

EUROPEAN NARRATIVES ON EU'S ENERGY SECURITY
VIS-À-VIS RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS

Verena Kaun

Pro gradu-thesis

Political Science

Department of Social
Sciences and
Philosophy

University of
Jyväskylä

April 2018

ABSTRACT

EUROPEAN NARRATIVES ON EU'S ENERGY SECURITY VIS-À-VIS RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS

Verena Kaun
Political Science
Pro gradu-thesis
Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy
University of Jyväskylä
Supervisor: Professor Pekka Korhonen
April 2018
71 pages

The aim of the study is to analyse how the European Union perceives its energy security in relation to Russia in the sphere of natural gas. Additionally, the study discusses the EU's struggling of building a common and coherent energy policy and its aim to decrease its dependence on Russian natural gas imports.

The research material as well as the analysis consists of two parts. In the first part of the analysis the research material consists of a transcript of the European Parliament's discussion of the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006. In the second part of the analysis the study discusses the European Energy Security Strategy released by the European Commission 2014. These research materials represent well the EU's voice and approach in energy security. At the end of the study, the recent developments of the highly securitized and geopolitically intense Nord Stream 2 pipeline project are introduced and discussed in the context of the analysis.

The study was conducted using narrative policy analysis. The analysis was conducted with a methodical framework of narrative analysis and political reading applying elements of security and securitizing theories. The study identified different master-narratives and counter-narratives in EU's perception of energy security regarding Russia. These narratives showed that the EU perceives Russia as a geopolitical actor and a threat to its security of gas supply. Furthermore, the results of the study show that energy security has become a major priority on EU's political agenda. Energy security per se has become a goal of the EU's energy policy and energy security is dominating other goals like the market liberalisation.

The study shows that struggles of internal divisions characterize the EU's energy policy due to different interests of the Member States. This hampers the building of a coherent European energy policy which can be stated to be a precondition for the EU in order to strengthen its energy security and to become a stronger external actor in energy policy.

Key words: European Union, energy security, Russia, securitization, natural gas, Nord Stream 2

TIIVISTELMÄ

EUROPEAN NARRATIVES ON EU'S ENERGY SECURITY VIS-À-VIS RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS

Verena Kaun

Valtio-oppi

Pro gradu-tutkielma

Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitos

Jyväskylän yliopisto

Ohjaaja: Professori Pekka Korhonen

Huhtikuu 2018

71 sivua

Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten venäläinen maakaasu vaikuttaa Euroopan Unionissa käsityksiin sen energiaturvallisuudesta. Lisäksi tutkimuksessa käsitellään EU:n yhtenäisen energiapolitiikan muodostamisen haasteita ja EU:n pyrkimystä vähentää riippuvuuttaan venäläisestä tuontikaasusta.

Tutkimuksen aineisto sekä analyysi koostuvat kahdesta osasta. Ensimmäisessä analyysiosiossa aineistona on Euroopan parlamentin istuntopöytäkirja Venäjän ja Ukrainan välisestä kaasukriisistä vuodelta 2006. Toinen analyysiosuus käsittelee Euroopan komission vuonna 2014 julkaisemaa energiaturvallisuusstrategiaa. Aineistoista voidaan havaita Euroopan unionissa vallitsevat puhutavat liittyen energiaturvallisuuteen. Tutkimuksen lopussa esitellään viimeisimmät kehityskulut liittyen erittäin turvallisettuun ja geopoliittisesti jännittyneeseen Nord Stream 2-kaasuputkihankkeeseen peilaten tutkimuksen analyysiosioihin.

Tutkimuksessa käytettiin narratiivis-poliittista luentaa. Tutkimuksen metodologinen viitekehys ja teoreettinen keskustelu on yhdistetty politologiseen tulkintaan. Analyysissa nousevat esiin erityisesti turvallistamisen teemat. Tutkimuksessa tunnistettiin erilaisia hegemonisia narratiiveja ja vastanarratiiveja siitä minkälaisia käsityksiä EU:ssa on sen energiaturvallisuudesta suhteessa Venäjään. Narratiivinen analyysi osoitti, että EU käsittää Venäjän geopolitiittisena toimijana ja uhkana sen maakaasun toimitusvarmuudelle. Lisäksi tutkimus osoittaa, että energiaturvallisuus on noussut merkittäväksi poliittiseksi tavoitteeksi EU:ssa. Energiaturvallisuudesta itsessään on tullut EU:n energiapolitiikan tavoite ja energiaturvallisuus on kohonnut esimerkiksi markkinoiden vapauttamisen edelle.

Tutkimus osoittaa, että EU:n energiapolitiikkaa luonnehtii sisäinen jakautuneisuus johtuen jäsenmaiden erilaisista intresseistä. Tämä vaikeuttaa yhteisen energiapolitiikan rakentamista, mikä olisi edellytys EU:n energiaturvallisuuden vahvistamiselle ja unionin merkittävämmälle ulkopolitiittiselle roolille energiapolitiikassa.

Avainsanat: Euroopan Unioni, energiaturvallisuus, Venäjä, turvallistaminen, maakaasu, Nord Stream 2

Content

1. Introduction	1
1.1. The aim and structure of the study	1
1.2. The new era of energy security	4
2. European energy policy and energy security: definitions and background.....	7
2.1. Various types of energy scarcity	11
3. The European Parliament as a narrator	13
3.1 The Establishment: master-narratives	15
3.2 Counter-narratives.....	23
3.3 MEPs following the master-narrative with a counter streak	27
3.4 The Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis as a wake-up call	32
4. The Energy Security Strategy	33
4.1. The eight pillars.....	40
4.2. Immediate actions in the light of the winter 2014/2015.....	41
4.3. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms and protecting strategic infrastructure	42
4.4. Mutual dependency and market liberalization	45
4.5. The security dilemma	53
5. The battle continues - EU's attempt to stop Nord Stream 2.....	58
6. Conclusions	64
Literature	68

1. Introduction

EU-Russian energy relations have been studied a lot, especially and with a greater intense since the beginning of 2000s when conflicts between the EU and Russia raised. The EU's energy policy has been for long time part of the internal market policy and energy became only with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 part of EU law. The energy sector on the global scale is going through a major transformation in an era where climate change is often defined as the biggest challenge of mankind. The EU is a strong actor in climate policy setting objectives for the increasing of renewable energy and the decarbonising of society. The global energy market is shaken by new technologies which impact the businesses, local and transnational actors and the whole energy governance. Climate change and the accelerating competition of resources impact the sphere of energy. At the same time, energy is highly political and affected by geopolitical changes and international developments on the energy market. The EU has faced many geopolitical changes since the beginning of the new millennium. Especially, its enlargement to the East in 2004, has changed EU's geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia. While aiming to be a strong actor in energy internally, the EU is highly dependent on external energy suppliers. All these developments have raised the question of energy security within the EU high on the political agenda.

1.1. The aim and structure of the study

There are multiple studies discussing the EU-Russian energy relation from a historical, economic, governmental, legal and political view. Many of these studies analyse the different actors and developments broadly. Nevertheless, the scope of energy is constantly changing and the EU-Russia energy relations have become even more significant and tensed during the recent years. There is room for an updated understanding of the European Union's perception on its energy security. The purpose of this study is to analyse the hardship of building a common European energy security policy from the perspective of the EU and EU's objective to decrease its dependence on Russian gas. I discuss this with the following research question: How is the EU perceiving its energy security in the relation to Russian natural gas?

In this study EU's energy policy and the political narrative of EU's energy security is analysed through a narrative policy analysis using theoretical elements applied from Dicle

Korkmaz-Temel's doctoral dissertation (2016) "Turkey's energy security vis-à-vis with the EU: A narrative policy analysis from the English School Perspective". The methodological framework and theoretical discussion is placed in the analysis alongside the political interpretation.

The study starts by an introduction chapter followed by a broader chapter introducing the EU's energy policy and its relation to energy security. This is essential in order to understand the two chapters of analysis. The first analysis reviews the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis from 2006. In this part of analysis, the transcript of the European Parliament's debate is discussed. The topic of the debate was the energy security of the EU, particularly gas and it was held right after the gas crisis. I chose the transcript of the European Parliament as the research material because it provides a comprehensive overview of the immediate reactions of the EU. Furthermore, the debate was a dialogue between the members of the parliament and the then president of the Council as well as the Commissioner for Energy at the time. Therefore, the transcript gives a more inclusive overview of the EU's perception of the gas crisis than just a statement of the Commission only. A green paper on energy was released later 2006 by the Commission but it does not discuss the gas crisis directly.

The second part of the analysis discussed the European Energy Security Strategy released by the European Commission in May 2014. The Commission has been the EU's strongest institution internally in leading the way towards a common energy policy. The Energy Security Strategy was a natural choice for the analysis since it is the only document released by the EU with the exclusive focus on energy security of the union. It can be seen as a result of a chain of different events and global changes in the field of energy such as the dwindling of stocks, China's and India's increased consumption of energy as well as political tensions in the energy rich areas. One significant contributing factor to the timing of the Strategy, was the annexation of Crimea which increased the tension between the EU-Russia energy relation remarkably. All these developments have increased the pressure for the EU to take action in order to guarantee the security of energy supplies. According to Gawdat Bahgat (2006), Europe's vulnerability related to its energy security supply has increased, especially in the beginning of the new millennium (Bahgat 2006, 961).

The study is concluded by a short review of the very current developments considering EU-Russia energy relations. The Nord Stream 2 project has received significant attention in the EU and even in international politics. Nord Stream 2 is the most significant, delicate and

confrontational political project of the EU-Russia energy relations in the new millennium. For instance, the international news agency Reuters has described Nord Stream 2 being the biggest foreign policy quandaries that the EU has faced since the Cold War (Reuters 26.3.2018). Finally, the thesis is concluded by the results of the study.

I focused in this thesis on natural gas because of several reasons. Natural gas differs structurally as well as economical from other forms of energy (Belyi 2015, 42). There are several specific features of the gas sector and the gas market that not only differ from other energy sources but are permitting factors that gas is used as means of political power. According to Andrei Belyi (2015) gas has significantly replaced oil as a source of energy in the EU and some scholars have suggested that gas is the fuel of the 21st century. Belyi states, the challenges of gas are its difficult storing and very expensive transporting. In the gas chain from production to supply, the transmission cost account from 60 per cent up to 80 per cent from the total costs of natural gas. Gas is primarily transported through different kind of pipelines but also in the form of LNG (liquified natural gas). (Belyi 2015, 40-42.)

On the other hand, there are several advantages of gas which explain its popularity. Gas is efficient in use, gas turbines are rather profitable to install and gas has low greenhouse gas emissions. Natural gas is the least polluting fossil fuel in terms of Co2 emissions and according to Belyi the competition between fossil fuels and renewable energy favors natural gas. Natural gas power plants are also used for energy backup solutions. Furthermore, natural gas markets are closely associated with demand level which is more elastic than the demand for oil and coal. Therefore, political conflicts and economic cycles influence to the disadvantageous side of natural gas. (Belyi 2015, 41-42.)

Notably the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2006, was a wake-up call for the EU. The crisis can also be seen as a certain turning point, which forced the EU actually to rethink its energy politics. According to Alessia Biava (2010), as of 2006 the gas disputes on gas prices between Russia and Ukraine have threatened the gas import from Russia to the EU via Ukraine which has affected the EU gas market (Biava 2010, 17). After the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 the will of the European parliament and the Commission for a more coherent and common European energy policy and energy security has been strengthening further. Bahgat notes that the gas crisis highlighted the risk of dependence on a few energy suppliers (Bahgat 2006, 961).

According to Biava, the gas crises both in 2006 and 2009 showed the EU that Russia and Ukraine are unreliable partners for the EU's gas market and its correct functioning. Furthermore, Biava states that in both disputes the role of the EU as a political actor for solving the crises was weak. Thirdly, as a consequence of the disputes, the EU started actions and measures from an internal point of view in order to prevent similar disputes. Finally, the last lesson learned by the EU is the promotion of solidarity among Member States. (Biava 2010,27.)

1.2. The new era of energy security

Pami Aalto and Kirsten Westphal state that energy issues have in a way re-entered the global and the European policy agenda during the 21st century since the time of oil crises in the 1970s. Especially the awareness of energy being essential for sustaining social, economic and political life as well as the awareness of its scarcity has been increased during the new millennium. (Aalto & Westphal 2008, 2.) The integration of the EU in the field of energy has been for a long time on the agenda, but the steps have been minor. According to Bahgat (2006), the Commission issued a Green Paper on energy security in 2006 with the title "A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy". Encouraging the solidarity among the Member States as well as creating a coherent external energy policy were among others the objectives of the Green Paper in 2006 (Bahgat 2006, 962). The paper included many targets similar to the Energy Security Strategy, which was released 8 years later. One of the main issues why building a common European energy policy has taken so long is the lack of solidarity among the member states of the EU. Caroline Kuzemko and Amelie Hadfield (2016) state that establishing an energy policy on the EU level and finding a common ground between member state has been a tall order. According to Kuzemko and Hadfield, the geographic location of fossil fuels, particularly oil, within distinct state boundaries has long produced tensions within international trade and political relations. These tensions have often made energy security a matter of national security. Kuzemko and Hadfield claim that within this context EU's start in finding common ground can be seen quite positively though EU multilateral versus national energy policy remains still a thorny issue. (Kuzemko & Hadfield 2016, 22.)

Aalto and Westphal (2008) state that the question to which extend there is a pan-European energy policy or rather to which extend there should exist a pan-European energy policy, is essential. According to Aalto and Westphal, this leads to the question of how the term

“policy” is defined. One definition is that a policy requires a direction, purpose and stability in a certain domain, such as energy. (Aalto & Westphal 2008, 6.) Creating a common and coherent European energy policy and energy single market has been the aim of the EU already for several decades. According to my interpretation there has been a coherent but slow evolution towards a common European energy policy. The purpose of this direction has been quite clear though there are necessarily many reasons behind it. According to Bahgat (2006), one main reason especially during the 21st century has been the need to increase Europe’s energy supply security in order to ensure reliable and sustainable energy supplies at reasonable prices (Bahgat 2006, 965). Especially after the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 the Commission and the Council of the European Union have been stressing for a collective and cohesive strategy on energy security. According to Aalto and Westphal, another more general purpose or drive behind the direction has been the process of European integration, though especially in the sphere of energy the integration has not been as deep as in many other policy areas. (Aalto & Westphal 2008, 6).

Furthermore, there are many other kinds of reasons why a common European energy policy would be profitable for the EU. Those reasons involve, among others, environmental as well as economic gains, such as cutting of Co2 emissions and increment of economic competitiveness. Moreover, political stability and geopolitics as well as geo-economic are all interests, which are strongly tied to energy politics. Nevertheless, that the direction of development has been relatively clear and long-standing, it has not been a linear path, and there is little stability in the sphere of energy policies. Aalto and Westphal remark that policies are often created in fishy conditions with bureaucratic struggles and different kind of internal contradictions (Aalto & Westphal 2008, 6).

Emery Roe (1994) states that defining features of public policy issues are uncertainty, complexity and polarization. According to Roe, the creation of policies is happening in an environment where the empirical, political, legal and bureaucratic merits are often unknown and not agreed on. (Roe 1994, 2-3.) In other words, this means that the policy making processes and the different levels of decision making are often uncertain, complex and polarised and not necessarily transparent, visible and unanimous. Roe (1994) states that because of this, the only things left to examine and analyse are the different stories of policymakers as well as the critics of these stories. By analysing these stories, it is possible to make sense of the uncertainty, complexity and polarization of the issue. (Roe 1994, 3.) In the sphere of energy there are a lot of interests from different stakeholders and groups which

are affected by policies. The domain of energy is really multifaceted, and it involves a lot of different interests and discourses. The complexity, polarization and uncertainty as well as the multifaceted feature of energy security is well phrased by Mehdi P. Amineh and Wina H.J. Crijns-Graus (2014) their article “Rethinking EU Energy Security Considering Past Trends and Future Prospects”.

Although the European Commission laid down clear priorities, overlapping competences of policymaking institutions within the EU and its member states, complex government-business ties and competing energy priorities all hamper the effective establishment and execution of a common energy policy. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 816.)

Amineh and Crijns-Graus state that though the Commission is setting a clear framework for a coherent energy security policy, there are many factors which are hindering the formulation of a strong and coherent external energy policy. This reflects the difficulty and the hardship of building a European energy policy that would actually be implemented united on the EU level, which would improve the energy security of the union as a whole. Moreover, the statement of Amineh and Crijns-Graus also highlights the leading role of the Commission in the process of building a coherent European energy policy and energy security policy. As Amineh and Crijns-Graus state, the Commission has laid down clear priorities, in fact by releasing several policy frameworks, strategies and green papers over the years but bureaucratic, complex economic trade relations, economic reasons and competitive interests of different stakeholders in the scene are hindering and slowing down the evolution.

2. European energy policy and energy security: definitions and background

Creating a common European energy market has been the goal of the European Commission since the early 2000s. Essentially, the pursuit of a unifying and coherent energy policy at the European level can be seen as a longer trend, starting from the 1980s and primarily led by the European Commission. Therefore, the Commission has been the body which has played a major role in the endeavor of a coherent and integrated European energy policy. According to my reading, there has been a strong coherent political will on this issue within the Commission since several decades. Still, only in February 2015 the Commission launched the huge Energy Union package with the really strong aim to create a European energy single market.

Already the name “Energy Union” refers to a strong common and solid energy strategy. The Energy Union package is the EU’s first major strategy in the field of energy since the previous energy and climate package of 2008. Energy politics is a great example of the slowness of decision making in the EU. There were talks of an energy single market since before 2000 but it is only 15 years later that the Commission launches a package to actually start action. Of course, gradual action has been underway before but the Energy Union package is indeed a significant step forward and the first major strategy which aims to create a European single market in the industry of energy. Nevertheless, the package of 2008 can be seen as the start of this strategic work. Also, the gas and electricity market have already been liberalized in the period of 1998 to 2004 (Amineh and Crijns-Graus 2014, 764). The project of establishing a harmonized and common gas market started already in the late 1990s. It is understandable and obvious that the process is extremely complex and therefore takes time.

