Taina Meriluoto

Making Experts-by-experience

Governmental Ethnography of Participatory Initiatives in Finnish Social Welfare Organisations
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Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by permission of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Jyväskylä, in Seminarium, auditorium S212, on November 24, 2018 at 12 o'clock noon.
This dissertation analyses expertise-by-experience in Finnish social welfare organisations as part of the participatory practices presented as new democracy. It employs a governmental ethnographic method to investigate how a person with difficult experiences is made into ‘an expert of one’s own life’ and how the subjectivity thus created is connected to different possibilities and rationales of participation. It asks: 1. What characterises the subjectivities created in the initiatives? 2. How (through which practices) are the participants constructed as experts? In this summary article the democratic quality of expert-making practices is interpreted through a critical democratic lens by inquiring: 3. How do the practices identified sustain or, conversely, undermine democracy?

Conceptually, the research builds on a Foucauldian vocabulary by connecting processes of subjectivation with knowledge-claims as undergirding practices of governing. The data consist of ethnographic material produced in a civil society organisation, of themed interviews with experts-by-experience and practitioners from seven projects in Finnish social welfare organisations and of policy-documents delineating the concept and its related practices.

The research argues that the initiatives studied primarily seek to construct collaborative and consensus-seeking participants. This is achieved by defining ‘expertise’ as the ability to present neutral and objective knowledge over specific issues despite one’s personal experiences. Participation is constructed as a distinctly a-political activity based on objectified knowledge. Collective advocacy, emotions and opinionated inputs are deemed unfitting. This configuration of expertise as a pre-requirement for the right to participate establishes epistemic thresholds for participation, making it possible to choose participants according to the projects’ predefined objectives. This is a cause for concern for democracy.

Nonetheless, the research also suggests that the emphasis on expertise also renders the concept available for contestations and critique. The participants’ and practitioners’ attempts to destabilise the technocratic expert-construction illuminate the existing boundaries of expertise and serve to politicise the boundaries of inclusion in participatory governance. Still, the acts of resistance do not contest participatory governance’s underlying premise of joint knowledge production, which reaffirms that the value of participation lies in its epistemic contributions to decision-making.

**Keywords:** expertise-by-experience, participatory governance, governmentality, ethnography, subjectivity, service user involvement, democracy, social welfare
TIIVISTELMÄ

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Tutkimus nojaan käsitetellisesti Foucault’laiseen sanastoon, joka yhdistää subjektivisaatioprosessit hallitsemiskäytäntöjen taustalla oleviin tietokäsityksiin. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu järjestön järjestämän kokemusasiantuntijuushankkeen aineistusta, seitsemän hankkeen kokemusasiantuntijoiden ja työntekijöiden teemahaastatteluista sekä kokemusasiantuntijushankkeen aineistoja ja subjektiviteettisistä politiikka- ja yhteiskuntatutkimuksista.


Asiasanat: kokemusasiantuntijus, osallistava hallinta, hallinnallisuus, ethnografia, subjektiviteetti, palveluiden käyttäjien osallistuminen, demokratia, sosiaaliala
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Before starting my PhD I would read the Acknowledgment-sections of doctoral dissertations with a small grin on my face. I thought the acclamations of how this work ‘would not exist’ without certain people were gross overstatements. Surely, it was the author’s work and accomplishment.

Oh, how wrong I was.

This work would literally not have existed without a number of people. Professor Emerita Marja Keränen was enough of an optimist to hire me in 2014 to conduct this research as part of her project ‘Superdemocracy – Critical Assessment of the Participatory Turn’. She has been the greatest mentor anyone could have hoped for, providing not only insightful and careful feedback but also moral support and encouragement that were regularly and sorely needed throughout this process. Her example of a kind, courageous and profoundly wise academic is what I will be at pains to follow. I cannot thank her enough.

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24th October 2018,
On a train to Kuopio
Taina Meri luoto
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ORIGINAL ARTICLES
1 INTRODUCTION: NEW EXPERTS IN TWO TALES OF DEMOCRACY

Over the past twenty years a widespread participatory emphasis has come to shape public governance (e.g. Polletta 2016, Saurugger 2010). Citizens, in different constellations and through different means, are now expected to be engaged and activated in different stages of decision-making and policy-implementation (e.g. Barber 2003, Creighton 2005, Fung & Wright 2001). Their active role is crafted through novel concepts such as service co-production, participatory governance and co-creation networks (Bovaird 2007, Bevir 2010a, Barnes, Newman & Sullivan 2007). Participation, in all its ambiguity, has become an indicator of a nourishing democracy, of legitimate government and of happy and healthy citizens (Baiocchi & Ganuza 2017, 3, G. Smith 2009, 8–9).

This new participatory agenda has received a warm welcome particularly among organisations working with marginalised citizens. There are high hopes that through these participatory practices the voices of the hitherto marginalised people will be heard in public decision-making and that active, contributing citizens will be produced in the process (Tonkens & Newman 2011, 9–11, Matthies 2014, 9, Matthies, Närhi & Kokkonen 2018).

Concurrently with the ever-growing interest towards participatory forms of democracy, research on new forms of expertise has also accrued in recent years. On the one hand, calls for ‘evidence-based policymaking’ have steered governments to emphasise the role of expert-knowledge in their decision-making (e.g. Cairney 2016), leading to what some authors have dubbed ‘expertisation’ or ‘technocratisation’ of democracy (e.g. Liberatore & Funtowicz 2003, Fischer 2009, 18–22). On the other hand, traditional forms of expertise have also been challenged by the participatory mechanisms that now place citizens as experts in policy-making processes. This has happened notably by introducing new notions of ‘lay’ or ‘experience-based’ knowledge and expertise (Epstein 1995, Lawton 2003, Noorani 2013, Collins & Evans 2007, 142, Demszky & Nassehi 2012), leaving some interpreters optimistic about ‘the democratisation of expertise’ (Nowotny 2003, see also Strassheim 2015, 319).
The notion of an expert-by-experience balances intriguingly at the crossroads of these two trends and tales of democracy. It is a term used to refer to people who have undergone problematic experiences in their past and have then been invited to act as experts based on those experiences in social welfare and healthcare organisations. The concept is, at the same time, used as a tool towards various goals: to empower the participants by giving value to their experiences and recognising the knowledge gained through them (Healy 2000, 29–30, Randall & Munro 2010, 1495); to gain specific, often rather strictly predefined information in the form of ‘real life experience’ to be used in service-production and policy-design (Eyal 2013, 886–887, Rabeharisoa, Moreira & Akrich 2014); to meet the participatory norm of good governance by including ‘the stakeholders’ in the governance networks; and to ‘activate’ the former service users from being passive recipients of aid into active members of society (Stewart 2016, 2–7, Leino & Peltomaa 2012, Demszky & Nassehi 2012, 174). Expertise-by-experience can be viewed both as a means to democratise expertise by bringing recognition to alternative sources of valuable knowledge and legitimate expertise, as well as a tool in the expertisation of democracy in crafting new possibilities for the participation of experts, instead of members, citizens or activists. In the 2010s, expertise-by-experience has become what Cornwall and Brock call a ‘buzzword’ in the Finnish social welfare; a word that is ‘warmly persuasive, fulsomely positive and promising an entirely different way of doing business’ (2005, 1043).

From 2011 to 2014, I was in charge of developing expertise-by-experience in a Finnish civil society organisation. I worked in a project whose objective was to ‘increase voluntary work, enhance inclusion, enable service users’ participation and develop new means to combine experiential knowledge with professional expertise’.¹ The organisation, although a civil society organisation at its roots, had developed into a strong, professional service provider, and as one of my former colleagues put it, had ‘tossed the baby out with the bathwater’. Now, with a significant push from the organisation’s funder, the Slot Machine Association,² it wanted to re-discover its roots, to welcome volunteers into its functions anew and most of all to reconceptualise the service users as active agents instead of passive recipients of aid.

As it turned out, this was no small task. The idea of civic participation was often responded to with varying levels of caution; the trained and specialised professionals were conscious of their own expertise and stressed that ‘random citizens’ did not possess enough knowledge or capacities to help the organis-

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¹ Project implementation plan 2011.
² For anonymity reasons, I have chosen not to identify the CSO nor the project I was employed in. See section 3.3.4. Ethical considerations for further discussion.
² The Finnish Slot Machine Association was a public organisation that had a monopoly of gaming in Finland. Its profits went towards the funding of civil society organisations working in the health and social welfare sector. Through the allotment of grants it provided resources and thus significantly steered the work done in Finnish CSOs. In 2017, RAY supported a little over 850 organisations with a total sum of 317 600 000 €. The organisation’s gaming functions were merged with two similar gaming companies from the beginning of 2017, and it is now called Veikkaus. Its profits are now distributed through the Funding Centre for Social Welfare and Health Organisations (STEA), part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
tion’s beneficiaries in the same way the professionals could. Moreover, although the idea of empowering the service users was met with enthusiasm on a rhetorical level, in practice the new, active citizen in the making caused many feelings of unease among the social welfare professionals. Mixed emotions between the will to empower and the need to protect, between a willingness to listen and the self-consciousness of ‘knowing better’, were everyday struggles for my colleagues – myself included.

As a way forward, our project introduced the notion of expertise-by-experience into the organisation’s vocabulary. Borrowing a term that had already gained traction in our fellow civil society organisations, we re-labelled the service users as experts-by-experience, hence recognising the value of their experiential knowledge. This was done as an attempt to open up an avenue for them to collaborate with other experts in the field and perhaps more importantly to make our colleagues’ way of working more inclusive and participatory. The notion seemed like an innovative way to overcome the expert-citizen dichotomy by ‘promoting’ the service users up into the category of experts, all the while not threatening the other experts’ positions by emphasising the different source of the experts-by-experience’s expertise. I was excited beyond words by this innovation and eager to start working on it with the people we now called experts-by-experience.

For four years I was immersed in developing expertise-by-experience in this organisation. I met truly amazing survivors, whose point of view definitely deserved to be included and heard. However, at the same time, I grew increasingly concerned. The idea of expertise-by-experience was introduced by us, the organisation’s practitioners. It stemmed both from our commitment to the inclusive values of civil society and also from what we thought our funder was expecting of us. As one of my interviewees put it later, she ‘didn’t want to become an expert-by-experience, she was rather made into one’. This was decidedly not a bottom-up initiative. It was not about the people fighting to get their voices heard. Instead, it was about us wanting to show that we listen.

In addition, quite a few of my colleagues expressed a strong urge to contain and limit either the issues the experts-by-experience would be allowed to discuss, or the scope of who should be allowed to act as an expert-by-experience. Participation and inclusion were often approached through the potential risks they might entail, both for the participants’ ‘recovery’ as well as for the organisation’s everyday work. A common worry was how participation can be harmful for people in vulnerable positions, and on the other hand, that there was no way of knowing how their input would affect the organisation. The response was to set up standards, guidelines, rules and recommendations that would make participation manageable.

Finally, it was the notion of expertise that baffled me. Why do we need to call these people experts to be able to listen to them? As I then began finding out, the aspect of ‘making experts’ was a crucial tool in the initiatives as they constructed their participants as subjects.

This PhD thesis analyses this process of expert-making in a social welfare context with a governmentality ethnographic approach. I am interested in how a
person with difficult past experiences is made into ‘an expert of one’s own life’ and how the subjectivity thus created is connected to different possibilities of participation. My focus is, hence, on the processes of the participants’ subjectivation (Foucault 1994, 718–719, M. G. E. Kelly 2013, Cremonesi et al. 2016a). I examine what kind of subjectivities participatory governmentality enables, through which practices they are constructed and, in turn, how the participants themselves engage with, contest and redefine the possibilities being offered to them. My specific interest is in how the expertisation affects the participants’ possibilities for being.

The processes of making experts-by-experience provide a particularly intriguing empirical case for the study of the participants’ subjectivation, as the notions of knowledge, truth and the participants’ self-government are here intertwined in a particularly explicit way. The participants are trained and named to become ‘experts of themselves’, which makes certain conceptions of truth, knowledge and expertise both tools through which their way of being is governed and manifestations of the governing rationales on which the expert-constructions are based. What the participants are experts of, what constitutes expertise and knowledge in this context and who defines these become questions that directly influence the experts-by-experience’s self-making. At the same time, the concepts of knowledge and expertise become key arenas for political struggle in an increasingly ‘governance-driven democracy’ (Warren 2009, Lappalainen 2017, 118): Who gets to participate in defining knowledge? Whose knowledge is credible and to be enacted on? How is it possible to challenge and redefine knowledge?

My motivation for focusing on the projects’ subjectivation practices is that through them it becomes possible to conduct a more grassroots-level evaluation of participatory initiatives’ democratic quality (see also Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014). In the original research articles that compose this dissertation I explore the process of expert-making in the context of participatory social welfare with the help of the following questions:

1. **What characterises the subjectivities created in the context of expertise-by-experience?**
   What kind of participation and ‘way of being’ is encouraged and made feasible?

2. **How (through which practices and techniques) are participants constructed as experts?**
   - How are notions of expertise and knowledge (re)defined and used in the participants’ subjectivation?
   - How are certain subject-constructions made (to appear) rational and feasible?
   - How do the participants respond to and engage with their subjectivation?

3. **How do the practices identified sustain, or conversely, undermine democracy?**

In this summary article, I focus largely on my third research question and reinterpret my articles’ findings through a critical democratic lens. By using a critical
framework, I refer both to a specific understanding of democracy and a particular usage of the knowledge produced through research on democracy. First, I subscribe to an understanding of democracy that Aletta Norval (2014) calls post-structuralist theories. These approaches, encompassing radical and critical democratic theories, conceive of democracy as an unfinished process that strives towards equal possibilities of action and towards ever enlarging possibilities to critique and destabilise the structures and rationales of governing that are made to appear as ‘self-evident’ (Laclau & Mouffe 2014, Rancière 1999, Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, 24–26, Li 2007c, 19, 22–25, Blaug 2002, 105–106). A critical approach to democracy research, in turn, adopts a normative and emancipatory stance in the uses of theory and seeks to produce knowledge that would enable politicising existing social structures, to contest dominant rationales and ‘truths’ and to open up spaces for action in environments that have previously been closed and for groups that have previously been supressed (Bohman 2016, Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, Cotterell & Morris 2011).

This ‘emancipatory criticism’ (Bohman 2016) will serve as my analytical lens when interpreting my articles’ findings with an aim to evaluate the participatory processes’ democratic quality. Through this lens, participation in itself is not enough to contribute to a better functioning and deeper democracy (Cornwall & Coelho 2007, 5, cf. Fung & Wright 2001). In addition, it has to be equally accessible – and forcefully designed to further promote equality – and include possibilities for profound criticism and re-politicisation of also those issues and underlying assumptions that the administration and the governing elite would rather retain untouched (Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, Baiocchi & Gauza 2017, 13–14). Furthermore, the approach locates democracy in the grassroots practices of governing and resistance (Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, 30–32), and it interprets how these everyday ways of guiding, negotiating and contesting contribute to the democratic project. The key analytical questions for these practices’ democratic quality are to what extent they enable 1) questioning of what we ‘know to be true’ and furthering the possibilities for such destabilisations and re-politicisations and 2) claiming room for new actors, new issues and new ways to engage in political debate. The particular focus of this approach is on the margins of democracy; whether the possibilities for participation created are founded on an egalitarian premise (Rancière 2011, 79) and whether they allow marginalised and silenced citizens to reclaim the right to define knowledge and truth, break from pre-given identities and craft out their own way of being that might currently seem unthinkable, unimaginable and undoable (Rancière 1999, 14–15, Genel 2016, 20, 27).

I investigate these two core aspects of democracy through two potential developments in the connections between democracy and expertise in the participatory initiatives developing expertise-by-experience. To probe the potential of developing more equal possibilities for participation, I ask to what extent and under what circumstances the initiatives contribute to ‘democratisation of expertise’, i.e. enhance the capacity of marginalised and silenced citizens to have a stronger influence in political decision-making on issues that are relevant for them. To in-
vestigate the potential of re- and de-politicisation, I reformulate the question and inquire whether the practices can be perceived as tools in ‘expertisation of democracy’, i.e. the de-politicising of issues by moving them to the realm of technocratic governance and creating new, epistemic thresholds for democratic participation, hence moving the possibilities for political action even further from the reach of those whose voice is already heard less.

Through this investigation, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of how we are constructed as subjects under the participatory governmentality and discusses how this process can be evaluated from the point of view of democracy. More broadly, the research explores the practices that maintain, and in turn, challenge democracy. It moves the notions of knowledge and expertise to the centre of interpretive analysis on democracy and hence transcends the dichotomy between administration and political decision-making that may be ill suited for our governance-enmeshed democracies (see Keränen 2014). This opens up knowledge and expertise as political concepts and sites of struggle, where democracy in practice actualises in the everyday world.

In the next subsection, I will present the case at hand by explaining the uses and definitions of the concept of expertise-by-experience, recounting its background and describing the context in which it emerged in Finland. Then, I will situate the phenomenon within the discussion on the different uses and roles of knowledge and expertise in democratic government. In the following two subsections, I will tell the two, partially conflicting tales of democracy through which expertise-by-experience could be interpreted. First, I will explore the participatory enthusiasm, the belief in the democratisation of expertise, and the ensuing practices of participatory governance, service user involvement and service co-production. Then, I will assume a more critical outlook and describe the concerns and problems identified with participatory governance. I will in particular focus on the alleged de-politicising effects of participatory governance, on the ‘expertisation of democracy’, and its co-opting tendencies for participants’ input.

1.1 Experts-by-experience in Finnish social welfare

Expertise-by-experience as a concept and practice has been traced back to the ‘third way’ health and social care reforms in the UK, which sought to craft a new, active role for the service user (Barnes & Cotterell 2012, Fox, Ward & O’Rourke 2005, P. M. Wilson 2001). In keeping with many other participatory measures, these service user involvement initiatives were introduced as a response to an array of problems (Newman & Clarke 2009, 134–139, Barnes & Cotterell 2012, Lewis 2010, 277–278, Stewart 2013a). By inviting experts-by-experience to participate in the planning and execution of social services, they were to become empowered and assume more responsibility over their own life and care (see Healy 2000). In addition, and in part through the participants’ greater responsibility over themselves, the co-produced services were to be more efficient and consequently less costly (P. M. Wilson 2001, 136–137, Barnes 2009, 219–220). Further-
more, through service user engagement the new ‘duty’ (Barnes & Cotterell 2012, xviii) of public involvement, sketched in numerous public policy outlines, was met. This supposedly made public governance more legitimate as it adhered to the new participatory norm (Leal 2007).

Stephen Cowden and Gurnam Singh (2007, also Martin 2008a, Noorani 2013) have identified two, somewhat contradictory political projects and rationales that contributed to New Labour’s invention of an active public service user. On the one hand, an active user-citizen fits nicely with the state’s aims to withdraw, i.e. to cut back on public services and reduce the state’s role to mere ‘management through communities’ (Newman & Clarke 2009, 49) An active service user and an engaged citizen was to pick up the slack and resume more responsibility for their own and their families’ well-being (Newman & Clarke 2009, 165–166, Cowden & Singh 2007, Barnes & Cotterell 2012, xvii). On the other hand, the service users’ voice was also intensified through the claims made by the New Social- and Self Help-Movements of the 1970s, which sought to destabilise the existing power dynamics and purported the primacy of people’s own first-hand knowledge and which led later to various interpretations of survivor activism (Borkman 1976, Cowden & Singh 2007, Mazanderani 2017, Noorani 2013, Beresford 2009, Lawton 2003). While both of these projects worked towards the service users’ activation, their underlying rationales for seeking to craft an active role for the experience-based experts was crucially different, which contributed to the creation of very different possibilities for participation.

In the 2000s, the notion of an active service user, labelled as ‘an expert-by-experience’, also made it to shore in Finland (also Alanko & Hellman 2017). One of the first organisations to use the term was the Muotiala Accommodation and Activity Centre Association in Tampere, which received funding from the Slot Machine Association for the development of experience-based expertise in mental health services in 2001. Drawing on examples from the UK and Denmark, it was then disseminated to many other sectors, including both public sector organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs), especially in the 2010s (Rissanen 2015, 201).

The landscape in which the concept took root can be considered particularly welcoming for a notion that seems to emphasise at the same time the value of people’s first-hand knowledge and the unique value and position of experts in decision-making. On the one hand, Finland’s civil society has a long history of active patient organisations and interest mediation (Saukonen 2013, M. Sisäjäinen & Kankainen 2009, 97). Finnish CSOs have been an intrinsic part of political decision-making, and their role has historically been profoundly collaborative with the state (Alapuro 2005, 383). The CSOs have been customarily treated as legitimate representatives of people with first-hand experiences of a social problem or an illness, which is characteristic of the so-called social-corporate political system (Jepperson 2002, 73–74). The inclusion of interest-mediating associations has been frequent in a consultation-based administrative model in which new policy outlines were discussed with ‘all relevant stakeholders’ in a consen-
sus-oriented manner (Kuokkanen 2016, 65; Keränen 2017, 146). The voice of experiences, in this manner, was nothing new in the Finnish political system.

On the other hand, the Finnish political culture can be considered particularly knowledge-oriented and expert-reliant (Luhtakallio 2010, Raevaara 2005). In the Finnish context, political arguments are considered more compelling if they are substantiated with ‘facts’ and figures. Emotion-filled personal testimonies, in turn, easily wash away a person’s authority, and strongly value-laden discourses are labelled as ‘unnecessarily politicising’ issues that should ideally be dealt with in a calm and rational manner (Luhtakallio 2010, 79, 197). This has constructed the legitimate role of associations and participating citizens more broadly as collaborative knowledge-producers rather than as strong advocates of private interests (Luhtakallio 2010, 23, 157) – a tendency further enforced by the neo-liberal, de-politicising visions of governance (Keränen 2017, 147–148). Eeva Raevaara (2005, 175–178) provides a telling example by recounting how women’s equal political representation was justified in Finland not with claims of democracy but by emphasising how their expertise would be invaluable for the good of the nation. Within this context, it was not very surprising that the concept that labels service users and beneficiaries as experts resonated positively among Finnish decision-makers and public servants. There was already a role in the Finnish ‘functionalist-rationalist polity’ (Luhtakallio 2010, 22) in which these new experts could be envisioned.

What was, however, a novel innovation was that through the introduction of the concept of expertise-by-experience it was no longer the employees or elected spokespeople of CSOs but people with first-hand experiences who needed to be included and activated. This signified a move away from a historically very mediated form of civic participation towards a more direct model. Above all, this shift in emphasis was a reflection of the broader paradigm shift in governance norms and Finnish public policy outlines, which stressed the importance of active citizen engagement and pushing towards new innovations to involve and activate citizens (Salminen & Wilhelmsson 2013, 10–11, Matthies & Uggerhj 2014, 3–4). This was the government’s response to the so-called ‘democracy-deficit’, which was evident for example in decreasing turnout, as well as in civil society and party organisation memberships (Paloheimo 2013, Kuokkanen 2016, 68–69). Some of the first responses drafted for this concern were the Ministry of the Interior’s Inclusion-project of 1997–2002 and a cross-sectoral project entitled ‘The Citizen Participation Policy Programme’ in 2003–2007, which resulted in the institutionalisation of democracy policy as its own policy field (Keränen 2007, Salminen & Wilhelmsson 2013, 10–12). The cross-sectoral concern for the need to increase civic participation was expressed in the project’s final report:

The contents of the process of decision-making needs to be significantly opened up to those citizens and civil society organisations that want to exert influence but that feel like they do not possess the means to do so. Second, tools need to be developed to amplify the voices of those who have already lost their faith in having an impact.

To answer this call for new avenues, new mechanisms and more direct possibilities to participate, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health (MSAH) defined ‘inclusion’ and ‘customer-initiated service production’ as the prime goals of its National Development Programme for Social Welfare and Health Care (Kaste). The programme adopted the concept of an expert-by-experience and placed it as one of the key tools to achieve the programme’s goals. In a similar vein, the main funder of Finnish social welfare CSOs, The Finnish Slot Machine Association, started to draw back funding for the CSOs’ service production (Särkelä 2016, 296–298). This directed social welfare CSOs to define their role more sternly as facilitators of civic participation and inclusion. Moreover, Finnish municipalities were equally compelled by the revised Local Government Act of 2015 to craft new avenues for participation for their inhabitants (Local Government Act, 410/2015, Section 22). One form of such participation is described as ‘planning and developing services together with service users’ (ibid.). The combination of these steering efforts and incentives quite understandably resulted in an explosion of new initiatives seeking to enforce the participation of the beneficiaries and members of both public and third sector organisations.

The notion of expertise-by-experience was quite understandably compelling for Finnish social welfare organisations, as it seemed to provide an apt tool to increase the target groups’ participation. It would not only enable the crafting of new possibilities and new venues to participate, but it would also acknowledge the participants’ experiences in a novel way. Now, experiences were reframed as experiential knowledge, and as such easily incorporable into policy-making. Further, the concept served to blur the distinction between ‘the experts’ and ‘the beneficiaries’, fitting both the ethos of participatory and dialogical social work (Närhi 2004) as well as the Finnish expert-reliant political culture like a glove.

In addition, and my no means insignificantly, the incorporation of expertise-by-experience was a fitting concept to provide proof of the organisations’ innovative and participatory attitude for the organisations’ funders. It can be perceived as the organisations’ – especially the CSOs’ – attempt to strategically manoeuvre within the new demands of public participation set by their funders in order to secure the best possible resources for their work.

Närhi and Kokkonen (2014, 103–104) have discussed the multiple purposes the novel participatory trend was positioned to answer in a social policy context. In addition to the socio-liberal understanding of participation as a right to be included, Närhi and Kokkonen argue that participation has increasingly become an economic tool. They have identified a strong upsurge of the neo-liberal rationale in participatory social policy outlines of the 2010s, focusing on responsibilising the individual citizens and improving the economic competitiveness of the country (also Aaltio 2013, Särkelä 2016, 73–78). A quote from an interview with a public official from the MSAH illustrates this rationale concretely:

It [increased participation] can benefit the society in two ways. On the one hand, it pulls people along, and can thus decrease some expenses related to marginalisation.

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3 http://stm.fi/en/kaste-progamme
On the other hand, it can produce added value to our economy. These are the two points with participation.


This interpretation has since been intensified, as Finnish social policy has increasingly adopted neo-liberal concepts, such as activation, as part of its rhetoric, emphasising the active role and responsibilities of the welfare recipients (Julkunen 2017, 148–148, Matthies 2017). The inclusion of the participants’ ‘voice’ is also hoped to improve the services and make them more efficient in meeting the clients’ needs and to promote the welfare recipients’ own wellbeing (Matthies 2017). Crucially, with the use of this concept, the beneficiaries were now engaged primarily as customers of specific services and as individuals rather than collectives.

Finally, expertise-by-experience in Finland was a distinctly top-down development (also Närhi & Kokkonen 2014, 96). It was a strongly government-initiated and steered initiative that sought to engage new participants by crafting a sufficiently novel, but at the same time reassuringly familiar, role through which ‘the target group’ could be engaged. This is in line with Mark Warren’s (2009) observation on the general trend of ‘governance drivenness’ of participatory initiatives internationally, but it may also reflect the Finnish political culture and the history of Finnish civil society more widely as a state-driven and collaboration-oriented project (Stenius 2003, 358–359).

Today, the concept of expertise-by-experience is used widely and has become somewhat of a marker for an inclusive and empowering welfare organisation. Indeed, ‘the establishment of an operating model for expertise by experience and client involvement’ is one of the government’s key projects for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH),4 developed under the steering of the National Institute of Health and Welfare.5 At present, it is one of the most powerful concepts in use to open up and delineate possibilities for participation for marginalised groups.

However, the concept is a broad church. It is used both in healthcare6 and social welfare and can be used to refer to paid professionals, freelancer performing paid ‘gigs’ upon invitation or volunteers. In its broadest meaning, the equivocal concept refers to a person who has undergone social or health-related difficulties and is now acting as an expert based on those experiences. In the seven projects investigated in this research, the problematic experiences include substance abuse, mental health illnesses,7 domestic violence, gambling addiction, homelessness and the use of income support. Most commonly, experts-by-experience

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4 stm.fi/en/services-responsive-to-client-needs/project-description
6 See, e.g. www.kshhp.fi/fi-
FI/Sairaanhoidopiiri/Muu_toiminta/Perusterveydenhuollon_yksikko/Kokemusasiantuntijat
7 Many of the issues transcend the dichotomy of either health or social issues. Although substance abuse and mental health problems are, decidedly, also illnesses, and fall also within the domain of medical concerns, they also bring forth a myriad of social problems. I consider them here as social issues following the organisations’ own framing of their field of work.
perform the following: they act in different service co-production working groups, they bring their ‘experiential knowledge’ to political decision-making in different working committees and governance networks under the MSAH and in local social welfare and health boards, they evaluate services, deliver lectures on their experiences for professionals and political decision-makers or participate in public debate through the media. Their tasks are, however, extremely varied. Among the most creative are those serving as tourist guides for local politicians’ fieldtrips to ‘the underbelly’ of their municipality or turning an apartment into an art performance by filling it with signs of domestic violence for the public, local professionals and policymakers to see.

Figure 1 depicts the interviewed experts-by-experience’s position in the policy process:

The black and grey circles in the figure represent one mention of a task my interviewees had performed as an expert-by-experience. The problem formulation / agenda setting phase refers to the very early stages of a policy cycle where an emerging issue is being introduced and attempted to be placed in the policy
agenda. These tasks were mainly carried out by the civil society experts-by-experience and consisted, for example, of writing opinion pieces or letters to MPs in an effort to point out the public’s interest in an issue. Policy formulation, for its part, refers to the concrete environments in which a policy is being drafted; namely committees and working groups in Ministries in which experts-by-experience were invited as representatives of people with experience of the issue being discussed. Decision-making regards institutions and arrangements, such as municipal councils and the boards of municipalities’ Joint Authorities, in which decisions about policy outlines or, for example, budget allocations are made. Policy implementation consists of a variety of project steering groups and network arrangements through which social policy is being implemented, both nationally and locally. Service delivery refers to the concrete sites that organise social welfare services; places where experts-by-experience hold a role as ‘peer supporters’ or other customer contacts. Policy evaluation refers to different evaluation committees and practices where experts-by-experience held a position of ‘an evaluator-by-experience’. Finally, policy-revision refers to committees and steering groups whose task was to re-evaluate and redraft a policy.

As we observe, the experts-by-experience’s tasks focus mostly on the implementation and evaluation phases of the policy-process. These tasks include memberships in various service design committees and evaluation groups, as well as training practitioners and administrative staff on how to improve services. The second most frequent context of participation is the agenda-setting phase. Here, the experts-by-experience’s tasks include various efforts to influence political decision-makers and bring their phenomenon of expertise to their decision-making agenda. Some experts-by-experience had been active in drafting policy-initiatives and bills themselves, while others have been in contact with politicians either directly or via art or other creative means. On a few occasions, the experts-by-experience described themselves as part of the policy-formulation of the revision phase, mainly as parts of ministerial working groups. It is particularly noteworthy that none of the experts-by-experience interviewed described having taken part in any decision-making (which in a representative system is understandable), but furthermore none of them had been present in environments that they considered having decision-making authority.

As is apparent, the experts-by-experience’s tasks vary both in terms of their objective, their scope and their context. The term can be used to refer to beneficiaries of a civil society organisation who bring forward their experiential knowledge in everyday conversations over a cup of coffee. At the same time, it can be used much more formally to refer to appointed customer representatives in ministerial committees or service co-production groups. The experts-by-experience’s participation could be directed very narrowly at developing a specific service and making the specificities of this service and its impacts the core of their expertise. On some occasions, the experts-by-experience were also invited to provide services for current customers. For example, some municipalities adopted a practice where an expert-by-experience had their own ‘reception’ in munici-
pal social welfare services, providing the customers with a peer-support-like assistance in finding the right form of support for their situation.

In other environments, the experts-by-experience’s expertise was conceived of more broadly as a deep understanding of the problem they have had to undergo. This view on their experiential expertise also broadened the scope of their participation. On these occasions, the experts-by-experience focused more on influencing public and decision-makers’ attitudes, instead of focusing on practical and technical arrangements of a specific service. Furthermore, many of the projects both invited experts-by-experience to develop their own activities or services and drew on their experiential knowledge in their advocacy efforts. This often made the experts-by-experience spokespeople for a larger imagined community with similar experiences. As is then visible, no one understanding of the concept, the tasks it entails and the participation it makes possible exists. The common denominator of these varied tasks is the experts-by-experience’s own story – and its expressions and influence.

Despite some efforts of the National Institute for Health and Welfare,8 the concept of expertise-by-experience continues to receive different, even contradicting interpretations in practice. Practitioners and experts-by-experience have very different views on who can and should be allowed to act as an expert-by-experience and what their tasks and the possibilities for impact should be. One of the key points of contestation is the experts-by-experience’s training: While some actors tie the concept only to people who have undergone specific training for experts-by-experience (see, e.g. www.kokemusasiantuntijat.fi), others perceive these trainings as problematic thresholds and even artificial selection processes (Meriluoto 2018b). The trainings in question are described as growth-processes where experts-by-experience-to-be ‘turn their experiences into a story’, ‘learn to move from a self-absorbed perspective to collective thinking’ and develop ‘a wider understanding in lieu of just talking about their own experiences’.9 Five of the seven projects studied in this thesis offered training to their participants. They varied significantly in length, ranging from a six-day course up to a two-year process with ‘on-the-job training periods’ in between. The most common components of these trainings were varying methods of working with and reconstructing the participants’ stories and learning additional information, such as scientific knowledge on the phenomenon in question, or legal frameworks and service structures within which the field practitioners’ work.

In addition to the divergent positions towards trainings, it is equally ambiguous whether the experts-by-experience are thought to represent themselves

8 The National Institute for Health and Welfare hired a consultant to carry out seven workshops across Finland in late 2013 and early 2014. Their task was ‘to map the concept of expertise-by-experience, the expectations towards it and potential issues that need to be developed, as well as to gather local working methods and other emerging themes’ (Kokemusasiantuntijuus – totta vai tarua? Kooste kokemusasiantuntijuus työpajoista 12/2013 – 3/2014 [Expertise-by-experience, true or false? An overview of the workshops on expertise-by-experience 12/2013 – 3/2014]).

9 Quotes from a blog post by an expert-by-experience: keskuststo.akilinikka.fi/tietopuu/etusivu/tietopuublogi/pia_alarto_kokemusasiantuntijuuden_maarittely_tarkeaa_ja_ajankohtaista
and their personal experiences when acting as an expert-by-experience or whether they act as a representative token for a large group of people with similar experiences (Meriluoto 2016). Moreover, the objectives thought to be achieved through increased public involvement – in the initiatives introducing expertise by experience, as well as in participatory policies more widely – remain unclear. The projects inviting experts-by-experience into social welfare organisations rarely explicate why these new experts are needed and what functions their involvement is thought to fulfil. Increased participation appears as a ‘dogma’ – a new norm for good governance and modern social policy, which rarely achieves particular attention, let alone gets scrutinised critically.

The Finnish participatory turn, then, appears by no means as a coherent governmental strategy to widen people’s possibilities to participate and ‘deepen democracy’ (also Newman & Clarke 2009, 166, also Polletta 2016, 232, Blondiaux 2008, 132–133). Instead, previous studies have shown how the people constructed as participants take on very different roles depending on the rationale evoked to explain the need for increased civic participation and the corresponding understanding of democracy (see Charles 2016, loc. 93, Marinetto 2003, 107–108, Richard-Ferroudji 2011, Talpin 2006, Lowndes & Sullivan 2008).

Following from this confusion of conflicting interpretations, meaning-makings and underlying rationales, I propose that a more grassroots-level investigation is needed to better understand what takes place in these participatory initiatives, what makes these actions understandable and what effects they have for the participants. In previous interpretations of participatory measures, two very different tales have been told on their effects for democracy; one rather optimistic and the other more critical, even pessimistic (see also Kuokkanen 2016). In the following, I present these contrasting interpretations through two possible objectives and potential outcomes of introducing lay experts in policy: the belief in ‘the democratisation of expertise’ and the suspicion of ‘the expertisation of democracy’. To lay groundwork for these interpretations, I start with a brief overview on previous research on the role of experiential knowledge in policy-making.

### 1.2 Experiential experts in participatory governance

The role of experts and lay citizens – in terms of what is thought desirable, feasible and rational from both groups – has been an on-going question in debates on democracy (Dewey 1994, Fischer 2009, Walker, McQuarrie & Lee 2015, M. Berger & Charles 2014). In broad terms, the division between experts and citizens has served as a marker between ‘the political’ debate open for the passionate, opinionated citizens and the ‘de-politicised’ sphere of administration and governance reserved for the ‘neutral and rational’ debate between experts (Swyngedouw 2011, Van Puymbroeck & Oosterlynck 2014, Wood & Flinders 2014). Now, the participatory enthusiasm marches the citizens as experts onto centre stage (Blencowe, Brigstocke & Dawney 2013, Rabeharisoa, Moreira & Akrich 2014, Liberator & Funtowicz 2003, Nowotny 2003) and expands the notion of expertise to
refer to new groups such as patients (Eyal 2013, Epstein 1995), service users (Barnes 2009, Noorani 2013, Toikko 2016, Alanko & Hellman 2017) or local residents (Leino & Peltomaa 2012, Fischer 2000). These democratic innovations that seek to bring out the citizens’ ‘local expertise’ have made the distinction between expert-inputs and public participation nigh impossible (Barnes 2009, Blencowe, Brigstocke & Dawney 2013, Martin 2008a, Rabeharisoa, Moreira & Akrich 2014).

However, from the outset, understanding lay knowledge as well as its uses has been a site of redefinitions and struggle (Rabeharisoa, Moreira & Akrich 2014, Mazanderani, Locock & Powell 2012, Eyal 2013). The diverse and partially contradiciting terms and purposes allotted to lay experts reflect different answers to two key questions that underlie the creation of these new experts: 1) What is the role and value of participation in a democracy? and 2) What role should (scientific) expertise play in democratic governance?

The first question is an evergreen in democratic theory, and the relationship between participation and democracy has by no means been as self-evident as it appears in the context of today’s participatory enthusiasm (Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015, 9). First of all, democratic theorists have pondered whether participation is a necessary pre-requisite for or an intrinsic element of democracy (see Pateman 1970, 2–14, G. Smith 2009, 8–9). While some see participation as a core component, even the very essence of democracy (Barber 2003, 8, Fung & Wright 2001, 7), others have gone as far as to suggest that (direct) participation might be antithetic to the democratic values (Schumpeter 1943, 254–256). As participation became a core focal point of deepening democracy throughout the 1960s in the claims of the student movements (Pateman 1970, 1, Baiocchi & Ganuza 2017, 4), democratic theorists started to focus on more nuanced interpretations of the relationships between participation and democracy. As a result, they developed, for example, varying approaches to evaluating when participation can be considered democratic (Norval 2014, Rancière 1999, 14–17, G. Smith 2009, 16–17) and what the value of participation for a democracy might be (see, e.g. Baiocchi & Ganuza 2017, Ganuza, Baiocchi & Summers 2016, Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015).

The plethora of possible answers is tangibly present in the various interpretations of the role and purpose of lay experts’ participation. Their participation can be valued as a means to ‘empower’ the participants – to make them feel valued, appreciated and included and to ‘build their capacities’ (Cornwall & Brock 2005, Eliasoph 2016). It can also be regarded as a means to build the input legitimacy of government by showing the width and variety of voices included in decision-making (Cotterell & Morris 2011, 59–60). Here, the participating citizens are seen to act as a ‘necessary counterweight to elite power and bureaucratic rationality’ (Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015, 7). At the same time, and partially at odds with the former, participation can be valued as a means to gain citizen input or ‘lay knowledge’ on a specific theme or question (Borkman 1976, Fischer 2000, Leino & Peltomaa 2012, Smith-Merry 2012, Epstein 1995). Here, the value of participation is instrumental (G. Smith 2009, 9). Its emphasis is not on the act of participating but on the knowledge and insight produced through it to reach better-
reasoned decisions and more efficient public policy, thus contributing primarily to ‘the throughput legitimacy’ of government (Schmidt 2013, O’Toole & Gale 2014).

Researchers have developed different analytical categories when attempting to elucidate the differing conceptions of the purpose and value of participation. Graham Martin, for example, has identified two main ways to valuate and justify participation; one that values participation as a value in and of itself, and one that perceives it as a means to (varying) ends (Martin 2008a). He has termed them ‘democratic’ and ‘technocratic’ rationales, which contribute to participants being perceived as either ‘representatives’ or ‘experts’ in the participatory schemes. Graham Smith (2009, 8–9) makes a very similar distinction between the intrinsic and instrumental value of participation. Ricardo Blaug (2002) takes this dichotomy one step further by arguing that ‘incumbent democracy’ seeks to instrumentalise and domesticate participation for the purposes of efficient and manageable decision-making, while ‘critical democracy’ values participation as a means to destabilise the existing decision-making structures and institutions. Concretely, these competing rationales of participation contribute to very different possibilities for participation for the lay experts (e.g. Richard-Ferroudji 2011, M. Berger & Charles 2014, Martin 2008a, Carrel 2007).

The second question, the aspired role of expertise, has regained salience after the novel emphasis on ‘evidence-based policy-making’ (Cairney 2016). As there is an increasing hope that policies are ‘evidence-based’, questions on the balance between popular control and expert-assessment in political decision-making are (re)emerging (Strassheim 2015, 320–321). The (elitist) technobureaucratic conception of the policy-process perceives the citizens’ role as making value-based assessments and evaluations of political decisions and presupposes a ‘rational’ administrative sphere in opposition to the value-laden field of public participation (Fischer 2009, loc. 87–95, Torgerson 2003, 114–115). The experts’ role, on their part, is to provide the decision-makers with ‘relevant and reliable information’ and ‘scientific evidence’ as the basis of their decision-making (Cairney 2016, 15–19, Lippmann 2004, 17).

Participatory innovations blur this Schumpeterian dichotomy of elite experts and lay citizens (Chambers 2017, Strassheim 2015, 321). First, models of deliberative democracy rely strongly on the premise of rational dialogue between participants and a reasoned decision, as well as educated and enlightened participants as a result (Fishkin 2009, Fischer 2009, loc. 115–121). Deliberative ideals claim to make expertise and knowledge a matter for mutual deliberation, instead of perceiving them as a prerogative of the elite (Dewey & Rogers 2016, 28–35, Torgerson 2003, 121). Second, many participatory processes operate on the logic of ‘participatory governance’, justifying civic participation as a means to widen the governance network and to include the maximum amount of diverse forms of knowledge in decision-making, as will be discussed in the following. Subsequently, participation’s relationship to expertise can be perceived as an antidote to excessive expert power, as well as a vehicle for delivering different forms of expertise to decision-making (see Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015, 12).
This desire to create new experts has been identified as emblematic of a paradigm shift from ‘government to governance’ (see Sullivan & Skelcher 2002, Barnes, Newman & Sullivan 2007, Peters & Pierre 2001) and further to ‘participatory governance’ (Fung & Wright 2001, Bevir 2006, McIvor 2011). The rationale underpinning this new way of thinking about ruling taps into instrumental valuations of participation: its premise is that through greater collaboration and joining up different forms of knowledge, a new hands-on type of knowledge is to be acquired in decision-making, which is particularly suitable for forming networks of knowledge that can address the increasingly ‘wicked problems’ of the contemporary condition (Sterling 2005, 146–153, Ferlie et al. 2011, Sullivan & Skelcher 2002, 19, Fischer 2009, loc. 925). This has meant a new, active role for citizens, who are now called to participate in ‘co-governing’ or ‘co-producing’ specific (pre-defined) issues or services (Warren 2009) and who are perceived as contributors to and collaborators in administrative processes (e.g. Swyngedouw 1994, 2005, Newman et al. 2004, R. Dean 2014). In public service production, this has manifested in the introduction of new practices and vocabulary, such as service user involvement and co-production (Brandesn & Pestoff 2006, Needham 2008, Palumbo 2015, 74–75).

Participatory governance further renders the connection between participation and expertise as ambiguous. First, it seemingly breaks down the elitist understanding of expertise by inviting different stakeholders to contribute their unique knowledges to the policy-process. At the same time, its operating principle, relying on collaborative networks, breaks the linear conception of the policy-process (Cairney 2016, 16–18, Hajer & Wagenaar 2003, 8–9), making it increasingly clear that the artificial distinction between facts and values, or administration and ‘the political’, is not the most useful heuristic when attempting to understand how power operates in participatory schemes. Marja Keränen (2014) has argued that this division is both performative as well as institutionalised and that it is reproduced in everyday practices and negotiations. While they condition the roles and possibilities that are opened up for participants placed in each context, these demands for the participants’ way of being are effectively concealed by the governance-talk that presents all participants as equals. Subsequently, it becomes extremely difficult to investigate power in these governance arrangements. This makes the study of different conceptions of knowledge and expertise, and the corresponding possibilities for political action opened up through them, of crucial importance (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003, 13). It is for these purposes that I steer my analytical focus towards the uses and (re)definitions of knowledge and expertise in a participatory governance setting.

Thomasina Borkman’s (1976) definition is often quoted as the first attempt to define the concept of experiential knowledge. She sketched the concept as ‘truth learned from personal experience with a phenomenon rather than truth acquired by discursive reasoning, observation, or reflection on information provided by others’ (ibid., 446). Borkman, then, distinguishes experiential knowledge primarily through its method of acquisition. She goes on to argue that ‘the most important elements of experiential knowledge are 1) the type of “information” on
which it is based, and 2) one's attitude toward that information' (ibid.). According to her, experiential knowledge is the ‘wisdom and know-how gained from personal participation in a phenomenon instead of isolated, unorganized bits of facts and feelings upon which a person has not reflected’ (ibid.). She concludes that this knowledge tends to be ‘concrete, specific, and commonsensical, since they are based on the individual's actual experience, which is unique, limited, and more or less representative of the experience of others who have the same problem’ (ibid.). Furthermore, Borkman argues that a crucial component of experiential knowledge is one’s conviction of their experiences to truly constitute ‘the truth’ about the phenomenon (Borkman 1976, 447).

Much has been debated after Borkman’s initial attempt to define experiential knowledge. While the foundation – experiential knowledge as information based on what a person has lived through first hand – still seems valid, researchers have since critically explored several other aspects of experiential knowledge. First, although Borkman recognised the possible tension between experiential and professional knowledge, she presented the two knowledges as rather effortlessly mutually complementing one another (Borkman 1976, 448). This, somewhat idealistic, view comes into question in light of more recent empirical studies that have noted how the participants’ knowledge is often treated as ‘second’ knowledge (Rabeharisoa 2017, Moore & Stilgoe 2009, Barnes & Cotterell 2012), positioning it in a subordinate position to researchers’ and practitioners’ knowledge. Furthermore, lay knowledge is sometimes conceptualised as a different kind of knowledge, making it unclear whether and how it should be used along with scientific knowledge (Cotterell & Morris 2011, 58–62).

Second, Borkman’s way to define experiential knowledge as something else than ‘isolated, unorganised bits of facts and feelings upon which a person has not reflected’ (Borkman 1976, 446) has, in recent studies, been pinpointed as one of the ways to delineate appropriate forms of knowledge in public discussion. The rejection of feelings and personal views in favour of objective and general knowledge has been shown to cause problems of exclusion in initiatives that claim to incorporate experience-based knowledge, but can, in essence, end up curbing and limiting its manifestations in public (e.g. Lehoux, Daudelin & Abelson 2012, Richard-Ferroudji 2011, Meriluoto 2018b).

Finally, Borkman’s view on experiential knowledge as ‘more or less representative’ or others’ similar experiences has been questioned – both in terms of whether experiential knowledge can be representative, as well as whether it should be in order to be utilisable in policy-making (Martin 2008a, 2008b, Saward 2009, Warren 2009, Lehoux, Daudelin & Abelson 2012).

If experiential knowledge – especially its functions and position towards other forms of knowledge – seems like a debated concept, the general notion of ‘knowledge’ in policy-making is equally ambiguous. In fact, as Cairney (2016) persuasively summarises, every part of the concept of evidence-based policymaking is equivocal and, moreover, an object of political struggle. If evidence is ‘an argument or assertion backed up by information’ (Cairney 2016, 3), your resident Foucauldian will tell you that the definitions of what constitutes ‘information’ or
‘knowledge’ are already, and fundamentally, sites of power and critique (Foucault 2007, Foucault et al. 1980). Furthermore, following Cairney, it is no less complicated to define a policy, the process of making it and the status where it is considered to be ‘backed up’ by science (also Freeman & Sturdy 2014, Boswell 2009). Is it enough to listen to the experts, or do they need to be actively involved in drafting the policy? Who are the experts in each case? What is the form of input expected of them? Furthermore, as Boswell succinctly puts it, the role of knowledge in policy-making is most often ‘symbolic rather than substantive’ (2009, 7–8); knowledge is used as a means to increase legitimacy, build authority and credibility, rather than as an actual input in the policy-making process.

In the Finnish social policy context, the role of knowledge in policy-making has undergone a significant change in the 2000s. From an overview of the strategy documents of the Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH), it becomes rapidly evident how the term knowledge has gone from being almost non-existent in 2001,10 to ‘knowledge-based decision-making’ being elevated to one of the strategy’s subtitles and thus becoming one of the key objectives of the strategy-period in 2011 (MSAH 2011).11 Curiously, the authors have opted for the term ‘knowledge-based’ rather than ‘evidence-based’ or ‘science-based’, which hints that the resource for the most applicable and relevant knowledge may also exist elsewhere than among the research community.

