

TOWARDS A
PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF
INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION



JUKKA-PEKKA PURO

JYVÄSKYLÄ STUDIES IN COMMUNICATION 6

Jukka-Pekka Puro

Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Interpersonal Communication

Esitetään Jyväskylän yliopiston humanistisen tiedekunnan suostumuksella
julkisesti tarkastettavaksi yliopiston vanhassa juhlasalissa
maaliskuun 16. päivänä 1996 klo 12.

Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of
the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Jyväskylä,
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UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

JYVÄSKYLÄ 1996

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JYVÄSKYLÄ 1996

Editor
Raimo Salokangas
Department of Communication
University of Jyväskylä

URN:ISBN:978-951-39-8094-8
ISBN 978-951-39-8094-8 (PDF)
ISSN 1238-2183

ISBN 951-34-0686-5
ISSN 1238-2183

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Cover
Design: Outi Mäkelä

Jyväskylä University Printing House and
Sisäsuomi Oy, Jyväskylä 1996

ABSTRACT

Puro, Jukka-Pekka

Towards a phenomenological theory of interpersonal communication

Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 1996, 214 p.

(Jyväskylä Studies in Communication,

ISSN 1238-2183; 6)

ISBN 951-34-0686-5

Finnish Summary

Diss.

The aim of the present study is to explore the metatheory of interpersonal communication research. It will be shown by bibliometrical analysis that three theories dominate the field. The uncertainty reduction theory of Charles Berger and Richard Calabrese, constructivism as represented by Jesse Delia, and James McCroskey's communication apprehension are clearly the key theories of interpersonal communication research.

These theories are epistemologically very different. Berger and Calabrese rely on empiricism, Delia is an interpretive scholar, and McCroskey stresses practical values. According to recent articles on the epistemology of human communication research, this difference implies certain problems in the field. Most significantly, it seems to be difficult to develop new theories in a field which is so metatheoretically fragmented.

I will argue that phenomenology may offer an useful perspective on this problem. Phenomenology provides a large scale view of such issues as uncertainty, constructions, and apprehension. In doing so, it clarifies the question of why theories are different. Furthermore, phenomenology opens the way to new theories. It will be shown that phenomenology is, in this sense, not only an interesting tradition, but also a practical framework for the new wave interpretive scholars in the field.

Keywords: phenomenology, interpersonal communication, uncertainty, constructivism, communication apprehension

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to several people. The encouragement of the rector of the University of Jyväskylä, Professor Aino Sallinen, was very valuable during the process. The criticism and guidance offered by Professors Bruce E. Gronbeck and Matti Leiwo were illuminating and led to new, important insights. I also owe thanks to my colleagues; in particular, the advice of acting professor Maarit Valo, Hannele Dufva, application designer Erkki Ahvenniemi and Michael Freeman, were significant. My discussions with Irma Hulkko, Eero Lukin, Jari Hoffrén and Ilari Koskinen, as well as debates with Hilikka and Teuvo Rasku, offered new perspectives. The financial support of the University of Jyväskylä and the Väinö Tanner Society was of vital importance.

I dedicate this study to Outi and our two-month-old daughter, who knows how astonishing everything is.

Jyväskylä,

February 1996

J-P P

CONTENTS

| | | |
|---|---|----|
| 1 | INTRODUCTION | 9 |
| | 1.1 Aims | 9 |
| | 1.2 An outline of the study | 11 |
| | 1.3 Interpersonal communication: Definitions | 13 |
| | 1.4 Theories of interpersonal communication: History | 17 |
| 2 | THEORY AND TRADITION IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH | 29 |
| | 2.1 Traditions of science in interpersonal communication research | 29 |
| | 2.1.1 Empiricism in communication sciences | 29 |
| | 2.1.2 The hermeneutical alternative | 33 |
| | 2.1.3 Phenomenological philosophy | 37 |
| | 2.2 Paradigms in interpersonal communication research | 42 |
| | 2.2.1 The nature of paradigms | 43 |
| | 2.2.2 Paradigmatic evaluation | 45 |
| | 2.3 Theories: What are they? | 50 |
| 3 | THE BIBLIOMETRICS OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION | 54 |
| | 3.1 Bibliometrics as a research method | 54 |
| | 3.1.1 Bibliometrics: Background | 54 |
| | 3.1.2 Bibliometrics in communication studies | 56 |
| | 3.2 Bibliometrics: Data and methodology | 57 |
| | 3.2.1 Selective citation analysis | 57 |
| | 3.2.2 The selection of core journals of interpersonal communication | 59 |
| | 3.2.3 The selection of articles | 63 |
| | 3.3 Bibliometrical analysis | 64 |
| | 3.3.1 Organization of the data | 64 |
| | 3.3.2 Most-cited authors | 65 |
| 4 | THEORIES OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION | 68 |
| | 4.1 Theoretical thinking | 68 |
| | 4.2 Charles Berger: Uncertainty reduction theory | 69 |
| | 4.2.1 Bibliometrical analysis | 69 |
| | 4.2.2 The theoretical background of uncertainty reduction theory | 72 |
| | 4.2.3 Uncertainty reduction theory: Reformulations and competing views | 75 |

| | | |
|-------|---|-----|
| 4.3 | Jesse Delia: Constructivism | 76 |
| 4.3.1 | Bibliometrical analysis | 76 |
| 4.3.2 | Constructivism: Its operationalization and terminology | 79 |
| 4.4 | James McCroskey: Communication apprehension | 81 |
| 4.4.1 | Bibliometrical analysis | 81 |
| 4.4.2 | The substance of communication apprehension | 83 |
| 4.4.3 | Communication apprehension: Theoretical dimensions, operationalizations, criticism | 85 |
| 5 | THEORIES: TRADITION AND PARADIGM | 88 |
| 5.1 | General perspective | 88 |
| 5.2 | Critical issues of tradition | 89 |
| 5.2.1 | The tradition of uncertainty reduction theory | 89 |
| 5.2.2 | The tradition of constructivism | 96 |
| 5.2.3 | Communication apprehension: A case of practicality | 101 |
| 5.3 | The nature of constructions | 105 |
| 5.3.1 | The paradigm of uncertainty reduction | 105 |
| 5.3.2 | Paradigm and constructivism | 107 |
| 5.3.3 | The paradigm of communication apprehension | 109 |
| 6 | THE PATH FORWARD | 112 |
| 6.1 | Towards a new formulation of theories | 112 |
| 6.2 | Theoretical alternatives | 115 |
| 6.2.1 | Epistemological questions | 115 |
| 6.2.2 | A phenomenological theory of uncertainty | 117 |
| 6.2.3 | The formal theory of constructivism | 121 |
| 6.2.4 | From constructivism to phenomenology | 123 |
| 6.3 | Empirical phenomenology | 127 |
| 6.3.1 | General principles | 127 |
| 6.3.2 | Phenomenological apprehension as an exemplar | 128 |
| 6.4 | The characteristics of interpersonal phenomenology | 133 |
| 7 | FINAL CONSIDERATIONS | 141 |
| | REFERENCES | 145 |
| | YHTEENVETO | 174 |
| | APPENDICES 1-4 | 177 |

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aims

The aim of this study is to compare different epistemological possibilities in interpersonal communication research and to demonstrate that an alternative perspective, particularly phenomenology, provides a rational possibility for constructing a solid epistemology for interpersonal communication research. Hence, this study supports the idea that interpersonal communication should turn to alternative philosophy instead of empiricism-oriented and analytically-based view of interpersonal communication research presently dominant (see Deetz 1973, 1978, 1982, Farrell 1987, Grossberg & O'Keefe 1975, Hawes 1977, Hyde 1980, 1982, Hyde & Smith 1979, Oravec 1982, Pilotta 1982, Pilotta & Mickunas 1990, Stewart 1986, 1992). The primary question is, however, what this 'alternative philosophy' actually means.

The number of potential alternative philosophies and different '-isms' is high. For example, such movements as existentialism, pragmatism, marxism, new thomism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, dialecticism, critical philosophy and deconstructionism can be seen as alternative perspectives. Different perspectives on communication research emphasize different '-isms'. In the following categorization, however, only the most widely accepted views will be discussed. If analytical philosophy (including analytical pragmatism) and marxism are considered as the so-called most widespread philosophies of 20th century western science, then the strongest alternative views are, evidently, existentialism, hermeneutics and phenomenology (see Hellesnes & Tranøy 1968, Niiniluoto & Saarinen 1987, Ricoeur 1978, von Wright 1982, Wagner 1984). This distinction is, however, general, and thus only indicative.

Because of its generality, this distinction does not describe, for example, actual alternatives in interpersonal communication research. As, for example,

Farrell (1987) points out, it can be asked whether Marxism (from a North American point of view) can actually be argued to be a widespread philosophy. The legitimation of different philosophical movements depends, as it has always depended, on the prevailing epistemological commitments, which vary in scientific communities. In this study, the most crucial aspect is to concentrate on those epistemological commitments that have been made within communication research, particularly within interpersonal communication research. A secondary dimension, albeit an interesting one, is to discuss how these communicative implications can be seen in the more general context of the philosophy of science. It can be argued that in communication, particularly in interpersonal communication research, a distinction between the mainstream and the alternative can obviously be drawn between analytical empiricism (often even logical empiricism), and phenomenological or hermeneutical standpoints. This assumption is based on the discussion of the epistemological essence of communication research in Bostrom and Donohew (1992), Bowers and Bradac (1984:872), Daniels and Frandsen (1984:223-225), Hyde and Smith (1979:363), Jacobson (1985:98-99) and Smith (1972:181-182).

Consequently, this study will concentrate on three philosophical movements that have influenced communication studies. The first of these is empiricism and, as a part of it, logical empiricism, which can be seen as a background to the mainstream view. Second, two alternative perspectives, hermeneutics and phenomenology, will be discussed. These three perspectives and the tension that has been found between different epistemologies and ontologies form the central material of this study. Thus, for example, paradigmatic evaluation and theoretical analysis, which are inseparable parts of this study, will be discussed in close connection with these three movements. One of the central issues is that, considering the relatively high number of evaluative and introductory articles on phenomenology and hermeneutics, it may be surprising that there are practically no phenomenological or hermeneutical programs at all in interpersonal communication research. That is, although the ideas of phenomenology or hermeneutics have been supported by several communication scholars, they are not to be seen in theoretical formulations or research practice. Consequently, there are no extant phenomenological or hermeneutical theories of interpersonal communication, for example.

This study is an attempt to demonstrate the utility of concretizing hermeneutical and phenomenological perspectives. The starting point is that either phenomenology or hermeneutics or both can offer possibilities for the construction of alternative theories of interpersonal communication which are also of a practical nature. Thus, the presupposition is that if these alternatives are to be considered as useful, it should be demonstrated that they not only offer a philosophical principle, but also concrete solutions. It will be argued in this study that phenomenology, at least, offers a concrete possibility for the creation of an alternative theory. This does not imply, however, that hermeneutics is a fruitless perspective in human communication research. However, considering the present state of the field, phenomenology is seen as a more useful alternative because it clearly provides concrete solutions to some

of the central problems associated with the mainstream theories in interpersonal communication.

It will be argued that the application of phenomenological principles to interpersonal communication research not only testifies to the strength of the phenomenological approach, but it may also act as a springboard to metascientific discussion. In the phenomenological approach, it is possible to conceptualize specific metascientific guidelines for interpersonal communication research of an alternative kind. However, as it will be shown in this study, these guidelines are, necessarily, not only phenomenological, but also generally interpretive in nature. This means that although phenomenology may seem to provide a means towards the solution of certain problems in the present situation, hermeneutics, among other interpretive views, can be seen as holding out a promising solution to the new questions that seem to be emerging in the field.

1.2 An outline of the study

Three approaches will be used in this study. First, the scientific *traditions* of empiricism, hermeneutics, and phenomenology and their characteristics will be discussed. Second, different *paradigms* (in the Kuhnian sense) of interpersonal communication research will be analyzed. Finally, general principles of scientific *theories* will be discussed. This structure is based on the argument that a scientific tradition represents different possibilities for studying interpersonal communication, but that paradigms are concerned with the practice of research. Thus a paradigmatic approach can describe how a given philosophical view has been received in a field, and how it has affected, sociologically and psychologically, that field.

The analysis of tradition and paradigm make it possible to approach the metatheoretical level of interpersonal communication research. Interpersonal communication theories are not only theories, but entities derived from both a philosophical (i.e. traditional) and Kuhnian socio-psychological (i.e. paradigmatic) background. This view of tradition and paradigm is relatively similar to that expressed by Feyerabend (1975/1994). Following Feyerabend (1975/1994:225), in using the term 'tradition', my objective is to explore the scientific world view as such, trying to understand why scholars think as they think. On the other hand, such questions as 'Why do some world views appear to be more significant than others?' or 'Why are world views competitive?' are best approached as paradigmatic issues (Feyerabend 1975/1994:211-213).¹

¹ It must be stressed that paradigm and tradition have, thematically, much in common. In both cases the aim is to interpret scientific world-views. Therefore, the distinction between a tradition and a paradigm is not absolute. It is important to note that the distinction is a practical one. The term 'tradition' is used, when scientific world-views are considered on their own grounds. 'Paradigm' is used when world-views are compared to each other, and when the rationality of world-views is discussed.

These three key terms - tradition, paradigm and theory - can be seen throughout the key chapters of the present study. The purpose is to lead from the analysis of a tradition ('What is the scholar's world view?') to the analysis of a paradigm ('How does the scholar's world view affect the field?'). Finally, it will be explored how a tradition and a paradigm lead to theories. In other words, a theory indicates the metatheoretical consequences within the field. The order of these terms can be summarized by using the following formula:²

Tradition -> Paradigm -> Theory

The explicit definitions and conceptualizations of these terms will be discussed in Chapter 2. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the essential debate, considerations and foundations relating to these basic concepts. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 the concepts will be discussed in relation to current interpersonal communication research.

Although the formulation is theoretically clear, there exist a danger that such a thematic analysis will remain vague if no concrete examples are used. In other words, mere thematic analysis and evaluation may offer only thematic results, which are often difficult to connect with actual scientific practice, such as the construction of theories or the generation of scientific innovations. Therefore, a bibliometrical analysis was carried out on the field of interpersonal communication. The aim of the analysis is to demonstrate who are, following Beniger's (1990) terms, the most important theoreticians in the field of interpersonal communication. Unlike some other areas in communication research, interpersonal communication has not been studied bibliometrically before. Thus, the bibliometrical analysis not only provides material for the purposes of this study, but also investigates a new area.

Bibliometrical analysis is a quantitative method. It could be argued that quantitative analysis is not the best tool for this kind of research. On the other hand, it is evident that bibliometrics will provide empirically reliable data. In this way, bibliometrics makes it possible to evaluate recent history without the problems that are involved in subjective views of what are important theories. The main problem in bibliometrics, however, is obviously that its strengths and weaknesses lie at the same point. Bibliometrics is an objective method, but it could be argued that it is too objective, considering the nature of this study. This problem has been solved by using certain qualitative methods in addition to bibliometrical raw data. In this way the statistical perspective can be softened but the ideas of objectivity and reliable data can be retained.

It must be, emphasized, however, that bibliometrics is, in So's (1988:237) terms, only a tool. It provides a means by which certain crucial theories can be concentrated on instead of examining everything that is published. As will be shown in Chapter 3, bibliometrics is a useful tool. Its application clearly demonstrates that three theoretical frameworks dominate the field. These frameworks

² This order may apply only in the context of interpersonal communication research, whereas in e.g. sociology, social-psychology or linguistics a 'theory' may be used in a thematically broader sense (see Niiniluoto 1984:193-194).

- *uncertainty reduction theory* by Charles Berger and his colleagues, *constructivism* by Jesse Delia and his associates, and James McCroskey's *communication apprehension* - hold such a strong position that their analysis will also provide enough possibilities to approach the question of defining the legitimate tradition in interpersonal communication.

1.3 Interpersonal communication: Definitions

In this study, the phenomenological alternative will be applied in interpersonal communication. Although several definitions of interpersonal communication exist (see e.g. Berger & Bradac 1985:1-6, Bochner 1984:544-550, Cappella 1987:188-193, Danziger 1976:xvii-xviii, Miller 1976:15, Miller & Steinberg 1975:22, Ruesch 1951/1987:15-16), these definitions are largely conflicting. They are not in competition and neither can they be seen as alternatives to each other. They can not be sensibly compared since all are reasonable in their authors' own context. That is, there are no correct or incorrect alternatives, only different perspectives.

This argument can be supported by examining Berger and Bradac's (1985) categorization of the definitions of interpersonal communication. According to Berger and Bradac (1985:2-4), interpersonal communication can be defined from four main perspectives. First, interpersonal communication can be defined *numerically*. That is, interpersonal communication "occurs between two persons or among small groups of persons" (Berger & Bradac 1985:2). A second alternative is to define interpersonal communication *situationally* (Berger & Bradac 1985:3). Thus, it can be argued that certain types of interpersonal communication are, for example, 'professional situations' while others are 'genuinely interpersonal' (see Cappella 1987:189, Kreps & Thornton 1984:97-116).

According to Berger and Bradac (1985:3-4), the third perspective is *functional* and the fourth *developmental*. That is, interpersonal communication can be defined in terms of serving different functions, so that, for example, it "induces different emotional states" or "changes attitudes and behaviors" (Berger & Bradac 1985:3). When considered from the developmental perspective, the factors which influence the development of a relationship are crucial (Berger & Bradac 1985:4). Berger and Bradac (1985:5-6) consider the functional and developmental approaches to be closely related. Hence, these two approaches can also be seen as a single perspective which emphasizes the importance of interpersonal processes. In other words, different functions of communication as well as relational development can be actualized only through time, as a result of certain cognitive and communicative processes (see Berlo 1977:12-13).

All four perspectives above are problematic in some sense. Therefore, no ultimate definition of interpersonal communication exists. It is obvious that no single perspective has been proved to be more rational, useful or heuristic than any other. For example, Miller and Steinberg (1975) clearly take a broader and less detailed view of the definition of interpersonal communication than

Cappella (1987). However, as Berger and Bradac (1985:11-12) admit, the Miller and Steinberg view is still very useful, because it can easily be applied in practice. Cappella's case is more problematic. The view of Cappella (1987:188) is rigorous, but precisely to that reason its applications are rare.

In short, it would seem that the most sensible standpoint in relation to the different definitions is to consider them as realizations of relatively different, but equally rational perspectives on interpersonal communication. Interpersonal communication cannot be defined from solely a numerical or a processual perspective, but must include *both*. Both aspects are equally rational, considering the essence of interpersonal communication. Therefore, it seems that the best solution is to construct as *synthetic* a perspective as possible.

Naturally, this view can be criticized because of its looseness. Instead of a strict and water-tight definition - as suggested by Cappella's (1987:189) 'definitional minimalism' - the both-and synthetic perspective, as presented in this study, leads to a general and descriptive definition. However, it can be asked which is scientifically more heuristic and useful: a specific and strict definition or a general and widely acceptable one? On one hand, if interpersonal communication is defined as human communication between two or more persons, and if on the other hand another definition sees it as communication that follows certain processes, it is evident that a sensible synthesis to stake is that interpersonal communication involves two or more people who are involved in an interpersonal process.

This same synthetic principle can be followed when considering the situational aspect. Hence, interpersonal communication is a type of communication in which two or more individuals communicate and which is process-like in character, but which also involves situational characteristics. For example, these characteristics imply that the interactants must be able and willing to express their attitudes and opinions to a given individual, and that they must be able to evaluate the feedback in the situation immediately.³

As can be seen, these situational characteristics are relatively descriptive in nature. On the other hand, as Ruesch in the classical work of Ruesch and Bateson (1951/1987) points out, situational dimensions can, despite their descriptiveness be succinctly summarized. The most unambiguous way to distinguish these situational dimensions is to approach interpersonal communication through the notion of the interpersonal event. According to Ruesch (1951/1987:15), an interpersonal event includes the following characteristics:

1. The presence of expressive acts on the part of one or more persons.
2. The conscious or unconscious perception of such expressive actions by other persons.
3. The return observation that such expressive actions were perceived by others.

These characteristics, although general, meet the requirements of a situational definition. First, in order to be interpersonal, at least two individuals

³ As is evident on the basis of Cappella (1987:188) and Miller (1976:15).

must be involved. Second, all the dimensions of face-to-face interaction must be considered. That is, not only verbal but also non-verbal, as well as prosodic and proxemic features of human communication must be considered (see e.g. Goffman 1967:5-46).

The third, and last, level in Ruesch's typology is, however, perhaps the most crucial in considering situational definitions. It can be argued, for instance, that a teacher's communication is interpersonal only if the teacher actually checks that his/her messages are understood. Thus, for example, a lecture situation - without direct feedback - would not, in Ruesch's typology, be considered interpersonal. Analogically, doctor-patient interaction would only be interpersonal if the doctor actually ensures that he/she is understood and if the patient has an opportunity to make free and instantaneous replies (see Kreps & Thornton 1984:16, 106-108).

Consequently, taking the situational dimension additionally into account, interpersonal communication can be defined as follows: *interpersonal communication occurs situationally in communicative and cognitive processes between two or more individuals*. This means that not all situations in which two or more individuals are involved, are necessarily interpersonal, because it is possible for a person to withdraw from the actual interpersonal communication processes (see Miller & Steinberg 1975). If a member of a small group, for instance, does not participate, the situation is not interpersonal. Only if all members are interactively bound together, to use Bochner's (1984) well-known terminology, can the situation be called interpersonal.

It must be noted that the synthetic definition above is not necessarily meant to be a superior or correct alternative. For example, it must be recognized that Cappella's (1987:189) idea about definitional minimalism is, in terms of the philosophy of science, a sound one. The less complicated a definition is, the more useful it is in practice. Without a certain minimalism, it would be practically impossible to apply definitions in research practice, as there would exist an indefinite number of different thematic consequences. However, minimalism must be regarded, as Cappella stresses, only as a general guideline. The definition above is relatively broad, and it contains both communicative and cognitive processes. As general a definition as possible was seen to be the most relevant for the purpose of this study, as a broad definition will offer the best possibilities to approaching the field of interpersonal communication research as a whole.

On the other hand, the synthetic principle does not actually imply that marked differences would be found between a synthetic approach and Cappella's minimalistic definition. On the contrary, to a great degree, a synthetic definition is consistent with Cappella's (1987) views on what constitute the most central dimensions of interpersonal communication. According to Cappella (1987:188), the definition of interpersonal communication should meet the following requirements.

1. A definition should be broad enough so as not to exclude a priori a set of interpersonal relationships.
2. A definition should avoid a bias toward interactions that are reciprocal.

3. A definition should have interpersonal communication rather than interpersonal relations as its focus.
4. A definition should define interchange so that it is interactional.

As can be seen, almost all Cappella's principles can be found, in one form or another, in the synthetic definition. Cappella's first dimension is actually identical to the starting point of the synthetic approach. Second, Cappella (1987:190) also emphasizes that a definition should not concentrate on "positive behavior". For instance, it should not be expected that, in order to be interpersonal, the situation must include manifest turn-takings (see e.g. McLaughlin 1984:104-110). This principle is actually repeated, in slightly different terms, in Cappella's fourth dimension. That is, it is evident that those situations in which interactants are not 'actual actants' are not to be regarded as interpersonal. As Duck (1976:128), for example, emphasizes, in real-life contexts interpersonal communication occurs "at hundreds of levels simultaneously". Sometimes it may be difficult to distinguish actual signals and messages, even though the situation is definitely interactional and, hence, part of interpersonal communication (see Duck 1976:128).

Cappella's third dimension is evidently the most problematic one, as, according to the synthetic definition, relational issues cannot be totally separated from communicational occurrences. This view is supported, for instance, by Duck's (1988:42-44) observation that relations are a substantial part of structuring, evaluating and understanding messages in interpersonal settings. Hence, interpersonal relations are, not only in terms of situation, but also in terms of process, significant. Communication processes may be impossible to understand if the relationship between the interactants is not examined.

Thus, Cappella's view of interpersonal relations can be understood as a general *ideal*. Clearly, it is sensible to approach actual communication instead of more implicit relations. However, this ideal cannot be literally followed in practice. Interpersonal relations are an integral part of the process of communication, which is in turn a part of interpersonal communication. Conceptually, these levels of interpersonal communication can be seen as hierarchically ordered, but in practice it is impossible to exclude interpersonal relations from actual communication (see Baxter 1993). It is important to note, however, that such ideals seem to be necessary in the development of interpersonal communication research as a communication science. Nevertheless, it is realistic to expect that in scientific practice principles like these are likely to be passed over. Because relational issues seem to be heuristically relevant to the majority of interpersonal communication studies, they can hardly be excluded in the attempt to build an independent field of study (see Cohen 1985:289-291).

1.4 Theories of interpersonal communication: History

The history of interpersonal communication research can be approached from two main perspectives. First, it is possible to discuss the history of interpersonal communication in terms of the foundations laid in ancient Greece (see e.g. Conley 1990, Enos 1985, Foss & Foss & Trapp 1985:1-14). Thus, if interpersonal communication is considered as a subdivision of rhetoric, the history of its theories is some 2500 years old (see Conley 1990:4-5). According to Foss, Foss and Trapp (1985:12), for example, the study of rhetoric began in 465 B.C. in Syracuse, following a revolt in this Greek colony.

These ancient roots may be ignored, however, if we accept the argument of Foss, Foss and Trapp (1985:13) that ancient rhetoricians did not deal with interpersonal communication as we do today. In that case, the history of interpersonal communication studies is relatively short. According to Delia (1987a:20), whose perspective is to locate the "field of communication study historically, particularly as an organized institutional domain", the history of interpersonal communication begins in the 1940s. Delia (1987a:20-42) emphasizes that he does not deny the significance of the studies that were carried out in the 1920s or 1930s and does not belittle the influence of classical studies, but he argues that the field was not defined as a clear domain until very recently.

Interpersonal communication studies can be approached through these two perspectives. First, certain areas of interpersonal communication research - such as the study of correct argumentation or the general principles of persuasion - clearly have their origin in ancient times (see e.g. Bavelas & Black & Chovil & Mullett 1990:19, Craig 1989:98-102). On the other hand, actual, empirically and epistemologically systematized (see particularly Rorty 1979:131-138) research into interpersonal communication and interpersonal relations did not begin until the 1930s.

The pioneering authors in the study of interpersonal communication were such writers as Alfred Korzybski (see Rawlins 1985:109, von Wright 1982:184), Kurt Lewin (see Schramm 1989:17), and George Herbert Mead (see Littlejohn 1992:170-171), who published their studies in the 1930s. According to Rawlins (1985:109), it was Korzybski who started the study of human relations and "emphasized the practical utility and psychological significance of spoken language in everyday interactions between people". Lewin, on the other hand, concentrated on group communication and general field theory, but at the same time developed some ideas about interpersonal communication that were interesting as well (see Schramm 1989:17).

While the works of Korzybski and Lewin can be said to represent the visible roots of interpersonal studies, Mead's influence on them can be argued to be one sign of the general interest in interpersonal questions that emerged in the 1930s (see Pearce 1985:280, Taft-Kaufman 1985:163). In addition, not only the work of Mead but also that of Charles Horton Cooley on social relationships, carried out between 1900 and 1940, has had a strong impact (Cooley 1902/1964). Both Mead and Cooley stressed the importance of spoken communication in

human relations (see Hinkle 1966, Mead 1956:215-220, 293-294, St. Clair 1980:24). In other words, both Mead and Cooley supported the development which led to the birth of a new field of study: interpersonal communication.

In addition to these well known authors, many of the social psychologists of the 1930s also emphasized communicational aspects. One was Elwood Murray, who was interested both in conversational rules and in attitudes of interpersonal communication (Cohen 1985:293, Rawlins 1985:112-117). Well known are also the studies of Landis and Ross on humor in interpersonal settings and the study of the role of interaction processes in the social development of children carried out by Murphy and his associates (see e.g. Delia 1987a:42). These studies, along with the work by Sherif (1935) on social norms, were - considering the rise of social psychology in the 1930s - primarily social psychological in character (see e.g. Baron & Byrne 1991:13). That is, links to interpersonal communication research can only be seen as coming in the wake of these studies.

However, it is obvious that an increase in the number of studies dealing with interpersonal communication occurred simultaneously within different disciplines in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the term 'communication' was rare in the titles of journal articles or books before the 1940s (Delia 1987a:57). The first scholars to construct communication articles and who were directly communication-oriented were Paul Lazarsfeld, Carl Hovland and Bernard Berelson (Bochner & Eisenberg 1985:318, Troidahl 1989:50). Their famous studies appeared in the late 1940s (see Berelson 1949, Hovland 1948, Lazarsfeld 1948).

Considering the profile of the emerging field of interpersonal communication, the most widely known authors began their careers in the early 1950s (see e.g. Cohen 1985:293-294). Three names are probably the most important. The first is George Bateson who, with his group, studied relational communication (see Bavelas & Black & Chovil & Mullett 1990:19-20, Danziger 1976:141-142, Millar & Rogers 1976:87, 94-98). The second is Robert Bales, who carried out studies of interaction analysis and decision making (Cohen 1985:293-294), and the third is George Kelly (1955), who developed the construct theory (Burleson 1989:32, Delia 1974:119-120).

However, the period during which these three authors with their groups occupied a key position was relatively short. Various new theories and developments began to influence the field in the 1950s. For instance, Donn Byrne studied attraction and relational development (Duck 1985:658), and Harold Kelley and Fritz Heider developed attribution theory (Cappella 1985:478, McQuail 1987:335, Parks 1985:181). Also, Leon Festinger published his theory of cognitive dissonance (Craig 1993:27, O'Keefe 1990:66-67). Furthermore, studies involving sensitivity training, which were carried out in the 1950s by Jack Gibb and his colleagues, received much attention (Larson & Giffin 1964). Sensitivity training stressed such issues as interpersonal trust or personal acceptance. These issues also played an important role in the first textbooks on interpersonal communication (see e.g. Giffin & Patton 1971).

Consequently, the number of basic theories rapidly increased during the 1950s. At the same time, it was seen as important in research to specify different interpersonal contexts. In other words, the study of interpersonal communica-

tion was not based on a permanent, self-identified tradition in which the same fundamental assumptions are shared by all groups. Instead, each researcher seemed to concentrate on an issue of his/her own, interpreting his/her findings according to a background theory of his/her own. This development further accelerated in the early 1960s, when R.D. Laing (1961) and Sidney Jourard (1964/1971) published their work on self-disclosure (see Giles & Street 1985:225), and George Homans, John Thibaut and Harold Kelley developed their exchange theory (see Werner & Haggard 1985:66-69). At the same time, however, earlier findings still occupied a significant position in interpersonal communication studies.

As Rawlins points out, post-war studies (c. 1940-1960) seem to form an independent group. According to Rawlins (1985:113, 117), this era can be called 'the period of social integration'. At that time, the authors of interpersonal communication emphasized such questions as social conventions or the social goals of interpersonal communication. At the same time they de-emphasized persuasion "as a means for aiding society", but stressed traditional speech skills instead (Rawlins 1985:121-123). Compared with the mainstream communication research of the 1940s and 1960s, the most crucial feature of the interpersonal approach was its rejection of persuasion, which was one of the main areas in mass communication research (see Delia 1987a:24-28).

The period ranging from the 1960s to the 1970s changed the direction of interpersonal communication studies. According to Rawlins (1985:118), this period can be called the "individual integration era". The key authors of this period, according to Rawlins (1985:118), "viewed the 'technique for communicating' orientation as highly impersonal in origin, as objectifying persons, and reducing potentially creative encounters with human beings..." One of the main characteristics of this period is that - unlike those from the 1940s and 1950s - it is difficult to point to the most influential authors. Rawlins himself (1985:118-119) emphasizes the role of the research carried out by Keller and Brown as well as that by Gorman, Johannessen, Ilardo and Stewart, who studied such issues as "genuineness, spontaneity, openness and mutuality" or "interpersonal ethics". However, the ultimate value of these studies is difficult to evaluate. As a matter of fact, it is probable, as Rawlins argues, that the movement that arose in the 1960s is more important as a whole than the work of certain individual authors.

The third and the last of the periods that Rawlins distinguishes began in the early 1970s. According to Rawlins (1985:119-120, 123), this period of time, or, using his own term, "the situational integration era", stressed the importance of "communication skills along with an astute attitude of situationally appropriate communication". Both social conventions and idiosyncratic rules, such as different habits and personal choices, were emphasized, in opposition to the individual integration era during which the importance of idiosyncrasy was stressed, and to the social integration era during which the importance of social conventions was emphasized (see Rawlins 1985:123).

According to Rawlins (1985:119-120), "one of the clearest harbingers" of this, most recent, movement is the article on rhetorical sensitivity of Hart and Burks (1972), in which "situationally-based rhetorical strategies are employed

rather than approaches which result from a rigid mind-set" (see Hart & Burks 1972:81, Rawlins 1985:119-120). However, almost simultaneously with the study of Hart and Burks, a considerable number of other significant views was also expressed. Undoubtedly, one of the best known innovations of the 1970s is the uncertainty reduction theory of Berger and Calabrese (1975).⁴ This theory was "designed to explain communicative behavior during initial encounters", as Honeycutt (1993:462) puts it. Another well-known theoretical framework, at least within European research, is the speech accommodation theory of Giles and his colleagues (Giles & Powesland 1975, Giles & Smith 1979), which, according to Berger (1985:481), "seeks to explain why persons sometimes adjust various attributes of their speech".

One difference between the 1970s and previous decades is that most of the innovations were theories. In addition to uncertainty reduction theory and speech accommodation theory, Altman and Taylor (1973) constructed their social penetration theory. According to this, partners in interpersonal encounters "evaluate and compare their current relationship's quality to an internal subjective standard based on prior experiences" (Werner & Haggard 1985:67). Another example of the theoretical expansion is the theory of coordinated management of meaning by Pearce and Cronen (Cronen & Pearce & Harris 1979, Pearce 1976). This theory "seeks to understand who we are, what it means to live a life, and how that is related to particular instances of communication" (Cronen & Chen & Pearce 1988:67). As Cronen, Chen and Pearce (1988:67) point out, coordinated management of meaning is, epistemologically, "going the other way" when compared, for example, to the other theories discussed above. Instead of assuming an empiricism-bound point of view, Pearce and Cronen followed the principles of alternative philosophy.⁵

These new theories were not the only signs of the theoretical expansion in interpersonal communication in the 1970s. There are at least three other theoretically interesting phenomena. First, in addition to the new innovations, older theoretical views that had not been applied to the study of interpersonal communication, were subjected to reanalysis during the 1970s. One well-known example is the game theory of conflicts by Steinfatt and G. R. Miller (1974), which is based on theoretical ideas that were expressed as early as the 1930s. Another example is G. A. Miller's (1974) reconceptualization of the general information theory by Shannon and Weaver (1949/1964) (see Frandsen & Clement 1984:354). Finally, Delia (1977a-b) and his colleagues modified the construct theory of Kelly.

Second, earlier constructs of interpersonal communication theory were often revisited. For instance, Jourard's (1964/1971) concept of self-disclosure also plays a central role in social penetration theory (Taylor & Altman 1987:257). Self-disclosure is, in Roloff's (1976:175) terms, a "conceptually rich" term. Consequently, it has been used in several theoretical frameworks, and given various modifications (see Bochner 1984:601-608, Gilbert 1976, Miller &

⁴ This argument is to be dealt with in more detail later in this study.

⁵ For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 6.

Steinberg 1975). Also, theoretical approaches to compliance-gaining seem to be essentially similar. Compliance-gaining was first studied by Marwell and Schmitt (1967), but, as O'Keefe (1990:295) points out, there are several frameworks that use a similar conceptualization during the 1970s (e.g. Falbo 1977, Miller & Boster & Roloff & Seibold 1977). Like self-disclosure, compliance-gaining is also conceptually rich and its use has led to new theoretical concepts.

Third, it is obvious that a rigorous metatheoretical discussion of interpersonal communication was emerging. In other words, not only the number of interpersonal communication theories, but also the number of theoretical approaches to interpersonal communication theories, increased. For instance, such landmarks as O'Keefe's (1975) article on logical empiricism in human communication, or the article by Berger, Gardner, Parks, Schulman and Miller (1976) on interpersonal epistemology and interpersonal communication, were published. Researchers in the field sought metatheoretical grounds for interpersonal communication research.

Consequently, it can be argued that in the 1970s a *theoretical turn* took place in the short history of interpersonal communication research. Research began to approach interpersonal phenomena not only by systematizing interpersonal events, but by systematizing the field. Researchers aimed at constructing sound theories, as it would have been impossible to consider interpersonal communication research as a legitimate academic discipline without a solid theoretical foundation. However, as a consequence of these new theories, applications, reformulations and metatheoretical considerations, interpersonal communication faced new problems. Although it is obvious that all three aspects discussed above were positive considering the development of the field, it is equally obvious that, put together, they imply confusion. It could be argued that development was simply too rapid. The theoretical turn derived from a situation in which the scholars were aware of new theories and perspectives in the field, but, nevertheless, could not see it as a coherent whole.

This lack of coherence is one of the central issues in the critical discussion of interpersonal communication that followed during the next decades. What really happened during the 1970s in interpersonal communication research? It is obvious that development was accelerated, but what were the epistemological and theoretical choices that were made? Were they justified, and how was it that certain theories found a legitimate position in the field, while others did not? Obviously, the last decade that can be approached historically is the 1970s. The succeeding decade is clearly too close for an objective analysis. The aim of the following discussion is to concentrate on those considerations that relate to the theoretical turn. Hence, the purpose is to analyze how the key authors of the period between the 1980s and 1990s have evaluated the theoretical state of interpersonal communication research and, especially, how they discuss major theories and metatheoretical developments.

Although the theoretical turn occurred in the 1970s, its effects could not be clearly seen until the 1980s. As theorizing increased, so also did epistemological problems. In other words, the new perspectives increased uncertainty about interpersonal communication research. One well-known example

of the growing uncertainty was *Ferment in the Field* (1983), a special issue of the *Journal of Communication*. As the title of this issue suggests, its main concern was the potential fragmentation of the field. For the purpose of the present study, the articles that were the most interesting and enlightening - in terms of the historical and thematical analysis - were those authored by Schramm (1983), and Rosengren (1983).

According to Schramm (1983:6), the roots of fragmentation can be found in the problems that appeared in the communication studies of the 1950s. In 1959, for instance, Bernard Berelson had argued that communication research was "withering away" (Schramm 1983:6-8). But as Schramm (1983:8) continues, in Berelson's times the field was totally different from that of the 1980s (see Troldahl 1989). In the 1950s and 1960s, the problems seemed to culminate in the works of Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, Lewin and Hovland (so-called *Founding Fathers*). At present, hardly, any figures as dominant as these can be found. On the contrary, there is a large number of more or less equal scholars. Rosengren's (1983:185) view of fragmentation is more direct: "there is ferment in the field, no doubt about that". Rosengren (1983:185) emphasizes that fragmentation exists on several levels. First, there is intellectual fermentation. According to Rosengren (1983:185), "critical scholars and hard-nosed empiricists vehemently fight each other, disdainfully ignore each other..." Second, there is international fermentation. As Rosengren (1983:185) puts it, "scholars and social scientists from the old and the new world meet and marvel at each other's strange ways of thinking."

It must be noted that both Schramm and Rosengren are rather communication scholars than interpersonal communication scholars. However, the sentiments expressed in *Ferment in the Field* and the fragmentation of communication studies can undoubtedly be seen as some of the consequences that followed the theoretical turn. Other consequences are expressed also in *Speech Communication in the 20th Century* by Cohen (1985) and Pearce (1985) and, more recently, in *Rethinking Communication* (Vols. 1-2) (1989). In *Rethinking Communication*, several authors, for instance Rosengren (1989), present new evaluations of the field's paradigms. Rosengren (1989) however, assumes basically the same argument that he expressed in *Ferment in the Field* (see Becker 1989, Bormann 1989, Cappella 1989, Craig 1989, Krippendorff 1989, O'Keefe 1989).

In *Speech Communication in the 20th Century*, Cohen and Pearce demonstrate how the general uncertainty and confusion within speech communication research has increased. One reason for the confusion is that the value of theoretical developments has been unclear. In other words, as Chaffee and Berger (1987:106) put it, in many cases common knowledge about communication has been used instead of a sound scientific theory. Although researchers have found different tendencies, regularities and laws in communicative events, they still do not have a general theoretical context to explain their findings (see Berger & Chaffee 1987:18). *Rethinking Communication* (Vols. 1-2) clearly summarizes the theoretical problems which arose in the 1970s and in the early 1980s. First, as made clear by the arguments in Volume 1, there are epistemological problems. For instance, it is obvious that Cappella (1989:141-142) does not accept the interpretive viewpoints of either Craig (1989) or Krippendorff (1989) presented in the same volume. The problem of epistemology is the main question also in

the articles by Berger (1989), Carter (1989), Corcoran (1989), Kepplinger (1989) and Miller (1989).

On the basis of notions put forward in *Rethinking Communication*, it is evident that epistemological disagreement, and the paradigms that follow that disagreement, is a central issue in interpersonal communication research. In other words, in order to throw light on the problems embedded in interpersonal communication theories, the paradigmatic nature of these problems must be considered. However, considering the aims of this study, this can only be a preliminary question. As implied in the second volume of *Rethinking Communication*, paradigmatic features (i.e. socio-psychological commitments) can be observed and evaluated, but they do not form the core of interpersonal communication research and its recent problems.

Thus, in Volume 2 the paradigmatic differences are accepted. In other words, its articles aim to show that in spite of certain significant differences between perspectives, research continues. The paradigms of interpersonal communication research are not Kuhnian paradigms in the sense that they control and limit scientific work (see Burleson 1989:30). At the same time, it must be noted that the return to a general theory of communication, or to a certain "oneness", as Rogers (1989:210) puts it, is probably impossible. Fragmentation cannot be stopped by creating a general theory, because general theories cannot, either in practice or in principle, share necessary presuppositions.⁶ This means that although scientists who are quantitatively oriented would accept a given general theory, there would still be others to deny it simply because of the qualitative nature of all interpersonal occurrences.

However, it is obvious that *Rethinking Communication* opened an important channel for the metatheoretical considerations of the 1990s. From the perspective of this study, the most important observations were clearly made at the beginning of the 1990s. The paradigmatic questions discussed in *Rethinking Communication* and the general tendency of early 1990s research are particularly significant. While in the 1980s there uncertainty reigned concerning metatheoretical orientation, the lack of theoretical development became conspicuous by the early 1990s. The best-known example of this is probably Charles Berger's (1991) article *Communication Theories and Other Curios* (see also Burleson 1992, Proctor 1992, Purcell 1992, Redding 1992). Berger summarizes most of the problems embedded in the theories of interpersonal communication. Although Berger uses the more general term 'communication', it must be noted that his emphasis is on the interpersonal context (see Berger 1991:102). Nevertheless, he has succeeded in raising issues that are inherently problematic. In short, although it is evident that Berger's views can be subjected to criticism, it is equally evident that his argumentation cannot be ignored.

According to Berger (1991:101-102), there are two basic problems with current communication theories. First, all communication studies, including interpersonal communication, are fragmented, as was demonstrated in *Ferment in the Field* by Rosengren (1983) and Schramm (1983), and further discussed in

⁶ As argued by Mills (1970) or Namier (1963), whose arguments have recently been supported by Skinner (1985).

Rethinking Communication. Second, as argued by Berger and Chaffee (1988:318), the theoretical core of communication research is unclear or missing (see also Thayer 1983). Consequently, there are several interesting dilemmas. First, the number of communication theories, at least the number of those which are developed by specialized communication researchers, is low (Berger 1991:102). Furthermore, communication researchers seem to suffer from methodological fixation. In other words, it can be argued, along with Berger (1991:105-106) that communication researchers are, by and large, well-educated hypothesis testers and data collectors. Considering Berger's own theoretical perspective (see Chapter 5), this argument may seem strange, as it can be claimed that Berger himself has supported this development. However, as Berger argues, it is evident that the capability to construct a theory seems to be missing today.

The distinction between Berger's (1991) article and most of the metatheoretical articles that were written in the 1980s is obvious. Writings in the 1980s were merely analytical, wishful intellectual attacks, as Berger and Chaffee (1988:318) argue, whereas Berger's (1991) article seeks to display the actual crisis of communication theories. In other words, while previous articles recognized the problem, Berger's idea is to force communication scholars and researchers to find solutions. However, it must be noted that Berger's article is not the only sign of changes in the field. Another example of the growing interest in theory is the birth of the journal *Communication Theory*. The first issue of *Communication Theory* was published in 1991. As Craig (1991:1-3) writes in the first number, the journal is to be a mirror to the field of communication, because "the scope of communication theory as well as its proper forms and functions have become increasingly uncertain and controversial."

Even more recent manifestations of the interest in communication theories are to be found in the two special issues of *Journal of Communication* dedicated to *The Future of the Field*. These issues include the papers by Beniger (1993), Craig (1993), Dervin (1993), Fitzpatrick (1993), O'Keefe (1993), Rosengren (1993), Shepherd (1993) and Swanson (1994), all of which discuss communication theories and aim at evaluating the state of the art in communication research. For example, Craig (1993:27-28), Fitzpatrick (1993:119-124) and Swanson (1993:165-166) concentrate on precisely the same problems as Berger. As regards the state of interpersonal communication in particular, the most crucial aspects are summarized by Fitzpatrick and Craig. As Fitzpatrick (1993:123-124) suggests, research in interpersonal communication needs philosophical solutions (see also Grossberg & O'Keefe 1975:196). As my earlier arguments suggest, Fitzpatrick's view is strongly supported in this study. In order to be a 'mature science', in Kuhnian terminology, interpersonal communication research should be based on a philosophically solid, general and sensible metatheoretical background, which would support and explain the theoretical considerations (see Fitzpatrick 1993:123).

