"A STRONG UNION IS ONE THAT THINKS STRATEGICALLY"

Analysis of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy

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Pro gradu -thesis

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ABSTRACT

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The aim of the study is to analyze what kinds of understanding of security does the European Union have and what themes are linked to security. Additionally, the study aims to analyze the European Union as a power in international politics.

The research material consists of two security strategies. The focus is on the Global Strategy for European Union's Foreign and Security policy, which was published in June 2016. This strategy is compared to the European Security Strategy of 2003 in order to detect new trends in European security policy. The strategies act as guidelines for the European security policy and thus represent the main actors and themes related to European security. Therefore, strategies provide interesting research material.

The study was conducted through the method of political reading. Political reading (Palonen, 1988) aims to study how the political aspect appears in texts and what kinds of interpretations can be made from the political parlances. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde's (1998) categorization of the areas of security was a useful tool when analyzing the security threats presented in the Global Strategy. When studying the European Union as a power, Toje's (2011) concept of small power was used alongside McCormick's (2007) work on superpower.

Based on the results, the field of European security is quite versatile. Strongest emphasis in the Global Strategy is on European military and economic security. Political and societal security is in most cases overlapping other areas; the strong institutions and European values are in the core of European security policy. Despite the EU's role as a trendsetter for environmental awareness, environmental security is underrepresented in the Global Strategy of 2016.

The study shows that the European Union has behavioral elements of both a small power and a superpower. It can thus be argued that the EU relies heavily on international institutions, such as the UN, in its global actions, but at the same time tries to achieve a position as an independent actor. Operational independency was especially a current theme in the material. According to the Global Strategy of 2016, the European Union is a small power that aims towards recognition as a great power.

Keywords: European Union, foreign and security policy, securitization, small power, superpower, strategy

TIIVISTELMÄ

"A STRONG UNION IS ONE THAT THINKS STRATEGICALLY"
Analysis of the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy
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Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää, millainen turvallisuuskäsitys Euroopan unionissa vallitsee ja minkälaisia teemoja turvallisuuteen liitetään. Lisäksi tutkimus pyrkii analysoimaan Euroopan unionia vallankäyttäjänä kansainvälisessä politiikassa.

Tutkimuksen aineisto muodostuu Euroopan unionin kahdesta turvallisuusstrategiasta. Päähuomio on vuonna 2016 julkaistussa Euroopan unionin ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittisessa globaalistrategiassa, ja vertailuaineistona käytetään vuoden 2003 Euroopan turvallisuusstrategiaa. Strategiat valikoituivat tutkimuksen aineistoksi, sillä ne määrittelevät suuntaviivat ja toimintaperiaatteet Euroopan unionin ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikalle ja näin ollen kuvaavat keskeisimpiä teemoja ja toimijoita Euroopan unionin turvallisuuteen liittyen.

Tutkimus toteutettiin käyttäen metodina Palosen (1988) poliittista luentaa. Poliittinen luenta pyrki tutkimaan, kuinka poliittinen ulottuvuus ilmenee tekstissä ja minkälaisia tulkintoja tekstistä voidaan tehdä poimimalla siitä kiinnostavia ilmaisuja. Analyysin tukena käytettiin turvallisuusuhkia selvitettäessä Buzanin, Wæverin ja de Wilden (1998) kategorisointia turvallisuuden osa-alueista. Euroopan unionin valta-asemaa tarkasteltiin Tojen (2011) pikkuvallan sekä McCormickin (2007) supervallan käsitteiden avulla.

Tutkimuksen perusteella Euroopan unionin turvallisuuspoliittinen kenttä näyttäytyy laajana. Vahvimpina osa-alueina vuoden 2016 globaalistrategiassa esiintyvät sotilaallisen ja taloudellisen turvallisuuden alueet. Poliittinen ja yhteiskunnallinen turvallisuus ilmenee osittain rinnakkain ja lomittain; eurooppalaiset arvot ja vahvat Euroopan unionin instituutiot ovat EU:n turvallisuuspolitiikan perusta. Huolimatta asemastaan ympäristönsuojelun edelläkävijänä ympäristöturvallisuus jää vuoden 2016 globaalistrategiassa vähälle huomiolle.

Tulosten mukaan Euroopan unionin käytöksessä on havaittavissa piirteitä sekä pikkuvallasta että supervallasta. Voidaankin todeta, että EU nojaa globaalissa toiminnassaan vahvasti kansainvälisiin instituutioihin, mutta pyrkii myös luomaan itsenäistä asemaa. Erityisesti operatiivisen riippumattomuuden tavoittelu nousi aineistosta kantavana teemana. Aineiston perusteella Euroopan unioni on pikkuvalta, joka pyrkii kohti tunnustusta suurvaltana.

Avainsanat: Euroopan unioni, ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, turvallistaminen, pikkuvalta, supervalta, strategia

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1. INTRODUCTION

The year 2016 will probably be remembered as a year of challenges in Europe. Euroscepticism, embodied in the Brexit referendum, and the rise of populist movements all over Europe have shaken the fundamentals of the European Union from the inside. External challenges, such as the inflow of refugees, terrorist attacks, and the turbulent nature of world politics, have contested the European Union to redefine its objectives and strategies at home and also globally.

The European security policy has been studied from various perspectives during the past decades. The focus of the studies has been on integration and its possibilities, and the structure of policy-making processes linked to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The latest studies focus on versatile aspects of the institutions around the CSDP, for example, the Europol's role in counter-terrorism (Jansson, 2016), the possibilities of intelligence cooperation in the EU (Bilgi, 2016), and the bilateral relations of the EU and its partners (Blanco, 2016; Nitoiu, 2016). The points of view present in the study of the CFSP are often sectoral case studies of a certain aspect of the CSDP, or historical descriptions of the integration processes. Some studies contribute to the European security policy as a whole, but due to the multiplicity of the CSDP, the results often stay on a general level.

The European Union's security and defence policy is directed by the European External Action Service, led by the High Representative Federica Mogherini, and by the member states. In order to make effective foreign policy, the approach on security needs to be coherent. The European Union is an extraordinary actor in its foreign policy, since it represents 28 countries, some of which have history as great powers and empires. Contrastingly, the member states act also independently in their foreign relations. The Union's efficiency in its foreign policy is highly dependent on the coherency of the member states. To create a common direction for CSDP, strategic approach on security is needed. The European Union's security strategies set guidelines and create framework for European global actions and also for providing security policy at home. They reflect the European core values and intentions on security and therefore give insights to the thinking

behind CSDP. That is why the security strategies provide a fertile material for the overall study of the European Union's security policy.

1.1   The aim of the study

The nature of security policy is time-related. Events around the world can challenge the perceptions on threats, and change the themes that are hyped in security discourse. Therefore, the study of security policy needs to be up to date and new analyses are produced after major shifts in the focus areas. As the world becomes ever more linked, for example through markets and Internet, the structure and form of security is also challenged. The European Union is a part of the global institutions and considers itself a global actor, and thus cannot be excluded from conflicts in world politics. Local disturbances are often upgraded to global. In the changing field of security, an updated insight is required on European Union's security and defence and on its place in the world.

The purpose of the present study is to analyze the European Union's conception of security. This includes the understanding of the European Union's perception of security issues and the analysis of the European Union as a global power. In order to reach its goal, the study is conducted through two research questions:

1. What issues are linked to European Union's security policy?
2. What kind of a power the European Union is?

The first question contributes to the discussion of the understanding of the field of European security and defence policy. It focuses on what threats are perceived and what areas of security policy are emphasized. The first research question aims to build a picture of the European understanding of security as a whole.

The second research question intends to focus on the European Union in the global arena. It endeavors to analyze the European Union's role on international politics by studying its power qualities, such as, its behavioral patterns, dependencies, and capabilities. Whereas the first research question's point of view is more focused on the internal than external

security, the second question tries to identify the European Union's security policy in relation to other actors in the global politics.

1.2   The structure of the thesis

The next chapter of the thesis discusses the theoretical framework for the present study. The key terms and theories that are used as tools for the analysis are explained. The second chapter aims to provide the reader with sufficient theoretical understanding for understanding the analysis. The third chapter takes a strategic approach on European security. The development of European strategic thinking towards security policy is discussed, and the process of making the 2016 Global Strategy is described in more detail. This chapter gives an account of the research material and the method of the present study. The fourth chapter is the first chapter of analysis, and focuses on the field of the European Union's security policy. The second analysis chapter discusses the second research question and the Union as a power. Finally, the results of the study are concluded.

2. THEORETICAL APPROACH ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

In this chapter, the theoretical background for the present study is discussed. The theories related to the research questions are explained and the key concepts are described. This chapter aims to create an overall picture of the framework that is being used to support the analysis.

2.1 The European Union's many roles

Toje (2011b:5–10) defines ten global roles for the European Union. Primarily, the EU is a system of governance. Integration is a tool to succeed in the insecure anarchic international system. Membership in a union can redirect national interests, so the challenge is to transform national interests into a common European interest. The Europeanization of policy issues has provided a solution to this problem. In addition, the EU is a community of values. The European project is different from other alliances, such as NATO, in a sense that it requires accepted shared values from its members. The value-atmosphere of an applying country affects the progress of the membership process. Most importantly in relation to the present study, the EU is a security community. The EU has been built to secure peace among its member states, and internal security remains a key target. Internal security can be seen as a tool to control the increase of power politics in Europe as well as a way to navigate international politics. In relation to the foreign policy, the EU is a trade block. In the field of trade policy, the member states are more effective together than by themselves, since the EU creates one of the greatest economies in the world. In addition, the euro is the biggest symbol of European integration and power.

It can be argued that the EU is an understanding among powers. The goal has been to prevent any state from dominating the continent as the more powerful states agree to the same rules as small states. Moreover, the EU is a normative power, which means that the EU tries to export its values and norms and thus affect the world politics and reduce the use of hard power. By changing what is considered normal in world politics, the EU can shape international relations to its own benefit. In its means to succeed in world politics,

the EU is a civilian power. The EU is known to rely on non-military power using resources such as diplomacy, enlargement, humanitarian aid, and trade instead. The civilian tools are extremely important when it comes to the border countries of Europe. From this point, the EU's role as a regional pacifier and the global role of a humanitarian actor are important. Central and Eastern Europe have been stabilized partly due to the Union's actions for democratic development. The EU gains its legitimacy from commitments to its members, and the transformative power that the EU membership has clearly brought stability to the European continent. Finally, Toje (2011b:10) argues that the EU is a power in the traditional sense. The EU's role in international politics is still not a product of any grand design, but the EU is a sum of various foreign policy initiatives that sum up to something more significant (Toje, 2011b:5–10.)

It is important to understand that the European Union acts through various roles and appears different to different partners. It can be argued that all of these roles can be connected to the Union's security actions. The strategies that are produced in shared institutions are based on shared values that create mutual understanding among member states. The EU uses its power as a trade block as a global tool by making trade agreements, introducing sanctions, and applying regulations on its market. The European Union's approach to conflicts is usually constructed of humanitarian aid and exporting norms of a civil society to the target countries. The Union's agenda and tools to achieve goals on global scale consist of various multilateral approaches that are overlapping and intersecting.

2.2   Concept of security

The analysis considering the first research question will be conducted from the perspective of security. The focus will be on how security is presented in the research material and how the field of security policy is understood in the document. Security is thus a key concept in this study. Security policy has previously been studied from various angles. Major contributions to the field of international security studies have been made from different realist points of view by the likes of E.H. Carr, Kenneth Waltz, and Hedley Bull.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde have studied the concept of security. They (1998:21) argue that international security differs from security within a state, which includes, for example, social security and policing. International security is rooted in power politics and often manifests in forms of military-political power. Security in international relations is about a state's survival: a state's security is under an attack when an issue is posing a threat to its existence. Security threats are often used as a justification of emergency measures. What poses an existential threat depends on the state and no universal standard can be found. (Buzan et al. 1998:21.)

The term securitization is linked to international security. Securitization is a tool to make an issue appear as a security issue. Generally, any issue can be placed on a spectrum from nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized. When securitized, an issue is presented as an existential threat, which often justifies extraordinary measures to tackle it. States can have varying views of what issues are politicized or securitized based on their preferences. For example, environment is an issue that for centuries belonged to the sphere of nonpolitical. It has been politicized only recently, and later on securitized. Securitization is defined through action, and thus it is something that cannot be explicitly defined. Security is therefore a self-referential concept, since it does not make a difference whether something is or is not a real threat. The focus is on presenting an issue as a security threat (Buzan et al. 1998:21-24.)

