

**THE TWO STORIES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: HOW
RUSSIA SANCTIONS ARE LEGITIMIZED IN BUSINESS
NEWS MEDIA**

**Jyväskylä University School
of Business and Economics**

2017



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ABSTRACT

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<p>Title of thesis The Two Stories of Economic Sanctions: How Russia Sanctions are Legitimized in Business News Media</p>	
<p>Discipline Entrepreneurship / IBE</p>	<p>Type of work Master's thesis</p>
<p>Time (month/year) December 2017</p>	<p>Number of pages 75</p>
<p>The focus of the present study is to find out how economic sanctions are discussed in two popular economic journals. This is done by examining the discursive de/legitimation strategies and discourses in the chosen Finnish and Russian journals using critical discourse analysis. CDA examines how discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of power and dominance in society. (van Dijk 2001, 353.) The present study is driven to answer the following research question – what strategies were used in the legitimation of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia in the chosen news media articles? The results will eventually reveal the two stories on the legitimation process of the sanctions against Russia, from Finnish and Russian perspectives. The research data consists of articles which were published in Finnish Talouselämä and Russian Kommersant between March 2014 and March 2015. Legitimation is considered being the process by which speakers recognize a type of positive, beneficial social behavior in a specific situation. (Vaara & Tienari 2008; Vaara 2009; van Dijk 1998; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes 2011, 782.) Vaara and Monin explain that delegitimation in turn means establishing a sense of negative, morally intolerable action. (Vaara & Monin 2010, 6.) This master's thesis consists of four main parts which are theoretical framework, methodology, research findings and then discussion. The results of the critical discourse analysis show that Finnish discourse highlights the rational reasoning of sanctions harming the economy but however along the European Union Finland imposes sanctions, after all the annexation of Crimea is against the international principles of integrity of a sovereign state. The Russian discourse emphasizes the fact how economic sanctions will not affect the foreign policy of Russia, actually many quotes show that some authorities explain Russia to become stronger due to imposed sanctions which will make Russia to activate in domestic food producing industries.</p>	
<p>Keywords critical discourse analysis, Russia, economic sanctions, discursive legitimation strategies</p>	
<p>Location Jyväskylä University Library</p>	

TIIVISTELMÄ

Tekijä Saarinen, Sini	
Työn nimi Talouspakotteiden kaksi tarinaa: miten Venäjän vastaiset talouspakotteet on legitimoitu talousmedioissa	
Oppiaine Yrittäjyys / IBE	Työn laji Pro gradu -tutkielma
Aika (pvm.) Marraskuu 2017	Sivumäärä 75
<p>Tiivistelmä - Abstract</p> <p>Tämän pro gradu -tutkielman päämääränä on selvittää, miten talouspakotteita käsitellään Suomen ja Venäjän suosituissa talouslehdissä. Tutkimusaineisto koostuu suomalaisen Talouselämä ja venäläisen Kommersant -talouslehtien artikkeleista, jotka on julkaistu ajalla maaliskuu 2014 - maaliskuu 2015. Tässä pro gradu -tutkielmassa vastataan tutkimuskysymykseen mitä diskurssiivisia de/legitimaatiostrategioita on käytetty Venäjän vastaisten talouspakotteiden legitimaatiossa valituissa talouslehtien artikkeleissa? Tutkimussuuntauksena käytän kriittistä diskurssianalyysiä, joka tutkii, miten diskurssirakenteet vahvistavat, oikeuttavat, toistavat tai haastavat valtasuhteita yhteiskunnassa. (van Dijk 2001, 353.) Venäjän talouspakotekeskustelu on aiheena ajankohtainen, sillä Venäjän vastaisten talouspakotteiden vaikutus näkyy vieläkin kansainvälisessä kaupassa ja yhteistyössä.</p> <p>Pro gradu koostuu neljästä keskeisestä osasta, joista ensimmäinen on teoreettinen viitekehys, jota seuraa työn toinen osa, metodikappale, sen jälkeen analyysin tulokset sekä päätäntäkappale. Tulokset paljastavat kaksi tarinaa legitimaatioprosessista Venäjän vastaisista talouspakotteista suomalaisesta ja venäläisestä näkökulmasta. Legitimaation ajatellaan olevan prosessi, jossa puhujat tunnistavat positiivista, hyödyllistä ja sosiaalista käyttäytymistä tietyssä tilanteessa. (Vaara & Tienari 2008; Vaara 2009; van Dijk 1998; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes 2011, 782.) Vaaran ja Moninin (2010, 6) mukaan delegitimaatio sen sijaan tarkoittaa negatiivisen, moraalisesti tai muuten epäsovivan toiminnan tunnistamista ja käsittelyä. Kriittisen diskurssianalyysin tulokset osoittavat, että suomalainen diskurssi keskittyy rationaaliseen ajatteluun ja talouspakotteiden vaikutukseen talouteen. Suomen on oltava Euroopan Unionin mukana yhteisellä pakoterintamalla, sillä Krimin liittäminen Venäjään rikkoo kansainvälisiä oikeuksia valtion koskemattomuudesta. Venäläisessä Kommersant-lehden diskurssissa sen sijaan esiintyy, kuinka talouspakotteet eivät vaikuta Venäjän ulkopoliittikkaan. Monet artikkeleista poimitut sitaatit osoittavat, että Venäjän viranomaiset selittävät pakotteiden positiivista vaikutusta Venäjän talouteen. Tämän pro gradu -tutkielman tulokset auttavat ymmärtämään Venäjän vastaisia pakotteita ja niiden vaikutusta laajemmin diskurssihin ja kansainvälisen kaupankäynnin onnistumiseen, sillä aihe on vieläkin suhteellisen tuore, eikä aikaisempia tutkimuksia juuri suomalaisesta ja venäläisestä näkökulmasta ole vielä julkaistu.</p>	
Asiasanat kriittinen diskurssianalyysi, Venäjä, talouspakotteet, diskurssiiviset legitimaatiostrategiat	
Säilytyspaikka Jyväskylän yliopiston kirjasto	

Table of contents

1 INTRODUCTION	5
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	7
2.1 Institutions	7
2.2 Institutional change	8
2.3 Legitimacy	9
2.3.1 Legitimation	12
2.3.2 Deinstitutionalization and delegitimation	13
2.3.3 De/legitimation strategies	14
2.4 Economic sanctions	16
2.5 Participants of the economic sanctions	20
2.5.1 The history of Russia	20
2.5.2 The history of Ukraine and the Ukraine crisis	22
3 RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA	25
3.1 Studying media texts	25
3.2 Research method	27
3.2.1 Discourse analysis	28
3.2.2 Critical Discourse analysis	30
3.3 Data collection and analysis of the data	31
4 RESEARCH FINDINGS	34
4.1 Talouselämä	34
4.1.1 Rationalization Legitimation	35
4.1.2 Rationalization delegitimation	37
4.1.3 Authorization legitimation	39
4.1.4 Authorization delegitimation	42
4.1.5 Moralization legitimation	43
4.2 Kommersant	46
4.2.1 Rationalization legitimation	47
4.2.2 Rationalization delegitimation	48
4.2.3 Authorization legitimation	51
4.2.4 Authorization delegitimation	53
4.2.5 Moralization legitimation	54
4.2.6 Moralization delegitimation	55
4.3 Comparing the journals	55
5 DISCUSSION	62
5.1 Contributions, limitations and further research	65
REFERENCES	66

1 INTRODUCTION

Politics and governmental regulations have an impact on international business and international relations, (Meyer & Jensen 2004, 122) and for example economic sanctions are a method of political diplomacy showing a powerful message. Russia and Ukraine have a long history together (see for instance Luukkanen 2001 & 2009, Kaakkurinniemi 2012), however the unresolved situation in Ukraine has intensified tensions between them (Ketola & Vihavainen 2014). What happened at Independence Square in Kiev 2013 had far-reaching effects on international business and international relations. After the annexation of Crimea the European Union, the United States and other countries began the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia, which are the main focus of the present study.

The phenomenon of sanctions against Russia is interesting because this is the first time that the United States and the European Union have imposed economic sanctions on the Russian Federation. The topic is still quite new which means there is little earlier research done on the legitimization of the economic sanctions against Russia in the Finnish-Russian context. Thus, the present study will provide new information from a Finnish and Russian perspective on how the sanctions against Russia are legitimized in business news media.

The focus of the present study is to find out how economic sanctions are seen and discussed in the popular economic journals in the sender country and in the country that is imposed sanctions on. This is done, in particular, by examining the discursive de/legitimation strategies and discourses in the chosen journals. The present study is driven to answer the following research question – what strategies were used in the legitimization of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia in the chosen news media articles? The results will eventually reveal the two stories on the legitimization process of the sanctions against Russia, from Finnish and Russian perspectives on the globally recognized phenomenon.

The present study is conducted by adopting critical discourse analysis (later on: CDA). According to van Dijk, CDA often focuses on social problems and political issues. It is usually multidisciplinary trying to explain discourse structures in the light of social interaction and social structure. CDA examines how discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of power and dominance in society. (van Dijk 2001, 353; van Dijk 1995, 17.)

Legitimation is considered being the process by which speakers recognize a type of positive, beneficial, ethical or necessary social behavior in a specific situation. (Vaara & Tienari 2008; Vaara 2009; van Dijk 1998; Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999; Reyes 2011, 782.) 'Legitimation' refers to making something legal or legalized (in Latin 'legitimus'). In this respect, legitimation is a justification of a mental or physical behavior. (Reyes 2011, 782.) Vaara and Monin explain that delegitimation in turn means establishing a sense of negative, morally or otherwise intolerable action or overall state of affairs. However, legitimation and delegitimation are not always symmetrical processes. (Vaara & Monin 2010, 6; via Rojo and van Dijk 1997, van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Siltaoja, M. E. & Vehkaperä, M. J. 2010, 493.)

This master's thesis consists of four main parts which are theoretical framework, methodology, research findings and then discussion. First, the theoretical framework chapter introduces the key concepts of institutional change, legitimacy and (de)legitimation strategies. After that a brief introduction to economic sanctions and history of Russia and Ukraine are presented. Second, the methodology chapter outlines the main concepts and disciplines of the discourse studies. The methodology chapter is followed by the presentation of research findings which explains the results of the analysis on how sanctions against Russia are legitimized in business news media. Furthermore the empiric part briefly reveals the results of thematic and textual analysis on Finnish journal *Talouselämä* to have a deeper understanding on the data. Lastly there is discussion chapter to sum up the main topics of the present study.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

It is not always easy for organizations to perform in a new situation and establish a new way of activity especially when there are no other previous examples to show the way how to act (Suchman 1995, 586). This relates to the situation when completely new sanctions against Russia were first introduced. To understand the media discussions on economic sanctions it is important to distinguish some basic information on institutional change. The following chapters explain the concept of institutional change and also the elements which are part of the creation of new organizational forms.

2.1 Institutions

Institutions are the humanly devised rules that shape interaction and structure incentives in economic, social or political human exchange (North, 1990, 3). They are seen as legitimate by social actors and therefore unexpected events or controversial actions can cause 'legitimacy crises' where earlier conceptions of taken-for-grantedness are challenged. (Vaara 2014, 502.) Maguire & Hardy define institutions as historical layers of past practices and considerations creating conditions on action through the way in which they obtain the status of taken for granted facts which will shape future interactions and discussions (2009).

Institutionalized practices consist of normative, cognitive and regulative elements, also known as pillars, providing stability and meaning to social life through which legitimacy is established. The normative pillar influences behavior by defining what is appropriate or expected in a given social situation. It consists of values and norms that produce conformity as a result of social expectations and moral obligations. The cognitive pillar is based on shared conceptions establishing the nature of social reality and defining the dominant convention. Perceptions with so called taken-

for-granted status are legitimate. The regulative pillar refers to the authority of certain actors to formally constrain actors' behavior. It involves the established rules and laws which ensure stability and order in societies. Organizations have to comply with the stated requirements of the regulatory system in order to be legitimate. These three institutional pillars help to reproduce behavior; institutionalized practices may be held in place by one dominant pillar or by all three, however one or more of these pillars can collapse making deinstitutionalization more likely to happen.

2.2 Institutional change

Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve over time and therefore is the key to understanding historical change (North 1990, 3). Meyer & Jensen explain how the pace of reform depends on each country's economic and institutional legacies. Some countries were among the developed economies before World War II while others went directly from a feudal or early capitalist system to a socialist system. These distinct cultural and systematic legacies affect informal institutions such as norms and values in these countries. (Meyer & Jensen 2004, 122.)

Institutional theory attends to the deeper aspects of social structure considering the processes by which structures, including rules, norms and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It has an impact on how these elements are created, adopted, and adapted and how they decline and later become disused. The roots of institutional theory lay in the formative years of the social sciences, for example since K. Marx and M. Weber. (Scott 2004, 2).

Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) enlighten there are three main elements developed by institutional theory to explain how new organizational forms emerge. The first element is legitimacy, which plays a critical role in institutional change when new organizational forms are about to emerge. Suchman explains that legitimacy and institutionalization are synonymous which empowers organizations by making them seem natural and meaningful. (Suchman 1995, 575-576, 578.) The second element shows that institutional change links to dramatic shifts in institutional logics that reinforce actors' frameworks for reason and belief. Suddaby and Greenwood clarify that "institutional change is the result of shifts in the underlying logic by which legitimacy is assessed." (Suddaby & Greenwood 2005, 36.) The strategic use of persuasive language – rhetoric – is the third element, which helps achieving the shifts in dominant institutional logic. These rhetorical strategies legitimate or resist a new form creation by building either similarity or non-similarity among the aspects of the innovation, dominant institutional logics and creating motivations and patterns for institutional change. (Suddaby & Greenwood 2005, 2, 36, 39-41.) These three elements –

legitimacy, shift in institutional logics and rhetoric provide the optimal settings of new forms in which language is used to achieve shifts in logic within organizational fields. These above mentioned modify the criteria which are used to assess the legitimacy of organizational forms, allowing new forms to arise and survive. (Suddaby & Greenwood 2005.) Furthermore, theories in the organizations literature remind how legitimacy affects the organizational survival and success. (Johnson, Dowd, Ridgeway 2006, 2).

A profound change, such as the establishment of a new organizational form, is therefore the product of continued symbolic work where actors construct “legitimizing accounts” linking innovations to cultural views. Consequently new organizational forms are the continuing result of negotiations and contests over which logic, and thus the criteria by which organizational legitimacy is assessed will dominate. (Suddaby & Greenwood 2005, 2-3.) The next chapters illustrate more the important aspects in institutional change which are legitimacy and legitimation strategies.

2.3 Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a key topic in organizational institutionalism, however earlier definitions of organizational legitimacy have been vague and only a few distinct social science disciplines focused rather on studying the theory of legitimacy than testing it empirically. Furthermore, case studies in newer legitimacy related literature mostly concerned whether legitimacy was gained or lost not as much studying legitimacy as variable. (Deephouse & Suchman 2008, 49.) Weber is often credited for introducing the concept into organizational studies. He explained ‘maxims’ or rules together with social norms and formal laws determine the creation of legitimacy. (Deephouse & Suchman 2008, 50; Johnson et al. 2006.)

According to Deephouse & Suchman legitimacy has been studied since the 1970s. For example Dowling & Pfeffer explained in 1975 the important link between social values of organizations’ activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in social system structuring organizational legitimacy. If there is disparity between these value systems there might emerge threat to organizational legitimacy in form of legal, economic or other social sanctions. (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; Deephouse & Suchman 2008, 49.)

In 1983 Meyer and Scott’s definition “organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization – the extent to which the selection of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives” brought more depth in the discussion of legitimacy. Furthermore, the 1995 can be

considered an important year for the theorization of legitimacy, for example Scott defines ‘Legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws’ (1995, 45) (Deephouse & Suchman 2008, 50-52.) Furthermore in 1995 Suchman (574) describes legitimacy as follows:

“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions”.

Nowadays legitimacy is a topic of research in organization studies (Deephouse & Suchman 2008, 50) but also in disciplines such as political science, philosophy, psychology and sociology (Suddaby et al. 2015). Vaara & Monin (2010, 5) explain that legitimacy is a fundamental social phenomenon and justification refers to a rationale given for a particular change. Legitimacy is established in relation to discourses providing the frames with which people make sense of certain issues and give sense to them (Vaara & Monin, 2010). These framings have important implications for the actors involved. On one hand, the available discourses greatly constrain specific actors when making sense of and giving sense to particular actions. Furthermore, particular discourses allow only certain kinds of subject positions or warrant voice for particular concerns (e.g., Fairclough, 1992; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). On the other hand, actors can also purposefully mobilize particular discourses for their own advantage (e.g., Hardy et al., 2000; Rojo & van Dijk, 1997). There is more information on discourses provided in chapter 3.2.

Organizations are looking for legitimacy for many reasons, and conclusions about the importance, difficulty, and effectiveness of legitimation efforts depends on the objectives against which these efforts are measured and compared to. (Suchman 1995, 574.) Legitimacy enhances both the stability and the comprehensibility of organizational activities, and these factors are often enhancing each other. Suchman adds that legitimacy tends to be continuous because audiences use desirable or proper resources to organizations. (Suchman 1995, 574.) Legitimacy is socially constructed reflecting congruence between the behaviors of the legitimated entity and the shared beliefs of some social group. Thus legitimacy needs a collective audience, but not any particular observer. (Suchman 1995, 573-574.)

According to Johnson et al. even though individuals may not always hold the same norms, values, and beliefs, they might act accordingly to what is considered appropriate and accepted by most others. (Johnson et al. 2006, 3.) Furthermore, an organization may differ from individuals’ values but instead have legitimacy. Therefore if a certain behavioral pattern is said to have legitimacy, one declares that some group of observers accepts what is considered being the

behavioral pattern. (Suchman 1995, 574.)