Fitzpatrick's argumentation is also supported by Craig. According to Craig (1993:26), "even as we do more theory, we become ... less certain of exactly what we are doing or should be doing." Craig (1993:27) goes on to stake that one of the main reasons for this situation is the theoretical turn in the 1970s. Researchers modified theories without recourse to commonly discussed

definitions of their field and without considering even the most crucial concepts of theoretical construction (Craig 1993:28). Such are the alarming observations which have been noted in the field. However, the number of serious attempts to solve these problems is small. Although the philosophical background of interpersonal communication research has been acknowledged as a problematic issue, very few attempts have been made to seek a solution to these problems.

Within communication education, however, the first steps towards a solution have been taken. One important example can be found in Littlejohn's (1989, 1992) widely known textbook of human communication theories. While in the 1989 edition Littlejohn did not discuss the epistemological essence of human communication theories, in the 1992 edition there is a new chapter clarifying this area. Littlejohn's (1992) solution has been taken up in recent discussion on the theoretical problems in communication research (see Stamp & Vangelisti & Knapp 1994). Littlejohn's reasons for his project are obvious. As he notes, there was a possibility that students who used the previous edition of the textbook did not get a coherent picture of communication theories as a whole (see Littlejohn 1992:383). In other words, although students may have acquired much knowledge about different contexts and perspectives, they might not have gained a true understanding of the epistemological underpinnings of communication research. Bearing Berger's and Craig's argumentation in mind, this estimation is obviously correct.

Littlejohn (1992) aimed at solving this problem by isolating certain central theoretical elements in human communication. Littlejohn follows Berger and Chaffee in naming these elements as a "core". The idea is that if students are able to recognize the elements that are most central in human communication, they will also have a certain epistemological understanding, and thus will have a general picture of communication theories. According to Littlejohn (1992:378-383), this picture is based on five central elements. In other words, the epistemological core of human communication can be derived from five fundamental units.

The first element in Littlejohn's (1992:378-380) system is "message production". As Littlejohn (1992:378) puts it, "core communication theory attempts to explain the ways in which messages come into being." The second element is "interpretation and generation of meaning". This aspect of the core theory addresses questions concerning message understanding (see Littlejohn 1992:378-380). Littlejohn's (1992:381) third element of core communication theory is labelled "message structure". Littlejohn (1992:378) argues that this aspect "looks at the ways in which texts are organized and how message organization itself may be an expression of meaning". The fourth element in this list is "interactional dynamics". Littlejohn (1992:378) describes this aspect as follows: "...it is involved with the ways in which individuals coordinate and mesh their behaviors, how they perceive one another and act on those perceptions." Finally, the fifth of Littlejohn's (1992:378) elements is "institutional dynamics". This element, as Littlejohn (1992:378) puts it, "deals with the political and societal forces of communication." As Littlejohn (1992:382-383) notes, this side of human communication has been extremely significant in many philosophical theories of human communication.

It must be emphasized that these elements are not what Littlejohn (1992:378) calls "separate theories", or "independent dimensions of communication". Instead, they should be viewed as "dimensions or perspectives on the same process" (Littlejohn 1992:378). To sum up, the aim of these five elements is, in practice, to describe the relevant questions to be asked when students who use the textbook try to apply the theories to real communicative events. The "core" points out that there are at least five elements in every communicative situation and that these elements must be approached in different ways. In this sense, Littlejohn's typology has similarities with some other models of communication, such as those of Ross (1965) or McCroskey (1968). For example, in McCroskey's model, the categories that are equivalent to Littlejohn's "core elements" are "creation of message", "message", "interpretation", "feedback" and "process". Both Littlejohn and McCroskey distinguish between certain elements of communicative events in order to show their students that, in order to be able to analyze communicative events, they must have a 'map of human communication' in their mind in order to check that they are really analyzing communication. As Littlejohn (1992: 383) puts it, the goal of core communication theory is to distinguish communication from "other human endeavors".

However, such a map is obviously familiar to all communication scholars and researchers. That is, Littlejohn's view does not offer anything new, innovative or heuristic to those who already deal with theory (see Puro 1994). Littlejohn is obviously right when he argues that message production, interpretation, and interpersonal dynamics, are important issues in human communication theory, but this typology hardly provides anything new to scholars and researchers. The main problem is that Littlejohn's 'core' resembles a communication model, and models invariably describe what has been found and how these findings may be systematized. In this sense models are reflexions. They reflect different aspects of communication events, but they do not explain why precisely those aspects have been chosen and what would be a good avenue for further research.

Thus, in terms of the aims and purposes of this study, Littlejohn's framework must be taken only as a reaction to the theoretically fragmented situation in the field. Considering the recent discussion on theoretical and epistemological problems in the field, the term 'reaction' must be emphasized. For example, Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp (1994) seem to consider Littlejohn's solution an epistemological alternative. It can be argued that this perspective is quite problematic, as it leads to a list about the 'right' research questions (Stamp & Vangelisti & Knapp 1994:200-201). However, the article by Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp along with the collection it was published in (see Casmir 1994) introduces a perspective that is both interesting and significant. First, Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp (1994) focus on interpersonal communication in particular. Second, they base their argument on concrete example theories. Third, their aim is to construct appropriate heuristic research questions to serve research into interpersonal communication. Because of these concrete dimensions, the perspective of Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp (1994) includes evident benefits, although their idea of evaluating interpersonal communication theories using Littlejohn's categories must be criticized.

Other articles in Casmir's (1994) book, especially that of Olson (1994), are also illuminating. As Olson (1994:50-51) points out, the present confusion within the study of human communication is, as is suggested also in the present study, epistemological in character and, hence, connected to certain paradigmatic and traditional issues (see Fitzpatrick 1993). The present study is analogical to Olson's article in the sense that they both assume that it is as important to analyze the world view of the field as it is to analyze its theories (Olson 1994:50). In other words, instead of investigating interpersonal communication theories as independent entities, the epistemological background of these theories is what must be studied and thus systematically clarified.

In relation to the recent articles discussed above and the continuum in which they appear, this study seeks to find its place as yet another alternative in interpersonal communication. Compared to related works of the 1990s, the present study may seem to represent rather a radical approach. However, it can be assumed that solutions like this may be necessary not only account of epistemological concerns but also as a vehicle for promoting discussion. It is obvious that the project in which communication scholars, in the words of Berger and Chaffee (1988:318), "wake up to generate" new theories and a new epistemology of human communication, is still in its infancy. In this study, an attempt to support such a 'wake-up' project is made by participating in the ongoing discussion on the theoretical possibilities in interpersonal communication research.

In addition to these current aspects of the 1990s, it must be stressed that *Towards a phenomenological theory of interpersonal communication* is also history-oriented. In short, the argument of the present study is difficult to understand outside the historical context of theories. It is obvious that theoretically something very important occurred, especially in the 1960s and 1970s: the well known metatheoretical considerations of Berger, Gardner, Parks, Schulman and Miller (1976), Grossberg and O'Keefe (1975), O'Keefe (1975) and Smith (1972) and the theories of the theoretical turn (e.g. Altman & Taylor 1973, Berger & Calabrese 1975, Delia 1977a-b, Giles & Powesland 1975, Pearce 1976) were interrelated. Concurrently with several new theories the metatheory of interpersonal communication research was also thoroughly explored. The main question is: What were the aims of these explorations, and how they can be seen in concrete theories?

As further analysis will show, this question leads to the 1960s. The origins of the metatheoretical concerns of Grossberg and O'Keefe (1975), for example, can be seen in phenomenological philosophy. The works of Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz received much attention and led to metatheoretical uncertainty in the social sciences. As in other related fields, also communication scholars published statements in support of or opposition to the ideas of these philosophers (see Deetz 1973). In the 1970s these statements led to philosophically 'alternative' and 'conventional' theories. The coordinated management of meaning theory of Pearce and Cronen (see Cronen & Pearce & Harris 1979), for example, was 'alternative' (phenomenologically-oriented), whereas the uncertainty reduction theory of Berger and Calabrese (1975) was 'conventional' (empiricism-bound).

Therefore, the object of the present study is to explore the relationship between interpersonal communication research and phenomenology. As the articles of Deetz (1973, 1978), Grossberg and O'Keefe (1975), Hawes (1977) and Hyde (1980) show, phenomenology was a popular issue in the 1970s, and such research institutes as the *Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology* were created. That did not, however, lead to concrete changes in the field. The actual number of phenomenologically-oriented theories remained small in interpersonal communication. In addition to the framework of Pearce and Cronen, only a few widespread theories were phenomenologically involved. Delia (1977a-b), for example, was obviously interested in phenomenology, but he did not see a direct connection with phenomenology and constructivism (see Chapter 5.2.). Most of the widespread theories tended to follow the ideas of experimental social psychology (Appelbaum 1985:234, Baxter 1992:331). Although scholars in the 1970s constructed theories which were - as Rawlins (1985) pointed out (see above) - different from those of the 1960s, the epistemology did not change.

The present study considers the following question: What would happen if the epistemology of phenomenology were to be taken literally? If the argument of uncertainty reduction theory, for example, is reconsidered from the phenomenological point of view, what are its consequences? In order to reply to these questions, I will explore, in particular, the works of Heidegger (1927/1962), Husserl (1931/1962) and Merleau-Ponty (1962). As the publication years of these works imply, I will focus on the 1960s.⁷ Hence, more recent phenomenologically relevant topics, such as 'intersubjectivity', are considered relatively briefly. That does not mean that current phenomenological themes are ignored. However, the original arguments of Heidegger, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty must be the primary source in this study, since they were crucial in the United States in the 1960s when most of interpersonal communication theories were created. Yet, as further explorations will show, they will lead us to ask what overall meaning we ascribe to such terms as *intersubjectivity* and, more interestingly, *interpersonal communication* (see Lowe 1995:151, Rorty 1979:225-227). Phenomenology approaches human communication from the perspective of the 'communicator' (i.e. the individual); it tends to ignore communication (i.e. symbols and interchange) as such. As the final chapters in this study will show, this perspective leads to challenging implications.

⁷ Heidegger's and Husserl's works were published originally in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. They were published in translation in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

2 THEORY AND TRADITION IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH

2.1 Traditions of science in interpersonal communication research

In the following sections, a historical and thematic discussion is given on the concepts of the philosophy of science that will be needed in the further analysis. The aim is to offer tools for analyzing interpersonal communication in terms of the science of philosophy in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Only a few comments about interpersonal communication itself are made in the present chapter. Instead, the general principles of human communication research and different ways of approaching communication studies are emphasized.

2.1.1 Empiricism in communication sciences

Throughout the 20th century, empiricism, which relies on the collection of empirical data, and seeks means to test its hypotheses using this data, has been the primary method in the construction of scientific knowledge (see e.g. MacIntyre 1984:79-81). Because of the success of empirical science, particularly in the natural sciences, scholars in different fields have commonly accepted the idea of an empirically justified science. This method can be labelled empiricism. In order to clarify, however, what this means in terms of communication research in general, and interpersonal communication in particular, it is necessary to investigate the changes that have taken place in the interpretation

of the word empiricism. That is, the term 'empiricism' embeds meanings which are semantically and historically different and which must be discussed.

The first step in the evolution of empiricism, in the 18th century, was taken by the philosopher Hume. Hume's final statement in his *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748/1977) summarizes his radical ideas about empiricism:

If we take in our hand any volume ... let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

These sentences summarize two of the most fundamental aspects of Hume's philosophy. In order to be scientific, an enquiry must include quantitative and experimental reasoning. During the 19th century this idea was advocated by Comte. Comte's philosophy concentrated on the 'positive dimensions of knowledge' as presented by Hume. The most fundamental idea was to eliminate all metaphysical aspects, such as idealistic values or virtues, from science (see Comte 1842/1974:19-41). Instead of upholding unnecessary beliefs about values and virtues, science should look for evidence which, by empirical means, could be shown to be true in an absolute sense.

The final phase, which was obviously also the most significant one in the tradition of empiricism, occurred in the early 20th century. The most crucial decade was the 1930s. Following the ideas of Hume and Comte, several well-known philosophers, including such figures as Neurath (1938/1955), Hempel (1942/1965)⁸, Carnap (1938/1955) and Russell (1938/1955) argued that in order to avoid the danger of being a pseudo-science, pure science should strictly obey certain empiricist rules (Neurath & Cohen 1973). In addition to the original Humean notion of empirical science, the 20th century manifestation included logic as an additional dimension. Logic, which developed rapidly at the beginning of the century as a result of the logical investigations of Frege (1879/1960) and Russell (1901/1971), would be the procedure by means of which the growing number of empirical findings could be systematized.

Consequently, this phase in the evolution of empiricism has been labelled logical empiricism (or logical positivism). Logical empiricism had three primary aims. First, following the originally Humean argument, it was seen as necessary to replace metaphysical statements by empirical tests (Neurath 1938/1955:510). Second, it was assumed that the integration and unity of science could be approached through logico-empirical principles (see Neurath 1938/1955:15-19, Russell 1938/1955:39-41). Third, it was argued that only such

⁸ Hempel's (1965) book is titled *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*. Most of the essays were originally published in the 1940s and 1950s.

language of observation as is both objective and common to all should be used in scientific argumentation (Carnap 1938/1955:52-54).⁹

There were at least three metascientific consequences, as Morris (1937, 1938/1955) calls them. First, logical empiricists argued that scientific knowledge is cumulative. If all the sciences follow the same principles, they will support each other and, as a consequence, general knowledge will expand. Second, all theories must serve three aims: explanation, prediction and control (see Brodbeck 1971, Dray 1971, Hempel 1971, Lanigan 1979, Toulmin 1960, Wolman 1960).¹⁰ In order to be capable of explaining and making certain predictions, a theory must contain strict law-statements. When a theory is law-based, explanation and prediction are, as O'Keefe (1975:170) argues, "formally identical and differ only in their temporal placement relative to the phenomenon to be explained". Finally, all observations must be theory-free. That is, empirical data must be described in terms of an objective 'language of observation', which must be neutral with respect to the claims of other sources of corresponding data (Ayer 1936/1952:10-13). In other words, in order to guarantee that the best possible theory can be found, the language of observation must be different from the language of theoretical debate.

Yet, considering the relationship between empiricism and interpersonal communication to be discussed in the present study, two additional dimensions of logical empiricism must be emphasized. First, as Johansson (1979:9-10, 17-20) points out, logical empiricism ended up strictly following the Humean idea of causality in science. In short, since theories must be based on explanatory and predictive laws, they must be causal, following, in their most elementary type, the $X \rightarrow Y$ formulation. As Hume argued, all occurrences have causal reasons that may be experimentally demonstrated. Second, logical empiricism stressed that scientific knowledge must be based on verification. One of the most lucid definitions of verification has been offered by Ayer (1936/1952). According to Ayer (1936/1952:37) a proposition is said to be verifiable if "its truth could be conclusively established in experience". The aim of the so-called 'verification principle' (or, verification thesis) is to ensure that metaphysical arguments can be distinguished absolutely from statements that are purely scientific (see also Ayer 1956/1962:20-21).

Logical empiricism is obviously the most powerful scientific tradition and philosophical movement of the 20th century.¹¹ The most important aspect of this power is evidently the 'spirit' of logical empiricism. That is, although it can be argued that logical empiricism is practically extinct nowadays (that is, it

⁹ For further argumentation, see the works of Achinstein and Barker (1969), Johansson (1979), Sintonen (1987) and von Wright (1982).

¹⁰ The aim of control has been explicitly explained by Popper (1975). According to Popper (1975:344), every good scientific theory is aimed at 'forbidding' certain things to happen. As Popper (1975:344) continues, "The more a theory forbids, the better it is." That is, according to the nature of logical empiricism, the events to be explained must be explained totally (see Brodbeck 1971:371-377).

¹¹ For a more detailed discussion of power, see Sintonen (1987).

is difficult to find anyone claiming to be a logical empiricist), the spirit of the movement continues to exist (see Sintonen 1987:1-2, 34). Thus, for example, the term empiricism, as it has been used among communication scholars in their metascientific debates, is often based on logical empiricist perspectives. Albeit modified and reinterpreted, logical empiricism evidently is - even at present - the strongest dimension in general empiricism.

The relationship between communication research and empiricism has been investigated by many scholars (e.g. Bostrom & Donohew 1992, Craig 1989, Grossberg & O'Keefe 1975, Hawes 1975, Hewes 1978, Olson 1994). One of the best known articles in this area is O'Keefe's (1975) *Logical Empiricism and the Study of Human Communication*. O'Keefe points to two central issues. First, he discusses the idea of a theory-free language of observation of logical empiricism. According to O'Keefe (1975:177) this idea implies that a researcher "jumps from study to study, producing more and more data without any theoretical program underlying the activity". Second, O'Keefe discusses the theoretical terms related to operational definitions. O'Keefe (1975:179-181) argues that a strict distinction between the language of theories and the language of empirical observations is impossible. Instead, O'Keefe emphasizes the importance of a critical reflective analysis. Without this "communication theorists will undoubtedly be lost in an increasing mass of confused and unconnected 'empirical findings', still vainly hoping that 'more research' will provide all the answers" (O'Keefe 1975:181).

O'Keefe's observations are interesting because he claims that the problems of empiricism also are problems of communication research. In short, according to O'Keefe (1975:177) the picture of "jump(ing) from study to study" is not an "entirely unfair portrayal of a good deal of contemporary communication research." Furthermore, O'Keefe (1975:182-183) continues, something should be done about it. As O'Keefe (1975:183) puts it, "what is required is the renunciation of the positivistic philosophy of science." Following O'Keefe, communication scholars should try to look for other and more suitable philosophies of communication studies. Instead of attempts to predict, to construct causal explanations, or to follow solely empirical grounding or law-statements, which are - as Bochner and Krueger (1979), Cappella (1977), and Hewes (1978) demonstrate - the main issues both in present empiricism and in logical empiricism, there should be more attempts to find new avenues for research.

It must be stressed, however, that most modern empiricists are not against this project. As Feyerabend (1975/1994) stresses, empiricism does not imply the rejection of new opportunities. Furthermore, although Neurath and his colleagues are still considered important pioneers of empiricism, modern empiricism does not necessarily adhere to the philosophical world view of the 1930s. It has been pointed out that, for example, the 'unity of science', which was one of the most fundamental notions of Neurath, cannot be accepted as a guideline to research. Yet, as has been emphasized, such issues as the unity of science are not the most fundamental in modern empiricism. It is important to note, however, that modern empiricism, and especially its idea about social reality, which "comprises a set of social facts that include the overt acts (behaviors) of individuals that can be defined physically or institutionally"

(Taylor 1987), still plays a substantial role in the scientific explanation of human sciences. Thus, empiricism should not be belittled. It is possible, as Daniels and Frandsen (1984:236) put it, that empiricism has been seen negatively only "because a system of accounting for and explaining that [tradition of] science has failed".

Therefore, it must be noted that O'Keefe's arguments will not be accepted as such in this study, although the aim is to develop a phenomenological perspective. Instead of a renunciation an attempt is made to analyze how empiricism actually affects communication research. For example, Charles Berger (1977a-b) has strongly supported the fundamental principles of empiricism. Berger, however, is not to be taken as a logical empiricist. In any case, there is really no point in asking whether Berger is a logical empirist or not. His work simply cannot be 'renounced'. As Cappella (1977) has pointed out, empiricism nowadays carries a negative label, and logical empiricism often has been seen as the ghost of modern science. Instead of putting labels into things, it should be examining, what empiricism actually means in communication research and what its consequences are in terms of scientific practice (see e.g. Miller & Burgoon 1978).

Thus, as, for example, Bostrom and Donohew (1992), Daniels and Frandsen (1984) and Jacobson (1985) have recently emphasized, we should not allow empiricism to be ignored in communication research simply out of false prejudice. Current empiricism is not to be taken as identical with logical empiricism, and, on the whole, the dangers of logical empiricism may have been exaggerated. Therefore, what is needed is careful metatheoretical analysis. Thus, the claim that there are too many empiricism-bound studies in interpersonal communication research, as argued, for example, by Budd (1977) will not be upheld in this study. It is not claimed, for example, that uncertainty reduction theory must be approached in terms different from those of Berger. Instead, it will be emphasized that there are, indeed, possibilities to develop complementary and alternative approaches. Empiricism will not be approached as a tradition which must be rejected.

2.1.2 The hermeneutical alternative

Hermeneutics is one of the main philosophical alternatives to empiricism. The history of hermeneutics is, however, relatively short and it is different from that of empiricism. According to Gadamer (1982:153-159) and Kusch (1986:11), the first hermeneutical philosophers proper were Schleiermacher (1849) and Dilthey (1893/1970) in the 19th century. These authors, and the tradition that followed, concentrated on two questions (Gadamer 1982:162-173). First, how to interpret theological facts (theological hermeneutics) (Dilthey 1893/1970:40-81). Second, how to interpret and understand language (Schleiermacher 1849:516-517). For the purposes of this study, the latter is obviously the more central dimension.

Dilthey and Schleiermacher had a slightly different philosophy of language. Dilthey has been explored, especially by Ricoeur (1982). According to Ricoeur (1982:59), the main concept in Dilthey's theory was *Urphänomen*, the 'original phenomenon'. Following Dilthey, the aim of hermeneutics was to find pure and original, or as Schutz (1967:240) calls them, intuitive, dimensions in the use of language. In other words, instead of following a structural analysis of language, interpretation and understanding of the *Urphänomen* behind the structures of language should be focussed on. Thus, language is not to be understood as only a matter of producing language (ie. speaking), but also, as a process of pure understanding (ie. listening) (see Ricoeur 1982:58-59).

The most fundamental concepts developed by Schleiermacher in the philosophy of language are grammatical interpretation and psychological interpretation. Schleiermacher has recently been investigated by Gadamer (1982). According to Gadamer (1982:165-171), Schleiermacher's aim was to determine what kinds of levels are to be found in language. On the one hand, language consists of grammatical sentences and signs, which can be logically described and approached as a mechanical process. On the other hand, language is expression of creative productivity and hence psychologically unique. While the first can be *analyzed*, the latter must be *understood* "as an element in the total context of a man's life" (Gadamer 1982:166-168).

As Gadamer (1982:164) points out, Schleiermacher stressed that both psychological and grammatological interpretations are crucial in order to understand language. When Schleiermacher defines hermeneutics as "the art of avoiding misunderstandings" (Gadamer 1982:163), this is not to exclude consideration of the grammatological rules in language. On the contrary, if there is no grammatological interpretation, there is no psychological interpretation either, and vice versa. For example, as Gadamer (1982:166) puts it, speech always contains words and expressions, and without this dimension there is no speech. However, in order to express one's own emotions and feelings, one must rely not only on grammatical words and expressions, but also on one's own mental inspiration (Gadamer 1982:167).

As in the case of empiricism, the philosophical foundation that was laid in the 19th century continues to have a strong impact on present thought. Modern hermeneutics, although reconsidered and modified, still adheres to certain original principles. One of the most essential concepts of modern hermeneutics, for example, is Schleiermacher's term *Verstehen* (understanding). That is, modern hermeneutics, like its predecessor in the 19th century, emphasizes that understanding is more than a grammatological issue. Thus, the aim of the philosophy of language is to interpret how language is understood and interpreted in different contexts. Gadamer (1982:345), one of the best known hermeneutical philosophers in recent decades (see Chen 1987, Scult 1983, Stewart 1986), discusses the principles of understanding, language and the use of language in a passage that is very interesting from the point of view of interpersonal communication:

We say that we 'conduct' a conversation, but the more fundamental a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a fundamental conversation is never one that we want to conduct. Rather, it is generally more

correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. ... No one knows what will 'come out' in a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like a process which happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was a poor one. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language used in it bears its own truth within it...

As can be seen in Gadamer's argumentation, language, hermeneutically thinking, cannot be distinguished from the use of the language. This, obviously, is a crucial difference between empiricism and hermeneutics (see Bruns 1987:240). Actually, following Gadamer, it can be said that conversation, both as a psychological experience and as a situation, defines rules as to the use of language (Hernadi 1987:265). Thus, as Gadamer emphasizes, in order to properly understand what happens when two or more people communicate using language, we need to concentrate both on the situation and on the individuals who "fall into conversation". In other words, there is no other possibility than to interpret how individuals express themselves as subjects in conversations.

As is obvious, Gadamer's central ideas have direct relevance to the central theoretical questions of interpersonal communication studies (see also Deetz 1990, Hyde & Smith 1979:347-349). For example, Gadamer's (1982:345) argument that conversation is not conductable (in the input-output sense) can be seen as a clear reply to the law-governed perspective of empiricism. While empiricism argues that communicative situations, including conversations, can be explained in terms of causal law processes, Gadamer as a hermeneutic philosopher, argues that this causality does not exist, because no one can know what actually happens in a conversational process.¹² Or, as Gadamer puts it, if the so-called 'output' can be determined, the type of the conversation must be different from so-called "fundamental conversations".

Furthermore, Gadamer is obviously a good, or relevant, philosopher for the communication scholar to study because he discusses examples of communication, and emphasizes the relevance of communicative activity instead of language (Gronbeck 1981:245). Gadamer (1982:346-347) maintains, in opposition to empiricism, that the primary question is communication in which individuals are involved, not the language which is used (which is the case in the well-known Saussurian and Vygotskian schools, see Bakhtin 1979/1986:61, 68, Vygotski 1931/1982). Thus, Gadamer reinforces the human component of communication research very strongly. As Chen (1987:196) puts it, Gadamer offers us a "(humanistic) hermeneutical attitude and a meaningful direction (struggle for freedom) for communication scholars".

Along with Gadamer, Habermas is the other crucial hermeneutic philosopher of the last decades. As with Gadamer, the thinking of Habermas (1987) has also influenced a number of communication scholars (see Brockriede 1982, Burleson & Kline 1979, Francesconi 1986, Huspek 1991). It can be argued that Habermas' influence is based on the same features as Gadamer's and focusses on the notions of interpretation and understanding, with the emphasis on

¹² A good example of recent empiricism is Jarboe's (1988) causal theory in which conversations are explained in terms of input-output -model.

communicative activity. Furthermore, Habermas has introduced some significant and central notions which have usually had a direct bearing on the study of human communication.

The first term that is particularly interesting from the communicative point of view is 'communicative rationality'. Rationality, in Habermas' (1987:96) terminology, refers to action which is motivated by a desire to find a consensus between subjective views (attitudes and opinions) and the objective world. That is, in order to be able to communicate rationally, one must be able to evaluate the interaction between the world, society, and the self. As Burleson and Kline (1979:427) point out, this implies that communicative pragmatics is a much larger issue than usually assumed within the so-called "pragmatics of language" (see Bochner 1985:32-37, Leiwo & Luukka & Nikula 1992:16-18). Habermas argues that one cannot, for example, rationally have conversations, converse in the Gadamerian sense, if one does not have the subjective willingness and if one does not have appropriate knowledge of the context.

The second important issue in Habermas' (1987:82) thought is 'communicative competence'. Communicative competence refers to the capacity to communicate in a satisfying way, related to the conditions of rationality.¹³ If Habermas' perspective is compared, for example, to the notion of relational communicative competence of Spitzberg and Cupach (1984:187-189) widely-known among communication scholars, it obviously contains certain similarities. According to Spitzberg and Cupach (1984:188), communicative competence should be approached both in terms of cognition and behavior, and "by realizing the 'interactive' nature of communication". Habermas (1987) emphasizes the same basic dimension.

By developing terms such as communicative rationality and communicative competence, Habermas has offered hermeneutic tools to communication scholars. According to Burleson and Kline (1979:428), for example, Habermas "aids in clarifying the duties, obligations, and privileges of speakers pursuing the critical examination of fact and value claims in an argumentative context". However, as McGee and Lyne (1987:397) note, Habermas' philosophy is not necessarily realistic in everyday discourse. Although it can be shown that it is possible to apply Habermasian philosophy to communication research at the conceptual level, it can be still asked what the practical advice or procedures it offers (see also Applegate & Sypher 1988:43, Fortner 1994:218).

This is an important dilemma considering the present state of interpersonal communication research. Hermeneutics does not necessarily provide an adequate basis for a rigorous research program. Hermeneutics can be seen as a rational perspective that helps to interpret communicative occurrences and to evaluate, for example, the significance of interpersonal encounters in different situations.¹⁴ Furthermore, hermeneutics certainly provides new metatheoretical

¹³ For a more detailed discussion, see Giddens (1991), Huspek (1991), or White (1988).

¹⁴ The idea of the 'hermeneutic circle', for example, illuminates central issues in communication models. The 'helical spiral' of Dance (1967), in particular, is interestingly related to the notions of Gadamer (1982:167): "Fundamentally, understanding is always a movement in this kind of circle, which is why the repeated return from the whole to the parts, and vice

insights. Thus, it could be hypothesized that hermeneutics would support the so-called rules perspective and that it would help to explain why rules describe human communication better than laws.

However, it would be difficult to assume that hermeneutics could produce an explicit, clearly formulated theory of interpersonal communication. Naturally, one can also ask whether it is at all possible to construct a synthesis in which explication and hermeneutics are combined. As Gadamer (1982:167) argues, hermeneutics will explain merely totalities, not single occurrences. In interpersonal communication one must, however, understand both the micro- and macrolevel of communication. That is, the aim of interpersonal communication is not to interpret societies, or the world, but, primarily, communication between individuals. Thus, because of the holistic nature of hermeneutics, the usefulness of this tradition is not a simple issue. As Chen (1987:196) observes, it is relatively difficult to construct, for example, directly Gadamerian communication research programs. Although hermeneutics offers opportunities for fruitful rethinking, it does not necessarily further actual conceptualization. Chen (1987:197) is probably right in arguing that what is needed is a conceptually concretized "hermeneutic enterprise".

2.1.3 Phenomenological philosophy

Phenomenological philosophy is, along with hermeneutics, a response to empiricism, and an alternative to it. Like hermeneutics, phenomenology has a relatively short history behind it, when compared to empiricism. According to Warnock (1970:24), "phenomenology began with the work of Franz Brentano" in the 19th century. Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Point of View* (1874/1973) outlined a programme for the phenomenological movement and introduced terms that came to be crucial in later phenomenological discussion (Husserl 1931/1962:359). The most important finding of Brentano, as far as modern phenomenology is considered, was intentionality. The following central paragraph from Brentano's book describes well his approach to intention.

Every psychological phenomenon is characterised by that which the scholastics of the Middle Ages have called intentional inherent existence of an object, and what we, although not entirely in unambiguous terms, would call the relationship to a content, the tendency towards an object (by which we do not mean a reality) or the immanent 'objectivity'. Each contains something as an object in itself, although not each in the same way. In the idea something is conceived, in the judgment something is recognized or discovered, in loving loved, in hating hated,

versa, is essential. Moreover, this cycle is constantly expanding, in that the concept of the whole is relative, and when it is placed in ever larger contexts the understanding of the individual elements is always affected." The hermeneutic circle may be give us an explanation of why "communication while moving forward is at the same moment coming back upon itself?", as Dance (1967:296) argues.

in desiring desired, and so on... No physical phenomenon shows anything like this intentional inexistence. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention.

This paragraph has been analyzed in various ways. Hintikka's (1982) discussion offers perhaps the clearest analysis. According to Hintikka (1982:68), by this statement Brentano made a distinction between so-called not-intentional physical phenomena, which can be explained (in terms of an $X \rightarrow Y$ formulation) and intentional phenomena, which must be interpreted and understood. Thus, Brentano's aim was to distinguish between physical and psychological facts. While physical facts (or the physical world) exist without emotions and feelings, psychological facts (or intentions) - like love or hate - always need someone's subjective emotions towards something or someone. As Husserl (1950/1995:33-40, 1931/1962:229) argues, intentions are always relational, since they are always toward something.

Although Brentano's influence on modern phenomenology is obvious through his notion of intentionality, it can be argued, however, that Brentano was not yet an actual phenomenologist. It was Brentano's student, Husserl, that can be regarded as the founder and pioneer of the modern phenomenological philosophy, which started to develop at the beginning of the 20th century (see e.g. Bengtsson 1990, Hintikka 1990, Juntunen 1986, Merleau-Ponty 1964/1989:43-59, Schutz 1967:45-74). It was Husserl who formulated the general principles of phenomenology, and he also was the first representative of so-called German phenomenology, the later representatives of which include Heidegger and Schutz.¹⁵

The main innovation in Husserl's philosophy is that although he followed the general line laid down by Brentano, he did not accept the distinction between the psychological and physical (Warnock 1970:27). Husserl, originally a mathematician, wanted to apply logic to Brentano's idea of intention. Husserl was interested in intentions, genuine experiences and emotions, and, at the same time, sought logical laws which would explain these psychological facts (Husserl 1950/1995:33-45). In short, as Juntunen (1986:21-43) notes, Husserl's aim was to construct a logical phenomenological science.¹⁶

The term 'logic', in Husserl's philosophy, has two different meanings. On one hand, logic is a mathematical phenomenon. On the other hand, logic is a phenomenological process (Smith & MacIntyre 1982). In the mathematical sense, logic follows absolute and rigorous mathematical laws (such as the $X \rightarrow Y$ formula) (see Husserl 1931/1962:116). The mathematical sciences, like physics, are thus certain and offer, in Husserl's terms, an ideal for all the sciences. In the second sense, or in the sense of the logic of phenomenology, a far more complex issue is at stake, because there are no clear mathematical rules and laws for defining the phenomena (Husserl 1950/1995:43-44). Hence, according to

¹⁵ Schutz will be discussed more specifically in Chapter 6.

¹⁶ See, however Merleau-Ponty (1989:50), who argues that Husserl's philosophy could be labelled "phenomenological positivism".

Husserl, the aim of phenomenology is to concentrate on building a humanistic science which would allow phenomenological phenomena to be approached rationally and which would simultaneously approach them following a mathematical maxim (see Orth 1984).

The third figure in the history of phenomenology is Heidegger. Heidegger was Husserl's student in the 1920s, as Husserl, some decades earlier, had been Brentano's. Heidegger is, however, probably the best known of them. His fame is based primarily on one, very well-known book. Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927/1962, 1927/1977¹⁷) defined phenomenology and what it means in terms of everyday ontology. As stated by Macquarrie and Robinson (1962:13), *Being and Time* is "perhaps the most celebrated philosophical work which Germany has produced in this century."

The primary task of *Being and Time* is obviously to investigate the question of Being. As Heidegger (1927/1962:23) himself argues, "Being is of all concepts the one that is self-evident". Hence, "Being is the most universal concept" (Heidegger 1927/1962:22). However, Heidegger (1927/1962:36-49) also emphasizes that in addition to this 'being-in-general' dimension, it is also crucial to explore the "nature of man, who stands in a peculiar relation to Being as a whole, because he and he alone of all beings can raise questions about Being" (Warnock 1970:51). According to Warnock (1970:52) "man is the only being who is capable of considering Being as a whole".

The aspects of Heidegger's phenomenology that are the most relevant to the present discussion can be found in his philosophy of language (see Heidegger 1959/1982). According to Denniston (1988:1), the core of the Heideggerian philosophy of language is the following: man's being is inseparately connected to language. That is, language does not exist by itself, externally, but language "brings beings into Being" (Denniston 1988:vi). In Desilet's (1991:155) words, "language serves the unity of Being and understanding through its role as 'the house of Being'". As can be seen, Heidegger's philosophy of language is, both terminologically and thematically, inseparately intertwined with phenomenological epistemology and ontology.

It can be argued, however, as Kusch (1988:83) observes, that these arguments about language are tautological. Following Kusch (1988:83), the reason for this is not, however, the fact that Heidegger's philosophy of language is conceptually vague, but that Heidegger wants to demonstrate that language is an existential whole. For example, to say "being in the world" is not only to say a sentence but to experience what the sentence means (Heidegger 1959/1982:58-59). Hence, language is an inseparable part of human existence, because it is man's primary means of experiencing and feeling what 'being-in-the-world' is ontologically (see Heidegger 1959/1982:57-58). Tautologies, however, cannot be avoided, because the sentence "being in the world" and actual everyday 'being-in-the-world' are, from a phenomenological point of view, identical (Heidegger 1959/1982:18-21).

¹⁷ Because of translation problems with the original *Sein und Zeit* (1927), two English translations have been used in the following citations.

Tautologies aside, it can be concluded that Heidegger's philosophy of language contains at least two interesting dimensions as far as communication is concerned. First, Heidegger emphasizes the importance of subjective experience in the philosophy of language. There is no actual human language or human communication without experience. Thus, as Heidegger (1959/1982:59) states, "scientific and philosophical information about language is one thing; an experience we undergo with language is another". Heidegger further argues that the most crucial dimension in the philosophy of language is to explore speech in everyday situations (Heidegger 1959/1982:3-5, 18-20, 58-59). According to Heidegger (1959/1982:58-59), silence, for example, is an important part of everyday language, although it cannot be formulated in terms of the language of science. Silence is a good example of language which is experienced during speech, although it cannot be linguistically formulated.

Heidegger's views have been widely discussed during the last few decades by contemporary phenomenological philosophers. Geographically, it is interesting to note that the majority of these philosophers are French. The communicational viewpoint has been explored by Gusdorf (1965) in particular. As Gronbeck's (1972:36-37) discussion on Gusdorf demonstrates, he can be seen as a follower of Heidegger. However, he has also succeeded in building on some of Heidegger's ideas. Hence, his work offers a new opportunity to evaluate the phenomenological perspective. First, Gusdorf emphasizes the importance of speech in the phenomenological approach. Hence, according to Gusdorf's (1965:33) interpretation of phenomenology, the primary problem in any philosophy of natural language is not "language *per se*, but a problem of speaking man".

Gusdorf's (1965:35-36) aim is to point out that in the phenomenological approach the term 'speech' cannot be separated from the term 'language'. As in the case of language in Heidegger's argumentation, "we must consider speech not as an objective system ... but as an individual enterprise: to begin speaking is one of the major tasks of man" (Gusdorf 1965:35). Hence, the Heideggerian term 'language' and Gusdorf's term 'speaking' fundamentally refer to "both expression (self-affirmation) and communication (contact with another Self)", as Gronbeck (1972:37) states.

Another French phenomenological philosopher, who has discussed communication is Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964/1989). Merleau-Ponty's philosophy contains two significant communicative principles. First, according to Merleau-Ponty (1962:67-72, 174-187), communicative encounters are actually encounters with the world. That is, communication is an inseparable part of the Heideggerian being-in-the-world project. Second, Merleau-Ponty (1962:182-184) stresses that communication cannot be defined completely in terms of linguistic concepts. Instead, Merleau-Ponty (1962:183) argues as follows:

In order that I may understand the words of another person, it is clear that his vocabulary and syntax must be 'already known' to me. But that does mean that words do their work by arousing in me 'representations' associated with them, and which in aggregate eventually reproduce in me the original 'representation' of the speaker. What I communicate with primarily is not 'representations' or

thought, but a speaking subject, with a certain style of being and with the 'world' at which he directs his aim.

Moving forward in his argument, Merleau-Ponty turns to the speech-centered phenomenology of language, a notion which is quite closely related to Gusdorf's perspective. In contrast with Gusdorf, however, Merleau-Ponty (1962:174-179, 183-189) draws particular attention to the significance of gestures in speech. By the term 'gesture' Merleau-Ponty wants to point out that language or speech are not primarily connected with words (see Edie 1976:82-83, Lanigan 1979:39). Instead of words, in authentic communication one uses one's body. That is, one's body and the gestures which reflect the 'body-subject' are the primary issues of social interaction.¹⁸

As can be seen, phenomenology offers various notions that are directly bound to human communication. Furthermore, although both phenomenologists and hermeneutical philosophers have discussed questions that are communicative in character, phenomenology has also spread widely among communication scholars (Deetz 1973, Hyde 1980, Pilotta 1982, Pilotta & Mickunas 1990, Stewart 1972, 1986). The discussion on Heidegger's thinking, especially, has been lively (see Corcoran 1984, Desilet 1991, Francesconi 1984, Hill 1983, Hyde & Smith 1979, McGee 1984, Megill 1983, Rosenfield 1983, Wander 1983). All the above-cited authors, however, seem to have a different starting point and a different perspective. For example, it is evident that Corcoran (1984), Francesconi (1984), McGee (1984), Megill (1983), Rosenfield (1983), Hill (1983) and Wander (1983) share the same 'ideological' context. Nevertheless, they read Heidegger's original texts differently. Hyde and Smith (1979), and more recently Desilet (1991), focus exclusively on metatheoretical foundations.

It is evident, however, that it is difficult to construct Heideggerian notions for the purpose of interpersonal communication research. Hyde and Smith (1979:363) seem to be correct in observing that "once the proper place of [phenomenological] rhetoric is recognized, theories of communication, and particularly rhetorical criticism, will become deeper, more important, and more enduring." However, although Heidegger's thought has been found illuminating, the proper place for it is difficult to locate. The same applies to Husserl. Although Husserl's original work is obviously a crucial starting point for modern phenomenology, it is difficult to find a 'niche' for it in recent communication research.

Thus, the argument of Hyde and Smith (1979) about deeper research is still more of a promise than an actual alternative. Heidegger, Husserl or Merleau-Ponty can be regarded as important influences on communication research and as authors who provide guidelines for the phenomenological investigations of communication. The number of successful phenomenological studies, however, is very small. It can be argued that in the present situation the primary task of phenomenological research is to find what Saarinen (1987:112) calls the 'phenomenological touch'. That is, instead of an analysis of the

¹⁸ For a more detailed discussion on the body-subject, see in particular Barral (1984).

prominent authors themselves (e.g. Heidegger's political views) it would be worthwhile, as Pilotta and Mickunas (1990) argue, to turn to the epistemological positions and alternatives that these authors represent.

One example of the phenomenological touch, albeit the sole representative of its kind, is Hyde's (1980) article on phenomenological experience and communication anxiety. Hyde's approach is interesting not only because of its phenomenological dimension, but also because of its thematic content (see also the later chapters on communication apprehension). According to Hyde (1980:141-142), the main issue is to distinguish, as Husserl (1931/1962:148) did, an 'ontic' from an 'ontological' analysis of anxiety. While ontic analysis studies behavior and predictions (causal explanation), ontological analysis describes the experience itself (see Husserl 1931/1962:147-149, or 1970:310).

Ontological analysis is, according to Hyde (1980:142-143), a communicationally problematic issue not only because of the nature of the analysis itself but also because of the nature of communication. As Hyde (1980:142) points out, the fundamental Heideggerian questions (e.g. "What does it mean to be?"), are inseparable from the question of anxiety. However, it is clear that the results of the ontological analysis are not understandable in the sense of empiricism or, for example, in the sense of conventional 'communication apprehension' or 'communication reticence'. According to Hyde (1980:146), Heidegger sees anxiety as "Nothing in the sense that it is 'no-nothing'" and "the source of anxiety is not a particular object, person, or situation..." Hyde (1980:147) continues to argue that the "source of anxiety" is thus 'indefinitive'.

Consequently, Heideggerian ontological analysis leads to the 'eternal questions of existence'. As the terminological connection between 'Being', 'language' and 'speech' shows, this is a typical characteristic of phenomenology. In phenomenology, the questions and the answers are connected to each other in such a way that the one cannot be separated from the other (Heidegger 1927/1977:45-46, 1959/1982:57-60). Consequently, it is obviously a difficult task to shape a communicationally-oriented phenomenology. On the other hand, a holistic view of phenomenology may provide an opportunity to devise a coherent picture in which the different hierarchies of human communication can be seen as a single entity.

2.2 Paradigms in interpersonal communication research

As the exploration of the tradition shows, views of human communication depend on scientific world views. In short, if we are empiricism-oriented researchers, we share different scientific values and rules from those of phenomenologists and hermeneutically-oriented scholars. For example, empiricism argues that such terms as 'Being' or 'being-in-the-world' are, as Hume and Comte argued above, sophistry, and therefore unnecessary, even dangerous, in science. In phenomenology, they are, as Heidegger (1927/1977:42-50) shows, the most central exploratory concepts. The aim of the following sections is to

consider what happens when different traditions collide. That is, what is the consequence of discussion when an empiricist argues that the concept 'being' is unnecessary, and phenomenologist replies that the empiricist just cannot see what 'really happens' in the world?

2.2.1 The nature of paradigms

According to the hierarchical structure presented in the introductory section (Chapter 1.2.), interpersonal communication theories can be approached through paradigms. In science, or the philosophy of science, the term 'paradigm' is used in the sense introduced by Thomas Kuhn in the early 1960s. As Niiniluoto (1984:247) states, it was Kuhn's idea to demonstrate how both the personal and shared beliefs, values, and attitudes of researchers and scholars are realized in science (see also Føllesdal & Walløe 1977:67-68, Rossiter 1977:70, Selzer 1993:4-5). According to Kuhn (1962/1970), beliefs, values, and attitudes affect the methodological choices and aims of research programs in scientific communities. Verronen (1986:57) defines the essence of the term paradigm as follows:

We shall say that any paradigm P is (at least) an ordered quadruple

$$P = [O, U, E, V]$$

in which O is an ontology, U a set of symbolic generalizations in a natural or symbolic language in a suitable formalism ..., E a set of exemplars (i.e. "successful" research performances) and V a set of values (if, for example, a scientific community gives priority to quantitative over qualitative predictions, this value thus attributed belongs to the set V).

Although this formulation is, in the definitional sense, quite clear, semantically the term paradigm so-defined contains several dimensions. Masterman (1970:65), for instance, distinguishes 21 different meanings of the term. However, according to Verronen (1986:202, 1988:35-42), this should not be interpreted as the sign of a vague concept. Instead, Verronen (1986:202-203) emphasizes that the paradigm has an essential role in scientific conversations about the conditions and characteristics of the development and progress of science. Therefore, it is natural that it should be reinterpreted and modified through discussion (Kuhn 1962/1970:208-209). According to Verronen (1988:42), the original term is, however, reliable and semantically relatively clear.

