

JYU DISSERTATIONS 306

Konstantinos Bizas

Cambridge Classics in the History of Ideas

Main Studies and Commitments of Method in the Work of Quentin Skinner & John Dunn



UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES

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Editors

Olli-Pekka Moisio

Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä

Ville Korkiakangas

Open Science Centre, University of Jyväskylä

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ABSTRACT

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The dissertation offers a minute discussion of aspects of the work of the eminent historians of political thought Quentin Skinner (b. 1940) and John Dunn (b. 1940) from the point of view that a privileged focus on the authors' method allows. The aim of this investigation has to do with an attempt to appreciate in a new light the growing scholarship that has become widely known throughout the last half of the century as the 'Cambridge School' in the history of political thought and the history of ideas and which strongly centers upon the works and deeds of the two examined authors next to those of their older lifelong associate J. G. A. Pocock. In these respects, the dissertation revisits certain undue commonplaces in late currency concerning the 'Cambridge School', such as its frequent reception as an ensemble of methodological *formulae* that appeared in some of the authors' older articles, the opposite trend of treating their work as recommending the writing of an history with no concern for method, and its frequent reduction in an antithetical contrast between Skinner's and Pocock's individual approaches, introducing in their place a more elaborate account of the standing of the individual authors as well as of the entire School.

In the wake of the conventional trends, this study aspires to turn the emphasis towards the more analytical insights on method that the authors' concrete historical investigations have to offer, bringing to the surface at the same time the important roles that Dunn and many other far-reaching academic minds have been playing in the shaping of the 'Cambridge School' from its early steps up to present. For this reason, the introductory chapter of the dissertation begins with the provision of an account of what is meant in this work by method and then briefly presents the key people and events from the preceding generations that have retrospectively proven to be constitutive for the original formation of the 'School' at Cambridge. Following this, the two main chapters of the work turn to the close examination of a defined portion of concrete historical studies of a single concept or idea by each one of the two authors that covers a considerable span of their academic careers, allowing us thus to discuss their method and its variation in considerable detail. In the former case, Quentin Skinner's pieces on the history of the concept or idea of the State is examined, whereas the latter case turns to Dunn's writings on democracy and its history. Both chapters end up with a reassembling of the acquired insights in more general terms, as is further the case with the short general conclusion of the dissertation. Throughout the work, an unprecedented range of biographical and contextual sources of relevance have been very actively employed in an effort to cover the far-reaching nuances that the writings of the examined authors have been implicating to the greatest possible extent favoured by the subject matter.

Keywords: history of political thought, history of ideas, Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, Cambridge School, conceptual history, method

TIIVISTELMÄ (ABSTRACT IN FINNISH)

Bizas, Konstantinos

Cambridgen klassikoita ideoiden historiassa. Tärkeimmät tutkimukset ja metodiset sitoumukset Quentin Skinnerin ja John Dunnin tutkimuksissa

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Väitöskirja sisältää yksityiskohtaisen analyysin ja arvion kahden huippuluokan poliittisen ajattelun historioitsijan, Quentin Skinnerin (1940-) ja John Dunnin (1940-) akateemisista töistä tekijäin metodiin kohdennetusta näkökulmasta. Tutkimuksen pyrkimyksenä on arvioida uudessa valossa sitä poliittisen ajattelun historian sekä aatehistorian tutkimussuuntausta, joka viimeisen puolen vuosisadan ajan tunnetaan yleisesti 'Cambridgen koulukuntana'. Tämä suuntaus on vahvasti keskittynyt kahden tutkimuskohteena olevan kirjoittajan sekä heidän elinikäisen liittolaisensa J.G.A. Pocockin ympärille.

Tutkimus arvioi kriittisesti joitakin viimeaikaisessa reseptiossa selviöinä pidettyjä mutta epätarkkoja näkemyksiä 'Cambridgen koulukunnasta'. Näihin kuuluu koko joukko metodologisia formuloita, jotka mainitaan joidenkin kirjoittajien vanhemmissa julkaisuissa, samoin päinvastainen trendi, joka väittää, että heidän tapansa kirjoittaa historiaa ei sisällä mitään metodia sekä myös yleinen tapa redusoida koulukunta Skinnerin ja Pocockin yksilöllisten näkemysten vastakkaisuuteen. Tämän kaiken sijasta tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on esittää huoliteltu tulkinta, joka asemoi sekä yksityisten kirjoittajien että koko koulukunnan merkitystä.

Vastoin mainittuja sovinnaisia trendejä tämä tutkimus tavoittelee painopisteen siirtämistä vahvemmin analyttisiin oivalluksiin metodista sellaisena kuin kirjoittajien konkreettiset historialliset tutkimukset tarjoavat. Tässä yhteydessä tuodaan etualalle myös John Dunnin keskeinen osuus 'Cambridgen koulukunnan' muodostumisessa ensi askelista tähän päivään saakka, esimerkkinä monista laaja-alaisista henkilöistä, joilla on ollut oma osuutensa koulukunnassa. Tässä tarkoituksessa johdantoluku alkaa esityksellä niistä käsityksistä, joita tässä tutkimuksessa tarkoitetaan metodilla. Se sisältää myös lyhyen esittelyn niistä henkilöistä ja tapahtumista, jotka - jälkikäteisessä tarkastelussa - osoittautuivat 'koulukunnan' muodostumista Cambridgessa määrittäneiksi seikoiksi Skinneriä ja Dunnia edeltäneen sukupolven tutkijain keskuudessa.

Tätä seuraavat kaksi keskeistä kappaletta sisältävät yksityiskohtaisen tarkastelun valikoidusta osasta kummankin tutkimuksen 'päähenkilön' konkreettisia historiallisia tutkimuksia yhdestä kummankin tutkijain keskeisestä käsitteestä tai johtoajatuksesta, jonka käsittelyyn he ovat käyttäneet huomattavan osan akateemisesta karriäärästään, mikä tarjoaa tilaisuuden analysoida ja arvioida tekijäin metodia ja sen ajallisia vaihteluita riittävän yksityiskohtaisesti. Skinnerin osalta tutkimus kohdentuu hänen valtion (*the State*) käsitteen historiasta esittämien näkemystensä tarkasteluun, kun taas Dunnin mielenkiinto on suuntautunut demokratian käsitteeseen ja sen historiaan. Molemmat kappaleet sisältävät myös kokoavan arvion tekijäin esittämistä ideoista.

Päätösluvussa samaa menettelyä sovelletaan koko tutkimuksen päättävään arviointiin. Työn kuluessa tekijä on käynyt läpi ja arvioinut aikaisempaa tutkimusta laajemman joukon työn kannalta relevantteja biografisia ja kontekstuaalisia lähteitä. Tämän menettelyn tavoitteena on ollut kattaa laaja-alainen joukko näkökohtia, joilla on ollut merkitystä tutkimuksen kohteena olevien kirjottajien töille ja heidän tutkimuskohteilleen.

Asiasanat: poliittisen ajattelun historia, ideoiden historia, Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, Cambridgen koulukunta, käsitehistoria, metodi

Author Konstantinos Bizas
Department of Social Sciences & Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä
Email: konstantinos.k.bizas@jyu.fi
ORCID registration: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5910-8978>

Supervisors Mika Ojakangas
Professor of Political Thought, Rhetoric and Culture
Department of Social Sciences & Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä

Kari Ilmari Palonen
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
Department of Social Sciences & Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä

Reviewers Hubertus Buchstein
Professor of Political Theory and the History of Ideas
Department of Political Science & Communication Studies
University of Greifswald

Evgeny Roshchin
Associate Professor, Dean of the Faculty of International
Relations and Political Studies
Department of Comparative Political Studies
The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and
Public Administration

Opponent Johan Strang
Associate Professor, Docent
Centre for Nordic Studies
University of Helsinki

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To whom could an early career scholar start expressing his gratitude shortly before reaching to hold his doctorate? The question becomes particularly hard to reply since this specific course has been extraordinarily long for a short list to recover every single name and to assign every single due, as well as quite strongly associated with circumstances very intricate and of a great distance for most readers of these lines to note.

My most formative dues in academics certainly belong to my longtime tutors in my native Athens in an once young department with a rare concentration of many minds of a nationwide excellence in their fields back at a time when the bonds that today's international academic mobility is setting around the world were facing strong delays in reaching Greece. This made those people's efforts to teach and mine to concentrate upon their objects quite precious from the beginning of an accidentally top-entrance student who had never heard of that establishment a few months earlier. I refer first and foremost to Prof. Gregory Molivas, Prof. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, and Prof. Pericles Vallianos, and next to them very significantly to Prof. Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Prof. George Th. Mavrogordatos and his deeply instructive *Stillborn Republic*, and the restless Prof. Elias Nikolakopoulos, in the midst of an ensemble of academics at a department once founded by Prof. A.-J. D. Metaxas and further including Antonis Kontis, Nikos Tatsis, Stergios Manouras, Nassia Yakovaki, George Theodoridis, Yannis Tassopoulos, Antonis Makridimitris, Paris Varvarousis, Konstantina Botsiou, Panos Kazakos and Christos Lyrintzis. Also, I have more than one good reasons to feel Prof. Pantelis Bassakos as a rarely gifted longtime teacher beyond description, to whom I would further owe several years afterwards my current shelter. To the teaching staff at the small University of Exeter, such as Iain Hampsher-Monk, Dario Castiglione, Christopher Gill and Robert Lamb, I owe my first pieces of acquaintance with the realities that prevail in late academics as well as some more focused bibliographies in certain areas where I was wishing to develop my expertise. Upon my return to Greece, I received great benefit and retain the best of memories from the summertime seminars that Northern Greece's great anthropologists had begun to hold by then, whereas I should also express my gratitude for the great extent of hospitality I was shown by the historian people of the University of Crete, which allowed me also to be very actively introduced to the disciplinary routines and respective worldviews of social and economic history. Towards the end of this series Dr. Spyridon Tegos and Prof. Vasso Kindi made a very pleasant entrance in my life and deserve many more dues than those stated in a relevant chapter of this work. A list of the fellows and associates whom I got to know and learn from in all these circles in and out of academics in any possible way would be a difficult task by itself and hence they may feel to receive their dues as proper.

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he is responsible for my introduction into a wide range of impressively hard-working and highly supportive associates as well as for my progressive catching up with today's most advanced academics in substance and in form. For these and for many other reasons, even though Kari Palonen encouraged me to address him by his first name from very early on, all I can see is a Sir. A same standard and concern in the supervisor's role has been kept as well all along this time by Prof. Mika Ojakangas, who was serving also as Head of Department when my studies here officially began, to be succeeded in this office by Prof. Marjo Kuronen, who has kept on guaranteeing that I would miss no necessity in the completion of my work. On the whole, I could have never wished for a finest environment than Jyväskylä for living and working on my dissertation and part of the people who have made this happen are Prof. Pekka Korhonen, Dr. Kia Lindroos, Janar Mihkelsaar, Liliya Zenina, Ratih Adiputri and Prof. Sergei Prozorov. Some more recent and more particular dues belong also to the two referees for the dissertation's pre-review stage, Prof. Dr. Hubertus Buchstein and Dr. Evgeny Roshchin, for the time that they spent with the text as well as for their very informative comments.

It might not be necessary to state at this point how supportive Prof. Quentin Skinner and Prof. John Dunn have been throughout the process; whereas a more analytical part of the irreplaceable dues that belong to the University of Cambridge and its great academic community for their hospitality for the Easter Term in 2018 has been reserved for a later place in this work. What one needs to add here is that Prof. Skinner had been previously also one of the very few academics to show an active interest in an uncomfortable peripheral student's longtime quest to be given a chance to prove his academic potential by working on a far more ambitious topic, of the kind that several young students proud of and caring for their education tend at some point in their careers to pursue. That list was a quite short one indeed and among its few other members next to my current supervisors, I should refer to Dr. Samuel James, Cambridge, and Prof. Martin Jay, Berkeley.

What I have been owing to my closest kin throughout the years is impossible to fit in words.

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K.B., Jyväskylä, October 2020

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ABSTRACT

TIIVISTELMÄ (ABSTRACT IN FINNISH)

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I INTRODUCTION

Few people would nowadays deny that conceptual history has been lately serving as a *locus communis* for some of the most demanding projects in present-day humanities. This state of affairs seems to have to do with the fact that projects of the kind call for a far-reaching handling of an extensive range of sources and methods that had been usually reserved up to now for rather separate treatments shaped in terms set by the more firmly established humanitarian disciplines, such as those of 'philosophy' and 'history', as well as by various areas of expertise designated in terms of 'politics' or the 'social sciences', inviting thus hard-working scholars to display the extent of their intellectual skills. This being the case, this study will seek to examine some of the ways in which what can be described as probably the most influential academic nexus of our times with a share within this broad intellectual tissue has found best to proceed on relevant issues, starting from its earliest steps many decades ago up until the time of the writing of these lines.

We are referring to no other than the said 'Cambridge School' in the history of political thought and the history of ideas. The 'School' is best known for quite some time already through the works and deeds of its longtime leading practitioners, who have also had a decisive role in its original establishment at the great University of Cambridge on the East of England and well beyond this institution, i.e. such historians of political thought as J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner and John Dunn. Furthermore, this same characterization seems to apply also for the latter's own increasingly expansive circles of disciples, associates and close collaborators throughout the years, as well as possibly to a more restrained extent, for all those, in addition, who have found good reasons to pay serious heed to the scholarship offered by all this set when producing academic research of their own throughout these years. From this point of view, an overall appreciation of this greatly valuable and steadily growing academic production seems to be turning into a demanding case by itself. This being so, one may hope to make an advancement to this cause in case we start treating the founding figures of the School under the lights usually reserved for a discipline's acknowledged classics.

As this way of introducing our topic might be already suggesting, this investigation aims to place under its focus what we usually refer to as method. However, even though method is a rather easily recognizable topic for most people in present-day academics and beyond, things do not seem to remain that sufficiently clear when it comes to what one actually means or expects when 'method' or 'methodology' are brought into discussion. Moreover, further complications appear as soon as one adds the raise of similar issues in terms alluding to 'theory' or to one's 'approach'; whereas, to complicate things a little more, our main authors under examination have been appealing to all these terms in a wide range of occasions. This being so, perhaps we can expect some greater gains for our investigation in case we shed some light first on how one may best hope to conceive of 'method' in a way that can allow for the least possible confusion in its ongoing references throughout an extensive study like this as well as for the assignment of some according distinctive space in it for the other relevant terms in currency. In order to achieve this goal, there seems to be no better way to begin than with a short overview of the depths of the historical record of references to 'method' in times often taken to be less composite than ours.

To place things under a least controversial beginning, readers may be allowed to remember that *methodos* has been actually a Greek word in origin and to get know that its register can be already amply traced in the ancient and middle Greek sources. This is composed out of the simplest words *meta*, which stands for the senses conveyed by 'along with' and 'after', and *odos*, which stands for 'way' and 'path', and its earliest testimony, which seems hard to date, provides us with the picture of a wedding cart dragged by a pair of draught animals which are said to effect a bride's transference (*poieisthai tēn methodon*) as they carry her along with her mate to their new lodge.¹ In case we turn ourselves to some more easily recognizable times and places, on the other hand, we find 'methodos' and its effectation in Plato's dialogues, where it designates the pursuance of a found way of inquiry, including those of physicians, those that the highlighted speakers in the works opt to follow as well as even some of those that the latter discard in the course of their conversations.² Following this, in Aristotle's tracts, among which a lost piece about logic called *Methodics* should have originally had a place, we find the term being employed in order to refer to the more individualized intellectual identification of processes that form part of an action or of an investigation, as well as the attendance to a designated mode of enquiry in less 'received' terms than those more frequent in Plato.³ This case seems to have given way in turn from the early Hellenistic to the Byzantine times to a long record of 'methodos' and derivatives as designating the rule-based or systematic medicine, the more general mode of working according to a rule, and eventually the sense of regularity and the calling of master artisans as

¹ See the division I in the entry «μέθοδος» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1091. It is further worth pointing out in the light of what follows that this same phrase can be also read as meaning that the draught animals 'follow after' the bride's lead.

² See the divisions II.1-3. in the entry «μέθοδος» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1091.

³ See the divisions II.1-2. in the entry «μέθοδος» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1091.

‘methoditai’,⁴ whereas other early parts of Plato’s legacy were providing from quite early on a basis for some further liaisons with these senses in the uses of ‘methodos’ for designating the systematization of found means of effect in rhetoric and for what several morally sensitive authors were starting to perceive as found modes of deception.⁵

In case one turns a little closer to our own times, instead, the earliest instances of ‘method’ in English from at least the 16th century onwards seem to register a rather similar range of successive trends. More specifically, aside from the references to prescriptive medicine,⁶ one finds ‘method’ denoting from early on the orderly arrangement of ideas and topics in one’s thinking or writing, including literary compositions,⁷ as well as the according investigations concerned with the ordering and arrangement of arguments and propositions in rhetoric and logic.⁸ The former of these last two sets of senses was also fostering increasing references to ‘method’ for the more general habit or way of doing something according to an orderly plan,⁹ until its eventual usage by the 18th century for denoting particular practical arts and professions,¹⁰ whereas the latter set similarly expanded to designate the ordered procedures or principles of any intellectual field of study, with some gradually greater pertinence for mathematics, the experimental sciences and inductive reasoning in succession as we reach the 19th century, shortly prior to the late conversion of ‘method’ into a more self-standing object of academic cognition that cannot help but bring to mind as well the emergence of an interest for ‘methodology’ by the same times.¹¹

An attempt to appreciate this long record as a whole, may allow us to reach our previously stated goal. In these respects, one may notice from the very beginning of the register a hard to separate coexistence of an appeal to an already found way for a destination, actual or reflected, with the interest to bring such a way into effect. These cases seem to be greatly succeeded by interests to explore further and even devise new ways of the kind beyond any immediately perceived ‘reception’ of them, to the point of ‘method’ ending up designating in turn the more firmly established schools of medicine, practical arts and cognitive objects against less proven challenges, which seems to bring us to a position of some resemblance to where we started, and more specifically to the first of our two original components. This being so, it might help us if we start conceiving of method in what follows under an according succession of senses. In the first place, ‘method’ gives us a designation that enables us to concentrate on what an author

⁴ See the division II, especially II.4-5. in the entry «μέθοδος» as well as the other «μεθοδ-» derivatives in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1091.

⁵ See the division III in the entry «μέθοδος» as well as the other «μεθοδ-» derivatives in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1091.

⁶ See the division I.1. in the full entry ‘method, n.’ in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2020).

⁷ See the divisions II.6-7. and a little later I.4. in the full entry ‘method, n.’ as well as the full entry ‘method, v.’ in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2020).

⁸ See the division II.5. in the full entry ‘method, n.’ in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2020).

⁹ See the divisions I.2.a.-c. and II.8-9. in the full entry ‘method, n.’ in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2020).

¹⁰ See the divisions I.3.c. in the full entry ‘method, n.’ in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2020).

¹¹ See the divisions I.3.a.-b., d.-f., I.2.d. and II.10. in the full entry ‘method, n.’ as well as the full entry ‘methodology’ in *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2020).

such as those that we will be studying can be seen to have drawn as of practical worth from the earlier makers that shaped their intellectual environment when producing works of their own. In this case, it might be better if one conceived of this interest as one concerning the 'received method' in order to distinguish this as best as possible from the next ones. Following this, a concentration on these authors' method can also allow us to itemize, rather in retrospect, what has proven to have been distinctively effective in the way such people themselves have been proceeding in their various works, for which case we might better talk about their 'method at work'. What follows this way of viewing things in turn can be said to have to do with the occasions in which such authors showed an interest to have a say in the more concentrated discussions of an interest to articulate and further amend the accepted 'methodology' of one or more fields of our intellect, for which case the most appropriate term seems to have been already given. From this point of view, readers may notice that 'methodology' and a more proper contribution to it seem to claim a very close connection with some preceding groundwork of some skill on an issue and consequently with what we have been itemizing under the previous senses of 'method'. This being so, it might not be unsuitable for our purposes in case we saw 'theory' and 'approach' at this point as trying to break part with this connection. We might therefore say that, on the one hand, 'theory' seems to apply more fittingly to discourses in which such connections cease to have any particularly decisive role, turning the emphasis instead to the quality of their authors' offered reasonings, which are sometimes taken to be of such an extraordinary far-sightedness as to gain acceptance as 'philosophy'; whereas 'approach', on the other hand, seems to suggest a contrasting route, in which the interest in reasoning is lost from sight and what seems to remain in its place is the less pronounced effort of individual scholars to steer themselves in the course of their investigations by sole practice and thus in increasingly particularizing terms that bring us again to a case of some analogy to our initial view of 'method', closer to its second original component this time. This being so, references to 'theory' and 'approach' when it comes to the work of the authors under own examination shall remain limited and mostly suggestive of their measured relevance against our core interest in 'method', as will be also the case with 'methodology', which at the current level of academic discussion seems to have become somewhat prone to similar inconveniences and to have been leading its readers to miss many crucial things from the overall picture.

Bringing this view to an even more concrete effect for our own case, readers may take fuller benefit of what follows in case they view it as consonant with these succeeding emphases. In particular, the final part of this introduction as well as the early sections of the main chapters will be primarily concerned with the fullest possible identification of what the main authors under examination can be said to have more crucially received out of the environments and times with which they found themselves engaged and which we will be introducing by appealing to the rubric of 'contexts'. What is hoped to be achieved in this way is not to miss out from one's appreciation of these authors their dues to a long chain

of words and deeds of great minds from the preceding times without whom their own accomplishments would have remained beyond the sphere of possibility. To the extent that this issue is covered, the progression of the chapters will be turning the emphasis towards the ways in which the examined authors can be seen to have worked methodically by themselves, including under this viewpoint both how they have been engaging with insights and materials adopted from other authors within more particular circumstances, which one should conceive of as 'contexts' in the narrower sense of the term, as well as the identifiable merits of an even more personal credit that the accepted outcome quality of their works itself has been suggesting. The increased complexity of the issues considered at this part of our examination will be also leading us to seek for the assistance of certain authors of acknowledgement for their method from the recent past, principally having to do with the work of Max Weber, which can therefore allow us both to retain an extent of a recognizable coherence in the way the information at this part of the text is processed as well as to associate the work of the examined authors with an external point of reference that was far from alien in the making of their own views, as our investigation will also suggest in several occasions. As for the final sections of the main chapters, these strive to complete the suggested sequence by moving in turn towards a broader reconstruction of the authors' method throughout the years as a whole as well as to an appreciation of this undersighted aspect of their work in the light of some more general frames of reference.

At this point, it might prove to be of further convenience in case we provide a brief outline of some more particular matters concerning the way we have proceeded to work throughout this investigation. In these respects, one may begin by noting that the core part of the following chapters introduces a rather novel approach for the standards of the examined object. This consists in our primary concentration upon a defined portion of these authors' works of concrete historical research that has been carefully selected with the specific aim of discussing the issues of relevance to method to the greatest available level of detail that the academic record of the authors allows.¹² This selection consists in each one of the two study cases in a set of the authors' primary publications that have been examining the history of a single 'idea' or 'concept' which has been preoccupying them on a repeated number of occasions throughout their career. What is hoped to be achieved by means of this process is to capture by comparison the evolution of the authors' method throughout a considerable span

¹² It should be noted at this point that an according emphasis to analyzing the minute detail of a deliberately small portion of a topic extending to an apparently much broader range of referents, with which the author has had some acquaintance and thus reserves some dues, has been already brought forward, among other according trends, by a series of historical studies lately known as 'microhistory', for an overview of which see Burke (2019), pp. 45-49. However, as the latter author also suggests, the choice of topics and the approaches pursued by this trend have been tending to appeal to the outlook that we usually associate with 'culture', which in its ordinary senses does not seem to favour the degree of strict identification of singular actions of individual persons that is more visibly taken to be appropriate for our own object. For a similar mode of investigation undertaken under working assumptions closer to the ones pursued here and to which we therefore owe greater dues see Palonen (2017b).

of time and on a level of groundwork detail that seems to be of further-ranging consequence than that of their studies of the history of the political thought of single intellectual figures or than that of their pieces concerned with methodology; whereas the concluding parts of the main chapters will seek to use the acquired level of detail as solid base for our attempted generalizations on the work of these authors as a whole, which takes an even more wholesome shape at this dissertation's short general conclusion.

To expand a little further on the gains expected out of the outlined approach, one may go on to suggest that this dissertation aspires to provide an overall result that might be of assistance for readers interested to move beyond the limitations of the two most widespread ways in which the 'Cambridge School' has been received by thirds up to present. As the existing literature on the topic may also serve to suggest, these have to do, on the one hand, with the provision of some of Skinner's and Pocock's early articles about method as exemplars for beginners in various academic courses on the methodology of relevant fields, nowadays offered around the globe;¹³ and, on the other, with the very different affiliation with these authors' practice as historians and academics from their more direct associates mostly by means of personal example.¹⁴ In these respects, it is hoped that our approach may possibly prove to retain the intuitive merits of both perspectives by means of their merge within a more promising point of view, which we strive to achieve by keeping ourselves as close as possible to the authors' concrete practice as historians along with our retention of an interest to discuss this in a way that allows it to be of an accessible interest for the wide audience in terms of method. As for a final topic to be raised, it should be also said that in an effort to make up for the losses that the aforementioned common receptions of the 'Cambridge School' have been tending to implicate, our investigation opted to cover the work of the much undersighted Dunn next to that of Skinner in the wake of the occasional lack of the former's inclusion in what one conceives to have formed a constitutive part of this kind of scholarship

¹³ From this point of view, the articles with which most readers of the 'Cambridge School' have been gaining their first acquaintance with the authors up to now are Skinner (1969b), alternatively given in its shorter revised version (2002c), and Pocock (1971c), and, following these, their directly surrounding Dunn (1968b), Skinner (1970), (1972a), and Pocock (1971a), (1971d), (1973), to which one may go on to add Pocock (1985), (1987b) and Skinner (1999b) in turn, with most of these articles of the last two authors nowadays available in modified versions in Skinner (2002l) and Pocock (2009) respectively. The systematization of the views expressed in these articles as an instructive methodology for the 'history of political thought', the 'history of ideas', and eventually 'intellectual history' started with Tully (1983), for Skinner's case, and Hampsher-Monk (1984) for Pocock's, and went on, usually discussing both authors and their mutual differences, with Richter (1986), (1987), Tully (1988), Bevir (1992), (1994), (1999), (2011), Hampsher-Monk (1998), (2001), Lamb (2004), (2009a), (2009b), Whatmore & Young (2006), (2016), Whatmore (2015) and Koikkalainen (2011), among others.

¹⁴ Some published titles that have been gradually documenting aspects of this different way of learning from the workings of these authors are starting to appear as the years go by; see Goldie (1994), Brett, Tully & Hamilton-Bleakley (2006), James (2011), (2019b), (2019a) and Whatmore (2016b). For a more comprehensive study that appreciates similar aspects and has mostly influenced the one attempted here see Palonen (2003), (2004); for later titles of disciplinary political philosophers and theorists that also mediate between the two received approaches by means of substantial empirical research of standards resembling the practices of 'political sociology' see Koikkalainen (2005), (2009), (2015) and Alexander (2016).

despite Dunn being the only among these authors still residing in Cambridge. This has very emphatically not been the case in either terms of academic residence or of given attention by thirds with Pocock, who has been therefore unfortunately left mostly throughout the main chapters of an initially overambitious doctoral dissertation at the place of several well-informed situated comments.¹⁵

These few clarifications having been given in what has to do with what to expect from method, we can next proceed to a short overview of the existing research on several people and settings from the recent past whose very specific acts and roles have retrospectively proven to be constitutive for the overall original formation of today's 'Cambridge School'. In these respects, we will first discuss the establishment and the successive shifts in the study of History and Politics in Cambridge and gradually we will start focusing more on the workings of individual figures on the scene up until we reach the more immediate circumstances that gave rise to our main authors' preoccupations in their early days.

To begin this short examination, those who are unacquainted with the history of the university of Cambridge might feel a slight extent of surprise in getting to know how extraordinary the interconnections between the study of Politics and that of History have been since the former's very first days as a taught object at the institution.¹⁶ More specifically, the creation of the new study program to be offered at Cambridge as its Historical Tripos from the early 1870s onwards gave the chance to such socially sensitive members in its ranks as Henry Sidgwick and John Robert Seeley to establish a curriculum centred upon papers of 'political science', loosely defined but very importantly seen as deserving to be studied under a more individual focus than the much broader Moral Sciences Tripos that had been already established two decades earlier.¹⁷ The case was

¹⁵ At this point also, the author would like to express some regret for some inappropriate lack of uniformity in terms of style and tone between the two main chapters of this version of the work, which is mostly due to the important chronological distance between their basic writing.

¹⁶ The information in the following paragraphs, unless differently stated, is mainly drawn from Collini (1983), (2001), Goldie (1994), James (2011) and Alexander (2016). As far as the latter of these surveys is concerned, this presents a considerable range of invaluable information for this part of the Cambridge academic establishment that reaches up until the mid-1970s and which has been appreciated without necessarily accepting the entirety of its author's arrangements of the information provided or his overarching scheme of a much broadly conceived 'Cambridge School' said to cover the entirety of the numerous Cambridge minds of his examined period and to suggest a very specific set of variations of the "fundamental" concern to "bring [...] history and politics together, no matter how, and no matter the consequence" (p. 385), as has been also the case with the beginnings of James' quite thorough ongoing research, as originally seen in his (2011), the History-centered approach of which ends up perceiving "an irony that this 'genuinely historical' view of the history of political thought (to use Quentin Skinner's expression) has its origins in the inclusion of consciously nonhistorical subjects in the Cambridge Historical Tripos" (p. 396); cf. also Bevir's (2011) much cruder attribution of a 'modernist empiricism' to Cambridge authors of this kind.

¹⁷ For more information on the original establishment of the new Historical Tripos in Cambridge see Collini (1983), Goldie (1994) and Alexander (2016). Moreover, the economist Alfred Marshall should also be mentioned among the proponents of the new scheme until he took with him the principal teaching of economics beyond the Historical Tripos for his

argued by the introducers upon the expectation that 'pure history' would not attract a considerable number of students and apparently drew out of the university's need to respond to an increasing number of agents primarily interested in matters that could prove to be of direct relevance for practical politics as well as for Britain's greatly expanding civil administration.¹⁸ This being so, the core papers of 'political science' in the Tripos rather reflected Seeley's interests in the training of the students in the use of the comparative method as applied upon a far-ranging set of chronologically arranged empirical materials appertaining to politics that we would nowadays count as basics of political history, on the one hand, and Sidgwick's similarly-crafted interests in 'political philosophy' and further theory, on the other, which under the label of 'History' would encourage the dispassionate study of the examined topics necessary for them to count as 'science', and which, as a mindful investigator of the case notes, would also act "as a prophylactic against the contagion of sudden and unwise political changes".¹⁹

This peculiar admixture of the two disciplines would prove to be particularly susceptible to various shifts in the years that followed. From this point of view, one may initially notice that the next generations of emerging scholars at the institution showed an interest to take the very practice of 'History' way more seriously than the early political scientists had. In particular, starting from 1885 a source-critical and archive-oriented paper on history would find its place in the Tripos, following the according suggestions of Mandell Creighton, Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the institution from the same year, and Frederic William Maitland, soon to become Downing Professor of the Laws of England, and signifying at the same time the arrival of the Rankean principles of professional historiography at Cambridge.²⁰ Even more consequentially on the short scale, the aged Lord Acton would succeed Seeley as Regius Professor of Modern History in 1895.²¹ Combining a history-intensive education in South Germany with Seeley's political sensitivities, Acton would reveal the new directions for the Tripos to which he was aspiring in his inaugural lecture when noting that in his view "some knowledge of the essentials of the history of thought, especially of political thinking, was needed by the side of the history of action"²² and would go on to bequeath both components of this set to posterity with the posthumous publication of the unprecedented *Cambridge Modern History* series (1902-1912), characteristically political and comparative in its themes and

own political science-affiliated Economics Tripos in 1903. As for the eventually narrowed Moral Sciences Tripos, this would be turned at that point into the Philosophy Tripos, following also the death of the former's last proponent Sidgwick a few years earlier. On these episodes see Collini (1983), pp. 345-348, 351-353, and Tribe (2017), (2019).

¹⁸ See Collini (1983), pp. 347, 353-355, 362, Goldie (1994), pp. 179-180.

¹⁹ See Collini (1983), pp. 348-349, Alexander (2016), pp. 362-365. For more information concerning the formation of the relevant interests of the introducers of 'political science' in Cambridge see also the previous pieces in Collini, Winch & Burrow (1983), Collini (2001) and Alexander (2016), 374-375.

²⁰ See Goldie (1994), pp. 180-181, 188, and Collini (1983), p. 347.

²¹ On Acton's activities in these settings see Goldie (1994), p. 180 and Alexander (2016), p. 365, 369, 379-380.

²² Alexander (2016), p. 369.

overall attitude, and with a considerable place reserved for political thought in its volumes. One of the first scholars of distinction to emerge out of these successive revisions to the Tripos would be the short-lived historian John Neville Figgis, who would go on to edit Acton's essays and lectures among his other activities, which included his ordinance in the Church of England by 1902.²³ His own emphases are further suggestive of the developing trends of the times, since in his most remembered work, *The Divine Right of Kings* (originally published in 1896 and revised for its 1914 edition), Figgis would very characteristically seek to trace the long historical evolution of the idea of sovereignty from the times of the medieval Popes' claim to *imperium* through the response to it by the authors associated with the so-called absolutist State and up until the late ideas of parliamentary and popular sovereignty, making use of several less known authors than those taught in the philosophical canon for the purpose, as would be even more the case with the apparent sequel to this work, *Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625* (1907/1916), which would present an history of the opposite trend from Catholic conciliarism up until the first springs of modern constitutionalism.²⁴ This being the case, by the time we reach the early years of the next imposing historian in Cambridge, Herbert Butterfield and his short classic statement *The Whig Interpretation of History* (1931),²⁵ one sees an historian's great easiness in disqualifying rather in principle the scholar quest for grand political narratives sketching a meaningful course for history from past to present, framed as 'general history' and discretely alluding to the workings of his contemporary fellows, in whose place instead he advanced concrete 'historical research', with its "chief aim" consisting principally in the sole "reconciliatory elucidation of the unlikeness between past and present".²⁶ As for an another relevant sign of 'History's triumphal ascent in high British academics close to the same years that would be also felt very soon, one can turn to Robin George Collingwood, an outsider to the University of Oxford's late 'Philosophy, Politics & Economics' study program, and his philosophical defense of all knowledge as being of an essentially historical character, dissoluble in what he was seeing as a 'logic' of individual 'questions and answers'.²⁷

This being the substantial ground that 'History' was impressively establishing for itself against other taught objects in Cambridge and beyond, it might not be surprising to expect that the following times and scholars would display interests in retrieving what this emerging landscape was more prone to be leaving outside. In these respects, one should note the return of a 'Political

²³ On Figgis see Goldie (1994), Palonen (2003), pp. 63-64, and Alexander (2016), pp. 369-370.

²⁴ Figgis (1914) and (2011) respectively; for an overview of their contents see Goldie (1994), pp.181-185 and Palonen (2003), pp. 63-64. As both investigators further astutely note (Goldie 1994, pp. 191-192; Palonen 2003, pp. 63-64), most of the authors examined in the two books by Figgis would reappear in Skinner (1978a), (1978b) in terms of more carefully attributed contexts for each case.

²⁵ Butterfield (1965). For more information about Butterfield, who has already drawn the attention of a few extended studies, see Bentley (2011), McIntire (2004), Sewell (2005), Burrow (2007), pp. 472-475, Alexander (2016), pp. 380-381 and James (2019b), pp. 87-90.

²⁶ Butterfield (1965), pp. 1-12.

²⁷ See Collingwood (2017), (1946). For more information about Collingwood see the essays accompanying the former of the two titles.

Science' for the Faculty of History in Cambridge through the creation of an official chair for it in 1928 upon the delayed adoption of the example of the creation of similar chairs in Oxford and the London School of Economics and Political Science more than a decade earlier.²⁸ The Cambridge chair would go to Ernest Barker, a highly synthetic mind, as he made clear when suggesting in his own inaugural lecture "an obvious affinity between history and political theory",²⁹ with principal interests in political philosophy and political theory, which he would display from the very beginning by removing in 1930 Seeley's old comparative-inductivist paper in place of a core paper on the 'History of Political Thought', and by substituting for Sidgwick's abductivist paper one on 'The Theory of the Modern State'.³⁰ Furthermore, the heat of the war would force Butterfield as well to pay some heed to the need to consider the value of reasoning specifically about politics, as seen in his explicit denunciation of the intellectual implications of his early book in its own sequel *The Englishman & his History* (1944),³¹ which appeared in Barker's *Current Problems* publication series and where we read that

[w]e are all of us exultant and unrepentant whigs. Those who, perhaps in the misguided austerity of youth, wish to drive out that whig interpretation, (that particular thesis which controls our abridgment of English history,) are sweeping a room which humanly speaking cannot long remain empty. They are opening the door for seven devils [...]. We, on the other hand, will not dream of wishing it away, but will rejoice in an interpretation of the past which has grown up with us, has grown up with the history itself, and has helped to make the history. [...] The whig interpretation came at exactly the crucial moment and, whatever it may have done to our history, it had a wonderful effect on English politics.³²

In the wake of these statements, one sees their author trying to register throughout his short book how the Whig interpretation itself came historically to have its own organic place in the assumed English mindset, bequeathing thus to his young supervisee Pocock by the end of the decade something more than a delicate research agenda. As for another retrospectively influential hard-working newcomer of the same age as Pocock but present in Cambridge already since the late 1930s, Peter Laslett, he would gradually bring to the institution, among other things, the new interests and working methods of what we would nowadays

²⁸ For more information about the original establishment and early days of these chairs, including also among them for Oxford the more consequential later chair of the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, see Wokler (2001).

²⁹ Alexander (2016), p. 375.

³⁰ See Collini (1983), pp. 350-351, Goldie (1994), pp. 190-191, Wokler (2001), pp. 138-144, and Alexander (2016), pp. 375-376. For more on Barker see Stapleton (1994). It is also worth noting that the 'Theory of the Modern State' paper that Barker was establishing at that point was taking as its base the Swiss-German lawyer's Johann Kaspar Bluntschli's 1886 once much-influential book which carried the same title and which was a core reading in older versions of the Tripos. See further Kelly (2016), pp. 145-148.

³¹ Butterfield (1944).

³² Butterfield (1944), pp. 3-4, 7.

identify as those of a social historian.³³ In these respects, Laslett would very crucially opt to devote a great part of his early academic labours in the 1940s and 1950s on the very demanding study of the history of the political thought of two 17th century British authors of great prominence, Sir Robert Filmer and John Locke respectively, that would suggest Laslett's mastery in the handling of hard-to-date and more generally hard-to-appreciate historical sources by substantial means of patiently itemized comparisons between the most particular components of pertinence to his subject matter. These would eventually result in the retrospectively renowned critical editions of Filmer's and Locke's main political writings in 1949 and 1960 respectively,³⁴ after which Laslett would find himself tutoring about his mode of work to such eager to learn newcomers of the next generation as Skinner and Dunn, shortly prior to his settlement to the study of historical social demography.

The names taken to have been foundational for the making of the 'Cambridge School' are already making their appearance and therefore a more concentrated consideration on Pocock's own early workings seems to be due at this place. Being a proud New Zealander and the only non-metropolitan Briton featuring in this account, John Greville Agard Pocock seems to have been more distinctively motivated and more unintimidated in his chosen approach and investigation themes in his early days in Cambridge.³⁵ More specifically, after an initial interest to study the Levellers' contentions on English history upon his arrival from New Zealand in 1948, Pocock was persuaded by Butterfield to concentrate primarily instead upon how the more conservative authors of the same times had been arguing on such topics.³⁶ In these respects, Pocock follows very closely the respective authors and themes discussed in *The Englishman & his History* by going into greater detail on the relevant sources and by supplementing the case with some further features of his own. Aside from submitting an impressive dissertation for the standards of the times,³⁷ Pocock went on to expand his theme a little further with the eventual result to give it the definitive form that we nowadays find in his first book, the known *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century*.³⁸ As the subtitle suggests, one sees Pocock suggesting that he studies some said peculiarly English varieties of 17th century 'historical thought' corresponding to a considerable range of English authors, both underrecognized and members of the canon, as "contrasted" or "opposed" to other chosen authors and texts of the times, mainly from France and from England's more adjacent Scotland and Ireland, in order to suggest the different ways in which the former

³³ On Laslett and his lifetime work see Goody & Szreter (2002) and Dunn & Wrigley (2005); more information can be found in Turkka (2004), Koikkalainen (2009) and more broadly (2005), and Skodo (2014).

³⁴ Filmer (1949) and Locke (1960); nowadays more easily available as Filmer (2017) and Locke (1988) respectively.

³⁵ Pocock's early period as a scholar is best documented by James (2019b). For a recent overview of this author's work see Sheppard (2016).

³⁶ As Pocock himself notes in (1987d), pp. vii-ix; see also James (2019b), p. 87.

³⁷ Pocock (1952).

³⁸ Pocock (1957); nowadays available as a 'reissue with a retrospect' as (1987a).

successively provided shape for an arguably substantial part of the changing political controversies of the times. In these respects, in a narrative strongly reminiscent of the authors examined, Pocock homogenizes the ways appeals to English history were brought forward by jurists of the common law by the beginning of the age as formative of the belief in the immemorial character of an 'ancient constitution', taken to be in effect from the long past up to the examined present and to have been undertaking any due modifications silently and in the long term;³⁹ following this, the book moves to the introduction to England, close to the same times, of the alternative view of a specifically middle age origin for at least some of the constitution's laws and institutions, such as the very consequential case of the parliament, which is termed as a whole as the 'feudal law' and is attributed to the more distanced work of antiquarians such as the extensively examined Henry Spelman;⁴⁰ and then Pocock goes on to suggest how several authors of all kinds of interests and leaning in law and politics, said to include even Filmer, the Levellers, Hobbes, and possibly Locke, next to the various Tories and Whigs of the times, started responding to the new argument and to each other by adopting and revising different parts of the two original views of English history up until the 'Whig interpretation' ended up dominating this series by the Glorious Revolution, removing thus many of the previous views and authors from common sight.⁴¹

The large edifice of the *Ancient Constitution and the Common Law* would prove to be accompanying Pocock for quite some time. In these respects, it is worth noting that having left England occupationally for good by 1958, originally for New Zealand and since 1966 for the United States, Pocock would go on expanding this perspective to the point of suggesting strong connections between the common law and the late 18th century canonized philosophical figure of conservatism Edmund Burke,⁴² as well as to develop a say for other conservative authors in Britain and beyond, including even his older contemporary philosopher Michael Oakeshott.⁴³ On the other hand, this same person, Pocock, would at the same time start expanding his interests to the historical and political thought of several other authors who brought forward more constructive claims on relevant topics, such as the republican-drawn political theorist James Harrington in 17th century England and Machiavelli quite earlier than that in Renaissance Italy,⁴⁴ which he would reassemble along with the aforementioned common law matrix within a very widely reconstructed scheme of 'republicanism' in his better-known book *The Machiavellian Moment* that would seek to encompass numerous instances of authors vastly ranging from the times of ancient Greece up until the first century of the existence of the Republic of the

³⁹ See Pocock (1957), chaps I-III.

⁴⁰ See Pocock (1957), chaps IV-V.

⁴¹ See Pocock (1957), chaps VI-IX.

⁴² Pocock (1960).

⁴³ See Pocock (1964), (1968b), (1970a).

⁴⁴ See Pocock (1965), (1968a), both of which apparently draw from the according 'interlude' chap VI of (1957). More generally, all the articles listed in this paragraph which followed after (1957) were collected with slight modifications in (1971b), which in turn was subsequently reprinted with a new preface as (1989a).

United States.⁴⁵ However, Pocock would have already started getting strongly involved in the initiatives associated with the 'Cambridge School' by then, suggesting thus that other things should have a place in this investigation prior to further discussion of this author's work.

What seems to remain for this brief overview to come to an end is no other than a closer look at the more concrete sequence of events that gave specific rise to the 'Cambridge School' as a collective singular to note. For this case, one should go back to another great initiative due to Laslett. Aside from his developing a new strict method for undertaking studies in the history of political thought and tutoring young students about its results, the early Laslett would also prove to be uncomfortable with the more general disappearance of an active 'political philosophy' both in Cambridge and in the early post-war Anglophone academics more generally as well as with the relative lack of a keen interest to develop studies of 'social science' of a similar intent. This being so, in an effort to raise some sensitivities to these goals Laslett would initiate in 1956 the eventually renowned *Philosophy, Politics and Society* volume series,⁴⁶ in the first introduction of which he would plead for a reversal of the reigning 'death of political philosophy'.⁴⁷ The volumes that would be published throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s would draw many high academics of the Anglophone world interested to respond to such a say or to further publicize their already articulated says back then whose names are nowadays recognizable by all readers in the humanities and the social sciences worldwide.⁴⁸ In what has to do with our own topic, one finds Pocock presenting one of his first methodological statements in the second series,⁴⁹ whereas Dunn and Skinner would follow with similar articles in the midst of their own developing historical research in the next volumes, next to their offering editorial assistance to their dear tutor at the same time.⁵⁰ This

⁴⁵ Pocock (1975); this was republished in a new edition with a 'new afterword by the author' as (2003a), and is yet more recently available in a new 'Princeton Classics' edition as (2016).

⁴⁶ The seven volumes of the *Philosophy, Politics and Society* series: Laslett (1956b); Laslett & Runciman (1962); Laslett & Runciman (1967b); Laslett, Runciman & Skinner (1972); Laslett & Fishkin (1979); Laslett & Fishkin (1992); Fishkin & Laslett (2003).

⁴⁷ Laslett (1956a), p. vii: "[i]t is one of the assumptions of intellectual life in our country that there should be amongst us men whom we think of as political philosophers. Philosophers themselves and sensitive to philosophic change, they are to concern themselves with political and social relationships at the widest possible level of generality. They are to apply the methods and the conclusions of contemporary thought to the evidence of the contemporary social and political situation. For three hundred years of our history there have been such men writing in English, from the early seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, from Hobbes to Bosanquet. To-day, it would seem, we have them no longer. The tradition has been broken and our assumption is misplaced, unless it is looked on as a belief in the possibility that the tradition is about to be resumed. For the moment, anyway, political philosophy is dead".

⁴⁸ To make an almost impossible selection of mentions among the contributors, one needs to list only Michael Oakeshott, Isaiah Berlin, the young John Rawls (three times), Hannah Arendt, Carole Pateman, H. L. A. Hart, Bernard Williams, Robert Nozick, Charles Taylor, Reinhart Bendix, Kenneth Arrow and Robert Dahl.

⁴⁹ Pocock (1962a).

⁵⁰ In these respects, Dunn is thanked for his role in the preparation of the third series at Laslett & Runciman (1967a), p. 5, whereas we have already seen that Skinner appears himself as co-editor in Laslett, Runciman & Skinner (1972). Furthermore, in the latter volume one finds also Dunn (1968b) republished with fewer footnotes as (1972a) as well as Skinner's original (1972b).

being so, it is not hard to perceive that the series was encouraging the participants and their receivers to start reading each other attentively, creating thus a common space that would allow for the shaping of shared attitudes as well as for the identification of disagreements.⁵¹ In fact, Skinner and Dunn seem to be a highly exemplar case, as two young contemporary peers who were just beginning to develop their attitude in academics inside and outside their institution. From this point of view, Laslett's platform seems to have played a role in strengthening the formative ties between the two rising academics, since the cross-references to each other's new or upcoming works at the times that were already making their appearance seem to be already suggesting by then a sense of shared interest as well as an extent of concerted action towards thirds.⁵²

This first case seems to meet an end with Skinner's publication of his well-known intervention on method 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas' (1969), which allows us to reach our contemporary times.⁵³ This is so because the article managed to generate an extensive public debate of much attention by itself as a result of its author's assertive style in his detailed unraveling of a long list of deficiencies of non-historical philosophical and social-science contentions of great currency in the relevant studies back then, against which Skinner was already articulating a different method of his own which he would go on to expand in further articles in the following years.⁵⁴ This would also be a time when Pocock would start responding to Skinner's pieces as a favourable interlocutor by writing further pieces on method that brought forward closely related views,⁵⁵ whereas the emerging overall nexus of the ongoing scholarship of the three authors, causing great impression both for its far-reaching empirical content as well as for its public stand and marked by several apparent cross-references and jointly processed views, would be already leading several third authors to discuss the group as a whole as the 'Cambridge School'.⁵⁶ This case would consolidate as a result of Skinner's and Pocock's

⁵¹ For a broad exploration of this theme see Koikkalainen (2005), (2009).

⁵² To limit ourselves to cross-references in the 1960s see Skinner (1965), p. 171; (1966a), p. 317; (1966b), p. 200; Dunn (1967), pp. 175, 182; (1968b), pp. 100, 104; (1969b); Skinner (1969a); (1969b), pp. 6, 24, 28, 30, 53; whereas the case strongly persists in the next decade as well.

⁵³ Skinner (1969b).

⁵⁴ Expanding our previous lists for Skinner's early years see his (1964), (1966b), (1969b), (1970), (1971), (1972a), (1972b), (1974), (1975), to which one may further add the reviews (1973), (1976), (1979). Some of these articles reappeared in Tully (1988) and together with some later pieces are currently available in modified versions in the collection Skinner (2002l). The former collection, and especially Skinner (1988b), provides also an overview of some of the many titles that took part in the debate.

⁵⁵ Expanding again for Pocock's methodological statements in his early years see his (1962a), (1962b), (1968b), the recently published for the first time (2017a), (1970b), (1971c), (1971d), (1973), (1979), (1980), (1981), (1985), (1987b), (1987e). Many of these pieces were once again collected with slight modifications in the collections (1971b)/(1989a) and along with later titles in (2009). For a fuller record of Pocock's early publications see Hampsher-Monk (1984).

⁵⁶ The first Anglophone reference to a 'Cambridge School', among the many that soon followed, has been thoroughly documented by James (2019b), pp. 84-85, as appearing in print in 1973. One may also go on to add a little earlier than that to this list two 1967 references by these authors' longtime silent reader Foucault in (1998), pp. 279-281. Furthermore, it might be also worth noting that by that point a distinctively-profiled circle with dues for their substantial intellectual formation as well to earlier residence in Cambridge would start finding peaceful shelter for some decades at the University of Sussex, regularly describing

development of regular correspondence by that point,⁵⁷ which would bear some early visible fruit with Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment*, whose title emerged following Skinner's suggestion,⁵⁸ and with Skinner's allusions to Pocock in his own first book, the two-volume *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, the finest and everlasting 'Cambridge School' classic.⁵⁹ Following this, Skinner and Pocock would go on interacting in several occasions in the course of their increasingly personal projects, whereas Dunn would develop a less pronounced profile with different emphases earning ground, though still retaining a close interest for the works and for further interactions with his Cambridge fellow Skinner, as well as with Pocock to a quite lesser extent. The picture of the 'Cambridge School' as we nowadays know it comes into place with the ongoing flourishing of numerous disciples in Cambridge as well as with the impact of several distinguished associates upon their arrival at the institution and beyond. This being a brief overview of the making of the entire fabric of the School, we are now most fully equipped to start unravelling some key threads at the level of detail that they seem to deserve.

themselves as 'intellectual historians' from quite early on and developing an interest in the laborious study of themes lying at the periphery of those which the 'Cambridge School' was taking up. We are referring above all to such historians as John W. Burrow, Steffan Collini and Donald Winch, who would be characterized by a far more discrete public presence, both during their time in Sussex, which is when one finds their impressive Collini, Winch & Burrow (1983), and following their dispersion afterwards, whose work Cuttica (2014), (2015), (2019), (2020) has recently started bringing to common sight. In what has to do with Cambridge, some of the original dues for their formation seem to fall to the Scottish historian of political thought Duncan Forbes (Burrow 2001; Cuttica 2020), as well as to Butterfield, either via Forbes or more directly (Pocock 1987d, pp. viii-ix; James 2019b, pp. 97-98; however, cf. Forbes 2001; Pocock 2019a, p. 102; Cuttica 2019).

⁵⁷ This case has been recently brought to light in Whatmore (2016a) and thereby dates since 1968, whereas Skinner mentions correspondence with Pocock also in (1966a), p. 317.

⁵⁸ As Pocock revealed in (2006), p. 39.

⁵⁹ Skinner (1978a), (1978b). Pocock appears in (1978a), pp. x, xiv, 82, 102, 147, 156, 162, 182, 208. For an overview of the debate that this work by itself generated in turn see again Tully (1988) and more analytically Palonen (2003), pp. 91-94.

II QUENTIN SKINNER'S WORK ON THE STATE *

One can certainly not think of a figure that has caused more impression for the 'Cambridge School' nexus than Quentin Skinner. The situation is probably so since Skinner has been a very active presence in practically all the important initiatives and events that we have already started identifying as formative of the character of the School in the previous chapter, whereas it can be argued that things have remained on a similar key up to our contemporary times, as this chapter will further attempt to show. In all cases, the dues seem to be well-deserved since we are talking about one of the acknowledgedly most hard-working scholars in the high academics for something more than five decades already, who has remained from his early days typically mindful of the slightest technical detail in his presented works. This being the case, this chapter examines an interconnected series of Skinner's relevant works on the history of the "concept" or "idea" of the 'State', a topic which in turn has also drawn the attention of several other influential scholars of recent decades who can be justifiably seen as working towards a similar direction.⁶⁰

* Preliminary versions of this chapter were presented at the International Society for Intellectual History Conference 'Borders, Boundaries and Limits' in St Andrews, Scotland, UK in June 2018 and at the 21st International Conference on the History of Concepts 'Interdisciplinarity: Conceptual Explorations' in Málaga, Spain in September 2018. The author has received extensive benefit from the commentary on his work in both occasions. Furthermore, the author has been tremendously assisted by his academic visit at the Department of Politics and International Studies of the University of Cambridge during the spring semester of 2018, for which case he should express his deep gratitude to Prof. David Runciman, as Head of Department, Prof. (then Dr.) Duncan Kelly, Dr. Samuel James, and Dr. Michael Sonenscher, among a wide range of Cambridge-residing scholars very keen to exchange their views. This occasion also included an extensive interview that Prof. Dunn himself generously provided to the author, keeping him thus safe from presenting several insufficiently supported statements at this place. All views and possible errors rest solely on the author's responsibility.

⁶⁰ For instance, one could identify similar directions in the treatments of the "idea" or "concept" of the 'State' and of the directly relevant 'status' and 'raison d'état' in the respective works of D' Entrèves (1973), Williams (1983), pp. 299-301, Foucault (2007), Boldt, Conze, Haverkate, Klippel & Koselleck (1990), Viroli (1992), (1998), Runciman (1997), Renaut, Billier, Savidan & Thiaw-Po-Une (2005), chap. 20, Palonen (2011), (2017a) and Eco & Fedriga (2014). At this point, it should be also clarified that such late conceptual histories and histories of the idea of the 'State' have not interrupted the persisting production of important

The chapter is comprised of three distinctive parts. The first part is intended to provide readers with a few substantial points of reference concerning the wider contexts in which Skinner's examined work is situated as well as with the main method devices that have informed the sustained reading of the relevant texts. Then, we proceed to the most detailed part of this chapter, which consists in an analytical examination of Skinner's work that follows the main periodizations that Skinner himself seems to have acknowledged in his pieces on the 'State'. Finally, we have reserved a few more general conclusions for the end of this chapter, in which the findings of the preceding parts will serve as a base that can be regarded as broad enough for a more comprehensive discussion of Skinner's intellectual portrait as a whole.

