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Teea Kortetmäki

Abstract
I argue in this article that a theory of broad ecological justice or the extended capabilities approach, an interesting approach in contemporary environmental ethics, shares many of its core ideas with deep ecology and Arne Næss’s ecosophy. The similarities between these approaches include the ambition to address the roots of environmental problems, emphasis on recognition and the criticism of oppressive structures, and a systemic orientation. Acknowledging these similarities illustrates the contemporary value of the deep ecology movement. It also helps to develop the theory of broad ecological justice further, especially in terms of bridging the gap between movements and theoretical discussion.
What is ‘broad’ in broad ecological justice?

There are different views on which issues can be considered as questions of justice. Until rather recently, the distributive paradigm, or the view that justice is primarily and mostly an issue of distributing certain goods, has dominated the discussion in social justice (Fraser 2009, 32–34). Today, distributive paradigm has been challenged by the idea that justice also has other important dimensions such as recognition—the ‘cultural’ dimension of justice that concerns respect and social relations—and participation (or representation), the ‘political’ dimension (Fraser 1998; 2009; also Fraser and Honneth 2003). I propose that this multidimensional approach could be labeled as a ‘broad’ view of justice, in comparison to a ‘narrower’ frame that considers distribution as the only element of justice.

Lately, discussion on the broad view of justice has attracted attention in environmental ethics and ecological justice as well (Schlosberg 2007; 2013; Cripps 2010; Crescenzo 2013). Ecological justice considers certain non-human entities as proper recipients of justice, and the broad view of ecological justice asserts that ecological justice should involve, in addition to distribution, the elements of recognition and participation. It is important to note that the broad view does not reject the distributive dimension of justice: rather, it considers justice to have more dimensions than distribution alone. In other words, the shift is about extending the concept of justice.

According to the broad view, injustice does not arise merely from maldistribution, but is tied to issues of recognition and representation. As Nancy Fraser (2009) argues, these two additional dimensions are needed in order to understand today’s forms of (in)justice and justice claims. Whereas distribution can usually be understood as the economic or material dimension of justice, recognition refers to the cultural (with regard to the respect and consideration of others) and representation to the political dimension of justice. Iris Young
(1990, 15–38) asserts that the distributive paradigm tends to presuppose and obscure the institutional contexts determining material distribution, and that it also produces an incomplete social ontology, consequently misrepresenting the justice related to immaterial things. The focus on maldistribution does not pay attention to the structures and practices that are themselves unjust and (re)produce maldistribution.

These structural factors can be addressed and evaluated using the notions of recognition and representation. In the context of non-human nature, recognition can be understood as showing “...respect for nature’s ‘bodily integrity’, the recognition of the potential in nature to develop, its autonomy, resilience, or a respect for autopoiesis” (Schlosberg 2007, 136). This recognition is present and visible, or lacking, in the cultural practices and beliefs of a particular community. For example, by recognizing a river, the community respects the autonomy of the river and its potential to sustain itself. Harming or benefiting from the river system becomes a moral question in addition to, or on a par with, the treatment of other recognized entities such as persons. Although analyzing the impediments of recognition is important in helping reduce distributive injustice, it is not the whole point. The obstacles of recognition that often arise from institutional processes and social and cultural beliefs essentially constitute the cases of injustice in themselves. There is no justice without recognition.

Participatory or representational justice is, in turn, a prerequisite for implementing recognition (Schlosberg 2007, 157); like Fraser (1998; 2009) and Nussbaum (2011), Schlosberg argues that equality in representation is an integral part of any definition of justice. This also applies in the case of ecological justice. For Fraser (2009, 17–18), this political dimension deals with questions of inclusion, exclusion, and the decision-making rules and participatory parity among the included; these cannot be reduced to other
dimensions of (in)justice. Only humans give speeches and are able to participate directly in politics, yet it is possible to include non-human nature in political decision-making as well (for the discussion on this issue, see for example Dryzek 1996; Mathews 1996; Eckersley 1999; Dobson 2010).

Environmental and ecological justice theories have mainly been narrow and concerned with the distribution of resources and burdens. These approaches lack theoretical tools to “discuss valid issues of justice that the distributive paradigm simply cannot encompass” (Schlosberg 2007, 125). This problem particularly related to recognition: plainly distributive theories of justice do not consider it as a requirement for justice, which in turn enables disregarding various instances of misrecognition such as domination, humiliation, and disrespect, in the framework of justice. The victims of such practices would be denied the possibility of making justice claims in relation to such affairs.

