‘RESILIENCE IS A STRATEGIC PRIORITY’

Conceptual analysis of the European Union’s Global Strategy

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1 INTRODUCTION

This is a conceptual study of the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), published in 29th of June 2016. The timing happened to be very interesting: the strategy was published in the same particular month on which the public of Great Britain voted on leaving the EU. Although the subject is mentioned only once and en passant in the EUGS, the mere possibility of the UK leaving the Union was enough to challenge the image of a stable and constantly uniforming Europe and therefore has likely impacted the preparations of the strategy. It was not, however, the only major internal challenge the EU has faced during past couple of years, but instead is accompanied with several tragic events and trends. In significant addition, disorder in surrounding regions and the refugee crisis have shaped the environment the EU operates in considerably.

While the British referendum appears in the text only once, some other concepts are repeated numerous times. Most obtrusive one of them is resilience, featuring over 30 times in the less than 60 pages of the global strategy. This notion was made by Kaarina Vainio (2016) in her article in the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs1, and was striking enough to awake interest for this study. The concept of resilience was familiar to me from clinical psychology, where it is related to above average coping from challenging situations. My first notes on the subject referred to Bleuler (1978), whose classic study found that some children of schizophrenic mothers become especially successful later on life. This is a typical psychological example of resilience.

Against this background the EU’s choice of word came forth intriguing. Of course, resilience is not merely a psychological concept and therefore it was likely that the EUGS would employ it in a different meaning. It might even appear that the EU presents a completely novel interpretation of resilience. However, some similarities might exists, since in psychology resilience relates to experiencing stress, challenges and even catastrophes, which seems to describe the EU’s current situation rather truthfully. Therefore I wanted to study how resilience is defined in the EUGS and what kind of meanings it is given.

1In Finnish, Ulkopolitiikka-lehti, published by the Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs.
I examine which themes it is connected to and how its relevance is reasoned. Through these notions I aim to gain a broader view on why the concept of resilience was used in such a volume. There are already several articles written on the EUGS and even on the concept of resilience as its *leitmotif* (see e.g. Wagner & Anholt 2016) but they have not approached the subject from a multidisciplinary viewpoint, which I will do by exploiting psychological view of resilience in my analysis. While my aim is not to present the psychological interpretation as ‘correct’ and see if the EUGS has employed it accordingly, the former is important mirror for analysing the strategy’s interpretation of the concept.

This will be done through conceptual history, which is a very apposite method for studying different interpretations given to concepts. In the case of resilience conceptual history is relevant, since it provides insight on the possible meanings of the complicated concept. I present the method in more detail in the second chapter. Applying the method follows directly after as resilience in the psychological terminology will be analysed for the comparative background of forthcoming analysis. Then I will consider the political relevance of the concept. The third chapter elaborates in the EUGS and the definition of resilience within it.

In the fourth chapter the focus is on resilience in different policies. Firstly I enlarge on matters regarding the Union itself and secondly foreign issues, although these two are closely connected. As we will see, resilience is applied in various contexts throughout the text, but foreign policy in the Unions surroundings is clearly the one where resilience has most weight. Chapter 3.2. *State and Societal Resilience to our East and South* (EEAS 2016, 23–27) in particular is built on the idea of resilience, and I therefore recommend reading it from the attached strategy, if the reader is interested in becoming acquainted with the subject. My aim is however, to offer enough reference for understanding this study without reading the contents of the global strategy.

The document has been translated to all 22 EU languages. Resilience is expressed in various ways in these documents, for example in the Finnish version it is worded in three different ways (ability to cope, resistance/endurance and tolerance to change). While this is interesting, I found the original version more fruitful subject of study for my purposes. In addition, I prefer working with original texts in general, because translating has always impact on the message, varying from slight to eminent.
2 CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF RESILIENCE

2.1. Conceptual history as a window for analysis

Conceptual history is a qualitative method for analysing usage of concepts and meanings given to them. The starting point is sensibility for concepts that are often considered obvious building blocks of language with no input in themselves, and seeing their shifting meanings as an issue worth studying. The approach does not aim for finding flawless definitions for concepts but views them as a ‘fluid set a features whose patterns depend on which elements are included or excluded’ from them, as Michael Freeden (2011, 77–78) notes. The focus is not on the concept itself, but on how it has been perceived and what it has been made to be. According to Hans Eric Bödeker (2011, 34), Reinhart Koselleck worded this by stressing that concepts in themselves have no history, it is their reception that has. This notion is based on the way Koselleck distinguishes words from concepts. His stand can be summarized so that a word appears stable and can be defined, a concept is conflicting and can only be interpreted (Bödeker 2011, 29).

However, conceptual history does not study merely the meanings given to concepts (what they are) but it can also examine how the concepts have impacted history (what they have done) (Freeden 2011, 91). This notion expresses well the premise that concepts as parts of speech acts and texts do not merely describe the reality, but instead they also shape it. Furthermore, they do not exist on their own; they are connected to other speech-acts and texts. This is why conceptual history analyses concepts as parts of broader network of propositions, presentations and definitions. Separating a concept from its surroundings does not enable finding how it interacts with other concepts or the sematic field and ideational context it is put in (Freeden 2011, 74).

The method is employed by different branches of political sciences, such as political theory, history of political study, political ideologies as well as by scholars of history and philosophy. It is not tied to a specific theory in itself, but since it its fundamental premises

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2 Reinhart Koselleck (1923–2006) was an eminent historian and father of the Germany based school of conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte). My references to Koselleck are based on writings of several authors in Sebástian (edit.) (2011): New Approaches to Conceptual History. Political Concepts and Time. Since these references are not first-hand, there is more room for construction and possible distortion.
claim that linguistic actions include use of power and choice, conceptual analysis cannot be completely unaffected by ideologies, historical experiences and receptions of relating concepts. Perspective is essential part of conceptual history, since one cannot operate on rich political concepts without operating from some ideological or theoretical perspective.

According to Bödeker (2011, 33), Koselleck also stated that differences in linguistic usage go hand in hand with differences in thinking. This is what makes conceptual history such a useful and abundant approach for studying political theories and thinking. By looking into similarities and differences in chosen concepts and their relations to other concepts, it is possible to chart actor’s positioning on theoretical field, on-going debate or ideology. Conceptual history can therefore be described as a way of reading that recognises social and political context and as such has strong source critical element attached to it (Bödeker 2011, 26). In this study, conceptual history is used to strategy of the EU and through that examining what the EU priorities and how it positions itself in the global field.

In addition to reading into how the concept is used, conceptual history includes a premise that a concept may be present even if a word is absent (Freeden 2011, 89; Burke 2011, 108). This demonstrates well the depths conceptual history can be taken to. However, in all its possibilities the method includes some risks, namely total or hopeless relativism. Kari Palonen (2011, 180) borrows Koselleck as he explains that total relativism follows from applying definition, which itself includes expressions that are defined or relativized. Therefore one has to distinguish between the analytical, defining categories through which they operate and the subject matters that are analysed (ibid.) This notion is an important one, since the way conceptual history reads texts takes nothing as given, yet every concept cannot be opened for discussion at once.

Another example of potential minefield is the ‘Mannheim’s paradox’ where an attempt to establish a non-evaluative conception of ideology as socially relative thought lead Karl Mannheim to ideologically favour relativism (Freeden 2011, 80). This summarizes well conceptual history’s sensitivity to choices, both as a subject of study and as part of doing analyses.
2.2. Resilience in psychology

Words *resilience* (noun) and *resilient* (adjective) have derived from the Latin word *resilire* meaning, “to rebound, recoil” or “act of rebounding” (Harper 2016). This idea of response or recovery is still present in today’s understanding of the word. For example, the literal applications the Oxford Dictionary offers for resilience are ‘the action or an act of rebounding or springing back’ and ‘elasticity’. In addition to it is meaning in common language, resilience is a widely employed concept in different fields of academic research. The concept is generally considered to belong to psychology, where it refers to individual’s ability to attain positive development under a challenging situation. Resilience was brought front to psychology from child psychiatry and development psychology (Vernon 2004, 14) and has therefore been commonly related to children and adolescents (e.g. Liebenberg & Ungar 2009).

In psychology the importance of carefully defining processes and contributing factors is great, since it reflects on how they are researched. When studying attributes in real people, the measured factors need to be precisely qualified from the point of view of the study. Therefore psychological literature contains several definitions of the same concepts. Results of a research offering support for certain views of resilience are often adaptable only in the same context that was chosen for the research. This scientific journey includes errors and incompatible definitions. Support for theories has to be conducted from small pieces, which can then be combined to gain a wider view. In order to get a grip on the bigger picture I have studied several psychological conceptual analyses, especially ones by Marie Earvolino-Ramirez (2007) and Mary Joe Garcia-Dia et al. (2013). Based on them, I will begin opening the concept of resilience focusing on the features essential for multidisciplinary use of the concept.

It is worth noticing that although resilience is most often approached from an individual’s point of view, it is also studied as a collective phenomenon. There are, for example, studies of *national resilience* (e.g. Gorosht & Eshel 2013) and *community resilience* (e.g. Davis et al. 2005). However, since these conceptual analyses of psychological resilience emphasize the aspects of concept that are most commonly present in literature, they tend to approach it from a point of view of an individual. Consequently, some of the attributes cannot be
directly applied to groups of people, but they are still brought out since they offer important insight on what type of features impact resilience in general.

Although resilience is often described as ability, it is nowadays not considered a permanent quality. It is rather seen as a process that needs a certain kind of antecedent in order to begin. The main antecedent for resilience is adversity, which distinguishes resilience from social management and personality traits (Earvolino-Ramirez 2007, 78). According to Earvolino-Ramirez, adversity includes aspects such as challenge, change and distribution (ibid.) In order for resilience to occur, an individual has to confront a deeply stressful or challenging situation, such as a natural disaster or a dysfunctional family environment. Furthermore, the individual has to interpret the adverse situation as traumatic for physical and/or psychological health and have a realistic understanding of the situation. Then the individual may accept the events in hand and developing mechanisms for coping can emerge (Garcia-Dia et al. 2013, 267). In the beginning of this process emphasis is therefore on how the individual perceives the adverse event.

On the other end of the process are outcomes, meaning the consequences of resilience. The most important outcome is effective coping. It can be described as successfully dealing with adversity while maintaining the ability to live to the fullest (ibid.) Other consequences that characterise resilience are positive adaptation (beneficial recovery), mastery (seizing a fine skill or knowledge) and integration (age appropriate level of learning and social skills (Earvolino-Ramirez 2007, 78; Garcia-Dia et al. 2013, 267). Therefore, the overall consequence of resilience is positive development. It is good to be aware of the lack of consensus among psychologist on what degree of ‘positive’ this development has to be in order to refer to resilience. The discussion is multivoiced and too wide for being decently covered here. It is, however, worth mentioning that effusive interpretations, where the development has to lead to ‘flourishing’, are not very common. According to Windle (2011, 159) they are mainly related to positive psychology, which holds a different view on humanity than most fields of psychology.

Defining antecedents and outcomes forms a frame for resilience and a context in which it is relevant. However, they represent only half of the defining attributes that characterise resilience. The other half consists of the attributes that lead from adversity to successful
coping. The attributes that are most commonly related to resilience throughout literature are known as *defining attributes*. Some of the most common defining attributes are relevant only from the point of view of individual’s resilience, nor communities are nations, but from multiply of choices Garcia-Dia et al. (2013, 266) mention four: 1) *rebounding*, 2) *determination*, 3) *self-efficacy* and 4) *social support/positive relationships*. Earvolino-Ramirez (2007, 76–77) has come to a very similar conclusion, adding only *flexibility/adaptability* and *sense of humour* to the list. Rebounding, also reintegration appears to be most indubitable on other sources as well. It refers to ability to continue life “normally” while acknowledging the adverse event. An example of this would be a person with HIV, who integrated the sickness into her life by viewing it as a chronic disease instead of a death sentence and hence gain a sense of control over her disease (Garcia-Dia et al. 2013, 266). Again, the view an individual holds on her of his situation seems to be significant.

As mentioned, these defining attributes are elements that have been found to combine different studies of resilience on a wide spectrum. There are of course several other possible factors that promote resilience and contribute to each individual’s process. The elements that cumulatively lead to resilience are called *protective factors* (Garcia-Dia et al. 2013, 265). These factors are divided into internal and external according to their source. Most of the mentioned defining attributes represent abilities, qualities and characteristics of an individual and are hence internal factors. As for social support or positive relationships, their existence is strongly tied to issues outside of a person and they are therefore external factors.