1. Contexts and method

The 'State' has definitively been one of Skinner's dearest topics, since it seems to have preoccupied him throughout a considerable portion of his longstanding career in repeated occasions, as has been also the case with Skinner's perennial interest in the classical English philosophical figure of Thomas Hobbes,⁶¹ and with his several pieces on 'liberty' since the 1980s.⁶² In fact, the 'State' seems to have substantially informed Skinner's very first book, his 1978 two-volume classic *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*,⁶³ in the Preface of which Skinner identified three aims in the writing of his book, ordered according to a move from the most particular to the most general one, with the second of them consisting in the relatively "general historical theme" of indicating "something of the process by which the modern concept of the State came to be formed".⁶⁴ In the same pages Skinner made also clear that his research actually identified the gradual acquisition of the "main elements of a recognizably modern concept of the State" and not the precise acquisition of this concept as such and that it would be in the work's retrospectively famous Conclusion that he would turn to such concerns,

works that have been treating the State with a greater or less extent of plausibility either as a concrete 'historical'/'social'/'political' entity accepted to be found in a range of empirical settings and/or as a significant logical component in analyses of a more theoretical interest. Several instances of such works will be brought up in the course of this chapter on the appropriate occasions, since late works of this kind seem to have affected Skinner's work in several ways, explicit and implied. The relatively limited extent of such engagements of Skinner's has led us to the choice of keeping the consideration of these cases mainly for the footnotes, in an effort to facilitate readers not to miss the wide picture that emerges out of Skinner's examined work as soon as one attains to see it as a whole. For a comprehensive summary of the former of the two aforementioned sets see Pierson (2004) and cf. Skinner's quite relevant edited volume (2011b), which includes no piece by Skinner himself.

⁶¹ Even though a complete referencing of Skinner's works on Hobbes in a footnote would be a highly impractical task, since Skinner has presented shorter or longer analyses of Hobbes in the vast majority of his published writings, readers may turn to (2002n), (1996), (2008b) and (2018f) for the greatest part of Skinner's titles that have Hobbes as their main theme.

⁶² For comprehensive summaries and extensive analyses of Skinner's different works on 'liberty' see Palonen (2003), pp. 95-132 and Geuna (2006), pp. 64-72.

⁶³ Skinner (1978a), (1978b).

⁶⁴ See Skinner (1978a), p. ix.

moving thus “from history to historical semantics” and “from the concept of the State to the word ‘State’”.⁶⁵ In fact, the very term ‘State’ or what could possibly be acknowledged as its modern or any other version of a concept of it are not particularly common in the greatest part of the 18 main chapters of the two volumes of the *Foundations*, whereas this is also the case even in the first part of the Conclusion, in which Skinner summarized what he took to be out of his research in the main chapters the four “most important preconditions for the acquisition of the modern concept of the State”.⁶⁶ Skinner’s first collected thoughts on a study of the concept of the ‘State’ finally appear in the second part of the Conclusion, where he turned to his findings -up to that point- of the cases that did register the gradual emergence of the modern concept of the ‘State’ itself, putting the word *State* within inverted commas, a practice that apparently reflected Skinner’s explicit understanding at that point that the secure acquisition of such a new concept probably went through the development of a new vocabulary that suggested the “free” or “current” usage of the term in its new sense.⁶⁷

This peripheral interest of Skinner in the *stricto sensu* conceptual history of the ‘State’ in the *Foundations* has led us to turn the attention of this chapter on Skinner’s following works of relevance, since it is these later works that suggest a clearer thematization and therefore Skinner’s more detailed focus on the topic we are interested in as such. In these respects, it might be worth introducing from the outset the titles that will serve as our most extensive subject-matter on an individual basis. Skinner’s first article that belongs to this case is his extensive contribution on “The State”⁶⁸ in an *Ideas in Context* volume dedicated to “conceptual change” that was edited by three American associates of Skinner at that time.⁶⁹ This article has been republished in 2002 in “an extensively revised and much expanded version” under the new title “From the State of Princes to the Person of the State”⁷⁰ in a three-volume collection of a great number of similarly reworked articles of Skinner up to that moment.⁷¹ The next work that fits our interests is Skinner’s celebrated 1997 lecture “Liberty before Liberalism”,⁷² which was given upon the occasion of Skinner’s moving to the Cambridge chair of the Regius Professor of Modern History in the year before the lecture. Our following source, Skinner’s individual contribution “States and

⁶⁵ See Skinner (1978a), pp. ix-x.

⁶⁶ See Skinner (1978b), pp. 349-352.

⁶⁷ See Skinner (1978b), pp. 352-358. Cf. Tully’s (1983, pp. 500-502) treatment of Skinner’s project in the *Foundations*, where Tully did not even bring up the very term ‘State’ when discussing the book, as well as Skinner’s rather inverted declared analytical starting point in (2018h), p. 11, where we read that “complex conceptual disputes are often disguised by shared vocabularies” and that “there has never been any agreed concept to which the terms *representation* and *the state* may be said to refer”.

⁶⁸ Skinner (1989b).

⁶⁹ Ball, Farr & Hanson (1989).

⁷⁰ Skinner (2002e).

⁷¹ Skinner (2002l).

⁷² Skinner (1998). Skinner’s formation of the perspective that is put forward in this lecture is evidently based on his older attempted reading of Machiavelli’s understanding of liberty in (1983), which, in turn, has evident dues to Pocock (1957), (1975), even though Pocock is minimally cited in that piece (1983, p. 14).

the Freedom of Citizens”⁷³ in a collected volume partially edited by himself on the historically variable relations between ‘States’ and ‘citizens’,⁷⁴ seems to have been the direct sequel of this lecture, as one can tell out of a detailed reading of the two pieces. Our next two main sources consist in Skinner’s subsequent works on the ‘State’, in which Skinner quite interestingly sought to designate his method as that of a ‘genealogy’. The first of them is Skinner’s 2008 British Academy lecture “A Genealogy of the Modern State”,⁷⁵ and the second one is the latter’s “greatly abbreviated version” entitled “The Sovereign State: A Genealogy”,⁷⁶ which has been included in a following volume dedicated to the history of the concept of ‘sovereignty’.⁷⁷ Finally, since Skinner has had the kindness and the admirable zeal to seek to work further on his views on the ‘State’ after the first drafts of this chapter were produced, moderating and relativizing thus several of the features that are more extensively discussed in what follows, this chapter also examines in variable extents several articles that have been integrated in Skinner’s latest book,⁷⁸ insisting mostly on the first main chapter “Classical Rhetoric and the Personation of the State”, which seems to be corresponding to Skinner’s earliest related works from a chronological point of view,⁷⁹ as well as on the “concluding” chapter “Hobbes and the Concept of the State”,⁸⁰ which Skinner designated as “basically a revised and extended version” of his first ‘genealogical’ piece.⁸¹

As regards the wide context for this kind of work, since a considerable part of Skinner’s background has been already quite well-documented,⁸² we should

⁷³ Skinner (2003).

⁷⁴ Skinner & Str ath (2003).

⁷⁵ Skinner (2009).

⁷⁶ Skinner (2010).

⁷⁷ Kalmo & Skinner (2010).

⁷⁸ Skinner (2018f).

⁷⁹ Skinner (2018e). The chapter is said to be “largely a new kind of work, although it incorporates some material” from the collection of (2002m) and from (2005a).

⁸⁰ Skinner (2018d).

⁸¹ It should be noted that one has to include in the same ‘State’ genre from the point of view of its thematization as well Skinner’s 1998 lecture that was devoted almost exclusively on Hobbes’ uses of the ‘State’. (1999a; republished in a revised form as 2002f), which has been set aside from this chapter due to its limited relevance to our intended focus. This has been also the case with Skinner’s attempted ‘theoretical sketch’ of his views on the state in a recent interview under strikingly oversimplifying terms that suggest quite loose connections with Skinner’s concrete empirical research that will be brought under detailed examination. See (2016a), pp. 16-23. In these respects, we should also point out that we have additionally thought best in this chapter, as a more general principle and to the extent that this has been possible, to set aside the late and constantly increasing number of Skinner’s less formal and seemingly experimental public presentations of pieces of his late academic labours or of his associated thoughts through other currently available channels, such as video-taped lectures and some of Skinner’s less formal interviews, restricting the chapter’s focus thus for Skinner’s academic products that can be most convincingly treated as claiming a clearer degree of individual finality as completed scholar statements. For instance, this is the case with the late perplexing revisions and additions of new sources of relevance presented in the form of ‘preliminary observations’ in (2017) and then incorporated in (2018c).

⁸² For detailed contextual accounts of Skinner’s career as a whole or in part, as well as of the well-known basic scholar influences that Skinner himself has also repeatedly acknowledged for his work, see Palonen (2003), (2004), (2014d), Brett, Tully & Hamilton-Bleakley (2006) and Kindi (2010b), as well as the more broadly conceived socio-political and late-philosophical ‘plausible’ framing of Skinner’s work attempted by Perreau-Saussine (2007), and some of the

restrain ourselves at this point in bringing up only some very few basic landmarks in the examined period of Skinner's career that reflect the most crucial institutional allegiances in which Skinner has been engaged, leaving thus the treatment of more particular contexts of relevance for the parts of the main analysis that they seem to affect in each case, as well as Skinner's standing in terms of even wider frames of reference for the concluding part of the chapter.⁸³ The first institutional allegiance of Skinner we are interested in has to do with the fact that right after the first publication of the *Foundations* in 1978 Skinner succeeded W. B. Gallie, a figure principally remembered in late years for his ingenuous paper on the "Essentially Contested Concepts",⁸⁴ in Barker's original chair of the Professor of Political Science at Cambridge,⁸⁵ which means that Skinner became more directly interested at that time than before into following the ongoing popular debates in such domains as 'political philosophy' and 'political theory'.⁸⁶ Then, in 1984 Skinner and his associates initiated the currently famous *Ideas in Context* series at Cambridge University Press, which –in some respects- seems to have put Gallie's insights into practice and to have institutionalized Skinner's interest in the regular production of scholar works in line with the thematization we are interested in.⁸⁷ Our next moment of interest is set at the end of the 1990s, which was a time in which Skinner started coming to terms with the acknowledgement of similar projects of other academic circles, such as the presently famous work of the proud German scholars who have been associated with the *Begriffsgeschichte* project, as well as the relevant works of scholars from other countries. In these respects, Skinner participated in 1998 in the foundation of the international scholar association that is currently known as the *History of Concepts Group* and which has substantially contributed to the institutionalization of international collaborations and to the acknowledgement of relevant works on an even wider basis than the one that used to characterize the most highly prestigious academic centres of the previous decades.⁸⁸ This

more extensive relevant accounts offered by Skinner himself in (1988b), pp. 233-234, (1998), pp. 101-120, (2002h), (2002j), (2006a), in quite more oversimplifying terms in (2011a), and in (2016b).

⁸³ On the rationale underlying our keeping a considerable portion of such cases for the footnotes see the first numbered footnote of this chapter.

⁸⁴ Gallie (1956).

⁸⁵ See Goldie (2006), pp. 17-18. For more information about the early days of this chair of Political Science see Wokler (2001).

⁸⁶ Skinner's following of the latest trends in these as well as in other areas in the "human sciences" that were raising accordingly influential claims to the status of a 'grand theory' is quite obvious in his publications after the *Foundations*, such as the directly characteristic (1985b), as is also the case with Skinner's specific interests in 'liberty', which also date from the same years. For more on these topics, see Palonen (2003), pp. 95-180.

⁸⁷ In direct association with the preceding note, it is worth noting that the first volume of this long-standing series of outstanding scholar quality, which appeared as a result of workings of roughly the same years, had the much-revealing ambition in its title to situate *Philosophy in History*. See Rorty, Schneewind & Skinner (1984).

⁸⁸ On these topics see Richter (1995), Lehmann & Richter (1996), Hampsher-Monk, Tilmans & van Free (1998), Castiglione & Hampsher-Monk (2001) and Palonen (2004), (2014b). It is also worth noting at this point that the end of the 1990s was also a time in which Skinner started providing a few apprehensive overt allusions on a more frequent basis as compared to his older pieces to the late unconventional intellectual critic Michel Foucault, an author whom Skinner has acknowledged to have been studying since the late 1960s; see (2002j), p.

overall state of affairs seems to have directed Skinner's engagements towards projects and scholar productions well beyond the range of the kind of literature that had been reaching to the attention of the grand Cambridge circles up to that time, as seems also to have been the case with our last moment, which has to do with Skinner's move from Cambridge to Queen Mary, University of London at the chair of the Barber Beaumont Professor of the Humanities in 2008, which has allowed Skinner to create a new scholar environment according to his own late interests and standards, enabling him thus to pursue further new directions beyond the most established *topoi* of our times.

The specific interests of this chapter on Skinner's work prescribe the need to attend to a consistent method in our approach. More specifically, since we are interested to appreciate Skinner's examined work as a whole, we are primarily concerned with the way Skinner has been synthesizing the great number of the different sources that he has been using in order to draw up a narrative and thus present an argumentative claim. In these respects, our main methodological point of reference is the way in which Weber used to refer to the elaboration of a 'special logic' as a convenient device that allows for the accommodation of neighbouring (or in any other conceivable way comparable) items under examination in terms of a common and easy-to-grasp narrative.⁸⁹ This means that our examination in the main part will lay a characteristic emphasis on Skinner's arrangements of his different sources, taking these arrangements to stand for his 'special logic' for each case. Furthermore, arrangements of this kind have been also used in order to divide Skinner's examined work in distinct periods, drawn exclusively on the basis of the chronological frames that Skinner himself accepts when he discusses the different cases at hand and when he tries

44, as well as some strong praises in (2002h), pp. 229-230, 238, and cf. Skinner's downplaying passing relevant statement that "doubtless I was influenced by postmodernist fashions of the time" in (2011a), p. 277. The latter state of affairs has left an apparent mark on Skinner's designation of his later works on the 'State' in terms of 'genealogy', even though Skinner cites at that point only Foucault's late 19th century most classical point of reference, i.e. the conservative-drawn groundbreaking literary-philosophical critic Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as the Cambridge-migrant academic philosopher Raymond Geuss' (1999) discussion of Nietzsche's genealogy, which was also meant to provide criticism to Foucault. See Skinner (2009), p. 326 and cf. the omission of this reference to Nietzsche (though not to Geuss) in (2010), p. 26, as well as Skinner's late apparent references to Foucault mostly in the guise of referring in a critical tone to the views of "the Nietzscheans" in (2018d), pp. 379-383; for an examination of Skinner's relations with Nietzsche's genealogy see Lane (2012); also cf. Tully (1983), pp. 498-502 and Lamb's (2004) much cruder treatment of Skinner as a 'post-modernist' historian, which seems to depend almost exclusively on Skinner's congenial discussion in (2002h).

⁸⁹ For Weber's use of the 'special logic' and its "easy intelligibility", almost in these precise terms, in the case of the "neighbouring scientific disciplines" of the 'cultural sciences' see Weber (2012b), pp. 139-140, whereas Weber's classical defense of the comparison of any specific kind of 'one-sided viewpoints' for the claim of scientific 'objectivity' see Weber (2012a). At the opening part of his late handbook-form writings that have become known since as *Economy and Society [Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft]*, Weber provided further justification for his preference on the 'rational' and the 'logical' outlook of the understanding for a more rigorous claim of scientific self-evidence in 'intellectual' terms vis-à-vis an "empathetic" understanding requiring a "full inner reliving of an experienced emotional context" due to the provision by the former of "meaning that is, directly and unambiguously, intellectually accessible" on the basis of its advantage of being accepted "to our own way of thinking" "quite unambiguously". See Weber (2019), pp. 80-81ff.

to place them in a meaningful order, whereas paying attention to this practice will also serve as a means for further comparative reflections on the way Skinner's different schemes succeed one another across the different periods of time that he examines. However, as the majority of Skinner's readers might already suspect, the isolation of such features in Skinner's work is a quite demanding process, since Skinner has tended to avoid presenting his categorizations in a straightforward fashion, as ordinary political and social scientists usually do, or in terms of a relatively clear chronological order, as one would expect from simpler-minded historians, inserting instead several divisions and further subdivisions in the midst of his narratives, which usually identify two subtypes for each division and which leave the most emphatic between them to be treated second in turn.⁹⁰ Hence, aside from the identification of the basic divisions in Skinner's dense accounts, this chapter will also try to bring up a few critical points of interest for each period of the sort of the Italian-Jewish historian Carlo Ginzburg's 'clues' of unfitting features in given accounts,⁹¹ as well as of the kind of Michel Foucault's emphasis on the identification of 'gaps' and 'lacunae'.⁹² The isolation of features of this kind is expected to facilitate readers in the assessment of Skinner's work in the wider light of important considerations that apply for each case and which are not easily discerned in case one reads Skinner's relevant pieces *prima facie*, paving the way thus for the overall assessment that will be carried out at the final part of this chapter.⁹³

⁹⁰ This practice is extensively common in the entirety of the *Foundations* and persists up to a significant extent in Skinner's pieces that serve as the subject-matter for this chapter.

⁹¹ For Ginzburg's analytical account of working in terms of 'clues' (or 'indices' or 'evidence') and for their varying uses with a range of references extending from the prehistoric times until Freud see Ginzburg (1989) and cf. Ginzburg (2001b), where the role of the historian is asserted as being far more active than that assumed in the search for 'clues'.

⁹² See Foucault (1989), and particularly p. 205.

⁹³ A few supplementary comments on the compatibility of the different methodological devices that have been brought up seem to be necessary for most demanding readers, since there are several strong reasons for which Ginzburg's 'clues' and Foucault's 'gaps' cannot be simply reduced to Weber's workings. In fact, early Ginzburg's ultimate theoretical sanction of his 'clues' rested on what he characterized as the historically acquired 'low intuitions' (1989, pp. 124-125), following thus Italian trends of the 1970s on the appropriation of post- and non-Weberian German hermeneutics and bringing up a selective part of the more diachronic insights of Italian aesthetics as well, whereas Weber is strikingly absent from Ginzburg (2001a). As for Foucault, who would end up trying to claim a disguised distance from Weber in the course of his defensive responses to Habermas (1984b, p. 32: "From Hegel through Nietzsche or Max Weber to Horkheimer or Habermas, hardly any philosophy has failed to confront this same question [of the *Aufklärung*], directly or indirectly" - emphasis added), the archaeological 'lacunae', 'gaps' and 'defects' reflected his interests in philological critique and in several trends in the French structural linguistics of his time, such as J. A. Greimas' Heidegger-influenced call for registering the absences of linguistic terms, even though the more specific way Foucault seems to have been predisposed to treat such devices rather approximated Freud's use of the 'lapsus' and thus practices of this kind could find a place within Ginzburg's wide range of 'clues'. Nonetheless, the specific way in which Weber employed the 'logic' seems to allow for a convenient accommodation of insights beyond his direct points of reference, such as those of the two aforementioned later Southern European critics. Hence, for the reasons we are interested in 'clues' and 'gaps', we deem that they can be integrated, at least 'ideal-typically', as accentuated instances of what Weber called in his 'special logic' dictated article as the 'evaluated [...] starting points from which the causal regression proceeds'. See Weber (2012b), p. 160. In fact, in *Economy and Society* Weber accepted in strikingly similar terms the self-evidence of the interpretation of understandable

Finally, one last feature that we have thought best to provide at this early point with the aim of allowing readers to follow Skinner's examined work in greater detail consists in a brief presentation of the methodological devices on which Skinner himself seems to have been relying in the course of his career. In these respects, the first feature that one needs to emphasize is Skinner's quite persisting tendency to describe the various instances in which the different examined authors employed the characteristic words of each case in order to refer to the assumed ideas or concepts at issue as 'uses' and occasionally - and in a tone suggesting comparatively more limited impact - as 'usages'. This extensive reference to 'uses', which is quite common in Skinner's works on the 'State', seems to have been Skinner's most enduring appropriation out of the appeal of the legacy of the controversial Austrian-Jewish logical philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, an idiosyncratic figure that had managed to impose himself within the Cambridge academic establishment during the first half of the 20th century, according to Skinner's own words, as "our image of philosophical genius".⁹⁴ In fact, Skinner had sought to vindicate the methodological grounds of his own project through Wittgenstein's appeal and through the latter's 'uses' already from his early and deservedly most influential methodological article with the quite Weberian-leaning title "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", placing also next to Wittgenstein in a similar light J. L. Austin's highly popular in the early post-war Britain philosophy of language, which is mostly remembered for the similar concept of the 'speech acts'.⁹⁵ In the following years and basically up until the first publication of the *Foundations*, Skinner sought to expand the methodological grounds of his case with further references to Austin and to the following elaboration of Austin's views by the American linguist John Searle, retaining at the same time an apparent allegiance to the Anglophone Weberian social science of the time,⁹⁶ whereas right after the *Foundations* Skinner made extensive use of the same grounds in the course of his pressing criticism of the cultural critic Raymond Williams' *Keywords* project,⁹⁷ in whose place Skinner provided detailed suggestions for the study of 'evaluative terms', as well as in Skinner's summarizing methodological statement for those years.⁹⁸ Following

"errors' (including [...] problems whose elements have become entangled one with another)" as second-best right after the purer 'rational' and 'logical' devices and actually as greater than that of 'values'. See Weber (2019), pp. 80-81.

⁹⁴ See Skinner (2002j), p. 46.

⁹⁵ See Skinner (1969b), pp. 30-53, (2002c), pp. 79-89.

⁹⁶ For extensive treatments of all these pieces of Skinner's work and of Skinner's relations with the philosophers of language as well as for directly relevant criticism see Collini, Winch & Burrow (1983), pp. 3-6, Tully (1983), (1988), Hampsher-Monk (1984), pp. 107-111, (1998), pp. 42-46, Bevir (1999), pp. 31-77, Palonen (2003), pp. 29-60, Lamb (2004), (2009a), (2009b), Hamilton-Bleakley (2006), Syrjämäki (2011), pp. 50-118, Browning (2016), chap. 4, and Whatmore (2016b), pp. 99-103. It is also worth noting that Skinner later attributed his original interest on Austin to Dunn (1968b), p. 101; see Skinner (1988b), p. 327.

⁹⁷ See Skinner (1979); republished in modified versions in (1980), (1988a), (1989a), (2002d).

⁹⁸ See (1988b), in which Skinner's strong interest in Weber, though kept unnamed, can be seen from the way he insists on the importance of the standard of the situational rationality of the beliefs of the authors under scrutiny, which bears strong resemblances with Weber's conceptual edifice in what has come down to be counting as the first () and even more properly the single volume of *Economy and Society*; on this specific topic see (1988b), pp. 246-

Skinner's later turn to the extensive study of Roman and Renaissance rhetoric in the 1990s, it seems that rhetoric has substituted for the philosophers of language in Skinner's concern to display methodological grounds of a similar appeal, as one can tell from the extensive role of rhetoric in Skinner's concluding methodological piece of these times,⁹⁹ although in this same piece Skinner reserved a separate place for the acknowledgment of employing non-rhetorical and rather Weberian methods in his work as well.¹⁰⁰ Finally, Skinner's more recent turn for methodological grounds to Nietzsche, an author previously sided with rhetoric,¹⁰¹ seems to have been serving the same purpose with the appeals to the philosophy of language and rhetoric.¹⁰²

2. From the 'status' to the 'State', Roman times – 16th century

Skinner's earliest references to the 'State' cover a quite extensive period of time which can be said to begin from the Roman times and to extend well into the High Renaissance and its immediate intellectual heirs,¹⁰³ reflecting in this way Skinner's extensive primary research in the first volume of the *Foundations*.¹⁰⁴ In

259. The same piece also contains Skinner's famous insistence for those times that "I remain unrepentant in my belief that there can be no histories of concepts as such; there can only be histories of their uses in argument" (p. 283). This claim has proven to be a quite much-bent one since, following Skinner's subsequent original research and allegiances that we have already noted. Nonetheless, Skinner has recently returned to declaring in the introduction of his new book that "I am skeptical of the project of writing histories of concepts [...] I focus not on the history of concepts but rather on their verbal expression and their uses in argument" (2018h, pp. 10-11), right before he ends up using a considerable portion of his following chapters as substantial evidence for his "concluding" chapter on 'Hobbes and the *Concept of the State*' (2018d; added emphasis).

⁹⁹ See Skinner (1999b); (2002g); notice the omission of the single citation of Austin in the revised version, against which one should note that Skinner has kept inserting occasionally a few citations of Austin and his speech acts since; for the most substantial case see the three citations and their role in (2008a), pp. 651-654. A similar notice of this specific shift also appears in Lamb (2009b), pp. 251-258.

¹⁰⁰ See Skinner (1999b), pp. 64-66; (2002g), pp. 179-182.

¹⁰¹ See Skinner (1999b), pp. 69-70; cf. (2002g), pp. 185-186.

¹⁰² See Skinner (2009); (2010). For a reading of Skinner's early work and methodological claims in 'rhetorical' terms, which actually prompted Skinner's (1999b) and which seems to have persisted in the way Skinner himself was prone to describe a considerable part of his early work in retrospect in (2011a), pp. 277-281, see Palonen (1997), (1999), pp. 44-49, (2013); for a reading of Skinner's early work and principally of his interest in Wittgenstein in 'genealogical' terms see Lane (2012), pp. 80-81; for a wider indication of Skinner's persisting use of the appeal of 'controversial' and 'dramatic' positions in order to draw attention to his work see Hampsher-Monk (2001), pp. 163-173 and cf. Skinner's more appealing tone in (2011a), pp. 281ff., whereas it is also worth pointing out that the 'dramatic' and the 'rhetorical' element have retained their crucial role in Skinner's following book-sized study on Shakespeare (2014) and that the very term 'genealogy' and its theorizing function have been quite clearly relativized in (2018d), pp. 379-383, where Skinner attributes his own understanding of 'genealogy' to Geuss; on the other hand, for Skinner's relations with Weber see Palonen (2004).

¹⁰³ For Skinner's treatment of these first two sets see (1989b), pp. 91-95, (2002e), pp. 369-373.

¹⁰⁴ See Skinner (1978a).

these respects, Skinner initially draws from the work of earlier Anglophone historians on the idea of the 'State'¹⁰⁵ and proceeds to a distinction of two separate uses of the Latin term 'status' and its various later equivalents of the same etymology in the Latin-based languages of Western Europe. The first use [which we can designate as A1] is that of a distinctively personal 'status', which has to do with the conditions according to which one can be acknowledged as falling within the case of an individual person, or more specifically, according to Skinner's earliest citation, that of the legal standing of a 'human'. Skinner's basic point of reference for this case is the mid-6th century influential compilation of Roman legislation of the late times of Justinian's rule of the Eastern Roman Empire that is commonly known as the *Digest*, and more specifically to the chapter "De statu hominum" of the opening rubric of the *Digest*, in which the authority invoked is that of the late 3rd century CE Roman jurist Aurelius Hermogenianus (or Hermogenian), to whom is attributed the view that "since all law is established for the sake of human beings, we first need to consider the status of such persons, before we consider anything else".¹⁰⁶ According to Skinner this sense seems to have evolved gradually after the revival of Roman law studies in Italy since the 12th century to a general use of the word 'status' in order "to designate the legal standing of all sorts and conditions of men", and most importantly to the ascription of a distinctive 'status regis' of rulers.¹⁰⁷ In fact, this 'royal state' is the one on which Skinner mainly insists, since it is used in order to introduce his presentation of this distinctively individualistic sense of the 'status' as a whole, considering it as well to be the "predominant" sense for the "formative period" that starts from the 14th century,¹⁰⁸ and providing specific citations of actual uses in cases drawn exclusively out of two late 14th century sources from the monarchical environments of France and England, i.e. the chronicler Jean Froissart (: "the queen was to be seen in an *estat* of great nobility") and the member of the English parliament William Thirnyng (: "the state of King, and of lordship and [...] all the dignity and worship that [be]longed thereto"), in the light of which Skinner also presents the two 17th century cases of John Milton (: "all the state that royalty could put into his [King Canute's] countenance") and Bossuet (: "*état* of *majesté*").¹⁰⁹ Moreover, it is also worth noting at this point that this kind of insistence seems to be quite fitting for Skinner's overarching scheme for the period in the relevant pieces, which accepts a move from "an era in which the concept of public power had been analysed in more personal and charismatic terms" to "a simpler and more abstract vision of sovereignty as the property of an impersonal agency".¹¹⁰ Therefore, in full accordance with the adoption of this perspective, Skinner presents the 'royal state' as a 'high estate' or a 'state of majesty' that gave

¹⁰⁵ In particular, the three basic works from which Skinner repeatedly draws for the formation of his own initial presuppositions for the topic are Hexter (1957), Post (1964) and Tierney (1966). For their first acknowledgement by Skinner in this light see (1978b), p. 353.

¹⁰⁶ See Skinner (1989b), p. 91, (2002e), p. 369.

¹⁰⁷ Op.cit.

¹⁰⁸ Op.cit.

¹⁰⁹ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 91-92, (2002e), pp. 369-370.

¹¹⁰ Skinner (1989b), p. 90, (2002e), pp. 368-369. Readers can notice the apparent Weberian connotations of the scheme.

expression to the ordering force of display in what counted as sovereignty during those times.¹¹¹

On the other hand, the second set of uses that Skinner identifies for the same long period of time [A2] is what he variably refers to as the 'status reipublicae', the 'status civitatis', or – in chronologically later cases – the 'status regnum'.¹¹² As one could reasonably expect, Skinner's citations of instances that reflect this comparatively rather collectivist sense of the 'status' are drawn out of a range of sources quite comparable to those of the previous set, since the earliest references consist in the early Roman classics Livy, Sallust, Cicero and Seneca¹¹³ and the *Digest*, out of which Skinner cites this time a different chapter of the opening rubric, where the authority invoked is the early 3rd century CE Roman jurist Ulpian, who is said to have claimed that "public law is that which pertains to the *status rei Romanae*".¹¹⁴ Skinner then turns to a broad range of references extending from early 13th century authors in the Italian city-states to Northern Europe's early 16th century humanists.¹¹⁵ In the interior of this latter range, a first group that we could identify [i] consists in the 13th and 14th century Italian authors of advise-books for city magistrates, with the specific references being comprised of the anonymous treatise *Oculus Pastoralis* (: "status civitatis"), Giovanni da Viterbo (: "status civitatis"), Brunetto Latini and Filippo Ceffi (: the city's "buono stato"), with the latter being used as a representative author of the early 14th century vernacular writers of the *Ars Dictaminis*.¹¹⁶ The second set [ii] consists in "Aquinas and his Italian disciples at the end of the thirteenth century", who are said to follow the usages of the previous group, even though Skinner's sole specific citation at this point comes from Aquinas himself, who spoke of the "status communis" and appears thus not to be that directly reducible to the earlier uses of the "status civitatis".¹¹⁷ The next set [iii] consists in the 15th century Italian humanists who are said to turn the 'optimus status reipublicae' into a basic feature of their political views, for which case Skinner cites two authors: Giovanni

¹¹¹ Skinner (1989b), pp. 91-92, (2002e), pp. 369-370. As Skinner himself notes at this point in both versions of his work, he formed this opinion - almost without changing the relevant formulations in the late version - out of the work of the eminent American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, with whom Skinner collaborated for some quite formative years in the 1970s when Skinner spent four years at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, which is the place where he actually managed to complete the writing of the *Foundations* (1978a, pp. xviii-xix). For an account of these years in Skinner's career and for the impacts of Geertz, Richard Rorty and Thomas S. Kuhn, all of whom were also based in Princeton at that time, on Skinner's work as a whole see Kindi (2010b), pp. 5-6 and Skinner (2002h), pp. 238-239 and cf. the presence of Kuhn only in Skinner's inspecting 'Grand Theory' volume (1985b). Finally, it is also worth pointing out that Skinner returns to this exact point in the overall conclusion of his pieces under discussion, in which he draws on Geertz again, adding also in the article's revised version a critical footnote on Foucault's similar point, for which case he brings up the presence in the times of the Renaissance of "a more abstract understanding of state authority" that seems to run parallel with Skinner's own following claims for the examined period. See (1989b), pp. 124-126, (2002e), pp. 411-413.

¹¹² See Skinner (1989b), pp. 92-95, (2002e), pp. 370-373.

¹¹³ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 92-93, (2002e), pp. 370-371.

¹¹⁴ See Skinner (1989b), p. 92, (2002e), p. 370.

¹¹⁵ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 92-95, (2002e), pp. 370-373.

¹¹⁶ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 93-94, (2002e), pp. 371-372.

¹¹⁷ See Skinner (1989b), p. 94, (2002e), p. 372.

Campano (: “status reipublicae”) and Filippo Beroaldo and the latter’s treatise *De Optimo Statu*.¹¹⁸ Turning to Northern Europe after these cases, we note Skinner’s once again introductory opening of this part as a whole with the 14th and 15th century French and English monarchy-centred references to the ‘state of the realm’, [iv] with the citations consisting in Froissart (: the king’s decision “to reform the country *en bon état*”) and in a mid-15th century case of English petitioners to their parliament who promised to the king that they prayed “for the good estate and prosperity of your most noble person of this your noble realm” and whose case is said by Skinner to be indicative of the turn of the “idea of linking the good state of a king and his kingdom” into a commonplace by this time.¹¹⁹ Finally, this broad range of references at this part as a whole closes with Skinner’s turn to the examination of the appropriation of the Southern European humanist ‘status reipublicae’ by their early 16th century Northern European counterparts [v], as documented in Erasmus (: “optimus” and “pessimus reipublicae status”, “felicissimus status”), Thomas Starkey (: “the most prosperous and perfect state [...] in any country, city or town”) and Thomas More (: “optimus status reipublicae”).¹²⁰

What is quite interesting from the point of view of our interests is the fact that Skinner also accepts significant shifts in the uses of the ‘status’ and its directly equivalent terms since the period of the early Renaissance.¹²¹ In particular, Skinner accepts the emergence at that time of the ‘status principis’ or ‘status del principe’¹²² [B1] as a “mutation”¹²³ of the two previous senses, since this case is claimed to rest upon the holding on of princes “to their state or standing as effective rulers”.¹²⁴ This category is quite crucial for Skinner’s wider argument, since Skinner identifies a proliferation of meanings for ‘status’ and ‘stato’ in this case, which is said to be suggestive of the gradual extension of what Skinner initially introduces plainly as the sense of the ‘princely condition’ [i] through the provision of the three specific references – coming from the 14th to the early 16th century and seeming to be meant as indicative for the entire period under consideration – of Giovanni Villani (: civic dissensions against “il popolo in suo stato e signoria”), Ranieri Sardo (: “stato e governo” enjoyed by the new “capitano”) and Machiavelli (: “tenere” or “mantenere lo stato”)¹²⁵ to senses which are said to serve as “preconditions of the effective government” of the ‘princely state’.¹²⁶ These ‘preconditional’ cases of new extended senses which

¹¹⁸ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 94-95, (2002e), p. 372.

¹¹⁹ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 92-93, (2002e), pp. 370-371.

¹²⁰ See Skinner (1989b), p. 95, (2002e), p. 373.

¹²¹ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 95-114, (2002e), pp. 373-387.

¹²² See Skinner (1989b), pp. 95-102, (2002e), pp. 373-378.

¹²³ This precise characterization for this sense is inserted in Skinner (2002e), p. 373.

¹²⁴ Skinner (1989b), p. 97, (2002e), p. 374.

¹²⁵ See Skinner (1989b), p. 98, (2002e), p. 374. It is worth noting that as the virtual omnipresence of Machiavelli in the following subdivisions will also suggest, the very fashioning of this entire division in these ‘princely’ terms is strongly shaped on the basis of the authoritative figure of Machiavelli, who has been turned into a major point of reference for Skinner’s project already since (1981).

¹²⁶ See Skinner (1989b), p. 98, (2002e), pp. 374-375.

Skinner accepts for the 'status' seem to be more fittingly divided into four distinct sets which we will successively bring under examination.

Skinner's first two sets of new senses for the 'status' in terms of this kind of 'princely state', i.e. the sense of [ii] the 'prevailing regime', and that of [iii] the 'form of government', are not quite clearly distinct from each other, since Skinner presents them as a single "precondition", more clearly introduced under the heading of the former sense.¹²⁷ Skinner's specific citations for this former sense of the 'status' as [ii] a 'prevailing regime', which cover a period from the 14th to the early 16th century, consist in Villani (: the government established in Florence by the "parte Nera" as the "stato de' Neri"), Sardo (: the fall of the Nove in Siena as the loss of the "stato de' Nove"), Vespasiano da Bisticci (: the setting up of a new government by the enemies of Cosimo de' Medici as a change of "lo stato") and Francesco Vettori.¹²⁸ Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the specific citations of what counts for Skinner as more distinctively [iii] the sense of the 'form of government' are dated from earlier times, since they start from the Latin translations of Aristotle's types of rule as "stati", which are judged to have had a crucial impact in the popularizing of this sense by Aquinas (: the oligarchy as the "status paucorum" and the rule of the people as the "status popularis"), whereas the subsequent and quite numerous specific citations for this sense consist in Beroaldo (: "status popularis", "status paucorum", "status unius"), Francesco Patrizi of Siena (: different types of regime as different "types of states"), Vespasiano da Bisticci (: contrast of the rule of "signiori" with the "stato popolare"), Francesco Guicciardini, Machiavelli ("stato di pochi", "all the *stati*, all the dominions [...] either have been or are republics or principalities") and Vettori.¹²⁹

The next new sense in terms of the 'princely state' concerns what Skinner itemized as [iv] the sense of the 'territory' or of the area of the prince's control. The citations of specific Italian instances for this case consist in the *Oculus Pastoralis* (: the magistrates caring for the welfare of their cities as maintaining "suos status"), the authors of the *Gratulatio* to the people of Padua (: praying for the tranquility of the whole "status"), the verses accompanying the frescoes of Ambrogio Lorenzetti (: how the "signiori" should act "per governar suo stato"), Sardo (: truce extended throughout the "stato"), Guicciardini (: the forfeiture of one's all lands as the loss of the "stato") and Machiavelli (: the princes' losses and the acquisitions of new "stati"), whereas Skinner also accepts that this sense was expanded to the 16th century Northern Europe as well, citing in defense of his claim Guillaume Budé (: the range of the "pays" of August as the extent of his "estat"), Starkey (: the establishment of a Council in England in order "to represent the whole state") and Lawrence Humfrey (: a ruler's vices can spread "into the whole state").¹³⁰

¹²⁷ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 98-99, (2002e), pp. 375-376.

¹²⁸ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 98-99, (2002e), pp. 375-376.

¹²⁹ See Skinner (1978b), p. 353, (1989b), pp. 98-99, (2002e), pp. 375-376.

¹³⁰ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 100-101, (2002e), pp. 376-377. It is worth noting that Skinner's designation of this division, in terms of 'territory' must have been probably shaped on the basis of Weber's best-known definitions of the 'State', since all the other subdivisions of this

The final set that Skinner seems to have accepted as a new ‘preconditional’ sense for the ‘princely condition’ was the perception of the ‘State’ as [v] the ‘coercive institutions of government’. Skinner seems to have implied for this sense that it is an extension of the ‘prevailing regime’ sense, since he claimed that, in relation to the latter sense, this set of uses referred “more specifically, to the institutions of government and the means of coercive control that serve to preserve order within political communities”, with the specific citations for the case being comprised of Vespasiano da Bisticci (: conducting oneself in the government of the “stato”, holding power over “uno stato”), Guicciardini (: losing control of the “stato”, holding on over the “stato”), Baldassare Castiglione and Machiavelli (: “cose di stato”, abstract writing on statecraft as “dello stato”).¹³¹

Even though Skinner apparently, and in terms quite fitting to his overall scheme, lays strong emphasis on the category covered by the aforementioned senses which are said to be drawn from the ‘princely condition’ as the decisive meeting point of the two older senses of the ‘status’,¹³² quite interestingly he also

set are also designated in terms of quite characteristic 20th century connotations of the ‘State’, In particular, in the Preface of the *Foundations* Skinner cited an abbreviated version of what he took to be Weber’s “famous definition” of the State in the first volume of the English translation of the times of the *Economy and Society* writings, according to which Weber was said to have provided a conceptualization of the State “in distinctively modern terms” as “the sole force of law and legitimate force within its own territory, and as the sole appropriate object of its citizens’ allegiances” (Skinner 1978a, p. x). Skinner’s selection of the features that are mentioned in this summary of Weber’s relevant paragraph in *Economy and Society*, including the frequently downplayed ‘territory’, are apparently affected from Weber’s simplified definition of the State in his famous guest-lecture addressed to university student activists in München in January 1919 in the midst of the experimentations of the times of the so-called German Revolution, where we read that “nowadays, by contrast [to past experience], we have to say that a state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of *legitimate physical violence* within a certain territory, this ‘territory’ being another of the defining characteristics of the state” (Weber 1994, pp. 310-311); thanks to its brevity, the first part of this passage had already made its way into an immense number of textbooks used in a wide range of academic curricula offered in the times when Skinner brought forward his relevant claims.

¹³¹ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 101-102, (2002e), pp. 377-378. Skinner’s emphasis on coercion, its means and its final aim in the preservation of order at this point seem to reflect another well-known feature of Weber’s aforementioned view of the state as well as possibly an interest of Skinner to fashion this division in terms responding to the much-propagated division back in those years between ‘coercive’ and ‘ideological apparatuses’ of the State as well as to the popularity that relevant intra-Marxist debates on the nature of the elites comprising the state and state power enjoyed back in those years (see Giddens 1986, pp. 73-79), as one may also infer out of Skinner’s following references to the preceding cases of uses of the ‘State’ in terms that denote an “apparatus of government” and a “power structure [which] is not in fact viewed as independent of those who have charge of it”. See (1989b), pp. 102-103, and cf. Skinner’s change of terms at this point to “apparatus of power” in (2002e), p. 379; also cf. Skinner’s retrospective depiction of his relations to Marxism in (2002h), pp. 219-221 and (2016b), pp. 126-127.

¹³² To expand on this point, Skinner’s intended emphasis on the category of the ‘princely condition’ can be seen from the fact that in (1989b), pp. 102-104, its theoretical conclusion in relation to Skinner’s overall scheme for the move from the personal and charismatic to the impersonal and abstract senses for the ‘State’ is used as an introductory session to the next chapter, in which Skinner is about to analyze its rival tradition. In particular, the extent of the significance of the ‘princely’ category can be seen from Skinner’s tone in the final paragraph of this unit: “I conclude that, for all the importance of the writers I have been considering [...] in all the discussions about the state and government of princes in the first

demarcates for approximately the same period of time a distinct range of relevant meanings used by a “tradition” or “strand of thought” explicitly described as being “in contestation with the theory of princely government throughout the era of the Renaissance in Italy and beyond”.¹³³ This is in no other than [B2] the group of authors identified as expressing the ‘republicanism’ of the Renaissance and of the immediately following times,¹³⁴ for whose case Skinner accepts a range of distinctive relations with the ‘state’ which we will bring under examination in the following paragraphs.

In the first place, Skinner goes at lengths throughout his examination of this set in order to provide evidence suggesting that the senses of the ‘status’ that we have already encountered as versions of the ‘princely condition’ were covered by the authors of this group through the use of other terms on the basis of the ‘respublica’, such as ‘universitas’, ‘civic power’ or ‘civium libertas’.¹³⁵ As far as the isolation of more specific relevant citations is concerned, these are found in a paragraph in the original version of Skinner’s article under examination that referred to the origins of the independent ‘civil’ and ‘political’ authority of the Italian cities and which was omitted from the late version. The citations consisted in the 13th century authors Viterbo (: ‘civic power’, ‘civium libertas’) and Latini, who are treated by Skinner as setting up a “tradition” that would be later found in Locke’s ‘civil government’ as well.¹³⁶ Moreover, in both versions of his article Skinner would also note two late Renaissance cases of authors writing in Latin (Alamano Rinuccini, Gasparo Contarini) where ‘republic’ is still used for senses of the examined kind that had been already covered by the rather vernacular ‘stato’¹³⁷ and, finally, in a passage at the end of this unit that appears only in the early version, Skinner concludes that Milton, James Harrington and other 17th

half of the sixteenth century, there will be found scarcely any instance in which the *état*, *staat* or state in question is unequivocally separated from the status or standing of the prince himself”. (1989b), p. 104. In the respective part of (2002e), pp. 378-379, even though the same unit is placed in an abbreviated and quite less imposing form in the more appropriate placing at the end of the chapter to which it logically belongs, Skinner introduces the theoretical importance of the rival tradition by placing it as the second one of the “two overlapping strands of constitutionalist theory that likewise rose to prominence in the course of the *fifteenth and sixteenth centuries*” (added emphasis), with the first strand being the one centring upon the so-called ‘monarchomachs’, who actually emerged at the end of the 16th century. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that in the (2002e) version of the article, Skinner omitted the political-historical unit of (1989b), pp. 96-97, in which he had introduced the background importance of the Italian cities and which was more extensively taken into consideration in the *Foundations*, which consisted in the fact that since the early 12th century these cities “succeeded in acquiring for themselves the status of autonomous and self-governing republics”, giving thus rise initially to the literary genre of the treatises for city-magistrates, whereas the rule of the “signori” and the setting up of hereditary princes are acknowledged to emerge in the following centuries, giving thus rise to an interest for a mirror-for-princes literature. Hence, one may reasonably infer that Skinner’s predisposition seems to have consisted in the downplaying of this “rival tradition” vis-à-vis the ‘princely state’, as the substantial analysis that follows will also suggest.

¹³³ Skinner (2002e), p. 379 and cf. (1989b), p. 104.

¹³⁴ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 104-114, (2002e), pp. 379-387.

¹³⁵ For Skinner’s presentation of the deployment of these themes by several ‘republican’ authors see (1989b), pp. 104-105, 107, (2002e), pp. 379-380, 381-382.

¹³⁶ See Skinner (1989b), p. 107.

¹³⁷ See Skinner (1989b), p. 109 and (2002e), p. 383.

century English authors with strong allegiances to this ‘republican’ tradition “hardly ever use the term ‘state’” and “almost always prefer the term ‘commonwealth’” for the cases under examination instead.¹³⁸

Nonetheless and in spite of this setting, Skinner also acknowledges a rather limited extent of uses of the actual term ‘status’ or ‘stato’ for this set in the same unit. Skinner’s argument at this point is unfolded in two successive steps. The first step, which seems to be the one on which Skinner’s argument relies as a whole is the attribution to the ‘republicans’ of the insertion of the idea that [i] a ‘free state’, meaning a state that has ‘libertas’ against external interferences, can be achieved only under the internal condition of a republic.¹³⁹ The positioning of the ‘free state’ as a whole vis-a-vis ‘republicanism’ in such terms is quite obscure at this point, since the former, in case it is seen by itself, seems to be a wider category than the latter, with the ‘republicanism’ being reserved as only one of its versions. However, Skinner seems to be interested to insert the ‘free state’ only in the course of his account of ‘republicanism’ and without any other apparent associations with the other earlier or contemporary employments of the ‘state’. Furthermore, Skinner’s citations of specific authors with actual uses are again relatively obscure, since the idea is said to be present as an “underlying assumption” in Dante, Ceffi and Villani, whereas more specific citations of the ‘free states’ in this respect are provided in the 16th century cases of Machiavelli and Contarini. Finally, it is also worth pointing out that the citation provided by Skinner for the last author, Contarini (: the Venetian elective system of government maintains “a mixture of the status of the nobility and of the people”) seems to be leaning to form a wholly distinct sense of the ‘status’ vis-à-vis the two steps of this ‘republican’ conception that we are discussing, which seems to be that of [iii] the ‘status’ of each one of the two main groups within the city instead of expressing the system of government as a whole.¹⁴⁰

In all cases, Skinner’s presentation ends up stressing as the second step in his account of the ‘republican’ uses of the ‘status’ what he takes to be the most distinctive innovation of this strand concerning the senses of the ‘status’ in terms of his overall scheme, which has to do with [ii] its being used in order to introduce the idea of a structure of law and institutions that is taken to be independent of the rulers.¹⁴¹ It is worth pointing out that Skinner introduces this sense once again as rather derivative or at least as second-hand when compared to that of the ‘princely condition’. In these respects, Skinner states that

¹³⁸ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 113-114. A quite similar kind of predisposition of seeing other terms as acting in place of what one could count as standing for ‘the State’ according to the previous division and its most straightforward successors to be analyzed in what follows seems also to be quite present in (2018e), where Skinner goes at lengths in order to claim crucial precedents of Hobbes’ theory of state sovereignty in the direction of a broadly conceived ‘humanist’ culture, said to be originating in Cicero and other Roman masters of rhetoric and clearly available in the mid-17th century, that gradually elaborated a theory of representation of the “civitas”, which Skinner constantly transcribes as meaning the ‘state’. However, it should be noted the only clear citation of an author that does use the very term ‘State’ in this account is Hobbes himself.

¹³⁹ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 105-107, (2002e), pp. 380-381.

¹⁴⁰ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 105-107, (2002e), pp. 380-381.

¹⁴¹ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 107-114, (2002e), pp. 382-387.

[t]he republican theorists no longer equate the idea of governmental authority with the powers of particular rulers or magistrates. Rather they think of the powers of civil government as embodied in a structure of laws and institutions which our rulers and magistrates are entrusted to administer in the name of the common good. They cease in consequence to speak of rulers 'maintaining their state' in the sense of preserving their personal ascendancy over the apparatus of government. Rather they speak of the status or stato as the name of that apparatus of government which our rulers may be said to have a duty to maintain.¹⁴²

Nonetheless, Skinner's specific citations start from the 13th century and consist in Latini (: maintaining the city's elected officials in a good 'estat' and maintaining "the estat of the city itself"), Giovanni da Vignano (: government of cities as their 'stato'), Matteo de' Libri (: "our good stato [...] to remain in peace"), Francesco Patrizi (: how magistrates must act if they are to prevent the "status" from being overturned), Guicciardini (: advisers loyal to the "stato"; "every stato, every sovereign power, needs dependents" who are willing "to serve the stato and benefit it in everything") and Machiavelli (: to establish "uno stato"; "the order of the government or, rather, of lo stato") for the Italian cities, whereas they also extend to the later English cases of Starkey (distinction between the 'state' itself and "they which have authority and rule of the state", the "office and duty" of rulers is to "maintain the state established in the country", rulers and ruled alike are "under the same governance and state"), John Ponet (: the duty of rulers is that of upholding the state, the "government of any state", "see the hole state well governed"), Lewes Lewkenor, who translated Contarini in English (the "state" is occasionally used as a translation of the "respublica" instead of the most frequent "commonwealth") and Milton (call for the people's sovereignty to be 'delegated only, and as it were deposited' with a governing Council of State).¹⁴³

Turning to an examination of a few critical points for this part of Skinner's work, the most obvious clue for a questioning of Skinner's account has to do with the existence of several overlaps in the references used in the different divisions Skinner drew for this period. In particular and bringing together our evidence from Skinner's particular divisions, one may quite easily notice that, aside from the more complicated case of the two citations from the *Digest*, Froissart appears in both A1 and A2; Aquinas appears both in A2 and as a seeming precursor of

¹⁴² Skinner (1989b), p. 108; the passage is kept intact in (2002e), p. 382 except for a minor change of words in the final sentence to a more categorical tone (: [...] which our rulers have a duty to maintain and preserve).

¹⁴³ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 107-114, (2002e), pp. 382-387. Furthermore, another interesting feature that one could parenthetically highlight out of this unit has to do with the fact that Skinner removed from the late version of the article two overt references to conservatism that were introduced as opposed to the 'republican' strand under examination; the first of these references consisted in a citation of Burke (: "society is indeed a contract", but "the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement") and the second one talked of "the concept [of the state] we have inherited from the more conservative mainstream of early-modern political thought" in contrast to a later "recognizable concept of the state [...] that many Marxists and exponents of direct democracy continue to espouse". See (1989b), pp. 112-113 and for the second case cf. (2002e), p. 386, where the former concept of the state has been transformed into "the mainstream theory of the modern state".

the extensions of B1; Machiavelli is cited both in B1 and B2, whereas Starkey, is simultaneously cited in A2, B1 and B2. This state of affairs seems to suggest the existence of several instances in which a single author is said to have used one and the same term in order to express what Skinner has accepted as clearly different and even antithetical senses. This being the case, the interpretative value of the underlying logic of Skinner's different categorizations seems to be questionable, up to a certain extent at least.

In fact, a further logical testing of Skinner's divisions can suggest the need for a few modifications. Skinner's emphasis in A1 on the 'royalist state' sense as the one that sets the tone for the entire division seems to be unjustified, since a more rigid chronological and logical ordering of the citations provided indicates that the cases of the simpler individualistic sense significantly precede those of the royalist one, which seem to be introduced rather as one particular version of the individual 'status' that fitted the monarchical settings of France and England since the 14th century. Seen from this point of view, Skinner's claim that the 'princely state' was introduced as a mutation of the individualist qua royalist 'status' with the 'status civitatis' seems to be logically unstable since Skinner's citations of certain versions of what he accepted as the 'princely state' sense in Italy start from the 13th century, whereas even in the greatest frequency of uses recorded for the 'princely state' sense that appear since the 14th century there seems to be no apparent influence from the specifically 'royal state' cases recorded for France and England for the same time. Turning to A2, Skinner's introductory emphasis to the 'status regnum' as relatively equivalent with the 'status civitatis' and the 'status reipublicae' can be logically questioned on similar grounds to those of the royalist vis-à-vis the individual 'status', whereas one could even press the differences in the subsets and the distinctive uses of 'status civitatis', 'status communis' and 'status reipublicae' that actually appear in each one of them on seemingly exclusive grounds. Moreover, both the earliest Roman and the medieval citations of A2 actually precede those of the respective periods of A1, raising thus strong doubts on the downplaying of A2 vis-à-vis A1. Strong logical and chronological *aporiae* emerge in Skinner's B1 category as well. The citations in some of the "extended versions" precede those of the *stricto sensu* 'princely condition' cases and do not always vindicate a direct devolvement from the possession of the ruler's state, as one can tell from the fact that several cited instances talk about "the state" instead of "someone's state". This is especially the case with the cited instances of the 'form of government' and 'territory' senses, which are the ones with citations that start from the 13th century, i.e. before the typical 'princely condition' senses. As for the internal ordering of Skinner's claimed subdivisions for this sense, the instances suggest that the 'form of government' sense should precede the 'prevailing regime' sense, which in turn should have been followed by the 'coercive institutions of government' sense. However, it is worth pointing out that in the first two subsets almost all the citations that are not impersonal ascribe the 'status' to parties or major groups within the city and thus seem to be quite more collectivist than a simple devolvement from a (questionably) prior 'princely state' would imply. Finally, in

the rival B2 division we note once again the chronological primacy of this category's earliest citations vis-à-vis those of B1, which suggests the logical inadequacy of the former's downplaying against the latter.¹⁴⁴ As for Skinner's subdivisions of these claimed 'republican' senses of the 'state', the final emphasis on the idea of a ruler-independent structure of law and institutions seems to approximate the subdivision of the 'form of government' and 'coercive institutions of government' senses, whereas the 'partisan' [B2-iii] case that we have previously singled out in this set seems to be similar to the respective instances found in the 'form of government' and the 'prevailing regime' senses.

Moving to the gaps that one could bring up for this part of Skinner's account, we could seek further assistance for the resolution of the *aporiae* we have identified in Skinner's scheme through a consideration of the relevant terms found in the ancient Greek literature. Even though Skinner has made important use of his meritorious knowledge of Latin in order to shed light on neglected voices from the Roman times and the early Renaissance, a turn to the Ancient Greek *kosmos*, the highly revered archetype for the entirety of Rome's cultural and intellectual life as well as for the furthest-reaching scholars of the Renaissance, could have allowed him to cross-reference the origins and consequently the further development of the various later senses of the 'status' that he has identified in the light of much earlier and quite extensive literary evidence. In what follows, the author has principally drawn on the documentation of the instances and citations of the associated terms that appear in the authoritative Liddell-Scott-Jones English lexicon of ancient Greek,¹⁴⁵ which he has tried to arrange in terms of what seems to be a more fitting chronological and logical ordering of the different recorded senses for each term, whereas the citations of concrete sources provided in the following paragraphs and their footnotes are restricted to the most recognizable Greek voices and to the cases of primary interest for our purposes. In these respects, we will first examine the basic Greek etymological and semantic correspondences for the 'status', which are 'stasis' and 'kratos' respectively, and then we will consider the extent to which similar observations can be brought up through an examination of 'politeia' and 'politeuma', two terms whose common etymological nucleus has served as the main source for the subsequent formation in the Latin-based languages of the directly relevant vocabulary produced out of 'res publica', 'civitas' and 'politics'.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Skinner's practical disappearance of the A1 and B1 equivalents as well as of most of their successors in his attempt of grounding Hobbes' theory of state sovereignty to the broadly conceived 'humanist' culture in (2018e).

¹⁴⁵ See Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011).

