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During the First World War, the legitimacy of established polities was challenged everywhere in Europe. Not only the combatant great powers but also smaller states witnessed a resurgence of constitutional disputes and competing ideological conceptualizations of revolution and reform, the will of the people, democracy, and parliamentarism. While these controversies primarily focused on the future of the national polities concerned, historical experiences and discourses accelerated by the war and the Russian Revolution were transnationally interconnected and contributed to discursive transfers between political cultures. Swedish and Finnish socialists were linked by their internationals, liberals were connected by transnational debates for and against ‘Western’ democracy and parliamentarism, and conservative politicians and academics were involved in ideologically oriented networks. This article reconstructs transnational links and discourses in order to understand the exceptionally confrontational dynamics (which, in Finland, partly led to a civil war) and the outcomes of the Swedish and Finnish constitutional debates in 1917–1919. It examines the nature of the transnational connections of eight Swedish and Finnish conservatives, liberals, revisionist socialists, and far-Left socialists, analysing their argumentation on constitutional questions in published works and parliamentary speeches as illustrative examples of the political groups they represented.

Keywords parliamentary democracy, Russian Revolution, internationalism, transnational history, Finland, Sweden

Introduction
The revolutionary experiences of the last two years of the First World War and the post-war settlements of 1919 have traditionally been studied from nation-state-centred perspectives. Such an approach is, of course, justified, given the significance of the
post-war situation for the formation of enduring constitutional solutions in several European parliamentary democracies. Nation states have also remained the primary object of analysis in comparative histories of the period, though comparisons have to some extent challenged separate national narratives, revealing pan-European developments and suggesting transnational entanglements.

As discursive, spatial, transnational, and mobility-related turns have redefined political history over the past decades, it is timely to explore what such perspectives might add to our understanding of the aftermath of the Russian Revolution in northern Europe. More specifically, how were the political processes of the time in Sweden and Finland affected by the transcultural transfers of political discourses in various national spaces that took place across national borders as a result of the mobility of the political actors involved? These two countries have thus far received only marginal attention in surveys of post-First-World-War Europe, even though they were then objects of considerable great power interest, becoming nexuses in which a number of transnational ideological discourses came together with national ones, clashed and produced new political discourses. Furthermore, Sweden and Finland constitute exceptional objects for comparative history thanks to their long shared political tradition, which was maintained in Finland by the preservation of Swedish law even after the country was conquered by Russia in 1809.

Sweden avoided involvement in the First World War, seeking to balance cultural sympathy for the German constitutional monarchy against rising predilections for Western markets and parliamentary models. However, Sweden, too, was fundamentally affected by the consequences of the war, both economically and socially, and there was the threat of a revolution there in the spring of 1917. In 1918, the country feared developments resembling those in Finland and Germany, and a postponed suffrage reform was implemented as a counter-measure. Finland, which was still part of the Russian Empire in the spring of 1917, became a nexus of Swedish traditions of constitutionalism, Germanic legalism and monarchism, and increasingly radical Russian revolutionary discourses. It declared its independence in late 1917, experienced a civil war and a Prussian-inspired monarchical reaction in 1918, and reached a compromise on a republican constitution only through Allied pressure in the summer of 1919. Thus, several transnational conservative, liberal, and socialist constitutional discourses clashed in Sweden and Finland, catalysing latent national political confrontations and producing revolutionary changes in the polities without an open revolution; although one was feared in Sweden and unsuccessfully attempted in Finland.

Both comparative surveys of Europe in the late 1910s and national historiographies refer to major discrepancies between the sacrifices that were demanded from the masses by the authorities in a state of total war and the opportunities for popular political participation. When the administrations failed to deliver what the people expected from them, their legitimacy deteriorated and they faced calls for constitutional, parliamentary, and suffrage reforms in circumstances in which universal and equal suffrage and parliamentary government were not yet the rule.

In the aftermath of the Russian February Revolution, both the great powers engaged in the war and smaller states not directly involved in it saw the resurgence
of constitutional disputes that had been postponed in 1914 owing to the conflict. Sweden and Finland were not immune to such constitutional confrontations: in Sweden, where male suffrage for the lower chamber had already been extended, wealth-dependent plural voting (allowing for up to 40 votes for a single person) continued to apply in local elections and in those for the upper chamber of the national parliament, and women were still excluded from suffrage. In Finland, the introduction of a unicameral parliament and universal suffrage including women (in 1906) had not led to parliamentary government and the expected social reforms as a result of conservative opposition and Tsarist vetoes. The disputes that followed in the two countries concerned both appropriate solutions to crises of subsistence arising from wartime conditions and the implications of the international situation for the national constitutions. They became all the more intense as a result of the possibilities opened and the threats posed by the Russian Revolution. Although they had multiple dimensions, they often focused on competing ideological conceptualizations of the political role of the people and the proper form and implications of democracy and parliamentarism.

While debates surrounding the need to strengthen popular influence in politics and thereby the legitimacy of the political system primarily took place in national governments, parliaments, and presses, they were transnationally entwined to a higher degree than has been generally recognized. This interconnectedness had existed even before the war as a result of the inherently comparative character of constitutional discourses and from the complex webs of personal transnational connections between members of the political elites; especially those of smaller nations who sought to learn from the political models of the great powers. They were also supported by interlinked wartime media debates, particularly in a period when news was mainly replicated from foreign newspapers and the sessions of national parliaments constituted rare occasions for uncensored public debate. Competing ideologically motivated webs of politicians, who included conservative professors, liberal editors, and socialist agitators, were reactivated. These webs were inspired or provoked by the war, which was generally seen as a battle between a well-organized German constitutional monarchy that was inclined towards militarism and Western parliamentary democracies, which, although challenging this kind of Prussianism, nevertheless needed to make compromises in order to win the war. In early 1917, the webs became animated by the potentially all-changing event of the Russian Revolution, which could be seen alternatively as endangering all established political and social order, as opening the gates for universal suffrage and parliamentary government, or as an example of an effective transition towards socialism through direct rule by the people.