Experiential knowledge is defined in a more detailed manner in projects that implemented the MSAH strategies. The function of experiential knowledge in these policy documents is well summarised in the following quote from a guidebook12 that outlines practices that incorporate experience-based expertise as well as guidelines for its future use:

An expert-by-experience brings the genuine experiences of people in vulnerable positions and facing welfare risks to complement the professionals’ knowledge. Different experiences and needs concerning, for example, the sufficiency, efficacy and quality of services is crucial to be voiced, so that the services can be developed in a customer-led manner.

(Kostiainen et al. 2014, 4, emphasis added. Translation by the author)

What, then, happens when these ‘genuine experiences’ are brought in to ‘complement’ other experts’ knowledge? Furthermore, what are considered ‘genuine experiences’, and when are they evaluated as ‘complementing’ others’ knowledge? How are experiences compatible with knowledge, and what happens to them when they are invited around the same table with other forms of expertise?

In this thesis, I am not looking to examine or characterise experiential knowledge as a ‘real’ form of knowledge that exists ‘out there’ (cf. Collins & Ev-

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ans 2002, Collins & Evans 2007). Instead, I am very much interested in looking at what is done with and through the concept of experiential knowledge. More specifically, I want to look at how experiential knowledge is constructed, how these definitions are made to appear rational and what is attempted and achieved through these definitions. What kind of participation becomes possible through the redefinitions of knowledge and expertise? Next, I will consider two possible interpretations of the effects of reconfiguring participants as experts.

1.3 Democratisation of expertise?

The optimistic view of the effects of the introduction of new forms of knowledge and expertise is termed here following, e.g. Helga Nowotny (2003) and Frank Fischer (2009) as ‘the democratisation of expertise’. This interpretation perceives the new conceptualisations of expertise as an imaginative attempt to overcome the dichotomy of experts and citizens (Dewey 1994) and renegotiate who should have the right to take part in public governance. The introduction of lay experts is seen as one means of ‘deepening democracy’ (Fung & Wright 2001) and thus enabling more people to have a direct impact on issues that concern them. The newly drawn connections between the different experts are represented as being equal and inclusive, which is in contrast to the hierarchical organisation and power discrepancies of traditional practices of governing (Sterling 2005, Martin 2011, 913, for a critique, see Davies 2012).

Indeed, prior research has noted how these projects actively use democratic rhetoric to justify the need for increased public participation, claiming to ‘open up the administration’ or ‘give a voice to the people’ (Bevir 2006, Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, 4-5, Eriksson 2012, for examples, see e.g. Barber 2003, G. Smith 2009, Fung 2006). This reframes experience and presents it as an increasingly powerful source of authority (Blencowe, Brigstocke & Dawney 2013, 4, Demszky & Nassehi 2012, 172). Experience, the optimistic interpretation states, is now regarded an equally valuable source of expertise in participatory governance. Participatory arrangements, such as deliberative forums and consensus conferences, rely and build on the participants’ lay expertise to make decisions on a variety of complex matters (Strassheim 2015, 326). Subsequently, through the active involvement of citizens as experts, public governance is to become more participative, more inclusive and, as some would argue, more democratic as public administration would now need to take into account a variety of stakeholders’ views in governance processes (Blanco 2015, Martin 2011, Martin 2009).

How, then, should we interpret this ethos of participatory governance, with its aim to democratis e expertise from the point of view of democracy? While it certainly does seem to contribute to the democratisation of the notion of expertise, lending it generously to ‘all relevant stakeholders’, do these practices actually contribute also to more democratic decision-making? The proponents of deliberative democracy seem optimistic. They perceive participatory processes as a means to facilitate reasoned deliberation between all parties concerned, hence
contributing to better justified political decisions (esp. Fishkin 2009, also Norval 2014, Grönlund, Bächtiger & Setälä 2014). Moreover, through rational debate, an equally important aim is to shape participants’ attitudes, alleviate differences and foster understanding and a sense of belonging among the citizens. By encouraging people to participate, empowered and consequently healthier, more reliable and more co-operative citizens are to be constructed (Lister 2002, 39, Gaventa & Barrett 2012, Perälä 2015).

Indeed, one of the key functions of democratising the notion of expertise is to use the concept as a tool of empowerment (e.g. Healy 2000, 29–30, Randall & Munro 2010, 1495, Närhi 2004, 54–55). Expertise as a notion lifts them above the public into a new sphere of discussion among experts (Richard-Ferroudji 2011). Volona Rabeharisoa, Tiago Moreira and Madeleine Akrich (2014) even suggest that through the reworking of the notion of expertise, service users and patient organisations have been able to craft new, collective identities for themselves and to impact governance networks from within through ‘evidence-based activism’.

However, a dilemma remains. Even though the participatory initiatives seem to indeed have democratised the uses and the notion of expertise, its content is another story. As noted, service users’ knowledge is often regarded as an alternative form of knowledge, implying that ‘first knowledge’ remains situated elsewhere. This makes it possible to evaluate service users’ knowledge vis-à-vis scientific knowledge criteria (Barnes & Cotterell 2012, xxi, Healy 2000, 40–42). Furthermore, it has been noted that the participants are often invited to take part based on their experience-based knowledge but are required to transcend their personal views when actually engaging in activities of participatory governance in order for their participation to be considered legitimate (e.g. Lehoux, Daudelin & Abelson 2012, Neveu 2011, 151, Richard-Ferroudji 2011). Frank Fischer points to this contradiction by stating that in participatory arrangements ‘on one hand, everyone’s voice is equally valuable, while on the other, reliable knowledge is the domain of an exclusive community with certain skills and capabilities’ (Fischer 2003, 205). In other words, even though most seemingly everyone is now called an expert, everyone’s expertise is not treated equally, and the dominant paradigm of knowledge remains unchallenged. I will explore this discussion further in the following section.

1.4 Expertisation of democracy?

While the above described democratisation of expertise might seem like a relief for those of us worried about citizens’ decreasing possibilities for political action, some previous research has suggested that these initiatives contribute in the opposite direction, i.e. to the expertisation of democracy (Liberatore & Funtowicz 2003, Strassheim 2015). By engaging their participants as experts, the participatory schemes have the potential to define and choose their participants based on their epistemic contributions and the level of (appropriate) expertise they possess (Martin 2008a, M. Berger & Charles 2014, 10–11, Strassheim 2015, Meriluoto 2018a).
Here, the citizens’ right to participate stems from their ability to produce reliable and relevant input for the decision-making process, instead of, for example, from their right to be heard or right to be included (see Strassheim 2015, cf. Young 2000).

Earlier research has suggested that this expertisation of civic participation can further deepen democratic inequalities, as the citizens who are able to formulate their demands by tapping into the ‘appropriate’ – neutral, objective and technocratic – form and rhetoric of knowledge (Barnes 2008, Lehoux, Daudelin & Abelson 2012, Martin 2012b, Meriluoto 2018b), are most often the ones who possess a wealth of resources, already recognised forms of knowledge and expertise, and who want to use them in co-operation with the administration (Bang 2010, 2005, Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015). Henrik Bang (2010) calls them expert citizens – and their voice is already heard in decision-making.

Subsequently, as has also been pointed out in a rather critical tone, public participation continues to develop in an elite-driven manner. Despite efforts to make new democratic innovations equally accessible to everyone, and to identify and tackle the factors of exclusion (economic compensation for the loss of time, childcare etc.), participatory innovations have, to a large extent, failed to engage the least well-off (Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015, Stalsburg & Ryfe 2012, Luhtakallio & Mustranta 2017). Instead, effective civic participation seems to continue to require significant resources and abilities from the citizens, suggesting that in order for their input to gain recognition in policy-making, citizens need to be able to operate using similar rhetoric and similar forms of expertise as in traditional, techno-bureaucratic models of policy-making (also Cotterell & Morris 2011, 69).

Expertisation has been dubbed as being one of the key practices of depoliticisation in ‘post-democratic’ societies (Li 2007c, 7, Swyngedouw 2011, Rose 1999, 192, Blühdorn 2014). By employing technical vocabulary, identifying problems in technical terms and emphasising knowledge over values, discussions can be re-framed from political debates into administrative discussions where best decisions are reached not through opinion-based debate but through information-based management (e.g. Swyngedouw 2005, 1994). Earlier empirical research has suggested that this emphasis can serve to steer the participants towards collaboration and dialogue by making critical voices and strong personal attachments and agendas appear as unfitting (for an expert) (Martin 2012b, 2009, Beresford 2002, Richard-Ferroudji 2011). Instead of offering the participants sites for contestations or even conflict, the participatory governance taps into its participants’ will to cooperate for the ‘common good’, urging them to surmount their personal viewpoints to assume a more general outlook (Barnes 2008, Barnes, Newman & Sullivan 2006, Lehoux, Daudelin & Abelson 2012, Richard-Ferroudji 2011, Baiocchi & Gauzera 2017, 17). Expertise, within this frame, equals the ability to provide technocratic, neutral and objective, knowledge-based arguments (Meriluoto 2018a, Martin 2008a) in ‘co-governing’ specific (pre-defined) issues (Warren 2009).

The depoliticising tendency of participatory governance has not gone unnoticed in service user involvement studies either. Previous studies have suggested that by introducing the talk of networks and partnerships, current user involvement schemes can be geared to co-opt the user-groups’ experience-based
knowledge (Barnes & Cotterell 2012, Martin 2012c, Fox, Ward & O’Rourke 2005), hence limiting their possibilities to voice criticism and act as advocates for their members (Beresford 2002, 96, Noorani 2013, 50–51, Barnes, Newman & Sullivan 2007). Many service user involvement schemes have reported on their disappointment in the public engagement initiatives on the grounds that despite their inclusive promise, the participatory innovations have not been ready nor equipped to recognise and incorporate different forms of knowledge and expertise (Yiannoullou 2012, Cowden & Singh 2007, Smith-Merry 2012, 37). The most critical commentators have suspected that some service user involvement schemes are targeted at constructing co-operative and self-sufficient social welfare users, rather than seeking any true input from them (Fox, Ward & O’Rourke 2005, A. Wilson & Beresford 2000).

This consensus-oriented partnership-building has been identified as ‘post-democratic’, as it strongly relies on participatory practices that ‘simulate democracy’ (Blühdorn 2013, 28–29), while ignoring the actual input produced. In a post-democratic constellation, as critiques suggest, possibilities for political participation are increasingly watered down and replaced with technocratic expert-contributions to achieve, above all, an efficient and well-functioning economy (Swyngedouw 2009, J. Wilson & Swyngedouw 2014, Larner 2014). Peculiarly, participatory practices may be promoted more sternly than ever, but their scope and nature is narrowed so that they do not risk promoting people’s possibilities to influence decision-making (e.g. Polletta 2014). It has been interpreted that within initiatives of ‘invited participation’, elected officials, the administration and professionals are in practice reluctant to let go of their possibilities to use power (e.g. Wagenaar 2014, 224). This results in ‘grand spectacles of public participation’ that, in fact, make it easier to carry on making decisions in the back rooms ‘unscrutinized and unchallenged’ (Polletta 2016, 234). Edward T. Walker, Michael McQuarrie and Caroline W. Lee (2015, 7) label these forms of activation as ‘new public participation’, emphasising how they are elite-driven, seek to channel lay citizens’ voices to serve the elite’s interests, aim at collaboration and rallying up support for the elite’s authority and prioritise ‘the collective wisdom of assembled publics’ over traditional forms of expertise.

A common interpretive frame for such simulative forms of democratic participation is a governmental outlook, which suggests that participatory innovations are, above all, targeted at governing the people who participate (e.g. Cruikshank 1999, 68–69, Miller & Rose 2008, 98–107, Lister 2002, Beresford 2002, Barnes 2008, Charles 2016, Martin 2012a). The governmentality interpretation posits that through participative initiatives, people are made to ‘govern themselves in appropriate ways’ (Newman & Clarke 2009, 23) – to construct themselves as certain kinds of (self-reliant and active) subjects (Walker, McQuarrie & Lee 2015, Gourgues, Rui & Topçu 2013, Bevir 2006). The governmentality critique suggests that the rationale behind increased participation does not draw its justifications from either emancipatory or epistemic outcomes of participation but has instead become ‘part of the planning power itself’ (Baiocchi & Gauza 2017, 4).
This allusion to the instrumentalisation of participation (Fischer 2009, loc. 946) suggests that participatory measures are symptomatic of a strategy to pacify the citizens in the interests of the governing elites (also Blaug 2002). Fischer describes them in Foucauldian terms as ‘a technology used to manage decision processes and control projects in ways that constrain popular engagement and discipline citizens’ (ibid.). This critique, I argue, is particularly salient in Finland, where the local initiatives of expertise-by-experience have all been top-down processes. As no civic activism, calling for the inclusion of service users’ local knowledge, is to be found behind the initiatives, the Finnish initiatives easily appear as governmental devices to facilitate participation in a manner that best serves the administration’s interests.

From a governmentality perspective, then, the expertisation of democracy can take place on two levels. First, it refers to the creation of epistemic thresholds for participation that need to be surpassed in order to claim the right for a voice in political decision-making. This makes the definitions of knowledge and expertise apt tools in delineating who gets to participate and how. Second, and in part through the former process, expertisation of democracy can also be symptomatic of a broader development, namely the instrumentalisation of participation, where the democratic innovations as a whole are turned into tools of governing, which are geared towards funnelling and domesticating the participants’ input.

This research departs from an observation of the expertisation of participation and investigates it with the tools of governmentality research. Instead of merely identifying the initiatives as governmental tools to steer their participants’ way of being, this research focuses on the how-questions – or on the first level of expertisation of democracy. It asks how the participatory initiatives turn their participants into experts, how the notion of expertise gets used and redefined and how the initiatives’ participants respond to these techniques of expert-making. Hence, the concepts of knowledge and expertise take centre stage as key sites of political struggle and venues for democracy in-the-making (Blencowe, Brigstocke & Dawney 2013, 4, Demszky & Nassehi 2012, 172, Smith-Merry 2012, Barnes 2009). In the increasingly governmentalised democracy, the questions concerning who gets to participate in the definitions of knowledge, whose knowledge is recognised and how the notion of knowledge can be redefined, transcend the dichotomy of administration and politics, making the battles of knowledge and expertise key sites for the actualisation of the possibilities of democracy.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This compilation dissertation is composed of the following four original research articles. The articles are numbered by their date of publication in print:

(1) Meriluoto, Taina. 2016. Mitä kokemusasiantuntijat edustavat? – Analyysi edustamisen politiikoista osallistamishankkeissa. [What do experts-by-


(4) Meriluoto, Taina. 2018c. ‘The will to not be empowered (according to your rules)’ – Resistance in Finnish participatory social policy. *Critical Social Policy* [online first].

In article 1, I focus on the construction of experts-by-experience’s subjectivities with the help of conceptual tools from representation studies. I ask what the experts-by-experience are positioned as representing, who makes such ‘representative claims’ (Saward 2009) and what might account for the conflicting representation-constructions. The article illustrates how the experts-by-experience are presented either as experts of neutral and collective knowledge or as advocates for the interests of a marginalised group.

The tension between neutral experts and passionate advocates in the representative claims made would later appear, in one form or another, in all my future analysis, regardless of the conceptual tools adopted to illustrate the experts-by-experience’s subject-making. And, indeed, it later made its way into the title of article 2. I came to interpret the coexisting demands for neutral and objective knowledge and passionate, ‘raw’ and authentic interest mediation, as being revelatory of the multiple underlying rationales of participatory governance. On the one hand, the reason for increased participation was to acquire as much relevant information as possible for evidence-based decision-making. Following this rationale, reliable and representative knowledge that is easily incorporated into policy-discussions appears logically as the appropriate type of input. On the other hand, participation was also encouraged for its democratic value; as a means to increase equal possibilities for participation. Here participation is seen as a right and as having a value of its own, hence disregarding the technocratic criteria of validity and the reliability of the participants’ knowledge and valuing instead their inputs as personal expressions of opinions, values even emotions.

The exploration of these conflicting rationales became the focal point of article 2, where I investigated how the notion of expertise is understood in projects developing expertise-by-experience and how the different expert-constructions are made to appear as legitimate. I made use of the conceptual tools of sociology of engagements, based on the work of Laurent Thévenot, to illustrate how different definitions of expertise are used to steer the participants’ way of being and how these definitions appear valid only within a specific frame of justifying civic

The article unveiled three, partially contradicting justifications for increased civic participation: rehabilitation, co-production and the exercise of civic rights, which then translate into seeing expertise either as a universal quality or as specific, technocratic knowledge. Finally, I argue that the participants’ expertise comes to be defined as the ability to ‘projectify oneself’ according to the projects’ specific objectives, making the evaluation and selection of participants possible.

Article 3 takes a closer look at this process of projectifying oneself and investigates it as a process of self-government. The article’s focus is on discerning the participants’ possibilities for freedom in their self-construction. By making use of Michel Foucault’s conceptual tools of care of the self and confession, I illustrate how, contrary to the projects’ emancipatory promise of providing the service users the freedom to reconstruct themselves, the projects entail practices that curb the participants’ way of ‘knowing themselves’. I argue that the projects require the participants to reframe their raw experiences as neutral and objective knowledge by making alternative ways of knowing appear irrational and hence easily discountable. Empowerment and well-being are presented as synonyms for self-control, perceived through a neutral and consensual manner of speaking. The ability to meet the projects’ demands of correct conduct is considered as a sign of progress, discrediting and devaluing other possible forms of participation and ways of knowing. Despite the initiatives’ promise of incorporating different forms of knowledge, the participants are in practice required to realign their way of knowing with the dominant knowledge paradigm in order to be accepted as participants.

As articles 2 and 3 revealed the intricate uses of the notions of knowledge and expertise in governing the participants’ possible ways of being, I wanted to explore these practices further from the point of view of resistance. Article 4 then asks what practices of resistance the techniques of participatory governmentality incur. Building on the analysis of articles 2 and 3, it focuses especially on the redefinitions and critique of the notions of knowledge and truth.

In article 4, I adopt what Carl Death calls a counter-conducts approach (2016) as my lens to scrutinise the grassroots-level negotiations, alterations and ‘ways of being differently’ that the participatory projects’ members employ. I use Foucault’s notion of parrhesia (parrêsia) to illustrate both the position crafted for experts-by-experience as those speaking ‘truth to power’ (Foucault 2008, 2009, 2004b, see also Dyrberg 2016, Luxon 2008, Cadman 2010, A. I. Davidson 2011), as well as their manner of stretching the limits of what can and should be acknowledge as truth (Cadman 2010, 551, also A. I. Davidson 2011, Death 2016). I illustrate how the participants largely view their alleged position as truth-tellers as a form of what I term ‘governed resistance’ that only allows critique until a certain point. In turn, I also argue that parrhesia as a manner of speaking the truth frankly and at all costs can be employed as a tool of counter-conduct to construct alternative ways of being for the participants. By taking up the initiatives’
promise of treating them as truth-tellers, the participants successfully contest the boundaries of what can and should be considered ‘the truth’ in the initiatives. Through parrhesiastic speech, the participants strengthen their connection to their own version of the truth and exemplify the primacy of their experience-based knowledge as a basis for their subject-construction. Parrhesia, then, serves as their means of being (conceived of) otherwise and as a tool to politicise the notion of ‘telling the truth about oneself’ in the projects’ context.

In this summary article I tie the articles’ findings together by assessing them through a critical democratic lens (see Blaug 2002, Norval 2014, Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014). I re-interpret the subjectivities crafted and the practices identified by using the conceptual tools provided by critical democratic theory, focusing particularly on the de- and re-politicising potentials that these projects entail, the possibilities of conflict and critique enabled and the egalitarian values drawn upon and advanced. I examine to what extent and under what conditions the practices identified can be interpreted to close down possibilities for participation by limiting the scope of issues discussed, the possible ways to participate or the pool of participants accepted. In turn, I also pay attention to the instances that enable opening up room for new issues, new ways and new participants to take part. Through these questions, I interpret how practices of participatory innovations might sustain democracy, and how they in turn can undermine and challenge it. The broader aim of this thesis, then, is to investigate participatory initiatives’ contribution to the democratic project and to consider what analytical tools might be of use in such evaluation.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: In section 2, I will describe my conceptual tools, borrowed from the late works of Michel Foucault, as well as from pragmatic sociology literature. Section 3 presents my methodological choices, my data and includes a discussion on my research position along with my ethical considerations. Section 4 summarises the key findings of my original articles. Section 5 discusses these findings in light of critical democratic theory.
2 CONCEPTUAL TOOLS: FOUCAULT ON SUBJECTIVATION

The critique of instrumentalising participation to create specific kinds of participants builds on the Foucauldian notion of governmentality, which combines the ‘top-down’ governing practices with the inner processes where one steers one’s behaviour to meet certain criteria or expectations (Foucault 1994, 785; Gourgues, Rui & Topçu 2013, 23–24; Dean 1995, 563). In this section, I will provide a brief description of the concepts that I employ as my analytical devices. I will first introduce Foucault’s views on power and governing, as well as the widely employed and varyingly interpreted notion of governmentality. Second, I will present Foucault’s notions of subjectivity and subjectivation, moving hence towards more concrete practices through which liberal forms of governing are enacted. Third, I will connect the practices of subjectivation with Foucault’s concepts of truth-telling and knowledge of the self. Fourth, I will discuss his conceptualisation of resistance as counter-conduct before ending with how the Foucauldian analytical tools can be brought into discussion with tools from pragmatic sociology in empirical analysis.

2.1 Governmentality

To govern means to act on the actions of subjects who retain the capacity to act otherwise. (Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983, 220)

Foucault’s concept of governmentality may be one of the most analysed and interpreted notions among present-day social scientists (see, e.g. Bevir 2010b, Brockling, Krasmann & Lemke 2011, Burchell, Gordon & Miller 1991, M. Dean 2010, Li 2007a, Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, Walters 2012). One of the reasons for its popularity may very well lie in its ambiguity. The term is used both to refer to practices of governing, as well as to ‘the art’ or the rationality – a way of
thinking about and reasoning governing (Foucault, Senellart & Burchell 2008, 2, Brady 2014).

Upon its first introduction in his lecture series entitled Sécurité, Territoire, Population at Collège de France in 1977–1978, Foucault provided three meanings for the term governmentality (Foucault 2004b, 111–113): First, he used it to refer to the combination of institutions, practices, analysis, calculations and tactics that allow the use of a complex form of power that is targeted at the life of the population. Second, he used it to denote a new way of ruling in the Western societies that had taken pre-eminence over other forms, such as domination. This, he later elaborated, meant a variety of activities that attempted to steer, direct and lead people’s actions, behaviour and way of being (e.g. Rose 1999, 3). Third, by the term, he historicised the modern state and developed the idea of ‘a governmentalised state’ that has come forth as a result of the development of the administrative state in the modern era (Foucault 2004b, 111–113, see also Walters 2012, 11–13, Lövbrand & Stripple 2015, 95–97, Brady 2016, loc. 284–295).

Perhaps the most prominent way to use the term in contemporary social sciences is to use it as a synonym for Foucault’s catchphrase ‘the conduct of conduct’, which is used to refer to a specific way of governing (see Li 2007a, 275). Foucault traced its roots to the Christian pastoral power, whose dynamics of governing he explains by using the Christian metaphor of a shepherd and his herd. The role of the shepherd, i.e. those who govern, is to steer the sheep gently and benevolently along the right path and towards a good life (Foucault 2004b, 130–134). Governing, as the conduct of conduct, works through subtle techniques of suggestions, advice and encouragement, ‘structuring the possible field of action of others’ (Foucault 1982, 789–790, also M. Dean 1999, 12, Li 2007a, 275) in order to subtly steer people’s behaviour towards an aspired way of being.

This manner of governing through subtle and indirect techniques became popular under the liberal politico-economic rationale, which called for the state to draw back (or ‘laissez-faire’) and rely excessively on the individuals’ and free processes’ ability to govern themselves (Foucault 2004b, 49–50). This ‘liberal art of governing’ (Foucault, Senellart & Burchell 2008, 51) emerged as a critique to excessive government and is distinct from direct means of rule such as domination or coercion (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, 84). Its key characteristic was that it operated on free individuals and through this freedom.

However, governmentality as a concept does not only refer to specific practices of governing. Instead, Foucault presented it as an analytical field that combines the rationalities, logics, objectives and tactics of governing (Foucault, Senellart & Burchell 2008, 186). It concerns the will to govern, the ways to rationalise that will and its ensuing practices, the principles and knowledges drawn upon, the problematisations provided to justify the governing practices and the actual tactics used to govern (Foucault 1982, 792, Li 2007a, 275–276, Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, 84).

A central feature of Foucault’s understanding of governmentality is specifically the entanglement of rationalisations and ruling (e.g. Foucault, Senellart & Burchell 2008, 311–313, Lemke 2002, 54–55). Governmentality entails the idea that
power and ruling operate on certain ways of thinking and knowing that concern
the objectives, reasons, targets and ways of governing. They are rationalised prac-
tices, geared to shape conduct in relation to certain objectives (Rose 1999, 4). Fou-
cault’s genealogical approach was targeted precisely at historicising contempo-
rary ways of understanding that appear to us as the only possible or rational lines
of thought. Instead, Foucault wanted to show the contingency of contemporary
forms of knowledge, rationality and truth and sought to illuminate how ways of
ruling are connected to certain ways of rationalising and certain conceptions of
knowledge (Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, 84, Lövbrand & Stripple 2015, 94,
Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983, 210). The concept steers the analytical focus
towards technologies that attempt to rationalise certain policies and practices of
ruling; specifically ones that are directed at constructing subjectivities such as ‘a
welfare beneficiary’ or ‘a survivor’ (Bevir & Gains 2011, 451). This interconnect-
edness of knowledge and the governing of subjects is further elaborated on in
section 2.3.

Conceiving power and rule in this manner signified somewhat of a shift in
Foucault’s thinking. Mark G. E. Kelly (2009) argues that from late 1970s Fou-
cault’s focus in discerning and understanding power changed in two important
ways. First, he became increasingly interested in power at the individual level
(ibid., 59). Lövstrand and Stripple (2015, 97) note: ‘The governmentality concept
introduced a new dimension to Foucault’s power analysis that allows him to
study the co-evolution of modern statehood and modern subjectivity: the macro-
political techniques of rule and the micro-physical “technologies of the self”’. The
focus of the study of power thus shifted towards governing individuals, even at
the level of people’s relations with themselves (Foucault 2004a, 252, M. G. E.
Kelly 2009, 63, Cremonesi et al. 2016b, 8), and started to emphasise the plurality
of the sites and actions in which power becomes manifest (Foucault 1982, 786–789,
M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 69). I will discuss this novel approach to governing as subjec-
tivation in the next section.

Second, the notion of governmentality entailed – or furthermore necessitat-
ed – the freedom of those being governed (M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 64, Rose, O’Malley
& Valverde 2006, 90–91). Compared to the mechanisms of power Foucault had
described in his earlier work which operated, for example, through practices of
discipline, this new logic of ruling perceived of governing as acting upon the ac-
tions of free individuals who could subsequently always choose to act differently
(M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 38, Cremonesi et al. 2016b, 2). This steered the analytical
gaze towards practices that work on the wills of individuals, encouraging them
to wilfully steer and moderate their own actions and ways of being (Foucault
2012, 226, 2004b, 205, Brady 2014, 19). This emphasised the role of rationalisations
and knowledge-claims in governing. It also allowed Foucault to consider the pos-
sibility of ‘counter-conduct’ (Foucault 2004b, 205) – of ‘being otherwise’. This is
discussed in section 2.4.

Foucault’s idea of power as power relations (e.g. Foucault 1982, 789), or
even ‘a game between relative equals’ (M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 64), has understanda-
bly been a compelling approach for scholars trying to understand power in net-
work governance arrangements (Brady 2014, 18). For the study on participatory governance more specifically, the idea of power as being exercised at the same time on and through free individuals (see Foucault 1982, 780–782) has been compelling. The participatory repertoire is filled with techniques that seek to activate or empower, providing a concrete toolkit for the participants to become engaged in their own governing (see also Newman 2005, 122, Gourgues, Rui & Topçu 2013, 12). The idea of power as working through the individual’s own will to moderate their actions seems to be particularly tangible in participatory arrangements that rely heavily on the active role of those governed and that take the reshaping of the governed as one of their primary tools of governing. They operate through enticing, defining and enabling participation and by steering the participants towards a certain kind of participation – an activated, participating subject (e.g. Cruikshank 1999, 68–69, Charles 2016, loc. 28, Gourgues, Rui & Topçu 2013, 23–24, Baiocchi & Ganuza 2017, 7). Guillaume Gourgues, Sandrine Rui and Sezin Topçu (ibid., 23) refer to participation as ‘the anchoring point of modern governmentality’.

Often, the analytics of governmentality have placed themselves as studies on (neo)liberal rationalities, as this was the governmental rationality Foucault was trying to make sense of (e.g. Foucault, Senellart & Burchell 2008, 22). These studies, have, however, enticed well-founded criticism that an analytics of governmentality is merely interested in identifying a neo-liberal plot underlying all contemporary practices of rule (Brady 2014, 14, Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, 97–98). As an increasing number of recent studies have begun to argue, Foucault’s shift towards the idea of governmentality also enables moving from the assumption of one rationality of rule towards multiple rationalities and forms of governing, which are assembled to work in conjunction but which may also conflict with each other (Brady 2014, Collier 2009, McKee 2009). Instead of one dominant rationality that would both explain and directly translate to all contemporary governing practices, governmentality can also be conceived of as an evolving and deliberately constructed assemblage of ruling that entertains multiple rationalities and translates to diverse, even conflicting governing practices (Brady 2016, loc. 491). This use of governmentality as an interpretive tool is discussed further in section 3.

In this thesis, it is the interplay between rationales of government and the grassroots-level technologies of the self that interest me. I follow Foucault’s idea of governing as structuring the possible fields of action of others, particularly through influencing their self-making. By adopting the notion of governmentality, I in turn draw my attention to the repertoires of knowledge and language that make governing perceivable and serve as tools in making governing appear reasonable and feasible. I perceive the participatory practices as assembling multiple rationales of government under one participatory hubris; participation is made to appear as a solution to a variety of problems, and it can be made to appear as a reasonable response to a variety of societal issues (Newman & Clarke 2009, 138–139). It becomes, at the same time, a tool of governing individuals and an aim to
aspire towards that can potentially be aligned with many different ways of reasoning.

Finally, a short caveat is in order. A brief description of Foucault’s concepts might very well be one of the biggest tasks a social scientist can face, since Foucault himself very rarely provided his readers or listeners with specific definitions of his concepts. Instead, he developed them in different directions throughout his body of work using his genealogical method, which draws extensively on historical texts. Furthermore, he did not consider his studies to form theories of power. On the contrary, he explicitly pointed out on several occasions (e.g. Foucault 1982, 777, Foucault 1994, 451) that he does not attempt to formulate a theory of power, to analyse it or to elaborate foundations for such analysis. Consequently, Foucault’s historical concepts should not be applied as theoretical models applicable as such to explain forms of present-day governance. Instead, their applicability lies in their heuristic value to ‘enhance the “think-ability”’ and the “criticize-ability”’ of the practices identified (Walters 2012, 5, also Lövbrand & Stripple 2015). Instead of providing monolithic and all-encompassing explanations of what characterises power, they provide tools to make sense of the situated practices by providing examples of how power operates.

2.2 Subjectivity and technologies of the self

Par subjectivité, j’entends le mode de rapport de soi à soi.

(Foucault 2012, 221)

The notions of subjectivity, subjectivation and technologies of the self constitute the core of Foucault’s work in the 1980s (Lorenzini 2016a, 71). As he continued to investigate practices of governing, he contended that it is in forms of subjectivation – in how human beings are made subjects – that present-day forms of power operate (Foucault 2004b, 187–188, see also M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 87–89, Revel 2016, 165, Allen 2011). Subjectivity is the central venue where power struggles in contemporary societies become manifest and become both the object and tool of government (Foucault 2007, 154, Cadman 2010).

Mark G.E. Kelly (2013) has traced the notion of subjectivity in Foucault’s work and has had to admit that, characteristically for Foucault, there is no one explanation nor a definition of what he meant by this central concept. However, Kelly has identified five key elements of subjectivity: 1) it is something constituted; 2) more specifically, it constitutes itself; 3) it is something that is ‘ontologically distinct from the body’; and 4) nonetheless it is a form, not a substance. Finally, it is constituted through practices (M. G. E. Kelly 2013, 511–512). Here, I conceive of subjectivity as one’s construction of and relationship to the self, constituted and made visible at the intersection of norms, expectations, governing practices and the responses they invite concerning one’s way of being.
Foucault coined the term *subjectivation* to refer to the processes where one constructs oneself as a subject in relation to the expectations and suggestions upon this self-construction from the individual’s surroundings. According to Foucault (1994, 718–719), subjectivity is created in the processes that are directed at the individual to define them and in the relationship that they form with regard to that definition (also M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 100–101, Ball & Olmedo 2013, 87). The notion of governmentality is, hence, inextricably linked with the concept of subjectivity and its construction. A person constructs themselves as a subject through pondering their relationship with shared truths, norms and ways of knowing that are used to steer their way of being (Foucault 1994, 723–728, 783–785); for example, by positioning themselves vis-à-vis the instructions, suggestions and ideals presented to them as being for instance ‘normal’, ‘good’, ‘sane’ or ‘efficient’ (Miller & Rose 2008, 55, le Blanc 2016, 133).

Foucault deliberately used the term subjectivation, instead of *subjection*, because he wanted to emphasise the active role of the individual whose subjectivity is being worked upon (M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 87–88, A. I. Davidson 2016, 57–59). As Daniele Lorenzini explains, subjectivation entails a reactive moment where the individual interprets and responds to the mechanisms that attempt to govern their way of being and a creative moment where one practices freedom in constructing oneself differently as a subject (Lorenzini 2016a, 71, Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, 7). It is a well-suited concept for the purposes of this research, as it allows seeing the subject at the same time as instruments, objects and agents of conduct (Binkley & Cruikshank 2016, 5).

Foucault introduced the notion of *technologies of the self* to investigate more thoroughly the processes through which one constitutes a relationship to oneself, that is, constructs oneself as a subject (Foucault 1994, 785, also Gourgues, Rui & Topçu 2013, 23–24, Faubion 2014, 5–6, Cremonesi et al. 2016a, 8). This activity of self-government (esp. Foucault 2009, see also Foucault 1986, M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 99–102) entails two core aspects: knowing oneself and cultivating one’s self that require ‘steering the subject’s gaze inward’ (Foucault 2004a, 254–256, Fornet-Betancourt, Becker & Gomez-Müller 1987, 116–117). Through them, one is thought to establish an active relationship towards oneself (P. Kelly 2013). Judith Revel argues that a shift in emphasis from subjectivity towards subjectivation and technologies of the self is a crucial one, as it ‘displaces the discourse from being to making’, and places focus on the practices of self-making (Revel 2016, 164). This shift allows seeing subjectivity as an assemblage, drawing from different rationales, truth-regimes and norms, and being constantly under reconstruction. Consequently, the formation of subjectivities should be investigated as an interplay between practices of governing and technologies of the self – the processes where the conducts are being conducted through subtle direction and suggestion, such as definitions and descriptions of norms and values, as well as the processes where the conditions under which one is deemed to know oneself are being defined (Foucault 1994, 785).

Finally, for the purposes of this research, the tension between the potential to govern people’s way of being in participatory processes and the simultaneous
possibilities to resist and ‘be differently’ are of particular interest. The practices of
governing through self-making, crucially, require active participation from their
participants. The people engaged in these practices need to be willing to actively
work on themselves, ‘get to know themselves’, share this knowledge of them-
selves and engage in its critical examination and cultivation (see Foucault 2012,
the practices that invite people to such a reworking of their subjectivities? How
can these processes limit the participants’ freedom, and how in turn might they
enable contesting the demands for their subjectivities? To investigate these ques-
tions concretely, the interconnectedness of knowledge, truth-regimes and gov-
erning needs to be further illustrated.

2.3 Truth, knowledge and the subject

In his 1979–1980 lecture series, entitled ‘Du gouvernement des vivants’, Foucault
started to focus on the interplay between (self)government, knowledge and truth.
He argued that the government of the selves – the construction of subjects and
their possibilities for being – takes place through ‘regimes of truth’; the condi-
tions under which it becomes possible to consider certain things to be ‘true’, and
the practices and institutions that define what is considered the truth (Foucault
Rose 1999, 8). Subsequently, the definitions of truth and knowledge become
powerful tools in delineating possible ways of being for people, and reversely,
opening up new possibilities of being becomes possible through redefinitions of
knowledge (Foucault 2007, 190, Death 2016, Cadman 2010).

More precisely, Foucault focused on how ‘government by the truth’ oper-
ates at the individual level of subjectivation (Lorenzini 2016a, 66–69). If knowing
oneself is one of the two components of subjectivation, then the characteristics
and conditions for ‘knowing’ are understandably key sites where power is exer-
cised (see also A. I. Davidson 2016, 57). Foucault talks about ‘a critical ontology of
ourselves’ (Foucault 1997, 316), signalling that it is in these battles over what
counts as knowledge of us that ‘the immediate struggles over who we are’ (Fou-
cault 1982, 780–781) take place.

Through genealogical investigations, Foucault identified two distinct ways
that modes of self-making or ‘practices of subjectivity’ can be connected to re-
gimes of truth (Foucault 2004a, 10, also Iftode 2013, Lorenzini 2016a, 66–74): the
Christian ‘hermeneutics of the self’, and the pre-Christian ‘care of the self’. Their
key difference is their positions towards the subject’s freedom. Care of the self
regarded self-construction as a practice of freedom and conceived it as first and
foremost an ethical practice to create one’s own truth (Foucault 2012, 232–234,
2004a, 132–133, see also M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 100–102, Lorenzini 2016b, 66–69).
Foucault used the term to illustrate a manner of self-making that enabled the sub-
jects to be ‘artists of their own lives’ (O’Leary 2006, 121), to construct themselves
free from externally defined norms (Iftode 2013, 82). The Christian hermeneutics
of the self, in turn, require revealing and evaluating oneself according to norms ‘from above’; transforming oneself by adhering to this outside moral paradigm (Foucault 2004b, 186–187, 2012, 220–221, 2004a, 186–187, also M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 94). Subsequently, it takes up the process of self-making as a governmental device to curb and steer ways of being (Foucault 1982). The question is, then, whether the truth about oneself is something that resides outside the subject and that one needs to ‘learn’ or whether it is something that one can create themselves (see also Cadman 2010, 553).

Lorenzini (2016a, 67–71) takes up Foucault’s discussion about the Christian practice of confession to illustrate how truth-telling of oneself can be used as a tool of governing. As Foucault argues, the whole business of modern ‘confessional sciences’, such as psychiatry and psychoanalysis, expects the individual to reveal the truth about themselves in order to be healed. As he puts it, ‘a postulate which is generally accepted in Western societies is that one needs for his own salvation to know as exactly as possible who he is and also […] that he needs to tell it as explicitly as possible to some other people’ (Foucault 2007, 148). As Lorenzini notes, the purpose of these practices of truth-telling is to require the individual ‘to tell the truth about themselves in order for a certain mechanism of power to govern them’ (Lorenzini 2016a, 70–71). Foucault posits that the governmental power necessitates that the administration knows the governed through-and-through (Foucault 1982, 783, also L. Siisiäinen 2016, 315). Governing, by definition, is a way of ruling that requires and operates through knowledge concerning the governed. It requires a confession-like character where people are made to reveal their innermost secrets so that effective and meaningful strategies of governing can be conceived (Foucault 1982, 783).

At the same time, that knowledge is used as a tool in people’s self-government to offer the contours for their process of knowing themselves (M. G. E. Kelly 2013, 518). As an example, several previous studies have explored how contemporary welfare practices steer the ways people ‘discover themselves’ as well cultivate this discovery. Leila Dawney (2011, 547) uses the 12-step programme, used for example among AA-groups, as an example to illustrate governing practices that steer how a person gets to know and ‘develop’ oneself require sharing one’s experiences as a story and working on them for a new, improved self to emerge (also Pollack 2010, McFalls & Pandolfi 2014, 173–174). They provide criteria for how one is to get to know oneself and how this stage of knowing oneself manifests to others. These practices are vividly clear in trainings organised for experts-by-experience, which entail lessons on how to ‘rearrange one’s story’ and practice lectures focused on learning ‘the appropriate way’ to tell this story to others. Fox, Ward and O’Rourke (2005, 1307) summarise by calling the role of an expert-patient a ‘double-edged sword’: ‘it is to be empowered to manage one’s health and illness, but to adopt this power from a dominant disciplinary system of thought’.

Foucault’s argument that the conceptions of what constitutes knowledge and what is considered rational or reasonable are contingent and as such fundamentally political is crucial for my research. It opens up an avenue to consider
the definitions of reliable knowledge or rational argument as forms of governing, which echoes a dominant discourse and suppresses alternative ways of speaking and knowing (see Young 2000, Sullivan 2014, 191). This governing potential is further intensified when the knowledge in question is the people’s ways of knowing themselves.

The practices of subjectivation, as Foucault continues to argue, produce and require certain types of knowledge that in the West ‘tend to be organised around forms and norms that are more or less scientific’ (Foucault 2007, 151). This bind between scientific knowledge and truth makes it both possible to conceive of people’s ways of knowing themselves within the scientific knowledge paradigm and, crucially, to envisage that someone’s knowledge of themselves is ‘untrue’ and subsequently needs to be and ought to be corrected (Rose 1999, 9, M. G. E. Kelly 2013, 520). Knowledge of the human sciences has come to displace the truth of the Christian religion, but the requirement to know and govern oneself in accordance to elsewhere defined truths, along with the subsequent governing potential of defining what can be true, is unaltered.

What makes the enmeshed character of knowledge and self-government a particularly compelling framework for interpretation for my study is the initiatives’ explicit play on the concept of expertise. Because the substance of the participants’ knowledge, in this context, is the knower themselves, the definitions of what is considered legitimate and credible knowledge in policy-making comes to directly define what is considered ‘the truth’ about them – when they are considered to be capable of representing ‘a true version of themselves’. The very essence of expertise-by-experience is their talk about themselves, evaluated and reconfigured through varying conceptions of knowledge and truth. This means that the understanding of knowledge in policy-making, as well as the knowledge of the self required of the participants, becomes entangled in a particularly explicit manner. Hence, whether the truth is something that exists within the expertise-by-experience or is something that needs to be aspired towards appears to be a central object of struggle.

To better grasp the struggles that take place in the different definitions of knowledge, Foucault’s notion of subjugated knowledge is a useful point of entry. Foucault defines subjugated knowledge as ‘a whole set of knowledges that are either hidden behind more dominant knowledges but can be revealed by critique or have been explicitly disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’ (Foucault et al. 1980, 82). By the notion of subjugated knowledge, Foucault points not only to the primacy of scientific knowledge in contemporary governing arrangements but also to the contingency of such a setting. There are other forms of knowledge and possible ways of knowing that exist in parallel, and they are occasionally able to challenge the dominant paradigm of knowledge. Here, I am interested in how different ways of knowing oneself are prioritised. How, and under what conditions, can one’s experiential knowledge of oneself be subjugated? And reversely, how can alter-
native ways of knowing oneself become tools in challenging pre-existing understanding of knowledge in policy?

2.4 Resistance and critique

If governing takes place as attempts to define the possible forms of being for an individual, resistance takes shape as the myriad of techniques to resist conducting one’s own conduct within a certain regime of truth – as a means to ‘be differently’ (Foucault 2007, 190, Death 2016, Cadman 2010). For the purposes of this research, I am specifically interested in how the notion of truth and knowledge of oneself is used in attempts to construct oneself differently. Here, Foucault’s concepts of counter-conduct and parrhesia are useful.

When elucidating his thinking on resistance, Foucault came to use the term counter-conduct (contre-conduit) (Foucault 2004b, 204–205). He coined the concept to refer to ways of behaving differently from the conduct suggested as appropriate, beneficial or ideal by those who govern (Foucault 1982, 788–789). As his famous quotation goes, it is a compilation of means of ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them’ (Foucault 2007, 44, cited in Odysseos, Death & Malmvig 2016, 153). The purpose of counter-conduct is to stretch the limits of one’s freedom by contesting the mechanisms that attempt to limit and steer one’s possibilities for being (Lorenzini 2016b, 10). If assuming a subjectivity is to perform according to the rules and expectations set for this particular subjectivity (e.g. of a good participant), counter-conduct signifies the acts that deliberately challenge these rules and by so doing seek to render them contestable. Ruth Lister has termed this ‘the ability to act as a critical citizen’ (Lister 2003, 7).

For my research, two characteristics of the idea of counter-conduct are of particular significance. First, as Foucault specified, counter-conduct was ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’ (Foucault 2007, 45), or an attempt to govern oneself differently (Lorenzini 2016b, 11). This means that counter-conduct also entailed more fine-tuned and subtle ways to work with and in line with governing techniques, instead of understanding resistance as a will to ‘not being governed at all’ (Lorenzini 2016b, 13, Death 2016). As Louisa Cadman (2010, 553) notes, counter-conduct points towards the multitude of ways of ‘being differently’ that are not easily explained through a dichotomous view of self-government as either succumbing to the normalising process of self-making or refusing every aspect of such a process as part of one’s self. Counter-conduct, then, takes place also at the micro-scale, in everyday negotiations, reformulations and means to act and be differently (Death 2010, 238, Death 2016). It is better conceived of as a means to stretch the limits of what appears possible, instead of standing blatantly against those who govern (Foucault 1982, 781, Cadman 2010, 549). Subsequently, the concept enables understanding as political a variety of situations that entail
debate about the limits of what is possible and rational, instead of merely focusing on analysing institutions where power is exercised.

Second, counter-conduct is, by definition, critique through action. It is a means of contesting ways and furthermore rationales of governing by being critically (e.g. L. Siisiäinen 2016). Counter-conductive practices open up ways to think and act otherwise by bringing forth and questioning the regime of truth through which people are engaged as objects and subjects of government (Foucault 2007, 190, Cadman 2010, 550, Death 2016). In the context of participatory arrangements, this can for example mean that people take an active part in the participatory processes, but while doing so they may strategically behave differently in order to question the limits set for their participation and the thinking underlying these limits.

In the lectures series of 1982–1983 and 1984, Foucault explored at length one particular practice that explicitly operated on contesting understandings of what is to be conceived as true. This is the practice of parrhesia referring to a way of speaking from ‘below’ (Foucault 2008, 98, see also Dyrberg 2016, Foucault & Pearson 1983, A. I. Davidson 2011). The Greek concept, Foucault explains, refers to saying it all (tout-dire), truth-telling (dire-vrai) and speaking frankly (franc-parler) (Foucault 2008, 71). It means both the contents of truth, as well as a manner of saying it bluntly, frankly and risking everything (ibid. 56–60, also Dyrberg 2016, 269). Moreover, it is the counter discourse of the weak that points out the injustices performed by those who govern (ibid., 63–67, 126–130). It can, thus, be regarded as a tool of counter-conduct, seeking to critique and destabilise the ways in which our conduct is being conducted (L. Siisiäinen 2016, 316).

Nancy Luxon (2008) explains that in parrhesiastic relationships, the expressions of the varied, personal truths as opposed to commonly agreed upon set of values are able to manifest. They can then be viewed as speech-acts that challenge the dominant discourses or norms presented as self-evident (see also Cadman 2010, 551). It would be easy to assume that parrhesia – a way of speaking based on alternative, ‘raw and pure’ ways of knowing in order to keep those who govern in check – would be precisely what is expected of experts-by-experience.

At the same time, the concept of parrhesia serves to make sense of how the experts-by-experience’s alternative ways of knowing themselves can be used as a critical practice. Foucault explains that parrhesia signifies being fiercely, adamantly and fearlessly connected to one’s own perception of truth and maintaining it at all costs (Foucault 2008, 63–67, Luxon 2008, Flynn 1994, 103). For my purposes, it is particularly well-suited to illustrate how knowledge, a certain manner of speaking and the experts-by-experience’s subjectivity are intertwined in the participatory initiatives’ techniques of governing and resistance. Because the experts-by-experience are both the objects of knowledge and agents of truth-telling (see Flynn 1994, 106), their way of speaking truth about themselves can serve both as a means of governing their way of being, as well as a means of being differently. The participants’ ‘unacceptable’ forms of speech are one manner through which they attempt to stretch the limits of their knowledge of themselves and, as such, the limits set for their way of being (also Cadman 2010, 551,
A. I. Davidson 2011, Death 2016, 214). I perceive these subversive ways of speaking as the experts-by-experience’s means to resist the subjectivity suggested by telling their truth in their own terms. Here, alternative knowledge becomes a tool in their subversive self-making.

In my analysis, following critical theory, I liken Foucault’s ideas of critical practices to practices of politicisation. Critique, in this view, works by contesting and redefining concepts and meanings in order to question the paradigm of knowledge through which people are being governed. This makes it possible to redefine the terms of political debate, to claim room for new actors, new issues and new ways to engage (Foucault 1997, 32, Bevir 2011, Rancière 2011, Genel 2016, for an example, see Li 2007c). Jacques Rancière, for example, has labelled practices similar to parrhesiastic speech as ‘disruptive performances’ that seek to destabilise the police order that attempts to define what is sayable, doable and visible – what ‘speech is understood as discourse and what as noise’ (Rancière 1999, 29–31). For Rancière, the essence of the political is in the possibility to reconfigure political spaces. Through questioning what appears logical and self-evident, also social positions and the capacities to act connected to them become contestable (Genel 2016, 11). This, in my understanding, comes very close to the Foucauldian idea of criticism as practice working towards questioning the limits of what can be imagined as reasonable, feasible and true.