To be fair, not all distribution-oriented environmental theorists ignore the aspect of recognition. For instance, Brian Baxter (2005, 4; 117–23) speaks of recognizing the claim of other life forms to a fair share of environmental resources. Satisfying the welfare interests of non-humans requires a fair share of resources, and those interests invoke claims of justice whose proper recognition and respect is to be defended by proxies that “articulate the interests of inarticulates.” Recognizing the potential of nature has also been given a central role by some earlier thinkers (Low and Gleeson 1998). Yet the flaw in such approaches is that the obstacles or prerequisites for recognition are not addressed (Schlosberg 2007, 132). A more detailed critical examination of the distributive accounts of environmental and ecological justice is offered by Schlosberg (2007, 103–25), illustrating how those approaches fail to encompass the full spectrum of injustice.
The importance of recognition is brought out not only by broad justice theorists but by environmental movements as well. Several movements have demanded recognition in its different forms: recognition of different cultures and cultural identities; of local practices and forms of knowledge; and for example in the case of climate change, of the rights of women, youth, and indigenous peoples (Schlosberg 2007, 86–89). The importance of the representational dimension of justice, or the parity of participation, has also been mentioned both in the demands of various movements as well as in related academic discussions. For example, Bryan G. Norton emphasized the importance of participation, encouraging community participation combined with good science (Norton 2005, 492–98). As environmental ethics arises from the motivation to respond to the worry invoked by environmental problems and risks, it is clear that a feasible theory of environmental and ecological justice should be able to listen to the environmental movements and provide an applicable grammar of justice.

The shortages of a plainly distributive approach have also been exemplified in the recent (2012–2015) Finnish case of the Talvivaara mine in Kainuu region of Finland. Several lakes near the mine are popular summer cottage areas. Due to mining practices, the lake water has become contaminated. Despite a lack of data on the particular chemical causing this, the water can no longer be used for everyday practices such as washing, swimming and fishing. Consequently, the Regional State Administrative Agencies ruled that the Talvivaara mining company must distribute clean water to the cottage residents (Regional State Administrative Agency, decision PSAVI/12/04.08/2013). However, as the national news agency Yle reported on June 20, 2013, this clean water distribution cannot replace the loss of swimming and fishing opportunities the lake used to offer. Here, the issue is not about distributable goods, but about the lakes themselves as places to which the people have special
relations. The point is similar to the one made by Schlosberg (2012, 451) in relation to climate change: the lack of recognition of people's relationships with places is a status injury, a case of injustice. A distributive approach to justice is ill-equipped to fully address the injustices present in situations like this.

In the case of the Talvivaara mine, the broad view of environmental justice would claim that the residents should have been included in decision-making in the earlier phases. This has to do with the third, representational dimension of justice. As the damage has already been done, recognizing the cottage residents’ rights to participate in the decision-making on how the situation could and should be corrected would in the environmental sense be the minimum condition of doing justice to the residents. Doing justice to nature would, in addition, require that the lakes are 'heard' or represented as well. This would ensure that the decisions made would not threaten non-human life and its diversity the way current mining practices do. The Talvivaara example also shows that attempts to conduct a monetary harm/benefit analysis of mining, as outlined in Haltia, Holm, and Hämäläinen (2012), are very problematic: calculating or distributing incommensurate goods is often hard. Hence, environmental and ecological justice are not only about distributive justice in relation to environmental pros and cons as many theorists, such as Baxter (2005, 8), have proposed. They must adopt a broader view to encompass what is really at stake in environmental issues.

In addition to the three dimensions of justice, broad ecological justice adopts the discourse of extended capabilities as its fourth dimension. This idea derives from the framework of human and sentient animal capabilities developed by Nussbaum (2006; 2011): in this account, capabilities are opportunities that define what an individual is able to do and to be. Realized capabilities turn into functionings, or actual states of doing and being. These constitute the overall well-being of an individual. As opposed to Nussbaum’s individualist
approach, Schlosberg promotes applying the capabilities framework to populations, habitats, or ecosystems. In his extended capabilities approach, central notions comprise flourishing and the capabilities that are necessary for enabling flourishing. Doing justice to nature is primarily about removing the impediments that hinder the capabilities of nature to reach its functioning and integrity (Schlosberg 2007, 142–54). An important remark here is that Schlosberg uses the notion of justice in a rather general sense of overall rightness and fairness, a way similar to many environmental and social movements that demand justice.