Internal factors were emphasised in the beginning of resilience research (Earvolino-Ramirez 2007). In these studies resilience was described as a rather stable characteristic (Wilkes 2002, 229), and the focus was on finding why some people possess it while others do not. Longitudinal studies, where same subjects are studied for a long period of time, have offered information in support of inborn qualities and social capabilities, which may enable resilience. Examining children from challenging backgrounds until adulthood has shown some characteristics in common for those individuals, who overcome the odds and reach a stable adulthood (e.g. Werner & Smith 1982).
Research on resilience seems to have gradually increased during the past three decades. Positive factors gained support from research results, strengthening the view that some characteristics can make an individual more resilient than others. Abilities to form lasting relationships or to make plans for future were among these factors (Collishaw et al. 2007, 213; Masten et al. 2004, 1091). However, while later research continued to support the existence of positive factors, the view of stable resilience was challenged. Jeannette L. Johnson and Shelly A. Wiechelt (2004, 660–661) state the same protective factors that promote resilience for one individual might not do the same for another, even similar, individual. In addition, the protective factors that benefit an individual in one occasion might not be beneficial in another situation the same individual faces. (ibid.)

Such notions on the contextual benefits of protective factors lead to shift in research. This shift has been called ‘the second generation of resilience research’ by Glenda Wilkes (2002), who herself represents it. She also points out that the second generation is not opposite the earlier view, it actually draws from it. The idea of protective factors is still recognized but instead of focusing mainly on internal factors, research pays more attention to how the external factors impact on individual’s resilience. These external factors include social aspects, such as parental support or family cohesion, and society aspects such as institutional and economical factors (Windle 2011, 157). Resilience is nowadays viewed more as an interactive process, where many factors together can lead to positive development.

2.3. Political relevance of resilience

Understanding what fosters successful coping from adverse situations is an obvious aim for psychology. On the other hand, the idea of resilience is easily adaptable to many contexts and it has therefore become a multidisciplinary concept. People and communities face adversity constantly and continuing life can require a lot. Circumstances that are potentially socially, physically or mentally destructive can be found from every sphere of life. Taken that into account, it is not surprising that resilience seems to have become a trending word in common language. In the academic world, resilience has been studied besides biology, nursing, medicine also in ecology and business (Garcia-Dia et al. 2013, 264). It has also entered the political science, which is useful from the viewpoint of this
study. However, my choice to read political meanings to the concept would be possible even if it had not.

As a manifold and expressive concept resilience is an ideal instrument for political language. Political speech-acts are sometimes thought to be oblique, eloquent or without tangible substance. From another point of view these same features could be described highly contextual, rhetoric and ambiguous. This is in large part due to the concepts employed in political language, which often have more than one interpretation, as discussed earlier. Political concepts are used to deliver large and complicated issues in an expressive way. Taken that into account resilience, which has a positive, even appealing connotation attached to it, fits to political speech very well. It appears as an altogether empowering concept and its vagueness has actually made it easily acceptable in various political contexts (Wagner & Anholt 2016, 415).

However, I do not believe that the weight of resilience is merely rhetorical in politics or political science. Conflicts, wars, regime changes and financial crisis impact states and their citizens by causing adversity. In addition, political resilience seems to often refer to target communities, societies or even states. There are various threats present on different scales of societies, from global warming to regional disputes, and state-lead violations of human rights to racism in small communities. According to the Fragile State Index from 2015, on a scale of alert, warning, stable and sustainable only 29,2% of world’s nations are sustainable or stable while 70,2% are considered warning or alert.

This is not to say that the overall situation was worst than before, but globalisation has brought formerly distant issues closer to each other. On the one had, there is more information on what is happening across the globe and on the other, the events impact a wider sphere than before globalisation. I believe that this may have lead to increased concern and problem-oriented discussion, both on public and on private levels of society. Furthermore, this new focus of dialogue requires new tools for conceptualising current phenomena. The idea of resilience fits well in this purpose and has therefore been used in development aid and disaster management even spreading to political language more generally (Wagner & Anholt 2016, 417).
As we saw earlier, in psychology resilience appears in connection to risk. In their text Linda Liebenberg and Michael Ungar (2009, 3) describe this close linkage as inseparable:

> Ironically, we can’t study resilience without studying risk. -- Studying resilience requires that we assess the level of risk posed to children, which means that we need to get close enough to vulnerable individuals to understand their lives within the culture and context in which they live.

From the European point of view, the society has experienced several incidents in a short period of time that have effected the normal life, as it was known. The financial crisis of 2007–2008, the following Great Recession and especially the European debt crisis have challenged the discourse of financial growth. Especially the latter impacted negatively on the unity of the Union, which has shown as increased nationalism and referendums on issues related to the EU’s influence and even discontinuing membership of the Union. The unrest both inside and outside the EU’s borders has brought new sense of threat and risks to daily conversations and long-term policies.

The concept of resilience has became evidently present in policies and reports by different actors from non-governmental and large international organizations (e.g. the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)), to UN agencies and the British Department of International Development (DIFD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It has been mentioned in several EU documents as well, surely in 2012 but possibly even earlier. (Wagner & Anholt 2016, 416–417.)

According to Ana E. Juncos (2016) in the EU’s usage of resilience is connected to a pragmatic turn in social sciences. In other words, the concept is connected to a shift a focus from preventing known threats to a new governmental logic, which views threats as unpredictable due to their complexity and uncertainty. This applies to both: political practice and theory. Her view aligns with the connection between risk and resilience, since resilience, as ability, is not specific action aiming at preventing a risk, but instead confronts risk comprehensively. Therefore, when resilience is connected to this pragmatic view, it emphasizes possibilities of transformation and learning processes as ways of responding to potential risk. (Juncos 2016, 4–6.) This interesting notion will be regarded in more detail in the following chapters.
3 RESILIENCE IN THE GLOBAL STRATEGY

3.1. Presenting the research material

The European Union published its global strategy, which is the first of its kind. The previous similar document, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was published in 2003, and concerns a narrower set of issues and is rather different in nature. While the earlier strategy focused mainly on the Union’s inner matters and values, this new strategy paints a picture of the EU in the stage of global community. Due to the differences between these documents, I decided to study the global strategy as a separate document instead of comparing it to its predecessor.

The strategy was published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and presented by Federica Mogherin, who is High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. However, the EUGS does not present merely the views of the EEAS, since it is a product of broad conversation. The European Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the Strategic Planning Division of the EEAS have worked closely in preparing this strategy. The groundwork included outreach events in many EU capitals, gathering Members of the European Parliament and Prime Ministers, as well as events organised by national parliaments. One of these outreach events was held in Helsinki and hosted by the Finnish Parliament. (Missiroli 2016.)

In addition to involving several of the union’s committees and politicians from all the member states, the EUISS executed a wide consultation process, involving several academics and experts from all over the world. 50 leading analytics were asked to write a comment on what issues the EUGS should address and how. In addition a writing competition on the meaning of the EU’s security for their daily lives was held for undergraduates and graduates. The comments were collected and published as well as the winner texts from the competition. (EUISS, 2016.)

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3 These comments are available in Towards an EU global strategy – Consulting the experts (EUISS, 2016). The foreword, written by Antonio Missiroli, offers information on preparations of the EUGS, and has been a useful source in this chapter.
The wide-ranging process that preceded the EUGS implies that the leaders wanted to understand how the union is viewed from different perspectives. Inviting commentators from all over the EU, from politicians, academics and other experts such as civic organisations messages that the strategy aims for covering European Union as a society, not merely as institutions. On the other hand, including voices from all over the world – approximately half of the 50 analysts were from outside of the EU– implies that the strategy seeks to present the EU in relation to the rest of the world, acknowledging how it is viewed from the outside.

Of course, all of the ideas gathered from discussion events and comments cannot be included in the document – and such a strategy would not even be desirable. The dialogue has lead to a strategy that takes account several viewpoints, but a collection of separate opinions would make a poor strategic tool for the union’s policy. Therefore another important part of the preparations has been choosing the focus for the EU’s foreign and security policies. The strategy names five priorities of external action: 1) The Security of Our Union, 2) State and Societal Resilience to our East and South, 3) An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises, 4) Cooperative Regional Orders and 5) Global Governance for the 21st Century.

From these five priorities, the concept of resilience is employed mainly in parts of text focusing on the second and fourth; states and societies in the neighbourhood and regional orders. As mentioned, most important chapter is the 3.2. State and Societal Resilience to our East and South, which deals with the second priority. While my analysis begins with references from that particular chapter, the focus is on the general definition given to resilience. I have examined all the parts of the global strategy in which the concept of resilience is employed, and enlarged on the parts where it is given an important role. The aim is to gain understanding on how the EUGS presents resilience and what is the function of the concept. Comparison with the psychological interpretation of resilience is sometimes used as a mirror for highlighting what is essential in the EUGS’s usage. A natural starting point for analysis is to survey the definitions resilience given in the global strategy itself. I will begin by the actual definition, and then observe it in the context it is given in.
3.2. Ability to reform – the Global Strategy’s definition of resilience

In the strategy, resilience is defined as ‘the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises’ (EEAS 2016, 23). It is not presumed that this worded definition necessarily reflects all the aspects of resilience present in the text. However, this is a carefully prepared document and it is likely that such definitions are aimed to represent the exact views of writers. It is hence worth thorough concern. There are a few interesting notions to make from the definition. Firstly, resilience is regarded an ability. Secondly, it is an ability to reform, not for example an ability to recover. Withstanding and recovery are outcomes of resilience. Lastly, the antecedents can be both internal and external.

Defining resilience as ability indicates a connection to the psychological definitions. As seen earlier, describing resilience as ability is common throughout the psychological resilience research (e.g. Liebenberg & Ungar 2009, 3–5). In this, the strategy’s definition is closer to the psychological one than the common language usage of the word. From the common understandings of the latter the aspect of capability is often missing; ‘flexibility’ refers to a quality while ‘rebonding’ appears as a description of reaction or response. Deducting whether it includes an unstated idea of ability to rebound is beyond limits of reasonable.

The most interesting feature of this definition is the second notion of resilience as ‘ability to reform’. The meaning of reforming becomes evident by considering how the definition would have came across without it. Defining resilience as ‘ability to withstand and recover’, would have been quite reasonable and fit in the context. Yet, reforming indicates a stronger connection to surroundings than withstanding or recovering. In the psychological definitions of resilience we saw that the way an individual treats the occurring adverse event is crucial for emerging of resilience. The steps required for beginning of successful coping presumed realistic understanding of the situation and the potential harm it may cause.

While withstanding and recovering may lead to coping, they do not necessarily imply having a realistic outlook on faced challenges. In addition, strategically the difference between reforming to achieve restoration and imposing withstanding alongside recovery as desirable goals without naming any means for getting there, is remarkable. According to
this definition, resilience is an ability to respond, to begin a process of changes, through which recovery may be achieved. In the following chapters we will look into what specific manners of reformation process are mentioned in the strategy.

The third component in the definition is outcomes. They play a crucial role in explaining why resilience is desirable. Again, ‘recovering’ aligns with the basic idea of psychological resilience: it leads to positive development. However, in regards to the discord on how positive this development has to be, it should be mentioned that the definition strategy offers is very composed. Yet, in the context of the European Union and the crises this definition refers to, very buoyant articulations could come over rather steep. Especially ‘withstanding’ speaks of durable resistance, coping, bearing and enduring (Pocket Oxford American Thesaurus 2012, online), rather than appreciably positive development.

This idea of endurance as outcome is supported by the surrounding textual context of the definition in hand. In the text the definition of resilience is presented in contrast to fragility beyond unions borders, which ‘threatens all our vital interests’. Resilience in its turn ‘benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies’. (EEAS 2016, 23.) It appears that resilience in itself is not the goal, it is seen as the path from fragile to sustainable. Therefore, withstanding and recovering are reasonable goals. The strategy does not express desire to rapid development; instead it aims for sustainable growth and well being of societies on both sides of the union’s borders.

