UNROOTING INEQUALITY FROM DEVELOPMENT

Recognition and Justification of Inequality in Global Development

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ABSTRACT

How does the tension resolve between a moral order with egalitarian imperatives, such as sustainable and inclusive human development, and a global political economy based on a market system that prioritizes meeting the wants and needs of those with purchasing power? By developing a comprehensive theoretical framework as analytical contribution, I propose to rethink a practice-intensive field and analyze the texts that represent the dominant discourse in development policies: the UNDP Human Development Reports and the World Bank’s World Development Reports. These influential institutions have shaped the rise of neoliberalism as a hegemonic development paradigm, and their discourses about development have shaped socioeconomic logics of what ‘worth’ means, turning market-led growth – without equity – to be recognized and justified as generic development policy. Global inequality, enacted through normalized intersubjective relational disorders, has become a ‘natural’ situation in which there is apparent agreement to tackle inconsistencies under a seemingly tolerable promise of proper management in a future of sustained status quo.

My thesis analyzes the way these disruptive situations, despite the crises of legitimation and questioning, appear to hold together. My research dwells in overlapping fields, between the German social philosophy in Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition, and the French economic sociology in Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s methodology of Justification and Economies of Worth. Understanding this process will need a complex methodological scope, which: 1) maps patterns of exclusion, using a recognition-theoretical view of inequality as a displacement of exclusionary practices, and shifts of relational disorders in society; 2) applies conceptual tools to describe subject-formation and performativity under these disorders, including their political dimension; 3) grounds these theoretical findings in the context of development studies, unveiling unconscious attachments that subjects have to actively prefer and accept these relations; and 4) applies a holistic and highly pragmatic methodology of Justification and Economies of Worth to analyze and identify how this process is justified to an extent to which inequality is tolerated.
I use this intersecting methodology to analyze the Human Development Reports by the United Nations Development Programme, and how they resolve the paradoxical tension in favor of neoliberal capitalism by being subjectively different, but objectively aligned and complicit.

**Keywords:** Recognition, Hegemony, Justification, Global Development, Neoliberal Capitalism, Inequality, Subjectivity, Discourse
INTRODUCTION

Development is arguably a practice-intensive field, where theory is rarely questioned without risking to appear as an unnecessary or outdated challenger to the (often fictionalized) emancipatory discourses around it. This thesis is an attempt to bring back attention to how unquestioned theories are formed, and the controlled outcomes of the practice and polices informed by them. In this respect, aiming for an ambitious theoretical component is essential, and the theoretical development and discussion constitutes much of the work, joined by grounded examples in mainstream development practices to situate the discussion, and evidencing this with an empirical methodology in hopes of contributing to an improved hyper self-reflexive and conscientious practice.

In analyzing this paradox, I address neoliberal capitalism as the political and economic philosophy that hold market-led growth as a core mechanism in regulating standards of social relations and order, and as a main engine for development and progress. I start by identifying the practices in which neoliberal socioeconomic rationalities twist the egalitarian principle of international development discourse to a tolerable extent, reaching a ‘concealment threshold’, that suspends questioning and allows it to stand. It is important to understand that this practice can be analyzed in communicative practices as seen in dominant development texts. Communicative practices realize the social, and affect intersubjective recognition through claims and entitlements (Deranty 2012, 46).

To expose and explain how inequality has been recognized and justified as a natural situation, I use an ambitious and eclectic framework that responds to the similarly dynamic and branching formations of neoliberal capitalism. Although divergent, my critical approach is decisively challenging the predominant frameworks in mainstream social and political theory, namely, liberalism and utilitarianism (Deranty, 2012, 40). A critique must match its object of questioning in terms of complexity. I study dominant, hegemonic discourse as practice (Chapter I the Power Grid), the power-embedded subjectivity as its formation (Chapter II hegemonic relations), inequality as that subject’s performativity (Chapter III postcolonial and psychoanalysis in development), and development practice and policy as a field which congeals this process into unquestioned convention (global reports as justification of inequality).
My proposed thesis research consists of a recognition-theoretical review of inequality in market societies, as seen in the social philosophy of Axel Honneth, head of the Frankfurt School (Critical Social Theory). The Theory of Recognition, which analyzes the social pre-conditions of mutual, inter-subjective recognition, has two main aspects. Firstly, it states that subject agency or autonomy requires the formation of practical relations to self that are, according to Honneth, constituted in and through relations of recognition along three relational orders of respect, esteem, and care with others (thus forming self-respect, self-esteem, and self-care/confidence). Secondly, the lack of recognition or misrecognition throughout any of the relational orders of self-formation is experienced as harm or injustice, which could foster a struggle for recognition (Brink & Owen, 2007). Therefore, without conditions that enable mutual recognition (i.e. increasing social inequality), pathological relations develop, eventually hindering agency and autonomy. Honneth’s theory allows for normative reconstruction of social conflicts in contemporary societies. However, this is only the first step of the research, since the tools to analyze how the struggle for recognition is occluded, and global inequality appears to hold together, can be obtained through an accompanying methodology.

By using the poststructural concept of hegemony provided by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), I try to link it as a conceptual tool between the theoretical base of my thesis, Recognition Theory (Honneth 1996), and the chosen methodology, Economies of Worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). EW is a pragmatic approach to analyze the coordination of actor interactions to reach common goals, specifically through socio-cultural resources (conventions or orders of worth), that overtime become historically incorporated behaviors (Diaz-Bone, 2011). Coordination (agreement) is reached when a lack of contradiction allows the interaction to reach its goal, and allows for orders of worth, value and justification to be enacted in order to create – a posteriori – social ontologies. This is a direct reversal to neo-classical economics and represents a situationalist approach from a new economic sociology and Post-Bourdieu sociology. Equipped with the methodological tools from EW and advancements by its successor Economics of Conventions (EC), I perform the identification of the different orders of worth that are summoned in establishing the conventions that justify inequality, and how actors suspend questioning to reach cooperation.
1. Statement of Research Problem

Development discourse is stranded between fulfilling the objectives of egalitarian human development and complying with the structural requirements of the predominant political economic system, both of which pursue fundamentally conflicting outcomes. Development is therefore essentially disputed and shaped by this binding space of opposing forces. This limits the ability of alternative development discourses to effectively and sustainably transcend that foundational restraint without ultimately risk forfeiting one of the two objectives, or in some cases limiting one to be indirectly and partially pursued as a secondary outcome.

The result is the continuous tension of global inequality, which can arguably be said to constantly resolve in favor of the economic requirements of the time rather than the achievement of human development. This constancy exacerbates the discrepancies between both goals, increasing global inequality. Yet, the paradoxical tension is held together through a discursive repetition that has become the normalized reality, both customary and unchallenged. I argue in the following sections that this paradox is strained – and sustained – by the perpetuation of relational disorders between subjects, enacted by unquestioned pathologies of recognition (which I call bottlenecks) in hegemonic practices that become ‘natural’ conventions. The paradox is analyzed in the scenario of ‘late’ liberal political and economic philosophy, neoliberalism.

In sum, my research problem is the analysis of how a disruptive situation such as global inequality is held together. What are the hegemonic practices, formations, performativities and conventions through which inequality becomes rooted in development?

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1 See Honneth & Harmann (2006) and their account of the paradoxes of neoliberalism in The I in We. Both authors, as well as Fraser (2013), discuss the paradoxical tension of emancipatory and pathological effects of neoliberalism in ‘developed’ countries. I am interested in extending this understanding to the global consequences of the same tension imbed in global development policies.

2 A similar concept of normalization can be seen in Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ and ortho ‘doxa’, as he explains the “pre-reflexive intuitive knowledge shaped by experience, to unconscious inherited physical and relational predispositions” (Bourdieu, 1984).

3 Neoliberalism advocates for individualized, atomistic conceptions of negative freedom, keeping its legitimacy through emancipatory discourses of self-realization, while ultimately undermining the social pre-conditions for mutual recognition. See Fraser (2013) as she displays the acquisition of emancipatory discourses by the market in ‘Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History’, ‘Feminist Ambivalence and Capitalist Crisis’, and ‘A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis after Polanyi’.
2. **Research Question**

How does a disrupted situation – that can be qualified as pathological, dysfunctional, or conflictual – such as global inequality, appear to hold together?

2.1 **Additional Questions**

- What is the arrangement of beings in this situation, or how does the relational orders between subjects need to be, to present a minimally coherent situation that stands?
- What is the role of development studies in this? And how does the neoliberal socioeconomic rationality twist the egalitarian principle of development?

My research thesis is that development (international development discourse and policies) acts as the discursive articulator of a stable, manageable value-horizon (forthcoming human development), that makes the unstable present situation (of unequal relational disorders) tolerable to a minimum extent.

3. **Research Objective**

My main objective is to understand the justification and exacerbation of inequality through the analysis of the permanent struggle for recognition among subjects within a complex landscape of divergent value-horizons or *worlds* (principles of order). This entails the identification and description of how and when the appearance of stability (order) is maintained through the occlusion and diffusion of instability (disorder) to misrecognized, and misrepresented societies.

To do so, my theoretical approach will seek to identify the nature of social conflict through understanding relational orders of intersubjective recognition, and the struggle that arises if those social preconditions for mutual recognition are not met. Afterwards, I employ a methodology that identifies how struggles are resolved (discursively) by finding the justifications, and principles of order and worth that are employed to command authority in situations of disagreement, and thus suspend critique. As such, a secondary goal of the thesis was finding an appropriate methodology that could ground the eclectic intersection of my theoretical framework in social research. Arguably achieved, this methodology helps to determine the moment in which the exclusionary patterns in relational disorders are fixed and become a social, economic, cultural or political convention that appears as a ‘natural’ situation, and goes unchallenged.
4. Research Data

My theory-methodology tandem is conveniently aligned with the Postcolonial approach in terms of the type of data it will require. As Ilan Kapoor presents, contrary to the theories that rely on social science methodology and fieldwork research, “postcolonial theory emerges out of literary studies, disclosing its arguments based primarily (although not exclusively) on literary sources” (2008, 6). I analyze the Human Development Reports by the United Nations Development Programme, briefly comparing them to World Poverty Reports by the World Bank, from the 1990’s to present day.

4.1 Data – Particularity of Chosen Texts

These texts represent the predominant discourse in development policy and practice, and are commonly presented as opposing discourses to what development represents for the market (World Bank) and for humans (UNDP). Each institution reportedly builds a different conception and approach to what is ‘worth’ pursuing in development. The Human Development Reports have been lauded as ‘independent, analytically and empirically grounded discussions of major development issues, trends and policies’, but further examinations reveal a different scope (Cammack, 2017. See Chapter IV). These texts continue to influence decision-making processes that result in growth without equity, despite the discourses that assume development to tackle this issue.

A closer look into these texts may reveal how these institutions produce research in assessing inequality through the compilation of national statistics, which may be a combination of quantitative economic approaches with descriptive and normative notions ingrained in them (Lucas, 2004). However, this is not commonly investigated. The dominant discourse continues implying that “economic analysis should not focus on problems of either inequality or income distribution but rather on issues concerning growth and poverty because the potential for improving the lives of poor people by finding different ways of distributing current production is nothing compared to the apparently limitless potential of increasing production (Giovanni Guidetti, referenced in Lucas, 2004). Are these texts exempt from such logic?

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4 See research by Laurent Thévenot on the politics of statistics, concerning classifications and practices that endow relevance or worth to groups or individuals. In Thévenot, Laurent. Conventions for Measuring and Questioning Policies. The case of 50 years of policy evaluations through a statistical survey. 2011.
5. **Methodology**

My methodology consists of the following elements:

1) A comprehensive review of literature (section 8) including discussions on the use of the theories of Recognition and Justification;

2) A proposed conceptual and theoretical framework to analyse the thesis problem and provide a complex research scope (Section 6)

3) A critical reading of the empirical texts from dominant development institutions that have defined the generic, mainstream discourse in development policy (Chapter IV)

The first elements are integral to the empirical analysis and are formed as chapters with own theoretical discussions and findings which are aligned with the main argument. Most importantly, the findings from Chapter I-III are a part of the contributions of my thesis, and are essential in informing the data analysis in Chapter IV.

The methodological approach of the Economies of Worth (Justification theory) aims to understand the practices that make things hold together (Diaz-Bone 2011, 56). It deals with the relation between *agreement* (the constitution of an order) and *disagreement* (the critical move that calls it into question). Constructing legitimacy can result from a plurality of forms of agreement, mainly through *orders*, or higher common principles. In orders, several subjects and objects (beings) are endowed with value in different degrees, until they form a coherent and self-sufficient situation, called a ‘world’ (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 40). The methodology allows us to research how worlds can be called to judgment from other worlds. According to both authors, tests are called upon in times of disagreements, which leads the persons involved in the disagreement to reach an agreement on the relative importance or usefulness of the beings (persons, institutions, policies, methods) involved in a particular situation (ibid). The worlds seek to keep an order in which legitimate performativity (practical reason or prudent behavior) is secured. The theoretical formulation of the Power Grid in Chapter I and II is crucial for this.

Before addressing the theory behind the methodology, I briefly present the key components of the empirical part of my methodology:
• The unit of analysis is the situation. Within situations, several conventions or orders of worth struggle to become the logic of coordination and evaluation (Diaz-Bone 2011, 43)
• Orders of worth are rooted in empirical historical analysis of economic institutions and socio-cognitive categories (ibid)
• Special focus is given on objects and material properties in setting the way individuals coordinate and evaluate. Objects serve as proof of the ‘worth’ of other beings, such as persons, and their actions. They are used as references within ‘tests of worth’, once the worth of persons or actions is questioned in critical situations (Diaz-Bone 2011, 22)
• The method does not use an established theory to apply it to historical material, but starts from the way which people “conceive, act, coordinate, realize, evaluate, and deal with justifications” (Diaz-Bone, 23)

With these main points explained, I commence the incursion into the research scope that frame and form my thesis.

6. Research Scope

“The primary language of critique was and is the language of power and of asking for justifying reasons for norms and institutions all are subject to”

– Rainer Forst (2007, p 237; emphasis added)

The scope of my research can be generally situated within critical development studies, close to postcolonial critique, yet framed by the intersection between the Theory of Recognition (Critical Theory in German social philosophy) and Justification Theory as methodology (Sociology of Critique in French economic sociology). In order to bridge theory and method in a holistic manner, I make use of the concept of hegemony from poststructuralism. I focus on this intersection to distinguish my analysis of development as an innovative stance for both Postcolonial Critique and the Theory of Recognition. The former gaining insight in the political dimensions outside of cultural critique, and the latter in being suited from social theory to social research with a global

5 I use the term broad to distinguish it from other content analysis methodologies. The broad Discourse Theory I assume is referred by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe as the notion of the social as a discursive space (2014, preface, x).
Development is understood as “the dominant representations and institutional practices that structure relationships” between the global north and south (Kapoor, 2008, introduction).

In my first chapter, I implement Critical Theory concepts based on Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition, which occupies a central place in contemporary debates in social and political theory (Brink & Owen, 2007) aided by Poststructuralist concepts from Judith Butler. Correlating the concepts of ‘recognition’ and ‘power’, I analyze how pathologies of recognition form systemic patterns of exclusion within a theory grid that charts positions of power (aka the ‘Power Grid’). The grid is well aligned with previously discussed concepts in development studies by Postcolonial theorists (Kapoor, Spivak, Babha, and Said) in the sense that it unveils deeply rooted and complex relations of domination and subjection/resistance (Kapoor, 2008). This chapter draws the field in which the ensuing chapters develop.

In my second chapter, I implement conceptual tools from Poststructuralist, Post-Marxist theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, to further analyze the concept of hegemony as a key element to analyze power, and ground the theory with the methodology presenter afterwards. This second part entails the study of ‘power’ as a formative element of practical identities and subjectivity (Foucault, 1983; 1994 and Butler, 1997), mainly through hegemonic discourses in power-contingent societies. This chapter aims to explain the spatial relations and possible movement within the grid from the first chapter.

Consequently, my theoretical scope consists of the implementation, analysis and perhaps enrichment of the concepts of recognition and hegemony within the scenario of international development. I will do this with the epistemological example and discussion from the existing tradition of Postcolonial Critique in development studies, mainly in Chapter III, which will in turn be aided by the theory by adding the identification of the political dimension in development.

Based on this, I implement a tandem theoretical-methodological collaboration between social philosophy and economic sociology to analyze which conventions or orders of worth are used in development literature (World Bank’s Global Development Reports, and the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Reports). Are these orders of worth ultimately used to justify inequality as a continuously ‘temporary’ instability that will be resolved through maintaining the political economy (normative) status quo? The concept of hegemony
In order to present a detailed scope of my research, I first clarify my type of critique. Then I also distinguish my conceptual assumptions of what is being critiqued behind development, namely, the political philosophy and economic philosophy of ‘late’ liberalism that informs and shapes most of the dominant development policies and theories. Subsequently, I present which assumptions of the concepts of recognition and power are used within my type critique. Therefore, the following is part of explaining the scope of my study, and is not an explanation of the concepts themselves but the assumptions I use of each. The conceptual and theoretical descriptions are presented farther below, in section 6.

6.1 What Type of Critique?

It is important to distinguish my assumption of critique, and differentiate it from other types of critical stances. My critical scope is unlike the Kantian approach that authors such as John Rawls represent. I am not interested in answering questions of rational justifications, or finding universal norms of justice, quite the contrary. Criticizing universalist, essentialist, positivist approaches is – ironically – ‘essential’ for my criticism (strategically essential according to Spivak, described later). Generally speaking, it is initially based on a Neo-Hegelian approach of critique, insofar as it is reappropriated by Axel Honneth in his Theory of Recognition, and the Left Hegelian thought (e.g. Marxism). My assumptions are intrinsically aligned with Honneth’s take of critique in The Limits of Liberalism (1995) and The Struggle for Recognition (1995), questioning the atomistic, rational, and instrumental assumptions of agency he identifies in the Hobbesian roots of contemporary liberal political philosophy (as introduced by Brink & Owen, 2007, 3).

More specifically, in order to build from this base assumption of critique, my critical stance draws additionally from the ‘Foucauldian’ approach that gender studies and subaltern studies take in analyzing relations of power. Authors such as Judith Butler (Poststructuralism) and Gayatri Spivak (Postcolonialism) are a clear example of this approach, which also benefits enormously from sharing a Left Hegelian critical basis. In this sense, my assumption of critique

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6 This distinction was accurately pointed out to me by Hans Arentshorst during one of the earlier reviews of my drafts. He was really helpful in elucidating the different types of critiques and I owe much of my knowledge and access to sources on the theory of recognition and Axel Honneth to him.
is hybrid. Even though it is equipped through ‘Foucauldian’ critique in the conceptual understanding of power, and therefore linked to Post-structuralism, it also draws from and reinforces itself through Left Hegelian elements studied in Marxism and Honneth’s Critical Theory. Both complement and enhance each other in interesting forms. This is further clarified on the following section on philosophical background and in Chapter 1 as I directly discuss these theoretical concepts.

6.2 Critiquing which Liberalism?

By liberalism, I mean the liberal political philosophy that is – broadly speaking – based on a theoretical nature of human individuality and its normative implications. Namely, it presents an ‘original’ nature of free and rational individuals that are self-defining, self-determining subjects (Pippin, 2007, 60). It steps beyond the scope of my study to distinguish between the different versions of liberalism (e.g. relativists, libertarians, welfarists, value-neutral, skepticals, among others). However, I refer to the mostly general view of western liberal democratic tradition of such philosophy, and specifically, to neoliberalism, detailed afterwards.

The general western liberal democratic tradition argues that there are rational arrangements to how political life - and by extension how the state – should be (Pippin, 2007, 58). According to Pippin, it can either be an interest-based, pragmatic conception of political life, where political problems are solved in rational thinking processes that could result in consent over how to enforce a civil order (Mill, Lock and Hobbes are some exponents), also seen in the predominance of rational choice models of reasoning; or it can also be seen as a similarly original conception of equal moral entitlement (through rights) to justify the establishment of a civil order in which individuals are ‘rationally willing’ to let a sovereign, a state, have coercive authority to protect said rights (Rousseau, Kant and rights-based approaches are some examples). These idealizations can have considerable overlaps, Pippin argues, but are still distinguishable from the alternative political reflection presented by Axel Honneth.

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7 Honneth has previously found overlaps with Foucault’s work (and French poststructuralism) in The Critique of Power (1993) and Foucault und Adorno (1986). Although he ultimately preferred the Critical Theory stance against the initial structuralist approach of the early Foucault, he found the poststructural change of Foucault’s late work to be more compatible with Critical Theory (Hohendahl, 2001, 23-25).

8 See Robert Pippin’s 2007 explanation in Recognition and Reconciliation: Actualized Agency in Hegel’s Jena Phenomenology for a detailed account of the liberal philosophical theory and how Neo-hegelian approaches by Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth have challenged it.
Even though it is more clearly explained further below, Honneth’s alternative presents that before the original nature of liberal political thought of the free, rationally choosing individual, comes an unavoidable social dependence, a pre-condition of prior inter-subjective relations that enable the existence of any individual will, agency or autonomy (ibid). These are the limits of liberalism (Honneth, 1995), because any achievement of true individual independence is pre-conditioned to relations of mutual dependence. The limits of liberalism are only the starting point of the theory of recognition. Before that, I will detail what I assume neoliberalism to be, to then return to recognition.

- On Neoliberalism

I assume neoliberalism to be a political and economic philosophy starting from the 1970’s that hold market-led growth as a core mechanism in regulating standards of social relations and order, and as a main engine for development and progress. I also assume it to be what theorist Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) describes, as the term implied to mark the switch in both state politics and market relations after the decline of the Bretton Woods agreement (also known as Keynesianism) in the 1970’s. Povinelli elucidates the break between approaches towards the optimal relation between markets, state, and civil society. Keynesians argue for state regulation during capitalism’s periodic crises, as a redistributive compromise among all players, whereas neoliberalists argue for privatization and deregulation of state assets, a limited presence – if any – of the state in market affairs. My understanding of neoliberalism follows this conception, argued by Povinelli, that “central to neoliberal thinking is the idea that the market naturally pays people what they are worth” (2011, 17). Any external intervention, by the state or organized labor, is perceived by neoliberals as a distortion of fair income distribution, because the market – as previously stated – already pays people what they are worth. Povinelli states that, far from being an event or a given state of affairs, neoliberalism is a term used to “conjure, shape, aggregate, and evaluate a variety of social worlds” which helps “disperse liberalism as a global terrain” (idem, 16). To her, and I concur with her understanding, neoliberalism is a series of struggles in an uneven social terrain.