The ways in which the experts-by-experience tell the story of their lives, then, takes centre stage both when analysing practices of governing and practices of resistance. The significance of defining when the experts-by-experience ‘know themselves’ or are capable of sharing ‘knowledge’ on themselves becomes evident when looked at through a Foucauldian framework. These initiatives are particularly explicit with their practices that attempt to influence the participants’ subjectivities. Furthermore, they operate specifically with the concept of knowledge and expertise, making the potential to govern through their definition tangible. At the same time, the actions of the participants who engage in these projects but do not behave according to plan are best understood as forms of counter-conduct. Through these unaccepted ways of speaking, the participants operate within the governing practices but attempt to illuminate and critique these practices, as well as the ways of reasoning that underpins them. By so doing, they make use of the governing practices in ways that open up spaces for them to redefine the rules of the game (O’Toole & Gale 2014, 203). These are the two practices that are at play in the process of subjectivation and that are the focus of this research: the practices of governing the participants’ way of being, and the ‘practices of freedom’ that seek to critique and politicise the governing practices (Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, 8).

2.5 Repertoires of rationalisation

While Foucault’s concepts provide a useful toolkit for analysing the techniques and practices of governing, and their connectedness to specific ways of rationali-
sation, a further analysis of these processes and conditions of rationalisation benefit from an engagement with sociological literature, in particular pragmatic sociology. Decidedly, the interconnected process of governing, self-making and resistance does not happen in a vacuum. Instead, how a certain practice of governing can be made to appear rational is a profoundly contextual question; one shaped by the culturally available repertoire of what is (readily) presentable as just, fair, logical and rational (also Eliasoph & Lichterman 2010, 483–484).

Pragmatic sociology is interested in the ‘practical reasoning’ individuals use when evaluating and defending action (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, Silber 2003, 429). It investigates the interconnectedness of individuals’ processes of reasoning and justifying and the macro-cultural framework that structures these processes. Its particular focus is, then, on the use of values, regimes of justification and other ‘moral contents’; how actors draw on these shared repertoires to make their actions intelligible to others (Silber 2003, 432, Blokker 2011, Luhtakallio 2010, 35). Instead of perceiving this relationship between repertoires of justification and action as deterministic, pragmatic sociology approaches it through a tension: an individual is both seen capable of critically evaluating these repertoires, strategically move between them and reconfiguring them through action, while at the same time being constrained by one’s cultural repertoire and situational context that makes some actions, meaning-makings and justifications (more) available (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, Silber 2003, 430).

Concretely, these repertoires are an assemblage of moral evaluations, ways of framing, ways of talking and ways of meaning-making. In studying practices of democracy, Eeva Luhtakallio has evoked Ann Swindler’s (1986) notion of a toolkit when describing the combination of discursive strategies, interpretative repertoires, skills, habits and cultural standards actors can (and have to) draw on when designing their actions and when acting (see also Eranti 2016, 17–23). Luhtakallio (2010, 227) has further emphasised how these tools are also the object of constant reworking and contestation, not just static resources to be used and stored in one’s cultural toolbox.

For the purposes of present research, how one chooses and uses a certain tool, in this case, a particular way of understanding and performing as an expert, is of particular interest. Crucially departing from Bourdieus’s critical sociology, pragmatic sociology seeks to understand actors’ reasons and justifications for acting in a certain manner from the disposition of the situation in which they act, not from within the actor themselves in terms of their social positions or habitus (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, Blokker 2011). Laurent Thévenot, one of the main initiators of a pragmatic sociological approach, has termed these situational coordinations that shape how a person’s actions in any given situation are valued and evaluated and how these contours then shape and steer one’s ‘coordination of oneself’ (Thévenot, 2014c, 2016, 9). Julien Charles, who has applied the approach to studying participation, concretises this nicely: ‘Participation does not mean doing whatever, however, with whomever you want.’ Instead, Charles continues, it requires participating in a manner that ‘the participative dispositive is ready to receive’ (Charles 2016, loc. 28).
In practice, these situational coordinations have been analysed through different conceptual tools. Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman (2003) have developed the notion of group styles and, more recently, scene styles (Lichterman & Eliasoph 2014) that offer actors the contours of possible, appropriate ways of talking and behaving in a certain context. Julien Talpin (2011, 67–72) develops Thévenot’s and Luc Boltanski’s work further and speaks about grammars, in particular of a participatory grammar, as implicit social norms that shape the aspired role of the citizen. Thévenot (2014a) has written about governing through objectives, pointing to how participatory projects all evaluate – and subsequently steer – civic participation according to their specific, value-laden objectives. Marie Leth Meilvang and colleagues (2018) investigate formats of participation in urban planning as composition devices that condition participation.

In this work, pragmatic sociology helps me to root the results of my governmental analysis. While the main focus of my work is on identifying the subjectivities created through participatory practices, as well as the techniques of governing, rationalising and resisting employed at a more abstract level, pragmatic sociology roots these practices in context. As a governmental analysis seeks to explain how we are governed and our subjectivities constructed, pragmatic sociology helps to understand how these specific tools and ways of rationalisation have become (more) available in this particular context.

Concretely, I consider the situational coordinates – styles, grammars, formats and the like – to embody the norms, expectations and valuations of ‘good participation’ in relation to which the participants construct themselves (see also Thévenot 2014c). If the situation within which an expert-by-experience participates values rehabilitation above anything else, the rational-appearing demands for their participation are entirely different than if the object of highest value would be to acquire specific, formal knowledge through their participation. These situational coordinations for one’s behaviour also serve as the object to resist and renew through counter-conductive practices. This process can best be understood through the concept of politicisation. Nina Eliasoph (2018), for example, has put forward that the critique of scene-styles, i.e. of the demands set for one’s way of being, should be conceived of as a moment of politicisation. There is a clear parallel to Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct as a way to behave in a manner that stretches and questions the norms set for one’s behaviour.

To analyse these situational coordinations and their significance for rendering practices of governing rational, my analysis focuses mostly on the emergences and appearances of norms for preferred ways of talking and performing as an expert that shaped the experts-by-experience’s participation, and the practices my informants employed to illuminate and contest these norms. In article 2, I look at different regimes of engagement – different ways and logics of being together – from a governmental perspective as normative fields of action in which the initiatives’ participants are called to take part. Each regime of engagement holds particular, underlying value-assessments, which become manifest through different ‘grammars’, i.e. different valued ways of speaking and relating to each other (also Thévenot 2014c). These valued ways of speaking, I suggest, can be
regarded as governing practices, structuring the participants’ subjectivities (see also Charles 2016, Thévenot 2014a). Here, pragmatic sociology provides a bridge between the analysis of rationalities of governing and the concrete practices used.

In article 1, I also make use of Michael Saward’s (2009) concept of a representative claim to probe the reasoning behind the construction of the experts-by-experience’s subjectivities. Saward’s notion suggests that representation is, above all, a position constructed through claims and can subsequently be studied as speech acts or performances that construct both the representatives and the represented in a specific way (e.g. Ankersmit 2002, 196–197, Näström 2011, 506). The concept of representation serves here as a tool for creating, not describing, representative relations. By studying the making of experts-by-experience’s subjectivities through the idea of claim-making, it becomes possible to ask both as what the experts-by-experience are being constructed and how this subject-construction is justified and defended. Hence, it provides another concept to investigate how the bridge between rationalities and practices of governing is constructed.
3 METHODOLOGY: GOVERNMENTAL ETHNOGRAPHY

Recently, the governmentality-approach has been criticised for its excessive interest in abstract rationalities, policy documents and the aspirations of the administration. It has been argued that many governmental studies pay little or no attention to concrete practices of governing and hence remain blind to the gap between ‘what is attempted and what is accomplished’ (McKee 2009, 478–479, also Brady 2011, Teghtsoonian 2016, Li 2007c).

My purpose in the following is to develop methods of policy ethnography by applying Foucault’s governmentality-approach. First, I will present governmentality as an analytical strategy. Next, I will bring forth the criticism the governmentality-attuned studies have received and discuss how proponents of governmental-ethnography have suggested to answer these concerns. After having set my methodological scene, I will move towards the concrete and present my methods of data collection and analysis along with reflections on my position as a researcher.

3.1 Governmentality as an analytical strategy

When departing from the Foucauldian premise of power, not as a zero-sum game, but as a ubiquitous ‘capacity to act’, there is little point in aiming to determine who ‘holds power’ in a given situation. Instead, the focus of analysis shifts to ‘asking the how-questions’: How – through which techniques and practices – power is exercised and how it is responded to and reacted on (see Teghtsoonian 2016, Lövbrand & Stripple 2015, Foucault 2007, 1982). A governmental analysis concentrates on the mentalities and ways of reasoning that underlie certain strategies and techniques of governing (Bröckling, Krasmann & Lemke 2011, 11, Li 2007a, Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006). It can, for example, focus on the ways on which problems are formulated in order for certain techniques to appear legitimate, or on knowledge-constructions that enable certain technologies of governing.
Furthermore, a distinct feature of a governmental study is its particular focus on knowledge and language as constructive and responsive of the practices of governing (Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, 8). As has been noted above, governing takes place through definitions of knowledge. They make reality perceivable and conceivable and, as such, construct it in specific ways (M. Dean 2015). As Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke (2011, 11) note, in a governmental study, ‘rationality is understood in relational terms, meaning that what is considered “rational” depends on the particular starting points, means and objectives set for each practice’. Consequently, it becomes extremely important to pay attention to local contexts, governing practices and situated meanings, especially with regard to how those practices are made to appear as rational, in line with the pragmatic sociological approach. By focusing on the ways of reasoning behind practices of rule, governmentality analysis makes ways of ruling more visible and discernible, but it also denaturalises them and opens them up for criticism (Walters & Haahr 2005, 6, Larner 2006, 52).

However, governmentality as an analytical strategy does not come with an elaborate methodological toolkit. Instead, as Bröckling, Krasmann and Lemke (2011, 15) put it, it is ‘a research perspective in a literal sense: an angle of view, a manner of looking, a specific orientation’ (also Rose, O'Malley & Valverde 2006, 101). In essence, one could state that while governmentality provides the researcher with what to look for, it does not come with a way to find it. As a result, governmentality studies have employed a variety of research methods – also to a varying degree. At times, a governmental study is coupled with a distinct, separate methodological toolkit (e.g. Brady 2011), while sometimes governmentality seems to be understood both as a theoretical approach as well as a manner of reading and, as such, a tool of analysis (see Lövbrand & Stripple 2015). In this thesis, I combine governmentality as an analytical approach with ethnographic methods of policy analysis.

3.2 Bridging policy ethnography and governmentality

Recently, much debate has been going on as to what methodological choices can be considered fitting for a governmentality approach. Most notably, the role of practices of governing and their study has generated heated debate among governmentality scholars (see, e.g. M. Dean 2015, Brady 2014). Li formulates the discussion diplomatically as she explains that while the focus of a governmentality study is justifiably in the rationalities and mentalities of governing, its focus on a limited set of practices might occlude some aspects that are also central for governing – in particular, the interplay of governing practices and the responses of those being governed (Li 2007b, also Brady 2011, 266).

As a solution for this lack of ‘real life’, and to illuminate this blind spot between mentalities and practices of rule, some researchers have suggested the governmentality approach be combined with ethnographic methods (Teghtsoonian 2016, McKee 2009, Li 2007c, Marston & McDonald 2006, Brady...
The proponents of governmentality-ethnography argue that through this combination, a governmentality analysis can steer its focus towards practices of governing, instead of relying merely on texts and ‘mentality of rule’. Instead of viewing governing practices as manifestations of a governing rationality, they are seen as sites where rationalities of governing are ‘made real’ and redefined through local debates. This combination has also received criticism, maintaining that such focus was not Foucault’s intention when he set out to study ‘not the complexity of everyday life but the conditions under which we form a knowledge of and seek to govern such domains as everyday life’ (M. Dean 2015, 359). In this section, I discuss what the mode of analysis is that arises from a combination of governmentality and ethnographic methodology, and propose also a way of combining the two in a complementing manner.

According to Paul Atkinson and colleagues (2001, 4–6), the central, distinguishing factor of an ethnographic study is the researcher’s own experiences – her observations and participation on and in the phenomenon studied. While the set of methodological tools is extremely varied, ‘being neck deep’ in a research context is what distinguishes an ethnographic study from other qualitative and interpretive forms of inquiry (Schatz 2009, 5, also van Hulst 2008, 145). In addition, Edward Schatz (2009, 6) couples the requirement of first-hand observations with a demand for ‘ethnographic sensibility’. An ethnographic scholar must be interested in and committed to making visible people’s own, situated meaning-givings, and the rationales and contexts that make these meaning-givings and perceptions rational and feasible (also van Hulst 2008, 147). This requires an interpretivist approach as well as a social-constructionist epistemological stance; a researcher cannot ‘go out in the field’ to discover ‘the truth’ and then return to their desk to write it up. As there is not one truth to be discovered, but everyone’s particular and momentary interpretation, a researcher can at best describe the settings, the interactions and people’s views and interpretations on them, followed by a detailed description of their own process of observation, interaction and interpretation (Dubois 2015, 473). To do so, the researcher needs not only to understand how someone else interprets a given situation, but they also need to acquire the tools necessary for analysing what affects and might account for such ways of thinking and seeing (Pader 2006, 165). A critical ethnographer, furthermore, strives to question definitions, practices and views that appear to us as ‘normal’ or ‘common-sense’ and sets out to unveil the hidden uses of power that surreptitiously hinder or limit people’s possibilities for action (Dubois 2015, 478, Howarth & Griggs 2015, 117).

Michelle Brady (2014, 12) argues that the governmentality scholars ‘exclusive reliance on archival sources and publically available documents’ would be much enriched and enforced by ethnographic methods, incorporating observation of everyday life, interviews and the collection of documents on the ground to

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13 It has even been suggested that all governmental studies have an ethnographic underpinning, as the core of Foucault’s thinking can be seen as the deconstruction of our contemporary societies’ ways of governing that appear to us as ‘normal’ or unquestionable (Lövbrand & Stripple 2015).
a governmentality analysis (also Teghtsoonian 2016). Brady suggests that ethnography can provide a remedy for the governmentality studies’ lack of attention to multiplicity and context: ‘Because these governmentality inspired ethnographies focus on actual people located within a specific place over a period of time, the researchers are thrust into the multiplicity and dynamics of everyday social life. In turn this gives these researchers greater insights into the multiplicity of power relations and practices within the present, as well as the actual processes through which subjectivities are formed’ (Brady 2014, 13). Ethnographic governmentality studies do not contend to merely describe the rationality of governing on which, for example, the participatory projects rely, but they push further (or downward) to see how these rationalities are turned into practical technologies to steer participants’ behaviour and how the participants respond to these technologies (also McKee 2009, 473–474).

The core difference between traditional and ethnographic governmentality studies, then, appears in their focal points: while traditional governmentality studies are interested in governing rationalities and the discursive ways certain objectives and ways of being are made to appear rational, a governmentality ethnography takes a bottom-up perspective and asks how the rationalities are made practical and how they are interpreted, perceived and responded to and resisted (Brady 2011, Marston & McDonald 2006, McKee 2009, Li 2007a). Kim McKee argues that this bottom-up perspective helps to preclude the attribution of a false coherence to political rationalities and programmes of governing, and instead it reveals their ‘messiness’, situatedness, struggles and multiple possible consequences (McKee 2009, 478–479). As Brady notes: ‘Governmentality studies informed by ethnographic analysis seeks to understand what happens when plans to govern meet the processes and subjects they seek to transform’ (Brady 2011, 267).

While remaining aware of the critique towards this combination (see esp. M. Dean 2015), I choose to follow the example of Brady, McKee and others in seeing governmentality and ethnography as complementary rather than mutually exclusive approaches (see also Hacking 2004, Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006, 100). This combination, I posit, is particularly well suited in an examination of practices of subject-formation, as it allows paying attention to the possibilities of interpretation, adaptation and resistance of the governed (also McKee 2009, 479). My argument for bridging a governmentality approach with ethnographic methodology is that together they allow us to see how governmental rationalities are interpreted, made real and, in turn, reconfigured in grassroots-governing practices – pointing to how they are employed and made sense of in a specific context, by specific actors. This approach makes their critical study possible (see Denzin 2000).

By focusing on practices – and moreover how those practices are experienced and interpreted – I am able to investigate not only what the inexplicit objectives, political ambitions and situational coordinations guiding the practices are but also ‘the inevitable gap between what is attempted and what is accomplished’ (Li 2007c, 1). As the essence of liberal governmentality is the play on the
freedom of those governed (Foucault 1982), to merely investigate the policy documents would neglect the very essence of governing through individuals. This approach to the analysis of power justifiably emphasises the role of the party being governed and, again, the relational character of power.

Furthermore, an ethnographic approach to governmentality studies helps to approach governmentalities as deliberately enacted resources for making certain ways of thinking appear as logical and certain ways of being as preferable. By focusing on the practices and technologies that make governmental rationality alive, it is easier to avoid the deterministic undertone of some governmentality studies. Practices and techniques are not merely manifestations of a governmental rationality, but they are also deliberately and purposefully built assemblages that can draw aspects from multiple different rationales and, in turn, reconfigure their inner logic and truths. I maintain that governmentalities are themselves very much the contextually-bound result of deliberate political choices to value certain values and ways of knowing above others that are constantly remade, reinforced and reinvented through governing practices.

3.3 Data and research position

I produced my research data within the following seven projects. The projects were all government funded (either directly or via the Finnish Slot Machine Association), and they were executed either by civil society organisations (1–5) or municipalities (6 and 7). The projects worked within the area of adult social work, and following Julkunen and Heikkilä’s (2007, 97) distinction they focused on providing or developing problem-oriented services. Out of the seven key projects studied, six invited experts-by-experience to act in and through their own organisations, while one was focused on ‘producing’ experts-by-experience for the needs of other organisations in the social welfare sector. I have numbered the projects randomly.

(1) Finnish Central Association for Mental Health: The establishment of expertise-by-experience and evaluation-through-experience in the development of mental health and substance abuse services (2011–2015)

(2) The Federation of Mother and Child Homes and Shelters: Miina – The participation and empowerment of women who have encountered domestic violence (2008–2012)

(3) No Fixed Abode: The utilisation of expertise-by-experience in the design and production of services for the homeless (Own keys 2012-2015)
Muotiala Accommodation and Activity Centre Association: The project of preventive mental health work – experience-based knowledge about mental health issues for the working-age population (Turning experience into knowledge – project 2005-2009)

Sininauhaliitto ry: A low-threshold information and support centre for gambling problems (Tiltti 2010–2014)

City of Vantaa: Key to the Mind I and II (Mielen avain) projects for developing mental health and substance abuse services in Southern Finland (2010–2015)


In addition to the seven projects above, I interviewed practitioners in two other projects:

Youth Against Drugs: Expertise-by-experience in preventive substance abuse work

The Central Association of Carers in Finland and The National Family Association Promoting Mental Health in Finland: Customers and practitioners developing informal care (OPASTAVA)

Although the observations and conversations in projects 8 and 9 certainly supplement the data as they contribute to building my understanding of the phenomenon, these supplementary data are not analysed in the same detail as the core material listed below. This is primarily due to the lack of interviews with experts-by-experience, which I was not able to conduct in either of the projects. The projects’ practitioners, although supportive of and interested in my research, felt that they were in such early stages of developing expertise-by-experience that there were ‘not yet really experts-by-experience to interview’. I did not contest their interpretation, as this would have led me to define who the experts-by-experience in their projects’ context were. I used the conversation material from these two projects as background information in article 1, but I chose to exclude it from the subsequent and more detailed analysis later on.

The projects were chosen initially following a search from the funders’ database and website to find projects that had received funding for the development of expertise-by-experience in the domain of adult social work during the funding period of 2012–2015. Following the database search, I contacted altogether seven projects, six of which agreed preliminarily to partake in my research
(projects 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 and 9). From there on, further data were produced through respondent-advised sampling (see. Heckathorn 1997 on respondent-driven sampling). Many of my interviewees proactively suggested other projects that I should include in my research and mentioned organisations that had influenced their work on expertise-by-experience. As a result of these suggestions, and the following contact with the projects’ employees, three other projects were included in the data (projects 4, 5 and 7). Muotiala’s project, in particular, was mentioned by several interviewees as the first to employ the concept and practice in Finland, and subsequently presented it as ‘a compulsory component’ in my research.

The organisational contexts of the projects differed from each other in terms of their size, organisational structure as well as the focus of their activities. Of the CSOs, the Finnish Central Association for Mental Health, The Federation of Mother and Child Homes and Shelters and Sininauhaliitto are all national umbrella organisations that have local branches and associations across Finland. The local associations of Federation of Mother and Child Homes and Shelters, as well as Sininauhaliitto, are also social welfare service providers in their area, while the Finnish Central Association for Mental Health focuses most of all on offering peer-support opportunities, trainings and serving as an advocate for its member and member associations. No Fixed Abode is also a national organisation, but it does not have local branches and operates mainly in the capital region. It runs housing and low-thresholds services, but it focuses also strongly on advocacy. The Muotiala Accommodation and Activity Centre Association (now Mielen ry) is a local mental health organisation in Tampere, which also offers social housing services in the region. The three, large umbrella organisations can be considered as quite well established and institutionalised CSOs, while the latter two are younger and smaller.

The two municipalities, Tampere and Vantaa, have been somewhat pioneers in adopting the concept of expertise-by-experience. Vantaa’s project was in many ways the flagship of the KASTE-programme and was largely responsible for the wide and fast spreading of the concept of expertise-by-experience. It had significant financial resources (over 10M euros between 2010 and 2015), and although it was officially managed by the city of Vantaa, it involved organisations from 20 municipalities in Southern Finland (Falk et al. 2013). It focused on the area of mental health and was among the first projects to develop a training model for experts-by-experience. Tampere’s project, on its part, was equally a KASTE-funded project, which involved actors from 56 municipalities in Central-Finland (Final Report of the SOSII-project). When compared to the CSOs’ projects, the public sector projects appear more as networks of different subprojects and actors.

The core data corpus of the research produced in these contexts is presented in the following table:
Table 1 Description of data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data category</th>
<th>Description of data</th>
<th>Context of data production</th>
<th>Time of data acquisition</th>
<th>Uses of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic data</td>
<td>Field notes and memos</td>
<td>A CSO project(^{14}) and its working context; conferences, workshops and meetings</td>
<td>2011–2014</td>
<td>Building a thick understanding of the phenomenon and its related practices; identifying appropriate research questions and developing the research approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-produced images, memos, guidelines, presentations etc. defining and outlining expertise-by-experience</td>
<td>A CSO project’s process of developing expertise-by-experience</td>
<td>2012–2014</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Notes from discussions with practitioners</td>
<td>Projects 8 and 9</td>
<td>Spring 2014</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview data</td>
<td>Themed interviews with 23 experts-by-experience and 14 practitioners</td>
<td>Projects 1-7</td>
<td>2014–2015</td>
<td>Core data; close-read as illustrating how the governing practices took shape, were experienced and responded to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group discussion with five (six) experts-by-experience</td>
<td>A CSO project</td>
<td>November 2016</td>
<td>Core data; close-read as illustrating how the governing practices took shape, were experienced and responded to; also member checks for my interpretations and analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Background interviews with six public officials</td>
<td>Ministry of Social Welfare and Health, National Institute for Health and Welfare, Slot Machine Association, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities</td>
<td>Fall 2016</td>
<td>Building a thick understanding of the phenomenon; also member checks from public administration’s point of view for my interpretations and analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{14}\) For anonymity reasons, I have chosen not to identify the CSO I was employed in or the organisation where the group discussion was conducted. For further discussion, see section 3.3.4. Ethical considerations.
Next, I will present my data, and its uses in more detail. I start chronologically with my ethnographic data, followed the themed interviews and policy documents.

### 3.3.1 Ethnographic data

Marja Keränen (2001, 85) quotes Linda Hantrais’ terminology when describing different ethnographic methods of data acquisition and analysis. In what she calls ‘a safari method’, a researcher develops research questions beforehand, from and within her own cultural and societal context, and then (briefly) sets out to gather data to test her pre-formed assumptions. Eeva Luhtakallio (2012, 5–6) builds on Keränen’s and Hantrais’s vocabulary to describe her own research as the ‘traveler method’: subjecting every aspect of a comparative study to contextually aware scrutiny and paying particular attention to local meaning-givings. Following this playful and illuminating vocabulary, I describe my method of data acquisition as ‘the indigenous approach’ (see also Atkinson et al. 2001, 3). I was, quite literally, in the middle of the phenomenon that later appeared as the object of my study.

In practice, between 2011 and 2014, I was employed in one of the civil society organisations studied. A major part of my duties was the development of ‘participatory practices’. In a brainstorm meeting with practitioners from two of our local CSOs, a colleague introduced the notion of expertise-by-experience. I had never heard of the concept, but it energised the room instantaneously. There was
a feeling of novelty and excitement; this was going to be the new and innovative thing the project would leave behind (and the funder would be happy). After that meeting, it became my task to develop expertise-by-experience in the organisation. There were prior experiences of the practice in three of our local associations, so my initial response was to start working with the beneficiaries and practitioners that had already come across the topic. Together with them, we built our CSO’s version of expertise-by-experience. My objective was to take a facilitating role and let the experts-by-experience and the local practitioners define the concept and outline the practice from their point of view. Consequently, I took as my task to document the working process, as well as its outcomes, in order to provide a benchmark for our local associations on how to incorporate participatory practices in their work.

During my four years in the field, I was able to participate in and visit several locations where expertise-by-experience was developed and discussed, ranging from large conferences to one-on-one discussions with actors in the field. In addition to the CSO main quarters in Helsinki, I travelled to local associations in Oulu, Turku, Mikkeli and Joroinen, drank countless cups of tea and coffee while debating expertise-by-experience with local practitioners, listened to lectures delivered by experts-by-experience, painted ‘the landscape of expertise-by-experience’ with finger paint on all fours and went to the sauna with experts-by-experience.

Most crucially for the purposes of this research, I organised two weekend workshops for the CSO’s experts-by-experience in spring 2012. Their purpose was to outline how we would use the concept and how we would like our local practitioners to start developing it. Eight experts-by-experience and five practitioners (myself included) participated in these weekends. The data, connections and most of all the understanding produced during them were a crucial starting point for my research.

Overall, the material produced during the four-year period is extremely varied. In addition to my own notes (129 pages in total) produced in the context of meetings, training sessions and workshops related to expertise-by-experience, the ethnographic data comprise material that was co-produced with experts-by-experience and my colleagues in an attempt to define and make sense of expertise-by-experience. These data consist of textual data, illustrations, narratives, letters, diagrams, presentations and guidelines.

I treat these data differently according to the phase of their production. The primary focus of the workshops and meetings was to produce material in order to develop expertise-by-experience for the organisation’s purposes. My early notes reflect this objective, focusing most of all on attempting to capture and draw synthesis of what was discussed. These data cannot be ethically analysed as ethnographic material, as the participants of these processes (myself included) were not aware and thus had not given their consent for this research. They have, however, enabled me to build a deeper understanding of the phenomenon and develop my research questions that arise from the field (D. E. Smith 2005, Geertz 2000, Teghtsoonian 2016, Paechter 2013).
In fall 2013, a position for a doctoral candidate opened up at the University of Jyväskylä as part of the project Superdemocracy – Critical Assessment of the Participatory Turn. I applied for the position, and in October 2013 it was agreed that I would start working as a doctoral candidate in January 2015. During the interlude I was to continue working at the CSO and at the same time start collecting data as part of my work. At this point, I informed my own organisation about my research project and acquired written retrospective consent from the experts-by-experience and practitioners who had been part of the development workshops to use our collaboratively produced data in my research. However, due to my continued double-role, I treat these data as autoethnographic to gain a deep understanding of one process of developing expertise-by-experience as well as to develop an early operational understanding of the key practices through which how the concept was institutionalised from an idea into a practice.

It is vital to note that these data all originate from the context of one CSO and its local associations. As my position changed towards that of a researcher, I started conducting interviews to widen my pool of data and contextualise my autoethnographic material. I first invited all the participants of the workshop weekends as interviewees in order to learn how they had experienced and interpreted the process of ‘making experts’ I myself had been an active contributor in. I was able to interview five experts-by-experience and two practitioners. After these interviews, I reached out to other projects for interviews and meetings. These are discussed in more detail in the following section.

After my initial data production, I made an effort to stay in touch with my field. During the deskwork period (Yanow 2000, 84), I trained experts-by-experience, presented my initial findings and submitted them for discussion and feedback. In addition, I co-authored an article with one of my interviewees. For the article’s purposes, a group discussion among five experts-by-experience (six including my co-author) was organised on 30 November 2016 to discuss our initial analyses and findings. I developed the discussion themes with my co-author, but I was not present for the discussion, in order to facilitate an environment where the participants would feel free to criticise and contradict my initial analysis and interpretations. This discussion, then, also served the function of a member check (Schwartz-Shea 2006, 103–105) whose purpose was to both enhance the research’s accountability and respect for the interviewees’ own interpretations and meaning-givings (e.g. Shdaimah, Stahl & Schram 2011), as well as to provide them a possibility to object to my interpretations (Mosse, 939). In addition to improving the validity of the research, the purpose of my on-going ethnographic presence in the field was to ensure that I would investigate expertise-by-experience as a living, constantly evolving phenomenon.

The timeline of ethnographic and interview data production in correspondence to my position as a researcher is presented in Figure 2 below:

15 See a more thorough reflection on the researcher’s position in section 3.3.3.
Timeline of Data Production

- **2012**: First workshop on expertise-by-experience 17.-18.3.2012
- **2013**: Notes from in-house trainings, project meetings etc. 2013-2014
- **2013-2014**: Employment as a Doctoral Candidate 1.1.2015-4.6.2018
- **2014**: Second workshop on expertise-by-experience 5.-6.5.2012
- **2015**: Contract on future employment as a Doctoral Candidate Nov. 2013
- **2015-2016**: Local workshops in Joroinen, Oulu and Turku 10.2.-23.5.2014
- **2016**: Employment as a Doctoral Candidate 1.1.2015-4.6.2018
- **2016**: Group discussion 30.11.2016

Figure 2  Timeline of data production
3.3.2 Interviews and policy documents

I conducted themed interviews with experts-by-experience and practitioners charged with developing expertise-by-experience between 4.4.2014 and 16.10.2015. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. They were conducted in Finnish, and I translated the excerpts later into English. All of the 23 experts-by-experience were interviewed individually. The practitioners (14) were given a choice between individual and group interviews. Five opted for individual interviews, and nine chose to be interviewed with their colleagues (three in pairs and one group of three). The pair and group interviews can be regarded to complement the individual interview data, as they can also be interpreted as the organisation’s internal negotiations on the topic at hand (Pietilä 2010, 181–183). This openness to interview design can also be seen to follow good ethnographic practice, as the initiative for pair or group interviews always came from the interviewees themselves. Hence, this suggests that they wished for their interpretations to be studied in dialogue with their colleagues.

Fourteen (CSO) experts-by-experience’s interviews, as well as all but one of the practitioners’ interviews, were conducted on the organisations’ own premises. It is worthwhile to note that it was not possible to interview any of the public sector experts-by-experience in the environment they participated in. This can indicate a certain level of distance between the experts-by-experience and the public sector organisations. As a result, their interviews had to be organised in various different locations (my office, the library, a coffee shop, an interviewees’ home).

The interview material amounts to 31 hours, 20 minutes and 43 seconds of interview recordings. Transcribed, they compose a text material of 208 484 words. The interviewees are presented in the material with the abbreviations E1-23 for experts-by-experience and P1-14 for professionals. Some details have been omitted from the transcripts to ensure the interviewees’ anonymity.

The interviewees were either volunteers, paid professionals or ‘semi-professionals’ performing ‘paid gigs’ when invited. Their tasks varied from consulting in service production and projects steering committees, to service evaluation, training and peer-support. At the centre of all of these functions was making use of the experts-by-experience’s story and the resulting experiential knowledge. Eighteen of the informants were women and five men. Eight of the experts-by-experience were involved in a public sector project, and 15 participated in or through a CSO. Eight of the experts-by-experience were employed by the organisation, making their position a dual one: they were at the same time experts-by-experience and practitioners developing it.

The total number of experts-by-experience in these organisations is difficult to estimate, as the concept was (and deliberately was not) used in a variety of ways. While the organisations that trained their experts-by-experience were able to give very precise estimates about the number of their experts-by-experience, other organisations stated that they consider all their members, or all people having experienced the particular social problem in question, as experts-by-experience. So as to not risk the anonymity of my informants, I will not provide
the numbers of experts-by-experience in the organisations where this information is available, as this would enable identifying the organisations that train their experts-by-experience.

The experts-by-experience’s background information, as described by the interviewees themselves, is summarised in the following table.

Table 2 Background information of the interviewed experts-by-experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experts-by-experience</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>‘Paid gigs’</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The professionals, on their part, all worked in projects tasked with developing expertise-by-experience in their respective organisations. Twelve of the practitioners interviewed were women and two men. Their positions ranged from project employees to executive directors. Four of them worked in the public sector, and 10 were employed by a CSO.

I invited the interviewees to participate in the research by sending an open invitation e-mail for the organisations to forward to their group of experts-by-experience. I interviewed everyone who expressed their interest in being interviewed in order to minimise my own gatekeeper role in the interviewee selection. Two remarks are, however, in order: First, the significance of the gatekeeper function of the organisations needs to be considered. Even though the organisations were encouraged to send the invitation to all their contacts, it is possible, if not very likely, that they could have chosen particular experts-by-experience and encouraged them to participate in the research. Furthermore, the organisations have made a definition of expertise-by-experience when deciding to whom the invitation was sent to.

A second remark regarding the selection of interviewees is how well the experts-by-experience interviewed can be thought to represent the whole body of experts-by-experience subject to my research. It would be a fair enough assumption to claim that the experts-by-experience willing to participate in a study might be the ones that are either exceptionally active, particularly compliant to the organisations aims or both. On the other hand, one could however assume that it would be possible to present also critical points of view, as the interviews were confidential and conducted by an ‘outsider’ to the organisation. Though the latter assumption was empirically proven on various occasions during the interviews, I have to consider the possible bias produced by the selection of interviews when analysing the results. However, this need not present a problem for the research design, as the research question is precisely to examine the subjectivities created through the processes of expertise-by-experience. In this sense, the interviews can be interpreted as particular manifestations of the outcomes of
those processes, valuable in and of themselves, rather than as representatives of a ‘general trend’ or ‘a usual outcome’.

The interviews were themed and open-ended to ensure their regard to the interviewees’ own meaning-makings and ways of understanding, following the principles of good ethnographic research. Before each interview, I described to the interviewees the focus of my research, explained that I take a critical perspective towards the topic and told them that I had my own, prior experiences on the matter as a practitioner. As an interviewer, I made sure that some core aspects of expertise-by-experience were discussed with everyone, but I allowed the interviewees to talk rather freely and posed clarifying questions only when necessary. The core themes of the interviews focused on practices of expertise-by-experience: Why and how one had become an expert-by-experience, or why and how an organisation had started to adopt the practise. For example: What did the experts-by-experience do in practice? How were they chosen, trained and evaluated? In addition, I focused on meanings given to the practice: Why was expertise-by-experience important, or was it not important?

I conducted the interviews during a time when expertise-by-experience as a concept and practise had gained rapidly in popularity. Many of the interviewees were both very conscious and somewhat critical towards the notion. They were strikingly well informed on the other organisations and actors developing expertise-by-experience. Many organisations had exchanged experiences with other projects, but especially the CSO actors also presented criticism towards other projects’ approaches. It was quite common to define an organisation’s view on expertise-by-experience against another organisation’s definition. Of particular importance, which brought about some heated debates, were the role of trainings and the selection of experts-by-experience. The discussions on definitions were not the sole domain of practitioners. The experts-by-experience held strong positions in the debate, and in a good Finnish manner, some had even founded an association of experts-by-experience and promoted one particular view on expertise-by-experience.

I acquired the policy documents and other text material by contacting the relevant people in the projects organisations, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the National Institute for Health and Welfare, and I asked them to provide me with all their material on expertise-by-experience. The material acquisition was complemented by an Internet search to find any possible public material produced by these organisations on the subject. Without fail, the organisations provided me with a much more extensive set of material than that accessible through public databases. The policy documents analysed are listed in Appendix 3.

To enrich the administration’s view, I was also able to draw on two interviews with four representatives of funders (Ministry of Social Welfare and Health and The Slot Machine Association). I conducted these interviews in autumn 2016

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16 For a full list of interview themes for both experts-by-experience and practitioners, see Appendices 1 and 2.
17 See www.kokemusasiantuntija.fi
for another project but acquired the interviewees’ permission to use the transcribed interviews as supplementary data for this research. They helped to develop a thicker description of the phenomenon and served as member checks for the public administration’s point of view.

### 3.3.3 Researcher’s position

In interpretive research, consideration of the researcher’s own position is a crucial, although often under-reflected, topic (see Yanow 2015, 415). It is particularly vital in ethnographic studies where ‘the ethnographer’s self becomes a conduit of research and a primary vehicle of knowledge production’ (Shehata 2006, 246). The demand for reflecting on one’s normative premises is further enforced in critical research, where a researcher’s objective is to unearth structural inequalities and to speak on behalf of those often silenced (Dubois 2015, 469–473). My previous position as a practitioner in the field, and as a facilitator in many of the data production processes, further makes it necessary to reflect on the presumptions and precognition that steer my research in order to make my analysis trustworthy and transparent (Schwartz-Shea 2006, also R. Berger 2015, 221).

Roni Berger (2015, 220) lists three main major ways that the researcher’s position may impact their study: First, it can affect their access to the field. Second, it can have an impact on the nature of the relationship between the researcher and the researched. Third, it impacts the overall design and conduct of the study through the ways the researcher perceives the world, uses language and understands their surroundings. Building on these, the researcher chooses their point of view, the questions asked, the interpretations made and the consequences drawn (also Yanow 2006).

In my case, my own position as a practitioner was crucial for gaining access to the field. First, it is highly unlikely that I would have discovered the topic or made contact with the relevant informants had I not had personal experiences of working with the policy (Paechter 2013). Thanks to the contacts made during my time as a practitioner, it was far easier both to identify the key sites where expertise-by-experience was being discussed, as well as to contact the relevant people and persuade them to be part of the research. My prior experiences also appeared to make many of my interviewees more at ease in the interviewee setting, with many of them making comments such as: ‘Oh, but you know how it is, you’ve seen how it goes’. It is possible, then, that because I was able to relate to and share my interviewees’ experiences on the policy, and the practices related to it, they were able to provide me with more thorough and perhaps deeper contemplations on the issue than could have been achieved through a discussion with a complete outsider. On the flipside, it is possible that my interviewees have withheld some information, assuming that ‘I already know’ – even though I did not, or knew differently. In a similar vein, I may have steered the interviews along the lines of my own experiences (also R. Berger 2015, 223). In practice, however, quite a few of my interviewees were not afraid to question and contradict my assumptions, and they often corrected me if I spoke about an experience they did not relate to.
Next, to identify how my position has affected my research design and interpretations, I describe the journey I have taken with expertise-by-experience. I do this in order to make my personal assumptions and commitments as visible as possible.

My contact with expertise-by-experience started as a practitioner. I was extremely enthusiastic about the notion of expertise-by-experience and perceived it as a possibility to promote civic activism and enable the marginalised people to get their voices heard. Consequently, I jumped at the possibility to develop the practice and felt it was extremely important to do so in collaboration with the experts-by-experience. It seemed that both the process of collaborative development and its outcomes of a joint understanding on the meaning and uses of expertise-by-experience were equally important. It was only after enthusiastically developing the practice for quite a few months that I started to question myself – what was I actually doing? What were the effects of my work and what was behind these initiatives?

The workshops in spring 2012 and the four intensive days I spent with eight experts-by-experience and four of my colleagues marked a turning point for me. There was a huge inner struggle as I witnessed these survivors truly feel empowered by the new concept and practice. At the same time, a question kept nagging me: Why do we need to call these people experts in order for them to be heard? The ethos of empowerment of the margins rung both a positive and a negative bell for me: I wanted to be part of a movement that would give the voice back to the people. At the same time, I was concerned about the possibilities of co-optation and worried by some of my colleagues’ remarks that reflected a fear of giving the survivors the power to decide.

It was this contradiction that led me to my research. The Superdemocracy-project’s research plan, focusing on the critical inquiry of concepts and practices of participatory democracy and governance, seemed to provide me the conceptual tools I needed to make sense of what was going on around me. I started to situate my own work in a larger frame and began slowly to understand the wider, societal development that had led to our need to activate these new experts.

As I sought to find a balance in my new dual role, and detach myself from the position of a practitioner, I grew increasingly critical towards the concept and practice. This criticism stemmed in large part from what seemed to be a mismatch between what we as an organisation wanted to happen and what the experts-by-experience’s goals were. This was particularly visible in my colleagues’ strong urge to ‘protect’ the experts-by-experience from participation. While it seemed to me that most of all the experts-by-experience wanted to get their voices heard, the organisations’ point of view focused more strongly on nurturing and caring. In this context, civic participation in general and political activism in particular appeared as threatening. I was baffled, as I found this approach a bit condescending; it did not allow the experts-by-experience to decide for themselves what they wanted to and were capable of doing. At the same time, it seemed that quite a few of my colleagues were rather cautious towards the new policy; most of all they were afraid of the uncontrollability of ideas and actions
that might be encouraged through the novel concept. This, to me, seemed to illustrate rather concretely how strongly expertise-by-experience was guided by the needs of the organisations.

However, my concerns seemed to be in contrast to what my informants were saying and producing in our workshops and meetings. They were enthusiastic, eager to ‘finally get their point across’. At this point, I started conducting interviews and gathering policy documents outlining the practice to get a wider view on how the policy was employed and experienced elsewhere. I attempted to minimise my gatekeeper role in interviewee and data selection by including everyone and everything on offer, but my critical position undoubtedly had an effect on my interview themes and the subsequent interpretations. In hindsight, I recognise a detective-like drive to ‘unearth a conspiracy’ behind the policy in both my interview themes as well as in my early conclusions drawn from the interview data.

During the lengthy writing process that involved countless rounds of data analysis using different lenses and asking different questions, my own position grew, if not less critical, then at least less distrustful. I started to see the complexity of the practices and the significance of the grassroots battles and negotiations taking place every day. Instead of painting the story of the experts-by-experience’s subject-construction in only black-and-white, all shades of grey started to appear. At this point, the analytical focus of the research was clarified. The micro-level focus on the everyday practices, interpretations and struggles allowed to see the multiple dynamics involved and enabled to overcome the less fruitful dichotomous interpretation between the ‘suppressive administration’ and the ‘resistant subjects’. I no longer considered my research objective to be telling the story of ‘the oppressed experts-by-experience’, but instead it became one of painting a multi-coloured picture about the concrete practices, negotiations and situated agents that make the participative policy alive.

The deskwork period also made me reconsider my own position and to question the dichotomous idea of moving from the position of an invested practitioner to that of an ‘objective’ researcher. It grew increasingly evident that my practitioner background made me what David Mosse (2006, 938) calls ‘an interested interpreter’ and my study an ethnography in which I am myself also one key informant. I have been, to some extent, part of the institutionalisation of the concept and practice of expertise-by-experience. My practitioner background means that the practices analysed include those I have myself employed during the participatory processes (Mosse 2006, 940). Although the rounds of analysis, and the work done through many manuscripts, presentations and talks, have enabled me to develop a distance between my immediate experiences as a practitioner and the interpretations made through different analytical lenses,¹⁸ I do not consider the knowledge produced through this research to be objective nor my position as a researcher that of a detached, neutral reporter. Instead, this is an interpretive work, thoroughly influenced by my own experiences from within the field. In retrospect, the extremely critical positions I assumed at early stages

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¹⁸ For a parallel in experts-by-experience’s expert-making, see section 4.2.
of the data analysis appear as attempts to create a rupture from my role as an enthusiastic practitioner (Mosse 2006, 946) – a need that was later alleviated as I came to terms with my double role as an interpreter and an informant and started to consider my own experiential knowledge as a legitimate source of information.

Finally, I need to state clearly that my research questions hold a normative stance. By exploring the contingent nature of expertise and knowledge, I am hoping to provide tools for the experts-by-experience to contest the uses of these notions and to give them more of a say in what counts as knowledge. Through describing and opening up the concepts of expertise and knowledge, I aim to make their political nature visible and, by so doing, enable the participants to engage in redefining them and using them to meet their purposes. Through my research, I aim to give more voice to those currently silenced or less heard.

3.3.4 Ethical considerations

The key ethical questions related to my research concern my own position as both a practitioner and a researcher, my own role in data production, the informants’ awareness of the research being conducted and the potentially traumatising nature of the experts-by-experience’s experiential knowledge drawn out during the interviews.

I started systematically gathering my research data in late 2013, while at the same time still continuing to work as a practitioner. At this point, I told my colleagues, as well as the experts-by-experience I was collaborating with, about my research project and asked each expert-by-experience individually whether I could use the previously co-produced material as part of my research data. All of the participants gave their written consent to use the material, and several expressed their joy at the fact that the topic was ‘finally’ going to be studied.

Martin Tolich (2010) has justly inquired whether it is possible for informants to give their consent retrospectively in an ethnographic study. He is concerned that such a setting may not give the participants a fair chance to give a genuinely informed consent or to decline. Furthermore, the research ethical guidelines of the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity (2009) outline that the informants should preferably be given a chance to give their informed consent before the research. Hence, despite the written consent acquired from the participants, I treat the collaboratively produced data from 2012 as autoethnographic, giving insight on the practices and techniques through which expertise-by-experience was institutionalised in the context of one organisation. Furthermore, to protect the anonymity of my informants, and respect the principle of informed consent, I only use quotes from data for which explicit, prior consent was given by the informants. For the same reasons, I do not identify the organisation I was employed in or the names of my colleagues or the experts-by-experience I was working with.

Furthermore, to ensure I do not conflate my notes from the workshops with the experts-by-experience’s views, I later interviewed five experts-by-experience and two practitioners who had been part of the collaborative development pro-
cess in an attempt to provide them a platform to reflect upon the process of ‘making them experts-by-experience’. This proved beneficial, as several interviewees felt at ease to criticise our process.

In keeping with the principle of causing no harm, stressed in the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity’s research ethical guidelines (2009), I refrained from asking questions concerning the experts-by-experience’s past, as these themes could very possibly have evoked painful memories that I was not equipped to provide counsel for. To this end, I made sure to explain very thoroughly to every interviewee that the focus of my research was in their experiences as an expert-by-experience and that I would not be asking them questions concerning their past experiences. Nonetheless, quite a few interviewees chose to recount passages of their past in the course of the interview. If this occurred I did not stop them and instead steered the focus towards their more recent experiences in my next question.

In taking into account the potentially stigmatising experiences my informants shared with me, and the critical remarks some of them made on the practices of expertise-by-experience, I have chosen to anonymise all my informants. Although some of my interviewees expressed their willingness to be quoted under their own name, I have opted to anonymise all of the interviewees in order to avoid causing any unwanted consequences either in terms of evoking painful memories or hampering the interviewees’ possibilities to act as experts-by-experience in the future.

3.3.5 Uses of data and tools for interpretation

Katherine Tegthsoonian (2016, 337) points out that a governmentality analysis is interested in *the materiality of discourse* – in language as it appears as preferred ways of talking, making visible and presenting (also Yanow 2015, 404, Schwartz-Shea 2006, 92). Governmentality analysis is interested in how ruling is enacted, interpreted and reacted on through language. Fundamentally, language is seen as constructive of the social world and, as such, manifestations of the power relations in which people live and on which they engage in negotiations (see also Foucault 1994, 123–124). This poststructuralist approach stresses the deliberative nature of the creation and reformation of concepts as tools for crafting social phenomena, and the uses of power necessitating and resulting from it (Howarth & Griggs 2015, Howarth 2010).

The focus of an ethnographically oriented governmentality analysis prioritises the everyday ways in which a policy is enacted, interpreted and made practical through language (see Teghtsoonian 2016, 338, Rose, O'Malley & Valverde 2006, 89). More precisely, the object of an ethnographic study is to understand the phenomenon from the participants’ particular positions and points of view (Yanow 2015, 404–406). Its aim is to both gain knowledge of what other people mean when using language and to connect these meaning makings to their surroundings: to the particular context, normative assumptions and other factors influencing the way people perceive of and interpret the world. This contextual orientation is also the bread and butter of pragmatic sociology, discussed in sec-
This ‘reflexive deliberation’ (Fischer 2015, 57) enables the researcher to understand the different meaning-makings through its particular situatedness – or, to make sense of sense-making.

In my analysis, I have made use of various interpretative tools to illustrate and discuss the practices, negotiations and struggles involved when constructing the subjectivities of experts-by-experience. They all fall under the vast umbrella of interpretative policy analysis, approaching the political through language (e.g. Yanow 2015, Fischer et al. 2015). The core premise of an interpretative policy analysis is that it does investigate practices as such but seeks to interpret them as guided by the rules, norms and underlying assumptions that make specific practices possible and reasonable in a given situation (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003, 17, see also section 2.5). Its focus is, thus, on practices of meaning-making that connect ways of reasoning with ways of ruling.

The objects of interpretative policy analysis are often linguistic (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea 2006, 207). As Hajer and Wagenaar (2003, 30) sharply note: [In interpretative policy analysis] ‘the representation of an issue (unemployment, global warming etc.) is the issue’. The questions to be asked in an interpretative study, then, are for example, how the problems explaining the need for a policy are defined (Bacchi 2012), how metaphors or categories (Yanow 2000, 41–60) or narratives (Czarniawska 2004) are used to construct meaning and what assumptions or objectives might underpin these linguistic choices. Interpretative work, thus, presupposes a double hermeneutics between the data and its analyst: the researcher sees the data as rich in the informants’ meaning-making but also uses it themselves to make sense of a certain phenomenon (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea 2006, 266–267, see also Hay 2011).

