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Author(s): Hietalahti, Jarno

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1. Carl Jung and the Role of Shadow and Trickster in Political Humor: Social Philosophical Analysis

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the author will analyze the relationship between humor and power in the light of court jesters (comedians) and sovereign (president). The chapter offers a philosophical perspective on the social significance of the White House Correspondents' Dinner. It will not discuss the detailed history of the Dinner. Instead, it will focus on the role of the invited comedienne Michelle Wolf, who performed at the Dinner in 2018. As regards the sovereign, special attention is given to the current president of the United States Donald J. Trump. The theoretical framework is based on C. G. Jung's theory of the archetypes, and especially on the concepts of the 'shadow' and the 'trickster'. The chapter is divided in four parts: First, the author will discuss Jung's theory of archetypes, and argue for its relevance in modern social philosophical thinking. Second, he explains how this theory can be used to analyze the Correspondents' Dinner and how it can shed light on those aspects of the occasion which are often left aside. Third, the author will argue how the trickster and the shadow are present on a socially unconscious level in these meetings, and how they offer a symbolic explanation for the current political situation in the Western world. It will be argued that Jung's theory opens new ways to interpret the relationship between power and humor. At the end, these threads are combined by discussing the need for ridiculing Trump.

BACKGROUND

The White House Correspondents' Dinner underlines the age-old idea that humor and power have always intertwined (e.g. Berger 1993). Traditionally, humor challenges the *status quo*: during medieval carnivals the world was turned upside down, and false kings took over temporarily (see Bakhtin 1984). The most obvious example of this kind of oppositional element is a court jester or fool, who can be considered an epitome of humor (Zijderveld 1982). He is the one who can criticize the sovereign through humor (Fromm 2010, 80). This fool is often described as a shadow of the king (e.g. Otto 2001). It will be argued that in the contemporary political scene, there is still demand for modern fools and sovereigns.

The court jester is a prominent symbol. It reminds that the current social situation is not irreversible. Fools challenge the common sense and rigid rationality, and offer a route to liberation from the everyday rules (Korhonen 1999). They promote the freedom of emotion and acting according to inner strivings without contemplation. C.G. Jung's theory of archetypes, and especially the concepts of shadow and trickster, offers a way to deepen this old theme. Drawing from Jung, it can be claimed that fools are in an internal relation to the prevailing order. The trickster offers a challenge to the shared rationality, but on a deeper level – behind all the superficial foolishness – this challenge is drawn from the totality of humanity. That is, it is a part of a broader humane wisdom. This idea suggests that fools and rulers are not opposing powers *per se*, but instead form a combination of different aspects of humanity.

Conceptually, humor is understood here as an umbrella concept which covers all different funny genres from farce to satire, and from slapstick to parody. The author follows the so-called incongruity theory which claims that humor is based on contradictions. Humor stems from clashes between cultural categorizations, or in other words, humor is triggered when something unexpected happens (see Morreall 1983; 2009). In humor, something goes wrong, so to speak. Of course, there is a wide discussion about the details of incongruity theory (see e.g. Hurley & al 2011, Oring 2016), but this chapter follows the general idea of the theory. Detailed analysis about nuances of the theory and comparisons to other forms of surprises (e.g. tragedy, horror, etc.) are left for other papers. Also, laughter here refers to laughter triggered by humor, and not, say, by tickling or toxins.

JUNG'S THEORY OF ARCHETYPES: THE SHADOW AND THE TRICKSTER

Psychoanalyst Carl Jung's theories are constantly questioned: he is often seen more a mystical than a scientific thinker. True, Jung's writings about self-contradictory and historically evolving God (2011), paranormal phenomena (1977), and alchemy as a root for psychological studies (with Jaffé 1965) are somewhat obscure, to say the least. Richard Noll (1997) calls Jung a cult leader and one of the biggest liars of the 20th century, who forged case studies to support his theories. However, if his writings are not taken literally but metaphorically, there are several valuable ideas in his collected works about the psychology of human beings and their collective behavior. If approached this way, his theory of archetypes is still valid. Here, the Jungian psychoanalysis, or analytical psychology like Jung himself calls his findings, is treated as a way to describe the plurality of human beings. The author does not defend psychoanalysis as a scientific theory but as an inspiring framework for critical social philosophy and social psychology. Jung's thinking helps to dive deeper into the individual and social psyche, and into the dynamics of humor in interpersonal relationships.