¹⁴⁶ We should add at this point that the extent of this research is far from substituting for more comprehensive treatments of the histories of these terms; especially for acknowledged further research involving the last two terms under discussion in the following paragraphs see Meier (1990), Palonen (2014a) and Cartledge (2009), chap. 2.

As far as 'stasis' is concerned,¹⁴⁷ a proper chronological and logical arrangement of its recorded instances suggests that the senses of the 'status' cited by Skinner for the Roman times were neither the earliest nor the most common ones in the ancient Greek sources. In fact, in the 6th century BCE 'stasis' seems to have had originally a rather warlike sense, since the earliest instances from that time, whose record starts from the fragments attributed to the early 6th century BCE Athenian lawgiver Solon and from those attributed to Nietzsche's favourite late 6th century oligarchic poet Theognis from the Athens' neighbouring town of Megara, and which seem to have evolved into a quite frequent set of uses throughout the 5th and 4th century BCE, had to do with the signification of 'bands of people in joint action', mainly for seditious purposes, as well as with the signification of discord between groups in general,¹⁴⁸ as was also the specific case with Aristotle's well-known account of the reasons of 'staseis' in the *poleis* on the basis of the different forms of government that prevail each time and his relevant preventive advice, all of which have been misleadingly conceived of as his theory of 'revolutions'.¹⁴⁹ This belligerent origin of 'stasis' and its need for an active assumption of a specific standing of the persons involved seems to have served as a background for another set of common uses of 'stasis', basically appearing in medical writings and sources from the times of the Athenian democracy in the 5th century BCE up until the Roman times, that referred to the particular 'standing of the body' as well as to the isolation of the notions of 'stationariness', which is recorded exclusively in medical writings and in the cases of the most theoretical voices, such as Plato, Aristotle and Aristotle's direct successor in the Lyceum Theophrastus, and of the 'overall attitude' that characterizes a body or an individual person, whereas the Liddell-Scott-Jones record of this overall set of senses extends until Roman times and authors, including the instances of Cicero and Hermogenianus as well.¹⁵⁰ Nonetheless, the cases of our interest, also appearing during the same times as the latter set, though in fewer and logically derivative cases, are the ones in which 'stasis' meant the 'setting up' of a physical or, more generally, of any kind of object within a more general framework.¹⁵¹ This case seems to have paved the way for the later uses of 'stasis' in the *Septuagint* and elsewhere in the senses of the 'standing stone' or 'pillar', of the 'building' and, quite importantly, of the sense of the 'legal decree'.¹⁵² In these respects, the most plausible logical inference seems to be that the early instances from the Roman classics that Skinner cites for his initial collectivist use seem to be a further development of the sets of cases signifying the particular 'placement'

¹⁴⁷ See entry «στάσις» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1634. The author owes his sensitivity on the relevance of 'stasis' in these respects to Prof. Bassakos' (2010) discussion of Cicero's theory of 'status'.

¹⁴⁸ See the divisions B.II., B.III. in the entry «στάσις» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1634.

¹⁴⁹ *Politics*, Book V; the actual mentioning of 'stasis' in IV.1296a8.

¹⁵⁰ See the divisions B.I.1., B.I.2.a, d.-e., B.I.3-4. in the entry «στάσις» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1634. One should probably also include within the range of this set the indirectly-preserved creed of rhetorical 'staseis' of the long-forgotten 1st century BCE Hermagoras of Temnos, which has had a quite seeming impact on such minds as those of Cicero and Ulpian.

¹⁵¹ See the divisions A.I.1., A.II., B.I.2.b.-c., B.I.4. in the entry «στάσις» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1634.

¹⁵² See the divisions A.I.2-3, B.V. in the entry «στάσις» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1634.

of the ancient Greek individual person, possibly affected from the cases of the 'setting up' of objects in terms of their more general surroundings, which are apparently the decisive ones for the formation of Skinner's initial legal uses in the *Digest* in both his collectivist and individualist categories.

The case is quite different with 'kratos',¹⁵³ which has been recorded already since the earlier times of Homeric poetry and whose warfare background seems to be rather the opposite one vis-à-vis 'stasis'. In particular, 'kratos' initially referred to 'victory' in battles or in sports, to 'physical force' in general, as well as to 'force' and 'might' in an even more general sense, including in the latter case Aeschylus' renowned personifications of 'Kratos' as 'Might' or 'Force' next to 'Dikē' [Justice] and next to 'Via' [Violence] in *Choēphoroi* (244) and *Prometheus Bound* (1-86) respectively.¹⁵⁴ In the 5th century BCE democratic Athens we also find 'kratos' referring to the 'established power' upon other persons or upon a community as a whole,¹⁵⁵ approximating thus Skinner's early Roman 'status reipublicae' instances. However, the fact that the etymological associate of 'stasis' was the one to be adopted in the Roman contexts as 'status' instead of a derivative from 'kratos', which has persisted for the relevant senses in Greek up to present, seems to have owed something to Rome's self-perception in using 'second-order' terms for the designation of the collective state (and the later legal uses until which Skinner's research reached) as something that is (or ideally should be regarded as if it were) 'already found in place' instead of its more active formation implied by the early origins of 'kratos'.

'Politeia'¹⁵⁶ is recorded since the mid-5th century BCE democratic Athens and its primary chronological and logically ordered sense, with the earliest recorded instance being probably found in Herodotus (9.34), referred to the acknowledgement of the property of being a citizen, and thus of being able to take part in the decision-making of the *polis*.¹⁵⁷ This sense seems to have evolved in two ways, with the earliest and most frequent one referring to the 'established exercise of the decision-making power' by a specific empowered person or by the citizens' body as a whole,¹⁵⁸ and with the other one referring to a citizen's everyday life in general and then even more generally to a person's conduct towards the others,¹⁵⁹ which is also the sense towards which 'politeia' is meant to be intimating in the illustrious Platonic dialogue that bears the very title *Politeia* and that has been unfortunately translated in terms of *The Republic* in the Latin-based languages, since right before the greatest part of the work concentrates on the features of the ideal and gradually of the degenerate forms of government (the dialogue's 'politeiai'), Socrates is brought to be concluding right after the

¹⁵³ See entry «κράτος» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 992. It should be noted that 'kratos' is also found as 'kartos' or 'kretos' in Greek dialects other than the retrospective canon set for ancient Greek on the basis of the Attican dialect.

¹⁵⁴ See the divisions I., II.1. and III. in the entry «κράτος» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 992.

¹⁵⁵ See the division II. in the entry «κράτος» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 992.

¹⁵⁶ See entry «πολιτεία» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁵⁷ See the division I.1. in the entry «πολιτεία» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁵⁸ See the divisions I.3., II. in the entry «πολιτεία» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁵⁹ See the division I.2. in the entry «πολιτεία» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

interlocutors' opening search of a proper understanding of justice that the latter should be viewed as a personal property of the *psychē* and to claim that he will principally turn to a discussion of justice in the *polis* in the sort of a form of government due to the convenience that this case allows for seeing justice writ large (368d-369b3).

On the other hand, 'politeuma',¹⁶⁰ which is recorded since the early 4th century BCE, is a term quite close to 'politeia', though usually employed for the more abstract senses, since its initial sense referred to the entirety of the 'acts of government'¹⁶¹ and seemingly evolved into the sense of the 'constitution of government' and that of the more particular 'form of government', including a case in which 'politeuma' signifies what would be in more recent terms the distinctively 'republican form of government'¹⁶² - 'politeuma' shares all these senses with 'politeia' throughout the same period¹⁶³ - , whereas a more limited extension of 'politeuma' to the senses of the 'body of citizens' as a whole or of more particular collectivities has been recorded as well.¹⁶⁴

The preceding examination of this last set of closely related terms allows us to end up this visit to ancient Greece by drawing up a more general conclusion towards which we have already hinted in the cases of 'stasis' and 'kratos'. More specifically, even though 'politeia' and 'politeuma' do not seem to be as directly associated with the 'status' as 'stasis' and 'kratos' are, at least when considered from the retrospective Latin-based etymological point of view, the general picture that one may reasonably infer out of the examination of these cases and from their gradual affinity to some senses later assumed by 'status' and 'stato' in what Skinner accepted as the 'princely condition' context is that Skinner's sharp distinction of his two original meanings of the 'status', i.e. the individualistic-royalist and the collectivist one, as well as his detrimental emphasis on the individualistic and princely senses against the collectivist ones should be definitely revised towards a more 'middling' direction that would conceive of the relevant conduct of individual persons within the bounds set by the collectivities they are engaged in, as we have noticed that the case has been with 'stasis' and 'kratos'.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁰ See entry «πολιτεύμα» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁶¹ See the division I. in the entry «πολιτεύμα» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁶² See the divisions II.-III. in the entry «πολιτεύμα» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁶³ For these last two senses of 'politeia', which are apparently extensions of the 'established exercise of power' sense, see the division III. in the entry «πολιτεία» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁶⁴ See the division IV. in the entry «πολιτεύμα» in Liddell, Scott & Jones (2011), p. 1434.

¹⁶⁵ In all fairness, Skinner's late designation of the broad 'humanist' culture as a quite encompassing interpretative framework for Hobbes and the latter's understanding of the State seems to be pointing towards a similar direction.

3. The 'State', late 16th & 17th century

The examination of Skinner's treatment of the next period that one could isolate out of his relevant work yields a number of features of a similarly considerable interest to that of the previously examined case.¹⁶⁶ In particular, in his early works, Skinner begins with a subdivision [A] that seems to succeed the last set that we identified for the previous period, i.e. the 'republican' one, and which initially grouped together a wide range of authors from quite diverse backgrounds that can be more conveniently divided into three different groups. The first of these groups [i] is comprised of the so-called French, Scottish and Dutch 'monarchomachs' and some quite closely related Catholic antiroyalists in France and England in the late 16th and early 17th century.¹⁶⁷ As far as the 'monarchomach' authors of this set are concerned, Skinner, being wholly aware of the difficulties involved in the identification of authors with this relatively retrospective and initially abusive label, brings up in these parts of his work the writings of the French Calvinists since the 1570s, citing more specifically the most influential treatise of the kind *Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos*, most probably authored by Hubert Languet and Philippe du Plessis Mornay, the anonymous treatise *Reveille-matin des François* and François Hotman, as well as the early 17th century political treatises in the Low Countries of Johannes Althusius and Johann Werdenhagen.¹⁶⁸ As for the Catholic opposition to the French and to the English crown during the 1580s and the 1590s, Skinner cites respectively in the revised version of his early article Jean Boucher, who drew substantial parts of his claims from the *Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos*, and the English Jesuit Robert Persons, using the term 'monarchomach' again for both cases,¹⁶⁹ bringing also up in the same text the case of the Scot George Buchanan as stated in his 1579 tract, who was actually the main polemical target, along with the aforementioned French Calvinists, of William Barclay's coinage of the term 'monarchomach' in 1600.¹⁷⁰ The second group of this division [ii] has to do with a set of late English 'politic humanists' that was omitted from late versions and articles. The case consisted in a set of late 16th and early 17th century English writers designated more precisely by Skinner as "'politic' humanists who were critical of classical republicanism" and more clearly comprised of the instances of Francis Bacon (: [1625] rulers and their councillors have a duty to consider "the weal and advancement of the state which they serve", distinctions between the state and its rulers and between the state and its subjects; references to the "founders of states" and to the "subversion of states and governments") and Walter Raleigh's *Maxims of State* (: [1661] the "common-

¹⁶⁶ Skinner's relevant treatment of this period can be found in (1989), pp. 114-116, (2002e), pp. 387-394, (1998), pp. ix-99, (2009), pp. 332-340, (2010), pp. 30-33, (2018d), pp. 341-353.

¹⁶⁷ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 114-116, (2002e), pp. 387-394, 396-397.

¹⁶⁸ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 114-116, (2002e), pp. 387-394; Skinner's interest in most of these 'monarchomach' authors dates from (1978b), pp. 239-348.

¹⁶⁹ See Skinner (2002e), pp. 388-389.

¹⁷⁰ See Skinner (2002e), pp. 396-397.

wealth" had come to be used "by an usurped nickname" to refer to "the government of the whole multitude"; the 'state' as "the frame or set order of a commonwealth").¹⁷¹ As for the third and final group of this division [iii], this is comprised of a few English parliamentarians of the early times of the English civil wars, in which, in spite of the bringing up of other sources throughout his different works, Skinner reserves the role of the protagonist for Henry Parker and his popular writings of the 1640s in favour of the parliamentary cause.¹⁷²

Taken as a whole, Skinner's treatment of this entire division displays a great number of shifting and thus quite hard choices. In the first place, this complicated landscape of different authors generated apparent difficulties to Skinner's concern to treat all these authors in rather unifying terms, as one can tell from his initial attempts to group them under the overarching names of the 'monarchomachs' and the 'contractarians', since in his initial article Skinner described this set as "'monarchomachs' and other contractarian opponents of early absolutism" and extended its range of references from Marsilius of Padua to Locke,¹⁷³ whereas in the revised version of the article he describes the same set as "the contractarian theory associated with the so-called 'monarchomach' or king-killing writers".¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, this unifying intention of Skinner becomes obvious as soon as one turns to the fact that all of these authors will still be grouped together in Skinner's later writings, along with the 'republicans' this time, under the more encompassing naming of the 'neo-Romans',¹⁷⁵ the insertion of which was clearly meant to serve as a substitute of the 'republican' division that would be able to encompass the aforementioned and distinctively non-republican authors of the post-Renaissance times.¹⁷⁶ Nonetheless, a more important point in terms of our topic has to do with the fact that, in line with his views on the 'republican' authors, Skinner accepts that the authors of this category display limited uses of the 'State', in which the term is used in order to

¹⁷¹ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 119-121. This set, whose cited uses of the 'state' are in fact closer to Skinner's argument for the absolutist case, was omitted from the revised version of the text, whereas the only case where Skinner returns to such "'politic' humanists" in his examined works consists in a short reference to Richard Beacon and Francis Bacon in (1998), pp. 11-12.

¹⁷² Skinner's first bringing up of Parker appears in (1998), pp. 1-2, whereas Parker also appears in (2002e), pp. 393, 397.

¹⁷³ See Skinner (1989), p. 114.

¹⁷⁴ Skinner (2002e), p. 379.

¹⁷⁵ Skinner's celebrated introduction of the 'neo-Roman' category appears in (1998), pp. ix-99.

¹⁷⁶ For this specific function of the 'neo-Roman' idiom readers can turn to two quite characteristic formulations of Skinner in (1998), p. 11 (: "I have previously spoken not of the neo-roman but the republican theory of liberty. [...] But this usage now seems to me liable to mislead.") and in his reading of Parker's "'monarchomach' claim" in (1998), pp. 21-22 (: "Some commentators have called this line of thought 'republican'. [...] But while Parker is clearly opposed to tyranny, [...] his line of argument [...] is not inherently republican in the sense of embodying a repudiation of the institution of monarchy. Parker himself insists that he is 'zealously addicted to Monarchy'"). Skinner is also quite clear in maintaining this specific point on the original introduction of the 'neo-Roman' idiom in (2017), p. 4. This being so, however, readers of the latter paper are left with *aporiae* on Skinner's subsequent refusal to count Milton as a 'fully-fledged neo-Roman' due to Milton's refusal to equate all kinds of monarchy with tyranny, which is said to be keeping him at the level of a 'monarchomach'. See (2017), pp. 18-20 and the persistence of this claim in (2018c), pp. 158-159.

designate the institutional structure of popular sovereignty, going indeed at lengths in order to highlight the use of terms other than the 'State' by the authors of this group for the institutional structure of government and other relevant notions, such as 'civitas', 'respublica', 'city', 'regnum', 'kingdom' and 'commonwealth', tracing their background to the direction of the Roman and the early Italian contexts brought up for the 'republican' category as well.¹⁷⁷

As for the actual uses of the 'State' in this category in Skinner's early writings, they seem to deserve a closer examination. Skinner originally claimed that "these writers never find themselves tempted to use the terms *status* or state when describing the powers of civil government",¹⁷⁸ whereas in the revised version of his early article Skinner brings up two instances of English authors writing in the vernacular that do use the 'State', i.e. Persons (: the survey of the history of French and English laws of succession as a survey of the practice "of the States of France and England"; decisions made by "the whole State") and Parker (: [1642] "the State hath an Interest Paramount in cases of publique extremity"; in England the Parliament is given ultimate charge of "matters of Law and State").¹⁷⁹ However, it is also worth pointing out that in his treatment of the 17th century English constitutional upheavals Skinner brings up the "neo-roman theory of the free states" as one of the most important aspects - particularly during the Interregnum of 1649-1660, a time when England was proclaimed as a 'Commonwealth and Free State' - of what he regards as the "neo-roman ideology" or "school of thought" of those times and its claimed distinctive conception of liberty, for which case he traces the same Roman and Italian lineages with those associated with the 'republican' authors.¹⁸⁰ Nonetheless, the positioning of the relevant authors brought up in this case as a whole in terms of an explicit support of the cause of the 'free state' as well as vis-à-vis the 'republican' cause remains quite obscure, since Skinner's citations of actual uses of the 'state' and of the more particular 'free state' are still quite minimal, consisting only of Marchamont Nedham (the author of the editorials in the newspaper *Mercurius Politicus* in 1651-2, where it is claimed that the Englishmen living under the new constitution have "settled in a state of freedom" and which were revised and republished by Nedham in 1656 under the title *The Excellency of a Free State*), and Henry Neville (the author of the dialogue *Plato Redivivus*, published in 1681 and directed against the Stuarts, in which the figure of a Noble Venetian claims that the body politic of Venice currently enjoys "the best state of political health" and the figure of an English Gentleman reports that "the English state has lately collapsed"). Furthermore, Skinner also reports on the part-time turn of some authors to a plea for "a genuinely republican settlement" in the midst of Oliver Cromwell's rule in 1656, which caused Nedham's revision of his editorials among other things, whereas, as far as the earlier times of the 1640s are

¹⁷⁷ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 114-116 for the references to the first three of these substitute terms of the 'State' and cf. their omission and the turn to the last three terms in (2002e), pp. 387-394.

¹⁷⁸ See Skinner (1989b), p. 115.

¹⁷⁹ See Skinner (2002e), p. 393.

¹⁸⁰ See Skinner (1998), pp. 1-57.

concerned, Skinner also notes Parker's "detestation of Machiavelli" and his lack of a discussion of a 'free state'.¹⁸¹ In all cases, as far as the uses of the 'State' by such English authors are concerned, in what follows we will notice that in his later works Skinner brings up additional and quite earlier uses of the 'state' and of the 'free state' by authors that fall into this division.

Another important feature for the overall outlook of this broad division that is worth pointing out has to do with the fact that, even though the opposing side of the numerous challengers of popular sovereignty [B] is initially introduced as a reaction to this first rather 'monarchomach' or 'contractarian' category [A],¹⁸² in his late works Skinner quite interestingly shifted the order of emphasis, presenting the authors of the first category as those who react to the others and thus proceed to the "eventual rise of the populist theory of the state" [C].¹⁸³ However, the following closer examination of Skinner's subdivisions of this category, as described in these latest terms, suggests that this downplaying is not necessarily justified when considered in logical and chronological terms.

In particular, Skinner's first subdivision of this set is comprised of authors that he calls 'political anatomists' [C1].¹⁸⁴ The category is mainly comprised of the translations of the much earlier Italian Renaissance and relevant Roman treatises and provides numerous contrasts of monarchies with 'states', 'popular states' or 'free states'. More specifically, Skinner's earliest - and omitted from the abbreviated version of the original article under scrutiny - citation for this category is Contarini's translation by Lewes Lewkenor [1599] (: "the state of Venice"; foreigners may acquire the Venetian citizenship "if they have done the state some notable service"), which is presented as setting up a background for a relevant verse in Shakespeare's *Othello* [written in the early 1600s] (: "I have done the state [of Venice] some service"). Other citations of the set that were omitted from the revised version are Sallust's translation by Thomas Heywood [1608] (: "how our Auncestors managed the state"; "the affaires of the state"), the English translation of Thomas de Fougasses' directly relevant *Generall Historie of the magnificent state of Venice* [1612], as well as the translations of Machiavelli by

¹⁸¹ See Skinner (1998), pp. 13, 15, 23-25, 47.

¹⁸² See Skinner (1989b), pp. 116-121, (2002e), pp. 394-404, (1998), pp. 1-7. For instance, Skinner is quite clear in this precise ordering when he states that he will turn at this point "to a strongly contrasting group of legal and political philosophers who made it their business to address themselves critically to the thesis of popular sovereignty, whether in its republican guise as a claim about 'free states' or in its legal and neoscholastic form as a claim about the inalienable rights of communities, [...] that is, to those theorists whose aspirations included a desire to legitimise the more absolutist forms of government that began to prevail in Western Europe in the early part of the seventeenth century. See (2002e), pp. 394-395; cf. the multiple corrections in the formulations of this same part and Skinner's directly following omission of the characterization 'counter-revolutionary' for these theorists that appeared in (1989b), p. 116.

¹⁸³ On this division as such see Skinner (2009), pp. 332-340, (2010), pp. 30-33, (2018d), pp. 347-353.

¹⁸⁴ It is worth pointing out parenthetically that the very term 'political anatomy' seems to have been coined a little later than Skinner's relevant citations, and more specifically in the times of William Petty and his 1672 *Political Anatomy of Ireland*, and that it was brought up as such in order to serve as a wider theoretical label by Foucault with a different sense prior to it being later seemingly "overdetermined" by Foucault's turn to 'biopolitics' and 'biopower'. See Foucault (1977), pp. 28-31 and cf. Foucault (1978), pp. 135-145, (2008).

Edward Dacres [1636, 1640], which would create further complications to readers due to the complexities we have noted in Machiavelli's uses of the 'stato'. As for Skinner's citations for the division that appear in both versions of the article, they consist in the first complete English translation of Livy by Philemon Holland [1600] (: the expulsion of Rome's kings as a shift from tyranny to a 'free state'), in the multiple English translations of Botero [from 1601 up to Robert Johnson's most extensive translation of 1630, which is the one that Skinner cites] (: Switzerland as "a state popular, and subject to no one Prince"; the constitution of the United Provinces as a 'state' of a similar kind), in Edwin Sandys' own treatise on the comparison of the religious and constitutional arrangements in Europe [1605], seemingly dependent on Botero (: counter-distinction of monarchies and 'states'), and in the translation of a treatise authored by Traiano Boccalini [1626] (: Venice has always been a 'free state').¹⁸⁵ Finally, another feature of this specific subdivision which is worth pointing out is the fact that Skinner uses also this case in order to introduce with discretion and for the first time an earlier terminological precedent for the 'state' in the legislative assemblies of the 'Estates' and in the attribution to their members of a certain 'status' or 'state'.¹⁸⁶

As far as the second subdivision is concerned [C2], this seems to be summarized by Skinner as the gradual emergence of "a more radical line of attack on the absolutist theory of the state".¹⁸⁷ At this point, this subdivision is quite seemingly presented by Skinner as logically and chronologically 'second-hand' in relation to the use of the 'state' and of the 'free state' as a mere opposite to monarchies by the 'political anatomists',¹⁸⁸ whereas the few specific citations of such "more radically anti-absolutist" uses of the 'state' by English parliamentarians in the mid-17th century are said to serve as instances of the introduction of the "broader claim" that original sovereignty in all forms of government, either monarchical or not, always resides in the body of the people. However, it is worth noting that Skinner acknowledges at this point that this view was present since quite earlier times in a minoritarian strand of the scholastic thought, for which case he cites Jacques Almain from the early 16th century, and that it had already been acquired in this form by such 'radical Huguenots' in late 16th century France as Theodore de Bèze and the authors of the *Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos* (readers can notice that Skinner has not used the term 'monarchomach' in this case). As for the actual uses of the 'state' by the 17th century English parliamentarians, Skinner cites a more extensive set of cases drawn from Parker's tracts (: [1640] the union underlying civil government occasionally referred as the 'state'; the three 'States' or 'Estates' in Parliament; [1642] "the whole State of England"; "the whole body of the State"; it is our "national union" that makes us a "whole state"; "Parliament is neither one nor

¹⁸⁵ See Skinner (2009), pp. 332-336, (2010), pp. 31-33, as well as (2018d), pp. 347-350, where these same authors are introduced on the basis of Knollys' 1606 translation of Bodin.

¹⁸⁶ See Skinner (2009), pp. 332-333, (2010), p. 31. Instances of this kind are also brought up in Harding's (1994) research on the concept of the State, which was also meant to cover Skinner's gaps up to a certain extent.

¹⁸⁷ See Skinner (2009), pp. 336-340, (2010), p. 33, (2018d), pp. 150-153.

¹⁸⁸ E.g. Skinner states that "these arguments had the effect of enlarging the case in favour of 'free states'" in (2009), p. 337, (2010), p. 33.

few, it is indeed the State it Self"; the two Houses of Parliament "are to be accounted by the vertue of the representation, as the whole body of the State"; [1644] since Parliament "can have no interests different from the people", it comes to hold "the supreme reason or Judicature of this State", the King as a "servant to the State"), the anonymous 1642 parliamentary tract *The unlimited prerogative of kings subverted* (: difference between the "head of the State" [i.e. the King] and the "whole State"; difference between the "naturall head" and the "civill Head of the state", because it is not true that "if the head of the State be cut off, the State dies", since the body of the people can choose for itself another head of state), and a 1643 tract authored by William Bridge and based on Bèze and *Vindiciae* (: the ruling power was originally possessed by the people, whose community is referred to as a "commonwealth" or as a "state"; "if the State be wronged and oppressed", it can always take back the power it mistakenly assigned to him).¹⁸⁹ Finally and quite interestingly in terms of Skinner's connection with the centrality of the 'free state' thesis for this overall division, readers should pay attention to the fact that not even a single reference to a 'free state' occurs in these numerous citations.

Skinner is also quite analytical when it comes to the opponents of popular sovereignty [B].¹⁹⁰ The presentation of this category is quite complicated since its internal divisions vary in the different texts. In particular, in his early work Skinner introduced the category without any apparent internal subdivisions, aside from a claimed overall differentiation from what is seen at that point as a marginal 'divine-right' form of absolutism (see [B1] below); in passages that were later omitted Skinner characterized this overall set in distinction to the 'divine right' case as the 'natural law theories of absolutism', whereas in the revised version of the same text Skinner seems to have turned into highlighting as the distinctive feature of the set the acceptance by these authors of an original contract or covenant that provided the rulers with their absolute power.¹⁹¹ As for the authors that Skinner includes in this broad category, his initial citations consist in Bodin (: [1576] references to 'ville', 'cité', 'république', ruler who "maintain their 'estats'"; occasional uses of 'estat' as a synonym for 'république'; "l'estat en soi" as the locus of "indivisible and incommunicable sovereignty") – and especially in his first English translation by Richard Knolles (or Knollys) (: [1606] usual translation of the 'république' as the 'commonweale'; frequent translations of 'cité', 'république' and 'estat' as 'state') –, the leading Counter-Reformation theorist Francesco Suárez (: [1612]: references to the 'respublica'), Grotius (references to the 'civitas' and the 'respublica') and Hobbes (: [1642] references to the "city or civil society"; reference to the 'state' in the Preface; [1651] turn towards the 'commonwealth' and the 'state'; gradual leaning towards the

¹⁸⁹ See Skinner (2009), pp. 336-340, (2010), p. 33 and (2018d), pp. 350-353, which includes a few further sources as well.

¹⁹⁰ The sources for the treatment of this set are drawn from Skinner (1989b), pp. 116-121, (2002e), pp. 394-404, (1998), pp. 2-10, (2009), pp. 328-332, 340-348, (2010), pp. 27-30, 34-37, (2018d), pp. 342-345, 353-361.

¹⁹¹ Skinner's move away from the 'natural law' designation for this set must have been probably due to Richard Tuck's (1987) more concrete historical research on the conceptualization of 'natural law' for the period under examination.

'State' and the 'Civill State' in Parts 3 and 4), whereas in the revised version Skinner adds the late 16th century Scottish circle of the anti-monarchomach Pont-a-Mousson writers in France, specifically naming Adam Blackwood (references to the 'respublica' and the 'status') and William Barclay as its leading voices the directly relevant French voice of Pierre Gregoire (references to the 'status'; 'una Respublica seu status') from the same times, , as well as the 17th century English authors John Hayward, Calybutte Downing and Dudley Digges, who would be later split up in terms of Skinner's subdivisions of the absolutist case.¹⁹² This being so, we will successively turn to the analysis of these minimally three identifiably separate strands that Skinner distinguishes in the course of the examined works for this case, noting, however, that, despite their apparent precedents, the first two of the three following subdivisions appear in their most definitive form in Skinner's late works, whereas the authors who are left outside them form a substantial part of Skinner's overall treatment of absolutism throughout his works and thus they can be justifiably viewed as forming at least one additional strand of absolutism, even though, as we will see, in his late works Skinner tried to distance a substantial part of this set from absolutism.

The first of these three strands [B1], originally acknowledged by Skinner explicitly as such only in late French sources, was that of the "shortest way" of the absolutist 'divine right of kings', in which the king is regarded as the 'head of state' that has been directly sanctioned by God, i.e. in quite similar respects to the older royal and princely senses.¹⁹³ To be precise, in a passage that was later omitted Skinner originally insisted that the absolutists examined throughout this overall division should not be conflated with "that form of absolutism of the divine-right theorists who rose to such prominence during the same period", for which case his single citation was drawn at that point from Bossuet in late 17th century, who is seen as echoing Louis XIV and as deliberately obliterating the distinction between the office and the person of the king, claiming for the ruler that "tout l'état est en lui".¹⁹⁴; whereas John Maxwell's case [1644], which is brought up in *Liberty before Liberalism*,¹⁹⁵ definitely reflects the same pattern. The characteristic affinity of this category with the earlier 'royal-majestic' sense of the 'state' can be also verified out of Skinner's inclusion of Bossuet in the latter case that we have already noted in the previous chapter.¹⁹⁶ However, in his late works, Skinner has come to accept the "doctrine of the divine right of kings" as the one of the two "distinct strands of legal and political discourse" that picked up the "absolutist theory of the state" in early 17th century England. In this case, Skinner cites the Roman lawyer John Hayward, who explicitly based his argument on Bodin (: [1603, responding to Persons, who is actually cited as "Parsons"]) it will always be more natural "that one state, bee it great or small, should rather bee

¹⁹² See Skinner (1989b), pp. 116-121, (2002e), pp. 394-404.

¹⁹³ For the citations of this set, unless stated otherwise, see Skinner (2009), pp. 330-332, 340-341, (2010), pp. 29-30, 33.

¹⁹⁴ See Skinner (1989b), p. 118 and cf. (2002e), p. 397

¹⁹⁵ See Skinner (1998), p. 2.

¹⁹⁶ Skinner's bringing up and relative downplaying of the 'divine right' apparently draws from the theologically-drawn Figgis' study *The Divine Right of Kings* (1914), which had been strongly criticized in later times due to its strong dependence on organicist metaphors.

commaunded by one person" as head of state; [1607] "the rights of Sovereignty or of majesty" consist in "an absolute and perpetuall power, to exercise the highest actions and affaires in some certaine state"), James I (: [1605 onwards] kings are endowed by God with absolute authority over their states; the mass of the people who are subject to sovereign power as "the body of the whole State"; the two houses of Parliament as "the representative body of the State"; since all rulers are heads of state, "if the King want, the State wants, and therefore the strengthening of the King is the preservation and the standing of the State"), Robert Filmer (: [c. 1630] the kings as Lord's anointed enjoy supreme and unquestionable power over the body of the commonwealth or state), the Roman lawyer Calybutte Downing (: [1632/1634] the king must be recognized as the "supreme Civil head" over the ecclesiastical no less than "the Civill State"; the "State is so framed" that there is one person with unquestionable authority to govern all the "distinct and settled societies of that State"), and, at a later point, William Ball's reply to Parker (: [1642] God as "the authour of all power"; the king as a true possessor of sovereignty and as head of state holds complete authority to maintain or alter the state).

The second subdivision [B2] is quite shorter than the previous one, since only two authors are cited for its case. This set consists in the appropriation in England of the late Scholastic "quasi-alienation" of the political rights of the *universitas* of the people when submitting to government in terms of what is seen by Skinner at that point as an absolutist theory that accepts an original contract of a pre-existing people with a monarch which, once made, has the effect of turning the latter into an absolute ruler. The citations that support this "strand of legal and political discourse" consist in the Catholic apologist Matthew Kellison (: [1621] a vindication of the independent authority of the Church as "the most eminent state"; as soon as the body of a people "make choice of a King", "the Communitie despoileth it selfe of authority"; the king is then turned into an absolute ruler over the entire body of the state) and John Bramhall's line-by-line critique of Parker (: [1643] "Power is originally inherent in the People"; the "collected Body" that underlies civil government as the essential "Body of the State"; there cannot be "any State in England without the King"; as soon as the people alienate their sovereignty, the ruler becomes absolute head of the "whole Body" of the state).¹⁹⁷ Nonetheless and despite this brevity, this case is in need of a few further remarks that will approximate our subsequent bringing up of 'clues'. In the first place, it is worth noting that the previous English Catholic political author before Kellison and clearly anti-absolutist Robert Persons, whose cited uses of the 'state' we have already brought up, is missing from this point, since he would damage Skinner's interest to present this strand as an 'absolutist' one. Accordingly, the fact that Hayward's 1603 treatise, i.e. the earliest citation in the 'divine right' strand, was directed against Persons (or "Parsons") was omitted in the respective abbreviated version.¹⁹⁸ Finally, one last relevant feature that we should keep in mind is that the identification of this category in terms of a certain

¹⁹⁷ See Skinner (2009), pp. 329, 341, (2010), pp. 29, 34 and cf. (2018d), p. 354.

¹⁹⁸ See Skinner (2010), pp. 29-30.

'absolutism' could be further challenged if one brings to mind Skinner's observation that the early 17th century English Roman lawyers of the previous strand were primarily concerned to counter the English Catholics, including Kellison.¹⁹⁹

In all cases, the most crucial division in Skinner's entire account of the 'State' is the following one, originally a further part of the absolutist or anti-populist category [B3], but later turned into a distinct non-absolutist category [D] called the 'fictional theory of the state' and centred upon Bodin and more principally on Skinner's favourite Hobbes. In this case, the 'state' is acknowledged as an entity independent of both rulers and ruled that becomes the seat of sovereignty, whereas the 'people' is viewed as emerging in the form of a unified entity only thanks to the sovereign state itself. The explicit citations of authors in this division consist in Hobbes' *Elements of Law* (: [1640] no use of the 'state') and principally the extensively discussed *Leviathan* [1651], and Digges, who is presented as writing under the decisive influence of Hobbes' *Elements of Law* (: [1643] an account of how a multitude can institute the kind of civil union that makes "the essence and Being of a State").²⁰⁰ It is worth pointing out that this 'fictional' division is presented by Skinner as emerging in the English civil war context as a sort of a synthetical view that attempted to mediate between the parliamentarians and the older absolutist strands, as was also the case with the same set already in the opening pages of *Liberty before Liberalism*, which mainly focus on Hobbes' theory of state sovereignty as found in his *De Cive* [1642/1651], a book dedicated according to its Preface to "a more curious search into the rights of States, and duties of Subjects" and *Leviathan*, which is, according to its own famous Preface the name of what is called "a commonwealth or state").²⁰¹ Nonetheless, the case of this set is quite more perplexed, since a footnote of the latter work clearly suggests that Hayward had earlier expressed a similar argument (: [1603] the state as a union in which "many doe knit in one power and will"),²⁰² whereas Skinner later accepted for some time that Hobbes "had owed an evident debt to a body of Continental treatises on corporations as *personae fictae*", comprised of Althusius and Werdenhagen among others.²⁰³ More importantly, Bodin, an author whom Hobbes openly admired, should be definitely included in this set, as one can clearly tell from Skinner's account of the former's views on the formation of the people through its subjection to the sovereign, even though this important relation is not stressed in Skinner's latest works.²⁰⁴ Hence, this set is the one that accomplishes the combination of what

¹⁹⁹ See Skinner (2009), p. 331, (2010), p. 30.

²⁰⁰ See Skinner (2009), pp. 341-348, (2010), pp. 34-37.

²⁰¹ See Skinner (1998), pp. 3-10.

²⁰² See Skinner (1998), p. 3.

²⁰³ See Skinner (2009), p. 349; this piece of information was omitted from (2010), p. 38, whereas in (2018e, p. 41) Skinner reached to claim that it was "misleading" of his part "to associate these distinctions of legal personality with Hobbes", since authors of this kind are said to bring forward the legal personality of the people instead of that of the civitas or state.

²⁰⁴ See (2002e), pp. 398-399, (2009), pp. 328-329, (2010), pp. 28-29. Besides, readers should note that in contrast to this case, in the final pages of the *Foundations* Skinner had already emphasized Bodin's importance in quite similar terms as the theoretical introducer of state sovereignty. See (1978b), pp. 355-358.

were explicitly seen by Skinner for a long time as the retrospectively most important innovations of his earlier dualistic sets of strands. As one may already figure out from the analysis up to this point, these cases consisted, on the one hand, in the conception of the state as an entity that is distinct from the ruled but not from the rulers, a feature that was claimed to have started taking shape from the 'princely condition' sense²⁰⁵ and apparently kept developing on the same lines in the absolutist case, and, on the other hand, in the conception of the state as an entity that is distinct from the rulers but not from the ruled, which was said to have been the characteristic feature of the 'republican' and of the other late collectivist strands.²⁰⁶ Consequently, what authors like Bodin and Hobbes accomplished, according to Skinner, was to come up with what Skinner used to designate for a long time as the "recognizably modern concept of the state".²⁰⁷

To complete the presentation of Skinner's account of the absolutist set as a whole, we need to single out two additional features of interest that are found in his late works, in which the division is restricted in the Anglophone case and starts from the late 16th and the early 17th century, i.e. a time that is seen as the "earliest period" of "widespread discussions about the state, statehood and the powers of states" within Anglophone legal and political theory.²⁰⁸ The first of them has to do with the fact that Skinner has been interested to ascribe a wide range of long-term precedents to the case, whose confluence is said to have brought up the development of the absolutist theory of the state. In these respects, Skinner accepts the emergence of the Anglophone absolutist theory of the state as resulting out of three separate strands: i) the scholastic discussions about *summa potestas*, which are more narrowly identified with the basic Counter-Reformation theorists of the so-called Second Scholastic of the late 16th century, i.e. Francisco de Vitoria, Robert Bellarmine, and Suárez, and are thus directly associated by Skinner with his relevant strand of the absolutist contract of the pre-existing people with the king; ii) the late 16th century availability of English

²⁰⁵ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 102-104, (2002e), p. 378.

²⁰⁶ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 108, 112-116, (2002e), pp. 382, 386-387, 393-394.

²⁰⁷ The introduction of this conception under various formulations with minor alterations first appears principally on the basis of Weber's abbreviated definition of the 'State' in (1978a), p. x, which we have already brought up and which reappears in Skinner's concluding (1978b), pp. 352-358, whereas similar views appear in (1989b) and (2002e). Skinner's early nuancing of this conception of the 'state' as the 'modern' one apparently drew from the massively influential 'modernity' and 'modernization' genres of the Anglophone social sciences of the first post-war decades. Following the late relativization of these standpoints, Skinner has been criticized on this point in (2002h), p. 236 and in a 2003 conference dedicated to the *Foundations* by Goldie (2006) and Pocock (2006). Consequently, in his late 'genealogical' writings Skinner seems to have withdrawn from this contention, claiming in a footnote instead that he has hereby corrected his older argument in which he "was still operating with the assumption that there is one distinctive concept of the modern state that historians can hope to uncover", citing only Goldie's criticism on the topic. See (2009), p. 326; this footnote was omitted from (2010), p. 26. This being the case, it seems that it is this background that best explains Skinner's turn to the methodological appeal of 'genealogy' and his limited interest to seek for an informed understanding of the term, rightly emphasized by Lane (2012), instead of turning to a more careful reading of the actual employment of 'genealogy' by Nietzsche or by other figures from the times (at least) of the Peloponnesian sophist Hippias of Elis up to Gilles Deleuze's and Foucault's more recent relevant interests. Cf. Skinner's response to Lane in (2012b), pp. 127-129.

²⁰⁸ See Skinner (2009), pp. 326-327, (2010), p. 27, (2018d), pp. 341-342.

translations of French treatises “on the duties of councillors and other *officiers d'état*”, authored by François de la Noue, Pierre La Place and Jacques Hurault among others, as well as the distinct case of Bodin and his first English translation of 1606; and iii) the early 17th century availability of translations of “Italian manuals on ‘politics’ and reason of state”, for which case Skinner cites at this point only Dacres’ late translations of Machiavelli.²⁰⁹ As for the second relatively new feature, this has to do with Skinner’s acknowledgement that the greatest part of the authors that comprise this set generally opt for other terms instead of the ‘state’ in order to express the relevant senses, accepting more specifically that the ‘realm’ is more common in the cases of James I and Hayward, whereas the ‘nation’ is singled out for the cases of Bodin, Hayward (again), Downing and Ball.²¹⁰ Readers can notice the shift away from Skinner’s bringing up of the terminological relations of ‘city’, ‘republic’ and ‘commonwealth’ with the ‘state’ for the absolutists in his early works that we noted earlier on towards these apparently non-republican terms.²¹¹

Turning to some clues for the period under examination, a good starting point for a critical assessment can be sought in an overall consideration of Skinner’s shifts throughout his works. In the first place, we should emphasize Skinner’s interest to homogenize the category that is associated with popular sovereignty [A] and his late effort to present it as the one that is responding to the absolutists, turning it thus according to our terms from A to C.²¹² These shifts indicate Skinner’s predisposition to treat the wide range of the authors of this set and their uses of the ‘state’ in a way that is similar to the one that he reserved for the earlier collectivist strands, and especially for the ‘republican’ strand, i.e. as rather secondary vis-à-vis the opposing strand and as presenting comparatively limited uses of the term and a preference to other terms for the signification of such senses. Furthermore, this dubious downplaying can be also set in doubt as soon as one examines Skinner’s gradual insertions of evidence of uses of the ‘state’ by such authors, which generally precede the earliest citations of absolutist uses of the ‘state’, with the exception of Bodin and the Parisian anti-monarchomachs. In fact, if one sticks to the English case, the earliest uses of the ‘state’ for this set by Persons and the early citations of ‘political anatomists’, which, as we saw, were omitted from Skinner’s relevant abbreviated text, precede the earliest uses

²⁰⁹ See Skinner (2009), pp. 327-329, (2010), pp. 27-29, whereas in (2018d), pp. 342-343 only the last two strands are identified by Skinner in this specific overall light.

²¹⁰ See Skinner (2009), p. 327, (2010), pp. 27-28, (2018d), p. 353.

²¹¹ However, cf. Skinner’s massive turn to ‘civitas’ in (2018e).

²¹² The responsive outlook of this overall division persists up to a considerable extent in (2018d), pp. 342-361, in which the authors of the ‘populist theory of the state’ are said to be responding to the early ‘divine right’ absolutist theorists of the state, whereas later on Skinner accepts that “royalists and absolutists of every stamp” sought to repudiate the civil-war ‘populist theory of the state’, also seemingly drawing their increasing use of the very term ‘State’ as well as several parts of their argument by the latter. As for the ‘stamps’ that Skinner included in this late division of ‘royalists and absolutists’, these consisted in all three subdivisions that have been brought forward by our examination, i.e. in late ‘divine right’ absolutists of B1, in ‘absolutist contract’ authors of the B2 type, and in Hobbes and the Hobbes-drawn Digges, who end up bringing forward the distinctive ‘Hobbesian theory of the state’.

by the absolutists, which actually start with a response to Persons, as is also the case with the English translations of the respective foreign tracts that are specifically cited for both cases, whose original time of authorship, in turn, was quite earlier for the collectivist strand. Moreover, Skinner's homogenization of this category in terms that fit the 'republican' or the 'free state' thesis in its 'neo-Roman' version can be seriously challenged as soon as one notices the chronological, logical and seemingly quantitative primacy of the uses of the 'state' vis-à-vis those of the 'free state' that come up for this set once Skinner's inadequately supported emphases are set aside and his omissions in his late abbreviation are retrieved, as also seemed to have been the case with the relevant citations we came across for the 'republican' strand as well. Similarly, another logical cross-checking that our analysis of Skinner's preceding strands can offer at this point is the challenging of Skinner's C2 claim of a late extension of the 'state' by the "more radical challengers of absolutism" vis-à-vis the 'political anatomists' of C1 as an original description that applies to all forms of government in place of designating only the non-monarchical ones, since our analysis up to this point has already suggested a great number of strong precedents, such as those found in the uses of the 'state' in the 'form of government' sense of the previous period and in the main set of its claimed 'republican' uses.

On the other hand, we have noticed that Skinner has gradually become more interested to differentiate the divisions of the challengers of popular sovereignty and to present them as having the leading role in this period, as we saw that the case had also been with the 'royal' and 'princely' uses of the 'state'. In these respects, we have seen Skinner adding next to his early citations of Bodin, Suárez and French and Scottish anti-monarchomachs for the case in B a considerable number of new authors and divisions that serve either as precedents or as comparatively early instances of absolutist uses of the 'state', such as the 16th century *officiers d'état* and the Second Scholastic authors, the older Italian manuals on politics, and a great number of early instances of the 'divine right of kings'. Furthermore, in spite of Skinner's late acknowledgement of the predominant use of alternative terms in place of 'state' by these authors, this category has been framed as being extensive enough to allow for quite different uses of the 'state' in the cases of B1, B2 and B3. Nonetheless, we have noticed that Skinner downplayed the responsive character of the early instances of B1 to Persons and other English Catholics, whereas the placement of B2 in the opponent's place for B1 as well as its plausible connections to the precedent of Persons provide a clue for challenging the validity of the demarcation of this strand;²¹³ as regards B3, we have noticed that Skinner downplayed its early instances, including Bodin, in an effort to present it as a late division around Hobbes that achieves the decisive and rather 'middling' innovation on the use of

²¹³ In these respects, it is worth noting that B2 seems to have disappeared in Skinner's depiction of absolutism in (2018a), in which the authors discussed are described only in terms of divine right, whereas the B2 authors return only in (2018d), p. 354, where they are claimed to be responding to the parliamentarians, as we have already noted.

the 'state' as D.²¹⁴ This being the case, we may suggest that Skinner has made a quite questionable effort to emphasize the wide range of argumentative innovations that he associates with the absolutist case in a way that has been quite similar to the leading role that he had reserved for the 'royal' and for the 'princely' senses of the 'state' in his treatment of the earlier period.

Furthermore, a few more clues for challenging the points of emphases in what we have called the 'special logic' of Skinner's schemes for this period can be sought in the way Skinner treated other comparatively 'middling' cases than Hobbes and the 'fictional theory of the state'. In particular, Skinner has omitted from his examined works a whole set of uses of the 'state' by mid-16th century French humanists laid down in the Conclusion of the *Foundations* that started from Budé, whose writings on the topic were said to have had an impact in the following generations up until Bodin, and indicated the "transition to a more abstract concept of the state". More specifically, after citing Budé (: [1547] address to the prince on the need to "maintenir votre estat"; analysis of "les espèces d'estat politique"; "l'estat publique" as a locus of political power distinct from the powers of the prince), Skinner reports on the adoption of Budé's terminology by the next generation of the French humanist writers on legal and political thought, citing for the case Michel de l'Hôpital's address to the States General (: [1562] the role of law "in maintaining and conserving all 'Estatz et Republicues'") and Bernard Du Haillan's history of *The State and Success of the Affairs of France* (: [1570] "the *estat* of France"; description of "the progress, accidents and fortunes of this state"), introducing also Bodin precisely as an author writing on the basis of this background.²¹⁵ Moreover, Skinner's omission of the quite relevant set of the later English 'politic humanists' from his late works which we have already noted has meant the downplaying of Bacon's and Raleigh's similarly abstract uses of the 'state' among other things. Therefore, we could claim that an illustration of these instances against the absolutists and the 'fictional theorists of

²¹⁴ It is worth noting at this point that in (2018d), p. 341 Skinner seems to be hinting to the substitution for Hobbes' 'middling' innovative use of the 'State' with a quite corresponding 'middling' innovative effect said to be found in what he suggested in (2018a) to be Hobbes's account of political representation on the basis of both long-standing and more recent precedents, with the latter of them mainly consisting in the more straightforward impacts on Hobbes' relevant views of English theologians theorizing the representative function of the heads of church and commonwealth since the 16th century on the basis of what Skinner takes as a Ciceronian-based 'theatrical' understanding of representation as meant by actors individually personating their roles, on the one hand, and in the version of representation favoured by the early civil-war Parliamentarians, on the other hand, who were said to have been putting forward a much cruder theory of 'virtual' representation as meant in a portrait representing all the crucial features of the country's populace in proportionally satisfying terms. Pressing the point a little further, it is also worth paying attention to the fact that Skinner presents Hobbes in that same chapter as incorporating several features of the Parliamentarian account within a 'theatrical' theory of representation that ends up discrediting the most radical implications of the Parliamentarians. However, readers of the book may pay attention, among other things, to the fact that this same chapter ends up pointing to the impact on Hobbes of the Biblical sea monster of Leviathan as "an image of terrifying strength", as the newly sovereign House of Commons was already noting in March 1649 as well (2018a, p. 221), right before Skinner presents us a monumental analysis of Hobbes' strong dues to the visual culture of humanist book frontispieces, which also includes an exhaustive analysis of the unforgettable frontispiece of *Leviathan* (2018g).

²¹⁵ See Skinner (1978b), pp. 354-355.

the state', as well as Skinner's similarly downplayed acknowledgement of the dues of this whole set to the more collectivist 'estates' could temper the setting up of Skinner's emphases on the individual contributions of Bodin and especially Hobbes.²¹⁶

However, and turning more clearly to the identification of gaps, the most striking gap in the entirety of Skinner's writings on the 'State' in these respects seems to have been that of the so-called Levellers, whose popular tracts were a product of the late 1640s, thus being practically contemporaneous with Hobbes' most significant treatises, and who have been the ones that have been usually singled out with greatest sympathies by a considerable portion of Skinner's Anglophone colleagues due to their apparent argumentative affinity to Locke and late liberalism and their opposition to Cromwell's side within the parliamentary camp of the early civil wars, as classically illustrated in the retrospectively famous Putney Debates of 1647.²¹⁷ In fact, the Levellers' broader mental horizons and political views, which included a distinctive understanding of liberty and an apparent lack of Parker's "zealous addiction to monarchy", do not seem to favour a fitting into Skinner's 'republican' and 'monarchomach' categories or in their late 'neo-Roman' merge. More precisely, Skinner's claim that the 'neo-Roman' (and thus the 'republican') political thought is primarily distinguished from other creeds through its distinctive understanding of liberty as the absence of dependence and the reliance of this claim on the 'free state' thesis seems to be missing the extent to which one of the most substantial demands in the concerted actions of the Levellers had to do with the more 'privacy'-oriented issue of religious freedom and with the call for toleration of the different Protestant sects from the governors' part. This firm reliance of the Leveller understanding of the religious and of the other aspects of freedom on the case of the individual person and his or her own consciousness turned their call for liberty into being such a hard-to-compromise case that not only did it not tend to an institutional allegiance to monarchy as the 'monarchomachs' did, but it also reached up to a distrust of the Parliament itself when the latter seemed to have given in to attempts of the Presbyterians to assume the role of a national church.²¹⁸

²¹⁶ Cf. Skinner's attempt in (2018d), pp. 344-345 to present the 'estates' as a background for the absolutist understanding of the State.

²¹⁷ On the interest for the Levellers see Pocock (1957), chap. VI, Wootton (1991), Hampsher-Monk (1976), (2015), Mendle (2001); the latter volume also contains a piece by Pocock. For what has presently become a slightly old list of other titles of the relevant literature see the 'Bibliographical note' in Sharp (1998), pp. xxxi-xxxiv, as well as Skinner's own recent suggestion of titles in (2017), pp. 11-16 and (2018c), pp. 151-158. For the most extended version of the records of the Putney Debates see Woodhouse (1951), pp. 1-124 and for an extensive set of analyses on the debates see Mendle (2001).

²¹⁸ Cf. Skinner (2018c), pp. 150-151, where religion is acknowledged to have had a major share in the Parliament's final *Declaration* for the raising of its own army on August 4 1642. In all cases, it is also worth pointing out parenthetically that this background also seems to explain the reason why these Protestant Leveller authors did not have the same extent of intellectual dependence on the background of ancient Greek and Roman sources as was the case with the 'republican' and other relevant authors, or those in turn who principally depended on the latter.

Furthermore, the problems raised by this gap become more obvious as soon as one turns to the Leveller uses of the 'state'. The most important case to consider in these respects is that of William Walwyn, the most erudite of the Leveller authors. Walwyn referred to the 'state' quite persistently in his writings in a similar way to that of the authors described in A and C and who allegedly presented second-hand and limited uses of the term. In particular, in one of his most important tracts in which he responds to the claims of a letter of Presbyterian ministers that rejected toleration towards the other Christian sects, Walwyn uses the term 'state' 20 times in a total of 22 pages of a modern edition.²¹⁹ More specifically, responding to the letter's claim that "no such toleration has hitherto been established [...] in any Christian state, by the civil magistrate", Walwyn extensively replies that

[I]t seems by this reason, that if in any Christian state a toleration by the magistrate had been allowed, it would not have been unreasonable for our state to allow it - the practice of states being here supposed to be the rule of what's reasonable. Whereas I had thought that the practice of Christian states is to be judged by the rule of reason and God's word, and not reason by them. That which is just and reasonable is constant and perpetually so; the practice of states, though Christian, is variable we see - different one from another and changing according to the prevalency of particular parties - and therefore a most uncertain rule of what is reasonable. Besides, the state of Holland doth tolerate; and therefore the ministers' argument, even in that part where it seems to be most strong for them, makes against them. Again, if the practice of a Christian state be a sufficient argument of the reasonableness of a toleration, our state may justly tolerate because Christian, and because they are free to do whatever any other state might formerly have done.²²⁰

²¹⁹ See Walwyn (1998a) [1646], pp. 9-30.

²²⁰ See Walwyn (1998a) pp. 15-16; also see pp. 17-18 (: "of all sects of men, those deserve least countenance of a state that would be persecutors"; "whosoever shall cast an impartial eye upon times past and examine the true cause and reason of the subversion and devastation of states and countries, will, I am confident, attribute it to no other than the tyranny of princes and persecution of priests. So that all states, minding their true interests - namely the good and welfare of the people - ought by all means to suppress in every sect or degree of men [...] *the spirit of domination and persecution*"; "that spirit therefore which is contrary to God, to reason, to the well being of states - as the spirit of persecution evidently is - is most especially to be watched and warily to be circumscribed and tied up by the wisdom of the supreme power in commonwealths."); p. 19 (: "all sectaries [...] have a like title and right to freedom or a toleration, the title thereof being not any particular of the opinion, but the equity of every man's being free in the state he lives in and is obedient to - matters of opinion being not properly to be taken into cognisance any further than they break out into some disturbance or disquiet to the state"); pp. 22-23 (: in case "the state is not equal in its protection but allows one sort of men to trample upon another", "from hence must necessarily arise heart-burnings, which [...] will ever be perpetuated to posterity, unless the state wisely prevent them by taking away the distinction that foments them [...] by a just and equal toleration."; "the way to foster love and amity as well in a family as in a state being an equal respect from those that are in authority."); p. 24 (: "coldness of affection [...] proceeds from the different countenance and protection which states have hitherto afforded to men of different judgements"); Overton & Walwyn (1998) (: [1646] "lords [...] that were malcontents and vexed that the king had advanced others, and not themselves, to the managing of state affairs"; "a compulsive mastership or aristocratical government over the people in the state"; "if ye would in many things follow their [the Hollanders'] good example and make this

Furthermore, the 'state' appears in other popular Leveller tracts as well, at least in the Levellers' early years of glory prior to the Putney debates, even though the 'state' had become by that time much more common for the Levellers' opposing side at Putney of Henry Ireton and Cromwell.²²¹ Finally, aside from these numerous instances of the 'state' in the Leveller tracts, one should also add at this point the continuous presence of the individualized 'estates' throughout all relevant tracts, usually placed in the third or in the fourth place after such items as 'lives', 'liberties' and 'properties' when the authors refer to the ultimate objects to be protected, which would also raise strong challenges to Skinner's schemes for the 'state' for this period.²²²

The case of the Leveller writings being so, Skinner's characteristic delay in providing a piece on the Levellers seems to be leaving informed readers with strong *aporiae*, since in that case an eclectic part of the Levellers' writings was made to follow Parker and other parliamentarians of the early 1640s in the advancement of the 'neo-Roman' liberty.²²³ In particular, Skinner chose to discuss in these few pages the views on the right to vote of the Leveller military spokesmen at the Putney debates, mainly insisting on those spokesmen whose argument on this specific topic was closer to that of Ireton and Cromwell, which case is in turn used as a vindication of the Levellers' maintaining of the neo-Roman liberty as a whole, whereas Skinner further strengthens this portrait by placing the Levellers, as well as Locke's understanding of the proprietorship of oneself, both in the preceding as well as in the remaining part of the article as

nation a state free from the oppression of kings and the corruptions of the court"); Walwyn (1998b) (: [1647] "the great oppression of the High Commission was most evident in molesting of godly peaceable people for non-conformity or different opinion and practice in religion - judging all who were contrary-minded to themselves to be heretics, sectaries, schismatics, seditious, factious, enemies to the state").