Finally, resilience may be present in both internal and external crises. As seen above, the resilience is presented as important for the EU and it’s neighbours. Baring in mind that this is a strategy for security and foreign policy, it is important to cover both potential sources of risk. Although the EUGS speaks of the Union as one entity and rarely refers to its members as separate actors, the fact that it is a union of many different states forces it to acknowledge the possibility that major risks come within itself. However, the actions that need to be taken in order to cope with interior risks are likely to be quite different from the ones taken under external risks. The ability to reform in both cases would indeed appear to be a good quality to possess for any global actor.
3.3. A resilient state and society

There are two approaches to the concept of resilience in the text. Before moving onto examining resilience in relation to different themes, I will open these two aspects to analyse further the meaning of resilience in the global strategy. Firstly, it used to conceptualize actual situations the EU currently deals with. This is the main purpose the concept has. Secondly, it has a more theoretical function in describing an idea of a resilient state.

When mentioned in the text, resilience is nearly always an object to a verb. The verbs that are directly related to resilience are ‘foster’, ‘invest’, ‘promote’, ‘support’, ‘enhance’, ‘nurture’ and ‘strengthen’. In addition to these there is one occasion where the EU’s will to ‘pursue a multifaceted approach to resilience’ is declared. Often these expressions are mentioned in relation to some specific subject, as we will later see. What is essential to notice here is that these expressions present resilience as an attribute, whose presence can be impacted. They describe how the EU will administer resilience and why focusing on resilience in specific areas of policy is important.

Some exceptions occur when resilience has a different place in a sentence (e.g. ‘resilience benefits us’, ‘resilience is a priority’) or when the concept is part of a list (e.g. ‘Targeted approaches to resilience, conflict prevention and resolution require deeper situational awareness’). However, the viewpoint on the concept remains the same. Resilience is connected to the real world, concrete actions may be done to elevate it and it in turn enables development that is required to secure the sustainable future of the EU.

The other aspect is present only in a few sentences. Yet, these small sections of text imply an approach to resilience that clearly differs from the one described above. They deal with an idea of a resilient state, which is related to a resilient society:

A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But the reverse holds true as well. To ensure sustainable security, it is not only state institutions that we will support. -- resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state (EEAS 2016, 23–24)
Here the concept of resilience is in the form of an adjective. The gobbet above speaks neither of some specific state or situation, nor the European Union. Although it is found under the headline of neighbour policy it of refers to an unknown resilient state and an unknown resilient society, which might as well exist anywhere or in any period of time. Reasons for this interpretation are the consistent usage of indefinite article and the overall message that resilience is matter of universal importance. That is also why this general idea of a resilient state is relevant; the European Union does not consider resilience important only for itself, but also for its diverse neighbourhood. On the other hand, conceptualising resilience in a theoretical form that can be applied generally important for the EU as well since is both a heterogeneous society of 50 billion people and an alliance of various states and societies.

How then is resilience presented in this occasion? Firstly, a state that is resilient is also secure. The wording does not reveal is the relation between these two unidirectional and causal or is it equivalent. In other words, is a secure state also a resilient one? However, since instead of expressing causality these two descriptions of a state are said to be simultaneously present, they appear somewhat parallel. As the sentence continues, clearer causality is included. Security is prerequisite for prosperity and democracy. Interestingly, democracy is said to follow security.

Furthermore, this definition goes deeper into the core of a resilient state and finds a society. This society is again resilient and related to democracy. However, on this level resilience foregrounds trust in institutions and sustainable development, instead of security or prosperity. A little later in the same chapter the relationship between a resilient state and society is mentioned again. This time the resilience of state is conditional to the society’s collective experience of ‘becoming better off’ and having ‘hope in the future’ (EEAS 2016, 26).

Ultimately the definition of resilience, the ability to reform thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises, is the same for state and society, but in addition, a state cannot be resilient unless the society within it foregrounds on democracy, manifests sustainable development and experiences ingenuousness towards institutions, hopefulness and ‘becoming better off’ (ibid).
4 RESILIENCE IN POLICY

In this chapter the focus is on different spheres of policy where resilience is applied. The aim is to gain an understanding something on what kind of policy the strategy promotes and what it attempts to express through the concept of resilience. In order to do this, I will analyse the context around the concept as well as parts of the text that are connected to resilience and repeat the idea of it, even though it was not mentioned in each sentence. However, I would like to note that even then my analysis operates through the concept of resilience, and therefore does not offer comprehensive view on all aspects and themes present at the EUGS.

First subchapter enlarges on the themes were resilience is related to the EU itself, beginning with credibility of the Union and then continuing further to security. The second subchapter explores main issues of foreign policy that are approach through resilience. There I begin with areas that the EUGS determines geographically, namely surroundings of the Union, and then continue to regions, which are addressed through the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

4.1. The EU in the global field

4.1.1 Credibility of the Union

The EU’s credibility has been questioned quite possibly ever since the Union was founded. The question of credibility is relevant in case of any global actor, since they all operate on a field that is changing, beyond national legislations and impossible to demarcate or cover fully with international laws. That is why I will begin my analysis of the Union’s policy from the point of view of credibility and its relation to resilience.

Credibility is recognised in the EUGS as something needed in order to ‘engage responsibly with the world’ (EEAS 2016, 44). The global strategy includes various proposed ways for promoting credibility, which can however be considered rather idealistic. In the same breath with ‘living up to our values’ it repeatedly mentions that the EU will ‘foster the resilience of its democracies’. According to EUGS the extend to which the Union remains
constant to the values it was build on, will determine its influence and externally evaluated credibility. (EEAS 2016, 8, 15.) These values include human rights, fundamental freedoms and rule of law, which are written out as justice, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination, pluralism and respect for diversity (EEAS 2016, 15). This is further connected to fostering the resilience of democracies.

While there are no means mentioned for fostering resilience per se, ways for safeguarding the democracies or their ‘quality’ can be found. They are attempted to achieve by all-embracing respect of international, European and national laws (EEAS 2016, 15, 19) alongside managing ‘interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world’ (EEAS 2016, 8). It appears that obedience to laws and bearing the partial lack of independence combined with loyalty to the Union’s values, is the strategy’s recipe for credibility. In addition, the EU’s credibility is said to hinge on unity, numerous former achievements, effective and consistent policymaking, power of attraction and adherence to values (EEAS 2016, 10). This raises two questions: Does the EU’s credibility deficit truly trace back to the level of values, or could it be caused namely by lack of capacity for external action? Secondly, what actually is in need of resilience and why? I will return to the first question later and focus now on the latter, which is more relevant from the point of view of this study.

Concluding what actually is in need of fostering resilience is complicated. On the one hand ‘its democracies’ seems to refer to the Union’s members in general, not in their democratic aspect in particular. Bearing in mind that this discussion belongs to the theme of resilience, resilient member states would probably promote Union’s credibility as a global actor. On the other hand, democracy and credibility are strongly connected in the text, and the member states are referred to as ‘democracies’ only in this specific context. This would imply that it is the democratic aspect in particular that needs more resilience. Therefore I assume that while the expression refers to the member states, the choice of wording deliberately implies to democracy as well.

What then causes the need for more resilience? Surprisingly, the EUGS does not name any antecedents of resilience directly. There is however several risks mentioned throughout the wider context of the global strategy. Finding them requires looking for the idea of
resilience, even when the concept itself is not mentioned. The narrative of risks and coping by reforming was the core of the definition of resilience and it is essential in the chapters of security policy as well.

4.1.2. Security of the Union

Juncos’ earlier discussed notion on the EU’s pragmatist turn seems to be reasonable, since the EUGS presents risks as a complex ensemble of interconnected problems. Although many security hazards are listed, the focus is not on preventing specific threats but on enhancing Union’s security comprehensively through ‘a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world’. (EEAS 2016, 14.) The overall stress of the security discourse seems to be on the Union’s capability and ability to manage risks, not on the risks per se. However, since the way an individual or group recognises challenges in relation to self, is an important precondition for resilience, it is interesting to enlarge on how the strategy describes risks.

Some of the risks are old enemies, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organized crime, which were all already mentioned in the strategy of 2003. Energy (in)security, climate change and cyber security were added to the ESS in 2008, and have remained increasingly relevant in the new strategy. (Smith 2016, 448.) Some new ones are mentioned as well, hybrid threats and economic volatility representing the more concrete end (Mäksoo 2016, 382). Interestingly, the EUGS treats all of these threats as new ones, repeatedly referring to the decades of ‘unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity’ of the union, which ‘yet today’ are challenged. (EEAS 2016, 9,18). Occasional elaborations bring these threats to the more specific context of recent history: ‘terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle, as well as Europe itself’ (EEAS 2016, 13).

Since the security is one of the two mainstreams of the EUGS, the topic is covered rather widely. From to point of view of this study and resilience, analysing all of the discussion would not be relevant, so I will focus on the only aspect directly linked to resilience, alongside the general approach the EU takes on the risks. Resilience is mentioned when dealing with cyber security, which is an important part of the security policy. The EU plans to focus more on resilience of vital infrastructure, networks and service (EEAS 2016, 22).
The Union’s resilience will also be enhanced through cyber security, by developing digital services and products alongside cyber technology. Investing in cyber technology is one of the ways through which the EU attempts to build its credibility in security, defence and external action. (EEAS 2016, 44–45.) This notion takes us back to the question of what is in the core of credibility deficit. The EUGS is a net of multidimensional claims and speech acts, which makes it impossible to analyse it comprehensively through one concept. On the other hand, it is simultaneously data for research.

In addition to these specific threats, the EUGS speaks of security also on a deeper, more profound level. It states that the lifestyle and values characterising the Europeans are now confronted by ‘the politics of fear’. To conquer this kind of risk, ‘a step change is essential’. (EEAS 2016, 19.) The overview on security is a romanticised picture of princess Europa in serious yet unformed danger. As a response, the EUGS focuses of building Europe that cannot be destroyed and that will survive even from unpredictable crises. Although the strategy recognizes and even highlights the interactive side of security, there is also a clear emphasis on the bottom up-development. This is evident in the opening line of the chapter on security: ‘Global Strategy starts at home’ (EEAS 2016, 18) which is written out as Europeans ability to ‘protect Europe, respond to external crises and assist in developing our partners’ security and defence capacities’ (EEAS 2016, 19). Underlining internal resources, the people and the Union’s ability as key for security aligns with the EUGS’s definition of resilience.

4.2. The Surroundings of the EU

In the context of foreign policy, the EUGS applies resilience very coherently to the same, often-repeated targets: states, societies and countries. In contrast, the countries and regions concerned vary greatly both in geographic location and in their meaning to the EU. The rough understanding of surrounding regions makes it interesting to examine closely where the EU places resilience.

4.2.1 East, south and surrounding regions

Resilience is most often mentioned in relation ‘to our East and South’ and ‘in the surrounding regions’ of the EU. Sometimes the expressions of cardinal points are defined
as Central Asia and Central Africa. It is worth noticing, that when the former is concerned, the preposition expresses always direction ‘to’ or ‘stretching into/down to’. When talking about surroundings or the less mentioned neighbourhood, the preposition is always ‘in’. This is the first indicator of the EU’s work on resilience; in addition to being internal matter of the Union, it occurs in its surroundings and spreads to countries further to countries far away.

Although stretching to such a distance may seem exaggerated, the EUGS reasons it with a deep concern that investing in the resilience of states and societies in between the Union’s borders and central parts of the surrounding continents is in the interest of the Union’s citizens. By contrast, ‘fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests’. (EEAS 2016, 23.) Here resilience is presented as a stabilising element, whose presence may and will be supported widely in foreign policy. The most concrete means for investing in resilience in relation to the Union’s east and south are focusing on and targeting most acute dimension of fragility where ‘a meaningful difference’ can be made. (EEAS 2016, 25).

It is left to the reader to decide if this aimed difference is meaningful primarily from the point of view of the EU, the countries concerned or if they are mutually beneficial to both. Although cynicism is not a fruitful filter for analysis, the EUGS clearly reasons its ambition for promoting resilience abroad with its own interests. While resilience, as it is defined in the EUGS, is desirable for all parties, there might be different views on what are the most acute dimensions of fragility. Later on in the same chapter the EUGS includes a note that clarifies its priorities: ‘A special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees’ (EEAS 2016, 27). This also explains why the surroundings were stretched over Middle East to and both sides of Sahara.⁴

The EU’s migration policy has proven to be lacking resilience. The EUGS answers to this need with and an impressive list of changes: stepping humanitarian efforts, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation, working with origin countries to prevent displacement, improving reception, offering education, making returns more effective, 

⁴ Migration Policy Institute (MPI) offers interactive maps that allow examining figures of international migration by country of origin and destination based on UN calculations. Figures from Immigrant and Emigrant Populations are available from last year and on Refugees and Asylum Seeker Population from years 2000–2015 (see list of references).
enhancing legislation and finally, developing new approaches to migration with countries of transit and origin. Some of these approaches will be common and other tailor-made (ibid.). Tailor-made policies are mentioned also in relation to the surrounding regions more generally, alongside pursuing ‘a multifaceted approach to resilience’ (EEAS 2016, 25).