The specific interpretative tools used for analysing the language data are specified in each article. Crucially, the language of the policy documents, interviews and ethnographic artefacts are seen as attempts to assign a particular meaning to expertise-by-experience and its related phenomena. They are interpreted through their choice of words and discursive repertoires in order to get to the rationales and political objectives that make this kind of meaning-making rational and desirable.

I read the policy documents as revealing the premises and objectives of the policy-makers. Of particular interest are the ways in which problems are formulated and the subsequent interpretative repertoires of expertise-by-experience enforced. In addition to the policy-makers’ choice of words and other rhetorical devices, what interests me the most is how the practitioners and the experts-by-experience made sense of, interpreted and responded to the policy outlines in their everyday practices. This becomes perceivable through the ethnographic and, in particular, the interview data.

I use the co-produced ethnographic material from the workshops to reflect on one process of expert-making where I myself was an active practitioner. Due to its autoethnographic nature, its main purpose has been to enable me to develop a thicker description of the processes of expert-making and to zoom in my analytical focus by formulating more incisive research questions. The ethno-
graphic data provides me with records of how a policy in this context was turned into practice and how I, in connection to others, made sense of it at the time. When analysed in parallel with the interviews, our workshops appear as a rather typical (CSO's) process of expert-making, entailing very similar negotiations, concerns and excitements to those described by my interviewees. As a result, the workshop data have helped me understand the experiences that my interviewees brought up, as I had participated in very similar discussions and situations myself.

In contrast to purely ethnographic research whose main focus would be on the situational context and its effects on participation and ruling, the main focus of this research is at a more abstract level. As my main task is to identify practices of subjectivation and their underlying processes of rationalisation, and to develop an analysis of their significance for democracy, the relevant level of description and analysis is less closely detailed than in traditional ethnographic research. Subsequently, in my analysis, I do not draw mainly on the ethnographic data, but instead I interpret mostly the interviews and policy documents to understand the experts-by-experience’s, the practitioners’ and the administration’s meaning-makings.
4 RESULTS FROM ARTICLES

My articles approach the process of ‘making experts’ with different conceptual tools. In doing so it concentrates on how the projects’ participants were made as subjects, how this subject-construction was made to appear as rational and how, in turn, it was debated, critiqued and contested. In this section, I will present my key findings, first concisely with the help of the questions formulated at the introductory section and then by a more detailed analysis of my four key arguments. Instead of merely repeating my article’s key findings, this section seeks to draw connections between the articles’ conclusions in order to do justice to the colourfulness and variety of the phenomenon in my data. As the article format only allows drawing out one specific aspect of the multifaceted phenomenon at a time, I use this section to join these aspects in order to discuss them together.

My key focus in the articles was on two aspects of expert-making: 1) the characteristics of the subjectivity of an expert constructed in the projects and 2) the practices and techniques used in this expert-construction.

1. **What characterises the subjectivities created in the context of expertise-by-experience?**

   What kind of participation and ‘way of being’ is encouraged and made feasible?

Most commonly, the initiatives seek to construct collaborative and consensus-seeking participants who are able to produce ‘reliable’ knowledge for decision-making and public governance. Framing the experts-by-experience’s participation as co-production makes knowledge, instead of an opinion, a legitimate content of political participation and the ideal form of participation a ‘joint effort for the common good’.

Crucially, as the experts-by-experience are now welcomed as participants because of their input, rather than because of their right to be heard, an altogether new stage is set. Now, it becomes perfectly justified and legitimate to choose participants according to ‘what they can bring to the table’. As in the co-production discourse where participation is not considered a right but a beneficial practice, it
becomes feasible to evaluate participants’ performances and contributions and to choose the ones the public officials see as useful. This, at times, causes disappointments and feelings of exploitation among some participants, as well as some practitioners.

Another, what I’ve termed a subversive subject-construction, seeks to destabilise this ‘tamed’ view on expertise. It prioritises the experts-by-experience’s raw and emotion-filled speech over other forms of input, and it purports that they be at the very heart of experience-based expertise. In contrast to the above tendency to experticise participation, it seems to attempt the democratisation of expertise by fundamentally questioning who, in these contexts, should be recognised as an expert and given the corresponding possibility to participate.

2. How (through which practices and techniques) are participants constructed as experts?
   - How are notions of expertise and knowledge (re)defined and used in the participants’ subjectivation?
   - How are certain subject-constructions made (to appear) rational and feasible?
   - How do the participants respond to and engage with their subjectivation?

The experts-by-experience’s way of being is steered primarily by defining knowledge and expertise to reflect the underlying rationality and justification framework of participation. As stated above, the most common justificatory framework is that of co-production, defining expertise as the ability to present neutral and objective knowledge over specific issues despite one’s personal experiences. Experiences become both the raw material of knowledge and also something that need to be surpassed in order to assume a full role of an expert. Subsequently, the notion of ‘expertise of oneself’ emerges as a tool in delineating when one manifests an appropriate distance from one’s past experiences and is able to show an appropriate relationship to one’s painful past. Here, neutrality, suppression of ‘emotional outbursts’ and generalisability of one’s story are made synonyms for being an expert of oneself.

The different underpinning rationales used to justify the reason for increased participation translate to differing definitions of expertise and knowledge. They, in turn, translate to differing demands made for the experts-by-experience’s participation and the possibilities for being made available through the projects. This makes experts-by-experience ‘experts in governing their selves’ – in identifying the appropriate register of participation and discourse.

The emphasis on expertise also renders the concept available for contestations and critique. Both some experts-by-experience and some practitioners challenge the criteria set for ‘reliable expertise’, hence destabilising the technocratic expert-construction and disassembling the expertisation process. Subsequently, the contrasting definitions of expertise are both revelatory of the differing ration-
ales underpinning the participatory initiatives and tools in ‘democratising expertise’ – in redefining whose knowledge and what form of input should count.

In the following, I will explore these findings in more detail through four points of view:

1. ‘Conflicting rationales of participation’ explores the diverse rationales underpinning the participatory initiatives, and the corresponding subjectivities created. It manifests how the technocratic rationale, which values the experts-by-experience’s participation because of the input it succeeds in providing, appears more prominent than the democratic rationale, which sees participation as having an intrinsic value.

2. ‘The journey towards becoming an expert of oneself’ traces the concrete practices used when constructing the participants as experts of themselves. Here, I sketch a story of ‘an ideal’ expert-by-experience, growing towards neutral and collaborative expertise by creating a distance to one’s experiences. I identify the key moments in becoming an expert and discuss how the processes of expert-making can be geared towards producing co-operative and de-emotional participants. However, I also illustrate the many departures from this ideal story that my interviewees recounted, attesting to what happens when the will to govern meets the individuals it seeks to transform.

3. ‘The danger of trained monkeys’ illustrates the disconnect between the promises of participatory governance and the participants’ experiences. It recounts the interviewees’ critique towards the subjectivity of a neutral collaborator and the experienced limitations it sets upon the participants.

4. ‘Unwelcome truths and wild participants’ explores the practices of counter-conduct and the possibilities for critique in the initiatives. It explores how the experts-by-experience sought to, and to some extent succeeded in, challenging the governing practices that were used to steer them towards a neutral and collaborative way of being. It focuses on the participants’ way of speaking in unwanted and unaccepted ways in order to question and destabilise the notions of knowledge and expertise in the initiatives’ context.

These points of view, although all presented in my original articles, do not correspond directly to any one article. Instead, all of them overlap and appear in different combinations in more than one article. They illustrate the four key aspects of expert-making that emanate both from my data as well as from prior research on participatory mechanisms; the reasons behind the need for new experts, the corresponding ideal participant created, the participants’ experiences of the subjectivity suggested for them and their responses towards it. Because of their interwoven nature in my articles, I will not present my findings one article at a time. Instead, I will present them thematically, referring when appropriate to the original articles for a more detailed analysis.
4.1 Conflicting rationales of participation

As I began to closely read my data to sketch an image of the expert that the projects’ participants were crafted to become, my interpretations revealed a tension that would later appear, in one form or another, in all my future analysis, regardless of the conceptual tools adopted to illustrate the experts-by-experience’s subject-making. This is a tension between neutral experts and passionate advocates – a binary that later made its way into the title of article 2. The tug-of-war between the demands of ‘raw and pure’ experiences and the need to transform them into neutral and objective knowledge appeared as a central struggle on the experts-by-experience’s way of being. It was, as I later came to interpret, revelatory of the diverse rationales underlying these participatory initiatives. Furthermore, it epitomised the differing demands made for the experts-by-experience’s participation. I will start presenting my findings from this tension, as it reveals the different justifications behind the need for new experts.

As many previous studies have indicated, the rationales that underlie participatory arrangements are many. Martin’s (2009) democratic and technocratic rationales have been echoed, and developed, in later studies (Rowland et al. 2017, Stewart 2013b, Knaapen & Lehoux 2016, Kuokkanen 2016, 145). Rowland and colleagues add a third, emancipatory rationale to Martin’s view by suggesting that in addition to valuing participation as a means of acquiring citizens’ lay knowledge for a more efficient and evidence-based policy-making, or seeing it as having intrinsic value for democratic government, participation may be a form of subversive social movement, which reclaims the subordinate to have a voice in policy-making (Rowland et al. 2017).

The projects investigated in this thesis also stated their purposes in a multitude of ways. In broad terms, expertise-by-experience was presented as an answer to the following problems:

1. Unwell, excluded individuals
2. Too costly and inefficient services
3. The ‘democracy-deficit’ of the administration

Expertise-by-experience, as with so many other participatory arrangements, appeared as a tool towards varying goals, epitomising different ways to rationalise why more participation was needed. On the one hand, it was presented as a means to empower the participants, making the act of participating, not its outcomes, the most important aspect of participation. When the objective is to support the participants’ self-actualisation, the focus is on what Eliasoph (2016, 254) calls ‘the aesthetic experience’ of participation. The act of participation is itself thought to have transformative potential, leading many of the projects studied to perceive themselves as ‘training grounds’ and ‘safe havens’ for participation. Indeed, some interviewees even stated how it does not matter if the experts-by-experience end up participating anywhere outside their own organisation, or if...
their participation has any impact beyond their own empowerment. What matters most is that they get ‘an empowering experience’ from participation.

At the same time, as Barbara Cruikshank (1999) has famously noted, the participants’ empowerment also serves as a tool to meet the other, more inexplicit objectives of participation. By defining empowerment in a specific manner, the experts-by-experience can be steered to become participants who meet the particular purposes of the projects. If the underlying purpose of participation is to gather more evidence for the purposes of knowledge-based decision-making, the participants can be ‘empowered’ to become neutral and objective experts, ready to provide accurate and useful information to improve social services. This rationale is explored in more detail in the following subsection.

If, on the other hand, the primary motive for increased participation is to correct the administration’s democratic deficit, empowerment comes to be defined through presence. The participants are empowered as they are allowed into new environments of decision-making. This can, at worst, lead to participants being used as tokens of participatory governance. They can be invited but not included, serving merely as symbols of adhering to the participatory norm. This rationale is explored in subsection 4.3.

Finally, there are also some signs of Rowland and colleagues’ emancipatory rationale. Even though the Finnish initiatives are all orchestrated top-down, leaving very little room to interpret them as social movements’ emancipatory projects, some experts-by-experience’s and practitioners’ responses can be interpreted as being rooted in this radical democratic ethos. This aspect is explored further in chapter 4.4.

These diverse, partially conflicting rationales, however, do not seem to be mutually exclusive in the initiatives. Rather, they coexist as the basis for different demands made for the experts-by-experience’s subjectivity, contributing to very different possibilities of self-making for the projects’ participants (see Barnes, Newman & Sullivan 2007, Newman & Clarke 2009, 151). By drawing on a particular justification for making increased public participation desirable, certain ways of participation can be made to appear as reasonable and legitimate, while others can be discredited and excluded (Martin 2009, Barnes et al. 2003, Richard-Ferroudji 2011, M. Berger & Charles 2014). If the reason for increased participation is to acquire more knowledge in decision-making or service co-creation, the contours for the co-producers’ way of being are very different from the demands made on the participants when participation is advanced because of its subversive potential.

I posit that the introduction of experts-by-experience in Finnish social welfare organisations can be conceptualised as an ambiguous situation (situation trouble), following Boltanski and Thévenot (1999). This concept signals a situation that combines different, contradicting value-basis, different problem-constructions and different corresponding rationales for participation, hence providing different repertoires of rationalisation and interpretation for the projects’ actors. These repertoires are ‘building blocks speakers use to construct versions of actions’ (Whetherell & Potter 1988, 172). They consist of the linguistic
tools, such as metaphors and specific choice of terms, as well as of the material conditions, that are employed to present a phenomenon from a specific interpretive point of view to justify and rationalise them in connection to a certain value-base and to subsequently set demands for the participants of this particular situation of meaning-making (also Eliasoph & Lichterman 2010, 485). In the case at hand, for example, expertise-by-experience can be interpreted as part and parcel of co-production, presenting it as a solution for the lack of evidence in decision-making and service design, and inviting terms like ‘reliable knowledge’ and ‘collaborative problem-solving’. At the same time, it can be interpreted as a mode of participatory social work, solving the problem of excluded and marginalised citizens, enticing terms like ‘empowerment’ and ‘rehabilitation’.

In previous research, two vocabularies have become popular when discerning the different positions and possibilities crafted for the participants. On the one hand, researchers have worked with the concept of representation to illustrate as what the participants are expected to take part in participatory processes (Bohman 2012, Kahane et al. 2013, Martin 2008b, 2008a, Saward 2009, Stephan 2004, Warren 2008). On the other hand, researchers have drawn upon the notions of knowledge and expertise to illustrate the tensions in the participants’ role (Martin 2009, Martin 2008a, Dickens & Picchioni 2012, Leino & Peltomaa 2012, Rabeharisoa 2017, Rabeharisoa, Moreira & Akrich 2014, Smith-Merry 2015, Strassheim 2015).

These two vocabularies can also be seen as indicative of the two, conflicting rationales on which participatory innovations draw. The one investigates expertise-by-experience as a means to claim political authority, while the other considers it as a mode of epistemic authority (Strassheim 2015, Rowland et al. 2017). The coexistence of the two modes of authority claims results in an inherent tension in participatory innovations calling for lay expertise: a tension between authenticity and expertise (Newman & Clarke 2009, 141; Dodge 2010). Participatory projects that are aimed at incorporating participants’ lay expertise operate on the assumption that their participants are both able to faithfully represent the authentic experiences of the group concerned and transcend these immediate experiences to be able to provide generalisable knowledge in decision-making (Lehoux, Daudelin & Abelson 2012, Richard-Ferroudji 2011, Eliasoph 2014, 474). The experts-by-experience are expected to be genuine but reliable, to bring forth ‘raw experiences’, but in a generalisable and neutral manner. They seem to be drawing on multiple rationales of participation simultaneously, hence mixing interpretive repertoires and constructing subjectivities with inherent contradictions for the participants.

These tensions are my focal points in articles 1, 2 and 3. In articles 1 and 2, I set out to illustrate how the different rationales undergirding lay experts’ participation affect the construction of their subjectivities as participants. In article 3, I follow the transformation from ‘the raw and genuine’ experiences into neutral and objective expertise to highlight the practices used in the process.

In article 1, I used Michael Saward’s (2009) notion of ‘representative claim’ to illustrate the contrasting positions created for experts-by-experience. I argued
that the experts-by-experience are, on the one hand, positioned as experts of neutral and collective knowledge, representing the general experiential knowledge of the people with similar experiences and, on the other hand, as advocates for the interests of a marginalised group. In article 2, I continued probing this dichotomous position by introducing the conceptual tools of sociology of engagements, as developed by Laurent Thévenot (see section 2.5). In article 2, I combined these conceptual tools with the methodology of governmentality ethnography to examine how the notion of expertise was defined in the projects and how these differing definitions are revelatory of the differing underlying rationales concerning the value of public participation. I discovered three different ways to value public participation: as a means of personal rehabilitation, as a tool to gain relevant contributions and as a civic right in and of itself. These valuations, I argued, were used to craft very different possibilities for participation and to make a certain conception of expertise appear as legitimate.

Based on my findings in articles 1 and 2, I argue that the projects developing expertise-by-experience draw both on epistemic and political modes of authority (see Strassheim 2015, 326), causing the inherent and somewhat unsolvable tension between the demand for true and authentic experiences and reliable and objective expertise. Moreover, I show how most of the projects investigated justify the experts-by-experiences participation as a tool to gain specific, objective and reliable information on a predefined issue, hence relying more strongly on epistemic claims of authority. This places the experts-by-experience in governance networks as experts and makes it possible to evaluate their right to participate based on their contributions to the discussion. Furthermore, I show how their evaluation criteria are the same as for formal forms of knowledge and expertise. To be recognised as valuable input, the experts-by-experience’s knowledge needs to be general, neutral and objective, distanced from one’s personal experiences and emotions. Moreover, this objective way of knowing and speaking is something that the participants need to achieve before participation, instead of viewing objective judgement as a result of collaboration (Young 2004, 24–26). This places the experts-by-experience in a position where they need to perform a balancing act between personal and general repertoires of discourse. It is through personal experiences that they succeed in justifying why they should have a seat at the table. However, in order to be allowed to converse at that table, these experiences need to be distanced, the participant needs to have ‘risen above’ the personal level, and ideally, to have gathered other people’s experiences and ‘more general knowledge’ as one interviewee put it, for their input to be recognised as knowledge.

In the following, I will explore the creation of the subjectivities of a co-producer and a passionate advocate, and consider how the different rationales lend themselves as discursive repertoires employable to make a specific kind of participation feasible.
4.1.1 The subjectivity of a co-producer

P3: I believe that the underlying idea [of expertise-by-experience] is something like user-driven service-design. I think that during these times of productivity and efficiency, it is pretty self-evident that in order for us to get these treatment paths working, the voice of the customer who uses the services is worth listening to and incorporating.

(A civil society practitioner, 27.5.2014)

The above quote illustrates the prominence of co-production talk in user-involvement initiatives. The idea of service co-production, and participatory forms of governance more broadly, are the most common repertoires drawn upon when justifying the need for lay experts (article 2). The idea to incorporate experts-by-experience into networks of service design, production and evaluation appears extremely logical under the rationale of participatory governance, with its calls for multiple forms of knowledge drawn together. As a result, it is not surprising that the rhetoric of ‘co-creation’ and ‘co-operation’ was used very widely in my data to justify the need for experts-by-experience. It provided the vocabulary to legitimately justify why the lay experts should have a seat at the decision-making table. It was presented both as the administration’s justification for inviting experts-by-experience into governance networks, as well as the participants’ own prime motivation for getting involved in the initiatives.

The experts-by-experience were invited to participate, varying from project to project, in varying stages of service development. Most often, they were invited to contribute to evaluate existing services, or to participate in networks tasked with redesigning or developing public services. The following figure is from a manual for experience-based service evaluation, produced in the context of one of the CSO projects. The figure can be read to depict ‘the ideal’ of service co-production from the CSO’s point of view. It emphasises equality among the network participants and illustrates a flow-like process of continuous service development:

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19 The original figure is in Finnish, and the translations into English are mine. The original can be found at http://mtkl.fi/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Kokemusarvioinnin-käsikirja-1.0.pdf
As we can see, the co-production scheme is utilised specifically to advance the customers’ and former beneficiaries’ possibilities for action. Following the ideals of participatory governance, people with first-hand experiences of the matter need to be incorporated to ensure the combination of multiple forms of knowledge. Here, I posit, a shift in the participants’ role becomes visible; under a co-production scheme, the lay experts are not welcome to participate as advocates but as collaborators (see articles 1 and 2, also Newman et al. 2004). The stage of participation is not set as a debate between different interests and opinions, but as collaboration for achieving mutual goals.

The above figure succinctly highlights the joint objective of the network members and depicts their collaboration as a team effort striving for mutual objectives. Co-production, here, is used to illustrate ‘partnership’, i.e. equality and collaboration of the network members. Although the idea of partnership with the public sector is in no way a new position for the Finnish CSOs, it is worth noting that the co-production talk is now employed to make partnership appear as the only possible position for their representatives. This setting was enforced particularly by the CSO practitioners, emphasising how working ‘in partnership’ with the public sector meant not stirring up emotions and controversy. Instead, neutral and objective knowledge and a commitment to mutual objectives were expected of a good partner. The following two practitioners even talk about ‘a part-
nership society’ when explaining the role of experts-by-experience in service development:

P9: An expert-by-experience has to be able to deliver one’s message in a way that it can be received.
P8: Yeah, experts-by-experience don’t act in a therapeutic environment, and the listeners don’t need to receive any emotional outbursts but only the facts as they are.
P9: For example, when talking about service development, if you have very bitter experiences, it’s very good if you have been able to form them into constructive criticism. Then you don’t cause any resistance on the professionals’ part.

(Two civil society practitioners 27.4.2015)

In the case of expertise-by-experience, technocratic standards are most often set to what constitutes a legitimate form of participation (see also Martin 2009). The personal, emotion-filled experiences need to be worked upon into ‘reliable information’, utilisable in service production (article 3). This is largely in line with Luhtakallio’s (2010, 160) observation about the Finnish ‘engineer-like’ participation style, which prioritises expertise and knowledge over values and emotions. What is now being used as a tool to legitimise such claims is the novel logic underlying co-production. In the new, co-production-oriented participatory arrangements, the participants are regarded as contributors. Their right to take part in governance networks is neither inherent nor justified simply because they would have a right to be heard. Instead, their active role is justified, and hence evaluated, through the contributions they are able to bring to the table (article 2). Consequently, they are also assessed based on the input they are able to provide for decision-making. In the following quote, an expert-by-experience describes how her new role is different from her previous position as a civil society actor:

E1: When I became an expert-by-experience, I got a new name for my activities. And of course a new dimension also, this productive side. I mean before it wasn’t so much producing something, it was more like peer support, being in a group, interacting with your peers. So it brought a new dimension of productivity to it.
TM: Uhum, what are you producing?
E1: Knowledge mainly.

(A civil society expert-by-experience, 4.4.2014)

The above interviewee’s quote illustrates by far the most prominent way of differentiating the subjectivity of experts-by-experience from other participants. What distinguished the novel ‘productive’ role from other tasks, such as peer-support, was the production of knowledge. Both words are, I posit, equally important. In the context of participatory governance, a legitimate participant needs to be able to contribute something to the discussion. Moreover, the accepted form of contribution is not opinions or personal points of view, but knowledge (Smith-Merry 2012, Barnes 2009, articles 1, 2 and 3).

Because participation is evaluated based on the value of the input it can produce for decision-making, demands for neutrality, generalisability and rationality of discourse become plausible. This emphasis of knowledge as a legiti-
mate form of input, in turn, may be employed to delineate who is to be considered a good partner and consequently given access to participate in governance networks.

4.1.2 Passionate advocates

Another repertoire drawn upon when constructing the experts-by-experience’s active role is connected to what could perhaps be called a democratic rationale. It envisages participation as a political right, and subsequently sees it as having a value of its own instead of holding merely instrumental value. This leads to a very different subject-construction to that of the collaborative co-producer described above. Here, the experts-by-experience are positioned as advocates for their marginalised constituents (article 1), and their participation is legitimised by tapping onto values of equality and democracy (article 2). This makes experience a legitimate reason to claim political authority, not the object of representation itself as in the expert-construction within the co-production scheme.

When participation is perceived of as a right, the notion of expertise gets used as a tool to carve out new room for participation and to voice out demands for the experts-by-experience’s rights to participate. Here, the notion of an expert-by-experience receives a subversive function: it is used to contest the current governance processes, and the dominant expert-construction on which it rests. Idioms such as ‘everyone is an expert of their own lives’ are used to emphasise how everyone should have an equal chance to voice out their points of view and to highlight how the position of a co-producer can be used to narrow the participants’ possibilities for being (articles 2 and 3). The goal, here, is to destabilise the dominant assumptions of legitimate governance and to seek out new possibilities for meaningful participation. Peculiarly, however, this subversive subject-construction does not attempt to get rid of the notion of expertise as the basis for the right to participate. Instead, it adopts the concept, but contests and redefines it to be used as a tool in broadening the possible horizons of being for the participants. This is an aspect I develop further in article 4 and summarise in section 4.4.

On the other hand, valuing participation for itself also enables its simulative use. If the objective of participation is participation, it becomes possible to strip participation off of any possibilities, and indeed the need, of influence (article 2). This tokenistic potential of participation is explored in more detail in section 4.3.

The coexistence of multiple governing rationales means that the demands made towards experts-by-experience’s legitimate form of participation and ideal way of being are occasionally at odds. This becomes most strikingly visible in the tug-of-war between demands for neutrality and personal attachment. Subsequently, in article 2 I posit that that expertise in these participatory projects comes to mean the ability to conduct oneself according to the project’s objectives, i.e. to know and present oneself in line with the projects’ demands. This requires the skill to identify which repertoire of participation, in terms of speaking about oneself, is acceptable in the context, and the ability to align one’s rap-
port towards oneself according to these rules. For example, when engaging in a project that seeks to empower, the experts-by-experience need to manifest the will and ability to talk about themselves in a detailed and intimate manner. In a co-production setting, such talk is deemed inappropriate. Consequently, the experts-by-experience become experts in ‘reading the room’, in knowing themselves in multiple repertoires and in presenting themselves in different modalities. Expertise as the ability of conducting conduct – traditionally the domain of experts in the psycho-social field – is now also construed as one’s ability to ‘conduct one’s own conduct’. One becomes an expert in and of one’s own self-governance. This is the process I scrutinise in more detail in article 3, presented in the following section.

4.2 The journey towards being an expert of oneself

The projects’ techniques of expert-making operated through transforming one’s immediate experiences into a source of expertise. This made the notions of knowledge and expertise tools to delineate the appropriate ways of being for the participants. Because the object of knowledge, in this context, was the participants themselves, defining knowledge and expertise meant defining when the participants ‘know themselves’ and express ‘expertise over themselves’. Subsequently, the practices of expert-making operate very explicitly on the participants’ self-construction. As a civil society practitioner described, expertise-by-experience was ‘a way of learning to become yourself and to see yourself in a new light’. This is the process I unpack in article 3, with a specific focus on the techniques and practices employed. The core question, explored in article 3, is whether, and to what extent, the participants can express freedom in their self-making in the projects’ context.

The projects state their purpose to be emancipatory, but as I show in article 3, the projects entail several practices of ‘working on oneself’ that are geared towards creating a specific relationship between oneself and one’s experiences. I suggest that in order to be accepted as an expert-by-experience, one needs to be able to turn oneself into something one knows rather than is — and to draw the definitions of knowledge from the dominant system of thought.

4.2.1 The (ideal) path to expertise

The interviewees frequently described the process of becoming an expert-by-experience as a ‘journey’ or a ‘path’, which is a common metaphoric construction when describing the transition from ‘social exclusion’ back into the society (P. Davidson 2013, 215). To illustrate how the experts-by-experience were constructed towards a neutral and collaborative conception of being an expert of oneself, I make use of the means of narrative analysis. As the techniques, such as trainings and practice lectures, used to steer the experts-by-experience conduct were focused on ‘reconstructing one’s life story’, and practicing ‘the appropriate’ or ‘the most
credible' way to tell it, it seems worthwhile to attempt to reformulate ‘the ideal story’ of becoming an expert-by-experience.

From the perspective of narrative studies, subjectivity is seen as a narrative construct, forged continuously through the stories and tales we tell about ourselves. These stories are constant reinterpretations of the events of our lives, and they change and are changed through time and context. The narratives are hence particularly revelatory of how one perceives, and furthermore, wants to perceive and construct oneself (Zahavi 2007, 180–183, Holstein & Gubrium 2000, 104, Ricoeur 1991, 73, 80, Patterson & Monroe 1998, 319–320). More precisely, I adhere to the idea of subjectivity as a narrative performance, which puts emphasis on the contextual and relational aspects of the self. The self is not a unitary, pre-existing entity, but rather a temporally and contextually bound construct that is being forged and put forward through storytelling. As such, it also becomes a potential site of conflict and struggle (Riessman 2003, Langellier 2001, 150–151, Holstein & Gubrium 2000, 106–107). As self-constructing efforts become perceivable and understandable to others through narratives, the narratives also become core objects of governing when attempting to construct certain kinds of subjectivities. As Barbara Czarniawska (2004, 5) succinctly notes: ‘we are never the sole authors of our own narratives’. Instead, the way we construct ourselves through storytelling is deeply impacted by our culture’s and interpretive community’s repertoire of legitimate stories (ibid., 5–6). Following Foucault’s thoughts on the subjectivation, it can be argued that it is by influencing how we interpret and recount our stories of ourselves that the construction of our subjectivities can be steered, and by analysing these narratives that the battles around how the self should be constructed can be scrutinised.

Narratives are, then, not only the objects of governing. As present day governance operates through subtle techniques like the crafting of ideals and recounting alarming examples, narratives are also, to a large extent, its tools. It is through telling stories about, for instance, good life or great companionship, that the behaviour of people can be steered implicitly and subtly (e.g. Stone 2002, 138–145). In narrative studies, the concepts of master narratives or scripts are often evoked to mean our culturally available and accepted stories of the ‘normal’ (Hyväriinen 2008, 455, Bamberg 2004, 361). When focusing on the subjectivities, these scripts sketch ‘the possible lives’ in a specific context (Bruner 2004, 694). It is crucial to note, however, that I am using the notions of master narratives in a poststructuralist sense (Hyväriinen 2008, 451, Czarniawska 2004, 88). Instead of attempting to identify ‘deep structures’ and universal storylines behind personal narratives, I see the master narratives as deliberatively constructed, preferred ways of telling one’s story that are used to steer people’s self-construction.

A common way to legitimise any interventions or change is to describe the present situation as ‘a problem’ and to proceed to offer certain practices as components in a story towards a better future (Miller & Rose 2008, 14–15, Prior 2009, 18–23, Keränen 2017, 135). As I have illustrated in the previous section, the problems sketched behind the need for experts-by-experience were many. What is,
however, common to the process of making experts, is that it is ‘the growth to expertise’ that is the answer. This setting scripts the journey of becoming an expert-by-experience in the narrative form of a romance; the protagonist starts by being in some ways problematic, unfitting, unaccepted or unaffiliated, but then he or she works hard and overcomes obstacles to reach their true potential (Czarniawska 2004, 21, see also Cruikshank 1999, 67, Holstein & Gubrium 2000, 104–105).

In the following, I have constructed the general script of becoming an expert-by-experience. It does no correspond to any actual story that an interviewee recounted, but instead it combines excerpts from many interviews to illustrate the way in which the journey to expertise was generally told. I posit that a general script of this kind can be interpreted as successful techniques of governing in motion. By recounting similar stories in response to questions concerning the process of becoming an expert-by-experience, the interviewees can be interpreted to construct themselves along the script suggested upon them by the projects, hence steering the interviewees’ to conduct themselves according to this ideal.

I constructed the ideal story by first identifying the key moments most of my interviewees described as parts of their journey towards expertise-by-experience. I then complemented this story by comparing the key moments to the instances that experts-by-experience described as ‘different’ or ‘particular’ in their own stories, hence marking deviations from what they considered to be the norm. In the following, I present this script as the locally preferred way of telling the story of becoming an expert.
For twenty years, I remember hoping that it would be awfully great if, having gone through all of these horrible experiences, I could help someone who is living a similar life. I had an urge to have an impact and to gain a meaning for my experiences. I felt that these issues are understood all wrong, and that I can make everyone – politicians, practitioners and regular John Does – understand us better if I share my experiences. It could help so that no one else would have to face what I’ve had to face.

I had been struggling to find a way to make use of my experiences, and then one morning I was in my car, on my way to work, and was listening to the radio and heard an interview with someone talking about this training that was about to start. And as soon as I got to the office, I went straight online and looked it up, and it seemed extremely interesting. And I thought, could this be it? So, I applied and got selected for an interview. There were, I don’t know, some 500 applicants, and I was sure I wouldn’t be chosen, but then I got in!

The training started in the autumn, and I have to say it was excellent. It was a very diverse group of people, 22 of us originally, but three dropped out. The training entailed a lot of knowledge on the social welfare system, but also a lot of psychological stuff. We went through our life stories, and sort of learned to rearrange it, take a different perspective on it, and probe which aspects we’d like to share with others. And then we studied how to tell the story to others. And I have to say that I for one felt it extremely empowering to be able to, sort of, become a master of oneself, because the recovery process was not finished at that time. So the training enabled turning the experiences into tools to help others. It gave a new, wider perspective on my experiences, and a sense of meaning. And of course the title also lifted me to a more equal status with the practitioners. I was a recognised expert with something to contribute.

After graduation, I have been working as a client representative in different meetings on service development. I have also given lectures to future practitioners and policy-makers about my experiences. My aim is to provide a second knowledge to the discussion and to also suggest solutions. Because it doesn’t advance anything if I just shake my fist; it has to be constructive criticism so that it doesn’t cause resistance on the professionals’ part. It feels empowering that I am being included. I mean, it makes no sense to develop services without listening to people who have actually used them. Without us, the picture cannot be whole, and because of that, I see expertise-by-experience as a really beneficial system. Most of all, I’ve noticed how I have been able to act as an encouraging example for others going through similar experiences.

This year, I applied to pursue further social studies. My aim is to be able to work as a social worker, to be able to help others with similar experiences. For that, I have started to put my role as an expert-by-experience aside. After all, I cannot be a professional and an expert-by-experience at the same time. As a professional, my personal experiences can no longer push through.
The journey towards expertise of oneself is constructed as a story of learning and personal growth. The expert-by-experience ‘gets better’, ‘learns’ to look at things more generally and objectively and creates a ‘healthy distance with her past’. This process of growth is often described with the term empowerment. Concretely, it is very often described to take place in a training process for experts-by-experience (see also McKee & Cooper 2008) and, more specifically, through techniques that work on the participants’ life stories. In article 3, I investigate these techniques with Foucault’s concepts on different forms of truth-speech. I inquire what form of talk on the participants’ selves is required from them at different stages of the growth process.

As a starting point, the participants’ past experiences and current form of self are described as problematic. This renders the conduct of the experts-by-experience-to-be legitimate objects for interventions (also Miller & Rose 2008, 15). The path towards expertise departs from a ‘useless state’, as one interviewee described. Here, the experiences have no meaning, and they solely cause sorrow and pain. Subsequently, the expert-by-experience-to-be wants to start working on their experiences to turn them into something useful.

In article 3, I suggested that at the first stage the required form of speech resembles a confessional, demonstrating the experts-by-experience’s willingness to reveal everything about their past and submit it to scrutiny and revisions. Foucault has argued that confession, as a mode of self-making, requires revealing and evaluating oneself according to norms ‘from above’ (Foucault 2004b, 186–187, 2012, 220–221, also M. G. E. Kelly 2009, 94). Subsequently, it can be used to curb and steer the process of self-making (Foucault 1982), requiring the subject to submit herself to be governed within the dominant paradigm of knowledge (Foucault 2004a, 98, Besley 2005, 374–375, Besley 2002, 134). This ability and willingness to reveal one’s past fully is considered the necessary first step of rehabilitation and empowerment.

‘The confessional’, in these participatory schemes, takes place primarily in and through different techniques of training where the participants first write, illustrate or tell their story, and then afterwards they ‘reconstruct it’ as one interviewee put it. These techniques require the participants to transform themselves into ‘who they ought to be’. One public sector expert-by-experience described this by saying how she ‘turned herself into a project’.

Working upon oneself, in this context, is defined as one’s ability to adhere to outside ideals and standards of reliable knowledge and credible expertise:

TM: Why is dealing with your past important?

P9: Well, it is precisely the expertise of the expert-by-experience. I mean, that she has organised her experiences. She will probably have had many tools to do it, therapy, for example, training and peer support also. It distinguishes experience-based expertise from other experience-based knowledge. I mean, everyone has experience-based knowledge and that of the service users needs to be exploited, but it isn’t necessarily so organised and thought through, but instead it is some raw form of knowledge.

(A civil society practitioner 27.4.2015)
The next stage of becoming an expert of oneself, then, takes place through distancing one’s immediate experiences as a ‘resource’ – as a source of knowledge that is nonetheless alone not enough to make someone an expert. In addition, one needs to ‘think through’ or ‘work upon’ these experiences and preferably build on them by drawing upon others’ experiences as well as scientific knowledge:

P4: In the training, the experts-by-experience get general theoretical knowledge. [...] They have been allowed to calmly reflect on their own experiences, gather additional information and then reorganise it. [...] Before the training, the horror scenario was that what if someone goes out there and starts to cry. We thought that the person isn’t ready yet and that it will be awkward for everyone. That it is another forum where one needs to be acting at that point.

(A public sector practitioner 13.6.2014)

In many of the projects I investigated, knowledge was defined as being distanced, neutral and objective; and the core feature of expertise as the ability to ‘assume a more general outlook’ and ‘not to have any emotional outbursts’. This was done, primarily, by labelling the ability to express one’s experiences neutrally and constructively as a sign of empowerment and rehabilitation. The following interview transcript illustrates this:

TM: What does it mean that the past has been dealt with?
E17: [sighs] Well, I think that dealing with your past means that you are able to talk about it without big emotional reactions, I mean that you don’t burst into tears or feel very angry or bitter, but you are able to talk about your experiences in a calm and neutral manner. I mean that your emotions are no longer uncontrollable. And that you have constructed your story into a whole where you already understand the connections between the facts.

(A civil society expert-by-experience 11.6.2015)

These pre-requirements of neutrality and objectivity can be identified as measures to contain and control the experts-by-experience’s participation (see also Newman et al. 2004, 211–212). By equating ‘knowing oneself’ with the ability to talk in a neutral and objective manner, the projects’ practitioners retained control over deciding who and what kinds of input would be accepted and recognised. Furthermore, they preserved the ability to legitimately exclude unwanted and awkward inputs, and to steer the participants towards a way of being that was convenient for them. Here, the dominant paradigm of knowledge becomes a framework within which the experts-by-experience’s knowledge on themselves gets evaluated, making it also a tool to justify why a certain way of being from the experts-by-experience is needed, as the following quote from a CSO practitioner shows:

P8: In an acute phase, your own experience can be strongly emotion-filled, it can be bitter, you can blame others for all sorts of things. This is not very convincing. You need to have developed a clearer view on what has happened and what it has been all about.

(A civil society practitioner 27.4.2015)
The emotion-filled, raw speech, then is ‘not very convincing’, hence legitimising the need to make the experts-by-experience fit their way of knowing themselves into the dominant paradigm of knowledge. As an expert-by-experience, they need to faithfully replicate a certain, technocratic expert-role through a neutral discourse and a consensual manner of participation. Subsequently, while experience remains the source of legitimacy for their right to participate, it becomes a burden causing unreliability when the participants assume the role of an expert-by-experience. Here, a new, distanced position towards one’s past is needed to align effortlessly with other experts in the field.

These techniques of expert-making, focusing strongly on neutralising the experts-by-experience’s way of telling their stories, illustrate both the dominant paradigm of knowledge in this policy-context, making the recognition of experiential knowledge difficult, but also the underlying rationale behind incorporating the experts-by-experience into the policy-process. Experts-by-experience are considered, first and foremost, as experts, and their participation evaluated accordingly. This places them sternly within the collaborative network-governance scheme, making their evaluation and subsequent inclusion or exclusion based on the value of their contributions, legitimate and feasible.

The specific techniques of participant construction, in these initiatives, operate largely through defining when one is considered ready to move from a more intimate sphere of engagements into a more public one. This is operationalised in the definitions of empowerment. In the projects studied here, a participant is most commonly thought to be empowered if they manifest the ability to ‘view matters more generally and present them in a neutral manner’. Consequently, it can be argued that the definitions of empowerment, revolving around neutral and collaborative way of knowing and representing oneself, become key tools in governing the participants’ way of being. This makes it possible to present alternative ways of articulating oneself appear as irrational, and symptomatic of ill-health, making their exclusion from participation legitimate.

This finding is a crucial stepping stone for further inquiries, as it illustrates the significance and role that the definitions of knowledge and expertise hold in this context. As the participants’ subject-construction is influenced by the projects’ definitions of the appropriate process and form of ‘knowing oneself’, and the experts-by-experience are expected to participate as experts of themselves, the definitions of credible knowledge can be translated into conditions the participants have to meet to be allowed to participate. ‘Knowing yourself’ becomes a prerequisite for participation, and the definitions of that knowledge provide powerful governing devices to steer the participants’ way of being.

4.2.2 The counter narratives

This ideal growth story from an excluded individual to a neutral and empowered collaborator did not, of course, always correspond to what actually happened. Although the administration, as well as many experts-by-experience, especially within the mental health sector, recounted the key moments of this story rather faithfully as parts of the process of becoming an expert, many interviewees also
described how their paths had not followed this route. Either they expressed how they were made experts in a different way, contested the techniques employed as parts of the process of making experts or criticised the role offered as an expert. I consider these stories as counter narratives – as attempts to resist and distance oneself from the preferred ways of telling the story of becoming an expert (see Hyvärinen 2008, 455, Bamberg 2004). In the following, I illustrate these counter narratives with quotes where my interviewees describe their journey differently from the key moments identified in the above outlined general script of becoming an expert.
Key moments
Traumatic experience

Need / urge to do something (useful) with the experience

Seeking the position of an expert-by-experience

Making proof of one's 'readiness' to work on experiences

Developing one's experiences 'into a tool' – a neutral attitude and a distance to one's experiences

‘Empowerment’
New meaning and use for the experiences

Acting as an expert-by-experience in collaboration with the practitioners and the administration

Experiences of helping others and having an impact

Growing beyond expertise-by-experience and leaving it behind

'I was dragged out from my home. They wanted to activate me.'

'I can't say that I've wanted to become an expert-by-experience. I was mostly made into one.'

'I don't know if I can say that I want to be an expert-by-experience. Others want to call me that.'

'I would never go to a training for experts-by-experience. For me, expertise-by-experience is something that relies entirely on my own experience. It's my life. I know what I'm talking about when I talk about my life. I don't understand what part of it I could possibly study.'

'I felt like I was pushed down by saying 'hey, you're recovering'. I got a feeling that [with a patronising voice] 'We're now trying to nurse and empower you, don't you try to be too active yet. Just take it easy.'

'Sometimes, especially when I talk to the professionals, I intentionally poke the hornets' nest to evoke thoughts and emotions'

'They tell you what the topic of your talk will be and what opinion you should hold. If you don't agree, then you don't need to come at all. [...] They say that you can disagree with the professionals, but you have to remain within a certain frame. So, in effect, you can slightly disagree, but if you disagree a lot, it is the wrong opinion to have.'

'I've always been an expert-by-experience. But it is only now that others have come to realise that.'

'It is a new title for something I've always been.'

'I think the trainings are utter bullshit. They kill the experience by putting it into a frame'

'You can't have an impact if there are no emotions involved. It is through emotions that we have any affect on anyone! You can't have an impact if there is no emotional connection.'

'I have to say bluntly that it is only in hindsight that I've started to feel used. And then, to put things in an ugly and caricatured way, cast away into the corner.'

'I think that I should be allowed to say what I have on my mind and not have to polish it. There might be these dignified gentlemen who can't bear to hear this. But I think that it's useless to speak if you can't say it the way you experience it.'

'Think of how frustrating it is when your participation leads nowhere?!'

'Now I should be able to get rid of my criminal background in order to lead a normal life. But if I say that I am an expert-by-experience, I have to justify why I claim to be an expert. I have to rip my entire life open. And every time someone new comes to a meeting, I have to start over.'
The experts-by-experience’s counter-narratives of their process of becoming an expert were varied. First, seven of the 23 interviewees claimed that they had not sought to become experts-by-experience, but were rather made as ones. Furthermore, three insisted on how they had always been experts-by-experience, but that this was only just now recognised by the organisation and public administration. Hence, even though a majority of the interviewees described expertise-by-experience as an opportunity they had actively sought for, nearly a half questioned this view and suspected that something else was behind the will to make them experts. One civil society expert-by-experience speculated:

E6: I think it comes more from the professionals’ part. They want a title or a sign that you’re not just anyone when you walk into an office. The title signals that you come from somewhere and are, somehow, an employee after all. So by the title you’re also given the right to access these environments. I think it’s a safety measure on the part of the professionals, so that not just anyone can walk into a ministry. You need the title to show that you have a legitimate reason to be there.

(A civil society expert-by-experience, 14.5.2014)

The above interviewee points towards the critique that is well known from earlier governmentality studies on participatory initiatives. It is an observation that titles such as expert-by-experience or empowerment can also be used to delineate appropriate participants – to pick and choose only those voices that conform to the administration’s goals (Martin 2008a, M. Berger & Charles 2014, 10–11, Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015, Article 2). As their response to the perceived attempts to steer their way of being, five experts-by-experience rather forcefully expressed how they would never go to a training for experts-by-experience (articles 3 and 4), and four others stated to be sceptical towards trainings and suggested that they should only be focused on practical matters, such as how the social welfare system works. In addition, six of the 14 practitioners interviewed expressed doubts concerning the purpose of the trainings. These critical interviewees saw trainings as a means to take control of the participants’ experiences and to steer their way of being, as the following quote from a civil society practitioner illustrates:

P13: The trainings and criteria are an easy way to devalue expertise-by-experience. For instance, of course there are people who are in such conditions that they’ll never get through training. But that doesn’t mean that they are any less valuable as participants than those who have gone through long trainings. That’s why I have this suspicion that the trainings might create too high of a threshold for expertise-by-experience. Are they made these little professionals?

(A civil society practitioner 16.10.2015)

The experts-by-experience who refused trainings, and the practitioners who contested them, were also quite wary about the demand of presenting one’s experiences neutrally and objectively. They saw it as a contradiction in terms, purporting instead that if it is experiences the administration wanted to hear, then it is experiences that they should be ready to listen to (article 4).

It is noteworthy that the experts-by-experience who most departed from the general script, and the practitioners who were most explicitly critical towards the
practices of expert-making, acted in a civil society context. Furthermore, experts-by-experience with a mental health background followed the general script the closest. This, as I suggest in articles 2 and 4, may be revelatory of the different justification regimes drawn upon when developing expertise-by-experience. In a civil society context, it is easily feasible to tap into everyone’s right to be heard and hence contest evaluating experts-by-experience’s participation merely through the input it produces. Furthermore, compared to the public sector, it is easier for a civil society actor to successfully justify one’s subversive position towards the administration. On the other hand, this can also be illustrative of the hierarchical power dynamics in the psychiatric domain, enticing the experts-by-experience to ‘heal’ according to the instructions outlined to them (Randall & Munro 2010). However, these categorisations are of course not clear-cut, and exceptions occur.

Moving further along the journey, eight interviewed experts-by-experience were dubious as to whether their participation had had any impact, or explicitly stated their deception towards its outcomes. Most commonly, they saw their participation ‘leading nowhere’, or more severely, felt used or exploited. I will explore these deceptions towards the promises of expertise-by-experience in the following section by illustrating the experienced limits of their expert-role. Then, I will continue with a more detailed description of the practices of resistance in section 4.4.

Finally, it needs to be mentioned that while most of the interviewed experts-by-experience felt that the practice had helped them to move further in their process of recovery, a few also felt that dragging the experiences along was exhausting and wearing them down. They felt that, because of the concept, they continuously needed to go through their experiences for their expertise to be justified, hence hindering them from moving on in their life.

4.3 ‘The danger of trained monkeys’ – the perceived limits of expertise

The experts-by-experience’s most common deceptions towards their possibilities for participation concerned either the narrow space, or the false promises offered by the concept of expertise. On the one hand, the very notion of expertise was experienced as carrying with it a set of requirements that limited the participants’ possible ways of being (articles 1, 2, 3 and 4). On the other, some interviewees felt that despite the promises, they were not genuinely treated as experts (article 4). I will consider these two limits of expertise next.

The following picture was drawn spontaneously by an expert-by-experience employed in a CSO during the course of an interview. The drawing illustrates his experiences of the co-production process of a social housing project he was invited to participate in. The name of the organisation in question has been blurred from the drawing.
The interviewee’s illustration, in contrast to the ideal model of co-production presented in section 4.1.1, is filled with question marks and unclear connections between actors. It shows how the expert-by-experience was extremely confused and disappointed in the disconnect between the projects’ promises and his experiences of what actually happened. In comparison to the neat ideal model presented above, the experienced ‘co-production’ seems much messier, and not very inclusive.

First, the interviewee expressed their disappointment with the co-operative setting, which they had experienced as a false promise. They did not feel like they were being treated as an equal expert, much to the contrary:
E14: All through these various phases, I wasn’t included. Which does not stop this bunch of clowns from reporting that they had an expert-by-experience consulting the whole project.

(A civil society expert-by-experience 8.4.2015)

Another expert-by-experience reports a similar experience:

E17: I think now expertise-by-experience has become a trendy catchword, and everyone wants to use it. Even the funder wants to see it everywhere. So, as a result, we’re being asked to meetings and are forgotten in the corner. We’re not really included, but hey, they can put it in their report that we were there.

(A civil society expert-by-experience 11.6.2015)

Collaboration, in the critical interviewees’ view, all too often meant co-optation of the service users’ knowledge and using it to advance decisions already made elsewhere (article 4). The goal of expertise-by-experience, in this view, meant providing ‘citizen representatives’ to meet the norm of participative governance the administration could then use to legitimise already made decisions. Collaboration and participation, in these interviewees’ experiences, were merely rhetorical devices to make the governance process appear participatory and hence build its legitimacy (article 2). In their view, the experts-by-experience were present in meetings and participatory arrangements merely for appearances, not for actual input.