My scope on the use of ‘neoliberalism’ implies its pursuit of market-led growth, a promarket philosophy, emphasizing privatization and individualization to alleviate poverty (Povinelli, 183). “Social, economic, and political life is increasingly organized around the neoliberal view that bodies and values are stakes in individual games of chance and that any collective agency (other than the corporation) is an impediment to the production of value” (ibid).
The impression is given that this is a game of chance, “whose truth lies not here and now between us but there and then in who wins and who loses” (ibid). Individual responsibility is fostered as the culprit of any disadvantages or harm, while an idealized future serves to narratively justify present hardships as ‘sacrifices’. My interest in critiquing neoliberalism within the liberal philosophy is due to the pervasiveness of judgement against individual failure despite the wider, systemic repetitions of unequal (and unjust) development. Such a strong narrative is what has made neoliberalism into a new form of governmentality, a “new way in which power over and thorough life and death was being organized and expressed” (idem, 22).

Yet, before going into more detail on the discussion itself (presented in section 5), it is important to distinguish what theoretical conception I have on the theories that will help me analyze this tradition within liberalism. A recognition-theoretical reading of liberalism comes first, along with its conceptual clarifications.

### 6.3 Which Conception of Recognition?

Following the conceptual distinctions of ‘recognition’, proposed by Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen to clarify and distinguish between the formulations used to discuss it, I would also like to differentiate my assumptions here. Both authors present the terminological distinction of recognition as a concept used to either: identify, acknowledge or recognize, the last one being addressed as a ‘recognitive attitude’ (2007, 34). These three phenomena may be distinguishable, but can also be interrelated, as both authors propose.

My assumption of recognition falls in place with Honneth’s take on the three-pronged types of recognition (explained in section 6 later) that occur in intersubjective relations. My view on recognition is also in line with the terminology of a recognitive attitude: taking someone as a person, acknowledging the claims of that personhood, and adopting a way of being towards that person that shapes our responses. It is also a *dialogical* conception of recognition, in which A recognizes B, and B recognizes A to be a “competent recognizer” (ibid). This is called a ‘recognizee-sensitive’ conception of recognition, in which A not only recognizes B – a monological conception – but in which B is sentient, sensitive about A’s competency to recognize, and thus, a

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9 See Ikäheimo and Laitinen’s 2007 *Analyzing Recognition: Identification, Acknowledgement, and Recognitive Attitudes towards Persons* for a very detailed review of the usage of the term ‘recognition’ by several authors to explain political struggles.
dialogical conception emerges. It must be noted that this does not need to be symmetrical (i.e. A recognizes B as unequal), and can be multi-dimensional (i.e. A can have recognitive attitudes towards certain aspects of B). There is judgemental content in the recognitive attitude of others, and this is strategically crucial to analyze how and if those others are acknowledged to have a ‘respected’ judgemental competency (idem, 47). Misrecognizing a person is therefore linked to misacknowledging the claims of that personhood. My research focuses on analyzing the predominant rules and norms of society from which subjects assess the judgemental component in the relations of recognition, further explained below.

- **Recognition as a model of justice?**

It should also be clarified that although Honneth’s theory of recognition can be seen as an alternative model of justice, especially compared to the view of liberalism that it challenges, my study does not focus on the element of justice, or on expanding it. I analyze development studies through the theory of recognition, to understand the effects of neoliberalism in development theory and practice. Therefore, I use Honneth’s theory in as much as it provides a central starting point, but I also intend to build upon that. It is therefore necessary to briefly pinpoint why I believe a follow-up theory can be enhanced by it, and enhance it as well.

Specifically, the Theory of Recognition challenges liberalism’s assumption that liberty is something that all individuals can achieve on their own (Honneth, 2014, 46) as that leads to the belief that it is enough to distribute disposable goods among individuals in a fair, sufficient and equal manner, so that they can ‘autonomously’ fulfill their self-determined goals. As it was argued above, Honneth’s alternative sees autonomy as an intersubjective process: “Individuals achieve self-determination by learning, within relations of reciprocal recognition, to view their needs, beliefs and abilities as worthy of articulation and pursuit in the public sphere” (ibid). Recalling that changing the landscape of social justice is not a part of my research scope, it is still necessary to highlight that this is the starting point of my theoretical assumption of recognition.

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10 Then, my view is not distant from Nancy Fraser’s take on status, her status-model of recognition, in which members of a group can have different status based on cultural patterns of value (Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, also Ikäheimo and Latinen, 2007, 51). My assumptions in reappropriating Judith Butler’s grid of intelligibility in Chapter I (theory grid) acts according to a specific cultural pattern of value which grants recognition to or takes it away from people, treating them accordingly.

11 Rawls’ Theory of Justice, and his subsequent followers, is a clear example of this tradition of liberalism becoming a dominant account of social justice.
It is also relevant to recall that intersubjective relations recognize normative worth, from which individuals learn to value themselves. Yet, how is this value granted? Honneth describes relations of recognition to be historically contingent structures “turned into institutional practices in which subjects are involved or from which they are excluded” (ibid). Practices in this sense, rely on a common moral principle, that is, a mutually agreed norm as its their starting point. This is where my scope uses conceptual tools to study power, and the hegemony involved in making appear a certain set of norms and moral positions to be the standard, unquestionable reality. From this point, I study how subject-formation is affected under these practices (Chapter II), and how power-embedded (hegemonic) subjects change the political dimension in global development studies, as evidenced by Postcolonial critique (Chapter III). Justification methodology (Chapter IV) then provides the empirical approach to evidence said practices.

6.4 Which Conception of Power and Hegemony?

While Honneth does argue that moral principles are the result of already existing relations of recognition, he only hints that the justification behind this historical material can be identified in “the relations of communication, and their conditions of validity” (idem, 47). Understanding the moral principles that invite or exclude individuals from being part of mutual recognition is therefore reliant on analyzing, reconstructing, the relations of communication and justifications behind to shed a light on the struggles for recognition. My assumption of power is therefore swayed towards the ‘Foucauldian’ view of power as a political articulation, and the critical stances of Poststructuralism.

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, core authors of the Poststructuralist perspective of my second chapter state that their approach “privileges the moment of political articulation, and the central category of political analysis is, in our view, hegemony” (2014, preface, x, own emphasis). Both authors’ take on power rises from their research question: “How does a relation between entities have to be, for a hegemonic relation to become possible?” (ibid). They then continue with the clarification of the main conceptual category of my thesis, hegemony: “its very condition is that a particular social force assumes the representation of a totality that is radically incommensurable with it” (Ibid). Laclau and Mouffe argue that this analysis is only possible through the notion of the social conceived as a discursive space, to which I concur. Although

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12 As informed by Postcolonial (Spivak, Kapoor) and Feminist (Butler) epistemologies in Poststructuralism.
discursive, as is explained further in the second chapter, that political articulation has an unmistakable effect of change of the materiality around it (Chapters III and IV).

In the view of these authors, power is contingent. Both authors argue that power only acquires meaning in precise conjunctural and relational contexts (2014). I have determined those contexts in the theory grid presented in Chapter I (tentatively and quirkily named the ‘Power Grid’) to be two-fold: the extent or lack of recognition (through the existence or lack of acknowledgment of claims) and the ranges of normative values, as positioned by the repetition of either hegemonic or subversive values. Thus, I agree with Laclau and Mouffe in understanding that power is not foundational, but contingent on this context.

Going back to the first theoretical link, I therefore assume that the area, in which the contestation of the patterns of recognition of our times occur, is political. Questioning the norms and institutions that people are subjected to, especially those that have become the ‘natural’ world (mainstream, habitual) is the prime area for critique of power and the core element of its analysis is hegemony. In Development studies, this task has been meticulously performed by Postcolonial critique (see Chapter III), and it is within the intersection of recognition and (the critique of) power that I discuss inequality and the means to eventually address it. To implement this theoretical finding in social sciences, I will employ a methodological approach based on Justification Theory (Economies of Worth) to analyze situations of disagreement, which questions norms and institutions through ‘tests of worth’, and situations of agreement, which suspend the need to justify.

As it can be observed, the research scope already provides an overview of the research structure, as well as an advance view of some theoretical concepts, yet it is important to clarify these assumptions before discussing the main content of the study.

7. Discussion on a Theory-driven Research Framework

There are a few intersections among fields of study in which my research and argumentation is based on (Figure 1). Marxism and Poststructuralism share inter-connected fields with one another, as previously stated, but these links are better understood with the limited use of a third

13 This figure is an inconclusive attempt to have a visual representation of the theoretical background I have used to frame this chapter. It is by no means exhaustive, normative nor accurate, and it is only designed for my own research aid and conceptualization.
field – Psychoanalysis – which will not form a large part of my study but is strategic in ordering and visualizing my theoretical framework. These inter-connected fields have allowed for existing theories, concepts and their authors to develop, expand and be studied through other fields.

The schools of thought that form my study are framed within these intersections. For instance, the Frankfurt School (of social research) and Critical (Social) Theory draw from both Marxist and Psychoanalytic bases. Deconstructionism, a critical approach used by Postcolonial critique, emerged from Poststructuralist theorist Jacques Derrida. Some literary theory and text analysis methodologies have a convergence point in the linguistic dimension analyzed by Derridian deconstruction and Foucauldian critique of power relations. This is also known as Critical (Literary) Theory, where multidisciplinary methodologies such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) emerge from, and where the problem of language can be addressed from an enlightening perspective. As a previously mentioned example, looking at the “notion of the social conceived as a discursive space” (original emphasis), provides a distinctive view that is unthinkable within physicalist or naturalistic paradigms (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, preface). Through Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognition, philosophy has a foothold in empirical social sciences, as he relies on sociological and psychological studies to support his philosophical concepts of the moral grammar of social conflicts (Deranty, 2012, 40).

This intersection has allowed for multiple approaches and collaborations on theories. Many concepts find a common house in more than one field, such as hegemony, as initially built from the Marxist base (and departure from it) of Antonio Gramsci in what could be considered Post-Marxism. As mentioned in the last chapter, the Gramscian concept of hegemony was later taken to new directions by Poststructuralist theorist Ernesto Laclau in his book *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985), where he discusses his

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14 The overlap is specifically clarifying when studying theorists. For example, Poststructuralist / Post-Marxist theorist Ernesto Laclau, Poststructuralist / Gender theorist Judith Butler, and Lacanian psychoanalyst / Hegelian theorist Slavoj Žižek, have acknowledged their affinity with Marxism, and the political left (Butler, 2000, 11).
approach to also be arguably Post-Marxist, in as much as it is understood as “the process of reappropriation of an intellectual tradition, as well as the process of going beyond it” (Ibid). Subjectivity and subjective formation is another concept coined by Foucault and expanded by Butler, both Poststructuralists, while intersubjective relations reach not only the interest but even the core of Honneth’s Theory of Recognition. For instance, Honneth has retained Foucault’s emphasis on the conflictual nature of social life and general understanding of power, even though Honneth reinterprets that conflict normatively, or construed as moral identity-claims (Deranty & Renault, 2007, 96).

My general theoretical approach lies in the central intersection of Critical (social and literary) Theory, informed by Postcolonial and Feminist epistemologies. Namely, the work of the aforementioned theorists is the tool that helps me enhance the political dimension that is often lacking in Postcolonialism, which has been pointed out to be one of the analytical dimensions that Postcolonial Theory could improve (Kapoor, 2008, 14-16), as well as in the Theory of Recognition, as it is argued that it often shies away, or is too prudent to engage with its political dimensions (Deranty & Renault, 2007). The analysis of power is a first step to address this, and is present in all three fields of study presented above (Figure 1), yet the central, pivotal, nodal point for my theoretical approach in this paper is the critique of power they all share at the core junction. Finding how the operation of critique works in social sciences was the added challenge of this theory-driven research.15

This intersection allows for a partial fixation of strategic essentialism (as Spivak calls it) to consider oppression and coercion as a determinant feature in the other fields of study. Although my approach is non-essentialist, it would be outwardly denialist that I will not use certain essentialist elements to articulate my argument. Poverty would not be identifiable or even perceived to be a research problem if it was completely deconstructed to the point it became as relative as any other concept, based on the ever escaping totality of meaning. I will then use

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15 Philosophy already has a foothold in social sciences through Honneth’s work in sociological and psychological studies to defend his philosophical concepts (Deranty 2012, 40), but out of the variously applicable methodological approaches that can align with it, such as Honneth’s normative reconstruction, the Economies of Worth presented much promise in understanding how different worlds challenged each other (critique) and justified themselves (consent through meaning-fixation).
partial-fixation – and therefore, a strategic essentialism – to an extent in order to rearrange the previously deconstructed elements. Judith Butler speaks of ‘affirmative deconstruction’ (Butler, 2001, 279), elaborated by Derrida and Spivak. Butler does not advocate for a ‘hypercriticality’ that puts every word in quotation marks, but rather, she believes that “it seems important sometimes to let certain signifiers stand, assume a status of givenness, at a certain moment of analysis, if only to see how they work as they are used in the context of a reading, especially when they have become forbidden territory within a dominant discourse” (Butler, 2001, 269). Therefore, using specific terms such as ‘global north/south’, ‘globalization’ or ‘development’ does not mean that they are taken for granted, or that the essentialism behind the words is considered a given.

7.1 Contextualizing the Study into Existing Discussions

I will briefly present the richness of overlap between the abovementioned fields. Specifically, the overlap reactivates Poststructuralism to act within its uneventfulness and undecideability, it deconstructs Marxism to escape its essentialisms and determinisms, and although it is not a part of my research scope, it also equips psychoanalysis with the conceptual tools and praxis to enact outside its traditional structures of meaning. All to the extent to which they can contribute to critique and understanding of power. To me, then, the critique to Poststructuralism that it may not address issues of social justice due to its inability to recognize absolutes such as extreme injustice and extreme poverty, is partially fixed by the overlap with Marxism. Certainly, this justification is also an example of the articulation of seemingly dispersed elements. I will use this partial-fixation, a philosophical articulation, to conduct my research.

Once the overlap is contextualized, it is imperative to describe how it fits into existing discussions in development, more specifically, within critical development studies. Equipping Postcolonialism with political concerns such as inequality will allow the discussion to reach that materiality outside its usual cultural and representational issues (Kapoor, 2008, 17). Not shying away from politics, this framework aims to cover another reportedly unattended spot in Postcolonialism: not just to identify local agency but to reveal how it can have global consequences outside epistemological approaches (ibid). This study could also be considered normative due to the challenge of dealing and prioritizing political concerns, as the theory of recognition does. However, it also benefits from the other critical perspectives, which regularize counter-intuitive and highly self-reflexive practices.
There are other epistemologies from which I draw elements and concepts. Although they will not be detailed any further, it might serve to consider this research as possibly helpful in those specific philosophical assumptions. For instance, my approach is non-essentialist, closely linked to also being post-positivist, and it greatly relies on reappropriations of feminist epistemology. Development studies are no stranger to either these epistemologies, or the overlap of theory fields I use. An example of this is how Ilan Kapoor (2008), a Postcolonial theorist along Said, Spivak and Bhabha, uses Poststructuralist thought from Foucault and Derrida, Postmarxism from Mouffe and Žižek, and lately (see Kapoor et al. 2014), even Psychoanalysis from a Lacan and Žižek. My take adds author Judith Butler in poststructuralist thought, and of course, the tandem frame of Honneth’s social philosophy and Boltanski and Thévenot’s economic sociology.

8. Core Theories and Concepts

8.1 Recognition Theory

The Theory of Recognition is a social philosophical approach that analyzes the social preconditions of mutual, intersubjective recognition, and it is composed of two main aspects. Firstly, it states that subject agency or autonomy requires the formation of practical relations to self that are, according to Honneth, constituted in and through relations of recognition along tri-folding relational orders of respect, esteem, and care with others. It is through a recognizer that self-knowledge – and therefore individual autonomy- is achieved, respectively as self-respect, self-esteem, and self-care/confidence. Secondly, the lack of recognition or misrecognition throughout any of the relational orders of self-formation is experienced as harm or injustice, which could foster a struggle for recognition (Brink & Owen, 2007). Therefore, without conditions that enable mutual recognition, pathological relations develop, eventually hindering agency and autonomy. Honneth proposes this approach to understand the moral element embedded in social conflict and the rising claims for recognition.

Discussions about the implications of this normative proposal in other disciplines commonly link recognition-theoretical views with matters of social justice, but its broad assumptions allow it to explore many fields of study. The I in We, for instance, is an exploration of how the self-realization of individual autonomy and rational action – the cognition of “I” – is formed through the supportive experience of group processes – practicing shared values as a “we” (Honneth, 2014). Self-realizations cannot be maintained without intersubjective relations.
The branching considerations of this proposal and each of recognition’s relational orders of love, respect, and esteem, require serious attention in sociological insights.

Honneth’s take on love sprouts from a Hegelian understanding of a ‘first stage’ of recognition. It represents the transition from brash desire into a mutual confirmation of the nature of other subject’s needs, where each subject learns to limit herself and recognize others as ‘needy creatures’. Psychologically, Honneth complements this view by tying the relation-to-self that a subject (children in the case of Winnicott’s psychology) can develop when knowing herself to love and be loved by a person she comes to experience as independent (mom). Once a subject becomes sure of the other’s love, she comes to trust herself to be by her own without anxiety, realizing a self-confidence (her needs will be secured), precisely by being sure of the continuity of that care even in the absence of the other. Ostensibly, relational disorders become the object of study of Recognition Theory, insofar as it prevents or misconfigures the practical realization of the self, and directly undermines the subject’s emotional self-confidence.

Relational disorders can be reproduced in future pathological relations. In this case, a mutual recognition exchange turns into an imbalanced supplementation or complementation between subjects. Per Honneth, one of the subjects is then unable to detach her/himself from either the state of ‘egocentric independence’, or the other pole ‘symbiotic dependence’, and will seek within this fixity to complement herself with other correspondingly-supplementing subjects. One-sidedness thus overcomes reciprocity (continuously shared concern in the case of love), and the precondition for self-respect and self-esteem.

Taking the step towards respect and esteem is a key turning point for linking Recognition Theory to contemporary sociology. Respect is treated by Honneth as the experience of legal recognition of each subject’s autonomous capability of taking reasonable decisions about moral norms. Under this assumption, one’s actions – obeying public law – are respected expressions of autonomy, and self-respect is the formed through this agreed participation. Behavior then follows ‘universalistic’ principles that are already justified. Esteem is taken to be an evaluative frame of reference: a measuring framework for the ‘worth’ of such participation. Under this assumption, esteem is granted to those actions (including behaviors, traits and abilities) that are perceived to help achieve the highest, commonly accepted social order of values and goals. Self-esteem, and an accompanying self-worth, is built on recognizing the contribution of each subject’s
achievements as ‘valuable’ by others; a sort of collective pride or honor that fosters solidarity. The discussion now enters the realm of how an ‘intersubjectively shared value-horizon’ (Honneth, 1995) is formed. How are the principles behind what is valued or worthy defined?

Table 1 - The structure of relations of recognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of recognition</th>
<th>Love</th>
<th>Respect</th>
<th>Esteem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dimension of personality</td>
<td>emotional support</td>
<td>cognitive respect</td>
<td>social esteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of recognition</td>
<td>needs and emotions</td>
<td>moral responsibility</td>
<td>traits and abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental potential</td>
<td>primary relationships (love, friendship)</td>
<td>legal relations (rights)</td>
<td>community of value (solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical relation-to-self</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>generalization, de-formalization</td>
<td>individualization, equalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of disrespect</td>
<td>abuse and rape</td>
<td>denial of rights, exclusion</td>
<td>denigration, insult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatened component of personality</td>
<td>physical integrity</td>
<td>social integrity</td>
<td>‘honour’, dignity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.2 Justification Theory and Methodology – Economies of Worth

After an initial French publication in 1987, and 1989, Luc Boltanski and Larent Thévenot’s On Justification was translated in 2006 to reach prominence abroad. Their book served as a founding document for the currently growing school of thought known as Economics of Conventions in France (Diaz-Bone, 2011). Boltanski and Thévenot’s concepts, such as the principles of orders, are used interchangeably as ‘conventions’ in latter historical economy works. The work presented in Economies of Worth, compared to the latter developments in the Economics of Conventions (EC), is conceptually closer to sociology, and therefore clearer for setting a common ground to contemporary theories.

The Economies of Worth deal with the relation among beings (subjects and objects) and how they are configured to reach agreement or disagreement in given situations. Agreement comes through the constitution of a relational order that musters command or authority by which legitimacy is built, while disagreement or discord is the critical move that calls the agreement into question. Building legitimacy can be the outcome of a diverse range of forms of agreement, called orders by Boltanski and Thévenot, which are basically higher common principles. Within these orders, both subjects and objects are given value to different degrees, until they represent a
coherent and self-sufficient arrangement, called *worlds* by both authors, which are seen by subjects as a ‘natural’ situation (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006, 40). A world, along with its order of worth, can stand together, until questioned by another world in what is known as a ‘test of worth’. These tests are, according to both authors, called upon when discord arises, and it makes the persons involved to reach an agreement of the relative worth of the beings in a particular situation, thus setting the need to justify. Worlds seek to maintain stability through orders in which reasonable practices or prudent behavior is secure.