The strategy of combining theoretical vocabulary with the grammar used by various movements is the first similarity between Schlosberg and the deep ecologist Arne Næss, and this observation starts the next part of this paper, which looks at the structural similarities between the ideas of broad ecological justice and deep ecology.

Næss: preliminary broad ecological justice

The ‘seeds’ of a broad view of justice can already be found in deep ecology and especially, in the writings of Arne Næss who strongly proposes similar broadness, though this similarity has not been, to my knowledge, discussed anywhere. The structural similarity of these two approaches can be examined by looking at the way in which deep ecology identifies itself by making a distinction between the shallow and deep ecological movements. This comparison reveals a remarkable similarity between the ‘broadness’ of Schlosberg’s approach and the ‘depth’ of deep ecology.

The differentiation between shallow and deep ecology movements is crucial, as it justifies the whole label of ‘deep’ as separate from other approaches of environmental ethics and environmental movements. Since this article focuses on the philosophical and ethical issues rather than ideologies as such, I will keep myself within the theoretical realms of deep
ecology. This is not to say that the link deep ecology builds between theory and practice should be rejected—it is a strength. The same can be said about Schlosberg’s approach, as one of his clearly stated aims is to overcome the gap between justice theorizing and environmental justice movements, which enables both sides to learn from each other (Schlosberg 2007, 5).

The cornerstone of deep ecology, or what makes deep ecology deep, is the demand for broader change than is allowed or required by shallow approaches. At stake is not just “a slight reform of our present society, but a substantial reorientation of our whole civilisation” (Næss 1989, 45). Instead of treating environmental problems separately and in isolation, changes should be made in the economic policies, ideological structures, and cultural practices to address the reasons beyond the problems (Næss 1986, 405–7; revised 1989, 28–32). Whereas shallow movements do not question prevailing practices, “[s]upporters of the long-range deep ecology movement take a broader view” (Drengson 2008, 26). The shallow approach favors technological fixes and cost/benefit analyses, whereas deep ecology aims to promote cultural and social change, especially in industrial societies (Næss 1986). Furthermore, deepness means deeper argumentation that can be traced back to our ultimate premises and worldviews instead of remaining in the normative and political level (Næss 2008, 105–19). Although the shallow approach is often labeled anthropocentric and the deep approach ecocentric, the shallow–deep distinction does not necessitate centrism-related notions, as will be seen below. Rather, the deep ecological principles can be arrived at from very different ultimate worldviews (concerning, for instance, their religious contents).

The above distinctions made by deep ecology resemble those that demarcate the distributive or narrow paradigms of justice from the broad view: the latter argues for going beyond maldistribution in order to identify the structures and practices that constitute and
contribute to injustice. This call to go beyond the ‘symptoms of injustice,’ asking how the injustice is produced and reproduced, has been expressed clearly by Young (1990, 22) and Fraser (2000), two influential advocates of broad (or multidimensional) views of justice. According to this viewpoint, making the world more just requires changes in the economic, social, and cultural realms, rather than just corrections when the injustice has occurred.

Sustainability, despite being a contested and vague concept, is often endorsed as a general guideline that should steer the actions of human societies. From this viewpoint, there is a significant similarity in the attitudes shared by deep ecology and broad ecological justice. Because (re)distribution only corrects the problems that have been realized but does not deal with their roots, it does not help to prevent future problems. To put forward an analogy, distributive justice is like palliative ‘sick-care’ while multidimensional or broad justice aims to work in the spirit of preventive health care. In health politics, many of us intuitively favor the latter: it is better to prevent than to treat. If taken as an eligible goal, sustainability would require a shift toward preventive politics—a view endorsed by both deep ecology and broad ecological justice. As Schlosberg (2007, 126) puts it: “any attempt to find common ground between sustainability and justice necessitates an examination and understanding of misrecognition—not just maldistribution—of both those communities striving for environmental justice and the natural world.”

The arguments made this far have shown that the shallow–deep distinction made by deep ecology is structurally similar to the narrow–broad (or distributive–multidimensional) ecological justice distinction, and deep ecology is ‘on the same side’ with Schlosberg’s broad ecological justice. On this account, I find it useful to deepen this comparison, as there is a chance for mutual learning if a more detailed analysis reveals more similarities between the approaches. In order to see whether this is the case, I next compare the keystones of
‘broadness’ in Schlosberg’s approach with the main points of deep ecology. First, the three dimensions of justice—distribution, recognition, and representation—are discussed. After that, I discuss capabilities, the last important element of Schlosberg’s framework from which the name extended capabilities approach is also derived.