As a result, expertise-by-experience was perceived by some as a mere smokescreen – a catchword used in funding applications as a sign of adhering to the norm of participative governance. The interviewee explains their drawing further:

E14: So, here we have the Ministry who initiated the project. And here we have a big city. The Ministry and the City\textsuperscript{20} agree on a partnership, they agree on doing something together. The other one has a lot of money, and they give it to the other. And here, in between, they invite us [the CSO]. Because there is no contract without us, they need us for it.

(A civil society expert-by-experience 8.4.2015)

The interviewee describes how ‘they need us for it’ because ‘there is no contract without us’. The call for collaboration, in their view, is not made because diverse forms of knowledge are needed (epistemic claims), or because the beneficiaries would be considered to have a right to have a say on matters that concern them (political claims) (see article 2). On the contrary, the interviewee suspects that they have been invited because of the participatory norm of participatory governance; the CSO is needed so that the norm of partnerships in a stakeholder society would be met. As one participant in a THL organised workshop put it, this can lead to a situation where the experts-by-experience fulfil the role of ‘trained

\textsuperscript{20} Detailed information has been omitted to ensure the anonymity of the participants.
monkeys’ – they are physically present to show that the participatory duty was met, but no contribution is welcome from them.

In a similar vein, many interviewees, both experts-by-experience and practitioners, questioned whether the experts-by-experience actually were treated as equal experts. Some experts-by-experience even stated that as long as they rely on their experiences, they cannot be considered ‘full experts’, and many had pursued further studies to be able to be considered an equal. A group discussant illustratively put this by saying how they will pursue a university education only so that they can say after graduation that ‘this was my opinion all along’.

The interviewees’ second criticism concerns the limitations to the possibilities of participation brought up by the notion of expertise. Some interviewees described how definitions of expertise translated into selection of the participants that would agree with the administration’s view and support the pre-made decisions (article 3). In some of my interviewees’ experiences disagreement and contradicting opinions were not welcome, and their advancement often resulted in being excluded for ‘co-operation’ altogether. An extract from the group discussion illustrates this well:

G4: In my opinion, the experts-by-experience are usually only given pre-defined tasks. [...] The public officials think about what they want to order, according to what some doctor or another wants to hear.
G1: I agree. In my opinion, our need to be heard, maybe it’s only met in those issues where it’s convenient for them to hear us.
G4: Yes. It’s some sort of ‘made to order’ business. Like, if you don’t have the right opinion, they’ll use someone else instead. [...] They tell you what the topic of your talk is and what opinion you should hold. If you don’t agree, you don’t have to come at all.

(Groups discussion among civil society experts-by-experience, 30.11.2016)

The group discussants forcefully describe how they need to have ‘the right opinion’ in order to be accepted as participants. This, it appears, most often meant agreeing with the organisers’ point of view. This consensus-seeking requirement, I argue, becomes feasible and reasonable under the participatory governance paradigm that evaluates the network participants based on the inputs they can produce. It can, hence, be employed to exclude opinionated participants and conflicting interests (Blühdorn 2013, Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015, Martin 2012b, Richard-Ferroudjji 2011), something that prior research has named the participatory processes’ ‘obsession for consensus’ (see Gourgues, Rui & Topçu 2013, 21, also Bevir 2006, 426–429). The ethos of co-production seats the different kinds of experts on the same side of the table, assumably ready to tackle mutually worrisome issues in partnerships (see also Newman & Clarke 2009).

Rationalising participation as a tool in co-production makes knowledge, instead of an opinion, a legitimate content of political participation. When the experts-by-experience’s participation is justified because of the contributions it produces, it makes perfect sense to open up possibilities for participation only for experts. Moreover, when the appropriate kind of participants are experts, definitions of ‘valuable knowledge’ become perfectly logical tools to be used to deline-
ate ‘valuable participants’ (articles 2 and 3). Valuable knowledge, in turn, gets logically evaluated by using the same criteria of neutrality and objectivity as for other experts’ knowledge (see also Cotterell & Morris 2011, 69).

The descriptions of possibilities of participation created for experts illustrate how this setting can also be experienced as very limiting (articles 2 and 3). The following group discussant explains:

G4: I quit the customer board myself. I felt that the possibilities of truly having an impact were pretty non-existent. I mean, they say that you can disagree with the professionals, but you have to remain within a certain frame. So, in effect, you can slightly disagree, but if you disagree a lot, it is a wrong opinion to have.

(A group discussant, 30.11.2016)

The obsession for consensus appears very strongly in the group discussant’s experience. Disagreeing a lot was ‘the wrong opinion to have’. As explained in articles 3 and 4, these delineations of appropriate speech were very skilfully and implicitly constructed in the projects through the concept of expertise. Because the participants were engaged as experts, it was not appropriate to assume a strongly critical position.

Five practitioners interviewed expressed a similar suspicion towards the narrow role of an expert. The following excerpt from an interview with a civil society practitioner illustrates this:

TM: Why do you think you have adopted the concept even if the activities are something that have always existed in your organisation?

P7: The funder says that everything has to have a name [laughs].

TM: Right.

P7: The [funder’s] steering is peculiar. They start steering and categorising these terms, while we’ve continuously tried not to give labels or create classifications.

TM: What are the consequences of creating categories?

P7: Precisely the continuous compartmentalising and control through it. That you draw only specific things out of a specific compartment, and other things from the next. The person as a whole gets ignored. What do we have if we don’t have that? More legally defined boxes containing experts-by-experience. But it shouldn’t be a box that is called expertise-by-experience. There should be different ways, different shapes and different routes to the ‘normal’. I hate the talk of, ‘Right, now we get these people to get integrated back into society.’ Great, have they not been part of it before? It only means that now they’ll behave.

(A civil society practitioner, 20.4.2015)

The practitioner above expressed their concern that by calling the participants experts, ‘we’ – as in the project staff and the public administration they work with – will be able to choose what appropriate expertise is. They emphasise that it should be the experts-by-experience who create their own way of being an ex-
pert, and suspect that the practice, as it now stands, is only a means to ‘make them behave’ (articles 3 and 4).

Another civil society practitioner articulated a similar concern in an interview, explaining how the concept of an expert might cause the participants to get detached from their community and its everyday life and create an artificial hierarchy among the participants (also article 1):

P14: Lately I’ve started to think that there is a risk with all of this. Because the expert as a word might... I mean the danger is that then there are the people with problems and then there are experts-by-experience. So if we build this system where the experts-by-experience are a group of their own with no connections to the community, then we encounter problems. The word ‘expert’ is very dangerous in a way if it isn’t tied down to the community’s other activities because it doesn’t mean that you’re somehow above everyone else. You’re only a piece in a puzzle that is constantly changing.

(A civil society practitioner 16.10.2015)

The above practitioner says, ‘The word “expert” is very dangerous’, and puts into words what the critical experts-by-experience and practitioners all seem to point towards. By using the word ‘expert’, it becomes possible to determine appropriate participants in a way that best suits the project’s or, moreover, its partners’ demands. It also enables falsely presenting experts-by-experience as having an equal impact on decisions made and actions taken, even though their input would, in practice, have little effect. A report from one of THL’s workshops, where experts-by-experience and practitioners debated the concept and its current uses, forcefully illustrates these two reservations towards acting as an expert:

Experts-by-experience were also experienced as parts of the system, stuck in the bureaucratic machinery. They no longer bring ‘an edge’ but are a part of the system until they retire. Some felt that they lose their ‘rock n roll’ and become ‘poodles’ who are paraded around. A worry for the exploitation of experts-by-experience has been common for all areas. People don’t want to be showpieces, but they want to have an impact and help by sharing their experiences.

(Report from a THL workshop on expertise-by-experience, 22.1.2014)

The fate of becoming ‘stuck in the bureaucratic machinery’ was what some participants as well as some practitioners ended up resisting by being an expert in a different way. This is explored in the next section.

4.4 Unwelcome truths and wild participants

The experts-by-experience are not, by any means, mere sitting ducks. Some of them, along with some practitioners, engaged vigorously in questioning the demand to be neutral and collaborative. Intriguingly, they did not discard the notion of expertise in so doing, but instead they took up the initiatives’ promise of treating them as ‘truth-tellers’. In various ways, the participants attempted to re-
claim the right to define the meaning of expertise and knowledge in the projects’ context. For them, expertise-by-experience was the gateway to *politicise knowledge and expertise* in a social welfare context – something that the policymakers seem to have been largely unequipped and unwilling to engage in. These practices of contestation and critique are at the focus of article 4.

To make sense of the delicate practices of resistance that the experts-by-experience and the practitioners employed, I made use of Foucault’s concept of counter-conduct and parrhesia, which are discussed in more detail in section 2.4. Through the concept, it becomes possible to make visible the more mundane, grassroots negotiations that aim at stretching the limits of participatory schemes, while all the while engaging in them (see O’Toole & Gale 2014, 202–203). Instead of overt refusals to participate, these practices of resistance mean taking part in initiatives of expertise-by-experience and at the same time questioning what expertise and knowledge should mean in this context.

In article 4, I depart by showing how the projects are set as stages for the participants to act as *parrhesiastes* – as truth-tellers whose task it was to remain connected to their own truth and force the administration to critically examine the legitimacy of its rule. This kind of a scenario was painted, for example, in a workshop organised by the THL. A public report of the event summarises it as follows:

> Expertise-by-experience completes the administration’s understanding, which can be detached from true everyday lives and practices.

*(Report from a THL workshop on expertise-by-experience, 22.1. 2014)*

The experts-by-experience, then, were expected to bring ‘the raw and authentic truth’ to the administration’s awareness. However, as is also visible in the above quote, this raw truth is to be complementary, not primary, in decision-making.

This is the setting that eight of the 23 experts-by-experience and six of the 14 practitioners interviewed explicitly contested. They did so by illuminating and stretching the limits of appropriate participation, which in this context means the appropriate ways to talk about one’s experiences so that they are considered knowledge. Here, I discern the participants’ and practitioners’ counter-conduct through the four different strategies for expanding the limits of knowledge and expertise I identified. The first two took place by making the limits of current conceptions of knowledge and expertise explicit. The second two entailed concrete practices that stretched and tested who can be considered an expert in the projects’ context.

First, the experts-by-experience and practitioners made visible the processes where the participants were made experts, highlighting how the dominant notion of expertise remained unchallenged. The following two practitioners explain how trainings can be used as a means to ‘validate experiences’:

P13: At this point, it is probably good to tell you that I’m somewhat sceptical of the model [of expertise-by-experience]. I wonder whether the heavy training demands result in a setting where people’s experiences are validated through a training that is
planned and conducted by professional experts. I mean, that it is only after [the training] that they get a say and the freedom to speak in matters where they should be listened to anyway.

P14: Your experience only starts to matter when you are an expert-by-experience.

(Civil society practitioners 16.10.2015)

By illuminating the potential problems in the process of making experts, the above practitioners questioned how expertise should be conceived of in this context. In their view, the participants' experiences should be recognised and regarded as valuable without official trainings and diplomas.

Second, some interviewees explicitly took up the notion of knowledge, and they demanded that it should be reconsidered and its limits expanded when talking about experts-by-experience. The following civil society expert-by-experience uses an illustrative metaphor when they explain how experts-by-experience should be treated as authors, rather than books. I perceive of this metaphor as an attempt to illustrate an alternative epistemological stance that seeks to destabilise the requirement that the experts-by-experience’s knowledge should be aligned with, and compared to, scientific knowledge:

E13: Somehow I feel that the official actors [public administration] think that an expert-by-experience is a dictionary of different knowledge and vocabulary. You open it when you need it, and you put it back on the shelf when you’re done. The thing that they don’t realise is that the expert-by-experience is in fact the one who writes the dictionary. She constantly replenishes it. But the public officials don’t know how to receive that kind of information. Instead they expect their participation to be very concrete, a very specific task that is fulfilled and that’s it.

(A civil society expert-by-experience, 8.4.2015)

The above interviewee highlights how central it is that the experts-by-experience, not the administration, are the ones who defines the contours of their knowledge. Furthermore, they seem to purport a constructionist understanding of knowledge as something that is formed in interactions and is constantly changing and replenished.

Third, as their concrete practice of counter-conduct, four interviewees recounted having deliberately talked in manners that they knew would not be regarded well. They did so in order to ‘evoke conversation’ or ‘poke the hornets’ nest’. The following group discussant expresses a similar desire. They explain their plans to give feedback to a project where the group discussant felt like they had been treated as a mere token:

G5: When I’ll go there [to the project’s final seminar], I will be sure to give a speech that will be a slap in their faces. I will go and I will deliver that speech, and I will say quite frankly what I think about this project. I mean, I won’t trash the whole project, but I will give a speech that will surely make them tremble. We have to hold our own in those situations. I, for one, will not be exploited.

(A group discussant, 30.11.2016)
The group discussant realises that the way they plan on speaking is not what is expected, as it will be ‘a slap in their faces’. They nonetheless hang on to their right to speak their mind, however critical it might be, even though they are aware of the limits for what is considered appropriate participation. This, as I suggest in article 4, can be viewed as indicative of the participants will to sketch the conditions of their participation themselves; to participate as an expert, but to critically engage in defining what expertise should mean.

Finally, the participants’ counter-conduct also took the form of opening the doors to other people who did not meet the standards of appropriate expertise. The following experts-by-experience recounts an incident from one of her fieldsites, where her open approach to expertise-by-experience was opposed by a practitioner’s narrower notion as to who can be allowed to participate:

**TM:** Are the people you work with in [a Finnish town] experts-by-experience also?

**E6:** Yes. They are in their own way because they live in these places. And what I try to accomplish there is that I go and pick also the voices that maybe are not so welcome otherwise. I mean precisely the negative stuff, what people actually say there. We had this incident in [the town]. There was this building project coming up, and an architect was there. They had invited customers to participate, and a few came. One came and didn’t appear to me to be very disoriented or anything. But an employee knew them and took them to the kitchen to do a breathalyser test, and then threw them out. […] I brought it up later and said that since you promote this as being a place of low-threshold, could this actually be one? This employee said that they have chosen the clients I get to talk with. I answered that this will not be the case, I will talk to everyone. They clearly got mad at me for that. I thought it was funny as it was such a clear example of how practitioners, after all, are able to steer whose voice gets heard and whose does not.

(A civil society expert-by-experience, 14.5.2014)

In the above example, the interviewee wanted to openly contest the local practitioner’s view on whose voice should be heard and, furthermore, who can decide that. By advancing ‘precisely the negative stuff’, the interviewee wanted to stretch the limits of acceptable knowledge and force the project’s partners (public administration and other CSOs) to listen to utterances they might be uncomfortable with.

In article 4, I interpreted these experts-by-experience’s and practitioners’ attempts to newly define knowledge and expertise as a form of counter-conduct. Its purpose was not to refuse to participate altogether but rather to redefine the conditions under which the experts-by-experience were made to participate. These interviewees saw the different quality of the experts-by-experience’s knowledge as its strength, even as its very core; something that would be lost if it was to be moulded to fit the dominant understanding of knowledge. As a civil society practitioner described, it is a form of knowledge that ‘cuts through the Teflon’, i.e. it enters the decision-makers on an emotional level, making it harder to ignore. Furthermore, they perceived the processes of expert-making inversely compared to the ideal story presented in section 4.2.1. Instead of seeing it as a process where the experts-by-experience transform themselves to fit their representation of themselves to the dominant paradigm of knowledge, they saw the
experts-by-experience’s participation as a means to destabilise the way knowledge is to be understood. Through the notion of expertise-by-experience, new and different ways of being should be made available.

Two aspects are particularly noteworthy in these practices of resistance. First, the concepts of knowledge and expertise were stretched both by experts-by-experience and by practitioners. This makes the dichotomous setting between the administration that governs, and the citizens that resist, problematic in light of empirical findings. In fact, especially in a mental health context, it was mostly the practitioners who challenged the dominant understanding of knowledge. The experts-by-experience, in turn, often relied heavily on the hierarchy it provided as the basis of their subject-construction. They were happy to be ‘more’ than the people who were not considered experts.

Second, the practices that seemingly invite the participants’ ‘raw knowledge’, but that use it mostly to legitimise ready-made decisions, and the practices that take up the concept of expertise in order to open it up for political debate, illustrate the interwoven character of power and resistance. Both necessitate one another; the administration harnesses the participants’ critical discourse as a legitimation tool, and the participants use the limits drawn for their participation as a basis for their subversive self-making (see also O’Toole & Gale 2014, 204). In this way, the attempts to govern by creating experts can also, inadvertently, enable politicising expertise, and by so doing, opening up new possibilities for participation.
5 CONCLUSIONS

P14: Truth be told, it bugs me that we need to call these people experts-by-experience in order for them to be heard. Maybe it tells a little something about our system and the lack of participatory democracy, which isn’t quite up there where it should be. I think it’s a sign of how inclusion in our society is still limited. You need to prove you’re something before you can be heard.

(A civil society practitioner 16.10.2015)

In my introduction, I laid out that the objective of this thesis was to inquire how the practices of expert-making sustain, or conversely, undermine democracy. I asked whether expertise-by-experience contributes to ‘democratisation of expertise’, i.e. enables recognising hitherto disregarded forms of knowledge, and opening up new avenues for political participation for silenced groups, or whether it conversely leads to ‘expertisation of democracy’; building new epistemic thresholds for participation and moving an increasing variety of issues from the realm of political debate into the domain of ‘neutral administration’. In this concluding section, I revisit my article’s findings and reinterpret them through a critical democratic lens (Griggs, Norval & Wagenaar 2014, 25–28) in order to evaluate the democratic capacity of these processes of expert-making.

5.1 A normative evaluation of participatory practices

I started this section with a quote from a civil society practitioner who was very disappointed with the democratic potential of expertise-by-experience. As the concerned practitioner illustratively puts, in the context of the activation projects studied in this thesis, ‘you need to prove you’re something before you can be heard’. This concern coincides largely with my interpretations of the practices of making experts. The projects studied were ripe with practices whose objective was to ensure the participants ‘were ready’ for action. As I have illustrated on many occasions in the previous section, this enabled the projects to determine criteria for the participants’ ‘readiness’ according to the projects’ objectives.
But how can we evaluate these practices more specifically from a democratic perspective? In this concluding section, I take on a challenge to bring together a normative theoretical framework of democracy with an empirical analysis of participatory practices (see Norval 2014, 76–77, G. Smith 2009, 12–15). I am going to revisit the governmentality analysis of my articles and consider the participants’ processes of self-making with the help of Jacques Rancière’s thinking. This makes it possible to use critical theorists’ understanding about democracy as a normative framework to illustrate both the democratic capacity of the participatory practices themselves, as well as the power relations at play in rationalising and setting norms and limits for these practices (see Norval 2014, 69).

Normative democratic theory provides us with several potential points of entry when evaluating participatory initiatives’ democratic and emancipatory potential. Griggs and colleagues (2014, 30–32, also Li 2007c, 24, Bornemann & Haus 2017, Rose 1999, 277) suggest looking at whether the processes enable critique, re-politicisation and de-stabilisation of what ‘we know to be true’. This can be studied by looking at possibilities to disagree, and the projects’ attitude towards conflict and disaccord (e.g. Mouffe 1993, 5–6, Laclau & Mouffe 2014, 138, Li 2007c, 24–26, Norval 2014, 77). It would also be possible to look at the possibilities to form collective identities and to advocate for collective interests (Li 2007c, 22). A Foucauldian approach, in addition, steers the analytical gaze on the individual level, encouraging to investigate the potential for freedom in self-construction and the diverse ways of ‘being critically’ (Foucault 2007, 190, Cadman 2010, 550, O’Toole & Gale 2014, 204).

However, as Norval (2014, 76–77) points out, while these poststructuralist approaches provide us with several characterisations of crucial aspects to democracy, they remain very abstract and cannot be effortlessly translated into a set of criteria to evaluate participatory projects’ democratic capacity. On a more practical level, and partially in criticism of the attempts to develop evaluative frameworks from a normative theoretical perspective, Graham Smith (2009) suggests a more practical toolset. He proposes four ‘democratic goods’ whose realisation we should focus on when evaluating participatory processes’ democratic capacity: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgement and transparency. By inclusiveness, Smith means looking at both who is present, as well as how institutional norms, rules and expectations steer who is able to voice their perspectives through participation (ibid., 24–26). Popular control refers to the extent to which citizens have the possibility to define the agenda of participation and to actually have an effect on the final decisions (ibid., 26–27). With the notion of considered judgement, Smith encourages us to investigate how the practices support citizens to learn more about the issues at hand and build their understanding of others’ perspectives (ibid., 27–28). Finally, transparency means both the transparency of the conditions under which citizens are participating, as well as the openness of the participatory processes to the wider public (ibid., 29).

In order to infuse Smith’s evaluation with the depth of normative theory, I propose crafting an evaluative tool-set of participatory practices based on critical theory, particularly Jacque Rancière’s thinking. For critical thinkers like Rancière,
critique is a key practice of politicisation, as it works on contesting and redefining concepts and meanings with an aim to destabilise the paradigm of knowledge through which people are being governed (Foucault 1997, 32, Bevir 2011, Rancière 2011, Genel 2016, for an example, see Li 2007c). This critique enables redefining the rules and norms of political debate and opening up room for new actors, new issues and new ways of taking part. Furthermore, Rancière’s thinking adds a radical emancipatory ethos to the Foucauldian examination of critique. For Rancière, critique’s role is to allow marginalised and suppressed citizens to claim the right to define knowledge and truth, to contest the subjectivities suggested upon them and create new ways of being that might currently seem unthinkable, unimaginable and undoable (Rancière 1999, 14–15, Genel 2016, 20, 27, on a similar point in Foucault’s work, see Cadman 2010, 550). These ‘interruptions’ are founded on a radically egalitarian premise, which, for Rancière, constitutes democracy (Rancière 2011, 79, Rancière 1999, 17).

In sum, Rancière places democracy in battles that seek to destabilise the limits of who is allowed to act and how – and who gets to define that. Using Smith’s more practical terminology, these battles are places to contest the current limits to inclusiveness and popular control, as well as the norms contributing to what is considered ‘considered judgement’. Below, I will follow Rancière in probing these participatory projects’ democratic quality by asking whether the processes of expertise-by-experience 1) are founded on an egalitarian premise, 2) enable questioning what we ‘know to be true’ and further the possibilities for such destabilisations and re-politicisations and 3) claim room for new actors, new issues and new ways to engage in political debate. In Smith’s terms, my interpretations deal most of all with how the mechanisms of expertisation contribute to the inclusiveness, popular control and norms for considered judgement within the participatory practices.

If we go back to the practitioner’s quote at the start of this section, the grade given for the projects’ democratic potential seems fairly low on all of the three aspects. First, the egalitarian premise seems to be non-existent, i.e. ‘you need to prove you’re something before you can be heard’. Indeed, this ‘lifting up’ was one of the core objectives of the processes of expert-making. The participants were something ‘less’ before they entered the activation processes, and were transformed into ‘empowered’ and credible experts – provided they closely followed the steps that were required of them. Through trainings and practice lectures, the experts-by-experience ‘learnt’ to share their stories in appropriate ways, or were able to ‘develop’ their experiences into tools. Despite the compelling rhetoric of how ‘everyone is an expert of their own lives’, the actual practices point out how the projects’ premise is not at all equal in terms of recognising everyone’s knowledge as equally valuable and everyone’s participation as equally welcome.

The participants’ unequal valuation in participatory governance is also visible in the projects’ focus. A vast majority of them developed expertise-by-experience by creating trainings for experts-by-experience and offering possibilities to practice their performances. It was the experts-by-experience who needed to learn a new way to speak and a new outlook on their past experiences. It was
only a few civil society projects that also explicitly targeted the politicians and local decision-makers and invited them to reconsider what they know about the issues in question. Most often, it was the experts-by-experience who needed to ‘learn to know differently’ in order to be elevated to the same level with other experts.

This inegalitarian premise is what makes the projects’ practices of governing appear legitimate and rational. When people with difficult experiences are considered to be less capable of knowing and talking about themselves in appropriate ways, the practices that are geared towards ‘helping’ them to empower or create a ‘healthy’ distance to their past, as one practitioner put it, can be easily presented as legitimate and necessary. This becomes recognisable especially when the alternative is considered: if marginalised people were considered to possess equally valuable information, and their way of being an equally possible way of taking part in political debate, all attempts to steer and harness their speech would seem outrageous and a violation of their rights. How would it be perceived if members of the parliament were assigned to a two-year course where they were taught ‘the appropriate way’ to rearrange their story and speak about their own lives?

Second, in light of my findings, it seems valid to interpret expertise-by-experience as one symptom of the expertisation of democracy, which solidifies rather than de-stabilises ‘what we know to be true’. The practices that are geared towards constructing the participants as experts remain tightly connected to a very technocratic notion of expertise, and hence they are focused on ridding the experts-by-experience of personal attachments, emotions and opinions. Experts-by-experience are envisaged as consultants to public administration, which makes it easy to deem their opinionated efforts to influence politicians or public opinion as unruly behaviour. This provides a very concrete example of the depoliticising tendency of the participatory governance project. The participants are invited to take part in what is made to appear as neutral management of services, or joint knowledge-production with the aim to find the objectively best solution to a given problem. They are to become experts of themselves, not advocates for the causes that matter to them. This is a move that Tania Murray Li calls ‘rendering technical’ – one of the most prominent practices of de-politicising an issue and delineating the appropriate experts for its handling (Li 2007c, 7). Participation, in this scheme, takes the form of a seemingly a-political activity, which is performed in neutral collaboration and based only on commonly recognised, objective knowledge (see also Sullivan 2014, 184, J. Wilson & Swyngedouw 2014, 3–5, R. Dean 2014, 12–13). Collective advocacy, strong emotional and personal ties and opinionated inputs are cast outside, as they are deemed unfitting for this repertoire of action.

Third, it would seem that instead of enabling new actors to participate in political debate in novel ways, the practices of expert-making are directed precisely to ensure that no such thing happens. By making it seem like new avenues for participation are opened up, the participatory mechanisms may be an effective way to dissuade the marginalised groups from forming collective identities
and start advocating for their rights to be heard (also Lee, McQuarrie & Walker 2015, 14-16, Martin 2012c, 51-52, Polletta 2016, 234). By simulating democracy, the groups’ input can be domesticated to fit easily in line with the dominant understanding of knowledge, and the administration’s aspirations for the future. Nothing needs to change as long as the people have the illusion of having a say. Instead, the participants can be treated as tokens or ‘poodles’ as one participant on page 101 put it. They can be used to legitimise pre-made decisions and to manifest how the participatory norm was met in the governance process.

Furthermore, the projects that invite experts-by-experience invite them as individuals. As I showed in article 1, advocating for a group is rarely seen fitting or acting on behalf of a collective accepted. Instead, the experts-by-experience act as individual experts, which is a significant transformation from a previously very collective-oriented way of organising public participation in policy-making. It is also in quite a stark contrast to the far more common rhetoric of communality found in many participatory strategies in Finland. This individualising tendency has been identified by feminist and Marxist thinkers as one of the mechanisms that can serve to de-politicise the themes under question by privatising collective issues and problems (Pateman 1983, Davies 2012, Okin 1998). This hampers the participants from forming collective identities and from formulating and advocating for their own political agendas. In the Finnish context, it can also disempower CSOs as collectives, as it is now primarily carefully chosen individual experts who are welcome to represent the target groups of the policy.

Peculiarly, the introduction of expertise-by-experience has enabled the formation of one form of collective identity: that of trained experts-by-experience. The experts-by-experience who have undergone one specific training scheme have formed an association of trained experts-by-experience (KoKoA ry), which seeks to advocate that only the experts-by-experience who have undergone this form of training to be formally recognised as experts-by-experience. They root for formally defined criteria for expertise-by-experience, and seek to claim ownership of the concept so that untrained experts-by-experience could not use the term. Curiously, then, their collective action is focused on advancing the status of experts-by-experience within the existing administrative structures, which solidifies rather than questions their underlying assumptions. Theirs seems to be a conforming collective identity that works in line with the administration’s aspirations. Subsequently, it presents a dilemma for researchers studying such practices from a democratic point of view: while the participants’ empowerment through collective identity-building seems evident, its flipside is that it is achieved by constructing a hierarchy between these semi-professional experts and other participants. As such, it achieves the empowerment of the participants but does so at the expense of making the practices less inclusive to others.

5.2 De- and re-politicising knowledge

To summarise, the key finding of this research is that the delineating of the experts-by-experience’s possibilities for action is done through definitions of knowledge and expertise. I argue that this emphasis on knowledge and expertise as a basis for participation has itself little relevance for the project’s democratic quality, as these concepts could potentially be also defined in radically inclusive ways. However, this emphasis constructs the definitions of knowledge and expertise as the tools through which the participants’ way of being can legitimately be steered. Crucially, this might also be one of the key reasons for some public officials’ willingness to emphasise knowledge so sternly; it allows them to have the final say on who is to be able to participate.

Based on this research, what matters most for the initiatives’ democratic quality is how knowledge and expertise get to be defined in a specific context. When examining the democratic capacity of participatory governance, I suggest that we should focus on the practices that work on and through the notions of expertise and knowledge. It is in these definitions, where the politics of participatory democracy – the battles over who gets to participate, and how – takes place (also Blencowe 2013).

As has been described, my interpretation is that, in the case of Finnish experts-by-experience, knowledge and expertise are most often defined in a technocratic manner, making it appear as legitimate to require neutrality and objectivity from the experts-by-experience. This enables envisioning invited forms of participation as part of public administration, imagined in a strikingly traditional, techno-bureaucratic way. Hence, contrarily to the oft-described characteristics of participatory governance as blurring the boundaries of administration and political decision-making, the experts-by-experience’s case suggests that the participatory thrust rather reinforces this distinction. Furthermore, it envisages civic participation as taking place in the confound environments of ‘neutral and objective’ public administration, with it merely being tasked to produce neutral knowledge and to objectively assess the effects of policy. Fundamentally, the experts-by-experience’s participation is conceived mainly as a means to transport ‘sound evidence’ to decision-making, or as a means to make the participants feel empowered. The projects were markedly ill-equipped to deal with instances where the experts-by-experience aspired to promote their own agendas, or where they deliberately positioned themselves in opposition to the ‘mutual goal’.

This precedence of neutral knowledge and expertise over opinions and values also mirrors a certain conception of the policy-process and the role of experts in democratic governance. Subsequently, it can be extrapolated to consider the democratic capacity of the trendy evidence-based decision-making more broadly. At present, the evidence-based decision-making paradigm, combined to the network governance project, seems to operate under the assertion that it is possible for the expert-community (however varied) to come up with something that could be objectively called ‘the best solution’ (Lähteenmäki-Smith & Kuitunen
The wise politician, the idea continues, would only need to follow the sound advice of the experts, and good policies would inevitably follow. Holger Strassheim (2015, 322) has called this view ‘objectivist epistemologies’, where the policy-process is conceptualised in analogy to a scientific process, separating ‘facts’ from values.

However, as the theoretical positions of this thesis make clear, this premise is problematic from more than one perspective. First, as is both evident from the debate on evidence-based policy-making and the disappointments of the excluded experts-by-experience, to find a consensus is rare, and the process of seeking it is more unequal and power-laden than it is deliberative and neutral. Science and knowledge are not power-free safe-havens, detached from the rest of society, but are very much at the centre of struggles for power (Fischer & Gottweis 2012, Strassheim 2015, 324, Freeman & Sturdy 2014, 4). As the experts-by-experience’s struggles to have their knowledge recognised show, what is recognised as knowledge might be one of the key, albeit hidden, sites of struggle for power in our times, where knowledge allegedly steers political decision-making.

Second, if we were to carry the idea of evidence-based policy-making to the extreme, would this not lead to an expertocratic system – a true expertisation of democracy – where the role of democratically elected decision-makers is diminished to merely carry out the decisions deemed as best by the allegedly objective experts? Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Roberto Ganuza (2017, 5) have noted how it is peculiar, and somewhat counterintuitive, how participation as a governance norm has began to spread precisely at the moment when an increasing number of decisions have been moved beyond the realm of democratic decision-making. Global and highly complex problems, such as climate change, have led some researchers to suggest that while democratic participation might be beneficial at the local level, it is not equipped to deal with the complex, global challenges that urgently need to be solved (Brennan 2016). This leads them to opt for an expertocratic system and even to suggest putting democracy ‘on the shelf’ while we deal with the burning problems of our time (Fischer 2017). The rhetoric of evidence-based policy-making can be used to contain the possibilities of democratic participation.

Indeed, as the experts-by-experience’s experiences of deception illustrate, these participatory initiatives invite their participants to act in a rather strictly defined environment of action, often focusing very specifically on a certain, predefined service. Broader, societal questions, such as growing social inequality and the political decisions contributing to the participants’ traumatic experiences were largely considered to be out of the remits of their participation. They were given the possibility to participate, but the scope of participation was so tightly defined that they did not risk causing any true changes in power dynamics (also J. Wilson & Swyngedouw 2014, 5–6). The concepts of knowledge and expertise enable limiting possibilities to participate in a manner that seems not only legitimate but also rational and reasonable.

The potential perils of such a system are readily perceivable in this thesis; as the experts are not democratically elected, and the criteria for their selection is easily presentable as neutral, it becomes increasingly hard to detect who holds
power in complex governance arrangements, and nigh impossible to influence such expert-based decision-making. Furthermore, as the emerging hierarchies between ‘mere citizens’ and trained experts-by-experience manifest, it is a slippery slope from everyone’s expertise to a meritocratic arrangement. In a system where you are expected to know before you are heard, it becomes increasingly acceptable do disregard uncomfortable opinions. The possibilities to contest and think otherwise are diminished when the legitimate form of input is knowledge, which is defined and evaluated out of the citizens’ reach.

This brings us to the second aspect of the democratic potential of knowledge-based participation; the implications of the struggles concerning the definitions of knowledge and expertise. Despite these practices that seek to contain and limit the experts-by-experience’s participation, I wish to articulate that by relying and building on the notions of knowledge and expertise, the processes of expertise-by-experience can also enable their critique. It appears that re-politicising the notions of knowledge and expertise becomes possible through the participants’ counter-conduct, which seeks to make visible the unjust boundaries constructed for their way of being.

Among my interviewees, one of the most common ways to strategically engage with the contours set for legitimate participation was to question the need and the motives behind the projects’ will to train the experts-by-experience. These critiques sought to question the existing boundaries for experiential knowledge and, by so doing, illuminate the rationale undergirding its use, as the following quote exemplifies:

E1: Personally I would never go to a training for experts-by-experience.

TM: Why not?

E1: Well what kind of experience can I learn from school? Then it would be like reading a book. For me, expertise-by-experience is something that relies entirely on my own experience, my own life that I’ve lived. It is my life. I know what I’m talking about when I talk about my life. I don’t understand what part of it I could possibly study.

(A civil society expert-by-experience 4.4.2014)

Based on this research, it appears that through illuminating the existing criteria for knowledge and expertise and furthermore calling them under scrutiny, some participants succeeded in carving out subversive subjectivities for themselves. These conceptions of participation sit uneasily with the ones that seek to promote participation as an instrument of evidence-production. If one sees the value of participation in the input it can provide for the design of public services, it seems inconceivable and counter-productive to listen to personal points of view, accept disagreement and engage in debates on values – let alone encourage them. When viewed in connection to the outspoken promises and objectives of expertise-by-experience, it is however curious that the participants’ will to stick to their own version of truth and propagate a more constructionist notion of knowledge appears as radical action.
The analysis of the practices of resistance also revealed that a dichotomous setting between the administration that seeks to steer and contain, and the participants that seek to contest and resist, is artificial at best, and misleading at worst (esp. article 4). As I have illustrated, many of the participants embraced the hierarchical setting between different kinds of experts, and the technocratic demands for their knowledge of themselves, and relied upon them as a basis of their self-making. Conversely, many project practitioners were both very aware and also quite explicitly wary of the projects’ potential to pick and choose their participants according to the public administration’s wishes.

This observation also leads us to consider the factors that enable politicising knowledge and expertise in the projects’ context. It would appear that on many occasions it was more possible for the practitioners to contest the current limits of participation. In comparison to the experts-by-experience who often were volunteers or worked on commission, the practitioners had a far more stable position in their respective organisations to call the perimeters set for the projects into question. The experts-by-experience who seemed able and willing to politicise the notion of expertise were mostly involved in CSOs, or had chosen to quit acting as experts-by-experience altogether.

One conclusion to be drawn from this observation is that the situation of participation was perhaps more explicitly ambiguous in CSOs, where a tradition of advocacy is continuously present with newer demands for network-collaboration. In this context, the multiple possible repertoires of rationalisation are simultaneously present, making their critique and politicising action more possible (see Boltanski & Thévenot 1999). Alternatively, the experts-by-experience that sought to critique the demands or the conception of knowledge set upon them had to be indifferent towards the possible consequences of ‘acting appropriately’. Understandably, both those practitioners and those experts-by-experience who were concerned for their future possibilities to take part or secure resources were extremely unwilling to ‘bite the hand that feeds’, i.e. criticise and call into question the present possibilities for participation on offer.

What is particularly surprising is that while the practices of resistance identified in this research attempt to re-politicise knowledge and expertise, most of them nonetheless reaffirm that it is through expertise and knowledge that these issues are best resolved. As such, they seem to further strengthen the depoliticising tendency of participatory governance, recognising knowledge-sharing between relevant experts as the appropriate way to solve social problems. Although they critique who should be considered an expert in this context, they do not seem to contest how themes such as homelessness or social exclusion are presented as questions for which a correct answer is to be found once enough accurate knowledge is gathered. By seeking to illuminate the existing boundaries of who is considered an expert and whose knowledge gets listened to, these acts might then serve to politicise the boundaries of the governance-process. However, the underlying premise of participatory governance, inviting participants to perform joint knowledge production towards mutual goals, remains securely hinged. Instead, the target of the critical experts-by-experience’s and practitioners’ cri-
tique are the assumptions of knowledge, and the hierarchical setting between the participants.

As the attempts of re-politicisation did not contest the governance paradigm, but rather reproduced its emphasis on knowledge-based action, they can be interpreted as reinforcing the governance ethos but questioning its parameters. This leads one to consider whether, and under what circumstances, the participatory governance arrangements could contribute to a deeper democracy. Crucially, as the participants’ critique begins to show, the paradigm of knowledge, and the equality of all participants would have to be radically rethought in order for the participatory arrangements to be in service of the democratic project. It is, however, debatable whether this would be enough to make the participatory governance project an asset for democracy. Even if the governance processes would be radically transformed so that they would recognise multiple forms of knowledge and treat them all equally, other concerns still remain unaccounted for. The individualising tendency, the lack of any representative mechanisms and the limited possibilities to define and refocus the problems that participatory processes are geared towards answering remain as structural problems that are not, and perhaps cannot be, challenged through the participants’ critical way of being.

This leads us to also consider the limitations of my Foucauldian approach. Even if the projects’ strong emphasis on expertise and knowledge enable their critique, so far this critique only appears as performative. The participants’ critical way of being does enable to illuminate the boundaries for their participation and create subversive subjectivities for them as individuals. As I show in article 4, they can become empowered by constructing themselves as participants who deliberately deviate from the norms set for them. What remains unclear, however, is whether this critique results in anything more than performative elucidations of the boundaries set for the participants’ way of being. A Foucauldian approach, celebrating critique as a way of life and a means of self-making, is less capable of making visible the broader changes this kind of critique may or may not bring forward. It does expose the potential to re-politicise the self-evident, but it does not provide tools to evaluate whether this politicisation leads to any changes in the conditions and dynamics that enabled the participants’ suppression in the first place.

In my analysis, I saw very little evidence of any changes in the dominant paradigm of thought. While many of my interviewees felt empowered, and saw the individual benefits and effects of their participation, only two practitioners spoke of any wider impacts of expertise-by-experience. Very few experts-by-experience had experienced their participation as having an effect beyond their immediate surroundings, such as an actual change in service delivery, or a shift in policy-emphasis. Furthermore, a few experts-by-experience explained how they had no expectations of having a political impact of any kind. They were rather content with sharing their story in order to feel appreciated. This prompts one to recognise how critical democratic theory is only one possible interpretive frame to evaluate the participatory projects’ quality. Furthermore, it might not resonate with the participants’ understanding of meaningful participation.
5.3 Towards participatory governance in service of democracy?

How, then, could participatory governance practices be rethought in order for them to be in service of the democratic project? One answer might begin with Ricardo Blaug’s (2002) proposition. Blaug postulates that democracy may, in fact, be not one but two projects. If democracy is understood primarily as ‘a set of institutions’ and a way to organise ruling, a sensible form of participation is ‘manageable’ and geared to enhance the efficacy of government (ibid., 105–107). This incumbent democracy, as Blaug calls it, translates rather effortlessly to initiatives that rationalise participation as a means to gain specific knowledge input from the participants (see also R. Dean 2014, 10–13). Critical democracy, in turn, is a normative view on democracy, valuing participation as a good in itself and as a core component of a struggle towards the democratic ideals of equality and empowerment (Blaug 2002, 106–107).

It has become somewhat customary to read these understandings of democracy as undergirding two, dichotomous ways to rationalise participation. Participation is seen to have either instrumental or intrinsic value, and as Blaug (ibid., 105) notes these approaches are considered as ‘mutually exclusive’. This thesis is no exception. It has shown how the projects of expertise-by-experience may very well be in service of incumbent democracy by providing appropriate input for more efficient decision-making. Further, it has shown how the projects are successful in developing participation as an instrument that serves the purposes of efficient and evidence-based governance. However, when evaluated with the normative criteria of critical democracy, the participatory practices fall short on more than one front.

I am, however, drawn to consider here whether these two approaches to value democracy – as an efficient way to reach collectively acceptable decisions and as a tool in advancing equality and empowerment of the silenced – could not be brought together. In this final section, I attempt to imagine how practices of participatory governance could be reconfigured to be in service of both of these democratic projects. Is it possible to imagine participation that would have an instrumental value that would not only contribute to better, well-founded decisions but would also nonetheless retain its connection to the normative goals of equality, critique and empowerment of critical democratic theory? This effort seems vital in order for the democratic critique of participatory practices to contribute to something more than abstract criticism. Otherwise, we risk reinforcing the current state of affairs where, as my interviewees described, their critical way of being most often resulted in them being excluded from the participatory processes altogether.

It appears to me that two possible avenues for enhancing the practices’ democratic capacities would be available. The first concerns a radical rethinking of the connection between expertise and policy-making, and the other disassembles the instrumentalist assumptions of participation that undergirds participa-
tory governance. However, as we shall see, neither of these is without problems of its own.

The democratisation attempted by my interviewees, as described above, happens by re-politicising the notions of knowledge and expertise. Although these practices succeed in highlighting the contingency of the existing paradigm of knowledge, they very rarely attempt to question the linear conception of the policy-process that underlies this thinking. In the context of participatory governance, where decision-making is already dispersed among multiple actors, the salience of this input-output model could legitimately be questioned (Cairney 2016, 16–18, Hajer & Wagenaar 2003, 8–9). Furthermore, it can be justly questioned whether the pure transfer of ‘raw knowledge’ into decision-making could actually exist. Instead, one could argue that all experiences are already funnelled through the dominant paradigms of knowledge when we make sense of them both to ourselves and to others. Hence, nothing we experience is ever ‘pure’ and nor is experiential knowledge ever ‘raw’ in the sense that its incorporation would somehow transcend all other needs for the consideration of other aspects of democracy.

Instead, knowledge and political decisions could be seen as fundamentally enmeshed fields of action, where any boundaries that might exist between the two are locally and temporarily negotiated (also Freeman & Sturdy 2014, 4, Jasanoff 2004). This would acknowledge that discussions about relevant knowledge and a legitimate basis of decision-making are always situated and that choices for the recognition and use of a particular type of knowledge are always political. Furthermore, knowledge could be seen as collectively constructed as part of the policy-process (Jasanoff 2004, 15) – an ideal that was hinted at by some of my interviewees as they imagined ‘a dialogical process’ of knowledge production and decision-making. Such a premise would enable debating legitimate forms of participation locally, making multiple ways of participating and knowing possible (also Lähteenmäki-Smith & Kuitunen 2015, 120).

The strength and weakness of this situated view on knowledge is that it places all forms of knowledge at the same level. When viewed from the point of view of critical democracy, this is an asset, as it allows silenced citizens to legitimately claim room for their experiential knowledge to be heard and discussed, hence destabilising the existing contours of our way of knowing. However, it can also enable discrediting scientific knowledge by allotting the same value for, for example, the knowledge produced by environmental science and climate change denialists in the form of epistemological populism (Saurette & Gunster 2011). Furthermore, the unequal resources for negotiating what counts as valuable knowledge, remains a concern. It would thus seem that, in order for participatory governance processes to be a strength for democracy, what is needed are locally applicable criteria for the evaluation and selection of forms and uses of knowledge that would have a critical democratic normative foundation.

The other recourse, stemming from a critical understanding of democracy, would be to disconnect the instrumental expectations for participation and advance participatory practices as a value in and of themselves. The strength of this
approach is its rootedness in an egalitarian premise of everyone’s participation being equally valuable, which would make it harder to cherry-pick ‘appropriate’ participants in governance processes. However, this approach also enables promoting participation for the sake of participation. Without any instrumental value at all, participation is easily contained as its own field where citizens ‘practice democracy’ or ‘become empowered’, without any expectations of their participation having an impact on actual decisions.

Rikki Dean (2018) has suggested an interesting approach to connect these two democratic projects. His proposal detaches participatory practices from their task of delivering knowledge in service of consensual decision-making, but it nonetheless retains the instrumental value allotted to participation. Dean suggests that participatory practices be integrated within governance institutions but that some of them should be reconfigured so that they not only allow but encourage disagreement and dissent. Dean calls this ‘counter-governance’, and it resonates with a proposition some of my interviewees were also making locally. The idea of counter-governance institutionalises participatory roles that are tasked to critique, question and destabilise – a position that many of my interviewees expected to be able to assume when they were invited as experts-by-experience (see also Lowndes & Paxton 2018).

This thesis has attempted to make headway for the interpretive study of lay expertise in order to imagine new ways in which participatory governance arrangements could be configured to be in service of democracy. It has made visible how the process of determining what is accepted as expertise in these arrangements is, in itself, already a value-based assessment, accepted and evaluated in relation to specific political objectives. Moreover, as I have attempted to illustrate by drawing on the ethnographic approach on studying governmentality, it is the grassroots struggles and the how of governing that provides the most fruitful results when evaluating the projects’ democratic capacity. When evaluating the participatory processes’ democratic quality, the most productive analytical setting does not seem to be to identify whether the participatory processes are ‘liberating’ or ‘repressive’ (McKee 2009, see also article 4). Instead, it becomes worthwhile to ask how these processes enable illuminating the conditions and assumptions under which we are being governed, and furthermore, whether they enable criticising and even altering these contours for our way of being. If we consider the critical way of life as a necessary precondition for democracy to exist, then it is precisely the grassroots struggles and possibilities to be differently that we should appreciate when looking for the participatory processes’ democratic quality. What would logically follow is that we should also focus on how we might institutionalise practices that would enable and encourage participants’ ways of being critically.

By constructing its participants as experts, the participatory governance arrangements have both the potential to delineate and curb the participants’ way of being and to enable contesting and politicising the notions of knowledge and expertise in their context. However, while the play on the notions of knowledge and expertise enables performative illumination and thus the politicisation of the
boundaries of legitimate participation, at the same time the participatory processes do not enable the participants to form collective identities so that these contours might be effectively and meaningfully challenged. The traditional, technocratic conception of administration seems to continue undergirding participatory governance arrangements, making it seem rational to construct and evaluate participants as first and foremost experts and contributors of knowledge. Re-politicising this knowledge and expertise is a necessary first step, but it is only a first step in a path where many more steps would be needed in order for the participatory governance processes to be truly in service of the democratic project.

In light of my findings, when we continue working towards enhancing the participatory practices’ democratic capacity, the key questions to ask focus on the possibilities and will to radically rethink both the function and nature of knowledge in democratic decision-making. If we want to avoid the already visible perils of creating an epistemic threshold and semi-professional participants, we would need to shift the gaze from training the participants to reconsidering the knowledge claims and epistemic assumptions of decision-makers. Furthermore, the boundaries of evidence-based decision-making need to be publically scrutinised by questioning the technocratic nature of the issues that are debated. Following Dean’s idea of counter-governance, I suggest that in order to build participatory practices that are in service of both of Blaug’s democratic projects, we ought to consider how values, opinions and knowledge could coexist in participatory arrangements, as well as how we could consider different forms of knowledge concomitantly without losing the value of scientific inquiry. It might be that the hope for more democratic participation – in our times of knowledge-based decision-making – lies in the attempts to politicise the concepts and functions of knowledge and expertise in a democracy.
FINNISH SUMMARY

Kokemusasiantuntijoita tekemässä – Hallinnallisuussetnografia suomalaisten sosiaalialan organisaatioiden osallistamishankkeista

Työn tausta


asiantuntijana, ei esimerkiksi jäsenenä tai vertaisena.

Kokemusasiantuntijuuden käsite ja toimintamalli on levinnyt vauhdikkaasti ja laajalle; 2010-luvulla, muun muassa Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön KASTE-ohjelman ja Raha-automatistiedikyksen avustuslinjausten vauhdittamana, siitä muodostui sosiaali- ja terveysalan muotitermi, jota käytetään hyvin laajasti sekä julkisella että kolmannella sektorilla (Rissanen 2015, 201). Monitulkintaisella käsitteellä viitataan laajassa merkityksessä henkilölleen, joka on kohdannut sosiaalisia ja tai terveysongelmia ja toimi nyt erilaisissa asiantuntijatehtävissä noihin kokemuksiinsa nojaten.