The present author has previously analysed comparatively the intertwined processes of constitutional debate in the British, German, Swedish, and Finnish parliaments at the macro level together with related reporting in conservative, liberal, and socialist newspapers. My focus here is more on the micro level: on the significance of transnational (going beyond mere interaction between nation states) connections or webs of individual political agents in the revolutionary circumstances of the late 1910s. Using relevant aspects of the biographies and written works of a selection of politicians
to provide further contextualization, I reconstruct interconnections between domestic and foreign debates. My analytical interest concerns definitions of a future parliamentary democracy or an alternative political system by four Swedish and four Finnish politicians acting in both a national and a transnational context in the revolutionary period from the spring of 1917 to the summer of 1919. The interventions of these politicians are by no means representative of the entire complex debate on democracy in the studied period, yet they illustrate engagement among competing political groups. The selected active participants in constitutional debates (both in- and outside parliaments) exemplify links between various forums of debate within the main political parties of the time. Some other politicians would have been equally illustrative, while others lacked such connections.

The Swedish and Finnish conservatives are, respectively, Karl Hildebrand and R. A. Wrede, the liberals Otto von Zweigbergk and Tekla Hultin, the revisionist socialists Hjalmar Branting and Väinö Voionmaa, and the radical socialists Carl Lindhagen and Otto Wille Kuusinen. I focus on these key actors as ‘historical bodies’ – or agents whose actions are considered in relation to the simultaneity and reflexivity of all their embodied physical experiences, beliefs, and attitudes – and on their interventions as points of coming together of a variety of political discourses. I explore how they contributed to the creation of transnational links and how these links may have affected their interventions in constitutional debates at the national level.

In this kind of history of multi-sited political discourse, politics is understood as a combination of physical and discursive processes that take place in different, potentially interconnected, forums simultaneously. In parliamentary debates, political discourses from public, academic, and transnational spheres encountered each other in a competitive environment, and their clash gave rise to new discourses, conceptualizations, and evaluations. Particular attention needs to be paid to both earlier and contemporary involvement in other national and transnational forums by the agents concerned, the physical mobility of individuals between these forums, and the discursive transfers between the political cultures. The parallel consideration of biographical data, published works, and parliamentary argumentation allows us to classify the politicians concerned as conservative nationalists with upper-class internationalist ideas, liberal internationalists with Western or German inclinations, revisionist socialist internationalists, or utopian and Leninist socialist internationalists.

Foreign models were selectively and tendentiously cited to win a political argument at home, not to provide balanced representations of foreign political systems. Sweden and Finland remained cultural hinterlands of Germany and would start to re-orientate themselves towards the Anglophone world only during and after the war. The Prussian monarchical order provided the idealized model for Nordic conservatives, and Swedish and Finnish conservative academics in almost every field echoed theories taken from German academia. Liberal politicians – often journalists – were well aware of the constitutional controversies inside and between the great powers and emphasized the relevance of foreign empirical experiences. Both revisionist and revolutionary socialists were inspired by German Social Democratic theorists, although the war also led to a rising awareness of alternative Russian revolutionary socialism. All groups recognized the
importance of German constitutional developments for those in their own countries. The reformists correctly claimed that socialist internationalism was being impeded by an equally international network of Rightist capitalists, academics, and bureaucrats. But what were these competing ideological webs like, and how did they enable political transfers that impacted on both national debates on reform and the course of political activities?

Conservative nationalists, upper-class internationalists: Karl Hildebrand and R. A. Wrede

Rightists in Sweden and Finland typically wanted to maintain their inherited, largely shared, native constitutions as they understood them, defending them with rhetorical redescriptions ostensibly reconciling structural continuity and the trendy concepts of democracy and parliamentarism. They generally looked to Imperial Germany as a model for a well-organized state and developed academic culture, and they were frequently challenged by their political opponents for this orientation. Our two conservatives, with their respective historical and legal educations, held anti-reformist interpretations of the shared Swedish constitutional history and were particularly critical of the mid-18th-century Age of Liberty, when the estates had dominated the native political system. They argued against what they regarded the rule of the uninformed masses, which would stem from the excessive democracy and parliamentarism that they considered Leftist politicians and academics to be advocating.

Karl Hildebrand had published widely on historical and economic topics and worked as the Editor-in-Chief of Stockholms Dagblad, the organ of the moderate Right. Unlike most of his Högern (The Right) Party, Hildebrand had welcomed universal male suffrage and proportional representation. By 1917, he was the leader of the parliamentary group and a member of the Constitutional Committee, and he was well prepared to argue against ‘democratism’, as he called it, having published a collection of essays on the subject. According to Hildebrand, ‘democratic reflections’ and ‘lower-house parliamentarism’ tended to lead to calls for the state to intervene in everything in ways that violated inherited constitutions. Hildebrand referred to the US, British, French, German, and Swiss cases to give the impression that theorists were globally opposed to socialist and liberal internationalist demands for the extension of democracy. As a conservative nationalist, he exploited selections from international academic debates to argue for the maintenance of what he saw as unique in the Swedish polity.

Hildebrand’s internationalism during the Great War was highly partial: he made a visit to the German Western Front, publishing a book in Berlin in which he heroized ‘the German people’, eulogized the strength of the German nation, and created idealized characters of a German officer and professor. All this reflected an uncritical sympathy for German militarism and academia (see also Tiina Kinnunen on Rudolf Kjellén’s admiration of Germany; in this issue). Hildebrand foresaw the war as strengthening the trinity of monarchy, executive power, and conservatism in Germany and revealing the weaknesses of ‘English or French parliamentarism’. The latter, admired by the Swedish Left, was to be rejected, while the Russian
Revolution could simply be disregarded.\textsuperscript{11} When the Kaiser indicated in the spring of 1917, at the time of the US declaration of war, that the inequitable Prussian suffrage could be reformed after the war, Hildebrand insisted that earlier Swedish reforms had already provided an extended suffrage that surpassed both the Western powers and a future Prussia in equality and democracy. Moreover, revolutionary history had demonstrated that backlashes were unavoidable, which spoke for a Swedish-style gradual democratization and the postponement of constitutional modifications to the future.\textsuperscript{12}