There are six worlds considered in the Economies of Worth, and six more added in the Economics of Convention. The initial six were interestingly drawn from canonical political philosophy texts, which could seem unfeasible in any other sociological endeavor. Boltanski and Thévenot treaded carefully not to compare literary sources on any more categories than their discursive articulation of a common humanity (a value-horizon of sorts). The legitimacy within the principles of orders were studied as the world of *inspiration* (Augustine’s *City of God*); the *domestic* world (Bossuet’s principles in *Politics*); the world of *fame* (in the signs of glory and value in Hobbes’ *Leviathan*); the *civic* world (found in the general will of Rousseau’s *Social Contract*); the *market* worlds (as wealth in Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*); and the *industrial* world (as efficiency in Saint-Simon’s *Du Système Industriel*). These works were not analyzed or criticized, but rather taken (perhaps in a Weberian ideal type) as the articulated sources of the kinds of principles of order that people employ when they must justify their actions, regardless of whether they have read or know about the classic texts. If the test of worth is surpassed through this justification, the situation that came into questioning then stands.

To wit, the unit of analysis in both the Economies of Worth and the Economics of Convention is the *situation*, and how different orders of worth can be used to hold it together through their respective logics of coordination and evaluation (Diaz-Bone, 2011). If a test of worth is called upon, the individuals involved in that situation employ a special focus on objects as evidence of the ‘worth’ (referential value) of other subjects and objects. Prominence is given to how people “conceive, act, coordinate, realize, evaluate, and deal with justifications” (Diaz-Bone, 2011, 23) which ultimately leads to coordination of the evaluation framework of a given situation (common value-horizon), and therefore pass the test of worth by avoiding further questioning, allowing the situation to stand, or hold together.
8.3 A Possible Interdisciplinary Arc? – Social Philosophy and Economic Sociology

Based on these backgrounds, it can be argued that both theories, Recognition Theory and Justification Theory (also a methodology as well), meet within a common base in their objects of study. Namely, in finding a framework of orientation or evaluation that can be used as a system of reference for the appraisal of beings (including subjects) and their actions, through which ‘worth’ (and the practical relation to the self) can be measured. How subjects appeal to a common humanity (political philosophy) or a common value-horizon (social philosophy) to evaluate or recognize each other is, I believe, the meeting point from two different approaches. This common field is, in other words, the analysis of the conflict among different moral beliefs, or moral philosophy, as hinted by Honneth in The I in We (2012, 99).

Honneth’s relational orders, especially those found in respect and esteem (self-worth), are inherently tied to the intersubjective judgement of culturally defined values, that is, the formation of a value-community (other critical theories such as gender studies find this through a matrix of legitimate performativity). Honneth tries to locate how the value-ideas embedded in social ethical goals are organized hierarchically so that a scale of ‘more and less valuable forms’ of behavior arise, which is precisely the work of Boltsanski & Thévenot. Out of the three types of recognition, social esteem appears to be a prime field for building this interdisciplinary arc. In that type, actions and behaviors are stratified, or ordered, per their contribution to achieving central values, and as such, honor, prestige and worth in Honneth’s theory can be arguably analyzed through Boltanski and Thévenot’s worlds. Stratifications of subjects and their activities into vertical structures also opens the door to conceptual tools from other disciplines, such as power, hegemony and ideology. Honneth himself tries to address this when he presents that “groups tend to try to deny non-members access to the distinguishing features of their group, in order to monopolize long-term chances for high social prestige” (Honneth, 1995). Inequality, even outside the scope of a theory of justice, is a prime field of study for recognition-theoretical works.

Far from this bridging proposal, the work of these authors seem to be at odds in many aspects. Honneth precisely analyzed the Economies of Worth in The I in We (chapter called “Dissolutions of the Social: The Social Theory of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot”, 2012), differentiating both author’s work as a ‘sociology of critique’, which unlike Honneth’s field of critical sociology, “(…) abstains from any normative judgements and strictly focuses on observing
the critical activity of competent actors” (Honneth 2012, 109). In focusing on everyday actors in everyday situations, Honneth continues describing, Boltanski and Thévenot suggest that common actors already perform what was previously thought to be the intellectual terrain of philosophers and critical theorists (Honneth 2012, 110). This is in principle a positive and practical feature that allows the Economies of Worth to be a highly pragmatic and situationalist approach to methodological work. Yet Honneth implies that a ‘neutral’ sociology of critique lacks awareness of the pre-structured normative nature of society, and that “an analysis of society, compelled by the object of its investigation, forces us to criticize the respective form of the social” (Honneth, 2012, 117). In this case, he refers to liberal political philosophy and the underlying liberal political economy seen in neoliberal capitalism. Honneth is also especially concerned about the reliance of objects as the sole use of proof in tests of worth, and he presents that subjects could use knowingly or unknowingly, normatively misplaced criteria (Honneth, 2012, 111). In his concluding remarks, Honneth preferred to cautiously distance both theories even while acknowledging there were overlapping interests.

That distance is not only marked by Honneth. Other central distinctions are noted theorists such as Rainer Diaz-Bone, who expand on the foundational work of Boltanski and Thévenot in the now current tradition of Economics of Conventions (EC). Diaz-Bone (2011) differentiates between theories with 1) an external-view which apply a theory to social reality (e.g. Recognition Theory) from internal-view theories which use people’s common sense to analyze their social formations (e.g. EW/ EC); and 2) Normative theories that explain deviations from defensible ideals of interaction (e.g. Recognition) from Non-normative theories that avoid judgements and limit themselves to observation (e.g. EW/EC). The object of study of both theories are also distinct, but that does not mean that there are no intersections such as those described earlier (i.e. the analysis of conflict among different moral beliefs).

I argue that if the proper epistemological and structural considerations are taken, both theories can create a more potent synergy to be used jointly. Honneth’s theory, apart from a normative reconstruction approach, does not rely on a specific methodology devoted to research in social sciences. Several methodologies from disciplines such as psychology and political...
science could be applied, but the Economies of Worth seem like a more precise fit when analyzing the attribution of predetermined worth in intersubjective (relational) orders. Few other methodologies could provide such an insight on the conflicting process of setting dominant interpretations around systems of reference than the Economies of Worth and its worlds. In later works (2014) Honneth calls to break away from ideal-theoretical methodologies that are removed from everyday practices, and focuses on how “all social institutions, without exception, must legitimate themselves in the light of ethical values and ideals that are worth striving for” (Honneth 2014, 4), and strategically important for this tandem operation is that the “criterion for determining what counts as just can ultimately only be judged in terms of the ideals actually institutionalized in society” (Honneth 2014, 5). The common base for joint action is set.

Entering the contested arena of orders of worth appears to further equip and enhance pragmatic social research, and I argue that it is not only feasible but advisable to retain the normative precaution that critical theory offers. Understanding the moral grammar of social conflict and the permanent struggle for recognition among subjects within a complex landscape of divergent value-horizons or worlds is, ultimately, the key to both theories, and the main objective of this research endeavor. In sum, instead of undermining each other, I propose that they can provide the theoretical and methodological tools that can potentialize the other.

I will now proceed to map the pattern of exclusion in a theory grid that will be the first step in linking a theoretical development and an empirical implementation in the following chapters.
CHAPTER I

Discourse as Hegemonic Practice
or “The Power Grid”

"The social system is not an unchangeable order beyond human control but a pattern of human action."


I argue that inequality is embedded in development due to the perpetuation of asymmetries of power in global social relations. These asymmetries are formed and sustained by pathologies of recognition which act as bottlenecks of development. Bottlenecks allow the repetition of hegemonic actions and discourses based on Neoliberal values that have permeated social interactions at a global scale, and exclude or marginalize actions and discourses that stray from those values. In the following subsections I will explain how each of these steps are formed, starting by the reach of global relations as a system, to the way it ingrains inequality downstream.

1. Global social relations: Basis of coercive structures

It is important to first acknowledge that social structures are based on human actions and relations. They are not a natural or divine occurrence, but are the result of social patterns that can be changed (Rawls, 1971). In order for patterns to be initially set, different value systems seek dominance over others. “For any system of thought to become dominant, it requires the articulation of fundamental concepts that become so deeply embedded in common sense understandings that they are taken for granted and beyond question.” (Harvey, 2007 p 24). Dominant systems, such as Neoliberalism, have become ‘hegemonic’ or mainstream in the XXI Century as their reach and penetration of values expands at a global scale. Timo Jütten (2010) refers to this process as the ‘universalization of market rhetoric’, as he discusses its further and

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17 For this study, Neoliberal values are considered to be the current ‘hegemonic’ or ‘mainstream’ discourses. Hegemony was already defined in the Research Scope with Neo-gramscian authors Laclau and Mouffe. It should nonetheless be relevant to recall what Antonio Gramsci originally presented as hegemony: “power based on the consent from intellectual and moral leadership through social structures” (Quintin Hoare, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Lawrence and Wishart, 1978). Hegemony, even in its original conception, generates consent and agreement on a situation, and therefore, avoids questioning or suspends critique.
seamless involvement in social relations. “The conceptual scheme of universal commodification has been naturalized and internalized by modern subjects, and because this instrumental and strategic attitude is a pre-requisite for success in attaining their goals” (Jütten, 2010, p 249, original emphasis). However, systems do not solely transport values, but depend on the systematic repetition of those values to sustain its hegemony. Both positive and negative aspects of the naturalized values are therefore perpetuated. As the capitalism paradox has demonstrated, value tensions that ultimately result in inequality are also internalized. The imposition of global institutional orders, which had been mainly economic, have become systemic in reproducing global inequality (Pogge, 2002) in the social domain.

The coercive nature of this system requires further examination. According to Jeffrey Reiman (2012, p. 748), economic systems are seen by Marx under the same logic of a system built by human actions when he states in Capital “capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things” (Marx, 1967 translation, vol I. p. 766), later describing it as a “coercive relation” based on the idea that “the dull compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist” (Ibid, p. 737). Reiman (2012, p.748) also argues that Kant recognizes property ownership not as a relation of a person to a thing but as a relation of a person to persons (Kant, 1964 translation, p.55). The overlap between economic and social values is discernable at this stage, but how then do social relations imbue coercion? According to Iris Marion Young, “Social structures do not constrain in the form of the direct coercion of some individuals over others; they constrain more indirectly and cumulatively as blocking possibilities” (Young, 2011, p. 55). Young argues that social structures create ‘channels’ that guide and constrain actions of individuals in certain directions (Young, p. 53).

This chapter aims to identify the collective coercion enacted by the – global – social structures designed and implemented to perpetuate structural inequalities. This global structure is formed by what Young describes as ‘channels’ or as I will later refer to them, ‘bottlenecks’, that only allow access to mainstream and mainstream-enabling/facilitating development alternatives, while they exclude alternatives which do not result in immediate utilitarian gains by market rationalizations. The tools used to enact, sustain and narrow-down these bottlenecks are the

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18 Thomas Pogge (2002, p. 199-204) discusses three ways in which this imposition occurs at a global level: through shared institutions, uncompensated exclusion of appropriations (single-base resources as oil), and a background of violent history of colonialism.
pathologies of recognition, in which non-utilitarian merit is systematically excluded from attaining the necessary recognition to be deemed valid, and therefore, implemented. First, however, it is important to explain the formative stage of this coercion.

1.1 Hegemonic Formation: Hegemonic Discursive/Epistemic Model of Intelligibility

The concept of a hegemonic system that shapes social structures (i.e. relations between people) represents the example of the coercive relation shown above. The imposition of hegemonic systems entail a level of compulsion.19 The risks of not complying with this system of indirect coercion can be exemplified through Judith Butler’s gender theory concepts. She argues that after birth, humans are exposed and shaped by a ‘grid of cultural intelligibility’, or a network of norms that define the parameters of what societies consider possible or not (Butler, 2007, p 126). This ‘matrix’ or grid is a hegemonic discursive/epistemic model that determines which ways of life are livable and thinkable within the social domain (Butler 1999, p. 208), while ways of life who do not express “coherence and continuity” with this are marginalized in society, and become outcasts. That means, they stop belonging to the society which upkeeps those parameters, the social domain to which one is born. Repeating these parameters coherently and continuously enough to perpetuate the pattern eventually becomes a ‘naturalized’ survival skill.

Slightly appropriating Butler’s concept of the intelligibility grid, I argue that we can perceive the global economic system as a ‘capitalist matrix’, to which we are all enculturated as part of hegemonic systems of education and pervasive structures of power in development opportunities (i.e. labor and markets to global extent). Rethinking Butler’s grid concept20, there are grounds to claim that there is no recognized development alternative from the Global North or South that is not a product of the ‘capitalist matrix’, the grid of economic intelligibility sustained by the global, coercive, and asymmetrical structures of power. If development alternatives fall beyond this hegemonic grid, they face the risk of losing recognition and become marginalized. It becomes a matter of survival for development narratives to embrace – at least in discourse and to a certain minimum extent – the values that are upheld by the grid of economic

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19 There are sanctions imposed on a social level for those that fail to follow the accepted social patterns. These can be shown in terms of exclusion of social relations, patterned isolation, that end in the deprivation of the necessary mutual recognition that enables self-esteem, self-respect and self-confidence (Honneth, 1992) of the individual.

20 Aret Karademir reappropriated Butler’s philosophy in a similar manner to great success in Butler and Heidegger: On the Relation between Freedom and Marginalization. I owe the innovative idea of reinterpreting Butler for this section as well to Aret Karademir.
intelligibility posed by Neoliberalism (i.e. instrumentality, marketization). That in itself, is the main reproduction capacity of the capitalism paradox as it embeds inevitable inequality into its products, either in mainstream, enculturated narratives, or in the surviving discourses of those alternatives which managed to adapt21.

1.2 Ingrained by Inequality: Development Narratives under Hegemonic Formation

Development narratives are shaped within this tension. They are formed by the terms with which they are designed, but also by those with which they are not, meaning that development can be perceived as growth, but not as de-growth, nor zero-growth. It is compelled and moulded by repeated discourses based on western concepts of linear improvement, comparable measurement22, and most prominently guided by the neoliberal values of utilitarian merit and market rationalization as mentioned before. Thinking about (post)development alternatives requires thinking beyond the paradox, about post-capitalism, in order to allow a new intelligibility grid or a new set of norms that can transition away from the rooted inequalities of the paradox23. However, transition strategies will be analyzed further in future research.

Another example of the repetition of hegemonic values in development narratives is the use of ‘power’ in their general conceptions. Even when referring to highly recognized emancipatory discourses involving freedom or justice, power is infused in their scope (i.e. empowering minorities, strengthening the civil society), as if there was no valid ‘power’ already in place. Or ‘not enough’, ‘not the right kind’, once compared. When the conversation is centered on power, about strengthening and giving the tools to individuals to compete for their self-realizations, everything that falls outside of that scope is ‘counterproductive’.24 It also indirectly

21 Perhaps an interesting follow-up to this logic would imply two outcomes: either choose to perpetuate inequality – for others – or risk marginalization for oneself. This is the binding tension where development is designed and implemented. Ultimately, some would argue that there is little choice to be made, and the results are visible.
22 Comparable measurement plays a very important role in the appropriation of subjective terms such as poverty and richness. Compared to whom, is a never ending endeavor under the increasing inequalities sustained by the paradox.
23 One could argue that the risk of becoming an academic, economic, or professional outcast may be high enough to avert indulging in this thought for too much. Under grids of intelligibility, the risks of subversive narratives is a direct invitation to be misrecognized and get locked under a bottleneck.
24 It is also an invitation to join a ‘game’ that has already been won in the terms it is presented (“develop as we have, through means that benefit us”), or at the very least that is unwinnable for everyone. Not everyone can be as ‘empowered’ in an ever increasing global equality gap.
disjoins the elements of mutual recognition that serve as a basis for cooperation and incentivizes the individualized conception of competition as a desirable objective for all.

There are consequent limits to recognition. The risk of being marginalized from the global economic grid, or recognizing a discourse that does not seek power, is unintelligible for development agents, subjects, and policy-makers to even consider recognizing non-utilitarian alternatives to development narratives. As I will describe later, non-utilitarian alternatives that do receive recognition are at best presented as a case study, well set apart from opportunity to shape the mainstream. Following my argument that the limits to recognition reach only as far as the economic intelligibility grid (i.e. naturalized capitalist matrix) allows, it is necessary to bring the conversation to the definition of pathologies of recognition and the formation of bottlenecks.

1.3 Pathologies of Recognition as Systemic Bottlenecks

Pathologies of recognition occur when a single form of recognition takes places over another (Canivez, 2011, p 883). For example, the quite often assumed ‘subordinated’ form of the ‘Global South’ as a whole, frequently in need of ‘development’. This means that a single account of all the formative elements that constitute a concept is recognized as the most determinant. This is different from ‘essentializing’ the concept, because it does not reduce it to its simplest perceived components, but grants a defining weight of values towards a single set of elements that repeat or are similar to the current hegemonic grid, or matrix. For instance, the instrumentality found in descriptions of human development, or the potential to reify and commodify it (see Chapter IV). According to Patrice Canivez, “particular forms of recognition must complete each other” (Ibid), and would therefore not be sufficient to recognize the Global South as an agent in finding ‘alternative discourses’ only when the Global North looks for them, but as a permanent peer in other instances: in academic discussions, or in political decision-making bodies which could alter theories. Without the possibility to enact change into the mainstream, alternatives will remain marginalized as merely subversive acts.

The systematized pathologies of recognition in global social relations, having naturalized the economic grid of intelligibility and Neoliberal values as mentioned above, subsequently create a pattern of misrecognition. One through which discourses are formed and – if recognized – turned or invited into the mainstream. If they are not recognized as a source of valid claims because they do not repeat the hegemonic values enough, then they face inaccessibility, and
inexistence within the grid. Once the pre-requisite of recognition under hegemonic values is not met, the claim that “recognition-precedes-cognition” takes hold (Jütten, 2010), and incognizance and unintelligibility occur. Alternative discourses become non-narrativisable, and dismissed by a repetition of denial of wholesome recognition.²⁵

The abovementioned pattern, the repetition of pathologies of recognition on a global scale, form what I argue to be structural ‘bottlenecks’. Other authors have referred to this figure through which the collective coercion is enacted as ‘channels’ (Butler, 1997; Young, 2011). Their layered pattern can be found in the social and economic domains that frame our lives. An example of the reach of this pattern is unknowingly portrayed by Manuel Castells as he explains ‘globalization’: “Not everything or everyone is globalized, but the global networks that structure the planet affect everything and everyone”, Castells continues, “This is because all the core economic, communicative, and cultural activities are globalized. That is, they are dependent on strategic nodes connected around the world. These include global financial markets (…)” (Castells, 2008, p. 81). The ‘strategic nodes’ may be analyzed as a parallel concept to the structural bottlenecks presented before. Sooner or later, global social activities and relations depend on going through these bottlenecks. Most development alternatives still depend on initial capital from traditional sources of funding, and are held responsible for reaching thresholds of profit to achieve financial sustainability.

However, economic ‘nodes’ or bottlenecks are not the only concern here. Bottlenecks of merit and behavior are also set in professional development opportunities, albeit usually undisclosed. For example, in May 2015 a UKIP parliamentary candidate was recorded saying this about an uprising political opponent: “His (Jayawardena’s) family have only been here since the Seventies. You are not British enough to be in our parliament (…) I’ve got 400 years of ancestry where I live. He hasn’t got that”²⁶ (section 4, Chapter II provides more examples of social reproduction and exclusion through homosocial recruitment practices). Most importantly, social and cultural bottlenecks, ruled by pathologies of recognition, are determinant in sustaining

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²⁵ Misrepresentation can also play a big role in this if it is useful for the hegemonic system. By highlighting how different a marginalized system is, the ‘otherness’ confers further legitimacy to the hegemonic discourse. We are what they are not. The marginalized are also necessary for the hegemonic identity.

²⁶ Myers Russel transcribed and commented the rest of the remarks in the Mirror (source: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/robert-blay-ukip-suspends-parliamentary-5641537)
inequality by allowing, limiting, or sanctioning the extent to which certain actions, behaviors and discourses take place on a global scale. Castells exemplifies the relevance that these global structures have for this study: “Not everyone is globalized: networks connect and disconnect at the same time. They connect everything that is valuable, or that which could become valuable, according to the values programmed in the networks.” That is, hegemonic values in this case. He later pinpoints, “They bypass and exclude anything or anyone that does not add value to the network and/or disorganizes the efficient processing of the network’s programs.” (Castells, 2008 p. 81). As such, a clearer vision of how practical bottlenecks work is presented.

Bottlenecks formed by pathologies of recognition are not only meant to describe institutional patterns. Pathologies can also be attributed to societies when they are understood as an ‘organic’ interplay of social ‘organs’, a process of interconnected systems serving the end of realizing ultimate values (Honneth, 2014). This organic conception of social structures allows for the thesis that societies can be stricken by diseases (Ibid). Disease-riddance conceptions are not within the scope of this research, but it is certainly welcoming to enable the epistemological identification of inequalities as symptoms of a pathology, a relational disorder, whose root cause is reproduced at a global level as we have seen.

1.4 Theoretical Deductions: The Need to Chart and the Means to Redirect

So far, I have presented different arguments, starting with the reach of global social relations and the formation of systems or structures. Followed by the coerciveness of such structures framed by naturalized Neoliberal values. Later describing the coercive tools through which that asymmetry of power is held by filters or ‘bottlenecks’, and lastly, how these bottlenecks are formed by pathologies of recognition that systematize the exclusion of non-hegemonic discourses. Development narratives are born and shaped within this space of parallel, yet conflicting, actions of systemic exclusion and ‘power-enabling’. As mentioned earlier, the discourses that repeat hegemonic values sufficiently become a part of the mainstream, while alternatives which fail to be coherent with these values are discarded.

These deductions bring us to relevant, if still preliminary, theoretical findings.

- The way global asymmetric structures of power are instrumented by institutional bottlenecks makes any development initiative to end up either facilitating inequality, or facing systemic exclusion up to the point of extinction or impossibility of fulfillment;
• Inequality-embeddedness can be called the main reproductive means, the defense mechanism of the current hegemonic values from Neoliberalism;

• Therefore, there are very few means for current or future policy makers to avoid the ‘capitalist matrix’ of hegemonic education systems or to get the necessarily recognized merit to achieve real change.

