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Shared experiencing, shared understandings: Intersubjectivity as a key phenomenon in drama education

Abstract

This article is a philosophical reflection on intersubjectivity in the context of drama education; it draws on the concept's most recent neuroscientific basis as well as the perspectives of Merleau-Ponty, Buber and Husserl. Its purpose is to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms of interaction in learning processes in drama education. In the stream of interaction in drama, the central conditions are shared experiencing and shared understandings. Intersubjectivity encompasses both of these. This study views intersubjectivity as an innate capacity and a phenomenal reality, suggesting that intersubjectivity is a key phenomenon in the interaction of drama education.

Keywords: intersubjectivity, neuroscience, phenomenology, philosophy, interaction, drama education

Introduction

This study explores the dimensions of intersubjectivity in the interactional context of drama education. It aims to deepen knowledge of the question ‘What is the core in drama and in learning in drama?’ by exploring the question ‘What are the mechanisms or dimensions of interaction in drama?’ Drama processes are comprehensive and complex, and several of the core phenomena they contain have been written about, such as experience and embodiment, participation and cooperation, aesthetics and dual awareness (or aesthetic doubling) and transformation and reflection (e.g. Prentki and Stinson 2016: 5–6). All of these phenomena unfold in (or after) interaction, both in participants’ contact with the context (e.g. space, time, role), and mainly, in interaction between the participants. Thus, the quality of interaction is crucial. This article argues that successful drama processes—denoting fluent, committed, impressive and meaningful dramas—have one main concern: the two unfolding frames of shared understanding and shared experiencing must exist concurrently. The concept of intersubjectivity simultaneously encompasses both of these.

Philosophers, like Merleau-Ponty, Buber and Husserl, discerned intersubjectivity a century ago, and recent studies in the field of neuroscience reveal that intersubjectivity unfolds on neurological levels. This has led to a conceptualisation in which intersubjectivity is seen as an innate human capacity from which ‘our common knowledge and perception of ourselves as knowers of meaningful facts depends upon, and grows from’ (Trevorthen 2008: foreword, vii; Ammaniti and Gallese 2014). On this basis, creating a joint drama is inherent, and not an extraordinary gift. With innate capacity as a starting point, this study elaborates theoretically on how intersubjectivity unfolds in interaction in drama processes with the above-mentioned phenomenon of drama education. The dimensions of intersubjectivity are

studied from the phenomenological perspectives of the philosophers Merleau-Ponty, Buber and Husserl.

To date, a handful of drama research articles have touched on intersubjectivity in understanding how the mind operates (Simons 1997: 198–199), as a way to generalize experiences (Cox 2008) and as a fundamental form of meaningful participation in the world (Wright 2011: 111–114). Sofia (2013) suggests connections between the effectiveness of theatre training and cognitive functions at the neurobiological level, relating them to intersubjectivity. Trimmingham and Shaughnessy (2016) demonstrate how intersubjectivity could be achieved with children with autism (and their caregivers) through intermediality.

However, intersubjectivity is not examined thoroughly in the context of drama education. It is often understood as a theory of mind, to the exclusion of its corporeal origin. Intrinsically, corporeality is observed as one basis in drama education. It is specified as embodied learning (e.g. Water, McAvoy and Hunt 2015: 19–20) or as embodied cognition (e.g. Duffy 2015: 241–245), but it lacks a clear connection to intersubjectivity in interaction. In the following sections, intersubjectivity is theoretically studied in its physio-psychological and interactional dimensions in order to gain a deeper understanding of the essence of interaction and of the learning processes in drama education. Because of the theoretical approach, the study treats drama education on an ideal level, that is, when drama proceeds well with committed, enthusiastic and cooperative participants and the teacher – in the spirit of ‘flowing with the world and the self’, as *disponibilité* (Frost and Yarrow 1990: 152). The interactional dimension contains both the interaction outside roles and especially in roles, inside the double frame of metaxis (Bolton 1992: 11). First, the new understanding of intersubjectivity as an innate capacity in relation to drama education is discussed. Next, Merleau-Ponty’s, Buber’s and Husserl’s views on intersubjectivity are examined in the context of drama education. Finally, these multi-layered approaches including the concepts at the outset are summarized, concretized and discussed in the context of drama education.