2.2.1 Areas of security

Securitization can take place on various fields of society and cover different policy areas. Buzan et al. (1998) discuss five areas of security. Firstly, military sector forms an area that is most commonly related to security. The state is the most important referent object in the field of military security, and the political elites do the securitizing through policy-making. The military sector is highly linked to territory. High military capabilities are used to guarantee territorial sovereignty. Even though the military agenda is focused around states, other actors such as military alliances and intergovernmental organizations are relevant as well (Buzan et al. 1998:49–50.)

Securitization of the military sector focuses on existential threats for state-sovereignty and consists of two perspectives: on one hand, the armed forces are capable of acting offensively or defensively when needed, and on the other hand, both parties have perceptions of each other's intentions and capabilities. In this sense, the perception of a threat is important whether the threat actualizes or not. The understanding of a threat in a society is socially constructed rather than objectively decomposable. In threat perception, same issues can create a different sense of threat to different securitizing actors. For example, a history with a heavy armed neighbor can create a sense of vulnerability even if no actual threat is posed. (Buzan et al. 1998:51–57.)

A less visible area of security is the environmental sector of security. The history of securitizing environmental issues and values is relatively short. Securitizing environmental issues have generally taken place through other political gains and agendas. The securitizing actors of environment in the society vary more broadly than on other sectors; alongside with states, communities and social movements have contributed to environmental discourse. The environmental sector of security consists of a scientific and a political agenda. Though overlapping each other, the scientific agenda is generally enclosed to sciences and non-governmental actions. It is constructed to remain outside the realm of politics, and mostly contributed to by scientists and institutions, and its discussions are based on already existing environmental problems. The scientific area is controlled by authoritative assessment of threats. The political agenda is governmental and focuses on how to address these problems, and is based on state and public awareness of environmental issues, the acceptance of political responsibility, and the management of environmental policies. Potential issues on environmental security might be, for example, the disruption of ecosystems, energy, population and food problems, and civil strife. The challenge with environmental security is that those who cause and those who suffer from environmental issues are often different actors and regions. (Buzan et al. 1998:71–85.)

The economic sector of security is one of the most politicized and controversial areas of security (Buzan et al. 1998:95). The economic sector of security is quite controversial due to being highly politicized and being dependent on the referent object. For an individual, economic security might mean being able to fill basic human needs: having adequate amounts of food, water, clothing, shelter, and education. From the point of view of economic security, the difference between states and firms is that firms can cease to exist

through bankruptcy, but states cannot. States are expected to be permanent structures, and while in theory they can become bankrupt, they cannot dissolve. If a state is incapable of supplying for its industry and population, it needs access to resources outside its domain. If the access to outside supplies is compromised, the state practices economic securitization to guarantee its stability. The controversy here comes from the liberalist points of view that promote minimum state involvement in economy and the liberalization of markets. (Buzan et al. 1998:95–106.)

Nevertheless, the economic sector indirectly affects various areas of security by causing political instability, decreasing investments to military capabilities, and possibly even conflicts between states. Examples of economic security are the ability to maintain independent military production, the fear of the global market producing more losers than winners, avoiding dependency on natural resources such as oil to secure energy supply, fighting illegal trade and the fear that the global economy would collapse due to failing policy-making processes in the international financial system (Buzan et al. 1998:95–106.)

In addition, Buzan et al. (1998:119–140) discuss the societal sector of security. The societal sector focuses on the nation, not the state, as a security unit. From the point of view of international relations, societal security is about the ideas and practices that identify individuals as parts of a larger community. The factor that most affects the societal sector is identity. A threat appears, when the existence of a community is under attack. Societal security includes self-sustaining identity groups, which are significantly different in different times and places. A set state can have many identity groups, and therefore the society does not always correlate with the population of the state. Most common threats to societal security often include migration, in a sense of being overrun by a new culture and identity, horizontal competition that might cause linguistic and cultural influence on the identity group, and vertical competition caused by an integration project or a regionalist project that changes the identity narrower or wider. The European Union is an example of vertical competition, as it is an integration process of various culture groups and identities. (Buzan et al. 1998:119–121.)

Finally, the political sector of security consists of the organizational stability of social order. A threat to the political security is a threat to state sovereignty. Buzan et al. (1998:141) point out that the political sector is the widest sector, since all other sectors can

be considered political as well. All threats are politically constructed, and no aspect of security is nonpolitical. Politicization and securitization are always political, and in this regard, political security could be an umbrella term for the other sectors. The field of political security is at the same time vast and narrow, and therefore recognizing threats as political is difficult. Where many threats could be categorized as military-political or societal-political, it is important to recognize those that can be interpreted as political. Political threats are typically non-military threats that cannot be defined strictly as economic, societal, military or environmental (Buzan et al. 1998:141–142.)

Buzan (1991:118) defines political threats as threats that aim to shake the organizations of a state. Their aim might vary from pressuring the government to disrupting the political institutions of a state to make it weaker, for example, prior to a military attack. In addition, political threats can be ideological and aim to attack the ideological foundations of a nation-state, for example, to make neighboring states to behave in a suitable manner or to change the ideological setting of a neighbor before annexation (Buzan, 1991:119-120.)

Even though the theory of the sectors of security mainly discusses nation states, it can be argued that in this case it can be applied to the European Union as well. In the Global Strategy, the EU is presented as one individual actor that has a clear vision and goals, and no divergent objectives or ambitions of the member states are visible. The sectoral approach on security was chosen, since the present study aims to capture comprehensively the European Union's perception of security, and in order to do that, the understanding of security needs to expand to cover as many areas of security as possible.

2.3   Powers of great and small

The analysis of the second research question aims to study the EU Global Strategy through power politics. Toje (2011) has studied the European Union as a power. Toje (2011a:43) argues that by taking a strategic approach on security, the EU has entered the area of power politics. As the world seems to be shifting towards multipolarity, the EU needs to rethink its own status. Common security and defence policy (CSDP) is the strongest tool the Union has to affect the world, since no other field of EU policy symbolized the will to act as a

united Union. Since the 1990s, the EU has been able to develop its military, diplomatic, and economic abilities to act. Toje (2011a:44) argues that there is a lack of discussion of the EU as a power in European studies, because many scholars tend to discuss the Union more as a civilian or normative power instead of arguing the Union's place in power politics. The term 'power' is important in the context of world politics, since many European languages refer to states that matter as 'powers'. Contrastingly, recent studies have preferred to discuss the EU in terms of actorness. (Toje, 2011a:44.)

According to Toje (2011a:45), there are two approaches to the classification of powers, relational and quantifiable. Quantifiable classification is based on indicators that are calculable, such as gross domestic product. This approach is not sufficient, since it can be argued that not all elements of power can be combined into one general indicator. Relational approach focuses on behavioral patterns of powers and evaluates them by their actions. It assesses powers in relation to other kinds of powers. For example, Toje (2011a:45) uses Keohane's (1969) classification of powers in relation to their impact on world politics. Keohane (1969:295-296) discusses four categories of states by their ability to influence the international politics. Firstly, there are system-determining actors that can be identified by their ability to dominate the international system. Secondly, system-influencing actors are not strong enough to change the course of the international system, but are able to shape it. Thirdly, there are system-affecting actors that cannot affect the system by themselves, but can influence it through groups of other states, for example, through international organizations. Finally, system-ineffectual actors are states that have minimal impact on the world politics. (Keohane, 1969:295-296.)

2.3.1   A small power

From previous studies by scholars of power politics, Toje (2011a:47-48) has gathered four behavioral characteristics of a small power. Small powers' behavior is defined by dependence. A small power cannot rely only on its own competences when it comes to security, instead small powers try to achieve neutrality or alliance. In an alliance, small powers will follow the leader closely, in order to maintain the alliance. Where there is no geopolitical threat, small powers usually try to remain neutral. (Toje, 2011a:47.)

Another characteristic of a small power is variable geometry: small powers tend to have relatively small capabilities to project power. Their geopolitical situation, limited resources, and the current international system restrict the small powers' abilities to address all relevant risks and threats. Therefore, small powers tend to prioritize their security agendas and act only those issues that appear to be the priority. Small powers are status quo oriented and try to shape the world in the current framework instead of trying to create a completely new order. (Toje, 2011a:47.)

Small powers are the ones who benefit most of international organizations. It is necessary for small powers to follow and endorse international law. Rules are adopted and encouraged in order to strengthen small powers' position and to restrain great powers' actions. Small powers tend to act as normative or moral powers in international organizations and prefer multidimensional solutions to international problems. Small powers are therefore active in their participation, since international organizations are the places where they can conduct foreign policy most effectively. (Toje, 2011a:48.)

Small powers are defensive by nature. They focus more on dangers than opportunities in their global action. They have limited freedom to act and, therefore, they have a narrow range of global interests. Small states tend to focus only on their own geographical area and closest neighbors, whereas great powers have interests globally around the world. Small powers generally promote multilateral and non-military solutions to security challenges, because small powers are characterized by an unwillingness to use coercive measures. (Toje, 2011a:48.)

Toje (2011b:137–156) builds an argument of the European Union as a small power. Small powers are powers that are often dependent on other states or organizations to provide security; variable in geometry in a sense that their power resources are relatively small; they benefit from the international law and institutions and therefore reinforce them; and are defensive by their nature. A small power is an actor that is not a great power, but is not a small state either. A small power is system-affecting in a sense that it cannot affect the global system by itself, but can have an impact through acting in small groups or in international organizations (Toje, 2011b:138–140.)

Toje (2011a:49) argues that if the EU wishes to become a great power, it would need a capacity to act. The formation of the CSDP has been an attempt to create great power qualities. The Union has failed to maintain independent relations with other powers because they are understood to require an ability to command armed forces. Since the European Security Strategy of 2003, there has been an attempt to create such forces. Since the narrative has remained mostly instructive, the member states have been unable to contribute to the making of armed forces to project the political ambitions agreed by the same member states. (Toje, 2011a:49.)

The failure to provide CSDP is a result of three factors. Firstly, European states do not value military spending very high on their budgets. In 2005, military spending actually fell in Europe. Secondly, the military personnel of the member states are incompatible, and there are legal restrictions hindering participation in shared operations. Thirdly, the competing national market industries produce duplication and excessive market for military hardware. (Toje, 2011a:50.)

In conclusion, Toje (2011b:152–156) argues that the EU is a small power, since uniting national and supranational interest has proven to be difficult. The European Union is less than the sum of its parts; national sovereignty continues to be the goal for many members while a closer Union could bring gains on the international stage. The paradox here is that the EU states want to create a powerful union, but then again do not want to commit to policies that further the integration. In order to become an effective small power, the European Union should become more skilled in to handling stress and start to pursue its own policies. The European Union is still an effective actor on the agendas on which it can create a consensus. (Toje, 2011b:152–156.)

2.3.2   A superpower

McCormick (2007) has taken a contrasting focus on power politics. France, Britain, Germany, and Russia have all achieved a great power status at some point in history; they have had the largest economies, the strongest positions in global trade, huge investments in the global system, as well as most powerful militaries. Still, according to McCormick

(2007:17), it can be argued that none of these countries has achieved the status of a superpower, which is measured on an altogether different scale. Since quite various definitions exist for a superpower, McCormick (2007:17-20) has been able to gather characteristics for a superpower from previous literature. The main argument that differentiates a superpower from a great power is the ability to mobilize power. In other words, a superpower does not only have the military and economic capabilities of a superpower, but has also the ability to act independently on a global scale. In addition to military and economic capabilities, a superpower is motivated to use its force.

McCormick (2007:18-19) sets four characteristics for a superpower. A superpower has a high level of autonomy and self-sufficiency when it comes to international relations. This independency is gained through high military capabilities. In addition, superpowers have interests not only locally, but globally. Superpowers can protect their interests, and are willing to do so, even aggressively. Protection of global interest can be active or passive, and happen through various policies. A superpower can achieve its status through the resources it controls, for example natural resources such as oil and water, or military resources such as nuclear weapons. A superpower can achieve its role by declaring it through its actions, having it given to them by lesser powers, or by the virtue of what the superpower represents, may it be economic opportunities, political influence, or, for example, moral credibility.