The final outcome is that, regardless of where alternative discourses come from, if they are intelligible and recognized, they are directly or indirectly enabling or facilitating inequality. Otherwise, alternatives are academic (i.e. ‘archaeological’) findings in need of ‘intelligible’ meaning by recognized professions (‘archaeologists’ of knowledge). If alternative discourses are not recognizable, non-narratvisable, and unintelligible, they are marginalized and excluded. Mostly used for selective reinforcement of what the hegemony and mainstream is not.

Once we allow the inception of a pathological essence to systemic inequality-embeddedness, new perspectives arise on the conception of hegemonic, neoliberal development. The mainstream depiction of ‘developed’ countries speak of a position beyond the bottleneck of development, while ‘developing’ countries present the aspiration to follow the same path, while being situated well below the bottleneck. A pathological “re-cognizance”, a new recognition of the essence of the mainstream allows us to wonder if, under the aforementioned inequality-perpetuating nature, ‘developed’ would rather mean ‘overdeveloped’ or clearer still, ‘misdeveloped’. In this case, critical questions arise. Would misdeveloped countries require a de-development, while misdeveloping countries require a re-development? Regardless of the prefixes, ‘development’ as it stands, cannot be achieved by everyone, as over 25 years of unequal market-led growth development have shown in the Human Development Report and World Development Reports (Chapter IV). It is designed and sustained by inequality. Rethinking the path requires charting, but also a means of redirecting it.

Going back to Judith Butler’s gender theory can shed some light into this issue, not only for being an indispensable element of Critical Theory, but because we have identified the primary functioning of the bottlenecks through value repetitions, her expertise within the intelligibility grid concept. The counter-reproduction of patterns to discontinue hegemonic repetitions is referred by Butler as ‘subversive repetition’. Subversive in the sense of challenging the hegemonic values with counter-repetitions to set an alternate pattern of intelligibility. A struggle for power
in many senses. Seen within Honneth’s recognition theory, the struggle for recognition of the international development narratives occurs in the binding space of the capitalist paradox, thrusting back and forth as they reposition by the shrinking and distending motion of value repetitions, from the subversive, to the hegemonic. An attachment and detachment of pathologies of recognition.

I will now present a very basic position chart for narratives under these intertwined levels of recognition and power in terms to adherence and repetition of values. The following positioning chart is a theory grid conceived from the aforementioned theoretical arguments.

2. Recognition and Power – Theory Grid

“And finally ‘not want to be governed’ is of course not accepting as true (...) what an authority tells you is true, or at least not accepting it because an authority tells you that it is true, but rather accepting only if one considers valid the reasons for doing so.”


Based on the theoretical deductions and findings, I have charted an initial view of the interrelation between recognition and its pathological counterpart, with the repetition of values (relational patterns) in alignment to either hegemonic or subversive social patterns. Several degrees of alternatives can traverse among discourse positions depending on the repetition of these divergent values. Yet, as described before, plain repetition is often not enough to move vertically among the axis of performativity. Traversing the ‘capitalist matrix’ is limited by bottlenecks, which are tests of worth where ‘legitimate’ value repetition is verified. Grid movement into ‘deeper’ or ‘higher’ orders is determined by how subjects justify their repetitions as valuable for society. The closer it gets to the highest common value horizons the more social consent is rallied behind such actions and practices. Freedom of movement means bypassing the need to prove oneself, suspending the need to present further evidence of worth. This can be achieved by carrying states of value or the ability to justify and switch among them (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 216). This theory grid shows the complexities of societies, and how their members identify and navigate the relational orders. Overall, the chart represents the level of recognition and some details on the type of discursive components of all four subsets, as well as their positions of critique or adherence to the intelligibility grid.

This chart does not directly represent the structural changes that bottlenecks enact on them, which is attempted to be shown in later figures. The actual position of the discourses is not
confined to the four specific subsets, and are subjected to the dynamism of repetitions, as stated before. However, groupings of hegemonic-perpetuating discourses (Group A) and subversive-struggling discourses (Group B), will be discussed below.

**Figure 2 – Theory Grid – ‘Capitalist Matrix’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subversive</th>
<th>Hegemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recognized</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mainstream – Group A</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| *Alternative I – Group B* | - “Trickle-down economics”  
- Utilitarian merit  
- Atomistic identity and individual responsibility |
| - Non-instrumental  
- Non-peer / competitive  
- Archaeology of knowledge |
| Allows for limited discursive meaning only when recognized by others |
| **Misrecognized** | **Alternative II- Group A** |
| *Marginalized - Group B* | - “Trickle-up benefits”  
- Utilitarian merit  
- Commodified emancipation |
| - Non-narrativisable, unexpected  
- Non-scientific  
- Non-imperial language |
| Engenders anxiety for self-consciousness |

- **Mainstream subset**

The mainstream subset presents the least required struggle for recognition as it already holds it. It is a power-holding position. It involves a defense to keep the values and merit that sustains the recognition of those who already have it, and the dismissal, reduction, and distortion of different values and merits. Institutions and structures located near this subset are shaped and maintained to recognize a certain type of value and merit over other, designing and implementing selection filters or bottlenecks in order to designate a single flow of recognition. Exponential inequality takes place and development is based on trickle-down economics.

- **Type II Alternative subset - Developed under what conditions?**

These alternatives struggle for recognition as they are presented outside the immediately recognized hegemonic space. Notwithstanding, it ultimately falls into the extension of the support of production (Spivak, 1999 p. 67), therefore directly or indirectly facilitating or enabling inequality. Local, grass-roots, ‘empowering’, rights-based, bottom-up ideas that, agreeing or disagreeing, have to repeat hegemonic values (i.e. buzzwords) to comply with the systematic bottlenecks and become recognized ‘alternatives’. Presented as ‘modern’ approaches to mainstream discourses, these alternatives invariably are filtered upon their upholding of
neoliberal values. Inequality is facilitated and trickle-down development is supported by trickle-up gains.\footnote{An interesting look into this can be found in Thomas Piketty’s (2013) \textit{Capital in the Twenty-first Century}, and his simple formula $r > g$. The return to capital is bigger than the rate of growth, meaning that despite how the capitalist paradox unfolds (almost inevitably towards the economic requirements), there is always an even bigger return to capital (accumulation of wealth) than actual growth that can be ‘distributed’. In other words, any economic growth will be more beneficial to the investment capital owners than to those producing the growth, and hence, the inequality gap is arguably exacerbated by any further growth.}

**Discussion on Group A Discourses**

Heterogeneously recognized, but vying or ultimately enabling hegemonic repetition, Group A discussions face the two problems presented at the beginning of this research. They are either already shaped by the ‘capitalist matrix’, or are in need of sufficient recognition to bypass the bottlenecks to be enacted. That is probably why it would not be surprising to find ‘grass-roots’ projects, even designed by people disempowered by the society, that advocate for mainstream narratives such as economic growth and empowerment, which facilitate inequality, often in exchange for recognition (and investment) for being ‘developing’. An example comes from Ilan Kapoor’s (2004) analysis of Gayatri Spivak’s work applied in development theories. He recalls Spivak’s assertion that “The by-product of ‘selling access to telecommunications-as-empowerment’ is capitalist penetration by global computing and telecommunications industries” (Spivak 1997, 3; 1999, 419; and 2003, 613).

A distinct level of adherence and enculturation to the capitalist matrix has already occurred (mainstream) or is required (alternative), even by the misrecognition of the source value. As seen before, pathologies of recognition add specific value only to a certain element of the whole, considering it the most important. In this case, the potential to reify and commodify under the marketization logic is the essential outcome. Spivak exemplifies this while talking about some individuals from the Global South that manage to bypass bottlenecks of development: “as ‘well-placed Southern diasporic[s]’ or natives, they help advance corporate multinational globalisation through the patenting of indigenous knowledge and agricultural inputs, microcredit programmes for women, or population control” (Spivak 1999, 310; 2003, 611). This is a struggle to be intelligible, to have practicality under instrumental, utilitarian values. Discussions on what overall development should aspire to be often take place within this space, later reproduced by policies. More examples are shown in Chapter III.
• **Type I Alternative subset - Recognized in which terms?**

Alternative discourses in this subset face a very limited struggle for recognition, but are largely treated as non-feasible (utopian), historical (non-repeatable), or as case-study (unique exception) scenarios. Thus, powerless, except for the utility to distinguish the mainstream as what it is *not*. Lacking the repetition of hegemonic values, these alternatives are non-instrumental, and therefore fall beyond the scope of the economic grid of intelligibility, the capitalist matrix. Consequently, narratives in this subset are not considered to come from peers, because they are not coherent and continuous with the intelligible system of values. The only recognition they receive is granted, or bestowed upon them when a previously recognized researcher, (an ‘archeologist’ of knowledge) translates its values to mainstream discussions. The possibility of these subversive values to be ‘instrumentalized’ in new meaningful forms is the only means of having this type of recognition hold any amount of power.

• **Marginalized subset**

Marginalized discourses face the greatest struggle for recognition, with close to no existing power to position themselves across the grid outside of the pathological appropriation and misrepresentation of recognized individuals or institutions. These narratives are often non-narrativisable under hegemonic values, and may yield unexpected discourses (i.e. silence as discourse) that are often unintelligible for the single flow of recognition towards the mainstream. They do not follow scientific methods or imperial languages from the ‘recognized’ space. It may eventually be dismissed as inexistent, or used to contrast what recognized ‘development’ is *not*. However, subversive repetition takes its most natural form in this unrecognized space, and holds the greatest potential to detach pathologies of recognition by engendering anxiety for self-consciousness.

○ **Examples**

This is a quick, non-integrating list of examples of dismissed behaviors that fail to repeat values to the extent they can be recognized beyond bottlenecks.
- Academic writing that is not based on the recognition of already highly recognized voices to legitimize arguments. The obligatory ‘referencing-precedes-cognition’ in order to receive recognition;28
- Work without a phenomenological perspective, as it excludes a reality / identity form analyzing itself. The unilateral analysis from the recognized hegemony towards the other subsets, in a pathological irreversibility of roles; and
- Research and policies that do not reach a ‘critical distance’ to which the observer or academic can analyze objects or subjects of study in order to gain an elusive ‘objectivity’.

This last dismissal is very strategic for the defense mechanism of hegemonic values. Straying away from an ‘objective’ (i.e. matrix-enculturated) view of judging the ‘other’ immediately disables the possibility of recognition for the research due to the risk of losing sight of the hegemonic intelligibility grid. The researcher faces the threat of being excluded from formal recognition if she/he allows more subversive repetitions to have intelligible value.

**Discussion on Group B Discourses**

Heterogeneously recognized, but invariably subversive, Group B discourses face two challenges as well. Firstly, they are either misappropriated, used to contrast and define the mainstream (but never actually having a possibility to become part of it), or dismissed. Secondly, they still face a completely disjointed system of pathologies of recognition that hinder their applicability. How can alternative metrics be measured? Are institutions and individuals prepared to recognize the results they yield? Will they survive the case-study treatment? Or the endless barrage of misrecognition that may undermine its legitimacy? This is a struggle not to be misrecognized, not to be intelligible under hegemonic values, but to be recognized as equally-valid values and the

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28 There are a limited amount of recognized sources that do not need to depend on “surplus” recognition, for example Alternatives I (Group B).
29 As relevant as the Global North may find it, a development policy from the South to the North would fall under the Group B category and would likely be pathologically misrecognized.
30 International economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) are no exemption of this pattern of ‘behavioral’ exclusion. In October 2016, after almost 15 years of WTO membership had passed, China expected to be granted the status of ‘market economy’ per WTO regulations. The German Economy Minister’s response to that was to warn that complying with the rules was not enough: “If China wants to get the market economy status, then it also has to act accordingly.” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung in an interview, quoted in Reuters see at: [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-china-m-a-idUSKCN12T0FS](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-china-m-a-idUSKCN12T0FS)).
possibility to enact subversive repetition to challenge the hegemony. A war of position in Gramscian terms (Cook, 2008). In order to find how the struggle for recognition among subjects is enacted within the first landscape of hegemonic value-horizons or worlds, I present below the conceptualization of the Power Grid.

2.1 The Power Grid

In sum, the Power Grid is a limited attempt to visually represent an example of how higher principles of order and value horizons are formed. Based on the subsets from the ‘capitalist matrix’ above, the Power Grid proposes the X axis as a measure of **meaning-fixation** (further detailed in Chapter II), and the Y-axis as a measure of **recognition**, recalling that claims for recognition – specifically in creating relations of social esteem for individual practices – are conditioned to previous acknowledgement of those claims as valid by others. Movement through the X axis is based on **performativity** between hegemonic and subversive values as seen before, while movement through the Y axis is attained by the **justification** behind the claims for recognition. The subsets allow for the following principle of order in intersubjective relations.

**Figure 3 – The Power Grid, first stage of an order of worth and recognition**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subversive</th>
<th>Hegemonic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recognition</strong></td>
<td>Unsanctioned deviancy</td>
<td>Justifiable performativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerable subversion</td>
<td>Unchallenged agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Recognized meaning-fixation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Misrecognition</strong></td>
<td>Unintelligible noise / silence</td>
<td>Illogical resemblance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contingent inconsistencies</td>
<td>Complicit hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Concealed as irrelevant, psychotic, mad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To avoid representing the Power Grid as a structured, defined composition of subsets, it is important to reinstate that each subset can be influenced by surplus repetition and
acknowledgement, in such a manner that sub-subsets are constantly created. Sociocultural formations are dynamic and move outside of rigid structures, so a continuous division within a system of constant creation and recreation of difference (more details in Chapter II) must include this.

*Figure 4 – The Power Grid – Systems of Difference*

Figure 4 is an attempt to represent how higher orders are formed within the subsets. Built on top of a power subset, excess worth is retransformed from surplus value to higher orders of worth. The attainment of either / both: *justifiable performativity* and / or *recognized meaning-fixation*, have therefore bypassed previous bottlenecks (tests of worth) and lead to the entryway to higher principles of order until reaching the highest principle that society holds as the value horizon towards which all actions, behaviors and values should strive for. The levels of compliance to bypass the bottlenecks in sociocultural formations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II. In sum, once the subject passes through the bottleneck, or test of worth, it aligns with a new discursive world, a new order of worth that comes to settle as a new convention.

To wit, the Power Grid attempts to be a graphical representation of intersubjective relational orders, and the way performativity (value repetition) and discourse (justification) align to construct sociocultural formations. The Power Grid then deals with social reality. I would
argue that previous orders of almost completely misrecognized and subversive orders concern natural ‘reality’. Whereas the power grid deals with contingency, nature has non-conceptual behaviour (i.e. infinite randomness; Deranty 2012, 47). Social reality re-appropriates the natural reality by making observations and experimental procedures to ‘filter the noise’ (fourth subset) of nature’s randomness (Deranty 2012, 48) to extract conceptual structures. I would add that, more than just filtering noise (expressible, noticeable), there is a lot of translation and most importantly interpretation of silences (unknown, assumptions, theories). Although the order of nature is not addressed here, the interpretation of ‘social data’ taken from it is reviewed in Chapter III.

The following Chapter deals with how these constitutive elements of power affect the formation of practical identities / subjectivities (Foucault, 1983; 1994 and Butler, 1997). It signals the impact in social formation based on this view of discourse as hegemonic practice. Subjects who are power-imbued, with hegemonic identities that are formed from a higher principle of order as starting point. The following Chapter continues the theoretical development of the Power Grid, and how intersubjective relational disorders (patterns of exclusion and inequality) become fixed as ‘natural’ situations. Chapter III explores this practice in global development, and Chapter IV analyzes how Human Development Reports address it.
CHAPTER II

Subject-position as Hegemonic Formation
or “The Power Greed”

1. Conceptual Tools to Bridge Theory and Method

Before addressing the extent by which the Power Grid influences subject-formations, I will make use of a few conceptual tools that can clarify the following discussion.

- Articulation, Nodal Points, and Systems of Differences

Articulation is defined as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice is discourse” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 91). In other words, the practice of articulation grants meaning to (possibly previously unrelated) elements, resulting in discourse. Barnard-Wills (2012) similarly describes elements as “differences not currently articulated in a discourse” (Barnard-Wills, 2012, 71). Once arranged in a discourse, elements with no particular relation to each other can be rearranged so that their differential relations from other elements can become clearer (i.e. defined by what they are not). This is one of the main conceptual pillars: as these differences become more firmly set, their meaning starts becoming fixated. Turning unrelated elements to a common sign in language (i.e. discourse), articulation “is a fixation / dislocation of a system of differences” (Laclau & Mouffe, 94).

Not all discourses are equally effective in establishing differences (i.e. fixing meaning). In establishing articulation, there are Nodal Points, which are privileged discursive points with partial fixation (Ibid, 99). Similarly, Lacan refers to nodal points as points de capiton in psychoanalysis, or as “privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying chain.” (Ibid). As seen in the Power Grid chart (Chapter I), there are discourses that do not establish fixation and are therefore in the periphery, excluded from the mainstream. For instance, discourses that are incapable of cementing that fixity of meaning are usually described as the discourse of the...
psychotic (Ibid). As part of the object of study, grasping how heavily cemented meaning fixation can occur even with partial fixations is essential.

Laclau presents the relevance behind the focus on deconstructing discourse: “a discursive structure is not a merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘contemplative’ entity; it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations. (Ibid, 82, added emphasis). The practice of articulation is the construction of nodal points that partially fixate meaning. Social practices are articulatory in this sense. For example, even this research thesis is an articulation of social research elements that may not necessarily share any pre-given relationship, as Glynos and Howarth argue (2007).

Argumentations, discourses, research, ideologies are articulations. They require building nodal points, or privileged points, to fixate meaning – and differences – more decisively. This does not mean that all attempts of fixation of differences goes uncontested. Meaning is political, Barnard-Wills describes, given that “any articulation involves the exercise of power, and the repression of alternative articulations.” (Barnard-Wills, 2012, 72).

- **Hegemony and signifiers in power relations**

The hegemonic struggle is considered by Laclau and Mouffe to be a political struggle over discourses that can be articulated to both structure and dominate a field of meaning (Barnard-Wills, 71). This is done by creating fixations of “identities and meanings in a particular way to the exclusion of other potential formations” (Ibid). Žižek, Barnard-Wills argues, also explains it as the ‘mechanism of ideological cement’, binding social bodies together. This post-structural approach was built upon the original Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony as the reproduction of power structures by leadership which creates consent among classes. Laclau and Mouffe go beyond structural elements such as pre-given classes, and argue that this domination of meaning (former Gramscian ‘consent’) is done within discourse (hegemonic practices), with actual results in changing the materiality around it (e.g. hegemonic formations).

Linguistically, signifiers and signifieds were traditionally thought to be fixed to each other, but Derrida’s deconstructionist approach (1978) presents signifiers as referring, fixating – and creating - their signifieds. There are signifiers which enable hegemonic practices try to take

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31 Deconstruction is defined by Laclau and Mouffe as “displacing some of the conditions of possibility of the categories of an ideology and developing new possibilities which transcend anything which could be characterized as the application of a category” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2000, preface ix)
hold within this deconstructionist finding. Empty, or floating signifiers are “signifiers over which no discourse has hegemony and for that reason are the subject of political struggle” (Barnard-Wills, 2012, 71), they resemble a definite signified, but are too broad to completely grasp. Governance, itself an articulated concept, includes political struggles for the dominance of meaning of floating signifiers such as emancipation, freedom, or justice, among other concepts. Hegemony is dominance over contestation (in order to define what is ‘universal’). It does not mean that dominance is complete. Foucault reminds us that “as soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance” (1989). Understanding the practice of contestation is addressed by the methodology of Economies of Worth.

These are the concepts with which I articulate this chapter, and through which I arrange the following inquiry: inasmuch as hegemonic practices (discourse of neoliberal capitalism) reach global dimensions, hegemonic formations (subjectivity and identity formation) must be reassessed accordingly in order to understand its articulations, nodal points, differentiations, use of signifiers, struggles over fixation, and contestations.

2. Deconstructing Subjectification

“Rereading theories in light of contemporary problems necessarily involves deconstructing the central categories of that theory” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001 preface).

2.1 Global Hegemonic Discourse

Following my aforementioned inquiry, the contemporary problem in which this can be evaluated is the global reach of neoliberal capitalism, arguably perceived in concepts or processes such as globalization, and the dominant texts of development policies (e.g. UNDP Human Development Report). I do not intend to evaluate or assert the complex relation between neoliberalism and globalization, and therefore, I do not analyze globalization per se but only the discursive articulation that enables such a concept as ‘globalization’ to have meaning at all, even if it is series of partial fixations. Deconstructing categories of what was understood to be ‘subjectification’ under the hegemonic articulation of ‘globalization’, can allow a clearer perspective on the constitutive elements of power involved in current subject formation.

I argue in the following sections that subjectivity is constituted as the hegemonic formation of the hegemonic practice of neoliberal discourse, enacted through a domination of
meanings and differentiations / antagonisms (the Power Grid) with a global reach. This is a partial fixation coming from articulatory constructions, such as the concept of ‘globalization’, as a nodal point (i.e. a privileged position for discursive reach and fixation). Elements articulated under ‘globalization’ are floating signifiers, which have sedimented to conceal their political dimension, and any subjectification occurring under it is formed and sustained by the same empty signifiers. Due to this, identity formation is dependent on an already clouded – but ungrounded - power-embeddedness. Subjectification in higher orders requires systematic exclusion of ‘powerlessness’ (i.e. material exclusion and meaning abandonment of other vulnerable, subversive or misrecognized subject-positions) to maintain its partial fixation on floating signifiers.