When the Swedish Liberal-Social Democratic ministry attempted to introduce universal and equal suffrage in all elections in the spring of 1918, Hildebrand maintained that the inclusion of ‘uninterested and ignorant’ voters would merely produce an unqualified parliament that would lead to anti-parliamentarism, as had happened in other countries.\textsuperscript{13} Here he was presumably referring to Finland, which at the time was emerging from a civil war that could be interpreted as a warning example of the consequence of universal suffrage. For Hildebrand, Leftist reform demands represented the kind of mistaken anarchical individualism of the ‘members of the Red Guard in Finland’ (cf. Katarina Leppänen, in this issue, on Social Democratic views).\textsuperscript{14}

In late 1918, in the aftermath of the fall of the German constitutional monarchy, Hildebrand nevertheless became one of the few Rightist leaders to accept a compromise on reform. Even though continuous opposition within his party forced him to argue against immediate parliamentary reorganization, he conceded that public opinion had changed and that now ‘a mighty wind of revolution blows over countries and has demonstrated its power to overthrow thrones and to revolutionize constitutions’.\textsuperscript{15} According to Hildebrand, the Right was ready to ‘relinquish their status as political leaders’,\textsuperscript{16} but their conception of democracy had not changed: it still opened the door to ‘democratic degeneration’ and ‘an upheaval of a revolutionary nature’, as the far-Left councils in Germany and Bolshevik atrocities in Russia demonstrated.\textsuperscript{17} US, French, and German experiences had shown that democracy might lead to ‘a rise in the power and strength of the people’, but that the same people might be divided if ‘democratic development is allowed to exert an influence unhindered’.\textsuperscript{18} Education was needed to create a ‘mature will of the people’ based on awareness, in order to avoid a democracy in which the ‘primitive and immature’ abused power in the name of the people.\textsuperscript{19} The provisos of education and constitutional counterweights allowed the compromise-ready conservative leader to accept a gradual transition to parliamentary democracy, despite the fact that Rightist opposition to the transition remained strong.

Among Finnish Rightists we encounter another conservative academic whose reactionary views were only reinforced by the Russian Revolution. R. A. Wrede, a nobleman who supported the Swedish People’s Party, was a former Professor of Roman law and Rector of Helsinki University and had also served as the highest judge in the land. Wrede had travelled extensively in Germany and Sweden, studied in Leipzig and Tübingen, stayed in Berlin in exile, and been influenced by German and Swedish jurists, among whom he had several friends, including Ernst Trygger, the Rector of Uppsala University and leader of the Swedish Right. He was made an honorary Doctor of the Universities of Lund (1918), Hamburg (1924), and Munich (1926).\textsuperscript{20} Wrede had participated in the Parliamentary Reform Committee (1906), in
which he supported bicameralism. In 1917, after the fall of Tsarism, he continued to oppose parliamentarism and to advocate monarchy in the committee that drafted a constitution for Finland.\textsuperscript{21} Wrede’s aristocratic, learned, and bureaucratic internationalism was influenced by classical political and legal thought, an idealization of the Germanic race, and upper-class solidarity. It combined aristocratic cosmopolitanism with chauvinistic nationalism.

Wrede’s moment of influence arrived in the summer of 1918, after the bourgeois side had won the Finnish Civil War, during which Wrede’s youngest son had been killed.\textsuperscript{22} The monarchist Right used German theorists and quotes from Otto von Bismarck to justify their constitutional policies, which ultimately led to the election of the brother-in-law of Kaiser Wilhelm as the King of Finland.\textsuperscript{23} Wrede chaired the Constitutional Committee, defending the rights of the Swedish-speaking minority, who saw a protector in a German monarch.\textsuperscript{24} Wrede drew on Aristotle and Cicero for criteria in evaluating constitutional models and to conclude that international trends towards republics led to ‘a semi-anarchical parliamentary power’ arising from the ignorance of the populace. As Finland belonged to the Germanic cultural sphere, a constitutional monarchy was needed to balance universal suffrage and a unicameral parliament. Democracy and parliamentarism had led to party strife and corruption and were declining internationally, with the unicameral Finnish parliament demonstrating degeneration into an ‘oppression by the majority’ that was destructive of all social order.\textsuperscript{25} The solution lay in the conservation of the inherited Gustavian monarchy (the Swedish constitutions of 1772 and 1789), complemented with the Prussian model. Wrede’s Germanic conservative internationalism was openly critical of parliamentarism if not downright anti-democratic, and his party would oppose the republican compromise of 1919 to the very end.

\textbf{Anglophone, French, and German liberal influence: Otto von Zweigbergk and Tekla Hultin}

Liberals in the Swedish and Finnish parliaments were open to influences from ideological brethren in several of the great powers: they were typically interested in British and French parliamentarism and in German Left-liberalism. In the Swedish First Chamber, Otto von Zweigbergk, the Editor-in-Chief of \textit{Dagens Nyheter} (the leading Liberal newspaper of the country), spoke consistently and in quite radical terms for an international liberal cause. His liberalism carried on the traditions of the French Revolution, about which he had translated a couple of booklets. Zweigbergk was a liberal internationalist of the Western type, inclined towards the Entente, critical of Prussianism, and enthusiastic about the early phase of the Russian Revolution, seeing it as an historic turn not experienced in Europe since the French Revolution. When the suffrage issue came up in the Swedish parliament in April 1917, Zweigbergk’s editorial of the day criticized the way the Right continued to fight against democratization in Sweden, even when it had become unavoidable as a result of the ongoing constitutional changes in Britain (where the Representation of the People Bill had been introduced in late March), Germany (where the Kaiser had made vague promises about reform), and...
Russia (where the Revolution was gathering speed).²⁶ In the First Chamber, Zweigbergk joined Mauritiz Hellberg, a fellow Liberal editor, to confront Rightist anti-reformism,²⁷ calling for an immediate parliamentarization of government and an extension of suffrage and presenting Sweden as ‘a kind of miniature Germany up here in the north’.²⁸ Once the United States had joined the war – in order to make the world ‘safe for democracy’ as President Woodrow Wilson put it²⁹ – the transformation of Prussia into a democratic polity appeared as the only way to end the conflict. Zweigbergk insisted that the expected political reforms in Prussia compelled the Swedish Right to realize that continued opposition to universal suffrage was just ‘building dams of ice in springtime’.³⁰

