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101

Jussi Kotkavirta

Practical Philosophy and Modernity

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A Study on the Formation of Hegel's Thought

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UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ

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ABSTRACT

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According to Hegel, philosophy should comprehend its own time in thoughts. Hegel meets this "need of philosophy", as he calls it, by constructing a massive and very consequential system in which he claims to explicate the fundamental principles of the modern age as a result of a historical development. The present study aims at analyzing Hegel's conception of modernity as a philosophical problem. It concentrates on his early practical philosophy, in which Hegel seeks to establish a synthesis of Platonic and Aristotelian thought and modern theories. He considers this synthesis necessary because he cannot approve of the modern differentiation between ethics, political sciences, economics and jurispudence, each of which studies society from a viewpoint if its own. Instead, he works out a normative presentation of modern society as a unity, comprising its various institutions, norms and values, and considers them against the demands of reason and life itself. The study analyzes the formation of this construction and its development up until the year 1807 when Hegel left Jena. It concentrates especially on the changes that have taken place, since antiquity, in the notion of labor and its theoretical status. Being well aware of the division of labor and the exchange of goods as underlying principles of modern society, Hegel maintains that the classical model of practical philosophy, articulating ethical and political praxis within a polis, cannot be applied as such. The study analyzes the formation of Hegel's modern equivalent for this model. After postulating first a somewhat anachronistic ethical substance and founding it metaphysically on the notion of ethical nature, he gradually develops a practical philosophy based on his dialectical metaphysics of subjectivity and spirit. He recognizes the principles of subjective freedom and individuality fundamental in modernity, while being simultaneously critical of their actual historical forms. The study also explicates some of the particular qualities of Hegel's practical philosophy in his Jena period as compared to his later philosophy of spirit, and defends its significance for the present discussions concerning the foundations of ethics and political philosophy.

Keywords: practical philosophy, labor, modernity, modern society, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion.

"Strive towards the sun, my friends, so that the weal of the human race soon may ripen! What are the leaves and the branches holding you back trying to do? Break through to the sun. And so what if you tire! All the sounder will be your sleep."

Hippel[1]

Der eine klärt das Zeitalter auf, der Andere empfindet es in Sonetten hinauf, erzieht es auf, reflectiert, schaut es hinauf, betet es hinauf. Das Zeitalter is für jeden der truncus ficulnus, aus dessen Ganzem jeder einen Merkur fabriciren will; aber der Teufel führt ihm unter den Händen den truncus, oder, um in ein ander Gleichniss überzugehen, den Montblancgranit weg und lässt ihm nur ein Splitterchen oder Körnchen, so dass, wenn man sein fertiges Werk nunmehr beim Licht besieht, er ein verdammt kleines Merkürchen herausgebracht hat, und nicht genug über Schlechtigkeit der Zeit und des Teufels schimpfen kann, der ihm nur solche Bromasen gelassen hat, so dass nur eine Menge von Zeitälternchen herumlaufen, die alle anders schildern: Salzmännisches, Campesches, Kuchpockenzeitälternchen; - es abklären, dass es reiner klarer Ether werde, aus dem frei die Sterngestalten in ewiger Sonnenschönheit in der Mitte herausbringen.

Hegel[2]

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1 Quoted by Hegel in his letter to Schelling in 16th April, 1795.

2 Aphorismen aus der Jenenser Zeit. Cit. Rosenkranz 1844, p. 555.

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I want to dedicate this book to my mother and to the memory of my father, and to the late Ilkka Patoluoto and Matti Kosonen.

At Wind Village 14th November 1993

Jussi Kotkavirta

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION

This study is a systematic reconstruction of Hegel's practical philosophy in Jena, including its early formation. It is built on a close reading of Hegel's texts up until his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, which is only briefly discussed in the epilogue. The study aims at making intelligible Hegel's philosophical position in respect to his own time, so as to comprehend his original and in fact highly consequent pursuit of what the time in his view most urgently needed on ethical, political and spiritual levels. In this way we hope to get a better insight into both Hegel and his time.

Hegel started his career as a philosopher in 1800. Before that he thought of himself in the first place as a kind of religious reformer, as a would-be *Aufklärer* who wanted to subject the entire religious institution to thorough and critical examination, considering the various forms it had taken over the centuries after Jesus. It is clear, however, that although the development of Hegel's thought from the Tübingen years up until the Jena period contains most amazing and radical changes, an essential continuity can be detected, too. This continuity, it seems, has to do with the way Hegel conceives of his own task as a thinker in the domain of religion and, later, in philosophy. There is, as I will try to show, something unique in Hegel's understanding of his own task, something which distinguishes his thought from Hölderlin and Schelling, from Kant and Schiller, and this is closely connected with the specifically Hegelian idea of practical philosophy.

This idea of practical philosophy and its development stands out as the main subject of the present study. More generally it should be noted, however, that as far as Hegel's time, the historical epoch which he attempts to both comprehend and criticize, can be viewed as that of ours, too, his ideas might still deserve serious consideration - not only for idea historical reasons but also because of their actual implications. It has been the author's conviction that Hegel's ideas on practical philosophy,

many of which he later gave up in his better-known philosophy of spirit, might have important consequences for the present efforts to think of the foundations of both ethics and political philosophy. Only some of these will be taken up explicitly in the course of the present study, however.

Although Hegel himself does not use yet the term "modernity" - in fact it did not establish itself as a general term until the end of the 19th century[1] - he should be considered as the philosopher for whom modernity itself, as a specific historical epoch with its own self-understanding and principles, becomes a, or even the, major problem.[2] Many philosophers before Hegel, from Descartes and Hobbes on at least, had studied the fundamental issues of both theoretical and practical philosophy from premisses that are clearly modern. In fact, the premisses and also the results of Kant, for example, or those of Descartes and Hobbes, are in many respects "more modern" than those of Hegel, and it would be easier to defend their actual signicance as compared to Hegel.

Most signicantly there had been a wide unanimity among philosophers, whose thinking was otherwise founded on very different traditions, on the fundamental issue that philosophy in the modern sense must begin from the subject. Thus philosophy denies the authority of the instances that are beyond the cognitive or practical capacities of the human subject and *constructs*, instead of seeking the logos of such ontological instances, the fundamental principles of reason, whether theoretical or practical, from the subject himself. At its various levels and in its own ways, philosophy thus articulates or constitutes the fundamental principles of the modern age as a whole. Before Hegel, however, no philosopher seems to have faced as a problem that the premisses and principles of modern philosophy which - as Hegel very clearly perceives - are essentially those of modernity at large, should themselves be subjected to most fundamental and critical inspection. Rousseau's work, naturally, points to this direction, as Hegel too

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1 Giusti 1987, p. 26 is thus quite right as he remarks that for this reason he instead of choosing "modernity" uses the term "modern world". However, in the important discussions during the last few years the term "modernity" has come to denote a theoretical notion with several meanings of such relevance for my study, that I I find it problematical not to use the term, too. While being aware of this terminological agreement, we should not necessarily commit ourselves guilty of a serious anachronism. Pippin 1991, for example, has made a similar decision.

2 This is formulated clearly and correctly by Jürgen Habermas 1987, p. 16: "Hegel was the first to raise too the level of a philosophical problem the process of detaching modernity from the suggestion of norms lying outside of itself in the past. (...) He sees philosophy confronted with the task of grasping *its own* time - and for him it means the modern age - in thought. Hegel is convinced that he cannot possibly obtain philosophy's concept of itself independently of the philosophical concept of modernity." I cannot, however, agree with Habermas' conclusion, which follows from his own theory of this age - that Hegel would in his "too good" formulation of the problem loose all touch with his time. "In the end, philosophy removes all importance from its own present age, destroys its interest in it, and deprives it of the calling to self-critical renewal", he writes (p. 42). My reading of the Jena Hegel will imply as a comment to this line of interpretation that Habermas, who, after all, still thinks very much within the Kantian framework, is not attentive to the critical idea of the specifically Hegelian practical philosophy and perhaps not even to Hegel's philosophy in general.

recognizes, but he was not as yet able to reflect on the principles themselves in a sufficiently radically manner. Hegel's relation to Kant, as far as it is a critical one, may be understood as arising from a consequence of the insight that neither is it possible for him as yet to proceed far enough in the domain of reason and to reflect the principles he has detected. According to Hegel, the same can in principle be said of Fichte. And as to Hegel's closest friends in his youth, Schelling and Hölderlin, he came to understand that their efforts, viewed as a whole, are perhaps radical enough but do not relate to the actual modern world and its problems in a way that would fulfil the the standards he has set for his own work. Schelling's philosophy is esoteric in a sense which Hegel cannot subscribe, and the ingenious Hölderlin is after all a tragician and a poet. Thus, Hegel strives after something to which perhaps only Nietzsche's and Heidegger's later and very different critiques of modernity and its philosophy could be compared.[3]

In the following I will try to illustrate how Hegel gradually, through several theoretical steps, which in many cases only vaguely point to the same direction, constructs his practical philosophy, which is to be called modern in the sense that it is based on the principles of modern philosophy, although it is fundamentally at odds with the principles of this historical epoch. Thus his philosophy contains a reflection on the principles of modernity, relating them to a longer historical development of the western world. It is a Hegelian strategy to present the conditions of the present as the result of a historical process as comprehensively as possible, after which their totality is viewed from from a still wider or "absolute" viewpoint. At least as far as his practical philosophy is concerned, this strategy is by no means as incomprehensible as it may seem but contains, because of its very insistence on the absolute viewpoint, i.e. one that encompasses all the relevant phenomena as a totality, an indispensable critical potential.

To put the matter in more concrete terms, I would say that Hegel in his practical philosophy basically wants to study the modern world, its cultural and social formations, against the demands of life itself. We shall see that one of his central intuitions attained already in his very early years is that one should think of society and its institutions, or culture, religion and of art, too, not only through the use of reason but also as they are actually experienced, felt and sensed. Hegel is most noticeably interested in their contribution to the modern life itself in its individual and collective forms. During his formative years before Jena, his fundamental questions were centered on the idea of a folk religion, concerning the demands of life on the one hand, and those of reason on the other. How should these demands be understood and combined, he asks again and again. Very essential for him is to think of them together

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3 A number of interesting comparisons of Hegel's and Heidegger's critiques, in particular, have been made fairly recently. See, e.g., Gillespie 1984, Taminiaux 1985, Kolb 1986, Schmidt 1988, Thomä 1990. On Hegel and Nietzsche see Pippin 1991 and esp. Djuric 1985 and Ottmann 1987.

and precisely this, it seems to me, is one of the specifically Hegelian viewpoints here, from which his solidarity with and his opposition to Kant's practical philosophy, for instance, only becomes intelligible.

In Hegel's practical philosophy such central notions as life, love and ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) are all indications of Hegel's view of human Dasein as a kind of organic unity. This unity, however, is not of a simple kind and it would be very misleading to call Hegel a philosopher of life, perhaps in any sense of the word. For it is a distinctively Hegelian insight, which he came to at a young age, that life is always lived as a collective ethos, which in turn is decisively conditioned by historically changing norms and other institutional arrangements. The question of life, or of ethical life, which is the ultimate question of his practical philosophy, is then a question of society in all its conceivable meanings.

Here we have in fact the basic elements in which Hegel will present the problem of modernity in his practical philosophy. Hegel faces modernity with the demands of ethical life and reason, and seeks intensively his way to formulate the correct combination of them. One of the problems pertaining to the idea of reason, which Kant had in his epoch-making critical philosophy detected, was its abstractness and heterogeneity. We may say that reason in its Kantian formulations did not fulfill the demands of substantiality and unity of life. According to Hegel this actually applies to the modernity as a whole, for everything in it tends to "differentiate" and become abstract or "positive", loosing its connection to a living unity.

During his formative years in Tübingen, Bern and Frankfurt, Hegel looked into these conflicting demands, concentrating on his notion of a folk religion. It is a critical notion and very much directed against the prevalent Christian views about religion and church. One of the constant aspects in his reflections - as in the one's of many other contemporary German thinker- - are references and allusions to the classical Greek world. Besides Rousseau's civic religion, he is evidently thinking of the ancient polis and its ethos, when he in Tübingen and after emphasizes that a folk religion should be a public religion and promote citizen's participation in the public and official affairs. But, we should notice, especially the two other demands for a folk religion which Hegel makes in *Tübingen essay* (see ch. 4 below), that it should be found on universal reason and that it should be rooted in our imagination, heart and the senses, are not themes that could, in this form at least, be found in the ancient authors' works. Plato and Aristotle, who to Hegel are the most important classical writers, do not reflect on religious questions or on subjective demands of this sort in their practical philosophy. Thus, when Hegel ponders on religion againts the concrete needs of life, his context and problems are basically modern, i.e. those created by Christianity in general and more specifically by the religious and intellectual culture of his home state Württemberg.[4]

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4 See esp. Dickey 1987, pp. 1-180, who reconstructs the theological and political

For Hegel the main problem with Christian religion is that it has become "positive". This means that it has distanced itself from actual life and tends to repress instead of edifying man's spiritual needs. What are these needs? Especially in Bern, where Hegel intensively studies the historical reasons behind the emergence of this religion, he makes it clear that he is ultimately thinking of the need for a moral autonomy in the Kantian sense of the word. Thus he reproduces Jesus as the teacher of the Kantian moral reason and opposes him to the legalism of his Jewish contemporaries. Hegel is here not so far from the critique of religion as presented by certain proponents *of Aufklärung*, but his interests point to another direction. Later in Jena - especially in the essay *Glauben und Wissen* and then in *Phänomenologie des Geistes* - he will explicate his fundamental position which seems to have been his option in Bern already, that the spiritual needs of the time cannot be fully satisfied by either of the poles in the opposition of reason and faith. Thus he is after a folk religion that would contain them both, but not in the "positive" form as they exist in contemporary debates.

The radical turns that take place in Hegel's thinking after he meets Hölderlin again in Frankfurt can be understood as his attempts to found the program of a folk religion on a stronger philosophical notion than that of the Kantian practical reason. The most central notions are those of love, now more than before in the sense of the Platonic *eros*, of life, and of *pleroma*, of a complement to the law which Hegel now discovers in Jesus' teachings, all of which remind us of *hen kai pan*, the symbol of the Tübingen friends for a living unity vanished in the modern world. This is the period in Hegel's development when he distances from his earlier Kantianism and, now closer to both Hölderlin and Schelling, and Fichte too, attempts to think of a fundamental unity that preceeds the Kantian dualisms of autonomy and heteronomy, reason and faith, freedom and necessity, individuality and universality. This early development of Hegel's thought will be studied in some detail in ch. 4.

When Hegel then in Jena publishes his first programmatic essays, it turns out that, instead of a folk religion, he is thinking of philosophy as that intellectual instance where one should look for the ultimate answers to the spiritual needs of the time. Hegel's idea for a philosophy, i.e. for a modern philosophy as it then is formulated during his first Jena years, will be discussed systematically in ch. 6. In order to grasp the full meaning of Hegel's practical philosophy, what is he trying to point out there and why and in what kind of arguments, it is necessary to create a fairly comprehensive picture of his philosophical program as a whole.

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milieu of Hegel's home state with extreme care and within an interesting theoretical framework. Dickey tells in fact much the same story which I intend to present, but he does it exclusively in the German religious and theological context of the time. The main emphasis of his study is on the context itself. It illuminates several relevant details in an interesting way, but remains nevertheless fairly remote from my more systematic efforts to comprehend the formation Hegel's practical philosophy. Dickey has the most to say about pre-Jena Hegel, and his critical comments on Kaufmann's, Lukács' and Taylor's interpretations of Hegel's theological periods are basically relevant, I think; see Dickey 1987, pp. 150-157.

Hegel's practical philosophy is speculative by nature and it is also supposed to be systematic.

Ch. 7 will continue to discuss of Hegel's general philosophical program and principles, since there take place dramatic changes in Hegel's thought. Hegel's overall program focussing on a fundamental and living unity remains unchangend, but the basic principles and structures which should carry this program are radically reconsidered several times. Thus Hegel eventually gives up the rather Schellingian substance metaphysics, replacing it with a metaphysics of subjectivity. This development is accompanied by structural changes in the the system, which philosophy in his view is to adopt, and also by the introduction of dialectics as the adequate method of philosophy. Last but certainly not least, turning to the metaphysics of subjectivity implies and contains a change in Hegel's view on the fundamental notions of nature and spirit. This change is of special importance for the present study, because it touches upon the very core of Hegel's critique of modernity, containing also deep re-assessments in his relation to the philosophical tradition. In a sense, and from a certain point of view, the rest of the study organized around this problem. For the purposes of the present introduction, I would like to clarify the matter from a somewhat wider perspective.

Though treated many times before, I have chosen to found my discussion of Hegel's practical philosophy on the classical distinction between poiesis and praxis. My intention, however, is not to defend or oppose any general distinction pertaining action theory or political philosophy derived from this, as is frequently done, e.g. in treatments of Hannah Arendt's or of Habermas' work. Neither is it my intention to reduce Hegel's practical philosophy to - or even to evaluate it as such against - any interpretation of this distinction. Two general reasons could be given for adopting this approach in my discussion, however. First, it is simply so that Hegel frequently refers to both Plato and Aristotle in his writings on practical philosophy, and it is quite evident that he proposes a conception which systematically owes to these classical authors rather than to the practical philosophies of Hobbes or Kant, for instance. For that reason, then, it should be worth studying in what sense Hegel builds, and in what sense he does not, on the distinction between praxis and poiesis which for Aristotle, in particular, belongs to the deep structure of his practical philosophy.

While my study focusses mainly on Hegel's position is relation to his own time, i.e. the early modernity, I will also have to touch upon what modernity, especially for Hegel, stands for. The second reason for starting with the distinction between praxis and poiesis is connected with this task. For modernity is very much, and Hegel's critical concern with it derives from his exceptional awareness of its being, a world dominated by "poietic" activities and principles. At a very general and partly superficial level, Hegel's practical philosophy may be - and has been - understood as an attempt at rehabilitating, in a world which for

him is becoming all too much a *bourgeois* world, this distinction by distinguishing the state as the arena of ethico-political praxis from the civil society. However, the matter is extremely complicated, for Hegel and for us alike, because of his awareness of how deeply rooted the ethos of making, constructing, bringing about and producing lies in the principles of modernity - philosophy itself included. Especially in *Phänomenologie des Geistes* Hegel will later try to recognise this ethos of modernity in the most fundamental principles of his philosophy.

I will start in ch. 2 by looking into the nature and significance of the notions of praxis and poiesis especially in Aristotle's texts and how the distinction between them is established in his practical philosophy. In what sense do Aristotle and Plato justify the exclusion of the poietic activities from the actual ethical and political praxis, is the question to be studied here. I will then draw up a more historical narrative of how the dominant views about labor have gradually changed thereafter, how labor itself is, in the Christian tradition, for example, taken not so much as "toil and trouble" than as a task given by God to us all.

This narrative appears more to the point when approaching the beginnings of modernity. For the new direction in political philosophy brought about by Hobbes, and even the rupture caused by Descartes in the *prima philosophia* itself, is in essence related to the normative distinction between praxis and poiesis. In modern philosophy, a theory is something fundamentally different from the ancient theoria. A modern theory no longer questions the logos of some ontological object. There is no need or room for a dialectic, neither in the Platonic nor in the Aristotelian sense, which would proceed to the very first ontological principles of the object under inspection. Modern philosophy, instead, focuses on the knowing subject himself and finds qua epistemological reflection the few evident premisses from which it may then construct or produce its objects.

The consequences of this change, as I will try to indicate in ch. 2. and ch. 3, appear most dramatic within practical philosophy. In fact, practical philosophy in the traditional sense tends to dissolve as a result of this change. As we know, especially Aristotle, but perhaps Plato, too[5], emphasized that in practical matters knowledge has an altogether different purpose another and nature than it has in theoretical philosophy. Most clearly and very consciously this distinction is resolved in the work of Hobbes. He considers political philosophy no less exact or demonstrable than geometry. It too has its evident premisses from which it may safely proceed and gain as true knowledge as any theory.

This will imply, among other things, that the arena of ethical and political praxis as a whole, in the sense it was conceived by the Greeks, disappears more or less totally from theoretical horizon. No longer is it seen as the arena where citizens' actual views on how the individual and

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5 See esp. Gadamer 1986, where the fundamental continuity of their practical philosophies is defended in a very thoughtful manner.

collective problems of life should be arranged are discussed and studied from the viewpoint of some ultimate good. There is no *empeiria* in the Aristotelian sense in Hobbes' political philosophy.[6] By bracketing basically all the pre-philosophical views of men, i.e. their ethical and political praxis, philosophy takes on an exact and demonstrable character. It becomes, we may say, in a very general sense "poietic".[7]

Thus, instead of the classical praxis and the highest good, labor and power are the most fundamental notions in Hobbes' social and political theory. In a somewhat different sense they are the most fundamental ones in Locke's thinking, too, as he attempts to justify a political community of private owners by appealing to a state of nature where one's original possessions are gained by means of his own labor. Not the classical freedom from labor, but labor itself is seen by these early modern thinkers as the activity which is supposed to justify one's membership in a political community. And the community itself, as Hegel will point out, is very different from the classical ideas of a state.

In ch. 3 I further elaborate my discussion of the changes that have taken place in the foundations of social and political philosophy. I will start by commenting on Reinhardt Koselleck's and Hans Blumenberg's important efforts to reconstruct the modern idea of history as a general process of the human species, seeking to answer the ultimate of what modernity itself is in the light of its own self-understanding. The issue naturally involves complicated problems of legitimation, and I will make an attempt at relating some of the views represented by modern social thinkers to the simultaneous undertakings aiming at giving a modern definition of human needs and, on the other hand, of the labor which satisfies those needs. I will reflect here on political economy, especially that of Adam Smith, as a kind of modern practical philosophy which, though it tends to follow methodically rather the model of Newtonian natural science, is connected with the normative problems of the entire tradition of the natural law thinking. The chapter will end with a brief discussion of the fundamentals of Kants' practical philosophy.

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6 An interesting history of the different conceptions of what empeiria implies within for social reseach is Bonns 1982. Though the quantitative social empeiria was produced much later as a statistical construction, one could certainly say that it would not have been possible without the pioneering philosophical constructions of Hobbes and others.

7 Let me quote here Taminiaux 1985, p. 27, who reports about Heidegger's findings on this matter: "At the moment in which *mathesis* determines the new view that modernity casts on nature, it challenges from the very outset the introduction of the ancient Greek distinction between *poioumena* and *fysika*, between things as they are produced by man and things as they emanate from nature and are manifested from themselves. For *mathesis*, this distinction looses all epistemic import, when for Aristotle it grounds two types of *episteme*: poietic knowledge, which measures up the work to be produced, and knowledge relative to the things of nature, which measures up that which manifests itself from itself, and which is for perception; that is to say, Heidegger explains (in *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, J.K.), 'for pure and simple acceptance and reception (in contradistinction to the fabrication and the manipulating of things)'. This double distinction in the thing and in knowledge collapses with modern *mathesis*. This latter, one could say, asserts that there is *fainomenon* only as *poioumenon*."

This is necessary because Kant in fact defines philosophically the ultimate principles of modernity itself, and because all the efforts of Hegel, like those of Fichte, Schelling and other German thinkers, must be seen as attempts to complete Kant's transcendental turn in philosophy.

In the subsequent chapters central to my study, I will then follow in detail the formation of Hegel's practical philosophy. In ch. 5 his political interventions, especially *Verfassung Deutschlands* will be discussed. The Hegelian idea of a state, as formulated in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* and in his later lecture courses, will be outlined here. After going into the general systematic intentions and principles of Hegel's philosophy and their development in Jena, I will undertake a close comparison of his two most complete sketches for a practical philosophy, i.e. *System der Sittlichkeit* from the academic year 1802/03 and *Realphilosophie* 1805/06. My reading will center around the notions of labor and ethical life.

First, in ch. 8, the beginnigs of the two systems will be studied. I attempt to show how Hegel - very much unlike Kant - starts by concentrating on the actual social and economic phenomena. Following Plato and Aristotle rather than the modern traditions he, then, in *System der Sittlichkeit* presents the various activities and institutions as forms of natural ethical life, which in his presentation already imply or presuppose the following more substantial ones. For reasons linked with the character of modernity itself and with Hegel's attempts to come to terms with it he will, however, proceed very differently in *Realphilosophie* 1805/06.

For now he begins with the individual subject and his most elementary activities. Hegel's idea is to show, then, how the subjects in their various activities act except on the objects and other subjects also on themselves, and how they by doing so create or constitute themselves as modern individuals. By studying the different forms of their mutual recognition, Hegel now presents critically the emergence of what for him is a modern civil society, with its various institutions and norms, as an intermediary stage towards the state as an ethical and political totality. Labor has according to Hegel roles very central to the constitution of the abstract "system of reality", as will be shown in my comparative readings. From a more general viewpoint, one feature of particular interest in these early versions of his theory of civil society and state is that the subjective structures of action and mutual recognition are developed together with the corresponding institutional considerations. Thus ethics, social theory and political philosophy all belong together here. For this reason, then, we may speak about Hegel's practical philosophy in Jena as something which does not have an exact equivalent in his later lectures on *Philosophie des Rechts*.

In ch. 9 the Hegelian idea of state, as presented in the two lecture courses, will be studied systematically, concentrating on two complicated questions, both of which stand out as essential when Hegel's critical relation to the modern world and its principles is considered.

First, I will conclude my discussion concerning the notions of poiesis and praxis by looking into Hegel's complicated conception of action as he in the two systems, with different principles, presents his state as the organization of substantial or absolute ethical life. Secondly, I will, then, compare the two systems as to the roles assigned to the individuals within the political realm of the state. This, as we know, is one of the topics usually brought up when criticizing Hegel, for example, as an antiliberal and a substantial communitarian who ultimately does not understand what is going on in the modernity.[8] In my view Hegel, who very clearly recognized individuality as the higher principle in the modern world, has much more to say on this topic.

In the epilogue the major results of the study are explicated at a somewhat more general level. I will also ponder the question why Hegel, while lecturing *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, was writing the book which later became his final breakthrough, i.e. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. An interpretation of *Phänomenologie* does not come within the scope of my study. However, I will discuss briefly its relations to Hegel's practical philosophy in Jena, pointing up the relevance of the notion of labor in the book, at both practical and speculative levels.

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8 For a view of this kind see e.g. Larmore 1987, pp. 99-107.

2 LABOR AND ETHICAL LIFE IN HISTORY

When Hegel in Jena begins to outline his ethical and political philosophy systematically, he is most inspired by the authors of classical antiquity.[1] In opposition to the modern philosophy in general and to the Kantian practical philosophy in particular, Hegel builds on the following Aristotelian principle:

> The positive is prior by nature to the negative, or, as Aristotle says: "The state comes by nature before the individual; if the individual in isolation is not anything self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state in one unity, just as other parts are to the whole. But a man incapable of communal life, or who is so self-sufficient that he does not need it, is no part of the state and must be either a beast or a god (*GW 4*, p. 468; *NL*, p. 113).[2]

Like the classical practical philosophy as a discourse about good life in *polis*, Hegel too conceives of the individual always as a moment within a larger social, political and ethical entity. For him, too, this totality is of primary importance, not the individual as such, for only within it may the individual develop into what he really is. In much the same manner as Plato and Aristotle, Hegel will then attempt to demonstrate the "natural" or true organization of this ethical and political entity, and to situate the individuals, through their corresponding estates or classes, into their proper positions in the totality. Hegel intends his presentation to have a normative force in the same sense as the writings of Plato and Aristotle have. He too would like to present the idea of the good as existent in the modern state as an ethico-political totality.[3] Thus we may

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1 The exemplary role of Aristotle is emphasized, e.g., by Ilting 1963/64, Ritter 1969, Riedel 1984; the importance of Plato, instead, by Viellard-Baron 1979 and Düsing 1985.

2 Hegel cites *Politics*, 1253a25-29.

say that Hegel systematically proposes a certain rehabilitation of the classical practical philosophy as a normative unity of ethics, politics and economics. Or perhaps we should rather say that this rehabilitation stands out as a very central element in his speculative correction or *Aufhebung* of modern attempts at thinking philosophically of the ethical and political praxis.

This characterizes especially the texts written during his first years in Jena. In his first philosophical treatments (until the year 1800 he conceived of himself mainly as a religious reformer; see ch. 4 below) as well as in his early political interventions (cf. ch. 5 below), Hegel faced the fragmentation of the ethical and political community rather directly with the Aristotelian idea of an organic totality. Against its fragmentation, its *Entzweyung*, i.e. its differentiation into autonomous spheres which do not perceive themselves as belonging to the ethical totality - which re recognizes as the distinctive and pervasive quality of modernity - he defended a fundamental unity as an ethical substance. Already before entering Jena, however, he was fully aware that the idea had to be modified because the modern society, and the modern world in general, indeed functions on different principles and ideals than the classical one. Thus Hegel studied most intently both the contemporaneous societies as well as their historical backgrounds - working on every kind of material from foreign newspapers to a wide range of theoretical treatises.[4]

In the two chapters that follow I will first try to outline the idea historical background against which Hegel eventually poses the modern world as a philosophical problem. Like many thinkers before him, Hegel too is of the opinion that this world, in contrast with its ancestors, very much concentrates on the acquisition and growth of material wealth, that it tends to be a bourgeois world of making. Labor and work, their efficiency and division, goods and their prices in the markets - all these and related phenomena are important coordinates in the modernity. Ethically, or more precisely *sittlich*, when the ethical life of a community considered, these issues are problematic, though, according to Hegel; for like the Greek thinkers he is convinced that both individual and society, or state, should have higher ethical and political ends than the growth of wealth as such or material affluency. In respect to these ends, labor and work should be seen primarily as a means and not as an end in itself.

In the present chapter I will go briefly into Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions about this constellation, describing also the subsequent change in the views after them. In the next chapter I will characterize more generally the notions of modernity and modern world, considering them against an overall re-evaluation of not only the notions of labor and work but also of their status in the social and political thought

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3 On the idea of the good in Plato's and Aristotle's thought see esp. Gadamer 1986.

4 See Rosenkranz 1844, pp. 59-60. On Hegel's familiarity with the Scottish sources see esp. Waszek 1988, pp. 56-141.

which took place during the 17th and 18th centuries.

In what follows, the reader should be reminded, no more than certain basic coordinates will be explicated. Neither the practical philosophies of Platon and Aristotle, nor the Scottish political economy, the theories of universal history, the various theories of natural law, or of freedom in the modern sense, will be discussed exhaustively. My intention here is to sketch out the background necessary for comprehending of Hegel's problem and his critical discussion of the modern world, which will be the theme of the subsequent chapters.

Poiesis, praxis and labor

In his practical philosophy Aristotle studies that part of being which is constituted in and through human action. In his ethics and politics a systematization of various types of human action is carried through from a teleological viewpoint. Thus *Nichomachean Ethics* (*NE*) begins with the following well-known words:

> Every art and every inquiry, and similarily every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better that the activities (*NE*, 1094a1-5).

Aristotle here indicates the famous distinction between praxis and poiesis, or acting and making, wherein lies the basis for the distinction between the productive sciences, e.g. medicine, engineering, economics, and, on the other hand, the practical sciences proper, i.e. ethics and politics.[5] While the theoretical sciences study the beings with the principle of their movement and rest within themselves, the objects of the productive and practical sciences move through the action of a human "mover". The practical sciences are further differentiated from a certain teological viewpoint.

Aristotle opens *Nicomachean Ethics* with a dialectical discussion about the various ends of human action and reaches, by "saving the fainomena"[6], i.e. by trying to do rationally justice to the actual views of the Athenians as well as to the doctrines put forward by other thinkers, the conclusion that the highest end for men is *eudaimonia*. This conclusion, that men seem to choose eudaimonia, and only it, "not for anything other than itself" (*NE*, 1097b7-8), will then serve as the premiss

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5 On the classification of sciences see esp. *Metaphysics*, 1025b3-31.

6 Cf. *Metaphysics* 1074a1 and Nussbaum 1986.

directing the subsequent discussion about a rational and good life. Eudaimonia is the highest end, and every other end appears more as a means in relation to it. Eudaimonia as such may rarely, if ever, be the immediate end of an action; actions are rather directed towards ends that in various ways contribute to eudaimonia. The respective contributions of poietic and practical activities to it, however, differ from each another, Aristotle maintains. Yet he does not distinguish between them quite unequivocally. The matter is difficult and deeply embedded in the overall definition of practical philosophy, and even of philosophy as a whole. It is also a distinction whose original meaning is difficult to capture for a modern reader.

In one of his formulations Aristotle maintains that poiesis and praxis are "different in kind"[7], while he in another one states, more carefully, that "neither is acting making nor making acting"[8]. Though the first formulation could be taken to suggest the opposite, Aristotle is obviously not of the opinion that praxis and poiesis are, or belong to, two ontologically different classes of events with exclusive extensions. He rather seems to think, as especially the second formulation may be read, that they are two teleologically different aspects or points of view to an action, or two possible descriptions of an event with different intentions.[9] There are actions that may be described only as practical, or poietical, but there are also ones that may be classified as both.

More tricky the distinction in question becomes when the making proves to be a means of acting, poiesis of praxis, and especially for that which Aristotle calls *eupraxia*, i.e. good praxis.[10] The Greeks generally considered poiesis something subordinate to praxis, especially to the political praxis of free men. But in what sense, then, can one make the distinction between means and ends, and talk about ends apart from the corresponding activities? One of the central clues here is the following:

> Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative to the end, e.g. the process of making thin is of this sort, and the things themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e. without being already that at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that in

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7 *NE*, 1140b2-4: "...practical wisdom cannot be knowledge nor art; not knowledge because that which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different kinds of thing."

8 *NE*, 1140a: "Among things that can be otherwise are included both things made and things done; making and acting are different (...); so that the reasoned state of capasity to act is different from the reasoned capasity to make. Nor are they included one in the orther; for neither is acting making nor making is acting."

9 This line of interpretation has been defended e.g. by Ebert 1976 and Müller 1982a and 1982b. Ebert 1976, p. 21 writes: "Mit der Aussage über die Zugehörigkeit zu unterschiedlichen Genera trägt Aristoteles dem Unterschied auf intesionaler Ebene Rechnung; mit der vorsichtigen Ausdrucksweise in 1040a5f dem Umstand, dass der intensionalen Unterschiedenheit nicht auch eine extensionale Disjunktheit entspricht."

10 Cf. Ebert 1976, p. 20.

which the end is present is an action.[11]

In a poietic act the end remains outside its scope, whereas in praxis it is present in the act itself. Aristotle, however, seems to maintain that one and the same action may be described not only as containing an end but also as a means to this end.[12] This is true of playing the guitar, for example, which falls under poiesis but may be described as praxis, too.[13] This applies still more clearly e.g. to shooting a person, let us say a tyrant: we can take it both as a skillful and effective piece of making, and as a patriotic act, i.e. praxis.[14] Thus, when we characterize an act we must, in the Aristotelian conception, always specify why, *what for*, one starts to do whatever he starts to do. A poietic act is started for an end apart from the activity in question (for a house, for a thinner shape): it therefore differs from the a practical action, where the end does not fall apart from the activity but lies in the habitus of the actor itself.

How does the notion of labor, then, relate to Aristotle's distinction? Undoubtedly we must say that labor, cultivating land or transporting goods or building a house or making a shoe, for example, is dominantly a poietic activity. All these activities have a distinct end, result or even product which is arrived at; and when this end is attained, the activity is brought to an end. They all constitute a special skill, a *techne*, and this becomes understandable only if we deliberate on it in the light of the end result, i.e. the product in question (cf. *NE*, 1112b12-18).[15] But the fact that Aristotle also uses here the example of reducing weight, of which we normally would not say that it is labor, indicates that the notion of poiesis is by no means identical with that of labor. This may be so because the Greeks did not use labor as a general notion that would correspond to the meaning of the term in the modern sense.[16]

The matter becomes more clear when we keep in mind that the example of reducing weight is part of a discussion which does not deal only with human action but, at a more general level, also with different

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11 *Metaphysics* 1048b18-23.

12 I follow here the suggestions of Müller 1982a, pp. 209-230, and Müller 1982b.

13 Ebert 1976 seems to miss the point here as he defines playing the guitar as "an action which happens for its own sake".

14 Cf. Müller 1982a, pp. 221-222. The idea is, as Müller himself recognizes, basically the one suggested by G.E.M.Anscombe in her book *Intention*.

15 Cf. also Müller 1982b, pp. 40, 47-48, who uses the term "technical teleology" in this connection.

16 Obviously neither in everyday language nor in theoretical discourses. Cf., e.g., Kuchenbuch, Sokoll 1990, p. 26: "'Arbeit' schlechthin, d.h. als Kollektivsingular für *alle* Formen der Erwerbstätigkeit zum Zwecke der Sicherung des Lebensunterhalts, ist eine moderne Kategorie, die im Grunde erst auf den industriellen Kapitalismus anwendbar ist. (...) Insofern ist es eigentlich ein unzulässiges Unterfangen, sich mit der 'Arbeit im vorindustriellen Europa' befassen zu wollen. Denn strengenommen gibt es einen solchen Gegenstand überhaupt nicht." The same point is suggested also by Vernant 1982.

kinds of movements.[17] Both building and reducing weight represent an incomplete movement in the sense that they both necessarily stop when the "what for", the intended state of affairs, is accomplished, while this is not means true of thinking or enjoying something or of living well, for example. Aristotle's distinction is obviously more fundamental than action theoretical only.[18]

If we, however, study human activities from this Aristotelian perspective - Aristotle seems to suggest, after all, that man is an acting being (e.g. *NE*, 1139a33-b8) - in any case it means that we have to understand these activities from their ends. The ends make it possible to distinquish individual activities from one another, as they also make it possible to evaluate them in principle. This seems especially clear in the case of poietic activities. When one makes, let us say, a shoe, or a painting, or raises wheat, we cannot in fact understand the activity unless its end result is a good shoe or a painting or a crop. And whether it is a good shoe, or a house or a painting or a crop evidently depends on certain qualities which make it functionally good in use. "A good X" and "a bad X" are not in every respect even logically equivalent when we specify X, the end result, from which we may then recognize the corresponding poietic activity.[19]

In the case of practical activities we cannot refer to an equivalent relation between the result and a good action because we, according to Aristotle, do not have here an unequivocal end apart from the activity itself, yet there is an analogical relation between acting and acting well as there is between making something and making it well.[20] This is in fact a very crucial point in Aristotle's ethics of virtue. Thus he writes of courage as follows:

> The man, then, who faces and who fears the right things and with the right aim, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave; for the brave man feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way reason directs. Now the end of every activity is conformity to the corresponding state. This is true, therefore, of the brave as well as of others. But courage is noble. Therefore the end also is noble; for each thing is defined by its end. Therefore it is for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs (*NE*, 1115b17-23).

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17 See esp. *Metaphysics* Book IX.

18 Lange 1980, p. 21 may have it right, from a modern point of view, when he suggests that it is primarily logical and grammatical. For the Greeks it certainly is an ontological distinction, as it is for Heidegger too. See Taminiaux 1989.

19 Cf. Müller 1982b, pp. 50-53.

20 Cf. Müller 1982b, pp. 61-63. The "analogical" may be taken quite literarily here, for Aristotle attempts, in *Metaphysics* Book 5 and in the beginnin of *NE*, to answer Plato's efforts to conceive of what good or its "idea" as such is by developing the idea of a proportional analogy within the different categories. In *Metaphysics* Book IV he treats good as a kind of *arche* which makes it possible to speak about good in more spesific senses. See Gadamer 1986, pp. 126-158 and also von Wright 1964.

"Now the end of every activity is conformity to the corresponding state" reads originally "*telos tes pases energeias esti to kata ten hexin*", and one may translate "*hexis*" also as "disposition" or as a "way of being" (Gadamer), or as "habitus" (Müller).[21] Prima facie Aristotle seems to say here that virtuous action is action according to the virtue and good in this sense, but we should note that this can mean very different actions depending on the situation: it can mean staying where you are, but also running, speaking or keeping silent, giving or taking etc. What is decisive, according to Aristotle, is that these different actions take place in conformity with the corresponding hexis, which here is courage (see. *NE*, 1115a8-b6). For the very same actions can, as such, belong to the opposite hexis as well.

Courage is one of the virtues which through the corresponding disposition or habitus for its part defines the ultimate ends of human life. To live courageously is one of the succeeding forms of the human being according to Aristotle. This is so because the end of this kind of life is in itself - just like it is in the eudaimonia in general. For

> if some activities are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else, while others so in themselves, evidently happiness must be placed among those desirable in themselves, not among those desirable for something else; for happiness does not lack anything, but is self-sufficient. Now those activities are desirable in themselves from which nothing is sought beyond the activity. And of this nature excellent actions are thought to be; for to do noble and good deeds is a thing desirable for its own sake (*NE*, 1176b1-8).

Besides the courageous life Aristotle considers, first, the life spent for "pleasant amusements", because "we choose them not for the sake of other things" (*NE*, 1176b9-10). Also this kind of life is praxis, not an end of poiesis. And what is still more important, the most complete way of life, i.e. the theoretical one which is spent in contemplating objects that are most permanent, is also praxis. Aristotle's main argument for the contemplative kind of life is that it is the most self-sufficient. "And this activity alone would seem to be loved for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart from the contemplating, while from the practical activities we gain more or less apart from the action" (*NE*, 1177b1-4).[22] Aristotle may be taken to imply that while practical activities in general can be given a poietic description as well, the comtemplative activity alone

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21 Cf. Müller 1982a, pp. 224-228.

22 Gadamer comments this complicated matter as follows: "Practice itself is the all-inclusive, distinctive characteristic of the human being. Thus, one must understand even theoretical activity as the highest praxis (*Politics* 1325b). Aristotle remains quite vague in discussing the relationship here. At the end of his treatment of phronesis (*EN*, Zeta 13) he argues that the inclusiveness of human practice entails no subordination of theory to practice. Practical reasonableness, though, is the precondition for engaging in theory and in developing theoretical reasonableness. At the same time, practical reasonableness is also something highest. Indeed, it is this same highest, nous - albeit in another application which is not reducible to theory but which is also *beltiste hexis tou aletheuein* (a most excellent disposition of knowing truly)."

seems to be for its own sake only.[23]

Although Aristotle is not quite unequivocal in discussing the question of what eupraxia ultimately is, whether it is virtuous praxis or theoria, or both[24], he clearly excludes the possibility that it could be poietic in kind. "But life is action and not production", he maintains in *Politics* (1254a7). Life, good and successful life, may be lived in several forms - but always for its own sake, never in producing or in contributing to an end apart from the activity itself. From this it follows, according to Aristotle, that those people who spend their lives mostly in poietic activities - i.e. slaves, women, craftsmen, merchants etc. - do not themselves lead good life but rather rather produce prerequisites for good life than live it.[25] They live mostly in *oikos*, i.e. in families or houses, and in villages. They live as 'companions of the cupboard', i.e. in privacy, while the public ethico-political praxis of *polis* is confined to the free men.[26] From this it follows, therefore, that the lower societal forms do not have any independence in relation to polis as *koinonia politike*, which alone is truly autarchic. As Aristotle remarks, "but all these seem to fall under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous for the life as a whole" (*NE*, 1160 a21-22). In this way there arises the normative distinction of these two communal arenas with the corresponding hierarchy between practical and poietic activities that are dominant in them.[27]

Changes in the social and theoretical status of labor

The views of Aristotle, and even more so those of Plato, reflect the fact that labor was not very highly esteemed in the Greek city states. Though one may take these views simply as aristocratic gestures or ways of legitimating the status quo, somewhat more fruitful would perhaps be the strategy at interpreting them rather as attempts to articulate the

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23 Cf. Müller 1982a, pp. 229-230.

24 This seems to be suggested in *Eudemian ethics*, Book VII.

25 "A slave", Aristotle maintains alluding to the distinction between acting and making, "may be said to be another's man who, being a slave, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor." *Politics*, 1254a14-15.

26 See *Politics* I 2.

27 Cf. esp. Riedel 1972, pp. 89-95, who does not, however, fully recognize the nature of Aristotle's distinction between the two kinds of activities. Hannah Arendt's *Human condition* is well analyzed by Reist 1987 a as generalization of this distinction and as its extension to a critical view about modernity. Habermas' critical theory may be read too as another version of such a generalization and an extension, though it is, of course, much more a theory of the modernity itself.

principles of good and just for life within the frames of polis.[28] At any rate, there was the labor which needed to be done in the society, and it was carried out either by the slaves or the manual workers and craftsmen. Especially Plato is strict in his insistence on the ideal organization of polis that permits the *otium* necessary to the development and exercise of the virtues. This means for him the exclusion of not only slaves and workers, but in many cases also artists and even doctors. Similarly, the marginal position of *Economics* in Aristotle's practical philosophy indicates that he basically agrees as far slaves and manual workers are concerned.[29] However, even our two authors differed considerably in their views on this matter.

In Plato's *Politeia* it seems to be some kind of a natural or anthropological fact that most people are equipped with a soul which makes them suitable for nothing more than producing prerequisites for good life in the true sense of the word. Among the members of the third and largest class, the one which is devoted to labor, "the best part is naturally weak in man so that it cannot govern and control the brook of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them" (*Politeia*, 590c). These men are appetitive, and if they are let to live freely, "they feast like cattle, grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights" (*Politeia*, 586ab). They should not be given too much freedom or access to power or easy work; it is even futile to try to educate them, morally or cognitively, for the appetitives

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28 Thus in the aporetic dialogues, e.g. in *Protagoras*, *Menon* and *Charmenides*, Plato strives to define the individual virtues as well as their relations, and he criticizes the sophists for neglecting also this; in *Politeia* he gives a systematic characterization of the virtues, proposing a political solution to the problem of their unity. Virtues seem to be political for Plato throughout, but not until *Politeia* does he develop on full scale the influential analogy between the individual soul and the structure of polis. Plato criticizes the political conditions of his time (e.g. in *Gorgias* 515e-519b, *Politeia* 496c-497c, 555b-565c) and tries to characterize the "natural", i.e. not yet degenerate polis, where the idea of justice could be recognized. Plato was philosophizing in a more practical situation than Aristotle after him, where the old narratives had lost much of their strength and where the sophistic teaching had to be countered with strong arguments. See Gadamer 1986, passim. - In the second book of his *Politics* Aristotle makes several points against Plato's ideal polis, claiming that this would be neither feasible nor desirable (cf. Nussbaum 1980). Being more empirically orientated in his ontology and also in his practical philosophy, Aristotle tries to do justice, when possible, to doxa, to the views the Athenians actually held. This does by no means imply that he wanted to justify the status quo as such (cf. Nussbaum 1986, pp. 240-263 and Knuuttila 1989).

29 We should note that labor or work as such was not thematized even by Aristotle. He and, following him, very much of the economic thinking up till the early modernity, dealt only with the relations between *oikia* and *chrematistikē*, distinquishing the value in use and the value in change accompanied with warnings about the tendency of money to turn from a means to an end (cf. *Politics* 1256b26-1257b37) . - Conze 1974, p. 158, notes about the *New Testament*: "Ihr Thema ist nie die Arbeit an und für sich selbst, sondern nur die dem eigentlichen Sinn der Existenz des Menschen unter- und eingeordnete Arbeit; diese ist nicht nur notwendig, da sie dem Lebensunterhalt dient, sondern von der Qualität des Menschen als Person vor Gott unablösbar und zur Bewahrung vor Laster und Faulheit wertvoll." - More generally, the remark of Kuchenbuch, Sokoll 1990, p. 30, should be kept in mind: that all the literary sources which report about labor in the antiquity were written by people who did not labor themselves.

are inherently ineducable.[30] Plato's solution is to grant them a place in the organization of polis where their souls are under constant supervision and control excercised the more reasonable ones. Socrates concludes:

> Then is it not in order that such a one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the grounds that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same? (*Politeia*, 590d-e)

Thus while the state gives a philosophical education to those who themselves govern their appetites by reason and will, it imposes a rational control on the rest of the citizens. It does this in order to accomplish general freedom (*eleutheria*) and to avoid the shame of real slavery under the appetitives.

If the state succeeds in these arrangements, then also the slaves "take only those pleasures which reason approves" (*Politeia*, 586d7), although the reason here, unlike in the case of the free men, is not of their own but comes from outside. Clearly this implies that the slaves - and probably all those who do not share the virtues of *sofia* and *andreia* but are, anyhow, capable of *sofrosyne* - should not be treated as mere tools or bodily extensions of the master. But it also implies that these people are unequipped for deliberating rationally on their lives themselves, so that they should live under the command of their masters. According to Plato, this is due to the natural and as such ineducable weakness of the rational parts of their souls. From all this it follows that these people should be excluded from any kind of political deliberation, also when their own lives are concerned.[31]

Aristotle too speaks about "natural slavery". He is very close to Plato when writing: "For he who can be, and therefore is, another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend reason; they obey their passion."[32] Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle is mainly concerned "to indicate how few of the people held as slaves really belong in that condition"[33] which, according to him, after all is a shameful and inhuman one.

Aristotle also differs from Plato on the issue of manual workers, when he regrets that injustice is done when these people are forced to

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30 Cf. Nussbaum 1980, pp. 406-408.

31 Cf. Nussbaum 1980, pp. 408-409.

32 *Politics* 1254b21-23.

33 Nussbaum 1980, p. 420.

produce means for the good life of the others, for they themselves would have natural capacities for *eudaimonia*. The fact remains, however, that there is labor to be done, and "no man can practice excellence who is living the life of a mechanic or a labourer" (*Politics*, 1278a20-21), "since leisure is necessary both for the development of excellence and the performance of political duties" (*Politics*, 1329a1-2). For some people to be able to practice their excellence, the others must produce the prerequisites. But Aristotle does not try to justify the subordination of craftsmen and manual workers with a theory about their appetitive nature or special needs in the way Plato does. For him their exclusion from the political body is beyond justification. As Nussbaum puts it, "contingent limitations make Aristotle's scheme look something like Plato's in practice; the profound philosophical difference is that what Plato sees as the success of distribution, Aristotle sees as its failure."[34]

This distinction conceived by Plato and Aristotle, and the corresponding evaluation of the poietic and practical activities has been enormously influential. It has very much concealed the higher esteem which the nobility earlier held for agricultural labor - Hesiod and even Xenophon report of this[35] -, and it has been much more influential than the attempts of some cynic and stoic thinkers to change the hierarchy of the actions in question[36].

In central European languages labor is designated mostly with two different words that have different etymologies.[37] In the tradition which originates from the classical Greece, its negative meaning, labor as "toil and trouble", has dominated over its more positive meaning with creative connotations.[38] On the whole the Jewish and Christian tradition tends to attach to labor a more positive value. A certain tension between these two meanings has dominated the subsequent history of the notion up to its modern usage.[39] In the *Old Testament* labor is presented as a task

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34 Nussbaum 1980, p. 421.

35 Cf. Conze 1974, p. 155. In Rome there was a similar kind of tradition, of which Vergil's *Georgica* may be the most prominent example, and which had real influence on the ethos of noblity later, too.

36 Conze 1974, p. 156 tells us: "Bei den Kynikern wurde Arbeit, *ponos*, Tugendmittel; die Stoiker prägten die wörter *euponia*, "Fleiss" und *filoponia*. "Liebe zu Arbeit". Doch die mittlere Stoa (Poseidonios) kehrte zur Arbeitsverachtung besonders des Handwerks zurück."

37 Riedel 1973, p. 126: "Das Griechische unterscheidet zwischen *ponein* und *ergatsesthai*, das Lateinische zwischen *laborare* und *facere*, das Franzosische zwischen *travailler* und *ouvrer*, das Englische zwischen *labour* and *work*, das Deutsche zwischen arbeiten und werken bzw. schaffen. Ihnen lassen sich zwei Grundbedeutungen zuordnen: Arbeit als "Mühe, Qual, Last, Not" (ponos) und als "Leistung, Werk" (ergon)."

38 The distinction between labor and work as made and elaborated extensively in Arendt 1958 can be seen as an attempt to rehabilitate some of its earlier meanings against the later concealment. See Arendt 1958, 79-80.

39 Cf. Conze 1974, p. 158.

given to men by God after working six days. God created man as the picture of himself and gave him his own ability to labor. Labor may be painful, but it is God's will and therefore of major value. Neither the positive connotations[40] nor the negative ones (labor as a punishment of God) should be stretched too far here. God obliged man to preserve himself and labor is the primary means for this. In fact labor was a necessity already in Paradise; it became only more troublesome when man was driven out. In the *New Testament* the preaching activity of Jesus and his followers is also interpreted and appreciated as work.[41] Generally, the hierarchy between labor and work was abandoned and, instead, the equality of all men before of God was emphasized. Slave labor was condemned. Labor was no more opposed to *otium* or *schole*, this condition necessary for free and comtemplative life, but to *otiositas*, i.e. idleness which was disapproved of as sin.[42]

During the early Middle Ages a certain functional division of labor emerged, both within monasteries and outside them: *labores* of the farmers, *artes* of manual workers, *opera* of monks and others who cultivate the products further, *officia* of the overseers and, finally, *ministeriales* of the management and the administration. In the monasteries all this was situated within the service of God, *opus Dei*.[43] From the 9th century on the conception of society as divided into three estates became dominant. There were *oratores*, the priests, *bellatores*, the military, and *laboratores*, the peasants as well as workers of every kind. The third estate, however, did not gain an unequivocal composition because of its heterogeneity (the groups of teachers, doctors and other professionals, beggars, harlots etc. were growing in towns).[44]

The tension between the Christian and Greek views on labor culminated in the Aristotle-reception of scholastics. Thus Thomas Aquinas translated the Aristotelian "*ergon douleoin*" as "*opera servilis*" with strong connotations to slave labor. He also introduced the terms "*vita activa*" and "*vita contemplativa*", prefering unequivocally the latter. The distinction and hierarchy of "*agere*" and "*facere*" was rehabilitated along the Aristotelian lines as well. While labor presupposes some external material which preceeds its form, action accomplishes itself through immanent *prudentia* and *virtus* of the actor.[45] Aquinas presented a four-stage normative synthesis of the Christian and Aristotelian views of action and labor. According to it, the most valuabe and nearest to God

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40 As Max Weber reminds us.

41 In the latin Vulgata a preach worker is called "operarius", from "opus"; the opposition to "labor" is visible. Cf. Conze 1974, pp. 158-160 and Walther 1990, pp. 8-10.

42 Cf. Conze 1974, pp. 159-160 and Dare, Welton, Coe 1987.

43 Cf. Kuchenbuch, Sokoll 1990, pp. 34-36.

44 Cf. Kuchenbuch, Sokoll 1990, pp. 37-38 and Conze 1974, pp. 160-161.

45 Cf. Riedel 1973, p. 131; Conze 1974, p. 162; Walther 1990, p. 12.

was a pure act of comtemplation, which was followed by ascesis and philanthropy; the third stage was respectable manual work, Jesus the timberman being the paradigm here; the lowest and the most sinful, finally, was the worldly labor for subsistence, *ad victum quaerendum*.[46]

Although Luther conceives of labor as God's punishment, and although his views are tightly bound and restricted to agricultural labor for subsistence, his ideas contain certain progressive elements. "Nicht faul und müssig sein, auch nicht auff eigen erbeit und thun zu verlassen, sondern erbeiten und thun und doch alles von Gott allein gewarten. Das ist so viel gesagt: Es muss alles im glauben und trawen zu Gott geschehen", he writes.[47] It is God's will that men labor, and this applies in principle to everybody: "Keine betteler unnd bettleryn sollen ynn unnserm kirchspiell ynn der stadt noch dorffern, gelidden werden, dann welche mit adler oder kranckheitt nicht beladen, sollen arbeiten oder aus unnserm kirchspiell ... hynwegk getrieben werden."[48] Labor as God's service in this sense does not acknowledge the hierarchies of Aristotle or Aquinas - on the contrary: "Müssiggang ist Sünde wider Gottes Gebot, der hier Arbeit befohlen hat." This applies also, and especially, to the vita contemplativa of klerus; the concession to the noble anticipated in fact the later revolutionary movements against the privileges. Everyone is equally near to God and should serve him by living laboriously.

Although labor is central in the ethos preached by Luther, it is still a pre-modern ethos and strongly bound to the estates and the feudal state. Luther translates the Greek *ponos* as *Beruf* and identifies this with *Berufung*, i.e. with the heavenly fate to submit to one's given social position and condition - to obey.[49] In 16th and 17th century Germany the dominant meaning of the word "Arbeit" is "toil and trouble", *Mühe und Qual*, with few creative connotations , and due to the Christian impact this will be influential also during the next century.[50] Even Calvinism, with its more positive attitude to the worldly results of one's labor, can hardly be interpereted as the ogininator of modern capitalism in the way Max Weber suggests. This has, without doubt, erased certain hindrances but one should see that its usage of the notion of labor was, even more than that of Luther, bound to heavenly "*Berufung*" and predestination.

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46 Cf. also Helldén 1979, pp. 82-89.

47 Cit. Conze 1974, p. 163.

48 Cit. Conze 1974, p. 164.

49 Cf. Walther 1990, p. 14. Conze 1974, p. 165: "Da aber von christlichen Arbeitsbegriff ein Streben nach sozialen Aufstieg und sozialer Mobilität ebensowenig abgeleitet werden konnte wie Programme sozialer Wandlung oder gar eines sozialen Umsturzes, folgte aus solcher Gleichheit keine sozialrevolutionäre Gleichmachung, sondern blieb die gestufte Ordnung unangefochten, ja duch die christlich begründeten Fürsterstaat neu legitimiert, erhalten. Gleiche Rang und gleiche Ehre aller Arbeit im "Christenland" zu betonen, hiess daher auch keineswegs, in der politisch-wirtschaftlichen Praxis die Vielfalt der jeweils durch ständisch bedingte "Ehre" unterschiedenen Arbeit abzubauen."

50 Conze 1974, pp. 165-166.

Thus there hardly exists a "direct bridge from Christian labor to modern capitalism".[51]

The bourgeois re-evaluation of labor

The development of natural sciences and new technical innovations - "printing machine, gunpowder and compass" (Bacon) - initiated a liberation from the cyclic as well as static agrarian world view, paving also the way for a change in the conception of labor. The Aristotelian or Thomist hierarchy of acting and making, as well as the Christian image of labor as divine service, were abandoned to a growing extent.

It is quite evident that - though I do not want propose here any "externalist" hypotheses about how - the changes in the conception of labor are related to certain (preindustrial) social and economic processes.[52] Thus, e.g., commercial capital started to grow bringing about worldwide markets as well as a division of labor; agricultural products were increasingly sold in the markets; different preforms of modern wage-labor started to become common, and more and more people subsisted on their wages only. Generally this meant - or was accompanied by, for there were several simultaneous, democraphic and other processes - an overall impoverishment of people, so that a constant topic in the discussions of the time was the connection between labor and poverty. It is noticeable how their relationship was now turned upside-down: while it in the antiquity and during the Middle Ages was rather evident that those who had to labor for their subsistence and who, consequently, were excluded from the political community, were also 'poor', it was now maintained that no one able to labor need be poor. One may consider it an important indication of modern society that labor was, thus, conceptually connected with wealth and property instead of poverty.[53]

Generally, the economic development from the 13th century on rapidly increased the demand for labor, and consequently also its appreciation. New techniques of disciplining labor (ranging from restrictions on the mobility of workers and prohibitions against begging to various new organizations of manufacturing) were introduced; "time economy" began to advance, i.e. the working day was regulated,

51 Conze 1974, p. 166.

52 I follow here mainly Kuchenbuch, Sokoll 1990, pp. 44-47.

53 Baruzzi 1988, p. 63 makes the same point: "Worauf es ankommt, ist die Arbeit. Diese, im klassischen Zeitalter der Polis as Mühe und Last gesehen, wird nun in ihrer Mühe zu unseren eigentlichen Reichtum. Arbeitete man in der Polis, um in der Armut zu bestehen, um die Notwendigkeiten des Lebens durchzusetzen, so arbeitet man nun, um reich zu werden. Man arbeitet nicht aus der Notwendigkeit der Armut, vielmehr Freiheit. Arbeit ist Freiheit des unendlichen Besitzes."

measured and controlled by clocktime (clocktowers were built in towns) instead of the natural rhythm, which made possible a new kind of intensification of labor, etc.[54] Here one may find a background for the urgent development of the concept of labor in the philosophical and economic thinking of the early modernity - of its emergence as a, and later even the, central notion and principle of the new society.

Although it is true that major philosophers before the 17th century did not make very much use of this notion in its own principle, a general paradigmatic change within philosophy clearly points to its significance. For instead of a cosmos or a God cognizance of which was metaphysical or theological, *prima philosophia* is now, in one way or another, constructed from the subject and his activities. This subject is no longer situated as a constituent part of a teleological or teological order; it is rather as preserving and defending itself, the center of everything.[55] As a consequence of this general change in the views about what knowledge ultimately is, human labor too is no longer seen as subordinate either to nature or to action in the traditional aristocratic sense. Rather, precisely through labor man is understood to be able to develop himself as a subject, to gain dominance over nature and to make progress in his life.

This overall change can be registered e.g. in the texts of such thinkers as Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal, who all would seem to be far from the arising new social phenomena. In the midst of religious and civil wars, seeking himself, Montaigne - or the fictive subject of the essays - describes his own activity: "J'ay mis tous mes efforts á former ma vie. Voylá mon mestier et mon ouvrage." Although a nobleman with his cognisant distance to the practical necessities of life, the character conceives of himself and his life as "work" in his free "profession". These terms differ interestingly from the corresponding ones used by Aristotle when he describes the theoretical way of life; still more important is the connection between work and life, i.e. the modern idea of the subject as constituting himself.

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54 See Stamm 1982, esp. pp. 107-131.

55 Breuer 1983, pp. 309-310 describes, relying on Troeltsch, the classical episteme: "In der klassischen, aus der Verbindung des Christentums mit dem Aristotelismus hervorgegangenen episteme waren die Individuen Teil einer universalen kosmischen Ordnung, die in Gott ihren Ursprung und ihr Zentrum hatte. Der Mensch hatte diese Welt nicht geschaffen, er war auch nicht ihr höchstes Telos, aber er war doch durch Gottes Wille Teilnehmer und bewusstes Medium des Göttlichen Schöpfungsplanes, der sich auf verschiedenen Stufen des Seins durch die Aktionen der Geschöpfe realisierte. In dieser Ordnung gab es kein Element, das nicht auf das Ganze bezogen war. Die verschiedenen sozialen und politischen Bildungen waren Stufen in einer vernünftigen Entelechie, in der die Einzelsubstanzen in teleologisch geregelter Bewegung ihren Zweck verwirklichten und dabei doch zugleich durch die stätige Präsenz der göttlichen Auktorität gelenkt wurden, die teils die Einzelnen ihre Zwecke selbst verwirklichen liess, teils korrigierend und Gerechtigkeit stiftend intervenierte. Die Einheit der Individuen war gewährleistet durch einen gottgewollte Stufenfolge von Institutionen, die über Familie, Gemeinde, Stand und Staat bis zur Kirche als sichtbarer Verkörperung der göttlichen Herrschaft über die Welt reichte, und durch die 'participatio' der Individuen an der göttlichen Vernunft, die den Zusammenhang des Ganzen garantierte."