Suchman defines three different types of legitimacy which are pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. Even though these legitimacies do not constitute a strict hierarchy, they reflect two important fundamental distinctions. These types include a generalized perception that organizational activities are appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. However, every type lays on different behavioral dynamic. (Suchman 1995, 577-578.) Scholars have also pointed out that unexpected or controversial actions create a particular need to negotiate and reestablish legitimacy (Suchman 1995, 577-579). Furthermore, the types of legitimacy often reinforce one another however they sometimes can clash with each other. (Suchman 1995, 585.)

Pragmatic legitimacy is known for the self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences. Often this immediacy involves direct exchanges between organization and audience but however, it also can involve broader political, economic, or social interdependencies, in which organizational action can visibly affect the audience's well-being. (Suchman 1995, 577-585). Moral legitimacy means that a particular activity benefits societal welfare and is the right thing to do as according to the audience's socially constructed value system. Suchman explains how moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its activities. Moral legitimacy differs from pragmatic legitimacy in that it is based on judgments about whether the activity is as defined by the audience's socially constructed value system. Therefore, moral legitimacy reflects a pro-social logic and moral concerns generally prove more resistant to self-interested manipulation than purely pragmatic thoughts. (Suchman, 1995, 577-579.)

Cognitive legitimacy involves either affirmative backing for an organization or mere acceptance of the organization as necessary or inevitable based on some taken-for-granted cultural account. Two variants are particularly significant: legitimacy based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness. (Suchman 1995, 582-583.) Theorists focusing on comprehensibility in legitimation portray the social world being chaotic – consequently legitimacy consists of cultural models that provide reasonable explanations for the organization. In the presence of such models organizational activity will be predictable and meaningful however in their absence, activity will collapse more often due to repeated distractions. According to taken-for-granted view institutions can transform disorder into a set of intersubjective “givens” that suppress the possibility of opposition. If alternatives become unthinkable then challenges become impossible, and the legitimated entity becomes absolute by construction. (Suchman 1995, 582-583.)

Suddaby et al. (2015) explain there are three types of how legitimacy is perceived by researchers. The first type is “legitimacy-as-property” and in this approach legitimacy is seen as an

object which can be possessed among firm's intangible assets acquired from its environment, even though Scott had defined earlier (1995) that legitimacy cannot be possessed. Suddaby et al. describe that a firm can through adoption of legitimate structures, practices and symbols "gain", "acquire" or "buy" legitimacy from its audiences. (Suddaby et al. 2015, 12.)

The second type "legitimacy-as-process" describes that legitimacy is the product of an ongoing interactive process of social negotiation. This involves multiple participants, for example leaders, followers and stakeholders demonstrate a high degree of agency where the elements of legitimacy are not fixed but rather continuously in a changing mode. This approach shares the idea that legitimation begins from the "ground", is "built" over time and at some point the peak is achieved and legitimacy is established. Furthermore, studies that see legitimacy as a process usually prefer using the term "legitimation" than "legitimacy". (Suddaby et al. 2015, 12-15.)

The third type is "legitimacy-as-perception" including the idea of legitimacy being a form of socio-cognitive perception or evaluation. Suddaby et al. (2015) describe that legitimacy-as-perception is focusing on the role of individuals in the process of the social construction of legitimacy. The individuals perceive organizations and they are making judgments about their legitimacy, and acting upon these, eventually producing macro-level effects. The research on legitimacy as perception is having a multi-level approach not only concerning to what happens at the individual micro level (cognitions, beliefs and judgments) because it recognizes the multilevel nature of the socio-cognitive process of legitimacy judgment formation. Furthermore, legitimacy evaluation is not limited to individual-level processes because it also includes sense-making of collective actors, developing the concept and understanding of legitimacy being a cross-level socio-cognitive process working through the interaction of individuals' cognition and supra-individual social processes. (Suddaby et al. 2015, 12-13.)

2.3.1 Legitimation

Deephouse & Suchman (2008, 58) explain that "(de-)legitimation is the process by which the legitimacy of a subject changes over time". The process of legitimation is enacted by providing arguments explaining our social actions, ideas or declarations linking to a broader cultural framework of cognitive beliefs about social reality. In addition, the act of legitimizing or justifying is related to a goal, which usually is to get support and approval – this can be motivated by different reasons: to obtain or maintain power, to achieve social acceptance or to reach popularity. Thus, people often attempt to obtain support or acceptance by first presenting their own proposals as the

right thing to do, the appropriate way to proceed. (Reyes 2011, 782; Johnson et al. 2006, 5.) Legitimation relates to diffusion and institutionalization. For example, Johnson et al. (2006) research developed a four-stage model of legitimation consisting of innovation, local validation, diffusion, and general validation. Deephouse and Suchman consider the dynamics of legitimation being similar to those of institutionalization. (Deephouse & Suchman 2008, 58.)

Suddaby et al. explain there are three key processes called persuasion, theorization and identification by which legitimation can occur. First, many researchers recognize legitimation as a process of persuasion and influence, collective meaning-making within through language, communication and the translation of texts. It is said that communication is a key element in the formation of legitimation; however it is said that the process of meaning-making is planned. These researchers tend to use the term “rhetoric” or “framing” rather than “discourse” to emphasize the high degree of agency in using language purposively to construct legitimacy. (Suddaby et al. 2015, 39-31.)

The second process is called theorization, which refers to the process by which existing norms and practices are abstracted into generalized categories allowing them to become taken-for-granted. It can usefully initiate change when it both delegitimizes an existing practice and at the same time offers a solution (i.e. legitimates). (Suddaby et al. 2015, 39-31.) Finally, the third process being identification/categorization in which organizations need to be at the same time both different with unique identity and alike with others – these both are driven, and achieved, by processes of legitimation. Both identity and differentiation are closely related to assessments of approval of an organization’s actions by a range of social stakeholders. Organizations rely on similar processes to be similar and legitimate enough to a recognized reference group, while also differentiating themselves from their competitors. (Suddaby et al. 2015, 25-31.)

2.3.2 Deinstitutionalization and delegitimation

Deinstitutionalization refers to the process whereby previously institutionalized practices are abandoned, due to the fact that better options have been found, existing practices have lost their original meaning, taken-for-grantedness are questioned and the pillars have collapsed. (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 5-7; Kostova & Zaheer 1999, 69.).

It is not easy to change the meanings of existing institutionalized practices, since they stem from belief systems that are well rooted. A good example of deinstitutionalization is a study on how the book “Silent Spring” by Rachel Carson affected the disuse of commonly used toxic pesticide

DDT. In the research Maguire and Hardy (2009) analyzed the historical delegitimation of DDT in North America. The results of the analysis show that the cognitive pillar that supported the previous DDT practices and taken-for-granted facts were destabilized and publicly knowing that using DDT was not safe for the environment the view was normalized. (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 23.) The normative pillar supporting existing use of DDT instead was undermined because it was disregarded by the public, individual NGOs and politicians. Also environmental politicians began to author texts which problematized DDT as they started to recognize the public “warranted voice” regarding the pesticides. (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 19-20, 27-28.)

It was easier to find studies related to legitimation than delegitimation. Vaara and Monin have stated that delegitimation means establishing a sense of negative, morally or otherwise intolerable action or overall state of affairs. According to Joutsenvirta & Vaara (2009) criticism is an act of delegitimation. However, legitimation and delegitimation are not always symmetrical processes. (Vaara & Monin 2010, 6; via Rojo and van Dijk 1997, van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Siltaoja, M. E. & Vehkaperä, M. J. 2010, 493.) For example, Martin et al. (1990) showed in their analysis of 20th century revolutions that the delegitimation of the status quo and the legitimation of an alternative regime did not follow the same patterns – therefore delegitimation involved more complex arguments than legitimation. (Vaara & Monin 2010, 6.)

2.3.3 De/legitimation strategies

Discursive legitimation strategies in media context have been studied by researchers such as Vaara, Tienari and Laurila (2006). They, for example, studied newspaper articles on a mill closure using critical discourse analysis to identify five types of discursive legitimation strategies. The authors note that even though journalists construct the texts the use of certain legitimating strategies is not always intentional. Journalists are considered as gatekeepers delivering message and they maintain power by deciding which topic or perspective to choose, however this power should not be overestimated because journalists are both dependent on their information sources and audiences for instance what the audience knows and wants to hear. (Vaara et al., 2006, 8-9; Suddaby et al. 2015, 29.)

A few years later Vaara & Tienari (2008, 990) studied the Finnish multinational company Wärtsilä. Their study called *A Discursive Perspective on Legitimation Strategies in Multinational Corporations* is outlined to see how discursive strategies are used to legitimate change. In this sense the discursive struggle in the Wärtsilä case was about the right of Finnish-based MNCs to engage in

shutdowns of profitable units. (Vaara & Tienari 2008, 990.) Vaara and Monin (2010) focused in their study *A Recursive Perspective on Discursive Legitimation and Organizational Action in Mergers and Acquisitions* on the actual legitimation processes. They had a critical discursive perspective to find out how discursive strategizing is part of organizational politics and power plays within merging organizations. Vaara and Monin examined a case to distinguish typical risks and problems in discursive legitimation. They stated that the recursive model connecting discursive legitimation and delegitimation strategies to concrete organizational action makes a more general contribution to understanding of organizational legitimation. (Vaara & Monin 2010, 3-4.)

Vaara also studied discursive legitimation strategies within Eurozone crisis (2014, 500) in the chosen Finnish media texts. Position-based authorizations include institutionalized authorities and so called voices of the common man and also knowledge-based authorizations which focus on economic expertise, rationalizations focusing on economic arguments, in addition moral evaluation based on unfairness used especially for delegitimation.

A CDA can be used for examining the specific ways in which legitimation is present and this is conceptualized as “legitimation strategies” meaning ways of mobilizing specific discursive resources to create a sense of legitimacy or illegitimacy (Vaara & Tienari via Fairclough, 2003, 98-100; van Dijk 1998, 255–262). In many cases discursive strategies are planned and used in a conscious way, for example business news are characterized by specific conventions regarding what can or should be said and how it should be said (e.g., Fairclough, 2003). These conventions greatly affect the use of particular legitimation strategies in a given setting. Thus CDA can be also used for examining the more subtle ways in which specific discursive functions and practices are used to establish or resist legitimacy in a particular text. (Vaara & Tienari 2008, 987.)

Researchers such as van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999, 104-109) have presented four general types of semantic-functional strategy – that is, ways in which language functions and is used for the construction of legitimacy. The following chapters present the strategies, which are authorization, moralization, narrativization (also known as mythopoesis) and rationalization.

Authorization is a legitimation strategy that is reference to the authority of tradition, custom, law or institutional authority, and it usually answers to a question “why it is so”, for example “according to the Prime Minister”, which is personal authorization. In addition there is an impersonal authorization strategy such as “the law” or “the regulations” (Fairclough 2003, 98, van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999, 104-105; Vaara & Tienari 2008, 6, 988.) Moralization strategy instead concerns moral justification and evaluation by reference to value systems providing the moral basis for legitimation. (Fairclough 2003, 98; Vaara & Tienari 2008, 6, 988.) Another strategy mythopoesis – also known as narrativization – is legitimation carried through narratives telling

stories or constructing narrative structures to indicate how the issue in question relates to the past or the future. (Vaara & Tienari 2008 6, 988; van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999, 110.) Rationalization is another legitimation strategy that stresses utility of the social practice and institutionalized action but also the knowledge society has constructed to provide them with cognitive validity and common sense. (Van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999, 105-106; Fairclough 2003, 98; Vaara & Tienari 2008.) Each of four general types of semantic-functional strategy includes a number of subtypes, the relevance of which naturally depends on the setting in question. Legitimation strategies however are usually intertwined and several strategies are often the most effective forms in specific texts. (Vaara & Tienari 2008 6, 988.) The next chapter introduces economic sanctions and different types of them. Furthermore the economic sanctions and measures imposed on Russia are briefly explained.

2.4 Economic sanctions

Hufbauer describes that economic sanctions have been used as a part of diplomacy already in ancient Greece; however there is better documentation on economic sanctions since the First World War (2007, 9-10). International economic sanctions seem to be a common feature in political interactions between states, for example The United States has often imposed economic sanctions after World War II (Caruso 2003, 2-4) and Hufbauer gives examples of US foreign policy developments that are justifications for sanctions and these are human rights abuses, international terrorism, antinarcotics efforts and nuclear proliferation (Hufbauer 2007, 4). Since the early 90s sanctions have become a common instrument of the United Nations Security Council as well. Sanctions have not been imposed on Russia before but instead The United States imposed embargo on Soviet Union after the Second World War and also after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. (Caruso 2003, 2-4; Schaefer 1997; Encyclopedia of the New American Nation.)

Economic sanctions are a governmentally set withdraw of trade on countries' commerce with foreign states, firms, or individuals to force a change in their behavior (Early 2015, 5), a part of international diplomacy (Hufbauer 2007, 3-5) without using military force. They tend to be used in response to objectionable foreign behaviors that require a more assertive response than diplomacy alone but in which the use of military force is undesirable (Early, 2015, 5.) It is also an indicator that the sender country is interested in making interfering actions to the decision making of another country. Hufbauer also states that usually the sender of sanctions is a larger nation that is taking an active participation on foreign policy of another country (2007, 5). Economic sanctions can be unilateral meaning that they are imposed by one country or multilateral when several countries are

imposing on many other countries economic sanctions. (Hosseini & Askari 2003, 31.)

Sanctions can be defined as actions introduced by one or more international actors “the senders” against others “the receivers” with either or both of two purposes in mind: to punish the receivers by diminishing some value from them and/or to make the receiver obey with certain norms which the senders consider important. (Galtung 1967, 379.) The third-party states comprising the rest of the countries in the world. Sanctioning efforts succeed when their targets surrender to their senders’ accompanying demands, and they fail when senders lift the sanctions without fulfilling their objectives. (Early, 2015, 18.) Third-party states can support the senders’ sanctioning efforts, offer sanctions-busting support to target states, or respond neutrally. Even third-party states with no preferences as to the sanctions’ outcome can be affected by the sanctions’ spillover effects or be drawn into the dispute by sender and target governments seeking their support. In theory, the varying ways in which sanctions affect third-party states and how the states respond to them can meaningfully influence the outcome of sanctions arguments. (Early, 2015, 18.)

Scholars typically differentiate between negative and positive sanctions. Negative sanctions are imposed in order to cause an economic damage and positive sanctions are meant to foster cooperation among some countries. Usually economic sanctions are negative. (Caruso 2003, 2-4.)

Effectiveness of international negative sanctions is commonly studied; however, the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy is still uncertain. It is often thought that welfare losses of the target countries will have an effect in the behavior of the government. Boycotts and embargoes, for example, should withdraw the target country of some of the gains of trade and hence lower welfare. However, the sender country could also be negatively affected by imposing sanctions such as commercial and financial linkages with target country agents could be threatened, suspended or blocked. (Caruso 2003, 2-4; Hufbauer 2007, 9.) According to Hufbauer, the economic sanctions might be inadequate in their influence, since the task might be too large for them or the cooperation between other nations is too weak (2007, 7).

Early (2015) explains that economic sanctions’ negative effects are not exclusively limited to their senders and targets but spill over to involve other countries as well. For example, economic sanctions often prove disruptive to their targets’ broader network of trade relationships with third-party states. As an unintended consequence, sanctions can thus do a great deal of harm to their targets’ trading partners. (Early, 2015, 8.) By encouraging the development of illicit trade and smuggling networks, sanctions can also empower organized criminal enterprises within sanctioned states and their neighbors. Yet economic sanctions also create profitable opportunities for some third-party states to profit from exploiting the sanctions imposed against target states. (Early, 2015, 8.)

Economic sanctions on Russia

March 2014	July 2014	August 2014
Crimea => sanctions	Plane crash => stricter sanctions	Counter-sanctions from Russia

The first round of sanctions in March 2014 included for example imposition on the President Putin's close circle of oligarchs. These sanctions already possibly decreased trust of households and companies. (Berg-Andersson & Kotilainen 2016.) After the Malaysia Airlines airplane was shot down in July 2014 the European Union imposed another round of sanctions on Russia in response to Russian policy towards Ukraine. These measures target oil exploration, military assistance, sensitive advanced technology and state-owned banks. (Berg-Andersson & Kotilainen 2016; Jones & Whitworth 2014.) There are various means of economic sanctions such as tariffs, embargo, travel bans and freezing assets. The next chapter introduces the sanctions imposed on Russia which are defined in Finnish Foreign Ministry's website on September 24th 2014 (in English and in Finnish).

The Finnish Foreign Ministry informed that the European Union has expanded the restrictive measures adopted in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine. The expansions concern the sectors already subject to restrictions, i.e. defense material, dual use goods, capital markets, and oil production and exploration. In addition, new persons have been added to the list subject to restrictive measures. All of the new measures entered into force on September 12th 2014.

