

HELENA SEDERHOLM



STARTING TO **PLAY** WITH ARTS EDUCATION

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Helena Sederholm

Starting to Play with Arts Education

Study of Ways to Approach Experiential
and Social Modes of Contemporary Art



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ABSTRACT

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Finnish summary

Diss.

This study discusses and interprets contemporary art that has become a challenge to art education. Both the theory and practices of art education have been based on the notions of the autonomy of art(s), aesthetic experience and metalanguages of arts. Mostly, the concepts used have been raised from the premises of analytic aesthetics and its language-based foundation.

The intention of this work is to find means by which to grasp alternative ways to approach and understand contemporary art that is open processes, collage-like and that has lost its autonomy. Instead, it stresses communication, collaboration, participation and an experience - whether aesthetic or not.

I examine the influence of the radical avant-garde and the situational aesthetics of the 1960s on contemporary art. On the one hand, in these phenomena the nature of art has gone through a change from studying the form into examining the meanings and tasks of art. On the other hand, these art modes have already had the kind of playful attitude that is seen in contemporary art that I define as 'performative art'. It means any kind of collages of arts which try to create an experience, not just by describing, representing and asserting statements but by offering a space for interaction, participation and dialogue. I argue that there is no necessity for language only (ie, arttalk) when dealing with arts, but other performative modes, such as noises, gestures, walking (flâneur) etc., can be meaningful as well.

My hypotheses are that on a practical level arts education would be contextual processes emerging in a current situation at hand. On a theoretical level, ie, when teaching to-be arts educators, the starting point should be providing tools to shape as manifold a concept of art as possible.

The theoretical background of this argumentative study is the concept of pragmatist aesthetics. With pragmatic basis I have been able to develop concepts for revising art education so that it could much better to operate in the field where different art modes are blurred, media dissolved and the roles of artists and audiences are changing.

Keywords: arts education, contemporary art, collage, performative art, social art, avant-garde, pragmatist aesthetics

Elämän taiteelle

“Jedermann sein eigener Fussball”

I HAVE AN UMBRELLA IN MY VEIN

My friend, dramaturgist, playwright, long distance runner and theatre director, Juha Hurme said a few years ago, that a good theatre performance takes as much time as a football match. To my mind it is not only the time that should match in football and art. It is also an experience, a common joy, excitement and even disappointments. In the art education a solitary and individual experience and its durability, even permanence, has been stressed. But is it possible for art to be as passing and transient experience as a football match? In that case one do not get permanent satisfaction but needs more and more. Art can also become a part of life, not just a part of one's Sunday afternoons.

What could an art educator do in the middle of a playing field? It is the main problem in my study. It may be that I cannot give satisfactory answers, but at least I have tried to shape good questions. When I almost got lost in the field of unessentials and irrelevances, I got quite indispensable help from Yrjö Sepänmaa and especially from Erkki Sevänen, who gave useful comments on earlier drafts. I thank them very much. I am also grateful to Tom Sandqvist for reading the last version and giving valuable advices.

I am not going to list here my friends who have supported me, and to each of whom I wish to give a warm hug, if I had learned to do something like that at all. I know that every one of them knows that (s)he is worth of these imaginative embraces - especially Markus.

It is tragic, (or, is it pathetic?) that these theses almost killed me. Last summer, year ago, I had already been sitting for months and written this work. I loved to work so much that it engulfed me, and I kept sitting for hours just writing and forgot to stand up every now and then. The result was that blood in my veins formed trombooses, which started to make their way up my veins as embolias, and those little clots obstructed totally my lungs. My heart was about to burst. Of course, doing this work was not the only reason for what I had to experience. They set an umbrella filter in my vein, and I went through a difficult surgery (pulmonal artery endarterektomy). After the technically successful operation, I got some other problems due to total arrests during the operation. Thus I am grateful to senior surgeon Rauno Luosto and his colleagues for saving my life, and neurologist, assistant doctor Lauri Soinne for pursuing some decisions that, in the end, made possible for me to revise this work. I thank also the neuropsychologist Anna-Riitta Putkonen for support.

And I do not know what would have happened if clinical neuropsychologist Marja-Liisa Kaipio has not believed that I am a Genius. I trusted her, and here we are

. . . and I'm carrying this rage like a blood filled egg and there's a thin line between the inside and the outside a thin line between thought and action and that line is simply made up of blood and muscle and bone. . .

David Wojnarowicz 1954-1992

In Alppila, Helsinki on 14th July 1998

Helena Sederholm

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PART 1

Talking about music is like dancing about architecture.
Steve Martin



The rabbit chute on the schoolyard of Pupuhuhta suburb in Jyväskylä.
(See Appendix)

INTRODUCTION

*O nein, wir haben keine Künstler,
Jeder tut alles so gut wie möglich.
- Fluxus*

My purpose in this study was to discuss and to interpret contemporary art, a phenomenon that has become a challenge to arts education. The domain of art is so wide and manifold that all the art that is produced today does not provoke questions or problems to be grasped. But, in broader sense, the nature of art has changed into a more performative direction. This means that the various arts can more often be seen as contextual and open situations where it is possible to participate in one way or another. I have tried to relate them to the aesthetic and art theoretical field that arts education leans on nowadays. I have suggested that the field could be wider, especially since the reception of art has gained new emphasis. In addition to the traditional aesthetic and artistic criteria, theory as well as arts educational practice should take more notice of the blurring of art modes, openness of form, dissolution of media, and the change in the roles of artists and audience.

The intention of my work was to find means by which to grasp some of the phenomena in contemporary art which still merely float on the margins of the art world without concepts with which to approach them for a closer look. In contemporary performative* art, there are a few important features which I concentrate on: (1) it is frequently based on relatively open processes and thus (2) a work of art is a subject of dissolution in a certain sense and to a certain extent. Its central mode of expression is collage in its various and more or less historical and particular (tied to time and place) forms (including ready-mades and other objects outside the traditional realm of art). (3) It is often controversial, since it has lost its autonomy in the sense the Modernists understood it. Since I argue that art has merely lost its autonomy, at least in the sense it is something vital and important

* I want to stress that the term 'performative' in this context does not mean only dramatic or other performances and acts. I shall provide a more exact definition of the term later.

I have to find out when and why this happened. Then I have tried to identify both the cultural and aesthetic situation in some postmodern definitions of art, without going into details of the postmodern situation. However, the definitions I have dealt with explain something about the relation of art to its past and its position in present-day society as well as about the changes in the structure of art works. To take into account some definitions of postmodern art is motivated by the fact that they function as a "conceptual bridge" between past radical avant-garde and present contemporary art. In this study I do not use the terms 'postmodernism' and 'contemporary art' as synonyms. My opinion is that it is possible to define postmodernism as a transitional phase after modernism which saw the formulation of certain cultural premises more suitable to a situation where, for example, the erosion of belief in rationality and the superiority of, say, a patriarchal heterosexual society of white men was already being questioned in practice. However, these two concepts do temporally overlap. Concerning postmodern art, it is just a part of the broader phenomenon of contemporary art when it is defined in its chronological meaning, that is, it consists of late-modernist art both before the term postmodern began to flourish (which took place mostly from the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s), and also since the term has begun to show signs of wear (in the 1990s). However, in this study I use the term contemporary art to refer mostly to certain art after the late 1970s until this day¹, and when necessary I use appropriate attributes to tell exactly what kind of contemporary art is in question. Hence the art of the 1960s, which I also introduce in my study is late-modernist, although sharing some features also seen in contemporary phenomena.

It is also interesting that it describes changes in approaching political contents by artistic means. It is important to take this into account, since the relation between art and life is at its most complicated and fruitful in political, or as we can call it nowadays, social or activist, art. (4) The context of performative art is often outside the habitual frames of art, mostly on the streets of the city or sometimes in the countryside. Nonaesthetic and nonartistic interests have become important. At least, art world frames are played with, not taken for granted. I propose that in the background of much contemporary art it is possible to find the very same thing that also had a central place in modern art in the beginning, ie, the flâneur. Although today he is more and more she, wandering around without aesthetic intentions and as not so alienated as before.

In sum, partly due to what I have said above, there have been major changes in the roles of artist and audience, since between them - between self and object - there is no longer the language(s) of art but just cases and processes that we can sense and experience without an enormous apparatus of learned "grammars" or "metalanguages". I am not against art talk, but, especially in arts educational practice, it has to have a concrete and, even, very pragmatic character. Otherwise, as arts educators we would stop everything before it has even begun. That is why I prefer illustrative and experiential cases, even if they sometimes do not seem to be abstract enough for comprehending the whole picture. I am convinced that only through individual cases can we avoid falling in the trap that as of making general

statements about art, not to mention everyday life, both of which are such manifold and complicated phenomena that we cannot just stop to think but we have to start to go through it and see what is around it, take part in it, and at the same time think about what we are seeing, doing and experiencing. I suppose it is no longer a surprise for a reader that pragmatism should form a philosophical background in my work. I have not only tried to find out the *what* of the concepts and metalanguage of certain art, but *how* and *why* these concepts exist. An important factor is an experience in art as a mediator between a (wo)man and her environment. When trying to label the art I deal with in this work I define it as performative, hence often it is art that is almost impossible to put simply within the categories we already have.

I stress the point that I want to reject certain hierarchies. To my mind there is no difference between something called 'marginal' and something that is described as an example of "excellence in art". This is a tradition we have had since the punk culture of the late seventies. It is difficult to say any longer if the sharp division between, on the one hand, opera, modern dance or modern painting, and on the other hand, other modes of art, exists only for the purpose of selling, for example, copies of Impressionist paintings to a large public: "Ainutlaatuinen mahdollisuus hankkia kotiin oma "taidemuseo" ja opettaa lapset ymmärtämään suurta taidetta!"² (The unique opportunity to have your own "art museum" at home and to teach children to understand great art!) Or, then, to say that opera and dance, for instance, are reserved for experts and, should I say "snobs" as expensive entertainment for them. Who can say where to draw the line between entertainment, commercial, or popular culture and art, since van Gogh is as popular as Disney. This will be seen in the examples of art I shall use; they include both "types" of art; marginal as well as classics. In this study, when giving examples, I have deliberately mixed up famous and known artists and their masterpieces with artists and works or projects almost nobody has ever heard of. If I hadn't done this, just a few people would have known of them. But that was not my point, though. My point was that it is my own politics that I am practising. Maybe it is possible to claim that I am a child of the punk culture of my youth: I do not believe in hierarchies, certainly not in art, not to mention in theory either. I prefer freedom to choose, of course on the grounds that I can explicate the premises underlying what I have chosen. Nonetheless, without doing it this way I do not believe we could ever change our ways of seeing and comprehending things. Perhaps I wanted to be slightly revolutionary, but this is certainly not a bomb, just a doctoral thesis.

My emphasis was on the performative - and thus in contemporary art. In a certain measure we have problems with different art modes; each of which has its own autonomy that has set the standards for that mode. I compare this to the intermingling of different arts and to the interrelations between the arts (*Gesamtkunstwerks*). My hypotheses are that 1) on a *practical* level arts education was analogous to play, that is, it would be contextual processes emerging in a current situation at hand; and 2) on a *theoretical* level, ie, when teaching to-be arts educators, the starting point could be

knowledge-based, such as it would provide options and ways in approaching art, and thus tools to shape as manifold a concept of art as possible.

In this study I deal, first, with the premises art education is based on today, as a branch of study in the university, without entering any deeper into the problems of education. Hence my point was to study art and its nature. In sum, the premises I mentioned are the notion of autonomies of art that has prevailed in Modernism and especially in analytic aesthetics. Due to this, theories of art education have been shaped in terms of a rather coherent narrative of art and philosophical aesthetics, which has, however, remained open enough in the sense that it shows alternatives. Some have seen this confusing, and have tried to tie up these alternatives with such concepts as 'metalanguages' or 'arttalk'. I saw that this openness enables more alternatives to be added, although I see it rather as an endless project that follows artistic practices.

Modernism installed in its phallic ivory tower, aimed at autonomy and the individual, emphasized the cult of genius and tried to get rid of popular culture; it remained alien to everyday life. This is what is often said about Modernism. But it is not this simple. Modernism may concern the canon of modernist masterpieces, that is, art of Picasso, Kandinsky, Klee, Schönberg, Eliot, about whom art critic Hilton Kramer wrote that among them we are likely to find "the most solid and enduring achievements of the modern era" in contrast to the extreme radical revolt represented by Dada.³ Because his ideas are very well represented in the theories that form the background of the arts educational praxis, I have chosen another modernist tradition which has been neglected in arts education. This tradition draws on the sources of the radical avant-garde and cross-artistic phenomena.

What I have said above leads to the question of what there is in contemporary art that does not lend itself to those older images or narrations or languages. Thus I have focused on the kind of art I defined as performative; art that is largely the result of the dissolution of art modes and the collage becoming such a dominant mode of expression. This is also connected to the postmodernist assertions about the aestheticization of life, which means that, in fact, nothing essential is lacking, although aesthetic qualities are not the exclusive property of art any longer. One can style oneself aesthetically, create one's life as a work of art, by adopting and adapting familiar roles and life-styles. These generic forms can be adjusted to the individual's contingent circumstances. Shusterman also asks why our autonomy cannot be expressed in the freedom to define ourselves through an already existing life-style or language. Autonomy and radical individualism are not the same thing.

This is an age of expertise, not professional expertise, since traditional modes of knowledge do not provide instruments through which understand the world. Those who emphasize the reality principle are being left behind. What has happened in postmodern is that there problems of credibility and trust have emerged, if expertise is based on the notion of science/art as truth and people do not believe it, if there are no facts anymore. People know that in advice political, moral or other values are always involved, and this also concerns arts, and especially arts education. Dealing with this

issue proves also that style, for instance, will no longer do as the grammar or language of aesthetics in dealing with art.

Contemporary artists are no longer jealous of their autonomy, but, in many cases, have given it up. Hence it has merely been an illusion that has prevented them saying or doing something that would concern people's lives. It has been a pleasurable illusion to play with, though. This liquidation of autonomies acquired its strength in the 1960s, and, consequently, I have focused on this decade.⁴ In fact, the historical context and background in my work are to be found in the situational art of the 1960s with its roots in the radical avant-garde. The issues mentioned above have been taken into account since the beginning of the 1960s. Therefore I have described what happened in art at that time. Much of it was influenced by the radical avant-garde of the 1910s and 1920s. There was a transition from notions concentrating on the work of art to process, from creating new forms and images to exploiting the old ones, from elitist valuations to no need today down any hierarchic values, and from staring into the future, waiting for the revolution, to the present moment and experiencing it.

There was also a breakdown in the old structural opposition of the cultural and the economic. The first has 'commodified' and latter 'symbolized'. This conflation of the cultural and the economic renders critical distance, as has been maintained, impossible; and without critical distance critique seems to become impossible. The tradition of Modernism, which willingly maintained critical distance, has not totally vanished, however, but when dealing with contemporary socially and politically meaningful performative art we are compelled to seek the theoretical background in the radical avant-garde of this century. The radical avant-garde focused on the relations of art and life, somewhat against the idea of the absolute autonomy of art. The radical avant-garde introduced and practised open and fragmentarized forms of artistic expression. It preferred collage, used various (already existing) styles, and mixed together vaudeville, literature, music, popular arts, dance, as well as painting, theatre and other art modes.

The radical avant-garde, which opposed bourgeois capitalism and ways of life, when engaged in politics, was anarchist or leftist. This makes it quite appropriate to deal with a political art that has leant on critical theory and more or less marxist ideas. Critical theory has formed a strong foundation for experiencing social life as well as art. It has aimed at the democratization of an experience, but its shortcoming from the point of view of postmodern thinking has been that it has practised a rather specialized and elitist ideal of expert culture. In the modernist art world socially and politically engaged art has been marginalized. This is logical because in the modernist ideology art has merely been seen as apolitical in itself. For Modernism political analysis was done satisfactorily enough from a viewpoint outside of art by some representatives of critical theory (Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, among others), who have usually maintained the autonomy of art by shifting all the problems concerning power relations and ideology as standing out more clearly in popular culture, which has been put in opposition to arts.

Cultural studies inherited attitudes and methods from critical theory, and rightful criticism has been levelled against cultural studies that there

is a tendency to celebrate resistance *per se* without distinguishing between types and forms of resistance. Art has been seen to be ideological and political as a whole. Marcuse and Adorno argued that art is oppositional when it performs its ideological function through its aesthetic form and not its explicit revolutionary content. Art pits innovation against the status quo. This means that the most important values are those of freshness, creativity and innovation, which is a rather modernist assumption about art. Art is either totally autonomous, or, it has a certain (critical) distance. In both cases it posits a distance between a work of art and its receiver.

The thoughts of many art educators have arisen out of a notion of the holistic distance, although these arts education theorists have often been opposed to the notion that art resists the prevailing systems.⁵ Other more leftist theorists have claimed that artistic thought reveals the false consciousness of the dominant ideology by telling the truth about how things really are. The problem is that these statements hold art to be something in its wholeness. The idea of critical distance does not take enough notice of differences in the external relations of art to the lifeworld. To take into account the relations between artworld and lifeworld is necessary, though; hence contemporary art can be both critical and conformist as well as fragmentary at the same time. Some art is explicitly political, some not at all. There is also art that demonstrates the workings of political attitudes, but is also caught up in them. It is (performative) art which can exploit those “catchy melodies” for critical purposes (as has, in fact, been done in the strategy of mimicry), but it does not necessarily have a critical influence. This is the reason why I suggest that taking more careful notice of external relations presumes an attitude to art that does not make any general statements, but applies analysis or interpretation to individual cases and even to parts of them, that means more pluralism. It means also that the meaning of elements of art that are tied to a historical time and/or place can be specified. For Adorno it was enough that there are ruptures and invasions of external things into art for art to remain tangential to life. Nowadays, when collage is a part of most contemporary works of art (at least at the intertextual level), it is necessary to identify those elements (in installations, for example) those individual (partial) references and the meanings of these external relations, which often are, in fact, ready-mades or other such components in works. In postmodern sociological theory and cultural studies there is a notion that all everyday practices that do not act inside the dominant code are not automatically resistant or revolutionary. Ideology is not the only standard and images do not reflect power relations *per se*. The question is, instead, how they are *used*: the stress is on *doing*.

My intention was thus to examine the influence of the radical avant-garde on contemporary art, because, to my mind, it can provide new perspectives for arts education. In this study I have been less interested in formalist or style-creating avant-garde phenomena. But there is a slight paradox in my suppositions in the sense that I have tried to identify some of the characteristic features of radical avant-garde and contemporary art. In my opinion they cannot, however, be defined as a style but instead as strategies or tactics to action, whether it is a question of developing art or making social or political statements. In Modernism there was a stronger dual-

ism, but in contemporary art, the influence of the radical avant-garde can be seen both in more established and in marginal modes of art and culture. There are no schools anymore. Art history has tried earlier to define certain 'isms', mostly based on the concept of style. But nowadays it is difficult to estimate art by connecting it to specific chain of influences. In fact, it is impossible to prove exactly to what extent one cultural movement has been influenced by another, since there are so many factors affecting the development of avant-garde or other groups. Connections are looser, or, it is fruitless to make connections, because of radical differences, for example, in practices of making political or artistic statements. We are not in the avant-gardist battlefield of oppositions anymore. In Modernism the positive and negative practices of art were polarized, and this has shown itself in critical debate and the formation of theory. Evaluating contemporary art does not start from such a point, though. Avant-garde as a concept and practice works in a realm which bordered by institutional theories of art. If art is defined through experiential premises, anything can be art, and thus borders collapse - at least borders around the area of fine art. This means that avant-garde becomes a useless concept.

Modernism also contains the tradition of flâneurism. It created an active (not only representational) relation of art to urban space. The site of the contemporary activist and performative art is often an urban space; indeed, communal performance activity even makes places into pieces of art. In this respect, it is easy to see the meaning flâneur's character as a functional factor in an urban environment had in artistic practice. Leftist theoreticians, Marcuse for instance, have seen art as a location of freedom; both as a physical location (works of art) and as a mental place. However, art has changed from works of art and monuments to open, collage-like works in spaces where the place and context are an integral part of the work, not isolated from it. Artists also construct "settings" that people can occupy, transform, imagine, and maintain, not only mentally but by doing, in order to develop new visions of their location and their situation. In his time the flâneur represented an aesthete, the minority, typically modernist in its bohemian elitism. Nowadays (s)he represents a contemporary (self-made) life-style person. The flâneur has become prosaic and commonplace; flâneurism has become democratized. A role in this development has been played by a flourishing capitalistic consumer culture, but another role has been played by art and the major changes it went through in the 1960s and the 1970s. If we now organize our lives along stylistic principles, there are tendencies towards non-style in art, which to my mind continues the tradition of breaking up the routines and continuity of (stylised, or, should we say, entirely spectacularized) everyday life.

There have been some changes and ruptures in art and culture since the beginning of the 1960s. They may not have been as explicit in mainstream culture as perhaps in more marginalized subcultural phenomena which the mainstream has not paid much attention to. But there have been changes in art which criticize the very premises of Modernism, although the seeds of that criticism was already present in some modernist movements from the beginning.

The starting point of many avant-gardists who wanted to join art and life together was that the new order of life would organize itself on the premises of artistic ideals. This suggests that there can be no avant-garde which only aims to integrate art and life without artistic goals. Thus many avant-garde groups, although they even wanted to abolish art, had to define artistic ideals or modes for the reformulation of form. They thought that it had to be revolutionary art first and after that, a revolution. The Situationist International (SI, 1957-72) is an example of the late modernist avant-garde that took the negative practices of modernism to their limits. It brought the project of the self-assertiveness of art to its logical conclusion; hence the SI is an example of an extremely self-conscious avant-garde movement; it even stumbled over its ultimate reflection. The SI was said to be "the last avant-garde movement in the world", and there are certain premises which uphold this point of view. Defining the SI as the last avant-garde movement in the world may not be flattering for modernism and the avant-garde. But my intention was not to throw a new spanner to the wheels of art history. Instead, I wanted to study the crisis or rupture that took place in art during and after the discussions about exhaustion of innovation and the end of the avant-garde. That debate and the concomitant practices in art were the turning-point in modern art on which has been typical to build theoretical constructions.

The forms and ideas of the radical avant-garde and the tradition of urban flâneurism were well united and condensed in the SI. Although the SI did not belong to the mainstream of art history or theory, I took some of its ideas as sources and examples. I did this also for the reason that if I argue for the liquidation of (value) hierarchies I do not want to be the first to repeat just the same, already often trotted out, examples. The SI wanted to suppress both institutional art and party politics; it developed activities to be practised by all, not just artists, or politicians. The SI is an interesting object of research because of its capacity to resist being an integral part of the art world. It is a not so well examined movement especially in relation to art. There is also a lot of vagueness, doubts and discussions about the possible influence of the SI on the art of the last thirty years. It influenced later activities, such as Punk at the end of the 1970s, that took the do-it-yourself idea in art to the most extreme. After that not much was left the same as before.⁶ I have analyzed various (political) methods in art trying to focus on those grey realms between art and life, which may question the fundamental modernist premise of the autonomy of art. In many ways the SI was a border phenomenon in the matter of modes of political art. The reputation of the SI had a greater influence than its activities. It is an example of the difficulty of realizing a theory in a situation where art has been defined as separate from life. Early Futurist performance around 1909 was also more manifesto than practice, and more propaganda than actual production. The manifestos were more art than about art. Contemporary activist art approaches the concept of art wholly differently. It may produce some statements, but they are not manifestos in the modernist sense.

Since Punk, the cultural field has fallen into pieces which do not form hierarchic structures anymore. To my mind, Punk was to artistic practice what postmodern theories were to philosophy, sociology and art theory. Al-

though art wants to communicate political meanings, and does so, in a sense they are local meanings. Situationist methods thus influenced Punk, and later the so called TV and comics generation. Today this generation makes contemporary art; artists such as Damien Hirst, Alvar Gullichsen, Teemu Mäki, and also Kathy Acker (although she was older in age). This is an area in which there has not been much research into art theory, however. One reason may be that these influences and phenomena are too close to subcultures.

The situationist emphasis on play is important since this is preceding the form contemporary art has taken. It takes play as a positive value. In fact, concerning art, we have learnt to read and perceive *as if* a text or work has meaning, *as if* its content matters. This *is* play. And play has many qualities that are interesting when considering what matters in art. Gadamer defines play as a work of art (drama), as something the actual being of which cannot be detached from its presentation. And in this presentation the unity and identity of a structure emerge.⁷ Gadamer writes that a play experiences a continuous determination of its meaning from the occasion and situation of its coming-to-presentation. He thus thinks that hence the stage is a political institution par excellence.⁸ But it is a differentiated and alienated place in many cases. During the sixties the street became a comparable stage for political action as well as art.

I subjected also other phenomena of the situational aesthetics of the 1960s to closer scrutiny, especially happenings and the Fluxus movement. These have indisputably influenced the arts of the later decades, and I have tried to find in their theory some means with which to outline performative contemporary art both in form and in content. My justification for taking the SI as a central example is that the SI reinforced and condensed other situational strategies of the time. In fact, it developed many strategies actually seen in contemporary art practices in which the question is no longer about controversial works attempting to break with the artistic tradition but about introducing such things as participation, interaction, locality, transitoriness, presentness, intertextuality, repetition, social concern and other more or less underrated criteria in art. I suggest that these criteria are best graspable via a pragmatic theory of aesthetics and art. The re-evaluation of John Dewey's theory of art as experience is especially fruitful in this light. I used his *Art as Experience* (1934). In dealing with the autonomy of art, I mostly used Hans-Georg Gadamer's book *Wahrheit und Methode* (Truth and Method, 1974, originally published in German 1960) and some anthologies of aesthetic criticism of the last century. Peter Bürger's *Theorie der Avantgarde* (Theory of the Avant-Garde, 1974) was a starting point for dealing with an avant-garde. (I have already dealt specifically with his ideas in my book *Vallankumouksia norsunluutorinissa*, 1994.) Among the other books I have used - and that nowadays exist mostly in edited collections and anthologies of essays and articles - I should mention Richard Shusterman's *Pragmatic Aesthetics* (1992) and Allan Kaprow's *Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life* (1993).

The theoretical background of my work is the concept of pragmatist aesthetics. The basic statement of the pragmatist aesthetic is that "for anything to have human value, it must in some way serve the needs and enhance

the life and development of the human organism in coping with her enviroining world."⁹ I quote Richard Shusterman further, since I agree that "theory, like all human thinking, always occurs within a particular situation and is motivated by purposes which help define that situation. . . . Theory, then, is not only shot through with practical motives, it is founded on practice and itself constitutes a practice".¹⁰ For me, the very particular situation from which my work emerged was the alienation of art from the everyday, and a theory of art that is grounded on this fact is mediated through existing arts education theory and practice. Not least my work was motivated by the very personal discovery of how strong an experience can be in art. Of course in a few so called "masterpieces" of art history, but even more in the works of some women artists: Louise Bourgeois, Angela Carter, Djuna Barnes, Meret Oppenheim, Jane Campion, Kathy Acker, Laurie Anderson, Suzanne Lacy, Maaria Wirkkala, Marita Liulia, Henrietta Lehtonen, Kaija Saariaho etc.

When dealing with the problem of the meaning and status of art in present-day life and the motivations and possibilities of arts education in relation to this, I hold contextual performative and activist art to be an interesting realm of examples since they reach for a direct relation to everyday life. Thus, these are for me comparable borderline cases to those of Duchamp's *Fountain* or Warhol's *Brillo Boxes* to other theorists.

In sum, this study, as its name indicates, is a starting point for arts education and its practice and thus belongs to that same branch of study. Since arts education is based on particular notions and concepts about the arts I tried to outline alternatives to help in revising and shaping the theoretical background of arts education. This also explains why I limited this study to a certain kinds of art, to contemporary arts that have seemed to be a problem for arts education, although my examples are varied.

The influence of critical theory is seen in my work. By that, I mean that the relation, and, even some distance, between art and society is an important thing, whether it is held as good or bad. I shall deal with this when I argue that we have to give up the dichotomy of autonomy, and speak instead about degrees of autonomies and their liquidation in various ways.¹¹ Such terms as 'commodification' and 'reification' come to mind, and from time to time also occur in my text. I do not subscribe to all the viewpoints of critical theory, though. For example, I agree with Theodore Roszak who envisions art as a new form of wealth: the more creative people become, the more opportunity they have to experience the joys of creativity, the less they will be consumers, especially of mass-produced culture. He sees that as a kind of new wealth that counts for more than owning and having material things.¹² But I do not agree that mass-produced culture is necessarily inferior to art in aesthetic value.

In many more or less political projects of contemporary art no predetermined aesthetic formula guides the design and production of the work, but the images - the art - are determined by the particular circumstances of each situation. These kinds of works do not have the same "stability" as traditional masterpieces but, as Shusterman argued, it is not relevant to demand they should have. These works of art or projects are not fixed but only "relatively constant". According to Shusterman, who follows the pragma-

tist line, "[a]rt-works or texts are cultural entities that are constituted and re-constituted as individual objects by the social and linguistic practices and traditions of the culture they serve."¹³ It is obvious that lifelike, project-oriented, collectivist etc. contemporary art is typical in a society where lifestyles are constantly changing, where social practices are defined from many different perspectives, and where we no longer need any fixed monuments, but have become used to the act of consumption - with the difference that "consuming" this kind of art is not ecologically wasteful because its prime material is in many cases human activity and social relations. However, our (high) culture easily denies the value of the ephemeral and transient unless it has been made "eternal and immovable", since it creates problems of classification. For example, the soft sculptures by Claes Oldenburg have been too much for some conservative critics who held them to be just jokes. In fact, Oldenburg's soft sculptures of the 1960s were a move away from stable materials such as bronze, marble, steel or wood to impermanent and transformable materials. Soft sculptures were not objects of aesthetic contemplation but consumable in that they change as organic things, they flatten out, become empty and so on.

I make many, seemingly different, topics and have seemingly many aims in this study. Too many, perhaps, if one is to consider them all as evidence for certain narrowly stated hypotheses. This was not my main interest, because I have tried to discuss different discourses and put them together in the way the radical avant-garde movements did. In my opinion their latitude has usually been seen to be more narrow than it has, in fact, been; this has, for example, in the art world, especially in art history, resulted in difficulties in determining appropriate criteria when evaluating, defining and dealing with, for example, activist and political contemporary art. I have tried not to fix any criteria as such but to suggest some so as to prove that in arts education we need to take account the tradition of previously marginalized art. The goal is not more ideological arts education than before; on the contrary, it needs to be less ideological and more realist, that is to say that we must try to take notice of all art phenomena without the dictatorship of good taste and the canon of master works. To mix different art modes together in a theory of arts education is a good starting point since traditional categories have become far too narrow.

By the instrumental use of art (or, art as a catalyst) I mean to consider art, for example, as a means to say something, to change the world, to change people's thoughts, behaviour and lives etc. In the broader sense instrumentality in art means that "the work, in the sense of working, of an object of art does not cease when the direct act of perception stops"¹⁴. In a sense an art work is a catalyst when it directs attention to something outside of itself, that is, draws attention off both the internal and external relations of the object. This tends to imply the idea that it is not possible to pay full attention to all of these parts, but that an aesthetic experience is positioned as the opposite of other experiences. Art can be understood as instrumental only when it is held as separated from the other realms of life. Thus the modernist concept approaches the instrumentality of art differently than the one that does not hold art to be totally isolated from life.

I deal with politics in the broader sense of the word. It may be too artificial to reconstruct the standard moral-aesthetic distinction, that is to say, to separate art works which supply novel stimuli to action from those which simply offer relaxation (see Rorty 1989), but I have made this distinction to a certain degree, because I wanted to find out if there have been any similarities and common strategies in more or less politically engaged art in Modernism, and after Modernism in contemporary art. By the term 'political' I thus mean a rather wide range of aims and intentions, from questioning the status and nature of art itself to creating a better world to live in. Of course art is important in itself, but that is not my point of view in this investigation. Although it is not always easy to explain what "art is important in itself" means. The *raison d'être* of arts education is art, which is, according to Albert William Levi, "the intuition of the artist and its embodiment in a particular material"¹⁵. There is nothing wrong with this definition, except that the definitions of an artist and a particular material of art are disputable. We can define an artist either as an individual, or, as a collective and materials either by the traditions of different arts and what is peculiar to them, or, by contents or meanings.

The main intention of a discipline-based art education is to provide a sense of civilization, foster creativity, teach effective communication and supply tools for the critical assessment of what one reads, sees, and hears. Schiller held that man's growth to (political) freedom is a matter of aesthetic education. By aesthetic he meant theories of Beauty. But the radical avant-garde (and Modernism as a whole, for that matter) has taught us that art is also something else. Form does not necessary mean balance, symmetry, harmony and integrity in a work of art, nor in a properly constituted human self. It can also mean destruction, imbalance, asymmetry, disharmony etc. Dewey was conscious of distinctions, differences, isolations and conflicts among the elements of our being. He wanted to utilize the oppositions among them to build a richer personality. But although he sought form to unify these differences in our experience, he did not mean to harmonize or to balance them on some static level. Is art not a mean of dealing with distinctions and conflicts, of putting them "in the same picture"; but in a way distinctions and conflicts remain as they are, not getting rid of them or not necessarily molding or changing them too much?

In the beginning of this study I briefly outline the theoretical background, ie, some aesthetic and art theoretical notions and their critiques that contribute to our concept of art. The most important issue from the point of view of my study is the question of the autonomy of art that is connected to modernist notions of art and its avant-garde. I also introduce some of the concepts and theories I use as instruments, such as the concept of performative art and postmodern theories of the nature of art and style as just one part of aestheticized life nowadays. Secondly, I deal with the historical background, which concerns Modernism and avant-garde. The latter of the two terms I propose to outline and define more precisely than is usually done in general theories of modern art. I also describe the major changes in art, the life-like art of the 1960s and, for the most part, the Situationist International, which followed the tactics of the radical avant-garde. In the third part, I deal with contemporary art and its character. I take

up a few of the most important and interesting areas where changes have happened that are not much dealt with, at least in connection with arts education. In the last part I show what implications and consequences those changes may have for art theory and arts education. Play, games, processes, all open-ended performative activities have important roles in this. There is no ontology, only experiences.

An Arts Educational Problem

Works of art that are not remote from common life, that are widely enjoyed in a community, are signs of a unified collective life. But they are also marvelous aids in the creation of such a life.

- John Dewey -

In Finland, we have only a few departments of art education in universities, and in fact only one that grounds its teaching on a knowledge-based art education, where art theoretical research is also done to create a basis for an effective arts educational practice. Usually the term 'art education', which is often a synonym for 'aesthetic education', means concentrating on the visual arts, and when it is a question of all art modes - as in the Department of Art Education in the University of Jyväskylä - then the term should be 'arts education'. Hence I do not want to focus only on the visual arts, but try to argue for less strict borders between art modes. Hence I use the term arts education. Arts education as it has been taught is defined as consisting of practical and theoretical problems concerning existing art, the reception, interpretation and evaluation. It also includes questions concerning the way works of art are planned and created. In short, the theoretical and practical purpose of arts education is to educate people to know and understand art, especially contemporary art and its roots.

Ralph A. Smith and other American art (or, aesthetic) education theorists promote the practice of discipline-based art education (DBAE). Roughly, a discipline-based art education means that there are four elements in developing aesthetic skills: the enhancement of perceptual skills, historical understanding which usually means art history, or, art and culture, aesthetic judgement, ie, criticism, and getting acquainted with making art, which is valued more for its contribution to an understanding of art itself and its unique effects than for its general development and social outcomes. In the United States there is strong pressure to make art education a part of education in the humanities. Art education leans strongly on the notion of the autonomy of art and on the idea of a rather coherent grammar, or narrative, of art and aesthetics in relation to it. Art education theories have some problems, however, mostly due to their conservative approach to art and society. Of course, this is related to the social systems in the United States. These problems constitute not only limitations for arts education,

but their roots are in a concept of art that has some difficulties in dealing with, on the one hand, socially and politically oriented art (which can be termed either instrumental art or art as a catalyst), with on the other hand art that operates outside (or between) the traditional categories of painting, sculpture, dance, theatre, literature, photography, film etc. This kind of art, which in this study I call 'performative', is an important and discernible phenomenon in the art world and in culture generally. Performative art modes are often used when a need has been perceived to make political statements or to try to influence social conditions and the quality of people's lives. Performative art is not self-same thing, although it can even have (aesthetic) form. It gives also space to participatory, collective, socially meaningful and formally open work when included among the examples used in educational practice, especially since in a discipline-based art education examples are very important part of teaching.

The starting point of arts education is that students get an idea of the concept of a work of art. Then they can know what to do with cases they have not met before. For this reason it is important that the concept is coherent and limited. But art is not. There is agreement that art has no essential qualities but exists in various manifestations, and that it is precisely the art world that defines something as art, if it has been put up as a candidate for art (Dickie). Even events in the history of art did not proceed in a logical fashion. Theories of arts education play with different aesthetic views, however. Traditional theories of art have been used as evaluative proposals vis a vis certain criteria of excellence in art and in arts education, as recommendations to attend in certain ways to certain features of art. There have been attempts to maintain that art that is not evaluated by aesthetic or artistic criteria only, as autonomous, is not noteworthy, at least in arts education. This means that a lot of contemporary art made by women is not seriously considered, since it is either political (feminist) or different in its aesthetic qualities (emphasizing patterns, repetition and mimicry, for example). In fact, those aspects Smith stressed as negative in postmodernism and thus undesirable¹⁶ are that much contemporary art undermines the authority of the cultural tradition, and postmodern deconstructionism claims the endless displacement of meaning.

I see Smith and his kind as special cases in arts education. My intention is to try to offer ideas for alternative practices. This is in accordance with the belief that furthering pluralism is an important goal, although at the same time a certain unassimilated identity is necessary. I want to stress the point that I am for arts education as a subject-specific instruction; I do not regard the arts as a catalyst for something else when talking about education. What I want to argue is that the model for art (or aesthetic) education Smith offers is too narrowly focused on art as an autonomous entity (on the theoretical level) opposed to the social, psychological and other realms, which has been taken into consideration merely in terms of history only. This has led to conservatism, and made it difficult to outline qualities of art that try to function socially or politically as a catalyst and, at the same time, be artistically of high quality and democratic. By democratic I mean participation and interaction *in* art, not only the capability of practising criticism.

Thus the emphasis in my study is on certain phenomena in contemporary art, on those often relegated to the margin as inconvenient to deal with, or held to be inferior and casual in their contingent or fleeting character. Quite deliberately I do not believe in any canon, since to my mind we must get rid of the strict hierarchies constructed on the foundation of some general and universal narrative or metalanguage of arts.

When criticizing arts education, we have to separate the critique of theory from the critique of practice. Arts educational practice does not always lean on theoretical knowledge. And in many cases theory does not ground itself on contemporary artistic practice, by which I mean that the theory of arts education is always a few steps behind the changes that take place in art. We have inherited this kind of thinking from an art history that sees it as almost impossible to study art in real time. There is little research on contemporary art. Of course, these things also influence arts educational practice. To take an example, one of our challenges would be to address, for instance, the methods of picture analysis, and consider how we can adapt these more traditional methods to newer art modes: performative, media art and so on.

Aesthetic Backgrounds

Is the aesthetics a necessary component in art (or could we have art without any aesthetics)? Or, can aesthetics emerge better in some other areas than art? I shall deal with these questions more closely later. But in this context I take aesthetics into consideration, hence it is such an important part of the background of an arts educational theory, and of its practice.

Arts education is based on the notion that there is something special in art. It produces an aesthetic experience that differs from everyday experience and thus brings something special to people's lives. When dealing with the aesthetic experience Smith, for instance, follows mostly Monroe C. Beardsley's notions of aesthetic qualities, which are based on the premise that intrinsic value inheres *in* works of art. According to Beardsley, aesthetic experiences are noteworthy for few reasons, (1) object directness. This means that the spectator's attention is centered on an object of noteworthy presence whose elements, formal relations, qualities, and semantic aspects are freely entertained. (2) The perception of the fittingness of the elements and free participation in making them coalesce into a unified whole. (3) Freedom from everyday concerns. An aesthetic experience needs an emotional distance; this disinterested attention enables the spectator to remain engrossed in works of ominous or distressing import without being emotionally overcome by such content. (4) A feeling of active discovery or understanding.¹⁷

When we examine these features and premises of aesthetic experience, it seems at first that there is little that does not conform to these in contemporary performative works of art. It is only a question of how we use these features. The nature of the work, ie, what we mean by the notion of an ob-

ject with elements that form unified whole, and by the concept of disinterestedness are the most interesting questions in contemporary art in relation to the aesthetic problem. Many theorists have said that in order to speak of a work of art specifically as a work of *art*, we must clear the object in our minds of properties that are not relevant to its being a work of art. This provokes the question, what are these irrelevant properties? Other theorists have formulated the same thought by saying that certain properties, or energies, are concentrated in art.

To my mind, both of these viewpoints are combined in Paavo Rintala's novel *Jumala on kauneus* (1959). In it an artist thinks about his work, and sees that

- Siinä se on koko juttu. Maalauksessa ei saa olla näkyvissä kuin hyvin hyvin pieni asia, niin vähäinen, että sillä on varaa katsojan mielikuvissa suurentua loputtomiin.
- Koko juttu on siinä.
- Maalaaminen on pelkistämistä, sitä että väreillä ja pensselinvedoilla karsitaan kuvasta pois kaikki mahdollinen. Jäljelle jää pieni ja vaatimaton, jota ei voi karsia. Sillä on mahdollisuus kasvaa loputtomiin.¹⁸

Hans-Georg Gadamer writes about 'aesthetic differentiation', which means that by excluding purpose, function and the significance of the content of an art work as extra-aesthetic elements of the work, it is abstracted to its own sphere: to the autonomous world of art.¹⁹ In other words, aesthetics is often a tool with which to define the autonomy of art. Thus, according to Gadamer, through 'aesthetic differentiation' the work loses its location and the world to which it belongs insofar as it belongs instead to aesthetic consciousness.²⁰ He asks if the concept of art is a product of this aesthetic consciousness, whether it becomes questionable.²¹ He refers to the ages and times in the history of art when people made art without any aesthetic awareness of its religious or secular political use. He also suggests some critique of the idea that art should be entirely distinct from its context of production, or of other conditions.

According to Gadamer, 'aesthetic differentiation' is an abstraction, that is, a painting, for instance, is detached from that what it represents. Aesthetic differentiation means abstracting an aesthetic reflection from the presence of the original in the picture.²² We all know the paradox of attempting to say something in words that cannot be clothed in plain words, that is, cannot be abstracted anyway.

In many theories of art, it has often been questioned what kind of work a work of art is, but some theorists, Gadamer, for instance, emphasize that a work of art not only is but happens as well. It is realized in the reality of human life; it is a product that is consumed, sent and received. Thus we should ask, how do works of art function? Art is understood as an event, aesthetic process. It might be useful to compare aesthetic differentiation as an abstraction and the concept of play (in this sense more like drama), which does not isolate the work of art from the contingency of the chance conditions in which it appears. Gadamer states, that the being of art cannot be defined as an object of an aesthetic consciousness; hence an aesthetic attitude is part of an event of being that occurs in presentation.²³ I return to this later,

since the concept of play (as a drama, or, more like a game) and adventure are things that make questionable the idea of the autonomy of art, and of aesthetic differentiation.

'Aesthetic qualities' are presented as certain features that explain to us something of how to separate art from non-art, from direct messages, statistics and such things as contemporary art has been mixed up with, since it uses these as material. 'Aesthetic qualities' is a concept that needs clarification, although there are numerous definitions about what constitutes them. Since the concept is somewhat ambiguous, value judgements soon come into the picture. Aesthetic value has often been connected with aesthetic experience. Beardsley, for example, understood aesthetic experience as a measure of aesthetic value, which, according to him, is the highest degree obtainable under optimal circumstances. Optimal circumstances occur when the object is experienced correctly and completely, which presuppose that it is a unified whole.²⁴ Contemporary art is often open in form and structure, it can be experienced, even interpreted partly, without even recognizing about all the elements belonging to the whole complex. It is difficult to square Beardsley's thoughts with this.

Other theorists have claimed that evaluation of the work of art is possible without aesthetic experience, or aesthetic enjoyment, as John Fisher called it. He maintained that the lack of enjoyment is compensated for by the perceiver's general sensitivity to the formal qualities of art and acquaintance with current artistic norms.²⁵ This brings in the concepts of artistic and artistic value which differ from that of the aesthetic. Artistic values are objective in nature, since they are tested by such properties of the work of art as originality of conception, degree of technical difficulty, perfection of a performance, functionality, etc. The evaluation of the work of art with regard to artistic values requires competence and connoisseurship. Then we make use of such categories as "perfection of execution", "attitude toward artistic tradition", "innovation", "originality", "style", "artistic convention". Artistic values are connected with the objects themselves, they refer to the internal structure of a work and its relations with other works.²⁶ But if we agree that art is an event, we cannot concentrate only on a work of art, nor on an artist and an audience only, for art happens in an open field connecting all the above-mentioned aspects. Experiential values pertain to relations between the work and its perceivers. Aesthetic experience is an important factor in this, although it is a rather slippery and vague concept. It means to take into account the richness and intensity of a given experience as a whole and the quality of its particular constitutive components: sensual impressions and emotional experiences, the activity of the imagination, and reflection.²⁷ Usually this presumes an intense and contemplative concentration on the work of art. However, if we are to accept that the work of art cannot be understood only in terms of aesthetic consciousness, then many phenomena of marginal importance to modern aesthetics become less problematic and, instead move into the center. Gadamer writes that "[i]t no longer admits that the work of art and its world belong to each other, but on the contrary, aesthetic consciousness is the experiencing (*erlebende*) center from which everything considered art is measured."²⁸

Aesthetic values are relational and not to be reduced to the properties of the object nor to the experiences of the subject, but they are a result of a correlation between certain properties of the object and the experience of the subject.²⁹ There seems to be no contradiction then, although we shall have to think of a process as an art "object". The process, then, includes interactive, participatory, dialogical, contextual etc. features. The problem emerges only when the work of art itself is held to be only a tool used in the constitution of a valuable aesthetic object. Then we encounter once again the concept of aesthetic qualities, which are only a part of the qualities an art work has.

Marcia Muelder Eaton says that one way to approach art and that what separates it from other things is *arttalk*, our way of speaking about art. Although we cannot define "aesthetic", we can describe aesthetic traditions. Thus she talks about qualities which are worthy of being noticed in the aesthetic and art historical tradition. Although Eaton's idea sounds reasonable enough, we should also take notice of those qualities which do not fit in with the tradition Eaton talks about. Such qualities are, for example, non-permanence or the momentary nature of the work, collectivity and participation or interaction as a component of the work. These are also a part of an *arttalk*. Eaton does not deny this, but neither she does affirm it. She says that what is special in *arttalks* is not their content but intention, not *what* is said, but *why* it is said. The idea is to persuade people to look at things they had not seen by themselves. This is, in terms of its goals, arts education: educational activity, or, learning to understand or to take part to something one has not had any prior acquaintance with at all. Some theorists have then talked about the languages of art, or a metalanguage of art that arts education should take an interest in. If we referred to this kind of language-based aesthetic knowledge as important when dealing with art, we were talking about something that involves learning and judgement developed through a certain way of life, that is a kind of connoisseurship. In arts education this was a knowledge of what talk is about when we talk about art. Aesthetic knowledge has a value when using it in the right time and place. This corresponds to Eaton's emphasis on the intention of *arttalk*: *why* something is said. The question as to which qualities are worthy of being noticed brings with it the notion of value. Smith, for example, draws a clear line between art and popular culture and tries to direct practice according to this concept. In Finland we usually do not make similar distinctions explicit, although the examples we tend to use have a certain emphasis. It is, in fact, a question of practices. It is easy to choose examples within certain frames, but then we can easily end up neglecting phenomena which are (not yet) inside the approved frame. To my mind the problem of arts education nowadays is that it leans too much on general aesthetic structures and, on a practical level, uses certain examples legitimated by the concept of excellence, when it should perhaps turn more to a pragmatic account of individual cases, which form a vast field of simultaneous alternatives. *Arttalk*, when understood as a social practice, is an example of a pragmatist approach.

An example of *arttalk* that has been founded on a specific metalanguage of art is the habit of using such phrases as "people's awareness that it is *only* a play" in aesthetic language. The phrase implies,

among other things, that when something is only art it has no practical consequences. It is a question about art as an autonomous entity. It has its own history and laws that are not comparable to other entities in life, such as morals or science. Many newer art modes maintain precisely the opposite marginal awareness that "it is only a work of art" that is being observed. Playing with the media in, for example, social art projects and much activist art is to get people to forget that it is only art. If we use such forms of expression, we need to know what the boundaries are of the concept of art. These include the positions of artist, object and audience. In much lifelike art, in happenings, and even more in constructed situations these positions change. In such works there are attempts to inhibit the occurrence of attentional and emotional distance.³⁰

'Aesthetic distance' is one of those concepts much discussed when dealing with an aesthetic experience. The concept has meaning, especially in relation to political and activist art. Edward Bullough tried to define the meaning of the concept in 1912 in an essay "*Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle*"³¹. Bullough maintained that aesthetic distance is a relative concept that differs according to the nature of the object and according to the individual's ability to maintain a distance. Loss of distance would mean loss of aesthetic appreciation. It is a matter of the relation between subject and object. Allan Casebier considers the question and divides the focus of attention concerning an art object. He makes the presupposition that to pay attention to something is to stand at a distance from it. This means (1) focusing attention on external relations (meaning relations of a work of art to something outside of it); (2) focusing attention on internal relations; and (3) focusing on the internal qualities and internal relations and on external relations of any kind. Casebier separates 'attentionally distant' and 'emotionally distant'. Emotional distance is localized in the response of the observer. There are emotions that preclude aesthetic emotions such as satisfaction, a feeling of being deeply moved, joy, etc. These precluding emotions are those such as anger, hate and terror, for example. Thus, according to Casebier, there are "appropriate emotions", and an appropriate range of emotions for each genre, for comedy, tragedy, romance and so on.³² He also states that in determining whether an appreciation is attentionally distant, we should look to see that the spectator's attention is focused predominantly on personal, practical, historical, social, or other external relations. Then we should look to see if his attention is focused on internal qualities, internal relations, and external relations of various sorts.³³ The division may sound arbitrary, but there are interesting elements in it. Often, when dealing with performative contemporary art, the question arises concerning, on the one hand, "appropriate emotions" and, on the other, to what degree attention is directed to personal, social, political, and other such relations, termed external when dealing with aesthetics and often seen as external when dealing with art too. However, in aesthetics the term disinterested attention is often used. Thus Casebier makes a useful distinction, although he meant other things by it than stressing an interest in the external relations of artworks.

Is there any difference between the distance presented by critical theory and that of divided by Casebier into the categories emotionally and

attentionally distant? In fact, his division, and his method of finding out what kind of relation (distance) a perceiver has to the work, could be useful, although arbitrary. If we compare his notion of internal and external relations to the theories of Adorno and Marcuse, for instance, only slight differences emerge. All three have preferred an attentionally distant approach, but whereas Casebier tries to make distinctions in relation to art genres and to works of arts, Adorno and Marcuse "closed" their concept of art thus suggesting that art has no external relations at all, at least as art. An illustration of this is Adorno's attack on a cultural industry that fragmentizes classics by taking from a piece of music some catchy melody and selling it to those who do not know better and who do not have enough patience to familiarize themselves with the whole work as a unified entity.³⁴ These catchy melodies bring forth emotions which Casebier would also define as non-appropriate emotions precluding aesthetic emotions. However, what is interesting is to think about the fact that it is a question of the very same work. Still, as Adorno preferred an art work to be a unified entity, Casebier is able to separate internal and external relations, although I doubt that he would prefer fragmentation in the way Adorno described it. At the level of interpretation, Casebier preferred more divisions, which is, in fact, simply practising analysis. This is not circular reasoning, although, if his own opinions gravitated towards the premises of analytic aesthetics, by putting more weight on the analysis of external relations, it might be possible to get more out of artworks than derived by Adorno and Marcuse, for example.

In summary, since the Romantic era, an authentic work of art has been held to be something finished and completed in itself, and something unique that exists for itself, and whose value lies in itself. I shall deal with the autonomy problem later, but here I mention only that there have been certain confusions due to the fact that analytic aesthetics in particular has tended to promote the idea of the autonomy (or autonomies) of art. It has concentrated on such problems as interpretation, the definition of art, representation, expression, fiction, and an ontological status of artworks. It has given less attention to value, in fact, many analytic theorists have skirted the question of evaluation as irrelevant. Although, at the same time, their analysis, for example, the illustrations they have used (mostly as philosophers, and thus often taking up some art form just as a hobby) imply certain values. Another limitation in analytic aesthetics is that it deals with 'metalanguages of art'. To my mind it would be problematic if an arts education - both in theory and practice - was based almost solely on philosophical aesthetics, at least since that analytic aesthetics, for instance, "explains" and analyses criticism (theory of art) and especially critical practice. This is arttalk, which is actually an analysis of criticism - not art itself.

One argument in analytic aesthetics is that a work of art is the imagined experience of a total activity. "Thus a work of art proper is a total activity which the person enjoying it apprehends, or is conscious of, by the use of his imagination." (R. G. Collingwood)³⁵ What then if the experience of the (total) activity is not imagined but real? Would it then be less meaningful? No, it would not. But then we have a problem, whether is it 'a work of art proper'. What I am saying is that it is just conclusions like these which presume and need art to be autonomous (at least as a concept in aesthetics).

Richard Shusterman displays two approaches to analysis in his introduction to the anthology he has edited on analytic aesthetics. One is the reductive breaking down of a concept, fact, or putative entity into its more basic components or properties. (This occurs, for example, in art education when so called "visual ruling aesthetics" and other such subjects are practiced.) The results are often metaphysical reductions. Another approach tries to clarify the vague and problematic notions employed in some area of discourse, distinguishing such a notion's complexities and different uses. This second form has dominated analytic aesthetics, writes Shusterman.³⁶

How far, then, does it provide concepts (when it gives only a language) for arts educational practice? Shusterman has a good metaphor:

The job was to provide a clear map or picture of a very complex and vague terrain, intuitively familiar to critics who were its best explorers but had no skill in precise cartography.³⁷

In fact, it was Beardsley, in his *Aesthetics. Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (1958), who called attention to the difference between art and art criticism, and then proposed that aesthetics, instead of remaining the philosophy of art or the philosophy of aesthetic dimension, should become the philosophy of art criticism. In the opening paragraph he said as follows:

There would be no problems of aesthetics, in the sense in which I propose to mark out this field of study, *if no one ever talked about works of art*. So long as we enjoy a movie, a story, or a song, in silence - except perhaps for occasional grunts or groans, murmurs of annoyance or satisfaction - there is no call for philosophy. But as soon as we utter a statement about the work, various sorts of questions can arise.³⁸

Because philosophers often concern themselves with the internal necessities of the conceptual schemes, with the necessary relations holding among concepts, it follows that analytical aestheticians in particular are merely considering *ways* of talking about art or criticizing it, that is research concepts. It functions as long as we act outside the practical ways of action and talk. But, arttalk grounded on what was said above, is not enough in arts education, since then there are talk within an area of autonomy only. Shusterman writes that

For philosophy's abnegation of normative judgement as to how texts and artworks *should be* understood for the sake of representing accurately how they *are in fact* understood seems to betray the issue that really matters to us, and instead pursues an old analytic dream of discovering and mirroring the true structure of facts, here the logical structure of criticism.³⁹

This dream rests on the assumption that the nature of criticism (or art) is simply there to be discovered rather than to be made or remade, he continues. For arts education it is this "should be understood", the very thing analytic aesthetics avoid, that is important. Plain arttalk is useless.

Theories of Art

The realm of arts education includes a variety of theories of art. Theories of imitation, expression, form, play, and symbol have tried to define art as a special category of phenomena and attempted to find its singular essence. In the 1950s Morris Weitz rejected the essentialist definitions of art and referred to Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance. According to Weitz, art is the complex networks of similarities and family resemblances that provide common material for employing and teaching the general concept. The basis for doing this is consisted by the artworks that are known and their networks of similarities. With their aid it is possible to apply the term 'art' to new and unfamiliar objects. Art is an open and mutable concept which stresses, according to Weitz, originality, novelty, and innovation. Weitz was criticized on the grounds that mere similarities cannot explain the unity of the concept of art. Alternatively, Weitz used a similar background to that of Adorno about twenty years later in his *Ästhetische Theorie* (Aesthetic Theory, 1970). That is, they both referred to known and established artworks only, ie, to art history. To my mind this is a weakness of both of them.

George Dickie's and Arthur C. Danto's institutional theories of the art world have been quite popular, since they give space for different emphases. Dickie's institutional theory of art uses the term 'work of art' both in a descriptive and valuative sense, at least in theory. According to the theory, the artwork has also to be an artifact. Dickie defines an artwork as an artifact upon which some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the art world) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation. Dickie's theory has been criticized of being both too wide and too narrow, and especially of its lack of historical depth. One point of criticism has been that Dickie excludes value in the sense that he defines the notion of the art world so loosely that we cannot evaluate if "conferring the status of candidate for appreciation" has succeeded.⁴⁰ The theory leaves foreclosures, prejudices and such evaluations to the artworld and persons active and prosperous in it. This brings up the question of value. This is seen also in arts education. The art world, and issues that are more emphasized, have been modified culturally; historical constraints structure the art world.

According to Danto, objects are artworks if they are so interpreted, and art is essentially a complex historical practice of a tradition, which must be defined historically. The definition implies that a common or typical way of appreciation, "an atmosphere of artistic theory" and knowledge of the history of art all approve.⁴¹ This notion of the art world Danto originally described is strict, since he demands that if something can be a work of art, both the art world and the artist who put the work up as a candidate for appreciation, must have similar theories about what art is. Nothing is, in fact, art without advance conjecture.⁴² Danto's theory depicts art's recent history as a development toward the understanding of its own historical essence, which means the end of art when it has fulfilled its historical mission. This means the end of the linear history of art, the end of the great narrative. We see the ghost of Hegel passing by.

Another definition is art as a practice, as a complex of interconnected activities which require learned skills and knowledge. It aims at achieving goods and values internal to that practice, but since these internal criteria, standards, values and goods are not rigidly defined, art as practice involves a debate over their interpretation. This can result in a variety of different achievements and the expansion of the internal qualities of the practice of art. A unity is formed through a common history.⁴³ The application of this theory is, in fact, an arttalk. Artworks are identified from other objects by the internal criteria and standards of the complex practice of art. The practice of art also comprehends the makers and receivers of works of art. Thus art is defined in terms of a coherent historical narrative. We confront again to the matter of value: internal goods are defined by the practice of the art world. The theory stresses the autonomy of art.

If an arttalk leans on the tradition of art and aesthetics, then it implies that artifacts bring certain experiences to people when owning the status of art, that is, when they were defined or made as art. In this light, Danto's comment about Hans Haacke's political work, for example, becomes understandable. Haacke's exhibition in Guggenheim 1971 was cancelled six weeks before the opening since the director of the museum held Haacke's work *Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, A Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971* to be politically too risky. The work consists of 142 photographs of building facades and empty apartments, documents listing facts about these buildings and maps that demonstrate their location. It pointed out how the real estate holding had neglected the buildings it owned and how they were turned into a slum because of the company's greed. Haacke's work was based solely on publicly available material, and thus it is interpreted as a stand against both a corrupt and inhuman holding company and also against people's apathy, since the material was there but nobody was interested. According to the museum director, the fault of the work was that it described real people and it was not an independent creation but served some external purpose. The director of the Guggenheim thus formulated arguments from the art-centering point of view with which he could pretend as if it were "theoretically" grounded prohibition on showing a work which could risk impairing the relationship between the museum and business. It was later Haacke's that work and its kind was labelled system theoretical art. According to Danto, the work was dangerous only because it was art, and that it was intentionally aggressive, using the sanctity of art as a moral shield to infiltrate a politically important space and as a way of securing the artist against counterattack.⁴⁴ This makes sense if the starting point is the avant-garde idea that life must follow art, but not in alienated, over-aestheticized ways. Instead, we can attempt to gain original and authentic, but safe, experiences in everyday life also. Experience requires concentrated perception, however, and from art we can learn to organize elements of life in a way they will have an effect.

In art and aesthetics an understanding of form is an important element. Usually form in traditional aesthetics means the coherence and unity of all the parts of an art work. However, Dewey stated that every experience has form. In contemporary art, we confront a more fragmented and open form (which is due to the influence of collage and montage). In addi-

tion, we are used to taking into account the context: art *in* the world and as creating a world.

The roots of most theories of arts education lie in the modernist concepts of art. I argue that the most often used concept of (modern) art is rather one-sided and too formalist, even in terms of the nature of Modernism itself. I mean too formalist in a sense that even when taking contextual matters into account, the main premises are that art is autonomous in relation to everyday life and can have no other relevance to it except to be as an alternative to the quotidian.

The Problem of the Autonomy of Art

In this chapter I shall provide further discussion on the aesthetic background and modernism important from the point of view of the autonomy of art. Earlier, artists did not have an autonomy problem at all; they made art for religious or political institutions or organizations. This is the reason why some art historians have claimed that to study art one has to try to reconstruct the original state of affairs, context and so on. Gadamer opposes this "hermeneutics of reconstruction", since it is arbitrary and never the same as the original. Then again, to put art where it once was is futile.⁴⁵ However, we can take another perspective, and think about reconstruction as withdrawing autonomy in the sense that it is something universal. In fact, later, Derrida, Barthes and some others ended up with just this kind of conclusion, mostly in relation to literature, although it is applicable to other arts too. In fact, Kuusamo says in his dissertation that semiotics and hermeneutics share the notion of historicism: history is something continuously reinterpreted and functioning in the present moment.⁴⁶

The institution of the autonomy of art began to develop rather early on: as far back as in the Renaissance. At that time an artist was held to be an individual, and the different forms of art were separate. Later, Kant emphasized the independence and disinterestedness of an aesthetic judgement. According to him, there was no question about utilitarian aims and interests, not even to realize moral purposes. It was a time when aesthetics soon became its own autonomous field of philosophy. Kant created the basis for the autonomy of art by detaching it from the task of representing the ideals of nature. Then art could be the 'self-encounter' of people in nature and in the human, historical world.⁴⁷ During the 19th century art as beautiful appearance was contrasted with practical reality and also understood in terms of this contrast.⁴⁸ Instead of complementing each other, art and nature were contrasted as appearance and reality. Before that, the "fine arts" were the perfection of reality. But then art became the standpoint of its own autonomous claim to supremacy, as Gadamer says.⁴⁹

Hegel gave art a mission other than telling something about the world to the best of the artist's ability. He thought merely about the content and its abstraction in an art work as something more metaphysical, ie, the Truth itself. It is not the restoration of the past but *thoughtful mediation*

with contemporary life. Hegel places such thoughtful mediation on the same level as the truth of art itself.⁵⁰ It is an attempt by Spirit to comprehend itself also in the outside world, that is, in contemporary life. According to Hegel, the meaning of art was to represent the absolute through the perception of the senses. This is anything but art as of understanding it in my focus in this study. However, for Hegel, the art of his time was dead and empty; the Truth was in classicism and the art of the remote past. And he gave pride of place to philosophy.

However, it took a long time after these autonomy talks for paintings, for instance, to contain certain motifs, the themes and contents of which were political in nature, and thus worked against the principle of autonomy.⁵¹ Self-assertion and self-critique became possible when contents in their turn lost their political character, and art did not want to be anything else but art. This leads to a question whether the autonomy of art is more a political and ideological than an aesthetic problem.

I return to this question later. But the fact is that we have been educated to think that works of art are autonomous totalities. As many theorists have admitted, we enter the tradition of attitudes and practices of our institution of high art. We have learned to listen and see attentively, or certain ways of using poetry - at least not printed on T-shirts! By whom, then, and with what knowledge, is arts education practised? And why and what does an arts educator explain about art? It is a matter of ideology and even politics. Here I refer again to the fact that the autonomy of art has been maintained by analytic philosophers who have seen art as a totality and analyzed only generalized concepts and language of criticism (arttalk). If they have been leftist in their own ideology, they have maintained the notion of critical distance (Adorno, Marcuse, Bürger, among others) and thus outlined a border between art and life. If they have tried to be apolitical, they have referred to aesthetic reception that needs a certain (aesthetic) distance - usually based on rational (or, should I say, knowledge-based) skills of philosophical aesthetics, and notions of art that have dealt with emotions as much as the latter can be approached with the intellect, objectively, approving only of certain detached emotions that are not spontaneous and do not overwhelm the viewer, reader or listener, or lead her to far too subjective or too external a relation to an artwork. (See the chapter *Aesthetic Backgrounds*.) As I stated, these distances, critical and/or purely aesthetic, exist no longer in *all* contemporary art that is of high quality.

However, we could take the closer look at the concept of autonomy, since it is the only way to avoid a too strict dichotomy, held, for instance, by the critical theorists. What I am criticizing here, is the notion of the autonomy of art as an ideology and a theoretical background. Of course, I cannot give up a certain relative amount of, should I say, the different autonomies art even has, if we consider it, at the moment, as a holistic concept. We can then divide autonomy along the lines Göran Hermerén does in an essay in which he outlines the arguments concerning the autonomy of art. Although schematic, it presents some important points that I list below with my own comments.⁵²

(1) One argument is that art has an autonomous origin, and a work of art can never be completely understood and explained unless the explanation is

partly or exclusively given in terms of artistic or aesthetic considerations. I would add that this includes the notion that aesthetic qualities are independent of other qualities, and art is to be seen as the main mode of aesthetic values or aesthetic communication. Hermerén held this concept to be almost fruitless since it is difficult to define the meaning of 'artistic' and 'aesthetic'.

(2) Another argument is that interpretations as well as analyses and explications of works of art are checked against the qualities of the work of art in question. According to Hermerén, the problem with this thesis is that every work of art is open and can be described and interpreted in many ways. Beardsley's principle of artistic autonomy is close to this thesis, and Adorno has argued that art is autonomous in a sense that facts about the social setting of a work of art are not decisive when checking interpretations of it. Hermerén asks if the expressions "the qualities of the work of art" or "the work of art in question", and their cognates, can be defined without referring to nonartistic or nonaesthetic factors. In other words, this notion implies that art has a functional autonomy: products reflect their own production and thus draw from it the field's own principles and specific presuppositions.

(3) There is not much interest in maintaining that artistic innovations cannot be completely derived from social, psychic or other changes. But, art is also held to be independent as an institution. This means independence from all economic, political, or other institutions.

Very close to this is (4) the notion that every work of art is a closed world without any connection with anything else, or do not refer to any subjective or objective reality outside the realm of art, that is, art has no relation to lifeworlds or everyday life. Yet, artworks contain references to "the real world", nonartistic events, ideas and so forth. Hermerén also remarks that if a sharp distinction is made between art and life, it becomes difficult to understand why art should have any importance.

(5) The institution of art has also been held to be autonomous (or at least it ought to be) in the sense that there is no political, moral, or religious authority telling artists what to do and how to do it, or making prohibitions concerning certain motifs, means of expression, etc. The idea that works of art are not in any way contextually or externally determined, is quite common. I argue that this notion can be criticized, since art can exist in relation to other institutions and external conditions without being determined or dominated by them. This matter has attained ever greater relevance when considering certain phenomena in contemporary art. Where are the approvable (moral) limits and who has the right to define them? Can art transgress these limits and still remain as art, and is it thus saved from attacks from nonartistic realms of life? Problems have arisen both concerning art that claims to be a reflection of reality and art that transcends and changes reality by changing our experiences of the world by creating alternatives, and by suggesting new possibilities and combinations, being thus a source of mental (and moral) innovations.

(6) One deeply grounded notion is that works of art only have aesthetic or artistic effects on the beholder's thoughts, attitudes, and feelings, and this is the meaning of art in society at large; it has no important nonartistic ef-

fects. This means that only the aesthetic experience matters, hence it is much 'purer' experience than the so called quick or instant experiences kitsch or entertainment bring to us. Connected with this notion is the argument that nonartistic and nonaesthetic effects are always separated from the aesthetic and artistic value of the work of art, and it is evaluated without considering any such effects, values, or intentions. As Hermerén stated, the thesis that in the case of conflicts between values and norms, aesthetic and artistic considerations should always be decisive and outweigh moral, political, and religious ones has obvious implications for cultural and educational policy. This is precisely the problem I am concerned with.

(7) There is also another notion Hermerén does not mention, but that has relevance for research, although I shall not be attending to this matter any further. It is that aspect of art as autonomous is the idea that art as a sign system, or, semiotic organization is closed in relation to other cultures, or cultural systems: sports, gastronomy, fashion, and so on. Although, semiotics emphasizes the science of a sign as culturally conditional and through this as a contextual system⁵³ it also tends to categorize and differentiate cultural systems, and thus, in fact, give them a certain amount of autonomy.

These divisions may help us to avoid too holistic a notion of art in aiming for the pluralism I prefer. However, art still preserves an amount of autonomy, especially since certain kinds of contemporary art need it more than others. In fact, almost all arts need some 'type' of autonomy, although it can be said that all the various autonomies listed above have reduced and eliminated. However, instead of the dichotomy of autonomous /non-autonomous, we might use "degrees" of autonomy when shaping a theory, as well as practices, for arts education.

When reading Hermerén's essay, an interesting point arises concerning the language he uses. Although not identical, the terms 'nonartistic' and 'nonaesthetic' refer to mean such artistically and aesthetically external realms and values as the moral, political, and religious. This is one, and a common, way of dividing art and life into categories. But it does not take into account the complex element of the everyday that is not only a combination of moral, political, and religious aspects, but also routines, contingencies, communication, and not "aesthetically appropriate emotions". These are not commensurable with moral, political, or religious systems, which are too universal categories to take account of the tiniest particularities that form the flow of life.

L'art pour l'art as a slogan came into fashion among young bohemian poets and painters in Paris during the 1830s. But it did not attain full maturity until the aesthetic movement at the end of the 19th century. Greenberg has written about the dominant art forms. In Europe, literature was the dominant art form long enough to become a prototype for all the other arts, which imitated its effects and modes of expression. As I already remarked, this led to the situation that other arts were also evaluated by the criteria of this dominant form of art, literature. In fact, some theorists, such as Schopenhauer and Pater, held music instead of literature to be the most important art; hence it was the purest art mode. Modernism was born only by awakening the consciousness of art of itself, and especially the different art forms and their own modes of expression.

The aestheticians in the middle of the 19th century, from Baudelaire and Gautier to Wilde and Symons, demanded autonomy for art. Baudelaire wrote that modernity is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is one half of art, the other being the eternal and the immovable.⁵⁴ This definition releases art from its confinement to its immediate past, that is, the frozen academicism of the 19th century France. In modernism the transient, fleeting and contingent is seen in that modernism has rejected everything certain and given: definite aesthetics, definite style and safe and lasting form. However, modernism did have an idea about the possibility of attaining definite universal truth, although it can be represented and expressed in different ways.

The Spanish theoretician José Ortega y Gasset has helped to clarify Baudelaire's thoughts. According to Ortega, plain Cartesian rationalism is withdrawal from life. Instead, every life is a point of view directed upon the universe, reality, which is not unchangeable but organized according to different points of view.⁵⁵ Ortega stated that above all in this century in new art (which he did not specify) the conflict between traditional and new values is not so poignant as before in bourgeois modernity, which had its roots in the Enlightenment. About this bourgeois modernity he wrote in the 1920s that the specifically modern sensibility is mistrustful and contemptuous of everything spontaneous and immediate and is enthusiastic about all the constructions of reason.⁵⁶ It would be easy to take modern art as an aesthetic answer to the continuous revolutionary experience of modernity, but the sensibility of aesthetic modernism seems to be oppositional to this, for whereas rational, cartesian thinking searches for the absolute, the truth, artistic expression is bound up with life and perception, and is in this sense irrational. Ortega argued that through rationalism we have discovered spontaneity.⁵⁷ He stated that revolutionary thinking presupposes ultimate rationalism, for revolution needs belief in the absolute, in utopia. This utopia is, however, impossible to attain because it is only a construction of reason. That is why a revolution freezes immediately after it has lost its impetus and flowing nature.

Utopia is the eternal and immovable Baudelaire mentioned, but art, as life, as present reality, as one point of view, is at the same time transient and fleeting. One aim of modern art has been to realize the rationality, utopia, which attempts have been made to reach through negation: trying to return, to regress, for example, to the sources of pure creativity, the spontaneous. This has usually happened through the self-criticism of art. The history of modern art reveals a certain dialectic: Abstract Expressionism, or jazz improvisations, as an ultimate vitalism gave birth to an ultimate counter-reaction in Minimalism on the part of various arts, which took art very close to its utopia - the absolute.

Alternatively, modern art has reached for the universal, but it has been pluralistic too. In studying modern art this difference between universalism and pluralism should be taken notice of. Universality presumes some common criterion against which it is possible to study the development of modern art. For example, for Greenberg this criterion in the essence of art was a common tendency to abstraction, on the foundation of which he created a whole theory. Instead, pluralism questions the existence of this

essence itself. Unity - if thinking pluralistically - is a unity of differences. Thinking universally, the stress is on the formation of theory; but pluralism prefers the practice of interpretation. In modernism many manifestations, for example, the writings of artists about their own artistic intentions have been based on universal aims. Mondrian, for instance, said always that his purpose was to reach the cosmic, universal and transcendental through abstraction.

These aims toward universality have their own weaknesses. Hans Sedlmayr has remarked that when modernism reaches for the universal world of abstract concepts, it reveals one typical feature of the modern imagination:

The human being as a physical entity is no longer as important for it [Modernism] as "humanity", and it [Modernism] does not believe in God anymore, but however, in the "godlike", "divine".
 . . . the real world where there would be divine, humanity, femininity, vegetation and moonlightness, but no sun no moon no plants no women no human nor God, was in reality dreadfully ghostlike world.⁵⁸

In talking about the autonomy of art, it is worth seeing what Bürger has to say. He writes about the historical avant-garde, (instead of which I use the term 'radical avant-garde'). He held it to be the opposite of the aesthetic modernism of the 19th century.

Bürger stated that the intention of the avant-gardiste may be defined as the attempt to direct toward the practical the aesthetic experience (which rebels against the praxis of life) that aesthetic modernism developed.⁵⁹ In other words, the radical (historical) avant-garde wanted to dissolve art's alienation and make art the model for life. The radical avant-garde negated those determinations that are essential in autonomous art: the disjunction of art and the praxis of life, individual production, and individual reception as distinct from the former. The avant-garde intended the abolition of autonomous art, by which it meant that art is to be integrated into the praxis of life⁶⁰, but in the sense that life would start to follow art and especially the laws of aesthetic experience. Consequently, the representatives of the radical avant-garde preserved the ideas of the aestheticians at the end of the last century: life should imitate art.

Thus Bürger's notion of autonomy is problematic: On the one hand, he stresses the historical avant-garde as the opposite of an elitist and estranged autonomous art, and on the other, he emphasizes autonomy, for, like his inspirer Adorno, he does not see any other possibility for art to remain as something special and with an identity than a certain amount of autonomy. This is precisely the point where relativizing an autonomy could help. It is a matter of the character and amount of autonomy, not autonomy as a concept *en bloc*. However, Adorno quite willingly maintained the autonomy of art, because he saw as quite fruitful the gap between an autonomous art and a mass culture produced by the culture industry. This was for him a place for interesting games and possible tensions; both extremes were boring, such as opera as an old elitist art form or the use of pieces of classical music as consumable easy-to-listen-to fragments, and popular culture in the mode of the latest hit songs. Bürger followed the similar lines, but he does

not take so much interest in popular culture as much as Adorno did, and I think this is where he contradicts himself when he tries to criticize the false consciousness of the contemporary entertainment industry. The concept of life, in this case, is for Bürger much less accurate. However, to my mind, Adorno's ideas would hardly be any better. In his aesthetic theory there was 'life'; it was a sort of kitsch & jazz that he despised.

Bürger argues that it is art as an institution that is alienated, not necessary works of art. He too has a holistic notion of art. But it was a kind of necessity when an avant-garde begins to understand itself as a realm of value among other autonomous realms like science and ethics. We must remember that the turn of the century was a time of inventions and differentiation. According to Bürger, the historical avant-garde turned against the institution of art and against the way the autonomy of art functioned. He has been criticized on the grounds that Futurism, Dada and Surrealism - the historical avant-garde - could not criticize an institution, since it scarcely even existed. I do not agree, however. Already at the beginning of this century there were art practices and institutions, even (and especially) for different arts - at least in Europe. Since at the end of the 18th century there were public exhibitions, concerts, publishing, and quite soon there became galleries, museums, salons, bookshops and cafés with certain reputations. An audience behaved in certain ways: it wanted stars, pretended connoisseurship and taste, disdained or was full of enthusiasm. Dada, for instance, came into being to mock this kind of behaviour, but as we know, it soon became popular. Although it had also other intentions. I would criticize Bürger for seeing the radical avant-garde as a continuity that gnawed and nibbled at an autonomous institution long after the historical avant-garde. Not all aspects of autonomy, however. But, mostly, the radical avant-garde wanted to give up art as a separate island in the middle of the lifeworld or the mundane, it wanted to overturn the dominance of aesthetic qualities and a pure aesthetic experience, and it also rejected the functional autonomy of art.

Bürger did not want to define strictly the target of the radical avant-garde, to integrate art and life, for to do this would mean there would be no use in talking about artistic intentions and, on the other hand, art that has wholly merged into the mundane loses the necessary distance and its capacity to criticize life. In this sense the modernist project of the radical avant-garde drifted into its cul-de-sac at the latest when the Situationist International, Fluxus and suchlike movements, mostly in the 1960s, proved that it was impossible to mix up art and life: it is a utopian notion. However, many postmodern theorists have claimed that it is impossible to separate art and life anymore. Baudrillard states that art has melted into reality and the aestheticization of the world has become complete. Michel Maffesoli spoke of the aesthetic sense as social cement: art cannot be reduced into a canon of masterpieces but everyday life can be seen as art.⁶¹ Bürger disagrees with many postmodernists. He argues that the entertainment industry in consumer society has falsely realized the unification of art and life. His thinking also implies that continuous critique is a value as such - his whole theory is based on the idea of art as a critical institution in society. Thus art is seen almost solely as an instrument (or catalyst) for social change. It has been dif-

difficult for Bürger to meet the kinds of postmodernist and contemporary art where the nature of criticism and the relation between art and life is altogether different from the previous transgressive modes. At first, Baudrillard and Maffesoli both seem to be clever enough when giving up the idea of the separateness of art and life. But, to my mind, they both confuse art and aesthetics, or hold them to be almost identical.

Bürger separated art as an institution from individual works and their content. The autonomy of art, which he defined as the functional mode of the institution, determines the influence of the content of an individual work, but works of art have, however, their freedom and autonomy inside the institution. Therefore, instead of avant-garde works, Bürger's theory concentrates on avant-garde manifestations. An individual work can function as a manifestation, as Duchamp's *Fountain* (1917) did in its time. It was the first contextual work. But it is not always possible to determine the status of the institution of art through art works and vice versa.

When the avant-gardistes demanded that art become practical once again, they did not mean that the contents of works of art should be socially significant. The demand was not raised on the level of the contents of individual works. Rather, it directed itself to the way art functions in society, a process that does as much to determine the effect that works have as does the particular content.⁶² According to Bürger, an art institution separated from the praxis of *Lebenswelt* should be dissolved, because "[i]t became apparent that the social effect of a work of art cannot simply be gauged by considering the work itself but that its effect is decisively determined by the institution within which the work 'functions'".⁶³ Thus, although works do not always speak for themselves, the existing organization of society and the art world speak for them. This of course was in accord with the situation of the 1960s, and reflected the modes of thought at that time.

Perceiving avant-gardes almost solely as an (art) political phenomena - resistance - leads to Bürger's questioning. Critical distance, that is, some aesthetic differentiation between art and life on the level of actual works of art, is precisely that element of autonomy that he cannot dispense with. His theory explains certain starting points and aims of the radical historical avant-garde, but he has not formulated a theory to include the relativity of the aesthetic avant-garde, not to mention the usage of the term. "There will never be one avant-garde and the avant-garde will never be one," wrote Andrew Benjamin.⁶⁴ He did not consider the opposition towards tradition, and calling it into question, the most essential aspects of an avant-garde, as Bürger did. Instead, Andrew Benjamin considers the most essential feature of an avant-garde the recognition that to represent and to repeat unity, homogeneity and pure presence is futile and impossible. It is a question about the refusal to repeat.⁶⁵ As such it is, to my mind, dead. I suggest that we should rather start to consider the repetition as a positive aspect in art. I do not mean the repetition of grid or such only.

Abstraction is always Truth, said Hegel. Of course it is; therefore chance cannot influence it, and even if this were to happen, it must have some wider meaning in history. This concerns, especially, the autonomy of art as an abstraction.

But it concerns also works themselves that have usually been understood as if the artist had planned and made them as complete as possible. The artist can give chance a possibility, but then it is never an accident, or, she can plan beforehand an open work. However, we are taught and used to suppose that at least the artist knows what she is doing.

My argument is that although we cannot yet write the history of contemporary art, we can see some changes and react to them. It is no use waiting till an artist dies and his works are conserved in a museum, or archives. In fact, the days are gone when all art could have been installed in a museum, or even its garden. This is important both to the theory and practice of arts education. Although the latest *Dokumenta* in Kassel (1997) did not confirm this, art has often been made with political and social motives too. It is temporary, contextual, and so on. Interesting question is, how temporariness and contextuality influence art, and especially, how these influences are seen in art made after the vigorous development of an aesthetic field as part of philosophy. Some have said that even philosophy itself has become aestheticized. Or that art has become theory. Nicholas Wolterstorff writes that the task of the philosopher is to make the hidden manifest. Has not the same task been given to the arts too; and recently more and more loudly? Philosophers reveal the inaccuracies and concealments of ordinary language. And writers on art such as Suzanne Lacy say that an artist can be a reporter, even an analyst (more about this in the chapter *Changes in the Artist's Role*). But there is a difference between these notions. What Lacy means is not that art is changing into philosophy. In contemporary art, very often, when the hidden was made manifest, at the same time there were more or less participatory audiences, that is, reality and action, not concepts only. As in Lacy's works where elderly people have been given a voice and visibility. This brings along contingencies, localities. And then we should take a pragmatist approach in the way William James reminds us, that the glory is in our participation in fallible and transitory human projects, not in our obedience to permanent nonhuman constraints.⁶⁶

Nonetheless, we are conscious of 'aesthetic consciousness' as a criterion. It has to affect contemporary art in some ways. These can be:

- 1) Art tries to find a relation to aesthetic values and qualities. (If not so sincerely, at least with some irony. I am going to give some examples later, when dealing with the concept of intertextuality.)
- 2) Art cares nothing about aesthetic values and criteria but concentrates on something else, mostly content, or collaborative or collective work with other artists and 'an audience' as taking part in some project. In this case it is the artist's *work*, not the material product, that is important. And it is difficult to evaluate it with only aesthetic qualities in mind.
- 3) Content and form can be united in the aesthetic sense, as happened during the radical modernist period in the Russian Avant-Garde or photomontage in Germany before World War II. In contemporary art the same thing happens more often in environmental, contextual, or site-specific projects and works; sometimes also in art made for the Internet.
- 4) Aesthetics, and especially an aesthetic differentiation, absorbs art, of whatever kind, by making it a style that the artist has chosen and by emphasizing

meanings the artist herself gives to her work. This matter I shall focus on later.