In Descartes' study on method, the instrumental character of knowledge and even philosophy is emphasized, obviously against the scholastics: "La raison est un instrument universel, qui peut servir en toutes sortes de rencontres." Descartes also points out the connection between exact knowledge and new technical inventions, which only make men "maitres et possesseurs de la nature." More generally, it can been shown that there is a fundamental difference between the *ethos* as presented in Descartes' meditations and the classical one or, more specifically, between his geometrical studies and those of Euclid, for example, because Descartes places the human subject, whose basic activity is *construction* instead of wonder (*thaumazein*), at the center of everything.[56]

Pascal's world, again, is perhaps dominated more by free self-reflection than by the ideal of construction - mainly reflections of religious and spiritual problems - but he too chooses the metaphor of labor: "Travaillons donc à bien penser; voilà le principe de la morale." Thus, it seems, labor is used by these early thinkers of modernity as one metaphor, among many others, for the self-constitution of the subject - in a way which, as we shall see, is excessively used by Hegel especially in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. As a social category, labor is most often associated by these authors with inventions and technology.[57]

This connection can be seen even more clearly in the utopias of the period. Thomas More criticizes the noblemen who live of other people's labor, painting, in contrast, a picture of a society where labor is by and large diminished by making it more rational and by dividing it more justly. Francis Bacon pictures in his Nova Atlantis - a work with the motto scientia et potentia in idem coincidunt - a society equipped with a technology which would take care of the major part of the necessary labor. The aim of his "new science" was not in the arguments, as in scholastics, but in the techniques, *artes*; not in winning the opponent in a disputation, but in winning nature through labor.[58]

Thomas Hobbes' work may be described as the first attempt at bringing within one concept the most contradictory, even chaotic processes which finally led to the new market economy and the new political authority first in England.[59] In this work there are few traces of the classical episteme.[60] For us it is important here primarily to note the new conceptual basis of his political theory. For Hobbes, all theory can be reduced to action (*actio*) or labor (*operatio*), and the benefit of science

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56 See esp. Lachterman 1989.

57 Cf. Walther 1990, pp. 16-17, where the above quotations are taken from.

58 Cf. Conze 1974, p. 167.

59 Breuer 1983, pp. 291-308 gives an insightful and precise summary of these prosesses and the respective literature.

60 Cf. *Leviathan*, p. 669, where Hobbes gives his general judgement about Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Politics* and *Ethics*.

lies in its functional ability to initiate and foster movement and thereby contribute to new action or labor. There is a connection between action or labor on the one hand, and power, *potentia*.[61] Power is, in fact, the basic notion in Hobbes' anthropological thinking, as is labor in his social theory.[62] Hobbes wants to construct his social theory on the basis of mechanistic laws of motion, and the individuals are in his conception like self-preserving atoms.

Thus, contrary to the classical views, both Aristotelian and Christian ones, for which it is in accordance with man's ethical nature or his essence to live in and establish political communities, Hobbes sees the political body as a human construction, a product of an art which even at its best can only imitate the divine creation.[63] The highest law of nature, also for man, is that one should preserve and defend himself.[64] In a state of nature men, who seek the company of each other but are also apt to "invade and destroy one another", are not capable of reaching any unanimity nor creating conditions for decent life ("there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, no use of the commodities...; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short").[65] Hobbes thus replaces the former distinction between *status oeconomicus* and *status*

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61 Riedel 1973, p. 132, writes: "Arbeit in Gestalt handwerklich-technischen Hervorbringens wird zum Paradigma menschlichen Tätigseins, wobei sich mit sprachlichen Beizeichnungsmitteln wie factio, operatio, actio usw. statt der traditionelle, über den Aristotelischen Energeia-Begriff vermittelten Bedeutung einer "zweckerfüllten" und "in sich ruhenden Tätigkeit" der Begriff der Macht (potentia), einer ziel- und ruhelosen, über jede Einzelhandlung hinausgreifenden und jeden erreichten Zweck zum Mittel herabsetzenden Tätigkeit verbindet."

62 Cf. Conze 1974, p. 168 and Riedel p. 1975. It is a matter of dispute, however, whether there are such ahistorical principles in Hobbes' theoretical corpus. Macpherson 1962 and also Tuschling 1978, who read him as the first thinker of the capitalist society on the whole, are inclined to positive answer, while Lichtblau 1978 and Breuer 1983 deny their existence. Breuer 1983, pp. 324-325: "Der Grund, auf dem der 'Leviathan' ruht, ist nicht quasi-ontologisches Fundament der bürgerlichen Gesellschat, er ist Ansatz und Ausgangspunkt einer Bewegung, in deren Verlauf die hinter dem Rücken der Privatindividuen sich herausbildende Gesellschaftlichkeit auf den Ausgangspunkt zurückwirkt, ihn modifiziert und umgestaltet, bis sie sich schliesslich nicht mehr an ihm bricht: das Neben- und Gegeneinander von nur über die zirkulative Medien wie Geld, Recht und Staat verbundenen, nur formell miteinander verknünften Individuen ist insofern nur eine frühe, wenngleich für den Kapitalisierungsprozess unentbehrliche Phase der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, keinenwegs deren Grundriss schlechthin."

63 Cf Hobbes 1966, Book IX. I follow here those interpetations which criticize the Taylor-Warrender -hypotheses and emphasize Hobbes' break with the classical episteme. Cf. Willms 1979, Lichtblau 1978, 37-48, Tuschling 1978, pp. 215-250, Breuer 1983, pp. 309-325, Taminiaux 1985.

64 Cf. Hobbes 1966, pp. 113-114.

65 For Hobbes the state of nature is, as Lichtblau 1978 following Riedel 1975 clearly formulates, *a privatio* of the civil society: "Die resolutiv eingelösten Konstitutientien des Naturzusatndes lassen sich so unter Abwesenheitsbedingungen vom status civilis rekonstruieren und diesen selbst wiederum als Negation der Abwesenheit, d.h. als Negation seiner eigenen Negation positivieren" (Lichtblau 1978, p. 39). That is why all that can be said of is that it must be left.

civilis with the one between *status naturalis* and *status civilis*, which contains the modern ontological idea that the natural does not have any normative force or priority within the civil society. To civilize means to distance from nature and control it.[66] In consequence, men are forced to make themselves a contract, creating thereby a POLITICAL BODY, a sovereign,

> which is as much to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and everyone to own, and to acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements, to his judgement. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by acovenant of every man ... This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that *mortal god*, to which we owe under the *immortal God*, our peace and defence.[67]

After Hobbes it is John Locke who most systematically takes up the real bourgeois reevaluation of labor by making it explicit that labor, and not any action of the nobility, is the source of all value, property and thus also of legitimate political power. "Nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expenses about them - what in them is pure owing to Nature and what to labour - we shall find that in most of them ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labour", he writes.[68] In fact Locke seems to have two - analytically distinguishable - concepts of labor, both of which are closely tied to the concept of private property. Locke wants to show that a society based on private property is also "natural".[69] In a state of nature[70], from where Locke starts:

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66 Cf. also Giusti 1988, pp. 250-251.

67 Hobbes 1966, pp. 157-158.

68 Locke 1967, # 40.

69 Tuschling 1978, pp. 251 describes Locke's program as follows: "Unbeschränkt private Aneignung is ein naturliches Recht, es geht dem staatlichen Zustand voraus, und die Unterordnung der Individuen unter eine staatliche Zwangsgewalt geschieht ausschliesslich zum Zweck der Erhaltung des Eigentums." The program fails, however, according to Tuschling, so that Locke after all arrives close to Hobbes: "Mithin reduziert sich die berühmte Lockesche Eigentumstheorie kraft der ihr immanenten Widersprüche, wie bei Hobbes, auf dem Bürgertum so anstössige These: dass das Privateigentum als gesellschaftlich gesichertes, einklangbares und daher reproduzierbares Verfügungs- und Anspruchsverhältnis gegen alle anderen mitvergesellschafteten Individuen *nicht* "antecedent to government" ist, sondern in dieser Qualität durch den Staat *erst erzeugt wird*. Und dies ist, wie ja auch Locke nicht müde wird zu betonen, der wesentlichste Zweck von Staat und Recht" (253-254). This seems to be an overstatement, however, as we shall see.

70 Locke's state of nature is not, or not only, at least, a *privatio* of a political body, but it includes both historical and antropological elements. Cf. esp. Medick 1973, pp. 64-133, who interprets it as "eine normativ und zugleich historisch orientierte Theorie der Strukturprobleme der frühen bürgerlichen Gesellschaft" (p. 116). See also Arschaft 1987, esp. pp. 97-122.

> though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This no body has any right but himself. The labour or his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever he then removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left in it, he hath mixed his labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men (*Second Treatise*, # 27).

Here we find Locke's first notion of labor. In the state of nature, more precisely in its first phase, each man, possessing himself, is free to labor with his body, to toil, and so mix something of himself with the fruits of nature. Through his labor man changes things of nature into "works of his hands" [71], and with these works he, then, satisfies his desires and needs.[72] In this original state of nature - "the Golden Age (before vain ambition, and amor sceletarus habendi, evil concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honour)" (# 111) - each man acquired property through his labor as much as he personally needed: "As much as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property" (# 32). Unlike Hobbes, Locke presumes that man in this state, though based solely on the law of self-preservation, would be able to avoid the war.

This is, however, no more than the initial phase. Up til that stage, nature has put a limit to each man's ambition to acquire property - one should labor "as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils" (# 31; cf. also # 45) - the situation changes considerably when man makes "the invention of money, and the tacit agreement (...) to put a value on it" (# 36). For from now on, "in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent, men would take in exchange" (# 47), "the desire of having more than men needed (...) altered the intrisic value of things" (# 37). From now on there were no natural limits to each one's property; "this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them" (# 48).

In opposition to the first phase, we encounter here "disproportionate and unequal possession", some people having money to buy land and means for labor, others not, having only the possibility to sell their labor force.[73] In order to justify the unequal property

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71 Arendt puts a major weight on Locke's passing distinction between labor and work; cf. Arendt 1958, 100-105 and passim.

72 Baruzzi 1988, p. 67: "Die Welt wird auf den Körper eingestellt. Alles dient nur dem Körper. Dabei bleibt die körperwaltende Mühe, wenn auch verwandelt, erhalten. Die Mühe der Begierde hält uns in Atem, indem wir immer zu neuen Produktionen fortschreiten. Keine mühevoll errungener Besitz genügt, vielmehr treibt er weiter zu neuerm Besitz." Thus via man's bodily desire his labor has its end in itself, as a work which belongs to him. The Aristotelian idea of the self-purposive praxis as superior to poiesis is here turned upside-down.

relations of this second stage, which has many features of Hobbes' *bellum omnes*, Locke introduces his "second" concept of labor[74]:

> God gave the world to men in common, but since He gave it them for their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed that He meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it); not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious" (# 34).

In other words, those who have property have been rational and industrious, i.e. able to make use of the law of nature (# 34), while the others have not. Although men thus have very unequal possibilities to acquire more property, the situation cannot be changed post festum. Even the fact that those without property are charged with most of the labor does not change it. Their labor, which is wage labor, no more quarantees the right to property. Nor does it guarantee a right to political participation. For the political body, which will necessarily emerge because of the contradictions of this state of nature, is set up for the protection of private property. Unlike labor in the second phase, labor in the first phase of the state of nature guatantees to its performer both "the natural right to property" and "participation in the natural right".[75]

"Political, or Civil Society"

According to Locke, too, the political body or civil society is necessary because of the contradictions that emerge in the state of nature. The contradictions stem, after money has been invented, from "unequal and disproportionate possession", and consummate to an extent which threatens the already created possessions and the functioning of the markets in general. In order to secure them, man, i.e. the one who has possessions, "by consenting with others to make one body politick under one government, put himself under an obligation to everyone of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it."[76] Unlike Hobbes' Leviathan, a true sovereign, Locke's political or civil society is permanently dependent both on the conditions of its birth and on its members. It is a kind of a club with rules based on a common agreement.[77] This also means that the activities of the political

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73 Tuschling 1978, p. 256 argues, pace Macpherson 1962 and Brandt 1974, that the wage labor relation, and even the simple master-servant relation, is not possible until this second phase.

74 Cf. Krämer-Badoni 1978, pp. 22-45.

75 Lichtblau 1978, p. 57.

76 Locke 1967, # 97.

body have, unlike in Hobbes' construction, certain limits:

> It is *not*, nor can it possibly be absolutely *arbitrary* over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joynt power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they enter'd the society, and gave up to the community. ... A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the common-wealth, and by it to the *legistlative power*, so that the legistlative can have no more than this. Their power in the utmost bounds of it, is *limited to the public good* of the society (# 135).

If the common wealth surpasses its agreed limits, we may infer that a return to the state of nature with its conflicting interests is inevitable. Unlike Hobbes, Locke does not regard the state of nature as a chaotic bellum omnium, but rather an elementary picture of modern society in its early stages of development.[78] Hobbes, who did his writing during a lengthy civil war, was to conceive of the activities of the political body mainly in the form of prohibitions[79], whereas Locke could present the status civilis in more positive terms. But Locke's theory, too, is modern in the sense that it is founded on human labor, on the basis of which he legitimizes private property. This labor does not serve any higher natural or religious purposes than the self-preservation of members in their political body.

It is true that Locke's "Club" has several characteristics of the premodern state. Especially his conception of a family resembles in many ways the traditional *oikodespotes*. All the members of the "Club" are equal, but those "never capable of being a free man" are refused entrance, i.e., "lunatics and ideots" and also "wives, children, servants and

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77 The expression is taken from an instructive passage by Lichtblau 1978, p. 59: "Nicht eine antagonistische Klassenspaltung von Habenden und Nichthabenden, sondern das alltägliche Normalverhalten der Mehr- oder Weniger-Habenden begrüdet schliesslich den Gesellschafts- und Staatsvertrag unter den Besitzenden. Individuen, deren Besitztum sich auf ihre eigene Arbeitskraft beschränkt (Lohnarbeiter), kommen der Lockeschen Theorie nicht in den Blick; Vernunft, moralische Autonomie und Rechtsfähigkeit zur Vertragsbeteiligung kommt nur derjenigen zu, die akkumuliert haben: "estate" wird zur Voraussetzung des *Eintritts* in die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, die hier noch als Organisation oder Club gedacht wird."

78 Breuer's assessment seems to be well balanced: "Während Hobbes' Darstellung den totalen Zerfall der naturwüchsigen Gesellschaft registriert, wie er in der Tat für den Bürgerkriegszustand und für die Anfänge der 'ursprüngliche Akkumulation' im 17. Jh. charakteristisch ist, spiegelt sich in Lockes Darstellung die Konsolidierung der sozialen und politischen Verhältnisse im postrevolutionären England. Sein Naturzustand, um den Unterschied zu eine knappe Formel zu bringen, reflektiert weniger die Endphase der naturwüchsigen als die Anfangsphase eines Systems der reinen Vergesellschaftung, das freilich noch immer starke Rudimente der naturwüchsigen Vergesellschaftung aufweist und deshalb nicht umstandlos, wie C.B. Macpherson meint, auf den Nenner 'rein kapitalistischer' Verhältnisse zu bringen ist" (pp. 337-338).

79 Cf. Leviathan Ch. 29.

slaves"[80], all of whom should rather live under the paternal power. It is true as well that the end result of Locke's elitistic theory, according to which some people are "more rational and perceptive than the rest", and therefore chosen to the common-wealth, is not so far from Plato's anthropological doctrine. But we should not dismiss Locke's efforts to justify his construction with conceptual means which are clearly different from the classical ones.[81] For although Locke uses the term "civil, or political society"[82], he certainly develops a conception of society with money and exchange relations, unequal private property and even an elementary wage labor, i.e. a conception of a sphere which Hegel is later to call civil society in distinction from that of the state. As we have seen, Locke takes important steps towards conceptualizing civil society and does not, like Hobbes, present it as a mere *privatio* of the political condition. He certainly remains bound to the work of Hobbes, without being able to reflect on the concept of civil society as distinguished from family and state. Riedel's claim that the notion of civil society was not properly established before Hegel[83], may be said to apply in this sense at least to Locke.[84]

If we, however, consider the development of political philosophy from Plato on, the modernity of Hobbes' and Locke's thought should be emphasized. For although neither the economic revolution, leading to the differentiation of family and civil society, nor the political revolution, differentiating civil society from the state, is yet taken into their concept, the whole complex is thought from the economic point of view and not in terms of a teleologically or theologically justified political praxis. At a more general level we may see that instead of praxis as an activity which contains its purpose, its "what for" in itself, the most fundamental normative activity in their theories is labor, which is "poietic". Clearly the theories of Hobbes and Locke belong to the modern world which, then, with its secularized and subject-centered principles distances itself from the pre-modern metaphysical hierarchies.

In conclusion to this historical survey, we can remark that it is now labor, not political praxis as such, which is viewed as anthropologically fundamental and constitutive to man. One could even

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80 Locke 1967, # 60, 86.

81 Riedel 1984, pp. 129-156 goes too far in equating Locke with the tradition, as he maintains that this simply identifies political society and civil society as has been done within political philosophy from Aristotle to Albertus Magnus, from Aquinas to Melanchton, from Bodinus to Hobbes, from Spinoza to Kant.

82 Riedel seems, as Lichtblau 1978, p. 61 remarks, to confuse terminological and conceptual history.

83 Riedel 1984, p. 132-137.

84 We shall see that not before his Jena period does Hegel take the decisive steps beyond Locke here. However, as Koselleck 1976 interestingly points out, already Hobbes' achievement was paradoxical. Hobbes constructs a purely political body without any real social life, but, in fact, he can be regarded as the founder of the modern theory of civil society.

say that human life, as it is conceived at this historical period, is a matter of making and not acting. As David Hume puts it, "everything in the world is puchased by labour, and our passions are the only causes of labour."[85] Instead of poverty and the lowest estate, labor is now bound up with wealth, social status and even political power. In the next chapter we shall see how this activity is then to be connected to the modern ideas of historical progress and individual education, as well. Interesting - and important for Hegel's notion of labor, too - is that labor is no longer conceived of as *techne* imitating nature, but rather as a process which conquers nature or creates a mediation between man and nature. Labor in the meaning of toil and trouble is abandoned at the expense of number of more creative connotations.

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85 Cit. Conze 1974, p. 168.

3 MODERNITY, LABOR AND 'JE NE SAIS QUOI'

The preceding inquiry already provided certain points of departure for a more general discussion on the theorical notions of modernity and the modern world. In the present chapter I shall proceed in this discussion, which will constitute an interpretative perspective of Hegel's practical philosophy, by studying certain ideas embedded in 18th century thought concerning the historical process and by relating them to parallel changes in the usage of the notion of labor. With the terms "modern", 'modernity' and "the modern world" we normally refer to a heterogeneous complex of phenomena: to certain changes in everyday experience, to new aesthetic and artistic tendencies, to the ever higher degree of industrialization and urbanization, to certain global threats to the human civilization, etc. The only meaning of the term which is of major interest for us here, however, is "modernity" as denoting a specific historical period or age which breaks through in Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries and which brings about a remarkably new kind of historical and philosophical self-consciousness. It is this formation, especially Hegel's systematic views about it, that we are studying.

Scholars generally agree that the final breakthrough of modernity as a historical epoch takes place some time during the 18th century. Reinhardt Koselleck has called the period beginning after the middle of the century "*die Sattelzeit*", for there appears in a rapid tempo a large number of new experiences and conceptual phenomena, both in everyday life and within scientific institutions. These may be seen as attempts to grasp in various ways the changes that are taking place throughout society. Thus, for example, there emerge not only new scientific paradigms, but also a number of new scientific disciplines,

such as political economy, philosophy of history, philosophical anthropology and philosophical aesthetics.[1]

The meaning of the term "modern" itself goes through a series of interesting changes, as well. While it earlier denoted mainly "present" in opposition to "past", it now came to denote "new" in opposition to "old" - and this, more and more, in a wide, emphatic and normative sense.[2] "Modernity" as a noun begins to denote the new historical time ("Neue Zeit", "Modern Times, Les Temps Modernes), an epoch which has begun only recently and will continue into the open future.

Intensification of historical experience and the idea of progress

Koselleck has made an interesting attempt at capturing the new constellation of elements with two complementary figures. The first one is "the temporalization of history" (*Verzeitlichung der Geschichte*). History, i.e. history in general, as a "collective singular", is conceived of as a dynamical process which encompasses earlier centuries as well as historical periods (the Old times, the Middle Ages) and contains, within a single period of chronological time, historical noncontemporaneities.[3] The historical experience itself intensifies, and people become overhelmed by an experience of transience[4], which makes it increasingly difficult for them to define and analyse their own time.[5] Eventually, the gap between one's experience of the present and one's expectation of the future, between *Erfahrungsraum* und *Erwartungshorizont*[6] in Koselleck's terms, grows wider.

This gap is closely linked to the modern idea of historical progress. For the expectations are now typically situated in the historical future and not in the other world which would leave our temporal world untouched.[7] In fact, the concept of historical progress

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1 Cf. esp. Foucault 1966, Marquard 1973 and Lepenies 1978.

2 On the history of both the term and the concept see, e.g., Gumbrecht 1978, Habermas 1987, pp. 1-22 and Pippin 1991, pp. 16-45.

3 Cf. Koselleck 1985a, pp. 231-249 and Skalweit 1982, passim.

4 Koselleck 1985a, p. 251: "(...) one's own time was not only experienced as a beginning or an end, but also as a period on transition."

5 Koselleck 1985a, pp. 253-258.

6 Koselleck 1985a, pp. 276: "My thesis is that during *Neuzeit* the difference between experience and expectation has increasingly expanded; more precisely, that *Neuzeit* is first understood as a *neue Zeit* from the time that expectations have distanced themselves evermore from the previous experiences."

7 Koselleck 1985a, p. 277: "As long as the Christian doctrine of the Final Days set an immovable limit to the horizon of expectation (roughly speaking, untill the mid-seventeenth century, the future remained bounded to the past."

both separates and reunites the experience and the expectation - bringing their temporal difference for the first time within one single notion.[8] Similarly, Hans Blumenberg has interpreted the onset of modernity as the invasion by "the world time" of "the lived time".[9] The terms "progress", "development", "perfection" were first used in the fields of technology and the natural sciences, then in different domains of culture and society, and finally as denoting the historical progress as a whole.[10] In this latter sense it is used, e.g., by Kant who opens his *Idea for a Universal History* from the year 1784 as follows:

> Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e. human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. History is concerned with giving an account of these phenomena, no matter how deeply concerned their causes may be, and it allows us to hope that, if it examines the free exercise of the human will *on a large scale,* it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions. In the same way, we hope that what strikes us in the actions of individuals as confused and fortuitous may be recognized, in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing but slow development of man's original capacities.[11]

The latter of Koselleck's figures is the "historization" or "denaturalization of time" (*Geschichtlichung, Denaturalisierung der Zeit).* He seems to develop this rather directly from the rising tempo of everyday life, effected mainly by the new technology and industrialization.[12] The rhythm of daily life had accelerated already before the industrial revolution, in consequence of new roads and canals, of the "time economy" and the overall growth of towns, but the invention of the steam engine, which freed man from animal and wind power, was the real turning point.[13] The steam locomotive became the symbol of the modern world view, to which innumerable poems were devoted. Well known is Marx' metaphor "the locomotive of history", for example, which, true enough, is dynamic and modern as compared to earlier clocks and other machines! All this implies that the historical time emancipates "from every natural time and the succession of

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8 Cf. Koselleck 1985a, p. 279.

9 Blumenberg 1986, p. 241: "Geschichte, als der die Lebenszeiten und Generationszeiten übergreifenden Prozess, integriert sich die Individuen, stösst zugleich aber auf deren Widerstand und Unbehagen, sich integrieren zu lassen. Was wiederum die Beschleunigung zur Folge hat: etwas wie den Kompromiss zwischen Weltzeit und Lebenszeit, indem sie die Illusion einer erneuten Konvergenz erwecken."

10 Cf. Art. Entwicklung. Fortschritt, and Art. Geschichte in Brunner, Conze. Koselleck, Bd. 2 and Rohbeck 1987, passim.

11 Kant 1991, p. 41.

12 Koselleck 1985a, pp. 92-104, 276-279, 283-285, and esp. Koselleck 1985b.

13 Cf. Koselleck 1985b, pp. 78-92.

generations".[14]

In the present study we can only touch upon the very complicated question, how one should conceive of the relations between the new social phenomena, which give rise to a new kind of experience filled with historical expectations and to new theoretical paradigms, even disciplines. Koselleck and his colleagues have generously pointed out[15] the existence of several interconnections. But should we read the new theoretical formations as articulations of changes in the historical experience, or rather, one way or another, as reactions to these changes? And if the latter, as reactions to what and reactions of what kind?[16] In any case, it is clear that the philosophies of enlightenment and the political economy, as well as their reception in the German idealistic philosophy, perceived history as a changing and advancing process filled with worldly expectations and future prospects. The interpretations of or reactions to this advancement, of which one could use the term 'the coming of modernity', greatly varied. If not in fysis or in Heaven where, then, is the primary cause and perhaps even the subject of history to be found? Is there any normative order against which to judge historical events. Generally it has been maintained - Kant's *Idee for a universal history* is a representative example - that it is to be found in man himself, as a species, as a succession of generations. But how should one understand and explain the idea of progress here as a peculiarity of the human species? I will briefly comment upon this complicated matter, in order to relate the present discussion to how the views about the notion of labor developed.

The discussions concerning the so-called "secularization theses" have dealt with the very problem presented above. According to the original formulation of Karl Löwith, the thesis reads: "this in the form of progress towards its goal oriented concept of history is 'ours' so far as it is western *and* Christian. In the last analysis it stems from the anticipation of the kingdom of God."[17] According to the thesis, then, one

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14 Koselleck 1985b, p. 88. Koselleck 1985a, p. 321 sums this up as follows: "Time is no longer simply the medium in which all histories take place; it gains a historical quality. Consequently, history no longer occurs in, but through, time. Time becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right."

15 In their massive *Handbuch der Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe.*

16 It seems to me that some of the critical remarks of Johannes Rohbeck may be instructive here. He maintains, generally, that Koselleck moves rather too unproblematically from everyday experiences to the new scientific forms of thought. Against the theses of a general acceleration occurring at both levels as well as an intensification of historical time, Rohbeck proposes an interpretation according to which one should, instead, view the new theories of history as attempts to create coordinates relatively independent of the temporal process, aiming at describing and evaluating the general change. As more radical break thus appears to exist between the accelerated everyday experiences and, on the other hand, the new theories of universal history, which can be taken as attemps to abandon chronology altogether, than Koselleck (and Lepenies too) proposes; cf. Rohbeck 1987, pp. 84-86 and passim.

17 Löwith 1961, cit. Wendorf 1980, p. 328.

should interpret the idea of the human species as progressing - and the various theoretical metaphors ('Natural Purpose', "Invisible Hand', 'List der Vernunft', 'Law of Value', 'Universale Kommunikationsgemeinschaft' etc.) - as something equivalent to the Divine Providence. The thesis, as it is presented by Löwith, is strikingly reductive, however[18] - in fact no more than an analogy, incapable of explaining why there exists a certain redemptive motif in the modern philosophy of history, and why it has adopted the particular form it has.[19]

Especially Hans Blumenberg has put a great deal of effort into demonstrating that the origins of the modern 'philosophies of history' are not eschatological. He outlines alternative origins - above all the overthrow of the Aristotelian conception of science and its replacement with modern scientific procedures based on subjective certitude and exact methods, as well as the emancipation from classicism within the arts and literature. These are in fact more probable factors, he argues, for there are major structural differences between the Christian hope and its modern, historical equivalents, ones which invalidate Löwith's theses. Here is one of his critical formulations:

> The fact that hopes for the greater security of man in the world grow up around this expansionism of progress [generated by the scientific community making progress, J.K.], and that these hopes can become a stimulus to the realization of the idea, is demonstrable. But is such hope identical with Christian eschatology, now gone over into its secularized form? Eschatology may have been, for a shorter or longer moment in history, an aggregate of hopes; but when the time had come for the emergence of the idea of progress, it was more nearly an aggregate of terror and dread. Where hope was to arise, it had to be set up and safeguarded as a new and original aggregate of this-wordly possibilities *over against* those possibilities of the next world. From a point of view that understands history as progress, the teological expectation of the final events impinging on it from outside - even if they were still hoped for - appears as a hindrance to the attitudes and activities that can secure for man the realization of his possibilities and the satisfaction of his needs. It is impossible to see how the one 'expectation' could ever result from the other, unless perhaps we were to represent the disappointment of the transcendent expectation as an agent of the immanent one.[20]

Blumenberg does not, of course, claim that there exist no continuities between the Christian heritage and modern views on history. The idea of history as a single process - and, likewise, the question of its overall meaning - originates, clearly, from the Christian story about creation and salvation, and modern philosophies of history may be seen as attempts to deal, using new means, with this problem - which according

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18 On its theological critiques cf. esp. Jaeschke 1976.

19 Cf. also Bubner 1984, pp. 78-81.

20 Blumenberg 1983, p. 31.

to Blumenberg, however, is not a major modern problem in itself.[21] Modern, instead, is "the elimination of the premise that the world has a particular quality for man that in effect prescribes his basic mode of behavior"[22], i.e. the elimination of all natural or theological teleology, and its replacement with an "existential program of self-assertion". According to this program, "man posits his existence in a historical situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the reality surrounding him and what use he will make of the possibilities that are open to him."[23] In other words, it is modern to see history as progressing as far as it is made by man himself, and this view should be considered a generalization of those progresses that are being made in theoretical, aesthetic, moral and technical domains. Of primary importance for Blumenberg's hypothesis are the efforts to assert, defend and preserve subjectivity in the fields science and technology.[24]

All this amounts to the conclusion that the modern idea of historical progress, or more precisely the *legitimacy* of this idea, would basically be something else than a theological residue. Although it is very difficult to say whether Blumenberg's theory of "sufficient rationality"[25] is correct or not, we should at least clearly acknowledge that we have now arrived at the very core problems of modernity. How does modernity, as a gesture of self-assertion, of self-determination, of subjective evidence and autonomy, of method, justify itself? Both approaches, Löwith's historicism and Blumenberg's immanent reconstruction do have their strengths as well as weaknesses when weighted.[26] One of the main points of the present study will be the suggestion that Hegel, in posing the modernity as a philosophical problem, goes in fact in several respects behind the opposition in question. Already in the next chapter we shall see how Hegel from the very beginning asks questions about the legitimacy of the Christian tradition over the Greek one, while relating them to his own time.

But in order to push the matter forward and to tie it up with our theme we shall ask next, whether the new conception of history as a progressing collective singular really emerges - or rather, can it be justified - from the subjective experiences, as Blumenberg seems to imply? Is Hegel, after all, wrong in relativizing this experience and the corresponding intentions in the historical arena itself? One could also see rather, political economy as well as the philosophies of enlightenment and of history as expressly trying to conceive of such

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21 Cf. Blumenberg 1983, pp. 53-63, 125-226.

22 Blumenberg 1983, p. 143.

23 Blumenberg 1983, p. 138.

24 A similar view is formulated by Mittelstrass 1976; cf. esp. p. 347.

25 I borrow this term from Pippin 1991.

26 Cf. esp. Pippin 1991, pp. 1-29.

historical forces which transcend the individual subject? Does not Kant, when he examines "the free exercise of human will *on a large scale*" and speaks of the signs of history, for example, allude to such a providence or teleology, to *Naturabsicht*, which certainly is subjective in some sense, as compared to the Classical view, yet beyond the control of an individual subject? In other words, one could ask, is something missing in Blumenberg's answer, and perhaps in that of Koselleck too, to Löwith's thesis?

This question has been posed by several authors. Odo Marquard, among others, maintains that the idea of an autonomous and active subject as the point of departure for modern philosophies of history is basically an illusion. For it is not the subject but an anonymous power, which has taken the place of God and which, in the name of the subjects, directs the course of history, he asserts.[27] There is probably an element of truth in this, but if one makes a global claim of this kind, one should say a lot more about this 'anonymous power' and the ways its works behind the backs of men.[28] And even when this is done, the theory remains as an external analogy. One step further along this line, perhaps, is taken by Hans-Dieter Kittsteiner who argues, ideology critically, that history as a collective singular and the idea of progress should be explained without too much subjective teleology, namely with the new social form founded on the capital relations which broke through in Europe during the "*Sattelzeit*".

According to this view, the modern ideas of history and progress, as well as the corresponding metaphors, would be fetishes in the Marxian sense, or allegories with which modern thinking has attempted to defend the (illusory) autonomy of man. It implies that the idea of historical progress should not be understood as a self-assertion of the modern man, for it is not true that this man 'makes a history of his own'. While Blumenberg may tentatively explain the earlier phases of modern historical thinking, he cannot grasp the turn from several progresses to the view of of history as a collective singular. From this turn on, namely, man no longer asserts himself, but is taken into a larger dynamics basically unintelligible from a subjective point of view.[29] In other

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27 Cf. Marquard 1973.

28 Following perhaps the clues found in Michael Foucault's work.

29 Kittsteiner 1980, p. 162: "Wenn die neuzeitliche Aktivität des Menschen darin besteht, "dass der Prozess des Telosschwundes nicht mehr nur hingenommen und gleichsam erlitten, sondern als kritischen Destruktion in die Hand genommen und vorangetrieben wird" (Blumenberg), das fallen das Sekulasierungstheorem und mit ihn der Herkunftsbereich der wichtigsten Kategorien der Geschichtsphilosophie aus der Neuzeit heraus. O. Marquard hat diesen Sachverhalt mit dem Satz kommentiert, die Geschichtsphilosophie sei nicht Neuzeit, sondern in ihr misslinge die Neuzeit (op.cit., 16). Indes ist diese elegant formulierte Paradoxie mit einem Datierungsproblem behaftet, denn schliesslich ist die misslungene Neuzeit neuer als die alte, vermeintlich eigentliche Neuzeit. Vielleicht wäre es sinnvoller, von zwei "Neuzeiten" zu sprechen und ihre historische Einordnung auf die Transformation des Feudalismus in den Kapitalismus zu beziehen. Dann fiele die Blumenbergsche Neuzeit mit den Anstrengungen zusammen, den beiden grossen Krisen der

words, it is the movement of capital which is the progressing subject of history and supplies it with a teleology.

One should wonder, however, whether this will do even for historical reasons. Did such a capital relation really exist during the 18th century as it is presupposed here, and did such a notion of historical progress exist actually which is talked about here. In his study Johannes Rohbeck questions at least the last argument by and large. Generally we should perhaps remark that such structural analogies after all have weaknesses when used to explain why and how something, here the social change during the period in question, was interpreted - in this case as it historical progress. Rohbeck's study, though he does not say a word about Hegel, appears particularly relevant for us, and I will make use of it in the next section, because his main point is that when looking for the origins of the theories of progress, one should consider what these thinkers of the early modernity have written about the notion of labor and related phenomena.[30]

Models of progress and labor

In Locke's thought we have already become acquainted with the conception of man as a being who satisfies his natural needs and desires through labor. The notions of private property and the civil society as a whole, are derived from this anthropological basis. In the theories of history and in the political economy of the late 18th century, man is viewed very much in a similar way. "Hunger, thirst, and the passion for sex are the great supports of the human species. After food, clothing and lodging are the two wants of mankind", Adam Smith writes.[31] Smith wants to show that the economic progress is traceable to the comsumptive needs of man, and especially to the change and development of these needs. The needs of man extend and become finer, and even more important is the emergence of needs which are not natural but artificial and, per definitionem, unsatisfiable.

For Smith the problem of why human needs develop and emerge,

Feudalismus im 14./15. und im 17. Jahrhundert zu entkommen; die Neuzeit der Geschichtsphilosophie steht aber schon am Anfang der Durchsetzung des Kapitalverhältnisses seit der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts."

30 I emphasize, again, that my aim here is not to take a standing in the debate about the various origins proposed for the modern philosophy as such. I do not prefer the hypotheses of Rohbeck, which concentrates on the labor process in a rather concrete sense, to those of Lange or Breuer, for example, for whom a more important lesson of Marx is to be found in his theory of the capital form. In other words, I do not read Hegel either as a philosopher of labor or as an advocator of capitalism, but rather as a philosopher who concentrates on the issue of modernity as his central problem.

31 Smith, Works V, p. 527.

then, remained an enigma as it did for his teacher David Hume.[32] Their followers Adam Ferguson and John Millar, the theorists of history, however, found a solution by deriving the development of needs from labor, and not vice versa. "He suits his means to the ends he has in view; and, by multiplying contrivancies, proceeds, by degrees, to the perfections of his arts. In every step of his progress, if his skill be increased, his desire must likewise have time to extend; and it would be as vain to suggest a contrivance of which he flighted the use, as it would be to tell him of blessings which he could not command", Ferguson writes.[33] This is an important point, for it actually implies the priority of production over circulation, and of means of production over its ends. And when one further notes that labor itself was considered, e.g. by Ferguson in his polemics with Mandeville,[34] as a human need important for individual happiness and perfection, it becomes clear that this will have wider implications for the notion of labor.[35] Most importantly labor is no longer seen as a teleological process with one direction, from the subject and his needs to the end that he sets for himself. Instead, it it is thought to influence back on the subject himself and on his needs, so that it widens and develops the horizon within which the subject, then, assumes new ends. In other words, labor is no more seen as a "poietic" activity merely bringing about its end. Later we shall see that this is central to Hegel's notion of labor.[36]

Hans Blumenberg has demonstrated how the ancient image of art, and also of labor, as *techne*, which is always seen as *imitatio naturae*, is replaced - e.g. in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa - by the modern idea of art as *inventio*.[37] According to the modern idea, labor, especially that of a craftsman, is not *mimesis* but inventive, creative and expressive by nature.[38] Contrary to the view that a new image of craftsman's activity emerges as a modern paradigm in the texts of the Cusanus, Rohbeck maintains, however, that craftsmanship cannot be the historical paradigm of inventio.[39] Instead, one should look for the

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32 Rohbeck 1987, pp. 110-114. On the problematics as a whole, cf. Schanz 1981.

33 Ferguson, History of civil society; cit. Rohbeck 1987, p. 115.

34 Cf. Rohbeck 1987, p. 119.

35 See Waszek 1988, pp. 146-157, who points out striking parallels between the discussions of the Scots and those of Hegel on the needs and their multiplication, particularization, refinement as well as their classification.

36 In Anmerkung 214, Rohbeck contrasts the idea with the interpretation of Lange 1980, but as far as I can see, this is one of the central elements in Lange's explication of the Hegelian externalization. See Lange 1980, esp. pp. 38-49. See also Waszek 1988, pp. 157-171, who compares Hegel's notion of labor with that of the Scots.

37 Blumenberg 1988.

38 Following the terminology of Hannah Arendt, one should here speak of work instead of labor. See Arendt 1958, pp. 136-174.

genesis of the inventio principle in the activities of the Renaissance engineers, whose technical inventions no longer imitated nature, but the *ars infinita* of the Divine Creator. In any case, when the theories of historical progress were constructed four centuries later, the general conception of labor had changed, as we have seen. Thus, while still in the *Guerelle entre des ancients et des modernes* during the 17. century the modern principle of invention was mainly defended within the arts, it was fairly soon extended over the entire field of technology. Perhaps one should not, however, aly too much emphasis on this principle alone. For in the theories of progress nature itself was assigned a significant role, as a model and a teacher of inventions, as well as supplier of means for new constructions and for their use in production. In this sense nature was conceived of as a prerequisite for the technological progress, which for its part also guarantees the continuity of the process. Thus one should say that although modern man no longer imitates nature but invents and constructs worlds of his own, he is still dependent on nature. The second half of Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, for example, would give some plausibility to this view.[40]

Labor and the growing national wealth

In the first modern theories of natural law formed by Pufendorf, Locke and Hobbes, man is perceived as a creature who asserts himself by satisfying his needs through labor, acquiring private property and founding, a by mutual agreement with his fellow-men, a political community for the protection of his rights and property. In the light of the Aristotelian tradition, which justified the political existence of a privileged nobility by referring to the minor status of labor as compared to free and independent praxis, these theories are modern. Their view of nature is no longer filled with classical teleology, and it is the individual who, by following his material interests in the state of nature, founds a

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39 Neither can it be, as has been proposed by Fontius, the labor done in manufacturing. For the idea of *inventio* is older than mamufactures and, besides, there is little of inventio in manufacture, Rohbeck argues.

40 Rohbeck 1987, p. 157. points out an important change in the concept of invention. "Sie ist keine" ohne Model schaffende inventio", wie Jauss noch bei Perrault noch behaupten konnte. Im Sinne der einmaligen genialen Endeckung wurde die Erfindung relativiert. Nach dem Verständniss der fotschrittstheoretiker des 18. Jahrhunderts geht die Erfindung, wie Raynal bemerkte, nicht mehr aus dem Nichts hervor, sie ist keine völlige Neuschöpfung, sondern bestheht in der Ausschöpfung des Alten. Die Erfindung ist Nachmung von etwas Vorgegebenen - zunächts Nachahmung der Natur und in späteren Kulturstufen Nachahmung des selbst hergestellten Arbeitsprodukte."

political community, not vice versa.[41]

However, when one relates these constructions to the theories that were created in the latter half of the 18th century, especially in France and Scotland but also in Germany, it becomes evident that they still articulate a rather early stage of modernity. For as we have already indicated, renewed attention will be turned on the anatomy and functional meachanisms of the coming society, based on the development of needs and their satisfaction through labor and markets. Especially significant were the efforts of the Scottish historians and moral philosophers who were to become, among other things, the founders of political economy. They gave up the axiomatic structure of the natural law theories, together with the social contract theorem altogether, concentrating on the mechanisms of the then new economic process. This does not mean, however, that they would have lost all contact with the normative problematics of the natural law.[42]

Apart from being a political economist, Adam Smith is also an important moral philosopher and theorist of history. These elements constitute a reflected oeuvre, as may be seen already from the Glasgow lectures which Smith delivered as a young professor in moral philosophy. The lecture course was composed of a "Natural Theology", of "Ethics" and of "Jurispudence" which was further divided into the sections "Justice" and "Police, Revenue and Arms".[43] From the second part Smith built *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), and from the last one *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). Smith did not manage to finish for publication his major work on the history of jurispudence.[44]

A new and, no doubt, modern aspect as compared to e.g. the lectures of his predecessor Hutcheson is the status given to economic phenomena. While Hutcheson still conveived of economy basically along the classical doctrine of *oikos*, as subordinated to the natural political community,[45] in Smith's hands it gains independence and is only regulated by a "welfare police", which Smith explicitly distinguishes from the classical *polis*. Natural needs and desires, division of labor, the determination of prices, functions of money, state income as well as the concept of wealth are, then, treated in this part. The overall conception has not changed when Smith in 1776 characterizes his political economy as an independent part of his moral philosophy:

> Political economy, considered as a branch of science of a statesman or legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful

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41 Cf. Medick 1973, pp. 135-136.

42 Cf. Medick 1973, p. 137 and Lichtblau 1978, pp. 62-63.

43 Cf. esp. Steward 1963 and Medick 1973, pp. 180-182.

44 Cf. Medick 1973, pp. 182-189.

45 Cf. Lichtblau 1978, pp. 65-66.

> revenue or subsistence for the people, or, more properly, to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.[46]

Smith proceeds quite consciously in accordance with the tradition of political philosophy when he, after discussing the principles of production and division of incomes created here, devotes the large Book V. to "The Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth". The following passage gives some view of his approach to the tradition:

> Wealth, as Mr. Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires, or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford him the means of acquiring both, but the mere possession of that fortune does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possesion immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing; a certain command, over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in proportion to the extent of this power; or to the quantity of either of other men's labour, or, what is the same thing, of the produce of other men's labour, which it enables him to purchase or command. The exhangeable value of every thing must always be precisely equal to the extent of this power which it conveys to its owner.[47]

The discussion as a whole deals with a society far more more advanced than that of Hobbes. Smith aims at more than justifying a political sovereign by deducing its necessity from the state of nature, nor is his concept of labor designated, like Locke's, as the legitimation of private property. Both private property and political authority, which quarantees this, actually exist for him and the problem, instead, lies in their optimal function. The real basis of society, and the real source of its legitimacy as well, according to Smith's analysis, is the economic system where the national wealth is produced and exchaged. The basis of this system is productive labor and its division. Smith begins his work as follows:

> The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.[48]

The optimal production of national wealth is Smith's perspective on society, for the growth of this wealth is the foundation of all progress. And by wealth, as we have indicated, Smith does not mean private

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46 Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, Int., Works, vol. 3, p. 138.

47 *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I, Works, vol. 2, p. 45.

48 *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 1.

property as the ticket to the commonwealth nor, like the mercantilists, a mere power to purchase, nor like the physiocrats, the fertility of the mother land. For him wealth consists, like its real power, in its ability to produce more wealth, i.e. goods to satisfy of people's needs.

Certainly Smith and Ferguson were not the first to recognize the advantages offered by by division of labor and exchange of the products. Quesnay in his "tableau économique", for example, as well as other physiocrats had outlined a system of economy, but Smith and Ferguson were the first tp make the division of labor the basis of their entire political economy.[49] For them, all other social relations between the individuals, and the development of these relations, too, are founded on the division of labor. According to Smith's famous pin-maker example,

> This great increase of the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.[50]

The views of Smith and Ferguson on the origin of division of labor differ. For the latter derived it directly from the variation of individual technical skills,[51] whereas for Smith "it is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another."[52] This is a kind of anthropological principle which, however, becomes truly effective only in a society based on the division of labor. Although Smith connects this division directly to a societal structure based on excange instead of the technical conditions, he, too, has difficulties in seeing the principal differences between the division within a single manufacture and society.

In any case there exists a division at both levels and consequently the products are exchanged in the markets. In his analysis Smith seeks for a regulative measure at the heart of these relations. Except for their price, the products have their value - more precisely, "the value in use"

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49 Rohbeck 1987, p. 188, reports of their bitter personal quarrel about the original author of this invention. Waszek 1988, pp. 207-211 organizes his discussion on the subject in three originally Scottish points: the division of labor is seen as 'the driving force behind economic development'; it is discussed in the framefork of the most advanced technological and economical conditions, and its advantages and disadvantages are treated together.

50 Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book I., Works, vol. 2., 11-12.

51 See Rohbeck 1987, pp. 189-190.

52 *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 20.

and "the value in exchange".[53] The products are generally assumed to be exchanged according to their "real price", i.e. according to their value. This is, however, difficult to determine exactly, since it is normally expressed in money, for "gold and silver, like every other commodity, vary in their value..."[54] Behind this expression, however, there is the value which comes from the labor involved:

> The real price on every thing, what every thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What it bought with money or with goods is purchased by labour, as much as what we acquire by the toil of our own body.[55]

According to this "labor-command"-theory, products of equal value, i.e. containing an equal amount of toil and trouble, are exchanged. This is the principal law according to Smith, although one may study "the causes which sometimes hinder the market price, that is, the actual price of commodities, from coinciding exactly with what may be called their natural price."[56]

For us it suffices to note that Smith at least wants to claim that the value of a product is determined by the labor which it contains and "commands". What Smith remarks on this labor appears interesting in view of the history which we have been recounting. About labor as an irreducible standard Smith writes:

> Equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength and spirits; in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price he pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it. Of these indeed it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times that is dear which is difficult to come at, or which costs much labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price; money is their nominal price only.[57]

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53 *The Welath of Nations*, p. 42: "The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in exchange; and on the contrary, those which have their greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use." Water is given as an example of the former, a diamond of the latter.

54 *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 47.

55 *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 44.

56 *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 42.

57 *The Wealth of Nations*, pp. 48-49.

This does not rescue the Smithian theory of value from its inconsistencies, for the phrases "equal quantities of labour (...) may be said to be of equal value to the labourer" and "the price which he pays" are themselves ambiguous, and probably meant to be so. At this point we should especially note that the labor which is invested in the product is always paid by the laborer with a certain amount of ease, liberty and happiness, and that it is this toil and trouble, contained in the products, which according to Smith is the real source of all wealth.[58]

As a political economist Smith studies the optimal mechanism for producing wealth. The division of labor and the existence of markets constitute the basis of this mechanism. The principles of exchange are equal to everyone and, consequently, just. For Smith, the fact that some people enter the markets as land or capital owners, while the majority only with their propensity - or, rather, necessity - to labor, is not such a serious problem as it especially for Rousseau.[59] Neither does he consider it necessary to justify this inequality with the notion of labor, as Locke did.[60] As far as private ownership serves the mechanism of production and the growth of wealth, it is legitimate. From this it follows, however, that the owners of land and capital are obliged to put their resources in productive use.

Thus Smith draws a parallel between the growth of private property and national wealth. His famous distinction between productive and unproductive labor is derived from this. Smith defines: "There is one sort of labour which adds to the value upon which it is bestowed: there is another which has no such effect. The former, as it produces value, may be called productive; the latter, unproductive labour."[61] Smith's examples of the latter are - if we consider the normative hierarchy of actions and its tradition that we have depicted - quite impressive:

> The sovereign, for example, with all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and navy, are unproductive

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58 Cf. Foucault 1970, pp. 253-263, according to whom this rather concrete view of labor fades, then, in Ricardo's and Marx's hands into more abstract systems of representation.

59 In his "second discourse" Rousseau traced its origin to the division of labor. According to Rohbeck 1987, pp. 193-194, Rousseau lets his history of labor begin at a relatively late stage, with division of labor and the emergence of private property together with inequality. The theorists of progress in turn, Smith included, situate these rather as mere episodes within a longer development of human labor. Thus while Rousseau's explanation severs his critique, the perspective of the Scots is functional to their more legitimating purposes.

60 Rather, Smith and other theorists of progress wanted to write a detailed "natural history" o f the present civil society. Characteristic to this historical analysis is, as Rohbeck 1987, pp. 196-212 demonstrates, to view the present society as the natural end of its whole (pre)history. The normative connotations of the program, which were not affirmative ones only, are unmistakable. See esp. Medick 1973, pp. 250-295.

61 Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book II, chap. III, Works, vol. 3., p. 1.

> labourers. They are the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other people. Their service, how honourable, how useful, or how necessary soever, produces nothing for which an equal quantity of service can afterwards be produced. The protection, security, and defence of commonwealth, the effect of their labour this year, will not purchase its protection, security and defence for the year to come. In the same class must be ranked, both some of the gravest and most important, and some of the most frivolous professions: churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-dancers &c.[62]

This does not mean for Smith, of course, that all these people where superfluous.[63] But the fact remains that only productive labor contributes to the growth of capital and that of wealth, and such is above all the labor done in material production, especially of new means of production which accumulate as capital.[64] From this unilaterally economic and also quantitative point of view, the activities which traditionally were values mostly, are now reduced to unproductiveness. The labor itself, on the other hand, is reduced to its productiveness sans phrase. We will later see that this line of thinking has a great influence of Hegel, but also that for him it represents a danger. It stems from a bourgeois world for which man's activities are basically economic, a world which, then, should not become "positive", i.e. gain dominance over its natural limits.

Civil society as the most difficult task of mankind

In his theoretical and practical philosophies alike, Kant seems to be completely conscious of the tradition, of its empirist as well as rationalist currents, when he gives his own synthetizing proposal for its fundamental principles. Kant's following lines about what practical philosophy is not, appear relevant here:

> The solution of the problems of pure geometry is not allocated to a special part of that science, nor does the art of land-surveying merit the

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62 *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 3.

63 As Waszek 1988, pp. 177-179 points out, Sir James Steuart was more than Smith inclined to empasize the significance of nobility and other not productive citizens, and we will see that Hegel rather follows him.

64 Cf. Rosner 1982, p. 85: "Produktive Arbeit ist diejenige, die den Reichtum vermehrt und unproduktive Arbeit diejenige, die es nicht tut. Aber es geht dabei gar nicht um die Arbeit selbst. Es geht um die Produktivität der Arbeit für das Kapital: Vergrössert sich der Reichtum durch Arbeit anderer, oder wird es verringert. Nur durch die Identität der Akkumulation des Kapitals mit der Vergrösserung des gesellschaftlichen Reichtums ist die für das Kapital produktive Arbeit schlechthin produktiv. Durch die produktive Arbeit wird der Unternehmer und die Gesellschaft reicher, durch unproduktive verarmen beide."

> name of practical, in contradistinction to pure, as a second part of the general science of geometry, and with equally little, or perhaps less, right can the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or of observation be ranked as a practical part of the cience of nature, or in fine, domestic, agricultural, or political economy, the art of social intercourse, the principles of dietetics, or even general instruction as to the attainment of happiness, or as much as the control of the inclinations or the restraining of the affections with a view thereto, be denominated practical philosophy - not to mention forming these latter into a second part of philosophy in general. For, between them all, the above contain nothing more than rules of skill, which are thus only technically practical - the skill being directed to producing an effect which is possible according to natural concept of causes and effects. As these concepts belong to theoretical philosophy they are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries of theoretical philosophy..." (*Critique of Judgement*, p. 10; *AA* XX, pp. 172-173).

A little earlier Kant remarks that, as far as the general division of philosophy into theoretical and practical is concerned, "a gross misuse of the terms has prevailed" (*CJ*, p. 9; *AA* XX, p. 171). By this he means that the "practical" has been taken mainly as something which is "applied" within the theoretical field in question. This use of the terms amounts in fact to no division at all according to Kant, for both parts, the "theoretical" and the "practical", "might have similar principles". Instead we have to look at the most fundamental principles of philosophy, for "philosophy may be said to contain the principles of the rational cognition that concepts afford us of things" (*CJ*, p. 8; *AA* XX, p. 171). When this is done, we get a "perfectly sound" division of philosophy into theoretical and practical parts.

Thus "there are but two kinds of concepts, and these yield a corresponding number of distinct principles of the possibility of their objects. The concepts referred to are those *of nature* and *of freedom*" (*CJ*, p. 8; *AA* XX, p. 171). There are two worlds for Kant, with two different sets of principles, two "causalities", and therefore philosophical cognition, which centers on the possibility of its objects and is synthetic *a priori*, falls into two parts. Theoretical philosophy studies the *a priori* concepts and the principles of nature, whereas practical philosophy looks into the *a priori* conditions and principles of the determination of our will. The former studies the *a priori* conditions and principles of our experience and cognition of nature, while the latter investigates the principles of freedom as the *a priori* conditions that makes the moral law absolutely binding.

According to Kant, there has been a gross misuse of the terms in practical philosophy because the question whether "the concept by which the causality of the will gets its rule is a concept of nature or a concept of freedom", has remained unresolved. Thus the will is confused with the desire or other natural inclinations. However, everything turns on this distinction between the different kinds of objects that require different principles of cognition. "For let the concept determining the causality be a concept of nature, and then the principles are *technically-practical*; but, let it be a concept of freedom, and they are

morally-practical. (...) Hence technically-practical principles belong to theoretical philosophy (natural science), whereas those morally-practical alone form the second part, that is, practical philosophy (ethical science)" (*CJ*, p. 9; *AA* XX, p. 172).

Kant agrees with the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical as such, and he would also add to them logic as organon. As regards the principles and the completeness of the division, however, he disagrees fundamentally. In more general terms, this involves a distinction between the principles of modern philosophy and those of classical thought. For both Aristotle and Kant, the division is founded on the ontological difference of the objects, but while the Aristotelian philosophy studies the beings themselves, trying to find out their *logos*, philosophy for Kant is a study of the *a priori* conditions of such a study. Kant perceives of the ultimate principles of philosophy, both theoretical and practical, as lying in the subject itself, in the different faculties of the transcendental subject, and the task is to detect these conditions of possibility for rational knowledge or moral action. Aristotle, as we have seen, views them in the different kinds of being, so that theoretical philosophy studies that being which moves on its own and necessarily so, whereas practical philosophy concentrates on the contingent being whose movement is caused by our actions. Unlike this Greek ontological art of thinking, the modern philosophy starts from the subject and constructs from it the fundamental principles of the world. Kant himself spoke about the "Copernican turn" or an "overall revolution" in the art of thinking.

In respect to practical philosophy, what follows from Kant's redefinition of the object and the first principle is that "all technically-practical rules (i.e. those of art and skill generally, or even of prudence, as a skill in exercising an influence over men and their wills) must, so far as their principles rest upon concepts, be reckoned as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. For they only touch the possibility of things according to concepts of nature, and this embraces, not alone the means discoverable in nature for the purpose, but even the will itself (as a faculty of desire, and therefore a natural faculty), so far as it is determinable on these rules by natural motives" (*CJ*, pp. 9-10; *AA* XX, p. 172). Rather than Aristotle himself Kant, may here think of Chistian Wolff, who had proposed an Aristotelian kind of a practical philosophy founded on modern subjective principles. Kant was unsatisfied with this - as he was with basically all the modern attempts at practical philosophy except for *Du contrat social* of Rousseau - because it did not formulate clearly or radically enough its object and first principles.[65]

Thus as Kant in *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten* gives a definition of these principles in a preliminary way, he discusses Wolff's general practical philosophy which lacks the definition of willas

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65 See Riedel 1984, pp. 6-9. On the significance of Rousseau for Kant's practical philosophy see esp. Velkley 1989.

follows: "his propedeutic differs from a metaphysics of morals in the same way that general logic is distinguished from transcendental philosophy, the former expounding the actions and rules of thinking in general, and the latter presenting the particular actions and rules of pure thinking, i.e., of thinking by which objects are completely a priori. For the metaphysics of morals is meant to investigate the idea and principles of a possible pure will and not the actions and conditions of the human volition as such, which are for the most part drawn from psychology" (*Foundations*, p. 7; *AA* V, p. 390). Wolff does not distinguish between the empirical motives for action and those presented *a priori* by reason alone, and it is only consequent that his concept of obligation is "anything but moral".[66]

In the second section of *Grundlegung* Kant then distinguishes the moral imperative from other types of imperatives. This is done in "the only correct order", by first establishing "the doctrine of morals on metaphysics and then, when its is established, by procuring a hearing for it through popularization", Kant argues (*Foundations*, p. 26; *AA* V, p. 410). One could perhaps say that this procedure is closer to Plato than Aristotle, and that as compared to Kant Hegel is, as far as the "respect" of the existing ethical views is concerned, closer to the latter. In any case, Kant's discussion of the different imperatives is important for our theme. "All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former present the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else which one desires (or which one may possible desire). The categorical imperative would be one which presented an action as of itself objectively necessary, with regard to any other end" (*Foundations*, p. 31; *AA* V, p. 415). A hypothetical imperative may futher be problematical or assertorical, depending on whether the purpose to which the action is good is possible or actual. A categorical imperative, instead, is apodictical.

Kant may be thinking of Wolff, but he in fact comments on Aristotle too when he continues by dividing the hypothetical imperatives into the rules of skill and the counsels of prudence. In the case of the former, "the question is only of what must be done in order to attain it [i.e. the end, J.K.]. The precepts to be followed by a physician in order to cure his patient and by a poisoner in order to bring about certain death are of equal value in so far as each does that which will perfectly accomplish his purpose" (*Foundations*, p. 32; *AA* V, p. 415). These rules of skill may be said to correspond roughly to the poietic actions in the Aristotelian sense. From these Kant distinguishes the assertoric imperative, for there is, according to him too, a natural end common to us and always present. He almost paraphases Aristotle when writing:

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66 On this background of Kant's practical philosophy, see esp. Böckerstette 1982 and Caygill 1989, pp. 103-188.

> There is one end, however, which we may presuppose as actual in all rational beings so far as imperatives apply to them, i.e., so far as they are dependent beings; there is one purpose not only which they *can* but which they presuppose that they all *do* have by necessity of nature. This purpose is happiness. The hypothetical imperative which presupposes the practical necessity of action as means to the promotion of happiness is an assertorical imperative (*Foundations*, p. 33; *AA* V, p. 416).

The imperatives of skill and prudence concern man as a dependent, natural being. They both are analytical in the sense "that whoever wills the end wills also (necessarily according to reason) the only means to it which are in his power" (*Foundations*, p. 35; *AA* V, p. 418). However, though happiness is a necessity and the highest of the natural ends of man, this end, taken not as an idea but practically, is natural and individually varying, and consequently beyond the reach of philosophical knowledge.

> He cannot, therefore, act according to definite principles so as to be happy, but only according to empirical counsels, e.g., those of diet, economy, courtesy, restraint, etc., which are shown by experience best to promote wellfare on the average. Hence the impretatives of prudence cannot, in the strict sense, command, i.e., present actions objectively as practically necessary; thus they are to be taken as counsels (*consilia) rather than as commands* (*praecepta*) of reason, and the task of determining infallibly and universally what action will promote the happiness of rational being is completely unsolvable (*Foundations*, p. 36; *AA* V, p. 419).

In distinction to these imperatives, beyond which Aristotle, according to Kant, in fact did not reach, the idea of man as a moral being should be founded *a priori* on pure reason alone. "Thus if there is to be a supreme practical principle and a categorical imperative for the human will, it must be one that forms an objective principle of the will from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself. Hence this objective principle can serve as a universal practical law", Kant argues (*Foundations*, p. 47; *AA* V, pp. 428-429). To this law he gives three formulations: "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"; "act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a universal law of nature"; and "act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" (*Foundations*, p. 39; 47; *AA* V, p. 421-429).[67]

Thus moral philosophy has its anthropological part, but Kant's project is to demonstrate that the whole of it ultimately rests on a pure ground. Instead of describing man or acquiring knowledge of him, the pure moral philosophy prescribes man, gives him as a rational being, as the final end, *a priori* laws. This is metaphysical for Kant, but not in the

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67 On the relation of the three versions see e.g. Riley 1983, pp. 37-63, who defends a teleological reading of Kant's ethics against the "constructivist" interpretation of Rawls.

traditional sense, as resting on the idea of good, on *eudaimonia* or on God, for pure theoretical reason has demonstrated the antinomical character of these ideas. The moral laws are founded on the pure reason alone, which here, in order to become practical, needs the metaphysical postulates of freedom, of man's immortality and of God. These are presented in *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (cf. esp. *CPR*, pp. 137-151; *AA* V, pp. 133-146), which contains the critique of non-pure practical reason and the deduction of the pure one. The three postulates of practical metapyhysics are necessary, Kant argues, in order that the idea of the highest good, i.e. the complete coincidence of morality and happiness, would be possible. This idea is not a matter of knowledge, whether practical or theoretical, but of rationally justified hope (cf. *CPR*, pp. 139-153; *AA* V, pp. 134-148).

I have presented these Kantian principles so as to shed light on how he in general conceives of the historical and political reality. This has signicant bearing on the matter at hand, as we shall see in the next few chapters centering on the formation of Hegel's rather different vision of the same reality. Kant views history and politics as existing in between man as a noumenal and phenomenal, or as a moral and natural being. They are filled with tasks, duties, striving and hope. It is man's task to strive towards his self-realization as a moral being, but Kant conceives of him as highly contradictory by nature.[68] The definite end of history, however, should lie in the complete coincidence of man's two aspects, the moral and the natural one. This would signify the unity of happiness and morality, and it would also mean the unity of a political and moral community.

Thus Kant's idea of man as the final end of creation binds his ethics in a special way to his political philosophy and, on the whole, to the philosophy of history.[69] In *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, when trying to resolve the problem of natural teleology, Kant makes an important distinction between the final and the ultimate end. As a noumenal being, who lays down his own laws and thus creates himself a realm of freedom, man dependends neither on nature nor experience, and as such a being he is the final end and the highest good for nature (# 82). But while man lives within the sphere of nature too, he has his natural ends as well, among which happiness stands out as the highest. This is one of Kant's ideas of reason, without exact content derived from experience. As a culturalbeing, Kant sees man as striving towards his moral and natural ends, and in doing so he is the ultimate end for nature. "But, where in man, at any rate, are we to place this ultimate end of nature? To discover this we must seek out what nature can supply for the purpose of preparing him for what he himself must do in order to

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68 See e.g. *AA* VII, pp. 321-325 and *AA* XV, Reflexion 1521, and *AA* VIII, p. 26; *Idea*, p. 49.

69 On this problematics see, e.g., Yovel 1980; Krämling 1985; Velkey 1989; Castello 1990.

be a final end, and we must segragate it from all ends whose possibility rests upon conditions that man can only await at the hand of nature" (*CJ*, part II, p. 94; *AA* XX, p. 431). From this point of view, then, Kant makes a difference between the culture of skill, through which man develops technology and improves his political institutions, and the culture of discipline, which "consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires" (*CJ*, part II, p. 95; *AA* XX, p. 432).

According to Kant, culture, politics included, takes place in between the realms of freedom and necessity. The question whether politics is based on any distinct principles appears difficult for him, and there exist very different interpretations of the issue.[70] "Officially" Kant pleas for moral politics when he in *Zum ewigen Frieden* defines politics "as an applied branch of right" (*Perpetual peace*, p. 116; *AA* VIII). Kant is aware, however, that the connections between morality, right and politics are of a conceptual nature, and that Machiavelli's view of politics may, after all, be more realistic. Thus he does not give any detailed precepts for the "moral politician", who unlike his pragmatic colleague, the "political moralist", tries have his eye on the moral and legal principle and justifies his reforms in public.