Michael E. Smith (2016, 450–452) evaluates that enhancing resilience in the Union’s biggest problems are currently enhancing resilience in the surroundings together with integrated approach to conflicts and crises (which was one the five priorities of external action). He is not convinced that the EU is able to materialize the core of the ideological, ambitious goals the EUGS presents, since he states that the most important parts of the strategy are also the least coherent.

The EUGS indeed presents a variegated group of solutions for promoting resilience in the surrounding regions – in addition to the ones already mention concerning migration policy. When means vary from fighting poverty to encouraging energy liberalisation and from deepening relationship between governments and civil societies to fostering pluralism and respect (EEAS 2016, 26–27), it appears that the EUGS aims for omnipresence. This approach might be caused by the strategy’s definition of resilience: when reform is the primary way for responding to conflict, it leads to temptation to reform everything. Smith also notes that stressing reform may lead to ‘accepting severe problems as a given rather than attempting to diagnose their root causes’ (ibid.)

4.2.2. Resilience in and beyond Neighbourhood

In addition to merely geographical articulations, the EUGS defines regions through the Union’s policies: the enlargement policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The enlargement policy and credible accession process within it is essential for enhancing resilience in the Western Balkans and Turkey. However, the EUGS does not rule other possible candidates either, since it is mentioned that ‘any European state which respects and promotes the values enshrined in our Treaties’ may apply for a membership. Apparently every country that shall do so will in return experience enhanced resilience as a product of the Unions credible enlargement policy. (EEAS 2016, 24.)
The EUGS states that resilience is a strategic priority in countries within and beyond the ENP, some of which wish to come closer to the EU, while others ‘have no wish to do so’ (EEAS 2016, 25). The reluctance for cooperation some parties may show has also been referred in relation to promoting human rights –as part of enhancing resilience in surroundings– through dialogue and support ‘including the most difficult cases’. (EEAS 2016, 26). One of these strategically challenging cases is mentioned by name a little later under the European Security Order: Russia (EEAS 2016, 33–34). According to the EUGS, the Union will not accept Russia’s destabilising actions in Ukraine nor recognise Crimea as part of it. Instead, resilience of Eastern borders will be enhanced as well as regions’ right to choose their approach towards the Union (ibid).

This takes us back to the issue of credibility: after the EU’s relatively weak earlier performance in relation to instability in its neighbourhood, is it a reasonable basis for the strategy? Smith (2016, 453) even mentions that during Russia’s intervention both Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine 2014, were the EU’s ENP partners, and asks how the Neighbourhood Policy is still supposed to attract countries in a meaningful way. Bearing in mind that all of the North African countries all ENP partners as well, the Union’s capability to promote resilience in its neighbourhood has not been very convincing in the recent past. In addition, influence through the enlargement policy does not seem very credible either, since it is hard to imagine which country from the neighbourhood would have actual membership potential in the near future.

However, there are elements in the EUGS that might explain this seemingly inconsistent logic. Besides the lists of changes and investments on ways for promoting resilience, there is also a note on long-term commitment to civil society, since ‘positive change can only be home-grown, and may take years to materialise.’ (EEAS 2016, 27.) Although this statement includes the idea of the EU’s commitment, it simultaneously delivers a message of a change that begins within a society and cannot be planted from outside. This refers back to the definition of resilience as path for sustainable development and on the other hand it could be the Union’s backdoor out of responsibility.
5 CONCLUSION

The concept of resilience is a strategic priority in the EU’s global strategy. It is given important roles as a securer of democracy, a building block of sustainable growth and a path to a safer neighbourhood. It is associated with some of the core characteristic of the Union, which have experienced decrease in endorsement and been offered as a solution for issues the Union has never succeeded in. The concept of resilience is easy to apply in different contexts, and the EUGS exploits this to a great extend.

In the psychology, models of process have risen as the most important views for interpreting resilience, and the EU’s definition aligns with this trend. The first condition for emerging of psychological resilience is an individual’s attitude towards a risk or faced adversity, followed by a process that requires internal attributes and external support to succeed. Similarly the EUGS words that a state cannot be resilient if the society in its core does not possess resilience, trust for institutions and democracy. The EU’s resilience relies mainly on internal factors and resilience is presented as home-grown attribute. The EUGS does not mention any external factors that would support the EU’s resilience, although ‘a solid transatlantic partnership’ will help the Union in addressing promoting resilience abroad (EEAS 2016, 37).

To balance this lack of external protective factors, the EU has added it’s own special feature to the definition of resilience – reforming. While this aligns with the idea of a process, it is not present in the psychological definition of resilience, but instead appears as the EU’s own addition. It is part of the logic Juncos (2016, 4–6) refers to as pragmatic turn, where risks are complex and unpredictable and the focus is on endurance instead of mere prevention. Simultaneously, making reforming a key strategic element serves as reasoning for new policies. It also distinguishes resilience from stability, which ‘would also apply to a dictatorship such as Belarus, and this is not what we want’ as one of Wagner and Anholts’ (2016, 418) interviewee stated. It appears that employing resilience was a carefully considered strategic choice, designed to serve as both justification and desirable goal in policymaking.

On another hand resilience is aimed to promote the EU’s values: it is linked to democracy, peace-building and sustainable development. It is also connected to impact beyond the
Unions borders, which can be considered one of the most important aims for the strategy. The importance or resilience seems to lay in its potential to protect and foster the issues that are closest to the EU’s heart. Regardless of the source of challenges, be they internal or external, resilience plays a significant role in the solution. This is evident in the amount of contexts resilience is mentioned in. The definition of resilience appears to be rather consistent throughout the EUGS, although there are differences in how deeply the idea of the concept is present. In some occasions, for example in relation to cyber security, resilience does not express the whole idea of reforming as a path to recovery, yet the meaning is still not conflicting with the actual definition discussed in third chapter.

However, the use of resilience is not completely clear. The various verbs implying the EU’s aim to support resilience do no offer a watertight plan for doing that. Further confusion is due to the fact that the EUGS appears to see a need for more resilience everywhere: in its infrastructure, in its democracies, in itself and most importantly in the states and societies of its surroundings. Approaching all these aspects simultaneously does not come across as very effective strategy, even though some prioritising is done when the surroundings are named as the most important focus in terms of resilience. The most emphasized means for promoting resilience in the neighbourhood are policies that have existed for quite some time. There are some new aspects or nuances, such as tailor-made policies (EEAS 2016, 25), but despite of them resilience appears to be the most important new innovation.

This reissuing of the ENP policy and the EU’s power of attraction are done in the same vain with representing all the main security threats as new ones. The thirteen years since the EES enable launching a new strategy without constantly referring to the previous one. However, the EUGS seems to be nearly rootless as it highlights the current state without recognising that many of today’s security threats were already present thirteen years ago, or at least in the updated version of the ESS published in 2008. Similarly, the unrest and fragility beyond the EU’s borders is not a new phenomenon, although it has recently taken new forms and impacted the Union’s internal matters more than previously. Resilience seems to be a tool for patching up the deficiency of the Union and speaking of old enemies as new ones, dismissing the fact that this is not the first time the EU tries to address them.
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ATTACHMENT

Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe

A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy
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The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before. Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens’ lives. In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together. This is even more true after the British referendum. We will indeed have to rethink the way our Union works, but we perfectly know what to work for. We know what our principles, our interests and our priorities are. This is no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a Strategy. We need a shared vision, and common action.

None of our countries has the strength nor the resources to address these threats and seize the opportunities of our time alone. But as a Union of almost half a billion citizens, our potential is unparalleled. Our diplomatic network runs wide and deep in all corners of the globe. Economically, we are in the world’s G3. We are the first trading partner and the first foreign investor for almost every country in the globe. Together we invest more in development cooperation than the rest of the world combined. It is also clear, though, that we are not making full use of this potential yet. A vast majority of our citizens understands that we need to collectively take responsibility for our role in the world. And wherever I travel, our partners expect the European Union to play a major role, including as a global security provider. We will deliver on our citizens’ needs and make our partnerships work only if we act together, united. This is exactly the aim of the Global Strategy for European Foreign and Security Policy.
“Global” is not just intended in a geographical sense: it also refers to the wide array of policies and instruments the Strategy promotes. It focuses on military capabilities and anti-terrorism as much as on job opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It deals with peace-building and the resilience of States and societies, in and around Europe. The European Union has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so, because we are the best in this field. However, the idea that Europe is an exclusively “civilian power” does not do justice to an evolving reality. For instance, the European Union currently deploys seventeen military and civilian operations, with thousands of men and women serving under the European flag for peace and security – our own security, and our partners’. For Europe, soft and hard power go hand in hand.

The Strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union. This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values. Yet we know that such priorities are best served when we are not alone. And they are best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism. This is no time for global policemen and lone warriors. Our foreign and security policy has to handle global pressures and local dynamics, it has to cope with super-powers as well as with increasingly fractured identities. Our Union will work to strengthen our partners: We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO, while we will also connect to new players and explore new formats. We will invest in regional orders, and in cooperation among and within regions. And we will promote reformed global governance, one that can meet the challenges of this 21st century. We will engage in a practical and principled way, sharing global responsibilities with our partners and contributing to their strengths. We have learnt the lesson: my neighbour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses. So we will invest in win-win solutions, and move beyond the illusion that international politics can be a zero-sum game.

All of this will make each of our Member States – and each citizen of our Union – better off. All these goals can only be achieved by a truly united and committed Europe. Joining all our cultures together to achieve our shared goals and serve our common interests is a daily challenge, but it is also our greatest strength: diversity is what makes us strong.

Yes, our interests are indeed common European interests: the only way to serve them is by common means. This is why we have a collective responsibility to make our Union a stronger Union. The people of Europe
need unity of purpose among our Member States, and unity in action across our policies. A fragile world calls for a more confident and responsible European Union, it calls for an outward- and forward-looking European foreign and security policy. This Global Strategy will guide us in our daily work towards a Union that truly meets its citizens’ needs, hopes and aspirations; a Union that builds on the success of 70 years of peace; a Union with the strength to contribute to peace and security in our region and in the whole world.

Federica Mogherini
We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects.

We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological progress – alongside our deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.

1. Our Shared Interests and Principles

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders.
The EU will advance the prosperity of its people. Prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals worldwide, including in Europe. A prosperous Union also hinges on an open and fair international economic system and sustainable access to the global commons. The EU will foster the resilience of its democracies. Consistently living up to our values will determine our external credibility and influence.

The EU will promote a rules-based global order. We have an interest in promoting agreed rules to provide global public goods and contribute to a peaceful and sustainable world. The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core.

We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.

In a more complex world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world.

In a more connected world, the EU will engage with others. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging the wider world.

In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. We will engage responsibly across Europe and the surrounding regions to the east and south. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights.

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external partnerships. In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key players in a networked world.
2. The Priorities of our External Action

To promote our shared interests, adhering to clear principles, the EU will pursue five priorities.

The Security of our Union. The EU Global Strategy starts at home. Our Union has enabled citizens to enjoy unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity. Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity endanger our people and territory. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders. We will therefore enhance our efforts on defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy and strategic communications. Member States must translate their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties into action. The EU will step up its contribution to Europe’s collective security, working closely with its partners, beginning with NATO.

State and Societal Resilience to our East and South. It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa. Under the current EU enlargement policy, a credible accession process grounded in strict and fair conditionality is vital to enhance the resilience of countries in the Western Balkans and of Turkey. Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), many people wish to build closer relations with the Union: our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation in these countries. But resilience is also a priority in other countries within and beyond the ENP. The EU will support different paths to resilience, targeting the most acute cases of governmental, economic, societal and climate/energy fragility, as well as develop more effective migration policies for Europe and its partners.

