Esa Konttinen, Tapio Litmanen, 
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ALL SHADES OF GREEN

The Environmentalization of Finnish Society
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FOREWORD

In Finland, a remarkable increase in the interest of social scientists in environmental matters occurred at the late 1980s and early 1990s. While very few social science scholars had been engaged in environmental issues up to that time, ten years ago a number of mainly younger researchers became involved in the topic. More or less integrated study groups emerged at several universities. At the University of Jyväskylä, Institute of Sociology, such a group organised itself in 1993, consisting of a number of graduate and postgraduate students as well as of their teacher.

In Jyväskylä, some themes are more popular than others, resulting from previous research trends at the institute of sociology. Environmental conflicts and movements, for instance, have been in the focus of attention. Since the 1980s the institute has developed a tradition in the study of social movements. Also connecting previous trends, issues of local environmental administration are among the popular themes. Reflecting this background, the research project “Local environmental conflicts and local administration in Central Finland”, financed by the Academy of Finland, was working from 1993 to 1996. Environmental conflicts were placed within the context of their social environments in an attempt to find out what kind of influence – temporary or more permanent – they had on local communal life and communal decision-making and how the local people and authorities reacted to these conflicts.

The research of the group came to consist of national environmental issues like the acceptance (or unacceptance) of the national shore
protection program by municipalities and by other local actors; problems and local conflicts concerning the nuclear waste plans of national energy companies; environmental movements in the country; local experiments of sustainable development; etc. Today the research themes are even more diverse, as the present anthology shows. Accordingly, theoretical orientations are also more varied, reflecting the personal interests of the researchers.

As one can see, the focus of interest lies in specific concrete processes in Finnish society. The intention is to detect specific social and cultural formations determining local and nationwide environmental policies. The articles, showing the complexity of the contemporary situation, reflect the specific dynamics of each issue within the context of larger societal structures. Diverging tendencies – some of which are highly contradictory – can be detected. Thus, when moving into the 21st century, we are making choices in crosscurrents.

Dr. Esa Konttinen, leader of the group, is a Senior Research Fellow of the Academy of Finland. Currently his main research interests are environmental movements and their activists. Tapio Litmanen, Lic. Soc. Sc., whose work is also financed by the Academy, has specialized in the nuclear waste problem and its local aspects. Matti Nieminen, Lic.Soc.Sc., appointed by the Academy, conducts research on the representations of citizenship in Finnish environmental politics and administration. Marja Ylönen’s, Lic.Soc.Sc., research is financed by the University of Jyväskylä. Environmental crimes are her present topic of study.

*Esa Konttinen*
Matti Nieminen, Esa Konttinen, Tapio Litmanen & Marja Ylönén

INTRODUCTION

Listening to the experiences of tourists visiting Finland will give one an impression that Finns live in a country where environmental problems must be non-existent. The five million people are scattered across a large area of relatively untouched nature, and a tourist crossing the country will be overwhelmed with the vast forests, large swamp areas, lakes that are so clean that you can drink the water, and – in the north – fells you can hike without seeing a living soul for days. Once the tourist gets to know people, he will also notice that most Finns put a great emphasis on natural values in their everyday lives. There is an advanced recycling system in Finland, and citizens see it as their duty to separate all the household waste and to place it in appropriate containers which each household must have. Finns love to hike in the forests and fells; with everyman’s right of public access to the countryside, they are able to fish, swim, pick berries and mushrooms and even camp almost wherever they like; those living in urban areas have summer cottages on lakesides, where they spend their holidays enjoying the simplicity and tranquility of rural lifestyle.

So is Finland the green dreamland it appears to be to a visitor from, say, some densely populated urbanized country in Central Europe? Have Finns found a way of balancing human needs and interests with environmental values? Or is there something wrong with the picture? In this collection of articles our aim is to reveal what is behind “the green
curtain”. To a foreign visitor’s astonishment, environmental conflicts do exist in this Eldorado of green gold. To a Finnish environmentalist Finland is also a country where many cultural, political and economic factors have for decades hindered environmental reforms. The juridically well-protected private land ownership has made nature conservation an issue of great contradictions; the traditionally strong forest industry – “the backbone of Finnish well-being”, as the popular phrase puts it – has severely clashed with environmental pursuits; and despite the environmentalist attitudes Finns seem to share, they still surrender to the temptations of free-riderism if their personal interests are at stake. So one could say that although Finnish society to some extent can be considered “a green society”, where a close, plain relationship to the environment prevails, this greenness is manifested in many different shades both in national policies and in the everyday life of the people. To give the reader a better understanding of the background of this collection of articles, we will next briefly summarize some of the central features of the processes that propelled environmental issues into broader attention in Finland.

The awakening of environmental concern

Finland, a highly industrialized and technologized country of five million inhabitants in Northern Europe, has experienced a development of environmental awareness typical of Western countries. Within environmental protection, the period before the 1960s was a period characterized by conservationist protection ideology. In accordance with this ideology, national parks were established, mostly in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country. Environmentalist challenges were first voiced by the radical movement in the second half of the sixties. A number of ‘single issue movements’ came to birth, the environmental movement being one of them. Pamphlets on pollution issues were published and associations established in order to influence environmental policy, e.g. traffic policy. The conservationist trend characterizing the most important national voluntary association in environmental protection, the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC), was challenged by young environmentalists. They put the human being in the centre of attention and focused their interest on industrial pollution.
Introduction

In spite of loud criticism by these intellectuals, the new trend could not yet win broad support among decision-makers and wider population strata. The prevailing world view and cultural climate were still too much in favour of continuous industrialization and material well-being – and the environmental demands had not yet any deeper influence. The pollution problems connected with industrialization were generally seen as unavoidable. However, some advancement was made in the form of administrative developments. For example, the regional water resources administration was established. Also, a consultative committee was set up to plan national environmental policies in the beginning of the 1970s. But a proposal by the FANC for establishment of the Ministry of the Environment was rejected by the main centrist and rightist parties, and by the national agricultural and industrial associations.

After a few years of more latent development, the most important period of transition in environmentalism took place in the late seventies and early eighties (Järvikoski, 1991; Rannikko, 1994; Konttinen, 1996). Attitudes had become more sympathetic to environmental concerns all over the nation, mirroring what had already occurred in the international scene.

Again, one of the main promoters of ecological thinking was the environmental movement. As elsewhere, the anti-nuclear movement emerged in Finland, too, in the second half of the seventies. However, in this country, much more influential were numerous local protest events at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties. A nationwide environmental protest culture, lasting for a few years (Konttinen, 1996), came to birth. Many of the protests concerned everyday milieus of the common people, threatened by the industrial use of natural resources. In particular, issues concerning lakes and rivers were of burning interest at that time (Rannikko, 1994; Konttinen, 1996). There are tens of thousands of lakes in Finland, and these have traditionally been an important element of the way of life of the Finns in many districts. These old ways of life had become threatened by intensive industrialization. But valuable natural and town milieus, too, were defended. Students, local people and in some cases also local authorities participated in the protests, to which the mass media paid a lot of attention.

The general social mood had become favourable to environmental
concerns to such an extent that considerable changes in the national policy-making in favour of environmental protection could now take place. The Green Movement was established in 1983. Moreover, the established political parties became more interested in environmental matters, and not only in their rhetoric. New laws for protecting valuable nature milieus like rapids were directed by the government and Parliament. And the most importantly from the viewpoint of the future, The Ministry of the Environment was founded in 1983. A more intensive and systematically organised planning work for protecting environment could now begin. It was the start towards a more integrated environmental policy, a tendency which was further strengthened during the last years of the eighties by the environmental policy of the OECD, and particularly by the report of the Brundtland commission, Our Common Future in 1987 and the subsequent discussion in Parliament next year (Rouhinen, 1991: 239; Koskinen, 1994; Jokinen, 1995).

The eighties were an economically favourable period for the country. This contributed to the institutionalization of environmentalism in administrative life. In addition to the developments at national and regional levels, the establishment of new organizational structures could occur in municipalities too. In 1986, special environmental boards were established in municipalities with more than 3000 inhabitants. Those with less than 3000 inhabitants dealt with environmental matters in some other board, usually in the boards of building or health matters. Quite soon new offices of environmental experts were also founded in a large number of municipalities. Three fourths of the municipalities had a professional expert in environmental matters in their staff in 1993 (Rönn, 1993), the rest sharing a specialist with some other municipalities. A municipal environmental expert is a kind of specialized generalist in environmental matters. One of her or his tasks is to confirm that regulations and measures planned in the central administration are implemented at the local level. Even more generally, the environmental experts are aimed at promoting environmental protection and thinking in local circumstances.

The regional level of environmental administration was also developed further. The main institutions have been regional water resources administration and nature protection departments of the county administration. In 1995 both organs were fused into one organisation
called regional environmental centres, subjected under nation wide Environmental Institute of Finland. The centres, thirteen in all, have played an important role in steering and controlling environmental practices at the local level. Officials responsible for environmental matters in municipalities can have expert knowledge and administrative support from the regional centres. In an international comparison (Jänicke, 1992: 48), however, the institutionalization of Finnish environmental policy occurred relatively late.

The period from the late 1980s onwards has been called the period of ‘thorough ecologization’ (Heikkinen, 1993). This is a time when ecological rhetoric and concepts spread everywhere in society. New issues following international tendencies came to the forefront in environmental discussions, including sustainable development, global environmental risks, eco systems, and threats to biodiversity. This discussion also reached the business world. Having earlier been conceived as mere hindrances to economic success, environmental issues have become part of the everyday activities of industrial enterprises, much resulting from the demands of the market. A positive environmental image is a factor of growing importance in competition. In particular, environmental attitudes in the export markets of forest products have influenced the policies of this branch in the 1990s; the change in orientation can be described as dramatic. However, more generally the orders of the central administration by laws can be evaluated yet in the mid-1990s still more important factor to regulate environmental behaviour of the firms (Lovio, 1995: 145-159). In 1994 about half of the big enterprises had their own environmental program. Firms have appointed expert staff in environmental protection and taken qualified experts in their decision making organs. Various kind of certificate systems are also being created for products. But in spite of this advancement, in 1992, no more than 1.1 percent of total investments in industries were made to environment. A more intensive use of economic steering systems are generally objected among the business (ibid: 145-146).

One special issue subject to vivid debate in Finland has been the forest issue, above all the fate of old forests. In this country forestry has been one of the main sources of the livelihood, and forests are effectively used by the forest industries. According to the environmentalists, the protected areas, one percent of total forest areas, are insuf-
ficient for the preservation of biodiversity. The conflict concerns primarily the differences between forest owners and nature protectors.

The Rio conference in 1992 and the consequent agreements are often seen as an important milestone. Finland’s memberships in the OECD and the European Union (in 1995) have brought the Finnish system of environmental regulation closer to that of other western European countries. Through the policy of the European Union the emphasis is being directed more to economic steering issues. The European NATURA 2000 program as well as Local Agenda 21 by the United Nations are acute and much discussed topics during these days. A new milestone in the way of protecting the environment is the new Nature Protection Law, taken into use in 1997.

Finland faced a deep economic depression in the early 1990s. In addition to a bank crisis and other depression factors, the long-lasting trade relations with the Soviet Union collapsed following the societal upheaval in this big eastern neighbour. The unemployment rate soon rose from a few percent up to 17-18 percent. The general concern shifted to employment issues and changed people’s attitudes in favour of economic growth. According to surveys (Tanskanen, 1997: 86), the proportion of those seeing environmental protection as more important than economic growth had decreased from 63 percent in 1988 to 40 percent in 1992. In an international comparison of 13 EU countries (ibid.: 86), Finland and Ireland were the countries with highest proportion of those who wanted to put economic growth in the first place. However, half of the Finnish population think that environmental issues are not paid enough attention in social decision making (Ympäristö, 5/1995: 10).

The contradiction or the ambivalence of choosing between economic growth and environmental values or of combining the two is, of course, one of the central questions of modern environmentalism and environmental policies throughout the world. We will next briefly present some of the features of this ambivalence as it has been analyzed in environmental sociology and as it appears in a modern Western society. We will also highlight the essential theme of this collection of articles: the different and changing faces of environmentalism in Finnish society.
Lifting “the green curtain”

The spreading and institutionalization of environmentalism as well as the overall greening of society are processes that take place in different ways both spatially and chronologically as well as in different areas of society. In some areas of social life environmental viewpoints have become a crucial part of planning and decision-making, whereas in others they still have no substantial and practical relevance. Understanding the processes of environmentalization demands a broad theoretical perspective, but it also calls for analysis of individual cases.

An important question in this situation – and one that crystallizes the standpoint of this anthology of articles – is: *To what extent has the process of environmentalization penetrated Finnish society?* According to Klaus Eder (1996b), environmentalism has become a masterframe in Western societies. Eder argues that it has become a collectively shared ideology and that ecological concern has become a non-controversial issue in public discourse. Pertti Suhonen (1994, 69–70) shows how the environmentalization of Finnish society can be seen in media attention. In the 1960s ecological issues were still practically non-existent in Finnish media, whereas in the early 1970s the situation changed radically and environmental issues suddenly had a great news value. Environmental issues made the final breakthrough in Finnish media in the 1980s, and they have received a lot of media coverage ever since.

The cultural process of environmentalization that Eder (1996b) describes has in fact two sides. On the one hand environmental viewpoints to some extent give direction to people’s everyday activities and thinking as well as to the practices and policies of institutions and organizations. People are accustomed to recycling; there is a Ministry of the Environment; legislation has been reformed in the name of sustainable development; companies have adopted new, environmentally sounder technologies, and so on. In sociology this positive development has been described and analyzed, for example, by means of the theory of ecological modernization (Jokinen 1995). This theory deals with the processes of production and consumption and emphasizes the importance of eco-technological innovations and the need to rearrange production practices.

On the other hand the collectively shared ideology of environmen-
talism has a tendency to blur “genuine” ecological thinking. When everybody is green, nobody is green. This phenomenon can be analyzed with the help of the concept of ecological discourse. Environmental concern has lost its distinctiveness. The masterframe of environmentalism has turned ecology into a non-controversial collective concern (Eder 1996b, 183). The ideological consensus of environmentalism and the spreading of ecological discourse has led to a situation where environmentalism has lost its former potency. In this situation “traditional” environmental organizations and movements have lost their status as the primary mouthpiece of the environment. The competition for public attention in the “marketplace of public communication” (Eder 1996a, 206) has become so tight that according to some theorists we have entered an era of “post-environmentalism” (Young 1990, according to Eder 1996b, 180). In the present situation environmentalism has lost its status as a counter-discourse and become an institutionalized ideology instead.

One could say that environmentalism is in a croscurrent. The green world view that appears to be a collectively accepted ideology clashes in practice with other world views, values and interests. With the overall greening of society, environmental controversies have become more complicated and often more subtle than at the time when environmentalism was easily identifiable as a feature of only a few active groups and organizations. It is not easy to draw a line between environmentalists and non-environmentalists any longer. Actors at all levels of society claim to be environmentally conscious, and everyone is able to use environmentalist arguments – the ecological discourse – for legitimating his or her actions.

The studies in this anthology indicate that environmentalism both has and has not penetrated Finnish society. It has penetrated it as an administrative project and as a marketing gimmick, and in many ways environmentalism has become part of people’s everyday life (recycling, “green consumption”, etc.). However, it is still very much evident that this development has not been coherent or stable, and it definitely has not permeated all levels of society to the same extent. In fact, environmentalism seems to have different meanings and interpretations in different situations and instances, of which some meanings and interpretations are more ecological or environmentally sound than others. The widespread process of adopting the ecological discourse has led to a
situation in which environmentalism reveals itself in a large variety of forms.

One feature of the present situation in which the ecological discourse has been absorbed into all areas of social life is that the environmental concern is cyclically sensitive both in public discussion and in the minds of individuals. During a period of economic recession “hard” values come to the surface, issues of economic growth and labour predominate, and claims concerning environmental protection are treated as secondary or even harmful (see e.g. Konttinen’s article *Four Waves of Environmental Protest* in this book).

One strong tendency in the development of Finnish environmentalism in the 1990s has been the strong role of the economy in the greening of the society. As late as the 1980s business regarded green issues as expensive hindrances or obstacles to business, but now ecological viewpoints are major drawing cards in advertising and campaigning for one’s products. Ecological modernization of the economy and production can be seen as a pursuit of economic and productive growth by changing environmental concern from an obstacle of growth into a powerful marketing method.

The adoption of environmentalist strategies has in many cases been for the benefit of nature, but structural changes in the logic of the economy have nevertheless been small. With good reason one can claim that with the adoption of ecological discourse the economic system has in many ways legitimated its actions without radically changing the principles or logic of production. In many cases production has defined itself as non-polluting. This has, for example, been the case with Finnish agriculture (Jokinen 1995). Nowadays a “green halo” can be easily bought in a supermarket. By choosing pro-environmental products of pro-environmental companies consumers get a blessing for their consumption.

In politics, too, there appears to be a consensus on the importance of environmental issues. In their programmes and manifestos, political parties and individual politicians never seem to forget to spare a few thoughts for the environment. However, when the issue is viewed from a neo-Marxist viewpoint, as for example Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg (1996) do, the fragility of this consensus is revealed. Society as a political-economic system is oriented towards increasing production, consumption and economic growth, as this is seen as the only
way of gaining public well-being. This belief ties together the interests of private capital, labour force and the Government. This logic of action, which Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg call “the treadmill of production”, demands a constant speeding up of production in order to get the resources for social well-being – in other words, an uninterrupted exploitation of ecosystems and natural resources. For this reason private capital, labour force and the state are all committed to maintaining and speeding up the degradation of nature.

The articles in this anthology illustrate the changing face of environmentalism in present-day Finland. In many ways “Finnish environmentalism” has developed in parallel with the international development, but there are some features in Finnish environmentalism that can be regarded as idiosyncratically Finnish. In a country where a small number of people populate a large area of relatively unspoiled nature, environmentalism and the claims concerning nature appear different from those in, for example, the densely populated Central Europe. Finnish environmentalism can at present be described as ambivalent. It takes a different form in different contexts and in different situations. The “green project” is still very much incomplete. The right direction is being searched in the crosscurrent of different and often controversial messages that are all green on the surface, but interpret the present situation according to differing values and interests.

The articles

In the first article, “Four waves of environmental protest”, Esa Konttinen analyzes environmental protest cycles in Finland from the sixties up to the present. As widely agreed, the appearance of such protest events does not follow any linear model (or a totally random one); rather, the protests typically follow a cyclical model, where an active phase is followed by a less active period. Protest waves surrounding specific themes can also overlap chronologically. In the post-war era, four environmental protest waves can be identified, each of which has brought new themes into public discourse. New features of each wave are described and general social conditions for the success and failure of the protests are discussed.

In his second article, “Environmental challenges in Finnish coun-
tryside in the 1990s”, Konttinen analyzes contemporary environmental challenges in the Finnish countryside. The focus of attention is the countryside community. Community structures and tendencies are analyzed from the viewpoint of their ability to respond to environmental challenges. A number of supporting and hindering social factors are examined.

In his first article, “International anti-nuclear protest”, Tapio Litmanen analyzes both the anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapon movements in Finland, France and the United States. He shows how the international anti-nuclear protest has continued from the 1950s to the 1990s and how the periods of strong influence of the two movements have varied, and what kind of interaction there has been between these two movements. Both movements have had three important periods of active mobilization. Litmanen’s article also shows how the social, cultural and political factors as well as the coexistence of other social movements, such as the peace movement and the environmental movement, introduce national differences into the cyclical appearance of these movements.

In his second article, “From the Golden Age to the Valley of Despair. How did nuclear waste become a problem?”, Litmanen examines the long-term trends both in public discussion and in people’s attitudes towards nuclear power and nuclear waste. He draws a picture of the ways in which attitudes changed from the 1950s to the 1990s. Quite a number of studies have been devoted to this subject, but there has been much less discussion of why the expansion of nuclear industry has come to a halt after its golden age. In his article Litmanen emphasizes the importance of the international nuclear culture and the factors influencing it.

In his article, “Bystanders, bureaucrats and local bigwigs. Discourses of democracy and environmental values in Finnish parliamentary debate on Land-Use Legislation Reform”, Matti Nieminen analyzes the stormy debate in the Finnish parliament concerning the unsuccessful land use reform proposal in 1995. His study concentrates on the discussion concerning democracy and environmental values in the debate. Specific attention is given to the relationship between the State, local councils & administrations, and citizens, as envisaged in MPs’ argumentation supporting or opposing the reform proposal, and how different characterizations of the state, local councils & administra-
tions and citizens were strategically used to legitimate possible legal and administrative actions. Further, the implications of competing interpretations of the principles of grass-roots democracy and environmental sustainability are examined.

Marja Ylönen analyzes a case that is part of the environmental protest cycle of the 1980s in her article “The formation of a power relationship in an environmental conflict”. The focus is on the question of power. Power is understood here as a consequence of strategies and networks. Ylönen examines the way the main actors – representatives of a forestry company and local inhabitants – persuade other actors to side with them and construct their networks in order to establish themselves as spokespersons for the environment in the conflict.