The origin of right is in morality, but right is also an empirical matter. Unlike morality, right is external, coercive.[71] Right is, however, ultimately based on the moral duty of each actor. It is not merely a pragmatic regulation of intersubjective relations.[72] Thus in his introduction to *The doctrine of right*, Kant makes a distinction between a juridical law which makes an action objectively necessary and a moral law whose necessity is that of subjective incentives (*MM*, p. 46; *AA* VI, p. 219). This is the general principle of right: "Any action is *right* if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexists with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law" (*MM*, p. 56; *AA* VI, p. 230). This principle resembles the categorical imperative, but it does not presuppose an action based on moral duty. One may see the connection between the two kinds of law, but one may also simply obey the juridical laws. Such laws are needed, according to Kant, because contradictory in his social being (*"ungesellig gesellig"*) as man is, he does

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70 See e.g. Riley 1983, Kersting 1984, Arendt 1982, Vollrath 1977 and Vollrath 1987, Lyotard 1983 and Lyotard 1986, Schmitz 1990.

71 Kersting 1984, p. X writes. "Die Konzeption des Rechtgesetzes und der ihm zugeordneten juridischen Vernunftsgesetzgebung ist die Konsequenz der moralischen Möglichkeit der Erwingbarkeit schuldiger Handlungen. Die reine praktische Vernunft ist juridisch gesetzgebend, insofern ihr Gesetz den Zwang zu solchen Handlungen für moralisch möglich erklärt, die um ihrer praktischen Notwendigkeit willen auszuführen, sie gleichwohl als ethisch gesetzgebende Vernunft verlangt."

72 Kersting 1984, p. 78: "Wie die rechtliche Verpflichtung eine in die Intersubjektivität verlagerte Selbsverplichtung ist, so ist der Rechtzwang das äussere gegenstück des moralischen Selbstzwangs, gleichsam sein kausal-mechanisches Äquivalent."

not follow his sense of duty but is inclined to various selfish decisions.[73]

For Kant, one could somewhat simplify, moral freedom is intelligible and personal, while juridical freedom is empirical and historical. The former should serve as the ultimate foundation for the latter.[74] The latter is for it essentially a means, and - in principle - a constant threat too. It is ultimately of utmost importance for Kant to think of right in a moral perspective, and of politics in legal and moral terms, but he does not regard politics and political institutions as morally practical in the first place. Here the contrast between Kant and Hegel is, as we shall see, a major one. For Kant, freedom is in essence something individual. Hegel's intention, on the contrary, is to demonstrate the state to be the realization of freedom, which contains the idea of one's being freely oneself in or through other people. Common to them is - at least in this sense we may speak about their "liberalism", too - that they both oppose the patrimonial conceptions of the state as formulated by Ch. Wolff. In some sense Hegel could subscribe this: "A government might be established on the principle of benevolence towards the people, like that of a father towards his children. Under such a *paternal government* (*Imperium paternale*), the subjects, as immature children (...) would be obliged to behave purely passively and to rely upon the judgement of the head of the state as to how they *ought* to be happy, and upon his kindness in willing their happiness at all. Such a government is the greatest conceivable *despotism (...)" (PW*, p. 74; AA VIII, pp. 290-291). Both Kant and Hegel are modern thinkers of freedom, but they differ considerably in the their conception of its realization in society and history.

The quoted passage of *Gemeinspruch* is from a critique of Hobbes where Kant defends, in accordance with the tradition of "possessive individualism",[75] certain inalienable human rights. These are "the right of freedom", i.e., "each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end"; "the right of equality" as subjects of the state; and "the right of independence" that every citizen of state has (PW, pp. 74-79; AA VIII, pp. 290-296). These are natural human rights which, however, may be realized only within a civil society and a state which is legally regulated. Of property, and, correspondingly, of citizenship and legal personhood, we may speak only in this legal state of affairs.[76] "Anyone who has the right to vote on his legislation is a *citizen* (*citoyen*, i.e. citizen of a state, not *bourgeois* or citizen of a town). The only qualification required of a citizen (apart, or course, from being an adult male), is that

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73 See the section Von dem Hange zum Bösen in der menschlicher Natur in the book on religion *AA* VI, pp. 28-32.

74 On Kant's theory of freedom see, e.g., Böckerstette 1982 and Allison 1990.

75 Cf. Breuer 1983, p. 509.

76 See Siep 1989 and Angehrn 1989.

he must be his *own master (sui iuris)*, and have some *property* (which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to support himself" (*PW*, p. 78; *AA* VIII, p. 295).[77]

Unlike Locke, Kant does not deduce the property right from the natural rights of an individual to his labor and its results. This right is for him conceptually necessary and universal.[78] Both the state of nature and the social contract are for Kant conceptual constructions, "ideas of reason". The latter contains the *a priori* principles, deduced from the practical reason, of a rightful possession. The central among them reads like this: "it is a duty of Right to act toward others so that what is external (usable) could also become someone's" (*MM*, p. 74; *AA* VI, p. 252). For Kant, the social contract is not a fiction ("*Erdichtung*") of any kind, but a pure conceptual deduction of the general will. Nonetheless it has its practical reality: "for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented with the general will" (*PW*, p. 79; *AA* VIII, p. 297). This solution of Kant to derive the formal principles of civil society and state directly from practical reason is, of course, in line with his critiques: the validity of knowledge, will as well as judgement, is founded on the interplay of a priori structures and empirical matters.

To conclude this discussion of the basic principles of Kant's practical philosophy,[79] a few words about the connection between history and politics are in order. "The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a *civil society* which can administer justice universally", Kant writes in his *Idea for a universal history* (*PW*, p. 45; *AA* VIII, p. 23). In a society of this kind "freedom under external laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, but this is so difficult to attain because the highest authority should be both perfectly just and a human being." Man may never solve this problem completely, but this idea of practical reason is the most important "regulative principle" of the historical man who approaches the solution. In *Streit der Fakultäten* Kant writes: "All forms of state are based on the idea of a constitution which is compatible with the natural right of man, so that those who obey the law should also act as a unified body of legistlators. And if we

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77 See also *The doctrine of right* # 46, where Kant adds to this the distinction between an active and a passive citizen. Thus, an apprentice in the sevice of a merchant or artisan, a domestic servant, women and all whose existence is dependent on other persons, must be treated as free, equal and independent human beings, but they cannot be taken as active memebers of the state. Most importantly, Kant maintains, the positive laws should not be contrary to the natural law "that anyone can work his way up from his passive condition to an active one".

78 On Kant's notion of property, see Saage 1973, pp. 12-53; Kersting 1984, 113-183 and Williams 1983, pp. 77-96.

79 I have attempted to treat the subject more thorougly in Kotkavirta 1992.

accordingly think of the commonwealth in terms of concepts of pure reason, it may be called a Platonic *ideal* (*respublica noumenon*), which is not an empty figment of imagination, but the external norm for all civil constitutions whatsoever, and a means of ending all wars" (*PW*, p. 187; *AA* VII, pp. 90-91). Although Kant recognizes that states with their constitutions are rarely arrived at peacefully or rationally, qua a decision, but rather qua the various effects of the human *ungesellige Geselligkeit*, i.e. wars and other forms of antagonism, history of the species "represents" this ideal better and better in the world of experience, he maintains. Thus wars, repressive forms of power etc. would eventually be overcome and man could regulate his social life according to the republican principles. According to Kant, the task of political philosophy, then, is to attempt to conceive of the principles on which the reformatory action striving towards the republican ideal could be based.

In his philosophy of history Kant studies this striving of man in between the noumenal and the phenomenal, and, at least as compared to Hegel's later philosophy of history, Kant leaves the results considerably open. He thinks here within a German tradition, which unlike the Scots does not yet emphasize the signifigance of the economic processes in modernity but concentrates on moral and legal phenomena. However, Kant's teleological ideas of nature, of Naturabsicht in history, of the principles of the reflective judgement that would grasp the modern historical teleology, should also be read as his contribution the problems which Adam Smith, in a rather different tradition, tried to resolve with his metaphor "Indivible hand".[80] They both are attempts to comprehend the modern secularized and temporalized process of history, though from two rather different perspectves. In his practical philosophy, then, Hegel will try to do justice to both of these perspectives, i.e., to understand what the economic and social mechanisms of the modern society are and what they amount to, but always against most radical normative claims based on the Kantian postulate of freedom.

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80 Caygill 1989 is a very instructive reading of this sort; see also Kittsteiner 1980, pp. 207-220.

4 HEGEL'S EARLY IDEAS OF ETHICAL LIFE

During his formative years, before entering Jena in 1800, Hegel worked mostly with problems pertaining to religion. He had studied theology for five years in the Tübingen *Stift*, which he left in 1793. Hegel did not consider himself as a priest, however, nor a as philosopher yet, but as a *Volkserzieher* or an *Aufklärer* who would supply his to contemporaries a new religion that they needed. Both his home and the gymnasium in Stuttgart were enlighted in spirit, and Hegel's early thinking - or, in fact his thinking as a whole - should be viewed as an effort to widen the narrow limits of German *Aufklärung*. Thus Hegel directs radical critique against *Aufklärung*, athough he maintains a loyalty to its general program. In addition to Kant, authors important for his early thinking were especially Schiller, Jacobi and Rousseau. His closest friend in the *Stift* was Hölderlin, with whom he constructed an ideal image of the classical Greece which was to serve, at a later state, too, as an important normative contrast in his critiques directed against the abstractness of the modern world.

There are certain turns, even breaks, in Hegel's early development, but a clear continuity can be perceived as well. In the present chapter I shall try to reconstruct this development in its main lines, for Hegel's specific idea of practical philosophy and its various formulations in Jena are only to be made intelligible in this way. This is especially true of the notion of ethical life, on which the Hegelian practical philosophy to a great extent rests. One course often taken to follow Hegel's early development is to study his reception and critiques of Kant's thought, and I have chosen this approach, too, because it afords so much material essential for the understanding of our theme.

All the three critiques of Kant, as well as his book on religion which came out in 1793, were widely read in the *Stift*. In fact there arose an interesting controversy about Kant, above all between professor G.C. Storr and K.I. Diez, a younger tutor. Storr, who was an orthodox

Lutheran, basically wanted to make room for the Christian God with the aid of Kant's agnosticism. Thus Kant is right, Storr maintains, when he says that we cannot prove the existence of God within the limits of our theoretical reason. He is also right in defending the primacy of the practical reason. According to Storr, however, Kant's conception of morality does not play any part in real life and in the actual motives of men, because Kant altogether sets aside the human striving for happiness from the realm of morality. And if one admits the importance of this pursuit for our morality, as in Storr's view should be done, it follows that one has to consider the relation between morality and human nature. More specifically, one has to bind morality both to human feelings - Storr regards respect for moral law as a "moral feeling" - and to man's sensuality (*Sinnlichkeit*). For Storr, who was a dogmatic theologian, all this means that it is man's innermost nature to strive towards eternal happiness, towards God, and all our feelings and sensuality should in the last resort serve this end.[1]

Dieter Henrich tells us that Storr primarily related to Kant's earlier version of his moral theology, in which there existed a closer yet ambiguous relation between our pursuit of happiness and the moral law. The moral law is presented here as the necessary form all happiness, while Kant later, from the *Grundlegung* on, makes a much stronger case for moral autonomy and the moral law. Thus the question of why there must be an ultimate end (*letzte Zweck*) for our actions, which is taken up explicitly in *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, i.e. why our striving towards happiness and the moral law should coincide, still remains unsettled. While Kant's moral theology in his later thinking is, in fact, a kind of historical appendix to his ethics of autonomy, the matter is less clear in his early work, to which Storr appeals so as to make room for faith. It is Kant's later position, however, which appears most important to Hegel and Schelling.[2]

Diez set out to criticize orthodoxy in a radical manner, grounding his arguments on Kant's first critique. This led him, as Henrich puts it, to "an overall rejection of Christianity" and, in addition, to the claim that Jesus ultimately practiced deceit on people.[3] His strong defence of reason against the theology of revelation had a decisive influence on Schelling and Hegel. It became clear to them that Storr only defended the letter of Kant's philosophy; his intentions were in essence contrary to its critical spirit. However, especially Hegel did not want to follow Diez in his rejection of Christianity. The primacy of practical reason in Kant's

1 For more on Storr's reasoning, see Kondylis 1979, pp. 170-174 and Dickey 1987, pp. 158-159.

2 Henrich 1967, p. 51 summarizes the matter aptly: "Die einen wollten mit Kants früheren Lehre zeigen, dass die Autonomie des Willens ohne Hoffnung auf Glück zu schwach sei, um den Willen zu bestimmen, - dass also Moralität ohne Religion *nichts* sei. Dem stellten die jungen Kantianer entgegen, dass die Autonomie vollständig sei, ohne dass die herkömmlichen Begriffe von Gott und Unsterblichkeit eingeführt werden; Moralität is *alles* nur ohne diese art von Religion."

3 Op. cit., p. 58.

thought was more important to him - as it was to Storr, too - than for Diez. Thus, although Storr defended the primacy of the practical for different purposes, his arguments had an influence on Hegel in particular. The distinction between subjective and objective religion, which will be central in Hegel's subsequent texts, actually comes from Storr.[4] Hegel modifies and deepens it, especially on the basis of Jacobi's strong distinction between understanding and feeling, and suggests, as we shall see, that only a religion which appeals to us as individual persons may be living.

Like Hölderlin and Schelling, Hegel was very much interested in the personal teachings of Jesus. They all perceived Jesus as a teacher of Kantian morality. However, Hegel in particular was not satisfied with the abstract form which Kant gives to morality. If we may rely on the general picture outlined by Kondylis[5], it was in fact a kind of common effort of that time to open up new perspectives on the Kantian morality, so as to make it something deeper felt, sensed and lived. This was the direction of Schiller's and Jacobi's work, and the influence of Rousseau's *Emile* pointed to it too. Hegel's early texts are part of this movement. What may be unique in them is Hegel's eye, present from the beginning, for social and institutional arrangements that condition men's moral actions. There are more or less favorable arrangements for seeking the ideal of freedom, which have an effect on men's actions, and unlike any of his colleagues, Hegel is interested in the whole complex of these historical connections. In the following I shall take up only some of Hegel's early texts. The first one is the so-called *Tübingen Essay*, which Hegel wrote just before he left for Bern.

Subjective and objective religion

The question of religion is for Hegel a question of its significance for life. Contrary to Storr, his view of human nature is optimistic. Man is receptive to the ideals of reason and freedom, if only these ideals are supplied in an appropriate way, he thinks. Religion is not a matter of thought, argumentation and memory. It is a matter of heart. "It influences our feelings and the determination of our will; and this is in part because our duties and our laws obtain powerful reinforcement by being represented to us as laws of God, and in part because our notion of the exaltedness and goodness of God fills our hearts with admiration as well as with feelings of humility and gratitude" (*GW* 1, p. 85; *TE*, p. 32). Religion should then function as an edifying force in this way. It should

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4 See Kondylis 1979, p. 176.

5 See op. cit., pp. 77-151.

be subjective. But unfortunately, Hegel implies, the Christian religion is often merely objective and appeals to our understanding only. Being a matter of discursive reasoning, it can contain knowledge which has practical importance, "but only as a sort of frozen capital". It is closer to theology than religion. For his part, Hegel is interested only in the latter, however:

> Let the theologians squabble all they like over what belongs to objective religion, over its dogmas and their precise determination: the fact is that every religion is based on a few fundamental principles which, although set forth in the different religions in varying degrees of purity, however modified or adulterated, are nonetheless the basis for all the faith and hope that religion is capable of offering us (*GW* 1, p. 89; *TE*, p. 35).

Objective religion, because it is a matter of abstraction, has produced several complicated systems. Subjective religion, on the other hand, though it is always individual, i.e. personally sensed, felt and lived, does not show such variety. "While objective religion can take on most any color, subjective religion among good people is basically the same: what makes me a Christian in your eyes makes you a Jew in mine, Nathan says" (allusion Lessing's drama from 1779, J.K.) (*GW* 1, p. 92; *TE*, p. 37).

A subjective religion may be either private or public and have, accordingly, different aims. A private religion may train "individuals in keeping with their character, counsel in situations where duties conflict, special inducements to virtue, comfort and care in the face of personal suffering and misfortune" (*GW* 1, p. 102; *TE*, pp. 47-48), whereas a public religion influences "the spirit of a people but in a general way". Hegel's main interest is directed towards the possibility of a public religion which would be subjective, not objective by nature. From this perspective he also discusses critically the limitations of enlightenment which makes us smarter and more conscious of many things but not wiser or morally better (*GW* 1, pp. 94-101; *TE*, pp. 39-46). From this standpoint he takes up the Greeks. The folk religion of the Greeks is, then, presented as a contrast to Christianity, which for Hegel all too often misses the primary tasks of religion. But how should a folk religion be constituted? Hegel states three essential demands:

> I. Its teachings must be founded on universal reason.
> II. Imagination, the heart, and the senses must not go away emptyhanded in the process.
> III. It must be so constituted that all of life's needs, including public and official transactions, are bound up with it (*GW* 1, p. 103; *TE*, p. 49).

The idea of a folk religion is in fact highly ambiguous and Hegel will work on it for several years. Its doctrines should first "be authorized by the universal reason of mankind", i.e. by practical reason as defined by Kant. Hegel is well aware of the difficulties involved in making them really common to all: "Some of the noblest - and for mankind most interesting - ideas are scarcely suited for adoption as universal maxims. They appear to be appropriate only for a handful of ripened individuals

who, having endured many trials, have already succeeded in attaining wisdom" (*GW* 1, 104; *TE*, p. 50). Because it is a fact that they "do not readily qualify for wholeharted acceptance on the part of the people", it is evident, Hegel infers, actually along the lines of Kant himself[6], "that a folk religion, if as its very concept implies its teaching to be efficacious in active life, cannot possibly be constructed out of sheer reason." It must be completed with another element that makes it "accessible to sensual disposition" (*GW* 1, 96; *TE*, p. 42).

Thus it should be so constituted that it engages the heart and imagination of men. But how should one conceive of the relation of this element to the principles of practical reason? Hegel poses this question as follows: "How would a folk religion have to be constituted so that a) negatively, the opportunity for people to become fixated on the letter and the conventions of religion would be minimized, and b) positively, the people would be guided toward a religion of reason and become receptive to it" (*GW* 1, 100; *TE*, p. 45)? In order that this religion would not turn into "an idolatrous faith", it should appeal to and strengthen our moral feelings and benign inclinations (sympathy, benevolence, friendliness etc.), and tie them together with the demands of reason in the notion on love. Love, according to Hegel, who is influenced by Hölderlin here, is "the fundamental principle of our empirical character". Hegel makes an interesting connection between love and reason:

> Forgetting about itself, love is able to step outside of a given individual's existence and live, feel, and act no less fully in others - just as reason, the principle of universally valid laws, recognizes its own self in the shared citizenship each rational being has in an intelligible world (*GW* 1, 101; *TE*, p. 46).

In Frankfurt Hegel will develop this notion of love further and transforms it later, in Jena, into a speculative figure of the absolute ethical life. He wants to maintain that the noblest task of a folk religion is to weave the fine strands of our feelings and inclinations, of our heart, into a noble union suitable to our nature, but what this would amount to in practice seems to be unclear to him as yet. He makes references to the Greeks and discusses also briefly the proper role and function of religious ceremonies (*GW* 1, 107-109; *TE*, pp. 53-55). He would like to have both the ideal of reason, the universal church of the spirit, and the ability of certain historical religions to appeal to and to edify our sensual and emotional capacities. But at this point he is still unable to imagine a combination of them in any concrete terms.

According to the last requirement, a folk religion should assemble all needs of life, including the political ones. This clearly indicates that Hegel's ideal is not only of a religious nature. He is seeking a unity of reason and religion, a unity which is supposed to supply an answer that is better yet than the one which the enlightenment has so far been able

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6 See Kant AA 6, p. 105, 112 and Busche 1987, pp. 66-67.

to give to the anomies of modernity. In other words, Hegel attempts to formulate an idea of reason that could, and should, be institutionalized in a religious-political totality of a people. "The spirit of a nation is reflected in its history, its religion, and the degree of its political freedom; and these cannot be taken in isolation when considering either their individual character or their influence on each other. They are bound together as one, like three companions none of whom can do anything without the others even as each benefits from all" (*GW* 1, p. 111; *TE*, p. 56). This conception would be something more sensuous, more in touch with actual life, something more historical and collective than the Kantian practical reason. "A folk religion must be a friend of all life's feelings; it should never intrude, but should seek to be a welcome guest everywhere" (*GW* 1, p. 110; *TE*, p. 55).

Hegel's conception of reason is, however, only at an early stage of its formation and does not yet facilitate him to give consistent answers to the anomies of modern life. Thus, again he ends the essay with adoring remarks about the Greeks[7] who, unlike the modern man, faced the life, its joys and sorrows, as they are, and whose folk festivals were quite different from ours:

> Indeed at the greatest of our public feasts we proceed to the enjoyment of the holy eucharist dressed in the colors of mourning and with eyes downcast; even here, at what is supposed to be a celebration of human brotherhood, we fear we might contract venereal disease from the brother who drank out of the communal chalice before. And lest any of us remain attentive to the ceremony, filled with the sense of the sacred, we are nudged to fetch a donation from our pocket and plop it on a tray. How different were the Greeks! They approached the altars of their friendly gods clad in the colors of joy, their faces, open invitations to friendship and love, beaming with good cheer (*GW* 1, p. 110; *TE*, p. 56).

But how could this ideal of a religious-political unity be rehabilitated in the modern world? It would certainly have to be founded on practical reason in the Kantian sense. It would have to be a union of reason and heart, like Herder, Jacobi, Schiller and Rousseau, too, had indicated. Love, in a sense which reminds one of the Platonic *eros*, would obviously be central in it. It would be neither cosmopolitan nor private, but a public and national ideal, one that would appeal to usual German people (Cf. GW 1, p. 76, 80). In Bern, Hegel will work on this program further, first by depicting the historical conditions of an ethical life, and secondly by studying more closely its foundation on practical reason.

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7 The lively Greeks is a constant theme in his Tübingen fragments. Already as a schoolboy in Stuttgart he had contrasted (cf. *GW* 1, p. 80) the "simplicity" and "originality" of the Greek authors he read with the cold *Buchgelehrsamkeit* of his own time.

Jesus and Socrates

Is the Christian religion in principle able to meet the requirements of a folk religion? If yes, how should it be accomplished then? If no, as rather seems to be the case, where then lie the roots of its failure? These questions are of chief importance for Hegel in Bern, where he served as a home teacher in the family of von Steiger until the autumn 1796. Thus his work gained a stronger historical orientation. As compared to the Greeks, there seem to be certain defects in Christianity already in its initial shape, but still more problems emerge when Christianity later appears to become an objective religion. "Making objective religion subjective: this great undertaking the state must asume." But "how much can the state (properly) do? And how much must be left to the individuals" (*GW* 1, p. 139; *TE*, p. 79)? With these questions in his mind Hegel now engages in exploring Christianity and criticizes it.

Hegel simultaneously attempts to clarify his own ethical thinking, i.e. the theoretical program of a folk religion itself. He is not yet sure how strongly this religion should be founded on the universal reason, to what extent it should be private and to what extent public (see. e.g. *GW* 1, 157-158; *TE*, p. 97). At least partly due to this hesitation, Hegel pays in Bern considerable attention to the personal career of Jesus. From it he hopes to find elements that would support his ideal and his picture of the Greeks. Hence he makes the contrast between Jesus and the later forms of Cristianity. He needs this contrast as he realizes still more clearly that the gulf between the ideality of the Greeks and the modern world is virtually unbridgeable.

Certain changes or at least shifts of emphasis in Hegel's ethical position take place in Bern, too. In Tübingen he had notably pursued a critique of both religious objectifications and the abstract line of enlightenment, including partly also Kant.[8] In Bern he is more concerned with Kant's moral philosophy itself, and rather than the relation of understanding and *Empfindsamkeit*, the subjectivity of a folk religion, his interest is now directed towards the role of practical reason in this religion.[9] Correspondingly he puts more emphasis than earlier on the rational element of the Greek culture.

In some of the first fragments written in Bern, Hegel reflects upon the historical fate of the original "childlike spirit" that united a people before the opposition of private and public religion emerged. The reason for the disappearance of this spirit lies, first and foremost, in the general

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8 Though his relation to Kant is a complicated one, for behind his subjective religion there are, as we have seen, the Kantian postulates of practical reason. Fujita 1985, p. 27 is right, I think, in asserting in opposition to Haering 1929: "Es ist daher verfehlt zu behaupten, die Lehre des Kantischen praktischen Philosophie passe nicht zu der Grundintention Hegels in dieser Zeit."

9 See Kondylis 1979, pp. 235-256, 409-441 who demonstrates how he takes an number steps from a rather moderate to a more radical, even "militant" Kantianism.

differentiation of culture: "as reason presses forward, a lot of feelings are irretrievably lost, and many otherwise stirring associations in our imagination become more and more faint (*GW* 1, 124; *TE*, p. 67). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Hegel refers to the hierarchization of society: "but as soon as a class (the rulers, the priests, or both) loses this spirit of innocence by which its laws and conventions were engendered and animated, then the general public will most certainly be oppressed, degraded, and demoralized, and ethical simplicity faces its inevitable doom" (*GW* 1, p. 124; *TE*, p. 67; cf. also *GW* 1, pp. 153-162; *TE*, pp. 92-101).

The loss of original simplicity implies a change in the function of religion. Originally religion served "the advancement of morality". In Kantian terms Hegel maintains that its "proper task is to strenghen, by means of the idea of God as a moral lawgiver, what impels us to act ethically and to enchance the satisfaction we derive from performing what our practical reason demands, specifically with regard to the ultimate end that reason posits: the highest good" (*GW* 1, p. 154; *TE*, p. 93). Like Kant, Hegel now presents religion primarily as a medium in the furtherance of moral autonomy, although this autonomy is for him not merely an idividual but a collective matter as well.[10] Religion loses its proper function, however, when "those who were in power became also the effective administrators of religion" (*GW* 1, p. 154; *TE*, p. 93). In this case the religious collectivity, which originally was free and fraternal, "becomes rather a mass whose leaders coax from it pious sentiments that they do not share" though they, like Kant's political moralists, pretend to do so (*GW* 1, p. 125; *TE*, p. 67-68).

By these remarks Hegel does not mean that Christianity had merely been used for political purposes external to itself. Quite the contrary, it contains elements that make it rather an objective than a subjective religion and more suitable for the "princely power" than for the advancement of common morality. The very origins of Christanity are Judaic and thus heavily "legalistic". What is more, the teaching activity of Jesus himself, "his rules of conduct, were really suited only for the cultivation of singular individuals", not a moral collectivity, and even when an individual is concerned, Jesus' actions do not really improve him but "a person can become good if he was already good to begin with" (*GW* 1, pp. 128-129; *TE*, pp. 70-71).

There are in Christianity, Hegel maintains, elements that make it suitable for the maxims of legality rather than for those of morality. Carefully he examines most of the central doctrines of Christianity, and

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10 Cf. Busche 1987, p. 80. Hegel writes: "Überhaupt muss das erste Gesetz aller dieser Lehren seyn, dass sie dem Menschen keine Art Gott zu gefallen anweisen, als die den guten Lebenswandel - oder keine andre Triebfedern zum gut moralisch handeln angeben, als rein moralische" (*GW* 1, p. 142; *TE*, p. 82). If one compares this to a corresponding formulation of Kant, it becames clear how closely Hegel was studying Kant's book on religion: "alles, was ausser dem guten Lebenswandel der Mensch noch tun können vermeint, um Gott wohlgefällig zu werden, ist blosser Religionswahn und Afterdienst Gottes" (*AA* VI, p. 170).

arrives in each case at the conclusion that they miss the most essential idea of a folk religion or, we should rather say, of a religion of reason - that of moral autonomy based on practical reason (cf. *GW* 1, 141-152; *TE*, pp. 81-92). He sharpens his point concerning the Christian practices in the following way, for example:

> The apostles (...) were satisfied when a multitude of generally ignorant people allowed themselves to be so bedazzeled by an hour or two of oratory that they believed the apostles' words outright and let themselves be baptized; thus were they instanly made Christians for life. Having been carried on for centuries, this manner of conversion is practised in essentially the same way even today on the banks of the Ganges, the Orininoco, and the St. Lawrence River (*GW* 1, p. 151; *TE*, p. 91).

The point Hegel ultimately makes here is that Christianity tends to be objective and not subjective, which now means that it does not further people's ability to act morally. A change has clearly occured in Hegel's religious ideal since the days of Tübingen. For when speaking about a subjective religion, he no longer emphasizes the importance of the sensual in the first place but, instead, the determining role of the moral law.[11] With this intent he now demands that a folk religion should be as simple as possible and "contain nothing which common human reason does not acknowledge" (*GW* 1, p. 142; *TE*, p. 81).

In several fragments written in Bern, Hegel contrasts the teaching activity of Jesus with that of Socrates, in order to clarify the legalistic elements in Christianity. Although there are many similarities in their situations where they acted - in both cases it was at a moment of crisis, a broken unity of a political collectivity, in both cases it ended with a conflict with the authorities - yet there are many differences, as well. Above all, whereas Socrates "lived in a republican state where every citizen spoke freely with every other and where a splendid urbanity of intercourse flourished even among the lowest order (...) the synagogues had accustomed the ears of the Jews to direct instruction and moral sermonizing, and the squabbles between scriptural authorities and the Pharisees had inured them to much coarser mode of refuting one's opponent" (*GW* 1, 115; *TE*, p. 60). Consequently, their teaching authorities were of different kind. Socrates "left no Masonic signs, no mandate to proclaim his name, no method for seizing upon the soul and pouring morality into it: the *agathon* is inborn in us"; and, above all, he did not "outline some detour by way of *him* ..." (*GW* 1, 120; *TE*, p. 64).

Because the maieutic of Socrates appeals to our inborn goodness and reason, his teaching authority is based on his exemplar integrity and superior reason. "One did not hear him speak *ex cathedra* or to preach from a mountain top - indeed, how could it ever have occurred to him to preach in Greece?" He had "disciples of all sort - or rather he had none at all." They were his friends and enthusiasts, but the important thing is

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11 Cf. Kondylis 1979, pp. 238-242 and Fujita 1985, p. 36.

that they were not only that: "a number of them became great generals, statesmen, heroes of all sort - but not heroes of one and the same stamp, nor heroes in martyrdom and suffering; rather, each (prospered) in his own province of action and life" (cf. *GW* 1, pp. 118-119; *TE*, pp. 62-63).

By contrast, the disciples of Jesus, the twelve apostles, lacked a similar autonomy. "Christ was not content to have disciples like Nathanael, Joseph of Arimathea, Nicodemus and the like - to have had exchanges of ideas with men of exceptional intellect and heart; instead, "the apostles alone enjoyed his intimate acquaintance, divesting themselves of all other ties in favor of his companionship and instruction, striving to become as totally like him as possible, and seeking to gain, by virtue of his teaching and living example, eventual possession of his spirit" (*GW* 1, 117-118; *TE*, pp. 61-62). Thus they devoted themselves totally to religious activities and neglected not only their civic professions but all participation in the public life as well - in a way which for Hegel is symptomatic to the private character of Christianity in general.

As Hegel now argues from a far more Kantian position than in Tübingen, his emphasis is no more on the rather simple opposition between private Christian versus public and sensual Greek religion. Instead, he focuses on the opposition autonomy versus heteronomy, morality versus mere legality. Thus, when he in Bern says that "the Christian religion was originally a private religion", he by no emans implies that it were esoteric in some negative sense. Rather he means, simply, that it is built on principles and maxims which are not generalizable but are only suited for the cultivation of singular individuals. So he remarks: "were a nation to introduce Christ's precepts today - ordering at best external compliance with them, since the spirit cannot be effectively commanded - it would quickly come apart" (*GW* 1, p. 129; *TE*, pp. 70-71). Hegel thinks here especially of the early Christian ideal of communal property. Still, it is true, Hegel's ideal is a public religion that would promote moral ends, but he has already learned from Kant that room must be left for the individuals themselves to realize these ends. Hence the state and "its institutions must be compatible with freedom of conviction". However, "they must not violate conscience and liberty, but exert only an indirect influence on the motives of the will. How much can the state (properly) do? And how much must be left up to the individuals?", Hegel asks (*GW* 1, p. 139; *TE*, p 79).

As he thus approaches the Kantian conception of the moral freedom of the individual, it is also conceivable why he towards the end of the Bern period pleas more and more strongly for the separation of the state from the matters related to religion and the church.[12] In accordance with the Kantian morality, however, Hegel would expect of religion, if it is a religion of reason that promotes moral action, the ability as well as the capacity to oppose unjust forms of legality. This is the weak point in

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12 Cf. Kondylis 1979, pp. 242-244.

the community initiated by Jesus: "it never occured to them that they might establish an ecclesiastical authority as a bastion of freedom of conscience to counterbalance princely authority - indeed they made Christianity subservient to princely power" (*GW* 1, p. 131; *TE*, p. 72). From its original weakness, from its private character and "positivity" as Hegel is soon to call it, grew up something worse: "the tendency falsely to extend what is appropriate only in the context of the immediate family to civil society as a whole" (*GW* 1, p. 132; *TE*, p. 72). In one of his last Bern fragments Hegel makes it quite clear what Christianity has amounted to, contrasting it again with the Greeks:

> Today those masses of humanity who no longer posses public virtue and have been contemptuously relegated to an oppressed condition need other props, other modes of solace that compensate them for their wretchedness without further jeopardizing their self-esteem. The inner certainty that stems from faith in God and immortality has to be replaced with external assurances, by belief in people who are adept at creating the impression that they are better informed regarding matters of faith. - By contrast, the free republican, in keeping with the spirit of his people, devoted his energies, indeed his very life - to his fatherland; and he did so out of duty, without placing such value on his own efforts that he could presume to expect compensation or reimbursement (*GW* 1, p. 163; *TE*, p. 101).

Hegel contrasts here, we may say, the free republican who lives for his *idea* that he seeks to make true in this world, with those who under their princely powers strive for religious *ideals* that are to be made true only in the coming world (see *GW* 1, pp. 197-202). Long before Marx and Nietzsche, he is thus very aware of the tendency of the latter people to enslave the society, its rulers included. This may be seen, e.g., in "the warm and open reception of the Christian religion once the Romans had lost their public virtue and their empire was in decline" (*GW* 1, p. 164; *TE*, p. 102).

Jesus and the positivity of the Christian religion

In July 1795, Hegel completed a lengthy study which is known as *Leben Jesu*.[13] There he seems to draw back some of his earlier claims about the privacy of Jesus' teaching activity and presents him, instead, as a teacher of moral autonomy. The study is clearly a step in Kant's direction. It is neither a break in his development nor a provisional *Gedankenexperiment*[14]; it should rather be viewed as Hegel's new attempt to found his idea of a folk religion more firmly on the concept of practical

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13 *GW* 1, pp. 207-278; trans. *TE*, pp. 104-165.

14 As Haering 1929, pp. 185-191 suggests.

reason.[15] But why does he expound on the career of Jesus in such depth, presenting him as a Kantian? The most likely answer is that he wants to demonstrate qua this way that the idea of folk religion, as he conceives of it now, is possible to put into a *volkerzieherische* practice.[16]

In *Leben Jesu* Hegel makes a comparison between the parallel passages of the Gospels and gives then, in his own wording, an account of the different episodes that should grasp, as literally as possible, what Jesus did, or wanted to do, and meant at each stage of his career.[17] The text opens with a passage which is a principal key to the whole of it:

> Pure reason, transcending all limits, is divinity itself - whereby and in accordance with which the very plan of the world is ordered (John 1). Through reason man learns of his destiny, the unconditional purpose of his life. And although reason at times is obscured, it continues to glimmer faintly even in the darkest age, for it is never totally extinguished. Among the Jews John reawakenend the people to this, their own cognity - not as something alien, but rather as something they should be able to find within, in their true self. They were not to seek it in their lineage, nor in the desire for happiness, nor by devoting themselves to something dignitary, but rather in the cultivation of the spark of divinity allowed them - their proof of descendance, in a higher sense, from the Godhead itself. The cultivation of reason is the sole source of truth and tranquility; and John, never pretending to possess reason exclusively or as something rare, insisted that all men could uncover it in themselves (*GW* 1, p. 207; *TE*, p. 104).

Of Jesus and John the Baptist, who are thus presented as teachers of Kantian morality, the former is less rigorous, perceiving of morality as more in harmony with other human capasities. According to the picture given now, Jesus did not distance himself or his disciples from ordinary life, and he did not attempt to found a special authority for himself. He was a teacher of moral autonomy. The contrast between Jesus and Socrates is not taken up. Of miracles that Jesus would have done, including even the Resurrection, Hegel remains silent as well. He is in accordance with Kant, who does not exclude the possibility of Jesus' divinity but emphasizes his significance as a moral teacher.[18] In fact Hegel had already a few months eearlier indicated the line he would take in *Leben Jesu*:

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15 To my mind Harris 1972, p. 195 puts the matter quite well when he writes: "Before he moved to Berne Hegel had formulated his own ideal of life as it should be. In his first eighteen months in Berne he was preoccupied with the analysis of how life had come to be the way it was, in order to discover how the Greek ideal could best be restored. He had found that the only hope lay in the reintegrative powers of *Vernunft*, and that the original root for our falling away from the Greek ideal lay in the acceptance of a non-rational principle of authority in religion and society. The first essential for the redemption of man's dignity as a rational being, therefore, was the re-establishment of religion on its rational foundation."

16 Cf. Fujita 1985, pp. 42-43.

17 So Harris 1972, p. 196.

18 See Kant, *AA* VI, pp. 60-78 and Fujita 1985, p. 42.

> It is precisely the admixture, the addition of the divine, that makes the virtuous individual Jesus fit to be an ideal of virtue. Without the divinity of his person we would have only the man; whereas we have a truly superhuman ideal - an ideal not foreign to the human souls, however short of it humankind might be compelled to regard itself. Moreover, an ideal like this has the advantage of not being a frigid abstraction: already akin to our spirit, it is brought still closer to us by its individualization for our sensibility (our hearing it speak and seeing it act) (*GW* 1, 149; *TE*, p 89).

Thus it is the divine aura of Jesus which, to Hegel's mind, promotes the fulfilment of the idea of folk religion.[19] Of greatest importance in Jesus' teaching is its spirit and real content, not the law and its various forms, as the Pharisees and the Tübingen orthodoxy understood it. Hegel makes it very clear that Jesus' teachings are Kantin in spirit, as can be seen from the lines we quoted from the beginning of the text, or from the following statement: "To act only on the principles that you can will to become universal laws among men, laws no less binding on you than on them - this is the fundamental law of morality, the sum and substance of all moral legislation and the sacred books of all peoples" (*GW* 1, p. 221; *TE*, pp. 115-116). Or, again, from the following words put in Jesus' mouth: "Respect for yourself, belief in the sacred law of your own reason, the attentiveness to the judge residing within your heart - your conscience, the very standard that is the criterion of divinity - this is what I have sought to awaken in you" (*GW* 1, p. 258; *TE*, p. 148).

However, *Leben Jesu* is not merely a Kantian text. Besides the poem *Eleusis*, it is in fact the only text where Hegel before Frankfurt demonstrates how religion, as he conceives of it, should function, and clearly this religion is more than the Kantian "knowledge of all our duties and divine commands".[20] *Leben Jesu* contains, in fact, three distinguishable conceptions of morality.[21] First there is the Kantian conception: Hegel defines morality as "respect for duty" (*GW* 1, 234; *TE*, p. 128). But secondly, he continues the line he had started in Tübingen and emphasizes the importance of ethical feelings. Thus Jesus says to his quarreling disciples: "If you do not change and return to the innocence, simplicity and unpretentiousness characteristic to this child, you are truly not citizens of the kingdom of God. Anyone that feels antipathy towards others - let alone to a child like this - or believes himself entitled to take something from them, is an unworthy person" (*GW* 1, p. 235; *TE*, p. 129). Reason and morality are central in Hegel's religion too, but he is

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19 In this point I am inclined to follow Busche 1987, pp. 104-105, who maintains that Jesus appeals also to our senses and affects, rather than Fujita 1985, who writes (p. 43): "Hegel hat die Geschichte Jesu geschrieben, nicht um Jesus Ansprüche über die Moralität darzulegen, sondern eben um das Übergewicht der Moralität über die Sinnlichkeit mit Hilfe der (sogar gemäss der Kantischen Vernunftreligion modifizierten) Aussprüche Jesu zur Geltung zu bringen."

20 Cf. Kant, *AA* VI, p. 153.

21 See Busche 1987, pp. 107-119.

not ready, as Kant is, to subordinate feeling and other motives to them.[22]

There is, however, still a third conception, for Hegel depicts Jesus as an advocator of a morality based on love. "Love" has here a more general meaning than in Tübingen. It contains elements of the Christian *agape*. In a very abstract manner Hegel speaks about "the spirit of love and reconciliation" (*GW* 1, p. 237; *TE*, p. 130), and distinguishes it from the "natural feeling" of love "which even the wicked would not dispute" (*GW* 1, 217; *TE*, p. 113).

Hegel connects now the spirit of love with the "spirit of reason" more closely than in Tübingen. He writes: "indeed, by endowing man with reason the Deity so distinguished humankind from the rest of nature that man came alive with the reflected splendor of the divine essence; and only through his faith in reason does man fulfill this high destiny" (*GW* 1, p. 212; *TE*, p. 108). According to Hegel, it is the purpose of Jesus to bring this "light" and "spirit" among people. Thus at the end of the essay, he lets Jesus speak to God:

> My intention was not to secure honor for myself by means of something original or distinctive, but to restore the self-respect that a degraded humanity had lost; and I take pride in seeing that the characteristic common to rational beings, the inclination toward virtue, has become everyone's endowment (...) I come to you with this prayer so that the joyous feeling that quickens me might flow through them as well (*GW* 1, p. 268; *TE*, p. 156).

It is illustrative of *Leben Jesu* in general that it aptly ends with an intimation to the immortality of soul, not to the Resurrection. Through his death Jesus abolishes all the wordly authorities and paves the way for moral autonomy and reason among men. Though such central notions as love, spirit, reason and virtue are here still used rather unspecifically, they evidently point to Hegel's emerging conception of religion as a collective ethical phenomenon. A folk religion for Hegel is an ethical and political ideal which he now has tested in the teaching practice of Jesus.

At about the same time when he was writing *Leben Jesu*, Hegel worked on another lengthy study known as *Die Positivität der Christlichen Religion* (*GW* 1, pp. 281-351; trans. *ETW*, pp. 67-181). The two works are coordinated at a general level so that we may take them as a single attempt to answer the question raised about a year earlier: How far is the Christian religion qualified for the furthering of morality?[23] While *Leben Jesu* concentrates on the noble elements of Christianity found especially in the career of Jesus, the latter essay takes up the questionable side of it. "How could we have expected a teacher like Jesus to afford any inducement to the creation of positive religion, i.e. a religion which is grounded on authority and puts man's worth not at all, or at least not

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22 Busche 1987, p. 115 remarks, correctly I think: "er (kennt) auch in Bern so etwas wie eine moralische Hingabe im Gefühl, in der der Einzelne über sein eigensinniges Ich "erhaben" ist."

23 Cf. Harris 1972, p. 207.

wholly, in morals", Hegel asks now (*GW* 1, p. 284; *ETW*, p. 71). Hegel's intention is not to interpret the doctrinal history of the Christian church but to characterize, in broader terms, the general spirit of different epochs, especially that among the Jews during the appearance of Jesus, of the early Roman empire and of the modern world, and then contrast it with the free spirit of the Greeks.[24] In accordance with Kant[25], Hegel describes the Jewish religion as "overhelmed by a burden of statutory commands which pedantically prescribed a rule for every casual action of daily life and gave the whole people the look of a monastic order" (*GW* 1, p. 282; *ETW*, p. 68). This *knechtisch* spirit is then juxtaposed with Jesus as the teacher of moral autonomy. The "miserable situation", in which he had to act, explains both his troublesome success and his fate.

There is, Hegel suggests now, another side in Jesus of which he remained silent in *Leben Jesu*. For "he was a Jew", and "the principle of his faith and gospel" was not merely "his own heart's living sense of right and duty", but also "the revealed will of God as it was transmitted to him by the Jewish traditions" (*GW* 1, p. 288; *ETW*, p. 75). Thus, in order to hold people's attention and to convince people, Jesus had to build partly on his personal authority. By speaking so much about himself, by presenting himself as Messiah, by doing even miracles, Jesus in fact built a "circuitous route to morality" (*GW* 1, pp. 288-291; *ETW*, pp. 75-80). This route qua individual authority and miracles was, according to Hegel, the root of the failure of Christianity, the reason for its "fate".

Already the disciples of Jesus based their convictions and teaching "on their friendship with him and dependence on him", not on "truth and freedom by their own exertions". Their ambition, consequently, "was to grasp and keep this doctrine faithfully and to transmit it equally to others without any addition, without letting it acquire any variations in detail by working on it themselves" (*GW* 1, p. 289; *ETW*, p. 81). In this connection Hegel returns to the contrast between Jesus and Socrates. Unlike the disciples of Jesus, who had given up everything their public duties included in order to follow their master, "the friends of Socrates had developed their powers in many directions. They had absorbed that democratic spirit which gives an individual a greater measure of independence and makes it impossible for any tolerable good head to depend wholly and absolutely on one person. In their state it was worthwhile to have political interest, and an intererest of that kind can never be sacrificed" (*GW* 1, 289; *ETW*, p. 82).

Hegel illuminates this contrast with a threefold pattern of sects. Each of them presupposes a certain separation from the general opinion, a certain positivity. "It is by recognition and conviction of the teachings of a philosophical system, or, in practical matters, by virtue, that a man becomes an adherent of a philosophical sect" (*GW* 1, p. 310; *ETW*, p. 100).

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24 This comparison is made esp. in *ETW*, pp. 145-167 (*GW* 1, pp. 359-378). Hansen 1989, pp. 392-418 gives a fine interpretation of these pages.

25 Cf. Kant, *AA* VI, pp. 141-193, 196-197.

In distinction to this, a positive sect is the one "for which both ethical principles and also what strictly does not depend on reason at all but has its credentials in the national imagination are not so much unnecessary for morality as downright sinful and therefore to be guarded against." Between these two there is a religious sect which "accepts the positive principle of faith in and knowledge of duty and God's will", though it relates rather to "the command of virtue" than to "the positive doctrines" (*GW* 1, pp. 287-288; *ETW*, p. 74). The teaching activity of Jesus created a religious sect, while Socrates gave birth to a philosophical sect, Hegel maintains. He is critical here towards Christianity, which has replaced the individual right to deliberation in the questions of truth and moral goodness with the duty to express gratitude to the dogmas of the church.

So Jesus in effect paved the way for positive sects. These are authoritarian, heteronomous for the individual, and when these sects later formed "spiritual states", they, especially in the form of catholicism, came very near to the original Jewish conditions against which Jesus once had so ardently protested (cf. *GW* 1, pp. 306-317; *ETW*, pp. 95-108). "The church has not stopped at thus prescribing a number of external actions whereby we are supposed to do honor to the Deity (...) It has also directly prescribed laws for our mode of thinking, feeling, and willing, and Christians have thus reverted to the position of the Jews", to a "bondage to law" (*GW* 1, p. 346; *ETW*, p. 139).

This has especially been the fate of Protestantism, although "great men have claimed that the fundamental meaning of "Protestant" is a man or a church which has not bound itself to certain unalterable standards of faith but which protests against all authorities in matters of belief" (*GW* 1, p. 336; *ETW*, p. 128). As a matter of fact, the Protestant church has violated the "most sacrosanct right of every individual and every society, namely, the right to change one's convictions", for its officials "have tried to regard their authority as more extensive and to hold that the congregations have left it to their judgement to decide among themselves what the church's faith is" (*GW* 1, pp. 330-332; *ETW*, pp. 122-124). Thus it breaks against the original task of the church to contribute to the general advancement of morality, all the more when it becomes a state-church with its civil penalties to those who do not follow its canons. This is something that should never take place according to Hegel. The state alone should use legal coercion. The state should and it is to use the church for the fulfilment of its ethical task, because only the church as a voluntary organization, and not the state as such, may have any influence on the moral behaviour of the individuals. Thus the church should function on the basis of religious faith alone, and though it ultimately contributes to the ends of the state, which as an institution lies above it, the church should be kept apart from the state.[26]

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26 Cf. esp. Harris 1972, pp. 220-224. In the letter of April 16th 1795 to Schelling, Hegel makes it quite explicit what he thinks of the present marriage of the state and the church: "Religion and politics have joined hands in the *same* underhanded game. The former has taught what despotism willed: contempt for the human race, its

Reason and beauty

Towards the end of his stay in Bern, Hegel's conception of religion begins to change again. So far he had criticized the positivity of the Christian religion from two points of view, i.e. with regard to the Kantian moral autonomy and his own ideal picture of the Greek folk religion. Correspondingly, the moral autonomy instead of passivity and the satisfaction of imagination, heart and senses were the two demands which he in Tübingen presented for a religion that was needed. Together they would lead, when defended philosophically, to a unity of reason and the senses ant to a harmony between an individual and his community. So far, such a defence had been beyond Hegel's reach, however. In Bern, as we saw, the former demand had been in the foreground. Hegel had been defending those elements in Christianity which were in accordance with the demands of practical reason and opposing the ones which contradicted it. An intensified correspondence with his Tübingen friends Hölderlin and Schelling, as well as the influence of Fichte's programmatic writings, led him to take up the old problem of the unity of the two demands. This time, however, he assumes a philosophical approach and therefore he seeks, as may be seen from the few fragments he wrote before his leave for Frankfurt, conceptual means to deal with the problem.

In a draft for a new introduction to the Positivity essay, *In positiver Glauben...* (*GW* 1, pp. 352-358), Hegel tries to strenghen the concept of reason and makes the distinction between reason and sensuality more pointed than before. Positivity, i.e. "faith in authority" (*GW* 1, p. 352), appeals to sensuality in men, and the autonomous reason stays in a fundamental opposition to them both. "Happiness is no more connected to the concept of reason than is sentiment to that of understanding" (*GW* 1, p. 357), Hegel maintains. His arguments for this position now go beyond Kant, owing clearly to Schelling[27] - like whom he criticizes Kant's conception of the highest good, although on different grounds. For Schelling, who had a much further established philosophical, even metaphysical position of his own, the Kantian highest good, i.e. the harmony of morality and happiness, is not the final end of creation. The end, instead, is to rise altogether above the sphere of happiness which,

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incapacity for any good whatsoever, its incapacity to be something on its own." As regards his own task as an *Aufklärer*, Hegel goes on to write: "With the spread of ideas as to how things *ought* to be, the indolence that marks people set in their ways, who always take everything the way it is, will disappear. This enlivening power of ideas even when they are in themselves still limited - such as the idea of the fatherland, of its constitution, and so forth - will lift hearts, which will learn to sacrifice for such ideas" (*Letters*, p. 35).

27 The indebtedness to Schelling is discussed in detail by Fujita 1985, pp. 52-73.

as conceptually related to sensibility, is contingent in respect to morality.[28] Hegel is not ready to subscribe this Platonic conception. Neither does he yet follow Schelling, who in a Spinozistic manner presents the absolute I as an immanent cause of everything in the world. Like Schelling, however, he criticizes Kant for mixing happiness and sensuality with morality in the notion of the highest good; but unlike Schelling he does this for the sake of moral autonomy and freedom. Thus he endeavors to exclude non-moral elements from the highest good, so as to strengthen the notion of reason.[29]

The constellation of positivity, sensuality and reason changes, however, when Hegel proceeds to his second point of view, the ideal Greek folk religion. In the fragment *Jedes Volk...* (*GW* 1, pp. 359-378; trans. *ETW*, pp. 145-167), which is a supplement written in the summer of 1796 to the *Positivity essay*, Hegel reflects on reason and sensuality in the form they took among the Greeks contrasting them with the Christian positivity. In this context, reason and sensuality coexist in a natural relation, and Hegel does not deal with the demand of the dominance of reason. Thus he asks, when discussing the reasons for and mechachisms of the victory of Christianity in the Greek and Roman world:

> How could the faith in the gods have been left from the web of human life with which it had been interwoven by a thousand threads? (...) how strong must the counterweight have been to overcome the power of a physical habit which was not isolated, as our religion frequently is today, but was intertwined in every direction with all men's capacities and most intimately interwoven even with the most spontaneously active of them (*GW* 1, p.366; *ETW*, pp. 152-153)?

There arises for Hegel, consequently, the vexed problem of the compatibility of his two critical viewpoints against the Christian and, more generally, modern positivity. Obviously, they both cannot be defended together[30], as Hegel himself acknowledges now. So, influenced increasingly by both Schelling and Hölderlin, Hegel begins to ponder on his earlier rather uncritical manner of applying the results of Kant's practical philosophy.

This is the context where one should study the text known today as *Das älteste Systemprogram des deutschen Idealismus*.[31] I take it to be proven convincingly enough that the author of the fragment is Hegel and that it was compiled shortly before he moved to Frankfurt.[32] The

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28 See Fujita 1985, p.64 and Kondylis 1979, pp. 419-423.

29 See also the fragment from 1795, *GW* 1, pp. 195-196, where Hegel attempts to interpret Schellings conception of the absolute I as an extension of the Kantian practical reason.

30 Cf. Kondylis 1979, pp. 415-416.

31 Critical edition in Jamme, Schneider 1984, pp. 11-14; translated in Harris 1972, pp. 510-512.

32 I rely here mainly on Hansen's reconstruction; see Hansen 1989, esp. pp. 374-

beginning of the fragment accords with Hegel's interest to construct a practical metaphysics on the basis of Kant's three postulates.[33] It runs as follows:

> ...an *Ethics*. Since the whole of metaphysics falls for the future within *moral theory* - of which Kant with his pair of practical postulates has given only an *example*, and not *exhausted*, (--) this ethics will be nothing less than a complete system of all Ideas (*Ideen*) or of all practical postulates (which is the same thing). The first is, of course, the presentation (*Vorstellung*) of *my* self as an absolute free entity (*Wesen*). Along with the free self-conscious essence there stands forth - out of nothing - the entire *world* - the only and thinkable creation out of nothing.

The absolute I, to use Fichte's and Schelling's term, the free self-conscious entity as the first postulate and starting point, is here clearly spoken of in a more explicit and emphatic manner than by Kant himself when formulating his idea of the transcendental unity of apperception. On the basis of this reformulated first postulate it is claimed to be possible to present the whole of metaphysics as practical and not theoretical philosophy. This is, as we have already indicated, a specifically Hegelian line of thought.[34] A central motive in his critique of Christian positivity is to defend republicanism as exemplified by the Greeks and to develop a modern equivalent for it. Thus Hegel seeks ways for a real enlightenment and is against all kinds of esoteric notions, whether theological or philosophical. In the letter of April 16 he writes: "an esoteric philosophy will, to be sure, always remain, and the idea of God as the absolute Self will be part of it". This is so because the idea of God may be demonstrated only by means of the theoretical reason, which shall always remain esoteric. With his own practical metaphysics, however, Hegel intends to reduce the role of such theoretical doctrines to the minimum. He continues his letter as follows:

> The consequences that will result from it will astonish many a gentleman. Heads will be reeling at this summit of all philosophy by which man is being so greatly exalted. Yet why have we been so late in recognizing man's capacity for freedom, placing him in the same rank with all spirits? I believe there is no better sign of the times than this, that mankind is being presented as so worthy of respect in itself. It is proof that the aura of prestige surrounding the heads of the oppressors and gods of this earth is disappearing. The philosophers are proving the dignity of man (*Letters*, p. 35).

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376. Harris 1972, pp. 249-257 also arrives at the conclusion that Hegel is the real author of the fragment, but dates it little later. On the various positions concerning the dating, the author etc., see now Hansen 1989, pp. 1-343.

33 In January 1795 Hegel wrote to Schelling: "Some time ago I took up again the study of Kantian philosophy to learn how to apply its important results to many an idea still current among us, or to elaborate such ideas according to those results" (*Letters*, p. 30). - In 16. April, the same year, he writes to Schelling: "From the Kantian system and its highest completion I expect a revolution in Germany. It will proceed from principles that are present and that only need to be elaborated generally and applied to all hitherto existing knowledge" (*Letters*, p. 35).

34 Cf. Harris 1972, p. 249 and Hansen 1989, p. 382.

The fragment itself is imbued with the very same radicalism and pathos for freedom. After making a brief contrast between "present-day physics" and a philosophy of nature that poses, like Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, the teleological question of "How must the world be constituted for a moral entity?", Hegel turns to "the work of man". Under the influence of Schiller, especially of his sixth *Letter on the Aesthetic Education*, he claims that the state is like a machine, "a mechanical thing"[35], and that - Schiller, however, did not arrive at this radical consequence - seen from the demands of practical reason it is impossible to formulate an idea of the state, since "only something that is an objective (*Gegenstand)* of freedom is called *idea*. So we must go even beyond the state! - for every state must treat free men as cogs in a machine." Formulating, then, an ideal which has been characterized as a program of revolutionary Spinozism with the claim that "God is in us"[36], in any case an ideal that is in line with Hegel's formulations against all dependence on alien authorities[37] and with his dissatisfaction with the Prussian state, the author claims to "strip the whole wretched human work of State, constitution, government, legal system - naked to the skin", and ends by declaring: "Absolute freedom of all spirits who bear the intellectual world in themselves, and cannot seek either God or immortality outside themselves."

So far the fragment may well be understood as Hegel's program for a completion of the practical metaphysics as initiated by Kant. The rest of it, however, is not, prima facie at least, any direct continuation of this ethico-political program, though it, too, may be read as an advancement of Hegel's earlier themes. It continues:

> Last of all the Idea that unites all the rest, the Idea of *Beauty* taking the word in its higher Platonic sense. I am now convinced that the highest act of Reason, the one through which it encompasses all Ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that *truth and goodness only become sisters in beauty* - the philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the poet. Men without aesthetic sense is what the philosophers-of-the-letter (unsre *Buchstabenphilohen*) are.

Hegel is here seeking his way to combine the two demands of reason and imagination which he had posed on religion. Not only the *Volkerzieher* but also the philosopher must have the aesthetic power of a poet, i.e. the educator (Hegel) cannot lean on the philosopher (Kant) any more but must found the program himself.[38] This is new and fits well to Hegel's

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35 Other influences are possible here too, for it was, as Jamme, Schneider 1984, p. 55 remark, a general topos of the time to use machine metaphors when speaking about the state.

36 Jamme, Schneider 1984, p. 56.

37 See the detailed discussion in Hansen 1989, pp. 382-418.

38 Cf. Harris 1972, p. 253.

present efforts. Clearly one can perceive, besides Kant and Schiller[39], the growing influence of Hölderlin in this aesthetic form of the program.[40] In the second half of the fragment can be heard echoes of the Tübingen-program of the three friends, the symbol of which was *hen kai pan*, endeavoring to grasp the original unity of what is:[41]

> Until we express the Ideas aesthetically, i.e. mythologically, they have no interest for the *people*, and conversely until mythology is rational the philosopher must be ashamed of it. Thus in the end enlightened and unenlightened must clasp hands, mythology must become philosophical in order to make people rational, and philosophy must become mythological in order to make philosophers sensible (*sinnlich*). Then reigns eternal unity among us.

This excerpt typifies Hegel's efforts to formulate his idea of a subjective religion that would be both rational and exoteric in the real sense, an edifying part of everybody's life. As we shall see, they essentially proclaim the development of both Hegel's ideas of ethical life and his philosophical position by and large. What would ultimately become of the practical metaphysics that completed Kant's initiation; what would be the roles of moral community and of the individual; how would the relationship between philosophy and religion and, on the other hand, between philosophy and art, develop; what kind of a new mythology, instead of the old and non-German and Christian one is needed; what roles does the state have in ethical life and what should be its relation to the church - these principal questions, among others, left more or less open in the *Systemprogram*, will be central for Hegel during the three years in Frankfurt.

Unity, love, life

At the same time Hölderlin had been elaborating, very much through a critical confrontation with Schiller and Fichte (whose lectures he had

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39 The connection between the ideas of reason and sensuality in Schiller and Kant is discussed and related to Hegel in detail by Hansen 1989, pp. 425-444. He also explicates the uniting role of the aesthetic domain between the theoretical and moral in Kant and Schiller and points out the close similarities in the fragment; see Hansen 1989, pp. 445-465. The idea of an aesthetic mythology in the service of a religion of reason is present in Schiller and Kant too, as Hansen 1989, pp. 465-474 explicates.

40 See especially Jamme 1983, 119-140.

41 The remark of Wylleman 1989, p. 8 about the second half corrects Hansen's somewhat one-sided reading of it through Kant and Schiller: "It can, therefore, mean that the highest act of reason, which achieves this unifying idea of beauty in an aesthetic manner, is more than the positing postulate, namely the *grasping* of something that *is*. The divinity that can be approached through this "ethics" would then have become the unifying beauty of the *hen kai pan* grasped by loving intuition (*amor intellectualis*)."

attended in Jena), his philosophical program aiming at comprehending the fundamental unity of being.[42] In the fragment *Urteil und Sein* from the year 1795 his remarks about it are exceptionally direct. "Being (*Seyn*)", he defines, "expresses the joining (*Verbindung*) of Subject and Object", relating then judgement to it:

> *Judgement*: is in the highest and strictest sense the original sundering of Subject and Object most intimately united in the intellectual intuition, the very sundering which first makes Subject and Object possible, the *Ur-theilung*. In the concept of division (*Theilung*) there lies already the concept of the reciprocal relation (*Beziehung*) of Object and Subject to one another, and the necessary presupposition of a whole of which Object and Subject are the parts. 'I am I' is the most appropriate example of this concept in its *theoretical* form, but in practical *Urtheilung* it (the Ego) posits itself as opposed to *Non-ego*, not to itself (Harris 1972, p. 516).

In January 1797 Hegel moves to Frankfurt and meets Hölderlin, who had been active in getting him there.[43] During his first two years there Hegel writes a group of short fragments which not only show the decisive impact of Hölderlin on him, but can also be regarded as his first steps towards a philosophical position to his own. Hegel quite rapidly abandons his earlier Kantianism, while adopting Hölderlin's *Vereinigungsphilosophie*. Most clearly one can see this from the last fragment out of the series written during the spring 1798, entitled by Nohl as *Glauben und Sein*. It reads as follows:

> what is conflicting can only be recognized as conflicting because it has already been united; the union is the standard <measuring rod> against which the comparison is made, against which the opposities appear as such, appear as unsatisfied <unfulfilled>. So if it is shown that the opposed limited terms could not subsist as such, that they would have to cancel themselves (or one another - *sich aufheben müssten*), and that even to the possible they would presuppose a union (just to be able to show that they are opposed, the union is presupposed) then it is thereby proven, that they have to (*müssen*) be united, that the union ought to exist (*sein soll*) (Nohl 1907, pp. 282-283; trans. in Harris 1972, p. 512).

The fundamental union (*Vereinigung*) is thus presupposed, which makes possible both the sundering (*die Trennung*) and the need for a union. The sundering is not a mere opposition but rather a force, or a way, back to the union. It is an incomplete union and should be studied, in each of its forms, in relation to the complete union. Positive religion, reflection, enlightenment and Kantian philosophy are all such incomplete forms of union. Like Hölderlin, Hegel contends that "Union and Being are synonymous" (Nohl 1907, p. 383; Harris 1972, p. 513). He aims, above all, at defining the relation of faith to this being. "Faith is the mode, in which the unity, whereby an antinomy has been united, is present in our *Vorstellung*. The union is the activity; this activity reflected as object is

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42 See e.g. Kondylis 1979, pp. 283-365.

43 See Jamme 1983, pp. 138-150.

what is believed" (Nohl 1907, p. 382; Harris 1972, p. 512). Following Hölderlin, Hegel now thinks that we as finite beings are ultimately unable to grasp the being, the union, as such; we only have a contact with its more or less reflected, i.e. sundered, post *Ur-theilung* forms.