Intersubjectivity and its newest interpretation

According to Zlatev et al. (2008: 12), intersubjectivity is a complex phenomenon ‘in which experiential, behavioural, genetic and neural processes and levels are interwoven in both potentiating and actualizing ‘what it means to be human’. In drama, the questions of humanity are obviously present and often under investigation. Ammaniti and Gallese’s (2014: 6–9) description of the intersubjective process seems to relate to the interactional flow in making drama:

When encountering others, we can experience them as bodily selves, similarly to how we experience ourselves as the owners of our bodies and the authors of our actions. When we are exposed to others’ expressive behaviours, reactions, and inclinations, we simultaneously experience their goal directedness or intentional character, as we experience ourselves as the agents of our actions; the subjects of our affects, feelings, and emotions; and the owners of our thoughts, fantasies, imaginations, and dreams.

(7)

As a simplified example, one can imagine an improvised scene in a drama where three strong, male demonstrators start marching in the public square. By way of the movement they sense one another's intentions and experiences intercorporeally. If one of them is slightly slower and/or wavering, the others, who could be forcefully rebellious, sense it and probably react, e.g. by dragging him in. This sensation happens in a microsecond, and it is just one in an uncountable, intercorporeal continuum of sensations.

This so-called 'second-person approach', which is based on recent developmental and neurobiological studies, challenges the prior, widely-held views of cognitive science (Ammaniti and Gallese 2014; Zlatev et al. 2008). Known as the classic approach, theory of mind or theory-theory, in this view, an individual builds a theory of others' minds according to their visible behaviour and 'its statistical recurrence in a certain context'. In addition to this approach, there is another established view, simulation theory, in which the understanding of others is based on putting one's soul into the other's position. (Ammaniti and Gallese 2014: 3–4; 6.) Cognitive thinking processes are central in both of views. – These views can also be applied to phenomenal reality in drama education. For example, as spectators in drama, the view of the classic approach suits the meaning-making processes of the characters' intentions and thoughts, and simulation theory helps in identifying with main or favourite characters. However, as in the example above, the marching 'demonstrators' are hardly likely *thinking* about the intentions or experiences of others because they are inside the action and following their own intentions.

In contrast to the classic approach, Ammaniti and Gallese (2014) state that the new understanding of intersubjectivity is based on the characterisation of the non-declarative and non-metarepresentational aspects of social cognition. As said above, the encounter is about experiencing others as bodily selves, which means that 'the other' is much more than a different representational system. Then the content of the perceptions and following categorizing are not in the focus. Instead of it, the basis of our capacity to be attuned to the intentional relations of others lies in the particular functioning of brain circuits and neural mechanisms. The copious studies on the existence of a mirror mechanism, including as early as the neonatal phase, report that it enables mimetic learning, opening up a new evolutionary scenario of motor cognition and embodied simulation. Thus, when detecting others' behaviour, we directly grasp their motor intentional behaviour. In addition, understanding others' emotions and sensations unfolds with the use of the same neural circuits that underpin our own emotional and sensory experiences – it activates the same network of brain areas as real affects, feelings and emotions do. This means that we experience others as having experiences that are similar to ours, but we do not necessarily experience the same specific content. Thus, intersubjectivity is ultimately based on the intertwined self and the other because intercorporeality links them. (Ammaniti and Gallese 2014: 2, 7, 9–17, 20, 24–25.)

In this view of intersubjectivity, the interesting point in relation to drama education is the intercorporeal understanding of others' experiences – but not the exact content. In addition, simultaneousness in experiencing others' intentions and goal directedness could be seen as one main feature in making fluent drama, especially at the non-verbal levels. It is like understanding the intentions and feelings of the drama in situ, but by what those intentions

are motivated and what kind of meaning and value the experienced feelings have to specific individuals remains unknown. When making drama, individuals are constantly acting and reacting to each other's moves and gestures – that is, to the goal directedness, and they simultaneously experience and share the experiences that they themselves create. Still, the meanings of these experiences differ from person to person. As drama continues interactively, the 'amount' of shared understandings and shared experiences increases, and in this spiral of the shared lifeworld with its multiple actions, intentions, feelings and meanings, the view of the intertwined self and other becomes understandable and representative. It is the joint process of meaning-making and transformation (Bolton 1992: 141; Taylor 2000: 130).

In the next section, the cornerstones of intersubjectivity and the intertwined self and other are addressed according to three phenomenological philosophers.