1. Restrictions concerning capital markets

The Regulation that entered into force at the beginning of August prohibits participation in the medium-term and long-term **financing of certain Russian financial institutions**. Now the ban also includes certain Russian companies operating in the **defense industry or in the oil business**. The prohibition also encompasses the subsidiaries that the companies listed in the Annexes have established outside the EU Member States, as well as the entities working on behalf of these companies. In addition, the restrictions were extended so that the prohibition now applies to financial instruments with a maturity exceeding 30 days instead of the previous 90 days. The prohibition **applies to instruments issued after the Regulation entered into force**. The prohibition also covers new loans and credits with a maturity exceeding 30 days. The prohibition does not include loans that are used to finance legal exports or imports. (Finnish Foreign Ministry)

2. Export restrictions on dual use products

In the beginning of August, the exports of **dual use goods and technology** to Russia or for use in Russia were prohibited if these products can be intended for **military use or for a military end**

user. The export restrictions were now expanded to include certain companies that manufacture products for both civilian and military use. The provision of financing and technical assistance related to such transactions and products is also prohibited. (Finnish Foreign Ministry)

3. Export restrictions pertaining to oil exploration and production

The export of certain products for deep **water oil exploration and production**, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia was banned in early August. The export ban has now been expanded to cover certain services such as drilling, well testing, logging and completion services, and supply of specialized floating vessels if they are intended for deep water oil exploration and production, Arctic oil exploration and production, or shale oil projects in Russia. (Finnish Foreign Ministry)

4. Prohibition to export and import defense material

The prohibition was adjusted by adding an explicit reference to insurance and reinsurance related to such products. (Finnish Foreign Ministry)

5. Restrictive measures aimed at persons and companies

The Council has added new persons to the list of restrictive measures owing to actions threatening or weakening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. (Finnish Foreign Ministry)

The Effect of Sanctions on Finnish Exports to Russia

Finland's merchandise exports to Russia have decreased by 44 % between 2012 and 2015. Main part of this is because of the downfall of the oil prices and depreciation of the Russian Ruble. Both of these factors have weakened the purchasing power of Russian enterprises and households, especially what comes to foreign goods and services. The trend continues due to the sanctions imposed after the Ukrainian crisis. The sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia have had a relatively small effect on Finnish exports to Russia – after all the share of the sanctioned product groups was small before the crisis, only a half of a per cent. The counter-sanctions which Russia imposed on 7th of August 2014 instead imposed by Russia on food exports of the EU countries (the countries which imposed sanctions first on Russia) have had a larger negative impact on the Finnish exports to Russia. The share of the sanctioned product groups was about 5 % of Finnish goods exports to Russia. These sanctions have had a considerable negative effect on the exports and profitability of the dairy, meat and agriculture industries. (Berg-Andersson & Kotilainen 2016.)

2.5 Participants of the economic sanctions

The legacy of the tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union is one of the crucial factors for understanding Russian–Ukrainian relations. Kappeler (2014) states that “Russia regards Ukraine as a part of its own strategic orbit, while many Ukrainians want to liberate themselves from the Russian hegemony and advocate a closer cooperation with the European Union”. (Kappeler, 2014; Luukkanen 2015, 121.) In order to understand the background of the crisis which drove the European Union and the United States to impose sanctions on Russia, the history of Russia and Ukraine is briefly introduced to see how they once were intertwined and then separated.

2.5.1 The history of Russia

Kievan Rus since 900th century

It has been said that the state entity called Kievan Rus, center of which was Kiev, emerged in the late 900th century (Remy 2015, 11) due to Norsemen trying to find silver in Northern Russia and then in southern Kiev. The rivers in Russia helped Scandinavians to do trading between north and south with commodities such as fur, beeswax and honey, which could be later traded with the Arabic for silver. (Luukkanen 2009a, 52,80; Luukkanen 2009b, 35; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.) Current studies have showed according to Luukkanen that the word ‘rus’ could be rooted with the Finnish words ‘ruotsalainen/Ruotsi’ (Swedish / Sweden), name of a place Roslagen/Roden and also word ‘rodh’ or ‘rodhz’ which is interpreted as rowing a boat. (Luukkanen 2009a, 53-54; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.)

This chapter presents two rulers that have had a substantial influence on the development of Kievan Rus. First, a Viking chief of Scandinavian heritage called Rurik was the founder of the dynasty which ruled Kievan Rus and his family became legitimate leader in the area surrounded by Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes. Second, Vladimir the Great’s adoption of Christianity as a main religion in 988 later improved the sense of unity in Kievan Rus area (Remy 2015, 11). After the ruler of Kievan Rus had died there were conflicts over who should be ruling Kievan Rus. (Luukkanen 2009a, 75; 80-81; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.)

Mongol invasion period and the Grand Duchy of Moscow since 13th century

Kievan Rus area was invaded by Mongols which lasted over 200 years (1236-1480s). Heavy taxes were collected and central ruling system was introduced, also international relations towards some

western countries were weakened but instead Russian culture was influenced by eastern ancient cultures in politics, handicraft and architecture. (Luukkanen 2009a, 82-89; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015; Remy 2015, 12.) After warfare in 1389 and 1395 the Golden Horde, Mongolian nomadic tribal confederation was defeated and Moscow stopped paying taxes to Mongols. Ivan the 3rd started gradually conquering surrounding territories (smaller principalities). Learnt from the Mongol period the central ruling system was highly present, therefore everybody had to obey Moscow's orders in Grand Duchy of Moscow. (Luukkanen 2009a, 91-93.)

Imperial Russia since 17th century

In the early 17th century, a new Romanov Dynasty continued this policy of expansion and began significant reforms in the society, for example in the army and Orthodox Church. Especially the tsar Peter the Great (born in 1672 – died in 1725) who proclaimed the Russian Empire was interested in modernizing Russian institutions and Russian culture by western European professionals on different areas, such as architecture and shipbuilding. (Luukkanen 2009a, 116-119; 171-172; CIA The World Factbook; Kaakkurinniemi, 2012; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015; Vihavainen 2014.) Russian society had gone through some serious changes since 1861 when the Emancipation Manifesto signed by Alexander II ended serfdom, however the reform could not offer better economic welfare for peasants by not giving enough land for them. (Luukkanen 2009a, 116-119; 171-172; CIA The World Factbook; Kaakkurinniemi, 2012.)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics since 20th century

The conflict between the people and the government began in St. Petersburg in January 1905 when a peaceful demonstration was stopped with violence by the government's troops – which contributed to the Revolution of 1905. Rioting and strikes continued and in order to stop them State Duma, multiparty system and the constitution called the October Manifesto were formed in 1905-1906. (Luukkanen 2004, 35-36; Remy 2015, 121-122.) However the discomfort of the current state had already risen. Several defeats by the Russian army during World War I and the food shortage led to widespread riots and strikes, which led to the takeover in 1917 of the imperial ruling by the provisional government. This is called the February Revolution. However after a few months Bolsheviks took over in November 1917 which is known as the October Revolution. (Luukkanen 2009a, 179-181; 193-194; Luukkanen 2004, 82-87; CIA The World Factbook; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.) The communists under Vladimir Lenin seized power and formed the Soviet Union, the USSR in 1922 (Kaakkurinniemi 2012) which ended the over 300 years of ruling by the Romanov dynasty. (Luukkanen 2009a, 190; Luukkanen 2004, 156; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.)

V. I. Lenin died in 1924 and a few years later following ruler Joseph Stalin (1928-53) mobilized in 1928-1932 forced collectivization which was intended for making Russia industrialized to compete with the western countries. (Luukkanen 2004, 184; Luukkanen 2009a, 270; 317-318, Remy 2015, 180.) Many lives were lost during the Stalin big terror in 1936-1939 and the Second World War, consequently the memory of WW II has been a uniting experience for Russians even today. (Luukkanen 2009a, 364; Juntunen 2009, 31; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.) After the death of Stalin in 1953 the Soviet economy and society stagnated in the following decades of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev instead (1985-91) introduced glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) trying to modernize communism (Luukkanen 2009a, 412; Gregory 1994, Kaakkurinniemi 2012), but his initiatives unintentionally affected forces that by December 1991 split the USSR into Russia and 14 other independent republics. (Luukkanen 2004, 344; Luukkanen 2009a, 427-428; CIA The World Factbook; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.)

Russia today since 1991

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has moved from a globally-isolated, centrally-planned economy towards a more market-based and globally-integrated economy. Economic reforms in the 1990s privatized most industry and specific vouchers were distributed to people which they could use for exchanging shares of the companies to be privatized, however the energy and defense-related sectors were left out from the auction – Russian Federation held for example big companies such as Gazprom and Transneft. (Luukkanen 2004, 440-441; Luukkanen 2009c, 117-119, Itoniemi et al. 2017, 63; CIA The World Factbook; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.)

Today Russia is one of the leading producers of oil and natural gas and besides it is a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary aluminum. Russia is reliant on commodity exports which makes its economy vulnerable following the unstable swings in global prices. Furthermore Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and the following economic sanctions affected the prospects of economic growth. (Itoniemi et al. 2017, 71-73; Juntunen 2009, 155; Puolustusministeriö 2012, 74; CIA The World Factbook; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.)

2.5.2 The history of Ukraine and the Ukraine crisis

The Kievan Rus area became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (ca. 1320-1569), furthermore in 1386 Lithuania and Poland merged into dynastic union Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which by the year 1462 had invaded Smolensk and Kiev having the former land of Kievan Rus. The Grand Duchy of Moscow could expand to Ukraine after long wars in the 1600s and Ukraine was divided between Poland and Moscow. (Luukkanen 2009a, 91-93; Vihavainen & Ketola 2015.) Eventually a

new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after a rebellion against the Poles from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795). The Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for over 100 years, however, by the late 18th century, most Ukrainian territory was claimed by the Russian Empire. (Luukkanen 2015, 55; Remy 2015, 27, 53.) After the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine was during a short period of time independent (between 1917-20), even though it suffered civil and other wars until the Soviet Union was formed by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Transcaucasia in 1922. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine achieved its final independence in 1991. (Kappeler 2014, 109-110; Hellenberg & Leinonen 2016, 18; Sakwa 2015, 7; CIA The World Factbook; Remy 2015, 141, 174, 226.)

A peaceful mass protest “Orange Revolution” was held at Independence Square in 2004 which forced the authorities to overturn a questionable presidential election permitting a new internationally monitored vote giving power to Viktor Yushchenko. Later on following internal disagreements along the Yushchenko group allowed his rival Viktor Yanukovich to return in parliamentary (Rada) elections. Yanukovich became prime minister in 2006 and was elected president in 2010. (Hellenberg & Leinonen 2016, 18-19; Zygar 2015, 125-135; CIA The World Factbook; Luukkanen 2015, 59,64,150-151,212; Mitikka 2015, 81; Remy 2015, 242-250.)

After Russia, the Ukrainian republic was the most important producer in the former Soviet Union of agricultural and food products, but also heavy industrial equipment and raw materials. Ukrainian economy today is vulnerable to external shocks because of its dependence on Russia for energy supplies and the lack of significant structural reform. (CIA The World Factbook; Mitikka 2015, 87; Remy 2015, 258.)

Ukraine had agreed to 10-year gas supply and transit contracts with Russia in January 2009 and in April 2010 Ukraine negotiated a price discount on Russian gas imports in exchange for extending Russia's lease on its naval base in Crimea. Many things have happened since these agreements. With the formation of an interim government in late February 2014, the international community began stabilizing the Ukrainian economy, including IMF. (CIA The World Factbook; Remy 2015, 253.)

The Ukraine crisis began in November 2013 when the President Viktor Yanukovich turned down the Association agreement of closer economic integration with the European Union. This resulted in peaceful demonstration against corruption which was organized by politically unsatisfied people at Kiev's Independence Square. Later in February 2014 the government used force to break up the protest camp. During the invasion of Crimea by Russian military troops partly violent demonstrations were organized for demanding Ukraine to become a federation or these eastern areas from Donetsk to Odessa to join to Russia. These battles and violent hooliganism in different

cities in the eastern part later turned into a warzone. Meanwhile in Kiev, the President Yanukovich fled to Russia, the new Parliament was formed and the new President, P. Poroshenko, was elected. (BBC News 1.5.2014; Hellenberg & Leinonen 2016 45; Luukkanen 2015 105-122; CIA The World Factbook; Remy 2015, 260-264, 267, 269.)

On the 16th of March 2014, 97 per cent of voters in the referendum favored Crimea's accession to the Russian Federation and Russia's Vladimir Putin recognizes Crimea as nation. The Ukrainian government, the EU, the UN General Assembly and the United States hold the vote illegal. Russian forces now occupy Crimea and Russian authorities claim it as Russian territory, even though the Ukrainian Government declares that Crimea is still part of Ukraine. ([BBC](#); Talouselämä 17.3.2014; Berg-Andersson & Kotilainen 2016; Hellenberg & Leinonen 2016; CIA The World Factbook; vox.com; Remy 2015.)

3 RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA

In this section the research and data collection methods used for the study are presented. First chapter introduces how studying and understanding media texts is important and second, research method and the most important theories around CDA are presented. Last chapter describes how the data of this present study was collected.

3.1 Studying media texts

Fairclough emphasizes the importance of studying media discourse. According to him the mass media is powerful enough to shape governments and parties representing things in specific ways, which is mostly a matter of how language is used. That power can as well influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations and social identities. (Fairclough 1995, 2.) The aim of the present study is to show how sanctions against Russia are represented in the news media. As Fairclough mentioned, mass media can be used for influencing people's opinion. This can be done by often repeating the same topic which gradually might become socially constructed reality.

Language plays a critical role in creating a news media text and consuming it because words are socially constructed. Journalists can have a lot of power because some people believe them without any critique therefore a journalist is an authority above the reader. Let us take an example of a child whose parents (authorities) keep repeating the word "lovely" at an angry voice – soon a young child gradually starts to believe that the meaning of the word "lovely" is not anything pleasant.

The news we read daily on the newspapers are perceptions of reality, even though journalists and other people working within media should be objective on the matters they write about. However the news are somewhat handled through their personal lenses how they perceive the world and what is considered being relevant or interesting for the target readers of the news media.

Journalists can also exercise significant power in legitimation. They often reinforce existing ideas and interpretations in their capacity as gatekeepers and editors of information flows. Journalists seem to play varied roles in promoting or downplaying specific discourses, warranting voice to specific concerns or silencing them. (Vaara & Monin 2010 6 via Kjaer and Slaatta 2007.) Having said that now is time to observe van Dijk's comments on the media: media power is usually symbolic and persuasive having the potential to control the minds of readers, but not directly their actions. (van Dijk 1992, 10-11.)

Van Dijk clarifies that even though media can have a great impact on some people, there are always readers or viewers that will think critically considering more deeply what the agenda of the news writer is or is there any hidden agenda – they will not blindly trust everything they read or see on the media. (van Dijk 1992, 10-11.) Van Dijk continues that mind control by the media is effective when the media users do not realize such control and when they “change their minds” of their own free will, as when they accept news reports as true or journalistic opinions as legitimate or correct. (van Dijk 1992, 10-11.)

Even though CDA is rather a young discipline (van Dijk 2001, 6) many studies show that CDA has been a popular way of conducting research in recent years. For instance M. A. Kandil from Georgia State University studied several articles in his dissertation *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in American, Arab, and British Media: Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis* (2009) to get a wider perspective from the conflict discussion. The study uses also corpus-based keyword technique to help analyze which topics are most used or left out from Al-Jazeera, CNN and BBC, for example *terrorism, occupation and settlements* were one of the main topics. Kandil's dissertation gave an inspiration of the textual and thematic analysis for the present study.

Rojo and Van Dijk (1997) used framework of CDA on illegal immigration discussion in Spain “There was a Problem, and it was Solved!”: Legitimizing the Expulsion of ‘illegal’ Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse. They examined discursive aspects of political legitimation by analyzing the speech of the Spanish Secretary of the Interior, Mayor Oreja; on the occasion of a military-style expulsion of a group of African ‘illegal’ migrants from Melilla, Spain in the summer 1996. They studied three levels of legitimation which are pragmatic consisting of various strategies of the justification of controversial official action, the second one was semantic: the ways a discourse represents its partisan view of the events or properties of actors a ‘true’ or as the ‘facts’. The third level was sociopolitical: the way official discourse self-legitimizes itself as authoritative and delegitimizes alternative discourses. For these various aspects of legitimation, several levels of discursive structure were examined in detail.

3.2 Research method

The following chapters present the concept of discourse, discourse analysis and lastly critical discourse analysis, which is the key framework used in the present study. ‘Discourse’ is basically how language is used in social interaction; it is language in social context. Discourse is often stated as a contributor to the ‘construction’ of social reality (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, 78, 81) and it is used by social theorists and linguists (Fairclough 1995, 54 via Foucault 1972, Fraser 1989; van Dijk 1985). Discourses define standard and acceptable ways to think, talk and act and as a result, discourses produce power and knowledge relations which are linguistically communicated, historically located, and rooted in social practice. (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 6-10.) However, the term ‘discourse’ can be used for more than one concept, usually meaning a signification as an element of the social process; but also the language associated with a particular social field or practice, e.g., ‘political discourse’; and in addition a way of construing aspects of the world associated with a particular social perspective. (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012; 78, 81.)

Discourses are collections of interrelated texts producing both meanings and effects, and they also generate particular experiences and practices in the real world. Texts are symbolic forms of representation, e.g. documents, books, interviews and speeches. Fairclough refers ‘discourse’ to spoken or written language use but also portrayed in some way becoming accessible to others, such as other media sources: photography, film, video and also non-verbal communication (Fairclough 1995, 54; Maguire & Hardy 2009, 6-10.). Coherent discourses tend to show more unified view of some aspect of social reality becoming taken for granted. Therefore, practices tend to be reproduced when the discourse about them is “structured” after all institutionalized practices are reinforced and reproduced through two key mechanisms which are known as subject positions and bodies of knowledge (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 8-9.)

Subject positions include bureaucratic positions, as well as socially constructed and legitimated categories of identity also known as that “warrant voice” (via Potter & Wetherell 1987). In any discourse, only “a limited number of subject positions are understood as meaningful, legitimate, and powerful” at a given point in time (via Hardy, Lawrence & Grant 2005, 65). These subject positions provide the actors that occupy them with rights to speak and act and an increased likelihood that their text production will be consequential by influencing other texts and shaping the discourse. Positions are not fixed but “negotiated and created by the maneuvering” of actors, as a result of which the ability to influence the field may change over time. (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 8-9.)