²²¹ See Lilburne (1998a), p. 7 (: [1645] "treason acted and done [...] against the state and kingdom"); Overton (1998), p. 65 (: [1646] the "constant magnanimity, fidelity and good service [of the free people of England] both in the field and at home, for them and the state"); Several hands (1998), p. 94 (: [1647] "the power of this and all future representatives of this nation is inferior only to theirs who choose them, and doth extend, without the consent or concurrence of any other person or persons, [...] to the treating with foreign states"); for a use of the 'state' by the main spokesman of the Leveller cause in the Putney debates, Colonel Thomas Rainborough, see Woodhouse (1951), p. 56 (: [1647] "many a man whose zeal and affection to God and this kingdom hath carried him forth in this cause [fighting for the Parliament], hath so spent his estate that, in the way the state [and] the Army are going, he shall not hold up his head, if when his estate is lost, and not worth forty shillings a year, a man shall not have any interest"). Finally, as far as the late times of the Leveller activity are concerned, the 'state' seems to have been withdrawn from the Leveller tracts, probably as a result of their repeated calls during the year 1649 against the suggested erection of a 'Council of State' that would have authority in the crucial times between the dissolution of the Rump Parliament and the election of a new Representative; see Lilburne (1998b), pp. 142-154; Lilburne, Walwyn, Prince & Overton (1998), p. 172; Lilburne (1998c), p. 181. It is worth noting that Skinner himself also turned to this last case recently, trying to integrate it in terms of his 'neo-Roman' framework and situating it principally under the slightly following declaration of England as a 'Free State' in the same year. See Skinner (2017), pp. 16-20 and cf. (2018c), p. 158.

²²² See the tracts that have been collected in Sharp (1998) as well as the preserved record of the Putney debates as already noted.

²²³ See Skinner (2006b), pp. 160-165 and the latter's "revised and extended version" (2018c), pp. 151-158.

resting upon the background of the neo-Roman understanding of liberty which was said to have been maintained by the advocates of the parliamentary cause since the early 1640s.²²⁴

4. The 'State', late 17th - 19th century

Skinner's treatment of the following period is the most complicated one and includes several instances of a change of mind.²²⁵ This being so, the most appropriate isolation of Skinner's 'special logic' in his treatment of this period for our purposes seems to suggest an ordering of the relevant items in terms of separate sets of divisions which we will examine by succession.

In the first place, Skinner starts discussing the period already from his early writings by emphasizing the immediate challenges to the sovereignty of the state by two seemingly opposing sides. The first side had to do with a limited number of conservatives that persisted in the 'divine right' justification of the rulers' sovereignty [A1], for which case Skinner originally referred to "conservative theorists anxious to uphold the old ideal of *un roi, une foi, une loi*",²²⁶ whereas in his late writings Skinner referred to the English Tories of the decades right before 1688, bringing up the posthumous revival of Filmer's writings in the 1670s and their "reverting to the absolutist claim that the King must be recognised as the God-given head of the passive and obedient body of the state", as well as to the post-1688 'divine right' apologists Henry Sacheverell and Charles Leslie (: [1709] God grants supreme and unquestionable power immediately to kings as absolute 'heads of state'), whose references were omitted from the abbreviated version of this same piece.²²⁷ As for the second and more persistent side of challenges to the sovereignty of the state, this was comprised of several politically more optimistic authors, including Locke, Thomas Paine and Richard Price among others [A2], who were designated under various headings, such as 'contractarians', 'Whigs', late 'commonwealthsmen', and even 'neo-Romans', for whose case Skinner

²²⁴ See Skinner (2006b), pp. 160-165. This case persists under the same terms and settings with the addition of further and chronologically earlier sources in (2017), pp. 11-16 and (2018c), pp. 151-158. Seeing things in more general terms, in (2018f) Skinner has been insisting more explicitly either in stressing what he perceives as differences between Parliamentarians and Levellers or in seeing both sets as acting on similar grounds, always keeping the former though in a more favourable light than the latter. In these respects, the most crucial point for Skinner's overall account seems to consist in the attribution to the former of the 'virtual' theory of representation, which Skinner originally introduces in the book as "responding" to the Levellers' seemingly more demanding call for "the Members of Parliament [...] to find out the views of their constituents and then attempt to have those views enacted into law" (2018e, p. 19); however, Skinner returns to examine this specific point only in (2018a, pp. 207-208), where the Leveller Richard Overton is brought to be the one who "attacks" the Parliament's supposedly 'virtual' claim to representation in 1647, maintaining instead in a seemingly 'theatrical' tone that 'such as are the representers of Free-men, must be substantial and real Actors for freedom and liberty'.

²²⁵ For this period see Skinner (1989b), pp. 122-125, (2002e), pp. 405-410, (1998), pp. 77-99, (2003), pp. 16-21, (2009), pp. 348-356, (2010), pp. 37-41, (2018d), pp. 361-371.

²²⁶ See Skinner (1989b), p. 122, (2002e), p. 405.

²²⁷ See Skinner (2009), pp. 348, 354-355, (2010), pp. 37-38, as well as (2018d), p. 361.

accepts an avoidance of the terminology of the 'State' in place of such terms as 'civil government' or 'commonwealth'.

The complications of Skinner's views in the treatment of this last set of authors deserve further attention. Skinner originally accepted for this case, the emergence of the "more radical" demand or the "reassertion" by the radical theorists of "the ideal of popular sovereignty in place of the sovereignty of the state", including in this set the English 'contractarian writers' of the first post-Hobbes generation Locke and Locke's admirer Benjamin Hoadly, and their respective appeals to 'civil government' on the one hand and 'civil authority', 'civil government', 'supreme civil power', and the 'power of the civil magistrate' on the other hand, as well as the 'so-called commonwealthsmen' in 18th century Britain who continued "to speak of civil associations and commonwealths" instead of states.²²⁸ Readers might notice in this last instance Skinner's reluctance to include the claims of these authors in a 'republican' or 'commonwealth' vision as framed on the basis of the standards set up from Skinner's extensive work on the earlier periods. In fact, the presentation of the relevant authors for the period under examination in Skinner's 'neo-Roman' writings is characterized by a similar uneasy fitting into the framework of the 'neo-Roman' theory of liberty, since in *Liberty before Liberalism* Skinner introduces as a sort of a continuing "thorn in the side of contractarian as well as patriarchal theories of government" a "revival of the neo-roman theory in order to attack the alleged despotism of the later Stuarts" by Neville and Algernon Sidney in the 1680s, an "opportunist use of the neo-roman theory of civil liberty as a means of denouncing the Whig oligarchy" by Bolingbroke's parliamentary opposition in the 1720s-1730s and the "contentious restatement of the neo-roman theory of civil liberty by the so-called commonwealthsmen to defend the American colonists and their unilateral declaration of independence", for which case he cites Price,²²⁹ and in his following piece Skinner presents in a similar 'neo-Roman' tone Sidney, Locke, John Trenchard's and Thomas Gordon's *Cato's Letters* of the early 1720s, Bolingbroke, and what he sees as the advancement of the "same neo-Roman arguments" in order "to uphold the cause of the American colonists against the British crown" by Joseph Priestley and Price.²³⁰ As for his latest works, Skinner refers at this point to Whigs of the times of the constitutional crisis of 1679-1681 who "sought to legitimize their renewed attack on the Stuart monarchy by reviving and consolidating the populist theory of the state", citing for the case in what is claimed to serve as an example Sidney's *Discourses Concerning Government* and their comparisons between monarchies and republics or 'states', in which the latter are also described as 'free states' and as 'popular states', as well as to the defenses of the American Revolution by Paine and Price (: the lawful state refers to the sovereign power of the "collective body of the people";

²²⁸ See Skinner (1989b), p. 122, (2002e), p. 405.

²²⁹ See Skinner (1998), pp. 12-13.

²³⁰ See Skinner (2003), pp. 16-18.

“the will of the state” is equivalent to “the will of the whole”), which are said to be suggestive of a widespread reassertion of the ‘populist theory of the state’.²³¹

The isolation of this first set of Skinner’s divisions for this period closes with the individual case of Hegel as considered by Skinner in his early work [A3]. At that point, Hegel was presented as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ for whose case Skinner states that “Hegel and his followers argued that the English contractarian theory of popular sovereignty merely reflected a failure to distinguish the powers of civil society from those of the state, and a consequent failure to recognise that the independent authority of the state is indispensable if the purposes of civil society are to be fulfilled”.²³² This being so, Hegel is apparently seen by Skinner at that point as a figure approximating the authors of state sovereignty though in rather more problematic terms, he was seen as drawn into the British understanding of ‘civil society’ of A2 and as trying to bring this conception back under the independent authority of the ‘State’.²³³

Nonetheless and in spite of all this rather problematic background, Skinner accepts the gradual insertion of the ‘State’ in the late 17th and 18th century up until the opening years of the 19th century. This case seems to be more suitably divided in three distinct subsets.

In the first place, Skinner has exhibited particular concern to describe this insertion of the ‘State’ in rather Hobbesian or at least ‘fictional theory’ terms in the case of jurisprudence [B1]. Skinner first introduced this subdivision under these terms in the revised version of his earliest article on the ‘State’, seemingly as a substitute for the non-Hobbesian subdivision of the respective part to be analyzed in the following note.²³⁴ In particular, Skinner introduces in the revised version the new claim that “it is remarkable how quickly the Hobbesian conception of the State nevertheless succeeded in establishing itself at the heart of political discourse throughout western Europe”, citing in favour of his case Pufendorf’s strongly Hobbes-influenced classic *De Iure Naturae et gentium* [1672] – cited in its English 1717 translation by White Kennet of the influential French translation of Pufendorf by Jean Barbeyrac (: the ‘Civil State’ is “a compound Moral Person, whose Will, united and tied together by those Covenants which before pass’d among the Multitude, is deem’d the Will of all; to the End, that it may use and apply the Strength and Riches of private Persons towards

²³¹ See Skinner (2009), pp. 348, 354-355, (2010), pp. 37-38; cf. (2018d), pp. 361 and 372. It is also worth noting that these defenses of the American Revolutionary cause, which are no longer described in terms of ‘commonwealthsmen’, were omitted from Skinner’s abbreviated version of the original article.

²³² See Skinner (1989b), p. 122, (2002e), p. 406.

²³³ It might be also worth pointing out parenthetically at this place that although the very term ‘civil society’ that Hegel employs (actually transcribed through the much-connotated German word *Bürgergesellschaft*) in his lecture-based book on the *Rechtphilosophie* was not absent from some of the English and Welsh authors comprising A2, the term was more extensively used by the famous Scottish intellectuals of the 18th century who are not included in this set, since it seems to have fitted more properly to the Scottish affairs following the Act of Union of 1707 and Scotland’s prosperity in the absence of a parliament. It is these influential Scottish teachings that probably mostly informed Hegel’s account at this point, though apparently in merge with English contractarian features.

²³⁴ See Skinner (2002e), pp. 406-410 and cf. (1989b), pp. 122-123.

maintaining the common Peace and Security”), Louis de Jaucourt’s article on ‘l’État’ in the *Encyclopédie* (: [1756] “the state can be defined as a civil society by means of which a multitude of men are united together through their dependence upon a sovereign”) as well as the key legal treatises of the most influential English common lawyer of the mid-18th century William Blackstone (: a ‘state’ is “a collective body, composed of a multitude of individuals, united for their safety and convenience, and intending to act together as one man”) and of the leading legal theorist of Bentham’s circle of the much later times John Austin, an overt admirer of Hobbes (: [1832] the ‘state’ is usually synonymous with ‘the sovereign’, denoting the individual person, or the body of individual persons, which bears the supreme powers), adding up for this last case that the apparent divergence from Hobbes’s advancement of state sovereignty is an instance of the “confusion” brought up by “those selfconsciously commonsensical writers who felt it obvious that the powers of the state must be reducible to the powers of some identifiable person or apparatus of government”.²³⁵ In his late works, Skinner extended this same set up to a quite considerable length, both in ‘fictional theory’ and in Hobbesian terms, bringing up not only Hobbes’ already noted dependence on earlier Dutch and German sources, but also Hobbes’ impact in the Continental juristic thought, as seen in the cases of Abraham van Berkel’s Dutch translation of *Leviathan* [1667], Hobbes’ own Latin translation of the same work [1668], Pufendorf, Pufendorf’s influence on the legal treatises of Ulric Huber [1673/1684] and Johann Christian Beckmann [1674], Barbeyrac’s French translation of Pufendorf [1706], the works of the French jurists François Richer d’Aube [1743] and Martin Hubner [1757], as well as Emer de Vattel’s influential 1758 treatise on the law of nations (: ‘l’État’ as a distinct “personne morale”). Furthermore, the instances concerning the assimilation of the case in “English political thought” were also similarly extended, consisting this time in Kennet’s translation of Barbeyrac’s edition of Pufendorf, the publication of the first collection of Hobbes’ political works in England since the publication of *Leviathan* [1750], the English version of Vattel [1760], and, the sole original English author of the times in this set, Blackstone.²³⁶

However, it might be worth insisting more distinctively on the fact that despite the elaboration of this extensive list of references Skinner had originally described the insertion of the ‘State’ in the wider ‘political discourse’ in quite general terms indicating a certain extent of vagueness [B2]. In particular, in a reference that appears only his earliest examined work Skinner had stated that “it is all the more remarkable to observe how quickly the term ‘state’ and its equivalents nevertheless became established at the heart of political discourse throughout western Europe”, claiming in fact that “by the middle of the eighteenth century the new terminology had become virtually inescapable for all schools of thought”. Nonetheless, Skinner’s actual citations for this case consisted exclusively in three authors, i.e. the more republican-drawn Bolingbroke (: talk

²³⁵ See Skinner (2002e), pp. 406-410.

²³⁶ See Skinner (2009), pp. 349-354, (2010), pp. 38-40 and cf. the more nuanced approach of this set in (2018d). pp. 362-371 and 372-373.

about the authority of the 'state' and about the need of the 'state' to be supported, protected and reformed), and the canonized figures of Hume and Rousseau.²³⁷ Readers may easily notice the lack of any apparent connection with Hobbes in this original conception of the examined case, which Skinner later sought to revise to the direction of Hobbes as seen above, whereas the same inference seems to be reasonably drawn out of Skinner's subsequently attempted approximation of Hume to this same direction in the way of the latter being one among the comparatively "more conservative political writers of the age", along with the utilitarians John Lynd and Bentham, who revived the "Hobbesian contention" of liberty as the absence of (actual) coercion against the late voices of the time in favour of the 'neo-Roman' liberty as the absence of dependence.²³⁸

This shift of emphasis towards Hobbes and the 'fictional' or 'Hobbesian theory of the state' seems to have led Skinner towards quite bolder claims in his latest writings. In these respects, Skinner seems to have reached more recently to the claims that the fictional "conception of the state as the name of a distinct moral person attained an almost hegemonic standing in the Enlightenment" and that "it would not be too much to say that the fictional theory was one of the most important legacies of the Enlightenment to the political theory of Continental Europe in the course of the nineteenth century and beyond", citing in favour of his case Hegel's *Rechtsstaat*, the influential early 19th century German historian Otto von Gierke and the case that "in France the image of the state as a *personne morale* became the subject of an extensive legal literature" as instances drawing on the 'fictional theory of the state' [B3].²³⁹

Moving gradually to the later part of this period, we should turn our attention to Skinner's strong concern to provide criticism to what he variably describes as 'classical liberalism', 'utilitarian liberalism', or, in more obscure occasions, simply as 'utilitarianism' [C1], a category comprised of a great number of principally British references ranging from citations of late 18th century authors, including Bentham and William Godwin among others, up to Sidgwick, and

²³⁷ See Skinner (1989b), pp. 122-123.

²³⁸ See Skinner (2003), p. 18.

²³⁹ See Skinner (2009), p. 355. It is worth noting at this point that Skinner's interest in Gierke dates from quite earlier times, and more particularly from the times when Skinner was writing the *Foundations*, for which case Skinner has retrospectively claimed that "Gierke was my Bible in those days, and I had it on his authority that with Hobbes the struggle to articulate the idea of the state as the bearer of sovereignty was finally brought to a triumphant close". See (2006a), p. 238. Readers of the latter autobiographical piece of Skinner may also pay attention to the fact that Skinner's studying of Weber's *Economy and Society* back in those years and his respective depiction of the modern State in Weberian terms are not brought up at this point, even though this piece was occasioned partially as a response to Goldie's piece (2006) where we noted that this specific relationship was brought to extensive light. Quite on the contrary to an emphasis of this kind, Skinner's article brought up Weber only twice, with the former occasion consisting in a footnote in which Skinner sought to clarify his extensive use of 'ideology' as an exegetical means throughout the *Foundations* by maintaining that "I was employing the term not in a Marxist sense to refer to distortions of social reality, but rather in a Weberian sense to refer to discourses of legitimation" (2006a, p. 242), whereas Skinner's second reference to Weber, in which he actually concedes that "as I emphasised in my Introduction [of the *Foundations*], I was addressing an essentially Weberian theme" appears only quite later in the article in p. 248; also cf. (2002h), p. 236. .

characterized by various complications.²⁴⁰ In particular, Skinner's direct challenging of this portrait of liberalism and its intimate connections with the utilitarian creed is inaugurated in *Liberty before Liberalism*, where the neo-Roman theory of liberty is presented both in the Preface of the work and in the final units of its empirical part in terms designed so as to highlight its points of convergence and its differences from its claimed "rival view of liberty embedded in classical liberalism".²⁴¹ In these respects, Skinner tends to talk about a 'classical liberalism',²⁴² including in it in more or less explicit terms Priestley, Lynd, Bentham, who is explicitly described as formulating the "liberal tenet" of the concept of liberty, William Paley's treatise on *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* [1785], which served as a long-lasting textbook in British universities, allowing thus Skinner to call him "perhaps the most influential spokesman for what became the classical liberal case", the French case of Benjamin Constant,²⁴³ Austin and Sidgwick, whereas, as far as 'utilitarianism' is concerned, Skinner accepts the "rise of classical utilitarianism in the eighteenth century" and the subsequent "use of utilitarian principles to underpin so much of the liberal state in the century following", using also the term in order to characterize specifically Paley and Sidgwick, who is said to have reiterated "the classical utilitarian case".²⁴⁴ Following this, Skinner introduces the same set in his following piece by referring to the "Hobbesian contention" of liberty of the "utilitarian writers" Hume, Lynd, Bentham and Paley, turning gradually from the 'classical utilitarians' to the mid-19th century "heirs of this school of thought", for which case Skinner cites only John Stuart Mill, bringing up Mill's apparent distance from this claimed "neo-Hobbesian analysis of liberty" and leaving a single bringing up of the gradual creation of "the philosophy of liberalism" by this time for the end of this section.²⁴⁵ As for his latest pieces, Skinner introduced this set rather as the divergence of the "English branch of the genealogy" of the modern State as compared to the claimed Continental Enlightenment heritage of the State, suggesting more specifically that Blackstone's introduction of the fictional theory

²⁴⁰ For the treatment of this case see Skinner (1998), pp. 77-99, (2003), pp. 18-21, (2009), pp. 355-356, (2010), p. 41.

²⁴¹ Skinner (1998), p. x. For a late relativization of 'rivalries' of this kind, see (2018c), where Skinner presented the neo-Roman theory of liberty as a "different view of liberty" (p. 139) and as a "contrasting sense" of speaking "about a loss of liberty" (p. 140) than that offered by the 'Whig' and 'hyper-Whig' interpretations of the place of liberty in the English civil wars, prior to claiming that giving "due prominence" to the former allows one "to appraise at least three episodes of the revolutionary decade of the 1640s rather differently", including the ability "to supplement existing accounts of what was at stake in the constitutional debates held at Putney in October and November 1647" (p. 147).

²⁴² See Skinner (1998), pp. 70, 78, 82, 84, 98, 116.

²⁴³ Constant's case is explicitly brought up in Skinner (1998), pp. 60, 117.

²⁴⁴ See Skinner (1998), pp. 77-99. It should be noted that Skinner's interest to portray a certain critical distance from liberalism as well as his reworking of his older views in the 'neo-Roman' idiom were substantially influenced from his choice to collaborate with the Irish-born political theorist Philip Pettit and the latter's Pocock- and Skinner-influenced project of making-up a non-liberal political theory of 'republicanism'. For more information on this relation, which also included Skinner's visits to Pettit's academic base at the Australian National University in Canberra, see Palonen (2003), pp. 124-130; see also Skinner (2002h), pp. 229-230.

²⁴⁵ See Skinner (2003), pp. 18-21.

of the state to a broad English readership fell victim to the “almost lethal attack” initially associated with “the rise of classical utilitarianism”, which is represented at this point by Bentham (: [1789] section on “offences against the state”; to have a ‘state’ is simply to have “particular persons invested with powers to be exercised for the benefit of the rest”; if there were no such persons with such powers, “there would be no such thing as a *state*”), whose imposing criticism of fictions is said to have influenced the lack of discussions of the state by the “other early utilitarians” Paley, Godwin and James Mill, whereas “later utilitarian theory” is represented by Austin (: [1832] the term ‘state’ denotes “the individual person, or the body of individual persons, which bears the supreme powers in an independent political society”) and Sidgwick (: [1891] description of the ‘state’ as nothing more than an apparatus of government empowered to command the exclusive allegiance of those living under it).²⁴⁶ Among the different features attributed to this set, we should note that Skinner accepts for their case a “reductionist” or “commonsensical” critique of the state,²⁴⁷ the absence of sustained discussions of the state in early utilitarians, aside from the cases of Bentham and Austin, which were singled out by Skinner himself,²⁴⁸ their adoption of the seemingly “Hobbesian contention” that the power of the state sets the gravest threat to the freedom of the citizens,²⁴⁹ and what Skinner ends up presenting as these authors’ ultimate support for a ‘minimal state’.²⁵⁰

To complete the mapping of Skinner’s interests for this period, we should note Skinner’s identification of one last 19th and early 20th century category in his early writings. This was a separate set of post-Hegelian critics [C2] comprised of the paradoxical grouping of Marx and Engels next to Michels and Pareto, all of whom seemed to have been drawn into the questioning of the Hegelian independence of the State, apparently as the latter was framed in Skinner’s early presentation of Hegel as a relatively problematic case in A3, talking more

²⁴⁶ See Skinner (2009), pp. 355-356, (2010), p. 41, (2018d), pp. 373-375. Readers should pay attention to the fact that J. S. Mill has disappeared from the citations of these late pieces.

²⁴⁷ See Skinner (2009), pp. 355-356, 358 and cf. (2010), pp. 41-42, where all the uses of “reductionist” were ultimately replaced with “commonsensical” as well as the late opposite move in (2018d), pp. 373-375. It is worth pointing out that the very term “common sense” does not appear in these authors, characterizing instead the relatively reserved late 18th century Aberdeen circle of Scottish intellectuals and Paine’s famous early pamphlet *Common Sense* in defense of the cause of the American rebels. Furthermore, it is also worth noting at this point that long before Skinner started highlighting the distinctive innovations of Hobbes, he had sought to situate Hobbes in the course of wider sets of authors presented in terms of a quite similar “de facto” idiom, which is apparently drawn from Pocock (1957), p. 150. See Skinner (1965) and especially (1966a); (2002a) and (2002b); cf. Skinner’s declared relativization of this emphasis on Hobbes’ distinctiveness in (2018d), p. 341.

²⁴⁸ See Skinner (2009), p. 356, (2010), p. 41.

²⁴⁹ In particular, in (2003), pp. 19-20 Skinner claimed that “so long as the power of the state continued to pose the gravest threat to the freedom of the citizens, the neo-Hobbesian analysis of liberty popularized by the classical utilitarians continued to hold the field”, noting also that J. S. Mill “agrees with earlier utilitarian theorists that potentially the most serious threat to individual liberty comes from the coercive powers of the state”, a claim for which he provides no actual citations out of Mill’s work.

²⁵⁰ See Skinner (2003), pp. 20-21, where the endorsement of the ‘minimal state’ by the authors of this set is explicated as an interest in the state from the point of view of “the defence of a *cordon sanitaire* of inviolable rights, a *cordon* beyond which the state must under no circumstances be allowed to trespass”.

precisely about “sceptics in the tradition of Michels and Pareto, no less than socialists in the tradition of Marx [sided by Engels in the revised version of the text]” drawing on “Hegelian roots” in their insistence that “the state’s vaunted independence from its own agents as well as from the members of civil society amounts to nothing more than a fraud” and ascribing to both traditions the view that “modern states are in truth nothing more than the executive arms of their own ruling class”.²⁵¹ Nonetheless, Skinner has not been interested to return to this set when revising his appreciation of Hegel in B3 nor at some other point in his later writings.²⁵²

The perplexities of Skinner’s views on this extensive period, for which one should note in all fairness that it lies outside Skinner’s main expertise, could allow for the tracing of several clues of interest. A good starting point seems to lie in Skinner’s discrete concessions that try to include the most canonized figures of this period, i.e. Locke, J. S. Mill and Marx within the proponents of the ‘neo-Roman’ (and thus, for Skinner, anti-Hobbesian and accordingly probably anti-Hegelian) theory of liberty, presenting in all three cases this inclusion as being only a partial one and actually reserved by Skinner mostly for his footnotes. More specifically, in a relatively early footnote of *Liberty before Liberalism* Skinner introduces Locke’s understanding of consent in counter-distinction to the one ascribed to the ‘neo-Romans’, since Locke is said to have employed consent only in order to discuss “the origins of legitimate government”, whereas the ‘neo-Romans’ are said to “add the more radical demand that each law must be enacted with the consent of those who will be subject to it”,²⁵³ but quite on the contrary to this claim, in a later footnote at the same work Skinner informs his readers that Locke is an example of a political writer “who espouse[s] the theory of liberty I am discussing without being republican in the strict sense of opposing the institution of monarchy”.²⁵⁴ As for Mill and Marx, they appear in the first pages of the Preface of the same work next to another 19th century reference that has

²⁵¹ See Skinner (1989b), p. 122, (2002e), p. 406.

²⁵² With the late exception of a few lines on the continuation of this line of argument by the 20th century Marxists and Hayek in (2018d), p. 378. At this point, one should also add another aspect of the conception of the state for these times which has been also left barely untouched by Skinner, which is that of the state’s engagement with the ‘nation’. The only place where Skinner brings up this topic is the very first footnote of the Preface of the *Foundations*, where Skinner informs his readers that the authors examined in the period covered by the book “of course [...] lacked the post-Enlightenment conception of the relationship between the nation and the State”. See (1978a), p. ix. In fact, taking into consideration the politically sensitive issue of the ‘nation’ in Skinner’s account of the State for the nineteenth century would raise strong challenges to Skinner’s points of emphasis for these times since, as one may also tell out of Ellie Kedourie’s own emphases in his highly influential back in those years study of ‘nationalism’ as seen in terms of the history of ideas (1961), nationalism and its association with the State was primarily viewed as a problematic Continental invention, whereas the appropriation of the study of nationalism in the following years from other disciplines thanks to the major works of social scientists and socially-minded historians seems to have also acted as another deterring factor for Skinner’s further involvement with this significant feature of the late conception of the State and its implications.

²⁵³ See Skinner (1998), p. 27.

²⁵⁴ See Skinner (1998), p. 55; note the absence of the characterization ‘monarchomach’ at this point. This seems also to be Skinner’s positioning of Locke vis-à-vis the ‘neo-Romans’ in (2017), p. 4 and (2018c), pp. 155-156.

tended to raise political-ideological sympathies in the late times, which is that of the Chartists. In all three cases, Skinner accepts the survival of “some elements” of the ‘neo-Roman’ theory of liberty, reserving the citation of the particular cases of each for his first three footnotes of the piece.²⁵⁵

Another directly associated clue has to do with the fact that what Skinner identifies as Mill’s ‘neo-Roman’ element of liberty comes only from some pages on women’s ‘servitude’ from the *Subjection of Women*,²⁵⁶ a choice which, as Skinner seems to have been clarifying retrospectively, seems to have been dictated by his interest to present Mill as a case vindicating a symmetrically limited counter-emphasis on ‘domestic life’ vis-vis Marx’ emphasis on the ‘workplace’.²⁵⁷ Nonetheless, in the first page of Mill’s renowned essay *On Liberty*, probably the first essay that most present-day Mill readers start reading, Mill introduces ‘liberty’ as rather opposed to ‘power’, or as more clearly opposed to ‘authority’,²⁵⁸ i.e. against terms that do not seem to be quite distant from ‘dependence’, against which Skinner contrasted his ‘neo-Roman’ liberty or in any case they do not seem to be as distant from it as they seem to be from the Hobbesian freedom as the absence of coercion that Skinner ascribed to Mill’s utilitarian/liberal set of C1, whereas Mill actually describes his understanding of liberty at the same place in terms of ‘independence’ more than once. As we have seen, Skinner returned to this apparently unfitting element for his thesis in his following piece, where Mill was said to have differed from the earlier and from the later voices of his set due to his being “more concerned about the inhibiting effects on individual freedom of growing demands for social conformity”, a claim that is supported by a citation from *On Liberty* on the comparative increase of the “yoke of opinion” against the “yoke of law” in England in contrast to the relevant situation in most other countries of Europe. Skinner goes on to associate this claimed difference of Mill with the revival of the belief, said to originate in Plato and to be also present in Locke and, after Mill, in Freud and several Marxists, that individuals can be enslaved by their own passions, which in turn is said to introduce a wholly distinctive understanding of freedom vis-à-vis the ‘neo-Roman’ and the (neo-)Hobbesian one.²⁵⁹ This being so, it is quite possible that the reason why Skinner has not returned to Mill in his late writings has to do with the accumulated *aporiae* that this kind of interpretation of Mill generates (e.g. how can one infer an enslavement to one’s individual passions from the yoke of social

²⁵⁵ See Skinner (1998), pp. ix-x.

²⁵⁶ See Skinner (1998), pp. ix-x.

²⁵⁷ See Skinner (2016a), p. 11: “But later writers in this tradition [of the Roman way of thinking about freedom] were equally interested in two ways in which this form of power can also arise in relationships between citizens. Marxists emphasised how the power of bosses in the workplace can become arbitrary if there is no possibility of bargaining about conditions of work. Marx spoke of wage slavery, and that condition still exists today. [...] Liberal contemporaries of Marx were more preoccupied with the sphere of domestic life as one in which arbitrary power can similarly be exercised. If a woman is wholly dependent economically on her partner, then she will likewise be living at his mercy, and hence in a condition that, as John Stuart Mill was to put it in *The subjection of women*, will be little different from that of a bondslave”.

²⁵⁸ See Mill (1991a), pp. 5-6ff.

²⁵⁹ See Skinner (2003), pp. 19-20.

conformity?; is social conformity the sole opponent of liberty that interests Mill?; is social conformity a form of 'power' or 'dependence' or not?; etc.).²⁶⁰

This being the case with the grand figures, the problems seem to increase as soon as one turns to Skinner's own main points of reference for the examined period. In fact, Skinner's readers are left with the *aporia* whether there has been too much or too little 'State' in the 'Enlightenment', since the apparently pro-Enlightenment set of A2 was said to have avoided the 'State', whereas, quite on the contrary, the 'State' was present in the numerous authors of B, in whose case the Enlightenment is apparently assumed in the downplayed set of B2, and explicitly brought up as such in the concluding B3, whereas we also noted that B1 ultimately included the *Encyclopédie's* apparently 'enlightened' article on the topic. Furthermore, it is not quite clear how Skinner can conclude that the 'State' acquired a hegemonic standing as an Enlightenment heritage, and especially in terms of a fictional theory of sovereignty, when claiming at the same time that the utilitarians/liberals of C1 ended up advancing a 'minimal state', unless liberalism is somehow less enlightened than Hegel and Skinner's other Continental 19th century juristic citations of B3. Another quite similar *aporia* which should also be kept in mind for the wider conclusions of this chapter has to do with whether there has been too much or too little Hobbes in 'classical liberalism', since, on the one hand Skinner presented the liberals as having undermined Hobbes' fictional theory of the state through their commonsensical critique, but, on the other hand, he also accepted that these same authors also integrated Hobbes' theory of liberty in place of the 'neo-Roman' one, although J. S. Mill was in turn separated from the other authors of this set on this topic.

As far as the gaps for this period in Skinner's account are concerned, it might be worth standing more closely to the case of J. S. Mill, the most canonized of all liberal voices, with his renowned extent of education that reached all the way up to classical Athenian philosophy. Even though this great figure was absent from Skinner's early works examined in our case, we have noticed that Mill eventually appeared in Skinner's writings with a few partial and quite dubious references that placed him principally in accordance with Bentham and Sidgwick, whereas quite interestingly even these references have been wholly omitted from Skinner's latest pieces. However, as far as the topic of the 'State' itself is concerned, it should be noted that Mill does provide sustained discussions of the effectively acting role of the 'State' and of its relations with other agencies of a similar kind, such as 'government', 'society' and individual

²⁶⁰ As far as Skinner's views on 'power' itself are concerned, it might be worth pointing out parenthetically at this point that in one of his very rare attempts to provide a refined summarizing logical scheme for his views, and more specifically for his overall understanding of 'liberty', Skinner seems to have used the term in a quite questionable sense that seems to correspond more properly to 'capability', since he presented the "power to act in pursuit of a given option (or at least alternative)" as an independent and common feature of liberty in all three kinds of the latter that he identifies, i.e. 'i) the 'neo-Roman' liberty as the absence of dependence, ii) liberty as lack of interference in either the Hobbesian and neo-Hobbesian or in the Millian, Freudian and Marxist version, and iii) the positive liberty of self-realization. See (2003), p. 22. Readers may notice the logical difficulties arising from Skinner's effort to fit the two strands of ii) in these specific terms under a single heading at this point.

persons in more than one writings that have already acquired the character of a classic. In particular, extensive accounts of the interrelations between the 'State' and 'government', a term that Mill usually either mildly - though quite elaborately - distinguishes from the 'State' or employs in ways that ascribe to it a generic relation against it, are provided in *On Liberty* already from the first chapter of the essay, where Mill initially introduced the former of these two terms in the form of a concretization of the origins of the struggle between 'liberty', on the one hand, and 'power' or 'authority', on the other, maintaining that "in old times this contest [between Liberty and Authority] was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the Government", a claim whose implications from the point of view of the claimers of liberty was right afterwards explicated by Mill as suggesting that "by liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers".²⁶¹ Mill's specific introduction of his conception of the 'State' appears a little later in an account mainly drawn in terms of 'rulers' and their 'government' as seen by the 'people', in which Mill maintains that "a time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure",²⁶² whereas the sole further reference to the 'State' in that chapter made clear that the 'State' implies a particular conception of government that secures its own and already existing interests (: "the ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practice [...] the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens; a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies [...] and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom").²⁶³ Furthermore, in the essay's final Chapter V, in which Mill suggests a great number of "applications" of his doctrine of liberty, Mill returns to the extensive employment of these terms in order to identify the effective agents entitled to take the action needed for the safeguarding and for the further advancement of liberty,²⁶⁴ whereas the case is

²⁶¹ See Mill (1991a), p. 5.

²⁶² See Mill (1991a), p. 6.

²⁶³ See Mill (1991a), pp. 17-18.

²⁶⁴ More analytically, Mill adopts at this point a carefully balanced shift of terms concerning the agencies at issue as the chapter proceeds with the different applications with the clear aim of easing his readers into seeing 'government' and the 'State' as agencies that should be meant to serve for particular ends viewed in terms of wider and socially accountable contexts. In particular, Mill's first two sets of applications, the conditions surrounding success in an overcrowding profession or in a competitive examination, and the regulation of trade (1991a, pp. 104-106), bring up the legitimate interference of 'society', which is meant in a sense broad enough to cover both the interference of legislation and morals, as was also the case with the essay's opening chapter. Mill then proceeds to the examination of preventive and punitive functions, such as those of the police, subtly introducing 'government' and turning the emphasis towards the use of 'legal' means (pp. 106-109), right before he starts referring to the imposition of restraints by the 'State' for reasons having to do with interests of various kinds in a wide range of applications (pp. 109-120), whereas in the final part of the chapter

quite much of the same kind with the use of these same terms in several parts of Mill's treatise which is specifically concerned with matters of the most direct relevance *Considerations on Representative Government*,²⁶⁵ as well as with Mill's final book in his earlier *Principles of Political Economy* and its ultimate call for a number of governmental roles against what was understood back in those times as the 'laissez-faire' economy.²⁶⁶ This being so with these three works, one is led to the clear conclusion that Mill designated quite active roles for the 'State', as well as for 'government' in general, that are anything but minimal as Skinner's schemes for this period would tend to suggest.

Mill turns to a wide range of applications that involve the limits of "governmental interference", which is distinctively specified as having to do with cases where "the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them" and in which the 'State' appears occasionally for the designation of certain governmental functions of this kind (pp. 120-128), culminating in Mill's famous ultimate call against the degeneration of the administrative 'machinery' of the State in a stagnant 'bureaucracy' (: "the worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [...] a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes - will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.", p. 128).

²⁶⁵ In this work (1991b), whose main writing follows the writing of *On Liberty*, 'government' again prevails in relation to the 'State', which again appears occasionally throughout the work, whereas in Chapter II Mill advances his criteria for the consideration of the merits of a good government in terms of our already familiar distinction between "the most important point of excellence of any form of government" of promoting "the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves" or "the degree in which it [a government] tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually", on the one hand, and "the quality of the machinery itself" or "the degree in which it [a government] is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities that may at any time exist, and make them instrumental in the right purposes", also described in 'apparatus' terms, on the other hand (pp. 225-229). Mill's employments of the 'State' in the book are apparently extensions of the second criterion, as one can also tell from some of its more emphatic uses in the cases of the relations between the 'State' and the localities and Mill's call for diffusing power to the local representative bodies (Chapter XV), his *prima facie* recommendation for accommodating separate nationalities under separate 'States' (Chapter XVI) and his views on the relations between "particular States" and the 'Federal Union' or 'Federal Government' in the course of his recommendations concerning the advantages to be expected from the establishment of federations and commonwealths of states (Chapter XVII).

²⁶⁶ See Mill (2006b), Book V "The Influence of Government", where Mill prescribes a great variety of roles to be undertaken by the 'government', occasionally employing the 'State' in a similar tone to the one analysed above, which are considered to be necessary or at least compatible with the acceptance of the ongoing endorsement of the doctrine of the 'laissez-faire' economy of those times; cf. Mill's apparent choice in his later *On Liberty* (1991a, pp. 105-106) to substitute for 'Free Trade' the 'laissez-faire' as well as his treatment of trade in 'society' terms instead of 'government', which has been already explicated in the previous footnotes.

5. The 'State', late 19th & 20th century

Skinner's treatment of the 'State' in the most recent times is quite more limited and focuses almost exclusively on the Anglophone case.²⁶⁷ In the first place, Skinner accepts the emergence in the closing decades of the 19th century in Britain of what can be plausibly described as a 'positive liberty' liberalism [A1], decisively shaped by the rather troublesome Continental influences of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, as seen initially in the writings of T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet [i], and a little later [ii] in the more sympathetically viewed F. W. Maitland's Gierke-influenced writings. In particular, Skinner initially included in this set only Green and Bosanquet, who were said to be "genueflecting in the direction of Kant and Hegel",²⁶⁸ whereas in the late texts Skinner presented these two authors, i.e. Green (: [1886] the 'state' is an institution with a duty to maintain the rights and serve the common good of its citizens; "it is not a state unless it does so") and Bosanquet with his *Philosophical Theory of the State* (: [1897] praise of Hobbes for having recognised the state as the name of a distinct person; denial of Hobbes' contention, claiming instead that the 'state' is far from being "an empty fiction"; call for "the identification of the State with the Real Will of the Individual in which he wills his own nature as a rational being") as turning "to Rousseau and especially Hegel for help in articulating the claim that the state is the name of a person with a real will of its own", also inserting this time as an introductory reference for the entire set Maitland and his dependence on Gierke (: [1900-1903] the "persona ficta" of the 'state' as the most "triumphant" fiction of all).²⁶⁹ Skinner accepts that through this set 'liberty' and 'rights' were transformed from an inviolable *cordon sanitaire* into parts of the 'common good' and that the state has been respectively transformed into a means of furthering this common good,²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ For this period, see Skinner (2003), pp. 21-24, (2009), pp. 357-360, (2010), pp. 41-44, (2018d), pp. 375-379.

²⁶⁸ See Skinner (2003), pp. 21-23.

²⁶⁹ See Skinner (2009), pp. 357-358, (2010), pp. 41-42. As far as the case of Maitland is concerned, it should be noted that Skinner had inserted it for the first time in an unexpected point at (1998), pp. 110-111, probably as a result of the relevant dissertation of his late student David Runciman (1997); on this last influence see also Skinner (2011a), p. 277 and (2018d), p. 358.

²⁷⁰ These contentions are included in Skinner (2003), pp. 21-23, where Skinner's overall presentation of the case clearly justifies the viewing of the entire set in terms of 'positive liberty', as one can also tell from the reminiscence of the strong dependence of these authors on the key Continental reference points of Berlin's celebratory polemic postwar distinction between 'negative' and 'positive liberty' (2002), which apparently predisposes Skinner at this point, whereas Skinner turned towards more text-sensitive evidence for the authors in his following pieces, as seen above. Notice also Skinner's silencing on whether Mill's well-known grounding of liberty and rights upon "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being" (1991a, p. 15) has any kind of relation with this set. The decisive impact of Berlin, one of young Skinner's respected political heroes next to Bertrand Russell (Palonen, 2003, pp. 125, 140), upon Skinner's understanding of and main divisions for this period can be also seen from his strong concern to discuss his own various treatments of 'liberty' throughout his career in 'negative' and 'positive' terms that aimed to pluralize Berlin's oversimplifying dualism, with the most emphatic case having been reserved for his (2002i), which makes clear that Skinner's fashioning of the 'neo-Roman' liberty as a whole in 'negative' terms has been a quite conscious reconstructive project based

with the ultimate result of turning the state into either a distinct fictional corporation [ii] or quite more problematically into a non-Hobbesian person with a real will of its own [i].²⁷¹

Even though followers of Skinner's line of argumentation up to this point would expect that Skinner's sympathies would fall on the side that we have examined right above, the case seems to be quite the opposite one. In fact, greatest sympathies can be seen in Skinner's following introduction of an initial critical response to the aforementioned state of affairs by the 'individualistic liberalism' of L. T. Hobhouse and Harold Laski [A2], for whose case Skinner accepts that even though they raised a quite "Benthamite" and "reductionist" or "commonsensical" reaction to the exponents of 'positive liberty' liberalism, depicting the state instead as nothing more than the 'governmental apparatus', they still retained it as the "master concept to be analyzed". In these respects, Skinner initially introduced at this point Hobhouse and his critical treatise against Bosanquet with the title *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (: [1918] "by the state we ordinarily mean either the government or, perhaps a little more accurately, the organization which is at the back of law and government"; the 'state' is merely the name of a "governmental organization"), turning later to the provision of more precise textual evidence, adding also at the same time Laski's criticism towards Rousseau and his disciples up to Green and Bosanquet (: [1919] "our obedience, in reality, goes to a government"; "a realistic account of the modern state thus suggests that what we term state-action is, in actual fact, action by government"; when we talk about the 'state' we are merely referring to a prevailing system of legal and executive power, together with an associated apparatus of bureaucracy and coercive force; it is "with a sovereign state that we are today confronted"; the goal must therefore be to construct "a working philosophy of the state").²⁷²

Turning more strictly to the 20th century, Skinner seems to have been accepting, at least up until recently, a division that is said to follow straight from the last two sets. In particular, Skinner accepts that in spite of the early reaction of the 'individualistic liberals', the 'positive liberty' perspective remained the dominant one in the opening decades of the 20th century, which is the time when it is considered to have evolved into the 'welfare state', which is also described by Skinner as the 'interventionist state' [B1] and for the case of which Skinner cites on his side the Constitutional alcohol prohibition in the United States in the

on the appeal of Berlin's own and primarily liberal 'negative' liberty, as had been already quite explicitly the case with his (1984) and with Pettit (1993). Nonetheless, Skinner has subsequently claimed in a more aphoristic tone that "my own view is that Berlin's distinctions are best forgotten: when applied to the early-modern period they are not only anachronistic but completely fail to capture the range of categories in use at the time" (2006a, p. 260).

²⁷¹ See Skinner (2009), pp. 357-358, (2010), pp. 41-42; cf. (2018d), pp. 375-376, where only the reference to Kant as a precedent for [i] is omitted.

²⁷² See Skinner (2003), pp. 21-23, (2009), pp. 358-359, (2010), p. 42, where readers may note that the two authors' "reductionist" critique of the state is turned into a "commonsensical" one in the revised version of the second piece, as was the case with the utilitarian liberals; however, cf. the relativization of this difference through the use of both terms in (2018d), pp. 376-377.

1920s and (what is seen retrospectively as) the “confiscatory” levels of welfare taxation of the 1945 Labour government in Britain.²⁷³ Following this, Skinner accepts that after the war Western societies have entered into a predominance of reactions against ‘positive liberty’ and the interventionist state [B2], for which case Skinner cites as basic instances Berlin’s and Gerald MacCallum’s expositions of ‘negative liberty’, MacCallum’s impact on the late accounts of liberty offered by J. P. Day, Jan Narveson and Adam Swift, as well as Nozick’s said claim that “if we genuinely value our rights, and hence our freedom of action, we must recognise that the very legitimacy of the state is questionable” and Robert Paul Wolff’s more pressing relevant inference that “if autonomy is our fundamental value, the state cannot be accepted as a legitimate institution at all”, which, taken as a whole, seem to allow Skinner to conclude that presently “the *cordon sanitaire* became everything”.²⁷⁴ Nonetheless, one should also note at this point that in his late writings Skinner attempted to insert at a different place and in a quite critical tone a citation on Rawls, one of the most influential voices in these settings, that does not seem to fit easily into Skinner’s aforementioned subdivisions, since Rawls is claimed to have used ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’ as “the first virtue of all social institutions”.²⁷⁵ This being so, the formulation seems to leave an unresolved *aporia* on whether Rawls would fit more properly in B1, where “social virtue” had been an important component of Skinner’s understanding of ‘positive liberty’ and the ‘welfare state’, or in the more individualistic B2, as a result of the strong individualistic features underlying Rawls’ contractarian theory, his emphasis on institutions and his being an actual disciple of Berlin, which is probably the placing that seems to fit Skinner argument at that point, since Rawls is claimed to have meant that “if we ask what justice requires, one inescapable part of the answer is that priority must be assigned to the rights of individuals, over any attempt to promote such inclusive goals as the common good” and to have been distortingly read by American neo-liberals in this direction.²⁷⁶

²⁷³ See Skinner (2003), p. 23; cf. the almost complete omission of these cases in (2018d), pp. 377-378.

²⁷⁴ See Skinner (2003), pp. 23-24, where readers may notice the absence of a bringing up of David Gauthier’s more Hobbesian-drawn libertarian theory, which would complicate Skinner’s claims at this point and cf. (2018d), pp. 377-379, where Skinner refers to these same set in vaguer terms as comprised of post-World War II “conservative” and “neo-liberal” authors, including Hayek and acting in parallel to “Marxist critics”, who seem to have been vindicating Skinner’s contention that the basic view of Hobhouse and Laski has “remained an orthodoxy” in Anglophone political theory. .

²⁷⁵ See Skinner (2009), pp. 362-363, (2010), p. 45; whereas Rawls is wholly absent from (2018d), pp. 377-379. It might be worth pointing out parenthetically that this formulation seems to be a quite questionable summarizing statement of the work of one of the most influential theorists of the 20th century and an actual contemporary of Skinner. In particular, Skinner seems to be fusing at this point Rawls’ classical suggestion of using the particular case of ‘social justice’, whose field of application is taken to be the loosely defined “major institutions” that comprise what Rawls called the “basic structure of society”, as his primary focus as a device for strengthening the ‘sense of justice’ of a state’s citizens (1999, especially Chapter I.2.), with the retrospective sanctioning of the theoretical pieces of one of Rawls’ most celebrated late interlocutors, Ronald Dworkin, who sought to justify his own persisting interests in ‘equality’ in terms of seeing it as the ‘sovereign virtue’ of our times (2000).

²⁷⁶ See Skinner (2009), pp. 362-363, (2010), p. 45. This placement of Rawls in Skinner’s mind is also clearly favoured by Skinner’s references to Rawls in (1983).

Finally, in order to complete Skinner's account of the 'State' for the 20th century and his historical mapping of the concept as a whole, we should turn to a wholly different category [C] that Skinner has been interested to highlight in his same latest writings after A1 and A2. This case has to do with the rise of the international legal organizations at the outset of the century as well as with several international legal theorists of the time and their impact up to present debates, all of which are used by Skinner as instances of a trend suggesting an uninformed outdatedness of the 'State' as a master concept, against which Skinner apparently places the intellectual intervention of his own scholarship. In particular, Skinner brings up at this point the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the respective Hague conventions on the laws of war, the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1922 and several other international and multinational agencies that seem to challenge state sovereignty (without including the EU in the early versions of the list), whereas Skinner's basic citations of theorists from international law and political theory that seem to vindicate his specific point consist in Norman Angell (: [1914] to think of the 'state' as the basic unit of political analysis is hopelessly outdated and "at variance with the facts"), A. D. Lindsay (: [1920] political facts have obviously outrun the doctrine of the independent sovereign state; "the League of Nations, if it is to mean anything at all, will have to impair the sovereignty of the states which join it"; we have lived onto in a world in which the 'state' as the "be-all and end-all" of political theory is finally out of date), Richard Falk (: [n.d.] "the old statist categories that have informed diplomacy and statecraft for centuries" are now being "so evidently superseded" that we shall soon cease to describe political life in these terms at all) and Frank Ankersmit (: [2007] "now for the first time in more than half a millennium the State is on the way out").²⁷⁷

Turning to a few critical points for Skinner's account for this late period, we may begin with a selection of clues. In the first place, we have noticed Skinner sympathizing rather with A2 vis-à-vis A1, even though the former authors are recognizably closer to the 'classical liberals', whereas A1 and its strong Continental grounds would probably be a more consistent choice. Besides, A2 is grouped by Skinner together with B2 as the second wave of Anglophone challenges to the 'fictional theory of the state' after that of the utilitarians/classical liberals. Furthermore, Skinner's construction of B2 is quite puzzling by itself, since its key instances are said to include both the rather sympathetic cases of Berlin and MacCallum as well as the more problematic libertarian cases, but not (or at least not quite clearly) Rawls. This being the case, it is not so clear whether (some kind of) liberalism remains at this point Skinner's

²⁷⁷ See Skinner (2009), pp. 359-360ff., (2010), pp. 42-44ff., whereas the case is brought forward in quite similar terms in (2018d), pp. 377-379, with the most crucial change probably lying in Skinner's attempt to present this set as a background precedent that has been strengthening the late B2 orthodoxy, towards which Foucault – and more silently Weber – is also brought forward to be intimating. One could also suggest parenthetically that Skinner's own following placement against this trend as well as against Rawls in these same pages of the initial pieces would probably turn Rawls into a C2 and Skinner himself into a C3, although this state of affairs would generate unresolved *aporiae* in turn as far as the divisions of B are concerned.

critical target against which he is interested to bring up external insights or not.²⁷⁸ The case becomes even more complicated with C, a category which seems to have no direct relation with any kind of liberalism and whose importance as a representative instance of dominant academic trends against which Skinner is supposed to intervene is quite questionable. In fact, in case one turns instead to the quite influential political-philosophical genre of the debates which have been generated on the basis of the Rawlsian idiom - Nozick included - , one could plausibly claim that the State or at least the ensemble of a society's governmental institutions seem to be probably the most substantial effective agents of such so-called 'normative' philosophies, which practically tend to focus on the provision of argumentatively qualitative legislative and judicial advice, irrespective of whether one wishes to view the State or its institutions as sovereign or not.²⁷⁹

Turning gradually to the side of the numerous apparent gaps, we may bring up two very basic occasions that also seem to suggest that it is not quite clear at all that the active role of the State is found on the retreat or that the State has stopped being used as a master concept in contemporary intellectual life. The first case has to do with the place of what one may plausibly count as corresponding to the State in the work of Keynes,²⁸⁰ an author who was not even mentioned in Skinner's B1, as well as the similar wide set of roles that are reserved for the State in the discipline of political economy, especially in the latter's so-called division of 'macro-economy'. Furthermore, one could bring up for the same purpose another quite canonized figure of the times, i.e. Weber, a *Staatswissenschaft* professor in Freiburg in his early days,²⁸¹ and, quite more crucially, the massive impact of the way Weberian insights were transcribed, however distortingly, in an extensive number of curricula and disciplines, including the treatment of the State as an acting agency by the Anglophone historical sociology.²⁸² In fact, as we have already noted, Weber's analytical definitions of the 'State' were brought up by Skinner in other crucial instances of his account, as was also the case with the

²⁷⁸ The case becomes quite expectedly obscurer in (2018d), pp. 377-379, with the silencing of B1 and the apparent downplaying of Skinner's sympathies towards A2, since we have noted that B2 seems to have gradually turned into a dominating "conservative" - "neo-liberal" ensemble against which Skinner's own Hobbesian theory of the state in its latest claimed outlook seems to be aiming to intervene.

²⁷⁹ In particular, Rawls' "major institutions" of the 'basic structure of society' seem to have been principally, though not exclusively, concerned with the governmental as well as with other state institutions, as one can tell out of Rawls' detailed institutional suggestions in (1999), Chapters IV.-V. and Sen's (2009, Chap. 2) relevant criticism of Rawls, whereas this has been also the case with Dworkin, whose main examples in his most influential theoretical pieces as well as his suggestions of practical applications of his views centre on "governments" and "officials" of a similar kind (2000); as for Nozick's (1974) celebrated strong criticism of the predominant State perspective which Nozick sensed that it was implied by Rawls, it is worth pointing out that Nozick himself was forced to attribute some crucial roles to the State as well when it came to the maintenance of his conception of rights.

²⁸⁰ See Skidelsky (2010).

²⁸¹ See Palonen (2017c), pp. 3-5.

²⁸² For an extensive analysis of the different ways in which Weber's work was transcribed in the Anglophone world throughout the previous century that also highlights the highly problematic understanding of Weber in the majority of these contexts see Scaff (2014), especially pp. 118-125, which focus on Weber's and on the Anglophone Weberians' 'sociology of the state'.