One of the best-known forums in which the paradigm has been discussed is *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (1970) edited by Lakatos and Musgrave. In this collection of articles both the strengths and the weaknesses of Kuhn's (1962/1970) concept are scrutinized. The articles by Watkins (1970), Popper (1970), and Feyerabend (1970) in this collection are especially enlightening. The arguments of these authors, along with Kuhn's (1962/1970) own views and Verronen's (1986) comments, form a sound basis for a discussion of the term paradigm.

According to Kuhn (1962/1970:49-50), all the mature sciences - and by 'mature' Kuhn means fields that have a century or two of history behind them - contain several possible paradigms. Paradigms exist in competition, and each paradigm will seek to attain dominance in the field. The winning paradigm will become the dominant one, or, in Kuhn's (1962/1970:10-12) terms, come to constitute "normal science". Hence, a normal science is, according to Kuhn (1962/1970:23-27), the one that is in the psycho-sociological sense, the strongest (see also Bohm & Peat 1987:41, Stegmüller 1976:196-197).

Different paradigms are incommensurable. As Kuhn (1962/1970:149) argues, it is important to note that because of the incommensurability of paradigms, researchers working within different paradigms do not understand each other in a scientific discussion. This situation can be compared to one in which two people who have a different religion try to determine whose God is the real one (Watkins 1970:33). Hence, as Stegmüller (1976:147) points out, in the Kuhnian sense the discussions over different paradigms are merely a form of rhetorical persuasion and propaganda, not genuine, scientifically neutral, conversations. Thus, the so-called scientific revolutions are not based on choices that are scientifically rational (see Rorty 1987:41). On the contrary, scientific revolutions, that reflect on new ways of solving epistemological or ontological questions, are usually based on 'suitable situations' and 'rhetorically efficient and successful argumentation' (Kuhn 1962/1970:111-135). As Kuhn (1962/1970:66-72, 77-80, 90-98) argues, a scientific revolution occurs when the dominant normal science declines to be replaced by a new normal science at an appropriate time and place.

The main point in Watkins' (1970) criticism of Kuhn is the paradox of the notion normal science. According to Watkins (1970:28), Kuhn argues that normal science is the 'normal state' of science. However, Watkins claims that if normal science is seen as the normal state of science, scientific progress would stop. Thus, Watkins (1980:28) argues that it is impossible to determine, how progress in science occurs, because normal science seems to support only such research as is carried out within its own domain. In other words, if Kuhn's theory of paradigms is correct, there would be no scientific progress. In the light of the findings of science to date, this claim does not seem, however, to be supported by the facts or even to be hypothetically rational.

According to Verronen (1986:89), Kuhn's idea of using the concept normal science is, however, only to demonstrate what is the expected and thus normal state in the sciences. Verronen (1986:90) emphasizes that Kuhn does not mean that 'normal' is an axiological statement. That is, both normal science and the normal state exist only for as long as there is no change, and there are no axiological reasons for their existence. In short, normal does not imply, in Kuhn's terminology, that one state is better than another. If axiological estimations are necessary, it can be claimed that normal is, for Kuhn, rather a negative than a positive issue in science.

Popper (1970), unlike Watkins, does not deny the existence of normal science. Instead, Popper (1970:55-57) concentrates on the question of how normal science appears as well as emphasizes the dangers of normal science (Popper 1970:51-54). Normal science is, according to Popper (1970:53), a state in

which researchers do not want to handle problematic questions. In other words, in the state of normal science researchers try to find easy and acceptable solutions, which is fatal considering the general aims of science.

However, unlike Kuhn, Popper argues that discussion between paradigms is possible. Popper's perspective is that a scientifically rational truth is objective and absolute and, thus, a common guideline for all researchers alike. As a consequence, Popper claims that a pure philosophical metalanguage can be understood by all discussants (see also Popper 1968). According to Popper, all scientists are equally searching for rational truths, although they may represent different paradigms. Thus, they share the same scientific principles and, at the metatheoretical level, a common world view (see also Kuhn 1962/1970:111, 126-135). In other words, while Kuhn emphasizes the importance of psychological and sociological aspects, Popper stresses the essence of shared rationality.

Finally, in his critical evaluation of Kuhn, Feyerabend (1970) takes a stand against Kuhn's antihumanism. According to Feyerabend (1970:198-199), the central question is whether Kuhn's view is descriptive or normative. If Kuhn's theory is normative, it must be noted that it is - according to Verronen's terminology - axiologically empty (Feyerabend 1970:200). Thus, Feyerabend (1970:200) emphasizes the following aspects of Kuhn's theory.

Every statement which Kuhn makes about normal science remains true when we replace 'normal science' by 'organized crime'; and every statement he has written about the 'individual scientist' applies with equal force to, say, the individual safebreaker.

Hence neither Feyerabend nor Watkins see any evidence for the need to the term normal science. Feyerabend's (1970:207) question about the nature of normal science is simple: if normal science can be recognized and if it is a negative phenomenon in terms of scientific development, why it is allowed to appear? Since it is possible to fight crime, it should be equally possible to fight normal science (see Feyerabend 1970:207). Hence, as Rorty (1987:45) concludes, Feyerabend's aim is to show that despite the existence of "fierce competition between alternative theories, movements and schools", it is also possible to stop negative tendencies (see also Hall 1989:55, Verronen 1986:100).

2.2.2 Paradigmatic evaluation

According to M. Smith (1988:299), in human communication research, as in all other disciplines, Kuhnian paradigms are characterized by four fundamental dimensions. First, there are paradigmatically grounded ontological assumptions to be found. In other words, each paradigm tends to produce a "world in which it is true" (Kuhn 1962/1970:111-135, see also e.g. Barnes 1985:92). Applied to communication research, as Smith (1988:299) argues, "ontological beliefs describe the nature of human communicators and the process of communication itself". Second, every paradigm is connected with certain epistemological assumptions.

According to Smith (1988:307), epistemological assumptions are based on a given scientific tradition, such as empiricism, hermeneutics or phenomenology (see Casimir 1994:27, McNamee 1988:52-54). Smith (1988:307-311) argues that there are at least six epistemological movements that have clearly influenced communication scholars: rationalism, rational empiricism, mechanistic empiricism, constructivism, and constructive realism.

Third, following Smith's typology, there are paradigmatic metatheoretical assumptions, which "address the types of theoretical explanations that are appropriate to human communication" (M. Smith 1988:311). As Smith (1988:311-314), along with Adler (1978), Berger (1977a), Cushman (1977) and Jacobson (1985), argues, there are two main metatheoretical approaches in communication studies: the 'laws approach' and the 'rules perspective'. Finally, there are certain paradigmatic methodological assumptions. Smith argues that two influential methodological trends describe the present situation in communication research (see also Montgomery & Duck 1991:325-327). The first of these is the "shift from methodological monism to pluralism", and the second is the "development of several distinctively communicative research methods, like conversational analysis and rhetorical models" (M. Smith 1988:314).

These dimensions systematize the features to be found in more sophisticated approaches. The ontological aspects of interpersonal communication theories are, for instance, discussed interestingly by Cheng (1987). According to Cheng (1987:26), the ontology of western science is based, naturally, on western philosophy. That is, ontological assumptions about interpersonal communication are based on the western scientific world-view, the roots of which can be found in ancient Greece, in the classical European philosophy developed by Locke and Hume, for example, (see e.g. Husserl 1970, Rorty 1979), and in the empiricism of the 20th century (Cheng 1987:26, Woelfel 1987:314-315).

Cheng claims that the ontology presented by western philosophers is not, however, the only possible alternative. According to Cheng (1987:25-31), the most elementary notions in western ontology, such as the distinction between 'form' and 'substance', or between 'mind' and 'body' (see Heidegger 1959/1982:1-20, 1927/1977:323-339, Rorty 1979:22-69), are given a different interpretation in eastern ontology.¹⁹ Unlike in the Cartesian view, the eastern view does not recognize form without matter, and reality "is the totality of things, each of which has its own form and own substance" (Cheng 1987:27, see also Husserl 1970:78-86, Woelfel 1987:315).

As, for example, Kincaid (1987) realizes, these ontological differences are significant in terms of interpersonal communication theory. For Kincaid (1987:333-335), the notion of totality, for example, is relevant in the consideration of the goals of interpersonal communication. If there is no distinction between a 'part' and the 'whole', as in the eastern perspective, one's criteria of effective communication is bound to change radically. For example, if no difference between 'I' and 'society' (following the well-known terms of

¹⁹ Cheng refers to at least three Chinese schools of philosophy: Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. In most cases, the so-called 'eastern perspective' is connected to Taoism and Buddhism.

Mead) is made, expectations concerning rational communication change totally. For example, the western idea of communicative competence (or, say, communication skills) cannot remain the same as has been proposed in, for example, Spitzberg and Cupach (1984), because the agent and the context of this competence cannot be defined.

The second dimension of M. Smith, that of epistemological assumptions, has been discussed by several communication scholars, as seen in Chapter 2.1. above. As Smith points out, epistemological discussion on paradigms is directly connected to the essence of scientific traditions. These questions, too, have already been examined in previous sections. The metatheory of interpersonal communication, as the third dimension, has been one of the main issues in several important articles dealing with the state and development of interpersonal theories. The rules perspective is represented, for example, by Cushman and his colleagues (Cushman 1977, Cushman & Craig 1976, Cushman & Kovacic 1994, Cushman & Pearce 1977, Cushman & Whiting 1972). The law approach, has been taken up by Berger (1977a) (see also Berger 1977b, Berger & Perkins 1978, Cappella 1977, Daniels & Frandsen 1984, Miller & Berger 1978). The most useful forum in which to compare perspectives is provided by the special issue of *Communication Quarterly, Alternative Theoretical Bases for the Study of Human Communication*, in which both Cushman's (1977) and Berger's (1977a) views were originally published.

The basic idea behind the complex rules perspective of Cushman (1977) has been explicated by Cahn and Hanford (1984). According to Cahn and Hanford (1984:286), "Cushman and his associates view human beings as rule-governed, intentional, social creatures." Rules are social conventions, they function out of practical necessity, and hence, people usually tend follow them (see Cushman 1977:33, 39, also Harré & Secord 1976:183, McLaughlin 1984:16-21). Naturally, as Cahn and Hanford (1984:286) point out, it is clear that although people know the rules, they can be always violated, changed or modified (see Cushman 1977:36-37, Cushman & Florence 1974).

The rules perspective of Cushman is, as he points out, focussed directly on the interpersonal context (Cushman 1977:41). In interpersonal communication, the most important rule-governed issue is the individuals' self-concept (Cushman 1977:39-40). According to Cushman (1977:39) "interpersonal communication has as its principal goal the coordination of human activity in regard to the development, presentation, and validation of individual self-concepts". What is important in the relationship between self-concept and interpersonal communication is that Cushman classifies the 'personal subjective' and the 'intersubjective' sides as two distinct categories. In this categorization, the personal subjective side is phenomenologically unique and private (see Cahn & Hanford 1984:288). Interpersonal subjective experiences, or "intersubjective experiences",²⁰ on the other hand, "are socially shared, rule-governed and standardized in usage" (Cahn & Hanford 1984:288).

²⁰ Following the terminology of communication research as represented by Anderson and Goodall (1994), Ickes and Tooke (1988), Olson (1994) and Pilotta and Mickunas (1990).

From these intersubjective experiences Cushman (1977:41) draws his idea of the rules theory of interpersonal communication. The theory has two main levels. The first of these is to present "a role-taking paradigm for locating the exact structure of an individual's self-concept" (Cushman 1977:41). The second is "to employ the self-concept as a generative mechanism for outlining a theory of message content, interpersonal relationships, and communication styles" (Cushman 1977:41, see also Cushman & Kovacic 1994:270-276).

Berger's (1977a) law perspective is based on views articulated by such well-known empiricist philosophers of science as Braithwaite, Hempel, or Nagel (Berger 1977a:8-11). Following empiricist thought, Berger both supports empiricist logic and emphasizes the importance of logical explanation and prediction. As Berger (1977a:7-8) points out, the law perspective can be described as a general approach to all scientific problems in which the question is simply, 'why?'²¹ Hence, the law perspective is not bound to any specific theory (see Merton 1971:468-469, 478).

According to Berger (1977a:335-347), scientific statements that are reliable and justifiable from the law perspective, can be divided into three fundamental types: deductive nomological, deductive statistical and inductive statistical. Here, Berger follows the widely-known typology of Hempel (1965:335-347, 380-393). Following Berger, it is common to these alternatives that they are all aimed at building causal relations between objective natural events (see Apel 1984:48-50). In that sense the law perspective of Berger is undoubtedly connected to certain ideas of empiricism, even logical empiricism. In terms of interpersonal communication, this implies (as Merton 1971:478 argues) that, for example, a message, of the type X implies a reply which is explicated as a type X_1 (see also Apel 1984:48-49).

Unlike Cushman in the case of rules, Berger does not, unfortunately, demonstrate how the law perspective could be applied to interpersonal communication. One very interesting question is, naturally, what is the position of laws in Berger's own, uncertainty reduction theory (Berger & Calabrese 1975). Berger (1977a) does not use it as an example in his article, but it can be argued that it is actually one of the most explicitly law-governed theories in interpersonal communication research (see Chapter 5.2., see also Berger 1977b).

Finally, the last of the four categories proposed by M. Smith, that of paradigmatic methodological assumptions, are discussed in great detail in *Ferment in the Field* mentioned above (see Chapter 1). A basic distinction as far as methodological assumptions are concerned can be made between the humanistic (e.g. hermeneutical, or phenomenological) and the experimental, empiricism-bound perspectives (see Gerbner 1983:359-360, Katz 1983, Miller 1983, Thayer 1983:83-85, 91, but also Bochner & Cissna & Garko 1991, Duck & Montgomery 1991). Using the experimental perspective, Miller (1983:34) emphasizes that one of the main features of contemporary communication research is that researchers have turned to processual analysis instead of their previous static perspectives. According to Miller, present experimental research is not based on the previous naive interpretations, according to which human

²¹ For a more detailed discussion, see Apel (1984:49-56) and Toulmin (1960:83-85).

behavior is explained in predetermined static terms. However, at the same time, as Thayer (1983:84) points out, another experimental problem has arisen, that of the endless proliferation of excessively small analytical units (see also Gerbner 1983:359). The more sophisticated empirical methods are, the more fragmented the field becomes. Thayer follows O'Keefe's (1975) argumentation (see Chapter 1.1.) that, regardless of the validity and reliability of research, experimental findings are overcumulative. Katz (1983:51-52), for example, argues that this development should be stopped and the current research methods replaced by assuming totally new, and more open, humanistic alternatives.

One of the best-known articles to deal with the relationship between interpersonal communication, paradigms and methodological solutions is that by Poole and McPhee (1985). Poole and McPhee (1985:150) maintain that the key methodological factor is choosing between qualitative and quantitative perspectives (see also Anderson 1987). As Gronbeck (1981:243, 252-253) points out, the dichotomy between qualitative and quantitative approaches led - particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s - to totally different worlds and camps in communication research. Qualitatively-oriented scholars did not accept the quantitative approach and vice versa.

As Poole and McPhee (1985:159) state, the paradigmatic quarrel between quantitative and qualitative methodology has subsided recently. Thus, it has been generally accepted that the dichotomy should not be overestimated. According to Poole and McPhee (1985:159), "close examination of the patterns of reasoning underlying the various techniques clearly shows affinities in both 'camps'". Instead of examining the epistemological problems between these vague camps, Poole and McPhee (1985:159) argue that "there is a need to fight against the narcissism of technique" (see also Berger 1991:105-106). According to Poole and McPhee (1985:159-160), interpersonal communication research has "witnessed an ever-increasing emphasis on the importance of method". At the same time, the properties of different methods are not well understood (Cappella 1977:45, 48-49). Thus, the narcissism of technique dangerously supports the tendency to substitute methods for theoretical thinking (Poole & McPhee 1985:160).

The observations of Poole and McPhee (1985) clearly support what was argued above about the present state of interpersonal communication research. The most crucial questions addressed in the present study are connected with the ontological, epistemological and metatheoretical aspects of the theories, not with the methodological issues. This is true from the point of view of both paradigms and traditions. This does not imply that methodology is irrelevant as far as paradigms in communication research are considered. However, if the theoretical and methodological maturity of present communication research are compared, the theoretical dimension is clearly more 'open'. Hence, it can be concluded that in order to evaluate paradigmaticity and the paradigmatic dimensions of interpersonal communication research, we must start with theories and their characteristics. This calls to an examination of what the theories in the field are, and what they imply paradigmatically.

2.3 Theories: What are they?

Like 'paradigm', also 'theory' is a broad term. For example, as Niiniluoto (1984) notes, the reason for this is to be found in the fact that different disciplines and schools are not similar in the philosophical sense. According to Niiniluoto (1984:198), there are, for example, fundamental differences between the so-called mathematical and the factual sciences.²² The mathematical sciences - such as mathematics, chemistry or classical physics - primarily employ analytical theories, while the factual sciences - such as sociology, psychology, linguistics or communication - use theories that are systematizing, generalizing or empirical in character (see also Merton 1971:465-466, 476-478, Rescher 1970:132-133). The distinction between the mathematical and factual sciences is not, however, very clear-cut in practice. The distinction is fuzzy especially in the case of mathematical applications. Mathematical argumentation and analytical theories have often been employed in the factual sciences (see Arrow 1971:635-637, Lazarsfeld 1971:609). For instance, the well-known mathematical and analytical definitions of theory by Bergmann (1957:31) or Braithwaite (1959:22) are clearly meant to be general in the sense that they would cover all possible contexts, regardless of the different nature of the disciplines.

During the last few decades, this tendency has been challenged by several authors. One well-known response to the mathematical definitions of Bergmann and Braithwaite has been presented by Harré (1972). Harré emphasizes the importance of the explanatory power of a theory, in terms of interpretation and understanding, instead of its analytical and logical correctness (see also Harré & Secord 1976:40-41). Similar thoughts have been presented, for example, by Apel (1984:244-245) and Weber (1947/1971). According to Harré (1972:23-24), what is most important is that a theory "must serve as the basis for explanation" and that it "must describe the means by which the phenomena it explains come about" (see also Harré & Secord 1976:40).

The tension between mathematical definitions and interpretative perspective can also be seen in communication studies. One of the best known definitions of theory offered by communication scholars is Lustig's (1986) proposal, which follows the ideals of Kerlinger (1973) and von Wright (1971). According to Lustig (1986:451), a theory is "a set of interrelated propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena."²³ Another mathematically-oriented definition has been offered by Hewes and Planalp (1982). According to Hewes and Planalp (1982:113), "a scientific theory (1) must be a connected set of propositions and (2) must bear some specifiable relation to observable events".

²² It is obvious that Niiniluoto's (1984) view is related to Husserl's (1962) distinction between different sciences, see Chapter 2.1.3.

²³ A similar definition has been put forward by Chaffee and Berger (1987:101), who argue that a theory is "a set of constructs that are linked together by relational statements that are internally consistent with each other".

An interpretative perspective on communication research has been introduced by Pilotta and Mickunas. Pilotta and Mickunas (1990:163) argue in their *Science of Communication: Its Phenomenological Foundation* that "an understanding of situations and contexts is a sociohistorically learned adaptation of rules, of interpretations of normative and theoretical structures, resulting in a conjunction of theory and concrete actions". This is not, however, a definition. Pilotta and Mickunas (1990) are simply stating the three most significant aspects of an interpretative perspective: rules (cf. Cushman), interpretations (cf. Heidegger, or Gadamer) and concrete actions (cf. the idea of interpersonal communication as an interactive and intersubjective occurrence, as argued by e.g. Cushman & Kovacic 1994:272, Hyde & Smith 1979:350-352, and Oravec 1982:60-61).

On the basics of the distinction made at the beginning of this study, those researchers who prefer mathematical definitions seem also to prefer empiricism (e.g. the notion of "observable events" argued by Hewes and Planalp above seems to be related to verificationism, see Chapter 2.1.1.), while phenomenologically- or hermeneutically-oriented scholars seem to prefer an alternative perspective that emphasizes interpretation. It should be stressed, however, that Lustig (1986) and Hewes and Planalp (1982) have succeeded in constructing exact definitions, while Pilotta and Mickunas (1990), Cushman (1977) or Hyde and Smith (1979) merely have sketched outlines for an interpretative approach. At the moment, interpretative definitions of theory do not exist. Therefore, as Bostrom and Donohew (1992:114) observe, 'theory', "as researchers use the word and "theory" as a description of very broad frames of reference ... are quite different".

But how to build a rational consensus between mathematical and interpretative perspectives? This has been given serious attention recently. An interesting discussion is offered by Achinstein (1968) (see Niiniluoto 1984, Littlejohn 1992). According to Achinstein (1968:122), theory is a term that includes different ontological and epistemological dimensions. Accordingly, some theories are based on rationalizations, some on probabilities or causalities, and some on interpretation (see Apel 1984:24-25, Merton 1971:477, Weber 1947/1971:21-22). In addition, some theories are propositional, while others are merely relational. These dimensions are not, however, necessarily contradictory. According to Achinstein (1968:128-129), it is to be stressed that none of these perspectives is more useful as such, or superior to others.

Achinstein (1968:129) thus formulates a definition of theory that follows synthetic principles: "T is a theory, relative to the context, if and only if T is a set of propositions that (depending on the context) is (was, might have been, and so forth) not known to be true or to be false but believed to be somewhat plausible, potentially explanatory, relatively fundamental, and somewhat integrated." This definition is broad. It contains not only mathematical elements (propositions) but also interpretative aspects, as Achinstein's use of 'explanation' resembles more closely that of Harré than those of Bergmann or Braithwaite. Because of its breadth, this definition is relatively suitable for a variety of contexts, such as, for example, interpersonal communication discourse.

One of the problems with Achinstein's definition, however, is the fact that he uses many hedging terms. Propositions, for example, are "believed to be *somewhat* plausible" or "*potentially* explanatory". As a result, Achinstein's definition is not very useful in practice, as it leaves so many questions open: How do propositions depend on contexts? What is "truth" and what is "plausible"? What is meant by "fundamental"? Although Achinstein has chosen elements that are important in the construction of a theory, he does not define the exact relations between these elements. Therefore, Achinstein's definition is interesting in the sense that it aims at describing all the crucial aspects of theory construction. However, the attempt is not practical because it is more a list of items than a strict definition.

It must be asked, however, how this problem of a useful definition could be solved. As Littlejohn (1992:21) points out among others, it may be impossible to construct a covering definition of theory, because "among scientists, writers, and philosophers, the term is used in a variety of ways". For this reason, it can be claimed that instead of trying to define something as slippery as a theory, it might be sensible to concentrate on the functions of theories. For example, as Littlejohn (1992:28-29) puts it, theories summarize or organize, they are focusing, heuristic or clarifying, and quite often they predict, control, or offer an observational aid. However, it is clear that this is also only a list, and one fundamentally similar to that drawn up by Achinstein.

The question, then, is how to avoid lists. However, it may turn out that lists are unavoidable because it is sensible - at least in studies like this - to use as broad a definition as possible (see Chaffee & Berger 1987:104). When a definition is broad, it is often a listing, because it attempts to contain all possible aspects of theory construction. It is obvious, however, that this study is forced to follow Achinstein's line of thought, regardless of a certain ambiguity in the definition. In short, it is more sensible from the point of view of interpersonal communication research to support Achinstein's wide perspective and to accept that a definition has weaknesses than to use a narrow perspective and end up with constructing a definition which is too limited for the consideration of different perspectives.

This does not mean, as Cherwitz and Hikins (1983:262-266) argue, that all possible perspectives (i.e. all possible theories) should be taken into epistemological consideration. The aim of a broad definition is only to guarantee that the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' theories (see Cappella 1977) is not based on formulative expectations. Thus, the term 'theory' is used here in a sense roughly similar to Achinstein's (1968) definition. In order to be one, a theory does not have to have a mathematical framework and it does not have to be predictive in terms of Bergmann (1957) and Braithwaite (1959). In order to be a theory and to be evaluated as a such, a theory need only be "believed to be somewhat plausible, potentially explanatory, relatively fundamental, and somewhat integrated".

Arguments that support this solution can be found in Bowers and Bradac (1984), in which authors argue for a broader focus of theories. Bowers and Bradac (1984:886) consider explanation and prediction as important, but they do not, however, see them as essential for a theory. This idea is supported

also by Nass and Reeves (1991:241-243) who argue that in order to be able to compare theories, they must be approached from as open a perspective as possible. Thus, not only predictive and explanatory aspects (as defined by von Wright 1971), but also descriptive and narrative ones are of value, supposing that they concern the same object. This argument is important for the present study, because the aim of the following analysis is to approach different theories as equal entities. Although theories have different characteristics, they can be assumed to be, in the theoretical sense, equal.

Equality and the open perspective will be considered with great care. Equality is stressed in the argument put forward by Feyerabend (1975/1994). It is important to note that theories are equal, because "science is not one tradition, it is many, and so it gives rise to many and partly incompatible standards" (Feyerabend 1975/1994:231). These "incompatible standards" lead, as Feyerabend (1975/1994:232) shows, to different theories and competitive definitions of theory. Hence, when theories and definitions of them are compared with the aim of determining which is 'the best', what is actually being compared are standards, which vary from tradition to tradition and from paradigm to paradigm. That is, Feyerabend's notion leads to an argument crucial to the aims of this study: theories must be compared in terms of tradition and paradigm. They stand or fall according to their traditions and paradigms. In other words, theories, paradigms and traditions constitute a whole. They can be kept separate in the thematic sense, but in practice every theory is bound to its standards, and standards are created by traditions and paradigms.

The aim of the following chapter is to analyze theories which are significant in the sense that they have succeeded - as Feyerabend (1975/1994:226) put it - in gaining followers in interpersonal communication research. According to tradition, the analysis leads to a consideration of what world views exist in interpersonal communication research. Paradigmatically, the analysis also leads to a consideration of how these world views interact with each other. As the concluding sections of the present study show, discussion about traditions and theories can be an open exchange (Feyerabend 1975/1994:227-228). That is, there is no reason to assume that traditions and theories of interpersonal communication are unable to talk fruitfully to each other. Instead, I will assume that it is possible for the participants in the discussion to, as Feyerabend (1975/1994:228) puts it, "get immersed into each other's ways of thinking, feeling, perceiving to such an extent that their ideas, perceptions, world-views may be entirely changed - they become different people participating in a new and different tradition."

3 THE BIBLIOMETRICS OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

3.1 Bibliometrics as a research method

3.1.1 Bibliometrics: Background

The aim of the bibliometrical analysis in this study is to locate the most influential theorists and, hence, the most significant theoretical constructs in recent interpersonal communication research. These aspects are discussed in this methodological chapter such as they appear in the field. It is evident that bibliometrics cannot analyze 'scientific reality' as such, but only qualities which have been seen to have significance in the field. But, once these significant issues have been discovered and the 'most crucial theorists' found, it will also be possible to evaluate the philosophical background behind the 'most crucial theories' (see Chapter 4).

The classical definition of bibliometrics is that of Pritchard (1969:349), who defines it as "the application of mathematics and statistical methods to books and other media of communication." This definition is broad, but it is also general enough to include the various bibliometrical methods (see Borgman 1989:585). As Lievrouw (1989:615) points out, however, Pritchard's definition is not the only one. Recently Broadus (1987:376) has defined bibliometrics as "the quantitative study of physical published units, or of bibliographic units, or of the surrogates for either.", a definition that has certain advantage as compared with Pritchard's. Broadus' emphasis on physical units is a practical viewpoint, in comparison with Pritchard's reference to "media of communication".

Bibliometric studies may employ a number of techniques. The best-known is citation analysis (Amsterdamska & Leydesdorff 1989, Borgman

1989:586, Cole & Cole 1973:220-221, Lievrouw 1989:616, Price 1986:155-157). Because of its dominance, the whole field has sometimes been known as citation analysis (see Reeves & Borgman 1983:119). But, as Rice, Borgman and Reeves (1988:256) state, citation analysis is only "an important (but not the sole) indicator" in bibliometrics (Small & Greenlee 1989:642-643). The reason for the strong position of citation analysis in bibliometrics is based on the general characteristics of citations. Like Lievrouw (1989:616) notes, bibliometrics is founded on scientific artifacts and products: scientific papers, articles, and books (see Cole & Cole 1973:220, Paisley 1989:702, Price 1986:155-165). Citations are links that form networks between papers, articles and books, and hence, citation analysis serves, as So (1988:237) argues, as "a useful tool in studying various networks of relationships among authors, journals, and fields in an objective and quantitative manner."

Frequently, citation analysis has been used in evaluation and ranking, because it offers an opportunity for comparison between universities, departments, authors or institutions (see Garfield 1992a, 1992b, Hirst 1978, Moed 1989, Zhu & Meadows & Mason 1991). Thus, citation analysis has a direct connection with scientific policy (Garfield & Welljams-Dorof 1992, Moravcsik & Murugesan 1975:87, Phillips & Turney 1988, Price 1986:142). From this perspective, citation analysis is a complex issue. Citation analysis offers information, for instance, about the most-cited papers, most productive institutions, most-cited institutions, most productive authors and most-cited authors (Garfield 1991, 1992a-b, 1993). On the basis of number of citations and productivity, every author and institution is assigned a certain 'impact number'.

In short, bibliometrical data is "both revealing and reliable", as Garfield and Welljams-Dorof (1992:7) write, but "only when performed properly - with expert interpretation." Bibliometrics can provide "an interesting view of research", but this view must not be understood as the only one (Garfield 1993:15). It can also be dangerous, if an oversimplifying perspective is assumed. Citations cannot be taken as the sole sign of productivity and results. Hence, it is clear that all bibliometrical studies require careful interpretation (Aversa 1992:9, Garfield & Welljams-Dorof 1992). Citation analysis of research articles, for instance, "can be interpreted as networks of interpersonal contacts" (Lievrouw 1989:617). Analogically, the impact numbers of certain theorists, ideas, publications or terms, can be *interpreted* as a manifestation of a certain line of thought (see Beniger 1990:702-703).

The problem lies in the fact that quantitative results are interpreted to be answers in themselves. Following Leydesdorff (1989:335), this "is leading to a crisis of interpretation since, despite their potential policy relevance, we still have a theoretically underdeveloped understanding of what these bibliometric data actually mean." As Moed (1989:474) argues, the results simply describe "what most other colleagues do", and bibliometrical indicators measure "popularity rather than anything else." Consequently, the plea of Garfield and Welljams-Dorof for "expert interpretation" cannot be overestimated. Bibliometrical data needs interpretation, the explanatory insight, and the final assessment should be made by researchers in the field (Brooks 1989:693). Then not only quantity, but also quality would be estimated.

3.1.2 Bibliometrics in communication studies

The number of bibliometrical studies in communication research is high, considering the brief history of the field. The first well-known bibliometrical study was carried out by Reeves and Borgman (1983). In their study, Reeves and Borgman (1983:119) examined nine core journals in the field and "evaluated their influence on each other and on journals outside the field." The study by Reeves and Borgman was soon followed by that of MacCallum (1984:135-136), who focussed on research and publication productivity in speech communication departments. Thus MacCallum's study has some connections with articles which were published in the *Association for Communication Administration Bulletins* and which dealt with institutional investigations (see Barker & Hall & Roach & Underberg 1979, 1980, Edwards & Barker 1977, 1979, also Stacks & Hickson 1983). Fairly well-known also are the bibliometrical analyses by Rice, Borgman and Reeves (1988) and So (1988). In both studies, the perspective is partly similar to that of Reeves and Borgman (1983). Rice, Borgman and Reeves (1988:256) analyzed the citations and the impact factors in the communication journals that appeared during the years 1977-1985. The authors employed network analysis, which was used "to identify the structural aspects of the citation patterns". So's (1988:238-240) aim was to develop new citation indices and compare methodology with Reeves and Borgman (1983).

All the studies mentioned above have much in common. First, they all used the *Social Sciences Citation Index* as their primary information source. Second, all employ citation analysis as their research method. Third, their goal was to find out what kind of influence communication journals had in the field of scientific journals in general. Soon after these studies, *Communication Research* published a special issue on bibliometrics, focussing particularly on citation analysis (Borgman 1989, Brooks 1989, Griffith 1989, Lievrouw 1989, McCain 1989, Miyamoto & Midorikawa & Nakayama 1989, Paisley 1989, Small & Greenlee 1989, Zsindely & Schubert 1989). However, this issue was introductory in nature and the fundamental *topos* in most articles is how to use bibliometrics as a methodological tool in communication studies (see Borgman 1989:595, Brooks 1989:693, Lievrouw 1989:623, McCain 1989:679, Paisley 1989:703).

From a definitional viewpoint, all the above studies are distinctly bibliometrical and also titled as such. In addition, there are several studies in which bibliometrics is used as one significant research method among others. Perhaps the best example of such studies can be found in Beniger (1988, 1990). In his first article, Beniger (1988) investigated citations by comparing the citations in *Handbook of Communication Science* (Berger & Chaffee 1987) to the most-cited authors in handbooks of humanities, semiotics and cognitive sciences. His results showed that authors in communication research were totally unknown in closely related fields (Beniger 1988:210-214). In a more recent article, Beniger (1990) gives an overview of the *International Encyclopedia of Communication* (Barnouw & Gerbner & Schramm & Worth & Gross 1989). His

basic question, also closely related to the key question of the present chapter, is expressed in the title: Who are the most important communication theorists? Importance was estimated by counting the naming of authors: the more the name is mentioned in the *Encyclopedia*, the more important Beniger (1990) takes it to be.

While Beniger's articles focus on communication studies as a whole, two studies were recently published that concentrate on narrower areas. Meyers, Brashers, Center, Beck and Wert-Gray (1992) examined citations in organizational communication research. The research method is citation analysis. The other recent study is that of Hickson, Stacks and Amsbary (1992), which deals with female scholars and their research productivity. It, too, uses citation analysis. Nevertheless, as Hickson, Stacks and Amsbary (1992:351) point out, they also found some significant weaknesses in citation analysis as a research method. These weaknesses are discussed in a later chapter.

3.2 Bibliometrics: Data and methodology

3.2.1 Selective citation analysis

The research method adopted in this study is citation analysis in which, along the lines presented by Moravcsik and Murugesan (1975:87-88), the structure of the cited text is also considered. In other words, not only is the number of citations calculated and summarized but also the position of citations marked and recorded as an equally significant variable. This methodological choice is supported, for example, by the criticism of Small (1982) and Hickson, Stacks and Amsbary (1992). According to Small (1982:297), the value and significance of citations depends on their location in the text and on how they are used. In this study, the primary aim of which is to discuss theories, Small's contribution is acknowledged by giving emphasis to those citations which appear in the theoretical parts of the cited articles.

The reason for this emphasis is based on the general perspective of this study. As argued above, it is not of primary importance to analyze the influence that the authors may have had, for instance, on statistical methods in communication research. Consequently, these parts of evaluated texts are approached as secondary elements. Moreover, the theoretically relevant parts of scientific texts can be found quite easily. For example, in empirical research reports, theoretical discussion is usually to be found in the introduction, and, later, in the discussion (or, conclusion) (see Bazerman 1988:329-330, Booth 1985:6). Hence, there is no real problem in distinguishing the theoretical and methodological parts of an article. According to certain writing guides to scientific writing, this standard structure is actually very clear (see Emberger & Hall 1955). Weissberg and Buker (1990:160), for example, in their well-known

writing guide state that "researchers use the discussion section to examine their work in the larger context of their field".

In addition to focussing on theoretically relevant parts, another modification was also made. Previously, the total number of citations has been summarized; here the number of relevant citees appearing in one text is limited to three. Because the writers of scientific articles obviously themselves regard certain theories as the key ones in terms of the goals of their study, there is no reason to ignore this estimation in the analysis. Thus, in the theoretical part of each text only the three most frequent citations are considered. Thus, the number of the most cited authors varies between one and three. The upper limit of three was based on the texts themselves and emerged out of a pilot study in which several alternatives were tried.

Overall, the general structure of the bibliometrical analysis can be illustrated by the following formulation.

- Text, which includes theories, paradigms, and traditions
- > selection of the theoretical part of the text
- > evaluation of the citations on theoretical dimensions
- > selection of 1-3 most frequently cited authors

A selective citation analysis like this is new. Whereas the technique in previous citation analysis has been to mark all the citations in the texts, here the theoretical dimension is emphasized. It follows that the most important citations theoretically, will be discovered.

These principles are applied to selected journal articles. In practice, these principles are used as follows. First, the characteristics of different texts are examined. A basic distinction is drawn between empirical research reports and theoretical articles (ERR and TA, see Appendix 1). In empirical research reports, the one to three most frequently mentioned names are selected, paying particular attention to the discussion or the conclusion. In most cases, this principle is sufficient. However, in several cases citational distinctions are not absolutely clear in a discussion, or, there may be no citation at all in the discussion. Or, discussions may be extremely short in comparison with the other sections of the article. In these cases, not only discussion, but the whole structure of the article is examined. The same principle is applied in the analysis of theoretical articles. In theoretical articles, the evaluation is different in two respects. First, as there is no separate discussion, the theoretical articles will be approached as a whole. The most frequently cited authors are selected on the basis of the whole article, as the whole text can be argued to be theoretical.

Furthermore, in theoretical articles the citing system often differs from that in empirical reports. Citations in empirical articles are usually formally similar. In theoretical article, it may not be necessary to mention the publication, the year it was published or page numbers referred to. One can simply refer to 'Burke's thinking' or 'Heideggerian philosophy'. Thus, in theoretical articles the definition of a citation is necessarily more open than in empirical articles. If the name of the author is not used in the citation, but the source is otherwise clearly identifiable, it is considered as a citation in the present analysis. These principles were both useful and reasonable in practice, but two problematic

questions emerged during the investigation. First, in some cases the distinction between the most relevant and other relevant citations is very small. Second, because of differences in writing styles, the three most cited authors may not necessarily be the ones that are theoretically the most relevant. In a problematic case such as the latter, the use of citations was analyzed in more detail. If the citations appeared in a long paragraph and if they were explained carefully, they were selected. In these cases, the criterion is the space a citation was given in an article.

3.2.2 The selection of core journals of interpersonal communication

In short, the selective citation analysis technique was applied to texts of interpersonal communication in order to analyze the theories of interpersonal communication therein. Here, these texts were journal articles.²⁴ The articles were selected from the 'core journals' in the field, published during the 10-year period 1982-1992. The principle of selection was close to that of Reeves and Borgman (1983) and So (1988). The term 'core journal' itself was first used by Reeves and Borgman (1983). In order to be chosen as a core journal, Reeves and Borgman (1983:123) established three conditions. The core journals were 1) referenced by the *Social Sciences Citation Index*, 2) concerned primarily with communication research, and 3) used as a publication outlet by the *International Communication Association*.

In this study, the selection of core journals was based on two principles. Partly, selection was made by studying what had been classified as core journals in previous studies. However, new insights were also used in the selection. Previous selections of core journals have been rather similar to each other. This is clearly shown in Table 1 which shows the journals that have been listed in recent bibliometrical analyses. The studies referred to are those of Applbaum (1985), Hickson, Stacks and Amsbary (1992), MacCallum (1984), Meyers, Brashers, Center, Beck and Wert-Gray (1992), Reeves and Borgman (1983), Rice, Borgman and Reeves (1988) and So (1988). The journals are the following: *Communication Education (CE)*, *Communication Monographs (CM)*, *Communication Quarterly (CQ)*, *Communication Research (CR)*, *Communication Studies (CS)*, formerly the *Central States Speech Journal*, *Human Communication Research (HCR)*, *Journal of Communication (JC)*, *Quarterly Journal of Speech (QJS)*,

²⁴ It must be stressed that journal articles are not more significant than, for example, articles in books. However, most bibliometrical studies are based on journal articles, because scientific journals share same publication principles (such as peer reviews), they are usually uncommercial (i.e. they are published by professional organizations), and the definition of 'relevant journals' is a much easier issue than the definition of 'relevant books' (for example, scientific journals are always professionally oriented, whereas books are often textbooks).

Southern Communication Journal (SCJ) and *Western Journal of Speech Communication (WJC)*.

TABLE 1. Journals of interpersonal communication research as rated in some bibliometrical studies.

| | CE | CM | CQ | CR | CS | HCR | JC | QJS | SCJ | WJC |
|------------------|----|----|----|----|----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|
| Applbaum | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Hickson et al | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| MacCallum | X | X | X | X | X | | | X | X | X |
| Meyers et al | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Reeves & Borgman | | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | |
| Rice et al | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | |
| So | X | X | | X | X | X | X | X | | |

As Table 1 shows, *CM*, *CS* and *QJS* are all listed as core journals in previous bibliometrical studies. *CE* is missing from Reeves and Borgman (1983), and *HCR* and *JC* are missing from MacCallum (1984). However, it is evident that all these journals can be considered significant. Obviously, these studies share conceptions of what constitutes a core journal. On the other hand, criteria change. Reeves and Borgman (1983:123), along with Rice, Borgman and Reeves (1988:260-261) and So (1988:240-241), used the listing of the journal in the *Social Science Citation Index* and *Journal Citation Reports* as one significant criterion. Meyers, Brashers, Center, Beck and Wert-Gray (1992) as well as Hickson, Stacks and Amsbary (1992) use fundamentally similar criteria to those applied in Reeves and Borgman (1983), Rice, Borgman and Reeves (1988), and So (1988). They all start from a general citation index. Instead of the *Social Science Citation Index* both Meyers, Brashers, Center, Beck and Wert-Gray (1992:242-243) and Hickson, Stacks and Amsbary (1992:351) use the *Index to Journals in Communication Studies*.

The criteria of Applbaum (1985) and MacCallum (1984) are clearly different from those of others. Applbaum analyses journals without presenting any criteria, and MacCallum's (1984:136) journals "were chosen on the basis of their regional representation, longevity, and importance in the field of speech communication." However, neither importance nor longevity are defined. When the studies of Applbaum (1985) and MacCallum (1984) are compared to those of others, it is nonetheless evident that in spite of a certain vagueness in the criteria of selection, the result is in practice similar. Certain journals are seen as core journals despite differing perspectives on the idea of core.

The goals of the present study are different from those of the studies discussed above. In order to examine whether there were some other factors that should be considered were present, some additional data were collected. This information is presented in Figure 1. The data was compiled using the CD-ROM systems at the University of Jyväskylä and at the University of Iowa. These included, for instance, such new databases as *Eric*, *Sophia*, and *Ulrichs*. In these databases, 44 journals that deal with interpersonal communication are found. They are listed alphabetically in Figure 1. In the first column, 'x' marks all those journals which are published regularly and that have been published at least bi-annually for not less than ten years (between 1982-1992). The purpose is to establish the number of permanent periodicals.²⁵

In the second column, the number of articles per year on interpersonal communication is analyzed. The purpose is to locate those journals which actually publish articles on interpersonal communication. Those journals that have published at least two articles on the subject are marked with 'x'. In the third column, the publishing policy of the journal is evaluated. If the journal announces in its publishing policy statement that it addresses issues of interpersonal communication, 'x' has been marked. The circulation of the journals during the years 1991-1992 was also examined on the basis of information given in the journal (i.e. statements of ownership, management and circulation) and in *Ulrichs*. 'x' indicates a circulation of more than 1000.

The reason for the additional data is to demonstrate certain differences in the journals. For the purpose of the present study it was thought appropriate to examine journals with a large readership and a focus on interpersonal communication. As all four sectors are examined, it is possible to argue that there is a difference between journals which have three or four x-markings and those which have two or less.

As seen in Figure 1, eight journals were assigned four x-markings: *Communication Monographs (CM)*, *Communication Quarterly (CQ)*, *Communication Research (CR)*, *Communication Studies (CS)*, *Human Communication Research (HCR)*, *Quarterly Journal of Speech (QJS)*, *Southern Communication Journal (SCJ)* and *Western Journal of Speech Communication (WJSC)*. In comparison with previous bibliometrical studies, it can be seen that these journals are often considered core journals. *CM*, *CS* and *QJS* all appeared in previous studies, and they were shown to be important by additional data, too. The situation of *HCR* is not significantly different from these three journals.

On the other hand, *CQ*, *CR*, *SCJ* and *WJSC* were not among the core journals in all previous studies. However, it is evident, as shown in Figure 1, that they are central journals, as they fulfil all four criteria. As a result, they were included in the present bibliometrical evaluation. The position of both *Communication Education (CE)* and the *Journal of Communication (JC)* is problematic. Although they seem to be influential journals and they have been examined in almost all previous bibliometrical studies, they are not actually

²⁵ The analysis was carried out in Spring 1993. The databases did not include *Communication Theory*, which was founded in 1991.

journals of interpersonal communication. Because of the interpersonal perspective of this study, *CE* and *JC* were excluded.