No suffrage reform followed in 1917, but the Swedish government was parliamentarized after a major election victory of the Liberals and Social Democrats in September. When the Prussian order crumbled in the autumn of 1918, Zweigbergk attacked the Right for still viewing democratization as the source of all evils.³¹ He himself was even ready to abolish the monarchy, following Austria and Germany.³² Rather than speaking openly for Western liberalism, Zweigbergk emphasized German reforms, in which Left-Liberals were in key positions, and hoped that Sweden would make a similar turn towards parliamentary democracy. Zweigbergk’s liberal reformism was patently transnational, inspired by international, and especially German, developments.

The same is true of Tekla Hultin, the first female academic doctor in Finland, a leading women’s rights and constitutionalist activist, and the most highly esteemed female MP, who, from 1907 on, represented the Liberal Young Finns. Hultin was a Fennoman nationalist but entirely bilingual, socialized in both Finnish and Swedish cultures. She had studied Anglophone political and economic thought for her degree in history as well as French politics, economics, and revolutionary history at the University of Paris in 1898. And she had worked as a correspondent of Päivälehti, the liberal organ in Finland, in Saint Petersburg, Stockholm, and Paris.³³

Hultin initially welcomed the Russian Revolution and admired Kerensky but supported parliamentary sovereignty and full Finnish independence from Russia. She seconded the Leftist policy of not recognizing the sovereignty of the Russian Provisional Government over Finland.³⁴ She was thus the only bourgeois member of the Constitutional Committee to support the radical act for parliamentary sovereignty proposed by the Social Democrat parliamentary majority in July 1917.³⁵ Hultin was willing to move towards a kind of parliamentarization that most non-socialists saw as threatening the balance between executive and legislative powers, but she wanted to nevertheless retain the governmental right to dissolve the parliament as a counterforce.³⁶ Towards the end of 1917, however, Hultin distanced herself from the Left, condemning the alliance of Finnish socialists with the Bolsheviks, although she also attacked the Right for a ‘bourgeois legalistic’ that seemed to block all compromises.³⁷

Hultin reacted strongly to the Red uprising and terror in Finland, questioning previous socialist talk about ‘rule by the people’. From the summer of 1918 on, she openly admired Germany and spoke for monarchy as the means to protect law and order, guarantee Finnish
independence against Russia, and perhaps extend the territory of Finland. Although this conservative turn led her to join the new National Coalition Party, in parliamentary debates she continued to look for a middle path between parliamentary democracy and a well-ordered constitutional monarchy of the Norwegian type. In her opinion, although a Bolshevist-style ‘wrong democracy’ based on the unpredictable will of popular assemblies was to be rejected, the Finns, being accustomed to universal suffrage, nevertheless needed a democratic constitution, particularly as international trends continued to favour democracy. Even after news about the parliamentarization of the German polity reached Helsinki, Hultin insisted that the proposed monarchical constitution would give the people greater political influence than in other monarchies, or indeed in most republics.

In June 1919, when a republican constitutional proposal was under debate, Hultin continued to be critical of it, preferring for security political reasons an independent presidency combined with ‘a parliamentary form of government’. She remained a political agent, bringing French and German constitutional ideas to Finnish debates and trying to counterbalance anti-parliamentary tendencies within her new party.

Revisionist socialist internationalists: Hjalmar Branting and Väinö Voionmaa

Internationalism was a core tenet for Social Democrats. Hjalmar Branting, the Chairman of the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party, who would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1921 for his peace initiatives, activities in the Socialist International, and support for the League of Nations, was exceptionally well-connected internationally. After a journey abroad in 1882, Branting had become interested in Western European (especially French) radicalism and, later, also in German socialist controversies on revisionism and in Russian revolutionary movements. He had worked as a reporter for Social-Demokraten, an agitator and a translator of socialist theorists, and had edited the Swedish version of an international history of Social Democracy. Branting’s stance was consistently revisionist and pro-parliamentary. He accepted the Entente’s interpretation of the First World War as a battle for democracy against Prussian militarism.

The significance of Branting’s transnational mobility for his initiatives can be illustrated with an example from mid-April 1917, a month after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. Branting had just returned from Petrograd, where he had congratulated the revolutionaries on the victory of the socialist proletariat and the birth of a new Russia and had discussed possibilities for peace. He returned straight into a parliamentary debate on suffrage in local elections; a debate that was accompanied by hunger demonstrations, extra-parliamentary agitation, and hints of a rising revolution in the Leftist press (see Jonas Harvard, in this issue). In the Second Chamber, Branting described an ongoing global revolution from which Sweden could no longer remain apart: in Russia, he said, the world had seen ‘the greatest events since the French Revolution’. The promised reforms in Prussia meant that ‘even in the old solidly built state of the Junkers in the south they have begun to feel that the time has arrived when democracy cannot be directly rejected or postponed to the future’. To persuade the
Right, Branting also used nationalist arguments, emphasizing a reformist theory of a 1,000-year-old trajectory of democracy and parliamentarism in Swedish history.\textsuperscript{46}

In an interpellation, Branting stated that ‘Global events of extraordinary extent and scope are revealing themselves before our eyes this spring of 1917’. The war had led to ‘democratic demands’ by ‘all peoples’ for ‘a radical break with the old system’. The Russian Revolution had initiated this ‘democratic wave’ and ‘the breaking-up of the ice for the forces of democracy all over the world’.\textsuperscript{47} Branting spoke for reform both outside and within the parliament.\textsuperscript{48} In the chamber, he depicted how ‘the international movement for political equality’ was ‘making progress all over the world’, in particular in Austria, Britain, Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, and Russia. In Sweden, the necessary constitutional revision should be executed through the parliament, not by any ‘Russian methods’,\textsuperscript{49} or by Finnish ones for that matter.\textsuperscript{50} The Right, like conservatives in other countries, should finally recognize that ‘[t]he era of democracy has begun and will not allow itself to be suppressed’.\textsuperscript{51}