An Integrated Approach to Conflicts. When violent conflicts erupt, our shared vital interests are threatened. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, and foster human security through an integrated approach. Implementing the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ through a coherent use of all policies at the EU’s disposal is essential. But the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded. The EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, responding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilisation, and avoiding premature disengagement.
when a new crisis erupts. The EU will act at different levels of governance: conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya have local, national, regional and global dimensions which must be addressed. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by us alone. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships, which the EU will foster and support.

**Cooperative Regional Orders.** In a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore. Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU’s own peace and development in the 21st century, and this is why we will support cooperative regional orders worldwide. In different regions – in Europe; in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa; across the Atlantic, both north and south; in Asia; and in the Arctic – the EU will be driven by specific goals.

**Global Governance for the 21st Century.** The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system. The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated responses with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors.

3. From Vision to Action

We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent way. To fulfil our goals, we must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union.

**A Credible Union.** To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is vital. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values. A stronger Union also requires investing in all dimensions of foreign policy. In particular, investment in security and defence is a matter of urgency. Full spectrum defence
capabilities are necessary to respond to external crises, build our partners' capacities, and to guarantee Europe's safety. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, to acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, defence cooperation must become the norm. The EU will systematically encourage defence cooperation and strive to create a solid European defence industry, which is critical for Europe's autonomy of decision and action.

**A Responsive Union.** Our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. The Common Security and Defence Policy must become more responsive. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored, and might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential. Development policy also needs to become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities.

**A Joined-up Union.** We must become more joined up across our external policies, between Member States and EU institutions, and between the internal and external dimensions of our policies. This is particularly relevant to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals, migration, and security, notably counter-terrorism. We must also systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions.

This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of and ambition for a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference in the world. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others. It is now up to us to translate this into action.
We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects. We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned. To the east, the European security order has been violated, while terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East, as well as Europe itself. Economic growth is yet to outpace demography in parts of Africa, security tensions in Asia are mounting, while climate change causes further disruption. Yet these are also times of extraordinary opportunity. Global growth, mobility, and technological progress – alongside our deepening partnerships – enable us to thrive, and allow ever more people to escape poverty and live longer and freer lives. We will navigate this difficult, more connected, contested and complex world guided by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded in the values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its collective role in the world.

1. A Global Strategy to Promote our Citizens’ Interests

Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action.
“Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests.”

**Peace and Security**

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. This means that Europeans, working with partners, must have the necessary capabilities to defend themselves and live up to their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties.

“Europeans, working with partners, must have the necessary capabilities to defend themselves and live up to their commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity enshrined in the Treaties. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions.”

Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world.

**Prosperity**

The EU will advance the prosperity of its people. This means promoting growth, jobs, equality, and a safe and healthy environment. While a prosperous Union is the basis for a stronger Europe in the world, prosperity must be shared and requires fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) worldwide, including in Europe. Furthermore, with most world growth expected to take place outside the EU in near future, trade and investment will increasingly underpin our prosperity: a prosperous Union
hinges on a strong internal market and an open international economic system. We have an interest in fair and open markets, in shaping global economic and environmental rules, and in sustainable access to the global commons through open sea, land, air and space routes. In view of the digital revolution, our prosperity also depends on the free flow of information and global value chains facilitated by a free and secure Internet.

**Democracy**

The EU will foster the resilience of its democracies, and live up to the values that have inspired its creation and development. These include respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. They encompass justice, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination, pluralism, and respect for diversity. Living up consistently to our values internally will determine our external credibility and influence.

“Living up consistently to our values internally will determine our external credibility and influence.”

To safeguard the quality of our democracies, we will respect domestic, European and international law across all spheres, from migration and asylum to energy, counter-terrorism and trade. Remaining true to our values is a matter of law as well as of ethics and identity.

**A Rules-Based Global Order**

The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. As a Union of medium-to-small sized countries, we have a shared European interest in facing the world together. Through our combined weight, we can promote agreed rules to contain power politics and contribute to a peaceful, fair and prosperous world. The Iranian nuclear agreement is a clear illustration of this fact. A multilateral order grounded in international law, including the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is the only guarantee
for peace and security at home and abroad. A rules-based global order unlocks the full potential of a prosperous Union with open economies and deep global connections, and embeds democratic values within the international system.

2. The Principles Guiding our External Action

We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic assessment of the strategic environment as from an idealistic aspiration to advance a better world. In charting the way between the Scylla of isolationism and the Charybdis of rash interventionism, the EU will engage the world manifesting responsibility towards others and sensitivity to contingency. Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.

“Principled pragmatism will guide our external action in the years ahead.”

Unity

In a more complex world of global power shifts and power diffusion, the EU must stand united. Forging unity as Europeans – across institutions, states and peoples – has never been so vital nor so urgent. Never has our unity been so challenged. Together we will be able to achieve more than Member States acting alone or in an uncoordinated manner. There is no clash between national and European interests. Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together.

“Forcing unity as Europeans has never been so vital nor so urgent. There is no clash between national and European interests. Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together.”

clash between national and European interests. Our shared interests can only be served by standing and acting together. Only the combined weight of a true union has the potential to deliver security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive difference in the world. The interests of our citizens are best served through unity of purpose between Member
Europe’s values and interests: Europe’s values and interests will be expressed through the actions of its representatives. The Union will ensure that its interests and values are taken into account in any engagement with others. The Union’s unity will be based on solidarity and mutual trust, and on the capacity of its citizens to engage constructively with the wider world.

States and across institutions, and unity in action by implementing together coherent policies.

**Engagement**

In a more connected world, the EU will reach out and engage with others. In light of global value chains, galloping technological advances and growing migration, the EU will participate fully in the global marketplace and co-shape the rules that govern it. The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. Retreat from the world only deprives us of the opportunities that a connected world presents.

“The Union cannot pull up a drawbridge to ward off external threats. Retreat from the world only deprives us of the opportunities that a connected world presents.”

Environmental degradation and resource scarcity know no borders, neither do transnational crime and terrorism. The external cannot be separated from the internal. In fact, internal policies often deal only with the consequences of external dynamics. We will manage interdependence, with all the opportunities, challenges and fears it brings about, by engaging in and with the wider world.

**Responsibility**

In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. There is no magic wand to solve crises: there are no neat recipes to impose solutions elsewhere. However, responsible engagement

“We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights.”
can bring about positive change. We will therefore act promptly to prevent violent conflict, be able and ready to respond responsibly yet decisively to crises, facilitate locally owned agreements, and commit long-term. We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights.

**Partnership**

The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Co-responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order.

“The EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships.”

In pursuing our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations. We will work with core partners, like-minded countries and regional groupings. We will partner selectively with players whose cooperation is necessary to deliver global public goods and address common challenges. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key actors in a networked world. We will do so through dialogue and support, but also through more innovative forms of engagement.

**3. The Priorities of our External Action**

To promote our shared interests, adhering to clear principles, we will pursue five broad priorities.

**3.1 The Security of Our Union**

The EU Global Strategy starts at home. Over the decades, our Union has enabled citizens to enjoy unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity. We will build on these achievements in the years ahead. Yet today terrorism, hybrid threats, climate change, economic volatility and
“The EU Global Strategy starts at home. To preserve and develop what we achieved so far, a step change is essential. We must translate our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity into action.”

energy insecurity endanger our people and territory. The politics of fear challenges European values and the European way of life. To preserve and develop what we achieved so far, a step change is essential. To guarantee our security, promote our prosperity and safeguard our democracies, we will strengthen ourselves on security and defence in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law. We must translate our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity into action, and contribute more to Europe’s collective security through five lines of action.

**Security and Defence**

As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend its members – most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.

Europeans must be able to protect Europe, respond to external crises, and assist in developing our partners’ security and defence capacities, carrying out these tasks in cooperation with others. Alongside external crisis management and capacity-building, the EU should also be able to assist in protecting its Members upon their request, and its institutions.
This means living up to our commitments to mutual assistance and solidarity and includes addressing challenges with both an internal and external dimension, such as terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber and energy security, organised crime and external border management. For instance, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations can work alongside the European Border and Coast Guard and EU specialised agencies to enhance border protection and maritime security in order to save more lives, fight cross-border crime and disrupt smuggling networks.

When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two. In this context, the EU needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defence is essential also for the sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States.

Member States need the technological and industrial means to acquire and sustain those capabilities which underpin their ability to act autonomously. While defence policy and spending remain national prerogatives, no Member State can afford to do this individually: this requires a concerted and cooperative effort. Deeper defence cooperation engenders interoperability, effectiveness, efficiency and trust: it increases the output of defence spending. Developing and maintaining defence capabilities requires both investments and optimising the use of national resources through deeper cooperation.

The EU will assist Member States and step up its contribution to Europe’s security and defence in line with the Treaties. Gradual synchronisation
and mutual adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices can enhance strategic convergence between Member States. Union funds to support defence research and technologies and multinational cooperation, and full use of the European Defence Agency’s potential are essential prerequisites for European security and defence efforts underpinned by a strong European defence industry.

**Counter-terrorism**

Major terrorist attacks have been carried out on European soil and beyond. Increased investment in and solidarity on counter-terrorism are key. We will therefore encourage greater information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Member States and EU agencies. This entails shared alerts on violent extremism, terrorist networks and foreign terrorist fighters, as well as monitoring and removing unlawful content from the media. Alongside, the EU will support the swift recovery of Members States in the event of attacks through enhanced efforts on security of supply, the protection of critical infrastructure, and strengthening the voluntary framework for cyber crisis management. We will deepen work on education, communication, culture, youth and sport to counter violent extremism. We will work on counter-radicalisation by broadening our partnerships with civil society, social actors, the private sector and the victims of terrorism, as well as through inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue. Most crucially of all, the EU will live up to its values internally and externally: this is the strongest antidote we have against violent extremism.

“The EU will live up to its values internally and externally: this is the strongest antidote we have against violent extremism.”

**Cyber Security**

The EU will increase its focus on cyber security, equipping the EU and assisting Member States in protecting themselves against cyber threats while maintaining an open, free and safe cyberspace. This entails strengthening
the technological capabilities aimed at mitigating threats and the resilience of critical infrastructure, networks and services, and reducing cybercrime. It means fostering innovative information and communication technology (ICT) systems which guarantee the availability and integrity of data, while ensuring security within the European digital space through appropriate policies on the location of data storage and the certification of digital products and services. It requires weaving cyber issues across all policy areas, reinforcing the cyber elements in CSDP missions and operations, and further developing platforms for cooperation. The EU will support political, operational and technical cyber cooperation between Member States, notably on analysis and consequence management, and foster shared assessments between EU structures and the relevant institutions in Member States. It will enhance its cyber security cooperation with core partners such as the US and NATO. The EU’s response will also be embedded in strong public-private partnerships. Cooperation and information-sharing between Member States, institutions, the private sector and civil society can foster a common cyber security culture, and raise preparedness for possible cyber disruptions and attacks.

**Energy Security**

The Energy Union represents an integrated effort to work on the internal and external dimensions of European energy security. In line with the goals of the Energy Union, the EU will seek to diversify its energy sources, routes and suppliers, particularly in the gas domain, as well as to promote the highest nuclear safety standards in third countries. Through our energy diplomacy, we will strengthen relations worldwide with reliable energy-producing and transit countries, and support the establishment of infrastructure to allow diversified sources to reach European markets.

“Through our energy diplomacy, we will strengthen relations worldwide with reliable energy-producing and transit countries, and support the establishment of infrastructure to allow diversified sources to reach European markets.”

However, binding infrastructure agreements with third countries can have a differentiated impact on the security of supply within the Union or hinder the functioning of the internal energy market. Therefore, such
agreements must be transparent and any new infrastructure must be fully compliant with applicable EU law, including the Third Energy Package. Internally, the EU will work on a fully functioning internal energy market, focus on sustainable energy and energy efficiency, and develop coherently reverse flow, interconnection, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) storage infrastructure.

**Strategic Communications**

The EU will enhance its strategic communications, investing in and joining-up public diplomacy across different fields, in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners. We will improve the consistency and speed of messaging on our principles and actions. We will also offer rapid, factual rebuttals of disinformation. We will continue fostering an open and inquiring media environment within and beyond the EU, also working with local players and through social media.