Column 1: The regularity of appearance of the journal
 Column 2: The number of articles on interpersonal communication
 Column 3: The publishing policy of the journal
 Column 4: The circulation of the journal

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A C A Bulletin | x | - | - | - |
| Journal of Asian Pacific Communication | - | x | x | - |
| Canadian Speech Communication Journal | - | - | x | - |
| Communication | x | - | x | - |
| Communication and the Human Condition | - | - | x | - |
| Communication Abstracts | x | x | x | - |
| Communication Education | x | x | - | x |
| Communication Monographs | x | x | x | x |
| Communication Quarterly | x | x | x | x |
| Communication Reports | - | - | x | - |
| Communication Research | x | x | x | x |
| Communication Research Reports | - | x | x | x |
| Communication Studies (Central States Speech Journal) | x | x | x | x |
| Communication World | x | - | - | x |
| Communications | x | - | - | ? |
| European Journal of Communication | - | - | x | ? |
| Florida Communication Journal | x | ? | x | - |
| Free Speech Newsletter | x | - | - | - |
| Human Communication Research | x | x | x | x |
| Human Relations | x | x | - | x |
| Iowa Journal of Speech Communication | x | - | x | - |
| Journal of Applied Communication Research | x | - | - | x |
| Journal of Communication | x | - | - | x |
| Journal of Language and Social Psychology | x | x | x | - |
| Journal of Social Psychology | x | x | - | x |
| Kommunikation (Journal for planning and organization) | - | - | - | - |
| Language & Communication | x | x | x | ? |
| Language and Speech | x | - | - | x |
| Language in Society | x | x | - | ? |
| Markt Kommunikation | x | - | - | x |
| Michigan Association of Speech Communication Journal | x | ? | x | - |
| North Carolina Journal of Speech Communication | - | - | x | - |
| Ohio Speech Journal | x | ? | x | - |
| Quarterly Journal of Speech | x | x | x | x |
| Southern Communication Journal | x | x | x | x |
| Speech | - | - | - | - |
| Speech Communication | x | - | - | ? |
| Spectra | x | - | - | x |
| Sprechen | x | - | x | ? |
| Talk-Back | - | - | ? | - |
| Texas Speech Communication Journal | x | ? | x | - |
| Western Journal of Speech Communication | x | x | x | x |
| World Communication | - | - | x | - |
| Women's Studies in Communications | x | x | x | - |

FIGURE 1. Selected qualities of certain communication journals.

All the journals are published in the United States. In order to eliminate ethnocentrism, two European journals were also included, although they have not been examined in previous studies, and although they may not be significant in the sense of the criteria given above. These journals are *Communications (CO)* and *Sprechen (Sp)*. As a result, 10 journals of interpersonal communication were finally included in the present bibliometrical evaluation. Most are published by the *Speech Communication Association (CM, CQ, CS, QJS, SCJ, and WJSC)*. *CQ, CS, SCJ* and *WJSC* are published by subdivisions of the *Speech Communication Association*. The *International Communication Association* is represented by *HCR*. The other journals are not published by any influential international association.

3.2.3 The selection of articles

Once the core journals of interpersonal communication research were selected, their articles on interpersonal communication could be explored. First, all writings that were not scientific articles were excluded. For instance, book reviews, introductions to special issues and various announcements were not analyzed because they do not necessarily represent the scientific perspective of the author(s). The selection of the articles on interpersonal communication was done by following the synthetic definition of interpersonal communication presented in Chapter 1.3. In other words, all those articles which examined situationally relevant, communicative and cognitive processes between two or more individuals were included.

Consequently, articles on intercultural communication, for example, were included, if they were, at the same time, interpersonal. Similarly, articles on negotiation, small group communication, or classroom communication were included, if they were at the same time, interpersonal in the sense of the present definition. In most cases, instructional communication was excluded, as most of these articles concentrated on teaching as a public-speaking situation. Organizational and political communication, as well as rhetoric, were problematic. In some cases, it seemed that an article implicitly dealt with interpersonal issues, even if this theme was not included in the title. Thus, the final selection was made article-by-article. Those which were clearly interpersonal, according to the present definition, were included.²⁶

Thus, for example, articles on mass communication or written communication were excluded. Discussions of computer-based technological inventions, such as e-mail or CD-ROM applications, were also excluded. On the other hand, papers dealing with the telephone or videoconferencing were included. Also, articles that discussed philosophical or psychological issues were included, mainly for two reasons. First, interpersonal communication seems to be of intrinsic importance in themes like these. And, although these articles frequently address fairly general questions, implications for interpersonal communication can be easily found. Second, these articles were seen as important because of the overall philosophical context of this study.

²⁶ An example of the selection process may be given by having a look at the article by Rubin and Feezel, *Teacher Communication Competence: Essential Skills and Assessment Procedures*, published in *CSSJ* (1985, 36). This paper was included, because it studied classroom communication both from the students' and the teacher's points of view. On the other hand, the article by Rhodes, *What the Communication Journals Tell us About Teaching Listening*, in the same volume, was excluded, as its focus was on teaching and education in general, and interpersonal communication was not given special attention. Similarly, the article by Cheney and Tompkins, *Coming to Terms with Organizational Identification and Commitment*, published in *CSSJ* (1987, 38) was excluded because of its being substantially organizational. On the other hand, the paper by Nykodym, *Organizational Communication Theory: Interpersonal and Non-interpersonal Perspectives*, published in *CO* (1988, 14) was included, because it contained clearly interpersonal themes.

3.3 Bibliometrical analysis

3.3.1 Organization of the data

The total number of articles on interpersonal communication in the 10 journals was 1047. In order to organize the data all the articles were first listed by author(s). Second, each article was classified as either an empirical research report (ERR) or a theoretical article (TA). Third, the most important authors (one to three) cited in this article, along with their cited works, were given. These are listed in Appendix 1. An example of the procedure is given in Example 1.

Example 1.

Burke, J. & R. Clark. "An Assessment of Methodological Options for Investigating the Development of Persuasive Skills Across Childhood."
ERR, Delia et al 1976, 1977, 1979, 1979

The article of Burke and Clark (1982) is titled *An Assessment of Methodological Options for Investigating the Development of Persuasive Skills Across Childhood*, it is an empirical research report (ERR), and the most significant sources in this article are those authored by Delia and his colleagues in 1976, 1977, 1979a, and 1979b. No other references fulfil the criteria presented in chapter 3.2.1., as no other authors are given. To take another example, let us have a look at the article by Anderson (1982), published in *WJSC*. In his phenomenologically-oriented study, Anderson cites the studies of Arnett, Buber and Rogers.

Example 2.

Anderson, R. "Phenomenological Dialogue, Humanistic Psychology, and Pseudo-Walls: A Response and Extension." TA, Arnett 1981, Buber 1965, 1965, Rogers 1951, 1959, 1961, 1967, 1968, 1978, 1980, (& Stevens 1967)

Thus, one work of Arnett is referred to, and two texts by Buber cited. Seven texts of Rogers are quoted, and one by Rogers and Stevens. It can be seen, however, that there is a crucial technical difference between the coding of those two articles (Ex. 1 vs. Ex. 2). In the first example, citations are attributed to "Delia et al", whereas in the second example, Stevens' collaboration with Rogers is specifically noted. Thus, co-authors are referred to as "et al", if over a half of all citations have been made from studies authored by a group of scholars. For example, while most of the studies by Rogers were authored by Rogers alone, most of the references to Delia involved a co-authored article. If more than a half of the citations are references to groups instead of single authors, the most frequent first author has been selected.

One important aspect of the present coding is that all the cited works are listed. This was done because it was seen as important to explore the thinking of a given author in general, not simply to concentrate on specific articles. Often, theories are developed, modified and reformulated, and it is sensible to consider this. One well-known example of this is the uncertainty reduction theory. In addition to examining the original work by Berger and Calabrese (1975), it is necessary to examine how the theory has been developed, for example by Berger.

In this study, the most important information is the names of the authors (given in bold lettering, see Appendix 1), who were cited in the articles. Using an ordinary frequency analyzing program, the number of the names appearing in bold was counted. These results are given in Appendices 2a-2b. How the author referred to his/her own work was also examined. The # -sign (Appendix 1) implies that the most important sources given by the author are his/her own previous studies. Sometimes, the references were rather ambiguous, or vague. Thus, * -sign (Appendix 1) means that a reasonable estimation of the most important citations is impossible, either because there are a number of absolutely equal authors, or, because there are no citations at all.

3.3.2 Most-cited authors

The list of most-cited authors is based on the analysis presented in Appendix 1, 2a and 2b. It seems justified to treat the 10 most-cited authors as a group separate from the rest. These ten authors were quite clearly cited more frequently than any of the others. The examination can be focussed on them. The authors cited were compared by examining two dimensions: first, the number of times a given author has been cited in all 1047 articles, and second, the number of articles in which citations appear. These are presented in Table 2. For example, Charles Berger has been cited 109 times, and the number of articles in which these citations appear, is 31. As a further step, the numbers of these two columns were multiplied. This way it was possible to develop a simple impact number system. However, it is important to observe that this system is relevant in this context only and may not be relevant in other bibliometrical studies.

The information in Table 2 shows that three authors emerge above all the others: Charles Berger, Jesse Delia, and James McCroskey. The total number of references to these authors was clearly the highest, as was the number of articles in which they were referred to. Their impact numbers are clearly higher in comparison with the authors who followed them on the list, but the differences between them were very small. After these three authors, the next most influential author is Kenneth Burke, whose works were published in contrast with the works of the first three authors over a lengthy period of time. While Berger, Delia and McCroskey carried out their most influential studies in the

1970s, Burke's work covers the period between 1922 and 1985.²⁷ After him, comes a group of scholars: Barbara O'Keefe, Michael Cody and Margaret McLaughlin. One evident reason for their equal rating is that they have been working in the same research groups. Also, the studies by Cody, O'Keefe, and McLaughlin were mostly done after the 1970s.

TABLE 2. The most-cited authors and their impact numbers.

| Name of cited author | Number of citations | Number of citing articles | Impact number |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------|
| Berger, C. | 109 | 31 | 3379 |
| McCroskey, J. | 153 | 22 | 3366 |
| Delia, J. | 114 | 28 | 3192 |
| Burke, K. | 35 | 18 | 630 |
| O'Keefe, B. | 42 | 14 | 588 |
| Cody, M. | 38 | 14 | 532 |
| McLaughlin, M. | 38 | 13 | 494 |
| Schegloff, E. | 38 | 13 | 494 |
| Baxter, L. | 34 | 13 | 442 |
| Sacks, H. | 28 | 13 | 364 |

The last group consist of Emanuel Schegloff, Leslie Baxter and Harvey Sacks, and also they have much in common. Sacks and Schegloff have co-authored several times, as have Cody, O'Keefe and McLaughlin. Schegloff and Sacks, however, started their career earlier, in the 1960s. Leslie Baxter is different in the sense that, although she has participated in the work of different groups, she does not have any permanent group of associates.

As can be seen from Table 2, the last impact number included is Sacks' 364. The gap, however, between Sacks and the following author is quite wide.²⁸ It seems justified, however, to make a distinction between the first ten authors and the rest, whose impact numbers are under 300. Yet, even the first

²⁷ As was pointed out in Chapter 3.2.3., philosophically-oriented scholars such as Burke were included because they may provide interesting perspectives on the metatheory of interpersonal communication research.

²⁸ The closest is Mark Knapp, who has been cited 20 times in 14 articles and whose impact number is 280. Close to Knapp is Virginia Richmond, 30 times in nine articles, with an impact number of 270. Next is Ruth Anne Clark, who has been cited 26 times in 10 articles, with an impact number of 260. The difference between Clark, Knapp and Richmond and the following authors is small. For example, Daly (22 citations in 11 articles, impact number 242), Snyder (30 citations in eight articles, impact number 240) and the group of Cacioppo and Petty (cited 28 times in eight articles, impact numbers 224) are not far from Clark, Knapp and Richmond.

ten authors can be divided to two distinct categories. The first category comprises those with impact numbers over 3000, and in the second category are those with impact numbers between 360 and 630. The gap between 3000 and 630 is substantial, and it must be taken into consideration when the importance of different theoretical constructions in interpersonal communication is further discussed.

On the basis of these results, it seems clear that there are three most-cited authors in interpersonal communication research: Charles Berger, Jesse Delia and James McCroskey. James McCroskey, in particular, is an interesting name in the list, because he is one of the best known authors in the study of public speaking. He seems to be, however, a widely cited author in interpersonal communication research as well. In addition to McCroskey's stage fright-oriented studies (see McCroskey 1970a-b), he has also studied such issues as classroom communication (see McCroskey 1976b, 1977a), social behavior (McCroskey & Sheahan 1978), superior-subordinate communication (see McCroskey & Richmond 1986), the characteristics of different communication cultures (see McCroskey & Burroughs & Daun & Richmond 1990, Sallinen-Kuparinen & McCroskey & Richmond 1991) and self-disclosure (see McCroskey & Richmond 1978a). These studies are clearly focused on interpersonal communication, and they seem to have strong impact in the field.²⁹ Therefore, McCroskey's claim (see e.g. McCroskey 1977a:29-30, McCroskey & Sheahan 1978:41) that his studies are both interpersonally- and public speaking-oriented, is obviously correct.

Hence, when the theoretical conditions of the field are explored, it seems justified to assume that it is the work of Berger, Delia and McCroskey that offers the best perspective for a state-of-the-art evaluation, and, moreover, helps in the reconsideration of certain issues of paradigm, tradition and theory in interpersonal communication research. The position of these authors is remarkably different from that of those below them. For instance, the high impact numbers of Berger, Delia and McCroskey may indicate that there are paradigmatic scientific camps in the field which are connected with the work of these three authors. Whether the hypothesis of scientific camps applies to the other authors, given their much lower impact numbers, is a more complex issue.³⁰ Consequently, it can justifiably be argued that the work of Berger, Delia and McCroskey is both theoretically and metatheoretically exceedingly important in the field, and that in the further analysis of tradition, paradigm and theory it is reasonable to focus on them.

²⁹ As Chapter 4.4.1. shows, the articles on classroom communication are especially widely cited in interpersonal communication research.

³⁰ Expect for Kenneth Burke and *Kenneth Burke Society*. The aims of *Kenneth Burke Society* are, however, very different from paradigmatically oriented scientific camps.

4 THEORIES OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

4.1 Theoretical thinking

The aim of this chapter will be to analyze the main characteristics in the theoretical thinking of Charles Berger, Jesse Delia, and James McCroskey. As has been shown by the bibliometrical analysis, they are the most significant authors in the field of interpersonal communication research and thus, crucial in the analysis. The work of Berger, Delia and McCroskey will be discussed through the metatheoretical notions presented in Chapters 1 and 2. First, the work of each author and its most crucial characteristics will be analyzed. Second, as the key concepts of each author are examined, their theoretical commitments and methodological choices are explored. This exploration aims to be neutral - I will try to understand *what* theories argue about interpersonal communication. Also, I will focus on the question of *how* theories approach interpersonal communication: What is the structure of the theory? What is the methodological orientation of Berger, Delia and McCroskey? What are the key concepts of the theory?³¹

The conclusions of this exploration will offer a bridge to Chapter 5, in which the epistemological and paradigmatic influence of these three authors in the field of interpersonal communication research is studied. Because of their high impact in the field, it is possible to evaluate interpersonal communication through the thinking of these 'core authors'. My aim is also to demonstrate

³¹ The idea of conceptual analysis is outlined by Harré and Secord (1976). Following the perspective of Harré and Secord (1976:3), the theoretical concepts of Berger, Delia and McCroskey are analyzed in particular in terms of "conceptual properties" (what is the use of the concept?) and "logical properties" (what are the logical restrictions of the concept?).

what kind of viewpoints these three most widely cited authors actually represent. The results of the bibliometrical analysis are considered when necessary. On the basis of the data above, it is possible, for instance, to define and analyze certain hot articles and key concepts, crucial in the work of these authors.

4.2 Charles Berger: Uncertainty reduction theory

4.2.1 Bibliometrical analysis

From a bibliometrical point of view, Charles Berger's work contains two distinctive aspects. The most frequently cited work of his was written in 1975 (see Appendix 2a). The frequency of citations of the 1975 article, as compared to his other articles, is very high. In all, his articles were cited 109 times. The 1975 article was cited 28 times, which accounts for about 25% of all references. Next are the articles from the years 1979 (cited 12 times, or, 11%) and 1982 (cited 13 times, or, 12%). On the basis of these statistics, it seems relevant to approach Berger's work from two perspectives. The view presented in the 1975 article is best treated on its own. The other articles, and the views presented in them can be approached as a whole. The 1975 article is *Some Explorations in Initial Interaction and Beyond: Toward a Developmental Theory of Interpersonal Communication* by Berger and Calabrese. This article is the initial source of uncertainty reduction theory (URT), or as Sunnafrank (1986b:3) puts it, the source of the "original uncertainty perspective" (see also Berger & Gudykunst 1991:25). Practically all subsequent studies on uncertainty in interpersonal communication are, in some respects, reflections of the ideas introduced by Berger and Calabrese (see Ayres 1979, Gudykunst 1983, Parks & Adelman 1983, Perse & Rubin 1989, Planalp & Honeycutt 1985, Sunnafrank 1986a-b, 1990).

All the articles in which the work of Berger and Calabrese have been cited (see Appendix 2a) directly refer to the theory. Thus, it is evident that the most important aspect in the article by Berger and Calabrese is the construction of URT. Therefore, the first step is to investigate what constitute the main characteristics of URT. In order to find out what is most crucial in this theory, the recent comments and reinterpretations of Berger himself, along with the interpretations and modifications contributed by other scholars of uncertainty reduction theory, will be examined (see Berger 1977b, 1979, 1986a-b, 1987, 1993, Berger & Bradac 1985, Berger & Gardner & Parks & Schulman & Miller 1976, Berger & Gudykunst 1991, Douglas 1990, Kellermann 1993, Kellermann & Reynolds 1990).

The basic idea of uncertainty reduction theory has been considered in several articles (see e.g. Berger 1979, 1987, 1988, Berger & Bradac 1985, Douglas 1990). One of the most important sources, however, is to be found in Berger, Gardner, Parks, Sculman and Miller (1976:151), who observed that, according to URT, "persons generate predictions and explanations about others' behaviors

and beliefs so that they can select advantageous responses from their available repertoires." Berger (1988:241) has further developed this definition by his observation that the *primus motor* of the theory is related to explanation and prediction: "Explaining each other's actions is ... critical to the reduction of uncertainty; although, accurate prediction is somewhat easier to achieve than is complete explanation". The arguments of both Berger and his colleagues point out that the most essential part of *URT* is the interactants' need to make predictions. In the original paper by Berger and Calabrese (1975:100-101), the importance of predictions is presented as follows:

First, at the very beginning of a particular encounter, there are number of alternative ways in which each interactant might behave. Thus, one task for each interactant is to attempt to predict the most likely alternative actions the other person might take. Moreover, the individual interactant must then select from his own available response alternatives those which might be most appropriate to the predicted action of the other.

As can be seen, the interactants' ability to predict the actions of the other participants is the main issue which determines interpersonal interaction. In order to handle the uncertainty aroused by the alternative ways in which the other person might behave, one must be able to predict possible behaviors (Berger 1979:124). Thus, according to Berger (1993:492), uncertainty is a "phenomenon that individuals must seek to reduce to ensure continuity in their interactions with others". This is done by the procedure of prediction.

URT is not only a communication theory, but also a cognitive theory. From a cognitive point of view, there are two main concepts in *URT*. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975:99-101), uncertainty reduction is both a matter of *self-awareness* and *knowledge of others* (see also Berger 1979:127, Berger & Gudykunst 1991:24, also Littlejohn 1992:269). Self-awareness is connected with several other terms, such as self-monitoring and self-consciousness (see Berger 1979:127). In *URT*, the basic assumption, as regards self-awareness, is that the level of self-monitoring is high, if the level of uncertainty is high. Accordingly, if one does not know how the other person might behave and what are the appropriate behavioral rules that can be expected in the situation, one cannot know how one is supposed to behave (Berger & Calabrese 1975:99-100). Yet, as long as there is much uncertainty about the appropriate communicative behaviors in the situation, one must act in a way that is highly self-monitoring (see e.g. Berger 1986a:58-61). Thus, one must carefully control one's actions. In Berger's terms, this means that one must be also highly self-conscious. Instead of actual communication (i.e. the open exchange of messages between interactants) one is primarily concerned about the appropriacy of one's behavior (Berger 1988:255, 1993:496, Berger & Gudykunst 1991:37-39, McKinney & Donaghy 1993:33, Sunnafrank 1990:80).

Hence, a high amount of self-monitoring and self-consciousness are, in Berger's terms, typical of self-awareness (see Berger & Metzger 1984:290-292). According to the claim originally put forward by Berger and Calabrese (1975), self-awareness tends to be high particularly at the beginning of an interaction (Kellermann & Reynolds 1990:5-6). Thus Berger (1979:127) argues that there are

various levels of awareness to be found in everyday interactions (see also Berger & Metzger 1984 and Berger & Perkins 1978:171-173). At the beginning of an interaction, high self-awareness is typical. As the interaction proceeds, the level of self-awareness, including self-monitoring and self-consciousness, frequently decreases (see Berger & Gudykunst 1991:44-45). The same process occurs when knowledge about others is considered. In initial encounters, people are uncertain about what the others are going to do (see Berger 1986a:51-53, 1986b:35-37, 1993:490, also Sunnafrank 1990:80), and therefore, they are highly self-aware. As long as one does not know the rules that determine the interaction and the behavior of others, one cannot proceed in interaction (see e.g. Kellermann & Berger 1984:413, McKinney & Donaghy 1993:35, also Planalp & Honeycutt 1985:593-595).

Hence, as Berger and Calabrese (1975:99-100) argue, expectations as to the development of interaction are basic in the interpersonal communication of initial interactions. Although from the individual point of view it may be significant to observe the importance of emotions (i.e. feelings of discomfort), the primary explanation of the behavior in initial interactions can be found in the developmental stages of interpersonal communication (Berger & Calabrese 1975:99, see also Berger and Gudykunst 1991:24). It is assumed that people try to reach certain developmental stages in their relationships, and as uncertainty prevents this development, people feel that it must be reduced (Berger 1988:244-246).

Berger and Calabrese (1975:99-100) have divided these developmental stages into three categories: 'entry phase', 'personal phase' and 'exit phase'. By entry phase Berger and Calabrese (1975:100) mean that a message "tends to be focused on demographic kinds of information" and information "tends to be symmetric". "By the end of the entry phase", claim Berger and Calabrese (1975:100), "the interactants have a fairly confident estimate of whether or not they will develop their relationship toward a more intimate level." Hence, the personal phase begins when the entry phase is finished. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975:100), the personal phase "begins when the interactants engage in communication about central attitudinal issues, personal problems, and basic values." At the same time, as Berger and Calabrese (1975:100) note, "communication is more spontaneous and less constrained by social desirability norms." In the final phase, the exit phase, interactants make decisions about the desirability of future interaction (Berger & Calabrese 1975:100). As Berger and Calabrese (1975:100) point out, the final phase may vary a lot in different circumstances (Kellermann & Berger 1984, Parks & Adelman 1983, Planalp & Honeycutt 1985). That is, the exit phase may occur over several interactions, or, it can occur already in the end of the first encounter, depending on the nature of the interaction and the personal intentions and attitudes of the interactants.

To sum up, URT is both a processual communication theory in the sense that it describes the development of interpersonal encounters, and a psychological theory that emphasizes the role of cognitions and emotions in human interactions. In practice, these dimensions cannot be separated. For instance, emotions play an important role in the need to make predictions. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975:107), if "persons are unable to make

sense out of their environment, they usually become anxious". In order not to become anxious, people try to make sense out of the interpersonal encounters by relying on their capability of prediction. One of the most essential predictions is the expectation that the interpersonal relationship will develop. Berger and Calabrese argue that, without this developmental prediction, there would not be any sense at all in interpersonal communication.

4.2.2 The theoretical background of uncertainty reduction theory

As Berger and Calabrese (1975:99, 101, 107-108) point out, the theoretical background of the *URT* is based on findings within social psychology. The background for the *URT* of Berger and Calabrese, and also, for the later texts of Berger, was created by such authors as Theodore Newcomb, Fritz Heider, Leon Festinger, George Kelly, John Thibaut and Harold Kelley (see Berger 1987:40, 1993:492, Berger & Gudykunst 1991:23). As Berger (1987:40) argues, the importance of these authors is based primarily on the term 'uncertainty', which has been investigated by all the social psychologists mentioned above. The theory of Berger and Calabrese was a link between these seminal investigations and human communication research (Berger 1987:40). On the other hand, as Berger (1979:123) remarks, in *URT*, uncertainty has been defined "in a manner similar to the way in which the construct is viewed by information theorists". Consequently, the influence in particular of Shannon and Weaver (1949/1964) must be noted (see e.g. Berger 1979:123, Berger 1987:41). However, it must be emphasized that, in the original article by Berger and Calabrese, the position of information theorists is very small in comparison with that of social psychologists.

When regarded from the perspective of the philosophy of science, one of the most essential aspects of *URT* is that clearly aims at being a scientific theory. In other words, *URT* is, in all respects, a theory, according to all possible definitions of the word. Actually, Berger and Calabrese (1975:99) emphasize this by expressing the wish that *URT* "can be used to make predictions about and explain interpersonal communication phenomena..." As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, prediction and explanation are the main characteristics of a theory in empiricism. Consequently, by their argument that the primary aim of *URT* is to provide predictions and explanations, Berger and Calabrese explicitly locate their theory within the tradition of empiricism.

The influence of empiricism is visible in the theory of Berger and Calabrese also in its conceptualization and structure (see Chapter 5.2.1.). Essentially, *URT* is structured in terms of axioms and theorems. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975:101-109), these axioms and theorems are the following:

Axioms

1. Given the high level of uncertainty present at the onset of the entry phase, as the amount of verbal communication between strangers increases, the level of uncertainty for each interactant in the relationship will decrease. As uncertainty is further reduced, the amount of verbal communication will increase.
2. As nonverbal affiliative expressiveness increases, uncertainty levels will decrease in an initial interaction situation. In addition, decreases in uncertainty level will cause increases in nonverbal affiliative expressiveness.
3. High levels of uncertainty cause increases in information seeking behavior. As uncertainty levels decline, information seeking behavior decreases.
4. High levels of uncertainty in a relationship cause decreases in the intimacy level of communication content. Low levels of uncertainty produce high levels of intimacy.
5. High levels of uncertainty produce high rates of reciprocity. Low levels of uncertainty produce low reciprocity rates.
6. Similarities between persons reduce uncertainty, while dissimilarities produce increases in uncertainty.
7. Increases in uncertainty level produce decreases in liking; decreases in uncertainty produce increases in liking.

Theorems

1. Amount of verbal communication and nonverbal affiliative expressiveness are positively related.
2. Amount of communication and intimacy level of communication are positively related.
3. Amount of communication and information seeking behavior are inversely related.
4. Amount of communication and reciprocity rate are inversely related.
5. Amount of communication and liking are positively related.
6. Amount of communication and similarity are positively related.
7. Nonverbal affiliative expressiveness and intimacy level of communication content are positively related.
8. Nonverbal affiliative expressiveness and information seeking are inversely related.
9. Nonverbal affiliative expressiveness and reciprocity rate are inversely related.
10. Nonverbal affiliative expressiveness and liking are positively related.
11. Nonverbal affiliative expressiveness and similarity are positively related.
12. Intimacy level of communication content and information seeking are inversely related.
13. Intimacy level of communication content and reciprocity rate are inversely related.
14. Intimacy level of communication content and liking are positively related.
15. Intimacy level of communication content and similarity are positively related.
16. Information seeking and reciprocity rate are positively related.
17. Information seeking and liking are negatively related.
18. Information seeking and similarity are negatively related.
19. Reciprocity rate and liking are negatively related.
20. Reciprocity rate and similarity are negatively related.
21. Similarity and liking are positively related.

In short, in terms of empiricist vocabulary, *URT* is an axiomatic theory. The general principles of empiricism-bound theory construction have been clearly formulated by Bergmann (1957) (see also Chapter 2.1.1.). Bergmann (1957:35) argues that a scientific theory consist of axioms, theorems, the evidence of these theorems, and definitions. Evidently, Berger and Calabrese have followed the lines suggested by Bergmann. The fundamental definitions are made in pages 99-101, the axioms are formulated on pages 101-107, and the theorems deduced from the axioms along with existing evidence are to be found on pages 107-110.

The structure and idea of axioms has been clarified by Hempel (see Berger 1977a). According to Hempel (1965:111), axiomatic terms are "primitive basic terms, which are not defined within the theory, and defined terms, which are explicitly defined by means of primitives." This refers to the idea of objective observation language (Chapter 2.1.1.). In the case of axiom 1 in *URT*, for instance, 'uncertainty' is a defined term, and 'increase' is a primitive term. The idea of axiomatic presentation is to use expressions that are as logically determined and as general as possible. All axioms and theorems follow the general logical framework, in which sentences are not derived from any other sentences (Hempel 1965:111-113). Consequently, all axioms and theorems can be approached as logically independent entities, which can be supported individually by empirical evidence (see Berger & Calabrese 1975:110).

As recent essays on *URT* demonstrate, the axiomatic approach of Berger and Calabrese has persisted (see e.g. Douglas 1990, 1991, Honeycutt 1993, McKinney & Donaghy 1993). In other words, uncertainty reduction has been permanently studied using the empiricism-bound perspective. On the one hand, Berger himself has, in his later articles, sustained these principles. On the other hand, Berger's colleagues, as well as his critics, have shared the idea of science presented in Berger and Calabrese (see Sunnafrank 1990).

The principles of Berger can, of course, also be examined by investigating his whole work. As might be expected, a large number of Berger's articles concerns uncertainty reduction (Berger 1977b, 1979, 1986a-b, 1987, 1988, 1993, Berger & Bradac 1985, Berger & Gudykunst 1991). Those not strictly on the topic of uncertainty reduction frequently deal with social influence (Berger 1980, 1985, Berger & Bell 1988, Berger & Metzger 1984, Berger & Perkins 1978, Kellermann & Berger 1984) or general theoretical construction (Berger 1977a, 1991, Berger & Chaffee 1987, Berger & Chaffee 1988, Chaffee & Berger 1987).

For the purpose of the present study, the dimension of theory construction is central, because most of the essential aspects of the other writings can be explained through his theoretical considerations. Berger's (1977a:7) perspective becomes clear in an article in which he observes that the "basic aim of scientific theory is to provide explanations for observed phenomena". According to Berger (1977a:7), "if a theory can provide a complete explanation for the phenomenon, it can predict the phenomenon". Practically all theoretical writings of Berger share this empiricism-bound presupposition. Consequently, for example, the definition of communication science, as presented by Berger and Chaffee (1987:17), is that it seeks to develop "testable theories, containing lawful generalizations". As Berger and Chaffee (1987:17) continue, those whose

research activities cannot be subsumed under this scientific definition are not doing 'actual communication science'.

Thus, Berger's research is based on empirical testing and the aim is to produce lawful generalizations (see Berger & Perkins 1978:182-183). This is shown in practically all those of Berger's articles which are not concerned with general theoretical questions. The most recent examples are Berger and DiBattista (1992, 1993) and Berger and Jordan (1992). Their basic method is testing, and the logic of these studies follows the general principles of empiricism. Thus, there are no crucial differences between the earlier (e.g. Berger & Calabrese 1975, Berger 1977a-b) and the later studies of Berger and his associates (e.g. Berger 1993, Berger & DiBattista 1992, 1993).

4.2.3 Uncertainty reduction theory: Reformulations and competing views

In addition to Berger's own scientific activity, his general influence on the field of interpersonal communication must also be discussed. From this point of view, *URT*, which has been analyzed, interpreted and modified by several authors is central. A reason for the modifications is that Berger and Calabrese originally aimed at explaining initial interactions only (Berger & Calabrese 1975:110). As Berger and Gudykunst (1991:25) observe, *URT* has been extended by other authors "to more developed relationships". One of the best known applications of *URT* is the work of Gudykunst and his colleagues (see Berger 1977, Berger & Gudykunst 1991, Gudykunst 1988). In their studies, Gudykunst and his associates have discussed the intercultural implications of uncertainty reduction (see Berger & Gudykunst 1991, Gudykunst 1989, Gudykunst & Nishida 1984, Gudykunst & Yang & Nishida 1985). These studies have been successful. Gudykunst (1988:124) argues that intercultural research indicates that "uncertainty reduction theory is useful in explaining communication between people from different cultures".

Another well-known discussion is to be found in Parks and Adelman (1983). Parks and Adelman followed the original axioms and theorems of *URT*, but added, as Berger and Gudykunst (1991:25) put it, a "shared communication network as a major variable".³² This modification does not, however, imply a radical change in the original *URT*. As Parks and Adelman (1983:56) put it, the goal of their study is to enhance the understanding of the development of romantic relationships. This aspect was also discussed in the original *URT*. Thus, the studies both of Gudykunst and of Parks and Adelman support the basic ideas of *URT*. At the same time, they share the tradition of empiricism represented by *URT*. The studies of Kellermann and Reynolds (1990) and Douglas (1990, 1991) are similar. Both Kellermann and Reynolds (1990:71) and

³² This means that an eighth axiom was added to the original seven: "Shared communication networks reduce uncertainty, while lack of shared networks increases uncertainty."

Douglas (1990:76) consider the fundamental assumptions of *URT* as basically valid. Accordingly, although the empirical results do not necessarily support the theorems (see Planalp & Honeycutt 1985), the theory itself is seen as reasonable.

The influence of Berger and his *URT* can also be clearly seen in rival theories. The best known of these is the theory of Sunnafrank (1986, 1990) on *predicted outcome value (POV)* (see also Berger 1986b, Honeycutt 1993:464). According to Sunnafrank (1990:76), uncertainty reduction theory and the theory of predicted outcome value "offer competing explanations of interpersonal communication in early acquaintance". According to Sunnafrank (1990:76), the basic distinction between *URT* and *POV* is as follows. *URT* proposes that communication behavior is "primarily understandable through interlocutors' goals of predicting and explaining the actions of partners and self", whereas *POV* "posits that interactants' goals of achieving positive relational outcomes provide a more accurate and complete account of both communication behavior and uncertainty reduction" (Sunnafrank 1990:76). As Sunnafrank (1990:76) continues, there are several implications following this theoretical difference: "*URT* axioms and *POV* propositions produce several conflicting predictions" (Sunnafrank 1990:83).

However, as Sunnafrank's argument suggests, the basic aim of *POV*, in terms of scientific explanation, is the same as in *URT*: to construct predictions and, as a consequence, covering explanations. Although Sunnafrank (1986:2627) uses a different terminology than Berger and Calabrese (e.g. 'propositions' vs. 'axioms'), there are no real epistemological differences. In other words, although *URT* and *POV* are competing theories, they share the same tradition. This dimension has recently been discussed by Honeycutt (1993). Honeycutt (1993:485-487) convincingly argues that there are strong bonds between *POV* and *URT*. Thus, the competition between these two theories may not be as marked as Sunnafrank argues. Hence, for example, the argument of Berger (1986b:37) that "it may be more accurate to say that the act of predicting an outcome value itself is an uncertainty-reducing event" may be correct.

4.3 Jesse Delia: Constructivism

4.3.1 Bibliometrical analysis

Jesse Delia was cited 114 times in 28 articles (see Appendix 2a). In the bibliometrical sense, Delia's work seems rather similar to that of Berger. When considering the data (see Appendix 2a), certain key texts clearly emerge as shown by the high number of citations. However, in Delia's case the results cannot be interpreted as directly as with Berger. Bibliometrical analysis shows that the most cited texts by Delia were published in 1977 and in 1979. However, unlike Berger in 1975, Delia published several articles in 1977 and in 1979 (Clark & Delia 1977, 1979, Delia 1977a-b, Delia & Clark 1977, Delia & Clark & Switzer

1979, Delia & Kline & Burleson 1979, Delia & O'Keefe 1977, O'Keefe & Delia 1979). In other words, instead of examining one key article, which was reasonable in Berger's case, it is obvious that Delia's output must be analyzed in terms of several key articles. Furthermore, these articles date not only from the years 1977 and 1979, but the years 1974, 1976, and 1982 are also significant (see Appendix 2a). However, although the number of key articles is higher than in Berger's case, there are remarkable theoretical similarities between Berger and Delia. Although Delia has not produce a single 'hot article' comparable to that of Berger, the main ideas of both are very well formulated. Although Delia has discussed his key notions in several articles, as compared to Berger, his different texts nonetheless constitute a coherent whole.

The main concept in Delia's work is constructivism. According to Delia (1987b:255), "the constructivist approach to communication attempts to draw attention to the complexity of the interpretive processes organizing communicative behavior and the necessity for analyzing those processes as they are related to particular features of behavioral organization." This definition is basically similar throughout the work of Delia and his colleagues (see e.g. Applegate & Delia 1980:245, Delia 1974:119, 1976, 1977b:70, Delia & O'Keefe 1977:168-169, 1979, O'Keefe & Delia 1982:41).

According to Delia (1987b:256), what is most crucial in constructivism is that "human behavior is organized by cognitive or interpretive schemes." These schemes are based on both conscious and nonconscious processes, and they contain psychological, social, and cultural levels (see Burleson 1987:305, Delia 1987b:256). Delia (1987b:269-272) argues that schemes are, in the typological sense, difficult to represent as distinct categories in terms of everyday behavior, because all levels are, in the cognitive sense, interrelated (Delia 1987b:272). Hence, schemes cannot be approached hierarchically.

Delia's theory has not been axiomatized or presented in terms of logic and rigorously defined sentences, as has that of Berger and Calabrese. One illuminating, and unambiguous view, however, has been presented by Neuliep and Hazleton (1986). According to Neuliep and Hazleton (1986:211), constructivism "asserts that all social processes occur through a cognitive system of constructs..." Neuliep and Hazleton (1986:211) claim that according to the theory, "people do not directly experience reality but perceive it through personal constructs." Hence, constructivism emphasizes that individual experiences are not similar. Each individual has his/her own way of perceiving reality (see also e.g. Kline & Hennen-Floyd & Farrell 1990:350).

Although constructivism does not emphasize experience, it has been seen as a person-centered perspective and, hence, related to epistemologically alternative traditions (Applegate & Delia 1980, Burleson 1987, 1989, Gronbeck 1981:250-252, O'Keefe & Delia 1982, see Chapter 5.2.2). This argument follows the general notion that constructivism emphasizes the importance of personal constructs and interpretive principles (Stamp & Vangelisti & Knapp 1994:193-195). However, as Applegate and Delia (1980:246) observe, in the constructivist context these terms are not primarily philosophical, but psychological. Thus constructivism has not been much influenced by interpretive philosophy, but, instead, has received influences from the interpretive personal

psychology of George Kelly and Heinz Werner (see Burleson 1989:31-32, Delia 1974:119-120, Delia 1977b:70).

The influence of both Kelly and Werner can be seen in the central concepts of Delia's constructivism. These terms are *cognitive complexity* (CC) and *interpersonal cognitive complexity* (ICC). The original definition of CC was given by Bieri in the 1950s (see e.g. Bieri 1955), influenced by Kelly and Werner, but it was first discussed in the context of interpersonal communication research by Crockett in the late 1960s (see Burleson 1989:32, Crockett & Gonyea & Delia 1970, O'Keefe & Sypher 1981:73). Although both CC and ICC are central terms in constructivism, the latter is more interesting, because Crockett's influence in Delia is more direct than Bieri's, Kelly's or Werner's (see Delia 1974:119-121, Delia & Clark & Switzer 1979:274, O'Keefe & Delia 1982:40-42).

Crockett's influence is not surprising, considering the fact that Crockett and Delia have co-authored several studies (Crockett & Gonyea & Delia 1970, Delia & Crockett 1973, Delia & Crockett & Press & O'Keefe 1975). Thus Delia has not only assumed some of the Crockett's concepts, but has worked with him as well (see especially Crockett & Gonyea & Delia 1970:375, Delia & Crockett & Press & O'Keefe 1975:13). Because of this co-operation, Crockett's central role in constructivism, as developed by Delia, is understandable. Consequently, for example, certain definitions developed by Crockett are adopted in most constructivist studies. According to Crockett (1965:49), CC can be defined as follows: "A cognitive system will be considered relatively complex in structure when a) it contains a relatively large number of elements [constructs] and b) the elements are integrated hierarchically by relatively extensive bonds of relationship." Crockett (1965:56) defines ICC as follows: "as one has a richer variety of social interactions he develops a greater number of dimensions for making discriminations among others".

Thematically, the relationship between terms the 'constructivism' and 'CC' is interesting not only because of Crockett's influence, but also because of connections in research between CC and constructivism. As Neuliep and Hazleton (1986:211) observe, most of the studies of "bare" CC "stem from a constructivist orientation". Thus, studies on CC or ICC are - according to Neuliep and Hazleton - constructivistically-oriented, although the constructivist roots are not always explicitly pointed out (see e.g. Hale 1982, or O'Keefe & Shepherd & Streeter 1982). The reason for this is evident. From the very beginning of constructivist studies, CC and ICC have been used as constructivist terms (see Burleson & Applegate & Neuwirth 1981:212-213, Crockett & Gonyea & Delia 1970:375, Rubin & Henzl 1984:263). They are not theoretically independent. Hence, constructivism is embedded in CC and ICC, although it is not necessarily explicitly acknowledged.

This is significant because of the relatively high number of studies on CC. The number of studies on CC and ICC in the 1980s and 1990s shows that these two terms are among the main terminological introductions in recent interpersonal communication research (see e.g. Burleson 1987, Burleson & Samter 1990, Hale 1982, Kline & Hennen-Floyd & Farrell 1990, McMahan & Stacks 1984, Neuliep & Hazleton 1986, O'Keefe & Shepherd & Streeter 1982, O'Keefe & Sypher 1981, Rubin & Henzl 1984). Thus, it seems justified to claim

that the term CC may be better-known than the underlying framework of constructivism. Furthermore, it must be noticed that in spite of their terminological roots, all studies on CC or ICC are not necessarily constructivist in the sense suggested by Delia. In other words, it cannot be argued that all researchers working with CC or ICC support the theoretical notions of Delia and his colleagues. A recent example is the discussion between Burleson, Waltman and Samter (1987) and Beatty and Payne (1984) (see also e.g. Beatty 1987). In this discussion it was questioned whether it is possible to analyze CC in the way it has been done in most studies (Beatty & Payne 1984:209). As Beatty and Payne (1984:209) argue, it can be claimed that particularly the operationalization of CC, as offered by constructivist researchers, is irrelevant (see Burleson & Waltman & Samter 1987:317).

Burleson and his colleagues have faced similar criticism before (see Burleson & Applegate & Neuwirth 1981). For example, in a well-known study Powers, Jordan and Street (1979:70-72) argued that the assessment of CC is strongly related to verbal fluency. By that they suggested that constructivist studies may not in fact be investigating CC, but general verbal intelligence instead (Burleson & Applegate & Neuwirth 1981:221-224). Essentially, the criticism both in Powers, Jordan and Street and in Beatty and Payne is identical. Both aim at showing the methodological weaknesses in the constructivist studies of Delia and his associates. Methodologically, the research carried out by Delia and his associates is fairly similar from study to study in his use, for example, of the *Role Category Questionnaire (RCQ)* of Crockett (1965) (Delia 1974:120-122, Delia & Clark & Switzer 1979:276-277, O'Keefe & Delia 1979:234-235, O'Keefe & Delia 1982:54-55, 62-65).

4.3.2 Constructivism: Its operationalization and terminology

As can be seen, the link between Delia and Crockett is not only to be found in their definitions and concepts, but also in their methodology. This methodological dimension, the use of the *RCQ*, is at least as important an aspect of constructivism as CC, or ICC. The importance of the *RCQ* in constructivism has been clearly articulated for example, by Burleson and Waltman (1988:1-2):

First, virtually all cognitive complexity research appearing in the human communication literature has made use of Crockett's conceptualization and operationalization of this variable. This research has stemmed largely from the theoretical perspective of constructivism... - a perspective which has subsumed Crockett's analysis of cognitive complexity within more general analyses of social cognition and sophisticated interpersonal functioning.

To sum up, constructivism includes three significant aspects, which cannot be separated from each other. The constructivistic theoretical framework has resulted in the concepts of CC and ICC, which, respectively, have been

operationalized by using the *RCQ*. All three are fundamental in constructivist research as represented by Delia.

Because of the central position of the *RCQ*, its function and nature must be carefully noted. First, it may be interesting to note that, originally, the *RCQ* was developed by Crockett to assess the interpersonal cognitive complexity of children (Burleson 1989:32). This starting point can be seen in several studies by Delia (Applegate & Delia 1980, Clark & Delia 1976, Delia & Clark 1977, Delia & Crockett 1973, Delia & Kline & Burleson 1979). However, as Applegate and Delia (1980:250) point out, these studies were not only aimed at analyzing children's communication, but, at the same time, at exploring the general developmental processes of human communication.³³

The nature of the *RCQ* makes it possible to explore phenomena on a more general level as well. Although age, for example, is an important variable in the *RCQ*, the questions used are general enough to enable its use for different age groups (O'Keefe & Sypher 1981:77-78). Hence, the results that have been gained with the *RCQ* have resulted in several interesting notions. One of these is social *perspective-taking* (*PT*). According to O'Keefe and Sypher (1981:81), "perspective-taking (the ability of a person to represent another's perspective or point of view) has been argued by many theorists to be a basic social-cognitive ability underlying communication". *PT* can explain what *CC* and *ICC* implicate in practice in interpersonal encounters. In short, it can be argued that the higher the scores one receives in the *RCQ* as regards cognitively complexity, the more able one is in social perspective-taking (see Clark & Delia 1976:1013, Delia 1987b:257, Hale 1982:339, Hale & Delia 1976, Kline & Hennen-Floyd & Farrell 1990:350-351).

As O'Keefe and Sypher (1981:81) point out, the term *PT* existed, however, in George Herbert Mead's terminology long before Crockett and the rise of constructivism. Thus, this term is not a result of constructivist research. More appropriately, *PT* can be thought of as the only suitable explanatory term for the *RCQ*-centered constructivist approach. Yet, as O'Keefe, Shepherd and Streeter (1982:333) put it, it must be remembered that *PT* is only one aspect in the explanation. Although *PT* is a crucial term in several studies, it is only one term among others.

This can be shown by examining the position of the term *persuasion* in constructivism. Delia (1987b:258) defines persuasion as follows: "Persuasion occurs when one person wants something from another person who is presumably unwilling to satisfy the want." This is one definition among others (see e.g. Miller & Burgoon 1978:33, O'Keefe 1990:15-17). On the other hand, it is obvious that Delia's aim has not been to conceptualize a general definition of persuasion, such as suggested by Miller and Burgoon. Instead, persuasion must be understood contextually, in terms of constructivism. As defined by Delia and his associates, persuasion is a communicative issue which develops as both *CC* and the ability to devise interpersonal constructs develop (Applegate 1982:277-279, Clark & Delia 1979:193-194, O'Keefe & Delia 1979:231, 1982:66). Furthermore, it particularly explains *RCQ* results. As O'Keefe and Delia

³³ For the procedure, see Appendix 3, as copied from Burleson and Waltman (1988:23-25).