Klaus Staeck: Die Kunst ist frei, 1987.

The concept of taste nowadays is somewhat relativistic, “neo-pragmatist”, or “post-modern”. Gadamer considers of some length the contextualization of the concept of taste; perhaps since it seems, at first, to be an escape from the prison of autonomy that tends to separate art from social life. The ruling taste of society, receives its stamp from the conventions of social life.⁶⁷ In fact, the concept of taste is contextual, or, should we say: a social phenomenon over and above the conception of the German philosophers, and in this case, especially, Kant, had. Kant argued that aesthetic evaluations are valuations by taste, they are not rational, they do not tell us about what things are or what their content is. Instead, taste expresses some emphatic attitude or feeling towards concrete objects. “Wie das Subject durch die Vorstellung (des Objectes) affiziert wird, sich selbst fühlt”.⁶⁸ Thus evaluation by taste is subjective, although people may have followed “the ruling taste of society”, which also includes ethics and morals. It is not the private feeling - not ‘ein Privatgefühl’, since it is disinterested pleasure. Gadamer writes that before Kant the concept of taste was originally more a moral than the aesthetic idea which Kant turned it into in his *Critique of Judgement*. Taste implies a mode of knowing, says Gadamer. One can like something that one’s own taste rejects.⁶⁹ This is especially important if we think about the autonomy of art, since it meant that one can and even has to get rid of one’s own subjectivity. On the other hand, it apologized for the view that people should *learn* to make judgements, that is, that it is always good and sure taste with no hesitation and no searching for reasons. Taste is more like sense, Gadamer wrote. In its operation it has no knowledge of reasons.⁷⁰

The reason I discuss taste so extensively is Gadamer's remark that it as a phenomenon is very closely connected to fashion. Although fashion is constituted by empirical universality, it creates a social dependence. By contrast, taste is an intellectual faculty of differentiation. It operates in a community, but is not subservient to it.⁷¹ Thus it is somewhat contextual. There emerges a question if a tendency to create one's own (life) style using one's own judgement is closer to taste than fashion. This suggests that one takes from fashion only what harmonizes with one's style. To this I should add that Gadamer drew a strict distinction between taste and fashion: "Against the tyranny exercised by fashion, sure taste preserves a specific freedom and superiority".⁷² It means also, then, that at least the autonomy of art as aesthetic institution and the realm of its own "artistic" history remains, since sure taste is not so subjectively open as fashion is. He admits that taste knows something, though in a way that cannot be separated from the concrete moment in which something occurs. Taste cannot be reduced to any rules and concepts.⁷³ Do any aspects of the autonomy of art strip away the moral aspect of taste and diminish the area of referents/comparable things according to which the objects of art are judged? No, not actually, since, as Gadamer remarks, at issue is always something more than the correct application of rules or general principles. Taste, too, is determined by the individual case.

It is easy, however, to use one's (good) taste in judging and evaluating such clear cases of art as a landscape painting or a photograph of poor people or architectural monuments such as Steven Holl's Museum for Contemporary art, *Kiasma*, in Helsinki. But what about such works as Rauno Tösta maa's⁷⁴ *Rahulik öö Lenini-mäel* (1985), which is made of video fragments and beard lichen? Is it for (in that time when there existed yet the Soviet Union the part of which Estonia, in fact, was) an Estonian artist an avant-gardist work, or a naïve attempt to connect contrasting things (technology and nature) to create something critical (and if so, then what is the point of criticism?). The receiver's attitude and taste judgement will depend heavily on, and even vary widely, depending on whole, if (s)he was a Soviet citizen at the time or an art critic in some Western country, the United States, for instance. I take this illustration since I wanted to show that to study and analyze the language of criticism is also connected to the context of the work.

It may be that in Modernism (and especially in its avant-gardes) taste became a game, or a cheap commercial plaything. Kant in his time, however, drew an analogy between an aesthetic and the morally good: *The beautiful is the symbol of the morally good*. Schiller followed this in his theory of aesthetic education. He developed the concept of the play instinct (*Spieltrieb*), which actually gives birth to an aesthetic attitude. We sense and take notice of phenomena in life, but when contemplated, they show themselves to us as immaterial (*als stofflos*) and apparent (*als blosser Schein*). The materiality of aesthetic objects are meaningless *in themselves*. This is not the same thing as in some contemporary art; in body art, for example, the materiality of the body is connected to producing an abstraction. But, if Stelarc did not really hang on those 18 hooks, or, Marcel'li Antunez Roca had not allowed an audience to torture him, then those abstract ideas about fear, pain, hallucinations due to physical affliction, indifference and so on

would not have reached us as well. In these cases materiality is not meaningless in itself, since it is precisely material (a body) that brings forth emotional and even extreme physical reactions. In fact, it was those Casebier held to be “non-appropriate emotions” to an aesthetic experience or related to an aesthetic attitude at all, such as anger, hate, and terror. Schiller separated physical, aesthetic and moral states, and ordered them into hierarchy. A human being was to develop through these three states from a state of physical suffering, natural and sensuous domination *through the aesthetic state* into the state of reason and will, which meant the state in which by acting /doing the individual rules nature.

Kant wrote about the playful facility of one’s mental powers. And this is precisely the pit we have fallen into. I assume that the physical is a factor lessening the autonomy of art in the sense in which it is understood as a separate realm from the lifeworld. The reasons are many, and I shall deal with them in later chapters. The pure physicality of gestures that do not symbolize anything. Another thing is that the art world functions as a frame within which anything is interesting as long as it has first been defined as exterior (outside the realm of art’s institutional and functional autonomy), and provided it is first conceptualized, abstracted and translated into the language of arttalk. Genuine physical experience is not enough. The audience feels an obscure need to understand. The tradition of the intellectual appropriation of art has been too long and sticky. Once you have learned to talk about art, even physical nausea turns into mere odourless words to be written down. To give an example: Wolf Vostell has remarked that Duchamp’s urinal is not a work of art merely as an object - using it is also art. On the other hand, pissing off-target is only acceptable as art when it takes the form of an idea shaped by the artist. This is what we are talking about when we are talking about the institutional autonomy of art.

To my mind, this old and arbitrary division into mind and body is a burden we continue to drag along. It is the same division as that of reason and emotions arts educators constantly encounter in their work. I would like to suggest other concepts instead, but I am not sure what they would be: taste, perhaps, as adopted in art, keeping in mind its older meaning as morally good but without Kant’s concentration on the beautiful. But not certainly in the sense it is used in the concept of ‘trend’, as in the definition of avant-garde I cited above. Or, then, passion, that functions when mind and body, intellect and emotions, are put together. Still, these are overly vague concepts, for the theory at least; although it is easier to use them in arts educational practice. It is easy to see that such concepts as taste or passion are more subjective than the abstractions of mind, body, reason, or, that of ‘appropriate emotion’. Later, I shall deal with the literalization of the symbolic by introducing such concepts as ‘noise as language’ and ‘mimicry’ into art. I hope that then this problematic will also become clearer. I do not see that this kind of subjectivity does any harm, though, on the contrary, arts educators may need it due to the nature of the contemporary art they deal with.

I think that, in addition to the analogic or symbolic relations of some contemporary art, there is also the question of literal moral (social and political) statements in art. I argue that these are local ones. Gadamer writes about the notion of experience, and that it implies a contrast between life

and a mere concept. Experience has a definite immediacy: everything that is experienced is experienced by oneself, and part of its meaning is that it belongs to this self and thus contains an unmistakable and irreplaceable relation to the whole of this one life. Thus, he says, essential to an experience is that it cannot be exhausted in what can be said of it or grasped as its meaning. Thus experience is never totally abstract but always has an inner relation to life.⁷⁵ This has often been a problem for art theory or philosophy. Modernism, for example, often strove for impersonality. There was much talk about interpretation, understanding or having knowledge of certain basic rules etc. There was much less talk about connecting art experiences with one's own sphere of life or lifestyle, to be openly and locally subjective.

"An Enormously Tiny Bit of a Lot"

A reversal back to the perfection of reality is that what much art today wants to achieve. Or even showing a picture of an imperfect reality - but local realities, if artists suppose there is any fixed reality at all. Contemporary art is coming back to the particular. It means that, in a sense, art is no longer dissociated from its social situations and contexts.

In fact, one possible - but rather extreme - definition of art could be that it is: *the contingencies of locational and institutional circumstances*. This is, of course, in opposition to the concept of "Reality", which is defined "as what is untransformed, and art as the raising up (*Aufhebung*) of this reality into its truth."⁷⁶ This is rather a metaphysical notion. Later in this work I shall compare performative art and the strategy of mimicry to this, since it is connected to the problem of personality versus subjectivity in art. (See the chapter *Is Love Necessarily Round?*) Kuusamo remarks that this has been the weak point of both structuralism and semiotics, since it supposes a kind of ideal interpreter; however, of another kind than that of formalism.⁷⁷ Structuralism, for instance, held that a differentiated and autonomous object of research should be related to collective symbolical systems. Structuralism did not suppose any "spirit" for every epoch. It stressed universal *structures* of meanings, which produced transcendental historical meanings.⁷⁸

These are simple but important reasons why I did not choose structuralism or semiotics as the methodological basis of my work. To my mind they greatly resemble the theory of the spectacle by Guy Debord, who defined the spectacle as outside-given roles that people play on the stage of their lives, while at the same time remaining alienated spectators of their own lives. People use to realize certain collective systems, whether learnt from film, tv, or popular magazines. And these systems, on their behalf, emphasize universal structures of meanings, that are transcendental, since they are not real; all those sayings about women, for instance. Of course, here can be seen the influence of critical theory; and Debord, as well as the dadaists much earlier, believed that somewhere there is something real

and naturally creative and spontaneous. It was later that people stopped believing in any "real" reality at all.

There are a few concepts I have to make more clear. These are the site, situation, context, occasion, and chance; the last of these is an important part of all art. Again I first cite some definitions from *The Concise Oxford English Dictionary* (1986):

Site: "Local position, situation, ground on which anything, esp. a building stands."

Situation: "The place in which something is situated, position, locality; position of affairs or circumstances, esp. a critical juncture in a story or play, or place." The dictionary mentioned 'positions' and 'places where something is situated', but I would like to broaden these definition to include situation as a case. Concerning taste or other "criteria" in evaluating art always rises the question of individual cases. Art works as those 'individual cases'. And sensing them is 'a position of affairs', ie, a situation in a specific context.

Context: This concept is defined as "the parts of a discourse or book immediately connected with a sentence or passage quoted; the setting, surroundings". There is a strong linguistic emphasis.

The cultural dimension in the autonomy of art rises from the particular to the universal - as Gadamer says, from allegory to symbol. It is a distancing from the particularity of immediate acceptance or rejection, even respecting what does not correspond to one's own expectations or preference.⁷⁹ This means that the setting, surroundings are there, but they are also neutralized; the "passage quoted", ie, the work of art, is connected to some discourse, but this is not so important, and least important is a subjective discourse: one's own expectations or preferences.

Occasion: "An event, circumstance, or position of affairs, giving an opportunity, reason, or motive for doing something; motive, ground, reason, need; an incidental or subsidiary cause; the immediate cause or condition as dist. from the primary cause. An occurrence or time of importance or having special interest." On occasion: "Now and then."

The 'occasionality' Gadamer writes about, connecting it to play as drama that takes place and has its meaning determined in the certain situation, is nonetheless a concept of artistic autonomy which draws a line between art and the world. The relation of art to the world around would be different if we took up the idea of the constant changing, exploiting and molding of art, which the situationists, for example, have so strongly talked and theorized about. It is interesting since then in this case autonomous works do not exist, but only ideas changing along with the occasion, ie, also according to motives, grounds, reasons or needs.

For aesthetic consciousness what is common to all of these is the *occasionality* that characterizes such art forms. Occasionality means that their meaning and contents are determined by the occasion for which they are intended, so that they contain more than they would without this occasion.⁸⁰

Is this only an attempt to handle the problem of context in aesthetics? In fact, the word 'occasional' sounds more incidental than 'context'. A certain locality is more connected to site, situation and context. Occasion is more a tempo-

rary event, fleeting circumstance; as the dictionary definition says, "the immediate cause or condition", that is, the condition at hand.

Since I do not believe, although I cannot know for sure, that Gadamer could go so far that he would claim, as I am arguing, that when we think about contemporary art, we must ask if such components as interaction, participation, collectivity, dialogical communication etc., can be added to the list of the qualities of art. This would lay more stress on the concepts I have explained. But intention is not necessary for the specific occasion to determine contexts. It may be chance that determines the situation, context, or occasion. And the role of chance has grown since the first half of this century. *Chance* is defined as "the course of events; event, issue, result; undesigned result or occurrence; accident, risk, possibility, opportunity. Likelihood. Propability; fate, the indeterminable course of events". Duchamp, John Cage, and others gave the possibility for chance; it was not purely coincidental or accidental.

Artists have organized sites, situations, contexts or settings where something can happen by chance (incidentally) or where a possibility for something to happen is given, such that the receiver's activities influence it. This is play (leikki, lek) in a sense that people can change roles, there are no premeditated rules, but everything is open: an adventurer does not know beforehand what waits her. The playground can be anything. Contemporary flâneur, the situationist *dérive* and tactics are all connected to this. This differs from Gadamer's notion of occasion, since he writes that the meaning and contents of forms are determined by the intended occasion. I assume that the word 'intended' in this context means something an artist has intended, even structured into a more or less unity beforehand. An occasion is thus to go to the theatre to see the play, not any other place that is not recognized as a stage. Brecht discusses this when he gave an example of a man telling about an incident in the street (see the chapter *The Construction of Situations*.) And Brecht also use this occasionality concept in his estrangement theory, since he thought that consciousness of the occasion brings more to meaning and contents. But Brecht also hoped for an audience to react after they have left the occasion. Now, the difference between Brecht and occasions organized nowadays by an artist is that in the latter occasion approaches its dictionary definition as an event and an immediate cause or condition that is not determined by any intended act but chances realized by the participants which create something with the artist, or from the often rather open premises she had given. This means that motives, reasons and needs come "outside of art", from everyday life, so that it would not be even necessary to the artist to make choices. She can also grasp what is going on already. Then, however, the distance between an artist as a functioning subject and reality as her material vanishes. An artist returns to an immediate mode of being and also accepts the world as it offers itself (cf. Harries about Kierkegaard).

Adorno would not approve of this, since he demanded an autonomous art, although he mentioned that a certain nominalism, that is, an invasion of life, is vitalising for art, since only then could it have (in the widest sense) a political meaning as a contrast to ordinary life. Bürger is on similar lines, although he talks even more abstractly about art as an autonomous

institution. Nevertheless, Adorno stated that art was separate yet analogous to life; art had its own life. Bürger wanted art to merge up with life, but he never actually makes clear how, since, as I have remarked, he separated art as an institution and works of art. I suppose that Bürger might have thought along similar lines to Gadamer: it is the occasion that matters, it determines whether meaning and contents are given more or less weight, or, in Bürger's case especially contain criticality.

Gadamer's notion that the language of art speaks to us in a significant and definite way⁸¹, is a basis for aesthetics as we apply it. When aestheticians talk about taking part, for example, in tragic action in the theatre, usually they refer to the receiver's capacity to understand and even empathize with what happens, since the story is familiar to her from a religious, historical, or literary tradition. Drama should be the presentation of common truth. Brecht wanted estrangement since we could see the truth knowing we have our own lives apart from the (political) truth on the stage. In fact, Gadamer - although he does not mention Brecht at all - denies the notion supported by Stanislaw Witkiewicz and Antonin Artaud, for example, that it has to be a temporary intoxication, and after the performance you are as if awaking from the dream. Here we are talking about play more as a ritual. Instead, Gadamer says that it is the receiver's own world, and he also explains how she comes to belong to her world more fully by recognizing herself more profoundly in it.⁸²

The problem is, Gadamer (like many others) speaks about the language of art as something that can be put into words, at least in some abstracted meta-level, and forgets altogether that we could "speak" a speechless language - physicality and feelings, for example. They are not so definite and specific; they do not yield to concepts. That they are very subjective Gadamer does not deny. But what he does not approve of is, that the work of art, drama, for instance, could have been made into something other than the presentation of common truth. To my mind, illustrative of the locality and subjectivity is what Meret Oppenheim wrote in her poem *Ohne mich ohnehin...* from 1969: "Mit ganz enorm wenig viel" .

In the past there were claims that artists represented universal and common issues and ideas in a personal and original style, often in totally new ways and forms. But, as I already mentioned, subjectivity is different from personality. An artist can tell the story of her life or listen others, draw from experiences that cannot open for all and so on. This kind of art does not search for personal brushstrokes, but can be a bunch of hair from an artist's hairbrush.⁸³ Aestheticians and art theoreticians (who have been men, mostly) have usually rejected any subjectivity as a hostile to the autonomy of art and its ability to represent universal truths. Consequently, genre and women studies have shown that they are not necessary shared truths of all people. Tradition can be common, but, especially as an experience, as I have stated, it is in interaction with one's own life, and the truth in this sense is not elevating for all. Even if we have something we can call a common tradition that is taught to all of us. Gadamer was very close to this notion when he introduced his term 'occasion'. This is a practical problem of arts education: how much energy should you put into teaching the tradition and tradi-

tional methods of criticism (as in the DBAE) when the contemporary situation (of your pupils and even in art) is so very different.



Photo: Juha-Petteri Kivimäki

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

1. Here we have some linguistic problems. In English, German and Finnish there is only one word for each language: contemporary art/ Gegenwartskunst/ nykyaide. In Swedish, for instance, there are terms 'nutidskonst' and 'samtidskonst'.
2. From the brochure by ATLAS Kustannus. I found it inside the *Kotilääkäri* 10/1997. The magazine concentrates on subjects concerning physical health.
3. Levi & Smith 1991, 110. Quoted from Kramer: *The Age of the Avant-Garde*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1973, p.7.
4. See f.ex. Levi & Smith 1991, 10.
5. When I am writing this there will be more than two months to the opening of the Museum of Contemporary Art, named *Kiasma*, in Helsinki, Finland. In this week, papers have written about it and its politics towards people. The director and staff of the museum have stated that its realm of art starts from the 1960s, and that art is a part of the conversation about the future, in what kind of society people want to live in. See, f.ex., *Helsingin Sanomat* 17.3.1998 (Kulttuuri C6) & *Helsingin Sanomat* 18.3.1998 (C5).
6. The influence of punk culture, both in Europe and America, cannot be underestimated, on the contrary. In England the SI influenced punk in a certain degree. However, I do not treat this issue here, since I have written about it in my *Intellektuaalista terrorismia* (1994), which has a summary in English. I also concentrate here exclusively to the Parisian Situationists and do not deal with the Second Situationist International which was formed after the split of 1962 in Sweden. This movement joined to other avant-garde groups in Scandinavia, for example to the Fluxus-influenced Co-Ritus group and soon it was the part of Scandinavian art scene, although not very conformist in action.
7. Gadamer 1975, 122.
8. *Ibid.*, 147.
9. Shusterman 1992, 9.
10. *Ibid.*, 59.
11. I awoke to understand this idea about the degrees of autonomy when I read comments about the earlier draft of this study by Erkki Sevänen. Also other theorists, Göran Herméren , f.ex., have dealt with rather similar divisions. Therefore I put their ideas together.
12. Gablik 1995 (b), 352. From an interview with Theodore Roszak.
13. Shusterman 1992, 94.
14. Dewey 1958(b), 139.
15. Levi & Smith 1991, 17.
16. Smith defines the deconstructionism as a "contemporary intellectual movement ... [that] reveals no conspicuous interest in the humanistic functions of works of art. Negative and nihilistic in outlook, it has therefore no relevance for art education". (Levi & Smith 1991, 173.)
17. Smith 1989, 33.
18. Rintala (1979), 146. Original text (the title is in English "Beauty is God") is published in 1959. I make a very rough translation: " That's the whole thing. There must not be but only a very small thing in a painting to see. Such a small that it has afford to widen into the infinity in spectator's eyes. That's it. Painting is to simplifying, that with colours and brushstrokes you reduce all the possible from the picture. What remains is small and simple that you cannot reduce anymore. It can grow endlessly."
19. Gadamer 1975, 85.
20. *Ibid.*, 87.
21. *Ibid.*, 81.
22. *Ibid.*, 153.
23. *Ibid.*, 116.
24. Dziemidok 1983, 55. See Beardsley: *The Aesthetic Point of View, Metaphilosophy* 1 (1970).
25. *Ibid.*, 60.
26. *Ibid.*, 63-64.

27. Ibid., 64.
28. Gadamer 1975, 85.
29. Ibid., 63.
30. Casebier 1977, 797.
31. Reprinted in Dickie & Sclafani (eds): *Aesthetics. A Critical Anthology*. St. Martin's Press, New York, 1977.
32. Casebier 1977, 798. Originally published in *The Personalist*, Winter 1971.
33. Ibid., 797.
34. See Adorno 1991.
35. Quoted by J.O.Urmson in his essay "The Methods of Aesthetics" in Shusterman (ed): *Analytic Aesthetics*. 1989, p.23.
36. Shusterman 1989, 4.
37. Ibid., 13.
38. Cit. by Wolterstorff 1989, 36. Italics mine.
39. Shusterman 1989, 15.
40. Eaton 1994, 110. This kind of criticism is displayed by Ted Cohen in his *The Possibility of Art: Remarks on a Proposal by Dickie*; published in *Philosophical Review* 82, 1973.
41. Id.
42. See Danto 1986, 77-78.
43. See Shusterman 1992, 42.
44. Danto 1992, 185 & 195. Haacke continued along similar lines since the beginning of the 1970s. See, f.ex., Hans Haacke & Pierre Bourdieu: *Libre-Échange* published by Éditions du Seuil/Les Presses du Réel, 1994. It was published in Finnish on the title *Ajatusten vapaakauppaa* by Kustannusosakeyhtiö Taide, 1997. See also Brian Wallis (ed): *Hans Haacke: Unfinished Business (The New Museum of Contemporary Art, New York & M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986.)*
45. Gadamer 1975, 167.
46. Kuusamo 1996, 23. He refers to Hayden White's *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*. (1986), pp. 101-102, 116-117.
47. See Gadamer 1975, 45-46 & Krohn 1965, 42-45.
48. Gadamer 1975, 82.
49. Id.
50. Ibid., 169.
51. Bürger 1984, 26.
52. I have given a summary of Hermerén's essay *An Autonomy of Art* (1983).
53. Kuusamo 1996, 18.
54. Baudelaire 1863, 215.
55. Ortega y Gasset 1961, 91.
56. Ibid., 34.
57. Ibid., 58.
58. Sedlmayr 1968, 36. Translation by myself.
59. Ibid., 34. For example of the alienation of aestheticism, extracts from Oscar Wilde: "Art takes life as part of her rough material, recreates it, and refashions it in fresh forms, is absolutely indifferent to fact, invents, imagines, dreams, and keeps between herself and reality the impenetrable barrier of beautiful style, of decorative or ideal treatment. . . . Art finds her own perfection within, and not outside of, herself. She is not to be judged by any external standard of resemblance." (Wilde 1889, 148.)
60. Ibid., 53-54.
61. Maffesoli 1991, 8. Daniel Bell has written in his 1976 published book *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (Basic Books, New York, pp.53-54. Cit. Calinescu in *Five Faces of Modernity. Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism*. Duke University Press, Durham, 1987, p.6.): "What we have today is a Radical disjunction of culture and social structure, and it is such disjunctions which historically have paved the way for more direct social revolutions. In two fundamental ways the new revolution has already begun. First, the autonomy of culture, achieved in art, now begins to pass over into the arena of life. The postmodernist temper demands that what was previously played out in fantasy and imagination must be acted in life as well. There is no distinction between art and life. Anything permitted in art is permitted in life as well. Second, the life-style once practiced by a small *cénacle* . . . is now copied by the "many" . . . and dominates the cultural scene."
62. Ibid., 49.
63. Ibid., 90. Bürger did not refer to institution in the similar sense, for example, Dickie has done, ie, as a vast system covering all parts of the art world. Think about for example site-specific art or art that directs its critique against museums; they concentrate the very functions of (hieratic) relations between the work and the institution that determines it.

64. Benjamin 1991, 103.
65. Ibid., 63-64. More transcendental levels are also lacking from Bürger's theory. For example, such matters Russian artist Mikhail Larionov mentioned in his letter to Alfred Barr in 1930. Larionov described rayonism as follows: "Ultimately, rayonism admits of the possibility of a definition and a physical measurement of love, ecstasy, talent - those spiritual qualities of the lyrical and epic state. . ." At least in the Eastern Europe, in the Russian and Polish Futurism, there was the marked a tendency toward an intuitive and mystical, painting of the soul, at the same time when art was revolutionary and political. Not to mention the psychic levels of Surrealism. As I mentioned, Bürger concentrated his attention merely on the polemics inside the art world, not on individual works of art. He did not take much notice of aesthetic experience as such, and he probably thought that art has not much to do with a critical consciousness about language, although the mistrust in language and its critique is one of the starting points of Modernism.
66. Wolterstorff 1989, 53.
67. Gadamer 1975, 84. More about 'taste', see f.ex. pages 35-42. (I used the metaphor of prison of autonomy, which, to my mind, resembles a lot the prison and a peculiar world of Krazy Kat comics so many modernist artists have been familiarized to, and whose creator George Herriman, on his behalf, had familiarized to Dada and Surrealism.)
68. See Krohn 1965, 43. Citation originally from Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790).
69. Gadamer 1975, 36.
70. Ibid., 36. (More comparisons to Krazy Kat, since Krazy always interprets a brick Ignaz the mouse throws on the cat as a prove of Ignaz's love and affection for Krazy, although Ignaz is just mean and hates Krazy. Sheriff of the county hates Ignaz, and repeatedly puts the mouse into the jail. All these actions are just matters of really subjective taste, in fact.)
71. Ibid., 37.
72. Id.
73. Ibid.,38.
74. Rauno Töstamaa "is" an Estonian born artist (b. 1962) in Pölsamaa. He studied in the Soviet-Estonian Academy of Art in Tallinn 1980-84. He moved to the United States in 1986. However, he is totally a production of my own imagination to illustrate the one hypothetical case in art, and to prove the difficulties in the situation where there are so many artists, of which even the experts cannot have knowledge of.
75. Gadamer 1975, 67-68.
76. Ibid., 113.
77. Kuusamo 1996, 21.
78. Ibid., 18.
79. Gadamer 1975, 84.
80. Ibid., 144.
81. Ibid., 51.
82. Ibid., 133.
83. Henrietta Lehtonen in fact put in her exhibition (in Turku, Finland) what she had taken off from her hairbrush. Another example is Outi Liusvaara who carefully listed and categorized by types all things she had in her apartment.

PART 2

On nastaa, että joku tyyppi pelaa mun asettamassa kehikossa.

Jari Aalto-Setälä

MODERNISM AND THE RADICAL AVANT-GARDE

*Dvala, förruttnelse,
spyflugors surr I stinkande likkött,
jäsande liv - det är världen,
mänskornas värld, mänskobildernas värld.
Din hårda hand, konstnär,
din fyrkantiga själ,
din tankes järnslägga,
din eldiga brutalitets famntag -
det är det den behöver,
världen, den brunstiga honan,
den otillfredställda
aldrig tillräckligt fående.*

- Elmer Diktonius (1921) -

I argued that the knowledge-based arts education of today rests on the notion of autonomous art, that is, purely on Modernism and its ideals. Thus the autonomy of art is quite an important question. Since I ground my arguments relating to contemporary (political and activist) performative art on a certain avant-garde tradition in modernism, it is important to state what kind of concept of modernism and avant-garde I lean on. In this chapter I deal with some of the characteristic features of modernism that have also changed along with changes in art. However, I want to stress that I concentrate on some features only: (1) the negative intention of Modernism (a notion which is not shared by all theorists), (2) its timeless and placeless nature, (3) subjectivity hidden under the cover of personality and originality, and (4) I clarify the confusing term 'avant-garde' as a part of modernism.

The term avant-garde is such a manifold and confusingly used term that I hold it to be important to try to sort out what it is. Although I argue that the radical avant-garde especially, has had an influence on contemporary art in many ways, I think that the term itself has "melted into air". I try to prove that we can nurture a certain avant-garde tradition, its strategies, without using the confusing term itself.

Phoenix Rising from the Ashes

When Modernism was born artists made both a new kind of art and talk and wrote about it. Anarchism, at least on the level of common parlance, explains why the rise of modernism seemed to be a revolution. Although the new concept of art seemed to be a rupture with old, institutionalized academicism, especially hegemonic in France, the break of aesthetic modernism with the old was never as complete as people wanted to believe. Everything was not questioned or demolished, although many spoke enthusiastically about anarchist efforts to burn all their bridges. An impression of a complete rupture with previous art modes was given by the rhetoric loaned from the political avant-garde, for example talk about revolution. The idea about the autonomy of art took the place of utopian socialist pragmatism which had given art a social mission. In the newborn Modernism, writers, artists and aestheticians manifested their political opinions now and then, but they seldom confused their styles of making art with their political aims.

Charles Baudelaire developed the idea that the main characteristic of a decadence is its systematic attempt to break down the conventional boundaries between the diverse arts.¹ In the last century there was lots of talk about breaking the boundaries between the different arts, but also about giving autonomy to each art, which was Walter Pater's favourite subject. The conflict was only apparent. Autonomy for each art was justified as opposing the practice of valuing, for example painting, according to the criterion of literature and to avoid the value hierarchies which John Ruskin among others had built. Independent, equal art modes could exchange influences or form a Gesamtkunstwerk. Baudelaire actually established a relation between the aims of decadence in demolishing borders and artistic modernity. The project of bourgeois modernity aimed for specialization and differentiation, which was also reflected in modern art.² This is something that all the elements in art institutions have not abandoned, even nowadays.

Negative actions produce catastrophes which break the illusion of continuity. These were necessary if modernism wanted to maintain a concept of continuous progress. In his aesthetic theory Adorno asked what guarantees the authentic quality of modern works of art. And answered that

[i]t is the scars of damage and disruption inflicted by them on the smooth surface of the immutable. Explosion is one of the invariable traits of art, whose anti-traditional energy becomes a voracious eddy that consumes everything. To that extent modernism is myth turned against itself. Through modern art, the timeless quality of myth becomes a catastrophic instant wherein all temporal continuity is destroyed.³

Clement Greenberg's theory of art described the question of the gradual abstraction of art. According to him the history of avant-garde painting [Greenberg used the term avant-garde as a synonym for modernism] is that of a progressive surrender to the resistance of its medium. This resistance consists chiefly in the flat picture plane's denial of efforts to "hole through" it for a realistic perspectival space.⁴ Greenberg wrote about flatness and the

demarcation of flatness as adequate norms for painting. He actually accepted the possibility of a clean canvas as a work of art, although he didn't find it artistically very successful.

In his critical remarks on Greenberg's art theory T. J. Clark develops the above ideas. Clark argued that despite its positive intentions the *practice* of modern art is negative. He stated that modernism insisted on its medium and meanings can henceforth only be found in practice. The practice in question is extraordinary and presents itself as a work of interminable and absolute decomposition, a work which is always pushing the medium to its limits, to the point where it breaks or evaporates or turns back into mere unworked material.⁵ Aiming for pure art such negative practices have been, for example, changing and distorting perspective, using colours independent of local colours, as the Fauvists did, using unartistic materials, denying total and conscious control of an artefact, applications of automatism, emphasizing an insignificant element, parodying previous styles etc.

There are two kinds of negative tendencies in modern art. On the one hand, the purely formalistic, where the question is to some extent about the fragmentization of representation (of reality). Picasso described this by saying that in the old days pictures went forward toward completion by stages, a picture was a sum of additions. In contrast Picasso characterized his own pictures as a sum of destructions: "I do a picture - then I destroy it. In the end, though, nothing is lost".⁶ On the other hand, the practices of modernism can be thought to be negative in a broader sense. For example, the strivings towards pure art have been realized merely by negation: there have been attempts to throw away some "waste". This kind of progress is displayed in Piet Mondrian's art and its change from representing visible reality to representing the universal. Also content, subjectivity and realism have been avoided in different degrees. In the machine drawings, which Francis Picabia, Marcel Duchamp and others made at the beginning of the century, artists concentrated on minimizing subjectivity, or expressive lines, and the degree of visible intention in the work. Picabia's drawing of a spark plug (*Portrait d'une jeune fille américaine dans l'état de nudité*, 1915) could be from any catalogue of car components.

According to Clark, negativity does not appear as a practice which guarantees meaning or opens up a space for free play and fantasy in the manner of a joke or irony, but, rather, negation appears as an absolute and all-encompassing fact, something which once begun is cumulative and uncontrollable, a fact which swallows meaning altogether. It is a continuous return to the black square, the hardly differentiated field of sound and to spectral colour. Always on the other side of negation is emptiness. That is a message which modernism never tires of repeating. According to Clark, negativity is a fact of modern art. Following the spirit of critical theory, Clark stated that negation is an attempt to capture the lack of consistent and repeatable meanings in the culture and to make the lack over into form.⁷ In other words, negativity is to grasp the fragmentization of reality, to accept that in the surrounding world nothing harmonious and coherent exists anymore. Clark did not analyze the extremes of negativity, but theoretically he is in line with Adorno, who thought that a structure of art parallels the

organizational structure of society. For example the holes and ruptures in art reflect a lack of coherent meanings. Art thus reflects reality, but in its own terms. Hence, with similar intentions, contemporary art does not concentrate on medium or technique; it does not show dehumanizing tendencies as clearly as in Modernism. Contemporary art often originates from a situation and contents; this is where the difference lies.

Negative tendencies can also be described as an endless movement between the original and the banal in modernism. Once the style and features of an 'ism' have acquired plenty of imitators it has become a cliché, banal. It has been said that it is typical of modernism always to start from the beginning, and the modernist project is a life-long work. While modernism seeks to produce something new all the time, it has to demolish too familiar structures now and then and return to chaos, that is, to create something the most original. "To die and to be reborn with the memory of one's former existence is called fainting; to awaken with other organs which must first be reeducated is called birth."⁸ Thus has modernism's goal often been (naively) a return to zero, an absolute *tabula rasa*, and so to the rebirth of creativity, the creation of new organs. The old story about the Phoenix emerging from the ashes could be the trade mark of modernism. In other words, the tendency of modernism may be negative in praxis but positive in its intentions. Thus the movement between the original and the banal has lost its meaning in contemporary art, since original "avant-gardist" and innovative novelties are also produced outside the art institutions (advertising, fashion, design). However, it may be meaningful to take notice of a negative intention of Modernism, since I argue that given that the roots of contemporary art are in modern art, it is important to understand the soil, ie, where the tradition lies.

In creating a theory of Modernism, favouring the theory of negativity helps in understanding the fragmentariness and heterogeneity of Modernism. It is difficult to put different artists and their output under the same theory if negation is not taken as the mode of interpretation. Many theoreticians who have denied the idea of negation in modern art have vigorously attempted to create theories based on evaluation. For example, Michael Fried wrote about the duty of a critic to depend on an intuition of "rightness" which is formed on the basis of all the formalistic parts of the work.⁹ In fact, Fried criticized theorists of negation for talking about essence, which they generalize to all art to which it is possible to return according to a reductionist viewpoint. Fried stated that this kind of general essence does not exist, instead, he emphasized the given moments in the history of art as a referent for the artist's activities. Thus Fried represented a kind of theory of art as a practice. On the contrary, many theorists who favour negation have stressed on art's relation to society and a state of culture. They have characterized Modernism as negative but put stress on the negativity as a (instrumental) method, not as nihilism; ultimately it is looking towards a future.

Is Love Necessarily Round?

Those who have argued for the autonomy of art in the late 19th century included such aestheticians as Charles Baudelaire, Charles Swinburne, Walter Pater, James Whistler, Oscar Wilde, and Arthur Symons. The poet and critic Swinburne concentrated in his critique on formal aspects of the work and spoke up for psychological meanings. He also defended the freedom of art against canons and conventions, that is, against certain academic motives and rules. He emphasized that what is important is *how* something is done. He also attacked the Victorian moralists by remarking that it is impossible for any valuable and serious art to be under the cover of any kind of puritanism.¹⁰

Pater had an enormous influence on the aestheticians of the subsequent generation. He wrote and talked about 'modern ideas', exotic beauty and an artist as a magician or priest. In his most well-known text, *The Renaissance* (1873), he argued for the autonomy of individual art modes, and in this sense he differed from both the German idealists, and his teacher Ruskin, who created hierarchies of art raising poetry far above music and painting. Pater was especially critical of dealing with and criticizing painting in the terms of literature. He wrote that

true pictorial quality which lies between the inventive or creative handling of pure line and colour . . . is quite independent of anything definitely poetical in the subject of accompanies. . . . Each art, therefore, having its own peculiar and incommunicable sensuous charm, has its own special mode of reaching the imagination, its own special responsibilities to its material.¹¹

He also noted that the motives of poetry or painting are nothing without form, and this mode of handling, form, should become an end in itself.¹² Most important is not what follows from experience, its fruits, but an experience itself. Pater also introduced a typical modernist idea that a continuous effort should be made on the part of the audience to learn to understand art.¹³

According to Wilde, art should function as an inspiration for life. At first this idea sounds like a kind of slogan for social public art. In fact, it was just an opposite. He meant that life should be as artificial as possible. He himself made an artwork out of his own life. His kind of dandy - an intentionally pretentious fop - took a position against the utilitarian values and ideals of the bourgeoisie.

Finding no meaning without, he strives to find it within himself and tries to live his life as if it were a work of art, or, more exactly, he tries to transform life into a construction which owes its meaning only to the freedom of the artist.¹⁴

In Wilde's famous dialogue *The Decay of Lying* (1889) he lets his fictitious characters utter the idea that

Art never expresses anything but itself. It has an independent life, just as Thought has, and develops purely on its own lines. . . . The only history it preserves for us is the history of its own progress.¹⁵

Form was an end in itself also for Wilde, as well as the independence of the different art modes from each other. It was he who produced the famous utterance "Life imitates art". Wilde considered the relation between art and nature, and concluded that nature is appropriate as raw material. "Things are because we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts that have influenced us".¹⁶ He thought that all bad art comes from returning to nature and life, and elevating them into ideals. Thus they must be translated into artistic conventions.

Whistler remarked in his famous *The Ten O'Clock Lecture*, in London February 1885, that forms and colours in Nature are the same as notes on the keyboard of a piano. An artist picks and chooses and groups these elements, but "[t]o say to the painter, that Nature is to be taken as she is, is to say to the player that he may sit on the piano".¹⁷ It was obvious that with his remark Whistler was above all attacking Ruskin. Whistler also emphasized that the real artist is not interested in moral or social issues, but solely the aesthetic perfection of his art. Whistler was very offended by some of the remarks critics made about his paintings, and thus he took them as a special target. He accused them, from among of whom most were usually writers themselves, opening a gap between an audience and painting, since those literature-centered critics tend to consider the work absolutely from a literary point of view. This meant that they interpreted pictures more or less as symbols, hieroglyphs and tales - as novels or historical stories.¹⁸

In the latter part of the 19th century the argument between literature compared to painting was merely on the level of motives and contents. Half a century later in a sense similar arguments dressed themselves in another kind of mantle: Roland Barthes tried to bring linguistics into the analysis of pictures via semiotics (structuralism). However, I shall not deal with that vast problematic here; one reason for this is Altti Kuusamo's dissertation *Tyylistä tapaan* (1996), which deal with just this problematic of style, semiotics and iconography.

In fact, Whistler considered it impossible for an audience and critics to produce any relevant evaluations about art, as they do not understand the prolonged processes and complicated skills that are needed in making art. Thus he said that people have the "habit of looking, as who should say, not *at* a picture, but *through* it. . ."¹⁹ In those days an art education (or, an aesthetic education) was in its cradle being rocked only by Schiller's few followers. But think about opinions of many later aestheticians (Suzanne K. Langer, for example) who had written that an artwork, painting, or other work, is transparent in the sense that it radiates through something, that is, it has another reality, a co-reality that becomes present in a concrete, material shape.

The thought that an individual, a genius, creates something bigger than life, something universal, prevailed in Modernism. Jim Collins writes that what the postmodern theorist Fredric Jameson considers high modernism bears a striking resemblance to high romanticism as it has been transformed in the 20th century. The obsession with the absolute uniqueness of

self and style is carried to the point where a quasi-private language becomes the ideal mode of expression.²⁰ Roy Lichtenstein referred to this feature of high modernism with his series of "brush stroke paintings", for example, *Big Painting* (1965). He painted enormous brush strokes in his comic strip style so that the brush strokes with the thick black outlines were totally impersonal. These paintings questioned the line between popular culture, condemned as anonymous, and art that emphasized personal expression. One icon of high art was questioned. But it was questioned in a way that strengthened the notion of (Lichtenstein's) individual style. It is not a surprise that some highbrows interpreted Lichtenstein's paintings as anti-art, as being "copies" offending the idea of originality. Literature and music have shown similar practices: chance, seriality, the ready-made and impersonality have been explorations into the relation between intentional uniqueness and a certain (intentional) indifference.

The emphasis on self and style in high modernism, which resembles the myth of genius in high romanticism, has led to, according to Collins, to coding as a concept either being ignored (the notion that "personal genius" transcends commonplace communication), or defined negatively (codes exist only to be broken by "personal genius").²¹ Precisely because of the difficulties in coding, high modernism has been accused of hermeticism, inwardness and unwillingness to communicate. Alternatively, it is possible to argue that it is a misconception: there are no meanings to search for, no expression of one's inner world in the same way as for example in Expressionism, nor social and political manifestations aiming to change the world.

Autonomy also means that works of art are not tied to a certain place or time, but attempt to be entirely independent of geographical restrictions or the past: they want to be ahistorical. Conversely to modernist art, contemporary art is often local, historical etc., even when what is public is not necessarily defined by a place, that is, by *where* it is, but by what it *does*. In Peggy Diggs's *Domestic Violence Milkcarton Project* (1992) an image against the abuse of women and domestic violence was printed on milk cartons. Phillips stated that by conforming to the circumstances of product advertisement and distribution, activist art accepts - and subverts - an institutionalized system as a vehicle for social change. The poignancy of Diggs's strategies of distribution in the project is that an immense process of delivery concluded with an intimate encounter with the product since the milk cartons ultimately reach home. According to Phillips, consumers do not expect to encounter provocative information on the sides of food containers. This is the unexpectedness that has already been discussed earlier. The final paradox of the project is that it did not become an activist, public project until it had invaded the sanctuary of the home.²²

In the past sculptures, for example, followed monumental logic: they were made for a specific place and they told something about the meaning and function of that place. But Rosalind Krauss remarked that this logic of the monument changed along with Rodin. Rodin's *Gates of Hell* and *Balzac* (1897) were commissioned works that were not, however, carried out for intended locations. They remained siteless and homeless. In fact, in modernism the monument became an abstraction: functionally placeless and merely referring only to itself.²³ Picasso's *Guernica* (1937) is also an

example of this kind of work. His starting point was the bombing of small Basque village in the Civil War in Spain. But the meaning of the finished work goes far beyond this historical fact.

The process of creation has been seen as individual and thus ahistorical and even ageographical. In 1915 an article in *New York Tribune* dealt with the escape of French artists from the First World War to the United States. Many of them stressed that in America they hope to find freedom to create and a foundation for individualism. For example Albert Gleizes pointed out that art is not a thing of geography, but of persons. The individual is of the highest importance.²⁴ In the same article Picabia confirmed Gleizes' opinion: "So far as painting goes - it is a matter of indifference to me where I am. Art is purely subjective, and the artist should be able to work in one place quite as well as another".²⁵ Like Gleizes and Picabia many artists emphasized individualism in their public statements, without, however, specifying what they meant by it. In an interview about his work *Mechanical Forces of Love*, Jean Crotti was asked whether love is necessarily round. "Oh no," Crotti answered. "It is round because I wish it. Another artist might see it in squares."²⁶ The idea inherited from Romanticism of a genius who is possessed by a compulsory need to create exists in modernism as well. Through this genius something transcendental is conveyed to ordinary people. In this sense the artist's creation is comparable to the organic recreation of nature. This mystification of the artist places him (the genius could not ever been she) in a special position in relation to others.

Trying to reach the universal and being personal are contradictory but not mutually exclusive in modernist art practice. I should explain what I mean by individual or personal compared to subjective, although it is not exactly the same thing. Individuality and personality (in brushstrokes or in original ideas) have always been the foundation of modernism. An artist expresses things that could be individual or personal but then grow into universal meanings, since they grow from the common consciousness or something close to that. Subjectivity, though, means that an artist deals with tiny little local issues from her own life or surroundings - the particulars of appearance - even though it is difficult or impossible for others to understand all meanings that the work has for her.

As a background to this problem I introduce the modernist notion displayed along the lines of Kierkegaard's thoughts by Karsten Harries.²⁷ According to Harries, Kierkegaard describes a romantic nihilist who no longer tries to reach for the unveiling of the infinite, but finds himself alone and bored in a world which is indifferent to his demand for meaning. Despairing of discovering meaning, he attempts to invent it, and thus to escape from the absurdity of his situation. It may be possible to escape from the absurd by escaping from the polarity which opposes the (questioning) subject to (a mute) world, ie, reality. Harries refers to Camus and describes three escape routes: (1) One can affirm the subject and deny the world. This is an attempt to escape polarity by retreating into subjectivity. (2) One can deny the polarity in its entirety. The finite is negated to make a return to a more immediate mode of being possible. (3) One can deny the subject and accept the world as it offers itself. Here, to my mind, is an important

difference between, on the one hand, the romantic and the modern, and on the other, contemporary art. Kierkegaard's aesthete chooses the first route: he attempts to become self-sufficient by replacing the world with make-believe worlds of his own construction. This resembles the attitudes of both the flâneur of the last century and one who aestheticizes her life in postmodern culture. Thus the world should provide no more than a reservoir of material out of which the aesthete takes whatever she needs to fashion the imaginary life she has chosen for herself. To gain the distance necessary to treat the world as a mere source of material for aesthetic play, the aesthete uses irony. This notion conforms well to the postmodern theories about the aestheticization of life and also about certain modes of artistic expression. However, I suggest that much contemporary art, at least its performative modes, chooses of these alternatives either the second or third, or both. Subjectivity merges into them so that the world is not denied, but subjectivity functions in the immediate mode of being-in-the-world, the latter accepted as it is, taking it as a starting point for changing it; but in this case the content and meaning come first, and only then the world as a source of material. Thus I stress that subjectivity has changed from a subject reaching desperately for the universal to a subject that tries to make this world a better place to live in. By making these distinctions it is also easier to see why modernism produced so many coherent and carefully structured art works, while in contemporary art works are different, partly due to the open historicism which presumes that one does not choose the first alternative, as Mondrian, for example, did.

Mondrian described his aiming at pure, universal art as ignoring the particulars of appearance, that is to say, natural form and colour. On the contrary, it should find its expression in the abstraction of form and colour, that is to say, in the straight line and the clearly defined primary colour.

. . . The balanced relation is the purest representation of universality, of the harmony and unity which are inherent characteristics of the mind.

. . . We find that in nature all relations are dominated by a single primordial relation, which is defined by the opposition of two extremes. Abstract plasticism represents this primordial relation in a precise manner by means of the two positions which form the right angle. This positional relation is the most balanced of all, since it expresses in a perfect harmony the relation between two extremes, and contains all other relations.²⁸

I brought the rectangles together. The pictorial space become white, black, or grey; the form become red, blue, or yellow. . . . It was clear that rectangles, like any individual forms, influence one another, and must be neutralised by the composition. After all, rectangles are never an end in themselves but a logical consequence of the lines that definite them; they are produced spontaneously by the intersection of horizontal and vertical lines. To divest the compartments of their character as rectangles, I later reduced my colours and stressed the intersecting lines that served as their boundaries.²⁹

In the text cited above Mondrian presented an objective method for pure art, but making these rules was left totally to his subjective discretion. Hans Sedlmayr argued that the principle behind these rules is inadequate: why for example is the combination of primary colours not approved of, if gray as the combination of black and white is approved?³⁰ Mondrian's objectivity is

more apparent than it seemed to be at first. He stated also himself that in terms of composition the new plasticism is dualistic: "Through the exact reconstruction of cosmic relations it is a direct expression of the universal; by its rhythm, by material reality of its plastic form, it expresses the artist's individual personality."³¹

Lies are Sins no more: Postmodernism and Art

I have been referring to postmodernist ideas as forming our present understanding of culture. Until the 1960s, Modernism have established position in the art world (or, should we say, the art world had matured); it had become a canonized and academic high modernism. When we talk about academicized or high modernism it should be remembered that it is also a matter of certain modernist image created in the 1950s America. The image was of nonpolitical, pure, individualist but universal art. The term 'high modernism' has been defined chiefly by theorists of postmodernism. Charles Jencks writes about late modernism. He states that it takes many of the stylistic ideas and values of modernism to an extreme in order to resuscitate a dull or clichéd language.³² In high modernism the personality/universal duality continued to flourish. Different avant-garde modes also had an established status in the 1960s. The experiments which had been marginalized before were now academicized, which led to the banalization of modernism. Many theorists have claimed this to be the point of transition to postmodernism.

In fact, many modes of the autonomy of art originated in the Renaissance, culminating in Kant's aesthetics and Romanticism. Modernism itself liquidated autonomies more than theorists have been willing to admit. Dichotomies broke up so, that such postmodern theorists as Vattimo, Lyotard, Lash, Baudrillard and Jameson needed only to ascertain these points. However, I shall concentrate on Jencks, Owens and Jameson, since, to my mind their definitions and remarks are the most relevant to art.

Lists of comparisons between modernist and postmodernist signification have been drawn up.³³ Usually they form oppositional pairs, which is a rather modernist strategy. However, some comparisons are useful when trying to determine the changes that took place in art during the last decades. The postmodernist break happened along with the increasing devaluation of formalisms, leading instead to more juxtaposing of the signifiers of daily life. The doings of cultural texts became more and more important than their meanings, and there were tendencies to operate through the spectator's immersion in the cultural object.

What is the position of art in all this? If we think about terminology, it is rather talk about cultural texts than art. In fact, art has in some way shrunk into just one fragment of aesthetic culture. Or, should we say that art as a commodity has become more visible in culture at large? There is no longer any talk about integrating art and life, so that life would imitate art. If we put aside the commodified mainstream of gallery art and music in

concert halls and opera houses, we could say that art has begun to imitate life. But life has become fiction. As David Avalos has remarked: "The politicians are acting like performance artists, while we're trying to be political."³⁴

It seems that the critique of institutions (museums, for example) and an antipathetic attitude towards art institutions were at their strongest in the 1960s and 1970s. There are no longer such sharp contradictions in art, crossing the boundaries as an end in itself has declined - or the borders changed, for example, moved inside the subject. An example of this is the ARS95 exhibition in Helsinki, the theme of which was public/private.

Although Jameson has a marxist background, which is seen in his way of calling for "real things", I think his way of describing the shift away from the metaphysical in postmodernism is rather telling. In his article *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (1984) Jameson lists four "depth models" used also in the interpretation of art. The first is the dialectical one of essence and appearance. The second is the Freudian model of latent and manifest. The third is the existential model of authenticity and inauthenticity, closely related to the opposition between alienation and disalienation. And the fourth is the semiotic opposition between signifier and signified. According to Jameson, in postmodernism everyone of these models have been replaced by a conception of depthlessness, close to Baudrillardian thought that there is nothing behind images, only intertextuality and play with forms and discourses.³⁵ Also the emphasis of self and style has, in a way, become a superficial concept.

Jameson is especially worried about the waning of affect. By waning of affect Jameson means that expression of certain pathos, metaphysical pain and real feeling have changed. Emotion is projected out and externalized, as gesture, or signs, as the outward dramatization of inward feeling. Images are more decoration, surface, which means more concentration to practices, discourses and textual play than before.³⁶ Postmodern art is not transparent "reality", but its intention is to demonstrate that our cultures are so thoroughly discourse-based that we cannot to encounter "real life" unless we investigate the ways discourses shape our experience.³⁷ Texts form a domain of discourses, which is only a model, not co-terminous with any actual field of discourses. This model field is a constructed arena within which any text battles with other texts according to its own ground rules. A given text labours to create a fictional universe and also an accompanying fictional arena which surrounds it.³⁸ It functions as a spectacle. Intertextuality and meta-levels are ways in which to play in the world of discourses. They are rather different ways if we compare them to the modernists' attempts to grasp something essential about reality directly, as the cubists, Kandinsky and others tried to do.

There are various theories about postmodern art and its nature; the most moderate of these is by Jencks. He describes some of the characteristic aspects of postmodernist art.³⁹ The first is the tendency to disharmonious harmony, that is a tendency to create syncopated proportions, fragmented purity, unfinished wholes, and dissonant unity, that is, a combination of components, not a synthesis. Elements are forced to confront each other on their own terms. Secondly there is pluralism, both cultural and political,

which often favours a collage of motifs and materials, and also means variegated content and style. The elements do not necessarily have any symbolic significance. Third character is urban contextualism, which means that new buildings are not only integrated with the old ones in their immediate environment but extend it as well. The next tendency is antropomorphism. The use of parody, nostalgia and pastiche is also characteristic of postmodern art, also as an aspect of double-coding which, according to Jencks, means the combination of new techniques and old patterns in order to communicate with the public and specialists. Double-coding also means a permanent tension; hybrid, mixed, and ambiguous, a strategy of affirming and denying the existing power structures at the same time. Tradition is thus reinterpreted in a way that means the creative transformation of conventions. The last aspect of this list is an absent center. For him post-modernism means both the continuation of modernism and its transcendence. His theory suits architecture best, less the other arts, although certain aspects of Jencks's ideas are similar to those of other theorists.

Another list of qualities characterizing the practice of postmodern art is by Craig Owens, who in his series of essays *The Allegorical Impulse* (1980) proposes six strategies: appropriation, site specificity, impermanence, accumulation, discursivity and hybridization.⁴⁰

Appropriation is used by artists who generate images through the reproduction of other images. Such artists are, for example, Sherrie Levine and Robert Longo. They subject reproductions to manipulations in order to challenge the uniqueness of the art image and its specific 'aura'.

Site specificity means that the work is located within a defined context, and there is a tendency to engage in a reading of the site, not only its topography but its psychological resonances as well. Work and site stand in a dialectical relationship. For example, Robert Smithson's *Spiral Jetty* (1970), and many of Krzysztof Wodiczko's slide-projections during the 1980s.

Impermanence usually concerns site-specific works that are installed in particular locations for a limited duration, as the above-mentioned slide-projections. Their material is often ephemeral, as in other works where, for example, body liquids play a role, or in the (auto)destructive art of Gustav Metzger.

Accumulation means drawing out the creative process using a repetitive logic, or through the production of works in series. The result is static, ritualistic and repetitive, as in works of Carl Andre, Sol LeWitt, Hanne Derboven, Eva Hesse and others. (Jencks calls these late-modernist works.)

Discursivity is the mixture of the visual and the verbal in the same piece, since allegory, which Owens describes as an important impulse in postmodernism, is writing composed of concrete images. The works of Lawrence Weiner are this kind. This also means a disregard for aesthetic categories, the mixing of aesthetic mediums and stylistic categories, and crossing of aesthetic boundaries. To my mind, all this was put together in Joseph Kosuth's *Passagen-Werk (Documenta Flânerie)* in Kassel, Documenta IX, 1992. This *hybridization* is the combination of materials, genres, and period references to produce eclectic constructions, both in content and form. Owens also states that it embodies the deconstructive

impulse characteristic of postmodernist art in general, and it must therefore be distinguished from the self-critical tendency of modernism.⁴¹

Hal Foster presents a more radical theory in the sense that, on the basis of critical theory, it gives space to a political and activist art dividing postmodern art, on the one hand, into a more conservative and reactionary element, which lives and flourishes inside the art world and its (economic) systems, and on the other, into a more critical and historical art that reaches outside the art world in some way.⁴² This "conservative" mode can be also defined as Marco Livingstone does, as the works of artists who seek to counter modernism's linear progression and quest for new forms with an eclectic and synthetic approach to the entire history of styles.⁴³ This narrower definition of postmodern art is worrisome since it excludes much. It emphasises that tendency of the formalist avant-garde in modernism that is carefully nurtured by some art educators, or such conservative critics as Kramer. But it excludes the tradition of the radical avant-garde in modernism, and is apparently almost ignorant of such phenomena as the impact of the feminist movement in art since the 1970s.

Owens writes about site specificity, and Lucy Lippard observes that such terms as "territory", "land", "earth", "terrain", and "mapping" are ubiquitous in both theory and practice. In postmodern art, and since, geography has become an important aspect. Lippard states that on the one hand mapping can be seen as abetting surveys, fences, boundaries and zoning, on the other hand maps tell us where we are and show us where we are going.⁴⁴ In postmodern culture maps are not only a vehicle of power, not only abstract representations of space, as the SI stated. Maps are understood also more "psychogeographically" as personal aids to orientation, or even for other purposes. Cities have become objects of exploration, investigation and interpretation. In fact, Jameson writes about cognitive maps which will help us to orientate, "to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle"⁴⁵. Jameson connects the original term by Kevin Lynch to the Althusserian notion of ideology as the representation of the subject's imaginary relationship to her real conditions of existence.

Other environments are often put up as the opposite of urban environments. Ecological aspects are stressed, whereas urbanism stresses the quality of life according to other premises and in other ways. Since the end of the 1960s these have become more and more important in art, which is of course connected to general social and cultural development.

The Roots in the Radical Avant-Garde

The avant-garde has battled on two fronts: on the one hand, against academism and high culture, on the other, against mass culture and everydayness. Thus the avant-garde has been a double agent. Peter Bürger wrote in an essay that what these days goes by the name of post-modernism could more accurately be termed 'post-avant-garde', for this is an ep-

och marked by the failure of the historical avant-garde's attack on the artistic institution.⁴⁶ If the representatives of the historical avant-garde thought that art as an institution determines the (political) influence of an individual work of art, the disappointment arises from the inability to change the status and nature of the institution along their lines of thought. These are failures and disappointments only from the viewpoint of critical theory, however. Bürger's starting point was that the institution prevents socially radical art and works aiming at change to act as such in practice. This starting point implies, however, a strong element of elitism, and a notion about the opposedness of the art world and everyday practices of politics, for instance. This has become old fashioned after the blurring of the lines between different arts, between art and popular culture and between art and media. Not even the institution of art is homogeneous, although that apprehension long has been maintained for example in art administration and art policy.

Once the modernist avant-garde had taught us that 'anything goes', the avant-garde as a brave and daring vanguard lost its traditional meaning. New techniques, above all data applications, have blended the realms of art and technology in the way that was undreamt of for the avant-gardists of the beginning of the century (for example the futurists with their cyborg-utopies). Contemporary art operates merely in the field of the media, which is also the aesthetics of the mundane. This makes it difficult to separate off avant-garde art, which has taken the integration of the art and life worlds as an end in itself. This has happened, the spectacle has been completed. I argue that these movements taught us that the line between art and life is not necessarily so important and serious. It may be interesting to play with it, or not. As artists became more relaxed, possibilities for the emergence of new kind of "lifelike" art which need not bother so much about the form/content dichotomy were also opened up.

Avant-garde phenomena have been an essential part of modernism; therefore the concept is not independent of the history of modern art. The first to use the term avant-garde was Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), French utopian socialist and ancestor of modern communism. At first Saint-Simon, an engineer, had the most newtonian concept of the world, and in his early writings he tried to limit the role of the artist to popularizing ideas introduced by scientists. Later he drew away from his mechanistic worldview and started to develop the radical religious doctrine he called *Nouveau Christianisme*. In his last two books, published in the year he died⁴⁷, Saint-Simon tried to give artists the leading role in the forthcoming good society. He stated that artists have to be missionaries of a kind devoting their lives ultimately to social problem; in other words, an artist's work should be based on functionality and utilitarianism; they should make works of art didactic and easily understood. As a former soldier Saint-Simon used the term avant-garde in its militaristic meaning: as a risk-taking vanguard which had a relevant armature: the possibilities of poetry, music, painting and sculpture to disseminate new ideas among people.

There was a dual figurative sense in Saint-Simon's thoughts about the avant-garde, and the two trends became separated from each other over the next hundred years. Thoughts about artists as missionaries of new

ideas were formulated into a concept of art as religion. This was already done by an early follower of Saint-Simon, Émile Barrault, who declared in the 1830s that the fine arts are the religion, and the artist is the priest. This thought was repeated in many ways in aestheticism in the end of the last century. Conversely, the Marxians applied Saint-Simon's ideas solely to politics. Although they did not use the word "avant-garde" Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist Manifesto that communists must give priority to the common interests of the proletariat. On the other hand, the communists are the most advanced and determined of all the proletarian parties. Later, when Lenin wrote that the party constitutes the vanguard of revolutionary forces, he used the Russian word *avangard*.⁴⁸ Thus the concept of avant-garde became on the one hand a purely artistic and, on the other a political term. When writing about the artistic avant-garde I shall use the term 'aesthetic avant-garde'. The same idea about missionary work was in the background of both the aesthetic and political avant-gardes.

Those radicals who separated art and politics at the end of the last century were usually politically anarchists, followers of Proudhon or Bakunin. As I have stated, they did not, however, mix their political opinions up with their art. Those who thought that the communist party was the vanguard of progress ended up with the dilemma that they approved of political avant-garde but not an aesthetic one. The Socialist Realism that became a doctrine in the Soviet Union and China in the 1930s was regarded by most western communists as reactionary both in its forms and techniques, and also academic in its spirit.

The radical avant-garde, or the historical avant-garde, as it is usually called after the theories of Bürger, tried in its own way to bring the spirit of both the political and aesthetic avant-gardes together. The concept of the historical avant-garde is problematic, however, since it connects avant-garde phenomena to certain movements and an era, ie, to the specific avant-garde movements before World War II: Futurism, Dada and Surrealism. However, the avant-garde strategies developed around the beginning of this century have also been repeated and reformed since. Therefore I suggest a better term would be the *radical avant-garde*, despite the fact that the historical avant-garde has already established itself in art theory. By the radical avant-garde I refer to a broader range of strategies and modes of thought than particular modernist 'isms'.

The term avant-garde has been used confusedly and vaguely in different contexts. This can also be seen in dictionaries. I choose a few definitions at random. In *Taidesanakirja* (Finnish Dictionary of Art, 1967) an avant-garde is considered to be the courageous and daring vanguard that moves in advance of progress, especially in the means of expression used and in creating innovations in form. In this case it is possible to talk about formalistic aims of an avant-garde. *The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (ed. A.S. Hornby, 1974) defines an avant-garde as "radical leader(s) of any movement (in art, drama, literature etc.)". *The Concise English Dictionary* (1984) explains avant-garde: "As a forerunner in music, art, etc.; in advance of contemporary artistic taste or trend". *Webster's New Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1996) says that an avant-garde is "people (as artists) who create or use new or experimental ideas". Despite certain simi-

larities in these definitions, the fact remains that the most recent one (from 1996) put 'artists' in brackets. Anybody can be an avant-gardiste, whether developing something new or experimental ideas for elitist (aesthetic) or commercial purpose. This was also evident in 1984 when such terms were used as 'taste' or 'trend' which did not belong to the established artistic vocabulary. In addition it is not a question of creating ideas only, but also of using new and experimental ideas (perhaps originally created by somebody else). Thus the term has become so wide, it has actually melted into the air.

The terms Avant-garde and Modernism has even been used interchangeably, but in Europe theorists have usually separated Modernism and Avant-garde, even different avant-garde modes and expressions. In America, however, the term is used in a broader meaning. Greenberg, for example, used the term avant-garde when writing about aiming at pure and sensuous art. The American avant-garde after World War II corresponds to the dictionary definition. Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock have thus claimed that there has been only one avant-garde in this century: in the America of the 1930-40s when Abstract Expressionism was born. In other words, the kind of the avant-garde that corresponds to the Parisian avant-garde of the 1850-1870s.⁴⁹ The American Andreas Huyssen has used the term 'classical avant-garde' referring to more formalistic avant-garde aims.⁵⁰ These are only few examples of the different ways of perceiving and using the term. It varies also in different art forms. In film, for example, an avant-garde has not been perceived as the focus of the development of a tradition but as distinct from commercial cinema. In other words, an avant-garde film has almost always been held as distinct from the history of film; it has rather been seen in the terms used in the art world (painting, music, poetry, even architecture), and less as an entertainment industry. John Hanhardt has defined the avant-garde film as the expression of an artist devoted to such aesthetically advanced movements as Surrealism, Cubism, Abstract Expressionism, or Minimalism. Such film transforms cinematic conventions by examining the medium and its qualities and materials. In this process cinema creates its own history, one that deviates from the history of classical narrative cinema.⁵¹

Thus there is emphasis on different avant-garde aims, which explains the numerous practices in using the term. The aesthetic avant-garde, or the general aims of avant-garde, can be divided into formalist and radical avant-gardes. In making this division I use the form/content dichotomy as an instrument, although I want to stress that these are not wholly separate or mutually exclusive phenomena and practices, but, as I have stated, it is a matter of emphasis.

In avant-garde phenomena there always arises to a certain degree the question about the development and reformation of form, material and medium. These developments influence a receiver, and with them it is possible to direct the activity of receivers.

The formalist avant-garde pays more attention to art-centered problematics, for example, to how it is possible for art to aim at truth or represent universal ideas by developing forms. The formalist avant-garde used not to question the autonomy of art but even considers it necessary to

separate art and life. This does not mean that art cannot have a social function and importance. Adorno, for example, emphasized aesthetic autonomy but saw also correspondences between the structures of art and of society. There are no specific movements belonging to the formalist avant-garde but avantgardiste aims are relative and thus connected to the historical phase of the development of art in a given time. Impressionism, Cubism, Abstract Expressionism and many other styles and movements started out as avant-garde in the beginning but later lost their avant-garde nature.

The term radical avantgarde is more comparable to the term formalist avant-garde than Bürger's historical avant-garde because, detached from specific movements, it can be estimated as a set of specific intentions and strategies. The radical avant-garde has questioned and even rejected the ideological and institutional frames for making and receiving art. The emphasis of the radical avant-garde has been on reforming these frames. Nevertheless, the general aims of aesthetic avant-garde can also be seen in radical avant-garde phenomena: forms and means of expression were also developed. All the same, the radical avant-garde has not concentrated on this only but it has also tried to accommodate art to society and culture in broader sense.

Although using the term radical avant-garde, I describe it merely in accordance with Bürger's definition of the historical avant-garde in his *Theorie der Avantgarde* (1974). The roots of Bürger's theory are in Adorno's thinking, although he is also critical of Adorno now and then. Adorno wrote that the social function of art is in its functionlessness, that art does not engage politically but stays separate and independent. Adorno stated that *l'art pour l'art* was perfectly acceptable to the bourgeoisie because it served as a means to neutralize art. He also remarked that ideological essence of *l'art pour l'art* lies not in the emphatic antithesis it posits between art and empirical life, but in the abstract and facile character of this antithesis.⁵² In other words, when art starts to repeat the forms it has created, when formalistic problems become more abstract and when forms are established and approved by society - then art is vulnerable to neutralizing.

In the 1980s there was a brief revival of geometrical art, called Neo-geo. Artists painted works which resembled constructivist pictures but were short of that universalist dimension typical of works of the 1920s and the 1930s, even of Minimalism. In Neo-geo the most important features were refinements of form and colour. In a sense Neo-geo was the ultimate perfection of the perversion of form, which is a term invented by Witkiewicz already in the 1920s: as works of art these paintings did not bring out any aesthetic or social problems - they were simple repetitions of form which sold in the art markets of the late 1980s. It is impossible by pure perception to see the "lack of depth", but in the context of the Neo-geo, that it is a question of the repetition of form, shows in these paintings as gestures only. At the same time art usually changes into a commodity to some extent, and loses its supposed political power. Therefore Adorno thought that there is radical potential only in an art that continuously renews its modes and through this activates an audience.

The opposition between art and life does not mean that there are no common interests, but art cannot be integrated to life. Bürger wrote, howev-

er, that the lack of tangible effects is not the same as functionlessness, but characterizes a specific function of art in bourgeois society: the neutralization of critique.⁵³ Art has become a realm where everything is allowed as long as it remains art and is separable from everyday life as a sort of producer of substitute experiences. There is also a tendency in society to water down any social critique by naming it as art and thus transforming the critique to an area outside of social and political praxis. In other words, the roots of the autonomy of art are in that the isolation of an art work from the practices of everyday life has turned into the idea that a work of art is wholly independent of society. However, as Bürger wrote: "The apartness from the praxis of life that had always constituted the institutional status of art in bourgeois society now becomes the content of works".⁵⁴ His arguments were supported by assertions of many artists, for example, Malevich's, Mondrian's, Gertrude Stein's and also Greenberg's statements that art as such does not represent anything but itself.

From the perspective of the radical avant-garde, art that produces works valuable only by the (aesthetic) criteria of its own hermetic system has become a fetish that has nothing to say anymore. The philosophical concept of art has been replaced by individual works of art that are only objects of selling, buying and art historical research. This was the reason the dadaists declared that they want to kill art (including visual arts, literature, music, etc.), which actually meant the killing of empty seremonies, of the institutionalized "normal art" of its time. Of course, there was no institutionalization in the same sense as we understand it now after Dickie's theory, but the dadaists were conscious of the behaviour of an audience, attitudes of critics etc. The aim was to clean up the whole playing ground of the arts to get to the roots of "pure creativity". It was a matter of a utopia.

Both the formalist and the radical avant-garde movements can be seen as self-criticism or consciousness inside the modernist art world. During the present century critical modes in the avant-garde have varied, but within the avant-garde the purest negative practices have occurred in modernism. At the beginning of this century the radical avant-garde movements that tried to produce anti-art were tireless in asking *What is the use of art?* and *What has art to do with people's lives?* These same questions have been repeated also in activist art of the 1980s, and in social, ie, new genre public art of the 1990s.

The radical avant-garde tried to prevent the ritualization of art and opposed the role of art as a neutralizer of criticism. Other modernists have also been critical, but mostly inside the realm of art: the impressionists criticized the previous academic art styles, apologizing their own views, Cézanne and later the cubists wanted to get rid of the "superficiality" of impressionism, the symbolists criticized the others, thinking of their own views as the most advanced, and Duchamp criticized almost all of them by stating that he was against all plainly retinal art⁵⁵ etc. This kind of severe critique preserved an impression of newness and freshness in modernism without grasping the nettle of the ideological basis of art, or the problem of its social existence. Aesthetic modernism and *l'art pour l'art* were avant-garde in their time, but already at the beginning of this century the radical

avant-garde attacked the principles of modernism, and the formalist avant-garde continuously renewed its forms.⁵⁶

"Les enfants perdus"

Avant-garde had two kinds of end. Some movements claimed the suppression of art, the Situationist International and Fluxus were the vanguard of these claims, other movements got rather close to realizing the ideals of modern art. Many tendencies in minimalist art, for instance, were on the border of art and non-art. Mondrian has written already in 1937 as follows:

What is certain is that no escape is possible for the nonfigurative artist; he *must stay within his field and march towards the consequence of his art.* This consequence brings us, in a future perhaps remote, towards the end of *art as a thing separated from our surrounding environment, which is the actual plastic reality.*⁵⁷

He predicted that after this the direction changes and different areas of art will come together, which has actually happened in contemporary art. But Mondrian's statement implies also that the logical end of nonfigurative art, its utopia, produces finally art objects which cannot be differentiated from other objects. The paradox is, that trying to be wholly autonomous and self-grounded art actually ceases to exist. Danto has stated that non-imitativeness is also a criterion of reality, thus, the more pure art artefacts become the closer they are to reality, and pure art collapses into pure reality.⁵⁸

Most theories of art start from artefact. For example, lack of objecthood in *dérive* or construction of situations prevents from defining situationist practices as non-art in case it is understood as an artefact which functions or has ceased to function as art and has come off from the artworld. Hence non-art has been understood to be something which says nothing, which is not a sign in an atmosphere of interpretation despite that it has at least negative relation to the artworld. According to this modernist definition, kitsch, for example, is non-art, because it may have an artistic form but it is form only in physical sense. Some kitsch object can even be presented in artworld context, but only therefore it fits into it by form. In this case there is a question about a work which has fetishized as far it only has its existence, nothing else; the work asserts its existence but says nothing more, in other words, it has ceased to function as art. A copy of an art work is not non-art because it may continue its functioning as an (interpretative) sign and brings up qualities which material objects as such do not have. But copy is not art either, when it has come off from the artworld, ie, the context of original work. This happens when a work of art has become a cliché. It was this aspect that fascinated the situationists in *détournement*. Kuspit maintained that postmodern art works are such, in them the difference between art and reality is only apparent, they are ultimately reified. However, the difference between art and reality is essential from the viewpoint of art's transcendentalism and therapeutic character.

Austrian artist Hermann Nitsch has used slaughter animals, urine and animal blood in his "shock therapeutical" performances he called as *Abreaktionsspiel* (abreaction play) which aim to break up taboos. In addition to multisensational effect, in his performances blood and secretions have certain symbolic dimension. Instead, when Rudolf Schwarzkogler exhibited pictures about an amputation with knives and bloody gauzes, nobody thought that the pictures were documents of self-mutilation of which he died. When Chris Burden let his friend to shoot him on the left arm, he based the artistic character of his action in that in this case shooting was not purpose-rational act: he did not want to make a suicide nor is he evidentially insane. Difference between art and reality can be negligible, but its significance can be seen if compared Nitsch's and Buren's gestures with Schwarzkogler's doings. Fluxus and the SI had slightly different notions of reality. The SI considered the relation of art and reality from the basis that reality is thoroughly spectacularized and false. In Fluxus's notion of reality spectacularity was not so emphasized.

Up to the 1950s it was obvious that the aesthetic avant-garde was considered significant by the very same class the values of which the radical avant-garde so sharply rejected, namely the bourgeoisie. Already in 1950 Ad Reinhardt remarked that when the revolution became an institution, then the avant-garde would become official art.⁵⁹ Deliberations about the character and fate of the avant-garde were extremely lively in the beginning of the 1960s. One of the most thorough critics was Hans Magnus Enzensberger who analyzed the concept, starting from its military roots, and considered the various meanings of the term.⁶⁰

The *avant* of the *avant-garde* contains its own contradiction; Enzensberger writes that it can be marked out only a posteriori. Walter Benjamin stated that one of the foremost tasks of art has always been the creation of a demand which could be fully satisfied only later.⁶¹ With the aid of tradition we can, however, identify meanings - not necessarily looking for sameness but also comparing an object with tradition and examining what it is not. This is the reason why the Situationalist International group (1957-72) took little interest in avant-garde revolutions inside modern art, for they were just an apparent renewal of the spectacle. These revolutions always already contain a given art world: a background formed by culture, artistic life, traditions and practices, against which works of art are described, interpreted and valued. A seemingly new work was defended by pointing to some, perhaps quite surprising, relations to tradition. In fact, this is just practising arttalk, which leads us to circular reasoning, to an apparently useless discourse. It is a matter of seeing similarities which lead to a new way of seeing, understanding and valuing the work. But this is not a total revolution, instead, the system recuperates the new into itself showing how it has already been dependent on the system, that is, tradition. The system benefits from this gradual renewal, although basically remaining the same as before. According to Andrew Benjamin, it is impossible to define the avant-garde as simple (counter-traditional) negativity; if it were it would have the status of non-meaning.⁶² The meaning is always tied to tradition. A. Benjamin may be right in this, but only if we use such a concept as an avant-garde. He may be right in that meanings are always tied to

tradition. However, it need not be an artistic tradition; many contemporary works of art, for instance, exploit a wider cultural tradition.

Progress, movement, has according to many critics frozen especially in the 1960s; movement has been the end in itself. Enzensberger wrote about the similarities between avant-garde and totalitaristic movements: their center being precisely empty kinetic activity, which spews forth thoroughly arbitrary, indeed manifestly absurd, ideological demands and proceeds to implement them. According to him the indeterminacy of its "actions" always pretends to be exact. It tries to convey this impression by means of a terminology for which the most diverse disciplines have been ransacked. Enzensberger listed catchwords like constellation, material structure, correlogram, coordination, rotomodulation, microarticulation, phase-shift, autodetermination and transformation.

Enzensberger's critique was negative but it is possible to see the movement as an end in itself also as a positive aspect. It can be seen even as an ultimate parody of systems, as Jean Tinguely's machines, for example, which seem to be real machines but they don't function or they function by chance. Tinguely's machines work also as an example of destructive art which attempts to free the audience from compulsory consumption creating an absolute consumption, in the case of Tinguely, partly simulated incapability or destruction - state in which it is not possible to circulate commodities anymore.

Enzensberger criticized the experimentalism which the avant-garde claimed to be in the 1960s - when the term artistic laboratory has become such cliché that many art groups and theatres which need to receive attention called themselves as laboratories. According to Enzensberger, experimentalism cannot be an end in itself because "its intrinsic worth equals zero"⁶³ He compared the term to science and maintained that experimentalism is only a vehicle, transient phase, nothing as important as the artistic avant-garde has pretended it to be. Quite cynically he stated that the farther removed from any sort of experience they are, the more the experiments of the avant-garde are "experimental". According to him this proves that the concept of avant-garde is nonsensical and unusable in art. Again Rosenberg's thoughts were parallel to Enzensberger's, for he also remarked that in the avant-garde it is something unreal and fabricated which has made just to meet the demand.⁶⁴ Alternatively, if the experimentalism of the avant-garde were as exact as science it would be science and will lose characteristically artistic aspects like randomness and absurdity. We can accuse the both theorists of not making any distinction between a term avant-garde as an artistic term and its popular use in such contexts as in popular magazines about art, design, fashion or of other such things.

According to Rosenberg the idea of the short life of a work of art belongs to the epoch of the avant-gardes. That the art history saves these works violates its avant-garde essence and compels it to deny itself.⁶⁵ Critics who want to dismiss or cover the institutional nature of art have formulated their theories to the concept of 'work of art', which isolate the individual works. The aesthetic institutions, in visual arts the museum and art history, for example, maintain the work-centered ideal in art. In a

way, it is to return the work of art its status as a piece of history. But the advocates of institutional and functional autonomies of art already managed to take away the 'aura' of the works. Thus they float in a more or less imaginary museums not connected to any other history but their own. The hermeneutic concept of 'work' replaces a philosophical term 'art', as an art historian Hans Belting has noted.⁶⁶

Autonomous art has been thought as a container of some "higher truth". The mystery of creative act, moved to kind of aesthetic no-man's-land, has furthered this kind of idealism.⁶⁷ If artistic intention is something exceedingly original, inspired and sublime in immaterial form, the art world wants, however, art objects as a proof of the power of inspiration. This need destroys abstract "sublimation" and misuses it. Claims of explanations and rationality actually seize that power of abstract sublimation of which the art world would like to get hold. The radical avant-garde, drawing the borders of art institution more visible, wanted to return to the concept of art its value and at the same time devalue art *objects*. In Modernism "hand made" has been fetishistic concept meaning what one expects the 'work' be in the work of art. In paintings the brush strokes have been often the most valued. However, the radical avant-garde questioned that in works of art an emphasis was in (hand)work; it wanted to return the conversation to a state where the art's material values were not the primary values.

Considering a work of art it has been a tendency to avoid its nature as a material object and to concentrate to it as an object of interpretation where the target of interpretation is more than mere material object. An aesthetic attitude has been said to be an attitude of mind. The problem "form is pure but materials impure" has troubled artists the whole century. To impure materials belongs also the reality of life in the 20th century - motive from which for example dramatic art has drawn. The artists of the radical avant-garde, however, adopted less problematic attitude towards material and medium than other modernists. This is also one thing contemporary art has inherited from avant-garde.

In artistic production the material means of production have a relatively minor bearing on the quality of the product. This does not mean, however, that material has been less meaningful in the production of modern art, often it has been the opposite. Kuspit has argued that especially in high modernism many movements have refused to consider the work of art as anything more than the work and material that went into it. Only little interest have been in why the effect should be made - in fact that kind of interest has been condemned even detrimental to an understanding of the immediate presence of the work.⁶⁸ On the background of this is Greenberg's thought that a modernist work of art should avoid communication with any order of experience not inherent in the most literally and essentially construed nature of its medium.⁶⁹ Although an emphasis on medium is not exactly the same thing as an emphasis on material commodity character of the work. Concentration to the nature of medium has in many cases lead to emphasis on material, though.

An emphasis on material and medium is thus characteristic to avant-garde. Medium has been the most natural place of negation and alienation,

of which the importance of collage and montage in the artistic expression of this century is an example. Collage do brought into various arts materials from outside of art. T. J. Clark has pointed that the way that modernist art has insisted on its medium has been by negating that medium's ordinary consistency by pulling it apart, emptying it, producing gaps and silences, making it stand as the opposite of sense or continuity, having matter be the synonym for resistance. It is the synonym for resistance in the sense that the mere issuing forth or discharge of raw material is not expression; there should be interaction with something external. Minimizing this is a gesture of negation. Clark maintained that modernism would have its medium be absence of some sort, absence of finish or coherence, indeterminacy, a ground which is called on to swallow up distinctions⁷⁰, which also means vanishing of particularity. There are many examples of this, in our age for example German sculptor Isa Genzken who uses concrete as her material.

Chocolate is an example of material that is in interaction with something external. Janine Antoni made classical portrait sculptures of herself by licking the chocolate that was her material. She made also the similar series of self-portraits of soap. These works are not as permanent as those made of stone or marble. Their intention is to be transient and to be made of very ordinary and everyday material. It is interesting to compare this development in contemporary art: using such materials as blood, urine, vomit, chocolate, lipstick, soap, etc. to Osborne's statement: "The senses which offer the greatest opportunity for strong and immediate pleasure-tone are taste, smell, and touch. But these senses do not provide a vehicle for art works".⁷¹ Today these senses can be a part of a combination which forms a work of art. Daniel Spoerri, for example, organized dinners as art already in the 1960s; nowadays Rirkrit Tiravanija has already gained international fame by offering a meal to an audience.

Enzensberger also referred to the elitist roots of the term *guard*. Every *guard* is always also a collective, first the group and only then the individual. Discipline is common to all belonging to the group. Rosenberg has also stressed this: he wrote that "[v]anguard art tends to sketch the outlines of a dogma, or a set of convictions. No matter how radical its effects, an action is not avant-garde without an ideology to characterize it. With most twentieth-century avant-gardes the ideology comes first and shapes the action, as well as accrediting it"⁷². Already at the end of the last century Arthur Symons wrote about Mallarmé's doctrine and commented on Maeterlinck's book as follows: "But, after all, the claim upon us of this book is not the claim of a work of art, but of a doctrine, and more than that, of a system"⁷³. The notion of creativity in modernism adored inventing new *laws on* how to organize things, which was actually connected to the aims of universalization in Modernism. It is seen also in avant-garde manifestos, although in reading them it is better to consider also their ironical and satirical nuances, as those of Breton's *Surrealist Manifesto* of 1924.

Despite the emphasis on the individual, a certain contrast between collective and individual, ideology and absolute freedom, has remained unchanged throughout the century and has in fact been one source of vitality in art. Thinking about the roots of the avant-garde, Enzensberger wrote

that "[t]he guard's vocation is combat. In it, and only in it, does the guard prove its worth. Not productivity but contest is its *raison d'être*: it is always militant"⁷⁴. Along these lines he also thought about the nature of the aesthetic avant-garde: where is its enemy if it is the only one to inhabit the future?