Anglophone historical sociology of the State. To be precise for the latter case, in the second volume of the *Foundations* Skinner inserted two critical footnotes on the weaknesses of Perry Anderson's almost contemporary [1974] *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, in the second of which Anderson's work is taken by Skinner to correspond only to the 'material preconditions' for the development of the free use of the term 'State' in "a more abstract and recognizably modern sense", against which Skinner introduces the distinct category of the 'intellectual preconditions', the autonomous presence of which he has attempted to bring to light throughout the work.²⁸³ However, in the 'Grand Theory' volume a few years later Skinner returns to Anderson's as well as Theda Skocpol's [1979] 'historical-sociological' work on the State in a more critical tone that seemed to approximate the entire genre of historical sociology with 'structuralism':

[m]ore recently, however, the general case in favour of a more structuralist approach has also been defended, while at the same time a number of writers – notably Perry Anderson and Theda Skocpol – have succeeded in deploying the evidence of historical case-studies in such a way as to press the argument for a more deterministic stance.²⁸⁴

Moreover, it should be noted that Weber seems to have been lately turned into a locus from which Skinner tries to keep some distance. In particular, in his 'genealogical' writings, Skinner noted that

[t]his [the genealogy of the state] is not to deny that one particular definition [of the state] has come to predominate. As handbooks of political theory regularly point out, there has been a noticeable tendency in recent times to think of the state – usually with a nod in the direction of Max Weber – as nothing more than the name of an established apparatus of government. [...] The issue that remains, however, is whether our thinking may have become impoverished as a result of our abandonment of a number of earlier and more explicitly normative theories that a genealogical survey brings to light,²⁸⁵

vindicating thus our earlier reading on the reasons behind Skinner's turn to 'genealogy'. Readers can notice that Skinner here is not that directly critical to Weber himself, but rather to the way Weberian insights had been received and transcribed in later influential debates, such as the one of 'historical sociology'. However, even if this is the case of Skinner's ultimate interests in Weber, it is not quite clear where would Weber's own relevant views fit into Skinner's divisions.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ See Skinner (1978b), pp. 264, 354.

²⁸⁴ Skinner (1985a), pp. 18-19.

²⁸⁵ Skinner (2009), p. 326 and (2010), p. 27.

²⁸⁶ For fuller accounts of Weber's multiple treatments and definitions of the State see Pierson (2004), pp. 5-17, Scaff (2014), pp. 118-125 and Palonen (2011), (2017a), who also takes into consideration the latest publications of Weber's work that had not been available in the past and who also discusses the political implications of Weber's views on the State. For Weber's political views and active engagements more generally see Mommsen (1989) and Palonen (2017b).

6. Conclusions

Turning to a few conclusions concerning Skinner's examined work as a whole, we will refer to three succeeding levels. We begin with a summing up of some overall conclusions concerning Skinner's *stricto sensu* methodological features as these have been extensively seen in practice throughout the main part of this chapter. Then we proceed to the broader perspective of judging Skinner's work in disciplinary grounds in order to be able to appreciate Skinner's methodological choices in more comprehensive terms, whereas in the end we discuss in a similar key the socio-political implications that Skinner's work seems to suggest.

Starting with the methodological level, one cannot help but acknowledge that Skinner definitely deserves to be praised as a pioneering mind for a number of reasons. In the first place, Skinner's extensive scholar work throughout all these decades has brought up the substantial introduction of a whole range of new sources that had been marginalized in the academic milieus of earlier times, such as the study of the writings of authors beyond the classical figures and their best-known works, as well as the more concentrated consideration of the precise circumstances that framed the individual cases as their more particular contexts.²⁸⁷ In this way, Skinner seems to have urged his readers who were studying what had been conventionally designated in the early times of his career as 'political philosophy' – a mostly late 18th and 19th century academic designation – or the 'history of ideas' to attend to their research objects up to their most concrete affecting circumstances and to mind for following the actual historical chains of events of each case in the strictest possible terms instead of resting satisfied with generalizations taken at face value, contributing thus substantially to the transformation of the aforementioned research areas into what tends to be mostly treated nowadays as '(the history of) political thought'²⁸⁸ and 'conceptual history' respectively. Furthermore, one should also add at this point that these same tendencies have been substantially encouraged not only as a result of the *Ideas in Context* series, which we have already brought up, but also from another Cambridge publication series owing to Skinner's initiative, i.e. the *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, a series that was initiated in 1989 and has substantially improved since then the access of interested researchers to the writings of an increasingly wide spectrum of significant political figures, as has been also the case with the subsequential and quite further-reaching Oxford series of the *Oxford World's Classics*, which was reshaped in this format in turn in 1996.

²⁸⁷ For a clear indication of Skinner's primary interests in the so-called 'minor texts' "in the hope that they will illuminate other texts of unquestionable importance" see (2002h), pp. 232-233.

²⁸⁸ On the introduction of the 'history of political thought' in Cambridge see the earlier parts of this dissertation. Furthermore, it is also very characteristically worth pointing out that Barker's original chair of Political Science, which Skinner also very influentially used to occupy as well, has been lately (2010) renamed as the chair of the Professor of the History of Political Thought; see James 2011, p. 397.

Nonetheless, our examination has shown that Skinner has tended to neglect showing any kind of an equally demanding concern for the 'special logic' of his schemes, a state of affairs that has been leading him to selective emphases, gaps, questionable and perplexing divisions, as well as several changes of mind. In these respects, Skinner could have been possibly assisted in the elaboration of more sustainable schemes for his works through a more 'social-scientific' or perhaps even through a philosophical cross-referencing of his various divisions. This means that Skinner could have been more actively assisted through a parallel consideration of the relevant practices and findings for each case drawn out of acknowledged contributions from the social sciences,²⁸⁹ as was in fact the case with his most esteemed book, the *Foundations*, whereas sanctioned perspectives and practices derived from philosophy's canonized figures may also serve the same end in Skinner's works, in case they do not do so already, as one can perhaps tell from Skinner's variable uses of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Berlin that we have already come across in various occasions.

In these respects, it might be worth insisting a little more on the distinctive merits of the *Foundations* as a concrete example of the benefits that we have in mind in our immediately preceding suggestion. More specifically, Skinner spent either entire chapters of the *Foundations* or substantial portions of the remaining parts of the work in the provision of thoroughly prepared summaries of the main events in political history that inform each particular examined case, achieving thus to highlight what Skinner described in his Conclusion as the interactions of the 'material' with the 'intellectual preconditions' for the free use of the term 'State' in the "more abstract and recognizably modern sense".²⁹⁰ This being so, Skinner's attentive concern in the selection and the carefully weighed ordering of the different features that are brought up for each case seem to be indicating the impact of the rigidity of the Weberian science of the time on Skinner's work back in those years, rendering thus the *Foundations* Skinner's Weberian work *par excellence*,²⁹¹ as one can also tell out of several features of the book. In the first place, the 1968 English translation of Weber's *Economy and Society* is Skinner's first citation in the entire work, even before the immediately following Collingwood.²⁹² Furthermore, not only does Skinner make extensive use of basic Weberian terminology throughout the work (e.g. 'legitimacy', 'ends', 'values' etc.), but Skinner's other basic conceptual tools strongly resemble Weber's

²⁸⁹ A quite striking case in which Skinner made use of this approach appears in (2018b), where Skinner discusses Milton's presence at Cambridge in the light of statistical and other kinds of comparative evidence on Milton's "generation". The case suggests an apparent allusion to the majestic use of such techniques by Peter Laslett, Skinner's early unofficial supervisor in Cambridge, in the course of the former's elaboration of his 'historical sociology', which involved a substantial focus on the insights to be gained through the comparisons of individually separated generations.

²⁹⁰ See Skinner (1978b), p. 354.

²⁹¹ On a quite straightforward -though slightly critical- acknowledgement by Skinner of Weber's importance for the *Foundations* in most of these respects see (2002h), p. 236. Note also Skinner's quite relevant remark earlier in the same interview (p. 232) that "my books tend to have rather elementary bits of political history in them at the beginning, and then a great deal of intertextual material". For a relevant point see Whatmore (2016b), pp. 104-107.

²⁹² See Skinner (1978a), p. x.

devices, since Skinner's analysis of 'rulers' and their 'rule' seems to correspond to Weber's *Herrschaft*, whereas Weber's *Zwecke* seem to be very close to Skinner's discussions of the more Machiavellian-nuanced 'aims' of the authors examined.²⁹³

Turning our point of view to the disciplinary level, we should note that, both in the examined case as well as throughout his entire career, Skinner has been tending to use 'History' as a powerful instrument for providing criticism to several established variations of 'Philosophy'.²⁹⁴ However, the assumption of an attitude of this kind invokes a few *aporiae*. An initial range of *aporiae* has to do with the reasons why someone would be interested to display that all that she or he is primarily concerned with is to provide 'external' criticism to 'Philosophy' for such a long period of time and whether this can be done convincingly through the use of 'History', an academic practice which, in the particular way Skinner has been practicing and promoting it, has gained credit principally in what one usually understands as 'political philosophy' or 'political theory'. In these respects, it is worth noting at this point that the attempt of Cambridge to replicate the *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought* series in the advancement of a *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy* project has not drawn a similar degree of attention, raising thus doubts on the direct application of Skinner's basic methodological suggestion of seeing the examined authors as trying to intervene in the form of issuing in their 'intentions'²⁹⁵ or legitimizing their 'aims' against the narrowly defined historical contexts of each case. In fact, it is not quite clear that the actual practice of the philosophers, who have devoted that great a portion of their labours in order to come up with refined reasonings on such topics as the well-ordered understanding of the natural and physical world, logic, causality and the perceived effects of the succession of time can be adequately appreciated simply by examining the authors' present-day circumstances and their interests to engage in practical interventions without any reference at all to wider non-interventionist considerations or at least to the quite regular existence of an interest to respond to preceding views of a similar kind, quite often

²⁹³ On these topics see Palonen (2004), Goldie (2006), pp. 4-8. In what has to do with the invocation of 'aims' here, one should also note that Skinner seems to return to this term at this point in place of his very influential advancement of the study of 'intentions' in (1969b), pp. 44-53 - already featuring in (1964), of which he had showed more substantial dependence in (1966b), aligning thus himself with Butterfield (1965) and the early Pocock (1957).

²⁹⁴ This has been apparently the case already in Skinner (1964) and (1965) as well as with his early academic formation as a whole, as Skinner himself acknowledges in (2002h), pp. 214-218, on the basis of what he seemed to have intended and conceived of as a radicalization of Laslett's practice in the latter's early historical investigations concerning the philosophical figure of Locke, and in (2002j), pp. 35-39, whereas Skinner's extensive account of the historian's role in the final part of (1998) pp. 101-120 and in the introductory note of (2002k), the similar presentation of his academic projects as those of an 'intellectual historian' in (2005b) - a designation to which Skinner was already alluding in (1988b), (1998) and (2002k) - and the late turn for methodological grounds to 'genealogy' in (2009) and (2010) seem to have been attempts to provide theoretical justifications of the same purpose. For a great number of applications of this aspect of Skinner's interests in the domains of 'political theory' and 'political science' more generally see Palonen (1998b), (2002), (2005) as well several other relevant essays of the same author collected in (2014b).

²⁹⁵ As previously noted, see Skinner (1964), (1969b), pp. 44-53; Skinner's interests to the term may be due to Wittgenstein's late student Anscombe (1957).

articulated well beyond the frames of reference that have been usually counting as 'contexts'.²⁹⁶ Furthermore, turning more clearly to the recognizable intervention of the human factor and more specifically towards the 'political' domain itself, we should note Skinner's lack of interest to deal with 'political economy', a discipline that has been both a matter of extensive preoccupation for the most constructive points of reference of what has come down to be accepted under the name of liberalism as the guiding political creed of the late centuries, from Locke and Montesquieu up to Weber and Amartya Sen, and a privileged object to be challenged for the most pressing critics of the times, from Rousseau to Foucault. In this case as well, it is not quite clear at all that the writings of 'political economy' were not intended to develop means and practices of a more permanent importance instead of serving merely as legitimizing or delegitimizing interventions of their authors to their present-day circumstances or that their later readers have not proven to be able to draw effective lessons from them to their own practical benefit. Nonetheless, and quite on the opposite to this way of seeing the relations between the disciplines, it might be worth pointing out that the practice of Philosophy by its most influential voices throughout its long presence as a rather disciplined and conscious activity has displayed a constant interest to integrate the intellectual innovations of each time within wider mental frames of reference. In these respects, a great number of the most canonized philosophical figures, from Plato and Aristotle up to Locke, Hume and Mill, to name but a quite respected selection, have been engaged either in substantial historical projects or/as well as into considering the role of History itself as an activity of interest for cultivated minds within wider frames, even though these aspects of their interests have been frequently downplayed as a result of present-day academic priorities.²⁹⁷ This being so, one may be allowed

²⁹⁶ For further *aporiae* on the uses of the 'context' by Skinner's circle see Burke (2002), where the explicit mentioning of Skinner and Pocock by name is left, with a minor exception, for the article's 19th page, and Jay (2011), pp. 557-562, whereas for some efforts to raise similar points against Skinner's claims with the use of Leo Strauss' highly problematic old-time intuitive idiom of 'perennial problems' in philosophy see Bevir (1992), (1994) and Lamb (2009a).

²⁹⁷ More specifically, restricting ourselves principally to the most canonized philosophical figures, readers interested in the presence of historical accounts in ancient Greek philosophy can have a look at Rossetti (2015), pp. 201-227, whereas what has been lately labeled in academics as the 'philosophy of history' (see the highly influential works in the preceding academic generations of Löwith 1949 and Walsh 1967) of a wide number of relevant figures from the following times up to the 20th century provides further reference points for this case. Furthermore, one could expand the case to other central philosophical figures that are usually read in this light. For instance, readers of Burrow's (2007) currently authoritative survey on the practice of the leading historians of the Western world from Ancient Greece up to present can consider the way in which several philosophical figures, such as Montesquieu and Hume have contributed to the shaping of the writing of history, as is also the case with Robertson's (2015, pp. 60-66) singling out of a considerable extent of interests in history by a wide range of 'Enlightenment' authors; for Locke's understanding of practicing a very specific kind of 'history' in his *Essay on Human Understanding*, to which we will later return in the following chapter, see Kindi (2014), pp. 99-103, whereas Mill's inclusion of the 'Historical Method' as the case of the - progressively more crucial - employment of the "inverse deductive method" in the "moral sciences" in the final parts of his *System of Logic* appears in (2006a), Book VI, Chapters X-XI. For more recent cases of the late times of a similar kind, see also the footnotes that follow.

to suggest that Skinner's persisting claim that "there is [...] simply no hope of seeking the point of studying the history of ideas [which conveniently substitutes at this point what had been mostly taken as 'Philosophy' at the time when these lines were written] in the attempt to learn directly from the classic authors by focusing on their attempted answers to supposedly timeless questions"²⁹⁸ might not necessarily be a quite satisfying presentation of the intellectual landscape at stake.²⁹⁹

In fact, Skinner's readers might also notice at the same time that, in contrast to his persisting use of 'History' *contra* 'Philosophy', Skinner seems to have been tacitly acknowledging Philosophy's vantage point in terms of elaborating more comprehensive perspectives of a persisting relevance in repeated occasions. In the first place, this had been the case both at the beginning and at the end of Skinner's apparently programmatic early methodological piece, the groundbreaking "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", in which, despite his long series of examples of the faults of philosophical readers of the time vis-à-vis a historian's approach, Skinner insists, under quite complicated terms and in a tone quite reminiscent of Wittgenstein and Collingwood, that he wishes to "invest the history of ideas with its own philosophical point".³⁰⁰

²⁹⁸ Skinner (1969b), p. 50.

²⁹⁹ Furthermore, it is also worth pointing out parenthetically that treating this subject-matter of the study of philosophy in this way would make Skinner join the list of the Oxford and Cambridge 'realists' whom Collingwood had earlier lamented in his *Autobiography* (2017, especially Chap. VI) for the annihilating demolition of all possible ways of seeking any kind of guidance from the positive doctrines of philosophical classics.

³⁰⁰ More specifically, in fulfilment of his introductory outline that "the attempt to substantiate this assertion [that the current literature in the history of ideas is filled with a series of conceptual muddles and mistaken empirical claims] must necessarily be somewhat critical and negative. I undertake it here, however, in the belief that it can be shown to yield much more positive and programmatic conclusions for the nature of the current confusions in the history of ideas points not merely to the need for an alternative approach, but also indicates what type of approach must necessarily be adopted if such confusions are to be avoided. I believe that this alternative approach would be more satisfactory as history, and moreover that it would serve to invest the history of ideas with its own philosophical point.". (1969b, p. 4), Skinner returns at this case in the final pages of the article, where we initially read that "the most exciting possibility [in the value of the history of ideas], which I cannot now explore, but which I have touched on [...], is the possibility of a dialogue between philosophical discussion and historical evidence" (pp. 49-50). Skinner then proceeds to maintain that "my main conclusion, however, is that the critique I have mounted already serves to suggest a much more obvious and less remote point about the philosophical value of studying the history of ideas", consisting in gaining negative knowledge on the faults of seeking 'perennial problems' and 'universal truths' in the philosophical classics and further explicated with highly twisting formulations that end up restricting these problems in seeking 'perennial answers' from such cases (pp. 50-52), right before trying to express himself in slightly more positive and equally perplexing formulations stating that "it is the very fact that the classic texts are concerned with their own quite alien problems [...] which seems to me to give [...] the key to the indispensable value of studying the history of ideas. The classic texts, especially in social, ethical, and political thought, help to reveal - if we let them - not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable moral assumptions and political commitments. It is in this, moreover, that their essential philosophical, even moral, value can be seen to lie", that "the very reason for regarding such histories as indispensably 'relevant', not because crude 'lessons' can be picked out of them, but because the history itself provides a lesson in self-knowledge", and that "to learn from the past [...] the distinction between what is necessary and what is the product merely of our own contingent arrangements, is to learn the key to self-awareness itself" (pp. 52-53). Notice Skinner's

Following this, the same attitude is apparently adopted in Skinner's declared "main reason" for the elaboration of his approach in the Preface of the *Foundations*, which consisted in the provision of an enhanced ability "to return to the classic texts themselves with a clearer prospect of understanding them",³⁰¹ in his mildly sympathizing introduction to the inspecting contextualization of his early 'Grand Theory' contemporaries, who were said to "have played, we believe, a role of exceptional importance in helping to bring about these changes of theoretical allegiance",³⁰² as well as in Skinner's claimed ordering of his reasons for his insistence on Hobbes' theory of the person of the State, for which case we read that "one reason for wishing to focus on Hobbes's answer to this question is essentially historical [...] a second reason for focusing on Hobbes is more strictly exegetical [...] my principal reason for concentrating on Hobbes, however, is a more philosophical one").³⁰³ Finally, this has been even more emphatically the case with Skinner's appeasing acknowledgement of the greater value of the works of the major philosophical figures more recently in his most telling interview, in which Skinner states:

*[a]s I have already confessed, however, there is a sense in which the acceptance of the idea of a canon underlay my work from the outset, and certainly helped to determine why I began by working on Hobbes. More recently, moreover, I have become easier in my mind about the reality of a canon of western philosophy. I am less dogmatically reluctant to recognise that there are deep continuities as well as ruptures within our inherited traditions of thought, and that the former are reflected in the fact that leading thinkers have always attended to the works of other and earlier thinkers.*³⁰⁴

In these respects, it is also worth noting that, in stark contrast to his portrait of 'Philosophy', Skinner has been treating 'History' as a relatively unproblematic discipline. This is quite obvious, in the first place, from the fact that Skinner has been wholly unconcerned to consider the criticisms towards History by a considerable number of such acknowledged minds of the late century from Weber and Saussure up to Foucault and beyond. Starting from Weber in these respects, it is worth noting that in his most extensive treatment of History, after a suggestion of the multiple ways in which particular concepts and empirical facts that were used rather unreflectively by the historians of his time could be employed for an equally multiple range of analyses bringing out different aspects of the cases at hand, Weber gradually turns his attention to the importance of working on the basis of a comparatively construed 'evaluative analysis' of the items of each case, prior to concluding that a scientific history should strive to

difficulty in coming up with more positive points as well as the Socratic tone in the concluding sentence and cf. these same passages in (2002c). Convoluted formulations of a directly similar kind also persist in (1988b), especially pp. 231-235.

³⁰¹ See Skinner (1978a), p. xiii.

³⁰² See Skinner (1985a), p. 6.

³⁰³ See Skinner (1999a), pp. 2-3:

³⁰⁴ See Skinner (2002j), p. 44.

present its items in the form of an accordingly elaborate 'adequate causation'.³⁰⁵ As for Saussure, who viewed Durkheimian sociology as one of the exemplars on which his conception for the sciences of 'linguistics' and 'semiology' was based, the isolation of the autonomous study of 'synchrony' beyond and prior to the historical study of 'diachrony' aimed to secure the analytical primacy of the detached examination of the interrelations of the particular contemporaneous elements of a specific language, Saussure's *langue*, prior to their equally illuminating comparative associations with previous and later states of the same language, allowing thus a substantial advancement in terms of the analytical possibilities for greater precision that have become available for the study of language beyond the holistic schemes of the historical linguistics that had been dominating the field up to that time.³⁰⁶ Turning also towards Britain, we should highlight at this point that, in contrast to the late Victorian trends of the British academic establishment towards an upgraded interest in history that have apparently influenced Skinner's intellectual formation and which we have already come across in the case of Cambridge, several influential mid-20th century Continental liberal minds that eventually found shelter in Britain expressed constructive discontents with the burdens and with the practice of what each one of them had been experiencing as 'history', echoing thus the perspectives of Weber and Saussure and turning instead to the elaboration of new methodological standpoints for history or against it.³⁰⁷ Furthermore, one could also bring to mind and reflect in the background light of these cases on the quite more imagined and strongly conditional Continental calls for a constant transformation of history that were brought forward by Wiesengrund Adorno and Benjamin³⁰⁸ as well as the comparatively more moderate pro-scientific calls of a similar intention - as a result of these authors' more informed epistemological background - found in Foucault's critical relations of his 'archaeological' and 'genealogical' methodological expositions with 'history' and his increasing tendency to simplify his research practice in the recognizable outlook of a scientific history in his academic lectures, and in Rancière.³⁰⁹ As for the latest Anglophone debates on the intellectual status of history and the more cautious scientific expectations one can have out of it, one should bring up in these respects the prevalent works of Hayden White and Ian Hacking,³¹⁰ which further remind us that History is nowhere but a panacea for the practice of the Humanities and their ever-changing trends of emphasis.

³⁰⁵ See Weber (2012b) and cf. Skinner's bringing up of Weber in (2002h), p. 226 in the convenient guise of a "great historian", whose work "asks fundamental questions about our understanding of social structure and social change", and who, had "he written a textbook about the history of Germany aimed at 'a wider audience', he would not only have misused his talents but would not have reached nearly as wide an audience as he eventually did".

³⁰⁶ See Saussure (1974).

³⁰⁷ See Gombrich (2005), Popper (2002) and Berlin (2012), where the last two authors acknowledge their significant dues to Weber.

³⁰⁸ See Wiesengrund Adorno (2006) and Benjamin (2007).

³⁰⁹ See Foucault (1998), (1989), (1984a), (1984b) and Rancière (2015). For a recent criticism of Skinner on the basis of this Continental genre see Jay (2011), pp. 562-569.

³¹⁰ For overviews of these cases, see Kindi (2010a), (2014).

In these same respects, Skinner has proven to have been almost completely uninterested into following the methodological debates within 'History' itself. To be precise, even though Skinner advanced a few publications thematizing the 'history of ideas' and 'intellectual history' in the early 1980s,³¹¹ it is quite surprising that such a strong personality has not shown an equally strong concern to situate himself at the forefront of the debates of a discipline on which the success of the reception of his work seems to have been so firmly based. In particular, in spite of having acknowledged the value of Maurice Mandelbaum's systematization of 'intellectual history' as a wider domain than that of the 'history of ideas'³¹² in his own programmatic piece on the 'history of ideas' a few years later,³¹³ Skinner did not pursue a strong presence in the following North American debates on 'intellectual history' between such historians as White, Roger Chartier and Dominick LaCapra.³¹⁴ As for the late years, even though we have noted that Skinner has gradually accepted the identity of the 'intellectual historian' as an overarching orientation for his work,³¹⁵ readers can pay attention to Skinner's expressed skepticism on the value of committing oneself to the historical labours implied in the directly relevant 'history of books' project³¹⁶ and to the fact that in a 2001 influential British conference that aimed to summarize the current historiographical trends,³¹⁷ British intellectual history was represented not by Skinner himself, but from one of his late disciples, who provided a rough sketch of a 'Cambridge School' and its points of convergence with the massively influential French historiography of the *Annales* genre and with a few other authors from third disciplines.³¹⁸ In these respects, as far as the consideration of the latter genre by Skinner himself is concerned, readers of the *Foundations* come across a single sympathetic reference of Febvre's 'mentalités' (without naming their introducer) in the Preface,³¹⁹ next to Skinner's persisting use of the 'ideological' idiom for the description of features of this same kind throughout the work, and a single critical footnote on a particular claim made by Braudel and the seemingly greater precision of the information provided on the same point by Le Roy Ladurie towards the end of the second volume of the book,³²⁰ whereas in the 'Grand Theory' volume the *Annales* School is left for the last individual chapter, which principally focuses on Braudel, as well as for Skinner's respectively last introductory commentary, in which Skinner brings up only Braudel's history of the Mediterranean as "that Bible of *Annales* historiography" and as being indicative of the extremely anti-individualistic call for the historians "to adopt a far more sociological as well as deterministic

³¹¹ See Palonen (2003), pp. 185-186.

³¹² Mandelbaum (1965).

³¹³ See Skinner (1969b), p. 3.

³¹⁴ On this debate see the characteristic contributions in LaCapra & Kaplan (1982).

³¹⁵ See Skinner (1988b), (1998), (2002k), (2005b), and quite characteristically (2012a), pp. 9-10.

³¹⁶ See Skinner (2005b) and cf. the themes discussed in (2018g).

³¹⁷ See Cannadine (2002).

³¹⁸ See Brett (2002).

³¹⁹ See Skinner (1978a), p. xi.

³²⁰ See Skinner (1978b), p. 258.

perspective”;³²¹ finally, what seemed to have succeeded these cases has been a reply of Skinner more than a decade later to an interview question asking about his view on the ‘mentalités’, in which he stated that “although Bloch and Febvre were great historians who wrote wonderful texts, I would not recommend a student to study a *mentalité*. To ask about an entire ensemble of beliefs is, for me, the wrong type of unit to take”, claiming for himself instead a fundamental interest in ‘linguistic contexts’ and describing thus his hermeneutical task as a “much more modest” one than the one involved in the study of the ‘mentalités’.³²² These instances provide another striking case of Skinner’s limited interest in disciplinary engagements with History, in which Skinner actually provides a quite impoverished and slightly polemic portrait of one of the most basic historiographical trends of the recent times.³²³

In all cases, the overall examination of all these instances may also serve as a further stress of the fact that Skinner has been retaining practically his entire attention instead in both the selection of his themes and in his choices of emphasis into the following of the changing popular debates in ‘Philosophy’ and ‘Politics’, against which Skinner has been using ‘History’ and the accompanying standing of the ‘scholar’ as a seemingly unfaulted perspective for testing their claims.³²⁴ Therefore, we might be allowed to claim a latent substantial dependence of Skinner on the workings produced in the first two out of these three broad disciplines. However, it is also worth noting in defense of Skinner that, as one can also tell out of Dunn’s and Pocock’s early methodological statements which appeared in the same years as Skinner’s and reflected a similar Cambridge-based

³²¹ See Skinner (1985a), p. 19 and cf. Skinner’s following criticism of Le Roy Ladurie in (1988b), pp. 242-243 as well as the more recent siding of “Fernand Braudel and the *Annales* School” next to the Marxist economism in (2016b), p. 126.

³²² See Skinner (2002h), pp. 231-232.

³²³ In these respects, cf. Le Goff’s (2015) characteristic absence of citations of the works of Skinner’s circle in his late work that touched relevant topics, including an emphatic omission of citing Skinner’s respective work in the former’s own discussion of Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s frescoes. Furthermore, another occasion in which Skinner stated his views and preferences in terms of a wider picture that was meant to consider current historiographical trends can be seen from his brief reply to a relevant question in an interview which was published in a Greek newspaper, where Skinner maintained that “historians are no preachers and it is not their job to tell their readers what they should be thinking. Their job is to provide their readers the information that will allow them to form better judgements. The most suitable language for them to perform this task is, in my view, that of distance and impartiality. Of course we do the right thing when we allow to our values to choose for us the topic that we will study and, to be honest, I do not see how this could be done differently. But from the moment we choose our topic, I think that we should try to write it down in the way of an angel that records rather than that of a judge that hangs” (2007b). Readers may notice Skinner’s overarching Weberian orientation in this passage, which is then followed by a discrete criticism of Ginzburg’s (1999) attempted analogy of the historian’s practice to that of a judge, in whose place Skinner seems to be pointing towards a moderate appropriation of Benjamin’s (2007) invocation of the picture of the Angel of History. Nonetheless, Skinner’s interest to discuss all these cases remains in quite short and discrete terms.

³²⁴ For a quite substantial moderation of this overarching outlook see Skinner’s introductory stated aim in (2018h), p. 1 “to supply *enough history* to understand the meanings and intentions of the writers I discuss by recovering the circumstances in which they wrote” (added emphasis), where this claim is originally put forward on the basis of the authority of a corresponding passage of Hobbes.

educational background,³²⁵ the ‘philosophy’ and the ‘political philosophy’ Skinner had in mind as an object to be criticized consisted in the attempt to construct encompassing schemes for the views of one or more classical philosophical figures on the basis of patterns provided by philosophically-influenced projects on logic or linguistics, as was quite characteristically the case with the analytical logic project in Cambridge, without taking into substantial consideration the use of concrete-based evidence for each particular case under examination. However, as we have already noted, this is certainly far from a quite satisfying portrait of Philosophy as a whole, as Skinner’s most-sympathizing philosopher Collingwood himself had also noted in his *Autobiography*, having specifically in mind this and other relevant British academic philosophical projects.³²⁶ Quite on the contrary and staying on the figures upon which the cultural autonomy of the educational practice of philosophy is commonly taken to have been established, it is worth pointing out that Socrates’ oral and quite conversational creed as well as the subsequent provisions of lively exchanges of argument between the different voices in the Platonic dialogues do not seem to fit into the exhaustion of philosophy to projects of the aforementioned kind. In fact, Skinner’s most impressive methodological innovation which we have reserved for the end of this survey, the extensive use of direct quotes of the examined authors in each case of his works for exegetical purposes, seems to have provided a cost-effective means for a greater approximation of this highly sanctioned practice of philosophy than the ones provided by the analytical logic project.³²⁷ Besides, Skinner seems to have pointed to a thin irony in the use of this practice as one can tell out of his description of the adoption of this same practice of direct quotations by the authors examined in the late chapters of the *Foundations* as ‘plagiarism’,³²⁸ providing thus a further association with the classical Greek philosophical legacy and more specifically with the Socratic-Platonic employments of *palinodies*.

As for the historian Skinner’s most obvious dues to Philosophy, which have to do with the everlasting acknowledgement of his dues to Collingwood, they seem to deserve particular attention. More specifically, the philosopher Collingwood and his distinctive understanding of all knowledge as being essentially historical in character as seen his *Autobiography*³²⁹ has definitely been, in Skinner’s own words, “the most immediate and powerful influence in the direction of my work”³³⁰ from the outset and throughout all crucial points, in spite of Skinner’s declared keeping of a few distances.³³¹ In these respects,

³²⁵ See Dunn (1968b), Skinner (1969b) and Pocock (1971c).

³²⁶ See Collingwood (2017), Chaps. IV and V.

³²⁷ For an account of the impression caused by the introduction of this practice by Skinner see Goldie (2006), pp. 4-6.

³²⁸ See Skinner (1978b). In these respects, Jay’s latest (2013) and quite sympathetic “complementary” siding of Skinner next to White in terms of the common feature of a “Socratic and dramatic irony” set against what is seen as the “unstable and paradoxical irony” of poststructuralists seems to be in need of substantial revisions.

³²⁹ See Collingwood (2017).

³³⁰ Skinner (2002j), p. 45.

³³¹ See Skinner (1969b), pp. 7, 37-38, 50-51, in the last two pages of which Skinner distances himself from Collingwood’s “strong thesis” that “the fact that we can identify his [a

Skinner has been usually isolating only two specific points out of Collingwood's *Autobiography*, consisting respectively in the call for viewing the entirety of the labours of the study of philosophy as reconstructing the shifting complexes of particular questions and answers, and in the need to identify the particular historical 'context' involved in each case,³³² and which points Skinner has been acknowledging as the "two methodological injunctions that together formed much of my critique of the history of philosophy".³³³ Nonetheless, readers should pay attention to the fact that Skinner basically brings up only these few pages of Collingwood's relevant chapters of the latter's sharing of a few intimate aspects that had been shaping the course of his thought in his *Autobiography* instead of a more proper consideration of the arguments of the entire book or Collingwood's fuller theoretical statement on these topics that is found in the latter's *Idea of History*,³³⁴ which would seem to be more unfitting for the justification of Skinner's own claims due to the more idealistic connotations of the latter book.³³⁵ In all cases, the actual extent of Collingwood's importance as the ultimate philosophical sanctioning of Skinner's project as a whole can be also seen out of Skinner's contribution to a collected volume aiming to summarize international variations in the study of political thought and edited by Skinner's more theoretically minded and non-Cambridge-based British colleagues, in which Skinner tried to provide an "effective theoretical defence" of a "Collingwoodian approach to the history of political thought", mainly based on the same passages and said to have also crucially informed (though quite implicitly) the work of the other Cambridge-educated major scholars of the genre. However, it is worth pointing out that this defense of Skinner principally lies in the hypothetical gains to be expected from the extension of Collingwood's views in comparison to the weaknesses of older Continental trends, such as deconstruction and hermeneutics, whereas Skinner has not been interested to return to a similar attempt since.³³⁶ Quite on the contrary instead, Skinner later sought to distance himself even further from Collingwood, who was said on a subsequent occasion to have employed an "unfortunate phrase" in his crucially distinctive call in *The Idea of History* "to think other people's thoughts after them" when compared to the following - and less "traditional" - voices of a much more broadly conceived 20th century European and American 'hermeneutics', depicted in this case as having been broad enough so as to have included the "deconstructive moment", which is presently claimed to "have passed", raising

philosopher's] problem is proof that he has solved it", (1978a), p. x, (1998), p. 102, (2002c), pp. 59, 83, 85-88, where the reference to Collingwood's aforementioned "strong thesis" was omitted, (2002h), pp. 216, 222, 233-234, and (2002j), pp. 35, 42, 45-48, 52.

³³² These points appear in fuller form in Collingwood (2017), Chaps. V and X respectively; cf. Skinner's reading of both cases.

³³³ See Skinner (2002j), pp. 45-46.

³³⁴ See Collingwood (1946), Part V.

³³⁵ On this topic and on Skinner's relations with Collingwood more generally see Palonen (2003), pp. 14-17 and Hamilton-Bleakley (2006), pp. 22-24.

³³⁶ See Skinner (2001).

thus doubts on the soundness of the claims that had been guiding a considerable part of his earlier work.³³⁷

Finally, we will use the case that we have been examining in this chapter as a device for a reflection on the socio-political implications of Skinner's work. In these respects, the fairest way to begin with seem to pass through a bringing up of the relevant merits of the case. More specifically, Skinner's advancement of new sources and new points of emphasis has had the effect of retrieving several heritages from the past to our present-day consciousness, broadening thus the extent of our present possibilities of political reflection. As we have already observed throughout this chapter, this has been quite emphatically the case with republicanism, which has also lately included Skinner's interest to supervise a research program specifically meant to retrieve the "shared heritage" of an European republicanism.³³⁸ Furthermore, we have also noticed that Skinner has proceeded even further in claiming a clearer distinctive relevance for present-day politics of this kind of interests in republicanism that have assumed up to present the form of a distinctive understanding of liberty.³³⁹

Nonetheless and in accordance with the issues raised in the previous levels, Skinner has been quite eclectic when it comes to the fuller articulation of his own political views. In these respects, Skinner usually provides support to a wide range of relatively commonsensical demands. For instance, in the concluding remarks of his account of 'liberty' right after the treatment of the 20th century, Skinner lists a great number of problematic instances of the present which he takes to be indicative of the need to reconsider the merits of the neo-Roman view of liberty:

[c]onsider, for example, the current predicament of the British people, who have for so long prided themselves on the enjoyment of their liberties. They now find themselves living more and more under asymmetric relations of power and powerlessness. The triumph of free markets, with the concomitant collapse of trade union movements, has left successive governments subject to blackmail by multinational corporations while leaving the work-force increasingly dependent on the arbitrary power of employers. Meanwhile the British people still lack a written constitution, and accordingly remain bereft of any liberties that their Executive cannot decide to take away. Ethnic minorities remain under continuing pressure to conform to a normative account of what it means to be British, an account that

³³⁷ See Skinner (2008a); the tacit suggestion of this weakness of Collingwood also appears in (1988b), p. 252.

³³⁸ For the substantial corpus of research work that has emerged out of this program see van Gelderen & Skinner (2002a), (2002b). The author might be allowed to indicate at this point that this outlook of a shared European heritage of republicanism does not include instances coming from the long literate history of the once actual birthplace of Western democracy, i.e. Greece, even though Skinner's Cambridge circle had already attempted a few years earlier to present a relevant volume on 'democracy' that did start from ancient Athens and which was "interestingly published by Oxford University Press - not Cambridge" (Hampsher-Monk 2001, p. 170). See Dunn (1992). For an attempt to discuss Greek cases on the basis of the aforementioned 'republican' idiom see Kitromilides (2003), (2006), (2013), chap. 9.

³³⁹ For Skinner's clearest political advocacies of 'republicanism' on the basis of its claimed distinctive understanding of liberty, which seem to have survived Skinner's invention of the 'neo-Roman' idiom, see (2007a), (2011a), pp. 278-280, 283-284 and (2017), pp. 2-4.

devalues much of their culture while undermining their freedom to criticise. The British people as a whole have no power to check their governments, save by changing them at frequent intervals. Nor does the Legislative, thanks to the unparalleled size of recent parliamentary majorities, have any effective capacity to check the Executive. Any checks constituted by the existence of a second chamber have been made residual, and Britain remains the only country within the European Union to operate with the paradoxical concept of a non-elected representative assembly. The outcome is an unregulated system of Executive power, with the body of the people and their representatives alike condemned to a state of corresponding dependence. With the passing of the latest Anti-Terrorism Act, even the fundamental right of habeas corpus has been jeopardized. There is now a power of detention, without charge or trial, on mere suspicion of having committed an offence.³⁴⁰

Once again, it is far from clear how would all these political demands fit together in a reasonably justified scheme that assesses the particular weights of each case, as the hard labours of all political theorists of the previous century have been constantly proving as well as whether this fitting in can be effectively performed in terms of Skinner's 'neo-Roman' theory of liberty. In fact, it is also worth noting that Skinner himself seems to have pointed out to this kind of disordered heterogeneity in the previous page of the same article, in which the three different traditions of liberty were said to have responded in the past to "important human interests" which were specified in quite comparable terms to those appearing in Skinner's list of present-day problems to be dealt with through the neo-Roman theory of liberty. In particular, the neo-Roman tradition was said to have "worked well for those whose chief concern was to limit the exercise of arbitrary power", the Hobbesian/'classical liberal' tradition was said to have "worked well for those who wished to insist that contracts are free so long as they are not coercive and that colonisation is legitimate so long as subject peoples are not actively oppressed", whereas 'positive' liberty was said to have "worked well for those who aspired to check the ravages of free markets and to insist on the duty of the state to help those who are unable to help themselves".³⁴¹

Furthermore, as soon as Skinner's political views leave common sense, they seem to be turning to the direction of heterogeneous insights drawn from his historical research. As we have been noticing across our study once again, this has been characteristically the case with the rather opposing calls for more 'republicanism' and for the acknowledgement of a quite active agency to the state.³⁴² In these respects, it is worth insisting more particularly on the fact that, in clear distance from Skinner's concluding remarks in our lastly examined passage that the effect of what is taken to be the current acceptance of the Hobbesian/'classical liberal' freedom has been "to shift the balance away from the liberty of citizens and towards increasingly arbitrary forms of state authority" and that "if we believe in democracy, we shall want to shift the balance back

³⁴⁰ Skinner (2003), pp. 24-25.

³⁴¹ See Skinner (2003), p. 24.

³⁴² A similar point also appears in Perreau-Saussine (2007).

again”,³⁴³ Skinner closes his late ‘genealogical’ writings on the state with a call for taking more seriously the need of conceiving of public power in terms of the fictional theory of the state, for which claim he brings up what he takes to be two characteristic instances. The first instance, which is claimed to be introduced *contra* Rawls, has to do with situations related to times of “emergency” or “crisis”, for which Skinner accepts that they suggest that “there must be a strong case for saying that the person whose life most urgently needs to be saved is the person of the state”. Skinner’s choice of terms makes clear that the reference point behind this claim is apparently the notorious conservative jurist Carl Schmitt, a decisive early influence on the hard-working Reinhart Koselleck, the main *Begriffsgeschichte* scholar with whom Skinner’s work has been lately sided.³⁴⁴ In all cases and irrespectively of the reasons for this particular choice, Skinner’s aptness to pick a feature out of Schmitt’s employment of the ‘State’ instead of considering how Weber, or at least one of Schmitt’s most direct liberal respondents, the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen, who suggested that the way Schmitt and several other German voices of the time represented the State tended to transform the latter into a “metaphysical wonder”,³⁴⁵ would respond to a claim like this seems to raise further difficulties in terms of fittingness with Skinner’s republican cause and its claimed defense of liberty as the absence of dependence.³⁴⁶ As for Skinner’s second instance in favour of the fictional theory of the state, this has to do with the “need to be able to make sense of the claim that some government actions have the effect of binding not merely the body of the people but their remote posterity”, for which case Skinner brings up as an example the decision of a government to incur a public debt and the need of the *persona ficta* of the state as a person beyond specific governments that can be “sufficiently enduring to be capable of owing and eventually repaying such debts”³⁴⁷ and which similarly seems to neglect considering the criticisms of the manipulative impacts attached to the concept of public debts which have been raised already since the times of Hume, Paine and Kant. This being the case, Skinner’s advancement of the fictional theory of the state as a whole creates apparent difficulties in terms of fittingness with the rest of his political views, especially as soon as one considers Skinner’s claim at the same point that “the absolutist and populist theories [of the state] [...] are nowadays of exclusively historical interest”.³⁴⁸ In fact, Skinner’s lack of interest for a consideration of the political relevance of popular sovereignty, which can be also seen from his lack of contributing not even a preface in a recent volume partially edited by himself

³⁴³ See Skinner (2003), p. 25.

³⁴⁴ On the origins of this siding see Richter (1986), (1987), (1990), Ball, Farr & Hanson (1989) and Palonen (1999).

³⁴⁵ On Kelsen see Baume (2012).

³⁴⁶ It is worth pointing out that this overall ‘Schmitt *contra* Rawls’ case has been wholly omitted from Skinner (2018d), pp. 381-382.

³⁴⁷ This instance persists in (2018d), p. 381, where Skinner establishes his argument on the basis of the relevant points made by Pufendorf and Sieyès.

³⁴⁸ On all these claims see Skinner (2009), pp. 361-364, (2010), pp. 45-46 and for an attempt to mediate between such notions in these terms see Palonen (2017a), pp. 131-132.

on the history of popular sovereignty,³⁴⁹ seems to create hard-to-resolve barriers to an accommodation of this claim with Skinner's 'republicanism' as well as with his more particular demands, which have been shaped by creeds that have actually rested on the background of the acceptance of the notion of popular sovereignty.³⁵⁰

The preceding presentation of Skinner's political views might allow us to close this part of our survey with a conclusion for this particular case which could possibly prove to be more telling for thoughtful readers of this chapter who might share the author's appreciation of the wide perspective in the humanities. In particular, even though the political attitude which we have identified in Skinner's work could be regarded as quite legitimate in many respects, it still produces *aporiae* on the way Skinner's different demands and perspectives could possibly fit in a consistent scheme. In fact, it is these kinds of problems that seem to have been a shared concern for all the past intellects that Skinner has been studying for practically his entire lifetime and perhaps this is an important insight in itself that Skinner can possibly go on adopting from the hard labours of so many minds.

³⁴⁹ Bourke & Skinner (2016).

³⁵⁰ In these respects, it is worth noting that Skinner has started working on the accommodation of such claims in the concluding (2018d), pp. 382-383, where the current relevance of the Hobbesian theory of the state is said to be most importantly vindicated via its newly presented implication of meaning the state to be standing for as an enduring "substantial ideal of the common good" that can serve as a standard for the assessment of the acts of particular governments.

III JOHN DUNN'S WORK ON DEMOCRACY & ITS HISTORY*

To retain a cordial engagement with issues that have assumed a quite visible place among the most immediate concerns of the broad public of our contemporary world has been increasingly proving to be far from a simple case for academics seriously committed to their work. However, the presentation throughout this study hopes to have been already suggesting up to this point that the 'Cambridge School' minds under examination offer us a very rare instance of such a combination of retaining a highly meritorious devotion to the hard labours of professional academics without losing from sight the political impact with which their work has been expectedly accompanied in the ever-changing present. This being so, there seems to be no better way to close our main chapters than with a more concentrated examination of the work of John Dunn, who can certainly be considered as the Cambridge mind who has done most to preserve this feature as a plain matter of ongoing priority in his writings throughout his career. In these respects, we will have a look at Dunn's work on democracy as a case of considerable interest and extent to be appreciated in terms similar to those that we employed for Skinner's work on the State. We will begin by bringing up a few very basic points concerning the main contexts as well as the method that will be informing our approach in this chapter. Following this, we will examine the parts

* Preliminary versions of this chapter were presented at the International Society for Intellectual History Conference 'Borders, Boundaries and Limits' in St Andrews, Scotland, UK in June 2018 and at the 21st International Conference on the History of Concepts 'Interdisciplinarity: Conceptual Explorations' in Málaga, Spain in September 2018. The author has received extensive benefit from the commentary on his work in both occasions. Furthermore, the author has been tremendously assisted by his academic visit at the Department of Politics and International Studies of the University of Cambridge during the spring semester of 2018, for which case he should express his deep gratitude to Prof. David Runciman, as Head of Department, Prof. (then Dr.) Duncan Kelly, Dr. Samuel James, and Dr. Michael Sonenscher, among a wide range of Cambridge-residing scholars very keen to exchange their views. This occasion also included an extensive interview that Prof. Dunn himself generously provided to the author, keeping him thus safe from presenting several insufficiently supported statements at this place. All views and possible errors rest solely on the author's responsibility.

out of Dunn's quite extensive academic production that accord with our interests in a rather chronological order, whereas we have reserved a few more general conclusions for the end.

1. Contexts and method

Starting with the far-reaching matter of contexts, this chapter would like to suggest that one of the most convenient ways to introduce ourselves to Dunn's voluminous work seems to be provided through its preliminary division in terms of the successive standings and offices that Dunn has assumed from his first steps in academics up to this day.³⁵¹ In these respects, one of the first issues that is worth pointing out is that, as Dunn himself has acknowledged, his interest in politics quite much preceded the beginning of his academic studies, in which he was drawn to remain at the Historical Tripos at Cambridge in the absence of any other more satisfying alternative in the institution for a young and ambitiously hard-working student's crave to "save the world".³⁵² This being so, the next matter to which one needs to turn their attention is the fact that, right after the completion of his distinctive studies at the department of History (1958-1964), Dunn showed a quite apparent concern to divide his time as a Cambridge academic into both the flourishing practice of studying history at the institution and to a more engaged interest in the specific study of politics, as one can tell out of his initial holdings of teaching posts mostly in parallel both as a College Lecturer in History (1966-1986), on the one hand, and as a Lecturer in Political Science (1972-1977) who then turned into a Reader in Politics (1977-1987), on the other.³⁵³ This concern to keep up a place for politics within an environment where history was unceasingly gaining ground makes it not hard to see that it is to his more peculiar interest in the study of the former that Dunn seems to have gradually settled his mind to commit his professional labours, as one can further tell from his follow-

³⁵¹ The biographical information presented in this unit and beyond comes from sources of three kinds. The first of them is a late version of Dunn's *curriculum vitae* that the Professor kindly provided to the author, allowing him thus to avoid uncertainties in chronologies and attributions of official titles; the second source is the Professor's equally illuminating aforementioned interview to the author, whereas the third source is Dunn's older published interviews and retrospective accounts, such as (2006b), (2012a), (2017), (2018c), (2019c) and (2020a), in which cases he further discusses crucial parts of his biography at different lengths in starkly straightforward terms.

³⁵² See particularly (2012a), pp. 181-184, where Dunn specifically uses the cited phrase when describing himself in respect to those years, as well as (2019a), pp. 2-3. What is also further worth pointing out at this place also is Dunn's repeated acknowledgement in these as well as in many other occasions that his interest in politics was principally raised as a result of a young Briton's tragic encounters with strongly politically conditioned settings in devastation abroad, starting from his very early years in life, such as the sight of Hamburg's post-war ruins, of the political vicissitudes of Iran, of India, later of Ghana and so on, which may also account for the gradual development of his interest to cover an increasing part of the globe in his pieces to which we turn at the appropriate places.

³⁵³ For a brief personal account of Dunn's trajectory across these three offices and the role of his interest in politics in the process see (2019c).

ing election to the chair of Professor of Political Theory (1987-2007), which signifies the next phase in Dunn's career as an academic. As for the latest years, the same case can be said to persist, since starting from 2008 Dunn has been rewarded for a lifetime's labours with the assumption of the quite esteemed and much more released status of Emeritus Professor of Political Theory, which seems to have already quite much led him to reshape the priorities of his earlier career through the exploration of further aspects in his themes of interest. This being so, a retrospective view of Dunn's career as a whole in this light provides us with three distinctive phases that can serve as the very broad contexts to be kept in mind for a situated ordering of his intellectual production. In fact, this choice seems to be also quite characteristically vindicated by the very similarly corresponding major shifts in Dunn's works that we have employed as primary sources for our topic. In the light of this case, our subsequent analysis of Dunn's works broadly corresponds to Dunn's three successive academic positions, whereas the latter will also serve as the bases upon which the more particular contexts at work in each circumstance will be introduced.³⁵⁴

Having provided an outline of the broad contexts of Dunn's career in this way also allows us to introduce the main titles of his work upon which this chapter will seek to turn the focus on a more individual basis. From this point of view, the first thing to note is that as a result of Dunn's ever-growing production of texts of various lengths, levels of abstraction and geographical ranges of reference on democracy, which seem to suggest different kinds of most immediate receivers for each case, our primary sources principally reflect a carefully weighed selection of the occasions in which Dunn studied democracy at length in recognizably historical terms extending beyond the discussion of singular localities and simpler reflections on present-day occasions, and in which democracy was usually quite much the main theme under consideration. What this choice aims to bring to light is Dunn's most direct treatment and reflection on the widest possible range of concrete instances with which he has been working on the topic as a means that can allow us to assess both his merits as a historian scholar working with concrete cases and to convey to readers the depth of the specifically acquired knowledge on democracy that has been informing his more abstract pieces and commentaries on events of his ever-moving present. In

³⁵⁴ As far as the distribution of particular contexts between the main text and the footnotes in this chapter is concerned, the same general principles to those employed for Skinner's case apply, i.e. the contexts that appear in the main text are those that allow readers to keep in mind the overall shape of the evolution of Dunn's work across the years, whereas more concretely affecting contexts and further interpretative comments have been reserved for the notes. One short issue that might be in need of further clarification has to do with the fact that since the main works analyzed in this chapter are discussed in a more straightforwardly chronological order, it has been thought best to retain certain contexts that seem to have affected each period of Dunn's work at large in the main text despite their relative time-boundedness. This presentation device was not used for Skinner's work, since the different periods covered by those pieces did not correspond to such a straight or full chronological order in terms of their appearance in publications. This being so, a comparison between the shifts within Skinner's treatment of each broad historical period in his subject matter allowed for a more effective isolation of the issues of interest for our examination instead of a more sequential following of his publication record.

these respects, after an initial consideration of Dunn's crucial focus on Locke in his early academic years, the first source that we will examine in depth is his first historical study of 'democratic theory', which was originally published in 1979 as the first chapter of his short book that bore the quite revealing title for Dunn's concerns in those years *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* and which was based on a series of invited lectures that Dunn gave at the University of British Columbia in Canada in 1977.³⁵⁵ Our next source to be examined in detail comes from a collective volume edited by Dunn on the history of democracy, which was first published in 1992 under the accordingly characteristic title *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey – 508 BC - 1993 AD*,³⁵⁶ and for which Dunn had gathered an outstanding cast of historians of individual expertise to serve as contributors on the different periods and settings that the volume addressed, including a piece authored by Skinner on the Italian city-republics among them.³⁵⁷ This unprecedented collection of qualitative pieces on basic episodes in the long history of democracy enabled the editor in turn to close the volume with an extensive 'Conclusion' that consisted in a very detailed overview of the topic and which allows us to have the closest possible look of Dunn's most historically elaborated reflections on democracy at work in those early years of his holding the chair of Professor of Political Theory.³⁵⁸ Our next source of analytical consideration brings us to the end of this period in Dunn's career, since it consists in Dunn's own research of an impressive reach on the history of democracy from the ancient times to his present in a vast range of geographical settings in his book which was first published in 2005 under the title *Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy*.³⁵⁹ As for the latest years, our main source will be Dunn's short book which was originally published in 2014 with the title *Breaking Democracy's Spell*, again based on a distinguished lecture series coming from 2011,³⁶⁰ and in which Dunn both summarized in a slightly new key some of his core findings and thoughts that had featured in *Setting the People Free* and went on to present new relevant historical findings mostly in reference to geographical regions lying beyond the scope that his previous book had managed to cover.

Aside from the variety of institutional standpoints and the different kinds of academic writings that we have already identified, the quite composite landscape of Dunn's intellectual career is also manifest in his very shifting use of language, interests in exposition and prioritizations of themes with which readers of his different writings on democracy come up and which seem to require a yet more focused persistence on a consistent method. This being so, this

³⁵⁵ Dunn (1979a); republished in a more easily accessible Canto edition (1993a) very shortly after our following main source.

³⁵⁶ Dunn (1992e).

³⁵⁷ Skinner (1992).

³⁵⁸ Dunn (1992c).

³⁵⁹ Dunn (2005b); reissued in the United States under the title *Democracy: A History* as (2006a) and nowadays available in a second edition under the original title as (2019a).

³⁶⁰ Dunn (2014). Adding to the record of works of an interested to those examined in this chapter, one should also add that an article based of a recent lecture of Prof. Dunn's in China will appear in print very soon as (2020b). The author's humble view is that this article summarizes the earlier works analyzed here in substantial continuity to the Professor's already crafted approach that we will go on to unravel.

chapter will be approaching the writings under examination in an attitude that aims to insist on what could be considered in Weber's language to stand as the commonly perceived 'values' at stake in each case, as one may judge them to be so by extracting, or - in rather more strictly Weberian terms - by stressing them as 'one-sided viewpoints' out of the subject matter under discussion.³⁶¹ Furthermore, it is also hoped that this kind of approach will allow us to shed some further light on the specific ways in which Dunn sought to associate with one another the different kinds of primary facts of experience that he has been using in his examined works, in an effort to make more visible what would be in Weber's terms the 'special logic' that underlies Dunn's different treatments of democracy as a theme.³⁶² Weber's specific uses of 'values' in these respects seem to be particularly fitting for the peculiarities of Dunn's overall work that we have been presenting in an outline form, since they allow both for an appeal to functional common denominators meant to facilitate the overall interpretation of a complex case under examination and for not losing from sight that devices of this kind neither exhaust the entirety of meaningful information that one may reasonably extract out of the items considered, nor - let alone - impose any kind of necessary mental approbation, theoretical, moral or of any other kind, to their users, as Weber sought to suggest through his well-known references to 'value-relatedness' and 'value-freedom' respectively.³⁶³

2. Dunn's early work on Locke and democracy

In order to appreciate Dunn's writings in the opening years of his career in Cambridge, one seems to be in possession of no better way of access than the identification of some more particular contexts of decisive importance that can help us account for his early intellectual formation in fuller light. From this point of view, one needs to turn first of all to the constructive role that two quite distinguished

³⁶¹ Weber's most definitive account of the place of 'values', usually introduced as a term by the same author with the use of quotation marks, within his much more comprehensive elaboration of a reliable method for the working out of his views when dealing with more individualized topics appears in (2019), pp. 80-81ff., where Weber turns his readers to his older methodological articles, including (2012a), in which the way of working with 'one-sided viewpoints' is presented in length.