Three philosophical approaches to intersubjectivity

The perspectives of shared mind and shared experience emerged in phenomenological philosophy from the 1920s. As Zahavi (2001; 2012) points out, instead of the classic approach or simulation theory, in which perception and inference are in focus, phenomenologists see that intersubjectivity can only be understood in the interconnection of the self, the other and the world. Being in the world in this way enables one to experience the other directly as a minded being. (Zahavi 2001: 151, 166; 2012: 183, 187-188.)

In this study, the choice of examining the views of the phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber and Edmund Husserl is based on their extended perspectives, which cover the intercorporeal, interactional and interpsychic aspects of intersubjectivity and being in the world. However, they all place their own emphases on the subject. Additionally, Ammaniti & Gallese (2014: 7–9) view Buber's thinking close to their second-person approach.

Merleau-Ponty's (1945a; 1962: 59) starting point is perception because, as he states, 'we live all the time in a world of perception'. Perceiving is not only a corporeal function, but through corporeal existence, it is the original connection to the world (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 59–60). As Hotanen (2010: 135) writes, we already exist in the world before we even start to think about what it is like. Perception bestows on us the transcendental reality of creatures, other human beings, space and time (Luoto 2012: 11).

According to Merleau-Ponty (1945a), the basis for experiences is originally anonymous and preconscious because the perceiving consciousness is localized in the living and acting body – in the bodily consciousness. Thus, the basis becomes not *I think* but *I can*. The individual, with his or her body, bends to the world, which is the aspiration to the original relationship with the world of being in the world. (Merleau-Ponty 1945a: 159–162.) As Merleau-Ponty (1947: 100) states, 'I understand myself as a special kind of thinking, which is committed to certain objects: as a functional thinking'. Luoto (2012) writes that our intentionality is not primarily linked to our conscious acts, but that it is 'acting intentionality'. It continuously affects our perception and all of our actions, from motor, affective and sexual acts to linguistic, social and cultural ones. In this process, the world is discerned significantly, as it unfolds in the perception itself (and is the logos of the aesthetic world). Thus, this rationality arises inside the corporeal experience instead of being a precondition to this experience. (Luoto 2012: 18–21.) This view is similar to Ammaniti and Gallese's (2014)

explorations of motor cognition and embodied simulation. Merleau-Ponty (1962: 68) concludes that a human being as a functioning body has gestures, expressions and finally of language, and it turns toward the world to give to it its meaning.

Merleau-Ponty's description is full of openness and easiness in human beings' capability in turning to the world. In a fluent and committed drama, it is easy to imagine this kind of 'acting intentionality' with the basis of *I can*. When the participants are turned psycho-physically (in a state of dual awareness) toward the drama world they have created, they are able to express an 'acting intentionality' and to give the drama world its meaning. But, drama is not always fluent and committed – this is explained in greater detail in the discussion section.

In understanding and experiencing the experiences of others, Merleau-Ponty's inference seems to be similar to the classic approach and to simulation theory, but in fact, it approaches Ammaniti and Gallese's (2014) views. As Hotanen (2010) says, in Merleau-Ponty's corporeal turning toward the world, one recognizes the other's subjectivity because of the corporeal and behavioural similarities. In addition, the other's feelings can be understood by putting one's soul into the other; however, this intersubjectivity unfolds, above all, intercorporeally. Intercorporeal empathy brings the other concurrently close and distant: I understand him or her, but I do not experience what he or she experiences, and I do not see the world in his or her point of view. In fact, the close and known, the distant and unaware – both exist in one's relation to himself or herself, in one's relation to the other and in one's relation to the world. It is through one's relation to the other that the invisible and untouched emerges and has an effect. The world is not one's own, but it is a shared world. A corporeal subjectivity does not own the world without its being owned by the world. (Hotanen 2010: 135, 146–148.) In the example, the rebellious 'demonstrators' can intercorporeally understand and experience the man who is wavering, but they don't know, if he, in fact, didn't want to join them, if he is just moving more slowly or if he is about to change his mind.

Owned by the world, the corporeal subjectivities are related to each other. In which way and with what kind of attitudes are studied next. Buber (1923) acknowledges the different attitudes with which one takes a position in relation to the other. In his reasoning, the basis is our ability to perceive the outside world. In there, *You* is first. When one perceives oneself as *You*, the interpersonal dialogue can turn into an inner dialogue, perceiving the *I*. In Buber's own words: 'A human being is conceived as *I* throughout *You*. A child has no sense of its own distinctness from the other; it is born with *an innate Thou*'. (Buber 1923: 48, 52; see also Ammaniti and Gallese 2014: 8; and Crossley 1996: 13.) Intercorporeality is present in the bodily interaction, like in the foetus' contact inside the mother's womb and the infant's atactic gestures toward its mother and the surrounding environment (Buber 1923, 48–49).