When the Liberal-Social Democratic coalition attempted a reform in the spring of 1918, Branting made similar points to demonstrate that international trends were determining the course of Swedish constitutional solutions.\textsuperscript{52} However, appeals to possible reforms in Germany were not particularly convincing, given the fact that Germany appeared to be winning the war, especially in the east. Branting continued to assure the British press that the Swedish government was aiming at ‘a firmly democratic Sweden’ resembling ‘a Western democracy’.\textsuperscript{53} Together with foreign colleagues, he organized an international labour conference in support of democracy, looking to a future after Prussianism was crushed.\textsuperscript{54}

When the Prussian state did fall, Branting, a believer in historical materialism and evolution,\textsuperscript{55} urged the masses to join the Swedish reform movement, carried by ‘the democratic wave that is rushing forth over the world’.\textsuperscript{56} In the parliament, he suggested that the Right must now necessarily submit itself to ‘democratic opinion in the world’ (a Wilsonian and liberal internationalist phrase) and to allow Sweden finally to become a democracy.\textsuperscript{57} For Branting, who chaired a special committee that was preparing the reform bill, the Swedish constitutional change was just ‘part of the great global settlement after the war’. It was essentially interconnected with the German Revolution, owing to Sweden’s close geographical contact with central Europe.\textsuperscript{58}

The emerging German democracy provided him with models for ‘a social republic’ and, indeed, moderate socialization as well.\textsuperscript{59} Sweden would later develop into a global model of social democracy, but this was not yet the understanding of the Swedish reformists of the late 1910s: they rather wished to catch up with the rest of Europe, while the Swedish anti-reformists wanted to retain the established order by redescribing the system as being sufficiently democratic. Branting saw the Swedish transition to parliamentary democracy as being connected to a transnational revolution, though not one of the Russian or Finnish type.

In Finland, revisionist Social Democrats were scarce during the confrontations of 1917: in the Rump Parliament of 1918 they only had one MP. Nevertheless, revisionist rethinking was ongoing, and the Social Democrats returned to the
parliament following the elections of March 1919. One of the new MPs was Väinö Voionmaa, a professor of Nordic History. Voionmaa had worked in Amsterdam, the Baltic, Berlin, Copenhagen, London, Uppsala, and Stockholm archives and libraries and familiarized himself with German and British economic and social history. He subscribed to Vorwärts, the organ of the German Social Democratic Party, and sympathized with Danish socialism, some activists of which he knew. He had edited the Finnish version of an international history of social democracy (resembling Branting in this), expressed an interest in the ideas of British and German moderate labour leaders, sympathized with ‘democratic Europe’, especially France, during the war, and published a volume about the history of that nation. Voionmaa had kept his distance from the radicalized Finnish Social Democratic Party, yet he accepted the post of a minister in an all-party coalition and contributed to the formulation of the revolutionary law on parliamentary sovereignty in the summer of 1917. In 1918, after the Civil War, his treatise on a democratic constitution made him an expert on constitutional issues within his party. In it, Voionmaa lamented the delayed update of the constitution of Finland, but rejected the Red uprising as a destructive Bolshevist coup. During the constitutional debates, he, as a member of the Constitutional Committee, remained consistently dedicated to a parliamentary revisionist form of Social Democracy and set up Western liberal democracies as models, thereby contributing to the parliamentarization and even the Westernization of his party in the aftermath of the failed Finnish revolution.

Voionmaa endorsed the thesis of the ancient roots and evolutionary development of democracy and parliamentarism in Swedish and Finnish societies. Referring to Anton Menger, an Austrian socialist legal theorist, Voionmaa advised the Finns to guard their political liberty jealously and to supervise the executive through the parliament. The introduction of ministerial responsibility and the construction of ‘Western bureaucracy’ would decrease class divides by creating ‘strong feelings of responsibility to the broad ranks of the people’ in the administration. Such views differed both from the Finnish Social Democrats’ rejections of ‘Western’ or ‘bourgeois’ parliamentarism in 1917 and from continuing conservative criticisms of it. Voionmaa favoured the Norwegian Constitution of 1814, with its restrictions on executive power, and advocated British means of controlling the executive, although he found imitable practices in Sweden, Australia, and the United States as well. On the other hand, he was critical of the US presidential system, which was opportunistically admired by formerly German-oriented monarchists in 1919. The rise in anti-parliamentarism, with its inclination to subordinate parliamentary government to direct rule by a popular vote, was a further object of concern for him. Rather, he thought, the president should be elected and controlled by the people through the parliament; otherwise parliamentarism was in danger of becoming overshadowed by ‘unknown unparliamentary forces’. A strong awareness of the international context, particularly the experiences of Germany and the Western great powers, affected the way Voionmaa envisioned the Finnish constitution in the post-Civil-War situation.
Utopian and Leninist internationalists: Carl Lindhagen and Otto Wille Kuusinen

The far Left in Sweden and Finland had common ideological goals, but the Swedish movement was at no stage as radical as the Finnish and lacked its extensive electoral support. The Swedish Leftist Social Democrats were internationally well-connected thanks to their wartime peace activism and the status of Stockholm as a hub of radical socialism.  

By contrast, the Finnish socialist radicals, who had previously oriented themselves mainly towards Germany, in 1917 were isolated and tended to associate themselves quite exclusively with the revolutionary Bolsheviks, whose newspapers they one-sidedly quoted.