Jung worked with this theory of archetypes throughout his published works. An archetype is a striving which affects individual's consciousness and choices as well as, for instance, ethics. Archetypes are parts of the unconscious which conflict with the ego and conscious thinking. In short, they shape human behavior, and in this sense, an archetype refers to a pattern of behavior (Jung 1980, 5). There is no need to go through all the different archetypes, but nevertheless one should not think that there is, for example, a concrete Mother, Child or Old Man as such, but they refer to unconscious motivations which people have shared throughout eras. They are symbols of different aspects of humanity (for a detailed take on different archetypes, see Jung 1980). Jung's archetypal ideas can be considered as symbols (see Jung 1978b) which reveal the humanity in its totality. Archetypes need not to be 'real' in the natural-scientific sense, but instead they symbolize human motivations, desires and objectives. Different archetypes offer different perspectives on values and meanings shared by wide groups of people. Here, the two central archetypes which challenge the so-called normality of the social world will be discussed: the shadow and the trickster. As it will be shown, both are highly relevant for understanding the social significance of the White House Correspondents' Dinner. The shadow is, as the name

suggests, the neglected part of the personality which is nevertheless an alive and influential part of the unconscious:

The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with considerable resistance. (Jung 1978a, 145.)

Among humor researchers there are only a few scholars who discuss Jung's ideas. One of them is Lydia Amir, who sees Jungian depth psychology as a process of redemption of the personality. Amir points out that for Jung, it is essential to harness the opposites within a personality to become a whole. (Amir 2014, 269.) During this self-reflective process, it can be added, understanding humor in relation to the neglected sides of personality is pivotal. In short, analyzing the shadow deepens understanding of the social psychological aspects of humor and laughter. Following Jung, it could be suggested that people need to understand humor through the shadow which refers to the dual nature of human beings: human beings are rational, but there are repressed forces that are unknown to them. In short, when analyzing humor, researchers analyze the shadow, too.

It should be noted that the shadow is a social psychological concept because human beings estimate themselves in comparison to others. According to analytical psychology, ego-ideals are built on the foundation of shared social values. For this reason, the shadow is a dynamic concept, and its contents vary from time to time. For instance, if people value serious thinking and straightforward technological achievements, humor and creativity are parts of the shadow. Jung refers by the concept of the shadow to the negative side of the total personality, and those aspects persons wish to hide (Jung 1967). Interestingly, modern Jungians agree on that there is no direct access to the shadow, but it appears in daily lives, and

we meet it in humor – such as dirty jokes or slapstick antics – which express our hidden, inferior, or feared emotions. When we observe closely what strikes us as funny – such as someone slipping on a banana peel or referring to a

taboo body part – we discover that the shadow is active. (...) It's usually the shadow who laughs at jokes. (Zweig & Abrams 1991, xviii.)

An old idea is in play here: laughter reveals deeper attitudes. This notion is present also in Sigmund Freud's theory of humor (see Freud 1968a; 1968b), but it can be traced back to Plato's idea of how laughter expresses a mixture of joy and scorn (see Plato 2001). In the Jungian framework, the shadow (and humor) is a door to human individuality as social beings. In this setting, humor can express both high and low features of humanity. Confronting the shadow is necessary but also disturbing for an individual:

It is not until we have truly been shocked into seeing ourselves as we really are, instead of as we wish or hopefully assume we are, that we can take the first step toward individual reality. (Whitmont 1991, 16)

In many respects, Jung's position on humor comes close to Friedrich Nietzsche's idea about the Dionysian nature of laughter in comparison to the Apollonian position (see Douglas 2008, 27). Laughter expresses inner strivings and the darker side of humanity. For Nietzsche, this is golden laughter which questions the socially shared reality and tries to find a new basis for morality and humanity (see Nietzsche 2006), and one may very well add, a new basis for humor at the same moment. Following this Nietzschean tradition, humor operates as a looking-glass which offers a view on the clashes between irrationality and rationality, emotional strivings and rational self-control.

In this light, shocking humor may have a cathartic element because it exposes the inner self. Upsetting humor calls for self-reflection: on what is a reaction – be it laughter, disgust, or getting offended – to this type of humor based (see Hietalahti 2016)? The author suggests this is the main principle on which roasts at the Correspondents' Dinner are based. Humor, even in a disturbing form, is seen as a good thing for individuals and a society because it handles taboos and sensitive topics.