Talking about common European energy policy easily leads to the questions of what this European energy policy actually is, what it should look like and to which extent there is or should be a common European energy policy. According to Pami Aalto and Kirtsen Westphal (2008), on the European level there is a long-standing aim of building a strong direction and purpose which would provide collectively good outcomes in European energy politics. Aalto and Westphal state that this is the source of this drive i.e. the reason behind this will of creating a common policy in the domain of energy is in fact in itself an illustration of the process of European integration. Nevertheless, this integration in the area of energy,

since the end of the Cold War, has not been that deep and successful as many have wished and as has been in many other fields of the EU. (Aalto & Westphal 2008, 6). So underneath the actual building of a common energy policy; building infrastructure, building pipelines and creating a single market, is the huge motive of deeper European integration.

Building a common European energy policy includes a range of aspects: huge investments, infrastructure, technical matters and in general a huge accent on economics. Then there are the necessarily environmental and climate policies which build a remarkable part of the energy strategy and which is one of the reasons that the Energy Union strategy was created. Environment and climate politics is the one of the main discourses when talking about energy politics. Energy politics includes highly political issues as well as at the national and at the European level. In this thesis I studied the deeply political side of the narrative of building an energy union. One of the biggest political aspect within energy politics is energy security. Energy security can be principally understood as energy supply security. That again includes geopolitical matters, changes in world's global security politics as well as international politics but also questions of energy supply and demand as well as changing circumstances regarding to supply and demand.

Pami Aalto and Kristen Westphal (2008) categorize the many approaches of energy policy as following: energy diplomacy, geopolitics and energy security, energy economics and trade, energy and the environment, political sociology of energy, bureaucratic politics of energy and regional politics of energy (Aalto & Westphal 2008, 5). This is a very comprehensive categorization and shows the many aspects of the sphere of energy politics and ways to approach it. Still, many of these categories are at the very least partly overlapping. For instance, energy security is related to pipeline politics and energy failures which again has something to do with infrastructure which again is an important part of energy economics and trade. Therefore, I claim that the research within energy policy cannot completely concentrate on one category and exclude other aspects.

Energy security or energy supply security is defined in various ways and includes many different aspects. The understanding of the concept depends a lot from which viewpoint energy security is being looked at. As Mehdi P. Amineh and Wina H.J. Crijsns-Graus (2014) state:

Definitions of the concept of “energy security” range from narrow issues of physical supply disruption to wider ones engaging the economy, environment

and political consequences of changes in the energy market, resources and fossil reserves. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 761).

This pictures quite comprehensively the extensiveness of the concept of energy security. It also defines the different factors which can cause disturbance and disruption to energy security. It points out the factor of the possibility of political instability within the energy market as well as the fact that stocks and reserves are constantly decreasing. "Changes in the market" may refer to political instabilities in the reserve-rich areas and the increasing demand of energy on the trade market. Furthermore, this definition raises the huge role economic and environmental issues play in the sphere of energy security.

The awareness of energy sustaining economic, social and political life as well as the awareness of its scarcity have increased since the 2000s. At the same time climate and environmental issues have only strengthen and expanded due to climate change. Specifically, issues regarded to energy production and transportation are really problematic in the context of global warming associated with the use of fossil fuels like oil and coal as well as the oil transportation catastrophes. Furthermore, there have been electricity supply failures in the beginning of 2000s due to infrastructural issues and weather circumstances for instance in Northern Europe, Germany and Russia. (Aalto & Westphal 2008, 2-3.)

Especially significant is however the fact that disruptions in energy supply have not only occurred due to failures in power supply lines, dry summers or extremely snowy winters but also because of highly political reasons. One of those disruptions was the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis in 2009 which is also mentioned by Amineh and Crijns-Graus (762, 2014). The crisis first started in the turn of 2006 when Russia and Ukraine had disagreements about the gas prices. This was followed by Russia cutting the gas supply to Ukraine for a couple of days in January 2006. In addition to Ukraine also other EU countries suffered of this. Also in 2009 the Russian owned company Gazprom simply shut down the gas pumps which affected 18 European countries. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 762-763).

The first Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 has been kind of a turning point in the energy security policies of the EU. Of course, some initiative was taken already earlier but still quite little to the comparison of after 2006. The sudden disruption in gas supply really evoked the EU. The crisis definitely rose awareness of the susceptibility of the European energy supply security. In the other hand for instance the recent report of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs state that the reactions of the Western cooperation partners and decision

makers have been quite slow and the cooperation with Russia has been continued though the disruptions in gas supply in 2006 and 2009 woke some European policy makers (Marttila et al. 2016, 34). In this context it is especially important to understand how extremely dependent Europe and the EU is on fossil fuel import. As Amineh and Crijns-Graus state, the EU is highly import depended on energy and it does not have a common defense which is necessarily contributing to Europe's concern of energy security (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 757-758.)

Gas is such significant because it has increasingly replaced oil and its consumption within the EU in the last decades. In 2012 the share of imported natural gas was 65 per cent while the same number in 1990 was 46 per cent (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 773-774.) In 2012 35 per cent of EU's gas import originated from Russia and the Commission has estimated that in 2030 this share is expected to be 60 per cent while the overall dependency will be 80 per cent. The production of natural gas in Europe was in 2012 6 per cent which is 5 per cent from the global production and the reserves were 60 per cent which is only 1 per cent of the global gas reserves. Meanwhile the gas consumption of Europe was 18 per cent which makes 14 per cent of the global level. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 777-780).

Those numbers highlight the meaning of gas as the primary imported energy in Europe. Gas consumption keeps on growing which means that there is more and more gas imported to Europe. Meanwhile the production of gas as well as the reserves in Europe are negligible in comparison to demand, global production and reserves. The consequence of all that is an increasing dependence of Russia which has been a rising cause of concern for the policy makers of the European Union. This concern has truly started in 2006 with the Ukrainian gas crisis and has since then been increasing, especially very recently due to the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014.

There are probably several reasons why the demand of natural gas is wobblier than the demand of oil and coal. Three major factors are affecting the demand level of gas; economic growth, cold and hot weather and the fact that gas is used as balancing power. Renewable energy sources (RES) like solar and wind energy are highly dependent on weather changes (Belyi 2015, 41) and that is why the energy production from RES is not stable and predictable. Therefore, balancing power, like gas and hydropower, is needed to compensate the irregular flow of solar and wind energy in order to answer the demand on the market. Weather conditions like hot summers and cold winters affect the demand of natural gas

remarkably since gas is used for heating in households. Also, the demand for gas of the electric power sector increases during hot summer weather because the demand of air conditioning increases (EIA, 23.8.2017).

2.1. Various types of energy scarcity

Geopolitics plays necessarily a huge role in energy security but there are also many other matters which effect the whole sphere of energy security in total. According to Amineh and Crijns-Graus (2014), energy security can be threatened by various types of scarcity. Those different types of scarcity can be again affected by different types of geopolitical forces. Amineh and Crijns-Graus separate three types of scarcity: structural scarcity, demand-induced scarcity and supply-induced scarcity. According to the authors those three types of scarcity epitomize the setting of energy security which again is consisting of three main factors mentioned above: decreasing reserves, increasing consumption (especially of oil and gas) as well as geopolitical rivalry. Amineh and Crijns-Graus state that demand-induced scarcity is caused by three factors. One is the growth of population in consuming countries. The second is the growth of the income per capita especially in the newly industrialized countries in the South and East Asia. According to Amineh and Crijns-Graus scarcity varies for different groups depending on the income per capita i.e. income gaps are putting people in unequal position when it comes to energy supply security. As the authors state, those people who cannot afford market prices will be excluded from the market without that actually any actor or institution excluding them. Due to this, high-income societies which industrialized first and are now using cheap energy, are the last ones to suffer from demand-induced scarcity. The third factor causing demand-induced scarcity is the technological change, starting in the 1850s has contributed to the access of fossil energy since it is essential for the production of economical welfare and power. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 761).

Furthermore, supply-induced scarcity is caused by the dwindling of stocks. Amineh and Crijns-Graus state that supply-induced and demand-induced scarcities are actually interacting since the intersection of demand and supply determine the prices for the consumers. Nevertheless, supply-induced scarcity has to be studied also in its own because among other things the dwindling of stock is not translated into price increase as it should by the price mechanism. According to the writers, price volatility will increase as soon as the awareness of decreasing stocks rises. Furthermore, the authors state that supply-induced scarcity and its prediction may lead to a process where economically and military capable

import-dependent countries try to gain power over resource-rich areas and territories where stocks are located either by strategic investment or by military force. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 761-762). This is an extreme interesting statement which highlights the geopolitical and world political side of energy politics and energy policy making.

This also leads to the third type of scarcity, structural scarcity. According to Amineh and Crijns-Graus structural scarcity actually consists of supply-induced caused by the intentional action of a major power, non-state actors such as huge oil companies, producer cartels or strong National Oil Companies (NOC) from resource-rich areas. Amineh and Crijns-Graus bring up many examples of the past where structural scarcity has been used, often especially by military force. Those cases go back to the first and second world war. However, there have also more recent cases of the use of structural scarcity. The above-mentioned Russo-Ukrainian is an excellent example of how Gazprom used structural scarcity by shutting down gas pumps affecting 18 European countries.

Moreover, it is not only Russia who has used energy as a means of gaining a certain geopolitical position to ensure its geo-economic interest. USA is a master in using structural scarcity in different ways. According to Amineh and Crijns-Graus the aims of America's "energy foreign policy" is to induce structural scarcity of contenders by diverting flows on land. Amineh and Crijns-Graus state that USA is giving special attention to the Persian Gulf, the richest in oil, to keep it within the American sphere of geopolitical power projection. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 762).

3. The European Parliament as a narrator

Russia has an overwhelming position on the market due to its huge gas reserves. Russia is using and exploiting this position as a political force. According to Frank Umbach, Vladimir Putin's policy in gas is using Russia's gas reservoirs and pipeline monopolies as a forceful political instrument of enforcing itself economic and political power and accomplishing its geopolitical and economic interests (Umbach 2010, 1239). Also, the report of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs highlights Russian's use of geo-economics as a strategy and as a way to affect another country by using economical means. The aim of this is to make the target country doing something it would not otherwise do. A good example of Russian's negative use of geo-economics are Ukrainian gas crises in 2006 and 2009. (Martikainen et al. 2016, 35.)

The president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, called in his opinion piece in the Financial Times in 2014 the EU to form a unified external energy policy to address Russia. He also called the EU to change Russia's internal energy institutions and make them follow market liberal rules.

Europe should confront Russia's monopolistic position with a single European body charged with buying its gas. Once this has been achieved, Europe should undertake the lengthier task of breaking up the Russian gas monopoly and restoring free market competition. True, this will require Europe's governments to take a unified position.

(Financial Times, 21.4.2014.)

Tusk wrote this quote above right after the annexation of Crimea. With these words Tusk aims to highlight the importance of building a common European energy policy and a European energy single market in order to challenge Russia's monopolistic position on the gas market. A more coherent energy policy and a common energy security strategy has been demanded by the EU leaders in a growing extent since 2006. Also, the president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker has stressed the need for a common European energy security policy referring to the recent geopolitical issues (EUobserver, 20.3.2015). The background of the strife towards an Energy Union is the aim and the goal of increasing EU's energy self-sufficiency and to decrease the dependence of Russian gas.

The transcript analyzed is from a debate held on the 17th of January in 2006 which was right after the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis. The debate focused on security of energy supplies, especially gas. In this debate the builder of the narrative i.e. the narrator is the European Parliament which consists of its members. Also, the Commissioner of Energy as well as the President of the Council of the EU participated in the debate. Therefore, the debate can be seen as a dialogue between the different institutions. A narrative always reflects the interpretation of the narrator which means that narratives are different depending on who creates the narrative (Korkmaz-Temel 2016, 69). A narrative is a way to understand and interpret the world and the political realities around us. This is done on the individual level but also as nations, groups and collective units. (Patterson & Monroe 1998, 316.) Therefore, official documents can also be seen as narratives (Korkmaz-Temel 2016, 69).

In the context of the debate, the transcript is the narrative, and the European Parliament in interaction with the representatives of the Commission and the Council, forms the narrator. Nevertheless, within this transcript many kinds of different of narratives constructed by different narrators can be found. Within each narrative there is often a counter-narrative which can be understood as an alternative to the master-narrative or to the dominant narrative (Squire et al. 2014, 32). According to Patterson and Monroe what is right and ordinary is discussed i.e. presented as a matter of fact and what is unusual is what is being remarked on. (Patterson & Monroe 1998, 316). This is also explaining the characteristics of the dominant story and the counter story. According to Corinne Squire et al. the counter-narrative has the feature of contestation. Counter-narratives are not clearly divided dichotomous categories but rather interwoven with one another. Stories are always in a relation with other stories. Though counter-narratives can be seen as resistant, they often include acknowledges to the master-narrative and also borrow some components of the dominant storyline while rejecting others. (Squire et al. 2014, 32-34). In addition, a narrative has always a plot, a beginning, a middle and an ending (Korkmaz-Temel 2016, 79.) Also, Patterson and Monroe state that a crucial element of the narrative is a certain kind of sequential order in which things happen (Patterson & Monroe 1998,316.) Nevertheless, this essential character of narrative coherence has also been criticized (cf. e.g. Hyvärinen, 2010).

According to Squire et al. (2014) narratives are always constructed via interaction. The narrator interacts with words, with the audience and with other stories. One important character of all narratives, also political ones, is the co-construction. The dialogic feature, the interaction of narratives, is one example of the co-constructed character. (Squire et al.

2013, 24-25.) The debate in the European parliament is an arena where this dialogic feature appears clearly. The narratives constructed in the plenary session are constructed through interaction in the debate. According to Squire (2014), narratives are shaped among other things by the writers, their intended or actual audience and by the medium of writing which defines, for instance, the possibility of reading multiple times. Narratives also often include the feature of performativity. Narratives can be seen as performances including the narrator the audience, their interaction and the social, cultural and moral world of the story. (Squire at al. 2014, 24-25, 28-29). In context of political narratives, political beliefs, ideologies and values are also important. The plenary session of the European parliament can be seen as an arena of performance where each member of the parliament constructs their narratives through an interactive dialogue which is affected by different political beliefs of the members.

3.1 The Establishment: master-narratives

The debate of the European Parliament on the 17th of January in 2006 is started by the President-in Office of the Council of the European Union at that time, Martin Bartenstein (Bartenstein 17.1.2006). Bartenstein was at time the Austrian Minister of Economics and Labour and was representing in this debate Austria, the holder of the presidency of the Council of the European Union at that time. Furthermore, he was president of the European Union Energy Council. (Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, 29.3.2016). In this sense Bartenstein's opening comment has in a way a bigger weight and importance than the comment of a regular member of the parliament. Bartenstein represents in this debate the Council of the European Union. His speech which begins the debate defines to a certain extent the tone and also the perspective of the debate. In other words, he is creating the master-narrative, the dominant narrative of the debate.

On the floor he starts by creating the narrative. He begins with referring to the latest events of early January: the dispute of gas between Ukraine and Russia (Bartenstein 17.1.2006). He presents the happening as a huge turning point which at the same time is the beginning of the narrative he builds. The turning point is that something really extraordinary and abnormal has happened which has shaken the European Community deeply. Bartenstein's conclusion of this changing happening is that Europe can not anymore take secure supply of energy for

granted. After that he appeals to the parliament the EU, “we”, should learn the right lesson of what has happened i.e. take action. (Bartenstein 17.1.2006.)

Bartenstein begins his speech on the floor with the story about the gas disruption between Russia and Ukraine and can in that way easily present the happening as a turning point which again leads to the conclusion that security of energy supply cannot be taken as a normative anymore. This change in the sphere of energy security requires action of the EU. Action is needing to be taken in order to secure Europe’s energy security and specially in this context to secure the supply of gas. Bartenstein also indicates that the responsible for the gas disruption is Russia by saying that the situation was solved by the Commission and the Austrian Presidency of the Council (Bartenstein 17.1.2006).

Here Bartenstein is representing the unpredictability of energy supply as a threat to the member states of the EU. The EU is the good one who actually solved the situation and brought the disruption to an end. Especially he seems to highlight his home country Austria which presidency of the Council according to him helped to bring the incident to an end. Nevertheless, it is important to note that while the disruption of gas and the growing insecurity of gas supply is presented as a threat, Bartenstein doesn’t directly blame Russia and also doesn’t speak about the political reasons and the geo-economic strategy that Russia is actively using. He also doesn’t condemn Russia and its action, instead he appeals to Russia and Moldova and asks them to negotiate a solution for the problems between them (Bartenstein 17.1.2006). The threat is the insecurity of Russia’s gas supply and obviously Russia’s unreliable behavior and its strategy to use gas as a political weapon in order to achieve special interests. All this is not said by Bartenstein, instead he mentions the growing insecurity of gas supply and presents several actions as a solution to secure the gas supply to Europe.

According to Asle Toje (2011,) the EU can be seen as a typical small power which in order to be a great power, would need a capacity to act. Toje states that the EU’s Member States lack common foreign policy interests, traditions, goals and outlooks to generate substantive common policies. Because of the diversified agendas within the Members States, the EU is not able to form a common approach to the management of hard power. According to Toje, the EU fails to show behaviour associated with global powerful players in the international system. The EU is economically strong but militarily weak and politically fragmented. (Toje 2011, 49, 52-53.) Bartenstein’s speech can be perceived as a talk of a small power which

does not bluster but has a defensive approach and focuses on the call for internal actions. In the end, internal actions, the fostering of solidarity within the Member States and the deepening of integration are the only substantial tools the EU has in order to enhance its energy security towards Russia.