In his second article, “What land? What nature? What threat? Controversy over Finnish shorelines”, Matti Nieminen looks at the controversy that was created between Finnish landowners and environmental authorities by the Government’s decision in principle to launch a national programme for the protection of shorelines. The programme aroused anger among landowners and their organizations. This controversy, which began in 1990, has been portrayed by the media as largely a money issue. However, a frame-analytical examination of interviews and press material indicates that the conflict, in fact, boils down to different views of the environment and to different interpretations of the meaning of private land and its ownership.
Introduction


Esa Konttinen

FOUR WAVES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST

Frames of waves

The modern history of the environmental movements in Finland will be studied from specific angles. It is the field of the movements which is as the target of attention, how this field is structured and what are the main changes and general continuities in this area of activity. Attention is directed to broad changes in the “frames” the collective action represents.\(^2\) Rucht (1994, 246) and Eder (1996, 162-183) distinguish three symbolic packages\(^3\) in the modern environmental pursuit: those of conservationism, political ecology and deep ecology. Conservationism is based on a presumed dichotomy between nature and culture (town and country, cultivation and wilderness, conquest and conservation). Conservation principles were developed as an attempt to save the natural world from the destructive effects of civilization. The political ecology package politicizes the environment and emphasizes political action designed to improve nature and environment; first and foremost, as a place for human beings to live in. Deep ecology, a fundamentalist approach, stresses the intrinsic value of nature. This symbolic package displaces human being’s position as the centre of world and Lord of creation, and sees that other creatures of nature have equal right for “good living”. For her part, Robyn Eckersley (1992, 26-31) makes a difference between an anthropocentric or human-
centered, and an ecology-centered orientation. In the former case, the non-human world is considered to be of value only insofar it can serve as an instrument to human ends. The latter approach values the non-human world for its own sake. Thus, while e.g. the symbolic package of political ecology is often human-centered, that of deep ecology, instead, represents an eco-centrist approach. Eckersley (ibid., 34) stresses that one can see a general trend from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism in the western world, but this will not occur as a linear progression. Generally there are arguments to be found in the tendencies, which manifest both approaches.

How have these orientations and symbolic packages developed in environmental movement front in post-war Finland? I will try to interpret the developments that have taken place in the light of Finnish society, the structure of its economy, and its cultural peculiarities. New trends in thinking about the environment may best be viewed with reference to the period of their emergence, i.e. in terms of their social and cultural context. Working along these lines, we can identify environmental protest waves in Finnish post war history, each of which has reshaped the field of symbolic packages.

As is generally known, the development of social movements does not follow any simple or smooth evolutionary model, but is a more complex phenomenon, where one can identify periods of more or less intensive change, during which a great deal of attention is directed to particular issues, by broader or narrower social strata. One can discern in Finnish post-war history four more active periods of environmental protest, each of which has had more long-term effects on environmental thinking. The first of these waves occurred in the late years of the sixties and the turn of the decade, the second at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, the third around the turn of the eighties (but still in motion), and the latest, a very specific wave, during a few last years.

The first wave: a shift from conservationism into environmentalism

The modern environmental movement reached Finland in the second half of the sixties. The rise of this environmentalism was mainly
connected with rapid industrialization and its harmful consequences for natural environments, and with social and cultural radicalism of the sixties.

In Finland, the industrialization process from the fifties up to the seventies was one of the most rapid in Europe. It has been said that during this period the country changed from being an agricultural nation into an industrial one. From the viewpoint of the environment, the specific form of this development is most important. Finnish industrialization occurred, above all, in the form of the growth of forestry and forest industries. Forestry has long been the main industry of the country; a position it has held until very recent years. It has even frequently been referred to as the locomotive of the national economy.

Unfortunately, forest industry was a very problematic one for the environment. In particular, pulp mills used to be very water-polluting; and during this period of rapid industrialization, water areas below the mills became badly polluted. The industry is also energy intensive, which has encouraged an energy policy of devoting all the country’s water resources to energy production, and building nuclear plants (now four in the country). And being also a striking factor, the power forestry programs, planned in the late fifties and the beginning of the sixties, dramatically changed Finnish forest nature by their massive ditching of marshes, broad clear fellings, massive use of fertilizers and pesticides, and general shift to mechanical forestry.

These very visible changes in the national environment contributed to an environmental awakening. However, this awakening occurred among a narrow social strata. The nation at large, which had experienced the period of post-war distress, now enjoyed a rise in material well-being; and a substantial majority of the common people were content to regard the spoiling of the environment as an unavoidable payment. Forestry enjoyed a hegemonic position in the field of industrial policy-making (Donner-Amnell 1991) and also in the minds of ordinary people. To all intents and purposes, criticism was limited to the group of classical nature-protectors and their voluntary association, The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation* (FANC), certainly the most important national voluntary association in the field of environmental protection. Originally, this criticism was aroused in the framework of the conservationist symbolic package, representing the classical idea of nature protection, i.e. the protection of valuable natural or
wilderness areas for research, for aesthetic refreshment and, for future
generations (Järvikoski 1994). Nature, particularly “wild nature” was en-
dangered by economic development, and measures for protection should
be employed. Proposals for national parks were made in the fifties by
FANC and some scientific societies, and many of these were realized by
the government. Largely through its highly-appreciated scientific élite\(^5\),
FANC had authority among the decision-makers. Also the first Nature
Protection Act of 1923 manifested the idea of protecting valuable nature
areas for coming generations. In the Act and in the old conserva-
tionist movement, the primacy of human being could also be seen in the
emphasis of aesthetical values (Nieminen & Saaristo 1998, 75).

In the sixties, FANC activists warned of the consequences of power
forestry for the Finnish forests. Decision-makers were appealed to pre-
vent the forests from being changed dramatically and all-inclusively.
Further, the forest ecosystems were seen as being endangered by power
forestry. Thus, the ecological aspect, too, was presented in the argu-
mentation. Economic development was not opposed as such, but rather
its “total”, “one-sided” character. However, this opposition met little
response among decision makers in the sixties. These demands did not
accord with the strengthening ideology of industrialism in the rapid
period of modernization.

Criticism grew within the association during the second half of the
sixties. This radicalization must be understood, not only in the context
of industrialization, but also in the context of the more general radical-
ism of that period. As elsewhere in the western world, single-issue
movements, like the peace movement, and movements to promote social
equality and democracy came into being. Culturally, the emerging ten-
dencies in the environmental movement belonged to this “family of
movements”, although personal ties between FANC and other move-
ments seem to have been minor. As in the case of other issues, a number
of pamphlets were published on the pollution of the environment\(^6\), and
an association, Enemmistö ry. (“Majority”), directed against the increas-
ing numbers of cars was founded. Pollution issues now came to the
fore, as elsewhere in the West. This radicalism was human-centred:
issues were considered from the point of view of how they affected
human beings.

In this radicalized situation, the old conservationist frame or “sym-
bolic package” was called in question. Most importantly, this occurred
in the form of a “revolution” in the leadership of FANC. Old conserva-
tionists had to give place to young environmentalists in 1967, who
directed attention to the question of pollution and other harmful re-
results of Finnish industrialization. The harmful effects of power for-
istry on Finnish forests were bitterly criticized (Järvikoski 1994). And
it was the human being, her or his all-inclusive well-being, which was
the focus of attention of these radicals. True, an anthropocentric view-
point could also be seen in the earlier criticisms made by the conserva-
tionist trend of the FANC. For instance, critics were worried about the
decreasing recreational potential of the forests, and the term “social
nature protection” came into use.

The new movement attempted to influence the environmental policy
of the state. This was attempted by means of pamphlets, meetings,
seminars, and statements in the mass media. It was a non-violent cry
for a healthier environment. Most importantly, the establishing of a
Ministry of the Environment was demanded by FANC. However, this
was opposed by industrial and agricultural associations, and by centre
and rightest political parties. The demand was not realized.

Environmental issues received more publicity in the early seventies.
International occasions like the Stockholm international environmen-
tal conference, and the Limits to Growth report by the Club of Rome in
1972, etc. had their influence also in the Finnish publicity. Local envi-
ronmental conflicts occurred here and there in the country. However,
the radical movement of the sixties adopted a more unified Marxist
course, and social problems were commonly translated by the young
radicals into the language of Marxism – they were seen as products of
capitalism. Support moved from single-issue movements to Marxist
political movement, which with its Soviet sympathies was a strong ten-
dency in Finland. This can be seen as one of the reasons why the
environmental movement did not get any stronger in the first half of
the seventies. For instance, Soviet nuclear reactors were seen as safe by
the Marxists. – The young Marxists were not anti-environmentalists,
but rather gave environmental problems a special interpretation in their
theoretical frame.

The strong position of FANC in the environmental NGO’s field,
its tradition and membership contributed to the fact that both the older
conservationist trend and the new political ecology could exist within
the same field and the same association.
The second wave: the coming of environment as a central social issue

The most important development of environmentalism occurred at the end of the seventies and the beginning of eighties. This development was partly a logical extension of previous development and the result of increasing knowledge about environmental threats. However, this explanation on its own is too narrow. One can discern a broad cultural change behind the development. A national “macro frame”, in the sense of broad cultural climate (about the concept, see Brand 1990) as an orientating principle, experienced a deep change from what had existed in the sixties and the early seventies. From the middle of the seventies onwards the cultural orientation moved towards “soft” values and against the “hard” direction. Industrialization, economic growth, bureaucracy, instrumental science, modern party politics and other corner-stones of modernization faced growing criticism among intellectuals. Such values as the autonomic subject, a healthy everyday environment (traditional countryside milieu being the ideal for many) were now emphasized. In general, soft values also won broad support among the general public, which can be seen in the results of public attitude polls (Puohiniemi 1993). On the basis of its emphasis on the autonomic individual and her and his subjective life or “lifeworld”, one could call this social mood a cultural climate of “the defending of human subjectivity” (Konttinen 1998a). It formed a broad culturally-based frame, in which social and political issues were interpreted and construed by intellectuals and broader social strata.

The connection of the emerging cultural climate and the rise of the environmental protest wave is clear. The anti-modernistic mood was directed against “hard” industrialization and in favour of healthier milieus. A healthy everyday environment became a primary objective in the name of the well-being of human subjectivity.

The emerging Green movement had its important roots among young intellectuals, who were active in movements emphasizing authentic human subjectivity, and who themselves realized new “alternative way of life” practicing, for example, vegetarianism. This environmental wave had certain features in common with some other movements of that period, e.g. with the new feminist groups in their
phasis on the quality of womanhood, motherhood, and the appearance of female subjectivity. The issue of quality (as opposed to the technocratic view) was common to all of them.

The anti-nuclear movement could grow stronger within this kind of cultural situation, in which criticism of hard technology was one basic feature. An anti-nuclear association (Energiateollisuusyhdistys – vaihtoehto ydinvoimalle) was founded in 1977. But most importantly in the Finnish context, the theme of the defence of pristine environments (for human beings, but also for non-humans like birds) could be seen in the numerous local environmental conflicts which broke out at the end of seventies in various parts of the country. The general theme was protest against the harmful consequences of industrialization and of intensive agriculture for local milieu. The most central single theme was the water issue like the intensive use of rivers and lakes for energy production and the pollution of waters around forest industry centres (Rannikko 1994; Konttinen 1996).

The protest wave had its culmination in the so-called Lake Kojärvi protest in 1979 (Järvikoski 1981), when a group of young intellectuals mainly from Helsinki (many of them drawn from the ranks of the above-mentioned alternative way of life-intellectuals) protested against the drying-up of a valuable bird lake in southern Finland by local farmers. In the light of the prevailing cultural situation, one can understand the great publicity the conflict secured, and also the broad support the protest gained among the general public.

In the context of this conflict, a new tool in the repertoire of national environmental protest actions was developed, one that allowed direct activities, such as chaining oneself to an excavator in order to prevent environmental damage, but which on the other hand, strictly prohibited one from causing damage to human beings or to the property of other people. This form of protest, resembling that employed by Greenpeace, soon came into a more general practice. Today it is easy to see that it proved to be a successful innovation, since, on one hand, this form of action, with its avoidance and refusal of violence, was not in contradiction with the Finnish tradition of demonstration (Siisäinen 1994), while on the other hand, it was able to win wide publicity for the issue under debate.

The new form of protest was widely accepted among the Finnish people, as opinion polls prove (Järvikoski & Kylämäki 1981). A na-
ionwide environmental protest culture arose (Konttinen 1996). The protests were not controlled or directed from a single centre; however, the activists involved in the various conflicts were well aware of other conflicts and the protest actions taking place there. Thus the activists shared a common collective frame and the associating emotions, and were inspired by each other’s actions. Within the common emotional and cognitive frame they were convinced of the need for environmental protest, and they adopted a common repertoire of models of action. It is also usual to talk about “the Kojärvi Generation”. Many participants deeply internalized environmentalism as a basic motive of their lives in this, but also in other conflicts belonging to that cycle. Some activists have become “professional” environmentalists in this context; they have taken part in later conflicts; also they also could reject an economically more secure profession in favour of acting for environmental protection e.g., in the service of FANC.

As stated, characteristic of this wave were an anti-modernistic orientation, an emphasis on the respect of human subjectivity, and the connected search for unspoiled environments. Closely connected to these ideals, alternative lifestyles, like vegetarianism and moves into the countryside, became more popular at this time. Emphasis on non formal forms of activities and small groups, and on qualities instead of technocratic or bureaucratic measures was common to all new movements of this period.

The human being was at the centre of attention during this protest period, and the old conservationist trend was condemned as being too narrow. During this period, a substantial number of nature and environmental protection associations, e.g. local associations of FANC, and single issue (lake, river, etc.) protection associations were founded (Litmanen 1998). Thus, although the leadership of FANC was criticized by the activists, the association preserved its prominent position in the field of environmental movements.

Even protests directed against the country’s main industry, the forest industry, could become effective in the prevailing cultural climate of the late seventies and early eighties. Up to this period protests directed against environmental problems caused by this branch of industry generally proved to be in vain (they also were not numerous) (Konttinen 1998b), but now, instead, a number of valuable rivers and rapids were protected and not taken into energy production. Special
protection laws were passed by the Parliament. One of the biggest forest companies in the country was forced by the demands of an environmental movement to build an effective waste-water cleaning system (Konttinen 1997); which was something that had never happened before in the national history. This conflict, called the Lake Päijänne Movement (1982-85), proved to be one of the turning points in the development of the industrial waste-water policy in the country (Konttinen 1998b).

More generally, one can conclude that this general cultural climate gave new opportunities for environmentalism in the national political field as well. That the Finnish political establishment had traditionally been strongly anchored in the promoting of industrialization (in its specific Finnish contents) and was not very responsive to the demands of the environmental movement threatening the advantages of the forest industry, is one reason why the protest wave gathered force so entirely outside the parliamentary politics, and occurred relatively late in international terms. It was a kind of eruption that took place when the pressure behind the walls had become strong enough.

But the protest itself proved strong enough to influence the political field. First, the Green movement, later organizing itself as a political party, was born in this context (1983), mainly due to the initiative of the activists of the Lake Kojärvi Movement. The old established parties had to adopt environmental angles in their policies and rhetoric. “The greening” of policy-making started in this context. And the most importantly, the Ministry of the Environment was set up in 1983. Manifesting the importance of the Lake Kojärvi Movement and the group behind it, many of its core persons institutionalized in political life. The contemporary (1998) Minister of the Environment belonged to this group. Thus, it was very clearly political ecology, which formed the symbolic package of the movement, and the entire protest cycle.

This protest wave, which raised environmental issues to the position of central social issue in the country, was over in a few years, ending about 1983-84. The following years were a rather quiet period in the environmental movement. It was, above all, the period of the institutionalization of environmentalism in administrative life, not only at the level of the central administration but locally, too, that now developed. It has been suggested (e.g. by Rannikko 1994) that new institutions now took on the previous tasks of the environmental move-
ment, and that this was a main reason for the more “silent” period of the mid-eighties.

The third wave: the forest conflicts

The third wave emerged in late eighties. Again, local conflicts arose here and there in different parts of the country, in towns and in country localities. There were various questions in dispute, such as the preservation of old town centres, the pollution of water by industry, road-building plans, and plans for the storage of nuclear waste, etc. However, the most striking and characteristic issue in this wave was the forests, particularly old forests (Lehtinen & Rannikko 1994).

International discussions about global environmental threats and sustainable development preceded this wave. During the eighties the forest issue, and the theme of biodiversity, together with other ecological themes, had won more attention among scientists, nature protectors, the environmental administration and also in political life (but not so much among ordinary people). Thus, in a country of large forests it is not any wonder that the environmentalists should direct their attention to this topic, which had been totally ignored during the former protest wave.

The first of the new forest conflicts was the so-called Kessi Movement in 1987. The movement opposed the fellings planned by the national board of forestry, the owner of the Kessi area in the northern part of the country. Soon other conflicts in northern parts of the country followed, such as the Murhijärvi, Talaskangas and Porkkasalo conflicts (Pekurinen 1997). The protectors demanded the preservation of old forests. In some cases, nature protectors formed a common front with local inhabitants; in others the locals bitterly opposed the movements. In the latter cases, the protection of the forests was seen as threatening the livelihood of the locals; forestry had long been an important source of income for them. In their eyes the protectors were southern daydreamers, who did not care about northern people and their living. In all these cases the main opposing party was the biggest owner of forests in the northern part of the country, the National Board of Forestry. Its representatives argued that the forests in question were not genuine or original old forests, but commercial forests which had been made to serve this purpose before. However, as a re-
sult of these conflicts, in most cases substantial areas of forest were saved from felling.

One of the strongest forest conflicts, so far, was the Kuusamo old-forest conflict of 1994-1996. More than any of the earlier ones, this conflict set the locals and the protectors against each other. For the first time, the dispute involved private forests. Thus, the problematic nature of land-owning came to the forefront with this conflict. This contributed to the bitterness of the “forest war”. Only after numerous phases and bitter disputes and conflicts, a partial agreement at least was reached after the state had offered the owners an opportunity to exchange their forests for others owned elsewhere by the state.

The core group of most forest conflicts consisted of students (of biological sciences and the arts) from the southern universities and members of the youth association (Luontoliitto) of FANC. For the first time, the leadership of the FANC took a leading role in one of these conflicts. The leadership argued it was defending the valid nature protection law. In a number of cases support was given by ecological and biological scientists.

In addition to more conventional forms of activity, the activists used methods developed in the previous protest wave. Young environmentalists chained themselves to forest machines and climbed up trees in order to prevent the fellings and to gain the greatest possible publicity for their goals. There were also “old” activists of the previous wave, e.g. those in Lake Koijärvi in 1979, taking part in these conflicts. Now, FANC gave its support to the struggles, at least in most cases.

The symbolic package of these conflicts manifested a scientific, ecological orientation – one can call it an ecological frame. The principle of biodiversity, and the importance of old forests for the eco-system was what was focused on (the recreational function of the wilderness was mentioned in the argumentation, but ecological arguments received the main stress). Thus an ecocentric view as a legitimation basis was characteristic of these conflicts. The centrality of ecological issues during this wave is also manifested in the new voluntary associations, which appeared. Data by Litmanen (1998) show that the new element during this period was the emergence of associations manifesting ecological thinking.

This protest cycle testified to an internationalization of the Finnish environmental protest. During these conflicts, direct international aid
was widely used by the Finnish environmentalists. The Kessi movement turned to the German Greens and sought support from other parties abroad (Pekurinen 1997, 62). Some newspapers in Middle Europe reacted, and demanded the preservation of the last European wilderness. *Die Zeit* even compared the fellings in Kessi with the destruction of Amazonian forests. The Kuusamo forest conflict won much publicity in Europe, e.g. in the Netherlands. One of the consequences of this internationalization of the conflicts was that the domestic forest companies, which are greatly dependent on the European demand for paper, have kept a low profile in these conflicts. In particular, German environmentalists and consumer associations closely follow the policies of the Finnish forest companies, which have become cautious.

This issue is the most important one in which Greenpeace has participated in Finland. However, protest groups independent of it were apparently the core actors. Generally, the importance of Greenpeace in the Finnish environmental movement has not been as remarkable as that of local movements, of FANC and its youth association.

The forest conflicts are still taken place. As a proof of this, in January 1999, a major conflict bursted out in the north-eastern part of the country, by the Russian border-line. The dispute concerns, as typically, the value of local old forests in Malahvia, where the National Board of Forests has started fellings. The situation in Malahvia is quite a complicated one. Demands for protection were presented by some local residents supported by FANC, but opposed by a local association of FANC. A representative of the local association gives his support for the fellings.

The fourth wave, the one that has arisen during three last years and is still going on, differs greatly from the previous ones in many respects. We will take a closer look at this protest cycle.

The social and cultural state of the nation in the first half of the nineties

The local environmental protest wave of the turn of the eighties seems to be over in the middle of the nineties. These “old” kind of environmental conflicts are not so numerous, and they do not win as
much publicity as before. Maybe they have also lost some of their early crusading spirit, and become more a matter of routine. The concepts of ecology and the environment have lost their once “counter-cultural” meanings, and become part of official jargon (Järvikoski 1995, 86). Newspaper articles describing them are more matter-of-fact than they used to be.

Interpretations for the present low state of “customary” environmental conflicts can also be found at the level of cultural climate, or social mood. Apparently, the prevailing cultural climate is less favourable to concern for the environment to the extent that still prevailed in the very beginning of the nineties. Attitude polls show that concern for environment is now lower among the Finnish people (Sairinen 1996; Tanskanen 1997)\(^{10}\). (This is not to say that such concern has disappeared; on the contrary, the environment is still one of the most important general interests of the people).