Arguments about the death of an avant-garde can be summarized by the remarks Enzensberger and many other critics have made that the avant-garde plays its game in a future that does not belong to it. Its movement is regression, and the avant-garde becomes its opposite: an anachronism. Nonetheless, the avant-garde has been capable of self-irony. Already in 1952 Guy Debord called himself and his (lettrist) friends "les enfants perdus", lost children. Like avant-garde, it is a military term, which Debord employed. Unlike avant-garde, vanguard, 'les enfants perdus' does not indicate a certain direction but the moment of a troop's dissolution.

In the mid 1960s in the *Times Literary Supplement* a debate took place about the fate of an avant-garde. Jonathan Miller wrote in an article in 1964 that

the avant-garde dissolved in its own definition, and all that remained was the strenuous work of popular evangelism, of familiarizing the general public with the new category which was already senescent at its birth. . . . The anticipation of the general public is now so comprehensive that even for them the avant-garde seems to have eaten its way out of its own container and dissolved into thin air.⁷⁵

Society needs the myth of an avant-garde artist. Douglas Cooper sighed in the middle of the 1960s for the real, original and elitist avant-garde. He asked what qualities distinguish the true avant-gardiste, and replied that an avant-gardiste "is a man who embarks voluntarily on a solitary creative adventure, advances fearlessly, and gives no thought to winning quick recognition from the community to which he belongs. He is original in thought and outlook and possessed by a relentless creative urge."⁷⁶ According to Cooper in the middle of the 1960s this quality no longer mattered, and all kinds of vague attempts and products were approved as an avant-garde if they just sold; the avant-garde had become a trade-mark.

Although the avant-garde was declared to be dead, this does not mean it was dead to everybody. The former lettrist Marc O summarized one avant-garde paradox in 1952, writing that an avant-gardiste is the first who believes in an unchanging film. He is the point of reaction against the new avant-garde. This individuality of an avant-garde is disastrous for the avant-garde.⁷⁷ In fact, it was from conflicting attitudes regarding the vitality or weakness of an avant-garde that there developed one shoot of that legitimation crisis of the intellectuals which some have said to be the root of postmodernity. In other words, the elite who knows better and defines other's needs is no longer unanimous. It becomes difficult in the name of progress to impose one kind of art and to marginalize another kind.

In the 1960s, then, there was a strong critique against the avant-garde, but the distinct viewpoints and emphases differed widely. Cooper wanted to go back to a virgin state, to the real and original, to pure creativity, which was attainable only by a small group of initiated individuals. He ro-

manticized an artist's work in the Kantian manner, that is, talking about Geniuses who create almost like Nature itself, although their creations are quite the opposite of the natural. Enzensberger and Rosenberg talked about the watering down of the avant-garde from the other viewpoint. It is interesting that Cooper's rhetoric is so similar to that of the SI when talking about the commercialization of an avant-garde. But the starting point was just the opposite. The SI wanted to go back to a pure creativity which would be attainable by all, not just the few. The same concerns many other groups in the 1960s, Fluxus, for example; especially at the end of the decade when students founded open workshops where they produced graphics and posters and so on.

DEFINING THE CONCEPTS

. *what cannot be imitated perfect must die.* .
- Bob Dylan: *Farewell Angelina* -

. *nonart is a matter of imitating imitation.*
- Allan Kaprow -

What then are the differences in contemporary art that do not fit the traditional picture? There has been some dissolution of art modes since the birth of modernism, but this tendency has increased during the last forty years. Especially the theatre and the visual arts have had close contacts, whether we talk about the "theatricality" of paintings or sculptures, or new ways of dealing with space and context in the visual arts. In fact, Bauhaus in Germany and Black Mountain College in the United States have had a lot of influence.

The development of techniques of reproduction and the swelling of popular culture and the culture industry have played their roles in the dissolution of the autonomy of art from other areas of life. Uses of art have changed, and the way art is consumed has changed too. There is much talk about the aestheticization of life, which means that we are not short of aesthetic experiences, even though there are few of them left in art anymore. Thus we need to outline the role of art on the basis of these facts.

In this chapter I shall define the concept of performative art, trying to prove that it is not only theatricality that matters in it but that it is a general mode of being for contemporary art. If we consider performative art as a collage of various arts, it also fits some seemingly more traditional projects where totality has been shaped by different elements, such as Tom Phillips's and Peter Greenaway's *TV Dante*, which actually consists of Dante's original *Divina commedia*; *Dante's Inferno* translated and illustrated by Phillips in various editions, *A TV Dante* with Peter Greenaway and *A TV Dante. Notes and Commentaries* for Channel 4 Television, London.⁷⁸ Much of the pictorial and linguistic Dante-tradition can also be seen in the work.

I also argue that the experience is the important element in art, although it need not be an aesthetic experience only. In fact, postmodern

theories of art have pointed out some characteristics in art that shift the emphasis onto other aspects than the traditional categories of aesthetics.

Performative Art and Other Terms

There is a lot of confusion with terminology in the area of art I deal with. Partly it is due to the lack of serious research in this field. There are such attributes as political, activist, communal etc. That under which attribute, or, in which category, something is put depends on whether one looks the style, intent, content, form, or effect of works. Performative art is a general term I use to describe certain phenomena in art and culture, emerging mostly after the 1960s.

Among others, Peggy Phelan and Marvin Carlson have stated that the discursive performative at play in contemporary theory is derived from a particular reading of linguistics. Both refer to J. L. Austin's speech-act theory⁷⁹ which distinguished speech acts into two separate categories: constatives and performatives. The first describe events, and performatives enact them, as when one christens a ship or makes a bet. Within the performative the signifier and the referent are mutually enfolded within one another: the signifier performs the referent within the performative because the referent *is* the speech act itself. Thus the primary purpose of the performative is to do something rather than simply to assert something. The action in question lies in the act of uttering certain words in certain circumstances. The statement is always generalized, whereas the meaning of a performative expression is individualized.

Austin's ideas have been criticized, especially by Derrida. Both Phelan and Carlson went through this critique which I shall briefly describe. One problem with Austin's theory of performative speech acts is that he believed they can be evaluated according to their success or failure. These possibilities emerge from the assumption that speech acts can convey their full contexts transparently. Derrida argued, however, that such transparent reproduction is impossible. For him every speech act both conveys and represses multiple signatures, events, and contexts. Phelan points out that the performative speech act short-circuits the projected future (the other in the future) and lies only in the "self-same" present in which it is articulated. Thus the performative act, like the live performative event, cannot be exactly repeated or reproduced. This creates specific problems for arts education, for instance. Because of this self-same character, that is, the impossibility of representing difference, mimesis becomes a problematic mode of representation, since it is difficult to find the "original" with which to compare representation or citation. Derrida pointed out that it is precisely the act of citation that makes performative utterances successful. An act must be identifiable in some way as a "citation". But the citation is never exact, because it is always being adapted to new contexts. Any citation "can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable"⁸⁰. According to Derrida, a

performative produces or transforms a situation. This argument, as Carlson says, moves the concept of linguistic performance back into the realm of repeated and contextualized activity; to those performative practices which are contingent, transitory and fugitive, but may function as bearers or exhausters of certain established meanings. This possibility has been important for political, especially feminist, art.

Performative practices include a variety of things such as theatre, rock concerts, sports events, and so forth. It is important to keep this in mind, since it opens up perspectives from which to see and to evaluate artistic performative practices in contemporary culture. In fact, one background for performative art is found in action painting, where the canvas became the four-sided arena. As Rosenberg has stated,

Criticism must begin by recognizing in the painting the assumptions inherent in its mode of creation. Since the painter has become an actor, the spectator has to think in a vocabulary of action: its inception, duration, direction - psychic state, concentration and relaxation of the will, passivity, alert waiting.⁸¹

Later, the canvas changed into environments, at first the artistic environments, then the "alternative environments" artists used, and nowadays urban environment, or even the whole of society. Rosenberg argued already in 1952 that traditional aesthetic references are irrelevant; instead, there is the human experience involved in action paintings. What is art, ie, the relation of the painting to the works of the past, to colour, texture, balance etc., comes back into painting by way of psychology.⁸² Allan Kaprow has maintained that the happening started from environments. To my mind, it is interesting to trace where the roots of contemporary performative art are to be found, but I want to emphasize that it is not only a question of the theatrical tradition but of a mixing of arts. That what the radical avant-garde already introduced in many ways.

A distinction can be drawn between the concept of performative art and performance, the latter referring to an action carried out for someone, an audience or observer. If art is described such that it requires an artist with certain skills to handle a particular artistic medium, in performance it has usually meant the physical presence of trained or skilled person whose demonstration of their skills is the performance.⁸³ This is a broad and rather traditional definition, however. Speaking about the same thing, Richard Schechner describes actions consciously separated from the person doing them as "restored behaviour", which points to a quality of performance not involved with the display of skills, but rather a certain distance between "self" and behaviour. Restored behaviour is any kind of role playing, since all performance involves a consciousness of doubleness, through which the actual execution of the action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an ideal, or an original model of that action.⁸⁴ Performative art actually rejects the conventional definition of theatre according to which the relation between theatrical speakers and the words they speak are fixed in advance. Instead the concept of performative art underlines contingent and heterogeneous relations between the subject and the utterance or expression. Performative relations are not definitionally settled. Modern 'theatrical performance' as an art mode is not based upon characters

previously created by other artists, as in traditional theatre, but upon the artists' own bodies, own autobiographies, specific experiences in a culture, made into performances by the artists' consciousness of them and the process of displaying them for audiences. Such a performance is experienced by an individual who is also part of a group, thus social relations are built into experience itself. Bim Mason also separates performance artists from performing artists. According to him, performance artists usually work only inside the art world. There may be a degree of audience participation but only as one element in the total concept. The artist is not interested in the individual personalities of the participants. Alternatively, there are performing artists who are defined by Mason as those whose main concern is to create visual images outdoors, on the streets.⁸⁵ Mason's concept is close to that of a happening artist, or, today, of artists doing site-specific work which is essentially aesthetic in nature, more concerned with form than content. Direct contact with the audience is limited; the spectators can take it or leave it.

Even performance as an art mode has shifted its focus from the performing body to the performance situation. This is what the SI very much anticipated in trying to develop methods for activist and political art. Performance is seen more as a play where people take part, entering into a specific situation, a context in which meanings are not so much communicated as created, questioned, or negotiated. Thus I see also the pragmatist approach as quite appropriate to a study of the acts and contexts in which they are performed. Performative art includes performance as a certain art mode defined by its practices and traditions, but, in addition to this, it also includes social performance in broader sense as an organized situation for people to take part in.

Patterns of social performance are constantly constructed, reformed and organized by the pragmatic process of collecting together pre-existing fragments and scraps of material, in other words, collecting the "citations" Derrida writes about. In an essay which considers who is the (responsible) subject of performative acts, Judith Butler has referred to the fact that a performative work draws on and covers the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized.⁸⁶ These conventions are thus not only repeated and ritualized in performative acts but they may be also recuperated, by paying attention to the certain situation and context. I argue that one form of a performative which is a citational practice is a *détournement*. Thus this kind of pragmatic performance operates within highly cultural systems but may yet generate new configurations and modes of action. There has been a shift from general cultural structures to individual events and from general operating strategy to an interest in "performativity", ie, activity that allows the operation of improvisatory experimentation based on the needs and felt desires of the unique situation, as Carlson stated.⁸⁷ One must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into opportunities. This is what Michel de Certeau calls 'tactics'.

De Certeau wrote about "unrecognized producers, poets of their own affairs and trailblazers in the jungles of functionalist rationality"⁸⁸. They make apparently meaningless "sentences", that is, acts that remain unpredictable within the space ordered by the organizing techniques of systems.

Although they use as their material what is available in the systems, they remain heterogeneous to the systems they infiltrate and in which they sketch out the guileful ruses of different interests and desires.⁸⁹ The term *different* is important in this. De Certeau describes strategy as something that postulates a *place* that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats can be managed. Thus the opposite of its place is the other, *different*. Strategy leans on power so that it gains from, on the one hand, panoptic practice, which means that the eye transforms foreign forces into an observable and measurable and thus controllable object. "To be able to see (into the distance) is also to be able to predict, to run ahead of time by reading a space."⁹⁰ On the other hand, it is the power to provide oneself with one's own place, that is, areas that are "autonomous", "neutral", "independent" institutions, "disinterested" research etc.

One of the most strict strategies of the modernist 'isms' is that of Surrealism. Since it included an objectification of women as the Other, it was Breton's strategy to give a chauvinist name for Meret Oppenheim's *Fur Covered Tea Cup, Saucer and Spoon* (1936). Later, Oppenheim denied her work, perhaps for the reason that the name Breton gave for it, and which became known, referred to Manet's controversial *Déjeuner sur l'herbe* (1863), since it was *Déjeuner en fourure*. As Matthew Gale recently analyzed, Breton's reading ignored other possibilities, such as the contradictions presented by the object on a practical level, as well as the suggested transformation of a familiar, everyday object.⁹¹ In opposing the rationality of strategy that always functions from a place, de Certeau defines a tactic as something that is:

a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delimitation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for autonomy. The space of a tactic is the space of the other.⁹²

A tactic takes advantage of opportunities and depends on them. It operates in isolated actions and within "the enemy's field of vision". De Certeau remarked that:

What it wins it cannot keep. This nowhere gives a tactic mobility, to be sure, but a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment.⁹³

A tactic cannot have any preconceived configurations or plans, which is its strength. And which is, I suppose, also the chance birth of Oppenheim's fur covered things, since she had already done furred bijouteries. De Certeau wrote that a tactic is an art of the weak. It is also an art of the moment, contingent and placeless, as a performative, dependent on the situation in question.

To sum up, a performative has the following features: It is an individualized expression and contextualized activity; it is impossible to repeat a performative act as such. It draws on but also covers the familiar conventions, thus operating in a way similar to the way a tactic works within an open, undefined field. We have to also pay attention to the fact that the in-

ner structures of the art in question are not reduced to an outer description of them.⁹⁴ The problem is that we have art modes that are difficult to describe and to define in conventional artistic terms, which produces problems for the arttalk idea as the sole basis of arts education. This kind of art has the characteristics of performative art in the sense in which such theorists as Phelan, Carlson and Butler have broadened the uses of the concept outside of the field of linguistics.

In much contemporary art, traditionally separate art modes and other modes of communication are included in performative practices. There are different combinations of architecture, painting, photography, advertising, speech acts, films etc. Thus, short of any other appropriate definition, I prefer to use the term performative art to mean *any kind of collages of arts which try to create an experience, not just by describing, representing and asserting statements but by offering a space for interaction, participation and dialogue.*

Suzanne Lacy has introduced a concept of 'new genre public art' as an opposite of traditional monumental public art. She states that the construction of a history of new genre public art is not built on a typology of materials, spaces, or artistic media, but rather on concepts of audience, relationship, communication, and political intention.⁹⁵ Thus it is what I call non-style art, something always varying and changing. According to Lacy, new genre public art is visual art that uses both traditional and non-traditional media to communicate and interact with a broad and diversified audience about issues directly relevant to their lives. And it is based on engagement, Lacy argues.⁹⁶ She mentioned that it is a question about *visual art*, although she also states that this kind of art might include a combination of different media (which also resembles Fluxus ideas about intermedia). If it is a question about visual art or something else, has an importance for arts education since before we can get rid, or at least lessen the meaning, of the boundaries between traditional arts, it is always a problem whose task it is to teach what kind of art. Arts educational theories nowadays, however, have strong emphasis on visual arts.

There is social dimension also in Lucy Lippard's definition of public art ". . . as accessible work of any kind that cares about, challenges, involves, and consults the audience for or with whom it is made, respecting community and environment."⁹⁷ Close to public art is a concept of site-specific art, that is art commissioned and designed for particular space. It takes into account the physical and visual qualities of the site. Artists have also turned their attention to the historical, ecological, and sociological aspects of the site, although usually only metaphorically. Defined as above, new genre public art and site-specific art altogether differ from the public art, which is art monuments indicative of author's personal manner of working, not cultural monuments of symbolic of contemporary society. In these cases the public debate often centers on artistic style (eg, abstract versus figurative art) rather than on public values. Lacy mentioned that this happened in the United States in the late sixties and early seventies. In Finland this has happened during the 1980s, when debates flourished around Mika Waltari monument by Veikko Hirvimäki and Risto Ryti monument by Veikko Myller. These debates in Finland have in fact concerned public

values, since there has been a question of monuments for nationally prominent persons.

New genre public art can be offensive because its "connectedness to the actual (not just artifice); its practical function (not just aesthetic experience); its transitory or temporary nature (rather than permanence and collectibility); its public aims and issues as well as public location; its inclusiveness (reaching beyond the predefined museum-going audience); and its involvement of others as active viewers, participants, coauthors, or owners."⁹⁸ This definition of Jacob describes well how the new genre public art differs from the values usually put as a ground stones for arts education. There is not a question of a common denominator that absolutely everyone will understand and endorse. Modernist art looks favourably on the representations of permanent dispositions which reflect general qualities of Character, for example, universal characteristics of human personality (monuments). Has this changed and been displaced by more specific, particular, and more local? In some cases, it has. Public art can be an engagement in collective exploration of public ideas, individual requirements, and communitarian values. It accepts the differences and constituencies inherent in public life.

'Activist art' is art which attempts to change the state of things. It is participation trying to improve conditions of life. This means that it changes contents rapidly, which means more spontaneity. Suzi Gablik has defined activism as follows: There is ". . . a kind of activism - not political activism in the sense of demonstrations in the street, but an activism where the artist is engaging actively with, or intervening in, particular situations, and using his or her creativity to create a space for some kind of healing to occur."⁹⁹ It differs from progressive high art, that is, an art that criticizes existing structures from more of a distance. Activist art is usually defined as separate from mainstream. It resists cultural dominants and homogenization of culture. It is also pragmatist. Activist art is confined to no particular style, thus it is non-style art, rather best defined in terms of its functions, which also cover a broad span. It does not, for the most part, limit itself to the traditional art media. To varying degrees it takes place simultaneously in the mainstream and outside of accepted art contexts. In practice, activist art might include teaching, publishing, broadcasting, filmmaking, or organizing. It often incorporates many different media within a single, long-term project. Lippard states that the most activist artists are trying to be synthesizers as well as catalysts: trying to combine social action, social theory, and the fine arts tradition, in a spirit of multiplicity and integration, rather than one of narrowing choices. Activist art is process-oriented. Tactics, or strategies of communication and distribution, enter into the creative process, as do activities usually considered separate from it, such as community work, meetings, graphic design, posterage.¹⁰⁰ Reflecting Dewey's ideals about aesthetics in the relation between people and environment, and the notion of life-styles of contemporary sociology, Lippard wrote that: "What these diverse works [examples of activist art] *do* share is the way style and aesthetic are deeply entwined in the social structures in which they operate."¹⁰¹

A starting point to activist art may be that social change, revolutionary or slower one, is incomprehensible without a command of the emotional forces at work. In fact "emotional forces" are important constructing component in contemporary activist art. Dewey wrote that in the development of an expressive act, the emotion operates "like a magnet drawing to itself appropriate material, appropriate because it has an experienced emotional affinity for the state of mind already moving. Selection and organisation of material are at once a function and a test of the quality of the emotion experienced."¹⁰² This feature of artistic expression has not vanished, but our notion of appropriate material have changed a little. Of course, emotional forces have been important also in political art before, but in different ways: as sentimentality (political kitsch), or as highly calculated element.¹⁰³ In fact, I agree with Lippard's description of contemporary political and activist artists as someone whose subjects and sometimes contexts reflect social issues, usually in the form of ironic criticism. Political art, she stated, tends to be socially *concerned* and activist art tends to be socially *involved*. The former's work is a commentary or analysis, it is still more connected to the strategies of critical theory, while the latter's art works *within* its context, *with* its audience. Of course political and activist artists are often the same people.¹⁰⁴ I have already referred that activist art is performative in nature: usually it is taking place only once, it is citational, process-oriented, situational, non-stylistic, and it bases on participation. The concept of new genre public art is so close to the definition of the performative that I rather use the performative as a general term meaning the both. However, there are slight differences in how the terms are used. Lacy stresses more the role of visual, and opposition of traditional public art, that is, monuments.

Repetition in the Place of an Idea of Progress of an Avant-Garde

According to Rosenberg the new is the historical necessity, but the new as creation and the new as avant-garde, however, are not always the same thing. The avant-garde mind is usually fixed on thoughts leading to the ideologically determined next step. In other words, the avant-gardist acts on the assumption that the momentary, present, is the means of transition to the future. Instead of communing with the present as the container of the past and the possible, he seeks to use it to fulfill the commands of his system.¹⁰⁵ This connects to the idea that a revolution always needs an utopia, its target is to realize some utopia, which is impossible, however. After the revolution has taken place and creating of a new system begins, there has also been given up the utopia and the revolution has changed to past. Avant-garde tries, however, to maintain the state of continuous revolution, which means that its aims could never come true. That is why it is understandable when Rosenberg maintained that avant-garde styles have two oppositional values: on the other hand they have always tried to recover that freshness and unexpectedness of innovations that gave rise to the

movements, on the other hand, to affirm the rationale of the movement as representing a new order.¹⁰⁶

In the 1960s such phenomena as Happening and Pop art were examples of the ossification of an avant-garde revolution. In the beginning of this century Dada represented the purest avant-garde, it has its utopia about revolution through which it would be possible to reach new kind of creativity. In the middle-sixties ex-dadaist Raoul Hausmann said that Dada was a negation of Cartesian logic; it based on the "creative indifference" which was sensitive to hazard. About the neo-dada of the 1960s he wrote that it takes the object as a "thing in itself", which Dada denied. As an example he mentioned neo-dadaistic happenings which, according to Hausmann, were not spontaneous at all but very intentionally calculated and empty repetitions of Dada acts.¹⁰⁷ Hausmann's intention was to represent and protect the "originality" of Dadaism. He was right stating that the mental atmosphere Dada grew from cannot be repeated. To reproduce only the forms is not the same avant-garde anymore but a vanguard repeating the forms of the radical avant-garde has become a rear-guard if compared to the radical avant-garde. But searching for similarities is not necessarily the only way to approach such phenomena as Pop or Happening. The existing historical context should be regarded too.

The aesthetic conventions, ie, the codes of the neo-dada, could be familiar from the earlier radical avant-garde and there are no new meanings to reach by merely reading them - so far it is possible to argue that the neo-dada was not an avant-garde. In order to interpretate meanings we have to consider what did mean the reproducing of the radical avant-garde of the beginning of this century in the 1960s. In Europe this reproducing of forms may seemed to be as a repeating of the earlier avant-garde but in America Dada, for example, was not in the 1910s as widespread and a strong movement as in Europe. In America the tradition of the radical avant-garde was not so well known and that's why the neo-dada of the 1960s seemed to be more fresh and new. There were thus already repetition of stylistic aspects (increasing appropriation) in the 1960s, but it was repetition purely inside an art world. It has to be separated from such contemporary art that repeats, for instance, routines of an everyday life. This does not mean that they did not have similar ideas on the background, I mean ideas of the meaning and formalistic possibilities of repetition. And now I do not mean Minimalism or seriality in music as such repetition. But there were seen already in the 1960s some repetition of styles, that is, increasing appropriation inside art. This is not the same repetition as that of making repetitious rhythms in form from, for instance, such everyday materials as routines, advertising, etc. On the background there is, however, the same idea: increasing attention to nowness, presentness, instead of searching for newness.

Theories of modern art have been one-sided in many cases. As for Bürger, for example, an avant-garde was merely attempts to provoke and subvert, although it also very much made individual and personal legitimate and commendable. This is what the SI wanted to integrate into the broader historical conception in the way that every individual would become acknowledged as the producer of her own life. This kind of thinking

further influenced (through the feminist movement) the certain modes of contemporary art.

Mierle Laderman Ukeles, for instance, has challenged the modernist idea of privileging linear progress over the repetitive tasks required to maintain people, places, cities, and environments. This is one of the numerous (feminist) aspects that have changed the ways to outline what is art. Especially many women have been searching the social and intellectual traditions, unacknowledged by modernism, that justified making art which is an organic part of everyday life, or, at least has some effect on it. On the other hand, repetition in the form of a performative act is a way of creating identity. Theories about performative actions, which I have been discussed earlier, help to understand this. The repetition denies the possibility of a pre-existing subject constrained by regulatory laws, but subject is itself performatively constituted by acts. An innovative agency arises from the ritualized and citational repetition of social performance. Gender performance is citational, but it never precisely repeats the absent original. This way it exceeds our knowledge.¹⁰⁸

Earlier political radicalism was based on charging a current social practice with being unfaithful to reality, with getting things wrong. It was necessary to prove this, and find the truth from behind the spectacle. Now the political practice is dropping the appeal to neutral criteria and instead, making language of your own. This is political pragmatism. In contemporary activist art it is locality and particularism which are important elements, and moral is based on we-thinking, that is, empirist premises. Activist art today emerges from the experience of being at once inside and outside of frame. Then the subject is indistinguishable from its direct object.¹⁰⁹ This brings to art something we can call a political double-coding; for example, ironic disturbance by mimicry that undermines rather than reinforces the existing "Truth".

Jameson has argued that it is no longer possible to oppose or contest the logic of the image-world of late capitalism by reinventing an older logic of the referent (or realism). Instead, one potential strategy is "ever greater doses of the poison - to choose and affirm the logic of the simulacrum to the point at which the very nature of that logic is itself dialectically transformed."¹¹⁰ To a certain extent détournement, somewhat paradoxically, is an example of this. When the most distant detoured elements are put together, as, for example, soldiers and a lipstick advertisement, and they in a strange way form a new meaning together, then the value hierarchies collapse onto the same level which makes room for the reevaluation. Rather similar strategy is mimicry.

Imitation theories have a central role in art, and especially in performative art mimesis is an important factor because of the temptation to refer, to remember, and to show. Mimesis posits a truthful relation between model and copy, or nature and image. It has this self-same character, which, at first, seem to reject differences. But it also implies difference between copy and the model. However, the truthful representation of social experience has yet become a problem since "the Truth" is just one given image, usually the "truth" of the status quo. Traditional theatre has leant on one mimetic system, but Elin Diamond presents other possibilities for theat-

rical performance.¹¹¹ She takes as an example Adrienne Kennedy's *Funnyhouse of a Negro* (1964) as a classic of what she calls mimesis-mimicry seen in Kennedy's fractured "selves" in this performance; the Duchess of Hapsburg, Patrice Lumumba, a hunchbacked Jesus, and Queen Victoria are each designated "One of Herselves". This mimicry dismantles the Truth through multiplicity of representations, endless repetitions and reflections without "real" origin. According to Diamond, it is possible to produce a body she called "true-real". It means that the body has given axiological (truth-telling) status but have made it impossible for that body to tell the truth. This is subversive mimesis, often used in theatrical performances, in which the actor's body speaks not for but before the referent.¹¹² Diamond stated that mimicry can function as an alienation-effect, framing, for example, the gender behaviour dictated by patriarchal modes as a means of recovering the place of the performer's exploitation. This means theatricalizing the patriarchal modes, or of slipping back and forth between claiming an identity position and ironically questioning the cultural assumptions that legitimate it. Women performers can assume in appearance a role of a fantasy fetish, they can dress themselves womanly with dyed-blond hair, heavy make-up or high-heels. Thus they underline femininity by deliberately assuming the certain role, with parodic self-conscious they affirm it thus undermining the basic assumptions.

Is there an identity behind the expressions? In fact, I argue that nowadays that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions', that are said to be its results. For example, gender is expressive and performative - it creates the identity it is to be; it is doing, but the doer is a fictive figure added to this doing. On the other hand, mimicry can also be seen as tossing metaphors into discourse, at least to the sense it disturbs somebody. On the other hand, we have art as a metaphor, on the other mimicry, when the copy yet represents that what it is imitating by an exact replica, that is, an image, symbol or stereotype which are not real. Gadamer writes something about this connected to the new media. He considers in what respect the Bild, image, is different from Abbild, ie, copy. According to him, a picture has an essential relation to its original. "The concept of mimesis, applied to both kinds of representation, did not mean a copy so much as the appearance of what is represented."¹¹³ Although Gadamer displays relevant criticism of traditional aesthetics, he states that a presentation of play, for example, does not stand like a copy next to the real world, but "... Is that world in a heightened truth of its being"¹¹⁴. He adds that certainly reproduction, that is, theatre performance on the stage, for instance, is not a copy beside which the original performance of the drama retains separate existence. Gadamer is not wrong; his thoughts apply to the most traditional arts, but he cannot deal with other arts, nor he cannot give us any tools to grasp phenomena where there were no script, as in many performances and in participatory projects, or, where there is a script, but it is not a play to read as literature, but it has been made straight for the stage performance.¹¹⁵ Gadamer's remark of the appearance of what is represented, consists of the notion that there are something original (ur-bild). He states that the original acquires an image only by being imaged, and yet the image is nothing but the appearance of the original.¹¹⁶

This meant that mimicry is a false copy, not a representation, since it has nor an original, or its original is already a replica, appearance. Thus mimicry is closer to Gadamer's notion of a mirror image that has no separate existence. It has only a fleeting existence as something that depends on being reflected. However, according to Gadamer, the picture has its own being. True, but what about Robert Rauschenberg's white paintings, for instance. They are all the time changing depending on who passes by and whose reflection is on the white surface at a time. Today art is even not as stable as Rauschenberg's pictures.

During the Romantic era there had been gotten rid of the thought that the work of art only imitates. Instead, an artist imitated, for example, the ways nature was created. Modernism and analytic aesthetics (as a sort of an apologist of the former) held successfully this view of an artist as creator. Now, artists and people as an audience or participators do not imitate reality nor imitate its creation. They live (through) it - in art, and also aestheticizing their lives. This is the reason I think that we have something to learn from flâneurs and other aimless wanderers who have been held merely as curiosities in Romanticism and in Aestheticism during the last century.

In this discussion Owens had also something to say. He suggests that the deconstructive impulse is characteristic of postmodernist art. He also remarks that it must be distinguished from the self-critical tendency of Modernism. He writes that modernist theory presupposes that mimesis, the adequation of an image to a referent, can be bracketed or suspended, and that the art object itself can be substituted for its referent.¹¹⁷ This will not do in strategy of mimicry.

If we concentrate on art that brings forth only fleeting experiences: What if the picture, or a work of art, has not its own being, which notion is a groundstone of an autonomy of art? What if it at the same time is artistically perfect political poster on the street wall, graffiti, or something. Gadamer is right in that the picture (art) can be an event of being - in a sense, process. "Appearing" of the idea itself.¹¹⁸ But, as Dewey, Gadamer is also stuck in the thought of an unified and structurally complete work the being of that is the same, or, at least wholly comprehensible. As aestheticians usually have done, they held the picture itself to be not any means to an end but "the representation remains entirely connected with what is represented - indeed, belongs to it"¹¹⁹ If we are considering does the *function* of the representation working properly, we must try to define the function. For pragmatics it can be both aesthetic and utilitarian, for metaphysical aesthetics it is only in the service of an aesthetic consciousness and through that connected to the Truth.

Gadamer claims an autonomous reality for the picture, since "that the picture has its own reality means the reverse of what is pictured, namely that it comes to presentation in the representation."¹²⁰ However, that a picture has its own reality does not necessary mean that it is autonomous, which Gadamer, in fact, does not even suggest. What he suggests is, that a picture is something more than what is pictured. Perhaps. But as the example of Rauschenberg's painting shows, it is not even any stable interpretation, but we could interpret the picture from the point of view of external re-

lations which may have not been as well an intention of an artist, not to mention a critic. Here we have come again a full circle back to the Dickie's institutional theories of art.

Finnish mathematician (PhD) and performance artist Irma Optimisti does mimicry in her performances. In these performances a context is important *if* one wants to separate it as art as a distinct from such phenomena as, for instance, *Spice Girls*, a band. I pass over a topic if we had to make any distinctions at all. Namely, the paradox is, though, that Irma Optimisti wanders in trams and shake people's hands telling: "Hei, olen Irma Optimisti, performanssitaiteilija." (Hello, I am IO, a performance artist.) Conversely, just to see (not even to meet) Spice Girls, you must find a stage where they are performing, if they are at all, since for long they just did some songs and promotion including various products. Irma Optimisti is then manifestly present when Spice Girls product is not. Should we try to see this as a distinction between art (presentness) and stylised life (or, consumable product of culture industry as Adorno would)? In my opinion, in the shallowest level of mimicry the "ideology" is similar. Spice Girls talk about "girl power"¹²¹ and thus fashionably politicized their product. Why they are not mimicry "for real"? Irma Optimisti is, she have an other, entirely different, life teaching mathematics in a university. Spice Girls is only a product. Why not take this kind of things as a starting point in arts educational practice. Why not make comparisons, even if it would leave the problem open? Why to practice an arttalk with a second-order language, when we could be more life-specific from the start? These questions are not new, on the contrary, they are familiar for arts educators. But they still may have difficulties to deal with them.

Pragmatism and Art

The avant-garde has changed during this century, especially since World War II, and certain practices, methods and premises of art have changed considerably (after modernism). This implies the end of modernism in the sense that some of its basic premises have changed, both in theory and practice. The most important of these premises are basically the metaphysical notions of universality and individuality. My background is, on the contrary to philosophically analytic aesthetics, in anti-essentialist pragmatist thought, one of the basic statements of which is Charles Sanders Peirce's: "To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object . . . we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve - what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare."¹²² When we add to this Hilary Putnam's remark that ". . . the logical primitives themselves, and in particular the notions of object and existence, have a multitude of different uses rather than one absolute "meaning",¹²³ then there we have in outline the starting points of my premises for dealing with art.

Modern art has been characterized by different kinds of phenomena, and it is thus difficult to formulate a coherent theory of modern art. In fact, it is difficult to formulate coherent and universal theories about any heterogeneous phenomenon. This theoretical problem was explained by Alfred Jarry at the end of the last century when he labelled the discipline he invented: pataphysics. According to Jarry, pataphysics is science covering all the exceptions in the world. It is typical of Modernism that as a phenomenon it is full of exceptions - even nothing but exceptions - but nonetheless there have been continuous attempts to create a general and universal "pataphysics". In this sense a theory of Modernism is a paradox. But it is possible to divide up modern art roughly into a more autonomous, intentionally positive "normal art" with its advanced modes of the formalist avant-garde, and into a more radical and committed avant-garde which has dealt above all with the problem of the separateness of art and life. This is what representatives of critical theory have done. Their theories usually a question about the form/content dichotomy. Although this dichotomy is not as absolute as some would like to believe, it is useful as an instrument.

I agree with Stanley Fish's statements on interpretation him that between a work of art and its interpretation there is no conflict between the work and its results, since a work of art is what it does: ". . . the text is always a function of interpretation, then the text cannot be the location of the core of agreement by means of which we reject interpretations."¹²⁴ Knowing that art has a multitude of different uses, it is not possible to assign absolute meanings to works, and this of course has some effects on political art.

Hence, following the pragmatists, I reject the foundationalist idea of immutable essences which permanently define the identities of our objects and concepts. But it is not the subject of this work to enter deeply into this problem on the philosophical level but, instead, to try to show that in contemporary art this rejection can also be seen, a rejection which we must realize in arts education. However, Richard Rorty has stated that the objective truth is the best idea we currently have about how to explain what is going on.¹²⁵

To make a summary of Rorty's quite relativistic pragmatism, he says that it is enough that any reading should fulfil the main conditions of (1) playing its role in an ongoing cultural 'conversation', (2) hanging together in an interesting way with other contributions to the same broad enterprise and (3) making acceptable sense on whatever terms are provided by the present-day consensual rules of the game.¹²⁶ Wolterstorff, who compares pragmatism and realism, implies at the same time critique against Rorty's relativism. Wolterstorff writes that pragmatists and realists agree in a few things: in rejecting a picture of a scheme of necessities imposed on a given of contingencies and rejecting the notion that the philosopher is a specialist in necessity, they both share the opposition of classical foundationalism and concept constructivism. But their main difference is that the realist holds that there is a reality 'out there', a reality which includes necessity, not just a social game with changing rules.¹²⁷ I bring this up here because I assert that in metaphors there are lots of similar

performativity as in much contemporary art. As much as the pragmatist approach do fascinates, in Rortian mode it is based on language, ie, conversation, and then we are again back into the discourse about the possibility of arttalk with metalanguages. Art of the 1960s did not yet fully realize this kind of pragmatism. But in the new genre public art there is used this kind of community conversation in a very local and small level. Although, it has gone even further; there is not only a question of conversation but participation: acting and doing as well, which is in fact just what Barthes described in his example of a woodcutter who 'acts the object'; the tree is not an image for her but simply the meaning of her action.¹²⁸

We can criticize Rorty of a circular reasoning as, in fact, Apel has done. Consequently, the pragmatist fallacy rests on the argument that since all reasoning is conducted in the context of particular languages, paradigms or communities of discourse, therefore reasons can only hold good in so far as they cohere with certain culture-specific values and assumptions. This involves an appeal to conventions or 'conceptual schemes'.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, there are problems in the performativity, say, due to that paradoxical situation that we approve certain relativism and especially that subjectivity in everyone's life I mentioned before. There has already happened that the performative aspect of an artist's characteristic mode of operation (even when collaborative) is repeated and circulated as a new art commodity, with the artist functioning as the primary vehicle of its verification, repetition, and circulation.¹³⁰ This seems to be impossible to avoid. To a certain sense it is a question about the autonomy of an artist, her resources and so on. Is it possible for her to be autonomous *inside the artworld*, in the middle of arttalk, which is developed by others, mostly aestheticians who have not even had any contacts with art or artists, but have tried to find so called common grounds, that is, universal criteria to deal with art, or, rather, an art criticism. That is why it is so difficult for aestheticians to deal with body art and other physical things, which I shall return later in this chapter. On the other hand, we can talk about the "subversion for hire", as Miwon Kwon does. Then, criticism turns into spectacle.¹³¹ If the specificity of site or context is rendered irrelevant, it makes easier for autonomy to be smuggled back into the art work, says Kwon.¹³² She continues her argument claiming that in this case the artist is allowed to regain her authority as the primary source of work's meaning. Thus art work is newly objectified and commodified, and site specificity is described as a personal aesthetic choice of an artist's stylistic preference. Active processes are transformed to inert objects, and in this way, site-specific art comes to represent criticality than perform it. So, we are again isolating the presentness of an (aesthetic) experience.¹³³ And, then, we are soon back into the playing field of autonomy, aesthetic differentiation, excellence, exalted style and sublime. But whose problem is that we need to use such conversational discourses as arttalk which is based on written, or rather, spoken, language?

Rorty's relativist statement has aroused much critique, also among the pragmatists. How do we know what is the best idea? Does it depend on power? Or ideally continuous conversation? Do artists give alternatives in trying to start conversations? Putnam argues that it does not involve radical cultural relativism if we deny the possibility of one absolute meaning

in favour of a multitude of uses. She writes that "[o]ur concepts may be culturally relative, but it does not follow that the truth or falsity of everything we say using those concepts is simply "decided" by the culture."¹³⁴ Fish agrees. According to him, truth is what any interpretive community allows as true, a matter entirely constituted by that community. Truth is in the making rather than already established. There are no ultimate truths because they vary individually and are dependent on individual experiences; but there are arguments and practices molded by tradition. Alternatively, an analytic philosopher, Danto, writes in his *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of art* (1986) that interpretations are what constitute works. Hence there are no works of art without them and works are misconstituted when interpretation is wrong.¹³⁵ However, if we cannot approve or agree to one interpretation only, this cannot be enough for a definition of art. From pragmatist viewpoint it is not a problem, though, since individually varied interpretations are followed by communication. Could an arttalk be this, when there are also taken along things outside of the institution. Problem is, who is an outsider, hence Dickie's and Danto's theories of institution of art, artworld, are vague. How much you need to know about art (not as professional) that you can put yourself up as a candidate for a member of artworld, and thus has the "right" to take part in arttalk. To my mind, pragmatist "practice" is, in this sense, more relevant, since it seems not to concentrate on legitimation of community (even the concept of taste) but on how interesting the conversation.

William James wrote that we have the pragmatist and the rationalist side with which to handle the structure of the universe.

On the pragmatist side we have only one edition of the universe, unfinished, growing in all sorts of places, especially in the places where thinking beings are at work. On the rationalist side we have a universe in many editions, one real one, the infinite folio, or *édition de luxe*, eternally complete; and then the various finite editions, full of false readings, distorted and mutilated each in its own way.¹³⁶

Of the theorists of modernism, Ortega y Gasset represented the latter side. Also Enzensberger's avant-garde concept proves the avant-garde, and especially its amorality, to be extremely rational.

Of course, we can accuse pragmatists of discounting analytic talk about reason, truth, ontology, or other metaphysical absolutes, as Christopher Norris remarks. According to him, it belongs, in fact, to the nature of pragmatism to pick out those passages that happen to square with the pragmatist view, which acts along with current beliefs, language-games or cultural forms or, even, styles of life. Some theorists have wanted to preserve the truth-conditional apparatus, along with its realist premises, but then the truth becomes as an intra-linguistic term, Norris states.¹³⁷ I think, that just what Norris criticizes is that what can make art (and arttalk) more democratic by taking into conversation also "ordinary people".

One important quality in postmodern thought is relevant to my study. For example, the situationist *détournement* was based on the postmodernist-type pragmatist idea that by redescribing and recontextualizing anything can be made to look the opposite of what it

seemed to be at first. The same goes with happenings and much performative art altogether. It then becomes very understandable that art started to create situations for different uses, and thus the leading element (which guides uses in some desired direction) is context. Activities in a certain context can be either context-preserving, ie, routinized, or context-breaking, ie, transgressive. Or both, in that one can also emphasize traces of non-hegemonic discourses within the dominant without claiming to transcend its terms.¹³⁸ One aim when making contextual activist art is to make art that has practical effects. It is important to make conceivable and comprehensible effects previously ignored, and to try to make conceivable practical results from these effects. This idea is based on pragmatist theory in the sense James has written about that "[i]deas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience."¹³⁹

There is no reason to exclude certain kinds of art. The heart of the problem is that we expect from art permanent and eternal statements. Theories of arts education are founded on this notion. Those who reject the political, social and didactic uses of art usually ground their arguments on the notion of art's eternal quality. It is, in fact, a matter of practice: a matter of documentation and the transient character of performative (and/or political and activist) art. Following James's train of thought, artistic truth for an activist artist without any strict style is a class-name for all sorts of definite working-values in experience.¹⁴⁰ I shall deal more with problems of experience in the next section in connection with illustrations of art; here I only introduce the pragmatic notion of experience, mostly as seen by Dewey. Art works emerge out of ordinary experiences. He reflected also James's pragmatism when writing that a philosophy of art is sterilized unless it makes us aware of the function of art in relation to other modes of experience.¹⁴¹

According to Dewey, an artist's separateness from main streams of active interest in industrial society is due to his lack of integration in the normal flow of social services. Thus artists isolate themselves, and a peculiar esthetic individualism results as an opposition to mechanical mass production.¹⁴² He stated that "[t]he conditions that create the gulf which exists generally between producer and consumer in modern society operate to create also a chasm between ordinary and esthetic experience."¹⁴³ The point is that there is no longer a gulf in this sense: artists are not so isolated. But the art world acts as if they were. Dewey continues remarking that ". . . theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in the realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, are not inherent in the subject-matter but arise because of specifiable extraneous conditions."¹⁴⁴ This can be interpreted thus, that extraneous conditions are institutions, an artworld, or even philosophy, not so much art as a form, or aesthetic, or any such thing. In Smith's recommendations for arts education the aesthetic perception of ordinary things is introduced as a preliminary state to make it easier to move to the wholly separate realm of art which is held to be *the* realm of real and appropriate aesthetic experience. Although Smith uses the term aesthetic education, it does not mean that it deals with the continuity of aesthetic experience in the normal process of living. On the

contrary, Dewey stated that "[e]ven a crude experience, if authentically an experience, is more fit to give a clue to the intrinsic nature of esthetic experience than is an object already set apart from any other mode of experience."¹⁴⁵ It is in art where the full meaning of ordinary experience is expressed, and thus art and the everyday have a similar rhythm. To my mind Dewey's theories are usable because he did not separate art totally from other human activities, for which he has also been criticized by, for example, Beardsley, Kuspit and Eaton. Experience broadens the scope of artistic legitimacy into areas outside of the narrowly defined domain of fine art. Art is no longer limited to certain traditionally privileged forms and media. (Aesthetic) experience as Dewey theorized it may not be the best single definition for classifying art; for that it is too vague, but, as Shusterman remarks, it gets us to focus on the experiential dimension of art, which has meaning especially when we talk about more participatory and interactive art forms, not to say about such forms like rock, and fashioning one's life according to certain stylistic principles. It helps us to better understand the role of an artist for example in activist art. It is also a matter of rhetorical persuasion in arttalk. When experts can no longer draw clear lines, it becomes more interesting to move between already known and familiar realms in trying to confront and experience something seemingly familiar but unforeseen, and make it meaningful for oneself, as in subcultural practices that recode cultural signs. All in all, theory is something to organize practice with. It forms a structure to relate, coordinate, or arbitrate between different practices.

Art Must be Suppressed! Background to Some Ideas of the 1960s

The situationist Raoul Vaneigem asked: "Are we an avant-garde?", and answered: "If so, to be avant-garde means to move in step with reality".¹⁴⁶ Of course, he meant that the "rear guard", prevailing society, was the society of the spectacle, and for that reason somewhat "unreal". But this statement also reveals another feature which anchors the SI and its kind strictly in the Modernism: they believed in reality, or, to be more specific, they were faithful to the reality principle of traditional ideological analysis. Modernism has always contained an idea of ultimate truth, although it can be represented in different ways. Alfred Jarry wrote: *The dramatist, like all other artists, is searching for the truth - which exists in several different versions.*¹⁴⁷

At first, the modernists believed that representational modes could be neutral, and thus that it was possible to make direct statements about reality. The situationists questioned this. In their opinion representation was manipulated, and people were given only a false version of it. They also thought the same way as the poststructuralists that culture has so thoroughly fragmentized into discourses that we cannot make contact with real life unless we first examine the ways these discourses form our experiences. Some of the poststructuralists ended up with the conclusion that there is

no such thing as "real life" but that representational modes are discourses themselves - they also construct that what is given expression to. According to Baudrillard, they (representational modes) create what is expressed - neutrality is an impossibility. Thus we can understand Jarry's idea (in the truly pragmatist manner) to mean that the truth itself exists in several different versions - not only representations of it, as Jarry admittedly stated - and that there are no attempts to gain the truth, but to investigate its different versions, ie, discourses. This is best demonstrated by comparing the sabotage perpetrated by the German actor Wolfgang Neuss in 1962 to present practices. He bought advertising space from the widely circulated newspaper *Der Abend* and revealed in advance who was the murderer in a television detective series which people had excitedly been watching for weeks. It is interesting to compare Neuss's move with the activities around the TV series *Twin Peaks* thirty years later. When the series started, "everybody" knew who killed Laura Palmer, but you could not say it aloud because it was a secret - a kind of simulated secret, though. The artificial 'aura' built around *Twin Peaks* connects it to postmodern culture; especially since the nature and identity of Laura Palmer's murderer was not so clear a "truth" as the identity of the murderer in the detective series thirty years earlier.

In the 1960s there was a lot of vivid discussion about the state of art over the previous 25-30 years and the fate of the avant-garde. It was maintained that it was only at that time that people had become aware of the failure of the avant-garde. This awareness led to the institutionalization of criticism. If art became aesthetic commodities, then criticism wrapped them up. The situationists, especially, were keen on displaying this sort of criticism. They stated that all art is, however, "social" in the sense that its roots are in a given society and it has to have some relation to the prevailing conditions or their negation. In other words, the situationist vision of art started with the notion that art has political and social tasks, and *l'art pour l'art* is only an alienated art of the spectacle society. Because art which had become banal through repetition was art appropriated by the spectacle, they claimed that it must be forbidden. Although art had continuously renewed itself, the situationists stated that what changes our way of seeing the streets is more important than what changes our way of seeing a painting.¹⁴⁸ This loan from the surrealists was a common notion among other groups in the sixties too, such as Fluxus.

According to the situationists, and other radical leftists, a revolutionary alteration of the present forms of culture can be nothing less than the supersession of all aspects of the aesthetic and technological apparatus that constitutes the aggregation of spectacles separated from life. The change must be total. One should not look only at the surface meanings when trying to find a spectacle's relation to the problems of society, but at the deepest level, at the level of *its function as a spectacle*.¹⁴⁹ To understanding this level would also need an understanding of the means of (autonomous) art, for the spectacle exploits them, especially in advertising and politics.

The situationists dusted down Dada and Surrealism and borrowed their ideas and expressions as needed. Dada, especially, excelled in destroying the conventions of artistic communication. Dada held attack to be the

best gesture; with Surrealism the situationists also learned to defend. The most original feature of the SI was that they did not start headlong to produce new ideas, but concentrated on weeding the modernist garden. The situationists began their activity as an artistic revolutionary movement, although claiming, however, that all aware people agree that art can no longer be justified as a superior activity, or even as an activity of compensation to which one could honorably devote oneself.¹⁵⁰ Art as an end in itself, as artistic commodity production, is useless. In the founding program of the SI, Debord pointed out that "[o]ne of the contradictions of the bourgeoisie in its phase of liquidation is that while it respects the abstract principle of intellectual and artistic creation, it at first resists actual creations, then eventually exploits them".¹⁵¹ The bourgeoisie is uncertain, and it needs the label 'art' to evaluate, define, and, in the end, feeling secure, to recuperate creative products. It was against the bourgeoisie that the radical movements started their crusade in the beginning of twentieth century, at first the dadaists and after them many others, the situationists at the end of the 1950s.

In the SI, a critique of art and more general argumentation about art and culture were the most heated from the beginning of the 1960s. In the third conference in Munich, April 1959, ideological differences between the Dutch section and Debord became aggravated: Debord held revolutionary creativity to be totally separate from the prevailing culture, whilst the Dutch representatives defended a unitary urbanism as an important alternative means to arriving at free creativity, and they supported the idea of a cultural revolution. Debord had to see creativity as separate from the dominant culture, since it was bourgeois. He did not want to fall into the same dilemma as the surrealists, who a few decades earlier had had difficulties in combining free creativity and revolutionary political ideas. Those 'Debordian' situationists wanted to realize and suppress art.

The time for art is over. It is now a matter of *realizing* art, of really building on every level of life everything that hitherto could only be an artistic memory or an illusion, dreamed and preserved unilaterally. Art can be realized *only by being suppressed*. However, as opposed to the present society, which suppresses it by replacing it with the automatism of an even more passive and hierarchical spectacle, we maintain that art can really be suppressed *only by being realized*.¹⁵²

Realizing art meant to make art needless, which would happen when everyday life becomes through the construction of situations so interesting and rich that there is no longer any need for artificial substitutes such as art. The SI, however, did not fall into iconoclasm. Art was a part of the spectacle which had to be totally destroyed. When the goal is total revolution, there is no point in directing havoc at only one part of the spectacle. The situationists were also quite aware of the fact that iconoclasm functions like atheism: wanting to destroy pictures, it actually strengthens and admits the power of pictures. Thus the situationist strategy was more constructive; instead of destroying pictures, past works of art, they began to exploit them by detouring, ie, recycling and reusing them. They turned the Dada strategy upside down. Dadaists tried to create scandals and spectacles in art

by using materials from outside of art, whereas the situationists tried to make a total revolution by using art as material. Of all the art modes they above all approved of the film, for it best enabled detournement. Comics was another favoured art, since it is the art of the masses. Popular culture was commodity culture, though, and, according to the situationists, inauthentic. They did to comics the same thing Jorn had done to flea market pictures when he overpainted them (and called them modifications): by putting their own fingerprints on anonymous comics, that is to say, for example, by changing the texts in speech balloons, the situationists made them more "authentic". The break was made with the more traditional arts, since they were held to be elitist and isolated.

The situationists made it clear that personal expression within an institutional framework cannot be called creation. They argued that creation is not the arrangement of objects and forms but the invention of new laws prescribing that arrangement.¹⁵³ They meant that what counts are the novelty of structures and new modes and media of expression. Their notion of creativity was a rather traditional, based on originality. The SI wanted to be authentic and original - not to play any role. This is a subject-centered notion, typical of an avant-garde based on the metaphysical thinking that there is an essence in things as opposing historical or contextual relativism.

The situationists, and lettrists before them, had often blamed art and creativity for liquidating into repetition after the active phase of the radical avant-garde. There has been a transition from the original avant-gardist battle stations to the alluringly packaged and published repetitions of prevailing forms, pieces and slices of previous culture, which have been wholly removed from the context of their real meanings. These opinions prove how the situationists had internalized the modernist demand for continuous novelty. In their view the former moments of contestation have survived only fragmentarily and lost their artistic (or postartistic) value to the extent that they have lost the heart of the original controversy. With their loss of this heart they have also lost any reference to the mass of postartistic acts, such as revolt and free reconstruction of life, that already exist and that are tending to replace art.¹⁵⁴ They accused such art phenomena as Pop of an apparent revolt which is only performing, not really fighting for important things. This kind of fragmentary contestation can only withdraw to an aesthetic position and harden into a dated and ineffectual aesthetic.¹⁵⁵ The situationists claimed that this had happened to the Surrealism, for example.

In their time the situationists maintained that the submissive intelligentsia's mode of existence denies the living values of intellectual and artistic creation, and yet this intelligentsia wants to embellish its social position by claiming a close relation with this creation of "values". This intelligentsia is more or less aware of this contradiction and tries to redeem itself by an ambiguous glorification of artistic "bohemianism", the situationists wrote.¹⁵⁶ They argued that a revolutionary minority can realize its project only by suppressing itself. The "Intellectual Party" can really exist only as a party that supersedes itself, a party whose victory is at the same time its own disappearance.¹⁵⁷ It is a question of the same thing as in the realization of art:

"We are artists only insofar as we are no longer artists: we come to realize art".¹⁵⁸ Thus the situationists deliberated and actually anticipated the crisis of the intellectuals, which had been claimed to be the starting point of postmodern culture. Postmodern has been said to express the experience of those intellectuals and experts who had fallen into an identity crisis on realizing that nobody needs their services anymore. The crisis is due to the fact that the work of legitimation done by intellectuals is no longer significant in a situation where the grand narratives have been replaced by new, recyclable and fragmented discourses, and where people's self-expertise has become favoured.

The situationists, Fluxus, many happening groups and individual artists, writers and directors (both in film and theatre) in the 1960s had continued the radical avant-garde project of uniting art and life. The SI can reasonably be called the last avant-garde in the world, since it took this project theoretically furthest, which is the reason I deal so extensively with this group in my study. They were not content with what many other conceptual and happening artists at that time were satisfied with, namely to think that art and life as different spheres only touched each other in appropriate contexts, that is, were integrated momentarily. The situationists wanted total fusion, such as would change both art and life. Let Mark Boyle's happening *Street* (1964) illustrate the difference between the SI and other avant-gardists. The work posed a question about the congruence of art and life. In this happening the art "work", uncovered behind the curtains on the opening night, was the gallery window, through which one could see ordinary streetlife, and those on the street side saw the vernissage audience staring from inside. In this case there remains only the plain institution: the gallery and the situation where everybody is in fact in the role of the flâneur. However, whereas the other avant-gardists would be inside the gallery, the situationists would have been on the street. For the SI this would only be the start for a critique, although the event seemed to some extent to resemble the construction of situations.

The radical avant-garde had some ideals; they believed in changing the reality that is there. At the end of the 1980s, the neoist Monty Cantsin wrote: "I believe in the power of the imagination to change the world, to release all the prisoners and abolish all oppressing systems for whom the most frightening idea is freedom!"¹⁵⁹ This statement summarizes a whole century of idealistic ideas: it unites Jarry's pataphysics, Marinetti's manifestos, dadaist gestures as well as Klein's leap and Maciunas' games. In fact, Neoism is an ism that swallowed every modernist ism and then puked out the pieces, as Cynthia Carr writes. She continues that in a culture where it is increasingly difficult to find the margin, the neoists had found it.¹⁶⁰ I doubt this, since with their catchy illogical and nihilist phrases, they have their place on the cultural map in relation to the tradition of the radical avant-garde, as having an ironic attitude to it. In fact, they demonstrate the relation of contemporary culture to the modernist tradition. It is empty of belief in any real ambitions, but a convenient way to consume time. The neoists were born about the same time as Neuss performed his "sabotage"; they are the generation for whom TV series and cult movies constitute essential culture and the cold war concrete history. They are with-

out any illusions: the slogan of '68 *Under the Cobblestones the Beach* was changed in the 1980s into *Under the Cobblestones the Sewer*.¹⁶¹ It is not a question of a utopia in the same sense as the earlier utopia that aimed at for changing the world. Utopianism has had a tradition, and, for example, a samizdat aspect since the beginning of the century, which has given it a possibility (at least partly) of remaining independent and outside the cultural and commercial institutions of the ruling society. What was left of utopianism in the 1980s was only the samizdat and a tradition - but no utopia any more.

SITUATIONAL AESTHETICS OF THE 1960S

*Meret Oppenheim ist so berühmt dass
manche sie, ungeachtet ihres schönen
Vornamens, für einen Mann halten.*

- Jan Tabor -

At the end of the fifties American artists Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns brought Dada again into the art world. In art history one starting point of this rebirth has been said to be Robert Motherwell's *The Dada Painters and Poets*, published in 1951. The Europeans did not find Dada through it, but the Dada spirit had been mediated to them through the surrealists (COBRA) and the Lettrist movement¹⁶², the latter of which had declared Dada dead and Lettrism its substitute. Thus it is, in historical sense, slightly far-fetched to consider the relation of détournement of the SI to, for example, Rauschenberg's collages, in which, although there are political images, they do not take social positions. The closest connection can rather be found in Edward Lucie-Smith's remark that the logical elements of Rauschenberg's creative work can be seen in relation to the urban society and technology in which he lives.¹⁶³ At first this observation seems quite trivial: the whole of modernism is derived from the wandering of the Baudelairean flâneur in the midst of the shock experiences of city culture. But, in fact, art had already in the 1950s drawn itself ever farther apart from the surrounding reality. Difficulties had been experienced in placing the surrealist wanderings in Paris into art history. Cage, whose student and colleague Rauschenberg was in the late 1940s, returned the relation to the mundane, although he talked about the gap between art and everyday.

In fact, the happening was, at least around the beginning of this century and especially in Dada, anti-art in nature: life was, so to speak, brought into art. Dada-happenings had therapeutic meaning in that through their existence they demonstrated a utopia about a better world, which anyway cannot exist, because its realization is prevented by the worse world the dadaists presented.¹⁶⁴ Almost half a century later, in so-called neo-dada, the happening became established in art; its task was to work on behalf of (pure) art against reified and commodified art.

Something is Happening

Art had become separated from people's lives. Thus artists tried to find new bridges. The happening was one of them. Entering the happenings of the late fifties was the need to do art that was distinct from any known genre (or any combination of genres). It meant eliminating art contexts, audiences, single time/place envelopes, staging areas, roles, plots, acting skills, rehearsals, repeated performances and readable scripts. Kaprow claimed that this new art/life genre reflected equally the artificial aspects of everyday life and the lifelike qualities of created art.¹⁶⁵ I deal with lifelike, or happening, art at rather length because, although inside the art world (as well as Beuys), it paved a way for more boundary-transgressing social and communal contemporary art. Artists and theorists of the 1960s laid the basis on which it became possible to deal with other performative art. It is also important to understand that it is not only a matter of the performing arts but to connect and mix medias. This has often been misunderstood or forgotten, probably due to the theorists' own limitations, since usually they have been educated in only one art genre, or, at least they have defended certain genres only, perhaps to maintain their positions. Even more oddly, philosophers have not seen this either; perhaps they are not so keen on the arts as a whole than their particular 'art' hobby.

A kind of prologue to the happening was an event at the Black Mountain College in 1952 where various performances took place at the same time.¹⁶⁶ In art history usually the first of these was Kaprow's *18 Happenings in 6 Parts* (1959), from which the media picked up on the label "Happening" for the new genre.¹⁶⁷ This was not Kaprow's intention. He simply wanted to throw out the conventions of the theatre, and this is reflected in his writings about happenings. Some other theorists, Darko Suvin, for example, have tried to define the genre and its aesthetics by connecting it to theatre. Suvin also integrated magical-religious aspects into the happening, as also did Jean-Jacques Lebel and Schechner. (I suppose Danto's theory of 'disturbing art' is in debt to these notions.) Thus there are slightly different opinions as to the nature of a happening. Although theorists usually agree about certain basic features, such as a lack of plot, literary script or roles etc. Michael Kirby was one of the first who tried to define the genre, and I follow him in presenting the basic conceptions behind the happening.

According to Kirby, happenings have a nonverbal character and compartmented structure, which is based on the arrangement and contiguity of theatrical units that are completely self-contained and hermetic. The compartments may be arranged sequentially or simultaneously. The happening is also nonmatrixed performance: no use is made of time, place, or character etc. When the performer carries out a task, variations and differences do not matter within the idea for the action formulated by the artist. One performer reacts only functionally, and not aesthetically or creatively, to the actions of another.¹⁶⁸ This differs from artistic improvisation. Kirby stated that action in happenings is often indeterminate but not improvised. According to Kirby's definitions: a happening is "a purposefully composed form of theatre in which diverse alogical elements, including

nonmatrixed performing, are organized in a compartmented structure."¹⁶⁹ However, nonmatrixed performances which are complete in themselves are referred to as events.¹⁷⁰ Fluxus "concerts" were usually composed of events. In the happening there is no information structure: the acts do not add meaning to one another, and one can be fully "understood" without any of the others. There is neither logic nor illogic, but it is alogical. Without acted out emotions, ie, roles, to mask their own feelings, the performers' own attitudes are more apt to become manifest than they are in traditional theatre.¹⁷¹ Kirby called works which are performed without an audience activities. Examples of such works are some pieces by George Brecht, whose work, according to Kirby, implies that any performance piece has an aesthetic value for its performer or creator which is distinct from its value for an audience.¹⁷² To my mind, that value have not to be aesthetic in any way. This kind of happenings are also comparable to the Dada soirées, which have no structure either, although often performed on stage.

The possibility of mistake is an integral part of happenings. It brings a chance into play. Kaprow argued that chance and uncontrollability over the everyday environment appeared more attractive and interesting than the relative predictability of the chance method in traditional modern art. If Cage brought the chancy and noisy world into the concert hall (ie, to the art world environment), a next step was to move right out into that uncertain world and forget the framing devices of concert hall, gallery, stage, and so forth.¹⁷³

From the point of view of an audience, there is no relevant framework of reason to which impressions may be referred.¹⁷⁴ Thus there arises the question about an experience without either practical or analytical interests. But neither is life organized into any hieratical structures. The less the theatrical occasion is structured and the more it is like unstructured daily life the greater will be the stimulus to the structuring faculty of each person in the audience. "If we have done nothing, then he will have everything to do", said Cage.¹⁷⁵ In many happenings there is a great difference in both amount and quality, in what is seen by different spectators.¹⁷⁶ Even though each individual component may be very structured in a happening, the combination would tend to go in a nonintentional, unstructured direction. According to Cage, it then resembles daily life.¹⁷⁷ This is also a difference from Dada soirées and events. They were supposed not to resemble daily life but to shock people to the edge of frustration when an audience easily became provoked and even violent sometimes. They evoked feelings an art audience did not normally has.

There was an apparent lack of meaning or content in early happenings towards the end of the 1950s. An example is the happening evening in New York in 1960 that was really intended to make an audience become conscious of the very situation: Dick Higgins counted in German until everybody left. This "performance" by Higgins was a catalyst in the sense that people in an audience could observe their own behaviour and reactions. It possibly directed some people inwards, to their own thoughts, some others to react to the situation as art. It was more modest developed than those of Dada - acts which were just for irritation. Suvin has asked

whether happenings shock for therapeutic or terrorist ends. They can do both. Study of an audience later became an important part of happenings.

New York artist Dan Graham studied the active and passive conduct of the viewer in his works. He wished to combine the role of active performer and passive spectator in one and the same person. In *Two Consciousness Projection* (1973) two people were asked to verbalize how they viewed one of the partners. A woman sat in front of a video screen which showed her face, while a man looked through the video camera trained on her face. As she examined her features and described what she saw, the man, at the same time, related how he read her face. Both the man and woman were active in that they were creating a performance (in front of an audience), but they were also passive spectators in that they were watching themselves performing. RoseLee Goldberg writes that Graham's theory of audience-performer relationship was based on Brecht's idea of imposing an uncomfortable and self-conscious state on the audience in an attempt to reduce the gap between the two.¹⁷⁸ Consequently, there was "hightened awareness" of the situation as Osborne referred to it in his theory of appreciation. However, it was hardly an entirely detached and separate experience. Osborne, like many other theorists, apologizes for non-controversial art. It is possible to alienate things safely to present the familiar as unfamiliar to the extent that we see something new in it, its "true nature", as Osborne states. Dewey writes about parting us from "the slackness of routine" and enabling us to forget ourselves in the midst of varied qualities and forms of life. According to him, it orders us into a new experience of life. I would argue that both of them are slightly wrong, at least in what concerns Graham's work and works like it. Graham wanted to give the language between self and external reality a new role, more like, say, the cubists at the turn of this century; a participant was to see herself from all sides at the same time: as a spectator, performer and as subject matter. Thus Osborne's detached aesthetic experience and Dewey's transformation to another state of perception are both irrelevant when dealing with the kind of art exemplified above. However, well-intentioned, we can defend Dewey's account, since it was a matter of a new experience of life, if, perhaps as disordered as life itself. This, however, left the question as to what, then, these possible pragmatist consequences are.

By the 1970s, along with the happenings of the previous decade, an audience had already learnt to be a participant. They knew what was expected from them and how to take part in a game. They no longer presumed that they should take any aesthetic distance, at least not in the use of all the art(s). In fact, it means to break the state of aesthetic contemplation in the traditional sense, where absorption is achieved so that there is a loss of subjective time-sense, a loss of the sense of place and a loss of bodily consciousness.¹⁷⁹ However, the Brechtian notion presumed that there should be a proper (aesthetic) distance: perceiver should know her role and place as a part of an audience. Graham's work studied this situation by mixing up the roles of producer, receiver and the place of the work of art in relation to subjects and objects.

In the United States when artists (painters and sculptors) crossed into theatre, they took with them their way of seeing and doing things, that is,

their visual arts aesthetic. The European venue was the street, in *flâneur*. Americans performed more in galleries and other art spaces. Art did not move into the streets in the United States until the end of the 1960s. Americans were more eager to make happenings "plain" art and connect it to the tradition as an art form. Europeans were more political.

Wolf Vostell is an important person in the history of the European happening. Vostell's happenings were life and also commentary on it. His ideal was also to confront the spectator with reorganized fragments of reality. Continuity of space and time was interrupted in the context of the well-known, the habitual, the familiar. The intention was, once more, to provoke the spectator to take a fresh look at things, in the same way as the *flâneur* had looked at his surroundings. But just looking at was not enough, not the passivity of the *flâneur*. Already in the 1960s artists wanted to force people to *react* creatively with their environment. Vostell used spatial surroundings to influence the participants through the environment, and the environment through the presence of human beings.¹⁸⁰ He also used materials which are usually symbolic objects of consumer society: TVs, telephones, cars, buses. These attempts differed from Surrealism and Dada which concentrated on the message received: shock, cruelty and insolence.

At first Vostell did not call his art happenings but they were a decomposition of life - *décollage*. Later he also talked about happenings, which, according to his definition are:

. . . planned or improvised events (incorporating already existing events plus phases & shocks of the environment) occurring either simultaneously or in linear succession in many parts of the city and not depending on closed rooms; . . . the spectator is actively engaged in a series of events that have not been rehearsed - his reactions & behavior determine the course of the happening. . .^{1 81}

According to Jean-Jacques Lebel, who created happenings in the early 1960s, and also belonged for a short time to the SI, all happenings have in common that they give back to artistic activity what has been torn away from it: the intensification of feeling, the play of instinct, a sense of festivity, social agitation.¹⁸² Of course it is possible to ask to what extent have they diminished art? I suppose that Lebel meant a certain gallery art of his time which had taken for granted the detached aesthetic experience in the sense of Osborne's appreciation. The qualities Lebel listed may have been vanishing from the point of view of the receiver of art. Alternatively, community, festivity and social agitation were the ideas of the 1960s, born on the contrary out of the privatization of life (in suburbs, for example). They hold still good, even better than ever. In Lebel's statements can be seen the influence of Surrealism: the preeminence of artistic creation over rational examination and also the renovation and intensification of perception.¹⁸³ Lebel stated that all art is magic and it satisfies a need for magic. According to him, although happenings often revert to ritual attitudes, their ritual is subjective and almost mythless, a point also emphasized by the situationists. It was to ritualize a mix of lifelike elements and fantasy, reject the staging area, and invite a number of people to take part, explaining the

plan in the spirit of ceremony. In this ceremonial situation the artist was the leader, and, to some extent, nonetheless it eliminated the audience and lent a piece a little autonomy.

Kaprow made the rules for happenings in 1966.¹⁸⁴ They can be compared to contemporary performative art. Kaprow wrote that *the line between the Happening and daily life should be kept as fluid and perhaps indistinct as possible. Then the reciprocation between the handmade and the readymade will be at its maximum power.* This reciprocation is no more a value in itself although it is also used in contemporary art. Secondly, *themes, materials, actions, and the associations they evoke are to be gotten from anywhere except from the arts, their derivatives, and their milieu. Happenings are not a composite or total art, nor even are they a synthesis of the arts.* This is also slightly different from, for example, the radical avant-gardism of Brecht and the détournement of the SI or other practices of using a cultural heritage as material. Contemporary art has more open relation to the cultural past. It has no need to differentiate itself from the traditional art modes to gain any identity. On the contrary, it uses the cultural past hence its images are often familiar and the meaning levels are materials to play with. According to Kaprow, *the Happening should be dispersed over several widely spaced, sometimes moving and changing, locales.* This is to be in opposition to the institutional frames. Since the 1960s art has gained more space in the urban or other non-art environments, and the institutional frames have also become wider. Kaprow was against formalisms when he stated that *time, closely bound up with things and spaces, should be variable and independent of the convention of continuity. Whatever is to happen should do so in its natural time.* In contemporary art, there is often playing with conventions. We are used to the fact that the rhythm of everyday life differs from the rhythm of nature. We modify our life-forms and create rhythms. Kaprow stated that *the composition of all materials, sections, images, and their times and spaces should be undertaken in as artless and, again, practical a way as possible. This does not refer to formlessness, but the avoidance of form theories associated with the arts that have to do with arrangement per se, such as serial technique, dynamic symmetry etc. A happening perhaps alludes more to the form of games and sports than to the forms of art.* Nowadays it is not so much in controversy against art (theories) in art. They are just one piece of play. But even more so art has come closer to the other performative modes, or the aestheticization has brought them closer to art. Partly it is only a matter of definitions, since there is not much that differentiates a rock concert or sports events from artistic spectacles. Kaprow wrote that *Happenings should be unrehearsed and performed by nonprofessionals, once only. No skills are required to enact the events, thus there's no reason to rehearse and repeat because there is nothing to improve.* We can also think that art can be an arts educational process in a sense that participants are also learning some skills. Kaprow thinks of only one happening - a work of art, not a process. *It follows that there should not be (and usually cannot be) an audience or audiences to watch a Happening. All are participants in one way or another.* In fact, Lacy's notion of a public domain of many performative works broadens also the concept of participants. There are an artist or a

group, collaborators, performers (participators), contacts, spectators (the audience on the spot), the art audience (learning about the project through documentations), and the larger audience that contacts the work through media.

To these Kaprow adds that a happening means of assigning a new or multiple set of functions to a situation normally bound by convention. It is always a purposive activity, whether it is gamelike, ritualistic, or purely contemplative. Having a purpose may be a way of paying attention to what is commonly not noticed. Purpose implies a selective operation, limiting a happening to certain situations out of countless options; the choice itself suggests value: what is presented is worthwhile in some way. What is left out, by virtue of its very exclusion, is less worthwhile for the time being: it is withheld from our attention. Life as a happening is only a small portion of life that can be apprehended as one.¹⁸⁵ Kaprow's concept of happening consists of framing and stopping situations, as such it resembles an attitude of the flâneur. When we bring the productive aspect into this it means what Dewey stated that art is instrumental to new satisfying events, and this fineness is not limited only to the traditional art modes, but any act relevant to production of objects or dispositions, which are in turn productive of further satisfying events, exhibits fineness of art.¹⁸⁶ An artist should start a chain reaction producing art, not only the work itself.

In an essay *The Real Experiment* (1983) Kaprow made a summary of lifelike art. Then he saw that the key experiment was not to invent new art genres but to recognize the secularization of the entire art situation: genre, frame, public, and purpose. Art shifted from its familiar contexts. Performing was *doing* something, not acting in the theatre. According to Kaprow, the art public had changed: the traditional audience which used to go to exhibitions, concerts and plays had become irrelevant; instead, there were participants, artists in their art by themselves, and all in all, there was no longer an ideal public but a diversified and mobile one with particular interests. Kaprow stated that lifelike art did not merely label life as art but was continuous with that life; it was always attentive. The purpose of lifelike art was therapeutic: to reintegrate the piecemeal reality we take for granted, not just intellectually, but directly, as experience at this moment, in this place.¹⁸⁷ This do not need any skilled appreciation. Lifelike art was not the same thing as transforming non-art to high art by framing it properly. This have been done a lot, usually in three stages: (1) Select some aspect(s) of non-art (Duchamp), and put them on exhibition or on a stage. (This is like tossing a metaphor into a conversation; the change of context Derrida also talks much about.) (2) Select certain non-art sites and then find ready-mades. In these spaces that signified art we present something more or less lifelike that only minimally engages the surrounding environment. (3) Discover high art everywhere. (The flâneur and, in a certain sense, admirers of camp culture did this.) The problem with this approach, said Kaprow, is that we cannot bypass the perceptual clichés and values of traditional modern art. These attitudes produce artfied packages of the elements drawn from the everyday environment.¹⁸⁸

The nouveau réalisme, or, junk art, as it was also called, was in Europe merely just the commercial version of "lifelike" art as objects. These

objects, constructed of scrap vehicles or rubber gloves and so on, were different from later works, such as Portia Munson's *Pink Table* (1995) and the objects that it consists of, that is, everything pink she could find. The latter work also contained elements of historicity and particularism, but nonetheless, objects had lost their original nature to a certain extent. The perceiver can give them her own entirely subjective meanings; objects do not mean the same thing for all, they have some historical nature, and the colour has certain symbolism (at least in the United States), but what kind depends on the subjective biographies and narratives of a recipient. We can use the terms 'artified' and 'contextual' contents, which are opposites in these works, although they are displayed in museums. The objects of nouveau réalisme referred to an art world; as in Dada, they were junk brought into art. However, Munson's work directed itself outside of the art world into people's lives, despite the fact that she used collected ready-made material. She did not make it unfamiliar; instead, delight in recognizing something familiar was just one way of approach the work.

The SI resisted the incorporation and alienation of the happening into art. Instead, they wanted to return this mode of expression, borrowed from art, without any name into everyday practice, back to life. The line is extremely thin, as the comparison of Vostell's happenings with the psychogeographical *dérive* proves. But there are also differences. For instance, in happenings the performer is frequently treated in the same fashion as a prop or a stage effect; the individual creativity and technical subtlety of the human operation decreases. It thus involves modernist dehumanization. "Performers become things and things become performers."¹⁸⁹ Or, as Adrian Henri remarked: "In happenings the people are just people, like the Coke-bottles stuck on an assemblage."¹⁹⁰ This idea is an example of the instrumental use of an audience and also of evaluation by the standards of visual art only; it is a comparison with collage-type expression. The descriptions of the happenings of the 1960s feature a lot of 'naked girls', anonymous women, who just stand on the stage, or were instruments for making something an artist wanted to do. The most known example is Yves Klein's naked 'girls' who function as paintbrushes. There is a distinction between the happenings of the 1960s and certain performative modes of contemporary art: performers have become more like real participants whose own doings, ideas and motives influence the structure of work.

If we roughly summarize, we can say that characteristic of the European happening was its political awareness directed against consumer culture and alienation (Vostell)/ therapeutic character (cults & rituals (Beuys, Nitsch)/ existentialism (Filliou, Vautier)/ familiarity with Brecht's ideas, and awareness of Dada. American happenings were usually more theatrical using human elements as material parts of live artistic collage, they were performed also in artistic locations.¹⁹¹

The Construction of Situations

To examine the "boundary" between an autonomous art and life, it is interesting to study the construction of the situations mounted by the SI, since with their theory of it they did in fact try to create a new mode of expression by combining all existing expression modes under the concept and sphere of activities.

Constructing situations was the most important form of activity of the situationists. It included psychogeographical explorations, *dérive* and *détournement* as a form of expression. They attempted to fulfill the utopia of the radical avant-gardists: to unite art and life. According to the situationists, it was necessary continuously to anticipate a world where the construction of situations would become everyday reality. Anticipating that kind of world means attempting to realize it. The situationists did not see any inconsistency in claiming to create such situations as would ease the emergence of a revolutionary condition, which, for its part, was destined to produce the world where the construction of situations would be possible. Like the lettrists, the situationists believed that the new civilization of the future would consist of adventurers who would construct situations and adventures; they held the existence of a science of life to be possible, if one could just overcome the everyday routines that the situationists saw as a fault of the spectacle society. We must not forget that, although both the situationists and early pragmatists believed in the reality principle, everyday in its routines was for the situationists unreal. Alternatively, Dewey, for example, even held everyday reality to be routinized, although he wanted to organize it in order to make it richer in experience. Dewey also had educational aims in mind. In fact, a similar pragmatism can also be seen in the situationists' theories.

The first "manifesto" about the construction of situations was in Debord's film *Hurléments en faveur de Sade* (1952). It was stated that psychology, statistics, urbanism and moral elements should be joined together to form an entirely new kind of conscious creation of situations. "The construction of situations begins on the ruins of the modern spectacle", Debord wrote five years later in a text outlined for the foundation of the Situationist International. He continued that it is easy to see to what extent the very principle of the spectacle, that of non-intervention, is linked to the alienation of the old world. Conversely, he claimed, the most pertinent revolutionary experiments in culture have sought to break the spectator's psychological identification with the hero so as to draw him into activity by provoking his capacities to revolutionize his own life.¹⁹² In this Debord refers to the alienation effects of Brecht's epic theatre. I suggest that the idea of constructing situations is a slightly extended application of Brecht's basic idea that the situation is made to be lived by its constructors. The role played by a passive or merely bit-part playing "audience" must constantly diminish, while that played by those who cannot be called actors but rather, in the new sense of the term, "livers", must steadily increase.¹⁹³

Already at the turn of this century the dadaists stated that by living one's life one is doing Dada! The starting points of the situationists were in dadaist ideas, but their aim was to widen these ideas to become more applicable to everyday needs. They tried to develop more exact methods for their activities, in order to remove the indecision and curiosity that remained associated with Dada. In an article *Problemes preliminaires a la construction d'une situation* (Preliminary Problems in Constructing a Situation), published in the first issue of the *Internationale situationniste*, June 1958, some premises for constructing situations were outlined. Activities have to be intentional: each of the participants in an adventure would have to discover precise desires for ambiances in order to realize them. Hence it is possible to determine the elements out of which situations can be constructed, along with projects to render these elements dynamic. The constructed situation is necessarily collective in its preparation and development. Although, the situationists claimed that at least for the period of the first rough experimentations a given situation requires one individual to play a preeminent role as "director".¹⁹⁴

Although the situationists remarked that the relation between the director and the "livers" of the situation must never become a permanent specialization but has to be the purely temporal subordination of the whole team of the situationists to the particular person responsible for the particular project, what else is talk about constructing situations than talk about plays (as *leikki*, or *lek*) whose organizers change, or about a theatre where the roles of the director and actors succeed one another? The situationists declared their aim to be complete collectivity, but they found it to be impossible in practice. Alternatively, the idea about changing roles is fruitful, even if roles are not discarded; this problem haunts discussions about art even nowadays, when people are said to realize different roles and lifestyles in their everyday lives; although it can be said that only number of roles for art audiences is rather limited.

When situations are artificial (ie, constructed), every part of them creates an effect. In this sense they resemble works of art the artist has made into organized and predetermined wholes. Dada realized the same idea by carefully preparing presentations, events and soirées; happenings are part of the same tradition. However, constructing situations in the situationist meaning differs from organized events as described above in that they were not as performative in their nature as Dada actions, or part of the happening boom of the 1960s. Although the situationists talked about the science of life (which in fact was rather typical rhetoric without necessarily any content for them), they did not aim to construct the whole of life but *an insight* into what was done at a given time and why. The intention was to experience *Erlebnis* even in the most ordinary situations, and thus escape the dullness of life. Roberto Ohrt still refers to the similarity between of constructed situations and artificial spectacles. He asks whether the construction of situations is only one kind of spectacle targeted at a protest-enthusiastic audience.¹⁹⁵ In fact, it is to a certain extent a matter of shaping reality and utopia.

The situationists themselves held the construction of situations to be the opposite of art works, whose aim is to give form to momentary things

and to make them permanent. Intentionally constructed situations, instead, consist always of their own negation and opposite; they are continuously changing so that it is impossible to grasp the event or to stop it. Tensions emerged from continuously finding new and surprising elements in the situations. Ohrt is quite right asserting that the idea of constructing situations greatly resembles certain tendencies in Europe and the United States during the 1950s which stress processes and action as the motives and contents of art. Klein, for example, considered his demonstrations around the late fifties as "spiritual marks of captured moments"¹⁹⁶. The situationists wanted to dissociate themselves from these movements and the happening boom, but, however, did not do it very convincingly.

In fact, the starting point of the SI and some other movements in the 1960s was to suppress art because it encourages reification. One way to resist art becoming an object of possession is to activate art. The aim is a pure doing that one cannot reduce even to the need to have the result of that doing. After World War II, at least in Abstract Expressionism, art activated itself when the emphasis moved from an art object to the process of making art. During that time happenings, and later performances, became more and more frequent. To resist the commodification of art was a political gesture. It was to study the internal development of art, but also to point out the status art has in a society. It was circulating around the problem of the autonomy of art in the sense that of who has a right to art and how. The situationists are an interesting example, since they were stubborn in denying all 'arttalk' about their doings which, in fact, other groups, Fluxus, for example, eagerly practised and also played with.

The SI wanted to examine the relation between consciousness and its being at the mercy of the world, but it did not try (as many other movements at the time) to separate consciousness wholly from the situation, ie, factuality or world. They, for example, did not care about the hippie and LSD culture of the 1960s. Rather it was a matter of showing and revealing the world in the sense Sartre was writing about.

The starting point is that no one can escape her situation, that is to say, her (historical) context. Also the refusal to speak or to take part means to take a position. With the SI the question arose about becoming conscious of the situation and, further, its construction; not so much about transcending the historical situation of an individual and its factuality. The context is not given only for the purpose of apprehending it and adjusting to it, but it is the context for the act, that is to say, the situation is created *for* something (for becoming conscious of something, for apprehending the possibilities of changing the world, etc.) This is also activity in its most ideal state, because it does not produce any commodified object for having. Aesthetic theories and theories of art do not deny the role of the individual situation and context, but their aim is to reduce their part in experiencing art. Art is not intended for something other than, at most, an aesthetic experience itself.