**Distribution, recognition and representation in deep ecology**

To claim similarity between deep ecology and broad ecological justice, it is necessary to examine the relationship between deep ecology and the three dimensions of justice. After all, a demand for going ‘beyond the problems’ and arguing for change in the whole society does not, in itself entail that deep ecology would agree with the demands for recognition and representation. The comparison in the next passages rests mostly on the writings of Næss on deep ecology. At some points, I refer particularly to his own ecosophy T (T as Tvergastein, the place Næss greatly identified with). Ecosophies are the individual level applications of deep ecological principles, and they are best understood as personalized combinations of personal ultimate worldviews, premises, and shared deep ecological ideas “philosophies of life”.

The motive for adding ecosophy T writings to my comparison is that those texts are exceptionally insightful in their approach to conceptualizing self-realization, which significantly resembles the way capabilities and flourishing are linked in the capabilities approach (and the capability element of broad ecological justice). Moreover, ecosophy T texts offer a valuable example on how a personal ecosophy—the “individual outcome” of deep ecology—can be compatible with broad ecological justice. However, it must be kept in mind that ecosophy T is not the same as deep ecology; it is only an example of a personal worldview that can be adopted within the framework of deep ecology, an ‘applied version’ of
a more general framework. The use of ecosophy T in this article is comparative and
illustrative; the reader should keep in mind that rather than promote his own Tvergastein
ecosophy, Næss invites everyone to create their own ecosophies inspired by the general deep
ecology platform (Drengson 2008, 39).

The first dimension of justice, distribution, is so integral to all approaches that it is
unnecessary to deal with it in great detail here. Like other authors, Næss (1989) discusses
distribution in relation to humans and non-human nature. With respect to distributable
resources, Næss focuses on the argument that human use of natural resources is excessive.
Although he focuses on human–nature-relations, Næss observes the problems of class

Recognition, the second dimension of justice, is related to cultural practices and
attitudes that have been institutionalized, as was earlier described. In this context recognition
is understood as adequate regard (as opposed to a narrower mutuality insight, in which
recognition requires mutuality and therefore excludes any possibility of the recognition of
non-persons; cf. Laitinen 2010). Misrecognition can take different forms of which Fraser
(1998, 7) has constructed a typology: 1) general cultural domination, 2) non-recognition or
ignorance, and 3) disrespect (visible in public and cultural representations). Respectively, on
the more just side, cultural recognition can take at least three different forms: non-
domination, non-ignorance or ‘visibility’, and respect.

The deep ecology platform (Næss 1989, 29), or a set of general views as Næss later
preferred to call it (Clark 2010, 29), emphasizes general respect for nature. The list states that
every being has the right to blossom. The uniqueness of our species does not justify
domination (or the overall prioritization of human interests, whether vital or not) and
mistreatment. Rather, it should lead to the attitude of universal care (Næss 1989, 171). Deep
ecology embraces biospherical egalitarianism, “in principle”: it is acknowledged in early deep ecology literature that living a life always necessitates some exploitation and suppression of other life forms (Næss 1973). Yet, this biospherical egalitarianism entails that exploitation of nature always requires careful consideration and justification. This demand for non-domination of other forms of life is similar to the first form of recognition, nondomination. Moreover, in the early work on deep ecology, Næss (1973, 97) criticizes the ignorance of biospherical relationships and the effect of human disturbances on non-human nature. This can be interpreted as the criticism of ignorance, another form of misrecognition. Biospherical egalitarianism is one, though not the only way to increase the recognition of non-human nature.

More passages criticize human domination or the prioritization of human interests in all situations, and ignorance towards nature. The discussion takes place in the political context but belongs in the realm of recognition as the focus is on cultural values and assumptions rather than inclusions of politics. For example, Næss accused the prevailing economic and political paradigms of pursuing the domination of nature. Economic growth ignores the external effects that economic activities may have on non-human welfare, as gross national product for example, turns non-human nature invisible (Næss 1989, 110–16). Nature must be rendered politically more visible. One example of answering to this call is the practice of environmental impact assessment (EIA) adopted by several nations. However, this assessment has not been used in many decisions that affect non-human nature.