Second, discourses reproduce a particular way of seeing as “truth” and they produce messages for example ‘good’ and ‘bad’ but also acceptable and inappropriate behaviors. Discourse therefore creates bodies of knowledge which normalize certain ways of believing, speaking and behaving. (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 8-9.) When practices are institutionalized that is taken for granted and repeatedly reproduced subject positions tend to privilege dominant field incumbents who support the status quo; while bodies of knowledge tend to construct practices as effective, beneficial, appropriate but if these practices need a change then the discourse about them must change as well. (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 8-9.)


3.2.1 Discourse analysis

Media texts should be considered as valuable material for researching change, since they are a sensitive indicator of sociocultural change (Fairclough, 1995, 52). There are many ways to analyze media texts and one of them is discourse analysis. Fairclough presents a few questions that can be answered when analyzing media output, for example, how the world (relationships and events for example) is represented, what identities are set up for those who are part of the story, such as reporters, audience and what kind of relationships do they have with each other, such as reporter – audience. (Fairclough, 1995, 5.)

Fairclough explains (1995, 16) that media language should be analyzed as discourse and the linguistic analysis of media should be part of the discourse analysis of media. Fairclough continues that linguistic analysis focuses on texts in a broad sense, for example a transcription of television or radio show is text as well. Discourse analysis instead is also interested in sociocultural practices (the social and cultural happenings which the communicative event is part of) and discourse practices, which means the way a text is produced by media workers in media institutions and how readers, listeners or viewers receive the text. (Fairclough 1995; 5, 13, 16-17.) Discourse analysis is attempting to show systematic links between discourse practices, sociocultural practices and texts. Fairclough defines that any part of any text is at the same time representing and setting up identities and relations. (Fairclough 1995; 5, 13, 16-17.)

The relationships between text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice are on the central focus of critical discourse analysis of a communicative event. Fairclough explains that the concept ‘texts’ covers written or oral text of which oral texts can be spoken as on the radio or spoken and visual as on television. By ‘discourse practice’ Fairclough means the processes of text production

and text consumption. The diagram above summarizes the analytical framework. (Fairclough, 1995, 57-58)



(Fairclough, 1995, 59)

Analysis of texts is concerned with both their meanings and their forms. Fairclough explains that where forms change, there will be some difference in meaning and vice versa. Even though it might be useful analytically to contrast these two aspects of texts, however in reality it is difficult to separate them. After all the analysis of texts covers traditional forms of linguistic analysis – analysis of vocabulary and semantics, the grammar of sentences and smaller units, the sound and writing systems. (Fairclough 1995, 57-58)

Fairclough explains that any given text is at the same time having three main categories of function, each of which has its own systems of choices – which are ideational, interpersonal, and textual (representation, relations and identities). This view of text harmonizes with the constitutive view of discourse outlined above, providing a way of exploring the concurrent constitution of systems of knowledge and belief (ideational function) and social relations and social identities (interpersonal function) in texts, as with representations, relations and identities. (Fairclough 1995, 58.) The analyst might focus on how three aspects are articulated when analyzing a sentence in a written text, for example particular representations and re-contextualization of social practice (ideational function) perhaps carrying particular ideologies. Particular constructions of writer and reader identities, for example what is highlighted – is it status and role aspects of identity, or individual and personality aspects of identity, or particular construction of the relationship between writer and reader e.g. formal or informal, close or distant. (Fairclough 1995, 58.) Fairclough explains that the analysis is focusing not only what is present but also absence in texts to representations, categories or participant, constructions of participant identity or participant relations which are not found in a text. (Fairclough 1995, 58.)

Gee explains that discourse analysis is based on the details of writing that are relevant in the context and to the arguments the analysis is attempting to make. Using a discourse analysis needs to

be taken into account that it is not based on all the physical features present that might be relevant in some other purpose. Such judgments of relevance are eventually theoretical judgments, which are based on analyst's theories of how language, context and interactions work in general and in the specific context that is being analyzed. (Gee 2010, 117.) Critical discourse analysis will be explained more detailed in the next chapter.

3.2.2 Critical Discourse analysis

According to Teun van Dijk, critical discourse analysis (later: CDA) is used for studying the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and speaking in a social and political context. Van Dijk argues that critical discourse analysts are willing to comprehend, uncover and finally resist social inequality. Van Dijk explains that CDA is not a direction, school or specialization as other approaches in discourse studies, but instead it has a different mode or view developing theories, analysis and application through the field. (van Dijk 1995, 17-19; van Dijk 2001, 352.)

Discourse can be understood in many ways. First of all, CDA has intended to change linguistics by introducing critical perspectives on language, drawn from critical theory in the social sciences, which were previously absent, and to contribute to critical social analysis a focus on discourse which had previously been lacking or underdeveloped, according to Fairclough. This includes a better understanding of relations between discourse and for example social relations and relations of power, ideologies, social institutions, social identities, and besides better ways of analyzing and researching these relations. (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 78.)

CDA is a not a specific direction of research, which makes it diverse by nature not having one clear framework. Thus there are many types of CDA, which might be very different compared to each other, for example analysis of conversation or news reports, however, there can be found some general theoretical frameworks, which are closely related. Van Dijk continues that using CDA questions can be asked about the construction of certain discourse structures in the reproduction of social dominance, whether they are a news report, a part of a conversation or other contexts and genres. (van Dijk 2001, 353.)

Fairclough explains how connections between the use of language and the exercise of power are often unclear to people, however they are important to the working mechanisms of power. Fairclough gives an example of a doctor who is the main information source of the illness when

discussing with a patient. Practices like these (doctor – patient consultation) are shaped, with their common-sense assumptions, according to usual relations of power between groups of people. The normal opacity of these practices to those involved in them, the invisibility of their ideological assumptions, and of the power relations which underlie the practices, helps to sustain these power relations. (Fairclough, 1995, 54.)

Fairclough is citing Austin (1962) and Levinson (1983) to explain that viewing language use as social practice indicates language being a socially and historically situated mode of action, in a dialectical relationship with other sides of the social. Fairclough states that dialectical relationship is at the same time socially shaped but also socially shaping. Critical discourse analysis explores the tension between these two sides of language use, the socially shaped and socially constitutive, rather than favoring one over the other. (Fairclough, 1995, 55.) The next chapter describes how the data for the present study was collected.

3.3 Data collection and analysis of the data

The primary data of the present study consists of news articles which were published in business journals Finnish *Talouselämä* and Russian *Kommersant* between March 2014 and March 2015. Word combination “economic” and “sanctions” was used for the data collection in the journals’ databases. In the beginning the data collection of *Talouselämä* consists of 134 Finnish news articles and of *Kommersant* 198 Russian news articles. Before the critical discourse analysis could be conducted there needed to be made some preparations such as those extracted articles which fit with the topic were chosen and then saved as a Word document for further study and later on all the important sentences related to Russian economic sanctions were underlined and finally those related articles were chosen for the critical discourse analysis.

Furthermore the extracted articles will be examined more carefully during some key events; first the annexation of Crimea in March, which caused the EU and the United States and other countries to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation. Second, the discourses in July for stricter sanctions after the Malaysia Airlines plane crash in the Ukrainian territory. Third, also counter-sanctions imposed by Russia in August are studied because they affect negatively on Finnish exports, even though the main focus is in sanctions against Russia.

Talouselämä (est. in 1938) is Finland’s only weekly business magazine and the largest in Nordic region. Its circulation covers 75 141 and total for printed and digital paper is 363 000 (in 2017). *Kommersant*, in Russian *Коммерсантъ* translated as *Businessman* and often shortened to *Ъ*,

is a nationally distributed daily newspaper published in Russia mostly devoted to politics and business. In 1989 founded leading business broadsheet has daily circulation of approximately 120,000 (in 2013). Kommersant is widely read Russian newspaper which has different categories such as “den’gi” for finance and business related news.

Talouselämä	Amount	Talouselämä.fi	Amount	Mobile	Amount
Circulation	75,141	Weekly reach	227,000	Different browsers per week	306,000
Readership	165,000	Page downloads per week	855,000	Page downloads per week	332,000
Combined reach (print + digital)		363,000			

Talouselämä reach Sources: The Finnish Audit Bureau of Circulation 2015, NRS Magazines + total 2016, TNS Metrix 2017 (weeks 2-7 average), Google Analytics Nov16-Feb17

The critical discourse analysis consisted of original articles which were published in Finnish and Russian language; however I translated all the chosen articles from Finnish and Russian into English trying to maintain the original tones (for example some spoken language). Translations also include the status of the referred person when the news article was published, and later on obviously their positions could have changed, for example the French President and the President of the United States, thus this means in practice that if the President of the United States is referred to it means Barack Obama instead of Donald Trump.

The structure of the analysis is as follows: the first part of the analysis presents the results of CDA of Finnish business journal Talouselämä with 46 chosen articles and Russian journal Kommersant with 29 chosen articles. The legitimation strategies of these journals are compared with each other to comprehend the sanctions discussion and see the story within Finnish and Russian context.

Online Journal	Number of extracted articles
Talouselämä, FIN	134 altogether, 46 for CDA
Kommersant, RUS	198 altogether, 29 for CDA

The second part of the analysis consists of thematic and textual analysis of Talouselämä which help to outline a deeper understanding on the sanctions discussion. In the present study often repeated topics and keywords are collected for the thematic analysis. Afterwards there will be a textual analysis which instead is focusing on deeper levels the word usage, for example what kind of verbs or nouns are used in that discussion. The next chapter presents the research findings.

4 RESEARCH FINDINGS

The following chapters will introduce the research findings on the legitimation strategies of the sanctions against Russia. The present study is driven to answer to the research question about which legitimation strategies are used in the chosen business news articles. The next chapter first presents the legitimation strategies in *Talouselämä* with quotes from the extracted articles. After that the strategies found in *Kommersant* are presented. Finally the findings of both journals are compared with each other in order to create a full picture of sanctions discourses and the stories from Finnish and Russian perspectives. The categories of de/legitimation are presented as follows: first rationalization, then authorization and finally moralization.

4.1 *Talouselämä*

Altogether 46 articles published in *Talouselämä* journal were chosen for the critical discourse analysis to comprehend how Russian sanctions are legitimized and presented in the news media. The results show that in *Talouselämä* journal the most common legitimation strategy is clearly authorization with 18 identified articles and the next used strategies are moralization and rationalization both with 8 articles. However, narrativization strategy was not noticeable therefore it is not outlined here. There is also sanctions related news written on a delegitimation perspective, in which the rationalization strategy is used 14 times and authorization is present only in two articles, furthermore moralization in delegitimation perspective could not be found.

This table below demonstrates how authorization is more frequently presented strategy in legitimation than in delegitimation. As a result it is well noted that informing about imposing sanctions in the media requires reference to many politicians. Actually the number of articles varies much compared to legitimation and delegitimation. Furthermore, delegitimation of sanctions is justified more frequently with rational reasoning and reference to rational utility – after all sanctions

would affect negatively on many European countries' economies. Some of the same articles share "blurred" strategies therefore they have been counted twice, which makes the numbers in the table below more than 46 articles altogether.

Legitimation	Amount	Delegitimation	Amount
Authorization	18	Rationalization	14
Moralization	8	Authorization	2
Rationalization	8	Moralization	0

Table: the amount of articles per strategy

4.1.1 Rationalization Legitimation

Rationalization legitimation was less used strategy in Talouselämä than rationalization delegitimation and that is mostly due to economic factors. After all rationalization as a legitimation strategy is based on utility, on what is considered being common sense and reasonable. It seems that one of general opinions in the articles states that the economic sanctions harm the economy. Some Russian point of view was also presented in this Talouselämä's strategy which is that economic sanctions help Russia to become more self-sufficient in agriculture and producing food.

The rational basis of imposing sanctions on Russian oil and gas industry is presented in the **quotes 1 and 2**. The legitimation of rational strategy introduces the idea that the cuts of import of Russian gas and oil is no longer a problem due to the fact soil gas is not used in households and imported gas is replaceable. These quotes share both legitimations of rationalization and in addition authorization strategy is used in the quote 2. In this case authorization is done by interviewing the foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja who said "there are substitutes which can be used for Russian soil gas". This is how general opinion can be shaped; at first it was said that energy sanctions are better to keep away because they would have an impact on other European countries' gas resources, however later on the news article presents that Russian soil gas is anyway replaceable in Finland which gives the impression that there is no need for more imported Russian soil gas and imposing sanctions is a rational choice after all because they don't cause dis-utility on this matter.

1“Also the gas industry has been left out on purpose from the sanctions list in the fear of Russia’s revenge because many EU-countries are very dependent on Russian gas deliveries.” (Talouselämä 28.7.2014)
2“Approximately 30 % of the imported gas used by the EU-countries comes from Russia, but some eastern European countries are even 90 % dependent on Russian gas. All soil gas consumed in Finland is imported from Russia. It is not however very critical fuel for Finland’s gas consumption. Soil gas is not used in households and in facility use it is possible to move to the use of substitute fuel. Also the foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja says the Russian gas consumed in Finland is replaceable.” (Talouselämä 31.7.2014)
3“According to Medvedev, Western sanctions are a good reason to develop a self-generating economy. In addition, when possible export restrictions on Russian products enter into force, Russian companies according to the Prime Minister are worth of focusing on the Asian markets.” (Talouselämä 22.4.2014)
5“Possibly there are no good options. Nobody wants a war in the area. Economic sanctions would strike in Europe and surely in Finland as well. Something has to be done anyway.”
6“According to Barroso potential sanctions are not to make the crisis worse but to get Russia to negotiate. He thinks “there’s no sense starting a new cold war””
7“we should maintain peace. Sanctions policy is taking peace further away. When one is imposed sanctions on, it has to reply”.

Russian point of view was also presented in Talouselämä’s rationalization legitimation strategy. The **quote 3** in the table presents the idea of sanctions helping Russia to become more developed in new industries which is also shown in Kommersant rationalization chapter. Authorization strategy is also used by referring to the President Vladimir Putin. The **quote 4** (in appendices) shares the Russian point of view on how the sanctions and counter-sanctions are protecting Russian citizens and their health from products of bad quality by forcing Russia to produce more by themselves and activate in new industries. In this case sanctions can be perceived as a rational choice for cherishing health and for Russia becoming more self-sufficient regarding food producing and agriculture.

The **quotes from 5 to 7** show that sanctions are the only way to express that the annexation of Crimea is not tolerated. Because military responses are not a solution but instead there are political ways, in this case economic sanctions, which will send the message how the European Union and the United States feel about what has happened. The quote 6 shares some of the features from rational legitimation strategy (no sense) and also authorization legitimation (According to Barroso). Discourse of calming down the restless situation in Eastern Ukraine was present a few times in pro-sanctions discussion. It could be understood as a rational threat to Russia for example: “calm down or there will be sanctions”. The European Union and the United States had declared an ultimatum for Russia to co-operate so that peace negotiations would be successful.

“New stricter Russia-sanctions are valid today. The goal of the sanctions imposed by the European Union is to make Russia to cooperate for calming down Eastern Ukraine.”

“The attitudes of the European countries’ leaders have become stricter because it is believed that Russia has even added the support to the separatists of Eastern Ukraine.”

It can be seen in Talouselämä’s articles that Russia was not participating enough on calming down the situation in Eastern Ukraine and nobody wants a war, so by rational reasoning, by diplomatic efforts without violence and armed conflicts, avoiding war requires imposing sanctions, even though they would harm all parties. To sum up the discourses found within rationalization legitimation: first, it is only rational to choose peace over war and second, Russian point of view presents that sanctions are helping Russian economy boost in different industries such as agriculture. The next chapter presents the rationalization delegitimation strategy in Talouselämä.

4.1.2 Rationalization delegitimation

I discovered that rational delegitimation discourse in Talouselämä presents that imposing economic sanctions is an irrational choice because sanctions are considered being expensive and causing harm also for the sender country. Rational delegitimation strategy was very dominant in the research since it was present in altogether 14 articles.

“According to EU Observer, Russia’s political leaders said in a press release on Wednesday it is an irrational and irresponsible step [sanctions], which leads inevitably to the price rising in the European energy markets” (Talouselämä 31.7.2014)

The theory part of the present study described that multifaceted strategies tend to work well and this is also visible in the following quotes which share two approaches for delegitimation – and that is rationalization and authorization. The **quote 1** explains that Alexander Stubb has been working a lot to avoid economic sanctions’ influence on border programs because Finland would lose benefits, therefore this is reference to economic harm and then reference to Stubb who was the Prime Minister at that time. The **quote 2** is also using double approaches: reference to commissar Rehn,

which is authorization and reference to economic losses and utility which is rationalization strategy.

The **quote 3** sums up the two approaches of delegitimation rationalization and authorization – the President Hollande says sanctions are not doing any favor for the European Union on Ukraine conflict. Rationalization delegitimation is used for discussing the ability of sanctions to harm economies in many countries, not only in Russia therefore it would be a rational choice to avoid economic losses but if we compare war and economic losses – avoiding war is more important for humankind in general.

The **quote 4** presents how some German companies feel about the sanctions imposed on Russia using not only rationalization but also authorization strategy. There are also some “mysterious” references such as “anonymous sources” and “some business executives”, furthermore several business representatives are mentioned in the quote. Talouselämä has similarly taken some Russian point of view in their articles by citations of foreign and also Russian media; especially ineffectiveness of sanctions is often commented in these articles which Talouselämä refers to. These quotes from Russian perspective share two approaches – again rationalization and authorization.