Carl Lindhagen, a lawyer and journalist, had previously been a radical republican liberal, but, by 1917, had come to be the far-Left Mayor of Stockholm and a member of the Second (and later the First) Chamber. Lindhagen, too, had visited Germany in 1915, but as a peace activist. He had also participated in an international conference on parliamentarism in Bern. In April 1917, he hosted Lenin on his journey from Switzerland to Russia, and in May he participated in the third Zimmerwald Conference in Stockholm. At the same time, he completed a work on democracy, and in 1918 he published an account of his travels in Revolutionary Russia and Finland. In these and his speeches, Lindhagen’s internationalist socialism, based on idealism and pacifism and expressed in individualist rather than classical Marxist terms, reached utopian levels.

The book on democracy polemicized against the Majority Social Democrats, from whom the Leftists had separated, listed constitutional reforms, and envisioned a ‘world parliament’ developed out of the Socialist International and peace conferences. Lindhagen advocated humanism as a joint goal of liberalism and socialism to Lenin and suggested the obligatory teaching of one world language as a way to enhance ‘internationalism’. Not even far-Left Marxist socialists seconded all such radical reformist initiatives.

Lindhagen had been inspired by the abdication of Nicholas II. He insisted that, after the Revolution in Russia, the Swedish government should send commissions to Germany, Britain, and France to explore their models and start preparations for reform instead of just building on the native constitutional tradition. Popular initiatives, referenda, and the cancellation of the mandate could be adopted from the US system, despite its major deficiencies. The means for ‘direct popular rule’ were to be sought through the political education of the people and the activation of the masses to work for a better future. Western parliamentarism as bourgeois parliamentarism, too, had many shortcomings, and the Majority Social Democrats were mistaken in surrendering to ‘parliamentary politics’ of the bourgeois type and rejecting the direct democracy of popular meetings. The mere parliamentarization of government was, for Lindhagen, ‘the opposite of democracy’; the Swiss system, in which the parliament elected ministers, would work better. In his German-language book Der parlamentarismus, Lindhagen nevertheless argued in line with other peace activists for the extension of the parliamentary control of foreign policy as a way to advance democracy and publicity and to create a new world order after the war. Interparliamentary cooperation should be replaced by a ‘world parliament’ elected through general and
direct elections. Lindhagen had evidently been inspired by Anglo-American liberal internationalist ideas emphasizing the role of openness and informed public opinion in the prospective new world order, and he shared the goals of internationalist socialists with regard to the democratization of international relations.

On 14 April 1917, after meeting Lenin in Stockholm on the preceding day, Lindhagen claimed that the entire world was changing: there was ‘an outbreak of spring in all politics’ that would bring in a new era for all political systems. In June, he foresaw ‘a terrible upheaval’ in the West, too, leading to consequences identical to those of the Russian Revolution. This was all speculative, although a committee of the German opposition parties was actually contemplating the possibilities for reforming suffrage in Prussia. Lindhagen nevertheless set peaceful reforms over a revolution of the Russian type: ‘democratic forms’ needed to be constructed in cooperation with other ‘democratic parties’.

Visits to Petrograd, where he discussed the possibility of an international revolution with Lenin, and to the Red-occupied area of Finland, where he offered a financial contribution of the Zimmerwald movement to the Reds of Finland, reflect his revolutionary enthusiasm, but they did not convert Lindhagen to Bolshevism. While he was keen to challenge Western parliamentarism in search of some better solution, he doubted whether Bolshevism advanced ‘the power of the people’ (folkmakten). Whereas Lenin saw the Finnish Social Democrats as having betrayed the cause of the revolution, Lindhagen viewed the majority of that party as having actually attempted to make one. However, the constitutional proposal of the Red government in Finland, too, offered no more than ‘formal democracy’, he thought. When the Swedish suffrage reform finally became a reality in the spring of 1919, Lindhagen was again active, voicing transnationally discussed ideas on a republican constitution, unicameralism, and referenda, albeit with little effect.

Otto Wille Kuusinen stands out among Finnish far-Left socialist internationalists. Within the Finnish Social Democratic Party, nationalism and internationalism were interconnected: the Party advocated class struggle and revolution within the Finnish nation state, keeping distance from Russian socialism, but at the same time the Russian Revolutions provided it with models to follow. One widely shared belief was the connectedness of the class interests of the Finnish and Russian bourgeoisie. Kuusinen led the party indecisively in the autumn of 1917, when there was a choice between parliamentary and revolutionary means available to the Party, drafted a constitution for Red Finland, and after the lost Civil War went into exile in Soviet Russia, where he participated in the founding of the Finnish Communist Party. As a philosopher by education and a journalist by profession, he had been influenced by French and German socialism, attending socialist conferences in Copenhagen and Basle. In 1905, he wrote about class animosity and, in 1906, about anarchy and revolution. Even though Finnish Social Democracy has customarily been characterized as Kautskyist, Kuusinen’s speeches in the autumn of 1917 and his draft constitution rather justify us in calling him a revolutionary internationalist.
Kuusinen’s internationalism was supported in 1917 by intense transnational links between Finland and Revolutionary Russia: Social Democrat MPs visited Petrograd and attended revolutionary meetings there, and Bolshevik leaders like Alexandra Kollontai and Joseph Stalin agitated for revolution in Helsinki and, in the case of Lenin, went into hiding there. The Bolshevik leaders viewed the Russian and Finnish revolutions as interconnected and urged the Finnish Social Democrats to launch one, while Finnish Social Democrats (and later historians) disagreed on whether or not the goals of the two revolutions were identical. The Bolshevist view was that the first socialist majority (later minority) in the Finnish parliament should make the first revolution in a ‘Western’ country.

The presence of Bolsheviks in Helsinki overshadowed connections with revisionist Swedish and German social democratic leaders in Finland during the war. Kuusinen himself spoke Russian, was interested in Russian culture, wanted to enhance Finno-Russian relations, and was happy to discuss the prospects for a revolution with Lenin. David Kirby has concluded that, during Lenin’s stay in Finland between July and October 1917, Kuusinen became committed to the Leninist programme and rejected revisionism for revolution. Many other Finnish socialists, too, were keen to follow the most radical element of the Russian revolutionaries, as they thought that this would support their claims for national reforms. Joining the Russian revolutionaries also seemed to them to be a way to defend international democracy (rule by the proletariat) against a counter-revolutionary bourgeois international.