Overcoming the existing situation is a part of an avant-garde. An artist tries to minimize the factuality in her situation, or, at least, continually fights against the effects of factuality when trying to retain her freedom. The situationists wanted to make everyone an artist and a hero of her own

life. The routinized everyday life is not a matter of repetition as such but of repeating conventions without motivating them at all from one's own standpoint. Freedom in a situation does not resolve the problems, however; it is only a starting point, and the situationists also held it as such: as a premise for changing the world.

The situationists did not consider the construction of situations as art, but as precisely the opposite, namely as an activity replacing art. Thus they joined with those movements in the 1960s who held art to be an artificial, false and bourgeois phenomenon, and wanted to substitute it with something else. As I have stated, Adorno's attitude to these aims was rather cynical. In his aesthetics he talked about the spirit which turns artefacts into art. But he did not hold it possible for this spirit to exist without its antithesis, ie, an artefact. According to Adorno, the history of art knows of no works which have attained pure identity of spirit and non-spirit.¹⁹⁷ Adorno's statement of the reasons for this are weak in that he held the history of art to be an authority; although it is in art history's nature to claim objects and artefacts as transcendent of spirit, only then is it possible to examine and categorize. I do not deny Adorno's argument about the impossibility of purely spiritual art. But it is interesting to follow the endeavours to make possible in modern art the existence of work of that kind. The purely spiritual artwork is a utopia of art, but a utopia the realization of which would dismantle the whole concept of art. In the beginning of his unfinished essay *Philosophic Art* Baudelaire wrote: "What is pure art in the modern sense? It is to create a suggestive magic containing at the same time object and subject, the world exterior to the artist and the artist himself."¹⁹⁸ Also the situationists tried to crystallize what Adorno thought of as impossible. They had ideas about the history of moments, where the subjects (self as doer) and objects (reality as material) of poetry were simultaneous without any artefact as an intermediary link. Then the creator and receiver were one, a goal of the construction of situations. Situationist ideas were not conceptual art, however, in the sense that they would have illustrated, demonstrated, or, visualized any specific ideas; instead, the construction of situations was based on *experiencing*.

Happenings have been understood to mean an intensification of our actions in life. But they could also be very artistically "performative" objects. There has been a tendency not to emphasize stardom and celebrity in performative lifelike art. This is also connected to the question of who are the audience. Kaprow writes about a lifelike art project where one woman walked on sand dunes for a week, also constituting her own audience. Each day around 3 p.m. when the wind rose on the dunes, she took a walk and watched her tracks blow away behind her. Every evening she wrote an account of her walk. Next day she read her story and then tried to repeat exactly what had happened. "I wanted to see if I could stop change." She arranged a project in certain frames, and it ended in a certain self-knowledge; Kaprow stated that "[s]he went to bed qualitatively changed. The meaning of her work was internalized; it was "experienced meaning"¹⁹⁹. This is comparable to keeping a diary, to analyzing and observing oneself, which has usually been a part of women's life. In art again, it is something new (for men). To be not the bystander in her own life but the spectator of her own

life when "the spectacle" is a situation made by herself. This resembles Sartre's famous account of a waiter in a café who is, Sartre suggested, playing at being a waiter in a café. It is a game where through this playing the waiter realizes his condition. According to Sartre, it is dangerous if we exist only in representation, but this is often the real condition of women's existence in society. Many artists have thought, however, like Cage, who said that ". . . everyday life is more interesting than forms of celebration, when we become aware of it. That *when* is when our intentions go down to zero"²⁰⁰. But is it possible to distinguish between intentions, interpretations and awareness of something more real than something else? Kaprow comes close to this problem when he tries to describe lifelike art: it "plays somewhere in and between attention to physical process and attention to interpretation. It is experience, yet it is ungraspable"²⁰¹. This follows a notion in aesthetics that aesthetic interest leads to outward-looking forms of activity, which means that in aesthetic contemplation one is less conscious of one's own feelings than usual. Or, those "appropriate emotions" (Casebier) are projected out or neutralized in criticism and arttalk. "An aesthetic attitude is one which carries attention and awareness out upon the object (the mental or 'intentional' object) of experience away from inner feeling and subjective affect."²⁰² This is grounded on the notion that the pleasure in aesthetic contemplation comes from the exercise of the skill of appreciation. This is the Kantian view that aesthetic pleasure is a pleasure arising from the heightened exercise of our cognitive faculties on an object adequate to give them scope. However, it is possible to pose the question: Why has one to be less conscious of one's feelings and inner state? The aim might equally be to become more conscious of one's inner feelings and subjective affects, which can of course lead to their better recognition and analysis. Why should the practice of certain cognitive skills be more eligible than internalized meanings?

The idea behind the happening is the notion that it is the very separation of spectator and work which is responsible for the artificiality of the form of an artwork.²⁰³ The happening can be considered as an attempt to construct a situation in isolation, but the situationists held that action in the form of the happening rests on "material and spiritual poverty". In contrast, the situation as defined by the SI can be constructed only on a foundation of "material and spiritual richness". This means that the construction of situations has to be both the work and play (as *leikki*, or *lek*) of the revolutionary avant-garde, not just presentation.²⁰⁴ The situationists held that activity was not yet developed enough in happenings because despite attempts to be something else they nonetheless remained presentations where people were spectators not taking part spontaneously, and if they did, it was only because they were forced.²⁰⁵ The SI tried also to abolish the passivity of spectators, but in other ways. In a broader sense the situationists's reactions to happenings were connected with the fact that many underground movements in the 1960s aimed at finding the individuals inner world, and this search often ended in irrational mysticism. The SI differed from other movements in that although it stressed individualism and the need to change - actually to free - human reflection and activity, it took no interest in mysticism. The situationists thought that to concentrate

solely to the metaphysical was about as useful as to be politically naïve. They claimed that Surrealism had lost its edge for both reasons, but foremost because it had turned inwards.

The situationists claimed that the structure of happenings was too hierarchical and the presentations were issued from above. Although in these arguments there were lot of plain rhetoric against an existing art mode, it was not just nonsense; Claes Oldenburg, for instance, wrote that the effect of his happenings is wasted if people do not understand his specific intention and technique. People may misunderstand the nature of the presentation. Hence Oldenburg stated that he aimed at the perfection of the details of the events (at the expense of the composition). The audience he considered an object and its behaviour as an event among the other events. The place of the audience in the total structure of the event was determined by its seating and by certain simple acts of provocation.²⁰⁶

In the manifestos of happenings an idealism has often been claimed that had no counterpart in practice. At the same time, the systematic and hierarchic aspects were not always denied either. Vostell said about his happenings that they were ideas an audience must live (. . . gelebt werden müssen).²⁰⁷ He planned events in some detail beforehand. He defined the city as a decorated or improvised event where extracts from reality, facts and dreams were presented.²⁰⁸ The happenings organized by Vostell were especially interesting in that he took his "audience" to certain spots in the city, an act which resembles the psychogeographical activities of the SI. In 1958 Vostell arranged the happening (or, as he called it at that time, *décollage*) entitled *Das Theater ist das Ereignis auf der Strasse*, in which he took people around the streets of Paris and let them to see the events he had arranged along the trip. The happening in 1962, *PC - Petite Ceinture*, was more spontaneous from the audience's point of view: Vostell asked the audience only to take a bus of the PC (circulating) line in Paris on the 3rd of July and to keep a look out for acoustic and optical impressions.

This kind of happening differed from the psychogeographical *dérives* of the SI (and from those of the *lettrists* before them) only in that an artist conceives the ideas and thus limits the input of participants, whereas the situationists removed the role of the organizer and need for a certain time and place or route, a title for the event etc. It is true, however, that the reports made about *dérive* by the situationists made it possible to historicize their psychogeographical driftings. In the construction of situations the elements of space, time and the role of an organizer were more essential, but this kind of situation was not a public performance where anybody could take part. Gadamer is right in that an occasion is important for shaping forms (see the chapter *An Enormously Tiny Bit of a Lot*), but meaning and contents are not wholly determined by it, since the consciousness and 'an experience' (*elämys/ Erlebnis*) of a receiver, or rather a participant, is always a subjective part of the individual self and life. It is not even any longer drawn from the generalities of social life such as taste, contrary to what Gadamer suggests. If we connect his definition of occasion with what people experience in works such as Vostell's, I think we can get further, if we want to develop some means or concepts with which to grasp certain phe-

nomena in contemporary art, at present merely marginalized in arts education.


In the situational aesthetics of the 1960s the question arose about the relationship with the contemplative way of receiving art. "The more he contemplates, the less he lives", Debord wrote. The shock tactics of Dada, and later Punk, were targeted in the aesthetic sense to shatter contemplative reception, but the methods of the situational artists even presuppose contemplativity or at least concentration and attentiveness if these are understood as an opposite of the distracted perception Walter Benjamin wrote about. The same concerns Vostell's happenings described above. In them too was the question about flâneurism in the traditional sense, ie, the aestheticization of urban environment to a certain degree, and thus also about aesthetic contemplation. In the methods intended to substitute for art, which the SI created, contemplativity did not resemble that in traditional aesthetics. The *intensity of Erlebnis* is the opposite of Benjamin's concept of distraction. Repetition as an element increasing distraction was absent from the situationist methods. However, there are not enough examples of the SI methods in practice. The SI did not arrange specific events. Few occurrences, such as the evening in the ICA in London in 1960 were unpremeditated.²⁰⁹ In fact, in their critique of the happening the SI "re-searched" the relationship of contemplation to passive and active reception. Passive participation is participating according to given rules; an active one is voluntary and spontaneous and can direct itself in the terms of the participant. If contemplation was understood solely as intensive concentration on something, we can propose that in Punk concerts, for instance, an audience was both active and contemplative. Punk is a suitable example because it acted the same way as Dada did: there was no (mental) escape from the situations, which nevertheless were open, in other words, their form was not outlined beforehand. Punk did not repeat the ideas developed and experimented by Dada, however, but adjusted its events to historically actual contexts. Instead, in many happenings in the 1960s art world there could be problems with the intensiveness of concentration. Oldenburg was worried that audiences may get bored or see activity where there was no intentional activity, in other words, an audience could disengage itself from the intensive scrutiny and experience of an event and begin to develop activities of its own. Then perception is distracted, although in a certain sense it can pass from passive to active. In the situations created by Dada and Punk, experience (*Érfahrung*) changed immediately into an experience (*Erlebnis*), which of course could be negative too. Repression of the shock and the reflection that one could instantly find an exact place for an event in one's consciousness, was to be passed. In many happenings of the 1960s a spectator could find an exact place for the event in her consciousness, could pigeonhole it in a certain tradition, because it was in a relatively explicit artistic form: continuing in contexts of the art institutional forms developed already at the beginning of the century.

The SI claimed to create more participatory forms, not conventional (interpretative) "aesthetic behaviour". However, the participation which affects an artist was not possible for the situationists, because they wanted to be rid of the artist. The thing that most interested the situationists in

participatory forms of action is, as Kaprow remarks, the fact that actual participation in a work of art courts anarchy.

It invites the participant to make a choice of some kind. Usually that choice includes whether to participate. In choosing to participate, one may also be choosing to alter the work - its object, its subject, its meaning. In choosing not to participate, one has at least acted consciously. In either case, the work has been acted upon (which is different from thinking about acting.) Though the artist sets up the equation, the participants provides its terms, and the system remains open to participation.²¹⁰

It is important that the experience of participating - especially when it is catalyzed in play - transforms the participant as well as the game.²¹¹ Kaprow's statement that one can choose to alter the work implies that there is "a work" made by someone (an artist). It is important to consider whether the work exists as such that there is a possibility to vary it by manipulating it (as Öyvind Fahlström's paintings which have movable parts), or, whether the work takes on form and develops along with and out of participation (as in Martha Rosler's project *If You Lived Here. . .* (1989), or Suzanne Lacy's *Whisper, the Waves, the Wind*, which was one of her first works with elderly women in La Jolla, California 1984). This has meaning when we try to define an artist's role in such art.²¹²



Suzanne Lacy: *Whisper, the Waves, the Wind*, 1984, La Jolla, California.

In the construction of situations there was a striving for an ultimate authenticity, and also for realism: a participant was distanced (or distanced herself) from situations as much as to disallow talking about naturalism. On the other hand, it was not a question about a purely aesthetic distance between situation and participant, although the distance permitted the possibility of contemplation and along with that reflection and the opportunity to enhance consciousness. The situationist methods were close to Brecht's ideas of *Verfremdung*, which he also called historialization. But as Brecht created theatre performances - spectacles - the situationists tried to realize similar techniques outside of the frames of an art institution. In both cases it was a matter of the techniques with which to describe incidents between people so that they provoked attention, needed an explanation, and were not evident and plainly natural.

Brecht described the so called "street scene" (*Strassenszene*) already in 1938 and compared it to the theatre scene. The street scene refers to a situation where, for example, the eyewitness to an accident tells others about it. The performer is not an artist. The storyteller must not "enchant" anybody with the perfect ability to transform herself. She does not need any suggestive abilities. The performer builds the personae of her story wholly from their actions, and from these imitated actions it is possible to draw conclusions about their characters. In a street scene there is no illusion typical for the traditional theatre. The performer of a street scene does not try to make her show an unforgettable experience for her audience. She does not want to produce plain emotions, but the performance has a socially practical dimension. Brecht stated that in this kind of situation the performer is perpetually bound to the two positions. In the front of an audience there is not a fusion of the performer and performed, self-dependent, harmonious third person, and the performer never forgets that she is not the person performed but a performer.²¹³ It can be said that the SI tried to make of Brechtian theatre a *quotidienne* - something that Roger Shattuck referred to when he wrote that to be[come] oneself, one must act that role. One must arouse emotions artificially at first: "simulation brings stimulation; acting is becoming".²¹⁴ But one should not drown in artificiality. When postmodern theories speak about the aestheticization of life and making lifestyles, that is, acting out roles in different contexts and situations, this means that there are no artificial roles in a sense there would be an authentic one but that all acted roles are real and authentic; there are just more situations to choose from. Uniqueness of self and style is a piece in a game. Alternatively, to exist only in representations has been the perennial condition of women in society.

Brecht describes *Verfremdungseffekt* as a method belonging also to everyday life:

Der V-Effekt besteht darin, dass das Ding, das zum Verständnis gebracht, auf welches das Augenmerk gelenkt werden soll, aus einem gewöhnlichen, bekannten unmittelbar vorliegenden Ding zu einem besonderen, auffälligen, unerwarteten Ding gemacht wird. Das selbstverständliche wird in gewisser Weise unverständlich gemacht, das geschieht aber nur, um es dann um so verständlicher zu machen. Damit aus dem Bekannten etwas Erkanntes werden kann, muss es aus seiner Unauffälligkeit herauskom-

men; es muss mit der Gewohnheit gebrochen werden, das betreffende Ding bedürfe keiner Erläuterung.²¹⁵

It is also characteristic of the social spectacle that it does not explain anything.

Sensatorium Minimimum (1964) by Fluxus artist Tomas Schmit seems to be a *Verfremdungseffekt* adapted to everyday life. The idea was to irritate occasional passers-by by small acts of provocation, for example, to scream something into someone's ear, give him a kiss, smack her on her shoulder, put a flower in his hair etc.²¹⁶ According to Schmit it was an attempt to remove the distance between art and audience, or, as Emmett Williams crystallized these kinds of actions: ". . . eine graue Alltagssituation in einen illusionären rahmen zu vergrößern, der händeschütteln zu elegantem nonsense macht".²¹⁷ In Schmit's action there was a strong aspect of performance, though; the roles of creator and receiver were differentiated. On the other hand, if we think about a *V-Effekt* adjusted to everyday life, the differences between Brechtian alienation, the situationist idea of constructing situations and Schmit's work and alike, are not so noticeable anymore. They all aimed at breaking up the routines, ie, continuity, of everyday life for a moment, and these breaks became necessary contingencies.

On a "meta-level", happenings and constructed situations are close to each other. This is so at least if we consider where Kaprow ended up in the 1980s and 1990s, stressing the importance of life in particular, not in the abstract. Another similar feature is in evaluation: in the open happening or performative installation the work can "succeed" on some days and fail on other days: "we may seem to disregard the enduring and stable and to place an emphasis upon the fragile and impermanent."²¹⁸ Kaprow stresses chance, which unlike spontaneity implies risk and fear. This the SI did not approve of; instead, they stressed spontaneity. If the SI tried to make the happening art for everyone, what is the smallest common denominator? It is an effect, in fact, the same element as in kitsch. But it is a surprise effect created by a slightly extraordinary situation, not the spectacular effect of an organized performance; or artificially created fear, or a totally expected and safe effect, as in kitsch.

The happening theories of artists have, of course, been more important for institutional art than the theories of the SI. The political nature of the SI was an obstacle they also stumbled into themselves. In the 1960s saw outlined the frames and consciousness of the institutional nature of art. This created a need to reject the old aesthetic problems and draw up new battle lines; as Kaprow wrote in 1966: "The real issue is that until these actions are written here or, if not written, until they are pointed out by those calling themselves artists, they would hardly have been classifiable as part of fine art. / This uninhabited area is experimentation's proper place."²¹⁹ On the other hand, Rosler sees the meaning of the art world differently. She admits that works on the streets with ordinary people highlight the difficulty of establishing a strategy one can maintain over a long period. These works can influence present practice only by somehow becoming part of a restricted universe of discourse, that is, an art world. It can come to be written about - and classified - only after entering the art world as a

commodity.²²⁰ This presumes also the possibility of arttalk, that is, the possibility of a metalanguage. Kaprow's notion of people (persons) as art was visually "formalist" in the sense that he describes people as shapes, with colored clothing, certain movements and constantly changing "meanings" (of the work) by shifting of positions.²²¹ He writes also about open and fluid forms. It is easy to see performance aspects in almost everything, but it is difficult not to conventionalize them. He writes that

. . . you experience directly what you already know in theory: that consciousness alters the world, natural things seem unnatural once you attend to them, and vice versa. Hence if everyday routines conceived as ready-made performances change because of their double use as art/non art, it might seem perfectly natural to build the observed changes into subsequent performances before they happen, because they, or something like them, would happen anyway. . . . Preparing an Activity, therefore, can be considered a naturally artificial act.²²²

To become conscious of artificial activities in the spectacle society, ie, to be conscious of the character of artificial (cultural) activities which seem natural, by framing them, which means to deliberately artificialize them, means manipulating an ordinary. This means going back to qualitative meanings and functions: art offers ways of perceiving things rather than producing more physical objects. It is only artists who are usually aware of the performative character of ordinary daily affairs since they are educated to manipulating techniques etc. Non-artists are not aware of this performative character "because there is no frame around everyday transactions the way there is, literally, around a television program and, more figuratively, around a strike or parade. Repetitive daily occurrences are not usually set off from themselves."²²³

Osborne writes that "[b]y acquiring skill in appreciation we acquire the power to perceive features of the world around us which had hitherto passed unnoticed and unremarked. . ." ²²⁴ All that exists are just issues of aesthetic experience (as we all, or at least the most ordinary of us, were quite blind to) have repeated so many times by philosophers: (1) To take notice of features of surrounding reality that have not hitherto been perceived. (2) To see the familiar in a new way. Are (1) and (2) the same things? To sum up, at the ground level the same question exists, but "to see things in new ways" has changed. How and why? This is not a topic dealt with in this study, but it surely merits more research. I can only say that there may be no point in asking whether Schmit's and the other situationalist works have any of the aesthetic or artistic qualities described in the introduction to this study, or what they are. I argue that our attitude to the world and its realities has undergone such changes that those skills in appreciation are merely outdated. To state some of my premises for this argument, I need simply list the changes that had come with the new media, for instance. It is no longer just music, a song, or just a picture that counts on music videos, but the fact of the surrounding noise: usually people do not watch or even listen to them. In film there has been more emphasis on technical achievements and skills, such as special effects, than the narrative or structure of a film. This is the distracted perception Benjamin talked about. It is

also an example of the influence of the radical avant-garde of the beginning of this century; to mention only what Man Ray and Maya Deren did. We are in a constant hurry in the midst of vast amount of influences, but why should we be stopped, if we are nonetheless able to orientate ourselves. Do we really need art to see things differently? Or, rather, is art the best and only way to show us parts of our lives in a new way? It may be to a certain extent, and after all, contemporary art is also coming back to the particular. In a sense art is no longer dissociated from its social contexts.

The Nature of An Experience

In connection with minimalist art the concept of 'presentness' has often been brought up. It is possible to understand presentness at least in two ways, and in minimalist works these two ways meet. On the one hand, minimalist works only have presence, the works are mute material, objects which do not communicate; on the other hand, it can be stated that minimalist, like other non-representational or non-figurative works of modern art, represent to us something about the universal (the immutable in the contingent), which is not attainable in other ways - they represent to us the presentness of the other, the universal; that something exists that cannot be made visible.²²⁵ The opposite of this presentness in a situation is the historical (the contingent in the immutable or in alienated routine). We are faced again with the old "conflict" about the nature of art; on the one hand, as a universal category, and on the other, as a (ideological) historical phenomenon, and also the connection between art and everyday social practice.

The modernists merely thought that to experience certain moments (situations) is to experience something sublime and ahistorical. The presentness of the universal in modernist (non-representational) paintings is an aesthetics of the sublime. The situations of the situationists are, for their part, important in their historical dimensions. The idea of constructing situations is to continue the project of the radical avant-garde, the premises of which were in Modernism, which brought universalizing tendencies of art to an individual level, and it was up to the radical avant-garde to connect them to the historical moment of an individual existence. In this, the situationists in fact followed the tendencies of the aesthetic avant-garde. According to them, it was not important to examine the structures of power but of the everyday, and through this it is possible to grasp the real structure of power.

Aesthetic experience was presented in terms of an attitude of mind. Dadaists confused this attitude by frustrating and irritating the spectator. However, the body was not included; rather, it was covered or masked, as in Hugo Ball's famous recitation of *Gadji beri bimba*. . . Despite that, dadaist presentness was perhaps even more concrete to an audience than in many body performances. This is a reason many aestheticians have despised their activities.

To be present means to participate and to pay attention to something. This became problematic in the age of the happening when the audience seldom went to the specific art space. That leads us again to the question of distance. Aestheticians are usually keen to put the certain distance (mental or even physical) between the receiver and the work. Gadamer refers to the Greek concept of 'theoria'. According to him 'theoros' means someone who takes part in a delegation to a festival. Such a person has no other distinction or function than to be there.²²⁶ This leaves autonomy for the work. Of course, Gadamer says that the spectator belongs essentially to the playing of the play, since her distance from the play is an essential relation whose *raison d'être* lies in the play's unity of meaning.²²⁷ Many aestheticians have leant on too much to this 'theoros', that is, just to be there. Alternatively, Shusterman writes about fleeting (physical) feelings and emotions which differs from those aestheticians have usually spoken about. Physical feelings "straight from the gut" in a rock concert or a football match, why should they be inferior to more cultivated and attentionally distant emotions? According to Shusterman, to take part can be an ecstatic feeling, as in dancing, and intoxicating in relation to a certain kind of art (rock'n'roll, punk, techno and rap or hip hop, for example), an experience which certain "theoreticians" usually have held to be immoral and transient, the reason why they always linger somewhere outside the "imbecile human flock" (G.-Albert Aurier in 1891).

To be deliberately lacking in emotion can bring forth very strong emotions in an audience. I suggest that materiality in contemporary art is also an instrument or a catalyst to deal with certain abstractions, as in body art. Fear or rage is not adaptable to all cases in body art either. The SI were not interested in the problematics of an interplay of body and mind, as this was presented in some happenings and body-performances. An experience was the medium of situationist (art) practice, however. Kaprow's interest in happenings began with the question *What is an authentic experience?* He read Dewey, but did not get a satisfactory answer.

Experience is a difficult word in English because it consists of two slightly different meanings without always explicitly differing them in distinctive contexts. (Compare the German words *Erfahrung/Erlebnis*, and in Finnish *kokemus/elämys*.) Dewey uses the concept *an* experience more in the meaning of *Erlebnis*. For Dewey *an* experience is not distracted or inchoate, but, "so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency."²²⁸ Life is a flow of different "contingencies", and, according to Dewey, in "real experience" there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts.²²⁹ In much of their experience people are not concerned with the connection of one incident with what went before and what comes after. There is no selecting interest which controls attentiveness. When things just happen, people just drift, experiences have no form or structure, people yield according to external pressure, they are not conscious of experience: one thing replaces another, but does not absorb it and carry it on.²³⁰ Such concepts as form and rhythm in creating form, are important for Dewey: "Some decisive action is needed in order to establish contact with the realities of the world and in order that impressions may

be so related to facts that their value is tested and organized."²³¹ For Dewey, art is what the product does, its working. He states that the actual work of art is what the product does with and in experience, not only its physical manifestation. He questions the prestige art works possess, because of "a long history of unquestioned admiration" it creates conventions that get in the way of fresh insight.²³² When artistic objects are separated from their origins and operation in experience, art is remitted to a separate realm from every other human effort. This means the necessity of restoring continuity between the forms of experience that are works of art and everyday events and doings.²³³ Dewey uses the term expression in a rather broad sense. It includes things usually not held to be art. He writes about an experience that an experience is fit

to give a clue to the intrinsic nature of the esthetic experience than is an object already set apart from any other mode of experience. . . . Experience is the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication.²³⁴

Dewey also emphasized that an experience constituted of a fusion of old meanings and new situations.

For Dewey, experiences could have an emotionally satisfying sense of "internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement"²³⁵ - that is, they could have aesthetic qualities. Dewey maintained that experiences could have shapes, beginnings and ends, meanings, patterns etc. (Life as an aesthetic form.) In ordinary life, organization is less direct: the organization of energies is piecemeal, one replacing another, while in the artistic process it is cumulating and conserving.²³⁶ The situationists were trying to accumulate energies so that the sense of the conclusion was carried at every stage of the experience. But they did not construct a "conserved" end product. The fusion of the different elements was "the felt presence of the same qualitative unity in all of them."²³⁷ In other words, as I have stated earlier, an experience has a certain unity; its parts don't lose their own character, although fusing into unity. In fact, this unity means that in an experience no distinction of self and object exists, the two are so fully integrated that each disappears, as Dewey has stated.²³⁸ Moreover, Gadamer speaks about art as "the variety of changing experiences (Erlebnisse) whose object is filled subjectively with meaning like an empty mold."²³⁹

Gadamer writes that experience itself is lasting, rather than the original content.²⁴⁰ Dewey had firmly held the same opinion. And Georg Simmel considered the important thing about the concept of an experience (Erlebnis) that "the objective not only becomes an image and ideal, as in knowing, but an element in the life process itself".²⁴¹ It is tempting to refer to Collingwood again. He defined a piece of music, ie, 'a work of art proper' as "an imagined experience of total activity". If this is connected to Simmel's remarks, then Collingwood, in fact, was not defining anything but knowing something. And with this "knowledge" we are practicing arttalk, which is usually not based on the concreteness of primal experience (that represents the undifferentiated unity Dewey also writes about) but we are

differentiating and determining an experience by the objectivizing method of knowledge.²⁴² Every experience has something of an adventure about it.²⁴³ According to Gadamer, who in this reflects Dewey, an adventure is by no means just an episode, since episodes are a succession of details which have no inner coherence and therefore no permanent significance. An adventure ventures out into the uncertain. An adventurer interrupts the customary course of events, but is related to the context which she interrupts.²⁴⁴ Gadamer's ideas about successive episodes is almost exactly as Dewey's, although Gadamer did not refer by it to any special or differentiated meaning. The situationists, on their part, also said that every one is an adventurer. But does customary course of events really exist? The SI and many others over thirty years ago believed there were, but since the sixties the situation has changed considerably.

As I already referred, Gadamer argues that, instead of this (open work), "presentation" (Darstellung) is the mode of being of the *work of art*: "In being played the play speaks to the spectator through its presentation. . ." ²⁴⁵ The players are not the subjects of the play; instead play reaches presentation through the players. Thus he separated 'art' and 'the work of art' as Bürger also did. Dewey either took the notion of a work of art as given, as I suppose, or he just does not bother to make a distinction since, although his aim was to prove that a society could be more democratic with people taking their behavioural modes from art and aesthetic attitudes, he meant this on an individual level, and was less concerned about what consisted the status of art in society where different political aims meet, as in the United States, for instance.

When we are talking about art we used to say that it is now this work and now it is this work no longer.²⁴⁶ An aesthetic experience is a series of "moments": existence in pure immediacy and discontinuity. Theoreticians have said that the purpose is to achieve the continuity of self-understanding.²⁴⁷ I argue that the series of experiences, sensing these moments could also be a way of life without any stable references. Art can be held as worldview(s), and that is why we may have a far too fine-art-centered emphasis in arts education. It is not only that in the end many works are immaterial (as ideas and changing images as in cd-roms and in Internet), but also these ideas themselves can be changed - they are flowing. This is, in fact, a challenge to the iconography and other ways of analysis. It is also a challenge for arts education.

Dewey emphasizes the relation of the subject and its environment, the attaining of periods of harmonious cooperation of man and the world in experiences that are complete. But he also maintains the notion of attaining impersonal emotions. This kind of emotion "is attached not to personal fortune but to the object to the construction of which the self has surrendered itself in devotion. Appreciation is equally impersonal in its emotional quality because it also involves construction and organization of objective energies."²⁴⁸ Thus (aesthetic) experiences can be complete but they exist in an other world that is hypothetical. However, Dewey explains why it is important to reach for ordered experiences; he argues that "for only when an organism shares in the ordered relations of its environment does it secure the stability essential to living."²⁴⁹ The situationists were probably in-

terested such thoughts as these, since alienation "breaks down the rhythm". Rhythm and form does not mean stability but organizing the anonymous flow of life into a constellation of meaningful parts. It is the ever changing structure of continuity that helps us to outline the relation between ourselves and our environment. Dewey also writes that the difference between the aesthetic and the intellectual is one of the places where the emphasis falls on the constant rhythm that marks the interaction of a live creature with his surroundings.²⁵⁰ He is a little unclear in this. But he meant that the intellectual usually strives for ends and the aesthetic concentrates on processes. Perhaps we need to put these together and talk again about passion. Just as mind and body can become one in passion. Equally, one can go through some experiences trying to give them graspable form. Often, when an arts educator meets people in a practical situation, the first thing people usually maintain is that it is impossible to keep the emotions and intellect in balance. Nonetheless, if you are, for instance, afraid of dying, and the fear seems to be enormous and formless, something you cannot reject with your intellect (it just comes), and you are overwhelmed with emotion since the fear replaces everything else you could imagine, but if you are not afraid, if you have some passion, if you could sense the similarity between the rhythms of life and art, then you might also obtain control over, or should I rather say, become friends with fear or even death. This I know from my own subjective experience. I also argue that this is what much body art is about: to make present the fear of death, rejected feelings and danger in a situation which is not their 'natural' or obvious one. An audience remains a prisoner of these metaphors, and what follows is excitement, terror, anxiety and (mental) suffering. But body art is structured, and physical and psychic control has been taken to the extreme. When these familiar meanings (fear, suffering or pain) are connected into a new context the receiver has to evaluate her experience according to quite different premises than those of everyday life. As Dewey writes: experience differentiates itself by the given form from other human acts; it works as art and produces 'an experience'. It is totally another thing to assert that something "works as art". Thus, we cannot draw the conclusions that it is a form only that guarantees something as art. Or, if we could, it would be quite fruitless, though. In front of performative works spectators are usually more passive visually than in front of traditional paintings: they have to look at what is given them to see, they cannot choose or repeat angles of observation. On the other hand, they are physically more active: they react more sensitively to the given and also act themselves by participating or communicating.²⁵¹

Dewey writes about the recreation when perceiving an object as a work of art. It means grasping some processes and relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent. It is possible to connect the aim of situational aesthetics into this. Quite literally, creating situations is just one step further from this. The point is, to stress *an* experience of creation. Traditional aesthetics, represented by Osborne, for instance, states that appreciation is complementary to creation. He means that a spectator goes through processes comparable to those undergone by the artist, but appreciation is neither similar to nor has the same process as creation. The specta-

tor's process is to gain pleasure from the exercise of the skill to appreciate. Although the construction of situations is not the same creative process an artist goes through making an individual work of art, it is the giving of a chance to anyone to take part in the process of creation that influences what the situation will become.

Experience is just the opposite of repetitiveness and monotony; it is variety, dynamics. The SI also wanted life to be similar, instead of the repetitiveness of the spectacle. Although one cannot say that Dewey was talking about the spectacle society, he wrote that

we live in a world in which there is an immense amount of organization, but it is an external organization, not one of the ordering of a growing experience, one that involves, moreover, the whole of the live creature, toward a fulfilling conclusion. . . . The remaking of the material of experience in the act of expression is not an isolated event confined to the artist and to a person here and there who happens to enjoy the work. In the degree in which art exercises its office, it is also a remaking of the experience of the community in the direction of greater order and unity.^{2 52}

The question is: how much is the construction of situations to transform the environment? In adaptation it is a question of the adaptation *of* the environment to our own activities as well as our activities *to* the environment.²⁵³

The construction of situations is not only self-expression, since it also consists of interaction and communication with others. But *in* that communication there is also an amount of self-expression. According to Dewey and others, the work of art is recreated every time it is aesthetically experienced. In the construction of situations a similar recreation does not exist because there are no mediating objects in the sense of artworks. The notion that the connection of qualities with objects is intrinsic in all experience having significance leads us to ask what those objects can be in the construction of situations. The answer is: the situations themselves. The object may also be the combination of elements of an urban environment, for instance, of which I shall say more later.

The situationists did not attempt a (Rortyan) chaos of contingencies, but defined forms, to unities that would be neither foundationally given nor static. In terms of pragmatist aesthetics, "[s]uch unity can even accommodate a self of multiple narratives, as long as these can be made somehow to hang together as a higher unity from the right narrative perspective, one which makes that self more compellingly rich and powerful as an aesthetic character."²⁵⁴ Thus the question arises about the variety inside the frames that can be coherently held together in some satisfying unity. I would specify that, although it seems that Dewey apologizes for form, this does not mean that we have to identify form and aesthetics as necessarily constituting art. Dewey argues that an experience has form, and even the situationists reached for the unity of experience. However, this was more about an open organization where the parts are independent. I have referred to what an aesthetic form means as a closed system (see the chapter *Aesthetic Backgrounds*). To my mind, form can also be functional and open as an experience (cf. Benjamin's distracted perception, repetition, and

collage works that are not composed following “formalist” aesthetic principles.)

The “frames” I referred to are not literal anymore. It is interesting to notice that the concept of virtual reality may help us to understand these things better. I’m not going to focus any further on this, but I would like to mention that the construction of situations has much to do with the worlds created by technology, although maybe not on any ideological level. In visions of virtual reality, traditional art objects are also just pictures with frames. Frames are the line between a picture and the world. When frames are removed, there is no longer a picture but the world only. In the digital space of virtual reality, where there are no more frames, one stops to think of pictures and begins to think of worlds. In that realm the space outside the frame becomes dominant. If one turns with goggles on, the virtual room also turns. It is the virtual world that seems to be real since one can turn around and still be in it. The space outside the frame is thus like reality. This is the point where using the space outside the frame becomes unlimited, and art starts to treat as much the invisible as the visible.²⁵⁵ Thus art becomes reality.

Contacting virtual reality simply means experiencing it. According to Jaron Lanier, information is alienated, denatured experience. It is up to virtual reality to return, paradoxically, its natural quality to experience. This is paradoxical for the reason that the return becomes possible only through the intervention of technology. According to Lanier, people can identify their experiences since they really imagine themselves to be in virtual reality, which is ironic, since the space is artificial. It means that the more artificial the world is made, the more visible the subjective experience becomes. Lanier saw the technology of virtual reality as a sensitizer to these subjective and experienced features of life.²⁵⁶ When talking about creating reality, as in visions of virtual reality, the most obvious comparison in art is Surrealism (as Jukka Sihvonen has remarked) - and later the SI, which took these surrealist techniques and thoughts theoretically further. In virtual reality the participant can shift from talking about reality to making it, even to improvising it. Sihvonen remarks that this kind of activity resembles how the surrealists, when improvising with elements of reality (ie, combining two totally different kinds of phenomena), created from their symbiosis new meanings and experiences, which often have shock effects as intended.²⁵⁷

Homo ludens in a Labyrinth

Owing to Schiller’s theories, play has blurred meanings which are almost the same but not quite. Schiller did not specify if all play is aesthetic, or whether it was just a certain genre of play that differs from play as general. I return to this in the chapter on flâneurs. Another interesting and seemingly different notion of play is what Gadamer says about it. He defines the work of art as play, which means that its actual being cannot be detached from its presentation.²⁵⁸ Gadamer writes as well about play as drama and

play as a game-like activity. More interesting is that he states that to be present does not simply mean being there along with something else that is there at the same time, but to be present means to participate.²⁵⁹ He does not mean that literally, though, but displays for us a spectator who participates in the solemn act through his presence. This participation is not active but passive. In this sense being present has the character of being outside oneself, namely being totally involved and carried away.²⁶⁰ This resembles more what the Polish painter, philosopher and drama writer Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz's (Ignacy Witkacy, 1888-1939) thought of as waking up from some strange dream after a theatrical performance.

Many artists, especially in the beginning of this century - surrealists, expressionists, Artaud, Witkiewicz - disagreed saying that "it is not an experience of an adventure producing a temporary intoxication from which one reawakens to one's true being; instead, the elevation and strong emotion that seize the spectator in fact deepen his *continuity with himself*."²⁶¹ Witkacy wanted quite intentionally and purposefully to create "metaphysical vibrations" in an audience. In 1923 he wrote:

On leaving the theatre, one should have the impression of awakening from strange reverie in which the most ordinary objects possessed that mysterious, impenetrable magic which defies all comparison and is so typical of dreams.²⁶²

For him, the metaphysicality of the experience was almost real, or rather it meant that it is impossible to show life as a simple and static process of cause and effect, but it must be shown in all its multiplicity. Thus Witkacy wanted to dramatize the "plurality of realities", which was, in fact, the precise opposite of the 'continuity'. In his plays, for example, the corpses and live bodies of the same characters were often on the stage simultaneously. He was close to the surrealists, although I assume that Artaud, and perhaps Aragon, were the closest to him, since the other French surrealists in the 1920s and the 1930s were studying the unconscious dreamworld of the individual. Reality in Witkacy's plays is rather an image of a twisted social and political system where nothing is simple but some men. To be honest, he argued in favour of artistic elements and aesthetic considerations. Yet, we have to remember the utter cynicism of Witkacy. Although he held that life of an artist is inessential when compared to his works, on the other hand he saw an artist as a small part of a manifold entity; a part that is changeable. I quote him more extensively to show how he had difficulties with form on the other hand, and real-life on the other. Witkacy developed a Theory of Pure Form:

I think that the social significance of the theatre could be infinitely enhanced if it ceased being a place taking a fresh look at life, for teaching and for expounding "views", and instead became a true temple of experiencing pure metaphysical feelings. . . .

The concept of Pure Form is a boundary concept and no work of Art can be created without real-life elements. Some sort of beings will always act and speak on the stage, parts of the compositions in paintings will always be more or less analogous to actual objects in the visible world, and

the reason is the impossibility of dispensing with dynamic and directional tensions.

. . . Because art acts as a kind of narcotic whose effect is to evoke what I have called metaphysical feeling through a grasp of formal constructions, and because the effect of every narcotic weakens with time, necessitating increasing doses, we have reached a point where the works of the old masters have stopped making an impression on us, and Art, given the waning of metaphysical feelings in the course of social evolution . . . has degenerated to an imitation of life and the world. Art's inessential elements assumed the first place, and the formal aspect became reduced to the role of intensifying qualitatively different elements: real-life feelings and the sphere of intellectual concepts.

The revival of Pure Form, which in a final desperate effort opposes the tide of grayness and mechanization flooding the world, cannot in our present circumstances dispense with the use of non-sense and of deformation of the world (1921).²⁶³

Pure Form was to be self-contained, autonomous and in this sense absolute. Witkacy wanted it to be an opposite of the world that he saw as absurd and nonsensical. But the Witkacy's sorest problem was that the real-life had become a mechanized, gray setting for the faceless masses (which was a typical way of thinking about it in those times - and again in the 1960s) and was in fact its own imitation. Witkacy believed it inevitable that the greedy masses will win, since he held it to be social necessity, without which the inequality between (wo)men would endure, which he did not want. He was a sort of a communist himself, but a very pessimistic one, since he always emphasized individualism.

"The "subject" of the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself". . . . "For play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those who play."²⁶⁴ But what if it is not so, but if the "player's" consciousness *is* the play. And by this I mean play also in the sense of children's play, or a game, not only drama. This doubtless leads again to the notion that a work of art is not stable, as the situationists among others claimed. According to Gadamer, the game masters the players.²⁶⁵ It is the structure of a play that absorbs the player into itself. That is, art (as an act and an event) masters a receiver. This kind of representation then leaves behind it everything that is accidental and inessential, for example, the private, particular being of the actor. But this is just the point major changes have happened. Structures are no longer so clear and wholly comprehensible. The receiver even invents the game/play herself. It is an attitude, connected to an aesthetic attitude towards life, which is seen not as purposeful and serious (in contrast to play) as before. We may also have lost a significant content of life, or nature. If we think about play or game as self-same and repeatable movements without any purpose, that, of course, gives a justification for the autonomy of art as a functionless phenomenon. However, then, it is already more a ritual than a play. Alternatively, Gadamer explains that playing is a natural phenomenon: water and light and animals play as well, and (wo)men also play. In this sphere, he says, there is no point in distinguishing between literal and metaphorical usage.²⁶⁶

The situationists spoke a lot about 'poetry', which was equal to all art, and by realizing poetry they meant simultaneously and inseparably cre-

ating events and their language. In other words, the aim was "to multiply poetic subjects and objects and to organize games of these poetic objects among these poetic subjects".²⁶⁷ The situationist terminology sounds complicated, although they tried to define it. 'Poetry', for example, meant "the organization of creative spontaneity, the exploitation of the qualitative in accordance with its internal laws of coherence"²⁶⁸; this is analogical to art, which was a term the situationists didn't want to use. Poetry rarely meant poems, for the situationists thought that the most works of art betray poetry. Rather, they held poetry to be a radical theory embodied in action. As Vaneigem said, it is revolutionary strategy, and "the high point of the great gamble on everyday life".²⁶⁹ Poets are those who know how to use it to best effect.

Behind all this grand jargon is the idea that art products are no longer needed to mediate experiences, that is, there is no need to transform subjects by artistic means into usable objects, but the situation, experience, and *Erlebnis* would happen simultaneously, and interaction between subjects and objects would be continuous, as, for example, that between a drifter conducting a psychogeographical investigation and an urban environment. Absent works of art (about which the lettrists had already talked) were expressly this play of poetic subject and objects, where the most essential element is precisely the play.

The term 'play' has the certain connotations: absence of seriousness and substance, idleness, free of care about moral or practical utility. Kaprow tried to distinguish between play and game as follows:

This critical difference between gaming and playing cannot be ignored. Both involve free fantasy and apparent spontaneity, both may have clear structures, both may (but needn't) require special skills that enhance the playing. Play, however, offers satisfaction, not in some stated practical outcome, some immediate accomplishment, but rather in continuous participation as its own end. Taking sides, victory, and defeat, all irrelevant in play, are the chief requisities of game. In play one is carefree; in a game one is anxious about winning.²⁷⁰

In other words, play is open, game has a goal; it may have more rules, that means conventions, than play has. An important element in play is discontinuity. There is not so much restraint by other elements but action proceeds by jerks and spasms. The revolutionary project of the SI disapproved of the classical idea of a game in a limited space, in time and in qualitative depth.²⁷¹ The situationist game, with its psychogeographical *dérive* etc., consisted of some self-made rules, but it differed from the classical notion of game in that it strictly rejected competition and separation from everyday life, which had been seen as essential for the traditional concept of a game. Instead, they saw games and play as liberating from hierarchies; there was no room for self-sacrifice, roles or leaders. In play self-expression liberates itself, and social relations become more transparent. The lettrists had realized play devotionally, for the movement in fact consisted of a group of drifters who just hung around. The ideal was to practice "happy nihilism" a rather romantic thought, it seems to me. The difference from plain leisure is that both the lettrists and situationists were busy constructing theo-

ries about their activities, and also inactivities. Pointedly formulated, their main idea was to create unending and perpetual free time. According to Vaneigem, there is an essential difference between play (as a game also) and ritual: once the idea of sacrifice appears the play/game becomes sacred and its rules become rites. For those who play, the rules, along with the ways of playing with them, are an integral part of the game. In the realm of the sacred, by contrast, rituals cannot be played with, they can only be broken.²⁷²

According to Vaneigem only play can open up the possibilities of total freedom, since only in the realm of play is it possible to think about turning Chartres Cathedral into a fun-fair, into a labyrinth, into a shooting-range, or into a dream landscape.²⁷³ A society that maintains and supports rituals disapproves of such possibilities. Vaneigem's thoughts were presumably grounded in Jorn's statements about play. Jorn and Constant were interested in Johan Huizinga's book *Homo ludens*, where Huizinga tracked the idea of play to festivals and art, rhythms of music and dance, masks, totems, and magical labyrinths of ornamental motives. In 1948 Jorn wrote that if play continues in adulthood as a natural life force so that creative spontaneity remains, it becomes a content of ritual, it is humanity and life which remains the primary factor and the form changes uninterrupted with the living content. But if play lacks a vital purpose, then ceremony fossilizes into an empty form which has no other purpose than its own formalism, the observance of forms.²⁷⁴

Theorists have considered the relation of play and art. I quote Dewey at length, since he did not separate play from structured activity, but neither did he change a playful attitude into a ruled, governed game; he wrote:

The philosophical implications of the play theory are found in its opposition of freedom and necessity, of spontaneity and order. This opposition goes back to the same dualism between subject and object that infects the make-believe theory. Its underlying note is the idea that esthetic experience is a release and escape from the pressure of "reality". There is an assumption that freedom can be found only when personal activity is liberated from control by objective factors. The very existence of a work of art is evidence that there is no such opposition between the spontaneity of the self and objective order and law. In art, the *playful* attitude becomes interest in the transformation of material to serve the purpose of a developing experience. Desire and need can be fulfilled only through objective material, and therefore playfulness is also interest in an object.²⁷⁵

Play is also closely connected to the attitude of the flâneur, which is not so concerned with objective material at first sight. But taking a closer look we realise that the object he is interested in is reality: "The *flâneur* is not on vacation from reality's rules. True, he is not determined by the rules, but he must learn them and ponder how to go on in the face of their ubiquity. Whatever can be characteristic for his behaviour is then consequential on grasping the anonymous trite colloquiality in its various shapes. It is the antipode to the artistic 'as-if-ness' (the virtual world of fictional Otherness)."²⁷⁶

When making and improving ideas about play, game and rituals the situationalist artists retained the idea of autonomy of the art (ie, Schiller,

Kant). They wanted to preserve what was good, active, creative and even educational in art; it was only art's reification, specialization, industrialization and seeing the category as an end in itself which did not suit them. The body of art should be killed but the soul retained. For their part the projects of situational art were directed against visibility and opticality, that is, hegemony of gaze, which prevailed in modernism.

To sum up, the dissolution of the art object can be seen in the modes I have described, but also in the nature of the objects themselves even where they were concrete. Interpretation of the works of contemporary art extends beyond them. We can recognize the character of play in contemporary art, more than in Modernism, except perhaps for a few movements and representatives of the radical avant-garde who merely played with art, rather than with works of art. In particular, postmodern architecture was play. The playfulness is also seen in that doings of cultural products have become more important than their meanings which can be many. Alternatively, dramatic gestures are also essential, even if where it is a question of an artistic object. In a way, this can explain why such phenomena as Vanessa Mae, Luciano Pavarotti, or even traditional opera have flourished recently.

PART 2

MODERNISM AND THE RADICAL AVANT-GARDE

1. Calinescu 1987, 166. From Baudelaire: *L'Art philosophique*; according to Calinescu written probably in 1859 but published posthumously.
2. The avant-garde emphasized more the synthesis of arts, but in a way Brecht mentioned in his *Kleines Organon für das Theater* (1948): "So seien all die Schwesterkünste der Schauspielkunst hier geladen, nicht um ein "Gesamtkunstwerk" herzustellen, in dem sie sich alle aufgeben und verlieren, sondern sie sollen, zusammen mit des Schauspielkunst, die gemeinsame Aufgabe in ihrer verschiedenen Weise fördern, und ihr Verkehr miteinander besteht darin, dass sie sich gegenseitig verfremden." (Brecht 1964, Band VII, 61.)
3. Adorno 1984, 34.
4. Greenberg 1940, 43.
5. Clark 1982, 59. Michael Fried criticized in his article *How Modernism Works: A Response to T.J. Clark* (originally published in *Critical Inquiry*, no 1, september 1982. Reprinted in Francis Francina (ed): *Art After Pollock*, pp.65-79) Clark's views about the negativity of modernism. Fried accused Clark that he did not provide any concrete example to prove his arguments right. On the other hand, when Clark do cite for example Ad Reinhardt, Fried rejected an example arguing that Reinhardt is too insignificant artist to be an example. In Fried's criticism there is a strong interest to valuation, a stress on genius and apology of an institution. Fried is a good example of an elitist theoretician in High Modernism who try to reach an authoritarian role of a legitimator by devaluating other's points of view. Something about his conservative views tells the rhetoric he uses, such utterances as "major works of modern art" are frequent. He has also written as follows: "Does he simply dismiss the insistence by Greenberg and others on the need to distinguish between the large mass of ostensibly difficult and advanced but in fact routine and meretricious work - the product, according to those critics, of an ingratiating and empty avantgardism - and the far smaller and often less obviously extreme body of work that really matters, that can survive comparison with what at that juncture they take to be the significant art of the past?" (Fried 1982, 72-73)
6. Chipp 1968, 267.
7. Clark 1982, 59-60.
8. See Derrida 1978, 233.
9. Fried 1982, 75.
10. Swinburne 1868, 238.
11. Pater 1877, 24-25.
12. *Ibid.*, 27.
13. Pater 1889, 57. "To really strenuous minds there is a pleasurable stimulus in the challenge for the continuous effort on their part, to be rewarded by securer and more intimate grasp of the author's sense." Pater's remark reflected the romantic notion that an audience must learn to understand the artist, ie, his intentions, since he is the genius, an exceptional individual.
14. Harries 1968, 56. It has to be remembered that a dandy is not the same as a bohemian. Bohemians were more often really poor coming from lower classes, and they have social(ist) sympathies, although their life values maybe differed from those really poor working class people. Dandies, on the other hand, were more often from upper social circles, or, from impoverished noble families. Thus they were often rather

- tragicomical persons, since they were not very practical, but tried to maintain their noble roots. More about them can be read for example in Gerd Stein 1985 (hg): *Dandy - Snob - Flaneur. Exentrik und Dekadentz. Kulturfiguren und Sozialcharaktere des 19. Und 20. Jahrhunderts. Band 2.* Fisher Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. (The first part consists of Bohemien - Tramp - Sponti).
15. Wilde 1889, 153.
 16. *Ibid.*, 150 & 154. "Life imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life." . . . "A great artist invents a type, and Life tries to copy it." (Wilde 1889, 149.) "It follows, as a corollary from this, that external Nature also Imitates Art. The only effects she can show us are effects that we have already seen through poetry, or in paintings. This is the secret of Nature's charm, as well as the explanation of nature's weakness."
 17. Whistler 1885, 80.
 18. *Ibid.*, 82. There was the famous controversy between John Ruskin and Whistler. The former, who has had authority in aesthetic matters at least till the 1870s, stressed 'truth to nature' in art, and thought that it was proper - even necessary - for an artist to address himself to social and moral problems. Whistler's opinions were just the opposite. Ruskin attacked in print one of the Whistler's Nocturnes, not long after he had defended Turner's not dissimilar late style. Whistler sued for libel, and won in court. Ruskin had already had a mental breakdown and could not attend the hearings. (See more f.ex. Warner & Hough (eds): *Strangeness and Beauty* vol 2, 1983, p.73ff.)
 19. *Ibid.*, 77.
 20. Collins 1989, 122. See also Jameson 1991, 15, as a starting point to the discussion in question.
 21. Collins 1989, 135.
 22. Phillips 1995(b), 295 & 296.
 23. Krauss 1985, 280.
 24. Kuenzli 1986, 129. Anon. "French Artists Spur on an American Art". *New York Tribune*, Sunday, October 24, 1915.
 25. *Ibid.*, 133.
 26. *Ibid.*, 137. Nixola Greeley-Smith: *Cubist Depicts Love in Brass and Glass; "More Art in Rubbers Than in Pretty Girl!"*. *The Evening World*, Tuesday, April 4, 1916.
 27. See Harries 1968, part II: The Aesthetics of subjectivity, chapter 5, from page 52 onwards. Harries refers mostly to Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*.
 28. Mondrian 1919, 322-323.
 29. Cit. Haftmann 1965, 202.
 30. Sedlmayr 1968, 41.
 31. Mondrian 1919, 323.
 32. Jencks 1986, 35.
 33. The most known of these lists is maybe Ihab Hassan's comparison between modernism and postmodernism in his essay *Toward a Concept of Postmodernism* (in Hassan: *The Postmodern Turn. Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture*, 1987.) Charles Jencks has also made one introductory kind in his essay *The Post-Modern Agenda* (in Jencks (ed): *The Post-Modern Reader*, 1992.) And David Harvey also has made his own list.
 34. Pincus 1995, 49. Examples of this were seen especially in the Congress of the United States in the end of the 1980s when some senators tried to convince others of the decadence of art through demonstrating the display of pictures and carefully choosing details from larger works.
 35. Jameson 1991, 12.
 36. *Ibid.*, 11-12.
 37. Collins 1989, 60.
 38. *Ibid.*, 43.
 39. See Jencks: *What is Post-Modernism?* (1986), *Post-Modernism. The New Classicism in Art and Architecture* (1987) and an essay "The Post-Modern Agenda" in Jencks (ed): *The Post-Modern Reader* (1992). It is worth to notice that Jencks, f.ex. uses the word written as 'Post-Modernism'. On the other hand, Hassan and Harvey, and also others, use the word 'Postmodernism'. It depends on if a theoretician has wanted to stress the notion of Post(-)Modernism as a more or less a continuum of Modernism.

40. Owens 1980, 205-209. Essays are reprinted from *October* no 12 (Spring 1980) & no 13 (Summer 1980).
41. *Ibid.*, 235.
42. See Foster 1985.
43. Livingstone 1989, 393.
44. Lippard 1995, 118.
45. Jameson 1991, 54.
46. Bürger 1991, 14. We must remember that in the 1910s & 1920s, when the historical avant-garde flowered, there was not such art institutions and art worlds as nowadays.
47. *Le Nouveau Christianisme* (1825) and *Opinions littéraires, philosophiques et industrielles* (1825). References concerning Saint-Simon to an essay by Donald D. Egbert: *Idea of "Avant-garde" in Art and Politics*, *Historical Review*, vol LXXIII, no 2, December 1967. *Opinions littéraires*. . . has usually put in the name of Saint-Simon, but in reality this unsigned book is a product of cooperation: besides Saint-Simon its authors were his followers Halevy, Rodrigues, Duvergier and Bailly. Egbert didn't mention this but gave the honour for using term avant-garde only to Saint-Simon.
48. Egbert 1967, 339. Cit. Vladimir I. Lenin: *Works*. Vol XXXI (Berlin, 1958).
49. Orton & Pollock 1981, 167-183.
50. Huyssen 1986, 162.
51. Handardt has written an introduction to the general history about an American avant-garde film titled as: *A History of the American Avant-Garde Cinema*, published by The American Federation of Arts 1976.
52. Adorno 1984, 336.
53. Bürger 1984, 13.
54. *Ibid.*, 27 & 48.
55. See more of this in Irmeli Hautamäki: *Marcel Duchamp. Modernin identiteetin ja taideteoksen ongelma* (1995), which is her dissertation. See also Hautamäki: *Marcel Duchamp. Identiteetti ja teos tuotteina* (Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 1997), which is a popularized version of the doctoral thesis.
56. Orton and G. Pollock defined avant-garde as "a concrete cultural phenomenon that is realized in terms of identifiable (though never predetermined) practices and representations through which it constitutes for itself a relationship to, and a distance from, the overall cultural patterns of the time". Their definition is wide, but it implies continuity in artistic tradition. Instead, Bürger was reluctant to place the avant-garde of the 1910s and 1920s and the neo-avant-garde after World War II under the same definition. There were just different points of view. Orton and Pollock were closer to the nature of aesthetic modernism, Bürger paid more attention to the differences of the negative strategies between aesthetic modernism and the radical (historical) avant-garde. Aesthetic modernism concentrated on the attacks on the traditional techniques and valuations, as Stein or Joyce did. Instead, the radical avant-garde can be understood as an attack meant to alter the institutionalized commerce with art. In the 1970s, when Bürger was writing his book, such holistic terms as 'commercialism', 'institutions' and even 'spectacle' were very much in fashion. Modernism aimed to harmony at least technically, but the radical avant-garde allowed gaps, roughness and disturbances of reality to be seen in the fragmentariness of works of art. Aesthetic modernism did not pay much attention to art's social and political status in the bourgeois society believing it had got rid of it for good. Radical avant-garde was political in its nature.
57. Mondrian 1937, 362.
58. Danto 1973, 106. The concept 'non-art' is little problematic, though. In some art theoretical texts there is a question of art becoming philosophy. On the other hand, non-art can be understood as synonymous to practices of everyday life. As it is, art, and philosophy as well, are practices of life; but there is difference if we are talking about material reality in everyday life, and conceptual notions of philosophy.
59. Harrison 1982, 227. Original the lecture *Art as Art Dogma* by Ad Reinhardt in ICA London May 1964.
60. In 1962 Enzensberger published an essay *The Aporias of The Avant-Garde*. I have considered the analysis more thoroughly in my *Vallankumouksia norsunluutormissa* (1994).

61. Benjamin 1970, 239.
62. Benjamin 1991, 53. The term tradition is problematic nowadays. Benjamin wrote as follows: "Tradition, rather than being either a positive term delimiting history or a negative term describing that against which innovation or experimentation is to be judged, becomes the site of conflict whose aim is the search for legitimation. The impossibility of unity would thereby be accepted." (Benjamin 1991, 134.)
63. Enzensberger 1962, 748.
64. Rosenberg 1967, 83.
65. Ibid., 85.
66. Belting 1987, 20.
67. Ibid., 27.
68. Kuspit 1984, 231.
69. Id. Cit. Greenberg: Sculpture in our Time. *Arts Magazine*, June 1958, p.22.
70. Clark 1982, 58. The other side of concentrating to medium and a negation of it is the rationality which in the development of arts means finding the optimal solution to the given technical problems.
71. Osborne 1970, 43.
72. Rosenberg 1967, 84-85.
73. Symons 1899: 253 & 256.
74. Enzensberger 1962, 743.
75. Miller 1964, 703.
76. Cooper 1964, 823.
77. Cit. Ohrt 1990, 35. Original: Marc,O: *Première manifestation d'un cinéma nucléaire*, ION, Avril 1952.

DEFINING THE CONCEPTS

78. *Dante's Inferno. The First Part of the Divine Comedy of Dannte Alighieri translated and illustrated by Tom Phillips*, which consists of etchings, screenprints, lithographs and hand-set text. It was published in 1983 by Talfourd Press, London. Another version was *Dante's Inferno. The First Part of the Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri translated and illustrated by Tom Phillips*, which is the laser-scanned offset-lithograph version of the previous work; published by Thames and Hudson, London, 1985. *A TV Dante* was a co-production of a KGP Ltd Dante BV for Channel 4, first broadcast in July 1990. *A TV Dante. Notes and Commentaries* was made for Channed 4 Television in association with the Talfourd Press.
79. The foundation of the theory was laid in the William James lecture series delivered by Austin at Harvard in 1955. See Phelan 1993 and Carlson 1996, the latter of whom is more thorough in describing the theory.
80. Derrida in *Signature Event Context*; quoted by Carlson 1996, 66.
81. Rosenberg: The American Action Painters. *Art News*, December 1952. Reprinted in Harrison & Wood 1992, 582. At first, I read about this in Tom Sandqvist's *Den meningslösa Kuben* (1988).
82. Id.
83. See Carlson 1996, 3.
84. Ibid., 5. Thought is from Richard Bauman & Erik Barnouw (ed): *International Encyclopedia of Communications* (1989).
85. See Mason 1992, 74.
87. Butler 1995, 205.
88. Carlson 1996, 138.
89. De Certeau 1984, 34.
90. Id.
91. Ibid., 36.
91. Gale 1997, 312. Déjeuner en fourure means literally: 'luncheon in fur'. Oppenheim eas one of those artists who had not a definite style.

92. Ibid., 37.
93. Id.
94. Austin postulated that it is not possible to reduce a performative utterance to an outer description of an inner state of mind. Neither we cannot reduce our ability to identify the action performed in a performative utterance to a matter of calculating the effects on some audience, real or imagined.
95. Lacy 1995, 28. Nowadays, the term 'new genre public art' has been "translated" into the term 'yhteisötaide' in Finnish.
96. Ibid., 19.
97. Lippard 1995, 121.
98. Jacob 1995, 56.
99. Gablik 1995, 141.
100. Lippard 1984(b), 342-343.
101. Ibid., 344.
102. Dewey 1958(b), 69.
103. For example, poststructuralism was in its ideology of representation strongly rationalist, emphasizing intellectual and disparaging emotions. Above all, the emotional identification was worst of all. (Hietala 1993, 32.) To my mind, Michel Maffesoli was right when he wrote that ". . . the more a utilitarian idea of life is supported, the more, as a replay, sociality, which is based on imaginary, existential light-heartedness, aspiration for hedonism, shared joy of life, appearance and the play of forms, is highlighted." (Maffesoli 1995, 69. Translated by Juha Virkki.)
104. Lippard 1984(b), 349.
105. Rosenberg 1967, 86-87.
106. Ibid., 88.
107. Hausmann 1964, 800-801.
108. Carlson 1996, 171-172.
109. Avgikos 1995, 87.
110. Jameson 1986, 43.
111. See Diamond 1993.
112. Ibid., 379.
113. Gadamer 1975, 137.
114. Id.
115. This problem has been dealt by Juha Hurme in his pro gradu work for art education. It has been published by the name *Parrakkaat lapset. Johdatus esityskeskiseen teatterinäkemykseen ja esitystutkimukseen*. (Published by Karloff Film Ltd, 1992.)
116. Gadamer 1975, 142.
117. Owens 1980, 235.
118. Gadamer 1975, 144.
119. Ibid., 139.
120. Ibid., 140.
121. "Girl power" is a right to live aesthetically: to take roles, to be talkative, to behave as you want, even badly, to giggle and to be selfish, to be aggressive, and especially to enjoy your body despite what others say (of your tattoos, body piercing or something else).
122. Peirce 1995, 44.
123. Putnam 1995(a), 173.
124. Fish 1995, 256 & 261.
125. Goodman 1995, 7. Quoted from Richard Rorty: *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979).
126. See Norris 1989, 109.
127. Wolterstorff 1989, 54-55.
128. Barthes 1985, 145-146.
129. Norris 1989, 117.
130. Kwon 1997, 102.
131. Id. In fact, the last remark is from Isabelle Graw's article in *Flash Art* November/December 1990, 137.
132. Ibid., 98.

133. Id.
134. Putnam 1995(a), 174.
135. Danto 1986, 45.
136. James 1963, 113-114.
137. Norris 1989, 108.
138. Auslander 1987, 23.
139. James 1963, 28.
140. Ibid., 33.
141. Ibid., 12.
142. Ibid., 9.
143. Ibid., 10.
144. Id.
145. Ibid., 11.
146. Vaneigem: *Basic Banalities II*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 123. "Banalités de base"; published in *IS*, no 7, Avril 1962 & no 8, Janvier 1963.
147. Shattuck & Taylor 1965, 86. Quoted from Jarry: *Twelve Theatrical Topics* (Douze arguments sur le théâtre).
148. Guy Debord: *Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency's Conditions of Organization and Action*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 25.
149. Debord: *For a Revolutionary Judgment of Art*. (Pour un jugement révolutionnaire de l'art.) Dated on February 1961. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 310.
150. Guy Debord & Gil J. Wolman: *Methods of Detournement*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 8. Published in *Les Lèvres Nues*, no 8, May 1956.
151. Guy Debord: *Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency's Conditions of Organization and Action*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 17.
152. *Response to a Questionnaire from the Center for Socio-experimental Art*. Signed by J. V. Martin, J. Strijbosch, R. Vaneigem and R. Viénet, on 6th December, 1963. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 145. "Réponse a une enquête du Centre d'art socio-expérimental"; published in *IS*, no 9, Août 1964, pp.40-44.
153. Guy Debord: *Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency's Conditions of Organization and Action*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 22.
154. *Response to a Questionnaire from the Center for Socio-experimental Art*, signed by J.V. Martin, J. Strijbosch, R. Vaneigem and R. Viénet on 6th of December, 1963. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 144. "Réponse a une enquête du Centre d'art socio-expérimental"; published in *IS*, no 9, Août 1964, pp.40-44.
155. Id.
156. *Ideologies, Classes and the Domination of Nature*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 106-107. "Domination de la nature, ideologies et classes"; published in *IS*, no 8, Janvier 1963.
157. Ibid., 109.
158. *Questionnaire*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 139. "Le questionnaire"; published in *IS* no 9, Août 1964, pp.24-27.
159. Monty Cantsin, the neoist, in December 1988. Monty Cantsin is a pseudonym invented in 1977. The neoists declared that since they are fed up living in a fragmentarized world, they want to seek for unity by taking the joint name Monty Cantsin.
160. Carr 1993 (1988), 105 & 111.
161. *Under the Cobblestones, the Beach* was again on the wall in exhibition "City: Visions and Revisions" arranged by Martha Rosler. She wrote: "Its romanticism may perhaps be excused by its reminder that the built environment is just that, and that, furthermore, the question of the body, of pleasure, and therefore of liberation cannot be divorced from rational considerations of urban life." (Rosler 1991, 36.)

SITUATIONAL AESTHETICS OF THE 1960S

162. I have written some more about Lettrism in my *Intellektualista terrorismia* (1994).
163. Lucie-Smith 1977, 154.
164. Becker & Vostell 1965, 13-14.
165. Kaprow 1993 (1979), 195.
166. The event went as follows: John Cage, dressed in a black suit and tie, read a lecture on Meister Eckhart, M. C. Richards recited from a ladder, David Tudor played a piano, and other performers were mixed in the audience occasionally saying something, movies were projected on the ceiling, Merce Cunningham improvised a dance (a dog followed him and was accepted as a part of performance), Robert Rauschenberg operated records with old phonograph. There's not an agreement what happened, though, since there are no documents but only stories of eyewitnesses, who saw different things due to their different sitting position in an audience. (See f.ex. Mary Emma Harris: *The Arts at Black Mountain College*. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987, and Goldberg 1988, 126-127.)
167. Kaprow's happening took place in October 1959. In December of the same year Meret Oppenheim organized what she called "a spring banquet", denying always that it was happening. There was a table on which laid a young woman covered with food and anemones (spring flowers). A photo of this occasion was published in many books and publications, for example, in Becker & Vostell 1965 - always without Oppenheim's name. The published picture also makes an impression of occasion what it was not. (See more of this: Gorsen, Peter: *Meret Oppenheims Festmähler - Zur Theorie androgynen Kreativität* and Oppenheim's letter. In exhibition publication: Meret Oppenheim. Galerie Krinzinger, Wien, 1997.)
168. Kirby 1965(a), 5-9.
169. *Ibid.*, 11.
170. Kirby 1965(b), 32.
171. *Ibid.*, 35.
172. *Ibid.*, 43. Another example Kirby presented is Stanley Brouwn's *Phonedrawings* which exists only in the mind of the performer, who is aware that if the locations he has called on the telephone were connected the image he has chosen would actually exist on a vast scale.
173. Kaprow 1993 (1987), 225.
174. Kirby 1965(a), 10.
175. Kirby & Schechner 1965, 58.
176. Kirby 1965(a), 4.
177. Kirby & Schechner 1965, 58.
178. Goldberg 1988, 162.
179. Osborne 1970, 35.
180. Berghaus 1995, 320. Quoted from Vostell: *Happening. Theater Heute*, May 29/1965.
181. *Ibid.*, 324. Quoted from Vostell: *Genesis and Iconography of My Happenings*. In *Miss Vietnam* 1968, 1-19. San Francisco: The Nova Broadcast Press, page 14.
182. Lebel 1968, 274. Originally published in *Tulane Drama Review* 13, 1:89-105.
183. *Ibid.*, 282.
184. See Kaprow 1993 (1966), 62-64.
185. Kaprow 1993 (1967), 88.
186. Dewey 1958(a), 365.
187. Kaprow 1993 (1983), 205-207. Notice the change of discourse from talking about the routinized everyday to talk about the reality taken for granted. Rhetorics became more abstract in ca. Twenty years.
188. *Ibid.*, 207-208.
189. Kirby 1965(a), 9.
190. Henri 174, 86.
191. There were also conceptual happenings, such as everyday life "exhibited" by Ben Vautier in the Venice Biennale of 1966: in French pavilion the audience was informed on the placard that:

- 400 miles from Venice/ In Nice/ 32, Road Tondutti-de-l'Escarène/ From the 18th of June 1966/ During the Biennale of Venice/ BEN SHALL LIVE AS USUAL./ Everyday/ He shall inscribe in a Fluxus copybook/ Unimportant and important details/ Of the day./ At the end of the Biennale of Venice/ This copybook/ Signed and dated/ Will represent/ EVERYDAY LIFE./ Ben's contribution to the Biennale of Venice 1966.
192. *Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency's Conditions of Organization and Action*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 25. Original: "Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions de l'organisation et de l'action de la tendance situationniste internationale". L'Internationale situationniste was founded in Alba, Italy 1957.
 193. Id.
 194. The situationists take as an example an imaginary project in which, for example, a research team has arranged an emotionally moving gathering of a few people for an evening. It is important to distinguish a director or producer responsible for coordinating the basic elements necessary for the construction of the decor and even for working out certain plans for interventions people can make (although, it is quite possible for people to make their own plans of ways to participate the event). Apart the director there are direct agents living the situation, who have taken part in creating the collective project and worked on the practical composition of the ambiance. There are also passive spectators who have not participated in the constructive work who should be reduced to action. (*Preliminary Problems in Constructing a Situation*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, p.44. "Problèmes préliminaires a la construction d'une situation"; published in *IS*, no 1, Juin 1958, p.11.)
 195. Ohrt 1990, 48. Ohrt is a German art historian.
 196. Goldberg 1979, 147.
 197. Adorno 1984, 132.
 198. Quoted by Shattuck 1984, 262.
 199. Kaprow 1993 (1983), 215.
 200. Kirby & Schechner 1965, 65.
 201. Kaprow 1993 (1990), 241.
 202. Osborne 1970, 41.
 203. Kirby 1965(b), 43.
 204. *The Avant-Garde of Presence*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, p.109-110. "L'Avant-garde de la presence"; published in *IS*, no 8, Janvier 1963, p.14ff.
 205. *Response to a Questionnaire from the Center for Socio-experimental Art*, signed by J.V. Martin, J. Strijboschin, R. Vaneigem and R. Viénet in the 6th December 1963. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, p.144. "Réponse a une enquête du Centre d'art socio-expérimental"; published in *IS*, no 9, Août 1964, pp.40-44.
 206. Sohm 1970 (no numbered pages). Originally published in M. Kirby: *Happenings*. New York 1965.
 207. Cit. Becker & Vostell 1965, 14.
 208. Cit. *Ibid.*, 46.
 209. See descriptions of the situation in Atkins: Asger Jorn. *The Crucial Years 1954-1964*. (1977), which is the most often referred description, and Ohrt: *Phantom Avantgarde*. Ohrt quotes Ralph Rumney's description of the ICA incident, and it slightly differs from Atkins's description.
 210. Kaprow 1993, xviii. Introduction by Jeff Kelley.
 211. *Ibid.*, xxii.
 212. Robert Filliou "made" *No-Plays* in 1964. It is an example of playing with the concept of participation and a work without an audience. It begins: "This is a play nobody must come and see. That is, the not-coming of anyone makes the play". Thus the "existence" of the No-Plays fully depends on the choice of the participants. Filliou explained the concept behind his No-Art that from the point of view of permanent creation a thing is of equal value if it is well made, badly made, or not made. Art is creation, and as such it has value. Art is not only good art, but a principle, it remains art even if it is bad. (See Berghaus 1995, 343-344.)

213. Brecht 1964, band V, 74-91. Written in 1938.
214. Shattuck 1984, 121. Jukka Sihvonen writes in an essay about virtual reality that it can be both simulation and stimulation of an experience. In William Gibson's novels there is a concept *simstim*, which means that with proper technical equipments the future society had created a new mode of conscious industry which produces simulated stimulations. Sihvonen writes, that in this sense *simstim* is as if Adornoan vision projected to the virtual future. (Sihvonen: *VT ja täydellisen kokemisen unelmat*. In Erkki Huhtamo (ed): *Virtuaalisuuden arkeologia*. Lapin yliopisto, Rovaniemi, 1995, p.265.)
215. Brecht 1964, band III, 188. First published in 1952.
216. See the full description of the work in Becker & Vostell 1965, 246-250.
217. Becker & Vostell 1965, 261. Emmett Williams: *Bemerkungen und Haltungen*.
218. Kaprow 1993 (1958), 12.
219. Kaprow 1993 (1966), 78-79.
220. Rosler 1994, 60.
221. Kaprow 1993 (1958), 11-12.
222. Kaprow 1993 (1977), 190.
223. *Ibid.*, 186-187.
224. Osborne 1970, 15.
225. Lyotard mentions about this in his essay *Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?*, published in *Innovation/ Renovation*, edited by I. Hassan & S. Hassan 1983. When referring to Minimalism I mean those zen-aspects some artists have mentioned.
226. Gadamer 1975, 124.
227. *Ibid.*, 130.
228. Dewey 1958(b), 35.
229. *Ibid.*, 36.
230. *Ibid.*, 40.
231. *Ibid.*, 45.
232. *Ibid.*, 3.
233. *Id.*
234. *Ibid.*, 11 & 22.
235. *Ibid.*, 38.
236. *Ibid.*, 172.
237. *Ibid.*, 192.
238. *Ibid.*, 220 & 249.
239. Gadamer 1975, 115.
240. *Ibid.*, 60.
241. *Ibid.*, 69. Quotation from Simmel is from "Brücke und Tür", ed. Landmann (1957), p.8.
242. See Gadamer 1975, 68.
243. Here Gadamer cites Georg Simmel: *Philosophische Kultur, Gesammelte Essays* (1911), pp.11-28. See Gadamer 1975, 69.
244. Gadamer 1975, 69.
245. *Ibid.*, 116.
246. *Ibid.*, 95.
247. This is, in fact, the subject of Marjo Räsänen's dissertation *Building Bridges* she made in the Department of Art Education in the University of Art and Design, Helsinki. She defended her doctoral thesis so recently, I haven't had time to familiarize with her work enough.
248. Gadamer 1975, 186.
249. *Ibid.*, 15.
250. *Id.*
251. Sederholm 1996, 34.
252. Gadamer 1975, 81.
253. Dewey 1995(b), 97.
254. Shusterman 1992, 253.

255. Gene Youngblood: *Simulacrum in aura (Aura of Simulacrum)*. A lecture in a seminar by AVEK in Helsinki 17.5.1991. Published in Erkki Huhtamo (toim): *Virtuaalisuuden arkeologia*. Lapin yliopisto, Rovaniemi, 1995, p.243.
256. Timothy Druckery: "Revenge of The Nerds: An Interview with Jaron Lanier." *Afterimage*, vol 18, no.10 (May) 1991. Quoted by Jukka Sihvonen: VT ja täydellisen kokemuksen unelmat. Published in Erkki Huhtamo (toim): *Virtuaalisuuden arkeologia*. Lapin yliopisto, Rovaniemi, 1995, page 266.
257. Jukka Sihvonen: VT ja täydellisen kokemuksen unelmat. Published in Erkki Huhtamo (toim.): *Virtuaalisuuden arkeologia*. Lapin yliopisto, Rovaniemi, 1995, p.264.
258. Gadamer 1975, 122.
259. Ibid., 124.
260. Ibid., 125-126.
261. Ibid., 133.
262. Witkiewicz 1923, 295-296.
263. Witkiewicz 1921, 148-149. In Gerould (ed): *The Witkiewicz Reader* (1992). This lecture, *Pure Form in a Theater*, by W. was given on 29th December 1921 at the Maly Theater in Warsaw.
264. Gadamer 1975, 102.
265. Ibid., 106.
266. Ibid., 105.
267. *All the King's Men*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 115. "All the King's Men"; published in *IS* no 8, Janvier 1963, pp.29-33, & Guy Debord: *Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency's Conditions of Organization and Action*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 25.
268. Vaneigem 1983, 153.
269. Ibid., 154.
270. Kaprow 1993 (1972), 122.
271. *Instructions for Taking Up Arms*, In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 64. "Instructions pour une prise d'armes"; published in *IS*, no 6, Août 1961, pp.3-5.
272. Vaneigem 1983, 201.
273. Id.
274. Wollen 1989, 89.
275. Dewey 1958(b), 279.
276. Morawski 1994, 185.

PART 3

. . . Mein Bauch ist von einer warmen Meeresströmung umflossen, ich stehe in den Lagunen. . . . Die Schrift ist verbrannt, als die Bibliothek von Alexandria brannte. Die schwarze Schlange mit dem weissen Kopf steht im Museum in Paris. Dann verbrennt auch sie.

Meret Oppenheim:

Selbstporträt seit 60 000 v.Chr. bis X (1980)

Let's see. Uh, it was on an island. And there was this snake. And this snake had legs. And he could walk all around the island.

Laurie Anderson: Langue d'Amour (1983)

DISSOLUTION OF THE ART OBJECT

*And Fred said: You know?
I think he's in some kind of pain.
I think it's a pain cry.
And I said: If that's a pain cry.
The language is a virus.
- Laurie Anderson:
Language is a Virus (From Outer Space)
(1983) -**

The important factor in comprehending contemporary art is how we understand what constitutes a work of art. Earlier, in modernism, when different art modes concentrated on improving and experimenting with their own modes of expression, trying to reach the fulfillment of a certain medium, the work of art was a rather clear entity: a picture, a film, a book or a composition. Theoreticians mainly considered the question of what is constituted by an aesthetic object, which they defined as a mental thing, an attitude of mind, as did Collingwood, for example, in a passage quoted in the chapter *Aesthetic Backgrounds*. The artist creates and her public appreciates what she has created. Through a successful act of appreciation we make aesthetic contact with an object, achieve a more adequate awareness of its aesthetic and artistic properties, and enjoy the aesthetic impact which the object makes upon us. Works of art are aesthetic objects specifically designed to favour the prolonged and repeated activity of aesthetic perception.¹ They are framed outside of reality. This framing, however, acquired increasingly conceptual forms from the beginning of this century onwards. The dissolution of the art object began with Futurism and Dada. Art was also understood as a composition utilizing different media. Duchamp made us see a process as a work of art in the sense that art is something that happens. But it was around the end of the 1950s, the birth of the happening, this development was accelerated.

* Original phrase "Language is a virus from outer space" is from William S. Burroughs.

Danto continues (see the chapter *Pragmatism and Art*):

the correct interpretation of object-as-artwork [that] is the one which coincides most closely with the artist's own interpretation. . . . And knowing the artist's interpretation is in effect identifying what she or he has made. The interpretation is not something outside the work: work and interpretation arise together in aesthetic consciousness. As interpretation is inseparable from work, it is inseparable from the artist if it is the artist's work.²

It is very clever to say: ". . . if it is the artist's work", since Danto, in any case, subscribes to a very artist-centered theory about what constitute the works of art.

A notion commonly held is of art as a language, and works of art as examples of that language. Nelson Goodman, for instance, held the languages of art to be entirely conventional, an idea which, of course, could easily help in shaping arts educational practices based on the specific "grammars" for teaching these conventional languages. However, nowadays not many theorists of arts education would agree about the existence of strict grammars of art modes that are teachable to us, although some have noted that in practice we are schooled to think that works of, especially, the fine arts have a special excellence and function autonomously, or that they are autonomous totalities.³

Talk about arts as languages is talk practised by analytic philosophers, who, after considering the autonomy of language in general, have applied their conclusions to art and artistic practices. There have been problems of how to use language and how to read it (in case of art how to interpret), of coding and decoding. Even excluding the idea of teaching us grammars some theoreticians, at least, refer to practices (arttalk) that are based on certain metalanguages. This is to walk a tightrope between the analytic and pragmatist camps. Speech about metalanguages seeks to avoid the search for essences and is even to deny the validity of evaluation, and discourse about practices of arttalk introduce up some of the relativity that is needed, especially when we are discussing arts educational practices. These tight-rope walkers then need not relativise everything or give up rules altogether, at least on the theoretical level, since there is the concept of metalanguages to fall back on, and they practice a discourse between these metalanguages. I think this is only to evade some of the problems both in the theory of art and in relation to an arts educational practice. These problems are, eg, the dissolution of the art object and the vanishing of the concept of art as autonomous (if it has ever been autonomous, at least in the sense that aesthetic values are independent of other values, and that art is a different from the everyday and life worlds, which I take in this chapter as an example Danto's theory of disturbing art).

At first, I want to prove that close systems no longer exist, that is, a clearly limited language of art, but that metaphors have gained more space as indeterminate and open language-games, that can be tossed into a discourse with an intention either to make it richer or to create a disturbing impression. In the previous part I defined performative art as a collage of arts or other elements. Its elements can also be metaphors.

I argue in this section that there has been a transition going on from works of art and their interpreting, experiencing and appreciating to the process that is analogical to the concept of play: play is an experience in itself. In one sense this is the same thing as an aesthetic experience as traditionally defined, but the shift is from meaning and its interpretation to doing. Of course this tendency does not concern all art.

As an example of making playing fields, I refer to the construction of situations (theoretized by the Situationist International) and happenings. They are open processes in a certain context, which is what influences acting and doing. It is not an art game or play where what is essential is the skill of appreciation, but play where anybody can take a role. This is connected to the latter part of the definition of performative art, as offering a space for interaction, participation and dialogue.

I already mentioned in the chapter on the problem of autonomous art that the concept of 'aesthetic consciousness' is a criterion that also affects contemporary art. In this section I take a closer look at those four ways of relating to the concept. Danto writes that work and interpretation arise together in aesthetic consciousness⁴. In using the term 'aesthetic consciousness' he is as vague as many other philosophers. If 'aesthetic consciousness' means a knowledge of aesthetic values and qualities, I am not denying that contemporary art also has some relations to them. However, it is wholly different question whether we can use those relations only to interpret or analyze contemporary works.

In this section I deal with the four relations displayed on page 42. (I refer to them by the numbers given there). I focus on the uniting of content and form in the aesthetic sense (3), and on intertextuality, that is, an ironical relation to aesthetics (1), mostly in the first three chapters. In the final chapter I focus on modes of art that seek to dispense with aesthetic values and criteria (2). The fourth (4) relation, that aesthetics absorbs art by making it a style even if it is not, concerns almost all the examples I present in this section. (I consider this relation more closely in the latter part of the chapter *From the Medium to the Process*.) To my mind this is the most interesting game of all in the arts, since making the symbolic literal, ie, mimicry is a "double-style" in the realm of art. It is based on a stylized life-world transformed on the stage or in other performances. If they are categorized as the style of an artist, the whole concept of style goes bankrupt.