Yleisimmin kokemusasiantuntijat toimivat erilaisissa palvelujen yhteiskunnallisten työryhmässä, tuovat ’kokemustietoan’ poliittiseen päätöksenteokseen Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön, tai kuntien sosiaali- ja terveyslautakuntien alaisissa verkostoissa, arvioivat kokemuksistaan alan ammattilaisille ja paätäällä, mutta tekevät myös julkista vaikuttamistyötä esimerkiksi lakialoitteiden, mielipidekirjoitusten ja mediaesiintymisten kautta. Se on yksi keskeisimmistä käsittpeistä, joilla marginalisoitujen ihmisyhmusten osallistumismahdollisuksia tällä hetkellä konkreettisesti avataan ja rajataan.

Tutkimusasetelma ja tutkimuskysymykset
Osallistumisen asiantuntijaistuminen on demokratin kannalta merkittävä kyseys. Sen mekaniikan tarkastelu rauhonjuuritasolla on tämän väitöstutkimuksen fokusessa. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, seuraako maallikkoasiantuntijoiden mukaan ottamisesta ’asiantuntijuuden demokratisoituminen’ (Nowotny 2003) – vaikutusmahdollisuksien laajennimen ja monimuotoistumien aiemmin vaiennettujen kansalaisten äänten voimistamiseksi –, vai onko nähtävissä
pikemminkin ‘demokratin asiantuntijaistuminen’ (Strassheim 2015, Liberatore, Funтович 2003) – pyrkimys epäpolitiisoida keskustelua kehystämällä osallistujien kokemat sosiaaliset ongelmat sosiaalitasolla hallinnon mekanismeilla ratkaistaviksi kysymyksiksi? Tuovatko uudet asiantuntijuuden muodot uusia vai

ikutusmahdollisuuksia, vai tuottavatko ne uusia tieto- ja osaamiskynnyksiä polititiseen osallistumiseen, vieden näin vaikutusmahdollisuuksia entistä kauemmas jo aiemmin marginalisoitujen ryhmien ulottumattomiin?


Tutkimuskysymykseni ovat:

1. Millaisia subjektiviteetteja kokemusasiantuntijuushankkeissa tuotetaan? Millaiset osallistumisen ja siten olemisen tavat tulevat mahdollisiksi?


3. Millainen merkitys em. asiantuntijaistamisen teknikoiolla on demokratian näkökulmasta?

Tutkimukseni keskeinen tarkastelun kohde on osallistamishankkeissa tapahtuva tiedon ja asiantuntijuuden käsitteiden uudelleenmäärittely ja näiden määrittelykampailuiden merkitys demokratialle. Kysyn, millaiseksi asiantuntijuus hahmotellaan osallistamishankkeissa, millaisiin järkeilyin tapoihin nämä asiantuntijuussrakennelmat kytkeytyvät ja miten niitä käytetään asettamaan ja toisaalta haastamaan osallistujien toimintamahdollisuuksien rajoja. Yhteenvetoartikkelisani tulkitseen tunnistamiani asiantuntijaksi tekemisen prosessia demokratin näkökulmasta, keskittyn: 1. epä- ja uudelleenpolitiisoinnin mahdollisuuksien hankkeiden käytännöissä, sekä 2. tasa-arvoon ja yhdenvertaisuuteen nojaavien tausta-
oletusten rooliin osallistujien toimintamahdollisuuksia hahmoteltaessa ja perusteltaessa.

Tarkastelen, millaiset elementit asiantuntijaksi tekemisen prosessissa rajavat ja sulkevat osallistujien mahdollisuuksia kyseenalaistaa ja avata uusia kysymyksiä keskustelulle, ja rakentavat kynnyksiä, jotka estävät tasavertaisia osallistumismahdollisuuksia toteutumasta. Toisaalta pohdin, millainen asiantuntijais- tuminen mahdollistaisi uusien toimintatilojen avautumisen ja edistäisi kaikkien osallistujien tasavertaisia mahdollisuuksia vaikutta. Näin tulee mahdolliseksi tarkastella, millaiset osallistamiskäytännöt näyttävät demokraattista projektia vankistavina, ja millaiset puolesta näyttäisivät horjuttavan tai rapauttavan demokratiaa edelleen.

Aineisto ja tulkintamenetelmät

Olen tuottanut tutkimusaineistoni seuraavissa seitsemässä, julkista rahoitusta saaneessa kokemusasiantuntijuushankkeessa. Hankkeista viisi (1–5) oli järjestön jaaksi (6–7) kuntien toteuttamia.

5. Sininahaliitto ry: Matalan kynnyksen info- ja tukipiste (Tiltti 2012–2014)

Tutkimukseni aineisto koostuu:

1. yhden tutkimukseen osallistuvan järjestön toiminnassa kerätystä etnografiesta materiaalista
2. teemahaastatteluista 23 kokemusasiantuntijan ja 14 kokemusasiantuntijuuden parissa työskentelevän työntekijän kanssa yllä mainituissa seitsemässä hankkeessa
3. ryhmäkeskustelusta viiden kokemusasiantuntijan kesken eräässä tutkitchaista hankkeesta
4. taustahaastatteluista kuuden (6) virkamiehen kanssa Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriössä, Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitoksella, Raha-automaattiyhdistyksessä ja Kuntaliitossa
5. Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön, Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitoksen ja Rahaa-automaattiyhdistyksen kokemusasiantuntijuutta koskevista politiikkadokumenteista (22)
6. Hankkeiden tuottamista, kokemusasiantuntijuutta käsittelevistä dokumenteista ja materiaaleista (27)


Tulokset


Väitän, että kokemusasiantuntijuushankkeiden taustalla vaikuttaa usea, keskenään ristivetoineen järkeilyn tapa ja osallistumisen arvon perustelu (artikkeli 2). Tämä tuottaa osallistujille ristipaineen tasapainoinnilla ’raa’an kokemuspuheen’ ja neutraalin kokemustiedon esittämisen välistä. Heistä muodostuu, ennen kaikkea, oman itsen-hallintansa asiantuntijoita, joiden ensisijainen asiantuntijuuden kohe on tunnistaa kuhunkin toimintaympäristöstään soveltuva ja siinä kontekstissa hyväksyttävä olemisen tapa. He oppivat, erään haastattelemani kokemusasiantuntijan sanoin, ’tekemään itsestään projektin’, tuotemaa itsensä ja ker-
Tomaan tarinansa niiden vaatimusten mukaisesti, jotka hankkeissa tiedoksi hyväksytään.

Tutkimukseni keskeisin havainto on, että kokemusasiantuntijuushankkeiden kontekstissa asiantuntijuus määritellään pääsääntöisesti hyvin teknobyrokrattisin määrin. Asiantuntijuus merkitsee *neutraalia ja objektiivista tietoa* ja kykyä tarkastella käsitteillä olevaa asiaa laajassa kontekstissa, ’välimatkan päästä’. Kokemusasiantuntijoiden tapauksessa tämä merkitsee, että hankkeiden osallistujilla edellytetään oman kokemuksensa työstämistä ’neutraaliksi tiedoksi’. Vahvat tunteet tai oman agendiin ajaminen hahmottuu epäsopivaksi tässä toimintaympäristössä. Sen sijaan kokemusasiantuntijoilta edellytetään kykyä ja haluaa toimia *yhteistyössä* hallinnon ja muiden asiantuntijoiden kanssa, ja ponnistella rinta rinnan ’yhteisten päämäärien saavuttamiseksi’. Määrittelemällä tietämisen neutraaliiksi, tunteita ja henkilökohtaisia näkökulmia väistää kerronnan tavoin, tulee mahdolliseksi säädellä, millaiset ihmiset pääsevät osallistumaan, ja millainen tieto kuulumaan päätöksenteossa.


**Johtopäätökset**

Samalla tutkimukseni kuitenkin nostaa esille tiedon ja kokemuksen määritte- 
telykamppailut demokratian toteutumisen areenoina. Koska kokemusasiantunti-
juushankkeet keskittyvät niin avoimesti juuri tiedon kautta ja asiantuntijana osal-
listumiseen, avautuu myös mahdollisuus noiden käsitteiden uudelleenmääritte-
lylle. Erät osallistujat, ja myös osa hankkeiden työntekijöistä, haastavatkin tietoi-
sesti ja strategisesti asiantuntijuuden kapeana koettua määritelmää, tuoden näin 
näkyviin käsitteen kautta osallistujille nyt asetettavat rajat ja vaatimukset. ’Vasta-
käyttäytymällä’ osa osallistujista onnistuu tuomaan esiin, millainen osallistumis-
nen hankkeiden kontekstissa ei ole sopivaa, ja haastaa näin tiedon ja asiantunti-
juuden kapeat, ja usein tarkoitushakuiski koetut määritelmät. Tämä ’vääränlai-
nen’ tieto ja puhetapa onnistuu kuitenkin toistaiseksi ainoastaan nostamaan esiin 
kokemusasiantuntijoiden osallistumiselle asetettuja rajoja. Jotta nämä rajat myös 
konkreettisesti muuttuisivat, täytyisi osallistavan hallinnan toimijoiden olla val-
miita ajattelemaan tiedon ja asiantuntijuuden mahdollisia määritelmiä, sekä osal-
listumisen erilaisia tarkoituksia radikaalisti uusilla tavoilla.
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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1

Interview themes for experts-by-experience

Background
When/where did you first hear about expertise-by-experience? What did you think about it?

You as an expert-by-experience
How did you become an expert-by-experience?
(Was the role determined beforehand? Were you active or were you invited? How was the process? Interview, training etc.?)

What do you do as an expert-by-experience?
(Are the tasks defined elsewhere or by the expert-by-experience? Can you create new ways of participating? Are there limits to what you can do?)

How would you define expertise-by-experience?
(Is it a job, a role, an attitude…?)

Objectives
Why do you want to be an expert-by-experience?
What has its meaning been to you?

Why is expertise-by-experience in general important? What can be achieved through it?

On a general level
Who, in your opinion, can be an expert-by-experience? Does it require something?

What are the tasks of experts-by-experience? Is there something that an expert-by-experience cannot do?

How would you describe the difference between the positions of an expert-by-experience and an employee?
How about that between an expert-by-experience and a peer(supporter)?

How would you define experience-based knowledge?
Why is it needed?
What do you think about the concept of expertise-by-experience?

Why do you think we are now witnessing a storm of new people being called experts-by-experience?

**Future**
How would you like to see the future of expertise-by-experience and experience-based knowledge?

What would change if this were to happen?
APPENDIX 2

Interview themes for practitioners

**Background**
When/where did you first hear about expertise-by-experience? What did you think about it?

**Practises in the organization**
How and did you start to employ the practise of expertise-by-experience in your organisation?

Why was it done?

Who, in your organisation, can become an expert-by-experience? (Does it require something? What is the process through which one becomes an expert-by-experience?)

What do experts-by-experience do in practise?
How are these tasks determined? (Can the experts-by-experience also take initiative?)

What are the issues that an expert-by-experience can have an effect on?

**Position towards others**
How would you describe the difference between the positions of an expert-by-experience and an employee?
How about that between an expert-by-experience and a peer(supporter)?
What is the position of an expert-by-experience in your organization?

How would you define experience-based knowledge? (How is it different from the professionals’ knowledge?)
Why is it needed?

How would you define expertise-by-experience? (Is it a job, a role, an attitude…?)

**Objectives**
What can be achieved through expertise-by-experience? (Why do we need experts-by-experience)?

Why do you think we are now witnessing a storm of new people being called experts-by-experience?
What do you think about the concept of expertise-by-experience? (Why is it named like that?)

**Future**
How would you like to see the future of expertise-by-experience and experience-based knowledge?

What would change if this were to happen?
APPENDIX 3

List of the policy documents in data

Ministry of Social Affairs and Health

Kaste 1

Kaste 2


National Institute for Health and Welfare

Reports from workshops on expertise-by-experience organised by the National institute for Health and Welfare 2013–2014

17. Tamperealaisia ajatuksia kokemusasiantuntijuudesta. 17.1.2014.
20. Oulun seudun ajatuksia kokemusasiantuntijuudesta, vol. 2. 10.2.2014
21. Mikkeli alueen ajatuksia kokemusasiantuntijuudesta 17.2.2014

Documents from the projects

Key to the Mind 1 and 2

5. Kokemusasiantuntija terveysasemalla –työmallin arviointi
Finnish Central Association for Mental Health


No Fixed Abode


13. Piirainen, H. & Brady, C. PAAVO Verkostokehittäjät -hanke Teemaesittely: Teema, toimintamalli: Kokemusasiantuntijuus ja osallisuus

14. Korhonen, J. Kokemusasiantuntijat välittävät yhteiskunnalle suoraa tietoa asunnottomuudesta

15. Osallisuuden suositukset. “Niinhän ne väittää, että me ollaan normaaleja vuokralaisia”.

Yad youth against drugs ry

16. Kokemusasiantuntijuus ehkäiseväässä huumetyössä. YAD.

17. Kokemusasiantuntijuus ehkäiseväässä huumetyössä –hankkeen sosiaalinen tilinpäätös 2014

The Federation of Mother and Child Homes and Shelters


20. Kokemusasiantuntijamainos tilaajalle

21. Ole rohkea, tilaa kokemusasiantuntija
24. IdeaKirja sosiaalityön kehittämiseen

Muotiala Accommodation and Activity Centre Association
26. Mitä on kokemusasiantuntijuus? – power point presentation

Sininauhaliitto ry
28. Kokemustieto osaksi kehittämistä
MITÄ KOKEMUSASIANTUNTIJAT EDUSTAVAT?
– ANALYYSI EDUSTAMISEN POLITIIKOISTA OSALLISTAMISHANKKEISSA

by

Taina Meriluoto, 2016


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The article presents a case study of the politics of representation in a participatory policy implementation. Building on non-institutional interpretations of representation (Saward 2011, Warren 2008), it asks how different definitions of representation are used to expand or limit possibilities for action. The case, expertise-by-experience in the Finnish social welfare sector, is investigated by making use of Michael Saward’s notion of a representative claim (2010). The article investigates what experts-by-experience are presented as representing, and how their representativeness is being legitimized. It demonstrates how the representative positions of experts-by-experience are constructed through two significantly different claims: on one hand, experts-by-experience are presented as experts of neutral and collective knowledge, on the other, experts-by-experience position themselves as advocates for the interests of a marginalized group. These contradictory claims, it is argued, are indicative of attempts to frame the experts'-by-experience representation in a specific way. As a result, the article suggest that when investigating the newer, non-institutional forms of representation, the questions where representation is presented as taking place and who makes the representative claim, become relevant and revelatory.
Edustamisen murroksessa


Mitä kokemusasiantuntijat edustavat? – Analyysi edustamisen politiikoista osallistumishankkeissa

edustuksen puute, ylikansallisten kysymysten ja edustajien esiintymän, sekä osallistumistutkimuksen kannalta eritoten deliberatiivisen demokratian puolustajien kritiikki kyseenalaistivat ohuen ja mekaanisen tavan ymmärtää edustaminen (Saward 2010, 1–2; Urbinati ja Warren 2008, 395; esim. Fishkin 2009; Fung ja Wright 2003; Rehfeld 2006; Young 2004; Williams 2000).


Samanaikaisesti edustamisen käsitteistön venyttämisen kanssa edustamistutkimusta muokkasi sisältävän ns. konstruktivistinen käännön (Disch 2011, 1; Näsström 2015, 1). Käännön ulottuminen parlamenttien ja vaalien ulkopuolelle merkitsi myös sen poliittisuuden ja kontingenttiuden näkyväksi tekemistä (Saward 2010, 26). Sen sijaan, että edustamisen nähtäisiin kuvaavan tyylinä valituksi ja edus-
Analyssin lähtökohdat

Artikkelini aineisto koostuu seuraavien yhdeksän kokemusasiantuntijalta ja niiden rahoittajalta (RAY ja STM) aihetta käsittelevistä teksteistä sekä 23 kokemusasiantuntijan ja 14 kokemusasiantuntijalta kehitteenä työntekijän teemahaastateluista:

1. Mielenterveyden keskusliitto ry: Kokemusasiantuntijan ja -arvioinnin vakiinnuttaminen mielenterveys- ja päihdepalvelujen kehittämisessä

2. Ensii- ja turvakotien liitto ry: Miina – Väki–valtaa kokeneiden naisten osallisuuden ja voimantumisen tukeminen

3. Youth Against Drugs: Kokemusasiantuntijuus ehkäisevässä huumetyössä

4. Vailla Vakinaista Asuntoa ry: Kokemusasiantuntijoiden hyödyntäminen asunnottomien palveluja suunniteltaessa ja tuotettaessa (Omat Avaimet)

5. Muotialan asuin- ja toimintakeskus: Ehkäisenvälinen mielenterveystyön projekti – kokemus tietoa mielenterveyden häiriöistä työikäisille (Kokemus tiedoksi)

6. Omaishoitajat ja läheliset -liitto ja Mielenterveysomaisten keskusliitto -FinFami: OPAS-TAVA – Asiakkaita ja ammattilaiset omaishoitoa kehittämisissä

7. Vantaan kaupunki: Mielen avain. Etelä-Suomen mielenterveys- ja päihdepalvelujen kehittämisosuus

8. Tamperen kaupunki: SOS II – Sosiaalisesti osalliseksi sosiaalityöllä

9. Sininauhaliitto ry: Matalan kynnyksen infon ja tukipiste (Tiltti)


Sawardin edustamiväitteen osia ovat väitteen esittäjä, subjekti (edustajaksi esitetty), objekti (edustamiväitteen tekijän käsitys edustettavasta asiasta), referentti (kaikki, mitä edustettava asia on tai voi olla) sekä yleisö, jolle edustamisväite tehdään. (Saward 2010, 36–38.) Saward ajatut on, että edustamiväitteessä sekä edustaja, edustamisuhde että edustettava asia tuotetaan ja uudelleen tuotetaan jatkuvassa dialogissa (mt., 16–17, 36–37; vrt. Rättilä ja Rinne tässä numerossa).

Edustamiväitteen käsite mahdollistaa edustamisen tarkastelun poliittisena toiminnana, sillä se korostaa väitteen esittäjän ja yleisön merkityksiä. Edustaminen on aktiivinen teko, jossa edustamiväitteen tekijä väärittää parhaileen edustavansa (tai jonkun toisen edustavan) jotain. Tämä väite on osoitettu tiettylle yleisölle, joka hyväksyy tai hylkää, haastaa tai
myötäilee väittettä. (Saward 2010, 45–56.) Näin edustamisväitteiden avaiminen mahdollistaa edustuksen politiikkojen tarkastelun: kuka oikeastaan tekee väitteen edustamisesta, mitä edustajan esitetään edustavasta, ja ennen väite esitetään?

Tässä artikkelissa kiinnostukseni kohteena ovat eriliset vaikutukset edustettavasta objektista sekä subjektiin ja objektin välille tuotetusta suhteesta.

Kysyn aineistolani kahta asiaa: mitä kokemusasiantuntijoiden esitetään edustavat ja kuinka heidän edustajuutensa legitimoidaan, ts. kuinka subjektin ja objektin välille tuotetusta suhteesta.

Kokemusasiantuntijat edustajina

Kokemusasiantuntija-käsitteellä tarkoitetaan suomalaissosialialalla henkilöä, jolla on kokemusstä tietystä sosiaalista ongelmasta, ja joka on sen vuoksi kutsuttu toimimaan tämän ilmiön parissa työskenteleväksi organisaatiossa. Sosialialalan kokemusasiantuntijoja toimii sekä julkisella että järjestösektorilla, ja heidän toimintansa voi olla joko työsuhteessa tehtävää palkkatyötä, palkkiopohjasta kehitysmääräyksiä tai tapaamistoimintaa. Yleisimmin kokemusasiantuntijat toimivat konsultoivassa roolissa esimerkiksi hankkeiden johtoryhmissä tai muiden asiantuntijapalamisissa, asiantuntijoina palveluiden kehittämisessä ja suunnittelussa, kouluttajina alan ammattilaisia ja päätäjäitä tai kertoivat omaa tarinaansa julki suudessa. Tämän lisäksi kokemusasiantuntijoiden toiminnasta on luksuisia, organisaatiosta toiseen vaihtuvia sovelluksia.

Kokemusasiantuntijojen rooli on hyödynnetty Suomessa kehittämään Iso-Britanniasta saatujen oppien muokkaan ensimmäisenä päähde- ja mielenterveysjärjestöissä (esim. Rissanen 2015, 201). Britannialaisessa ilmiön taustalla on ollut alkuperäinen näkemys, että järjestöteko saattaa tehdä vuoroja ja teloja suuremmasti ja hyvin kestävemmin. Tämä on ollut oltava keskeinen kokemusasiantuntijoiden tehtävänä, jotta ne voivat olla tärkeää edustajina

Osallistamisprojekteille tyypillisesti kokemusasiantuntijoiden edustajana toimiminen kannabina on hyödyllistä kansalaisten ja erilaisen näkemysten välissä. Tämä on merkittävä kehityslaji, joka edistää asiakkojen osallistumista ja toiminnan toiminnan ylläpidemiseen. Tämä on tärkeää koko suurvaltion ja kansalaisten välissä suhteissa.

Osallistamishankkeissa

Osallistamishankkeissa on tärkeää, että kokemusasiantuntijat toimivat julkisessa keskustelussa ja edustavat asiakkojen näkemyksiä ja mieltöjä. Tämä on tärkeää siksi, että asiakkaat voivat olla tärkeä osa järjestöjen päätöksissä ja toiminnassa.

Tämän lisäksi kokemusasiantuntijoiden osallistaminen edustajana on tärkeää, koska heidän osallistuvana toiminnana voi olla järjestöjen edustajana. Tämä on tärkeää, koska kokemusasiantuntijat ovat tärkeää osa järjestöjen päätöksissä ja toiminnassa.

Kokemusasiantuntijoiden toiminta on tärkeää, koska heidän osallistumisensa on tärkeää järjestöjen päätöksissä ja toiminnassa. Tämä on tärkeää, koska kokemusasiantuntijat ovat tärkeä osa järjestöjen päätöksissä ja toiminnassa.

Kokemusasiantuntijoiden osallistuminen edustajana on tärkeää, koska heidän osallistuvana toiminnana voi olla järjestöjen edustajana. Tämä on tärkeää, koska kokemusasiantuntijat ovat tärkeä osa järjestöjen päätöksissä ja toiminnassa.

Myös moni kokemusasiantuntija kitytää toiminnan ytimeksi muiden äänten kanavoinnin.

TM: "Mitä se kokemusasiantuntijuus sinusta on? Onks se tehtävä vai rooli vai mikä se on?"

K7: "Rooli ehkä. Koska mä oon sen takia mielesiänkö rakennettua rakentevoja palautetta ja sitä kautta mun mielestä mä oon ollut kokemusasiantuntija koko mun sairauden ajan. --- Usein mä oon se joka sanoo, että hirveen moni mun esimerkiksi ystäviäni, ne ei uskallassaan samoihin paljon mitään. Ett mä sanon niidenki puolesta, jotka sanoo vaan mielestä ollaan mutteiksi, mut he ei uskallassaan paljon mitään mieltäni koskaan."

Kokemusasiantuntijoiden hahmotellaan siten toimivan väylänä “kentän” äänten esiintumiseen, kuten kokemusasiantuntijat itse suhdetta kuvaavat. Kenttä, jota kokemusasiantuntijat edustavat, ei kuitenkaan ole valinnut edustajiaan itse (ks. myös Dovi 2002, 734). Päinvastoin, kokemusasiantuntijuus on tutkimusaiheena mukaan sen takia, että mä oon antanut psykiatrin palautetta ja sitä kautta mun mielestä mä oon ollut kokemusasiantuntija koko mun sairauden ajan. --- Usein mä oon se joka sanoo, että hirveen moni mun esimerkiksi ystäviäni, ne ei uskallassaan samoihin paljon mitään. Ett mä sanon niidenki puolesta, jotka sanoo vaan mutteiksi, mut he ei uskallassaan paljon mitään mieltäni koskaan."

K13: ”jotenki viralliset tahot aattelee, että kokemusasiantuntija on sanakirja, semmonen niinku erilaisen tiedon ja erilaisen sanaston sanakirja. Sä avaat sen kun sä tarvii sen ja sä laitat hyllylle kun sä et enää tarvii sitä.”

Edustamisen kannalta keskeistä on huomata, kuinka asiantuntija-väitteessä kokemusasiantuntijoista tuotetaan nimenomaisesti kollektiivisten kokemusten edustajia – kokemustiedon ruumiillistumia, joiden tehtävänä on representoida kentän elämisestä ja kuntoutumisesta. (Pitkin kuvailee deskripitiivistä edustajuutta niemenomasti luotettavan tiedon välittäjän tehtävänä. Hänen mukaansa ryhmänsä edustavaksi esimerkiksi nostetun edustajan tehtävä on toimia mahdollisimman tarkan tiedon välittäjänä. (Pitkin 1967, 61).) Kokemusasiantuntijoiden tekemä asiantuntija-väite on suunnattu muille päätöksentekoon osallistujille. Se on huuto kokemustiedon kuulemisen tärkeyden puolesta:

TM: ”Niin minkä takia kokemusasiantuntijoita täytyy olla?”

K11: ”Siks koska ammattilaiset ei voi saada sitä tiedot mistään muualta, minkälaista on oikeesti sairastaa, minkälaista on oikeesti käyttää niitä palveluja. --- Mun mielest turhaan käytetään rahaa niiden palveluiden kehittämiseen, jos ei kuunnella niitä ihmisiä, jotka on käyttäny niitä palveluita ja tietää, mikä on toiminut ja mikä et.”

Kokemusasiantuntijoiden asiantuntija-väitteet ovat lähes poikkeuksetta luonteeltaan hyvin varovaisia. Niissä korostetaan omia asiantuntijuutta toisen tiedon edustajina ja varotaan ”astumastaa viranomaisten varpaille”, kuten eräs kokemusasiantuntija kuvasi. Niiden yleisönä on kuitenkin selvästi taho, joka tekee päätöksiä, tai jopa taho, joka päättää päätöksentekoon osallistuvat. Asiantuntija-väitteellä halutaan raivata tilaa kokemusasiantuntijoille yhteisii päätoksentekopöytiin. Kokemusasiantuntijat voivat kuitenkin esittää asiantuntija-väitteen vasta, kun heidät on kunkin hankkeen menetellytypojen muaisesti formaalisti määritelty kokemusasiantunti-
jaksi. Asiantuntijuus-väite on voitava perustella esimerkiksi koulutuksen tai oman toimintaperinnän läpi käynnissä, jotta väite katsotaan asiantuntijadiskuursissa legitiimiksi.

Myös useassa hallinnon asiantuntijaväitteessä korostuu muu päätäjille. Niissä korostuvat eritoten kokemusasiantuntijoiden edustamalla tiedolla saadut hyödyt: paremmat ja tehokkaat palvelut, sekä voin maantunneet ihmiset.

Parhaimmillaan kokemusasiantuntijoiden tieto täydentää palvelujärjestelmän, asiantuntijoiden ja ammattiautattujen osaamista. Tietoa ja kokemusta yhdistämällä luodaan uudenlaista tietoa ja löydettävänä näkökulmana, jota auttavat suuntautumaan entisistä paremmiin ja toimivampiin toiminta- ja toimintapaikkoihin myös edullisempia palveluita.

(Kuntoutussäätiö & Mielenterveyden keskusliitto: Opas kokemusasiantuntijatoiminnasta, 2015, 11–12)

Hanketekstit, joissa väitteen tekijä on hallinto, suuntaavat väitteen tekstin olettelelle lukijakunnalle. Niissä kokemusasiantuntijoiden asiantuntijuutta on tarpeen väittää niille, jotka toimivat hallintoperiaatteita tai mahdollistaa heidän pääsyään hallinnon sisään.

Edustamisväitteen poliittisuuden kannalta paljon tärkeäksi näyttää, että osa kokemusasiantuntijoiden toiminnasta on keskusteltavaan yhteydessä, sillä hallinnon asiantuntijak不容te on valdin ne hallintoperiaatteita tai mahdollistaa heidän pääsyään hallinnon sisään.

K16: "Mut tavallaan se on niin muutosana se kokemusasiantuntijaa, että sitä halutaan viljellä joka paikkaan. Mä tiedän, että RAY edellyttää usein, että siellä näkyy jollakin tavalla se kokemusasiantuntijaa, joka sitä haluaa viljellä. Onko tämä mahdollista? Jos sitä halutaan, mä haluaisin, että se halutaan viljellä joka paikkaan, sillä se on jopa turvallisuushyödyä hallinnon osalta."

K12: "Kyl mä lähtisin mielelläni seuraavaan hallitukseen asuntoministerin avustajaksi. Ja pitäisin minulla sitä, että RAY edellyttää usein, että siellä näkyy jollakin tavalla se kokemusasiantuntijaa, joka sitä halutaan viljellä joka paikkaan. Mä haluaisin, että se halutaan viljellä joka paikkaan, sillä se on jopa turvallisuushyödyä hallinnon osalta."

Kokemusasiantuntijan kuvaus kokemusasiantuntijan tehtävästä eroaa huomattavasti neutraalista kokemusasiantuntijasta. Hallitun asiantuntijuuden sijaan haluaisin, että se halutaan viljellä joka paikkaan, sillä se on jopa turvallisuushyödyä hallinnon osalta.
ole kuulunut. Edustamisväite rakentuu siten margi-
nalsisoidun ryhmän (objekti) ja tuon ryhmän etujen
puolesta taistelevan edustajan (subjekti) välille. Tätä
suhdetta voidaan avata tarkemmin Nadia Urbinatin
asianajon (advocacy) käsittäen avulla (esim. Urbina-
ti 2000).

Urbinatin ajatus asianajajuudesta tiivistyy kahteen
ehtoon: intohimoiseen sitoutumiseen edustetun ryh-
män etujen puolustamiseksi sekä edustajan omaan
harkinnanvapauuteen. Asianajajana edustaja on Ur-
binatin mukaan vuoroin tuloselven edunvalvoja
ja vuoroin päätöskokeekseen deliberoja. Hän on eh-
dottoman lokaali edustamansa ryhmän edulle, mut-
ta ei ainoastaan huuda vaatimuskään tuuleen. Sen
sijaan edunvalvon vaikutus keskustelukontekstis-
na, jossa asianajaja on valmis kuulemaan ja ymmär-
tämään myös vastapuolen argumentteja. (Urbinati
2000, 773–777.) Juuri tällaiseksi valtaosa kokemus-
asiantuntijoista rakentaa omaa edustajasubjektiaan.
Kokemusasiantuntijoiden kuvauksissa edustajuu-
deräntä korostuu etenkin ryhmän edunvalvonnan
ja ryhmään sitoutumisen merkitys. Asianajajan roo-
lissa oikeus edustaa kentänä edellyttää, että kokemus-
asiantuntija on edelleen sidoksissa sen aitoihin ko-
 kemuksiin ja tunteisiin (myös Hokkanen 2013,
158–159). Tämä näkyy esimerkiksi uskollisuutta,
kentän tavoille toimia ja olla:

K13: "Ja sit tau itse palveluiden käyttäjät, heidän
mielestä se kokemusasiantuntijan, se on kuitenkin
edelleen sidoksissa sen aitoihin kokemuksiin ja
 tunteisiin (myös Hokkanen 2013, 158–159). Tämä näkyy esimerkiksi uskollisuutena
kentän tavoille toimia ja olla:

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 kemuksiin ja tunteisiin (myös Hokkanen 2013,
158–159). Tämä näkyy esimerkiksi uskollisuutena
kentän tavoille toimia ja olla:

Siinä missä kokemustiedon asiantuntija nimenomaan
erottautui edustamastaan kentästä kylläään, raken-
tuu asianajajan suhde edustamansa kentänä hor-
 isontaalisena. Ollakseen uskottava ja legitiimi edus-
taja, täytyy asianajajan sijoittaa itsensä yhtäläiseksi
osa edustamansa kentänä, yhdeksi meistä (myös
Dovi 2002, 736). Tämä "meidän jättä" hahmo tuo
esiin erään kokemusasiantuntijan asianajajuuden
legitiimeen ehtoa: samankaltaisuuden kokemuksen
tuottamisen suhteessa kentänä sekä yhteisöön, jonka
asianajajaksi asettua (ks. Dovi 2002, 735). Kokemus-
asiantuntijan käyttäminen rongki kieli ja samankaltais-
ten kokemusten jakaminen rakentavat kokemusasian-
tuntijasta vertaisen kuvan edustamansa kentän
silmissä. Jotta kokemusasiantuntijan puolestaan voi
oikeuttaa toimintansa olemalla "vain yksi meistä", täytyy olla mahdollista rakentaa "me", jonka osaksi
kokemusasiantuntija asettuu. Tämä saattaa osaltaan
selittää asianajajan roolin yhteisyyttä nimenomaan jär-
estöjen kokemusasiantuntijuihehkeissä. Järjestöt
Tarjoavat kokemusasiantuntijoille valmiin yhteisöön,
onkaa aänetekstiä asettuu.

Samaistuttavuuden ja vertaisuuden korostaminen
on ristiriitainen strategia oman edustajuuden legi-
timoimiseksi. Laajetut kokemukset toimivat tehokka-
aan perusteluna edustajen toiminnasta ja siksi
väistää kentänä toimintaa ja olla mahdollista rakentaa "me", jonka osaksi
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Tarjoavat kokemusasiantuntijoille valmiin yhteisöön,
onkaa aänetekstiä asettuu.
asiantuntijat esitetään yleisellä tasolla, ajoin melko voimakkain sanankääntein, marginaaliin painetujen ryhminä. Oma edustajasubjekti tuodaan kuitenkin esiin vähämerkityksellisenä. Asianajajänä-vaiteella kokemusasiantuntijoiden edustamista rakennetaan kahden, keskenään ristivetovaisuuteen uskottahan edustamista. Asiantuntijoiden pienimmät hallinnon tekstissä, mutta osin myös kokemusasiantuntijoiden puheessa, kokemusasiantuntijoista rakennetaan neutraalin, kollektiivisen kokemustiedon asiantuntijoita. Tämä vaite on kohdistettu eritoten muille päättökohteenisoiville osallistuville perusteluksi kokemusasiantuntijoiden asemalle.

Mitä kokemusasiantuntijat edustavat? – Analyysi edustamisen politiikoista osallistamishankkeissa


Sen sijaan asianajajaväitteellä kokemusasiantuntijoiden sijainnitaita kiihtyvät yhteen liittymään politiikan pelikentille. Kun kokemusasiantuntijat esitetään intressiryhmien äänitorvina, määritetään toimintakentät yhteen hiileen puhuttamisen sijaan kamppailuksi, jossa kokemusasiantuntija-asianajalla on oikeus ja velvollisuus on tuoda esiin marginaaliin työntynyt intressi. (vrt. kokemusasiantuntia artistin roolilla edustajana, Luoto tässä numerossa). Tämä on erityisen houkutteleva, jos järjestämättömiä kysymyksiä matkan kautta, jotka näin pyrkivät pääsemään osaksi niitä keskustelun ehtojen määrittelyjä, joita halintoon pyrkii hallinnon kontrolloimaan. Jos vähemmistöedustajiksi kutsutujen asiantuntijoiden tehtävää on legiti mainoida päätöksentekovarastavia, on asianajajien intresseissä sitä vastoin juuri noiden toimintatapoja kyseenalaistaminen ja uudelleenmäärittely.

Sawardin (2010, 36–38) käsitteistöä käyttäen rakennettavat edustamisväitteet voidaan tiivistää seuraavaksi taulukoksia:

### Taulukko 1: Kokemusasiantuntijoille tuotetut edustamisväitteet ja edustuksen konteksti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Väitteen) Esittäjä</th>
<th>Objekti (edustavuusväitteen tekijän käsitys edustettavasta asiasta)</th>
<th>Referenti (kaikki, mitä edustettava asia on tai voi olla)</th>
<th>Yleisö</th>
<th>Kehys / Konteksti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hallinto, koulutetut kokemus-asiantuntijat</td>
<td>Asiantuntija (kokemus-asiantuntija yksilönä)</td>
<td>Kollektiivinen, neutraali kokemustieto</td>
<td>Kokijoiden &quot;kenttä&quot;</td>
<td>Muut asiantuntijat, hankkeiden arvioijat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokemus-asiantuntijat, myös etenkin järjestöjen työntekijät</td>
<td>Asianajaja (kokemus-asiantuntijat kollektiivina)</td>
<td>Monimuotoiset intressit ja edut</td>
<td>Kokijoiden &quot;kenttä&quot;</td>
<td>(Muut) päätöksen tekoon ja sen ehtojen määrittelyyn osallistuvat, toissijaisesti muut kokijat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kokemusasiantuntijuuden tapaus osoittaa, kuinka erilaiset edustamisväänteet sijoittavat edustamisen erilaisiin toimintatiloihin ja siten hahmottelevat myös edustuksen vaikutusmahdollisuudet ja rajat. Nämä edustamisen erilaiset kuvausket tuottavat erilaisen käsityksen keskustelun lähtökohdista, sijainnistaa ja vallankäytön mahdollisuuksista ja voivat siten toimia välineinä keskustelun epäpoliittisissä tai politiikoinnissa. Tämän vuoksi uudenlaisten edustamisen muotojen tapauksissa on kysyttävä myös, missä niihin sijoittuva edustaminen esitetään tapahtumassa. 

VIITTEET


3 Edustamisen politiikat -muotoilusta kiitokseni Tiina Rättilälle valittavien edustamisen institutionaalisen kontekstini osallistumisperiaatteissa tapahtuvan marginalisoitujen ryhmien ”uuden edustamisen” tutkimus sen sijaan on toistaiseksi hyvin vähäistä.

LÄHTEET


Mitä kokemusasiantuntijat edustavat? – Analyysi edustamisen politiikoista osallistumishankkeissa


NEUTRAL EXPERTS OR PASSIONATE PARTICIPANTS
– RENEGOTIATING EXPERTISE AND THE RIGHT TO ACT IN
FINNISH PARTICIPATORY SOCIAL POLICY

by

Taina Meriluoto, 2018


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Neutral experts or passionate participants?
Renegotiating expertise and the right to act in Finnish participatory social policy

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ABSTRACT
This article examines a case of participatory social policy in which former beneficiaries were invited as 'experts-by-experience' into Finnish social welfare organisations. It combines a governmentality perspective with the analytical tools of the sociology of engagements to explore as what the projects' participants are engaged, and how the differing demands made on their ways of being are made to appear as legitimate. The article shows how different definitions of expertise are used to steer the participants' forms of engagement, and how these definitions appear valid only within a specific frame of justifying civic participation. It concludes that the participants' expertise is defined in terms of their ability to 'projectify themselves' according to the projects' specific objectives: rehabilitation, co-production, or the exercise of civic rights. The article suggests that this demand to align one's way of being with project purposes is what makes it possible to evaluate and select participants.

ARTICLE HISTORY
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KEYWORDS
Expertise-by-experience; participatory governance; lay expertise; sociology of engagements; governmentality

Introduction: Lay experts in participatory governance

In the course of the last 30 years, most Western democracies have adopted participation and citizen engagement as their norm of governance (Polletta, 2016; Saurugger, 2010). In the context of social welfare and health policies, this has, among other initiatives, taken the form of incorporating 'lay' or 'experience-based' expertise in policy-making and service co-creation (Demszky & Nassehi, 2012; Epstein, 1995; Noorani, 2013). Service users and other laypeople are increasingly being invited to participate as 'experts on their own lives', making the equivocal notion of expertise a
central object of struggle (Barnes, 2009; Meriluoto, 2017; Rabeharisoa, Moreira, & Akrich, 2014).

In social welfare, experience has become a source of authority both because of its content – the ability to articulate ‘real-life evidence’ into decision-making (Eyal, 2013; Rabeharisoa et al., 2014; Smith-Merry, 2012) – and because of its ‘location’. Because it is possessed by ‘lay citizens’, it neatly serves as a tool to fulfil the public engagement requirement for participatory governance (Demszky & Nassehi, 2012; Leino & Peltonmaa, 2012; Polletta, 2016; Stewart, 2016). Furthermore, acknowledging people’s experience-based knowledge as a form of expertise is thought to empower marginalised groups in particular (Healy, 2000; Nez, 2016; Randall & Munro, 2010).

The prominence of experience-based expertise has, unsurprisingly, resulted in varying interpretations of what forms the participants’ expertise should take (see Knaapen & Lehoux, 2016). Previous studies have noted, for example, how citizens are often invited to participate based on their experience-based knowledge, but are required to abandon and surpass their personal views when actually participating in participatory initiatives (Lehoux, Daudelin, & Abelson, 2012; Neveu, 2011; Thévenot, 2007, p. 420). This ambiguity in meaning exemplifies how the inclusion of experience-based expertise opens the door to a myriad of interpretations of what constitutes expertise, and who can be considered – and allowed to act as – an expert (Rabeharisoa et al., 2014).

In this article, I wish to articulate the notion of expertise not only as a central object of struggle in participatory initiatives, but also as a tool for crafting participants’ subjectivities and for making specific kinds of participation conceivable and legitimate (see also Newman & Clarke, 2009, p. 138; Rabeharisoa et al., 2014). Previous studies have shown that the process of involving the public is often elite-driven (Bevir, 2006; Warren, 2009), making definitions of expertise powerful tools in determining who gets to have a voice in participatory arrangements.

This article investigates the process of ‘making experts’ through a grassroots governmental study from the Finnish social welfare sector. It investigates ethnographic and interview data produced in seven participatory initiatives aimed at introducing ‘experts-by-experience’ into social welfare. The experts-by-experience were people with prior social problems who were invited to participate in tasks such as service planning, evaluation, and project co-ordination, bringing their ‘experience-based knowledge’ to the policy processes. The paper’s point of departure is the observation that, although the initiatives studied share a participatory
rationality of governing, they produce very different interpretations of this paradigm in practice. In other words, although all of the projects shared the aim of increasing civic inclusion, they produced distinctly different definitions of who should be allowed to participate and how.

My aim in this paper is, first, to make visible the different participant-roles crafted in the initiatives, by illustrating the different meanings assigned to ‘expertise’. Second, by combining a governmentality approach with the analytical tools of the sociology of engagements, I conceptualise the participatory projects as ‘plans’, and connect the different forms of legitimate participation with different objectives set for the projects. This works to illustrate how a certain perception of ‘good participation’ is made to appear logical in the context of the projects by appropriating different reasons and justifications for civic participation (see also Barnes, Newman, Knops, & Sullivan, 2003; Ganuza, Baiocchi, & Summers, 2016; Lowndes & Sullivan, 2008; Martin, 2008).

I begin by discussing previous studies on expertise, and then connect them with the governmentality literature, viewing the concept of expertise as a tool in conducting the lay experts’ conduct. I then move to a discussion of how a governmentality perspective can be combined with the analytical tools of the sociology of engagements to elucidate the political nature of the everyday practices that steer people’s ways of being. Conceptualising the projects studied as ‘plans’ (Thévenot, 2014a), the analysis examines how different justifications put forward for increased civic participation are used to legitimise a certain form of engagement on the parts of the participants (see also Berger & Charles, 2014; Charles, 2016; Thévenot, 2014a). The three main justification frames of the projects – rehabilitation, co-production, and the exercise of civic rights – all make use of the notion of expertise in distinct ways in order to construct their participants as specific kinds of experts. The paper concludes by considering what implications these findings may have for developing the democratic potential of the projects, and reflecting on future possibilities for combining the sociology of engagements with governmental analysis.

**Bridging governmentality and the sociology of engagements

*Expertise as a governmental device*

The amount of social-science research on expertise has expanded in recent years, as the concept of expertise has been challenged and redefined, especially from ‘the bottom up’ (see Liberatore & Funtowicz, 2003;
Nichols, 2017; Nowotny, 2003). The core question for the sociology of expertise is, under what conditions, through which processes, and for what purposes can someone be called ‘an expert’ (Collins & Evans, 2007, p. 2; see also Edwards, 2010; Eyal, 2013; Fischer, 2000). This has become increasingly difficult to answer, and crucial to probe, since the introduction of new forms of lay or experience-based experts (Barnes, 2009; Blencowe, Brigstocke, & Dawney, 2013; Noorani, 2013; Rabeharisoa et al., 2014).

In addition to identifying its different forms (Collins & Evans, 2007), or illustrating the ways it can be used to rule or assign others to rule (Rose, 1993, pp. 291–292, 1998, p. 86), expertise has received attention due to interest in the process of ‘making experts’ (see Eyal, 2013; Rabeharisoa et al., 2014). Joining this growing body of literature, the present article directs attention to the notion of expertise as a tool of subject-formation. I will examine how the concept of expertise is assigned different meanings in the project contexts, and enquire into how differing interpretations of expertise are deliberately used to guide the participants towards certain forms of being.

This governmentality approach builds on Michel Foucault’s thinking. For Foucault, modern forms of government operate on and through the people being governed, making the subject both the product and tool of governing (Foucault, 1982). Liberal forms of government work through subtle techniques such as offering suggestions, encouragement, examples, and ideals geared to influence people’s willingness and ability to conduct themselves in a certain manner, that is, to affect the construction of their selves (Foucault, 1994, pp. 783–785, 2004, pp. 108–113; also Dean, 1999, p. 12; Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 55). Nikolas Rose has argued that this form of governing has contributed to – and is enacted through – ‘the psy disciplines’ (Rose, 1998, p. 81), making skills in conducting people towards acceptable ways of being the specific domain of, for example, social workers’ psychological expertise (Rose, 1998, pp. 86–88; for an example, see Randall & Munro, 2010).

The governmental outlook on participatory measures, and especially ‘empowerment projects’ (Eliasoph, 2016), is by no means a new imaginary (Cruikshank, 1999; Miller & Rose, 2008). A number of recent studies have suggested that participatory projects’ aims lie not so much (if at all) in promoting people’s possibilities of influencing decision-making or impacting on societal issues (Polletta, 2014; Walker, McQuarrie, & Lee, 2015), but in making people ‘govern themselves in appropriate ways’ (Newman & Clarke, 2009, p. 23), construct themselves as subjects of a certain kind
However, it has been noted that participatory initiatives’ ideal subjects take on very different meanings in different contexts (Berger & Charles, 2014; Dagnino, 2007; Martin, 2008; Richard-Ferroudji, 2011). For example, Talpin (2006) persuasively shows how the ‘speech situation’ where participation takes place contributes to differing views on what it means to be ‘a good citizen’. In a similar vein, Carrel (2007) has identified how different conceptions of democracy and the social responsibilities of the state are connected to different participatory projects with different outlooks on citizenship and civic participation (see also Berger & Charles, 2014). In service-user involvement schemes more specifically, Martin has identified ‘democratic’ and ‘technocratic’ rationales, contributing to participants being perceived as either ‘representatives’ or ‘experts’ (2008). Hence, participatory initiatives do not manifest ‘a coherent governmental strategy’ (Newman & Clarke, 2009, p. 166; also Blondiaux, 2008; Polletta, 2016), but are better conceptualised as tools in various, even contradictory, projects that create subjectivities consistent with the projects’ own strategic goals (also Charles, 2016; Marinetto, 2003). Thévenot (2014a) calls this ‘governing through objectives’, suggesting that participatory projects all measure and evaluate – and consequently steer – civic participation according to their specific, value-laden objectives.

**Forms of engagement as normative fields of action**

To better understand the ‘confluence’ (Dagnino, 2007) of participatory initiatives’ goals in the construction of ‘the participative subject’, I draw here on the sociology of engagements, building on the work of Laurent Thévenot. The focus of the sociology of engagements is on the situational coordinations that shape how a person’s activity in a given situation is valued and evaluated, and how these factors then shape and offer the contours for one’s ‘coordination of oneself’ (Thévenot, 2007, 2014b, 2014c, 2016).

I posit that it is also possible to view the differing forms of engagement from a governmental perspective in terms of the normative fields of action in which the initiatives’ participants are called to take part, hence structuring the participants’ subjectivities. This view bridges the underlying value-assessments and moral connections of the different fields of action, which define what kind of participation is valued and why, with the governmental aims of the initiatives which seek to shape the figure of ‘the good
participant’ (see also Charles, 2016; Thévenot, 2014a). As Julien Charles (2016, loc. 28) has perceptively noted, ‘Participation does not mean doing whatever, however, with whomever you want.’ Instead, it requires a transformation of the participant to comply with the modality of engagement and way of participating that ‘the participative dispositive is ready to receive’.

Thévenot (2007) operates with three ‘regimes of engagement’, each connected to its own ‘grammar’, i.e. valued ways of speaking and relating to each other (also Thévenot, 2014c). In the regime of familiar engagement, engagements are intimate and close, valuing well-being and personal stories, and employing 'a grammar of close affinities'. In an engagement in a plan, a person ‘projectifies herself into the future’ (Thévenot, 2007, p. 417), i.e. makes plans, determines goals and works to achieve them. Here, the criteria for appropriate action are always determined through the goals of the particular plan. Finally, in the justifiable action engagement regime, all actions must be publicly justifiable.

The moral foundations of publicly justified action are conceptualised as different ‘orders of worth’ by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). Each of the (now) seven ‘orders of worth’ takes a different view of ‘the common good’, and evaluates people, their behaviour and their arguments accordingly (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; also Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio, 2016). For the purposes of my analysis, two of the seven are of particular interest: civic worth, which evaluates all things and actions in respect of how they contribute to the community and people’s sense of belonging, and in which the winning argument is the one that can persuasively tap into the values of equality, mutual respect and the common good (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, pp. 185–193); and industrial worth, which evaluates actions in terms of efficiency and productivity, valuing experts who can contribute to increasingly seamless and efficient production (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, p. 204). A legitimate actor in a given context must possess capacities that guarantee her ability to act in accordance with the common good employed. Thévenot calls these aptitudes ‘qualifications’, or the criteria that determine the appropriateness of the participant and their ‘valued forms of engagements’ (Thévenot, 2014c, p. 13). This provides the framework for the construction of the actor’s subjectivity (see also Autto & Törrönen, 2017).