In November 1917, on the day following the Bolshevik Revolution in Petrograd, Kuusinen made a speech demanding societal reforms in the name of the Social Democrat parliamentary group and suggesting the possibility of a revolution. Lenin believed that Germany was already ripe for revolution, and Kuusinen expected ‘a European proletarian revolution’, to which the one in Finland would be connected. He hoped that revolution would reach Germany and turn into ‘a general European fire’. The Finnish bourgeoisie should prepare for a revolution, he warned, if the reform demands were not met. Kuusinen demanded the introduction of ‘democracy, rule by the people’ at all levels, and threatened a civil war, while his party supporters were preparing for a decision to launch a revolution. Encouraged by a letter from Lenin, he rejected a presidential republic as ‘undemocratic’ and ‘bourgeois parliamentarism’ of the Western European type. According to him, the ‘so-called parliamentary governments’ in France, Britain, and Italy were weak, and the French and US presidencies were undemocratic. For Kuusinen (like Lindhagen, above), only the Swiss model, with a direct election of the government by the parliament and a rotating presidency (enshrined in the unpromulgated Act on Parliamentary Sovereignty of July), constituted ‘sovereign parliamentary democracy’. Kuusinen was approaching, and some of his comrades explicitly shared, Lenin’s view that bourgeois democracy was incompatible with genuine democracy and that all the structures of the class state, including parliaments, should simply be abolished.
During the Civil War, Kuusinen authored a proposal for the constitution of Red Finland on the basis of views expressed previously in parliament, calling for ‘true democracy’ as opposed to ‘rule by the masters’, and prioritizing rule by the people over the parliament, democracy, the executive power, and the courts of law. After the lost Civil War, he concluded that the Kautskyist parliamentary class struggle had merely diminished the working class’ faith in a revolutionary struggle. In a tract, Self-Criticism of the Finnish Revolution, published in several languages and aimed at both the Finnish communists and the communist international, Kuusinen related his experiences to Leninist thought, concluding that the Finnish Social Democrats had made an historic mistake in cooperating with the bourgeoisie in an attempt to implement ‘parliamentary democracy’. Extra-parliamentary demonstrations with ‘Russian military comrades’ had been useful, while the implementation of the democratic process before the Civil War had only led to disappointment with parliamentarism among the workers, an acceleration of the class struggle, and the desire for revolution. The Finnish revolution would have succeeded had it been launched in November 1917 and not in late January 1918, had it been supported by Russian troops, and had it immediately aimed at a dictatorship of the proletariat, Kuusinen concluded. As for the Swedish Social Democrats, they had been ‘international social traitors’ in condemning the Finnish revolution as a danger to ‘international democracy’. Kuusinen’s ideology was internationalist and of a communist revolutionary kind: rather than parliamentary efforts for democracy, armed struggles to achieve an international revolution and dictatorship were needed. While Voionmaa rejected the Finnish Red uprising as mistaken Bolshevism, for Kuusinen (and Lenin) it had not been Bolshevist enough and not executed in time.

Conclusion
Transitions to parliamentary governments based on democratic, universal, and equal suffrage took place in several north-western European polities in 1917–1919. This article has aimed at estimating how political discourses interconnected by transfers transmitted by transnationally mobile political agents affected the political processes of the time in Sweden and Finland. Attention to interconnections between the discursive processes of reform challenges narratives of national exceptionalism, particularly as analyses of social ‘realities’ and political ‘actions’ in national states in previous research have tended to dominate over their discursive ‘constructions’ and the transnational element. Suggesting that it is not enough to study national social or political history alone to understand the political dynamics of the years 1917–1919, this comparative analysis of discursive and transnational connections has demonstrated their significance for debates on democracy and parliamentarism in Sweden and Finland. It has shown how competing ideological webs of internationally connected conservatives, liberals, revisionist socialists, and revolutionary socialists influenced domestic constitutional debates through selectively introduced comparisons and transfers.

The significance of interrelations and comparisons between Germany, Sweden, and Finland (and, to a more limited extent, Britain, France, Russia, the United States, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland) is visible in the biographies, publications, and
parliamentary interventions of leading politicians in all major political groupings. The events of the spring of 1917 – particularly the Russian February Revolution but also the US entry into the war, the British Representation of the People Bill, constitutional disputes in the German Reichstag, and the Kaiser’s vague promises for future reform in Prussia – excited reformist and revolutionary thought everywhere. The German Revolution of 1918 provided an even more significant impulse for Swedish and Finnish reformists. Connections with Germany and comparisons with the Western parliamentary democracies remained central in the reform debates of 1919, even if there was a strengthening tendency to see constitutional issues as purely national after compromise solutions had finally been reached. References to Sweden and Finland also appeared in the parliaments and media of the great powers, though they hardly led to transfers proper. The Swedish political tradition – especially in its late 18th-century form, which was largely inherited in Finland – remained a major point of reference in Finnish constitutional debate despite tensions between the two countries regarding the possession of the Åland Islands and language policies in Finland. In Sweden, Finland turned from being a model for universal suffrage used by reformists to a warning example of a vitiated democracy for all parties.108

Rightists in Sweden and Finland typically resisted reforms by appealing to warning foreign examples and international (above all German) theoretical discussions that were critical of democracy and parliamentarism, bending themselves to limited compromises only after the German monarchy had fallen; or sometimes remaining totally inflexible in their anti-reformism. Liberals looked to Britain, France, and Germany (and, in the spring of 1917, also to Russia) and were excited by what they saw as a breakthrough of an international reform movement, advancing democracy and parliamentarism. At the same time, they rejected both conservative reactionary and socialist radical internationalism and sometimes also sought for ways to counterbalance what they regarded excessive parliamentary democracy. Revisionist socialists in both countries followed the policies of the German social democrats in appealing openly to international trends to justify national reforms, although, to persuade the Right, they also sometimes employed nationalist arguments. As a consequence of the result of the war, they moved increasingly from German to Western models. Utopian socialists, critical of Western models, envisioned a more radical transition to direct democracy at both national and international levels. They became disappointed with Bolshevism, which in turn attracted far-Left socialist radicals (future communists) who rejected the acceptance of Western democracy and parliamentarism as a mistaken strategy and looked to the emerging Soviet Russia as their revolutionary model. Instead of just constructing nation states on the basis of native constitutional traditions, many Swedish and Finnish politicians turned their national parliaments in the late 1910s into nexuses of general European debates on the proper form of government.