Here, I attempt to develop rather concrete terms and viewpoints as alternatives to traditional aesthetic notions when analyzing contemporary (performative) art. To do this, I hold to be necessary to discuss the "forms" and structure of contemporary art works. Thus, I present examples to describe what has happened in the arts. I also analyze a few of these examples and, in doing so, attempt to develop new concepts for use in interpretation, with a view to assisting arts educators when they shape their own viewpoints on arts.

From Medium to Process

Concentration of art on its medium has meant a division between subject (as self) and object (as reality). Trying to get rid of the particularity of a medium is an attempt to make it a universal. This means a collision with the metaphysical questions relating to the oppositions of individual and universal, and of subjective and objective. Dewey, for example, discarded this philosophical problematizing from art as in his opinion it is quite a specific thing. Expression as a personal act and as an objective result are organically connected with each other, with no external standard to criticize the result, only their inner coherence. The metaphysical tradition, instead, views emotions, desires etc. As criticizable if they fail to correspond to the essential nature of the human self.

According to Bürger the reconciliation of subject and object is only possible when mediated by the imagination (in religion) or the concept (in philosophy); mimetic art aimed at that too.⁵ In Modernism the medium really worked as a place of estrangement. Certain avant-garde phenomena, however, have aimed at reducing the proportion of material and medium in order to reconcile the subject and object once again. These aims exist in conceptual art where the attempt has often been made to reconcile subject and object in almost the same way as in philosophy. Another way to reconcile the subject and object is imitation and counter-imitation, that is, using mimicry to create a space for resistance.

According to Rorty, who has polemicized against metaphysical philosophy, one phase of the effort to replace the traditional subject-object picture, is an attempt to substitute "language" for "mind" or "consciousness".⁶

Subject (self) ----- Language (or other medium) ----- Object (reality)

This does not necessarily mean uniting subject (self) and object (reality), as the question remains about the role of language as a medium: is it primarily a medium of expression, or a medium of representation showing the self what there is outside of it? Rorty stated that such questions as "Is our language a transparent or an opaque medium?" is possible if we suppose that language is somehow a unity, a third thing which stands in some determinate relation with two other unities - the self and reality.⁷ Traditional aesthetics grounds itself on this notion, since the existence of art works as framed wholes are taken for granted. Aesthetic contemplation is said to begin when the material surface is seen concurrently with the depiction. At this point the picture is seen as an assemblage of areas "which fall into sets of interlocking patterns which are linked by formal relations of harmony and tension, balance, symmetry and contrast with rhythmic repetition, echoing and compensation."⁸ Every presentation contains a relation to structure and submits itself to the criterion of correctness. Gadamer claims that "[e]ven the extreme of a completely distortive *presentation* confirms

this. It is known as a distortion inasmuch as the presentation is intended and judged to be the presentation of the structure."⁹ What about an open structure (process) as a work of art, in which there is no totality but only fragments (and how then they are put together)? What *is* a structure in this case?

Gadamer talks about festivals, saying that they change from one time to the next, yet still remaining the same festival. Originally the festival had a specific character and it was celebrated in certain ways. But Gadamer remarks that the historical connections of a festival are secondary. As a festival it does not have the identity that historical events have, but neither is it determined by its origin in the sense that once there was the "real" festival. The nature of a festival is to be celebrated regularly. Thus its original essence is to be something different. It has its being only in becoming and return.¹⁰ This is the kind of structure it has, which would be distorted when compared to the original. When we talk about a process as a work of art, is it short of an identity, since it does not return again and again? It has its being maybe only once, and then no more. Identity also changes in masterpieces and classics through the course of ages and circumstances.

What would be an alternative both to the theatre and to life which had become presentation? The situationists often referred to play and festival, in the nature of which everyone is a participant, and the relation between performers and spectators passes to and fro between the two. In fact, festival is an example of moving from medium to process, where play and game have an important role. Jacques Derrida cites Rousseau, who in his letter to M. d'Alembert proposed that theatrical representations be replaced with public festivals lacking all exhibiton and spectacle - "festivals without "anything to see" in which the spectators themselves would become actors: "But what then will be the objects of these entertainments? . . . Nothing, if you please. . . . Plant a stake crowned with flowers in the middle of a square; gather the people together there, and you will have a festival. Do better yet; let the spectators become an entertainment to themselves; make them actors themselves."¹¹ To transform an audience into performers was also one of the aims of the situationists.

Lefebvre, too, considered the concept of festival, but broadly, as a concept in which play and games are only one aspect. In 1968 he quoted his *Introduction à la critique de la vie quotidienne*, published twenty years earlier saying that style had degenerated into culture, it has divided into an everyday culture of the masses and into high culture, which is a division leading to specialization and decay.¹² Lefebvre remarked that art cannot compensate for style and festival, but it is a more and more a specialized mode of action that parodies festival. Lefebvre supported the idea that life is changed into art through festival, since it would make possible authentic experience: people were allowed to experience freedom and, at the same time, become conscious of alienation and its scope and power. Lefebvre stated that the festival had not totally vanished but lived on in meetings, celebrations and amusement parks, which, however, are only substitutes.¹³

Perhaps it would also be fruitful to turn to art theorists. In the case of structure, for example, Jencks has a few relevant things to say when he

describes aspects of the postmodern in art (see the chapter *Lies are Sins No More...*). According to him, the structure need not be a synthesis but elements that confront each other on their own terms. A structure can be a combination of components, a collage of motifs and materials, even a collage of various arts, contents, or styles, as in performative art. When the elements are not harmonious, and when they do not even necessarily have any symbolic significance, but are just playful constellations of nostalgia or pastiche; or when power structures are affirmed and denied simultaneously in the same works or in different works, how, then, can we define any criterion of correctness, which, in fact, is just another concept of philosophical aesthetics for those analysts who try to find always some reason or purpose behind things? Instead, we could approach the concepts of play and adventure leaving aside such considerations as those of structure or correctness, and concentrate on strategies and especially on tactics, as Jencks, Owens, and de Certeau, among others, have proposed. I suggest that in approaching the arts we use these (pluralistic) strategies as a “vocabulary” (not grammar) for what we are looking for, in order to gain an experience of what we have in front of us. Then we would not need to think of works as objects or unities, as is often the case in much contemporary art.

In the first section I explained that philosophers have often maintained the existence of an aesthetic distance which makes a work of art its own world. For example, understood as symbols, art objects are no longer objects of aesthetic contemplation. Autonomy then vanishes also along with contextuality (particularism and the historicity of collages) and open structures, not to mention physicality in art. In the former case, that of the contextuality and historicity of collages, what Gadamer describes above as a distortion in a recognizable structure actually happens. At least, this is true if we think about the collages of modern art.

It is slightly paradoxical that when a work of art is understood as a symbol it loses the possibility to be an object of contemplation, as many aestheticians claimed, since, on the one hand, the one point of autonomy is that art (symbol) represents something else, what it is not. In fact, the symbol is a highly emphasized notion in the discourse about the autonomy of art, especially in the sense that here autonomy means that art as a sign system is closed in relation to other aspects of culture and so called ‘external relations’. In (postmodern) contemporary art there is more “returning” in the rationality of an allegory. One example of this is Laurie Anderson’s cd-rom *Puppet Motel* (1995), which also includes a lot of symbolism; although I would say that, even more allegories; there are familiar themes, sounds and images which do not symbolize anything, or, which, due to the interactive character of the work, may symbolize something (intertextually) a receiver has only in her head. Another example, although not yet internationally as well-known as Anderson’s, is the *Kalevala* project by the Finnish photographer Vertti Teräsvuori and his friends put on in Turku, Finland in autumn 1997. It was a collective making of garments, tools, pictures and so on of the Finnish national epic. Nowadays there is more emphasis on conventions and cultures and non-metaphysical relations. But, by conventions, I mean more the content than conventions of arts languages in Goodman’s sense. Rather, it is a question about what Pierre

Bourdieu writes about the languages of the arts. According to him, the languages of the arts are linked to a situated and dated social universe, and they become the subject of usages which are themselves socially marked by the social position of uses.¹⁴

Allegory is not a product of genius alone, but it rests on firm traditions and always has a fixed stable meaning. It is very much a social phenomenon, and thus even close to taste in its traditional sense. It is to do with the rationalization of the mythical¹⁵. And this concerns the myth as it is also defined by Barthes. He wrote in his *Mythologies* (1957) that myth has the task of giving a historical intention a natural justification, it makes contingency appear eternal. I quote Barthes at some length:

The world enters language as a dialectical relation between activities, between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of essences. . . . In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes a world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves.¹⁶

Thus myths maintain an autonomy of things by subtracting everything local and particular from them. According to Barthes, who wrote at the same time as the situationists were shaping their theories, myth is depoliticized speech. A political language represents nature, or situation, for a person only inasmuch as she is going to transform it. Then she 'acts things', as Barthes stated. But if she is not acting but only speaking about it, or on it, then she 'acts their names', and this is to the primary language what the gesture is to the act.¹⁷ This second-order language is exactly that metalanguage, which according to Barthes, is not entirely mythical, but is the very locus where myth settles. For myth can work only on objects which have already received the mediation of a first language.¹⁸ With this help from Barthes I argue that this is just the problem of arttalk which uses the metalanguages of the arts. It is, then, not to 'act art' but 'act on art', that is, act the criticism, ie, the second-order language. And I agree that it is depoliticized language, although since Barthes wrote his book, there various alternative ways have been proposed of repoliticizing language; to mention the strategy of mimicry alone. Its intention is to break up myths, for example, myths mediated by the metalanguage of women, for example. The same goes for art and aesthetics, however. In aesthetics, for example, there has been much talk about truth and beauty, even up to recent times. In arts education, Smith's notion of excellence in art and talk about masterpieces which are transparent windows on universal truths are depoliticized myths which sustain the autonomy notion. I do not quite understand - and I am not the only one - why it should be art in particular that is to reveal the metaphysical Truth(s). Do we not know or are aware of them in other ways? If there are any at all.

Gadamer says that the concept of allegory has undergone considerable expansion: it refers not only to the figure of speech (rhetoric) but to abstract concepts artistically represented in images: ". . . allegory assumes not the

kind of original metaphysical affinity that a symbol claims but rather a co-ordination created by convention and dogmatic agreement, which enables one to present by images something that is imageless."¹⁹ Contemporary art uses the knowledge and consciousness of these conventions, or should we say, myths, (both conventions of art and so called reality) to say something, to communicate, or to increase the sense of community. Today allegory is more and more in use as a rationalization of myth, resolving the metalanguage back its historical origins.

In art we have an artist and an audience. If we think of "language" in the place of an art work, it connects to the subject in that there is an amount of self-expression in it. As Dewey has written: ". . .the self assimilates that material in a distinctive way to reissue it into the public world in a form that builds a new object."²⁰ This object is not necessarily a physical product, though, but an experience that is a product of the continuous and cumulative interaction of the organic self with the world. The new object is a piece of an act of constant recreation on the part of a perceiver, as in happenings, festivals, constructed situations, or contemporary performative art. Recreation also includes self expression on the part of a perceiver, particularity, a changing of the object at different times. If not, a work of art (in a medium between subject and object) would have universality, which is a synonym for monotonous identity.²¹ However, this is not exactly the same as repetition in expression. Apart from more or less monotonous universality, works of art have qualities that can appeal to different audiences at different times, but not every time in exactly the same way. This view implies that meanings are inherited in a medium, although they are not static. Art is a process of moving along an axis the "ends" of which are subject and object. Some art attempts to shorten the axis by increasing the specificity of the material, subject-matter, or, situation. An attitude of mind sometimes approaches to physical feelings of the body etc. If we think that meanings are merely inherited in a medium, as has had often been thought in aesthetics, then one needs methods and tools to perceive the work comprehensively, one needs skills for appreciation. The more abstract or neutral the material, the more skill is needed to grasp its meaning. If material or subject matter is specific, the more easier it is to apprehend, but the more meanings are found in the relation of the medium to its surroundings, which needs contextual sensitivity. Thus the notion that meanings are inherited in a medium puts the emphasis on aesthetic and artistic autonomy. This is not absolutely necessary, though. According to Irmeli Hautamäki, Duchamp was against purely retinal (abstract) art, since he thought that it works only as an eye catcher teasing the desire of the gaze, which is never satisfied. Duchamp himself made works that criticized pure retinality. But his works were also difficult, since his continuous play between subjectivity and meanings is hard to grasp, or at least to invent by the perceiver. Consequently, Duchamp left an audience in a continuous state of uncertainty.²²

More open and relative is the notion that to have a meaning is to have a place in a language game. And again I have to take a detour into analytic philosophy in order to say that the one problem for philosophers has been truth and its verification. In a consensus theory of art, the notion

of the social production of truths is often applied (although we could say that earlier it was called 'taste' as I have mentioned in the first part). I argue that not in all contemporary art, but in many cases, at least in the performative and the new genre public art (this term I shall explain later), this social context is local and changing local realities. Yet, Rorty's rejection of truth altogether, as a pseudo-philosophical problem, and analytic aestheticians' talk about coherent-theories of truth or of some general common ground of truth, may both have little to contribute in the search for appropriate and relevant arts educational practices. But, if it is enough that such claims hold good within a given, albeit highly specialized community of language use (one of which is an artworld), then we have to teach arttalk, that is, the specialized language of art to those who cannot use it without such education. This is to maintain the autonomy of art as an elitist jargon. Here, we should not confuse the theory and practice of arts education, as has often been done. Of course an educator needs to know the alternatives and possibilities on the theoretical level also. But she need not necessarily apply them as such to her teaching. I do not want to go deeper into these philosophical problems of truth, since the border between analytics and pragmatics is in some cases very thin²³, and to my mind, in the end, all that matters are just individual cases, even in forming a theory (it is no use to anyone to have a theorist who does not know what is going on in art(s), or who has attitudes), not to mention the practice of arts education. I have at least two reasons for thinking so: one is the pluralism of the arts, another is that art has other tasks than only producing an aesthetic experience, although I do not deny that some art is for that too. I simply want to avoid holistic notions at a time when people are shaping their lives according to aesthetic styles. In this respect philosophical aesthetics is not enough in forming a theory of arts education.

Metaphors, for instance, by definition, do not at first take part in a language-game, because they do not have a cognitive content that its author wishes to convey and that the interpreter must grasp if (s)he is to get the message.²⁴ This is Donald Davidson's view which Rorty quotes: "Tossing a metaphor into a conversation is like suddenly breaking off the conversation long enough to make a face. . . . All these are ways of producing effects on your interlocutor or your reader, but not ways of conveying a message."²⁵ Sentences like this may be repeated and catch on. Then they will gradually require a habitual use, a familiar place in the language game. They will thereby have ceased to be metaphors - or, it will have become what most of the sentences of our language are, a dead metaphor.²⁶

If we think of art as metaphors, it is attempting to claim that many radical avant-garde groups, Futurism, Dada, Surrealism, Fluxus and the SI, for instance, had loved to toss ungraspable metaphors into conversations. They wanted to get rid of that meaningful "language" between subject and object. To a certain degree there has been a willingness to replace it, and also attempts to redescribe it, make it to a process, give it mobility, make it pure function/operation. The situationists tried to make from it a theory which is always changing, "art" that has no metaphysical referent. They also tried to avoid dead metaphors - universality as reiteration and monotony. In fact, they didn't want to develop any metalanguage of art but to take art as it is.

To give it performativity in the sense that the referent is the act itself, it is to do something instead of conveying a message, and it is contextualized activity, ie, practices that disturb established meanings. The situationists were - in a way - rather close to Dewey who writes about emotions tangling into acts of expression and an expressive object as an integral whole. Although we must remember that the work of art was a separate entity for Dewey, who thought in terms of the different art genres of the 1930s. Gadamer also refers to the metaphorical use of words. If the word was applied to a sphere where it did not originally belong, the actual "original" meaning emerges clearly.²⁷

Aesthetic consciousness is opposed to the particularity and locality of taste, which is based on the morals of a specific society or community. This is connected with the aestheticization of life (lack of stable values, morals or even commonly shared taste). Charles Altieri remarked that "[t]o value style is necessarily to value how things are said."²⁸ Exactly. And that is to my mind what people (in postmodern society) value now, and that is the reason for practicing styles. Social milieux, new styles and new communities are the vehicles through which people orientate themselves. This is also an aesthetics of life. Individuals need and have to make choices, and style has been developed as an instrument with which to make choices. In this context style is understood as an orientating concept or mechanism. It is possible to buy material and immaterial products according to aesthetic criteria only. This even becomes necessary when production becomes more abstract, as in the media for instance, where references exist between media products themselves. "The spectacle is capital accumulated until it becomes an image" (Debord). It also reduces the degree of autonomy of art since then it is no longer the only sphere of self-reflectivity. If life is aestheticized in terms of traditional artistic styles, art still remains oppositional to life, even if it radicalizes, activates and politicizes itself.

Sociologists define style as a kind of common language, even if it is a creation of a few. A few means not a kind of elite as in avant-garde, though. Every individual is real when she is exaggerating, ie, speaking creatively over and above normal standards, as in mimicry, for instance. Individuals make styles through it. This is close to the ways the SI tried to use language and the environment and to de Certeau's theories about producing rhetoric when walking along the street, to which I return later.

Besides the division into the formalist and the radical avant-garde, it is also possible to examine the avant-garde in other terms, for example as a style-creating avant-garde and its opposite which I call a non-style avant-garde. Style is usually defined as those characteristics of form which are peculiar to a certain work or a group of works. Empirically, style is the most essential qualities common to a group of specific works of art; belonging to a certain style requires that these qualities (or at least some of them) manifest themselves in the work. As analytical philosophers often have done, Altieri saw it only as a matter of taste without significant philosophical consequences.²⁹ To my mind, one important consequence is that art has become more "non-stylistic", since the mundane has become "stylized".

Not all art is non-stylized, though. Altieri wrote also: "Style remains performance, and it thus enters the endless regress of producing states that

can never be recuperated except in further performances *ad nauseam*.”³⁰ What is wrong with this? Mimicry too can be seen as a style, and then it makes something manifest in its own way where subject and object - self and reality - meet each other on a ground which is not between them but is composed of them. Then, what is a language? Altieri referred to Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, and states that by revealing what is alive in the sentence, style brings these paths before reflection.³¹ This means that we derive meanings not only from traditional practices, but also engaging in situations. We can think of style as performative also in *literally non-performative* contexts: in painting, architecture (which I actually hold to be performative), structured and unified installations, and so on. In fact, mimicry as a performance exists not only in the performative, but also in Kaj Stenvall’s duck paintings, in Michael Graves’ *Humana Building* in Louisville, Kentucky (1982-85), not to mention the quite well-known submission of Robert Stern for the *Chicago Tribune Tower* (1980). In fact, these examples of “double-coding”, or, conservative postmodernism, are so called dead metaphors brought alive in the new context. As symbols or allegories they can be seen as naïve, since they are only play, actually a game between arttalk practitioners. In these cases a large community recognizes them, which of course does not mean that every one knows all the meanings that connect them to past conventions and discourses. But they provide material to invent meanings, although some of them are quite explicit. Then again, there is no longer the hostility that used to exist against modernist architecture, for example, where everything was given from above, so to speak.

Ungraspable metaphors and disturbing effects are very subjective modes of communication, however. Rorty distinguishes a public use and a private use of language. The former is shared and serves the basic needs of the linguistic community. The latter need not and should not be shared if we aim to maximize diversity, novelty, and autonomy.³² Rorty writes about the intellectual’s private imagination. But to deny any common language is to deny any effective referential individuation, hence any effective discourse, as Shusterman states in his critique of Rorty’s thought.³³ This is what the situationists criticized in Surrealism, for instance. But in a way the SI had a public “art” and a private “art”: *détournement* is based on the notion of an existing common language. Constructing situations, and also *dérive* in psychogeography, means creating some kind of private language, comparable to metaphor. A compromise, or result, of this is play. In such play, everyone takes a role which is not a predetermined but an open situation. Ungraspable metaphors can also be comprehended in that there is an open ‘art situation’, that is, meanings or cognitive contents are not determined beforehand, there is no message to be conveyed at all.

Next I shall deal with the Danto’s theory of disturbational art. The question is whether if Dantoesque disturbance is a subjectivity that liquidates any demands for universality. I mean that, on the contrary to his own opinions, what he defines as disturbing does not necessary disturb everyone, and in this sense it would be a private language, comparable to metaphor. Are they then metaphors in the sense that they do not have a cognitive content that the author/artist wishes to convey?

Orlan is an example of disturbance that is not just plain provocation. The situation itself is performing cosmetic surgery operations where the doctors and nurses show themselves dressed in design garments of famous *haute couture* designers. Orlan makes video tapes of these situations and plays them to an audience that is usually on the verge of throwing up. In their intensity disturbance and disgust are as strong as in many of the examples Danto presents. But to create nausea is not Orlan's intention. In one of her surgery works she wanted to make herself the ideally most beautiful woman in the world following the paragons and therefore famous models of art: Botticelli's *Birth of Venus*, Leonardo's *Mona Lisa*, Boucher's *Europe*, Gérôme's *Psyche* and a Diana statue from the 16th century. Unlike some other body artists, Orlan abstracts the body in the extreme. Despite confusing our certainty that the body is the only solid thing that everyone has, she also raises questions of identity and otherness. In her own words, the operations she has gone through are transsexual transition rituals where a woman changes into a woman.³⁴ It is interesting that Orlan brought up the term rituals, since that is just what Danto sees as a basis for disturbational art. But, compared to his meanings Orlan's rituals are nevertheless quite estranger. They are mimicry in an extreme way.

Danto's Theory of Disturbation

Certain features are typical of contemporary political art: the functional strategies of works, open collage form, specificity, nominalism, historicity and contextuality, the using and copying of media images, mimicry, recontextualization, and so forth. I also introduce Danto's theory of disturbance in art, since it is one of the few coherent attempts by an art theorist to grasp existing phenomena.

Historicity is in the possibility to experience disturbances. In a living performance on a stage anything can happen, and an "error", intentional or not, connects the performance to the history of the moment. It is possible to define as disturbance every aspect that shatters the benumbing and automatic nature of the spectacle; both in an individual artistic spectacle and in the spectacle in the broader social context. According to Danto, disturbance in art has been common since the 1960s when art distanced itself from objects and directed itself towards (conceptual) processes. Danto thinks that the disturbance on the level of content of the work remains representational. Hence the most effective disturbance is when the boundaries between art and life are breached in some way the mere representation of disturbing things cannot achieve because they are representations and responded to as such. Reality must in some way be an actual component of disturbational art, Danto argues. And this reality should be itself disturbing. Obscenity, frontal nudity, blood, excrement, mutilation, real danger, actual pain and possible death are things Danto has listed.³⁵ He connects disturbing art especially to performance-type projects, where there's immediate contact between artist and audience.

In disturbational art the artist is not taking refuge behind the conventions, but (s)he is opening a space which the conventions are designed to keep closed.³⁶ According to Danto it seems that disturbational art belongs to the kind of audience out of which the theatrical audience originally evolved. Disturbational art has the means to regress to a more primitive relationship between actor and celebrants. The disturbatory artist aims to transform her audience into something pretheatrical, a body which relates to her in some more magical and transformational relationship than the defining conventions of the theatre allow. The disturbatory artist means to achieve this by the transformation of herself, which consists in taking off the protective and powerfully dislocative atmosphere of theatrical distance and making contact with reality. Danto claimed that in some way the disturbatory artist sacrifices herself so that through her an audience may be transformed, if only for a moment, as she becomes possessed by something alien. It is her enterprise for restoring to art some of the magic purified out when art became *art*, Danto writes.³⁷ Above I stated that Orlan's projects at least seem to belong to this category of transitional rituals, but it is in fact amusing to realise that the direction is just the opposite: she makes herself a woman according the great masterpieces of art, which are the anomalies, ie, that "alien" she will possess physically in its literal meaning. It is rather paradoxical that, whereas in Orlan's project the physical can be seen as increasing the autonomy of art, since she really abstracts the body, in an opposite way, Danto's notion of disturbance reduces the autonomy of art by making art closer to life. Of course it is not quite so simple, but a tendency anyhow. We can propose that Orlan's project has nothing to do with feminist mimicry, but is merely an example of maintaining an aesthetic lifestyle and selling it as art.

Danto, on his behalf, writes about disturbational art, or, as it is also often called, controversial art, since he needs a concept to deal with art that is historical "after art history", and can be dealt with in terms of those "external relations" Casebier writes about. Also in this case, external relations diminish the distance between art and life, and also between intellect and emotion, the latter of which merges together into a passion. I mean by this the remark that an artist sacrifices herself for the sake of her audience. Contemporary art is influenced by the realms of life outside the traditional modernist art world. Detachment from the hegemony of middle-aged white men has taken place as feminists and racial minorities have raised their voices. On the one hand, they want to take part in the art system, on the other, there have been attempts to find alternatives to the dominant practices. Disturbational art in the dantesque sense tries to realize the latter aims. At first it is tempting to derive analogies between disturbational art and the modernist anti-art of the radical avant-garde; but they are not directly comparable. In fact, it is impossible to differentiate disturbational and contemporary art in the sense it is possible to do this with modernist art and anti-art. Nowadays, when the concept of homogeneous culture has fragmented, it is impossible to conceive of disturbational art as a counter movement, not even as a unitary phenomenon, since it is an epithet for many possibly conflicting thoughts and aims. Disturbationary art does not even disturb every one.

The disturbance in disturbationary art is not as much aesthetic as political. Often, the disturbance comes from outside of the life of those men who have traditionally set standards, and is thus experienced as disturbing, or controversial. For example, in Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs there is nothing disturbing in their aesthetic form and expression, but disturbing is their content: men as sexual beings; nobody is startled by nude women. It is to be noticed that when, for example, the representatives of the radical avant-garde talked about the integration of art and life, they meant by life more the public political realm than the maintenance work of everyday life: taking care of children or doing the dishes. Nowadays "the personal is political" is stuck fast to art. And the more significant is that disturbationary art is not only fighting against institutional art, as anti-art did, but it is using those institutions and conventions for its own political needs.

Of course the critique is ultimately directed also at art institutions and the existing systems, but unlike modernist anti-art, the premises and the point of the critique stated by disturbationary art are often outside the art world and its problems. Apparently this is the reason why there have been conflicts in the United States at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. When art contains discourses and phenomena to which no attempt is made to give any universal or deeper spiritual meaning, as the modernists usually wanted to do, art cannot be separated off as an apparently useless and entirely autonomous phenomenon trying to attain a utopia. For some the idea of art as a revealer of universally human values has become a problem, especially during the late fifteen years, when there has been a new flowering of political art. During the last decade art has more often declared the political goals of certain small groups, which some think to be in conflict with the universality and general humanity of art. In fact, the disturbationary artists often identify artistic and political realms. Those disturbed, on their behalf, usually attack from the realm traditionally held to be outside of art (religious or political) against the category of art *en bloc*. Disturbance does not have any effect, but the political situation in the end of the 1980s in the United States was favourable for art to become an eyesore in domestic politics, or, alternatively, a hobby horse on which to ride away from other problems and to collect some credibility in politics. Thus attitudes in favour of censorship and argumens about the conditions for the public financing of art grew more intense. It was not so simple a question, though, as the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) which has supported art in the United States, has claimed to be doing that according to the criteria of artistic merit independently of markets, popular taste or political constituencies. Thus the NEA's ideological function lies in the modernist notion of timeless, priceless masterpieces bearing a purely aesthetic value. Precisely the same principles as in American arts education.

One of the most effective and provocative methods of disturbance was to put together or compare things that traditionally had been separately categorized, for example, the sacred and profane, that is to say, the spiritual and the bodily, religion and bodily fluids. One of the works that created lot of polemics was Andres Serrano's *Piss Christ* (1986) from a series of photographs where he created both formalistic and internal montages. Henrik Plenge Jacobsen's installation *White Love* (1995) aroused confusion

in the ARS95 exhibition in Helsinki. There was human blood, urine and semen taken and isolated from the body and put into a bottle, washing machine and blender. Menstrual blood has always been held to be especially unholy and impure, a fact which Casandra Stark Mele used in her film *Dead on My Arm* (1985) where she connects menstrual blood and Catholicism by baptising herself, thus being reborn by herself, with her own menstrual blood.³⁸

There is one problem with Danto's ideas, however. He assumes a wide and homogeneous audience that is challenged, provoked, assaulted or dismayed by certain controversial images. But the fact is that all disturbance does not arouse similar reactions in everybody. The same image which could provoke or shock some people can amuse, excite and even be very common, confirming already establishing identities, for others. The initiators and the core of arguments about censorship of art in the United States has been the most fundamentalist right wing republicans, for whom the right to represent and defend attitudes which differ from their patriarchal views is abomination; they have a history of putting together with communists, feminists, sexual minorities, African-Americans and other racial groups, liberals, ecologists, artists etc. We must remember that this fundamentalist right wing, as well as all those interested in art, do not represent a wide and coherent audience. (In fact, it is difficult to maintain that they are an audience at all, since they do not necessary have art as a hobby at all but follow scandals via the media.) They have been given space for their opinions now that the expert culture in modernist sense has disappeared and every one has her/his own voice.

The situationists wanted to bring certain disturbances into art, for example the possibility of unexpectedness in the construction of situations or *dérive*; and not only to art, but to the spectacularized life-world. And not only as a disturbing reality, for example in the morally negative elements Danto listed, but in connection with situations disturbance can be understood as bringing to art the historical dimension, ie, to making art more everyday and also politicizing it. In other words, the situationists did not care so much about shock elements, secretions, indecency, or the presence of certain dangerous potentials, with whom it might be possible to try to change the status of art. In fact, these elements are included specifically in disturbational *art* - aesthetics: such dichotomies as beauty/ugliness, truth /lie, good/evil, kitsch/avant-garde. Of course disturbational strategies also work in situations where everyday life has been reified (and aestheticized). The disturbance of the SI, as well as the other radical avant-gardist movements, had an instrumental character: it is designed to awaking people.

Are activist groups avant-garde then? Many activist artists do work in groups. In the modernist sense of avant-garde they are not, since their group work does not aim such goals as originality or developing new art forms. They simply use what is available and make combinations. One theory is that activist and political art approaches architecture in the sense that it is based on many components, namely economic, psychologic and anthropologic interests; it is collective group work, although it is not a question about "design teams". Rather, it is a question about playing on the wrong field, if we scrutinize art only on aesthetic grounds, as has also been

done in the field of architecture, for that matter. Is the problem that in functional forms there is nothing new, and this is what confuses critics who try to find artistic innovations?

Playing a Language-Game

Disturbation is, on the one hand, tossing metaphors in an art-game so as to get people to notice the frames of an art world, on the other hand, it is tossing metaphors in everyday discourse, testing its limits. This resembles the double-strategy of an avant-garde. In fact, the strategy is very much the same as in the radical avant-garde, but the aims have changed. It is no longer a question of attacking, but studying discourses etc. It is also a question of mixing up language-games; in fact, of studying different discourses and seeing how they lay a basis for the realities we have. By this I mean the distances between subject (self), language (as art) and object (reality). People use certain discourses by habit. New leftists use the term reification in connection with this. It is easier to forgive the first way (getting people to notice the frames), since it happens inside a relatively autonomous realm which is not supposed to influence the mundane. In the latter case, testing the limits of everyday discourse), the boundary between art and life may sometimes be so thin that, despite art having lost much of its autonomy, we can discuss whether it is a question of art at all anymore, but only one of exploiting its possibilities, that is, using art as a tactic.

To my mind, this dichotomy is not so easy to handle. Let us take, for example, Marcel'li Antunez Roca, who has connected himself to a computer, so that anybody in the organized situation can select impulses that get him to make distorted, sometimes painful moves. Marcel'li himself has explained that in his work *Epizoo* he tried to show people how easy it is nowadays to cause pain to somebody you do not know or even get near; he referred to the Gulf War. It sounds rational. But why it is art? The question is, what to choose? Can an aesthician, not to speak of an arts educator, set herself certain limits she refuses to cross? Can an arts educator repudiate art? These are practical questions. How come an arttalk would help to solve them if it is based on the notion of autonomous second-order languages of art, or, more specifically, art criticism? If we think about the four aims in teaching arts according to the principles of the DBAE, we inevitably meet a difficulty due to the ideological nature of art history (it brings the problem of which examples to choose) and to the fact that art criticism leans on a second-order language that emphasizes the autonomy of art in the sense that it might distance itself from the life surrounding it, and what is more alarming, even from the art being done right now.

Debord tried to carry out the strategy suggested by Adorno: the only way to get through to reified minds by means of art is to shock them into realizing the phoneyess of what a pseudo-scientific terminology likes to call communication.³⁹ The necessary condition for revolution is to change

the language, the language created by self; the situationists thus manifested as their goal as creating situations and a language for them, which was a sort of production of noise and disturbance. As Vaneigem writes: "But those who have rejected all hierarchical power can use any word as a weapon to beat out the *rhythm* of their action".⁴⁰ This concept of the rhythm of an action is important in radical avant-gardist and subcultural movements which have as their project the destruction of stereotypical structures of language and its exploitation according to their own needs, ie, to repoliticize 'speech'. Many of these movements (Dada and Lettrism, for example) concentrated on the rhythmical elements of language, phonetics etc., conscious inquiry into which has not been part of the practice of using the language of ideological hegemony, or, should we say convention.

The point is not to accept the dominant descriptions of the real but to create our own one. However, in this process of creation meaninglessness is what one has to flirt with when one is in between social, and in particular linguistic, practices - "unwilling to take part in an old one but not yet having succeeded in creating a new one", as Rorty remarked.⁴¹ This floating in the midst of meaninglessness, although intending something, is what Dada did in its time, and much later also Punk, maybe even more efficiently. The latter realized the "performing self", Richard Poirier has spoken about, that is, "a self that responds with a native guile to the deconstructive tendency in language."⁴² It means to use sounds so as to reverse the deconstructive movement even while allowing it. These sounds constitute of the grunts and groans which tend to disappear in daily utterance. Yet some subcultures can lay stress upon them. "All of us live all the time with the fact that while the language of daily life creates structures we can believe in, it just as beneficially creates gaps in those structures, gaps in what it only pretends already to have settled."⁴³ Some have taken it as their task to point out these gaps.

Playing with language has often been an end in itself. Play belongs to the nature of an avant-garde, which is not surprising, for plays and games have always fascinated especially young men, and the avant-garde has always been an affair of young men. This also explains attempts to create a special jargon in every avant-garde as a protest against the linguistic practices of an "old" world. Later, through disturbing art, for instance, this avant-garde tradition has continued in attempts by sexual, ethnic, gender and other minorities to create a protest jargon of their own even to replace the prevailing patriarchal linguistic practices.

In his lecture *Le théâtre de la cruauté et la clôture de la représentation* (1966)⁴⁴ Derrida dealt with things which can be connected to the problematic of creating situations. Derrida's starting point is the idea that life is the nonrepresentable origin of representation. Life carries man along with it, but is not primarily the life of man, which is only a representation of life.⁴⁵ This is easily connectable to Vaneigem's remark that people tend to learn behavioural modes from movies. People are given stereotypes (comparable to dead metaphors), forms, that is to say, some frames to act within; and they choose from this number of stereotypes their daily modes of behaviour. Even before Vaneigem and Derrida, Adorno wrote, when dealing with culture industry, that the monopoly of this industry, and a

society altogether, shuts its doors on anyone who fails to learn from the cinema how to move and speak according to the schema which it has fabricated.⁴⁶

In the lecture mentioned above, Derrida thinks about a situation where theatre has been released from the text and the author-god. The director and the participants (who no longer are actors *or* spectators) cease to be the instruments and organs of representation. It is not a question about totally rejecting representation, but as for example in Artaud's theatre of cruelty, the stage

will no longer represent, since it will not operate as an addition, as the sensory illustration of a text already written, thought, or lived outside the stage, which the stage would then only repeat but whose fabric it would not constitute. The stage will no longer operate as the repetition of a *present*, will no longer represent a present that would exist elsewhere and prior to it. . . . Nor will the stage be a representation, if representation means the surface of a spectacle displayed for spectators. It will not even offer the representation of a present, if present signifies that which is maintained *in front of me*. . . . And nonrepresentation is, thus, original representation, if representation signifies, also, the unfolding of a volume, a multidimensional milieu, an experience which produces its own space.⁴⁷

It is a question about the dissolving of the traditional opposition between actor and spectator and infiltrating a new kind of spatial thought into the spectacle, that is to say, producing a space that is used on every level. Analogically the urban environment and psychogeography of the situationists show themselves as the "new stage of the spectacle" - and then it becomes less a question about a Debordian spectacle than about a performative spectacle in the artistic sense.

If there are changes in the function of text and dialogue in a theatre, if their meaning is transcended or reduced, then speech and writing will once more become gestures; and the logical and discursive intentions which speech ordinarily uses in order to ensure its rational transparency, and in order to purloin its body in the direction of meaning, will be reduced or subordinated, Derrida writes.⁴⁸ The problematic of disturbational art is connected to this. It is possible that a certain dominant language will become a realm of action, gesture, and thus also a mode of behaviour, a style. In the 1950s some young British writers, Thomm Gunn among them, claimed that already then the juvenile revolt had become a style. In his text *On the Move* Gunn wrote about motorcycle boys that ". . . their motorcycles create a 'dull thunder of approximate words' such that one can almost hear the *meaning* of their noise".⁴⁹ In other words, performative gestures, and even literal noise and nonsense, can in certain context and discourse have dimensions which produce meanings. These dimensions can create expressive modes for subcultures (cf. graffiti, and rap, hiphop, grunge and techno during recent years). Much contemporary (disturbing) art is also based on this performative aspect. In fact, making a noise is the prerogative of the powerful: police, aeroplanes, emergency sirens etc. There are political noise and social noise. In an essay about Laurie Anderson, Sean Cubitt states that she uses her voice to make a noise and thus challenges both the subordination and weak subjectivity of women, since women in the part

have not been allowed to make any kind of noise.⁵⁰ Lydia Lunch is even more "primitive" than Anderson since she had produced pure aggression using her voice: screaming.

The creation of such situations can also be compared to the opinions of Lawrence Grossberg. According to him any practice is articulated into a situation or context that is not only meaningful but also has a particular "coloration", feel or mood. It is marked by different forms and quantities of energy (ie, the same object, with the same meaning, is very different in different contexts). Life is mapped out intelligibly and also by definitions of what matters. There are not only maps of meaning but maps that both describe and prescribe how we invest our energies, our desires, our passion, and even our "selves" in the world, maps that tell us how to generate energy, how to navigate our way into and through various moods and how to live within emotional histories.⁵¹ As I already mentioned, there has been much talk about maps lately. One reason for that may be that non-verbal expression is in principle characterized by a spatiality which is irreducible to the mental (linguistic) realm. Yet with different "maps" we can try to outline meanings. After all, talk about maps is really a fashionable talk in certain ways about the same abstractions as talk about aesthetic qualities. When it is impossible to use an exact language, then you must raise the level of abstraction - and then it is useful to make a map. To my mind, using such terms as style, the symbolization of the literal, or mapping is precisely to try to look for a mental analogy to the physical. I do not want to reject them, not at all, but if they conquer place in a certain discourse over some other terms, such as physicality or making noise, then I recommend searching again for what we are talking about. As I stated above, the (pure) physical has been underrated at least in art. It has been pushed to the margin since it creates inconvenience; and thus it has not been a part of an arts education to the extent it really has a part in art.

Rosenberg suggested that if the avant-garde is destined to become quality-less it should be possible to begin with an art having no qualities.⁵² He considered the works of such artists as Frank Stella and Donald Judd as a comment on various aims at reducing the proportions of material and medium. The minimalists deliberately produced art works in which the traditional artistic values were reduced to the extent that the only thing left was a physical object which no longer communicates but demands to be determined from outside itself. In minimalist works the unwillingness to communicate makes impossible to reconstruct an art structure and hence to form a theory. Max Kozloff wrote that the cycle is full, for in Minimalism has been attained the perfect non-representational autonomous work of art which can be considered and criticized only with the aid of outside information obtained from the context of abstract art.⁵³ Then with a good reason one can talk about true nihilism, a solipsist monologue which has no communicative value. Minimalism has been said to be the most hermetic phenomenon of high modernism. It can be said to realize in art the nihilistic aims of anti-art: the minimalists showed what happens to art after a work of art has finally become fetishized as an artefact which has nothing to say. A painting from which all the artistic qualities have been subtracted is not a painting anymore, a poem that has no other qualities but a word or

just a letter is not poetry anymore, and a piece of music in which only some monotonous themes are repeated, even just a few notes, is not music anymore, but objects defined as art by some institution. What seem to remain is only an organization, a skeleton: museums, galleries, theory, criticism. . .

Many minimalists understood the absolute artistic freedom possible only in the pure idea. They took the ideas of abstract art to the extreme; for example those formulated by Malevich and Mondrian. Mondrian wrote in 1919 that the aim was to express a balanced relation with a straight line and a clearly defined primary colour.⁵⁴ The minimalists took Mondrian's ideas to the extreme, balancing relations in perfect harmony and symmetry, whereupon the tensions ceased to exist. Mondrian also spoke about reaching the universal. In his essay *The Sublime is Now* (1948) Barnett Newman accused Mondrian for pruning the sublime to absolute perception. Newman tried to define the foundation of art by the concept of the pure sublime, which is actually closer to philosophy than art. It is not my task to consider if Duchamp thought along the lines of Newman, although it would have been something of a paradox, thinking of Newman's own works.

Even Dada could not fully realize anti-objects which had nihilized contemplative individual reception as efficiently as many minimalist works did. The exception is Duchamp's *Fountain*; later Duchamp played with the theme of opposing purely retinal art⁵⁵. Possibly the most extreme example of minimalist expression is the film *Hurlements en faveur de Sade* (1952) by Debord. It consisted of a twenty-minute soundtrack in a one-hour and twenty-minute film. When there was sound the picture was white, at other times black. Finally, the infamous end scene: 24 minutes of black silence.

The situationists opposed the idea of aesthetic contemplativeness. The dadaists had already tried to find objects which would frustrate the contemplative attitude and instead provoke public pique. Duchamp succeeded by bringing a urinal into the art gallery, and also a multiartistic program in the Dada soirées created annoyance. In film dadaists were unable to realize this goal as well as in Debord's *Hurlements*. Thomas Y. Levin points out that a cinematic event itself has the spectacular structure. The dark room, the stable rectangle of the screen, the fixed voyeuristic position of the spectator; all these isolate the spectator, thus the non-narrative organization or the radicality of cinematic form - as in the Dada film *Entr'acte* (1924), which did not function as a plain gesture, but as a Dada event.⁵⁶ Instead, Debord abolished from his film one of the most important spectacular elements of cinema: the picture. The abolition of the picture accomplish as a similar purpose as John Cage's *4'33"* (1952): the spectator (or listener in the Cage's case) perceives herself and is stirred to an action of looking. But a very restricted situation does not allow the spectator any compensation, but forces her into an irritable reaction. As Levin writes, the spectators, confronted with their desires and expectations for a spectacle, are provoked to the point of screaming (hurlements) when it is revealed to what extent they themselves are an integral part of the spectacular economy.⁵⁷

The minimalist method was thus the rejection of traditional paradigm, in other words, the abolition of aesthetic qualities from their works. The paradox is, that art cannot objectify its utopia because it would mean the end of art. For example, in architecture, skyscrapers with glass walls aim to give an impression of immateriality, but an immaterial building is not architecture anymore. Of course this can be seen as one end of art, or as a point from which there is no way forward.

There are other notions of Minimalism as well. Important for performative art modes are Yvonne Rainer's remarks about her dance productions in the 1960s, in which (for example, in *The Mind is a Muscle*, 1966) she stressed repetition, phrasing and energy instead of formal content and progression. Rainer made a comparison between an object and a performative act, emphasizing their relations. The basic idea was to match the object's qualities by other qualities in dance as follows:

Objects

Dances

substitute

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. factory fabrication | energy equality and
'found' movement |
| 2. unitary forms, modules | equality of parts |
| 3. uninterrupted surface | repetition or discrete events |
| 4. nonreferential forms | neutral performance |
| 5. literalness | task or tasklike activity |
| 6. simplicity | singular action, event, or tone |
| 7. human scale | human scale ⁵⁸ |

Rainer's ideals in dance are comparable to Kaprow's 'formalist' happenings and ready-mades, for example, one is a neutral "doer", and there is less spectacular demand on the body, emphasis is put on nuance and skilled accomplishment, and accessibility to comparison and interpretation; involvement with connoisseurship has less importance, if at all.⁵⁹ Performative art is easily comparable to visual, musical and even cinematic Minimalism. I do not mean as a style, but I am more interested in other qualities, such as the theatricality Fried wrote about in relation to visual minimal art. As I have understood it, he talked about gestures. I, too, mean gestures that cannot form narratives. Connected to this is the problem of the meaning of noise and rhythm. It is a question of the ways art exists. In political art, for instance, there is the matter of statements, although that is not the most essential point; what is essential is how. Rainer's qualities are but one example of how to form the everyday: it is to combine the most simple ordinary activities into a structure where gestures themselves, not any explicit narrative, are the important point. This is, in a way, mimicry. If it is supposed that the everyday is dull and

monotonous, to accentuate this by showing a similar rhythm in art is a way of expressing at least a part of everyday.

Tom Sandqvist writes in his book *Den meningslösa kuben* (1988) as follows:

. . . Handlingen föregår konceptet, meningen kan inte avskiljas från själva den fysiska existensen som uttryckande det särskilda, materiella tingets vara-i-världen, och existensen definieras i handlingen, i "the action". . .⁶⁰

Sandqvist also refers to Dewey's notion that an object is a part of a given context. In his dissertation, Sandqvist, among other things, argues that due to its facticity and concreteness pragmatism is an appropriate way of handling Minimalism, for instance, although, of course, he is not this unsubtle in his thinking.

What interests me in this context is the *some thing is doing* aspect. In fact, the action Sandqvist writes about is the very performativity I have defined. But where minimalist works were still very structured and concrete works, in the next chapter I present examples of the not-so-structured and more open (collage-like) works that have become more and more frequent in contemporary art in the recent past and today.

Process as a Work of Art

The life-world has been a source of material for artists in all areas of art, even in music sometimes. However, the aesthetic object, ie, a work of art, has been treated as something different from life, something special and autonomous in various ways. It concerns our senses only, as Osborne maintained; there is a tendency for perceptual activity to be enhanced and to predominate over analytical and classificatory thinking as we become engrossed in the perceptual object which holds our attention.⁶¹ Heightened awareness is all that there is; experience remains detached and separate. In fact, that is just the point: to alienate everyday things by restoring visibility to the ordinary and presenting familiar things in an unfamiliar light, which nevertheless strikes us as a revelation of their true nature. . .⁶² Dewey writes about art that it

. . . throws off the covers that hide the expressiveness of experienced things; it quickens us from the slackness of routine and enables us to forget ourselves by finding ourselves in the delight of experiencing the world about us in its varied qualities and forms. It intercepts every shade of expressiveness found in objects and orders them in a new experience of life.⁶³

Consequently, Dewey, as a pragmatist, wrote about many-sided expressiveness and varied qualities whereas Osborne, as an analytic philosopher, wrote about the 'true nature' of things meaning that there is

opaqueness in our ordinary life, but that only art can pull the curtain and reveal the truth.

An aesthetic experience is abstracted from the environment, framed apart, and even experienced in isolation. This presumes the notion of a dull and grey everyday routine. An aesthetic experience interrupts the everyday and detaches us from it. But, is the everyday as routinized and alienated as is often assumed? The everyday is treated as a continuous readiness for the future, which means a placing under tension with a view to the efforts to be exerted. It is a habitualized state of preparation.⁶⁴ What about the idleness and unemployment that is a part of the everyday in many people's lives? After all, it has generally been assumed that people are passive or indifferent in relation to *nowness* since the future and the past are implicit in our ordinary everyday perceptions, which are coloured by expectations for the future and associations from the past. An aesthetic experience arrests that *nowness*, and strips from it any practical attitude. The problem is what is meant by the 'true nature' of things that is revealed. In the 1980s the theorists in cultural studies focused on the observation that people behave creatively when using cultural products. They do not try to find out the true nature of things but use them according to their own preferences, which are not so habit-formed all the time. Thus they practiced tactics in the sense de Certeau describes it.

Dada already suggested that life does not unfold in a clear and logical sequence, nor is it easily or immediately interpretable. The question is in what dimensions this is taken account of in art, which is used to organizing life into more or less clear representations. Is life ordered by hieratical structures - as theorists argued in the 1950s? Kaprow saw certain common transactions - shaking hands, eating, saying goodbye - as ready-mades. According to Kaprow, their only unusual feature will be the attentiveness brought to bear on them.⁶⁵ This is framing, which means that there is some conceptual frame signalling to the audience that material within that established frame is being presented for their observation and interpretation.⁶⁶ The frame can be the art world as described by institutional theory (Dickie), form (Dewey), site (the place), or context; in the last two cases there is something *in* a phenomenon itself that differs from the usual uses of site and context. It might be form (also as in Gadamer's structure) that differs from everyday uses. It is the transforming of activities into performance: commitment to coherence and the selective arrangement of the material presented. It is the directing of activity toward communication rather than toward work-tasks.⁶⁷ Schechner remarks that the theatre person uses the consequential actions of social life as raw material for the production of aesthetic drama, while the social activist uses techniques derived from the theatre to support the activities of social drama, which in turn refuels the theatre.⁶⁸ We see from Schechner's comment that form or structure as such does not necessary make something aesthetic. Neither is form as an aesthetic quality a condition for something to be art. Often there is confusion in this. To my mind, it is due to the almost non-existent communication between the modes, genres and theories of different arts. The institutional theory of

art merely points to the visual arts, eg, Clive Bell's concept of 'significant form' is known only in the field of visual arts; in fact, the institutional theory developed out of criticizing it. If we talk about other arts, they have also defined an aesthetics based on a certain autonomy. In art theory it can become a problem, however. Film, for example, moves in a space between art and entertainment because the production needs relations with business life, and it is collaborative from the beginning. Auteur theory in its time tried to "ignore" this fact and stress a film as a work of art purely on the premises that it has its own "significant forms". This is just to disregard some of the facts related to a mode of art.

There are differences between open works seen as communicative processes, and ready-made-type framed performances. There are open works that are arranged situations for people to participate in, as Lacy's projects with elderly women. On the other hand, an artist uses the everyday as collage-like material by framing and organizing it, although not necessary manipulating everyday tasks. Kaprow and other happening artists in the 1960s were interested in the forms of framed gestures and acts. Many contemporary (women) artists do not organize everyday life, or if they do, it is not only formalistic but usually has social content. Mierle Laderman Ukeles, for instance, produced *I Make Maintenance Art One Hour Every Day* in 1976. It was an exhibition/project for the Whitney Museum of American art. She asked the maintenance staff to designate one hour each day spent on their normal tasks as art. For the duration of the project she visited the building every day and took Polaroid photographs of women and men doing routine chores, asking them if they were engaged in "art" or "work". The photographs with the employees' forms and remarks, were exhibited. On many occasions, maintenance workers performing identical tasks described them differently. According to Phillips, with this simple rhetorical question, Ukeles challenged the truth of language itself, and its role in the construction (and perpetuation) of cultural values and meaning.⁶⁹ Ukeles leaned deliberately on the traditional notion of art as a concept detached from life. She underlined the notion that art is merely an attitude, a state of mind, that it is *as if*, playing a game. This is only one way in contemporary art of treating artistic and aesthetic qualities and values, ie, examining them (cf. items 1 and 2, on page 42). On the other hand, we might say that Ukeles was trying to find a relation between aesthetic values and qualities and everyday, although they are not seen in her work, just the opposite. On the other hand, the collaborative nature of her many works can be named the very feature that questions aesthetic qualities as the only criterion. Ukeles's work is an example of examining the differences between art and life. It is not only a message according to communication theories, but making something visible or comprehensible. It is work that looks at the blind spots systems create when they have to look at themselves.⁷⁰ Compared to this, as I have stated, Kaprow's thoughts seem more "formalistic". At least in the middle of the 1970s he took a negative attitude to certain social projects which were brought into art since no other realm wants them.⁷¹ Political and social concerns became one of the main themes of performance activity in the United States

from the mid-1980s onward. In fact, Kaprow also changed his attitude in the beginning of the 1980s.

Earlier happenings were more planned and usually they had a coherent form when compared to created situations (SI) and some contemporary works that resemble each other more in their "lifelikeness". They genuinely have an open form. There is no such hierarchy between order and disorder as before. For example, in 1974 Kaprow ordered everyday life by separating five root types found in the mundane: *situational* models (commonplace environments, occurrences, and customs, often ready-made), *operational* models (how things and customs work and what they do), *structural* models (nature cycles, ecologies, and the forms of things, places, and human affairs), *self-referring* or *feedback* models (things or events that "talk" about or reflect themselves), and *learning* models (allegories of philosophical inquiry, sensitivity-training rituals, and educational demonstrations).⁷² His formulation was an attempt to organize life, and thus somehow to give it artificial form by structuring it, although the model was also made to organize some lifelike art phenomena between the 1950s and 1970s which were difficult to comprehend otherwise. Kaprow maintained at least some separateness between art and life. By making theory, however, he could assist arts educators with a practical terminology for both theory and practice; a terminology (or vocabulary) that differs from the usual aesthetic one in being more concrete.

CHANGES IN FORM AND STRUCTURE

This writing is all fake (copied from other writing) so you should go away and not read any of it.

*- Kathy Acker: Hannibal Lecter,
My Father (1991) -*

I argued that there is much contemporary art that is often open in form and structure and can even be experienced partially, not holistically, which most theories of aesthetic apprehension presuppose. A common notion in art is that it is a question of directed and controlled evaluative responses on the part of the observer. But how rigid is this control, or should it even be rigid at all?

In this chapter I examine these arguments more closely by taking into consideration the abandonment of the kind of autonomy which preserves art as separate from life and such institutions as politics etc. as when using collage and montage as modes of expression, and by dealing with changes in materials and structure of art works. In fact, it is surprising how little arts literature exists which focuses on collage or other types of expression where, instead of being unified, a work is seen as a fragmentary, discontinuous and incoherent on purpose. After all, giving up formalism, or at least abandoning a strong tendency to it in interpretation, needs an understanding of how works of art or artistic processes nowadays also point outside of themselves. In this chapter I shall suggest elements that can be used when dealing with such art as contemporary performative collages of parts. Thus this chapter is very concrete in nature, presenting a lot of examples, since I want to be logical in view of my thinking that individual cases are important when dealing with practical arts educational problems, and that moving onto the abstract level only is not consistent with my thoughts.

Often the use and impact of the materials of contemporary art, or how they are arranged, depends on contextual matters much more than before. Earlier, when theorists defined aesthetic criteria in works of art, they meant that the emphasis is, for example, upon the creation of 'emotional qualities', which are inherited in abstract patterns of colours, shapes, and lines.⁷³ Nowadays, also important are qualities which reside

in the material, ie, the more or less contextual character of the material. For example, the young Finnish artist Marianna Uutinen uses a plastic-type mixture of acryl paint and pigment. Her plastic works are abstract, but as much impact is made by the particular artificiality and superficiality of the material as by shapes and lines. In the pink table by Portia Munson the artifacts, which are mostly in plastic, are important, but the most important thing is the colour pink that the perceiver contextualizes both subjectively and more generally as a girl's colour. Although pink as a colour is universal in a sense, its meaning is different for (western) women than for men.

If art is organizing the everyday into tighter and more intensive modes without isolating it, then the full meaning of ordinary experience is expressed in art. The purpose of art is to make everyday images concrete, that means to literalize the symbolic by using very "authentic" materials: autobiography, concrete situations, actual political questions. It also means putting repetition in the place of the avant-garde ideal of progress. We saw that the avant-garde declared an opposition to repetition - not only the repetition of styles and forms but also content (parody of past and existing cultural products), and, especially, the repetition of daily routines.

To my mind, it would be useful in arts education to study more closely the backgrounds to the use of collage and montage, since much contemporary art, especially the new media, is grounded on collage-like fragmentariness, interruptions and contingencies. In addition it is necessary to understand the contexts or ready-mades that are used.⁷⁴ To combine fragments that are usually not connected to each other has not always been an approved, or even thinkable mode of expression. To understand *détournement* broadens collage also to include processual and performative art projects. It also means the everyday as material. In the situationist *détournement* effective means by collage-expression are defined. This is connected very closely to the new technologies, multimedia, for instance. In fact, montage and collage are the modes of expression of multimedia. They are examples of how art has developed methods through which people have learnt to observe in new ways. Since multimedia provides a moving space for the receiver, it is the ultimate transformation into a non-coherent (non-organic), entirely open work, and also into the anonymity of production; the very opposite of a work of art emphasizing unity and personality of expression.

Open Form: Collage

When collage emerged (1912), Braque and Picasso began to use collage elements in a rather subordinated position in relation to the total composition of a picture; they were an organic element of the work. However, when Braque and Gris used *papier collé* as more logical component of their pictures, making paper imitating wood grain into a violin or table,

Picasso used collage elements more paradoxically, exploring and changing any material, and by combining them in new ways producing unexpected meanings: flowered wallpaper changed into a table cloth or a newspaper clip changed into a violin. The most radical thing, however, was to combine unrelated fragments of the life-world into an abstract painting without manipulating them. In fact, Braque described collage elements as compasses in a highly abstract picture, they were something to recognize and to grasp at first. For contemporary art it has been important how the radical avant-garde around the beginning of the century used collage to introduce life into art, as a political element, utilizing already frozen symbolic meanings, such as in the photomontages by John Heartfield. In the situationist *détournement* it was a case of the recycling of preexisting aesthetic and other images. Excluding Heartfield, Kurt Schwitters and few others, mainly surrealists, collage was not especially popular between the wars.

Collage returned around the end of the 1950s both in America and in Europe. In the United States Robert Rauschenberg brought the Dadaist montage, the contradictoriness characteristic of the urban environment and its experiential and reproduct-technique experiments back into art. He used as material fragments from both art history and news items and popular cultural images. The mutual relations of the contents of a work usually remained open. In England, just before the middle of the 1950s, *The Independence Group* were formed. The group attracted artists, architects, critics and theorists who were interested in popular culture and rejected the formalistic high culture of the time.⁷⁵ During the first meeting in 1952, Eduardo Paolozzi showed postcards and advertisements he had collected; later he made collages and a series of prints of them named BUNK. The Lettrists had already experienced with metagaraphics, but in general the phenomenon was still regarded as somewhat strange in the art world (and also in popular culture, whilst advertising, for instance, imitated artistic forms). Originality and personality (eg, brushstrokes) were no longer the most important matter in art. Instead, there a certain indifference and new techniques developed hand in hand: serigraphy, seriality, and so on.

Décollage, in particular, made possible collective and entirely anonymous creation. Décollage means to tear to shreds the top layers of an advertisement or poster, and the end product was usually photographed.⁷⁶ The first décollage dates from 1949, when Raimond Hains and Jacques de la Villeglé declared a torn poster wall to be their art work and named it *Ach Alma Manétro* after fragments of the three words still readable on the obliterated surface. The essential aspect of décollage is that the action is moved from the studio to the streets; it was not collecting material from streets and bringing it to the studio (as Kurt Schwitters and other Dadaists had done). In décollage, art was literally in the midst of life, which was what the radical avant-garde had tried to achieve. Décollages also took into account the relations of people and their environment: urban life had changed, and there was a need for a means of dealing with it. It was also the question about making a gesture, perhaps a rebellious one. It also worked as a parodic contrast to the mythical arche-

typal models of Abstract Expressionism, which had been formed into the canon of modern art in the 1940s and 1950s. It was parodic, because the structure of *décollage* "productions" resembled strongly for example Jackson Pollock's works. Thus *décollages* also can be said to function as anti-art works.⁷⁷ On the other hand, *décollage* pointed to the acceleration of the decay of the urban environment, and was thus a political act, since it was directed against the consumer society and culture industry. It was also a historical phenomenon, since the product was not an everlasting work of art, an arrested moment, but at its best a work which changes and lives all the time before its destruction.

Cut-up Images in Modernism

An essential aspect of collage is the metamorphosis of ordinary and self-evident, ie, everyday material. This is change from taking into account the own nature of parts into the habit of pop art and *nouveau réalisme* to display material almost as such (in an art context). The latter trends tend more to aestheticize material by manipulating it, whereas *détournement* rather treated material (collage elements) as ready-mades. There is a nominalistic utopia in collage (Adorno). The collage technique was especially utilized by (anti)art groups that were resisting the notion that art is basically something metaphysical, isolated from reality. Collage is a meeting place for art and reality. The importance of montage lies in uniting the formalistic and the political (on the level of content). The political, an aspect of the life world, always exists in montage even if not employed politically. It connects with the nominalist utopia of montage about which Adorno has remarked that it wanted its facts pure, ie, free of contamination by forms or concepts.⁷⁸ Adorno's assessment of montage manifests itself in his critique towards Benjamin:

As is well known, montage reached its zenith under surrealism and rapidly declined when film got a hold of it. In any event, montage shuffles and re-shuffles elements of reality as seen by healthy common sense so as to wrest from them a change in direction or, at best, to awaken their latent language. What makes montage feeble, however, is its inability to explode its individual elements. By adapting the ready-made material supplied from outside, montage reveals a certain tendency to conformist irrationalism.⁷⁹

The inability of montage to explode its individual elements is precisely its inflexibility to unity, to the submitting of the individual elements to totality.

Many theorists have claimed that art history has been incapable of fully acknowledge the historicity and particularity guiding montage. Montage creates structural breaks in the work, and they allow the invasion of all kinds of (from the artistic viewpoint) strange material into the work. In analysis, however, there has often been attempts to fill up these breaks. Criticism has operated using the terms of traditional aesthetics, for

example, beauty and ugliness, "pure" material and impure material, or, as in Adorno's theories, beauty and truth. Art history has also rested on this. However, methods of traditional aesthetics pose problems when used for to evaluate many structurally open works of contemporary art. Over twenty years ago Kozloff and Kuspit demanded that one must scrutinize art works by the methods of dialectical criticism. Attention should also be directed towards internal tensions and contrasts of works, and especially, to the relations of various elements which point outside the work. The simple search for contrasts is not enough in contemporary art.

Benjamin Buchloh has stated that the new montage work expands the spacing of elements, singularizes the elements of appropriation and redirects the viewing or reading to the frame. And thus new montages decentralize the place of the author and subject by remaining within the dialectic of the appropriated objects of discourse and the authorial subject, which, according to Buchloh, negates and constitutes itself simultaneously in the act of quotation.⁸⁰ In these kinds of work there is a break away from the traditional artist-object axis so that it becomes possible to shift the focus from the object towards the artist; in fact, something happens in the space between the elements of the object. The roles of the producer and receiver of the work are united. On the other hand, the identity of the artist and her work already exists in body art. In the act of quotation the elements of montage lose their original place and meaning (ie, context) - there is the negation. At the same time new meanings are constructed which can be more and more independent of the intentions of (one) producer.

The Lettrists did in fact produce some *métagraphies* (they also called it hypergraphy), which meant making a kind of montage from different pictures and passages of text. Metagraphy was rather cinematic with its sequenced pictures and "cuttings". Like in collage, the components of metagraphy had connections with their former contexts. Peter Wollen stated that the lettrist metagraphy was a kind of interzone between dadaist word collage and concrete poetry.⁸¹ In the theory of metagraphy formulated by Isidore Isou, he claims that it introduces into alphabetic writing not only the art of painting but also graphology, calligraphy, riddles and picture puzzles, photography, sound reproduction, cinema and architecture - in fact, all existing symbolic matters, before it integrates all the philosophies and sciences from the sign to grammar and up to printing techniques, by way of mathematics.⁸² In fact, the hyper- and multimedia developed in recent years, especially on the Internet, resemble strongly Isou's theory of metagraphy.

According to the SI it is possible to produce critical art by using already existing means of cultural expression, everything from film and comics to paintings. Critical in its content, such art must also be critical in its very form, it should be critical of itself - or, at least contain the possibility of its own critique.⁸³

The situationists systematized a method of collage they called 'détournement'. Alternatively, they wanted to extend détournement into gestures and acts, which widens the collage idea to the level of performative and situational (art) projects. According to the situationists,

any element, no matter where it is taken from, can be useful for creating new combinations. In the article *Mode d'emploi du détournement* (Methods of Détournement, 1956) Debord and Gil J. Wolman remarked that the discoveries of modern poetry demonstrate that when two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed. The blending of two worlds of feeling, or the bringing together of two independent expressions, supersedes the original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy than one restricted to the personal arrangement of words, which is, according to Debord & Wolman, mere convention. Anything can be used.⁸⁴ Vaneigem described détournement as the reversal of perspective, that is, to stop seeing things through the eyes of the community, of ideology, of the family, of other people. It is to base everything on subjectivity and to follow one's subjective will.⁸⁵ Debord and Wolman remarked that the methods they describe are not their own invention but a generally widespread practice which they propose to systematize.⁸⁶ This is true, hence the method they describe is in fact a surrealist method. Détournement was not to be an artistic mode of expression, although its roots were in Dada and surrealist aesthetics. Using détournement presupposes a strong interest in representation and a comprehension of strategy, which means that détournement is best for propaganda uses. Elsewhere I have stated that Surrealism and other movements of the radical avant-garde were not, in fact, so much aesthetic art as artistic propaganda.

The SI wanted to use montage-like forms to maintain a certain ambivalence which would prevent the recuperating of contents as easily as those of more coherently structured systems. This contained a little bit of Adorno-like thought that the resistance of art to the real world lies in form. Employing montage and collage fitted also the habit of the SI swaying in different points of view and areas of life. In fact the whole of the SI as a political movement can be considered as a montage. At least on that level their politics has been détournement utilizing different sources: Socialisme ou Barbarie, Marx, Adorno, Lefebvre. . . Indigenous to the SI was only the recipe for combining these ingredients together.

The situationists defined two main categories of détourned elements: *minor détournement* and *deceptive détournement*. Minor détournement is the reuse of an element which has no importance in itself and which thus draws all its meaning from the new context in which it has been placed. Debord and Wolman mentioned for example a neutral phrase, press clipping and a commonplace photograph. Deceptive détournement, which can also be termed "premonitory proposition détournement", is the détournement of an intrinsically significant element, which derives a different meanings from the new context. This might, for example, be a politically or in other ways charged slogan, or a sequence from Eisenstein.⁸⁷ On the other hand, for example, the Odessa steps sequence in *Potemkin* (1925) has been taken from its context and imitated so many times that it has almost lost its political character and turned into a death metaphor.

Debord and Wolman formulated four laws on the use of détournement; the first is essential and applies universally. The other three are in practice applicable only to deceptive détourned elements. The laws are:

(1) It is the most distant détourned element which contributes most sharply to the overall impression, and not the elements that directly determine the nature of this impression. For example, in the *métagraphie* (lettrist poem-collage) relating to the Spanish Civil War the phrase with the most distinctly revolutionary sense is a fragment from a lipstick ad: *les jolies lèvres ont du rouge* ("Pretty lips are red").

(2) The distortions introduced in the détourned elements must be as simplified as possible, since the main force of a détournement is directly related to the conscious or vague recollection of the original contexts of the elements. The idea of pure, absolute expression is dead, Debord and Wolman claimed; it only temporarily survives in parodic form as long as other enemies survive.

(3) Détournement is less effective the more it approaches a rational reply. This concerns a rather large number of Lautréamont's altered maxims, or, for instance, the propose to détourn an anti-Soviet poster of the fascist organization "Peace and Liberty", which proclaimed, amid images of overlapping flags of the Western powers: "Union makes strength". The détournement would be to add onto the poster a smaller sheet with the phrase "and coalitions make war". According to Debord and Wolman the addition would be too rational and hence it becomes indistinguishable from the ordinary spirit of repartee, which uses the opponent's words against him.

(4) Détournement by simple reversal is always the most direct and the least effective.

In fact, in these rules are crystallized the strategies of some modes of contemporary art using media: the most distant element contributes most sharply to the overall impression, distortions have to be simple, and the too obvious witticism is less effective.

Fundamental to détournement is the loss of importance of each détourned autonomous element, and at the same time the organization of another meaningful ensemble that confers on each element its new scope and effect.⁸⁸ There is no need only to "correct" (art)works, or to integrate diverse fragments of out-of-date works into new one, but one can also alter the meaning of such fragments in any appropriate way, "leaving the imbeciles to their slavish preservation of 'citations'".⁸⁹ The situationists were obviously pointing their arrows at Duchamp and other (anti)artists of the twentieth century, who used to exploit citations and other borrowed fragments in their works. This was rather radical in its time, but later became more common in art. Duchamp's famous *L.H.O.O.Q.* (1919) - *Mona Lisa with a moustache* - for instance, preserved the value and meaning the original painting (actually its copy) has acquired in the art world. Duchamp founded his word play and the adding of moustache on fact that the meaning is well-known. (The pun on the initials that make up the title means (pronounced in French) "She has pain (or, is hot) in her ass".) Thus the meanings of the borrowed ele-

ments did not vanish anywhere, and the new message was grounded on the ability to read the old codes. Of course, Duchamp varied the meanings of the works he borrowed, but was the meaning of the new constellation in his case, and thus fundamentally different than the situationists' aims in their theory and work.

The situationists stated that the most powerful aspect in *détournement* is its consciousness, although only in premonitory relation to the original contexts. It is even possible to combine the most contrasting elements, as in the collage dealing with the Spanish Civil War where the text from the lipstick advertisement was in apparent conflict with pictures from the war. This is an example of picture analysis which it is also possible to use in arts educational practice. It is to stress the contrasting elements instead of the harmonizing ones. I do not claim that this is anything new. In this example the elements in collision are: war /beauty, poem/advertisement text and the symbolic meaning of red as socialist/capitalist, stereotypical feminine dimension which represents chaos and unexpectedness/the masculine order and severity of marching soldiers, and on the other hand, a lipstick as a bullet-form phallic object. By contrast, the contrasts are not as strong contrasts in the other example mentioned above: Union makes strength/and coalitions makes war. The situationists claimed that the rejection and alienation of the original meaning can be done before the radical new apparent contradiction. Manipulating comic strips, for example changing the texts inside the balloons, was the one of the most common forms of *détournement* in practice. In contrast to pop art that aestheticized or broke comic strips into fragments, the *détournement* technique aimed to return meaning and content to comics. The situationists maintained that comics are the only popular literature this century. It also made the most splendid instrument of propaganda. The intention was to combine the shock of recognition with the shock of displacement, and thus set off a chain reaction: to change the world by changing an image.⁹⁰ For example, the situationists inserted into the balloons of trivial comic narratives, quotations from famous communists.⁹¹ This displacement technique has been widely used by contemporary activist artists. Many activist artists mimic the forms and conventions of commercial advertising and news media to deliver information and activist messages one does not expect to encounter in a commercial space.⁹² *Kissing Doesn't Kill* (1989-90), an AIDS activist graphic by the Gran Fury group, was a bus panel presenting three couples kissing: black man/white woman, two men and two women. The text above the couples goes: "Kissing Doesn't Kill: Greed and Indifference Do". On the right of the panel there was another text: "Corporate Greed, Government Inaction, and Public Indifference Make AIDS a Political Crisis". The work resembled the Benetton advertisements by Oliviero Toscani. The strategy was to locate the panels on sites where the work might be mistaken, if temporarily, for a familiar form of mainstream media. This produces the shock of mis-recognition. Gran Fury member Avram Finkelstein describes the success of *Kissing Doesn't Kill* as deriving from the fact that it puts

political information into environments where people are unaccustomed to finding it. . . . It's very different from being handed a leaflet where you automatically know someone's trying to tell you something and you may not be receptive to hearing it. But when you're walking down the street and you're gazing at advertising . . . who knows what goes through [your] mind?⁹³

Hence contemporary art plays on the same field as media and advertising; there are no attempts at projecting a counter culture, through, for example, an intentionally clumsy, hand-made style, as was still the case from the 1960s until the 1980s. Activist graphics often employed self-consciously "craftsy" modes of fabrication, including freehand drawing, silkscreens, rough-hewn stencils and woodcut printing.

Jorn maintained that *détournement* is a game made possible by the capacity of devaluation. All the elements of the cultural past must be re-invested or disappear. In other words *détournement* is first of all a negation of the value of the previous organization of expression.⁹⁴ The capacity of devaluation has always been unfamiliar to the institutions preserving the doings of humankind, as museums do. Thus the idea of *détournement* was very avant-gardist. Usually, in practice the inevitable controversies take place: it is possible to reuse reproductions or paintings from unknown painters, already doomed as valueless (as Jorn did), but not masterpieces unless it is done in the manner of Duchamp's gesture: he suggested using a Rembrandt as an ironing board.

In contemporary art, elements of collage are not necessarily as dialectically arranged and contradictory as earlier in Modernism. Oppositions have been relativized and meanings have become multiplied and complex. Contradictions no longer imply hieratical value relations, but the elements in themselves are more heterogeneous.

By recontextualization it is of course possible to make some devaluations and still let the original work be part of a constellation, as in a certain nameless work by Michael Asher in a museum in Los Angeles in 1981. The work consisted of three parts: (1) a wooden sign in the museum park with the text: "Dogs Must Be Kept On Leash Ord. 10309"; (2) a poster with both colour and black-and-white stills from the film *The Kentuckian*. In these pictures Burt Lancaster comes out of woods with a child, a woman and a dog and meets two men with rifles. The poster was put in a place near the museum entrance where information about what is happening in the museum usually was put. There was also a map identifying the sign in the park as belonging to Asher's work. (3) The viewer was also informed that in the permanent collection of the museum was Hart Benton's painting *The Kentuckian* (1954), which was ordered at the same time the film was being made. It also shows Lancaster, a boy and a dog. But near the painting inside the museum there was no longer any information that it belonged to Asher's work. The elements of the work are, to use Andrew Benjamin's phrase, "anoriginally heterogeneous"; it is not possible to reduce their pluralistic meanings to a single right one only. The constellation of discourses that forms Asher's work is entirely open. After all, the elements do not shape totality, but a sort of open net, which radically diverge from previous modernistic ambitions for more

hierarchically organized and closed systems. Also under scrutiny are originality and authenticity, since there were so many quotations and ready-mades. In fact, can we even describe artist's intentions, since he had just made slight re-arrangements and left everything else open?

The difference between collage and *détournement* is not very great. Instead, it is more a question about the uses of collage; the SI claimed that it is of no use in art. They did not care about aesthetics. Hence they would not give much value for the cut-up technique William S. Burroughs used in *The Soft Machine* and *The Ticket that Exploded* (1962). Burroughs did not totally throw himself at the mercy of pure chance and multiple choices but edited, removed and organized in new way fragments picked up from his own and other's texts. He describes his cut-up technique in an article *The Literary Techniques of Lady Sutton-Smith* (1964). In it he writes that the cut-up technique is selection: "You only use the ones that *fit* you know". One has to put the collected materials in the right place. Burroughs also gives models for using the cut-up technique.⁹⁵ For Burroughs cut-up was a method of creation, and as such the situationists would have condemned it as merely a fashion. They argued that one of the slaves of this fashion, acceptance of devaluation as a method of combining neutral and indefinitely interchangeable elements, was Godard, who used such methods without negation, without affirmation and without quality, ie, without any useful propagandistic tendency.⁹⁶ Of course this was their notion based on particular personal grudges. It is more interesting that in Finland too there were experimentalists in the 1960s, to mention only Kari Aronpuro's book *Aperitiff - avoin kaupunki* (1965), and some translations in the middle of the 1960s for the *Times Literary Supplement* of poems written by such Finnish poets as Pentti Saarikoski, for example.

Cage also spoke about reusing existing elements as part of a collage. In an interview Cage mentioned that he thought of past literature rather as material than as art.⁹⁷ The idea of *détournement* was thus clearly inspired by dadaist and surrealist experiments. It was close to the habit of the surrealists to watch movies by walking from one cinema to the other and watching few minutes' sequences hardly knowing what films they were seeing. The situationists, however, added to the surrealist idea conscious and rational aspects. They took seriously Lautréamont's utterance about the chance meeting on a dissecting-table of a sewing-machine and an umbrella. In fact, the situationists claimed that *détournement* was originally formulated by Lautréamont.⁹⁸ The difference between past experiments and situationist goals becomes explicit in the following advice: ". . . let the heroes be some more or less historical people who are close to us, connect the events of the inept scenario to the real reasons which we understand are behind the actions, and connect them also to the events of the current week. Here you have an acceptable collective distraction. . ."99. This is just the literalization of the symbolic. Ultimately, the situationists wanted to make *détournement* a way of operating in everyday social life, so that people could see through the deception of the spectacle society. This was called *ultra détournement*, that is, gestures and words can be given other meanings than they usually have,

and habits and practices could be détourned too. This is, in other words, performative.

Détournement is making an original from the banal by preserving the familiar to a certain degree as it is. It is necessary for reception to have "right" receiving interest, that is to say interpretation needs a definite context, such as the cultural and political situation of a certain historical time. Familiar elements prevent alienation on the part of the spectator, thus the message is not excessively original or completely strange. In many postmodernist works using familiar images, pastiche and intertextuality are the foremost modes of expression. Kathy Acker did a lot of cut-up work, since some of her novels are composed almost totally of quotations from various sources. It is intertextuality as the mode of expression, not only as part of it. In these works the receiver's interpretation is not directed as much as in situationist détournement. In postmodernist and contemporary works usually there is no meaningful dialogue or discourse, exploited elements or interpretations of works are not connected to historical continuity, but in fact, are loosened from the original discourse and recontextualized. Postmodernist cultural production is understood as a serie of messages continually breaking apart and re-attaching in new combinations. These combinations of messages, however, are relatively arbitrary compared to the situationist détournements for instance, whose frame of reference in a politically leftist context was clear. In this sense détournement was still functioning in a Modern(ist) discourse.

Contemporary activist art is open in character: works are processes, not just representations. (This is the point on which Danto erred when he wrote about disturbational art.) Contemporary works will not get the meaning until they have gained attention from the media. In fact, a viewer would have to follow a series of events to understand its pictographic allusions.¹⁰⁰

Many women's performances feature nonlinear, episodic structures. The techniques of direct address, commentary and repetition are frequently used. Plays and performances may seem to be a constellation of a series of vignettes. Autobiographical material is often a starting point. Interwoven fragments, personal anecdotes and incidents are organized by montage and collage structures. There are multiple story lines and multiple points of view. Several historical time zones often overlap in the same space. There's a lot of remembering, collecting and documenting, not much constructing from "neutral" material. The director of Women's Experimental Theatre, Roberta Sklar, has said: "Women knew all along that feelings don't happen in logical sequence."¹⁰¹ The W.E.T. production *Feast or Famine* (1985) connected women's relationship with food and global politics as follows:

(Declared in a jazz riff):
 What if I didn't lose weight
 What would happen if I didn't lose weight?
 If I weren't obsessed with my body size so
 Well, where on earth would all my energy go?

This economy needs
 Me to starve
 You to binge
 And the third world to bleed.¹⁰²

Play with narrativity, abrupt shifts in perspective, and the sometimes surprising scale of the elements put together, prevailed in the feminist theatre and performance of the 1980s. This is evident in Robbie McCauley's productions, where the individual incidents as fragments are pasted together with the repeating phrases and tags. There is mimicry, and also analysis and metacommentary in her work. This also gives an answer to the question of how to take into account the "formlessness" of life. Similarly, open works are "collage performances", for example, many of Lacy's works, which can be considered performances as wholes (as distinct from theatre pieces), although they often incorporate several short specific performance pieces and images.

It is possible to combine art works, theatre performances, books, plays and films out of detached and independent elements while still having a framework, some overall representing interest, as can be seen, for example, in the stylistic synthesis of the works, in some recurring themes etc. This kind of stylistic synthesis is found, for instance, in Beuys's and Debord's rather modernist works, but not in Oppenheim's works. In many contemporary works there is no stylistic unity or comprehensive idea, a great master-narrative, which would provide a frame for the (unambiguous) interpretation of works. The existing framework(s) in many Modernist works made interpretation possible, although not necessarily any easier. For example, the mental construction Beuys created was not so well mediated through the works only.

In contemporary and especially in postmodernist art it is easier to return to the canon of masterpieces, for high art has already become popularized and commodified and people know the "most important" works. This implies the emergence and developing of the receiver-centered theories which started in the 1960s. Talk about the death of the author fed the premises of interpretation. In postmodernism there have not been either authentic products, as were thought to exist in high art, or products which are wholly simple and formally repeat the same genre, as in popular and mass culture, but it became a matter of shaping influences and other texts intertextually so that a message can be both simple and conventional and rich and complex at the same time. The situationists did not quite fully bear this ambivalence. The political wing of the movement, especially, tried to find the authentic, original, and right, and something that could change false consciousness.

Cannibalism of Images

If we are looking for some tools for arts educational practice, it would be not enough to understand the methods of collage but we must also define

the distinction between collage and intertextuality. It would be as easy to say that collage recycle concrete materials such as ready-mades taken from the lifeworld as intertextuality refers to materials already worked up, ie, other cultural products. Cut-up and détournement connect intertextuality and collage. With détournement a new relation to existing cultural products becomes understandable; their autonomy becomes relational.

There has always been intertextuality in art, including Modernism. The question is whether it has been covered or subordinated to other modes of expression, or whether it is, as in contemporary art, knowingly accepted as an important form of expression. As long ago as in the 1930s and 1940s Brecht spoke about using models: "Modelle zu benutzen ist so eine eigene Kunst; soundso viel davon ist zu erlernen. Weder die Absicht, die Vorlage genau zu treffen, noch die Absicht, sie schnell zu verlassen, ist das richtige".¹⁰³ He encouraged the use of compositions and poses taken from masterpieces of painting in his plays, but these "pictures" were merely illustrations and subordinated to the play and its intentions. This is also rather common today. For example, Francis Ford Coppola's film *Dracula* (1992) includes an adaptation of Dürer's selfportrait and also looser pictorial references to Munch, Redon, Klimt and Denis. In art history there are numerous allusions of this kind and loans from other art works: in Manet's *Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe* (1863), the famous composition is based on the painting of river gods and attendant nymphs by Raphael who had taken these elements from the old sarcophagus in the Villa Medici, or, as was commonly believed in the nineteenth century, Manet's composition is derived from Titian's *La Fête champêtre* (c.1510-11); in the 1950s Francis Bacon painted one version of Velazquez's *Innocent X*; Peter Blake's *The Meeting, or Have a Nice M. Hockney* (1981-83) is a version of Courbet's *La Rencontre* (1854), etc. In the opera *Hyönteiselämä* (Insect Life, 1996) by Kalevi Aho themes from cradle songs to the music by Richard Strauss (Also sprach Zarathustra), that is, the theme from the Stanley Kubrick's film *2001: Space Odyssey* (1968) were explicitly used. In these works allusions and citations were subordinated to other intentions: they are just one part of the work.

We can say that intertextuality became the dominant mode of expression after Pop art, which took a position on a border line between "traditional" and "postmodern" intertextuality. Pop artists wanted to choose motives that would shock a conservative audience. That was one reason Pop used citations and allusions from popular culture, advertising and everyday life. To the certain degree they aestheticized everyday objects and consumer culture, but they did not subordinate their objects to formalist aims in the same way as, for example, the cubists had done. However, they made high art from popular culture, especially comics, which was painterly or in other ways stylized in Warhol's and Lichtenstein's paintings. In contemporary, especially postmodern, art intertextuality has gained a solid foothold. It is either the dominant mode of expression, as in Heiner Müller's last play, *Germania 3* (1996), which is a collage of citations from Brecht's plays. Or, intertextuality is a part of creating art works which have not been dominated by any particular style. It is suit-

able for art which emphasizes content again and does not bother much about originality and newness - the essential features of Modernist Art.