Also, according to Svein S. Andersen, Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter (2016), the EU's institutional autonomy, capacity and cohesion differs profoundly from other state-like actors and other international actors which makes EU a weak external actor in energy policy. Andersen et al. state that EU's policy tools compared to many other states are limited. For instance, the EU is not able to spend a significant amount of money on energy infrastructure. Secondly, the EU lacks hard-power tools of other superpowers like the USA, Russia or China. While Russia makes the borders between state and company policies unclear and gives Kremlin the chance to use Gazprom as part of state affairs, the EU tries to ensure transit in the gas sector mainly by rule-based governance. The EU's approach to the security of gas trade is mostly regional while the US mostly handles the governance and the security of international trade of gas and oil trade. (Andersen et al. 2016,53.) Compared to Russia, the EU is a weak actor and a small power in energy policy on the international playing field. This position is reflected not only in Bartenstein's speech but throughout the debate.

Bartenstein emphasizes three main things Europe should do. Firstly, he mentions that the EU has to diversify the sources from where natural gas is supplied which means building new kind of pipelines. He mentions as an example the Nabucco pipeline running through the Caspian Sea and Turkey. The second point according to Bartenstein, is increasing the use of liquefied natural gas LNG since the transportation of LNG doesn't require pipelines. Thirdly, he mentions that there must be more transparency on the hydrocarbon market in order to make prices more stable. This is also crucial in the light of furthering investments in energy. (Bartenstein 17.1.2006).

By listing these points, he clearly continues with the story and comes to the middle of the narrative. This is essential for creating the plot of the story. In his third point where he requires transparency to the price regulation of the gas market, Bartenstein seems to refer to Russia's geo-economic strategy giving different countries different kind of prices. Again, he is not mentioning it straightly but merely strongly hinting at it. Here, it is important to mention that a narrative is also created through silence. Patterson & Monroe state that narrative provides data also in the spaces and silences (Patterson & Monroe 1998, 316). In

other words, the things which are left unsaid but are maybe only referred through the lines are also precious information and essential in analyzing the narrative. Those silences and their meaning can surely only be noted through interpretation.

According to the report of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (2016), Russia has provided the supply of gas to different EU Member States to different prices according to their politics. With this strategy Russia aims to divide the EU and to create a certain kind of discord between the EU member states. It is a clear mean Russia is using to affect the EU member states. According to the report Finland, Germany, and France are paying a significantly lower price for their natural gas than Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Czech Republic. Russia's conscious strategy giving some countries a lower price can be seen as a positive use of geo-economics. Still, the will of keeping the price low can cause to those countries political consequences which decrease the sovereignty of the country. (Martikainen et al. 2016, 34-35.) Gazprom which is partly owned by the Russian state, and under its control, can decide about the gas prices quite sovereignly since its strong, nearly monopolistic position on the market. Bartenstein may refer to that when he stresses the need for a more transparent market and prices.

After highlighting three concrete things which should be changed, Bartenstein continues with talking about the need for a greater integration of the supply network within the EU. (European Parliament, debate 17.1.2006) To stress the need of forming a more united energy market within the EU is clearly the main pursuit which can be seen during the whole debate and also in Bartenstein's opening on the floor. Building a common energy single market and increasing the integration in energy is presented as a common project. In fact, this is the master-narrative, the dominant narrative which is the basis of the debate and also the argumentation of Bartenstein. A common energy market and a more tight-knitted European energy policy is the primary solution to secure the supply of Europe's energy.

Towards the end of his speech he mentions also other objectives of the energy policy in the EU, such as increasing the use of renewable energy, diversify the sources of energy and improvement of energy efficiency. Furthermore, he highlights the importance of the EU's relations to its partners. Those relations have to be maintained consistently as well as on bilateral and multilateral levels. (Bartenstein 17.1.2006). Those are really common arguments being raised when talking about energy politics. Of course, all these measures also advance energy security. EU's dependence on fossil fuel import will continue to grow

also in the future during the next 20 years (Amineh and Crijns-Graus 2014, 779). This means that all increasing of the use of renewable energy sources will reinforce EU's independence from Russia and from imports in general because renewable energy is produced locally in Europe. Though behind all these arguments is the pursuit of a common European energy market which is the ultimate solution to the challenges of energy security, it is not a surprise that Bartenstein also mentions the importance of good relations to Russia and the EU's cooperation with its partners. In 2006 the EU-Russia relations were notably better than they are now, 10 years later. Looking back to the history, the gas crisis of 2006 could now be said to be the beginning of the dramatic cooling down of the EU-Russia relations.

Mr President, honourable Members, the events in the first week of January surrounding the dispute over gas between the Russian Federation and Ukraine have made it abundantly clear to us that we cannot take the security of our energy supply for granted. --- What matters now is that we learn the right lessons from what has happened. As I see it, there are three things we need to do if Europe's supply of natural gas is to be secure in the long term, and I shall now set out what they are. (Bartenstein 17.1 2006)

In his speech, Bartenstein is creating a narrative with a beginning, a middle and an end by first noting what has happened and stating how serious the crisis was, then creating the middle of the narrative by moving on to the present moment by saying that "we" the EU has to learn about what happened. Finally, he forms the end of the narrative by calling for action and defining the needed action in the future and the need for a common European energy policy. During creating this story line, he is also using the rhetorical act of security which can be identified in the quote. According to Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) in a securitization move the threat is seen as existential and very urgent. In this way an issue can be taken out of the field of normal politics and brought to the field of security which means that it is presented as either special kind of politics or it is taken above politics. The aim of this rhetorical act is to legitimate the violation of rules or rights. Furthermore, an important feature of securitization is the acceptance of the audience. This is distinguishing securitization from a securitizing move. (Buzan et al. 1998, 23-25). Bartenstein's comment doesn't fulfill all the features and criteria of securitization, mostly because he is not trying to legitimate action which would be against norms, rules or rights, but it can still be seen to include many aspects of security and a securitization move. Buzan et al. state that the feature

of securitization is a special rhetorical structure including three steps: existential threats, emergency action and effects of breaking the rules. (Buzan et al, 1998, 26).

This quote highlights how Bartenstein constructs his narrative but also creates the securitization aspects in his comment. In the beginning he defines the threat – the insecurity and precariousness of energy supply. He presents the threat as new and very existential. He stresses the need of action in order to defeat the threat. If no action is taken, Europe's natural gas supply will not be guaranteed and secure in the future. After that, he lists the forms of action which needs to be taken. Then towards the end of his speech he emphasizes again the need of emergency action which must be done. The challenges in the field of energy are growing and in order to face and overcome them, Europe needs to take much more action i.e. efforts.

Europe must redouble its efforts to be equal to the challenges presented by energy policy, for by 2030 the world will be using 50% more energy and Europe will become even more markedly dependent on the importation of fossil energy sources. (Bartenstein 17.1.2006)

Bartenstein left the floor by appealing to all EU's Member States. He says that all Member States have the common interest of securing EU's future energy supply and that he is convinced that the EU will succeed in it. (Bartenstein 17.1.2006.) In this way he appeals to the European community as one entity and aims to strengthen the unity of the EU. It can also be seen as a strong and earnest request to the members of the parliament listening to his opening speech. Its starting point and premise is that all MEPs are like-minded over this issue and agree with him and his narrative, his way of seeing things. In one sense it can also be seen leaving not much space for other kind of interpretations, opinions and alternatives. Bartenstein creates the master-narrative with the assumption that all members of the parliament perceive the urgency of the energy security equally intensely. Nevertheless, he speaks on a very general level setting the broad frame for the discussion without going into further details about actions.

After Bartenstein's opening speech Andris Piebalgs, the Commissioner for energy in 2004-2009, takes over the floor. Like Bartenstein, also Piebalgs is representing the establishment, the European Commission. Piebalgs' comment follows a lot the speech of Bartenstein. The structure of Piebalgs' comment is very similar to Bartenstein's comment. He starts with telling about the extraordinary incident between Ukraine and Russia which the EU helped to

solve. He also talked about how the EU should learn the lessons from the happening. Accordingly, at this point he is using the exact same expression than Bartenstein. Then he is also mentioning three lessons, three points which the EU should learn and do i.e. he defines the actions which needs to be done. He mentions that the EU should be proactive and maintain close bilateral contacts without taking sides. Secondly, he stresses the need of dialogue between Ukraine and Russia which the EU should put a momentum to. Thirdly he stresses the need for a clearer, coherent and proactive EU-wide energy security policy. (Piebalgs 17.1.2006.)

Throughout his speech Piebalgs stresses very strongly the importance of a common and coherent European energy policy and energy single market. Very similar to Bartenstein, he appeals to Russia and Ukraine to solve their problems and encourages them to closer dialogue. Here with he is taking a really diplomatic approach. He also highlights the meaning of the EU to encourage the dialogue and also mentions the importance of EU's good relations to Russia and to Ukraine. Piebalgs strongly emphasizes the need and the importance of the pursuit of a coherent and common European energy policy and energy security strategy in order to correspond primarily to the security of supply but also to achieve other goals such as competitiveness and sustainability. He also stresses the need for a common approach toward energy. Again, like Bartenstein, he doesn't refer to Russia directly as a threat. Instead, the threat is presented as the disruption of energy supplies (Piebalgs 17.1.2006.)

The fact that Russia caused the disruption of gas because of political reasons, is not mentioned directly. Instead, the strong emphasizing of the need that Europe forms a coherent and common approach to energy speaks for itself. Piebalgs leaves out that Russia's role in the gas conflict and that Russia is actively utilizing its monopolistic position on the gas market by using its gas supply as a geo-economic strategy in order to ensure certain interest, among others to divide the EU (Martikainen et al. 2006, 34-35).

Probably also Piebalgs is aware of that but still chooses to not to say that aloud. Instead, he chooses to emphasize the importance of a coherent and common European energy policy. That again tells about the significance and seriousness of the threat.

Commercial negotiations between the two sides will continue in order to find a price adjustment formula that is mutually acceptable. --- In conclusion, this dispute has again been a real wake-up call for us all. While it is true that energy

is just a commodity, it is a commodity that is fundamental for our continued economic development and wellbeing. We must learn the lessons from this episode, which I will sum up as a need for a common European energy policy. (Piebalgs 17.1.2006)

Compared to Bartenstein, Piebalgs is even more in a way concentrating on not to politicize the gas conflict but rather being really diplomatic and stressing the need for action, especially the need to create a common European energy policy. Piebalgs is even referring to energy as “just a commodity”. Furthermore, he is talking about “commercial negotiations” as if the gas disruption wouldn’t have been highly political and involving geopolitical and geo-economic reasons. Piebalgs is using economical vocabulary instead of talking much about the political side of energy. He describes energy as a commodity which is crucial for Europe’s “economic wellbeing”. Admittedly, he talks about energy policy as a means to secure energy supply but he is not highlighting the political side of the gas disruption or by any means of energy in general. On the contrary, he is playing the political aspect down. Buzan et al. (1998) state that securitization can be seen controversial to politicization because it doesn’t leave room for choices. Securitization means to present an issue as existential and very urgent which should be treated with high priority to other issues. (Buzan et al. 1998, 29.) Both Piebalgs and Bartenstein mention the high priority of the action to be taken which is crystallized in building a common energy market.

In his speech today, the President-in-Office clearly indicated the importance the Presidency attaches to this particular issue and that many concrete and clear proposals have been made. (Piebalgs 17.1.2006)

In that sense, in both Piebalgs’ and Bartenstein’s speeches can be seen the conscious political choice to securitize the issue of energy supply. Both present an intense securitization act while on the same time leaving out Russia’s role in the political conflict. The threat of insecurity of gas supply is defined and presented in the beginning of the narrative. Then both move on with stressing for urgent action and end with a similar way of appealing to the parliament for forming a coherent and common energy policy. All in all, this narrative which involves many aspects of securitization and in which at the same time the narrators avoid mentioning Russia’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests, is highly political. In particular, the fact that the geopolitical and geo-economic motives of Russia which were

behind the gas crisis are mentioned by neither the Commissioner nor the President-In-Office of the Council, is strengthening the politicality of their comments.

3.2 Counter-narratives

Emery Roe defines in his book *Narrative Policy Analysis* (1994) the nature of counterstories. According to Roe, counterstories run counter to the controversy's dominant narrative. Finding and identifying the counterstories of an issue is the second step in Roe's narrative policy analysis. (Roe 1994, 3.) According to Corinne Squire et al., despite that, counter-narratives can be seen as resistant, they though often include acknowledges to the master-narrative and also borrow some components of the dominant storyline while rejecting others. (Squire et al. 2014, 32-34) Furthermore, Roe highlights the meaning of uncertainty, complexity and polarization as essential to narrative policy analysis. Roe states that complexity and polarization often cause uncertainty and the effort to reduce uncertainty or polarization increases the complexity of the issue. (Roe 1994, 2-4). In other words, those three factors are highly interconnected with each other and affect each other.

The issue of the security of gas supply from Russia can be seen as highly complex since it involves a lot of different aspects which have also shown in the debate. These aspects are among other things Europe's high dependency of Russia, Russia's political interests, the threat of security and the security move, the aspect of gas as a commodity, and the perspective that the gas important can be seen as a treating relationship between Russia and the EU without any geopolitical aspects which is depoliticizing the whole issue. The issue of Europe's energy security vis-à-vis to Russia is also necessarily extremely uncertain. The major factor which makes the issue highly uncertain is the uncertainty of Russia itself and its action. Furthermore, it is also uncertain because the whole disruption of gas. Especially the situation during the time of the debate was really unstable and unclear. As the analysis of the master-narrative showed there were a lot of confusion and uncertainties concerning the security of gas supply from Russia.

The core of the master-narrative is the concern of the security of gas supply which leads to the conclusion of the urgent need to form a common and coherent European energy security policy. As Roe states, master-narratives or in his words policy narratives, are stories with scenarios or arguments that are in a way underwriting and convincing as well as stabilizing the assumptions of policy making in face of the issue's uncertainty, complexity or polarization (Roe 1994, 3). In other words, the master-narrative is trying to create steadiness

and stability despite the possible uncertainty, complexity or polarization within the issue. The premise of the master-narrative in this debate is the uncertainty of the gas supply. The ultimate conclusion is that in order to defend the uncertainty Europe needs to create an energy security policy. This conclusion is represented as a way to decrease uncertainty of the situation. This reflects well the EU's above-mentioned role as a small power. The EU approaches the uncertainty and external threat by launching internal adaptive actions. The EU's answer to the external threat to its energy security is the creation of a common energy security policy which shows that the EU's approach to the threat to its energy security is internal, not external as the approach of a strong external actor would be. While a state with a great power status would confront the problem by directly influencing the cause, the EU focuses on internal measures. The core of building a common energy security policy is the deepening of EU's integration which goes well in line with EU's self-identity.

Nevertheless, there can be identified counterstories in the debate regarding the securitization of the situation. The most significant counter-narrative is set by the Finnish MEP Esko Seppänen who speaks on behalf of the European United Left-Nordic-Green Left group.

Western Europe has been dependent on the gas pipeline that comes from Russia via other countries. The planned pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea will reduce this dependence. The project is understandable, because some of the countries the pipeline now passes through are hostile towards Russia. We in Finland have not had the slightest problem with the gas supply in 40 years. --- Our group supports good partnership relations and cooperation on energy with Russia. (Seppänen 17.1.2006)

Seppänen is presenting a very interesting counter-narrative by stating that Russia's unreliable gas supply is actually not a threat to the EU and to Western-Europe. Instead, the threat is created by the transit countries through the gas pipeline was running in 2006. When talking about the pipeline which would run only through the Baltic Sea and not via any Eastern European countries he is referring to the first Nord Stream project which plans started in 2006 and which was put into service in 2012 (Nord Stream, 2016.) Seppänen is presenting a strong counter-narrative to the securitization act of the previous speakers by implying that Russia and the dependence of Russian gas is actually not a threat. He is not as such against the conclusion of the master-narrative but his counter-narrative aims to attenuate the strong securitization. According to him, the problem are other countries

through which the gas pipeline was running. Seppänen sees these countries as hostile to Russia. Here he is using a really strong expression. The word hostile refers to aggression and hatefulness. According to my interpretation Seppänen blames the other countries through the gas pipeline is running, for the gas crisis i.e. in this case Ukraine and possibly also Moldova. Another matter of fact which is inferring to this is his comment about which Finland hasn't had any problems with security of Russian gas supply. In other words, Seppänen aims to say that the reason for the gas disruption are the other countries, not Russia.

According to maps of the existing gas pipelines between Russia and Europe, there are two major pipelines, despite the Nord Stream 1, which runs from Russia to Europe through several Eastern European countries, among others Ukraine, Belarus, Slovakia, Poland, and Moldova. Furthermore, there are numerous offshoots of those pipelines which go through whole Europe until the very South of Spain. A kind of cluster of those offshoots is clearly in the area of Germany. Also in the area of the borders of Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia there are frequent offshores of the major pipelines. (Petroleum Economist Cartographic Services). In his comment, Seppänen implements that the threat for Western Europe is not the high dependence on Russian gas but the Eastern European countries through which the pipelines run and which are hostile towards Russia. Seppänen is then referring to Nord Stream 1 as a good project and seems to be in favor of it. His argument is that Nord Stream one is better than the other pipeline or pipelines which run through several Eastern European countries since Nord Stream is running from Russia at the bottom of the Baltic Sea straight to Germany. In that way Western Europe would get more independent of the hostile East European countries.