One must agree that Jung's and Jungians' conceptualization of humor is somewhat limited, but the basic idea is intriguing. Humor, although often neglected in the name of reason and science, is an essential part of humanity. Even if humor does not always make sense *per se*, it is possible to understand this painfully human feature. However, it should be noted that

not all humor is part of the shadow. The Jungian view on humor and laughter must admit that the shadow is present on the type of laughter which expresses negative aspects of humanity. Simply put, the shadow operates when people laugh at things at which one should not laugh. This means that it is possible to study and analyze the dark side of humanity during those moments when people, so to speak, lose self-control. Evidently, one cannot claim that all laughter is similar, nor that one accidental burst of laughter defines the whole person (see Smuts 2010). Even so, there are moments of laughter during which neglected features gain space through humor (in comparison to ego-ideals).

The question is, then, who makes the shadow laugh? Jung's answer would be the trickster. Trickster is not just an archaic phenomenon but an archetype that is present in everyone (see Jung 1980). It draws from the paradoxical nature of the human psyche which is full of joy and hatred, as well as selfish and altruistic tendencies. Essentially, the human being is a distorted whole. Disarray and confusion fuel Jung's trickster who challenges all order. An old biblical idea 'the good that I would, I do not: but the evil I would not, that I do' (Romans 7:19) describes this psychological aspect well. Jung writes that the trickster is a sum of contradictions. It does not have a fixed form, and it is hard to give an exact definition for a trickster, as Paul Radin reminds:

Trickster is at one and the same time creator and destroyer, giver and negator, he who dupes others and who is always duped himself (...) At all times he is constrained to behave as he does from impulses over which he has no control, he knows no good nor evil yet he is responsible for both. He possesses no values (...) is at the mercy of his passions and appetites, yet through his actions all values come into being. (Radin 1956, ix).

Because trickster is neither 'good' nor 'evil', he is not immoral either but amoral. This position allows trickster to confuse and to rattle the cultural structures, and for this reason, trickster is implicitly a political figure. Of course, this is nothing new. As Marianna Keisalo-Galván has pointed out, in the Western world, people are used to the interaction between politics and humor. As it happens, politics has its own court jesters (Keisalo-Galván 2011, 179). This all symbolizes comedians' role at the White House Correspondents' Dinner. Fittingly, Michelle Wolf's performance was the most controversial roast since Stephen Colbert's in 2006. Wolf did something that is not suitable for a comedienne in this type of

situation, that is, she made the collective shadow surface through humor. Wolf was accused of telling jokes that are inappropriate and after her humorous performance, it has been noted that professional comedians should not be invited to the Dinner any more (see Grynbaum 2018). But was Wolf a genuine trickster in a Jungian sense? In some respect, there are clearly features which fit well to the trickster profile. However, as Radin reminds:

every generation occupies itself with interpreting Trickster anew. No generation understands him fully but no generation can do without him. Each had to include him (Radin 1956, 168).

If Wolf had a clear political agenda, for example, against Trump and his administration, she took more privileges than are allowed for true tricksters. A Jungian trickster is not necessarily concerned about daily politics because he does not aim for political manifestos. In a social psychological sense, the trickster is a universal symbol that is always defined in new ways. Reactions to the trickster reflect unconsciously shared trickster aspects. “If we laugh at him, he grins at us. What happens to him happens to us” (Radin 1956, 169). Wolf’s performance needs to be analyzed more closely, if one wants to understand her humor and its social philosophical meaning.

The Shadow of the Trickster: Who has the Right to Humor?

Michelle Wolf attacked right-wing populism and post-factual politics in her performance. Her criticism targeted the current political situation in which facts or truth do not matter as much as emotions and personal motives. A couple of examples from her routine:

We should definitely talk about the women in the Trump administration. There’s Kellyanne Conway. Man, she has the perfect last name for what she does: Conway. It’s like if my name was Michelle Jokes Frizzy Hair Small Tits.

You guys gotta stop putting Kellyanne on your shows. All she does is lie. If you don’t give her a platform, she has nowhere to lie. It’s like that old saying: If a tree falls in the woods, how do we get Kellyanne under that tree?