Very concrete social factors can be found behind this kind of development. The country fell into a deep economic crisis at the turn of the eighties, one that followed from the simultaneous influence of a number of factors (regular economic low conjuncture was deepened by a severe bank crisis and the collapse of the Russia export market after the collapse of Soviet Union). In a short time the unemployment rate climbed from a few per cent up to 16-18 per cent. Suddenly the nation that was accustomed to a high degree of social security with a good economy and the comprehensive services of a well-developed welfare state faced deep threats to the security. Because of massive loans by the State the fall was not absolute, however. And in a few years the economy turned again to rapid growth. However, a high unemployment rate still existed in the Spring of 1998, being some 12-13 per cent, since the intensive increase in productivity.

Factors supporting employment, like economic growth, now came to forefront in the minds of the Finns. Employment is what matters more than anything else for many Finns, and the environment has been forced into the background, in a way to wait for better times. In this kind of cultural climate “hard” values, the values of industrialism have again raised their head. An attitude poll reveals that support for the existing nuclear power among the people is higher than ever before (although further nuclear plants are not supported by the majority). Criticism has come also from the workers’ trade unions of the “too
massive public costs of environmental care”. Even the abolition of
the Ministry of the Environment was proposed by some trade union
officials two years ago – proposals of this kind were still culturally
impossible at the turn of the 1980s.

Further, a kind of counter-movement has been provoked against
“too intensive” environmental protection. In the planning of the
NATURA 2000 network of the European Union, strong opposition
emerged from landowners and their organizations in the Spring of
1997 – this criticism is still going on in the autumn of 1998. The criti-
cism can partly be understood on the basis of the strong value at-
tached to land ownership, its “holy” character among the Finns and
connected to this, the somewhat unskilful planning of the program by
the authorities. But there can be no doubt that it is largely the prevail-
ing general climate of opinion, which has supported this criticism. The
Central Union of Agricultural and Forest Producers gives its strong support
for the counter movement, being also an organizer of protests.

Thus, what form did the new environmental wave take in this kind
of cultural climate not generally favourable to environmental concerns?

The fourth wave: the animal rights movement

In the Spring of 1995, the Finnish publicity was shaken by a succession
of events. Some fur farms were attacked in different parts of the coun-
try, and fur animals were set free. These strikes were followed by others,
in which animals were daubed and fur-production equipment destroyed.
In the autumn of 1996 the strikes rapidly increased in number, and in
addition to fur enclosures, animal laboratory institutes were attacked,
animal hauls en route to slaughterhouses were attacked by destroying
the trucks, some Shell service stations and McDonalds establishments
were daubed and slogans painted. Demonstrations were arranged in
front of fur stores. It was characteristic of these attacks that property
could be destroyed, and also animals indirectly injured (when set free,
many animals were doomed to death). However, no physical harm was
caused to human beings. Militant activity continued at high level in
1997 and 1998.12

This kind of militant collective action is a new phenomenon in the
national tradition of demonstrations, which emphasizes discipline and
order and strongly rejects violent forms of behaviour (Alapuro 1997). The first beginnings of the new activism could be seen as early as the first years of the 1990s. The activists were young students and pupils of schools and many of them had sympathies with punk culture, anarchistic circles, and emerging vegan movement (Luukka 1998). There are many girls participating the actions. (The activists of the 1995 fur-farm attacks were immediately labelled as “fox girls” by media).

In addition to the violent form of collective action, another break with the former protest waves is that it is no longer directly the publicity (at least solely) that is aimed at by the activists. By continuous disruptions, the activists attempt to make e.g. fur production and animal laboratories too expensive to maintain. Furthermore, by attacks, it is tried to influence the policy by more moderate branches of the environmental movement, to “make more space” for their activities.

If violent forms of radical activity are generally criticized by Finns, the goal of activity itself is rather widely supported among certain groups. In particular, it is young people who object to fur production.\textsuperscript{13} Further, opposition to laboratory testing involving animals is common among the young people. In a recent survey (Parikka 1998, 54), a quarter of the school youth polled felt that animal tests are a serious problem, and as big a proportion considered the issue to be a moderately serious one.

Thus, it may be significant here that employment and animal rights do not conflict with each other, at least any seriously: since fur production is an important source of livelihood only locally and for a limited number of people. Although young people too seem to be inclined to favour employment opportunities at the cost of the environment (Järvinen 1995, 59-62)\textsuperscript{14}, the interest of youth in animal protection has increased during the period of high unemployment (Parikka 1998, 38). Thus, it might be that the insecurity in society has strengthened sympathies towards animals. If so, it may partly be a kind of identifying oneself with the weak, solidarity with the others threatened. At least, it seems that the importance of pets has increased during the depression years (This is seen in the increase in numbers of pets during these years). However, animal rights sympathies have supposedly already been on the increase for years. During the last two or three years this development has been broadened and intensified.

Animal rights may be considered a post-materialist value in the terms
of Inglehart (1990). If so, then the increased support for animal rights among the young age cohorts seem to support Inglehart’s thesis about the strengthening of post-materialist values instead of materialist ones. But what makes the case interesting, and also the thesis contradictory, is that materialist values (economic security) have strengthened at the same time, and among the same groups, who show animal rights sympathies. Maybe the phenomenon is better explained in the theoretical terms by Zygmunt Bauman (1992), as Parikka (1998, 38-42) does. She understands the moral rights of animals as being a typical post-modern value. From the point of view of individual, adopting such a value and involving oneself in the group representing it serves to create order in one’s personal life, offering a new habitat in the post-modern world, where the clarity and one-dimensionality of the social world is becoming lost and replaced by plurality and ambivalence. This interpretation does not necessarily mean that one should give up materialist values.

Be this as it may, it is above all the youth that are involved in; but further, it not so much youth in general but the girls, who support animal rights; as is clearly indicated by Parikka’s data\textsuperscript{15}. Thus, animal rights sympathies are rather strictly connected with the values and attitudes typical of girls in the present social and cultural situation. This connection can also be see in the attacks on fur farms. We can conclude that the explanations based on the postmodern term of habitat are rather abstract ones, and in no way sufficient as such. The explanation shall include the viewpoints that make understandable the sensitivity of young girls for the issue. As for protesting, violent forms of behaviour seem have to become more acceptable among girls (Vieremö 1992, 103, 105). More generally, women express their emotions of hate in social and personal life more freely than earlier (Nykyri 1998). Maybe there are also something in common with the new culture of girl power? The real context of the militant attacks encourages to conclude that it might be a combination of empathy towards close creatures\textsuperscript{16} manifesting principles of woman- and motherhood, and of an increased ability by the actual cultural trends to carry feelings and emotions into militant activities. But the question is not only about girls and the changes in their culture. To Paakkunainen (1998, 139), the new radical form of protest reflects a general change in the protest culture of the youth.
A new movement family

The symbolic package of animal rights movement differs greatly from that of the previous wave. The legitimation of the attacks is argumented in moral terms without scientific emphasis, on the basis of the claimed equal rights of all living creatures. Emotions of empathy towards the defenceless are characteristic of this activity. Fundamentalist elements are also often met in this symbolic packaging. Statements reflecting the principles of deep ecology are used in evidence. The frame manifests an eco-centric orientation.

It is much this moral and also way of life -dimension which seems to create a link between a growing number of other new movements and youth groups in present-day Finland. Characterization as “moral crusade” by Eder (1995) is illustrative in this case. During the past few years, there has emerged a large number of action groups and youth associations, such as anti-fascists, vegans, peace groups, anarchists, eco-anarchists, communists, anti-militarists, Friends of Earth, groups emphasizing the rights of underdeveloped countries, etc. The values of solidarity with the oppressed seem to be important in them. Although some of them have a longer history (like the movement supporting the underdeveloped countries), many of the associations and groups have been founded during the last few years, and an active expansive phase is in progress. In addition, some older associations or their youth organizations, like an old-established peace organization, Rauhantuolustajat (Peace defenders), have become close to them. In addition to the moral emphasis in favour of the less well-off, many of them share the same values: some kind of ecological emphasis, support for animal rights, support for a vegetarian or vegan way of life, an interest in some kind of ideal model of a just society. The Friends of Earth (the Finnish association founded in 1996) is an example of an association whose global view includes several issues, from world peace and democracy to environmental protection and animal rights. Many groups have close relationships to others, and umbrella organizations have been founded, and common meetings and demonstrations arranged (see also Luukka 1998, 65-70). A group of new associations (their central organizations) even have a common office. Further, a number of activists seem to be active in more than one group. Central organizations do not control strictly local activities, but on the contrary, au-
tonomy at the grass root level is allowed, and even emphasized. It is characteristic of the (present) frame of the new movements that their green orientation is a rather specific one consisting of the defending the animal rights, supporting vegan and vegetarian way of life, and opposing international companies like Shell and MacDonald’s. On the other hand, it seems that one of the most public environmental issues under discussion during the modern national “environmental era”, the NATURA 2000 network at the moment, is almost passed over by the new groups and associations. It is above all the well-established environmental associations, such as FANC and the Greens, who participate in these discussions and disputes. Some sections of the environmental field is strongly engaged with by them, but others are left for other people to attend to. In their groups, the young people emphasize acting on their own, they are constructing their identity independently of other social actors.

The new associations differ from each other as to the forms of protesting favoured. Many of the associations reject violent forms, and it has been estimated that the number of those involved in the more violent activities is not large. Rather, to Luukka (1998, 95), a small number of activists take part in many different attacks.

On the contemporary field of environmental movements in Finland

These four waves seem to point to be a clear change in the environmental frames of the movements from human-centered to eco-centric. While the orientation of the two first waves manifested human-centered emphasis, the two latest ones manifest eco-centrism. However, it would be misleading to conclude that the entire field of environmental movements has moved to the eco-centric pole in the course of this development. Rather, the entrance of the new elements in the various waves have transformed a formerly more uniform field into a set of movements with differing frames. Also, the emphasis may change inside associations.

There are roughly three kinds of environmental voluntary associations functioning in the country at the moment. First, there are the
old, purely national, well-established associations; first of all The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, celebrating its 60th anniversary in 1998. With its 36 000 members, 205 local associations and a handful of professional workers at regional and central level, FANC is indisputably the most authoritative of all environmental voluntary associations in the country. Its position in the field is stable. Within FANC, educational matters, ecology, nature as a hobby, and policy making are the primary focus of attention. Both environmental policy, such as waste management and recycling issues, as well as classical nature protection issues are taken care of. FANC enjoys broad acceptance and also appreciation among the general public and public authorities. The number of members has steadily grown for decades and the growth is still continuing. FANC is very insistent on correct forms of action, i.e. that the activities are in harmony with the national code for collective action. Today FANC and the great majority of its members accept the principle of direct action without violence. The central organization, particularly, stresses the lawfulness of activities.

Another example of old well established voluntary associations is the Union of Animal Protection, Animalia, consisting today of about 8000 members and 22 action groups. The predecessor of Animalia was founded in 1961. Although Animalia clearly rejects violent forms of action, after the first attacks on fur farms in 1995, about 3000 members left the association as a protest, apparently because they associated Animalia with violent attacks (most members are not active, but rather people who give financial aid to the association). Another animal protection association, The Finnish Animal Protection Association (Suomen Eläinsuojeluyhdistys, SEL in Finnish, founded in 1901) has 4000 members. This association has more than100 regional voluntary inspectors in different parts of the country, who monitor the treatment of animals.

The political dimension of this part of the field is represented above all by the Green League (Vihreä Liitto, founded in 1983), with its nearly 100 local associations and a party machinery, but with only about 1150 members. At the moment the Green League participates (from 1995) in the Finnish Government, having the post of Minister of the Environment. The support of the Green League stands at around ten per cent among the Finnish people.

In spite of the hardening of general cultural mood, this well-established section is not becoming weaker. The opposite development seems
more likely.

The second sector consists of national organizations of well recognized international voluntary associations. WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature, founded in 1961 in the UK) entered Finland in 1972. Today the organisation has a General Secretary and 15 full-time employees. The Association has good connections to other voluntary associations and the State. The WWF has won good reputation among the general public.

By contrast, Greenpeace has not had as much success in Finland as the association has had in some other countries. In fact, the Finnish organisation was finished in 1997; today the Swedish organisation includes Finland as a part of its responsibility. Most notably, Finnish Greenpeace participated in the forest conflicts around the turn of the eighties. Possibly the strong position of FANC can partly explain the relatively weak role of Greenpeace. It might also be that centralized forms of action are not favoured in a country where there is a strong tradition of individual participation, as local environmental conflicts in the late seventies and early eighties clearly show. FANC is organized very differently compared to Greenpeace. Although FANC has central organization, the local associations of FANC act with great autonomy.

The third section consist of the newest youth movements. Unlike the two previous ones, this section has a counter-cultural character. The membership of these groups varies from a few dozens to a few hundreds. One of the biggest, Oikeutta Eläimille (Rights for Animals) has about 500 members at the moment; the Vegan Union has somewhat more than 300 members. If the number of members is not great, it is growing, and the number of potential supporters among younger people is remarkable.

In conclusion, the field of Finnish environmental associations and movement groups has become more and more versatile, and now consists of growing number of specialized groupings and organizations. Each environmental protest wave has added its symbolic package to the environmental movement sector and rendered its composition more heterogeneous. Today the field consists of different movements and of “sets of movement families” according to their basic frames, goals and understandings of effective forms of collective action. Furthermore, the newest environmental groups are closely linked with other movements emphasizing moral ideals. (Instead, older organizations are strictly limited to environmental matters only).
Some factors determining success

In the light of the modern history of the environmental movements, two general factors seem to have been of crucial importance for the success of their policies. First, opportunities for success in achieving goals are greatly increased, if the prevailing state of collective consciousness, in the sense of the broad cultural climate of the period in question has supported the protest. And vice versa, the protests with clearly deviating frames, like those of radical counter-cultural movements have been less influential in their direct effects.

Second, the form of collective action adopted by the protesters seems to matter. If the means of protesting contradict a widely-accepted code of demonstration, the direct opportunities for success seem to decrease.

Both these prerequisites for success were best met in the protest wave of the late seventies and early eighties. The wave that took place at the turn of the eighties also fulfilled these criteria in the level of important élites (scientific, administrative and also political) to a considerable extent, and led to a number of successes from the viewpoint of the protesters. By contrast, the wave in the late sixties was a counter-cultural one in the sense that the ideologies of industrialism and material well-being were in the strong hegemonic position in society, and the environmental protest seemed to run counter to these ideologies. New environmental tendencies were not able to shake this dominant ideology deeply. Thus the function of this wave was mostly that of opener-up of new way of thinking, and not that of change-maker at the level of immediate policy.

The latest wave, too, has the character of a counter-cultural movement in its relationship to dominant ideologies. Groups of young people are challenging the dominant order, which, however, so far seems not to be ready for deeper changes at the level of policy. A relatively broad support for animal rights among the younger generation indicates that future opportunities for change are substantial. Further, the demands made do not threaten the economic interests of wide sectors of the population, although they emphatically do so in a number of local contexts. However, the new radical forms of protesting make the situation more complicated, if compared with the situation of the radical movement in the late sixties. Through the violent protesting of a small
group of radicals, the newest movements are easily stamped with the stigma of terrorism. In a country which concedes a high degree of legitimacy to its political system, and where the old tradition supports non-violent forms of protesting, it is, presumably, largely this factor that has changed the attitudes of the general public more in favour of fur-producers and against the new groups; also more generally. According to a poll (by Suomen Gallup in December 1997), 89 per cent of the population condemned the attacks and only six per cent approved them. The figures had become clearly more negative in the course of a few months. Further, the proportion of those demanding more severe punishments for activists climbed from 49 up to 64 per cent. And, at least partly for this reason, the new movements cannot have the kind of support from the mass media as did, above all, the environmental protests of the late seventies and early eighties.

Notes

1 The article is based on a paper presented at the ISA 14th World Congress of Sociology in Montreal, Canada in July, 1998.
2 Klaus Eder (1996, 162-183), responding to recent discussion on frame analysis and in harmony with Goffman’s (1974) understanding, says that “frames” refer to stable patterns of experiencing and perceiving events in the world which structure social reality. We use and apply frames in order to arrange the world, thus reducing the continuous stream of events to a limited number of significant events. Within the frames, an objective meaning is given to these events.
3 Symbolic packages are the means of framing strategies of collective actors (Eder 1996, 168). To distinguish themselves from competing collective actors, the movements generate “alternative” packages for environmental problems.
4 Natural scientists formed the leadership of FANC. The association was founded by individual academics and four scientific societies in 1938. All the members of the first board except one were doctors of science (Järvinkoski 1994). The character of the association as one of the (natural) science élite was also strong in the sixties, as regards not only the leadership, but also the members. Among the 5000 members in 1968 there were 140 persons with doctor's degrees, and in addition, more than 700 members with university degrees and nearly 900 students (Nurminen 1968). To a great degree
the scientific élite recruited their own students, many of whom later became teachers of biology in secondary schools. They, for their part, recruited the pupils of their schools. A large group of members consisted of forest officials. Naturally, the forest officials were closely involved with the forests, and before the period of power forestry, there was no gap between them and the nature protection trend. Power forestry changed the situation, and differences emerged between the forest officials and others in FANC. In a few years, following the radicalization of the leadership of FANC, a large number of the forest officials left the association.

5 The University of Helsinki, in which the scientific leadership of FANC mainly functioned, has traditionally been an institution with a remarkable high status. This dates back to the nineteenth century, when education at this university conferred the most important symbols of belonging to the gentry (Kontinen 1991). The continuity of the old élite in the University of Helsinki has been strong.

6 International influences in the forming of the new frame were clear. Already parts of Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962) had been published in the pages of the biggest newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, and certainly Carson’s book prepared the ground for a later awakening. But the book did not have a vast immediate influence on the country, maybe because the period of power forestry was just beginning and its massive impact on the forests was not yet realized. To Järvikoski (1994, 9), during this period FANC absorbed international debate within its conservationist frame.

7 It is related that in the Lake Kojijärvi conflict, the activists who in daytime chained themselves to digger, in night time kept guard so that no damage was caused to the digger.

8 However, criticism against direct action arose among the leadership of FANC. This testifies to the caution which has always been characteristic of the association in its activist programs. FANC is very careful to act within the conventional national code of collective action. But while the mother organization manifested caution, the youth association of FANC, *Luontoliitto*, adopted much more militant forms of action and participated in many conflicts. FANC and its members have later more widely accepted the form of protest adopted in the Lake Kojijärvi, and in some other conflicts at the same time.

9 The Lake Kojijärvi conflict became an immense activating protest event for the environmental movement of that time. This conflict served as a model and even came to function as a kind of icon for environmental protests. There is no doubt, if the Finnish people are asked today to name the single most important environmental protest event in the national history, the
majority would name this conflict. In a questionnaire to the chairmen of the local associations of the FANC in 1998, and very clear majority named the Lake Kojijärvi Conflict as the most important one. The second in order were the forest conflicts in the shift of the nineties.

10 Those who rate environmental concern as the number one issue have, according to Sairinen (1996, 67-68) sunk from 63 percent in 1989 to 40 per cent in 1992. In a comparison of EU-countries in 1992 (Tanskanen 1997, 86), of the proportion of those supporting the priority of economic growth compared to environmental protection, Finland had the highest proportion together with Ireland (11 and 12 per cents). Further, a willingness to accept higher prices in order to protect nature was lowest in the two countries (ibid., 102).

11 Departing from the practice of many other countries, the proposal of the Ministry of Environment for the Finnish NATURA 2000 network also includes private land. However, in a number of cases, no personal contacts with landowners were made by officials during the planning process. This brought a feeling of being treated as mere worthless objects by the administrative process, and they felt bitterly offended. This emotion can be understood on the basis of the deep rooted value attached to owning land, and the right to decide on the uses of one’s own land (Nieminen 1994). The feeling was that this right was neglected by the officials, who, without holding negotiations or listening to the landowners, made plans for the uses of private land. Criticism of the plans, supported and stimulated by the Central Association of Agricultural and Forest Producers, became massive. Altogether, 15 000 reminders were put forward by landowners. Hundreds of newspaper articles have been written about this issue.

12 So far the confrontation has had its culmination in the sixth of December, 1997, when in an attack on a fur farm in a countryside municipality, the owner of the farm fired three of the activists, who were wounded by the shots. This event involving firearms, raised the activism to the position of public issue number one for months. Police have reported altogether about 300 militant attacks between the beginning of 1995 and the spring of 1998.

13 According to the above mentioned poll, a third of people in the under 25 age cohort does not accept fur production, while the proportion decreases sharply among those over 25 years old, and is only nine per cent among those over 50 years. A poll of school youth (Parikka 1998, 67) indicated that as many as 75 per cent opposed fur production.

14 In Parikka’s study (1998, 54-55), school youth felt unemployment to be clearly the most serious problem.

15 42 per cent of the girls and 15 per cent of the boys said that animal test should be outlawed; 21 per cent of the girls felt fur production to be a very
big problem and 24 per cent as a rather big problem; for the boys, the figures were 6 and 8 per cent (Parikka 1998, 56, 68).
16 It is sympathy towards animals resembling pets, and not towards animals like e.g. fish, that are not emotionally close. Furthermore, this aggressivity itself resembles a type characteristic of women: to defend, even violently, close persons like own children.
17 When violence is officially rejected by many associations and groupings, their representatives may say that violent forms of protesting used by other groups are understood. They may add that it is not possible for them to control their members and local activists.
18 Of course, the cultural climate is not the only factor in this “opportunity structure” which matters. There are also e.g. political opportunity structures, economic structures, etc.
19 It might be interesting to note that, while condemning the attacks made by the activists, more than a half of the respondents approved the fur-producer’s action in firing at the militant activists.