³⁶² On Weber's concept of 'special logic' see his (2012b), pp. 139-140ff. It should be also noted that in what follows we are retaining in this chapter also the use of the conventional divisions of the presented concrete instances that Dunn considers in his works with designations of an alphabetical and numerical sequence (e.g. A1, A2, B1, B2 and so on) in order to allow readers to keep more easily in mind the 'special logic' that we suggest as being applicable for each case. Even though Dunn's mode of work with his subject matter does not render necessary a discussion of particular gaps and *aporiae* in the way we found them useful for Skinner's writings, this feature still allows readers to compare how Dunn moves from one source and one period to another within a single text or from one text to another, preparing thus the ground for our discussion of the place that comparison appreciated as a method can be seen to have had in Dunn's work as a whole.

³⁶³ For Weber's all-too-popular and quite accordingly all-too-often misunderstood concepts of *Wertbeziehung* and *Wertfreiheit* - which is again specifically employed by Weber with the use of quotation marks, see his (2012a) and (2012c) respectively.

lecturers in Cambridge had on Dunn while he was still a student. The first of them was no other than Laslett, an outstandingly energetic social historian in the making in the 1960's, which is when he agreed to serve as Dunn's doctoral supervisor. A few years earlier, in 1960, Laslett had accomplished the publication of his nowadays renowned critical edition of Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*, quite obviously a product of several years of very demanding labour that Laslett would keep on improving for decades and which, along with its introduction and critical footnotes on the main text, set up new and highly impressive standards for the academic scholarship that was meant to be appreciating the grand philosophical figures of the past.³⁶⁴ Next to Laslett, another quite active tutoring influence that one needs to take into consideration for Dunn's early intellectual formation is that of the American-turned-British classicist Moses Isaac Finley, whom Dunn first met at the third year of his studies at Cambridge and who would quite much capture Dunn's attention with his open seminar in that year (1961), which included an extensive examination of ancient Athenian democracy and thus proved to have been Dunn's first substantial engagement with a topic that he would then be studying for several decades to come.³⁶⁵ Both of these topics, Locke and democracy, were also to become crucial for the more critical contexts in which Dunn found himself to be engaged from quite early on in the course of those years, since both were quite straightforwardly challenged by the Canadian Marxist political theorist C. B. Macpherson's reductionist account of English philosophical figures from Hobbes to Locke as apologists of an early capitalism in his book on *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962), as well as by his numerous similarly-purposed worked essays that were to be ultimately republished in his collection *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (1973).³⁶⁶

The extent of the importance of both kinds of these contexts, constructive and critical, becomes strongly manifest as soon as one turns to the record of Dunn's publications during these same years of his first academic steps. More specifically, it now comes as no great surprise that Locke, and in an originally far more mediated manner, democracy proved to have been turned, up to a very substantial extent, into Dunn's two main *loci* of research focus from quite early on. In fact, Dunn's very first subject matter to be worked in detail on a consistent basis was Locke,³⁶⁷ initially the topic of his planned doctoral dissertation in the

³⁶⁴ Locke (1960); nowadays available as (1988).

³⁶⁵ On Dunn's relations with Finley in those years, including the effect of the latter's innovative teaching approach in holding seminars open to undergraduates with Hugo Jones, see Dunn (2018c), p. 148, (2019c), p. 7, whereas the proximity of these relations can be also witnessed through Laslett's and Finley's overt advocacies for reforms in the kind of 'history' that was then taught in Cambridge in Dunn & Young's (1962) student-run printed pamphlet dedicated to that specific topic; on the further range of topics that Finley's and Jones' seminar covered for the Roman times, i.e. the Roman Republic and mostly its succeeding Empire, see Dunn (2019c), p. 7.

³⁶⁶ See Macpherson (1962) and (1973), with the earliest article of the latter volume dating from 1945.

³⁶⁷ For more information about Dunn's doctoral dissertation under Laslett's supervision see (2012a), pp. 181-182 and (2018c), pp. 148-150. In the same pages Dunn acknowledges that he was initially interested to work on a doctoral dissertation on Hume under the supervision of one more gifted tutor at Cambridge in those years, the pioneering Scottish historian of political thought Duncan Forbes, who was unavailable to collaborate with Dunn while

mid-1960s.³⁶⁸ In the course of this project Dunn went on to publish, starting from the end of the decade, a series of themed articles on Locke along with a more comprehensive book that substituted for his need to defend a dissertation, in which he set for himself the task of providing, quite much in the spirit of Laslett's introductory essay and commentary of Locke's edited text, distinctively empirically-grounded accounts on all the topics for which Locke had been taken to have had any kind of considerable importance by the leading Anglophone political theorists of the times, showing in each case both the reach of merit and the critical faults of Locke's more historically uninformed interpreters who were rushing to read Locke's texts in terms set by their own and rather extemporal philosophical or theoretical projects.³⁶⁹ Authors of this kind included among several others the quite eagerly critical Macpherson, who was also more prominently present in Dunn's almost very first publication with democracy as its main theme, which was actually a very critical review of the latter's *Democratic Theory*.³⁷⁰ However, Dunn's turn of interest to a focused study of democracy as a matter of foremost importance was not to follow that soon. More specifically, as soon as Dunn started completing this circle of extensive research on Locke, it would not be that difficult for one to claim that he seems to have acquired a disposition similar to that of Locke's late interests as these were presented for instance in *The Reasonableness of Christianity*.³⁷¹ In these respects, Dunn devoted a considerable number of publications since the mid-1970s in the exploration of several kinds of potency for a minimal common denominator of allegiance in what one may ordinarily conceive of as characteristically appertaining to politics. The case can be quite convincingly observed out of the chosen titles for his summative books and collections of articles from those years, which were meant

working his own long way into the political-historicization of the main figures of the so-called Scottish Enlightenment. This being so, aside from a minor - though displaying quite Laslettian merits - publication on Hume's contemporaneous reception (1964), Dunn turned to Laslett's own Locke. Nonetheless, he would return to this early interest by the mid-1980s as a result of István Hont's eventual advent from Hungary to Cambridge and the latter's interest to historicize the classics of political economy, originally seen in Hont & Ignatieff (1983), which involved Dunn (1983b) in the consideration of Hume's and Smith's role in the theoretical establishment of modern market economics next to the world usually ascribed to modern politics, a piece of obtained insight that Dunn would go on bringing to the surface in later occasions, such as in his own editorial volume (1990f), which included a piece by Pocock (1990); cf. the shift of tone on Locke in Dunn (1984c) and (1990c); on Hont's impact on Dunn see also (2019c), pp. 5-7.

³⁶⁸ In particular, Dunn seems to have set out to work on a very ambitious dissertation concerning the three very different kinds of reception of Locke in the American Revolution, in the French Revolution and in Britain of the same times, suggesting thus through the first two of the three chosen settings a strong parallel with his later studies on democracy that we will examine in the course of this chapter. See (2012a), p. 181 and cf. (2018c), p. 149, where Dunn seems to be ascribing the idea for the topic to Laslett, whereas to complicate things a little further, Skinner (2002j, p. 41) has also retrospectively claimed that his early preference to work on Hobbes was considerably due to Dunn's take on Locke. In all cases, the topic, as stated in this form, was abandoned, mainly as a result of Dunn's discovery of Locke's minimal role in the War of the American Independence during his visiting fellowship at Harvard University in 1964-1965.

³⁶⁹ See Dunn (1967), (1968a), (1969c), (1969b), and a little later (1979c), (1983b), (1984a), (1984b).

³⁷⁰ See Dunn (1974); for an earlier brief case see (1972b).

³⁷¹ Locke (1999).

to bring up such themes as an overall assessment of the state of *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* (1979), *Political Obligation in its Historical Context* (1980) and the interpretation of *Political Responsibility* (1990), whereas this kind of disposition seems to have persisted up to a certain extent until his quite later *The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of Politics* (2000).³⁷² It is within this broad interest that Dunn's readers may notice that democracy as a more distinguished topic was gradually gaining a more prominent place that would lead to a decisive shift of priority in its study by Dunn since the late 1980s, as the following sections will try to suggest.³⁷³

Having set up the broad picture of his early academic ventures in this way, it might be worth insisting a little further on Dunn's initial studies of Locke, since they seem to have been pivotal for his subsequent projects in many ways. From this point of view, one may quite conveniently pay particular attention to the rather concluding statement of this circle of research in Dunn's short book named *Locke*.³⁷⁴ What is quite interesting here as compared to his other writings on Locke up to that moment is the fact that Dunn showed a particular concern to use his gained acquisition of a highly particularized knowledge of Locke's more specific arguments and views in a way that would allow the readers of the book not to miss the picture that one can shape for Locke's figure as a whole, or, as Dunn would repeat himself by stating it in a new preface employing a Laslett formula, "the man himself".³⁷⁵ Dunn renders this goal quite visible from the very beginning of the book, where we read that he "shall focus on Locke's intellectual life as a whole and attempt to explain how he saw the relation between the two huge and unwieldy questions [...] [of] how men can know [...] [and] how men should try to live".³⁷⁶ This kind of choice leads then Dunn to the suggestion of seeing Locke "as a tragic thinker, who understood in advance some of the deep contradictions in the modern conception of human reason, and saw rather clearly some of the tragedy of our own lives which we still see very dimly indeed".³⁷⁷ Locke's tragic tellingness for our own lives becomes more concrete in the course

³⁷² See Dunn (1979a), (1980d), the final chapters in the collections of (1985a) and (1990a), (2000b).

³⁷³ For the place of democracy in the aforementioned titles see particularly (1979a), chap. 1, (1980e), (1985c), (1990b) and (2000b), chaps. 6-8, among an increasing range of references to -democracy- throughout.

³⁷⁴ Dunn (1984c); reissued as (1992a) and (2003a). Even though this book is apparently a slightly subsequent product when seen next to Dunn's first pieces on democracy as well as to a more general advancement of his interests under way in those years, the book's very conclusive character along with its obvious reliance on Dunn's earlier research on Locke seem to allow for our treating it at this point as quite suggestive of the qualities of Dunn's work of our interest. Besides, synthesizing features of a quite respective kind are already quite characteristic in Dunn's first book on Locke (1969b). Nonetheless, the greatest range of the synthesis which was accomplished in this second book along with some additional features that it presents allow us to identify to a fuller extent the development of some trends that will become quite crucial for Dunn's examined works in the following decades and whose own origins in Dunn's early years will be brought to fuller light in the chapter's conclusion.

³⁷⁵ Dunn (2003c), p. ix; already appearing in (1969b), p. 10; cf. Section II in Laslett's both (1960) and (1988).

³⁷⁶ Dunn (1984c), pp. v-vi.

³⁷⁷ Dunn (1984c), p. vii.

of the work through Dunn's depiction of a "real justice in seeing the European Enlightenment as Locke's legacy",³⁷⁸ as well as through the discussion of the perceived aftermaths of the late Locke's failed attempt to foster "a culture of shared religious good intentions" in *The Reasonableness of Christianity*.³⁷⁹ In all cases, the overall effect to which the book seems to be laying its emphasis through the insistence on such connections seems to be very effectively summarized in Dunn's capturing phrase that "all of us" that have been living in the post-Lockean world have been ever since "the children of his failure".³⁸⁰

Even though certain aspects of this kind of thinking about major intellectual topics would prove their importance for Dunn's work under examination more clearly in later times, a closer analysis of Dunn's first substantively empirical investigation of democracy's past and of its present-day status by the time of the completion of the project allows us to observe the detailed employment of some of the features described above in practice. As we have already noted, the case appears as the very first chapter of *Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future* from 1979 and bears the title 'Democratic Theory',³⁸¹ a quite popular designation for ambitious political theorists of those years, especially in North America, to which we have seen Macpherson alluding also.³⁸² Quite much in accordance with this state of affairs, Dunn was conceiving of 'democratic theory' at that point as "the public cant of the modern world",³⁸³ a feature that actually seemed to render the issue implied in those terms more apt for discussion than the quite dubious record of what Dunn was referring to early in the text as the 'reality of democracy' or 'democracy as a social fact'.³⁸⁴ Dunn thus set for himself the task of tracing both the "intellectual origins and historical development" of 'democratic theory', in a dual set of interconnected goals that reflected his ongoing efforts to combine the more generalizing study of a politics meaningful for the present with the study of history. In fact, the seeming omnipresence of 'democratic theory' in the increasingly divided world that was gathering momentum in the first post-War decades in the West seems to have predisposed Dunn's engagement with the topic in a spirit quite comparable to that found in both his very earliest and his

³⁷⁸ Dunn (1984c), p. 21.

³⁷⁹ See Dunn (1984c), pp. 20-21. It is also worth noting at this point that Dunn's explication of *The Reasonableness of Christianity* project in terms of 'intentions' is an apparent sign of the impact of Skinner's according highly influential methodological injunction in the previous years (1964, and more confidently 1969b, pp. 44-53), which actually seems to have had dues, in turn, to Dunn's own early methodological piece (1968b, p. 98: "[t]he problem of interpretation is always the problem of closing the context. What closes the context in actuality is the intention (and, much more broadly, the experiences) of the speaker. Locke, in talking, talks about what he talks about."), as Skinner himself seems to concede by attributing his turn to Austin to Dunn in (1988b), p. 327; cf. Dunn's own discussion of Austin in terms of 'intentions' in (1968b), p. 101). For a later emulation of themes and tropes out of Skinner (1969b) by Dunn, including 'intentions', see (1978b).

³⁸⁰ Dunn (1984c), p. 21. This single phrase comprises actually an entire paragraph in the text, the one that concludes Dunn's chapter presenting Locke's life.

³⁸¹ Dunn (1979a), pp. 1-27 (chap. 1).

³⁸² For an overview of the genre see Cunningham (2002); see also the associated authors and titles presented throughout this chapter.

³⁸³ The phrase appears twice in Dunn (1979a) in p. 2 and again in p. 11.

³⁸⁴ Dunn (1979a), p. 2.

very latest interests in Locke in those years, as an intellectual figure underlying all major events in the 18th century Anglophone and French political history in the first case, and as a legator of the Enlightenment and other far-reaching public projects of relevance in the second, whereas this also seems to hold true for the post-Lockean disposition in his work that we have already brought to light.³⁸⁵

In what follows we will examine how Dunn carried out his demanding research goals in practice through an even more detailed examination of his treatment of the individual instances in the history of ‘democratic theory’ that were brought up in the chapter, according to the ‘special logic’ in which they appear to have been arranged in the text and along with a slight chronological smoothening of their order of presentation. In these respects, we see Dunn discussing quite extensively in the course of the chapter the distinctive features of democratic *practice* in ancient Athens [which we can designate as A], primarily with the use of terms usually emphasizing oppositional comparisons (far from always favouring Athens) with political realities and later visions of democracy discussed in the adjacent parts of the text.³⁸⁶ Readers at this point do not actually come up with any substantial citation of ancient sources supporting the case, with the understated exceptions of the insertion of a particular remark of Herodotus on the claimed wartime benefits of *isēgoria* and of a more theoretical classical citation of Aristotle on citizenship [A1].³⁸⁷ This is a feature of which Dunn was particularly aware, as one can tell from the fact that in the same pages he also makes very importantly clear for the appreciation of his readers that what has been mostly influential in retrospect out of the democracy of ancient Athens is not the outlined democratic practice itself but instead the “unsurpassed” “critiques of the moral limitations of democracy in operation” of the “bigoted opponents of the democracy” Plato and Thucydides [A2].³⁸⁸ A little before this highly esteemed past of democracy and its theory, Dunn was quite interested to expand also in quite considerable lengths, which actually introduced his presentation of historical references, on the presence of democracy’s numerous and important foes and few seemingly silent friends among prominent figures of political thought centred upon the late English 17th century [B].³⁸⁹ In these respects, the grave presence of democracy’s explicit and quite firm opponents is initially brought up, consisting of Charles I up until the scaffold, Leibniz, and the Irish Jacobite priest Charles Leslie, who reached far enough in his criticism of

³⁸⁵ In these respects, it is worth paying attention, furthermore, to the fact that, in a striking analogy with what was going to be the case with the respective part of Dunn (1984c), the main text of the chapter opens with the phrase “[w]e are all democrats today” (1979a, p. 1), whereas, after a long list of examples of distinguished claimed democrats from the book’s present and very recent past, the second paragraph once again consists of a single phrase announcing that “[t]his is all not how it used to be” (p. 2).

³⁸⁶ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 12-13, 15-18; notice the extensive dependence on Finley’s multiple publications on the topic in the footnotes.

³⁸⁷ Dunn (1979a), pp. 17, 15.

³⁸⁸ See Dunn (1979a), p. 17.

³⁸⁹ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 2-7.

Locke in 1703 so as to accuse him as a virtual democrat [B1].³⁹⁰ The latter occasion allows Dunn to convey to his readers an instance to reflect on the potencies of a rather obscure connection of Locke with democracy, next to the intimation of a mild sympathy towards mass suffrage a few decades earlier than that in the words and texts of the Levellers, and more characteristically in Thomas Rainborough's famous statement of the case at the Putney Debates [B2],³⁹¹ prior to the most decisive observation of the lack of any self-perception of the projects of the more radical zealots of the times, i.e. Gerald Winstanley of the Diggers, the Ranters and Fifth Monarchy outriders, as democracies of any kind [B3].³⁹² This being so, Dunn is able to close this section with the suggestion that the view of democracy as an issue of minimal interest remained quite much a commonplace in European literate circles until the late 18th century, since it seems to have been quite much implicating the effective political marginalization of opponents wherever it was actually brought up, as in the case of James Boswell's reference to the "Whiggish democratical notions and propensities" of a critic of Samuel Johnson [B4].³⁹³

Despite the unpromising circumstance for democracy and its theory with which Dunn's account places us up to here, the chapter goes on to show how things changed to the point of a complete overturn. In the first place, Dunn seems to suggest that the degree of this transformation may be observed in the gradual inclusion of democracy as a topic of some importance that has been spectacularly growing in the more encompassing thought of certain highly canonized figures from the early 18th to the late 19th century [C].³⁹⁴ The first author brought up is Montesquieu, who is said to be probably summarizing the commonplace wisdom noted above in his depiction of the English Commonwealth regime as a failed democracy,³⁹⁵ whereas things seem to have considerably altered throughout the 19th century. In this case, Dunn discusses Tocqueville and his renowned view of his century as bringing about the rise of democracy, Marx's elaborately ambivalent characterization of democracy as "the resolved mystery of all constitutions" in his critique of Hegel, and -the least easily accessible for a Western scholar- Liang Ch'i Ch'ao, who seems to have expanded Tocqueville's saying with his own 1897 prediction that all countries in all five continents would be transformed into democracies in less than a hundred years, for which Dunn suggested by the time of writing his book that it was quite much fulfilled in a way through the ongoing turn of democracy into "a highly desirable label" for all modern states.³⁹⁶ The chapter goes on to suggest that this state of affairs has had more particular theoretical dues to another set of canonized authors who

³⁹⁰ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 2-4. Readers may note the absence of a reference to Hobbes from this set as well as from almost the entire section of the historical references, despite an introductory distinguished citation on method (p. 2).

³⁹¹ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 4-5.

³⁹² See Dunn (1979a), p. 5.

³⁹³ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 5-7.

³⁹⁴ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 7-12.

³⁹⁵ See (1979a), pp. 7-8, where, Dunn notably makes additional room for the interpretation of Montesquieu as being himself also an early mild sympathizer of democracy.

³⁹⁶ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 8-12.

produced throughout quite much these same times more concentrated discussions of relevance for democracy's prominent role in the 20th century. This group was comprised of the well-known works of Rousseau and his outline of the *volonté générale* in the light of inequality's generated vices, Paine's depiction of the nascent United States as a representative democracy that was more advantageous than 'simple democracy', Marx's vision of Communism and the role of the rise of the proletarian class for its fulfilment, and J. S. Mill's said view of 'representative government' as a balance between bureaucracy and populist representation [D].³⁹⁷ These works in turn seem to have left late 20th century minds with "two distinct and developed democratic theories loose in the world today", each of which was carrying its own problems. The first of them, to which Dunn refers as "blatantly Utopian" [D1], was identified as beginning with Rousseau and seems to have led up to Carole Pateman's then contemporary theory of 'participatory democracy', whereas other discernible voices that seem to have had a place in the same strand included Marx and Joseph Stalin.³⁹⁸ The overall case of this kind of 'democratic theory' was very effectively summarized by Dunn as being

*[c]lose to meaning simply the good society in operation, a society in which we produce as profusely as we do today, if less wastefully and with better taste – and in which all social arrangements authentically represent the interests of all persons, in which all live actively in and for their society and yet all remain as free as before (where before means roughly as they could urgently and excusably desire).*³⁹⁹

As a consequence of the moral demands of the outlook of this theory, Dunn also goes on to suggest that, despite the retention of its charm, this strand had been already transformed by that time into an abstract moral standard which "perhaps only students in liberal capitalist countries still believe it to have anything to do with political reality".⁴⁰⁰ The case was strikingly different with the second and in those years less historically scrutinized strand of 'democratic theory' for the late times, which Dunn addressed as "the weaker versions of democratic theory prevalent in capitalist societies" and which contained citations of a wide range of authors, starting from Paine and Sieyès, followed by Bentham and James Mill, and,

³⁹⁷ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 13-15, 18-22. Even though one could consider including in this group the earlier reference to Sieyès in the chapter as a figure characteristically marking the end of democracy's commonplace rejection (p. 6), the characterization of the latter's use of democracy "in political antithesis to the word 'aristocrat'", for which we are reminded that Sieyès strongly likened it with the conditions of a 'caste', suggests that this kind of use was considered to be of a rather different order than the examined thought of these more canonized authors and texts, probably more fitting to the polemics occasioning the pamphlet on the *Tiers-État*; cf. also the following treatment of the same author in the same chapter.

³⁹⁸ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 18-22, 26-27.

³⁹⁹ Dunn (1979a), p. 27. As this detailed description makes clear, the outlook of this strand suggests a quite characteristic affinity with the features that Berlin (2002) had already attributed to 'positive liberty' doctrines, as one can further tell from Dunn's bringing up of Hegel as approximating Rousseau in the same pages, as well as from a reminiscence of the strong interests and fury that other totalitarian strands drew from this kind of claimed democracy (pp. 19, 21).

⁴⁰⁰ Dunn (1979a), p. 22.

more recently, by the unconventional economist Joseph Schumpeter and the political science practiced by Robert Dahl and S. M. Lipset in North America and by John Plamenatz in Britain [D2].⁴⁰¹ This time, the strand is characterized as “dismally ideological”, since it seems to have gradually turned democracy into the mere “name of a distinct and very palpable form of modern state, at the most optimistic, simply the least bad mechanism for securing some measure of responsibility of the governors to the governed within modern states”, a state of affairs suggesting an apparent congruence with Hobbes, who is also brought up at this point, and against which Locke’s inferred objections and the important dues of the ‘pluralist’ theories of democracy of the American political science to Tocqueville find also a short place of mention.⁴⁰²

Prior to moving beyond Dunn’s first extensive empirical investigation of democracy and its history, it might be also worth paying some further attention to the duality with which we are left by the end of the text. Our reasons for insisting on this feature have to do with the fact that it is this last setting up by Dunn of these two strands that has evinced its ‘value-relevance’ onwards in a number of ways, since not only has it retained its characteristic significance for democracy’s readers and sharers both in the late 20th and, since the first edition of the examined work, in the opening 21st century, but it has proven as well to be one of Dunn’s accordingly most persisting features in his various examinations of democracy’s history to which we will successively turn. This being so, the case provides us with another instance of Dunn’s concern to keep up discussing a more encompassing and still cordially engaged aspect of our understanding of a political issue that still matters next to that of the simpler scholar commitment to keep providing better-informed records of its constantly increasing past.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰¹ See Dunn (1979a), pp. 22-26.

⁴⁰² See Dunn (1979a), pp. 23-26. For a more theoretical consideration of these two strands see (1980e).

⁴⁰³ It is further worth pointing out parenthetically that the cordial engagement implied in this scheme also ran parallel in those years with Dunn’s repeated concern to explore in the possibly most strictly dispassionate terms, retaining at the same time a discretely reserved sympathizing tone wherever the investigation allowed so, the very sensitive outcomes of the enthusiasms that characterized the popular faith in left-wing politics, present in Dunn’s academic and social milieus until the gradual disintegration of the early post-war social order in the West and the collapse of the Soviet bloc in the East. On this topic, which included pieces investigating the past, present and (foreseeably) future case and hardships of the actual idea and events of ‘revolution’, of the political theory of ‘socialism’, and of “the Left more broadly”, see *inter alia* (1972c)/(1989a), (1984d), and (1993e) respectively, all of which seem to form a broad base for the strand that Dunn had in mind in the previously examined text as D1, whereas the case seems to have evolved into a recent exploration of ‘utopian futures of politics’ (see Choue, Dunn & Ikenberry 2008); on the origins of Dunn’s interests in the academic study of revolutions in King’s College as part of an early institutionalization of the study of politics at the institution see (2019c), p. 3 and for a retrospective self-presentation of the study of this topic ever since see (2017); also cf. the mildness of tone and the occasional adoption of characterizations drawn from the standpoint of this strand for the world beyond it in the texts that follow. As for a broader base for D2, Dunn alludes (1979a, p. 26) to Skinner’s earlier (1973) and sole attempt to investigate democracy, which took the form of a methodological critique of the inadequacies of both the North American ‘empirical theorists of democracy’ of the times and of their fellow theoretical critics, focusing primarily on the former, and in which Skinner intimates towards the need for a historicization of the term, acknowledged in turn (pp. 298, 304) to be due to a just-published critical review of Dunn’s (1972b) of a book addressing late theorists of democracy, and apparently providing the latter

3. The shift of focus on democracy

The period that followed was characterized by a quite apparent change of priorities that brought democracy to the forefront of Dunn's concerns. The most decisive constructive context for this case had been the gradual collapse of the Soviet bloc by the early 1990s and the important role that 'democracy' played in the process. The intensity of this state of affairs led Dunn to start producing a considerable number of publications specifically devoted to democracy, with the earliest of them consisting in his rather conclusively summarizing contribution dating from 1989-1990 on 'The identity of the bourgeois liberal republic'⁴⁰⁴ in a collected volume that was meant to explore the historical origins of the modern understandings of republic.⁴⁰⁵ The latter volume was then succeeded by the distinguished volume edited by Dunn himself this time on democracy's *Unfinished Journey* throughout history that we have already introduced⁴⁰⁶ and which appeared in the course of a wide range of further publications on democracy considered in a great multiple of respects.⁴⁰⁷ The extensive record of this circle of interests seems to have culminated into Dunn's outstandingly most comprehensive historical investigation of the topic from ancient Greece to present in *Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy* at the end of this period in his career.⁴⁰⁸ As for the more critical contexts in which Dunn found himself engaged for these same years, they seem to have appeared also rather towards the end of this phase and to have had to do with a need to address the most recent trends of relevance originating from intellectual circles principally conditioned by the frames and idioms of the so-called 'Continental' traditions of thought along with the consequences for the ordinary Anglophone academic scholarship of the times that the popularity of these trends was seeming to implicate. In these specific respects, attentive readers may sense Dunn's following of Pocock's and Skinner's coming to terms by the late 1990s with the accomplishments of the German scholarship of *Begriffsgeschichte* in the course of the latter's international acknowledgement,⁴⁰⁹

with the citation of Boswell. Finally, it is further worth noting that Dunn has recently acknowledged the establishment of his view of this dualism to his slightly subsequential collaboration with Hont (2019c), pp. 5-6.

⁴⁰⁴ Dunn (1994). In connection with our preceding comment, it is also worth pointing out that Dunn notes (p. 210) that he employed the term 'bourgeois liberal republic' as a consequence of its being used by the Chinese leader Deng Hsiao Ping as an accusation directed to the demands of the student occupiers of Tiananmen Square and of the more successful fates that respective events enjoyed in the more Western areas of the Communist bloc in the years up until the piece was first published.

⁴⁰⁵ Fontana (1994b).

⁴⁰⁶ Dunn (1992e).

⁴⁰⁷ See *inter alia* Dunn (1996a), (1996c), (1996f), (1998), (2000b) as previously noted, (2003b).

⁴⁰⁸ Dunn (2005b).

⁴⁰⁹ On Pocock's and Skinner's earliest engagements with the *Begriffsgeschichte* scholarship see their (1996) and (1999b) respectively, whereas Dunn's earliest positive allusions to "Koselleck's impressive book" mostly known as *Futures Past* as well as to the "much valuable work [...] on the history of the more analytically central terms in the modern vocabulary of social and political understanding under the editorial leadership of Reinhart Koselleck", seen actually as very close to Skinner's and Pocock's works, appear in (1989c), p. 339 and (1996b), p. 22 respectively. Dunn's own first signs of similar thematizations in terms of 'concepts' and

as well as a relatively subsequential disposition to consider the highly increasing popularity of 'post-structuralism' as an academic trend of the time, having more specifically to do with the interest drawn by Foucault's furthest-reaching mind in the genre.⁴¹⁰ The following paragraphs will attempt to suggest the more specific weight of each one of these contexts where appropriate next to the other features of interest in Dunn's works that we have selected for a more analytical consideration.

The conclusive chapter of the 1992 self-edited volume is quite revealing of Dunn's concern to deal with democracy in more foreground terms as well as in much greater detail than that characterizing his earlier works. The case is made clear from the very beginning of the piece, in which Dunn very straightforwardly observes that "[n]othing else in the history of the world, which had, as far as we can tell, quite such local, casual, and concrete origins enjoys the same untrammelled authority for ordinary human beings today".⁴¹¹ This distinctive feature that democracy had just acquired in those years, however temporarily and accompanied with misapprehensions, seemed to be placing what was understood by the word, in Dunn's view, on a more elevated state of appreciation than that of the mutually competing "great world religions" or even than that of the lately much-debated natural sciences, and therefore as a matter that called for a most urgent historical investigation.⁴¹² This being so, Dunn proceeds to a more detailed examination of the ancient Greek case [A] than the one that had appeared in his 'Democratic Theory' chapter.⁴¹³ This time the chronological range of reference begins prior to Athens' most classically acknowledged democratic times, since Dunn brings to the surface the dissociation of Solon's and Kleisthenes' 6th century BCE constitutional reforms [A1]⁴¹⁴ from the following actual understanding of democracy in Athens as a system of citizen self-rule in the 5th and 4th centuries BCE. as the latter is testified by such figures as those of

other shared vocabulary appear in (2000b), for which case it may also be worth pointing out that the very itemization of 'politics' as a subject matter fit for study had been already set in practice by Sellin's (1978) according entry in Koselleck's *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe* and by Palonen (1985), (1990), (1998a); for more on the debate concerning the German-styled *Begriffsgeschichte* and its various interlocutors and comparably similar trends on the way to the gradual transformation of the case into a broader and more variable 'conceptual history' nowadays practiced around the globe see Richter (1995), Lehmann & Richter (1996), Hampsher-Monk, Tilmans & van Free (1998), Castiglione & Hampsher-Monk (2001) and Palonen (2004), (2014b).

⁴¹⁰ To get a little more precise here, even though one may trace earlier comments of Dunn's that seemed to address Foucault's claims, either explicitly (e.g. 1980a, p. 335, 1996b, p. 23), or in very plausibly identifiable terms (such as in 1980e, p. 251 *contra* Foucault 1978), the suggested case for this part that one should keep in mind for what follows seems to have to do primarily with the impression caused by Foucault's concisely sophisticated (1984a), for the claimed 'genealogical' methodological injunction of which we have already intimated an interest by Skinner.

⁴¹¹ Dunn (1992c), p. 239.

⁴¹² See Dunn (1992c), pp. 239-240.

⁴¹³ See Dunn (1992c), *passim* and especially pp. 240-244. Readers of the chapter's references as well as of the suggested titles for "further reading" that accompany it (pp. 276-278) may also notice Dunn preserving a moderate predilection for Finley's pieces on ancient Greece and Rome next to the expectedly most up-to-date works of the major scholars of the following decades.

⁴¹⁴ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 240, 242, 250.

Pericles and Demosthenes, whereas Herodotus' claim on the military advantages of *isēgoria* for this *polis* is now more openly challenged [A2].⁴¹⁵ Furthermore, Dunn once again insists in a similarly disenchanting spirit that what has mostly survived in terms of retrospective influence has been the set of theoretical criticisms due to Plato, who is sided this time with the "more equivocal on this point" Aristotle [A3].⁴¹⁶ The chapter then moves forward in time along the same lines, turning thus to the republic of ancient Rome [B], for which case Dunn clarifies that it was "far from being a democracy", despite the crucial survival of a democratic element within it in the people of Rome choosing themselves some of their direct leaders.⁴¹⁷ In fact, it is this latter theme which Dunn notes as occasionally resurfacing in the next centuries in Western Europe [C], such as in the cities of late medieval Italy [C1] and during the English civil war [C2], in the midst of an overall lack of great interest until the mid-18th century.⁴¹⁸

Once the status of these early instances was duly considered, a great portion of the remaining part of the piece had to do with the beginnings of the late period in democracy's history that Dunn identifies at this point and which has to do with the gradual formation of the 'modern representative democracy' [D].⁴¹⁹ Dunn accepts at this point that this process was initiated through the new realities that were set for democracy with the emergence of the idea of the modern state with Bodin and Hobbes [D1],⁴²⁰ along with the subsequent accommodation of the justification of modern political economy as a rather restrictive parameter for democracy next to it through such authors as Hume and Smith [D2].⁴²¹ The accumulative outcome that this set of features along with the course of the political events of the immediately following times seem to have brought about to democracy according to the text is to have turned "what has survived from the

⁴¹⁵ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 240-242, 244.

⁴¹⁶ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 242-243.

⁴¹⁷ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 244-245.

⁴¹⁸ Dunn (1992c), p. 245. As far as the new itemization of the Italian city-republics at this point is concerned, the apparent dues belong to Skinner (1978a), (1992); as for the case of the English civil war, one should note Dunn's insertion of occasioned allusions of no considerable degree of referential elaboration to the Parliamentarians and to the Putney debates, which seem to inaugurate a broad range of similarly inserted references to instances and authors from various settings throughout the text. For the sake of brevity, references of the latter kind have been set aside at this point, since most instances along with this specific feature as a whole reappear in a more elaborate form in (2005b).

⁴¹⁹ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 245-256ff.

⁴²⁰ See (1992c), pp. 246-249, whereas in the following pages (pp. 249-251) Dunn attempts a theoretical generalization of three reasons behind the relative success of this kind of "democracy made safe for the modern state", quite much in the spirit of Skinner's 'Conclusion' in (1978b), pp. 349-352. In all cases, what is further worth pointing out here is the apparent correction of Skinner's downplaying of Bodin vis-à-vis Hobbes on this specific issue in the latter's (1978b), (1989b) that we already noted in the preceding chapter and which can be further testified by Dunn's citing of Skinner's latter title (p. 266).

⁴²¹ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 251-252, for which case Hont's previously suggested influence is obvious. As far as the adjacent parts of this treatment in the text are concerned (pp. 251-255), these explore the subsequent relations of democracy with the comparably unrivalled viability of the market-based economy, occasionally returning to the reality of the modern state, for which cases Dunn brings up, among other instances, the suspicion towards representative democracy expressed by such authors as Friedrich von Hayek, on the one hand, and by "the most intractable interpreters of the modern state" Weber and Schmitt, on the other.

experience of ancient democracy” since those times as falling into the more limited dual set of roles of “simply a word” of massive political effectiveness, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of the “diffuse and urgent hope [...] that human life in the settings in which it takes place may come to be more a matter of committed personal choice and less a matter of enforced compliance with impersonal and external (and unwelcome) demands” [D3].⁴²² In these respects, Dunn goes on to characterize the overall state of affairs as the emergence of the ‘constitutional representative democracy’, among a few other similar designations, or as “democracy made safe for the modern state”, and acknowledges the case as being already in place by the times of Constant and his successfully introduced agenda of the liberty of the moderns in place of the liberty of the ancients [D4].⁴²³

The treatment of democracy’s latest years in the same text [E] brings us to a position with which the chapter on ‘Democratic Theory’ has already made us familiar.⁴²⁴ More specifically, the piece closes with an expansion of the dual set of late roles for democracy as an effective ‘word’ for some constitutional features adopted by the modern state and as a more distant but still powerful source of ‘hope’ both onto the composite post-Soviet state of affairs of the times of the text, for which Dunn noted that “it is hard to imagine that another candidate of equal implausibility will in future win, even momentarily, in this respect the degree of imaginative dominance that constitutional representative democracy at present enjoys”,⁴²⁵ as well as towards a greater aptitude for theorization of the challenges for the case in the foreseeable future, as these end up being epitomized through the words of Catherine MacKinnon’s open-ended critical concerns.⁴²⁶ This being so, it is not hard to notice that this outlook as a whole suggests a renewed version of the dualism of our late conceptions of democracy with which ‘Democratic Theory’ had left us, suggesting this time a more reconciliatory picture of the ‘idea of democracy’ as “an encounter between the two forces of reasonable hope and the very practical and unexhilarating achievements as a state form”.⁴²⁷

Dunn’s most authoritative investigation of democracy and its history in *Setting the People Free* allows us to have a closer look at the distance covered throughout a period longer than a decade since *The Unfinished Journey*.⁴²⁸ Aside from the impressively extended consideration of a far-ranging number of particular cases of relevance to democracy throughout a variety of times and places which we will examine in subsequent paragraphs, the work is

⁴²² See Dunn (1992c), pp. 255-256ff.

⁴²³ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 243-244, 257. What is further worth pointing out here is that the quite foundational role that this kind of presentation attributes to Constant, who both introduces the antithesis between ancient and modern times in the text in ‘liberty’ terms and later concludes it, seems to suggest a less controversial precedent for Berlin’s agenda in the following century. Dues for this case belong to Fontana (1994a) and her edited volume of Constant (1988).

⁴²⁴ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 256-266.

⁴²⁵ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 256-258.

⁴²⁶ See Dunn (1992c), pp. 258-265.

⁴²⁷ Dunn (1992c), pp. 265-266. The concept of ‘encounter’ at this point suggests an allusion to Burke’s (1993), (1997) developing interests in the same years.

⁴²⁸ Dunn (2005b).

characterized by a considerable set of new features that permeate the very writing of the text and which quite strongly add to the intricate quality that many readers of the book might have also sensed while reading it. This being so, one may take fuller benefit out of the work in case we devote a part of this chapter in the bringing up of such features to a separate focus prior to an analysis of the way in which the particular cases have been treated in it. In these respects, the most capturing feature of the book seems to be Dunn's choice for his much-studied account of the quite modest outlook of a 'story', which brings to mind some earlier allusions to tragedy and other discrete devices of a similar effect that we have already met and which is further explicated at a later part of the book as meaning in the case of democracy that "as stories go, it [democracy's story] lacks a clear narrative line and conspicuously fails to carry its own meaning clearly to the surface".⁴²⁹ In fact, this kind of narrative moderacy in the treatment of a topic of such characteristic immensity seems to have been taken seriously enough by Dunn so as for him to claim at different places of the text not only that his account presents a multiple of kinds of stories instead of one,⁴³⁰ but even that some parts of the story "cannot be told" as well.⁴³¹

The implications of 'story' are quite substantially reflected in the different lenses through which Dunn examines democracy throughout the book. In these respects, readers find in different places democracy being treated as a 'word', as a 'name', as a 'term', as an 'idea', as a 'conception', as a 'political value', as an 'organizing principle' and as a 'form of government', among several other denominations, for the interrelations of which Dunn usually does not strive to suggest any kind of grave ordering.⁴³² A topic on which one might need to insist a little more at this point is the striking absence of 'concept' from this list as well as from the text as a whole, which probably suggests a reluctance to identify with the reception of *Begriffsgeschichte's* German-shaped style in those years. Nonetheless, the introduction of the denomination of 'conception' for democracy at a relatively early part of the book intimates to a quite straightforward interest to reap the benefits of a perspective quite close in kind to the one that Koselleck

⁴²⁹ Dunn (2005b), p. 137; cf. (2019f), p. xiii and (2019d), p. 167; cf. Koselleck in what follows.

⁴³⁰ For instance, one very characteristic passage towards the end of the preface declares that "[t]his book then, tells three remarkable stories. It tells in the first place the story of a word. But it also tells alongside it the story of an idea, by terms inspiring and ludicrous, and the further story of a range of widely varying practices associated with that idea" (Dunn 2005b, p. 20).

⁴³¹ Dunn (2005b), p. 141.

⁴³² The place where Dunn reaches closer to such an ordering is (2005b), p. 20, as previously noted, which quite much summarizes a similar sequence in the introduction of most of the different denominations for democracy of this list and where it is further said that the first two stories of democracy, that as a word and that as an idea, will be examined in the first two main chapters of the book, whereas the subsequent chapter was said to be going to consider a very important portion of the third story of democracy as seen in terms of practices, and more specifically that of "[o]ne broad family of those practices, the governmental forms of the modern representative capitalist democracy", which "now dominates the world through its wealth and confidence, and through the quite unprecedented powers of destruction which it has at its disposal". However, both the entirety of the preface as well as the rest of the book make clear the ongoing interplay between the different denominations all along. This pattern is further reflected also in (2019f), p. xii.

was bringing back to public attention at that point in time, since the according passage of the book states that

*[t]here is unmistakably at least one connecting strand [between democracy in ancient Athens and human communities today], which runs without interruption from the texts of Aeschylus to the present day. What is transmitted along this strand is seldom, if ever, firm structures of power or definite institutional practices. What travels along it, often with great vitality, is conceptions of what to value and aim for, and why and how to act on the basis of those conceptions. Conceptions of this kind (values, ideals, visions of life) never determine the outcome of the politics of any community, and change constantly as they shape and reshape purposes along the way. But no community can exist even fugitively, let alone persist and extend across long spans of time, except by courtesy of just such conceptions, and the complicated tissue of institutions and practices which they inform and sustain.*⁴³³

This long passage makes clear the extent to which Dunn is employing ‘conceptions’ here in a way that strongly approximates the mainstream understanding of ‘concepts’, trying at the same time to keep up in the clearest possible terms the decisive role that the individual persons play in their ongoing affirmation and change.⁴³⁴ Among the several dues and recipients that the choice of terms may allow us to infer,⁴³⁵ it might be worth insisting a little more on the proximities of

⁴³³ Dunn (2005b), pp. 30-31.

⁴³⁴ One may further judge that the case seems to be so out of Dunn’s retrospective allusion to Gallie’s (1956) ‘essentially contested concepts’ in (2019f), p. xii.

⁴³⁵ In these respects and *inter alia*, Dunn seems to have quite interestingly resorted to the same choice of terms that appears also in Locke’s *Essay concerning Human Understanding* at the according places (mostly in Books II and III). In any case, the role of ‘aims’ and ‘purposes’ in the course of the passage suggests Skinner’s influence at this point, as is also the case with the references to ‘actions’ based on such ‘conceptions’, which, Skinner apart, was quite much brought to light by Koselleck as well in more than one occasions (e.g. see his very characteristic 2004b), whereas the placing of ‘values’ indicates the extent of a concern to maintain a Weberian orientation for the entire approach. In addition to all this, it might be worth reminding ourselves once more Skinner’s older emphatic claim that “there can be no histories of concepts as such; there can only be histories of their uses in argument” (1988b, p. 283), which seems to have also left a mark of its own in the role that ‘arguments’ play in the lines that follow Dunn’s quoted passage and close this same paragraph (p. 31). Moreover, it is worth noting that the parenthetic sentence that immediately succeeds the same passage identifies the law of each society as being both “an endless battleground of contending force, but also and just as necessarily a seamless canvas for enquiry and interpretation, the play of intelligence and even the impact of scruple”, suggesting thus a critical integration of the late Foucault’s seeming emphasis on the presence of ‘forces’ and ‘power’ when treating texts of this kind, as one may further tell from Dunn’s counterposing reference to the latter author after two of the most insightful theorists of legal interpretation of the late times at the period’s corresponding footnote (p. 195). Finally, one may further add to this last instance the characteristic reshaping of the introductory view of (1992c) in a tacitly Lockean-Millian key at the preface of (2005b), in order to repeatedly hold that democracy has provided “for the present a single world-wide name for the legitimate basis of political authority”, which though “[n]ot, of course, uncontested in practice anywhere, [...] never, any longer, [rejected] in favour of an alternative secular claimant to cosmopolitan legitimacy”, and that it has won “its present prominence” and “cumulative victory” “in ferocious competition with very many other words, and not a few other ideas” (pp. 14-17ff.). For a more recent restatement of Dunn’s stance regarding Foucault and other post-structuralists see (2019c), pp. 13-14.

this outlook for 'conceptions' with Koselleck's account of concepts, and especially *Grundbegriffe* ('basic concepts'), as this is provided in the latter's most influential early piece discussing method, where we read that

*[i]n use a word can become unambiguous. By contrast, a concept must remain ambiguous in order to be a concept. The concept is connected to a word, but is at the same time more than a word: a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context within which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word.*⁴³⁶

The many apparent points of similarity between Dunn's immediately preceding views and Koselleck's understanding of concepts in history in this passage, such as the intimation of a close connection between words and concepts beyond an imposing ordering for it, the acceptance of operations in effect on issues of this kind beyond our most immediate forms of consciousness and the determinant role that concepts play in our perception and sustainment of social and political affairs as commonly singular items, which can be further strengthened by several other well-known insights in the latter's work in the same text and beyond,⁴³⁷ allow us to appreciate the extent to which hard-working scholars committed to their work under differently demanding circumstances can be seen as reaching approximate points of view.

In addition to the features presented up to this point, one could further suggest that Dunn's choice of the outlook of a story apparently seems to have been also meant to appeal to a certain degree of familiarity for the invited readers. This quality of what it means to make a story seems to have been also taken quite much under consideration by Dunn in the overall making of *Setting the People Free*, since the first two of the book's main chapters bear the titles of democracy's 'First' and 'Second Coming' respectively, pointing thus to an allusion to the massively influential core schemes of Jewish and Christian theology for the *longue durée* of human history that Dunn's account incorporates as vindicating the particular weight of the late acceptance of democracy.⁴³⁸ This being said in what concerns their framing as a whole, the time seems to be fit to turn to the just previously mentioned chapters in fuller detail.

⁴³⁶ Koselleck (2004a), p. 85.

⁴³⁷ To restrict ourselves to features of Dunn's account under examination that we have already brought to light, one may refer to Koselleck's overarching concern to emphasize the variability of concepts in time and across the different persons and broadly conceived 'social segments' employing them, which actually included a particular allusion to the comparative persistence of 'democracy' and other ancient Greek constitutional forms as ongoing concepts in the Western world, as well as the clear acknowledgement that no concepts ever bind or exhaust the outcomes that we most readily associate with the activities comprising our recognizably collective and political life, or 'social history', as the latter was broadly conceived to be found in a continuous tension with *Begriffsgeschichte* in Koselleck's early post-war West-German idiom. On these issues see particularly Koselleck (2004a) and the other articles of the same collection. See further also Dunn (2005b), pp. 50, 52-53.

⁴³⁸ One may also suggest at this point that these schemes were brought to the general attention of the wide academic public of the times as a very characteristic part of Löwith's (1949) provision of a popular canon for the long-term shaping of the modern Western 'philosophy of history'; cf. Dunn's own employment of the same schemes at this place.

Despite the fact that the first core chapter on ‘Democracy’s First Coming’ covers the same unusually broad period that we have already met in Dunn’s previously examined pieces, readers come across a quite carefully documented presentation of the cases of relevance from ancient Greece up to 17th century Western Europe.⁴³⁹ More specifically, starting over with the case of ancient Athens,⁴⁴⁰ the cases of Solon [A1] and Kleisthenes [A2] are much more characteristically disengaged from democracy strictly speaking, since Dunn points out this time that probably the very name *demokratia* had been an acquisition subsequent to the times of both lawgivers [A3].⁴⁴¹ This being so, Dunn proceeds further ahead in time in order to suggest the characteristic acknowledgement of the self-sustained presence of *demokratia* in ancient Athens since the mid-5th century, as registered both by the foe who has become retrospectively known as the Old Oligarch [B1], and by the friend Pericles in the renowned *Epitaph* [B2], for the case of which Dunn stresses the indirect nature of the evidence that has survived through Thucydides.⁴⁴² Dunn’s insistence on a relatively dense analysis of the short extant text of the *Epitaph* and Pericles’ brought illustration in it of the numerous features that had turned the Athenian constitution into a very encompassing way of life worthy to be emulated by thirds has an important role at this point, since not only is it taken to be the very first explicitly celebratory piece on democracy of the times, but also because one of its most famous passages, which is brought up at the very end of Dunn’s account, is credited with having made us all inheritors of democracy’s retrospectively most inspiring vision of hope, or in the chapter’s own words “there has never been a fuller or saner expression of the hope which lies at the very centre of democracy as a political ideal”.⁴⁴³ Furthermore, and leaving aside Dunn’s enlightening consideration of the actual institutions that sustained the classical Athenian democracy [B3],⁴⁴⁴ another interesting reference that deserves to be pointed out from the same period has to do with the discrete intimation to the case of the committed Socrates as one of the Athenian democracy’s silent

⁴³⁹ Dunn (2005b), ch. 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Dunn (2005b), pp. 24-50.

⁴⁴¹ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 32-34. It is worth noting that Dunn claims no exhausting precision on the very first uses or identifications of *demokratia* here aside from its literal dissociation from the actual evidence on its two traditionally supposed founders, which may also explain the absence at this point of the more complicated case of the Persian lords’ debate on the forms of government as presented to the Athenians by Herodotus (3.80-83; 6.43). This kind of exposition accords with the chapter’s very first footnote, where we read that “[s]ince we have come by now to mean so many different things by it, and since there is so much about the past of which we are blankly ignorant, you cannot really say when democracy in that sense [our today’s reasonably calling sense] began, or even, in any interesting sense, when it might have done so” (p. 191). Both instances suggest that Dunn here vests the origins of democracy in a quite ‘ancient-constitutional’ veil, as the latter term has been influentially introduced by Pocock (1957) and further used by the same author and other readers; cf. the late Foucault (1984a).

⁴⁴² On the consideration of the cases of Pericles and the Old Oligarch, which actually introduce Dunn’s examination of *demokratia* in ancient Athens in this chapter, see (2005b), pp. 24-29.

⁴⁴³ Dunn (2005b), p. 27.

⁴⁴⁴ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 34-38.

friends a little later in the chapter [B4].⁴⁴⁵ In all cases, Dunn keeps clarifying in greater precision that what has mostly survived from those times in terms of its influence has been the picture of democracy “as a body of thinking providing aid in understanding politics” [C] as a result of the more distanced accounts of Thucydides [C1], Plato [C2] and Aristotle [C3], each one of whom is considered in quite analytical terms in what has to do with their personal understanding of democracy, which in the case of Thucydides includes the late crucial impact of this author on Hobbes as well as on the more recent John Grote and his pro-democratic reading of *Historiai*.⁴⁴⁶ As for the chapter’s moving to the Roman times [D],⁴⁴⁷ Dunn here refers to the comparatively striking total absence of interest on *demokratia* by the Romans, with the similarly crucial exception of two descriptions prepared for their case by Greeks. These were no other than the histories drafted by Polybius and Cassius Dio [D1], for the former of whom Dunn goes into a similar degree of detail with that of Athens’ previously mentioned classics.⁴⁴⁸

The next steps in Chapter One have to do with the Latinization of *demokratia* upon the rediscovery of the ancient Greek sources for the Western Europeans from the late 13th century onwards and with the subsequent entrance of the word in the territorially more centralized environments within the same broad region until the beginning of the 18th century.⁴⁴⁹ As far as the specific instances of authors Latinizing *demokratia* and their own role in shaping the understanding of democracy in later times are concerned [E], Dunn brings up the cases of the translation of the Aristotle’s *Politics* by William of Moerbeke [E1], as well as the minimal uses of the term in the writings of Ptolemy of Lucca [E2] and Bartolus of Sassoferrato [E3] in the times that followed in Italy shortly afterwards, making clear all along that the term was far from characteristic for the concerns of the political authors of the Italian city-based polities and that it barely bore any particularly affirmative connotation when used, especially as compared to the great interest in ‘republic’, which kept marginalizing it to the role of an occasional and for the greatest part unfavourable accompaniment for centuries to come.⁴⁵⁰ The situation is seen as starting to change in the 17th century [F],⁴⁵¹ for which case Dunn brings a multiple of instances involving democracy under examination. In these respects, we may notice a move beyond the previous emphasis on the illustrious English experience and towards the inclusion of less pronounced instances, since the account begins with a consideration of the case of Andreu Bosch, active in Catalonia early in the century [F1], and then of some highly influential voices in the United Netherlands reaching until that of the extensively

⁴⁴⁵ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 43-44.

⁴⁴⁶ For the treatment of these three highly consequential authors for democracy see Dunn (2005b), pp. 38-50, whereas a few hypotheses on the reasons of this grave influence follow in the immediately succeeding pages.

⁴⁴⁷ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 54-57.

⁴⁴⁸ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 55-57.

⁴⁴⁹ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 58-70.

⁴⁵⁰ See (2005b), pp. 58-59, where Dunn declares his reliance on Skinner’s (1992) account for the political organization of the Italian ‘city republics’.

⁴⁵¹ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 59-70.

examined Spinoza [F2].⁴⁵² As for the actual treatment of the English case, Dunn insists in bringing to the surface an intimate connection to democracy for the Levellers, though in 'no public role' [F3],⁴⁵³ as well as a more extensively analyzed range of interests about it for the harsh critic Hobbes [F4],⁴⁵⁴ who is quite expectedly by now seen as providing a grave argumentative ground that would reappear much later and in more democratic terms in Constant's post-revolutionary project of domesticating liberty for the moderns in place of its ancient Athenian past.⁴⁵⁵ The references to the advanced 17th century times come to a chronological end with the slightly more straightforward expressions of sympathy to democracy than those listed above by William Petty and by the Irish-born John Toland in his private comment on James Harrington, John Milton and other mid-century advocates of 'democratical schemes of government' at the very end of this period [F5],⁴⁵⁶ which are sided with the contemporaneous Italian case of Alberto Radicati di Passerano [F6] at the opening of the next chapter in the book.⁴⁵⁷

A closer look at the authors and events of the advancing 18th century that are thoroughly considered in Chapter Two on 'Democracy's Second Coming' yields a plenty of findings of a similar interest to those of our preceding

⁴⁵² See Dunn (2005b), p. 59, where the Dutch authors listed to be discussing democracy before Spinoza in the United Netherlands are Johan and Pieter de la Court, and Franciscus Van den Enden; as for the analytical consideration of the place of democracy in Spinoza, see pp. 64-68. As far as the latter case is concerned, one may also note that Spinoza's predilection for democracy is ended up being seen as him being "no rhapsodist of democracy's edifying spiritual impact on the ruling *demos*", but being based instead more onto his being "an acute and forthright critic of the corrupting effects of personal power upon aristocrats and monarchs" (p. 68). This discrete comparative outlook for preferring democracy's case as principally being less at fault than its alternative offers of form of government cannot fail to remind oneself of a few traces of Berlin's view of the merits of 'negative liberty', whereas the reference to personal corruption by power points to an allusion to Lord Acton's known saying.

⁴⁵³ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 60 and 69-70, which actually provide the chapter with its epilogue. At the latter place we read, in full accordance with our previous note, that "[w]here we have become clearer, more frank and more confident as time has gone by is in what we deny when we take our stand in democracy", which is that "[w]e reject, in the great Leveller formula [...] the claim (or judgement) that any human being comes into the world with a saddle on their back, or any other booted and spurred to ride them". Furthermore, it is also worth noting at this point that even though Locke is absent from the instances examined at this part of the book, he is brought up in a quite similar key at the very ultimate footnote of the book's final page, where he is seen as expressing the "natural yearning (with a lengthy Christian and pre-Christian past)" of seeing the humankind as one 'great and natural community' and thus as standing on a par with the most optimistic hopes vested on democracy far beyond its concretely demanding realities and failures up to present (pp. 187-188, 238).

⁴⁵⁴ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 60-64; cf. the undertone on Charles I at this place and later on in p. 142, where he is seen as expressing a world way apart from the recent times.