Thus, for Buber being in the world is initially a relation, and the world of a human being is twofold according to his or her attitude toward the relation. These attitudes are realized in two 'basic words' – *I-Thou* and *I-It* – and 'only the basic word *I-Thou* can be said with one's whole being' (Buber 1923: 25; 50). *I-It* is objectifying: the other is perceived from a distance. However, when *I-Thou* is said, there is nothing to objectify or to bound; instead, there is an initiation to the mutual relationship (Buber 1923: 26–27). In his later

work, Buber termed *I-Thou* relationships to be interhuman and dialogical (Anderson and Cissna 2012: 134).

Relating to the quality of the interaction in drama education, the first notable element is the double frame of fiction and reality, and especially concerning the role and the self (O'Toole 1992: 166–170; Østern 2003: 458, 471–472). In a committed and enthusiastic drama work, the state of the interaction could be the Buberian *I-Thou* between the selves, meaning that the participants are truly and with their whole being with each other inside the drama. As Anderson and Cissna (2012: 136–137) and Stawarska (2009: 151) state, in this kind of experience, there is a spirit of openness, genuineness, respect and presence, and both unity and individuation are concurrently present and approved. These features belong also to Frost and Yarrow's (1990: 151–152) *disponibilité*. In addition, the role characters in the interaction could be in the state of *I-It* and/or *I-Thou*. Because of the intersubjective basis with the whole being of everyone involved, the playfulness and testing of different attitudes in roles is permitted and safe. Thus, despite a role character or a group of role characters interacting in the *I-It* state, the spirit of the interaction can stay in the *I-Thou* state, remaining very playful, intense and joyful because of the role cover in the double frame. For example, 'the wavering demonstrator' might want to stop participating in the movement when he 'suddenly realises' (in his improvisational mind) that it is his powerful uncle, against whom he absolutely cannot demonstrate. In the *I-Thou* state, the others accept this twist, but they will probably turn to the *I-It* state in their roles and leave the 'traitor'.

A twofold attitude toward the world can also be perceived in Husserl's thinking, but from a different starting point. According to Crossley (1996), Husserl's contribution to intersubjectivity is the existence of the transcendental ego – an experiencing and conscious ego that 'bestows meaning upon the objects intended in consciousness' – and its relationship to the other consciousnesses. The transcendental ego comprises the meaningful contents of the consciousness, and these meanings are concurrently dependent upon its own constitutive actions (Crossley 1996: 2–3). Transcendental egos are socio-historical subjectivities – the transcendental self is in continuous change and thoroughly temporal (Heinämaa 2010: 100). In phenomenological reduction, this naïve and dogmatic stance toward the world is set aside and replaced with a reflective and transcendental stance in which the examination of the experience, which embodies the said world, is possible from a distance and 'above being and the natural world' (Husserl 1962: 140–141). In this analysis of the active constitution of the objects of experience, it is essential that with uncovering the 'pure sphere of the manifestation' (transcendental reduction), the constitutive properties of the manifestation (eidetic reduction) are also conducted (Taipale 2006: 28). When this analysis encompasses the other consciousnesses with their perspectives of the world, more objective perception can be achieved. The meaningfulness of the world is in the community of transcendental subjects – that is, in the transcendental intersubjectivity (Heinämaa 2010: 100). Merleau-Ponty (1945b: 415) puts it aptly: 'Transcendental subjectivity is a revealed subjectivity; it knows itself and it is known by others; therefore it is an intersubjectivity'.

In drama, the created characters meet in their jointly created world. This imaginative creation needs consciousness of the double frame of fiction and reality. In drama, the transcendental egos of the roles are imagined socio-historical subjectivities in continuous change. These characters are revealed subjectivities in a special way because they are created

and expressed in joint action and inside the double frame of which all the subjectivities involved are conscious. The socio-historical dimension is significant in drama because when the participants are both creating and living through the events, their transcendental egos of the selves are experiencing, intertwined with the transcendental egos of their roles (i.e. the shared lifeworld). Outside of the roles, as the experiences in drama are reflected, the transcendental and eidetic reduction can be conducted further, and other perspectives of the world can be perceived in transcendental intersubjectivity. In a way, Husserl's idea of consciousnesses brings the state of Merleau-Ponty's *I think* to the picture, and this thinking, analysing and distancing above being and the natural world creates space for the process of reflection and learning in drama education.