Through humor, Wolf ridicules the modern era. But she recognizes the flip side of the post-truth politics; media in its different forms is a crucial part of the whole situation. Populism is big because populist politicians get so much attention:

You guys are obsessed with Trump. Did you use to date him? Because you pretend like you hate him, but I think you love him. I think what no one in this room wants to admit is that Trump has helped all of you. He couldn't sell steaks or vodka or water or college or ties or Eric, but he has helped you.

He's helped you sell your papers and your books and your TV. You helped create this monster, and now you're profiting off of him.

Obviously, it is hard to understand the whole totality of post-truth politics in short jokes because populism is a liquid concept, it is hard to grasp (e.g. Gellner & Ionescu 1969), and there are no clear joint points or common history between all the different kinds of populists (see Canovan 2004). Despite these challenges, there are certain common nominators between different populists: they tend to use similar concepts like the elite, the people, and the common opinion or common sense, and especially among right-wing populists, there is a general tendency to appeal to xenophobic emotions like anti-immigration policies. Typically, a populist leader presents him- or herself in such a way that he or she understands the people and shares their concern against the crooked elite who have forgotten the needs of common people and are lacking common sense (see Hirvonen & Pennanen 2018). Roughly put, populists want to create an emotional separation between 'us' and 'them' to feed the disappointments of the voters (Canovan 2004). In creating this separation, media has a role, as Wolf claims in her roast.

If the whole twisted modern situation is to be understood, one needs to take a step aside, and try to see the broader picture – not just particular deeds by the president or single jokes by a roaster. If one follows the long tradition of humanism and scientific thinking, the guiding principle is 'nothing human should be alien to me' (see Fromm 2006). This demand concerns also attempts of analyzing and trying to understand the era of post-truth politics. Drawing from this principle, one must start by noting that even Donald Trump should not be pathologized in an arrogant manner. This means that attaching labels like crazy, evil, or fool to a person is ideologically biased, if these labels are not backed up with any kind of

argumentation. For instance, in the International Society for Humor Studies annual humor conferences in 2017 and 2018 there were several papers analyzing how Trump is ridiculed in various kinds of humorous shows and memes. But it is striking that none of the papers analyzed how Trump uses humor in his own politics. In discussions, it was stated that Trump does not have a sense of humor at all, and that his statements are purely ludicrous, but not jokes nor humor. This is a critical under- and misevaluation. Among humor researchers (see Raskin 2008), it is widely accepted that humor is a central human feature. It touches in its various forms (almost) every human being in their everyday lives. To claim that a person has no sense of humor whatsoever is, if taken seriously, a devastating claim. It implicitly suggests that this kind of person lacks a central feature of humanity. This is, in most cases, unnecessary pathologizing. The question is, then, who has access to humor. Jung would argue that everyone, through the shadow which laughs at trickster-laden ideas.

Curiously enough, Donald Trump has been called both a court jester and a person who does not have a sense of humor (see Pickles 2017, Clopton 2018). If one is to understand what is going on in the world, these kinds of claims are over-simplistic in comparison to intellectually sincere research. It must be noted that Trump is not a court jester but possibly an incompetent politician, if evaluated from the perspective of how politics, so to speak, should be done. Second, it must be admitted that Trump has a sense of humor even if his humor taste differs from the so-called normal. Also, it is implausible to claim that there is nothing funny in Trump's humor because empirical evidence proves otherwise: there are millions of people who laugh with Trump. Following Jung, it must be admitted that the shadow and trickster are part of everyone. Even if one is not amused by the same things as Trump or his followers, his humor can be analyzed if one overcomes his or her own prejudices about humor. After this, it is possible to understand both Trump's character and his way of doing politics in a more precise manner. And perhaps what is more important, it possibly illuminates one's own relationship to humor. These aspects are crucial if one wants to understand the social significance of Wolf's performance in 2018.

During the presidential election campaign, Trump joked frequently, and presumably a vast number of people laughed with him. His most famous outbursts referred to the 2nd Amendment and hinted about the possibility of murdering Hillary Clinton, bragged how he as a celebrity has unlimited possibilities to grab the genitals of women, called Mexicans rapists and criminals, as well as belittled disabled persons. From a humanistic point of view,

these sexual, racist, and hostile speeches are not particularly funny; quite the contrary, they are disgusting. However, if one takes those speech acts as factual claims, it will lead to a grave misunderstanding; Trump was using humor as a rhetorical tool, for instance, when he speculated on the possibility that Clinton would be elected as a president and she would abolish the right to bear arms. The author is not making any value statements about the moral worth of Trump's humor but instead trying to acknowledge that he can produce humor – however appalling it may be. Here's an example:

*If she (Hillary Clinton) gets to pick her judges, nothing you can do, folks. (...)
Although the Second Amendment people — maybe there is, I don't know.*

In between the lines, it can be read that Trump suggests violence against Hillary Clinton. This is vulgar and distasteful. However, the disturbing comment should not blur the fact that there is humor in Trump's claim – even if it does not amuse everyone. Even so, the reactions of Trump voters cannot be neglected as there are probably millions of people who laughed or sniggered when they heard the speech. Tastelessness does not equal humorlessness. Trump, in a twisted way, winked an eye to his voters; he was probably not seriously claiming that Clinton should be murdered, but still he sent a message to his voters. In an interesting political level, Trump and his followers most likely understood that his claim should not be taken literally, and if their opponents did, they would just show how they are humorless boors.

With these kinds of outbursts (one only needs to have a glance at his Twitter account), Trump frequently attacks the so-called political correctness³², and it is funny for some. This is very understandable; according to incongruity theory, humor is based on contradictions (e.g. Oring 2016). A traditional politician should not be offensive but respectful, and Trump does the exact opposite. With this he challenges the prevailing ideas of what a politician should look and sound like. This is an attempt to show power, or perhaps more accurately, unlimited self-admiration – he is something that is above the old policies. Humor, in this sense, establishes a power relation, and it is used as a tool.

This all raises the question whether Trump is a trickster who rattles the cages of the old-fashioned political sphere. Jung's trickster symbolizes the possibility of violating taboos and

32 As a side note, political correctness is criticized by a large group of comedians, too.

at the same moment liberating spirit. Trickster parodies social norms and structures, and he inverts hierarchies and values. In this, the trickster questions the prevailing order. (Russo 2008, 257.) However, as it was claimed above, trickster does not care about power. He offers only mayhem and uproar. In this sense, Trump is not a pure trickster at least, even if the consequences of his politics are disturbing. Nevertheless, if a comedian or comedienne wants to be truly trickster-like, he or she must challenge the borders of humor, too. This is what Wolf appears to have done based on the negative reactions she received after the performance at the Dinner.

There is an open controversy about humor tastes. Those who claim that Trump is not funny and does not have a sense of humor typically appreciate humor that ridicules Trump, and *vice versa*. In a societal level, there is a confrontation about who has the right to humor. If one considers the concept of humor, this situation is twisted. Humor is a deviation from the so-called normal, and these aberrations can be found among every possible worldview. Jung would remind that one cannot praise humor as such. Instead, he would ask: what are people really laughing at when they, say, mock politicians, or themselves? The focus must be on the hidden motives or inner attitudes behind humor. It must be asked, what are the hidden motivations of Wolf when she ridicules Donald Trump? On a conscious level, she may want to fight for a better world and make people laugh (although she claimed that she came to the Dinner to only tell jokes without any agenda). But on an unconscious level, she builds walls in between different groups of people, namely those who oppose and support Trump. In this sense, she comes close to the populists she so harshly criticizes; she also supports the divide between 'us' and 'them'. Laughter is rarely a unanimous expression. Fun can be scornful.

Jung claims that accepting that the shadow is a living phenomenon is key to mental health. Human beings are controversial creatures, and humor cannot be understood without admitting and analyzing this aspect of humanity (see Hart 2008, 98-101). In the absurd setting called human life, humor has a special role. Human beings are silly creatures and they can find sense in non-sense. Not necessarily through joking, but as an attitude towards their social, intellectual, and ethical environments. The absurdity of it all can make sense through humor. Human mind has the propensity to contradictions and non-sensical thinking which is, however, often pushed aside. From a trickster perspective, opposing elements come together:

(...) wisdom and folly appear as one and the same; and they are one and the same (...) Life is crazy and meaningful at once. And when we do not laugh over the one aspect and speculate about the other, life is exceedingly drab and everything is reduced to the littlest scale. There is then little sense and little nonsense either. (Jung 1980, 31)

Should Trump be Ridiculed?

The White House Correspondents' Dinner brings forth an intriguing question: what are the actual consequences of humor? Does Wolf change the world through roasting? The immediate discussion after her performance targeted the significance of the Dinner. There was speculation over the role of comedians on the occasion; some even claimed that comedians should not perform anymore at the Dinner. These immediate reactions, however, are not the whole picture, and one must analyze the wider spectrum around humor and politics.