The nature of power is changing. The collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War led to a vacuum in power politics. The United States was able to fill that vacuum, since it did not have any opponents. Russian power was in decline. The United States was soon challenged by rising powers such as China. China is argued to be the main challenger for the US hegemony, mostly due to its large population, army, and large economic importance in the world. Though being an emerging great power, China lacks some important qualities it would need to become one, mostly due to the strong state control of economy and authoritarian rule (McCormick, 2007:19-21.)

Though having gained a hegemony position in the world, the US power is no longer what it used to be. McCormick (2007:23) argues that the decline of the US power status enables the rise of a European correspondent. In relation to the European superpower, McCormick challenges the traditional sources of power. The decline of American power can be

understood through three lines of thinking. The European Union has developed its identity further, and strengthened its internal policies. The single market has grown into the world's biggest economy, which has challenged the position of the US dollar. In addition, there is support in the member states for the EU playing its role in the international system. While the EU has developed, the United States has faced internal difficulties, such as economic problems and internal social divisions. The US foreign policy has faced challenges, especially since September 2001, and that has led to anti-Americanism and undermined American leadership. In addition, there have been shifts in the current political thinking towards non-military responses to international crises, which emphasizes European capabilities of multilateralism over American military capabilities. (McCormick, 2007:4–6.) The characteristics of small power and superpower are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Characteristics of a small power (after Toje 2011a:47–48) and a superpower (after McCormick, 2007:17–19)

	Small power	Superpower
Interests	Local interests, distributed through international institutions	Global, non-local interests
Resources	Variable geometry, relatively small resources, dependent on other actors	High military self-sufficiency, strong economic capabilities
Behavior	Defensive by nature, enhancing international law	Even aggressive protection of interest as a norm
Status	Acknowledged as a member of international organizations and groups of other small powers	Superpower status acknowledged by others

Even though McCormick (2007:2) challenges the conventional thinking of power by arguing that power can come from various sources in addition to economic and military capabilities, his model of traditional superpowers can be argued to be valid in the current world politics. For example, Kenneth Waltz (in Toje, 2012) argues that the international system is still based on power politics and power balances. Biscop (2016:1) argues that the Global Strategy represents a return to realpolitik. It can be argued that the current political atmosphere of the 2010s, with the Russian annexation of Crimea, terrorist attacks in Europe, and unstableness in North Africa and Middle East, has brought instability back to European politics. Hard power resources and geopolitics have become a part of

international relations in the Western world. Therefore, Toje's (2011) and McCormick's (2007) definitions of small power and superpower are suitable tools to analyze the European Union as a power holder in relation to the Global Strategy of 2016.

3. STRATEGIC APPROACH ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

This chapter discusses the European Union's security strategies. The chapter gives an account on the development of the strategic approach on Union's security by describing the processes that led from the European Security Strategy of 2003 to the Global Strategy of 2016. Additionally, the method of the present study is presented.

3.1 A secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy

The European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS), "A secure Europe in a better world" was published by the European Union in December 2003. This strategy was the first one for the EU's security policy and the first strategy that outlined the Union's aspirations in world politics.

In 2003, when the strategy was created, the European Union consisted of 15 member states. The Union had not yet enlarged to Eastern Europe, even though the membership processes for ten states were in progress. The Cold War was considered to be over, and the War on Terror had started. The United States dominated world politics and the Russo-Georgian War had not yet taken place. Russia was seen as a strategic partner of the European Union, and North Africa was a quite stable neighboring area.

This first European Security Strategy was presented in December 2003. The High Representative at that time was Javier Solana. The Strategy was adopted with ease, since it was not too radical a document, but it took a new approach by naming existing phenomena like terrorism and organized crime as threats. Another reason for the smooth acceptance of the ESS was that since it was not legally binding, it was relatively easy for member states to endorse. In addition, the ESS is not a typical strategy: it did not bring about strong strategic actions, but remained on a quite general level as not to cause disagreements among members. The European Security Strategy of 2003 is a political document written for multiple audiences. It seeks to define the EU as a distinctive and united actor in world politics (Marsh & Rees, 2012:47–48.)

The European Union's strategies have been based on its values. It uses a so-called multilateralism as its approach to conflicts. This approach is supposed to lead to fair and just outcomes, which can be understood as an opposing strategy to unilateralism. The EU enjoys the trust of the United Nations due to its non-coercive policy. For the EU, values fill the space that nation states give for national interests. The competition for the EU comes not in the form of military challengers, but from values. Internationalism and strong American domination challenges the EU's value-base, and thus the EU needs to keep its values in the center of all policies in order to tackle the attempts of outside influence. (Toje, 2011b:146–148.)

This strategy consists of 14 pages and three sections. The first section discusses the security environment by analyzing global challenges and key threats, while the second defines the Union's strategic objectives. The final section focuses on the policy implications for the European Union. Several themes appear multiple times on the document. These themes include resilience, multilateralism, and the credibility of the Union.

3.2   Need for a new strategy

As Europe has faced new security threats – such as terrorist attacks, global warming, mass migration, and the unpredictable actions of Russia – there has been a consensus among academic thinkers that the European Union needs a revised global strategy. The security challenges the Union faces are inter-sectoral and trans-border, and therefore they cannot be tackled by individual member states alone (Kettle, 2015:3.)

The need for a common security policy has its roots in European history. The continent has been torn by two great wars during the past century, and thereby there is a strong motivation to prevent such events in the future. This goal of lasting peace has legitimized the whole integration process. The European Union's views towards power politics and use of force have been overshadowed by the belligerent history of the continent. Therefore, the EU has strongly preferred soft power in its global politics. Nevertheless, three trends have caused the Union to reassess its strategy. Firstly, there is the question of how long the US

will act as a guarantor of European security. This question has risen from the changes in strategic environment since 2003. Secondly, the idea of soft power has been challenged by difficult conflicts, such as Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003. They have shaken the belief that soft power would, or even could, replace hard power in international relations. Thirdly, the European project has formulated from an economic to a political project, and thus security matters are indeed a core policy area where integration should progress. (Toje, 2011b:142–143.)

Various quarters inside and outside the European Union's institutions have contributed to the discussion about the creation of a grand security strategy for the EU. Barrinha (2016) argues that it is vital for the EU that a grand strategy is created to depict guidelines the member states can apply in their individual security actions. Riekeles (2016), alternatively, approaches a grand strategy from a more functional point of view: a grand strategy should be comprehensive and applicable in order to be effective and, thus, worth making.

Riekeles (2016:14) argues that there have been a few attempts towards taking the CSDP cooperation to a new level, but the European Council has tended to postpone the processing of a shared strategy, mostly due to conflicting priorities and more concrete matters that might cause tensions between member states. The economic crisis and inflow of migrants have shaken the political solidarity between member states. The current unstableness of European security has created an immediate need for a shared strategy. According to Riekeles (2016:15), the creation of the Global Strategy by High Representative Mogherini offered a chance for the European Union to create a new narrative of what the European Union is about, what are its threats and interests, and how it recognizes and realizes its potential on the world stage. In addition, a grand strategy would enable the citizens to learn and contest the European Union's central interests (Barrinha, 2016:449.)

In the field of international politics, the European Union acts with limited power and therefore it produces limited results. According to Barrinha, (2016:441-442) the realist approach implies that the EU's international actorness should be linked to a grand strategy that signals both the interests of the people and the relations of the Union with other actors in the international system. Therefore, a grand strategy would share light on the EU's role in the world, which is not as clear as it could be.

Toje (2011b:150-151) points out that European Union is indeed ambitious in its global action, and the problem of the Union as a global power is in its weak federation. Unlike the United States, the European Union does not have centralized decision-making when it comes to foreign policy. The European Union's weak decision-making processes make the Union appear ineffective in its global action. In addition, the European Union's ability to mobilize its resources to achieve its global goals is limited. (Toje, 2011b:151).

Biscop (2016:1) argues that the need for a new security strategy rose from the vulnerabilities of the European Security Strategy of 2003. In the ESS, there was an assumption that European security could be reached through spreading good governance and democracy. This has proven to be a challenging task, and the absence of democracy and governance has spiked crises to which the Union has failed to respond. The ESS of 2003 was considered too optimistic, and thus a new, more realistic and executive approach to CSDP was needed (Biscop, 2016:1.)

It is commonly acknowledged that the area of security policy is a challenging topic. Varying interests of member states and lack of political will make it common to conclude that European security strategy can only be a minimalist affair. Nevertheless, the European Union remains highly interested in its global actions, identity, and credibility as a global actor. The European security strategies act as demonstrations of the complexity of the Union's aspiration to provide security for its citizens and secure its position as a responsible actor making the world a better place for everyone. The European Union has created a unique role as a security actor: unlike NATO, which is purely a defence alliance, the EU acts through various levels of security cooperation. However, the unique role of the European Union makes it struggle at times to live up to its ideals of an ideal-type state (Mälksoo, 2016:374-375.)

The European Council concluded in June 2015 that the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was to work on a strategic approach towards security by preparing a grand strategy for the Union (Zwitter and Kettle, 2015:3). To the relief of those in favor of a shared grand strategy, the current High Representative Federica Mogherini took a strategic view on the CSDP (Barrinha, 2016:442.)

3.3 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy

In the making of European Security Strategy of 2003, there was a relatively small team working with the High Representative Solana. In 2015, there was a need for a different kind of process. The EU of 2015 was going through an internal crisis with Eurozone crisis, migration, and Eurosceptic national movements. Even though the EU was facing its deepest existential crisis, there was a strong support among the citizens for a stronger EU role in the world. It was also clear that many European challenges, such as migration, terrorism, and energy insecurity, were by-products of external challenges and conflicts, and therefore could not be tackled by member states individually. (Tocci, 2016:462.)

For High Representative Mogherini, the process of making the Global Strategy was as important as the final product. In addition to European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission, the Council, policy planners from member states, as well as the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), were involved in the process from an early point onwards. Through work with both the public and institutions, the collective effort made it possible to create a common narrative. The project consisted of two discussions: assessment of the strategic environment of the world and European action to navigate it. (Tocci, 2016:463–465.)

Drafts and conclusions of the Global Strategy were discussed with the member states. In those consultations, three issues were repeated as main concerns or policy areas that still needed to be specified. Firstly, the EU's stance on Russia was a concern for the states that have suffered from Russia's assertiveness, whereas some member states wished to normalize the EU-Russia relations. The result here was a united approach, where each side's concerns were equally understood. Secondly, there was the question of defence. There was a division among member states; some wanted to create a European shared defence, while others did not want to challenge NATO's position as the main defence allegiance. Some member states, mainly those who are not involved in NATO, wanted to

secure their autonomy. Some member states, along with human rights organizations, maintained an attitude that the Global Strategy should not focus excessively on security, because the EU should not appear too defensive (Tocci, 2016:467–469.)

Sus (2016:346–347) criticizes the strategy-making process for not taking the highest levels of national politicians into the discussions. Even though representatives of national ministries for foreign affairs were taken into the process, the strategic review of the security environment and the final draft were not placed under discussion in the European Council. Sus (2016:347) states that the political leaders of Europe, who take part in the decision-making in EU external relations, were absent from the process, and that affects the credibility of the shared authority of the Global Strategy process negatively. It also makes the strategy-making process appear as matter not important enough for European leaders' attention.

On the other hand, Mälksoo (2016:384) argues that in contrast to the European Security Strategy of 2003, which was written by a relatively small unit, the process of writing the Global Strategy of 2016 describes better the situation of security policy-making in the EU. The process of consulting representatives of member states, think tanks, EU committees and networks, the Commission, and European Parliament characterizes the balancing between national and transnational dynamics. (Mälksoo, 2016:384.)

In June 2016, European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission, together with European Council and various other institutions, published a new global strategy for the Union's foreign and security policy, which will be used as the research material of this study. The new security strategy carries the title "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy". The document provides a strategy for the European security policy as a whole by defining the principles and priorities guiding the external action and addressing issues of conflicts and crises. It also gives outlines for the actions and approaches the EU will take to promote its security further.