The **quote 5** has multi-layered discursive strategies used, in this case rationalization as the sanctions would be “crushing the foundation of global finance system” (see the appendices) and moralization by reference to the European democratic values. The **quote 6** demonstrates how authorization and rationalization delegitimation are used: Russian foreign minister states that sanctions will threaten communication on important issues such as solving the Syrian crisis – sanctions are disturbing useful and reasonable dialogue between Russia and the United States on important issues. After the quote the next chapter introduces another legitimation strategy found in Talouselämä which is authorization.

The results showed that delegitimation approach is more used than legitimation in rational perspective. It could be portrayed as natural because the journal was Finnish and the sanctions were considered hurting the Finnish economy after all economic sanctions imposed on Russia made Russia to impose counter-sanctions which had direct and indirect effects on international business.

<p>1“For the last few days I have done almost round the clock work to avoid these sanctions that would strike the border cooperative work between Finland and Russia, and Russia and the rest of the European Union”, said Stubb to HS. If all the border programs were frozen, Finland would lose some benefits worth of 200 million euros.” (Talouselämä 16.7.2014)</p>
<p>2“Finnish EU economic commissar Olli Rehn said on Friday that Europe should avoid imposing new sanctions on Russia because of the economic losses they would cause. All “rational” EU- citizens should avoid extra-sanctions, Rehn said on Friday Bloomberg’s interview according to Business Week. “it [sanctions] would hurt everybody, the Europeans and the Russians” Rehn said. Sanctions can be avoided only if Russia does not make the conflict worse. EU-parliament elections’ candidate Rehn said. The slowdown of Russian economy has already influenced “negatively” on Finnish and Austrian economies, Rehn said. The influence might spread to Germany, Poland and Baltic countries, he predicts.” (Talouselämä 2.5.2014)</p>
<p>3“Russian economic crisis is not benefiting EU at all thus Russia-sanctions should be ended, says the French president François Hollande. Hollande said to Deutsche Welle that the first step for solving the Ukraine conflict is deleting the sanctions. ”I think sanctions should be stopped now. They need to be removed if there is progress [in solving the crisis].” (Talouselämä 5.1.2015)</p>
<p>4“According to the Wall Street Journal, several large German companies are opposed to economic sanctions against Russia. This is for example the technology company Siemens, the automaker Volkswagen and the Deutsche Bank. According to the anonymous sources interviewed by the WSJ, the German rulers have been increasingly contacted by some business executives who are calling for non-imposition. The companies are concerned that business relations with Russia will suffer because of them [the sanctions]. (Talouselämä 2.5.2014)</p>
<p>5“According to the Financial Times another bank, VTB, which also got into sanction list says that the decisions are against the European democratic values. “The Europeans are working against their own benefits to obey the wishes of their colleagues across the sea”. By this comment the bank possibly refers to the US.” (Talouselämä 1.8.2014)</p>
<p>6“The Russian foreign minister warned today the United States about widening the sanctions. According to Russia adding sanctions could make the communication between countries worse on Syrian crisis and Iranian nuclear program.” (Talouselämä 30.12.2014)</p>

4.1.3 Authorization legitimation

The authorization strategy in Talouselämä mostly consisted of reference to some of the European leaders, presidents, prime ministers and politicians, for example A. Merkel, F. Hollande. Furthermore B. Obama / the US / the White House were often mentioned which makes it personal authorization strategy. For example, “Merkel decided to support the economic sanctions against Russia” or “The sanctions have been set in the EU, so they need to be followed by all members, the European parliament insists.” Of course, sometimes there could be found several strategies in one

article, for example both authorization and rationalization – drawing the line which goes into which category was difficult in some of the articles.

The **quotes 1 and 2** show authorization by referring to the White House, Barack Obama and the United States. Such concepts as sovereignty, territorial integrity and following agreement are referring to international laws. The **quotes 3-7** present authorization legitimization referring to Angela Merkel (Germany), the European Union and the European Parliament, the United States, David Cameron (Britain). First, Merkel is warning Russia about possible sanctions in March and in July after the Malaysia Airlines plane crash. A. Merkel and D. Cameron were supporting new stricter sanctions against Russia.

1“**According to the White House**, today's sanctions send a strong message to the Russian government that its actions have consequences. Russian actions violate Ukraine's **sovereignty** and **territorial integrity**. The referendum on Ukraine's exit from Ukraine was also illegal. **According to President Barack Obama**, the United States is ready to impose further sanctions if Russia exacerbates the situation in Ukraine. According to Obama, Russia's actions in Ukraine have separated it from the rest of the world and reduced its prestige. The Ukrainian government, the United States, and the EU consider the vote to be illegal.” (Talouselämä 17.3.2014)

2“**According to the United States** widening the sanction list is an answer to that Russia is not following the **agreement agreed** in Geneva which is trying to calm down the situation in Ukraine.” (Talouselämä 28.4.2014)

3“Merkel is warning Russia of sanctions that could **cause massive political and economic damage to Russia** if it fails to change the course on Ukraine. Russian Minister of economic affairs said that Russia is ready to reply to sanctions. Merkel is threatening with sanctions and Russia is doing the same.” (Talouselämä 13.3.2014)

4“**The fall of the Malaysia Airlines plane** led Merkel to support economic sanctions against Russia. The EU approved the sanctions on Tuesday.” (Talouselämä 14.7.2014)

5“**The European Union and the United States** intend today to announce the tougher economic sanctions against Russia (according to New York Times). The attitudes of the leaders of European countries have become more intense, as Russia is believed to have even increased the support it has given to the separatists in eastern Ukraine. Especially the German business sector is now more inclined to new sanctions, although it can be costly for the German economy.” (Talouselämä 29.7.2014)

6“According to **German federal chancellor Angela Merkel** new sanctions are imposed whether Russia does not change its course [on Ukraine]. She thinks the situation cannot be solved by military ways.” (Talouselämä 31.8.2014)

7“**Britain's Prime Minister David Cameron** was strongly supporting tightening the sanctions. “It's time to gather our power and resources into action”, Cameron said demanding harder sanctions on Russian economy. “Russia cannot expect free access to the European markets, its capital, knowledge and technical know-how while fueling the conflict in one of its neighbors in Europe,” Cameron said referring to the support given by Russian separatists to Ukraine.” (Talouselämä 22.7.2014)

The **quotes 8 and 9** tell how the European Parliament informed in January 2015 that sanctions will stay unless Russia do not stop warfare in the Ukrainian territory. The **quote 10** is showing

authorization strategy as Stubb is referred to and meanwhile legitimation rationalization is used since Finnish Prime Minister Stubb explained that there will not be excessive effects on Finnish economy, only some firms will suffer, even though it has been widely commented on the media that sanctions would hurt the Finnish economy very much.

The **quotes 11 and 12** are using, besides rationalization strategy, authorization strategy about Russian soil gas and whether sanctions could be imposed on energy sectors. At first it was said energy sector will not be on the sanction list, because Europe gets its energy from Russia. “Also the gas industry has been left out -- in the fear of Russia’s revenge because many EU-countries are very dependent on Russian gas deliveries.” A few days later it was highlighted in the news that “also the foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja says the Russian gas used by Finland is replaceable.”

The **quote 13** explains the relation which Finland faced when imposing sanctions. The legitimation strategy of impersonal authorization is used after all the sanction policy is decided in the EU thus Finland has to agree on the sanctions even though it has negative effects on the Finnish economy.

The **quote 14** displays how Finnish journalist explains the current situation of sanctions which have a bigger impact on the Finnish economy than American. This makes the decision-making of new stricter sanctions easier for the United States. The comment of the journalist about Finland agreeing on the sanctions terms and having greater economic losses than the United States could be interpreted as impersonal authorization. As Jones & Whitworth (2014) explain the relationship towards stricter economic sanctions might depend on the history of the country, is it a post-communist European country or Western European country, or whether the country is dependent on Russian natural gas or not. The large economic interests at stake explain why European policymakers were slower to adopt economic sanctions than Barack Obama’s administration in the US and some aggressive voices in the EU would have liked. (Jones & Whitworth 2014.) The **quote 15** expresses the different attitudes towards sanctions which European ministers have. The journalist comments regarding the Mistral warships deal which France and Russia had that it has an impact on how France reacts to the new sanctions. Germany is however trying to maintain conversations with Russia while Britain calls for stricter sanctions.

8“The European Parliament insists in its final statement the Europe-council to tighten Russian sanctions unless the country won't change its “aggressive and imperialistic” politics. (tells Yle) (Talouselämä 15.1.2015)”
9“ The European Parliament approved final statement informing the parliament insist keeping the sanctions until Russia stops its aggressive politics in Ukraine, respects cease fire, withdraw its troops out of the country and stops supporting separatists.” (Talouselämä 16.1.2015)
10“ The PM Alexander Stubb told earlier via his Twitter account that sanctions against Russia do not have ‘significant’ impacts on Finland. Some effects there are on firms. Besides there are ‘indirect’ influences on Finnish economy due to Russian business decline. The direct influences are visible only if the EU has to do more harsh economic actions against Russia. “We are tightly with the EU front.”” (Talouselämä 29.7.2014)
11“Also the gas industry has been left out on purpose from the sanctions list in the fear of Russia’s revenge because many EU-countries are very dependent on Russian gas deliveries.” (Talouselämä 28.7.2014)
12“Approximately 30 % of the imported gas used by the EU-countries comes from Russia, but some eastern European countries are even 90 % dependent on Russian gas. All soil gas consumed in Finland is imported from Russia. It is not however very critical fuel for Finland’s gas consumption. Soil gas is not used in homes and in facility use it is possible to move to the use of substitute fuel. Also the foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja says the Russian gas used by Finland is replaceable.” (Talouselämä 31.7.2014)
13“Finland cannot in anyway row against the sanctions current. The sanctions have been set in the EU, so they need to be followed by all members. Sanctions affect Russia’s economy six times harder than the Finnish economy. The direct impacts are limited, but indirect impacts are remarkable” says Pertti Korhonen, Managing Director of Outotec's Mining and Metal Industry Technology Provider.” (Talouselämä 8.8.2014)
14“It might be easier for the United States to make a decision [on sanctions] due to its economy that is less dependent on Russia.” (Talouselämä 13.5.2014)
15“Foreign ministers of EU countries met today on Tuesday to discuss the new timetable for Russia's sanctions, the New York Times tells. However, the meeting reveals great differences between the EU countries' attitudes towards sanctions. Germany is trying to maintain conversations with the Russian President Vladimir Putin when France is being pressured by an agreement with Russia on delivering warships. Britain, on the other hand, calls for a shift to more severe sanctions.” (Talouselämä 22.7.2014)

4.1.4 Authorization delegitimation

Only a few articles seem to have the authorization delegitimation strategy used. In the **quote 1** the President of Russia Vladimir Putin was referred to saying that economic sanctions are not acceptable and Russian government is thinking about counter-sanctions which would support Russian producers. The **quote 2** illustrates how the chairman of The Federation of Agricultural Producers comments Prime Minister A. Stubb’s earlier comments on how sanctions would not have large effects on Finnish economy. There is personal authorization strategy used in the extracted

quote as Marttila's opinions are highlighted in the news article. He criticized that the government had not prepared enough for Russian countermoves which affect the Finnish economy.

Consequently personal authorization delegitimation is used in the extracted **quote 3** in which the Mistral ship deal is commented by the President of France. Hollande said that cancellation of the contract would be very expensive for France. Obviously this has an effect on the sanctions discussion within the French people.

<p>1“The Russian president Vladimir Putin has ordered his government to consider some counteractions on sanctions imposed on Russia by western countries. Putin thinks the political ways that are also causing economic pressure “are not acceptable”, tells Itar-Tass. “In this case the Russian government has already suggested some actions for revenge because of some countries’ so called sanctions”, Putin says according to Itar-Tass. The Russian president wants to act so that they [counter-sanctions] would support Russian producers and not harm domestic customers. Putin thinks different producers in different countries should be working in an equally competitive environment, and then it would be according to the regulations set by WTO and would take care of international security.” (Talouselämä 5.8.2014)</p>
<p>2“Juha Marttila the chairman of MTK criticized the government in Maaseudun Tulevaisuus journal that the government was not prepared for counter-sanctions of Russia. “This is unforgivable that we have focused on which sanctions the EU imposes and not even thought about preparing for the counter-sanction”. A wide embargo of Russia is according to Marttila the worst option that we were afraid of. “I have this image that the ministry of treasury had closed their eyes from outside world to comment that sanctions do not affect anything.” Marttila hopes Finland takes example from Poland. “When Polish apples got embargo sanctions, poles stepped up and claimed that EU has to make it up for them.”” (Talouselämä 8.8.2014)</p>
<p>3““There are currently no sanctions to prevent delivery, and Russia has paid [the ship]” Hollande said to the newspaper, “the cancellation of the contract would cost France EUR 1.1 billion.” France has a Mistral ship deal that affects how they will react to new sanctions.” (Talouselämä 22.7.2014)</p>

4.1.5 Moralization legitimation

The legitimation strategy moralization is reference to values, moral basis, and emotional elements. The analysis clarifies the moral basis of imposing the sanctions which is the punishment by other countries for Russia because of the annexation of Crimea, “actions have consequences”.

The **quotes 1-3** explain the moralization strategy in Talouselämä which is the idea of reacting to the breaking of international laws by political ways without violence, using sanctions, even though also members of the European Union will suffer. The headline of the article is “The EU is ready to pay the price” referring to the mentioned above. Also the President of France F. Hollande says that “we don’t accept the annexation of Crimea – thus some of the sanctions will still last.” There were several strategies used in the same article for example moralization and authorization in the **quote 4** where Obama tells that the annexation is against the international principles and Russia

should go to another direction. If it happens [going to another direction] Obama will be the first one to outtake the sanctions.

The **quote 5** identifies two different discursive legitimation strategies which are moralization as referring to Russia's actions as illegal and once again authorization strategy used for reference to the foreign minister. Norway's attitude is clearly indicated because it is highlighted as not being part of the EU and even though it has wide business relations with Russia – it supports the European sanctions imposed on Russia. Some core values have been mentioned in the extracted **quote 6** such as freedom and democracy.

The **quote 7** displays that there will be new sanctions due to crisis which has humanitarian effects on the civil population. The **quote 8** has both moralization and authorization. First, it is told that sanctions will make the members of the European Union to suffer however the price has to be paid due to the violation of international law. This last argument is partly authorization strategy by reference to the law.

Talouselämä did not include visible signs of moralization delegitimation on imposing sanctions. Sanctions are a way to show that the European Union does not accept the annexation of Crimea and the common opinion was that the annexation was illegal according to the international laws. Therefore it would be morally questionable to present views on the Finnish media that the annexation of Crimea is silently accepted.

1“Economic interests are not above freedom and core values of democracy” and “According to the Western countries the investment restrictions’ purpose is to show that the West is not accepting the annexation of Crimea into Russia.”

2”Sanctions are a way to pressure and judge Russia for its actions in Ukraine and also the voting in Donetsk and Lugansk of territorial independency sovereignty.”

3“According to the Western countries the investment restrictions’ purpose is to show that the West is not accepting the annexation of Crimea into Russia.”

4“In the final press conference **Barak Obama** that only change in politics of Moscow towards Ukraine would be the way to ease up sanctions. He says that the US will hold to the **international principles** one of which is that you **cannot intrude into other countries**. He then continues that if Russia will take another direction – Obama himself will be the first one to suggest ending the sanctions.” (17.11.2014)

5“Norway is going to participate in the imposition of sanctions by the EU. (Reuters) Norway is not part of the EU and it has wide business relations with Russia, where it imports oil and gas technology and food products. ”Ever since Russia illegally annexed Crimea to itself in March, it has been clear to the government that it has to support its allies and partners answering towards the illegal actions of Russia in Ukraine”, says the foreign minister Børge Brende.” (Talouselämä 30.7.2014)

6“The President of Slovakia Andrej Kiska notes that he defends EU Russia's sanctions, says Czech newspaper Prague Post. Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovakia, Robert Fico, earlier criticized the EU's Russian sanctions as absurd. **"Sanctions cause us some financial losses ... but we have to be prepared to accept them. Economic interests are not above the fundamental values of freedom and democracy,"** writes Kiska on Facebook's profile.” (Talouselämä 15.8.2014)

7“The foreign ministers are appealing in their statements to the worsening crisis of Eastern Ukraine humanitarian effects on civil population. According to the statement EU is still ready to consider new sanctions if the situation in Ukraine is getting worse.” (Talouselämä 16.8.2014)

8“Not only Russia but the European Union members are suffering due to sanctions and anti-sanctions (counter-sanctions that Russia imposed on the EU and the US). But we have to react to the violation of international law and we did this without violence but using political methods, such as sanctions. “European Union is ready to pay the price”.” (Talouselämä 30.09.2014)

To conclude the above analysis on Talouselämä's articles, the most used legitimation strategy was authorization and then equal amount of both rationalization and moralization strategies were found in Talouselämä. The use of delegitimation was also very dominant with more rationalization and some authorization, however moralization was not presented. Many articles include rational delegitimation strategy suggesting that sanctions are not worthy for the Finnish economy. As we know the Finnish economy has been in stagnation since 2008 (stat.fi) and since the Russian counter sanctions Finnish exports to Russia has declined.

4.2 Kommersant

The data collection of Kommersant news journal consisted of 198 articles which were found in the university's database called *Integrum* by using a word combination in Russian “экономические санкции” (transl. economic sanctions). The table below shows that there are altogether 29 articles chosen for the critical discourse analysis.