There is a long-standing discussion whether humor is a socially conservative or revolutionary force (see Kuipers 2008). A large group of researchers suggests that humor is a counter-power in totalitarian societies: In the Soviet Union, people joked all the time about the regime, and via their humor questioned the prevailing order (Oring 2016). In the 1940s in concentration camps, for Jewish people humor was a tool for survival; it helped people to deal with the devastating situation (Franklin 2011). From these descriptions it can be seen that humor has (had) at least two different means of resistance: 1) fighting against the ruler, and being 2) an escape mechanism and a way to survive in a horrific situation. Similar logic can be found behind the current way of relating to those in power. This is related to Trump in at least two ways.

Obviously, Wolf was not the first to mock the president. Trump is constantly ridiculed in various kinds of humorous shows. Those who do not agree with Trump's politics try to resist him with humor. They mock and laugh at Trump's ludicrous and illogical statements and short-sightedness of his political choices. Trump is fuel for humor, like various academics have illustrated during conferences organized by the International Society of Humor Studies (2017 and 2018). Trump is surrounded by mockful jokes, pictures and

videos; for example, one can find humorous memes in which Trump excretes from his mouth, has sexual intercourse with the Russian president Vladimir Putin, and so forth. Humor, in light of these presentations, has helped to question the president's politics, as well as given breathing space in the insane situation. In short, it has been suggested both implicitly and explicitly that ridiculing Trump is normatively a good thing.

However, other theorists claim that humor is, eventually, a conservative power. Instead of igniting a revolution, humor tends to strengthen the *status quo*. For instance, Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) notes how humor may be critical in one moment when, through laughter, the world is turned upside down, social roles are distorted, and carnival kings burned; in short, chaos prevails. However, carnivals must end at some point, and their actual, but possibly hidden, function is to show how the normal circumstances make much more sense than the world of chaos. Carnivals offer an empty promise of freedom and happiness; the modern version of this kind of criticism is aimed at culture industry by critical theorists like Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (2002), who consider humor as a product of consumption and see it as a way to escape the aching boredom. However, they argue, fun does not cure the underlying problem, and only helps with the symptoms momentarily. Christie Davies (2011) has taken a step forward when he claims that jokes do not have any (or at best minimal) consequences on a society. Following this line of thought, it would be basically pointless to joke about, say, Donald Trump and his administration if one wanted to alter the social reality in which one lives.

From a Jungian perspective, the question whether humor is a critical or conservative power can be approached from a different point of view; instead of calculating the consequences of humor, it could be more sensible to try to understand the social significance of humor, or, what humor signals. Jung's theory of archetypes demonstrates that the question should be, what is the symbolical meaning of ridiculing, and on which emotional strivings is this kind of humor based. It should be asked, what kind of character trait humor is, and what are the dominant strivings that form the prevailing collective unconscious. This position triggers, at least, two significant questions: first, how do people treat other people with their humor, and what do they want to achieve via their humor. Clearly, the problem of humor is not only sociological but depth-psychological as well. (See also Ruch 1998.)

Right-wing populists are quite open with their vulgar statements, and this is not limited just to Trump. His short-termed communications director Anthony Scaramucci did not shy away from calling Reince Priebus ‘a fucking paranoid schizophrenic, a paranoiac’ during a phone call to a reporter from The New Yorker. In the European Parliament, one similar character has been Nigel Farage who has, for example, launched insulting attacks against Herman Van Rompuy and the whole Belgium. It is not an over-statement to say that these kinds of verbal abuses happen frequently among right-wing populists. And they appear to be funny to a whole lot of people.

These outbursts can and should be criticized, but nevertheless, there is a great number of people who admire this style of politics. Populists do not hide their loathing and despise towards those who are different. For instance, Trump appears to react rather quickly and impulsively via Twitter and does not blur his message with any kind of softening words. He speaks his mind in a straightforward manner. True, he appeals more to emotions than to facts, but nevertheless, he appears to be in a paradoxical sense honest. He lets his anger and selfishness shine out bright. He does not need to teach humility and unselfishness as those kinds of virtues are not of importance for him. In his thinking, brutal egoism is the key to victory, and everything else is of secondary importance. This position carries a strong cultural message; if the most powerful individual in the world can embrace a hateful attitude towards others, this kind of behavior and thinking is acceptable. This gives voice to the bitterness of masses who have felt themselves of secondary importance in a global world (compare with Fromm 1994). Their emotions, then, are acceptable too, if the most powerful person shares the same strivings. Trump is a symbol who justifies hate. Logically, degrading humor becomes more acceptable as well. These are negative traits and they can and should be criticized. For a liberal person, Trump represents all the spiteful features of humanity. He is an externalized shadow.