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Notes

1 Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora*; Ihalainen, *The Springs of Democracy*.
3 Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora*; Bessel, ‘Revolution’.
6 For history politics, see Ihalainen, ‘18th-century Traditions’.
7 Thulstrup, ‘Hildebrand’.
8 Hildebrand, *Demokrati*. These essays had been published previously in *Stockholms Dagblad*.
9 Hildebrand, *Ein starkes Volk*, iii, 2, 19, 27.
11 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 21 March 1917, 33:34.
12 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 14 April 1917, 41:38, 40, 68–9; 5 June 1917, 72:51.
13 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 27 April 1918, 44:26.
14 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 8 June 1918, 72:17.
15 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:45.
16 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:43.
17 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:25, 27, 32; 17 December 1918, 18:45.
18 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:26; 17 December 1918, 18:45.
19 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:27; 17 December 1918, 18:44–5.
21 Modeén, ‘Wrede, Rabbe Axel’.
23 Ihalainen, *The Springs of Democracy*.
24 *Hastvudsståndsbiet*, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 13 July 1918, regarded Wrede’s anti-parliamentary speech as one of the best heard in the unicameral parliament.
25 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 June 1918, 1253; 12 July 1918, 1648–9, 1651, 1653; 5 October 1918, 35; Vares, *Kansanvalta koetuksella*, 147.
26 *Dagens Nyheter*, ‘Situationsbilder’, 14 April 1917.
29 Reported on the first page of *Dagens Nyheter* on 4 March 1917.
31 FK, Otto von Zweigbergk, 17 December 1918, 10:47.
36 VP, Tekla Hultin, 2 July 1917, 695–6.
37 Hultin, *Päiväkirjani kertoo*, 9 November 1917, 223–4; 14 November 1917, 227; 24 November 1917, 239.
38 Kiiski, *Tekla Hultin*, 231–2, 235–6, 252.
39 VP, Tekla Hultin, 13 July 1918, 1678, 1680; 7 August 1918, 1833.
40 VP, Tekla Hultin, 8 October 1918, 63.
41 VP, Tekla Hultin, 3 June 1919, 724; Kiiski, *Tekla Hultin*, 258, 260.
42 Boëthius, ‘K Hjalmar Branting’.
45 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 14 April 1917, 41:66.
46 Lagerroth, *Frihetstidens författning*; Ihalainen, ‘18th-century Traditions’.
47 AK, 27 April 1917, 50:21–2.
48 Boëthius, ‘K Hjalmar Branting’.
52 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 27 April 1918, 44:74–5.
55 Boëthius, ‘K Hjalmar Branting’.
58 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:21–3.
59 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:30.
63 Voionmaa, *Valtioelämän perusteet*, 48; Ihalainen, ‘18th-century Traditions’.
64 Voionmaa, *Valtioelämän perusteet*, 56–7; VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 517.
65 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 518, 521.
69 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 3 June 1919, 719, 721–2.
71 Schiller, ‘Carl A Lindhagen’.
73 Lindhagen, *I Revolutionsland*, 33, 35–6, 79.
74 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:37.
AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:29, 64; 34:13.

Lindhagen, Der Parlamentarismus, 1–3.

Lindhagen, Der Parlamentarismus, 68–9.


Lindhagen, I Revolutionsland, 72. The planned meeting in Trelleborg was not successful.

AK, Carl Lindhagen, 14 April 1917, 41:47, 71.

AK, Carl Lindhagen, 9 June 1917, 78:71.

AK, Carl Lindhagen, 14 April 1917, 41:45.

Svenning, Hövdingen, 366.


Lindhagen, I Revolutionsland, 228.

Heikkilä, Kansallista luokkapoliittikaa, 386–9.


See Ketola, Kansalliseen kansanvaltaan, 70–1, 162, 379–80, for instance.


Rinta-Tassi, Kansanvaltukuksu punaisen Suomen hallituksena, 47–52.

Ketola, Kansalliseen kansanvaltaan, 361; Wade, The Russian Revolution, 223.

VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 10 November 1917, 56.

VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 10 November 1917, 55.

Polvinen, Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi, 130.

VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 351–2; Rinta-Tassi, ‘Kuusinen vallankumousvuosina’, 107, 135, has demonstrated Kuusinen’s reading on the Swiss political system.


Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 393, 396.

Suomen kansanvaltusuksunen ehdotus, 5, 7, 9, 14–15; Rinta-Tassi, ‘Kuusinen vallankumousvuosina’, 136; Rinta-Tassi, Kansanvaltukuksu punaisen Suomen hallituksena, 322–6, 330; Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland, 174–5; Jussila, Hentilä, and Nevakivi, From a Grand Duchy to a Modern State, 109; Haapala and Tikka, Sodasta rauhaan, 111.


Polvinen, Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi, 66–8; Kettunen, Poliittinen liike ja sosiaalinen kollektiivisuus, 90; Hyvärinen, ‘Valta’, 86, 90.

Carrez, La fabrique d’un révolutionnaire, vol. 2, 767.

Kuusinen, Suomen vallankumouskesta, 3–9, 11.

Kuusinen, Suomen vallankumouskesta, 39.
106 Kuusinen, Suomen vallankumouksesta, 40–1; Rinta-Tassi, ‘Kuusinen vallankumouksensa’, 138.
107 See also Hentilä, Veljeyttä, 139.
108 Ihalainen, Springs of Democracy.

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