In the beginning of his comment Seppänen is referring to Europe's high dependence of Russian gas. Seppänen states that the high consumption of fossil fuels will continue and that even still in 2030 80 per cent of the energy being used in the world is fossil fuels. He also states that one quarter of global gas reserves is owned by Russia and another quarter in unstable areas like Iran and Qatar. Then he draws a conclusion that if Europe wants to satisfy its growing energy consumptions with gas, there is no alternative for Russian gas import. (Seppänen 17.1.2006.) Seppänen ends his comment on the floor by highlighting that his group is supporting good partnership and cooperation with Russia. As mentioned above, highlighting the importance of maintaining good relations between Russia was also part of the master-narrative. Seppänen is in a way borrowing this important perspective from the master-narrative. On the contrary it can also be understood as an exhortation that Europe

should further continue its close cooperation with Russia in the sphere of gas which is quite controversial to the narrative of forming higher European integration within energy.

Another and really different counter-narrative is built by a German MEP Rebecca Harms who gives a comment on behalf of her political group, the European Free Alliance/ Greens. Harms implies that the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis is not a threat to Europe because it shouldn't be handled as a European issue. This is really controversial to the master-narrative where the prevailing and most important part of the story was that the gas crisis was seen as wider threat to Europe and as a wake-up call for the EU.

I would like to start with Ukraine, having been rather surprised that the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, which is an annual event nearly caused us in Europe to treat it as a European gas crisis. Ukraine, and later Moldova, found themselves in a situation that had been brought to the point of crisis, but Europe did not. Europe was able, as it has been before, to rely on stable trading relations with Russia. (Rebecca Harms 17.1.2006).

Harms implies that the gas crisis wasn't in any way special or extraordinary. She represents the gas disruption as an annual dispute between Russia and Ukraine. Herewith she refers to the disputes and disagreements which have occurred already during several years before 2005-2006. According to the Director of Gas Research Institute for Energy Studies Jonathan Stern the background of the 2006 gas crisis lies already in the instability and dissension of the gas relationships between Russia and Ukraine during the 1990s. Stern states that during this time Ukraine was not able to pay the price for gas Russia requested which led to a high level of debt. This in turn caused Russia to reduce its gas supply to Ukraine which again affected other transit countries. (Stern 2006, 2.)

In 2005 the situation escalated and the outcome was the gas crisis in January 2006. In the background there were rather dramatically and a complex set of events. Not the least factor behind the gas crisis was the messy presidential election in Ukraine in 2004 in which the rather pro-western oriented Victor Juštšenko won after the run-off election's re-voting. The other candidate was Victor Yanukovych who was strongly supported by Russia. Meanwhile, the dispute about the gas prices got worst and at the same time oil prices were rising which also contributed to the increase of gas prices. To top it all, at the very end of 2005, it was elicited that Russia had purchased all available gas from Turkmenistan for the first quarter of 2006 which meant that there was nothing left for Ukraine from that side. All this led to

the situation where Russia cut the gas supplies to Ukraine 1.1.2006 at 10 am Moscow time. (Stern 2006, 2-7.)

Though behind the gas crisis there were a lot of issues which were related to Ukraine's domestic politics, it is hard to see that the gas crisis was only a dispute between two countries. In her comment Harms aims to limit the crisis to a strife between Russia and Ukraine. She is further emphasizing that Europe has always had stable trading relations with Russia. This supports that her attempt is to limit the gas crisis to a bilateral conflict between Russia and Ukraine which has little to do with Europe and the EU. She presents the gas crisis as normal and ordinary by referring to it as an annual happening. In that way Harms is mitigating the crisis but also the importance of the whole debate. As mentioned above, it is true that there have been tensions and conflicts between Russia and Ukraine before 2006. The gas crisis did not come out of nowhere. Still, it is hard to see the crisis only as a bilateral conflict between two countries since the EU and its member states very highly influenced and involved. According to Stern (2006) many European countries suffered of loss of Russian gas during the gas crisis. Already at the 2nd of January Hungary was losing 40 per cent of its Russian gas supplies. Also, many other countries like Austria, Romania, Slovakia, Poland, France and Italy had all massive loss of gas supplies verifying from 14 per cent up to 33 per cent. (Stern 2006, 8-9).

Harms continues her comment by saying that Europe must no longer see Ukraine as a safe transit country but should rather actively help Ukraine to free itself from Russia's dependence in terms of energy policy. She continues with talking about the weakness of European energy policy which is according to her, an apart issue from the gas crisis. Harms talks about a coordinated coherent European approach towards energy in order to increase the productivity of natural resources and energy efficiency. The adequate use of raw materials would also decrease Europe's dependence on other countries. (Harms 17.1.2006.) Harms pictures the gas crisis as a separate issue which according to her is a bilateral conflict. The EU should though support Ukraine in freeing itself from its huge dependence on Russian gas supply. Her view is quite controversial to the Commissioner Piebalgs' view that Europe should not take sides but still ensure its own energy security.

3.3 MEPs following the master-narrative with a counter streak

The debate in the Parliament continues with comments of the different political groups. Many of the members of the parliament speaking are strongly following the master-narrative

built by the Commissioner and the President-in-Office of the Council. Still, many of these comments are also involving a certain feature of controversy. By this I mean mostly MEPs who are strongly supporting the view of the master-narrative and are clearly stressing for a common and coherent European energy policy but much more intensive and mightily than the establishment. So, while endorsing strongly the narrative of Bartenstein and Piebalgs, they are going in a way beyond it and are much more audacious in their rhetoric. I interpret this as controversy to the master-narrative because Bartenstein and Piebalgs are much more diplomatic and chary. On the other hand, or even at the same time, this could also be seen as an intense form of the master-narrative.

For instance, a Lithuanian MEP, Danuta Budreikaitė (ALDE), who speaks on behalf of her group is strongly supporting the idea of an Energy Union i.e. a strong and coherent European energy policy in order to defeat Russia and the threat of the possible insecure of Russian gas supply.

EU Member States assure their energy resources by concluding bilateral agreements. Russia is taking advantage of such agreements, including the forthcoming German-Russian gas pipeline, and is dividing the European Union by providing individual Member States with different degrees of access to energy supplies. Individual countries are easier to influence than the European Union as a whole. --- With the European Commission as the energy supply partner representing the interests of all 25 Member States, Russia would have to show more respect. Russia will not be able to completely cut off the supply of gas to the EU; it would simply not have any other way to dispose of it. (Budreikaitė 17.1.2006).

Budreikaitė is very clearly in favor of a common European energy policy like the Commissioner and the President-in-Office of the Council suggested. In contrast to them, however she is mentioning Russia many times and presenting Russia as an ultimate threat in terms of energy security. Budreikaitė sees the forming of a coherent European energy policy as very important since Russia will then be not able to cut off the gas supplies. She is also clearly pointing out Russia's strategy using energy selectively as a weapon against some EU member states in the aim of dividing the EU. According to Susanne Nies (2011), one of Russia's main interest in energy politics is using energy dependency as a tool of power politics. In that way Russia pursues its energy interests as well as other political interests.

Nies states that the use of the gas dependency is really selective and has never certain the EU as whole. One of these interests is Russia's will to remain the major player in European gas market. This means especially having reliable transit routes and infrastructure. Furthermore, it is very important for Russia to have control over the central Asian gas which is cheap since Russia is the only exporter. (Nies 2011, 282.)

Budreikaitė is very critical of the selective strategy Russia is using in order to divide the EU. She is also criticizing the bilateral cooperation of EU member states with Russia. Here she is especially referring to the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline which plans started in 2006 and which runs through the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. (Nord Stream 2016). Budreikaitė pictures Nord Stream 1 as very harmful to the EU since it would largely profit Germany and would be a bilateral agreement between Russia and Germany. Furthermore, Budreikaitė states that Russia is granting the EU concession because the EU is constantly referring to Russia as an important partner and is emphasizing its exceptional position among other countries. According to her the main reason for this concession is EU's growing dependence on Russian gas. Budreikaitė implies that there is nevertheless no longer a guarantee of Russia's concession for the EU. She says that the gas crisis shows that Russia might use the same tactics towards the EU and its member states. (Budreikaitė 17.1.2006.)

All in all, Budreikaitė is using a much riper, more intense and powerful rhetoric than Bartenstein and Piebalgs. She implies that in her opinion it is not good that the EU is being too submissive towards Russia in order to get concessions. This is quite opposite to the master-narrative which was emphasizing the importance of maintaining good relations towards Russia. Budreikaitė sees the threat of Russia cutting the gas supplies to the EU as concrete and perhaps even quite possible. In conclusion, Budreikaitė is building a strong confrontation between the EU and Russia through which she is legitimating the need of forming a strong and coherent European energy policy.

Furthermore, also the comment given by Jacek Emil Saryusz-Wolski on the behalf of the European Peoples' Party-European Democrats group, follows on one hand the master-narrative but is on the other much more intense. The rhetoric Saryusz-Wolski is using is very daring and emphasizes Russia's role in the gas crisis.

It is high time, since energy security is becoming increasingly important for the overall security of the European Union, and especially its economic security. ---Energy has been used as a weapon and foreign policy instrument,

and hence should be discussed in the context of foreign and security policy.
(Saryusz-Wolski 17.1.2006)

Saryusz-Wolski is strongly emphasizing the need of a common European energy policy. He is also clearly stressing the fact that Russia is using energy as a weapon. There is no prudence in his rhetoric which is quite opposed to the rhetoric of the master-narrative. Furthermore, he is mentioning a highly remarkable and important thing in terms of the analysis of policy narratives. Saryusz-Wolski states that since energy is used as a weapon it should be discussed in the sphere of foreign and security policy. I interpret this as a similar securitization act as I identified in the master-narrative. Saryusz-Wolski is saying really clearly that energy is a matter of security. So, this is in a sense controversial to Buzan's view that in securitization there is no need to say "security" or no need to define the issue directly as an issue of security (Buzan 1998, 28.) On the other hand, Buzan states that securitization is a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan 1998, 23). In this sense Saryusz-Wolski's statement that energy must be handled as a matter of security and foreign policy can be seen as a securitization act.

Saryusz-Wolski stresses the high importance of the debate, the gas crisis and energy security in general. He aims to lift energy up to a sphere which is usually handled with high priority and graveness. He is legitimating this move by implying that Russia has used energy as a weapon and the consequence of that is that the EU should handle energy as a matter of high importance i.e. handle it as a matter of security. Saryusz-Wolski is also at the same time stressing the need for a common European energy security policy by saying it is a high time that the EU takes action in terms of security of energy supply and sustainability of energy production and consumption (Saryusz-Wolski 17.1.2006).

Furthermore, perhaps the strongest and most intensive rhetoric is after all used by Toomas Hendrik Ilves, a MEP of the Party of European Socialists and also later known as the president of Estonia. Ilves states that contrary to some other MEPs opinion and in way also Bartenstein and Piebalgs rhetoric the gas crisis was not a unique event. This is similar to Harms view that the gas crisis was preceded by a longer term of conflicts between Ukraine and Russia. However, Ilves seems to see these conflicts strongly caused by Russia and its consist policy to use energy as an instrument of creating political pressure.

Mr President, contrary to opinion, including opinion within this Chamber, the Ukrainian gas crisis was not a one-off, first-time event justified by the need to

move to market policies. On the contrary, it is a consistent policy and has everything to do with politics. First, Ukraine had a contract, signed in 2004 and lasting until 2009. It was terminated because Ukraine elected the wrong president and because of forthcoming parliamentary elections. (Ilves 17.1.2006.)

Furthermore, Ilves speaks really directly by saying that Russia caused the gas conflict by terminating the contract Ukraine had with Russia. According to Ilves Russia terminated the contract because of the election of president Juštšenko who was, as mentioned above, pro-EU minded. While Ilves is presenting the issue quite one-sided as Russia breaking the contract, Jonathan Stern's perspective is slightly different. According to Stern (2006) Juštšenko's administration proposed that gas transit tariffs, which Russia paid to the transit countries including Ukraine, should be moved to European levels and paid in dollars. Furthermore, according to Stern Juštšenko also raised other objections to the settlement made in 2004, among other things the settlement of the depth of previous gas supplies. All this created the impression that Juštšenko declared the contract to be invalid. (Stern 2006, 5-6.) It is clear that this probably angered Russia. Needless to say, Ukraine had the right to question its high gas prices but the view of Ilves' that only Russia would have affected the termination of the agreement is perhaps a little unilateral. Still, it is remarkable that Ilves mentions the election of Juštšenko since it clearly was an issue which influenced the gas crisis. It is after all a matter of fact, that the pro-European Juštšenko was not the president Russia wanted.

To sum up, Russia has consistently used a government-owned monopolistic energy company to put political pressure on countries – market practices and existing contracts be damned. Empiricism is wiser than wishful thinking. The experiences of the new Member States, and of Ukraine and Moldova when they adopted a pro-EU stance, clearly show the dangers of lacking a robust EU policy on energy security. (Ilves 17.1.2006.)

Ilves ends his comment by implying that Gazprom cannot be seen as a normal company since it is owned by the state and is used as Putin's political instrument. Ilves is using really harsh rhetoric by saying that Russia doesn't care about market practices and contracts, in his word Russia damns them. Ilves stresses to action by saying that empiricism is wiser than wishful thinking. He emphasizes the need of a strong EU energy security policy by referring

to the gas crisis and to other comparable experiences of the Eastern EU member states in term of problems in gas supplies from Russia.

Also, Edward Lucas, the Central and East Asian correspondent of the Newspaper Economist states in his book *The New Cold War* (2009) that Gazprom is not a publicly traded, law-governed energy company but rather the gas division of Kremlin Inc. According to Lucas Gazprom has investments in 16 out of 27 EU member states. He states that Gazprom is directly linked to the end of press freedom in Russia. It has bought up several media outlets and tied them to Kremlin's volition. Lucas states that this is questionable in term of European market rules. The Russian regime doesn't allow any competition within its gas business. This raises the question if Russia allows it on the European market or if it tries to change the European rules. According to Lucas Gazprom doesn't tolerate much scrutiny or observation of the EU towards its activities. Though, the EU has several aims to change the situation. Among other things there are plans to liberalize the energy market and to change rules that the EU could for instance block investments which come outside the union and are harmful to the common strategic interest. Nevertheless, Lucas sees these moves still far away and also as a potential subject of sabotaging by Russia's allies in Europe. (Lucas 2009, 214.)

3.4 The Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis as a wake-up call

The Ukrainian gas crisis strongly dominated this debate of the European Parliament on Europe's gas supply security since it had just happened when the debate took place. The gas disruption between Ukraine and Russia affected the timing of debate since the crisis was not only bilateral but it affected many EU Member States. The debate was a comprehensive dialogue between the different MEPs, the Council and the Commission.

The majority of the MEPs and the representatives from the European Commission as well as from the Council of the EU described and represented the gas crisis as an urgent wake-up call for Europe and the EU to take action in order to secure EU's energy supplies. The majority of the MEPs pictured the gas crisis as a European crisis which had a strong effect on the EU. While there were also controversial opinions, the main conclusion of the debate was that the EU must create a common and coherent energy policy and energy security strategy. In the debate, gas supplies from Russia were widely seen as a matter of security and Russian gas was securitized.

4. The Energy Security Strategy

There are many kinds of definitions for energy security, but as already mentioned in the second chapter, the European Commission's definition of energy security refers to secure, sustainable and reliable supply of energy at reasonable prices. According to Dicle Kormaz-Temel (2016), the three main components of energy security are security, competitiveness and sustainability. Nevertheless, different actors in the field may have different understandings of the definition. It is also notable that energy security is realised on different levels and sectors. As Korkmaz-Temel states in her dissertation, the security dimension of the definition includes security of supplies and demands depending on the actor of the energy chain. Secure supplies are important for consumers - individuals and industry, while uninterrupted demand is crucial for producers. If the actor is a transit country both, security of supplies and demand is important. Furthermore, the aspect of sustainability refers to minimizing the environmental and climatic impacts which are caused by energy segment including everything from exploration to consumption. (Kormaz-Temel 2016, 28-29.)

The third aspect of the EU's energy security definition is affordability in other words competitive energy supplies. Korkmaz-Temel states that EU's seek for competitive prices which strongly implies preference for a liberal market, is only one side of the coin since a steady income and a fair return on capital are important matters for suppliers (Korkmaz-Temel 2016, 28-29). Energy prices, especially the pricing of natural gas imported by Russia has been an issue which has caused a lot of disputes especially in the first decade of the 21st century. According to a report of the Finnish institute of International Affairs, Russia has been using geo-economics as a means to divide the EU. Geo-economics involves economical and hidden means to affect another country. The gas cutbacks in 2006 and 2009 to Ukraine were part of Russia's geo-economic strategy. (Martikainen et al. 2006, 34-35.)

In this chapter I am using narrative analysis to analyse the European Energy Security Strategy which is a document released by the European Commission. In this study the Commission is perceived as narrator and the Energy Security Strategy as a story, a narrative. At the same time the document is involving different kind of narratives itself. The Commission can be considered as one of the main policymakers in the field of European energy policy and energy security. The Commission has been the main actor in the development towards a common European energy policy. It has been a significant actor in energy policies and it has been leading the drive for a more united EU in the domain of

energy. Furthermore, the Commission is a significant body in the decision making and legislation process since it has the monopoly of introducing legislative initiatives. Svein S. Andersen, Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter (2016) describe the role of the Commission in EU's energy policy really well.

Here the EU's approach is very much driven and shaped by the role of the Commission as the guardian and enforcer of the EU regulatory state. Indeed, the Commission emerges as a central actor in the EU's external energy governance, exerting leadership in shaping relations with key suppliers and their companies, and in addressing challenges related to transit countries and infrastructure. (Andersen et al. 2016, 52.)

This description by Andersen et al. of the role of the European Commission in energy security policy is clearly reflected in the Energy Security Strategy. The Strategy includes a lot of issues regarding infrastructure, relations with suppliers and companies as well as transit countries. Though the Energy Security Strategy can be seen to present the voice of the EU, it is strongly dominated and driven by the Commission.