Hegel considers faith to have a special access to the union, however. "Thus, what is thought of as a sundered thing must become something united, only then can it be believed [in]; the thinking is a union, and is believed, but what is thought of [is] not yet" (Nohl 1907, p. 383; Harris 1972, p. 513). By means of thinking it is possible to show the existence of antinomies and to recognize the elements constituting them as well as to contend that there *should* be a unity. "From thinkability", however, "being does not follow", while in the case of belief "that which is, does not have to be believed in, but what is believed in does have to be." Hegel talks here about a moral belief, or faith, which he distinguishes from a positive faith. The latter is now criticized as a more incomplete form of union, which remains in the antinomies:

> All positive faith starts from something opposed, a thing that we are not, and we ought to be; it sets up an ideal prior to its own being; in order for faith in the ideal to be possible, it must be a power - in positive religion the existent thing, the union is only a *Vorstellung*, something thought of (...) (Nohl 1907, p. 385; Harris 1972, p. 515).

When Hegel at the end of the fragment explicitly equates "Kantian philosophy - positive religion", his divergence from Kant is radical enough. Like before, Hegel is critical of positive religion, but his standpoint is not that of moral autonomy, nor that of repressed sensuality. Instead, he takes as his starting-point the complete union, the being to which he now seeks to relate metaphysically all the phenomena that human consciousness and action encompasses.[44] From this point of view it has cleared to him that the Kantian doctrine, too, is one of the subjective *Sollen*, of "fear of the objective".[45]

In the fragments from the year 1797 Hegel tries, again, to define his conception of religion, this time above all through the notion of love. "Religion ist eins mit der Liebe. Der geliebte ist uns nicht entgegensetzt, er ist eins mit unserem Wesen; wir sehen nur uns in ihm, und dann ist er doch wieder nicht wir - ein Wunder, das wir nicht zu fassen vermögen", he writes in *Liebe und Religion* (Nohl 1907, p. 377). This is love in the Platonic sense, as a relation between two equals where one is *bei-sich-selbst-im-andern*. For reflective thinking, such a union between equal and unequal is something to wonder at, but Hegel will later develop the idea in his notions of life and self-consciousness.[46] In the fragment *Moralität, Liebe, Religion* Hegel first criticizes positive religion of being dependent

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44 Cf. Kondylis 1979, p. 467.

45 Wylleman 1989, p. 14.

46 Cf. Fujita 1985, pp. 78-79.

on authorities, contrasting it with genuine moral concepts. Unlike during his Bern period, the latter do not mean the dominance of reason over drives (*Trieben*) but the sublation of all the oppositions (Nohl 1907, p. 374).

In the second half of the fragment (Nohl 1907, pp. 376-377)[47], Hegel defines the union he opts for in a way which makes his distance to Kant and Fichte perfectly clear. Instead of his former emphasis on moral aspects, he now conceives of the relation of man to God in metaphysical terms. "Religion is freie Verehrung der Gottheit. (...) Die Objekte beleben ist, sie zu Götter machen." To make an object, a brook e.g., godly means to perceive it as a complete union of subject and object: "Wo Subjekt und Objekt oder Freiheit und Natur so vereinigt gedacht wird, dass Natur Freiheit ist, dass Subjekt und Objekt nicht zu trennen ist, das ist Göttliches - ein solches Ideal ist das Objekt jeder Religion. Eine Gottheit ist Subjekt und Objekt zugleich..." In this union of freedom and nature or reason and sensuality, then, is all positivity won. What stands out as new and very important in this fragment is that Hegel does not privilege the practical over the theoretical. Instead, they are both defined as incomplete forms of union in respect to religion, or love: "Die theoretische Synthesen werden ganz objektiv, dem Subjekt ganz entgegensetzt. Die praktische Tätigkeit vernichtet das Objekt und ist ganz subjektiv - nur in der Liebe allein ist man eins mit dem Objekt, es beherrscht nicht und wird nicht beherrscht." Hegel has thus adopted the *Vereinigungsphilosophie* of Hölderlin and will on this basis make a partial return back to his initial ideas in Tübingen.

In another fragment, which Nohl entitled *Liebe* (autumn 1797), Hegel contrast "love for the sake of dead things" and "genuine love" which only is capable of a true union. In the former, man is essentually opposed to the external world which he he has cognizance of and control over; in the latter, which now is explicitly associated with religion, man is a living union with his beloved. This

> love neither restricts nor is restricted; it is not finite at all. It is a feeling, yet not a single feeling [among other feelings]. A single feeling is only a part and not the whole of life; the life present in a single feeling dissolves its barriers and drives on till it disperses itself in the manifold of feelings with a view to finding itself in the entirety of this manifold (Nohl 1907, p. 379; *ETW*, pp. 304-305).

The results of this reorientation are put in use and further developed when Hegel at the end of 1798 takes up serious studies of the history of Christianity. Again he reconstructs the Gospels opposing Jesus' teachings to the Jewish legalism, but this time not from the Kantian point of view. Instead, he looks from Jesus' career elements for a new "beautiful religion" of love. "Eine schöne Religion zu stiften, das Ideal davon? findet man es?", he asks in the *Grundkonzept zum Geist des*

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47 Both Henrich 1971, Anm. 63 and Kondylis 1979, p. 451 are of the opinion that this is an independent text written somewhat later.

Christentums (Nohl 1907, p. 387). Like in the *Spirit of Christianity* itself (Nohl 1907, pp. 261-342; *ETW*, pp. 182-301), he contrasts "the spirit of beauty" with "a bare service of the Lord, a direct slavery, an obedience without joy" (Nohl 1907, p. 262; *ETW*, p. 206). "In Jewish religion morality is impossible", Hegel maintains, but contrary to his thinking in Bern, he no longer considers genuine morality, which may well be found in Jesus' teachings, to be articulated in the Kantian ethics. In the latter the commands are subjective, not objective as in Judaism, but as from the point of view of the union they, too, imply a sundering:

> Das Gebot ist zwar subjektiv, ein Gesetz des Menschen, aber ein Gesetz, das anderen in ihm Vorhandenen widerspricht, ein Gesetz, das herrschst; es gebietet nut, die Achtung treibt zur Handlung, aber Achtung is das Gegenteil des Prinzips, dem die Handlung gemäss ist; das Prinzip ist Allgemeinheit; Achtung ist dies nicht; die Gebote sind für die Achtung immer ein Gegebenes (Nohl 1907, p. 388).

While for Hegel "morality is sublation of a sundering in life (*Moralität ist Aufhebung einer Trennung im Leben)*, and he again, like in Tübingen, opts for a union of reason and sensuality, the Kantian practical reason appears to him as a faculty of exclusion. But "das Ausgeschlossene ist nicht ein Aufgehobenes" (Nohl 1907, p. 388). Rosenkranz tells us that Hegel studied closely and wrote a (later lost) commentary on Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797), and that he decided in favour of a union of morality and legality belonging within the notion of life which he later calls ethical life (Rosenkranz 1844, p. 87). As seen from the perspective of this fundamental union, the Kantian morality is a more incomplete stage[48] than the one Jesus taught. For Jesus, "the principle of morality is love", and he "opposed the commands with conviction (*Gesinnung)*, i.e. the inclination (*Geneigtsein*) to act in that way" (Nohl 1907, p. 388).

In the essay *Geist des Christentums* itself Jesus is presented as fighting against the spirit and fate of the Jews, as symbolized in the figures of Abraham, Nimrod and Noah, preaching against the sundering in law and for a union in love. His efforts, however, were bound to fail, as Hegel states right in the beginning:

> Jesus did not fight merely against one part of the Jewish fate; to have done so would have implied that he was himself in the toils of another part, and he was not; he set himself against the whole. Thus he was himself raised above it and to raise his people above it too. But enmities like those he sought to transcend can be overcome only by valor (*Tapferkeit*); they cannot be reconciled by love. Even *his* sublime effort to overcome the whole of the Jewish fate must therefore have failed with his people, and he was bound to become its victim himself (Nohl 1907, p. 261; *ETW*, pp. 205-206).

Jesus' pursuit of the kingdom of God among men had to fail because

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48 Kondylis 1979, pp. 477-498 reconstructs from these fragments Hegel's first elementary schema of dialectic with practical and theoretical stages leading back to the fundamental unity.

God for the Jews was an authority to be served, not the father in whom one may live with others asserting a pure, self-justifying feeling of life, i.e. love (Nohl 1907, pp. 302-304; *ETW*, pp. 253-255). For the Jews think of the divine "in inspired terms", "without reflection's expressions", without commands and concepts. Yet, when John begins his gospel "In the beginning *was* the Logos; the Logos *was with* God, and God *was* the Logos; in him *was* the life", one should see that the sentences are not really judgements at the level of reflection, for here "the predicates are themselves once more something being and living" (see Nohl 1907, pp. 304-306; *ETW*, pp. 255-256).

The Jews could neither comprehend nor tolerate this spirited community of love. Consequently, Jesus with his disciples had to withdraw from the civil life of people: Jesus "into heaven", his disciples "into a union in God and in God only". They could express their feeling of life in their words and deeds, but it did not manifest in the civil life. So the spirit of Jesus was to remain private, lifeless, even "as poor as the Jewish spirit" (Nohl 1907, pp. 325.331; ETW, pp. 281-288). In spite of this conclusion, however, Hegel takes foremost interest is in the union of love which Jesus and his disciples were to create. This is now distinquished from and contrasted with the Kantian morality.

There are principally two kinds of prescriptions, Hegel argues, objective or external ones (he calls them also *bürgerliche*), e.g. washing one's hands before a meal, and subjective or moral ones. Neither of these types is capable of creating a union, for in both cases "positivity is only partially removed", and "there remains a residuum of indestructible positivity" (Nohl 1907, pp. 265-266; *ETW*, p. 211). In the former one, opposes an external master, in the latter an internal one, but in both of them one remains obedient, i.e. *knechtisch*, to a general law. This was not the spirit of Jesus' teachings:

> To act in the spirit of laws could not have meant for [Jesus] "to act out of respect for duty and to contradict inclinations", for both "parts of the spirit" (no other word can describe this distraction of soul [*Gemüt*]), just by being that divergent, would have been not in the spirit of the laws but against that spirit, one part because it was something exclusive and so self-restricted, the other because it was something suppressed (Nohl 1907, p. 266; *ETW*, p. 212).

Instead of an opposition to the law, whether external or internal, Jesus strove for a fulfilment (*pleroma*, complementum) of the law, for a union where the oppositions would be sublated. Following Hölderlin, Hegel calls this fulfilment being (*Sein*):

> Since the command of duty presupposes a cleavage [between reason and inclination], and since domination of the concept declares itself in a "thou shalt", that which is raised above this cleavage is by contrast an "is" (*so ist dagegen dasjenige, was über diese Trennung erhaben ist, ein Sein*), a modification of life (...) (Nohl 1907, p. 266; *ETW*, p. 212).

Thus Kant was fundamentally wrong in regarding "Love God above

everything and thy neighbour as thyself" as a "command requiring respect for a law which commands love" (Nohl 1907, p. 267; *ETW*, p. 213). For it is a *contradictio in adiecto* to speak about law or duty in the case of love. In hegel's view, Kant was also wrong in opposing the moral law to the inclinations (*Neigungen*). For a moral phenomenon, in the proper sense, should be something beyond this opposition. This sublime phenomenon, this very unity Hegel now captures in the notion of *pleroma*:

> This correspondence with inclination is the *pleroma* [fulfilment] of the law; i.e., it is an "is" (*Sein*), which, to use an old expression, is the "complement of possibility", since possibility is the synthesis of subject and object, in which subject and object have lost their opposition. (...) In the "fulfilment" of both the laws and duty, their concomitant, however, the moral disposition, etc., ceases to be the universal, opposed to inclination, and inclination ceases to be particular, opposed to law, and therefore this correspondence of law and inclination is life and, as the relation of the differents to one another, love; i.e., it is an "is" (*Sein*) which expressed as concept, as law, is of necessity congruent (*gleich*) with law, i.e. with itself, or as reality, as inclination opposed to the concept, is likewise congruent with itself, with inclination (Nohl 1907, p. 268; *ETW*, pp. 214-215).

Consequently, Hegel argues that a murder, for example, and perhaps any crime, should not be perceived primarily as a violation of the law, but, rather of life itself. Thus a criminal loses the "friendliness" of life and he experiences the destruction of its unity. His "fate" does not lie above himself but in his own life: thus he may, or may not, find the way back among other people, so that, if he manages, his "sins will be forgiven" (Nohl 1907, p. 270; *ETW*, pp. 216-217). Hegel speaks about life and its many forms as he will later speak about ethical life: "A living bond of virtues, a living unity, is quite different from the unity of the concept; it does not set up a determinate virtue for determinate circumstances, but appears, even in the most variegated mixture of relations, untorn and unitary. Its external shape may be modified in infinite ways; it will never have the same shape twice. Its expression will never be able to afford a rule..." (Nohl 1907, p. 295; *ETW*, p. 246). It is love as preached by Jesus which enables one to experience the friendliness and union of life. "(...) love reconciles not only the trespasser with his fate but also man with virtue, i.e. if love were not the sole principle of virtue, then every virtue would be at the same time a vice" (Nohl 1907, p. 294; *ETW*, p. 244). Thus Hegel reaches the same conclusion as in the fragments on love morality and religion. It is love which enables one to experience the fundamental unity of life and being, *hen kai pan*, as well as to perceive that, taken principally or metaphysically, the law is not an opposition but a *pleroma* of virtues.

Up to this stage, as we have seen, Hegel has to a high degree given his mind to the problem of religion. It is not that he were an exceptionally religious person, but through religion he is thinking of the realization of his *volkerzieherische* plan and, in addition, through religion he approached the fundamental notions of union, being and spirit, as well as history and his own time. This, in fact, distinguishes him from both Schelling and Hölderlin, whose notions of life and being were otherwise of decisive importance for Hegel.[49] For unlike his friends, Hegel thought that an intellectual intuition of the absolute is not possible, that only spirit may grasp spirit, life life. The absolute is not something above life; it is to be presented in union with life. So far, Hegel has approached this fundamental problem from the perspective of religion.

According to the position reached in *Geist des Christentums*, being as the fundamental union may be affirmed in faith or in religion, where the subject begins from his immediate *feeling* of life and proceeds, then, up till a *feeling* of union and harmony with both himself and the world, with the infinite life. For Hegel the notions of religious feeling, love and life are principally beyond conceptual operation, beyond reflection, and consequently they are developed within the frame of a narrative about the spirit and the nature of religious feeling among various peoples, the Jews, the Greeks, the Christians, the modern peoples. The fundamental insights of this narrative are for Hegel not reflective but spiritual. As finite beings we must speak of the infinite, of God, but the Jews did not obtain the *lógos* of John's Gospel: "However sublime the idea of God may be made here, there yet always remains the Jewish principle of opposing thought to reality, reason to sense; this principle involves the rendering of life and a lifeless connection between God and the world, though the tie between these must be taken to be a living connection; and, where such a connection is in question, ties between the related terms can be expressed only in mystical phraseology (*kann nur mystisch gesprochen werden)*" (Nohl 1907, p. 308; *ETW*, p. 258). That Hegel, however, was not completely satisfied with his formulations of the relationship between faith and thought, of religion and conceptual discourse, that he himself sought to express this relationship more in conceptual terms, can be understood from the *Systemfragment*, i.e. from the two fragments that have remained of a larger text which Hegel completed on September 14th 1800.[50] There he writes:

> This self-elevation of man, not from the finite to infinite (for these terms are only products of mere reflection, and as such their separation is absolute), but from finite life to infinite life, is religion. We may call

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49 See Kondylis 1979, pp. 525-529 and esp. Fujita 1985, pp. 93-106.

50 On the general interpretation of this important fragment see now Zhang 1992.

> infinite life a spirit in contrast with the abstract multiplicity, for spirit is the living unity of the manifold (...) (Nohl 1907, p. 347; *ETW*, p. 311).

According to Hegel, philosophy, operating with reflection, presupposes, first, "life undivided as fixed" and, second, individual subjects "as spectators" of life, and is consequently driven to oppositions between subject and object which it will never reconcile (Nohl 1907, p. 346; *ETW*, p. 310). Unlike religion, philosophy posits "the reality of the infinite as reality created by reflection", recognizes this "again as something posited by reflection and thereby itself restricted", seeks again "what restricts it" and postulates "a continuation in such a way ad infinitum" (Nohl 1907, p. 348; *ETW*, p. 313). Hegel refers above all to Fichte here, when speaking about philosophy of reflection that constitutes a "bad infinity".[51] Philosophy, or "reason", may accomplish more and better, however. It is capable of "sensing" the "opposition which still exists between itself and the infinite life", thus finding the way from regress to infinite life (Nohl 1907, p. 346; *ETW*, p. 310). This presupposes, however, that one should give up the reflection or understanding and, instead, adopt a position of reason:

> Philosophy has to disclose the finiteness in all finite things and require their integration by means of reason. In particular, it has to recognize the illusions generated by its own infinitude and thus to place the true infinite outside its confines (Nohl 1907, p. 348; *ETW*, p. 313).

Hegel thus attributes to philosophical reason a mediating role between reflection and religion. It demonstrates the finitude of reflection and poses the true infinitude outside the sphere reflection. It may produce such significant expressions as "life is a union of union and nonunion", but "when reflection propounds it, another expression, not propounded, is excluded" (Nohl 1907, p. 348; *ETW*, p. 312). Religion alone, however, is able to elevate finite life beyond the border of death. Thus Hegel contends: "Philosophy therefore has to stop short of religion because it is a process of thinking and, as such a process, implies an opposition with non-thinking (...)" (Nohl 1907, 348; *ETW*, p. 313). More emphatically than earlier, Hegel now maintains that religion will unite the feeling of infinite life with conceptual reflection.

In conclusion, we should, however, ask whether the infinite life is adequately comprehended only in religion, in which it is lived and felt, not thought and reflected. What follows then from this in respect to philosophy? In what sense should philosophy cease here? Should it, and in what way, step beyond the reflection of Fichtean philosophy, which Hegel then opposed, in line with Hölderlin and Schelling? Where should it stop? How does Hegel understand the Kantian dictum "I had to remove knowledge to make room for belief"?

In any case, Hegel's results are not merely negative for philosophy.

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51 Cf. Fujita 1985, p. 113.

For when philosophical reason realizes that the infinite life is beyond its reflective reach, this is a truth applying to philosophical reason. Such is also the formulation "life is a union of union and nonunion", which clearly anticipates Hegel's subsequent speculative dialectics. So, the infinite life should express its truth not only in religion but also in philosophical reason. The famous letter to Schelling on November 2nd, 1800 shows that a conclusion of this kind is becoming prominent in Hegels thought: "In my scientific development, which started from [the] more subordinate needs of man, I was inevitably driven toward science, and the idea of [my] youth had to take the form of reflection and thus at once of a system. I now ask myself, while I am still occupied with it, what return to intervention in the life of men can be found" (*Letters*, p. 64).

5 HEGEL'S INTERVENTION IN THE LIFE OF MEN

Especially in Bern and Frankfurt, Hegel did not work solely with problems connected with religion, but took also part in the intense political debates of the time. In the spring of 1798 he published his translation, completed already in Bern, of *Lettres confidentielles* of J.-J. Cart dealing with the policy of Bern authorities toward the Pays de Vaud. On the way from Bern to Frankfurt, in the spring of 1798, Hegel stopped over for some time at home in Stuttgart, and decided there to write a pamphlet *Über die neuesten inneren Verhältnisse Württembergs, besonders über die Gebrechen der Magistratverfassung*. During the same year he sent the manuscript from Frankfurt, but for some reason it was never published. His most important project related to politics, the essay *Verfassung Deutschlands*, Hegel started in 1799 and took it up again three years later in Jena.

Rosenkranz tells us that during the years 1798 and 1799 Hegel wrote a commentary not only on Kant's *Rechtslehre* and *Tugendlehre* but also on the German translation of Steuart's *Principles of Political Economy*.[1] Moreover, when we note that Hegel in September 1800, after finishing the *Systemfragment*, began to work on his *Positivity Essay* again, i.e. to study, this time from his new post-Kantian perspective, the historical reasons for the moral failure of the Christian religion, it becomes very clear that he was seriously preoccupied with the political needs of his own time. He felt that not only as an enlightened religious reformer but also as a philosopher he should influence the life of men.

We have seen how the development of Hegel's thought so far had

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1 See Rosenkranz 1844, pp. 86-87. See also Waszek 1988, p.114, according to whom Rosenkranz is at least partly responsible for the disappearance of Hegel's commentary.

convinced him that this could not happen in the form of transcendental reflection and ethico-political imperatives as Kant and Fichte had proceeded. The construction of a free ethical community that would embody the union necessary, *"hen kai pan"*, also involved for Hegel that he should go into the historical conditions of this realization. As a spiritual reality, an ethical community is embedded in history, and Hegel regarded these historical, economic as well as political, conditions as changing ones.

In the present chapter I shall outline a general picture of Hegel's first political interventions, the ideals and ideas on which they are founded. It will become clear that in political matters Hegel was both enthusiastic and very critical of the new phenomena pertaining to modern society which were emerging in Germany too, though more slowly than elsewhere in Europe. His friends in Tübingen had already called him "the old man", referring to his serious and careful attitude towards his studies. Especially his historical reading, his knowledge of ancient texts and a wide variety of non-German authors was exceptional among his contemporaries. We will see that in spite of his intensive studies of the Scottish political economy Hegel remained, till the end of the Jena period at least, faithful to his conception, adopted from the Greek authors, viewing the state as an institutional frame for the ethical life of a people.

There is an interesting tension in Hegel's political philosophy in Jena. He is better aware of modern society with all its positive and negative consequences than perhaps anyone else in Germany, but his proposals for a political structure of this society, as compared with those of Kant, for example, seem to date from older times. Some of Hegel's reasons for this have already been discussed here. In the present chapter I will study his proposals for a political structure. In addition to the texts mentioned above, I will take up the first systematic treatments of practical philosophy from the years 1802-1806. These institutional remarks will later be situated into their systematic context.

On the political reforms in Württemberg

Hegel's motives for his translation and anonymous publication of J.J. Cart's *Confidental letters upon the constitutional relation of Wadtland (Pays de Vaud) to the city of Bern,* as well as for writing the pamphlet *Über die neuesten inneren Verhältnisse Württembergs* were bound up with certain recent political events in Hegel's home state Württemberg. On the whole the question was about the growing pressure which the postrevolutionary France brought to bear on the disunited German princedoms. Napoleon had made in 1795 a separate peace with Prussia, and after invading Italy he also forced Vienna to make a treaty in

October 1797, so that he was then able to incorporate the whole of the western coast of Rhine into France. The Rastatt congress about the compensations for the princedoms started in December 1797. It lasted until april 1799, and was basically a farce which Bonaparte used as a means to keep Germany in a disrupted state.

The overall impact of these maneuvers of Bonaparte on the general backwardness of the small German states was ambivalent in Hegel's view, too. They accelerated the weakening of the dukes' positions, thereby creating opportunities for both economic and political development. But they also prevented the founding of an independent state of substantial strength in southern Germany.[2] Hegel's problem, however, was not the unification as such, but rather, as Avineri puts it, the modernization of Germany.[3] From this angle Hegel was inclined, with certain skepticism, to welcome the Frenchmen. Hegel was, as we should also remember, a great admirer of Napoleon.

Württemberg with a strong *Landtag* was in a way a democratic exception among the princedoms. In practice, however, the Diet had not been summoned after 1770. In March 1797 the financial crisis brought on by the Frenchmen forced Duke Ludwig Eugen finally to summon the diet and it was this episode which brought about a flow of pamphlets and public letters. Quite soon the discussion expanded beyond the current fiscal problems and centered around the political organization of the state and wider economic questions.

With his translation of J.J. Cart's *Confidential letters* Hegel sought to contribute to the discussion. The letters of the Swiss jurist Cart, written in Paris and originally published in 1793, were meant as a protest against the canton of Berne which, after the restoration of the oligarchy, violated various traditional and constitutional rights of the inhabitants of the French-speaking canton Pays de Vaud. "In general", Z.A. Pelczynski writes, "Cart's attitude may be summed up as the championship of constitutionalism and the rule of law against unfair privileges, arbitrariness and centralization" (*HPW*, pp. 10-11). Hegel's short preface and remarks on the letters (see *W* 1, pp. 256-267) show that he fully sided with Cart's case for Vaud. The publication implies that Hegel intends it as a more general defence of constitutionalism and a warning example against oligarchic policy. In his introduction Hegel writes:

> From the comparison of the contents of these letters with the latest events in Vaud, from the contrast between the semblance of peace imposed in 1792 and the pride of the government in its victory on the one hand, and its real weakness in the country and its sudden downfall there on the other, a multitude of useful lessons could be derived; but the events speak for themselves loudly enough; all that remains to be done is to appreciate them in all their fullness; they cry aloud over the whole earth: *Discite justitiam moniti*, but upon those who are deaf their fate will smite hard (*W* 1, p. 257; trans. Harris 1972, p. 422).

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2 See e.g. Heidegren 1984, pp. 119-120.

3 Cf. Avineri 1972, pp. 34-61.

Justice is here demanded from the political authorities, though Hegel leaves it very unclear what he means by justice. He refers to the historical and constitutional rights of the local people, i.e. to their traditional laws and customs older than the contemporary authorities.[4] In line with Cart, Hegel defends political freedom and fraternity of the citizens, but certainly not universal equality. His ideal was rather to re-establish a state according to an organic model of society built on a system of estates. As we shall see, he was, also during the Jena-period, concerned with introducing certain political ideas of the Greeks in modern society.

After the publication of his Cart-translation, Hegel starts an essay which he addressed - not to the *Landtag*, as had usually been done, but - directly *'To the People of Württemberg'*. Although Hegel in the opening pages radically pleas for a change, he does not, on the whole, have much to say about concrete steps to be taken for a reform. The inconclusiveness of the work may have been one of the reasons for Hegel's not publishing it. The main thread of thought reads:

> The picture of better and juster times has become lively in the souls of men, as a longing, a sighing for purer and freer conditions has moved all hearts and set them at variance with the actuality. (...) Whence could the Würtenbergers expect juster aid than from the Assembly of their Estates? (...) For judging that matter, justice is the sole criterion. The courage to do justice is the one power which can completely, honourably, and peaceably remove the tottering edifice and produce something safe in its place. (...) It is not only dishonourable but contrary to all sense, when things are felt to be tottering, to do nothing but wait confidently and blindly for the collapse of the old building, which is everywhere decaying and has its foundations undermined, and to submit to being crushed by the falling beams (*W* 1, pp. 268-270; *HPW*, pp. 243-244).

Hegel is well aware of and he also complains about the corruption and the contempt for usual people prevalent among the middle class and the officials. In the name of justice he condemns the absolutism of the Duke as well as the traditionalism of the officials. But how should these problems be tackled? To Hegel the only possibility appears to lie in strengthening the representative independent of these groups, and so he defends its indirect election in the town councils. He warns, however, against going too far here as well as of an unjustified optimism concerning various reforms.

In another fragment, which according to Haym belongs to the same essay, Hegel remarks: "Die Hauptsache wäre, das Wahlrecht in die Hände eines vom Hofe unabhängigen Corps von aufgeklärten und rechtschaffenen Männer niederzulegen" (*W* 1, p. 273). What kind of a

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4 Harris 1972, p. 423 writes that "they (Cart and Hegel) are in essence appealing to the justice of natural law and equity, and to the 'rights on man'." To me, however, Avineri 1972, p. 7 seems to be right when he remarks that "there is no reference in Hegel's comments of that period to natural rights."

body this would be, and how would it be elected, remains unresolved at this point, however. All he can say is that in the present conditions at least, general elections are out of the question: "(...) solange alles übrige in dem alten Zustande bleibt, solange das Volk seine Rechte nicht kennt, solange kein Gemeingeist vorhanden ist, solange die Gewalt der Beamten nicht beschränkt ist, würden Volkswahlen nur dazudienen, den völligen Umsturz unserer Verfassung herbeizuführen", Hegel remarks (*W* 1, p. 273).

The first approximation of the concept of state

Still during the same year 1798 Hegel began to write the essay entitled *The German Constitution*, by far the largest and most substantial piece of his early political studies. It is possible that Hölderlin's visit to Rastatt, the town where congress the met, partly inspired Hegel to pose the question whether Germany, as a whole, is a state at all and whether it should be one.[5] The atmosphere of the time may be sensed from the words Hölderlin wrote to his mother from Rastatt in March:

> It is likely that the war which is just now breaking out again will not leave our Württenberg in peace, though I have it upon sure authority that the French will respect the neutrality of the Imperial states (*Reichländer*) including, of course, Württemberg, as long as possible. ... In the event that the French are victorious there may perhaps be some changes in our fatherland (i.e. Württemberg)... That you may not in certain possible circumstances come to any harm, for this I would look to it with all my might, and perhaps not without avail. But all this is still very far off.[6]

Hegel starts his first sketch for a foreword by asking if the war with France should, after all, have other consequences for Germany than the loss of its beautiful territories and a lot of money - and implies that it should. For him the war conditions show more clearly than anything else that "Germany is no state any more". One cannot say whether it is a monarchy or an aristocracy; its constutition is, in the first place, "an anarchy" (*W* 1, p. 452).

Germany is a product of the preceding centuries and, consequently, "isolated from the spirits of the time". It is a product of a natural development comprising customs, local rights, properties, towns and estates - an absence of "a nation as a state" which Hegel calls "the saga of German Freedom". As far as there is a body of state, it is merely an aggregate of particular interests, and nothing universal that would belong to the whole as such (*W* 1, p. 453). This state of social and political

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5 See Harris 1972, pp. 435-437.

6 Harris 1972, p. 437.

disintegration is neither produced by any constitutional act nor is it based on any specific concept. Quite the contrary, Hegel contends: the German constitution is in fact a private law, and its political rights no more than private property sanctioned by law (W 1, pp. 454-455). It is futile and dangerous to imagine, he implies, that the German state would be anything else than a constitutional anarchy, "the sum of rights that have been taken away from the state" (*W* 1, p. 456).

In his unfinished sketch for an introduction written already in Frankfurt Hegel makes some important remarks on his study in relation to the actual events. He starts by pointing out that the opposition between the present state of affairs and what people unconsciously strive for ("nach Leben, welche die Natur zur Idee in sich hervorgearbeitet haben") has become more evident than ever before. This opposition, negative in respect to the nature, a limitation, positive in respect to the will, manifests in people's need to begin to live in accordance with their ideas:

> Der Stand des Menschen, den die Zeit in eine innere Welt vertrieben hat, kann entweder, wenn er sich in dieser erhalten will, nur ein immerwährender Tod oder, wenn die Natur ihn zum Leben treibt, nur ein bestreben sein, das Negative des bestehenden Welt aufzuheben, um sich in ihr finden und geniessen, um leben zu können (*W* 1, p. 457).

Hegel emphasizes that the opposition cannot be overcome by violence (*Gewalt*). Only by attaining a consciousness of the existing, present conditions may the need for this union be fulfilled. This is realized, Hegel maintains, when the present life has lost all its power and dignity (*Würde*) and become pure negativity (*W* 1, p. 458). Germany, in its old form, is verging on this condition, because it is composed of nothing but divergent forces and interests. The 'universal', the source of all rights, is present only as a 'thought', not as an 'actuality' (*W* 1, p. 459).

When the failure of the congress in Rastatt became clear during the spring of 1799 and war with France seemed likely, both Hölderlin and Sinclair were putting their hopes for radical changes in the French invasion of the southern Germany. Hegel, as we have seen, rejected a solution by violence, whether it be coming from outside or inside the country. For him such a solution would remain alien to the ethical substance of a people. "Alle Erscheinungen dieser Zeit zeigen, dass die Befriedigung im alten Leben sich nicht mehr findet", Hegel writes (*W* 1, p. 458). Time is ripe for a new life altogether. A revolutionary situation is bound to emerge and it will, unfortunately, contain violence. Hegel feels that his task is to show to his contemporaries "what there is in the present", what is passing and what is arising , and what should emerge, i.e. what kind of an ethical and political totality should be created in Germany.

Above all, Hegel teaches the Germans political realism, the lesson made clear by Napoleon at the latest: that "Germany is not a state any more". In his famous words: "The thoughts contained in this essay can

have no other aim or effect, when published, save that of promoting the understanding of what is, and therefore a calmer outlook and a moderately tolerant attitude alike in words and in actual contact [with affairs]" (*W* 1, p. 463; *HPW*, p. 145). Hegel thinks now, we may say, that the best way for him to act in accordance with the ideals of his youth is to advance the understanding of things as they are.[7] Anticipating the famous dictum of the Preface to his *Rechtsphilosophie*, he continues somewhat enigmatically:

> For it is not what is that makes us irascible and resentful, but the fact that it is not as it ought to be. But if we recognize that it is as it must be, i.e. that it is not arbitrariness and chance that makes it what it is, then we also recognize that it is as it ought to be (*HPW*, p. 145).[8]

What does Hegel mean by claiming repeatedly that "Germany is not a state any more"? Germany is not a state as is e.g. France, or any other European national state based on a constitutional law, but it looks rather like Italy, i.e. an anarchy, he maintains. Germany is not a state in the modern sense. Once there was a German state, but those were the days of customs and local cultures, not those of the law. The present society does not correspond to the old legal forms, or vice versa. "While these laws have lost their former life, the vitality of the present day has not known how to concentrate itself in the laws. Every center of life has gone its own way and established itself on its own; the whole has fallen apart", he writes (*W* 1, p. 465-466; *HPW*, p. 146).

This is the fate of the "German drive for freedom", i.e. of the refusal of the Germans to organize themselves under a common public authority. Instead, they have fixed multiform spheres of power and property which do "not constitute a *system* of rights but a *collection*". As a consequence of this dominance of particular interests, Germans are "a people without being a state" (*W* 1, p. 466; *HPW*, pp. 147-148). "German empire", he writes, "is a kingdom, like the kingdoms of nature in its productions, unfathomable as a whole and inexhaustible in detail" (*W* 1, p. 468; *HPW*, pp. 150).

In the first part of the essay Hegel defines, from the principal point of view, what is necessary for a community to become a state. His general position is a liberal one, although it diverges both from the liberalism of the Scots and that of Kant. Like Kant, he opposes the state apparatus of the German patrimonial tradition, regulated from top to base like a patriarhaic *oikos*. A state of this kind does not trust its citizens

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7 Harris 1972, p. 449 makes a relevant point in this connection: "Like Spinoza, Hegel holds that rational understanding, once it is achieved, becomes itself the actuality of freedom. So he can quite truthfully say at the beginning of his essay that he seeks only to advance rational understanding of things as they are, without ceasing to believe that things can come to be otherwise as a result of that understanding.".

8 Op.cit. In German, *W* 1, 463: "Denn nicht das, was ist, macht uns ungestüm und leidend, sondern dass es nicht ist, wie es sein soll; erkennen wir aber, dass es ist, wie es sein muss, d.h. nicht nach Willkür und Zufall, so erkennen wir auch, dass es so sein soll."

who, reciprocally, do not trust the state either.[9] Hegel's conception of the state is a narrow one, but it is substantial in the sense that Kant would not have agreed. Hegel's definition reads as follows:

> A multitude of human beings can only call itself a state if it be united for the common defence of the entirety of its property. What is self-explanatory in this proposition must none the less be stated, namely that this union has not merely the intention of defending itself; the point is that it defends itself by actual arms, be its power and success what they may (*W* 1, pp. 472-473; *HPW*, p. 153).

A community which, unlike the Germans, actually defends its property, must have a public authority. Hegel's point here is not that a state should protect the private property of its citizens, and probably not even that it should protect any common property.[10] Instead, he views the state as most clearly existent in the act of actually defending itself, whether it be successful or not. This much, "a common military and public authority" - what exactly the Germans lack - is conceptually necessary for a community to be a state. The functioning of the authority can be arranged in a multitude of ways, depending on contingent circumstances. What stands out as important, however, is the principle that raises *Willkür* to rationality, the fostering of the "living freedom and personal will (*Wille*)" of the citizens.[11] This is the *summum bonum* of political life, which also makes possible the most effective social arrangement.

Hegel then discusses such arrangements of the public authority that according to him are contingent, i.e., whether it should be a monarchy or an oligarchy or a democracy, whether the civil rights of the individuals should be equal or not, how the administration should be organized, how taxation should be allocated, how the public authority is tied up with the national languages, manners etc., as well as religious matters. This is done generally in the first part of the essay and, then, historically, concerning Germany, in the second. I will restrict myself here to a few remarks only.

The point which appears most interesting is that for a modern state, according to Hegel, ethnic ties are not necessary; both a linguistic and religious diversity may prevail.[12] Hegel's point cannot thus be German nationalism. In fact he introduces to the Germans the distinction between what he will later call 'state' and 'civil society', against the

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9 According to Avineri 1972, 44, "Hegel's dissatisfaction with German circumstances is an application of a general critique of the old patrimonial state which viewed political power as nothing more than an expression and extension of personal property rights."

10 Avineri 1972, p. 40 correctly notes that "following Hegel's later language, one can say that his definition here hovers somewhat uncertainly between 'civil society' and 'state'."

11 Harris 1972, p. 454.

12 See *W* 1, pp. 477-479; *HPW*, pp. 158-161, and Avineri 1972, pp. 45-47.

patrimonial tendencies which he finds not only in Prussia but also in postrevolutionary France. He writes:

> "(...) the public authority, i.e. the government, must leave to the freedom of the citizens whatever is not necessary for its appointed function of organizing and maintaining authority and thus for its security at home and abroad. Nothing should be so sacrosanct to the government as facilitating and protecting the free activity of the citizens in matters other than this. This is true regardless of utility, because the freedom of the citizens is inherently sacrosanct (*W* 1, p. 482; *HPW*, pp. 161-162).

And, Hegel argues, as regards the economic, intellectula and ethical utilities, a state which gives people a free hand to act in the civil society is superb as compared to a machine-like organization (cf. *W* 1, pp. 482-485; *HPW* , pp. 162-164). Thus, as a defender of the French Revolution, he cannot approve of the Jacobinism it has produced, but puts forward the alternative of a state that would concentrate on common defence, leaving, as far as possible, the rest to the citizens themselves.

The following remark which Hegel makes is also of interest to us: "The size of the modern states makes it quite impossible to realize the ideal of giving every free individual a share in debating and deciding political affairs of universal concern. The public authority must be concentrated in one centre for deciding these matters and, as government, for executing these decisions" (*W* 1, pp. 479-480; *HPW*, p. 160). Unlike the classical polis, a modern state cannot thus be founded on direct participation. It must subordinate particular estates and other groups, which are feudal reminiscences, under its authority, though not in a centralistic way as in Prussia. A modern state must be founded on a representative system, since "the quarantee that the government will proceed in accordance with law, and the co-operation of the general will in most important affairs of state which affect everyone, the people finds in the organization of a body representative of people. (...) Without such a representative body, freedom is no longer thinkable" (*W* 1, p. 572; *HPW*, p. 234). Within this body a state, then, should arrange its military defence as well as the finance system that makes this possible.

Prussia lacks a representative body and this is not, according to Hegel, due to its monarchy. On the contrary: "Prussia's modern politics have not proceeded from the principle of royalty or majesty, but from the *bourgeoisie*, and now, e.g. in contrast to the Austrian power, are in the position of the *bourgeois* who has built up his resourses toilsomely penny by penny through his labor in contrast to the free nobleman who has inherited wealth and whose possession rests on his estate and remains the same even if in small things he gives a free hand to his servants or his neighbours" (*W* 1, p. 566; *HPW*, p. 229). Already from this, and perhaps more clearly from outlook on post-revolutionary France, we can see that Hegel's program for the modernization of Germany is neither unambiguous nor uncritical towards new social phenomena. Instead of Prussia, Hegel's option, though not without reservations either, is Austria. They both are monarchies, and Hegel was to remain a

monarchist. But unlike Prussia, the Habsburgs had developed a system of representative Diets and also pursued a more liberal policy towards the religious groups that differed from the dominant Catholicism. The reason for this lies, as the above quotation suggests, in the fact that only the Austrian monarchy rested mainly on the nobility and not on the bourgeoisie.[13]

State as a positive ethical totality

Hegel ends *Naturrechtsaufsatz*, his major critical essay on modern treatments of the natural law which was published in 1802-03, with systematic remarks on how a modern state and its relations to society should be arranged. Correspondingly, the last part of *System der Sittlichkeit*, his first attempt at presenting practical philosophy in the form of a system, develops these suggestions further. I am aware of how problematical it is to discuss Hegel's views about various political institutions apart from the systematic context of those views. It is virtually wrong, I think, what Z.A Pelczynski writes in his introductionary essay: "There is, however, no need for a student of political theory to wait for a renaissance of metaphysical philosophy. Hegel's political thought can be read, understood, appreciated without having to come to terms with his metaphysics."[14] We must, instead, take literally what Hegel wrote in his letter to Schelling, i.e. that he "had to change the form of reflection into a system". This means that, at least from now on, though the same can be largely said of his earlier writings, too, we must read his political views as speculative statements. They are views which he has attained while systematically developing various concepts, more specifically in the systematic development of his practical philosophy. This is the case already with *Naturrectsausatz*.[15] In the present section, however, I will briefly take up those parts of Hegel's first systematic elaborations where he seeks to define the organizing principle of the political authority. In the next section I will treat his *Jenaer*

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13 Harris 1972, p. 473 comments on this: "This preference reveals once more the essential Platonic origins of his inspiration. It was in this way that he hoped to save the *Gemüt* of man amid the mechanical necessities of merchantilist economics." Harris has also emphasized (cf. Harris 1983, esp. pp. 62-64), correctly I think, that Hegel preferred Steuart to Smith, as far as the social ideal of his economic thinking is concerned. We shall return to this matter later and only point out this connection here.

14 See *HPW*, p. 136. Contrary to his claim, I do not think that this holds good for Hobbes either.

15 Heinz Kimmerle 1986, p. 132, among others, is right in remarking that the more specific differences between Hegel's later and earlier systems "betreffen nicht die Frage, dass die politische Philosophie als Teil des Systems spekulativen Character hat. In diesem Punkt ist der "Naturrechtsaufsatz" representiv für das Hegelsche Denken seit 1801."

Realphilosophie of 1805-06 in a similar way. Thus it will not be possible for the reader to understand these sections to the full, until a little later, when their systematic context is explained.

Already in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* Hegel's premiss, from which he develops his critique of modern theories of the natural law, is a prerequisite for absolute ethical life. With this notion he denotes a historical totality of laws and habits, institutions and norms, which is organic in the sense that no part has become isolated or dominant over the others. There is, in other words, no "positivity". It is Montesquieu who in his "immortal work" *De l'esprit des lois* has come closest to grasping this, for "while he did not rise to the height of the most living Idea, he did not merely deduce individual institutions and laws from so-called reason, nor merely abstract them from experience, raising them thereafter to some universal plane. On the contrary, he comprehended both the higher relationships of the constitutional law and the lower specifications of civil relationships down to wills, marriage laws, etc., entirely from the character of the whole and its individuality. (...) He has shown that these systems are wholly and solely the living individuality of a nation, an individuality whose highest specifications are to be comprehended once again from a more universal necessity" (*GW* 4, p. 481; *NL*, pp. 128-129). This both factual and normative comprehension is precisely what Hegel pursues, proceeding systematically. This conception is later to save him from moral relativism.

At the end of *Naturrechtsaufsatz* Hegel refers to the German nation - he was, we should remember, still reworking *Verfassung Deutschlands* - as a typical case where "the law and *ethos*" have separated, because the laws are old and do not contribute to the formation of the national state (*GW* 4, p. 483; *NL*, p. 131). The real task of philosophy is to have an eye for the whole, to distinguish within it "what is dead and without truth and what is living", to comprehend "incongruity between absolute spirit and its shape. But it cannot attain this absolute shape by escaping into shapelessness of cosmopolitanism, still less into the void of the Rights of Man, or the like void of a league of nations or a world republic" (*GW* 4, p. 484; *NL*, p. 132).

A considerable part of that which for Hegel is new though by no means always living in the modern world is brought about by what he is later to call "civil society". Well aware of this, when he attempts to characterize the state as an ethical totality his main concern is the relation of the political authority to this powerful economic and social sphere. One may certainly say that Hegel, if anyeone, is critical of civil society; that for him it in a sense embodies the culmination of the development which began with the destruction of the ancient *polis*. He would, however, by no means abolish this "system of reality", whose main problem is that it is a "pure reality" without true ideality. On the contrary, Hegel will speak for its growth, especially in Germany. His concern is merely that it should not become positive in the sense outlined above. Thus his principal argument is: "Since this system of reality rests

entirely on negativity and infinity, it follows from its relation to the positive totality that it must be treated wholly negatively by the latter, and must remain subject to the domination of this relation" (*GW* 4, 450; *NL*, 94).

The state should, consequently, prevent the expansion of this system into the communal spheres which function on different principles or rationality. "[T]he ethical whole must (...) preserve in this system the awareness of its inner nullity, and impede (...) the development of ever greater difference and inequality, for which its nature strives. In every state a process goes on more or less unconsciously in the shape of an external natural necessity from which it would have wished to be exempt" (*GW* 4, p. 451; *NL*, p. 94).

By this latter process controlling the civil society Hegel means the state expenditure and taxation, which rise proportionately with the growth of the system of property, thus reducing possession and making acquisition more difficult - as well as "war which introduces many-sided confusion into the business of acquisition". Due to these processes, "the result is that things go on to such a degree that the positive ethical life of the state itself permits the purely real [economic] system to become independent [of the individual] and the negative and restricting attitude to be upheld."(*GW* 4, p. 451; *NL*, pp. 94-95). According to the "liberalism" of Hegel, the economic system should prosper but only as a medium, because ethically it is null.[16]

Hegel poses, then, the question of the state as an ethical totality in terms analogous to those found in Plato's and Aristotle's definitions of *polis* in distinction from *oikos*. He cannot, however, take it for granted as his classical predecessors did that people would "naturally" be conscious of the necessity and inclined to such an ethical totality, as he cannot approve of slavery in the way they did.[17] Hegel knows that his classically inspired version of practical philosophy will diverge from the main line of the modern natural law starting from Hobbes[18], and he also knows well that the "political indifference" produced by the civil society does not fit very well in with the demands he wants to give to a political condition. That he in spite of the fundamental changes in the historical conditions of an absolute ethical totality attempts to found this totality along the lines of Plato and Aristotle, can clearly be seen from his theory

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16 In contrast to the tradition of "possessive individualism", which we discussed in ch. 3, there is in Hegel's practical philosophy a stronger ethical rupture between the state and the civil society. Avineri 1972, p. 85 captures this quite well: "that this *is* the inner rationale of the state, that by its very nature the state infringes upon property rather than protects it."

17 Hegel will argue, very much like the Scots, against slavery as well as against medieval conditions, defending free labor by appealing to the historical development of humanity and to the demands for efficiency. See Waszek 1988, pp. 161-170.

18 There are important parallels between his and Hobbes' thought especially after the first Jena years, though, as Taminiaux 1985 shows.

of the estates and state apparatus built on them.[19]

Hegel relies here on the classical doctrine according to which there is a fundamental equivalence between the ethical totality and human nature. In this totality man becomes what he truly is. He quotes Aristotle: "the positive is prior by nature to the negative, or, as Aristotle says: 'The state comes by nature before the individual...'" (*GW* 4, p. 468; *NL*, p. 113).[20] Thus in the state only does man attain such an autonomy or *autarkeia* which corresponds with his nature and makes a good life possible. And it is in relation to this ethical state that Hegel defines the estates. He introduces three classes or rather estates (*Stände*), attaching to each of them a positive and a negative determination which correspond to the two aspects of absolute ethical life: relation and indifference. The main problem is, then, how can the moments of the absolute totality exist together without destroying each other?

There are two aspects in this totality, that of unity and that of multiplicity. The latter "is the real *practical* realm; on the subjective side, feeling or physical necessity and enjoyment; on the objective side, work and possession". This practical realm constitutes the basis for legal relations, i.e. for a formal unity, and "above these two there is the third, the Absolute or the Ethical" (*GW* 4, p. 454; *NL*, p. 99). Now, the first aspects together constitute their own class "of those who are not free; it exists in the difference of need and work, and in the law of justice and possession and property; its work concerns the individual and thus does not include the danger of death" (*GW* 4, p. 456; *NL*, p. 100). This is the class of *bourgeoisie* which works for its private interests. It expects from the state security and protection of its property, and it is to supply both the state and the first class with the material goods needed (*GW* 4, p. 458; *NL*, p. 103). Hegel's ethical critique of this class, and later of the modern civil society, is directed against its political indifference.

From the *bourgeoisie* Hegel separarates the peasantry which "in the crudity of its uneducative work (...) deals only with the earth as an element" (*GW* 4, p. 456; *NL*, p. 100). Though normally "its work has the entirety of need before it in its immediate object without intermediaries", this class can evince, Hegel says, exceptional courage at war, by adding "the force of its numbers and their elemental being to the first class" (*GW* 4, p. 458; *NL*, p. 103).

Above these two there is the "the class of the free", which in positive terms is "the absolute living spirit" and negatively, i.e. as characterized through its work

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19 Düsing 1985 proves convincingly Hegel's debt to Plato. Ilting 1974 (orig. 1963/64) shows how the foundations of Hegel's early practical philosophy stem from his intensive reading of Aristotle and Spinoza during his first years in Jena.

20 We shall return to the systematic interpretation of this premiss. To give a preliminary clue to the matter, Hegel has, according to Ilting, four points in his mind: Rousseau's *volonté générale*, Montesquieu's (and Herder's, we should add) spirit of a nation, Spinoza's substance, and Aristotle's *polis* (cf. Ilting 1974, p. 764).

> proceeds not to the nullifying of single determinations, but to death; and its product, too, is not something singular but the being and preservation of the entirety of the ethical organization. The task that Aristotle assigns to this class is called *politeuein*, which means living in and with and for one's people, leading a general life wholly devoted to the public interest - or else the task of philosophizing. Plato, in keeping with his higher sense of life, wants these two tasks not to be separated but wholly linked together (*GW* 4, p. 455; *NL*, pp. 99-100).

Hegel refers here affirmatively to the role which Plato, and in a way Aristotle, too, assigned to philosophers in his ideal state, and he clearly subscribes the argument that their praxis verges upon *autarkeia*.[21] As a whole, Hegel's class of the free corresponds to Plato's class of guardians before it is divided into those who govern and those who fight. Unlike Plato, however, the virtue of this class, i.e. courage (*andreia*, for Hegel *Tapferkeit)*, is for Hegel the fundament of ethical life by and large. For it means to live not privately but "in and with and for one's people", even when at war. We know that Hegel admired this kind of public virtue among the Greeks and the Romans, and contrasted it with the private character of Christianity. In Frankfurt he had attempted to go beyond the Kantian morality with the notions of love and life, which were also "public" in a certain sense. In Jena, however, the highest virtue for him is above all political in kind, and that is why courage, instead of love, is now presented as the fundament for all other virtues.[22] Hegel demands a readiness to devote and even to sacrifice oneself to the ethical totality, to one's own people (*Volk)*, not humankind in general.

Hegel's overall point is that the classes must be radically separate, i.e. that the first class should give itself over to the public life and the other two to their private activities. Following Gibbon Hegel presents the Roman Empire as a warning example, where simultaneously with the gradual abolition of slavery the distinction between the various classes was lost as well. This resulted in corruption and degradation of the

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21 If we may believe Gadamer 1986, according to whom Plato's *Politeia* is essentially concerned with the education of the future members of the first class and with the role of philosophy in this, there is not a very dramatic difference between his and Aristotle's views here. For both, it is essential to think of the good itself, which for man is ultimately a matter of his *ergon*, as Plato too makes clear in *Philebus*, and for both it is essential to think of the ideal or natural organization of *polis*. It seems to me that Taminiaux 1985, p. 17, presses his point too far when he writes, commenting on Hegel's essay on natural law: "Likewise we might ask whether this reading doet not discount everything in Aristotle that betrays a tension between participation in the state and the ideal of the contemplative life. Is there not a deliberate wish here to reduce the classical vision of the best *politeia* to pure and simple patriotism." For Hegel, of course, speculative philosophy, both theoretical and practical, is of utmost importance as such and within the state.

22 Cf. Düsing 1985, pp.122-124. I would not agree with Taminiaux 1985, p. 18, who writes: "That the warriors take the place of the wise betrays the substitution of a principle of radical immanence for the Platonic principle of the transcendence of the Ideas." Hegel wants to think of an ideal state, but not in the Platonic or in the Kantian manner, in a form of an ideal. Like Aristotle he proceeds through *fainomena*. In *System der Sittlichkeit*, where the "ideal" state is treated more exhaustively , "the wise" are there in the "absolute government, as we shall soon see.

ethical life as a whole, for instead of the political entirety, a system based on private interests began to prevail (*GW* 4, p. 449; *NL*, p. 92). Hegel considers the modern principle of "formal unity and equality" to be a continuation of this development. Although Hegel will make many concessions to the modern ways of conceiving of the state, he will not give up the speculative idea of the state as an ethical totality that resembles the classical ideas of *polis*, where the civil society with its formal systems of needs and legality would be confined to certain classes only.[23]

But how is it possible to defend such an aristocratic conception with distinct classes or estates without committing oneself, anachronistically, to the acceptance of slavery under the modern conditions? One should firstly remember that serfdom was not abolished in Prussia until 1807, as a consequence of Napoleon's victory in Jena, and secondly admit that Hegel's political ideal was not egalitarian. Part of Hegel's strategy in facing the problem is that he does not follow Plato in founding the theory of estates ontologically on various virtues and psychologically, or anthropologically, on the different parts of the human soul. The estates with their virtues are related to the ethico-polical whole only, and this whole is presented as a historically changing one.[24]

Another part of Hegel's strategy is the complicated system of recognition between the classes which he calls "a tragedy on the ethical plane". It is visible already in *Naturrechtsaufsatz*, though its application here is somewhat enigmatic. Thus the first "organic" class masters death through its courage but does this together with the second class by sacrificing part of itself to this, recognizing and quaranteeing in this way its existence and simultaneously purifying itself of the second class. The two classes form together the Divine nature, where the "inorganic" class "so presents itself that the Divine casts its light into this nature and through this ideal unity in spirit makes it into its reconciled and living body; and this body, as a body, remains in difference and evanescence, and, through the spirit, beholds the Divine as something alien" (*GW* 4, 459; *NL*, pp. 104-105).

Hegel contrasts this tragedy with a comedy, or in fact with two comedies, namely with the Dantean and the modern one. In the first, there is no struggle because "absolute confidence and assurance of the reality of the Absolute exists without opposition". In the latter, which may be read as a parody of Kant's postulates in *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, the ethical nature is caught in an endless urge that is "not

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23 Düsing 1985, p. 127 remarks in this connection: "Diese ethisch-politische Auffassung also ist es, die Hegel unmittelbar über "formelle" aufklärerische Naturrechtstheorien und Theorien der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft hinaustreibt, nicht bzw. nur mittelbar die neue Begrifflichkeit seiner Logik und Metaphysik, in der jener ethisch-politische Ansatz dann freilich theoretisch begründet werden muss."

24 Cf. Düsing 1985, p. 113, 130. See ch. 6 below. Later Hegel will, as Waszek 1988, p. 164 aptly puts it, reject "slavery on the same grounds as his Scottish fellow literati: humanity and efficiency." See ch. 8 below.

playful but serious for the ethical urge, though comical for the spectator". This is so because the urge, "which seeks an absolute infinity in these finite things, merely performed the grace of its faith and its undying illusion (which is darkest where it is brightest), it being already lost and in the wrong when it images itself to be resting in the arms of justice, trustworthiness and pleasure" (*GW* 4, p. 462; *NL*, pp. 107-108)

In *Naturrechtsaufsatz* Hegel does not treat the organization of the state in detail. For him more important than these details is the general principle that the state enables the tragedy on the ethical plane, the realization of the unity between the universal and the particular. "The absolute and clear unity of ethical life is absolute and living in virtue of the fact that neither a single sphere nor the subsistence of spheres in general can be fixed - that on the contrary, while ethical life eternally protracts them, at the same time it absolutely collapses and cancels them, and enjoys itself in undeveloped unity and clarity" (*GW* 4, p. 476; *NL*, p. 122). Obviously, the estates do not represent their members in the unity of the state. It is the first, universal class, which lives "in and for and with" its people that alone is capable of governing the whole. The important thing is that the laws, especially the constitution, express the real *ethos* of a people (cf. *GW* 4, pp. 478-482; *NL*, pp. 124-129).

Hegel's first attempt to systematize this still rather sketchy program, i.e. *System der Sittlichkeit* lectured in 1802/03, contains in its third part sections dealing with the classes or estates (*Stände*) and some related institutions. Again the problem he faces is the position of the relative ethical life within the absolute totality, but Hegel no longer seeks to solve it by applying the tragedy-model. Instead, he tries to proceed phenomenologically by presenting the various forms of ethical life in a complicated system of subsumptions. As compared to *Naturrechtsaufsatz*, this first system appears more Aristotelian in the sense that Hegel now starts from *fainomena* themselves, i.e. from the forms of "natural ethical life", aiming to show, then, that the ethical nature of man may come true only within the ethico-political community.[25]

In *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel argues that the sphere of civil society is altogether based on abstract economic and legal relations, and hence it constitutes an inorganic totality. In the last part of the system he intends to demonstrate the necessity and possibility of a positive ethical totality within which this modern system of relations should be restricted. Again, this is done by presenting three classes or estates. According to Hegel, the absolute ethical life is "not the sum but the indifference of all virtues. It does not appear as love for country and people and law, but as absolute life in one's country and for the people" (*SdS*, p. 65; *SEL*, p. 147). The classes are then presented according to their characteristic virtues as well as works, and the idea is that only through his class may an individual become part of the absolute ethical life and aatain his true individuality. This primacy of the ethical totality over the

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25 This is pointed up especially by Ilting 1974. See ch. 8 below.

individual is emphasized also in the textual organization of *System der Sittlichkeit*, for Hegel starts from the most perfect identification with the totality and ends with the most imperfect one.[26]

In order that the virtues may become real, they must have their individual bearers, who are to identify themselves respectively with their class. The highest of the virtues is, again, courage. Actually it is not just one virtue among many others but "the indifference of the virtues". It is shown by the nobility, the higher officers and the highest civil servants, especially in a state of war, where "the moving force is national honor, not the injury of a single individual" (*SDS*, pp. 68; *SEL*, p. 147). The work of this class "can be nothing but waging of war, or training for this work", so that its activities "can have no relation to its needs." Thus it must be supplied with goods obtained by the work of the other classes (*SdS*, pp. 72-73; *SEL*, pp. 152-153).

The virtue of the second class, the *bourgeoisie*, is honesty within legal relations (*Rechtschaffenheit*). Being the basis of the relative ethical life, this class "cares for the family in accordance with the class to which family belongs, and for the fellow citizens" (*SdS*, pp. 68-69; *SEL*, pp. 149-150). Like in *Naturrechtsaufsatz*, Hegel especially endeavours to maintain a distinction between the two spheres of ethical life as separated. The bourgeoisie "is incapable either of virtue or of courage because a virtue is a free individuality. Honesty lies in the universality of its class without individuality and, in the particularity of its relations, without freedom" (*SdS*, p. 75; *SEL*, p. 155), Hegel writes in the tone of Plato and Aristotle, though without mentioning them any more. He is even closer to their patrimonial model when he defines peasantry as the "the class of crude ethical life", whose basic virtue is trust. Trust means elemental, non-reflective intuition of the ethical totality. When this class trusts in the first class, it may in wartime face the danger of death and show real courage (*SdS*, pp. 69-72; *SEL*, pp. 150-152). Therefore, unlike the formal class, which pays the costs of the first class and is thus exempted from military as well as civil service, the peasants are linked to the first class in times of war.

System der Sittlichkeit differs from *Naturrechtsaufsatz* in that Hegel now treats the government (*Regierung*) separately. Under the title "the Absolute Government" he describes the idea or "pure movement" of a government, pure wisdom that as a unity hovers above the difference of the classes, i.e. something equivalent to the tragedy on the ethical plane. "The external form of this government's absolute might is that it belongs to no class, despite the fact that it originated in the first one" (*SdS*, p. 84; *SEL*, p. 162). So "the maintenance of the whole can be linked solely to what is supremely indifferent, to God and nature, to the Priests and the Elders, for every other form of reality lies in indifference" (*SdS*, p. 79; *SEL*, p. 159), Hegel writes of this curious construction, which shows affinities with the role of aged philosophers in the state outlined by Plato.

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26 Cf. Göhler 1974, pp. 566-567.

"In order that this self-moving ethical substance may become effective, in order that the separation [of universal and particular] adopts such a movement that through it the particular is subsumed under the universal and becomes purely and simply equal to it" (*SdS*, p. 77; *SEL*, p. 157), it must engage with what is different. This is the task of the "universal government", which too is built of the members of the first class. It is the absolute government as put in movement and, to keep the ethical substance as living as possible, governs the systems of needs and justice, maintaining a certain system of discipline, as well (see *SdS*, pp. 79-101; *SEL*, pp. 156-176). Unlike Fichte's ephorate, this government depicted by Hegel is not "entirely formal and empty in its negative activity", and this is exactly because "it presupposes the difference of the classes and so is truly the supreme government" (*SdS*, p. 83; *SEL*, p. 162).

State and the development of freedom

In the third part of *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, i.e. the lectures on the philosophy of spirit which he delivered in 1805-06, Hegel again expounds his ideas about the state and related institutions from an ethical point of view. However, he does this within a new conceptual system which implies major changes in the corresponding phenomenal structure as well. In ch. 7 below I will discuss the changes in the system on a general plane and then delve more circumstantially into certain parts of *Jenaer Realphilosophie*. In the present section I will only refer to the most important changes as far as the classes or estates and the government are concerned. From this inspection we may already see how Hegel makes an effort to modernize his political conception, yet without giving up its critical potential.

Perhaps the most important novelty in *Jenaer Realphilosophie* is that instead of the presence of an ethical substance, Hegel now attempts to prove a hierarchy of consciousness which as a totality would manifest in the form of spirit. For this implies that he is no longer focuses on collective formations of ethical life per se, but various institutionalized forms of consciousness, whose bearers to a greater extent than before are individuals. For reasons that we will return to later Hegel, thus, founds his argument on the individualily, connecting in an interesting manner this change in the conceptual infrastructure with the specific character of the modern world:

> This is the higher principle of the modern era, a principle unknown to Plato and the ancients. In ancient times, the common morality consisted of the beautiful public life - beauty as the immediate unity of the universal and the individual, [the polis as] a work of art wherein no part

> separates itself from the whole, but is rather this genial unity of the self-knowing Self and its [outer] presentation. Yet individuality's knowledge of itself as absolute - this absolute being within-itself (*Insichseyn*) - was not there (*GW* 8, p. 263; *JPS*, p. 160).

With the individual as his starting-point, Hegel will thus make here many concessions to the modern theories of natural law. According to him the individuals also make a social contract, though by no means as a single act. Instead they make it, - if we use such a modern metaphor which does not fit all too well in with the Hegelian practical philosophy - and simultaneously constitute themselves as individuals, through the most diverse economic, social, juridical and political systems of mutual recognition, which Hegel now presents as the forms of ethical life. Despite the concessions, Hegel is still of the opinion that the various theories of the natural law - that Fichte, for example, who in many ways now becomes important for him[27] - in fact investigate merely the prelimiary stages of the ethico-political totality. Thus he begins the final part of *Jenaer Realphilosophie* by arguing against those theories of social contract which presuppose that a state, in the proper sense of the word, can only appear through the deeds of "great men" and a certain amount of tyranny:

> In this way Theseus established the Athenian state. And thus, in the French Revolution, it was a fearful force that sustained the state [and] the totality in general. This force is not despotism but tyranny, pure frightening domination. Yet it is necessary and just, insofar as it constitutes and sustains the state as this actual individualily (*GW* 8, p. 258; *JPS*, p. 155).

Much better than the Germans, Machiavelli sees the necessity of a certain amount of tyranny for establishing a state, Hegel contends.[28] Through tyranny the individuals are educated toward obedience, so that tyranny may later be replaced by the rule of law (*GW* 8, pp. 258-259; *JPS*, pp. 156-157).