Legitimation	Amount	Delegitimation	Amount
Authorization	7	Rationalization	11
Rationalization	6	Authorization	5
Moralization	5	Moralization	2

Table: the amount of articles per category in Kommersant

I made the CDA based on the original language of the articles, but for the present study I have translated all the articles from Russian into English trying to maintain the original tone of the speaker. In the present study I focus on the sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union and the United States, however counter-sanctions which Russia imposed are also acknowledged in the data found in Kommersant articles.

Some of the articles had blurred strategies meaning that there might have been for example both rationalization and authorization legitimation strategies used. This means that some of them were counted in several strategies therefore the sum altogether in the table above is more than the original amount of 29 chosen articles. The news articles presented in Kommersant consisted of more pages in general than economic sanctions related news published in Talouselämä. The articles in Kommersant shared many different discursive legitimation strategies, most often rationalization and authorization in the same news text.

4.2.1 Rationalization legitimation

In Kommersant rational legitimation presents the idea that sanctions may actually help Russia to develop its agriculture and to be more self-sufficient, increase domestic sales and gain more local customers now that the competition level is lower due to counter-sanctions. Russia imposed these sanctions as a reply to the economic sanctions first imposed on Russia by the European Union, the United States and some other countries such as Norway, Canada, Australia and Japan (Reuters.com). This is the only rational legitimation strategy that is perceived as positive reactions towards the sanctions from a Russian point of view found in the present study. Sanctions have been mostly presented as rationally questionable in Kommersant.

The **quotes 1 and 2** present the opinion on the counter-sanctions, so basically could be said that sanctions are a good solution because they will give an advantage for Russian domestic producers. As a political scientist states the government has explained that product embargo is an answer to the economic war that the West has set towards Russia and it helps Russia to develop its agriculture. According to the professor (see the appendix) Russians are willing to give up on some products and wellbeing for the sake of the national idea. The **quote 3** shares two different strategies, of which rationalization legitimation is used for explaining how product embargo is actually useful. Furthermore authorization strategy is used as well, for example reference to the Russian government authorities but also a political scientist and a professor. The rest of the extracted article can be found in the appendices.

The **quote 4** continues the same discourse that sanctions are said to be actually useful to Russia giving a push in food producing industries. Economic interests of Russia with Italy and Austria are mentioned and the meaning of Italy and Austria as business partners to Russia is highlighted in the **quote 5**. In Kommersant the legitimacy of Russian sanctions are presented so that the members of the European Union all together made response to the events in Ukraine, however Russia might be having troubles seeing the European Union as a partner because of its structure consisting of multiple countries.

1“Along the counter-sanctions of import we got a unique possibility to develop the most important lines of business, such as agriculture and food product recycling.” (Kommersant, 28.08.2014)
2“Domestic manufacturers are more radical. In the opinion of Svetlana Andrianova, the president of the Faraday footwear manufacturer, the counter-sanctions should be imposed not only on products manufactured in Europe or the US, but in general against brands owned by European or American companies . "More than 70% of the market is occupied by European brands, it is difficult for Russian companies to enter the consumer market, retailers are initially focused on working with foreign products," she says, emphasizing that domestic producers have large capacities, but they are under-utilized.” (Kommersant, 12.09.2014)
3“The authorities said that product embargo allows national agriculture to become more developed and it is also an answer to the economic war which the West declared to Russia” (Kommersant, 02.10.2014)
4“We understand that sanctions will go away but it is clear that WTO will stay. But these sanctions became a powerful push for the development of our producers. They gave us advantage . It is a great plus to what we already had. First, sanctions will give rise in prices in our livestock markets. Second, this already affected our investors who are building here large meat processing companies. (Kommersant, 16.10.2014)”
5“ Europe should be strict and answer to unacceptable events for example what is happening in Ukraine. But Russia has strategic meaning for Italy and Europe . We need to find common ground, even though nobody these days is interested in putting Russia down on her knees ”. “We need to hold the current sanctions until the Russian Federation will change its behavior and stop aggression towards Ukraine”, -- announced British prime minister David Cameron . "Speeches by the leaders of Italy and Austria are not just a continuation of traditional rhetoric in favor of or against Russia, but also a rational consequence of long-term economic interests," Sergei Utkin, head of strategic assessments of Center for Situation Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences , told Kommersant.” (Kommersant 22.12.2014)

4.2.2 Rationalization delegitimation

Many of rationalization delegitimation strategies consist of argumentation that the sanctions are illogical and useless in a way because they are not improving the situation regarding solving the Ukrainian crisis. However, little arguments why it is so were provided in the journal.

As the **quotes 1 and 2** explain, besides rationalization strategy authorization is also used as there is a reference to the Russian permanent representative on the EU who has both delegitimation and legitimation in his quote, for example ‘there is no sense’. Similarly the journalist describes that the general opinion in Moscow consists of the idea that sanctions are not productive.

1“Even the **ineffectual and indecisive officers** will understand that sanctions against the authorities of Russian Federation and “important players” from Crimea **will not have any impact** on improving the situation [Ukraine crisis].” (Kommersant, 26.07.2014)

2“**Permanent representative of Russian Federation (regarding European Union) V. Chizhov** informed that sanctions imposed by the EU will not make Moscow to change its politics towards the relations with Ukraine. He says “EU continues to move along the sanctions current even though these rails will take nowhere and there is **not any effect** on the de-escalations of the situation in Ukraine.”” (Kommersant, 26.07.2014)

3“**Deputy head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation Grigorij Karasin** said that “there is no sense to talk with Russia with sanctions” he then continues that “sanctions will help us gather ourselves and in the end Russia will have more **effective economy**.” (Kommersant, 30.07.2014)

4“**Nursultan Nazarbayev** said “it is important to stop sanctions confrontation. **It doesn’t lead to anything! People will suffer**, and in the end it will lead to **world crisis**”. Nazarbayev was **supporting Vladimir Putin** on this – even though, in the end the sanctions do not concern Kazakhstan.” (Kommersant, 27.08.2014)

The **quote 3** reveals rationalization delegitimation that sanctions are not a useful way of discussion with Russia about the current situation however in the same comment it is said that sanctions actually might help Russia to improve developing its economy and agriculture. Similarly this view has been discussed several times in other extracted Kommersant articles.

Once more several approaches of discursive legitimation strategies were used: In the **quote 4** the President of Kazakhstan explains again how sanctions are not leading to any good solution which is rationalization delegitimation. He also says that ordinary people will suffer and eventually sanctions will lead to a world crisis, which is moralization strategy after all it is morally wrong to let people suffer. Authorization strategy is the reference to the President who supports the Russian President Vladimir Putin. The journalist who wrote the article commented at the end of the quote that no state has imposed sanctions on Kazakhstan. This comment could be interpreted that the sanctions are not as serious for Kazakhstan as the sanctions are imposed on Russia instead of it or that it is easier to monitor the situation because Kazakhstan is not involved in.

<p>5“The Prime minister of Slovakia Robert Fico promised to be against the new sanctions imposed on Russia. “Economic sanctions are not effective and fair action.”” (Kommersant, 30.08.2014)</p>
<p>6“French Special Representative for Russia Jean-Pierre Chevènement replied to the questions of ”B” -France is interested in cancellation of sanctions – and they will be taken out when the implementation of the Minsk agreements is complete. Our common goal is to end this situation that is not good for the interest of Moscow nor Paris nor Europe. (Kommersant 18.09.2014)”</p>
<p>7“We are not performing as an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth but instead we want to act with clear head.” And he continues that “sanctions rarely reach the set goals. Against Russia they won’t succeed their goals” He then continues that “we are not happy about them but we will overcome difficulties which they might cause in some economic areas. Maybe we will become more independent and more self-reliant.” (Kommersant, 29.07.2014)</p>
<p>8“Vice President of the Italian ENI, Ferlenga, head of the Russian branch of the Confindustria Association of Italian Entrepreneurs: "All of our members are deeply concerned by the escalation of the conflict in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which has already led to significant economic losses and weakening of our positions on the Russian market" [...] In this case, according to the top manager, the sanctions will lead "only to the fact that Russia will again go on self-sufficiency."” (Kommersant, 12.09.2014)</p>
<p>9“Europe and Russia were repeatedly asked to abstain from sanctions by the Association of European Businesses (AEB). Thus, at the end of August, the AEB stated that "the previous sanctions were ineffective, they did not change the course of events and damaged the business environment and markets not only in Russia and Ukraine, but also in the EU."” (Kommersant, 12.09.2014)</p>
<p>10“The issue of sanctions was discussed yesterday at a meeting between the head of the presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov, and the co-chairman of the Franco-Russian Dialogue Association, Thierry Mariani. "In the global world, sanctions do not do any good, but harm bilateral relations [...]" Mr. Ivanov said. In response, Mr. Mariani said that many of the French parliamentary delegation that arrived in Moscow were against the sanctions. "These sanctions were a decision that the French parliament never adopted, they were introduced by the European Commission in Brussels," he said. "The history of the last century has shown that sanctions do not help to find a solution to the problem." He is convinced that, as a rule, countries are being pushed toward sanctions by the United States, which themselves remain aside.” (Kommersant, 12.09.2014)</p>
<p>11“The Russian Foreign Ministry harshly criticized the EU's decision to impose a new package of sanctions, stressing that it threatens the truce in Ukraine and is deprived of “logic and common sense.” “Now that the fragile peace process in Ukraine has begun [...] such steps look especially out of place and short-sighted,” the Foreign Ministry said. Sanctions will not remain without proper reaction.”” (Kommersant, 12.09.2014)</p>

Several strategies were used in the following quote. The effectiveness of sanctions is questioned by the Prime Minister of Slovakia which is authorization delegitimation strategy as it is a reference to the Prime Minister in the **quote 5**. This is also delegitimation of rationalization strategy since rationalization is as we know reference to utility. Furthermore his comment on ‘fair action’ might refer to moralization strategy and the ‘common ground’ what is considered being fair therefore rationalization strategy used. Additionally delegitimation of authorization and rationalization is presented in the **quote 6** in which the French representative comments that the harmful situation

should be ended, which is again reference to the common interest and utility. For example the foreign minister Sergei Lavrov informed (reference to authorization) in the extracted **quote 7** that if the sanctions are tightened by the US and the EU against Russia Moscow will not impose counter-sanctions. He then adds referring to the Code of Hammurabi (authorization strategy partly) that Russia will not react “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”. Again the sanctions are questioned to succeed against Russia. The last comment indicates how economy can be disregarded for political reasons and the whole situation is turned into a positive experience – making Russia’s economy stronger and more independent on foreign goods and this is legitimation rationalization instead.

Economic losses are once again a topic that is worrying and besides reference to several European representatives is authorization strategy. Also the fragile peace negotiation is in the center of attention that worries how sanctions might affect negatively on peacemaking. Furthermore the European Commission is referred to making the negative sanctions decisions which business representatives are against. The **quotes 8-11** show how sanctions are considered harmful.

4.2.3 Authorization legitimation

The **quotes 1 and 2** presented opinions of Russian politicians stating that it was good for Russian economy that sanctions were imposed because then Russia can develop its own agriculture. Furthermore, there are articles using citation from foreign press consisting of authorization legitimation. Therefore this demonstrates that the journal describes the sanctions discourse with objectivity as the perspectives from other international sources are presented.

The **quote 3** outlines how different perspectives of authorization strategy are present. First the president of the United States Barack Obama is mentioned signing act to support the freedom of Ukraine. After that the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is mentioned saying that sanctions can deteriorate the relations between the United States and Russia. Lavrov says that sanctions might be targeted to destabilize and initially change the regime in Russia. This statement is refused by the US representatives. As can be seen from the **quotes 4-6** the United States, the President of the United States and the White House are often referred to besides some European government officials. There is authorization strategy used in the **quote 7**. First, referring to Austrian S. Kurz and second there are references to international law and norms, which is impersonal authorization strategy.

<p>1“Obama said that if Russia takes another direction and respects the sovereignty of Ukraine and international laws then he will be the first one to cancel the sanctions. (Kommersant, 23.11.2014)</p>
<p>2“Thus, the president of the United States is entitled to impose sanctions on foreign citizens and companies who invest in projects Russian fuel and energy complex TEK on unconventional oil production, and receives broad authority to impose new restrictions on the export of equipment for the Russian fuel and energy sector. In accordance with the bill, the US president “should” impose additional sanctions against Gazprom if he decides that Gazprom takes significant volumes of gas [..] from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. (Kommersant 19.12.2014)</p>
<p>3“The US President Barack Obama signed the Congress adopted "Act to Support Freedom of Ukraine", which provides for the provision of assistance to Kiev and the imposition of new sanctions against Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that this law could "permanently undermine the opportunities for normal interaction" between Moscow and Washington. According to the interlocutors of "Kommersant", the US will mitigate sanctions only simultaneously with the EU countries. "So we will demonstrate unity and not allow a situation in which one or the other party will get commercial advantages (from renewing cooperation with Russia). American officials explain. In an interview with France 24, Sergei Lavrov [..] the Russian Foreign Minister added that he has "very serious reasons to believe" that with the help of sanctions the West is trying to achieve destabilization and a change of regime in Russia. Representatives of the US administration refute this.” (Kommersant 20.12.2014)</p>
<p>4“US President Barack Obama delivered his annual message "On the Situation of the Country." In the traditional list of "bad guys" this time, in addition to Syria, Russia entered, which Barack Obama threatened with isolation and further weakening of the economy. The US president could not ignore the situation around Ukraine, which caused the worst deterioration in relations with Russia since the Cold War. "Counteracting Russian aggression, supporting democracy in Ukraine and encouraging NATO allies, we uphold the principle that larger countries cannot intimidate small ones.” (Kommersant 22.01.2015)</p>
<p>5“Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama yesterday also threatened Russia with tightening sanctions. He blamed the aggravation of the situation for "Russian-backed separatists with Russian equipment, financing, Russian training and Russian troops," and added that the US "will continue to exert economic pressure on Russia.” (Kommersant 26.01.2015)</p>
<p>6“The US and EU are looking for the possibility of new sanctions on Russia. The relations between Russia and the West have undergone a new test to the very serious since the last summer, when after the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia might even be taken out of the SWIFT system. The President US Barack Obama yesterday also threatened Russia with tightening sanctions. He accused of worsening the situation of Russia which is supporting separatists with Russian equipment, financing, Russian training and Russian troops. He added that US will continue to add more economic pressure on Russia.” (Kommersant 26.01.2015)</p>
<p>7“Sebastian Kurz, head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria “Not only Russia but also the members of the EU would suffer from sanctions and anti-sanctions. However European Union didn’t close its eyes of this conflict. We had to react to violation of norms of international law and we did this not with power but political methods, with sanctions. (Kommersant 30.09.2014)</p>

4.2.4 Authorization delegitimation

In the **quote 1** the prime minister of Hungary is referred to and according to him sanctions are nothing but a way for the United States to interfere the internal politics of eastern European countries. The **quote 2** shows that there are multiple strategies used, for example authorization by reference to politicians, government officials but also rationalization by reference to utility and economy. The **quote 3** was also presented in rational delegitimation part, but reference to the President of Kazakhstan is authorization strategy which also covers the idea that sanctions are not effective and they will make ordinary people suffer.

The **quote 4** shows how the Prime minister of Slovakia feels about the economic sanctions – they are considered being harmful for the bilateral relations with Russia. The **quote 5** explains how the French decision making on sanctions imposition has been made in the European Commission and not on a national level which makes it confusing as the sanctions imposition is presented being reluctant act for the French parliament. Once again it is commented how the United States can make the decision on new economic sanctions easier because it is not that dependent on business with Russia than some other European countries.

<p>1“The prime minister also commented on visa sanctions against six Hungarian officials, imposed by the United States (Hungary's ally in NATO) in the autumn on charges of corruption. According to him, such a decision serves as a cover for Washington's desire to strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe. "A new era began when the United States began not only to interfere in the internal politics of countries in Eastern Europe, but also to take an active part in it, - the head of the cabinet is convinced.” (Kommersant 25.12.2014)</p>
<p>2“In Moscow it's considered that the new wave of sanctions imposed by western countries on Russia is “counterproductive” and has “cynical character”. ITAR-TASS Deputy head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation Grigorij Karasin said that “there is no sense to talk with Russia with sanctions” he then continues that “sanctions will help us gather ourselves and in the end Russia will have more effective economy.” (Kommersant, 30.07.2014)</p>
<p>3“Nursultan Nazarbayev said “it is important to stop sanctions confrontation. It doesn't lead to anything! People will suffer, and in the end it will lead to world crisis”. Nazarbayev was supporting Vladimir Putin on this – even though, in the end the sanctions do not concern Kazakhstan.” (Kommersant, 27.08.2014)</p>
<p>4“The Prime minister of Slovakia Robert Fico promised to be against the new sanctions imposed on Russia. “Economic sanctions are not effective and fair action.”” (Kommersant, 30.08.2014)</p>
<p>5“The issue of sanctions was discussed yesterday at a meeting between the head of the presidential administration, Sergei Ivanov, and the co-chairman of the Franco-Russian Dialogue Association, Thierry Mariani. "In the global world, sanctions do not do any good, but harm bilateral relations [...]" Mr. Ivanov said. In response, Mr. Mariani said that many of the French parliamentary delegation that arrived in Moscow were against the sanctions. "These sanctions were a decision that the French parliament never adopted, they were introduced by the European Commission in Brussels," he said. "The history of the last century has shown that sanctions do not help to find a solution to the problem." He is convinced that, as a rule, countries are being pushed toward sanctions by the United States, which themselves remain aside.” (Kommersant, 12.09.2014)</p>

4.2.5 Moralization legitimation

Most of the articles present the perspectives of other countries' media in moralization legitimation; after all it might be questionable to publish articles that comment on how sanctions are morally justified from a Russian point of view. The **quote 1** which is also presented in authorization legitimation section refers to norms and how the European Union chose to act with political methods on the annexation of Crimea. Violation of norms and international law is something that should be punished, but without violence.