References


Esa Konttinen

ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN FINNISH COUNTRYSIDE IN THE 1990s

A community perspective

This article analyzes the social dynamics of ecological modernization in the Finnish countryside. The point of departure is a countryside community. What is the role of a countryside community, with its decision making structures and civil society formations, in the management of the local environment? How are ideas of environmental protection adopted in local communal life? What kind of social factors favour improving environmental protection, and what kind of general obstacles to it can be found in the present situation? Answers to questions like these are sought in the specific content of rural consciousness, in the living conditions, civil society, and the administrative and domination structures of the countryside. In this effort, a community is understood as an entity with its inner structures and processes. This entity has complex relationships with regional, national, and nowadays increasingly with international lines of development.

However, in order to understand the environmental context in countryside communities, one needs some general information about their common living and administrative circumstances. In a great number of localities, these circumstances strongly resemble each other and make
up a common “situational structure” in which environmental policies are practiced and accepted or rejected.

What generally characterizes countryside community life in the late 1900s Finland are serious employment problems and the resulting migration of young people into the cities of the south in the search for jobs. This development began as early as the 1960s, mainly following rapid technological progress in agriculture and forestry as well as in forest industrial plants (so important for many countryside communities). This decrease in job opportunities is still going on, especially in the eastern and northern parts of the country. Municipal decision makers are thus under a chronic pressure to create new jobs for their inhabitants and to secure an economic basis for communal services. In a number of rural municipalities, this is nothing less than a question of survival.

What is also characteristic of Finnish municipalities in general is the long lasted stability of administrative life, in the sense of a well-established representative decision making structure originating as early as the 19th century. A later development is a well developed municipal bureaucracy producing communal services. In the seventies and the eighties, this municipal service bureaucracy functioned to a large extent in the role of implementing the policy of the state. It still has this role, but the independence of local decision making has clearly increased in the 1990s. At the same time, more economic responsibilities in service production have been given to municipalities themselves. This has naturally brought more economic problems to overcome.

The local administrative structure also consists of units of environmental administration. In the eighties, representative environmental boards were created on the municipal level. Offices of environmental experts were also established. In 1993, three fourths of the municipalities had employed a professional environmental expert, the smallest ones sharing a specialist with another municipality. It can be estimated that under the more difficult economic situation in the 1990s, this new branch of administration has, more easily than many older ones, become a target of financial savings. But certainly, from a general perspective, there exists a regional and local administrative infrastructure for environmental protection, and it is more or less rooted in municipalities. In 1997, there were 700 officials in municipalities working with environmental issues; 400 of them were professionals in environmental protection.
A great local variety

The general trend during the two last decades, except the recent depression, manifests an increasing concern for the environmental in the countryside too. However, let us not allow the overall trend cover the problems.

I take as the starting point the empirical finding (Konttinen & Litmanen, 1996) that a considerable variety prevails at the local level as regards the ways in which environmental matters are treated by authorities, economic actors, and the local people. This is particularly true of rural localities, while bigger towns are characterized by more uniformity.

To describe briefly the scope of the variety, we can find, first, municipalities in which concern for the local environments has been taken quite seriously. Some communities have responded to the cry of environmentalism. An environmental outlook has been adopted as one of the basic principles when local policies are planned and realized. There have also been attempts to use local natural resources like forests, lakes, sand or land (for building purposes) according to the principle of sustainable development. To take an example, comprehensive programs and development plans have been made by some municipalities specifically from an environmental viewpoint. In addition, there has been a positive reaction to the nature protection programs planned in the central administration as well as participation in the planning process. (On the efforts of some municipalities to respond to the challenges of sustainable development, see http://www.vyb.fi/ym/alo/news/ln/index.htm). The first Finnish municipality declared itself an “eco municipality” as early as 1981 and set as its goal “to integrate the human economy with the area’s natural economy”. Over the past 16 years this municipality, Suomussalmi, located in the north-eastern part of the country, has taken part in several projects, bringing nature-friendly thinking into village activities, schools, tourism and accounting. The project has created new jobs and improved the state of the environment.

But there are also local communities where the general orientation and everyday practices can best be described by the expression “shameless exploitation of nature”. This is true even though the municipalities, supposedly without an exception, today stress the quality and opportunities of their environments in their booklets and development
programs. The rise of general environmental awareness and the seeking of fresh nature by holidaymakers has brought economic opportunities that no municipality wants to leave unused. The result has been a vast environmental rhetoric which, however, often has little to do with reality. For instance, at the same time as the beauty of the local landscape is praised, high hills are tilled in a rough manner in order to construct winter sport centres, or the last remaining unbuilt lake shores in the area are filled with summer cottages.

The majority of municipalities are located somewhere between these extremes. In many of them, no special emphasis has been placed on environmental matters, but the laws, rules and programs set by the central administration are obeyed. Compliance with norms set by the central administration is a long-lasting characteristic of Finnish administration. In many cases, perhaps one or two sectors of environmental care – say, recycling of waste – are well organized, while some others are in a bad way.

If this picture of great variety holds true, as argued, we can conclude that it is not only the common rules and programs set by the central administration and the local administrative structure that determine the management of local environments. The laws and policies of the central administration concern all the local communities in the country, and the administrative structures are similar as well, but remarkable variety exists in the management of local environments. There must be certain local level factors that have a strong effect on the practical implementation of environmental policies.

Let us first inquire into those basic local conditions, or factors, that are needed for an effective management of the local environment, in addition to organisational structures and the steering exercised by the central administration. Such an analysis is needed in order to identify the problems that hinder effective environmental management.

### An ideal action model at the local level

A broad unanimity exists that in order to reach high effectivity in the management of the environment, an environmental outlook shall be present in all policies and decision making at all levels: international, national, regional and local. Most importantly, economic life shall be
put into the frame of sustainable development. Thus, for the first, the attitudes of the local people and authorities should be in favour of environmental protection. High environmental motivation leads to an ability to adapt new knowledge and helps one to change old practices which are unfavourable for environmental protection. The ability to participate and influence local environmental policy increases. Thus, in this ideal case, the environmental world view is being internalized by the actors of the local community. The quality of environments in its various contents is a principle on the basis of which public and private activities are evaluated. Economic choices are also made in a way that respects the environment. We may call this kind of state of consciousness an orientation respecting the principle of sustainable development. Environmental knowledge interests prevail, and above all, what Jamison & al. (1990: 2-7) mean by its cosmological dimension. To them, the cosmological dimension of environmentalism concerns a certain way of ordering reality, an understanding of how and why reality is structured as it is. Among other things, it makes problematic the dominant “modernistic” world view at the same time as it articulates its own “ecological” alternative.

The environmental world view is not an unchanging entity. By contrast, it is under constant change following public discussions and the change in the state of the environment. People give various interpretations to environmental protection. The environmental world view is to a large extent an attitude, putting oneself in the position of a defender of nature, the environment, and sustainable development, and the accompanying aspiration to exert influence so that the goals can be reached.

Second, in close connection with the previous principle, a close communicative and co-operative relationship between local administration and citizens with their voluntary associations seems to be a crucial characteristic of well-functioning management of the environment. The idea here is that in the case of great interest in one’s local environment and the principle of environmentalism being internalized by locals, they are able to function as an important resource in the protection and improvement of local environments. As is stressed by the Local Agenda 21 program, it is of vital importance to improve and develop the role of voluntary associations and citizen groups as participant in environmental planning, decision making and policies. To func-
tion effectively, the locals shall be allowed to act as an equal partner. As an independent party (as stressed by Rouhinen, 1991: 171), citizens’ groups – some of which are permanent voluntary associations, others being more or less unstable groupings born to promote some single issue – can display initiative and creativity. One of citizens’ tasks is to raise criticism of and demands to the official decision making structure.

If the official local decision making structure is able to acknowledge these kinds of formations of local civil society, the local action and planning structure may be called a companionship model. It is characterized by active discussions and debates, vivid voluntary associational life, the abundance of more and less stable groupings of the locals. The publicity comes to the forefront, offering tools for the management of environments in these communities. This mode is fairly well in line with the principle stressed by Frieder Naschold (1995: ix): the strategic importance of an interactive and decentralized negotiating process. In such a case the new steering systems are to be regarded not so much as a rationalistic basis for decision making than as a favourable context for collective and commitment-inducing learning, experience and conciliation processes. By participating in public debates and the learning process connected with it, local actors B authorities as well as citizens B may internalize the goals. Through these internalization and involvement processes they put their resources in motion. (See also Milbart, 1989.)

Using these two dimensions and their opposite poles, we can construct the map of ideal types, which also contains the corresponding “bad cases” (see figure 1).

Thus, in the upper left corner (A) we have an ideal case in the positive sense, an “eco-municipality” as regards the management of the local environment. Both a strong environmentalist attitude and a companionship model of administration prevail there. The opposite corner (D) is the pure form of the “bad case”, where the “exploitation of nature” attitude prevails, coupled with a strict bureaucratic or even high-handed model of domination. The other two corners (B and C) represent types where one of the positive and one of the negative poles in the two dimensions prevail. The type in the upper right corner (B) might be called a “bureaucratic eco-municipality”. From the viewpoint of the environment, this model may be a functional one in the circum-
Figure 1. Typification of municipalities according to the management of local environments

ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDE

A  B

COMPANIONSHIP
MODEL OF ACTION

C  D

AUTHORITARIAN
LEADERSHIP

‘EXPLOITATION OF NATURE’
-ATTITUDE

(Konttinen & Litmanen, 1996: 262)

stances where the level of environmental awareness is very low among citizens. In this case, it is a “top to bottom” model, through which progressive steps in the management of local environments may be taken. However, the “top to bottom” model of administration easily creates alienation among the local people. From the viewpoint of successful fostering of environmental consciousness, openness and public discussions are particularly important. The type in the lower left corner (C) is the one where a companionship model of administration prevails, but the general attitude among the locals manifests the “exploitation of nature” attitude. For instance, a companionship model may work purely in favour of economic growth and material wellbeing along with the principle of short-sighted use of local nature resources.

The “map” helps us to analyze real situations by giving tools for locating concrete cases. It might also be possible to construct types in the middle area of the map, i.e. types which are structured in a specific
way, manifesting to some degree both dimensions. Among them we can distinguish, for instance, a “passive conformist municipality”, one which passively carries out the prescriptions of central administration at the local level. Another case may be called a “conflict case”, where a local environmental movement attempts to influence the local decision makers. The municipal administration may have been divided into opposite poles in their relationship to the movement and environmental matters more generally.

Having identified some of the important characteristics of an effective management of the local environment and its hindrances, we return to contemporary Finnish realities, paying attention to some general obstacles in the way of a more sustainable development.

Peasant ideologies

While the ideology, or world view, of environmentalism has, from the late seventies onwards, reached all regions of the country, there exists a great variety in the scope and quality of environmental consciousness, particularly in the countryside. A number of reasons for this can be found. Since the peasant class is an old and influential, although narrowing stratum in a number of countryside municipalities\(^3\), let us first study its position in the general world view or environmental orientation dimension.

Some surveys indicate that the attitudes towards environmental protection among the agricultural population are somewhat less positive than those of the population on average (Järvikoski & Kemppainen, 1991; Pirttijärvi, 1992; Luoma, 1993: 69).

In Finland, two factors influencing farmers” ideologies are important to note. First, the country has a long history of a broad class of independent peasants. Unlike central and southern European countries, Finland never underwent a period of strong feudalism. The landowning base of the nobility remained weak. This is one factor that even today contributes to the strong self-consciousness of the peasantry. Second, the land reforms in the 1920s and after the Second World War created a broad stratum of small farmers. Together with the country’s relatively late industrialization (the real industrialization occurred only in the 1950 and the 1960s), this also has its impact on
peasant ideologies, and on the strength of the national farmers’ association and the political center party, which rests to a great extent on farmers’ support (Alanen, 1995).

A study by Nieminen (1994: 72-73) shows that the attitudes of Finnish farmers are strongly determined by a feeling of duty to continue the work of their fathers and forefathers and a corresponding responsibility to the coming generations. To cultivate and manage one’s own land is understood as a debt for past and future generations. Fulfilling these inherited expectations implies a high degree of self-determination in land use by the farmers themselves. From this conception of independence follows that the work process is completely in the control of the farmer, and no one is permitted to intervene in it.

Attitudes manifesting these belief systems can best be seen in the cases of various governmental protection programs. Interventions by the state in the form of nature protection programs are seen as serious threats within the self-determination frame (and not as much, for instance, within the frame of the instrumental exchange value of land property). The program for the protection of lakeshores planned by the Ministry of the Environment at the turn of the 1990s is an illustrating case. According to the program, valuable shore areas were to be protected, although in most cases not from all economic activity. When the Ministry of the Environment published its plans, the reaction was one of fierce opposition on the side of farmers and their allies. Another example is a quite acute one. In the spring of 1997 similar reactions could be seen, invoked by the European NATURA 2000 protection program. In accordance with the preliminary proposal, about 10 percent of the land area of the country would belong to protected areas, the majority being in the northern parts of the country. However, they consist almost entirely of already protected areas, and furthermore, the level of protection varies considerably. In any case, the proposal raised bitter criticism and even demonstrations in various parts of the country, especially among the peasantry. As many as 15 000 reminders were made by individuals and associations concerning the protection plan. The flood of reminders has also been interpreted as a fear of the increasing power of the European Union in local areas (Seppänen, 1997: 17).

At least indirect encouragement is given by influential associations. The protesting is supported by the Central Union of Agricultural and For-
est Producers, an effectively organized association of farmers and private forest owners. The environmental policies of the association have often been described as “defensive” (Luoma, 1993; Jokinen, 1995:111-119). The association consistently opposed the establishment of the Ministry of the Environment. Only from the late eighties onwards a slow change in the direction of environmental orientation has occurred in the association (Jokinen, 1995: 118). When the property of land owners is interpreted as endangered by protection programs, however, the union engages in strong protest activities.

Furthermore, it can be seen that the resistance in both cases can partly be interpreted as a result of the strictly bureaucratic way of preparing the protection programs in the Ministry of the Environment. Resulting e.g. from the lack of sufficient manpower, in several cases, no discussions were had with local land owners before publishing the protection plans. As a result of this, there was a lot of misunderstandings and confusion.

Let us consider the peasant ideologies in more detail. The values of hard work, persistence, and the tough preparing of untitled soil for agriculture are deeply rooted values in the Finnish countryside, needed particularly under the harsh circumstances of stony fields and long winters in the period when agricultural machinery was undeveloped. Under the construction of national economy between the World Wars and after the Second World War, these ideologies were highly appreciated as properties of an ideal country citizen. In its pure form, the model is present in well-known literary characters like “Paavo of Saarijärvi”, a man making his field in a swampy and stony land, overcoming with bare hands all hindrances, no matter how great the odds against survival. Effective use of land as a source of living is the point here. Later the value contents have become more consistent with those of industrialism: by using modern machinery and working hard, we take natural resources under our control.

Environmentalism, however, offers a new and competing value principle, reducing the scope of the old ideal. The earlier unlimited opportunities have now become limited. Environmentalism offers a new interpretation for the use of land, and at least a partial departure from the old ideology. Also, new economic opportunities opened up by environmentalism (e.g. eco tourism and natural agriculture) demand the learning of new skills like effective marketing and services. A change
in attitudes is needed, and that is not always easy.

As a result of the strengthening of environmentalism on one hand, and of the changed market opportunities on the other hand, Finnish farmers today do not form a uniform group in their environmental attitudes, but instead exhibit a great deal of variation (Taurainen and Tauriala, 1991: 6-9). Four subgroups in their environmental orientation can be found to Taurainen and Tauriala: supporters of ongoing economic growth (21 percent of farmers), developmental optimistic farmers (35 percent), the Greens (35 percent), and those indifferent in their relation to the environment (9 percent). It also seems that various environmental goals are adopted quite differently by them. If protection programs concerning the land property are bitterly opposed, there is more sympathy today, for instance, for the use of more sustainable forms of cultivation. Pure cultivation without strong fertilizers has become a marketing asset. It is this area where the Finnish producers may be able to compete in the markets of the European Union. According to a survey in 1991 (Luoma, 1993: 71), more than half of the farmers supported the development of agriculture in the direction of natural cultivation. Also, there seems to be more sympathy for the protection of local water systems from agricultural wastes. These problems are often seen and also suffered by the farmers themselves, who use lakes and rivers for refreshment. From the viewpoint of environmental protection, the influence of agricultural wastes on water systems can today be estimated to be a clearly more difficult environmental problem than those of the industries (Jokinen, 1995: 73 – in the eighties the situation was still the opposite).

**Threats to livelihood**

Let us next turn to an other source of anti-environmentalist attitudes in the countryside. This source has its basis in industrialization and in the recent economic repression. The values of *industrialism* are connected with the particular forms of Finnish industrialization.

The central sector of Finnish economy had long been the forest industries. In a number of highly industrialized countryside communities one big forest enterprise has often been, and may still be, in the position of practically the only industrial employer. This community
structure originates from the period when forest mills were built by river and lake systems in places where transportation of wood to the mill was easy. It has been said (by Koskinen, 1989: 184) that the Finnish industrial scenery came to resemble an “archipelago of industrial communities”. Later the industrial structure has become more versatile.

Unfortunately from the viewpoint of the environment, the forest industries used to be very energy-intensive and water-polluting. A great proportion of rapids in rivers have been harnessed for energy production, and a number of lakes are intensively regulated for the same purpose. In addition, as early as the fifties and sixties, waters below forest mills were badly polluted. These kinds of difficulties were endured by the local people because of job opportunities and the promise of material well-being. Wider criticism against the pollution of waters and the regulation of lakes for energy production arose only in the late seventies and early eighties; this was one of the main targets of the environmental protest wave. Since then, the load of waste waters has diminished radically, and the main interest of environmental protection of this industrial branch has been directed to other issues, such as the use of forests.

The forest enterprises have decreased manpower from the sixties onwards, as a result of an intensive use of new technologies. Profound technologization has occurred in agriculture and forestry as well. Therefore, a lot of people have had to move to the centres of southern Finland to seek for a new job. Partly due to the economic depression of the early 1990s, there prevails in rural communities a strong atmosphere shared by the citizens and the local authorities to preserve the still existing job opportunities. Environmental problems caused by enterprises may also be interpreted within this frame by the locals. Environmental problems are endured and even denied in the minds of the locals threatened by the loss of jobs. That this is the case can often be seen in conflict situations (Konttinen, 1994a; 1994b; 1997; Kortelainen & Kotilainen, 1994). The anti-environmentalist mentality may be so strong that environmental activism is bitterly condemned in favour of preserving job opportunities.5

Closely connected with living opportunities in the countryside, two acute environmental conflicts may be mentioned. The first one concerns old forests in the northern and eastern parts of the country.
National as well as international environmental movements have raised demands, connected with the principle of biodiversity, for protecting certain old forest areas, today quite rare in the European context. However, in those non-industrialized areas in the northeastern parts of the country the livelihood of a great part of the local people is much dependent on income from selling wood and working in woods. Bitter resistance against the protection plans has arisen among the locals. The second one concerns fur production, particularly important for some municipalities on the Western coast. There is going on a sharp conflict between fur producers and young animal rights activists. This conflict seems particularly problematic, since in some areas fur production is practically the only source of livelihood, and on the other hand, some of the young activists have engaged in violent forms of activity. Police have reported about 300 attacks at enclosure areas in order to free fur animals from the beginning of 1995 up to the spring 1998.

**Autocratic administration**

We move on to our second dimension, the relationship between local administration and local citizens. Here, too, we begin by fixing our attention on some main sources hindering an effective management of the local environment.

One basic precondition for the great variety in local environmental protection can in fact be traced far back to the national history. Finnish municipalities have enjoyed high self-determination from the 1865 and 1898 municipal acts up to the present day (although a number of local officials can today be described as footmen of the central administration). A lot of freedom in decision making in local matters was given to the local representative organs: the municipal council and the municipal board. The idea is that local participation needs will be satisfied along with the principle of local self-determination. In this way the local circumstances in decision making can be best taken into account. Logically, the long tradition has given much room for local factors to influence the local policies. Thus, a local culture of governing and domination has developed in municipalities. High autonomy, respected as one of the basic principles of democratic ruling, has, however, also
given room for the great influence of strong local interests, for instance those of big industrial enterprises, particularly in cases where there is only one big company in the area.

Of particular interest from the viewpoint of the local environment is the high local autonomy as regards decisions concerning land use. Land use plans are prepared by the local authorities and finally accepted by the environmental authorities at the regional and the state level. In Finland, this area of activity is today one of the most important ones from the viewpoint of environmental protection.

The need for closer co-operation between local administration and citizens has been emphasized in Finland. The increasing direct participating of citizens has been an official ideology in state administration since the period – the sixties and the early seventies – when the principle of equality was emphasized in public discussions and social policies. The formal representative decision making structure, based on equal, general and secret elections on every fourth year has been experienced as insufficient as far as the participation needs of citizens in communal life are concerned. In addition, practical attempts at developing local democracy have been made in accordance with the ideology of direct participation. A central target of the Municipal Law in 1976 was the strengthening of local democracy. Opportunities of citizens to have information about plans and local policy by authorities have been increased by the Law of Administrative Procedures in 1982. Furthermore, experiments for promoting the participation of citizens in local decision making have been carried out. From the viewpoint of local environmental protection, the Environmental Permit Procedures Act of 1991 is of special importance. This act stipulates that before any major alterations are made in an area (e.g. building of a road or a bridge), the environmental impacts of the project must be assessed.