Under the rule of law, the unity of individuality and the universal prevails as two individualities, that of the state itself and that of the society which has the individual as its end. Thus, unlike his ancient predecessor, the modern man lives simultaneously in two realms which do not coincide immediately: "the same individual who provides for himself and his family, who works, enters into contracts, etc., likewise works for the universal as well, and has it as his end. In the first sense he

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27 Cf. esp. Wildt 1982, pp. 287-393.

28 There is, of course, the connection to Hobbes' Leviathan. We will later see how for Hegel there are two sides in individual's relation to the state, a negative and positive one, obedience and trust. The suggestion of Taminiaux 1985, p. 26, that Hegel's speculative correction of Hobbes could be "reduced to this: It is not necessary to say that the absolute majesty of the state dominates us, but to say that it satisfies our most profound aspirations", is interesting and basically correct I think, though it may be read in several ways. He also points out (p. 35) that Hegel's rejection of social contract theories includes that of Hobbes.

is called *bourgeois*, in the second sense he is *citoyen*"(*GW* 8, p. 261; *JPS*, p. 158). The modern individual, who is conscious of this duality, knows in principle that he himself is immediately one with the universal within the state. There is, according to Hegel, a modern equivalent to "the beautiful [and] happy freedom of the Greeks, which is and has been envied so much" (*GW* 8, p.262; *JPS*, p. 159), one which adds to the ethico-political substance the individual freedom and self-knowledge. There is first the individuality, "free of the knowledge shared by all", secondly the government and the hereditary monarch, and thirdly the "spiritual tie", i.e. public opinion which is the "genuine legislative body, [the real] national assemblage" that requires "general cultivation" (*GW* 8, pp. 262-263; *JPS*, p. 159). Thus Hegel constructs here a totality where there is, first, the *Gesinnung* and self-consciousness of each class, secondly the political organization and, thirdly, the spirit as knowing itself in religion.

As compared to *System der Sittlichkeit*, Hegel allows here more room for and significance to the individual and his consciousness, even outside his class. The classes themselves are less rigid, and a person is not born to his class but counts as "that which he has made of himself" (*GW* 8, p. 264; *JPS*, p. 161). The labor and the work as well as the corresponding consciousness of the absolute totality stand out as essential here. Unlike earlier, the classes are presented from the most undeveloped to the most developed form of unity. In line with the underlying idea, this re-evaluation of the individuality as a higher principle of modernity Hegel could, and perhaps should, have presented every individual according to his class as both *bourgeois* and *citoyen*, as belonging at least ideally, according to his conciousness, also to the ethical totality of the state. That Hegel is reluctant to take this step, however, that he insists on a difference between civil society and the state, can be seen from what he actually says about the classes and the government here.[29]

Again Hegel distinguishes between the lower classes and the universal class. The former include, first of all, the peasant class whose labor is crude and concrete. A peasant has to "trust that what he put into the ground will come up of itself", and similarly he trusts his worldly lord who imposes taxes on him. "In war, this class comprises the raw mass. [It is] a crude, blind animal, self-satisfied in its insensibility." (*GW* 8, p. 268; *JPS*, pp. 163-164). Secondly, there is "the class of business and law", whose basic virtue is honesty or uprightness (*Rechtschaffenheit*). It has elevated itself above the unconscious, immediate and natural level of the peasant. The *Bürger* knows that he is recognized as an individual:

> Unlike the crude peasant, he does not enjoy his glass of beer or wine in order to rise above his usual numbness, partly to enliven his pratting gossip and wit - but rather to prove himself, in his fine coat and in the grooming of his wife and children, that he is as good as another and that

29 Cf. Göhler 1974, esp. pp. 584-589 and Bonsiepen 1977, p. 94. We shall return to this point more thoroughly in ch. 8 below.

> he has achieved all this (*GW* 8, p. 269; *JPS*, p. 165).

Hegel further distinguishes within this class the merchants, "whose work is pure exchange, neither the natural nor the artificial production and forming". A merchant is not interested in things from the viewpoint of their use, but only in their value as it is expressed in terms of money. "Value is hard cash [*klingende Münze*]. The formal principle of reason is here" (*GW* 8, p. 270; *JPS*, p. 166). In the merchant the spirit "in its abstraction, has thus become an object for itself - as the *selfless* inner." In other words, it has attained a certain universality which, however, is still distinct from individuality.

The members of the universal or public class recognize to a varying extent the connection of their own actions to the universal. The businessman, who organizes the manufacture production, follows the maxims of moral outlook and fulfills his duty. Also the scholar, the man of sciences, follows moral maxims in his knowing but does this in such an abstract manner which prevents him from elevating himself above his class and identifying himself directly with the universal. This is attained, again, only by the military class: "That is, the [state as a] totality is an individuality: the activity of this class is for the existing whole; its thought goes back into the selfhood [of the state as individual]. The totality is an individual, a people, turned against the others" (*GW* 8, p. 274; *JPS*, p. 170). In the activities of the *Volksindividuumen* belonging to this class, "morality has no part". Their readiness to face death and to sacrifice themselves for their people embodies most perfectly Hegel's ethical ideal.

Hegel only touches on the topic of the government here, and what he says about it mainly verifies our picture of his political conception. The government is recruited from the public class, though Hegel situates into it a greater proportion of *Bürgertum* than earlier.[30] And this goverment rules over all the classes or estates in order to keep the spirit alive. It should guarantee each part of the totality its freedom and simultaneously phohibit their expansion beyond their limits. In Hegel's words:

> The power of government consists in the fact that each system (as though it were alone) develops itself freely and independently according to its concept. And the wisdom of the government consists in modifying each system according to its class; i.e., to let go of the

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30 According to Göhler 1974, pp. 578-579 Hegel has taken this class disposition from *Allgemeine Landrecht*. Hocevar 1973 interprets it more as a reproduction of contemporary Germany. The study of Waszek is illumunating here, again, for he shows that though "Hegel's reception of political economy did not penetrate his views on classes", there are affinities between his and especially Steuart's corresponding construction. People are distributed to the classes in a notably similar way; both emphasize the role of the mechants in the second class; both recognize the non-economic role and importance of the nobility: "as opposed to 'self-interest, which is the ruling principle of all other classes, Steuart's governmental power, or just 'statesman', as well as Hegel's 'universal' class are guided by 'public spirit', their motive is the furtherance of the common good" (Waszek 1988, 179).

> strictness of the abstract concept for [the sake of] its living parts, just as the arteries and nerves serve the various parts, developing themselves and accommodating themselves to them (*GW* 8, p. 271; *JPS*, p. 167).

While *System der Sittlichkeit* only made a few remarks about the government, Hegel closes *Jenaer Realphilosophie* with a chapter on art, religion and philosophy as the spheres of "another world", "a world which has the form of spirit itself, where spirit's work is completed in itself and the spirit attains a view (*Anschauung*) of what spirit itself is, as itself" (*GW* 8, p. 277; *JPS*, p. 173). Without going into details here, because it demands more a systematic background than we as yet have, I note that the religion to which, as we know, Hegel gives an important public role, is more and more the Christian religion as he interprets it, instead of the Greek religion. This may be seen already from the supposed conclusion of *System der Sittlichkeit* as reported by Rosenkranz, where Hegel sketches a new religion on the basis of Catholicism (see Rosenkranz 1844, pp. 132-141; trans. in SEL, pp.178-186). In *Jenaer Realphilosophie* he speaks about an "absolute religion" where "everyone elevates himself to this view of his own self as a Universal self". In line with the fundamental principle of this system, i.e. subjectivity, Hegel now conceives of Christian religion speculatively as the true and absolute religion, and what is more, ends his system instead of religion with philosophy, which alone may comprehend the constellation of state, church and religion.[31]

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31 See Siep 1979, pp. 194-197.

6 HEGEL'S IDEA OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

In January 1801 Hegel felt ready to enter Jena, a small university town which for some time had been one of the intellectual centers in Germany. Hegel's father had died two years earlier, and the considerable inheritance he received made the move economically possible. During his first months in Jena Hegel tried to finish his essay on the German constitution, while working on some critical essays to be published together with Schelling and preparing his dissertation which he needed in order to get *venia legendi*. On August 27th Hegel defended his habilitation thesis.[1] Since November on he was announced to lecture on 'Logics and Metaphysics' and to join professor Schelling in offering an introduction to philosophy and a *diputatorium philosophicum*.[2]

At the turn of the century, Jena was not the same as it had been during the past decade. When Fichte was forced to leave the town because of the *Atheismusstreit* in 1799, the fame and a kind cultural renaissance attained by Goethe, the Schlegel brothers and Schleiermacher with their Journal *Atheneaum*, C. G. Schütz with his *Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung*, Fichte, Schiller and Schelling, too, who had worked there from 1798, was clearly on the decline. Schelling's and Hegel's decision to found a new journal, *Kritische Journal der Philosophie*, stands out as one of the last events of this sparkling period of Jena.

In addition to Hegel, Schelling initially planned to collaborate with Fichte, perhaps with Goethe and Schiller, too, but later he decided to edit his journal together with Hegel.[3] The first issue came out in the

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1 Its tittle is *Dissertationi philosophicae De orbitis Planetarum praemissae Theses*; Cf. *GW* 2, p. 153 and Rosenkranz, pp. 156-162.

2 See Harris 1983, pp. xxv-xxxiii.

3 For futher details, see Editorische Bericht in *GW* 4, pp. 529-537 and Harris 1983, pp. xxxiii-xxxvii.

beginning of 1802, the last one only about a year later. The reasons for the journal's short life had to do with changes in Schelling's plans. In the *Ankündigung* published in other Jena journals in 1801, the editors defend the actuality of philosophy as the true science that will recreate the living unity as a totality, differentiated by special interests of the time (Cf. *GW* 2, pp. 169-170). The program was clearly influenced by Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, but the other side of it was the identity thinking shared Schelling and Hegel.

Interestingly it was Hegel who wrote the programmatic essay for the first issue of the *Journal*.[4] The text starts by claiming that philosophical criticism is not possible without a standard independent of both the subject and the object of criticism, and this can be embraced only in the idea of philosophy. This idea is but one, a unity, and "this rests on the fact that Reason is but one" (*GW* 4, p. 117; *BKH*, p. 275). The task of philosophical criticism based on such a monism of reason - i.e., on a view which is strongly opposed to the Kantian conception - is twofold. It should articulate the relation of the apparently conflicting versions of the true philosophy, and distinguish between philosophy and non-philosophy.[5] The first task is discussed under the heading of "reciprocal recognition", the second under that of "unequal recognition" (*GW* 4, pp. 118-119). The result of this 'struggle for recognition (see esp. *GW* 4, pp. 127-128; *BKH*, pp. 285-286) should be "the true philosophy" and also a certain unity within the culture as a whole. The main target of the *Journal*, then, was dualism in all its forms. In the introductory essay this is traced back to Cartesianism:

> To be exact it was against the Cartesian philosophy and the universal culture that it expresses that philosophy like every other side of living nature had to seek a means of salvation. The Cartesian philosophy expounded (in a philosophical form) the universally comprehensive dualism in the culture of the recent history of our north-westernly world - a *dualism* of which both the quiet transformation of the public life of men after the decline of all ancient life, and the noisy political and religious revolutions are equally just different-coloured outward manifestations (*GW* 4, p. 126; *BKH*, p. 284).

This program was then put into use on both frontiers. And it was Hegel who in fact wrote the most important pieces for the *Journal*.[6] Before taking up some of them, however, we must look at Hegel's first

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4 *Einleitung. Ueber das Wesen der philosophischen Kritik überhaupt, und ihr Verhältniss zum gegenwärtigen zustand der Philosophie insbesondere.* *GW* 4, pp. 117-128; trans. by H.S. Harris, in *BKH*, pp. 275-286. They discussed it and Schelling certainly made his revisions, but the main author was Hegel. Cf. *GW* 4, p. 542 and Harris 1982, pp. xli-xlvii and *BKH*, pp. 273-274.

5 Cf. Harris in *BKH*, p. 253.

6 There have been discussions about the influences of Schelling and Hegel on each other's work during the two years of their intensive collaboration. The influence appears to have been reciprocal. See e.g. Hartkopf 1979, Tilliette 1980, Düsing 1980, Zimmerli 1980, Kondylis 1981, pp. 530-659, de Giovanni and Harris in *BKH*, Fujita 1985, pp. 133-173.

publication in book form, i.e. the *Differenzschrift*[7] which came out in the autumn of 1801. For here we find the most comprehensive statement of Hegel's program as an independent philosopher.

The need for philosophy

While most of his texts from the first Jena years are of critical nature, the first part of the *Differenzchrift* contains Hegel's clearest statement about his idea of philosophy. As it is said in the programmatic essay of the *Journal*, philosophical criticism in the proper sense is not possible without the idea of philosophy. And Hegel really uses the idea, his absolute position, as a norm independent of both the one who judges and the one who is judged.[8] In the beginning of the essay Hegel contrasts his idea of *philosophia perennis* with Reinhold's conception of philosophical tradition as a kind of developing handicraft and writes:

> But if the Absolute, like Reason which is its appearance, is eternally one and the same - as indeed it is - then every Reason that is directed toward itself and comes to recognize itself, produces a true philosophy and solves for itself the problem which, like its solution, is at all times the same (*GW* 4, p. 10; *Diff.*, p. 87).

Philosophy in its true sense must, then, free itself from idiosyncrasies of every kind and become, as it always has been in its true sense, speculative.

It is the need for this kind of philosophy that Hegel then takes up in *Differenzschrift*. What he finds characteristic of the contemporary era, i.e. the early modernity, is the dichotomy or the opposition between the absolute and its appearance, and this is at bottom "the source of the need for philosophy" (*GW* 4, p. 12; *Diff.*, p. 89). Out of this dichotomy, then, "the intellect, as the capacity to set limits", has built a whole series of other oppositions which "with the progress of culture (...) have passed over into such forms as the antithesis of Reason and sensibility, intelligence and nature and, with respect to the universal concept of absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity" (*GW* 4, p. 13; *Diff.*, p. 90). Hegel feels that his task as a philosopher is to grasp the origins as well as

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7 The whole title is *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie* (*GW* 4, pp. 1-92); trans. by H.H. Harris and Walter Cerf in *Diff.* pp. 79-195.

8 On Hegel's concept of critique, see Röttgers 1975 and Smith 1985, who also analyses the rhetorical figures used by Hegel in *Differenzschrift*. Zimmerli 1980 builds his interpretation of Hegel's development from *Differenzschrift* to on *Phänomenologies des Geistes* on the thesis that, in distinction to Schelling, Hegel has both an 'Einleitungsproblematik' and a 'Kritikproblematik'. The latter may be seen, according to Zimmerli, as a result of Hegel's disappoinment in his efforts to found a new religion, and this would force him to situate and recognise his new philosophy within the historical and philosophical process of becoming.

the mechanisms of these oppositions, i.e. to contrast them with a more fundamental unity.

He studies these oppositions in greater detail above all in the introduction to the essay *Glauben und Wissen*, which was published in the *Journal* in 1802. According to him, the most important opposition may lie between faith and knowledge. For the latter, in the form of understanding, has in the modern times gained a power unprecedented in history, so that it has, Hegel contends now, rendered religion a matter of merely private, subjective faith and beauty. This is especially apparent in Protestantism (*GW* 4, pp. 316-317; trans. by Cerf and Harris in *FK*, pp. 56-57). The victory of knowledge over religion in the Enlightenment seemed, it is true, decisive - but in Hegel's view it only seemed so. For, by posing itself in opposition to religion, knowledge neglected the absolute in itself and became finite and empirical (*GW* 4, p. 316; *FK*, p. 56). The philosophical reason, consequently, turned into an understanding which is characterized by negativity, opposition and finitude. As Hegel puts it, the opposition between faith and knowledge is now rooted within philosophy itself (*GW* 4, p. 315; *FK*, p. 55). If Protestantism is the modern form of religious inwardness and subjectivity *par excellence*, then the reflective thinking of Kant, Fichte and Jacobi, the thinking which always proceeds from the finite knowing subject and its possible representations, is its philosophical counterpart. They should both be viewed as reflections of the present epoch as a whole:

> When the might of union vanishes from the life of men and the antitheses lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain independence, the need for philosophy arises. From this point of view the need is contingent. But with respect to the given dichotomy the need is the necessary attempt to suspend the rigidified opposition between subjectivity and objectivity; to comprehend the achieved existence (*das Gewordensein*) of the intellectual and real world as becoming (*GW* 4, p. 14; *Diff.*, p. 91).

Thus according to Hegel it is the task of philosophy to show that the oppositions are contingent, relative to and dependent on an original unity. They are not absolute. More specifically, his main point will be that this original unity, this being, includes the oppositions and is thus an identity of indentity and non-identity.

Philosophy can only operate with reflection when constructing the Absolute for consciousness. This involves a contradiction, since reflection as the dominant form of intellect in the present day is first and foremost a limitation: "What must be shown above all is how far reflection is capable of grasping the Absolute, and how far in its speculative activity it carries with it the necessity and possibility of being synthesized with absolute intuition", Hegel writes (*GW* 4, p. 16; *Diff.*, p. 94). It should be noted that - unlike in the *Systemfragment* of 1800, where he still contends that the Absolute is attainable only through religion - Hegel now builds on the possibility of absolute intuition dependent on reflection. The

concept of reflection has in fact a double meaning in the essay. It is a limitation, positing oppositions, but "as Reason", i.e. as a truly philosophical reflection, it "nullifies itself and all being and everything limited, because it connects them with the Absolute". By connecting the limitation to the absolute, philosophical reflection is then able to recognize both the specific right of the non-identity and its relativity. As the non-identity at the ontological level is part of the absolute identity, philosophical reflection at the epistemological level is here recognized as a component of speculative knowledge (cf. *GW* 4, p. 18; *Diff.*, p. 96).[9] This on the condition, however, that the specific products of reflection are not taken in isolation, leading into antinomies, but as parts of the absolute unity.

With these reservations, Hegel defines, philosophical reflection "is the negative side of knowing, the formal aspect which, ruled by Reason, destroys itself. Besides this negative side, knowing has a positive side, namely intuition" (*GW* 4, p. 23; *Diff.*, p. 109). Together these two sides, then, form "transcendental knowledge" which "is at once concept and being", "intelligence and nature", "the ideal and the real" (see *GW* 4, pp. 27-28; *Diff.*, p. 110). Only philosophical intuition is cabable of presenting an image of the absolute essence, and only under the guidance of this image may reflection become philosophical in its true sense, i.e. regulated by the idea itself. From all this Hegel infers that philosophical knowledge must adopt a systematic form in order to establish the manifold connections between the finite and the Absolute (*GW* 4, p. 30; *Diff.*, p. 113). One of his fundamental statements about his own method is the following:

> The method of the system should be called neither synthetic nor analytic. It shows itself at its purest, when it appears as a development of Reason itself. Reason does not recall its appearance, which emanates from it as a duplicate, back into itself - for then, it would only nullify it. Rather, Reason constructs itself in its emanation as an identity that is conditioned by this very duplicate; it opposes this relative identity to itself once more, and in this way the system advances until the objective totality is completed. Reason then unites this objective totality with the opposite subjective totality to form the infinite world-intuition, whose expansion has at the same time contracted into the richest and simplest identity (*GW* 4, p. 31; *Diff.*, p. 114).

Relative and absolute unity

We can see now what kind of an idea Hegel regards as necessary for the philosophical criticism of modernity. The idea of philosophy as the knowledge of the Absolute is the norm against which Hegel, together with Schelling, wanted to test everything that claimed to be philosophy.

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9 Cf. Jonkers 1989, p. 53.

And what is more, especially for Hegel the idea itself should not only be an intuition but take a systematic form. Although Hegel in the essays written for the *Journal* does not yet develop his system in extenso, it is possible to trace how his idea for a system begins to take shape and, in addition, how it departs from its Schellingian origins. Of course we do not intend to follow the whole story, but focus on the emergence of Hegel's idea of practical philosophy. Most important for us, then, is Hegel's *Naturrechtsaufsatz* which appeared in *Journal* in two parts, in December 1802 and May 1803.

In this essay Hegel critically investigates the scientific and philosophical value of the modern theories of the natural law. He does this by locating the scope of these theories within his own idea of practical philosophy, by discussing their premisses and also by studying the relation of the natural law to the positive sciences of law. According to Hegel, there have been principally two forms of treating the natural law, "the empirical" and "the formal" one. His general contention is that, as seen from the viewpoint of the absolute, they both define the political condition which they are supposed to legitimate in a distorted or incomplete way. Both types of theory should then be viewed as parts of a larger theoretical whole , i.e. of a practical philosophy which presents the absolute as the spirit. As I hope will become clear in a closer discussion of the text, Hegel is drawing here something like a synthesis of ancient and modern practical philosophies. All the modern treatments, perhaps with the exception of Spinoza, are in his view unable to verify the necessity of an absolute ethical totality.

The only true distinction that can be acknowledged as marking the principle of science, Hegel postulates, is whether the science lies within the Absolute or outside this unity, i.e., in opposition to it (*GW* 4, p. 420; *NL*, p. 58). The Absolute is an absolute unity. A unity is absolute when it leaves nothing out but takes all the opposites within itself. It is an identity of multiplicity and unity, of difference and indifference, i.e. a higher unity within which both unity and multiplicity as relations between unity and multiplicity are sublated (*aufgehoben*). The differerence between the two is sublated as well. Absolute unity, as distinct from relative unity, can therefore be defined as an indifference (cf. *GW* 4, p. 432; *NL*, pp. 72-74. Here we have, then, the Absolute in its original, indifferent form. For Hegel this is the real point of departure:

> In this formal totality we must consider how absolute unity appears both as simple unity, which we may call the original unity, and as totality in the mirror of empirical knowing. Both unities, which are one in the Absolute and whose identity is the Absolute, must occur in such knowledge as separate and different from another (*GW* 4, p. 424; *NL*, pp. 62-63).

The latter unity, which is also called "absolute totality", embodies not only indifference but "incorporates the opposition of unity and multiplicity" as well. This totality, which Hegel opts for, is then an absolute "unity of indifference and relation" (GW 4, p. 433; NL, p. 73).

The basic elements of Hegel's early idea of a system can in fact be found here, as may be seen from what he defines next:

> And since the relation is double, the appearance of the absolute is determined (i) as the unity of indifference and of the relation, or the relative identity, in which the many is primary and the positive, and (ii) as the unity of indifference and of that relation in which the unity is primary and the positive. The former is physical nature, the latter ethical nature. And since indifference or unity is freedom, while the relation or the relative identity is necessity, therefore each of these two appearances is the oneness and indifference of freedom and necessity (*GW* 4, p. 433; *NL*, p. 73).

Thus, in physical nature relation and multiplicity is primary, hence this constitutes for Hegel the realm on necessity. In ethical nature, by contrast, indifference and unity prevail, which makes it the realm of freedom. This means that, while within the former real opposites will remain and must, so to say, be left at that, they in the latter, i.e. in the realm of freedom, they exist only for being negated and surpassed in the philosophical treatment. From these fundamental definitions propounded by Hegel one may already decipher something about his strategy concerning modernity and modern philosophy. The primacy of freedom, Kant's and Fichte's principal conclusion, is there, but Hegel speaks very consciously of "ethical nature" as the realm of freedom and, what is even more important, he wants to relate the principles of the two realms to the absolute unity.

One should remember that we are speaking about the determinants of the absolute *as it appears*. From the viewpoint of the original essence we could perhaps call physical nature free as well, but as an appearance it is marked by necessity, in opposition to ethical nature where freedom realizes itself.[10] Within the appearing totality, finally, Hegel characterizes the moment of unity and freedom as that of infinitude. Within this appearing totality, it is emphasized, the infinitude is marked by negativity and dependence on its opposites. It is this infinitude which "is the principle of movement and change, its essence is nothing but to be the unmediated opposite of itself. In other words, it is the negatively absolute, the abstraction of form which, as pure ideality, is with equal immeadiacy pure reality; as the infinite is the absolute finite; as the indeterminate is the absolute indeterminacy (*GW* 4, p. 432; *NL*, p. 71). Essentially the absolute is infinitude, but according to Hegel it must also appear, and this means that it must present itself as a finite world of external relations between ideality and reality, finitude and infinitude, determinacy and indeterminacy. In doing this, then, it sublates the external relations and returns to the inner unity which is its original foundation.

Spinoza's influence on Hegel's early system conception is evident. There is one substance, the infinite, "the divine nature", which has to

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10 Cf. Cruysberghs 1989, p. 88.

appear as well, and it does this in two parallel forms, as physical and as the ethical nature. Irrespective of this terminology, which shows at least how seriously the natural law is taken here, Hegel does not follow Spinoza's parallelism to the point where he did in the *Differenzschrift*, however. For while he there defined the absolute as an identity of identity and non-identity, both of which were conceived as subject-object relations so that the order of ideas (the subjective, intelligence) and the order of things (the subjective, nature) are similar (cf. *GW* 4, p. 71; *Diff.*, p. 166)[11], Hegel in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* emphasizes more strongly the priority of spirit. Hegel himself, and we too, shall return several times to the following programmatic statement about the matter:

> The Absolute is that which intuits itself as itself, and that absolute intuition and this self-knowing, that infinite expansion and this infinite recovery into itself, are simply one. But on this account, if both, as attributes, are real, spirit is higher than nature. For if nature is absolute self-intuition and the actuality of the infinitely differentiated mediation and unfolding, then spirit, which is absolute intuition of itself as itself (or absolute knowing), is, in the recovery of the universe into itself, both the scattered totality of this multiplicity, which it overarches, and the absolute ideality thereof in which it annihilates this separateness, and reflects it into itself as the unmediated point of unity of the infinite Concept (*GW* 4, p. 464; *NL*, p. 111-112).

Another principal novelty of the present essay is that Hegel strongly emphasizes here the practical nature of spirit. In *Differenzschrift* the practical part of philosophy, i.e. philosophy of spirit, was defined as that of intelligence. Hegel's most fundamental insight now is that the spirit organizes itself as an absolute ethical totality, "the absolute ethical life", where it is able to unite indifference and relation, freedom and necessity, and in doing this it would be able to rise above the nature. We shall see that it takes several years before Hegel arrives at a position where he can systematically demonstrate what this insight means for his practical philosophy. In *Naturrechtsaufsatz* already, however, he uses it as a kind of implicit norm in his critical discussion of the various treatments of the natural law.

The unity of concept and experience

Hegel limits his discussion to what he considers the two basic forms of treating the natural law, to the empirical and formal theories. In dealing with the former, he does not mention any names, but obviously he is thinking at least of Hobbes and Locke. He does not pay much attention to the differences between various authors, instead he concentrates on the general approach. This also applies to the various formal treatments.

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11 Cf. also Cruysberghs 1989, pp. 88-90.

Kant and Fichte are referred to, but the whole weight lies on general assumptions, premisses, and consequences of their approach. The discussion, one could say, is not very immanent and nuanced, because Hegel's primary task is to demonstrate the need of science for a natural law that is constructed in accordance with the idea of absolute ethical life. But the discussion has, one has to admit, its merits exactly because of its general and clear character. At this stage Hegel is making up his mind about a modern version of practical philosophy.[12]

In Hegel's view, the critical philosophy of Kant and Fichte has demonstrated that empiricism in the natural law can no longer be taken as scientific (*GW* 4, p. 418; *NL*, p. 57). In other words, after Kant and Fichte have conceived the fundaments of modern practical reason, empirical treatment has mainly a historical value for studying "the empirical condition of the world reflected in the ideal mirror of science" (*GW* 4, p. 419; *NL*, pp. 57-58). For although "an empirical attitude would have every right to assert itself against" abstract formalism, it is entangled, Hegel contends, "in such concepts as have become fixed in the culture of the day as 'healthy common sense'"(*GW* 4, p. 431; *NL*, pp. 69-70), without being able to organize them philosophically. Hegel, who puts forth very strong rational and critical claims, wishes philosophy to be more than a theoretical reflex of the status quo.

Empirical treatments are forced to use some key notions for organizing the material they describe, but the notions themselves are, as Hegel sees it, treated without any internal unity so that the essential character of the phenomena in question is not grasped (*GW* 4, p. 422; *NL*, p. 60). Characteristically empiricism tries to do justice to the vast multiplicity of phenomena as completely as possible. For this reason, various moments of absolute ethical life, too, may be represented in these treatments only in a distorted manner(*GW* 4, p. 419, 423, 427; *NL*,p. 58, 61, 66). The distortion is caused exactly by the lack of inner rational unity.

Empiricism knows nothing about absolute unity. Instead, it operates with an idea of an original unity similar to the one used in empirical physics. Hegel writes about this, commenting possibly both Hobbes and Locke:

> This original unity can therefore mean, so far as possible, only a single, simple, and small mass of qualities, whereby it believes it can suffice for a knowledge of the rest. In that ideal, empiricism, in which what thus passes vaguely for capricious and accidental is blurred, and the smallest indispensable mass of the multiplex is posited; it is *chaos* in the physical as in the ethical world. Chaos in the latter is conceived now by the imagination more in the image of the existence, as the *state of nature*, now by the empirical psychology more in the form of potentiality and abstraction, as a list of the capacities found in man, as the *nature and destiny of man* (GW 4, p. 424; NL, p. 63).

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12 In his useful book Steven B. Smith collects the modern treatments of the natural law, which Hegel criticizes principally under the following headings: egalitarianism, individualism, voluntarism, reductionism and universalism. Cf. Smith 1989, pp. 61-65.

Both the physical and the ethical world are here reconstructed from a unity which is a chaos, because it is conceived of with empirical means only, as a reduced multiplicity of the actual world. When empiricism makes this reduction of the multiplicity into the unity, it "lacks in the first place all criteria for drawing the boundary between the accidental and the necessary; i.e., for determining what in the chaos of the state of nature or in the abstraction of man must remain and what must be discarded. In this matter the guiding determinant can only be that as much must remain as is required for the exposition of what is found in the real world: the governing principle for this *a priori* is the *a posteriori*" (GW 4, p. 425; NL, p. 64). This, it should be kept in mind, is Hegel's principal comment on the British attempts to found a practical philosophy on the principles of modernity.

According to the "logic" of *empirical* theories, the original state of nature - presented as a natural condition of few individuals, or as an individual with a few natural inclinations such as that to self-preservation or sociability - is to be abandoned as a political condition because of its severe disadvantages for the individuals. In Hegel's opinion, however, the political condition, the state or civil society - which, characteristically, are not distinguished in any clear rational manner from each other - is here no less arbitrary than the original state of affairs. In Hegel's opinion, this applies to both Hobbes and Lockes:

> But the unity itself can only proceed, as in empirical physics, according to the principle of an absolute quantitative multiplicity; in the place of the many atomic qualities it can only exhibit a multiplicity of parts or relations - once again nothing but multiplex complexities of the presupposedly original simple and separated multiple units, superficial contacts between these qualities which in themselves are indestructible in their particularity and capable of only light and partial interconnections and intermixtures. Insofar as the unity is posited as a whole, it is given the empty name of a formless and external harmony called "society" and "state" (*GW* 4, p. 426; *NL*, p. 65).

Hegel then concentrates on pointing out the distorted manner in which the various moments are expressed im empirical treatments (*GW* 4, p. 427; *NL*, pp. 66-67). The state of nature, or the natural man, is a distortion of the moment of indifference - not a conceptual unity but a reduced multiplicity; the state of law, where the individuals then are subjected to the majesty of a supreme authority, is a distortion of the moment of relation - the multiplicity being here merely negated in the name of unity. Consequently the moment of unity, the unity of indifference and relation, may also be presented in these treatments only in a distorted form. The fundamental reason for this, according to Hegel, is in their empiricist view that the state of nature and the state of law would be two separate, highly independent and opposite conditions. The former is something negative, the latter something positive. For Hegel, however, they should be thought of and reflected on together, as moments of a more fundamental unity, because only in this way can they be related to

the constitution of absolute ethical life. Within this unity, it then turns out, the two states of affairs oppose each other only relatively: "The absolute Idea of the ethical life, on the other hand, contains both majesty and the state of nature as simply identical, since the former is nothing but absolute ethical *nature*; and in the realization of majesty there can be no thought of any loss of the absolute freedom, which is what would have to be understood by "natural freedom", or of any sacrifice of ethical nature" (*GW* 4, p. 427; *NL*, p. 66). Hegel's point is that the state of nature and the state of law should utimately be thought together, so that indifference proves to be the essence of nature, relation in a non-coercive sense being the essence of society, and their unity the essence of the individuality. He continues:

> Neither is infinity, nor the negation of individuals or subjects, fixed in the absolute Idea nor, in relative identity with majesty, as a relation of servility in which individuality too would be something simply posited. On the contrary, in the Idea infinity is genuine; individuality as such is nothing and simply one with absolute ethical majesty - for which genuine, living, non-servile oneness is the only true ethical life of the individual (*GW* 4, p. 427; *NL*, pp. 66-67).

Hegel's discussion of *formal* treatments of the natural law aims to show that in this case, too, the various moments of absolute ethical life remain separate and opposed to each other, and that, consequently, these modern treatments should be seen as radicalizations or rationalizations of empirical treatments. Instead of the multiplicity of empirical intuition, Kant and Fichte proceed from the purely formal unity of the concept, apriorily and without any empirical content. The pure concept as infinitude is here the absolute, more precisely "the negative absolute", for it negates all the specific contents (*GW* 4, p. 431; *NL*, p. 71). It is the merit of, "the great element" in the philosophies Kant and Fichte" (*GW* 4, p. 441; *NL*, p. 82) to have recognized this side of infinitude, of which empiricism remains unconscious. But they are, Hegel argues, as unable as empiricism to conceive of the fundamental indifference of the moments of unity and multiplicity. Like in empirical treatments, reality is here reduced to a relation in which unity and multiplicity, reason and nature, exercise causality over each other without being able to sublate their opposition. While nature as a multiplicity is, according to formal treatments, always opposed to the unity of reason, strictly speaking, as a theory of the natural law, it cannot gain any content at all only by "the formal transition of progression from the conditioned to the condition and, since the latter is in turn conditioned, so on ad infinitum. In this process, formalism not only abandons all its advantages over what it calls empiricism; rather (...) formalism itself is completely submerged in empirical necessity (...)" (*GW* 4, p. 424; *NL*, p. 62). In Hegel's view, the fundamental defect of empiricism is thus repeated here in a more conscious form.

Hegel demonstrates this general position by taking up, first, certain logical problems generated by the notions of pure will and pure

practical reason. He then makes an effort to point out the tautological character, or even self-contradictoriness, of formalism, as well as ahistoriality and weakneess of the morality deduced from these notions (see *GW* 4, pp. 431-442; *NL*, pp. 70-83). I will do not dwell upon them here, because the whole of this study attempts to make it clear in what ways Hegel's approach differs especially from Kant's standpoint.[13] The aspect that should be emphasized here is that the premiss in Hegel's critique is the positive Absolute and his conviction that it is possible to demonstrate the reality of it in its necessity. From this viewpoint, then, the Kantian notion of morality, as well as that of legality which is derived from it, are no more than ideals without real necessity. In the following passage Hegel attains, perhaps, his most lucid expression of this point:

> There is a conditioning of pure self-consciousness. This pure self-consciousness, the ego, is the true essence and the absolute, but nevertheless it is conditioned, and its condition is that it advances to a real consciousness. These two forms of consciousness remain downright opposed to one another in this relation of being mutually conditioned. That pure self-consciousness, pure unity, or the empty ethical law (the universal freedom of everyone) is opposed to real consciousness; i.e., to the subject, to the rational being, to individual freedom. Fichte expresses the matter in a more popular way as the presupposition that "faith and constancy are lost" (*Grundlagen des Naturrechts*, 14). On this presupposition a system is built whereby both the concept and the individual subject of ethical life are supposed to be united despite their separation, though the unity is on this account only formal and external, and this relation between them is called "compulsion". In this way the external character of oneness is utterly fixed and posited as something absolute and inherently necessary; and thereby the inner life, the rebuilding of the lost constancy and faith, the union of universal and individual freedom, and ethical life itself, are made impossible (*GW* 4, pp. 442-443; *NL*, pp. 84-85).

In the chapters that follow we shall see that Hegel remains faithful to this fundamental insight, that "the constancy and faith lost" is to be rebuilt in the modernity but not *qua* the Kantian duty or the Fichtean compulsion. Instead, one should demonstrate the elements of the absolute totality in the actual forms of the individual and collective activities themselves. In other words, one should study the modern ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) itself with its various moralities. Later in the essay, when Hegel attests that the terms "morality" and "ethical life" originally in their Greek usage meant basically the same, implying that the modern contrast between them is a misundertanding, he remarks: "Since real absolute ethical life, united in itself, comprehends infinity (or the absolute concept), pure individuality *sans phrase* and its supreme abstraction, it is directly the ethical life of the individual. Conversely, the essence of the ethical life of the individual is *the* real and therefore universal absolute ethical life; the ethical life of the individual is one pulse beat of the whole system and is

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13 There are numerous good discussions about Hegel's critique of especially Kant. One of the best is Wildt 1982, pp. 27-194; another very noteworthy study is Wood 1990. Cf. also Smith 1989, pp. 70-85.

itself the whole system" (*GW* 4, p. 468; *NL*, p. 112). From this quite Aristotelian viewpoint, clearly, the formal treatments of the natural law turn out as exemplifications of the dualism which, according to Hegel and Schelling, is dominant in the modernity.

The natural law and ethical life

In the next few chapters I will study more closely Hegel's solution to the problem of unity between indifference and relation. A short description of its basic principles, as they are defined but not put into use or developed in *Naturrechtsaufsatz*, suffices here. Instead, we shall concentrate on Hegel's remarks on the natural law within his own practical philosophy, for these are crucial programmatic statements which will orientate us to his later systematic efforts. This becomes immediately clear in the next section when looking into Hegel's first sketch for a system, i.e. *System der Sittlichkeit*.

Hegel's basic idea is to present absolute ethical life as a unity of indifference and relation, so that the sphere of relation appears - unlike in the empirical and formal treatments of natural law - as a necessary moment of the absolute unity itself (*GW* 4, p. 449; *NL*, p. 92). This means that "the system of reality", the sphere of needs and their mutual satisfaction and, on the other hand, of private law, with the characteristic relation between the individuals and the sphere as a whole, is situated within a larger social totality with a true ethical quality. Within this totality the relations of multiplicity to unity, difference to indifference, finitude to infinitude, which in the theories of natural law were solved with a coercive force, are presented positively in a people as an absolute ethical totality (*GW* 4, pp. 450-451; *NL*, pp. 93-94).

Hegel is critical towards the modern theories of natural law, especially those of Kant and Fichte, because they subordinate natural law to the science of morality. It is a modern phenomena to give theoretical priority to the individual point of view, deriving the general principles of the community from this. Although Hegel recognizes the significance of the principle of individuality, he wants to make a reversal here. For if an individual ethical life is considered as such, apart from the "real and universal" ethical life, it is always something negative, and it cannot express itself without "the pure spirit of a people". Hegel quotes Aristotle:

> The positive is prior by nature to the negative, or, as Aristotle says: "The state comes by nature before the individual; if the individual in isolation is not anything self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state in one unity, just as other parts are to their whole. But a man incapable of communal life, or who is so self-sufficing that he does not need it, is no part of the state and must be either a beast or a god" (*GW* 4, pp. 467-468;

NL, p. 113).[14]

Hegel conceives it as the task of natural law to express the organization of ethical life within a community, i.e. a people. As we shall see, in Hegel's view the ethical nature is essentially freedom, and so natural law should, in line with the model of ancient practical philosophy, articulate its meaning within the general ethical life of a people. When Kant and Fichte subordinated the natural law to individual morality, they reduced it to an external and coercive system of restrictions which, according to Hegel, reflects correctly a part of the ethical life of a modern society, i.e. that of the *bourgeoisie*, though by no means the whole of it.

Priority must instead be given to the ethical life of a people. This also expresses itself in the individual as such, although in a negative form, as the possibility of a universal spirit. Now, the science of morals and ethics in the Hegelian sense ties in with this expression. "The ethical qualities such as courage or moderation or frugality or generosity" should be taken as "possibilities or potentialities of being in universal ethical life." These ethical qualities, then, "are the subject-matter of morality, and we now see that the relation of natural law to morality has in this fashion been reversed; I mean that morality properly deals only with the area of the inherently negative, while the true positive belongs to natural law as is implied in its name. Natural law is to construct how ethical nature attains its true right" (*wie die sittliche Natur zu ihrem wahrhaften Rechte gelangt*) (GW 4, p. 468; NL, 113). Hegel makes here a distinction between ethics and science of morals. He contends that the latter deals with modern society and its dominant morality, that of the second class, the *bourgeoisie* which is preoccupied with possession and property and other relations:

> A science of this morality is thus, first a knowledge of these relations themselves, so that insofar as they are studied with reference to ethical life, a reference that can only be formal owing to their absolute fixity, the above mentioned enunciation of tautology finds its place here: this relation is only this relation (*GW* 4, p. 468; *NL*, p. 114).

For the science of morality in the Hegelian sense it is clear, secondly, that this relative ethical life cannot be absolute because its universal form contradicts its specific content. This being so, however, it is essential for this science to study the ethical properties in their dominant relative form and to conceive the social relations in which they are constituted. The term "ethics", on the other hand, Hegel wants to reserve for describing the ethical qualities in their pure and positive form, when they can be called "virtues", "such as the virtues of Epaminondas, Hannibal, Caesar, and some others" (*GW* 4, p. 469; *NL*, p. 114).

What should be brought to the foreground here, is that Hegel follows his ancient ideals and, while reversing the modern order

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14 The reference is to *Politics*, 1253 a25-29.

between the individual and his ethical community. Both moral philosophy and ethics as disciplines for studying certain ethical phenomena must, according to him, be subordinated to natural law. When the latter is really taken verbatim, as the science of ethical nature, it becomes evident that morality in its dominant modern form is not constituted by morality itself but by a certain economic and social order, and, further, that ethical qualities cannot be restricted, as Kant and Fichte have done, to the tautologies of this morality. One must, instead, proceed to the absolute ethical life, presenting it so that it can be recognized both in a state system of legislation and in a form of public religion (*GW* 4, pp. 470-471; *NL*, pp. 115-116).

A System of Ethical Life

During the same winter 1802/03 when *Naturrechtsaufsatz* was published, or during the spring 1803, Hegel wrote his first systematic sketch on practical philosophy. It is known as *System der Sittlichkeit*. While Hegel in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* aimed to demonstrate critically how the various treatments of natural law play unity and multiplicity against each other, he now gives proof of the absolute ethical life as being the necessary and sufficient basis for the unity of these notions. In addition to its terminology, the strong influence of Schelling can be seen in the emphasis that is given to intuition in the absolute ethical life. Ethical life, according to Schelling, is in principle the "liberation of the soul from that which is alien to it and from what belongs to the material, the elevation to determinateness by pure reason without mixture with anything else. This same purification of the soul is the condition for philosophy."[15] Schelling's idea of the intellectual intuition, which in his own words is both "the authentic ethical consideration of nature" and "the authentic intellectual consideration", is central to Hegel, too. However, he does not think of it as a purification of the soul in the same Platonic sense as Schelling. Instead, he emphasizes strongly that the intellectual intuition works together with its empirical counterpart, and the absolute ethical life should ultimately be intuited in all its determinacies.

System der Sittlichkeit is built on the alternately changing positions of concept and intuition at several levels. Generally, the concept represents the particular, the intuition the universal, and together they form the development of the absolute concept or infinity. This corresponds to the two ways in which the unity appears according to *Naturrechtsausatz*: as positively absolute uniting all the differences, i.e. as the authentic unity of the intuition; and as a relation between unity and

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15 Schelling, *Über das Verhältniss der Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie überhaupt* (1802). Cit. according to Leijen 1989, p. 121.

multiplicity, i.e. as the formal unity of the concept (see GW 4, pp. 23-24; NL, pp. 80-81). Infinity, "the principle of movement and change", is then presented as the conversion of the unity into the multiplicity and, vice versa, as the unity of indifference and relation.

Under such a systematic spell Hegel now wants to present the totality of ethical life from its most elementary individual forms to the state as an ethical community itself. What stands out as important is the systematic character of this totality: as its first individual configurations, already, refer to the authentic universality, so are its last determinacies of the true ethical community capable of satisfying all the individual needs only in their diversity.

The absolute ethical life, which Hegel wants to demonstrate, is the totality of all ethical determinacies, of all the different ethical forms as its particulars. Its absolute concept is the movement of its particular determinacies; its absolute intuition is the unity of this movement, and along with it the intuition is the moment embodying the unity of movement and particularity. As Leijen puts ist, "the core of *System der Sittlichkeit* is the question of how the absolute concept finds its fulfillment in the intuition of itself in its opposite."[16] Hegel studies this question in three main steps. First he presents the various elements of the absolute ethical life "in relation", i.e. in a form where multiplicity still dominates over the unity. The relation of the individual subjects to nature in the forms of need and labour are discussed here, as well as their mutual relations in the forms of family, gender, education and language. A detailed interpretation of these phenomena pertaining the natural ethical life will be given later in this study.

Within the subsumption of the intuition under the concept the unity exists only in relation, ideally and without reality. The ordering forces of the multiplicity come outside the individuals themselves, and for this reason there is no true ethical life. Hegel is very well aware that in modern society these forces are economic and juridical by nature. According to him they have been generated by the mechanization and division of labor, which have created conditions for the market mechanism in its varying and rapidly developing forms. This economic system is then controlled by a juridical one - a system within which the individuals are recognized as private owners and free as well as equal persons in the abstract sense characteristic of the whole system of relations.

In the second step Hegel makes an *Gedankenexperiment* where unity is realized and the opposition between universality and singularity sublated in the form of a crime. This means a destruction of the natural ethical life: a murderer annihilates an individual, as does a thief or a robberer to property. These destructive individual acts are recognized by the system of relations as crimes, however, and consequently punished or revenged. So the subsumption of the concept under the intuition in

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16 Leijen 1989, p. 125.

the form of an attempt to negate the system of relations by individual crimes fails. It cannot lead beyond a chaos, thefts, rapes, murders.

Finally in the third part, where the absolute ethical life is presented, the opposition of universality and particularity is positively sublated. The absolute appears now as the unity of concept and intuition: "the intution of this totality is the absolute people, while its concept is the absoliute oneness of the absolute individual" (*SdS*, p. 415; *SEL*, p. 101). A people with its different classes, as well as a political organization which quarantees the supremacy of the unity over the multiplicity, are presented here.[17] We have discussed this part in some detail already, and will relate it to the first part later.

Early conceptions of the system

In all the texts discussed above, Hegel's aims first and foremost at thinking speculatively of the absolute which enables one to perceive the different elements of modernity - faith and knowledge, concept and intuition, necessity and freedom, universality and particularity - as elements of a more fundamental unity. Like Fichte and Schelling, who also worked with the transcendental problems that Kant had left unresolved, Hegel took it for granted that the absolute must be presented in a systematic form.

Hegel's earliest system conception, which is here taken up briefly in order to tie up the strings of the present chapter, has four parts (it will be discussed at greater lengt in the next chapter). The first one contains logic and metaphysics. The part devoted to logic, which is supposed to destruct the oppositions existing at the level of reflection, is meant to serve as an introduction to the system, while the section of metaphysics will demonstrate a unity more fundamental than these opposities to be the basic principle of the system. This is then followed by a discussions of the philosophy of nature, which presents the reality of the idea in nature, after which comes the part presenting by the philosophy of spirit or intelligence, demonstrating the unfolding of the idea into ethical life. The absolute unity of subject and object, of spirit and nature, the return of the ethical life "back to the pure idea" is finally demonstrated in the fourth part of the system, in the philosophy of religion and art.[18]

The influence of Schelling on this early conception can be seen, for

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17 Hegel did not finish this sketch for a system, and so his possible ideas about the significance of religion for the ethical life have to be reconstructed from his notes on the these as reported by Rosenkranz 1844, pp. 132-141; trans in *SEL*, pp. 178-186. See the end of the ch. 5 and ch. 8 below.

18 There has been some dispute about this early conception. See Kimmerle 1970, esp. pp. 18-73, Horstmann 1972 and Horstmann 1977. See also Düsing 1976, pp. 76-149 and Harris 1983, pp. 3-73.

example, in the fact that the philosophies of nature and spirit are in principle of equal value as the appearing forms of the absolute. Like his colleague, Hegel maintains that the philosophy of nature is the "theoretical" part, the philosophy of the spirit the "practical" part of the system (see *GW* 4, p. 73). He goes further, however, by distinguishing within both of them a theoretical and a practical part, i.e., the philosophy of organic nature and the practical philosophy in the sense of the Aristotelian science of politics as their practical parts respectively.

Hegel's conception for a system changed considerably during his first years in Jena. Thus he in fact never made an attempt to construct a practical philosophy in accordance with the above conception presented in the *Differenzschrift*. Already *Naturrechtsaufsatz* contains some important changes. For here Hegel no longer builds builds "substance metaphysically" on the oppositions between subject and object but instead, as we have seen, on the possible constellations of unity and multiplicity. In criticizing the practical philosophies of Kant and Fichte, Hegel remarks that "there we can recognize only the *formal* Ideal of the identity of the real and ideal." However, it does not suffice to present the theoretical reason as ideal and the practical reason as real, or vice versa, for their indifference is thus never attained. Instead, the absolute must be presented as a double unity of unity and multiplicity. Hegel characterizes this double relation as follows:

> Since this twofold relation applies to multiplicity, and provided we term "indifference" the unity of the different which stand on the one side and in which that reality or the many are superseded, the Absolute is the unity of indifference and relation. And since the relation is double, the appearance of the Absolute is determined (i) as the unity of indifference and relation, or the relative identity, in which the many is primary and the positive, and (ii) as the unity of the indifference and that relation in which the unity is primary and positive. The former is physical nature, the latter ethical nature. And since indifference or unity is freedom, while the relation or the relative identity is necessity, therefore each of these two appearances is the oneness and indifference of freedom and necessity (*GW* 4, p. 433; *NL*, p. 72).

To conclude the present chapter, let me quote, once again: "The Absolute is that which intuits itself as itself, and that absolute intuition and this self-knowing, that infinite expansion and this infinite recovery into itself, are simply one. But on this account, if both, as attributes, are real, spirit is higher than nature" (*GW* 4, p. 464; *NL*, p. 111). As we will see, this contention that spirit is in fact higher than nature, that ethical life or ethical nature is to be thought as spirit, that this spirit is marked by its self-consciousness, this modern insight will force Hegel to a number of changes in his systematic principles.

7 SUBJECTIVITY AS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE MODERN WOLRD

During his Jena period, the overall purpose of Hegel's systematic writing remains basically the same. He wants to demonstrate the fundamental unity of everything, which makes it evident that all the opposites are merely opposites within this unity. The phenomenal themes of his writing are also relatively constant. He works several times through his system, where nature and spirit are finally united in religion, art and philosophy. The same cannot, however, be said of the conceptual organization of his writing, for there in fact several dramatic changes take place. These changes in particular make Hegel's early conceptions of a system, lectured between the years 1802 and 1806, i.e. before he wrote *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, interesting yet at the same time extremely complicated to interprete.

I have indicated how the writings of both Plato and Aristotle proved seminal at least for Hegel's early practical philosophy. Generally one could say that in his critique of modern theories of natural law and in his conception of a political organization of the ethical totality Hegel moves within the classical paradigm and attempts, in a sense, to "force" into this paradigm what he considered central in the modernity . This forced constellation, which Hegel faces in Jena, does not exist only, and perhaps not even primarily at the level of *Realphilosophie*, but concerns the most fundamental logical and metaphysical categories, creating problems which Hegel then endeavours to solve by new conceptual means. His invention of dialectic in the specifically Hegelian sense is one of these, and his introduction of the metaphysics of absolute subjectivity is another one.

Both of these general moves, which are accompanied by several more specific changes, may be understood as attempts to pose the modern world as a philosophical problem in categories more adequate than the ones here discussed so far. In the present chapter I will sketch a picture of Hegel's efforts to come to terms with the modern world at the level of his fundamental categories. In the two chapters that follow

thereafter, these results will be used when we, concentrating on the notions of labor and ethical life, look into the development of Hegel's practical philosophy in Jena.

Changes in the conception of the system

Hegel's first system conception has, as was indicated, four parts. The role of logic, and in a sense that of metaphysics too, is introductory. Logic is supposed to destruct the prevalent oppositions in the culture of understanding and its philosophy of reflection, i.e. those between subject and object, unity and plurality, finity and infinity. It must do this, however, in order to pave the way for a speculative resolution of the oppositions, and, according to Hegel's first conception of logic, it is - together with metaphysics which demonstrates the speculative unity as the fundamental principle of every philosophy - capable of accomplishing this constructive function.

In *Differenzschtift* Hegel maintains that logic may do this by presenting the various principles of philosophical reason, i.e. speculation, through the forms of understanding, i.e. reflection:

> Only so far as reflection has connection with the Absolute is it Reason and its deed a knowing. Through this connection with the Absolute, however, reflection's work passes away; only the connection persists, and it is the sole reality of the cognition. There is therefore no truth in isolated reflection, in pure thinking, save the truth of its nullification. But because the Absolute becomes produced by reflection for consciousness, it becomes thereby an objective totality, a whole of knowledge, an organization of cognitions (*GW* 4, p. 20; *Diff.*, p. 97-98).

Hence, reason has to begin from the notions of reflection and proceed to speculation and a knowledge of the Absolute. Unlike Schelling, who postulates an immediate entry to the intellectual intuition of the absolute, Hegel regards this as necessary because "no philosophical beginning could look worse than to begin with a definition as Spinoza does" (*GW* 4, p. 24; *Diff.*, p. 105). But how can philosophical reason demonstrate the one-sidedness and limitation of merely reflective thinking, that of understanding, in such a manner which makes a transition to the position of reason not only necessary but possible as well? And how, with what kind of justification, can it construct the alternative principles of this position, i.e. carry out the task which belongs primarily to metaphysics?

Instead of a destructive recourse to the categories of finitude, Hegel indicated in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* a new strategy which he then endeavours to explicate in *Logik und Metaphysik* of 1804/05 (this is the only version which has been preserved). For now he maintains that the primary task of logic is to prove that every category which for the

reflection appears as finite is in fact not finite when studied from the viewpoint of reason.[1] Consequently, the task of logic is to demonstrate that "this alone is the true nature of the finite: that it is infinite, that it sublates itself in its being" (*GW* 7, p. 33; *LM* 1804/05, p. 35). As a consequence of the efforts of logic, then, metaphysics should explicate and secure the speculative viewpoint, and construct from this the conditions for *Realphilosophien* of nature and spirit as based on the concept of reason.[2]

Although Hegel in the lecture course of 1804/05 devotes an entire chapter to metaphysics, he discusses metaphysical problems already in his presentation of logic. Logic should serve as both an introduction and a sufficient foundation for metaphycisas well, and this means that Hegel's logic is undergoing a transition from the logic of finite reflection to a speculative logic, which he later in Nuremberg will explicate in extenso.[3] Thus when Hegel point out o that the true nature of the finite is its infinitude, "that it sublates itself in its being", this is to be taken metaphysically in the same ontological sense in which it is used e.g. of the ethical substance in *Jenaer Realphilosophie*. This is the "true infinitude", an ontological relation to oneself through the other, as distinguished from the "bad infinitude" of reflection. However, Hegel's conception of logic is still in a state of transition. For while it is supposed to supply the foundation for a speculative standpoint, its critical role as an introduction remains unclear or even questionable.[4]

During the next academic year, when Hegel lectured on the philosophy of spirit and simultaneously worked on *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the foundation of his system attained its mature organization. Hegel closes his *Realphilosophie* 1805/06 with a sketch for a system where the entire first part of the system, i.e. logic and metaphysics together, are presented as "speculative philosophy - [concerning] absolute being which becomes "other" to itself, becomes relation to itself [in] life and knowledge, and a knowing knowledge, spirit, spirit knowing itself" (*GW* 8, p. 286; *JPS*, p. 181). The task of logic, which includes also metaphysics, is thus to present speculatively notions such as being, relation, knowledge or spirit as becoming definitions of the Absolute, simultaneously criticizing the traditional metaphysics. According to Hegel's present view, this first part is preceded by phenomenology, by "the science of the experience of consciousness" which introduces the ordinary consciousness to the speculative viewpoint; and it is followed by *Realphilosophien* of nature and spirit. While the former concerns the "expression of the idea in the forms of immediate being", of "becoming spirit, [becoming] the concept *existing* as concept", the latter concerns "the

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1 Cf. Horstmann 1977, p. 51.

2 Cf. Horstmann 1977, p. 52.

3 Cf. Kimmerle 1970, pp. 95-98 and Düsing 1976, pp. 150-156

4 Cf. Düsing 1976, pp. 154-155.

opposite, the universal, indeed sacrificing itself and thereby becoming the actual universal - and the universal actuality that is a people" where "each one takes his being-for-himself, through his own alienation and [self-]sacrifice" (*GW* 8, p. 286; *JPS*, p. 181). That Hegel approaches here, at the end of his philosophy of spirit, not only philosophy but also religion and art as the highest forms of the actual universal, proves that he has given up his earlier Schellingian conception, according to which the system is closed in a separate "resumption" of the idea into its intuition of itself.[5] This seems to be a corollary of the simultaneous fusion of logic and metaphysics.

Another and clearly parallel change is the emergence of dialectic as the method of Hegelian logic, which is accompanied by the disappearance of the Schellingian notion of intellectual intuition from Hegel's vocabulary. The term "dialectic" appears for the first time in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* (*GW* 4, p. 446; *NL*, p. 88)[6], where it is said that "in part, dialectic has to prove that relation is nothing whatever in itself, and, in part, this has already been briefly shown above". Hegel refers here to his presentation of the absolute as the unity of indifference and relation, connecting dialectic to the notion - or, rather, to the critique of the notion - of relation. Dialectic should demonstrate that relation is nothing whatsoever in itself. This conveys Hegel's view during his first years in Jena: dialectic has the introductory function to prove that the categories and notions such as concept, judgement and syllogism are intelligible only in relation to each other where they simultaneously exclude each other. When they are considered in such a contradictory relation, they lose their independence and refer, in principle, to something more fundamental, i.e. the Absolute. The Absolute itself, or the positive side of it, is not attained through these dialectical notions, however.[7] Dialectic so far has merely an introductory role in the cognition of the Absolute.

In the lectures of 1804/05 on logic and metaphysics, dialectic takes on a significantly wider role. For while Hegel had up til that stage insisted that the negative work of dialectic as "the true scepticism" must be completed by the positive intuition of the Absolute, he now creates such a conceptual construction of the absolute that it is possible to speak about it with pure concepts only, without intellectual intuition.[8] This presupposes above all a development of the notion of negativity.[9] In 1804/05 Hegel works on the idea of the Absolute as an absolute negativity, which by becoming the other becomes itself, an idea which makes it adequate for dialectical demonstration. Of this Hegel writes as

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5 Cf. Meist 1980, esp. pp. 74-79.

6 See Baum 1986, p. 225. In what follows, I rely besides on this thorough work, on Düsing 1976.

7 Cf. Düsing 1976, pp. 93-108; Baum 1986, pp. 225-231.

8 Cf. Baum 1986, p. 249.

9 See. esp. Bonsiepen 1977 and Henrich 1982.

follows:

> To keep the point in mind in a provisional way, this is the true cognition of the absolute: not the mere demonstration that the one-and-many is *one* [as if] this alone were absolute, but that with respect to the one-and-many itself the oneness of each one with the other is posited. The movement of that demonstration, the cognition of the oneness, or the proof that there is only one substance, proceeds as it were *outside* the one-and-many and their oneness unless this unity is conceived from the opposition itself - that is, unless it is unity as the infinite (*GW* 7, p. 35; *LM* 1804/05, p. 37).

Hegel is very explicit later in the lectures, when discussing the dialectical exposition of the concepts. This proceeds from a definition through a construction back to a unity at a higher level:

> The first potence was the concept or the definition itself; the second, its construction or its exposition as bad reality, its coming-outside-itself or its becoming-other; and the third, the true reality, or the totality, the movement of sublating this becoming-other through its subsumption under the first unity. With respect to the first unity it was demonstrated that it has in fact a separation in itself; in the face of this separation [it was demonstrated] that the connection rather is essential to it. The negative turning of the separating against the unity, of the unity against the separating, becomes a positive result in reality, which interlocks [both of them] in that it is a universal, self-reflexive definition (...) (*GW* 7, pp.113-114; *LM* 1804/05, p. 119).

Here we have, for the first time[10], all the constitutive elements of the Hegelian dialectic as organized in their proper places. According to Hegel's program, then, the philosophical reflection, as such a dialectic no longer needs the help of religion or intellectual intuition in order to attain a cognition of the Absolute. Yet it appears impossible for Hegel to accomplish the program, to make his dialectic speculative in the true sense, until he gives up the distinction between logic and metaphysics and conceives of them both as the metaphysics of subjectivity.[11]

The metaphysics of subjectivity

As developed during his first years in Jena, Hegel's program, his pursuing a cognition of the absolute in philosophical terms should be seen as a continuation of his efforts in Frankfurt to conceive life in its

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10 Cf. Baum 1986. p. 256.

11 See Düsing 1976, pp. 179-189.

fundamental sense qua the notion of love. We have also indicated how this first program Hegel developed aiming at a philosophical monism remains in the proximity of Schelling. For both thinkers there is one substance, the fundamental unity of everything which should be comprehended together with the finite. For both the *hen panta* is not merely a critical notion in respect to the natural world, but the fundament from which an adequate description of this world can only be attained. Thus for both, monism implies a philosophical system.[12] Of the two, however, Schelling binds the finite closer to the absolute, allowing it less substance. The finite must be thought of both as identical with and different from the absolute. In order that the finite may be different from the infinite as well as from another finite, it must be a totality with a certain degree of independence and self-contentedness. According to the monism of Schelling, both the independence and the real meaning of this independence of the finite, its dependence on the absolute, is grounded in the infinite.

Thus it is not true that Schelling presents only an empty substance "where all cows are black" (cf. *GW* 9, p. 17; *PhS*, p. 9), without *logos*. The totality is a dynamic one, for the absolute both excludes and includes the finite. It is true, however, that the movement of the totality takes place in itself, as it were, and outside time.[13] Thus for Schelling the appropriate way to comprehend this totality is the intellectual intuition. What kind of a correction does Hegel make here? The idea that the absolute has a double relationship with the finite is his starting point, too. He presents their relationship in another way, however, because the absolute and the finite and their relations are not merely ontological but also epistemic entities. Thus an entry to the Absolute, i.e. to its cognition, goes through the critique of reflective knowledge that fixes finite singularities.

The destruction of such a finite knowledge is, as we have seen, the task of logic. That it may accomplish this task, however, presupposes according to Hegel the absolute in an ontological sense too, and consequently logic is followed by, and, to a growing extent, assimilated to metaphysics. Thus there is both an ontological and epistemic negativity in the relation of the finite to the absolute. This absolute, which is itself through the other and becomes itself through its becoming the other, of which Hegel uses the term *Geist*, is now treated separately under the heading "Metaphysics of Subjectivity".

The constructive task of metaphysics is to explicate the notion of

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12 Cf. Henrich 1982, pp. 142-148.