The theoretical outlook of governmentality may be bridged with the analytical tools of the sociology of engagements by looking at the strategic use of different justifications to prioritise a specific form of participation. Thévenot (2014a) has suggested that current participatory schemes follow
the modality of engagement in a plan, in which people are induced to engage according to, and within the limits of, a project plan, and in which their participation will be evaluated though the lens of the plan’s objectives. This observation is analogous with the critical governmental perspective on participatory initiatives, as both contain the suggestion that project mantras of empowerment and deliberation (Eliasoph, 2016) are in fact used as governmental devices to define, measure, and induce ‘appropriate’ forms of participation (Blondiaux, 2008; Gourgues, Rui, & Topçu, 2013; Martin, 2012).

Hence, I will make the theoretical assumption that participatory projects are plans with given objectives based on specific sets of values, and employable as steering devices to define what kind of participation is desirable. These objectives are made explicit and defended in public, connecting the different justifications given for public participation with specific project objectives, according to which people’s participation and ways of being are assessed. Different underlying moral valuations can therefore be evoked to justify what counts as expertise in different arenas, and consequently who (or rather what kind of people) can legitimately participate, and in what manner (Charles, 2016, loc. 28).

**Context and data**

In the 2000s, a new participatory emphasis was introduced into Finnish public policy, stressing the importance of active citizen engagement and encouraging new innovations to involve and activate citizens (Salmi nen & Wilhelmsson, 2013). The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health defined ‘inclusion’ and ‘customer-initiated service production’ as the primary goals of its National Development Programme for Social Welfare and Health Care (Kaste). In a similar vein, the main funder of Finland’s civil society organisations (CSOs) for social welfare, the Finnish Slot Machine Association, started to reduce funding for organisations focused solely on service production, requiring proof of ‘effective civic activities’. This resulted in an explosion of new initiatives seeking to strengthen the participation of beneficiaries, such as projects developing expertise-by-experience.

The term expert-by-experience was introduced in the Finnish context by mental health organisations. Drawing on examples from the UK and Denmark (Barnes & Cotterell, 2012; Noorani, 2013), the idea then spread to many other sectors, to public-sector organisations as well as CSOs, especially in the 2010s (Rissanen, 2015). Crucially for this paper’s
investigations, the Finnish version of expertise-by-experience was very strongly governance-initiated (cf. Beresford, 2002; Noorani, 2013 in the UK). That is, the incentive came from the organisations, not the beneficiaries. In many instances, the tasks of the experts-by-experience, as well as the overall objectives of the practice, were determined beforehand.

Although the term has been widely adopted, it remains a contested and ambiguous concept, used to signify a variety of people and activities. In the seven projects investigated here, the term is used to refer to people with problematic backgrounds (such as substance abuse, mental health issues, domestic violence, gambling addiction, homelessness), who act as consultants in service production, peer support, advocates in public debate, or in training and education. Very often they also give lectures or interviews about their own history to provide professionals, decision-makers, and the general public with 'experiential knowledge' only attainable through personal experience.

This paper draws on thematic interviews with 23 experts-by-experience and 14 professionals, conducted in seven projects, all funded publicly by either the Finnish Slot Machine Association or the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The interview data are complemented by the projects' and project funders' texts concerning expertise-by-experience. In addition, my interpretations draw on my ethnographic observations as a practitioner in one of the CSOs studied. In 2011–2014 I participated in, and was responsible for arranging, training sessions, meetings, and workshops focusing on developing expertise-by-experience as a practice. The participants were both experts-by-experience and professional practitioners, and the data produced in these gatherings ranged from co-produced paintings, presentations, guidebooks, and letters, to my own written notes.

The interviewees were either volunteers, paid professionals, or 'semi-professionals' performing 'paid gigs' on invitation. Their tasks varied from consulting on service production and project steering committees, to evaluating services and providing training and peer support. The professionals, for their parts, all worked in projects tasked with developing expertise-by-experience in their respective organisations. Their positions ranged from project employees to executive directors. The interviews took place at a time when the concept and policy of expertise-by-experience had rapidly risen in popularity. As new organisations, working in various different fields, started to adopt the concept and translate it into their own work culture, a plethora of interpretations appeared concerning the purpose, position, and the desired outcomes of expertise-by-
experience, making the notion a site of negotiations between the experts-by-experience, the professionals, and the administrators in the different fields.

**Methods of analysis**

My analysis proceeded in two stages. First, I conducted a category analysis on my data to identify the characteristics that the informants highlighted as the organising principle of the expert-by-experience as a new actor category. As the analysis revealed conflicting interpretations of the same organising principle, ‘expertise’, I took this conflict as my interpretive focal point, asking why the interviewees employed their particular definition of expertise to construct and legitimise a certain kind of participant role.

I related the conflicting interpretations of expertise to the background information I had regarding the interviewees, their organisations, and ways of working. However, there were no correlations to be found between the interviewees’ different definitions of expertise, and the organisational backgrounds, the primary mission of their organisations, or the interviewee’s position (practitioner or expert-by-experience). In fact, the same interviewee might present various, even contradictory interpretations of expertise and of the role a participant should play. Different qualification criteria for the participants only made sense when I introduced the projects’ different objectives as the framework within which the participation took place.

Consequently, I conceptualised the projects as ‘plans’ and employed framing analysis (Rein & Schön, 1996; Yanow, 2000) as a method to unravel the differing objectives of the initiatives, and through this the plan within which participation of the experts-by-experience was evaluated. The act of framing, in a public policy setting, often takes the form of identifying (or creating) problems, hence also implying how to best resolve them (Bacchi, 2010; van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). What the sociology of engagements adds to these interpretations is the connectedness of the frames to certain moral valuations and views of the principle of the common good (or order of worth, see Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio, 2016). For instance, as we shall see in the following analysis, participation can be valued as a means of recovery, as a valuable input or as a source of democratic legitimacy.

The different objectives set for the projects developing expertise-by-experience then provided me with an entry-point towards understanding
the differing definitions given to ‘expertise’, the expected and valued engagement of the participants, and the set(s) of rules applied when evaluating their participation. Hence, my analysis connected the figure of ‘the good participant’ with the meanings and justifications the interviewees gave to increased civic participation.

It should be noted, however, that the focus of this paper is not in identifying which orders of worth are invoked in order to justify the new, public role of the expert-by-experience (as I regard Boltanski and Thévenot’s classification of seven justification regimes as a contingent social construction of its own: see also Lehtonen & Lonkila, 2008; Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio, 2016), but rather in identifying how the differing valuations are used for the purpose of legitimising or delegitimising certain forms of participation, with consequences for the participants’ subject-construction.

Analysis: Constructing subjectivities by governing through objectives

Participation as rehabilitation – expertise as a tool to empower

The first objective set for the projects of expertise-by-experience treats the notion of expertise in a very distinct way: as a tool to be used in one’s ‘individual plan’ of self-development (Thévenot, 2014c, pp. 14–15). Expertise is, above all, a feeling of mastery over one’s self. Consequently, it has a dual role: through developing ‘better expertise over oneself’, one can become ‘empowered’ and differentiate one’s current self from one’s previous, problematic state (also Barnes, 2008; Eliasoph, 2016). At the same time, this form of expertise is not to be used as a source of legitimacy or as an input in policy-making, but as a rehabilitation device inside an organisation (also Barnes & Gell, 2012).

This is the rehabilitation frame, and its context of participation is very limited. In it the value of participation stems from the rehabilitative effects on the individual, and the notion of expertise is primarily a therapeutic tool to ‘make people feel better about themselves and their capabilities’, as the following CSO practitioner explains:

P8:6 I think it [expertise-by-experience] is a means of rehabilitation and a way to feel important. I mean, it is very important for your holistic well-being that you feel part of a community or a society, active participation of that sort.

The rehabilitation frame was especially prominent among the social-work professionals. While a majority of the experts-by-experience named some
sort of empowerment as a benefit of participation, only 3 of the 23 gave personal empowerment as a justification for their participation. In contrast, 10 of the 14 practitioners named empowerment as one of the reasons for increasing their clients’ participation. They often positioned the participants’ feelings of inclusion above everything else. To put it bluntly, it was less significant whether the participation had an actual impact on public decisions than that people felt included, as is clearly visible in the following discussion among three public-sector professionals:

P10: One of our participants worked on a citizens’ initiative to have e-bank access in public libraries. She distributed leaflets about where to sign and so on. Well, it didn’t quite get 50,000 signatures, but I mean it was great that she went on with it. It also increased her knowledge and her influence in its own way.

P12: Yeah, and I thought that it was important for her, having a rough substance-abuse background and all. So that was what kept her from … And she went around town on a bike so it kept her fit, too.

P11: And our cheering her on, that was important for her as well.

Eliasoph (2016, p. 254) describes how the value of participation in these empowerment schemes is the ‘aesthetic experience’ they provide for their participants. Civic participation, in this frame, is not valued because of its outcomes, but as having an independent value for the participants. As the above quotation makes clear, it is the act of participating, with its supposedly transformative effects, that is at the core. Expertise is, above all, valued as a feeling, as means to make everyone feel valuable as is characteristic of intimate engagements (Thévenot, 2014c, p. 13), making the recognition of everyone’s local knowledge equally important. The following quote from a CSO expert-by-experience shows the success of this use of the concept:

E4: I think as a concept, it [expert-by-experience] is far more beautiful than if we were to talk about, say, victims. It is appreciative. It’s the expertise that gives you the idea that ‘We value your experience.’

In this frame, expertise does not entail criteria. On the contrary, it is used as an honorary title to give value and a feeling of empowerment to the participants.

However, while the rehabilitation frame favours familiar modes of engagement – such as intimate discourse and emotion-filled speech – they are esteemed only for their instrumental value as tools to meet the projects’ objectives of individual feelings of empowerment. Familiar forms of
engagement appear as markers of the participants’ willingness to start work ‘on themselves’ in line with the plan’s objectives. Furthermore, while everyone is considered *an expert on their own lives* when the plan is to rehabilitate, this is most often not the case when moving beyond the nurturing environment of the organisation, as we shall see in the following.

*Participation as a contribution – expertise as objective knowledge*

The second interpretation evaluates experts’-by-experience expertise by the same criteria as for professionals’ technocratic expertise. It justifies their active role through arguments such as the need for ‘more diversified knowledge’, which eventually translates into ‘more thorough expertise’, more efficient services, and better public decision-making. The active role of experts-by-experience is legitimised because they can bring *useful knowledge* into public decision-making.

This expert-construction situates civic participation in contexts of service production and evaluation. In these administrative settings, the discussions take place among experts – albeit of different origin – whose right to participate stems from the contributions they are thought to bring to the table, as illustrated by the following public-sector expert-by-experience:

E19: Maybe in times like these, when you have to save and cut back on everything, they have started to notice that it’s beneficial to society to listen to experts-by-experience. I mean, instead of defining laws and systems that are completely detached from reality, you introduce the voice of a regular person, and make things work better that way.

The particularity of the co-production frame is its emphasis on knowledge and the value of the participants’ contributions to decision-making. The value of participation lies in the inputs it produces (see also Charles, 2016, loc. 30; Thévenot, 2014a). Furthermore, the participants’ expertise is seen as a valuable input not on the grounds of equality but because of efficiency, as the next CSO practitioner explains:

P3: I believe that the underlying idea is something like user-driven service-design. I think that during these times of productivity and efficiency, it is pretty self-evident that in order for us to get these treatment paths working, the voice of the customer who uses the services is worth listening to and incorporating.

As a result, when the experts’-by-experience participation is valued because of the contributions it might bring to public decision-making,
expertise is logically defined as the ability to produce objective and generalisable information for the discussion. The following CSO practitioner explains:

P7: I think expertise-by-experience requires having reorganised your past life and everything it entails, and put it in the past as, I hate the word resource but that’s what it needs to become. Like, as a peer supporter, you can just go to places and talk about your personal experiences, but as an expertise-by-experience, you need to analyse your past and do something more with the knowledge. You need to parse together several peers’ experiences and draw conclusions, and then take the expertise into the darned organisation.

All of the interviewees justified experts’-by-experience participation at least in part through the contributions it produced. But it was the informants in the public-sector projects, as well as the CSO projects that cooperate with the public sector in service production, who framed participation in this manner the most. In the co-production frame, the expertise (and the right to act) of experts-by-experience is evaluated in technocratic terms, using many of the same criteria as are applied to other experts in the field. Instead of ‘just talking about yourself’, the distinctive feature of expertise-by-experience is that the knowledge is ‘analysed’. The personal, emotion-filled experiences need to be forged into a coherent and neutral story that is ‘on a more abstract level’, as one CSO practitioner put it (see also Barnes et al., 2003; Blencowe, 2013). This meant, for instance, the ability to refrain from ‘emotional outbursts’ or personal points of view (Martin, 2012; Meriluoto, 2017). The virtue of a good participant was the ability to produce ‘reliable information’ that could be utilised in service production, and consequently, this required the ability to ‘rise in generality’ out of the regime and discourse of familiar engagements (see Richard-Ferroudji, 2011, p. 168).

This interpretation epitomises engagement in a plan, since it demands that the participants conduct themselves in a way that works towards the overall goals of the project. From a governmental perspective, it is indeed significant how these characteristics of expertise are presented \textit{as preconditions} for entering the actor category. As presented by a professional in the quotation above, the information an expert-by-experience delivers \textit{needs to be} on a general level. Access to public debate \textit{requires} reorganising your past and representing it in a neutral, general manner. This technocratic view of expertise taps into industrial worth-claims to form a set of expert-criteria one has to meet in order to be considered a valuable participant in the public debate, potentially ruling out people who do not
meet the criteria of possessing ‘useful’ or ‘reliable’ knowledge (see also Berger & Charles, 2014).

**Participation as a civic right – everyone’s expertise**

The ‘rights frame’ is the one that could be imagined being found when looking for justifications given for people’s active role in society. It draws on civic values such as the right to participate, freedom of speech, equality, and solidarity (Thévenot, 2007, p. 419). Here, civic participation is taken as a value in and of itself, and no other arguments are needed to justify the goal of increased participation. Quite strikingly, only 3 of my 37 interviewees justified the experts’-by-experience participation primarily as a right. Instead of calling for experts-by-experience to participate because they have the right to be heard, the vast majority of my interviewees defended their participatory rights by emphasising the epistemic value their experience-based knowledge would bring to the discussion.

Participation was a ‘no-brainer’ mainly in the context of CSOs with no service-provision tasks. There, a few interviewees presented civic participation as something so fundamental that it goes almost unnoticed, as expressed by these CSO practitioners:

P6: This organisation was founded by the people suffering from this problem. So their inclusion … I mean it has been self-evident from the very beginning that we include everyone who is involved in our activities.

P7: Or we don’t even include them, but they have created everything and have then included us professionals!

This view was shared particularly among the organisations whose focus was less on service development and more on public advocacy. These organisations saw themselves as enabling civic participation, and some even referred to their participants as *citizens* – a term that stands out among the much more common rhetoric of clients, customers, and co-producers. The following CSO expert-by-experience is among the very few in her emphasis on civic values:

E6: I think expertise-by-experience is … should I even say that it is a civic right. I mean, people should be listened to more.

In the rights frame, the notion of expertise becomes the target for contestation. Instead of viewing expertise in technocratic terms as the capacity to contribute neutral and objective knowledge, experience-based expertise is defined precisely as something that is distinct from other forms of
expertise. In this frame, the notion of expertise is used to stretch and question the boundaries set for legitimate participation in the dominant co-production frame, as illustrated by the following CSO expert-by-experience:

E13: It’s impossible to define when you’re an expert-by-experience. It would be different if I had studied to become, say, an engineer. Then there’s a certain, concrete set of knowledge that I have to acquire in order to become an expert in engineering. But experience is so much more than that. It’s both the things that happen to you and your own personal way of dealing with them. When each and every experience is valuable, who has the right to define expertise when it’s based your experiences? Anyone can and should be allowed to be an expert-by-experience, even if it is only for a minute.

The above quotation crystallises the definition of expertise as every individual’s particular view on the world. By pointing out the contingent nature of experience-based knowledge and the problems regarding its evaluation, the interviewee discredits the notion of ‘usable knowledge’ as a criterion for granting admission to the category of experts-by-experience. This view, present particularly among CSOs with no service-provision tasks, adheres to the rhetoric of expertise and knowledge, yet defines expertise very differently. Instead of a technical contribution, here expertise is a means of building ‘mutual understanding’ or ‘empathy’, hence constructing the participants not as contributors, but as members of the same community (also Berger & Charles, 2014; Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio, 2016). As such, it can be seen as an attempt to ‘re-descend’ (Richard-Ferroudji, 2011, p. 172) from the general, and to extend legitimate forms of participation to include emotion-filled and personal discourses, as in the regime of familiar engagements.

This twist in using the notion of expertise then appears as an attempt to disrupt valuing participation solely in relation to ‘the plan’. It is used to contest the practice of evaluating and legitimising people’s right to participate according to their ‘level’ of expertise. Peculiarly, however, the interviewees supporting the rights frame did not abandon the notion of expertise altogether when defending everyone’s right to be included and heard. Instead, they embraced the idea of expertise-based participation, but used redefinitions of these notions as their tools in contesting exclusive expert-categories and ways of contributing that are constructed within the co-production frame.

Finally, the civic vocabulary was also employed by several public-sector practitioners, who called expertise-by-experience ‘a means to fulfil the
participatory norm’. In this ‘duty frame’, which is an inversion of the rights frame, justifying participation as having a value of its own made it possible to construct participation ‘for-the-sake-of-participation’.7 However, by flipping the right into a duty, the practitioners also exempted themselves from having to justify the need for increased civic participation altogether, taking the position of ‘merely carrying out their assigned tasks’. At its worst, this led to a merely symbolic form of participation that was not intended to have any other effect than to fulfil the new participatory demands of good governance, making all other forms of engagement beyond mere physical presence appear illegitimate. More than anything, greater civic participation appeared here as a tool needed to ensure the smooth functioning of the administration, hence drawing on the industrial ‘worth’ while employing civic vocabulary.

Table 1 summarises the frames of justifying civic participation identified in the data, along with the corresponding preferred modes of engagement, the notions of expertise crafted, and the ‘worths’ drawn upon to make these constructions appear legitimate.

**Discussion: Experts in self-conduct**

Above I have shown how different modes of participation are made to appear preferable in participatory projects through different definitions of expertise. I have argued that the preferred forms of participation
correspond to the objectives of the specific project. I have also shown how these objectives are publicly justified by drawing on civic or industrial worths in order for the project goals, and the corresponding demands made on the participants’ way of being, to appear fair and reasonable.

The main conclusion, based on the cases studied, is that expertise in these participatory projects comes to mean the ability to conduct oneself according to the project’s objectives, in other words to know and present oneself in line with the project’s demands. This requires the skill to identify which mode of engagement, in terms of speaking about oneself, is acceptable in the context, and it demands the ability to align one’s rapport towards oneself according to these rules. For example, when engaging in a project that seeks to empower, the experts-by-experience need to manifest the will and ability to talk about themselves in a detailed and intimate manner. In a co-production setting, such talk is deemed inappropriate. Consequently, the experts-by-experience become experts in ‘reading the room’, in knowing themselves in multiple repertoires, and in presenting themselves in different modalities. Expertise as the ability of ‘conducting conduct’ – traditionally the domain of experts in the psycho-social field – is now also construed as one’s ability to ‘conduct one’s own conduct’. One becomes an expert in and of one’s own self-government.

From the point of view of participation studies, the article has shown how valuating participation as an instrument within a particular plan also enables the corresponding forms of evaluating participants. The ‘reduction’ (Thévenot, 2014a) of civic values into tools towards the objectives of a plan makes it possible to define criteria for ‘appropriate’ or ‘worthwhile’ civic action. As a case in point, the powerful ethos of co-production, valuing participation not as a right but as an input, makes it possible to evaluate civic participation in terms of epistemic contributions. If civic participation is not defended because it is a right, but rather because of something it can produce, evaluations of one’s knowledge for its ‘value’ and hence participation for its legitimacy become not only possible, but necessary. They, in turn, contribute to the creation of participants as an exclusive actor category with entry criteria (or ‘a threshold’, see Berger & Charles, 2014) defined according to the needs of the administration.

I have also shown how redefinitions of the notion of expertise can be used to disrupt ways of evaluating participation within a plan. By defining expertise as a quality possessed by everyone, a contestatory justification for civic participation was introduced, one that attempts to broaden the
feasible modes of engagement for the participants. While the neutral, technocratic experts of the co-production frame are placed in discussions of how specific services or policy questions would best be resolved, the view of 'open expertise' is actually focused on redefining who should be heard in the discussions. The neutral experts can be perceived as agreeing with the preset definitions and roles of experts in technocratic governance, while for the passionate participants, this is precisely the setting they seek to question.

This critical frame brings to light how neither the construction of expertise nor the frames that determine valuable forms of participation are ever static, nor is the process of 'making experts' ever finished. Rather, as the frames and the conceptions of expertise coexist, overlap and sometimes collide, they are constantly in motion, being reworked and redefined through contestation and critique, allowing potentially new ways of framing and interpretation to emerge. Studying expertise through the lens of the sociology of engagement, then, opens a new avenue for the interpretive study of expertise. It makes visible how the process of determining what is accepted as expertise is, in itself, already a value-based assessment, accepted and evaluated in relation to specific political objectives. This insight, in turn, allows us to see beyond the currently ever-so-popular narrative of objective, evidence-based policy-making, by opening up expertise and knowledge as political concepts.

A justification analysis (Ylä-Anttila & Luhtakallio, 2016) seems, then, a worthwhile point of departure when attempting to develop the practices of participatory governance from a democratic perspective. As the organisations operating under a network-governance rationale are now in the novel position of being gatekeepers and facilitators, they have come to possess significant powers to define whose voice gets heard. Making their justifications for increased civic participation explicit, and possibly moreover inclusive, could be one way of making their definition processes of 'good and acceptable participation' more democratically robust. An explicit examination of the justifications underlying the participatory processes would build up their legitimacy, as well as making contestation and critique of them possible.

In addition to these practical implications, this article has attempted to develop the analytical tools of the sociology of engagement in connection with Foucault’s notion of governmentality, concentrating on the conditions under which human beings are formed as subjects, and the concrete practices through which this governing gets done. The combination of the sociology of engagement and governmentality
develops the vocabulary of the former into governmental framing tools of the kind that are deliberately used by political actors to create different possibilities for being. As such, they should not be solely employed to identify which values are invoked or which forms of engagement are preferred in order to make an action seem logical and reasonable, but they should be further developed as tools in ethnographic governmental analysis, concentrating on how different governing rationalities are made practical (Brady & Lippert, 2016; Li, 2007). Since it is in these concrete, grassroots actions that a governmental rationality is brought into being, the sociology of engagements might help us draw connections between the often messy and blurry activities that construct the contours of possibilities for people, and the governing rationale that is drawn upon and regenerated through these actions.

Notes

2. The Finnish Slot Machine Association (RAY) was a public organisation that had a monopoly on the gambling industry in Finland. Its profits went towards the funding of civil society organisations working in the health and social welfare sector. Through the allotment of grants, it provided resources and thus had a significant influence on the work done by Finnish CSOs. In 2017, RAY supported just over 850 organisations with a total sum of €317.6 million. The organisation was merged with two similar gambling companies at the beginning of 2017 and is now called Veikkaus.
3. The interviews were conducted between 4 April 2014 and 16 October 2015 by the researcher. They were conducted in Finnish and the excerpts were later translated into English by the researcher. The interviewees were invited to participate through an open invitation sent by e-mail to the projects mentioned in Note 4.
4. 1. Finnish Central Association for Mental Health: ‘The establishment of expertise-by-experience and evaluation-through-experience in the development of mental health and substance abuse services’;
   2. The Federation of Mother and Child Homes and Shelters: ‘Miina – The participation and empowerment of women who have encountered domestic violence’;
   3. No Fixed Abode: ‘The utilisation of expertise-by-experience in the design and production of services for the homeless (Own keys – project 2012–2015)’;
   4. Muotiala Accommodation and Activity Centre Association: The project of preventive mental health work – experience-based knowledge about mental health issues for the working-age population (Turning experience into knowledge –project 2005–2009);
   5. Sininauhaliitto ry: A low-threshold information and support centre for
5. For anonymity reasons, I have chosen not to identify the CSO.
6. In interviews quoted here, the abbreviations E1–E23 refer to the experts-by-experience, P1–P14 to the professionals and TM to the interviewer.
7. My thanks to Reviewer 2 for pointing me towards this important feature.

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References


III

TURNING EXPERIENCE INTO EXPERTISE – TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF IN FINNISH PARTICIPATORY SOCIAL POLICY

by

Taina Meriluoto, 2018


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Turning experience into expertise: technologies of the self in Finnish participatory social policy

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ABSTRACT
This article investigates the micro-level practices of subject-construction in Finnish participatory social policy. Through a governmental ethnography on projects that invite former beneficiaries to become ‘experts-by-experience’ in social welfare organizations, I discern the possibilities for freedom in the participants’ self-construction. By making use of Michel Foucault’s conceptual tools of care of the self and confession, I illustrate how, contrary to the projects’ emancipatory promise of providing the service users the freedom to reconstruct themselves, the projects entail practices that curb the participants’ way of ‘knowing themselves’. They require the service users to reframe their raw experiences as neutral and objective knowledge, making alternative ways of knowing appear ‘irrational’, and hence easily discountable. I conclude that despite the user involvement initiatives’ promise of incorporating different forms of knowledge, the participants are in practice required to realign their way of knowing with the dominant knowledge paradigm in order to be accepted as participants.

KEYWORDS
Expertise-by-experience; governmental ethnography; service user involvement; technologies of the self; truth-telling; participatory policies

Introduction
Over the past 20 years, a widespread participatory dogma has come to shape public policy-making (e.g. Polletta 2016; Saurugger 2010). Emerging in the crossroads of participatory and deliberative ideals of democracy, and the neoliberal ideology with its calls for increased individual responsibility, the project of making people more self-reliant, active and contributing has become an extremely compelling direction for policymakers (Eliasoph 2016; Polletta 2016; Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009, 4–5; Neveu 2007).

In social policy, this ethos has translated into the idea of service user involvement (e.g. Barnes and Cotterell 2012a). By encouraging people to participate, it is hoped that more empowered, and consequently healthier, more reliable and more cooperative citizens will be constructed (Lister 2002, 39; Eliasoph 2016, 254; Gaventa and Barrett 2012; Perälä 2015). In addition, by incorporating the service users’ ‘local knowledge’ into decision-making, the goals of cheaper and more efficient services as well as more legitimacy for governance are sought after (Nez 2016; Demszky and Nassehi 2012, 174; Fledderus, Brandsen, and Honingh 2014).
Previous studies on participatory initiatives in general, as well as service user involvement schemes in particular, have pointed to the governmental capacity of the projects (e.g. Wilson 2001; Fox, Ward, and O’Rourke 2005; Leppo and Perala 2009). These studies have shown how participatory projects construct their participants’ subjectivities in specific ways in order to meet the projects’ varied objectives (e.g. Gourgues, Rui, and Topçu 2013; Charles 2016, 19; Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007, 63–70; Newman and Clarke 2009, 138–139). Previous empirical research on participatory initiatives has focused primarily on what characterizes the subjectivities, or the type of participation, toward which the participants are being conducted (e.g. Charles 2016; Newman and Tonkens 2011) and on the diverse objectives set for the projects, as well as the rationales underpinning them (Ganuza, Baiocchi, and Summers 2016; Dagnino 2007; Barnes, Newman, and Sullivan 2007; Gourgues, Rui, and Topçu 2013). Thus far, less attention has been paid to how the initiatives work on their participants’ subjectivities – techniques that Kim McKee (2009, 478) calls ‘the micro-practices of local initiatives’.

This article responds to the recent call for more micro-scale, empirically grounded governmental analysis to scrutinize the initiatives’ ways of working (see, e.g., Polletta 2016; Brady 2016; McKee 2009). The article’s purpose is to flesh out the specific techniques and practices of subjectivation (Foucault 1994, 785) employed in user-involvement projects that introduce former beneficiaries as ‘experts-by-experience’ into social welfare organizations in Finland. These projects are treated as practical examples of participatory governance, seeking to ‘activate’ former service users by forging new, active identities for them. The article provides a micro-scale analysis of the initiatives’ ‘art of governing’ (McKee 2009, 473) by asking how they influence the self-construction of their participants. Through a governmental analysis of the often mundane, everyday practices, I hope to shed light on the actual processes of subjectivation, where the participatory governmentality is interpreted, enacted and responded to (see Brady 2016; Fridman 2014, 92).

As expertise-by-experience is a role created on the basis of certain previous experiences and their particular type of use, personal history becomes a key resource of governance and subject-formation. Hence, the article focuses on how the participants’ past and the stories they tell about themselves are operationalized as tools of governance. I employ Michel Foucault’s concepts of care of the self and confession (Foucault 2012) as analytical tools to illustrate the practices that delineate how the participants reconstruct themselves through the initiatives, and to critically examine the participants’ possibilities for freedom in this process. The article asks how the participants’ freedom is restricted, and in turn expressed, in the practices of self-construction.

The article’s main argument is that, in the initiatives studied, the participants’ self-construction is steered particularly through practices that define knowledge and expertise. More precisely, as the object of expertise in this particular case are the participants themselves, the key techniques of governance are those that define when a person knows oneself. Hence, I posit, the participants’ subject-construction is steered (1) by delineating the practices the participants need to undergo in order to ‘know oneself’ and (2) by defining the signs the participants need to manifest to be considered ‘knowing themselves’. The article then shows how ‘expertise over oneself’ is constructed as a synonym for knowing oneself according to the dominant paradigm of knowledge, making alternative ways of
articulating oneself appear as ‘irrational’. As a result, contrarily to the projects’ emancipatory promise, the projects’ practices can be seen as curbing the participants’ freedom.

The article begins with a discussion of the current literature on expertise-by-experience, and the consequently changing notions of expertise and agency in social welfare. Next, I introduce Foucault’s notions of subjectivation and discuss how the process of subject-construction has previously been studied in the context of social services. After presenting my conceptual tools, methodology, data and the context of the Finnish case, my analysis focuses on the practices used to steer the processes the participants undergo to ‘know themselves’, and their acts of resisting the practices. I end with a discussion considering the implications the identified governmental processes have for the debate on service user involvement.

**Expertise-by-experience in social welfare – transforming expertise, renegotiating agency**

Expertise-by-experience as a concept and a practice has been traced back to the ‘third way’ health and social care reforms in the UK, which sought to craft a new, active role for the service user (Barnes and Cotterell 2012a; Fox, Ward, and O’Rourke 2005; Wilson 2001; Tehseen 2013). Similarly to many other participatory measures, these service user involvement initiatives were introduced as a response to an array of problems – both social and economic (Newman and Clarke 2009, 134–139; Barnes and Cotterell 2012a; Lewis 2010, 277–278; Stewart 2013). By inviting service users to participate in the planning and execution of social services, they were to become ‘empowered’ and assume more responsibility over their own life and care (Healy 2000). In addition (and in part through the participants’ greater responsibility over themselves), the coproduced services were to be more efficient and consequently less costly (Wilson 2001, 136–137; Barnes 2009, 219–220). Furthermore, through service user engagement, the new ‘duty’ (Barnes and Cotterell 2012a, xviii) of public involvement was met, making public governance more legitimate as it adhered to the new participatory norm (Leal 2007).

Service user involvement has also received criticism, pointing particularly to the conflicting purposes given to the initiatives. While on one hand, the participants have been shown to engage in user involvement schemes with hopes of having an impact on the services and attitudes they have experienced as harmful (Barnes and Cotterell 2012b; Wilson and Beresford 2000), public administration has not always been keen to incorporate the knowledge of these new experts. Instead, it has emphasized the ‘therapeutic’ and ‘empowering’ functions of participation (Barnes 2009, 224; Yiannoullou 2012). Expertise-by-experience has even been accused of co-opting the civic activism of the survivors’ movement, introducing talk of networks and partnerships, but then ‘taming’ the survivors’ attempts of advocacy, hence undermining the activists’ efforts to make their voices heard (Beresford 2002, 96; Tehseen 2013, 50–51).

Consequently, negotiations on the role and authority of service users have turned into central power struggles within the social services (Newman 2005; Tehseen 2013; Powell et al. 2009; Wilson 2001; Fox, Ward, and O’Rourke 2005; Leppo and Perälä 2009). A key notion in these battles is the concept of expertise (Krick 2016; Smith-Merry 2012; Fledderus, Brandsen, and Honingh 2014, 426–428; Barnes 2009). Through its redefinitions – as it is now the users who are ‘the experts of their own lives’ – experience has become an increasingly powerful
source of authority (Blencowe, Brigstocke, and Dawney 2013, 4; Demszky and Nassehi 2012, 172). More emphasis is now put on the service users’ ‘lived knowledge’, both as a means of gaining valuable information on the structural inequalities and local contexts affecting the service users’ lives, and as a way of empowering them and making them feel valued (Healy 2000, 29–30; Nez 2016; Randall and Munro 2010, 1495; Närhi 2004, 54–55).

However – and this should be emphasized – in service user involvement schemes, the service users’ knowledge is most often referred to as ‘secondary’ or ‘alternative’ knowledge, hence implying that they serve a complementary role. Their expertise is often defined as being of a practical nature, adding something valuable, but not fundamental to the discussion. ‘First knowledge’ is situated elsewhere, allowing the secondary knowledge to be evaluated vis-à-vis it (Barnes and Cotterell 2012a; xv–xxvi, xxi; Healy 2000, 40–42). Furthermore, it has been noted that the participants are often invited to take part based on their experience-based knowledge, but are required to transcend their personal views when actually engaging in activities of participatory governance in order for their participation to be considered legitimate (e.g. Lehoux, Daudelin, and Abelson 2012; Neveu 2011, 151; Thévenot 2007, 420). Negotiations over knowledge – on whose and what kind of knowledge counts – are thus key sites of power struggle in participatory social welfare.

The question of knowledge as the basis for the right to participate has a particular significance in the context of service user involvement. As the object of knowledge is the participants’ own lives, the definitions of knowledge become questions of ‘knowing yourself’. Hence, truth, knowledge and self-construction become intertwined in a particularly explicit way. The notion of being an expert of yourself emerges as a prerequisite for participation, allowing definitions of expertise to be used as a governmental device to steer the subject-construction of the participants.

Consequently, the situated negotiations concerning the conditions for possessing an expertise on oneself become extremely interesting. When is one considered to be an expert? Conversely, can one not be an expert of her own experience? And moreover, how should one cultivate oneself to become such an expert? To elucidate these questions, I introduce Michel Foucault’s thinking on subjectivation and his conceptual tools that connect subject-formation with truth-telling.

**Technologies of the self in participatory social policy**

In Michel Foucault’s thinking, subjects are constructed at the juncture between outside attempts to define the individual and her own interpretations and responses toward those definitions (Foucault 1994, 718–719; see also Kelly 2009, 100–101; Rose 1999, 11; Ball and Olmedo 2013, 87). Consequently, his notion of technologies of the self has provided the basis for many analyses of power in contemporary social work and therapeutic practices that work to (re)construct the subjectivities of their ‘targets’ (e.g. Randall and Munro 2010; Dawney 2011; McFalls and Pandolfi 2014; Besley 2005).

Technologies of the self has proved a useful analytical device particularly when examining liberal forms of government, as it emphasizes the active role of the individual whose subjectivity is being worked on (Foucault 1994, 785; Faubion 2014, 5–6; Fridman 2014, 92). As opposed to a passive object of subjection, the subjects under liberal forms of government need to be willing to actively work on
themselves, ‘get to know themselves’, share this knowledge of themselves and engage in its critical examination and cultivation (Foucault 1982, 783, 2012, 219–235; Dawney 2011, 547; Powell and Khan 2012, 134–135). Here, participatory practices are understandably extremely compelling. They provide a concrete tool kit for the participants to become engaged in their own governance (see Newman 2005, 122; Gourgues, Rui, and Topçu 2013, 12; Perälä 2015).

The Foucauldian idea of self-governance (especially Foucault 2009; Kelly 2009, 99–102) entails two core practices: knowing oneself and cultivating oneself – e.g. training one’s emotions and mastering one’s passions (Randall and Munro 2010, 1494–1496). Through them, one is thought to establish an active relationship toward oneself (Kelly 2013). This ‘working with oneself’ is one of the primary tools and promises of participatory social policy. Participatory social work uses concepts such as ‘self-discovery’ to illustrate the various practices through which one ‘works with oneself’ in order to ‘reach one’s full potential’ (e.g. Randall and Munro 2010; Dawney 2011; McFalls and Pandolfi 2014; Langer and Lietz 2014, 124).

Previous studies have noted the paradox this emancipatory promise of liberal government entails (e.g. Heyes 2007; Fox, Ward, and O’Rourke 2005; Wilson 2001). In Rose’s, O’Malley’s and Valverde’s words (2006, 89), ‘The subjects so created would produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves rather than being merely obedient, and would be obliged to be free in specific ways’ (my emphasis). The liberal project of subjectivation, it is suggested, operates by providing environments and techniques for self-development and discovery, but then uses these processes of self-cultivation to steer the subject toward the normal (Heyes 2007; McFalls and Pandolfi 2014, 168–187; Dean 1999, 75–76; Healy 2000, 44). As Fox, Ward, and O’Rourke (2005) put it, to become an ‘expert-patient’ is a ‘double-edged sword’: ‘it is to be empowered to manage one’s health and illness, but to adopt this power from a dominant disciplinary system of thought’.

A crucial question for the investigation of participatory welfare practices, then, is whether, and to what extent, the participants can express freedom in their self-governance. While some scholars argue that the trendy participatory practices of social policy offer the promise of freedom through self-discovery (see Perälä 2015), others see them as limiting and normalizing, conditioning the process of self-cultivation through outside norms (e.g. Wilson 2001; Fox, Ward, and O’Rourke 2005; Dawney 2011; Langer and Lietz 2014, 194–198). In this article, I propose to investigate this emancipatory paradox through an analysis of the concrete practices that direct the service users’ self-construction at the micro-level. Through a detailed description of the technologies of the self, identified in the user involvement initiatives, it becomes possible to provide a nuanced investigation into the participants’ possibilities for freedom in self-cultivation. As my analytical tools, I employ Foucault’s notions of confession and of care of the self, which are discussed in the following.

**Methodology: interpreting the practices of self-construction**

In his later lectures, Foucault argued that, in practice, the government of the self takes place through ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 2012, 91–92; see also McFalls and Pandolfi 2014, 173–174), meaning the practices and institutions that define what is considered the truth, and when one is considered to be telling it (see also Brion and Harcourt 2014, 298; Rose 1999, 4; Dean 1999, 18). As one gets to know oneself by being honest with
oneself – and makes oneself knowable (and governable) to others by telling the truth about who they are (Foucault 2012, 221) – the definitions of truth become powerful tools in influencing people’s self-governance.

I employ Foucault’s historical concepts of care of the self and confession to illustrate the different practices connecting truth-telling and subject-formation in the user involvement initiatives, and to critically examine the participants’ possibilities to express freedom in their self-formation. What interests me are the practices that aim at defining how the participants’ previous selves are expected to be worded, or made knowable, in order for them to be considered ‘knowing themselves’. At stake in these practices are how the ‘truth’ is conditioned (meaning what kind of stories are accepted as knowledge over oneself) and how one is required to position oneself toward that story in order to be accepted as a participant. Viewing the practices identified against Foucault’s thinking on confession and care of the self as different logics of self-construction makes visible how the participants’ self-construction may be constricted and how, in turn, freedom in self-construction would be possible.

Foucault presented the notions of care of the self (souci de soi, epimeleia heautou) and confession as parts of the same historical continuum of ‘practices of subjectivity’ (Foucault 2004a, 10; see also Iftode 2013). Both rely on techniques that ‘steer the subject’s gaze inward’ – i.e. that require and enable the subject to know and to cultivate herself (Foucault 2004a, 254–256; Fornet-Betancourt, Becker, and Gomez-Müller 1987, 116–117). Their core difference lies in their contrasting positions toward the subject’s freedom. Care of the self, as a pre-Christian practice of self-cultivation, regarded self-construction as a practice of freedom (Foucault 2012, 232–234, 2004a, 132–133; see also Fornet-Betancourt, Becker, and Gomez-Müller 1987; Kelly 2009, 100–102). It represented a manner of self-making that enabled the subjects to be ‘artists of their own lives’ (O’Leary 2006, 121), to cultivate themselves free from definitions of truth and externally defined norms (Iftode 2013, 82).

The Christian hermeneutics of the self, says Foucault, take up these techniques of knowing and cultivating oneself, but couple them with an aspect of self-renunciation (Foucault 2004a, 255–257; Iftode 2013, 78). Foucault argues that confession is a mode of self-cultivation that requires revealing and evaluating oneself according to norms ‘from above’, transforming oneself by adhering to this outside moral paradigm (Foucault 2004b, 186–187, 2012, 220–221, 2004a, 186–187; see also Kelly 2009, 94). This pastoral type of power adopt the pre-Christian techniques of self-cultivation, but instead of using them as tools to enhance the subjects’ freedom in ‘modeling their own statues’ (O’Leary 2006, 54), they use them to curb and steer the process of self-making (Foucault 1982).

Contemporary studies of welfare practices have employed Foucault’s conceptual tools to critically discern their play on the participants’ freedom (see, e.g., Wilson 2001; Randall and Munro 2010; Perälä 2015; Heyes 2007; Dawney 2011). These studies employ care of the self as an analytical device to illustrate the practices that allow the participants to exercise freedom through self-formation (e.g. Perälä 2015; Heyes 2007; Ball and Olmedo 2013), as opposed to the normalizing governing practices that steer participants’ self-formation through outside norms (see Randall and Munro 2010; Besley 2005). Confession, in turn, has been used to illustrate how therapeutic practices in particular steer persons in the way they cultivate themselves by creating ‘a rupture’ between one’s past and future self (e.g. Besley 2005, 373; Dawney 2011, 547), requiring
the subject to submit herself to be governed within the dominant paradigm of knowledge (Foucault 2004a, 98; Besley 2005, 374–375, 2002, 134).

In this article, I consider confession and care of the self as contrasting logics of self-construction (see Foucault 2004a, 212). Confession, requiring subjects to transform themselves into ‘what they ought to be’, is used to make visible the practices that require the participants to work upon themselves to adhere to outside ideals and standards. Care of the self, in contrast, is used to illustrate an alternative means of knowing oneself that does not require one to seek outside ideals in the dominant system of knowledge, but instead allows one to construct oneself freely (Foucault 2004a, 83–86, 134–135; see also Heyes 2007, 113–117). The concepts in this article are used to ask whether it is possible for the participants to ‘know themselves’ in other ways than through the route sketched out by social care administrators.

My micro-level analysis responds to Michelle Brady’s call for an ‘ethnographic imaginary’ (Brady 2016) in governmentality studies. Brady argues that such studies give the researcher ‘greater insights into the multiplicity of power relations and practices within the present, as well as the actual processes through which subjectivities are formed’ (Brady 2014, 12; see also Teghtsoonian 2016). While traditional governmentality studies are interested in political rationalities and ambitions, a governmental ethnography asks how these rationalities are made practical, how they are interpreted, perceived, responded to and resisted in concrete programs, techniques and ways of working (Teghtsoonian 2016; Brady 2011, 2014, 11–33; McKee 2009; Li 2007a). Kim McKee maintains that this perspective helps to avoid attributing a false coherence to political rationalities and programs of governance, revealing instead their ‘messiness’, situatedness, struggles and multiple possible consequences’ (McKee 2009, 478–479; see also Brady 2011, 267; Fridman 2014, 94; Lippert and Brady 2016).

The ethnographic approach, I posit, is particularly well suited to examine practices of subject-formation, as it allows paying attention to the possibilities of interpretation, adaptation and resistance of the governed (see also McKee 2009, 479; Fridman 2014; Larner and Moreton 2016, 1319–1327). By focusing on practices – and moreover on how the practices are interpreted and experienced, I am able to investigate ‘the inevitable gap between what is attempted and what is accomplished’ (Li 2007b, 1). As the essence of governmental thought is in the play on the freedom of those governed, to merely investigate the policy documents would neglect the very essence of governing through individuals’ freedom.

**Context and data**

Expert-by-experience emerged in the Finnish social sector as a new concept at the turn of the twenty-first century. Following a participatory shift in norms of good governance in Finnish public policy, the new policy outlines stressed the importance of active citizen engagement (Salminen and Wilhelmsson 2013, 10–11), and pushed toward new innovations to involve and activate citizens, particularly among the ‘marginalized’ citizenry (see, e.g., the National Development Program for Social Welfare and Health Care)

Following suit on examples from the UK and Denmark, Finnish mental health organizations started to recruit and train former service users to become experts-by-experience in
service production and policymaking. The concept and practice then disseminated fast and widely among health and social welfare organizations in both the public and the third sectors (Rissanen 2015, 201). As it stands, the popular term is used to signify a variety of people and activities. Most commonly, experts-by-experience act as consultants in service development, as peer supporters, or in public advocacy based on their personal experiences.

This article draws on themed interviews with 23 experts-by-experience and 14 social work professionals from seven projects that have developed expertise-by-experience in the Finnish social welfare sector. The interview data are complemented by policy documents on expertise-by-experience, produced by the projects as well as their funders. In addition, I draw on my ethnographic observations as a practitioner in one of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) studied. Between 2011 and 2014, I participated in, and organized, training sessions, meetings and workshops on expertise-by-experience with experts-by-experience and with practitioners, both within the NGO where I was employed and with its partners.

The projects studied were run by either public sector organizations (2) or NGOs (5), and all received public funding. They all work within the area of adult social work, focusing on issues like domestic violence, gambling, homelessness, mental health and substance abuse. In broad terms, the projects presented two objectives for expertise-by-experience: the inclusion and empowerment of marginalized services users, and the introduction of experience-based knowledge into public decision-making. Out of the seven projects, six invited the experts-by-experience to act in and through their own organizations, while one was focused on ‘producing’ experts-by-experience for the needs of other organizations in the social welfare sector. Crucially for the premises of this article, the impetus for introducing the policy of expertise-by-experience was in all of the cases, as Warren (2009) would put it, ‘governance-driven’. Consequently, both the objectives and the practices of the projects, steering the participants’ subject-construction, were mostly defined by the administration.

Except for the project that trained the experts-by-experience for other organizations’ use, all of the experts-by-experience interviewed had prior connections to their respective organizations. All but one were former beneficiaries. They had become engaged in the projects through varying ways: 12 had actively applied for training, 5 were invited – or ‘lured’ as one expert-by-experience put it – and 6 felt that they were doing the exact same things they have been doing all along, only now under a different name. Seven of the experts-by-experience interviewed were employed in the organizations, 12 performed paid ‘gigs’ when invited, and 4 acted on a completely voluntary basis. The professionals, for their part, all worked in projects tasked with developing expertise-by-experience in their respective organizations. Their positions ranged from project employees to executive directors.

The interviews took place at a time when the concept and policy of expertise-by-experience had rapidly gained in popularity. As new organizations working in various fields started to adopt the concept and translate it into their own cultures, a plethora of conflicting interpretations on the projects’ purpose and ways of working arose. Many of the interviewees were well aware of these conflicts, and presented strong views on what things should be like. Many interviewees were also openly critical of the practice, pointing to the potential pitfalls, such as participant selection, in the projects.

The data were analyzed following a method of close reading (see Yanow 2015, 404). First, I identified the different requirements for experts-by-experience expressed in the data, as well as the practices – such as training and interviews – described as necessary
for someone to be able to act as an expert-by-experience. After having thematically
grouped the requirements and the practices, I discovered that all focused on the correct
form and position of the personal stories of the experts-by-experience. Consequently, I
placed the participants’ personal stories as the focal point of my analysis. I asked how
the service users’ stories of themselves are shaped in the projects, and what are the
characteristics of a story that is accepted as ‘the truth’ in this context.

**Governing personal stories**

In the following, I will present the techniques used in the projects to delineate how the
participants ‘know themselves’. I start by presenting the emancipatory promise of the
user involvement initiatives. This promise of the initiatives as sites for the ‘care of the
self’ is then critically examined by presenting the concrete set of practices of self-
governance employed in the projects. The final section of my analysis focuses on the
participants’ possibilities for resistance.

**The emancipatory promise – user involvement initiatives as sites for ‘care of the
self’**

A major promise, and one of the strongest appeals of expertise-by-experience
according to my interviewees, was the possibility of ‘building a new identity’. Expertise-by-experience carried with it a promise to ‘turn the painful experiences
into a strength’. In many instances, the user involvement initiatives were marketed
as sites for self-discovery and means of ‘self-actualization’, as presented in the
following citation from a guidebook for developing expertise-by-experience:

> Expertise-by-experience is empowering because it carries with it a feeling of significance of
one’s painful experiences. In expertise-by-experience, the participants can feel included
and build a new identity for themselves. They gain a possibility to have an impact and
develop themselves in issues that matter to them (Hietala & Rissanen 2015, 12).

This promise is analogous to ‘care of the self’ as a practice of freedom. The projects are
presented as sites of ‘building a new identity’ rooted in one’s own, significant experiences.
The process is presented as free and liberating, with the professionals merely providing ‘the
necessary resources’, as the following project report illustrates:

> In recovery-oriented services, the central theme is to increase an individual’s power in
their own lives, and hence support their agency. The relations of care are equal, and
instead of an expert-patient – setting, the professional positions herself rather as a coach or
a partner. The experience-based knowledge of the service user is valued. — The point of
departure is always in the service user’s own goals – not in recovery defined from the
outside. The role of the professional is to provide the service user with the necessary
resources, such as knowledge and skills, networks and support that enhance their abilities
to govern their lives (Falk et al. 2013, 10–11).