The document consists of 54 pages plus the acknowledgements, and is available online on the web pages of the EEAS. The strategy has four main sections: A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens Interests, The Principles Guiding our External Action, The Priorities

of our External Action (with subheads such as The Security of our Union, An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises, and Global Governance for the 21st Century), and From Vision to Action.

3.4 Strategy papers as research material

Due to the various conflicts between member states preferences, the Global Strategy is a set of compromises. Its language is therefore typical to an administrative document: it is hedging, polite, generalizing, and limited. The document needs to be read as an administrative document to understand the ideologies and meanings behind the EU-language and thus Palonen's (1988) concept of political literacy is useful.

According to Palonen (1988:23–24), political literacy is not about whether one is able to read a text or not, but instead how the text can be interpreted. Political literacy includes understanding of political vocabulary and its nuances. In order to be capable of political reading, one needs to have certain knowledge on, for example, current political issues and legislative procedures. In addition to mechanical knowledge on vocabulary and themes appearing in the text, politically literate comprehends the text as a political deed, and is able to evaluate its aims and consequences.

Researching politics is about analyzing and breaking down the expressions and political parlances instead of evaluating and assessing them. The focus is not on identifying whether something is political or not, but rather how the political aspect appears in the text. This means that any phenomenon can have a political aspect, every phenomenon does not necessarily have a political aspect, and that no phenomenon is outside the reach of the realm of political (Palonen, 1988:19). Palonen (1988:28–29) uses the term exegesis to discuss interpretation of political texts. Exegesis is here understood as the process of finding interesting arguments in a text and taking those into further inspection. The idea is then to study the underlying meanings and interpret the aspirations of a text through them. It is important to break the text into small enough components, and then rebuild the components into an interpretation. Exegesis can thus act as a tool for interpretation or as an independent research method.

The concepts of time, space, and language are essential parts of exegesis. It is necessary to discover the context of the political text by studying the period during which it was made. How is the past discussed in the text? What sort of a future it describes? What is the understanding of the present? The context can be argued to always be present in political texts; there can be no comprehensive interpretation of a text without understanding its context. By investigating to whom, in what time, and under what circumstances a text appears especially meaningful, the study of the context becomes a valid tool. It often requires reading between the lines and inspecting less obvious arguments and word choices. What is being said in a text is indeed important, but what is left out is equally important. (Palonen, 1988:61–63.)

Palonen (1988:14-15) argues that research is always based on interpretation, especially in political science. He emphasizes that understanding political texts requires interpretation on all levels, and therefore the aspiration for absolute objectivity would only make the analysis shallow and casual. According to Palonen, research is not about knowing the absolute truth, but more about changing and challenging the prevailing understanding of the state of affairs. New results do not mean that the previous understanding is being replaced with the truth; they only represent a new interpretation in the place of the old one. Therefore, all research is interpretation of the examinee situation. Interpretation is always a one-sided, conditional and imperfect understanding of the phenomenon. Every interpretation can be challenged and disputed, as well as counter-argued, and interpretation is never an exhaustive or conclusive account of the examined phenomenon.

Palonen's (1988) theory of political reading is a valid method for the present study. As the study aims to interpret strategy papers, political reading is necessary. When studying strategy papers, exegesis is a used to break down the political parlances in order to create an understanding of the interests and beliefs of the strategy. The aim is to find interesting points in the strategy, which can be then interpreted and gathered to create an understanding of the European Union's security strategy. As mentioned earlier, the EU-language is typically quite neutral, generalized, and hedging. Therefore, it needs to be read as an administrative document, and the use of political reading is inevitable in order to discover the underlying political parlances and arguments.

4. THE FIELD OF THE EU'S SECURITY POLICY

In this chapter, the overall conception of security presented in the Global Strategy is discussed. The focus will be on creating an understanding of the entirety of the security policies described in the document. The aim is to analyze, what agendas are linked to security policy and how comprehensive is the conception of security presented in the Global Strategy. In addition, the actors related to the Global Strategy are briefly discussed. The Global Strategy for the European Union describes and outlines the interests of the European Union in relation to its foreign and security policy. By studying the Global Strategy, it is possible to analyze the primary interests the European Union sets as its core agenda at the world stage.

4.1   Military Sector

The strongest connotations one has when thinking about security are related to military and physical violent threats, committed by hostile states. In realist political thought, military power is often discussed as the most important sector of world politics. In the anarchic world, competition on military power and the perception of threat are seen as the only permanent laws of the system. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:49) argue that even though the military threats in Western European states have diminished, there is still a strong set of military functions in the area. The sovereignty is linked to the states' legitimate right to use power and consist of offensive and defensive capabilities. In addition, Buzan et al. (1998:57) state, that one key reason for the military sector's strong role is the perception of threat: the psychological idea of the possibility of foreign hostiles instead of an immediate threat to sovereignty.

The military sector of security could be described as the Achilles heel of the CSDP. As Buzan et al (1998:49–52) discuss, the military sovereignty is the one field of policy that states want to hold on to. The right to use military power and decide on military operations is a factor that is argued to defend the sovereignty of the member states, which is one reason why it has such a significant symbolic meaning. Therefore, the stance taken in the Global Strategy on the military security is interesting.

Various issues are linked to the field of military security. In several parts of the document, terrorism is discussed as the immediate and most important military threat for the EU. Terrorism and increased military threats are visible in several parts of the document. A strong stance for military force is taken, even though other physical violent threats are not discussed in depth in the Global Strategy:

> As Europeans we must take a greater responsibility for our security […] Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously when necessary [...] Alongside external crisis management and capacity-building, the EU should also be able to assist in protecting its Members upon their request, and its institutions. (The European Union, 2016:19-20.)

The stance taken in the extract is quite a strong statement for a European military synergy. Demanding solidarity between the states is in line with the Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty that states that Member States shall have an obligation to assist and aid if another Member State is under attack. Despite the existence of Article 42.7, the mutual military assistance has not played a significant part in the European Union and the article has only been invoked once, by France after the terrorist attacks in 2016. The argument for stronger soldierly and military effort and force is a new characteristic of European strategic argument. In the previous Global Strategy for the European Union (2003), military actions are discussed quite vaguely, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is mentioned as the main military framework. In the 2003 Security Strategy, the rhetoric of military action is quite hedged and there are no strong arguments and drive for shared military action. There are no signs of efforts towards military union; the issue is downplayed to stating that military assets may be needed in case of a conflict.

In the 2016 Global Strategy, the rhetoric of military security is also quite imperative. There is a strong emphasis on the actions that the EU takes in phrases such as "the EU therefore deepens cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance" and "the EU needs to be strengthened as a security union" (p. 20). The shift in rhetoric is even more visible when compared to the suggestive phrases used in the 2003 Security Strategy, such as "we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs" and "military instruments may be needed to restore order" (p. 7). The shift in rhetoric is one of the most radical findings in the analysis as it clearly manifests that the European Union's strategic role as a user of soft power has

guaranteed neither immunity nor security from external threats. The rhetorical shift towards further use of hard power is present throughout the strategy paper.

4.2 Economic and Environmental Sectors

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998:95–117) define economic security as one of the sectors of security. The threats for economic security consist of various aspects of political action. Buzan et al. (1998:100–101) explain that the issues that fall under the category of economic security are dependent on the securitizing actor. The state can securitize nearly any economic issue by declaring it a security issue. According to Buzan et al. (1998:95-96), universally defining what existential threats the economic sector of the society faces is relatively challenging, since different idealists, such as mercantilists, liberals, and socialists, have different views on the relationship of economy and state. Despite the hardship, Buzan et al. (1998:98) have outlined elements that can be linked to economic security.

Firstly, according to Buzan et al. (1998:98), economic security can be identified as a state's ability to maintain independent capability for producing military supplies and having proper economy to mobilize state military when necessary. Secondly, it can be interpreted as a security of supply and thus exploiting the global market for political ends. Thirdly, the aspect of losers and winners on the global market space can create insecurity. Fears of market hegemony of a certain state, for example, the United Stated of America, may cause security concerns for other states, and developing states might be afraid of being exploited. In addition, black market goods such as drugs and guns entering and circling in the global market might cause security concerns. Finally, the fear that the complete international economy itself would collapse causes political pressure towards security policies. Buzan et al. (1998:99) highlight that not all of these fears embody as security issues and therefore they advise deliberate consideration before securitizing economy issues.

As the world's largest single market, the economic sector of security can be considered important for the Union. In fact, issues related to economy are present also in the Global Strategy of 2016. In the document, economic volatility and trafficking are mentioned as

some of the issues that endanger the security of the Europeans. The economic approach to peace is regarded as a tool for the European Union to promote stability in its neighboring areas and further. This is seen in the statement "the EU will foster the space in which the legitimate economy can take root" (p. 31). In a conflict area, this is described to mean "ensuring humanitarian aid and access to allow basic goods and services" (p. 31). Further synergy between trade and development to assist in long-term peacebuilding is mentioned as another point. This rhetoric is in line with the previous narrative in the EU-politics, as the Union is, proudly, the biggest donor of humanitarian aid in the world.

Restrictive measures are presented as a new agenda in comparison to the Security Strategy of 2003. In the Global Strategy of 2016, there is a short paragraph about using restrictive measures to "bring about peaceful change" (p. 32). Smart sanctions are mentioned as restrictive measures. They will "be carefully calibrated and monitored to support the legitimate economy and avoid harming local societies" (p. 32). In reference to the current sanctioning of Russia due to the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, this is a legitimate amendment to the Strategy. Whether smart sanctions can be placed in a way that will not harm the EU or its member states is questionable. In the current case, the possibility of doing so has been proven impossible, as the Russian counter-sanctions have shaken the producers of exports and have affected member states differently, harming the European economy (Internationale Nederlanden Groep, 2014).

The Iranian nuclear program is mentioned as a smart use of sanctions. The European Union used sanctions towards Iran from 2006 onwards in order to reach an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, which was perceived aggressive. Through placing smart sanctions, the European Union was able to negotiate an agreement with Iran (European External Action Service, 2017). The Iranian nuclear agreement seems to be something of which the European Union is particularly proud.

> We have a shared European interest in facing the world together. Through our combined weight, we can promote agreed rules to contain power politics and contribute to a peaceful, fair and prosperous world. The Iranian nuclear agreement is a clear illustration of this fact. (The European Union, 2016:15.)

> The EU will strongly support […] enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes. We will use every means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme. (The European Union, 2016:42.)

The European Union's pride of the successful sanctions that led to a nuclear agreement with Iran is visible in the citations above. They appear to put the Union up on a pedestal in a sense that the EU is able to solve even difficult crises through its abilities as an economy. As the European Union has not been that successful in its sanctions on Russia and North Korea, this way of speaking can be interpreted as a rhetorical choice to create a narrative of European success and respond to criticism towards European Union's difficulties with sanctions.

Another aspect that is highlighted in various parts of the Global Strategy is energy security. As the EU is highly dependent on imported energy, especially from Russia, the issue of energy is very well politicized and securitized. In the Global Strategy, there is a clear agenda for diversifying energy sources of the European Union and using energy diplomacy to strengthen relations to allow diversified sources to reach European markets (p. 22). This development is a relevant issue for both economic and security agenda.

The strategic attempts to diversify energy sources can be interpreted as an attempt to decrease the dependence on Russia, since it tends to be quite an unpredictable actor and unreliable partner in the field of world economics and politics. However, the Global Strategy does not issue an opinion on where and from whom it would import its energy supply instead of Russia. The issue of energy is highly complex and creates dependencies on any provider, since the European Union does not have the capabilities to provide for itself at the moment. It is stressed in the Global Strategy that all contracts and agreements related to energy infrastructure with third countries need to be transparent and comply with international standards.

By the environmental sector of security, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998:74-75) mean problems such as disruption of ecosystems, energy problems, population problems, problems related to food supply, economic problems such as unsustainable production, and civil strife, meaning the war-related environmental damage. There is very little discussion on these issues in the Global Strategy. The only expressions of these concerns are in the

field of energy supply and distribution, as discussed above, and some mentions of sustainable growth and hardships climate change can cause. Even though the environmental problems and threats are very visible on the global political agenda, they are not considered that important in the Global Strategy as primary threats to the European security.