(1979:240) put it, the *RCQ* "offers a clear example of the utility of our [constructivist] methodological orientation to the study of persuasive communication strategies." Consequently, persuasion is, along with *PT* and other related terms, such as 'informality', 'comforting communication' or 'listener adaptation' (Neuliep and Hazleton 1986:212), simply incorporated in constructivism. Thus, practically all the terms mentioned above have originated outside constructivism. None actually conceptually belonged to constructivist theory.

4.4 James McCroskey: Communication apprehension

4.4.1 Bibliometrical analysis

There are two aspects in the work of James McCroskey that, in the bibliometrical sense, distinguish it from that of Berger and Delia. First, the total number of citations McCroskey's works which is higher than that of Berger or Delia. These citations occur, however, in fewer articles. Consequently, these authors have rather similar impact numbers (see Chapter 3, Table 2). A more crucial bibliometrical difference, however, is the longitudinality of the cited works. While the most cited text of Berger is undoubtedly Berger and Calabrese (1975), and the most cited works of Delia were published in 1977 and in 1979, in the work of McCroskey it is difficult to find hot periods. The period of densest citation for McCroskey is 1976-1977 (Appendix 2a). During this period McCroskey (1976a, 1976b) was cited 28 times, or over 18% of his citation total. McCroskey (1977a, 1977b) was cited 23 times, which represents 15% of all his citations. Thus, a third of all McCroskey's citations are to four articles written in 1976 and in 1977. However, it does not seem justified to approach McCroskey's production using the 1976 and 1977 articles only. Although a relatively strong impact was made by these articles, McCroskey further developed his ideas in several other papers. As with Delia, McCroskey's works form a coherent self-supportive network. Thus, in order to analyze and assess the most important aspects in McCroskey's thinking, other of his publications must also be examined.

McCroskey's key concept is communication apprehension (*CA*). Almost all his work examines different dimensions of *CA* (e.g. McCroskey 1976a-b, 1977a-b, 1978, 1984a-b, McCroskey & Andersen 1976, McCroskey & Beatty 1984, McCroskey & Daly 1976, McCroskey & Daly & Richmond & Falcione 1977, McCroskey & Daly & Sorensen 1976, McCroskey & McVetta 1978, McCroskey & Richmond 1976, 1978a). There are no notable differences in the definitions of *CA* given in the works of McCroskey or his associates. One of the best-known definitions given by McCroskey (1982:137) is that in which he argues that *CA* "is an individual's level of fear or anxiety associated with either real or anticipated communication with another person or persons." Almost identical definitions

can be found in several other sources (see McCroskey 1977a:27-28, 1978:192, 1980:109, 1984b:13, McCroskey & Richmond 1976:41, Richmond & McCroskey & Davis 1986:171).

The total number of studies in which McCroskey discusses CA is high. However, the number of studies concerning CA, or related issues, is high overall. As the data gathered by Payne and Richmond (1984:247-294) suggest, the number of these studies approached 1200 as early as 1984. Thus studies dealing with CA have been popular in general. Consequently, the number of competing terms and conceptualizations in respect of CA is relatively high. According to McCroskey (1982:139-144), whose perspective is followed in the present study, there are at least six related terms. These are *stage fright*, *communication reticence*, *unwillingness to communicate*, *predispositions toward verbal behavior*, *shyness*, and *audience anxiety*. Furthermore, as Sallinen-Kuparinen (1986:12-13) observes, these terms have been further modified in research practice (see also Daly & Stafford 1984:125). Sallinen-Kuparinen (1986:12-13) shows that the whole variety of studies that are related to communication problems include at least 14 different descriptive 'labels'. However, here the focus will be on only the six terms mentioned above (see also Daly 1978:295, McCroskey & Richmond 1990:73).

The oldest term is *stage fright*, coined by Theodore Clevenger (see Clevenger 1955, McCroskey 1970b:270). According to McCroskey (1982:140), stage fright is nowadays considered as a subset of the more general construct of CA. However, the original concept of stage fright was problematic as such, because, "most importantly, the distinction between trait and state anxiety had yet to be made" (McCroskey 1982:139). The second term is *communication reticence* (see McCroskey 1976a:39-40). According to McCroskey (1982:140) communication reticence "grew out of the earlier work with stage fright and represented an expansion of that construct to include other communication contexts" (see also McCroskey 1970b:270, 1976a:39-40). Communication reticence has been studied, most notably, by Gerald Phillips (Phillips 1968, 1980, 1984).

Third, *unwillingness to communicate* is a term that has been advanced by Judee Burgoon (1976). According to McCroskey and Richmond (1990:73-75), unwillingness to communicate can be seen as an intermediate term between CA and communication reticence. Thus, communication reticence "is concerned with people who do not communicate effectively; unwillingness to communicate is concerned with one of the reasons that people may not do so" (McCroskey 1982:141). Fourth, a term employed by Mortensen and his colleagues, *predispositions toward verbal behavior*, is actually, as McCroskey (1982:141) notes, "very similar to the unwillingness-to-communicate construct".

The fifth concept is *shyness*, which has been discussed by several authors (see Buss 1984, Page 1980, Pilkonis & Heape & Klein 1980, Zimbardo 1977). However, as McCroskey and Richmond (1982:459-460) maintain, shyness is relatively problematic as a scientific concept, because of "the lack of a clear conceptualization of what is meant by shyness" (see McCroskey 1982:142, McCroskey & Richmond 1990:73). Consequently, according to McCroskey (1982:143), shyness "is a label that has been applied to a variety of disparate constructs", and this label has often been used inconsistently (McCroskey &

Richmond 1982:461-462, also Page 1980:96). Finally, the sixth term is *audience anxiety* of Arnold Buss (1984). This term is, according to McCroskey (1982:144), highly similar to, if not almost identical with the original concept of stage fright. Moreover, audience anxiety is, from the perspective of McCroskey (1982:144), clearly a subset of the CA construct (see also McCroskey 1977a:29).

For obvious reasons subsetting and hierarchical labelling like this raises axiologically problematic questions in scientific communities. Consequently, McCroskey (1982:144) emphasizes that he does not consider CA as the most appropriate or superior term. As McCroskey (1982:144) argues, his aim is only to construct a rational order between different alternative terms. Thus, for McCroskey (1982:144), communication reticence "seems to be the broadest construct". The position of CA in the hierarchy is because it is "one of the elements leading to unwillingness to communicate or negative predispositions toward verbal behavior" (McCroskey 1982:144, also McCroskey & Richmond 1990:73-75). The relationship between shyness and CA is difficult to describe, because there is no exact definition of shyness (Page 1980:96-97). Stage fright and audience anxiety are, for McCroskey, obvious subconstructs of CA.

4.4.2 The substance of communication apprehension

These terminological considerations, which have been widely discussed in the CA literature, do not reveal the actual substance of CA. In order to investigate this substance, different dimensions of the term must be discussed, as suggested by McCroskey (1982, 1984a) and McCroskey, Andersen, Richmond and Wheelless (1981). Accordingly, the dimensions of CA will be discussed in terms of *types, causes, treatment, and effects* of CA. Typologically, CA can be regarded from two perspectives (see Spielberger 1966:3-5). The original typological perspective has been called "trait conceptualization" (Beatty & Behnke & McCallum 1978:187-188, McCroskey 1984a:16, McCroskey & Beatty 1984:79, McCroskey & Richmond 1982:458). The more recent perspective is the "situational view" (McCroskey 1977a:31, 1984a:14, McCroskey & Beatty 1984:79, Zuckerman 1976:136). At present, these terms can be considered as interrelated. Thus, while CA was originally "restricted to a trait orientation, it is now viewed as representing both trait and state approaches" (McCroskey 1984a:15). Consequently, McCroskey (1984a:14) argues that traits and states should not be seen as dichotomous, because in everyday communication CA contains both aspects. Therefore, CA should be viewed as a continuum, in which neither trait nor state exists alone, but as a "meaningful consideration" (McCroskey 1984a:15-16).

Furthermore, as McCroskey (1984a:15-16) rejects the 'false dichotomy', he argues that there are four points along the continuum that can be identified. These points will describe the different aspects of CA in different circumstances. According to McCroskey (1984a:16-19) these points are as follows:

1. *Traitlike communication apprehension (TCA)* is a relatively enduring, personality-type orientation toward a given mode of communication across a wide variety of contexts.
2. *Generalized-context communication apprehension (GCA)* is a relatively enduring, personality-type orientation toward communication in a given type of context.
3. *Person-group communication apprehension (PCA)* is a relatively enduring orientation toward communication with a given person or group of people.
4. *Situational communication apprehension (SCA)* is a transitory orientation toward communication with a given person or group of people.

McCroskey (1984a:19-22) considers it important to emphasize the difference between these four types of CA, and pathological communication apprehension (*PACA*). Thus the distinction between normal and abnormal must be considered in all discussions on CA (see McCroskey 1970a:33, 1978:200-201, McCroskey & Andersen & Richmond & Wheelless 1981:122-124). The causes, as well as consequences, are different in pathological cases, as compared to the common types of CA (McCroskey 1976a:39, 1978:200-201).

The *causes* of CA can be approached through the four-item list above. The most essential explanations are connected to the marginal terms, traitlike communication apprehension (*TCA*) and situational communication apprehension (*SCA*) (see McCroskey & Andersen & Richmond & Wheelless 1981:123-125). Usually, causes of *TCA* are explained usually quite simply. According to McCroskey (1984a:23), "we can be born with it or we can learn it". As McCroskey points out, *TCA* is usually seen as a hereditary or environmental phenomenon (see also Daly & Stafford 1984:129, McCroskey 1980:110-111). The position of *SCA* is different. According to McCroskey (1984a:25), *SCA* contains several possible causal explanations. McCroskey (1984a:25) has found Buss's perspective insightful. According to Buss (1984:41-47), the basic reasons in the communication situation that can cause increased CA are novelty, formality, subordinate status, conspicuousness, unfamiliarity, dissimilarity, and degree of attention from others. According to McCroskey (1984a:25), *SCA* can be given a satisfactory explanation using the descriptive terms of Buss.

The third dimension of CA, the *treatment* of apprehension, is based on one of the most fundamental distinctions. Thus, the distinction between a) CA toward communication behaviors and b) CA toward cognitions about communication behaviors must be emphasized (see McCroskey 1970a:35, McCroskey & Andersen & Richmond & Wheelless 1981:129, McCroskey & Sheahan 1978:41-42). In the first case, the focus of the treatment must be on communication skills and it must be directed toward communication behavior (McCroskey 1970a:36, 1980:110-111, 1984a:30-32). In the second case, treatment must be connected to the management of different situations and to cognitions toward them (see McCroskey 1984a:30-32).

Finally, the *effects* of CA are both internal and external. By 'internal impact', McCroskey (1984a:33) means that CA is "an internally experienced feeling of discomfort" (see also McCroskey 1976a:39-41, 1977a:27-28, 1980:110). In the case of 'external impacts', three patterns of behavioral responses can be described: communication avoidance, communication withdrawal, and

communication disruption (McCroskey 1980:110, 1984a:34-35, McCroskey & Andersen & Richmond & Wheelless 1981:129-130, McCroskey & Sheahan 1978:41-42). As these terms suggest, external impacts are usually negative, "highly associated with ineffective communication" (McCroskey 1984a:37).

4.4.3 Communication apprehension: Theoretical dimensions, operationalizations, criticism

As in constructivism, attempts have been made to measure CA. In the case of CA, this measurement is the *Personal Report of Communication Apprehension* (PRCA). The PRCA, a self-report measure of communication apprehension (McCroskey 1984b:81-82, 85-94), was originally developed by McCroskey (1970b). McCroskey has since continued to develop his measurement. McCroskey (1977b:201-203) presented two different forms of the PRCA, the long and short forms (see also e.g. Levine & McCroskey 1990:62, McCroskey & Richmond 1982:461). As Leary (1988:370) observes, this has been a part of a project in which McCroskey has developed different PRCA versions to suit different age groups (see McCroskey 1970b:271, 1984b:91-92).

According to Leary (1988:370-371, see also Levine & McCroskey 1990:62) the current leading version is PRCA-24 (see Appendix 4). Following Leary (1988:370), PRCA-24 demonstrates high reliability (see also Levine & McCroskey 1990, McCroskey 1978:192) and its results correlate with studies in which real communicative encounters have been studied. Thus, the validity of PRCA-24 has been shown to be high (see e.g. McCroskey 1984b:92). Consequently, it is understandable that the position of the PRCA in its different forms is strong among CA-oriented communication scholars.

Furthermore, in addition to the reliability factor there is another reason for the success of PRCA, which has been aptly summarized by Leary (1988:371): "McCroskey and his colleagues have done a good job of demonstrating the applicability of the PRCA and PRCA-24 to real life settings." Hence, the number of different PRCA applications is high. The PRCA has been useful, for instance, in cross-cultural studies (McCroskey & Burroughs & Daun & Richmond 1990, McCroskey & Richmond 1990, Sallinen-Kuparinen & McCroskey & Richmond 1991) and in various professional contexts (Falcione & McCroskey & Daly 1977, Richmond & McCroskey & Davis 1986). These applications have shown that PRCA is a both practical measure and also, that it opens the way to a comparative analysis between different cultures and contexts (see e.g. Levine & McCroskey 1990:69, McCroskey & Richmond 1990:75-76, Sallinen-Kuparinen & McCroskey & Richmond 1991:61-62).

As can be seen, the position of the PRCA within CA is rather similar to the position of the RCQ in constructivism. In both cases, a single dominant measure is employed within the theory. This dominance is largely based on the success of the measures. However, there is also one crucial difference which must be emphasized and which is also important to the argument that follows.

The RCQ is connected, through the work of Crockett and Delia, to constructivist theory. Analogically, the PRCA should be connected to the theory of CA. The big question, however, remains: What is the theory of CA?

McCroskey has discussed this question particularly in connection with the PRCA (see McCroskey 1978). Thus McCroskey (1978:193-197) has attempted to construct theoretical propositions that could be used to predict and explain the results produced through the use of the PRCA. These propositions are as follows.

Proposition 1. People vary in the degree to which they are apprehensive about oral communication with other people.

Proposition 2. People with high oral communication apprehension seek to avoid oral communication.

Proposition 3. People with high oral communication apprehension engage in less oral communication than do less orally apprehensive people.

Proposition 4. When people with high oral communication do communicate, their oral communication behaviors differ from those of people who are less apprehensive.

Proposition 5. As a result of their oral communication behavior, high oral communication apprehensives are perceived less positively by others than are less apprehensive people.

The epistemological nature of these propositions is of primary importance. If they are really predictive and explanatory in nature, McCroskey's view could be called empiricist and CA labelled an 'empiricism-bound theory'.³⁴ However, McCroskey (1978:198) notes that these theoretical propositions particularly concern the PRCA as a measure, and that the aim of these propositions is to demonstrate the validity of the PRCA, not necessarily to articulate the substance of CA. Furthermore, although the propositions can undoubtedly predict phenomena connected to CA, it is not specified whether they actually aim at logical explanation at all. Hence, the question whether CA can be considered as an empiricism-bound concept is also open.

This epistemological dimension has not been much discussed by McCroskey. McCroskey (1984a:33) argues that CA is "experienced by the individual internally". Thus, the "only effect of CA that is predicted to be universal across both individuals and types of CA is an internally experienced feeling of discomfort" (McCroskey 1984a:33). It has not, for example, been examined whether CA could be regarded as an epistemologically grounded theory, as McCroskey (1978), in the terminological sense, seems to propose (see McCroskey & Beatty 1984:79-80, Richmond & McCroskey & Davis 1986:175-176).

Questions like this seem to suggest that CA may be a concept without theoretical substance. As McCroskey and Beatty (1984:79) point out in their discussion of the theoretical background of CA, it is related to such theories as,

³⁴ Hence, two extreme positions are available: 1) to argue that these propositions are epistemologically related to the axioms of Berger and Calabrese (1975) and are thus, literally, theoretical in nature and 2) that they are merely descriptive sentences. As will be pointed out in Chapter 5, this is a major dilemma confronting the theoretical justification of CA.

for instance, the assimilation theory of McReynold, or the trait perspective as represented by Mischel or Zuckerman. However, considering, for example, the early articles of McCroskey (1970a-b, 1976a-b, 1977a-b), the actual influence of these background theories may be questioned. No traces of obvious theoretical influences can be found in these articles.³⁵ Instead, it can be argued, as, for example, Daly and Stafford (1984:126) maintain, that "Virtually every major investigator interested in the topic seems to find it necessary to create both a new assessment instrument and a new referent for the disposition." *CA* and the *PRCA* are an example of this.

This argument must, however, be distinguished from the well-known negative criticism of *CA* of Porter (1979). According to Porter (1979:258-259), *CA* has practically no scientific value at all. According to Porter (1979:256), for example, the relationship between *CA* and the *PRCA* is not what McCroskey's has argued it to be, and because *CA* practically "stands or falls with its operationalization", the whole idea of *CA* remains vague. In short, according to Porter (1979:258), *CA* is a construct without evidence. As Porter (1979:241-242) emphasizes, his perspective concerns the validity of the *PRCA*, as he was concentrating on the measurement dimensions of *CA*. This is a logical solution in the sense that also McCroskey has justified the relevance of *CA* primarily through measurement data (see e.g. McCroskey 1978). However, it can be asked how well the measurement-bound approach describes the substance of *CA*. Instead of examining the instrument, the theoretical substance of *CA* must be explored. In other words, in addition to validity, metatheoretical issues also have to be considered.

³⁵ In addition to these theoretical frameworks, the influence of such authors as Philip Zimbardo must also be noted. Zimbardo and his colleagues (see e.g. Zimbardo & Mahl & Barnard 1963) showed that shyness may lead to notable social problems. These studies became well known in the United States, and they had, obviously, a certain influence on *CA* as well. McCroskey has not, however, written about this influence.

5 THEORIES: TRADITION AND PARADIGM

5.1 General perspective

This section will be divided into two main parts. First, the epistemological and ontological questions of uncertainty reduction theory, constructivism, and communication apprehension will be investigated in terms of tradition. The aim is to deepen the claim, made in the previous chapters, that these theories are related to certain traditions. Second, as these aspects of tradition are analyzed, the paradigmatic influences will be discussed. This discussion will be based on the Kuhnian view of scientific paradigms. Although traditional and paradigmatic aspects are thematically different, they share a basic question: What are the fundamental metatheoretical characteristics of these constructs?

From the traditional perspective, the primary aim is to analyze how these theoretical constructs are based on a certain world-view in terms of science of philosophy.³⁶ That is, the primary question is to discuss whether and how three significant traditions - empiricism, hermeneutics, and phenomenology - have affected the quality of some of the most crucial constructs of interpersonal communication research. On the other hand, it is also important to reflect upon the traditions we have adopted in the practice of interpersonal communication research and what were the consequences of choosing between the different world-views that can be seen in uncertainty reduction theory, constructivism and communication apprehension.

³⁶ The distinction between 'a construct' and 'a theory' is crucial. As Chapter 5.2.3. will show, not all constructs are theories. Therefore, by construct I want to point out that communication apprehension, in particular, is definitely a construct, but not necessarily a theory. The term theory will be used when such issues as the relationship between theory and tradition, or the epistemological features of theories, are discussed.

Furthermore, my goal is not only to demonstrate that certain theories are related to certain philosophical traditions and that this leads to certain world-view commitments, but to provide a springboard for the final chapters. That is, the aim of investigating the philosophical perspectives is to give an overview of the field of interpersonal communication research using three of its most widely known constructs. The assumption is that it is important to know the epistemological and ontological substance of different theories. This is also necessary in relation to the final discussion in this study and the reformulations that will be attempted.

From the paradigmatic viewpoint, the aim is to explore whether there actually are certain paradigms to be found, or a normal science to be observed, in the research of interpersonal communication. As the three constructs (communication apprehension, constructivism, and uncertainty reduction theory) are, in the bibliometrical sense, the most significant ones, they are hypothetically the best candidates for being made into paradigmatic constructs. If these areas, or some of them, are paradigmatic, the progress of the field must be approached from the 'negative expectation' perspective. In other words, progress must be a more complicated issue if there are certain paradigms exist than in a paradigm-free situation.

Thus, the aim behind both the traditional and the paradigmatic approaches is to speculate around the future of interpersonal communication research. The traditional analysis aims to present the most crucial philosophical principles concerning theory building. In other words, by the traditional analysis the fundamental epistemological and ontological aspects of theoretical construction are exposed to a critical evaluation, and alternative solutions are sought. By the paradigmatic analysis, some concrete possibilities - in terms of the everyday practice of interpersonal communication research - for these traditional projects are illuminated.

5.2 Critical issues of tradition

5.2.1 The tradition of uncertainty reduction theory

As was pointed out in Chapter 4.2., uncertainty reduction theory (*URT*) is empiricism-bound. In the traditional evaluation sense, *URT* embeds three central questions. First, what is the epistemological purpose of positing axioms in *URT*? Second, what is the epistemological basis of prediction and explanation in *URT*? Third, most crucially, what are the practical implications of *URT* from an empiricist point of view? That is, what is the precise meaning of the claim that *URT* is an empiricism-bound theory?

Bergmann (1957:31) claims that axioms are basically identical to laws in a theory. According to Bergmann, they are called axioms primarily because they relate to a certain generally confirmed theoretical construction. Thus, were they

not parts of *URT*, the axioms of Berger and Calabrese could be called laws. Theorems, on the other hand, are sentences which appear as conclusions from axioms (Bergmann 1957:31-32). For the present discussion the main question is what the axiomatic law perspective of Berger and Calabrese implies. That is, what it is that is represented by laws and what are the scientific assumptions *beyond* laws?

From this point of view, the previous discussion of the *Alternative Theoretical Bases for the Study of Human Communication* of 1977 (see Chapter 2) is, again, a significant standpoint. In the special issue of *Communication Quarterly*, Berger (1977a) outlines his law perspective. In response, Delia (1977a:46-50), for example, criticizes Berger's view. The title of Berger's (1977a) article refers to a 'covering law perspective', a label which has also been terminologically adopted in recent communication textbooks (e.g. Littlejohn 1992). However, as Berger (1977a:8-9) points out, the differences between such terms as 'laws', 'general laws', and 'covering laws' are actually rather small in terms of communication theories. The difference between these terms may be crucial, for instance, in physics (see Hempel 1965:345-347), but in the interpersonal context these words refer to a fundamentally similar perspective.

In the present approach, the term 'covering law' will be adopted, primarily because it is widely used among communication scholars and it can be defined clearly. In short, if 'law' is understood as a term which both explains and predicts a given phenomena, it is a covering law (see Hempel 1965:345-347, 1971:398-399, 411, Dray 1971:343, Weingartner 1971:352-355). That is, according to Hempel (1965:345), "the assertion that a set of events - say of the kinds C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n - have caused the event (E) to be explained, amounts to the statement that, according to certain general laws, a set of events of the kinds mentioned is regularly accompanied by an event of kind E." In other words, the covering law implies that events C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n are in causal relationship ($X \rightarrow Y$) with event E (see also Harré & Secord 1976:20, Ogden & Richards 1968:105-106).

As Delia (1977a:47) observes, Berger's own attitude toward the covering law perspective is two-fold. It must be noticed that Berger does not confess to being a defender or supporter of the covering law position (Delia 1977a:47). Berger's support of this position is implicit. From Berger's (1977a:18) point of view, covering laws are usually more explanatory and, hence, more successful than other perspectives. Although Berger does not argue - as logical empirists do - that all science should be based on covering laws, he does argue that covering laws are the primary mode of theories.

In short, Berger's view could be summarized as follows. First, Berger does not argue against the view that the rules perspective (among other alternative perspectives) suits certain situations and contexts. However, he seems to indicate that the covering law perspective is in general the best possible. While other perspectives are, usually, merely able to describe, the covering laws approach, according to Hempel (1965:416), seems to offer a complete explanation. Thus, alternative perspectives are - by all means - alternative, but covering laws are more elementary and thus, hierarchically primary, in comparison with other theoretical modes. According to Berger (1977a:12-13): "At some point one must go beyond the description of 'what the

rules are' and ask *why* some rules are selected over others. ... The discussion of possible relationships between laws and rules suggests that while the concept of rules may be useful at the descriptive level, it is still necessary to develop explanations for various manifestations of what appears to be rule governed or rule following behavior."

Following this argumentation, it is relatively clear that Berger himself adheres to the idea of covering laws. One of clearest examples is *URT* itself. *URT* is a concrete expression of Berger's empiricism-based perspective. This argument can be supported by an analysis of *URT*. Although Berger and Calabrese do not realize that *URT* is a covering law theory, it is clearly grounded on the basic notions of the covering law perspective. One of the clearest examples of this is the third axiom (Berger & Calabrese 1975): "*High levels of uncertainty cause increases in information seeking behavior. As uncertainty levels decline, information seeking behavior decreases.*" As can be seen, these sentences are clearly formulated in 'the logical sense', using 'formal language' (see Stegmüller 1976:33). As a matter of fact, they can be logically formulated as follows:

$U+ \rightarrow B-, U- \rightarrow B+$
(U = level of uncertainty, + = high, - = low, B = information seeking behavior)

Considering the logic of Berger and Calabrese's theory, another interesting axiom is the fifth. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975:105) "*High levels of uncertainty produce high rates of reciprocity. Low levels of uncertainty produce low reciprocity rates.*" These sentences could be presented as covering laws, or as the following logical formulation:

$U+ \rightarrow R+, U- \rightarrow R-$
(U = level of uncertainty, + = high, - = low, R = reciprocity rate)

In short, these axiomatic sentences are in fact as covering as possible (see Hempel 1965:345-350). According to Berger and Calabrese, the level of uncertainty is basically either high or low, and this level causally affects one's behavior in terms of reciprocity-seeking behavior. (Dray 1971:343, Weingartner 1971:350-351.) Thus, although Berger and Calabrese do not use logical formulations in their theoretical construction, their theory clearly follows the logical ideals of empiricism.

The second crucial point in Berger's thinking is the epistemological and ontological dimension that deals with the position of prediction and explanation in *URT*. According to Berger and Calabrese (1975:99), their "hope is that through subsequent research and theoretical extension" *URT* "can be used to make predictions about and explain interpersonal communication phenomena..." This hope is understandable considering the following argument by Berger (1977a:7):

The basic aim of scientific theory is to provide explanations for observed phenomena. Some might argue that theories also aim to predict; however, explanation takes precedence over prediction. If a theory can provide a complete explanation for a phenomenon, it can predict the phenomenon.

As can be seen, *URT* is one concretization of this general perspective endorsed by Berger. Berger (1977a) argues that a theory must be predictive and explanatory. *URT* meets this requirement. However, the nature of prediction or explanation as such is not the most crucial question in this context. What is more important is the relationship between these terms. The main issue is Berger's claim that, ultimately, explanation and prediction are identical.

Berger's argument as to the similarity between explanation and prediction is based on Hempel's (1965) philosophy. Hempel (1965:231-244) has also concretized his view. According to Hempel (1965:231), the significance of prediction and explanation can be approached through historical research. Hempel (1965:231-233) argues that it is possible to define certain covering laws which explain all historical events through logical and empirical investigation (see also Hempel 1971). Thus Hempel argues that the battle of Waterloo, for example, could be completely explained, if all the necessary variables concerning prior occurrences were known.

Even hypothetically, this is a difficult project because of the enormous number of variables that could be thought to be relevant in the description of Napoleon's battles. Furthermore, Hempel's idea leads to another problem that is even more to the point. If it were possible to explain historical events using certain variables, it should also be possible to predict the future. Thus, if we have perfect knowledge of present circumstances, we should be able to construct a covering law describing our future (Hempel 1965:242-243). Historical research would then be similar to futurological research in the explanatory and predictive sense.

However, it might be of interest to apply Hempel's idea to interpersonal communication research. First, in principle, it can be assumed that interpersonal events can be completely explained. These events are obviously explained by certain variables. When these variables are known and, therefore, the interpersonal events are explained, the explanation should predict the outcome of all future interpersonal settings. This very idea has been the primary aim of *URT*. Berger seems to suppose that interpersonal events can be explained by the notion of uncertainty reduction. Because uncertainty reduction is an explanatory variable in interpersonal communication, it is also predictive. Thus, according to Berger, interpersonal encounters in our social history can be explained through the concept of uncertainty reduction. Moreover, all future encounters can be predicted as the same explanation is used. In short, we can know what we are going to do in our interpersonal encounters to come.

Hence, Berger's theoretical assumptions, like those of Hempel, clearly belong to the tradition of the covering law perspective. The main question, however, is whether this type of explanation is really possible in the human sciences. Is it possible to describe human behavior in so complete a manner that clear causalities can be observed in actual human behavior? Berger supposes this is to be possible. This assumption, however, contains two problems. First, Berger assumes that uncertainty is a notion that has been similar throughout our social history. This means that were the Hempelian covering law philosophy to be accepted, the definition of uncertainty would be supposed to be similar in, say, Finland in the 1870s, and in the United States in the 1970s.

Second, Berger assumes that interactants are not aware of their own uncertainty. That is, Berger assumes that people automatically tend to reduce uncertainty, like machines (see Ryle 1949), without critical self-control and perceived knowledge of their uncertainty.

The questions that are hidden in these two issues are interesting. First, even hypothetically, a complete identity between prediction and explanation may be an impossibility. As Rescher (1970:23) put it, there "can never be a complete explanation of anything for the reverse of the reason that there can never be a complete description of anything". This means that although Berger may define what uncertainty means in the United States in the 1970s, it is a different uncertainty from that of Finland in the 1870s. This has been showed rigorously by Whorf (1956/1978:246-270): not only the meaning of the word 'uncertainty', but also the whole reality in which someone is uncertain about something, varies in different cultures. More recently this argument have been approached by Liberman (1990), who points out that although both North-Americans and Finns may be able to describe what they mean by uncertainty in interaction, and how they aim to reduce it, it is to be highly expected that their interpretation of uncertainty will be different, because the experience of uncertainty as such differs in cultures.

This problem may be explored in more detail by further analyzing the Axiom 3 of Berger and Calabrese. This axiom let us suppose, interestingly, that such issues as a 'high level of uncertainty' and 'information seeking behavior' may be given a situation-free definition, which means, therefore, that their relation also remains the same. Berger and Calabrese (1975:103) support this argument by the evidence gained from Frankfurt's (1965) study. Frankfurt's study examines, however, only the relationship between 'levels of uncertainty' and 'levels of information seeking behavior'. It neglects to discuss exactly when and where these levels are adequate. Berger and Calabrese (1975:103) claim that 'information seeking behavior' is connected to such issues as "requests for such information as one's occupation, hometown, places of prior residence, and so on..." Berger and Calabrese are obviously right (although they do not necessarily prove it) in arguing that such questions (e.g. "what is your job?" [question 1], "where do you come from?" [question 2], or "where did you live before this place?" [question 3]) are quite typical when people meet for the first time and begin their conversation. However, what happens after these initial questions is another issue. The basic issue is what happens to different levels of interpersonal settings. According to Berger and Calabrese, the principle behind Axiom 3 can be described as in Figure 2.

Figure 2 illustrates what Axiom 3 means in practice. According to Axiom 3, the level of uncertainty and the level of uncertainty seeking behavior are strongly interrelated. When person A, for example, asks where B comes from and B replies "from Finland", Berger and Calabrese assume that after this reply uncertainty has decreased. According to Berger and Calabrese, the more A and B know about each other, the lower the level of uncertainty is - and the lower the level of uncertainty is, the less A and B tend to ask questions. It must be asked, however, whether the B's reply really works this way. For example, it is quite possible that A does not know where Finland is, or even what it is.

Therefore, A may interpret "from Finland" as an ambiguous message. B can, naturally, make sure that A knows that Finland is a country in northern Europe. An ambiguous message leads, however, to the evident problem. Is it possible that the level of uncertainty really decreases as automatically as Berger and Calabrese assume? It can be claimed, instead, that B's reply has modified the original situation towards the position in Figure 3.

The obvious fact that some answers can increase the level of

uncertainty instead of decreasing it, is not new issue in *URT* research. Planalp and Honeycutt (1985) have, for example, demonstrated that some events (such 'equivocal messages' as e.g. "I'm coming from nowhere") may radically increase the level of uncertainty. Thus, Planalp and Honeycutt have succeeded in demonstrating that uncertainty does not necessarily decrease directly as Axiom 3 argues. Instead, the level of uncertainty may change over time. Thus the question "What is the eventual outcome for the relationship?" (Planalp & Honeycutt 1985:594) is not as clear as Berger and Calabrese suppose. According to Planalp and Honeycutt (1985:601), both the reduction and the increase in uncertainty emerge out of interpersonal relations.

The observations of Planalp and Honeycutt are crucial because they show how Axiom 3 ignores some significant everyday events. That is, it is assumed in this axiom that people tend to decrease uncertainty, no matter when and where they are (or, in which culture) and what they are doing (what is the situation). Berger and Calabrese have not taken into consideration that in 'real life' people may lie because they want to make a better impression on their partners in initial encounters, or that they may act unpredictably (which increases the level of uncertainty), just because they want to surprise somebody. Also, in certain cultures, people may not feel any need to decrease the level of uncertainty, because they do not feel that they should be able to predict the behavior of other people (see Planalp & Honeycutt 1985:594).

It can be claimed, following Rorty's (1979) well-known critique of the metatheory of empiricism, that Berger and Calabrese have ignored these issues




Figure 2. The illustration of Axiom 3 principle in Berger and Calabrese's uncertainty reduction theory.

because covering law researchers usually tend to ignore questions that deal with subjective intention. The possibility that someone would *want* to lie or would *want* to be equivocal does not belong to the worldview of empiricism. Berger and Calabrese do not consider the possibility that unpredictability is intentional, because "beliefs, desires, attitudes, and intentions" (Rorty 1979:18) are not interesting in the theoretical construction of empiricism.

The origins of the above dilemmas

may also be approached from another perspective. In addition to the arguments adduced by Berger, it must be observed that *URT* is based on a given social psychological background. In this context, the most interesting social psychologist is Theodore Newcomb (Berger & Calabrese 1975:99, 105). As Winch (1958:75-76) points out, the social psychological ideas propounded by Newcomb are both widely known and accepted. Newcomb's textbooks especially (Newcomb 1952/1965) have been successful. According to Winch (1958:76-80), his success is, however, a problematic issue, based as it is on empiricist simplifications. Winch (1958:67-77) observes, that Newcomb's social psychology is closely connected to the philosophy of causality as presented by such authors as Hume or Mill. Winch (1958:76-79) argues, however, that this is not the main problem, but the fact that Newcomb (1952/1965:23-35) sees interpersonal communication research in terms of laboratory tests. As Newcomb's emphasis is on observations made in a manipulated situation, they are not to be regarded as relevant in terms of everyday human communication.

Winch's arguments have certain strengths. First, Winch is correct in arguing that Newcomb's perspective is based on laboratory experimentation. For example, we do not necessarily know whether 'fear' means the same thing in real life and in the laboratory. It may be possible to construct a covering law in a laboratory which argues that 'when people fear, they escape' (see Newcomb 1952/1965:23-27). This is a formal logical sentence F (fear) \rightarrow E (escape). However, as Winch stresses, although this sentence may be shown to be true in laboratory circumstances, this does not mean that it applies in




Figure 3. Illustration of an interpersonal event in which uncertainty increases.

everyday life. According to Winch (1958:109-11), people not only experience fear, but they also know what fear is and where it comes from. When people know what fear is, they are able to understand it. Hence, people not only feel fear, it is also a meaningful concept for them.

This line of thought can be applied to the discussion of *URT*. It can be claimed that Berger and Calabrese have approached uncertainty in the manner the example of fear suggests. It is quite possible that in laboratory experiments uncertainty will decrease as Figure 2 indicates. In everyday life, however, the situation is different. Although the causal relation presented in Figure 2 may not be wrong (it is a theory, after all), it ignores the fact that people in interpersonal settings are able both to estimate the level of their own uncertainty and to influence it. Thus, the causal relations which are manifest in uncertainty reduction may be tendencies. It must be emphasized, however, that everyone is able to choose whether he/she actually fulfils this potential causal relation. It is obvious that people do not reduce uncertainty because it is a law, but because it is a choice they make; if they do not want to reduce uncertainty, they are free to do so.

5.2.2 The tradition of constructivism

It would be impossible to argue that any of Delia's several articles is more influential than any of the others (see Chapter 4.3.1.). For the discussion of the tradition, however, it is reasonable to focus on *Constructivism and the Study of Human Communication* (Delia 1977b). While the other articles by Delia and his colleagues are usually empirical - with particular emphasis on *RCQ* - and bound to a specific context, this article is a general outline which is also connected to the philosophy of science. Hence, it is principally similar to the article by Berger (1977a) on covering laws, although more implicit in its arguments.

The leading theme in this constructivist manifesto of Delia (1977b) is clear. Delia (1977b:66, 70) emphasizes that the aim of constructivism is to follow an interpretive scientific perspective. In what follows, I will discuss 1) what Delia actually means by interpretation in relation to his constructivism and 2) how this interpretative goal has been reached in constructivist studies. First, as regards the term 'interpretation', it is to be noted that Delia uses it differently in different contexts. Interpretation seems to include a number of semantic dimensions (Delia 1977b:66, 70, 73, 75, see also e.g. Levy 1963:5-21).³⁷ There are two spheres in these dimensions. First, interpretation refers to a scientific attitude opposed to empiricism (Delia 1977b:66-67). Second, interpretation is one of the methodological assumptions made within constructivism (Delia 1977b:73).

³⁷ This semantic observation is rather similar to the comments by Masterman on Kuhn's use of the term 'paradigm' (Chapter 2.2.1.).

As far as the tradition is concerned, the general scientific attitude is naturally more appropriate than methodological assumptions.³⁸ The scientific attitude of constructivism is summarized in Delia's article in his use of certain key terms. The most crucial of these is the *Weltanschauung* ('world-view' or 'way of seeing the world') of constructivism (Delia 1977b:67-67, 80-83). First, the *Weltanschauung* of constructivism is against the fundamental principles of empiricism. As a matter of fact, constructivism seems to have been developed as a reaction to empiricism, and as an objection to certain characteristics of logical empiricism thought to be negative. Thus, for instance, the importance of personal experiences, a general holistic viewpoint and antilinear thinking (see Delia 1977b:68-73) are all based on the idea that in traditional empiricism these communicationally relevant issues have largely been ignored. In the *Weltanschauung* of constructivism they are included.

However, Delia does not discuss any of these terms in depth (e.g. the essence of personal experiences, or the epistemological nature of holism or antilinear thinking). For example, although Delia (1977b:80) refers directly to 'existential causalities' and 'phenomenological experiences', he does not point out any actual bridge between constructivism and existentialism or phenomenology. That is, although Delia uses terminology that belongs to interpretative thought, he does not make explicit the meaning of these terms for everyday constructivist research. On the other hand, this ambiguity can be explained by assuming that Delia has been cautious in labelling. Instead of calling constructivism either a phenomenological or an existential framework, Delia has chosen to see the constructivistic *Weltanschauung* as lying somewhere between these two movements.

This aspect of eclecticism is shown, for example, in the term 'intersubjectivity'. In interpersonal communication, intersubjectivity is neither a phenomenological nor a hermeneutical concept, but it is clearly one of the main issues in interpretive communication research (Pilotta & Mickunas 1990:2). Thus, the notion of intersubjectivity in interpersonal communication research has arisen from both a phenomenological and a hermeneutical background. The same can be said about constructivism. As a matter of fact, intersubjectivity and constructivism reflect upon similar questions: What are the 'hidden characteristics' of human communication, as opposed to the behavioral perspective of empiricism? Constructs are actually a condition of intersubjectivity. For example, when one formulates a construct about another person, this will naturally contain intersubjective aspects, such as hopes for or anticipations of the future (see Pilotta & Mickunas 1990:136). On the other hand, hopes and plans cannot exist without given agents, subjects and objects. Hence, intersubjectivity depends on constructs that are made of other persons.

³⁸ It must be stressed, however, that 'tradition' and 'methodology' are strongly tied together. According to Feyerabend (1975/1994), for example, there is no tradition without methodology and vice versa. Feyerabend is correct. It is, hypothetically, possible to assume a tradition without methodology, but it is highly likely that the future of this tradition would be short. Without a methodology a tradition cannot create 'facts' and the 'success' needed in order to keep itself alive. This is important in view of further arguments on the research practice of constructivism.

In short, Delia's ideas are connected both to phenomenology and hermeneutics. Nevertheless, the roots have not been - and cannot be - pointed out. One additional reason may be found in the influence of Kelly. Kelly (1955:16-22), relatively freely, combined different epistemological and ontological perspectives. Kelly (1955:15) emphasized that "all of our present interpretations of the universe are subject to revision and replacement." One possible frame of interpretations is phenomenology (Kelly 1955:17). According to Kelly, there is no reason to concentrate on specific traditions, but it is more important to keep in mind that there are always numerous alternative world-views, and "no one needs to paint himself into a corner" (Kelly 1955:15). Delia has followed this line of thought.

It must be asked, however, what the consequences are of traditional links not being made explicit. Is it possible to construct a *Weltanschauung* in which, for example, the central notions are developed on grounds of their own? It is understandable that Delia, along with Kelly, is cautious about 'ambiguous movements' and 'dangerous labels'. Nevertheless, if the interpretative *Weltanschauung* of such authors as Kelly or Delia does not conform to the ideas of the interpretative movement, it is surely justified to ask what it is based on. The problems which arise out of this can be shown by examining, for example, the following quotation from Delia (1977b:71).

In the constructivistic perspective a person's understandings of others and their perspectives is understood as always in terms of construals, i.e., of images or impressions. The other's intentions, inner qualities, or attitudes are never apprehended directly; rather in interpersonal perception, impressions of others and their perspectives are erected within the cognitive structures (constructs) that perceiver brings with him to interpersonal situations.

In this quotation, Delia relatively directly points out the target of constructivist research. Constructivism analyzes construals. Construals are connected to images, impressions, intentions, inner qualities, and attitudes. Given the traditional roots of constructivism, it is of primary importance that although 'construal' is an independent term invented by Kelly, and further developed by Delia, such terms as 'intentions' or 'images' are not. Although Delia (1977b) has defined his own standpoint by assuming a concept of construal, practically all the other terms have long roots in the philosophy of science. For example, intention is one of the main issues in phenomenological philosophy (see Chisholm 1984).

The next question is to examine what Delia means, for example, by intention. Delia (1977b:72) emphasizes that he attempts to analyze "different ranges of social experiences". Intentions are a part of social experiences. When someone has an intention to do or to say something, it will affect his/her social environment. Delia points out that the main question in his perspective is not to discuss the quality of intention as such, but focus on *how* it will be manifested in social life, and in interpersonal communication. The solution of leaving the philosophical views of such authors as Brentano or Husserl out of his discussion is sensible, because it allows Delia to concentrate on communication (how do intentions function in terms of interpersonal

communication?), instead of psychological questions (what are intentions?). On the other hand, it seems that at the same time Delia ignores certain aspects that could be useful for the theory of interpersonal communication. For example, following Delia's argument one could claim that someone has an intention 'to hurt someone' and because of that he/she will act in a certain manner. This explanation of action is, however, always partial, because it does not make claims about the original intention, about *why* someone wants to hurt.

The problems that are hidden in Delia's *Weltanschauung* can also be approached from another perspective. What does it mean, in terms of interpretation, that the connection to the interpretative tradition is not made explicit? It might be argued that, for example, a situation in which religious people talk to each other refers to an 'inner quality' (religion) that also affects individuals' intentions (see Apel 1984:137). These intentions have an influence in interpersonal settings in terms of basic values and attitudes. In this sense religion belongs to the category of construals, and the constructivist perspective is able to explain how it will function in interpersonal settings. Delia (1977b:82) does not, however, want to go into theology and make claims about religion itself. This is understandable - communication research is, and must be, different from theology. The question is left, however, to discuss how Delia succeeds in interpreting communicative events without giving an interpretation of the substance of these events. The following quotation (Delia 1977b:70) throws light on this issue.

A constructivistic approach to social interaction ... stresses the interplay of shared and individual interpretive processes by which individuals define situations and construe the perspectives of others within them in making the anticipations necessary to joint conduct and coordinated creation of shared meaning.

But, if constructivism is really interested in 'shared processes', is it possible to analyze processes without considering the question of 'what is shared'? Is it possible to understand a process without understanding its underlying substance? According to Delia it is possible. In other words, Delia sees it as possible to analyze how, for example, religious people behave, while ignoring the question as to why they behave in this manner.

This perspective have been supported by a methodology that uses the RCQ. The aim of the RCQ has been to find evidence for the interpretative expectations of constructivism. Undoubtedly, the RCQ can be seen as an interpretive measure in the sense that it is very open by its nature. Consequently, respondents can freely answer the questions presented in the questionnaire just as they wish (see Appendix 3). From this point of view the RCQ seems to seek genuine images and inner qualities. It can be said that the measure is, in principle, feasible when one considers the arguments of Delia (1977b) on the idea of constructivism. The interpretation of RCQ results, however, is relatively problematic. If the instrument is meant to be interpretive, the analysis of its results should be interpretive as well (see e.g. Levy 1963). According to Gronbeck (1981:250), however, a great part of constructivist research "involves taxonomy-building and testing; qualitative (naturalistic) data are examined..."

These aspects of constructivist research make sense when one considers the *Weltanschauung* of Delia.