Earlier, intertextuality showed no such historicity, locality and particularity as has been the case in collage from the very beginning. Later, the situation changed when intertextuality became one of the dominant modes of expression, and when traditional painting, sculpture, theatre or narratives etc were more and more being given up. Consequently, it also includes the collage-like use of elements and especially the allegorical nature Owens mentioned. He also remarked that collage as the manipulation and consequent transformation of the highly significant fragment also exploits the atomizing, disjunctive principle which lies at the heart of allegory.¹⁰⁴ In postmodernist theories there is a lot of argument about the typical modes of representation in art, most of them based on intertextuality. We can talk about confiscation, parody, appropriation, or *détournement*.

Linda Hutcheon has studied the concept of parody; according to her, parody is transformational in its relationship to other texts, whereas pastiche is imitative. Parody emphasises difference. Hutcheon compared it to allusion which activates two texts through correspondence. Thus parody implies critical distancing, and therefore value judgements. Parody, unlike imitation, quotation, or allusion requires an ironical distance. However, quotation has become a form of parody in contemporary art. When there is no longer one truth or one reality, the nature of the mimesis of art has changed in that it more and more implies the existence of differences between model and copy. Hutcheon crystallizes her definition of parody as "repetition with critical distance, which marks difference rather than similarity"¹⁰⁵.

Pastiche has been seen both as a tool of radical practice and as an indication of the impoverishment of creativity. Jameson wrote about pastiche that:

Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language. But it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without any of parody's ulterior motives, amputated of the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists. Pastiche is thus blank parody, a statue with blind eyeballs. . . ¹⁰⁶

In Jencks' theory of the postmodern culture the historical memory is important. It includes the imaginative use of parody, nostalgia, and pastiche, as well as enigmatic, plotless allegory. Owens has his concept of appropriation, in which the essential thing is using reproductions of already photographic images. Appropriation usually challenges the uniqueness of the art image, or just plays with that concept. These concepts differ, although in both cases it is a matter about intertextuality in general. There are some differences in how these methods are employed. Pastiche, for example, can be seen as a play in the way that pastiche occupies a similar position in contemporary art as the use of naked girls in the happenings of the 1960s. They were like anonymous vignettes. On the

other hand, what Jameson called the neutral practice of mimicry is not necessary as neutral as he thinks, since mimesis-mimicry, using pastiches of cultural images, has actually become an important way to undermine those images. It may be a presentation of something that is inaccessible to critical consciousness, something that shows itself to be so self-evident and familiar we do not even see it until it is shown in an act of mimicry.

Andre has argued that the strategy of recoding no longer demonstrates any particular attitude in regard to contemporary culture. At first, recoding seemed to bring along a critical stance as in *détournement*, but such a reading was too simple. Andre has stated that if all the realms of culture use this new optional medium, it cannot in itself impart a special reflection to contemporary culture.¹⁰⁷ This thus implies that critical theory has reached its end, it has no validity in the realities of the art world.


Andre has written about photographers. According to her, deconstructionists approve of the seamlessness of the photograph and the transparency of its ideology. They choose "texts", ie, pictures from advertising and the media, which are the most strongest and effective pictures in our culture. They are chosen because they work so well. This is more passive than active deconstruction. Contrary to active deconstruction, the picture is not reworked so as to find its weak points. Instead, it is isolated and placed in a new context, which gives it the possibility of deconstructing itself, that is, of revealing its ideology. Behind this strategy is the idea that ideology is something manifest on the surface of things, that it simply offers itself for seeing. The demand for appropriation is a political act in itself. The recoding of advertising pictures fortifies the codes of the picture, underlines its exaggerations in such a way that the picture in fact deconstructs itself. Barbara Kruger's works, recoding the graphic design of billboards and tabloids, were formed out of moves by the intellect where all the communicative instruments of power are turned against themselves.¹⁰⁸

The main task of Kruger's photographic work is to unmask the patriarchal structure underpinning the oppression of woman. Implicit is play on the codes at work in both mass communication and social constructions. Kruger's intention has been to rupture naturalized, seemingly stabilized meanings by using familiar media images and stereotypes and adding subversive texts to them. This is much the same strategy as *détournement* in the situationist sense. Kruger uses strong binominal oppositions - we vs. you, nature vs. culture, passive vs. active, supine vs. standing - exposing those operations which construct the woman as other.

Lower right: *New York Times* p-Ed page, 1991

THE NEW YORK TIMES **OP-ED** TUESDAY, JUNE 4, 1991

Any Suggestions? By Barbara Kruger



The Male Manifesto

Barbara Kruger, 1991

Here, in a way, she also exposes the logic of the traditional counter cultural strategies which, like other earlier cultural structuring, opposes we against you (or them). On the other hand, using similar strategies, and by repeating them, practising mimicry, Kruger renders them transparent at the same time as she utilizes them herself. Using the same strategies at the same time as criticizing those very modes of constructing meanings is typical of postmodernist and contemporary art, and is one point where it differs from the modernist avant-garde. The position of the SI was between the strategies of the avant-garde and those of the postmodernists'. Although, to be exact, it was Punk that functioned as a mediator. *Détournement* is to recode the image world (politically). It actually floated between passive and active deconstruction.

Similar strategies as Kruger's have been used recently in the United States and Canada in mediaterrorism, which attacks consumption. The intention is to fool media audience for a few seconds by transmitting self-made "advertisements" on television, for example. People recognize the familiar product or trademark, but the message is against it. Karl Laske, who represents The Media Foundation, has promoted a campaign against advertising actually using *détournement* strategies. The problem is, however, that the traditional idea of the medium and the image has been turned upside down. Hierarchies collapse or disappear, and the power relations seem to become indifferent. Changes are even seen inside market advertising, an example of which is Benetton. In 1984, when Toscani became a head of Benetton's advertising campaign, the first photographs represented children of diverse races and the trademark "United Colors of Benetton". This was a banal and sterile image of the world of make-believe. In 1991 there was a reversal of the traditional marketplace logic in favour of controversial photojournalism in which Toscani used images of the AIDS crisis, environmental disaster, political violence, war, exile and natural catastrophe, and connected those to the Benetton logo. It is a question of a double movement between decontextualization and recontextualization. There has been lot of talk about the morality of these advertisements. Toscani maintained that only the meaningful, whether it is fine art or fashion, is art, anything communicational and provocative is good, provocation meaning to arouse an interest.¹⁰⁹ He puts "disturbing" pictures in advertisements in an effort to shake people's social consciousness. He has held exhibitions. In fact, the same pictures that drew no special affection at the Venice Biennale, aroused indignation when published in the French newspaper *Libération*. It is difficult to define the relationship between commerce and art. Even the spokespeople at Benetton say different things.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, there has been an accusation that by denying specificity Benetton suppresses the history of these images and thus they become depoliticized. For example, the picture of the dying AIDS patient enforces the cliché of people with AIDS as helpless victims.¹¹¹ Do they resemble art even more then, if we consider art to represent something ahistorical and universal? Toscani aestheticizes politics. When people are used to these images, what challenges does it present to activist art playing on similar ground? Where's the difference? To a certain extent, it is in the literalization of the symbolic.

Lippard has written about the "cannibalism"¹¹² of found images. She meant that documentary photography and film, comics, and illustrated books have also been resurrected as key tools for activism, even as their own conventions and clichés are subjected to increased scrutiny. There has arisen the journalization of art, where Hollywood films, TV commercials and slick magazines are either challenged or assumed. There are artists who are wholly concerned with media *style*, divorced from all but hermetic and ambiguous content. Others are populists or activists who see mass-culture techniques as ways to reach more people with both a narrative hook and a seductive familiarity: "keep the image, change the message."¹¹³

Andre and Lippard stated that the strategies of appropriation have become a style. Sherrie Levine and Richard Prince have played with concepts of copying and plagiarism as producers of meanings. Their works (exact reproductions of the advertising pictures or pictures of other photographers) seem totally apolitical. Thomas Lawson has deliberated on the success of these "post-Pop appropriations", as he calls them. He says that they elicit a complex response. Lawson writes that:

Staring at these works, we find them staring back at us. We recognize ourselves in the mirror of reproduction they hold before us, and we do not know if we should be flattered or offended. Like Man Ray's infernal object, they taunt us with the knowledge that our response is likely to be inadequate. Does Prince celebrate the triumph of a depoliticized aestheticism, or insult us for succumbing to the blandishments of the merely good-looking? . . . No matter where we look, it is becoming increasingly difficult to recognize an "original" from a copy, or from a copy of copy. Mimicry has replaced innovation as a creative value. We recycle everything. This is now a given; we understand the value of reuse. We no longer think we must discard what we have in order to gain access to that shimmering mirage, the new.¹¹⁴

This is rather pessimistic view of the possibilities of mimicry. What disturbs Lawson is important, though, since basically he claims that it is difficult to receive and interpret such ambiguous works which do not divide meanings and messages into a clearly structured order or hierarchy. In other words, the material is not intellectually worked up towards certain meanings but it leaves them open, even their nature; it just shows something. In art, the basic thing is, as Dewey remarked, that the primitive and raw material of experience is reworked in order to secure artistic expression.¹¹⁵ But sometimes there is the problematic of *whether* the raw material is, or even should be, reworked. In Lunch's performances material is reworked only to the extent that she literally shrieks out the concentrated energy of negativity, trying to express pure hate following an anti-intellectual punk tradition, using such words as 'fuck' that have already been stripped from its meanings. C. Carr remarked that Lunch's anger is abstract, an idea of rage.¹¹⁶ It can be compared to minimalist works of art in the sense that they are entities in themselves, they just are, and interpretations come from outside the work. In fact, mimicry, such as Lawson describes it, works in the same way.

Laurie Anderson's performance *United States* (1980) was worked up rather more, but, as Herman Rapaport argues, she uses blank parody or pastiche not to indict postmodern space but to perform it.¹¹⁷ This underlines the fact that the performative is doing. *United States* was a work of several hours' duration which is narrated, illustrated and accompanied by music. Its 78 parts tell about America in four zones: travel, politics, money, and love. It puts together familiar, vernacular styles, all that seems to be self-evident and literal, and an authoritarian elite which is always contaminated by the vernacular and thus made to seem ridiculous. For example, Anderson showed the picture, sent into space with Pioneer probes, of the figures of a man and woman. The man's right arm is bent up at the elbow, for it is he who is supposed to make first contact with

aliens. "Do you think that they will think his arm is permanently attached in this position?"¹¹⁸, Anderson asked. She used intertextuality, especially in the "Blue Lagoon" part where, as in the whole piece, woman is considered as a space. Theorists have proved how modernist architects and planners think of space as pre-existent and unlimited, as abstract and undifferentiated, and Anderson showed how space is so abstract and monotonous that only some very minimal detail can distinguish one place from another, such as a pool in the standard suburban house, not its architecture. This abstract place is less a place to live than a flat surface to traverse. We traverse through communication services, through changing images which we use but which have no deep and stable meanings for us. This theme is taken even further in Anderson's *Puppet Motel*, where there are only shallow images to play with, mostly aesthetically, a journey through an attic full of more or less beautiful or useless objects, to which it is also difficult to put the attribute 'truth', or any other metaphysical definitions for that matter. The receiver just travels through this work.

As a performance of literalization, Karen Finley's is also a performance of spatialization. According to Rebecca Schneider, Finley *maps* the violence of genderization upon her body parts.¹¹⁹ Literalization works as counter-mimicry. Finley destabilizes the mimetic truth of the authentic, and simultaneously she insists upon its real effects. She can appear on stage wearing a cocktail party outfit and then she steps shyly and a bit nervously over to the mike: "I go down on that ass with my mouth, my penis still kinda high and hard and I suck suck suck my own cum outta your butt juice with a little bit of yum yum yum yum yum baby liquid shit mixed up with that cum, baby. You can jerk off on my pancakes any time."¹²⁰ Or, she smeared chocolate or syrup all over herself, the substance also symbolizing shit. Thus the body becomes grotesque in the Bahtinian sense; inside becomes outside, and it is in immediate relation to the world. Finley also connects linguistic level to this. Rather than being a passive object, she forces men to be passive in the face of her rage. Jill Dolan wrote: "Her refusal to play the game leaves the male spectator nowhere to place himself in relation to her performance. He can no longer maintain the position of the sexual subject who views the performance"¹²¹. If this is so, and if he cannot give up the position he is used to, is all that is left for him in this case to repudiate art due to its inconvenience or disturbance? Nonetheless, it should not mean that it is not art what Finley does. It is a pity that although people know this, there are arts educators and aestheticians who do not want to deal with art of this kind. The question is, if we give an artist the right to do something very subjective, should we give the same right of subjectivity to an arts educator too? Or, does it depend on her position? If she is forming a theory of an arts education, we can presume some openness. In educational practice we can allow more subjectivity, although there are tragicomic examples.¹²² We have also to be very cautious with the traditional metalanguages of arttalk, hence it influences our notions of art. Historicity and a particularity of appearances are not enough when dealing with cultural symbols. It is not enough to use these symbols dif-

ferently. Sometimes they can be more exposed than literalized, when making a map real. This is playing back "reality" in a different register.

Anderson has made a collage where she just shows things, in much the same way as Mike Bidlo's paintings of famous paintings (or graphics) such as Warhol's *Portrait of Jackie* (1965); Bidlo's version is named *Not Warhol* (1984). These are different from détournement, though, because they are not, or do not even pretend to be political or critical in any way, although they can be interpreted as such. Instead, a better example of détournement as a style in the contemporary art would be the Smurf work by Mark Dion in an 1986 exhibition at Artists Space (London). Everything in a stage set of a child's bedroom - wallpaper, sheets, dishware, toys, and games - was a Smurf, or was covered with them. Against one wall a television played tapes of the Smurf show, except that the soundtrack had been replaced by a discussion of the Smurf phenomenon in terms of the economics of its distribution and the ideological function of the show as a carrier of entrenched ideas of power, sexuality, and morality. This discussion was conducted in the squeaky voices typical of Smurf characters.¹²³ This is ironic distancing, parody.

Colin Self's *Let's have it here and charge admission. . .* (1988) also resembles some situationist art works, in particular the modifications by Jorn. Self appended mass-produced plastic toys (including a model of the comic strip character Bugs Bunny) to an amateur tachist painting of the type produced in evening classes. Livingstone has maintained that the casual, almost throwaway quality of this act belies Self's convictions about what he calls 'people's art' as a form of artistic expression worthy of our respect.¹²⁴ I say that Self's work resembles Jorn's modifications, but Jorn played with amateur/professional dialectics differently. He *created* art by making it, meaning that Jorn bought cheap kitsch pictures from a market place, and by overpainting them, that is, by adding his own individual brushstrokes and signature (although sometimes leaving the old one too) onto them, he made them into witty, humorous and new art. Jorn was a modernist in this sense. Self is a postmodernist; he does not create any dialectical relationship between individual artist and anonymity, rather he operates along the axis: amateur (no skills) - production of mass culture (which is professional) - artist. It is not clear what role he gives to the artist, ie, himself. He did not create a work having any aesthetic merit, at least in the traditional meaning. The work could be a provocation á la Picabia's monkey, but stating what? If it aimed to make art world seem ridiculous, as its name suggests, then the work is a comment, but a weary one, a pastiche of a series of Duchampian gestures this century. Maybe he wanted to underline the thinness of the line between a work made by an amateur and one made by an artist, (which Jorn stressed). On the other hand, these, and Livingstone's, and any other interpretation as well, are all possible.

In sum, intertextuality is used as an opposition to originality and uniqueness of style. Despite this, many artists, such as Kruger, Anderson, Sherman, Acker etc. have created a style. According to Adorno, the tension between art and the products of the culture industry is important. How much of this gap is left in the works described above, since Kruger

and Sherman, for example, ground their works on the tension Adorno mentioned. The main issue is, however, that in art things are "displayed differently", perspectives on the dominant can change from one subject to another regardless of hierarchical relations. In other words, there can be a critical point of view, but no stable position.

Ideas adopted from the radical avant-garde or anti-art strategies and tactics are an essential feature of contemporary art. Criticizing various forms and modes of expression has been changed to parody. For example, Marianna Uutinen's, as such quite abstract works, refer to both problems inside art and outside art (to femininity). They are parody of formal structures and an attempt to depict a fleeting sensation, 'instant' experiences.

SPATIALIZATION OF TIME

*Nothing is ever completed;
it only changes.*

- Angela Carter -

Giving up the idea of progress means also to give up an emphasis on time to a certain extent, since we are no longer forced to go forward, but can even take a look around. To my mind the flâneur was the great-grand father of contemporary art; in so far as he practised gestures instead of performed narratives, he was performative, but not theatrical. I tried to make this difference clear in the earlier chapter on the dissolution of art, when I dealt with Minimalism. I now continue in an effort to determine the best premises with which to begin to develop a theory of arts education.

The flâneur connected art and life without differentiating the arts, since, in fact, he did not practice any. His style was ephemeral and incongruent even with the styles in fashion at the time. As often in contemporary art, sites and places were then as now a part of the "work", which was "doing" as such. The flâneur practiced psychogeography in the city. David Harvey wrote about the "spatialization of time" through the image, the dramatic gesture, and instantaneous shock, or by montage/collage. According to him, resort to the techniques of montage/collage provided one means of addressing the problem of the spatialization of time, since different effects drawn from different times (old newspapers) and spaces (the use of common objects) could be superimposed to create a simultaneous effect. By exploring simultaneity in this way, Harvey argues, the modernists were accepting the ephemeral and transitory as the locus of their art, although at the same time they were forced collectively to reaffirm the potency of the very conditions against which they were reacting.¹²⁵ The spatialization of time through the image is what the situationists also had to say about preserving the past for the future, which was, in fact, according to them simply the false illusion of an experienced moment. It is displacement, the infidelity of the element, they said.¹²⁶

And so the spatialization of time came into existence, which the situationists discussed in the 1960s: *le présent se donne à vivre immédiatement comme souvenir*¹²⁷, wrote Debord thinking about photography and film as ways of recording situations. At the same time a situation is recorded it is already past, temporal continuity has accumulated into a narrower space. And in the end, as many postmodernists have claimed, we give up linear history, and all we are left with are fragments of different times, which it is possible to handle in the same space. New critical strategies often explore extra-artistic concepts. Metaphors of time and place have offered ways of dealing with the issues raised by anyone.

Perhaps owing to their common ground in Marxist thinking, Jameson also writes about the return to nostalgia in postmodern arts, especially film and literature. He claims that such films and books are nothing but stereotyped pastiches, which are symptoms of the waning of our history.¹²⁸ He describes it as a crisis in historicity as follows:

If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity actively to extend its pro-tensions and re-tensions across the temporal manifold and to organize its past and future into coherent experience, it becomes difficult enough to see how the cultural productions of such a subject could result in anything but "heaps of fragments" and in a practice of a randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and the aleatory.¹²⁹

According to Jameson, a series of pure and unrelated presents in time is a schizophrenic situation in which we cannot act intentionally. He refers to Lacan's description of schizophrenia as a breakdown in the signifying chain, ie, the interlocking syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes a meaning.¹³⁰

Among other arts, Jameson also comments on architecture and city-planning. True to his thinking, which I do not agree with, is that in the end of his analysis of postmodernism, he tries to outline the political form of postmodernism, and, unlike many contemporary artists even at the time he was writing his essay, he arrives at the conclusion that it would be something that would have as its vocation the invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping, on a social as well as spatial scale.¹³¹

All types of autonomies tend to emphase globalities, not localities. In a book on analytic aesthetics one of the writers is irritated almost into making a fool of himself when he describes how pointless it is for aestheticians to offer unnecessarily far-fetched illustrations for their theories.¹³² I disagree with this, a view which I have already stated many times. However, it is understandable since in the concept of autonomy is written the difference from something else; but often a holistic difference. Local distinctions are not autonomous, at least in the sense they are distinct from life-worlds or other institutions, since they have the certain ground and context they spring from. Dewey said that it is characteristic of art that the intrinsic value remains after local elements have been stripped away.¹³³ Theorists seem to agree in this. Only that there is no clear agreement about what was meant by these *local* elements. We may as well think of certain places or sites as of some "irrelevant proper-

ties" such as who is presented in this portrait, or even what kind of period dress these actors are wearing in that play. When I use the term 'local elements' in this study, I mean quite concrete things, such as sites or persons, or motives that concern some rather exact purposes. And I assert that those are localities you cannot in all cases of art strip away, nor are they irrelevant properties to something being art. Alternatively, as I have said earlier, Dewey emphasized that art is definitely always in a context, whilst a work of art is just a locality of this context. I defined the concept of context in the chapter on problems in the autonomy of art. It seems to me that it is the concept theorists have had difficulties with, since the definition of Gadamer that I used is narrow, narrower than that of Dewey or others; of course its narrowness is also due to an unwillingness or incapacity to see the arts as something other than artistic and /or aesthetic objects. In fact, if we think so, the breadth of Dewey's notions also seems apparent. Referring to Gadamer's definition of context, which dealt with literature and was an example of art as autonomous when defining context only as inside an art mode, I want here to display a much broader notion of context in art, although I do not maintain that Gadamer's definition was adequate for the use he needed in that case.

The modernist flâneur had represented an individual in an urban space at the same time as when modernist urban planning was born. The distinction was marked in the 1870s. Then art gained autonomy around the same time as Baron Hausmann's plans for the renewal of Paris were realized. Art became a place for the individual. The city, for its part, became more abstract and dehumanized, it represented public power with new wide boulevards and large squares; people lived elsewhere.

There were attempts to connect the free expressive individual and the modern urban ideal for example in Constant's *New Babylon*, and on the other hand, in the situationalist art of the 1960s. I argue that the modernist flâneur is an important character when dealing with performative and situational contemporary art. Much contemporary art wants to connect people more closely to their local environment. Instead of monuments, the emphasis is put on experiencing moments. Art is still producing meaningful moments, but not necessary arresting and freezing them into aestheticized shapes. In fact, contemporary art discharges the flâneur's ideals of aestheticism keeping up a profile. Aestheticist ideals have moved into everyday culture (spectacle), leading to the aestheticization of life, as I have stated. Does this mean that art stands out as different from the rest of culture? It has begun to take a non-stylistic, unaestheticized attitude. This can especially be seen in many urban art works since the late 1960s. Part of it is environmental art in wider sense, the products of individual artists. Some art would use the city as a meeting place, a communicational space in which the isolated flâneur would disappear in favour of groups of flâneurs practicing *dérive*, ie, drifting in urban space.

To understand why the urban context has become such an important part in art nowadays, I describe at first the tension between urban ideals of the modernists and the individual as represented by the flâneur.

Urban Context

In modernist city planning the creation of space has been subordinated to general social and other non-individualized goals. Richard Sennett has stated that Baron Hausmann first held the notion that it is desirable to treat city problems as a whole. Hausmann planned the rebuilding of Paris in the 1860s. This wholistic belief assumes that because the social, economic, and physical phenomena of a city are interrelated in their functioning, it is a good idea to try to deal with them in a coherent way, so that changes in one realm will inevitably transform other realms of city life along structured paths. The ideology of planning is an ideal of planning the parts on the basis of the whole.¹³⁴ Sennett remarked that this is one of the most familiar modern images of unity. Yet, when this mentality of production, this image of machine efficiency becomes transferred to the production of cities, in the designing of social parts from a predetermined, previsualized urban whole, the result became inhumane.¹³⁵ Hausmann assumed that it was a good idea to plan physical space for predetermined social use; that is, instead of assuming that changes in the social structure of the city should be accomplished first in order to change the physical appearance of the city, Hausmann bequeathed the notion to us that it is somehow better, and certainly easier, to change the physical landscape in order to alter the social patterns of the metropolis.¹³⁶

The situationists insisted that the whole of urban planning can be understood only as a society's field of publicity propaganda, ie, as the organization of participation in something in which it is impossible to participate; hence it is a matter of insistence on popular consent, on individual integration into the inauguration of this bureaucratic production of conditioning. All this is imposed by means of a blackmail of utility, which hides the fact that the architecture and conditioning are really useful only in reinforcing reification.¹³⁷ It was just over ten years later that Sennett wrote that ". . . a majority of the planners proceeding on these lines conceive of the 'needs' of urbanites, not in terms of known experience, but rather in terms of the urbanites place in an order where needs are experienced abstractly, as part of a total function."¹³⁸ Thus modernist city planners have put images in place of cities, which had lost their own means of representation. The city has become an image, "something occasionally and casually consumed in spaces expressly designed for the purpose", as T. J. Clark has written.¹³⁹ According to these theorists, it is necessary to take back those everyday spaces which are forgotten in the official spectacle. Their analysis is pointed if we think, for instance, of contemporary city planning: people are asked and they can utter their opinions, but only in the terms of bureaucracy, by following certain rules - usually after the plans are made. Harvey has crystallized this problem stating that the conquest and rational ordering of space became an integral part of the modernizing project.¹⁴⁰ What most theorists have not emphasized, for instance, is that the everyday spaces are usually women's places. The abstractness of needs in modernist thinking was experienced

at its worst in women's lives, as, indeed, some (female) theorists have remarked.

Vaneigem describes how the first cities grew up around a point where heaven and earth converged; in the centre stood a temple or a church. Industrial towns surround a factory or industrial plant and administrative centers presided over empty rectilinear avenues. In late modernist examples of city planning there is no centre at all. Vaneigem stated that it is becoming increasingly obvious that the reference point is always somewhere else: cities have become labyrinths in which you are only allowed to lose yourself. "No games, no meetings, no living, only a grid of roads and a desert of plateglass. Oppression is no longer centralized because oppression is everywhere", he wrote, faithful to the political discourse of the sixties.¹⁴¹ Analogy to spectacle holding sway everywhere is obvious. If one is irritated by the strong terminology of Vaneigem, one can read Baudrillard who has taken these thoughts forward and ended up stating that it is totally impossible to locate an instance of the model, of the power, of the gaze, of the medium itself, since you are always already on the other side. According to Baudrillard, there is no longer a subject, focal point, center or periphery, but pure flexion or circular inflection. There is no longer violence or surveillance, but only information, chain reaction, slow implosion and simulacra of spaces where the real effect comes into play.¹⁴² Jencks also writes about the absent center. It is a matter of *whose* point of view is in play, ie, whose vanishing point is on the horizon between reality and meaning. Vaneigem also saw a positive aspect in urban decentralization: in conditions of almost total isolation everyone must begin to see that first and foremost it is they themselves that they have to save and to choose themselves as the centre. It is their own subjectivity out of which they have to build a world where everyone will feel at home.¹⁴³ It is very tempting to argue that this is precisely what happens when people develop their lifestyles, or when art makes projects for making a suburb a better place to live. Instead, the flâneur was a bystander, an onlooker who did not care to make things cosy for himself, on the contrary. Thus he was a typical modernist: he had his personality and individuality, but he did not use them to make subjective acts. The revolution the SI planned started from personal desires and consciousness of them: a collective always consists of a group of individuals.

Using space and time is not socially neutral, but any space implies, contains and dissimulates social relationships. According to Henri Lefebvre, any change in space relations affects the profitability of economic activity unevenly, and therefore leads to a redistribution of wealth and power. Any attempt to democratize and disperse political power likewise entails some kind of spatial strategy. Lefebvre has criticized the dominant tendency that fragments space and enumerates the various objects that space contains. Specializations divide space among them and act upon its truncated parts, setting up mental barriers and practico-social frontiers. Lefebvre emphasises that the ideologically dominant tendency divides space up into parts in accordance with the social division of labour. Space is seen as a passive receptacle. This leads to the trap of treating space

as space 'in itself', instead of uncovering the social relationships that are latent in spaces. It is the fetishization of space in a way reminiscent of the fetishism of commodities.¹⁴⁴ The situationists's ideas about unitary urbanism and psychogeography were grounded in this view.

In contemporary art the context is important. But it does not always behave in the same way. In art there can be combinations of different and even distanced sites and spaces or elements. For some it can produce meaningful combinations of feelings: one thing connected to another colours it in special way. It is common in contemporary art to try to produce effects but not to create works of art with which to prolong an aesthetic experience, or to try to create an endless and inexhaustible one.

This is related to the role of the flâneur in modern culture. I already mentioned that originally a flâneur was a bystander, a sort of decoration, or ornament among other (architectural) ornaments. He remained in the background trying to mediate the mood of the urban culture. In fact, he was rather a Kantian figure, in accordance with the notion that we cannot reach for the reality as such (an sich); all we know are the phenomena, things as such our minds shape them. But if we deal with Kant's aesthetic notions as pragmatists, all that remains are those phenomena (as different perspectives on reality as James and Ortega wrote). Jameson would argue that it is a waning of affect, just to play on a surface, but what is wrong with that. What I would like to do is to make the character of the flâneur represent contemporary performative people who create their styles, adventures, art and lives from more subjective points with the intention of raising the quality of their lives. It would also include more physicality than in the being of the modernist flâneur. The usual argument against this is, that not everyone has afford to do this. But I am not claiming that to create style means buying designer products or such-like. That would be far too straightforward, and need not any changes in arts education either.

Flâneur - "une poésie faite par tous"

For the situationists the unitary urbanism also meant seeing the urban space as a playing field where everybody interacts and everyone continuously creates and changes; in other words, the individual takes part in the creation of an urban environment, at the same time both finding and constructing it. The city, as a space and happening is a perfect constructed situation because of its uncontrollable nature and unfixity. There should be more room for every kind of play and games; the ideal playground would be an old town with its complex structure. "On the horizon, then, at the furthest edge of the possible, it is a matter of producing the space of the human species - the collective (generic) work of the species - on the model of what used to be called 'art'; indeed, it is still so called, but art no longer has any meaning at the level of an 'object' isolat-

ed by and for the individual."¹⁴⁵ In the spectacle society, commodity culture needs more organized structures, and hence the attempts of the SI to return the city to unreason.

One aim of the (earlier) artistic or theoretical invasions into the urban was to replace rational, bourgeois spectacle with the unorganized spectacle of cities where public arenas such as cafés and places of public entertainment offered a 'mise en scene', or setting (and where men of the bourgeoisie could meet and seduce or purchase working-class women). As Wilson has argued, the urban scene was at all times represented from the point of view of the male gaze: in paintings and photographs men voyeuristically stare, women are passively subjected to the gaze. And middle-class women were restricted to certain limited public spaces designated as respectable: parks and the opera, for example. They represented a bourgeois spectacle.¹⁴⁶ What, then, would constitute a more unorganized spectacle? The production of space, and on the other hand, play with spaces already produced.

Baudelaire's *flâneur* was the first type of artist who thought about sensing and representing an atmosphere of the public places of modern urban space. Baudelaire compared the flâneur experiencing the city to a child who sees everything as a novelty; the child is "drunk" in drinking in shape and colour, he sees the city as a collection of places and situations charged with mythical power. Into the adult experience should be merged child's ability to still be confronted by something new and be enchanted with it.¹⁴⁷ The experience of *homo ludens* can be an ideal when talking about sensing and experiencing an environment.

According to, Christel Hollevoet, the flâneur, the distance observer of modernity, first strolled through the arcades (*les passages*), then amidst street crowds, and eventually through department stores, where he became a consumer, where his experience embodied commodity fetishism, the seeking of *nouveautés* and *spécialités*.¹⁴⁸ This kind of development would be plausible for the flâneur, for already for Baudelaire the flâneur was a consumer for whom women, for instance, were only producers of services. The flâneur was a kind of forefather of the spectacle society. In his elitism, the typically modernist flâneur differs from the situationist wanderers. Hollevoet writes that the shift from Baudelaire's and Aragon's flânerie to Debord's *dérive* is significant because the situationists rejected art objects and aesthetic concerns in favour of social realities and life situations.¹⁴⁹ Instead, the flâneur aestheticizes his surroundings, there is quite an amount of the bohemian and dandy in him. As Benjamin has stated, the flâneur does not want to lose his privacy, and thus differs from the crowd in needing "elbow room", which the man of the crowd neither has nor wants to have. The flâneur is the secret spectator of the spectacle of the spaces and places of the city. Flânerie is an escape from the private sphere to the public, but the flâneur remains an individual. It is important for the SI that a flâneur is a subject. Still, as Baudelaire wrote in *Paris Spleen*:

The dialectic of the poet is, then, one of the sovereignty of individual self-hood in synthesis with a situation in which the practice of self-hood is

dependent on the contingencies of spectacles such as crowds. The dialectic of the poet is 'this divine prostitution of the soul giving itself entire, all its poetry and all its charity, to the unexpected as it comes along, to the stranger as he passes'.¹⁵⁰

Keith Tester comments that it is a quest for *being* through a restless *doing*; a struggle for satisfaction through the rooting out and destruction of dissatisfaction (dissatisfaction owing to the banality of coming across the familiar; dissatisfaction being the sense of *finding* a world rather than *making* a world).¹⁵¹ In other words, it is to make meaning of the world because the world is already there. This is doomed to lead to endless dissatisfaction, since the secret of *being* is the actuality of *doing*, continuous dissatisfaction.

A requisite distance is an important quality of the flâneur. This is of course the opposite of such activities as shopping (and this is one reason the flâneur is a man: only women do shopping, or are for sale). The flâneur consumes without financial or emotional expenditure.¹⁵² The SI also wanted a distance from the willingness to join the crowd, to enter into negotiations, and to create relationships. In fact, the situationists were in a similar position to flâneurs in the last century, namely in that the circumstances of the flâneur's life are the very condition of his being a flâneur - who then rebels against his circumstances, that is, capitalist, bourgeois Paris.¹⁵³ Alternatively, as Rob Shields remarks:

An interpretive attempt to grasp the totality of social relations through a *verstehen*-like experiencing of the 'aura' of the scene of commodity consumption in the arcades requires the *flâneur* to become part of the process of commodity exchange as a 'participant observer'. In doing so, the *flâneur*, like the prostitute, risks being swallowed up by the goods in the stores and becoming little more than a commodity or a mannequin: 'the sandwich man' whose identity is hidden by the large advertising sign carried front and back.¹⁵⁴

Benjamin wrote that as flâneurs, the intelligentsia came into the market-place. They thought themselves to be observers, but in reality they were there already to find a buyer. They were in an uncertain situation economically as well as being uncertain of their political function. The most spectacular expression of this was provided by the professional conspirators, who without exception belonged to the *bohème*. Thus Benjamin linked the flâneur socially and politically to the bohème.¹⁵⁵ The myth of bohème artist originates from the last century: Balzac used the term in the modern sense in his novel *Un grand homme de province à Paris* (1838). The term has been understood to mean artists and writers who, practising a nonconformist life style, proved to belong to the avant-garde as the opposite of the bourgeoisie and the academies ruled by the bourgeoisie. Many bohemians were devoted to *l'art pour l'art* and tried to irritate the bourgeoisie, but quite many also took part in political activities. During this century many modernist artists have nurtured the bohemian way of life. The surrealists developed a set of rules which forced members of their group to lead a bohemian life. Since it was so common to admire and practise a bohemian life style in the modernist art world

the situationists despised, they simply had to analyze and criticize the phenomenon. The situationists held the positive aspect of bohemianism to be that bohemian experience is qualitative use of everyday life. Thus bohemianism is a moment of richness within extreme poverty. But the official version of bohemianism needs an edifying ending: this moment of pure qualitiveness within poverty must finally arrive at ordinary riches. Poor artists have produced masterpieces, and they are saved because their work will turn out to be highly valued. The situationists meant that people who struggle against reification nevertheless end up producing commodities for the art world markets.¹⁵⁶ They also envisioned also the art work of the future, which has to be the construction of a passionate life. The situationists predicted the next mode of society, which would not be grounded on industrial production, but would be the society of realized art. The new type of production is the construction of situations, ie, the free construction of the events of life. It is difficult to say if it is a question of an admiration for romanticism, taken to the extreme, dandyism, or, bohemianism, but it can be seen in contemporary culture that something like that has happened: more and more people are taking on roles that in turn change as the context changes.

According to Elizabeth Wilson, the difference between the bohemian and the flâneur was that while the bohemian had been passionately emotional, the flâneur was a detached observer. The bohemian caught the fleeting, fragmentary quality of modern urban life, and, as an outsider, he also identified with all the marginals that urban society produced. In particular he empathized not so much with the organized working class as with the down-and-outs: the ragpickers, the semi-criminal and the deviant.¹⁵⁷

Flânerie had such strong elitist nuances that the situationists wanted to change this and make flânerie possible for everybody, to make flânerie a daily practice, but not a commodity. This is a symbolic gesture, since the flâneur is maybe the most important personification of Modernity, although he was not real but just an urban legend, a "mythical writer who's not writing"; for whom everything is mysterious until its meaning has been invented.¹⁵⁸ Many artists and groups in the 1960s emphasized the flâneur's decadent character as an artist not producing any art works, although the flâneur was not necessary mentioned in this context. A man doing *dérive* was symbolic as well. During the last half of the nineteenth century the flâneur became estranged and alienated. The same thing happened to him that happened to art, according to the situationists. And, in broader sense, as Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson observed, the dispossession of the individual by the city has a great deal to do with the increasingly conspicuous commodification of everyday life.¹⁵⁹

Benjamin argued that the rationality of capitalism and commodification itself defined the meaning of existence in the city so that there remained no spaces of mystery for the flâneur to observe. Were the situationists thus romanticising flânerie? No, they familiarized it by shifting the focus from spectacle and poetic mysteries to everyday experi-

ence. Before, life was aestheticized by experiencing its details as art (cf. Kaprow), but the SI tried to give meanings to experiences as such (cf. Punk).

Both the situationists's and de Certeau's thoughts seem to be analogous to the ideas presented by Benjamin in *Passagen-Werk*. Benjamin did not take the past as linear chain of moments and occasions, but rather as a miscellaneous collection of places and situations. As Hollevoet remarked, Benjamin has a vision of the city as an interior, or apartment, where the neighbourhoods are like different rooms and the advertising signs like pictures on the living room walls. In his private apartment Benjamin contrasted crowds, the proletariat of the streets, with the bourgeoisie chained by false subjectivity and individualism. The city was a room of the collective, its home.¹⁶⁰

Flâneurism is comparable to collage (*détournement*). The city has been seen as a text which the flâneur treats as allegorical and which he organizes. The flâneur wrests the details from out of their original context. To read them means to produce new constructions, means to derive more meaning from them than they possessed in their own present.¹⁶¹ However, the passivity of the flâneur is obvious, if we compare it to Lefebvre's ideas about the *détournement* of space. He wrote as follows:

An existing space may outlive its original purpose and the *raison d'être* which determines its forms, functions, and structures; it may thus in a sense become vacant, and susceptible of being diverted, reappropriated and put to a use quite different from its initial one. . . . The diversion and reappropriation of space are of great significance, for they teach us much about the production of new spaces. During a period as difficult as the present one is a (capitalist) mode of production which is threatened with extinction yet struggling to win a new lease on life (through the reproduction of the means of production), it may even be that such techniques of diversion have greater import than attempts at creation (production). Be that as it may, one upshot of such tactics is that groups take up residence in spaces whose pre-existing form, having been designed for some other purpose, is inappropriate to the needs of their would-be communal life. . . . From a purely theoretical standpoint, diversion and production cannot be meaningfully separated. The goal and meaning of theoretical thinking is production rather than diversion. Diversion is in itself merely appropriation, not creation - a reappropriation which can call but a temporary halt to domination.¹⁶²

Not the History of Monuments but Moments

During the 1960s there were attempts to unite a freely acting individual and her experience of an environment in such a way that the creative individual would not be in exile from her environment. It became a rather common practice to articulate as the situationists did that all space is occupied by the enemy, which has even reshaped its elementary laws, its geometry, to suit its own purposes. There was no possibility for authentic urbanism to exist unless this enemy, ie, the same bourgeoisie Benja-

min mentioned about, was driven away. The practice of the theory of unitary urbanism would be a reversal of the whole theoretical lie of urbanism and détourn it for the purpose of de-alienation. The situationists were also in this case ready to reverse perspectives, analyze things and turn them upside down just to wake people up and to get them to do something. Presumably Vaneigem is behind the statement in their pamphlet that "we constantly have to defend ourselves from the poetry of the bards of conditioning - to jam their messages, to turn their songs inside out"¹⁶³. According to Attila Kotányi and Vaneigem, people are blind to the possibilities of unitary urbanism, namely a living critique, fuelled by all the tensions of daily life, of the manipulation of cities and their inhabitants. By living critique is meant the setting up of bases for an experimental life, the coming together of those creating their own lives on terrains equipped to suit their ends. Unity is seen in that leisure, or any activities for that matter, are not separated from society and mundane, but life is understood as a whole. Like other situationist activities, unitary urbanism was also to be the contrary of specialized activity and the acceptance of a separate urbanistic domain. With the advent of unitary urbanism, city planning - which Kotányi and Vaneigem called a "geology of lies" - would be replaced by a technique for defending the permanently threatened conditions of freedom. Then individuals would be free to construct their own history. *Dérive* and the construction of situations were the techniques defending freedom, as recommended by the SI. They had already beforehand denied the accusations that they wanted people to return to some stage previous to modern urbanism, which they called an era of conditioning. Instead, people should move beyond it. Kotányi and Vaneigem claimed to invent an architecture and urbanism that cannot be realized without a revolution in everyday life, that is, before alteration of people's consciousness.

In the beginning of their movement, especially, the situationists were interested in architecture, which of all arts was the closest to life. Gadamer also gives importance to architecture for, according to him, it ". . . displays the element of mediation without which a work of art has no real "presence"."¹⁶⁴ He writes that architecture teaches us that although every work of art has its own world, this does not mean that when its original world is altered it has its reality only in an alienated aesthetic consciousness. Gadamer values architecture precisely since it gives shape to the place where it is possible to display and represent all the other arts. He also writes that architecture asserts its own perspective everywhere, and this perspective is decoration.¹⁶⁵ But then he states such claims that I hold it impossible to approve, since he does not give any reasonable justification for them. Namely, Gadamer maintains that, not to mention the visual and plastic arts, even the arts of the freest mobility, such as poetry and music, ". . . are not suited to any space whatever but to one that is appropriate: a theatre, concert hall, or church"¹⁶⁶. This is to obey the space-creating potentiality of the work itself. His claim is understandable if he is talking only of acoustics, but even that reveals his notion of what is art and what is not. Not all music needs acoustics the way classical music does, not all painted surfaces need walls inside

a building to hang on, we have graffiti and murals too. In addition, Gadamer expresses the usual notion about architecture that a building should be the solution to an artistic problem and at the same time it should fit into a way of life and not be an end in itself. This sounds reasonable; but then, on the very same page, he continues by maintaining that a building tries to fit into this way of life by providing ornament, "a background of mood or a framework".¹⁶⁷ This demonstrates that Gadamer has a rather fixed notion about the arts, architecture among them. Instead I would take a broader viewpoint of the environment and argue that when we are talking about the urban environment, we cannot stick with decoration or particular buildings only but have to consider the whole situation.

The SI connected architecture to psychogeography and formulated an idea of what architecture should be. It should not be based on free and poetic lines and forms in the same sense as the "lyrical abstract painting", but on the evocative power of rooms, passages and streets. As lettrist Ivan Chitchevlov claimed: everyone will live in his own personal cathedral. There will be rooms more conducive to dreams than any drug, and houses where one cannot help but love, or become angry.¹⁶⁸ In architecture, the material would rather be one of emotionally changing situations than emotionally moving forms. Experiments with this new material will lead to unknown forms. Situationist city planning derived its impetus from the result of "psychogeographical exploration", which was that an urban city reflects the structure of the spectacle society. Alternatively, Wilson, for example, argues that it is the urban truth that only by becoming a part of the spectacle can you truly exist in the city.¹⁶⁹ In fact, postmodernist architecture in its most extreme forms tried to realize ideas similar to those Chitchevlov talked about. Eclecticism, play with familiar motives and attempts to create evocative spaces, not necessary useful, are typical of this architecture. The irony is in the fact that it is just another spectacle, this time more aestheticized than utilitarian. Alternatively, there are both emotionally changing situations and emotionally moving forms. I stated above that Gadamer held decoration, especially ornament to be important in the latter. It may be due to his connecting architecture with the other arts as a space for them, but it seems to me that he was talking almost only about monumental architecture; less about living inside a building than how it is seen as a part of environment. In fact, postmodern architecture by Graves, Stirling, Jencks, Hollein, Venturi, and also Isozaki is largely ironical statement, although not intentional, commenting on Gadamer's and other such theories.

Indeterminacy, disorder, vagueness and shock characterize city life, although the ideal of the modernist planners was a calm, well organized and clean city divided into different sectors for different activities. As the opposite of this, many artists of the 1960s wanted to promote exactly the qualities first mentioned. In fact, they are the very same attributes as in the ideals of the avant-garde art movement around the beginning of this century: the need for disorder and chaos, continuous flux - and to create experiences from it. *Pas le histoire de monuments, mais celle de moments*. The SI wrote a lot about the artificial power relations reflect-

ed through monumentality, that is, to shifting attention from everyday life to monuments that represent the spectacle. Later, in his book *Production de l'espace* (1974) Lefebvre echoed these thoughts, writing that typical of monumentality is that it always embodies and imposes a clearly intelligible message. It says what it wishes to say - yet it hides a good deal more: being political, military, and ultimately fascist in character, monumental buildings mask the will to power and the arbitrariness of power beneath signs and surfaces which claim to express the collective will and collective thought.¹⁷⁰

Many theorists, though, have tried to strike a balance between architectural monumentality and more open understanding of space. Eco, for instance, suggested that architects should create structures which, while functioning as forms in their times, are open to new processes of signification appearing in the future.¹⁷¹ Of course there will always be "new processes of signification", but how to prepare for this? In planning, just staring at the future, as modernist city planners and architects have usually done, means forgetting, for instance, the small repetitive maintenance jobs in everyday life. In fact, it has been characteristic of art to concentrate on "surface". For example in architecture the International Style did not bother much about the needs of everyday life, but universalized. Constant, an architect who belonged to the SI, made plans which tried to unite the free individual and modernist architectural ideals. His plans for the *New Babylon* (started in the late 1950s) were a product of their times in the sense they were technocratic in form, even comparable to Le Corbusier's Radiant City. New Babylon consists of both residential areas and places for more social activities. The main idea was that everybody can freely create her space as she likes. Constant outlined a spiral-like chain reaction for creative activities, where creative interfering in things by one person will immediately provoke a counter reaction from a collective. And so on.

Constant's plans included a culturalization of nature, a cultural landscape. This culturalization is in fact also characteristic of much land art and environment art. Constant described the New Babylon as the world of *homo ludens*.¹⁷² He stated that it is possible to realize Lautréamont's demand of "une poésie faite par tous".

Many urban art works, as also the situationist *dérive* (drifting) and psychogeographical investigations had an experimental character. They can be compared to experiments by the avant-garde. In the radical avant-garde objects of research were usually outside art; for the surrealists it was a psychological, not artistic question. The aim was to obtain for art the same status as science had in modernist society. But there was also an attempt to develop instruments by which people could improve their lives. In this sense the idea of the autonomy of art was already fading in Modernism. The situationists thought that if people would awake from their alienation and begin to sense their surroundings, they would gradually learn to control it - and be happier. This was the reason Constant tried to create an architecture where the individual had the possibilities and freedom to work up her environment. Constant's plans were utopias, however; one utopia among others. They can also be compared to

the antiutopias of that time, of which excellent examples are Jacques Tati's films *Mon oncle* (1958) and *Playtime* (1965). Of course, Tati's films can be seen also as realistic sketches of a time which saw the emergence of a utopian element. Constant's architectural plans were highly technological and universal; there was no question of regionalism. Constant did not care much about *place*, its forms or character. The ideal was to cover the whole globe with a unitary technological grid. Experimental and scientific ideals, that is to say, outlining the general laws of things, lived on in the avant-garde of the 1960s whose representative Constant was. In fact, Constant represented late modernism in architecture. According to Jencks, a pragmatic and technocratic social ideology was typical of late modernism, which also took many of the stylistic ideas and values of modernism to an extreme.¹⁷³ Thus, one point where Constant's ideas differed from Modernism in was the lack of hierarchies in architecture and city planning: there was to be no centre in the New Babylon. By these hierarchies I mean relations between (consumer and work) centers and suburbia.

Constant's relation to technology was rather similar to that of the British architectural group Archigram in the 1960s. They viewed technology as a part of modern life. They did not glorify it but employed its powers to make flexible architecture and environments.¹⁷⁴ The 1960s saw the (theoretical) denial of the modernist grid of space and formal structures, in fact, the rejection of the whole concept of structure. Debate began about an architecture that creates situations.

Kevin Lynch's study *The Image of the City* (1960) has been important for social scientists. But its perceptual approach to the image of the city falls short as a means of analyzing the symbolic nature of that image, which the SI was already doing at the same time, around the end of fifties and the beginning of the sixties, when Lynch wrote his study. Lynch stressed certain physical features, namely the fivefold distinction of paths, edges, nodes and so on. This emphasis relegated the use of urban environments to the activity of movement.¹⁷⁵ If we compare Lynch's theories to de Certeau's, for example, Lynch's model for adapting to environment seems passive. He did not talk about changing of spaces.

Lynch, and the research tradition after him, has uncovered means by which the inhabitants of the city organize their behaviour. Many studies have observed that conceptual stimuli in the environment play a more fundamental role than mere formal perception, so that physical forms are assigned certain significations which then aid in directing behaviour. For example, Gottdiener and Lagopoulos have stated that urban structures act as stimuli because they have become symbols and not because they support behaviour by facilitating movement. They argued that the image of the city is a conceptual rather than perceptual one.¹⁷⁶ In reality, there are mental distances between places. Although the SI talked about movement, they stressed the symbolic, connotative level of the image. What is not so clearly articulated in the situationist texts, whilst having been their theoretical basis, is the social basis of their conception. Gottdiener (Lefebvre, de Certeau, Raban, Wolff, and others) has written about the resemanticization of space through social uses. In modern urban environments there have been attempts to create closed in-

strumental functions, but they interact with open social levels of connotation.¹⁷⁷

There are differences in artists's ways of approach urban space, for example, housing. Haacke and Rosler are a fruitful comparison. In Haacke's works the already mapped city meets the actual conditions of living on a rather theatrical level, as displayed in art exhibitions. It changes emphases by shifting the institutional context. In Rosler's work there is not a single context only, but one matter is seen in different contexts and handled in different ways: lectures, exhibition, actual projects, demonstrations, participation. Haacke produced a discourse about space using words, pictures and statistics. He tried to show us the abstract nature of space but also created abstractions himself. Rosler's project challenged the notion that urban spatial arrangements express the unified interests of a coherent society. It demonstrated, instead, that urban organization is a conflictual and uneven process. It was discourse in space. Haacke was, perhaps, more straightforward and placed more trust on rational causalities.

Rosalyn Deutsche has lately observed the city as a place for different (artistic) political actions in the way outlined by the SI almost thirty years ago, and by Lefebvre somewhat later. Deutsche wrote that forms of resistance or opposition depend on how the city is constructed discursively - whether, to name only one distinction, it is studied as a visual space or as the object of political economy - and how diverse approaches intersect at given historical moments. According to Deutsche, they do not *necessarily* occupy a coherent theoretical space.¹⁷⁸ This critical theory has given space to the more pragmatist idea that when the environment is not already loaded with meanings, people have freedom to construct, reinvent and change them. As architect Glenn Weiss stated: "We're only concerned with the effect of creating a situation for ourselves for a moment. That's a television age kind of effect."¹⁷⁹

The concept of 'moment' has travelled along with this study, since it is an important concept for us in understanding the differences between 'art as enduring masterpieces' and 'art as decisive moments', or, 'situations'. Lefebvre interpreted the 'moment' as fleeting but decisive sensations (of delight, surrender, disgust, surprise, horror, or outrage) which were somehow revelatory of the totality of possibilities contained in daily experience. Harvey crystallizes in his afterword to Lefebvre's book, that "[s]uch movements were ephemeral and would pass instantaneously into oblivion, but during their passage all manner of possibilities - often decisive and sometimes evolutionary - stood to be both uncovered and achieved. 'Moments' were conceived of as points of rupture, of radical recognition of possibilities and intense euphoria."¹⁸⁰ This can be compared to that what Adorno had said about ruptures and breaks in Modernism, especially in collages where nominalistic invasion is at its most obvious. In postmodern art and in subsequent art (since the 1980s) those 'ruptures' are once again interesting; hence they have a certain freedom to realize themselves in and as anything: indeterminateness in art is on the increase. It is not only possibility of different readings but changing 'works of art altogether', or, "rethinking art" (rather than nonthink-

ing its many phenomena as many conservative theorists seem to do). Harvey adds that Debord, however, critically observed that the moment, as Lefebvre initially conceived of it was purely temporal, as opposed to the spatio-temporality of the situation. The SI stated that the most insignificant thing is worth a situation. This idea was also an essential part of punk aesthetics: do-it-yourself is enough. Then moments will become more meaningful. Art can be a series of moments for consumption, as was Minna Heikinaho's final examination piece for the Finnish Academy of Fine Arts in 1995. She rented an empty shop at street level and served breakfast to anybody who popped in. The work consisted of various moments and talk with people, a slightly framed part of the quotidian.

This is the background for studying contemporary situational, site-specific and performative art. As the opposite of cognitive, symbolized urban structures, art has localized and literalized urban space. The flâneur as an outsider aestheticizing his environment has become a doer. On the other hand, the aesthetic attitude is not so isolated from the everyday but has become a camp attitude to anything. From one point of view we can say that the flâneur has started to make art, but art of a fleeting and changing character.

Reading the City

Maybe the most interesting, and in a way far-reaching, idea of the lettrists and situationists was that of psychogeography.¹⁸¹ The lettrists had defined psychogeography as "the study of the precise laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotion and behaviour of individuals"¹⁸².

Psychogeography as a field of research did not develop until the 1980s, when psychogeography was defined by H. Stein as an unconscious construction of the social and physical world; we project the psyche onto an outside world and act as if what we had projected is a quality of the world. Psychogeography refers to psychic representations common to all, which form a sort of map of the natural and social world. It examines the premises of development and group dynamics, which transforms and renews the common map. Psychogeography also investigates how groups act when living according to a cognitive psychic map.¹⁸³ The psychogeography Stein has defined is relatively collective, whereas the SI emphasized the experiences of the subject; associations and connotations were subjective. Contemporary psychogeographical research is for the most part closely related to psychoanalytic conceptions. The definitions the situationists, and later other psychogeographers, have formulated are similar in their starting points, but they put the emphasis on different aspects. The SI avoided psychoanalytical connections. Compared to the psychogeography of the 1980s, that of the SI was more active since it was connected to the quite conscious construction of situations and *dériver*.

In fact, the situationists were closer to the kind of psychogeography J. Raban presented in 1974 when he described a "soft city". He points out that cities, unlike villages and small towns, are plastic by nature. He continues as follows:

We mould them in our images: they, in their turn, shape us by the resistance they offer when we try to impose our own personal form on them. In this sense it seems to me that living in a city is an art, and we need the vocabulary of art, of style, to describe the peculiar relationship between man and material that exists in the continual creative play of urban living. The city as we imagine it, the soft city of illusion, myth, aspiration, nightmare, is as real, maybe more real, than the hard city one can locate on maps in statistics, in monographs on urban sociology and demography and architecture.¹⁸⁴

Raban's starting points, with their aesthetic nuance, seem to be in Baudelairean flâneur. If we wanted to make a slight leap into another art, it is possible to take Oldenburg's soft sculptures as examples (again). They are both the opposite of hard and enduring, and they also need a vocabulary to describe the relation between (wo)man and material, not to mention scale, which is also different both in the giant soft shuttle as in the "real imagined city" and, on the other hand, in maps and statistics. All in all, Raban's description of the soft city of illusion, myth or nightmare also resembles surrealist thoughts. In fact, Hollevoet pointed out that the concept of psychogeography is a logical outcome of surrealist literature. Debord, however, always eager to be provocative, wrote that *dérive* and situation go beyond the imbecile strolls of the surrealists in the case of the first, and beyond its usage in existentialist philosophy in the case of the second.¹⁸⁵ In this Debord may be right, since the surrealists were merely bystanders in the city, although they made art *of* it, not *in* it.

Ultimately the aim of psychogeography was the complete construction of an architecture and urbanism that would be within the power of everyone. Before the realization of this utopia we can begin, for instance, with the displacement of elements of decoration from the locations where we are used to seeing them. In their *Plan for Improving the Rationality of the City of Paris*¹⁸⁶ the lettrists suggested, for example, opening the roofs of Paris as pavements (escalators would make it possible to get there) and placing switches on street lamps so that the public may decide the degree of lighting it desires. They declared the abolition of museum, hence art should go to bars; that there should be liberal admission to prisons with the possibility of tourist visits; and that streets should not be named after saints or famous persons.

Similar claims have been presented from time to time since Futurism; they belong to the repertoire of the radical avant-garde movements. Although the lettrist suggestions may seem impossible and ridiculous, they imply interesting ideas. In lettrist and situationist psychogeography there was a tendency to transform space to virtual space, as wandering around in the German countryside following a map of London and other such inquiries proved. On the other hand, *dérive* in connection with psychogeographical investigation is also in a sense

analogical to Brecht's *Verfremdung* ideas. It was to strongly sense the place and the situation you are in. De Certeau has discussed people's relations to urban space. He, too, argues that the city as an ideology is different from the city as real practice. De Certeau stressed that the city takes shape through the people living in it: they create the city through their daily activities and movements. Specific urban spaces are composed of numerous acts marked with human intentions. De Certeau regards moving in the city as an expression resembling rhetoric. The walking of passers-by offers a series of turns (tours) and detours that can be compared to "turns of phrase" or "stylistic figures". Walking is also lack of place. The city created by the movements and doings of people is not the ideologically static city space which modernist planners wanted it to be, but moving about makes the city itself an immense social experience of lacking place.¹⁸⁷ Although there is much rhetoric in de Certeau's way of describing how people behave in an urban environment, there are other theorists who agree with him. Later, Janet Wolff also defined the concept of the city along similar lines. Wolff wrote as follows:

'The city' does not just refer to a set of buildings in a particular place. To put it polemically, there is no such *thing* as a city. Rather, *the city* designates the space produced by the interaction of historically and geographically specific institutions, social relations of production and reproduction, practices of government, forms and media of communication and so forth. . . . *The city*, then, is above all a representation . . . would argue that the city constitutes an *imagined environment*.¹⁸⁸

Analogically, it is possible to see art not as (modernist) static works of art but as moving processes. These can be put together by taking architecture into account as a space for performative art. There are also connections with contemporary arts on, for example, the level of virtual spaces of the newest technical art. A viewer also has to be a participant, ie, she is part of the work. It would be interesting to compare an irrational and imagined environment to a concrete environment one can play with. Is it the case that play with, and in, a concrete environment creates an imagined environment?

The situationists were extremely interested in maps and their relation to reality. Maps are abstract and functional systems for the factual ordering of phenomena in space. But there are also stories told about space. These narratives differ from maps which are "official" representations of "approved" places. The situationists wanted to return to stories. Through *dérive* they formed narratives from fragments, as shown by their enthusiasm, for instance, about running across the shop *Delicatessen-Provisions A. Breton* in 160 rue Oberkampf, Paris. De Certeau, who like the situationists particularly took temporal moving in space into consideration and did not think about places as abstract images, wrote that the flattening out, ie, two-dimensionality of drawing a map, in fact useful thing to do, transforms the temporal articulation of spaces into a spatial sequence of points. Instead, memory that creates stories is a sort of anti-museum: it is not localizable.¹⁸⁹ Power always belongs to the producers of maps, however, which is why the situationists tried to misuse

existing maps and to produce their own (cognitive) maps. Dada took literally the question Baudelaire asked: Is there anything more charming, fruitful and positively exciting than ordinary? The dadaists organized excursions in Paris choosing deliberately meaningless and common places. Announcements about these dada excursions specified that the visits were to places which are "particularly those which really have no reason for existing", places which are not picturesque, historically relevant, or sentimental. As was typical of dadaist anti-art gestures, such excursions were tributes to life and to the banal; they were intended to mystify bourgeois culture by attacking its monuments. Or, rather, ruins. The dadaists assured participants that they would immediately "become aware of human progress in possible works of destruction"¹⁹⁰.

Unlike the surrealists, who eroticized the city, the situationists adopted a calm and tranquil attitude. Ohrt mentioned that their aim was to explain the laws of urban life along the broad lines of new geometry, orienting from local quarters to the Polar regions of the globe.¹⁹¹ Not literally, however. But tension between globality and locality existed.

Dérive has been said to anticipate the notion of cognitive mapping, which Jameson has written about. According to Jameson the alienated city is a space in which people are unable to map (in their minds) either their own positions or the urban totality in which they find themselves. Disalienation in the traditional city involves a practical reconquest of a sense of place and the construction of an articulated ensemble which can be retained in the memory. With this total image the individual subject can map and remap along the moments of mobile, alternative trajectories.¹⁹² Jameson argued that the cognitive map, in the framework of daily life in the physical city, is called upon to enable a situational representation on the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society's structures as a whole.¹⁹³ Dérive is a technique for occupying space on the level of the mind, in the individual's memory. In this sense it is natural to combine the situationists's and Jameson's ideas, but Jameson even thought about disalienation in a rather abstract way, since, as I noted above, he wanted cognitive mapping on a global scale and repudiated any subjective approach as schizophrenic. The situationists stressed that everybody creates her own routes. Dérive usually happened in small groups who made their own routes. In a way the SI anticipated postmodern tribalism, or nomadism, in the sense Harvey has pointed out, ie, that different groups signal different meanings by their use of space and time.¹⁹⁴

Dérive is a kind of mental détournement, mental collage. The fragments, ie, the urban environment, are the existing elements; when the situation is added, that is, social and psychic dimensions, feelings etc, we get a narrative the producer of which is at the same time the receiver and who constructs her story from the existing fragments (comparable to intertextuality). The city, for the SI, constituted objects instead of their common properties. Thus there is a difference if we compare the city as writing to making the city a narrative by dérive. On the other hand, the situationists read texts as if they were urban labyrinths. A certain intoxication was the starting point, and then you not know where the street (or

sentence) goes, anymore. In *dérive* they stressed mental relations, not so much the body and its relation to space. Just as for the *flâneur*, the body was not necessarily the site of experiences.

When describing how people confront the city, the situationists, Raban, de Certeau and many others had in mind the modernist, rational and functional city space. Raban and de Certeau, especially, have tried to prove that people do not submit to given rationalities, but mold their own spaces by themselves; in fact, they act exactly as the situationists wanted and believed they are capable of acting. The situationists did not want to aestheticize their *dérive*, like the *flâneur*, or model it into an art work, like the artists such as Krzysztof Wodiczko and Douglas Huebler. In this sense de Certeau was on the same track as the situationists when writing that there are forests of gestures manifested in the streets which are impossible to capture in a picture, nor can the meaning of their movements be circumscribed in a text. Their rhetorical transplantation carries away and displaces the analytical, coherent meanings of urbanism. As de Certeau puts it, it is a matter of the "wandering of the semantic" produced by the people that make some parts of the city disappear and exaggerate others, distorting it, fragmenting it, and diverting it from its immobile order.¹⁹⁵ De Certeau wrote:

Unrecognized producers, poets of their own affairs, trailblazers in the jungles of functionalist rationality, consumers produce something resembling the "*lignes d'erre*" . . . They trace "indeterminate trajectories" that are apparently meaningless, since they do not cohere with the constructed, written, and prefabricated space through which they move. They are sentences that remain unpredictable within the space ordered by the organizing techniques of systems. Although they use as their *material* the *vocabularies* of established languages (those of television, newspapers, the supermarket or city planning), although they remain within the framework of prescribed *syntaxes* (the temporal modes of schedules, paradigmatic organizations of places, etc.), these "traverses" remain heterogeneous to the systems they infiltrate and in which they sketch out the guileful ruses of *different* interests and desires. They circulate, come and go, overflow and drift over an imposed terrain, like the snowy waves of the sea slipping in among the rocks and defiles of an established order.¹⁹⁶

De Certeau presents anew the problem of how to create poetical subjects and objects at the same time. He has similar thoughts to the situationists, but whereas the SI tried to systematise *dérive* and psychogeographical research, and to develop proper methods, de Certeau's ideas remained on the theoretical level. The situationists were idealists, but as a product of modernity they also believed in the possibility of their thoughts being realized.

The psychogeographical investigations of the SI can be described as an attempt to "read" the urban text de Certeau was talking about, although their goal was to create their own texts from their own reading. It can be called a kind of deconstruction. De Certeau does not, however, fully admit that the postmodern space is independent and autonomous, formed according to aesthetic endeavours and principles. (Harvey, for instance, maintains that the postmodern situation is like this.) De Certeau sees the organizers and the rulers somewhere, although they have lost

their power. "The postmodern city, as distinguished from modern city, is characterized by the growing erosion of the urban infrastructure", wrote Timothy Nye in an Whitney Museum exhibition book.¹⁹⁷ The lettrists and situationists loosened the first stones, and de Certeau and his colleagues then described the crumbling of the structure over the next thirty years.

Marked Sites

The city has occupied a certain role in modernist art: it can be a subject matter for art; it houses public art or art works; it can be seen as a work of art; and the urban environment influences artists creating emotional or perceptual experiences, which are, in turn, expressed or reflected in works of art. In art history, it has usually been held that timeless and spaceless works of art ultimately transcend the urban conditions that purportedly influenced them.

The relation between the city (or other geographical environment) and art changed in the 1960s, at first with some Fluxus events and Vostell's *décollages*, later with the emergence of environmental art. Rosalind Krauss has written about "marked sites", that is to say, about environmental works that can be situated in difficult places but which will be photographed, after which these documents circulate in the art galleries; for example, Robert Smithson's *Spiral Jetty* (1970). In his list of postmodernist features in art, Owens mentioned Smithson's work as an example of a work and site standing in a dialectical relationship, although Owens did not mean the gallery context, but the work itself located on the shore. Owens also mentioned a reading of site and its psychological resonances, that is, psychogeography. I suggest that if we put these things together (Owen's definitions, both the situationist and contemporary psychogeographical research, and an art theoretical discussion, 'arttalk') it may be possible to outline new ways to approach contemporary art.

Krauss has also written about the play between architecture and non-architecture. It can be an intervention into the architectural space. Whatever the medium employed, the possibility is a process of mapping the axiomatic features of the architectural experience onto the reality of a given space.¹⁹⁸ One can explore the abstract conditions of openness and closure and their interchanges - a sort of architectural meta-level. She was referring to certain installations with mirrors by Robert Morris in the middle of the 1960s. In June, 1962, Christo executed a work (*Wall of Barrels - Iron Curtain*) where the Rue Visconti in Paris was blocked by a wall of oil barrels four meters high and three meters wide. We are used to the idea that an (urban) environment can be a subject matter, a background for public art (monuments), or an inspirational source for artists, but the city in itself has been art only in the architectural domain. In contemporary culture it is different, however. When dealing with art in

the city, we no longer refer only to the buildings and public monuments but urban spaces and events as well. And I mean not only street-theatre, festivities, and such phenomena but also contextual situations organized by artists, or even the production of space by people who do not have official status as artists. For example, graffiti has held an interesting position between the production of space and an autonomous art world. There has been a lot of wavering as to whether graffiti is art in its original context or just when it is brought into the art gallery. When brought into the art world graffiti soon becomes a saleable commodity; its artificiality as such was soon discovered - the art mode was lost and gave up its autonomy at the same time. Whether graffiti gave an identity in its original site, in the abstracted space in an art gallery it became abstract itself.

The SI documented psychogeographical dérives, but did not present them as art or in art contexts. For the situationists, the city was a historical reality, possible to experience and see in different ways. But they saw no need to transcend it by making socially separate art works, or, for that matter, take it as only a *mise-en-scène* for aestheticized contemplation. The situationists saw the city as a (political) playing ground offering both hedonistic and intellectual revolutionary possibilities. Dérives were not actual physical manipulations of sites by leaving traces, ie, marking sites, although the situationists had planned ways of manipulating an urban space or arranging propagandistic (environmental) happenings, such as drowning Vietnamese corpses in the Seine, which was to be coloured red.¹⁹⁹ It was merely a question of subjective experiences and feelings in an existing situation - an invasion of the environment and architectural space by consciousness, or the invasion of the consciousness by this space. Dérive ultimately meant a journey away from the ordinary through the rapid changing of environments. Before the SI, the lettrists wrote about the ethics of dérive characterized, for example, by losing oneself, consciousness of relativity, the incompleteness and transientness of things, love of speed, belief in mental resources and the capacity to discover and to forget.²⁰⁰ The medium of the SI was active, and dérive, for example, resembles some of the environmental works executed in the 1960s and 1970s, where the one who was drifting was usually the artist. Richard Long realized such works as *April 1967. A Journey, by hitch-hiking and walking, out and back, from London to the Summit of Ben Nevis, Scotland - Two photographs taken at 11 A.M. each day at the position shown* (1967) and *A Line Made by Walking* (1967). Long did not make very radical marks on places; the changes made by walking on the ground were delicate, although his intention was to change the place and its materials. The situationist medium was the respective state of mind of that time, the human mind, or the medium was a situation, the construction of a situation, meaning a concentration and the susceptibility of being observed.

The element of chance is less determinant in dérive than one might think, Debord wrote. Since from the dérive point of view cities have a psychogeographical relief, with constant currents, fixed points and vortexes which strongly discourage entry into or exit from certain

zones. *Dérive* includes both the letting go and its necessary contradiction: the domination of psychogeographical variations by the knowledge and calculation of their possibilities. The spatial field of the *dérive* may thus be precisely delimited or vague, depending on whether the activity is aimed at studying terrain or at emotional disorientation.²⁰¹ The rules the situationists formulated for the *dérive* are parodic, though. To some extent it resembled *flânerie*, but the establishment of the time discipline the situationists recommended, for example, did not belong to *flâneur*'s habits. And where the *flâneur* was to become part of the exchange of commodities by aestheticizing objects and experiences, the *dérive* was to have other aims.

The situationists did not try to claim that it is possible to eliminate consciousness altogether, and then experience something immediately. They did not believe in pure chance as a method with self-value, as the dadaists and surrealists had believed before them. The surrealists had also practiced a kind of urban drifting or stroll. It should be remembered that Jorn, for example, had attacked quite sharply the psychic automatism the surrealists had promoted; Jorn held it to be irreconcilably conflicting and impossible. The situationists aimed at the conscious use of chance, since they maintained that its own logic did not produce anything else but a frustrating bouncing between alternatives already given. For the dadaists and surrealists this rambling became a habit, and thus the situationists concluded that the action of chance is naturally conservative and in a new setting tends to reduce everything to an alternation between limited number of variants. Debord wrote that progress is nothing other than breaking through a field where chance holds sway by creating new conditions more favorable to our purposes.²⁰² In other words, the situationists may have used chance as a method but reserved for themselves the right to intentionally choose from the alternatives created by it. In fact, artists like Cunningham or Cage did exactly the same. This style of using chance, instead of an unconscious one, can also be seen in much contemporary art (see the chapter *Enormously Tiny Bit...*). Art works are not wholly structured, but chance is an intentional method defining the result.

Walking along the streets of the city can be seen as self expression. I have mentioned above that de Certeau has compared it to rhetoric. Although the analogy he proposes appears at first to be far-fetched, he tried to illustrate wandering through expressive selection and creative action. According to de Certeau the walker actualizes some of the possibilities indicated by an organized spatial order. Through city planning places have been organized in which one can move, ie, combinations of possibilities, and, on the other hand, interdictions by walls that prevents one from going further. By her activities the walker makes them exist as well as emerge. But she also moves them about and invents others, transforms or abandons spatial elements. Actually she transforms each spatial signifier into something else. And if on the one hand she actualizes only a few of the possibilities fixed by the constructed order (she goes only here and not there), on the other she increases the number of possibilities for example by creating shortcuts, detours and prohibitions; she

may forbid herself to take paths generally considered accessible or even obligatory. She thus makes a selection. Her moving is not directed by chance only. She creates a discreteness, whether by making choices among the signifiers of the spatial "language" or by displacing them through the use she makes of them. She condemns certain places to inertia or disappearance and composes with others rare, accidental or illegitimate spatial "phrases".²⁰³

The situationist *dérive* seems to be more passive. Its primary idea was not so much to transform the environment than learn to see it. The situationists wanted more rapid and violent changes than the small ones created by ordinary everyday life described by de Certeau. But both started from the idea that urban space conditions our mental space and in turn becomes the object of our desires, fantasies, and systems of codification. It opened up the idea of marked sites to others than just the artists. This search for alternatives and organizing an everyday environment is precisely the art the radical avant-garde, Fluxus and others so fiercely propagated.

Using Urban Space in Art

When we think about art, we realise that urban space is not just a context for many contemporary art works. It is a part of the work, and this is why it is relevant to deal with some examples of how contemporary art and the urban environment play together. The notion that urban space is a part of the work is based on understanding the city space as social relations, not space as such. Lefebvre wrote about the abstract space of experts, the city planner's, social planner's, even sociologist's. As I have already stated, they arrange and classify space, that is, they homogenize it. It differs from the user's lived space, the space of the everyday activities which is a concrete one, subjective. Lefebvre pointed out, however, that abstract space has also an apparent subject, an impersonal pseudo-subject that seems to maintain specific social relations and oppose others. But it is only a scheme, an instrumental thing. Abstract space lacks affectivity and a sensory realm. Thus there is a subject and the subject's denial by the absurd rationality of space.²⁰⁴ Many contemporary artists have referred to this problematic. Life does not unfold in clear and logical sequences as the bureaucracies of an abstract space would like. I mentioned above how, earlier, art maintained the abstraction of lived life, and art spaces have been an abstraction of lived spaces. Nowadays art's intention is to find and change the quality of space. Lefebvre argued that an objective picture of urban space differs considerably from the one embodied in the representational space which people have in their minds. When social space is thus placed beyond our range of vision, its practical character vanishes; people turn their lived experience and their bodies into abstractions too. It is difficult to analyze space as directly experi-

enced. Rather, it becomes a "frame" to be filled with representational things.²⁰⁵

Jeff Kelley has stated that in the late seventies there has been a movement beyond sites and into places. The sites of art become the arts of place. This means the human particularity of places - as distinct from the artlike specificity of sites.

One might say that while a site represents the constituent physical properties of a place - its mass, space, light, duration, location, and material processes - a place represents the practical, vernacular, psychological, social, cultural, ceremonial, ethnic, economic, political, and historical dimensions of the site. Sites are like frameworks. Places are what fill them out and make them work.²⁰⁶

According to Kelley, architecture is not place until and unless we subvert it with the contents of our lives.²⁰⁷ The flâneur was the first to try to do this. This is what psychogeography is about: to take possession of an abstract space, and change it into place. This is also what many artists want to do.

Some artists intend their work to resemble, even be mistaken for, life. An example of this is art that activates the consciousness of a place by subtle markings without disturbing it, as in walking tours, where the history of place, or the character of a community is revitalized. To study this kind of art, I actually arranged a series of public "city walks" during the Jyväskylä Arts Festival 11.-15. June 1996 (See Appendix). These walks were directed places people do not usually know about, or visit, for example, the local governor served afternoon coffee, the group visited the jail, drank champagne on the ridge etc. They were to encounter situations which are not totally unusual, but neither familiar. The program was a surprise; people could not choose the situation in advance. The situations were open, there were just few frames: where, who, when. Those people who I asked to perform something decided themselves what they would say. I was also interested in knowing how a slightly extraordinary thing can nonetheless create an experience. The form of these city walks was a quite simple dialectical relationship between places: from a formal visit to the governor to stories about naked men running around the city, from a jail to publicly drinking alcohol, from church to bar, and so on. The theatre and performative group, *Yövieraat*, showed what this city, boasting of Alvar Aalto's buildings, really looked like: in the middle of a suburb, for example, there is an ugly, flat school building, and beside it a bunny rabbit made of concrete. The tour showed the difference between the image of the city and the real city where people live. The element of surprise proved to be important; people seemed to enjoy themselves when they could not be sure whether everything was organized - the situation itself was ambivalent. An essential element was also the atmosphere and feeling of places. People even did what they do not do normally: surprisingly many slid down the bunny rabbit chute. People made their own stories about these little experiences which they then told their relatives and friends (and next day to me, relating also how other people had reacted to their stories). The intention was

studying the experience of objects and actions in which the self is a participant. The focus was on lived experience with interplay and interaction. A shift from viewing the world as text to the world as performance also occurred; not the already 'discoursed' tourist attraction but places that had many discourses and a situation that mixed them.

In 1992, the Whitney Museum, New York, organized an exhibition *The Power of the City/The City of Power*. It was an inquiry into contemporary representations and use of urban space. Many of artists tried to analyze and articulate the sensations of vast spaces and power structures felt by the urban wanderer. They examined also how the effects of power structures are experienced by the inhabitants of the city, and how this more psychologically oriented space can be artistically rendered.²⁰⁸ For example, along with the increasing amount of graffiti there is also more argumentation about who has the right to public space and access to the systems of cultural legitimation. Artists who have social motivations do not design society, but represent a place.²⁰⁹ They make representational pictures of space. In many art works there is a play between abstract and lived spaces. Artists have also made new "frames" to make local places visible. Thus artists no longer experience urban space only by themselves, as the flâneur did, or, paint pictures of the urban landscape, but their work in urban space is more varied. Many execute works in space, and thus "act the place".

Since the 1960s artists have shifted from the representation of urban space to a mode of presentation in which the city becomes an arena for site-specific sculptures, installations and performances. Hollevoet has noted that in this process "they attempted to compensate for the sense of dislocation and alienation epitomized by the practice of *dérive* by positioning themselves in the incommensurable through cognitive mapping".²¹⁰ It is interesting that in their need for instruments to encounter and interpretate this kind of art, theorists have turned in addition to the flâneur and the writings of Lefebvre (see the endnote number 209) and de Certeau also to situationist concepts. In this case they differ from the SI in that *artists* brought *art* out of its ivory tower down to street level - literally. For example, Vito Acconci called his work, where he followed one person at a time and stopped only when this person entered a private place (1969), "interaction between the art activity and the daily living."²¹¹ He showed these pieces in an art context. However, some of the works documented in the Whitney exhibition were quite closely related to the situationist *dérive*.

In his *Duration Pieces* (1970), Douglas Huebler examined the relation between duration and spatial expansion by describing time and space simultaneously. He systematically gridded a small section of the city of Amsterdam, and began by selecting a random point in the city. There he took a photograph focused on the farthest point in view. He then walked in that direction for thirty minutes, turned 90 degrees and took another photograph, walked in the new direction for fifteen minutes, took a photograph, walked for seven-and-a-half minutes, and so on until time could no longer be divided. He mapped a small quadrant of Amsterdam; through action and documentation the element of time and

space become almost synchronous. The practical level, the process itself, was a discourse in space, the product was a discourse about space. The work also resembles that what the combination of constructing situations and *dérive* could be in practice. In fact, another of Huebler's works resembles a direct application of the theory of *dérive*: Huebler wandered in the Paris metro, flipping a coin to determine when and where to get out. When he ascended to the street, he took a random photograph of the site as he saw it.^{2 12}

In the United States there were no street-works until in the end of the 1960s. Lippard has stated the definition of streetworks. It goes as follows:

Streetworks tend to take two forms: impermanent physical objects or remains, and performances which last only as long as the action and, ideally, leave no pollution behind. . . . it commands an ready-made audience when it takes place in naturally crowded area; otherwise, it must be announced ahead of time to attract a more specialized audience, and the level of artificiality is raised considerably. . . . In *urban* outdoor art, esthetic interest cannot overwhelm communication. *If the art has no effect on the audience and the audience has no effect on the art, the streetwork is not succesful, and is hardly deserving of the name.*²¹³

It is important to notice in Lippard's remark that in the open air aesthetic interest cannot overwhelm communication. This is not quite true. Lippard may have had in mind certain archaic performances, but there is also a lot of street theatre that is based on almost plain aesthetics. But Lippard is quite right since even then it is only a question of a pleasurable entertainment; (aesthetic) skills of appreciation might not play any role. The border between what is supposed to be street *theatre* and what is another kind of performative situation is now as blurred as ever. In contemporary art there is more emphasis on communication, since it is a question not only about conversation but communication as an end in itself, ie, intentional collectivity as the opposite of privacy. Thus artists organize situations for communication. Alternatively, it is also typical that nowadays people discuss even more than works themselves their subjective ways of encountering them: "have you read that book. . . when I read it I. . .", "have you seen that film already. . .", "were you there then. . . When I was there, I remember. . .". This means that an experience, especially one concerning more traditional art works, is probably private, but its existence is an object to share with others by talking about one's feelings and opinions using rather ordinary descriptive language. Thus arttalk as the practice of the metalanguages of art still remains only in the realm of criticism or theory, and I doubt that even if we could find the proper vocabularies for arttalk, to educate people to really use them would be frustrating.

In the ARS95 exhibition there were many urban art projects; the most "situationist" was perhaps the *Chance Encounters on the Esplanadi* (1994) by Stephen Willats. He wrote about the project as follows:

In our world of random events and encounters, our drive for certainty forces us to seek a psychological framework on which to hang our dealings with the outface of society. These structures, that we create, we then form into models - an essential act of personal self-expression. . . The work "Chance Encounters on the Esplanade" is a representation of our processes of establishing interpersonal communication as seen through a set of random meetings. In the larger view these same processes can be seen to be the essential basis of the wider society that exists between people.²¹⁴

Thus, besides the representation of some processes, it is a question about the model which art provides us to use in our daily lives.

In the first chapter I mentioned that we do not understand the world through instruments provided by traditional modes of knowledge. We do not believe in the 'truth' given by professional experts in every realm of life, but we have entered a time of reflexivity and the migration of expertise. People are capable of discussions which do not follow the reality principle only, but also unserious principles, play, games, myths, rituals and so on. Understanding and coping in the world happens through social milieux, new (life)styles and communities, not only through believing in specialized legitimators and authorities anymore. An artist does not need to be a specialist as a scientist or politician, but she can utter opinions on behalf of common sense. Behind the shield of art it has been (and still is) possible to state almost anything. Conventions make everything more or less symbolic. What about when an artist becomes an expert, or all of us become one? Does the possibility of political influence grow? Will art become dangerous, and from whose point of view? These are the questions one can easily ask when culture has become more "self-expertised", and hierarchies or the division of work between the different realms of life are not so clear anymore.

The artists Newton & Helen Harrison execute ecological projects which are real invasions into life: they try to save rivers from pollution etc. Harrison's work does not resemble art in any traditional sense. On the other hand, it employs a multilevel, metaphoric kind of thinking that differs from the more linear and instrumental approach of conventional science and technology. They talk about "conversational drift" and suggest that their ultimate goal is to "change the conversation".²¹⁵ Thus they object to the complexities of specialized planning language, the production of abstract rationality. Instead, they put the emphasis on locality and the lived experiences of people that produce knowledge with which to exert political influence. This has nothing to do with art that deals with linear, instrumental and systematic thinking. The Harrisons are landscape artists of a new kind; they propose that nature is best comprehended not as a collection of landscape features to be memorialized in paint but as a set of interrelationships among the forces of biology, climate, and technology.²¹⁶ For the Harrisons, nature is also the element and material of their art; there is nothing left of Kant's disinterestedness of any distance. In fact, to my mind the Harrisons are perhaps the most Deweyan artists in the sense that if the material is such it creates life, as in Harrison's work literally, and if through such material an experience is created, both in fact have the same rhythm.