The intersubjective drama

The questions of the psycho-physiological human being and its relationship to the world are essential in the views on intersubjectivity presented above. In Figure 1, the dimensions of these views and the central concepts of drama education are presented with an illustration of one example of the lifeworld of drama with its role characters.




Figure 1: An ideal of intersubjectivity and its dimensions at the interactive stage of transformation in drama education: the embodied–intercorporeal (Merleau-Ponty 1945a; 1962; Ammaniti and Gallese 2014), interactional–dialogical (Buber 1923) and reflective–transcendental (Husserl 1962).

In Figure 1, the example in relation to intersubjectivity is from the middle of one process drama;¹ it is given in order to represent an ideal of committed and active role work in drama education. In this scene, the ‘townspeople’ – participants in their roles of a teacher, farmer, priest, hotel keeper, etc. – are having a meeting in order to decide the ‘destiny’ of the new stranger in town. The drama teacher plays the role of an ‘advocate of the state’ and is the chairman of the meeting. The ‘townspeople’ are presenting ambivalent opinions on the stranger’s treatment, of whom they have only heard stories (in the pretext and in rumours, which they have created in their roles) but not personally met. The ‘teacher of the town’ is the first to take the floor demanding relocation, which begins a heated discussion.

As this scene is from the middle of the process, the aspects of experiencing and embodiment as well as participation and cooperation have already been in focus. The participants have created the drama world – the actual town with its buildings – in the drama studio. They have chosen their roles, in which they have acted and lived through their ordinary lives in town. In this interaction, the roles are psycho-physically created and acted. This creation (the embodied–intercorporeal dimension), experiencing each other’s intentions and goal directedness, is the basis of the interaction. In the meeting scene, the aesthetics emerge in the positioning of the furniture and the people as well as in the speech, tones, gestures and bodily behaviour of the townspeople. For example, the ‘teacher’ walks ahead to take a seat in the first row; she sits up straight, leaning a bit forward as if she is ready to take the first floor—and she does. At the same time, the ‘priest’ is greeting others, warmly, nodding and mildly comparing notes. Acting in roles contains dual awareness of both selves and roles and reality and fiction. In the interaction, the participants in their roles have the Buberian attitudes of *I-Thou* and/or *I-It* toward each other and the outside lifeworld, including, in this case, the stranger. As presented earlier, in committed drama work, as in this case, the attitude *I-Thou* is obvious between the selves in interaction, which offers space for dialogue in roles. On the whole, the scene is a stage of transformation as the participants in their roles transform their ideas and reactions into moves, gestures and speech in their being in this drama world (see Østern 2011). Living in the double frame enables distancing, thus uniting the transcendental consciousnesses. This dimension offers space for reflection, which takes place both during the role work and after the drama. In this case, after the drama, the group shared an emotional and long discussion with diverse views about alienism in their today’s society.

Intersubjectivity covers the participants’ understandings of the frame of the drama, of the common drama world and of each other’s experiences, but not necessarily, as stated previously, the specific content of these. The participants share understandings on the meaning of the actual situation (in this case, the sense of their meeting and the stranger’s situation versus their community) and the understandings, experiences and sociocultural attitudes, norms and so forth of their own community of the townspeople in a drama world. In addition, they share understandings of them as a group of students and of the culture of their community in the real lifeworld.

To sum up, in interaction in the double frame of drama (education), the intercorporeal and the interpsychic are diversely intertwined when the multilevel dimensions of intersubjectivity are simultaneously present.

Discussion

This study of intersubjectivity offers one perspective and conceptualisation to the interactional phenomena in drama education. Firstly, when intersubjectivity is viewed as an innate capacity according to neuroscientific foundations, the intrinsic nature of engaging in interaction in drama work gets one answer. In other words, the innate capacity of intersubjectivity could be seen as an account for those often-reported processes where individuals with learning disabilities or conduct disorders show an extraordinary capability to concentrate, cooperate and express themselves in drama. They know how to use their innate capacity when there are no explicit cognitive demands. Additionally, under the safe cover of the role, they can occupy the *I can* state.