It is evident, therefore, that there is a certain inconsistency between the principles of constructivism and its methodological reality. The reason for this inconsistency may not lie within the *RCQ* itself, but in the way it has been applied. As the *RCQ* is not a quantifying measure, it approaches inner qualities, but its analysis is nonetheless based on a certain scoring system (Burlison & Waltman 1988:26-27). In short, it has been emphasized that the *RCQ* is, as Burlison and Waltman (1988:1) put it, an empirical operationalization. Following the basic idea of operationalization (see Bergmann 1957:56, Lenzen 1938/1955), such aspects as numerical correlations and variable analysis have been stressed instead of giving emphasis to qualitative constructs, such as interpretation (see Burlison & Waltman 1988:20-21). As a consequence, the results of constructivist studies are usually objective, when they should be subjective or intersubjective, and therefore studies employing *RCQ* clearly fail to manifest the *Weltanschauung* of constructivism.

It might be possible to generalize the problems of the *RCQ* to the whole framework of constructivism. As shown by the example above, constructivism may be able to answer the question of how religion is manifested in different situations, but it will not be able to say anything about the religious experience itself. Therefore, it could be argued that by the systematic application of certain hermeneutic or phenomenological principles, constructivism could be better equipped to describe how people behave and, also, why people behave in a certain manner. This is not to say that, say, hermeneutics or phenomenology would be able to answer why people believe in God. There are several interpretations of that, ranging from Marx to Heidegger, that provide us with different explanations. A philosophy can, however, offer a path to an explanation (see Gadamer 1982:478). Although none of them is to be regarded as 'the truth', they provide more insights than the *Weltanschauung* of Delia, in which ontological explanations are ignored. Although it is obvious that the aim of interpersonal communication research is not to say why people believe in God, it might be wise to adopt a tradition in which this type of explanation is possible. Then constructivism would be able to comment on inner qualities or 'phenomenological experiences' (Delia 1977b:70).

Moreover, it would be sensible to construct a systematic bridge between constructivism and hermeneutics (or phenomenology) since, after all, they have much in common. One obvious link between constructivism and hermeneutics can be seen, for example, in the concept of conversation. While Gadamer (1982:345) emphasizes that "no one knows what will 'come out' in a conversation", Delia (1977b:72-73), analogically, criticizes the 'linear model of communication'. As Delia (1977b:72-74) points out, this model defines a set of fundamental elements of human interaction. However, these elements - the source, the message, the channel, and the receiver - are external in relation to the inner qualities or the images. In the constructivist view, the essence of the personal involvements of actual communicators in real life interaction is more important than the elements of linear model. As can be seen, both Delia and Gadamer reject the view that conversation, or any type of human interaction,

can be approached in terms of a source and an output (see also e.g. Clark & Delia 1979:196).³⁹

5.2.3 Communication apprehension: A case of practicality

Compared with *URT* and constructivism, the tradition of *CA* is a more complex issue. First, it must be noticed that McCroskey has not articulated his scientific principles or published a manifesto in what he has published thus far. Therefore, the tradition of *CA* must be examined without relying on the epistemological arguments of McCroskey himself. Second, the characteristics of *CA* are, in terms of the tradition, very different from those of constructivism and *URT*. McCroskey has not grounded *CA* in any given tradition, as Berger and Delia have done. For example, in one place McCroskey (1978:193) refers to the principle of prediction, and, in another place, to self-disclosure (see McCroskey & Richmond 1978a:40-41), relying on the phenomenological inner experiences of Jourard (1964/1971:191-197). Hence, to relate *CA* to a given tradition is relatively difficult and involves hypothetical assumptions.

First, it might seem natural to approach *CA* through its initial conceptualization. Although McCroskey (1970a-b) has not clearly indicated which tradition supplies the background to *CA*, it is evident that it is based on certain scientific principles. According to McCroskey (1970b:269-270), the term *CA* itself is based on a comparison between various alternative conceptualizations. Hence, McCroskey's (1970b:270) primary aim has been to select the most practical and most multidimensional of these concepts. The comparison method is connected to several studies on communication-bound anxiety that employ factor analysis. McCroskey emphasizes that in particular the studies of Friedrich (1970), Paul (1966), and Phillips (1968) are relevant. McCroskey (1970a-b), in his analysis of these studies, selected *CA* as the best possible label to summarize his own view (also McCroskey & Ralph & Barrick 1970:33-34). In other words, *CA* is a terminological choice and functional selection, and therefore there are no manifest theoretical *CA* axioms or epistemological assumptions.

Considering the important position of *CA* in interpersonal communication research at present, these factor-bound roots are quite extraordinary. The first problem is that the theoretical value of *CA*, because of its roots in factor analysis, is unclear. *CA* can be called a 'theoretical construct', as *PRCA* can explain and also predict human behavior in different contexts (see McCroskey 1978:193). These theoretical dimensions are not, however, formulated or assumed in the notion of *CA* itself. Therefore, McCroskey's (1978)

³⁹ Furthermore, according to Gadamer (1982:345), every conversation can be said to have its own truths. These truths are not, following Nagel's (1971:113) terminology, 'objective truths'. Both in hermeneutics and constructivism (see Delia 1977b:72-74, Clark & Delia 1979:194-196), conversational truths are relative in the sense that they appear in every human communication event situationally.

propositions, which, principally, can be argued to be empiricist, are not in fact purely empiricist. Although McCroskey's propositions can be said to be factual (see Chapter 2.1.1.), they are based on statistical trends in factor analysis. There are no answers to epistemological "why" questions that would explain the origin of these propositions (see Apel 1984:49-53, Hempel 1965:334-368).

On the other hand, McCroskey has probably not even tried to construct a theory, in the empiricist, hermeneutic, or phenomenological sense. *CA* has been related to practice in terms of different everyday speech communication situations. Thus, *CA* does not have a theoretical value similar to *URT* or constructivism, because McCroskey was not aiming at a theoretical value. Instead, McCroskey favors the practical value of the concept, derived from various studies of communication-bound anxiety (see also Pörhölä 1995:11-13). Thus, McCroskey has valued the principle of practice, while Berger and Delia have valued the principle of tradition. Berger and Delia connected their constructs, however, implicitly to a general philosophy of science, whereas McCroskey connected his construct to everyday expectations concerning speech communication.

From this perspective, the essence of *CA* can be given an in-depth analysis. *CA* must be discussed in terms of the prevailing tension between theory and practice (Craig 1991, Friedman 1992, Krayner 1988, Penman 1992, Smeltzer & Suchan 1991, see also Jarboe 1992, Phillips 1992). *CA* seems to be consistent with the arguments put forward by Friedman (1992:91-93) and particularly, Krayner (1988:341): "more research toward variant individuals and situations". Krayner (1988:343), who emphasizes that interpersonal communication researchers should remember that interactants in interpersonal encounters are not only objects, subjects or general agents but also consumers, thus clearly supports McCroskey's perspective.

Thus the argument of McCroskey (1984b:30-33) that one of the main aims of *CA* is to offer treatment possibilities can be understood in a larger context. *CA* does not approach apprehension exclusively as a psychological emotion, but as a problem of the consumer or client. Although *CA* may not contain similar heuristical scientific value as *URT* or constructivism, it is valuable because it can help to solve several practical problems of treating apprehension (Penman 1992:248). *CA* offers solutions to practical problems, whereas *URT* and constructivism approach people without such everyday expectations as 'how to decrease uncertainty' or 'how to interpret everyday constructions'. Therefore, *CA* may be a relatively appropriate concept in practice, although in the theoretical sense it is problematic (Penman 1992:248). *CA* is a reasonable construct, when considered from the perspective of Krayner and Penman, whereas *URT* is reasonable when regarded from the perspective of the general philosophy of science (see Smeltzer & Suchan 1991:181-182).

On the other hand, even assuming a practitioner perspective like this, *CA* still contains certain problems which do not emerge in the case of *URT*, or constructivism (see Craig 1989:97-98, Penman 1992:238-239). The main question, as far as *CA* is concerned, is what a practical perspective actually represents. In other words, what is the relevance and value of practicality for scientific interpersonal communication research? When interactants are considered as

paying consumers or clients, the construction of scientific explanations may be radically different from the heuristic perspective in which people are regarded as 'ordinary communicators'. As Phillips (1992:221) put it, it is more difficult "to tell the pale truth" when someone pays for the results than when research is carried out to find heuristic scientific explanations (see also Jarboe 1992). As the aim of the CA is to examine individuals as clients, the basic terms of CA may be dangerously client-bound, and simplified. Thus, different dimensions in the 'continuum of CA' (e.g. the terms 'trait-like CA', or 'situational CA') may only exist to show that CA appears in different everyday contexts. That is, person A may feel apprehension in certain situations only, while person B feels apprehension in all situations. These terms are so easy to understand that clients can relatively easily identify their own personal problem.

The same client-boundness can be seen in the analyses of the causes of CA. For example, according to McCroskey (1984b:25), the categorization of Buss (1984) that involves the notions of novelty, formality, and subordinate status is useful. The client can quite easily find a cause for his/her CA. However, there is no discussion on why precisely these concepts are used to describe CA, and why they should increase apprehension, and why the listing of Buss is seen as a particularly appropriate one. These terms were probably selected because they are practical. Still, there are questions to be asked: "Is 'formal communication' something that can be defined on the basis of behavior, or is it a matter of implicit judgements?" "What are the criteria of novelty?" These issues are not reflected upon in a way which might be expected in scientific argumentation. It is evident that, for example, formality and novelty will increase apprehension, and it is also evident that this is a significant issue in terms of the treatment of CA. However, from the heuristic perspective of science one must ask why it is that these fundamental issues in particular - traits and states - are considered important in CA, and what is the precise meaning of Buss's terms. These questions are open in CA.

Consequently, it is practically impossible to verify or falsify (or, analogically, justify or unjustify) the position of CA as a relevant construct. The notion of CA has been based on fact that people feel apprehension or reticence, and this fact has been studied by means of factor analysis and explained in its terms. One cannot dismiss these terms as irrelevant, because they are statistically correlated - as demonstrated by *PRCA* - with the reality of clients, or customers. On the other hand, one cannot claim that they are totally relevant either, because they are not theoretically (by theoretized statements) grounded. Consequently, CA escapes further metatheoretical considerations. In short, CA is a construct, which cannot - except for its practical dimensions - be epistemologically evaluated, because no criteria exist for this evaluation. McCroskey uses terminology, which is either epistemologically familiar (e.g. 'prediction') or generally known (e.g. 'novelty', or 'formality'), but he does not explicitly discuss these terms.

Thus, practicality seems to lead to problems which are quite difficult to solve in the ethical sense. The first problem is to be found in the economic dimension (see Phillips 1992). One of the main reasons for adopting the methodological choices of CA was in the interests of economy. The choice

between self-report methodology and other methodological possibilities has been justified by McCroskey (1970b:271) as follows:

Because the primary need for instrumentation for communication apprehension is a measure that can be administered easily to large number of individuals at low cost, physiological indexes were also ruled out. Mechanical devices for indexing physiological changes are relatively expensive and not available on many college campuses or in most elementary and secondary schools.

This argument is problematic in the sense that, as McCroskey himself has put it, *PRCA* is based on an 'easy and cheap to use' philosophy. 'Easy and cheap' may be practically appropriate and economically good, but scientifically it is extremely problematic. For example, McCroskey claims that although physiological measurements may be more reliable than self-reports, they must, in practice, be rejected because of their high costs. This is obviously a dangerous tendency in interpersonal communication research.

Another point in relation to the practicality and ethics of *CA* is the fact that its results easily lend themselves to 'administrative practicality'. Administrative practicality is obviously welcomed. However, if this is to be the primary criterion for making methodological choices, it will lead to obvious problems of objectivity. If financial support is granted because of administrative practicality, there is a danger that 'politically correct' results will be produced (see e.g. Thayer 1983). The use of a measure which is supported by administrative money should be followed by severe self-criticism. This is evident in the case of *PRCA*. Although the advantages of the *PRCA* methodology over observer ratings or "devices for indexing physiological changes" (McCroskey 1970b:270) are clear in any case, McCroskey justifies his choice by emphasizing its connections with the everyday practice of administration. McCroskey (1980:271) puts it as follows:

I selected the self-report scales approach, specifically the Likert-type scale. This approach has three major advantages. First, such scales are easy and inexpensive to administer. Second, they can tap anxiety responses across a variety of communication contexts at one time. Third, Likert-type self-report scales, when properly developed, normally are highly reliable.

On the basis of the above argument, it could be claimed that one of the main aims of developing *PRCA* is to sell it. Because it is inexpensive, it can be easily used. This argument may be logical from the client's, or customer's, viewpoint, but in terms of the ethics and heuristic aims of science this is problematic. In short, if the aim of *PRCA* is to be a scientific instrument, it should aim at objectivity, regardless of economic values. Hence, although *PRCA* is undoubtedly a valid tool of measurement, it is ethically problematic, because the actual values behind *CA* are not made explicit. If these values are merely economic, the success of *CA* as a measure for such existential issues as emotion, or apprehension, may be doubted.

5.3 The nature of constructions

As has been shown above, *URT*, constructivism and *CA* are, in the epistemological sense, very different. *URT* focuses on explanation and prediction, whereas constructivism deals with interpretation. *CA* stresses practical values. Despite these differences all three have, however, much in common: they are the most influential concepts in recent interpersonal communication research. It can be claimed that, following the perspective of Kuhn, they dominate the field. Thus, the aim of following chapters is to consider the paradigmatic nature of *URT*, constructivism and *CA*. If they really dominate the field, certain negative phenomena, such as normal science (see Chapter 2.2.), can be expected to appear. The question of normal science and paradigms is very important in relation to the argument presented in Chapter 6. In brief, paradigmatic analysis offers a tool for considering the state of the field. If no paradigms or normal science can be found, the field is, presumably, more open to epistemological discussion than it would be otherwise.

5.3.1 The paradigm of uncertainty reduction

Following Verronen's (1986) definition of a paradigm, it can be argued that every Kuhnian paradigm should express its ontological commitments, symbolic generalizations, exemplars, and values (see Chapter 2.2.1.). Therefore, if it can be shown that *URT* contains certain ontological commitments, certain symbolic generalizations, certain exemplars and certain values, it can be safely regarded as a paradigm. As shown in previous chapters, the ontological commitments of Berger and Calabrese are based on the principles of empiricism. As Neurath (1938/1955:5-7) emphasizes, from the perspective of empiricism all those views which include any metaphysical content, are actually pseudoscientific. Consequently, for instance, all assumptions derived from the dialectical philosophy of Hegel and involving the use of such terms as 'absolute' or 'world spirit' (see Hernadi 1987:271, Mannheim 1971:118-119, Wolman 1960:276) are supposed to be unscientific.

As argued above, Berger supports just such an ontological solution. Thus, the ontological commitments of *URT* are empiricist. Accordingly, the symbolic generalizations of *URT* are related to empiricist principles. As stated above in the analysis of the tradition behind *URT*, the structure of the theory clearly follows the laws of formal logic. Although axioms and theorems are presented in sentences in ordinary natural language, they are based on Hempelian logical variables and primitives. In practice the distinction between the principles of Carnap (1938/1955:179-181) and the application of Berger and Calabrese is small.

The third aspect in paradigmaticity (i.e. research exemplars) is also clear in the case of *URT*. Although *URT* is not connected with any particular measure in the way constructivism and *CA* are, the epistemological principles underlying the various measures of uncertainty are a coherent whole. Research exemplars can be divided into two main groups. According to Berger and Gudykunst (1991:31), in the first group "various aspects of communication itself have been indexed to estimate uncertainty levels". The second group is connected with Clatterbuck's (1979) research, in which the aim has been "to measure persons' subjective feelings of uncertainty about others" (Berger & Bradac 1985:18). These research exemplars, although based on the use of different measures, are both characteristics of *URT* in the sense that they are constituted to test and verify its axioms (see Clatterbuck 1979:147-149, Sherblom & Van Rheenen 1984:221-222). Both directions are consistent with the epistemology of *URT*, and try not to present a competing view.

The fourth paradigmatic dimension (i.e. a set of values for *URT*) is also relatively straightforward. Clearly, all the studies by Berger and his colleagues on *URT* are quantitative and strictly empiricist in character. Although empiricism excludes values from its manifesto, it can be argued that the fundamental principles of empiricism are in fact values themselves - although not 'transcendental' or 'ideal'. To claim that "these are the right principles of research" indicates the presence of certain implicit value judgements which, consequently, lead to certain practical solutions (see Johannesen 1990:1, also e.g. Neurath 1938/1955:1-5). The values of empiricism are typical of *URT*, as *URT* is clearly linked to the ideology of empiricism. This ideology suggests the use of empirical data, objective methods of analysis, and the aim of verifying of its hypotheses. The studies by Parks and Adelman (1983), or Kellermann (1993), are a good example. A strictly quantitative perspective and empiricist *Weltanschauung* are characteristic of studies made within the framework of *URT*.

All four aspects of paradigm discussed above can be summed up as follows. On the one hand, there is no particular reason to deny that *URT* is a paradigm. On the contrary, *URT* has several characteristics which would seem to justify the claim that it is, indeed, a paradigm. But whether these features are strong enough to actually legitimate this claim is not certain. It may not be wise to claim that *URT* aims to occupy a dominant position and that it seeks the role of a normal science within interpersonal communication research. In other words, in order to argue that *URT* belongs to the sphere of normal science it would have to be demonstrated that Berger and his colleagues have been setting themselves in opposition to competing theories.

Indeed, it may be possible to find certain features in recent interpersonal communication research - in relation to *URT* - which could be interpreted as signs of competition between paradigms. First, it has been attempted to replace the *primus motor* of *URT*, the interactants' aim of decreasing the level of uncertainty in interaction, by another concept, the interactants' desire to increase the predicted outcomes of the interaction (Sunnafrank 1986a, 1990). Second, the process of uncertainty reduction as a stagnant process has been critically discussed recently by Honeycutt (1993). Third, the potential problems within the

Berger's epistemological framework have been pointed out, for instance, by Delia (1977b).

All these aspects can be interpreted as signs of scientific dispute. However, it may be an exaggeration to argue that there is a real paradigmatic fight in progress; for example, Berger's (1986b:36-37) reply to Sunnafrank (1986a) that "predicted outcome values are no more or less important to relationship development than is uncertainty reduction". Evidently, it is Berger's aim to achieve a conceptual consensus. Also Sunnafrank (1986b:39) agrees that the most important issue is the dialogue, not the fight. Similar qualities can be observed in the Berger's commentary (1993) on Honeycutt (1993) in which he does *not* claim that Honeycutt's argumentation is unreasonable or false. Berger emphasizes, however, that the empirical data concerning *URT* is not yet complete: "it is obvious that a large number of open questions remain concerning the mechanism by which cognitive structures and processes are translated into communicative actions" (Berger 1993:500).

Consequently, although meeting the formal expectations, or the 'formal criteria', of a Kuhnian paradigm, there is no rational reason to argue that *URT*, as represented by Berger and Calabrese is a genuine paradigm in interpersonal communication research. Although the position of the theory is strong and exhibits the requisite formal criteria to be a paradigm, it seems that the researchers and scholars working within *URT* do not act as if it were a fighting paradigm. Berger and his colleagues obviously do not claim that alternative views are unscientific or impossible.

5.3.2 Paradigm and constructivism

Compared with *URT*, the position of constructivism is different in the sense that the paradigmaticity of constructivism has been thoroughly discussed quite recently. Burleson's (1989) approach is interesting not only because of its object but also because of its purely Kuhnian perspective. Burleson, observing the views of Kuhn about the progress of science, examines the characteristics of constructivism. Burleson (1989:30) argues as follows:

Constructivistic theory and research concerning person-centered communication does not, in any strong sense, constitute a Kuhnian paradigm, primarily because this line of research has not won over a large number of adherents from other schools; Kuhn emphasizes that the consensual recognition and acceptance of a research achievement by members of the community is critical to his notion of a paradigm.

Burleson is undoubtedly correct in arguing for the unparadigmaticity of constructivism. However, it must be noted that constructivism also contains certain features which can be called paradigmatic in the formal sense. In the paradigmatic sense, these features are fairly similar to *URT*, although, by their epistemological substance, they are often utterly opposed to *URT*.

In the ontological sense, constructivism is clearly far more open than *URT*. That is, in constructivism the validity, or testability of scientific research is not seen as the central issue. Constructivism concentrates on cognitive constructs, which, clearly, cannot be manipulated or controlled. Hence, at least in principle, constructivism accepts a variety of ontological views - like religious and ethical statements - such as they appear in communicators' everyday lives. This is naturally an ontological commitment as well as conforming to Berger's empiricist view.

The symbolic generalizations of constructivism are connected to the key definitions of constructivism. That is, cognitive complexity (*CC*) is obviously not merely the main term of constructivism in the way self-monitoring and self-consciousness are in the case of *URT*. *CC* and its nature are connected in a solid manner to the constructivist research program. Thus, in *CC* one can find not only a symbolic tool, but also a method for the understanding of constructivism as a whole. Finally, constructivism also includes several research exemplars. This paradigmatic side of constructivism has been emphasized also by Burleson (1989:30). As Burleson (1989:30) argues, it must be noted how early constructivist studies "served as 'accepted examples of scientific practice'; these examples included 'law, theory, application, and instrumentation together', and provided models from which sprang a 'coherent tradition of scientific research'."

Finally, the values of constructivism are connected, through Delia's *Weltanschauung*, to the values of interpretive science. The aim of constructivism is to make person-centered research, respecting individual cognitions in interpersonal communication. Although these *Weltanschauung* values are not necessarily actualized and concretized very well in the research exemplars (the *RCQ*, for example, is very dominant in the field and leads to a statistical perspective), they are clearly to be observed in the manifesto-like article of Delia (1977b). In other words, certain scientific values have been chosen, although they do not necessarily appear in the research reality of the studies of Delia and his colleagues.

In short, there are good reasons to argue that constructivism is a paradigm in interpersonal communication research. However, because it is obvious that constructivism has not expressed explicit signs of competition, this statement might be an exaggeration - at least in the present situation. According to Burleson (1989:42-43), it can be said that constructivism includes certain pre-paradigmatic features (see also Olson 1994:59), which, from Kuhn's point of view, relate to the aim to construct a normal science, but these features are potential, not actual. One such potential feature is the strong position of the *RCQ* in constructivism. The position of the *RCQ* in constructivism is so strong that it seems to be more than just a measure.

The *RCQ* has clearly been chosen as *the* measure of constructivism. In fact, there are several reasons for improving the measure, because the principles behind the *RCQ* and the original aims of constructivism are clearly different. However, these improvements have not been made. The reason for this stagnation might be found in the assumption that the position of the *RCQ* is so strong because the paradigmatically successful research examples of Delia and his associates are largely based on the *RCQ*. Therefore, potential changes in the

RCQ could be interpreted as failure on the part of both the RCQ and the constructivist examples. A remodification of the RCQ would suggest that there is a reliability problem in constructivism.

It must be emphasized that reflections like this are extremely hypothetical. There are no reasons to claim that the position of the RCQ is based on a defence against competing theoretical frameworks. However, it must be noted that the position of the RCQ in constructivism is extraordinary, as it clearly can be shown that the RCQ cannot be considered the best possible measure for constructivism. Consequently, it is crucial to discuss the position of the RCQ. One answer, Kuhnian in nature, is the fact that constructivism is making preparations to move towards a position as a normal science. From this perspective, the monothetic position of the RCQ is more understandable.

5.3.3 The paradigm of communication apprehension

If the position of the instrument of measurement is strong in constructivism, for CA the instrument actually forms the core of the whole framework. While in URT and constructivism the measure is aimed to justify, verify, test or support the theory, in CA this hierarchical order could be claimed to be reversed. PRCA has been the main channel making CA well-known, legitimized, and widely accepted in speech communication research. CA has not been presented to the scientific community primarily because of its theoretical value, but because of the benefits produced by PRCA. As it has been noticed, this heuristically and also ethically quite extraordinary order does not necessarily imply that CA as a conception is unscientific. What it does mean, however, is that the potential paradigmaticity of CA is strongly based on the paradigmatic influence of PRCA. In other words, the discussion of the paradigmatic nature of CA must also include an examination of PRCA. From the paradigmatic perspective, it is important to note that the position of PRCA is central in considering the paradigmatic reality of CA.

In addition, CA should be shown to contain certain characteristics, if it is to be seen as a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. These characteristics are not very different from the features found in URT or constructivism. First, the framework of CA includes obvious symbolic generalizations. These are related, for example, to the different types of apprehension (see Chapter 4.4.2.). Unlike URT, these generalizations of CA are not logical (in the sense of formal logic) and cannot be hierarchically systematized. McCroskey's terminology does not follow the laws of causality and neither it is logically formulated (Chapter 5.2.3.). However, these different types of CA are to be seen as symbolic generalizations in the same sense as the logical constructs of URT.

A set of successful exemplars is naturally high for CA because of the widely spread use of PRCA. The position of PRCA as a measure of CA seems to be absolute. That is, although there are competing scales of measurement - such as Burgoon's (1976) *Unwillingness to communicate scale* or the *Shyness scales* of

Cheek and Buss (1984) and Zimbardo (1978) - *PRCA* is clearly the strongest among them (see Sallinen-Kuparinen 1986:13-22). In that sense *PRCA* does not meet much competition. Furthermore, as *PRCA* has been developed by McCroskey, whose own activity and position in *CA* research is strong, it is to be expected that the position of the *PRCA* will be strong as well.

From this point of view there is one crucial difference between constructivism and *CA*. While the *RCQ* does not seem to be the best possible instrument, in view of the aims of constructivist theory and while improvements in the measure seem to be impending, in *CA* certain amendments to the measuring instrument have been made quite frequently. One evident reason to this difference is that McCroskey's position in the field is different from that of Delia. Although they can both be considered key authors in their respective areas, McCroskey has developed his research tool himself, whereas the *RCQ* was originally developed by Crockett. As all versions of *PRCA* have been developed by McCroskey, he has been able to modify his instrument and reinterpret its effects.

The third paradigmatic aspect (i.e. a set of values concerning *CA*), is also relatively unproblematic, although clearly different from both *URT* and constructivism. While the aim of these two frameworks is to provide intellectually alternative scientific perspectives on interpersonal communication, the aims of *CA* are closely related to the management of everyday speech communication. Hence, its values are practical. Nevertheless, it is clear that *CA* incorporates values, just as do *URT* and constructivism, but also that these values are different (i.e. practical vs. explanatory).

To sum up, *CA* seems to be a paradigmatic construct. However, in comparison with *URT* or constructivism, there is one significant distinction. While both Berger and Delia have made their ontological perspective manifest, McCroskey has not written about the ontological dimension of *CA*, or apprehension in general. In that sense, *CA* is ontologically empty. One alternative is to argue, however, that the ontology of *CA* is related to the practicality of the concept. In short, it is possible that the practicality of *CA* can be used to compensate for its lack of an ontological dimension. Although *CA* is, in the ontological sense, empty, *CA* is such a successful construct that ontological emptiness is not necessarily a critical issue.⁴⁰

From this point of view it is possible to present the hypothesis that the position of *CA* is probably as strong as that of constructivism or *URT*, although the latter fulfil the paradigmatic norms more completely. The ontological assumptions may not be necessary, because a paradigmatic position can be achieved as easily by the evidence of *PRCA* as by the strength of ontological assumptions. Thus, *CA* does not necessarily *need* ontological assumptions in

⁴⁰ It can be claimed that the use of both self-reports and the Likert-scale implies that McCroskey can actually be seen to hold a prominent position between different traditions. By using self-reports McCroskey adheres to a person-centered alternative, similar to Delia, whose perspective is bound up with hermeneutics and phenomenology. On the other hand, since *PRCA* is based on the use of a scale, McCroskey's research can also be seen from a quantitative perspective. From this point of view, McCroskey is related to Berger.

order to be paradigmatic.⁴¹ Considering the development of science in the Kuhnian sense, this possibility is interesting because it is clearly risk-free to CA. Ontological considerations are assumptions by their very nature, and they cannot be claimed to be 'true' or 'false' in the same sense as empirical data. Consequently, it can be argued that CA uses different means than constructivism or URT in order to realize a dominant position.

However, it is quite clear that although CA can be shown to be potentially paradigmatic, no actual paradigm of CA exists. The dimensions of CA discussed above, are paradigmatic in the Kuhnian sense, but *only* in a preparadigmatic sense (see Rosengren 1989:24-26). That is, CA, URT and constructivism are all potential paradigms, but none of them act in the way typical of a paradigm. In other words, it is possible that present development will lead to paradigm formation in the future. For the present, however, the argument that actual fighting paradigms exist in the field, cannot be justified. For example, McCroskey, Berger and Delia are all very tolerant towards competing constructs. Thus McCroskey, for example, does not argue against the other directions, but emphasizes that all types of research within the area of CA share a common goal. In that sense, although CA, constructivism, and URT are different as constructs and contain different characteristics, they are, paradigmatically thinking, equal. Although Berger, Delia and McCroskey follow a different guideline in their research and have different aims scientifically, none attacks other frameworks. Hence, their arguments are not those typical of a paradigm.

⁴¹ This possibility has been considered, especially by Lakatos (1970), who argues that the most crucial issue considering the question of 'who or what achieves a dominant position in science' is methodology. According to Lakatos (1970:132-134), methodological evidence is, in fact, a more crucial issue than new theory; it is easier to construct a theory than to show that a theory provides empirical success. Because of that methodology has a specific value.

6 THE PATH FORWARD

6.1 Towards a new formulation of theories

As the paradigmatic analysis of uncertainty reduction theory, constructivism and communication apprehension implies, there are no distinct Kuhnian paradigms, or a normal science to be observed, in the field of interpersonal communication research. Thus, in the paradigmatic sense there are no substantial obstacles to free development in the field. Although all these theoretical constructs are strong and important, their nature is not directly paradigmatic. Therefore, it is possible, and also sensible, to approach these frameworks as structures that are paradigmatically 'open'. This openness implies that Berger, Delia and McCroskey have been open-minded enough to consider new perspectives for their work. In other words, the researchers working within these frameworks have obviously not 'closed' their conceptualization, or viewpoint or their scientific communities in order to protect their theories from the influence of other approaches. Instead, new perspectives and new inventions are readily discussed.⁴²

That does not mean, however, that the three prominent figures discussed above would eagerly welcome critical reconsideration. For example, it is difficult to imagine that Berger would turn round to claim that, in the last resort, *URT* is not a rational construction. It is to be expected that scientists will

⁴² It must be emphasized, however, that this argument is based on the articles by Berger, Delia and McCroskey in various journals and books. Illustrations of this lenient attitude can be found in Applegate and Delia (1980), who discuss Bernstein's theory of speech codes, in Berger's (1993) reply to the criticism of Honeycutt (1993), and in McCroskey and Richmond's (1990) response to Burgoon (1976). In these texts, the authors clearly point out that they are not against other competing constructs.

defend their own constructs and scientific arguments. This natural defence of one's theory must be, however, distinguished from paradigmaticity. Both the openness of the constructs and the nonparadigmaticity of the field imply nothing more than that it can be expected that new perspectives will not be paradigmatically attacked. That is, if the epistemologically-oriented 'new wave' researchers, to use Littlejohn's (1992) terminology, are disposed to express their argument in terms of a theory, it is not likely that they will be attacked by the representatives of a normal science.⁴³

Instead, researchers actually seem to be waiting for new ideas to emerge (see Berger 1991:112, Littlejohn 1992:376-383, Lustig 1986:452-453, 458). Hence, alternative perspectives seem to be impending, and both theoretical modification and new interpersonal communication theories must be allowed for. There is no leading paradigm that would decline these critical considerations. Therefore, the reason for the relatively low number of new theoretical inventions and the failure of the theoretical 'wake-up project' (see Berger & Chaffee 1988:318) of the last few years is to be found in other than paradigmatical problems.

But what are these other problems? In order to clarify this, two dimensions of recent interpersonal communication research have to be considered. First, the situation of the new wave theorists must be considered. Who are these new theorists, and why have they not produced notable inventions? Second, the possibilities and difficulties that lie within the field itself together with their effect on these new theorists must be examined. In short, the relationship between the theorists and the field must be scrutinized

The first dimension of this two-fold issue implies that the most urgent problem in interpersonal communication research consists of the new wave researchers themselves. As Phillips (1992) argues, those who are actually ready for a theoretical reconsideration are very few. Seen from this perspective, the field itself is not the problem, but the active new scientist is. This is one of the main points in Berger's (1991) critical essay concerning communication theories and graduate communication students. Berger (1991:108-109) distinguishes two main themes in his criticism of graduate students. First, there is the question of theoretical motivation. According to Berger (1991:108), "persons who select themselves into graduate communication programs ... are not motivated to develop communication theory." In other words, there are no new wave theorists because the students are not motivated to work towards such a goal.

Following Berger, one reason for this unmotivation is a desire to find easy solutions. Thus, Berger's second theme is the laziness he has observed among graduate students. According to Berger (1991:108), students are looking for pathways "to such enterprises as teaching communication skills, engaging in organizational consulting activities, and becoming market researchers." Berger is obviously aiming, at least in part, at being provocative. It must be noted that the claim that it is graduate students who are guilty of theoretical stagnation is

⁴³ It can be claimed, however, that paradigmaticity has an affect 'under the surface'. For example, it is possible, as Bohm and Peat (1987:63-76) argue in their discussion of physics, that scholars tend to ignore difficult opinions in their everyday practice (e.g. in teaching). These dimensions do not fall within the scope of this study, however.

extraordinary. If the older researchers and teachers cannot find new solutions and new inventions, how should the students be able to find them?

On the other hand, Berger's opinion can be understood as a sign of his dissatisfaction with the general unwillingness to initiate theoretical enterprises. This observation is alarming in any case. Berger's observation resembles Popper's (1970:53) well-known comments on 'dangerously lazy students':

They [engineering students] merely wanted to 'know the facts'. Theories or hypotheses which were not 'generally accepted' but problematic, were unwanted: they made the students uneasy. These students wanted to know only those things, those facts, which they might apply with a good conscience, and without heartsearching.

That is, Berger's arguments refer to the common desire to solve questions already solved, without taking a healthy scientific risk. This is relevant criticism in itself, regardless of what actually prompts it. It is obvious that the robust research tradition of interpersonal communication, which was described in Chapter 1.4., faces severe problems. New inventions are lacking. Whether or not it is wise to accuse graduate students of causing these problems, Berger's criticism itself deserves closer discussion. Whatever its reason, new questions are not welcome within the field.

Probably the best answer to this problem can be found in the confusion that besets the field itself. For example, as can be seen in Appendix 1, nearly 100 theoretically-oriented (TA) articles were published in communication journals between 1982 and 1992. This data seems to indicate that a theoretical orientation prevails in the field.⁴⁴ Instead of attributing it to laziness, there should be investigation into why the field does not offer new theoretical opportunities. Maybe the field itself is so problematic that new directions are difficult to locate, however high one's motivation.

The theoretical problems of interpersonal communication imply two things. First, there is a need for investigation into why new theoretical solutions are so difficult to find. Second, an inquiry must be launched into how this problem could be solved in research practice. In other words, the most problematic features in the field must first be located. Then, the reason for these problem areas must be reflected on. My hypothesis is that *the most essential reason for the lack of new theoretical solutions is that the field lacks the kind of new philosophical perspectives which could lead to the development of new theories*. Accordingly, it is argued here that the problem does not concern the theories as such, but the philosophical and, hence, epistemological background to these theories. As the arguments in Chapter 2 point out, the question whether interpersonal

⁴⁴ On the other hand, Berger is correct in arguing that many of these articles refer to relatively 'old' theories (such as field theory, personality theory or information theory). Furthermore, the number of 'new' theories is undoubtedly small and they have not widely been discussed. For example, information manipulation theory, persuasive argument theory, contingency rules theory or coordinated management of meaning theory, presented in communication journals between 1982 and 1992, were discussed in one or two articles only. There were no actual theoretical debates in communication journals as a result of these articles.

communication research is to be considered interpretive, predictive, critical, analytical, descriptive or prescriptive is, in the epistemological sense, unsolved (Pearce 1977). Not only is the number of different theories high, but so also is the number of different metatheoretical viewpoints.

The aim of the following considerations is to seek solutions to the problems above. I will argue that phenomenology solves two major problems. It shows to new wave students and researchers that we have to pay specific attention to interpretation. Profound interpretation is, as Burke (1935/1965) has observed, one of the most crucial features of human life. Therefore, prediction, prescription and an analytical perspective may be important terms, but they are not as significant as interpretation. Furthermore, phenomenology shows that a tradition-oriented approach may be very fruitful in practice. This is an interesting observation in the light of Berger's arguments. Traditions, such as phenomenology, lead to new theories. The question as to why phenomenology should be brought into interpersonal communication studies is therefore two-fold. First, it clarifies the metatheory of interpersonal communication. Second, it leads to the development of new theories.

It must be stressed, however, that my aim is not to reject or ignore empiricism. As the following considerations will show, phenomenology does not imply that we have to forget what empiricism-oriented studies have invented. Without empiricism, such frameworks as *URT* would not exist in the field. The same can be argued, say, about exchange theory and information theory (see Chapter 1.4.). Empiricism has been a very valuable tradition. In the current situation, however, phenomenology offers a more appropriate perspective. Empiricism was necessary between the 1940s and 1970s, when interpersonal communication theories were created. I assume that phenomenology is needed now. Its epistemology can help us to overcome current problems.

The aim of the following sections is to justify the arguments above. First, it will be pointed out what epistemological considerations imply in practice. In other words, the question as to why it is essential to examine traditions will be approached in a detailed manner. After that, the metatheoretical assumptions of *URT*, constructivism and *CA* will be rethought. The primary issue in this rethinking is what changes phenomenology effects in terms of interpersonal communication theories.

6.2 Theoretical alternatives

6.2.1 Epistemological questions

First, the epistemological choices of certain theories will be discussed. Why, for instance, is the epistemology of *URT* the one that it is? What is the main reason for assuming that the empiricist perspective is the most suitable for the analysis

of the phenomena of uncertainty reduction? These issues can be approached by adopting the explanation that selection is based on the sociological aspects of science. A Kuhnian perspective like this has been used, for instance, by Mendelsohn (1977) and Van den Daele (1977), who argue that scientific commitments are based on authorities, institutionalizations and social relations (see Colvin 1977:124, Mendelsohn 1977:12-18, Van den Daele 1977:45-48).

However, although social relations have, as the Kuhnian philosophy of science clearly implies, an important role in the acceptance of epistemological commitments, the substance of these commitments, or the essence of the actual epistemology itself, must be considered primary. Although paradigmatic, and, hence, sociological and psychological issues, are important in the general philosophy of science, the development of science must depend primarily on epistemological views, and, therefore, on epistemological values, not on the sociological commitments behind them. In short, although scientific communities exert an influence on epistemological questions in the sense that epistemological views cannot spread to scientific communities without the influence of scientists, without epistemology itself there is nothing to spread.

Therefore the essence of epistemology must be considered. First, the relation of *URT* to empiricism, and, on the other hand, the relation of constructivism to the interpretive view are discussed. Furthermore, the criteria for choosing a certain epistemology for a certain theory is discussed. In addition, the possibility of swapping the epistemologies of *URT* and constructivism is discussed. What if *URT* were to be based on an interpretive view, and constructivism on empiricism? In other words, how well-grounded are the existing epistemological choices? It is possible, for instance, to analyze uncertainty in an alternative way, by replacing the principles of empiricism with an interpretive perspective, following the philosophy of phenomenology, or that of hermeneutics? The aim of Berger and Calabrese has been to construct a predictive, explanatory and objective theory. Would it be possible to analyze uncertainty as a subjective and non-predictable phenomenon?

Moreover, some further questions concerning the epistemology of *URT* can be presented. First, what is the reason for the assumption that uncertainty is a state of mind, in the sense that its causal effects will either increase or decrease? Uncertainty is, undoubtedly, one of the major issues of human knowledge.⁴⁵ Therefore, how reasonable is it to claim that such human emotions or states of mind as uncertainty, for example, can be controlled and predicted in the way implied in *URT*?

As these questions show, there are no evident obstacles to creating a critically-oriented epistemology of *URT*. The same situation applies to constructivism. In the case of constructivism, the critical epistemology turns to a different direction, however. The aim of Delia and his colleagues has been to devise an interpretive theory. But constructs could also be approached - as, for example, Jackson (1982) has suggested - in logical terms, following the perspective of empiricism. There are at least two further questions concerning constructivism. First, what are the grounds for supposing that the interpretation

⁴⁵ See e.g. discussion on certainty by Peirce (1957:10-29) or Russell (1912/1989:90-91).

of constructs is a relevant project in interpersonal communication research? Second, why stress interpretation, if the most general explanation can be found in terms of causal behavior?⁴⁶ If one's behavior can be explained by using general logical terms, why is the interpretation of constructs necessary?

As has been shown by the discussion above, constructivism and *URT* face different directions in the epistemological sense. Epistemologically, they represent alternative world-views. McCroskey, on the other hand, has chosen not to articulate his epistemological views. However, although *CA* is different from constructivism and *URT* in the sense that it does not seem to contain epistemological or ontological commitments, it is also possible to reinterpret it. Consequently, at least the following question arises: Why is *CA* considered primarily a practical construction? It could surely be modified to satisfy theoretical expectations. It seems to be unfortunate, for example, that the epistemology of general phenomenological apprehension (as discussed by e.g. Heidegger or Sartre) has not been considered.

The aim of the following sections is not only to show that epistemological reconsiderations are possible, and, indeed, necessary, but also to argue that it is possible to construct a reasonable epistemological alternative for the study of interpersonal communication. Thus, the discussion focuses on the question of finding the most accommodating and appropriate epistemological alternative for theories of interpersonal communication. The aim of this alternative is to constitute a preliminary answer to the question of how to build new theories of interpersonal communication - one of the most interesting problems in recent interpersonal communication research. This question will be discussed from two perspectives. On the one hand, the most fruitful solution - both rationally and intellectually - will be sought. On the other hand, we shall try to find the solution that best opens new perspectives, given the current state of interpersonal communication research. First, different epistemological alternatives of the three frameworks are examined.

6.2.2 A phenomenological theory of uncertainty

If the epistemology of *URT* is critically approached, new epistemological solutions are self-evident. The perspective of empiricism does not necessarily provide the best solution. On the contrary, as previous criticism implies, other epistemological solutions may have more justification. One of the central epistemological problems presented by *URT* is that, according to Berger and Calabrese, uncertainty is the variable that determines the outcome of a communication process. However, uncertainty is then essentially disconnected from its origin. Uncertainty is fundamentally an emotion, or a feeling of uncertainty, not a variable.

⁴⁶ Following the principle of Occam's razor.

It is possible, however, to construct a new theoretical framework in which uncertainty in interpersonal communication is taken into account. Here, I will give a brief outline of a *phenomenological theory of uncertainty (PTU)*. This theory competes with *URT*, in the epistemological sense, as it attempts to show that uncertainty can be approached from a perspective that is epistemologically different from that of Berger and Calabrese. At the same time, it must be stressed that *PTU* cannot displace *URT*. This would be a naive assumption. *PTU* is, in the traditional sense, an alternative approach to the phenomenon of uncertainty. In contrast with the empiricism-oriented perspective of Berger and Calabrese, *PTU* applies phenomenological principles to the analysis of interpersonal communication.

Compared with *URT*, *PTU* emphasizes two dimensions of uncertainty in interpersonal communication. First, according to *PTU*, uncertainty is an inseparable part of human existence. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that uncertainty decreases according to a causal law, because of the process of interpersonal communication itself (see Merten 1977:122-123). Types of uncertainty may change as one communicates, but uncertainty as an elementary part of human existence always remains. This statement is consistent with the argument of the phenomenological nature of uncertainty presented by Heidegger (1927/1962). Uncertainty can be compared to such fundamental existential emotions as care (*Sorge*) and anxiety (*Angst*). When individuals are anxious or uncertain, they obviously tend to do something to decrease the strength of these emotions, as Newcomb (1952/1965) argues. However, as Heidegger (1927/1962:228-244) has observed, care, anxiety and uncertainty cannot be wiped away. Although in everyday life it is possible momentarily to forget the limits of human life, eventually one must face these aspects in one's being. Thus, care, or anxiety cannot be solved or treated. Although they can be temporarily relieved, ultimately one must face them.

The same applies to uncertainty. The more one tries to decrease one's uncertainty by acquiring knowledge, or as Newcomb (1952/1965:187-188) puts it, information, the more one actually knows what he/she does not know. This accords with Plato's cynical observation in the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus* that the more one knows the more one knows what one does not know. Hence, the less one is uncertain, the more uncertain one actually is. In that way uncertainty is intimately related to Heideggerian (1959/1991) care. Whatever human beings do, they know that they cannot be sure that it is the right thing to do. This is because every act will lead to other acts, the consequences of which cannot be determined (see Husserl 1970). That is, one cannot know what actually happens when one acts as one does (Ketonen 1981:173-174). Because of this indefinite open future, one feels care and, therefore, one is bound to be uncertain.⁴⁷

In addition to these phenomenological aspects of uncertainty, it is also necessary to reconstruct the empirical objectivity of *URT*. When phenomenological principles are followed, uncertainty cannot be considered as an objective issue that relates to interpersonal communication and

⁴⁷ It must be stressed that this argumentation is highly hypothetical. That is, there is no empirical evidence so far which would support the above arguments.

communicators. The process of communication itself does not change uncertainty. Uncertainty changes as one's feelings toward the interaction change. Thus, the actual measure for the increase or decrease of uncertainty must be reconsidered. These terms must be *subjective* in nature, because the feeling of uncertainty - like care and anxiety - is subjective. Therefore, the process of increase or decrease in uncertainty occurs only if one is subjectively capable and willing. In other words, uncertainty does not decrease because of the interaction process, but because of one's own emotional and cognitive processes.⁴⁸

Because these personal processes depend on one's subjective emotions and cognitions, it is necessary to consider what the actual relationship between consciousness and uncertainty is. As has been noted, from the phenomenological point of view one can never solve or bypass the question of uncertainty permanently. This fact is the most essential determinant in considering uncertainty in interpersonal encounters. Even though people experience a decrease in uncertainty in certain interpersonal encounters, or at certain phases of those encounters, uncertainty always increases in other encounters, or in other events. In other words, the more interactants know about each other, the more they also know what they do not know. Hence, analogically with Heidegger's claims, interactants must eventually accept that they cannot be sure about each other.