The lack of discussion of environmental issues as a security agenda is surprising. Since the European Union has various environmental policies and action programs, it can be considered even startling that the environmental security issues are not discussed further in the document. As migration and the turbulent situation in the Middle East are seen as security challenges for the Union, the fact that climate change and environmental challenges can be considered as key factors in the conflicts in Syria (Gleick, 2014) seems to be completely disregarded, except for a brief mention on page 27. The environmental issues are addressed briefly as issues that the European Union needs to take into account in its external action and responsibilities (p. 17).

4.3   Societal Sector

In addition to studying the external security threats, there needs to be an understanding of the internal security factors as well (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998:119). Buzan et al. (1998:119) point out, that state and societal boundaries nearly never go hand in hand, as state is a fixed territory whereas societies may vary across boundaries. For example, in the former Soviet area, states have mixed and cross-border societal groups and the nation-state where one lives does not necessarily define one's identity or roots. As an organizing concept for societal security, Buzan et al. (1998:123) define identity. Societal insecurity can be found when a community finds a development or potentiality a threat to its existence. In contemporary Europe, mainly national groups form this kind of communities, but religious or racial groups can have even more relevance.

Key threats to societal security are various. For example, migration might threaten a community, as a community might fear being overrun by another migrating community. In addition, horizontal competition can cause the perception of threat as it takes place with

minorities and the main culture, as the rights to culture and language of a certain minority might be threatened by majority politics and influence. Vertical competition is an interest for the present study. Vertical competition threatens societies, when people stop seeing themselves as a part of a certain community in a situation of, for example, an integration process or a regionalist project, that drives them towards either a wider or a smaller new identity. (Buzan et al. 1998:121.)

As Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998:122) discuss, the integration process may cause tensions and thus affect internal societal security. Therefore, it is highly intriguing that the Global Strategy of 2016 does not address the issue of internal conflicting identities at all. There is one section, in which the regional order is being discussed, but it is more or less oriented towards regions worldwide and not those inside the European Union. In addition, the focus is on creating regional organizations to support the local peace-keeping and economic gains of the area. The lack of discussion on internal conflicting identities is even more surprising in the context of Brexit and the rising eurosceptic movements all around Europe. Even though the Global Strategy was published only six days after the Brexit referendum, it is not discussed in the document. There is a brief mention of Brexit in the foreword:

> The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned [...] a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. This is even more true after the Brexit referendum. We will indeed have to rethink the way our Union works, but we perfectly know what to work for. (The European Union, 2016:3.)

The citation above confirms that Brexit as well as other possible exits are seen as existential threats to the European Union. The action chosen to respond to these doubts is to create an ever-closer Union. On this basis, it can be argued that the Global Strategy acts not only as a strategy for European global action, but also as a manifestation for European unity, one that states that the European Union will become ever stronger and more united during an internal crisis. In this context, the member states and the EU-citizen become one of the main audiences for the document.

The conflicting identities and ideologies inside the European Union are overlooked, even though they might be the greatest challenge for the European Union at the moment. The ideologies of sovereignty and the rise of nationalist movements are definitely partly due to

the intensive integration process, which is perceived to threat the national identities and the existence of nation-states. Conflicting ideas on who "we" and the "others" are can cause political instability. On the other hand, due to the sectoral integration process, the understanding of who "we" are varies between the topics referred to. For example, when it comes to issues related to euro, "we" might include the whole Euro-area, whereas when it comes to migration inside the EU, "we" might be limited to a nation or even to a smaller community. In the Global Strategy, no stance is taken on how the internal stability with conflicting interests between member states and inside the member states could be handled and what actions the European Union should take in order to secure peaceful opportunities for communities to influence the political developments and integration processes.

In the European Security Strategy of 2003, there was a positive attitude towards enlargement. It was stated that "we need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbors in the East", but at the same time it was clear that "enlargement should [not] create new dividing lines in Europe" (p. 8). Crises that have occurred since the enlargement of 2004, such as Russo-Georgian War and the multiple hardships in Chechnya, have established NATO and EU enlargements as security issues. There is an own subheading for Enlargement Policy in the Global Strategy of 2016, where the attitude towards enlargement is more reserved:

> Within the scope of the current enlargement policy, the challenges of migration, energy security, terrorism and organised crime are shared between the EU, Western Balkans and Turkey. They can only be addressed together. Yet the resilience of these countries cannot be taken for granted. (The European Union, 2016:24.)

The sentiment towards enlargement is significantly different in the Global Strategy of 2016 compared to the ESS of 2003. As the citation above indicates, the enlargement is not understood as an ultimate goal or valuable in itself. The enlargement is here seen as an appropriate action, only if it benefits the already existing member states and brings advantages to the Union. Distributing European values and lifestyle through enlargement is not presented as an ideal anymore, but instead the aim here is to protect the interest of the already existing European Union. When it comes to migration policy, the Global Strategy focuses on the origin and transit countries to promote resilience and security and thus hinder the urge to migrate to Europe. Due to the current inflow of migrants and refugees, it is understandable that the European Union is concerned of further enlargement;

according to the Global Strategy of 2016, the European Union will cooperate with candidate countries to ensure their adequacy as members and to ensure cooperation on, for example, counter-terrorism, security sector reform, and migration (p. 24).

It can be argued that the strict enlargement policy makes sure that the enlargement will not endanger the European values and that the candidate countries are fully invested and devoted to the membership. The Union does not want new members to apply just to benefit of the positive effects of the membership as bandwagons. As opposed to the Security Strategy of 2003, the issue of enlargement receives significantly more attention in the Global Strategy of 2016.

4.4   Political Sector

According to Buzan et al. (1998:142), political threats are aimed against the idea and institutions of a certain political entity. For example, international law and human rights are issues that can be securitized under the category of political security. In addition, threats that tend to cause disintegration and mistrust in a state or similar political entities without military force, can be argued to be political ones. (Buzan et al. 1998:142–145.)

The European Union is based on a set of values. In the Global Strategy (2016), these values are defined in the sections A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens' Interests and The Principles Guiding our External Action. The values and principles are peace and security, prosperity, democracy, a rules-based global order, unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership. Of these values, democracy, a rules-based global order and unity can be easily linked to the ideology of the Union itself, and threat to those values could be understood as a threat to the whole European Union. The concept of democracy includes human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law (p. 15). These values are presented as the main agenda of the European Union, and are therefore being carried out throughout the whole document. For example, the theme of democracy is linked to most of the chapters and sectors in some way.

There are some aspects of political security in the Global Strategy. There is a presence of the concept of political security that derives from the values the European Union is set to

defend, but concrete issues and examples raised that could be interpreted as purely political threats are subtle. As an example of political threats, cyber security is discussed as one priority guiding the European Union's external action. In the document, there is an understanding of increasing hybrid and cyber threats, and thus the European Union is discussed to provide member states aid in protecting themselves against cyber-attacks. This means developing the technology of threat recognition and creating policies for more secure data storage. At the same time, as to the value of fundamental freedoms, the European Union is described to emphasize the importance of maintaining "an open, free and safe cyberspace" (p. 21). In this example, there are actually two political threats combined; the first one is the external threat to the organizational stability by cyber-attacks, whereas the second threat that endangers the fundamental freedoms is a by-product of the measures taken to react to the first one.

Moreover, the whole Global Strategy is in a way derived from the political threat perception. In order to develop a security strategy, there needs to be a feeling of insecurity and most fundamentally that is a perception of a threat to the existence and ideology of the Union. As the main agenda for the Global Strategy is to promote our citizens' interests, the threat perception in the Strategy is consequential from the values that are seen to be the interests of the citizens and therefore they need to be defended.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998:152-153) present an interesting point connected to the European Union. They describe a political threat of the integration process, and use the European Union as an example. The threat even strong states might perceive is a threat to their sovereignty. Buzan et al. (1998:153) describe this as a strange kind of threat, since it is substantially self-imposed, since the member states are in the European Union on voluntary basis. The member states have entered the process for their own reasons, and the process is threatening the sovereignty of the member states. Since the member states are the ones that originally decided to join in the European Union, it is on one hand contradictory that the European Union is perceived as threat to the state, whereas on the other hand it is quite understandable that the member states fear that their sovereignty is gradually being taken further away from them. It would be provoking to study how this issue might be visible on the European security agenda, when there is a lot of debate going on about the future direction of the European integration process.

Political security is linked to Palonen's (1988:33) argument of classifications as political actions. Palonen (1988:33–34) discusses the conflict between us and the others, and the classifications of people or groups that are for or against us. These can be expressed through simply arguing what and who we are, and naming the others and their attributes. Another way of classifying is through negation: through what "we" are not. On the other hand, what "we" are can be argued through what the others are not. In addition, to make it even more dimensional, by arguing what "we" are, at the same time it is argued what the others are not. The discussion of shared identities is linked also to the societal sector of security, in a sense that it can be understood as a threat to member states and their societies and cultures, but when discussed from the point of view of the European Union, conflicting identities and strong member states can be interpreted as a threat to a strong Union. Therefore, it can be argued that in relation to political security, the discourse of a strong and united European citizens and Union is in fact a way to protect and legitimize the institutions and ideals of the European Union.

High Representative Mogherini addresses this issue in her foreword of the Global Strategy. She argues that the member states have shared goals and common interests, and states that achieving the goals requires a common European understanding.

> All these goals can only be achieved by a truly united and committed Europe. Joining all our cultures together to achieve our shared goals and serve our common interest is a daily challenge, but it is also our greatest strength. (The European Union, 2016:4.)

These arguments are in hand in hand with the writer's intentions: the High Representative Mogherini and the European Commission see the EU as one united actor and therefore the lack of diverse goals and conflicting ideologies fit well to that agenda, even though in reality creating a CFSP has shown to be extremely difficult and consuming.

In foreword to the Global Strategy for the Global Strategy, High Representative Mogherini uses various times expressions that Palonen would argue to depict the division into others and us. As Mogherini mentions the European Union for the first time, she refers to it as "our Union" and goes on to state that "our citizens" need a strong European Union. Mogherini mentions "our Union" and "our citizens" various times in the foreword, without referring straight to the EU itself. In addition, Mogherini uses we as the subject actor in the foreword, which can be stated to be chosen to create feeling of unity and belonging

between the member states. The timing of the publishing of the Global Strategy was right after the Brexit referendum, so using unifying terminology is therefore understandable. Even when speaking of the member states, Mogherini uses the phrase "our countries" to suggest that there is no conflict among member states. Overall, the foreword aims clearly to unify the member states and create on image of the EU as one united group of countries and people.

Miller (2012:42) discusses connotations as ways to convey meanings. Connotations are a way to give meaning to words and phenomena based on previous knowledge and experiences. For example, "we" and "us" connote with family, social and hobby groups, and have a strong positive emotional loading. Human beings are gregarious creatures, and therefore the usage of social inclusion is a valid rhetorical method. Mogherini's use of first person gives the reader a feeling of belonging and a sense of being included in the process and the system, and makes one to relate to the project and values even though one might oppose to the ideology in the first place.

As to the others, Mogherini chooses to refer as a semi-collective group. Terms Mogherini uses to describe the others are such as "our partners" and "rest of the world". Partners are named only in the cases of NATO and transatlantic cooperation. On the other hand, the EU is compared to the rest of the world by statements such as "we are in the world's G3", and "we are the first trading partner […] for almost every country in the globe", and by emphasizing the EU's superior investments in development cooperation, which are more than the rest of the world combined. It is worth noting that, besides the NATO, there is only the EU, its unidentified partners and, then, the rest of the world.

Federica Mogherini builds a strong argument for Europe in her foreword. "The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned" (p. 3) is a strong statement. She goes on to use another strong narrative by stating, "the world needs a strong European Union like never before" (p. 3). Both of these narratives have strong connotations and emotional charging, but no specific meaning. The existence of the Union is being questioned, but by whom? Moreover, why does the world need a stronger EU, even when the EU is losing one of its strongest military powers?

4.5 Securitizing Actors and Referent Objects

In addition to the sectors of security analysis, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998:35–42) discuss actors related to security policy. The main actors, according to Buzan et al. (1998:36) are securitizing actors and referent objects. The securitizing actors are the actors that perform the political acts related to security. The securitizing actor can be a person or a group, but most common securitizing actors are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups (Buzan et al. 1998:40). It is not always easy to determine who the securitizing actor is, since there is an ongoing debate whether a state can be an actor. It is argued that the actors are always the individuals that make the decisions and execute the policies.