Respect, the third form of recognition, is an important principle in deep ecological thinking. In the eight-point platform, the call for respect concerns the richness and diversity of life forms (Næss 1989, 29). This appreciation is understood to entail normative commitments—appreciating life in its different forms obliges one to carefully consider the
effects one’s actions may have on other living entities. Næss is also worried about the
disrespect for traditional cultures as a growing problem, which he links to the disrespect for
Næss concerns not only the disrespectful treatment of nature but also of the peoples. The
prerequisite for respecting a particular culture is its sustainability, but in unsustainable cases,
condemnation should concern unsustainable practices rather than take the form of disrespect
for the people performing those practices (Næss 2008, 141).

As the examples above indicate, distributive and recognitional dimensions of justice
are important for deep ecology. The third dimension of justice, representation or
participation, is more complicated as regards its role in deep ecological thought. In broad
ecological justice, the participatory aspect is essential for Schlosberg. He elaborates on
different problems and possibilities related to non-human participation and inclusion in
democratic decision-making and discusses strategies for internalizing nature into politics
(Schlosberg 2007, 187–210). Compared to the centrality of politics found here, participatory
issues play a substantially smaller role in deep ecology. Instead of focusing on politics, many
writers on deep ecology, and especially Næss, emphasize individual (and cultural) change
(e.g., Næss 1987; 1989; 1993; 2002).

One reason for the individual emphasis adopted by Næss is that a central theme in
many of his writings is self-realization or the expansion of the self (as formulated in the
Spinozist tradition), which is an individual process. This identification with the whole living
world leads, according to Næss, to a situation in which one is naturally inclined to act on the
principle of avoiding harming life more than is necessary. After all, harming others is
harming yourself, or to be precise, your ecological self (Næss 1987; 1993). If every human
being attained self-realization, there would hardly be the need for environmental ethics or
A similar idea of identification with the biosphere is present in the early works of Warwick Fox when he still defended deep ecology (Fox 1989). However, it is important to remember that self-realization is not a part of the theoretical deep ecology approach; it belongs to the personal views (or ecosophies) of Næss and possibly, other proponents. Even in this context, Næss admits that increasing sensitivity toward diversity is also a political question (Næss 1987, 40).

Despite the bias Næss has towards individual change, the political realm is already included in the eight-point deep ecology platform, although the exact formulation has varied slightly over the years. It states that “(6) Significant change of life conditions for the better requires change in policies. These affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures.” (Næss 1989, 29) Moreover, Næss views it “…desirable that everyone in the ecological movement engage in political activity” (ibid., 130). The question then is: what kind of policies does deep ecology endorse, especially in terms of inclusion, exclusion, and internalization of the non-human world into decisions? Local autonomy and decentralization have been at the core of deep ecology from its inception (Næss 1973). For Næss, this entails endorsing direct democracy combined with local equality where ‘the bottom’ and ‘the top’ can work and live together. Furthermore, democratic inclusion is not to be limited to humans but should lead to a “democracy of life forms” (Næss 1989, 144; 175). In terms of ecological justice and its participatory dimension, this view entails as broad non-human inclusion as possible.

The examples above indicate that the three dimensions of broad ecological justice match well with the ideas of deep ecology, although differences in the areas of emphasis can be found. Broad ecological justice has in its broadness many similar features with those that make deep ecology deep. Next, I elaborate on whether deep ecology meets the second
characterization of the broadness of Schlosberg’s approach, namely the structure of capabilities discourse. Granted that deep ecology does not use the grammar of capabilities directly, are there any grounds for claiming that deep ecology could be considered a capabilities-oriented approach?

Capabilities, functionings, and flourishing

Flourishing is at the heart of deep ecological thinking. The eight-point deep ecology platform declares that both human and non-human flourishing have intrinsic value, which is understood as value that is independent of any instrumental value. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to both human and non-human flourishing. A decrease in the human population is required in the long run for the sake of non-human flourishing, but this can be made compatible with a flourishing human life. (Næss 1989, 29–30.)

When Schlosberg integrates the capabilities approach with ecological justice, flourishing is also one of the key concepts. For Schlosberg (2013, 44) the main concern is what restrains the living systems “…from transforming primary goods into the functioning, integrity, and flourishing of those that depend on them.” The disruption of these processes and systems leads to decreased functionings and capabilities, and both human and non-human well-being is threatened. However, Schlosberg is not the first one who connects flourishing to the capabilities vocabulary; Nussbaum views it as the ultimate end as well. According to Nussbaum (2011, 32–33), the task of government is to enable people to flourish and pursue a dignified life. The importance of flourishing connects Nussbaum, Schlosberg, and Næss.