This acceptance must in turn lead to the acceptance of uncertainty. Uncertainty is thus, as Berger and Calabrese have pointed out, an inseparable part of interpersonal relations. However, contrary to the assumption of Berger and Calabrese, knowledge and information exchange between interactants does not imply a decrease in uncertainty. On the contrary, it could be claimed, following the logics of *URT*, that the more interactants know, the more uncertain they are, because they become aware of all those emerging questions that are impossible to solve.

Thus the total number of different ways of experiencing uncertainty in interpersonal encounters can never be completely estimated. Although the feeling that uncertainty decreases in relation to certain matters may be true, the feeling that there are other reasons for feeling uncertainty in other matters, is equally true. Consequently, the total sum of uncertainty remains stable. As in the case of Heidegger's philosophy, the best grounds for *PTU* can be found in everyday experiences. The perspective in which uncertainty is approached as a totality means, for example, that it is theoretically impossible to determine a situation in which one would *not* feel uncertainty. As 'common sense' tells us, whenever one realizes that one is no longer uncertain in regard to a certain issue, one inevitably finds another issues in which uncertainty appears. For example (by analogy with an example presented by Berger & Gardner & Parks & Schulman & Miller 1976), if person A asks about B's emotions towards A, and B answers that he/she likes A, A must always consider what 'liking' means to B. If A asks what B means, and B gives a definition, A must consider what this definition means. If A asks what this definition means in terms of the

⁴⁸ This consideration is partially consistent with Baxter (1988:272), who stresses "people's relational experiences" in connection with uncertainty reduction.

relationship between A and B, and B answers that it means that B likes to be with A, A must wonder what B means by 'being with'. This chain of open questions cannot be cut. Uncertainty, in one form or another, remains.

As this example, perhaps familiar from any interpersonal relationship, shows, a given uncertainty usually leads to other uncertainties. Thus, unlike in Berger and Calabrese's theory, uncertainty may appear as a chain. In many cases uncertainty actually increases where it is expected to decrease, because it changes in form towards more complex formats. Therefore, as Baxter (1988:272) has pointed out, uncertainty reduction theory oversimplifies interpersonal encounters. Uncertainty can be momentarily reduced, but never eliminated. When one issue is clear, a new kind of uncertainty takes place.

As this argument indicates, the relationship between uncertainty and the development of interpersonal relationships must be rethought. In *URT*, the basic assumption is that people try to avoid unpleasant emotions, like uncertainty, and that they reach certain developmental stages in their relationships. It must be asked, however, whether such avoidance is possible, and, therefore, whether there are developmental stages to be observed. *URT* does not examine who is supposed to judge the stage of development. Ultimately, it cannot be known whether the relationship between interactants actually develops, even though they produce and exchange information. For example, if one interactant produces false information and others notice it, are we dealing with development? It can be called development in the sense that others will learn not to trust a liar, but is this a general criterion. How can we safely use a concept like 'development', if it is practically impossible to define it in interpersonal encounters? (see e.g. Vangelisti 1994:75-77.)

As can be seen, *PTU* emphasizes that all interactants in interpersonal encounters have the ability to make critical evaluations. That is, people obviously know when uncertainty decreases or increases. Whenever one feels uncertainty decrease, one also knows that the feeling of decreasing uncertainty might be misleading. Consequently, because of the evaluative nature of human consciousness, it must be stated that uncertainty is always controlled by subjective choices. Individuals know in their subjective reality what they feel. Uncertainty decreases in some questions, if interactants take this to be a sensible solution. However, this solution is based on subjective decision-making.

Thus, the epistemology of *PTU* is based on the assumption that the most meaningful issue in the case of uncertainty in interpersonal encounters is the interactants' free will. Instead of emphasizing uncertainty as a level, or a variable, uncertainty is approached as an emotion, which is inevitable. According to *PTU*, uncertainty will not totally disappear in any circumstances. In *PTU*, uncertainty is seen as a self-sufficient emotion, while in *URT* the most important aspect has been to study the consequences of uncertainty in different contexts. Due to these differences, the causal logical structure of *URT* cannot be accepted in the *PTU* approach. On the contrary, *PTU* argues that uncertainty usually increases because of the never-ending chain of new uncertainties concerning the other interactants.

6.2.3 The formal theory of constructivism

In principle, an epistemologically emphasized reconsideration of constructivism is similar to the analysis of *URT*. The most elementary question is the same: What are the most fundamental underpinnings of a to constructivist epistemological solution? In other words, why is the constructivist program based on hermeneutics and phenomenology, instead of empiricism? An epistemological critique of constructivism leads to one crucial conclusion: it is probable that because of its epistemological nature, constructivism cannot provide the best possible evidence for the phenomena it studies. An approach in which constructs are seen in terms of formal logic provides more generalizable results.

Thus, I will present an outline for a *formal theory of constructs (FTC)*, which claims that, because a logically formulated theory of constructs gives more reliable and valid information about cognitive phenomena, it is able to examine constructs more successfully than Delia's constructivism. While constructivism, as an interpretive theory, cannot predict the consequences of certain constructs, the logical formulation of *FTC* is able to present the aspects of both prediction and explanation very clearly. In its most general and elementary form, *FTC* can be formulated according to few simple principles. Thus, the most elementary theoretical statement of *FTC* is the following:

$$\text{Co}_n \rightarrow \text{Be}_m$$

(Co = construction, n = type of construction, Be = behavior, m = type of behavior)

According to this formulation, an interpersonal construction (Co) implicates a behavior (Be).⁴⁹ Although the formulation is general, it will explain and predict individual behavior. To modify an analogical example of Pearce (1977:21-31), if a person A feels that a person B is his enemy, A probably tends to act differently than if B were considered a friend. Thus, the construct (Co), the type of which (n) is 'enemy', implies that A's communicative behavior (Be) is of a certain type (m). This sentence is logically valid also in the opposite case, in which A considers B as his/her friend. Only the type of construction, and consequently the type of behavior changes.⁵⁰

This argumentation and its causal formulation can naturally be criticized by claiming - as also shown in the previous criticism of *URT* - that human consciousness does not work mechanistically, on the basis of given 'brain-states' (Rorty 1979:86). However, this criticism is based on the presupposition that

⁴⁹ It must be stressed that this sentence is probably a matter of deontic or epistemic logic. This will be considered in following section, when the idea of the 'speaker's logic' is discussed. As the arguments of Vickers (1969) and von Wright (1985) point out, this does not mean, however, that causal relations cannot be observed.

⁵⁰ As in the case of *URT*, this argument is hypothetical. There is no empirical evidence so far which would support this formulation.

human consciousness behaves according to rules that are not implicative in character. Then the precise nature of these rules would need to be indicated. In short, how is it possible to consider human communication as rational, if cognitive processes are not supposed to be logical (see Schnädelbach 1989:1920)? The aim of *FTC* is, therefore, to show that causal logic and cognitive constructions function according to the same basic rules. The fact that interactants in interpersonal encounters do not simply follow certain mechanical brain-states, but have, for example, feelings and emotions, as Delia argues, does not indicate that they do not follow logical rules - even in the sense of formal logic (see Hintikka 1969, Sellars 1969). On the contrary, human behavior is a reflect of human rationality, based on the capacity for logical thought.⁵¹ Thus, there are no genuine theoretical, or intellectual reasons to deny the importance of the logical foundation. Jackson's (1982:205) quotation may throw light on this issue.

Many cognitive psychologists and communication theorists now agree that human reasoning is not adequately represented by formal logical rules. Yet formal logic serves as some sort of standard for deductive reasoning, even among those who consistently deviate from its prescribed patterns of inference.

Jackson is obviously right in arguing that formal logical rules are not always adequate in human reasoning. As Jackson (1982:205) argues, people may, for example, "...recognize the [logical] correctness of some patterns of reasoning and the fallaciousness of others, but nevertheless reason fallaciously..." The main point is, however, that Jackson argues that formal logic is a *standard for deductive reasoning*. The standards of logic do not disappear, although people often reason fallaciously. That is, although people may behave on the basis of fallacies - and they have freedom to do so - they also know how to reason correctly (see also e.g. Davis & Hersh 1987).

There is also another reason for stressing the significance of logic. In Delia's (1977b) perspective formal logical reasoning is ignored. Behind this claim is the view that formal logic is not able adequately to describe the processes of the human mind. Although logical arguments are used in *RCQ* studies, it has been claimed that logic is only - as in Jackson's case - a tool in interpretation.⁵² The real target in constructivism is interpretation, not logical reasoning. As my further analysis will point out, this principle has its strengths. It has to be stressed, however, that this interpretative perspective should not imply that the logic of interpersonal events is ignored. It can be assumed that in order to be rational in the logical sense, one usually tends to communicate in a logical manner. It is expectable, for example, that logically rational messages are more

⁵¹ As Wittgenstein (1961/1972:12, see sentence 3.03) in particular emphasizes, logic is based on logical thinking and the logical laws of the human mind, and is, hence, an inseparable aspect of human consciousness.

⁵² 'Logic' has here two meanings (see Feyerabend 1975/1994:190-191). On one hand, logic can refer to a theoretical assumption. It can be hypothetized, for example, as Berger and Calabrese do, that in interpersonal communication A causes B. On the other hand, logic can be used as a tool of interpretation. Although constructivists follow the principles of interpretation, they systematize and categorize their results according to logical rules.

widely understood than logically irrational ones. Thus, communicators do not behave logically because of any mechanical laws of behavior, but because of the rationality of logic itself.

6.2.4 From constructivism to phenomenology

The discussion above on the relationship between logical reasoning and constructivism implies that the significance of logic in interpersonal communication should be stressed. On the other hand, this should not imply neglect of the interpretative principles of constructivism. Instead, these two aspects, the genuine interpretation, and the logic of human consciousness, should be combined. Delia's approach may serve as a good starting point, and it can be argued that constructivism has already found these principles. Nevertheless, Delia has not examined the origins of interpretive epistemology, and this has proven to be problematic. If Delia and his colleagues had followed the line of thought represented by Burke (1935/1965) and other interpretative scholars, and paid attention to the phenomenological possibilities in particular, the importance of logic - as seen in Husserl - would have been apparent.

Thus it is evident that one central framework of interpretive philosophy, phenomenology, does not reject the importance of logic. On the contrary, as Husserl's philosophy demonstrates, it often demands logic. Phenomenological logic, however, is radically different from the logic of empiricism. While empiricism excludes all other types of reasoning than the logical, in phenomenology logical reasoning is used along with the other types. The aim of empiricism is to analyze reality in order to find logical causalities. The aim of phenomenology is to go on from this and to analyze these causalities (in the Husserlian sense: mathematical causalities), as intentional elements in human consciousness. These elements must be regarded, according to Husserl, as *noemas* and hence, subjective causalities. Thus Delia is partially correct in his approach of cognitions as constructs which cannot necessarily be described in terms of formal logic. It is typical to phenomenology that cognitions are not necessarily considered logical, in the sense of *formal* logic. The logic of cognitions depends on individual subjective reality, and in this reality intentional logic may be rather different from formal logic.

According to the assumptions of phenomenology, one does not behave in a certain manner because of the rules of formal logic, but because of one's subjective logic. Once again, Delia is correct in arguing that this subjective logic can only be understood through an 'interpretive touch'. The relationship between consciousness and cognitions that concerns the external world does not necessarily follow, as such empiricism-oriented researchers as Berger suppose, the laws of nature. Instead, as Kelly argues, a person perceives the logic of events in relation to his/her own reality, not as objective entities. In other words, the logic of objective events is different from the subjective perception of these events. However, this does not imply that human communication is not

logical. Logic is undoubtedly, as Husserl (1931/1962:10-11) argues, a phenomenon as such. Because logic as a phenomenon provides certain rational solutions to interactants communicating in interpersonal encounters, it is evident that it has a unique position in human consciousness.

Consequently, the benefit of the phenomenological view is that it takes into consideration both sides of human consciousness and human communication. By emphasizing that human beings can be both logical (and in the logical sense, rational) and illogical phenomenology manages to gain a more insightful view of interactants's reality than empiricism. When analyzed phenomenologically, interactants are seen as neither mechanistic nor irrational individuals, but as independent beings who are able to evaluate things using their free will.⁵³ In short, interactants are able to be logical and/or non-logical. Both sides are equally significant given the nature of interaction. It is possible to explore both sides of the essence of interaction within phenomenology.

Thus, in terms of the epistemology of interpersonal communication phenomenology seems to provide the best solution. Constructivism serves as a good example of how a phenomenological approach may be used in a reanalysis of a theoretical framework. Of the three main theories in present interpersonal communication research, constructivism as a research program is, undoubtedly, the most appropriate springboard from which to generate epistemological innovations, because it is interpretive in character. In spite of certain problems in Delia's epistemology, his solutions form a promising background to new perspectives in the epistemology of interpersonal constructions and, hence, in the everyday practice of interpersonal communication research.

The aim of the previous discussion was not, however, only to assess the merits of phenomenology, and to indicate that it can offer certain epistemological solutions in relation to current theoretical constructs. In what follows, I will show that phenomenology is also an adequate epistemological solution in the question of the progress of interpersonal communication theories. Furthermore, it can be shown that the phenomenological solution does not mean that interpersonal communication research falls into ambiguity. On the contrary, the phenomenological epistemology of interpersonal communication can be explicitly formulated. These new formulations can be made by following Husserl's principles. In particular, Husserl's *Ideas* (1931/1962) extensively investigates the relationship between the logic of consciousness and logic of nature (see Husserl 1931/1962:114, 147).

The general problem between 'subjective logic' and 'formal logic' has been discussed by Husserl (1931/1962:46) in his claim that "the world is the totality of objects that can be known through experience, known in terms of orderly theoretical thought on the basis of direct present experience". Because the world is a totality, the number and quality of different experiences is

⁵³ In the phenomenological context, 'free will' does not mean that interactants can do whatever they want. On the contrary, as Peter Berger (1963:163-165) emphasizes, in the phenomenological sense, free will often forces people to behave according to strict social rules, because 'to be free' must lead to 'free choices' and when several interactants make similar choices, it eventually becomes a rule.

indefinite. However, this does not imply, as Husserl (1931/1962:48) says, that experience is something vague. In particular, simple everyday experiences, in Husserl's terms 'direct experiences', are not direct in the sense that they cannot be approached in logical terms. On the contrary, they are direct precisely in the logical sense. Therefore, the 'right' or 'essential' intuitions in everyday encounters are not vague guesses (see Thomson 1963:95-105), but clearly logical. As Husserl (1931/1962:49) observes:

...essential intuition is the consciousness of something, of an 'object', a something towards which its glance is directed, a something 'self-given' within it; but which can then be 'presented' in other acts, vaguely or distinctly thought, made the subject of true and false predications - as in the case indeed with every 'object' in the necessarily extended sense proper to Formal Logic.

This argument of Husserl's points to what is crucial in considering a phenomenological solution to the epistemology of interpersonal communication: human consciousness and the different constructs of communicative acts must form the basis of the new wave interpersonal communication research. To progress, Delia's constructivism constitutes a sound epistemological opening for a discussion of interpersonal communication in terms of new wave principles. However, combining phenomenology with Delia's constructivism means that more attention should be paid to logic as described by Husserl. In interpersonal communication research, this implies that scholars should investigate the links between the Husserlian view (i.e. logical and non-logical consciousness) and interpersonal communication. The actual phenomenological research procedure of interpersonal communication could therefore be articulated following the apt example of Merleau-Ponty (1964/1989:80).

The phenomenologist tries to recover an awareness of what a speaking subject really is. He is certainly not in the attitude of learned observer who is confronting something external to him. This observer, for example, may be considering the state of the French language at the time when I am speaking and may be showing how this is explained by some preceding state. He is thus relating the present to the past. But the speaking subject is not concerned with the past. Most of those who are presently speaking French know nothing of etymology or the linguistic past which has made possible the language they are speaking.

Merleau-Ponty aims to demonstrate that the logic of all speech communication is dual.⁵⁴ In this dichotomy, Merleau-Ponty follows in the footsteps of Husserl. First, there is the logic of the speaker, which is either logical or non-logical as defined by the speaker's intention. This logic is formulated immediately in the situation. Second, there is the logic of the observer, where the emphasis is on formal logic (see also Vickers 1969).

Merleau-Ponty's argumentation must be understood as a simple guideline only. If interpersonal communication research concentrates on the observer's logic only, it cannot reach the level of the subjective logic, which is

⁵⁴ In this context, 'speech communication' is used primarily in the sense described by Bakhtin (1986:60-67).

crucial in a real situation. In order to explore the speaker's logic, one must not only broaden the scope of research, but also modify the laws of logic. Instead of examining human behavior through logical laws or non-logical irrational acts, phenomenological research emphasizes that logic is, when seen from the speaker's viewpoint, in practice a norm or a rule. One can choose whether or not one follows laws. As Merleau-Ponty stresses, since the speaker is oriented towards the future, he/she is able to generate new communicational solutions, which are rational and hence logical. These solutions are not forced to follow existing laws, norms or rules. Following Merleau-Ponty's line of thought, it can be said, for example, that although two friends in the street usually say "hello" to each other, because it is a societal rule or a norm, it is also possible not to say anything and in that way confute expectations (see Burgoon 1978). That way two people can create new norms for meeting. In the phenomenological sense, these are the speaker's possibilities. Hence, if interpersonal communication research is interested in the question of how speakers formulate their messages in actual situations, it should turn in a future-oriented direction and examine what people aim to create in situations.

The views of both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are significant in the sense that they provide means, as Cushman (1977:30) put it, for constructing an epistemologically "fruitful perspective" for the study of interpersonal communication. One central metatheoretical lack in interpersonal communication research appears to be the either-or perspective that has been used thus far (see e.g. T. Smith 1988). As the works of Pearce (1991) and Jacobson (1985) imply, it has been assumed that the logical and the interpretive perspectives are incompatible. However, as implied by Husserlian phenomenology, the different aspects may be seen as supporting each other. In order to be heuristic in terms of logic and rationality, a theory of interpersonal communication has to contain both the observational and the subjective aspects of logic. Thus, the alternative is not either-or, but both-and. Both subjectivity and observability must be considered.

It has to be admitted that this idea is not unknown to interpersonal communication researchers. For example, the theory of *the coordinated management of meaning (CMM)* by Pearce and Cronen notes that both formal and subjective logic are important in considering interpersonal interaction (Cronen & Pearce & Harris 1979). Hence, *CMM* does not aim to ignore empiricism. As Pearce (1976:26) points out, it does not make sense to construct a nonpositivistic theory purely for the sake of it. Instead, it must be considered how the new alternatives are related to the previous perspectives. The step towards a new perspective must be achieved by understanding the state of 'conventional science', that is, understanding the advantage of the observational position in interpersonal communication research.

Nevertheless, *CMM* is, along with constructivism, a concrete example of the fact that a Husserlian view of epistemology is, in principle, possible in interpersonal communication research. *CMM* can also be considered a pioneer in the sociology of interpersonal communication research. Pearce and Cronen argue that a phenomenological theory of interpersonal communication must be constructed in terms of both observation-based formal logic and subjective logic

and furthermore, that new wave theories must be taken up with caution. It is not enough that phenomenological principles are adopted as a research manifesto, if the phenomenological touch disappears in actual research because of preparadigmatic influences (as argued in Chapter 5.3.2.). It would be more sensible first to explore the field itself and after that see the implications of phenomenology. This principle has been applied in the case of *CMM*, and it is obviously a good guideline for all alternative perspectives in interpersonal communication.

6.3 Empirical phenomenology

6.3.1 General principles

One of the main arguments against alternative philosophy and, hence, against both phenomenology and hermeneutics has been that they do not imply, offer or even allow, empirical possibilities. Most recently, this claim has been presented by Bostrom and Donohew (1992:124), who argue, for example, that the *RCQ* and its open-ended questions cannot be used in interpretive research - open-ended questions are not a key to consciousness. This argument contains two aspects. On the one hand, as the arguments in previous chapters indicate, it is true that the *RCQ*, as a measure, is problematic. On the other hand, the problems of the *RCQ* are not necessarily those pointed out by Bostrom and Donohew. Open-ended questions (see Appendix 3) do not form the core of phenomenological empiricism, as Bostrom and Donohew (1992:124) seem to suppose. The type of questions in questionnaires is only the surface in phenomenologically-oriented empirical research.

The core of phenomenological empiricism is to find ways of approaching the subjective reality of the interactants.⁵⁵ Therefore, clarification is needed for such questions as why interactants in interpersonal encounters do certain things, or how they explain their behavior in different situations. In other words, as people have different reasons for communicating logically, these reasons must be investigated. Because people have different interpersonally relevant constructs (see Delia 1977b), we need to examine how people experience their constructs, how they affect their everyday lives, and how interactants explain these constructs in terms of their rational interpersonal communication. The use of open-ended questions, or, for instance, interviews, is a secondary problem in this context, because there are several possible means of exploring general questions. Subjective logic can be studied by means of

⁵⁵ As will be pointed out more carefully in Chapter 6.3.2., I claim that the argument for 'subjective reality' does not imply that we are not dealing with interpersonal communication research. The idea of phenomenological empiricism is to stress that interpersonal encounters must be described from the individual's perspective. The focus is, however, on the communication processes.

interviews as well as by means of questionnaires. Whether the answers are written on paper, or given in an interview is not important. What is relevant is what has been asked and how the answers are interpreted.

Consequently, Bostrom and Donohew (1992:120) are incorrect in claiming that interpretive scientists "go farther with less data". The phenomenological perspective does not imply that *a priori* statements determine the phenomenological foundations. On the contrary, the number of new empirical questions and the need to find new types of data increases in the phenomenological context. Thus, the phenomenological perspective does not imply that empirical science should disappear. It does not imply either that the objectivity of empirical results should lose its importance, as Bostrom and Donohew (1992:121) claim. Objectivity is not the absolute antithesis of phenomenology. As, for instance, Weber's (1947/1971:22-23) arguments suggest (see also Stegmüller 1969:142, or Weber 1905/1978), objective data can also be incorporated into the interpretive perspective. Thus the phenomenological perspective does not mean that objective results are disregarded. Objective data must be understood in relation to subjective realities.

The primary problem in the methodology of phenomenological investigation is not how questions are presented, but what is asked and how it is interpreted as an intersubjective occurrence. Hence, there is no reason why, for instance, uncertainty could not be explored by means of Likert questionnaires, such as *PRCA*. What has been asked, and how the answers are interpreted is the primary issue, not whether questionnaires employ either closed or open-ended questions. From the phenomenological perspective, however, one must approach subjective constructions, which are, in practice, difficult to analyze in a quantitative manner, by paying attention to authentic experiences as well. This is also shown by the problems with the *RCQ*. However, phenomenology itself does not deny the use of quantitative data. In phenomenological studies, a statistical approach is usually secondary, because alternative approaches to communicative events usually seem more appropriate than the analysis of objective data (see e.g. Hyde 1980, 1982). In principle, however, quantitative data offer evidence for the phenomenological perspective as well as that of 'conventional science'.

6.3.2 Phenomenological apprehension as an exemplar

As constructivism implies, empirical evidence may constitute an important part of interpretive studies and, hence, of phenomenological research. Although constructivists have not completely succeeded in their empirical research programs, their solution is obviously correct, in the phenomenological sense. Phenomenology does not imply that constructs cannot be empirically approached. According to Weber (1947/1971:22-24), empirical evidence cannot be rejected, if that evidence is justified from a phenomenological perspective. Therefore, in the case of constructivism, the problem is not actually in research

procedures, but in the lack of the phenomenological touch, that is, in the formulation of research questions and in the interpretation of the results. Although this touch can be found in their definitions and basic assumptions, it seems to have been forgotten in actual research.

Open questions, such as used in the *RCQ*, for example, do not imply phenomenologically relevant explanations as such. If the results of open questions are considered as statistical and quantitative data only, without a deeper understanding of such questions as how people themselves perceive their constructs and how they allow constructs to be a part of their everyday interpersonal communication, the research cannot be considered as phenomenological. The description of the effects of different constructs in interpersonal encounters, typical to the *RCQ*, is not as appropriate a question as how people experience their constructs. That is, the use of open questions is only a methodological choice.

If we aim to modify the *RCQ*, or any other research instrument of interpersonal communication, so as to follow phenomenological principles, we must seek the "genuine understanding of the other person" (Schutz 1967:111). This genuine understanding means that researchers must approach their research problems not as external events, and that they must be aware that they are exploring the consciousness of the other interactants. This guideline, provided by Schutz, in spite of the semantical difficulties with the word "genuine", is very significant in the sense that it offers a goal for an approach in which is the aim is to combine the phenomenological touch with the empiricist approach.

In the following paragraphs I will demonstrate that it is possible to construct a concrete phenomenological research program in which the phenomenological touch is not only epistemological but also empirical as a solution and in which a genuine understanding is present. In comparison with *URT*, or constructivism, McCroskey's *CA* would seem to offer the best grounds for the development of such an approach. As argued above, *CA* is not actually a theoretical framework, but a practical conceptualization. Therefore it is, in the theoretical sense, also open to a new perspective. Its pragmatic nature, which can be considered problematic in the field of speech communication research, is only useful when the general principles of empirical phenomenology are taken into account.

However, before the actual phenomenological empirical dimensions of *CA* can be discussed, some phenomenological considerations concerning its theoretical essence must be investigated. First, it must be noted that apprehension as a phenomenon is closely connected to certain central concepts of phenomenology. The phenomenological nature of apprehension is similar to anxiety, fear, or uncertainty. Therefore, the analysis of *CA* must consider epistemological questions like those that were discussed in the case of *PTU*. Thus, contrary to McCroskey's approach, the main question in the phenomenological analysis of apprehension is not how the term apprehension is connected to other, related terms, or how it can be operationalized. The main question is to study what apprehension means in terms of everyday life, and how people are able to deal with it in interpersonal encounters.

From this perspective it is crucial, for example, that different anxiety-related terms - such as shyness, stage fright, communication reticence or unwillingness to communicate - are relatively similar. This is shown also in everyday experience. Let us assume, for example, that a person A is in the office of a big company applying for a job. A has no previous experience in applying for a job. If a researcher into speech communication were to ask A whether his/her experiences are to be labelled as communication-bound anxiety, apprehension, reticence or fear, it would be very probable that A could not dissect the whole of his/her experience into separate categories like these. From the perspective of A, the negative experience itself is what is essential. At a certain moment, or in voicing a given utterance, person A may feel an emotion which can be labelled as anxiety, while at another moment, that person may feel fear. The different terms are used to describe different aspects of what Schutz calls genuine emotion. Thus, if one feels apprehension or fear, one usually also feels anxiety or reticence as part of the original, genuine negative experience.

Hence, from the perspective of the individual, the differences between these terms are often semantic. None of these terms is able to define the original experience. As Phillips (1981:366-367) puts it, all they can do is to describe it from different angles. In some cases, a person may claim that he/she feels fear, but if the question had been put differently, he/she might have maintained that the feeling is reticence. In the phenomenological approach the terminological choices are only images that describe the original feeling, and, depending on the context and on one's vocabulary, the ways of describing that feeling may change. When considered phenomenologically, CA must be approached holistically - in analogy with uncertainty - in which all problems in interpersonal events are taken into consideration. The aim of phenomenological analysis, unlike that of McCroskey (1982:160-162), is not the treatment of these problems, but rather the emphasis is on the dimension of analyzing the negative experience *as an experience*. For example, individuals may feel that they cannot express their opinions of X, either because of their communication-bound anxiety, fear or reticence. For a phenomenological scholar, the first question is how does the individual sees X and how does he/she experience the situation in which X is expressed?

Therefore, the phenomenological approach will offer only a few - perhaps occasional - hints as to the treatment of a problem. Although treatment is, undoubtedly, an important issue in itself, phenomenology focuses on finding out how different situations and emotions are lived through. If X is, for example, an issue like 'death', 'general care', or 'anguish' (see Heidegger 1927/1962:235-266, or Sartre 1956/1966:799-800), the only phenomenological statement that can be made is that one's attitude towards death or anguish cannot ultimately be solved, but neither can the role of these issues in human life be ignored. It is fully understandable that one feels anxiety when one speaks about death, because one cannot get passed the question in one's life. The essence of death cannot be forgotten or ignored in interpersonal settings, if X is connected to death. On the contrary, at funerals, for instance, it is natural that the central issue is difficult as such. From the point of view of

phenomenological research, it is essential to focus on how people talk to each other at funerals, and how they face the care and anguish they are bound to experience.

Death is an extreme example. The list of analogical issues is, however, relatively long. The number of issues which are similar in the sense that they can neither be treated nor ignored is high. To take an example from McCroskey's context, a person may feel the he/she is under the pressure of his/her superior (see Richmond & McCroskey & Davis 1986). If the problem is based on a clear misunderstanding between the superior and the subordinate, the problem can be undoubtedly be uncovered. This aspect has been noted in McCroskey's studies. However, if individuals feel anxiety or apprehension, because of the general hierarchical structure of their working organization, the problem is related to the distribution of power in society. The problem of power, along with the experience that someone is always at a higher or lower level in society, is a part of human existence.⁵⁶ If individuals feel that what they do is because others make them do it, and they feel anxiety because of this, it is understandable. Thus, it is also understandable that one's own communication in an organization should be problematic (see also Foucault 1972:215-230).

One may, of course, ask how many subordinates actually feel that the basic reason for their communication apprehension in their workplace is to be found in the problem of power. In other words, how many subordinates, in real life, face the problem above as a problem of power and how many will attribute their problem to the qualities or behavior of their superior? In many cases, a subordinate probably will argue that his/her problem is one particular superior as a person, or the nature of a specific organization. It can be claimed, however, that in many cases this argument is not very convincing. Although it is to be expected that answers to communication problems are sought in the immediate environment and in the particular circumstances, rather than in one's own qualities. However, the problems with certain persons or organizations often seem to be reflections of problems on a larger scale. For example, in formal situations, one may feel stress in talking to one's superior, as McCroskey and Richmond (1986) and Buss (1984) have pointed out. However, the reason for the experience of stress may not be formality itself, but the common experience that formality implies significance.⁵⁷

In short, in formal situations one is highly aware that whatever one does will affect the future. As Ketonen (1981:178) notes in his discussion of phenomenological and existential facts: one must be aware that he/she is responsible for future consequences. For example, one knows that one cannot take back and reformulate the messages mediated in a formal situation in a way that is possible in casual interpersonal encounters. The reason for anxiety is therefore the expectation that one will miss certain possibilities in one's life, if one fails in the present situation. At the most fundamental level one also knows that these possibilities may be missed for good. The main point, however, is to

⁵⁶ See e.g. Philp's (1991:67-69) discussion of Foucault.

⁵⁷ Again, as in the cases of *PTU* and *FTC*, this argument is theoretical.

notice that the reason for apprehension is neither the superior as a person, or the organization as such, but the general hierarchical structure of societies.

The aim of the examples above was to point out that all these problematic sides of human communication, CA among others, are invariably two-sided issues at least. First, one's way of perceiving and experiencing problems are necessarily bound to one's subjective reality, as Kelly and Delia have suggested. The goal of phenomenology is to explore this reality - how an individual interprets and understands different communicative situations, and what the nature of the processes of interpretation and understanding processes is like. 'Collective experiences', in the sense suggested by Billig (1994:60-62) or Middleton and Edwards (1994:23-28) are therefore excluded. In research practice, in order to make phenomenologically relevant questions with regard to CA, it is necessary for interpersonal communication research to approach apprehension as it is experienced and dealt with. Furthermore, the aim is to find out how people interpret apprehensive situations in their everyday life. Therefore, in the context of CA, there are at least two concrete phenomenological questions to ask:

1. How does one face communication apprehension in one's everyday life?
2. What, according to one's own interpretation, is the reason for communication apprehension - why is something apprehensive?

The aim of these questions is to find the subjective reality behind apprehension. That is, instead of trying to determine how CA affects one's behavior, or trying to find a treatment for CA, the aim is to interpret *how and why apprehension belongs to human life*.

It can be claimed, however, that these questions are not, at least intrinsically, interpersonal. It may be relatively easy to emphasize subjective reality, but it is considerably more difficult to demonstrate that this subjectivity is a relevant issue in terms of interpersonal communication research. Although phenomenological considerations can be applied in interpersonal settings, as the examples above show, all further considerations lead us to the question of how the *personal* ultimately belongs to the research of *interpersonal* communication. The main point is that, as shown by the examples above, and as suggested by constructivism, interpretive research requires an analysis of 'mind-stuff' (Rorty 1979:17-32). Phenomenology is inevitably a matter of consciousness, and therefore, the phenomenology of interpersonal communication is, in the end, also a matter of subjective occurrences. In terms of interpersonal communication this means that in order to examine the processes in interpersonal encounters, we have to analyze the experience of communicators in these encounters.

Therefore, any step towards a practical phenomenological research program in interpersonal communication must be based on the 'personal' side of 'interpersonal communication'. That is, the phenomenology of interpersonal communication implies an emphasis on the question of how an individual communicates. In practice, this would seem to lead to a view in which the study of CA, for example, would focus on the question of what is experienced when one feels apprehension, and when one talks to other people, for example, at a funeral. A phenomenological analysis of interpersonal communication

would focus on the subjective side of interpersonal encounters. In the case of CA this would mean the consideration of such questions as follows:

1. According to one's experience, how would one describe difficult interpersonal situations?
2. What is one's own interpretation of why these communicative situations are as they are?

The answers to questions like these may eventually show that CA is, after all, a relatively good term for describing the problems inherent in difficult interpersonal situations. More important than the establishment of a correct term, however, is to shed light on genuine personal experiences and interpretations. As the first question demonstrates, it is possible, for example, that people may think that there is nothing to report. This is a genuine experience and, therefore, a direct phenomenological reply to the question. If an outside analyst were to observe two people in discussion with each other, it is possible that, when asked what they think they were saying, they reply "nothing". The phenomenology of interpersonal communication means that events are 'interpersonal' only when persons think so (see also the following section). The same can be said about the phenomenology of CA. People may claim, for example, that applying-for-a-job-events are situations that evoke apprehension. The real question, however, is what one thinks happens when one is apprehensive. When people are engaged in a problematic situation, they probably experience something that is disturbing in its nature. Phenomenology emphasizes, however, that people do not merely *feel* emotions - they also *interpret* them (see Burke 1935/1965:29-36). Therefore, apprehension is not just apprehension, it is a part of the human mind. In the phenomenological sense, the most interesting question is how CA, or other corresponding issues (such as 'care' or 'anguish'), are manifested in interpersonal settings, and how people live with them.

6.4 The characteristics of interpersonal phenomenology

As the arguments above show, the 'personal' side of phenomenology and 'interpersonal' side of interpersonal communication research can be, at least in principle, combined in empirical research. Consequently, it is possible to devise research questions that are both interpersonally and phenomenologically relevant. Evidently, phenomenology can offer more than vague insights. It can help to establish a practical foundation on which new assumptions in the field of interpersonal communication can be made. The aim of this section is to summarize views about phenomenology, and to discuss their concrete relevance to interpersonal communication research in practice. The most fundamental viewpoints can be summarized in following seven statements.

1. From the phenomenological point of view, there is no interpersonal communication if the communicators do not think so - and everything that is claimed by communicators to be interpersonal, is interpersonal.

As has been stressed above, phenomenology embeds the idea that the most crucial issue is what is experienced. This implies that, in practice, if someone feels that he/she is not communicating, nothing interpersonal is going on. There is no such a thing as interpersonal communication if interpersonality is not experienced. It is clear, however, that this claim might seem absurd and that it would seem relatively easy to find counter-examples, by claiming, for example, that person A communicates something to person B where a researcher actually observes something being communicated, even though both A and B deny it. The real question is, however, what it is that the researcher hears or sees. If A and B claim that they were, as a matter of fact, saying nothing, those utterances that were heard by the researcher have obviously no importance to A and B. That is, they are meaningless in terms of interpersonal communication between A and B. From this point of view, the phenomenological view penetrates to a deeper level, and is not satisfied with the objective note of the researcher that something was communicated. Phenomenology is looking for communication which is *meaningful* to A and B.

The aim of phenomenology is to stress personal experiences, and as has been argued, there is a huge variety in how people experience interpersonal encounters. One can argue, for example, that at a funeral, where people tend to be silent, interpersonal communication still plays a very important role (see e.g. Jensen 1973). By being silent, or, by doing nothing, people are able to communicate with each other. From the perspective of phenomenology there does not need to be observable communication in the situation in order to say that something interpersonal happens. From the phenomenological point of view, communicators make interpretations, and the task of research is to try to understand these interpretations.

2. From the phenomenological point of view, interpersonal communication is to be understood as a chain of explanations.

As pointed out in the evaluation of *URT*, constructivism and *CA*, there is no scientific explanation that would comprehensively cover the phenomena of interpersonal events in interpersonal communication research, and would be correct in that sense. In other words, from the phenomenological perspective, there is no monothetical answer to such questions as "What happens when people communicate?", or "Why do people communicate in a certain manner?" (see Apel 1984:49-55). For example, although uncertainty decreases at one moment, it may rapidly increase in another. Or, in some cases it might be sensible to call a feeling 'communication apprehension' (in the McCroskeyan sense), while in other cases the reason for apprehension might be more fundamental and related to 'care' in the phenomenological sense. Phenomenology stresses that explanations depend on interactants' consciousnesses. What is a good explanation from the perspective of person A is not necessarily a good

explanation from the perspective of person B. Yet, A's explanation at the moment t_1 is not necessary the same as at the moment t_2 .

Because phenomenology approaches the world from the perspective of human consciousness, it accepts the existence of a number of parallel adequate explanations. Furthermore, these explanations change over time. In terms of interpersonal communication theories, this indicates that there may exist a variety of explanations for interpersonal events, and that they may all be correct on their own grounds. If a researcher asks person A to describe what usually happens, from his/her point of view, in his/her interpersonal encounters, it would be difficult to imagine the reply as something on the lines of "uncertainty decreases", or "I feel apprehension". It is possible that uncertainty explains some aspects of interpersonal communication, while constructivism and CA explain some other aspects. From the communicator's point of view, it is difficult to assume that these frameworks exhaustively explain the experienced interaction of individuals.

It must be emphasized, however, that the aim of this argument is not to point out that *URT*, constructivism and CA are somehow poor constructions. It is not the fault of *URT*, constructivism and CA that people hardly describe their own experiences in terms of these theories when they are asked to characterize their interpersonal communication. Phenomenology stresses that, from the communicator's point of view, interpersonal events are relatively mysterious occurrences. If person A is asked about his/her motives in a given situation as regards his/her communication with person B, it is likely that it will be claimed that a relatively high number of interpersonal events are for no peculiar reason. An individual can claim, that, when applying for a job, for example, he/she was trying to give a good impression, simply because he/she wanted the job. In this case the reason behind the behavior is easy to determine. But if the same question is addressed to a person who is chatting with his/her friends at coffee break, or, talking about the weather in a bus, the question is more difficult. It is possible that people talk to each other "just because there is nothing else to do". The question then is what people actually do when they are 'killing time' or 'being social'. The most probable answer is that, finally, they do not know what the point of 'killing time' or 'being social' is. People may like to talk, without any particular reason for it. This observation leads us to the following claim.

3. Phenomenology argues that although people are capable of understanding how certain phenomena affect their interpersonal communication, there are crucial 'why'-questions which are mysteries.

On one hand, phenomenology argues that people know that they feel apprehension or uncertainty, and when they know they feel it, they are capable of understanding and tolerating it. On the other hand, according to phenomenology, there are certain issues which are impossible to understand. In terms of interpersonal communication theory the most crucial 'mystery' is why people, in general, feel the need to communicate - why is it that they feel compelled to construct interpersonal bonds? Phenomenology offers a reply to this question. As Heidegger (1927/1962:78-90, 1927/1977:80) emphasizes, people stay together because it is the only way to be a human being in the world. In

order to be human, people must live with other people. This statement has a strong connection with interpersonal communication. In order to be a human being along with others one must make interpersonal bonds with other people, and the only way to do that is through interpersonal communication. When people sitting in a bus, for example, talk about something, there are perhaps no other reasons for this interpersonal event than the phenomenological expectation that 'man must talk' (see Heidegger 1959/1982:57-60).

At this point, phenomenology is clearly dualistic. It stresses that people are capable, through their capacity of critical self-consciousness, of understanding why they have to do something, but it also stresses that human beings cannot solve the most significant *primus motor* question of interpersonal communication. Ultimately, people do not know why they communicate, any more than they know why they are living. Therefore, the argument that "man must live with other people because it is the only way to be a human being" does not explain to the individual, why he/she has to communicate. This issue will always remain a mystery.⁵⁸ Because of this, interpersonal communication is, as has been argued, a matter of phenomenological care. Because people do not know why they have to communicate, as they do not know why they exist, they are forced into concern about such questions as what their responsibilities in a given interpersonal setting are, or what they should say in a given interpersonal setting in order to be honest to themselves.

Therefore, phenomenology claims that people know that interpersonal life has limits, but they do not know what the meaning of these limits is. People cannot ignore the fact that, ultimately, they are going to face a situation when they have to ask themselves what they have done with their lives, and why. From a phenomenological perspective interpersonal communication is inevitably a very important aspect, when people consider this question. Therefore, interpersonal communication is one of the most crucial issues in leading a fully human life. Whatever people do with other people, it usually happens through interpersonal communication.

4. Phenomenology is, in the first place, more interested in what people create in interpersonal settings than in studying the rules or laws of those settings.

Phenomenological theory does not imply, as some authors have claimed (see e.g. Bostrom & Donohew 1992, Daniels & Frandsen 1984), that the causal laws of interpersonal communication events are forgotten. On the contrary, logic and causalities play an important part in interpersonal encounters, because they are part and parcel of human life. According to phenomenological theory, people have the freedom to behave according to causal laws if they want to. The same can be said about rules. Both rules and laws describe what people do

⁵⁸ As Arendt (1958/1989:10) puts it: "The problem of human nature, the Augustinian *quaestio mihi factus sum* ("a question have I become for myself"), seems unanswerable in both its individual psychological sense and its general philosophical sense. It is highly unlikely that we, who can know, determine, and define the natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves - this would be like jumping over our own shadows."

in different circumstances. In that sense, although laws and rules are perspectives that are undoubtedly competitive, they have, seen from the phenomenological perspective, certain similarities. In both cases the main issue is that which people have already created. That is, both perspectives assume that there are some regularities of behavior that can be described as rules or laws, and which may be either followed or not followed.

A phenomenological theory of interpersonal communication attempts to understand how people interpret rules and laws. For example, if people know that there is a rule that orders one to say something to a friend encountered in the street, people may either follow this rule, or reinterpret it. It is possible, for example, just to nod, because one does not want to say anything. From the phenomenological point of view, interactants are oriented towards the future, and thus create new possibilities in behavior all the time. The phenomenological perspective emphasizes that it is more adequate to say that every interpersonal encounter creates its own ground than to say that people in interpersonal encounters follow certain specific rules, or laws. That is, although phenomenology is often brought in to account for events already created,⁵⁹ the primary concern must be to consider how such events came into existence in the first place.

5. From the phenomenological point of view, there are several adequate descriptions and interpretations of what really happens in an interpersonal encounter.

Because phenomenology argues that interpersonal communication should be approached in terms of interactants' consciousness, it will lead, in practice, to a view in which several different versions of interpersonal encounters are possible. As Burke (1935/1965:19-36) points out, not only do different people create different interpretations, but the same individual can interpret and reinterpret his/her actions from different points of view. For example, person A may argue that he/she was talking to person B in a bus about the weather, just because he/she wanted to say hello to a friendly looking person, who was sitting next to him/her. A might go on to assert that, in fact, he/she was talking about the weather because he/she also wanted to 'kill time'. And, finally, A can argue further that, actually, he/she somehow might have wanted to know what B thought about the rainy weather they were having at the time. Phenomenology argues, as do several attribution theorists (Seibold & Spitzberg 1981), that in most cases A is not fully aware of all the things he/she was doing. When people try to interpret why they do something, there are several possible interpretations, which may also change over time.

In terms of the practice of interpersonal communication research this means that we cannot find the ultimate answer to what genuinely happens in an interpersonal encounter. In terms of interpersonal communication theories, such as *URT*, constructivism or *CA*, this implies that they, along with their

⁵⁹ As, for example, the question 'why were these communicative situations as they were?' in the previous section demonstrate.

'mirrors' (especially *PTU*, and *FTC*) may all be correct in their way, depending on the circumstances. As Berger's studies have pointed out, in many cases strong evidence can be shown favor of *URT*. That is, A may claim that in a given conversation with a person B, his/her uncertainty decreases just as Berger and Calabrese (1975) claim. As justifiably, however, it can be claimed that *PTU* is also right. That is, it is possible that A thinks that uncertainty never disappears, and that one must always be to some degree uncertain. Analogically, constructivism is just as correct a description as *FTC*. The observation that there are several possible views follows from the phenomenological fact that there is no *one* way to interpret interpersonal occurrences.