The European Energy Strategy is a 24 for paged document which was released by the Commission on the 28th of May in 2014. The Strategy starts with a short introduction about the current situation as well as with introducing key facts and figures on EU energy security. The introduction of the document refers to the disruptions in gas supplies in 2006 and 2009 which effected strongly EU citizens in some eastern member states. The Strategy says that it was stark a wake-up call for the EU. The Strategy also stresses that a lot has been done since then to improve the energy supply security of the EU, especially the one of gas, as well as to reduce the number of member states, which are inclusively dependent on one supplier. At the same time, it is clearly highlighting that the actions already taken have not been enough and that EU's energy security is still fragile. (EC 28.5.2014, 2)

“Yet despite all the achievements in strengthening its infrastructure and diversifying its suppliers, the EU remains vulnerable to external energy shocks, as the figures below clearly show. The EU needs, therefore, a hard-headed strategy for energy security which promotes resilience to these shocks and disruptions to energy supplies in the short term and reduced dependency on particular fuels, energy suppliers and routes in the long-term. Policy makers at

national and EU level must make clear to citizens the choices reducing this dependency implies.” (EC 28.5.2014,2)

The Strategy emphasizes that EU’s energy security is vulnerable instead of steady and secure. After that it says that therefore, the EU needs a “hard-headed” strategy on energy security. In other words, the Strategy starts by justifying itself. This is done by first claiming that EU’s energy security is vulnerable and then proving that with a bunch of numbers. According to figures of the Strategy, 53 per cent of all energy consumed within the EU is imported. For crude oils the number is really high, 90 per cent and for gas it is 66 per cent from which 39 per cent is imported by Russia. According to the Strategy the most pressing issue of energy supply security is the strong dependence of a single external supplier which is especially the case in natural gas. Six EU countries are fully depended on Russia as their only external natural gas supplier and three of these countries use gas for more than a quarter of their energy consumption. Furthermore, the electricity network of Member State is fully dependent on a single operator. The EU energy import bill is one fifth from of total imports. Moreover, the global energy demand is going to increase by 27 per cent by 2030. (EC 28.5.2014, 2.)

The last sentence of the quote above could possibly be interpreted in many different ways. According to my interpretation it refers to the consequences of reducing the dependency of Russian gas. There could be a lot of different sort of consequences if the EU is strongly decreasing gas supplies from Russia and these have to be made clear for citizens. One main impact would be an increasing investment in different energy sources such as nuclear energy and renewable energy which improves the self-sufficiency of the EU. Nuclear energy is often considered a controversial topic but the Commission is in favour of nuclear energy mainly because it is helping to stop the declining trend of indigenous energy production within the EU (EC 28.5.2014, 12).

Politically and by geopolitical means the decrease of Russian gas import would affect the EU-Russia relations. Russia has a strong interest to export its gas to Europe since 71 per cent from its gas is exported to Europe (EC 28.5.2014). Also, Susanne Nies (2011) states that one of Russia’s major interest is maintaining the security on demand of natural gas in the coming decades in order to engage in investments. According to Nies, insecurity of demand from Russia’s perspective has increased because of EU’s climate policies as well as EU’s concerns regarding the security of supply. Moreover, other reasons for Russia’s decreased security of

demand are the financial crisis and certain changes in terms of trade like spot sales instead of long-term contracts, the increased use of LNG (liquefied natural gas) and the end of oil-gas price linkage. As EU is the main market for Russia, EU's actions in climate and energy policies effect Russia. (Nies 2011, 282.)

Nies' statement about Russia's increasing insecurity of demand is highly interesting. Firstly, it reflects the above mentioned two-sided nature of energy security. As Korkmaz-Temel (2016) implies, EU's definition of security of supplies is only one side of the coin. According to Korkmaz-Temel, the security dimension of the definition of energy security needs to also include demand depending security. (Korkmaz-Temel 2016, 28.) Secondly, it shows that EU's actions regarding the improvement of energy security have been at least to some extent efficient. Though the inefficiency and slowness of EU's actions have been criticised, the actions that have been taken have after all had an impact. Also, the Energy Security Strategy is mentioning that there have been achievements in strengthening the infrastructure as well diversifying suppliers (EC 28.5.2014, 2). Thirdly, Nies' statement also reflects the tie between climate and energy policies. EU's climate policies have had a negative impact on Russia's energy security which means that EU's climate actions like for instance reducing the consumption of fossil fuels and investing in energy efficiency as well as in renewable energy are actions which not only profit the climate but also support EU's energy security positively.

Fourthly, the situation can be perceived as a setting of EU's energy security versus Russia's energy security. If the EU is improving and strengthening its energy security it is affecting Russia's energy security negatively. In other words, it is a zero-sum game where Russia is losing while the EU is winning. This can also be understood through the concept of security paradox. According to Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008), a security paradox is a situation where two or more actors seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their words or actions an increase in mutual tension, resulting less security all around. A security paradox is a condition where a state, an actor or several states or actors follow policies to enhance their own security causing at the same insecurity and make other states feel less secure. (Booth & Wheeler 2008, 8-9.) The EU is increasing its energy security by policies which decline Russia's security of demand. Furthermore, the increasing development of the EU to diversify its energy supplier as well as other action in order to decrease the dependency of Russia might further create tension between the EU-Russia relations which have significantly worsen since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The

essential question is if the EU is actually improving security by its actions of strengthening its energy security or rather weakening the overall security situation of the European continent.

Nevertheless, that EU's interest has traditionally been to maintain good relations with Russia the objective of the EU during the new millennium and latest after the gas crisis of 2006 has been clearly to decrease the dependence on Russian gas. According to the Finnish institute of International Affairs, on the background of EU's will to form an Energy Union and its different objectives, is the common factor of reducing dependency from Russia. (Martikainen et al. 2016, 34). Also, Nies states that since Russia is using energy dependency as a tool for power politics, especially towards new member states and former Soviet states, the EU has declared the strengthening of interconnection as well as the diversification of energy sources of the concerned member states, to be a priority (Nies 2011, 282). Diversifying the external energy suppliers is one important part of EU's energy security and it is therefore also stressed in the Energy Security Strategy. The reinforcement of interconnection can be associated with the strengthening of solidarity which is in an important role in the Strategy.

The objective of increasing solidarity among the Member States is one major focus in the Strategy. The introduction part of the Strategy stresses the significance of solidarity among the member states. The lack of solidarity within the EU has been a major barrier and retardant in the development towards a common energy policy. According to Mehdi P. Amineh and Wina H.J. Crijns-Graus (2014), distrust among the member states about which interest should prevail has led to caution which has hindered the formulation and implementation of consistent strategies. Coherent strategies are needed in pursuit of the Commission's goals. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 816.)

However, too often energy security issues are addressed only at a national level without taking fully into account the interdependence of Member States. The key to improved energy security lies first in a more collective approach through a functioning internal market and greater cooperation at regional and European levels, in particular for coordinating network developments and opening up markets, and second, in a more coherent external action. (EC 28.5.2014, 3)

This quote clearly implies that the Commission is criticizing the member states for handling energy security issues only on a domestic level and in that way discriminating other member

states because member states are interconnected. In a broader picture this means the Commission implies that member states have not been solidary but rather ignoring towards the attempt of formulating a common energy security approach. The Strategy indicates quite clearly that a precondition for EU's strong energy security is a strong collective approach internally as well as coherent external action. That means there is a lack of coherency on the domestic EU level as well as on the external level. Amineh and Crijns-Graus (2014) state that it has been argued that the EU needs a coherent external energy policy if aiming to overcome the energy challenges facing. This kind of coherent policy would enable the EU to speak with one voice in its external relations and help it to play a more effective role on the international field in tackling global energy problems with its energy partners. (Amineh & Crijns-Graus 2014, 816.)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, energy security is multifaceted policy domain which includes complexity, polarization and uncertainty. The Strategy says that it is an integral part of the policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030 which was released by the Commission on the 22.1.2014 (EC 28.5.2014,3 & COM 2014 (15)). It also states that energy security goes hand in hand with a development towards a competitive, low-carbon economy which reduces the import of fossil fuels. Furthermore, the Strategy states to be fully in line and consistent with the competitiveness and industrial policy objectives. (EC 28.5.2014, 3). This reflects how manifold the sphere of energy politics is. It is strongly tied to economic as well as environmental policies. In fact, energy policies can be seen be defined through many other policy field such as economics, environment and security. The Energy Security Strategy ties itself to a broader context of EU's economic and environmental objectives. This means that for instance the objective of cutting Co2 emissions supports the objective of improving EU's energy security. Moreover, the Strategy also highlights its urgency. It stresses that it is important it is approved as soon possible so that the member states can start to prepare and implement long-term plans for competitive, sustainable and secure energy (EC 28.5.2014).

The Strategy defines eight pillars which are together fostering the cooperation between member states respecting national energy choices as well the principle of solidarity (EC 28.5.2014, 3).

It is based on eight key pillars that together promote closer cooperation beneficial for all Member States while respecting national energy choices, and are underpinned by the principle of solidarity. (EC 28.5.2014, 3).

In the same sentence the Strategy is emphasizing the close cooperation between the member states and the significance of solidarity while on the other hand approving national energy choices. This controversy reflects that the Energy Security Strategy is a document released by the Commission which is the outcome of a compromise between numerous parties including numerous stakeholders and the Member States. According to Roe's narrative policy analysis, policy narratives underwrite and stabilize assumptions for policymaking in situations that proceed with many unknowns, a high degree of interdependence and little agreement. (Roe 1994, 3-4). According to Corinne Squire et al. (2014), a counter-narrative has the feature of contestation. Counter-narratives are not clearly divided dichotomous categories but rather interwoven with one another. Stories are always in a relation with other stories. Even that counter-narratives can be seen as resistant, they often include acknowledges to the master-narrative and also borrow some components of the dominant storyline while rejecting others. (Squire et al. 2014, 32-34). The Energy Security Strategy is a conclusion which was preceded by many debates and advocacy. Since the document is an agreement, the Commission has to please the Member States and that is why the Strategy cannot only emphasize the significance of solidarity but has to simultaneously mention the freedom of Member States regarding energy choices.

Furthermore, these two different statements can also be seen as controversial narratives. Roe defines a counterstory as narrative which run counter to the dominant policy narrative.

One of the dominant policy narratives of the Energy Security Strategy is clearly the story of solidarity. Solidarity is seen as precondition and a basis for building up a coherent approach and a strong energy security strategy. The Commission is criticizing the Member States for addressing energy issues exclusively at a national level and is calling for greater solidarity and cooperation. At the same time though, the document states the importance of respecting the national energy decisions of each Member State. This can be seen as counter narrative which in way is very controversial to the dominant narrative of solidarity.

Since the Energy Security Strategy aims to formulate a more coherent European approach, speaking in the same sentence about greater solidarity and cooperation as well as the respect for national choices seems contradictory. Nevertheless, the EU needs to balance between

calling for a coherent EU level energy policy and respecting the national competences of the Member States. Marek Neuman states, the EU is not able to determine its Member States' energy mix, energy supplier, transport routes, or the signing of a bilateral energy treaty since the lack of competences (Neuman 2010, 345). According to Caroline Kuzemko (2014), though the efforts of politicizing energy at a EU level has been successful in terms of new institutions, such as DG Energy and the inclusion of energy in the Lisbon Treaty, it has at the same time strengthened notions on national energy sovereignty (Kuzemko 2014, 67).

The EU has no right to intervene in these policies of the Member States and therefore the call for solidarity is an important instrument for the EU in the attempt to build a coherent European Energy Policy. Kuzemko (2014) states that the EU has pursued over a long time the idea that speaking with one voice in foreign policy will allow the EU to be more strong and influential in energy policymaking (Kuzemko 2014, 62). The Energy Security Strategy is one more but strong attempt to not only form an internal coherent policy but also to show to external actors that the EU is one actor speaking with one voice.

4.1. The eight pillars

The eight pillars of the Energy Security Strategy are the following:

Immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU's capacity to overcome a major disruption during the winter 2014/2015; 2. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms including coordination of risk assessments and contingency plans; and protecting strategic infrastructure; 3. Moderating energy demand; 4. Building a well-functioning and fully integrated internal market; 5. Increasing energy production in the European Union; 6. Further developing energy technologies; 7. Diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure; 8. Improving coordination of national energy policies and speaking with one voice in external energy policy. (EC 28.5.2014, 3.)

I am analysing the different pillars of the Strategy regarding to gas. I am not studying each pillar in a specific order but my aim is to analyse the relevant narratives of energy security in terms of gas.

4.2. Immediate actions in the light of the winter 2014/2015

The first pillar of the Strategy is the immediate actions in the light of the winter 2014/2015 and it is overall focusing a lot of the possible threat of Russia causing a disruption to the gas supply to the EU.

In view of current events in Ukraine and the potential for disruption to energy supplies, short term action must focus on those countries that are dependent on one single gas supplier. (EC 28.5.2014, 4.)

The first pillar consists of immediate actions the Commission is calling for. The reason for the urgency of these immediate actions is clearly the worry of potential disruptions to energy supplies. While disruption in energy supplies could refer to any possible technical problem, *disruption to energy supplies* obviously refers to an external factor, a threat coming from outside causing a disruption that the Commission is worried about. This worry arises especially from the crisis in Ukraine which the quote is referring to. In 2014 May when the Strategy was released, the annexation of Crimea had happened only two months earlier and the situation was rather recent. Russia occupied a part of a sovereign state and acted against all international laws. Like every other party, also the EU condemned Russia's action strongly.

In this context EU's worry of its energy security and especially the security of Russian gas supplies, was necessarily amplified. EU's concern of Russian dependency has been risen during the whole 21st century and the EU have begun to see Russia a challenge towards its energy security. Nevertheless, the context in which this Strategy is written is clearly intensifying that position. Als Jakub M. Godzimirski (2016) states that the Russian intervention in Ukraine may change the rationales, logics and perceptions of energy cooperation between the EU and Russia. It can also change the attitude of different actors seeking either close energy ties with Russia or wanting to distance themselves further from Russia, also in terms in energy. Nevertheless, Godzimirski states that the intervention in Ukraine has caused political tensions raising the distrust between both parties to unprecedented levels. (Godzimirski 2016, 103.) According to Andrei V. Belyi (2015), the 2015 political crisis in the Ukraine has strengthened the conflictual pattern of the EU-Russia relations also in the field of energy (Belyi 2015, 134).

The immediate actions defined in the Strategy are: enhancing storage capacity, developing reverse flows, developing security of supply plans at regional levels and exploiting more the potential of LNG (liquefied natural gas). Specific key actions carried out by the Commission and the Member States are among others: intensification of cooperation with Gas Coordination Group, monitoring natural gas flows as well as the level of gas, updating of emergency plans, launching energy security stress tests, identify possible sources for additional short-term supply such as LNG, developing back-up mechanisms if necessary such increasing gas stocks, developing emergency infrastructures, reducing energy demand or switching quickly to alternative fuels within a short term. These actions are especially taken regarding the vulnerable areas. The Commission is implementing these actions in cooperation with member states, regulators, transmission system operators and operators in order to improve EU's immediate preparedness regarding possible disruptions. (EC 28.5.2014, 4.)

All these actions reflect a rather high level of concern on EU's side. They particularly imply the Commission's high concerns about the security and reliability of Russian gas supply. All the immediate actions mentioned in the Strategy refer to an increased concern about energy security on EU's side. Remarkably, this concern seems to exclusively be in respect to Russia. As mentioned above, the annexation of Crimea which was a fresh turn in the political scene effecting the security situation in Europe by the time the Strategy was formulated and released. This can be identified as an impacting factor intensifying EU's concerns and the overall, rather sharp, tone of the Energy Security Strategy, especially in the implications towards Russia.

4.3. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms and protecting strategic infrastructure

The second pillar of the Strategy includes the strengthening of the emergency and solidarity mechanisms and the protection of strategic infrastructure.

The EU has an overriding priority: to ensure that the best possible preparation and planning improve resilience to sudden disruptions in energy supplies, that strategic infrastructures are protected and that the most vulnerable Member States are collectively supported. (EC 28.5.2016, 4).

The second pillar seems to be quite similar to the first step of immediate actions in terms that both pillars are stressing the importance of preparing for potential sudden disruptions of energy supplies. The second pillar, like the first one is also emphasizing the special focus and actions regarding the vulnerable Member States. Like in the beginning of the Strategy, this pillar is as well stressing the strengthening of solidarity. To summarize, the second pillar includes a lot of same elements which have been already mentioned before in the Strategy. The four sections of the second pillar are oil stocks, the prevention and mitigation of gas supply risk, the protection of critical infrastructure and the solidarity mechanism among the Member States. (EC 28.5.2014, 5-6.)

What comes to oil stocks, the Strategy mentions that Member States should maintain minimum reserves of crude oil and petroleum in order to mitigate the risk of supply disruptions. Furthermore, the Strategy says that the guarantee that no disruptions will happen is important since it is a fundamental element to temper market prices in a case of crisis. Therefore, the EU should also promote further transparency of oil stocks and markets as well as cooperation especially with major newer consumer like China and India. (EC 28.5.2014, 5.) Mentioning the importance of oil stocks and oil prices reflects well the above mentioned third component of EU's definition of energy security, namely reasonable prices. Since almost 90 per cent of the oil consumed in the EU is imported (EC 28.5.2014,2,) it is one of the union's major interest to have control over the oil prices or at least to keep prices steady by limiting any uncertainty on the market which may raise the prices and lead to fluctuations.

Since the 2006 and 2009 gas supply crises, the EU has strengthened its coordination capabilities in order to prevent and mitigate possible gas supply disruptions. Investments in back-up infrastructure are now obligatory: by 3 December 2014 Member States must be able to meet peak demand even in the event of a disruption of the single largest infrastructure asset. In addition, reverse flows must function on all cross border interconnections between Member States. (EC 28.5.2014, 5.)