As it has been mentioned, populism is often accused of dividing people into ‘us’ and ‘them’. However, it can be argued that this happens also among those who keep ridiculing Trump and his administration. Social philosophers like Michel Foucault (1975) and Erich Fromm (1994) point out that in comparison to dictator regimes, in modern societies power is scattered, and it is hard to fight against an invisible enemy. Trump has changed all this; he is a clear target for all possible ridiculing. But is ridiculing Trump always ‘progressive’? Does it enhance the modern society? Or could this kind of humor stem from the personal shadow?

The modern situation is comparable to Fromm's analysis on different forms of hatred when he analyzed how people reacted to Hitler in 1930s and 1940s. In his essay 'Should we hate Hitler?' (1942) Fromm questions the collective reactions towards Adolf Hitler's war policies; not that he wanted to defend Hitler but to understand the social character of the Western alliance. Fromm distinguished two different types of hate: irrational (character-conditioned) and rational (reactive); rational hate is connected to life and growth, and it is triggered when there is an attack against these values. Irrational hate, on the other hand, is a continuous readiness to hate and destroy. Fromm believes this kind of hatred can be found also in jokes a person tells. In this sense, a sense of humor may be an indicator of irrational hate. (Fromm 1942, 220-221). To put in Jungian terms, irrational hatred is rooted in the shadow even if the rationalizations for the hate are defended by high moral aims.

This line of thinking offers an inspiring perspective on the contemporary cultural phenomenon of ridiculing Trump and his politics: on which strivings is this kind of aggressive mockery based? Should Trump be ridiculed? It is obvious that Trump's own (and probably his voters') humor stems from his yearning for power, and it should be criticized. However, it is not guaranteed that mockery towards Trump is any nobler if the motives or goals of this kind of humor are not clear. For evaluation of humor, one needs to understand his or her own personal motives behind humor, the possible consequences of humor, and the symbolic significance of humor. It is not enough to say that Trump should be ridiculed because, for instance, 'he is such a disgusting person,' or because it is funny to mock that kind of character.

According to Henri Bergson, humor and laughter work as a social corrective: if someone behaves in an odd manner, laughter offers a social punishment to straighten the fellow back in line (Bergson 1913). This might work, if a society is unified and there are only a few silly persons. However, if the social group is deeply divided, the effects of laughter hardly manage to correct anything. It is more probable that the group becomes more divided. True, laughter brings people together (Provine 2000), but this social mechanism typically works on like-minded people; humor can also exclude people from the cultural inner circle (Critchley 2002). Therefore, vulgar mockery against Trump will most likely be accepted only among those who are already against Trump. Aggressive ridiculing will probably cause aggressive counter-reactions by those who share the mocked values. Arthur Schopenhauer

analyzed this side of humor: if the basis of one's worldview is laughed at, laughter implies that there is something wrong with the very foundations of one's life. Because of this, laughing at a person's thoughts, political convictions or such, is always a straightforward and hurtful insult (Schopenhauer 1887, 281). Following Jung, shaming and hurting others – even if they disagree with you – is work of the shadow. Humor just for the sake of laughter is, eventually, very limited in a humanistic framework.

Obviously, it is possible to make distinctions between different types of humor. One way to do this is to estimate the power relations. Many comedians follow the idea of 'punching up', which means laughing at those in power; that is, when someone jokes about sensitive topics (e.g. rape, cancer, race), one should not target the victims but the perpetrators. This is an admirable guideline in an ethical sense, but it does not, unfortunately, justify all mockery towards the wrongdoers. Punching up is not a lifesaver which can be called out when needed. Instead, there must be stronger arguments for this type of humor, and one needs to consider, for instance, the motives of the joker as well as the probable consequences. (For a more detailed debate on ethics of humor, see de Sousa 1987, Smuts 2010, and Hietalahti 2016.) From a social psychological perspective, the reasons for mockery must be taken under critical analysis as well as the question why people laugh at harsh jokes.