### 3.2 State and Societal Resilience to our East and South

It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises – benefits us

“It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.”

and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. Together with its partners, the EU will therefore promote resilience in its surrounding regions. A resilient state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But the reverse holds true as well. To ensure sustainable security, it is not only state
institutions that we will support. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.

**Enlargement Policy**

Any European state which respects and promotes the values enshrined in our Treaties may apply to become a Member of the Union. A credible enlargement policy grounded on strict and fair conditionality is an irreplaceable tool to enhance resilience within the countries concerned,

“A credible enlargement policy represents a strategic investment in Europe’s security and prosperity, and has already contributed greatly to peace in formerly war-torn areas.”

ensuring that modernisation and democratisation proceed in line with the accession criteria. A credible enlargement policy represents a strategic investment in Europe’s security and prosperity, and has already contributed greatly to peace in formerly war-torn areas.

Within the scope of the current enlargement policy, the challenges of migration, energy security, terrorism and organised crime are shared between the EU, the Western Balkans and Turkey. They can only be addressed together. Yet the resilience of these countries cannot be taken for granted. The EU enjoys a unique influence in all these countries. The strategic challenge for the EU is therefore that of promoting political reform, rule of law, economic convergence and good neighbourly relations in the Western Balkans and Turkey, while coherently pursuing cooperation across different sectors.

EU policy towards the candidate countries will continue to be based on a clear, strict and fair accession process. It will focus on fundamental requirements for membership first and feature greater scrutiny of reforms, clearer reform requirements, and feedback from the European Commission and Member States, as well as local civil societies. At the same time, EU support for and cooperation with these countries must deliver concrete benefits today, and must be communicated well. This means cooperating
on counter-terrorism, security sector reform, migration, infrastructure, energy and climate, deepening people-to-people contacts, and retailoring some of the EU’s assistance with the aim of visibly improving citizens’ wellbeing.

**Our Neighbours**

State and societal resilience is our strategic priority in the neighbourhood. Many people within the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) both to the east and to the south wish to build closer relations with the Union. Our enduring power of attraction can spur transformation and is not aimed against any country. Within this group are currently countries such as Tunisia or Georgia, whose success as prosperous, peaceful and stable democracies would reverberate across their respective regions. The ENP has recommitted to Eastern Partnership and southern Mediterranean countries wishing to develop stronger relations with us. We will support these countries in implementing association agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). We will also think creatively about deepening tailor-made partnerships further. Possibilities include the creation of an economic area with countries implementing DCFTAs, the extension of Trans-European Networks and the Energy Community, as well as building physical and digital connections. Societal links will also be strengthened through enhanced mobility, cultural and educational exchanges, research cooperation and civil society platforms. Full participation in EU programmes and agencies will be pursued alongside strategic dialogue with a view to paving the way for these countries’ further involvement in CSDP.

Resilience is a strategic priority across the EU’s east and south both in countries that want stronger ties with the EU and in those – within and beyond the ENP – that have no wish to do so. The EU will support different paths to resilience to its east and south, focusing on the most acute dimensions of fragility and targeting those where we can make a meaningful difference.

**Resilience in our Surrounding Regions**

The EU will pursue a multifaceted approach to resilience in its surrounding regions. While repressive states are inherently fragile in the long term, there are many ways to build inclusive, prosperous and secure societies. We will therefore pursue tailor-made policies to support inclusive and accountable
governance, critical for the fight against terrorism, corruption and organised crime, and for the protection of human rights. Repression suffocates outlets for discontent and marginalises communities. The EU will therefore promote human rights through dialogue and support, including in the most difficult cases. Through long-term engagement, we will persistently seek to advance human rights protection. We will pursue locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors, and support fragile states in building capacities, including cyber.

We will work through development, diplomacy, and CSDP, ensuring that our security sector reform efforts enable and enhance our partners' capacities to deliver security within the rule of law. We will cooperate with other international players, coordinating our work on capacity-building with the UN and NATO in particular.

“Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States. We will nurture societal resilience also by deepening work on education, culture and youth to foster pluralism, coexistence and respect.”

States are resilient when societies feel they are becoming better off and have hope in the future. Echoing the Sustainable Development Goals, the EU will adopt a joined-up approach to its humanitarian, development, migration, trade, investment, infrastructure, education, health and research policies, as well as improve horizontal coherence between the EU and its Member States. We will fight poverty and inequality, widen access to public services and social security, and champion decent work opportunities, notably for women and youth. We will foster an enabling environment for new economic endeavours, employment and the inclusion of marginalised groups. Development funds should catalyse strategic investments through public-private partnerships, driving sustainable growth, job creation, and skills and technological transfers. We will use our trade agreements to
underpin sustainable development, human rights protection and rules-based governance. Societal resilience will be strengthened by deepening relations with civil society, notably in its efforts to hold governments accountable. We will reach out more to cultural organisations, religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders, and speak out against the shrinking space for civil society including through violations of the freedoms of speech and association. Positive change can only be home-grown, and may take years to materialise. Our commitment to civil society will therefore be long-term. We will nurture societal resilience also by deepening work on education, culture and youth to foster pluralism, coexistence and respect.

Finally, the EU will seek to enhance energy and environmental resilience. Energy transition is one of the major challenges in our surrounding regions, but must be properly managed to avoid fuelling social tensions. Climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict, in light of their impact on desertification, land degradation, and water and food scarcity. Mirroring security sector reform efforts, energy and environmental sector reform policies can assist partner countries along a path of energy transition and climate action. Through such efforts, we will encourage energy liberalisation, the development of renewables, better regulation and technological transfers, alongside climate change mitigation and adaptation. We will also support governments to devise sustainable responses to food production and the use of water and energy through development, diplomacy and scientific cooperation.

A More Effective Migration Policy

A special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees. We will significantly step up our humanitarian efforts in these countries, focusing on education, women and children. Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. Through development, trust funds, preventive diplomacy and mediation we will work with countries of origin to address and prevent the root causes of displacement, manage migration, and fight trans-border crime. We will support transit countries by improving reception and asylum capacities, and by working on migrants’ education, vocational training and livelihood opportunities. We must stem irregular flows by making returns more effective as well as by ensuring regular channels for human mobility. This
“Together with countries of origin and transit, we will develop common and tailor-made approaches to migration featuring development, diplomacy, mobility, legal migration, border management, readmission and return. We will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity.”

means enhancing and implementing existing legal and circular channels for migration. It also means working on a more effective common European asylum system which upholds the right to seek asylum by ensuring the safe, regulated and legal arrival of refugees seeking international protection in the EU. At the same time, we will work with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity. We will establish more effective partnerships on migration management with UN agencies, emerging players, regional organisations, civil society and local communities.

3.3 An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises

We increasingly observe fragile states breaking down in violent conflict. These crises, and the unspeakable violence and human suffering to which they give rise, threaten our shared vital interests. The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south, while considering engagement further afield on a case by case basis. The EU will foster human security through an integrated approach.

All of these conflicts feature multiple dimensions – from security to gender, from governance to the economy. Implementing a multi-dimensional approach through the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at conflict prevention, management and resolution is essential. But the scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’ will be expanded further. There are no quick fixes to any of these conflicts. Experience in Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan and elsewhere highlights their protracted nature. The EU will therefore pursue a multi-phased approach, acting at all stages of the conflict cycle. We will invest in prevention, resolution and stabilisation, and
avoid premature disengagement when a new crisis erupts elsewhere. The EU will therefore engage further in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the Eastern Partnership countries. None of these conflicts plays out at a single level of governance. Conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya often erupt locally, but the national, regional and global overlay they acquire is what makes them so complex. The EU will therefore pursue a multi-level approach to conflicts acting at the local, national, regional and global levels. Finally, none of these conflicts can be solved by the EU alone. We will pursue a multi-lateral approach engaging all those players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution.

“The EU will engage in a practical and principled way in peacebuilding, concentrating our efforts in surrounding regions to the east and south, while considering engagement further afield on a case by case basis. We will pursue a multi-level approach to conflicts acting at the local, national, regional and global levels; a multi-lateral approach engaging all players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution.”

and necessary for its resolution. We will partner more systematically on the ground with regional and international organisations, bilateral donors and civil society. Greater cooperation will also be sought at the regional and international levels. Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships.

Pre-emptive Peace

It has long been known that preventing conflicts is more efficient and effective than engaging with crises after they break out. Once a conflict does erupt, it typically becomes ever more intractable over time. The EU enjoys a good record on pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy. We will therefore redouble our efforts on prevention, monitoring root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change – which is a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement.
Early warning is of little use unless it is followed by early action. This implies regular reporting and proposals to the Council, engaging in preventive diplomacy and mediation by mobilising EU Delegations and Special Representatives, and deepening partnerships with civil society. We must develop a political culture of acting sooner in response to the risk of violent conflict.

**Security and Stabilisation**

The EU will engage more systematically on the security dimension of these conflicts. In full compliance with international law, European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives, notably civilians. The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises, especially to help fight terrorism.

“European security and defence must become better equipped to build peace, guarantee security and protect human lives, notably civilians. The EU must be able to respond rapidly, responsibly and decisively to crises, especially to help fight terrorism.”

It must be able to provide security when peace agreements are reached and transition governments established or in the making. When they are not, the EU should be ready to support and help consolidating local ceasefires, paving the way for capacity building. At the same time, through a coherent use of internal and external policies, the EU must counter the spill-over of insecurity that may stem from such conflicts, ranging from trafficking and smuggling to terrorism.

When the prospect of stabilisation arises, the EU must enable legitimate institutions to rapidly deliver basic services and security to local populations, reducing the risk of relapse into violence and allowing displaced persons to return. We will therefore seek to bridge gaps in our response between an end of violence and long-term recovery, and develop the dual – security and development – nature of our engagement.

**Conflict Settlement**

Each conflict country will need to rebuild its own social contract between
the state and its citizens. The Union will support such efforts, fostering inclusive governance at all levels. When the “centre” is broken, acting only top-down has limited impact. An inclusive political settlement requires action at all levels. Through CSDP, development, and dedicated financial instruments, we will blend top-down and bottom-up efforts fostering the building blocks of sustainable statehood rooted in local agency. Working at the local level – for instance with local authorities and municipalities – can help basic services be delivered to citizens, and allows for deeper engagement with rooted civil society. Working in this direction will also improve our local knowledge, helping us distinguish between those groups we will talk to without supporting, and those we will actively support as champions of human security and reconciliation.

The EU will also foster inclusive governance at all levels through mediation and facilitation. At the same time, we will develop more creative approaches to diplomacy. This also means promoting the role of women in peace efforts – from implementing the UNSC Resolution on Women, Peace and Security to improving the EU’s internal gender balance. It entails having more systematic recourse to cultural, inter-faith, scientific and economic diplomacy in conflict settings.

**Political Economy of Peace**

The EU will foster the space in which the legitimate economy can take root and consolidate. In the midst of violent conflict, this means ensuring humanitarian aid access to allow basic goods and services to be provided.

“A political economy of peace calls for greater synergies between humanitarian and development assistance, channelling our support to provide health, education, protection, basic goods and legitimate employment.”

It also means working to break the political economy of war and to create possibilities for legitimate sustenance to exist. This calls for greater synergies between humanitarian and development assistance, channelling our support to provide health, education, protection, basic goods and legitimate employment. When the prospects for stabilisation arise, trade and development – working in synergy – can underpin long-term peacebuilding.
Restrictive measures, coupled with diplomacy, are key tools to bring about peaceful change. They can play a pivotal role in deterrence, conflict prevention and resolution. Smart sanctions, in compliance with international and EU law, will be carefully calibrated and monitored to support the legitimate economy and avoid harming local societies. To fight the criminal war economy, the EU must also modernise its policy on export control for dual-use goods, and fight the illegal trafficking of cultural goods and natural resources.

3.4 Cooperative Regional Orders

In a world caught between global pressures and local pushback, regional dynamics come to the fore. As complex webs of power, interaction and identity, regions represent critical spaces of governance in a de-centred world. Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs. This is a fundamental rationale for the EU's own

“This cooperation is a fundamental rationale for the EU's own peace and development in the 21st century. This is why we will promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas.”

peace and development in the 21st century. This is why we will promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas. Regional orders do not take a single form. Where possible and when in line with our interests, the EU will support regional organisations. We will not strive to export our model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences. Cooperative regional orders, however, are not created only by organisations. They comprise a mix of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional relations. They also feature the role of global players interlinked with regionally-owned cooperative efforts. Taken together these can address transnational conflicts, challenges and opportunities. In different world regions, the EU will be driven by specific goals. Across all regions, we will invest in cooperative relationships to spur shared global responsibilities.
The European Security Order

The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of borders and the peaceful settlement of disputes are key elements of the European security order. These principles apply to all states, both within and beyond the EU’s borders. However, peace and stability in Europe are no longer a given. Russia’s violation of international law and the destabilisation of Ukraine, on top of protracted conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, have challenged the European security order at its core. The EU will stand united in upholding international law, democracy, human rights, cooperation and each country’s right to choose its future freely.