In spite of these efforts, however, the real development has – generally speaking – not been very promising. An authoritative person in the field of the development of local administration, Heikki Koski, has recently (1995: 16) estimated that the social distance between local authorities and citizens has even grown despite several attempts at creating opportunities for citizen participation. Citizens feel that they have only little power and opportunities to influence everyday municipal decision making. The picture of an unsatisfactory situation is also confirmed by a national evaluation group in its report on municipal ex-
periments of sustainable development (Kestävän kehityksen käsikirja kunnille, 1994: 11, 15). Generally, the interplay between municipal authorities and citizens had not taken any significant steps forwards in the municipalities participating in the experiment.

If the general situation is as Koski sees it, we can make an important conclusion. There are certain non-formal social factors at the local level which quite strongly determine the relationships between authorities and citizens in everyday life. In spite of advancements in law, the social distance between citizens and authorities may have grown.

One factor to contribute to this disadvantageous situation is based on the long-lasting bureaucratic culture of ruling, especially characteristic of the central administration. Its roots are far in the last century, when the central bureaucracy was built within the Russian context. Perhaps it is partly this cultural heritage that can be seen e.g. in the preparatory work for nationwide protection programs, as in the cases of the shore protection program and the NATURA 2000 program.

The national tradition may have contributed to the bureaucratic culture in the local decision making structures too. However, a wide local self-determination has contributed to the formation of specific local domination structures. Local democracy may be highly formalized, and the decision making structure may be less responsive to the initiatives of people. Governing according to the “top to bottom” model is often quite convenient for municipal authorities. It seemingly spares their energy and gives them bureaucratic power. A study by Sairinen (1994) showed that the clear majority of municipal leaders had a negative attitude to citizens’ initiatives, particularly when conflicting with the guidelines they themselves had set. These initiatives were experienced by authorities as harmful interference in issues which were seen to belong to bureaucratic functionaries and experts, not to laymen.

This kind of orientation may be contributed to by the fact that the position of leading officials in the municipal apparatus is strong. Departing from the general line, there are permanent offices of municipal managers in Finland (Ylönen, 1993: 34). This makes the position of the manager independent. The other powerful parties in the local power structure may be the leading figure(s) of the main political association(s) and of local business life. Thus, in a number of cases, true power on the local scale is exercised by a core network of a few powerful individuals consisting of the representatives of the parties mentioned above.
(Haveri, 1994; Hoikka, 1991; Pikkala, 1992). This kind of network can have developed particularly in circumstances where a community has not undergone rapid changes, but is characterized by a great stability. Structured formally (the leading posts of decision making organs) and informally (informal negotiations and discussions), the core network is usually a firm structure, because its members are accustomed to exercising power and enjoy high appreciation of local influential parties, which are highly dependent on their decisions. The rank-and-file members of local political associations are often in a situation where they face “raw facts”, “practical necessities”, i.e. the logical consequences of previously decided plans in their attempts to exert influence. The members of the core network often experience the independent activities of citizens as threats to their own posts. Even more threatening are demands which manifest a world view different from theirs.

This structure does not contribute to equal relationships with resourceful and independent citizens. Let us examine an illustrative example from a small municipality in the central part of the country (Konttinen, 1994a).

A few years ago there emerged a citizens’ initiative in this small municipality. The building plan of the municipality was regarded as too dense by a group of locals. Making roads safe for children and cycling was proposed. Generally, a greater respect on the part of the authorities towards the local natural circumstances was demanded by the citizens. These local residents had repeatedly tried to promote their aims through established political local associations, but to no avail. It was a firmly rooted practice that municipal decisions were actually made in meetings among a few leaders of political associations and the municipal manager. This core network was accustomed to acting according to its own will. One member of the municipal council, who did not belong to the core network, complained that no initiative could be realized without the acceptance of an old political leader, who had for decades been a leading figure in most of the central planning organs of the municipality. In addition to him, another leader and the municipal manager formed the core network.

The citizens’ group arranged an open meeting in order to discuss issues of their local environment. The reactions from the side of
the established core network were quite interesting. The leading figures attacked this initiative with passion and criticized its representatives for undemocratic measures. They demanded that “the normal circumstances” of “legal democratic” decision making be restored. The members of the core network refused to participate in the citizens’ meeting, as at the beginning did almost all the members of the municipal council. The municipal manager repeatedly attacked the local newspaper, which gave its support to the initiative. When the chief editor refused to obey the municipal manager, the municipal bureaucracy finished its financial aid. In a few months, the chief editor was forced to stop publishing the newspaper and soon a new paper, more obedient to the “official line”, was founded.

In this case the core network had accustomed to ruling without “disturbing factors”. There had prevailed a strong local culture of ruling, in which independent meetings of the citizens were interpreted as even pathological obstacles to the functioning of democracy. This concerned the meetings outside the prevailing system of domination. In this highly industrialized locality, workers’ associations had long been central organizations even for the way of life of the local inhabitants. The leaders of the associations were self evident leaders in the local representative system as well. For most of the inhabitants, this model of political influence had been felt as the only possible one for decades. In the beginning, people feared to act outside, and even against, the deeply rooted associational forms.

We meet the described domination structure most often in local communities with great and long-standing stability. They may be agricultural or industrial ones (but maybe not so usually in service-orientated localities). A minimal migration means that the members of the community have internalized the existing culture during their course of life. It is often outsiders or a deep crisis that can put the change in motion. For instance, in the conflict case described above, the independent action group of citizens consisted (at the beginning) not of the people born and bred in the municipality, but mostly of highly educated professionals who had moved to the community recently. They worked outside the municipality in a nearby town. The point is that they were not dependent on the local power structure, and were not bound by the local culture of domination. They formed a second
community (Konttinen, 1994a), very different from the original one, with their ahistorical locality-orientation as well as professional involvement and self-awareness.

It seems that environmental attitudes are not usually present among the described core network. A stagnant and self-satisfied leadership style connected with old type developmental strategies seems to prevail in these decision making structures.⁶

When environmentalism has been internalized among local decision makers, there seem to much more sympathy towards participatory democracy and the independent environmental voluntary associations of citizens. Perhaps this is due to the general way in which these leaders respond to new challenges; perhaps they also understand that in practice the functioning of environmentalism presupposes the high activity of locals.

Ways of advancement in local environmental thinking

So far we have dealt with basic contemporary social and cultural structures forming hindrances to a more effective management of the local environment. Next we pose a question about the possibility of overcoming the problems we have identified.

First, the future depends to a large extent on the more general development of environmental ideologies in society. Also, clearly, when job or other advantages accompanying an environmental ideology (e.g. income from natural agriculture without fertilizers) are present, changes in orientation become easier. The recent unemployment situation changed the attitudes generally in the direction of industrial growth; increasing job opportunities is now the most important goal for many people.

There seem to be several places from which the strengthening of the environmental orientation might begin. (1) There may occur a reorientation in the leadership of the municipality resulting e.g. from outside pressures; (2) the change may occur on the citizens’ side in the form of initiatives and protests, (3) the environmental sector of central administration will have a greater influence in local ways of dealing with environmental matters.
From above

A number of municipal bureaucracies have made a conscious choice in favour of ecological principles in the steering of their development. No doubt, a concern about the local and broader environments is a factor behind this conscious choice – this was the case particularly in the eighties under the circumstances of the stronger environmental mood. Recently, as stated, the environmental turn has also much to do with the economic situation of municipalities. In the job loss crisis new alternatives are sought in many localities. The protection of the environment has become an economic factor for rural municipalities in two ways. It is hoped that fresh nature will appeal to qualified employees and hi-tech enterprises, thus bringing tax revenue to such municipalities. And it can be seen that a number of country milieus close to economic centres have become places of residence. Many people working in towns want to live in a fresh nature milieu in the nearby countryside.

The conscious choice in favour of environmentalism has in some cases followed from a deep crisis the municipality has experienced. Facing the severe unemployment situation, municipal authorities in rural areas must intensively develop strategies for survival. Manifesting a new strategic choice, some municipalities decided to make an attempt to translate their weaknesses into a strength. This means an attempt at maintaining their natural environment intact and attractive to those who long for the quality of this kind of way of life. It was hoped that the respect for nature and the environment would also lead to an economically sustainable development. Let us take an example, a small municipality with only 1400 inhabitants in Central Finland.

After a structural change in agriculture, this small rural commune had experienced a deep crisis in the 1970s. The population had diminished considerably and become older after quite a number of younger people had moved elsewhere to seek work. The municipality had entered a situation where the existence of the community as an independent municipality was severely put in question. In this situation of crisis, those in influential positions in the municipality made an exceptional choice. After profound considerations, they decided to make an attempt to translate the weakness of their local
community into a resource. It was concluded that something totally new and radical should be done.

And they did. An original philosophy called suminism was developed (one can become familiar with the originality of the philosophy of this municipality, Sumiainen, at the municipality’s WWW-page http://www.reg.fi/ksliitto/kunnat/sumiainen/infoe.htm) The municipality declared itself a cradle of “creative madness”. The reasonable idea behind this “madness” was to mobilize the initiative and resourcefulness of the local residents, to put the silent resources in motion. The inhabitants would be awakened to a common goal. Therefore, the “creative madness” was systemically carried out by various projects. For example, unmarried men’s “bank” was established and loudly advertised throughout the country. New and exotic animals like ostriches began to be reared by some locals. This small municipality is today well known for its fresh and unprejudiced campaigns all over the country.

It was quite logical that this municipality also reacted positively to the environmental challenges. When the state set up, at the turn of the nineties, municipal experiments of promoting the idea of sustainable development, this municipality was chosen as one of the experiment municipalities. Projects were organised by the municipal authorities to promote the environmental awareness of the local inhabitants.

Some comparisons with the other cases indicate that this experiment proved to be a rather successful one. In Lahdenmäki’s (1996) interpretation, this relative success could to a large extent be attributed to the kind of special cultural climate in municipal government as described above. Also, the small size of the municipality gave an opportunity for direct relationships between the local authorities and citizens.

A central factor of change in this case is a breakthrough in the old local culture of action, in this case produced by the local authorities themselves. The new ideologies were soon introduced to the local people, who accepted and adapted them. A companionship model of administration could develop in an atmosphere of openness.

Our example is perhaps the most striking one of the new direction in Finland, but it is not the only one. It seems that, recently, some
municipalities, particularly those with the least industrial opportunities, have drawn the conclusion that their future opportunities rest above all on their ability to translate their weaknesses into strengths. This means that because of the low industrial development, their natural environment has been preserved better. This is what urbanised people are today seeking in their holidays. By the initiatives of local authorities, developmental projects like “Vitality to the countryside through environmental care” in an underdeveloped area of the central part of the country have been started. For example, there are attempts to reduce agricultural wastes to lakes and rivers in order to keep nature clean and more tempting. A light infrastructure for nature tourism is being built. Attempts are made to mobilize the local people, to get them involved in and to work for the new goals. This has not been too difficult because of the advantages clean nature offers to the locals themselves. Also, contacts to university researchers have been taken by the local authorities to promote the goals by means of research. Natural sciences and social sciences are used as well.

As another attempt at mobilizing the local level, contributed by the Rio 1992 conference, is the Local Agenda 21 program. The goal of the program is to promote environmental protection by activating local civil society so that economic, environmental and social aspects are combined. By October 1997, 90 (of Finland’s 452) municipalities have started the Local Agenda 21 activities. It is not yet possible to foresee if these programs indeed succeed to break old habits of thinking and to improve the role of local civil society in the planning and decision making concerning local environments.

*From below*

From the seventies onwards, new kinds of grassroots formations of civil society have emerged in addition to older structures, both in urban and in rural areas. A great part of them are organized in the form of registered associations – a very common type of voluntary organization in Finland, going back far in the country’s history (Siisiäinen, 1990). Two types of local nonpolitical associations are common today: local associations of the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation, and Village Committees. The former local associations came to birth in 1974
following the reorganizing of FANC – today there are about two hundred local associations in various parts of the country. These local associations act independently of the central association and have concentrated their attention on issues of the local environment. Sometimes they make use of the expert resources of the central association, and particularly those of the county organizations of FANC, in attempts to gain specialized information in environmental issues concerning their localities. Their typical activities are proposals for municipal boards concerning various environmental topics, arranging exhibitions and walking tours to local nature, and calling forth discussions at the local level. However, the activities as well as the local importance of the associations vary greatly. Some are mere hobby organizations interested in bird life, for example, while others participate actively in the local policy making and may also be appreciated by the local authorities.

The Village Committees also emerged in the first half of the seventies and were encouraged by nation wide developmental projects in the latter half of the decade. In the social mood of the quality of local milieu in the late seventies and at the beginning of the eighties, the number of these local committees rose to 1300 – more than one committee per every three villages (Rouhinen, 1981: 274). Interestingly, village action seems to be the most common in the less developed regions of the country, in Eastern and Northern Finland.

A village committee is a voluntary and independent association without any formal bindings to the official municipal organization, and it represents the whole village. The activity is mainly directed to developing the local quality of life in its various contents: services, leisure activities, environmental matters, village plans, etc.

These voluntary associations, at best, act as real grassroots developers, making plans, inspiring people to act, and influencing the authorities. Thanks to the relatively high educational level of the Finnish people even in the countryside – in about 60 countryside municipalities the proportion of university educated of the manpower is more than ten per cent – these associations have often learnt to make use of national and also international resources of various developmental programs. An example is given by the village committee of the village of Jaurakkajärvi, located deep in the countryside in a non-industrialized region in the municipality of Pudasjärvi in the Southern part of Lapland.
The village committee in the small village of Jaurakkajärvi, today comprising 80 permanent houses and, in addition, of 140 summer cottages, has acted for fifteen years. It has in its use an old school building, where meetings and other activities take place. With very few industrial jobs, quite many of the younger people have been forced to move away from their home district. The unemployment rate was in 1996 as high as 42 percent. However, in spite of this alarming figure, the locals have not fallen into despair. In the middle of the 1990s a developmental project was started by an initiative of the inhabitants themselves to increase job opportunities and the quality of life in this area characterized by vast forests, lakes and wooded hills. The village committee started their developmental project by making an assessment of opportunities. A questionnaire planned by the activists themselves was sent to every house to clear up the prevailing situation and to get new ideas. A report was made on the bases of the results (Simonen, 1996). Authorities were contacted, and support was soon sought in national and even international programs. Through the activity of the villagers themselves, a developmental project supported by a program of the European Union was set up. The goals were set on the basis of the results of the assessment. It was emphasized by the villagers that the future opportunities of their village lay in fresh nature, which was experienced as a real resource, and the preservation of environmental values was strongly emphasized. Various plans are being made to attract eco tourists to the region, and to develop other opportunities given by nature (more effective use of forest berries, more refined and specialized agricultural products, etc.)

In addition to these kinds of more stable associations, there have arisen a great number of citizens’ initiatives and protest campaigns against environmental plans or measures planned by authorities or economic interest parties. As mentioned above, a strong wave of such local protest campaigns led to a remarkable strengthening of environmental awareness on the national level at the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties. One of the first protection plans where locals played a central role was the marsh Kesonsuo case in the eastern part of the country in the mid-seventies (Borg, 1992: 94-101). The protection of this valuable marsh for bird life was proposed by local land owners, a
local teacher playing a major role in the organization of the protection. The persuasion of private land owners to support protection would hardly have been possible without the energy of local voluntary activists.

The consequences of protest activities may be unexpected. A citizens’ protest campaign may bring about profound changes in the whole local administrative and political culture. Let us return to our first example, the case of the municipality in Central Finland which faced a local upheaval at the turn of the 1990s.

As stated above, there was a self-satisfied core network in this municipality. During its long hegemony it had become accustomed to autocratic rule. When demands concerning building plans and other issues were voiced by citizens, this core network reacted angrily. But in spite of intensive efforts to suppress independent initiatives, e.g. by influencing the local newspaper, the attempts did not lead to the expected result. Once started, the movement went on and more local people became involved in, also original residents of the community. This state of affairs shows that there existed a real need for influencing local policy among the residents (importantly in this case, the demands did not concern the local enterprise and jobs were not seen as being threatened). After a while the change started among the municipal authorities too. Gradually more and more officials showed sympathy for the citizens’” initiative. This process of change was accelerated by the retirement of the old municipal leader.

After half year’s activity, the citizens’ movement institutionalized itself around four voluntary associations (three local village committees, one in every village of the municipality, and a local association of FANC). All of them are active even today, although not quite as active as during the protest year.

The point here is that the citizens’ movement was strong enough to be able to break the old cultural structures of domination. Changes occurred at the top of the local power structure as well: after a period of sharp conflict in publicity, a co-operative orientation won support among the leading municipal functionaries. Today the citizens’ local associations are more appreciated by the municipal authorities.

Our case shows that a protest campaign, even if it emerges around a small number of issues, can have a broad impact on the local way of
ruling. A change occurred, although quite few people believed in it at the beginning.

Quite different from our example are the cases, referred to above, where local inhabitants strongly oppose the demands of an outside environmental movement for the reason that their everyday living is endangered by the demands. In these cases a satisfactory outcome, from the viewpoint of environment, may be hard to reach, unless alternative living opportunities are sought and found. In the case of the conflict concerning the old forests in the northern and eastern parts of the country, at least a partial solution has been provided by the state’s decision to compensate for the protection of privately owned forests with state-owned forests elsewhere (the Finnish state is an important forest owner, particularly in the north). Furthermore, increasing nature tourism could give compensatory living opportunities for the locals. Making use of these opportunities, however, requires a considerable re-orientation among the locals – as well as effective regulation of tourism from the viewpoint of the protection of nature. Too, negotiative orientation and educational aid for the locals are needed from the authorities side.

Local administration: competitive steering principles

Finally, let us consider one part of the complex process of ecological modernization in the countryside, the local environmental administration and the role and the position of environmental officials in municipalities. Environmental offices have been founded from 1986 onwards as part of the construction of the local environmental administration. As we can conclude on the basis of our previous analyzes, their position and opportunity to promote environmental ends vary considerably in local settings. Furthermore, there are certain specific features in the local administrative structure which easily hamper the strengthening of environmental thinking. One such formation is the sectoral structure of Finnish municipal administration (Sairinen, 1994). Each area of activity – e.g. social welfare, building, health and the environment – have functionaries of their own. Of course, special-
ization is a factor of efficiency. But it also follows that officials of each department are oriented to the aims of their own specialties. The economic sector has its own way of reasoning and objects of interest, as do the health sector, the technical sector, and so on (Niklas Luhmann is known as a theoretician of this kind of development). In consequence, a “total view” threatens to be left aside. However, environmental protection essentially presupposes such a total perspective. The Agenda 21 officials in the central administration have reason to worry that “too often the Local Agenda 21 tends to become the responsibility of the environmental sector, and the important connection to strategic decision making is lost” (Local Agenda 21 in Finland: 6).

Another factor of importance is the position of municipal managers in Finnish local administration. As stated above, the municipal manager has a great deal of power in rural communes; therefore, the orientation of the manager is important. Although this orientation varies greatly from municipality to municipality, it seems that municipal managers quite often orient themselves in accordance with one-sided economic interests. This orientation follows, on one hand, from their responsibility for promoting the well-being of their municipalities and for minimizing job losses. On the other hand, it follows from their everyday contacts with those who represent pure economic interests. In this context, well-being easily takes on a one-sidedly economic content. A small-scale survey (Saaristo, 1996: 96) showed, as experienced by municipal environmental experts, that of all sectors of the municipal bureaucracy, the attitudes of the municipal leaders to environmental protection were the least positive. Paradoxically, these attitudes may sometimes be so prejudiced that clear economic opportunities connected with environmental protection are missed.

In line with our general argument about the great variety in the contemporary municipal environmental administration in Finland, the municipal environmental experts themselves evaluate the municipal administration with a great variety. According to a survey by Saaristo (ibid.), roughly half of the officials experienced their position as non-problematic and well-functioning. But a rather large minority stated that their position in the municipality is weak and that their work is not appreciated within the municipal organization. They complained that they were given less important tasks, whereas really important decisions were made behind their backs. Thus, the position of the environ-
mental expert is often not easy in rural localities. Saaristo concludes that a strong personality is needed in the circumstances where old, deeply rooted value contents prevail and where environmental protection can even be experienced as a threat to economic success. Qualities like a firm internalization of the environmental viewpoint and courage to defend and promote it in everyday activity are of great importance. In addition, such tasks as connecting functionally specialized sectors within the environmental frame of reference are essential goals of the environmental expert.

Municipal environmental experts and municipal environmental boards themselves are evaluated by citizens as reliable decision makers in environmental issues. Regional environmental centres, too, are regarded as reliable by the locals. Instead, according to this survey (Ympäristö 5/1995, 12), citizens have less confidence in local politicians, business life, energy companies and land owners in environmental issues.

Today the municipal bureaucracy faces pressure conflicts from various sides. These contradictory challenges have often not been too easy, particularly in cases in which big economic interests conflict with environmental values. The circumstances of confusion can be well seen in the following conflict case (Kontttinen, 1996b).