If it is the shadow who laughs at the cruelest forms of humor, it is suspicious to set oneself and one's own sense of humor above everyone else. Presumably, most comedians laughing at Trump do not aim at a deep social change, but instead want to promote themselves. Trump appears to be mocking every possible minority because he feels himself superior to those; and his supporters have a taste of this feeling of superiority while laughing with him. However, it is quite hard to fight hatred with hatred. It may very well be that one shares equally suspicious character-rooted strivings as the target of the mockery, that is, Trump. The shadow operates also within the so-called liberal side.

It would be easy to claim that Wolf makes critical humor in her performance. Those who despise Trump may very well laugh. Those who agree with Trump's behavior may feel offended by roasting. However, as David Hart (2008, 105) noted, Jung wants to go deeper in his analysis. People should not hang desperately on their personal values but move towards collective meaning. Humor is not an exception to the rule. In other words, human beings should be aware of their own unconscious motives which form their sense of humor in a

collective framework. Often even beyond the most ‘humane’ or ‘socially critical’ humor the shadow can be found. To humiliate another human being through humor always demands justification; a mere ‘because it is funny’ or ‘I am punching up’ is not enough even if the target itself happens to promote despicable politics. Hateful humor must be based on defending humane ideals, not on hatred itself. As Aniela Jaffé has so eloquently put:

Jung, who was as familiar with the dangerous dual nature of the unconscious as with the importance of human consciousness, could offer mankind only one weapon against catastrophe; the call for individual consciousness, which seems so simple and yet is so arduous. Consciousness is not only indispensable as a counterpoise to the unconscious, and not only gives the possibility of meaning to life. It has also an eminently practical function. The evil witnessed in the world outside, in neighbors and neighboring people, can be made conscious as evil contents of our own psyche as well, and this insight would be the first step to a radical change in our attitude to our neighbors. (Jaffé 1978, 316.)

CONCLUSION

This chapter has clarified the significance of C.G. Jung’s concepts of the shadow and the trickster for analyzing political humor. As it has been argued, every single human being has his or her own personal shadow, but the shadow operates also on the collective level. It represents the neglected side of humanity. Jung reminds that the even those who consider themselves liberal and progressive, may have dark motives, too. Humor, even if targeted at the most controversial president in decades, can stem from irrational hatred, and not, for example, high moral values. Amusement in itself is of little worth.

Jung’s theory of the archetypes is still valid, but one should not take it as a scientific theory. Instead, Jung’s ideas can be used if they are understood metaphorically. They should be understood as a personality theory which offers a valuable contribution to both humor research and political studies. As it has been shown, Jung’s theoretical works complement humanistic thinking, too. Humanism demands that nothing should be alien to oneself. If this premise is taken seriously, it forces everyone to admit that even the most distasteful people do have a sense of humor. A personal humor taste cannot dictate this universal feature. Even

if Trump speaks about minorities in a disrespectful manner, he still most likely has a sense of humor. When this is recognized, populist politics can be understood more accurately. Also, this kind of brutal humor offers a mirror to the liberals and their sense of humor: are the motives behind mockery (in a depth psychological sense) similar to those of right-wing supporters? Inhumane politics must be criticized, but at the same moment, critics have to be aware of hidden aspects of their own personalities. That is, people must have the courage to confront the collectively shared archetypes of shadow and trickster. This means, eventually, the courage to be human.

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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Analytical Psychology: A version of depth psychology or psychoanalysis developed and practiced by Carl Jung and his followers.

Archetype: A typical pattern of behavior among human beings. Symbols the aspects which are universally shared. Archetypes are part of the collective unconscious.

Collective Unconscious: A source of motivation of which people are unaware. Refers to socially shared ways of feeling and acting.

Humanism: A philosophical stance which values every human being as equal. Humanism is based on the idea of human progression and freedom.

Populism: A political ideology which separates 'the elite' and 'the people'. Appeals to socially shared fears by feeding xenophobic attitudes towards strangers and outsiders.

Shadow: An archetype which is the neglected ego-ideal. Commonly referred as the 'unknown dark side' of humanity. In many ways similar to Sigmund Freud's concept of the unconscious.

Trickster: An archetype which can be located on the borderline of conscious and unconscious thought. A joker who does not obey traditional moral codes such as 'good' or 'evil'.