Managing the relationship with Russia represents a key strategic challenge. A consistent and united approach must remain the cornerstone of EU policy towards Russia. Substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia are premised upon full respect for international law and the principles underpinning the European security order, including the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. We will not recognise Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. We will strengthen the EU, enhance the resilience of our eastern neighbours, and uphold their right to determine freely their approach towards the EU. At the same time, the EU and Russia are interdependent. We will therefore engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap.

“Substantial changes in relations between the EU and Russia are premised upon full respect for international law. At the same time, we will engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap.”

In addition to those foreign policy issues on which we currently cooperate, selective engagement could take place over matters of European interest too, including climate, the Arctic, maritime security, education, research and cross-border cooperation. Engagement should also include deeper societal ties through facilitated travel for students, civil society and business.

Spanning the region, the EU will foster cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE, as a Europe-wide organisation stretching into Central Asia with a
transatlantic link, lies at the heart of the European security order. The EU will strengthen its contribution within and its cooperation with the OSCE as a pillar of European security.

A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa

The Mediterranean, Middle East and parts of sub-Saharan Africa are in turmoil, the outcome of which will likely only become clear decades from now. Solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential to addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography, migration and climate change, and to seizing the opportunity of shared prosperity. The EU will intensify its support for and cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa and the Middle East, as well as functional cooperative formats in the region. However, regional organisations do not address all relevant dynamics, and some reflect existing cleavages. We will therefore also act flexibly to help bridge divides and support regional players in delivering concrete results. This will be achieved by mobilising our bilateral and multilateral policies and frameworks as well as by partnering with civil societies in the region.

“We will foster dialogue and negotiation over regional conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the EU will work closely with the Quartet, the Arab League and all key stakeholders to preserve the prospect of a viable two-state solution based on 1967 lines with equivalent land swaps, and to recreate the conditions for meaningful negotiations.”

The EU will follow five lines of action. First, in the Maghreb and the Middle East, the EU will support functional multilateral cooperation. We will back practical cooperation, including through the Union for the Mediterranean, on issues such as border security, trafficking, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, water and food security, energy and climate, infrastructure and disaster management. We will foster dialogue and negotiation over regional conflicts such as those in Syria and Libya. On the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the EU will work closely with the Quartet, the Arab League
and all key stakeholders to preserve the prospect of a viable two-state solution based on 1967 lines with equivalent land swaps, and to recreate the conditions for meaningful negotiations. The EU will also promote full compliance with European and international law in deepening cooperation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Second, the EU will deepen sectoral cooperation with Turkey, while striving to anchor Turkish democracy in line with its accession criteria, including the normalisation of relations with Cyprus. The EU will therefore pursue the accession process – sticking to strict and fair accession conditionality – while coherently engaging in dialogue on counter-terrorism, regional security and refugees. We will also work on a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, and cooperate further with Turkey in the fields of education, energy and transport.

Third, the EU will pursue balanced engagement in the Gulf. It will continue to cooperate with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and individual Gulf countries. Building on the Iran nuclear deal and its implementation, it will also gradually engage Iran on areas such as trade, research, environment, energy, anti-trafficking, migration and societal exchanges. It will deepen dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on regional conflicts, human rights and counter-terrorism, seeking to prevent contagion of existing crises and foster the space for cooperation and diplomacy.

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Fourth, in light of the growing interconnections between North and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, the EU will support cooperation across these sub-regions. This includes fostering triangular relationships across the Red Sea between Europe, the Horn and the Gulf to face shared security challenges and economic opportunities. It means systematically addressing cross-border dynamics in North and West Africa, the Sahel and Lake Chad regions through closer links with the African Union, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel.
Finally, we will invest in African peace and development as an investment in our own security and prosperity. We will intensify cooperation with and support for the African Union, as well as ECOWAS, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development in eastern Africa, and the East African Community, among others. We must enhance our efforts to stimulate growth and jobs in Africa. The Economic Partnership Agreements can spur African integration and mobility, and encourage Africa’s full and equitable participation in global value chains. A quantum leap in European investment in Africa is also needed to support sustainable development. We will build stronger links between our trade, development and security policies in Africa, and blend development efforts with work on migration, health, education, energy and climate, science and technology, notably to improve food security. We will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa, and assist African organisations’ work on conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and organised crime, migration and border management. We will do so through diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as trust funds to back up regional strategies.

**A Closer Atlantic**

The EU will invest further in strong bonds across the Atlantic, both north and south. A solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with the United States and Canada helps us strengthen resilience, address conflicts, and contribute to effective global governance. NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains

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the strongest and most effective military alliance in the world. The EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security.

With the US, the EU will strive for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, TTIP demonstrates the transatlantic commitment to shared values and signals our willingness to pursue an ambitious rules-based trade agenda. On the broader security agenda, the US will continue to be our core partner. The EU will deepen cooperation with the US and Canada on crisis management, counter-terrorism, cyber, migration, energy and climate action.

In the wider Atlantic space, the Union will expand cooperation and build stronger partnerships with Latin America and the Caribbean, grounded on shared values and interests. It will develop multilateral ties with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and with different regional groupings according to their competitive advantage. We will step up political dialogue and cooperation on migration, maritime security and ocean life protection, climate change and energy, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and countering organised crime and terrorism. We will pursue a free trade agreement with Mercosur, build on the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Cuba, and invest in deeper socio-economic connections with Latin American and Caribbean countries through visa facilitation, student exchanges, twinning, research cooperation and technical projects. We will also actively support the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements in the region, as we are doing in Colombia.

**A Connected Asia**

There is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security. In light of the economic weight that Asia represents for the EU – and vice versa – peace and stability in Asia are a prerequisite for our prosperity. We will deepen economic diplomacy and scale up our security role in Asia.

The EU will engage China based on respect for rule of law, both domestically and internationally. We will pursue a coherent approach
to China’s connectivity drives westwards by maximising the potential of the EU-China Connectivity Platform, and the ASEM and EU-ASEAN frameworks. The EU will also deepen trade and investment with China, seeking a level playing field, appropriate intellectual property rights protection, greater cooperation on high-end technology, dialogue on economic reform, human rights and climate action.

“The EU will deepen trade and investment with China, seeking a level playing field, intellectual property rights protection, greater cooperation on high-end technology, dialogue on economic reform, human rights and climate action.”

We will also develop a more politically rounded approach to Asia, seeking to make greater practical contributions to Asian security. We will expand our partnerships, including on security, with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and others. We will continue to support state-building and reconciliation processes in Afghanistan together with our regional and international partners. We will promote non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula. In East and Southeast Asia, we will uphold freedom of navigation, stand firm on the respect for international law, including the Law of the Sea and its arbitration procedures, and encourage the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. We will help build maritime capacities and support an ASEAN-led regional security architecture. In Central and South Asia, we will deepen cooperation on counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking and migration, as well as enhance transport, trade and energy connectivity. Across the Indo Pacific and East Asian regions, the EU will promote human rights and support democratic transitions such as in Myanmar/Burma.

A Cooperative Arctic

With three Member States and two European Economic Area members being Arctic states, the EU has a strategic interest in the Arctic remaining
a low-tension area, with ongoing cooperation ensured by the Arctic Council, a well-functioning legal framework, and solid political and security cooperation. The EU will contribute to this through enhanced work on climate action and environmental research, sustainable development, telecommunications, and search & rescue, as well as concrete cooperation with Arctic states, institutions, indigenous peoples and local communities.

3.5 Global Governance for the 21st Century

Without global norms and the means to enforce them, peace and security, prosperity and democracy – our vital interests – are at risk. Guided by the values on which it is founded, the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, which ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system.

“The EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter. This commitment translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing system.”

Reforming

A commitment to global governance must translate in the determination to reform the UN, including the Security Council, and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Resisting change risks triggering the erosion of such institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all EU Member States. The EU will stand up for the principles of accountability, representativeness, responsibility, effectiveness and transparency. The practical meaning of such principles will be fleshed out case-by-case. We will continue to call upon members of the UN Security
Council not to vote against credible draft resolutions on timely and decisive action to prevent or end mass atrocities. Across multilateral fora – and in particular the UN, the IFIs and the international justice organisations – the EU will strengthen its voice and acquire greater visibility and cohesion. We will work towards an increasingly unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund.

**Investing**

Believing in the UN means investing in it, notably in its peacekeeping, mediation, peacebuilding and humanitarian functions. The EU and its Member States, as already the first contributor to UN humanitarian agencies, will invest even further in their work. CSDP could assist further and complement UN peacekeeping through bridging, stabilisation or other operations. The EU will also enhance synergy with UN peacebuilding efforts, through greater coordination in the planning, evolution and withdrawal of CSDP capacity-building missions in fragile settings.

**Implementing**

The EU will lead by example by implementing its commitments on sustainable development and climate change. It will increase climate financing, drive climate mainstreaming in multilateral fora, raise the ambition for review foreseen in the Paris agreement, and work for clean energy cost reductions. The SDGs will inform the post-Cotonou partnership and drive reform in development policy, including the EU Consensus on Development. Moreover, implementing the SDGs will require change across all internal and external policies, galvanising public-private partnerships, and leveraging the experience of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in providing technical assistance and building capacities in developing and middle income countries.

**Deepening**

As the world’s largest economy, the EU is a prime mover in global trade and
investment, areas in which rules can be deepened further. Our prosperity hinges on an open and rules-based economic system with a true level playing field, which our economic diplomacy will further promote. We will pursue comprehensive free trade agreements with the US, Japan, Mercosur, India, ASEAN and others as building blocks of global free trade. Ambitious agreements built on mutual benefits such as TTIP and CETA can promote international regulatory standards, consumer protection, as well as labour, environmental, health and safety norms. New generation trade agreements which include services, the digital economy, energy and raw materials can reduce legal fragmentation and barriers, and regulate access to natural resources. The EU will ensure that all its trade agreements are pursued in a manner that supports returning the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to the centre of global negotiations. Connected to the EU’s interest in an open and fair economic system is the need for global maritime growth and security, ensuring open and protected ocean and sea routes critical for trade and access to natural resources. The EU will contribute to global maritime security, building on its experience in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, and exploring possibilities in the Gulf of Guinea, the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. As a global maritime security provider, the EU will seek to further universalise and implement the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including its dispute settlement mechanisms. We will also promote the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources and biological diversity and the growth of the blue economy by working to fill legal gaps and enhancing ocean knowledge and awareness.

**Widening**

We will seek to widen the reach of international norms, regimes and institutions. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems remains a growing threat to Europe and the wider world. The EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes. We will use every
“The EU will strongly support the expanding membership, universalisation, full implementation and enforcement of multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control treaties and regimes. We will use every means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme.”

means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme. The EU will actively participate in export control regimes, strengthen common rules governing Member States’ export policies of military – including dual-use – equipment and technologies, and support export control authorities in third countries and technical bodies that sustain arms control regimes. The EU will also promote the responsibility to protect, international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law. We will support the UN Human Rights Council and encourage the widest acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

Developing

At the frontiers of global affairs, rules must be further developed to ensure security and sustainable access to the global commons. The EU will be a forward-looking cyber player, protecting our critical assets and values in the digital world, notably by promoting a free and secure global Internet. We will engage in cyber diplomacy and capacity building with our partners, and seek agreements on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace based on existing international law. We will support multilateral digital governance and a global cooperation framework on cybersecurity, respecting the free flow of information. In space, we will promote the autonomy and security of our space-based services and work on principles for responsible space behaviour, which could lead to the adoption of an international voluntary code of conduct. On energy, we will encourage multilateral mechanisms aimed at ensuring sustainable energy patterns both by developing our own sustainable policies and by deepening dialogue with major energy
consumers and producers. On health, we will work for more effective prevention, detection and responses to global pandemics. Global rules are also necessary in fields such as biotechnology, artificial intelligence, robotics and remotely piloted systems, to avoid the related security risks and reap their economic benefits. On all such issues, the EU will promote exchanges with relevant multilateral fora to help spearhead the development of rules and build partnerships at the frontiers of global affairs.