13 I follow here Henrich 1982, p. 152 who writes: "In ihr [in Schellings Konzept vom All-Einen, J.K.] machen 'Prozess' und 'Produktion' die Weise aus, wie das Endliche aus dem Absoluten hervor- und in es zurückgeht. Und 'geistige' Verhältnisse sind diejenigen, in denen die Einheit des All-Einen ihren Primat über die quantitative Differenz ebenso wie über die relative Selbstständigkeit des Endlichen manifestiert. Die Totalität Schellings ist insofern in sich bewegt. Allerdings stellt Schelling diese Bewegungen so dar, als ob sie Zeitlos und ohne Widerstand in sich geschehen. Und diese entspricht gleichermassen der Spinozistischen wie der Platonischen Wurzel seiner Spekulation."

cognition in the specifically Hegelian sense. According to this conception, generally, we should understand by cognition a certain relational process between relata that are of the similar kind (*Gleichartig*). Consequently, in order to explicate the notion of cognition one must demonstrate that all the relations which function as moments of the relata in the cognitive relation, in all their stages, are structurally of the similar kind.[14] Hegel begins his metaphysics with a situation where "the object of cognition is the whole cognition", but only "for us"; for the cognition itself, the object is "something other" (*GW* 7, p. 126; *LM* 1804/05, p. 132). The task, then, is to demonstrate that the object and the cognition are, for the cognition itself too, of the similar kind, that the cognition consciously perceives itself in the object and knows that it produces out of itself the relation to the object where it successively identifies itself.[15]

Hegel says that this "realization" of cognition in the metaphysics is "its second becoming; in the first it becomes the other that it is; in the second it becomes so for itself. The content that comes to ground is the becoming of cognition within itself - that is, its becoming for itself" (*GW* 7, p. 136; *LM* 1804/05, p. 142). But how is it possible to demonstrate the complete realization of cognition, with all its successive relational moments? In his treatise Hegel organizes the different identity relations under three general headings, i.e. the metaphysics of cognition in general, that of objectivity and that of subjectivity. The idea is to proceed from the incomplete forms of the cognitive relation to the most complete ones, and this is accomplished, first, through a study of the ways in which the moments of each relata within the relation itself are of the same kind and, secondly, through an analysis of the different properties of the cognitive relation itself.[16] The relation which prevails between the relata of the same kind is first called "the ground" (see *GW* 7, pp. 135-138; *LM* 1804/05, pp. 140-144). Hegel does not describe his method as dialectic here, but in fact it corresponds with the dialectic as used in logic, and the operation of determined negation.[17]

It should be kept in mind that with the term "subjectivity" Hegel does not want to characterize here any specific domain of objects. Instead, it obtains its meaning from a certain totality of cognitive relations that has to do with the absolute. In his "metaphysics of objectivity" Hegel discusses the traditional themes of soul, world and God, and by organizing it within his theory of subjectivity Hegel indicates the genesis of the I as the genuine being.[18] While the first

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14 Cf. Horstmann 1980, pp. 184-185.

15 Cf. Düsing 1976, p. 189.

16 Cf. Horstmann 1980, pp. 186-187.

17 Cf. Düsing 1976, p. 190.

18 Cf. Düsing 1976, p. 191.

section maintained that there is is structural identity called "the ground" between the relata of the cognitive relation, the metaphysics of objectivity serves to prove that there is a more developed numerical identity between them, i.e. an identity between the relata that in their turn are composed of relations that are of a specific kind. Hegel calls this type of relation "infinity" and his idea is to show here how it becomes a reflective self-relationship (*Selbstbeziehung*).[19] He writes: "the two moments of simple connection in their realization - unity or being (determined as quantum, for which negation is something strictly external) and infinity, which [is] just this sublation into itself - are here posited as fulfilled. Unity was so posited earlier, as having returned out of the totality of the antithesis; infinity is so posited now as returning therefrom." (*GW* 7, pp. 154-155; *LM* 1804/05, p. 162). This reflective relationship of the infinity is then treated more specifically in the metaphysics of subjectivity, where it is called *Geist*.

In addition to the structural identity and the numerical identity between relata within the cognitive relation, Hegel develops here the identity between the relata and the cognitive relation itself in each of its stages.[20] This is spirit:

> Spirit discovers the other as such, as absolutely other, as self-sublating, as itself. In other words, it does not only intuit itself as itself, but [it] also [intuits] the other-as-such- as itself. It is equal to itself and equal to the other; the other is that which sublates itself and is equal to itself. This unity is the absolute spirit (*GW* 7, p. 173; *LM* 1804/05, p. 181).

With such a complex relational notion, which is both epistemic and ontological, Hegel gives up the Spinozistic substance as the basis of his monism. There is a certain connection to his ideas in Frankfurt period, during which he made use of the notion of *Geist*. In passing we should note,too, that although Fichte's influence on Hegel is considerable during the present period, when he is developing his new system of metaphysical subjectivity, he does not use this notion in the Fichtean sense, nor does he draw back his earlier critique, notably in *Glauben und Wissen*, of Fichte's philosophy of reflection.[21]

The subjectivity is first defined as the theoretical I or consciousness, then as the practical I and finally as the absolute spirit. Hegel presents the theoretical I as a tension between its determinacy and generality and as an infinite unity resulting from this tension. The theoretical I, which Hegel also calls the highest essence or God, is thus a process where it infinitely makes itself into an object (*sich zum Dinge machen*), and cognizes this other as not alien within its own relational identity. The process presupposes the Hölderlinian *Ur-Theilung* within

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19 Cf. Horstmann 1980, pp. 187-188.

20 Cf. Horstmann 1980, p. 188.

21 Cf. Düsing 1976, p. 192.

the I, and opposition which the I again and again sublates and thus preserves itself (see *GW* 7, pp. 157-163; *LM* 1804/05, pp. 163-170).[22]

The tension between generality and determinacy, which so far remains, is sublated only in the practical I. It is such a relation of the I to itself that the object is cognized, not merely as such but for itself as well, as the I. "The I, *qua* theoretical, is spirit in general; *qua* realized, practical I - for which determinacy is itself absolute determinacy or infinity - it is absolute spirit" (*GW* 7, p. 165; *LM* 1804/05, p. 172). The absolute spirit, then, is the complete self-cognition, where the I cognizes all the elements of its complex relational identity. In addition to being infinite, it also cognizes itself as infinite. Thus the infinity is not merely "for us", the philosophers, it is for the I itself, too. Although this metaphysical constructions of subjectivity in the end stands and falls with the premiss which is never proven but only presupposed, namely that thinking or cognizing is identical with its objects, that being itself may be presented in the forms of cognition or consciousness[23], we must admit, I think, that Hegel has accomplished at least the task which he set himself at the beginning of his treatise on logic and metaphysics.

The philosophy of subjectivity

So far we have given an account of how Hegel gradually replaces his more Schellingian version of metaphysics with the metaphysics of subjectivity, which is accompanied by thorough changes in his system conception. These general changes are not always considered as carefully as they should when discussing Hegel's practical philosophy in Jena. Several Marxian readings, for example, provide extreme instances of this. Yet, if one is supposed to explain the development of Hegel's practical philosophy, or to assess Hegel's relation to the modern world, one has to pursue in detail his most fundamental and general strategies. Before one may even pose the important questions about their mutual connections and conditionings, one has to recognize, first, that Hegel's metaphysics of subjectivity, as it was characterized above, and his "philosophy of subjectivity", i.e. the four Jena versions of his philosophy of spirit (*Naturrechtsaufsatz, System der Sittlichkeit, Realphilosophie 1803/04, Realphilosophie 1805/06*), differ essentially from each other.

In every system conception of the Jena period Hegel has a special section which should be called his philosophy of subjectivity. This is, to use his mature terminology developed in the later Jena years, the second half of his *Realphilosophie* entitled "Philosophy of Ethical life" or

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22 Cf. Düsing 1976, p. 194.

23 Cf. Düsing 1976, pp. 195-196.

"Philosophy of Spirit". Here Hegel studies such psychological, anthropological, economic, sociological, legal and political phenomena and relations which should prove, when properly organized as a sequence and taken as an organic totality, the realization of an ethical substance or subjectivity. This philosophy of subjectivity is, then, clearly to be distinguished from the general metaphysics which he constructs in *Logik und Metaphysik* of 1804/05. It has a different location in the system; its object as well as its systematic function is different .[24]

Although the metaphysical and the subjectivity theoretical levels must be distinguished, the connections between them should not be neglected either. For it is Hegel's systematic strategy, generally, to employ the fundamental systematic principles and notions in his *Realphilosophie*[25], to prove their realization, so that it would be curious were there no systematic connections. In fact we have already demonstrated how *System der Sittlichkeit* applies the systematic principles and the substance metaphysical conception of *Differenzschrift* and *Naturrechtsaufsatz*[26] and that changes take place later at both levels. This being recorded, however, the difficult questions about the directness of the connections as well as their direction are still open. One should be cautious here, as Horstmann teaches us. One should especially avoid too hasty conclusions from *Realphilosophie* to the metaphysical level. The problems of primary importance for Hegel are the logical and metaphysical ones which have to do with his relation to Schelling and Spinoza, to Fichte and Kant, to Aristotle and Plato, as is also the general question (which we will take up in the next section) about the normative conception of nature and its relation to *Geist*, i.e. subjectivity in the metaphysical sense. With all this in mind, however, I will continue to argue for an interpretation that would explain the changes of the fundamental concepts on both levels as motivated basically by Hegel's efforts to come better to terms with the principles of modernity and above all with that of subjectivity.

It is extremely difficult even to describe the changes that take place in the methodic and structural principles of the three versions of philosophy of subjectivity that Hegel works out in Jena. In every one of them Hegel's overall intention to prove that the fundamental unity, *Sittlichkeit* or *Geist*, where the individual consciousness or self-consciousness only is realized, is basically the same. In every one of them - more precisely, in *System der Sittlichkeit* and in *Realphilosophie* 1805/06, for *Realphilosophie* 1803/04 remains incomplete - Hegel presents very much the same wide collection of individual and psychological phenomena in order to situate the particular individual theoretically into

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24 Cf. Hortsmann 1980, pp. 181-183.

25 A very noteworthy, though problematic, study of Hegel's systematic strategies is Hösle 1987.

26 Whether it is the former, as Kimmerle 1970 maintains, or rather the latter text which contains the systematic program of *System der Sittlichkeit*, see Horstmann 1972.

a substancial generality. The unity of the particular and the universal, however, is defined and explicated as well as developed differently in each version of the philosophy of subjectivity. By and large it can be said that these changes are on the on hand effected by the more fundamental changes in Hegel's logical and metaphysical conception with which they accord, and on the other by cerain more specific requirements of the philosophy of subjectivity itself.

We are already familiar with Hegel's way to develop the unity or identity of all the determinations through alternating the subsumption of the concept under the intuition and vice versa. This method pertains to his substance metaphysical conception of the period, and it presupposes the possibility of cognizing the absolute ethical life through the totality of phenomena as organized accordingly. The method is, as we will see more closely in the next section, related to Hegel's strong orientation towards the Aristotelian practical philosophy. What is more, the method is external to the phenomenal development itself, at least in the sense that Hegel has to present his subjectivity theoretical categories as exemplars of manifestations of the corresponding subsumption. Thus the developing combination of concept and intuition, as it were, subsumes the phenomenal material under the method of presentation. In the logical sense the unity which each time is attained through reciprocal subsumptions may be called "infinite judgement".[27] It is brought about by uniting the contradictionary elements as such, immediately, i.e. without any mediating term, into a sequence which is supposed to present the totality as a unity.[28]

After *System der Sittlichkeit*, Hegel's whole conception of subjectivity undergoes through a series of changes, as we have seen, and this leads to, or is accompanied by, important changes at the level of *Realphilosophie* too. Generally, Hegel will give up the idea of unity based on the normative idea of nature that is supposed to be demonstrated as realized in the ethical and political realm. Instead, the unity is bound to the development of human consciousness as this is "for itself" and "for us", the philosophers who are reconstructing it. In *Realphilosophie* 1803/04 Hegel attempts to present the unity by constructing what he calls "middles" (*Mitten*), i.e. a sequence of third terms where "the being of conciousness" would be manifest and thus distinguished from the

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27 This is proposed first by Schmitz 1957.

28 See Göhler 1974, p. 378, who on the basis of his very detailed analysis comments on Schmitz' work as follows: "Schmitz unterscheidet in seiner Analyse nicht zwischen Reihungs- und Einheitsprinzipien, und er sieht speziel für das *System der Sittlichkeit* noch nicht den engen Bezug dem unendlichen Urteil und der Einheit des Begriffs. Tatsächlich handelt es sich hier als Einheitsform um ein und dasselbe logische Prinzip. Dadurch stellt gerade das unendliche Urteil als Einheit des Begriffs die für das *System der Sittlichkeit* massgebende und eigentlich ausgezeichnete logische Form der Einheit dar. Die Einheit der Anschauung, logisch von derselben Struktur der Unmittelbarkeit wie diejenige des Begriffs, dient mehr zur Konkretisierung und inhaltlichen Ausfüllung der logisch primär über den Begriff erreicheten jeweiligen Identität."

opposing elements of which they are composed (see *GW* 6, p. 276; *FPS*, pp. 214-215). A middle is characterized as follows:

> Consciousness is the ideality of the universality and infinity of the simple in [the] form of opposition; as universal it is an undistinguished unity of both [universality and infinity]. But as infinity [it is] the ideality in which its opposition *is*; and the two [aspects of universality and infinity] are distinct and external to one another in consciousness, they separate themselves; their unity thus appears *as a middle* between them, as the work of both, as the third whereby they are related, in which they are one, but [as] that therein they likewise distinguish themselves (*GW* 6, p. 275; *FPS*, p. 214).

Realphilosophie 1803/04 remained uncompleted, both systematically and phenomenally, obviously because Hegel's general metaphysics of subjectivity was still in the state of becoming and he could not yet organize the middles into the self-referring consciousness structure of *Geist*. The idea of the middle, however, is an important logical step towards the emergence of Hegel's dialectical conception, for it means a transition from infinite judgement to syllogism (*Schluss)* as the basic mode of conceptual organization.[29]

In *Realphilosophie* 1805/05 Hegel finally expounds his "philosophy of spirit", i.e. organizes the different psychological, social and political phenomena according to the general structure of subjectivity, and develops them from one another dialectically in the form of syllogisms. Instead of the ethical life, it is now the consciousness in its various forms and stages on which the system is built. Much more than in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, the forms of consciousness are linked up with the phenomena themselves, and in addition to the theoretical intelligence of major importance is also the practical counscoiusness or the will. But the general idea is basically the same. By cognizing various object phenomena the human consciousness recognizes itself in them more and more perfectly, until it finally is "in itself" altogether. In Hegel's own terms, in which syllogism instead of infinite judgement is visible, knowledge is defined as the synthesis of the drive (*Trieb)* and the self:

> Knowledge is precisely this ambiguity: each is identical with the other in that wherein it has opposed itself to the other. The self-differentiation of each from the other is therefore a self-positing of each as the other's equal. And this knowledge is cognition in the very fact that it is itself the knowledge of the fact that for it itself its *opposition* goes over into *identity*; or this, that it knows itself as it looks upon itself in the other. Cognition means one's knowing what is objective, in its objectivity, as knowledge

29 This principle of the middle, to which Hegel will be faithful also later, remains in Jena at least "undetermined" according to Göhler 1974, p. 430: "Sie soll ausdrücklich ein von den Extremen unterschiedenes Drittes und in sich selbst unmittelbare Einheit sein - sie soll aber auch alles sein, was die Extreme sind, und schliesslich den Schluss nur mehr so konstituieren, das sie die unmittelbare Einheit der Gegensätze durch kreuzweise Indentität ekspliziert. So bleibt es völlig offen, ob der Schluss durch eine Einheit von Gegensätzen über die Mitte so entsteht, dass ein neues, eigenständiges Phänomen aufgewiesen, oder ob als "Mitte" nur eine neue Bezugssphäre der Extreme erreicht wird, die die Konstellation kreuzweiser Identität als Voraussetzung unmittelbarer Einheit der Gegensätze herstellt."

> of one's Self: i.e., a [subjectively] conceptualized content, in the sense of a concept that is object (*GW* 8, p. 209; *JPS*, p. 106).

Thus we can see that Hegel develops here the phenomenal content of his philosophy of subjectivity in the form of cognitive structures which corresponds to his metaphysical idea of *Geist* as a relational and self-referential notion of reality. Each phenomenon is presented as a self-referential instance of the self-refential notion itself. The presentation proceeds towards ever more perfect knowledge of the spirit of itself, towards its immediate and complete self-transparency, i.e. towards the unity of particularity and universality. Phenomenally this is attained in art, religion and philosophy, which indicates that the tendency is towards spiritual spheres beyond material objectivity.[30] In the following chapters we shall see how the new system actually works. Here it suffices to comment on two related matters.

Hegel's new dialectical method is syllogistic and no longer based on infinite judgements as was the subsumption procedure in *System der Sittlichkeit*. As Herman Schmitz[31] has already demonstrated, this means that Hegel is now logically better equipped to make an allowance for the modern principle of individuality with the category of singularity. Within the infinite judgements, where the opposites are played immeadiately against each other, singularity either has phenomenal relevance or has it not, but only within a more fundamental unity, being thus in every case without a systematic value of its own. In the case of a syllogism, however, there exists the mediating middle term with a systematic value and function of its own, and this logically opens up new room also for the individuality as the extreme instance of singularity.[32] Of course this does not mean that Hegel would have given up his fundamental endeavour to get beyond the abstract forms of modern invididuality, as well as those of generality, towards their concrete unity. But it means that Hegel is now better able to reckon the various modern phenomena on their own terms and principles within his system, without an external method alien to these phenomena, and then run his critical discussion more immanently than before.

Thus there is a general connection between the development of Hegel's metaphysical and logical conception and the changes in his philosophy of subjectivity. Only the last one of the three versions of *Realphilosophie* is in line with the metaphysics of subjectivity, where the absolute unity is conveived as the complex relational notion of *Geist*. Horstmann is probably right in maintaining that Hegel views subjectivity primarily as a metaphysical notion, and that the changes in

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30 Cf. Göhler 1974, p. 423.

31 See Schmitz 1957, p. 146- and Göhler 1974, pp. 378-379.

32 Though Hegel does not yet formulate the logical triple of generality, particularity and singularity but still is, as Göhler maintains critically contra Schmitz, partly bound to the infinite judgement.

Realphilosophien originate in the first place from the general need to "realize" this notion, not from new phenomenal analysis or findings.[33] Merely the fact that the phenomenal content of Hegel's *Realphilosophien* changes much less than the principles of its organization and presentation suffices to confirm this. In any case, the parallel changes at both levels make Hegel's critical discussion of the modern world more and more adequate, and thus more and more interesting.

Spirit and nature

Another way to speak about the parallel changes at both levels is to say that Hegel is making fundamental changes in the way he conceives of the nature and task of his practical philosophy in general. During his first Jena years he had argued, anachronistically, one could certainly say, for a conception which relies heavily on Plato and Aristotle. Thus he had settled the relation between a philosophical theory of the ethical praxis and this praxis itself in a way which fundamentally diverges from the modern tradition as initiated by Hobbes. His critique of the modern theories of natural law was based on the presupposition that there is an ethical substance, one which is present within a people taken as an organic totality. For him the task of a philosophical theory here is to verify this substance within a larger system and then establish the proper position of each ethical phenomenon, institution and estate within this substantial totality.

Hegel's way to argue for he naturalness of an ethical totality is most definitively against the modern tradition. In *Naturrechtsaufsatz* he wrote:

> The absolute Idea of ethical life (...) contains both majesty and the state of nature as simply identical, since the former is nothing but absolute ethical *nature*; and in the realization of majesty there can be no thought of any loss of absolute freedom (...) (*GW* 4, p. 427; *NL*, p. 66).

Hegel speaks here about the absolute ethical nature of a people in a way which is influenced, as Ilting shows, by Rousseau's *volonté* as well as by Montesquieu's *esprit*, but most essentially by Spinoza's notion of substance and the Aristotelian idea of *polis*. According to Ilting, Hegel first combines the last couple rather directly, neglecting the fact that Spinoza himself does not use the notion of substance in order to justify the primacy of a people over the individuals, but then studies Aristotelian practical philosophy more thoroughly in order to give a phenomenal proof of the absolute ethical nature.[34] Especially *System der*

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33 Cf. Horstmann 1980, pp. 194-195.

Sittlichkeit is, then, organized along the lines of Aristotle's *Politics*.

When Hegel in *Naturrechtsausatz* contends that "the positive is prior by nature to the negative", he makes explicit what he has in mind with an important quotation from Aristotle:

> The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is nor self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state (*Politics* 1253 a25-30).

Being neither an animal nor a God, man is a political being, for only within a political community he may live according to his specific nature, i.e. humanly, and attain what he, like every being according to Aristotle, ultimately should attain, his specific self-sufficiency (*autarkeia)*. Thus man may become what he is, realize his nature, in a political community only.

Clearly Aristotle uses the notion of nature teleologically, in the meaning of movement towards the *telos* that in the case of man may be attained only through various communal formations, the state being the highest among them. Following Ilting[35], we may say that there are at least three aspects in this movement. First there is the structural connection between the constitution of man and the corresponding virtues. We have studied this connection already, as conceived by both Plato and Aristotle, (see ch. 2 and ch. 4), and especially demonstrated how the classical hierarchy of human actions was justified by them. Secondly, there are in between the various forms of human activity and the corresponding virtues of the various communal formations, the economic, social and political institutions which are organized into a normative hierarchy accordingly. The hierarchy ends with the political community which, in distinction from a family or a house or a village, may be called ethical, for this alone may constitute practical knowledge or practical philosophy and the corresponding speech (*logos)*.[36]

Hegel follows Aristotle's conception very closely especially in *System der Sittlichkeit*, where he begins by organizing the various phenomena of "the natural ethical life" according to their respective ethical qualities. In the next two chapters we will analyze these developments in detail. Within the context of the present chapter, and in fact for the whole of the present work, of major importance is to see as clearly as possible the change that takes place in Hegel's conception of nature in the years 1803/04.

So far Hegel had relied on a substance metaphysically grounded and very comprehensive notion, where nature is speculatively defined as the unity of the general and the particular beyond every finite unity. This metaphysical notion of nature comprises both the natural nature and the

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34 Cf. Ilting 1974, pp. 763-766.

35 Cf. Ilting 1974, pp. 768-770.

36 See *Politics* 1253 a 7-18.

ethical nature as well as their unity.[37] Thus, we recall, Hegel defines in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* the absolute as the unity of indifference and relation which he calls "the Divine nature". This expresses itself in reality in a double relation, in the one where the many is primary and positive, i.e. in the physical nature, and in the one where the unity is primary and positive, i.e. in the ethical nature (*GW* 4, p. 433; *NL*, p. 73). The double notion of nature as both the mirror of the Absolute itself and as the natural nature, this ontological reminiscence of the classical and Spinozistic philosophies, burdens the early system conception with a problem, even a contradiction. Within this conception, on which *System der Sittlichkeit* is also based, Hegel is namely unable to prove the systematic thesis which is central for his intentions and which he spells out in *Naturrechsaufsatz*, that "in both, as attributes, are real, spirit is higher than nature" (*GW* 4, p. 464; *NL*, p. 111).

The need to solve this systematic problem is one of the main reasons - it may be the reason[38] - why Hegel then changes the logical and metaphysical foundation of his system. His *Realphilosophie* 1803/04 comes halfway. Nature is there no longer presented in its double function, as the nature in general and as the natural nature, but is confined only to the latter. Between spirit and nature there prevails a negative relation:

> What is in the sphere of spirit, is its own absolute activity; and our cognition, in that it raises itself out of nature, [and] the antitheses that have standing in nature as ideal, having been cancelled, must be recognized as cognition of the spirit itself. Or [it must be recognized as] spirit's coming to be, i.e., its merely negative relation with Nature. This *negative relation with* nature is [the] negative side of spirit in general, or how it organizes *itself within itself as this negative*: or in other words, how it becomes [the] totality of consciousness of the *single* [mind] (*GW* 6, p. 275; *FPS*, pp. 214-215).

In principle Hegel is now in a position where he could define the absolute ethical life through the notions of consciousness and spirit, and then develop the different forms of ethical life as stages of consciousness. This would mean a consistent execution of the thesis that spirit is higher than nature. However, for reasons that we already familiar with, Hegel does not yet present his philosophy of spirit. The notions of spirit and consciousness are still organized within potencies which, taken together, were supposed to demonstrate the "absolute organization" of the ethical life. Thus, being still subsumed under this demonstration, the notions of consciousness and spirit do not yet have an autonomous - let alone

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37 Horstmann 1972, p. 109 remarks that among the many similarities there is a difference too, which Kimmerle 1970 tends to overlook, in Schelling's and Hegel's ways to found the system on the notion of nature. For Schelling, but not for Hegel, it is in the first place the natural nature as the transcendental condition of every spiritual phenomena, instead of the comprehensive notion in the ontological sense.

38 This is the thesis of Horstmann 1972. Cf. also Kimmerle 1986, p. 143.

higher - status of their own, as distinguished from nature.[39]

In *Realphilosophie* 1805/05 Hegel then organizes the whole philosophy of spirit according to his new metaphysics of subjectivity. In other words, subjectivity is here developed as a relational notion in which the I or the self cognized, recognizes and constitutes itself through various objective and intersubjective structures. This means among other things that it is spirit and not nature which produces and guarantees all the ethical phenomena. Nature, as the natural nature, is here no more in respect to the self-relational subjectity than the other, from which this returns back to its own self-transparency. The disappearance of the substance metaphysical notion of ethical life is accompanied, as we have seen in the present chapter, with the use of Hegel's syllogistic or dialectical method, which enables him to make more room for the individual in the context of various ethical phenomena.

In the next two chapters we shall analyse in detail both *System der Sittlichkeit* and *Jenaer Realphilosophie* 1805/06, concentrating on the notions of labor and ethical life. In ch. 4 we saw that Hegel's general organic conception of the state as well as the estates remains very much the same in the Jena period. The radical, even dramatic changes in his system conception and in the basic principles of his philosophy of subjectivity, however, give good reason to expect that changes will take place in the ways he defines these two notions of labor and ethical life and, especially, relates them to each other too. It all is very much a matter of how to come to terms with the demands and principles of the modern world. In the following two chapters we shall thus see whether, and in what sense, Hegel succeeds in adapting his philosophy of subjectivity to the higher principle of the modern world, as he calls it, i.e. the individuality - without giving up his fundamental critique of the outward aspects of this principle.

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39 Cf. Horstmann 1972, p. 114.

8 LABOR AND THE EMERGENCE OF RELATIVE ETHICAL LIFE

In the preceeding chapters we have demonstrated how Hegel in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* argues for his Absolute by sketching a system of unities of indifference and relation. There is first their original unity; then the physical nature is presented as their unity where the relation is primary, whereas the unity dominates in the ethical nature; finally the unity of these two is presented as the absolute totality. According to this early conception, the physical and the ethical nature are the two modes in which the absolute totality, the divine nature, appears, and we are told that necessity prevails in the former, whereas freedom is characteristic of the latter. Programmatically Hegel contends that of the two the ethical nature is higher, though he does not yet argue for this systematically. Similarly, when Hegel within the ethical nature attempts to organize the moment of relation within the more fundamental unity, he contends:

> Since the point here at present is to characterize the relations involved in these moments, and since the aspect of infinity must thus be emphasized, we presuppose the positive principle than the absolute ethical totality is nothing other that a *people*, a point that will also be demonstrated in the following moments of the negative which we are considering here (*GW* 4, p. 449; *NL*, p. 92).

The positive principle, the absolute ethical totality, is thus presupposed and comes fast as if it were "shut from the pistol".[1] As we have seen, this means a people (*Volk*) which as an ethical totality, as an absolute organism, is a universality that predominates over its citizens: "it relates not to single specific matters, but their entire actuality and possibility, that is, to life itself" (*GW* 4, p. 449; *NL*, p. 93). It is constituted *of* the

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1 Rose 1981, 59. The expression is Hegel's own; cf. *GW* 9, p. 24; *PhS*, p. 16.

individual citizens but not *by* them. Or, in Hegel's words: "absolute ethical life is so essentially the ethical life of all that we can scarcely say that it mirrors itself as such in the individual" (*GW* 4, p. 468; *NL*, p. 112).

Among a people in this sense, "taken up to its absolute concept", the moment of infinitude prevails - not, however, in the coercive sense that especially Fichte attaches to it according to Hegel, but as a reconciled restraint of the finite, i.e. as courage, a virtue which cannot be forced upon the individuals. And because infinitude here is identical with indifference, an individual who faces death by showing courage identifies himself immediately with the positive or absolute moment of the ethical totality. In order to give an empirical form of existence to this mainly aprioric construction, Hegel presents his first class or estate, whose members are ready to defend the people.

But how is the moment of relation, i.e. the theme of our present chapter, treated and characterized in the essay? This moment, where Hegel locates much of what he takes to be the modern society, is by no means a phantom of the natural law theories only. Its has its reality. Unlike the moment of indifference, however, it consists of a multiplicity of relations between its elements. Hegel describes these elements, which "reconstruct themselves out of difference", as follows:

> These are physical needs and enjoyments which, put again on their own account in a totality, obey in their infinite intertwining one single necessity and the system of universal mutual dependence in relation to physical needs and work and the amassing [of wealth] for these needs. And this system, as a science, is the system of the so-called political economy (*GW* 4, p. 450; *NL*, p. 94).

The moment thus forms "a system of reality", and in Hegel's view its problem lies precisely in its being a system of pure reality. This is the reason why it must then be incorporated into the absolute totality and prevented from becoming independent and self-constituting. It does not suffice that a certain equality and security is guaranteed for all. By introducing "many-sided confusion into the business of acquisition, as well as jealousy of other classes and restraint of trade", "especially through war", the ethical whole must "preserve in this system the awareness of its inner nullity", Hegel contends (*GW* 4, p. 451; *NL*, p. 94-95). The peaceful system, in itself formless and lacking a concept, gains its ethical dignity only in this way.[2]

Hegel's whole point is not, however, the negative restriction of this system of pure reality. The system consists merely of relations, "but the relation also contains an ideality, a relative identity of the opposed determinacies." This ideality, it is true, is only a formal one and cannot be

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2 Cf. Bohnert 1985, pp. 543-544. Hegel sees Kant's ideal of a perpetual peace as closely connected to this bourgeois world: " Just as the blowing of the winds preserve the sea from the foulness which would result from a continual calm, so also corruption would result for peoples under continual or indeed "perpetual" peace." One should, however, in this connection see what Kant writes in *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, # 28 about the sublimity of war, for he makes very much the same point.

"positively absolute", but Hegel wants to see what it amounts to, and for this reason he - in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* very tentatively, as compared to the systems that follow - studies the different forms in which a certain universality is constituted through a system of recognition within this sphere.

As an example of the positive aspect of the system of relations Hegel mentions here "the sphere of law", which creates within the system "an external and formal equality". "Through the identity into which the real aspect of the context of the relations is posited, possession becomes property, and particularity in general, even living particularity, is simultaneously determined as universal", he writes (*GW* 4, p. 451; *NL*, p. 95). A little later, when beginning to the discuss the classes, Hegel summarizes his discussion about "the negative absolute" as follows:

> We have shown above how indifference appears in prevailing reality, and is formal ethical life. The concept of this sphere is the *practical* realm; on the subjective side, feeling or physical necessity and enjoyment; on the objective side, work and possession. And this practical realm, as it can occur according to its concept (assumed into indifference), is the formal unity or the *law* possible in it (*GW* 4, p. 455; *NL*, p. 99).

The classes are then characterized and presented according to their "subjective and objective sides". Hegel's point, as we have seen (cf. ch. 5 above), is that in addition to the lower classes, living mostly in their economic activities, producing, exchanging and acquiring wealth, there must be the class of the free whose members live for the absolute ethical totality. The lower classes "exempt the first from the relation in which reality in respect of their inaction or action is fixed as possession and property and as work" - and thus release the modern world from the fate of the Roman empire. What Hegel reagards as most important is that there prevails a true difference between the classes, or between the economic and the political spheres. He acknowledges the expansion of the economic sphere in his own time but contends, referring to Plato, that this formal system of needs, work, property, contracts etc., "all of them are things on which it would be unworthy to dictate to good men" (see *GW* 4, pp. 456-457; *NL*, pp. 100-101).

In the present chapter I will concentrate on how Hegel proceeds from this position, i.e. how he in the two systematic treatments of the subjectivity, lectured in 1802/03 and 1805/06[3], develops the sphere of relative ethical life. By studying both the phenomenal content of the treatments and their systematic principles we may see in what sense Hegel's new method, i.e. the new systematic principles which correspond to his metaphysics of subjectivity, proves more adequate for the purposes of his critique of the modern world - and in what sense not.[4]

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3 Being methodologically in the middle of the way and phenomenally unfinished, *Realphilosophie* 1803/04 will not be treated separately. That Habermas in his seminal essay *Arbeit und Interaktion* concentrates especially on this version, already indicates that his approach to Hegel cannot be primarily systematical.

The following reading will focus on the notion of labor and its pertinent notion of work. I will first look into the beginnings of the two systems, where labor and work are discussed before the constitution of the "system of reality", independently of the determinations that they take on in this system. In the second part of the present chapter, Hegel's early theory of this system - a theory which in certain respects proves richer than its later version in *Philosophie des Rechts* - will be analysed. What is Hegel's constructive suggestion concerning the theories of natural law, which he has so vehemently criticized? How he interprets and makes use of the contributions of the Scots to the understanding of the mechanisms of modern society in his practical philosophy? These questions will at first be dealt in some detail.

Labor and natural ethical life

I have already characterized the general method and systematic principles of *System der Sittlichkeit* (cf. ch. 6). Through an alternating subsumption of the concept and intuition, Hegel attempts to demonstrate for the first time in a systematic way the reality of the idea of the absolute ethical life. This reality means for Hegel an absolute totality of all the different ethical forms. In the introduction Hegel defines:

> Now the Idea of the absolute ethical order is the resumption of the absolute reality into itself as into a unity, so that this resumption and this unity are an absolute totality. The intuition of this totality is an absolute people, while its concept is the absolute oneness of the individuals (*SdS*, p. 15; *SEL*, 101).

At most levels (though an exception is to be found already in the first movement) the intuition stands for universality and the concept for particularity. One of the reasons for the complexity of the system is that the two notions both refer to practical and cognitive relations. In other words, they designate not only the ethical life in its various forms but also the two perspectives of a philosophical consciousness which studies

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4 My discussion of these problems of adequacy is at a more general level than the detailed critique of Hegel's method in Göhler 1974. He characterizes his own method as follows: "Grundsätzlich ist die Ausgangssituation für methodenkritische Folgerungen stets dann gegeben, wenn Form oder Inhalt nicht gleichgewichtig und interdependent die systematichen Entwicklung vollführen und die politische Aussagen vollbringen, wenn also grundlegende politischen oder systematische Intentionen von sich aus die jewels als Einheit auftretende methodische Durchführung und inhaltliche Aussage einseitig bestimmen. Eine solche Situation ist in der Durchfühtung des Systems zu konstatieren, wenn in seinen Bereichen die Zuordnung von inhaltlichen Characteristik, logischer Bewertung und systematischer Einordnung der Phänomene nicht aus der Entwicklung der Sache selbst, sondern einseitig von vorgängigen Intentionen her festgelegt ist; ihre Zuordnung is dann gegenüber den beanspruchten immanenten systematischen Begründungszusammenhang beliebig." (Göhler 1974, pp. 468-469)

the various sumsumptions and identities of them on the first level. At both levels the concept represents the dominance of the subjective and particular, the intuition that of the objective and universal. When the system proceeds, the particular fills itself gradually with the universal, as the universal fills itself with the particular. Thus the procedure will anvance, generally, from concept to intuition, from abstract to concrete, from formal to authentic.[5]

In the introduction Hegel maintains that first the intuition must be subsumed under the concept. The dominating concept here designates an individual subject who as particular subordinates nature under his pure negativity. The universality which then originates from thisis still formal and relative, as presented in the second half of the first part. Referring to the whole of the first part of the system, Hegel writes:

> Ethical life is a drive (or impulse, *ein Trieb*). This means a drive which (a), is not absolutely one with the absolute unity, (b) affects the single individual, (c) is satisfied in this single individual - this singular satisfaction is itself a totality, but (d) it goes at the same time beyond the single individual, though this transcendence is here something negative and indeterminate (*SdS*, p. 17; *SEL*, pp. 102-103).

The first half, which is dealt with in the present section, is a subsumption of the concept under the intuition entitled "feeling". Here an individual is presented in his various and mostly undifferentiated "natural" relations to nature.[6] The relations are, as Hegel remarks, levels of practice, i.e., we subsume the ideality of nature under the individual singularity by acting upon it. For this reason, labor and work will be central among the relations in question. First, however, nature appears for the individual in its multitude as a separation in the form of *needs*. Besides this separation, or the feeling of it, a need implies "the more real concept of practical feeling", a more practical relation between nature and the individual, and in this case it is *enjoyment*. In enjoyment (*Genuss*), the separation is nullified in the instinctive satisfaction of the individual need, so that everything universal in the object is consumed by the subject.

Hegel's analysis of this phenomenon leads to a negative result: "The specific character does not enter the objectivity of intuition in such a way that something might arise for the subject which he may recognize as the identity of subject and object" (*SdS*, p. 20; *SEL*, p. 105). In spite of this, however, the individual has discovered that his subjective enjoyment is dependent on nature. In this sense the enjoyment "involves

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5 See Leijen 1989, pp. 130-137 and Harris 1978, pp. 7-20.

6 Ilting 1974, here esp. p. 771, has pointed out that the beginning of *System der Sittlichkeit* is a clear parallel to the beginning of Aristotle's *Politics*. Both start from the phenomena of the "natural ethical life", and both attempt to demonstrate how from these natural conditions of human life relations emerge that are more artificial and ultimately belong to the political order. And both proceed very much through the same sequence of natural phenomena (need, labor, tool etc.). We shall see, however, that Hegel's problems with these phenomena are specifically modern.

a consciousness of the objectivity of the object" (*SdS*, p. 20; *SEL*, p. 105).[7] This consciousness of the objectivity is the starting point for further development, and consequently the individual relation to nature, this ideality, should be given a form where the latter is not annihilated altogether. Exactly this is made in the next subsumption under the concept where labor, possession and tool are introduced. Here, it can be said, does the real elaboration begin.

Unlike in enjoyment, the individual in labor does not annihilate the object but, as Hegel writes, "the difference between desire (*Begierde*) and enjoyment is posited; the enjoyment is obstructed and deferred; it becomes ideal or a relation" (*SdS*, p. 21; *SEL*, p. 106).[8] Thus, there emerges in labor a relation between subject and object, an ideality which is further analyzed into three moments. First, there is "the ideal determining of the object", *taking possession* of it; then "the real annihillation of the object's form", *the activity of labor itself*; and finally the *possession* of the object, i.e. the possibility for the subject either to consume the object or to labor on it further (*SdS*, pp. 21-22; *SEL*, pp. 106-107).

This first analysis of labor surveys the different stages in which nature may become the possession of an individual for purposes of enjoyment or tool-use. The individual is still satisfying his needs and desires, but his attention is now directed towards possession, i.e. to the elementary objectivity which is constituted here. A possession may be given to or taken by the other too, like a tool may be used by anyone capable of doing it.[9] Of posession, and of taking a possession, Hegel does not speak in any legal sense. Yet one could compare the elaboration here to Locke's description of the labor carried out in the state of nature, but Hegel does not in the first place aim at the justification of actual private property. For although elementary possession certainly constitutes in some sense the basis of actual possession and private property, the latter will not be justified merely from the labor each individual has put into the "natural" objects but from a more complicated system of intersubjective relations. We will return to this point.

So far, Hegel has defined labor as an activity where the enjoyment is deferred. In labor, the individual subsumes the natural object by bringing about of it something he has intended. There arises through this

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7 The translation is based on Lasson's edition. Göhler's edition reads "Negativität des Objekts". In any case, Ilting's remark that the notion of need is a point of fundamental difference between Hegel and both Plato and Aristotle is an important one. According to the metaphysics of the Greeks, a need signifies a lack of being and is directed towards the fulfilment of this lack, while a need in Hegel's elaborations, already in *System der Sittlichkeit* but much more explicitely later, signifies a feeling of lack through which the subject "wakes up" and begins to fill this lack by constituting himself (see Ilting 1974, p. 773). The difference is still more clear, as we will see, in the case of the notion of labor.

8 Hegel distinquishes need from desire. The former is more primitive, more natural; the latter is the starting point of labor, its ideal pole.

9 Cf. Harris 1978, pp. 25-26.

labor a certain ideality or a relation. In the next subsumption, under the intuition, labor is studied from the viewpoint of the various objects. While earlier "a thing was the object that was subsumed, here it is the subject", Hegel writes, and presents the objects of labor as self-moving and living. He endeavors, presumably[10], to show that there is a difference between laboring on a plant or an animal or on another man. This is so because they allow to a different degree, or extent, the ideality which the laboring subject gives of himself to the object and through which he then grasps himself again. A plant is basically an external element, "with little or nothing of the specific life; labor on animal, instead, means "a taming of the animal's particular character for the sort of use appropriate to its nature", being thus, subjectively, "a more many-sided need" (*SdS*, pp. 22-23; *SEL*, pp. 108-109).[11]

It is of principal importance that Hegel considers here, when discussing the natural forms of individual labor, an elementary interpersonal relation as well. For this purpose he defines *intelligence*, the synthesis of the two preceding moments, which could also be called the absolute concept of this stage, as follows: "man is a power-level, and so he makes his reality, his own peculiar being, his effectiveness in reality into adoption with indifference, and he is now the universal in contrast to the first level" (*SdS*, p. 24; *SEL*, p. 109). This universality, the most elementary intersubjectivity created by labor, as both distance and independence from nature, is then determined as *formative education* (*Bildung*). Here man is both universal and particular and produces or brings about himself in a way that does not have an equivalent among the plants and animals. Within this formation a work (*ein Werk*) is constituted - in principle all work of human culture - in distinction to the activity of labor itself.

Thus, by considering here labor as a practical feeling both in respect to nature and other subjects, Hegel presents it as an activity through which the ethical life is initiated. An elementary unity as well as a relation between subject and object, and between subject and subject, emerges here. The way Hegel begins his practical philosophy here differs from the modern systems. He is inclined to follow Aristotle, building on the various *fainomena* of natural ethical life. His description of the way the ethical subject gradually develops diverges in principle different from the modern descriptions (those of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau) of the state of nature. An aspect peculiar to Hegel's approach is, apart from

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10 Göhler 1974, 485 comments on these strange passages: "Das Ziel Hegels ist es, reale Objekte der Arbeit als lebendige und somit selbst arbeitende aufzuzeigen, um in ihnen gerade als Objekten mittels der Arbeit den Subjekt-Objekt-Charakter aufzudecken und damit eine Sphäre gleichstrukturierter Totalitäten zu erreichen."

11 Harris 1978, p. 29 writes: "The highest object of labor is the human being itself. Plants can be quatitatively maximized as a harvest to maintain the animal existence of both man and his lifestock. Animals can be trained individually to assist man in his labor. But the human individual is laboriously trained to make his own nature into the tool of reason which is his concept. Here the labor of molding the life process is a direct assistence of the life process itself, to enable it to reach its goal."

his ethical viewpoint, that he goes behind the more or less ready subject of the modern theories one way or another preserving himself. In this ethical phenomenology of a particular kind, Hegel takes up the discipline which Aristotle called "poietics" and which had not been developed significantly ever since.[12] Thus, especially in the first part of *System der Sittlichkeit*, Hegel attempts to handle modern forms and phenomena of labor very much according to the model of Aristotle's political and economic theory.[13]

The matter proves complicated, however, already at this initial stage. For by labor Hegel does not understand merely poiesis in the classical sense, i.e. bringing about something or turning something from invisible into visible or from inexistence into existence.[14] This is very clear when Hegel writes, for example: "The labor [which produces intelligence] is a totality, and with this totality the separate subsumption of the first and second levels are now posited together; man is a power-level (*Potenz*), universality, for his other, but so is his other for him; and so he makes his reality, his own peculiar being, his effectiveness in reality into an adoption into indifference (...)" (*SdS*, p. 24; *SEL*, p. 109). Labor is here connected with a negativity, in fact with a double negativity, first towards the object that is labored upon, and second towards the laboring subject himself who then becomes an intelligence. Both in the classical ontology and in Hegel's elaboration, the laboring man abolishes a certain original lack or immeadiacy and thus creates the conditions for the realization of his specific potentialities, ultimately within a political totality.[15] For Hegel, however, the significance of labor in the constitution of the subject is by far greater than in the writings of the Greeks. This will become even more evident in the next section.

Before comparing this elaboration with the beginnig of *Jenaer Realphilosophie* 1805/06, I shall follow Hegel to the end of the first stage of the first part of *System der Sittlichkeit*. For here Hegel presents an interesting totality of the practical feeling. He makes a synthesis of enjoyment and all the phenomena connected with labor in the form of a mediating term, and this again at three levels. First there is the subsumption under intuition. This is "the highest individual natural feeling, a feeling of a totality of the living sexes", the *child* as the mediating term. Secondly, there is the subsumption under concept, which "is wholly external, according to the difference of the concept, while the inner is pure and empty quantity. This middle term is the *tool*."

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12 Cf. Riedel 1984, pp. 3-31 and ch. 2 above.

13 Cf. Ilting 1974, p. 772, who maintains against Marx' dictum: "Daher muss es nicht heissen: "Hegel steht auf dem Standpunkt der modernen Nationalökonomie" (Marx), sondern: Hegel ist durch die Ökonomie und Politik des Aristoteles dazu gelangt, die Ergebnisse nationalökonomischer Untersuchungen in sein philosophisches System aufzunehmen."

14 Cf. e.g. Platon, *Symposion*, 205b10-11, and ch. 2 above.

15 Cf. Ilting 1974, p. 773.

Finally, the middle term which contains both simplicity and ideality as well as intelligence is the *speech*, as further analyzed into the moments of gesture, corporeal sign and spoken word (*SdS*, pp. 26-31; *SEL*, pp. 111-116).[16] Generally these mediating terms signify a transition from the natural stage to the more conscious artificial stage in the ethical life. Through the family surrounding the child, through the tools made by human craftsmanship and through the speech with constant and intended meanings, the boundary between nature and human culture becomes more stable than so far.

The significance of labor in this ever more conscious self-making of man is decisive, as may be perceived in Hegel's remarks concerning the tool. As an object which is labored upon and further used in the labor, the tool designates distance from the immeadiacy of nature and the dominance of the concept and the form. "In the tool the subject makes a middle term between himself and the object, and this middle term is the real rationality of labor." What is more, this term suggests right from the beginning a certain universality: "In the tool the subjectivity of labor is raised to something universal. Anyone can make a similar tool and work with it. To this extent the tool is the persistent norm of labor", Hegel remarks (*SdS*, p. 28; *SEL*, p. 113). The making of a tool is a higher activity than the mere use of it, because the former develops the "technical rationality" of man. As for the development of the ethical life, a tool is a higher phenomena than an object fashioned for mere enjoyment, and tool-making higher that the enjoyment in general - obviously because it is both more universal and more rational.

Labor and the constitution of subject

The first part of the philosophy of spirit in *Realphilosophie* 1805/06, entitled "Spirit According to Its Concept", presents principally the same phenomena that we have discussed above. This is accomplished, however, within the new metaphysical program and within the new conception of the philosophy of subjectivity corresponding to that program. Instead of an ethical substance Hegel now wants to present a system of cognitive relations which as taken together would explicate the notion of subjectivity. For this purpose, Hegel applies the new methodological principles of dialectical elaboration, among which the figure of a syllogism (*Schluss*), replacing the subsumptive judgement,

16 Hegel develops these ideas further in his 1803/04 lectures. In a way, these mediating terms are the starting point for Habermas, not only for his interpretation of Hegel but for his social theory as a whole. A thorough critique of them both is developed in Tuschling 1978. Siep 1979, pp. 53-145 shows, among other things, how these "thirds" assume an important role in Hegel's model of mutual recognition. The model is different, as Siep clearly indicates, from the corresponding Habermasian ideas.

can be regarded as the most important one (see ch. 7 above). The first part which, unlike the opening part of *System der Sittlichkeit*, does not yet deal with intersubjective phenomena, is divided into three syllogisms, those of intelligence, will and knowing will. First the emergence of knowledge in the most abstract terms is presented; then certain practical relations of the I and the object are introduced very much through the notion of labor; finally their elementary synthesis is presented in the notions of love, family and mutual recognition. Our attention will be first and foremost directed towards the second syllogism.

Hegel begins with an impressive description of how the I, which is here presupposed as a theoretical ability, wakes up from a state of darkness and unconsciousness. First the I and a thing exist in space immediately. "Being is the form of immediacy, but Being should be posited in its truth" (*GW* 8, p. 185; *JPS*, p. 85). The I commences its awakening, its becoming a Spirit, a mediation, by intuiting (*anschauen*) what it confronts and by distancing from this immediacy. With "the representational power of imagination" it begins to form images and to structure them. By doing so the spirit sets about transforming its being "in itself" a being "for itself", in time.

First it is pure self, the phantasmagoric night which we according to Hegel see "when we look at a human being in the eye, looking into a Night which turns terrifying. [For from his eyes] the night of the world hangs out towards us" (*GW* 8, p. 187; *JPS*, p. 87). It begins to take shape, however, first by arbitrarily associating images or "ideas" of the object, then by collecting and remembering them. Here the I adds to the object, or to the original Night, the being of the object for the I, so that the I confronts "a synthesis of both: content and I" (*GW* 8, p. 188; *JPS*, p. 87).

As a consequence of this movement, the immediacy of the object is negated, or sublated, so that "the object is not what it is". It is both being in itself and being for the I, something that "counts as a *sign*". This latter aspect of its being, in fact, is its *essence*. Thus the Spirit has awakened when the I looks at things as signs, reflecting in their essence itself. Hegel calls this movement from things as such to the I, who perceives in things itself, the "immediate inwardness" (*GW* 8, p. 189; *JPS*, p. 89).

This inwardness must, then, become external, an object, and "return to *being* (*Seyn*)", which is presented in the opposite movement from the I to the objects. The movement begins with language as "the name-giving power" that "posits the internal as *being* (*seyendes*). This, then, is the true *being* of spirit as such." For by naming a thing the latter is posited as *being* from the I. "This is the primal creativity exercised by Spirit. Adam gave a name to all things. This is the sovereign right [of Spirit], its primal taking-possession of all nature - or the creation of nature out of Spirit [itself]" (*GW* 8, p. 189; *JPS*, p. 89). The result of this taking into possession ("...man speaks to the thing as *his*. And thus is the *being* of the object. Spirit relates itself to itself...") is that the nature *is* as a system of names, which has a certain stability as well as a validity, unlike the mere images. The order, however, is in the I alone, "in themselves

the names have no rank nor relation" (*GW* 8, pp. 190-191; *JPS*, pp. 208-209).[17]

The ability of the I to bear the free order of names is based, first, on memory (*Gedächtniss*) which creates a connection between the images and the names. "The exercise of memory", Hegel writes, "is therefore the first work (*Arbeit*) of the awakened spirit *qua* spirit." It results in fixing the names as signs whose relations have a certain permanence, necessity and universality. The spirit moves here already on its own and maintains itself as a free force.

> At the same time, its work is such that the I makes itself into what it is in the name-giving, namely a thing, a being (*seyendes*); it is of the names, and it is a thing. The I makes itself into a thing (*es macht sich zum Dinge*), in that it fixes the order of names within itself. It fixes them within itself, i.e., it makes itself into this unthinking order, which has the mere appearance of order. In the appearance of the order there lies the I - necessity, the Self with its aspects. But these aspects are as yet purely indifferent (*GW* 8, p. 193; *JPS*, p. 93).

The spirit, the I is active here and makes itself into an object (*Gegenstand*) which in itself, as a name, is the I. "The for-itself of recollection (*Erinnerung*) is here its activity [turned] to itself - bringing forth itself, negating (*negieren*) itself. If the name is seen as the object about which the I is active, then the I annuls itself (*hebt sich auf*)", Hegel concludes (*GW* 8, p. 194; *JPS*, p. 93).

The two movements from the things to the I and from the I to the things are followed by a synthesis. A difference, even a contradiction emerges between the universality of the names and the particularity of the objects. First, a judgement of this is formulated. From this, however, it must be proceeded further, for "insofar as the two extremes are opposed they are one in some third element; and insofar as they are identical, it is precisely their opposition, that which divides them (*das sie dirimierende*), that is the [unifying] third element" (*GW* 8, p. 199; *JPS*, p. 97). This third element, which is "everything the other two are", cannot be grasped in a judgement, by the understanding.

"The experience of consciousness" makes it evident that reason instead of understanding, and syllogism (*Schluss*) instead of judgement is needed. Here the universal and the particular, the thing and the I, are separated in-themselves but appear as united both for-themselves and for the other. The result of this syllogism, the third element, is *intelligence*, i.e. the first cognitive structure in this system. "Intelligence has no other object for its content, but having grasped itself it is its own object. The

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17 Taminiaux' detailed comparison of Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Hegel's "speculative corrections" is interesting. For both, he maintains, the question is of the mastery of nature, but in different ways: "Hegel insists, against the claims of empiricism, that language is not a labeling game that leaves the being named on the outside; yet, the suppression of this duality only succeeds in reinforcing the concept of domination, since nature as a whole is produced by Spirit out of language. Here, again, the identity of the other and the same is substituted for the various dualisms that burden the empiricist's project" (Taminiaux 1985, p. 20).

thing, the universal, is for intelligence as the thing is *in itself*: sublated [negated] being, as positive, as I", Hegel defines (*GW* 8, pp. 200-201; *JPS*, pp. 98-99).

The I is free in intelligence. Its freedom, however, still lacks content because the I has attained it exactly "as its own positing of content or making itself into its own content." All the imaginary aspects, and those related to memory and knowing in the names, are as yet but form, Hegel contends. The I must strive for a position where it is in and for itself within the content, and this may occur only through labor, or work, which has as its object things in a practical sense and not merely their images and names. This practical relation of the I to the things is analyzed in the next conclusion entitled "Will".

"Volition [simply] *wills*. i.e., it wants to posit [assert itself], make itself, as itself, its own object" (*GW* 8, p. 202; *JPS*, p. 99). This is how Hegel commences to follow the syllogism of *Will*. Here the purpose is general, the Self, and the activity particular, and the drive (*Trieb*) is the middle term. The universal is content and ground, the particular, the active Self that achieves the purpose, the form of the drive. The movement of the will consists of the polarizations of these extremes and the following unifications. This is presented in three syllogisms.

First the will "is *being-for-self* which has extinguished all foreign content within itself. But thus it is left without an *other*, without content - and it feels this lack." The feeling of lack which results from the mutual indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*) of universal and particular, this felt lack of opposition, is the definition given here to the drive (*Trieb*) (*GW* 8, p. 203; *JPS*, pp. 100-101). The second syllogism deals with the satisfaction of the drive. Here the drive is contrasted with animal desire (*Begierde*). For while in the latter the object is external to the I, so that the satisfaction means the disappearance of this being, the object of the drive comes from the I itself:

> (...) here, being is mere form: thus what is I in its totality is the drive. This the I separates [from itself] and makes its own object. This object is not empty satiety, the simple feeling of the Self, which is lost in desire and restored in its satisfaction. Rather, what disappears is the pure form of equivalence of the drive's extremes - the purpose, content, juxtaposed to particularity (*GW* 8, p.204; *JPS*, p. 101).

Before the satisfaction of a drive the I is empty and confronts indifferently the general purpose. From now on, however, it begins to labor on something coming from itself that it makes into its object. The I makes a distinction between the I and the drive, and knows that it has posited the distinction out of itself. This very distinction becomes the object of its further labor, so that its being is "fulfilled" in a new sense (*GW* 8, p. 204; *JPS*, pp. 101-102).

The objects of the satisfied drive are determined more closely in the third syllogism. In this context Hegel formulates the fundamentals of his new idea concerning the notion of labor. So far the I has distinguished in itself something that it labors upon. The distinction

results in certain elementary knowledge of itself as an activity. This is basically the opposition between the I as an activity and as an object of this activity, i.e. otherness which is mere thinghood without any activity of its own. It is sublated (*aufgehoben*), Hegel contends now, when the drive is satisfied through labor:

> The gratified impulse is [thus] the *transformed labor*; this is the object working in its stead. Labor is one's making oneself into a thing. The division of the I beset by drives is this very same self-objectivication.(*Der befriedigte Trieb ist die aufgehobne Arbeit des Ichs; dies ist dieser Gegenstand, der an seiner statt arbeitet. Arbeit ist das disseitige Sich-zum-Dinge-Machen. Die Entzweyung des Triebseyenden Ich is ebendiss Sich zum Dinge machen.)* (*GW* 8, p. 205; *JPS*, p. 103).

In contrast with the desire (*Begierde*) which always starts anew, the drive constitutes "a unity of the I as objectified". Labor, defined as the satisfaction of the drive, is thus capable of constituting the I in this sense, for it mediates between the I as activity and as otherness.[18] This negativity of labor, which is central in the whole constitution of spirit, is set out in the following:

> The *labor* itself as such is not only activity - the acid [which dissolves passivity] - but it is also reflected in itself, a bringing forth: the one-sided form of the content [as] particular element. But here the drive brings itself forth; it brings forth the *labor* itself. *(Die Arbeit selbst als solche ist nicht nut Tätigkeit (Säure), sondern in sich reflektierte, Hervor-Bringen, einseitige Form des Inhalts; aber hier bringt sich der Trieb hervor, er bringt die Arbeit selbst hervor [als] einzelnes Moment* (*GW* 8, p. 205; *JPS*, p. 103).

The drive is thus presented here as the fundamental force within the I, as the one which brings forth labor both as an activity and as an objectivication or making-oneself-into-a-thing. It is the drive that makes it possible for the I to perceive itself in its own products and to reflect itself as laboring.[19]

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18 Here the Hegelian interpretation of the praxis-poiesis distinction is most visible. Labor, both in its concrete and more abstract meaning which it gets especially in *Phänomenologie*, is neither poiesis nor praxis but, in a way, both. This is so because it takes place in relation to object and to subject alike, which are elevated at the same level. This elevation also makes it easier to understand why Hegel does not distinguish between the practical and the theoretical as especially Kant does. See Lange 1980, pp. 43-49, who criticizes Heidegger and Riedel for making the claim that Hegel would present poietic creation in the classical sense as the paradigm of all action.

19 Cf. Wildt 1982, pp. 350-351. Taminiaux' comparison is, again, provocative. He points out how "at the most elementary level in human activity, Hobbes posits 'small inner beginnings of movement', to which he gives then the name *conatus* or endeavour." In a parallel fashion, Hegel places what he calls *Trieb*, the German equivalent for *conatus*, at the most elementary level of the will. Both, Hobbes and Hegel, take pains to demarcate the human *conatus* or *Trieb* from the animal one, but in different ways. For Hobbes, "*the conatus* is properly human inasmuch as it is a desire for strength". The theme of strength, this theme of modernity, is the one of Hegel's too, but he lets it begin otherwise: "According to Hegel, *Trieb* severs it ties from animality by the production of tools. While animal desire plods along in the repetition of wants and of satisfactions, human desire has its specific trait, that 'the Ego', the titulary of the *conatus*, 'detaches itself from the drive and makes of it an object'" (Taminiaux 1985, p.

From this point of view Hegel, then, deals with the tool. For a tool (*Werkzeug*), as a material object which the I has brought about out of himself, not only mediates between man and nature as well as between man and man, like in *System der Sittlichkeit*; to this Hegel now adds a cognitive or reflective function. Thus "in the tool or in the plowed and cultivated field, I possesses a *possibility*, a content as something universal" (*GW* 8, p. 206; *JPS*, p. 104), i.e., it may reflect itself as something which has universal validity. As long as the tool is not self-acting, an active contribution of the laboring I is needed, and "the drive's own activity is not yet in the thing. The tool's activity must be placed in the tool itself, so that it is made self-acting", however, Hegel contends. This means the employment of nature's own activities, "their blind doing" being "made purposeful", "rational control of natural laws in their external existence" (*GW* 8, p. 206; *JPS*, pp. 103-104).

The division of the I is completed when "the drive withdraws entirely from labor". The drive lets nature labor on its own, "watches quietly and guides it all with only the slightest effort. [This is] cunning (*List*)" (*GW* 8, p. 207; *JPS*, p. 104). Thus in the tool the drive as the will has objectified itself completely, while it simultaneously as knowledge of this remains in the subject. There are two powers or two characters here, Hegel maintains. One is active in confrontation with the beings, but it is unconscious in its openness and straightforwardness. The other, the "feminine" character, knows, but only contemplatively, without taking the being it confronts fully seriously (*GW* 8, pp. 206-207; *JPS*, pp. 104-105).

These two extremes, the universal and the particular, must then be posited within a syllogism where their opposition is negated or sublated. Knowledge (*Wissen*) turns here into cognition (*Erkennen*):

> Knowledge is precisely this ambiguity: each is identical to the other in that wherein it has opposed itself to the other. The self-differentiation of each from the other is therefore a self-positing of each as the other's equal. And this knowledge is cognition in the very fact that it is itself this knowledge of the fact that for itself its *opposition* goes over into *identity*; or this, that it knows itself as it looks upon itself in the other (*GW* 8, p.209; *JPS*, p. 106).

From this knowledge which contains, as we have perceived, the two characters, Hegel then continues by turning it into love and into the idea of a family. This is followed by a discussion of possession and the acquisition of property, the elements of the so-called state of nature, as well as the elementary mechanism of recognition (see *GW* 8, pp. 211-222; *JPS*, pp. 107-118). All these phenomena determine the "knowing will" (*wissende Wille*), i.e. the structure through which an individual will in principle reach, "according to its concept", and before the thematization of the society in any form, universality, and vice versa.

To conclude the present section, certain differences between the

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beginnings of the two systems in respect to their treatments of the concept of labor should be mentioned. First of all, as Göhler maintains in his thorough analysis, it is clear that at the opening of *Jenaer Reaphilosophie* the direct systematic significance of the concept of labor decreases from the earlier system. The concept is not taken up before discussing the Will, and even there it does not carry the unity of universality and particularity as it does in *System der Sittlichkeit*. Under the title "Knowing Will" Hegel finally prepares for a transition to social phenomena, treating here love and mutual recognition, giving labor only indirect significance within the latter.[20] This being so, however, the systematic relevance of the concept of labor for the whole development - i.e. for the Spirit, though not perhaps for the ethical substance - has increased in *Jenaer Realphilosophie*. This can be seen especially in the analysis of the tool. The phenomenal content of the analysis is basically similar in both systems; in both of them Hegel emphasizes that as distinguished from desire, labor creates something permanent between the subject and the object. But only in the later system is he able to say what this "permanence" is.

This is because he now presents the connection between labor, drive and the division in the subject, acknowledging that in labor the subject in fact acts on and constitutes himself. Here the tool is treated - not as a phenomenon which renders the natural forms of labor to a more concrete and developed state, but - as a cognitive structure containing, already at this principal level, important elements of the subject's knowledge of itself as its other. A tool is treated here as an element of will that has been made a thing, an object; the more this object labors on its own, the more human knowledge is liberated from this practical tie to the study of itself and to the manipulation of nature from distance. As we shall see, on the whole, tools and labor indeed have such a cognitive relevance to the development of spirit in this system.

Thus, while the treatment of labor and tool in *System der Sittlichkeit* engenders the first real unity of subject and object, the result in the later system is rather an opposition between them in the form of knowledge and will. Instead of different forms of ethical life, i.e. of unities, Hegel develops here cognitive structures, and for them labor as taken according to its concept and tool are systematically central, though phenomenally but one intermediary stage. The complex changes at the beginnings of the two systems in respect to the history of the notion of labor do not, then, point to one direction only.

In the constitution of the social generality, as we will see, Hegel in *System der Sittlickeit* both phenomenally and systematically attaches a more significant role to labor that he does later and thus follows, it could be said, especially the Scots in their emphatic argumentation against the discrimination of labor. In the earlier system, however, Hegel's notion of labor itself approaches the classical poiesis model, though it already

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20 Cf. Göhler 1974, pp. 487-488.

shows Hegelian features, too. Only in *Jenaer Realphilosophie*, however, is he able to connect labor to the constitution of the subject itself and accordingly to subjectivity. Hence, the overall result of all this remains ambivalent.[21] We will obtain more details to the picture by studying, next, the manner in which Hegel sets out the field of social phenomena in the two systems.

Labor and ethical life in relation

So far we have discussed the beginning of *System der Sittlichkeit*, where the natural ethical life is dealt with in its individual forms only. In these forms the individuals, especially through their needs and labor, bringing about a certain distance to nature, an elementary difference between the subject and the object as well as an elementary unity between themselves. There is no true ethical life yet, because the unity exists for the individuals merely as an ideal. In the second half of the first part of the system, Hegel begins to introduce the unity as real, i.e. those structures and forms which "carry" the unity. The unity that emerges here from the activities of needy and laboring individuals is an abstract system of economy and law, abstract because its principles exist outside or above the individuals themselves. The ethical life is here relative for this reason. The following analysis will concentrate on the central role of labor in the constitution of this formal unity.