The projects’ promise is thus extremely emancipatory. Next, I turn to the concrete
practices of ‘self-development’ and investigate them against this emancipatory claim.
The projects’ practices of governance

Five of the seven projects studied offered training to their participants as a pathway from the role of a service user toward the role of an expertise-by-experience. These varied significantly in length, ranging from a 6-day course up to a 2-year process with ‘on-the-job training periods’ in between. They also varied in their selectiveness of the participants: in three organizations, everyone willing would be able to participate, whereas two projects interviewed and selected ‘students’ who were considered ‘to have the aptitude’ to take part in the training. However, in the three organizations with ‘open’ training, a selection process also took place before the experts-by-experience were allowed to act outside their home organizations. Quite concretely, based on their observations, the professionals selected the participants that they considered to be ready and provide ‘the best fit’ for a particular task. Hence, before the experts-by-experience were granted the possibility to claim their new role, their ‘readiness’ to participate was evaluated either in the context of the training or before proposing tasks that involve sharing their experiences in public.

A similar process was present in the two projects that did not require training for their participants. Even though the actors in these projects were rather openly against training of any kind, claiming that they ‘strip the experience of its value’, as put by an expert-by-experience in an NGO, they too placed a filter between the projects’ home organizations and the outside public. Everyone was indeed welcome to act as an expert-by-experience inside the organizations, but certain requirements had to be met before the participants were considered ‘ready’ for public participation.

A common feature in all of the training processes, as well as the other practices determining the ‘readiness’ of the participants, was that they placed a strong emphasis on ‘working with one’s story’. All of the training-processes included a section where the participants’ life story was laid down, rearranged and represented.

In the following, I will examine in detail the practices the experts-by-experience are required to undergo in order to be considered to know themselves enough to be ‘experts of themselves’.

Getting to know oneself

The first stage in the participants’ process toward becoming an expert-by-experience is ‘facing one’s past’. The ability to reveal one’s past fully is positioned as the condition of ‘truly knowing oneself’ (see also Foucault 2004a, 334). The following interviewee describes how talking about one’s experiences is the first, necessary step toward becoming an expert-by-experience, and considered proof of both the ongoing process of facing the past, and the increasing level of ‘self-awareness’ resulting from this process:

TM*: Does expertise-by-experience require something?
E4: Well, the experience. And maybe someone to talk to about it in order for the issue to start to resolve. I believe that you have to be able to talk about it.
TM: So even though you have the experience but don’t talk about it, you are not yet an expert-by-experience?
E4: Yes. It’s really hard to define. But the way I see it, an expert-by-experience talks about her experiences, if only to one person alone.
This process of ‘facing one’s past’ is in large part similar to Foucault’s ideas about the confessional as a technology for rendering oneself knowable, governable and ready for a new, improved subjectivity. As noted, the process of subject-formation through truth-telling can be influenced by defining the criteria it has to meet in order for it to be considered as truly revealing ‘the truth’ about the person. In these initiatives, true self-awareness and self-discovery were defined to manifest when one can talk about one’s past honestly and thoroughly, without shying away from passages that evoke awkward or painful emotions. The following interviewee, an expert-by-experience in the public sector, describes how omitting certain passages from one’s life story should be considered a warning signal of someone not facing one’s past fully and hence not able to cultivate oneself in the way expected:

TM: I’m extremely interested in the part of the training where you dealt with your life stories. Could you describe it a bit more? What happened there concretely and what do you think was its goal?

E18: Well, we wrote it down, and after we had done that, we read the stories aloud to each other, if not entirely, then at least the parts you wanted to share with the others. And then we reflected on them, on how it felt to tell and write the story. I think the point was that even though you don’t need to share everything you’ve written, if your paper is full of stuff that you are not ready to share, maybe you still have some processes that are unfinished.

If one cannot meet the criterion of full disclosure, one cannot be considered ‘ready’ to become an expert-by-experience. Consequently, as one starts the journey toward becoming an expert, one has to manifest the will and ability to encounter one’s past bravely and fully – preferably in the context of the projects’ training sessions. By so doing, one also lays oneself bare in front of others in the form of a narrative, ready to be conducted toward a new and improved self.

**Becoming an expert of oneself**

After having been proved ready to ‘work with one’s story’, the past that has been opened up for scrutiny is rearranged. This is where the ‘raw experiences’ get turned into ‘expertise’, as the following quotes from a policy document and an NGO practitioner illustrate:

The training for experts-by-experience in the Key to the Mind project was an eight months long process, during which the students were offered the possibility and the tools to work their raw experiences into expertise (Falk et al. 2013, 22).

TM: Why is dealing with your past important?

P9: Well, it is precisely the expertise of the expert-by-experience. I mean, that she has organized her experiences. She will probably have had many tools to do it, therapy, for example, training and peer support also. It distinguishes experience-based expertise from other experience-based knowledge. I mean, everyone has experience-based knowledge and that of the service users needs to be exploited, but it isn’t necessarily so organized and thought through, but instead some raw form of knowledge.

This is a crucial departure from the projects’ promise of providing a free space for re-creating oneself. Instead of giving value to the ‘raw experiences’ as a basis for subject-formation, they need to be worked upon under the dominant paradigm of
knowledge in order to be considered ‘the truth’. In practice, this entailed two interwoven requirements: distancing oneself from one’s experiences (see also Langer and Lietz 2014, 192), and reframing the experiences as a source of knowledge by transferring and comparing them to other knowledge available on the matter. Seventeen out of the 23 experts-by-experience, and 13 out of the 14 professionals interviewed used the terms ‘repositioning oneself’ toward one’s story, or ‘reorganizing one’s story’ when describing what was required of the participants in order to claim their new role as an expert-by-experience. The following transcript demonstrates this concretely. Here, a professional from the public sector talks about how gaining ‘additional knowledge’ and ‘analyzing one’s experiences’ in relation to it are presented as requirements of ‘knowing yourself':

TM: You said that there’s a difference between the trained and the non-trained experts-by-experience. What is the difference?
P4: Well, the fact that they work very thoroughly with their own story. But also that they acquire so much theoretical knowledge that they get possibilities to reflect on their experiences in a larger context. I think it helps to see different sides of things. And my experience is that, our 86 trained ones, they work in a very smart way out there. They have a lot to offer and I think it’s related to the fact that they have been able to reflect on their own stories over time and have received additional knowledge that has helped them analyze their experiences. That’s why they have very mature thoughts about many things.

One’s correct form of ‘knowing oneself’ was, hence, evaluated using the same criteria for ‘reliable knowledge’ as for other forms of expert-knowledge. Quite concretely, one had to manifest an expert-position toward oneself in order for one’s knowledge on oneself to be accepted as the truth. Signs of such an expert relationship toward one’s ‘raw experiences’ were defined by the concepts of distance and neutrality; ‘you have a certain amount of air between yourself and your experiences’ is how a professional in an NGO put it. ‘You have to be able to talk about your experiences without talking about yourself’ said an expert-by-experience in the public sector. This demand for neutrality is visible in the following quote from an expert-by-experience in an NGO, where a sign of having ‘sufficiently’ dealt with your past means ‘no longer’ being overemotional or uncontrollable, but already calm and neutral.

TM: What does it mean that the past has been dealt with?
E17: [sighs] Well, I think that dealing with your past means that you are able to talk about it without big emotional reactions, I mean that you don’t burst into tears or feel very angry or bitter, but you are able to talk about your experiences in a calm and neutral manner. I mean that your emotions are no longer uncontrollable. And that you have constructed your story into a whole where you already understand the connections between the facts.

The call for neutrality sets a normative condition for credible knowledge and consequently the legitimate form of being for the expert-by-experience. If one is too emotional or too passionate, one is considered ‘too attached’ to one’s experiences, or ‘not seeing the whole truth’, and consequently not qualified for participation. The ability to deliver one’s message within the norm of neutrality is deemed a sign of stability. In contrast, failure to do so is labeled a sign of mental instability, which
consequently justifies dismissal of the person’s message (see also Martin 2011, 166–168). As a result, a disconnect between the projects’ promise and their concrete practices, a contradiction ever-present in expertise-by-experience, emerges: the demand for ‘raw’ experience and the processing of that experience. The projects’ promise to value and cherish everyone’s ‘pure’ experiences, and to provide a free space for self-cultivation based on them, is in practice curbed through demands that define when a person is considered to ‘know herself’, be in command of herself and tell the truth about herself. Even though it is the strong personal experiences that create the possibility for someone to become an expert-by-experience, one has to turn those experiences into knowledge according to specific demands in order to be considered a competent and legitimate participant.

**Possibilities for resistance**

Interpreting projects such as expertise-by-experience as always succeeding in influencing subjects as intended is, of course, far too simplistic. In the last part of my analysis, I will focus on forms of resistance that can be mounted against the practices sketched earlier, by discussing first how one can refuse to prove that one has dealt with one’s experiences in the expected way, and second, how one can resist representing one’s experiences in a way expected by the projects. These acts of resistance, although rare, were nonetheless present particularly among the NGO projects studied.

If we maintain that the process of diligently going through and reframing one’s past as ‘knowledge’ is the key tool of governance in expertise-by-experience, one of the most obvious ruptures manifests when one refuses to take part in activities where such a process could be directed and proven. In the following quote, an expert-by-experience from an NGO questions the process of reframing one’s experiences as knowledge:

E1: Personally I would never go to a training for experts-by-experience.
TM: Why not?
E1: Well what kind of experience can I learn from school? Then it would be like reading a book. For me, expertise-by-experience is something that relies entirely on my own experience, my own life that I’ve lived. It is my life. I know what I’m talking about when I talk about my life. I don’t understand what part of it I could possibly study.

By questioning the training provided, the interviewee critiques the demand to turn experiences into a certain form of expertise defined through outside norms. Instead, she underscores the value of the experiences as such, hence claiming ownership over their interpretation and her own self-making.

Another manner of resistance is the refusal to comply with the norms set for appropriate representation of one’s past. The following quote is a rare one indeed, expressing a fierce will of an NGO’s expert-by-experience to determine his own manner of saying and being:

E23: This is my thing and no one else needs to direct it. — I think that I should be allowed to say what I have on my mind and not have to polish it. I think that it’s useless to speak if you can’t say it the way you experience it.
Such parrhesiastic subject-formations were extremely rare in my data. More commonly the interviewees described how their manner of representing themselves was limited through demands for appropriate knowledge and discourse. The following NGO expert-by-experience illustrates this by describing a struggle where his obligations toward the other beneficiaries restrain him from challenging the norms set for experts-by-experience:

TM: You joked earlier that you could say pretty much anything as long as it’s not offensive to the funder. Are there limitations to what you can do?
E12: Yeah, I can’t say some things because of the organization. Like, once they asked me if I wanted to destroy the organization. Well, I don’t because then there’d be no one who would defend the John Does on the street.

Here, the significance of meeting the conditions of the right way of knowing becomes vividly clear: if the conditions of the correct way of speaking are not met, the opinions the NGO puts forward in governance networks are disregarded altogether by their relevant stakeholders and partners, resulting in a situation where ‘there is no one who would defend the John Does on the street’.

The earlier quote illustrates the experts-by-experience’s difficulty to express freedom in self-formation. By delineating a specific position toward one’s past as ‘expertise’, and a specific representation of it as ‘knowledge’, all other forms of self-representation are easily discredited. This results in a Catch-22 where an expert-by-experience can either subject herself to the demands of the project in order to be able to advance her point of view (which may longer be her point of view) or refuse to play by the rules and to construct herself freely, resulting in being shut out of the project altogether.

Discussion

In this article, I set out to illustrate the concrete practices employed to construct the participants’ subjectivities in service user involvement initiatives within Finnish participatory social policy. By making the practices visible, my objective was to discern whether the participants have the possibility to practice freedom in constructing themselves within the project contexts.

Contrary to the projects’ promise of creating spaces for the participants to ‘develop themselves’ from their own point of view, the projects were found to entail several practices that, instead, curb this freedom by setting conditions for the correct ways of working with and presenting one’s story. In the context of service user involvement, it appears that one needs to be able to turn oneself into something one ‘knows’ rather than ‘is’ – and to draw the definitions of knowledge from the dominant system of thought. Consequently, the article has shown how, contrary to the projects’ emancipatory promise, the projects’ practices of self-governance can be seen as limiting the participants’ freedom.

This finding supports the previous studies’ suggestion that user-involvement initiatives may have a tendency to co-opt service users’ knowledge and require them to transform themselves to meet predefined norms of credible knowledge and way of being. This article has further illustrated how the projects succeed in their governance efforts. I have shown how the participants’ subject-construction is
influenced particularly by the projects’ definitions of the appropriate process and form of ‘knowing oneself’. As the experts-by-experience are expected to participate as experts of themselves, the definitions of credible knowledge can be translated into conditions the participants have to meet to be considered ‘knowing themselves’.

By employing the rhetoric of knowledge and expertise, alternative ways of articulating oneself can be made to appear as ‘irrational’. To refute the conditions set for expertise-by-experience would mean going against the ‘normal’ and the ‘sane’, making it easy to delegitimize attempts to advance different kinds of knowledge. This becomes clearly visible in the difficulty experienced by the experts-by-experience to have ‘their own truth’ accepted as part of the public discussion.

As a result, I conclude that a disconnect is apparent between, on the one hand, the participants’ expectations and the promises made by the projects and, on the other, the concrete practices employed. While the projects define expertise-by-experience as ‘alternative forms of knowledge’ and the project environment as a site for the participants to ‘freely cultivate themselves’, in practice the experts-by-experience were often required to adhere to very rigid requirements regarding ‘credible knowledge’ in order to be accepted as ‘knowing themselves’. This created a tension, as a majority of the experts-by-experience, as well as some professionals, took offence at these fixed definitions of knowledge, and instead entered the projects with a wish to engage in redefining what knowledge in a service user context should mean.

Such renegotiations of knowledge appear to be extremely difficult in service user involvement schemes. Although the ethos of participatory social policy is to engage multiple forms of knowledge in decision-making, the article’s findings show how the technocratic knowledge of the practitioners remains a measuring stick against which the service user’s knowledge of themselves is evaluated. Consequently, the requirements of neutrality and objectivity are also used to evaluate the participants’ ‘expertise over themselves’, resulting in a narrow and limiting way of ‘being normal’. To put it bluntly, the service users are often required to connect to, and faithfully represent, the ‘official truth’ on themselves, instead of being accepted as the embodiments of multiple, even conflicting personal truths and diverse ways of knowing.

Notes

1. Cressida J. Heyes (2007, 37) questions the idea that the normalizing practices either limit or enhance the subject’s freedom. Instead, she suggests that while the practices certainly are used to construct docile, ‘normal’ subjects, it is possible that people may willingly choose to follow them and cultivate themselves in a way desired by the administration, in an attempt to ‘feel normal’.
3. The projects studied are as follows:


Muotiala Accommodation and Activity Centre Association: The project of preventive mental health work – experience-based knowledge about mental health issues for the working-age population (2005–2009).


I conducted the interviews between 4 April 2014 and 16 October 2015. I initiated contact with the projects by sending them an open invitation to participate in the study, along with a request to forward the invitation to all relevant people in their organization. All experts-by-experience and practitioners who expressed interest in participating in the research were subsequently interviewed. The interviews were conducted in Finnish and the excerpts were later translated into English by the researcher.

Documents include the projects’ own material concerning expertise-by-experience, and the funders, particularly the Ministry of Social Welfare and Health’s key documents sketching out the policy.

In quoted interviews, the abbreviations E1–E23 refer to the experts-by-experience, P1–P14 to the professionals and TM to the interviewer.

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References


IV

‘THE WILL NOT TO BE EMPOWERED (ACCORDING TO YOUR RULES) – RESISTANCE IN FINNISH PARTICIPATORY SOCIAL POLICY

by

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‘The will to not be empowered (according to your rules)’: Resistance in Finnish participatory social policy

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Abstract
Participation has increasingly become a means and an end for successful and ‘empowering’ social policy. Building on previous governmentality critiques of participatory initiatives, this article investigates practices of resistance in the context of Finnish participatory social policy. I adopt a Foucauldian counter-conducts approach as my lens to study critical speech as a form of resistance in initiatives that invite marginalised people as ‘experts-by-experience’ in social welfare organisations. I illustrate how practices of governing and resistance are intertwined and mutually dependent in a much subtler and more practical manner than allows the often-used analytical dichotomy between dominance and empowerment. As an example, I show how the projects’ attempts to co-opt the participants’ critical speech may also serve as the basis for their subversive self-making and means of ‘being differently’.

Key words
counter-conduct, experts-by-experience, governmental ethnography, parrhesia, participatory initiatives
Introduction

The democratic capacity of the newly popular participatory arrangements is a much-debated issue (e.g. Lee et al., 2015; Papadopoulos and Warin, 2007). Often, these critical analyses operate through a grid that labels the participatory initiatives as either truly empowering, i.e. ‘giving power’ to subordinate groups, or repressive in their manner of co-opting the participants’ inputs to advance the administration’s goals (Wilson and Beresford, 2000; Leppo and Perälä, 2009; cf. Prior, 2009).

These analyses tend to echo an understanding of power as a zero-sum game with someone ‘holding it’ and on rare occasions as ‘giving it’ to the participants (Baistow, 1994; Pease, 2002; e.g. Arnstein, 1969). This makes power and resistance appear as polar opposites instead of seeing them as being mutually dependent and a product of one another (see Death, 2010). Subsequently, the subtler, small-scale negotiations that entail subversive potential are easily overlooked (also Griggs et al., 2014).

In this article I adopt Death’s (2016) counter-conducts approach as my lens by which to scrutinise the grassroots-level negotiations and ‘ways of being differently’ that the participatory projects’ members employ. I study seven Finnish participatory initiatives that invite former service users to act as ‘experts-by-experience’ in social welfare organisations. These initiatives entail different practices geared towards defining and teaching ‘appropriate ways’ to formulate and share the participants’ life stories so that they may be considered knowledge and subsequently recognised as valid input in decision-making. By focusing on the practices the participants use to resist these predefined ways of ‘knowing oneself’, I illustrate how practices of governing and resistance are intertwined and mutually dependent in a much subtler and more practical manner than allows the often-used analytical dichotomy between dominance and empowerment. As an example, I show how the projects’ attempts to co-opt the participants’ critical speech may also serve as the basis for their subversive self-making and means of ‘being differently’.

I will start by diving into the participatory wave of Finnish social policy and situate the projects developing expertise-by-experience among previous governmentality studies on participatory arrangements. Then I will introduce Foucault’s concepts of counter-conduct and parrhesia as my analytical tools. After presenting my data and my methodology of governmental ethnography, my analysis will focus on the instances where the projects’ participants attempted to ‘be differently’. I conclude by suggesting what possible further avenues for research might be opened up if power and resistance were understood as interwoven when investigating participatory practices.
Experts-by-experience and other governable subjects

The term ‘expert-by-experience’ was introduced into the Finnish context as an import, mainly from the UK (see Barnes, 2009a; Noorani, 2013). In early 2010, the concept was rapidly disseminated by mental health organisations to the social welfare and health care sector after the National Development Programme for Social Welfare and Health Care (Kaste) adopted the term as a symbol for involving and engaging social welfare clients (Rissanen, 2015). Nowadays, the term is used to refer to those former service users or social welfare clients who participate in various roles by drawing on their experiential knowledge. Their activities vary from being consultants and evaluators in service co-production, to lecturers, spokespeople and peer-supporters.

Expertise-by-experience is illustrative of a recent participatory trend in Finnish social policy that encourages social welfare organisations to ‘activate’ their clients (Leemann and Hämäläinen, 2016). As elsewhere, the rationales behind this will to activate, and its experienced outcomes, are diverse. Närhi and Kokkonen (2014) have shown how the participatory ethos merges democratic and consumerist rationales, which creates contradictory participant-roles for the service users (also Meriluoto, 2018). Furthermore, based on recent research indicating how many participatory initiatives have failed in their promise to amplify the service users’ voice in the service system (Matthies et al., 2018; Meriluoto, 2017), Finnish researchers have also come to interpret welfare users’ participation as a tool of government, aimed primarily at producing more self-sustained citizens and building legitimation for decisions already made (Matthies, 2017; Meriluoto, 2016). Leemann and Hämäläinen (2016) even propose that a particularity of Finnish participatory schemes is their strong emphasis on the experiential aspect of participation. What counts most is that people feel included.

As a case in point, the aims of expertise-by-experience are manifold. It is perceived of as a means to co-produce services, to ensure ‘knowledge-based decision-making’ through the incorporation of experiential knowledge, to provide proof of upholding the participatory norm of good governance and to ‘empower’ the initiatives’ participants (Barnes, 2009a; Cowden and Singh, 2007). Through increased participation, and most of all as a result of ‘getting their voices heard’, it is hoped that the projects’ participants feel more included and in charge of the issues that are important to them (Barnes, 2009a; Lee et al., 2015; Martin, 2012a). Fundamentally, the experts’-by-experience role is presented as being to provide ‘raw’ and ‘authentic’ experiences to help in decision-making, service production and public discussion.

A particularity of the Finnish initiatives on expertise-by-experience is that they are all, as Warren (2009) would put it, ‘governance-driven’, which is
in contrast to some user-initiated and user-led initiatives in the UK (Noorani, 2013). The projects’ administration is largely in charge of sketching the aims, scope and practices of the projects and invites the participants to a predefined environment of action. Moreover, the projects not only choose their participants but also include various techniques, such as training and ‘practice lectures’, that steer the participants’ discourse and way of being. These techniques operate very overtly on and through the participants’ self-construction. The training is organised with the aim to ‘reorganise the participants’ life story’, and the practice lectures teach participants ‘the best’ way of telling their experiences to different publics (see Meriluoto, 2017). Subsequently, in these projects the practices steering the participants’ self-construction are exceptionally tangible.

The governmentality literature has directed attention to these practices of self-making within participatory schemes, often criticising them for their tendency to curb rather than open up possibilities for being (Cruikshank, 1999; Polletta, 2014). Often, these analyses interpret the participants’ position through a binary of empowerment or appropriation/co-optation (Bais-tow, 1994; e.g. Fox et al., 2005; Wilson and Beresford, 2000; cf. McKee and Cooper, 2008). In general terms, empowerment in participatory initiatives is conceptualised as the participants’ ability to ‘act on their own terms’: to set agendas, gain recognition for their experiences and have a verifiable effect on policy or service development (Barnes and Prior, 2009; Wilson and Beresford, 2000). Domination, in turn, is understood as the administration’s ability to ‘steer the conversation’: to determine what kind of participation is welcome, who are eligible as participants, what can be achieved through participation and which topics are to be discussed (Beresford, 2002; Cowden and Singh, 2007).

As some recent studies have begun to argue, this dichotomy might not be the most analytically robust way to approach the concept of power in participatory schemes (Pease, 2002). As Gauza, Baiocchi and Summers (2016: 330) put it, “there is always something potentially subversive, and unpredictable, in arrangements that imply [democratic] equality” (also Barnes, 2009b; Griggs et al., 2014). Conversely, Cressida Heyes’s (2007) research shows that people may willingly choose to cultivate themselves in a way desired by the administration in an attempt to ‘feel normal’. Subsequently, participatory initiatives should not simply be interpreted as either empowering or appropriating but instead the analytical gaze should be steered more towards the everyday practices where governing and resistance take shape.

The power to steer and limit, and to resist and subvert, especially in social policy contexts, becomes manifest in practices that determine concepts like ‘normal behaviour’, ‘useful participation’ and ‘reliable knowledge’ (Barnes, 2008; Martin, 2012b; Miller and Rose, 2008). These practices operate
through the participants’ self-government, making their ways of being both a central target of governing and a tool of resistance (e.g. Dawney, 2011; Meriluoto, 2017; Randall and Munro, 2010). Subsequently, I draw on Foucault’s analytical toolkit to shed light on power and resistance in the everyday practices and negotiations of the appropriate ways of being that take place within participatory arrangements.

**Struggles over ways of being: Foucault on power and resistance**

Foucault argued that present-day forms of power operate through subjectivation – by influencing people’s abilities and willingness to steer their own actions to construct themselves as subjects (Foucault, 2004: 108–113; also Kelly, 2009). More specifically, Foucault posited that the (Western) subject constructs themselves by ‘getting to know themselves’ and renders themselves governable by ‘telling the truth about themselves’ to others (Foucault, 2007). This makes definitions of knowledge and truth – or ‘truth regimes’ – key tools to steer the subject’s way of being (Foucault, 1994, 2012; Cadman, 2010). Through them, it becomes possible to delineate what ‘makes sense’: what kind of making and representing of the self becomes feasible and rational and subsequently what kind of being is possible.

If power is exercised through attempts to define the possible forms of being, then resistance takes shape as a means to ‘be differently’ (Cadman, 2010; Death, 2016; Foucault, 2007). To illustrate this, Foucault chose the term counter-conduct (*contre-conduit*) (especially Foucault, 2004). By rejecting other possible concepts, such as resistance, Foucault wanted to underline the specificity of counter-conduct and its relation to power; governing as the conduct of conduct, and responding to this form of power through counter-conduct, were, for Foucault, interdependent and mutually constructive processes (Death, 2010, 2016; Haugaard, 2012; Medina, 2011).

Foucault described counter-conduct as “the art of not being governed quite so much” (Foucault, 2007: 45), meaning that instead of referring to acts of ‘pure’ refusal, counter-conduct entailed more fine-tuned and subtle ways to work ‘in line’ with governing techniques (Death, 2016). As such, counter-conduct has the capacity to be creative, take initiative and produce something completely new (Binkley and Cruikshank, 2016; Cadman, 2010). As Cadman (2010) puts it, counter-conduct points towards the multitude of ways of ‘being differently’ that are not easily explained through a dichotomous view of self-government as either succumbing to the normalising process of self-making or refusing every aspect of such a process as part of one’s self. It takes place at the micro-scale, in everyday negotiations and subtle ways to be differently (also Death, 2010, 2016).
In this article, I employ the notion of parrhesia (parrêsia) as my analytical device to probe the interconnectedness of governing and resistance, assembled in ways of speaking ‘truth to power’ (Foucault, 2008, 2009; also Davidson, 2011; Dyrberg, 2016). The Greek concept of true speech, Foucault explains, refers to both the contents of truth, as well as a manner of telling the truth bluntly, frankly and risking everything (Foucault, 2008, 2009). As the ‘counter discourse’ of the subordinate, parrhesia is a prerequisite for any government to function legitimately. Its purpose is to point out the injustices performed by the government in order to make its uses of power appear logical, reasonable and fair (Foucault, 2008; also Dyrberg, 2016). Furthermore, as Luxon (2008) explains, parrhesiastic speech brings forth varied, personal truths, which challenge the dominant discourses or norms presented as self-evident (also Cadman, 2010).

Parrhesia is a particularly apt concept to illustrate both the position suggested for experts-by-experience by the projects’ administration, as well as their means to contest and challenge it. As expertise-by-experience is a role crafted in order to bring forth ‘raw, real-life experiences’, parrhesia as a way of speaking the truth from ‘below’ (Foucault, 2008: 98) captures the expectations towards the experts’-by-experience subjectivity. Through the concept, it becomes possible to study what kind of knowledge and truth is expected (and accepted) from experts-by-experience and what kind of subjectivities are made possible for them in the process.

At the same time, parrhesia also entails subversive potential. Parrhesia, Foucault explains, signifies being adamantly and fearlessly connected to one’s own perception of truth and purporting it at all costs (Foucault, 2008; Luxon, 2008). Consequently, it can be employed as a form of counter-conduct – as the freedom to think and act otherwise – by questioning the regime of truth through which people are engaged as objects and subjects of government (Cadman, 2010: 551; also Davidson, 2011; Death, 2016).

I use the notion of parrhesia to illustrate how knowledge, a certain manner of speaking and the experts’-by-experience subjectivity are intertwined in the participatory initiatives’ practices of governing and resistance. As the experts-by-experience are both the objects of knowledge and agents of truth-telling (see Flynn, 1994: 106), their manner of speaking ‘truth about themselves’ is employable both as a means of governing their way of being, as well as a means of ‘being differently’ (also Collins, 2000).

In the following, I will argue that the administration aims at harnessing the participants’ critical discourses as a means to build up its legitimacy. By so doing, it is also enabled to interpret the notion of knowledge of the self differently. As a result, the participants employ ‘unacceptable’ forms of speech as their form of counter-conduct to challenge the subjectivity suggested for them.
Data and methodology: Governmental ethnography of resistance

This article analyses expertise-by-experience in the context of the following, publicly funded projects:

1. Finnish Central Association for Mental Health: “The establishment of expertise-by-experience and evaluation-by-experience in the development of mental health and substance abuse services”
2. The Federation of Mother and Child Homes and Shelters: “Miina – The participation and empowerment of women who have encountered domestic violence”
3. No Fixed Abode: “The utilisation of expertise-by-experience in the design and production of services for the homeless”
4. Muotiala Accommodation and Activity Centre Association: “Turning experience into knowledge – project”
5. Sininauhaliitto ry: “A low-threshold information and support centre for gambling problems”
6. City of Vantaa: “Key to the Mind – project for developing mental health and substance abuse services in Southern Finland”

The data analysed consist of themed interviews I conducted between 4 April 2014 and 16 October 2015 with 23 experts-by-experience and 14 practitioners, a group discussion among five experts-by-experience organised on 30 November 2016 in one of the projects studied and the projects’ own as well as publicly accessible documents on expertise-by-experience from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH) and the National Institute of Health and Welfare (THL).

My interpretations are also impacted by my experiences as a practitioner in one of the civil society organisations (CSOs) studied (see Mosse, 2006). During 2011–2014, I was in charge of developing expertise-by-experience in a CSO, and through the meetings and workshops organised I was a part of the concept’s institutionalisation. I use notes, memos and co-produced material from this period as autoethnographic data to reflect on one process of expert-making where I myself was an active practitioner. I have retrospectively acquired written consent from my colleagues and experts-by-experience to use these data in my research. In order to closely follow the research ethical guidelines of the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity (2009), I do not use excerpts from the ethnographic data in my analysis, taking into account the potential issues with retrospective consent (Tolich, 2010).

The experts-by-experience interviewed had suffered from domestic violence, substance abuse, mental health issues, homelessness, gambling or social...
exclusion in their past and had been invited to act in public and civil society organisations because of those experiences. Their tasks as experts were varied. Most commonly, they were performing ‘gigs’, as they called them; telling their stories to decision-makers and social welfare practitioners with an aim to ‘broaden their view’ or change their working methods. Often they also brought forward their experiential knowledge to develop better services, either within their home organisation, in service co-production networks, or in various committees tasked with re-drafting social policies at the national or municipal level. Many of the initiatives also entailed diverse experiments, such as art, discussion evenings or field trips, to influence the local decision-makers directly and emotionally.

The projects, on their part, were all focused specifically on developing expertise-by-experience as a novel practice. This stemmed mostly from the demands and suggestions of their funders, the MSAH and the Slot Machine Association, which was a public gambling organisation whose profits went towards the funding of civil society organisations working in the health and social welfare sector. The purposes of expertise-by-experience were often inexplicit, and the most common stated purposes were ‘advancing the participants’ inclusion’ and ‘providing experiential knowledge to service co-production’. In many ways, expertise-by-experience resembles what Cornwall and Brock (2005) call a buzzword: an intrinsically good idea whose content and purpose is very little reflected upon.

To overcome the dichotomous setting between dominance and empowerment in my analysis, I follow the methodology of ‘governmentality analysis with an ethnographic imaginary’ (Brady and Lippert, 2016). Governmental ethnography takes a ‘bottom up’ approach to studying power and focuses on the techniques that a governmental rationality manifests itself through and the responses it invites (see also Foucault, 1982: 780). This allows the analytical focus to be steered away from identifying who ‘holds’ power towards the more situated and everyday practices in which power is exercised, responded to and resisted (Foucault, 1982, 2007; also Lövbrand and Stripple, 2015; McKee, 2009). This provides a more nuanced view of power in participatory arrangements and highlights the salience of the negotiations and disputes that take place at the grassroots level.

I have close-read my data using practices of counter-conduct as my analytic lens. First, I identified the instances where my interviewees described friction between their actions and the expectations towards them. These included both their overt statements of deliberately ‘doing differently’ and also more subtle negotiations and suggestions where they had made an attempt to advance different ways of knowing and being to the official agenda. These practices of counter-conduct, then, allowed me to paint a picture of what they were resisting. This ‘ideal way of being’ for the experts-by-experience was rarely explicitly presented as a norm for the participants, but as the interviewees’ descriptions
will show us it narrowed their possibilities for being in practice. I term this way of being as governed parrhesia.

Analysis: Uses and abuses of parrhesia

The parrhesiastic setting

To illustrate how the stage was set for the experts-by-experience, I start with an extract from my field notes. It recaps a discussion I had with two other civil society practitioners on the need for expertise-by-experience. During the conversation, which was organised to discuss my research themes, one of the practitioners said:

At some point, [social welfare] institutions start focusing on self-sustainment. This is also visible in patient organisations. The objective of expertise-by-experience is to renew civil society organisations’ work and to bring their original purpose back to the centre. This is a corrective measure that brings the members’ and the clients’ voice back.

(CSO practitioner, 10 April 2014, emphasis added)

A similar scenario was painted in a workshop organised by the THL on 22 January 2014. A public report of the event states:

Expertise-by-experience completes the administration’s understanding, which can be detached from true everyday lives and practices.

The underlying ethos of expertise-by-experience, then, seems quite ambitious: to provide decision-makers with ‘the raw and authentic truth’ of the people, as they have drifted too far from the ‘real’ lives of citizens. Subsequently, this role of a truth-teller was what many experts-by-experience expected when engaging in the projects. They wanted to contest, shake and rattle ‘the system’ by incorporating their experiences into policy making and service production.

Peculiarly, however, when my interviewees recounted moments where they had ‘caused a stir’, they explained this behaviour to be problematic, unfitting and in conflict with what was expected of them. I will discuss these moments next.

Parrhesia as counter-conduct

The most reoccurring struggles between the participants’ comportment and the expectations towards them concerned the criteria for appropriate speech and
credible knowledge. The following public sector expert-by-experience gives us an example of speaking in a manner that ‘intentionally pokes the hornets’ nest’:

E17: I know that sometimes, especially when I talk to the professionals, I intentionally poke the hornets’ nest to evoke thoughts and emotions. But I warn them in advance. I think that professionals need to be able to hear all kinds of horrible things. I mean, they can’t possibly work with customers if they can’t be face to face with someone who says that they have been abused. I really do think that I need to have the right to say things the way they are. The way I see it, that’s one important role I have.

The interviewee recognises how their frank speech does not fit easily with the expectations put upon them but chooses to speak bluntly anyway. They position experts-by-experience as those who dare to say and contest, and the more or less openly laid out suggestions for good expertise-by-experience provide them with a point of rebuttal. Here, it is precisely parrhesia that is made an integral part of expertise-by-experience – they are someone whose task it is to provide a contrasting point-of-view.

Speaking in ways that are considered ‘unacceptable’ or ‘un-credible’ was the participants means to contest the boundaries for acceptable speech and reliable knowledge (also Pease, 2002). The following civil society expert-by-experience provides us with another example. They recount an incident where they spoke in a manner that they assumed was not accepted but that they nonetheless considered a crucial part of who they want to be as an expert-by-experience:

E14: The last time I went there [to a steering group meeting], [a CSO] contacted me and asked if I could bring this one issue forward because they cannot. If they present it, this lady will end their contract, and they won’t get their money. So I brought it up and it went okay, but I added some of my own perceptions to it. I said that this place of yours looks like a concentration camp, and that they had copied ideas from Hitler. The lady then announced that they no longer want to work with us.

TM: Right. What came out of it?

E14: Nothing. Everybody else was happy. And I managed to evoke a conversation there.

The above interviewee wants to construct themselves as precisely someone who pushes the boundaries and does unexpected things. They are someone who evokes conversation and certainly does not shy away from confrontation, even provocation. Fearless speech gets presented as the very core of their experience-based action.
Many interviewees presented critical speech as their practice of freedom (see Griggs et al., 2014). As the following group discussant explains, it serves to ensure that the expert-by-experience is ‘not exploited’ and instead participates freely according to their own terms. Here, they illustrate how they will react to having been treated as a token in a project:

G5: When I’ll go there [to a seminar], I will be sure to give a speech that will be a slap in their faces. I will go and will deliver that speech, and I will say quite frankly what I think about this project. I mean, I won’t trash the whole project, but I will give a speech that will surely make them tremble. We have to hold our own in those situations. I, for one, will not be exploited.

Parrhesia as speaking ‘frankly’ and ‘making them tremble’ pushes the boundaries of both the content and the manner of appropriate speech. Purporting the right to talk about what you want, the way you want, serves as a tool to contest the limits of possible action, but it is also a crucial component in the participants’ self-construction. The following civil society expert-by-experience describes how their freedom from ‘dictation’ is a crucial foundation for their subjectivity as an expert-by-experience:

TM: Do you have any limits to what you can do as an expert-by-experience? Do you get any directions from [the organisation]?
E23: No. Once, a magazine wanted to interview me, and they [the project’s employees] tried to hint that I should have talked to them before giving an interview. But I won’t take that at all.
TM: Why not?
E23: This is my thing, and no one else needs to direct it. […] I think that I should be allowed to say what I have on my mind and not have to polish it. It might be that in [a government organisation] there are these dignified gentlemen who can’t bear to hear this. But I think that it’s useless to speak if you can’t say it the way you experience it.

For this interviewee, the possibility to speak their own truth to the ‘dignified gentlemen’ of the state bureau was their very reason for participating. All polished and compliant manners of speaking were ‘useless’, and authenticity was the very essence of experience-based action.

The participants’ counter-conduct also took the form of opening the doors to other people who did not meet the standards of ‘appropriate participation’. The following civil society expert-by-experience explains how their position is to open up avenues for others’ ‘unwanted voices’:
TM: Are the people you work with in [a Finnish town] also experts-by-experience?
E6: Yes. They are in their own way because they live in these places. And what I try to accomplish there is that I go and pick also the voices that maybe are not so welcome otherwise. I mean precisely the negative stuff, what people actually say there.

The interviewee above also seeks to stretch the limits of appropriate speech. They do so by appointing others as parrhestiastes and by so doing, purport their right to be heard.

Crucially, the experts-by-experience were not the only ones stretching the limits of acceptable forms of being, and the projects’ practitioners are not the only ones ‘steering the participants towards the normal’. Indeed, quite a few experts-by-experience, especially within the mental health sector, enforced the need for criteria defining ‘a good participant’ and embraced the subsequent hierarchy as a basis for their self-making. On the other hand, some practitioners explicitly stated their wanting to challenge the notion of ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ in the projects’ context, claiming a subversive position towards the projects’ official goals, as does the following civil society practitioner:

P13: At this point, it is probably good to tell you that I’m somewhat sceptical of the model [of expertise-by-experience]. I wonder whether the heavy training demands result in a setting where people’s experiences are validated through a training that is planned and conducted by professional experts. I mean, that it is only after [the training] that they get a say and the freedom to speak in matters where they should be listened to anyway.

The practitioner above overtly criticises the demands made of the experts-by-experience and later during the interview explains how they have wanted to do things “differently”. Hence, the dichotomous setting between the administration that attempts to govern and limit and the participants that either resist or succumb appears problematic.

The techniques of counter-conduct illustrated above can all be seen as means to take part in defining what kind of participation should be feasible and accepted. Counter-conduct – acting against the norm of a good participant – is one way to illuminate and push the boundaries of feasible action without renouncing the participatory scheme altogether. The wild and uncontrolled speech is also the participants’ way of constructing alternative subjectivities for themselves that are based on the freedom to voice out criticism. It is a means not to succumb to the role suggested for them by the administration, which some participants perceive as being too narrow and constraining.

These practices of counter-conduct were more common in a civil society context. In the public sector, more experts-by-experience expressed
content with their role and had internalised its demands for their way of being. When asked about their motivations for participation, public sector experts-by-experience tended to emphasise the will to help others by developing services with professionals, whereas experts-by-experience in CSOs also described ‘urges’ to ‘break taboos’ or to have a political impact. Furthermore, experts-by-experience with a mental health background were less subversive than other participants. I have argued elsewhere that these differences can stem from different justification regimes drawn upon when developing expertise-by-experience (Meriluoto, 2018). On the other hand, they can also be illustrative of the hierarchical power dynamics in the psychiatric domain, enticing the experts-by-experience to ‘heal’ according to the instructions suggested to them (Randall and Munro, 2010). Obviously, these categorisations are not clear-cut, and significant exceptions occur.

What is resisted? Governed parrhesia

Based on the above practices of counter-conduct, it is possible to discern the elements of the often-inexplicit ideal subjectivity towards which the participants are being conducted.

The uninhibited speech was the participants’ way of countering the projects’ two main governing strategies. First, it was a means to challenge the position of someone ‘in need of empowering’, which legitimised the techniques directed at steering the participants’ way of being. Parrhesia was a manner of building up subversive subjectivities that decidedly were not in need of any guidance of steering but on the contrary were very much founded on independent truth-telling. The following civil society expert-by-experience describes how they felt like ‘empowerment’ was an attempt to undermine and take control over their way of being:

E17: For a long time I had a feeling that I definitely didn’t belong there [in the training for experts-by-experience]. There was this one time when a professional said to me something like, ‘Listen, this is rehabilitation. This is meant for people who are only just recovering.’ I got a feeling that she tried to force me into the role of someone who is recovering, which I didn’t feel like being anymore. […] I was pushed down by saying ‘hey, you’re recovering’. I got a feeling that [with a patronising voice], ‘We’re now trying to nurse and empower you, don’t you try to be too active yet. Just take it easy.’

In the interviewee’s narrative, empowerment becomes the tool through which the projects steer the participants’ self-making (also Cruikshank, 1999; Miller and Rose, 2008; O’Toole and Gale, 2014). Furthermore, they interpret the ‘empowerment’ practices as belittling; as attempts to position them
as someone in need of nurturing and caring and not capable of initiating change themselves (Eliasoph, 2016; Green, 2000; Julkunen and Heikkilä, 2007). This criticism is analogous with the feminist critique of empowerment acclaiming how empowerment cannot be ‘done to others’ but rather has to rise from among the subordinate groups themselves (Collins, 2000; McLaughlin, 2014). As a case in point, the above interviewee detaches themselves from the empowerment scheme and instead constructs themselves as an active figure, who relies on their own ways of telling who they are.

Second, the rough, even provocative way of speaking was the participants’ way of questioning the neutral and co-operative discourse expected of them. The following quote from a public sector expert-by-experience illustrates how they have internalised certain preconditions of a good expert-by-experience. In their view, the ability to use ‘diplomatic’ vocabulary and to work towards a common good are both prerequisites for experts’-by-experience participation, as well as being signs of recovery:

E11: I also think that it [expertise-by-experience] requires diplomacy. I mean that you can look at things from many different angles because it is useless if you just go there and shake your fist that this has gone to hell. You have to be able to suggest a solution. It doesn’t promote the customers’ status in any way if you are very offensive and rude about how bad things are in Finland.

A possible way of speaking for an expert-by-experience is, hence, not an aggressive promotion of their own agenda. On the contrary, in order for expertise-by-experience to be accepted as expertise, participation needs to be a co-operative and consensus-seeking activity, appreciating and conforming to the administration’s ideal of correct conduct (also Martin, 2009, 2012b; Beresford, 2002; Eliasoph, 2014). Prior research suggests this to be symptomatic of the network-governance project, which seeks to construct citizens as partners, who are working in collaboration towards mutual goals, and to suppress conflict (Lee et al., 2015; Newman and Clarke, 2009). The following civil society expert-by-experience affirms this:

E13: When you encounter people who work in the administration, they’re always doubtful as to whether or not you already possess enough knowledge to be on the same level with them. Like, ‘are we on the same level, or are you still there in the resistance?’ I mean, are you someone who has only come here to complain and who will take off as soon as you feel better, or are you also on our side?

By operating on definitions of knowledge, the projects attempt to construct a neutral and co-operative manner of speaking as a sign of ‘recovery’. This constructs vocal resistance as a sign of ‘not quite being ready’ for participation. The failure to uphold these prerequisites, consequently, will easily
lead to exclusion from participation altogether, as the following group discussant forcefully puts:

G4: They tell you what the topic of your talk will be and what opinion you should hold. If you don’t agree, then you don’t need to come at all. […] I mean, they say that you can disagree with the professionals, but you have to remain within a certain frame. So, in effect, you can slightly disagree, but if you disagree a lot, it is a wrong opinion to have.

The object of resistance appears as a form of participation that I call governed parrhesia. It is a manner of presenting the experts'-by-experience role as one of ‘speaking truth to power’ but in many subtle ways steering and limiting what is considered to be ‘the truth’ in this context. By defining rather strict criteria for the experts'-by-experience ‘credible discourse’, it becomes possible to delegitimise and ignore ‘too wild’ and ‘too raw’ experiences. As the participants of a THL workshop on 22 January 2014 colourfully put it, these demands made the experts-by-experience “lose their edge and their rock ‘n’ roll” and become “poodles that are paraded around”.

As McLaughlin (2014) explains, allowing participation to a limited extent but within narrow parameters may give the participants an illusion of power while actually solidifying the existing power dynamics (also Blühdorn, 2013). Consequently, the experts'-by-experience participation may serve to legitimise the administration’s decisions by showing how they have upheld the requirement of civic engagement without truly contesting their understanding of what constitutes expertise and what should be regarded as valuable knowledge in this context.

This interpretation gains support from the lack of experiences of ‘true impact’ among the experts-by-experience. When I inquired about the perceived impact of their actions, some interviewees believed that they were able to influence the perceptions and attitudes of individual practitioners and decision-makers. However, many experts-by-experience used words like ‘frustration’ and ‘mascot’ when describing their experiences of influencing decision-making. Although some individual practitioners and politicians as a group discussant put it “were genuinely interested in listening”, according to a disappointed expert-by-experience from a CSO, the experts'-by-experience participation ‘leads nowhere’ on a larger scale. The instances where the experts'-by-experience critical way of being resulted in anything more than a performative illumination of the unjust boundaries for their way of being were close to non-existent. Furthermore, some interviewees stated that they never expected their participation to have any broader, societal impact and were instead content with the experiential aspect of participation (see Leemann and Hämäläinen, 2016). These interviewees felt empowered and included even without any evidence of the impact of their actions.
Conclusions

In this article, I have explored the interplay of governing and resistance in participatory arrangements, which are assembled in ways of speaking truth to power. I have illustrated how the administrations of projects developing expertise-by-experience have taken up the parrhesiastic ethos as a tool to legitimise their rule. The service users were invited to the projects as ‘truth-tellers’ whose task was to bring ‘raw experiences’ into decision-making. However, as the participants’ forms of counter-conduct show, the participants largely view this position as a form of ‘governed resistance’ that only allows critique up to a certain point.

Furthermore, I have illustrated how the governing practices invite various creative, grassroots-level practices of counter-conduct that engage with the governing practices in order to alter them. By taking up the initiatives’ promise of treating them as ‘truth-tellers’, the participants illuminate and contest the boundaries of what can and should be considered ‘knowledge’ in the initiatives. Through parrhesiastic speech, the participants strengthen their connection to their own version of the truth and exemplify the primacy of their experiential knowledge as a basis for their subject-construction. Parrhesia, then, serves as their means of being (conceived of) otherwise and as a tool to politicise knowledge in the projects’ context.

These interpretations illustrate the situatedness and interconnectedness of practices of governing and resistance in participatory arrangements. First, as it was often experts-by-experience who sought to define criteria for correct comportment, and reversely, practitioners who sought to destabilise existing understandings of knowledge, the ladder-based models used to illustrate the democratic capacity of participatory initiatives appear problematic. Instead of attempting a diagnostic on the extent to which power is ‘given’ to the participants, the analytical focus should be on situated practices and everyday negotiations on the conditions of ways of being where power actualises.

Second, although the participants’ critical speech challenges certain aspects of the projects, it also strengthens their underlying ethos of participatory governance. By engaging in negotiations about who should be allowed to participate, the participants reinforce the objective of increased participation and employ its discourse as tools in their own formulations on different ways of being. By using parrhesia, they highlight the necessity of including subaltern voices to legitimise government and hence reinforce the participatory governance ethos of enticing participation to accumulate different forms of knowledge as a basis for political decision-making.

In sum, expertise-by-experience is a good illustration of governing and resistance being mutually dependent forms of power. On the one hand, the projects’ administrations need the participants’ free, critical truth-telling to
legitimise their administrative power. On the other hand, the administrations’ attempts to harness the participants’ critique to serve only the purposes that best suit the administrations, provide the participants a point of rebuttal on which they can construct their alternative way of being. This view might open up another manner of looking at the governmentality of empowerment projects. It allows us to perceive how the projects might in fact serve as ‘empowering’, i.e. opening up ways for the participants to construct themselves ‘freely’ precisely because of their attempts to define the participants’ way of being. By providing the participants something to subvert, the projects may (inadvertently) provide their participants a basis for counter-conductive self-making.

However, while their critical way of being makes the existing boundaries of legitimate participation visible, thus enabling their critique, little evidence exists of transformations in the dominant paradigm of knowledge as a result of this critique. The participants may indeed be capable of carving out ways to construct themselves freely, but effects that go beyond individual experiences of subversive self-making and performative illuminations of the unjust boundaries of participation, are scarce. This observation points to the limitations of a Foucauldian approach, prompting further studies on the effects and limits of participants’ critique.

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