The referent objects are the things or people that have been threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998:36). The referent object can be the state as well as the nation. The referent object can basically be anything that the securitizing actor wants to protect, and therefore the scope of referent objects is enormous. Referent objects might be nations, ideologies, or global systems, such as world economy.

In the Global Strategy, the European Union is presented as the actor that provides and defines security. Whether that is the case is arguable, since there are always individual actors designing the strategies. In addition, there is no clear notion of who is the author of the document. There is a foreword by High Representative Mogherini, and the security policy is an agenda of the European External Action Service (EEAS). In the Acknowledgements -section, almost every EU-organization is listed, starting with all ministers of the EU member states, European Commission, Parliament and the European Council. Greenhill (2016) sheds light on the difficulty of making effective policies if the member states have individual interests and if there are strong divisions of opinion in the domestic politics of a member state, for example, pro-migration versus anti-migration. Therefore, it can be argued that there is purposeful attempt to show unity and state that the document is done in cooperation with every EU agency.

Palonen (1988:78–82) describes the writer's relation to the text. Texts are always created by someone, and therefore the writer is an actor on the context of the text. The writer is

present in the text, even though it is often avoided and thus identifying the writer is a part of source criticism. The writer affects, for example, the expressions, words, idioms, tones and arguments presented in the text. According to Palonen (1988:79), even collective texts such as political platforms can provide hints of the individual members of the cabinet that have provided for the text. High Representative Mogherini and the EEAS are both working under the Commission, whose main purpose is to provide for the common good of the European Union. According to Mälksoo (2017:383) suggest that while the document focuses on the European Union's interests, it has a noticeable Italian imprint, since its main strategists, Frederica Mogherini, Nathalie Tocci, and Antonio Missiroli, are Italians.

If the Global Strategy truly describes a collective will, it might be a legitimate conclusion that the state, or in this case, the European Union, could be called a securitizing actor. In addition, the fact that the Global Strategy is presented as merely an administrative document can be interpreted as a defence strategy against criticism. When there are no clear actors behind the document and all EU-agencies and members are listed as contributors, it leaves little room for disapproval from inside the Union.

The referent objects in the Global Strategy vary during the Global Strategy. Generally, the values identified in the first chapter – peace and security, prosperity, democracy, rules-based global order, unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership – are the ultimate referent objects. The referent objects are further described in the first chapter: "the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons" (2016:10). The need for a strategy comes from a need to defend something from attacks, and it can be stated that in this document, those values listed above are the main referent objects of securitization. When it comes to military and economic security, the member states and the citizens can also be identified as referent objects, since their physical security and well-being is of concern. In some cases, for example when the external action and resilience of neighboring areas are discussed, the referent actors are also the citizens of those areas and the members of conflicts outside the European Union. The whole humanity can be understood as a referent object when it comes to nuclear safety and managing global crisis, such as poverty and famine.

When compared to the European Security Strategy of 2003, the Global Strategy is significantly more complex in its understanding of referent objects, since it recognizes a various range of issues as security matters. Still, it can be argued that there are no strong aims towards securitization in the Global Strategy of 2016. The biggest emphasis is on the securitization of European military security and the safety of the citizen from external attacks. Even though various issues are discussed and stressed as security agendas, the rhetoric of the Global Strategy, in most cases, does not appear strongly protective or definitive.

5. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A POWER

This chapter aims to discuss what kind of a power the European Union is. The issue is approached through three perspectives: the Union's interests, independency, and role in the world. The aim of the analysis is to evaluate the European Union as a power holder, its role and meaning in the world, and the abilities and resources it has to affect world politics.

5.1 Interests

The interests mentioned in the Global Strategy are various. Local interests focus on the prosperity of the EU area as well as the security of the citizen. For example, "the European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory" (p. 7), is an example of local and quite defensive interests, which are typical to small powers. The aim to advance the prosperity of people (p.8) can be understood as a local interest. In her foreword, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini argues that promoting the common interest of EU citizens is necessary.

However, promoting global interests is a characteristic typical for a superpower (McCormick, 2007:18). Global interests are visible throughout the Strategy. Firstly, in the introductory paragraph, the EU is understood to have a collective role in the world, which indicates an interest in matters beyond its borders. Secondly, the idea of a collective role is taken further shortly afterwards, where it states that the EU has "an idealistic aspiration for a better world" and that the EU is "a responsible global stakeholder" (p. 8). It is therefore arguable, that the European Union wants to be acknowledged to serve globally a greater purpose than only discuss what happens inside its borders.

In the Global Strategy, the European Union's global interests are interlocked with local ones. The Union is seen to achieve its own goals through various interests around the world. Biscop (2015:3) points out the positive narrative of the 2003 European Security Strategy that integrated internal and external security already in its headline: "A secure Europe in a better world" implies that the best way to secure the European Union's future and safety is to make the world a better place. In addition, Pomorska and Vanhoonacker

(2016:215) argue that it is not sensible to make separate internal and external security policies. An integrated approach is therefore necessary.

The same aspiration is also visible in the Global Strategy, as the global agendas are linked to European security and prosperity. For example, it is in "the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states" in, for example, Central Asia and Central and Northern Africa (p. 9). The Global Strategy has sections for various areas around the world, and each of them has a set agenda. "A peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean", "a closer Atlantic", "a connected Asia", and "a cooperative Arctic" are examples of the Union's global attractions. Even though the EU's global agenda is successfully linked to internal security and prosperity, the field of global interests is quite vast. Most goals are linked to better trade connections in order to achieve prosperity to both partners (p. 38) and there is also a visible attempt to take part in solving crises and conflicts around the world, for example, in North Africa, Korean peninsula, and Turkey (p. 34-38). Even though the global aspirations are highly visible in the Global Strategy, Rappold (2016) argues that the immediate interests of citizens are a key factor, whereas in the European Security Strategy of 2003 there was a more strategic outlook towards a better world. The Global Strategy focuses first and foremost to provide security and prosperity for the European citizen.

An example can be found, where the EU emphasizes its power in the global arena as a peace mediator by stating that the "European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace" and that "the EU will engage more systematically on the security dimension of conflicts" (p. 30). It can be argued that the European Union is declaring its status as a peace mediator as well as a more active and even more aggressive protector of the peace than before:

> The EU will engage more systematically on the security dimension of these conflicts. […] European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives, notably civilians. (The European Union, 2016:30.)

This is an example of the EU-language, where aspirations are sometimes hidden in complicated and polite structures. It can be argued, that this citation acts as a justification for intervention and military actions in areas and conflicts that significantly endanger the lives of the civilian population. The agenda for better preparation and readiness to take

action is presented here as a necessity, instead of a guideline. Using verb forms such as must and will give an impression of urgency and strong mindset to act in accordance with the set agenda.

"Global governance" has its own section in the Global Strategy, which indicates to the European Union's position in the world. It includes ideas of reforming global organizations and institutions, investing in cooperation, implementing international agreements, widening and developing cooperation in the fields of trade and security, and collaborating with new non-state actors, such as NGOs and human rights defenders (p 39-44). Through the examples given, it can be argued that the European Union is presented to have characteristics linked to a superpower. In the case of the United States, there has been a shared opinion of the US acting as a world police and governing the world to act in a preferred manner. The rhetoric of European "global governance" can be interpreted to stand for the same idea; it is in the European Union's interest that actors in the world politics all play by the same rules as the EU. To maximize its potential in world politics, the European Union needs international law and institutions, and therefore it is only logical that the Union needs the actors with greater power resources to follow the commonly agreed rules.

It can be stated that a superpower bases its actions on interests, while a small power emphasizes values. This argument is valid when studying the security strategies of the United States and Sweden. The United States can here be considered a great power, if not a superpower. Its National Security Strategy of 2017 begins with an introductory chapter that discusses the threats to American way of life and world hegemony, and identifies the enemies of the United States and thus attempts to justify the actions suggested. The document consists of five sections; first comes the discussion of the threats to the American way of life, then the promotion of interests, and the preservation of peace. When discussing the American abilities to preserve peace, American capabilities of military, defence industry, nuclear forces, and intelligence take up to seven pages, whereas diplomatic approach is limited to two pages. Fourth section focuses on advancing American influence in the world, which indeed is an aspiration of a great power. The strategy ends with regional approaches on different areas of the world. (US Government, 2017:V–VI.)

The Swedish National Security Strategy has a different kind of emphasis. While it begins with discussion Sweden's national interests, the interests are linked to homeland security, maintaining fundamental values of democracy and human rights, and strengthening solidarity within the European Union. As threats to Sweden's security, no specific actors are mentioned, but instead phenomena that challenge the state order and the welfare state, such as information and cyber-attacks, organized crime, health threats, and climate change. The Swedish security strategy focuses on regional security and stability. It does not address the whole world in the same way as the American document, and limits its functions to the Nordic area and the European Union. In addition, the introductory chapter of the document discusses major shifts and trends in the world politics without going much into detail; there is a strong agreement in the text that the world politics affect Sweden more than Sweden attempts to affect the world. (Government Offices of Sweden, 2017:2–3.)

It can be argued that the European Global Strategy is something in between. It starts with the definition of European values, which indicates towards a small power. In the Global Strategy, the EU addresses the whole world and has specific interests regarding different regions, which, on the other hand, indicates great power aspirations. It can be argued with certainty, that the European Union's Global Strategy is not as decisive in its attempts to protect its interests as the American counter partner, but has characteristics of great power agenda-setting and rhetoric.

5.2   Dependency and independency

The European Union's status as an independent actor is evaluated from two perspectives. The independency or dependency can appear through actions and attitude towards international law and organizations. Additionally, independency is studied from a military point of view, meaning operational independency to answer to threats and having credible defence capabilities. The focus is first on the European Union's perceptions on international law and institutions, such as, the United Nations. Then, the European Union's military powers and relations are discussed.

5.2.1 International law

Keohane (1969:295-296) discusses four categories of states by their ability to influence international politics. System-determining powers are the ones that have the ability to dominate the international system, whereas system-influencing actors cannot rule the system by themselves, but have enough power to shape it. System-affecting actors – also referred to here as small powers – cannot affect the system by themselves, but can influence it through groups of states or international organizations. There are also system-ineffectual states that have a minimal effect on the world stage. Toje (2011b:140-141) argues that the European Union acts as a small power by distributing its power through international institutions and, at the same time, has been able to affect the policies of other powers.

The European Union has been a big supporter of international law and the Global Strategy does not make an exception. Starting from the executive summary, the Global Strategy leans heavily on the idea of rules-based global order. It states that "the EU will promote a rules-based global order" and has "an interest in promoting agreed rules" in order to "contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world". The need for international law is argued as a way to protect the Union's "vital interests" such as peace, security, prosperity, and democracy (p. 39). The Union's "Integrated approach to conflicts" is as well based on agreements and partnerships (p. 10).

Global governance for the 21st century is discussed as a part of the European Union's global agenda. This agenda relies heavily on international law. The international law is characterized to "ensure human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons" (p. 10). The main framework here is the United Nations. At the world stage, the European Union trusts the United Nations to provide tools for achieving peace and prosperity globally. According to the document, the European Union is willing to invest in the work of the United Nations, especially in relation to peacekeeping, mediation, and humanitarian work (p. 40).

As a member of the United Nations, the EU does not only seek to be involved, but also to reform it (p. 39). Here, the EU acts like a system-affecting state; it tries to influence through international organizations. The pro-UN atmosphere present in the Global Strategy

is in line with Keohane's (1969) argument of a system-affecting power that understands it does not have an influence on the global system without the assistance of other actors.

The whole Global Strategy seems to be based on international law. The European Union is in itself a community of values and norms, and therefore it is understandable that its global action is based on those same guidelines. It can also be argued, that the European Union seeks security by relying heavily on rules in its global action. By relying on set of commonly accepted rules and norms, it can seek protection and support for its global actions and agendas. In addition, the United Nations and other international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) condemn and sanction breaking their regulations. Thus, they provide more security for the European Union, since the EU does not necessarily have to deal with violators of its agenda alone.