2.2 Identity Formation and Hegemonic Subjectivity

As Barnard-Wills explains from a model of identity in discourse theory, “the starting point is the assumption that identities (like all social objects) are discursively constituted, and are thus subject to articulations, antagonisms and hegemony.” (Barnard-Wills, 75). Identity formation occurs within the contestation of discourses. It is equally impacted by the gravitational pull of hegemonic discourses, and as such, it lacks an essential character. As such, it dismisses essentialist accounts of identity formation as a pre-conditioned, pre-given subject. Breaking away from Structuralism, Laclau and Mouffe present identity as undetermined by original categories nor objective logic. This includes pre-assumptions about rational behaviour in neoliberal discourses. On the contrary, “identities are given meaning through their positioning vis-à-vis other identities” (Ibid), meaning that rationality is recognized (or misrecognized) depending on discourse-positions. While subjects still retain agency through political subjectivity, subject positions only account for their location within ‘discursive orders’, such as the Power-Grid I proposed in Chapter I. Butler, Laclau and Žižek are also against the presuppositions that the political field is constituted by rational actors (Butler et al., 2001, 3).

Power relations are discursive (Fairclough and Wodak; 1997), and when the formation of subjects and their identities are also discursively constituted, the discussion on power relations become part of the discourse that constitutes societies and cultures (Ibid). Foucault saw subjectivity within similar lines, describing that it is within these same power relations that “certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be constituted as
individuals” (Foucault, 1980, 98). Hegemony therefore comes into the analysis of subject formation, as the struggle for domination on meaning, and therefore, the articulation of identities.

Laclau and Mouffe present the idea of ‘hegemonic subjectivity’ as the “relation between universalism and particularism. Based on a hegemonic link which is constitutively political, it results from the specific dialectic between logics of difference and logics of equivalence” (Laclau and Mouffe, xiii preface). This analysis is political as it attempts to ‘reactivate’, or reveal the sedimented structures of power and their fixed systems of differences. It is within the previous logics of difference and equivalence that individuals draw elements to constitute their subject-positions. Since these logics are dialectical, it means that whenever there is an equivalence built, a difference immediately arises with other discourses. The particularity of subjects is linked to their orders of equivalence and difference to the ‘universal’. “This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is what we call a hegemonic relation” (Ibid, added emphasis). The hegemonic subject therefore depends on systems of difference in social practices to be defined. In other words, according to both author’s interpretation of Hegel, “identity is never positive and closed in itself, but is constituted as transition, relation, difference.” (Ibid, 81), they refer to these relations as articulations, or a “negotiation among mutually contradictory discursive surfaces” (Ibid, 79. See Figure 4 and 5). An identity is formed by the negotiating adherence to opposing discourses. Hegemonic subjects exclude that which is not hegemonic, and orders of society are formed through identities of abandonment of subversive meaning and subversive performativity. As Laclau clarifies: “Every ‘society’ constitutes its own forms of rationality and intelligibility by dividing itself; that is, by expelling outside itself any surplus of meaning subverting it” (Ibid, 123).

It appears pertinent to include a consideration of the Power Grid at this point. Given the constitution of society and its matrices of intelligibility through divisions, as seen in Figure 4, another graphical representation of this division is advantageous. It is not sufficient, as Figure 4 shows, to present that higher principles of order can be formed as inner levels of social order, but it seems important to show the dislodgement of each order. As Laclau implies, this division needs to expel and therefore limit access to the new orders. A clearer representation of bottlenecks, or tests of worth, can be appreciated in Figure 5 below, where a new perspective shows the distance between orders and allow a clearer appreciation of the gap that represents movement within the Power Grid.
Hegemonic subjects are formed within higher orders, already exclusive of surplus subversivity and competing meaning-fixation from other subsets. Hegemonic subjects are formed under these new orders of previously justified performativity, and the elements of power that constitute them are recognized beyond critique. Hegemonic relations are ingrained in these new identities, and relational disorders are a more ‘natural’ situation.

When hegemonic practices reach global projections, when rationality and intelligibility attempt to have a global fixation of meaning, when identities are formed within asymmetries of power in relational disorders, then global intersubjective relations are constituted by exclusion, and embedded with inequality. In sum, under this social order, intersubjective relations seek to form themselves by dividing themselves, adhering to the hegemonic and expelling the subversive. Shaping behaviors are a prime field for reformation of logics.

2.3 Example of ‘Globalization’ as a Nodal Point

“Economic globalization constitutes social actors in reference to their position in the global economy which shapes their interests and even identities.” (Risse 2007).

As with other discourses, current hegemonic practices conceal their relations of power by articulating elements through apparently ‘neutral’ nodal points. For example, democracy is often presented as a “simple competition among interests taking place in a neutral terrain” (Laclau & Mouffe, xvi preface), devoid of asymmetries, and therefore described as the ‘universal’ meaning
of a level field for equal participation. Any political alternative to democracy is subsequently presented as non-neutral, antagonistically biased, unequal and inconsistent/dangerous. The same occurs within the economic sphere. There is a “lack in discourse of any reference to a possible alternative to the present economic order, which is taken as the only feasible one” (Ibid). Laclau and Mouffe refer in their 2001 preface to their 1985 book to Margaret Thatcher’s TINA or ‘There Is No Alternative’ politics as a historical example. In their example, what is necessary for a discourse to determine the ‘universal’, is the use of strategically ‘neutral’ nodal points to connect floating or empty signifiers, thus resulting in a meaning-fixation of such intensity and sedimenting capacity that no alternative is justifiably possible. Any option to reactivate the categories involved in that hegemonic formation are also completely excluded from recognized discourse, presented as though they bore no intelligible meaning (i.e. the description of those voices range from being ‘ignorant’ to ‘psychotic’. See the Power Grid’s marginal subset).

“The usual justification for the ‘no alternative dogma’ is globalization”, both authors explain, “a world where global markets would not permit any deviation from neo-liberal orthodoxy” (Ibid, xvi, preface). Taking global markets and other elements, such as technological advancement, under a seemingly neutral nodal point, the neoliberal discourse detaches itself from the political and enters the essential. It diffuses meaning to a partial fixation of empty signifiers. Both authors describe this process clearly in the following description of the historical ‘TINA-but-globalization’ discourse:

“This argument takes for granted the ideological terrain which has been created as a result of years of neo-liberal hegemony, and transforms what is a conjunctural state of affairs into a historical necessity. Presented as driven exclusively by the information revolution, the forces of globalization are detached from their political dimensions and appear as a fate to which we all have to submit. So we are told that there are no more left-wing or right-wing economic policies, only good and bad ones! (Ibid xvi)

‘Globalization’, as a nodal point of hegemonic practices, allows for the false logic assumption that it has undeniable points, which are decisively based on previously floating signifiers now...

32 Of course, this discursive tactic merely externalizes responsibility to the individuals in case there is not enough participation. Individuals are ‘lazy’ or filled with ‘apathy’, because the terrain is conceived as essentially neutral and open. Many theorists have discussed ‘parity of participation’ as the only obstacle to overcome to enter to the neutral area of democracy, such as Habermas, and to a limited extent, Fraser, although she has recapitulated.

33 Refer to Robinson (2007, 127) as he argues that some of the unequivocal points of globalization include: 1) a fast-paced social change; 2) increased connectivity among people (as an ‘objective’ stance), along with more awareness of it (as a ‘subjective’ stance); and 3) a multidimensional scope.
sedimented as fixed meanings. Building on top of existing hegemony is not only a required self-perpetuation strategy, but allows for even easier sustenance of systems of difference by dislocating itself even farther away. When ‘globalization’ is recognized as an existent concept and is used in discourses, uncontested power dichotomies are already intrinsically embedded in any consequent hegemonic subjectification. You are either with, or against that nodal point. You may be aware of it in different levels, or agree or disagree, but it is already fixed. Laclau and Mouffe then reinforce the importance of the inclusion of hegemony in analyzing this situation:

To think in terms of hegemonic relations is to break with such fallacies. Indeed, scrutinizing the so-called ‘globalized world’ through the category of hegemony (...) can help us to understand that the present conjuncture, far from being the only natural or possible societal order, is the expression of a certain configuration of power relations. It is the result of hegemonic moves on the part of specific social forces which have been able to implement a profound transformation in the relations between capitalist corporations and the nation-states” (Ibid xvi, xvii)

Cammack (2017) further evidences this profound transformation in the approach taken by the UNDP Human Development Reports. Aligning with the political economy of ‘adjustment’ that the World Bank or OECD have championed, the UNDP sought: “not to enlarge choice but to reform it – to change individual attitudes and behaviour by shaping risks and incentives to the logic of global competitiveness and thereby to promote the continuous development of the social relations of capitalist production on a global scale” (Cammack 2017, 4). Floating signifiers such as ‘resilience’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘choice’ have been appropriated by a distinct set of hegemonic relations (neoliberal capitalism), and have thus deeply transformed into an ideology (ibid). Chapter III presents more examples of logic twisting in global development.

Notwithstanding, hegemony can be challenged. Subject-positions formed under the fallacy of ‘globalization’ and other nodal points can have political subjectivity, agency, to reactivate the sedimented categories of this long-perpetuated hegemonic practice. It can be pursued by understanding that nodal points carry their own excluding practices in their attempt to reach the incommensurable totality. They are never truly total, as they inherently require to differentiate itself in each order / dislocation to continue its abandoning fixation. In other words, each ‘undeniable point of globalization’ carries its own deniability, which now stay as unarticulated elements themselves. These can be articulated under nodal points themselves to create a counter-hegemony and reactivate a political struggle for the domination of strategic
global meanings. However, it should be noted that counter-hegemonic practices may also include a redirection of hegemony in different orders of worth.

How would a complex landscape of divergent value-horizons look like? The Economies of Worth methodology presents a plausible scenario in which ‘counter-hegemonies’ (worlds) compete for control over floating signifiers to dominate meaning-fixation, but an accompanying graphical representation of such a landscape could be useful for this endeavor. In what follows, the Power Grid visually allows the formation of competing worlds trying to dominate the fixation of meaning in evaluating and interpreting situations through their respective orders of worth.

Figure 6 – The Power Grid – A Complex Landscape of Struggles over Meaning-Fixation

As seen above, divergent worlds or sociocultural formations within different subsets of the Power Grid develop their own value-horizons by dividing and expelling sub-subsets. Each order is an articulation of a higher principle that may share logics of equivalence with other worlds, but are ultimately based on diverging logics of difference. Alternative subject formations occur as well within these competing discursive practices, and can result in the formation of identities that can be perceived and interpreted by hegemonic subjects as direct affronts to their constitution.

3. Subversive Subjectification

Hegemonic subjectification is a formation of a hegemonic practice, in this case neoliberalism, through nodal points of meaning fixation such as ‘globalization’ (‘development’ as a nodal point

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34 If signaling out the systems of difference through subversive discourse is a first step towards contesting hegemony, then Postcolonial critique has already taken a decisive foothold in doing so in development studies.
is reviewed in Chapter III and IV). A subversive subjectification can, therefore, also occur as an alternative formation. Subversive subjects can be constituted from alternative meaning articulations, through alternative nodal points for reappropriating signifiers. This could be potentially done by the political articulation of deconstructionist practices. This could mean that hegemonic subjects would need to deconstruct elements of their own constituted identity to begin this reactivation. Subsequently, the biggest risk entailed in subversively misaligning with their own discursive-position is being systematically expelled by it, abandoned by their own hegemonic society. However, it comes as no surprise that this is already an existing condition for global minorities and subalterns, those in the subversive, misrecognized periphery.

Either the detachment of power from hegemonic subject-positions, or the articulation of subversive subject-positions, can face strong rejection, but fixation can take hold if the necessary political nodal points and systems of difference are organized. For instance, Laclau and Mouffe referred to the creation of a ‘radical democracy’ by having a leftist hegemony renew the diversity of political alternatives from the currently sequestered debate by right and ultra-right discourses (Ibid). Nonetheless, subversive subjectification is already occurring, with or without political articulations. Here are just a couple of examples of conceptualizations on subversive subjectivity.

- Rosi Braidotti’s *Nomadic Subject*. This is an example of a subject that has already undergone a systematic banishment and is already abandoned by hegemonic societies. According to Braidotti, a nomadic subject “has relinquished all idea, desire, or nostalgia for fixity. This figuration expresses the desire for an identity made of transitions, successive shifts, and coordinated changes, without and against an essential unity.” (Briadotti, 1994, 22). In other terms, Braidotti’s nomadism foregoes its classical socio-geographical nomenclature for a new cartographical approach to transversal, liquid performativity. One that escapes hegemonic meaning-fixation, but is apparently unable or unwilling to rearticulate its position in any counter-essentialism or unity. An unpolitical, permanent partiality.

- Bhabha’s *Radical Performativity* and Kapoor’s *Strategic Vigilance*. Arguably, a ‘Postcolonial Subject’\(^\text{35}\). Kapoor defines strategic vigilance as the understanding that: “where there is

\(^{35}\) While not precisely coined by the authors as such, this subject would indeed require the addition of Said’s and Spivak’s contributions, such as the inclusion of a ‘hyper self-reflexivity’ as a core element.
fullness and triumphalism, there is simultaneous lack and inadequacy; where constraint, possible diversion; and where taken-for-grantedness, plausible contestation” (Kapoor, 2008, 146). Kapoor proposes an advancement to the spontaneous and immediate subject formed through Bhabha’s radical performativity, into a strategic position. Kapoor points to the possibility of subjects with a ‘tactical predisposition’ to identify and contest the operations of power and turn them into political change to expose, divert, or split that same power (ibid).

In any case, a deconstructing subject might look for, or is already in the voluntary or involuntary process of, detaching its identity from power, from hegemonic discourse-positions, from (mis)recognitions.

It is also relevant to note that what is at stake for hegemonic subjects is the possibility to build resilient identities. Constituted within the interplay between positionings of power and vulnerability, resiliency is systematically avoided by the hegemonic subject’s rejection or misappropriation of powerlessness. Dependency on power-retention and vulnerability-diffusing prevents mutual social recognition, and undermines not only the formative elements of agency for the subaltern, but for the hegemonic subject as well, turning an inter-subjective relation of peers to a relational disorder, a social pathology. Further analyzed in Chapter III (section 3), this relational imbalance is not only relevant for understating social practices that articulate inequality, but it is also important to mention its effects in subject-formations. In this respect, it seems consequential that hegemonic subjects deprive themselves of building an (often emotional and social) capacity to withstand experiential shocks caused non-concealable contradictions or surplus subversivity. They therefore limit the opportunity to renew their subject-positioning by accepting the independence of the subaltern other, and their own dependence on others, twisting all relations to pathological, one-sided interactions without the possibility of mutual recognition. In turn, they reinforce hegemonic performativity through the adoption of surplus rejection – denouncing subversive identities – as the only meaningful possibility to retain their own identity. For them, a political articulation by subversive subjects will appear as the very own constitution of risk (vulnerability), a direct and daring affront to conventions (systems of difference), and an unjustifiable struggle for recognition.
As described earlier, a typical pattern of behavior – as repeated by persons in a society – is maintained through negative sanctions for deviant performance (Zurn, 2012, 68). Then what is the hegemonic response to ‘illegitimate’ claims? Moreover, how does this look in everyday social practices?

3.1 Case of Current Hegemonic Practices and Formations

“It is known how, in the colonial countries, the equivalence between ‘rights of Man’ and ‘European values’ was a frequent and effective form of discursively constructing the acceptability of imperialist domination.”

- Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 102

This is a brief example of current events that have allowed identities of abandonment to seek for strength in its own excluding constitution. Hegemonic practices continue to sediment and fix meaning to empty signifiers often referred to as ‘banal nationalism’, as it can be seen concerning the recent debates over border controls and restrictions on freedom of movement in Europe. Slavoj Žižek has lately argued that if the current identity problem in the EU is not resolved in light of the so-called migrant ‘crisis’ then “one should seriously consider that we are approaching a new era of apartheid in which secluded, resource-abundant parts of the world will be separated from the starved-and-permanently-at-war parts” (Žižek, 2015).

He continues to argue that until the 2015 protests from Greece to Spain, “the only ideology able to mobilize people has been the anti-immigrant defense of Europe” (Ibid). This is how hegemonic subjectification acts in a political level. Exclusion is generalized and repeated to the extent it becomes hegemony and it means identity. If we do not understand how subjects and identities are formed through discursive positions embedded in power, we will miss the subjacent, rooted political dimensions of exclusion. The identities of abandonment can only disregard, misrecognize, and perceive the other as subversive to their own existence. In this example, Žižek sheds light on the paradox that the democratic openness of Europe is based on exclusion. Democracy, development, globalization, freedom, (“insert nodal point here), exist on

36 In this article, Žižek positions himself in the tradition of ‘Western Marxism’, calling for an alternative leftist review of the European identity. It is against a classical left, or orthodox Marxist positions, and could be even perceived as apologetic for far-right constructions, even though he continues being critic of liberal politics. Although I do not share his apologetic political point of view, his arguments are very illustrating for this paper.

37 Little is considered about the role of the slave in the self-recognition of the master as master.
their ability to leave behind less articulated discourses, and by such, increase vulnerability and marginalization for others by escaping from it, while never reaching complete power either. As described earlier, this self-defeating practice hampers mutual social recognition. Doing nothing will allow further equivalences and differentiations to construct acceptability of domination and denunciation for ‘unmerited’ recognition.

4. Recognition, Positioning and Testing Hegemonic Performativity

What does hegemonic subjectivity add to the recognition-theoretical understanding of relations among subjects? And how does it help in informing the methodology used to elucidate this? The place for an identity-building understanding of power becomes clear once observable patterns of exclusion in social relations begin to rise. As an example of this, Holgersson (2013) and Brink (2009) refer to ‘homophily’, the patterns where people who are socially similar are more likely to have relationships with each other, and therefore, less with ‘others’. Social network and managerial network studies in job recruitment practices have reproduced these observations, and found that men’s social networks are more homophilous than women’s (Ibarra 1992, quoted in Holgersson 2013). Other studies into ‘homosociality’ or ‘ethnosociality’ show similar hiring processes (see Knocke 2003) in which individuals prefer the selection of other individuals that are similar to them in terms of gender, age, class, ethnicity, etc. This pattern slowly sediments to become a belief that anyone who complies or conforms with any set of specific social criteria deserve certain professional positions.

This leads to a further question, that somewhat already clarifies the link with Recognition Theory: with whom are hegemonic subjects more likely to have relationships with, and be willing to support (fund / hire / accept, etc.)? This question backs up the recognition-theoretical view of pathologies of (mis)recognition as relational disorders among subjects. Could there be such a thing as hegemosociality? An unreflexive practice that actively favors relations with similarly hegemonic subjects, and informally excludes non-hegemonic subjects38. If so, how is this

38 I leave clearly reflexive practices out of this analysis, since they are closer to corruption or illegal behavior. This usually occurs in private agreements instead of the observable situations analyzed by the Economies of Worth. A current example of this kind of intentional practice is the now infamous leaked mail from Democrat adviser Ron Klain to the chairman of the Democrat presidential campaign John Podesta in 2015, where he asks for help in securing his daughter a position in presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s team: “I’m not asking anyone to make a job, or put her in some place where she isn’t wanted.” Klain continues, “it just needs a nudge over the finish line” (email visible at: https://www.wikileaks.com/podesta-emails/emailid/19722). The position was given to her a month after the email.
unreflexive relation between subjects – that particularly allows inequality to thrive – sustained? Finding evidence of these patterns in the labor market and job recruitment is growing as mentioned earlier, but what shape would this pattern have if it had a global reach, and how would it be implemented? To address the implementation question first, a special focus in global development practice is required.

In development practice, international funding bodies, whether public or private, run the risk of perpetuating the unreflexive active preferences in the privilege of selecting and funding new global, regional or local projects and teams. Following the patterns outlined above, selected project teams can also be at risk of contributing, repeating, or confirming in some way the conventions of mainstream development projects. The project results, reporting and monitoring practices can also risk mimicking the expectations of the funding agencies to continue benefiting from their preferred funding. Most importantly though, is the common goal of ‘empowering’ developing subjects by providing capacity building, training, and education to develop capabilities and employ them in the labor market as an emancipatory objective.

Development pursues policies and practices that purportedly close gaps (economic, gender, class, etc.) but ultimately opens the door for demanding acceptance and conformity to a specific set of relations (neoliberal market competition). Chapter I already described the risk of sanctions in failing to adhere to a ‘capitalist matrix’. Compliance to market-driven growth is essentially the hidden outcome of development’s so-called emancipation goal. It is the ‘freedom’ to enter a pre-approved, pre-selected, competition arena (i.e. another market). In the apparently liberating empowerment of the newly ‘emancipated’ workforce, they are prescribed to become a part of the (global) labor market and flow through bottlenecks where they will be tested under the same worth of market competition. If they fail to comply and prove their worth, the process of exclusion (e.g. informal economy, unemployment) is seemingly justified by the competing market logic. If they succeed the test of worth, they have entered the (often complicit) work market periphery that not only supports the hegemonic neoliberalism of the core, but is also the place to which intolerable instability – work conditions - and relational disorders are displaced.

An evidence of this is offered by Honneth’s normative reconstruction of the liberalizing economic policies in the 1990’s (2014, 248). As the labor market was differentiated into a core and a periphery, Honneth describes, workers in the periphery suffered from lower salaries, job
instability, and reduced benefits; the unstable entry point mentioned above. However, in contrast to previous historical examples of similar situations, starting from the 1990’s there was an absence of a collective political response to these worsening conditions, explained by Honneth as “a massive individualization of responsibility with regard to people’s career biographies and occupational destinies” (ibid), which turned the focus towards bad individual choices as apology for maintaining the status quo (Culp & Soroko, 2015). Worse working conditions are then articulated as either 1) justified due to individual mistakes, or as 2) a temporary obstacle to overcome by individual professional growth, both of which avoid questioning the prevalence of worsening work conditions at all. The imaginary of a linear progression in professional development turns the attention from the bottleneck (i.e. test of worth) to the promised result of stepping from the periphery to the core. The 2015 Human Development Report from the UNDP “Work for Human Development” is an example of this change in discourse. Instead of focusing on the creation of more jobs, the report articulates work as a broader concept that encapsulates the ‘richness of human lives’ and rethinks decent and quality work for all39.