The gas section starts by referring to the gas supply crises of 2006 and 2009 which once again is a repetition since the gas crises were mentioned already in the introduction part of the Strategy. It reflects the huge significance and impact these events had on the EU. According to Alessia Biava (2010), the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes led to the situation where a lot of emphasis has been put on the EU to ensure solidarity among Member States

if disruptions to gas supplies happen. Biava states that the different level of Russian gas dependency between the Member States may cause a challenge to strong solidarity as well as bring out an inconsistent attitude towards a common EU energy policy. (Biava 2010, 18.) The disruptions to gas supply in 2006 and 2009 clearly declined the energy security on EU's side and this Strategy can be seen as one result of that. After mentioning the gas crises, the tone of the Strategy becomes rather strict. It doesn't leave much space for the earlier mentioned national energy choices but stresses the absolute need for obligatory actions. It also defines in a really definitive way that Member States must be able to respond to top energy demand even in a case of disruption and sets quite frankly a strict specific date by when this action has to be fulfilled. Furthermore, the allusion to a single largest infrastructure asset can be interpreted, especially in the light of the earlier reference of the gas crises, as an implication of Russia possibly cutting the gas supply to Europe. The gas section of the second pillar seems once again to focus on Russia and it is in way representing Russia as the most urgent threat towards the energy security of the EU. This can be seen as dominating narrative is this pillar.

Furthermore, the section of preventing and mitigating gas supply disruption risks also stresses the solidarity among Member States which seems to be the second master narrative mentioned dominating the Strategy. The Strategy refers to the gas coordination group which includes Member States, regulators and stakeholders. It says that cooperation and rules in this platform provide a European framework that creates trust and ensures solidarity guaranteeing that Member States enhance common security of supply. (EC 28.5.2016, 5.)

Furthermore, also the part of protection of critical infrastructure refers to the threat of Russia.

However, the recent experience of certain non-EU operators seeking to avoid compliance with EU legislation on EU territory might require a stricter application and a possible reinforcement of the applicable rules at EU and Member State level. In this context, the respect of EU internal market rules, notably as regards public procurement, also needs to be guaranteed. (EC 28.5.2014, 6.)

This quote is in a rather frank way implying that Russia's state-operated gas company Gazprom is not obeying the EU legislation. Also, Frank Umbach (2010) states that Vladimir Putin's policy is using Russia's gas reservoirs and pipeline monopolies as a forceful political instrument of enforcing itself economic and political power and accomplishing its

geopolitical and economic interests (Umbach 2010, 1239). According to Lucas (2009), deals with Gazprom raise a question about Europe's own rules. Since Kremlin does not allow any competition in its core business at home, why should it respect the laws of the European market. According to Lucas, Russia is more likely trying to change them. Gazprom does not like any kind of EU scrutiny of its activities which has showed for instance in 2006 when EU's leaders asked EU's competition directorate to investigate Gazprom's growing role in the EU. As a respond Putin complained sharply. Lucas states that the EU is considering new rules that would prevent Russia and other state-backed buyers to take full control over downstream energy assets such as distribution networks. (Lucas 2009, 214.) The quote can be understood to imply that the legislation for external operators should be made stricter. In other words, it can be seen referring to the kind of new rules Lucas mentions. At the same time, it is emphasizing that rules for EU companies on the internal market will not change but rather that the EU legislation will be expanded to apply also to third party actors by saying that EU internal rules need to be guaranteed. This is in turn establishing the fact that the stricter rules the document is referring to are planned to concern external operators, like Gazprom.

The section about solidarity mechanism is quite short and repeats a lot what was said already in the first pillar. It stresses the solidarity to be a hallmark of the EU that requires practical assistance for the most vulnerable Member States to severe energy supply disruptions. Furthermore, it emphasizes the significance of regularly reviewed contingency planning based on stress tests and discussions with national authorities and industry. Finally, it refers again to the annexation of Crimea and says that in this light immediate focus should be on the Member States on the Eastern border of the EU. (EC 28.5.2014, 6.)

4.4. Mutual dependency and market liberalization

The reduction of energy consumption in other words the moderation of energy demand is one of the most essential part of EU's energy policy and necessarily is also affecting Europe's energy security. An essential objective of the Commission has been already for a long time the reduction of energy consumption as part of EU's climate and energy policies. The improvement of energy efficiency is for example one of the five policy areas of EU's Energy Union package which was released by the Commission in 2015 (European

Commission, 2017.) In this light, it is very natural that this objective forms one of the pillars of the Energy Security Strategy.

“Energy demand in the building sector, responsible for about 40% of energy consumption in the EU and a third of natural gas use could be cut by up to three quarters if the renovation of buildings is speeded up. Improvements in district heating and cooling can also make an important contribution. Likewise, industry consumes around one quarter of gas used in the EU and there is significant potential for energy efficiency gains driven by a strengthened Emissions Trading System as proposed by the Commission as part of the 2030 climate and energy framework.” (EC 28.5.2014, 7).

What is quite notably though is the fact that the Strategy reasons the moderating of energy demand again through gas. The Strategy does not only identify the sectors which use a lot of energy but specifies particularly the consumption of gas of these sectors. According to the Strategy, both the construction sector as well as industry are the major energy consumers that are also responsible for a huge share of EU’s gas consumption. The Strategy stresses the significance of the improvement of energy efficiency on the construction sector as well as in the industry since it could reduce energy consumption. That would in turn contribute positively to EU’s overall objective of decreasing the import of Russian gas and broader the decency of Russia.

The fourth pillar about creating a fully integrated internal market emphasizes that decisions made by Member States need to be discussed on the EU level in order to prevent that national decisions of governments do not undermine the energy security of supply of another Member State. On that point Nord Stream 2, analysed in the next chapter, is a good example of a bilateral project between Germany and Russia which might hamper the energy security of the whole union and which currently tried to be stopped by the European Commission. It is clearly stated in the Strategy that an internal energy market is a key factor to achieve energy security and the mechanism to do that in a cost-efficient way. (EC 28.05 2014, 8) The liberal market is another dominant narrative in the strategy. The EU’s aim of market liberalization in energy has already been going on for around 20 years. According to Caroline Kuzemko, the market liberal ideas of the EU have not only shaped its own energy policymaking but they have affected the way how Russia’s actions in energy governance have been perceived. Russia’s actions are wrong from the liberal market perspective. (Kuzemko 2014, 61.)

When it comes to building an internal market for gas, a key factor are close interconnectors. As mentioned before, there are some structural and economic specificities of natural gas which are important to mention. The transport section is the core issue. Natural gas is difficult to store and expensive to transport when it comes to pipelines. The gas sector is totally dependent on infrastructure, either pipelines or LNG. (Belyi 2015,41, 49.) That is why a well-functioning and reliable infrastructure system is a core precondition for an integrated gas market which again is a crucial for ensuring energy security.

While the Strategy emphasizes the need for a competitive and liquid gas market it also calls for several construction projects of key interconnectors. According to the Strategy, there are 27 infrastructure projects related to gas that a critical for EU's energy security and their implementation is expected to foster the diversification of supply and solidarity in the most delicate parts of the union. (EC 28.05.2014, 8-10.) This pillar basically very much highlights the importance and role of an interconnected and integrated gas pipeline system within the Member States. It seems reasonable that in order to build a coherent Energy Union, there has to be a functioning internal pipeline network to ensure that the delivery of gas is flexible and comprehensive for every Member State. According to Belyi, pipeline systems are more reliable if they are connected to underground gas storages. Underground gas storages are natural wells from which gas can be withdrawn and stored. These underground wells are very important when it comes to the use of gas a balancing power. (Belyi 2015, 43.)

The main disputes in EU-Russia gas relations are often related to transit, as it was in 2006 and 2009 gas conflicts, which reflects the significant role of the transport sector in gas. According to Belyi (2015), the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) signed by 49 countries in 1994, was an instrument established to govern energy relations globally, not only between the EU and Russia as it is often claimed. Nevertheless, the controversies between EU and Russia often are related to transit governance, specifically around the Transit Protocol with is included in the ECT. The main issue was related to the negotiations about the Transit Protocol in the early 2000s. Russia wanted to get a right of first refusal which means that as a long-term supplier Russia would have the priority to conclude a transit agreement. (Belyi 2015, 129.)

The second issue was related to the development of EU's internal market. In 2003, after the adoption of the second Energy Directives, the EU declared itself as a Regional Economic Integration Organization and claimed that since it has an internal market the Transit Protocol

does not apply within the union. According to Belyi, these disputes demonstrate how differently the EU and Russia interpret the norms of energy governance. Russia wants to secure long-term supply chain and avoid competition whereas the EU wants to facilitate flexibility and new competition in the former Soviet Union area. (Belyi 2015,129-130.)

Indeed, as mentioned before, the EU and Russia have different kind of objectives in their energy politics. Like Jakub M. Godzimirski (2016) states, the EU and Russia belong to different categories of energy actors. Russia is a major energy producer and exporter while the EU is a major consumer and importer of energy. (Godzimirski 2016,92.) It is important to understand also the objectives of Russia in the context of transportation. Since the high costs of building long-distant infrastructure, the Russian interest is to have long-term contracts. According to Belyi, consumers on the other hand agree to long-term contracts only when the price of gas is more competitive than that of oil (Belyi 2015, 45-46).

Andrej Krikovick (2015) defines the EU-Russian energy relationship as a symmetrical interdependence which means that both sides are heavily dependent on each other. The EU is dependent on Russia for its energy needs and for Russia the energy trade with the EU is its most important foreign economic relationship when it comes to crude oil and natural gas. Nevertheless, unlike many scholars have expected, the mutual interdependence between the EU and Russia has not lessen the mistrust and conflicts between them. (Krikovic 2015, 9.) According to Godzimirski (2016), also, some authors have stated that such a strong economic should work as an incentive for good and smooth cooperation reducing the possibility of conflicts. (Godzimirski 2016,92.)

Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins (2003) state that there seem not to be reached any consensus in the field of studies related to economic interdependence and political discord, whether interdependence hinder and prevent conflicts or if it rather actually does not have any deterrent effect on war and even stimulates hostility (Mansfield & Pollins 2003, 4). According to Busygina and Filippov (2014), the energy trade with the EU is crucial important to Russia which means that harming these relations would cost Russia a lot. Nevertheless, as Irina Busygina and Mihail Filippov (2014) state, this interdependency has not stopped Russia from behaving in a confrontational way but rather created incentives to use geopolitical goals and domestic politics to create disputes with the EU but also the USA and post-Soviet states. According to the authors, Kremlin profits from the game where conflicts with the EU and other trade partners helps it to legitimize its authority power

whereas at the same time the close interdependency allows Russia to sell its natural gas with high prices to the West. (Busygina & Filippov 2014, 21.)

Russian energy commodities not only generate revenues for the state: they are also treated as an important policy instrument enabling Russia to cast long strategic shadows in its direct and indirect neighbourhood. (Godzimirski 2016, 93.)

The Energy Security Strategy's narrative about creating a liberal and liquid internal market can be seen as quite controversial to Russia's interests. According to Krikovic (2015), the EU's aim to diversify its supply routes as well as the measures to liberalize the European energy market prejudices Russia's state-owned energy companies. From the Russian perspective this is seen as Europe's intention to weaken Russia and to set the natural resources under Western control. Krikovic claims that Russia has answered this measures by fighting hard to ensure control over pipeline and energy supplies in the post-Soviet area. This again has risen the European worry about energy security and anxieties of gas dependency on Russia and as well as raised doubts about Russia's true intentions. (Krikovic 2015,9.) Also, Belyi writes about the project of the Europeanization of energy policies including externalization of EU's domestic energy policies as well as the attempt to diversify energy supply sources which have impacted the Russia-EU energy relations in a negative way. Belyi is especially criticizing the strong securitization of natural gas markets, which according to him has formed negative interdependence. (Belyi 2015, 104.)

From the Russian perspective EU's liberal and institutional approach on energy policies are surely seen as an offensive. It is still impossible to find an independent and objective view about the EU-Russia gas relations given the complexity of the situation on the natural gas market. Instead it is the choice of each scholar and author to choose the theoretical framework and perspective through which they are analysing the complex EU-Russia energy relations. As Godzimirski (2016) states, both Russia and the EU have adopted their own strategic approaches to energy. Whereas Russia has been using energy trade as a tool of power politics, the EU has been carrying out a strongly market oriented strategy where it has required from internal as well as external suppliers to play by the market rules of the EU. (Godzimirski 2016, 92.)

It seems very much like that the different understanding about economic ideas has been a major contributor to the trouble in the EU-Russia energy relations. According to Caroline

Kuzemko, the EU has seen market liberalization and a strong internal market as the key to ensure security of supply, affordable energy and strengthen economic competitiveness, already in 1986. It is notable that there was no separate energy directorate in the EU until 2010 but energy policymaking was included within a broad, non-specific ideology and movement of market liberalization. (Kuzemko 2010, 61.) In fact, energy was involved in the EU law only in 2009 with the Lisbon Treaty under the article 194. (EUR-lex 2012.)

1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to:

- (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;
- (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;
- (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and
- (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks.

(EUR-lex 2012, Lisbon Treaty, article 194, first paragraph)

The article 194 on energy involves the exact same objectives than are involved in the Energy Security Strategy in the eight pillars. As Umbach (2010) states, the EU is balancing between three parameters; security of supply, competitiveness and environmental sustainability (Umbach 2010, 1234). These objectives can be seen repeated when reading EU's outlines on energy policy. Nevertheless, the Energy Security Strategy aims to foster energy security in fact through these other objectives such as energy efficiency, developing of renewable energy sources as well as development of interconnected transit routes and the internal market. Energy security is not only closely linked to all the other energy policy objectives but it is actually reinforced and operated through them.

The EU has been clearly working since decades towards a competitive, integrated and liberal market. It can be said that the process of establishing an integrated energy market has taken only slow steps forward. Progress have been achieved but still the way to a one coherent European Energy Policy is long. Here one of the major obstacles, according to Marek Neuman, is that the EU Member States' dependency on Russian natural gas varies a lot and the old Member States have a highly interconnected grid whereas the new and former Soviet Union states have technologically retarded pipelines originated in Russia (Neuman 2010, 345).

The European Union's prosperity and security hinges on a stable and abundant supply of energy. --- Tackling energy security in a fast-changing environment will require flexibility, capacity to adapt and change. Hence, this strategy may need to evolve due to changing circumstances. (EC, 28.05.2014, 2-3.)

It seems that energy security has become a more and more of a significant matter to the EU and the concern of security in the field of energy has started to dominate the energy policymaking. Even though the high level of interdependency between the EU and Russia, EU is not seeing its relation to Russia as a cooperation in trade but rather as a relation characterised by concern and mistrust. According to Marek Neuman (2010), the EU is perceiving Russia as “other”, as an objective of EU’s strategy rather than a partner in a cooperative framework. Neuman states that this is result of the EU’s enlargement towards the former Soviet Union countries and the Soviet Union satellite states which was a blow to the EU-Russia energy relations. (Neuman 2010, 342.)

The Energy Security Strategy showcases that EU’s energy security in the EU-Russia energy relationship seems to have become an overwhelming matter which is not tackled anymore by the market only but which requires a more broad and targeted plan with all the actions listed in the Strategy. Energy security and the narrative of liberal market can be seen as counter narratives. In fact, the EU’s aim of securing energy security by ensuring market liberalisation and diversification of supply and by trying to export market liberalisation to the Russian energy market, has not only raised energy security over the liberal market paradigm made but also made the EU a geopolitical player in the field of energy. Furthermore, the EU’s securitization of natural gas has affected the EU-Russia gas relations and can be seen as one contributing factor to the increased tensions. As mentioned above, the different conceptions of market liberal ideologies between the EU and Russia is one reason behind this. According to Belyi (2015), the expansion of the EU model to Eastern Europe has led to a situation in which European concepts and practises clashed with Gazprom’s schemes (Belyi 2015,133).

The EU as a liberal market actor in energy has gained a new dimension of a geopolitical actor. It is somewhat ironic that the EU has started to use the same means against Russia than it has identified as threat on the side of Russia’s behaviour. With the securitization of natural gas in relation to Russia, geopolitics has risen in the approach and actions of the EU. According to Belyi (2015), some scholars have even raised the argument that one should

forget the markets. Belyi states that the market in terms of gas has been challenged by growing interventions. (Belyi 2015, 153).

Also, according to Kuzemko (2014), the energy security is reconceptualised and the EU's original idea about the liberal markets ensuring energy security has changed into a more interventionist approach. According to Kuzemko, there have been only two alternative frameworks of ideas, geopolitics and climate change, which have been challenging the dominance of the liberal market idea. (Cuzemko 2014, 64- 64.) According to Umbach (2010), the interlinkage between the globally generated concept of energy security relying on the liberal market and economic factors and domestic as well as regional political stability requires new thinking both in energy security as well as in foreign and security policies. (Umbach 2010, 1239).

The fifth and sixth pillar of the Energy Security Strategy deal with increasing the energy production within the EU as well as developing of new technologies. These two things go closely together since the increase of domestic energy production has two advances for the EU; firstly it fosters the self-sufficiency of the union and secondly it increases the amount of renewable energy since the increase of energy production within the EU comes from renewable energy sources. The narrative of renewable energy is of course linked to the EU's target of reducing Co2 emissions to mitigate climate change. Nevertheless, in the Energy Security Strategy renewable energy is linked to the potential of the decrease of imported natural gas.

“There is a significant cost-effective potential for renewable electricity and renewable heating to further reduce natural gas use in a number of sectors by the end of this decade. Notably, a fuel-switch to indigenous renewable heating sources can displace significant amounts of imported fuels.” (EC 28.05.2014, 12.)