Toje (2011a:47) discusses dependency as a feature of a small state. A small power understands that it cannot achieve security by acting alone. In addition, Toje (2001a:47) argues that a small power relies on neutrality and alliance, and that it tends to follow the leadership of the ally closely. As the European Union sets the United Nations as its main framework, it acts strategically as a small power. It does not set its own rules and make others to follow them, but relies heavily on the set of international rules that are created in cooperation with the western powers. As there is also the aim to affect the United Nations, the Global Strategy creates a picture of the Union as a key factor in the United Nations. This interpretation hedges the European Union's dependency of the Unites Nations to appear in a way that the European Union is a strategic actor and acts as sort of moral guardian for the United Nations. In United Nations' decision-making major powers tend to hinder unattractive decisions and push their preferred agenda on the expenses of other members.

5.2.2   Military perspective

Toje (2011a:47) argues that small powers depend on the protection of other powers and therefore cannot act alone or even protect themselves from external threats. This argument is heavily tackled in the Global Strategy, where the European Union is depicted as a strong, independent, and effective user of military power.

As argued in the first part of the analysis, there is a quite strong military presence visible in the Global Strategy. The EU's military action has its own section titled as "Security and Defence" (p.19-21). The focus in this section is on two agendas, increasing the EU's military capabilities, and being an independent user of force. The European Union is here described as a coordinated and united actor. There is a strong claim for "a better equipped" Union. According to the Strategy, the EU must be "ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect" the Europeans from external threats (p. 19). It is obvious, that the European Union is described to have high military capabilities in the future, and that the Union is moving towards cooperated defence and higher military presence than before and thereby claiming its position as a superpower.

The EU of the Global Strategy is also an independent actor. The European Union has previously been described as a follower of the United States when it comes to military attendance or peacekeeper operations, but the Global Strategy aims to change this connotation. In fact, when it comes to the Global Strategy, a very slight anti-NATO argument can be detected. Firstly, NATO is understood as an already existing organization of security that does not need to be demolished. At the same time, it is argued that NATO is not sufficient to protect the Europe: "while NATO exists to defend its member states (…) from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organized" (p. 19). Secondly, the European Union's policy decisions are disconnected from NATO's framework. It is argued that "EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO" (p. 20). This quote indicates that NATO cannot be the security framework for the European Union, and therefore there is a need to act autonomously. Thirdly, NATO is seen as an important partner for the EU, but the emphasis is on the independency of the Union's actions:

> The EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions with NATO. (The European Union, 2016:20.)

Actually, the phrase "to act autonomously" is repeated three times in the section about security and defence (p. 19-21), which indicates a quite strong emphasis towards military independency.

Toje (2012) reports a phone call with Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, two leading thinkers in international relations. Even though Waltz believes the US to be the strongest power in the world, he sees NATO's role in the world diminishing. He argues that nowadays NATO is not an alliance in military context, since it lacks military capacity and shared threats. He points out that NATO died with the end of the Cold War. When it comes to EU-NATO cooperation, Mearsheimer argues that NATO's power in Europe is in decline. He gives two reasons for the fading cooperation. Firstly, the economic recession has forced the United States to reduce its military spending. Secondly, the United States' attention is aimed towards the east: its military focus is on Asia. The United States are not interested in promoting unity with Europe anymore. When it comes to military alliances, NATO is becoming more and more about the United States and Europe's role in it is diminishing. The shift is based on a shift in US interests and the lack of Europe's motivation. Europe will struggle to become a security union, since it seems to lack great power capabilities and there are different levels of motivation towards the integration process. (Toje, 2012.)

The disappointment towards EU-US cooperation has been expressed also in the United States. The Obama administration has suggested that European NATO members need to take more responsibility of European security. In an interview with The Atlantic (April 2016), President Obama said that it has been a habit of European countries to call the US for action during times of crisis, such as the Gaddafi regime in Libya, and then showing no motivation to assist. In the same interview, he stated that "free riders" should be actively involved in the coalition. The United States will continue to apply military capabilities, but they expect others to act their part as well. The former Secretary of Defence Leon E. Panetta argued already in 2011 that NATO had become a "two-tiered alliance" due to the free riders. He added that Europeans should not assume that the US would always compensate for their failures to provide what is needed for NATO (New York Times, 5th October 2011).

Marsh and Rees (2012:66) state that the United States is less interested in and committed to European security than any other time since the Second World War. The Europe is not a significant focus of American global policy anymore, except for Balkan stability and Russian reassertion. Even though the US shows no more interest in Europe, it still counts Europe as an important partner in the war against terrorism.

Still, according to Toje (2011b:146), the European Union relies on the US to provide military security. The US-EU cooperation in Europe is based on NATO, which is based on the US. NATO remains the primary security framework in Europe, and US remains the primary framework of NATO. The European Union tends to act passively in this relationship, and expects the US to set the agenda for global action. Since the EU and NATO use the same European resources, it is difficult to establish Europe's own security forces. (Toje, 2011b:146.)

Even though the European Union has succeeded in its cooperation with NATO, the European Union as a partner is a better fit than NATO for some nations. For example, the European Union was definitely a more neutral partner than NATO for the post-conflict Georgia, since NATO and US presence might have caused extra tensions (Marsh and Rees, 2012:6). It can therefore be argued that the European Union can be more active in its peacekeeping operations with less NATO attendance, since it does not have to struggle with the agendas and conflicts of interests that the United States has gained throughout its history as a superpower.

In this light, the new military agenda of an autonomous Europe becomes valid. Since the United States shows less interest in EU-NATO cooperation, it is logical that the Union aims to promote its independency. The dispute between the US and European NATO members, in relation to the level of input for European security, has led the EU to think of other ways to provide for the safety of the Europeans.

McCormick (2007:17-19) argues that a superpower can be recognized by its military self-sufficiency and independency. In this sense, the European Union presented in the Global Strategy behaves like a superpower as it highlights its political independency of NATO and demands more cooperation and efficiency from its military and security capabilities. Moreover, Toje (2011b:141) reminds that potential power and demonstrated power are not the same thing. The capabilities need to be credible, even when there is no need to use them. The European Union wants to make sure it has the military capability to defend its citizens but it has not yet demonstrated its military strength.

In the Global Strategy, there is not too much discussion on the actual military capabilities of the European Union. Some discussion can be found on "the technological capabilities aimed at mitigating threats and resilience of critical infrastructure" (p. 22), but no concrete actions are presented. Toje (2011b:144) claims that even the EU has succeeded to gain a central status in European security, its military capabilities are weak; the Union lacks an integrated command structure, and therefore its military operations are complicated to execute. He (2011b:68–76) states that the most significant issue hindering the EU security cooperation is the lack of autonomous capacity to plan and command crisis management operations. The question of autonomous capacity was discussed already in 2003, when the EU-US relations were weakened by the Iraq war. At that time, the idea was opposed with the argument that Germany, France, and UK have the capability to command EU military missions on a rotational basis. Most of the member states understand the need for stronger EU capacity in crisis management operations. The existing structures are planned for pure civilian crisis management, but the EU would need a functioning civil-military agency. In addition to operational power, according to Toje (2011b:69), such an agency to have also symbolic importance. Such cooperation would lead to the Union eventually becoming more and more independent of NATO. (Toje, 2011b:68–70.)

There is a notable conflict between what the European Union could be and what it can achieve in relation to military power. Toje (2011b:153) argues that the European Union is a small power as long as it fails to unite supranational and national interest. There is a huge potential in the member states of the European Union united, but the structure of the European Union fails to integrate this potential for its gain. It is argued (Toje, 2011b:152) that the European Union is less than the sum of its parts. The European member states are aiming to become a power, but at the same time, there is no commitment to shared strategies and actions. The lack of effective policy-making hinders the EU's ability to mobilize economic or armed force for political gains. In addition, short-term goals of individual member states tend to overcome the long-term gains of the Union. The framework for the capabilities already exists, but the execution is lacking, since it relies on a consensus of member states. Therefore, the European Union's ability to respond to crisis effectively will remain limited also in the future. (Toje, 2011b:144–145.)

5.3   Role in the world

The European Union's role in the world is approached from two points of views. The European Union's role is defined through both its capabilities and tools it has to succeed in world politics, and through the status it has achieved. There is causality between these two approaches; the European Union has gained its status through its successful means to navigate world politics.

5.3.1   Means to succeed

The European Union's toolkit for global influence has traditionally consisted of soft power. According to Nye (2004:6-7), soft power can be understood as power of attraction. Soft power gets its influence from, for example, shared values and justness. Soft power helps one to achieve one's goal by affecting the behavior of others. Nye (2004:7) describes soft power as a co-optive power: using soft power is about shaping the others' goals by, for example, attractiveness of one's culture and values, or setting the agenda of political choices in a way which the others cannot disagree. Soft power uses multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to achieve attractiveness through a set of values, culture, policies and institutions (Nye, 2004:31).

Nye (2004:75-83) discusses soft power resources for Europe. He argues that Europe has various cultural magnets, such as art, music, literature, design and fashion. In addition, half of the ten most spoken languages in the world are of European origin. Nye (2004:76-78) explains that the European soft power stems from a set of values seen as "European", including environment and human rights. The whole integration process itself acts as a demonstration on soft power. The fact that many states want to join the European Union and thus change their domestic policies to match the values of the Union, is an example of the EU's ability to affect the actions and desires of others by attractiveness.

It is argued (Nye, 2004:78) that the European soft power is a positive force in solving problems globally. In comparison to the United States, the European Union plays a more positive role in solving global issues, such as fighting terrorism and reducing poverty. The European foreign policies aim to create better public goods, which is one of the goals for

the ESS of 2003. Globally, the European Union gains attractiveness from creating environmental policies, endorsing international law, and making efforts for human rights. Europe's position as a biggest single donor of development aid to fight poverty attracts positive attention. In addition, the European multilateral approach to nation-building and civilian crisis management makes European policies attractive to many countries and makes the EU a desired partner in global politics. (Nye 2004:80-81.)

Marsh and Rees (2012:161) support Nye's views. The growing power of the European Union in world politics reflects its development into a multi-dimensional security actor. The European Union is here seen as a value community that cheers for democracy, market economics, and the international law and human rights. These priorities of European policies extend to the international system. The European solutions to conflicts are being guided by soft power resources; the European policy of interdependence and rights of the citizen attract the wider international community. (Marsh and Rees, 2012:161.)

The attractiveness of the Union is being used as a strategic tool in the Global Strategy. An example can be found, when discussing the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is being stated:

> Many people within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy […] wish to build closer relations with the Union. Our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation and is not aimed against any country. (The European Union 2016:25).

The idea here is that the Union can enhance transformation towards "success as prosperous, peaceful and stable democracies" (p. 25) by its attractiveness; by its attractiveness, it can affect the goals of other states to become more like its own objectives. This is a textbook example of using soft power to affect other states' initiatives in international politics.

In addition, the European Union is a wanted partner in international politics due to its attractiveness. The EU has been able to provide the United States soft power resources as allies that can add legitimacy to US operations overseas. The European neutrality has allowed the US to pursue its goals also with countries that otherwise would dislike any US contact. The United States has also understood the European voting power in international

institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank. To shape international institutions, the US needs European cooperation. (Marsh and Rees, 2012:66-67.)

As discussed before, the European Union's global objectives are here linked with its interests at home. It is clear, that the Global Strategy focuses on the neighboring areas in its attempt to "pursue a multifaceted approach to resilience in its surrounding regions" (s. 25). As its tools for a multifaceted approach, soft power resources are used. "Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals" and "deepening work on education, culture and youth to foster pluralism, coexistence and respect" (s. 26) are examples of the areas where the values and priorities of the whole European project are visible.

The European Union's former reputation as a good user of soft power is not dismissed in the Global Strategy. Soft power resources are carried along throughout the text, even though there is a stronger emphasis on military power than before. "The EU will lead by example" (p. 40) is a slogan that summarizes the global action of the European Union. The European Union's soft power has been successful in the post-Cold War era. It is to be seen, how it will succeed in the shifting power structures of the post-9/11 era.

5.3.2 Status

McCormick (2007:17-19) lists status as a global actor as a key characteristic for a superpower. In addition, the status needs to be acknowledged by other powers in order to be credible. The status can be achieved by the amount of resources under the state's control, economic, cultural, or moral. McCormick (2007:19) adds that the superpower status can be gained also by the virtue of what it represents. These qualities can be, for example, political influence, moral credibility, or economic opportunity.