6. Phenomenology is a perspective in which the primary aim is to construct theories that are 'mirrors of consciousness'.

The argument above inevitably leads to a further question. If phenomenological theories are not in any sense better, or more successful than those constructed along empiricist (e.g. *URT*) or practical (e.g. *CA*) lines, why construct such theories? This leads us to the most interesting issue in the epistemology of phenomenology. The aim of phenomenology is to construct theories that mirror the consciousness. The view of *PTU* and *FTC* shows that there exist 'other sides to consciousness' which are not covered by either *URT* or constructivism. That is, both *PTU* and *FTC* demonstrate that theories can be turned around, and the consequence is that these mirror theories are just as reasonable constructions as the original ones. This is because the human consciousness often acts like a mirror. As has been stressed, uncertainty decreases and increases in a wave-like manner in different interpersonal situations. To sum up, there is always the other side of each interpersonal theory, because every consciousness has its own other side (see Laing 1961:44-50). The reason why phenomenological theories have to be constructed is based on this argument. Phenomenology shows that there is a variety of open issues in interpersonal communication, and that these issues should be examined in order to interpret occurrences in interpersonal encounters.

The notion of mirroring also gives a direct answer to the annoying question of why phenomenology cannot admit that its theories really aim at being more adequate than, for example, theories that are empiricism-bound. As Spiegelberg (1978:1-2) points out, phenomenology itself stresses that it is, after all, a matter of *Weltanschauung*. It is evident that phenomenology cannot argue that it is the best, or even the most rational, approach to interpersonal communication, because it is an essential argument of phenomenology that the value of different, subjectively grounded world-views cannot be denied. What is valuable to an empirist is valuable in terms of empiricism. As the most fundamental principles of phenomenology indicate, ultimately, it cannot be argued that the empiricism-bound view is a world-view of a wrong kind, because researchers and scholars have, as have communicators A and B in the examples above, full freedom to think as they wish. It is not possible for phenomenology to argue that a phenomenological theory is best, because it is assumed that all possible views - all mirrors - are needed in order to interpret

what people are capable of doing in different interpersonal encounters. By being itself a mirror of many consciousnesses, phenomenology accepts that there can be several corresponding mirrors.

The paradigmatic value of phenomenology is, therefore, in the notion that phenomenology is a 'fair' theory in terms of different world-views, unlike the arguments put forward by Bostrom and Donohew (1992). Although, for example, *PTU* is undoubtedly a competing theory in its relation to *URT*, the aim of competition in this respect is not to argue that *URT* should be replaced by *PTU*. Just as it cannot be assumed that *URT* alone is capable of explaining the relationship between uncertainty and interpersonal communication, it cannot be assumed that *PTU* is the only satisfactory mirror of uncertainty. As a matter of fact, from the phenomenological point of view, there is no reason for competition, because different world-views, whether they are empiricism-oriented, practical or interpretive in character, are just ways of seeing the world. Competition between different theories is probably an issue which cannot be avoided in science, because theories, such as *PTU* and *URT*, are developed to explore the same issue. For phenomenology, competition is not, however, seen as the goal. As a matter of fact, the phenomenological view suggests that competition should be avoided, because it is by using different theories that it is possible to describe how different perspectives are manifested in interpersonal communication.

7. The ontology of phenomenology is transcendental by its nature.

Although phenomenological theories do not - at least directly - oppose theories that already exist, the phenomenological perspective leads to certain radical implications vis a vis the scope of interpersonal communication research. These implications are ontological. While in empiricism, and in the quantitative tradition in general, practically all metaphysics has been rejected, in phenomenology metaphysical questions, statements and beliefs are seen to be a significant issue in interpersonal communication. In that sense phenomenology is, at least partly, a transcendental perspective. According to phenomenology, metaphysical experiences are, subjectively, as factual, and therefore equally important, as empirically verified facts.

This does not mean that the assumptions of phenomenology suggest that events are supernatural in nature. But, if an individual, for example, believes that he/she acts in a certain manner because of the influence of God, or angels, or that he/she behaves violently because of the influence of demons, these claims must be accepted as a subjectively pure fact. That is, the factuality of God must be accepted as a subjective truth and as a form of subjective reality. The researcher has to accept the reasons for communicative acts as they are reported to him/her by his/her subjects. That is, the researcher does not need to believe in God, or in angels and demons himself in order to interpret communication. On the other hand, the researcher must not reject the meaning of beliefs, if they evidently affect a person's subjective reality.

In short, phenomenology, as a researcher's guideline, does not imply that scientific realism should be replaced by unscientific irrationalism (see

Feyerabend 1975/1994). However, at the same time it must be noted that, in one's personal reality, irrationality - as judged by the researcher - can be rational. As, for example, Apel (1984:152-153) emphasizes, rationality cannot be defined purely by using objective terms. On the contrary, pure rationality is, in the last analysis, an intersubjective issue. Because of its intersubjectivity, the term 'irrational' is in practice unnecessary. There are always good reasons and subjective explanatory facts which explain why something happened. If the interpersonal relationship between two or more individuals is based on the belief that God has created them to be friends, it has to be seen as rational a statement as the explanation that the relationship is based, for example, on the biological similarities between the partners (Duck 1993:7-12). The phenomenological ontology of interpersonal communication must be based on a perspective in which all subjectively genuine interpretations are accepted.

7 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The primary aim of this study has been to show that phenomenology offers possibilities for the modification and development of interpersonal communication theories. Theories informed by phenomenology offer an alternative to the view represented by the dominant theories in the field. This is not to say that any particular theory, such as uncertainty reduction theory, or communication apprehension, have failed. However, phenomenology can explain their content more widely. While uncertainty reduction theory, as an empiricism-bound framework, ignores the question of 'subjective logic', phenomenology is able to explore interpersonal communication both in terms of 'subjective' and 'objective'. Communication apprehension, on the other hand, is not epistemologically justified. However, phenomenology offers a possible justification for the theory by assuming that apprehension is a matter of 'being-in-the-world', as Heidegger argues.

These examples show why it is precisely phenomenology that offers such a rational view in interpersonal communication research. Empiricism is a too narrow a tradition, in the sense that it ignores the subjective aspects of interpersonal communication. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, is too wide. Interpersonal communication is based on subjective, not collective or societal processes. Therefore, for example, the philosophy of Habermas has no appropriate place in interpersonal communication research. The philosophy of Gadamer, which is undoubtedly interpersonal in character, is interesting, but, for two reasons, not very useful. First, it cannot offer a direct reply to the arguments represented by current theories of interpersonal communication, as phenomenology can. For example, the notion of 'subjective and objective logic' is very useful in the reconsideration of uncertainty reduction theory. Also, apprehension is one of the central issues of phenomenology. Second, most of the interpersonally relevant insights of hermeneutics are also considered in phenomenology. For example, Gadamer's argument that 'conversations create

their own rules' is also discussed by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, the more detailed analysis of this argument is, the more relevant are the discussions by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty than that of Gadamer.

Consequently, the results of this study suggest that the so-called 'alternative view of interpersonal communication research', in which the aim is to find an epistemological alternative to empiricism, should turn in a phenomenological direction. Phenomenology offers 'paths that lead forward' in interpersonal communication research. It must be stressed, however, that this does not mean that phenomenology is to be taken as 'the only correct' view. One crucial feature of phenomenology is that it accepts the fact that it is one *Weltanschauung* among others. Therefore, the arguments offered by empiricism and hermeneutics retain their place in research. Phenomenology aims at understanding, rethinking and developing them, not at ignoring them. In that sense, phenomenology is not a competitive tradition.

In addition to phenomenology, hermeneutics and empiricism, there are also new theories emerging in the field, which cannot be ignored. For example dialectics, as studied by Baxter (1988), seems to offer significant insights into interpersonal communication research. Also, Duck's (1976) view on 'interpersonal flow' is interesting, in the sense that it explains how the cognitive and communicative aspects of interpersonal communication research can be combined in a rational manner. The present study is not opposed to these approaches. On the contrary, this study supports projects like these, as they obviously lead, like phenomenology, to the development of new theories. As argued above, new theories are needed in order to develop the epistemology of interpersonal communication research.

Epistemological considerations are not, however, the only target in this study. In addition to epistemology one of the main issues in this study has been to show that - as Jones (1981) argues - interpersonal communication offers a ground for philosophical discussion in general. In other words, this study has not meant to be only an argument for phenomenology, but also an example of philosophical analysis. Therefore, it can be claimed that the phenomenological arguments presented in Chapter 6 are problematic. It can be argued, for example, that phenomenology assumes too much in claiming that there are transcendental facts which must be considered in interpersonal communication research. However, it cannot be denied that philosophical investigations in interpersonal communication are necessary in general. It is obvious that phenomenology cannot be accepted by everyone. More important than acceptance, however, is increased awareness of the different possibilities available in studying interpersonal communication.

Phenomenology is, undoubtedly, a fruitful tradition in the sense that it leads to the formation of new theories. There is, however, also another aspect of fruitfulness, which is significant. That is, phenomenology is oriented strongly towards the future. Phenomenology stresses the notions expressed by Pearce (1985:278-281): metatheoretical debates have no actual winners or losers. The debate is significant as such. Furthermore, the debate is a never-ending project. I hope that the present study contributes to this debate.

It must be stressed that the present study has been done 'here and now', in the middle of the 1990s. During the last few years several important metatheoretical analyses have been put forward. For example, Berger's (1991) article on theoretical stagnancy, or the articles by Craig (1993) and Fitzpatrick (1993) on epistemological problems in human communication research, have been illuminating (see Chapter 1.4.2.). However, there have been no clear attempts to develop new theories or new epistemological viewpoints. Several practical analyses exist, while the number of actual epistemological claims or new theories is relatively low. The present study is an example of how to develop both the epistemology of the field and the theories in it. It is, I hope, an interesting argument along with other views in the metatheoretical debate.

There are, however, at least two significant limitations, which must be kept in mind when the arguments of the present study are considered. First, it might be argued that the statistical data of bibliometrics and the subjectivity of phenomenology are difficult to combine. It might be even claimed that they are incompatible in practice. Second, it is obvious that there are other ways of analyzing, modifying and developing the theories of interpersonal communication. They would, undoubtedly, lead to different conclusions.

The bibliometrical analysis of the present study was carried out in order to give lay a sound empirical basis for the theoretical substance of this work. Bibliometrics leads to concentration. The bibliometrical analysis showed that three frameworks - uncertainty reduction theory, constructivism and communication apprehension - occupy a particular position in present-day interpersonal communication research. In addition to its strengths, bibliometrics also has weaknesses. It may be difficult to approve it as a part of a phenomenologically-oriented line of argument. On the other hand, as, for example, Weber's classic studies have shown, there is no reason why objectivity and subjectivity should not be combined (see Anderson 1987:370-372, Kaplan 1971:606-608, Lazarsfeld 1971:633-634). In the present study, objective data has been used to support the epistemologically-oriented argument, which is interpretive and subjective in nature. In particular, Weber's (1905/1978) study on protestant ethics has served as an example of the rational combination of objective data and its highly subjective interpretation.

Another problem is the fact that bibliometrics is capable of analyzing citations only. Hence, So (1988:237), for example, is right in arguing that bibliometrics analyzes *what* has been cited only, and it does not tell us *why* the citation is used. In other words, it does not tell us anything about the intentions of the authors using the citations. Therefore, it is possible that, for example, Jesse Delia was cited frequently in the 1980s because several authors see him as belonging to 'the same camp' (see e.g. Price 1986:119-120). The question of how much a citation is connected with academic camps is open. It is possible that Berger, Delia and McCroskey are significant authors not because of their theories only, but also because they are the representatives of certain camps of interpersonal communication research.

The second objection that might be made in regard of the present study is the fact that another type of analysis would have lead to different conclusions. This is true. For example, T. Smith (1988) argues that the present

dichotomy (i.e. laws vs. rules) should be solved in order to develop the epistemology of interpersonal communication research. Both Nass and Reeves (1991) and Bostrom and Donohew (1992) emphasize that epistemology should be developed around the principle of using empirical evidence. Penman (1992) points out that moral issues should be stressed in order to modify the metatheory of communication research in general. Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp (1994) argue that there should be common, generally accepted criteria in order to evaluate a theory. In their study, Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp (1994:196) adhere to the principles presented by Littlejohn (1992) (see Chapter 1).

As can be seen, the variety of different approaches is relatively high. This study is one among others. The present study shares certain features with that by Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp (1994). Both studies concentrate on current 'real' theories of interpersonal communication. This study has also similarities with those by T. Smith (1988) and Penman (1988). Along with T. Smith (1988:31-33) and Penman (1988:248), the present study argues that epistemological speculations are extremely necessary, and also emphasizes that metatheoretical aspects of communication research should be explored. The empiricist argument of Nass and Reeves (1991) and Bostrom and Donohew (1992) is not favored here, although their perspective is understandable in terms of empiricism. It cannot be ignored, although it represents a different scientific tradition.

In short, it seems that the present study is in agreement with certain lines of thought in current research, and in contradiction with some others. It may be impossible to judge which view is the best. They all contribute something to the development and modification of theories in the field. In some cases the ethically-oriented argument of Penman (1992) may be illuminating, while in another cases the practical perspective of Stamp, Vangelisti and Knapp (1994) may prove to be useful. The empiricism-bound perspective of Bostrom and Donohew (1992:124-125) and Nass and Reeves (1991:240-242) is necessary when the question is one of the justification of empirical evidence. My study stresses the notions of interpretation and subjectivity, and has a different purpose from those of the studies mentioned above. The conclusions of the present study must be understood in relation to its primary aim: to develop the interpretive theory.

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YHTEENVETO

Kohti keskinäisviestinnän fenomenologiaa

Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan keskinäisviestinnän (interpersonal communication) tutkimuksen teorioita, traditioita, paradigmoja ja tieto-oppia. Tavoitteena on osoittaa, että fenomenologia - Edmund Husserlin, Martin Heideggerin ja Maurice Merleau-Pontyn jalanjalkia seuraten - avartaa tutkimusalueen tieto-oppia ja johtaa uusiin, entistä monipuolisempiin teorioihin.

Keskinäisviestinnän teorit

Tutkimuksen empiirisen osan tarkoituksena on selvittää, mitkä ovat nykyisen keskinäisviestinnän tutkimuksen keskeisimmät teorit. Tätä selvitetään bibliometriikan avulla. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan 1047 keskinäisviestinnän empiiristä ja teoreettista artikkelia, jotka on julkaistu puheviestinnän keskeisimmässä lehdissä vuosina 1982-1992.

Tulokset osoittavat, että kolme teoriaa on ylitse muiden. Charles Bergerin ja Richard Calabresen *epävarmuuden vähentämisen teoria* (uncertainty reduction theory), Jesse Delian edustama *konstruktivismi* (constructivism) ja James McCroskeyn kehittämä *viestintäarkuus* (communication apprehension) ovat bibliometrisessä mielessä tämän kymmenvuotiskauden merkittävimmät teoreettiset käsitteet.

Yllä mainitut teoretikot poikkeavat toisistaan selvästi. Berger ja Calabrese ovat empiristejä, Delia nojautuu tulkinnalliseen tutkimusotteeseen, ja McCroskey arvostaa tutkimuksen käytännönläheisyyttä. Erot heijastelevat keskinäisviestinnän tieto-opin nykytilaa. Alan teorit edustavat hyvin eri tyyppisiä tieteellisiä tavoitteita ja maailmankuvia.

Tämä on käsittääkseni johtanut keskinäisviestinnän teoriataustan pirstoutumiseen. On entistä vaikeampaa ymmärtää, mihin tutkimuksella lopulta

pyritään, mitä teorat keskinäisviestinnän arkitodellisuudesta kertovat ja kuinka täydellisiä ne lopulta ovat. Tämän epäselvyyden vallitessa keskinäisviestinnässä ei ole viime vuosina luotu uusia teorioita. Epätietoisuus siitä, millaisia teorioiden pitäisi olla, on johtanut siihen, että uusien teorioiden kehittäminen on ilmeisen vaikeaa.

Fenomenologian hyöty

Pyrin työssäni osoittamaan, että fenomenologia ratkaisee huomattavan osan keskinäisviestinnän tieto-opin ongelmista. Perustelen tätä ensisijaisesti kahdella seikalla. Fenomenologia ei pyri kumoamaan muita olemassaolevia tieteellisiä traditioita, joten se ei johda empirismin tai käytännönläheisyyttä painottavan näkökulman poissulkemiseen. Tästä johtuen fenomenologia 1) on paradigmaattisessa mielessä mielekäs. Fenomenologisen näkökulman tuominen keskinäisviestinnän tutkimukseen ei tarkoita sitä, että edessä olisi taistelu erilaisten maailmankuvien välillä.

Selkeimmin fenomenologian edut tulevat kuitenkin näkyviin pohdittaessa uusien teorioiden kehittämistä. Heideggerin, Husserlin ja Merleau-Pontyn kirjoitusten avulla voidaan tulkita jo olemassaolevia teorioita uusista näkökulmista. Hyvä havainnollistus tästä on epävarmuuden vähentämisen teoria. Heideggerilaisen tutkimusotteen soveltaminen Bergerin ja Calabresen teoriaan johtaa käytännössä uuteen teoriaan keskinäisviestintätilanteissa vaikuttavasta epävarmuudesta. Tässä mielessä fenomenologia onkin 2) uusien teorioiden kannalta hedelmällinen traditio.

Mistä keskinäisviestinnän fenomenologiassa on kysymys

Fenomenologia ei ole - kuten osa puheviestinnän tieto-oppia käsittelevästä kirjallisuudesta väittää - hämärä tai sekava traditio. Keskinäisviestinnän fenomenologian keskeiset väitteet on listattavissa selkeästi:

1. Tärkeää on se, mitä ihmiset itse ajattelevat tekevänsä, ei se, mitä ulkopuolinen tarkkailija havaitsee. Voimme fenomenologian mukaan puhua todellisesta keskinäisviestinnästä vain, jos keskinäisviestintätilanteissa olevat ihmiset itse ajattelevat viestivänsä keskenään.
2. Kysymykseen "Mitä keskinäisviestintätilanteissa todella tapahtuu?" on rajaton määrä vastauksia. Fenomenologian mukaan on lähdeittävä siitä, että kysymme viestijöiltä itseltään, mitä he pitävät olennaisena. Yksikään näin saaduista vastauksista ei ole vähempiarvoinen kuin jokin toinen.
3. Fenomenologia on kiinnostuneempi siitä, mitä uutta ihmiset keskinäisviestintätilanteissa luovat, kuin siitä, millaiset lainalaisuudet tai säännöt keskinäisviestintää selittävät. Tässä mielessä fenomenologiaa on vaikeaa soveltaa tieteenalalla käytyyn keskusteluun lakien (laws) ja sääntöjen (rules) välillä.

4. Fenomenologia kiinnittää erityistä huomiota siihen, että ihmisellä on itsetietoisuus. Tämä tarkoittaa käytännössä sitä, että teorioiden kehittämissä tulisi ottaa huomioon esimerkiksi se, että ihminen ei ole Bergerin ja Calabresen esittämällä tavalla pelkästään epävarma jostain, hän on myös tietoinen omasta epävarmuudestaan.

5. Ihmisillä on itsetietoisuudesta johtuen kyky ymmärtää, miten tietyt seikat - kuten tunne epävarmuudesta tai ahdistuksesta - vaikuttavat heidän viestintäänsä. Toisaalta viestintään vaikuttavat inhimillisyyteen erottamattomasti kuuluvat 'elämän perusmysterit', joita ei voida tieteellisesti selittää.

6. Keskinäisviestintätilanteiden analyysissa tulee lähteä siitä, että tapahtumat ovat ainutkertaisia: kaikki ihmiset ovat erilaisia, mistä johtuen heidän välinen viestintänsäkin on erilaista. Näin ollen yleispätevien käsitteiden luominen on keskinäisviestinnän tutkimuksessa vaikeaa. Fenomenologia painottaa sitä, että yleispätevyyden sijasta tulisi pyrkiä moniulotteisten ja -puolisten käsitteiden kehittämiseen.

7. Keskinäisviestintätilanteiden analyysissa tulee ottaa huomioon, että ihminen on transsendentaalinen luonteeltaan. Jos joku perustelee viestivänsä tietyllä tavalla, koska "Jumala sanoo niin", se on tieteellisessä mielessä paras saatavissa oleva perustelu tapahtumalle.

Nämä ovat teoreettisia lauseita. En pyri työssäni väittämään, että ne ovat ehdottomasti oikeassa. Keskeinen osa fenomenologiaa on, että varsinaista oikeaa näkökantaa ei ole olemassakaan. Tämä koskee myös fenomenologiaa itseään. Fenomenologia on teoria siinä missä kaikki muutkin teoriat: se kehottaa keskinäisviestinnän tutkimusta kiinnittämään huomiota ihmiseen ja hänen ominaisuuksiinsa, jotta voisimme entistä paremmin ymmärtää, miksi viestimme meille ominaisilla tavoilla.

Mihin fenomenologia johtaa

Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena ei ole väittää, että fenomenologia olisi jonkinlainen 'vastaus kaikkeen'. Se tarjoaa yhden näkökulman siihen vilkkaaseen keskusteluun, jota on viime vuosina käyty keskinäisviestinnän traditioista ja tutkimuksen tieto-opista. Osallistumalla keskusteluun tämä työ vie toivottavasti alan tutkimusta eteenpäin.

Tässä mielessä *Kohti keskinäisviestinnän fenomenologiaa* on otsikkonsa mukainen. Fenomenologian tavoitteena ei ole päättää mitään. Se on ennemminkin tie eteenpäin. Inhimillisen tiedon etsiminen on fenomenologian mukaan päättymätön projekti. Tämä ilmenee erityisen selvästi sellaisilla tieteenaloilla kuin keskinäisviestintä, jossa etsitään vastausta siihen, millaista ihmisten välinen kanssakäyminen on. Fenomenologia painottaa sitä, että viestimme jokainen meille itsellemme ominaisella tavallamme, ja olemme aina viestineet - ja tulemme viestimään - juuri kuten itse tahdomme.

APPENDIX 1

The data used in the bibliometrical analysis.

The articles in the core communication journals (1982-1992) selected for the analysis.

TA = Theoretical Article

ERR = Empirical Research Report

= the most crucial source used is the author's or authors' own previous work.

* = not included in the bibliometrical analysis because of insufficient data (no references used, unorthodox manner of references).

Journals in alphabetical order:

Central States Speech Journal (Communication Studies from 1989)

Vol. 33, 1982

Burke, J. & R. Clark. "An Assessment of Methodological Options for Investigating the Development of Persuasive Skills Across Childhood."

ERR, Delia et al 1976, 1977, 1979, 1979

Chmielewski, T. "A Test of a Model for Predicting Strategy Choice." ERR, Fishbein & Ajzen 1967, 1969, 1970, 1970, 1972, 1975, 1980

Hale, C. "An Investigation of the Relationship Between Cognitive Complexity and Listener-Adapted Communication." ERR, Alvy 1968, 1973, Burleson et al 1978, 1979, 1981

Hirokawa, R. "Consensus Group Decision-Making, Quality of Decision, and Group Satisfaction: An Attempt to Sort "Fact" from "Fiction."

ERR, Hoffman 1965

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Vol. 57, 1990

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Vol. 59, 1992

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Communication Quarterly

Vol. 30, Winter 1981-Fall 1982

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Quarterly Journal of Speech

Vol. 68, 1982

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- Hecht, M. "Satisfying Communication and Relationship Labels: Intimacy and Length of Relationship as Perceptual Frames of Naturalistic Conversations." ERR, #, Knapp (M.) & Ellis & Williams (B.) 1980
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- Murdock, J. & J. Bradac & J. Bowers. "Effects of Power on the Perception of Explicit and Implicit Threats, Promises, and Threats: A Rule-Governed Perspective." ERR, #
- Petronio, S. "Communication Strategies to Reduce Embarrassment: Differences between Men and Women." ERR, Brown (B.R.) et al 1968, 1970, 1971, 1978, Scott (M.) & Lyman 1970
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- Street, R. & R. Brady & R. Lee. "Evaluative Responses to Communicators: The Effects of Speech Rate, Sex, and Interaction Context." ERR, #
- Stutman, R. & S. Newell. "Beliefs Versus Values: Salient Beliefs in Designing a Persuasive Message." ERR, Ajzen & Fishbein 1975, 1977, 1980
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- Cline, R. & C. Musolf. "Disclosure as Social Exchange: Anticipated Length of Relationship, Sex Roles, and Disclosure Intimacy." ERR, *
- Hample, D. "Refinements on the Cognitive Model of Argument: Concreteness, Involvement and Group Scores." ERR, #, Petty & Cacioppo et al 1981, 1981
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- Owen, W. "Thematic Metaphors in Relational Communication: A Conceptual Framework." *ERR*, #, Baxter & Wilmot 1983, 1983
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- Shumanoff, S. "Rules Governing the Verbal Expression of Emotions Between Married Couples." *ERR*, #, Middelberg 1978
- Sunnafank, M. "Attitude Similarity and Interpersonal Attraction During Early Communicative Relationships: A Research Note on the Generalizability of Findings to Opposite-Sex Relationships." *ERR*, #
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- Martin, J. "Patterns of Communication in Three Types of Reentry Relationships: An Exploratory Study." *ERR*, Baxter & Wilmot 1983
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- Bell, R. & S. Tremblay & N. Buerkel-Rothfuss. "Interpersonal Attraction as a Communication Accomplishment: Development of a Measure of Affinity-Seeking Competence." *ERR*, #
- Blair, C. "The Statement: Foundation of Foucault's Historical Criticism." *TA*, Foucault 1972, 1973, 1973, 1977, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985
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- Engler-Parish, P. & F. Millar. "An Exploratory Relational Control Analysis of the Employment Screening Interview." *ERR*, #
- Frankel, R. "I wz wondering - uhm could Raid uhm effect the brain permanently d'y know?: Some Observations on the Intersection of Speaking and Writing in Calls to a Poison Control Center." *ERR*, *
- Glenn, P. "Initiating Shared Laughter in Multi-Party Conversations." *ERR*, Jefferson 1974, 1979, 1984, 1985, (& Sacks & Schegloff 1974, 1977, 1984)
- Gudykunst, W. & T. Nishida & K. Schmidt. "The Influence of Cultural, Relational, and Personality Factors on Uncertainty Reduction Processes." *ERR*, #, Hofstede 1980
- Hopper, R. "Speech in Telephone Openings: Emergent Interaction v. Routines." *TA*, Sacks 1967, 1970, 1972, 1972, 1975, 1984, 1987, Schegloff 1968, 1979, 1986
- Horne, J. "Rhetoric After Rorty." *TA*, Rorty 1979, 1982, 1984, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1986
- Lerner, G. "Notes on Overlap Management in Conversation: The Case of Delayed Completion." *ERR*, Schegloff 1982, 1984, 1987
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- Nofsinger, R. "Collaborating on Context: Invoking Alluded-to Shared Knowledge." *ERR*, Beach 1983, (in press), Schegloff 1972, 1979, 1987, 1987, 1987
- Papa, M. & E. Natalie. "Gender, Strategy Selection, and Discussion Satisfaction in Interpersonal Conflict." *ERR*, *
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- Beach, W. "On (Not) Observing Behavior Interactionally." TA, Motley 1990
- Cissna, K. & R. Anderson. "The Contributions of Carl R. Rogers to a Philosophical Praxis of Dialogue." TA, Rogers (C) 1942, 1942, 1951, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1986, (& Farson 1957)
- Courtright, J. & F. Millar & L. Rogers & D. Bagarozzi. "Interaction Dynamics of Relational Negotiation: Reconciliation versus Termination of Distressed Relationships." ERR, #
- Crowdes, M. "Feminine Voices: Ontological Dilemmas and Re-visions of Gender in Spontaneous Speech." ERR, McKerrow 1989
- Douglas, W. "Uncertainty, Information-seeking, and Liking During Initial Interaction." ERR, Berger (& Kellermann 1983, 1984, 1985), (& Perkins 1978, 1979), (& et al 1975, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1986)
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- Kline, S. & C. Floyd. "On the Art of Saying No: The Influence of Social Cognitive Development on Messages of Refusal." ERR, *
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- Motley, M. "On Whether One Can(not) Not Communicate: An Examination via Traditional Communication Postulates." TA, #, Watzlawick & Beavin & Jackson (D.) 1967
- Pavitt, C. "A Controlled Test of Some "Complication Factors" Relevant to the Inferential Model for Evaluations of Communicative Competence." ERR, #
- Schlueter, D. & J. Barge & D. Blankenship. "A Comparative Analysis of Influence Strategies Used by Upper and Lower-Level Male and Female Managers." ERR, *
Vol. 55, 1991
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- Hale, J. & P. Mongeau & R. Thomas. "Cognitive Processing of One- and Two-sided Persuasive Messages." ERR, Allen 1991, Petty & Cacioppo et al 1986, 1986
- Infante, D. & W. Gorden. "How Employees See the Boss: Test of an Argumentative and Affirming Model of Supervisors' Communicative Behavior." ERR, #
- Manusov, V. "Perceiving Nonverbal Messages: Effects of Immediacy and Encoded Intent on Receiver Judgments." ERR, #
Meyers, R. & D. Seibold & D. Brashers. "Argument in Initial Group Decision-Making Discussions: Refinement of a Coding Scheme and a Descriptive Quantitative Analysis." ERR, #
- Putnam, L. & S. van Hoveen & C. Bullis. "The Role of Rituals and Fantasy in Teachers' Bargaining." ERR, *
Rosenfeld, L. & G. Bowen. "Marital Disclosure and Marital Satisfaction: Direct-Effect Versus Interaction-Effect Models." ERR, *
Spitzberg, B. & C. Brunner. "Toward a Theoretical Integration of Context and Competence Inference Research." ERR, #
Stewart, J. "A Postmodern Look at Traditional Communication Postulates." TA, McCarthy 1987
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- Alberts, J. & G. Driscoll. "Containment Versus Escalation: The Trajectory of Couples' Conversation Complaints." ERR, *
Bayer, C. & D. Cegala. "Trait Verbal Aggressiveness and Argumentativeness: Relations with Parenting Style." ERR, Infante (& Rancer 1982, 1985), (& et al 1981, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989)
- Bridge, K. & L. Baxter. "Blended Relationships: Friends as Work Associates." ERR, #, Dillard & Witteman 1985
- Buller, D. & R. Aune. "The Effects of Speech Rate Similarity on Compliance: Application of Communication Accommodation Theory." ERR, #
- Foss, S. & C. Griffen. "A Feminist Perspective on Rhetorical Theory: Toward a Classification of Boundaries." TA, Burke 1950, 1952, 1954, 1966, 1968, 1970, Starhawk 1989, 1991
- Graham, E. & M. Papa & G. Brooks. "Functions of Humor in Conversation: Conceptualization and Measurement." ERR, *
Hopper, R. & K. Drummond. "Accomplishing Interpersonal Relationship: The Telephone Openings of Strangers and Intimates." ERR, *
Johnson, G. "Subordinate Perceptions of Superior's Communication Competence and Task Attraction Related to Superior's Use of Compliance-Gaining Tactics." ERR, *
- Legge, N. & W. Rawlins. "Managing Disputes in Young Adult Friendships: Modes of Convenience, Cooperation, and Commitment." ERR, Sillars et al 1980, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987
- Metts, S. & W. Cupach & T. Imahori. "Perceptions of Sexual Compliance-Resisting Messages in Three Types of Cross-Sex Relationships." ERR, *
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- Witteman, H. "Analyzing Interpersonal Conflict: Nature of Awareness, Type of Initiating Event, Situational Perceptions, and Management Styles." ERR, #

APPENDIX 2

The results of the bibliometrical analysis.

Appendices 2a and 2b list alphabetically all those authors who were cited in more than three articles in the core communication journals during the period 1982-1992.

Appendix 2a lists those authors whose cited works were published between 1970 and 1992. For instance, the cited works of Irwin Altman, the first name in the list, were published in 1973, 1975, and 1981. The number of citations of each work is given. For example, the text published in 1973 was cited 4 times, the 1975 text once, and the 1981 text twice. Hence, the total number of references to Irwin Altman is $(4 + 1 + 2 =) 7$. This number is presented in column N. In column f the number of articles in which citations appear is given. For instance, Irwin Altman was cited in three articles.

Appendix 2b is similar to 2a except for two additions. First, in 2b three chronological eras are distinguished. The first is the era 1922-1946 (see page 1). The second era covers the years 1947-1971 (pages 2-4), and the third era the years 1972-1992 (pages 5-6). The purpose of this division was to show possible temporal differences in the production of the cited texts. For example, Kenneth Burke wrote his first text in 1922, as page 1 shows, and his last text was published in 1985 (see page 5). The output of this author was distributed evenly across the different eras. In contrast, the references to Paul Watzlawick, for example, are concerned exclusively with the work written in 1967 (see page 4).

The other difference is that the columns N and f are presented in Appendix 2b separately (see page 7). In this table, the output of those authors who published their texts during the period 1922-1992 is analyzed. In Appendix 2a only those authors who published during 1970-1992 is analyzed. Appendix 2b lists those authors who are not included in Appendix 2a. The total number of references to Ludvig Wittgenstein, for example, is 4, as shown in column N. As seen on page 4, the cited texts were published in 1953, 1958, and 1960, and the text which was published in 1953 was cited twice. The publications in 1958 and 1960 were cited once. The number of articles citing Wittgenstein is 3. These data are shown in column f.

Appendix 2a (page 1). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1970-92

N= total number of cited texts

f= number of articles in which citations appear

| Name/ Year | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | N | f | |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|-----|----|
| Altman, I. | | | | 4 | | 1 | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | 3 |
| Anderson, R. | | | | | 2 | | 3 | | 2 | | 1 | 2 | | 2 | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | | 15 | 4 |
| Applegate, J. | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 10 | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | 14 | 4 |
| Bavelas, J. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | 7 | 4 |
| Baxter, L. | | | | | | | | | 7 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 34 | 13 |
| Beach, W. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 2 | | | | 4 | 3 |
| Bell, R. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 4 |
| Berger, C. | | | | 2 | | 28 | 6 | | 2 | 12 | 1 | 5 | 13 | 9 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 4 | | 3 | | | 109 | 31 |
| Boster, F. | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 2 | | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | 19 | 5 |
| Bradac, J. | | | | | | | 6 | 4 | | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | 20 | 6 |
| Brown, B. | | | | 3 | 3 | 2 | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 9 | 3 |
| Brown, P. | | | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | | | 2 | | 3 | | | | | | | 9 | 7 |
| Brummett, B. | | | | | | | 4 | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | 4 | | | | 12 | 7 |
| Burgoon, J. | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 2 | 3 | | 4 | | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 1 | | 20 | 8 |

Appendix 2a (page 3). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1970-92

N= total number of cited texts

f= number of articles in which citations appear

| Name/ Year | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | N | f | |
|-----------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|-----|----|
| Delia, J. | | | 3 | | 16 | | 14 | 24 | 4 | 25 | 9 | | 15 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 114 | 28 |
| Derlega, V. | | | | 1 | 2 | | 3 | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 9 | 3 |
| Derrida, J. | | | | 1 | | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | | 2 | 2 | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 13 | 3 |
| Dillard, J. | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 5 | 3 |
| Ellis, D. | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | 5 |
| Ely, I. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| Farrell, T. | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | 3 |
| Fisher, B. | 2 | 2 | | | | | | 1 | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | 3 |
| Fitzpatrick, M. | | | | | | | | 3 | | 4 | | | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | 18 | 5 |
| Gadamer, H. | | | | | | 5 | 1 | 2 | | | 2 | | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 13 | 4 |
| Geertz, C. | | | | 2 | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 5 | 3 |
| Giles, H. | | | | 4 | | 2 | | 2 | | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 20 | 4 |
| Goering, E. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| Gottman, J. | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | | 8 | | | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | 3 | | | | | 20 | 7 |

Appendix 2a (page 5). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1970-92

N= total number of cited texts

f= number of articles in which citations appear

| Name/ Year | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | N | f | |
|----------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|-----|----|
| Kellermann, K. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 7 | 3 |
| Kline, S. | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 3 | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 8 | 6 |
| Knapp, M. | | | | | 1 | | | | 6 | | 6 | 2 | | | 4 | | | | | | | 1 | | | 20 | 14 |
| Levinson, S. | | | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | 9 | 7 |
| McCroskey, J. | 7 | | 1 | 1 | 6 | 11 | 28 | 23 | 16 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 5 | 14 | 6 | 4 | 2 | | 4 | 1 | | | | 153 | 22 |
| McKerrow, R. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| McLaughlin, M. | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 13 | | 5 | | | 2 | | 4 | | | | 38 | 13 |
| Miller, G. | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | 3 | | 2 | 3 | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 11 | 7 |
| Motley, M. | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | 4 | | | | 9 | 5 |
| Norton, R. | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 6 | 1 | | 1 | | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | 16 | 7 |
| O'Keefe, B. | | | | | | | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | | 13 | | 1 | 1 | | 8 | 4 | 3 | 1 | | | | 42 | 14 |
| O'Keefe, D. | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | | | | | | 3 | 1 | | | | | 26 | 7 |
| Parks, M. | | | | | | | 2 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 6 | 4 |
| Pearce, W. | | | | | | | 1 | | | 5 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 17 | 6 |

Appendix 2a (page 7). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1970-92

N= total number of cited texts

f= number of articles in which citations appear

| Name/ Year | 70 | 71 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 | N | f | |
|---------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|----|----|
| Street, R. | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 10 | 4 |
| Strong, W. | | | | 3 | 3 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 8 | 3 |
| Sunna- frank, M. | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | 2 | 3 | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 10 | 4 |
| Switzer, J. | | | | | 3 | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 3 |
| Waltman, M. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 4 | | | | | | 5 | 4 |
| Wander, P. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 6 |
| West, C. | | | | | | 2 | | 2 | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 3 |
| Whaley, B. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| Wiemann, J. | | | | | | | 1 | 4 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 4 |
| Williams, B. | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | 4 |
| Wilmot, W. | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 8 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | | | | 15 | 10 |
| Wilson, S. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | 3 | 3 |
| Wiseman, R. | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | 4 |
| Zimmer- man, D. | | | | | | 2 | | 2 | | | | | | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 7 | 4 |
| Zucker- man, M. | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | 1 | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | | | 7 | 3 |

Appendix 2b (page 2). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1947-1971 ('The Second Era')

| Name/ Year | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Ajzen, I. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | |
| Bales, R. | | | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | |
| Beavin, J. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | |
| Bern, S. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| Brewer, M. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | |
| Brewer, R. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | |
| Buber, M. | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 6 | | 3 | | | 1 | 1 |
| Burke, K. | | | | 5 | | 4 | 3 | 4 | 2 | | | 4 | | 9 | 4 | | 2 | 5 | 10 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | | |
| Byrne, D. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 | 2 | 2 | | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 8 | |
| Chaffee, S. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | 2 | 2 | |
| Ekman, P. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | 1 |
| Fishbein, M. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | 2 | |
| Foucault, M. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | |
| Friesen, W. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | 1 |
| Geissner, H. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | |

Appendix 2b (page 4). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1947-1971 ('The Second Era')

| Name/ Year | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 69 | 70 | 71 |
|-----------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Watzla- wick, P. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | |
| Weaver, W. | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Weaver, R. | | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | 3 | | | 4 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | | 2 | 4 | 3 | | | | | 3 | |
| Wittgen- stein, L. | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |

Appendix 2b (page 5). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1972-1992 ('The Third Era')

| Name/ Year | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Bales, R. | | | | | | | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bem, S. | | | 6 | 4 | 8 | 3 | | 2 | | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Burke, K. | | 1 | 1 | | | | 2 | 1 | | | | 2 | 2 | 3 | | | | | | | |
| Byrne, D. | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Chaffee, S. | 8 | 3 | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Ekman, P. | 3 | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| Fishbein, M. | 1 | | 1 | 4 | | 1 | | | 5 | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Foucault, M. | 3 | 3 | | | | 2 | | 1 | 4 | | 1 | | 2 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Friesen, W. | 3 | | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| Geissner, H. | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| Goffman, E. | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Heidegger, M. | 1 | 1 | | 4 | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | | |
| McLeod, J. | 5 | 2 | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mehrabian, A. | 2 | | 5 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Phillips, G. | | 2 | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 3 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | |

Appendix 2b (page 6). The most frequently cited authors during the period 1972-1992 ('The Third Era')

| Name/ Year | 72 | 73 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 79 | 80 | 81 | 82 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 86 | 87 | 88 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 92 |
|---------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Rogers, C. | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | | | 1 | | | 2 | | | | | | |
| Sacks, H. | 4 | 1 | 8 | 1 | | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | |
| Schegloff, E. | 4 | 1 | 6 | 1 | | 5 | | 5 | 3 | | 1 | | 3 | | 2 | 4 | | | | | |
| Toulmin, S. | 2 | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Weaver, R. | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | |

Appendix 2b (page 7). The list of the authors analyzed in appendix 2b (pp. 1-6). The total number of cited texts is shown in column N and the number of articles in which citations appear is given in column f.

| Frequencies/ Names | N | f |
|-----------------------|----|----|
| Ajzen, I. | 4 | 5 |
| Bales, R. | 11 | 4 |
| Beavin, J. | 4 | 4 |
| Bern, S. | 31 | 7 |
| Brewer, M. | 3 | 3 |
| Brewer, R. | 3 | 3 |
| Buber, M. | 13 | 4 |
| Burke, K. | 35 | 18 |
| Byrne, D. | 17 | 8 |
| Chaffee, S. | 22 | 5 |
| Ekman, P. | 15 | 5 |
| Fishbein, M. | 19 | 5 |
| Foucault, M. | 19 | 3 |
| Friesen, W. | 15 | 5 |
| Geissner, H. | 5 | 3 |
| Goffman, E. | 6 | 3 |
| Guttman, L. | 3 | 3 |
| Heidegger, M. | 26 | 8 |
| Jackson, D. | 5 | 5 |
| Marwell, G. | 5 | 5 |
| McLeod, J. | 14 | 5 |
| Mehrabian, A. | 20 | 3 |
| Phillips, G. | 10 | 3 |
| Rogers, C. | 26 | 3 |
| Sacks, H. | 28 | 11 |
| Schegloff, E. | 38 | 13 |
| Schmitt, D. | 5 | 5 |
| Shannon, C. | 5 | 4 |
| Toulmin, S. | 7 | 3 |
| Watzlawick, P. | 4 | 4 |
| Weaver, W. | 3 | 3 |
| Weaver, R. | 8 | 4 |
| Wittgenstein, L. | 4 | 3 |

APPENDIX 3

The Two-Role Version of the RCQ

Age _____ I.D.# _____ Class Time _____ Sex _____

Our interest in this questionnaire is to learn how people describe others whom they know. Our concern here is with the habits, mannerisms—in general, with the personal characteristics, rather than the physical traits—which characterize a number of different people.

In order to make sure that you are describing real people, we have set down a list of two different categories of people. In the blank space beside each category below, please write the initials, nicknames, or some other identifying symbol for a person of your acquaintance who fits into that category. Be sure to use a different person for each category.

1. A person your own age whom you like. _____
2. A person your own age whom you dislike. _____

Spend a few moments looking over this list, mentally comparing and contrasting the people you have in mind for each category. Think of their habits, their beliefs, their mannerisms, their relations to others, any characteristics they have which you might use to describe them to other people.

If you have any questions about the kinds of characteristics we are interested in, please ask them.

Please look back to the first sheet and place the symbol you have used to designate the person in category 1 here _____

Now describe this person as fully as you can. Write down as many defining characteristics as you can. Do not simply put down those characteristics that distinguish him/her from others on your list, but include any characteristics that he/she shares with others as well as characteristics that are unique to him/her. Pay particular attention to his/her habits, beliefs, ways of treating others, mannerisms, and similar attributes. Remember, describe him/her as completely as you can, so that a stranger might be able to determine the kind of person he/she is from your description. Use the back of this page if necessary. *Please spend only about five (5) minutes describing him/her.*

This person is:

Please look back to the first sheet and place the symbol you have used to designate the person in category 2 here _____

Now describe this person as fully as you can. Write down as many defining characteristics as you can. Do not simply put down those characteristics that distinguish him/her from others on your list, but include any characteristics that he/she shares with others as well as characteristics that are unique to him/her. Pay particular attention to his/her habits, beliefs, ways of treating others, mannerisms, and similar attributes. Remember, describe him/her as completely as you can, so that a stranger might be able to determine the kind of person he/she is from your description. Use the back of this page if necessary. *Please spend only about five (5) minutes describing him/her.*

This person is:

APPENDIX 4

Personal Report of Communication Apprehension-24

Directions: This instrument is composed of 24 statements concerning your feelings about communication with other people. Please indicate in the space provided the degree to which each statement applies to you by marking whether you (1) Strongly Agree, (2) Agree, (3) Are Undecided, (4) Disagree, or (5) Strongly Disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers. Many of the statements are similar to other statements. Do not be concerned about this. Work quickly, just record your first impression.

1. I dislike participating in group discussions.
2. Generally, I am comfortable while participating in group discussions.
3. I am tense and nervous while participating in group discussions.
4. I like to get involved in group discussions.
5. Engaging in a group discussion with new people makes me tense and nervous.
6. I am calm and relaxed while participating in group discussions.
7. Generally, I am nervous when I have to participate in a meeting.
8. Usually I am calm and relaxed while participating in meetings.
9. I am very calm and relaxed when I am called upon to express an opinion at a meeting.
10. I am afraid to express myself at meetings.
11. Communicating at meetings usually makes me uncomfortable.
12. I am very relaxed when answering questions at a meeting.
13. While participating in a conversation with a new acquaintance, I feel very nervous.
14. I have no fear of speaking up in conversations.
15. Ordinarily I am very tense and nervous in conversations.
16. Ordinarily I am very calm and relaxed in conversations.
17. While conversing with a new acquaintance, I feel very relaxed.
18. I'm afraid to speak up in conversations.
19. I have no fear of giving a speech.
20. Certain parts of my body feel very tense and rigid while giving a speech.
21. I feel relaxed while giving a speech.
22. My thoughts become confused and jumbled when I am giving a speech.
23. I face the prospect of giving a speech with confidence.
24. While giving a speech I get so nervous, I forget facts I really know.