Since the end of the sixties, a national energy company had been planning a power plant, the operation of which would be based on the differences in day and night prices of electricity. The idea is to pump water at nighttime by means of cheap energy from the lake below up into an artificial dam on a hill, and in daytime, when the price of electricity is higher, the water is run back down to the lake through turbines. Unfortunately, the best place discovered by the energy company happens to be the most valuable area for its plants and insects in the whole central part of the country, classified as internationally valuable for its environmental qualities. Protest activities emerged as early as the beginning of the seventies. The conflict has lasted for more than 25 years. During the first fifteen years of the plan, the municipal organization with all local political associations eagerly supported the plan, hoping to create new jobs and bring tax revenue into this job loss region. However, basically for economic reasons, the company delayed the building of the power plant.

In the eighties opinions began to change more broadly among
local citizens as well. The general environmental breakthrough had also more and more influence in the countryside. Tough protesting by the local protest group (the so-called Vaarunvuori hill movement, see http://www.clinet.fi/~vaaruij/index.html, supported by regional environmental authorities and natural scientists of the provincial university, elicited a response among the locals. New investigations were carried out, and specialists found that the area was even more valuable than had been thought. The area, now in the possession of the energy company, was included in a number of national protection programs. The area is also included in the NATURA 2000 program.

In the mid-eighties the municipal organization, too, divided into supporters and opponents. The municipal environmental expert, together with the environmental board of executives led by her, opposed the plan, whereas the municipal manager supported it persistently. The case has been a difficult one for local decision makers – and for the company. The latter appeals to earlier decisions by the court as well as to the earlier investigations in the area. According to the environmentalists, essential new knowledge has been gained and the principle of biodiversity was not sufficiently known and understood when the earlier decisions were made.

The local and regional decision makers came into a state of confusion. The municipal organization has a central role in the dispute, since it is the task of municipalities to prepare the local land use plan. The powerful company has a lot of prestige and economic resources for effective propaganda in favour of the plan. A great deal of informal and formal pressure was exerted by the parties. The strong pressure from outside is manifested by the fact that the decisions of the municipal bureaucracy may have changed many times during a short period of time in this issue. Up to the present, the supporters of the power plant have had a majority in local and in regional decision making organs, but it seems that this majority is declining all the time.

At the end of 1998, the conflict seems to has a happy end from the viewpoint of nature. After a change in the leadership, the company has announced that the power plant will not be built, and that the area will be protected.

This conflict case illustrates how the economic interests of a big firm
and the need for jobs and new sources of income for the municipality conflict with the principle of environmentalism. The local level decision makers in the representative organs of the municipality found themselves in a sharply conflicting situation. On one scale lie the obvious environmental values, on the other the economic earnings for the municipality in the form of tax revenue. The local decision makers are in a position to decide, particularly through the local land use plan. The question is: how aware are they, for instance, about the principle of biodiversity, which is important here? Interestingly, as in this case, the state of confusion also seems to prevail among regional decision makers and in courts as well. In this and similar cases it has occurred recently that the Superior Administrative Court – the ultimate authority in judicial matters – has not been able to establish a consensus. The difference concerns the interpretations of the cases. Clearly, we are living in a period of breakthrough in our broad interpretative frame of references. It is characteristic of the present situation that functionaries of various sectors come into conflict with each other over environmental issues.

In today’s situation very important support for the local environmental authorities comes from the regional environmental administration. As stated above, the Finnish model of environmental administration is a three-level system, where 13 regional environmental centres (on this system, see http://www.vyb.fi/welcome_eng.html) steer, control and support local activities. To municipal environmental experts, it is this intermediate level environmental administration that functions best of all the sectors of public administration from the viewpoint of managing local environments (a survey concerning Central Finland: Konttininen & Saaristo, 1993). These centres have specialized tasks and usually a motivated and well qualified personnel at their service.

Making choices

The past two decades have shown the complex character of the ecological modernization in countryside localities. Different phases can be discerned in this process.

During the seventies, environmental protection was seeking its direction. The direction was chosen by the environmental protest cycle at late seventies and early eighties. The ideas of environmentalism now
penetrated into general publicity. In consequence, deeply rooted rural value and belief systems, as well as those of industrialism, were challenged. Here and there country people, too, participated in single-issue protest events to protect local environments. In several localities people had long suffered from the consequences of intensive industrialization. It was to a large extent a way-of-life perspective that brought country people into this environmental protest cycle. The social mood of the period, with its quality-of-life themes, gave support to these demands.

The eighties was a period when environmentalism, as a world view and in institutionalized forms, gradually entered the countryside. It was promoted by the modern mass media and also by the gradual change in the social composition of rural people. The construction of welfare state increased the number of educated professionals everywhere in the country in the 1970s and the 1980s. It was often members of the new educated middle class (e.g. teachers seem to have been one important group to advance environmental thinking at the local level) who, challenged the industrial values. The new administrative organs representing the environmental perspective were brought to municipalities together with vivid discussions on the themes of sustainable development, and global environmental threats contributed to the penetration of environmental values and attitudes among the rural population in the second half of the eighties. During recent years several national and international protection programs have set new and powerful challenges to the population and decision makers.

But the old ways of thinking and the old domination structures also prevail in several countryside contexts. The late eighties and the nineties are thus a period of the complicating and multiplying belief systems in the countryside. A competitive situation prevails between the ways of thinking. A simple modern period has moved to a more complex one. At its present state, the increased complexity creates also confusion among local actors. Defensive orientation may has strengthened among those, whose occupation has lost its earlier self-evident character by the challenges of environmentalism, and particularly among those land owners, who are “threatened” by protection programs. Recent demonstrations of land owners and their associations may indicate that the issues are becoming even more difficult problems.
What seems necessary in this situation is to seek solutions by means of active discursive practices, in which openness is obeyed. In situations where confusion prevails, it seems to be correct and useful from the viewpoint of protection, too, that the various parties abstain from major activities unless sufficient discussions and negotiations are carried out. At the same time, irrational forms of action and the disposition to these shall be firmly condemned by authorities and other actors of society.

When environmental protection has more support among the locals this has often happened within the frame of economic development. It is hoped that environmentalism offers new living opportunities to the regions bitterly suffered from job loss. Various experimental projects are launched to introduce new activities into a community, to vitalize local economy within the environmental frame. It is probable that the economic motive will continue to serve as a dominant driving force in the near future as well. No doubt, one major challenge for policy makers is to steer and support this development in close communication and negotiation relationship with the locals. This can be done by organizing education for the new sources of livelihood and relevant skills, as well as by arranging other kinds of support activities.

The future is that of choices. So far environmentalism has been better translated into economy than economy into environmentalism.

Notes

1 The article is based on a paper presented at the Congress of International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA): “Professionalism and Ethical Conduct for the Public Servant: Challenges for the 21st Century”, in Durban, South Africa, 30th June - 5th July, 1996.
2 The choice of this approach can be argued, among other things, by the fact that Finnish municipalities – 452 in all – are small. Only 14 have a population exceeding 50,000. Nearly half of the municipalities are small rural communities with less than 4000 inhabitants.
3 There are today only a few municipalities, in which the proportion of those working in agriculture or forestry amounts to over than 50 per cent. The number is much more higher (29 per cent) for those countryside municipalities, in which the corresponding manpower proportion is less
than 20 per cent. The broadest employment sector is today services. In about third of all countryside municipalities, more than half of manpower are working within services, and in less than a third of the municipalities the manpower proportion of services is less than 40 per cent. (Kuntafakta, 1997)

4 In some cases the protesting has got even nonrational forms, as it did in the case of the shore protection program too. A number of land owners in various parts of the country went to their valuable forests, hewing down trees as soon as they learned about the plans of the ministry. This could occur even before any decisions or plans had been made concerning the protection and the compensations by the state. The self-determination is felt by these land owners as such a holy value to such a degree that if it is threatened, destruction looms over as the only alternative.

5 In the case of the only employer, the enterprise exercises a great deal of power and its interests are naturally listened to by the local authorities. However, the owners of firms are no more patrons who determine in an authoritative manner all the public life in a local community. The dependence is today much more a dependence on job opportunities and on tax incomes for local needs than direct autocratic domination by owners. Interestingly, as shown by a number of examples, the fears of the decrease in job opportunities by environmental demands have often proven to be quite unrealistic in the end. Today, there are also cases (Konttinen, 1994b) where not only local people, but also the enterprise has profited from the decrease in wastes followed by the success of an environmental movement. As little wastes as possible has become an important advantage in marketing products. European markets for paper are a good example. More generally, good reputation in environmental care has become such an important factor of competition that industrial enterprises are rather willing to take environmental matters into consideration in their policies. It seems (according to a study by Peltomäki & Kamppinen, 1995: 45) that those industrial managers sympatetic to green ideas expect strict environmental regulations open up new kinds of economic opportunities and help their firms in business competition.

A remarkable variation in environmental thinking can be found in the relationship to the size of firms (Peltomäki & Kamppinen, 1995: 32). Managers of small firms seem to have the strongest anti-environmentalist attitudes, and respectively, those in larger firms are more sympatetic to stricter environmental regulation of economic life. In small firms, extra costs due to environmental protection are seen as an economic threat.

6 Although downright corruption can be estimated to be relatively low in Finland in international comparisons, in decisions concerning land use such
cases have occurred. For instance, there are cases where building enterprises
and local politicians have made secret agreements in which the official
building plan has been changed in favour of the enterprise. In land use
there is also a “grey area” between corruption and fair play (Isaksson, 1977).
For instance, exceptional construction permits of various kinds are granted
fairly often.

7 It may be worth mentioning that the forest conflict in the north-eastern
part of the country paradoxically brought some economic opportunities
to the locals. The conflict was reported in the mass media in some European
countries, and as a result a number of eco tourists from several European
countries arrived to see what they considered a rarity – old European forests.

8 This complexity can be very well seen in the case of a traditional rural
occupation, that of local forest functionaries (See Kuurne, 1997). These
functionaries have traditionally embraced the industrial ideologies of
forestry. The recent vivid debates on the old forests issue and the principle
of biodiversity have, however, challenged this ideological inheritance, which
emphasizes economical use of the frests. Clearly, the world view of many
forest functionaries has been driven into a state of confusion. It may be
particularly hard for them to reject the old ideology, since this ideology has
given so much prestige and even glamour to them in the period of greatness
of the forest industries.

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Tapio Litmanen

INTERNATIONAL ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTEST

The anti-nuclear energy movement and its relationship to the anti-nuclear weapons movements in Finland, France and the United States

During the 1970s the international anti-nuclear energy movement became an important political force in most of the industrialized countries using nuclear energy. So called new social movements succeeded in replacing the earlier enthusiasm for atomic power with misgivings about its safety. Although we can class the anti-nuclear energy movement as a new social movement, it was not, in fact, quite so new as it may have appeared to be. It is true that a social movement may bring new ideas forward, and make them the subject of public discussion; but it may, at the same time, owe much to its predecessors; or it may even be nothing more than an extension of the social movements it succeeds. By studying the international anti-nuclear energy movement’s relationship to its predecessor, the anti-nuclear weapons movement, I will indicate how interaction between these two movements has gone on for decades.

The trajectories of the anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons movements have been close to each other several times in their histories. To understand the nature of the anti-nuclear energy movement it is essential to take the other movement into account, too. But
the usual practice has been to study these movements separately. For instance some researchers have not considered their terminology carefully. In the literature relating social movements the terms “anti-nuclear movement” or “anti-nuclear protest” are used to refer both to the anti-nuclear energy and also to the anti-nuclear weapons movement. Sometimes these terms have been considered to comprise both movements (see, e.g. Brandon 1987; Rochon 1988; Flam 1994; Nichols 1987).

I propose carrying out a detailed analysis of these two movements in Finland, France and United States. In these countries the movements have developed differently because of the different social, political and cultural conditions they faced. I will also specify the role of peace and environmental movements in those cases where we need a much wider social movement perspective on anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons movements.

Movements in different political contexts

The protest against nuclear technology is not a uniform protest, repeating itself in the same way and simultaneously in every industrialized country using nuclear technology. The same international protest can have both national characteristics and widely shared common elements (cf. Kitschelt 1986). Many factors may affect the intensity of the protest. In particular, national differences in the various political and cultural contexts support or discourage the operation of social movements. We all know that for instance in France the anti-nuclear energy movement was the strongest in Western Europe in the 1970s, but despite this strong movement, in the 1980s France became the world’s leading nuclear power country in 1980s as measured by the percentage of electricity production. On the other hand in Germany the anti-nuclear energy movement was not so advanced as its counterpart in France, but during the 1980s the movement became so strong a social force that it could make it difficult to construct any more nuclear power plants and it also managed to change people’s attitudes towards nuclear energy in a more negative direction.

In the light of facts of this kind, it is natural enough to ask why the anti-nuclear energy movement should have succeeded in one country,
while in another it failed. One way to study these phenomena is to take into account the political opportunity structure and the changes taking place within it. The observation that political contexts and institutional structures affect the development of societal conflicts is not a new one. According to Meyer (1993) the concept of political opportunity structure was used in the social sciences for the first time in the beginning of the 1970s, when the tendency of cities to become the focal points of political protest came under scrutiny. Usually the concept is used to refer those societal cycles, situations or conditions, which affect the development of a social movement and which assist, or make it difficult for the movement to achieve its goals and their wider societal consequences (Siisiäinen 1990, 12).

Klandermans (1996, 165-180) classifies the political opportunity structure into two parts. On the one hand there are four existing structural opportunities, which are, 1) weak and strong states (e.g. USA and France), 2) the repression and/or facilitation of movements by the State, 3) party system as an institutional circumstance and 4) neocorporatistic forms of interest representation, that is systems of institutionalized bargaining between the state and interest organizations. On the other hand Klandermans speaks of transitory opportunities that exist over and above stable and long-term ones. According to him these transitory opportunities are 1) access to polity, 2) destabilizing alignments, 3) a changing alliance structure and 4) divided elites.

When trying to explain the development of social movements, we need to take account of both structural and transitory political opportunity structures. Although these factors have an effect, this effect is not mechanical. Klandermans emphasizes that political opportunities do not always exist objectively. For instance, movement activists have to perceive, interpret and understand what kind of political opportunity structure may be relevant to their movement at particular moment. Within movements, activists evaluate political opportunities, make their decisions on the grounds of estimated opportunities, and act according to these.

Besides the national political opportunity structures, there are also supranational and local opportunity structures. It is understandable that in an age of globalization, movements too operate in a global context. Despite the internationalization of the movement context, and the global communication networks which help the movements
overcome the restrictions of time and place, concrete action must take place in particular concrete places. Therefore it is also true to say that local political opportunity structures too have an effect on how movements operate. According to Klandermans, the political opportunity structure is multilayered in the sense that it includes supranational, national and local political circumstances.

By analysing the anti-nuclear energy and anti-nuclear weapons movements in Finland, France and the United States, we gain knowledge of how these movements have developed in different cultures and political opportunity structures and of how the old movement has opened or closed doors for the new one. The concepts of supranational and national opportunity structures are very important when trying to understand, why a particular movement may have had a unique history in one country, quite similar from the history of very similar movements in other countries; or why two quite similar movements in the same country part company from each other. I will follow Klandermans by dividing the multi-layered opportunity structure into existing and transitory structures.

Finland – from confrontation to the cooperation of movements

The Finnish anti-nuclear weapons movement has been part of the peace movement, where the most influential organizations have been the Peace Union of Finland – Association for UN (Suomen Rauhanliitto – YK-yhdistys), Committee of one Hundred (Sadankomitealiitto) and the Finnish Peace Committee (Rauhanpuolistajat) (see Table 1). The oldest peace movement, the Peace Union of Finland, has followed the ideology of traditional Christian-Liberal pacifism in which they have emphasised the important role of the United Nations (and of its predecessor, the League of Nations) when trying to solve disputes between states (Hallman 1986, 20; von Bonsdorff 1993; Taipale 1995, 78-81). The other peace organization, the Finnish Peace Committee, established in 1949, was characterised by its close relationships to Finnish Communists, but also with the Centre party of Finland. After the Second World War, both the Communists and the Centre party were very concerned
about the opinions and reactions of the big eastern neighbour, the Soviet Union. Therefore every action the Finnish Peace Committee took was carefully calculated from the point of view of good Finnish-Soviet relationships. Although the Centre party favoured conservative ideology, most of the activists in the movement were communists; and besides this the organization was a member of the World Peace Council (WPC) which was lead by communists. (Rintala, 1979, 211-213; Vire-Tuominen 1979, 14-16; Harle 1979, 34-38; Kalemaa 1981, 109-110; Hallman 1986, 20; Tuomioja 1991, 7). The history of the third important peace organization in Finland, the Committee of One Hundred, is intertwined with the new phase of the peace movement after the Second World War. This international nuclear weapon pacifism was established in Finland in 1960 (Tuomioja 1991, 8.) But in addition to these three central organizations many other bodies (or people belonging to those) have also contributed to the Finnish Peace Movement. We can say that the Peace Movement has included a people from the women’s movement, the environmental movement, the student movement, the labour movement, political parties, religious groups, and different professional groups such as scientists, doctors, and artists. (See cf. Kalemaa 1981; Itämeren... 1977, 92; Hallman 1986, 130, 136-137; 147; 152; Antola 1983, 2-3; von Bonsdorff 1993, 121, 182-183; Pugwash tänään 1989; Kodama 1990, 206-208).

The most important factors affecting the international political situation after the Second World War were the events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by the cold war between the Great Powers, the Soviet Union’s first nuclear bomb test, and the threat of nuclear arms proliferation. These factors created suitable international conditions for the development of the anti-nuclear weapons movements.

The first incentives to develop an anti-nuclear weapons ideology came to Finland in 1949 from the Peace Conference in Paris. After the conference nearly one million Finnish people signed the Stockholm Plea, which demanded a ban on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (Hallman 1986, 11-14; von Bondorff 1993, 137). Despite the massive realization of the Stockholm Plea, the idea of opposing nuclear weapons did not arise in the centre of the Finnish peace movement. As the supranational opportunity structure changed in 1960, it opened an opportunity for the anti-nuclear weapons movement. The tension between the superpowers reached its peak during the construc-
tion of the Berlin wall (1961) and the Cuba crisis (1962). The later event in particular brought the world to the edge of nuclear war, because the atomic bomb had been available in the arsenals of the USA and the Soviet Union (1949). The United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964) had also developed their nuclear weapons. Soon all these countries had also the hydrogen bomb. (Vesa 1979, 104).

In the van of the Finnish anti-nuclear weapons movement in the 1960s were the Finnish Peace Union and Committee of 100. The Peace Union of Finland had been active in peace actions from the 1950s, but in practice their activities had been in decline and the Finnish Peace Committee had taken over the initiative (von Bonsdorff 1993, 122-129, 135, 157). The change in the supranational political opportunity structure was due to intensive disarmament discussion in the media, the political activation of youth, and their increasing interest in international questions. All these things created a solid ground for the Finnish Peace Movement to integrate new members. (Vesa 1995, 70; Hellman & Seppä 1982, 59; von Bonsdorff 1993, 144). Part of the new activity was channelled to the Finnish Peace Committee, which had invested in activities like international solidarity work and opposing the Vietnam war (Vire-Tuominen 1979, 16-20). Despite their efforts, the Finnish Peace Committee couldn’t completely utilize the new activity to make their organization a stronger one. They witnessed the birth of a new anti-nuclear weapons movement, the Committee of 100. There were protest marches against the French and Soviet Union’s newly-started atomic bomb tests in different parts of Finland. The new movement became organized when the Finns followed the example of the radical wing of the British anti-nuclear weapons movement, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). The Committee of 100 was established in 1960, and three years later Finland had the same kind of organization (Kalemaa 1981, 112.) Although the Finnish Committee of 100 was established to work against nuclear weapons, it became a political and cultural movement, from which came loose new, specialized single-issue movements, like the Third World, anti-racism, and social-policy movements. (Kalemaa 1981, 113-114; Hallman 1986, 33, 46-49, 68; Tuominen 1991, 138, 184; Tuomioja 1991, 10).

In the beginning of 1970 the operational environment of the Finnish peace movement changed. The beginning of the period was characterized by the easing of tension between the Great Powers, and an
optimistic international atmosphere did not need so much activism. Secondly, the change in the supranational opportunity structure had created more working space for small countries like Finland, who could now make more initiatives concerning the international situation. Then occurred a shift from the old cold war and power-block politics towards a policy of détente, more fruitful cooperation in the UN and multilateral disarmament negotiations, where smaller countries too could exercise their skills as conciliators, mediators and critics. (Vesa 1995, 71-72.)

A third factor affecting the peace movement was the movement’s inner situation. As the state increased its official activity in international peace work, the need for citizen activity, like the Committee of 100, decreased. Simultaneously the strength of radicalism decreased, and the Committee 100 saw a proportion of its activists change sides and start to support the Finnish Communist Party’s minority wing, namely dogmatic Marxism–Leninism. This faction even tried to take over the Committee of 100, but they didn’t succeed. After this episode the Finnish Peace Committee organization acquired more new members, and the growth of the organizations’ size and political influence was evident. The Committee of 100 drifted into crisis in the beginning of 1970. A large part of its activists had moved to other movements, like the Third World and environmental movements. Also, part of organization’s activities had been institutionalized. For instance, peace research was established at the University of Tampere, and the interest groups representing the conscript soldier in the military and conscientious objectors in civil alternative service were founded.