⁴⁵⁵ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 62-63. This parallel between Hobbes' and Constant's outlooks is an apparent continuation of Dunn's earlier viewing of the latter as having had a crucial role in making democracy safe for the modern state that we have already examined. The case can be further vindicated by the fact that, as the chapter reaches its end, Skinner (2002e) - and Hont (1994) next to him - is cited as having "captured the political significance" of the fact that, as counterposed to what we usually accept about equality, "[i]n every state, freedom and liberty by necessity must be defined in the end, however intricately and courteously, on the state's terms and by the state itself" (pp. 69, 211).

⁴⁵⁶ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 61, 212.

⁴⁵⁷ Dunn (2005b), p. 71.

examination of Chapter One.⁴⁵⁸ Part of the importance of this period, which Dunn examines here for the first time in his studies on democracy, is undoubtedly due to the fact that the chapter records certain characteristic advancements in our understanding of a time that late readers have been mostly inclined to receive as having introduced democracy to our own present-day political life in a quite straightforward fashion through the range of experience commonly associated with the two so-called ‘Democratic Revolutions’, i.e. the War of the American Independence and the Revolution of the First French Republic.⁴⁵⁹ In these respects, Dunn is quite careful to introduce both the ‘American Revolution’ and its more passionately received French counterpart as having had actually the character of extraordinarily grave political crises back in their times.⁴⁶⁰ The choice of this outlook in place of the well-known retrospective readings of the same events seems to be intimating to the fact that the greatest part of the people involved in both cases would have probably been more interested to seek for resolutions pertaining to the more established political standards of the times instead of democracy, whose actual presence as a term in the course of the events in both occasions Dunn proves to have been much more restricted than commonly thought, pointing instead towards continuities with earlier uses of the word before them. We will examine each one of these issues as they succeed one another in the text.

The first main topic that is extensively analyzed in the chapter is that of the American War of Independence and its relation to democracy [A].⁴⁶¹ In these respects, even though Dunn goes into great lengths in describing the assembly activities throughout the war and their renowned deliberative deeds [A1],⁴⁶² the same part of the text makes also clear to readers that not only did the very term ‘democracy’ play no role in the actual initiation of the North American crisis,⁴⁶³ but even in the few instances in which the term did appear, the sentiments it was arousing were far from favourable for the greatest part. Arranging these instances in a most convenient order, readers come across Alexander Hamilton’s casual coinage of ‘representative democracy’ in 1777 [A2],⁴⁶⁴ and, much more consequentially, James Madison’s contrast between the endless factions of ‘pure Democracy’ and his favoured ‘Republic’ in the well-known article No. 10 of *The Federalist Papers* from 1787, further explicated with the addition of the principle of representation for the latter in an article of the following year [A3].⁴⁶⁵ Nonetheless, ‘democracy’ started gaining an occasional minimal recognition as an issue to be weighed in the formed circumstances, as one can tell out of the

⁴⁵⁸ Dunn (2005b), ch. 2.

⁴⁵⁹ The characterization (in the singular) is due to Palmer’s older classical study (1959 and 1964; nowadays available as 2014), which Dunn takes into substantial consideration, with the expected criticism, in the footnotes of the chapter.

⁴⁶⁰ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 71-72. See also Koselleck (2006).

⁴⁶¹ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 72-84.

⁴⁶² See Dunn (2005b), pp. 73-76.

⁴⁶³ Dunn (2005b), p. 72.

⁴⁶⁴ This information is actually provided quite later on in the text (Dunn 2005b, pp. 122, 226).

⁴⁶⁵ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 75-80 and 214-216, where Thomas Jefferson and his call to avoid an ‘elective despotism’ for the emerging polity are cited as akin to the views of his friend Madison.

words of such conservative-minded sceptics as John Adams' remark that 'a democratic despotism is a contradiction in terms' and Chancellor James Kent's later defence of property qualification to franchise as a means for taming 'the evil genius of democracy' [A4],⁴⁶⁶ as well as out of the prominent architect Benjamin Latrobe's acknowledgement of democracy's constitutional potencies for the political education of the populace [A5], a goal which the late Madison was also retrospectively embracing for the American Constitution that he had so much worked to establish next to his persistently "little sign of warming" to the term 'democracy' in the 1820s [A6].⁴⁶⁷ This being the case with democracy's limited presence throughout the war and its most direct aftermaths, one may best appreciate Dunn's introductory observation for this part of Tocqueville's later role in the retrospective view of the entirety this experience as 'democracy' [A7],⁴⁶⁸ which seems to run parallel with Dunn's concluding remark that "[i]n America, the battle for democracy, as Americans had come to understand it, was won effectively by default, even if much of its substance had been won much earlier and with much effort under very different names".⁴⁶⁹ Even so, Dunn will also make clear that this vision had limited impact beyond the two American continents up until the First World War and its sweeping the world by the end of the second World War,⁴⁷⁰ which are expectedly reserved to be considered for later on in the book.

The turn to Europe for the same times in the chapter is similarly characterized by an interest to counter stereotypes of a close kind concerning democracy's role and presence. The first thing to note here is that the treatment does not rush towards the loud claims associated with the Revolution in France, but opts instead to begin more properly with a chronologically anterior range of instances of a presence of democracy in other countries than France, bringing thus to common sight a strongly neglected part of the story that provides also a missing link with the earlier cases. More specifically, Dunn proceeds to the consideration of a region with which readers have already been acquainted shortly previously in the book, i.e. that of the Netherlands of the times [B].⁴⁷¹ The first setting under examination at this point has to do with the Dutch Patriot Revolt in its late phase between 1785 and 1787 [B1], for which case Dunn clarifies that "the movement [...] did not at any point define itself as a movement for democracy".⁴⁷² Despite this being so, Dunn brings up in the first place two occasions from 1785 in which the Patriot leadership in the Free Corps burgher Assemblies "found themselves adopting a position which it was entirely natural

⁴⁶⁶ Dunn (2005b), pp. 80, 83.

⁴⁶⁷ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 82-83.

⁴⁶⁸ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 72-73. It is further worth noting that these same pages also discretely intimate to the fact that this entire process also allowed for a part of England's practices concerning 'representative government' to "find themselves rechristened in the language of the ancient world" at about that time, leading thus the Americans in turn to identify themselves more firmly with their having already established a democracy.

⁴⁶⁹ Dunn (2005b), p. 84. The reference to democracy's effective win 'by default' may slightly remind us of our comment on the reading of Spinoza for one more time.

⁴⁷⁰ Dunn (2005b), p. 91.

⁴⁷¹ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 84-91.

⁴⁷² Dunn (2005b), p. 85.

to describe as democratic”, with the former of them referring to a ‘People’s government by representation’ and the latter seeking to assert a wide range of ideas of republican political sovereignty on the basis of their constitutional suggestions, whereas the case is very crucially further strengthened by the fact that in the following year the Dutch aristocrat Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp felt disposed to describe the political situation of the country as a division of the people into ‘aristocrats’ and ‘democrats’.⁴⁷³ The next two settings and the much stronger presence of ‘democracy’ in them seem to draw on this favourable background in the course of the new circumstances brought by the Revolution in the neighbouring France. In these respects, Dunn successively refers to the numerous instances of the unprecedented prominence of ‘democracy’ and ‘democrat’ in the Dutch politics in the times of the French-patronized Batavian Republic of the years from 1795 to 1805 [B2], which once in 1797 even reached far enough to claim to the French that the Dutch were capable of more democracy than their patrons,⁴⁷⁴ and to the short-lived regional revolt of the Austrian Netherlands against the Hapsburgs between 1789 and 1790, during which the faction led by Jan Frans Vonck were the first group that uncontestedly identified themselves as ‘democrats’ in order to counter the strong popularity that the domestic aristocratic faction of the revolt did not cease to enjoy [B3]. Nonetheless, Dunn points out that even in this latter case, the name was far from meant to imitate the radical reconstruction of politics ventured in France, since the declared project of the Vonckists kept being the reestablishment of the medieval liberties that the area had been enjoying until the late reforms in the regional policy of the Austrian crown.⁴⁷⁵

The consideration of France at the closing of the ‘Second Coming’ [C] displays the range of concerns with which the previous parts of the chapter have already acquainted its readers.⁴⁷⁶ Dunn begins once again well before the Revolution, bringing thus to light some further missing continuities with earlier uses of ‘democracy’ in place of a claimed total rupture. In these respects, the opening pages provide an extensive highlight of the undersighted case of the aristocratic royal official René-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis d’Argenson early in the century and his retrospectively insightful reflection on ‘how far democracy could be admitted into monarchical government’, [C1] which actually reached far enough so as to consider the role of equality and assemblies in the process of sound law-making and to draw a distinction between the ‘false democracy’ of the government of the multitude and ‘true democracy’, which acts through deputies and which was associated with the political life of the Netherlands and a little later on with that of the Swiss cantons of the times.⁴⁷⁷ D’Argenson’s impressive range of insights was said in turn to have had a profound influence on all better-known major political authors in France in the advancing century, reaching more specifically the Physiocrats, Quesnay,

⁴⁷³ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 84-87.

⁴⁷⁴ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 86-87.

⁴⁷⁵ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 88-91.

⁴⁷⁶ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 92-123.

⁴⁷⁷ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 93-97.

Mirabeau, Montesquieu, Turgot, Rousseau and Mably,⁴⁷⁸ and leading us thus to the great Revolution in France.

As the case has been already with the American War, the treatment of the Revolution itself highlights both the specificity of the very limited instances of the actual use of 'democracy' by the protagonists throughout the events as well as the primarily retrospective view of the entire process as 'democratic'.⁴⁷⁹ As has been already noted earlier on, Dunn proceeds to a detailed consideration of all such instances, starting with Sieyès' well-known set of 1788-1789 pamphlets [C2], including the last and most influential 'What is the Third Estate?', in which, while mainly drawing an opposition between the People and the aristocrats, Sieyès was categorical in his rejection of 'democracy', as one may tell from his dictum of 'no democracy' with and against the aristocrats, the depiction of the latter's estate as a 'feudal democracy', and his views that representatives are not democrats and that real democracy is impossible among such a large population as that of France.⁴⁸⁰ What follows is the observation that the tragic civil strife of the times did not allow for "any prospect of the simplest and justest of political conceptions achieving clearly intended and well-controlled consequences", apparently including the brought utilizations of 'democracy' in France and in countries beyond it (said to have been comprising Belgium, Holland, Italy, Germany and Poland), which in the latter cases is reported to have served as a mere label between contending political factions, well beyond the attempted terminological clarity of the most influentially received senses that were available by then [C3].⁴⁸¹ Having thus cleared up the most immediate background and surrounding fates of 'democracy' in the Revolution, Dunn then ultimately goes on to identify the most substantial presence of different views that depicted 'democracy' as a variably defensible goal by three highly influential voices in the actual events and well afterwards. Presenting these figures in a reconstructively more straightforward chronological order, one should turn first to Paine's [C4] American example-based account of the Revolution in his *Rights of Man* as striving to institute a form of government characterized as 'representation ingrafted upon Democracy' and presented as actually preferable to 'Simple Democracy' even in small territories.⁴⁸² The following and very extensively examined case is that of Maximilien Robespierre's twisting turn of 'democracy' and 'republic' into virtual synonyms [C5],⁴⁸³ basically carried out, among other features, by his "deploying the [former] term in a mildly eccentric manner of his own", since in the advancement to his reign in Terror he claimed that democracies based on constant popular assemblies or conflicting factions either never actually existed or were essentially despotic in character and by accepting instead 'republican virtue' and 'love of equality' embraced by both the government and the people as democracy's principle, which should necessarily

⁴⁷⁸ Dunn (2005b), p. 93.

⁴⁷⁹ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 92, 97-123.

⁴⁸⁰ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 102-111.

⁴⁸¹ Dunn (2005b), p. 111.

⁴⁸² See Dunn (2005b), pp. 112-113.

⁴⁸³ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 114-123.

be accompanied with Terror during revolutionary times. Nonetheless and despite such grave twists of words and thoughts, Robespierre is said to have expressed a hard-to-discern judgment “which most of us now in some form confidently presume to be valid”, made possible as a result of the very narrowly circumstantial positioning of a 1794 republic seeking legitimacy against a collapsing aristocracy and having available a categorical opposite in ‘democracy’ for this end, and with massively far-reaching consequences ever since, as the succeeding chapter will show.⁴⁸⁴ As for the chronologically final gravely consequential voice that is examined at this part of the book, this comes from 1797 and the Christmas admonition of the Italian bishop known at that time as Cardinal Barnaba Chiaramonti, and shortly afterwards turned into Pope Pius VII, that suggested to the faithful gathered ‘be good Christians and you will be the best of democrats’ [C6].⁴⁸⁵ The retrospective significance of this reserved treatment of the aftermaths of the Revolution is seen by Dunn as accommodating a most central channel of the Christian creed with an explicit version of ‘democratic government’, giving us thus an “historically somewhat premature version of Christian Democracy”, the silent work of which would be discerned much later on in time.

The last chapters in *Setting the People Free* bring us once again up to our contemporary views of democracy.⁴⁸⁶ In this part of the book Dunn quite expectedly provides a very long and dense account that calls for a very patient reading in order to reconstruct what we have been taking to stand as its ‘special logic’ and that leaves us no better way to assess other than attempting certain associations with the ‘values’ that we have been already analyzing as being at work both in the previous parts of the book as well as in Dunn’s older works on the topic. In these respects, the completion of the treatment of Robespierre at the beginning of Chapter Three on ‘The Long Shadow of Thermidor’ seems to indicate a strand [A] which draws from the latter’s previously examined depiction of democracy [A1] and which can be seen as paving the way for the formation of Marx’s associated views.⁴⁸⁷ The crucial station in between is set by the words and deeds of two persons that retrospectively became quite hard-to-dissolve. The first of them is Gracchus Babeuf and his ill-attempted 1796 coup in France that became known as the Conspiracy of the Equals [A2], whereas the second is Filippo Michele Buonarroti, an associate of Babeuf at that coup who most importantly published a retrospective account of the events and of the Revolution seen large in 1828, in which Babeuf’s party is strongly labelled as having been the ‘democrats’ all along and as representing the eventually defeated side of the ‘order of equality’ in its said clash with the victorious ‘order of egoism’, which was in turn said to have faltered the Revolution’s true cause [A3].⁴⁸⁸ This account was in turn read by Marx and seems to have been the text from which

⁴⁸⁴ On these issues see especially Dunn (2005b), pp. 119-123, which actually open Chapter Three; cf. also our earlier note on the way ‘utopian politics’ has been approached.

⁴⁸⁵ See Dunn (2005b), p. 112.

⁴⁸⁶ Dunn (2005b), chaps. 3 and 4.

⁴⁸⁷ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 119-130.

⁴⁸⁸ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 123-125.

he “drew much of his sense of the Revolution’s political and social dynamics” [A4],⁴⁸⁹ completing thus the transposition of the formed ‘values’ that we have been suggesting for this strand. On the other hand, Dunn also reminds to the readers at the same place of the text that by the end of these times Tocqueville would also start seeing the American democracy as having been established in actuality and on the basis of a different idea of equality [B], possibly intimating an effort to provide a certain remedy for the formed confusions of the case and, according to quite much of our later hindsight, vindicating the comparative superiority of Madison’s institutional edifice, despite the grave problems that the latter would not cease to face up to present.⁴⁹⁰

The increasing perplexities in the understanding of democracy which readers of the book up to this part have already started facing themselves in turn, and which reflect at the same time our most common experience of democracy’s later fates, lead Dunn to declare that in the years that follow democracy has been turned into a “story that cannot be told”.⁴⁹¹ The case seems to have been the summative outcome of the occasion of the subsequent meanings of democracy having become strongly implicated in the midst of idioms of particular persuasions and the “myriads of choices” with which these have been personally involving all of us ever since [C].⁴⁹² This being so, Dunn goes on to build an accordingly composite narrative after that point, for which one may provide only

⁴⁸⁹ Dunn (2005b), p. 123.

⁴⁹⁰ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 125-130. It is worth noting that the offered outcome of the American democracy at this point is also presented as having provided its citizens with a “cunning mixture of equality and inequality” and as having persisted over time “only because opulence and distinction (the combination offered) have struck more citizens on balance as collectively beneficial than as simply malign” (p. 128). The choice of words cannot help but bring to mind the broad outlook with which Rawls’ readers around the globe have come up throughout the latter’s quite expectedly far more elaborately reasoned theoretical argument of ‘political philosophy’ presented in remarkable detail in his (1999). Furthermore, the same pages (128-129) also provide a comment on the occasional abandonment of democracy for modern dictatorship, “often with very little hesitation”, in very many parts of the world in the 20th century in face of grave problems of a similar kind to those of the American case, primarily having to do with circumstances where “distinction must be sustained through stagnant or diminishing wealth”. What is interesting here is that this set of cases is presented as being situated within the frames set by democracy as already established, as one may also tell out of the absence of any felt need by Dunn to employ the very term ‘dictatorship’ at this point (reintroducing it in essence only in pp. 158-160), and by the acceptance of economic limits to politics of the sort that we have already pointed out as a much older insight informing his pieces (explicitly repeated with the same allusions in the footnotes provided for close to this part in pp. 227-228).

⁴⁹¹ Dunn (2005b), p. 141.

⁴⁹² See Dunn (2005b), pp. 131-133, 137-140. The outlook that has been adopted at this point seems to be quite much on a par with early Koselleck’s known acceptance of the same period in the leading countries of the West as being characterized by the diverging use of single concepts of social and political speech by different segments of the population for different meanings and by the accompanying proliferation of neologisms in what he once used to frame as the end of a *Sattelzeit* or ‘mount-saddle time’ in the history of concepts of the times; e.g. see his (2011). The proximity of this view with the account presented here seems to be further strengthened from the fact that Dunn employs ‘horizons of experience’ as an explicatory device in the course of the same part of the text (pp. 139, 151 and elsewhere; cf. Koselleck 2004c), whereas the itemization of the case in terms of ‘persuasion’ seems to suggest a moderate comment on Skinner’s said approximation to ‘rhetoric’ in the years of Dunn’s writing of the examined book that we have previously discussed.

a brief outline of its 'logic' and 'values'. Keeping thus ourselves in line with the preceding parts, one should notice that starting from these years Dunn sees for democracy "two stories merging inextricably with one another over much of the time and distance which we need to cover", mostly framed according to the aforementioned idiom of the opposition of the 'order of equality' to the 'order of egoism'.⁴⁹³ The first of the two threads of story that one may consequently discern seems to begin from Babeuf and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and to extend up until the 20th century Eastern European and Asian Communist regimes. and is actually revealed to have had a quite liminal relation with the support of universal suffrage or other concrete matters associated with democracy, insisting mostly instead on declared impositions of narrow visions of equality taken as a singularly defining principle against thirds [C1].⁴⁹⁴ On the other hand, a parallel thread to this seems to be identified as operating in Western Europe starting rather from practically the same times and credited with a more substantive role in the former matters, crucially including the concessions of the conservative politicians Cavour, Bismarck and Disraeli, the universal suffrage movement at large and the non-Communist Social Democrats in Western Europe [C2].⁴⁹⁵ The outcome of the course of these two Europe-based conceptions of democracy in the 20th century seems to have given place in Dunn's account to a more cynical perception of democracy as 'the rule of the politician' by Joseph Schumpeter, a migrant from Central Europe to the United States [C3],⁴⁹⁶ and more recently to the much cruder appeals to democracy made by George W. Bush, acting as President of the United States, and Tony Blair, acting as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, during their declared war against terrorism and tyranny at the opening years of our own century [C4].⁴⁹⁷ In all cases, the same late times are also characterized by the return of the American conception of democracy to the international forefront on the basis of the fact that democracy served as "the christening for a new formula for civilized rule" that was offered by the victors of the two successive World Wars [D].⁴⁹⁸ In these respects, Dunn successively brings up Woodrow Wilson's vision of democracy as an internationally influential offer of a new world order [D1],⁴⁹⁹ the far more effective appeal to democracy as a common banner for the eventual World War II victors [D2] and then in the service of the post-war struggle against the USSR [D3], up until the

⁴⁹³ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 130-134ff.

⁴⁹⁴ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 142-147, 150-153, 156-157ff. It is further worth noting that the view of equality as not being able to serve as an exclusive principle in politics is characteristically similar to Sen's (1992, ch. 9) standpoint in the debate between Rawls and his 'egalitarian' interlocutors, who are in turn cited at the footnotes for these parts (p. 229). Furthermore, one should also note that, in firm accordance to the inclinations that we have already discussed, Dunn yet asserts an important range of roles for equality in politics, mostly explicated in terms alluding to the political-theoretical idiom of 'recognition', popular in the times when the book was written (see Fraser & Honneth, 2003).

⁴⁹⁵ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 153-154, 156-157ff.

⁴⁹⁶ Dunn (2005b), pp. 133, 165, 184.

⁴⁹⁷ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 140-141.

⁴⁹⁸ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 155-160ff.

⁴⁹⁹ Dunn (2005b), p. 155.

reality of the latter's collapse,⁵⁰⁰ prior to adding again Bush's and Blair's late rhetoric to this list [D5].⁵⁰¹

The extensively analytical overview which was obtained through the consideration of the history of democracy throughout so many times and places up to present allows Dunn to turn towards an increasingly more theorizing account at the ending part of the book.⁵⁰² What we need to note from the viewpoint of our examination is that the claims to theorize are closely accompanied by numerous instances of democracy's fates across the previously investigated settings, vindicating thus our chosen outlook for Dunn's overall intellectual formation and concerns.⁵⁰³ In these respects, one may very characteristically note that these pages include a growing turn to 'representative democracy' and its present potencies,⁵⁰⁴ whereas a new description of our late dualism that we have repeatedly come across also has its place. The suggestion this time is brought forward in visibly sharper terms than those that appeared in 1992, since it consists in viewing democracy in the present-day 'order of egoism' as "an endless tug of war between two instructive but very different senses".⁵⁰⁵

4. Dunn's most recent interests in democracy

The presentation of Dunn's work up to this point makes it no hard to observe that the American conception of democracy is the one that presents greater interest, as a result of both its promises and late potencies. This being so, it makes no wonder that Dunn's works on democracy that followed have tended to strongly include a more privileged focus on the American conception of democracy. In fact, the case seems to have assumed a quite urgent tone in case one takes also into consideration the post-9/11 military expeditions of the United States to Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 respectively and the already-raised role that democracy has played in them. Continuing the approach that we have been employing for the presentation of Dunn's work in detail, one may count this state of affairs as the most critical context for this period in the relevant pieces, which have been consequently principally addressing American and Asian audiences and have been also characterized by a strengthening of Dunn's affiliations with Asia, especially including the relatively affluent region commonly referred to as

⁵⁰⁰ Dunn (2005b), pp. 156-158.

⁵⁰¹ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 158-160ff.

⁵⁰² Dunn (2005b), pp. 160-190.

⁵⁰³ It is worth noting that the increasing theoretical tone of these pages also allowed for a consideration of the late attention drawn by some rather imagery-appealing conceptions of democracy, citing John Dewey and the youth uprisings of 1968 for the case and suggesting that the vividness of their appeals tends to be quite time-restricted in place of the institutions-based conceptions of democracy; Dunn (2005b), p. 172.

⁵⁰⁴ See Dunn (2005b), pp. 160, 172, 179ff.

⁵⁰⁵ Dunn (2005b), p. 171; cf. Foucault (1984a).

East Asia and its own potencies, quite easily missed in present-day preoccupations in the West.⁵⁰⁶ In quite similar respects, the more constructive context that one can acknowledge as being at work for the same time seems to have been provided by the losses of a great number of grand American minds in the academic study of politics across these years, from Rawls (2002) and Richard Rorty (2007), up to Samuel Huntington (2008) and Robert Dahl (2014).⁵⁰⁷ The occasion seems to suggest that the time has come for an appreciation of their massively influential insights in wider lights, as one can quite characteristically tell out of Dunn's increased exploration of the potencies of the offered idioms and major works of such authors in his American-oriented writings.

Since the writings of this new period in Dunn's intellectual trajectory as an Emeritus Professor now on have tended to be usually short and theory-focused, and for the time being have not included many discussions expanding further on historically concrete cases of relevance to democracy, one may make some room for a consideration of the way the pieces of these years have been continuing an engagement with influential aspects of the works of the still active academics of the aforementioned kind as a very useful introductory lens for the more intricate nuances of Dunn's history of democracy of the recent times. In these respects, one may notice above all how the historian's *ethos* and the accordingly massive range of mutually differing instances about the topic that Dunn has been going on to consider throughout the years have made him apprehensive of the generalizing and self-vindicating claims that the appreciated views of such American-based academics have been tending to implicate. The case can be seen quite characteristically in Dunn's interest to keep reviewing the recent books of authors of the kind, continuing thus a disposition already in place since his earliest critical engagements with the genre of 'democratic theory'. A very crucial instance to which one should refer was certainly Dunn's sharp criticism of Francis Fukuyama's much-aspiring celebrated account of a said liberal-democratic *End of History* in the aftermaths of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which was actually followed in the very beginning of this period by a further review commenting on Fukuyama's platitudes and changes of mind in his declared advice on 'state-building' in the context of the then ongoing expedition

⁵⁰⁶ In these respects, it worth noting that Dunn's interests in Asia and the presence and potencies of democracy in the continent seem to start mostly from (1992d) and that they have included a very close concern and according range of collaborations with South Korea and its widely acknowledged late leader Kim Dae-jung.

⁵⁰⁷ In order to facilitate the readers' appreciation of the way this eventual state of affairs makes itself felt in the course of this period until its most definite presence in Dunn (2014), it might be worth standing on the relevant names and the years when their most personal voices were silenced. John Rawls' loss in 2002 had been preceded earlier on that year by that of his early interlocutor and widely influential critic Robert Nozick, whereas another voice that influentially joined this political-philosophical debate shortly afterwards, that of Ronald Dworkin, was silenced in 2013, remaining thus an active interlocutor in Dunn's writings up until that moment. The more critical philosophical voice of Richard Rorty, whose place in Skinner's formation we have already brought up, was silenced in 2007, whereas, passing to the more empirical science-oriented academics, on the other hand, one should note Charles Tilly's and Samuel Huntington's losses in 2008, followed by that of Robert Dahl in 2014. Furthermore, it might not be inappropriate to add to this list in quite according respects Kim Dae-jung's loss in 2009, as one may tell out of Dunn (2019e).

to Iraq and the latter's distancing from his early controversial thesis.⁵⁰⁸ In a similar spirit, we find Dunn in the opening years of this late period in his career showing also a particular concern to keep up reviewing works by other influential American authors, focusing more specifically on democracy this time. This case begins with a 2007 article published at the academic platform of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and meant to explore what one conceives of 'capitalist democracy'.⁵⁰⁹ Dunn recapitulates his late findings on the history of democracy in the piece, bringing thus to the forefront the dualism between the 'order of egoism' and the 'order of equality' and very crucially pointing out that the American conception of democracy has been far from single throughout its past and present and actually entails several features of different resonance and relation to the 'order of equality' conceptions. These include Dworkin's version of egalitarianism, seen as rehearsing weak features of the latter kind, whereas Dunn similarly relativizes the most ordinary American readings of Sen's approximation of the idea of 'public reasoning' as drawing in turn upon experiences beyond liberal democracy itself, such as the received spirit of Emperor Akbar's rule in India. In all cases, the article also provides certain very crucial differentiations concerning the more individual elements of the common American views of democracy, for several of which Dunn employs the language of 'entitlements', silently adopting thus a term brought to currency by Robert Nozick and exploring its explicatory potencies well beyond the latter's viewpoint.⁵¹⁰ This piece was followed in the next year by a review of the very recently late Charles Tilly's historical sociologist account of democracy, for which case one may notice Dunn's appreciative moderacy of tone and overall concern to bring to light the historical depth underlying Tilly's approach as well as the openness to individual agency and contingency with which the latter's presented structures and schemes could arguably be seen as meant to engage, forewording thus an attitude that we will also meet in the following book under examination.⁵¹¹ As for a final instance of similar concerns in the same years, one may turn to Dunn's reply to the characteristically impatient and flat-biased extensive review of his late work by the political theorist Don Herzog in 2010, to whom Dunn responds by pointing to him the inadequacy of the former's claims

⁵⁰⁸ See Fukuyama (1989), (1992), (1995); Dunn (1998); Fukuyama (2004a), (2004b); Dunn (2005a). One should probably add to this set Dunn's publication in Fukuyama's emblematic public journal (2010a) of an essay drawing on a critical review of the views and limitations of two non-American Anglophone titles on democracy, i.e. the Australian-based political scientist John Keane's informed view of democracy as evolving from its long historical past to present (2009; cf. 2019) and that of the much-cosmopolite publicist John Kampfner (2010), which are introduced as characteristic instances of felt inadequacy vis-à-vis Fukuyama's early thesis. Furthermore, Fukuyama's standing as most characteristic of the approach Dunn is interested to criticize is also vindicated in (2014), p. 163 and (2019d), p. 164.

⁵⁰⁹ Dunn (2007).

⁵¹⁰ See Dunn (2007), *passim*; cf. Nozick (1999), Dworkin (2000), Sen (2003), (2005). For an explicit allusion to Nozick's criticism against the binding ambitions of philosophical 'contractarian' theories of the latter's times see Dunn (2014), p. 22, whereas further tacit criticism to the limitations of Dworkin's employment of 'market' features in his recommendation of an 'equality of resources' in the face of humans' ongoing reevaluations of both offered procedures and outcomes, appears in (2019d), pp. 170-171.

⁵¹¹ See Tilly (2007), Dunn (2008), as well as (2014), p. 164. For a similar attitude see also (2013).

and grounds, including Herzog's said nostalgia of Dunn's for the Athenian democracy in place of working with the said modern premises, and how Dunn's own mode of work throughout the years was meant to be exploring democracy's importantly diverse origins, understandings and current potencies, which in the latter cases include a concern for the way the American conception of democracy has been rather globalized in the recent times.⁵¹²

The most extensive consideration of democracy's history in this period in *Breaking Democracy's Spell* allows us to have a closer look at the late features of our main interest in Dunn's work.⁵¹³ In these respects, the text quite much echoes the style and attitude that were elaborated in *Setting the People Free* as well as the accordingly relativizing integration of insights and idioms of American academics as suggested above, allowing us thus to restrict ourselves successively to only a few features of greater interest and to the new elements in the overall shaping of the book, prior to our usual focus on its most empirical parts. The first thing to note is that the book originated in a distinguished lecture series given in 2011 at Yale University, Connecticut, which has been actually the most established seat in the United States for the liberal-minded and empirically-oriented version of 'democratic theory' known for a long time as 'polyarchy' and mostly associated with the work of such highly influential political scientists working at the institution as Charles Lindblom and Robert Dahl.⁵¹⁴ This being so and in firm continuation with our preceding analysis, Dunn declares from the early parts of the book that he is aiming to bring to focus the unclarity and instability that has been underlying the rather American tendency of equating democracy with 'good government', in an effort to "de-parochialize the understanding of democracy [...] from the contingencies of local political experience and to relocate [its features] back in the intractably global setting that the term itself so unmistakably occupies",⁵¹⁵ or, in the text's further and more generalizing words that provided the title for the book, to register "the sort of spell through which the world's political imagination has come to be bewitched".⁵¹⁶ Quite crucially from the viewpoint of our examination, Dunn situates his intervention in further great discretion as forming part of

[t]he extreme urgency for the citizens of the wealthier countries of the West to learn to distinguish better a (predominantly) happy accident from a magic formula

⁵¹² See Herzog (2010); Dunn (2010b).

⁵¹³ Dunn (2014).

⁵¹⁴ For some massively influential titles of this approach see Dahl (2006), (1971) and Dahl & Lindblom (1976). Dunn himself acknowledges this context of the occasion in (2014), p. 11. Readers may bring back to mind at this point also Skinner's already discussed older criticism of the 'empirical theorists of democracy' (1973), which actually focused on Dahl's work as the most elaborate representative of the genre and was said to have dues to Dunn (1972b) in turn.

⁵¹⁵ See Dunn (2014), pp. 9-12.

⁵¹⁶ Dunn (2014), p. 6. In these respects, it is worth noting that Dunn's reference to 'breaking a spell' from the very title of his lectures can be seen as a relativizing allusion to the interests in 'disenchantment' that has been very popular in Weberian academics in North America for several decades. On the latter interests see Scaff (2014), chap. 2, and on Weber's own more nuanced *Entzauberung* see his (2012d). The author owes this observation to Prof. Palonen.

*projected drastically forward from the recent history of actually existing democracies.*⁵¹⁷

The choice of ‘happy accident’ for how democracy is viewed here cannot but bring to mind a tacit consideration of Rorty’s characteristic idiom in his attempted defence of the ‘contingency of the liberal community’,⁵¹⁸ as one can further tell from the alternation of references in the same introductory pages between our understanding of democracy as an ‘accident’ and several allusions to the precariously ‘good fortunes’ that many people living in the American or other Western democracies have the unreflective tendency to ascribe to its existence.⁵¹⁹ In all cases, Dunn actually provides a moderate citation to the then recently silenced Ronald Dworkin at this part of the text instead as an attempted theorization of how one may hopefully distinguish individual fortunes from brute luck, counterposing him to Rawls’ much different outlook on according issues⁵²⁰ and initiating thus from that point onwards throughout the text a massive list of both discrete and overt references to influential views in American academics which consequently fall beyond the reach of our examination.

On the other hand, some more things can be said concerning the more overarching narrative features of the book which our investigation has been interested to count as its ‘special logic’. In these respects, the device of ‘story’ has been very expectedly employed once more. Dunn’s ‘story’ here usually maintains a slightly more singularizing tone in place of the manifold stories of *Setting the People Free* as a result of its principal address to the American case, but this makes things far from straightforward throughout this book as well, since democracy is said to present itself under three distinctive features in its story that will remain strongly intertwined all along the text, with the first of them consisting in the story of democracy as a word, the second of them having to do with democracy as an idea or assemblage of ideas, and the third one consisting in democracy seen as a range of state forms and subordinate institutions.⁵²¹ As for a final and this time more distinctive feature in what has to do with the presentation of the different instances examined in the book that we should keep in mind, readers come across from the very beginning of the book with Dunn’s claim of registering “the passage of democracy in all its senses around the world”, which is then followed by a consideration of several specific ‘passages’ of the kind.⁵²² In these respects, it is not hard for one to notice that the choice of term is meant to substitute for the role that the Jewish and Christian schemes of the First and Second Coming played in the apparent breach of other ‘spells’ in the early parts of the narrative in *Setting the People Free*, in an attempt to move this time well

⁵¹⁷ Dunn (2014), p. 5.

⁵¹⁸ See Rorty (1989).

⁵¹⁹ See Dunn (2014), pp. 1-5ff., passim.

⁵²⁰ Dunn (2014), pp. 2, 163.

⁵²¹ See Dunn (2014), pp. 5-8ff. and cf. (2005b), p. 20.

⁵²² See Dunn (2014), p. ix, passim; the term seems to have been first introduced in this sense in (2007), p. 5.

beyond the geographic space shaped by the cultures of these religious creeds, as we will directly proceed to show.

The early sets of concrete historical instances of relevance to democracy appearing in the book bring us to already familiar grounds. More specifically Dunn provides a brief recapitulation of the main findings and schemes already used in *Setting the People Free* presented with an apparent concern to address the exceptionalism underlying the prevalent American conception of democracy. In these respects, a reconstructively chronological examination of the most distinctive features of this account allows us to see how Dunn initially tries to relativize this understanding through a consideration of the quite analogical claim that democracy was invented in ancient Greece [A] as being accompanied with exceptionalist implications of a similar range, since holding onto a belief in such terms also entails, “beyond the innocent narcissism of contemporary Greeks”, “the appropriation of effectively the same claim on Greece’s behalf by the remainder of Europe and its potent and wealthy diaspora across the oceans”.⁵²³ This being so, Dunn is interested to provide some space to “the counterclaim that any specifiable element of what has since come to be called ‘democracy’ had been prefigured and prenamed in other roughly adjacent settings”, pointing thus towards the ‘passage’ of according “cultural and intellectual elements” from proximate Asian civilizations, such as those of Mesopotamia and Phoenicia, despite the lack of any particularly suggestive evidence for it for the time being [A1],⁵²⁴ prior to his repeated bringing up that what has actually survived out of the ancient Greek democracy has been above all a word meant to be only an instrument of thought [A2].⁵²⁵ Moving further forward in time, Dunn brings up another disquieting range of issues to the reigning American views that democracy has been presenting throughout its history in the form of brief mentions to the English 17th century [B], for which case Charles I is this time brought up as offering a very early account of how problematically an actual democracy was taken to work long before the founding of the United States [B1],⁵²⁶ as also happens with Hobbes, who allows Dunn to expand on the reality of the strong connection between the effective operation of existing democracies and the acknowledgement or conferment of authorization [B2].⁵²⁷ In what has to do with the consideration of the American case itself, Dunn mostly repeats his earlier findings and views with few additions of further instances to no new effect, making always clear the limited importance of ‘democracy’ in the Independence War before Tocqueville [C],⁵²⁸ and the entanglement of its fates with Europe’s very different holistic egalitarian conceptions of democracy afterwards (D).⁵²⁹

⁵²³ Dunn (2014), p. 58.

⁵²⁴ See Dunn (2014), pp. 58-61. As Dunn acknowledges at the same place, this idea originates in Keane (2009).

⁵²⁵ See Dunn (2014), pp. 30-31, 61-62.

⁵²⁶ See Dunn (2014), pp. 15-18.

⁵²⁷ See Dunn (2014), pp. 18-24ff., 148-149.

⁵²⁸ See Dunn (2014), pp. 63-67.

⁵²⁹ See Dunn (2014), pp. 62-63, 67-70.

The following parts of the book provide us with the most original historical research on democracy of this period. In firm accordance with our approach up to this point, Dunn introduces this part of the text by informing us that “it is more urgent to improve our grasp of what has been going on in the contrasting adventures of the category [of democracy] in two other [than Russia’s] great societies on the Asian landmass”, i.e. India and China,⁵³⁰ turning himself thus into arguably one of the first leading scholars in present-day Western academics that has been working his way through against the deterring limitations that the grave distance of language and the long accumulation of culture impose on any third person’s attempt to provide a decently offered view on any parts of the histories of these large territories.⁵³¹ In order to bring this goal into effect, these parts of the text mostly assume the form of an informed discussion of the instances of relevance as these have been drawn out of accessible accounts of specialists. Seen in these respects, the two cases prove to be very instructive since they have presented strikingly different passages of democracy that seem to have mostly evaded the preconceptions of both their own regional and Western broad audiences, the United States included.

The first of the two cases considered is that of democracy’s passage from China [E], since it seems to provide a much less composite and least documented case than that of India.⁵³² Even though the case is covered in a long span of pages, the fact that the most concrete historical record of democracy’s passage and presence in China’s long-lastingly wholesome civilization is expectedly very thin leads Dunn mostly to an informed theoretical account of the historical reasons underlying this limited presence as seen from China’s point of view as well as of the counterpositively similarly treated difficulties that the prevalent American democratic view faces when it tries to appreciate the Chinese world.⁵³³ Nonetheless, Dunn does not fall short of turning the emphasis on China’s actual earliest recorded encounters with democracy when the latter reached its ground and on the subsequent fates of the case, bringing thus to light the undersighted fact that it was the American version of democracy the one to which the Chinese were first brought to respond. In these respects, the earliest episode that research has brought to light has to do with a set of early 19th century descriptions of Chinese officials that were trying to explicate the governing structures of the United States to their fellow-countrymen [E1]. The preserved pieces reveal the impressively and highly instructively preconceived way in which their learned

⁵³⁰ Dunn (2014), p. 70.

⁵³¹ On some early related attempts of Pocock while residing in New Zealand see (1962b), (1964), and for a recent reappraisal see (2019c).

⁵³² See Dunn (2014), pp. 70-102.

⁵³³ See Dunn (2014), pp. 71-81, 83-84, 85-91. It is worth noting at this point also that at the end of this joint discussion of China’s and the United States’ views of each other, Dunn finds a place to come to terms with the late Huntington’s controversial thesis of an unceasing ‘clash of civilizations’ in the world order (1996), in the face of which the former brings up the early 2010s circle of popular protests commonly known as the Arab Spring and the apparent leaning towards ‘democracy in vaguest outline’ that their indigenous participants adopted by themselves as an available ‘default option’ chosen in the light of what they were trying to reject (2014, pp. 91-94); the analogies of the outlook of the case with those examined in (2005b), chaps. 2 and 3 are plain enough.

authors were set to view the Americans and their democracy, since the latter are described as a 'tribe' of 'barbarians', whereas their mode of rule is initially degraded for the lack of a monarch and its replacement by a temporary 'headman' said to be drawn by lot and later slightly more soberly viewed as led by a temporarily elected 'president' or 'pivot' above the country's 'officials' and 'notables', whose main function is to preserve 'order' and 'pacify the common people'.⁵³⁴ What seems to have succeeded this case, according to the text, is the gradual extrication of the office of the president out of a vocabulary that originally designated village headmen and gunboat captains and its elevation to a more honorific status throughout the century that set up an unseen parameter of its own vis-à-vis the largest components of Chinese society and politics [E2].⁵³⁵ As for the subsequent times, these receive a more limited emphasis in the course of the text, mostly recapitulating Dunn's already expressed findings and views. One may notice at this point, among other things, the reference to the interest that certain Chinese scholars showed on Dewey and their expectedly limited grounds of public success [E3],⁵³⁶ as well a brief reference to the fact that the Chinese ruling structure has been drawing parts of its authority by appealing to Leninism [E4],⁵³⁷ whereas in the later years the discussion makes references to the limited economic success of Russian advisers to the Chinese authorities [E5] and to the relatively better fates of the Chinese economy and State up to present after the latter started choosing for themselves instead [E6].⁵³⁸

The final historical case which is examined at length in the book turns readers to what is nowadays the Republic of India [F], "by far the largest democracy that has ever been", as well as "the most surprising" one, as soon as one reflects on its territorial scale, comparable to that of China, and its persistence in settings still characterized by massive poverty.⁵³⁹ These forming one part of the peculiarities of the case and considering also the greater availability of referential sources, Dunn seems to have had good reasons to get into greater detail in the discussion of concrete instances of relevance for this passage of democracy than the one previously examined. A chronological rearrangement of the references brings to the surface the appropriately great caution that the text shows not to turn at once to the understandably very sensitive matter of the role that the times of the British Empire had in the passage, pointing instead towards the widely-shared possibility of acknowledging instances of the idea and practice of democracy in the long civilization of the South Asian subcontinent much earlier than the arrival of the actual term in the 18th century, expanding thus democracy's story in the region even further back in time than what has been

⁵³⁴ See Dunn (2014), pp. 94-96.

⁵³⁵ See Dunn (2014), pp. 96-97. It is worth suggesting at this point that this same vocabulary along with its original connotations can be also seen to have had an apparent effect in the times known as China's 'Cultural Revolution' in the late 1960s, since it formed a characteristic part in Mao Zedong's popular address at the period.

⁵³⁶ Dunn (2014), pp. 88-89.

⁵³⁷ Dunn (2014), p. 88.

⁵³⁸ See Dunn (2014), pp. 97-103.

⁵³⁹ On India's case see Dunn (2014), pp. 103-127.

Europe's case [F1],⁵⁴⁰ As for the actual role of British voices in the case, one can notice the moderately clarifying tone in what concerns J. S. Mill's controversially received views on the general role that civilized rulers should play in the further advancement of civilization in less favourable environments in the light of the similar views previously held by his father, the former's emphasis in democracy as collective self-education, and the bitter scorn of this point of view by their own compatriot that resided in India later on, jurist James Fitzjames Stephen [F2],⁵⁴¹ A quite differently consequential voice of the same times, on the other hand, was that of jurist Henry Maine, who saw through the importance of the residual autonomy of the Indian villages [F3],⁵⁴² not only introducing thus some early grounds for the later advocacies of 'pluralism' in British and American political thought, but, more crucially for our topic, having had an impact also on the character of the Swadeshi movement early in the next century [F4], as well as on Radhakamal Mookerji's Lucknow School of sociology and his 1923 study *Democracies of the East* [F5].⁵⁴³ The text then goes on to suggest the impact that this mode of thought had on Gandhi along with the personal role that the latter in common with the next two great leaders of India's Independence, Nehru and Patel, had in the edification of the Indian democracy [F6],⁵⁴⁴ whereas democracy's reality in the independent India and the people's 'romance' with it receive a more analytical treatment. In these respects, readers are reminded of the role that the existent administrative reach of the Indian state played in democracy's consolidation, as particularly witnessed in the acknowledgedly responsible work of the Election Commission of India [F7],⁵⁴⁵ shortly before a discussion of the comparable importance of the Indian Constitution as a project meant to help in rectifying a very historical injustice and been "unequivocally" received as such [F8],⁵⁴⁶ of an equally grave reference to the long-lasting failings of the Indian democracy [F9],⁵⁴⁷ as well as of the alleviating role that 'civil society' in India has been seen to be playing in these settings [F10],⁵⁴⁸ possibly continuing thus the aforementioned character of the Swadeshi movement and, arguably, of practices dating from much older times.

⁵⁴⁰ See Dunn (2014), pp. 112-113. It is worth emphasizing at this point that Dunn presents the case in quite 'ancient-constitutional' terms as suggestive of democracy's "immemorial but shadowy presence" in India's past, explicitly adopting in this way what formed "a central issue of judgment and allegiance for the nationalist movement [of India] from quite early in the twentieth century".

⁵⁴¹ See Dunn (2014), pp. 115-118.

⁵⁴² See Dunn (2014), pp. 118-120.

⁵⁴³ See Dunn (2014), p. 120.

⁵⁴⁴ See Dunn (2014), pp. 105-106, 120.

⁵⁴⁵ See Dunn (2014), p. 107.

⁵⁴⁶ See Dunn (2014), pp. 107-110, 120-122, 125-127, where the role of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, India's great jurist of the times, is also emphasized. It is also worth pointing out that the very choice of words concerning the ways in which India's constitutional democracy has provided "distributive gains" for "the conspicuously badly off in given settings" is once again suggesting an approximation to Rawls' (1999) and Sen's (1992) argumentative views in more relative terms, as one may also tell for Sen's case out of a reference to 'capabilities' in p. 113, even though actual discussion of part of his work is left for p. 127.

⁵⁴⁷ See Dunn (2014), pp. 108-109, 124-126.

⁵⁴⁸ See Dunn (2014), pp. 113-115, 120-121.

A brief turn to the last chapter of the book allows us to reach Dunn's most recent pieces of relevance, which have been in fact more recent than the original writing of these pages. In what has to do with the end of *Breaking Democracy's Spell*, it will make no surprise up to now that readers come up with an increasing theorization of the different insights and issues that were brought to light throughout the preceding parts, including the responsibilities of such academic centres of global education like Yale should undertake.⁵⁴⁹ What is more noteworthy is the fact that Dunn remains very candid in what has to do not only with democracy's own limitations next to its promising potencies, irrespectively of the conception one may have for it, but also with the brute reality of its incapacity to alleviate such immediately grave sufferings as those characterizing deeply injured countries in the opening years of our century, like the mentioned Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Libya.⁵⁵⁰ In fact, democracy and the world's problems around it and beyond have been still very characteristically informing some of the latest pieces of this sequence. In these respects, the new Preface and Conclusion of the 2019 edition of *Setting the People Free* allowed for a theorizing overview of the broadly perceived crisis in the Western world throughout the preceding decade that emulated the tone that we have traced across the works that displayed a more recognizably distance-based writing of 'history'.⁵⁵¹ What we need to note at this point is that the text sees into the multiple components of the misfortunes of the times, many of which actually originate well beyond the accordingly overburdened democracy.⁵⁵² As far as the latter is more specifically concerned, one very visible part of the implicated misfortunes of the case that provided a subject matter for reflection had to do with the ranging wave of electoral results of the times that have become known as 'populism', for whose case the text opts for references to certain concrete features of the most prominent cases in place of a rush to adopt the term as presently used, whereas readers also come across a reminiscence of both the differences and the implications between democracy and placing one's trust in the goodwill or acumen of a citizens' majority.⁵⁵³ 'Populism', named as such, is left for other publications of the same times, whose empirical focus lies more narrowly on South Korea and which make clear both that the term is far from designating any clear ensemble of ideas and that it might be more competently seen as forming part of the consequences that appear when democracies are facing problems rather than as a self-generating cause of events.⁵⁵⁴ This being so, one may see the treatment of this case along with that of the crisis of the last decade as instructive instances of the wide range of issues for which democracy and its unfinished journey may go on providing us with important grounds to reflect.

⁵⁴⁹ Dunn (2014), ch. 4.

⁵⁵⁰ Dunn (2014), p. 128.

⁵⁵¹ Dunn (2019f) and (2019d) respectively.

⁵⁵² See Dunn (2019d), especially pp. 177-183.

⁵⁵³ See Dunn (2019d), pp. 164-178, (2019f), p. xii. On the academic origins of the late prevalence of the 'populist' label see Mudde (2007), (2017).

⁵⁵⁴ See Dunn (2018d), (2019b).

5. Conclusions

The analytical examination of this considerable portion of Dunn's work allows us to proceed to the elaboration of some more general conclusions. In these respects, we will turn anew to the order of presentation which we have already found helpful when we considered Skinner's work in accordingly general terms. Consequently, we will begin from the simplest possible level of generalization with issues most directly pertaining to method. Then we will move to a more encompassing disciplinary level, prior to some final issues that can be more properly seen as having a socio-political texture.

Starting with a consideration at the level of method, Dunn's work seems to be characterized by a great number of visible merits, each one of which deserves a particular reference. In the first place, one should distinctively stand on the strict empirical grounding of the examined cases that Dunn's works have been always particularly interested to emphasize. Skinner's own qualitative writing is quite similar in these respects, even though in Dunn's case one may discern a predilection for framing the concrete references in his works in terms that may allow for a more straightforward reflection of their relevance or distance from the respective theoretical claims or general level of academic discussion about them, in place of Skinner's usually greater emphasis on a self-standing outlook for the features of each case in the light of the new contexts brought into consideration each time. Dunn's more distinctive inclination at this point has apparent dues to the outlook of Laslett's work with Locke that we have already brought up,⁵⁵⁵ as well as to Dunn's own longtime characteristic concern with

⁵⁵⁵ As noted before, see Laslett (1960), (1988). Since we are arguing at this point that some aspects of this kind of work have had a formative share in the shaping of young Dunn's own mode of investigation, it might be worth explicating a little further the specific character of what we have been summarizing as Laslett's own strictly empirically grounded scholarship, which covers not only his preoccupation with Locke but also his other academic ventures before and after that. In these respects, most commentators (though not Dunn & Wrigley 2005) are surprised by Laslett's turn to studies of historical social demography after his monumental achievement with Locke and either suggest a change in Laslett's methods or devise more abstract or more reserved interpretations for his work or parts of it. However, as Laslett himself later on maintained, his method was practically the same all along and was what he was calling according to the disciplinary idioms of the times as that of an 'historical sociologist' (e.g. in 1987, 2005). As Laslett further retrospectively acknowledged (1979, 2005), the dues for his own formation from this point of view mostly fall to his short pre-war doctoral supervision by the migrant Hungarian-Jewish sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim and his view of knowledge as differentially 'situated', particularly seen in the case of different 'generations' (as presented for instance in his 1952), which seems to have crucially shaped Laslett's identification of historically distinctive generational features in Filmer's political thought as well as the accordingly comparative situational and chronological disaggregation of the different elements in Filmer's and Locke's writings, thought and reception, prior to a more settled preference to stick to the value of comparative demography upon the increased interest in the history of political thought in Cambridge. Cf. James' downplaying of Laslett's role in the shaping of the 'Cambridge School' vis-à-vis Butterfield's practice of history in Cambridge in (2019b) and his upgrade of Laslett in (2019a); on the other hand, cf. Bevir's (2011) abstract attribution of a 'modernist empiricism' to Laslett and others in Cambridge and Koikkalainen's (2005), (2009), (2011), (2015) more concretely researched though still strongly loaded eventual view of Laslett as incurring a contextualist political philosophy for the early formative years of the 'Cambridge School'; for a yet more

politics as also noted. In these respects, Dunn seems to have been interested to take some steps beyond Laslett's mode of working, as one can tell from his opening comments in his first book on Locke, where we read that

[i]n crude outline what is aimed at is a more coherent and historically accurate account of what Locke was maintaining in the Two Treatises than has yet been given and a more coherent explanation of why he should have wished to maintain this. [...] Many elements of the interpretation have been perceived by others [including Laslett] at some point. [...] However, nothing very like the whole attempt has been made before. Laslett never gave a systematic full-length account of his interpretation of Locke's meaning [...]. Laslett's interpretation has to be pieced together from the section of his introduction [to the Two Treatises] with the addition of his notes to the text throughout.⁵⁵⁶

Readers may notice how much these lines bear witness to a concern to supplement the preoccupation with 'historical accuracy', which always remains the decisive issue in the character of the engagement, as the surrounding parts to these passages further suggest, with an interest for an overall 'coherence' in the offered account, which is therefore also seen fit to be further termed, in a recognizably Weberian vocabulary, as an 'interpretation' or 'explanation'.⁵⁵⁷

The evolution of these preoccupations in time is quite instructive of some further features in the method at work in Dunn's writings. More specifically, as soon as Dunn started getting involved in more topics in the course of his career, including also the less-informed bold claims of prominent theorists of the times that would remain influential in the Anglophone academic human and social sciences,⁵⁵⁸ the aforementioned concern seems to have been succeeded by a quite

balanced account see Skodo's (2014) much studied attempt to put Oakeshott in place of Butterfield and above Mannheim.

⁵⁵⁶ Dunn (1969a), pp. xi-xii.

⁵⁵⁷ See Dunn (1969a), *passim*, as well as (1969b), chap. 1. In fact, the interest to mind for a treatment of all these issues as an ensemble and in this kind of order, along with the grave difficulties in its practice, had also formed the core of Dunn's call in his intervening piece on the methodology of the 'history of ideas' in those times, originally published one year before this book; see (1968b). The similarity of thoughts and words in both occasions with the opening part of Weber (2019), chap. 1, are plain enough; cf. Dunn's own presented account of this disposition in (1990c), pp.9-11. Furthermore, the distinctive role of Locke's religious background in Dunn's interpretation of his thought in (1969b), especially in the late chapters, suggests another recognizable theme that Weber (1992) had allowed to be brought to mainstream academic attention by the examined times. Finally, one should further note that Skinner was quite fast (1969a) in writing a very accurate and predominantly favourable review for Dunn's book, whereas he has also retrospectively described its opening part as offering "a similar [to his own] (though calmer) account of how the history of philosophy might be written as a genuine history" (2002j, p. 39).

⁵⁵⁸ As far as the case of such theory-based academic trends is concerned, it is worth noting at this point that Dunn would go on to provide for practically a single further time after (1968b) an extensive response to a very wide range of relevant authors and philosophical-theoretical claims from his present and the recent past in (1978b), most readily available nowadays as (1980b). Aside from the strong reminiscence in tone and manner of address of Skinner (1969b), Dunn's lack of interest to provide anew a comprehensively coherent account against all the trends under consideration can be also seen from the fact that the article purported to investigate the grounds of popularity of a 'relativism' concerning the assumption of truth in the practicing social sciences and history of the times, equivalent in essence to the current

frequent and very characteristically nuanced interest to provide ‘conclusions’, both in his own books as well as in collective volumes with which he has been engaged.⁵⁵⁹ The turn to this format, distinctively adopted even when the character of the respective publications was more visibly historical and thus their readers would be more prone to expect the emphasis to be solely laid on the most particular aspects that the newest findings for each case would unceasingly go on bringing to the surface, seems to have allowed for the reservation of a limited place for a consideration of the overall coherence of the involved items that would avoid both strongly qualified preconceptions in the actual practice of each investigation as well as a need to go on replying to theoretical views at great lengths.⁵⁶⁰ Furthermore, the reserved theorizing tone of these pieces, which we have already noticed to have passed in the final chapters of Dunn’s late works on democracy as well, seems to suggest that one cannot always soundly claim that such a ‘coherent’ or ‘conclusive’ picture may be reached, or at least that it should not be considered as very readily attained simply once the most empirical parts of an investigation have been brought to a completion, as the reservation of some ‘conclusions’ for later editions of his works seems to further suggest.⁵⁶¹

usage of ‘post-modernism’ to denote the same trend, in whose place he would seek to discuss “why any coherent version of ‘realism’ should be so hard to state in this context” (1980b, p. 81). Among the features of the text, one may stand in the characteristic use of Weberian language in several places next to a tone of reverence when considering Weber’s own work (e.g. pp. 87, 319) in the course of Dunn’s criticisms of the various appeals to ‘methodology’, out of which Skinner’s relevant articles of the times are also discretely exempted (pp. 319-321); cf. Skinner’s ceasing to produce further methodological pieces in those years and his shifts of address in (1988b). Furthermore, the academic philosopher Bernard Williams’ (1973) insightful influence, then Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, in the outlook of the piece is visible and further vindicated by Dunn himself in (1980e), pp. 339, 247.