Much contemporary art in its activist modes tries to return simplicity and common sense to a specialized society. It is the growth of self-expertise that the situationists called for and that some artists practise today. Other artists use very real places. In *Touch Sanitation: Handshake Ritual* project 1978-79 Ukeles shook hands with 8500 sanitation workers in New York as a gesture of recognition. *Handshake Ritual* required the artist to adopt and accept the rhythms and routines of an established workplace, a site intrinsic to the public domain. It required her to embrace a prevailing public language. She worked on days and nights. Because it would be impossible to shake hands with every sanitation worker at random, cartography was a part of Ukeles's work: she mapped her routes. Her work was based on the notion that if people can directly observe how the city works, they can then direct their actions and ideas toward the construction of a meaningful public life. There was an attempt to create an exact picture of lived space, that is, to examine a structure of everyday.

Does all that is said and described above go to prove the phenomenon in question that everything can be explained as everything else by employing a certain (hierarchical) status - even if it only has a local meaning? Phillips wrote about Ukeles's work: "Just as research, experimentation, testing, and analysis are central to her creative process, the experiencing of the work requires similar levels of involvement from the viewers. . . . Ukeles's projects and performances are deliberately provocative catalysts designed to stimulate conversation and exchange among members of the public. . ."217 Thus this kind of research is quite different from that of Fluxus, for example. The supposition is that research stimulates conversation when science has become so specialized that it is not easy to understand what is a cause and what an effect. This sounds like Saint-Simon: artists popularize and explain the results scientists have created; although nowadays artists also criticize. This thought is not so far-fetched as it may sound at first, since we do need people to sort out relevant data for us from that enormous flow of information. Or artists who make manifest such things that are not held to be relevant enough: such as poor or elderly women, the unemployed, those suffering from (mental) illnesses, and so on. But this is riskable also. It sounds like artists would be above us mortal human beings. It is easy to make an artist a priest, as was done, in fact, in the beginning of the avant-gardes and Modernism. This would be a misconception, however. The foundation is on the Dewey's notions of democracy: the artist only points out something; the rest is on the responsibility of also other people.

GIVING UP THE CONCEPT OF ART AS AN AUTONOMOUS ENTITY

I am my art. My art becomes me.
- Hannah Wilke -

Baudelaire remarked that the aim of a man looking for modernity is to see through fashion and its historicity and reach for the poetry that resides there; he has to distil the eternal from the transitory.²¹⁸ This notion has been formulated in aesthetics to the effect that we must clear the object in our minds of properties not relevant to its being an artwork. Some modernist artists have also tried to reduce the fashionable, historical and inconstant from their art works in attempting to distil the eternal from the fleeting by simplifying and purifying the form and the medium. The Baudelairean flâneur reached this goal in that he did not produce any works of art but practised a pure attitude of mind; he preserved the aesthetic as conceptual.

We can also think that the function of art is to compress - instead of distilling - the transient, the fleeting and the contingent. That is, to organize and structure fragments of the lifeworld without rejecting or manipulating them. It is to make collages of the historical, to make changing combinations and unfinished wholes. And it is to make them in space, which is an important element in contemporary art whether we think about installations built in galleries and museums or environmental spaces. Even what we can call mental spaces in narrations, that is constellations of collage elements in literature or film, could be open. Often these spaces are borderless, suggestive places or impressions floating in certain rooms, such as the (literal) smell of blood, or food. In this concept the flâneur is a "ragpicker", one who collects these fragments as well as organizes and displays them, and thus she can influence the democratization of an experience. It was the flâneur of the late 20th century who started to make décollages and happenings where the city was an art space. I have already dealt with the creation of narrative out of urban elements into a collage. An artist, as a flâneur, can be a catalyst, her intention being to diminish the isolation of art from life. Thus, referring to the role of the flâneur, I argue that giving up the concept of the autonomy of art is already present in Modernism itself, namely in its flâneur.

The analytic aesthetics that has prevailed in this century has not, however, followed this line of development. On the contrary, it has repudiated it, and concentrated instead on inventing metaphysical definitions for aesthetic experience, ie, these "languages of art" that are based on symbols, not even randomly displayed metaphors. Critics have eagerly followed these analysts, perhaps more an account of their clarity than their thoughts themselves. Symbiosis of analytic aesthetics and criticism has been fruitful. Nonetheless, a crisis has been seen in analytic aesthetics itself. I have described it earlier. It is also the case that analytic aesthetics has stood relatively still while art has gone through major changes.

One of the most important tasks for the flâneur of the end of the 20th century has been to try to blur the boundary between art and popular culture. I mentioned that Adorno had stated that a tension between autonomous art and popular culture (ie, the culture industry) is essential in Modernism. But in contemporary culture art and the popular have been blended. At least in practice, that is how they are consumed, if not altogether from the point of view of art institutions. Many artists, even those working in traditional styles and art modes display themselves eagerly on the pages of popular weekly magazines. It is publicity, of course. The same is done by museums, galleries, theatres and concert halls. In fact, I do not see a problem in arts education if we want to give people the chance to encounter such art as classical music, opera, excellent paintings or the classics of literature. They are available for those who want to see them, and they are also taught and discussed. This "excellent art" has, in fact, become popular culture to a certain extent. Popular culture is not an alien phenomenon to art altogether. Boundaries have been built for other reasons than quality, for instance. Such modernists as Picasso and e. e. cummings admired comic strips and cartoons long before the Robbie the Robot showed itself in Whitechapel Gallery, London (1956).

Understanding of concepts of autonomy such as art is usually held to be the main vehicle for aesthetic experiences and thus separate from other realms of life and only developing its own forms. This notion was based on a concept of 'timeless' in opposition to 'historical time'. The postmodern spatialization of time can be interpreted at least in two ways: either such that we have all the fragments of different times, and we can play with them in the same space, or, that time (and things of a specific time) exists in relation to a specific place, the 'aura' of which remains in cultural memory. The past has become material that can be combined in similar ways as colours or notes: to make juxtapositions and dynamics, to evoke feelings, to be reminiscent of something, and so on. The difference is that this new recycled material is already loaded with cultural contents and meanings. Thus, when we analyze the organization of elements in art works, it would be more relevant to analyze the combination of these entities than aesthetic and artistic qualities that have been defined in a metalanguage of appreciation. Of course this means an analysis in relative; it will become a pragmatist practice, since there is no longer any trust to the existence of essential features common to all styles and traditions of art and in similar faculties and skills that are called in-

to operation whether one is contemplating contemporary art, or the art of the remote past.

The cultural past, or everyday life as material have historical dimensions other than in an autonomous art where artistic values are held to be only those connected to art's own historical development. The paradox is, however, that we must also be aware of the tradition of an autonomy of art, in order to be able to comprehend the 'aura' of the cultural past. However, the dissolution of monuments into moments is what happens today on the level of our ideas and attitudes as well as in artistic practice.

According to Debord the central idea of the construction of situations is the concrete construction of momentary ambiances of life; to concretize means to break off everyday routines, continuous and almost automatic activities. In contemporary art there are examples of art created with a similar intention in mind, and there is art that is (in practice) used by the audience for the same purpose. In his essay *Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire* Benjamin wrote as follows:

Je grösser der Anteil des Chockmoments an den einzelnen Eindrücken ist, je unablässiger das Bewusstsein im Interesse des Reizschutzes auf dem Plan sein muss, je grösser der Erfolg ist, mit dem es operiert, desto weniger gehen sie in die Erfahrung ein; desto eher erfüllen sie den Begriff des Erlebnisses. Vielleicht kann man die eigentümliche Leistung der Chockabwehr zuletzt darin sehen: dem Vorfall auf Kosten der Integrität seines Inhalts eine exakte Zeitstelle im Bewusstsein anzuweisen. Das wäre eine Spitzenleistung der Reflexion. Sie würde den Vorfall zu einem Erlebnis machen.²¹⁹

The construction of situations was an attempt to remove shock repression (*chockabwehr*) and automatic reflection. Instead, the situationists attempted (as the dadaists before them) to return the effect of shock - but in a way that consciousness would prevail. Thus, as Benjamin has written: "Dass der Chock derart abgefangen, derart vom Bewusstsein pariert werde, gäbe dem Vorfall, der ihn auslöst, den Charakter des Erlebnisses im prägnanten Sinn. Es würde diesen Vorfall (unmittelbar der Registratur der bewussten Erinnerung ihn einverleibend) für die dichterische Erfahrung sterilisieren."²²⁰ In fact, Benjamin had articulated that what the situationists were talking about when they wanted to suppress art (or poetic experience, *Erfahrung*) and to unite subjects and objects of poetry to something like *an* experience, *Erlebnis*.

Compressing Everyday (Experience) and Literalizing the Symbolic

Sartre's concept of situation was one element in the situationist collage of thoughts. Sartre's philosophy as such was not an essential part of situationist theory, but a closer look on the Sartre's situation will help

to outline what the construction of situation was about. I also deal with it in this context since Sartre is more familiar to theorists than the situationists. The Sartrean situation is a condition that is not constructed and where one does not try to find a way, but into which an individual is thrown against her will.

The situation is an outside reality which sets constraints. Factuality is closely related to it; it means the necessary contact of consciousness with the world, in other words, how much consciousness is at the mercy of the world. In a sense, factuality shows the limits of individual freedom, which builds itself as if upon these outside conditions: they tell the facts in relation to the function of freedom.²²¹ It is a question of individual freedom versus reality - an individual subject in a situation. Since only a person's own consciousness can define the meaning of her situation, only her own choice can give her those aims and goals she tries to attain in the situation into which she unwillingly is thrown. In fact, pure factuality is impossible to attain; any time the individual concentrates on her situation and its qualities given from outside, these qualities have already been arranged on the basis of the meanings an individual gives them herself.²²² In other words, the factual elements in each situation are organized according to the "theme" of the situation; they are not stable from one situation to another.²²³ This also supports the argument that there are no stable works of art at all. Even paintings and sculptures change with time and the themes of changing situations. In fact, this is just what Gadamer explains to us rather successfully.

There is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom, in other words, something has a meaning only in a situation of free choice.²²⁴ A person is free to choose her way of being. Motive is an integral part of the act. According to Sartre, motive, the act, and the end are all constituted in a single emergence, and each of these three structures claims the two others as its meaning. "It is the act which decides its ends and its motives, and the act is the expression of freedom. . .".²²⁵ Sartre thought of a situation as a rather organic totality, each element of which has an effect on the others and on the totality. This he notes, for instance, when writing about how the meanings and value of the past are constituted through the situation. It is impossible to consider a situation from the outside. It cannot be subjective either, for it is not a matter of the impressions which things make on us, but it is the things themselves and myself among those things. Neither can the situation be objective, for the subject is always involved in the system.²²⁶ Sartre wrote at the end of *What is Literature?* that the time of describing and telling is over, nor can we limit ourselves to explaining. Describing is only enjoyment on the level of observation; explaining is approving, it forgives all, and in both cases everything is already solved. But if only plain perception is action, where showing of the world is to reveal it hoping to: possible change, then we have to reveal for the reader her possibilities to construct and destroy in every concrete situation, in other words, her chances to act.²²⁷

Sartre's ideas can be compared to the nominalistic utopia of collage Adorno mentions, ie, the invasion of factuality into a work. It is impossi-

ble to reach pure factuality, however, because focusing one's attention on a situation is at the same time to organize its given (factual) qualities on the basis of the meanings given by the receiver. It is just this giving of a meaning by the receiver that art has devoted special attention to since the 1960s. The construction of situations is thus a kind of adaptation of collage or montage techniques to the life-world - an invasion of consciousness, or intention, breaking up the apparently consistent and coherent (ie, alienated) routines and habits. In the construction of situations it is a matter of the reduction of factuality, or, rather, of becoming conscious of those external provisions, and connecting them to one's own life experiences and desires.²²⁸ Alienation is to approve factuality, and it is important to be roused from it. In other words, situations have to be constructed; factuality, that is, external reality, has to be made more concise, and which one will see the possibilities that exist in the realm of freedom.

Sartre wrote that at each moment he apprehends his initial choice as contingent and unjustifiable, and therefore he is at each moment in a position suddenly to consider it objectively and consequently to transcend it and to make-it-past by making the liberating *moment* emerge. Sartre argued that extraordinary and marvelous are those moments when the prior project collapses into the past in the light of a new project which emerges from its ruins and which as yet exists only in outline.²²⁹ The creation of situations is precisely to create these moments Sartre was talking about, moment, when everything is possible but nothing is not yet definite and frozen. This is the opposite of many artists's aims to freeze the special moment.

I compare Sartre's philosophical ideas to Vostell's artistic language of the happenings, who just put concepts and sentences one after another. Vostell defines happening as follows:

. . . happening = life - life as art - no retreat from but *into* reality - making it possible to experience & live its essence - not to abandon the world but to find a new relation to it - to let the participant experience himself consciously in the happening - to shift the environment into new contexts - to create new meanings by breaking up the old - let the participant experience indeterminacy as a creative force - to uncover & let uncover nonsense in sense - lack of purpose as purpose - open form as form - eccentricity - participants & performers instead of spectators - simultaneousness through juxtaposition of contradictory elements - new combination & absurd use of everyday objects.²³⁰

This definition as well as that of Sartre's are both intrinsically contradictory in style. That makes them interesting. "When we 'perceive emotionally' in ordinary life the emotional character of the object perceived is bound up with its significance for the situation in which we stand and its implications for action in that situation".²³¹ This is why we need *constructed* situations. But how unreal does it make the moment or is it just the frame/distance needed for reflection or an alternative way of being, or, doing? This is not what Osborne meant, however. Like many others, he despises emotions without practising the skill of appreciation. As interesting is the concept of the literalization of the symbolic, about which

many theorists have written pure rhetoric without much content. This process of actualization is one of rendering the indeterminate determinate or concrete. Osborne, for instance wrote that the aesthetic object which is actualized in our awareness changes progressively, and this is an actual change.²³² This means that the content of our visual field, our visual experience has become different. And this may occur without any change in the material thing that is there. It is mental. He does not hold as good enough (that is, enticing contemplativeness) aesthetic experiences that are short, fleeting, and incapable of development.²³³ He defined a work of art as follows:

... a work of art is ... an entity which provides a more or less lasting possibility for a number of consumers to make such actualizations or concretions on the basis of the material thing or a series of physical 'happenings' which are the existential substrate of the work of art.²³⁴

These are the only "activities" Osborne wrote about. In fact, they are connected to attempts to try to maintain a lasting experience.

There has also been a reevaluation of art's instrumentality. Critical discourse has begun to take account of questions concerning change, chance, transformation, flexibility, and permanence as situational issues. Thus the relativity of art, instead of fixed, immutable and complete forms, has displaced the stasis of conventional formal analysis and fixed forms. Or at least it seems so on the level of the ongoing debate. There is not as yet any coherent theory about this, and this has not yet reach the level of arts education, despite the fact that the tradition of impermanent, flexible and very much relative art is at least as old as Modernism itself.

It can be said that the logic of monuments as something stable, timeless and permanent in the midst of the city spaces and of people's lives, has given way to a new kind of logic concerning the status of art in life. Kelley has written that aesthetic, abstract "space" and its temporal correlative, "timelessness", are now understood and experienced as concrete social situations. The space of art is filled up with people, processes, politics, messages, memory, institutions, events, experiences, communities, and other such phenomena of the everyday.²³⁵ The difference brought about by a postmodern consciousness is, that participation in the socioaesthetic processes of activist art is what makes it public, not just the fact that its site is now the street and not the gallery, as still was in the 1960s. Some feminists in the seventies saw art as a neutral meeting ground for people of different backgrounds. The discursive aspects of the work then became as urgent as the aesthetic. Media appearances, classes, exhibitions, discussion groups, public demonstrations, consultations, and writings were all developed as integral to the artwork, in fact, a central part of it, not as separate activities preliminary to the final product.²³⁶

In the 1960s it was leftist politics that influenced in art, and in the next decade it was the feminist movement. We can say that these political stances have used art as an instrument. These value systems insisted upon cultural workers supporting and responding to their constituencies.

According to Lippard, the three models of such interaction are (1) group and/or public ritual; (2) public consciousness raising and interaction through visual images, environments, and performances; and (3) cooperative/collaborative/collective or anonymous art-making.²³⁷ Art has always reflected the emotions and ideas that are associated with the chief institutions of social life. Or, art can take a critical, even resistant, stand in relation to them. It is important to realise that there is always some relation which is political, more or less. Thus we cannot draw a line of art between political or unpolitical. It has been done, however, especially when art has developed means and forms different from the traditional ones, and if the nature of the representation has been altered by, for example, the gender of the artist. Previously other individual differences were not taken notice of than the artist's personality. Feminists maintained that making art is not simply "expressing oneself" but is a far broader task: expressing oneself as a member of a larger unity, or community, so that in speaking for oneself one is also speaking for those who cannot speak. One of the feminist goals was to reintegrate the aesthetic self and the social self and to make it possible for both to function. Lippard argues that a populist definition of quality in art might be 'that element that *moves* the viewer'. The point is that a man cannot decide what that is for a woman etc.²³⁸ Although we do not believe that systems are so closed, we cannot claim that our interpretation or criticism is objective and true when based on certain "unpolitical" systems. Smith, for example, in various contexts recommends for teachers H.W.Janson's "History of Art", a book that does not include any women artists at all. Thus I take feminism as an example, although there are also other viewpoints.

Judith Barry and Sandy Flitterman have presented a typology of feminist art, which is useful, when modified, also as a typology for social and political art.²³⁹

(1) "One type of women's art can be seen as the glorification of an essential female power." This essential power could find expression if allowed to be explored freely. This is a stance supported especially by "cultural feminists" (Jill Dolan's term) who tend to valorise what they see as innate, biologically based differences between men and women. These types of works can be associated with mythologies, mysticism and ritual; they seek to encourage solidarity among women through emotional appeal, ritual form, and synaesthetic effects in performance. To this category belongs, for example, what Kuspit called "feminist decorative art", the most known example of which is Judy Chicago's *The Dinner Party* (1973-79).²⁴⁰ This item brings the relation between arts and aesthetics closer (see page 42). In this case art found a relation to aesthetic styles and qualities. The irony is, however, that these (decorative) styles were held to be old fashioned in the 1970s.

(2) "A second strategy in feminist artistic practice views women's art as a form of sub-cultural resistance." It presents types of works often overlooked in dominant systems of representation, eg, artisans' work. It tries to avoid the ideological distinction between 'high' and 'low' cultural forms. These works put an emphasis on "alternative traditions" of art making. There is a danger of a potential isolationism, though, in the

sub-cultural position. Political works which use a certain "political style": blurring of the picture etc. belong to this group. This matches to the second item (on page 42). Aesthetic values and criteria do not mean much - if at all. The same goes for the next point.

(3) A group can be separatist from the dominant art world and establish their own society. The positive consequence of this strategy is that it allows individuals to explore their feelings and attitudes and enables them to develop self-esteem.

(4) Artistic activity as a textual practice which exploits existing social contradictions. In these works images are not accepted as an already produced given, but are constructed in and through the work itself. This demonstrates the importance and function of contexts and discourse in the shaping of social reality. It is a question about a critical understanding of 'representation'. It transforms the spectator from a passive position as a consumer into an active producer of meaning by engaging in a process. A theoretical approach implies a break with the dominant notions of art. To my mind, we could think of this in connection to the fourth item on page 42, although 'an artist' could also be a collective. Women's movement has also changed itself along the same (postmodern) lines than culture in all has changed.²⁴¹

Lacy has, since the late 1970s, arranged spectacles which are social occasions in which the subjects are not passive spectators but active participants. The public domain of Lacy's works extend from the artist as the originator of an idea through collaborators, performers (usually participants, ie, the subjects of the performance), contacts (among the organizations and agencies involved with the project), spectators (where the performance takes place), the art audience (which hears of the projects through different forms of documentation), and the larger audience (which sees news spots on television or reads about the spectacle from the newspaper). Kelley has remarked that it is meaning, not just an aesthetic emotion, that cuts across these rings from the center to the farthest edge.²⁴²

Of course this can be said to be a kind of consumption of art. But there is also the question of activities unrelated to any economic goal. These activities are ends in themselves: communication, giving, creating, aesthetic enjoyment, even tenderness, the realization of physically sensuous and intellectual capacities, the creation of non-commodity use-values (shared goods or services) that could not be produced as commodities because of their unprofitability.²⁴³

Contemporary artists deal with issues which are not unknown in modernist art either. The difference is that the point of view differs radically. The subjects of much contemporary art include for example, otherness, marginalization, and oppression, analyzing the impact of technology, problems of ecology, popular culture, feminist and racial issues, art's role in maintaining, enhancing, creating and challenging privilege, and power relationships. Except for a few examples in the modernist tradition, contemporary art is also more humorous and even funny.

Art allows the display of the conflict between official utterance and nonofficial representation of everyday life. Rainer asked how an exhibi-

tion can constitute an approach that can offer not only a diversity of objects but can contextualize a social field in and from which the objects are produced and derive their meaning.²⁴⁴ What is the same work inside and outside the art world? According to most art theories it is not the same. And it is precisely the play with this fact that is interesting in political art. This kind of play, for example, is done by Annie Sprinkle who put on a pornographic show in the Cleveland Performance Art Festival and almost got arrested for what she had actually done before in porn clubs in the same city. Sprinkle explained that it was allowed "as long as it was *their* pleasure arena. But now that it's something for me. . ." ²⁴⁵ In postmodern culture, social life includes multiple streams of contesting momentary "depthless" or ahistorical images, which, detached from particular locales, join the company of other images. According to Rosler, one of the social functions of art is to crystallize an image or response to a blurred social picture, bringing its outlines into focus. Many artists and critics engage with these dislocating politics of the image through critiques of signification. Sprinkle is just one example.²⁴⁶

This is literalization of the symbolic, to actualize or concretize the situation, not only in the mental level. It is widely seen in contemporary art, as examples, documentary, performative and the new genre public art.


In the postmodern age, culture can no longer be considered simply as a sphere of representations, distant from the brute facts of life, since discourse theory sees representations as power in themselves rather than merely the reflection of power-relations that exist elsewhere. Power is not understood in the terms of large groups or monolithic blocks, but in terms of the networks of power-relations subsisting at every point in a society.²⁴⁷ Political art is not just offering messages, but challenging the processes of representation itself. This is done by using varied mediums, open form, fragmentation etc. The dissolution of certainties has opened up the possibility to offer alternatives. There may not be any common denominator for them. For example, the goal of performance is to encourage critical thinking about representation as a site for the production of cultural meanings. Community art challenges the traditional modes of representation. There can be "naturalism" and brute facts as, for example, in the Whitney biennale of 1993. But we can also consider more structured works from the point of view of a critical attitude to discourses. The English writer, Dennis Potter, stated that he tried, for example, to show people how our language and discourses form good and bad in his works. Potter was a good example of contemporary writer. He wrote for the television, a medium the nature of which is to produce material for consumption with a short attention span. Such aesthetic experiences are short and fleeting, and they have a certain pragmatist character; they are not for contemplation in the traditional sense.

As I said above, there are plenty of classics to reach for. A practical aspect of arts education is in that teachers can use such classics as soon as they are referred to or shown. I don't see any need or premises to get stuck into chronologies or hierarchies. In fact, works of art are (marketing) processes of a sort; in addition to the core that is the work itself, there

are booklets, critics, advertising, books, postcards, posters, stills, and other pictures, even reproductions available. This does not lessen the value of the art, but a certain dissolution of art can also be seen in so called classics, or masterpieces. Thus it is not so much giving up aesthetics but disregarding aesthetic categories. Concepts of traditional aesthetics do not become useless, but they should not be in the dominant position in an experience or valuation. Normally we are taught and used to structured representation, not the plain specificity of ready-mades, or fragmentation. Theorists claim that especially the latter gives us too much information, we cannot move or think.

CALVIN and HOBBS

by WATSON



Bill Watterson: from the comic album *Scientific Progress Goes "Boink"*, 1991.

But this concerns perhaps only a certain kind of people. For example, younger people are used to having multiple information around them. They just pick it up. Is arts education to teach the premises for doing this? Yes and no. It should be an option among others, I do not see it as any general need.

If we want to get rid of art's tendency to stress contemplation instead of participation, or universality instead of specificity, or structured representation instead of unrelational fragments, what remains? At first sight only Bürger's notion of art as a critique per se. This has been one starting point for political and activist art. Although ". . . it is not possible to change social reality without challenging its simplifying overlaid images"²⁴⁸, as Rosler puts it using a rather "situationistic" rhetoric, there should be something else that entitles us to call it art, if we do not want to throw away the notion that art is something special, and thus meaningful in people's lives.

It depends much on our own interests and it is a matter of our attitude to art. Those "simplifying overlaid images" may be the very elements we build our lives with - even an aesthetic experiential life, which is not necessarily connected to art works at all. To my mind we do not have to throw out contemplation, or structured representation. Everyone can choose according to her own situation. What I want is that we have alternatives, and I am afraid that nowadays arts education does not give many of them.

What, then, would be the something special that would still give us a right to call certain performative processes as art? That something is seen in social or political art, and also, surprisingly, in traditional documentary (symbolization) as representation: on the other hand it is contextualized, on the other, it literalizes the symbolic.

Documentary photography, or naturalist painting, have been ordinary means of representing social defects in art. Usually in aesthetics the subjective aspect is compassion rather than collective struggle. Pity is mediated by an appreciation of "great art", which supplants political understanding when compassion is not possible, as in Haacke's documentary Shapolsky piece. Hence the attempts to disqualificate Haacke's work within the art world. Haacke's work has been a model for American activist art of the 1990s. There has been an invasion of politics into art galleries and museums. But there has been also a strong movement out of art spaces. The SI was one group to give a model for the latter, and especially the situationist inspired Dutch Provo group, which in its time used happening techniques successfully for political purposes. They developed a system of an art-oriented protest against police repression. They practised creative vandalism mostly in Amsterdam but made also some practical proposals such as the municipal distribution of bicycles. Their *White Corpses* scheme was to provide for the drivers of cars who had killed pedestrians to make white outline figures of the bodies of their victims on the road surface.

Documentary has been an important form when trying to prove that reality does not match the picture or image offered of it. Influenced by poststructuralist and deconstructionist thought, we see realism as

more than an interpretation of reality passing as reality. It *produces* "reality" by positioning its spectator to recognise and verify its truths, as Diamond has stated.²⁴⁹ This implies the pragmatist notion that the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Instead, truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events; its verity is an event, a process.²⁵⁰ Documentary transparency is a myth in a world where some theorists see a growing distance between imagery and social meaning in the culture at large. This is the context where the discussion of the possibilities of documentary takes place. As Rosler has stated, social activists continue to recognize the importance of documentary evidence in arguing for social change. But, quoting Rosler: "The dead hand of "universalism" has lain heavily on documentary's shoulder, for a documentary work alibied as revealing an underlying human sameness becomes simply an excuse for spectacle."²⁵¹ Documentary symbolizes; it does not compress an ordinary event but abstract it, distils something more universal (human) from it. However, according to Rosler, documentary practices can produce meanings within specific contexts. Then it is important to acknowledge the place and time from which one speaks. Documentary has a place in collage. In collage it is easier to define the sources of the material and how it is used. The SI emphasized the use of more or less documentary material together with image-producing material such as comics or advertising. The art world context is an important element when analysing the problems of documentary.

In Rosler's essay on documentary she analyzed the depoliticized messages about urban poverty that certain photographs of homeless people convey. These meanings, she suggested, do not emanate from the photographs alone but from their relations with viewers, and they also depend on the institutional contexts within which photographic images circulate and which mediate between them and the public. Art institutions define art objects as creations of artistic sensibilities that can redeem wretched subject matter by transposing it into the universal register of art. This puts the photographer and viewer in privileged positions in relation to their subjects. It supports "the viewer's sense of superiority and social paranoia", as Rosler argued. The images reproduce a situation of "us looking at them".²⁵² Not only plain documentation, but documentation of a *certain* situation may cause contrasts between the work and receiver's own concepts, memories, or, experiences. The picture does not present space but fragmentarizes it, and it is always an artist's vision. This is one reason for attempting to go outside the picture frame. But it is difficult. For example, in Ukele's work *I Make Maintenance Art*. . . the artist plays with the concept of 'art' in her language game. Art is seen as the opposite of work, and art is culturally such a charged concept that it is interesting to examine whether it can change the character of work by making it visible. But the problem is, when work becomes art, it becomes a special case, it becomes useless. This is the problem in literalizing and concretizing the symbolic. As Lefebvre suggests: "[i]t fetishizes abstraction and imposes it as the norm. It detaches the pure form from its impure content - from lived time, everyday time, and from bodies with their opacity and solidity, their warmth, their life and their death. After its

fashion, the image kills. In this it is like all signs."²⁵³ But if it remains literal, determinate and concrete it brings along stronger positions, arguments and valuations. Communication becomes more important than "advancing" or competition. Thus fragmentation can prevail. In fact, Lippard has maintained that "One of the most efficient strategies of small-scale art in large-scale environments, country or city, is that of fragmentation - the establishment of many small units which, once visually associated with each other over spans of time, space, memory, make a whole - a continuity that is far greater than the sum of its parts."²⁵⁴ This is no longer play with picture frames and with art only. Large-scale fragmentation can also consist of human and quotidian elements.

How much does appreciation of larger artistic projects depend on understanding the social as well as the aesthetic goals of the piece? What demands does this impose for arts education? Much activist art fulfils the role Rorty assigned artists: to speak for the suffering. But if we listen opinions of some activists, such as John Malpede of LAPD (Los Angeles Poverty Department), it just is not that simple. Malpede has said that

People assume that all the stuff we do is autobiographical. But we're not interested in reducing people down to the tragedy of their lives, or giving street people a soapbox to stand on. We're interested in finding out who these people really are and what makes them special. The work comes out of that discovery process.²⁵⁵

Art can be seen as the exclusive province of the individuals to express their feelings and views. Art can also be seen as a part of the process of the individual - in the context of community - and the community coming to consciousness of itself. As in Ritva Harle's work in a suburban neighbourhood of Helsinki.²⁵⁶ In the first case, the artist is seen as a symbol of the antagonistic relationship between the individual and society. The latter case is what the SI wanted for art, and what Beuys claimed he wanted from art, and what some happenings tried to be in the Europe of the 1960s. The ideal for activist art is a dialogical situation, which tries to bring together different voices, world views, value systems and beliefs. The result is an open-ended performance resisting conclusions, but keeping up a conversation. The relationship between artist and audience may itself become an artwork. This means that the space between artist and audience can be an artwork. This is praxis, a context, in which meanings are created, questioned, or negotiated, that is to say, meanings that are not given but open and varying. As society and the mundane become more and more private, art, in fact, appears as an opposition. In this sense it is possible to say that the distinction between art and life holds up.

I mentioned earlier Lacy's works with elderly women: an audience can take an aesthetic attitude and to say it in aesthetic terms: take part emotionally, and they may see expressive qualities in these works. For participants it is an emotional experience and also a chance for communication and expression. There is also a visual structure, that is, sensory

and intersensory qualities. The work is not just a statement, and its interpretations are left open. We can use traditional aesthetic and artistic qualities, but in addition such features as participation and communication are qualities necessary to understand the meanings of the work. And there is also a subjective level: what old age means to a percipient, what it means to be an old woman, which is something personal, not interpersonal and objective. Thus we should learn to deal with an experience turning us inwards as well as out of ourselves, perhaps into an area we do not and cannot know. Instead of objectivity or practising some learned appreciation skills, the percipient's own affective experiences come out. There has been a common conception that when talking about art (ie, practising an arttalk) it is appropriate to indicate emotional qualities objectively discerned in works of art in the same ways as to indicate their sensory and intersensory qualities. This is to give those who 'properly' appreciate art the same notion of rewarding response and experience. Osborne stressed that ". . . we always remain residually aware that we are in the presence of a fiction and that we are contemplating something which is unreal."²⁵⁷ What about if we are a part of it? How unreal is a story about one's own experiences, for example? Is it fiction if it is (auto)biographical?

Contemporary activist and political art works and projects can be syntheses from the public use and private use of language. The private use of language can refer to the individual or the discourse of a certain group, elements of which are détourned from the mere public realm. A public context for private talk can be created. This is also the way to unify subject and object in an experience. In this the nature of performative art can be clearly seen.

Pragmatism: Tactics and Performativity as a Part of Contemporary Social and Political Art

Conceptual art and also body art have helped us to understand that dialogue and interaction can stand up as art without some physical manifestation such as an object or monument. If art is communication, between whom does it take place, whose dialogue is it? Is it a dialogue between artist and audience, or is it equality: the receiver as artist? One problem with political art has been that there may not be actual participation, but images, for example, homelessness (in Finland maybe unemployment) are *interpreted*: homeless, or unemployed, persons may merely be the subject of the photograph, and left out of the conversation.²⁵⁸ This is one difference between contemporary activist art and earlier (modernist) political art. Whereas a political elite used to claim to speak on the behalf of the people, we now have participation (which the SI actually claimed to achieve). Utopian-minded artists of the radical avant-garde in the early twentieth century thought in black-and-white: they could see but one option for political art: oppose the institution, put art in the

hands of the proletariat, and join hands in the revolution. As Jan Avgikos has stated, "those who believe that an art practice can be validated by virtue of the political message it broadcasts - they are the ones who wave the "alternative" banner . . . who fail to recognize the extent to which they have institutionalized the politics out of art by consigning it to fight battles it can never win."²⁵⁹ Today, activist artists exploit this fact. When Gran Fury was supposed to exhibit its *The Pope and the Penis* in Venice Biennale in 1990, the director of the Biennale declared that the group's contribution was not considered art, and the Italian customs refused to release the billboards. The work attacked the Catholic Church's position on AIDS. The collective held a press conference in an empty exhibition space, and after wide press coverage, the billboards were allowed into the exhibition. Thus the threat of censorship and manipulated controversy became an integral part of the work, as well as the ensuing debate on AIDS in the Italian media. However, the attitude of the representative of the art institution was the same as in Haacke's case twenty years earlier - and ten years earlier, too, when Haacke exhibited his *U.S. Isolation Box, Grenada, 1983*. Hilton Kramer wrote about it in *The New Criterion* (April 1984) as follows: "A parody of the minimalist sculpture of Donald Judd, perhaps? Not at all. This was a solemn statement. . . attacking President Reagan. Such works are not only devoid of any discernible artistic quality, they are pretty much devoid of any discernible artistic existence."²⁶⁰

Dewey made a distinction between a statement and an expression. According to him, a statement sets forth the conditions under which an experience of an object or situation may be had.²⁶¹ This has been used in activist and political art, when an artist outlines the area and the limits of situations. But when emotions are added to these statements they become expressions. The difference between expression and statement is that the statement is generalized; it conducts the mind to many things of the same kind. The meaning of an expressive object is individualized. In aesthetics a distinction has usually been made between a "statement" about an emotion and the representation of the emotion itself. Dewey remarked that "[t]he esthetic portrayal of grief manifests the grief of a particular individual in connection with a particular event. It is *that* state of sorrow which is depicted, not depression unattached. It has a *local* habitation."²⁶² But whereas, for example, Modernism tended to generalize and universalize by creating types, contemporary art tends more and more to "localize" (even literally). For example, photographer Riitta Chan, and researchers Marita Husso and Päivi Myllyniemi put on an exhibition entitled *Verta peiton alla* (Blood Under the Duvet, 1996). The exhibition was documentary, although the photographic images were fictional. The installation consisted of portrait photographs of women (also a fictional wedding picture), empty beds, including one hospital bed, tapes where women told about incidents of abuse and violence in their lives, excerpts from other authentic biographical texts which were some of the research material used by Husso and Myllyniemi. There was also informational material - brochures and phone numbers to aid victims of (domestic) violence in contacting social workers. The entire notion of

"political art" as defined in opposition to the dominant culture and its institutions was here reconsidered.

The important question is whether independence from prevailing systems is at all desirable or even possible. The difficulties of a counter-cultural position stem from the notion that reality is not the ordered and hierarchical opposition to the disorder created by play, but that in the background there is non-hierarchical thinking, which means that play, reality and culture are all involved in a continually shifting pattern of concepts and practices that each condition the other.²⁶³ The relation between reality and art (or play) is equal: art does not represent reality (cf. Huizinga, according to whom play represents reality). In Dada, for example, there were attempts to show this: the dadaists wanted to set an intentional state of chaos against reality that would thus reveal its absurdity. Dewey also wrote about intentional disorder. In disorder you can perhaps see the remaining structure of order, but in an alternative manner. Contemporary art includes art which uses the media and advertising as a medium, and which is open in structure and form. It rests on images which (so called) reality is made of. There is also art that draws on the happening and performance tradition and differs from conceptual art in its physicality and an immediate presence. Bodily activities can be 'daily techniques', which are concerned primarily with communication of content, and 'extra-daily techniques', which seek not to transform the body but to place it in a position where it is "alive and present" without representing anything.²⁶⁴ In the daily aestheticization of life, where styles have an important role, bodies have become the medium of communication, an image. Art, on the contrary, has shifted to the more immediate presentation of the body.

When we look at the whole picture of contemporary art, one cannot help but observe that there is a lot of art which is aesthetically admirable. Alternatively, there is also a lot of (performative) art that is based on values other than the aesthetic or even the artistic (in the sense I described these in the first part of this study). If we think of social and politically activist contemporary art as mediating 'thoughts', that is, subjects or themes, and that the medium is just a language for the conveyance of these thoughts (cf. Ruskin), since the way in which a subject or theme is presented was not given special relevance, or weight (as in Modernism), then we are wrong in that those thoughts do not necessarily form any statement that has to be mediated. Instead, these 'thoughts' may be situations, which in fact are the medium. Important is the way in which a subject or theme presents itself, ie, important is the content as an open process. The perceiver also becomes part of the medium, part of the situation or process, and she produces at least some part of the 'thought' in the work of art.

Contemporary works have not come from nowhere, however. Throughout the century there have been theoretical and practical attempts to examine the relation between art and life, of which the SI was just one example. The question is: is it possible to make art without stopping the flow of time and processes of life? Is lifelike art what Kaprow told us it is and in need of certain marks to identify it as art. But this

means we are dealing with art once again as an autonomous institution, at least in some sense. It seems we cannot give up the whole concept of autonomy, although art has lost a relatively large amount of its autonomies. Contemporary art, however, has not so strong a need to mark itself as art. Perhaps we are approaching a situation when it will be fully established that "made-to-be-art" objects are integrated with a variety of other types of artifacts and consumer products, thus creating a discursive field in which no single piece is elevated over another as a cultural signifier.²⁶⁵ The fine arts are being brought together with the products of supermarkets, or mass-cultural artefacts with historical objects. New techniques in art, for example, pyrotechniques, and juxtaposing work by artists and nonartists together with mass-produced objects, text, video, film, Internet and other media, creates semantically complex narrative and visual fields capable of generating multiplied meanings and sustaining contradiction in relation to a matrix of social themes.²⁶⁶ As an example of this is Group Material. Their exhibitions promoted a "single issue" within an atmosphere verging on controlled chaos.

Similar was a project called *Keskellä Espaa tuli lapsivesi* (In the Middle of Esplanadi There Came Amniotic Fluid) by Kirsi Reinikka and Virpi Hukkanen in Helsinki on the 30th of July, 1996. Early in the morning they stopped passers-by and asked them if they would agree to wear a T-shirt the whole day. The T-shirts were white with pictures of the birth of a child in the front and lines from mothers who had just given birth on the back. There was, for example, a picture of a newborn baby's toes, and the text: "Ihan isänsä näköinen" (Looks just like her father), a sleek blue umbilical cord, and the text: "Siinäkö sä oot, rakas" (So there you are, love). This "exhibition" will last as long as somebody wears one of these T-shirts.²⁶⁷

Contemporary activist art opens up potential alternatives for the situation when required by the normative system; it is the source of new possibilities often made in certain situations as a tactic rather than any too carefully planned strategy - not politically normative in itself. Using tactics is impermanent, pragmatist, even sometimes utilitarian. Alternatives are not always rational since there may be a lack of rationality and order but more feelings. (This counters the "overdose of order" of such political systems as the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany in their time.) It also challenges the rationality of the spectacle society. The starting point in contemporary political art is an attempt to bring about at least some *reaction* in people. This follows the tradition of political art this century, for example, Dada, Brecht, Picasso's *Guernica*, and so forth. The question is, how directed should that reaction be?

Wodiczko's projection of nuclear missiles on monumental buildings in Brooklyn's Grand Army Plaza (1984-85), and other similar projects, were potent images the interpretations of which were relatively open. Wodiczko has great trust in the ability of a general audience to understand his work. By employing familiar images he "creates a politically-charged atmosphere in a public context, even if people cannot agree upon the exact meaning."²⁶⁸ It seems sure that he is saying something, but precisely *what* may be perplexing. Here we can see the difference between the

avant-garde and postmodernism in the way meant by Patricia C. Phillips when she writes ". . . it is not so clear what everybody wants; it is only clear that everybody wants something - often for very different reasons. The image has had to accommodate this enhanced recognition of motivation and objective; it has become more layered and more calculated in its inscrutability."²⁶⁹ The avant-garde, instead, claimed always to be advancing in a certain direction (forward), and not in every direction. This also applies to the most political aspects of the avant-garde.

However, problems such as homelessness, miscommunication and powerlessness come up and begin to cry out for solutions. Thus art acts as a catalyst. Wodiczko uses already familiar pictures; thus his work is a kind of *détournement*. He says that he is searching for connections between what a site is suggesting by its shape and the way it is attempting to say something. He visits potential sites first and looks for what he can learn from them, and after that he uses - or abuses, misuses or subverts - those places. He calls his work "interventions in daily life."²⁷⁰ Acconci said that his works were "interaction between the art activity and the daily living". There is a difference: whereas Acconci plays more with chance, Wodiczko wanted to control the work, although not its depiction. It is in the context of display that Wodiczko insists upon controlling.²⁷¹

Wodiczko is an example of an artist whose political work is not just visual. Wodiczko's work in the ARS95 exhibition in Helsinki was based on the process of the action of communication and collaboration, and in the museum context, on the act of listening. There was also locality: the people who were telling their stories on video were foreigners living in Finland. Wodiczko has also realized practical social projects, for example, *The Homeless Vehicle Project*.²⁷²

Art theories stress that only when material is employed as a medium can there be expression and art. Everything depends upon the way in which material is used when it operates as a medium. In activist and political art the starting point is to gather objective material and to organize it so that it becomes the content and matter of the emotion - even statistics, which are often used in activist art. Emotions are the starting point, however. Usually, in art, emotions are connected to individualized things, and thus they express more than abstract descriptions of fear, joy, hate etc. In activist art, there is also an attempt to give form to some (political) matter, so that it is not merely a burst of emotion but something expressed and comprehensible. Emotions are administered and reformed to build up an expressive act through these modifications. This is the artist's role in many activist projects using people from the streets, suburbs etc. In activist art there is a medium, only it has an open form. The notion of the medium has lost its character in the sense that not only so called artistic mediums are used. For example, the Women's Action Coalition (WAC) wrote that "Mobilizing our creative instincts and expressing our concerns with posters, buttons, T-shirts, temporary tattoos, banners, flyers, letters, fax and phone zaps, giant puppets, drum rhythms, chants, costumes, state-of-the-art communication technologies, and media protocol, WAC used direct action as a means of direct education."²⁷³ To translate it into the language of arts education: the group

used artistic media and creativity etc. as instruments. These are not only means of resistance and attacks; WAC also sends "thank you" letters to companies which do not have racist attitudes etc. Actually this is important because it brings also positive practices to activist art.

An experience does not need to be heightened awareness in perceiving features of the world around us which had hitherto passed unnoticed and unremarked on. Is representation (the familiar thing displayed in new way, or making manifest something we have not notice before) then a "property" or "meaning" of an art work? Or, is it a matter of works as tools, instruments or catalyts as a frame for a process of self-discovery. Even if the result is the same, to my mind, at least, the activity of an audience and other (subjective) elements separate these art modes from each other. Traditional aesthetic experience reaches for a state of calm (cf. Osborne) Performative, activist and new genre public art have as their aim more personal and emotional experiences. The general tendency is from life in abstraction (in art) to life in particular.

There has also been a reevaluation of the instrumentality of art. Critical discourse has begun to take account of questions concerning change, chance, transformation, flexibility, and permanence as situational issues. Thus the relativity of art, instead of fixed, immutable and complete forms, has displaced the stasis of conventional formal analysis and fixed forms. Or at least it seems so on the level of continuous debate. No coherent theory of this exists as yet, and it has not yet reached the level of arts education, despite the fact that the tradition of impermanent, flexible and highly relative art is at least as old as Modernism itself.

It can be said that the logic of monuments as something stable, timeless and permanent in the midst of the city's spaces and of people's lives, has given a way to a new kind of logic about the state of art in life. Kelley has written that aesthetic, abstract "space" and its temporal correlative, "timelessness", are now understood and experienced as concrete social situations. The space of art is filled up with people, processes, politics, messages, memory, institutions, events, experiences, communities, and other such phenomena of the everyday. The difference brought about by a postmodern consciousness is that participation in the socio-aesthetic processes of activist art is what makes it public, not just the fact that its site is now the street and not the gallery, as was still the case in the 1960s, and still remains according to the development of the institutional theory of art, since it needs frames: spaces, curators, critics, theorists, historians, museum directors etc. to decide what is art.

Changes in the Artist's Role

Much contemporary art rejects the notion of the work of art as something an artist has created herself. I have described some phases of this development when dealing with the art of the sixties. Lately, some theorists, Phillips among them, have maintained that actually the whole space of

society might justifiably be described as "work", which thus may extend the notion to the result of a practice at level the whole of society. If this is the scale we are dealing with, it is easy to understand the difference with Modernism and, especially, the inability of a modernistically directed arts education to deal with some of the phenomena in contemporary art, or, in fact, any phenomena aiming at larger wholes and at various kinds of influence for that matter.

During the last two decades notions about originality and personality have diminished. The Fluxus happenings, for example, were composed on the premise that anybody can realize them at any time. Andy Warhol was one of the first who made authenticity only temporary, or devalued it altogether. Since the 1960s it has been possible constantly to take on new roles to which the artist's commitment is as authentic as to the one before. Many artists in the 1980s addressed themselves to the virtual impossibility of originality given the sheer weight of innovation presented in the many guises of modernism for nearly a century.²⁷⁴ As I have shown, the very notion of the avant-garde can be seen as a function of the discourse of originality. On the other hand, as Phillips has remarked, the actual practice of vanguard arts tends to reveal that "originality" is a working assumption that itself emerges from a ground of repetition and recurrence.²⁷⁵ In fact, the debate about the death of the avant-garde, at the same time as "the death of an author" was declared is just one example of this.

Today there are more artists than before. Art schools in different countries educate artists, even more than needed in society - at least if we think of art as a realm separate from life which does not concern many people. Not every artist can gain stardom and recognition in the art world. This situation means inevitable changes concerning the role for an artist if she is to remain a professional after training. Jerry Kearns, for instance, sees the artist in the overlapping roles of creator and curator. An artist may be a producer (like a TV producer), as well as an object maker.²⁷⁶ The fact is, that the role of the artist nowadays is multifaceted: she uses such methods as ceremony, rituals, performance, journal writing, poetry, teaching, curating, lecturing, collaborating with other artists and non-artists, etc. Art is seen as a profession whose main concerns are to project proactive images and information throughout a network of sites, events, organizations, media, collaborators, and audiences, as Kelley has stated. The technique/ content dualism in the modernist sense has lost its meaning in the performative phenomena of contemporary art. There is in contemporary art the search for form using an accurate technique, but the technique is not predetermined; instead, it depends more on the situation in hand. It is more tactics than strategy.

The artist can serve as an agent. The work in its totality is not necessarily her product in the sense of an object, and not her product in terms of the artist's personal expression. An artist only realizes the potential for activism in the work's topics and participants, who may be more or less anonymous. This means that creative works can be a representation of an actual relationship. Lacy has remarked that in these situations potential audiences are real people found in real places, not that abstract au-

dience somewhere at whom modernist artists mostly targeted their works. There was a kind of "normative audience" for "normative art", which means that significant differences were suppressed.²⁷⁷ This brings an artist closer to a director in the construction of situations, such as the situationists have described him. An artist selects, organizes, synthesizes and integrates aspects of things represented. But the artist is a participant in the process as well as its director. As Lippard has stated, the artist has to "live there" in some way - physically, symbolically, or empathetically.²⁷⁸ As Minna Heikinaho and Ritva Harle actually do when working in their urban environments. Some writers have maintained that this relational model draws upon a spiritual tradition in art. In a sense, it does have the similar aims to those of religious art.

In some theories of artistic expression it has been suggested that an artist is a man with unusually strong drives which find release in his works. Or that great art works carry echoes of the whole psychical being of the artist more fully and completely than consciously controlled productions. But expressive theories have not been very popular in the last thirty years, however. In contemporary art everybody's expressivity is of equal value, but capabilities of expression vary; consequently an artist as a trained professional can be the organizer of opportunities for others to generate the meaningful self-expression.

Dewey describes the artistic process so that at first an artist "observes the scene with meanings and values brought to his perception by prior experiences. These are indeed remade, transformed, as his new esthetic vision takes shape."²⁷⁹ But the prior experiences are there, and in activist or in performative art without any specific aims, they form the core of the work. Dewey stated that what most of us lack in order to be artists is not the emotion or technical skill in execution but the capacity to work a vague idea and emotion up in terms of some definite medium. An artist could help people to work up their ideas since it is what she is trained to do. It is also a matter of constructing an integral whole in which an incident/subject matter etc. acquires a new qualitative value. But not only in the sense of high art earlier (the case, eg, Dewey was immersed in), but also in terms of other values than the solely artistic or aesthetic. This is not in conflict with notions such as in the act there is no distinction between content and medium, but perfect integration of manner and content, form and substance.²⁸⁰ An artist must know the difference between what is done and how it is done. There really is pluralism, and it means that there are today both formally and structurally coherent works as well as those totally open in form.

There have also been changes in audiences. Since in activist art the audience is placed at the center of the art-making, its concerns and issues are adopted as the artistic subject matter. The audience reacts to the work, and its critical viewpoint may determine the artistic quality of the work. Audience participation is essential in this kind of public art. It is also an audience that has not been an art audience before. Locality is an important aspect of this. Public work of this kind is not universal and placeless in the sense more traditional public art works have been. For the practice of activist art, Judith Baca has suggested two working mod-

els. The artist can get a large amount of input from the community before the actual making of the image. Later the artist takes control of the aesthetic. Baca recommends this model in the case where an artist is going for the power of the image. The other model is a fully collaborative process. The artist gives a voice to the community and they make the image.²⁸¹

In her essay *Debated Territory: Toward a Critical Language for Public Art*²⁸² Lacy posits a typology from private to public. In it the artist is seen as experiencer, reporter, analyst and/or activist. According to Lacy, the artist as experiencer is the artist who enters the territory of the Other and presents observations on people and places through reporting on her own interiority. In this way the artist becomes a conduit for the experience of others, and the work a metaphor for the ensuing relationship. The artist as reporter gathers information to make it available to others. She calls our attention to something. Minna Heikinaho, for instance, rented a place she named *Push Firma Beige* in Kallio, Helsinki. There she asked people what they thought of love or what was best in life, and recorded the answers on a video that was shown in the Museum of Contemporary art. Or, she provides space for local artists as well as nonartists: for the handicapped, school pupils, small children, and others to do what they want. As analyst the artist adopts the position of an analyst, the visual appeal of imagery often superseded by the textual properties of the work, thus challenging the conventions of beauty. The analysis may assume its aesthetic character from the coherence of the ideas or from their relationship to visual images rather than through the images themselves. In this way, the art of analysis draws on the history of conceptual art during the sixties, when artists explored the dematerialization of art as object and its rematerialization in the world of ideas. In the situationist theories all these parts were manifest.

When working with different techniques and media it is no easier to develop a personal style. On the contrary, there is a need for different skills. This is one reason many contemporary artists have formed collaboratives where individuals remain anonymous. The question of anonymity versus individuality has been relevant in the radical avant-garde since Dada. But then it was a question of whether an anonymous collective could create something original. As we have seen, anonymity has been an instrument for games played between art and its institutions.

Alternatively, the problematic of group dynamics used not to be such a common subject when dealing with art, although it should be a part of art theory, at least when dealing with the motives and conditions of production. In particular, in the radical avant-garde of the beginning of this century, group dynamics played an important part. The same went for the SI; group dynamics was the reason it did not develop some of its artistic ideas further. After getting rid of the myth of genius, the artist have been seen more and more not as an unconscious creator, but as an individual with craftsmanship, ideas, even technical or social abilities. At least many artists see themselves more in this way they know the realities of art-making. The audience still merely seeks mystery, inspiration and deeper meaning in creation. This has led to the commodification of

the classics and masterpieces, which are often presented as works and experiences "bigger than life". Talking about excellence is only a slightly more modest version of this.

We can also think of artists as providing "services". This is a new concept that has been used a lot during the last three or four years. These services can be aesthetic or critical. There are many concepts used about contemporary art: "institutional critique", "post-studio art", "site-specific art", "context art", "community-based art", "new genre public art", "project art". . . I would add "performative art" to the list. Often they are difficult to differentiate from each other. "Service" as a concept does not mean the products of these art modes, but an amount of labour that artists perform independently of any specific material production. The point is that artists often make a contract: they undertake projects, the fee is payment for the artist's *work* itself, not for a work of art. Artists travel, build up temporary installations. Thus they work in some relation to different organizations and their representatives, curators and other art professionals. From the point of view of the autonomy question, these projects can be constituted more or less in relationship to externally determined interests or needs.

Helmut Draxler and Andrea Fraser organized in 1993 "Services: A Proposal for an Exhibition and a Topic of Discussion" in Universität Lüneburg. They defined the concept as follows:

It appears to us that, related variously to institutional critique, productivist, activist or political documentary traditions as well as post-studio, site-specific and public art activities, the practices currently characterized as "project work" do not necessarily share a thematic, ideological or procedural basis. What they do seem to share is the fact that they all involve the expense of an amount of labor which is either in excess of, or independent of, any specific material production and which cannot be transacted as or along with a product. This labor, which in economic terms would be called service provision (as opposed to goods production), may include:

- the work of the interpretation or analysis of sites. . .;
- the work of presentation and installation. . .;
- the work of public education. . .;
- advocacy and other community-based work, including organizing, education, documentary production and the creation of alternative structures.²⁸³

To my mind, this is a very interesting notion, which, in fact, is already in practice. We just do not know yet what influences it would have to a theory, although I have been trying to outline some.

Art as Therapy

Consequently, art can both call forth alienation or break it up. The concept of creating situations, and especially Sartre's remark that the cre-

ation of situations is to create moments when everything new is possible, could be seen as a start for healing; either on the societal or private level.

Some artists, and even some theorists, propose that the overall meaning of art is undergoing profoundly change. As Kaprow stated, it is changing from being an end to being a means, from holding out a promise of perfection in some other realm to demonstrating a way of living meaningfully in this one.²⁸⁴ Universality and rationality are changing into locality and presentness. Artists are no longer Utopians but pragmatists. They want to create social, political, and also aesthetic processes that work. They know that they will not save the world, but they want to get something done.²⁸⁵ (This marks a difference from Modernism, where the thought prevailed that art as a whole can be a saviour in its (symbolic) nature and that satisfaction is always somewhere else, as Shusterman has remarked.) If some change is happening, it means that the grounds of arts education must change too. However, arts education as a way of enabling aesthetic experience is based on the idea that art as a political or social factor of change or as therapy is external to aesthetic qualities. Thus an evaluation that stresses those qualities overlooks, for example, feminist art, just to mention one of these Others.

Its therapeutic character has been a motive in art, at least since the 1960s. In fact, hand in hand with notions of art as therapy is the matter of expressivity in art. Some radical feminist performances in the early 1970s were radical particularly on account of their expressive character during a time when the expressionism of the 1950s was thought to be over "and replaced by the psychic neutrality of Andy Warhol, the ironic detachment of Jasper Johns, the cerebral indifference of Marcel Duchamp, the affectless icons of Pop, and the monolithic forms and industrial materials of Minimalism," as Kelley has observed.²⁸⁶ Happenings at that time were not expressive, though. They were usually carefully arranged three-dimensional pictures (moving assemblages). And there was the problem of participation in happenings: the artist wanted the participant to embody the artist's metaphor and reinterpret it according to his own experiences. This was rather one-way participation, although openness should be that what distinguishes participation from manipulation. Kelley pointed out that participation at that time, was an ongoing process of negotiation *without a hidden agenda*. It is seen as a dialogical process that changes both the participant and the artist.²⁸⁷ It is easy to see that this concept no longer contains the elitist notion of a vanguard, and this is another reason I prefer not to use the term *avant-garde* any more.²⁸⁸ Participation opens up a space for therapeutic art, not in any clinical sense, but as art that can help people in trying to cope with their problems or just bringing positive feelings into being as in England where, in the area of social involvement the Arts Council organized public play-events, for example, *Blow-Up* of summer 1971 where hundreds of children romped in an inflatable environment made by a team of young artists who called themselves "Space Structure Workshop".

Perhaps the difficulties in dealing with therapeutic or in other ways instrumental art lie precisely in the fact that it is not part of the con-

tinuum of the history of art, ie, art for art's sake. For example, feminist art emerged in response to a social movement (women's liberation) and not from within the arts. Kelley supposed that perhaps the value of art for feminists was that it provided them with a category of professional activity into which the knowledge and experience of other professions could be meaningfully absorbed and used.²⁸⁹ This makes art a playing ground for almost any kind of (self)expertise. Art has always made a space for self-expression. In feminist art, subjective experiences hold an important place, as does the body as the physical site of their expression. The problem was that in art woman's body was reserved for other uses: we have to learn to appreciate, for instance, how Giorgione in *The Tempest* ". . . sets in powerful contrast to the impressionistic background the more sharply focused figures of the mother and child, with her garments, her bodily position, and above all, *the visual-tactile quality of her lovely flesh*". The extract is from Henry Aiken's *Learning and Teaching in the Arts* (italics is mine). Women as such abstractions and objects represent the way art has aimed for to represent generalities. Art educators have stressed the fact that art should awake in people "the need for restoring more elevated, civilized states of human existence"²⁹⁰ through aesthetic experience. Under this heading some instrumentality in art has even been approved providing it is as elevated a cause as possible. The problem is, however, where to draw a line. Is the therapeutic character of Beuys's work more to be approved than in Lacy's work? If so, this is only because Beuys is more known, and dealt with such great traumas as war, whereas Lacy "only" executes projects about elderly women, rape and other "women's matters". When reading the histories of art, these distinctions emerge clearly.

In fact, Kelley wrote about Lacy's art as "healing processes" and "a fundamental faith in the body as the site of experience and in art making as a healing process"²⁹¹. There is usually the question of the difference between mind and body, and - in aesthetic experience, for instance - the power of mind *over* body. There are lot of arguments about contemplation, disinterestedness and distance, but not much about such values as participation, empathy, interaction, affect and touching. It is a question of more concerted forms of experience. Kelley remarked that, like Kaprow, Lacy believes that a meaningful experience is the most effective way to change consciousness.²⁹²

In Hope Sandrow's art projects for homeless people, art is also seen as therapy, social work, or: "I thought that art, which was what I had to offer, could be a means for them to speak for themselves"²⁹³. It was a kind of constructed situation when in a photoproject one of the homeless women was allowed to express a side of herself that shelter life and poverty do everything to suppress. She wore a sexy dress in photograph. These "constructed situations" became dreaming of stereotypes, which is not "politically correct", at least in the sense critical artists and theorists would be seeing it. When talking about women, play with stereotypes is a natural thing, since culturally there are no authentic originals to strive for. Participation - a constructed situation - gives one the possibility to *be* someone in the process of defining one's identity, or "restor-

ing to more elevated state of existence". Judy Chicago's *The Dinner Party* also worked therapeutically when it elevated female exemplars and honored art forms traditionally sustained by women. On the other hand, Chicago's work was also a process involving numerous volunteers, needleworkers, ceramists, carpenters, photographers, researchers and administrative staff. It is interesting to compare this to Christo's packaging works; when they are discussed, it is often mentioned that they were actually collaborative processes. In Christo's case the work is not only the package but the happening around the packaging that occurred in Berlin in 1995, for example; an event, a festival where people gathered together to meet each other, to chat, to play music, that is, to do and produce something immaterial while watching the packaging *process* itself.

PART 3

DISSOLUTION OF AN ART OBJECT

1. Osborne 1970, 18 & 36.
2. Danto 1986, 44 & 45.
3. See f.ex. Wolterstorff 1989, 42.
4. Danto 1986, 45.
5. Bürger 1991, 7. On the page nine Bürger writes as follows: "Art is the unity of subject and object, of the intellect and the senses and yet that is exactly what it cannot be since alienation is the fundamental condition of modern life. In a word: art in modernity is forever coming up against the conditions of its impossibility."
6. Rorty 1989, 10.
7. Ibid., 11 & 13.
8. Osborne 1970, 179.
9. Gadamer 1975, 122.
10. Ibid., 123.
11. Quoted by Derrida 1978, 245. Original Letter to M. d'Alembert, translated by Allan Bloom, Glencoe: Free Press, 1960.
12. Lefebvre 1971, 36.
13. Ibid., 36-37.
14. Bourdieu 1987, 154.
15. Gadamer 1975, 79.
16. Barthes 1985, 142-143.
17. Ibid., 146.
18. Id.
19. Gadamer 1975, 73-74.
20. Dewey 1958(b), 107.
21. Ibid., 109.
22. See Hautamäki 1995. The book about Duchamp was the doctoral thesis for theoretical philosophy in the University of Helsinki in 1996.
23. Karl-Otto Apel, for just one example, has defended truth-conditional theory of interpretive reason arguing (1) that sentences can be assessed in terms of their ultimate truth-value, (2) that this process of assessment is carried on by a community of rational inquirers, and (3) that what qualifies a proposition as true is not just the present state of consensus belief within that community but also the community's readiness to make trial of it against evidence that may overthrow the consensus. (Apel's statements are from his essay "The Problem of Philosophical Foundations in Light of a Transcendental Pragmatics of Language" in Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman & Thomas McCarthy (eds): *After Philosophy: End of Transformation?* MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987. See Norris 1989, 114.) Apel, although wanting to maintain truth-value, write about community as its determinator, which is much closer to pragmatism than other analytical claims about truth.
24. Rorty 1989, 18. Quoted of Davidson: *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (1984), p.262. Although Rorty exploited Davidson in his own terms, Davidson did not agree in every case how his concepts are used. See more of this: Norris 1989.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Gadamer 1975, 103.
28. Altieri 1989, 65.
29. Id.
30. Ibid., 66.

31. Ibid., 69.
32. Shusterman 1992, 103.
33. Ibid., 102.
34. See an interview of Orlan "Ruumiini on taiteeni" (My body is my art) by Marja-Terttu Kivirinta in *Helsingin Sanomat* 14.10.1995.
35. Danto 1986, 121.
36. Ibid., 125.
37. Ibid., 131.
38. I have dealt with bodily fluids and body art in my essay *Ruumis Kiinan muurin mittana* (1996). Casandra Stark Mele's film belongs to the genre that is called as a 'transgressive cinema'. Mostly these transgressive works are post-punk parodies made in the beginning of the 1980s. They are amateurish, and resemble a lot of those technically poor "political documents" at the beginning of the 1970s, although transgressive cinema is mostly fiction, except few documentary works about American punk scene of the end at the 1970s and the post-period of the beginning of the 1990s.
39. Adorno 1984, 443.
40. Vaneigem: *The Totality for Kids*. "Banalités de base"; published in *Internationale situationniste*, no 7, Avril 1962 & no 8, Janvier 1963. In English: Christopher Gray (ed): *Leaving the 20th Century. The Incomplete Work of the Situationist International*, 1974, p.55. Emphasis mine.
 In Debord's first scenario for the film *Hurlements en faveur de Sade* was attempts to find out certain revolutionary rhythm. In addition to collage consisting of relatively autonomical sound and image material the film was meant to include a lot of graphic material concerning language; at times the film was meant to be, as was spelled on the screen: "T,e,l,l,e,m,e,n,t,v,i,d,e,à,h,u,r,l,e,r,à,h,u,r,l,e,r", (So empty one could scream, one could scream).
41. Cit. Goodman 1995, 133-134.
42. Poirier 1995, 276.
43. Ibid., 280.
44. The lecture (in English: *The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation*) was delivered at the Artaud colloquium, International Festival of University Theater, Parma, April 1966, and published in *Critique*, no.230, July 1966.
45. Derrida 1978, 234.
46. Adorno 1991, 79.
47. Derrida 1978, 237.
48. Ibid., 240.
49. Quoted by Nehring 1993, 197.
50. Cubitt 1994, 281.
51. Grossberg 1988, 178.
52. Rosenberg 1967, 85-86.
53. Kozloff 1970, 306.
54. Mondrian 1919, 322.
55. See Hautamäki 1995.
56. On the Passage... 1991, 84. Thomas Y. Levin: *Dismantling the Spectacle: The Cinema of Guy Debord*.
57. Ibid., 85.
58. Rainer 1968, 263.
59. Ibid., 267.
60. Sandqvist 1988, 382. Rough translation is: "... Action precedes concept, meaning cannot be separated from the physical being that expresses the certain, material object's being-in-the world, and being is defined in action..."
61. Osborne 1970, 21.
62. Ibid., 22.
63. Dewey 1958 (b), 104.
64. Osborne 1970, 30. From Henri Michaux: *Light Through Darkness* (1964).
65. Kaprow 1993 (1977), 188.
66. Carlson 1996, 40.

67. Ibid., 41. Cit. Erving Goffman: *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Doubleday, New York, 1959, 208.
68. Ibid., 22. See Schechner: *Essays on Performance Theory 1970-76*. Drama Book Specialists, New York, 1977, 144.
69. Phillips 1995(a), 174.
70. Pincus 1995, 36. In fact, David Avalos has described his own work with these words.
71. See Kaprow 1993 (1974), 148.
72. Ibid., 130.

CHANGES IN FORM AND STRUCTURE

73. Osborne 1970, 104.
74. In fact, I am presently writing a book/cd-rom about this subject.
75. The group organized 1956 an exhibition *This is Tomorrow* in Whitechapel Art Gallery, London. It was probably the earliest exhibition displaying media pictures almost as such in an art gallery.
76. In the 1950s Asger Jorn made collages by gluing fragments teared from posters onto the cardboard, which made the impression of a relief. In Silkeborg art museum in Denmark these works are named as *décollages*. If we think *décollage* as more ideological phenomenon than just a technique of tearing posters, it is questionable if Jorn's works are *décollages* but collages. On the other hand, the word *décollage* is nowadays used as meaning some video works. In the beginning of the 1960s Wolf Vostell named his happenings as *décollages*. It seems that it is not so important to define the general and "pure" meaning of this term.
77. Art historian Benjamin H.D. Buchloh writes in his essay *From Detail to Fragment, Décollage Affichiste* (1991) that *décollage* ruptures the collage paradigm both in terms of its materials and procedures. Rather than constructing the new pictorial universe, it limits its choices to the images and messages of urban advertisement, and rather than comparing fragments and textures, surfaces and seams, and arranging them according to the laws of a balanced relational composition, *décollage* foregrounds the latent temporal quality inherent in the collage paradigm. There is the past present in *décollages*. It is reduction, not construction. (Buchloh 1991, 107-108.)
78. Adorno 1984, 222.
79. Ibid., 83.
80. Buchloh 1982, 52
81. Wollen 1989, 82.
82. Isou 1964, 796.
83. On the Passage... 1991, 151. Guy Debord: *The Situationists and the New Forms of Action in Politics or Art*.
84. Guy Debord & Gil J. Wolman: *Methods of Détournement*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 9. Originally published in *Les Lèvres Nues*, no.8, May 1956.
85. Vaneigem 1983, 144 & 205.
86. Guy Debord & Gil J. Wolman: *Methods of Détournement*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 14. Originally published in *Les Lèvres Nues*, no.8, May 1956.
87. Ibid., 10.
88. *Détournement as Negation and Prelude*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 55. "Le détournement comme negation et comme prelude"; published in *IS*, no 3, Decembre 1959, pp.10-11.
89. Guy Debord & Gil J. Wolman: *Methods of Détournement*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 9. Originally published in *Les Lèvres Nues*, no.8, May 1956.
90. Marcus 1986, 87.

91. One of the most famous "situationist comic character" has been the cowboy philosopher university student André Bertrand created in 1966, during the scandal in University of Strasbourg. In his comic strip *Le retour de la Colonne Durutti* (The Return of the Durutti Column) two cowboys wondered their life:

- De quoi t'occupes tu exactement?
- De la réification.
- Je vois, c'est un travail très sérieux, avec de gros livres et beaucoup de papiers sur une grande table.
- Non, je me promène. Principalement je me promène.

The original text is almost word-for-word a passage from Michèle Bernstein's novel *Tous les chevaux du roi* (1960). Faults in grammar were in Bertrand's comic: "t'occupes" and "Durutti" which comes from the Durruti Column, led by the anarchist Buenaventura Durruti during the Spanish Civil War. In 1967 Christopher Gray translated the comic in English. The translation was not word-for-word but he changed it to more "situationist" and less literary:

- What's your scene, man?
- Reification.
- Yeah? I guess that means pretty hard work with big books and piles of paper on a big table.
- Nope. I drift. Mostly, I just drift.

Gray's translation includes drifting, which brings into it a connotation connecting to the English cliché "drifting cowboy". (See Marcus 1986.)

The comic strip was originally plastered across the walls of Strasbourg. These cowboy philosophers continued their situationist adventures at least during the next two decades. In May of '68 occupants of Sorbonne proved the usefulness of détournement as graphical expression form. In Berkeley during strikes of AT&T in 1971 Marx was given a six-shooter. But in those days cowboys had already lost their poetic character. Ten years later pseudonyms Chris Garrett and Mick Kidd made for the satirical comics group Biff Products a postcard serie *A Short History of Western Philosophy* (1982), but in this phase the Cowboy Philosopher had turned into a satire of himself. Couple of years later Bill Barminski made Hitler, Göring, de Gaulle and Churchill into cowboys.

The development of the Cowboy Philosopher is a good example of détournement. The jokes, as an old dada picture of Napoleon's head pasted onto a cowboy's body, Ronald Reagan's head on Rambo's body, or Hitler as a cowboy, are sarcastic remarks based on already fixed meanings of their elements. These examples are very close to a détournement approaching a rational replay, accordingly apparent one-way metaphor. Instead, Bertrand's Cowboy Philosopher was an open-ended metaphor of the most unlikely people talking about the most unlikely things, as Greil Marcus has remarked. And no-one knows where such a conversation ends. (Marcus 1986, 91.)

The lettrists claimed themselves to be the first to recognize the importance of the comic strip as a serious medium of communication. Maurice Lemaître wrote that the lettrists were the first, from 1947 onwards, to love the strip cartoon as presaging a means of communication that is greater than ordinary writing. According to him the lettrists defended comics against the retrograde art critics and literary critics of the period, who regarded it as a medium fit only for children and infantile adults. (Atkins 1977, 51. Citation from M. Lemaître: *Le lettrisme dans le roman et les arts plastiques...*, Centre de Créativité, Paris, 1967.)

92. Felshin 1995, 15.

93. Meyer 1995, 52-53.

94. *Détournement as Negation and Prelude*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 55. "Le détournement comme negation et comme prelude"; published in *IS*, no 3, Decembre 1959, pp.10-11. Citation from Asger Jorn's *Détourned Painting* (May 1959). Vaneigem wrote in his book, page 205, that Jorn's statement is from 1960, but he did not mention any firm source, thus it can be that it is a question about repeating the same basic idea.

Asger Jorn bought paintings by unknown amateurs from flea market, and over-painted them so, that the original picture became a part of new one, or it functioned as

if decoration for the events Jorn painted. Otherwise than Duchamp, who polemized by changing the works by famous artists, Jorn, in his own words, "sacrifice" the paintings buried in oblivion, and made something new of them. In fact, he happened to incorporate them in art history. Jorn's activities suited very well to the SI of the end of the 1950s. The first series of Jorn's *Modifications* were shown in Galerie Rive Gauche in 1959. In the exhibition catalogue he wrote:

Be modern,
collectors, museums.
If you have old paintings,
do not despair.
Retain your memories
but détourn them
so that they correspond with your era.
Why reject the old
if one can modernize it
with a few strokes of the brush?
This casts a bit of contemporaneity
on your old culture.
Be up to date,
and distinguished
at the same time.
Painting is over.
You might as well finish it off.
Détourn.
Long live painting.

(On the Passage..., 140. Asger Jorn: *Détourned Painting*. Translated by Thomas Y. Levin. Another translation is available in Atkins 1977, 65. Jorn's modifications are, however, marginalized in art history. Of course they are exhibited in the Silkeborg Art Museum in Denmark among other works of him. But they are rarely or only mentioned in passing when Jorn's art is dealt with in large.)

Jorn had made in 1957 a book *Fin de Copenhague*. It was a collection of inconsistent bits of texts and pictures cut out from papers among the colour spots. In 1959 Debord and Jorn made *Mémoires*, that was put together like *Fin de Copenhague* of mainly preexisting material: comic fragments, pieces of plan of the site maps, newspaper clips etc. Jorn added colour spots. The book was a sort of history of the L'internationale lettriste, although it has no plot or logical structure: the text runned on the page to all directions, and relationships between sentences has been left totally open. *Mémoires* was also bound to sandpaper covers, and when put to the shelf it destroyed books next to it; this was a way it influenced to the cultural past. Although without any hostility to past, it is evident that *Mémoires* was a multimedia, maybe better if realized in a cd-rom, which it strongly resembled and anticipated.

95. Examples for using cut-up technique: 1. Take a page of text and draw a line down the middle and cross the middle. You now have four blocks of text 1 2 3 4. Now cut along the lines and put block 1 with block 4 and block 2 with block 3. Read the rearranged page. 2. Fold a page of text down the middle lengthwise and lay it on another page of text. Now read across half one text and half the other. 3. Arrange your texts in three or more columns and read *cross* column. 4. Take any page of text and number the lines. Now shift permutate order of lines 1 3 6 9 12 etc. According to Burroughs there are many other possibilities. Selection and use of fragments is up to the writer. (See W.S. Burroughs: *The Literary Techniques of Lady Sutton-Smith*, Times Literary Supplement, Thursday, August 6/1964, pp.682-683.)
96. *The Role of Godard*. In Knabb (ed): Situationist International Anthology, 1989, 176. "Le rôle de Godard"; published in *IS*, no 10, Mars 1966, pp.58-59. Debord accused Godard for stealing some formal ideas from his films, which is at least partly true, since there are

- similarities, for example, in cutting technique, Debord being the first of the two using certain techniques.
97. Kirby & Schechner 1965, 54.
 98. *The Role of Godard*. In Knabb (ed): Situationist International Anthology, 1989, 176. "Le rôle de Godard"; published in *IS*, no 10, Mars 1966, pp.58-59. The Lautréamont citation from *Maldoror*, page 193.
 99. Cit. Levin 1989, 77. Originally published in *Potlatch* 24, Novembre 1955.
 100. Pincus 1995, 42. Just one example: There were a series of murders in San Diego County since 1985. The victims, numbering at least forty-five, were all women who had been classified as prostitutes, drug addicts and transient. There were rumour that the acronym "NHI", meaning "No Humans Involved" had been used to describe these women, and the police investigation was rather controversial and ineffective. Although the police denied this. Whether true or not, "NHI" became the name of the project by Luis Hock, Carla Kirkwood, Scott Kessler, Elizabeth Sisco and Deborah Small. In 1992 they put up billboards containing already familiar pictures of the murder victims. It was also an exhibition of photographs and an accompanying book. On the billboards was a picture of a woman accompanied by the text "NHI" in white against a black background. Without an immediate response from the print and electronic media, they would have remained obscure. But media reacted as the artists had calculated. The impact was deeply emotional, at least for many women.
 101. Malnig & Rosenthal 1993, 204. Cit. from Cornelia Brunner: *Roberta Sklar: Toward Creating a Women's Theatre*. Drama Review 24, no 2, June 1980, p.27.
 102. *Ibid.*, 211-212. Cit. from *Feast or Famine*, unpublished manuscript.
 103. Brecht 1964, Band VI, 55. From the text "Modellebuch *Mutter Courage und Ihre Kinder*. Anmerkungen zur Aufführung", 1949. "To use models is an art in itself; so-and-so can be learnt from it. It is not right to try to follow the pattern exactly but neither to get rid of it too fast."
 104. See Owens 1980.
 105. Hutcheon 1985, 6.
 106. Jameson 1991, 17.
 107. Andre 1984, 274. Original: Crimp: *Appropriating appropriation*, in "Image Scavengers/Photography (1982).
 108. *Ibid.*, 271-272.
 109. See Marja-Terttu Kivirinta: "Markkinatutkimukset ovat hölynpölyä". *Helsingin Sanomat*, Friday 7., June 1996.
 110. When Luciano Benetton admits that the ads have a traditional function to make Benetton known and to introduce the product, Peter Fressola claims that the firm is sponsoring these images in order to create compassion around social issues; they represent less a product than a lifestyle and world-view, which is close to the aims of activist groups.
 111. Giroux 1994, 198.
 112. Jameson, on his behalf, writes about "the random cannibalization of all the styles of the past" (see Jameson 1991, 18). In fact, play with this term both in theory and in the arts has been an interesting thing to follow. There has been made movies about the theme. The classic is George Romero's *Night of the Living Dead* (1968), that has also been mentioned as a model for all those so called 'splatters' that is just a genre full of cannibalism from Tobe Hooper's *Texas Chainsaw Massacre* (1974) on. Romero's film was not a splatter, though, hence cannibalism in it is displayed as a social phenomenon, of course, with fictitious means of horror film genre. In the 1980s was made Peter Greenaway's *The Cook, The Thief, His Wife & Her Lover* (1989), and Peter Richardson made a parody *Eat the Rich* (1987). Jonathan Demme's *Silence of the Lambs*, (1991) influenced also Kathy Acker to name her book as *Hannibal Lecter, My Father* (1991).
 113. Lippard 1984(b), 357.
 114. Lawson 1988, 163.
 115. Dewey 1958(b), 74.
 116. Carr 1993, 131.
 117. Rapaport 1986, 352.
 118. Anderson 1984. The first LP record from the series of five.
 119. Schneider 1993, 250.
 120. Quoted by Carr 1993 (1986), 122.
 121. Dolan 1987, 162-163.

122. See f.ex. Penn State University case of Goya's *Naked Maya* in Tarja Pääjoki's essay "PyhäTaide ja ArkiElämä: taidekäsitysten ja taidekasvatuksen yhteentörmäilyä" in Mirja Hiltunen ja Olli Mannerkoski (toim): *Synestesia - onko taiteilla väliä?* Published by the faculty of arts, series no C8, University of Lapland, Rovaniemi 1997, p.33.

There are also two kinds of rejection of art. Danish artist Peter Bonde has made a series of small paintings *Upside Down/Inside Out* (1993) in which patches of vomit have been sealed under varnish. An exhibition curator Dorthe Abildgaard writes: "The juxtaposition of materials provides a screaming contrast: the vomit is expertly varnished, and the glaze distances the viewer from the unpleasant feelings that usually accompany waste and bodily excretions. In these works, by combining varnish - the hallmark of élite art - with a new type of substance, Bonde consciously contests certain ingrained notions about artistic materials. Vomit, with its bodily and tangible form, challenges the idealistic complacency of Art." (From: Dorthe Abildgaard: "Enter: varnished" in a catalogue of the exhibition *Under the Skin*. Published by Alvar Aalto Museum, Henie-Onstad Art Center, Kjarvalsstadir's Art Museum, Norrköping Art Museum and West-Sjælland Art museum, 1996. Translated by Philip Landon.) To my mind, the conclusion drawn in Abildgaard's sophisticated arttalk coincide with the reflections of a non-expert annoyed by the display of bodily evacuations. The museum where Bonde's work is exhibited provides a site where it is possible to repudiate art. In fact, in two quite distinct ways. See more about this issue in my essay "The Stench under the Varnish" in the book to be published in the Autumn, 1998 by Jyväskylä Art Museum.

123. Lawson 1988, 170.

124. Livingstone 1989, 400.

SPATIALIZATION OF TIME

125. Harvey 1989, 21.

126. *The Role of Godard*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 176. "Le rôle de Godard"; published in *IS*, no 10, Mars 1966, pp.58-59.

127. "The present can now be lived immediately as memory." (emphasis in original) *Internationale situationniste*, Numéro 11, Octobre 1967, 57.

128. Jameson 1991, 21. He has many examples of which I mention only Lawrence Kasdan's film *Body Heat* and E.L. Doctorow's book *Ragtime*.

129. *Ibid.*, 25.

130. *Ibid.*, 26.

131. *Ibid.*, 54.

132. See J. O. Urmson's essay *The Methods of Aesthetics*, in Shusterman (ed): *Analytic Aesthetics* (1989), p. 28.

133. Dewey 1958, 129.

134. Sennett 1973, 77 & 79.

135. *Ibid.*, 79.

136. *Ibid.*, 78.

137. Unitary urbanism is one of the most important situationist slogan. At first they stated that urbanism does not exist; it is only an "ideology" in Marx's sense of the word. Instead, architecture really exist, like Coca-Cola. Though coated with ideology, it is a real production, falsely satisfying a falsified need. Urbanism is comparable to the advertising of Coca-Cola: pure spectacular ideology. They thus maintained that the development of the urban milieu is the capitalist domesticization of space, hence it represents the choice of one specific materialization, to the exclusion of other possible ones. (*Elementary Program of the Bureau of Unitary Urbanism*, signed by Kotányi & Vaneigem. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 65-67. "Programme élémentaire du bureau d'urbanisme unitaire"; published in *IS*, no 6, Août 1961.)

