive as both sides attempted to maneuver in the dense woods. Darkness halted the fighting, and both sides rushed forward reinforcements. At dawn on May 6, Hancock attacked along the Plank Road, driving Hill's Corps back in confusion. Longstreet's Corps arrived in time to prevent the collapse of the Confederate right flank. At noon, a devastating Confederate flank attack in Hamilton's Thicket sputtered out when Lt. Gen. James Longstreet was wounded by his own men. The IX Corps (Burnside) moved against the Confederate center, but was repulsed. Union generals James S. Wadsworth and Alexander Hays were killed. Confederate generals John M. Jones, Micah Jenkins, and Leroy A. Stafford were killed. The battle was a tactical draw. Grant, however, did not retreat as had the other Union generals before him. On May 7, the Federals advanced by the left flank toward the crossroads of Spotsylvania Courthouse.

Result(s): Inconclusive (Grant continued his offensive.)

Campaign: Grant's Overland Campaign (May-June 1864)

Principal Commanders: Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: 162,920 total (US 101,895; CS 61,025)

Estimated Casualties: 29,800 total (US 18,400; CS 11,400)

Spotsylvania Court House (Ni River, Harris Farm, Combats at Laurel Hill and Corbin's Bridge (May 8); Ni River (May 9); Laurel Hill, Po River, and Bloody Angle (May 10); Salient or Bloody Angle (May 12-13); Piney Branch Church (May 15); Harrison House (May 18); Harris Farm (May 19), Virginia

May 8-21, 1864

After the Wilderness, Grant's and Meade's advance on Richmond by the left flank was stalled at Spotsylvania Court House on May 8. This two-week battle was a series of combats along the Spotsylvania front. The Union attack against the Bloody Angle at dawn, May 12-13, captured nearly a division of Lee's army and came near to cutting the Confederate army in half. Confederate counterattacks plugged the gap, and fighting continued unabated for nearly 20 hours in what may well have been the most ferociously sustained combat of the Civil War. On May 19, a Confederate attempt to turn the Union right flank at Harris Farm was beaten back with severe casualties. Union generals Sedgwick (VI Corps commander) and Rice were killed. Confederate generals Johnson and Steuart were captured, Daniel and Perrin mortally wounded. On May 21, Grant disengaged and continued his advance on Richmond.

Result(s): Inconclusive (Grant continued his offensive.)

Campaign: Grant's Overland Campaign (May-June 1864)

Principal Commanders: Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: 152,000 total (US 100,000; CS 52,000)

Estimated Casualties: 30,000 total (US 18,000; CS 12,000)

Cold Harbor (Second Cold Harbor), Virginia

May 31-June 12, 1864

On May 31, Sheridan's cavalry seized the vital crossroads of Old Cold Harbor. Early on June 1, relying heavily on their new repeating carbines and shallow entrenchments, Sheridan's troopers threw back an attack by Confederate infantry. Confederate reinforcements arrived from Richmond and from the Totopotomoy Creek lines. Late on June 1, the Union VI and XVIII Corps reached Cold Harbor and assaulted the Confederate works with some success. By June 2, both armies were on the field, forming on a seven-mile front that extended from Bethesda Church to the Chickahominy River. At dawn June 3, the II and XVIII Corps, followed later by the IX Corps, assaulted along the Bethesda Church-Cold Harbor line and were slaughtered at all points. Grant commented in his memoirs that this was the only attack he wished he had never ordered. The armies confronted each other on these lines until the night of June 12, when Grant again advanced by his left flank, marching to James River. On June 14, the II Corps was ferried across the river at Wilcox's Landing by transports. On June 15, the rest of the army began crossing on a 2,200-foot long pontoon bridge at Weyanoke. Abandoning the well-defended approaches to Richmond, Grant sought to shift his army quickly south of the river to threaten Petersburg.

Result(s): Confederate victory

Campaign: Grant's Overland Campaign (May-June 1864)

Principal Commanders: Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: 170,000 total (US 108,000; CS 62,000)

Estimated Casualties: 15,500 total (US 13,000; CS 2,500)

Petersburg, Virginia

June 15-18, 1864

Marching from Cold Harbor, Meade's Army of the Potomac crossed the James River on transports and a 2,200-foot long pontoon bridge at Windmill Point. Butler's leading elements (XVIII Corps and Kautz's cavalry) crossed the Appomattox River at Windmill Point and attacked the Petersburg defenses on June 15. The 5,400 defenders of Petersburg under command of Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard were driven from their first line of entrenchments back to Harrison Creek. After dark the XVIII Corps was relieved by the II Corps. On June 16, the II Corps captured another section of the Confederate line; on the 17th, the IX Corps gained more ground. Beauregard stripped the Howlett Line (Bermuda Hundred) to defend the city, and Lee rushed reinforcements to Petersburg from the Army of Northern Virginia. The II, XI, and V Corps from right to left attacked on June 18 but was repulsed with heavy casualties. By now the Confederate works were heavily manned and the greatest opportunity to capture Petersburg without a siege was lost. The siege of Petersburg began. Union Gen. James St. Clair Morton, chief engineer of the IX Corps, was killed on June 17.

Result(s): Confederate victory

Campaign: Richmond-Petersburg Campaign (June 1864-March 1865)

Principal Commanders: Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Maj. Gen. GeorgeG. Meade [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee and Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard [CS]

Forces Engaged: 104,000 total (US 62,000; CS 42,000)

Estimated Casualties: 11,386 total (US 8,150; CS 3,236)

Petersburg the Breakthrough, Virginia

April 2, 1865

With Confederate defeat at Five Forks on April 1, Grant and Meade ordered a general assault against the Petersburg lines by II, IX, VI and XXIV Corps on April 2. A heroic defense of Fort Gregg by a handful of Confederates prevented the Federals from entering the city that night. Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill was killed trying to reach his troops in the confusion. After dark, Lee ordered the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond. Grant had achieved one of the major military objectives of the war: the capture of Petersburg, which led to the fall of Richmond, the Capitol [*sic*] of the Confederacy.

Result(s): Union victory

Campaign: Appomattox Campaign (March-April 1865)

Principal Commanders: Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant [US]; Gen. Robert E. Lee [CS]

Forces Engaged: Armies

Estimated Casualties: 7,750 total (US 3,500; CS 4,250)