The promise of eventually working one’s way out of a bottleneck of development is often enough for the workforce to continue building the competence and merit that will one day be acknowledged. Little is said, however, about the reproduction of these tests of worth beyond entry or mid-level jobs. As mentioned before, even top managerial labor selection is affected according to specific social criteria (see Kanter, 1977). Within the market logic, self-fulfilling prophecies like this abound (Holgersson 2013)40.

4.1 Stabilizing Unreflexive Practices Through Justification

Actively inviting and training people to participate in pre-conditioned labor practices that allow for inequality would be swiftly identified and challenged. So, what allows this unreflexive practice to continue? Addressing this second question, the proposed methodology of Economies of Worth (detailed in the Research Scope and Chapter IV) sheds light in this. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s methodology identifies the way individuals and institutions justify their

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39 Goal 8 of the Sustainable Development Goals also calls for sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth (promise of the future), based on full and productive employment, and decent work for all (transition to the core).
40 A whole range of critique against the idea of ‘meritocracy’ certainly arises. More specifically, it arises once the discursively justified process of competition by merit is dissolved into the realization that what ‘merit’ means is already informally favoring a set of criteria and qualities. Arguably, this could be the dialectic of meritocracy.
UNROOTING INEQUALITY FROM DEVELOPMENT

actions by appealing to principles that are embedded in social interactions. Rooted in historical patterns, these principles of order have developed *worlds* in which specific orderings of subjects and objects have an unquestioned authority (industrial, domestic, civic, inspirational, fame, and market worlds). Within the specific discursive logic of these worlds, critique is suspended, and patterns of exclusionary order are entirely justified. It is only through the challenge from different worlds that critique comes forward, as the validity of the worth of one world is questioned under principles of another.

Based on the methodological scope of the Economies of Worth, any situation appears to be stable and is agreed upon as long as there is no questioning to the world of order that is summoned to justify it. In this case, even unstable situations - such as systemic patterns of exclusion - can appear to hold together by veiling its inconsistencies to such a degree where there are no challenges to it. What that veiling of critique often consist of is the layered displacement of inequality to other subjects with less or misrecognized ‘voice’ (subject-position). That means that instability is not displaced in its entirety, but diffused by layered (gender, class, age, ethnicity, size, etc.) orders that appear to accommodate within more tolerable thresholds.

For instance, the presence of inequality that is intolerable in a market world (e.g. recruitment policies that would *explicitly* discriminate one gender over the other) is inconspicuously displaced to the domestic world where hierarchical orders would not seem out of place (e.g. a competitive bread-winner almost unilaterally supported by a highly-tolerant family / or “a traditional heterosexual male breadwinner lifestyle” Holgersson 2013). All of this is sustained by an apparently innocent job application criteria (e.g. a ‘highly-committed person with a large capacity to deal with stress and tight deadlines’). Seen outside of this contingency, it may appear as if each agent is acting per their principles of order. The company is trying to hire the best of the best in a competitively demanding marketplace (market world), while a family is supporting its hierarchical structure to achieve better life conditions and status (domestic world), and not only that, but even a larger, almost-scientific optimization of self-pursuant beings and consecution of historical linear progress or improvement is ‘being achieved’ by this (industrial
world). It is through this blurred and oblique process of layering exclusion that inequality is effectively displaced, sustained, and most importantly, justified.

A situation of inequality then stands, holding together despite its instability because it reached the minimum suspension of questioning needed to accept it. Not a single line of questioning will collapse this hegemonic situation because it holds on self-supporting, conveniently layered, and flexibly contingent justifications. The seemingly impervious logic of neoliberal inequality and its risk of perpetuating relational disorders (homosociality, ethnosophy, and arguably, ‘hegemosociality’) evades just enough, and once more, its critique.

How would this situation look if taken to a global level? Are hegemonic practices and formations analyzed in global development studies?

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41 It should be noted that a domestic world also exists in the recruitment process in the form of hierarchical trust between senior and younger workers.
CHAPTER III

Inequality as Hegemonic Performativity

“(D)evelopment is not only a socioeconomic construction, but also an ideological construction intent on effacing its various internal traumas and contradictions – the way in which development is “naturally” equated with neoliberal growth and liberal democracy, concealing the reality of rapacious capitalism, growing global inequalities and unevenness, and diminishing avenues for political contestation.”

- Ilan Kapoor (2014, 1117)

Development studies already have a tradition of critical theory in Postcolonial approaches, with authors such as Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Edward Said and Ilan Kapoor in the forefront of what could be considered a ‘southern’ theory. Although they criticize instances on neocolonial discourses and ideologies that still shape mainstream development policies and narratives, they differ from other critical theories (such as Dependency Theory) by focusing on the cultural dimension of how the Global South subaltern is assumed: “Our interaction with, and representations of, the subaltern are inevitably loaded. They are determined by our favourable historical and geographic position, our material and cultural advantages resulting from imperialism and capitalism, and our identity as privileged Westerner or native informant” (Kapoor, 2008, 45)

Critical development studies therefore provide additional insight of the workings of hegemonic practices and formations in global discourses, not only by analyzing discourse, but also by studying the emotional attachments and unconscious interpretations of those discourses by hegemonic subjects42.

42 Knowledge production is usually under the Postcolonial scope: “when the investigating subject, naively or knowingly, disavows its complicity or pretends it has no ‘geo-political determinations’, it does the opposite of concealing itself: it privileges itself” (Spivak 1988, 272, 292 quoted in Kapoor 2008). The intellectual is therefore liable, according to Spivak and Kapoor, of speaking for the subaltern, and in the process, end up “justifying power and domination, naturalizing Western superiority, essentializing ethnicity, or asserting ethnocultural and class identity, all in the name of the subaltern” (Kapoor 2008, 45).
1. Development Fantasies

Critical development is no stranger to psychoanalytic approaches, and holistically advantageous to this research, Lacanian / Žižekian approaches are commonly undertaken (see Caron & Margolin, 2015). Ilan Kapoor has described the inclusion of psychoanalytic approaches as a way to step beyond an initial discourse analysis – identifying discursive contradictions and inconsistencies – and step into a new reflexive point. One where we can “come to terms with our libidinal attachments to, and unconscious investments in, these discourses” (Kapoor, 2014, 1119). He intends to complement critical rationality with a reorientation of desires and fantasies embedded in development discourse and its ensuing social formation as subject-position.

Implementing psychoanalysis into development, Kapoor brings the example of Maureen Sioh who links ‘libidinal economy’ to political economy, by presenting how psychological anxiety of humiliation, and a veritable struggle for recognition in social esteem (desire for dignity) are enacted in a corporation in East Asia. The struggle for recognition from East Asian emerging economies, according to Sioh, is waged in the striving for economic growth to reach the same level of prestige (esteem) as the West in the global market economy. I would argue the same could occur to most emerging economies in their attempt to not only comply but overachieve in the rules set by the ‘global’ (neoliberal capitalism) market economy. There are lures within this complicit role. As Kapoor and Wilson argue (2014), the pursuit of economic growth is also the libidinal pursuit of jouissance, the enjoyment of going after the seductive promises of a life ‘worth living’. Taking the political economy of neoliberalism into account, how ‘worth’ is defined is also relevant to the analysis: development, according to the UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1998 Consumption for Human Development, can be achieved through (the libidinal pursuit of) consumption. The only caveat according to the report is to avoid ‘conspicuous’ consumption. It explains the increase in inequalities due to a bad distribution of the benefits of consumption (pursuing jouissance), and presents globalization as an opportunity to ‘integrate consumer markets’ with manageable risks.

If the hegemonic subject is also attracted to emotional discourses despite the heavy focus on her/his own apparent rational behavior, what types of emotional pulls is she/he susceptible to? Although traditional beliefs, faith, and emotions are generally subversive to the discourses of science, facts, and rationality, there is a certain type of romanticized beliefs that fit (almost too
precisely) the unconscious desires of the hegemonic subject (further discussed in a recognition-theoretical view below in section 3). For example, Gavin Fridell (2014) explores how the fair trade discourse of ‘ethical consumerism’ touches upon the highest-valued principles of hegemonic subjects: the central role to individualism and consumption, that by virtue of their rational repetition, can accomplish local democracy and empower others. Fridell presents it as the emotional reaffirmation of consumers imagined as saviors who can seemingly change the world through individual purchases. The chain of equivalence between fair trade and free trade is sustained by compatibility, but the added value of the emotionally charged ideological fantasies is often unseen (Fridell, 2014). We are reminded once more of the HDR of 1998.

Is there an example of ‘representational’ (cultural) sanctions against deviant performance? What is the emotional investment that hegemonic subjects have against an increased presence of subversive values? Fletcher et al. (2014) present the example of population as an articulated scapegoat. Overpopulation, as an ideological construction, “conceals the gap between the apparent symbolic order of international development and its persistent failure in practice” (Fletcher et al. 2014). He continues:

By conjuring the age-old image of animalistic barbarian hordes breeding inexorably and therefore overflowing their Third World confines to threaten the security – and enjoyment – of wealthier nations, the overpopulation bogeyman helps to displace attention from systemic issues within the political economy of development, namely, the futility of pursuing sustainable development within the context of a neoliberal capitalism that characteristically exacerbates both economic inequality and environmental degradation.” (Fletcher et al. 2014)

This is not to say that environmental and social sustainability does not present a valid point in the risks that overpopulation may represent for present and future generations, but it is highly noticeable that overpopulation concerns are ideologically allocated to Global South countries whereas those in the Global North are concerned about reversing the rate of their diminishing population. It is not the more of ‘us’ that is questioned – on the contrary – but it is certainly the more of ‘them’ that raises emotional alarms. A focus on overconsumption is also a temporary concern that quickly fizzles in light of its undermining and subversive implications for a market-led (consumption) growth. In this example, the self-defeating relation of sustainable development and neoliberal capitalism is not addressed in its entirety, but the critique is displaced towards the periphery, where libidinal attachments are left unquestioned.
As it has been presented, being critical on its own does not provide the type of insight of Postcolonial high self-reflexivity. Post-development critique is one of the most common challenges to mainstream development, yet according to Postcolonial authors such as Kapoor or Spivak, it also fails to question the subject’s unconscious investment in development discourse. It becomes, one may say, a narrative that links a paradox together. And just barely. It is in constant need of updating itself by reappropriating critique, and Post-development critique ignores that development politics and power “take hold, expand and crucially, persist through libidinal attachments” (ibid). Authors that are critical against Western universalisms end up appropriating and twisting the narratives of the global south subalterns. Instead of being open to the other, Spivak argues, one brings ‘the other into the self’ (Spivak, 2004, 567-8, quoted in Kapoor 2008, 35). This appropriation has, for example, twisted the original concept of women empowerment generated by feminist studies and turned it to fit the ‘predispositions of those who use it’ (Razavi and Turquet 2016, 86). Shahra Razavi and Laura Turquet identify how women empowerment has lost its conceptual clarity, with mainstream development policies seeing women as “largely untapped market of consumers”, or the ‘emancipation’ of women’s economic power “as a means to increase growth and solve the lingering problems caused by the global financial crisis” (idem, 87. See Caron & Margolin, 2015 for an additional case of twisting the ‘saving girls, investing in girls’ discourse in mainstream development projects).

Kapoor’s works are particularly strategic for the purposes of my thesis, because his psychoanalytical approach is precisely based on how development practitioners and westernized elites are often complicit in neocolonial knowledge production

2. Transforming Data into Given Facts

Yet all of this is forgotten in the practice-intensive scope of mainstream development, preoccupied with augmenting the output of knowledge production via the collection of ‘fieldwork’ data in the Global South, described by Spivak as the retrieval of information from a “repository of ethnographic ‘cultural difference’” (Spivak, 1999, 388, quoted in Kapoor 2008). The

43 Spivak argues that even progressive Western intellectuals like Foucault and Deleuze fall into universalizations of when appropriating the voice of the ‘Third World masses’: “the banality of leftist intellectuals’ lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns stands revealed; representing them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent” (Spivak, 1988 272-75, quoted in Kapoor 2008).

44 Kapoor exemplifies this with Marth Nussbaum and her take of women’s narrative from the global south as, paradoxically, a call for more Western universalistic approaches.
reproduction of cultural imperialism, according to Postcolonial critique, occurs with the collection of ‘raw data’ taken as facts from the Global South and turning it into ‘knowledge’ (Spivak, 1988, 275). The information taken from this repository of data then goes through a value-added theoretical (and ideological) process.

Diaz-Bone reminds us that institutions can also “borrow as justifications and rules some of the characteristics, orientations and formalization” from the theories that try explain social practices (Diaz-Bone 2011, 28). Within institutional practices of data collection, a normative framework can be incorporated in the production of knowledge from that data, so that the information could hardly be taken as a given fact that gives a clear account of the social reality. He refers to this as a methodological trap, called a self-referential loop. Researchers rely on having created new and evidence-based knowledge about social practices while “they are in fact only rediscovering normative judgements already included in the data they use” (ibid). The moment where knowledge production stops providing ‘neutral’ data is especially noticeable in the use of statistical instruments: “First and foremost, by pre-cutting reality into domains, by including and excluding, by qualifying and categorising, they shape and build information in some direction and with some underlying normative conceptions.” (ibid). Researchers are therefore often building the social realities they study. Mimicking Kapoor and Spivak in their view of how misrepresentations speak more of the neocolonial recognizer than the recognizee, Diaz-Bone argues that institutions and statistical apparatuses say more about their own frameworks of interpretation and how they transform social reality through their technical rules and principles, than the actual data they produce (ibid).

Perhaps this occluded transforming practice is how, as feminist thinker Rosi Braidotti puts it, the market logic came to dominate other logics by twisting “financial success as status for social groups, money as the means of emancipation, profit as the engine of progress” (Braidotti, 2005, 3). Jürgen Kädtler also focuses on how the global crisis of 2008 came to occur because a financial rationality dominated the interpretation of economic rationality. Hegemonic meaning-fixation is barely noticeable when logics use contested floating signifiers, and social reality faces the risk of being categorized, dissected, analyzed and turned to ideology in the pursuit of knowledge.
3. Recognition-theoretical Rejoinder

So far, we have seen the benefits of including post-structural concepts, as well as epistemologies from postcolonial and feminist thought to expand the application of Recognition Theory. However, understanding that development is both a socioeconomic and ideological construction that links a paradox still requires an explanation of how it achieves to hold it together. Recognition-theoretical views provide additional room for analyzing relational disorders from a very pragmatic standpoint. Before proceeding to the methodology there is a missing rejoinder to Recognition Theory that will provide coherence to this Postcolonial inclusion.

As presented in the Theory section (Introduction, section 6), Honneth presents pathological cases in which the reciprocity of intersubjective relations is destroyed. It occurs as one of the subjects loses its ability to detach her/himself from either a state of egocentric independence or from a state of symbiotic dependence (Honneth, 1995). This is a one-sided interruption of the mutual exchange that used to exist, and it replaces it with a supplementary, or complementary exchange. As described before, one of the subjects sustains a symbiotic dependence to complement the omnipotent fantasies upon which the other partnering subject is fixated (ibid).

Following the discussions from Chapter II, it seems plausible to determine that hegemonic subjects are unable to detach themselves from the state of egocentric independence, unconsciously having an active preference for the potential others (potential subalterns) to be the supplementary and symbiotic dependents. As seen in Postcolonial critique, development discourse is often found complicit in the neocolonial construction of subalterns - or the others - as either 1) victims in need of saving who will eventually become the saviors of everyone (Caron & Shelby, 2015) or as 2) faceless hordes that if left unchecked, would only worsen everyone’s situation (Fletcher et al. 2014) This is particularly effective in pursuing support from hegemonic subjects which find, through the intermediate ‘play’ of charity funding, donating or volunteering in the Global South (Kapoor 2012), the much-needed symbolic complement to their fixation on their ego-independence. They first find the perpetual symbiotic dependent, the Global South victim: A subaltern with dreams of following their steps, pursue the same development fantasies (e.g. competing in market-driven development), but in continuous need of their example and guidance. Then, they subsequently embed the global south subaltern with the potential of that
same fixation, so that the need to ‘empower’ the first-disempowered subaltern arises. Ultimately, in this initial search for supplements to hegemonic subjectivities’ fixations, they reproduce the relational disorder by engendering new subjects freshly attached to ego-independence, which will in turn create the need to produce more complementary or supplementary dependent sub-subalterns. And so, the hegemonic order advances, with power being enacted in the destruction of continuous exchanges and the active preference for one-sided attachments / addictions.

Under these pathological social preconditions of one-sided misrecognition, equality is temporary, and only achieved through the displacement of inequality to more subversive, less recognized beings (layered, or intersectional subalternity, or non-human animals and nature). The question now remains, how is this sustained? How come the displacement of inequality continues unchallenged? Is the focus on the temporary equality sufficient to suspend questioning of the growing inequality? How is this highlighting of success and occlusion of inconsistencies achieved and agreed on a global level? My next chapter will look into the literary sources with the apparent legitimacy to inform global policies, and the discursive articulations they use to justify this perpetuation of global inequality and avoid questioning in the deciding eyes of hegemonic subjects.
CHAPTER IV

Development as Hegemonic Convention

“The simplest way to construct a situation conducive to natural behavior is to include in it beings that share the same nature, and to exclude from it beings of different natures.”

- Luc Boltanski & Laurent Thévenot 2006, 41

If critique arises from different worlds, can the worlds coexist? What allows beings (persons and things) to belong to different worlds, be identified as such, but still avoid a challenge over a test of worth is what Boltanski & Thévenot call a ‘compromise’ formula between worlds. They give the example of a “worker’s rights” reference, where both the civic world (rights) and the industrial world (workers) can be associated without raising alarms to each others’ worlds (Boltanski & Thévenot, 277). That is, they avoid controversy and suspend dispute without the need to justify that composite situation between worlds. Clearly different from being only coincidental in each others’ world, each item’s worth is relevant in the other, and the equivalence is treated as self-evident. As such, it avoids being made explicit (ibid).

1. Methodological Analysis

After discussing how subjectification is influenced by discursive practices, and how subjects are emotionally attached to self-traps of that discourse, it rests to analyze an example of this discourse. In order to consider a plurality of subject-positions and the possible partiality of meaning-fixation, the method must consider how the struggle for recognition is contested in a complex landscape of contesting discursive practices. The Economies of Worth (known as Economics of Convention in contemporary discussions) consists in “the identification and removal of beings (subjects and objects) that do not belong to a present situation, and then call for an agreed test of worth among subjects to stabilize the situation” Boltanski and Thévenot continue, “once a test is validated by the lack of questioning, if the test goes unchallenged, the inconsistencies are ‘submerged in contingency’” (2006, 217). Inconsistencies such as growing global inequality is occluded, but not removed entirely. It is, according to both authors,
“concealed to the extent of irrelevance, that they should no longer be identified but merely present by circumstance” (ibid).

Recalling the interdisciplinary bridges that the Economies of Worth have with Recognition Theory (Introduction, section 8). It is important to present the positive aspects of using this methodology with the Poststructural view of discourse. For example, the articulation of unrelated elements under nodal points to result in meaning-fixation, can be empirically represented when analyzing how seemingly foreign objects and subjects (beings) are organized to result in a stable situation. The principles of order intersect in objective and scope to ‘chains of equivalence’, that coordinate a ‘natural’ arrangement among systems of difference. The domination of meaning, is seen as the moment in which a situation holds together and there are no more questionings, or dissent. Reaching agreements or consent, is included in EW/EC. Given the above, this methodology sees each subject as able to articulate, through nodal points of ‘common knowledge’, a set of commanding justifications that seek to fix meaning. Each subject, within this methodology, is therefore capable of hegemonic performativity. Critique within EW/EC can also be considered as the struggle for empty or floating signifiers, which are those signifiers outside of hegemonic fixity. It is the struggle over empty signifiers that allows the distinct worlds to call to tests of worth, and for hegemony to impose dominance over contestation.

2. **Data Analysis**

Reconstructing the initial paradox, how does the tension resolve between the moral order of egalitarian, sustainable human development and the market-led growth system of difference, competition and dispossession? Paul Cammack addresses this question by analyzing the UNDP’s Human Development Reports (HDRs) from 1990 to 2015. I focus mostly on the departing point of 1990, as well as key turning and coinciding points, and do not go into the same detail for each consecutive year.

He argues that the 1990 HDR *Concept and Measurement of Human Development* stipulated a clear separation of the concept of human development from the programme of global economic governance (neoliberal capitalism) that had been pushed in the last 25 years by international organizations such as the World Bank or the OECD. However, that initial distinction of broader notions of a ‘flourishing life’ worth living *alongside* the market has been waning, and has
transformed the logic of human creativity and freedom towards the logic of neoliberal capitalism’s competitiveness and social relations of capitalist production (Cammack 2017, 4).

In order to explore how this twist of logic occurred, I read the same texts with the composite methodology exposed in the previous chapters, applying a conceptual rereading. How are floating signifiers appropriated? When did the UNDP and World Bank started using the same nodal points to signal a common order of worth? Moreover, how did this common value-horizon started fixing what social relations of esteem meant?

In 1990, the World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR) Poverty presents the starting and the (seemingly) finishing point of what development has meant for mainstream policies and global institutional practices: increasing productivity of labor and the institutional provision of services to support it. The WDR aims to promote a two-pronged strategy, first, “the pursuit of a pattern of growth that ensures productive use of the poor’s most abundant asset – labor” (WDR 1990, iii), followed by the provision of the basic social services to support that productivity, namely, primary education, primary health care, and family planning (see Chapter III on the overpopulation ideology). The first part “provides opportunities”, while the second “increases the capacity of the poor to take advantage of these opportunities” (ibid). In terms of articulation of worth, it can be perceived that the deficiency of worth is presented as poverty, which is then called to a test (i.e. productive use) of its real worth (i.e. labor as asset). Economic inequality is conceptually mixed with a more rigid class structure in the early 90’s report, which envisions labor production to address it. The WDR presents its highest principle of order, a complementary order of social, institutional and government relations that presented market incentives, social and political institutions, infrastructure, and technology as objects that evidenced a ‘natural’ situation.