The **quote 2** shows two different strategies which are moralization and authorization. Barack Obama comments that it is not right to invade other countries. The **quote 3** has Angela Merkel as a reference and this is authorization strategy, however there is also moralization strategy used because of reference to "world order" "violate international law" "nothing can justify the annexation". These could be also interpreted being authorization strategies since order and law are referred to. In the **quote 4** the French President F. Hollande says that annexation was illegal which means that sanctions will last until the peace terms are met which were agreed in Minsk, Belarus. The **quote 5** concerns the counter-sanctions and it is said that it is a way of protecting national economic interests of Russia.

1 "Sebastian Kurz, head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria "Not only Russia but also the members of the EU would suffer from sanctions and anti-sanctions. However the European Union didn't close its eyes of this conflict. We had to react to **violation of norms of international law and we did this not with power but political methods, with sanctions.** (Kommersant 30.09.2014)

2 "At the final press conference, **Barack Obama** called the condition for easing the sanctions, which are the change in Moscow's policy towards Ukraine. According to him, "the US will adhere to the **key international principles**, one of which is that you cannot invade other countries." Accusing Moscow of supplying arms and financial support to the self-proclaimed republics in eastern Ukraine, Barack Obama said: "Russia must choose a different path." (Kommersant 17.11.2014)

3 "The chancellor of Germany A. Merkel yesterday rigidly criticized politics of Russia in the Ukrainian course. Merkel announced in Bundestage, that "actions of Russian Federation question **world order** in Europe and violate **international law**". According to her, "nothing can justify the annexation of Crimea or excuse direct or indirect participation of Russia in the fighting in Donetsk and Lugansk." (Kommersant 27.11.2014)

4 "The position of France was very clearly stated by President Hollande. Sanctions were imposed so that they could be taken off someday. And they should be taken off after the implementation of the Minsk agreements. We don't accept **annexation of Crimea which we think is illegal**. So, some sanctions will stay in power." (Kommersant 15.01.2015)

5 "Accordingly, measures to limit food import from the EU are not sanctions – it is our right to protect national economic interests and fight against unfair competition". (Kommersant 15.10.2014)

4.2.6 Moralization delegitimation

It is interesting that moralization delegitimation strategy was almost missing in extracted Kommersant articles similarly as Talouselämä lacked the view of moralization delegitimation. The **quote 1** presents a comment on sanctions not having justifiable grounds – it is a reference to justice, to what is considered being good and decent. The **quote 2** reminds that the meaning of economic sanctions is not a plan to make Russian economy to fully collapse – it is not in accordance with the common good. After all Russia would not be able to stabilize the situation in Ukraine if its economy is ruined as states the Foreign Minister of Germany in the comment below.

1“State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin at a meeting of the Presidential Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) demanded to withdraw from the "silent position" on the crisis in Ukraine and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation. The head of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Alexei Pushkov, told Kommersant that it is necessary to resume the dialogue, first of all, that the European colleagues **have no grounds for prolonging the sanctions against the Russian delegation** to the PACE. [...] The State Duma speaker is not satisfied with the absence of the PACE position on sanctions, "**which have no justifiable grounds**". (Kommersant 3.9.2014)

2“Let’s remind the decision about tightening sanctions became reaction to "illegitimate", from the Western point of view, elections in Donbass in November 2nd [...] Frank-Walter Steinmeier warned yesterday that calls for new sanctions against the Russian Federation indicate a "dangerous misunderstanding" of the current situation. According to him, the purpose of sanctions should not be to inflict economic harm on the Russian Federation. "**An isolated, economically weakened Russia will not be able to contribute to stabilization in Ukraine**, or it can become a great danger for itself and for others, so I cannot recommend this way," he said.” (Kommersant 28.11.2014)

4.3 Comparing the journals

The similarities in discourses of Russian and Finnish economic journal

Some articles presented in Kommersant indicate that the European countries would not want the sanctions to be implemented due to economic losses but the decision on sanctions’ implementation have been made in the Euro-committee in Brussels with the support from the US. These arguments are similar to the ones presented in Talouselämä. It is easier to mitigate the responsibility of the decision making by mentioning that on national level the decisions could be made differently but the European Union is forcing other EU countries to impose sanctions on Russia.

The rationalization legitimation strategy used in Talouselämä presents discourse such as “there’s no sense starting a new cold war”. This means that sanctions will replace other methods which could cause or be interpreted as a war. In both journals with rationalization delegitimation

strategy the rational basis of imposing sanctions were questioned. This might be because history has showed that sanctions rarely reach the set goals. Besides economic sanctions harm the economy of the sender country as well by decreasing exports and stopping new business negotiations and contracts, especially Finnish exports to Russia and business relations with Russia are influential reasons why Talouselämä presents economic sanctions as illegitimate in many articles. Here is the delegitimation example from Kommersant which have rationalization and also authorization strategy used:

“The sanctions which EU and Russia imposed one another will make the situation even worse. Former minister of finance of Russia Alexei Kudrin forecasts possible economic losses about 50 milliard euros a year”. (Kommersant, 28.08.2014)

Besides, the Russian point of view in rationalization legitimation in Talouselämä was also presented which is the same as in Kommersant: sanctions help Russia to be more self-sufficient for example in agriculture. Of course the reaction to the economic sanctions may depend on the position how the country is situated in the current sanctions discourses – Russia was the “target” for imposed sanction which naturally makes its attitude more defensive. It was surprising that in Kommersant authorization delegitimation the President of Russia Vladimir Putin was not referred to and many of the references were European Prime Ministers and a few Russian ministers. In Kommersant authorization legitimation strategy has many references to the United States and the President Obama for example:

“Obama signed a new act”

“The congress asks the US to help Kiev”

“Sanctions demonstrate the power of the US”

“Obama threatened Russia with new sanctions”

“The president of the US gives the right to impose sanctions”

“The president of the United States has the right to impose sanctions on foreign citizens and companies.”

Talouselämä’s authorization legitimation strategy also has many references to the United States but also A. Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany. Only a few times the Finnish Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and the European Parliament were mentioned. One could think that Merkel or the European Parliament would be mentioned more often because of geographical location and

important opinion influencer within the EU but still the United States was often referred as in Kommersant authorization legitimation.

Talouselämä authorization delegitimation included articles in which for example the Russian President Putin commented that economic sanctions are not useful and they will not be left without a proper answer (counteractions). Some personal authorization strategy was present, for example when the French President Hollande discussed the Mistral war ship deal which would be costly for France if that deal had to be cancelled. Kommersant instead presented authorization delegitimation strategy only a few times in interviews of different European presidents or ministers.

The differences in discourses of Russian and Finnish economic journal

Moralization legitimation strategy was a bit different – in Finnish journal majority of the extracted articles was sharing the idea that it is morally wrong to attack another country and violate international democratic values and principles, when in Kommersant this was not an argument that could be found. Otherwise some moralization delegitimation strategy presents in Kommersant that there is no right base for sanctions, ordinary people will suffer not only in Russia but also in the EU. It is said that the United States wants to show its power with these sanctions. Other measures which Russia imposed on e.g. the US and the EU are commented in Kommersant as follows: “counter-sanctions are not called sanctions because they are our true acts of protection of national economic interests and of a fight against unhealthy competition”.

One argument in Kommersant presented the idea that isolating Russia with economic sanctions does not help solving the Ukrainian crisis. Moralization delegitimation was not present in Talouselämä; after all it would be questionable to present the idea in a Finnish business journal that sanctions are illegitimate when the common opinion is how the annexation is morally wrong and against international principles.

Talouselämä	Legitimation	Delegitimation	Kommersant	Legitimation	Delegitimation
Rationalization	No war, Russia: more self-sufficient agriculture	Economic losses	Rationalization	Russian agriculture will be more self-sufficient	Sanctions rarely reach the set goals
Authorization	Personal: Obama, Merkel Impersonal: the law	Putin, Hollande	Authorization	Obama, Sergei Lavrov	Reference to European Presidents/Ministers
Moralization	Freedom, democracy, international principles	-	Moralization	World order, international law, norms	Isolating Russia doesn't solve the Ukraine Crisis

Table: Summarized legitimation strategies in Talouselämä and Kommersant

The following chapters present the results of thematic and textual analysis to acquire a deeper understanding on sanction discourse in Talouselämä. There were some repeated “hot topics” and keywords in the Finnish journal Talouselämä.


4.4 Thematic and textual analysis of Talouselämä

Thematic analysis

The topics of sanctions discourses related to the European Union are all sharing the idea of pro-sanctions as “sanctions complement”, which was repeated seven times in the articles, ”new sanctions” and ”stricter sanctions” five times. Besides “new sanctions” was mentioned four times and “expanding the [sanction/ black] list” twice in the US related news. Russia related news consisted of discourse as follows: “Germany (Merkel), the European Union and the United States threatened Russia with extra sanctions” which was mentioned three times.

Legitimation	Discourse topic	References
The European Union	“sanctions complement” & ”new sanctions”	12
The European Union	“stricter sanctions”	5
The United States	“new sanctions”	4
The United States	“expanding the [sanction/ black] list”	2
Russia	“extra sanctions against Russia”	3

The table below includes discourse category “new sanctions” where the EU related articles are most presented.




Different quotes from Russian media how Russia is not accepting the sanctions were repeated three times in Talouselämä. Lastly “sanctions are not helping anyone” was two times mentioned.

Sanctions news related to Finland is more concerned about how economic sanctions would hurt the Finnish economy. Topics which were mentioned many times are “negative effects on Finnish business” four times; “direct influence on the Finnish economy” and “indirect influence” were both mentioned two times.

Delegitimation	Discourse topic	References
Russia	“not accepting the sanctions”	3
Russia	“sanctions are not helping”	2
Finland	“negative effects”	4
Finland	“direct influence” & “indirect influence”	4

The table below includes discourse category of “negative effects” caused by the economic sanctions where the Russia related articles are most presented.



From the list above can be seen that discourses such as “new sanctions” and “complement of the black list” appear many times almost in every country category, a little less in the Finnish category than the rest. In German category there were not as clearly same topics repeating, but the change in attitudes can be tracked to July’s Malaysia Airlines plane crash. For example, these sentences are from the journal’s news:

“Many German mega corporations are against the sanctions”

“Russia-sanctions affect German economic growth”

“Merkel has moved to support the stricter sanctions”

“Germany is preparing for multiple sanctions”

Textual analysis

I also used a textual analysis by categorizing all relevant nouns, verbs, and phrases or metaphors into their own categories. Many nouns related to economic sanction show that negative words are used as follows:

- mode of pressure
- fear of revenge
- threat
- stricter economic sanctions
- conquest of Crimea
- differences of opinions
- new, more powerful economic sanctions

Verbs are following the same pattern that they are quite negative and show the relations between the “Western world” and Russia.

- will be judged
- to revenge
- will be costly
- is not going to accept
- crisis is escalating
- has decided to punish
- has warned
- has replied aggressively
- attitudes have become more intense
- to calm down the escalated situation

There is a metaphor used in one of the news articles, for example this with military language:

“Germany is ready to launch the hard ammo in the barrel of economic weapons”

“War of words” is getting stronger”

First journalist describes what has happened recently: The war of words is accelerating between Russia and the ‘Western countries’. The federal chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel is threatening the country [Russia] with economic sanctions – and Russia declared it is threatening back with counter-sanctions. When Russia annexed Crimea in March the headline of the first article was distinctive for

using words 'war of words'. By using this word the possibility of some kind of war is already represented. The reader is provided with an impression of fierce and aggressive conversations between Russia and 'the rest of Western world'. It can be noticed that before the actual imposition of the economic sanctions in the early March many verbs used in the articles about economic sanctions against Russia are negative or worried such as "would strike", "to warn", "are harming" and "cannot be accepted".

"Russian sources speculate that if Russia is doing the counter-sanctions it might swipe away 10 years of economic growth."
(Talouselämä 13.3.2014)

"Germany is ready to go further in economic sanctions" and "sanctions are already biting: Russian companies' money pipes will be closed".

To sum up, in the thematic analysis of Talouselämä "new sanctions" discourse was the most dominant among the European Union, the United States and Russia related news for legitimization. In delegitimation Finnish and Russian related news were common with the discourse "negative effects on the economy".

Textual analysis consisted of many negative and aggressive nouns and verbs which show how the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea was presented in the news before and at the same time of the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia. The next chapter is discussion which will conclude the main topics of the present study.

5 DISCUSSION

This master's thesis introduced the key concepts of institutional change, legitimacy and (de)legitimation strategies – which are rationalization, authorization, moralization and narrativization. These discursive legitimation strategies are used for obtaining legitimacy or illegitimacy for institutional change. Besides the above mentioned also a brief introduction to economic sanctions was provided in the present study. The methodology chapter explained the concept of discourse analysis and the method of this critical discourse analysis. This was followed by an empiric part which explained the results of the analysis on how sanctions against Russia are legitimized in business news media. This thesis was driven to gain more understanding of economic sanctions and their nature in the Finnish-Russian context.

The focus of the present study was to find out how economic sanctions are seen and discussed in the popular economic journals in the sender country and in the country that is imposed sanctions on. This was done by examining the discursive de/legitimation strategies and discourses in the chosen journals. The results revealed the two stories on the legitimation process of the sanctions against Russia, from Finnish and Russian perspectives. Furthermore the empiric part briefly introduced the results of thematic and textual analysis on Finnish journal *Talouselämä* to gain a more profound understanding on the Finnish data.

Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999), Vaara & Monin (2010) have presented discursive strategies which could also be found in the extracted articles of the present study. However there are other strategies as well such as normalization and narrativization which were not visible in the articles therefore they were left out from the theory part (Vaara & Monin 2010). The legitimacy in the articles is established through discursive legitimation strategies which are most commonly rationalization and authorization. The analysis revealed that rationalization was the most dominant strategy in delegitimation in both journals. Authorization instead was the most dominant strategy in both journals in legitimation. However, it depends on the journal whether the strategy was

delegitimation or legitimation. For instance, in Russian *Kommersant* legitimation moralization strategy was not presented – after all Russian journal did not recommend imposing sanctions on Russia based on moral reasons and the other way round with Finnish *Talouselämä*, which would not write about turning down the sanctions due to moral reasoning.

Delegitimation strategies were present in many articles in both journals. *Kommersant* presents the idea that sanctions are not useful according the general opinion of Russia and sanctions cannot stop Russia's actions, the annexation of Crimea. Institutional change requires legitimacy, a public approval that the actions are proper and valuable, as Suchman (1995) states. In this case economic sanctions were considered as an appropriate way to proceed after Crimea was annexed. The results prove that even though economic sanctions are harmful for all the members of the current situation they are still imposed if something “illegal enough” has happened, especially violation of human rights or a sovereign country's integrity.

The results of the critical discourse analysis show that Finnish discourse highlights the rational reasoning of sanctions harming the economy of the sender country and the receiver country. However along the European Union Finland imposes sanctions, after all the annexation of Crimea is against the international principles of integrity of a sovereign state. The Russian discourse emphasizes the fact how economic sanctions will not affect the foreign policy of Russia, actually many quotes show that some authorities explain Russia to become stronger due to imposed sanctions which will make Russia to activate in domestic food producing industries.

How the economic sanctions are legitimized and presented in the chosen business news media then? Sanctions are reactions towards illegal activities and within institutional change they are working as a threat or a punishment. The reality is constructed using different discourses on economic sanctions, for example that the sender country is interested in participating in the politics of the targeted country (see for instance Hufbauer) and that the sender country is willing to sacrifice possible economic relations with the targeted country even though business between the countries often deteriorates. Even though sanctions were imposed together with many sender countries on Russia, there are e.g. economic lobbies and ministers who are against them due to economic losses. Sanctions are harming the economies of many European countries, especially smaller countries which do business with Russia, such as Finland and this is presented in the both journals, especially in *Talouselämä*.

The first round of sanctions was imposed in March 2014 after Crimea was annexed to Russia. I discovered after analyzing news articles that the general view for the European Union and the US is that “they do what has to be done for solving the crisis”. However, the opinion on economic sanctions is not unite in Europe, for example, some economic lobbies in Germany, France and

United Kingdom and some of the southern EU countries struggling with economy are strictly against the sanctions furthermore Poland and the Baltic countries want stricter measures probably because of their history under communist rule. It was said in *Talouselämä* that Germany's chancellor Angela Merkel has been a balancing character in between the argument with Russia against "the other Western world". The journals give the impression that the European Union (mostly Germany and France), Russia and USA are the ones to solve the Ukraine problem; Ukraine's official opinion is not as often presented as the other European countries' opinion in the economic sanctions related discourses.

Many European countries including Finland are afraid of the economic sanctions to weaken their business competitiveness. Finnish and French opinion presented in *Talouselämä* could be interpreted as follows: "we have to impose sanctions even though they are hurting our economies". Sometimes France and Finland are presented as opponents for the sanctions because France had a major ship deal with Russia which could be threatened due to sanctions and because Finland's exporting, for example, dairy products to Russia is suffering. At first when the possibility of sanctions is introduced, there are no complaints but when the actual sanctions are imposed by several countries, especially Finland express concerns how the sanctions would affect negatively on Finnish economy. Furthermore, many economic influencers and representatives were against sanctions.

After the Malaysia Airlines airplane was shot down in the territory of Eastern Ukraine in July more sanctions were imposed on Russia by the EU and US during August and September. Discourse dramatically changed after that incident and Finland among other European countries changed their opinions on the need of stricter sanctions. At first Finland was considering whether it is useful to impose sanctions because it is hurting the exports but after the plane crash headlines turned into "sanctions are inevitable" and Finland was also more eager to impose economic sanctions on Russia to stop the war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea.