Secondly, the dimensions of intersubjectivity in phenomenal–philosophical reality illuminate the aspects of embodied, dialogical and cognitive processes during the interaction in drama. The affective, intercorporeal experiences and understandings are embodied in the intentional activity, which is more based on the idea of *I can* than on *I think* (see Luoto 2012: 11–12, 18–19). The acting intentionality of role characters is perceived and expressed in and through bodily consciousness. In the double frame, the interactional level of the selves can have the attitude of *I-Thou*, which constitutes the basis for commitment and dialogue. On that basis, the relationships of the roles can safely vary between attitudes of *I-It* and *I-Thou*. On the conscious level, the Husserlian intersubjectivity of transcendental consciousnesses offers space for different perspectives of the shared lifeworld at stake. At its best, experiential learning in drama encompasses the embodied–intercorporeal, interactional–dialogical and transcendental–reflective dimensions of intersubjectivity. These dimensions can be conceptualized through their reflection in drama experiences, thus enriching understandings of the real lifeworld and its diversity. However, this conceptualisation is theoretical and only the ideal of an enthusiastic, impressive and committed drama. Though intersubjectivity is seen as an innate capacity, the above-mentioned intrinsic engagement to drama work is not always self-evident. Thus, some viewpoints of both facilitating and problematic aspects in drama emerge.

There are at least three ways to facilitate engagement in drama activity: an interesting topic, a drama contract and aesthetic doubling. After capturing the participants' interest, a drama contract or general agreement of the procedures of action establishes the basis for acting. It includes a common understanding of the way of having and not having roles, of permissions and responsibilities in the playful and joint drama world and of voluntariness in the level of one's own role work. In addition, the state of mind (and body) is exempt from having a role through aesthetic doubling. The role cover helps participants to act with their whole beings; thus, the double frame in drama is essential. In contrast, acting in drama is vulnerable because of the personal and comprehensive aspects. Misunderstandings, misbehaving and a total collapse of the drama at stake are possible. Is it then a matter of a lack of intersubjectivity? When there are not shared and established understandings and experiences of how one is supposed to act and behave, what the acting is all about and why it is all being done, single individuals may have ambivalent directions in their 'acting intentionality'; then, they are not in the same frame. Naturally, problems in conducting

drama, like in any kind of learning processes, are contextual and sometimes very difficult because of group dynamics, personalities, accidental events, etc. However, drama teachers can pay special attention to this – that everyone in the group has concurrent understandings of ‘how, what and why’ in the course of drama.

In addition, making drama or practising drama/theatre skills can be viewed as ‘practising intersubjectivity’. For example, living through the drama world or training the senses, presence and contact with the space and co-participants is related to intersubjectivity. Thus, in drama, one can practice the skills of relating to others, of understanding them and empathising with them and of sharing their understandings and experiences on a fundamental level. This is absent in the increasing use of mediated drama through devices and across distances, although the interactions can otherwise be meaningful. In ‘here and now’ drama, the personal encounters with bodies and minds in a common space create the atmosphere and the meanings between self, other and the world, which can be sensed and discerned.

Intersubjectivity offers several issues for further study. Zahavi (2012: 187-188) underlines that a full analysis of intersubjectivity should include the first-person perspective. It would be useful to interview participants about their shared understandings, images and experiences during their joint drama work. Various drama activities or genres could be studied in order to reveal both when and how understandings, insights and judgements gain and do not gain meaning in an intersubjective sense. In addition, the bodily consciousness of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl could be elaborated on (see Heinämaa 2011), as could the Buberian levels of dialogue.

As Zahavi (2012) points out, phenomenologists (including many others than those mentioned in this article) have different emphases or even competing accounts of intersubjectivity. Despite this, their theories have the following common approaches: 1) the existence of pre- or extra-linguistic forms of intersubjectivity (e.g. body awareness), 2) the mutual interdependence of subjectivity and intersubjectivity instead of being competing alternatives and 3) the togetherness of the dimensions of ‘self’, ‘other’ and ‘world’, with the result that one can fully understand them in their interconnection (Zahavi 2012: 187-188). This article suggests that the existence of intersubjectivity is a key phenomenon in the comprehensive and complex interaction of self, other and world in drama education.

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¹ The author has videotaped and analysed the drama (Viirret 2013).