In contrast, the 1990’s HDR from the UNDP directly challenged the ‘narrow productivist view’ of other approaches, and called for human development that forms human capabilities (e.g. better health, better skills and increased knowledge), that could be used for both productive and

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45 One of the first steps is recalling the ‘late’ liberal political philosophy that informs both institutions and inscribes an ‘original’ nature to individuals as rational, individualistic, self-identifying and self-defining. To clarify, these institutions do not take responsibility of statements made in their reports, which is endowed to the report team each year. This leads the inquiry into what libidinal attachments, research self-traps (statistics), and unreflexive patterns of misrecognition they may be subjected to.
non-productive practices, such as leisure, and cultural, social and political affairs (HDR 1990, 10). Although criticizing the instrumentalist approaches of the World Bank, the HDR does not break away from its liberal sources. It clearly delineates the limits of the state (a self-imposed civic world) that should remain as a supportive figure of the higher-prioritized market (industrial and market worlds). The state, per the HDR, should limit itself to securing the policy environment that would allow for increased production, and overview a fair distribution of its benefit without intervening in the market.

Critical, yet subsumed, the 1990 HDR allows ‘unsanctioned deviancy’ (see Power Grid) from what is ultimately intelligible: market-led growth. As an example, the 1990 HDR calls attention to NGO’s and other ‘self-help’ organizations: “NGO’s are generally small, flexible and cost-effective, and most of them aim at building self-reliant development” (ibid). The reconstruction of the role of the state is undergoing in this historical example, and the inclusion of third-party organizations (whose fund sources and libidinal attachments are excluded of their ‘objective’ presentation) marks the discourse in this HDR. The articulation of the worth of NGOs is defined as well “They recognize that when people set their own goals, develop their own approaches and take their own decisions, human creativity and local problem-solving skills are released, and the resulting development is more likely to be self-sustaining” (ibid). This liberal articulation endows ‘self-dependency’ and ‘reliance’ as a given condition of individuals that needs to be potentialized by the infusion of market world worth in NGOs as cost-effective institutions, and the promise of untapped creativity from the inspired world worth. In short, it articulates a liberal political philosophy of individual agency under a competitive order.

Cammack argues that the 1990 HDR avoided resolving the tensions between ends and means of the market-led growth strategy. “Secreted within its approach”, Cammack describes, “was the imperative but unresolved strategic need to ensure that people’s pursuit of their goals in autonomous associations would promote the ‘workings of the market mechanism’” (Cammack 2017, 6). Human development was presented as more than commodified production, yet the means to reach that development revolved around productivity (ibid), albeit differentiated as both ‘productive and creative’ use of those capabilities (industrial and inspired worlds). The 1990 report from the UNDP report of 1990 bore the original paradox, the contested and unstable wholeness of ‘competitive economic growth and just, non-economic human development’. The development of individual capabilities, a floating signifier, is grounded in the logic of putting
them to use (liberal utilitarianism) creatively and productively. In this economic liberalism logic, the meaning of freedom is equalled to its use as expanded choice in properly functioning markets, and its use to shape political frameworks (HDR 1990, 1). The market world serves as an umbrella that can seemingly sustain other worlds (civic, industrial, inspirational). Its political liberalism logic then called for a state control of deviances from the hegemonic order: (re)distribution of goods and – inconsistently – keeping an eye on the market while not interfering with it. In terms of worth, the value-horizon is set through an empty signifier. ‘Freedom’ is linked to market operations “freedom to participate in the market according to one’s talents and preferences is the best vehicle for productive use of human capabilities” (HDR 1990, 83), while the obstacle to it (negative freedom) is an intervening government: “such freedom ensures that social goals do not become mechanical devices in the hands of paternalistic governments. If human development is the outer shell, freedom is its priceless pearl” (idem, 84). The highest principle of order is set.

In sum, depending on one’s point of view, the report either set out a positive agenda for human freedom that accepted but would not be reduced to the market, or set up a contradiction that it could not possibly resolve. In other words, the difference between the Human and World Development Reports was subjectively substantial, but objectively small. Over the following years it would diminish to the point of vanishing. (Cammack 2017, 7)

2.1 Merging Trends in the 1990’s

In 1991, the UNDP’s HDR Financing Human Development acknowledged the support provided by the IMF and WB in the foreword, and although the report was done by a team from the UNDP, it distances itself from it. “The validity of a report such as this depends on its independence and intellectual integrity. The views expressed in this report are those of the team, and are not necessarily shared by UNDP, or its Governing Council, or other member governments of UNDP.” (HDR 1991, foreword). Therefore, endorsed by the UNDP but not responsible for it, it sets the stage for ‘independent’ teams (independent from ideology and libidinal attachments presumably) to articulate a discourse which will carry the weight of its endorser - the worth (world of fame) of the UNDP - but not its commitment or political responsibility for its statements. This is common practice in report writing by multilateral organizations, but it stands out in the analytical review of how legitimacies are constructed. It sets the plausible deniability option in case of judgement or disagreement, and it secures a justification when being called out to a test of worth. Even more, it turns the data presented by an ‘objective’ team as facts (see knowledge production in Chapter III).
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The main statement of 1991’s HDR was that “lack of political commitment, rather than lack of financial resources, is usually the real cause of human neglect” (HDR 1991, foreword), which sets the stage for the report’s view on restructuring public sector budgets, and proposes a political strategy to engineer such changes, with a focus on public spending for human development, with synergistic relation between the private and the public sectors. Participatory development is introduced this year as a nodal point, a convergence of individual freedom to enact change in the political environment, and an emancipatory discourse of the civic world that supports the market / industrial worth of economic growth. In the search for ‘sensible reallocation of resources to serve humanity better’, the report calls for a people-centered process of decision-making: human freedom through creative energies for economic opportunities.

In many aspects, this approach does not collide at all with the 1991’s World Bank WDR The Challenge of Development that calls for a market-friendly approach by governments to support development. Nor with the 1992’s WDR Development and the Environment when it states that “the world has learned over the past two decades to rely more on markets and less on governments to promote development”, yet keeping the tense government role of supervisor and enabler, the WDR continues “but environmental protection is one area in which government must maintain a central role. Private markets provide little or no incentive for curbing pollution” (WDR 1992, 1). Notably, that role has been taken by market in the following decades, displacing other responsibilities to the government. The WDR of 1992 identified another turning point in linking logics, stipulating that environmental stewardship and economic growth went hand in hand, and the latter could still increase without compromising the former: “Addressing the environmental problems faced by these people will require better progress in reducing poverty and raising productivity. It is imperative that the current moment of opportunity be seized to bring about an acceleration of human and economic development that is sustained and equitable.” (WDR 1992, 2, added emphasis). Offering the continuation and prevalence of the status quo is not a unique feature of this report alone.

The merging trend continued. 1992’s HDR Global Dimension of Human Development starts with the assertion that “Never before has there been broader consensus on what is needed for development”, and despite the implied discursive difference of the last two reports, it continues “Economic development can be sustained only by unleashing the creative energies of all people
through competitive and efficient markets. And political development require the democratic participation of all people in shaping their own destiny” (HDR 1992, 1). As do future HDRs in the 1990’s, the political call is to open global south countries to the global market economies for the promise of better flow and distribution of benefits. Ensuing years were no different between reports, asking for less government, more competition in the industry that themed each respective report (health services for 1993 WDR *Investing in Health* and 1994 WDR *Infrastructure for Development*), more commercial management, and more privatization. The HDRs occluded the pursuit of the same goals by linking economic and political values in a new discourse of total emancipation. In the HDR of 1993 *People’s Participation*, where the chain of equivalence is formed between individual freedom, creativity, productivity and new global markets: “With free enterprise winning out over central planning, and the courageous voices of democracy quieting the terrors of authoritarianism, people everywhere are asserting their right to determine their own destiny” (HDR 1993, 1).

This discursive tandem between the WDR’s call for better policies and investing environments for global markets, and HDR’s articulation of human development as obtainable and evidenced through its use of the market, continued during the following years (1995-9). New topics are presented in each year with a distinct approach. The WDRs point to new priority areas for investment (e.g. infrastructure) and structural reforms (e.g. for governments), and the HDRs present new nodal points (1998’s *Consumption for Human Development* is the clearest example) that enlarge the chains of equivalence from the political discourse of emancipation to the attainment of the market needs. Each HDR is careful to reinstate the same message year by year, that the benefits have spread and are increasing, but they are badly distributed and unequal.

The resolution is objectively the same. Strengthening market-led growth will solve the problems caused by market-led growth or any other force. Increasing growth will take care of the environment (WDR 1993), consuming – not too much, but better – will take care of human development (HDR 1998), opening the doors to ‘global markets, global technology, global ideas and global solidarity’ will improve lives everywhere (HDR 1999). The last HDR of the decade has a strong position in sedimenting the nodal point of ‘globalization’ (see Chapter II) “characterized
by shrinking space, shrinking time and disappearing borders, globalization has swung open the
door to opportunities” (HDR 1999, 1)46.

Before departing to the 2000’s, it should be noted that the HDR of 1997 Human Development
to Eradicate Poverty builds one of the most evident discursive equivalences of the decade. It treats
tackling poverty as “removing barriers that deny choices and opportunities for living a tolerable
life” (HDR 1997, 2) and equals the operation to removing barriers to market practices. Recalling
Chapter II, on the justification of unreflexive practices, it is more evident now that there is harm
in widening the entrance to an unequal economic arena (‘market’) where the conditions of
participation (‘employment’) are already attuned to the characteristics of hegemonic subjects
(homo and hegemo-sociality). What is pending further analysis, not discussed in this thesis, is the
harm of the political side of liberal philosophy. In its pursuit of “empowering men and women
to ensure their participation in decisions that affect their lives” (HDR 1997), this political
philosophy is also opening and normalizing the entry to an unequal political arena (‘democracy’
as political market) where the conditions of participation (‘participatory election of
representatives) are already attuned to choosing among a set arrangement of characteristics of
the hegemonic subjects in power. Getting a job, participating in decisions, has deeply transformed
its meaning. Participation in both economic and political markets also means in reality becoming
complicit to economic and political hegemony. It means legitimizing whatever outcome results
from those unequal arenas in which merit or worth is already decided, once again, to actively
prefer the characteristics of economic and political hegemonic subjects.

The political dimension in 1997 cannot be understated. Cammack (2006) brings our
attention to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s address at Davos 1997, where he signaled the
underlying ideology knit throughout the 1990’s and expanded in the next decade: “The United
Nations and the private sector can and must work together to bring 60 percent of the world’s
population into the market” (quoted in Cammack 2006, 7). This funneling operation of enlarging
political and economic markets represents both the domination of a single logic (market world)

46 For whom are the boarders disappearing is the ultimate question. The global economy swings open doors,
windows and land in continuous dispossession, while the subaltern of the margin causes shock and awe, rejection
and expulsion once it migrates through the same ‘borderless’ world.
and, as skillfully articulated in the next decade, the emancipatory promise that the periphery can have access to the benefits of the core if they perform, behave and act in accordance to that logic.

2.2 Transitioning Points in the 2000’s

I now mostly focus on the HDRs in the transitioning decade of the 2000’s. Despite a surprising doubling of pages for reports (approx. 150 to 300 pages now), the core message found in the overview, foreword, and main findings is that in spite of unprecedented advances, not everyone has been benefitted (HDR 2000 Human Rights and Human Development is a prime example). This line of discourse is also what sustains the call for action, albeit paradoxical: yearly report production reinforcing a problem / solution reproduction. Part of the solution is appropriating new signifiers that could provide ‘new’ solutions. For example, HDR 2001 Making New Technologies Work for Human Development presents information technology as a breakthrough opportunity that could avoid the increasing the inequality gap: “the technology divide does not have to follow the income divide. Throughout history, technology has been a powerful tool for human development and poverty reduction” (HDR 2001, 274).

HDR 2002 Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World returns the spotlight to the core theme (liberal political philosophy) of the HDR of 1993, 1994 and 1997. “Democracy has proven to be the system of governance most capable of mediating and preventing conflict and of securing and sustaining well-being. By expanding people’s choices about how and by whom they are governed, democracy brings principles of participation and accountability to the process of human development.” (UNDP 2002, introduction to the HDR). The political arena of neoliberal democracy has arguably parallel comparisons as another competitive market in which hegemonic subjects already have the upper hand in designating worth towards objects that are controlled by them or subjects that resemble them (hegemo-sociality). As described before, entering this political arena does not just mean participation in a free space where any alternative of governmentality can succeed, it also means complicit participation in reproducing values (i.e. performativity) in a controlled landscape (i.e. grid of intelligibility) where supposedly new tests occur (e.g. elections) under the same pre-conditions (i.e. competition) of slightly different versions
of market-led growth. This report is an example of mending the often-occluded political link between liberal philosophy and economy.47

The project of enlarging a global relational order in alignment with neoliberal capitalism was solidified during this decade. With the previous hints of the new direction that the UN would undertake from the late 90’s into the early 2000’s, the HDR of 2003 Millennium Development Goals: A Compact Among Nations to End Human Poverty marked the start of this turning point. The objective of bringing new consumer into the global market was set from a more comprehensive institutional view, and further cemented by complementary UNDP commission reports to the Secretary-General in 2004 Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor, and 2005 Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In the 2004 report, the introduction statement bridges the action started in the late 90’s: “Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked us to convene the Commission on the Private Sector and Development to answer two questions. How can the potential of the private sector and entrepreneurship be unleashed in developing countries? And how can the existing private sector be engaged in meeting that challenge?” (UNDP 2004, i). An analysis of how actors convened and coordinated to articulate this report into a stable situation would pay extreme attention to this point:

The Commission’s work has been heavily influenced by the voices of entrepreneurs, expressed through their actions and through their responses to wide-ranging surveys launched to understand what most affects their ability to be productive and to grow. (…) Entrepreneurship encompasses the actions of small, informal, village-based individuals as much as it does that of the managers and innovators in multinational corporations and large local companies. It is their voices that we have heard the loudest. (UNDP 2004, ii, added emphasis)

As seen before, a new empty signifier (i.e. entrepreneurship), has built equivalence between the two poles of inequality, the paradox of global relational disorders finds a seemingly stable point under this logic. Cammack describes this key turning point better, as one of the logic-twisting moments that this thesis has set out to identify: “(I)n an ideological twist that was all its own, it opened by depicting global capital in the unlikely but ideologically captivating figure of the

47 In many ways, promoting liberal democracy (the market of politics) is not a different strategy than generic market-led growth. It is a different type of market that is still prescribed as leading to the inescapable higher principle of growth. Both political and economic systems march on, and are prescribed to continue or increase intensity, regardless of the (always-acceptable) losses. The objective of the reports is arguably the intersection Finding ways in which those lagging can catch up to the unstoppable, aimless pursuit of pursuit.

48 With over 384 pages, this was the first HDR to include a summary, a trend which continues to this day.
heroic ‘poor entrepreneur’” (Cammack 2012, 8). This particular articulatory discourse deserves special attention:

This report is about walking into the poorest village on market day and seeing entrepreneurs at work. It is about realizing that the poor entrepreneur is as important a part of the private sector as the multinational corporation. It is about acknowledging that the private sector is already central to the lives of the poor and has the power to make those lives better. It is about using the managerial, organizational and technological innovation that resides in the private sector to improve the lives of the poor. It is about unleashing the power of local entrepreneurs to reduce poverty in their communities and nations. (UNDP 2004)

Such a deep transformation of meaning requires going back to Honneth’s critique on the instrumentalization of the demand for self-realization (i.e. the poor struggling to be recognized as an equal entrepreneur under categories of market production), and most importantly, recalling the libidinal attachment that hegemonic subjects have with highly romanticized and fictionalized development discourse. The captivating figure of the poor entrepreneur, as Cammack describes it, is an almost too perfect fit for the hegemonic subject to resist it. That socio-cultural figure represents the ideal development fantasy (see Razavi and Turquet’s critique of ‘empowering’ in Chapter III). It shapes a legitimate recognizee for the individualistic, ego-centered subject that is drawn to power-embedded subjectivity; the heroic poor entrepreneur (e.g. heroic girls saving themselves and the world, see Caron & Margolin, 2015) is a potentially matching peer for the hegemonic subject, and a confirmation of the repetition of values that forms her/him.

In terms of the team behind writing the reports, Cammack reminds us that this decade was characterized by a ‘revolving door’ of top executives further coalesced the institutional connection between the UNDP and the World Bank.49 The stabilization of neoliberal worth became ingrained in practical terms in the HDR, and not just in philosophical roots. The HDR of 2004 Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World and 2009 Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development presented the protection of human rights and the freedom of movement under the same market logic of securing the provision of (paid) services, and mobility in terms of global labor migration that met the needs of the receptor markets. The latter report highlighted that vast global mobility is expected because almost 90% of the population growth in the world’s labor force

49 According to Cammack (2017, 9), Mark Malloch-Brown switched roles as vice-president and director of external relations at the World Bank, to become the head of the UNDP in 1999 with a “task to facilitate new business development” (quoted in Cammack, ibid); Jenni Klugman switched from the World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Team to become the Director of the Human Development Report Office of the UNDP, then guided and directed HDRs 2009 to 2011.
for the last 60 years had occurred in developing countries, “while developed countries are aging” (HDR 2009, 95). To clear any room for doubt, the report continues, “our agenda is largely oriented towards the longer-term reforms needed to enhance the gains from movement” (ibid).

The HDR of 2005 reinvigorated the funneling and expansionary logic, with its call to reshape international aid as a priority for all economic flows. “International aid, one of the most effective weapons in the war against poverty, needs to be renovated and reshaped. It should be thought as an investment as well as a moral imperative” (HDR 2005 summary, 28). Aid, security, freedom, choice, capabilities, and a series of other signifiers were appropriated to equal economic growth. HDRs 2006 Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis retook the role of finance and technology to avert shortages for higher demands of finite resources. Tellingly, the HDR of 2007-08 turned the response to climate change into an opportunity to reassert the role of global north industry and expertise (‘the rich country’s burden of not just finding solutions but implementing them’) in providing “assistance in reducing vulnerability and building the capacity of developing countries to more widely reap the benefits of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in areas such as the development of cleaner and renewable energies, climate proofing and fuel-switching schemes”, the report continues, “for example, we can help countries improve existing infrastructure to enable people to cope with increased flooding (…) More weather resistant crops could also be developed” (HDR 2007-08, 4).

2.3 Aligned Projects in the 2010’s

The ongoing decade has produced an aligned and complementary vision of HDRs to the fore. The HDR of 2010 The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development presented that the “varied pathways to human development (…) and impressive long-term gains can and have been achieved even without consistent economic growth” (HDR 2010, foreword). Different pathways of allowed and unsanctioned deviancy are marked in this report, as long as the common principle is kept: growth, regardless of rate. The real wealth of nations is presented as the potentiality that human development approaches can have to adjust to the political economy priorities and meet

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50 From 2005 to 2008 (three reports considering that 2007-08 was a joint document), the HDRs had their largest volumes to date. 388 pages in 2005, the colossal 440 pages-long report of 2006, and 399 in 2007-08. After the 2010’s, length was severely cut down once more.
51 The WDR of 1992 presented this idea “some of the potential problems facing developing countries - global warming and ozone depletion, in particular - stem from high consumption levels in rich countries; thus, the burden of finding and implementing solutions should be on the rich countries” (WDR 1992, 3).
the challenges of the MDGs (HDR 2010, 1). Inequality is addressed through ‘innovative public policies that harness dynamic market forces for the benefit of all’ (ibid). HDR 2011 *Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All* builds upon the theme of growth in these alternative, yet recognized means of growth. Low-emission growth, and the need to transition from fossil fuel-based growth is addressed, with the common caveat of investing enough and mobilizing financial flows to ensure growth in key industries to grant “access to renewable energy, water and sanitation, and reproductive healthcare” (HDR 2011, ii). The idea of a better future for all recalls the funneling strategy of previous decades, and is strengthened in the HDR of 2016.

The subsequent series of HDRs from 2013 to 2015 focused in greater detail in the theme of global south labor and individualistic conceptualizations of work as the means of self-realization. In HDR 2013 *The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*, the increase in global south economic growth was acknowledged, and the report suggests investments in education, health care and employment skills to sustain that growth. The individual focus on workers commences here and is reinforced by the HDR of 2014 *Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience*, with the conviction that sufficient investment in social protection, service provisions (same as above), and full employment *opportunities* will lead the atomistic individual to fend for her/himself in the increasingly competitive global labor market. In 2015’s *Work for Human Development*, the series reaches an inflection point of not only opening full employment conditions and enabling policies, but striving for decent work and the quality of work to take a central place. With the promise of transitioning from the periphery to the core of the labor market, these reports reinforce that continued prescriptions of growth adjustments and investment in growth-inducing sectors, will turn competitiveness into increased equal benefits.

The opposite is clearly marked by the HDRs themselves. In the latest HDR of 2016 *Human Development for All*, it is stated that “since 2000, 50 percent of the increase in global wealth benefited only the wealthiest 1 percent of the world’s population. Conversely, the poorest 50 percent of the world’s population received only 1 percent of the increase” (HDR 2016, 40). The call for further growth seems self-defeating under these acknowledged terms, yet the weight of decades of hegemonic practices has developed a hegemonic formation that apparently cannot be stopped. Despite the remorseful acknowledgement that decades of development progress have not worked properly for all, that ideological articulations such as the nodal point of ‘globalization’ have not worked for all, the HDR of 2016 offers this half-spirited justification:
There seems to be a widespread view that globalization is good for a small elite but not for the broad masses of people. (...) Even many academics and policymakers who welcomed globalization are revising their opinion. It was always thought that globalization would not benefit everyone but that the benefits would eventually outweigh the losses. (...) The backlash against globalization is reshaping politics in various countries. But it cannot be rolled back, so the challenge is to ensure that globalization leaves no one behind.” (HDR 2016, 35, added emphasis)

Since the hegemonic practices are seemingly unstoppable, the only alternative is to funnel – through bottlenecks of global labor competition and tests of worth of the market world – those left behind. Impervious growth remains unquestioned, and the only contingency left to manage is how to adjust policies to increase employment opportunities (neoliberal funnels of capitalistic production) and ‘empower’ / build resilience of those left behind so that they can continue to pursue their self-realization, (professional) identities, and human development in political and economic markets. A heroic pursuit of the promises of the ever-escaping core.