Næss further connects flourishing to the idea of self-realization in his own ecosophy, whereby flourishing requires self-realization. Self-realization refers to the fulfillment of inherent potentialities that are peculiar for that particular species or being (Næss 1987, 37). In
the case of human beings, this realization of potentialities leads to a broadened conception of
the self that seeks to promote the flourishing of other beings as well. As Næss (2008, 132)
states: “The mature human individual, with a broadened self [...] seeks a social order, or
rather a biospheric order, that maximizes the potential for self-realization of all kinds of
beings”.

This idea of self-realization that requires the fulfillment of necessary potentials
connects the ecosophy of Næss with the capabilities approach through structural similarity.
Whereas capabilities are potentials, self-realization refers to the process of turning these
potentials into functionings. Consider the following example: every human being (born with
normal psychological abilities) has the potential to use his emotional traits. The ability to
realize this potential equals the fifth central capability of Nussbaum, the capability to have
emotions and form attachments. Realizing the capability results in different functionings,
such as loving and caring, that contribute to the flourishing of that individual. The potential
of emotional traits is also linked to other capabilities, the details of which cannot be delved
into here. Nevertheless, the link from potentials to flourishing can be formulated as follows:

\[ Næss: \text{Potentials } \{a, b, c, \ldots\} \rightarrow \text{Realization of potentials that contribute to self-} \]
\[ \text{realization } \rightarrow \text{self-realization, state of flourishing} \]

\[ \text{Nussbaum/Schlosberg: Potentials } \{a, b, c, \ldots\} \rightarrow (\text{Central}) \text{ capabilities } \{x, y, z, \ldots\} \rightarrow \text{a set} \]
\[ \text{of functionings realized from capabilities } \rightarrow \text{well-being or flourishing} \]

The conceptual relationship is similar in both cases, and like Nussbaum and
Schlosberg, Næss focuses on protecting the potentials that are important for flourishing. This
entails for him, the general principle of minimizing the interference with non-human nature:
present human effects on non-human nature are excessively harmful. However, it is important
to acknowledge that human interference with non-human nature is unavoidable, and that not
all of the effects are bad—the quality and extent of the interference matters (Næss 1989, 29–30). Now, a proviso must be made: this discussion concerns only the ecosophy. Self-realization is not represented in general deep ecology (in this sense, ecosophy T perhaps goes even ‘deeper’ than the general deep ecology platform). Yet, I contend that even if the notion of self-realization is removed, the essential link from potentials to flourishing would be in line with general deep ecological thought. Næss simply offers the best clarification of the connection, and spices it with the idea of self-realization.

The idea of promoting non-human capabilities (or potentials, in Næss’s terminology) by non-interference is suggested as a way to understand the notion of doing ecological justice in the context of capabilities (Cripps 2010). The link between promoting environmental capabilities and the ecocentric argument of ‘letting nature take its course’ (within certain limits) is also observed by Schlosberg (2007, 152). The limitation refers to the fact that there are also harmful potentials and preventing their realization, or not letting nature take its course, is morally justifiable. Letting a malign virus spread may decrease the overall flourishing of several species and beings, and preventing this kind of epidemic is justifiable even in terms of maximizing the diversity of flourishing. The distinction between beneficial and harmful potentials or capabilities needs multidisciplinary understanding and discussion, combining the descriptive and normative evaluation of how certain potentials affect human and non-human well-being and whether they are, accordingly, morally desirable.

The distinction between beneficial or important and harmful capabilities is also made by Nussbaum (2011, 70–72), who argues that the task of the capabilities approach is to find those capabilities that must be promoted in order to secure equal dignity and (at least), minimum social justice for every human being. In the case of the human community, the capabilities approach does not find the minimized interference principle sufficient. Rather,
capabilities must be actively promoted by a just society. Næss shares this idea in the human context such that political actions should promote the developing and unfolding of different human abilities (Næss 2008, 127; 132).

I hope to have shown with this discussion that there are clear similarities between deep ecology (especially as it has been represented by Næss) and the broad ecological justice or extended capabilities approach, a new discourse introduced by Schlosberg. I am not arguing that these two discourses are identical—far from that. My argument is that the idea of broad ecological justice, with all the promising characteristics, is not actually as new an approach as it may at first seem. To avoid painting a picture that is too simplified, I will next explore the main differences between the deep ecological and broad ecological views of justice. This comparison also offers a good place to ask whether these two approaches can learn from each other. Is there something in deep ecology that, when adopted to the discourse of broad ecological justice, would help to develop Schlosberg’s ideas further? Or vice versa?