**Partnering**

The EU will lead by example on global governance. But it cannot deliver alone. It will act as an agenda-shaper, a connector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web of players. It will partner with states and organisations, but also with the private sector and civil society. On the vast majority of global governance issues, we will work with the UN as the framework of the multilateral system and a core partner for the Union,

“The EU will invest in pivotal non-state actors. We will sharpen the means to protect and empower civic actors, notably human rights defenders, sustaining a vibrant civil society worldwide.”

with other core partners such as the US, with regional organisations, and with like-minded and strategic partners in Asia, Africa and the Americas. The EU will also invest in pivotal non-state actors, particularly within civil society. In spite of increasing repression, global civil society is growing and fostering new types of activism. The EU will sharpen the means to protect and empower civic actors, notably human rights defenders, sustaining a vibrant civil society worldwide.

The format to deliver effective global governance may vary from case to case. On cyber, global governance hinges on a progressive alliance between states, international organisations, industry, civil society and technical experts. On maritime multilateralism, the EU will work with the UN and its specialised agencies, NATO, our strategic partners, and ASEAN. On humanitarian action, sustainable development and climate change, the EU will partner with the UN and the G20, as well as new donors, civil society and the private sector. On counterterrorism, we will deepen dialogue with the UN, while building broad partnerships with states, regional organisations,
civil society and the private sector on issues such as countering violent extremism and terrorist financing.

4. From Vision to Action

We will pursue our priorities by mobilising our unparalleled networks, our economic weight and all the tools at our disposal in a coherent and coordinated way. To fulfil our goals, however, we must collectively invest in a credible, responsive and joined-up Union.

A Credible Union

To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is essential. The EU’s credibility hinges on our unity, on our many achievements, our enduring power of attraction, the effectiveness and consistency of our policies, and adherence to our values. A stronger Union requires investing in all dimensions of foreign policy, from research and climate to infrastructure and mobility, from trade and sanctions to diplomacy and development.

“To engage responsibly with the world, credibility is essential. In this fragile world, soft power is not enough.”

In this fragile world, soft power is not enough: we must enhance our credibility in security and defence. To respond to external crises, build our partners’ capacities and protect Europe, Member States must channel a sufficient level of expenditure to defence, make the most efficient use of resources, and meet the collective commitment of 20% of defence budget spending devoted to the procurement of equipment and Research & Technology. Capabilities should be developed with maximum interoperability

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and commonality, and be made available where possible in support of EU, NATO, UN and other multinational efforts. While a sectoral strategy, to be agreed by the Council, should further specify the civil-military level of ambition, tasks, requirements and capability priorities stemming from this Strategy, some such areas can already be highlighted in line with commitments made by the European Council.

First, European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges. Europeans must improve the monitoring and control of flows which have security implications. This requires investing in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, including Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, satellite communications, and autonomous access to space and permanent earth observation. As regards counter-terrorism, Member States must implement legislation concerning explosives, firearms and Passenger Name Records (PNRs), as well as invest in detection capabilities and the cross-border tracing of weapons. Second, Europeans must invest in digital capabilities to secure data, networks and critical infrastructure within the European digital space. We must develop capabilities in trusted digital services and products and in cyber technologies to enhance our resilience. We will encourage greater investments and skills across Member States through cooperative research and development, training, exercises and procurement programmes. Third, regarding high-end military capabilities, Member States need all major equipment to respond to external crises and keep Europe safe. This means having full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabilities, including strategic enablers.

To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. Member States remain sovereign in their defence decisions: nevertheless, nationally-oriented

“To acquire and maintain many of these capabilities, Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm. The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.”
defence programmes are insufficient to address capability shortfalls. We remain far from achieving our collective benchmarks, including 35% of total equipment spending in collaborative procurement. The voluntary approach to defence cooperation must translate into real commitment. An annual coordinated review process at EU level to discuss Member States’ military spending plans could instil greater coherence in defence planning and capability development. This should take place in full coherence with NATO’s defence planning process. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has a key role to play by strengthening the Capability Development Plan, acting as an interface between Member States and the Commission, and assisting Member States to develop the capabilities stemming from the political goals set out in this Strategy.

Defence cooperation between Member States will be systematically encouraged. Regular assessments of EDA benchmarks can create positive peer pressure among Member States. Crucially, EU funding for defence research and technology, reflected first in the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework, and then in a fully-fledged programme in the next budget cycle, will prove instrumental in developing the defence capabilities Europe needs.

A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP. It can also stimulate growth and jobs. A solid European defence, technological and industrial base needs a fair, functioning and transparent internal market, security of supply, and a structured dialogue with defence relevant industries. Furthermore, ensuring participation of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the defence sector can improve innovation and investment in the military technologies of tomorrow.

A Responsive Union

We live in a world of predictable unpredictability. We will therefore equip ourselves to respond more rapidly and flexibly to the unknown lying ahead. A more responsive Union requires change. We need it in diplomacy, CSDP and development, as well as investment in the knowledge base underpinning our external action.

First, our diplomatic action must be fully grounded in the Lisbon Treaty. EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score. Our diversity is a tremendous asset provided we stand
united and work in a coordinated way. Cooperation between Member States can strengthen our engagement in the world. A Member State or a group of Member States who are willing and able to contribute may be invited by the High Representative (HR), under the responsibility of the Council, to implement agreed positions of the Council. The HR shall keep the Council fully informed and shall ensure consistency with agreed EU policies.

“EU foreign policy is not a solo performance: it is an orchestra which plays from the same score. Our diversity is a tremendous asset provided we stand united and work in a coordinated way.”

Second, CSDP must become more rapid and effective. Europeans must be ready to rapidly respond to crises in full compliance with the UN Charter. This requires Member States to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces through training and exercises. We must develop the capacity for rapid response also by tackling the procedural, financial and political obstacles which prevent the deployment of the Battlegroups, hamper force generation and reduce the effectiveness of CSDP military operations. At the same time, we must further develop our civilian missions – a trademark of CSDP – by encouraging force generation, speeding up deployment, and providing adequate training based on EU-wide curricula. A responsive CSDP also requires streamlining our institutional structure. We must strengthen operational planning and conduct structures, and build closer connections
between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these may be deployed in the same theatre. Enhanced cooperation between Member States should be explored in this domain. If successful and repeated over time, this might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty’s potential.

Third, development policy will become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities. We reaffirm our collective commitment to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in line with DAC principles. Development funds must be stable, but lengthy programming cycles limit the timely use of EU support, and can reduce our visibility and impact. The availability of limited sums for activities on the ground, notably for conflict prevention and civil society support, should be made more flexible. Across the Commission, flexibility will be built into our financial instruments, allowing for the use of uncommitted funds in any given year to be carried on to subsequent years to respond to crises. This will also help fill the gaps between financial instruments and budgetary headings. In parallel, the time has come to consider reducing the number of instruments to enhance our coherence and flexibility, while raising the overall amount dedicated to development.

Responsive external action must be underpinned by a strong knowledge base. Targeted approaches to resilience, conflict prevention and resolution require deeper situational awareness. The EU will invest in the EEAS and coordinate better across institutions and Member States. Putting our diverse national cultures at the service of our shared interests is a challenge, but the pool of talent available to us is unrivalled. To make the most of this, we will invest in people, particularly those on the ground. This means equipping our delegations with the necessary expertise, including on sectoral issues and in local languages, valuing experience in and of a region, beefing up the political sections of delegations, and encouraging operational staff to use their expertise more politically. It means strengthening the participation of women in foreign policy-making. It means investing in the EU Conflict Early Warning System, and making all our external engagement conflict- and rights-sensitive. We will also pursue greater information sharing and joint reporting, analysis and response planning between Member

“Development policy will become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities.”
State embassies, EU Delegations, Commission services, EU Special Representatives and CSDP missions. We will encourage cross-fertilisation between us and regional and international organisations, civil society, academia, think tanks and the private sector. We will do so both in traditional ways – through dialogue, cooperation and support – and through innovative formats such as exchanges, embedded personnel and joint facilities, harnessing knowledge and creativity in our system.

A Joined-up Union

Finally, our external action will become more joined-up. Over the years, important steps have been taken to this effect: these include institutional innovations, such as the Lisbon Treaty’s creation of the double-hatted High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). A strong EEAS working together with other EU institutions lies at the heart of a coherent EU role in the world. Efforts at coherence also include policy innovations such as the “comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises” and joint programming in development, which must be further enhanced. New fields of our joined-up external action include energy diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and economic diplomacy.

“Joint programming in development must be further enhanced. New fields of our joined-up external action include energy diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and economic diplomacy. A more prosperous Union calls for greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the EIB and the private sector. We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies.”

A more prosperous Union requires economic priorities to be set in relations with all countries and regions, and integrated into the external dimensions of all internal policies. A more prosperous Union calls for greater coordination between the EU and Member States, the EIB and the private sector. The Sustainable Development Goals also represent an opportunity to catalyse such coherence. Implementing them will generate coherence between
the internal and external dimensions of our policies and across financial instruments. It allows us to develop new ways to blend grants, loans and private-public partnerships. The SDGs also encourage us to expand and apply the principle of policy coherence for development to other policy areas, and encourage joint analysis and engagement across Commission services, institutions and Member States.

We must become more joined-up across internal and external policies. The migration phenomenon, for example, requires a balanced and human rights-compliant policy mix addressing the management of the flows and the structural causes. This means overcoming the fragmentation of external policies relevant to migration. In particular, we will develop stronger links between humanitarian and development efforts through joint risk analysis, and multiannual programming and financing. We will also make different external policies and instruments migration-sensitive – from diplomacy and CSDP to development and climate – and ensure their coherence with internal ones regarding border management, homeland security, asylum, employment, culture and education.

In security terms, terrorism, hybrid threats and organised crime know no borders. This calls for tighter institutional links between our external action and the internal area of freedom, security and justice. Closer ties will be fostered through joint Council meetings and joint task forces between the EEAS and the Commission. Defence policy also needs to be better linked to policies covering the internal market, industry and space. Member State efforts should also be more joined-up: cooperation between our law enforcement, judicial and intelligence services must be strengthened. We must use the full potential of Europol and Eurojust, and provide greater support for the EU Intelligence Centre. We must feed and coordinate intelligence extracted from European databases, and put ICT – including big data analysis – at the service of deeper situational awareness. Our citizens need better protection also in third countries through joint contingency plans and crisis response exercises between Member States.

We must become more joined-up in our security and development policies. CSDP capacity building missions must be coordinated with security sector and rule of law work by the Commission. Capacity Building for Security and Development can play a key role in empowering and enabling our partners to prevent and respond to crises, and will need to be supported financially by the EU. Our peace policy must also ensure a smoother transition from
short-term crisis management to long-term peacebuilding to avoid gaps along the conflict cycle. Long-term work on pre-emptive peace, resilience and human rights must be tied to crisis response through humanitarian aid, CSDP, sanctions and diplomacy.

Finally, we will systematically mainstream human rights and gender issues across policy sectors and institutions, as well as foster closer coordination regarding digital matters. Greater awareness and expertise on such issues is needed within the EEAS and the Commission. Better coordination between institutions would also add consistency and spread best practices, helping us build a stronger Union and a more resilient, peaceful and sustainable world.

**The Way Ahead**

This Strategy is underpinned by the vision of, and ambition for, a stronger Union, willing and able to make a positive difference to its citizens and in the world. We must now swiftly translate this into action. First, we will revise existing sectoral strategies, as well as devise and implement new thematic or geographic strategies in line with the political priorities of this Strategy. Such work must begin with clear procedures and timeframes agreed promptly by all relevant players. Second, the EU Global Strategy itself will require periodic reviewing in consultation with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. On a yearly basis we will reflect on the state of play of the Strategy, pointing out where further implementation must be sought. Finally, a new process of strategic reflection will be launched whenever the EU and its Member States deem it necessary to enable the Union to navigate effectively our times. Our citizens deserve a true Union, which promotes our shared interests by engaging responsibly and in partnership with others.

“We must now swiftly translate this vision into action.”

Acknowledgements

All EU Member States:
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