Furthermore, the Strategy states that the objective of reducing energy dependence requires significant changes in the energy system which demands a strong push for development of new technologies (EC 28.05.2014, 14). The development of new technologies promotes energy efficiency and renewable energy sources and contributes in that way also positively to energy security. The transition to a low carbon economy is a top priority of the EU and it seems to go well hand-in hand with energy security.

The seventh pillar of the Strategy discusses the diversifying of the external supplies and infrastructure of gas and uranium. The core of this pillar is the EU's major goal of becoming less dependent on Russian natural gas and developing partnerships with other partners. The Strategy talks about the Caspian region and the Southern Corridor and Norway. It also highlights the role of LNG as potential resource of diversification (EC 28.05.2014, 15-16). The EU' aim of diversifying gas sources can be really clearly be seen contributing to the EU's goal of reducing its dependence on Russia.

The eighth pillar consists of EU's goal to speak with one voice and improving the coordination of national energy policies. This last pillar repeats much of the goals mentioned before. It highlights the need for a mechanism that would enable Member States to inform each other on important decisions related to their energy mix before their adaption (EC 28.05.2014, 17). This is again a call for solidarity to the Member States since they have the full right to independently decide on their energy mix.

The European Union has a general interest in stable, transparent, rule based and liquid international energy markets. The EU should develop consistent and coordinated messages in international organisations and fora. (EC 28.05.2014, 17.)

The last pillar also includes a clear reference that the EU has a will to become a stronger actor in the international sphere of energy. International organisations are an important field of action for the EU. According to Asle Toje (2011) small powers are active in international organisations. A small power aims to minimize its cost of conducting foreign policy and in order to influential in its policies, it engages strongly in international organisations. (Toje 2011, 48.) Speaking with one voice and presenting a coherent approach in international organisations is important for the EU since it makes the union a credible and more significant player in the international scene. The EU operates for instance in IEA (International Energy Agency).

4.5. The security dilemma

Gas is very clearly to be one main focus of this Energy Security Strategy. References to gas are repeated over the whole Strategy in all pillars. This reflects the high level of concern of particularly the Commission but also wider of the EU. The strong concerns regarding energy

security seem to be distinctly mainly in relation to Russia. Russian gas, the worry about possible gas disruption caused by Russia and the overall high dependency of Russian gas and its huge influence on the EU, can be defined as one master-narrative of this Strategy which could be summarized as the narrative of Russia as a threat. The EU, by the voice of the Commission, is quite clearly identifying and defining Russia as a threat in this Strategy. This is indicated by the numerous refers to Russia and its gas. These refers seem to be reproduced during the whole Strategy and they appear in every of the eight pillars the Strategy consist of.

This master-narrative can also be represented through the concept of security dilemma. According to Booth and Wheeler, a security dilemma is a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states or other actors. Both of the levels consist of two related dilemmas or propositions which force decision-makers to choose between them. On the first level there is a dilemma of interpretation about the motives intentions and capabilities of the other party. The dilemma of interpretation is the predicament facing decision-makers on the first level. Decision-makers are confronted with matters affecting the security and must often choose between two significant and undesirable alternatives. According to Booth and Wheeler, the dilemma of interpretation is the result of the need to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives, intentions and capabilities of the other party. The decision-makers have to decide whether the perceived military developments are purposes to enhance the security in an uncertain world or whether they are for offensive purposes in other words to seek the change of status quo for their advantage. (Booth & Wheeler 2008, 4.)

The second level of the security dilemma is the dilemma of response which only begins when the dilemma of interpretation is settled. The dilemma of response means that decision-makers have to decide how to act. The choice is often to be made between whether to signal by words and deeds that they will react in a militarily confrontational way for deterrent purposes or whether to signal reassurance. (Booth & Wheeler 2008, 4.) The security dilemma is not realized as such in the field of energy because it does not include military actions or developments. It can though be adopted to the field of energy security because it is a matter of security which involves on one hand the EU as an entity, an actor and on the other Russia as a state. Furthermore, the EU-Russia energy relations are unstable and fragile involving a lot of uncertainty of the actions of the other part.

In the case of this Strategy and in the context of the master-narrative of Russia as a threat, it can be clearly seen that the first level of the security dilemma, the dilemma of interpretation is settled. EU perceives Russia as a threat towards its energy security. The Energy Security Strategy reflects that EU has made the interpretation that the purpose of Russia's actions is to harm and threaten EU's energy security. As mentioned earlier, this threat is not a military confrontation but instead Russia is using geo-economical means to practice its power in order to divide the EU and at the same time to strengthen its geopolitical position as well as political and economic interest. According to Lucas (2009), Kremlin's aims in the politics of energy are no secret since they are outlined in Russia's energy strategy which puts energy policy as the centre of Russian diplomacy. Lucas states, that the aim of Russia's natural resource industry is to boost the geopolitical strength of Russia. According to Lucas, this means in practice four things. Firstly, Kremlin aims to prevent European countries of diversifying their sources of energy supply, particularly gas. Secondly, Russia wants to strengthen its hold over the international gas market. Thirdly, Russia wants to acquire distribution and storage capability in Europe. Finally, Russia want to use these assets to exert political pressure. (Lucas 2009, 211.)

Nevertheless, here it should be noted that there is no objective party who has the absolute knowledge and information of the intentions, motives and capabilities of Russia. Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind that the narrative of Russia as a threat is only one side of the coin, in other words it is only EU's perspective of the situation, it is the way how EU has perceived and interpreted Russia's signals. The word *interpretation* itself refers to the fact that it is an understanding, a construction of a situation from one party. According to Krikovic (2016), most studies about EU-Russia energy relations are not noticing how threatening Europe's moves on diversifying its energy sources and suppliers as well as bringing down gas prices by market liberalization is for Russia (Krikovic 2016, 10).

Since the first level of the security dilemma is settled there is the second level of the dilemma of response. The EU has to decide how to respond towards the threat it is faced with. The EU has identified Russia as a threat. This situation can also be represented and clarified through the concept of a strategic challenge. According to Booth and Wheeler (2008), a strategic challenge is a situation where the dilemma of interpretation is settled. A strategic challenge occurs when the other identifies the other party as a real threat. There is no longer a dilemma of interpretation about what the other state is planning to do. Instead the challenge now is: what is to be done? (Booth & Wheeler 2008, 9.) The EU has identified Russia as a

threat which means that the dilemma of interpretation is settled. Now the strategic challenge for the EU nevertheless is the question of how to react and what kind of action to take concerning the threat. This comes back to the earlier mentioned situation of a security paradox which is related to the question how should the EU act in order to act rational in a way which does not weaken the overall security situation in Europe.

Krikovic (2016) defines the EU-Russia energy relationship as symmetrical interdependence while the EU is heavily dependent on Russian energy and the energy trade with the EU is in turn crucial to Russia (Krikovic 2016, 9). The EU has nevertheless, started to fear its strong dependence on Russia and therefore has set and implemented different measures outlined in the Energy Security Strategy in order to reduce its dependency on Russia. According to Krikovic (2016), the EU-Russia energy relationship has started to become a security dilemma where both sides have taken steps to decrease dependence and this threatens the balance of dependency. The EU cannot reduce its dependence on Russia without increasing Russia's dependence on the EU and at the same time threatening Russia's security and independence. (Krikovic 2016,7.)

This security dilemma is closely related to the two-sided nature of energy security. Energy security consists of security of supply and security of demand which reflects the fact that energy "takes place" in society and demands social interaction between states. According to Korkmaz-Temel security of supply and demand underpins the establishment of energy related to international organisation such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Korkmaz-Temel 2016, 39).

Russia has to some extent perceived EU's measures to decrease its dependency on Russian natural gas as a threat. According to Krikovic, Russia has fought hard against EU's gas market liberalization and has tried to secure its control over pipelines and energy supplies in the former Soviet Union space. Russia has also tried to lessen its dependence on the EU market by diversifying supplies to Asia. These moves in turn has raised EU's worries on Russia's reliability. (Krikovic 2016, 9.) This security dilemma seems to be a stalemate where neither of the sides can move without increasing the tension and decreasing the mutual security.

The Comission's Energy Security Strategy shows that the EU has decided to take rather strict actions in purpose to diminish Russian impact on EU's energy market as well as decrease EU's dependency on Russia. It can be stated that EU has identified Russia's actions in the

gas sector as harmful and threatening since all the eight pillars of the Strategy and the actions determined in these pillars focus to respond to the pursuits of Russia. Russia is using energy, especially natural gas as well as crude oil, to achieve its own foreign and security policy goals as well as strengthening its economic and political position as a global player. Kormaz-Temel states that Russia's external energy policy is restricting the EU's effort to speak with one voice in energy matters (Korkmaz-Temel 2016, 48) i.e. as an entity, as the Energy Union with an integrated energy market. Russia has the power to securitise and de-securitise and this is considered in the energy security society demonstrating that Russia is a great power in the European context (Kormaz-Temel 2016, 48).

These actions listed in the Strategy are likely to strengthen EU's energy security but the question is how they affect the relations between EU and Russia as well as Europe's overall security situation. The risk of further weakening the mutual relations in the context where the EU-Russia relations are already worse since a long time, especially due to the annexation of Crimea, is quite likely. It is really logical that EU acts in order to improve its energy security since it is confronted by Russia. In turn, this could nevertheless cause a situation where the overall security is weakened. Booth and Wheeler (2008) state that when leaders resolve the dilemma of response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, it creates a security paradox.

5. The battle continues - EU's attempt to stop Nord Stream 2

Despite Commission's strict policy in the Energy Security Strategy, the EU still does not seem to have achieved a coherent and consequent external approach towards energy security when looking at Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream 2 is an extension of the first Nord Stream pipeline project, a twin pipeline which is planned to be built through the Baltic Sea transporting natural gas from Russia to the EU, while the main beneficiary is Germany. According to Belyi (2016), the first Nord Stream pipeline represents a point of departure, where the politicization of EU-Russia gas relations deepened and a new chapter of energy geopolitics and security perception begun. A contributing factor to this was especially Poland's and the Baltic States' increasing tensions with Russia, as it was considering gas transit. (Belyi 2016, 97.) Now, the Nord Stream 2 can be seen as a further extension of Europe's perception of Russian gas as geopolitical and security issue.

A press release of the European Parliament from 10.5.2016 says that the majority of the MEPs are highly concerned about the project, since it goes against the objectives of the Energy Union and harms solidarity among Member States. According to the press release, most of the MEPs requested the Commission to put an end to the project as soon as possible. (European Parliament 10.5.2016.) Nord Stream 2 has received a lot of critique, which is reasonable, since it can be seen as being at odds with all the objectives and actions of the EU to improve its energy security. The European Commission's Vice-President for Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič said in a press release of the Commission 9.6.2017 that the planned pipeline Nord Stream 2 is controversial to the objective of the Energy Union and the Energy Security Strategy.

“Creating a well-diversified and competitive gas market is a priority of the EU's energy security and Energy Union strategy. As we have stated already several times, Nord Stream 2 does not contribute to the Energy Union's objectives. If the pipeline is nevertheless built, the least we have to do is to make sure that it will be operated in a transparent manner and in line with the main EU energy market rules.”(European Commission, 9.6.2017.)

The planned Nord Stream 2 is an offshore pipeline including two lines, and the project is led by the Russian state-owned company Gazprom. There are also five European investors involved in the project, including Dutch Shell, German Uniper and Wintershall, French

Engie and Austrian OMV. (Nord Stream 2, 2018). Nevertheless, Gazprom is the sole shareholder of the project. The gas of the Nord Stream 2 twin pipelines would flow to the integrated European gas network and onwards to the investors and other buyers. The project has faced furious and strong opposition by many Member States, such as the Baltic States, Poland and Sweden, along with EU's external partners. The United States has clearly expressed its worry about Nord Stream 2 being a threat to EU's energy security. The then US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said in January 2018 that Nord Stream 2 will weaken Europe's energy security and overall stability and gives Russia another political tool. (Euractiv 29.01.2018).

The sanctions against Russia, which have been set by Europe and the US because of Russia's involvement in the annexation of Crimea, have also been a potential tool for the US to make use of to stop Nord Stream 2. According to Belyi (2015), the sanctions show the weaponization of energy interdependence between the EU and Russia (Belyi 2015, 156). In the summer of 2017 the US Congress introduced some new law changes related to Russia sanctions, and since then there has been an ongoing debate about the US potentially applying sanctions also to Nord Stream 2, which would not only apply to Gazprom but also to the European companies involved in the project (EU Observer, 20.03.2018). Here I will not elaborate more deeply on the reasons why the US is opposing Nord Stream 2. Nevertheless, the US is a superpower and a geopolitical player like Russia with its own interests. One big interest of the US is doubtless the promotion of its LNG export to the EU. According to Belyi (2016), shale gas started to expand in the US markets significantly which has made the US a noteworthy gas exporter. Shale gas exports have had a crisp effect on the European and international gas markets since the supply and demand of LNG increased during the first decade in the new millennium. (Belyi 2016, 52-53.)

The EU has been internally very much divided concerning Nord Stream 2, and the whole project has become highly political and geopolitical. The Commission has been against the Gazprom led project, whereas the European Council representing the Member States has supported the planned twin pipeline. The background of this tensioned situation is the conflict regarding the nature of EU's energy policy. According to several authors, the Commission is internally a strong actor in the energy sector with strong policy tools at its disposal for calling Member States for more collective action and solidarity. On the other hand, it is a weak external actor, since it suffers constantly from the lack of competence, and it does not have a strong mandate in the heterogenous EU, where Member States have

different interests and there are no coherent policy goals. (Kuzemko & Hadfield 2016, 30, Andersen et al. 2016, 52-53.) According to Kuzemko & Hadfield there has broken out a turf war between the Commission, the Council and the key Member States which has caused a power gap which appears in a deeper “EU them” versus “Member States us” situation. In addition, this is not only tearing the EU apart internally but also could lead to a deeper foreign policy terrain where the confrontation appears as “EU us” versus any number of external actor. (Kuzemko & Hadfield 2016, 30.)

In the case of Nord Stream 2, the Commission’s position as a strong actor on one hand and its lack of competences on the other hand have formed a situation where there is a polarised conflict between the Commission and the Council. It seems that the current state of affairs can be described as the Commission being “the EU them” and the Council representing the Member States “us”. On the other hand, at the same time the Council is internally fragmented and divided since some Member States oppose the Nord Stream 2 strongly, while other are in favour. The Commission has had a negative attitude towards Nord Stream 2. In the above-mentioned press release from summer 2017, the Commission reported that it tries to receive a mandate from the Member States to negotiate with Russia about Nord Stream 2.

The Commission has been especially worried about tariff-setting, transparency in pipeline operation, third party access and the question of separation between supply and transmission (European Commission 9.6. 2017). The most important issue for the Commission has been the prevention of vertical integration in gas transport, i.e. separation of ownership in the value chain of gas, also called unbundling. This means that the EU has implemented legislation (gas directives), which aims to prevent the same operator or owner from owning the production, transportation and distribution of gas. According to Belyi (2016), ownership unbundling is the highest form of unbundling and the EU’s preferred form of liberalization (Belyi 2016, 61).

Through unbundling, the EU tries to advance its goal of a liberal integrated energy market with prominent levels of liquidity and competition. Nevertheless, in case of Nord Stream 2, energy security seems to have run over the market. The Commission’s attempt to get the Council’s permission to negotiate the above-mentioned terms with Russia did not happen. This was followed by the Commission’s amendment to the gas directive of 2009. On the 8th of November 2017 the Commission released its proposal for a directive amending the gas

directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (EC 8.11.2017).

With the proposed amendments, the Gas Directive in its entirety (as well as the related legal acts like the Gas Regulation, network codes and guidelines, unless otherwise provided in those acts) will become applicable to pipelines to and from third countries, including existing and future pipelines, up to the border of EU jurisdiction. This includes the respective provisions on third-party access, tariff regulation, ownership unbundling and transparency. (European Commission 8.11.2017, 2.)

The amendment to the gas directive aims to prevent vertical integration by extending the EU market rules to gas pipelines coming from third countries i.e. outside the EU. In the case of Nord Stream 2, Gazprom is the only shareholder, despite the five European companies that have invested in the project. The EU perceives this as a substantial security risk and tries therefore to apply the EU energy market rules to Gazprom. According to Andersen et al. (2016), the EU has sought to rely on anti-trust laws in order to foster competition on the energy sector and prevent dominance of individual companies instead of fostering European champions in energy (Andersen et al 2016, 54). According to Francis McGowan, the EU has used unbundling as a method to ensure a fully competitive internal gas market already in 2007 when it first proposed to increase the degree of separation between companies importing or producing and on the other transmitting, distributing and supplying. This already then controversial measures, gained the name “Gazprom clause”. (Mcgowan 2008, 101.)

The creation of an integrated gas market is a cornerstone of the EU's project to create an Energy Union. ---A functioning gas market is a prerequisite for enhancing security of gas supply in the Union. --- The EU is to large extent dependent on gas imports from third countries and it is in the best interest of the EU and gas customers to have as much transparency and competitiveness also on pipelines from those countries. (European Commission 8.11.2017, 2.)

Again, in the reasoning of the Directive, the same narratives can be found as in the Energy Security Strategy as well as in the plenary debate of the Parliament. The integrated internal and functioning gas market is the long-term objective of the EU which can be viewed as the most essential precondition for energy security. It is possible to argue that this amendment

to the gas directive is the latest desperate attempt of the Commission to prevent the building of Nord Stream 2 twin-pipeline. It is desperate at this point, because it is most likely not going to be accepted by the Council, since the Council's legal service has already rejected it. The opinion of the Council Legal Service is that, among other things, the proposal of the Commission is legally problematic regarding a shift of competences from the Member States to the Commission. Furthermore, the statement questions the proportionality of the proposal since under the principle of proportionality the directive should not exceed what is necessary to achieve the intended purpose i.e. energy security. (Council of the European Union, 26.3.2018).