**Learning from each other?**

One difference between deep ecology and broad ecological justice is that deep ecology is widely considered as a form of ecocentrism, whereas broad ecological justice actively refrains from taking a stance on the centrism debate. Adopting the attitude of Western liberalism, broad ecological justice does not commit itself to any particular metaphysical view. According to Schlosberg (2007, 137), the recognition of nature may first seem ecocentric but it can be endorsed without appealing to ecocentric ideals. It can be argued that this difference prevents mutual learning between deep ecology and broad ecological justice. This would hold true if broad ecological justice had to adopt metaphysical arguments from deep ecology in order to learn anything from it: in this case, the former
would lose its liberal stance. However, there are actually grounds on which it is plausible to assert that deep ecology does not require adopting a particular metaphysical stance.

Deep ecology accepts wide pluralism in the level of fundamental worldviews. Næss clarifies this with the so-called Apron diagram (Næss 2005, 63; 2008, 107–8), which notes that the common deep ecology platform, consisting of penultimate views, can be accepted and adopted by people who hold very different ultimate philosophical or religious worldviews. Accepting the platform does not presuppose a particular metaphysical view, nor consider nature to have inherent value (Næss 2008, 69). Broad ecological justice endorses pluralism in a similar spirit, holding a view that a plurality of justice discourse is not only empirical reality but also pragmatic necessity (Schlosberg 2007, 167). People with different worldviews and from different discourses may still reach agreement over the core issues of broad ecological justice. This core could, for example, consist of viewing ecological justice as a multidimensional issue that demands going beyond maldistribution and considering how injustice is produced and reproduced in the economic, cultural, and institutional realms. Along this line, changes would be needed in the economic, cultural and political realms.

Actually, broad ecological justice could be presented with a similar Apron diagram that was used by Næss. I do not intend to argue that the supporters of broad ecological justice inevitably endorse deep ecological view, nor that they should do so. The crux is that both approaches point to similar solutions, and both accept different worldview holders as their supporters; hence, endorsing both views is possible. Actually, I believe that many deep ecology movement supporters (though perhaps not all) would agree with the core tenets of broad ecological justice.

Another matter here is that Næss holds self-realization central in his own ecosophy, and self-realization may at first glance seem to require adopting a particular metaphysical
stance, or at least leads to adopting one (a monist, Spinozist-like worldview). However, it is far from clear that Næss would claim self-realization to require a particular metaphysical standpoint; indeed, the opposite can be defended as well. After all, self-realization is not reserved for philosophical beings such as humans only. Næss (2008, 95) mentions the self-realization of a praying mantis as an example. As a praying mantis is unlikely to hold a metaphysical worldview, it is questionable why human self-realization would require holding a particular worldview, as it cannot be the case with other species. Yet, it is also true that Næss (2008, 93) expresses a preference towards change in ontology rather than change in ethics. Therefore, self-realization is discussed at some point as resulting in a change in ontological views.

Interestingly, Schlosberg himself refers to “enlightened human self-interest rather than a belief in the intrinsic value of nature” as giving rise to the recognition of the integrity of nature (Schlosberg 2007, 138). Does this not sound similar to Næss’s idea that self-realization and identification with non-human nature brings nature into the sphere of a person’s self-interest? For Schlosberg, the enlightened self-interest takes the form of a rational and moral attitude. Whether that is the case with Næss (instead of more metaphysical changes), cannot be answered here. The arguments Næss makes regarding self-realization are partly contradictory and vague, and I refrain from making a statement on whether or not the idea of enlightened human self-interest is relevantly similar to the idea of self-realization. That question is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the ambiguity that relates to a personal ecosophy does not undermine the point that deep ecology itself does not require adopting a particular metaphysical stance.

As previously mentioned, another difference between deep ecology and broad ecological justice is that deep ecology emphasizes individual and cultural change, whereas
broad ecological justice mostly deals with the institutional realms as a theory of justice. Schlosberg leaves the individual lifestyle choices and value issues out of the discussion. In my view, this difference in focus is explained by deep ecology being not only a philosophical discourse but also an environmental movement aiming to make people feel motivated to start the change themselves, similar to the Norwegian ‘The Future in Our Hands’ movement (Næss 1989, 88–91). The argument in these movements is that change is needed in both individual lifestyles and on a political and institutional level: neither of them can be demanded to change ‘first’, but the change must happen concurrently on both levels.