138. Sennett 1973, 81. In fact, this is an actual issue all the time. See f.ex. in the Sunday pages (D8) of *Helsingin Sanomat* 15.3.1998 a little article named "Siirtykö keskusta?" (Will the Center Move?) where a Finnish professor of city planning criticizes useless visions of changing people's ways to behave without knowing anything about how they really behave: There are different rules for backyards and for the pleasant routes, he says.
139. Clark 1985, 36 & 60. Already in the beginning of the 1970s some semioticians pointed to an abstractness of city planning. Of course, they use their terms: "In a certain sense signification rather than disappearing becomes more important, in another form and according to another relation of signifier and signified: signs become autonomous and self-sufficient. Signs devour things. In the 'developed exchange system' carried to its extreme, that which constituted the expression of social relations appears as an independent reality. Space is a tissue of relations becomes autonomous and fixed. The 'reification' of space is in the process of completion. The reign of specialized urban planning has arrived. The language of the planners is that of signs and of the power of signs. The center, the agora are not realities but signs. And we expect that all things will be accomplished through the management of signs. This pure fetishism, this magical thinking, are not without a role and an effect on the level of ideology and its action. They do not produce life; they maintain the abstraction of space and the illusion that the life of urban space is the business of a neutral technique. The desire to discover a specific urban language is quite often associated with this project of specialization (cf. Baudrillard)." (Ledrut 1973, 126.)
140. Harvey 1989, 249.
141. Vaneigem 1983, 188.
142. Baudrillard 1983, 53-54.
143. Vaneigem 1983, 188.
144. Lefebvre 1991 (1974), 89-90.
145. Ibid., 422.
146. Wilson 1991, 56.
147. Baudelaire 1863, 213.
148. Hollevoet 1992, 29. Also Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson (1994) takes notice on this.
149. Ibid., 33.
150. "Ce que les hommes nomment amour est bien petit, bien restreint et bien faible, comparé à cette ineffable orgie, à cette sainte prostitution de l'âme qui se donne tout entière, poésie et charité, à l'imprévu qui se montre, à l'inconnu qui passe." (Baudelaire: *Le Spleen de Paris* (ed R. Simon), p.16. Quoted in Benjamin: *Passagen-Werk*, p.548 [M 10a,1])
151. Tester 1994, 5.
152. Parkhurst Ferguson 1994, 28 & 31.
153. Mazlish 1994, 49.
154. Shields 1994, 75. Walter Benjamin mentions this in his *Passagen-Werk*: "Der Sandwichman ist die letzte Inkarnation des Flaneurs." [...] "Grundsätzlich ist die Einfühlung in die Ware Einfühlung in den Tauschwert selbst. Der Flaneur ist der Virtuose dieser Einfühlung. Er führt den Begriff der Käuflichkeit selbst spazieren. Wie das Warenhaus sein letzter Strich ist, so ist seine letzte Inkarnation der Sandwichmann." (p.565 [M 19,2] & p.562 [M 17a,2])
155. Benjamin 1983, 54. "Im Flaneur begibt sich die Intelligenz auf den Markt. Wie sie meint, um ihn anzusehen und in Wahrheit doch schon, um einen Käufer zu finden. In diesem Zwischenstadium, in dem sie noch Mäzene hat aber schon beginnt, mit dem Markt sich vertraut zu machen, erscheint sie als bohème. Der Unentschiedenheit ihrer ökonomischen Stellung entspricht die Unentschiedenheit ihrer politischen Funktion. Diese kommt am sinnfälligsten bei den Berufsverschwörern zum Ausdruck, die durchweg der bohème angehören." (Benjamin: *Paris, die Hauptstadt des XIX. Jahrhunderts*.)
156. *Ideologies, Classes and the Domination on Nature*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 107. "Domination de la nature, ideologies et classes"; published in *IS* no 8, Janvier 1963.
157. Wilson 1991, 54.

158. Bürger observed that the surrealists aimed to change the urban environment into a kind of nature where they moved as primitives do in real nature, that is, searching for a meaning that allegedly can be found in what is given. The surrealists believed that they could wrest meaning from the phenomenon itself. (Bürger 1984, 71.) This lacks the potential for change. The situationists concentrated on changing of meanings, and in this their project differed from those of the surrealists.
159. Parkhurst Ferguson 1994, 33.
160. "Strassen sind die Wohnung des Kollektivs. Das Kollektiv ist ein ewig unruhiges, ewig bewegtes Wesen, das zwischen Häuserwänden soviel erlebt, erfährt, erkennt und ersinnt wie Individuen im Schutze ihrer vier Wände. Diesem Kollektiv sind die glänzenden emaillierten Firmenschilder so gut und besser ein Wandschmuck wie im Salon dem Bürger ein Ölgemälde, Mauern mit der "Défense d'afficher" sind sein Schreibpult, Zeitungskioske seine Bibliotheken, Briefkästen seine Bronzen, Bänke sein Schlafzimmersmobiliar und (die) Café-Terrasse der erker, von dem er auf sein Hauswesen herunter sieht. Wo am Gitter Asphaltarbeiter den Rock hängen haben, da ist das Vestibül und die Torfahrt, die aus der Flucht der Höfe ins Freie leitet, der lange Korridor, der den Bürger schreckt, ihnen der Zugang in die Kammern der Stadt. Von ihnen war die Passage der Salon. Mehr als an jeder andern Stelle gibt die Strasse sich in ihr als das möblierte ausgewohnte Interieur der Massen zu erkennen." (Benjamin: *Passagen-Werk*, p.533 [M 3a,4], and also pp.1051-1052, Pariser Passagen II.)
161. Frisby 1994, 100. Cit. M. Opatz: *Lesen und Flanieren. Über das Lesen van Städten, vom Flanieren in Büchen*. In Aber ein Sturm weht von Paradies her. Texte zu Walter Benjamin, Reklam, Leipzig, 1992, pp. 180-181.
162. Lefebvre 1991 (1974), 167-168.
163. Attila Kotányi & Raoul Vaneigem: *Elementary Program of the Bureau of Unitary Urbanism*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 67. "Programme élémentaire du burcau d'urbanisme unitaire"; published in *IS*, no 6, Août 1961, pp.16-19.
164. Gadamer 1975, 157.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. *Ibid.*, 158.
168. Ivan Chtcheglov: *Formulary for a New Urbanism* (1953). In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 3. "Formulaire pour un urbanisme nouveau"; published in *IS*, no 1, Juin 1958, pp.15-20. The similar idea has been stated in *Mister X* comic book (1986), written by Dean Motter (with the aid of Gilbert & Mario Hernandez) and art work by Jaime Hernandez.
169. Wilson 1991, 68.
170. Lefebvre 1991 (1974), 173.
171. See Eco 1968.
172. Künstler 20/92, pp.14-15. Constant's text in exhibition catalogue *New-Babylon, Imaginäre Stadtlandschaften*, Museum Haus Lange, Krefeld 1964.
173. Jencks 1986, 35.
174. Phillips 1988, 129.
175. Gottdiener & Lagopoulos 1986, 7.
176. *Ibid.*, 8.
177. Gottdiener 1986, 213.
178. Deutsche 1991, 56.
179. Leffingwell 1988, 140.
180. Harvey 1991, 429-430.
181. Debord has mentioned that the word 'psychogeography' was suggested by "an illiterate" Kabyle as a general term for the phenomena some lettrists were investigating around the summer of 1953. (Guy Debord: *Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 5. Originally published in *Les lèvres nues*, no 6, Septembre 1955.)
182. Guy Debord: *Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 5. Originally published in *Les lèvres nues*, no 6, Septembre 1955. Debord's interest in psychogeography reflects influences of traditional scientific psychology. Situationists détourned numerous maps from P.-H. Chombart de Lauwe's *Paris et l'agglomération parisienne* (1952) to their own magazine. In *Theory of the Dérive* Debord quoted this book. (See also Wollen 1989, 80, footnote no 40.)

183. Stein 1987, 15 & 3. See also Stein, Howard F. & Niederland, William G. (eds): *Maps from Mind*. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman and London, 1989.
184. Raban 1988, 10.
185. Hollevoet 1992, 33. Quoted in Martos: *Histoire l'Internationale Situationiste*, p.26. Using *dérive* as a technique the situationists produced psychogeographical reports. One of the best documented psychogeographical investigation is Ralph Rumney's photo report from Venice in 1957. Situationists planned also to colour Venetian canals at the end of the 1950s. A. Khatib examined the possibilities of Les Halles in Paris in 1958. He ended up to suggest that an area should be transformed to perpetually changing environment consisting of various and individually stimulating situations, designed for and by those who use them, for the purposes of play and provocation. Khatib was particularly keen to construct an enormous labyrinth out of the buildings on the site. (Bonnett 1991, 32-33. A. Khatib: "Essai de description psychogéographique des Halles"; published in *IS*, no 2, Decembre 1958, pp.13-17.) An idea about a huge constructed labyrinth haunted the situationists's mind. In some phase they wanted to build a labyrinth in art museum, but these plans came to nothing. Others did that in the 1960s, however.
186. Published in *Potlatch* 23, 13.10.1955. *l'Internationale Lettriste* published *Potlatch* first number of which came out 22.6.1954, there were fifty copies at first, later the circulation was of for to five hundred copies.
187. De Certeau 1984, 100 & 103.
188. Wolff 1994, 128. Quoted from James Donald: *Metropolis: the city as text*. In Robert Bockock and Kenneth Thompson (eds): *Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity*. Polity Press/ Open University, Cambridge, 1992, p.422.
189. De Certeau 1984, 35 & 108.
190. See Robert Motherwell (ed): *The Dada Painters and Poets. An Anthology*. (Second edition.), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1979 (1951), p.184. Also Goldberg 1979, 85. One excursion was organized to the little-known, deserted church of St Julien le Pauvre on 14 April 1921. The guides were to be Buffet, Aragon, Breton, Eluard, Fraenkel, Huszar, Pèret, Ribemont-Dessaignes, Rigaut, Soupault and Tzara. However, there was a lack of other participants.
191. Ohrt 1990, 83.
192. Jameson 1991, 51. In fact, Kevin Lynch had presented basic points of these ideas in his *The Image of the City* (1962).
193. Id.
194. Harvey 1989, 214.
195. de Certeau 1984, 102.
196. *Ibid.*, 34.
197. Nye 1992, 11.
198. Krauss 1985, 287.
199. Seine was to be coloured bloody red, and corpses would be drifting down the river past Notre Dame and L'île Saint-Louis. The corpses were actually chinese since one of the medical schools in Paris bought dead chinese for an autopsy. The situationists knew the route of the re Fridgerated truck and had plans for highjacking it. The bodies were to be dropped into the Seine upstream in the suburbs. The problem was the red industrial dye that was needed for colouring the river. (Gray 1974, 88.)
200. See Ohrt 1990, 79. (Original: A response to a questionnaire from René Magritte. Dated 5.5.1954, signed by Henry de Bearn, André Conord, Mohammed Dahou, Guy-Ernest Debord, Jacques Fillon, Patrick Straham and Gil J. Wolman.) Cf. Marcus 1986, 91. In *Internationale situationniste*, no 2, December 1958 was outlined the theory of *dérive* which included detailed rules for practicing it. In an article was stated, for instance, that the average duration of a *dérive* is one day, considered as the time between two periods of sleep. In a *dérive* one or more persons during a certain period drop their usual motives for movement and action, human relations, their work and leisure activities, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there. One can *dérive* alone, but according to the situationists, the most fruitful arrangement consists of several small groups of two or three people who have reached the same awakening of consciousness, since the cross-checking of these different groups' impressions makes it possible to arrive at objective conclusions. (Guy Debord: *Theory of the Dérive*. In Knabb (ed): *Situationist International Anthology*, 1989, 50-51. "Théorie de la *dérive*"; published in *IS*, no 2, Decembre 1958, pp.19-23. Another version of the same article had been published already in *Les Lèvres Nues*, no 9, Novembre 1956.)

201. Guy Debord: *Theory of the Dérive*. In Knabb (ed): Situationist International Anthology, 1989, 50 & 52. "Théorie de la dérive"; published in *IS*, no 2, Decembre 1958, pp.19-23. Another version of the same article had been published already in *Les Lèvres Nues*, no 9, Novembre 1956.
202. Guy Debord: *Theory of the Dérive*. In Knabb (ed): Situationist International Anthology, 1989, 51. "Théorie de la dérive"; published in *IS*, no 2, Decembre 1958, pp.19-23.
203. de Certeau 1984, 98-99.
204. Lefebvre 1991 (1974), 50-51.
205. *Ibid.*, 93-94.
206. Kelley 1995, 141-142.
207. *Ibid.*, 145.
208. Nye 1992, 11-13.
209. Kelley 1995, 145. Lefebvre also arranged levels of space. This division can be a tool in dealing with urban art, although in many cases art works belong to more than just one of these categories. The categories are (1) thought and discourse *in* space (ie, in one particular space, dated and located). This is comparable to the site-specificity and Barthes's thoughts of "act the things" - "act art"; (2) thought and discourse *about* space (ie, restricted to words and signs, images and symbols) and; (3) thought *adequate to the understanding* of space (ie, grounded in developed concepts). These two together are closer to appropriation and even discursivity (cf. Owens), and also Barthes's "act the names [of things]", that is, "act on art". These distinctions are themselves founded on a more fundamental one: they presuppose critical attention, on the one hand, to the *materials* used (words, images, symbols, concepts), and, on the other hand, to the *matériel* used (collection procedures, tools for cutting-up and reassembling, etc.). . ." (Lefebvre 1991 (1974), 104-105.) 'Materials' is reminiscent of the aesthetic approach, such as an arttalk is on a meta-level. 'Materiel' is more like an artistic approach (if we wanted to connect this to aesthetic or artistic qualities).
210. Hollevoet 1992, 33.
211. See Lippard 1984 (1976), 55.
212. The descriptions about Huebler's works are from the book *The Power of the City/The City of Power*, published by the Whitney Museum of American Art. (See Bibliography.)
213. Lippard 1984 (1976), 57. In February 1972, Robert Whitman, made a radio/street piece. While Whitman was at WBAI as the "receiver", thirty observers, each assigned to a different area of the city, phoned in to the station, reporting in a few seconds exactly what was happening outside the phone booths they occupied. Lippard wrote that: "Eyes and consciousnesses grew sharper as the half-hour piece progressed, and the observers found that in their last calls they were presenting "metaphors of themselves" as reflected in the environment. The result was an audio context which asserted itself in visual images of the life of the city." (Lippard 1984 (1976), 59.)
214. Cd-rom *Private/Public*. The exhibition ARS95 Helsinki was presented 11.2.-28.5.1995 by the Museum of Contemporary Art in Helsinki. Cd-rom is published by Painatuskeskus Oy/ Oy Edita Ab.
215. Heartney 1995, 148.
216. *Ibid.*, 161. Despite the ecological and scientific character of Harrison's' projects, art world institutions have financed them.
217. Phillips 1995(a), 190-191.

GIVING UP THE CONCEPT OF ART AS AN AUTONOMOUS ENTITY

218. Baudelaire 1863, 215.
219. Benjamin 1992, 111.
220. *Ibid.*, 110.
221. Saarinen 1983, 158.

222. Ibid., 159-160 & Sartre 1968, 245-246.
223. Sartre 1968, 269.
224. Ibid., 270.
225. Ibid., 248.
226. Ibid., 272-274.
227. Sartre 1976, 251.
228. Sartre 1968, 262-263.
229. Ibid., 262.
230. Berghaus 1995, 325. Quoted from Vostell: *Happening und Leben* (1965). Neuwied: Luchterhand, pp.231-232.
231. Osborne 1970, 77.
232. Ibid., 171.
233. Ibid., 175.
234. Id.
235. Kelley 1995(a), 232.
236. Lacy 1995, 40.
237. Lippard 1984 (1980), 154. *Sweeping Exchanges: The Contribution of Feminism to the Art of the 1970s*, reprinted from *Art Journal*, Fall-Winter 1980.
238. Ibid., 153.
239. Barry & Flitterman 1980.
240. Kuspit criticized this kind of art - pattern painting - in his essay *Betraying the Feminist Intention: The case Against Feminist Decorative Art* (published in *Arts Magazine*, 54, November 1979). Kuspit argued that the decorative art originates in a compromise with those (essentially modernist) forces in modern art that stand for everything that the feminist intention rejects. Kuspit accuses this art of being superficially vitale and aiming in formal purity. Although his criticism is partly rightful, it is not accurate in that he has a modernist, formalistic point of view himself - precisely different standpoint than (feminist) women. (See Kuspit 1984, page 377ff.)
241. From the start the feminist movement searched for different manners to act as earlier political groups. Differences have become more clear during the last fifteen years. In *Spare Rib* the editorial collective wrote as follows: "In trying to understand what is the modern day women's movement - there is no specific theoretical work to turn to, and no central organising committee to contact for a definitive blueprint... This is one of the most potentially dynamic and exciting aspects of the women's movement, affording it a flexibility, and a possibility for a unity with diversity, that is liberating in itself... It has de-emphasized theory and dogma and rules and text book politics... And this has led to an emphasis on 'process' and 'practice'". (Quoted in Hart & Phelan 1993, 197. Editorial collective: *Spare Rib* Replies. *Spare Rib* 209, February 1990, p.6.)
242. Kelley 1995(a), 242.
243. This is how many Marxists, André Gorz, for example, have defined art. See Gorz 1982, 80-81.
244. Rainer 1991, 13.
245. Carr 1993, 255.
246. Rosler 1991, 32.
247. Connor 1989, 224-225.
248. Rosler 1991, 35.
249. Diamond 1993, 366. "Documents which are not simply agglomerations of facts participate in the process of living, and every word in them vibrates with the intentions in which they originate and simultaneously foreshadows the indefinite effects they may produce. This content is no longer their content if it is detached from the texture of intimations and implications to which it belongs and, taken literally, it exist only with and within this texture - a still fragmentary manifestation of life, which depends upon response to evolve its properties. Most communications are not so much fixed entities as ambivalent challenges. They challenge the reader or the analyst to absorb and react to them." (Siegfried Kracauer: *The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis*, Public Opinion Quarterly, 1952-53. 16(4), p.642. Quoted by Frisby 1994, 106.)

250. The process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation. (James 1963 (1909), 135.)
251. Rosler 1991, 34.
252. Id.
253. Lefebvre 1991, 97.
254. Lippard 1984 (1977), 43.
255. Cit. Cohen-Cruz 1995, 136.
256. Harle has worked in Puistola, Helsinki with teenagers doing graffitis, with young drug addicts by casting them in a film, and with middle-aged unemployed in a local pub, who have started to repair and improve their environment.
257. Osborne 1970, 77.
258. Wolper 1995, 255.
259. Avgikos 1995, 111-113.
260. Steinberg 1986, 13-14.
261. Dewey 1958(b), 84.
262. *Ibid.*, 91.
263. Lacy 1995, 261.
264. Carlson 1996, 19 & 29. These techniques are originally described by Eugenio Barba in his "introduction" to Barba & Savarese (eds): *The Secret Art of the Performer*, Routledge, London, 1991.
265. Avgikos 1995, 91.
266. *Ibid.*, 103.
267. See a review by Suna Vuori in *Helsingin Sanomat*, Wednesday, July 31, 1996. There were 150 t-shirts given away in an hour and a half.
268. Finkelpearl 1988, 111. Wodiczko has written about his projections in a manner that strongly resembles the situationist ideas and rhetorics about unitary urbanism and psychogeography:

By imposing our permanent circulation, our absent-minded perception, by ordering our gaze, by structuring our unconscious, by embodying our desire, masking and mythifying the relations of power, by operating under the discrete camouflage of a cultural and aesthetic 'background', the building constitutes an effective medium and ideological instrument of power.

We must stop this ideological 'ritual', interrupt this journey-in-fiction, arrest the somnambulistic movement, restore a public focus, a concentration on the building and its architecture. What is implicit about the building must be exposed as explicit; the myth must be visually concretized and unmasked. The absentminded, hypnotic relation with architecture must be challenged by a conscious and critical public discourse taking place in front of the building.

Public visualization of this myth can unmask the myth, recognize it 'physically', force it to the surface and hold it visible, so that the people on the street can observe and celebrate its final formal capitulation.

This must happen at the very place of the myth, on the site of its production, on its body - the building.

(Wodiczko: *Public Projection*, in Harrison & Wood 1992, 1096. Originally published in *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory/ Revue canadienne de théorie politique et sociale*, vol.7 nos.1-2, Winter/Spring 1983.)

269. Phillips 1988, 131.
270. Haus 1993, 155-156.
271. Finkelpearl 1988, 112.
272. Haus 1993, 155.
273. Essoglou 1995, 348.
274. Livingstone 1989, 396.
275. Phillips 1995(a), 172.

276. Lippard 1984, 321. Or an artist can even be such as Mark Kostabi who has changed his branches continuously. Latest what I have heard of him is that he is a musician. Kostabi does exist, though. Rauno Töstamaa I told about before does not; he is purely imagined as well as his work. When there are so many artists who even change their genres all the time, who can know everybody? I insist that, on the viewpoint of an art world, there is no difference between Kostabi and Töstamaa otherwise than in the quality of their works, which I hold to be better in Töstamaa's work introduced in this book.
277. Lacy 1995, 37.
278. Lippard 1995, 129.
279. Dewey 1958(b), 89.
280. *Ibid.*, 109.
281. Lacy 1995, 44.
282. See Lacy 1995, 174-177.
283. Fraser 1997, 111.
284. Kaprow 1993 (1983), 218.
285. Kelley 1995(a), 243.
286. *Ibid.*, 222.
287. *Ibid.*, 232-233.
288. Avant-garde has changed. Something has remained, especially of the radical avant-garde. But as people change due to serious illness, something has irreversible changed. This is the reason I do not see any need to stuck with problematic terms.
289. *Ibid.*, 224.
290. Smith 1989, 35.
291. Kelley 1995(a), 225.
292. *Ibid.*, 243.
293. Wolper 1995, 258.

PART 4

Ihminen on liikuttava paradoksi - kärpänen ja jumala.

Mox Mäkelä

FROM INTERRUPTING EVERYDAY LIFE TO BUILDING IT UP

The conventions of painting, music, architecture, dance, poetry, theater, and so on may survive in a marginal capacity as academic researches, like the study of Latin.

- Allan Kaprow (1971) -

... art schools should be structured around ideas, not around physical matter or what tools you're going to use. Maybe they should be more like departments of narration, departments of political art, figurative art, abstraction, and so on - and then, whoever wants to work in whatever medium would think about the ideas first, and then find the medium at any given moment through which they could fulfill them.

- Carol Becker (1995) -

The theory and practice of aesthetics and art education has its roots firmly in the concept of the autonomy of art. An autonomous institution exists, as Pierre Bourdieu says, in things and in minds. In things it exists in the form of an artistic field, a relatively autonomous social universe. In minds, it exists in the form of dispositions, which were invented and taught to us by the same movement which formed the artistic field.¹ This is a background for an ahistorical analysis of a work of art and of an aesthetic experience as such analytic aesthetics sees it. Developments in contemporary art have shown, however, that those roots in autonomy are no longer as strong as they may seem to be. The ground for much contemporary art is found in the tradition of modernism, however, in the radical avant-garde and its relation to everyday life. Avantgardes display strategies in their manifestos and thus define their own place in the realm of modern art. Although some radical avantgardists from time to time organize happenings against the grain, we have to say that it is only during the last two or three decades that there has been created use of tactics in art, that is, not determining one's own place but flowing and acting when an opportunity comes - not even positioning oneself on the site of resistance.

Many aspects of contemporary art are comparable to the ideas developed by the SI and certain artists in the 1960s. Common to these ideas was separation from high modernism, where the process of creation had been seen as personal, and also ahistorical and ageographical. Instead, in contemporary art we find collectivity or subjectivity, historicity and locality, or globality and universality. The break with modernist notions, but also a dependence on them, is seen in theorizing about the Happening.

One of the most essential issue in this shift is the blurring of the boundaries of different arts. Instead of focusing on materials and progressing inside the particular art mode, such things as situational aesthetics, détournement (collage & intertextuality), and the urban setting have become important factors in art. At the same time the nature of resistance, ie, politics in art, changes from a representational politics to a politics of representation.

Anything can be made to look good or bad, important or unimportant, useful or useless, by being redescribed. The constructing of situations means precisely this: to redescribe time and place, and change its meaning. But, it can also mean that it is necessary to turn people inwards to find out their inner needs and desires (more metaphysical aspect). The SI stated that through examining the structures of the everyday, it is possible to grasp the real structure of power. Happening artists stated that through framing the structures of the everyday it is possible to get people to sense more in their lives and to wake them up from their spectacular reality. The basic issue is the same. I have taken happenings as an example of an open form. The happening creates a way of doing inside the art field; in this sense it was creating a style. The SI is an example of a non-stylistic strategy. It put together useful strategies with which it could be possible to give loose form to (specific) everyday problems; to break away from the routines and continuity of everyday life. The situationist strategies and happenings have in common the attempt to create an experience in a situation, dematerialization of an art object, the idea that the most insignificant thing is worthy of situation, collage structure and appropriation. This problem of form resembles intertextuality in the sense that we can define what is the dominant or subordinate mode of expression of the work. This is related also to institutional theories of art: they are wide, and they do not help in the practice of arts education but even support theories of autonomy.

The examination of the structures of the everyday often means the literalization of the symbolic, making everyday images (of the spectacle society) concrete using autobiographical materials, incidents etc. as a source of action. The public use and private uses of language are mixed up in contemporary performative art, especially in performative projects with people.

The situationists had an ideological construction behind their theoretical formulations. Other artists in the sixties had more general social and humanitarian ideas. The SI was de- and recontextualizing accidental everyday things. They termed 'ultradetournement' attributing of other than the usual meaning to gestures, habits, practices, and words. A similar activity in contemporary art is called 'mimicry'. It is, in fact, a subcultural practice of recoding cultural signs. Its resistance is not a strategy but a tactic,

performed through a creative transformation of commodities, values, attitudes, and so forth. It is composing a parodic collage of certain customized notions. In contemporary art these tactics are often used. There are no underlying general political or humanist ideologies, but artists work in more specific frames, case by case. The situationist aesthetics of the movements of the 1960s, when it took a political stance, had an oppositional position and functioned as resistance to the conditions it wanted to criticize. There has since then been a shift: contemporary artists use strategies at the same time as they criticize them. They do not make representations using a specific artistic medium alone. An example is the already mentioned *Epizoo*, a human robot. Marcel'li works at the crossroads of media and reality. The artist is connected to a sort of torture machine. It moves his body parts according to impulses mediated by the computer. A receiver may manipulate the artist by touching the computer screen. Marcel'li has said that for him the intention of the work is the violence it is possible to create with modern technology without the person who caused the violence being in any physical contact with his or her victim.

Subcultural resistance strategies also include taking notice of such neglected ways of producing meanings as using the rhythm of noise, "grunts and groans", which is, in fact, a tactic Punk brought onto the surface. This has meant a lot, especially in feminist political art. It is not quite the same thing as when Fluxus and other happening artists (and earlier, the futurists) and Cage urged people to take notice of all sounds, even everyday noise. This notion is, however, a basis for a more active use of marginalized sounds in art. It gives a voice also to those participating in performative projects - often those oppressed without a language, as Rorty said. Other neglected things have been used in disturbational art: certain images and gestures, bodily fluids, violence and so on. Although Danto's theory of disturbational art is also an effective shield that makes possible to swallow some aspects into the art world. As I mentioned, an avant-garde spirit has continued in such disturbational acts as Danto describes. Their impact has, however, fragmented.

It is not surprising that the rhetoric of urban activist art projects, such as working with homeless people (Rosler), the unemployed living in a suburb (Harle), or the handicapped (Heikinaho) resemble the situationist rhetoric of Vaneigem or Kotányi, for example. The environment has become an issue during the last forty years, and thus it has become a subject-matter of art. Art no longer represents the environment as beautiful, using it as in landscape painting, but to improve it. Oscar Wilde remarked that life follows art in the sense that art, landscape paintings with a sunset, for example, teaches us to see our environment in a new way. From this beginning has been traversed a long route by the maturing flâneur who stated by aestheticizing and symbolizing the urban landscape, then went on to practice *dérive* and marking sites, and who has now come to the point where the environment has become the material itself, not just a place to manipulate in detail. This entails that we think of this material as something to which we can give shapes and uses that change it for good.

The role of political in art has thus changed. There is more and more concentration on specific problems in local situations, and on opening up

possibilities for interaction and communication in dealing with these problems. It also means the democratization of art by the democratization of experience. Instead of being based on certain (aesthetic) rules or language it is now based on self-expertise and local life-styles. It is not necessarily separate from the everyday *as art*, but gives alternatives to normative concepts of living. As in Wim Gijzen's *Project for Schouwburgplein* (1966) where he wanted to transform a new city plaza in Rotterdam into a traditional Dutch green fields with cows.

The Frame of Arts Education

In arts education one of the most important questions concerns the values underlying educational practice. This means asking what kind of conceptions of art educators have. Albert William Levi emphasized the humanities in education and defined the humanities as the arts of communication, continuity, and criticism. Thus the end of a humanistic education is the cultivation of three abilities: to think critically, to communicate successfully, and to appreciate one's cultural heritage.² However, when putting the stress on tradition and the search for roots, one has to take account of *whose* narrative of history it is, and about whose tradition it tells us, since women and everyday life, for example, have usually been excluded. This means taking a critical attitude to the tradition of great narratives and classics, which also means learning the skills to deal with critical (political) attitudes in art, for example, feminist art. Such activities as those of Gran Fury, WAC and Benetton pose a challenge to arts education to deepen an understanding of how knowledge is produced, identities shaped, and values articulated. An understanding of formal elements of a work of art is just the start. There always exists a situation, a context that is relative.

In arts education we meet the masterpiece problematic: who is selecting the best ones. What actually is the smokes-screen of "quality"? The answer is that a continuous and cumulative admiration creates conventions. Some works and names are more discussed and shown than others. It was precisely for this reason the SI wanted to devalue some well-known works by *détournement*, that is, by showing that they have no absolute value that cannot be reused or changed, but that they have a certain use-value in the process of life. The various modernist attempts to overturn these values of the undeniable quality of masterpieces (Dada, Fluxus, Pop and Minimalism) produced interesting and, even more, playful and humorous objects and events. However, their site of exhibition, usually the museum or a gallery, focused on the singular object alienated from its social context. Art is often seen as an emblem of social cohesion, meaning it has conveyed beliefs about human existence and its destiny. It still has the same task, but the social cohesion element is not so broad; it is found within smaller groups. There is nothing wrong with traditional masterpieces, they *are* excellent art works. What may be wrong is how they are used as examples. Many political or socially critical works, neutralized and

aestheticized according to the modernist notion that art and life do not intermingle, are stripped of their content.

What happened along with the formulation of the institutional theories of art in the beginning of the 1970s was that the artifact of art was displaced by the concept of art. This originated a major change. It did not mean that the work of art totally lost its status, but the artifact was not the focus anymore. This created difficulties for some aestheticians. Osborne took as an example Tinguely's functionless machines and conceptual art saying that there is as yet no recognized principle of assessment or evaluation in these cases.³ From their conceptual art, the artists in such groups as the Group Material had learned to question the nature of art by focusing on the institutional structures that frame and regulate the aesthetic situation. However, they noted that attempts to sublimate are not enough in art anymore, but there is a need to act across the broader spectrum.

I want to escape the cultural habitus that the work of art exists as such only if it is apprehended by spectators possessing the necessary disposition and aesthetic competence, ie, a certain "connoisseurship". This is a closed circle that is, according to Bourdieu, shared by every institution "which can function only if it is instituted simultaneously within the objectivity of a social game and within the dispositions which induce interest and participation in the game."⁴ By playing this game the player assures its existence. Some reject the game. But can it be rejected if the players are joined by those who do not know nothing of a game in an artistic field? I would argue that this cannot happen, instead, the rules, or rather, ways of playing the game will change.

A commonly-held notion is that the intrinsic value remains after the local elements have been stripped away from works of art. This thought has led to local elements being not valued at all but taken as some necessary evil behind which can be seen what is valuable. However, I have shown that local elements are an integral part of the work. Intrinsic, lasting values may exist, but that does not mean that the more transient values should be underestimated. Usually the line of thought goes as follows: Process means locality (a place), specificity and materials, an end is universal, has (abstract) qualities and aesthetic values. However, Dewey stated that the end-in-view is present at each stage of the process. It is present as the meaning of the materials used and acts done.⁵ According to him, art is the solvent union of the generic, recurrent, ordered, established phase of nature in a phase that is incomplete, continuing, and hence still uncertain, contingent, novel, particular.⁶ This marks difference from Baudelaire's thought about the modern, for example. Art does not distill the eternal from the transient but brings them into equal interaction, a communicating union.

In contemporary art also, the means (or process) and ends are not so separated. Consequences belong integrally to the conditions which give rise to them. One has to be conscious of the meanings of means and relations. In particular, the elements the process includes are taken from perceptive factual reality. The problem that often rises for some is that reality is taken in a relative and provisional way. The more so nowadays, but also previously when the consciousness of its relativity, as for the SI, was also still a problem. If somebody does not accept the reality in hand, it is easier to claim

it to be false instead of admitting its truth for some in that special case. It is also to accept that the very same reality, proven to be true in a specific case, soon changes its nature in relation to other new cases. When evaluating art, elements of process have not had so much emphasis as those of permanent, intrinsic values, although they both form an experience. Kelley evinced a rather pragmatist viewpoint when he wrote: "Processes are also metaphors. They are powerful containers of meaning. You have to have people [critics] who can evaluate the qualities of a process. . ."7 Dewey also stated that the connection of qualities with objects is intrinsic in all experience having significance.⁸ Then we can ask: Can activity, that is, process itself, be an object in this sense? Definitions of art should be such that it is no longer relevant to ask (adapting Rorty): Does this work of art aim at truth or at beauty? At promoting right conduct or at pleasure? And ask instead: What purposes does this work of art serve?⁹ The question includes both the possibility of aestheticism and of engagement. For criticism it is important also to ask: What works for particular purposes? Lacy demanded too that "Whether the art operates as a concrete agent of change or functions in the world of symbolism (and how such symbolism will affect actual behavior) is a question that must inform a more complex critical approach."¹⁰

The identity of subject and object as aiming at a state of unity where separateness is considered as a shortcoming is characteristic of Modernism (basically this notion emerged from the psychoanalytic theories). And it also has been an ideal in the kind of arts education that aims to teach the skills requisite for understanding and appreciating art as art, that is, to gain an aesthetic experience based on such aesthetic concepts as object-directedness, the perception of a unified whole, freedom for everyday concerns, and a detached affect of disinterestedness. To my mind aiming at unity, intensity and complexity have not vanished from contemporary art either, but they have changed. Wholeness has given way to the unity of separate localities. Great narratives have become fragmented into smaller and more detailed ones, and therefore the exclusive concept of arts education produces some problems. Arts education theorists Levi and Smith have claimed that the arts can be an instrument by which the human individual achieves wisdom in the cognition of reality and in the appraisal of life.¹¹ They have called for perfection, harmony, or wholeness as ideals, although they do not necessarily work anymore. Instead, contradictoriness can be fruitful. Although aiming at unity made the SI the last avant-garde, the SI's idea of the labyrinth has a lot of non-progressivity. In the labyrinth one does not know where one is going. It is a magic of mistakes. There is no attempt to gain perfection and consistency, but instead to open oneself to the experience of incompleteness as such. The directness of experience and reflection is always present, but what is most important is the place: the labyrinth itself, and making one's own paths in it.

Art history has leaned merely on a narrative theory that, however, excludes details, insignificant and uninnovative art (the SI is an example) and too easily emphasizes the excellence of art, without which it is impossible to render a full narration. Shusterman pointed out these difficulties. He asked what the value is of a definition which represents a concept of art to the exclusion of every detail and repetition. If we define art as a practice

defined by an art-historical narrative, all substantive decisions as to what counts as art or *in art* are left to the internal decisions of the practice as recorded by art history. Then the philosophy of art collapses into art history and art theory represents an account of what art has been up to the present.¹² They become measures by which to evaluate contemporary art. And it may be difficult to see changes in the practice and concept of art, if such occur. In fact, Smith referred to this when he took as an example Leo Steinberg's criticism of Jasper Johns's *Target with Four Faces* (1955). Steinberg admitted that he had difficulties understanding Johns's work since he lacked concepts to grasp it.¹³ Smith describes how Steinberg turned to introspection to reveal his own critical disposition when trying to understand the work. This is, in fact, a pure example of warholism. And this is but one problem the DBAE tries to avoid when stressing philosophy and criticism in addition to art historical knowledge. However, the philosophy and criticism Smith took as examples lean on art historical examples, even stress excellent objects. One problem is the polarization of autonomous art and socially engaged, or political, art. This frames the production and interpretation of art history, which is one part of the DBAE. This frames artistic theory, practice and criticism, which are other parts of the DBAE. It is extremely important for arts education in universities that there is also art theoretical research in close relation to it. Without theory, the practice of arts education is not much; on the contrary, as I have referred, it tends to lean on one-sided and even old-fashioned concepts of art that have not much to do with the contemporary situation in art. Arts education understood merely as adding more pedagogical abilities to the education given in art schools, is a small part of arts education, limiting it only to the making of art. Art history does not replace art theory for the reasons mentioned above.

What to Do With an Aesthetic Experience

Underlying of the thinking about art as different and separate from social contexts are a number of different notions. Some theorists are afraid of political hegemony, and there are in the arts history some not-so-noble examples of attempts to mix arts with politics. The aesthetic objection to doses of morals and of economic or political propaganda in works of art is often found upon analysis to reside in the excessive weighting of certain values at the expense of others. Leftist critics, Bürger for example, have argued that totally uncritical and institutionally and functionally autonomous art neutralizes even the possibility of social criticism. Adorno, for his part, stated that only art as autonomous as possible can remain an alternative to the existing social status quo. Art as autonomous and art as non-autonomous are not mutually exclusive notions but allow the possibility to study different modes of autonomy, and to what extent those autonomies have lessened or increased. This means that it is not necessary to choose the one or another but it is interesting to play the whole field. This is what art education has forgotten when, for example, it justifies

its domain solely on the grounds of excellence in artistically autonomous art. In its extreme, it may create such tragicomical responses as that of a person who said about Anna Halprin's dance group's performance of *Apartment 6*: "I enjoyed myself thoroughly while I was there but I'll never come again". When she was asked why, she said: "It just isn't art".¹⁴

It is for rather practical reasons that arts education was grounded on seeing most art as a convention, or a set of conventions, by which the meanings of experience are framed, intensified and interpreted, ie, "art experiences" and meanings of art. This can bring with it problems, especially with respect of contemporary art, where the emphasis is on newer conventions, or those marginalized in the history of arts, and there the autonomy of art is not so self-evident a thing anymore.

Unlike the other philosophers dealing with aesthetic problems, Dewey states some basic arguments on which we can ground the premises of contemporary performative political and social art. One of these arguments is that we can no longer draw a clear line between nature and experience as we can no longer divide an experience itself into theory and practice, art and science, useful art and fine art, for art belongs to the total situation; in the total process, it is this process.¹⁵ Some theoreticians, Beardsley among them, have maintained that it was Dewey's incapacity to deal with aesthetic experience that lead him to put emphasis on the quotidian.¹⁶ Donald Kuspit presented the even more forceful criticism that Dewey de-emphasises the work of art and instead of reason grounding reality stresses the relationships implicit in an experience. In his article *Dewey's Critique of Art for Art's Sake* (1968), Kuspit accuses Dewey of destroying the historical character of an experience when he conceives of a work in terms of the continuity and rhythm of an experience with nature.¹⁷ Kuspit put forward rather simplistic arguments, however, since Dewey also stressed the sense perception: what is in the actual scene, and its interaction with what the beholder brings with him.¹⁸ He stated also that the existence of resistance defines the place of intelligence in the production of an art object.¹⁹ Other characteristics are continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension and anticipation. Dewey writes as follows:

The expressiveness of the object of art is due to the fact that it presents a thorough and complete interpretation of the materials of undergoing and of action, the latter including a reorganization of matter brought with us from past experience.²⁰

What Kuspit was not content with was that Dewey "falls back on the communal experience of common men in an ordinary world, which now and then has its moments, its experiences. . . . the infinite has decayed into the finite, the dim apprehension of absolute art has decayed into daily monumental moments. . ."21. From the viewpoint of the excellence of art and backed by artistic autonomy in the every sense, Dewey's interest in the actions of ordinary men, and art as an instrument in this action, is certainly blameworthy. At least at the end of the 1960s some theorists had a problem seeing art as something that is ready to draw the receiver into the artistic process as an active creator. Involvement and an emphasis on participation in the artistic process was seen to destroy the detached and contemplative

relation to art. Kuspit was also worried about art as an artifact: for him, as for other aestheticians too, it was impossible to think of art as the fulfillment of experience, not as a formal work. Kuspit argues that art for Dewey has no techniques special to it and no unique method. This is only partly true, since Dewey did not deny the importance of the work of art realized in a certain medium with certain methods and skills, he simply did not put stress on it.

An aesthetic experience has held to be the ideal outcome of a discipline-based art education.²² The concept of an aesthetic experience leans on aesthetic theories. Beardsley, for example, argues that without *aesthetic* experience the goodness of some work is not artistic goodness. If an experience is painful, when it assaults the mind instead of revitalising it, it is not an aesthetic experience.²³ But some works may be controversial in the way that some people gain an aesthetic experience, others not, as in Mapplethorpe's, Serrano's etc. works. The skill of detached affect is required of experienced aesthetic respondents. According to Osborne, art is a response to specific aesthetic needs, and works of art have no ulterior defining purpose other than evoking and sustaining aesthetic contemplation.²⁴ The term "defining purpose" means that it is not possible to define art from the viewpoint of extraneous purposes. This has often lead to the notion that art has (or should have) no purposes other than aesthetic. Osborne stated that there is general agreement that aesthetic contemplation demands primacy for direct perceptual awareness above theoretical and practical interests. The fine arts have in common the impulse to foster and expand our capacity for direct apprehension.²⁵ He writes as follows:

It is the provision of artefacts suitable for the stimulation and enhancement of perception itself rather than for any utilitarian motive that lies at the core of the modern conception of fine art. A work of art is thought to be a complex unity for perception with a hierarchy of emergent properties whose apprehension extends perceptual activity to an unusual level of alertness. Therefore it is that our experience of fine art removes us temporarily out of the commonplace world of cause and effect, means and ends, and immerses us in a rarer state of concentrated vision.²⁶

We can ask, though, whether art is a response only to aesthetic needs. What about creativity, for instance? Smith held it to be an important but minor part in arts education.

Osborne connects the evaluation of the work of art in terms of stature, that is, greatness, to its subsidiary functions such as education, persuasion, decoration, commemoration, display, amusement and so on. According to him, the functions most often emphasised are those of promoting understanding, the presentation of non-verbal thought and the expression of embodied feeling. He separates from these "religious or sociological propaganda". Non-verbal thought and emotional expressiveness are features which, Osborne stated, contribute largely to our ascriptions of stature, but which cannot be brought with the range of discursive understanding.²⁷ The problem is exactly this. Although giving space to subjective elements in aesthetic experience, Osborne persuades us to agree with him that some works of art have greater profundity than others. He

says that we cannot compare works of different artistic kinds, but what about works that in addition to artistic values have different external purposes? How does the social or political purpose affect the aesthetic evaluation of the work? Then we inevitably encounter the question by what and whose standards we evaluate it. To take a practical example, this problem often becomes apparent when discussing women's art. Some (men) just do not see the same profundity in art works made by women as women may see. The starting point is that meanings and values are brought to an artist's perception by prior experiences. In feminist art or otherwise positioned art these are more in the centre; for example, women's relation to art is peculiar for cultural reasons. Disinterestedness is difficult when one is the other, but there is no art which is devoid of prior experiences. How much recognition we thus should give these experiences in interpretation? As I have already mentioned, Dewey emphasized past experiences as part of an experience. According to him, the scope of a work of art is in fact measured by the number and variety of elements coming from past experiences that are organically absorbed into the perception of the artwork.²⁸ Of course this can be interpreted to mean that past experiences involve some skills of aesthetic perception which can be learned and trained by aesthetic education. However, Dewey was on the same lines as James in that he also took notice of the role of beliefs and people's life experiences when defining what past experiences are. In feminist art, for example, the stress is on experiences coming from the life world (of women); it is no use to pretend they have none, or less, relevance for an experience (*Erlebnis*). This concerns also differences other than gender alone: age, culture, sexual orientation, whatever can bring some differences to bear. This is a challenge for arts education.

An aesthetic experience is thought to be a matter of perception for the sake of perception itself, if we think that art has rather a lot of autonomy. In practical experience there are also other aims. Activist art contains many elements having different emphases. The problem is, whether it is necessary to try to specify on the other hand, the aesthetic elements (with the subsidiary ones) and, on the other hand, the other elements. Does an experience have different qualities when it is based on aesthetic elements compared to elements that by contrast have an "external character"?

But Is It Art?

Social and political art may also have some aesthetic qualities, but since they are often performative and the form of the works is open and collage-like, they are difficult to accommodate in the frames of traditional aesthetic theories, or it is difficult even to see them at all. Art as instrumental or as a catalyst may be approved of, but not usually when talking about established art. Form can be given different emphasis. Aesthetic form, as we have usually understood it, means a closed system (see the chapter *Aesthetic Backgrounds*), but form can also be functional and open as an experience (cf. W. Benjamin). In fact, Kuspit accused Dewey precisely for leaving form,

organization and structure too open. Form can also be understood not as the creation of new forms in abstract material but as organizing reality to construct an order which is form without any governing laws. It is not a permanent order, though, but one in continuous movement. In fact, even walking is to give form for something without any material (cf. Richard Long). Documenting this is no longer an artistic act.

For example, when combining the elements Rainer listed in the performative comparison of art objects (see chapter *From Medium to Process*) with the content, "form" emerges; art modes can also be outlined on the theoretically aesthetic level (formalistically). By this I mean adapting artistic forms to life. Connoisseurship then has less importance. What is important is the manner in which the general material is rendered, which "transforms it into a substance that is fresh and vital"²⁹. The subject must be made into a new object by means of the medium employed. Rainer states that repetition enforces the discreteness of a movement, objectifies it; it becomes more objectlike.³⁰ Rainer's thoughts, however, are quite Modernist. Apparently, a similar thing happens on the level of form, for example in Ukeles's works. She organized the handshaking ritual and made the act itself as simple a task as Rainer's dancer's acts. Ukeles created form *in* the everyday. At the same time her work also corresponds to an essence of the everyday in its routines. Thus content is given for repetition (or accumulation, as Owens called it). This is not the same thing as bringing some non-artistic material into an exhibition room. I have mentioned before that it is also important to consider the interaction of art and life in terms of how, and in what direction, material is used and transformed. Whereas, for example, nouveau realisme and junk art took material and presented it as representing the existing environment, the SI instead wanted to negate, to criticize and to idealize society with the material it took from the quotidian. Brutalism, like Modernism generally, was faithful to its materials, but the SI never concentrated on it. Its "materials" were fleeting, contingent: the (immaterial) things around with which people live. These differences are vague, somewhere on a line drawn on water between modernist concepts of the radical avant-garde and contemporary attitudes to a play with a certain form but without assigning it the main importance in art.

Dewey wrote that form in art is like a social relation: an affair of affections and obligations, of intercourse, of generation, influence and mutual modification. It is the mutual adaptation of parts, where each part is dynamic and plays an active role in constructing form.³¹ This kind of form exists also in contemporary performative art, although it cannot be as important in the formalist sense as in older art modes. This is also because the construction of form is not so rational as in, for example, modernist painting. There is a qualitative unity, but it maybe based more on emotional relations. Form may then be defined as the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfillment, as Dewey stated. Art allows for a political or social stance through the vehicle of form - a physical organization that captures a range of intangible experience. Thus the purpose of art is to make visible and comprehensible. The issues that arise relate to the motives, not the formalism or antiformalism of the acts.

According to Danto, nothing is an artwork without an interpretation that constitutes it as such. This also gives social and political art an opportunity to be defined as art. It is accepted that art has no essential qualities, then there is no need for artists, or a work need not represent a pure genre etc., that is to say, when the institutional theory of art permits any kind of art form, no other criteria remain than the value systems inside the artworld. But whose value systems are they? And why it is important to define something as art as against something else? Arts education needs an identity as well as the economy, status, the whole institution of art. Art theories do not transform our understanding of art, nor do they enhance or modify our experience and practice of art, says Shusterman.³² He states that in the postmodern situation there is both need and opportunity for theoretical intervention and reorientation instead of quiescent reflection. According to him, pragmatist aesthetics actually recommends such an activist role in rethinking and reshaping art.³³

It is becoming more and more difficult to separate art from something else. This creates the need for a person to evaluate phenomena by herself when it is no longer possible to categorize things right away, which in turn means that the political content of art phenomena also have their chance of being noticed. On the other hand, ritual, magic, etc. strongly accompanies the domain of contemporary art. Mysticism, rituals, and irrationality, are in opposition to the purpose-rationality of everyday. But they involve humans, they are not abstracted to symbols or signs only, but there are situations to take part in, even when the products are symbolized representations. Experiences in such situations differ from aesthetic experiences whose elements are almost solely cognitive. Lebel stated about the happening that its essential elements are the intensification of feeling, the play of instinct, a sense of festivity, and social agitation. What is said about the rhythms of noise are part of this too. Both cognitive and emotional perception are given credit more than before. In fact, in contemporary art there are many different meaning-generating elements: intellectual, linguistic, material, temporal, aesthetic, habitual, performative, ethical, and moral. Is there any point in selecting only some (aesthetic or artistic) of these? Nowadays some of these are deemed "external" when defining art through 'an aesthetic experience'.

Many forms of contemporary art appear as a confused group of things being done and entering people's consciousness and getting publicity explicitly through the art world, which means that they are art. And people count on this. I suggest, however, that it is possible to find a group of features common to these phenomena. Not to define them as "only" art by these features but to outline some standards for evaluating them as art without separating the meanings that in these art modes intentionally extend beyond the art world and that are often cut out of art discussions and theory as the opposite of art, as everyday life, democracy, or anti-intellectualism. If we have at least some concepts, some viewpoints, we can talk also about arts education.

Aesthetics and the concept of an aesthetic experience in the reception of art (which is wholly separated from the making of art) are based on rather rational notions of (analytic) philosophy and the notion of the autonomy of

art. According to theorists, aesthetic factors usually comprise: an artist who creates a work of art, an exhibition to which an audience responds, and interpretation and judgement of the work (within institutional frames in the society where the work is shown). Choosing examples that are appropriate to the existing frames means that much is left out and marginalized. This functioned well in a more hierarchical system, but our thinking and practices have changed. The cultural context of contemporary art is not the same as forty or fifty years ago. Some postmodern theories outline this contextual field quite well by describing certain characteristics of the cultural texts and doings of a time. The limit of these theories is their descriptiveness, though. As Sean Cubitt has argued, postmodern art practices do no more than sketch the grounds of their own possibility (or impossibility).³⁴ By this, he means the dialectic of resistance and recuperation. Others give more meanings to postmodernism. Hal Foster and Paul Crowther, for example, even separate a critical postmodern from the uncritical one. According to Crowther, whereas late-modernism questions the logic of art, post-modernism questions the social reality of art, that is, the status of the legitimating discourse.

Pragmatism and pragmatist aesthetics outline an experiential way to approach things. It takes notice of the human being in relation to her/his environment and does not play in any other world than the present. A change from the merely dehumanized art of Modernism to a human-centered art has occurred. Or, rather, we have pluralism, but in certain phenomena the emphasis on the formalist avant-garde has changed into an emphasis on the tradition of the radical avant-garde. The boundaries of the arts are blurred, but tradition continues in the different art forms too, although it does not create such problems for research as the forms I called performative. In the realm of art, the performative is an appropriate general definition for art that does not belong to any traditional categorization of art modes. The concept of the performative does not define art by form, materials or medium but by its doings, that is, the ways of producing meanings. This has its historical background in the lifelike art of the 1960s, rooted in the flâneurism of the last century and in the radical avant-garde of the beginning of this century. I suggest that if we encounter art that fulfills the "criteria" of the performative (briefly listed below), then it is plausible to deal with it by taking account of certain postmodern starting points.

Performative:

- * enact events (referent is the act itself)
- * it lies in the "self-same" present in which it is articulated
- * it cannot be repeated or reproduced and it is resistant to the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction (Phelan)
- * meaning is individualized
- * it is to do something than assert something
- * conveys and represses multiple signatures, events, and contexts
- * it is difficult to find the original with which to compare representation, or citation

- * contextualized activity: contingent, transitory and fugitive practices that bear or exhausten of some established meanings

Postmodern:

- * the doings of cultural texts have become more important than meanings which can be many
- * uniqueness of self and style as just a piece in a game
- * play with forms and discourses, depthlessness
- * expression of feelings have become superficial, emotions are projected out and externalized as dramatic gestures
- * importance of a context (contextual play)
- * fragmentarization
- * unfinished wholes, dissonance, that is, combination of components instead of synthesis
- * pluralism (variegated content and style)
- * erosion of belief in rationality
- * use of parody, nostalgia and pastiche
- * affirming and denying the existing power structures at the same time (creative transformation of conventions)
- * absent center
- * appropriation
- * site-specificity
- * impermanence
- * ritualistic and repetitive (accumulation)
- * hybridization (combination of material, genres, period references etc.)
- * discursivity (mixing visual and verbal)
- * disregard for aesthetic categories, confusion of (aesthetic) mediums
- * urban culture (maps)

Donald W. Crawford outlined five concepts for the use in the arts education: (1) the art object, (2) appreciation and interpretation (3) critical evaluation (4) artistic creation and (5) cultural context.³⁵ In art theories there have been different emphases on these. I use only this skeleton when trying to show some differences between the traditional (modernist) notions and contemporary practices.

(in Modernism)
traditionally

**in contemporary often
also**

The art object

coherent unity

open in form

permanent

temporary

an object	a process
static	an event
fulfillment of certain medium	composition of different media
morally, politically and economically neutral	positioned
autonomous	(socially) contextual

Appreciation and interpretation

emphasis on aesthetic and artistic values	taking account of participatory elements and interaction
universality	locality
originality and uniqueness of style	intertextuality, parody and mimicry, non-style
serious	entertaining

Critical evaluation

emphasis on aesthetic and artistic values of the work itself in relation to other art works	considering relations outside of the work
activity of experts	democratic

Artistic creation

artist's intention	artist as a catalyst
individual	collective
professional	mixture of professional and amateurish
progress in an art genre	centered around subject-matter
newness	repetitive (accumulation)

Cultural context

artworld	lifeworld
----------	-----------

great narratives	fragmented society
undivided (educated) audience	fragmented audiences
institutions	de- and recontextualisation

Although it is no reason to see these aspects as wholly oppositional or mutually exclusive; it is useful to compare them with each other to see that the differences are so radical that we cannot deal with all kinds of contemporary art if educated by the standards of the traditional (modernist) conception, using as examples only works of art chosen according to these criteria. Take for example the relation of activist contemporary art to the site. Modern art was seen as timeless and placeless partly due to its autonomous character. In contemporary art the *particular* site is important (as in Wodiczko's works), and sometimes it is not, as in Digg's milk-carton project, where the *nature* of the place (home) - although it is not a specific known site - is important. The essential thing is, however, that works are not separated from a specific context. Today we live in the paradox of the growing importance of locality and globality. It may be difficult for an artist to move to another place if she works with people. On one hand, globality is even more pervasive than before with Internet connections, satellites and other technical devices. This paradox is often a subject-matter of contemporary art.

Opposing the mass production and reproduction of images, art has tried to gain a new locality and authenticity, especially in 'new genre public art'. Instead of being used by the media, it uses the media. The commonplace in art emerged into consciousness again at the end of the 1950s with Johns etc., but its roots were in the radical avant-garde of the beginning of the century. This "you see what you see" attitude leads us to easily assimilate art that uses advertisement, direct symbols, and not hesitate to appropriate graphic designs when such borrowings suit its activist aims. That means that art has a similar way of using motives, material and expression modes as the SI; as a means to something else.

When art is outside the legitimating frame, ie, museums and galleries, aesthetic matters become, paradoxically, important; can art be noticed in the middle of other human activities? On the other hand, aesthetic matters have also become important in other human activities than art. The scope of the aesthetic field continues to widen so that art already has a minor part in it. Art may use an aesthetic form to direct or to center attention to a motive. In other realms of life an aesthetic form is also used to cover up the lack of any motives. However, the boundaries are blurred.

Whether speaking about style and non-style, the question arises as to whether the stress is to be put on the aesthetic and individual or on the contextual and more collective in making art. This makes the term avant-garde more relative, which allows us to grasp (theoretically) numerous different kinds of avant-garde phenomena. It became necessary to give up one-sided avant-garde definitions at the latest in the 1970s. (The same goes

for one-sided definitions of the autonomy of art.) However, did it also mean that these terms became irrelevant altogether?

Oposing the creation of style has shown itself in many ways during this century in art modes where the stress has been put on the relation between art and life, because creating a style tends towards *l'art pour l'art*. Dada, Surrealism or the Situationist International as 'isms', and artists such as Meret Oppenheim and Louise Bourgeois, did not develop a style but exploited styles created by others. More important than creating a style has been the content of art and creativity itself. Style has not been thought to be the most important thing if what matters is the need to alter the experience of the everyday. Richard Hamilton wrote in the catalogue of the exhibition *This is Tomorrow* (in Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1956) about his art group as follows: "We resist the kind of activity which is primarily concerned with the creation of style. We reject the notion that 'tomorrow' can be expressed through the presentation of rigid formal concepts. Tomorrow can only extend the range of the present body of visual experience."³⁶ Judith Barry wrote about the *Parallel of Life and Art* exhibition 1953 as follows: "The fact that the representations came from outside the art context, that they were not labeled or captioned, and that they were hung free-floating in a deliberately non-hieratic space, all reflected the organizers' belief that such imagery was altering the experience of daily life more than work being produced by 'fine artists'."³⁷ Such attributes as indetermination, non-hieraticity etc. connect an idea of lacking an original style as a value in itself.

In the sixties there was thus a deliberate attack on style; in the traditional avant-gardist sense. Nowadays it is merely indifference; choosing style is purely an instrumental act, style does not matter in art anymore. Still there remains the question: is it possible for the non-style avant-garde to become a style in a sense that certain features recur? Take, for example, intertextuality in postmodern and contemporary arts. It is also possible to hypothesize that as the aestheticization of life has brought style to everyday practice, this has led to some attempts at non-style in art. Ethics have gained in importance, and are connected to discussions about art's morality and its task in a society where ecological, racial, gender and sexual matters have become important. Usually the question is: where does aesthetics leave off and politics begin? However, this question is based on the Kantian aesthetic tradition of art as a finality without an end, and in the disinterestedness of the aesthetic. Why should we not think that there is no difference between aesthetics and politics, if our whole life has become "stylized" and the everyday "aestheticized", and the noncultural "real" no longer exists? Why, then, we should maintain differences in the realm of art? There is a need to develop a critical language that would identify and evaluate contemporary performative art uniting its political and aesthetic aspirations. What I want to do, is to give some suggestions for the perspectives from which to begin.

In the case of performative and social or political art it is difficult to create a canon of masterpieces due to their transient nature. In them experience is privileged over the material object which ordinary thinking identifies as the work of art. Thus arts education cannot be based on repeating the same examples of high art but on trying to make clear the principles and, perhaps, intentions behind art modes. Of course, intentions

can be also other than articulated by artists themselves. To learn to experience is different from learning to know what is good art. It is thought of as experience, then artistic creation must also be an experience which shapes the artist as well as the work.³⁸ When people are participating in the process of creation, they are shaped too. We need an artist to organize the process, to give it some mode. Even if it is not a question about participatory art, the perceiver creates by rewriting the work of art on her own terms. This is not submitting to art, or just filling the gaps left open, but remaking the work, constructing, and, at the same time, yielding to a captivated absorption. As Dewey thought, an aesthetic experience is not merely something that happens to us. It is a construct of the opportunities for interactions of persons and objects.

Taking the Frame Away

Can we "teach" people to take part? The Situationist International tried. Can we supply a means of communication in the absence of any kind of grammar (as in traditional art forms). Kuspit argued that Dewey's theory implies that when art exists for experience's sake one needs only a technique for involvement in the continuum of experience.³⁹ Do we not have a long tradition of participatory art modes and thus some practical knowledge of what kind of participation is meaningful. On the other hand, does William James's concept of "radical empirism", which is studying "the experience of objects and actions in which the self is a participant" help us. This requires a focus on "lived experience", which is concerned with interplay and interaction. This needs consciousness that "encompasses *both* the rage for order *and* the impulse that drives us to unsettle or confound the fixed order of things".⁴⁰ James wrote that "to know immediately, then, or intuitively, is for mental content and object to be identical"⁴¹. That is experience. It is close to what the situationists meant by uniting the subjects and objects in a situation. W. Benjamin described it by explaining how a shock effect becomes a part of consciousness through reflection. If we remember that aesthesis, in fact, means noticing the world - that is, experiencing a shock in this case - then, if the shock obeyed consciousness and the intensity of the resistance of consciousness was such that the effect immediately find its place in consciousness - without any halt in the artistic, or aesthetic experience (ie, transcendence, disinterestedness and so forth), then we can talk about an experience (Erlebnis). This happens in a situation. What is important is the sameness of a (wo)man and her environment - an experience as Dewey explains it. Experience, for Dewey, is latent with possibilities. As the opposition of transcendence, disinterestedness, separateness - the concepts of analytic aesthetics - there is no longer such a wide difference between experiencing subject and object. Art serves a variety of ends by enhancing our immediate experience, which invigorates and vitalizes us, thus aiding our achievement of whatever further ends we pursue. Art works are not merely a special function-class of instruments for

generating aesthetic experience, they modify and enhance perception and communication. Art would be richer and more satisfying to more people because it would be closer to their most vital interests and better integrated into their lives.

Gadamer held art to be a play and a game, something like a ritual with some rules, but open anyway. An art work is something that happens. In drama, for instance, actor or spectator play according to the script with relative freedom. Gadamer even sees an open game as a festival, which is close to the situationist idea of creating situations. In fact, it is possible to take different perspectives on play and game. (1) Play as a game means some rules for the roles of the artist (individual or collective) and the receiver as a player. You either play according to these rules or not, or deliberately try to change and improve them. (2) Many happenings and performances have been close to rituals that have drawn power from myths. One has or has not a role then, but to take part fully she has to know something about the character of that ritual, which can in fact be a frozen game. Paradoxical, though, play as a ritual creating a sort of "intoxication" is just what such sports as a football or ice-hockey are. (3) The situationists thought of the work of art as a play without rules. Everyone has a role but can change it whenever she wishes. Of course, arts education has often been seen as a play in the first sense. Students learn the rules of a game. Then they are given the chance to have a role in it (they become even a part of the art world). This rather presumes a strategy, ie, to see the playing field. The title of this work, *Starting to Play with Arts Education*, is intentionally ambiguous, referring to all those performative practices where taking part as a "player" is relevant. I have concentrated much on the idea of the flâneur and such-like, since this character was the first "to play" taking a role and certain attitude to his environment. Of course he wandered over a hundred years ago. However, to my mind every one has become a flâneur in a way.

Performative art does not duplicate scenes from real life, it represents certain aspects, or creates alternatives to choose from in life, for example, identity models etc. The subject itself is "performatively constituted" by acts, by choosing a style, by the ritualized repetition of some roles. There is also expression in performative art (expression of rage, hate, joy, and so forth). Art exists in a tension between the artist's rendering of reality and the artistic media. The problem is how to limit, on the one hand, a concept of representation, expression, an artist and, on the other hand, the artistic media. One solution is to understand art as practice. Performance, for example, is understood by praxis, a praxis that is itself contradictory, fluid, and protean.⁴² It is also a problem. Artistic practices do not need theory, but arts education and criticism do. Arttalk is an attempt to solve this problem by making theory a communicational practice as well. But it is not so clear how successful it can be. Therefore I tried to describe other things in relation to art than language only: physicality, noise, interaction and experiences on the emotional level, or mimicry, which are not translatable to any meta-language, at least in any appropriate way. Studying the features of the performative or postmodern I have listed above should prove this.

Outside the Art World, Within the Life World

Today we have the paradoxical problem of the broad audience: whereas art tries to play in the gap between art and life, or fill it up, the audience has been trained to think of art as something that has nothing to do with life, which does not mean that they have been trained to understand alienated art. As I have shown, the contemporary activist and political art do not merge into the modernist avant-garde, which has, in fact, lost ground. Thus to learn the premises of avant-garde art is not necessary the proper ground for understanding contemporary art. The ground has to be widened, and even to the avant-garde a wider focus must be taken, since what conservative critics and art educators have held to be nonsense has had a strong influence in art, as I have pointed out.


Art as a bourgeois construction means: not for the masses to understand. Shusterman mentioned that

for the dominant logic of high art and its aesthetic has long been one of relentless differentiation and distance from commonly accepted modes of understanding and experience. Such differentiation is expressed not only through the appreciation of radically new styles or works incomprehensible to all but the *cognoscenti*, but also through new modes of appropriating what is already appreciated by the general public.⁴³

This means that the dream that even the "underclasses" will acquire the requisite appreciation of high art, if only they receive a bit more time and education for the arts, is false. This means that it is rather paradoxical to claim that arts education should devise some system to take notice of popular culture or activist and political art, when it really means to make them even more elitist. But it is a start. Hopefully some day we shall lose the elitist ideals of the enlightenment and learn to discuss with people, and take notice of their experiences, not only practice arttalk to people. This does not mean that we should not make knowledge available for people to choose what they want to learn. To my mind the problem of art educational practice is its oneness in artistic concepts. It is merely divided along the lines of the traditional art modes. We have certain linear art historical narratives instead of more complex and multimedia-type relations of the history of art to contemporary art. Only recently, but very slowly, has there been research into the history of conceptual and performative art, although many contemporary public arts projects emanate from there. It is not to deny tradition and history of art, but to see contemporary art in relation to it, and as something different from it. Or, should we save a minor role for art history and concentrate more on theory. There are complaints about the difficulty of doing research into contemporary art, but perhaps it would be better to separate it from art history and try to find a path somewhere between cultural studies and art theory. Although it is true that artistic knowledge is cumulative and does not become obsolete (as in natural sciences), we must ask if we have to change our attitudes in studying it as well as in teaching it. We have had to revalue the meaning of the existing concepts of aesthetic and artistic values in art. To a degree they help to create

hierarchies by defining classics and masterpieces of art. Artistic autonomy is not self-evident, there are other aspects in art than those stressed by aestheticians and theorists of Modernism.

It was not my task to develop a curriculum for arts educators. I have tried to point out the need for a broader notion of the concept of art than there currently is in arts education. I do not want to tear down the premises of aesthetic education that have been already created, but I argue that an arts education limited to them is not enough for contemporary society. The most important point is not to pretend that there is a unified culture, even in the Western countries and in such faraway places as Finland. We can cry out for values, but the fact is we have many of them. Thus the notion of a meaningful experience must be democratized; in fact, it is difficult to state what a meaningful experience is. I do not claim that it is a totally subjective concern; rather, it is a participatory and an interactive concept if we mean by it the practicing of an arttalk. In addition, we do not have to talk at all; instead we could make a noise, scream, as people do at football matches. It is an experience where the physical and mental merge together, it has a meaning for people. I have opened up one avenue of inquiry only; there are other paths too. We must go on finding new corners to turn in this labyrinth, or, should we say nowadays, in this space of Star Wars.



The plaque attached to the Pioneer 10 and 11 spaceprobes was designed by late Carl Sagan and drawn by his wife, Linda Salzman Sagan.

PART 4

FROM INTERRUPTING EVERYDAY LIFE TO BUILDING IT UP

1. Bourdieu 1987, 149.
2. Smith 1989, 130.
3. Osborne 1984, 8.
4. Bourdieu 1987, 150.
5. Dewey 1958(a), 374.
6. *Ibid.*, 359.
7. Lacy 1995, 45.
8. Dewey 1958(a), 126.
9. Rorty 1989, 142.
10. Lacy 1995, 46.
11. Levi & Smith 1991, 22.
12. Shusterman 1992, 44.
13. See the description of Steinberg's problems in Smith 1989, 78ff.
14. Sandford 1995, 159. From: Yvonne Rainer interviews Anna Halprin.
15. See Dewey 1958(a).
16. See Smith 1989, 25.
17. Kuspit 1968, 94.
18. Dewey 1958(b), 87.
19. *Ibid.*, 137 & 138.
20. *Ibid.*, 103.
21. Kuspit 1968, 95.
22. Levi & Smith 1991, 169.
23. *Ibid.*, 150.
24. Osborne 1984, 5.
25. *Ibid.*, 6-7.
26. *Ibid.*, 7.
27. *Ibid.*, 9 & 12.
28. Dewey 1958(b), 123.
29. Dewey 1958(a), 108.
30. Rainer 1968, 271.
31. Dewey 1958(b), 134-135.
32. Shusterman 1992, 40.
33. *Ibid.*, 45.
34. Cubitt 1994, 291.
35. Levi & Smith 1991, 127. From Crawford: *Aesthetics in Discipline-based Art Education*; in R.A. Smith (ed): *Discipline-based Art Education*.
36. Cit. Whitham 1988, 39.
37. Barry 1988, 44.
38. Shusterman 1992, 54.
39. Kuspit 1968, 97.
40. Carlson 1996, 192.
41. James 1963 (1909), 162.
42. Carlson 1996, 193.
43. Shusterman 1992, 144.

APPENDIX

The "city walks" were organized in Jyväskylä in the summer of 1996 during the Jyväskylä Arts Festival every afternoon 11.-15. of June. The gathering place was the building of Suomen Pankki in the middle of the town.

I presented a paper of the walks in the Creative City, the international conference on the urban development and the information society that was held in Helsinki 15.-16. of August 1996. The following descriptions are from this paper.

Tuesday the 11th of June

There were fifteen people (the amount of participants was limited) and a few newspaper and TV journalists.

We walked to the meeting place of the county government where the local governor welcomed us and shook hands with the people. There was served coffee and blueberry pie. At first the atmosphere was embarrassed. Governor told about the history of the renovated and partly newbuilt building, about the plans to change the territorial division in Finland and about the cat of his family.

After the coffee the group moved to the yard where I told about the old incidents of men running publicly naked around the town. Local history of Jyväskylä tells about two such incidents from the 1880s and the 1930s, and one architect told about his own experiences of running naked on the university campus in the 1970s. The story was interrupted by a young man who dashed out of the bushes, naked, except shoes and a tie. He run past the group and vanished.

Wednesday the 12th

There were twelve participants and newspaper, radio and TV journalists. Many were along already the day before.

We walked to the police station where a police inspector told about people jailed for being drunk. The group visited two empty jails.

Then we walked to the ridge which is a green area in the middle of the town. There was a table with the white table cloth, champagne and bisquits. Walkers were served champagne (Cordon Negro) while the researcher Ari Turunen told about the drinking habits from antique to present day.

Thursday the 13th

Approximately 35 participant; all kinds of people, a word had spread.

We walked to the inner yard of a certain block on the main street (Kauppakatu). There is an old wooden temple of local christosophers (a branch of rosicrucians). Two of them presented the place and the activities there.

After that we crossed the street and went to the little bar (Vakiopaine) where coffee and biscuits were served. An actor presented the video *Pääteos* which is a document (made by Jouni Salo, Timo Siivonen and Helena Seppälä (Sederholm)) about a man who grew grass on his head. There was a lot of chatting after the presentation.

Friday the 14th

There were 45 participant and a TV camera crew.

The program consisted of a bus tour organized by *Yövieraat* (an art group that during the last eight years has made numerous plays, movies and other culture projects; in the Jyväskylä Arts Festival they had an exhibition and videos about what Alvar Aalto could have done and what he really was like; this completely new point of view on Aalto was named *Let's Make Waves*. A bus tour was part of the project.)

The first visiting place was a backyard of Aalto's Aira-house. There was waiting a two-men camel smoking Camels. The camel told that there has been found a dead and mummified horse in the cellar of the house, which is, in fact, a true story. Then a bus made a tour around the city and drove to the suburb of Kangaslampi (the reputation of which is not so good, and there is also a mental hospital there).

And so it happened that from one bus stop eight seemingly poor, crazy and smeared creatures got on the bus. One woman sitting in the front of the bus asked them to wait for the next bus since ours was a charter bus. Another woman asked me if these people were actors *for sure*. The group performed idiots, but so modestly that it was easy to confuse them to real ones: they "tried" to behave ordinarily and not to roar, but sometimes they became "spontaneously" excited about something. Most people in the bus had fun. The bus drove to the elementary school building where's also a big rabbit statue made of concrete; it is a chute for children. People were told that it is a compulsory ritual to slide down the chute which, surprisingly, rather many actually did. Then the bus drove back to the city and to the swimming hall where eight "idiots" left us. Many admired their performative skills later.

Saturday the 15th

There were over 50 participants and a TV camera crew.

There was no walking but a tattoo show in the building in front of which we had gathered. A researcher Timo Siivonen took his first tattoo: a sperm whale on his upper arm. People asked questions and Timo lectured about the body in our culture.

Another part of the program was a presentation of how microchips can be implanted under the skin, and people can thus be controlled. But the

preacher was not so passionate I was believed, and many people went away, only a small group remaining to discuss about tattoos.

One woman in training suit complained that there was not any walking although in an advertisement there read "city walks". I told her that walking was not precisely the point but she was really mad.

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YHTEENVETO

Tutkimukseni tarkastelee eräitä nykytaiteen muotoja, joista on parin viime vuosikymmenen aikana ollut vaikea saada otetta perinnäisin estetiikan ja taiteentutkimuksen käsittein. Taidekasvatuksen teoria ja siihen luottava käytäntö ovat perustuneet analyyttisen estetiikan luomaan käsitejärjestelmään. Taide, joka ei ole sopinut mainittuun käsitteistöön, on siirretty marginaaliin, eikä siihen ole kiinnitetty riittävästi huomiota, vaikka sen olemassaoloa taiteena ei olekaan kiistetty.

Laajemman (postmodernin) kulttuurimuutoksen myötä esimerkiksi elämän ja taiteen suhdetta on ryhdytty tarkastelemaan taiteentutkimuksen lisäksi myös kulttuurintutkimuksessa ja taidesosiologiassa. Kahden jälkimmäisen tutkimussuunnan näkemyksistä olen käsitellyt työtäni läpäisevänä teemana niin kutsuttua 'elämän estetisoitumisen' käsitettä. Usein on esitetty kysymys: Jos elämä on läpeensä estetisoitunutta, mitä virkaa silloin on taiteella? Tämän kysymyksen on mahdollistanut ainoastaan ajattelutapa, että taiteen tehtävänä on tuottaa esteettisiä elämyksiä.

Analyyttisen estetiikan teoreetikot ovat hahmotelleet käsitteistöä, jotta voisimme lähestyä ja tulkita taideteoksia. Heidän muotoilemansa käsitteet perustuvat tiettyihin oletuksiin esimerkiksi esteettisen elämyksen luonteesta ja sen tuottamisen edellytyksistä (taideteoksen artefaktius, teoksen yhtenäisyys, erillisyys elämismaailmasta, pyyteetön suhtautuminen teokseen jne.) Esteettinen eriytyneisyys tarkoittaa, että *taideteos* on jossain määrin erillinen siitä, mitä se representoi. Esteettisinä arvoina on pidetty usein suhdetta taiteelliseen traditioon, innovaatiota, originaalisuutta, tyyliä tai toteutuksen laadullista täydellisyyttä. Teosten tuottamien emootioiden pitäisi myös eräiden teoreetikoiden mielestä olla "sopivia" juuri esteettisessä mielessä, jopa niin että kukin taiteen laji tuottaisi juuri sille ominaisia emootioita. Kärjistäen, sopivia ovat ilon, mielihyvän ja syvän liikutuksen tunteet. Sen sijaan viha, inho tai kauhu ovat teoksen ulkonaisten suhteiden herättämiä tunteita, joilla ei sinänsä ole tekemistä teoksen sisäisen todellisuuden kanssa.

Analyyttinen estetiikka perustuu kielellisille käytännöille. Sen traditio on syntynyt lähinnä kritiikin ja teorian luomille käsitteille, harvemmin suorassa suhteessa teoksiin. On kehitetty käsite 'arttalk' - taidepuhe. Se perustuu ajatukseen metakielestä, jonka avulla voimme kuvata sanoin kuvaamatonta. Sen jälkeen taiteen arvottamisessa ja tulkinnassa jää enää hyvin vähän vastaanottajan taiteentuntemuksen ja vaiston varaan.

Yksi syvään juurtunut oletus on, että taide on autonomista, joskin monet (taidekasvatuksen) teoreetikot ovat luopumassa tästä käsityksestä. Niin sitkas käsitys kuitenkin on, että olen työssäni tarkastellut modernin taiteen autonomian syntyvaiheita. Jaan autonomian eri "autonomioiksi", sillä taide on (tai ei ole) autonomista suhteessa erilaisiin ilmiöihin.

Taidekasvatuksen teoria ja käytäntö ovat luottaneet edustaviin esimerkkeihin taiteesta: 'mestarteoksiin'. Niitä esittelemällä ja analysoimalla on pyritty opettamaan taidekasvatettaville käsitteistöä, jota nämä voi-

sivat soveltaa kohdatessaan uusia teoksia. Tässä muodossaan taidekasvatus (art education) on vakiintunut ainoastaan visuaalisiin taiteisiin ja luottanut taidehistorian arvottamiskykyyn. Koska taidehistoria - tieteen-alansa nimen ja luonteen mukaisesti - ei tutki keskeneräisiä ja meneillään olevia prosesseja, nykytaide on ainakin näihin päiviin asti paljolti laiminlyöty sekä taideteoreettisessa tutkimuksessa että esimerkiksi taidekasvatuksen teoreettista taustaa luotaessa.

Käytän käsitettä, joka vain kömpelösti taipuu suomen kielelle: taiteiden kasvatus (arts education). Nykytaide on sekoittanut taidemuotoja, kollaasista ja intertekstuaalisuudesta on tullut keskeisiä ilmaisumuotoja, ja nykytaide on hakenut vaikutteita populaarikulttuurista (ja päinvastoin), yhdistänyt taiteita ja luonut tyystin vanhoihin lajeihin mahtumattomia muotoja. Siksi onkin outoa, että esimerkiksi korkeakouluissa ja yliopistoissa annettava taideaineiden opetus ja tutkimus pysyttelevät yhä omissa linnakkeissaan.

Tutkimukseni ongelmanasettelu on kehittynyt mainitsemastani problematiikasta. Olen pyrkinyt löytämään tapoja ja käsitteitä lähestyä sellaisia nykytaiteen muotoja, jotka eivät perustu olemassaoleviin estetiikan ja taiteen teorioihin tai joille ei tee oikeutta niiden käsitteleminen vakiintunein (ja osin vanhentunein) käsittein. Ensisijainen tavoitteeni on luoda mahdollisuuksia saattaa taidekasvatuksen teoria ja käytäntö "ajan tasalle". Taidekasvatuksen uudistaminen on tärkeää, jotta nykytaiteen avoimet, muodoiltaan ja materiaaleiltaan vaihtelevat, prosessinomaiset, kontekstuaaliset, yhteisölliset ja myös poliittiset muodot tavoittaisivat yleisön.

Olen määritellyt käsitteen 'performatiivinen taide'. Se tarkoittaa taiteiden kollaasimaisia yhdistelmiä, jotka pyrkivät tuottamaan elämyksen, ei vain kuvailemalla, representoimalla tai esittämällä väitteitä, vaan myös tarjoamalla sijaa vuorovaikutukselle, osallistumiselle ja dialogille. Käsite on lähellä Suzanne Lacyn muotoilemaa termiä 'new genre public art', joka on nyttemmin suomennettu yhteisötaiteeksi.

Väitän, ettei ole syytä rajoittaa vain kielelliseen teosten vastaanottamiseen ja tulkintaan, sillä muutkin käyttäytymismuodot, kuten melun tuottaminen, eleet, toisto, vaelteleminen ym. voivat myös olla merkityksellisiä taiteen tekemisessä ja kokemisessa. Itse asiassa naisille edellä mainitut eikielelliset ilmaisumuodot ovat olleet usein merkityksellisiä taidemaailmassa, joka on operoinut sängen abstraktein käsittein ainakin 1960-luvun alkuun asti.

Lähtökohtani on, että vuosisadan alun radikaali avantgarde ja eräät 1960-luvun toiminnalliset taideilmiöt (Kansainväliset situationistit, Fluxus, happening, ym.) ovat vaikuttaneet nykytaiteeseen, ja erityisesti sen kommunikatiivisiin, poliittisiin ja vuorovaikutteisiin taidemuotoihin. Dada ja surrealismi on sysätty kurioositeeteiksi taidehistoriankirjoitukseen, muissa kuin visuaalisissa taiteissa niitä on tuskin huomattu, kun tutkimus on keskittynyt muihin ilmiöihin. Vasta viime vuosikymmenen aikana on havaittu, mikä merkitys on ollut sillä, että radikaali avantgarde siirsi painopistettä muodon problematiikasta taiteen tarkoitusten ja merkityksen pohtimiseen.

Kuusikymmenluvulta alkaen, happeningin, käsitetaiteen, performansien ja muiden vastaavien ilmiöiden myötä "taiteeseen sopivien" tunteiden

asteikko on laajentunut. Esimerkiksi kehotaitteessa on tutkittu kipua ja pelkoa. Minua ovat kiinnostaneet erityisesti taidemaailman ulkopuolelle asettautuneet Kansainväliset situationistit ja punk, jonka vaikutus taiteeseen on vielä tutkimatta. Esittelen Arthur C. Danton termin 'häiriötaide' pohtiessani, miten viha, inho ja kauhu ovat tulleet taiteeseen, ja missä merkityksessä niitä taiteessa käsitellään. Vaikka 'häiriötaide'-käsite onkin yksipuolinen, se toimii sisällöllisesti erinomaisena vastakohtana sellaiselle taiteelle, joka ei näennäisesti "häiritse", mutta tarkemmin tutkittaessa purkaa vakiintuneita myyttejä ja merkityksiä jopa tehokkaammin kuin häiriötaiteen suora hyökkäävyys. Tarkoitan esimerkiksi sellaista ilmiötä kuin 'mimicry', joka on eräänlaista jäljittelyn (mimesiksen) alleviivaamista: sellaisen jäljittelyn jäljittelemistä, jolla ei ole alkuperää.

Kaupungin katuja vaelteleva ja ympäristöään estetisoiva *flâneur* oli jo viime vuosisadalla yksi tunnetuimpia modernisteja, vaikkei tuottanutkaan taide-esineitä. Palaan työssäni flanöörin kaupunkilabyrinttia mittailevaan hahmoon, koska hän ei suunnitellut strategioita, eikä siten asettunut tarkkailemaan tilanteita niitä hallitakseen, vaan harrasti pikemminkin kulloiseenkin tilanteeseen sopivaa taktiikkaa, antaen tilanteen viedä. Nykytaiteessa - tai pikemminkin nykykulttuurissa - flanöörismi on demokratisoitunut elämän estetisoimisen taktiikaksi. Jo viime vuosisadalla flanööri oli kuluttaja, joka ei suhtautunut tekemisiinsä liian vakavasti, viihdyttipä vain itseään. Nykyisin huumori, pelit ja leikit ovat yhtä lailla taiteen kuin (tieto)koneistuneen elämämme sisältöjä. Pelien ja leikkien sekä toisaalta taiteen yhdenkaltaisuus ei ole uusi asia, mutta siihen on kiinnitetty enemmän huomiota nykytaiteessa, jossa nauru ja ilo tai äkillinen suru, kipu ja väkivalta ovat läsnä samalla kentällä - aivan kuin urheilutapahtumissa.

1960-luvun tilannetaiteilijat rakensivat elämystiloja yleisölleen. Nykyisin niiden tuottamisesta kilpailevat populaarikulttuurin luojat samoin kuin poliittisen, aktivistisen tai yhteisötaiteen edustajat, jotka haluavat vaikuttaa konkreettisesti ihmisten elämäntilanteeseen.

Tutkimukseni teoreettinen tausta on pragmatistisessa ajattelussa ja estetiikassa vastakohtana analyttiselle estetiikalle, joka metakielineen ja hermeettiseltä vaikuttavine taidepuheineen operoi mielestäni liian kaukana taiteesta.

Käyttämäni esimerkkimateriaali on tietoisesti epähierarkkista: käytän esimerkkeinä sekä taiteen mestariteoksia että jokseenkin tuntemattomien taiteilijoiden tuntemattomia teoksia. Samaan aikaan kun tätä väitöstä julkisesti tarkastetaan, on Jyväskylän Taidemuseossa esillä koostamani installaatio: kollaasi vuosi sitten kokemaani sairauteen liittyvää materiaalia. Se on ohimenevä kooste, erään elämänjakson analyysi, johon ei ole tarpeen palata samassa muodossa mutta joka tulee aina palaamaan elämäni eri muodoissa. Elämä on labyrintti, jossa suoria reittejä ei ole; tuon tuostakin palaamme kohtaan, jossa olemme jo olleet. Miksi taide sitten olisi jatkokertomus, joka etenee alusta loppuun?