It is difficult to tell what the different processes and reasons behind the Council Legal Service's statement are. Apart from the legal side of the amending directive, there is a strong political power struggle going on not only between the Commission and the Council but also within the Member States in the Council. Germany has played a major role in Nord Stream 2 being strongly in favour of the project and seeing it as an economic project, while other Member States like Poland have been opposing the pipeline relying on the argument that the twin pipeline is a security risk to the EU (Politico 16.2.2018).

Also, Denmark has been opposing the project and even passed a new law in order to prevent Nord Stream 2 pipeline from running in its waters (Reuters 30.11.2017.) As mentioned in the analysis of the Energy Security Strategy, the EU aims to foster solidarity and tries to appeal to Member States not to make bilateral agreements that might harm the security of another Member State or a region of the union. Currently, the dissension on Nord Stream 2 in the Council lies between the Member States of the investing companies and some Member States like Poland, Denmark and the Baltic states (EU Observer 11.4.2018). According to Kuzemko (2014), already since the gas disputes in 2006 and 2009, the former Soviet Union states have tried to diminish its dependence on Russia while other countries like Germany and Italy have continued the bilateral cooperation with Russia. Kuzemko states that this has contributed to further alienate Russia and indicates that the motivation behind EU solidarity was not only the promotion of energy security with the benefits of the free market but also about power struggles with Russia. (Kuzemko 2014, 67.)

According to Krikovic (2015), Germany's and Russia's strong economic interdependence also outside the energy sector has contributed to the fact that the Russian-German energy relations has been cooperative and mostly free from securitization. Therefore, Germany has

shown quite little interest in diversifying away from Russian supplies and is supporting energy projects that increase European dependence on Russian gas. (Krikovic 2015, 8.) This situation can be seen in the case of Nord Stream 2. Germany has been a strong defender of Nord Stream 2 and highlighted its role as an economic project. Nevertheless, the latest turning point is that even Germany has started to acknowledge that Nord Stream 2 is a political project. Germany's chancellor Angela Merkel has recently said that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is not possible without clarity about Ukraine's transit role. Since the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would go directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, it would bypass Ukraine which would cause Ukraine significant loss of Russian gas transit costs. (EU Observer 11.4.2018.)

The Nord Stream 2 case reflects clearly how strongly the EU has securitized gas and how dominant security is in EU's energy policy. It also shows how committed the Commission is internally to EU's energy security. The EU is using regulatory tools to prevent Gazprom's monopoly and to foster a competitive and free gas market. Regulation and legislation is necessary to establish market rules. Nevertheless, the Nord Stream 2 case shows how the securitization of gas has become stronger than the EU's objective of a free market enhancing energy security. According to Belyi (2015), the initiative of the Energy Union reinforces contradiction between security and economic dimensions of the EU's energy policy (Belyi 2015, 154).

Energy security has exceeded over the narrative of the liberal market. The EU's role as a regulatory state and a small power without hard-power tools is highlighted in the Nord Stream 2 case. According to Andersen et al (2016), nevertheless that the Commission is internally a more or less strong actor in energy, with no mandate and little capacity to address security of supply as such, it has to rely on tools at its disposal as the EU agency in charge of market integration. Therefore, the EU's policy is based on the idea security of supply as public good necessary to create a functioning internal market (Andersen et al. 2016, 54-55). The Nord Stream 2 case is not finished and we will see how the project continues.

6. Conclusions

This study aimed to deliver a narrative policy analysis of the hardship of building a common European energy security policy considering the internal perspective of the union and EU's objective to decrease its dependence on Russian gas. This was addressed through the following research question: How is the EU perceiving its energy security in the relation to Russian natural gas? To conclude the findings of the study, it can be stated, that the EU has highly securitised Russian natural gas. The EU is perceiving Russia as a geopolitical actor with more incalculable moves instead of a trading partner. The analysis of the Energy Security Strategy from 2014 showed that the securitization of gas was even more intense than in 2006. The EU perceived Russian natural gas as a dangerous tool harming the EU's energy security and tearing EU internally apart. The EU talked as a small power approaching the threat with internal regulative measures. The study highlighted that energy security seems to have become an ultimate priority for the European Union. The analysis indicated that the EU is not tackling energy security anymore by implementing the ideology of market liberalization but energy security per se has become a main goal of the EU's energy policy. The narrative political analysis was present throughout the study.

The study shows that energy security has become more dominant in EU's energy policy as the narrative of the free market. The EU's dominating narrative of the securitization of Russian gas has led to the urgent breakaway from the strong dependence of Russian natural gas. This priority was identified in the European Parliament's debate from 2006, in the Energy Security Strategy from 2014 and finally in the recent proposal of the Commission regarding the amending gas directive. Nevertheless, it seems that actions happen way more slowly compared to the urgency of the talk. Nonetheless, that measures listed in the Energy Security Strategy have been implemented and the internal gas market has progressed, speaking with one voice in the energy policy, remains a challenge to the EU. The question of what consequences EU's perception of Russia as a threat and its actions to decrease its dependence on Russia have on the EU-Russia energy relations, cannot be answered absolutely. Nevertheless, as analysed in the study, the danger of a hostile spiral where the actions of both parties trying to decrease their dependence on each other lead to even more serious collisions, is present.

The EU's actions regarding the promotion of solidarity is still, even 12 years after the Russo-Ukrainian gas crisis, an ongoing project of the EU and at least in the short-term future there is no sight of completion. The question of the common European energy policy is essentially a question about EU's integration. If the union develops towards a more unified and coherent entity, the energy sector will be more integrated as well. This would nevertheless require similar and common interests of the Member States, which is not the case currently. On the other hand, the wider the EU's enlargement goes, the more challenging integration becomes.

The study succeeded to outline that the path towards a coherent energy policy has been and still is a long and painful battle for the European Union. The analysis showcased how manifold and complex the aspects in the field of energy security are. The study managed to raise some key elements of European energy security policy as well as interesting master-narratives which are dominating the EU's talk on energy security. The recent changes on the geopolitical playing field, especially the annexation of Crimea and the sanctions followed, have increased tensions of the EU-Russia relations. This is a major reason why the EU has so strongly securitized the Nord Stream 2 project.

The study showed that EU's energy security is an extremely complex issue which is impacted by the EU's internal tearing and divisions as well as the external battle of dwindling resources and geopolitical power. Import of fossil fuels to the EU will increase still for decades though the increasing use of sustainable and renewable energy sources. Especially natural gas will continue to dominate the EU's energy mix since renewable energy sources are not yet sufficient enough to answer the demand of electricity. The role of gas as a balancing power in electricity network is crucial. Therefore, energy security remains one of the most important political questions for the EU.

The EU cannot be blamed of being a passive bystander in energy policy even if it might not be a powerful external player. The EU still clearly strives to be a stronger actor in energy policy. Nevertheless, as long as the union is not able to form a united approach in energy policy, the result of decreasing its dependence on Russia are minor. The challenge here is the lack of competences of the Commission since the energy security and the energy mix belong to the competences of the Member States and the Commission's power in the energy policy is tied to the European Single Market (Andersen et al 2016, 55). This situation produces confrontations within the EU since the Commission tries to do more than it actually is allowed to. Nevertheless, that the strive towards an Energy Union has increased and

common approach is gradually founded, energy and energy security remains still strongly a national interest.

In order to analyse the EU's perception of its energy security vis-à-vis Russia and to answer to the research question, several choices regarding the research material and the timeframe analysed, had to be made. These choices affect the reliability of the study. Furthermore, the study does not take into account the complex bilateral relations of Russia and Ukraine, as Ukraine is an important gas transit country in Europe. EU's energy security regarding gas could be analysed from different other perspectives which could provide different results. The narrative policy analysis in the present study aimed to consider also things that kept unsaid but since this is based on interpretation, the reality might be different. Another factor weakening the validity of the study is the use of a rather loose methodological and theoretical framework which on the other hand gave place for a broad political interpretation but on the other left the study slightly unstructured.

EU's energy dependency on Russia is likely going to remain but different changes within its relations to Russia and other external suppliers, partnerships, energy sources etc. will happen. According Godzimirski & Groeger (2016), various challenges such like the Member States vs Brussels as well as global governance challenges will remain. (Godzimirski & Groeger 2016, 211). On the other hand, there might be room for many new partnerships and positive developments for instance with the US enabled by the possible TTIP. Furthermore, major developments like increasing investments to renewable energy in order to enhance energy production in the EU as well as to mitigate climate change, will impact the EU's energy policy even more in the future.

The union has harnessed all its regulatory tools to foster energy security and loosen itself from Russia's geopolitical sphere of interest. The EU is above all a regulatory actor. According to Godzimirski & Groeger (2016) the EU should become a stronger geopolitical actor given that its dependence on imported energy continues to grow (Godzimirski & Groeger 2016, 207).

Godzimirski and Groeger summarize the major challenges of the EU in the energy sphere:

“Today's EU must adapt to the new international circumstances in order to promote its own energy interests, to communicate to others that the energy game can still be a win-win game and not a zero-sum one, and that how energy

issues are addressed is crucial for the global environment as well.”
(Godzimirski & Groeger 2016, 206.)

In the end, it might not be only energy security's geopolitical dimension which challenges the EU the most in the new millennium. It is most likely that the battle for resources accelerates while climate change and pollution confronts the EU with significant security issues. The EU's energy policy keeps on being securitized and therefore it remains politically a highly interesting research topic. It would be very interesting to study the relation between climate change and energy security in EU's energy policy. Furthermore, since the present study indicated that the different interests of EU's Member States prevent the forming of a more integrated energy policy, an interesting research topic would be the different power relations within the EU and its Member States in energy policy.

Literature

Research Material

European Commission (2014). European Energy Security Strategy. COM (2014) 330 final.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN>

European Parliament (2006). Security of energy supply, particularly gas. Debates 17.1.2006, Strasbourg.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20060117&secondRef=ITEM-011&language=EN>

Research Literature

Aalto, Pami & Westphal, Kirsten (2008). "Introduction". In Aalto, Pami (ed.): *The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe's future energy security*, Hampshire: Ashgate, 1-22.

Amineh, Mehdi P. & Crijns-Graus, Wina H. (2014). "Rethinking EU Energy Security Considering Past Trends and Future Prospects". *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 13, (5-6), 757-825.

Andersen, Svein S., Goldthau, Andreas, Sitter, Nick (2016). "The EU Regulatory State, Commission Leadership and External Energy Governance". In Godzimirski, Jakub M. (ed.): *EU Leadership in Energy and Environmental Governance*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 51-69.

Bahgat, Gawdat (2006). "Europe's Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities". *International Affairs*, 82 (5), 961-975.

Belyi, Andrei V. (2015). *Transnational Gas Markets and Euro-Russian Energy Relations*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Biava, Alessia (2010). "The Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Gas Disputes on the European Union Gas Market: The Energy Solidarity Issue". In Delvaux, Bram, Hunt, Michael & Talus, Kim: *EU Energy Law and Policy Issues*, Rixenart: Euroconfidentiel, 17-36.

Booth, Ken & Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2008). *The Security Dilemma*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Buňková, Renata: Meeting of the Energy Council 14 March, Brussels (2006). Retrieved 20.10.2016 from

<http://www.mpo.cz/dokument15042.html><http://www.mpo.cz/dokument15042.html>
29.3.2006

Busygina, Irina & Filippov, Mikhail. (2014). "Resource Curse" and foreign policy: Explaining Russia's approach towards the EU. Research Gate.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281872845_'Resource_Curse'_and_foreign_policy_Explaining_Russia's_approach_towards_the_EU

Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole & De Wilde, Jaap (1998). *Security. A new framework for analysis*. Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Council of the European Union. (26 MAR 2018). Opinion of the Legal Service. Retrieved 29.4.2018 from <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Gas-directive-CLS-second-opinion.pdf>

de Carbonnel, Alissa & Jacobsen, Stine (Reuters 26 MAR): Denmark faces dilemma over Russian gas pipeline. Retrieved 30.4.2018 from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-gazprom-nordstream-analysis/denmark-faces-dilemma-over-russian-gas-pipeline-idUSKBN1H21V8>

Energy Information Administration (2017). Retrieved 28.03.2018 from https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_factors_affecting_prices

European Commission (2017). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas. COM (2017) 660 final.
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2017/0660/COM_COM\(2017\)0660_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2017/0660/COM_COM(2017)0660_EN.pdf)

European Commission. Energy Union and Climate. Retrieved 8.1.2017 from https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en

European Commission (9 JUN 2017). Commission seeks a mandate from Member States to negotiate with Russia an agreement on Nord Stream 2. Press Release. Retrieved 14.4.2018 from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1571_en.htm

Euractiv (29 JAN 2018): US insists Russia using energy as 'political tool' in Europe. Retrieved 15.04.2018 from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/us-insists-russia-using-energy-as-political-tool-in-europe/>

EUR-Lex. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Retrieved 1.4.2018 from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012E194>

Godzimirski, Jakub M. (2016). "Russia-EU Energy Relations: From Complementarity to Distrust?" In Godzimirski, Jakub M. (ed.): *EU Leadership in Energy and Environmental Governance*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 89-112.

Godzimirski, Jakub M. & Groeger, Nina (2016). "Conclusion: The EU, Energy, and Global Power Shifts". In Godzimirski, Jakub M. (ed.): *EU Leadership in Energy and Environmental Governance*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 203-222.

Goldhau, Andreas (2008). "Rhetoric versus reality: Russian threats to European energy supply". *Energy Policy*. 36 (2), 686-692.

Hyvärinen, Matti (2010). *Beyond Narrative Coherence*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Pub cop.

Interactive European Gas Map. Petroleum Economist Cartographic Services. Retrieved 12.11.2016 from <http://egm.maps.petroleum-economist.com/#4/46.44/8.83>

King, Esther (Politico 15 FEB 2018): German and Polish Leaders clash over Nord Stream 2 Pipeline. Retrieved 29.4.2018 from <https://www.politico.eu/article/nord-stream-2-german-and-polish-leaders-clash/>

Korkmaz-Temel, Dicle (2016). *Turkey's energy security vis-à-vis integration with the EU: A narrative policy analysis from the English School Perspective*. University of Tampere. School of Management. Doctoral Dissertation.

Krikovic, Andrej (2015.) "When Interdependence Produces Conflict: EU–Russia Energy Relations as a Security Dilemma". *Contemporary Security Policy*, 36 (1), 3-26.

Kuzemko, Caroline & Hadfield, Amelia (2016). "Defining and Projecting EU Energy Policy". In Godzimirski, Jakub M. (ed.): *EU Leadership in Energy and Environmental Governance*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 21-50.

Kuzemko, Caroline (2014). "Ideas, Power and Change: Explaining EU-Russia Energy Relations." *Journal of European Public Policy*, 21, (3), pp. 58-75.

Lucas, Edward (2008). *The New Cold War*. London: Bloomsbury.

Mansfield, Edward & Pollins, Brian (2003). *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on and enduring debate*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Martikainen, Toivo, Pynnöniemi, Katri, Saari, Sinikukka & the Finnish Institute of International Affairs Team (2016). "Russia's changing role in Finland's neighbourhood". Finland: Prime Minister's Office Finland
http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/607/venajan_muuttuva_rooli_suomen_lahialueilla/

Matzen, Erik & Jacobsen, Stine (Reuters 30 NOV 2017): Denmark passes law that Could ban Russia pipeline from going through its waters. Retrieved 29.4.2018 from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-pipeline/denmark-passes-law-that-could-ban-russian-pipeline-from-going-through-its-waters-idUSKBN1DU19L>

McGowan, Francis (2008). "Can the European Union's Market Liberalism Ensure Security in Time of "Economic Nationalism"?" *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 4 (2), 90-106.

MEPs voice grave concerns about Nord Stream 2 Project (2016). Press Release, European Parliament. Retrieved 9.1.2017 from <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20160509IPR26345/meps-voice-grave-concerns-about-nord-stream-2-project>

Neuman, Marek (2010). "EU-Russian Energy Relations after the 2004/2007 EU Enlargement: An EU Perspective". *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 18 (3), 341-360.

Nies, Susanne (2011). "The EU-Russia Energy Relationship: European, Russian, Common Interests?" In Kanet E., Roger (ed.): *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Chippenham & Eastbourne: Palgrave Macmillian, 266-286.

Nord Stream AG (2016). Retrieved 9.11.2016 from <http://www.nord-stream.com/>

Nord Stream (2018). Shareholder and Financial Investors. Retrieved 29.4.2018 from <https://www.nord-stream2.com/company/shareholder-and-financial-investors/>

Patterson, Molly & Monroe, Kristen Renwick (1998). "Narrative in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 1, 315-331.

<https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.315>

Rettman, Andrew (EU Observer 11 APR 2018): Merkel: Nord Stream 2 is "political". Retrieved 29.4.2018 from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-pipeline/denmark-passes-law-that-could-ban-russian-pipeline-from-going-through-its-waters-idUSKBN1DU19L>

Roe, Emery (1994). *Narrative policy analysis theory and practice*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Squire, Corinne, Dava, Mark, Esin, Cigdem, Andrews, Molly, Harrison, Barbara, Hydén, Lars-Christer & Hydén, Margareta (2014). *What is Narrative Research?* London: Bloomsbury Academic

Stern, Jonathan (2006). "The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006." Oxford Institute of Energy Studies. <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Jan2006-RussiaUkraineGasCrisis-JonathanStern.pdf>

Teffer, Peter (EU Observer 20 MAR 2015): EU leaders want Energy Union: but what do they mean? Retrieved 19.10.2016 from <https://euobserver.com/energy/128093>

Toje, Asle (2011). The European Union as a Small Power. *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 49 (1), 43-60.

Umbach, Frank (2010). "Global energy security and the implications for the EU". *Energy Policy*, 38 (3), 1229-1240.