Howorth (2016:390) states that Europe, as a power, is in decline. Even though the European Union has achieved much by creating the single market and launching the Eurozone, it has also faced its biggest crisis. The credibility of the Union has suffered too much from the Euro-crisis and numerous bailouts, and the prevailing economic recession has lasted for too long. Including the Brexit referendum, the Europe's future seems uncertain (Howorth, 2016:390.)

The uncertainty prevailing in global politics is visible also in the Global Strategy. On one hand, the Strategy is ambitious for integrating the Union to become an ever-closer one. On the other hand, the Global Strategy focuses on homeland safety and promotes its global interests in accordance with their effects at home. Mälksoo (2016:380) argues that, in comparison to the 2003 European Security Strategy, the Global Strategy of 2016 focuses more on the European continent. She (2016:380) continues that the aim of the Global Strategy is to strengthen the European Union by reassuring the citizens about the European Union's possibilities and capabilities. On the contrary, hardships like the terrorist attacks around Europe and lack of solidarity between the member states during the heaps of migration have highlighted the European Union's challenges as a provider of security. (Mälksoo, 2016:380.)

Howorth's (2016) arguments are in line with Mälskoo's (2016). Howorth (2016:389-401) argues that the Global Strategy is not as global as the title suggests. He (2016:389) states that the Global Strategy focuses on the neighborhood areas and thus leaves, for example, emerging nations, to too little attention. In addition, he (2016:389-341) points out the contradiction between the talk about the EU's role in the world and its potential being unparalleled, and the fact that the Global Strategy still fails to address, for example, China, India, and Brazil as the Union's emerging priority trade partners. Howorth (2016:401) concludes that the emerging powers fail to recognize the European Union as a superpower since it lacks a coherent strategy and shared objectives, and the member stated individually are more active in big cities of the BRIC-countries than the pragmatic and ill-equipped Union.

On the other hand, the other audience of the Global Strategy cannot be dismissed. Surely, discussing and stating the European Union's global status and influence is also directed towards other powers, great and small. Marsh & Rees (2012:160) argue that the focus of world politics in the post-9/11 world is shifting towards the East and an era of multipolarity, even one of non-polarity has begun. In the meantime, West-based international organizations are challenged shifting patterns of wealth, military power, and influence (Marsh and Rees 2012:160). In this context, declaring its status can be interpreted as an attempt to fight this long-term trend of power and influence moving away

from the western states and assure the rest of the world that the European Union is still an important factor in world politics.

In the foreword by High Representative Federica Mogherini, the European Union's status is brought up. "Union of almost half a billion citizens, our potential is unparalleled" (p. 3) is a very strong argument for the status of the European Union in the world. The European Union's status and legitimacy as an actor in international politics is also justified by economic influence:

> Our diplomatic network runs wide and deep in all corners of the globe. Economically, we are in the world's G3. We are the first trading partner and the first foreign investor for almost every country in the globe. […] wherever I travel, our partners expect the European Union to play a major role. (The European Union, 2016:3.)

It can be argued that the assurance of the Union's global influence by declaring its political and economic status is aimed towards the member states in order to create unity and motivation towards the shared project of common security policy. By stating the European Union's influence when united, it acts as a rationale for the member states to act towards "an ever closer union".

The status of the European Union is carried out throughout the Global Strategy. The first paragraph of the Executive Summary consists of two sentences: "We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects." The latter sentence implies that the "wider world" expects the European Union to be a strong actor in it the world and thus provides a certain kind of legitimacy for the whole document. This is not just about the European Union wanting to take a strategic approach towards security, it is also what is expected of the Union and, even more than that, it is what the wider world needs. Toje (2011b:152) argues that the European Union is expected to make the world a better place, which loads the European project with a huge load of responsibility and expectations to live up to.

A curious aspect is that the "wider world" is not specified at any point of the strategy. There are quite a few references to groups that are left undefined. For example, partners, the world, superpowers, and neighbors are terms that are used quite often. In addition, passive voice is used to dispel the actors. The fact that the actors are left to a very general

level makes the arguments weaker than if actual threats or actors were named. For example, stating that the wider world expects the EU to act in a certain way sounds quite convincing, but when examined further, the lack of definition of the wider world could, on the contrary, make the argument actually appear weaker.

When it comes to the European Union's global actions, its status as a peacebuilder and a strategic partner is emphasized by discussing its accomplishments. It is argued that the European Union "enjoys a good record on pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy" (p. 29). In addition, when discussing the means of disarmament, the European Union's capabilities on this area are brought up: "We will use every means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme" (p. 42). By discussing the achievements of the Union's former policies, the importance of the European work abroad is recognized.

In the phone discussion addressed earlier, Waltz gives quite a pessimistic account on Europe's possibilities to affect world politics. He argues that Europe is not a state; it is a set of states, and, especially, it is a set of small states. Europe is no longer the one who moves the world, but the one who is moved by the world. Mearsheimer understands that the EU can reach its limits and start to disintegrate. He sees Germany as a strong actor that could lead the EU to a political recession by starting to act only based on its national interests. Waltz states that the UK and France lack the capabilities of a great power, whereas Germany lacks the motivation. (Toje, 2012.)

6. CONCLUSION

The present study aimed to analyze the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, published in June 2016. The study intended to analytically discuss the emphases and perceptions on security policy that are present in the Global Strategy, as well as the picture it paints of the EU as a user of power. This chapter aims to conclude the findings of the research and discuss possible questions for further research.

The first research question aimed to study what issues are linked to security in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. Through this question, there was an attempt to share light on the European perception of security policy. Of what parts does the field of European Union's security consist? To answer this question, the work of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) provided a useful categorization of areas of security. To conclude the findings, it can be stated that the perception of security policy in the document is quite versatile, since military, economic, environmental, societal, and political issues were linked to security policy. Strangest emphases were on military and economic security, whereas environmental and societal security were given less attention. The political aspect of security was present throughout the text.

Military sector focused on cooperation and the biggest perceived threat was terrorism. In relation to the economic sector, trafficking and black markets were perceived as a threat, whereas sanctions and EU's power as an enormous single market were described as strategic advances to address these issues. Energy security was seen as a weak link; there were some concerns of the Union's dependency on Russian energy, and objectives to move towards more versatile energy sources. Environmental sector was underrepresented, and the discussion here was mainly linked to nuclear safety and energy security. When it came to societal security, issues such as enlargement and migration were discussed as possible security issues. On the other hand, conflicting identities, multiculturalism, and divided opinions among and inside member states were not present in the Global Strategy, even though they are currently one of the main concerns for the survival of the European Union. In the field of political security, European values were seen as the referent objects, and strong institutions, united Europe, and multilateral approach to conflicts in neighboring areas were highly present as objectives through which to address these issues.

In comparison to the European Security Strategy of 2003, it can be argued that there is a much stronger emphasis on military sector in the Global Strategy of 2016. On the text level, military security and economic issues were emphasized. Political aspect of security was conducted through discussion on unity and strong institutions, and was visible in the values and objectives of each sector. Quite surprisingly, the environmental security was underrepresented in the Global Strategy; the European Union prides itself as a trailblazer on environmental protection and has multiple environmental policies, and it still does not focus on environment as a security issue in its most important paper on security policy.

It is challenging to define the securitizing actors of the Global Strategy. It is a debatable question, whether a state or an institution can be understood as an actor. Also in cases of collective decision-making, it is difficult to figure out what actors and institutions are behind the decision and, on the other hand, what actors and institutions might be overrun in the decision-making process. The fact that the Global Strategy is presented as an administrative document with no clear actors can be interpreted as a tool to tackle criticism and give an impression of authority. Referent objects vary on a range from values and ideas to institutions and citizens, depending on the issue that is being discussed. As the referent object that is being conveyed throughout the whole strategy are the values and principles that are defined in the beginning of the strategy.

The second research question focused on the European Union as a power. The purpose of the second research question was to figure out what kind of a power the European Union is in the context of the Global Strategy of 2016. Then, what kind of European power is depicted in the Global Strategy? McCormick's (2007:17-19) criteria for a superpower are based on a few characteristics. Firstly, the European Union is depicted to have global interests that would advance its own gains. Indeed, the European Union of the Global Strategy is willing to act by using all means necessary to execute its Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises (28-32). Secondly, the military independency and self-sufficiency is a recurring theme in the Strategy: the European Union is described to be an autonomous actor when it comes to security and defence and it needs to strengthen its capabilities and realize its military potential. Thirdly, the document reassures the European Union's status in the international politics.

The argument can also be built for a European small power. According to Toje (2011a), a small power is dependent on more significant actors when it comes to global politics, has relatively small resources, benefits from international law, and is defensive by nature. Actually, all of these characteristics are present in the Global Strategy. The United Nations is repeatedly brought up as the Union's main partner and cooperation is understood to be nothing less than necessary. International law is mentioned in almost every section and is carried along as the framework for European action. The concrete hard power resources the Union has are not being discussed in the Global Strategy, which would imply that there actually are not shared resources to discuss. It is also arguable that the European Union presented in the Global Strategy is defensive by nature, since there are no suggestions of armed interventions or military operations to protect interests. The defensive nature of the EU is also visible in the discourse of defending the Union from external threats and developing better defensive capabilities.

It can be argued, that in the Global Strategy the European Union is presented as a stronger and greater power than it really is. There is a wish for both an acknowledged status and strong military independence. The Global Strategy aims to create a justification for common foreign and security policy by declaring Europe's greatness and its possibilities. These are valid goals for the Union. Unfortunately, the current state of the Union with the ongoing Brexit process, various future scenarios for Europe, and Eurosceptic parties gaining support, makes the paper seem too ambitious and far fetching in its concept of a strong, united Europe. To conclude the answer to the second research question, the European Union presented in the Global Strategy is a small power who desperately wants to be recognized as a great power.

The European integration began as a project for lasting peace. It has succeeded to keep the continent somewhat united for sixty years. During that time, the European Union has taken steps towards security cooperation as well. Strategic approaches have been built to promote European values, institutions, and way of life. The process has been slow, since strategies cannot be too bold if all member states are wanted to support them. Security cooperation in Europe has tremendous potential, but only if the members are willing and able to execute it. A lot more political will is needed in order to build a European security union.

In order to analyze the Global Strategy from the points of view presented in the research questions, choices needed to be made that affect the reliability and validity of the research. In order to limit the subject and research material, the European Union's security policy was studied only from the points of view of the two security strategies. Therefore, the reality of European Union's security actions and policy-making processes could provide different results. Still, it can be argued, that strategies provide a useful tool to study policy areas, since they are meant to set guidelines for the actions taken.

Another factor that weakens the validity of the study is that only one theory was used to categorize the security issues that are presented in the Global Strategy. The theory affected the findings, since through a different categorization the results could have been different and because the chosen theory naturally affected the researcher's presumptions of what to look for when reading the Strategy. The theory of Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) was chosen since it gave quite a comprehensive look on security as a field that consists of various sectors. The same criticism is legitimate towards the analysis related to the second research question as well. To limit the study, only a few themes were chosen through which the small and great power aspects of the European Union were studied.

The method of political reading is highly based on interpretation, which is a process dependent on the researcher. As Palonen (1988:15) explains, interpretations can never be inclusive and absolute, and thus every interpretation can be contradicted. The researcher's experiences, attitudes, and presumptions all affect the interpretations one makes from certain texts. One text sample can evoke different interpretations in different researchers. Therefore, the present study represents the researcher's independent views and other researchers could come to the same or different conclusions.

The findings of the present study excite possibilities for further research. Since it has been almost two years since the launch of the Global Strategy, it would be intriguing to study the possible policy implications of the Strategy. Discussion on defence integration has increased since the Global Strategy and it would be interesting to find out whether there have been any significant changes in European defence discourse. In relation to the discussions, the member states' responses to the Global Strategy and the Strategy's implications on member states' own security agendas might prove to be a beneficial research topic in the development of European security policy.

Another useful line of research would be to study the actors of European security policy. Especially the strategists and actors of the EEAS are often overlooked in the study of European security, even though they act as a preparatory organ for the High Representative's work and for the Union's policy-making in the field of foreign policy. Since the present study found that the makers of the Global Strategy were hidden and no clear actors could be found, it would be highly informative to study the actors and processes behind the European Union's strategy processes.

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