The second potency taken as a whole is a subsumption under the concept. While the first potency was that of "feeling", this is the one of "thought"; while the former was finite and real, this is infinite and ideal.[22] In respect to the first potency of natural ethical life, a certain universality then gains reality and becomes dominant (*SdS*, 32; *SEL* 116). The key to the understanding of Hegel here is "the movement of conversion of the absolute concept as immeadiate conversion into its opposite."[23] In the present section we thus seek universality that is real and has a causal effect on the singularity. Law, for example, has such an effect on possession, which converts into property, while existing itself only in property relations. So far, as we have seen, a certain permanent distance between subject and object has emerged through need, labor and formative education. In all this the individual negates the immeadiate satisfaction of his needs, existing, consequently, as a subject, on his own. This very negation which constitutes the subject is the essence of the absolute concept. The concept gains more and more

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21 Cf. Göhler 1974, pp. 490-493.

22 Cf. Harris 1978, p. 36.

23 Leijen 1990, p. 141.

permanence when its conversions between universality and singularity are fixed in such phenomena as labor and the tool, which are now presented within the formal universality.

The treatment of relative ethical life is organized in three subsumptions again. The first one is under the intuition, and here Hegel introduces the first social determinants of labor. It is noteworthy that he starts with labor and constructs all the other relations on this basis. The influence of Adam Smith, who is not mentioned in the system, though, is evident both in the structure and several details of Hegel's presentation. The first form of universality, which still exists only in the singularity, is made possible by *mechanization* and the *division of labor*.[24] Such mechanical labor continues the movement where "the unrest of the subjective, of the concept, is placed itself outside the subject" (*SdS*, p. 24; *SEL* p. 110). It produces one and the same item infinitely, and because of this specialization it presupposes other items produced by other labor:

> ...this labor, applied to an object as an entirety, is partitioned in itself and becomes a single laboring; and this single laboring becomes for this very reason more mechanical, because variety is excluded from it and so it becomes itself something more universal, more foreign to [the living] whole. This sort of laboring, thus divided, presupposes at the same time that the remaining needs are provided for in another way, for this way too has to be labored on, i.e. by the labor of other men (*SdS*, p. 33; *SEL*, p. 117).

A certain universality, or rather a tension between universality and singularity emerges here, and it affects every working subject. An individual gains more independence from labor when watching a machine, "a self-differentiated power of nature", but he also becomes more dependent on this single product when the satisfaction of all his needs is concerned.

Besides the labor itself, which here becomes mechanical and "deadening", its products, too, are affected by the universality that is taking shape. The products have no direct connection to the individual needs of their producers and become a *surplus* that is produced for some others. From the subjective viewpoint of the producer, the goods are quantitative, general and abstract, and represent a general, not individual, availability to use and satisfaction of needs (*SdS*, p. 33; *SEL*, pp. 117-118). The vast multiplicity of products appears for the subject as the unity of different things which may be called affluence.[25] Hegel closes the present subsumption by mentioning that a general recognition of individual possessions, which make them individual property and create a certain generality, as well their legal guarantee as the abstract

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24 Waszek 1988, pp. 205-228 aply analyzes of Hegel's different treatment of the division of labor and especially the influence of the Scots. In the present as well as in the next chapter, I will not repeat his results which, as far as Hegel's relations to the Scots is concerned, seem to be rather definitive.

25 Leijen 1989, p. 143.

form of this generality, are necessary for the functioning of the economy.

The next subsumption under the concept determines more closely the ideality of the surplus of goods that are available for the individuals, i.e. their economic relations. So far there is an ideal relation between the needy individuals, who have together produced the surplus and who in principle agree on the necessity of *exchanging* the goods. Hegel develops here the interesting metaphor of magnetism. Though an individual possesses the surplus he has produced with his labor, he is unable to enjoy it in its present form. Hence the concept "in motion": the exchange has to take place. The individuals recognize each other as possessors and change their products in order to realize their surplus in consumption. A tension of separating and unifying forces emerges: "The separation is starker, but for that very reason the urge for unification [is stronger too], just as the magnet holds its poles apart, without any of their own to unity, but, when the magnet is severed, their indentity being cancelled, [we have] electricity, a starker separation, real antithesis, and an urge for unification", Hegel writes (*SdS*, p. 35; *SEL*, p. 120). The relation of an individual to his surplus as realized is thus mediated through the ideal relation of exchange, which is stronger of the two and carries then further the ideality of these practical relations.

The realization of the ideal relation in exchange presupposes, first, a practical recognition of possession as property in the form of legal right. Externally the exchange presupposes that there exists between the products exchanged a specific form of equality, which is called *the value*. The empirical measure of value, itself still an abstraction, is *the price*. These do not yet guarantee the actual execution of the transaction, however: an exchange "is itself something uncertain because of these empirical circumstances, which appear as the gradualness of the execution of the exchange, the postponement of the whole execution to a later date, etc.; the present moment does not appear here" (*SdS*, pp. 36-37; *SEL*, pp. 120-122). The contigency and "empty possibility and freedom" of exchange must be "established as something necessary and firm", and this is achieved through a *contract*.

In a contract "the fact that the two sides of the bargain are fulfilled separately at different times becomes unimportant", to which Hegel attaches a great importance. For a contract thereby transforms the movement of the exchange, which is the movement of the absolute concept itself, "from a real one into an ideal one, but in such a way that this ideal transfer is the true and necessary one". Hegel writes:

> This much results formally, that ideality as such, and also as reality in general, can be nothing other than a spirit which, displaying itself as existing, and wherein the contracting parties are nullified as single individuals, is the universal subsuming them, the absolutely objective essence and the binding middle term of the contract (*SdS*, p. 38; *SEL*, p. 123).

In a contract the movement of exchange, this middle term which is the absolute concept, is liberated from the individual intentions of the

partners, their possible dishonesty included. These are subsumed here under the force of universality. However in acontract, the universality of the concept achieves reality only formally, as a "for-itself-subsisting finitude", "and for this reason a true reality cannot fall within this level" (*SdS*, p. 38; *SEL*, p. 123).

Hegel confirms this in his conclusion of the first part of *System der Sittlichkeit*, which is an indifference of the two preceding potencies. He returns here to the notion of life, especially individual life. After defining briefly *money* as the universal possibility of satisfying all needs, and *trade* as the activity of mediating the surplus, he remarks that the totality of relations developed so far, "this totality as singularity, is the individual indifference of all specific characteristics" (*SdS*, p. 39; *SEL*, p. 124). If read together with the introduction, where Hegel speaks of a people as an intuition or indifference of the absolute order, this may be taken as an estimation of the extent to which such an order is visible here.

An individual, taken in the indifference, is a "*living being*". While he earlier was recognized as possessing things that he had produced, he is now recognized by the law as a *person*. The individuals are here equal, and they are free too, in the sense that they are actually bound to nothing. This freedom is purely formal and abstract, present only through the objects needed and the relations based on the natural life. An individual here is singularity; "his life is posited like a thing, as something particular". He does not possess life, but exists in "formal livingness". "The life of the individual is the abstraction, pushed to its extreme, of his intuition, but the person is the pure concept of this intuition, and indeed this concept is the absolute concept itself" (*SdS*, p. 40; *SEL*, p. 124).

The movement of the individual is, thus, the movement of the absolute concept. It does not consist only of the recognition by the law as formally free and equal: the subject has to face the "power of life" too, and here it turns out that "a living individual confronts a living individual, but their power (*Potenz*) of life is unequal" (*SdS*, p. 40; *SEL*, p. 125). This inequality behind the formal equality is constitutive for the relation of *lordship and bondage*, or master and servant, where the first as the indifferent and free has the power over the latter, who is the different and unfree. The relation between master and servant reveals in fact the essential character of the whole potency "of infinity and ideality in form or in relation". Equality, like individual freedom, is here "nothing but an abstraction - it is the formal thought of life, of the first level, and this thought is a pure ideal and without reality" (*SdS*, p. 41; *SEL*, p. 125). It is singularity which prevails here in reality, and universality is nothing but ideal. Universality may become real only in the form of singularity, as Hegel demonstrates in the case of the master, who exercises universality only by subsuming the servant.

Finally, as a kind of natural island of unity among the prevailing differentiation and multiplicity, as a unit seemingly beyond contracts and legal relations, Hegel takes up the *family*. This "supreme totality of

which nature is capable" (*SdS*, p. 45; *SEL*, p. 128) cannot, however, be a general solution, for there too universality dominates only in the singular and has therefore no permanence. Thus taken together, the potency of the ethical life in relation means a growing and deepening difference. It produces both the singularity and the universality, the elements of the absolute ethical totality, which it separates while simultaneously strengthening their striving of union in a way similar to the poles of a magnet (*SdS*, p. 35; *SEL*, p. 120). The role of labor, of its division and mechanization, of the economy surplus, of the legal apparatus of recognition, is, as we have shown, central for these modern relations between subjects and objects as well as subjects and subjects.

Labor and the constitution of intersubjectivity

In *Jenaer Realphilosophie* Hegel only focuses on the social determinants of labor in the second part of the system. This is entitled "Actual (*Wirklicher*) Spirit". Actual - Hegel will later use the term "Objective Spirit" - this spirit is in the sense that the movement towards the unity of universality and particularity runs here through "actually existing" social relations and institutions. Intelligence and will, so far abstractly treated, are now presented in their unity. What is more, Hegel presumably implies with the systematics the procedure which he at the same time develops in detail in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, yet from a different point of view. There he will attempt to demonstrate through the dialectical experience of consciousness the unity of knowledge as it is according to its notion and knowledge as realized - if not for this consciousness, then at least "for us". In the introductionhe writes:

> Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the Notion of knowledge, or in other words, not to be real knowledge. But since it directly takes itself to be real knowledge, this path has a negative significance for it, and (...) the road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of doubt, or more precisely as the way of despair" (*GW* 9, p. 56; *PhS*, p. 49).

In *Realphilosophie* Hegel establishes basically the same unity, but instead of the phenomenon of knowledge as such he concentrates here on the various psychological and social phenomena from the viewpoint of consciousness. Here Hegel does not develop the intersubjective phenomena directly from the subject-object structures of labor, as he does in *System der Sittlichkeit*. Instead, at the beginning of the second part, degree of a social generality begins to emerge as a result of a struggle for mutual recognition between the persons as they were introduced so far. Labor as it is divided and structured within a modern civil society, however, proves pertinent to the constitution of these relations according to Hegel.

The struggle for recognition had been introduced at the end of the first part of *Realphilosophie* in the syllogism of love and family. Love between the sexes and the idea of family are the most elementary structures of interpersonality that are not to be developed from the object-relation of labor only.[26] "In the very fact that each knows itself in the other, each has renounced itself - love", Hegel remarks (*GW* 8, p. 209; *JPS*, p. 106). In love, each person knows oneself in the other, whose will is approved. Though each person exists here still "as the natural individual whose uncultivated natural self is recognized, "it is the element of [custom or morality], the totality of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*)" (*GW* 8, p. 210; *JPS*, p. 107).

From the viewpoint of society, a family obviously constitutes the background for men who as free persons demand recognition among their equals. Hegel implies with his new systematics that love as the elementary form of mutual recognition makes possible all the other, i.e. legal, moral and ethical forms; at the same time, however, he argues decisively that these other forms may not be founded directly on love, solidarity or friendship. This special connection which Hegel sees between love and the rationality of other forms of recognition is a major step beyond the practical philosophy of both Kant and Fichte.[27] Social recognition may only be achieved through a struggle involving things produced, social positions and honour - metaphorically life and death.[28] As far as labor is concerned, Hegel thinks, like Kant, that before the social relations proper labor can be no more than an "occupation" or taking products into possession. More consequently than in *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel argues then, as we will see, that private property is not constituted until the real struggle for social recognition.

It is clear that towards the end of his Jena period Hegel approaches in certain systematic aspects the modern theories of natural law - especially the practical philosophy of Fichte[29] - and abandons, accordingly, certain arguments which he had adopted from Plato and Aristotle. All this ties in with his shifting from the substance metaphysics to that of subjectivity. One of these changes- and, as we already know, a complicated one - is connected to the idea of a state of nature and its role in practical philosophy. In *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel had started by presenting, very much like Aristotle, various forms of

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26 This is emphasized by Wildt 1982, pp. 353-356; cf. also Harris 1983, pp. 482-487. The systematic role of the master-servant dialectic has diminished here since *SdS*, which, according to Ottmann 1982, pp. 376-379, indicates that the signifigance of his classical ideals is weakening.

27 Cf. Wildt 1982, p. 356. See also Siep 1979, esp. pp. 53-67, 86-96, who shows that the recognition of the "I" within the "us" is founded on the dual form of recognition, i.e. on love and elementary struggle, and that, even this being so, the larger social and political phenomena cannot according to Hegel be founded on love or solidarity.

28 Bonsiepen 1977, 89-90 points out how Hegel's remarks about this struggle have become more metaphorical; cf. also Wildt 1982, pp. 360-361.

29 This development is studied most carefully by Wildt 1982, pp. 287-370.

natural ethical life. The second part of this system, however, indicates that Hegel is also thinking of certain modern ideas about the justification of the political order. For here, under the title "Negativity as freedom", most of the forms of struggle and domination are discussed with the implication that true ethical relations do not merely emerge from their natural forms but require also the element of ideality that stems from the mutual relations of the subjects.[30]

A number of important differences remain between the natural law theories and Hegel's position, however. Thus Hegel gives up the idea of a state of nature from which the political order would acquire its justification in one way or another. For him the state of nature is no more than one intermediary stage in the theoretical description of the constitution of the social subject - an abstraction which precedes the struggle for recognition, i.e. the field where the legal subject and the corresponding unities of generality and particularity take shape.

In the state of nature, according to Hegel, the individuals or families attempt to exclude each other through occupation. But to consider man in the state of nature is "an immediate contradiction" and the only thing we may say of it is "*exeundum e statu naturae*":

> Their only interrelation, however, lies in overcoming (*aufzuheben*) their present interrelation, to leave the state of nature. In this interrelation they have no rights, no obligations towards one another, but acquire them only in leaving that situation. What is posited thereby is the concept of freely interrelated self-consciousnesses - but only the concept itself. Since it is only the concept, it is still to be realized; i.e., it is to transcend (*aufzuheben*) itself in the form of a concept and approach reality. In actuality, it itself occurs unconsciously in the dissolution of the problem and in the problem itself - unconsciously , i.e., so that the concept does not intrude into the (realm of the) object. (*GW* 8, p. 214; *JPS*, p. 110).

Exactly this "realization" of the concept is presented in the second part of *Realphilosophie* where the actual (*wirklicher*) Spirit is thematized. Hegel quite unambiguously claims here that the individuals only gain their rights and duties as well as their liberties in their actual relations to things and to one another.[31]

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30 Ilting 1974, pp. 775-781, is of the opinion that Hegel is here influenced above all by Spinoza. There is an important difference between them, too, for Hegel strives for a kind of synthesis of classical and modern theories: "Aber Hegel betractet im *SdS* den kampf nicht nur als ein Bewegungsmoment in der Realisierung des Ideellen, sondern zugleich als ein Ideel-werden des Realen. Denn im Kampf setzen die Kämpfenden ihr Leben aufs Spiel für etwas Ideelles und beweisen damit durch die Tat, dass ihnen dieses Ideelle für wesentlicher gilt als die Realität ihres eigenen Lebens, und damit ist das Ideelle zur eigentlichen Realität ihres Lebens geworden" (p. 779).

31 In some respect, Hegel rather approaches here Hobbes, from whom he has taken the phrase *exeundum e statu naturae.* For both of them, unlike Locke and Rousseau, in the state of nature there are no rights of possion or of anything else, but merely the execution of strength, and that is why all that can be said is that this state must be left. The principal difference between them is that for Hegel the distinctively human *conatus* is not merely a desire for strength but also a desire for recognition, and "it is precisely the introduction of the desire for recognition at the core of the struggle

At least prima facie this seems to contradict the positions we have established in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* and *System der Sittlichkeit*, arguing that the ethical life of a people should be "natural" in the Aristotelian sense of the word. In the same essay, however, we also found the assertion that "spirit is higher than nature". As we have seen, Hegel works out his new metaphysics of subjectivity and the corresponding conceptual structure of *Realphilosophie* very much in order to justify this central programmatic thesis. In the following we will see in what sense Hegel's discussion of the actual Spirit, and especially his elaboration of the notion of labor here, appears more adequate as regards to this thesis.

It is important and also unique in Hegel's development here - compared both to *System der Sittlichkeit* and the later *Rechtsphilosophie*[32] - that he at this stage wants to deduce the generality of various social phenomena, the system of needs and labor, "genetically" from a basis of (individual) intelligence, will and knowing will. As compared to *System der Sittlichkeit*, we may say that "the deductive basis" here is individualistic[33], but in what sense? Hegel by no means intends to give up his notion of the absolute ethical life, and he will insist on a "speculative correction" of the natural law theories.

The first part of *Realphilosophie* should not not be read anthropologically as Hegel's version of the state of nature. Rather it constitutes part of his answer to Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Fichte, i.e. his attempt to comprehend the constitution of the not only knowing but willing and acting subject within the economic, legal, political and moral relations of modern society. The main point is that in *Realphilosophie* Hegel at last succeeds in formulating systematically his earlier thesis about the constitutive connection between the natural law theories and the modern civil society.

As long as Hegel employs the notion of ethical life, which is ultimately justified by his metaphysics of substance, and the corresponding figure of subsumptive judgement, he is not able to do this in positive terms. In *Realphilosophie*, instead, he begins with individual consciousness and then develops its theoretical and practical activities which constitute interpersonal relations, so that finally he is in a position to discuss adequately the system of needs and labor, including its theoretical reflexes. Unlike the third part of *System der Sittlichkeit*, the system of relative ethical life does not imply the simultaneous emergence of a people as an absolute ethical totality. Instead, the actual spirit is now an actual intermediary stage on the way to the absolute ethical life. Here certain form of general will take shape, but particularity and universality still oppose each other: the individual will maintains its particularity or singularity, while the general will does not yet fully

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between individuals that permits Hegel to perform his correction of Hobbes" (Taminiaux 1985, p. 23).

32 This uniqueness of *Realphilosophie* 1805/06 is emphasized by Göhler, Roth 1981.

33 Cf. Tuschling 1978, pp.316-322.

recognize individuality as its own moment.[34] In other words, the determinants of the system are individualistic, abstract and relative - as is also the system itself, according to Hegel. In this sense Hegel approaches the natural law theories, yet the civil society is here no more than merely a medium stage, which is reflected both in respect to the conditions of its emergence and its sublation in the absolute ethical life.[35]

At the beginning of his treatment of the "actual spirit" Hegel gives the following summary:

> Possession thereby transforms itself into (property) right, just as (individual) labor was transformed, previously, into universal labor. What was family property, wherein the marriage partners knew themselves, now becomes the generalized (sphere of) the work and enjoyment of everyone. And the difference between individuals now becomes a knowledge of good and evil, of personal right and wrong (*GW* 8, p. 223 ; *JPS*, p. 119).

We enter here the value-laden world of the individuals, who as persons "for themselves "do not exist untill they recognize each other mutually. "Prior to this, the individual is merely something abstract, untrue" (ibid.). What kind of a function, then, do the concept of labor and the notions related to it have in Hegel's development of this system of recognition? Although Hegel to a large extent repeats what he in *System der Sittlichkeit* has told about particular phenomena, due to the new conceptual organization both the notion of labor itself and its role are transformed here.

Hegel begins his elaboration of the actual spirit from the opposition between the individual I as an abstract being-for-itself and its inorganic nature as being. "The I relates itself negatively to it (its inorganic nature), and annuls it as the unity of both - but in such a way that the I first shapes that abstract being-for-itself as its Self, sees its own form (in it) and thus consumes itself as well" (*GW* 8, p. 224; *JPS*, p. 120). As distinguished from desire, and in enjoyment related to this, the activities of the I begin to gain stability in "a multitude of needs". The *needs*, unlike desire, are connected with labor, which is treated from the beginning as a social activity:

> The things serving to satisfy those needs are worked up (*verarbeitet*), their universal inner possibility posited (expressed) as outer possibility, as form. This processing (*Verarbeiten*) of thing is itself many-sided, however; it is consciousness making itself into a thing. But in the element of universality, it is such that it becomes an abstract labor (*GW* 8, p. 224; *JPS*, p. 120).

Already in the first part of the *Realphilosophie*, Hegel had proposed that the tools tend to make the many-sided natural forms of labor abstract. Now this becomes more meaningful. The needs are many, and when

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34 Cf. Siep 1979, p. 194.

35 Cf. Horstmann 1975, p. 302.

they are incorporated into the I, it becomes abstract. "The I, which is for-itself, is abstract; but it does labor, hence its labor is abstract as well." Hegel means that the multiplication of needs and the division of labor corresponding to this bring about a universality that abstracts the I. "The need in general is analyzed into its many aspects - what is abstract in its movement is the being-for-itself, activity, labor." Divided labor of this kindis abstract, since "each individual, because he is an individual here, thus labors for *a* need", though his needs are many. But what does Hegel mean with the "abstractness" of labor here? An individual labors for a need, yet

> the content of his labor goes beyond his need; he labors for the need of the many, and so does everybody. (...) Since his labor is abstract in this way, he behaves as an abstract I - according to the mode of thinghood. (...) His power consists in analyzing, in abstracting, dissecting the concrete world into its many abstract aspects. Man's labor becomes entirely mechanical, belonging to a many-sided determinacy (*GW* 8, p. 225 ; *JPS*, p. 121).

Hegel views the division of labor here from the perspective of an individual I and situates it to a sequence together with a tool and a machine. They all make the labor more effective - "ten men can make as many pins as a hundred", he quotes Adam Smith's famous example[36] - yet they also make it subjectively more abstract. Hegel maintains that if a worker is able at all to conceive of himself as an individual who satisfies his needs through his labor, this can only be done in abstract terms, and that this affects his whole life. A worker moves within a circle, for because he views himself abstractly, his work will be mechanical, too.

> Man's labor becomes entirely mechanical, belonging to a many-sided determinacy. But the more abstract his labor becomes, the more he himself is mere abstract activity. (...) In other words, pure motion is precisely the relation of the abstract forms of space and time - the abstract external activity, the *machine* (*GW* 8, p. 225; *JPS*, p. 121).

Hegel is not so far from Marx here when he points to a connection between the modern mode of production and the corresponding consciousness, though he clearly does not use the term "abstract labor" in its Marxian sense. For Marx, this is a theoretical term which designates human labor in general as the source of all value in exchange and as completely independent of the specific form the labor may take in actu. Hegel, by contrast , reflects here on the division of labor and its resulting one-sidedness as seen from the subjective point of view.[37]

Within this modern system of need and labor, the individuals do

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36 See Waszek 1988, pp. 128-134, who has analyzed all the Hegelian formulations of this example.

37 There has been some dispute over this matter among Marxian writers. Schanz 1981, pp. 166-175 criticizes Lukács 1973 and Marcuse 1977 for not taking enough notice of this difference; cf. also Krämer-Badoni 1978, pp. 81-85, Wolf 1980, pp. 184-189 and Breuer 1983, pp. 546-548.

not satisfy their needs immediately, so that there must be "a movement" which makes the individual needs - or more generally, the individual himself - concrete again. It begins with value and ends with a mutual recognition of the subjects within a general will and with the corresponding legal forms. Although Hegel relies here heavily on concepts taken from the Scottish political economy, he is not primarily interested in the needs and different forms of labor as such, or in their relation to the growth of the national wealth. Instead Hegel focuses here on what happens to the individual I, and even on what happens in this I, within the modern system of recognition.[38]

Hegel's discussion proceeds again in the form of syllogisms organized along the respective forms of consciousness. The criterion for this phenomenological procedure lies in the different forms of unity between the universal and the particular, i.e. in the different ways in which the individual subject recognizes himself as a part of the general structure, in which the subjects recognize each other in these structures and contribute to the general will.

So far an abstraction and diversification of individual needs, resulting from the division of labor, has been considered. The individual, who has externalized himself in labor and who then tries to satisfy his various needs through exchange, recognizes himself in these elementary forms both as equal to the others and as autonomous, i.e. different from the others. Hegel continues by studying the prerequisites for the exchange mechanism, starting with a preliminary definition:

> The judgment which analyzed them placed them against itself as determinate abstractions. Their universality to which this judgment rises is (that of) the equality of these needs, or *value*. In this they are the same. This value itself, as a thing, is *money*. The return to concretion, to posession, is *exchange* (*GW* 8, p. 225; *JPS*, pp. 121-122).

Thus in order that the needs may become concrete again and satisfied there must, first, be a certain sameness in or equality between the various products. Hegel describes this again from the subjective point of view: an individual gives up, or releases, the thing he has in his possession, while the others release their possession as well, "and this equality in the thing, as its inner aspect, constitutes its *value*, in regard to which I concur entirely with the opinion of the other." Value, Hegel adds, is "the unity of my will and his" (*GW* 8, p. 226; *JPS*, p. 122). Hegel does not propose a labor theory of value, not in the Smithian or in the Marxian form. His is rather a kind of subjective theory, or a mixed theory, defining the value as an elementary form of a general will and consciousness.[39]

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38 In the Marxian interpretations, which have very much concentrated on the present sections of *Realphilosophie*, a general problem from which many of the more specific problems then follow, is that they do not see the difference between Hegel's intentions and those of the political economists and of Marx.

39 Heinen 1977 may be right in arguing that in the history of the theories of value Hegel represents a position that mediates between the objective and subjective

Before the products of labor are mutually recognized as values, the individuals possess (*besitzen*) them. Through this recognition, however, the individual possession is transformed into something universal and spiritual and becomes *property*. "Property is thus an immediate having, mediated through being-recognized. (...) Here the contingency in taking possession is overcome (*aufgehoben*). All that I have, I have through work and exchange, i.e., in being recognized" (*GW* 8, p. 227; *JPS*, p. 123). Thus it may be said that although Hegel does not propose a labor theory of value, at least not in any unambiguous sense, he sees the constitution of a modern individual as a result of his economic activities, of labor and exchange, on which the other forms of social recognition are then based. This is of systematic importance. Since Hegel is here for the first time, owing to his phenomenological reading of the political economy, able to demonstrate systematically the intrisic connection between the natural law theories and the principles of a modern civil society. As a result of his assessment, the bourgeois legal subject is no longer seen as a natural and "ready-made" initiator of a social contract. Rather he is a subject whose constitution, both economic and legal, should be demonstrated.[40] The constitution of such a subject is also - this is the principal novum of *Realphilosophie* as compared to *System der Sittlichkeit* - the starting point for the further development of the civil society and emergence of political relations as higher forms of ethical life. From this it does not follow, however, that Hegel would have given up his fundamental view that this individual subject as such does not siffoce as the basis of the civil society or the more advanced political phenomena.

When the subjects have, through the phenomena of value, money and exchange, come to recognize each other actually, "my will is presented as *more valid* (*geltender*), not only for myself but also for the other - and it amounts to as much as existence itself. (...) There is a consciousness, a distinction of the concept of being-recognized: the will of the individual is a shared will (or statement or judgement), and his will is his actuality as (the) externalization of himself which is my will. This knowing is expressed in the *contract*" (*GW* 8, p. 228; *JPS*, p. 124). Like exchange, a *contract* means the externalization of a private will into a general, recognized will. It is however "ideal", "an exchange of declarations, no longer an exchange of objects. (...) Will has (thus) gone back into its concept" (*GW* 8, pp. 228-229; *JPS*, pp. 124-125). This is a crucial stage in Hegel's cognitive structures, for the contractual relation confirms the division within the subject between the I and the self, between the universal and the particular, in a way which then makes the subject more aware or conscious of himself and thus contributes something on which the further conceptualization of the will is to be built.

As for a contract, there appears an opposition, or "a division",

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theories. Cf. also Breuer 1983, pp. 546-547.

40 Cf. Lichtblau 1981, p. 111.

between the individual and the universal. For the universal will, which finds its expression in the contract, "has validity as such" and "is set free from actuality", so that "the individual will (appears) as the negative of the universal will" (*GW* 8, p. 229; *JPS*, p. 125). This negativity of the individual will is, as we shall see, characteristic of the whole sphere of the actual spirit and is only sublated in the state as an ethical totality.

When a subject enters into a contract and he is recognized as a party in it, his individuality is partly suppressed, since he is not recognized as a living I but as a legal person. Thus he is recognized as a free person, because he gives up his intentions that do not accord with the contract. Following Rousseau and Kant, Hegel says: "the person, the pure being for himself, thus is not respected as an individual will separating itself from the shared will, but only as that shared will. I become compelled to be a person" (*GW* 8, p. 230; *JPS*, p. 126). The contract binds the subject not as a particular identity, but as a legal person. What is more, the subject perceives himself as a person only within this universal will, though it is precisely what has absorbed him as the individual I. By studying the dialectic of recognition, Hegel wants to show which elements of the I enter the personhood that is constituted in the contractual relation, and which elements of the living I are absorbed by the abstractions.[41]

Hegel does not conceive of the contract as a direct social agreement involving honor and like qualities but, instead, things produced and exchanged. Therefore the universal will manifests itself in contingent things. Hence, the element of compulsion would not touch the individual wills as such but their "determinacy", "existence" as particularities only. "But", Hegel contends, "the (particular) existence (*Daseyn*) is dissolved in the (concept of) person, and in the universal will" (*GW* 8, p. 231; *JPS*, p. 127). In fact it is "the force of the contract" that it concerns not only the will in respect to certain things but also the individual himself: "not merely my possession and my property are posited here, but also my personality - i.e., this insofar as my existence includes my all, my honor and life" (*GW* 8, p. 231; *JPS*, p. 127). Thus, though honour and life as such are never matters of contract, the compulsion of the contract applies to the whole personality. If I commit a crime, i.e. concious of the contract I want to set my will against the universal will, a punishment follows, "a just revenge", a restoration of the general recognition that had been damaged (cf. *GW* 8, pp. 232-236; *JPS*, pp. 128-132). We may say that in a contract, the living I of the partners is inevitably violated , but this violation is both necessary and just in the sense of the system of recognition.

In the latter half of his presentation of the actual spirit, entitled "The Coercive Law" (*das Gewalthabende Gesetz*), Hegel introduces the social institutions that, in the first place, correspond to this negative universality, and also refer to the following treatment of the absolute

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41 See Siep 1979, pp. 86-96.

ethical life.[42] The discussion of this "interventionistic state" is divided into three parts: first Hegel considers the family from a juridical point of view, then he looks into the economic activies of society and state, and finally he deals with the legal restrictions of the individual activities. The second group of these themes will be discussed here.

In order that a possession, whether it belongs to a family or to an individual, may become property, it must be protected by the law. From the viewpoint of an individual, "his law is only that whatever he works upon or exchanges belongs to him. But the universal is at the same time his necessity, a necessity which sacrifices him in his legal freedom" (*GW* 8, p. 242; *JPS*, p. 138). This sacrifice means that the individual exists, unconsciously, though, in the universal. As a living individual he is suppressed in this universality; the idea of the state as a higher form of universality signifies to Hegel very much that it will liberate and fulfill this living individuality. With a formulation that could almost be written by Marx, Hegel maintains :

> "Society is his "nature", upon whose elementary, blind movement he depends, and which sustains him or negates him spiritually as well as physically. (...) He works at an abstract labor; he wins much from nature. But this merely transforms itself into another form of contingency. He can produce more, but this reduces the value of his freedom; and in this he does not emerge from universal (i.e. abstract) relations (*GW* 8, p. 243; *JPS*, p. 138).

The impact of this universal quality on the individual, whom it takes in its abstract possession, is in Hegel's view mainly negative. New needs emerge, it is true, and each individual need becomes more subtle. Consequently, taste develops, ever new distinctions are made. Hegel seems to be critical, however, first because these novel phenomena are artificially produced and the individual is "*cultivated* as naturally enjoying them". And what is even worse, this refinement of taste and needs conditions changes in the labor process which for the individual must be esteemed as negative:

> he becomes - through the abstractness of labor - more mechanical, duller, spiritless. The spiritual element, this fulfilled self-coscious life, becomes an empty doing (*leeres Thun*). The power of the Self consists in a rich (all-embracing) comprehension; this power is lost (*GW* 8, p. 243; *JPS*, p. 139).

For the individual there does not seem to be any departure from this abstract process: he may labor more, "but this reduces the value of his labor"; he may let the machines carry out part of the work, "but his own activity thereby becomes more formalized". Thus due to the division of labor, "his dull work constricts him to a single point".

Showing considerable sensitivity, Hegel notes that such

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42 In his later *Rechtsphilosophie* (# 230-256), *Polizei* and *Korporationen* are presented as institutions which mediate between the system of need and the state.

phenomena of compensation as "fashion, mutability, freedom in the use of forms" develop, in which "change is essential and rational". He clearly acknowledges their relevance to modern life but points out critically how they create yet another purely contingent and relative world:

> here there is no free beauty, only a charming beauty (*ein reitzende Schönheit*) which is the adornment of another person and relates itself to (yet) another, a beauty aimed at arousing drive, desire, and which thus has a contingency to it (*GW* 8, p. 243; *JPS*, p. 139).

While these phenomena acknowledged so far constitute for their part the modern subject of relative ethical life, the processes that Hegel discusses next, briefly but sharply, endanger the actual spirit itself. The division of labor leadsto competition and the necessity to produce as effectively as possible. Labor is made as simple and abstract as possible, ever more new machines are invented and introduced. A complex contingency spreads over the social whole. The first consequence is that "a vast number of people are condemded to a labor that is totally stupefying, unhealthy and unsafe; secondly "entire branches of industry, which supported a large class of people, go dry all at once because of (changes in) fashion or fall in prices"; and thirdly, "the contrast (between) great wealth and great poverty appears; the powerty for which it becomes impossible to do anything; (the) wealth (which), like any mass, makes itself into a force" (*GW* 8, p. 244; *JPS*, pp. 139-140).[43]

These consequences of acquisition of wealth in ever greater and more complex units "lead to the utmost dismemberment of the will, to inner indignation and hatred". However, there is no other way, no way back, since "this necessity, which is the complete contingency of the individual existence, is at the same time its sustaining substance. State power enters and must see to it that each sphere is supported" (*GW* 8, p. 244; *JPS*, p. 140). Thus although Hegel's view of the contingencies dominating the social whole is basically critical, he clearly acknowledges the futility of an attempt to deny or condemn its actual necessity.[44] It is, one could say, a necessity, though an evil one. As in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* and in *System der Sittlichkeit*, and being even more liberal[45], Hegel proposes that the interference of the state in the freedom of commerce "must be as inconspiciuous as possible, since commerce is the field of arbitrariness. The appearance of force must be avoided; and one must not attempt to salvage what cannot be saved, but rather employ the suffering classes in other ways" (*GW* 8, p. 245; *JPS*, p. 140-141). The coercive law, i.e. the state as functioning within the sphere of relative

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43 There is no point in repeating the remarks of Waszek's 1988, pp. 205-228 here. His discussion of Hegel's views about the division of labor and its positive and negative effects is - at last, we should say - very well balanced and acute. He shows convincingly that Hegel is even here not so far from the Scots.

44 For further details, see Waszek 1988, pp. 225-228.

45 Cf. Göhler 1974, p. 544.

ethical life, should do its job like a night-watchman.

9 LABOR AND THE LIMITATIONS OF RELATIVE ETHICAL LIFE

In the foregoing chapters I have studied systematically Hegel's two early sketches of a philosophy of subjectivity up till the point where the social universality is constituted. The two sketches are founded on two different metaphysics; therefore their logical and methodological principles of organization and presentation differ as well. In ch. 5 I have generally characterized Hegel's idea of a state and outlined its development in Jena. In the present chapter I shall attempt to draw the various strings together as far as the state, i.e. the organization of the substantial ethical life is concerned, concentrating on two broad and complicated questions. First, the discussion of Hegel's interpretation and usage of the notions of poiesis and praxis will be concluded by studying Hegel's complicated notion of action, which he draws upon when presenting the state as a living ethical substance or subjectivity. Secondly, against the background of the first question, I shall study the roles that an individual, originating from different estates, will have within the political realm. Both of these large questions are closely connected with Hegel's attempts in Jena to critically comprehend the principles of the modern world.

Morality, legality and ethical life

In *Naturrechtsaufsatz* Hegel had programmatically assserted what is wrong in the empirical and the formal treatments of the natural law. His main argument was that they both first present the moral law or some

other principle, which is then supposed to serve as the foundation for the legal and political relations, *in opposition* to the causal mechanisms of nature. He found empirical treatments altogether incapable of justifying a normative idea in a rational way, so that they end up in "a formless and external harmony called 'society' or 'state'" (*GW 4*, p. 426; *NL*, p. 65). Formal or transcendental treatments are more advanced in the sense that they correct the simple inconsistency of the empirical theories, i.e., they do not relate merely to empirical states of affair in their normative argumentation. Instead, Kant and Fichte argue from the apioric notion of pure practical reason, but this procedure amounts from Hegel's viewpoint to no more than a radicalization of the empirical theories. In *Naturrechtsaufsatz* Hegel made this point by claiming that neither of these approaches reach beyond the opposition or difference between multiplicity and unity, nature and reason, necessity and freedom, to their indifference. Hegel will remain faithful to this program, but we have already familiarized ourselves with some of his problems as well as solutions pertaining to his attempts to demonstrate the feasibility of his program.

One way to make comprehensible what Hegel has in mind here is to look at the "action theoretical" foundation of the different theories. I have indicated (cf. ch. 2) how both Hobbes and Locke, the "empirical theorists", conceive of the human action basically as making. Hobbes wants to construct his social theory according to the model of modern natural sciences, and consequently a human agent is a unit which through his action exercises power and brings about new action or movement. There is a close connection between *actio, operario* and *potentia* in Hobbes' theory, which attempts to justify the necessity of Leviathan from the causal movement of the human actors. In Locke's theory the idea that human action is first and foremost labor, *occupatio*, the subject's self-preservation against nature and other subjects, is made even more explicit.

This idea is, as we have seen, in one form or another essential to most of the theoretical images of the modernity. The modern subject does what he does, or makes what he makes, out of himself, "autonomously". He does not subordinate his actions to any ontological or theological telos, but only to his own will and intentions. The question of how autonomous his action in fact is, and to what extent and in what sense it is to be explained in causal terms, may be disputed, but in any case him no such mechanism as the objective teleology in the classical sense exists for him.

The modern subject acts poietically rather than practically. We have discussed already (cf. ch. 3) in what sense a reversion of the classical hierarchy of poetical and practical activities takes place in the early modern political and social theory, most definitively perhaps in the political economy. More generally, one should notice how thoroughly all the notions in the action theoretical field gain new meanings. Hobbes and Locke deal with nature and natural law in a different sense than

Aristotle does, conceiving of a political act as an act which should bring about a political or legal condition in opposition to the state of nature. In this case, political action is making, and there is an effective causality of a particular kind, different from the Aristotelian causa finalis, which should ultimately account for this action. The model is in fact closer to the Aristotelian house making, where the activity is to be distinguished and explained from its intended result. Thus a modern political agent very much founds and builds, creates and causes, constructs and legislates, and he does this of his own will and useing his imagination, not according to the plan of nature or God. This view, however, - and here seems to lie one of Hegel's main concerns - leads to a general change in the whole sense of normativity in legal and political matters.

Hegel views an empirical theory like that of Hobbes as simply inconsistent, because from such postulates as natural egoism and self-preservation a legal or political condition is never to be justified, he maintains. But what is more, perhaps, Hegel wants to point out in which way the whole idea of the modern subject who produces or brings about or constructs out of himself is defective, when the ultimate normative nature and signicance of law, or state, is considered. Hegel thinks of the classical view, according to which all the activities of man, whether poietic or practical or theoretical, should be seen in a wider and more fundamental context, which for the Greeks was the ontological idea of the good[1], and to which he attempts to give an interpretation that would be consistent with the principles of modernity.

From this viewpoint it becomes clear why for Hegel the transcendental theories of natural law are primarily rationalizations or radicalizations of the empirical theories. Although Kant excludes the economic and technical activities from the scope of his practical philosophy, he and Fichte explain, not unlike Hobbes and Locke, the legal and political activities from the individual subject as their autonomous initiator. From Hegel's viewpoint Kant argues along the lines of Hobbes and Locke, only more consistently, by postulating the pure reason as becoming practical. Instead of relating the activities of the human will directly to the legal and political condition, he does this qua the level of morality, where only the will itself, the motivation for action is relevant. At the level of legality, i.e. in the realm of law and politics, it is a matter of transforming the principles of morality into maxims that regulate the actions themselves. The result of this operation, for Hegel, is that though the human will as the origin and foundation is made pure, which is basically correct, its legislating activity is again a kind of making. In fact the gulf between the legislator and its work is only made deeper here.[2] Against this individualism Hegel seeks for a way to present, drawing upon the classical paradigm, the unity of the individual and his community from a normative perspective.

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1 See Gadamer 1986.

2 Cf. Giusti 1990, p. 54.

In *Naturrechtsausatz* and in *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel argues, still on the basis of his metaphysics of substance, that the difference between universality and particularity, freedom and necessity, will be sublated into their indifference in political life which is conceived of as the realization of the ethical nature. Thus he maintains that one should, even in modern times, think of the political praxis from the Aristotelian viewpoint, presenting it as positive ethical totality within which particular individuals as well as institutions only gain their true shape. Within this ethical totality, which for Hegel is "positive" in the affirmative sense of the word, the abstractions of the modern world, its *Entzweiungen*, or "positivities" in the negative sense of the word, which is familiar to us from Hegel's early texts on religion - in *Phänomenologie des Geistes* Hegel uses the term *Schein* here (cf. *GW* 9, p. 55; *PhS*, p. 48) - are situated in their natural, "organic" places in a way which reveals their real meaning.[3] Hegel refers to this meaning when he writing: "the positive is prior by nature to the negative, or, as Aristotle says: 'the state comes by nature before the individual; if the individual in isolation is not anything self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state in one unity just as other parts are to their whole.'" (*GW* 4, pp. 467-468; *NL*, p. 113).

Hegel thus follows Aristotle who contends that the state as an ethical totality is ontologically prior to its citizens. For Aristotle this priority means that the state is ultimately not founded or brought about by the citizens but is, instead, based on nature. The state exists "by nature", not "from other causes". Unlike all the "artificial products" or "products of art", it has "within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect to place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration)."[4] According to Aristotle, nature not only is the material of the state, but as its reality (*energeia)* it is also the essence (*ousia*) of the state. This means that nature in a teleological sense is present in the first forms of the state already, from which the development proceeds towards it mature, i.e. natural form. Aristotle shoes this clearly in the following passage:

> When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best (*Politics*, 1252b28-1253a2).

The state, ultimately a natural community, is thus prior to the individual

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3 For a closer study of the two meanings of the term "positivity" in *Naturrechtsausatz* see Giusti 1987, pp. 38-50 and Bonsiepen 1977.

4 See Aristotle *Physics* Book II, 192b8-23.

citizen for whom, as "a political animal", it is rational to try to develop himself *qua* the common political activity. This activity is, as we have seen (ch. 2), practical, for it does not bring about any particular states of affairs but develops itself, improves itself, by trying to take better care of the common rational matters. Aristotle's point is, and Hegel seems to follow him here, that the sophists, and perhaps Plato too, are principally wrong as they conceive of the political praxis according to the model of technical or theoretical knowledge.[5] Neither of these models is capable of doing justice to the "hermeneutical" character of praxis, i.e. its ever present dependence on the *ethos* of the community where it takes place. Aristotle views a political praxis as aiming at improving itself, attaining less deficient forms of itself, not to a result which is brought about once and for all, or to a separate theoretical insight. In this sense, polis and its ethos are for Aristotle the origin of the individual citizens, and not vice versa.

In respect to the modern theories, which in one way or another proceed from the individual, from his natural properties or his will, Hegel defends, especially during his first years in Jena, the classical view according to which man's ethical goals may come true only within the political community. We have seen how he in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* distinguishes between ethics in the proper sense of the word and the science of morals. The latter "deals only with the area of the inherently negative, while the true positive belongs to natural law as is implied in its name", he writes (*GW 4*, p. 468; *NL*, p. 113). He may follow Aristotle here, who begins his *Magna Moralia* as follows:

> Since our purpose is to speak about matters to do with character, we must first inquire what character is of branch. For it is not possible to act at all in affairs of state unless one is of a certain kind, to wit, good. Now to be good is to possess excellences. If therefore one is to act succesfully in affairs of state, one must be of a good character. The treatment of character then is, as it seems, a branch and starting-point of statecraft. And as a whole it seems to me the subject ought rightly to be called, not Ethics, but Politics (1181a-b25).

Hegel opens the final part of *System der Sittlichkeit*, entitled simply "Ethical Life" - and preceded, as we know (cf. ch. 6), by the first part on the natural form of ethical life and the second on various destructive phenomena in the ethical sense - with a contrast to the views of Kant and Fichte. He makes it clear that the absolute ethical life is a matter of political existence. "In the course of nature the husband sees flesh of his flesh in the wife, but in ethical life alone does he see the spirit of his spirit in and through the ethical order" (*SdS*, p. 60; *SEL*, p. 143), he writes about the "intellectual intuition" which is present here. Hegel thinks of the intuiting of one's *Volk*, the people and the country, its laws and customs, as the "intuition of oneself as oneself in every other individual", so that "the individual exists in an eternal mode; his empirical being and doing

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5 Cf. Gadamer 1986, Bubner 1982, pp. 66-73 and Giusti 1987, pp. 46-47.

is something downright universal; for it is not his individual aspect but the universal absolute spirit in him" (*SdS*, p. 61; *SEL*, p. 143). Hegel contrasts this intuition of the ethical life, where "absolute indentity, which previously was natural and something inner, has emerged into consciousness", with an "empirical intuition under a relation, made the servant of necessity, and posited as something restricted, with infinity outside itself" (*SdS*, p. 61; *SEL*, p. 143). With the latter he also refers to Kant and Fichte.

This becomes evident when he goes on to presenting the idea of ethical life "at rest" and "in motion", distinguishing between "constitution" and "government".[6] First the idea is as the intuition, then as the absolute unity of intuition and concept (*SdS*, p. 63; *SEL*, p. 145). Hegel begins by summarizing his critique of Kant's and Fichte's practical philosophies as follows:

> [T]he separation of particular and universal would seriously appear as a slavely of the particular, as something in subjection to the ethical law, and further as the *possibility* of a different subjection. In ethical life there would be no *necessity*. The grief would not endure, for it would be intuited in its objectivity, would not be detached; and the ethical action would be an accident of judgement, for with separation the possibility of another consciousness is established (*SdS*, p. 64; *SEL*, p. 146).[7]

Contrary to this reflective position, Hegel then presents his ethical totality where every agent, through his class, has his necessary duties as well as virtues. He argues here along the classical lines, as we have seen (cf. ch. 5), from the ethical (i.e. political) substance, in which only the individual agents are related in a necessary way to the whole. In Hegel's discussion of the classes, their specific relations to *Volk* can be regarded as most important. Ultimately only the "work" of the first class, of the nobility, i.e. its political praxis, expresses the virtues of courage and wisdom that are necessary for the "absolute, organic activity in the *Volk*". The bourgeoisie lacks both of them, while the peasantry may in wartime show courage.

Thus Hegel obviously points here to the connection between the abstract world of relations, in which the bourgeoisie lives, being capable only of the virtue of *Rechtschaffenheit*, and the abstract form in which Kant and Fichte conceive of morality as an opposition between the particular and the universal. For both morality is a matter of a subjective sense of duty and legality, a task which when accomplished should bring about a system of just relations. Against this view, Hegel himself is after a more concrete and organic picture of the positive ethical totality, where the bourgeois system of relations together with is moral theoretical reflex is situated - a picture which would grasp the ethical life as a necessity in its reality, not merely as a possibility in its absence. In *System der*

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6 As for the terminological difficulties here see Harris 1979, pp. 62-63.

7 For an interpretation of the last sentence see Harris 1979, pp. 65-66 and Harris 1982.

Sittlichkeit, however, I have argued, Hegel is not yet able to demonstrate systematically the connection is question. Neither is the way he builds on Aristotle's metaphysics, on the normative idea of nature, convincing under the modern conditions, as he himself realizes. Thus, in order to accomplish his program of a practical philosophy, he will change his whole conceptual apparatus and present, then, the concrete unity of the individual and his political community in dialectical and less anachronistic terms.

In *Jenaer Realphilosophie* Hegel depicts, as we have seen, both society and state in terms of an emergence of the complicated cognitive structure which he calls Spirit, starting with the individual agent and his intelligence, and considering thereafter his will and the way he in his activities is driven into various relations to the objects as well as to the interpersonal relation of recognition. In this picture the elaboration does not proceed towards a realization of the ethical nature of the individual, but towards a deepening consciousness of oneself in the unity with the whole, i.e. freedom. But does Hegel, and in what sense, now succeed better than in *System der Sittlichkeit* in demonstrating the thesis which he implies, namely that the Kantian morality still shares the same bourgeois restrictions as the modern theories of natural law, when the state is considered an ethical totality? In what sense does he sublate this morality into the substancial ethical life?

Although Hegel proceeds from the individual agent, from his intelligence and will, he does this in a sense which differs fundamentally from that of either Hobbes and Locke, or Kant and Fichte. Not in accord with the empirical theories, Hegel defends the practical reason as defined by Kant and Fichte; but unlike them he wants to present this reason as actual, as the Spirit demonstrated in the actions of men. Thus, again, morality is not a matter of demand or a task and a mere possibility, but a matter of reality and necessity, i.e. ethical life. Instead of the metaphysical substance, it is now the subjectivity on which this demonstration is built. The key idea, as we know, is that Hegel presents the constitution of subjectivity through the various activities of the agents and their corresponding cognitive structures. Hegel is now far better capable of doing justice in his critical manner to both morality and law. For they are no longer treated as belonging to the natural ethical life but as necessary stages in the formation of the general will and, consequently, in the liberation from nature. In spite of this, though, Hegel will not give up his critique of the individualism of the modern natural law and keeps on defending the idea of an ethical and political totality. The problem is, then, how to combine these options dialectically.[8]

In the last section of our previous chapter we followed how Hegel with his new systematics begins to develop the Actual Spirit, which is the sphere of needs and divided labor, of abstract morality and relations

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8 Cf. Siep 1979, pp. 197-202.

of private law. Unlike in *System der Sittlichkeit*, he proceeds from the will of the individuals, but not in the way Kant and Fichte conceive of the sphere of legality. We should again emphasize that for Hegel especially the will may function and is in fact constituted only in the activities of the individuals themselves. The idea of the good will and morality in abstraction, as a matter of motivation only, appears emptyfrom his viewpoint. The key for understanding Hegel here is his notion of activity through which the subjectivity emerges.

Through a drive (*Trieb)* and the needs, which are satisfied by laboring, a subject begins to act on himself in a constitutive fashion, Hegel claims. A dialectical relation between his I and his self emerges, where the latter represents the various interpersonal phenomena into which the I externalizes himself. The I then experiences himself in these various phenomena, cognizing and recognizing himself and the others in the various forms of action, and the point is, as we have seen, that both morality and legality should be seen as certain stages or aspects within this totality of relations.

One of the major steps in Hegel's discussion was the phenomenon of contract. "There is a consciousness, a distinction of the concept of being recognized: the will of the individual is a shared will (or statement or judgement) and his will is his actuality as externalization of himself which is my will. This knowing is expressed in the *contract*" (*GW 8*; p. 228; *JPS*, p. 124). In the contract the private will constitutes a certain ideal structure, through which the subject in a crucially new sense becomes aware of the universal and particular moments in himself. At the same time the opposition between the individual and the universal will emerges in a new sense, because the latter is "institutionalized" in the contract.

A contract is in fact a highly paradoxical phenomenon. There an individual will recognizes itself both as equal to other individual wills, as part of a general will, and as different from these wills, as an autonomous individual will. All this takes place, as we have seen, through the activities of labor, exchange, taking into possession, possessing and having property, activities which make a contractual relation of mutual recognition necessary. When Hegel analyzes these phenomena as cognitive structures within the individual subject, as a dialectic between his I and his self, he maintains lucidly that an individual is not the real subject, i.e. an autonomous initiator and a presupposition of these relations, but in fact a product of them. Alluding to Rousseau, Hegel then contends: "The person, the pure being-for-himself, thus is not respected as an individual will separating itself from the shared will. I become compelled to be a person" (*GW 8*, p. 230; *JPS*, p. 126).

For Hegel this implies that the contractual relations are necessarily abstract. An individual will is both autonomous and general here, but only through the abstract notion of legal personality where the personal I, the concrete personality is necessarily absent. Consequently, also the

general will is abstract. It is bound to injure one's concrete personality. In the original formulation of a contract this abstract generality is still ideal, "potential", but through the phenomenon of a crime it will show its actual force. If one commits a crime, i.e. breaks a contract, one "wants to be something (like Herostratus), not necessarily to be famous but only to have *his* will prevail, in opposition to the universal will" (*GW* 8, p. 235; *JPS*, p. 130). This is followed by a punishment, a retribution, which "is revenge, but as justice". This is also Kant's point but, as the following passage shows, Hegel does not operate with the clear-cut distinction between morality and legality when he presents the recognized general will:

> The injured party is recognized in himself; everything proceeds in the element of recognition, of Right. *Dolus*, the crime, has this significance: that the one doing the injury has previously recognized the injured, that the criminal (usually the thief) knew what he did, not [necessarily] its determinate scope, but its general determinacy; that he knew it to be prohibited, and knew that in this act he does injury to a person, such as is recognized in himself; that he [the criminal] lives in the element of recognition; [and] whatever exists derives its meaning in such recognition (*GW* 8, pp. 235-236; *JPS*, p. 131).

For Hegel "the inner [subjective] source of crime is the coercive force of the law" (*GW* 8, p.234; *JPS*, p. 130), i.e. the suppressive nature of this force for the individual as a concrete personality. Hegel concludes his discussion of the abstract system of economic and legal relations in the section "The Coercive law", which we have already dealt with (ch. 8). In the beginning he gives a very good summary when saying that "the law is the *substance* of the person", and defining that

> this substance is the mediation of the person with himself in his immediate existence - the substance of his existence, resting entirely on [his being in] community with others, hence the absolute necessity of the same. At the same time, the totality is nothing more than this universal subsistence, in which the individual person is transcended, negated (*aufgehoben*). That is to say, the totality alone is provided for, not the individual as such, who is rather sacrificed in the universal (GW 8, pp. 236-237; JPS, pp. 132-133).

Thus Hegel has reached the conclusion that in the relations in which the individual wills have externalized and recognized themselves, the individuals do not count yet as living persons. From this critique of modern society and its theoretical reflexes he then proceeds further towards the state as a more concrete ethical and political community. Before concluding with a discussion of the various roles Hegel gives to the individuals in this community, I shall take up the notion of necessity and contingency as they are used in the "Judicial Force" (*richterliche Gewalt)*, for they are of wider importance in Hegel's argumentation.

The law is the substance of a person. As a particular will he is what he is through the law, which is constituted as a result of the various activities of the individual will. This law is necessarily coercive, both in

the sense that it is sanctioned, that is has judicial force, and that it is needed for the maintainance of the general will. "The state is the existence (*Daseyn*), the power of right; the keeping of a contract (and of the permanence in its unutilized property); it is the existent unity of the word, of ideal existence and of actuality, as well as the immediate unity of possession and right: property as universal substance, permanence; the being-recognized as what counts" (*GW* 8, p. 246; *JPS*, p. 141). It is one of the interventionist tasks of the state to guarantee the power of this right. However, Hegel is distinctively of the opinion that this is not yet the truly ethical task.

For the law as such, be it the moral law itself or the existent (*daseiende)* law brought about by the particular wills and guaranteed by the state, does not yet constitute an ethical totality. The law is always accompanied by a tension within the particular subject between his self, i.e. the meaning of the law for him, and his personal I. Even if we imagine, as Hegel hypothetically does, that this tension could in principle be abolished, that the I would be perfectly one with the self through the law, the idea that an ethical community would be constituted by the law only proves impossible. For "a complete legislation in all its fullness is to set out on the same sort of thing as, for example, wanting to specify all colors. Unending process of legislation" (*GW* 8, p. 247; *JPS*, p. 143). This is a "bad infinity". The more laws there are, the more contigent is our knowledge of them and, consequently, of their power too. For the judges are less and less capable of applying the law skillfully to the cases at hand, and the trial proceedings themselves become less and less efficient (*GW* 8, p. 248; *JPS*, p. 144).

All this implies, for Hegel at least, that if we want to think of a truly ethical community, or to speak about the state as the sphere of the ethical life, we have to proceed further, seeking for a relation between the individual subject as constituted so far and the community not only as mediated by the law and other forms of recognized will, but also as a result of the lived *ethos* of the individual subjects. In line with Plato and Aristotle, Hegel's last word on practical philosophy in Jena thus emphasizes the various classes and their respective political praxis, i.e. the activities through which each of them contributes to the living political totality.

Individual subject and the state

For Hegel the problem of the modern world culminates very much in the question to what extent he himself is able to do justice to the individuality and its freedom. He writes:

> This is the higher principle of the modern era, a principle unknown to Plato and the ancients. In ancient times, the common morality consisted

> of the beautiful public life - beauty [as the] immediate unity of the universal and the individual, [the polis] as a work of art wherein no part separates itself from the whole, but is rather this genial unity of the self-knowing Self and its [outer] presentation. Yet individuality's knowledge of itself as absolute - this absolute being within itself (*Insichseyn*) - was not there (*GW* 8, p. 263; *JPS*, p. 160).

Because Hegel proceeds in his practical philosophy differently from all his modern collegues, and follows Plato and especially Aristotle in his defence of an absolute and necessary ethico-political totality, the problem of the status of individuality will be especially his.

In *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel intends to prove the reality of an absolute ethical substance under which the individual agent is subsumed within an infinite judgement. There is little room for a mediation in this judgement. The whole procedure ends when the concept has gathered all the determinations and the individual immediately faces, in an intuition, the absolute unity. Hegel remarks at the beginning of the last part: "Ethical life must be the absolute identity of intelligence, with complete annihilation of the particularity and the relative identity which is all the natural relation is capable of; or the absolute identity of nature must be taken up into the unity of the absolute concept and be present in the form of this unity..." (*SdS*, p. 60; *SEL*, p. 142). He speaks here of "true intelligence", where "the eyes of the spirit and eyes of the body completely coincide", i.e. where the individual agent would find himself as a necessary moment of the living totality; yet in what follows, then, Hegel does not concretize this "true individuality" any further.

The absolute ethical life is presented, by contrast, as a substance living and powerful in itself, without the contribution of particularity. The individual, on the other hand, may gain ethical dignity only by being one with this substance. In Hegel's last analysis a people (*Volk)* is the only "individual" agent preserved when it organizes itself in the form of a state. As a government, a people exists or "moves" beyond all particularities. There is first the idea of an "absolute government" which maintains the organic totality of the ethical life and protects every class or estate against the others. "This absolute maintenance of all the classes must be the supreme government and, in accordance with its concept, this maintenance can strictly accrue to no class, because it is the indifference of all. Thus it must consist of those who have, as it were, sacrificed their real being in one class and who live purely and simply in the ideal, i.e., the Elders and Priests, two groups that are strictly one" (*SdS*, p. 79; *SEL*, p. 158), Hegel defines. Secondly there is the "universal government", the executive of the state, which consists of the members of the absolute class and works in order make the lower classes and the systems of needs, justice and discipline fit into the ethico-political totality. "Since government is a subsumption of the particular under the universal", the particular has no part in the universal as the particular, but only as the object of the universal government. Thus the three "systems" mentioned above actually have no room within the positive unity of the ethical totality. Hegel summarizes the whole procedure as

follows:

> The movement itself is nothing but an alternation of these two subsumptions. From the subsumption under the concept where the opposities are single individuals, indifference arises and ideally intuits the single individual, which is thus posited outside the organism as what is proper to indifference, but itself still in the form of particularity, until indifference intuits the single individual as also really itself, or absolute identity is reconstructed (*SdS*, p. 89; *SEL*, p. 166).

This negative relation between the first class and the government on the one hand and the lower classes on the other, akin to the tragedy on the ethical plane in *Naturrechtsausatz* (see ch. 5), predetermines also the narrow space that is left for individual freedom. As Göhler points out, Hegel's systematic treatment of the state and the classes differs markedly from the liberal defence of the Habsburgs in *Verfassung Deutschlands*.[9] Hegel seeks there a middle way between the Jacobinian terror of freedom and the tyranny of a patrimonial state. The Germans, he suggests, need a state which will show its strength especially in the act of defence against its enemies *and* which will also be regulated by the principles of law and representation (see ch. 5). A strong state is needed, but this state should carry out only the necessary tasks and leave the rest to the individuals, i.e. to the classes, professional organization, town councils etc. Hegel seems to think here of a civil society o f some kind as he writes:

> ...the public authority, i.e. the government, must leave to the freedom of the citizens whatever is not necessary for its appointed function of organizing and maintaining authority and thus for its security at home and abroad. Nothing should be so sacrosanct to the government as facilitating and protecting the free activity of the citizens in matters other than this. This is true regardless of utility, because the freedom of the citizens is inherently sacrosanct (*W* 1, p. 482; *HPW*, pp. 161-162).

The contrast between this liberal picture and the systematic treatment of *System der Sittlichkeit* is striking, and its explanation is likely to be found in the different characters of the two texts. In any case Hegel does not devote any separate discussion to the political freedom of the individual citizens in his demonstration of the absolute ethical substance. Within this substance, which in itself is "supreme freedom and beauty" (*SdS*, p. 65; *SEL*, p. 147), the individual freedom appears merely as one attribute among many others.

More generally, the notion of freedom does not prove essential in *System der Sittlichkeit*. In the deliberation on the master-servant (or lordship-bondage) relation, freedom is defined as the indifference by identifying it with the figure of the master, the servant being dependent and thus in the difference (cf. *SdS*, pp. 40-42; *SEL*, pp. 124-126). Thus freedom is to be attained in the indifference, ultimately in the ethical

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9 Cf. Göhler 1974, pp. 592-593.

substance itself only. In order to be free, each individual agent has to go beyond his immediate being and unite with the totality, Hegel prescribes. The more an individual is in a position to face his death as a state citizen, the freer he is, and, accordingly the individuals belong to different classes or estates. With this contraction, which owes a great deal to both Plato and Aristotle, together with Spinoza[10], Hegel seeks a synthesis of his earlier ideas of freedom.[11] In his first writings in Tübingen and Bern, he had defended the Kantian idea of moral autonomy, while he in Frankfurt is driven more and more to the proximity of the Hölderlinian idea of a true freedom as union (*Vereinigung)* (cf. ch. 4). The early Jena texts are infused with that that an individual may gain "pure individuality *sans phrase*" (cf. *GW* 4, p. 464; *NL*, p. 112) and agree with the ethical substance, only by giving up the natural forms of his individuality. The three parts of *System der Sittlichkeit* intend to establish this particular idea.

The various classes are, as we have seen, in very different positions in respect to *Volk*, which as the highest indifference is absolutely autonomous and free. In fact only the members of the first class, whose work "can be nothing but waging of war, or training for this work" (*SdS*, p. 72; *SEL*, p. 152), evince such dignity and courage in their military and political praxis that one may regard them as free. The peasantry may in rare cases show a certain amount courage in wartime, whereas the bourgeoisie is totally devoted to its private interests. Hegel does not give here any representational mechanism for these classes, as he did in *Verfassungsschrift*. The bourgeoisie admittedly lives according to its principles which should not be violated by the government, and there is a certain extent of freedom that is necessary for its economic activities. This bourgeois freedom, however, does not have any greater degree of ethical value, and the whole weight of Hegel's point lies in the insistence that this negative sphere should remain negative. "The totality exists only as the unity of essence and form: neither can be missing. Crudity, with respect to the constitution in which nothing is distinct and the whole as such is directly moved against every single determinacy, is formlessness and the destruction of freedom; for freedom exists in the form, and there in the fact that the single part, being a subordinate system in the whole organism, is independently self-active in its own specific character" (*SdS*, p. 78; *SEL*, p. 157), Hegel writes. The conclusion of Göhler, that in *System der Sittlichkeit* there are not too many traces of the programmatic formulations *of Verfassungschrift* concerning political freedom, that Hegel systematically recognized this principle only to the extent which enables him to incorporate certain achievements of political economy in a system of ethical life which is then based on principles of a completely another kind, is correct I think.[12] This means that Hegel is not yet able to do

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10 Cf. Ilting 1974.