However in August 2014 the Russian counter-sanctions, which were imposed on dairy products, caught a lot of media attention in *Talouselämä*. The Finnish company Valio's export dairy products to the Russian market were targeted with embargo. Meantime Russian ruble was declining which caused the disappearance of bigger Russian tourist groups in Finland (*Yle Uutiset* 5.12.2014). Consequently this had an impact on the Finnish economy – affecting the overall atmosphere how to perceive imposing the economic sanctions against Russia.

Finnish or other Western companies planning to do business with Russia or operate in Russia can learn from these results that Russia as a large country can be independent what comes to production of different industries. Even though food industry is not Russia's core industry – oil and

metal production is, so international companies operating in Russia should keep in mind that many times political issues can overturn economic interests.

5.1 Contributions, limitations and further research

The study focus is unique and it gives new information from Russian and Finnish points of view on the discussion of economic sanctions imposed on Russia. The information which the present study provides can be applied in political and international relations studies as well as international business and communication studies. Ability to read media texts critically and understand the different strategies behind the texts is important for everyone, especially for people working within media, and for example journalists could find this thesis useful for understanding discursive legitimation strategies in Finnish and Russian context.

This thesis could act as a basis for future studies where an American economic journal could also be studied using critical discourse analysis or content analysis to get even wider perspective on legitimation strategies of the economic sanctions against Russia. Unfortunately, there was a time limit and therefore it was beyond the scope of the present study to incorporate the American view. Furthermore neither English nor Russian are my mother tongues, however I take full responsibility of the translations in the extracted articles.

If I could do something differently in the present study I could focus on fewer articles for more precise critical discourse analysis, however to form a “bigger picture” on the discourses during one year requires many articles. Textual and thematic analysis could be also conducted in future studies to find out how sanctions discussions are formed in word level with a chronologically ordered “discursive event history database” (Maguire & Hardy 2009) as “who said what, and when”.

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APPENDICES

Talouselämä rationalization delegitimation
<p>“Now we should think first of all that we try to influence Russia with sanctions, then our own companies are suffering relatively the most. (says Pertti Korhonen, Managing Director of Outotec's Mining and Metal Industry Technology Provider)” (Talouselämä 8.8.2014)</p>
<p>“What bothers me is that we impose sanctions on cheese, yoghurt and peaches but gas is bought as much as you can. If we really want to use sanctions effectively, we need to stop Ukraine’s ammunition business to Russia.” (Talouselämä 5.9.2014)</p>
<p>“Sberbank said on their press release that it does not have any part in geopolitical processes. Adding the bank to the sanction’s list is “crushing the foundation of global finance system and it does not help solving the European crisis caused by the Ukrainian situation”. Sberbank reminds that its stocks are listed in the world’s leading stock market over 1/3 banks’ owning is in Europe and the US and that the company has 217 000 owners. According to the Financial Times another bank, VTB, which also got into sanction list says that the decisions are against the European democratic values. “the Europeans are working against their own benefits to obey the wishes of their colleagues across the sea”. By this comment the bank possibly refers to the US. (Talouselämä 1.8.2014)</p>
<p>“According to the Wall Street Journal magazine, several large German companies are opposed to economic sanctions against Russia. This is for example the technology company Siemens, the automaker Volkswagen and the Deutsche Bank. According to the anonymous sources interviewed by the WSJ, the German rulers have been increasingly contacted by business executives who are calling for non-imposition. The companies are concerned that business relations with Russia will suffer from them. Some German businessmen have spoken in public. For example, former head of Daimler's automaker Eckhard Cordes said that the crisis should be solved peacefully at the negotiating table. Cordes currently manages Ostauschuss, who is lobbying for the German industry in Eastern Europe. The demands of the business world create pressure on German decision-makers, writes WSJ. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has repeatedly criticized Russia's efforts in Eastern Ukraine and warned the government of "serious consequences" if it does not change its activities. Merkel has, however, stopped calling for wider economic sanctions. Germany is not the only European country that is unwilling to increase sanctions. At least Italy and Greece are also trying to refrain from them. The already weak economies are afraid of further suffering if trading with Russia becomes more difficult.” (Talouselämä 2.5.2014)</p>
<p>“Russia has answered aggressively to the sanctions approved by the EU. According to the EU observer Russian political leaders announced that due to sanctions Brussels is setting barrels for wider co-operation e.g. on energy politics. “It is irrational and irresponsible step, which leads inevitably to the price rising in the European energy markets”, was said in the announcement. According to Russia the so called third step sanctions are affecting EU’s economy the same way as Russia’s. According to the government of Russia EU lets US to influence its decisions too much.” (Talouselämä 31.7.2014)</p>
<p>“The EU is thinking about tightening the sanctions imposed on Russia because the situation in Ukraine has not improved. One option is the ending of Russia and EU-countries cooperative funding programs. Border cooperative programs are one of them and Finland has three of those with Russia and half of the funding comes from the EU. “For the last few days I have done almost round the clock work to avoid these sanctions that would strike the border cooperative work between Finland and Russia, and Russia and the rest of the European Union”, said Stubb to HS. If all the border programs were frozen, Finland would lose some benefits worth of 200 million euros.” (Talouselämä 16.7.2014)</p>
<p>“Aleksey Meshkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, says that Russia would lose 50 billion dollars next year due to EU sanctions. Russia asked the EU to remove the sanctions, tells Business Insider. If EU removes the sanctions, Russia could do the same, says Meshkov.” (Talouselämä 1.2.2014)</p>

Talouselämä rationalization legitimation
It was written that the restriction of import of EU made of products is not sanctions but “it is our right to protect national economic interests and a fight against unhealthy competition” (Talouselämä 15.10.2014)
“The President of Russia Vladimir Putin says that the United States and the European Unions imposed sanctions could be also good thing for the Russian economy (Business Insider) “True, the restriction of importing certain consumer goods from Europe and US – force us to produce them by ourselves ”, Putin says. Putin means that economic sanctions are helping Russia to activate in new industries.” (Talouselämä)
Rationalization legitimation “According to Anatoly Aksakov, Vice Chairman of the Duma Finance Committee, Russia should have imposed import sanctions earlier, according to Ria Novosti . “We import already 50 % products but it does not mean that our country is not producing these products. It means that these products – which usually are bad quality and bad for health – the price is lower. “Actually we should have done this already long time ago, not because of sanctions but to protect our citizens and their health ” Russia has today published its own list of counter-sanctions as an answer to the western sanctions. It is rejecting import of fruit, vegetable, meat, fish milk and dairy products from the US, the EU, Australia, Canada and Norway.” (Talouselämä 7.8.2014)

Talouselämä authorization legitimation
“Both Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius demanded a military embargo that would almost certainly ban the implementation of the agreement of France. "We should have had an arms embargo some time ago," Bildt told to the New York Times before the meeting. "It is a bit difficult to defend delivering arms to Russia in this situation". On Monday, however, French President François Hollande was of the opinion that the first agreed warship would be delivered to Russia under an agreement in October. "There are currently no sanctions to prevent delivery, and Russia has paid [the ship]," Hollande said to the newspaper, "the cancellation of the contract would cost France EUR 1.1 billion." France has a Mistral ship deal that affects how they will react to new sanctions.” (Talouselämä 22.7.2014)
“The President of United States Barack Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said in their joint press release that Russia has to stop supporting separatists so that the Ukrainian elections can be organized without obstacles. “If elections cannot be organized we don’t have any other option than impose more sanctions”, Obama said according to Bloomberg. Merkel says being ready to support the US. The next step would be imposing sanctions on economic sector such as banks and energy industry. Sanctions would affect much more European countries than the US.” (Talouselämä 2.5.2014)

Kommersant moralization delegitimation

“State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin at a meeting of the Presidential Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) demanded to withdraw from the "silent position" on the crisis in Ukraine and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation. The head of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Alexei Pushkov, told Kommersant that it is necessary to resume the dialogue, first of all, that the European colleagues have no grounds for prolonging the sanctions against the Russian delegation to the PACE.

Yesterday, the State Duma speaker met with PACE head Anne Brasser and took part in the meeting of the so-called presidential committee of the Parliamentary Assembly. Then Mrs. Brasser declared to Kommersant that they would like to discuss with Naryshkin in the PACE possible formats for continuing the dialogue. Recall, after the transition of the Crimea under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, PACE colleagues accused Russia of "violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine" and deprived the delegation of the Russian Federation of the right to vote.

Both events were closed. "We expressed surprise that PACE took a silent position regarding the bloody crisis in Ukraine, does not use its voice to stop the fire," the State Duma speaker said after the meeting. Nor is he satisfied with the absence of the PACE position on sanctions, "which have no justifiable grounds" (a number of French deputies and businessmen supported him with his point of view on economic sanctions against the Russian Federation,).

From the statement of Mrs. Brasser PACE head Anne Brasser At the same time, the head of the PACE stressed that she does not agree with Sergei Naryshkin that the decision to deprive representatives of the Russian Federation of the right to vote in the organization "was done in violation of democratic norms." The positions of the sides in regard to what is happening in Ukraine [..].

The head of the Russian delegation to the PACE, Aleksey Pushkov, does not consider the past negotiations to be a failure: "They are planning a plan for the return of the voting right of the Russian delegation to PACE." Up to this point, he explained to Kommersant, the RF delegation refused to participate in the work of the PACE commissions, but already in September the State Duma deputy Olga Borzova will make a report to the commission on social issues. At the beginning of the work the delegation of the Russian Federation was insisted in the PACE presidential committee, assures Alexei Pushkov. In January 2015, "sanctions against the delegation will be nullified," and the powers of the Russian Federation will be fully restored, if no one advocates the extension of sanctions, so we need to create a "political atmosphere so that this desire does not arise.". Asked by Kommersant what arguments the Russian delegation will use, Sergei Naryshkin said: "We will continue to explain that the truth is on our side." (Kommersant 3.9.2014)

“Let’s remind the decision about tightening **sanctions became** reaction to "illegitimate", from the Western point of view, elections in Donbass in November 2nd and the build-up of military forces by the militia at the expense of support from the Russian Federation. Frank-Walter Steinmeier warned yesterday that calls for new sanctions against the Russian Federation indicate a "dangerous misunderstanding" of the current situation. According to him, the purpose of sanctions should not be to inflict economic harm on the Russian Federation. "An isolated, economically weakened Russia will not be able to contribute to stabilization in Ukraine, or it can become a great danger for itself and for others, so I cannot recommend this way," he said.” (Kommersant 28.11.2014)

Kommersant authorization legitimization

“Thus, **the president of the United States is entitled to impose sanctions** on foreign citizens and companies who invest in projects Russian fuel and energy complex TEK on unconventional oil production, and receives broad authority to impose new restrictions on the export of equipment for the Russian fuel and energy sector. In accordance with the bill, **the US president “should” impose additional sanctions against Gazprom if he decides that Gazprom takes significant volumes of gas [...] from Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.** In addition, the bill obliges the US president to impose restrictions on companies of the Russian military-industrial complex if Russia puts arms on any territory "without the appropriate permission from the internationally recognized government of that country." Thus, the reason for imposing sanctions may be the deployment of weapons in the Crimea.” The head of the Duma International Affairs Committee, Alexei Pushkov, in a conversation with Kommersant, described the US bill as "the legal formulation of a new unilateral cold war, "which goal is the rejection of those states that were in close relations with Russia." At the same time, the deputy expressed his confidence that "the bill giving the executive power a carte blanche for any hostile actions towards Russia, other than the use of armed forces cannot be called declarative." “The Head of Stratfor, famous American political scientist George Friedman told to Kommersant about the causes of Ukrainian crisis. -- In your opinion what is the idea in American sanctions? **Russian authorities** talk about US wanting to change the **regime**. -- The goal of sanctions is that with minimum risk to the US and some other European Union’s countries to harm Russia capitulated on American requirements. **The sanctions demonstrate the power of the US. I do not think that the main goal of the US is the regime change in Russia. The main goal was to limit the space of the Russian authorities' maneuver, which we observe.** But other factors also played a role here, such as a decline in the Russian economy, a drop in the price of oil.” (Kommersant 19.12.2014)

““Barack Obama signed the act on new limits against Russia, but the implementation of it was postponed. US President Barack Obama signed the Congress adopted "Act to Support Freedom of Ukraine", which provides for the provision of assistance to Kiev and the imposition of new sanctions against Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that this law could "permanently undermine the opportunities for normal interaction" between Moscow and Washington. Reminding, the document describes **in which cases the US president "should" toughen sanctions against Gazprom and companies of the Russian military-industrial complex.** In addition, the law provides a wide range of criteria, guided by which **the head of the White House "has the right" to introduce additional restrictions with regard to the Russian fuel and energy and financial sectors.** As Kommersant has already reported, unlike the extremely rigid initial version, most of the formulations of the final version of the law are of a permissive or recommendatory nature. In addition, the White House, according to Kommersant sources close to the US administration, obtained an exemption from the document on the codification of sanctions currently in force against the Russian Federation. If this provision remained in the text, all the temporary sanctions imposed by the US President on Russia would become permanent. According to the interlocutors of "Kommersant", the US will mitigate sanctions only simultaneously with the EU countries. "So we will demonstrate unity and not allow a situation in which one or the other party will get commercial advantages (from renewing cooperation with Russia). American officials explain. In an interview with France 24, Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow will respond to the law signed by the US president, depending on how it will be applied in practice. At the same time, the **Russian Foreign Minister added that he has "very serious reasons to believe" that with the help of sanctions the West is trying to achieve destabilization and a regime change in Russia.** Representatives of the US administration refute this.” (Kommersant 20.12.2014)

Kommersant rationalization legitimation

“EU countries began to speak out about the extension of restrictive measures against Russia. The Chancellor of Austria Werner Faymann announced yesterday that European countries are not interested in the collapse of the Russian economy. Nevertheless, there is no unity in the EU in this respect. With harsh criticism of the prospects for tightening sanctions against Russia, Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann spoke in an interview with the Sunday edition of the daily newspaper Osterreich. **“When we build a new wall that cuts off the Russian economy, we cut the branch on which we sit,”** the chancellor warned, saying that he had recently talked about the prospects for a way out of the crisis with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Already imposed sanctions, he, however, called correct, recalling that they were taken as a retaliatory measure. A number of other European politicians have come forward from similar positions in recent days. **Concern about the danger of destabilizing the situation in Russia amid European sanctions was expressed** by the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Denmark Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Martin Lidegaard. However the prime minister of Italy Matteo Renzi announced **“Europe should be strict and answer to unacceptable happenings for example what is happening in Ukraine. But Russia has strategic meaning for Italy and Europe. We need to find common ground, even though nobody these days is interested in putting Russia down on her knees”**”. “We need to hold the current sanctions until the Russian Federation will change its behavior and stop aggression towards Ukraine”, -- announced **British prime minister David Cameron**. “Speeches by the leaders of Italy and Austria are not just a continuation of traditional rhetoric in favor of or against Russia, but also a **rational** consequence of long-term economic interests,” **Sergei Utkin, head of strategic assessments of Center for Situation Analysis of the Russian Academy of Sciences**, told Kommersant.” (Kommersant 22.12.2014)

“International sanctions, according to Igor Shuvalov, in the government of Russia don’t evaluate as a prohibition to investment and as a short-term worsening of relations, which negatively affect the economy -- rather, analogy for government of the Russian Federation are international sanctions against Chile and South Africa in the 70s. That said sanctions, according to Igor Shuvalov, also, provided the president of Russian Federation a new support of society (“Ordinary people do not perceive sanctions with Putin, they take it as an attack on Russia”) support can be used as a resource for structural reforms.” (Kommersant 24.01.2015)

“Russians are ready along the patriotic euphoria to sacrifice wellbeing over the national idea, -- speaks professor of sociology faculty VSE (Higher School of Economics) Aleksander Demidov – the line of the party is more important than some food products.” The positive relation towards Russian sanctions on the West – it is consequence of patriotic movement and propaganda, according to political scientists Grigorij Dobromelov. **“The authorities said that product embargo allows national agriculture to become more developed and it is also an answer to the economic war which the West declared to Russia”** he reminds. According to the political scientist basically Russian people accustomed to that price will go up and now the price rising will “even have a positive connotation” – Russia tries to develop its agriculture and compete with the West.” Mister Dobromelov claims that the reaction to the sanctions will change if the course of ruble declines and the same time prices of products rise. (Kommersant, 02.10.2014)

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Kommersant rationalization delegitimation

“In Moscow it’s considered that the new wave of sanctions imposed by western countries on Russia is “counterproductive” and has “cynical character”. (via Russian newspaper ITAR-TASS) **Deputy head of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation Grigorij Karasin** said that “there is no sense to talk with Russia with sanctions” he then continues that “sanctions will help us gather ourselves and in the end Russia will have more **effective economy**.” (Kommersant, **30.07.2014**)

“The business circles of the EU meanwhile continue to oppose the sanctions speaking almost in one voice. Vice President of the Italian ENI, Ferlenga, head of the Russian branch of the Confindustria Association of Italian Entrepreneurs, wrote to the president of the association Giorgio Svinci early in September: "All of our members are deeply concerned by the escalation of the conflict in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which has already led to significant **economic losses and weakening of our positions on the Russian market**" The top manager believes that the losses "will be of a structural nature and beneficial to direct competitors from Europe and China who cooperate with Russia." Yesterday in an interview with Russia Today, he talked about Italy's losses at the level of "more than € 1 billion". In this case, according to the top manager, the sanctions will lead "only to the fact that Russia will again go on self-sufficiency."” (Kommersant, **12.09.2014**)