As the Committee of 100 had enjoyed the favour of the State and the President in the 1960s, the Defenders of Peace could enjoy this sympathy during the next decade. In fact, the Finland-Soviet Union Friendship Society and Finnish Peace Committee were both semi-official organizations in the 1970s. (Rintala 1979, 209; Kalemaa 1981, 110; von Bonsdorff 1986, 87-103, 293-294; Hallman 1986, 99, 103, 110-130; Pietilä 1990, 42-46; Tuomioja 1991, 10-11; von Bonsdorff 1993, 140; Kolbe 1996, 412.)

As the supranational opportunity structure changed in the end of 1970s, the context within which, a national peace movement operate changed correspondingly. In spite of détente and international arms supervision agreements the armament race had in practice continued.
The new phase of the Cold War was evident in the end of the decade, when the Soviet Union was ready to add SS-20 missiles to their armaments and NATO planned to place Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles in Europe. Tensions between East and West also increased also because of the crises in Angola, Afghanistan, Iran and Central America. In these circumstances, the policy of presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan was to increase military preparedness still more the years following the Kennedy period.

In the Committee of 100, activists started to reorganize an independent Peace and anti-nuclear weapons movement. The Finnish Peace Union became an umbrella organization for the Committee of 100, the alternative civil service organization, and other personal membership-based societies. After that it played a greater role in the international peace movement. At the national level, the trend towards political parties was nearing its end, and this affected to dogmatic Marxist-Leninists and their peace organization, Finnish Peace Committee, which lost its capacity to attract the younger generation. Now the young-oriented themselves towards alternative movements, where more important than traditional political influence was voluntary activity, personal opinions and an alternative life style. (Hallman 1986, 130-137, 151-154; Tuomioja 1991, 14; von Bonsdorf 1993, 165, 171).

The new European anti-nuclear weapons movement developed at the turn of 1980. The need for a movement of this kind was evident after NATO’s cruise missile decision in 1979, because this decision changed transitory and existing supranational opportunity structures. To begin with the decision was a contingent one in the sense that it tied the removal of missiles to the advance of the disarmament process, and each side allowed the other three years in which to comply. Secondly the decision gave rise to new contradictions inside NATO. The smallest member countries, such as Belgium and Holland, reserved their allegiance; and differences of opinion arose between the US and Western Europe. A third, and more structural change was that the world had moved to a new phase of the arms race. New types of missiles changed the balance of terror in Europe, and this opened up an opportunity to question security policy, which based on nuclear weapons. (Antola 1983, 1.)

The political program of the movement was the so-called END-plea, which was critical of both NATO and Warsaw Pact, and which

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rejected the idea of a status quo and stressed the importance of citizens’ activity exercised outside the framework of ideological boarders. END (European Nuclear Disarmament) was a campaign organization founded by British peace activists, but soon it became a large peace movement covering the whole of Europe. From Finland both the Committee 100 and the Peace Union joined the action. The protest against nuclear weapons culminated in Finland between the years 1981 and 1984 in peace marches held during the UN’s disarmament week. These marches at their peak got more than 200,000 people out in the streets. (Hallman 1986, 147).

However, the national political opportunity structure was against the Finnish END-movement. The principle of the State’s foreign policy was to acknowledge the 40-year-old fact of a divided Europe and Finland’s position in it. Also the idea that it was desirable not to interrupt the domestic politics of other States was one of the guidelines of the State’s foreign policy, and this discouraged the idea of co-operational peace work over the block borders. For these reasons, the State’s attitude towards the END-movement was very reserved. Some politicians accused the movement of being strongly against official foreign policy and good relationships between Finland and Soviet Union. Inside the peace movement the Finnish Peace Committee organization was also very critical of END, but soon it became a member of the END-movement.

When the break-up of the Eastern block began at the end of 1980, it meant large changes in the supranational opportunity structure. The national and international peace movements were also affected by these changes. For instance, Finnish Peace Committee took part in international END action until the political conditions weakened their own and their international organization’s, WPC’s, capacity to work, because of the collapse of the socialist block in 1989. Then many member organizations left the WPC, and its Finnish Chairman Johannes Pakkaslahti and other member organizations suggested WPC’s dissolution. (Antola 1983, 2; Hallman 1986, 156-164; END 1990, 14-16; Santi 1992, 75; Lodenius 1996, 126.)

If supranational and national political opportunity structure faced the anti-nuclear weapons movement in Finland with a new situation, the same is true of the anti-nuclear energy movement. In the anti-nuclear weapons movement there were hardly any opponents of the
civic use of nuclear technology. The Finnish Peace Committee, who tried ensure good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, didn’t oppose nuclear energy. And the Committee of 100 shared the same opinion. The attitudes of these two organizations can be understood if we look at political opportunity structures. In those days nuclear energy was included in political and commercial cooperation between the two countries. At that time it was customary in Finland that an important decision should take into consideration the viewpoint of geopolitical realism. Although Finland had not an anti-nuclear energy movement, the road to nuclear energy became a bumpy one. (Myllyntaus 1991, 138; Ydintoiminnan... 1979, 52-62; Ydinsähköä 1994, 25-29, 48).

As the international oil-crisis shaped transitory supranational and national opportunity structures in 1973 and 1974, it also produced factors which both helped and hindered an anti-nuclear energy movement. On the one hand, the fact that decision making on energy policy had been the preserve of a technical, economic and political elite, gave opportunity to opponents of nuclear energy. On the other hand the oil-crisis increased the popularity of nuclear energy, because through it the country could have decreased their dependency on foreign energy sources. We also have to remember that the oil-crisis decelerated economic growth, which raised the unemployment rates. At the same time, the industrialized countries were beginning to realize the kinds of environmental problems the pursuit of material well-being was producing. Taken together, all these things meant that people started to lose their faith in technological development and in nuclear energy. (Sänkiaho & Rantala 1987, 29.)

In this kind of situation the opponents of nuclear energy tried to organize a national movement. The movement spread from southern Finland to other parts of the country, when the report of the power plant place committee was published. The report suggested that the State would find sites for more than 30 nuclear power plants in 10 different municipalities. The problem the movement faced was that it needed allies. This road was blocked, because the dogmatic Marxist-Leninists leading the peace movement were favourably inclined to nuclear energy, which was part of Eastern politics. The Committee of 100 would have been a good ally for opponents of nuclear energy, but they too discounted the new direction, and besides this the Committee were experiencing a momentary trough in organizational action. One
good ally could have been the environmental movement, but the influence of dogmatic Marxist-Leninists also extended to the environmental movement. Although the biggest environmental organization, the Finnish Nature Conservation Association (FANC) and its youth organization, the Nature League (Luonto-Liitto) were against nuclear energy, the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist faction could prevent their active anti-nuclear work. It was not until 1977 that environmental activists established their own society against nuclear energy. The society called EVY (Energiaoppiittinen yhdistys – vaihtoehto ydinvoimalle – The Association for the politics of energy – an alternative to nuclear energy) had some central allies, which were the Finnish Swedish speaking environmental activists’ organization (Natur- och Miljövård – Nature and Environmental Management) and the southern district of FANC’s youth organization’s southern district. Because of the paucity of domestic allies, cooperation with other Scandinavian environmental organizations was vital to the start of the anti-nuclear energy movement. (Tammilehto 1994, 79-87, 94; Hallman 1986, 125-126).

The strong period of the anti-nuclear energy movement was between the years 1977-1983. The key to a success was that the movement could utilize transitory political opportunity. Those years were the time of the mass mobilization of the anti-nuclear weapons movement, and the Finnish anti-nuclear energy movement didn’t reject this kind of activity. The activists emphasized the connections between the civil and military uses of nuclear technology, and they participated in every peace march held in Finland. (Tammilehto 1980, 4; 26-35; Hallman 1986, 153-154 Tammilehto 1987, 85; Tammilehto 1994, 90-95; Taipale 1995, 193). In addition to this, many activists were members of both movements, which explains the close relationships (Lampinen 1984, 39-40).

The next change in the transitory national and supranational political opportunity structures to affect the anti-nuclear energy movement was Governmental decision making concerning new nuclear power plant and the nuclear power-plant accident in Chernobyl in 1986. The activism against nuclear power increased following a quiescent period of a few years, because the Government had decided on the further construction of nuclear power plants. Before the Chernobyl accident nuclear energy option was strongly favoured, but the accident and its consequences arrested this trend in the spring of 1986. A wave of activism moved from opposing nuclear weapons to opposing nuclear
energy. An illustrative example of this is the case, in which a group called Women for Peace changed their name to Women Against Nuclear Energy. After this active period had begun, the Association for Energy Politics’ work quietened down, because FANC, Finnish Greenpeace, and the Green Union had adopted an anti-nuclear ideology and begun the promotion of alternative sources of energy. The situation in autumn 1992 was that a new nuclear power decision could have passed Parliament. An initiative of the old Third World and solidarity activists was launched, urging people not pay 35 percent of their electricity bills, because this was the share of total electricity produced by nuclear power. The boycott aroused confused feelings, but it woke up the anti-nuclear factions in the political parties. The vote in Parliament was won by the opponents of nuclear power, and few years after this the Association for Energy Politics was dissolved.

Table 1. The protest against nuclear technology in Finland from the 1950s to the 1990s.

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<td>The anti-nuclear energy movement</td>
<td>Discussions about nuclear energy begin</td>
<td>Opportunity structures unfavourable: nuclear power was part of Eastern politics and the peace movement was favourable towards it</td>
<td>From local conflicts to the foundation of association: peace movement lukewarm to the anti-nuclear energy movement, later the new movement took part in anti-nuclear weapons activities</td>
<td>In second part of the decade the movement became active: Chernobyl aroused activism even more and activists from the anti-nuclear weapons movement join in</td>
<td>Ardent coming of new movements and dissolution: 1993-1995 saw discussion of new nuclear power plants and after that the anti-nuclear energy society was dissolved</td>
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<tr>
<td>The anti-Nuclear weapons movement</td>
<td>First incentives: Peace Union and Finnish Peace</td>
<td>Two strong parties: Communist Finnish Peace</td>
<td>Finnish Peace Committee became a semi-official organization</td>
<td>Period of cooperation of three organizations: a strong</td>
<td>Peace Union, Committee 100 and Peace Committee continue</td>
</tr>
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France – emphasis on national independence

The anti-nuclear energy movement strengthened in France from the 1960s to the year 1977, which was the culmination of the movement (see Table 2). Behind the movement was an association established in 1962, but it was not until the end of the 1960s that any politically significant protests emerged. In 1971 the movement got 15,000 people onto the streets in a demonstration, and this protest strengthened quickly. The peak point in the protest was in 1977, when approximately 60,000 demonstrators marched against Creys-Malville nuclear power station. This culminating moment was also the beginning of the movement’s fall, because the demonstration turned into a violent confrontation with police. In this skirmish one demonstrator died and several were hurt. The French Government continued the world’s most ambitious nuclear energy programme after this great eruption of popular feeling without encountering any remarkable resistance. The movement had lost the battle, and belief in change had disappeared. (Rüdig 1990, 193-194; Touraine et al. 1983, 18-28, 143).

The withering of the anti-nuclear energy movement cannot be understood by looking at a single important event. When expanding the analysis to the history of French nuclear technology, we realize that the same was the case with the anti-nuclear weapons movement. The development of country’s military and civil nuclear technology had already begun in the second part of the 1950s, but the Fourth Republic tried to avoid public discussion of the subject. Although the French tradition of collective action includes mass demonstrations and im-
petuous resistance over many political questions, this issue did not
arouse the same kind of mass movement against nuclear weapons as
in Great Britain and West Germany. (see Carter 1992).

Suitable preconditions for the same kind of mass movement also
existed in France. The organization opposing nuclear weapons was
founded in 1959, and in the year 1960 France became the fourth nu-
clear weapons state, when President De Gaulle announced their plans
to test nuclear weapons in the Sahara. The spread of anti-nuclear weap-
ons protest from other countries didn’t happen despite organizatio-
nal preparatory work, the fact that France was an obvious target to the
protest, and international campaigns. These factors created an oppor-
tunity, but as Klandermans emphasises, national opportunity struc-
tures can also hinder the movement’s work. Two things were against
the movement in France. First, the French political opportunity struc-
ture has been said to be closed; at least in the sense that the executive
power is strong compared with a weak legislation, access to political
decision-making is limited, and the party system is divided into two
central camps (Kitschelt 1986, 64-65). Secondly, the other side of the
very centralized system of administration is that civil society is not
very developed, the voluntary association system is weak, and social
movements are not based on an existing strong organizational field. In
these conditions, sustaining mass mobilization and getting admission
to political decision-making has been difficult for the movements. The
State has also committed itself to developing nuclear technological
expertise from the very beginning. (Rucht 1994, 130-131; Touraine et.
al 1983, 49-52.)

In France the anti-nuclear technology protest found itself in diffi-
culties, because it hadn’t any important allies. The country’s political
left was not united in supporting the movement’s aims as it was in
other countries (Touraine et al. 1983, 78-80, 119, 154-155, 186). The
communists were in power in the peace movement. They couldn’t unite
the movement, because the Left spent a great deal of energy opposing
the Algerian war, and then in France the threat of right-wing terrorism
a was real one. Further, French socialists were not so oriented towards
pacifism as, for instance, British socialists; who had peace-movement
traditions. The socialists in France praised the armed Resistance move-
ment during the Second World War and they associated pacifism with
cooperation with the Nazis. It was not until 1962 that a more powerful
peace movement emerged, but the change in the supranational opportunity structure had taken away all the opportunities the movement had had. The international movement was gradually fading, because international agreements over atmospheric nuclear bomb tests were signed and confirmed.

The problem for the whole peace movement in the 1960s was the changeable politics of the Left. While the Left had been against nuclear weapons in the middle of the decade, the communists started to drift away from the opposing view only in 1966. When President de Gaulle had taken France out of NATO and started to develop the country’s defence by nuclear weapons, national defence politics was revitalised. In 1972 the socialists and communists agreed on a common policy over nuclear weapons. But they didn’t announce directly that they did not support the country’s defence policy, which was based on nuclear weapons. They shaped a very careful programme, where the aim was to prohibit the strategic use of a nuclear strike, not dispose of nuclear weapons completely. A decisive turn was taken in 1977, when both Left wing parties announced that they supported French nuclear weapons (Carter 1992, 65). This meant that there were no influential supporters for the anti-nuclear weapons movement among political parties.

Further, the influence of the new pan-European anti-nuclear weapons movement in the 1980s was insignificant in France, when NATO renewed its nuclear armaments. National opportunity structures were against the movement, because in a country with strong and centralized state structures the established defence doctrine was the idea that France was the leading nuclear weapon state outside the Great Power blocks. It had only loose political contacts with NATO, which meant that it didn’t need to accept cruise missiles on French territory. The socialists, who had won the elections, organizations near the party, and other parties tried to keep a distance from the new movement, and they tried to nip in the bud the public discussion about nuclear weapons. Not even the press put pressure on the Government. President Mitterrand sermonized NATO and the United States about exploiting other countries, but the politicians didn’t want to worry their own citizens about nuclear weapons, or to remind them that in case of war the country could be the target of nuclear strikes. No public discussion of the matter was carried out in Parliament or in the media. The differ-
ence in attitudes can be illustrated through the fact that many members of the anti-nuclear energy movement in France, unlike their counterparts in other countries, didn’t see any connections between the civilian nuclear power program and the military. The trust in the nuclear doctrine was based on the one hand, in strong national feeling; and on the other hand on distrust of West Germany and everything, which seemed to gain popularity among Germans, for instance the peace ideology. (Brandon 1986, 100-101).

The lack of allies among political groups and the smothering of national discussion made it difficult to mobilize citizens’ support for the idea of disarmament. The opportunity to create a mass movement was a real one, because opinion polls showed that more than 50 percent of citizens supported European mass demonstrations against cruise missiles, and Frenchmen were as worried (44% of respondents) as other Europeans about nuclear weapons. In opinion polls the support for the French nuclear doctrine was only 50 percent. The cooperative organ of independent peace groups, CODENE, took part in pan-European protest, but the achievements of the fragmented movement were minor. (Brandon 1986, 144-146.)

Table 2. The protest against nuclear technology in France from the 1950s to the 1990s.

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<tr>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The anti-nuclear energy movement</td>
<td>The beginning of a movement: the association was founded in 1962</td>
<td>The growth of the movement: 15,000 demonstrators in 1971, 60,000 demonstrators in 1977</td>
<td>The withering of the movement: Socialists came to power in 1981 and the movement was politically isolated</td>
<td>The new rise of the movement: Nuclear tests arouse protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The anti-nuclear weapons movement</td>
<td>The minor role of the movement the discussion of</td>
<td>The rise of the movement a more influential movement</td>
<td>The withering of the movement Socialists and commun-</td>
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</table>
**United States – the cycles of strong movements**

In the country which was the first to develop the atomic bomb and use it in war, it was scientists and some members of Congress who were worried about the Great Power’s nuclear tests in the 1950s. The result of their discussion in 1957 was an extensive campaign in which different citizens’ organizations, the women’s peace movement, the student movement and several local anti-nuclear organizations all took part. A national organization called the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, SANE, formed an umbrella which connected different groups. Some independent peace groups also organized direct protests and nonviolent resistance to the siting and testing places of nuclear weapons, and demonstrated in front of important office buildings. (Wittner 1993.)

The legacy of the old anti-nuclear weapons movement was two things (Meyer & Kleidman 1991, 238-239; Carter 1992). The first was that the worries of the old movement became institutionalized. The second, and maybe the most important legacy was that the movement produced organizations and activists, which could strengthen citizens’ rights and the student movement and the movement against Vietnam war. These movements could give support to the new Nuclear Freeze Campaign by producing substantial numbers of leaders and activists, by creating communication networks between organizations, by testing the strategy and action repertoires and by legitimizing the idea of mobilization outside institutions.

The network, which developed over decades, included religious, environmental and other groups, both at local and at national level. Different groups fought against Reaganist politics in the 1980s as the movement strengthened. Community-based groups secured the cooperation of professionally-based organizations, such as associations of layers, teachers, technology experts, artists, writers, actors from the labour movement, and dozens of other professionally-based groups,
which expressed their worries about nuclear weapons. (Meyer & Kleidman 1991, 238-247.)

At both national and international level, the conjunctures were favourable to the movement, because people on both sides of the Atlantic ocean were worried about President Ronald Reagan’s hard-line politics. His public speeches about the possibility of limited nuclear wars poured more fuel on the fire. The American anti-nuclear weapons movement gained encouragement from European mass demonstrations, which were followed very carefully in the country’s mass media. This doesn’t mean that demonstrations in the USA were no more than a reaction to events in Europe. As Meyer (1993, 161) has pointed out, people took part in demonstrations because President Reagan favoured military projects at the expense of the social welfare system.

Together all these factors created an opportunity to resurrect the old idea of restricting nuclear weapons, which was something that had been proposed at the time of the old movement. The name, Nuclear freeze movement, encapsulated the central idea of freezing the nuclear weapons system in both the cold war camps. The idea was warmly welcomed only by religious, pacifist and left-wing peace groups in 1979, but the real opportunity for the movement appeared only after Reagan’s inauguration. According to Meyer (1993, 165; see also Meyer & Kleidman 1991, 237) Reaganist politics produced contradictions inside the political élite, and these contradictions gave an opportunity to the nuclear weapons movement. The movement grew very fast during the first year of Reagan’s presidency. It was noticed in national political institutions and the media. The movement won several federal and state referendums, and it carried out a mass demonstration, where nearly a million people came out in the streets of New York. In its time of strength the movement demanded action from the politicians. A number of opinion polls showed that from 70 to 80 percent of the public stood behind the movement’s aims.

The movement had managed to exploit the favourable situation, but as Klandermans (1996, 173-174) emphasises, the opportunities must be evaluated correctly, and from them one has to draw the right conclusions. Just before President Reagan’s second period in office was to begin, the movement was to all intents and purposes destroyed, and the idea of freezing nuclear weapons systems vanished from political discussion. The reason for this was a political miscalculation. In the
presidential election in 1984, the movement took Ronald Reagan as a central opponent; and it announced that if he were to be elected the outbreak of a nuclear war would become mathematically more likely; and that in the age of nuclear technology presidential elections were of paramount importance. They invested much of the movement’s energy and political credibility in the campaign. This turned out to be fatal mistake for the movement. When Reagan won the election, different parts of the movement carried out a reevaluation of the situation and chose their own directions. (Meyer 1993, 158-161; see also Waller 1987.)

The downfall of the movement was not only the result of miscalculation, because existing political structures also made it difficult to do peace work. The open political system offered a relatively easy entrance to the political field in the 1980s, but the movement’s real influence remained ritualistic. This meant that the movement began institutionalizing and it became unpolitical. The leadership’s efforts to acquire more political influence inside the major political institutions lessened the role of local activists and organizations. Institutional efficiency needed the support of disarmament experts, scientists, professional groups and politicians. The legitimation of the movement grew, the collecting of grants got easier, and the credibility in Congress increased, but after the loss in the presidential election there were not so many members to stabilize the diminished political value. (Meyer 1993, 168.)

The change in political opportunity structure also preceded the rise of the anti-nuclear energy movement at the end of the 1960s. In particular, the movement’s alliance networks changed (see Klandermans 1997, 172-173). The anti-nuclear energy movement’s strength was an alliance with nuclear weapon technology experts. When the first wave of the anti-nuclear weapons movement disappeared, a group of critical scientists from the movement called attention to the country’s nuclear power stations and their security. Another precondition (see Klandermans 1997, 173) was also fulfilled, because the political élite was divided after the oil crisis in 1973 and 1974. The anti-nuclear energy conflict escalated into a large-scale social movement only after the oil crisis gave birth to contradictions both in Congress and between Congress and the White House. When the energy question became political, it gave an opportunity to the nuclear energy critics. Organizations
like Friends of the Earth, the Sierra Club and the Union of Concerned Scientists demanded political changes in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), better security legislation, and more opportunities to take part in judicial processes. Although the administration made concessions, it continued the planned nuclear energy program. (Rüdig 1990.)