An important consequence of the individual and cultural focus in deep ecology is that it provides a rich collection of valuable points concerning the recognition dimension of ecological justice, as recognition is related to culture and values. Although Schlosberg (2007, 131–42) clearly talks about the importance of recognition in ecological justice, he remains at the level of general discussion about the types of recognition and that further work on the recognition of non-humans would be required to develop broad ecological justice. In this respect, broad ecological justice could use the deep ecology literature as a rich resource material for finding instances and examples on how the recognition of non-human nature can emerge.

As the differences discussed above are differences in degree rather than in kind, I propose it would make sense to acknowledge that the ‘broadness’ in broad ecological justice has a remarkably similar character with the ‘deepness’ in deep ecology. While this remark is valuable in its own right and contributes to the literature of comparative analyses on environmental ethics, there are more interesting questions. Are these findings on the similarity useful in any way? Does deep ecology offer something that could help develop broad ecological justice? I suggest the answer is positive: broad ecological justice can indeed
learn from deep ecology (and ecosophy T). Three points in which broad ecology could benefit from adopting certain ideas from deep ecological thought are discussed below.

1. Decreasing the gap between theory and practice. Schlosberg (2007, 5) mentions that one of his main aims is to overcome the gap between (broad) justice theory and environmental justice movements. He approaches this gap from the theoretical perspective; deep ecology, along with its ecosophy dimension, combines elements peculiar to movements and theories. While this probably explains the vagueness and weaknesses found in deep ecological thought, it nevertheless provides fruitful material for the broad ecological justice project to overcome the theory–practice gap. The ‘Apron diagram’ of deep ecology could prove to be useful in conceptualizing these relationships in broad ecological justice, as well as discussing the dialogical interaction between movements and theories.

2. Expanding the discussion concerning cultural pluralism. Although deep ecology has been accused of advocating strict cultural monism, as the different passages in this article illustrate, there are no strong grounds on which to assert this. Næss endorses cultural pluralism as far as it is exercised within the limits of sustainability. Moreover, he criticizes the disrespect of traditional, non-industrialized cultures and the attempt to ‘rationalize’ those cultures by implementing Western ideas and practices into their communities, and applies the recognition-like principle in these discussions (Næss 2008, 281–83; 1989, 100–02, 212). Even though Næssian criticism of technology transfer may be considered a bit exaggerated, the link he makes between the recognition of cultures, cultural pluralism, and ecological justice provides a variety of insightful arguments for the discourse of broad ecological (and environmental) justice.

3. One solution to the reconciliation of human and non-human flourishing. Cripps (2010) has examined the strengths and weaknesses of Schlosberg’s extended
capabilities approach, asking whether it can do justice to humans, animals, and ecosystems. ‘Doing justice to all’ has turned out challenging due to the extent of inevitable conflicts of interest. Although the works of Næss do not provide a magic cure to the problems raised by Cripps, his ecosophy offers an individual-level example of how human and non-human flourishing can be reconciled to a remarkable extent. What is needed for a broader cultural change and cultural recognition of non-human nature is a difficult question and goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, cultures change over time and in a sense, have evolutionary resilience that keeps them dynamic, like other socio-ecological systems (Davoudi et al. 2012, 302). Change is possible.

The similarities between deep ecology and broad ecological justice do not diminish the value of Schlosberg’s approach. Rather, this similarity strengthens the argument made by Schlosberg that broad ecological justice has potential as a theory that successfully captures the essential features of environmental movements and helps to create dialogue between theory and practice. I suggest that this dialogue can be even broader and more productive than Schlosberg perhaps has himself proposed. As my comparison shows, broad ecological justice discourse has the possibility to promote agreement between ecocentric and anthropocentric environmentalists as well as those who endorse rejecting the whole notion of different centrisms.

To recapitulate, broad ecological justice has two specific advantages as a theory of ecological justice. First, it helps to view the injustice as a deeper and broader question, tackling the impediments of justice that are rooted in the societal structures and social and cultural practices. Second, it provides theoretical and grammatical tools for overcoming the gap between justice theories and movements, promoting constructive dialogue between these different strands of environmental thought. Broad ecological justice is a valuable project that
deserves further development. Thus, it is useful to acknowledge its similarities with deep ecology and insights from deep ecology could help to advance the broad discourse forward, making it even broader—or deeper.

REFERENCES


1. In this paper, environmental justice concerns environmental problems and risks within human societies, whereas ecological justice concerns human-nature relations and the effects humans have on non-human nature. The terms are often intertwined in the works of Schlosberg.