11 Cf. Siep 1980, pp. 221-223.

systematically justice to the principles of the modern world as he himself recognizes them.

Realphilosophie 1805/06 is based, as we know, on principles which should and also do recognize the individual freedom to a considerable extent. Within this new philosophy of subjectivity, the notion of freedom itself goes through certain changes. Generally, while in *System der Sittlichkeit* the realization of the ethical substance basically presupposes that the individuals give up their natural individualities and unite themselves with the universal, the union with the universal is now comprehended as a figure of release, as *Freigabe*, which does not require such an abandonment of one's individuality. This can be considered as a kind of recognition.[13] Hegel follows now this figure when he presents the interpersonal relations between the individuals, the relation between a part and the whole as well as that between a consciousness and the spirit of a people.[14]

As to the first, we have seen how Hegel now develops a system which ends with the legal relations as a movement of mutual recognition through the phenomena of needs, labor, exchange, possession, contract, love etc. The point is that by releasing themselves into these interpersonal relations the singular agents are not lost but, on the contrary, constituted as individual together with the emerging universality. Similarly, at a higher level, the parts of the ethico-political whole release themselves to the state in a way which guarantees their freedom and gives them an ethical significance. Hegel writes:

> Just as free as each individual is in his knowing, in his outlook (as varied as it is) - so [likewise] free are the forces, the individual aspects of the totality, [its] abstract elements, [e.g.,] labor, production, the legal climate, administration, the military; each develops itself entirely according to its one-sided principle. The organic whole has many internal parts which [are complete in themselves and] develop in their abstractness [contributing to the totality]. Not every individual is a manufacturer, peasant, manual laborer, soldier, judge etc.; rather, [the roles] are divided, each individual belongs to an abstraction, and he is a totality for himself in his thinking [although the totality exists only in the combination] (*GW* 8, pp. 263-264; *JPS* pp. 161-162).

The spirit of a people, at last, is now viewed as the highest structure of subjectivity where "individuality's knowledge of itself as absolute" is present - more precisely it is, according to Hegel, present in the modern

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12 Cf. Göhler 1974, p. 595. See also Harris 1983b. Harris acknowledges that for Hegel's very unmarxian "theory of estates, it is the *ethos* - the virtue, or spirit - of the three modes of social life which is of primary importance" and emphasizes the significance of Steuart here. Waszek 1988, who speaks about the Hegelian 'Aufhebung' of the Scots, shows the connection in greater detail.

13 Siep 1980, p. 218 writes: "Freigabe bedeutet offenbar, etwas sich selbst zu überlassen, den Versuch aufzugeben, es zu beinflussen, zu verändern oder vereinnehmen. Freigabe heisst, etwas sich selbst geben und es so nehmen, wie es selbst sich will. Sie verlangt, sich selbst und den Anderen in seinem Eigenen zu akzeptieren und zu respektieren."

14 Cf. Siep 1980, pp. 223-226.

world though not in "the Platonic Republic, like Sparta, [characterized by] this disappearance of the self-knowing individuality" (*GW* 8, p. 263; *JPS*, p. 160). The modern world is individually conscious of itself in a new sense, and this "absolute being-within-itself" (*Insichseyn)* takes place, according to Hegel, especially in three ways: through the moral outlook (*Gesinnung*) of each class and the self-consciousness of its members; through the monarch, who in a free and natural way completes the ethico-political community (*Gemeinwesen*) as "self-enclosed and self-sustaining" (*GW* 8, p. 265; *JPS*, p. 161); and through art, religion and philosophy, where the state is comprehended from a wider historical perspective and where an individual gains a certain distance of his own to the existing spirit of a people. In philosophy, which is the absolute science, the I "knows, it comprehends, it is no other, [it is] immediate, it is the Self. The I is this indissoluble connection of the individual with the universal- of individuality as the universality of all nature, and the universality of all essentiality, all thinking" (*GW* 8, p. 286; *JPS*, p. 181).

These overall characteristics of Hegel's new philosophy of subjectivity, which Hegel presents at the beginning of the last part of *Realphilosophie* by emphasizing "the higher principle of the modern times", are visible in his discussion of the actual roles of individuals within the state. While in *System der Sittlichkeit* the members of the first class are in the position of a *citoyen*, all the others being *bourgeois* in their own ways, i.e. devoted to their works which serve to produce prerequisites for the political praxis itself, Hegel now maintains that principally everybody is in a position of a *bourgeois* in respect to the government. The terms are defined as follows:

> This unity of individuality and the universal is now present in a twofold way, [as] extreme poles of the universal, which is itself individuality (i.e., of state government, [itself] not an abstraction): the individuality of the state, whose end is the universal as such, and the other pole of the same, which has the individual as its end. The two individualities [are] the same - [e.g.,] the same individual who provides for himself and his family, who works, enters into contracts, etc., likewise works for the universal as well, and has it as his end. In the first sense he is called *bourgeois*, in the second sense he is *citoyen* (*GW* 8, p. 261; *JPS*, p. 158).

While in *System der Sittlichkeit* the members of the lower classes in the intuition of the first class took part in the ethical universality, here every individual has, through the consciousness and custom (*Sitte*) with which he according to his class or estate is equipped, his role and a degree of independence as well as a value of his own within the spirit. This takes place through his consciousness and knowing. At the practical level, Hegel contends, elections emerge with a majority and a minority, with the latter's right to protest and retain its conciousness, hence a certain degree of democracy, even in Germany. He thinks, however, that because we do not have "the beautiful and happy freedom of the Greeks any more", where "the individual will is identical with the universal

will", because all these actual forms of general will in the modern sense remain in the sphere of contingency, a higher distinction will now have to appear between individuality and universality:

> Yet a higher level of abstraction is needed, a greater [degree of] contrast and cultivation, a deeper spirit. It is the [entire] realm of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) - each [individual] is custom (*Sitte*), [and thus is] immediately one with the universal. No protest takes place here, each knows himself *immediately* as universal - i.e., he gives up his particularity, without knowing it as such, as his Self, as his essence. The higher distinction, therefore, is that each individual *goes back into himself* completely, knows his own *Self as such*, as the essence, [yet] comes to his sense of the self (*Eigensinn*) of being absolute although separated from the existing universal, possessing his absolute immediately, in his knowing (*GW* 8, p. p. 262; *JPS*, p. 159).

Although the individuals are basically *citoyens* only through their knowing they have, as compared to *System der Sittlichkeit*, a far greater degree of autonomy and freedom in the practical matters that concern their activities as *bourgeois*. Here Hegel takes up what he in *Verfassung Deutschlands* had proposed for the German state when writing: "Government must not come out on the side of the past and stubborly defend it. But at the same time it ought to be convinced to change. Geinuine activity, genuine will, through the election of the officials - every sphere, city, guild [is to be] represented in the administration of their particular affairs. It is bad for a people when it [itself] is the government, as bad as it is irrational (*unvernünftig*). The totality, however, is the medium, the free spirit - supporting itself, free of these completely fixed extremities" (*GW* 8, p. 263; *JPS*, p. 160). The government must guarantee that the individuals may freely take part in the practical activities of their towns, classes etc., and perhaps even in certain governmental matters, but Hegel does not fail to emphasize that at any rate the government moves on its own.[15]

Thus there are similarities and differences between the two systems as to the overall picture of the state as a free ethical totality and the role of the individual in this totality. In both cases Hegel ends the development with a situation where the totality has liberated itself from every external determination and is completely in itself (*bei sich selbst*), but in *Realphilosophie* this totality is related to the individuals in a new way. We may say that the individuals are no longer presupposed to give up their individual freedom, but the living totality is constituted through the release of their individuality to the spirit. In this way they may share the universality which is truly ethical, unlike the free but as such particular activities of their classes or towns.

If we then ask, in conclusion to this chapter and, in fact, to a

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15 According to Göhler 1974, p. 599 this is the principal difference between *Realphilosophie* and the later proposals for a constitutional reform in Prussia. In Humboldt's *Verfassungsentwurf* of 1817 e.g. there is a real mediation between the individuals and the government through a local administration, which is systematically excluded by Hegel.

significant part of the present study as a whole, whether Hegel changes his fundamental critique of the modern world and it theoretical reflexes, the answer is not very simple. In certain respects we should say yes, because he now has a better basis for recognizing the principles of this modern world in his own systematic constructions. But ultimately the answer is no, for Hegel is, and will be, of the opinion that this world of abstract differentiations and illusions requires an absolute philosophy which demonstrates in what ways freedom is existent in it and in what ways as yet not. Although the contribution of the individual actors to ethico-political universality is far greater in *Realphilosophie* than in *System der Sittlichkeit*, Hegel makes in fact no concessions in his fundamental - and, we should say, not merely communitarian but classical - conviction that the state is prior to the individual. By this he no longer implies that the individual would realize his ethical nature only in the state, but rather that the individual may be substantially free only within it.

This can be seen in the logical structure of Hegel's presentation of the constitution. For Hegel organizes it as a crosswise identity between the particular and the universal, where the positive aspect of the particular is identical with the negative aspect of the universal and vice versa.[16] First the individual, after externalizing himself in the universal, has in the universality his Self in the negative sense. This univerality has an absolute power over his life, and the identity here means that the individual may intuit his necessity in it. The negative identity of the individual with the universal is typically dread (*Furcht*) (*GW* 8, p. 259; *JPS*, pp. 156-157). But, on the other hand, the individual has in this externalization his positive Self as well. This is recognized as intelligence and it knows that the universal is constituted through it. It knows the identity of its own will and the general will, so that the positive relation to this universal, which protects the individual *Dasein*, is typically trust (*Vertrauen*) (*GW* 8, pp. 259-260; *JPS*, p. 157). Correspondigly, the universal is first of all the absolute power which demands unconditional obedience. However, the universal sacrifices itself and lets the individual realize his particular ends through the universal and thus acknowledge himself as the positive unity, as the becoming of the I to the Self. In Hegel's own words:

> The general form is this development of the individual to the universal, and the becoming of the universal. This is not a process of blind [i.e., unknowing] necessity, however, but is rather one that is mediated through knowing. Thus each one is thereby his own end, i.e., the end is already the source of the movement. Each individual is his own immediate cause; his [individual] interest drives him. Yet at the same time it is the universal that counts for him, the medium, which ties him to his particular [end] and to his actuality (*GW* 8, p. 255; *JPS*, p. 152).

To conclude the present chapter, I shall state a number of more general

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16 I follow here Göhler's careful reconstruction. Cf. Göhler 1974, pp. 448-452 and p. 596.

points which Hegel implies in relation to this identity between the individual and the universal. We have seen that the identity is no longer considered an infinite judgement as in *System der Sittlichkeit*, but a syllogism where the individuality has its systematic role between the particular and the universal. In spite of this, however, the actual role of the individual within the state is not explicated beyond what was said above, i.e., beyond the crosswise identity of the negative and positive aspects. Through the externalization of the individuals, through their devotion to the universal, through their knowledge of the universal and their particular ends within the universal, the individual and his class is constituted.

In *Realphilosophie* all this takes place in the form of cognitive structures, of subjectivity, which is realized when the individual immediately acknowledges or recognized himself in the universal: "Not only am I in agreement with it, but in that it is my real self, it is I who rule. It is lord (*Herr*), public force (*öffentliche Gewalt*), and ruler (*Regent*) - in these three aspects it is [directed] toward me" (*GW* 8, p. 256; *JPS*, p. 153). In the cognitive structures, as to his consciousness of himself, the individual is crosswisely identical with the universal, but not so in the actual political praxis. As we have seen, the government moves very much on its own. As Göhler puts it, a citizen is in reality *bourgeois* and only ideally *citoyen*.[17] Or, we should say, perhaps not even that, for as a state citizen the individual primarily lives in the ethos of his class or estate, so that in most cases by far the idea of state as such does not not very important even in his thoughts. If he does not belong to the functionaries of the state, the idea of participation will not be very essential to his self-identity as a citizen even in his thoughts. Consequently, Hegel emphazises the significance of such phenomena of inwardness as morality and religion in creating and maintaining the ethical unity. All this may be taken to imply that it was not an easy task for Hegel to present his dialectical construction in any concrete terms.

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17 Göhler 1974, p. 597.

10 EPILOGUE

I shall conclude my study by first recapitulating at a somewhat more general level the main results of the foregoing reading. Thereafter, I shall say something about the relation between Hegel's practical philosophy in Jena and *Phänomenologie des Geistes,* which he drafted during the years 1805/06. The overall signicance of the notion of labor for Hegel's philosophy will also be discussed.

Practical philosophy and modernity

There are of course numerous ways to approach modernity as a new historical epoch of a major import in philosophy, too. I have focused on the changes in the status of labor among the activities of men as well as in the theoretical images of those activities changes presented by philosophers when entering this epoch. In this way we may see how man generally places himself more in the center of his reality, not only producing his goods himself but also justifying his social reality increasingly by reference to this production. Thus the traditional view, articulated in an influental manner by Plato and Aristotle, according to which labor is to be seen in the first place as a means of producing prerequisities for the human life, which itself is more practical rather than poietic in kind, was tendentiously replaced by a new appreciation of labor and its results.

The notion of labor itself also changes, but even more significant are the radical transformations in the foundation of social philosophy itself connected with the new status of labor. Thus from Hobbes on, a political state is regarded as and also legitimized by action which is poietic rather than practical. The image which gains dominance is that a

modern subject must defend or preserve himself, and in order to do this he creates or brings about a political body which quarantees the social existence. The social and political activity needed to accomplish this task does not so much involve rational deliberation on political issues according the Aristotelian practical model, as the exercise of power. Most clearly this new constellation shows in the writings of Hobbes or Machiavelli, for example.[1]

In the justification which Locke gives to the civil society and, above all, in the writings of the Scots, labor explicitely enters into the focus of social and political philosophy. An increasing number of constitutive tasks is assigned to it within the theory, which itself becomes more practical again, though in a very different sense than the Aristotelian theory. It is now the principles and mechanisms of the modern society, where the division of labor and the markets lie at the center of men's social activities, which are studied with a practical intention to affect those mechanisms. This leads to a formation of political economy and, tendentiously, social sciences in the modern sense. Labor and the institutions and norms connected with it are seen as as constituting the very essence of the modern life, not merely as something producing means for the ethical life. The ethical considerations of Smith and Hume, among others, also spring from this context, as do the new theories of historical progress.

This forms part of the general background, in most simple terms, against which I have read Hegel's attempts to come to terms with modernity. Since his early stages, Hegel appears remarkably conscious of the new historical constellation. His reactions to the modern world are both enthusiastic and critical. He seeks to strike a balance between them when developing his original conception of practical philosophy, which owes to the Platonic and Aristotelian models but recognizes the distinctiveness new historical and cultural conditions, though.

A practical philosophy of this kind is from the outset at odds with the general character of the new epoch and, accordingly, with the various versions of modern social and political philosophy. In his *Naturrechtsausatz* from 1802 Hegel most emphatically expresses his disagreement with the premisses and conclusions of the modern political philosophy as a whole, both in its empirical and transcendental versions, defending a conception which owes a great deal to the classical paradigm. For Hegel the achievements of Kant, who founds his ethics on the a priori notion of the practical reason and the rest of his practical philosophy on this, basically amount to a radicalization or conclusion of the modern break with the classical view. In Hegel's view such a break cannot be accepted.

Hegel is, though, aware and convinced that in his ethics Kant also has captured something very essential to modernity. The idea of freedom and moral autonomy must be the option of any modern approach, but Hegel seeks to give a different kind of interpretation of it. He cannot

1 This overall change is well described in Honneth 1992, pp. 11-19.

approve of the independence or autonomy of ethics within the Kantian practical philosophy and is inclined to follow the classical view where ethics is situated within a larger practical theory. Thus one of the unkantian ideas of his practical philosophy is to demonstrate the ways in which the various social institutions and their development in the modern context are relevant to the ethical consideration of human life. And if we turn this dictum around, we may say that it is the task of practical philosophy to examine the present society with its institutions and norms from a normative viewpoint more substantial than the Kantian principles of morality and legality. That is, Hegel does not approve of the modern division of labor between ethics and social philosophy, neither its Hobbesian nor its Kantian version, but defends the classical paradigm in the modern context.

Already in Tübingen and Bern, Hegel attempted to combine his images of the Athenian ethical life with the Kantian ideas of moral autonomy and reason. His ideas concerning a subjective folk religion, having an impact on the senses and the hearts of men which, however, would be a religion of reason, lead him towards a more substantial conception than the Kantian idea of moral religion. Yet it was not easy to formulate, even tentatively, an idea of freedom which would make it in principle possible to unite practical reason with the idea of collective ethical life. But in Frankfurt he, under the influence of Hölderlin and Schelling, and distancing more and more from Kant, connects freedom with the idea of a union, so that freedom is viewed in social terms and not so much as a matter of individual moral autonomy. This is the main import of his notions of love, life and pleroma, which he elaborates in his studies on religion before entering Jena.

In Jena Hegel then changes his subject, turning from religion to philosophy. His program, which he at first formulates together with Schelling, is to be a speculative philosophy of unity - for Hegel, however, of a unity which reflects everything into itself. In Hegel's view, his time with its *Entweyungen* needs philosophy of this kind. His practical philosophy also endeavours to present modern life in its main constituents in the light of a fundamental normative unity. Thus Hegel criticizes modern theories of the natural law because they end, one way or another, with an *entzweite* constellation. Especially the Kantian contrasts between moral freedom and nature, or ethics and social anthropology, or the individual will and the institutional condition of this will, are points that he cannot agree on. Instead, he undertakes to demonstrate the unity of the individual and the general will in most concrete terms.[2]

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2 Rosenkranz 1844, p. 87 tells about the lost commentary on Kant's *Metaphysik der Sitten* as follows: "Er strebte hier schon, die *Legalität* des positiven Rechts und die *Moralität* der Ich selbst als gut oder böse wissenden Innerlichkeit in einem höheren Begriffe zu vereinigen, den er in vielen Kommentaren häufig schlechthin *Leben*, später *Sittlichkeit* nannte. Er protestierte gegen die Unterdrückung der *Natur* und die *Zerstückelung* des Menschen in die durch den Absolutismus des Pflichtbegriffs entstehende *Casuistik*."

In *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel for the first time attempts a presentation of modern society, its norms and institutions, following largely the classical paradigm, yet from a diferent viewpoint. For his normative principle is not the idea of good, or eudaimonia, but freedom as something which makes possible a union between the individual and the ethical totality. We know that in *Naturrechtsaufsatz* Hegel explicitly situates both what he calls "ethics" and "science of morals" under natural law, while in *System der Sittlichkeit* he seeks to carry out a very Aristotelian kind of practical philosophy, where the ethical considerations are transformed into social and political ones.[3] In *System der Sittlichkeit* the questions concerning the moral autonomy of particular individuals and their ethical relations are mainly treated by working out a system estates. As we have seen, individual freedom in this context embraces only in few cases and at its best a consciousness of oneself as being a part of a ethico-political whole. For the great majority of its members, Hegel's idea of *Volk* as an ethical totality presupposes so considerable a self-sacrifice that it is hardly convincing in the modern context.

Thus in *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel is as yet unable to demonstrate how freedom is present in a modern society. His discussion of the modern institutions related to the division of labor, exchange and private property as belonging to the sphere of the natural ethical life, fails to reach its aim, interesting though many of its details may be. The whole systematics suggests rather a kind of *privatio*, the absense of the substantive totality, rather than shows the modes of its presence in these relations. This feature is contrary to Hegel's systematic intentions, however. He is striving after a model which would enable him to proceed more immanently, deriving the more substantial forms of ethical life from the elementary ones. And as we have seen, he will over the subsequent years work out his new metaphysics of subjectivity and organize the entire system anew around the notion of spirit. Only this new conceptual system makes it possible for him to present the main institutions of a modern society as a progression of forms of consciousness and self-consciousness, i.e. as the presence of freedom.

Thus it is the new theory of spirit, of spirit as higher than nature, which serves as the foundation for Hegel's most satisfactory version of practical philosophy in Jena.[4] Here consciousness is defined as an

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3 Hegel will leave even less room for ethical consideration than Aristotle, so that his conception may rather be taken as Platonic than Aristotelian in this sense. If this is so, then it is not altogether unproblematical to reconstruct the specifically Hegelian ethics in the way Wood 1990 does, very much apart from the wider practical and metaphysical contexts of those ethical considerations.

4 I want to emphasize this because time and again readings are given out which are inclined to defend the Hegel prior to the proper formulation of his systematic ideas. Thus Honneth 1992 defends the model of mutual recognition in *System der Sittlichkeit* as against its later "consciousness" theoretical versions. A view of this kind is possible only if one abstracts the systematic problems of Hegel's philosophy in Jena. Honneth's reconstruction of Hegel's theory of recognition appears problematical, too.

activity which by working on its objects also works on itself and is capable, through a process of experience, of ascending on higher and higher planes. It could be shown, though it is not the task of the present study, that *Realphilosophie* 1805/06 is dissimilar not only to Hegel's earlier attempts to formulate his practical philosophy, but also to his later, much more systematic philosophy of spirit. His Berlin lectures on the philosophy of right, which deal with largely the same phenomenal content, are organized on the basis of the systematic differentiation between the subjective, objective and absolute spirits with their corresponding logical principles. There we can no longer speak about Hegel's practical philosophy as we have done here in studying the Jena material. There the three levels of the spirit are treated sepatately and the philosophy of right is set out as a demonstration of the objective spirit. That this is not yet the case in *Realphilosophie* 1805/05, is pertinent to the main theme of my study.

Thus we have seen how Hegel begins this system by outlining the syllogisms of intelligence, will and the knowing will. There the I first recognizes itself as being free in its elementary intellectual relation to its objects. Its freedom gains gradually content as a result of its practical relations, as it wills and begins to make itself too by making itself into objects. Hegel elaborates here, as we have seen, the notion of labor with its related notions, giving them a major role in the system. In respect to Hegel's later social philosophy, the distinctive character of this system can be seen most clearly when he concludes the first part "The spirit according to its concept" by presenting the "knowing will". For here we have a discussion of the elementary forms of social recognition, of family and the acquisition of property, and of "the state of nature". And, what is significant, this constitutes a direct continuation of the foregoing narration about the formation of the I. We may say that the first part of the system as a whole is but a beginning in the constitution of the subject and the subjectivity, which runs through the whole *Realphilosophie*.[5]

Then, in the second part of the system, the intersubjective phenomena which Hegel will later call *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* are presented as an extension of the first part. That they are no longer treated as belonging to the Aristotelian natural ethical life but rather as an intermediary stage clearly anticipates Hegel's later systematics.

Siep 1979 has shown very convincingly that there is a strong and mutually constitutive interdependence between Hegel's theory of recognition as the central structure of his practical philosophy and his new philosophy of spirit. Wildt 1982 also reaches a similar conclusion, (see e.g. his comments on *System der Sittlichkeit*, pp. 320-325), and so does Harris 1980. Honneth's Habermasian defence of *System der Sittlichkeit* is problematical if one wants, as he himself does, to develop a more up to date "post-traditional" version of a Hegelian theory of *Sittlichkeit*. For only in his "consciousness theoretical" concepts is Hegel himself able, if ever, to do justice to the principles of modernity. The claim that the "consciousness theoretical" concepts would as such be "monological" and exclude the "intersubjectivity", should not be taken too seriously, as may be learned from Siep 1979 and also Tuschling 1991. Though I disagree at the methodological level, I think that Honneth's project is of great importance.

5 Cf. Siep 1979, p. 192.

However, in my reading I have tried to point out how there, associated with the notion of labor, runs an essential continuity of a kind that cannot be found from the later *Rechtsphilosophie*. The latter part contains the realization (*Verwirklichung*) of the spirit according to its concept. It presents the constitution of the subject within the major institutions of modern society based on a division of labor, markets of exchange and private property. The very core of Hegel's critical discussion here is the subject, the I and the self, particular and universal, concrete and abstract, etc. within himself when he enters into the different institutional forms of recognition. Thus Hegel's practical philosophy in Jena is both a social theory of subjectivity and a critical theory of institutions.

The third part of the system extends the preceding ones, anticipating clearly again Hegel's later treatments of the absolute spirit. As we have seen, the estates and the political institutions are here organized according to the corresponding cognitive structures, leading to the most complete unity of the individual and the universal in the minds and lives of the citizens. While in *System der Sittlichkeit* Hegel was still thinking of his *Volksreligion* as the completion of ethical life, he is now not only more realistic but also at last capable of formulating his position in the question which had concerned him ever since Tübingen, i.e. the role of religion and church within the modern society and state.

Kant had insisted on the mutual independence of the state and the church. Instead of his folk religion. Hegel now relates his discussion to the Christian religion and church. While the church is, according to him, a necessary element in the institutional arrangement of the absolute ethical life ("the church is the state elevated in thoughts"), religion in the subjective sense transgresses the state and open up another, spiritual reality. Hegel speaks about "the absolute religion" which "is the depth brought into daylight - this depth is the I", importing that the divine nature articulated in religion "is not other than human" (*GW* 8, p. 281; *JPS*, p. 176).

As a form of "transgression", however, religion still remains defective, for "the content of religion is probably true - but this true-being (*Wahrseyn*) is an assurance without insight. This insight is philosophy, the absolute science" (*GW* 8, p. 286; *JPS*, p. 181). It is philosophy, then, which is ultimately capable of grasping and completing the movement of spirit, its externalization into its opposities and its return to itself. "Thus philosophy is man in general. And as [it is] the [ultimate significance] of man, so it is for the world; and as with the world, so with man. One stroke creates them both" (*GW* 8, p. 287; *JPS*, p. 182).

The status of absolute religion and philosophy in these passages is very interesting. They are presented as the cultural formations - of modernity - which make it possible for an individual to attain, finally, complete knowledge of the world and of himself in perfect union with this world.[6] That is, here we have at last the articulation of what Hegel

calls "the higher principle of the modern time", namely individuality in its Hegelian sense. Hegel no longer seeks to solve the problems of the German people in terms of a folk religion. Generally, his deeper insights into the nature of present-day society exclude this earlier program.[7] The final chapter of *Realphilosophie* 1805/06 also indicates that Hegel is beginning the move from his practical philosophy in Jena towards his later philosophy of spirit.

Practical philosophy and Phänomenologie des Geistes

With his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* published in 1807 Hegel again makes a new start and sets out to reorganize his system. The notions of subjectivity and spirit, as they were defined in Jena, will remain at the very center of his philosophy, but the roles of logic and metaphysics will be redefined and explicated later. *Realphilosophien*, too, will gain the more defined place and method. Hegel gives up his idea of logic as a critical discipline paving the way for metaphysics, and will later work out his logic as a speculative ontology. For us is relevant merely to note that because of its speculative nature, this logic *presupposes* an absolute standpoint. But if logic no longer enables this standpoint, then how is such a standpoint to be arrived at and justified? How is its connection of the empirical consciousness to be demonstrated?

The general task of *Phänomenologie* is to accomplish this particular task. The book is therefore primarily epistemological. It takes on both critical and important constructive functions. It should demonstrate to the "natural consciousness", representating something like the comtemporary consciousness, that its true being presupposes an ethical substance which has in the present times been almost completely lost (see *GW* 9, p. 197; *PhS*, pp. 216-216). The general tone of the work may well be described as modern. It is a critical defence of the present, yet another attempt to enlighten it. It pleas for a new beginning:

> The onset of the new spirit is the product of a widespread upheaval in various forms of culture., the prize at the end of a complicated, tortuous path and of just as variegated and strenuous an effort. It is the whole which, having traversed its content in time and space, has returned into itself, and is the resultant *simple Notion* of the whole. But the actuality of this simple whole consists in those various shapes and forms which have become its moments, and which now develop and take shape afresh, this time in their new element, in their newly acquired meaning (*GW* 9, p. 15; *PhS*, p. 7).

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6 Siep 1979, pp. 196-197 claims that only here does the process of mutual recognition come to its conclusion.

7 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Jaeschke 1986, Dickey 1987 and Zhang 1992.

Such a project of constructive criticism of the present is of course in line with Hegel's other works before and during his Jena period. So is also the central idea, i.e. to show that to be a subject in fact presupposes a substance, that to be an individual I in fact presupposes a universal I or a spirit. Again Hegel wants to establish a presupposed union, which is not consciously recognized in the reflective philosophy and in the culture of modernity as a whole.

In the Preface Hegel contrasts the modern condition with an image of the antiquity:

> Formerly they had a heaven adorned with a vast wealth of thoughts and imagery. The meaning of all that is hung on a thread of light by which it was linked to that heaven. Instead of dwelling in this world's presence, men looked beyond it, following this thread to an other-wordly presence, so to speak. (...) Now we seem to need just the opposite: sense is so fast rooted in eartly things that it requires just as much force to raise it. The Spirit shows itself as so impoverished that, like a wanderer in the desert craving for a mere mouthful of water, it seems to crave for its refreshment only the bare feeling of the divine in general (*GW* 9, p. 13; *PhS*, p. 5).

Also this tone is familiar from Hegel's previous work. The modern individual I would according to Hegel need a conscious union with the spirit of his community, ultimately with *das Volk*. The task given to *Phänomenologie* has then to do with the idea of a modern *Sittlichkeit*, but in a rather special sense. Hegel is not advancing practical philosophy here. Later in the Preface he makes the contrast again:

> The manner of study in ancient times differed from that of the modern age in that the former was the proper and complete formation on the natural consciousness. In modern times (...) the individual finds the abstract form ready-made; (...) hence the task nowadays consists not so much in purging the individual of an immeadiate, sensuous mode of apprehension, and making him into a substance that is an object of thought and that thinks, but rather in just the opposite, in freeing determinate thoughts from their fixity so as to give actuality to the universal, and impart to it spiritual life (*GW* 9, p. 28; *PhS*, pp. 19-20).

Hegel wants to make the thoughts of modern man and culture fluid, he seeks to put them in motion and free them from their fixity and immediacy, "by giving up not on the fixity of the pure concrete, which the 'I' itself is, in contrast with its differentiated content, but also the fixity of the differentiated nature of the 'I'. Through this movement the pure thoughts become *Notions*, and are only now what they are in truth, self-movements, circles, spiritual essences, which is what their substance is" (*GW* 9, p. 28; *PhS*, p. 20). In order to demonstrate this to the natural consciousness, *Phänomenologie* invites it on a journey where the consciousness looses its naturalness and becomes, defined as an "appearing consciousness" or as a "science that come on the scene", more and more aware of its true character.

Hegel describes this journey "as the pathway of *doubt*, or more precisely as the way of despair" for the experiencing consciousness", or

as "thoroughgoing scepticism". Its intent is "to examine everything for oneself and follow only one's own conviction, or better still, to produce everything oneself, and accept only one's own deed as what is true" (*GW* 9, p. 56; *PhS*, pp. 49-50). Thus Hegel will make use of the sceptical arguments, as he did at the beginning of the Jena period[8], in order to found his philosophy on the common understanding of the time. By turning this consciousness against itself, by making it doubt itself and by showing it how it will learn and become experienced in this doubt, Hegel attempts to demonstrate that it will find everything, the spirit and even the absolute knowledge, in itself.

Phänomenologie should be read as Hegel's attempt to found his speculative project once more on the modern principles of critical philosophy. It is an introduction to his metaphysics of subjectivity, which he will later give out in the form of logic. Hegel wants to do what Kant did in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: to continue the Copernican turn in epistemology and show *how* the conditions of knowledge correspond to the conditions of the objects of that knowledge.[9] However, instead of a transcendental deduction of the Kantian kind, he presents a genetic narrative which "for us", for the philosophers for whom the narrative is told, and for the consciousness under inspection itself, shows how the complete identity between the world and the consciousness emerges as a result of a complicated series of experiences. Hegel claims that the consciousness itself has the ability to prove critically its knowledge against the adequate criteria every time, and that it may proceed immanently through a complete series of its positions and reach, finally, that of the absolute knowledge.

It is not my task here to propose an interpretation of *Phänomenologie* and its tricky problems. What I want to point out, first, is the general relevance of the book for the modernity issue. Clearly Hegel continues here his critique of modernity in the sense that he wants to destroy every fixed position, every certitude of the consciousness, every positivity. He wants to put them all in motion and demands that the consciousness must not stop before it has reflected on the entire substance. He is much more radical here than Kant. So is he also in his reliance on the ability of the consciousness to accomplish this task. As Hegel sees it, there are no fixed categories or transcendental ideas, no facts of reason, nothing immediately given which would guarantee the success of the reflective project or put on it insurmountable limits. In other words, even more radically than Kant, Hegel places the subject, man himself, at the center of everything, criticizing all restricting

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8 On the relation between *Phänomenologie* and Hegel's essays in *Kritische Journal* see Bonsiepen 1977, pp. 132-134 and esp. Foster 1989 passim.

9 Claesges 1981 sets out these parallels very clearly. An important epistemological study of *Phänomenologie* is also Westphal 1989. Pippin 1989 builds his interesting interpretation on the Kantian backgrounds of the work, as well, stressing the notion of spontaneity and relating the whole issue to the principles of modernity in general.

assumptions here.[10]

Throughout the present study we have seen how Hegel's strategy in his practical philosophy differs from that of Kant's. He does not set forth or formulate ideal principles against which the natural world should then be judged, but studies this world as such and how it appears for us, claiming that its normative principles may be found in this way. Nowhere is this dialectical strategy more emphatically used than in *Phänomenologie*. As an introduction to the speculative standpoint, it claims to have a very rigorous structure, yet it illustrates its arguments with most diverse historical surveys and lessons, whereby it seeks to enlighten the contemporary consciousness. Such enlightenment is possible, because Hegel thinks that this consciousness is conditioned by the preceding and contemporary forms of life, and that there is not much definitive in a constellation of that kind. Everything should be seen as changing, moving, not fixed, and *Phänomenologie* should demonstrate to the consciousness, to "the immediate existence of Spirit", how to reflect everything onto itself.

Although *Phänomenologie* can in the first place be classified as an epistemological project, it has its practical aspect as well. This is so because Hegel does not distinquish between theoretical and practical as Kant does, but maintains that they belong together in many ways. The practical forms, institutions and norms of life condition the modes of thought and vice versa, hence they must be treated together. Hegel's practical philosophy and in *Phänomenologie* share many themes.[11] Both of them are discourses on modernity. Hegel's point of view, however, is rather different in them. The relation of *Phänomenologie* to the modern society is much freer than that of *Realphilosophie* written almost simultaneously. Hegel does not study here the institutions and norms of modern society as such, nor does he systematically on comment moral or political theories. He alludes to both of them rather explicitely (epecially to Kant), using also many other kinds of historical material when guiding the modern consciousness forward in its experiences. The general insistence on the ethical life, instead of mere morality, is evident in this book, too, especially in the chapter on Spirit.

I shall conclude my study by taking up three passages from *Phänomenologie* where its practical aspect is easily perceived. All of them deal with the phenomenon of labor, and we may see how the experience of consciousness, its confrontation with its truth, is related to labor. The first one is the well-known section on "Lordship and bondship", where the independence and dependence of self-consciousness is discussed. "With self-consciousness, then, we have entered the native realm of truth", Hegel remarks (*GW* 9, p. 103; *PhS*, p. 104). This means, at least, that though the work as a whole deals with self-consciousness and its

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10 See Pippin 1989 and Pippin 1991, pp. 61-74.

11 Bonsiepen 1977 has reconstructed the parallel roles of the notion of negativity in them; Siep 1979, p. 203-222 demonstrates the role of recognition in both of them.

various experiences, it was not yet explicitly existent in the previous section reflecting on consciousness. In the present section self-conciousness goes through a certain experience where both intersubjectivity and labor, or work, are introduced.

First Hegel presents the notion of self-consciousness itself, for which essential and true is not the immediate object, as it is for sense-certainty and perception, but its own unity. "In this sphere, self-consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this antithesis is removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it" (*GW* 9, p. 104; *PhS*, p. 105). Self-consciousness seeks to know its own unity through its otherness, first through the immediate objects of sense-certainty and perception, and is generally defined as desire. This fails, however, because it cannot negate the objects but must recognize, as self-consciousness, their independence. Hence "self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (*GW* 9, p. 108; *PhS*, p. 110).

This is followed by a drama where self-consciousness struggling for recognition attempts to integrate its otherness into itself, into its own relation to itself. This does not succeed as yet, and it turns out that more elements of Spirit are needed. Hegel is very explicit at this point: "A self-consciousness, being an object, is just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this, we already have before us the Notion of *Spirit*. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: 'I' that is 'We' and 'We' that is 'I' (*GW* 9, p. 108; *PhS*, p. 110).

The elaboration of lordship and bondage clearly shows that Hegel is inclined to incorporate practical considerations in an epistemological study. The section should not be read antropologically, historically or sociologically in the first place[12], but as a demonstration, angled at the contemporary consciousness, of the possibilities and limits of the self-consciousness abstract as yet. I have earlier pointed out the great significance of the lordship-bondship relation in *System der Sittlichkeit*, where it contributed to the transition from the natural to the absolute ethical life. This was so because Hegel still operated with a normative notion of nature, to which the relation belonged. In *Realphilosophie* 1805/06 it is no longer of analogous importance for the transition to the Actual spirit, and later, in *Enzyklopädie*, Hegel situates it explicitely into the subjective spirit.[13] Thus the systematic significance of the relation should not be exaggerated.

There are, then, two self-consciousnesses, attempting to acknowledge themselves in the other. They both should supersede this

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12 As has been done, following Marx, by Lukács, Kojéve and many others. On the critique of this line of interpretation see Ottmann 1982, Bonsiepen 1977, pp. 155-160 and Pippin 1989, pp. 154-163.

13 For a more thorough analysis of these changes, see Ottmann 1982.

otherness, which in fact is in themselves, and recognize themselves as pure self-consciousnesses. Consequently, they act on the other as well as on themselves, i.e. seek the death of the other and risk their own life in a fight. The prospects of a fight of this kind point to the experience, however, that life is as essential as the self-consciousness and that the solution must be found in a mutual recognition.

The lord and the bondsman are then presented. Their relations to the world of things differ: the former desires and seeks enjoyment, the latter works on the objects. These condition their mutual relations, too, because the lord puts the bondsman between himself and the things in order to be able to enjoy the latter. Under such conditions, equal recognition is impossible. "But for the recognition proper the moment is lacking, that what the lord does to the other he also does to himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the other" (*GW* 9, p. 113; *PhS*, p. 116). This does not happen. There are no prerequisites for the mutual independence and dependes of the parties as yet.

Relevant for the present study is, however, that a certain turn in the relation between lord and bondsman takes place, which has to do with the notion of labor or work. This should not be read in the first place as a historical emancipation figure, but it may be taken as a example of the practical aspect of *Phänomenologie*. Prima facie it is the lord who represents the independent and essential self-consciousness, whereas the bondsman stands for something impure and dependent. If, however, the lord recognizes the truth of himself in the bondsman, who for him is anything but independent, then "his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action" (*GW* 9, p. 114; *PhS*, p. 117). The bondsman, by contrast, who fears the lord and works for him, does not at first recognize the independence which in fact belongs to him when he becomes conscious of himself.

> Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is. In the moment which corresponds to desire in the lord's consciousness, it did seem that the aspect of unessential relation to the thing fell to the lot of the bondsman, since in that relation the thing retained its independence. Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its unalloyed feeling of self. But that is the reason why satisfaction is itself only a fleeting one, for it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence. Work (*die Arbeit*), on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its *form* and something *permanent*, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This *negative* middle term or the formative *activity* is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, *qua* worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its *own* independence (*GW* 9, pp. 114-115; *PhS*, p. 118).

The contrast between desire and work, or labor, is familiar for us from Hegel's other texts, as is in fact the whole argument. The context of it, however, is different. Hegel is not doing practical philosophy here. He is

not studying the modern society, nor describing its historical background.[14] He is developing his epistemological argument, according to which the consciousness has not yet detected the truth of its objects in itself, though it has, by facing another consciousness and becoming conscious of itself through this other, taken a major step forward.

It has turned out in particular that work creates such a certain permanence between the subject and its objects which enables the subject to work on himself, too, and proceed further. The fact that these practical aspects prove so highly relevant to Hegel's epistemological argument may well imply that the whole argument relates to the modernity, where the discussed phenomena are so central. These passages should not, however, be read as an adequate presentation of Hegel's social theory.

I will now quote another passage, where the practical aspect and especially the notion of labor is manifest:

> (...) action is itself nothing else but negativity. Therefore, when individuality acts, determinateness is dissolved in the general process of negativity or in the sum total of every determinateness. In *action* (*Tun*) and the consciousness of action, the simple original nature now splits up into the distinction which action implies. Action is first present in the form of *object*, an object, too, as pertaining to consciousness, as *End*, and hence opposes to a reality already given. The second moment is the *movement* of the End conceived as passive, and realization conceives as the relation of the End to a wholly formal actuality, hence the idea of the transition itself, or the *means*. The third moment is, finally, the object, which is no longer in the form of an End directly known by the agent to be *his own*, but as brought out into the light of day and having *for him* the form of an 'other' (GW 9, p. 217; PhS, pp. 238-239).

Here Hegel expresses in more nuanced terms what he means by the notion of activity. He no longer distinguishes explicitely between acting, doing and making, but this conception now also embraces the aspects of labor or work.[15] Thus Hegel distinguishes three moments in these activities: the subjective end, its transition into reality and, finally, the resulting new state of affairs. Hegel's key idea is that between the intended result and the objective result brought about through the activity exists an identity as to the content, and it is precisely this identical content which makes it possible for the bondsman, and for the subject in general, to acknowledge himself in the activity - and to realize

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14 Most of the studies which have concentrated on the notion of labor in *Phänomenolgie*, such as Lukács 1973, Kojéve 1969, Lim 1966, Janke 1977, and partly even Lange 1980, have not reflected enough on its different viewpoint from Hegel's simultaneous practical philosophy. Consequently, though the historical context of the episode, if anything, is antiquity, as e.g. Ottmann convincingly shows, it has time and again been situated later and related systematically to various modern phenomena.

15 In fact the very point of Hegel's conception of action, as it is formulated in his metaphysics and philosophy of subjectivity, is to present labor or work as a paradigm encompassing all kinds of activities. As we have shown, this is essentially connected to Hegel's attempts to come to terms with modernity, though it clearly does not mean that Hegel would reduce all the activities to the model of material production. Cf. Lange 1980, pp. 43-44, who criticizes Heidegger and Riedel for implying such a claim.

himself.[16]

Previous passage is quoted from the end of the chapter on Reason. The whole chapter aims at uniting the results of the preceeding ones on consciousness and self-consciousness. One of the main questions here is whether the individual self-consciousness arrives at such a union with the universal which deserves to be called truly ethical. By putting forward many arguments directed especially against Kant's moral theory, Hegel proves that this is not the case: the other, in which the individual perceives himself after having externalized himself, does not as yet result in a unity between the individual and the universal, even though he imagines so. The whole discussion again an exemplifies the practical aspect in *Phänomenologie*. It also contains Hegel's substantial critique of the relative ethical life so central in modernity. However, it does not thematize the modern society as such but deals critically with a variety of contradictions embedded in the various theories and ideologies stemming from this society.

Lastly, I would like to cite and comment briefly on a passage from the final chapter dealing with the Absolute Knowing. Hegel writes:

> This last shape of Spirit - the Spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its Notion as remaining in its Notion in this realization - this is absolute knowing; it is Spirit that knows itself in the shape of Spirit, or a *comprehensive knowing (...) Spirit, manifesting* or *appearing* in consciousness in this element, or what is the same thing, produced in it by consciousness, *is Science*. (...) But as regards the *existence* of this Notion, Science does not appear in Time and in the actual world before Spirit has attained to this consciousness about itself. As Spirit that knows what it is, it does not exist before, and nowhere at all, till after the completion of its work of compelling its imperfect 'shape' of its essence, and in this way to equate its *self-consciousness* with its *consciousness* (*GW* 9, pp. 427-428; *PhS*, pp. 485-486)

Hegel focal point here is "the work of the spirit". In the Introduction he speaks of the "labor of the Notion" (*GW* 9, p. 47; *PhS*, p. 43), and "the labor of the negative" which alone is capable of giving actuality to the divinity: "Just because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the divine essence is not to be conceived and expressed merely as essence, i.e. as immediate substance or pure self-contemplation of the divine, but as *form*, and in the whole wealth of the

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16 See Lange 1980, pp. 24-32 who recontructs this *Ent-Äusserungs -Model* carefully and interprets it as too strong a version of the logical connection theses in the action theory. The model suggests, first, that we may speak about action only in cases where the subject realizes his intention; secondly, that the subjective end is always considered as something inner; and thirdly, that the action itself is conceived as a kind of poiesis, as the externalization of the subjective end. Lange finds it problematical to describe action in these terms. It leads to an equivocation of the practical and poietical acts because it raises the subject and the objects which are acted upon, at the same level. Lange also considers problematical the consequence that Hegel cannot distinguish any more between psychological activities such as cognizing, perceiving, willing etc., and non-psychological activities such as cutting or building; see Lange 1980, pp. 38-47.

developed form" (*GW* 9, p. 19; *PhS*, p. 11). The form to this divine essence is rendered by the labor of the negative through knowing, ultimately in the Absolute Knowing of the Spirit itself. All its aspects, however, must be given the form; the substance must be the subject. This takes place in knowing as an activity in which the subject by making himself into the objects makes the objects into the subject. The externalization of the subject into the objects is thus accompanied by the internalization of the objects into the subject. At this stage no clear distinction between theoretical and practical exists here any longer. All the labor, or work, of man and of the divine winds together here.

From this absolute standpoint, attained at the end of *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hegel then characterizes history as a double externalization:

> This Becoming presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, must thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and digest this entire wealth of its substance. As its fulfilment consists in perfectly *knowing* what *it is*, in knowing its substance, this knowing is its *withdrawal into itself* in which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection. Thus absorbed in itself, it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness; but in that night its vanished outer existence is preserved, and this transformed existence - the former one, but now reborn of the Spirit's knowledge - is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit (*GW* 9, p. 433; *PhS*, p. 492).

TIIVISTELMÄ

Kun filosofia antiikissa ja keskiajalla oli rakentunut viime kädessä luontokokonaisuutta tai jumalaa koskeville ontologisille premisseille, moderni filosofia perustaa itsensä subjektin ja subjektiviteetin käsitteille. Tämä muutos filosofian perustassa, "ensimmäisen filosofian" luonteessa on yhteydessä siihen, että modernissa maailmassa ihminen kaikkiaan asettuu uudella tavalla oman todellisuutensa keskipisteeksi, subjektiksi. Modernisuus on historiallinen aikakausi, jossa länsimainen ihminen tulee uudella tavalla tietoiseksi asemastaan olevan kokonaisuudessa ja koettaa itsestään käsin perustella toimintansa normatiivisia periaatteita.

Hegel on ensimmäinen, joka asettaa modernisuuden kokonaisuudessaan filosofisena ongelmana. Häntä ennen olivat filosofit Descartes'sta ja Hobbesista alkaen rakentaneet modernia näkemystä ihmisestä tietävänä ja toimivana olentona, mutta Hegel pyrkii reflektoimaan esitettyjä näkemyksiä suhteessa uuteen yhteiskunnalliseen ja historialliseen todellisuuteen samoin kuin suhteuttamaan ne varhempiin aikakausiin ja filosofiin näkemyksiin. Hegel sekä puolustaa että kritisoi modernisuutta. Hän puolustaa tähän aikakauteen kuuluvaa tietoisuutta ja itsetietoisuutta, vapautta ja yksilöllisyyttä, mutta kritisoi aikakauden jakautuneisuutta ja sen abstraktiutta. Käytännöllisessä filosofiassaan Hegel pyrkii laatimaan modernia yhteiskuntaa ja kulttuuria koskevan kokonaisesityksen, joka vallitsevien ilmiöiden lisäksi osoittaisi niissä piilevät periaatteelliset mahdollisuudet. Tällainen esitys on hänen mukaansa mahdollista laatia järjen ja elämän vaatimuksia vasten.

Käsillä oleva tutkielma on järjestelmällinen selvitys Hegelin käytännöllisen filosofian muotoutumisesta. Se keskittyy Hegelin ajattelun kehitykseen Tübingenissä, Bernissä ja Frankfurtissa vuoteen 1800 sekä erityisesti hänen Jenan kauteensa vuoteen 1806. Ennen vuotta 1800 Hegel pohtii lähinnä kristinuskon perusteisiin sekä kirkon asemaan ja toimintaperiaatteisiin liittyviä kysymyksiä. Hän koettaa hahmotella uudenlaista ja elävää kansanuskontoa, joka vetoaisi niin ihmisten järkeen

kuin heidän aistimellisuuteensa ja sydämeensä vastaavalla tavalla kuin hänen mukaansa antiikin kreikkalaisten uskonto. Hän etsii myös uskonnolleen filosofista perustelua, ensin Kantin käytännöllisestä metafysiikasta, sitten ennen kaikkea Hölderlinin kehittelemästä spinozistisesta ykseysajattelusta.

Ensimmäisinä akateemisina vuosinaan Jenassa Hegel on läheisessä yhteistyössä Schellingin kanssa. Hänen ensimmäiset kirjoituksensa ja luentonsa rakentuvat Schellingin substanssimetafysiikalle. Samaten Hegel arvioi kriittisesti moderneja luonnonoikeusteorioita esittäen tälle substanssille perustuvan vaatimuksen absoluuttisesta ykseydestä, jota sen enempää Hobbesin ja Locken "empiiriset" kuin Kantin ja Fichten "formaaliset" teoriat eivät täytä. Oman käytännöllisen filosofiansa Hegel rakentaa tässä vaiheessa varsin suoraan Platonin ja Aristoteleen mallien mukaisesti esityksenä siveellisestä luonnosta ja sen toteutumisesta yhteiskunnallisissa instituutioissa.

Tämä antikisoiva käsitteistö on kuitenkin siinä määrin ristiriidassa modernin yhteiskunnan toimintaperiaatteiden kanssa, että sen puitteissa Hegelin ei ole mahdollista täyttää filosofialleen asettamaa keskeistä vaatimusta, jonka mukaan filosofian tulisi esittää osa aikansa ajatuksellisesti. Täyttääkseen tämän vaatimuksen Hegel rakentaa Jenan kauden jälkipuoliskolla uuden, subjektiviteetin ja hengen käsitteille perustuvan metafysiikan ja esittää myös käytännöllisen filosofiansa uudelleen subjektiviteetin filosofiana. Tutkielma pyrkii muodostamaan kokonaiskuvan näistä monimutkaisista siirtymistä ja osoittamaan erityisesti, miten Hegel rakentaa mainitun vaatimuksen täyttävän käytännöllisen filosofian.

Tutkielman erityinen näkökulma käytännöllisen filosofian ja myös modernisuuden perusteisiin liittyy työn käsitteeseen. Perinteisen näkemyksen mukaan, jonka Platon ja Aristoteles ovat vaikutusvaltaisella tavalla muotoilleet, työ on lähinnä poiesista ja tuottaa edellytyksiä ihmiselämälle, joka on ennen muuta praksista. Itse työn käsitteessä ja etenkin työn arvostuksessa tapahtuu 1600- ja 1700-luvuilla olennaisia muutoksia sekä yhteiskunnassa että yhteiskuntafilosofissa. Hobbesin sopimusteoria ei ylipäätään tunne klassista eettis-poliittista praksista, ja Locken pyrkimyksenä on oikeuttaa yhteiskuntasopimuksella luotu yksityisomaisuuden takaava poliittinen järjestelmä nimenomaan työn käsitteen avulla. Adam Smithin poliittinen taloustiede on tuottavalle työlle ja sen jaolle perustuva teoria yhteiskunnallisen varallisuuden kasvusta.

Hegel oli erittäin hyvin perehtynyt näihin moderneihin teorioihin. Uudelle subjektiviteetin metafysiikalle perustuvassa käytännöllisessä filosofiassaan Hegel esittää modernin yhteiskunnan keskeiset instituutiot yksilösubjektien yhdessä tuottamina ja ylläpitäminä tunnistamis- ja tietoisuusrakenteina. Hegelin keskeinen ajatus on, että samalla kun subjektit työskentelevät jonkin objektin kanssa, he työskentelevät itsensä kanssa. Työ on Hegelille itsensä ulkoistamista tai tekemistä kohteisiin. Samalla kun subjektit tuottavat yhteiskunnallisia rakenteita ja

instituutioita, he tuottavat itsensä tiedostaen ja tunnistaen itseään näissä rakenteissa. Hegelin käytännöllinen filosofia on teoriaa näistä rakenteista.

Tämän uuden käsitteistönsä avulla Hegelin onnistuu esittää modernin yhteiskunnan instituutiot tavalla, joka ei ole ristiriidassa niiden omien periaatteiden ja itseymmärryksen kannssa, mutta joka kuitenkaan ei ole kritiikitön näiden periaatteiden suhteen. Yhä edelleen Hegel katsoo, että erityisesti työnjaolle, vaihdolle ja yksityisomistukselle rakentuva moderni kansalaisyhteiskunta on periaatteitaan liian abstrakti ja "privatisoitunut" sekä yksilöllisen että poliittisen elämän näkökulmasta. Vaikka niin yksilöllinen kuin poliittinenkin elämä on modernina aikana olennaisesti riippuvainen tästä "tarpeiden järjestelmästä", Hegel puolustaa ajatusta valtiosta, joka asettaa kansalaisyhteiskunnan toiminnalle rajat ja omassa poliittisessa käytännössään kohottaa sen uudelle siveelliselle tasolle. Vasta löytäessään paikkansa osana valtiokonaisuutta modernit yksilöt saattavat Hegelin mukaan tiedostaa itsensä ja vapautensa sanan varsinaisessa mielessä.

Tätä klassisen käytännöllisen filosofian ideaa Hegel puolustaa nyt modernin yhteiskunnan periaatteista käsin. Tutkielma rakentuu käsitykselle, jonka mukaan Hegelin käytännöllisellä filosofialla on yhä merkitystä kun pohditaan modernin aikakauden perusperiaatteita ja rakennetaan tämän ajan etiikkaa ja poliittista filosofiaa. Tekijän käsityksen mukaan tämä pätee erityisesti Hegelin Jenan kauden jälkipuoliskon *Realphilosophie*hen. Tutkielman lopuksi tarkastellaan 1807 julkaistun *Phänomenologie des Geistes*in ja Jenan kauden käytännöllisen filosofian suhteita. *Phänomenologie*ssa Hegel vielä kerran perustaa filosofiansa uudelleen subjektiviteetille ja esittää oman geneettisen tulkintansa Kantin transsendentaalisesta deduktiosta, todistuksen subjektin ja substanssin ykseydestä hengessä ja absoluuttisessa tiedossa. Tämän teoksen jälkeen Hegel ryhtyy rakentamaan absoluuttista järjestelmäänsä ja sen osana hengenfilosofiaa, jonka luonteen ja ajankohtaisuuden puolustaminen olisi toinen ja vielä monimutkaisempi tehtävä.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Hatte die Philosophie in der Antike und im Mittelalter im wesentlichen auf den Prämissen der Naturganzheit und Gott beruht, so gründet sich die moderne Philosophie auf den Begriffen Subjekt und Subjektivität. Diese Veränderung in der Grundlage der Philosophie, in der Natur der "ersten Philosophie" selbst, hängt damit zusammen, dass der Mensch sich im Ganzen in der modernen Welt auf eine neue Weise zum Mittelpunkt seiner eigenen Wirklichkeit, zum Subjekt macht. Die Modernität ist eine geschichtliche Periode, in der der okzidentale Mensch sich seiner ontologischen Stellung mehr bewusst wird und die normativen Prinzipien seines Handelns von sich selbst aus zu begründen versucht.

Hegel hat als erster die Modernität in ihrer Ganzheit als ein philosophisches Problem gestellt. Spätestens seit Descartes und Hobbes hatten die Philosophen eine moderne Anschauung von dem Menschen als ein wissendes und handelndes Wesen aufgestellt, aber Hegel versucht, diese Anschauungen in Verhältnis zur neuen gesellschaftlichen und geschichtlichen Wirklichkeit zu reflektieren sowie sie in Beziehung zu den früheren geschichtlichen Perioden und philosophischen Anschauungen zu setzen. Hegel verteidigt die Modernität sowie kritiziert sie. Er verteidigt das Sebstbewusstsein, die Freiheit und die Individualität, die für die moderne Welt charakteristisch sind, aber er kritiziert die Zerstreutheit und die Abstraktheit dieser Welt. In seiner praktischen Philosophie versucht Hegel, eine die moderne Gesellschaft und Kultur betreffende Gesamtdarstellung auszuarbeiten, die ausser den herrschenden Erscheinungen auch die in ihnen verborgenen prinzipiellen Möglichkeiten zeigen würde. Eine solche Darstellung lässt sich nach ihm unter Berücksichtigung der Erfordernisse der Vernunft und des Lebens formulieren.

Diese Abhandlung versucht eine systematische Erläuterung der Gestaltung der praktischen Philosophie Hegels zu geben. Sie beschränkt sich auf die Entwicklung des Denkens Hegels in Tübingen, Bern und Frankfurt, und konzentriert sich besonders auf seine Jenaer Zeit bis zum Jahre 1806. Vor dem Jahr 1800 erörtert Hegel zunächst die mit den

Grundlagen des Christentums und den Prinzipien der Kirche zusammenhängenden Fragen. Er versucht, eine neue und lebendige Volksreligion zu gestalten, die sich sowohl auf die Vernunft des Menschen als auch auf seine Sinnlichkeit und sein Herz beruft, die in seinen Augen vergleichbar mit den Religion der Griechen in der Antike war. Er sucht für seine Religion auch eine philosophische Begründung, zuerst in der praktischen Metaphysik Kants, dann vor allem in dem von Hölderlin entwickelten Spinozistischen Einheitsdenken.

In seinen ersten akademischen Jahren in Jena steht Hegel in enger Zusammenarbeit mit Schelling, und seine ersten Schriften und Vorlesungen beruhen sich auf der Substanzmetaphysik Schellings. Ebenfalls befasst sich Hegel mit den modernen Naturrechtstheorien und stellt auf Grund dieser Metaphysik eine Forderung der absoluten Einheit auf, die weder die "empirischen Theorien" von Hobbes und Locke, noch die "formalen Theorien" von Kant und Fichte erfüllen. In dieser Periode formuliert Hegel seine eigene praktische Philosophie relativ direkt nach dem Vorbild von Platon und Aristoteles, als eine Darstellung von sittlichen Natur und ihrer Verwirklichung in Gesellschaftlichen Institutionen.

Diese antikisierende Begrifflichkeit steht jedoch in grossem Masse im Widerspruch mit den Handlungsprinzipien der modernen Gesellschaft, so dass es für Hegel in ihrem Rahmen nicht möglich ist, die zentrale Forderung zu erfüllen, die er an seine Philosophie gestellt hatte, nämlich dass die Philosophie ihre eigene Zeit in Gedanken fassen sollte. Um diese Forderung zu erfüllen, konzipiert Hegel in der zweiten Hälfte der Jenaer Periode eine neue dialektische Metaphysik, die sich auf die Begriffe Subjektivität und Geist gründet, und formuliert seine praktische Philosophie neu. Diese Abhandlung versucht ein Gesamtbild dieser komplizierten Veränderungen aufzuzeichnen und zu zeigen, wie Hegel eine die oben erwähnte Forderung erfüllende praktische Philosophie ausformt.

Die Abhandlung untersucht die Grundlagen der praktischen Philosophie und der Modernität insbesondere anhand der Veränderungen des Begriffes der Arbeit und seiner Stellung. Nach der traditionellen Auffassung, die Platon und Aristoteles in einflussreicher Weise formuliert haben, ist die Arbeit zunächst Poiesis und bietet Voraussetzungen dem Menschenleben, welches vor allem Praxis ist. Der Begriff der Arbeit selbst und besonders die allgemeine Würdigung der Arbeit erfährt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert wesentliche Veränderungen, sowohl in der Gesellschaft selbst wie auch in der Gesellschaftsphilosophie. Die Vertragstheorie von Hobbes kennt keine klassische Praxis, und Locke strebt danach, das durch den Gesellschaftsvertrag geschaffene politische System, das das Privateigentum garantiert, mit dem Begriff der Arbeit zu rechtfertigen. Die politische Ökonomie Adam Smiths ist eine Theorie über Wachstum von Gesellschaftlichem Reichtum, das auf produktiver Arbeit und ihrer Teilung beruht.

Hegel hatte sich sehr gut mit diesen modernen Theorien vertraut gemacht. In seiner auf einer neuen Metaphysik der Subjektivität basierenden praktischen Philosophie stellt Hegel die Institutionen der modernen Gesellschaft als Anerkennungs- und Bewusstseinstrukturen dar, die von den Einzelsubjekten gemeinsam erzeugt und aufrechthalten werden. Die zentrale Idee Hegels ist, dass während die Subjekte sich mit einem Objekt beschäftigen, beschäftigen sie sich mit sich selbst. Die Arbeit ist für Hegel Entäusserung seiner selbst oder sich zum Dinge machen. Während die Subjekte gesellschaftliche Strukturen und Institutionen erzeugen, erzeugen sie sich selbst und erkennen sowie anerkennen sich in diesen Strukturen. Die praktische Philosophie Hegels ist eine Theorie dieser Strukturen.

Durch diese neue Begrifflichkeit gelingt es Hegel, die Institutionen der modernen Gesellschaft auf eine Weise darzustellen, die nicht im Widerspruch mit ihren eigenen Grundsätzen und ihrem Selbstverständnis steht, die aber den Prinzipien der Institutionen kritisch gegenübersteht. Nach wie vor ist Hegel der Ansicht, dass die vorzugsweise auf Arbeitsteilung, Austausch und Privateigentum basierende moderne bürgerliche Gesellschaft prinzipiell zu abstrakt und "privatisiert" ist unter dem Gesichtswinkel sowohl des individuellen als auch politischen Lebens betrachtet. Obwohl das individuelle sowie das politische Leben in der modernen Zeit wesentlich von diesem "System der Bedürfnisse" abhängig ist, verteidigt Hegel die Idee von einem Staat, der dem Handeln der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft die Grenzen setzt und in seinem eigenen politischen Handeln sie "aufhebt". Erst wenn die modernen Individuen ihre Stelle als einen Teil im Staatsganzen finden, können sie sich und ihre Freiheit im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes erkennen.

Hegel verteidigt diese Idee der klassischen praktischen Philosophie von den Prinzipien der modernen Gesellschaft aus. Diese Abhandlung vertritt die Auffassung, dass die praktische Philosophie Hegels immer noch von Bedeutung ist, wenn man die Grundprinzipien der modernen Welt berüchsichtigt und Ethik sowie normative politische Philosophie von aktueller Bedeutung aufzustellen versucht. Nach Ansicht des Autors gilt dies insbesondere für die *Realphilosophie* der zweiten Hälfte der Jenaer Periode Hegels. Am Schluss der Abhandlung werden die Beziehungen zwischen dem im Jahre 1807 veröffentlichten Buch *Phänomenologie des Geistes* und der praktischen Philosophie der Jenaer Zeit in Kürze betrachtet. In *Phänomenologie des Geistes* gründet Hegel noch einmal seine Philosophie auf der Subjektivität und entwickelt seine genetische Interpretation von der tranzendentalen Deduktion Kants als Beweiss von der Einheit von Subjekt und Substanz im Geist und absolutem Wissen. Nach diesem Werk hat Hegel sich seinem späten System sowie Geistesphilosophie befasst, deren Charakter und Aktualität zu verteidigen noch eine schwerere und kompliziertere Aufgabe wäre.

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