⁵⁵⁹ To make the case a little more specific, in the wake of the short conclusion in Dunn (1969b), pp. 262-267, then in (1978a), and in the similarly terse (1984c), pp. 87-89, this format reappears, among elsewhere, in more considerable sizes in (1972c), pp. 226-257, as a new overviewing chapter in (1980e), in the ‘concluding essay’ in (1994) and in that of (1992c), and then as a minimal ending in (2000b), pp. 361-363; see also (2018a). This being so, seeing Skinner’s renowned ‘Conclusion’ in (1978b), pp. 349-358, and its role next to this developing inclination might not be inappropriate.

⁵⁶⁰ In the former of these respects, Dunn’s prefatory words in (1980c), p. x, are very characteristic, since we read there that “[the volume’s] introduction identifies the theoretical problem to which the book as a whole is addressed and indicates how the individual essays bear on this problem. The conclusion states a view of the nature of this problem and a consequent judgement on the sense in which, and the degree to which, it is soluble in principle”. In the latter respect, after (1978b), limited signs of similar attempts appeared mostly in the lecture-based pieces (1983a) and (1985b); cf. the difference of emphases in the (1996b) similarly addressed statement and the more particularized addresses to views of authors and trends based on third settings that we examined as an increasing part of the main contexts shaping Dunn’s examined work.

⁵⁶¹ For these retrospective ‘conclusions’ see Dunn (1993b) and (2019d). Furthermore, in quite similar respects Dunn has also shown an interest to prepare new prefaces and introductions for reeditions concerned with the retrospective reception that these editions might meet by later readers –see (1989b), (1993c), (2003c), (2019f) – suggesting thus a resemblance with Pocock’s similar disposition to add afterwords and new prefaces in much-seen distance from the original contentions of his respective writings, e.g. in (1971d), (1987d), (1987c), (1989b), (2003b), (2017c), (2017b), apparently influenced in turn by certain tactical historicizing practices of the ‘common law’ authors examined in his (1957). However, in place of Pocock’s frequent tendency to frame his current views as already present or implied in the past, Dunn rather employs the same devices in order to suggest the sensed differences between the

To expand a little further on the immediately preceding line of thought, one may be also entitled to view the late turn to 'story' as a presentation device that extends this same attitude towards the whole body of Dunn's recent texts. However, in order to appreciate the role of this specific feature in this approach more fully one should note that Dunn had also referred to his academic enterprise as having the quite crucial characteristics of providing the narrative of a 'story', among other things, already in his early piece on method,⁵⁶² whereas we have already noted a similar case some years later on with the 'tragedy' device,⁵⁶³ which further suggests that the concern for issues of the kind can be traced from a quite early period in Dunn's intellectual formation. Nonetheless, as we are hoping to have already started making clear, the early priorities in his work had to do with the establishment of the importance of attending to an empirically rigid treatment in the conduct of research to which the academic interest in his themes used to be most readily taken to belong that would not fall short of the need to consider their previously insufficiently explored particulars in their actual texture that history provides. In these respects, Dunn's bringing forward of 'story' at this point should be most properly seen as an essentially new prioritization to be conceived in the light of an already acquired empirical rigidity with the subject matter and as calling for a more distinctive attention fitting to this issue's own particular needs. This being so, Dunn's employment of 'story' can be said to mind also by its very constitution, for the required strictness with the empirical references as well as for further allowing for subsequent additions of relevant views and topics to which a reasonably due piece of attention has not been given yet.

Bringing our immediately preceding observation into greater focus in turn allows us to appreciate also another important feature in Dunn's work, particularly visible in the writings on democracy. This has to do with the increasingly geographically expansive reach of references that Dunn's pieces have been intending to cover and which allow for a claim to relevance for the lives and conditions of a respectively broad range of audiences. The pieces dealing with democracy were quite pivotal in Dunn's intellectual formation at this point, since these have included from quite early on a considerable number of tracts on various regions of the world well beyond the recognizable West and its own centres, which have been gradually extended to include discussions concerning entire geographical continents, already well before the elaboration of *Setting the People Free* and *Breaking Democracy's Spell*, and have been thus expanding the meaning of democracy's cause well beyond its most immediately perceived grounds in the European and American world.⁵⁶⁴ Adding on this and

present tenses in the writing of the early and the late editions of his works; as for Skinner, his relevant interest lies in the ongoing discrete modification of the actual contentions and references that his pieces include.

⁵⁶² See Dunn (1968a), passim.

⁵⁶³ See Dunn (1984c).

⁵⁶⁴ More specifically, Dunn's first piece that fits this set consisted in the study of the disenchanting reality of democracy in Ghana as seen in the setting of a rural constituency's voting in the post-coup 1969 parliament elections (1975), which would be soon followed by an interest to edit a comparative volume on West African politics as a whole (1978c); on

In firm accordance with the interest in the overall picture of affairs examined above, Dunn's more recent works have also included some pieces concerning the importance of not missing the 'global' reach and implications of certain matters and events of great consequence in our present-day world. Democracy aside, these have further included up to now the harsh economic reality of global capitalism as well as the challenges with which our relations with the commonly shared natural environment unavoidably keep us involved.⁵⁶⁵ As one may reasonably expect, the tone of these pieces is rather explorative and meant to offer an invitation to a wide and very necessary conversation that has been just starting.

In the wake of this brief outline of the course of Dunn's most elementary features of method as seen in the way he has been more directly dealing with the concrete subject matter in his works, one may express a few concerns regarding its present-day state and yet more crucially its current reception. This matter might be of greater importance than one may ordinarily think, since it can be too easily claimed that, in great distance to the prevalent outlook of his early work, Dunn's late writings point towards the lack of any meaning or need to work methodically when conducting an investigation on such topics as an author's political thought or the history of a given idea. However, as we have tried to suggest, the sources of this view have to do with the development of Dunn's interests towards the multiple of directions already discussed, which in turn has had an apparent impact on the quest for an overall interpretative coherence in his increasingly dense accounts. In these respects, one may be allowed to recommend certain ways that may hopefully strengthen clarity in both presentation and the actual design of according research, and thus possibly bridge the suggested distance between the late provision of 'conclusions' and 'stories', on the one hand, and certain practices in research that Dunn himself and his early readers had found to be of great benefit back in the times of his first works, on the other. In order to carry out this cause, one may be reminded of Locke's *dictum* that "Propriety of Speech, is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Men's Minds with the greatest ease and advantage", and his according suggestion that "[t]he proper signification and use of Terms is best to be learned from those, who in their Writings and Discourses, appear to have had the clearest Notions, and apply'd to them their Terms with the exactest choice

Dunn's reasons for selecting this setting as well as for leaving it shortly afterwards, and his eventual thinking about African politics "more comparatively" see (2019c), pp. 3-4, and (2020a), pp. 73-76. Following this episode and in the wake of his shift of focus on democracy, Dunn's increase of collaborations on Asian soil in the early 1990s seems to have enabled him to reflect on the past, present and future of democracy in Europe as a whole (1993d)/(1996c), (2003e), at about the same time when producing a dignifying piece on the 'transcultural significance of Athenian democracy' (1996a), as well to start examining democracy in Asia on a similar key to that on Europe (1992d), (1996f). Many short pieces on more particular Asian settings discussing democracy among other themes would appear in the succeeding years, as already noted, including another focused piece on the whole continent (2011), whereas various kinds of cross-references feature in many short works of Dunn ever since. In all cases, references to democracy's historical and contemporary presence throughout the various parts of the world have their according place in (2005b) and (2014).

⁵⁶⁵ See Dunn (2003d), (2018a), (2018b); also (2019c), p. 2.

and fitness",⁵⁶⁶ and therefore seek for advice based on the example of how certain acknowledged minds from the past proceeded in the face of relevant issues.

The first voice to be heard with this concern in mind is no other than that of Locke himself. More specifically, it might be worth standing a little more broadly than the preceding passage allowed on the brief suggestions included in this part of the *Essay* on how one may hope to provide some remedy or at least avoid what Locke was seeing as the 'inconveniences' in discussion due to the 'imperfection and abuse of words', particularly visible in the more immediate context of the nascent science of his times and in the absence of what would be later called an established 'scientific community'.⁵⁶⁷ In these respects, Locke's recommendations focus on how one may cautiously use their words as clearly and consistently as possible when the intention is to facilitate understanding or to convey knowledge and reveal a predilection to work with what he would call the available 'determinate' or 'determined ideas' that were enjoying wide currency in his times in place of more qualified schemes,⁵⁶⁸ as we have seen that the case certainly has been also with Dunn's own writings on democracy's history across a massive range of settings and its claimed theorists up to this day, intimating thus towards an assimilation of aspects of Locke's respective *ethos* by his longtime committed reader, resting well beyond a narrow reading of Dunn's late texts. In all cases, to bring this perspective even closer to our own circumstances in what has to do with 'science', one may ascribe a similar role to Weber's suggestion of the advantages of working with similarly offered 'concepts of types' in the context of a more focused set of the already-formed scientific circles of his own times, next to those of academic history, as a device for keeping one's accounts as plain and meaningful to thirds as this may prove to be possible.⁵⁶⁹ This being so, aside from our previous identification of a Weberian inclination in Dunn's early texts, one may see the benefits of a similar approach having been already mildly adopted in Dunn's examined writings by bringing to mind for example the ways the presumed American conception of democracy and the one starting from Robespierre have been playing an important role in the elaboration of the overall appreciation of the examined instances both in their original employments as well as when Dunn was passing to the examination of third cases or towards the assumption of a more theoretical tone, suggesting thus the everlasting importance of keeping such issues in mind beyond the crudest aspects which are taken to be characteristic of a historian's work.

Insisting a little more on the circumstances of our own and already much composite academic settings, one may next turn to a further range of similar concerns. At this point, one may stand on the example of J. S. Mill and Weber

⁵⁶⁶ Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book III, Chap. XI, § 11.

⁵⁶⁷ Locke, *Essay*, Book III, Chaps. IX-XI. On the circumstances of the writing of the *Essay* see above all Laslett (1988) and Dunn (1984c). On our late convention of reference to 'scientific community' see Peirce (1992) and Kuhn (2012).

⁵⁶⁸ On Locke's employment of 'determined' and 'determinate' ideas see *Essay*, 'The Epistle to the Reader' (2008, pp. 6-8).

⁵⁶⁹ See Weber (2012a), (2019), pp. 79-99.

among others and recommend paying closer attention to the economizing effect that the methods of comparison can have in the conduct of research extending well beyond the current frames set by individual areas of expertise, as is for instance quite often the case when one has to consider work developed in different expert fields or when one intends to expand such a field to a new subject matter.⁵⁷⁰ In these respects, we would like to argue that integrating comparatist concerns in one's approach can prove to be of great assistance in one's decision on the kinds and ways items can be more promisingly placed under focus in an empirical investigation instead of merely throwing oneself in the midst of the ongoing proliferation of available resources and perspectives. The possible gains that we have in mind at this point can be further illustrated through an examination of a few comparatist concerns that one may plausibly identify in the course of Dunn's examined work. From this point of view, one may notice how Dunn has been interested every time to add emphasis to the direction of comparatively undersighted instances out of democracy's history vis-à-vis its least-reflected employments in the academic and general level of debate of each period. To stand on a revealing example from the beginnings of our examination, readers may notice how the past and present of an underestimated part of the post-war 'democratic theory' was brought to the surface next to the dominant trend of the times as well as how Dunn brought up to a similar effect the Athenian case and the following devaluation and reappearance of democracy in various settings from a spectrum of classical figures of philosophy up until Liang Ch'i Ch'ao in China.⁵⁷¹ Despite the scarcity of accessible evidence for many of these cases back in those decades, the adoption of this point of view allowed Dunn to consider where it would be more necessary to prioritize the further expansion of concrete research in the following phases of his career in order to moderate the most common misunderstandings about democracy of each time. Extending the merits of this approach a little more, one may claim that this attitude has been also assisting the retention of a certain degree of interpretative coherence in the offered accounts, since it places them within widely shared frames of reference that the comparatist inquiry attempts to reconsider in each case, substituting thus for the concern for 'value-relatedness' in one's work, of which Weber used to be an advocate some time ago.⁵⁷² Furthermore, it is not hard to tell that a similar concern for a comparatist reconsideration of the discussed cases can be seen as being also at work in the interior of such broad episodes in democracy's history, as one can tell, for instance, from the intended reappraisal of the influential

⁵⁷⁰ On Mill's and Weber's suggestions on the applications of comparison see (2006a), Book III, Chap. VII and (2012a), (2019), pp. 85-87 respectively. In what concerns the subsequent fates of an overt interest for the comparative method, the case seems to have found its most influential institutionalization in the American-styled courses on 'comparative politics' of the late academic political science and its associated disciplines. For an overview of other significant interests in comparison in several early 19th century investigatory settings and beyond see Burke (2016), pp. 63-64, and for their passage in the making of the American political science see Ross (1991). Furthermore, it is also worth noting that Dunn himself once felt comfortable to frame his work as 'comparative politics' back in his early phase (1978c), providing thus further support for our suggestion at this point.

⁵⁷¹ Dunn (1979a).

⁵⁷² As previously noted, see Weber (2012a).

ancient Greek sources as being of a 'second-order' and personally filtered nature vis-à-vis the actual practices of Athenian democracy, or from the insistence on the limited role of the actual word 'democracy' and the strict concretization of the relevant events in the late 18th century American and French sceneries. This being so, we would like to argue that present-day readers of Dunn's late works may have good reasons to take benefit of these aspects of the texts they read as well instead of viewing them as maintaining the practicing and the writing of an history that rests merely upon archival work and idiosyncratic instinct.

A transcription of the issues presented above to the disciplinary level seems to be yielding a similar picture. In these respects, it certainly comes as no surprise by now that a reconstructed overview of Dunn's work presents us with a case of a modest mediation between the long-established disciplines of History, Politics and Philosophy.⁵⁷³ A distance from Skinner's inclination to counterpose History to the other two pieces of this set is quite apparent here and can be sufficiently accounted for according to our earlier observations. What seems to be more interesting to insist upon instead has to do with some more distinctive features that this mode of approach has had for Dunn's own practice of the history of political thought. This being so, readers may notice the retention of a moderate tone in the different pieces when the moment comes to consider the most acknowledged individual figures that have been inscribed in a country's or a given theme's past, as one can quite plainly tell out of the entirety of our analysis throughout this chapter. Continuing therefore our previous line of thought, it might not be an exaggeration to attribute this predilection to an *ethos* long trained not to rush into a devaluation of the long esteem that such figures have been found to enjoy across the times in the light of the everchanging trends in their academic reception, due or far beyond new historical particularities, but minds instead to pay greater heed to the role that their most involved fellows in each case have had good reasons to recognize to their deeds. In this way, not only does Dunn manage to keep his accounts as of interpretative interest for both the general readership and the broad audiences around the globe, but exhibits also a level of understanding to the reasons why such figures were found to be of interest by the academic varieties in the study of Philosophy and Politics throughout the times. Even more importantly, this attitude also went on far enough to start paying characteristic attention to the least controversially visible failures of such figures, and eventually of democracy itself, that the unceasing work of history and further intellectual comprehension are bringing to light as not falling short of their interpretative significance for readers, since they serve as instances of an instructive reminiscence of the tragic fallibility that even those most acknowledged among us have been always bound to display in their course of action throughout their lives.

In order to move our examination one step further in terms of our attempted generalization, one may next proceed to trace how this attitude relates to Dunn's broader scholar and academic engagements throughout his career. At this point, one should begin by paying further attention to certain features of Dunn's earlier

⁵⁷³ A similar appreciation appears also in Alexander (2016), pp. 367-368.

phase that we have not yet brought up. More specifically, one should turn to a very influential part of his early piece on method, where we read that

[t]here are certain banal truths which the customary approaches [in the history of ideas] appear to neglect; that thinking is an effortful activity on the part of human beings, not simply a unitary performance; that incompleteness, incoherence, instability and the effort to overcome these are its persistent characteristics; that it is not an activity which takes its meaning from a set of finished performances which have been set up in type and preserved in libraries, but an activity which is conducted more or less incompetently for most of their waking life by a substantial proportion of the human race, which generates conflicts and which is used to resolve these, which is directed towards problem-solving and not towards the construction of closed formal games; that the works in which at a single point in time a set of problems issue in an attempt at a coherent rational ordering of the relevant experience are in some sense unintelligible except in terms of this context; that language is [...] simply the tool which human beings use in their struggle to make sense of their experiences. Once talking and thinking are considered seriously as social activities, it will be apparent that intellectual discussions will only be fully understood if they are seen as complicated instances of these social activities.⁵⁷⁴

The quotation, in all its length, allows us to capture the extent to which certain important ideas appear on a repeated basis across the lines, suggesting thus that they were far from a passing comment in their author's mind. In these respects, one can see that Dunn's call for seeing 'thinking as an effortful activity', probably the article's finest and most remembered formula,⁵⁷⁵ was nothing but an isolated sleight of hand, as the recurrence of 'effort', 'struggle' and 'attempt' in face of the characteristic incoherence of our lives throughout an extract that would presage many issues that critics of the subsequent decades would repeatedly raise allows us to observe. In order to account for the elaboration of this viewpoint in turn, one should not forget that these were the years when Dunn was a very close reader of John Locke, a man of philosophy whose impact on Dunn in terms of *ethos* can be seen in an innumerable range of instances, as we have already occasionally started to suggest.⁵⁷⁶ The part of this influence that we need to raise at this point seems to be no other than the fact that the treatment of thinking as an effortful activity bears a characteristic affinity with what is usually summarized in present-day academics as Locke's labour theory of property,⁵⁷⁷ since it is not hard to notice that both references lay the emphasis on the fragile personal in-

⁵⁷⁴ Dunn (1968b), p. 88. In the light of the argument that that we will go on developing in these paragraphs, readers may keep in mind that Dunn sent this article for publication to the journal *Philosophy*, administered both then and now by the Royal Institute of Philosophy.

⁵⁷⁵ One of the first readers that bore witness to the fineness of this statement was no other than Skinner, who quoted it favourably in his own piece on method in the following year (1969b, p. 30), playing thus an unparalleled role in its circulation.

⁵⁷⁶ For a retrospective view of Dunn himself concerning the way Locke has went on influencing his work throughout the years see (2006b).

⁵⁷⁷ The classical statement is no other than Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, Chap. V.

volvement and according responsibility of each one of us through their very particular deeds with and against the world touched by human affairs, since it is upon the former that the latter seems to be always bound to stand.⁵⁷⁸

The case brings us to the issue of Dunn's dues to Philosophy writ large, which have remained for the greatest part reasonably subtle. What one may bring to further attention at this point is that the aspects of Locke's *ethos* that can be said to have had a share in Dunn's formation are far from alien to History, as one might more easily suppose, since Dunn actually once employed for his own standpoint Locke's introductory characterization of his venture in the *Essay concerning Human Understanding* as a case of the 'plain historical method',⁵⁷⁹ intimating thus that seeing Philosophy and History as antithetical enterprises is far from necessary. To elaborate this point a little further and closer to the times when Philosophy and History started being seen as highly separate scholar activities with their own individual standards of acknowledgement and with other academic disciplines earning their own ground between them, it might be worth bringing also to the surface two very characteristic metaphors of scientific practice that Dunn found good to employ for his own aspiringly comprehensive venture in his early years. These consist of a loosely-stated appeal to 'cartography' at the beginning of his early piece on method,⁵⁸⁰ and then, in a more self-confident key, of that to 'archaeology' in the very first page of his first book on

⁵⁷⁸ To make the suggested connection at this point a little more concrete, one may note that Dunn himself also provides some more easily perceived grounds towards this interpretation in (1996b), by stating that "no one is likely to deny that the great texts of political theory, whether secular or devout, are essentially human artefacts: products of concentrated intellectual labour and imaginative exploration by palpably human agents" (p. 19). Furthermore, in what concerns the latter piece, one should definitely stand on its achieved clarity of argument and mode of expression regarding the issues that we are discussing at this part, including Dunn's carefully stated points of merit and distances from Skinner's and Pocock's ventures of the times as well as his acknowledgement of the ongoing fertility of further theory- and philosophy-based approaches for the study of politics next to the advances of the late historical scholarship. For a recent broader exploration of this article from a different point of view see Cadeddu (2020).

⁵⁷⁹ See Dunn (2010a), p. 60, replying to the complexities and aspirations of Keane's account for the history of democracy: "[y]et even if the plain historical method (whatever that would be) were deployed with sufficient patience and cooperative energy throughout the lands of the global North and South, it is far from clear that it could guarantee to show us how to understand democracy's current ascendancy in all its ambivalent precariousness, let alone assess its prospective potency or vulnerability in different settings in the face of a lengthy future"; on Locke's characteristic description of his venture in the book as pursuing an 'Historical, plain Method' see *Essay*, Book I, chap. I, § 2.

⁵⁸⁰ See Dunn (1968b), pp. 86-87: "[t]he cartographic metaphor is clearly apt here [in the tactical choice between competing historical and philosophical simplifications]. It is not convenient to attempt to represent all conceivably replicable features of a geographical environment on any single map. But this tells us nothing of the ontological limitations of cartography. Maps are maps, not regrettably ineffectual surrogates for physical environments. And if such a choice between competing evils is necessary, it must be equally legitimate to represent it as a choice between competing goods. This painless resolution is in fact that which most practitioners adopt [...]. What I wish principally to argue in this paper is that the costs of such self-abnegation are much higher than is normally recognised; [...] that both historical specificity and philosophical delicacy are more likely to be attained if they are pursued together, [and *inter alia* that] an account of either of these rendered intelligible to an ignorant layman will display a considerable symmetry of form".

Locke.⁵⁸¹ The reason that we insist in the value of these two metaphors has to do with the fact they bring to their readers' awareness two elementary applications of science that were established long before the contest that 20th century social sciences raised to academics immersed in variants of History, Philosophy or beyond, and which actually have proven to be of practical service to both historians and other committed scientific minds in the humanities ever since. This being so, one may bring further to mind in turn that what we conceive of 'cartography' and 'archaeology' nowadays has been also far less alien to Philosophy than one may suppose, since the most recognizable establishment of both practices dates from the moment when certain followers of Aristotle's creed found shelter in Alexandria under the Greek *pharaoh* of Egypt shortly after the decline of Athens and set up there a lost *Museum* of sciences that served as a true Cambridge for the standards of the age.⁵⁸²

Setting things in this way also allows us to shed some further light on several other features of Dunn's work across the years. In these respects, one might be allowed to infer at this point that bringing the inherently effortful character of thinking in focus seems to account for the apprehension not to depreciate the most esteemed figures in Philosophy and Politics on the basis of ephemerally conceived shortcomings, since it has been usually the cumulative efforts of such fallible figures the ones that have attracted the appreciation of thirds. In case our argument up to here is sound enough, one may then go on to suggest an according rationale in the adoption of a more firmly biographical outlook by the time of the second book on Locke, for whose case we have already noted a disposition to hold onto the broader outlines in Locke's thought along with a very characteristic emphasis on his tragic failure throughout the text, and following this the transfer of the same kind of treatment in turn in the study of democracy and its own ongoing lives and failures.⁵⁸³ Moreover, the 'effortful'

⁵⁸¹ Dunn (1969a), p. ix: "[t]he claim that the account given here of Locke's argument in the *Two Treatises of Government* is 'historical' implies that its status depends upon the adequacy of its identification of Locke's *own* meaning. [...] In so far as the present work resembles an attempt at an extended archaeological excavation of Locke's mind, it may seem at first glance that the entire enterprise is supererogatory, that it is an exercise in the painful excavation of what is already above the ground. However plausible such an expectation may be a priori it will, I hope, be disconfirmed by a reading of the ensuing work. By 'historical', then, is meant an account of what *Locke* was talking about, not a doctrine written (perhaps unconsciously) by him in a sort of invisible ink which becomes apparent only when held up to the light (or heat) of the twentieth century mind. [...]". It is worth noting here that the emphasis to explicate 'archaeology' in terms of physical excavation along with the references to 'mind', which provide considerable structure to the entire book, suggest that Dunn's conception of the process draws from Collingwood (2017), (1946), for whom Dunn had expressed a mild sympathy in the previous year (1968b, p. 100); cf. (1980b), pp. 102-103.

⁵⁸² See Hanssen (2017).

⁵⁸³ On the important place that Dunn was recognizing for 'biography' as part of his intended approach in the times of his more comprehensive interpretative ventures see (1969b), ch. 1. It might be further worth noting at this point that Dunn, following also in the same years Skinner (1981), agreed to deliver his second book on Locke (1984c) as part of the *Past Masters* publication series of Oxford University Press that the Welsh social and cultural historian Keith Thomas had recently initiated back then, encouraging in this way monographic presentations of intellectual figures of the kind in such an overall biographical shape that aspired not to fall short in either historical sensitivity or in the assessment of their theoretical insights. This being so, one may go on to claim that this series and its intended emphases set

character of thinking further reminds us that we are dealing with an activity of a principally ongoing nature, as Dunn's frequent disposition to discuss 'thinking' instead of the most technically established reference to 'thought' also aspires to stress.⁵⁸⁴ This being so, this way of viewing things seems to have additionally enabled Dunn not to fall short in the retention of a mild level of engagement with the ongoing trends in the intellectual discussions on politics of each time, which has included also an interest for a low-key integration of the more instructive features of the new perspectives of each time as already seen in a number of occasions. To make this suggestion a little more concrete, the case seems to have allowed for a transcription of Dunn's longtime concern about politics, particularly when of relevance for our ever-changing contemporary times, in more disciplinary terms, as one can tell out of the frequent description of his approach as 'political theory' and the according creation of an academic professorship in Cambridge for the object that he would become the first person to occupy.⁵⁸⁵ A comparison with Skinner's institutional track is in order at this point also, since in stark contrast to the latter's early impulse as a Professor of Political Science in Cambridge from 1978 onwards to use History as a means for criticizing the contemporary trends in 'political theory' and similar genres, Dunn as a Professor of Political Theory at the same institution soon afterwards would show a greater interest to engage with the brought claims of such trends more constructively without abandoning his acquired commitment as an historian as well. In fact, a very similar consideration seems to have been also present in Dunn's conception of the very study of the grand authors in the history of political thought by that time, as one can notice out of his 1997 editorial initiative, along with his associate then Ian Harris, of the *Great Political Thinkers* publication series.⁵⁸⁶ This small series of two-volume sets, in principle, for each grand author

up a point of reference against which Skinner's own and more context-centred *Ideas in Context* and *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought* publication series in Cambridge shortly afterwards would seek to make a difference by displaying the further potencies of a most singularly-focused historical investigation. On Dunn's contribution to the opening volume of the former of these series, which very characteristically mostly completes, along with his (1984c), his early interest to work extensively on Locke and his move to other topics, see (1984a).

⁵⁸⁴ For some key episodes concerning the establishment of the 'history of political thought' as a widespread convention in high academics with an elaborate intellectual basis in its support see Castiglione & Hampsher-Monk (2001), especially the chapters on Italy and Britain.

⁵⁸⁵ On Dunn's confession that politics and 'political theory' were not even considered a subject fit to be taught at Cambridge when he began his career there see (2020a), pp. 71-73, and cf. the earlier course of his academic offices as well as Skinner's sooner appointment to a chair at the institution. This being so, Dunn's appointment as Professor of Political Theory in 1987 and Skinner's *Return of Grand Theory* volume two years before (1985b) seem to have accompanied the effect of the massively influential debate that Rawls (1999) had already started generating in North America in what can be seen as the signaling of a reversal of 'the death of political philosophy' against which Laslett (1956a) had been seeking to draw the attention of the Anglophone academic public much earlier on. See also Koikkalainen (2005), (2009). As far as Dunn's own turn to the label of 'political theory' in these respects is concerned, one may possibly suggest a slight extent of allusion to Hannah Arendt's (1961) critical voice from the recent past; for a suggestion of a degree of proximity between them on this issue see Buckler (2011), chap. 1.

⁵⁸⁶ Dunn & Harris (1997); see especially their 'Series Preface'.

of the canon aimed to bring together and make commonly accessible in times well before the broad digitalization of the academic humanities the most important interpretative statements both from the recent decades as well as from a more distant past for each case, intimating thus both that interpretative work with such figures did not cease being an advancing project in the times of an increasingly particularizing History as well as the need to retain a synoptic overview amidst the burgeoning proliferation of suggested perspectives.

Most of the features that we have been identifying in the preceding paragraphs can be seen in the way Dunn eventually presented his understanding of politics itself as a theme of study. The case was developed at very great lengths in the theoretically-styled treatise *The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of Politics*,⁵⁸⁷ for which we have already noted its role as an apparent terminal point for a long range of relevant ventures in the previous decades. To make things a little more specific, the book, which was prepared shortly before the main drafting of *Setting the People Free*, discusses in a characteristically loosely-ordered fashion Dunn's reached viewpoint on the features and interconnections among a wide range of issues most pertinent to political theory, such as the State and its roles, the need to develop one's 'political understanding', the traits and shortcomings of the 'modern representative democratic republic', the meanings and components of perceived crises in the latter, and even a general overview of the way politics was conceived of in the times when Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, provided in the sort of a practical example, prior to the elaboration of a slightly more constructive line of reasoning towards the end of the book. The overall outcome with which readers are left is a multi-faceted vision of politics that provides no easy answers as concerns the book's original set of questions, i.e. what politics is and how one may best hope understand it,⁵⁸⁸ preserving instead a dismaying tone of restraint concerning our abilities to approximate the existing and ongoing politics with the use of what we usually refer to as 'reason' and emphasizing the amount of personal thinking that each reader should strive to undertake on such a visibly cordial matter for our everyday lives by themselves.⁵⁸⁹ As its overall formation makes clear, the book is far from lacking the general orientation towards which its author alludes, which is yet provided in the form of mild suggestions for the readers' appreciation throughout the concrete analyses of the particular themes. In these respects, it might be worth singling out among them one allusion that seems to capture best Dunn's relations with Philosophy as seen even in the midst of his most extensive preoccupation with Politics. This has to do with Aristotle's weight in our understanding of the issue and was actually already discussed under a considerable focus in a more straightforwardly-formatted article from the

⁵⁸⁷ Dunn (2000b).

⁵⁸⁸ On this articulation of the book's main set of questions see Dunn (2000a), (2000b), pp. 3-8; cf. (1984c), pp. v-vi.

⁵⁸⁹ For Dunn's own retrospective self-perception of the writing of the book in similar terms see (2019c), pp. 9-10ff. For subsequent presentations of 'political theory' and of 'political science' more broadly on a similar key see (2015b) and (2019g) respectively, whereas for an older vision of a more reflective 'political theory' *contra* a 'political science' meant as restricted in measuring the effectiveness of policy-making see (1996d).

immediately preceding years that presaged several features and themes more expansively discussed in the *Cunning of Unreason*, politics included.⁵⁹⁰ In what has to do with the latter theme at this point, readers may pay attention to the fact that in both occasions Dunn's view is that Aristotle has provided us with the most equipped understanding of politics in wide currency up to present, but even his own work is seen as having been far from resolving all relevant matters, initiating thus an ongoing circle of further attempts.⁵⁹¹

Before leaving behind the appreciation of Dunn's work that seeing things at the level of disciplines has allowed us to obtain, one may bring up a few more particular concerns about the case in terms similar to those expressed at the end of our discussion at the level of elementary method. More specifically, we have come to notice that Dunn's work is characterized by a subtle disposition to seek for points of contact between the established disciplines and that the presented interrelations among them are becoming increasingly hard to discern in the course of his texts. This being so, one may rehearse our earlier direction of advice in what concerns a possible advancement of clarity for less patient readers on a matter far more perplexed than that of a hard-working scholar's individual proliferation of interests and more immediate interlocutors across the years, and consequently far less easily susceptible to alterations according to prescription. What one may note here is that part of the sources of this obscurity has to do with the changes in what one understands to belong to the different disciplines throughout their already long history across the Western world up until the more technical standards that contemporary academics aspire to ascribe to them, each one to itself and to the others. To bring up a very current example, this means that attempting to assert nowadays that one undertakes disciplinary Philosophy or Politics in order to raise claims beyond what one more readily perceives at this moment in time as findings of History may lead to further reluctance of engagement amid the professional practitioners instead of their working on the benefits of reaching a level of mutual understanding, since one's explications of how they see the role and dues of each discipline frequently encounters very different preconceptions by other accomplished academics to the point of a strong discouragement to move beyond the established themes and practices of one's narrowly formed field of expertise anymore. This being a very common case, and one certainly far beyond Dunn's own disposition as extensively discussed, an issue on which one could call for greater care could be the encouragement of an inclination to devise means that can facilitate some greater clarity of roles concerning when and how one employs the lights provided by more than one disciplines, either as these are meant at present or in possibly broader terms. In these respects, one very promising direction may be to draw resources out of long-tested combinations of such disciplinary frames by broadly acknowledged voices from a past closer to our current academic constellations, such as those that formed part of the works of J. S. Mill and Weber,⁵⁹² as a way

⁵⁹⁰ Dunn (1996b).

⁵⁹¹ See Dunn (1996b), pp. 27-30, (2000b), pp. 12-17.

⁵⁹² See Mill (2006a) and Weber (2012e), (2019).

for testing the availability of some relatively more easily discernible common grounds among the proliferating institutional trends in late academics.

We have already started dealing with matters of a more direct relevance to our contemporary affairs and consequently the time has come to move our perspective to a level of reflection in what concerns the socio-political implications of the approach that we have been discussing in this chapter. Readers of Dunn's writings, and hopefully of this chapter also, might have not failed to notice a tireless effort across the years to forge a well-esteemed background for our intellectual landscape that can possibly motivate a degree of common identification or at least of mutual respect among the diverse people who might feel them to be meaningful to their own concerns, for one reason or another. As we have seen throughout a very extensive set of instances considered in the light of the 'special logic' of each case, this ongoing attempt is presented in impressively candid terms for the gravity of the implied stakes, apparently drawing from the obtained strictness in the historical concretization of references along with the retention of the important insight not to neglect paying heed to the proper weights that the overall picture of things recommends, including both the weights that have already become apparent as well as those that can most reasonably be expected to emerge in foreseeable times. Furthermore, we have repeatedly seen that not only do these accounts bring to light relevant failures, but they are also meant to show how much more work there always seems bound to be done. As a matter of fact, this latter respect bears a very crucial weight in Dunn's view concerning the future of the study of democracy, a theme of prime importance within this landscape, since at a recent passage we read that

*[n]o one should mistake the result [of the approach presented] for the serious intellectual history, which still needs to be done, country by country, language by language, decade by decade, and done by those already sufficiently at ease with the contexts in question to fathom just what occurred within them.*⁵⁹³

In any case, it might not be entirely unnecessary to remind ourselves that this considerably open-ended horizon for the study of democracy has been far from disallowing Dunn from its ongoing personal exploration in more theoretical terms throughout his career from an increasing multiple of points of view that ends up offering an overall outlook for democracy very similar to the one that he elaborated for politics as a whole.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹³ Dunn (2014), p. 52.

⁵⁹⁴ Even though Dunn's prolific production of theoretical pieces on democracy allows for no practical summary in a short footnote, for some recent statements of the kind see (2012b) and (2015a). Furthermore, it might be also worth pointing out that the broad outlook for politics and democracy with which Dunn has been leaving his readers lately bears characteristic resemblances with Pierre Rosanvallon's respective historical and theoretical works on democracy and politics - the latter more abstractly conceived as 'the political' («le politique») - on the basis of a more extensive study of the fates of the French-speaking world throughout practically the same decades with Dunn's own efforts. For a collection of relevant older pieces see Rosanvallon (2006) and for a recent summary of this far-reaching scholar's work on these topics see Dormal (2019).

This being the broader outline of the socio-political implications that we have in mind for the case, we will next turn to some more particular concepts that seem to have assumed certain enduring roles in Dunn's pieces and might therefore help us concretize this side of his work a little further. From this point of view, readers can note that 'judgement' is yet another term strikingly present towards the end of Locke's *Essay*⁵⁹⁵ and one that has been gaining an ongoing characteristic prominence in Dunn's pieces at least since the 1990s, following the ascendance of 'prudence' in the preceding decade. Paying a slightly closer attention to the places where the two terms are employed with a more characteristic stress allows one to observe that 'prudence' has been seen as an attitude meant to be suggestive of the *ethos* that is thought to be optimal for the investigative scholar in circumstances in which the investigation tends to be rather too sensitive or too demanding for a more immediate appeal to 'reason' to enjoy some currency, as was certainly the case with the evolution of Dunn's own preoccupations in the course of those times.⁵⁹⁶ This emphasis was succeeded by a synoptic reference at the end of this period that stated the need of scholars to go on 'offering prudence' to readers,⁵⁹⁷ after which one can show the completion of a move through a much-repeated preoccupation with how to make the greatest possible room for the readers' own 'judgement' of what they are offered.⁵⁹⁸ This being so, it might not be improper if one sees this turn to 'judgement' as being in accordance with the other directions in Dunn's thought in the same years, i.e. the turn to 'story', dense accounts, a most expansive range of addressed audiences and so on, as these have been already analyzed. Moreover, one may further maintain that this interest to set the readers' ability of 'judgement' free against their received authorities has been also serving as a register of our increasingly pluralist and interconnected intellectual and political world, in which the unceasing diffusion of existing knowledge and further research of all kinds along with the broad and narrow stakes of our lives suggest that a growing number of people 'must learn to do their own thinking for themselves', as Skinner would strikingly pose the issue in public one year after the announcement of the 'effortful character of thinking'.⁵⁹⁹ In these respects, one may be ultimately entitled to see this entire interplay between the offer of a commonly esteemed intellectual landscape and the advancing encouragement of our own personal

⁵⁹⁵ Locke, *Essay*, Book 4, chap. XIV.

⁵⁹⁶ On 'prudence' see Dunn (1980e), (1985b), (1990e), (1990b), as well as occasional reappearances later on. The particular nuancing of the term in these respects seems to draw from Skinner (1978a), chaps. 8-9.

⁵⁹⁷ See Dunn (1990b).

⁵⁹⁸ To be a little more precise on 'judgement', even though the term is relatively frequent as an exegetical device already from the articles contained in Dunn (1980d) and (1990a), it is only towards the end of this period that we see Dunn discussing more often 'political judgement' and presenting it as a matter addressed to the readers' development of a personal attitude against what they are offered in the various texts, e.g. in (1990b). Following this, 'judgement' in this receivers-oriented or in a similarly framed theory-oriented sense becomes the standard, e.g. in (2000b), (2005b), (2014). This case can be further vindicated by the fact that Bourke & Geuss' (2009) dedicatory volume to Dunn set 'political judgement' as its central theme and quite revealingly included individual contributions exploring judgement in terms rather detached from Dunn's own writing.

⁵⁹⁹ Skinner (1969b), p. 52.

judgement against it as a silent call for the continuous rethinking of our ways and placements of 'trust' in all that falls into politics, both in what concerns the entrustment that we place on our past as well as the trust between individuals and on any other set of circumstances that provides form to our contemporary predicament; or, to leave the issue in Dunn's own concluding words at the end of his brief theoretical reflection on this last fugitive concept from some time ago,

[i]f a less alienated and objectified understanding of what politics is [than that of the theorists of social justice] is epistemically appropriate, this will in the end be because what politics consists in (at least from a human point of view) is a huge array of free agents coping with each others' freedom over time. In politics so understood the rationality of trust will always be the most fundamental question.⁶⁰⁰

As the intended address for the matter suggests, very few concerns can have a place at this final part of our examination of Dunn's work. What seems best to do in the first place is to expand on our earlier comments a little more. In these respects, one might be entitled to hold a reasonable hope that paying some greater attention to the importance of such previously discussed issues as simplicity in words, the retention of comparatist concerns in one's mode of thought and the interest in disciplinary resources that may assist the search for common grounds might allow for some complementary benefits in what concerns the receivers' placement of trust on the offered landscape or on parts of it, since devices of this kind have proven, for their greatest part, to facilitate clarity, soundness and the more general reception of ideas such as those with which we have been dealing all along, both in this short survey as well as in an innumerable range of circumstances characteristic of every person's life since practically time immemorial. As the tone of this comment might have been indicating, the scope of the advice up to here seems to cover the matters of trust in what one can more readily attribute to the province of the past. However, trust, judgement and all that we have seen that has been lying beneath them throughout this way of thought clearly suggest that a yet more qualified concentration is due on issues more visibly perceived as of straight relevance for our contemporary predicament and the demands in our efforts that its ongoing challenges never cease to raise. From this point of view, we have seen how the turn to democracy, with its failures and the calls for its further exploration by the readers themselves, has already managed to serve in Dunn's work as a deeply engaging theme that has been intimating a grandly shared common ground in apparent need of further individual reworking from past to present for all those interested in a possibly least harmful ordinary conduct of our lives nowadays.⁶⁰¹

⁶⁰⁰ Dunn (1996e), p. 98; the text was originally published as (1993f), but it did not appear in the second edition of its original volume. On other thematizations of trust see (1984a), (1984b), (1990d), (2018a).

⁶⁰¹ It is worth adding at this point that this need to address democracy's past and present from a multiple of perspectives has been already providing, *inter alia*, a great range of scholar work in various parts of the world and with the use of different lenses both well before as well as in the wake of Dunn's efforts. Aside from the titles that have been already listed throughout this chapter, one may further refer to some of the latest products of this interest

Trying therefore to extend this line of thought one step further, one could possibly suggest that a similar treatment of recognizable individual components of this broad theme, such as the main terms, ideas and practices that we usually associate with democracy, may hopefully allow for the proliferation of accordingly shared grounds to a very similar effect, possibly with the additional benefit of a slightly greater facility in the conduct of investigations as a result of the narrower referential scope of such components as compared to democracy itself. This being so, one of the most promising areas of investigation that one can presently think has to do with one of democracy's most recognizably ecumenical features throughout the times. This is no other than the life and times of assemblies with an influence on people's common fates, from their earliest traces in human civilization up until their nowadays globally firm establishment in the form of instituted 'parliaments' and beyond. As one may suspect, this specific kind of work has already begun and has been bringing precious parts of our common past back to the surface,⁶⁰² whereas it has been nowhere far from Dunn's own explicit interests on democracy as well.⁶⁰³ What one can consequently suggest at this point is nothing more than a wish for a greater dissemination of this revealing interest as well as for an according future for other projects of similar relevance and scope. In all cases, one should probably close with Dunn's constant reminiscence that everything that falls into contemporary politics seems bound to be left for the receivers' ultimate judgement.

that tend to approximate the features of the approach that we have been bringing to the surface, among which one can see several apparent dues to Dunn's, Skinner's and Rosanvallon's relevant work as well. See Hansen (1999), (2005), Ober (1989), (2017), Cartledge (2016), Israel (2010), (2011), Kloppenberg (2016), Gauchet (2007-2017), Julliard (2013), Foucault (2010), (2011), Rancière (2014), Conze, Meier, Koselleck, Maier & Reimann (1972), and Kurunmäki, Nevers & te Velde (2018).

⁶⁰² For instance, see Palonen (2008), (2014c).

⁶⁰³ For cases of the kind see the opening of the first chapter in Dunn (2005b), pp. 23-24, where one reads that "[v]irtually nowhere any longer, even in the most brutal of autocracies, are they [democracy's claims for authority and respect] merely unintelligible as claims [...]. Note, for example, what was first to respond even for Iraq in the summer of 2003 [...]. It was not the tyrant who had ruled the country with such murderous brutality and for so long [...], but what passed for a national representative assembly: a Parliament. It was they, not their real master, who showily declined to submit [...]" ; also, (2014), pp. 56-60: "[h]uman beings have had to devise ways of taking and lending authority to binding collective decisions on the varying scales on which they have lived together across the world and for far longer than we have reliable descriptions of how they did so. [...] It is certainly impossible to believe that the practice of assembling to discuss in public what to do did not, on different scales and bases, arise and persist in every humanly inhabited continent and do so well before we have legible records of how the inhabitants dealt with one another on any scale at all".

IV GENERAL CONCLUSION

Throughout this dissertation we have attempted to bring to light as many features among those that have given to the said 'Cambridge School' its distinctive intellectual shape as the extent of a project like this could allow. For this reason, our survey started by introducing the main people and events that led to the specific making of the School in Cambridge and beyond throughout a considerable span of time. Following this, we found best to narrow down our focus to a certain range of features out of the work of Quentin Skinner and John Dunn that we sought to anatomize as completely as possible. In these respects, not only have we sought to individualize the different components of what we took to be the 'special logic' in the themed writings of the authors that we examined, but we also went on to identify the great roles that contexts of various kinds and other frames of reference have been playing throughout the course. Bringing next this patiently acquired level of detail back to some more general treatment, we proceeded to an appreciation of these authors' individual oeuvres in increasingly overall terms, suggesting also both the concrete exchanges and the seen differences between the two as well as when seen against other authors and trends. This in turn further allowed us to express a few concerns regarding the course that this kind of work has been tending to implicate, which brought us closer to matters related to the reception of the said 'Cambridge School' within our contemporary state of affairs. This being the case, what remains to be discussed is what can be said to yet bring our main authors back together in the light of our having already viewed them apart. No raising of concerns seems to have a place at this point, since what one needs mostly to retain out of such a grandly recognized academic nexus as the one that we have had good reasons to introduce through some of its classics seems to rather consist in the ways in which this has proven to be instructive to thirds in the overall. This being so, we will draw upon the insights of the work of the authors that we acquired mostly in the conclusive parts of our main chapters according to the order of viewpoints already employed there, reintroducing also Pocock on the scene and suggesting how the different insights provided by each voice may be brought to some concord that can facilitate the reaping of benefits by thirds.

In the first place, one may reflect upon the different method devices that the three authors have brought to the fore. Starting from the older voice, the one least examined at this work, Pocock has been mostly remembered for two relevant issues, both appearing already from his early writings. The former of them comes from his early methodological statements and concerns the need for historians of political thought to focus on the study of what he termed 'political languages' throughout history.⁶⁰⁴ By introducing this device Pocock was seeking to turn the attention of the academics of the times to the concrete study of a great range of undersighted voices in the history of political thought as well as to the ways in which authors of the canon could be understood in new lights through an unravelling of their associations with wider and historically more concrete intellectual trends. In these respects, it is not hard to notice that the presumed varying course of a 'political language' through time apparently drew out of the main theme of his early book that we have already brought up. This was even further the case with another device that was already widely appearing in that book, i.e. the ongoing reference to 'implications', with which Pocock was seeking to suggest that the words and deeds of either individual authors or wider trends could be seen as playing a formative role in the subsequential course of events beyond any seen will of their original authors and which apparently paved the ground for the more influential advancement of the study of 'political languages'. Turning to a consideration of Skinner against this set, one can see a scholar eager to join the overall cause, to which he would give a more thorough technical bent and which he would prove to be far more eager to equally utilize for a focused treatment of grand authors as well. In these respects, Skinner's more consistent interests for 'intentions' and 'aims' have allowed for a more careful concentration on the historically concrete thoughts and acts of such individual authors than 'political languages' seemed to favour, whereas the interrelations between an author and their more particular affecting circumstances or between different authors have been more carefully itemized by means of turning the emphasis to the identification of 'contexts', next to which Skinner's occasional interests in 'legitimization' and 'rhetoric' can be also seen as able to perform a similar service. As for a placing of Dunn in this sequence, one may begin by noticing a technical strictness comparable to that of Skinner, to which an inclination for a greater comprehension of the according stakes for each case can be added. The latter seems to have been allowing Dunn to frequently accommodate both 'intentions' and 'aims' along with 'implications' in his works, whereas the more general balancing of authors and issues that his writing tends to reveal enables readers to reflect on the beneficial effects of working by paying attention to comparisons. This being so, Dunn's late interests to provide 'conclusions' and mind for the outlook of 'story' in his pieces, with their already discussed approximations to Pocock and parallels in Skinner for the cases, seems to complete the series by

⁶⁰⁴ See Pocock (1962a), (1971c). For a recent loose restatement that ends up identifying 'political language' with 'context', after a series of several interpolations in the years between, see (2019b).

making possible the reintegration of what was originally at stake with 'political languages' on a more elaborately crafted key.

The next point of view to which we can move our stand is the one that we have been itemizing as a discussion at the level of disciplines. In these respects, the defining characteristic of the 'Cambridge School' seems to substantially draw upon the original peculiar intimacy between disciplinary Politics and History in the Cambridge setting, whose track we followed at the introductory chapter. More specifically, as we ended up arguing back then and as our main chapters further allowed us to witness to a more concrete level of detail, it is not hard to see that our main authors signaled the renewed tendency to bring back next to the substantial practice that History had gained at the institution as the main form of groundwork investigation several features of the older versions of the Tripos that the new state of affairs was particularly prone to leave outside. This being so, we have already referred, to a certain extent, to Pocock's unintimated interests from his early days in the reconstructive potencies that history-writing seemed to allow, especially when this came to implicate matters appertaining to politics. From this point of view, one may go on to suggest that, as the years went by, this same author displayed a very active tendency to draw upon such practice in order to come up with a reconstructive merge of the disciplines of History, Political Science and Political Philosophy,⁶⁰⁵ initially pursued by his founding a Department of Political Science separate from that of History at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand in 1959, and then by assuming a similar chair of Political Science in the United States in 1966, prior to a very emphatic move to a chair of History in the same country at the same year when *The Machiavellian Moment* was originally published (1975). As far as Skinner is concerned, one sees a more focused commitment to a much stricter History taken to be of use as a powerful critical instrument for his very close inspection of Philosophy and Politics trends throughout the years. In fact, the case seems to present no substantial difference throughout Skinner's career and his successive assumption of chairs of Political Science, History, and the Humanities in Cambridge and beyond. Dunn, on the other hand, has retained a more moderate profile from this point of view, already from his early days when he was holding posts for both History and Politics at Cambridge and throughout his later academic career, as we have already seen in quite great detail. His own case provides a strong concern for a strict History that does not rush to depreciate what has enjoyed long esteem in Politics or Philosophy throughout the times, making also ample room both for the grave failures that have been unavoidably accompanying ventures of the kind as well as for noting the amount of work that always remains to be done. The latter of these respects next to Dunn's moderate use of history can be seen as having enabled him to develop a self-conscious interest in the distinctive undertaking of a 'political theory' which has been offered in the low key and on the basis of a deep historical erudition. What this outlook seems to add to our picture is the crucial insight that aside from seeing History solely as a corrective to other theories or as a least definable suggestion of a reconstructive

⁶⁰⁵ For Pocock's posing of the issue in these terms see (1965).

merge between past and present, we can always treat it also as enabling us to better observe the extent to which we regularly find ourselves in a position to explore our own potencies for a reconstruction of our contemporary lives in the more individual terms that befit each case.

The last issue to be raised is no other than the socio-political implications of the 'Cambridge School' approach. Preserving our order of presentation, we can begin by Pocock and his giving of a voice to many undersighted figures and themes from the long political past. Seen from this point of view, Pocock's broad reconstructions seem to have served, among other things, as a means for raising public sensitivities to the former's existence and for their possible domestication within mainstream culture, as the inclusion of most such cases to the broad 'republican' scheme of the *Machiavellian Moment* suggests. Adding to this, Pocock also similarly sought to draw the attention of his public to areas of the globe beyond the parts of Western Europe and the latter's historic episodes that usually enjoy the frontstage in a learned person's canon, encouraging also the strengthening of some commonly shared identities along the way, as one can tell from his long interests in the reconstruction of the history of New Zealand, of Britain as a whole, as well as of the Anglophone countries at large against their longtime ties with mainland Europe. Skinner can be seen as far more reserved in this case, since aside from his provision of strong criticism to several political trends in currency in academics and beyond throughout the years, one sees him gradually advocating a form of a more minimalistically introduced 'republicanism' that goes on expanding its claims in the historical past and present of an increasing range of referents, among which the grand authors of the canon and the modern idea or concept of the State are far from absent on the centre stage. Dunn is very expectedly more expansive from this point of view, as our investigation has allowed us to observe. The moderacy that we have been noticing as an accompaniment to his presented works seems to account for his greater interest for the fates of the more visibly established 'democracy' in the face of Pocock's and Skinner's 'republican' ventures. Recapitulating our earlier observations on the topic, one sees the room that this focus on democracy leaves for discussing its grave failures along with its potencies as an ongoing collective project that constantly binds its sharers' past, present and future throughout all parts of the globe. In these respects, we have also further bore witness to the way Dunn's writing on democracy has ended up unraveling the specific broadening of personal responsibilities and choices that the coming of democracy has been implicating for all of us on a constant basis, as his growing concern to increase the room for individual judgment also wishes to point out.

Having passed through all three levels of generality that have helped us bring our examination to an end, a very short address on a more personal key may be allowed as a more fitting epilogue to this study. In these respects, one may go on to suggest a further lesson that our Cambridge classics and their work can be said to provide, irrespectively of whether each particular receiver may opt to take it as being of a social, ethical, political or moral character; no matter if it be assigned to individual intellect or to shared culture. All three authors,

individually and as a group, have been making possible for their readers to bear witness to the feasibility and worth of not losing one's personal voice in the demanding world of present-day academics, an advanced microcosm of indescribable importance for the rest of the travails of our disciplined lives. Seen from this point of view, these largely influential authors have proven to be exemplary in the undertaking of investigations requiring some remarkably demanding amounts of crude labour from their part - with all the sacrifices that such an attitude of life entails for not losing one's concentration from the eventual end - which not only have resulted in the raise of higher standards in the profession, but equally crucially also in the public message of not missing the importance of acquiring an individual stand in the process. What is more to this, the close interactions of the authors with each other as well as with the numerous interlocutors that we have traced in the course throughout the more particular contexts of each case, render also concrete the great potencies for working to improve one's voice for the future to come by making substantial use of the means of engaging in an active dialogue with those around us, be it constant or short and possibly reminding to some of us something of the old Greek names that appeared in the very first pages of this work. Few people could have hoped to receive more everlasting gifts from a teacher.

SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION

Cambridge Classics in the History of Ideas: Main Studies and Commitments of Method in the Work of Quentin Skinner & John Dunn

The dissertation consists in a detailed examination of an important portion out of the sizeable work of the acknowledged British historians of political thought Quentin Skinner and John Dunn with a particular emphasis on the two authors' method. The aim of the study has to do with a new and more detailed appreciation of the scholar production of the two authors, which has been most influentially received along with that of their close associate J. G. A. Pocock throughout the years as having a foundational status for the flourishing 'Cambridge School' of intellectual history. This being so, the text begins with an introductory chapter that covers successively two distinctive topics. Its first part is meant to elucidate how 'method' is conceived of and employed throughout the course of the study as well as what distinguishes the chosen approach from the already existing literature on the topic; whereas the second part of the introduction presents a carefully reconstructed summary of the most significant authors, writings and initiatives that gave gradual shape to the emergence of the said 'Cambridge School'. The two main chapters of the dissertation proceed to the investigation of the two authors' method by means of a close examination of their consecutive studies of the history of a single concept or idea. Therefore, chapter II takes a closer look at Quentin Skinner's studies of the history of the concept (or idea) of the State and chapter III addresses Dunn's work on the history of democracy. Both chapters end up with a more general reconstruction of the authors' method and scholar profiles as a whole, whereas a similar attempt takes place in more rudimentary terms for the said 'Cambridge School' at large in the dissertation's general conclusion.

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* Explanatory note: the chronologies of the editions that were used are placed in parentheses - () -; in order to facilitate readers interested to consider the dates of the original publications and/or of the actual creation of each title, where this kind of information differs from the editions that were used and this is known to the author, the chronologies of the original publications are placed in square brackets - [] -, whereas further chronological information on the actual writing of each piece or on its first rather completed presentation in public is placed in braces - {} -; this practice has not been adopted for the case of the Ancient Greek sources due to reasons of practical convenience and personal reverence.

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