Although it is not a part of this study, the Sustainable Development Goals for 2030 hold the slogan of ‘leave no one behind’, clearly reinforcing the view and stipulating that some will keep moving forward, even at increased speeds and to conditions that cannot be for all, and the task is making sure everyone else does not lag too far behind. The same rhetoric of an unhindered future of progress is contained in the aspirational yet vague goal to “end poverty in all its forms” by 2030, which allows for any partial progress to be presented as a positive step and any inconsistencies to be used as justification to continue the same goals after 2045. As a self-sustaining discourse, indistinguishable indicators are an essential part of its continuation.

Back to the 2016 HDR stipulations that policies should be reoriented to those being left out. What stands as a political philosophy that may appear justifiable, is expectedly turned to meet the indisputable precondition to any of the promises – market-led growth. “Thus, economic growth is an important means to achieve human development, but if the benefits of growth are to reach disadvantaged and marginalized people, growth will have to be inclusive such that poor and disadvantaged people actively participate in the generation of growth and have an equitable share in the outcome” (HDR 2016, 105). Consequently, the idea set by the 1990’s WDR is objectively mimicked: moving poor people to work within recognized positions (formal jobs) to sustain a growth that is unequal (benefiting the 1 percent, as described above).
Slowing down, or stopping/reversing growth is also an emotionally charged risk for hegemonic relations. Avoiding depression or psychological shutdown is ‘strategically essential’ for the hegemonic subject to continue intensifying the imbalanced search for her/his self-realization, always barely out of reach and yet never far enough from the differentiated, subversive other in the periphery. After 26 years of articulations, the unrelenting vehicle of market-led growth seems to be the only logic that can accompany its subject-formations. The justification and naturalization of inequality would not be possible without an unquestioned landscape of ever-escaping promises and never-reaching equality.

3. Discussion on Findings

Analyzing the reports has yielded many findings. They have switched between themes or topics (water, jobs, migration, among others), describing how each of them has seen increases or benefits, but reminding that they are all unequally distributed and this requires much work, more investment, more management, and more political will to pay proper attention. The titanic task of each report is to signal all beings in a global situation in such a way that it seems to hold together. Evidences of inequality are acknowledged but described as contingencies, as manageable instabilities in need of a certain, specific, unique expertise that happens to be at the hands of global north. Experts, methods, policies, ‘best’ practices, are presented as universally essential for these inconsistencies. Evidences of equality, even if temporary, are not only acknowledged but described as results of the previous prescriptions. In this balancing act, HDRs are bending opposing principles of economic and political nature to appear as a logical linear continuation or as supplement/complement of one another. If recalled from Chapter II, this is the common relational disorder that hegemonic subjectivities agree upon. They internalize complementation - not interchangeable, peer mutuality – as convention. HDRs achieve the twisting of logic that conventionalize inequality as a global situation that appears to be stable, through the promise of dealing with instability in the future (see Jenny Andersson’s work on futurism and the construction of the long-term as the co-director of Max Planck Science Po Center on Coping with Instabilities). Articulating a convincing prescription for the future has become the placebo that soothes the present harm.

The second strategy is adding a ‘human face’ to it, to continue with the economic status quo. Almost all the analyzed reports start with the phrase “this report, like all previous HDRs, is
about people”. It always presents a variety of topics as a potential source of exclusion apart from being tools of progress, but pitches that a good management will yield greater rewards than risks. After 26 years of the same message, it has not changed much. The use of empty signifiers was vital in sustaining deep transformations of logic between the market world and other competing orders. The inclusion of intermediate objects such as NGOs and private organizations were presented as independent third-parties that bring about cost-effective and genuine development during the 1990’s. The discourse later turned towards active civil society and media (HDR 2011).

The principles of order, worlds of worth and justifications used in both development reports are not, as Cammack implies, objectively different, even if their subjective difference is clarified in almost every page of the HDRs. The importance of discursively highlighting this apparent contrast between the WDR and the HDR is the sustainment of evidence that ‘alternative’ development approaches are already included in mainstream discussions. It reduces the need to include more (subversive, misrecognized) alternatives to the fray, and it already creates a sense of balance in policy discussions. Both reports present different sides of the same (neoliberal) coin. Each report delegates the layered construction of the technical, economic, political, social, cultural and environmental justifications that cement or fix neoliberal conventions, sometimes overlapping in some of them. They do so while keeping opposing evidence (subversive discourse) of inequality, environmental impacts, injustices and harms in the spotlight. As Laclau and Mouffe mentioned, every hegemony must keep its inconsistencies near at hand, but also keeping them at bay. According to the reports, all possible subversions to hegemony are manageable, and if managed right, they could even yield far better results to continue economic and political hegemonic performativity (i.e. increased growth). Each inconsistency that might create disputing challenges is twisted to become a new tautological test of worth, new evidence that not only supports the present situation but calls for an acceleration (WDR) or a politically-coated enhancement (HDR) of it. ‘Yes, there is inequality, and it has been increasing in the last 25 years, but that’s why we are compelled to continue doing what we’re doing’.

Each report, as part of their hegemonic practice, is also actively reinforcing the conventions in which they are partially based. The reports are hegemonic practice, cementing the meaning-fixation of floating signifiers (development as anything that supports liberalism) that will recreate hegemonic formations (structural reforms for a market world). These are conventions in which hegemonic subjects can freely compete and find their complementing
‘other’, so finding their recognitively-supplementary subjectivities in others is almost a direct consequence of this world-building. For instance, through their themed focus, WDRs arrange the global scenario as a situation of opportunity to meet and surpass the impending changes brought by the unstoppable yet benign market forces. The framing of a ‘changing world’ (aka world market economies; WDR 1997), an ‘integrating world’ (aka globalization; WDR 1995), a dynamic world (aka competition, WDR 2003) is a constant. They may often seem to contrast with the apparently alternative view from the HDRs themed focus, which arrange a global scenario of opportunities to manage what is left behind of the unstoppable market force: a ‘diverse world’ (HDR 2004 and 2013), an ‘unequal world’ (HDR 2005), a ‘fragmented world’ (HDR 2002), a ‘divided world’ (HDR 2007/08). Yet these constructions of what lies ahead (WDR) and what is left behind (HDR) are not opposing practices in setting the ‘natural situation’ for liberalism. They both set the scenario of an unstoppable force that builds what lies beyond through 1) a prescription for those left behind to follow, and 2) a moral promise that intolerable injustices (often caused by this voyage itself) will be redeemed one day. None of these two visions present a scenario in which development is possible without market-led growth, because that would open the door to legitimize more subversive narratives that fall outside of the hegemonic order of liberalism. The situation then holds due to this bi-folding strategy among indirectly agreeing actors (WB and UNDP) of seemingly different commanding natures. This seems clear from a discursive point of view.

3.1 Recognition-theoretical rejoinders - part II

A recognition-theoretical view of this same process provides additional insights on the normative risks involved in this hegemonic performativity. The egocentric one-sidedness that has prevailed in modern western societies is visible in the “tendency to follow standardized patterns of identity-seeking” (Honneth, 2012, 162) that hegemonic subjects have come to accept as the experiential discovery of authenticity, and one’s own personality. It stands then that individual freedom, seems dependent on individual responsibility, competition, and the pursuit of that freedom through its use in political and economic markets.

As seen in the HDRs, Honneth argues that within the last three decades, a new conception of the working subject was formed, changing the traditional role of ‘employees’ to be addressed as creative ‘entrepreneurs’ or self-employed persons (Honneth, 2012, 163). Along with this
‘normative subjectification of labour’, a new and heightened esteem for individual labour and self-realization has risen. A sort of identity-based vocation of self-realization that is linked with market-oriented mechanisms: building oneself through the professional (labor) activities that are available as a personal choice of pursuing that identity. In only three decades of neoliberal capitalism employment was twisted “to be made dependent on a convincing presentation of a desire for self-realization in the workplace” (ibid). The image of the poor entrepreneur complements this pathological fixation of linking a demand for self-realization (claims against inequality) as naturally parallel to a demand for work, and the means to achieve the coveted and unquestioned fantasy of individual freedom as self-realization.

The potential benefiters, unemployed or awaiting advancement in the periphery, would not question this potential promise so easily either. “Employees, for the sake of their own future careers, must construct their own job history according to the pattern of self-realization, even though they most likely only desire a measure of social and economic security” (Honneth 2012, 164). Future security depends on the alignment, tacit agreement by the worker to comply with what is expected, even at the cost of feigning self-realization in the process of adapting to what is available. In global development, the ‘poor entrepreneur’ is not in line to receive the corresponding material and economic compensation that indeed accompanies the ‘hegemonic entrepreneur’, even if mainstream development discourse places them in the seemingly equal pursuit of a common value-horizon. More so than twisting the logic of development for the subaltern, which indeed spins expectations and maintains complicity in the long-term, this twisting is directed at the current hegemonic subject, the consumer of global reports that will see this disruptive discourse as natural, rational and acceptable as convention. Honneth continues, perhaps unknowingly, with this illuminating phrase about these justificatory processes of viewing the inconsistencies of neoliberal capitalism in the global south as “a tendency to transform increased demands for self-realization into a productive force in the capitalist economy” (Honneth, 2012, 164). As postcolonial critique raises the challenge to this exploitative practice, global development discourses continue luring the subjects’ emotional attachments (cultural productions), institutionalizing patterns of expectations to sustain social reproduction (romanticized development fantasies), and hold together a paradoxical situation of global relational disorders (legitimacy of inequality).
WDRs and HDRs are examples of this twisting of logics. Certainly, such a finding does not imply a conscious, organized complicity in its entirety. Honneth arrives as the same conclusion as Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello do in their finishing remarks in *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2007): “the processes of instrumentalization, standardization and fictionalization have turned the individualism of self-realization (...) into an emotionally barren system of demands within which individuals today seem more likely to suffer than to prosper” (Honneth, 2012, 164). Self-realization, seen through the floating signifier of development, has turned into an ideology and a productive force in a deregulated economic system. (ibid).

**3.2 Reconstruction of the object of study**

How does a disrupted situation that is qualified as pathological, dysfunctional, or conflictual, such as global inequality, appear to hold together? What is the arrangement of beings, or how does the relation between subjects need to be, to present a minimally coherent situation? How is the process of development carried out and expected to unfold correctly?

The dominant discourse of neoliberalism in development policy and practice articulates the managerial promise of an attainable value-horizon for all, turning the current status quo of global inequality – enacted by intersubjective relational disorder – to become tolerable and appear as a ‘natural’ situation that is being addressed. It does so by arranging elements (objects, and fictionalized subjects) that share the same nature, mainly through principles and chains of equivalence among them, and excluding from it beings of different natures. An example of the chain of equivalence is the liberal political philosophy of human development being comparable to enlarging the range of peoples’ choices, being equaled to the liberal political economy of poverty reduction (negative freedom), which is dependent and equivalent to market-led growth. An example of the exclusion of beings of different natures is discursively layering the inconsistencies in neoliberal political economy, such as the displacement of intolerable situations of inequality to less visible and misrecognized social, political, cultural, and economic peripheries. In the marginal periphery, neoliberal inconsistencies appear as contingent, and are cognitively stable to the hegemonic subject due to cultural misrecognitions of what the subaltern is ‘responsible’ for, or is ‘capable’ of getting out of by itself.

It holds as a natural situation for hegemonic subjects that the core in which they are positioned (subset of surplus power and worth) appears to be sustainable, and that any
inconsistencies are located in the periphery from which they are clearly distant. This minimum threshold distance from experiencing harm or injustice, as well as seeing her/himself among others that avoid it (hegemonic sociability), is what allows hegemonic subjects to tolerate and keep inequality elsewhere, since they are constituted by the belief that their specific performativity is what keeps them in the center, and the lack thereof is what keeps the rest outside. To avoid the inconsistencies of global inequality in the periphery (and the increasing inequality of the core) to become intolerable, mainstream development practices, policies and discourses articulate attractive and luring ideologies to produce higher orders of worth and avert disagreement once more. This is accomplished by highlighting consistencies that are intelligible to hegemonic performativity, chaining equivalences of worth among separate worlds, and misrecognizing inconsistencies as contingent temporalities in need of more of the same political economy prescriptions (managing, investment, policy adjustment, resiliency/capacity-building).

The HDR of 2016 report reinstates: “Despite the challenges, what humanity has achieved over the past 25 years and our desire to aspire to even more give us hope on many fronts. Challenges also offer rays of hope, and hopes face daunting challenges before they can be realized. This link needs to be kept in mind as we pursue our goal to overcome the challenges and realize the hopes” (HDR 2016, 26). And so, the ‘universal’ need to keep managing a commonly valued horizon, charged with emotional attachments for hegemonic subjects and complicit subjects, can avoid disrupting the intolerable present situation. This is the process by which the hegemonic order of worth is conceived. The economies of worth become entangled with the economies of subject exclusion (relational disorders), and the neoliberal economies of inequality are thus justified.
CONCLUSION

Throughout this research, I have argued that understanding a complex, dynamic and transforming paradox, such as the constant increase in global inequality while maintaining the status quo of market-led growth that fosters it, requires a similarly multifaceted research scope. Within the intersection of theoretical frameworks from Marxism, Poststructuralism, and Psychoanalysis, informed by Feminist and Postcolonial epistemologies, and working under an interdisciplinary arc between social philosophy (Honneth) and economic sociology (Boltanski and Thévenot), this thesis has tried to understand how such a self-defeating paradox, a disruptive situation, is sustained, as well as its impacts in exacerbating intersubjective relational disorders.

The struggle for recognition among subjects within a complex landscape of divergent value-horizons was mapped in four Chapters. First, discourse was presented as a hegemonic practice in which social recognition was conditioned to a previous acknowledgement of claims that must be interpreted as valid for others, and how the power behind that legitimacy or consent was gained through the repetition of mainstream values in neoliberal capitalism. The Power Grid was conceptualized here. In the second Chapter, the social outcome of that discursive practice was analyzed through subject formation under practices of differentiation and exclusion, while the concept of hegemonic subjects was presented as an identity based on inter- and intra-subjective abandonment. The third Chapter analyzed inequality as hegemonic performativity, presenting examples of how pathologies of recognition resulted in development fantasies and the twisting of data into given facts. The concealment of inequality was detailed in the end of Chapter II and III with examples in social reproduction in job recruitment, and libidinal attachments to enjoyment in fictionalized / romanticized development discourses. The fourth Chapter reviewed how this concealment has turned development into a historical and hegemonic convention of inequality, mainly by analyzing the global development reports that inform policies and practices, and how they justify, appropriate, and avoid critique to hold the status quo.

By constructing unequal social disorders as a contingent situation that will be dealt with, dominant development practices, policies and institutions articulate justifications that keep hegemonic relations as a situation that holds together. 26 years of HDR are used as the literary source to analyze these discursive practices that keep a hegemonic and fragile order – liberal
political and economic philosophy – in place despite its inherent perpetuation of inequality. Its results show that an increasingly layered displacement of inequalities towards misrecognized, subversive subjects is occluded by highlighting the temporary equality of hegemonic subjects. This strategy is aided by deep transformations of meaning and logic of floating and emotionally charged signifiers.

Unrooting inequality from development has required understanding development discourse (also policies and practice) as the articulatory practice of justified inequality, and it calls for uprooting neoliberal capitalism from it so that its egalitarian imperative resolve the paradox.

As Postcolonial critique suggests, continuation of development work without hyper self-reflexivity, will run the high risk of perpetuating inequality, because of the appropriation of the voice of the subaltern and its twisting to mean ‘development’ in a neoliberalist view. Development is also informed by neocolonial empirical studies that serve to build partial articulations considered “objective” to theorize and take decisions on development policies. Perhaps ‘nomadic’, or suspense-subjects, those that constantly miss domination or meaning fixation, can understand the subaltern and her/his voice in a political dimension, as a struggle for recognition outside of the neoliberal filter of intelligible, valid voices. Hyper self-reflexive subjects linked to political struggle, knowledgeable and vulnerable, understanding of recognition, are what “will inform empirical studies and document the factors preventing some groups from being heard” (Deranty 2012, 55).

Critique alone is not enough as seen throughout this study. After analyzing the data, the prevalence of neoliberal political and economic logics stood out as the apparently immovable yet always instable core of the hegemony. By appropriating the existing critique – that development is unequal – it renders any static critique outdated, since it is already acknowledged. It does not matter whether the ‘management’ of that inequality fosters even more inequality. That is the concealed aspect. What matters is that it is discursively addressed in the resurgence of neoliberal economic hegemony, causing a retrenchment of its critique. Certain points stand out in this process. Challenging, questioning or being reflexive, undermines the appearance of wholeness. Hegemonic subjectivities avoid identifying vulnerabilities in the self, so they seek imbalanced complementation by displacing those vulnerabilities to the ‘other’ through cultural, social and political misrecognitions. And very importantly, unreflexiveness allows inequality to thrive far
more than expected. The lack of conscious review of our emotional attachments and libidinal pursuits is perpetuating inequality through the repetition of politically-occluded patterns of exclusion and abandonment.

Neoliberal capitalism, as the hegemonic order of worth, is the marketplace of subject self-realization, where the acknowledgement to claims of personhood is withheld and actively preferred depending on the repetition of justified values and behaviors. The insistence to create a nodal point, a chain of equivalence between the market world principles and the rest of the orders of worth is what allows this twisting of logics.

1. Proposal for future studies and solutions

“My own opacity to myself occasions my capacity to confer a certain kind of recognition on others”


Although additional strategies for detaching pathologies could be developed in forthcoming research, these are some of the preliminary solutions I have gathered from my current investigation. Specifically, the work from Spivak and Butler hold very interesting insights for this. The overarching notion of the required solution starts from understanding the macro-level structural inequality being embedded in development theories and policies, undermining micro-level relational orders. The former part of this notion was presented in this study. I expect to propose a reverse motion that allows a change in the direction of development theories and policies and procure a deconstruction of asymmetrical power structures in the Global North.

Aret Karademir (2014) worked in an interesting approach, reappropriating Judith Butler’s theory of subversive repetition against the hegemonic grid of cultural intelligibility (in this case, the capitalist matrix), and infusing a concept from Heidegger known as the ‘readiness for anxiety’. Heidegger believed that ‘anxiety’, or the disturbance of existential facts, was the means to resist the “dictatorship of the ‘they’” (Heidegger, 1962 p. 437-38) or the rules, norms and practices of one’s sociohistorical world (Karademir, 2014). In this sense, I believe Karademir was very accurate in portraying an unlikely but very effective link between both theorists. Karademir then proposes a Butlerian subversive repetition that engenders anxiety, by repeating the imposed norms inappropriately (outside the conformity of the expectations of the hegemonic interpretation of the norms), in order to appropriate them differently (Ibid). Butler has stressed in her subsequent work that subversive repetition cannot be performed by the hegemony, but by
the marginalized to be effective. This appears to be the starting ground for the struggle for recognition from Group B discourses. However, this is part of the equation. Despite of the subversive repetition by the marginalized, is it possible to make the ‘developed’ rethink their position under new values? The remaining challenge lies in the structured grid of the mainstream which is unreachable, unmovable from outside.

Group A discourses, the mainstream and the mainstream-enabler, require a commitment to be conscientious. To allow subversive repetition to gain a recognizable space before they have to dwindle and twist through the bottlenecks. A will to detach pathologies of recognition and allow for the complete opposite stand (subversive) and the wide and multiple range of alternatives in between to be intelligible. Ilan Kapoor analyzes the hyper-self-reflexivity concept from Spivak’s work, and addresses it as following (Kapoor, 2004, p. 641):

The idea is to retrace the history and itinerary of one’s prejudices and learned habits (from racism, sexism and classism to academic elitism and ethnocentrism), stop thinking of oneself as better or fitter, and unlearn dominant systems of knowledge and representation. This is what Spivak calls a ‘transformation of consciousness—a changing mind set’ (1990a: 20), and what others have variously penned as ‘decolonisation’ (Fanon), ‘conscientisation’ (Freire) and ‘accountable positioning’ (Haraway).

The new path is dependent on both groups. The subversive repetition of the marginalized to counter hegemonic power structures and deconstruct bottlenecks, and the counter-intuitive reflexivity and focused mindfulness of the mainstream to detach pathologies of recognition from systemic global relations. ‘Learning to unlearn’, as Kapoor and Spivak call it, I will look into further transitions strategies to uproot inequalities in development.

Among the lessons learned in this ambitious and eclectic endeavor, we have seen why alternative development discourses cannot be genuinely recognized under a system of differentiation. We have learned that without the proper social preconditions, bottlenecks of development (tests of worth) will develop from relational disorders among subjects, and we have seen that a deconstruction of subject-position can dismantle the worlds and justifications that hold together neoliberal capitalism as a hegemonic order of worth. What is left is to ask whether these transformative findings could allow for a transition strategy towards a post-capitalist world.

Postcolonial critique also teaches that the slippages of power are politically exploitable, even by the subaltern, through a strategic vigilance of the porous nature of the hegemonic discourse (Kapoor, 2008). Thus, according to Kapoor, the tactical predisposition to critically
observe the operations of power can be translated into political change. This is aimed to be an exercise in such practice, as my research is aimed – as a political struggle for recognition – to generate hyper self-reflexive knowledge that can have an impact on changing hegemonic practices and formations. Unrooting inequality from development through a theory-based endeavor to enact change is a first step.

Any next steps would be advised to consider Derrida’s description of différance, a precautionary outlook into the risks of sanctions against this ultimate subversive behavior.

“Différance governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises any authority. It is not announced by any capital letter. Not only is there no kingdom of différance, but différance instigates the subversion of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening and infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presence of a kingdom. Derrida continues cautioning the reader: “And it is always in the name of a kingdom that one may reproach différance with wishing to reign, believing that one sees it aggrandize itself with a capital letter.” (Derida 1982 trans, 22)
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