At the beginning of the 1970s, anti-nuclear groups realized that the time was ripe for them to act. They worked to expand their movement, setting up their national network at the conference held in 1974. Simultaneously several negative facts came to light: for instance, the mysterious death of Karen Silkwood; the construction of Diablo Canyon's nuclear power station in a geologically doubtful area; the physicists' doubtful report about the safety of nuclear reactors; and dangerous fire at the Brown Ferry nuclear power station. Discussion of the need to restrict nuclear arms, the transportation and storage of nuclear waste, the disadvantages of mining uranium, problems with the economy of plutonium and the possibilities of sabotage intensified in the middle of the 1970s. When the shadow of suspicion had fallen on the whole nuclear industry and public concern had been aroused, the anti-nuclear groupings moved to a phase of mass mobilization. In 1977 there was a well-developed movement, which had a clear ideology, sophisticated arguments, a decentralized organizational structure and workable and appropriate action strategies. (Rüdig 1990, 199).

The period from 1977 to 1980 saw the fall of the country’s nuclear energy industry. The final kiss of death to any idea of expanding the branch was given by the huge demonstrations following the accident at Three Mile Island, and the escalating cost of nuclear energy. Internal problems and negative attitudes towards the industry produced a situation, in which the ordering of new nuclear reactors was halted completely in the period 1975-1986. During that period more than 110 orders that had been already confirmed were cancelled. (Brandon 1987, 85; Nichols 1987; Rüdig 1990, 200.)

The change in the political climate shifted the public’s interest from nuclear energy back to nuclear weapons within two years. The anti-nuclear energy movement died away and an opportunity was opened up for an anti-nuclear weapons movement. As described above, the most important factor in this was Reagan administration. The new anti-nuclear weapons movement tried distance itself with the other
movement. This affected the work of both movements. Although the organizational continuity from the anti-nuclear energy movement to the anti-nuclear weapons movement was not clear, at a symbolical level the connection strengthened. Fear of invisible contamination, the images of a mushroom cloud on the horizon and the idea of uncontrollable technology had been in the armoury of the anti-nuclear energy movement, and the revitalized anti-nuclear weapons movement now made use of them. (Joppke 1991,50-51).

*Table 3. The protest against nuclear technology in USA from the 1950s to the 1990s.*

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<tr>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The anti-nuclear energy movement</td>
<td>The beginning of a movement: local conflicts and the coming together of scientists critical of nuclear energy at the end of 1960s</td>
<td>Growth of the movement: formation of networks between the years 1973-1976, strong movement challenge to the nuclear industry</td>
<td>The movement weakened as the anti-nuclear weapons movement strengthened</td>
<td>The movement follows the development of the nuclear industry and evaluates it critically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The anti-nuclear weapon movement</td>
<td>The beginning of the movement: worries about nuclear tests give rise to a large campaign led by scientists</td>
<td>The growth of the movement: in 1962 protest sails against Soviet Union’s nuclear tests get international attention</td>
<td>New rise and fall of the movement: large demonstrations in Europe were repeated in USA. Widespread dissatisfaction with the Reagan administration</td>
<td>Protest against French nuclear tests in Mururoa</td>
</tr>
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The social reaction to nuclear technology and weaponry

The anti-nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear energy movements have each followed their own cycles and they have been in the first flight of international anti-nuclear protest. As Figure 1 shows, both movements have had three important active periods. The first phase of anti-nuclear weapons mobilization took place during the cold war, from 1957 to 1964. The second phase can be traced to the period from 1979 to 1987, when the siting of cruise missiles in Europe was under discussion. The third anti-nuclear weapons protest took place in the years from 1995 to 1996, when France was testing its nuclear weapon at Mururoa. The anti-nuclear energy movement grew gradually during the years 1971-1976. At the time the movement was based on local groups, but the opportunity to challenge the nuclear industry did not arise until the networking and organizing of the larger movement was ready at the turn of the decade. Then the conflict moved from the local level to the national level and at the same time the movement became internationalized. The last peak in anti-nuclear mobilization occurred after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986.

Figure 1 also shows, that with only one exception, it has rarely happened that the two movements have reached a peak simultaneously. The anti-nuclear weapons movement that arose after the Second World War had to give place to the anti-nuclear energy movement in the 1970s, until at the beginning of the 1980s the new anti-nuclear weapons movement emerged. In 1986 the Chernobyl accident once again mobilized the opposition to nuclear energy, which slowed the progress of the anti-nuclear weapons movement. The protest against French nuclear tests in the last decade of this millennium proved that a movement can revive after a long period of quiescence.

The exception mentioned above is the joint prominence of the two movements in the 1970s and 1980s. This followed from the fact that nuclear technology can be used for both military and civil purposes. Nuclear states tried to prevent the spread of nuclear technology to other countries, because it would have meant the start of nuclear weapon production. In many countries nuclear politics included both elements, and openness about these politics wasn’t considered desirable during
the cold war. Public opinion held that supporting the anti-nuclear weapons movement wasn’t in contradiction with supporting the anti-nuclear energy movement, being an activist over one of these issues could lead to activism over the other, too.

*Figure 1. The international protest against nuclear technology.*

<table>
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<th>International protest against nuclear technology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-nuclear weapons movement</td>
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</table>

We can divide the interaction between and among these movements into internal and external categories (McAdam & Rucht 1993). Internal interaction occurring in a movement may be geographical meaning that one national movement may have an effect on movement in other countries (see Kriesi et al. 1996). For instance, the Finnish anti-nuclear weapons movement was receiving input from England, Sweden and the United States already in the 1950s. We can also distinguish interaction in time. One movement can have an effect to another, in spite of undergoing clear interruptions or periods of quiescence. The analysis of international anti-nuclear movements has shown that strong impulses persist even though a long time may have elapsed since the original movement came into being. The interaction in and between movements can be illustrated by looking at how the anti-nuclear weapons movement in the 1950s and 1960s affected the anti-nuclear energy movement in the 1970s. The case of the USA showed that the
earlier anti-nuclear weapons movement created a base for an anti-nuclear energy movement in the 1970s. The original movement didn’t wither away; but it institutionalized, stepped aside from the public forum, and established a position as a power in the background.

The history of the international anti-nuclear technology protest movement appear to show that a popular movement can both create opportunities for the other movements, and, in different circumstances, make it difficult for such other movements to function. If the anti-nuclear weapons movement in the 1950s and 1960s created opportunities for the anti-nuclear energy movement in the 1970s, the situation was reversed in the next decade. In some countries at the time of mass demonstrations against cruise missiles, activists moved from the anti-nuclear energy movement to the anti-nuclear weapons movement, which actually impeded work of some sections of the environmental movement (Rüdig 1988, 28). The Finnish case shows that the anti-nuclear weapons movement at the beginning of the 1970s made it difficult to organize an anti-nuclear energy movement; but as the end of the decade approached, both movements strengthened each other. The same was the case in Germany, where both movements blossomed at the turn of the 1970s (Joppke 1991, 51-53).

We have to notice that national and supranational opportunity structures can affect both external and internal movement interaction. The cases I have analyzed show that even the strongest movements will not inevitably succeed, if national circumstances aren’t favourable or the actors fail to interpret and use their political opportunities correctly. Besides this, supranational opportunity structures have also had an effect on the protest against nuclear technology.

An example of an enduring supranational opportunity structure is the international political circumstance during the cold war. An example of a transitory opportunity structure is détente between the Great Powers, disarmament agreements, and events like Chernobyl, which get people’s attention all over the world and have an effect on the national movements.

Despite the strong support the idea of political opportunity structures has received among scholars, we should not underestimate the significance of economic factors. When trying to explain the cycles of social movements, political opportunity structures alone are insufficient. We can think, for instance, of the sudden rise of the anti-nuclear
energy movement in the 1970s. The oil crises and the economic shock they gave to industrialized countries helped the larger societal discussion of energy politics. Economic factors were also behind the weakening of the anti-nuclear energy movement at the beginning of the 1980s. The economic depression, and rising nuclear energy costs had reduced the enthusiasm for the construction of new nuclear reactors, and several countries had decided to postpone the implementation of their nuclear energy programs.

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Tapio Litmanen

FROM THE GOLDEN AGE TO THE VALLEY OF DESPAIR

How did nuclear waste become a problem?

As a source of energy nuclear power divides opinions. Although the nuclear industry has invested huge amounts of money in public relationship campaigns, survey after survey has shown that there are strong negative images connected with the nuclear industry (Slovic, Layman & Flynn 1991). In particular, nuclear power accidents, like Three Mile Islands in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, have given the public a glimpse of the risks which are included in nuclear fusion. These accidents have had a certain effect on people’s attitudes (van der Pligt 1992; Rosa & Freudenburg 1993; Rosa & Dunlap 1994). The risks of nuclear power are evaluated to be larger than those of any other high-risk civil technology (Rosa & Freudenburg 1993, 56). However, in the shadow of the majority there is a minority which doesn’t share this view. Some psychological studies have shown that people who live near or work in a nuclear power station don’t experience the normal use of the technology as a threat (Brown 1988; Drottz-Sjöberg 1991; Kivimäki & Kalimo 1993).

The most difficult interruption to the nuclear industry’s normal routine has been the planning of nuclear waste management and the search for a suitable place for waste facility. In almost all countries where
nuclear power is used, the process of searching for a disposal place for low, middle and high level radioactive waste has raised vigorous opposition (Carter 1987; Blowers, Lowry & Solomon 1991; Lidskog 1994; Litmanen 1994a and 1994b). The small opposition has usually been based on local communities, but despite this it has been strong enough to throw a spanner in the works of national nuclear waste policy. There have been several cases where the local opposition has even been able to shape national waste decisions (Blowers, Lowry & Solomon 1991, 25; Carter 1987, 234; Percival 1992, 211; Parker et al. 1987, 5-18, 5-19). Also larger environmental organisations, like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have taken a critical stance toward the nuclear industry.

If attitudes towards the whole industry are negative, even more negative are attitudes towards nuclear waste. Opinion polls have shown that people’s images of nuclear waste are extremely negative and that they don’t trust the engineers handling the waste management process. There is also a contradiction between citizens’ views and the views of experts. The public don’t agree with the views of the nuclear industry. The international nuclear community has for a long time kept announcing that they have reached a consensus and that nuclear waste doesn’t constitute a problem. For instance, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) sees the problem as already technically solved.

Because of the strong opposition, nuclear waste has become an Achilles’ heel to the global expansion of nuclear industry. In western countries the construction programmes of nuclear energy have come to an almost complete standstill. Only France, Japan and some newly industrialized countries in Asia favour nuclear power, but also in these countries we find strong confrontations. What is this unique phenomenon which is repeated across different cultures? The aim of this article is to study how nuclear waste has become a global problem and why. By analysing the nuclear debate and previous surveys of the attitudes towards nuclear power and nuclear waste I form a basis for the examination of these questions. But we should not see public opinion as isolated, as only reflecting facts and the situation to which it is a reaction. This kind of analysis is severely limited and must be replaced by a more holistic approach.

At the end of the article I will return to these questions and review the explanations which are most commonly used in the nuclear waste research literature. These explanations are interesting, but partial. There-
fore, I will sketch out a wider theoretical framework for examining the
trends in attitudes towards nuclear power. Researchers have almost
forgotten the role of the anti-nuclear movement, although it is widely
analyzed in the field of social movements research, and it has certainly
had an important role in evaluating the pros and cons of nuclear en-
ergy.

Three phases in the nuclear energy debate

Although in the 1960s there weren’t any opinion polls about nuclear
energy (van der Pligt 1992, 2), it is easy to characterize the general
attitudes at that time by looking at the public debate around the rise of
civilian atomic industry. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) have categorized
the debate after the second World War into three phases: 1) the age of
dualism, 2) the rise of anti-nuclear discourse and 3) the period in which
“life imitates art”.

The age of dualism lasted from Hiroshima to the end of the 1960s.
Right after the wars people’s awareness was dominated by images of
sudden and large-scale destruction, which was symbolized by the shape
of a rising mushroom cloud. Citizens wanted to get rid of the horrors
of the war, and very soon the nuclear discussion turned into the strong
faith that the engineers can create a new golden age to societies with
the help of civilian use of nuclear fission. Memories of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were brushed aside, and a twenty-year-long expansion of the
commercial nuclear energy industry began. The dualistic attitude
changed into enthusiasm about atomic energy, although the anti-nu-
clear movement developed gradually in the 1950s and 1960s, aiming to
put an end to the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. The
movement couldn’t stop the progress of nuclear energy, and before
the year 1970 civilian nuclear reactors were in use in Great Britain, the
United States, the Soviet Union, and in seven other countries. (Gamson
& Modigliani 1989; Dionisopoulos & Goldzwig 1992; Hasegawa 1994;

The beginning of the second phase in the nuclear energy debate is
linked with the oil crisis. All industrialized countries were shaken by
the rising cost of this fossil fuel, and this opened a lively energy policy
discussion in the years 1973 and 1974. Pro-nuclear arguments, like “by
using nuclear power society can be more independent in energy production than it has been”, had strong influence on politicians, but the heated energy discussion also gave opportunities to critical evaluation in the media. Especially the leaders of the super powers were concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. Suddenly it wasn’t so clear that one can separate the civilian and the military use of nuclear power. At the same time different groups formed a wide opposition, which started to criticise the safety standards of the power plants. Anti-nuclear activists emphasized that release of radioactive material in the atmosphere can result both from accidents in nuclear power plants and from nuclear war.

Gamson and Modigliani named the third phase of the debate “life imitates art”, because in 1978 the Hollywood film “China Syndrome” was finished and thousands of people saw the film just one year before Three Miles Island’s nuclear accident in Harrisburg Washington state. The film gave a plausible picture of how a nuclear accident could occur, and as the media in the United States reported that a reactor in the Harrisburg plant had been in a critical state, awareness of the risks of nuclear power increased among people.

The age of nuclear energy surveys

As the criticism escalated in the 1970s, the nuclear industry and its representatives launched a series of surveys aiming to find out the attitudes towards the industry. In the United States there had been only three surveys before 1973, but in 1974 three surveys and in the following year twenty-one surveys were published. The increase in the volume of nuclear energy surveys reflects the rise of nuclear energy as a controversial societal question (van der Pligt 1992, 2). On the grounds of these surveys we can divide the development of public attitudes towards nuclear energy into three periods: 1) enthusiasm at the beginning of the 1970s, 2) the age of ambivalence and 3) the strengthening of opposition in the 1980s (Rosa & Dunlap 1994, 297).

The longest time series cover the question whether the growth of nuclear power should continue or not. In the United States the majority of the public supported the expansion of nuclear industry throughout the 1970s. Opinion polls showed that during the first period the
support for this energy source was between 50 to 60 percent, while opposition to it was at its peak about 35 percent. Immediately after the TMI accident the steady phase of the support weakened and the time of ambivalence began. The opposition to nuclear power grew to 40 percent, but it did not yet reach the level of support, which was about 50 percent. During the following two years twelve surveys indicated that the support for nuclear power was relatively stable. The dramatic change in the attitudes can be traced back to the year 1981, when the balance of power changed in favour of the opposition. In the third period the support for the growth of nuclear power sank to 30 percent and the opposition rose to 60 percent. (van der Pligt 1992; Rosa & Dunlap 1994).

Researchers have explained this last surprising turn in the attitudes by the state of international politics. The newly elected president of the United States, Ronald Reagan, inaugurated a new foreign policy, which turned a new page in the history of the cold war. The armament race of the super powers stirred immediate protests, first in Europe and then in the United States. The long-term effects of the nuclear arms race can be seen in opinion polls. Although some researchers expected that the change would be only temporary, the support for nuclear power didn’t return to the levels which it had had in the 1970s. (Rosa & Dunlap 1994, 296-300; Rosa & Freudenburg 1993, 48-50; van der Pligt 1992, 2-3; Eiser & van der Pligt 1993, 150-153).

In Europe it is more difficult to analyze the development of public attitudes towards nuclear energy because the existing few surveys aren’t commensurable. The European Union produced the first standardized opinion polls at the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. These studies confirmed the previously described development. The support for nuclear power decreased in most of the countries in the European Union between 1978 and 1982. An exception was France, where the majority of citizens were in favour of the expansion of the nuclear industry. (van der Pligt 1992, 5-6; Eiser & van der Pligt 1993, 152).

As the news of the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl spread around the world, it had the same kind of effect on public opinion as the previous, but much smaller Three Mile Islands accident. The anti-nuclear movement and the new phase of the cold war had already strengthened the opposition and weakened the support, but immediately after
these serious accidents the public support collapsed. Many European countries were faced with radioactive contamination for the first time. Immediately after the Chernobyl accident, opposition to nuclear energy increased considerably in Finland, Yugoslavia and Greece (over 30 per cent), substantially in Austria, FRG and Italy (over 20 per cent), and moderately in the UK, the Netherlands, France and Sweden (12-18 per cent). Although there has been some recovery in the attitudes, the support hasn’t returned to pre-Chernobyl levels. (van der Pligt 1992, 8)

Researchers have followed the changes in attitudes towards different forms of energy in Finland from the beginning of the 1980s. The results of these surveys show strong opposition to nuclear energy. We can divide the general development into three phases: the time of decreasing opposition between the years 1983 and 1985, the sudden negative peak in the years 1986 and 1987, and the time of stabilization of attitudes between the years 1988 and 1991. In the first phase, nuclear energy increased little by little its popularity among the people. 48 per cent of the respondents were against the construction of new nuclear power plants and 23 per cent were in favour of the idea in 1984, but in the next year 43 per cent were against and 26 per cent in favour. The Chernobyl accident changed the opinions clearly against the construction of more nuclear power. In 1986, nuclear energy was opposed by 64 percent and supported by a mere 16 per cent of the respondents. After this the effect of the accident has gradually stabilized, and opposition to nuclear energy has remained under 50 per cent while support has risen to almost 30 per cent. During the last four years, opinion polls have indicated quite stable levels of opposition and support. (Kiljunen 1991).

Attitudes towards nuclear waste in Finland

The general trend in attitudes towards nuclear waste has been declining support. Nuclear waste took the central place in people’s concerns from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s. Studies show that before 1977, 40 per cent of respondents believed that the nuclear waste management could be handled properly and another 40 per cent that it could not. The remaining 20 per cent of the respondents were uncertain
about their views. Studies indicate that from the beginning of the 1980s attitudes were in transition so that in almost every opinion poll in western Europe the majority of citizens were against the siting of nuclear waste facilities. In several studies people were quite clearly of the opinion that nuclear waste forms a central unsolved problem for the expansion of nuclear power. (van der Pligt 1992, 10, 80-83; Rosa & Freudenburg 1993, 53).

In general attitudes towards nuclear waste are negative, even aggressive. Four out of five people (79%) see that nuclear waste forms a threat to the life of future generations. Only one in ten people (9%) doesn’t share this view. (Kiljunen 1988, 22; Kiljunen 1989, 18 Kiljunen 1991, 78).

The nuclear industry has tried to solve the problem of high-level nuclear waste by developing a model, where the radioactive material is stored in the bedrock. In Finland Teollisuuden Voima Ltd, a company which owns two of Finland’s four nuclear reactors, has planned to construct a repository that would store the encapsulated waste several hundreds of metres below ground (c.f. TVO 1992). The nuclear industry has invested huge amounts of money in investigations, planning and PR work, but this hasn’t had an effect on people’s attitudes. Although the amount of opposition has decreased from 60 to 50 per cent from 1983 to 1994 and support has increased from 15 to 30 per cent, the majority still share the view that it isn’t safe to store nuclear waste in the bedrock (Kiljunen 1995) and that it would be best to wait for more sophisticated technological innovations (Kiljunen 1992, 58).

The two nuclear accidents have had a considerable effect on local acceptance of nuclear facilities. Researchers have analyzed and labelled the negative reactions of local residents towards the possible siting of a nuclear waste facility. Today the NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) phenomenon is familiar in every country with nuclear power plants, but the situation was different during the period of nuclear enthusiasm at the beginning of the 1970s. At that time in the United States, for example, the general attitudes were quite favourable among the residents when the construction of a nuclear waste facility was proposed to a community. At the end of that decade the opposition grew, and one year before the TMI accident it had grown bigger than support. (Rosa & Freudenburg 1993, 51-52; van der Pligt 1992, 9).

Even more dramatic figures can be seen by looking at the attitudes
of local residents in planned host communities. During the 1980s the siting proposals turned out unsuccessful in many cases because of the aggressive and wide local opposition. In Finland, for example, the search for a suitable place for nuclear repository has met a lot of criticism in the chosen municipalities: Kuhmo, Eurajoki, Äänekoski, and Loviisa. The surveys conducted in these municipalities have shown the extent of the opposition. In Kuhmo the percentages of the opposition to the facility were 71 in 1987 and 81 in 1991 (Kiljunen 1988; Kiljunen 1992). In Eurajoki there has also been a gradual increase in the opposition; in 1985 the percentage of those who opposed the construction plans was 59, in 1987 it was 66, and in 1991, 65 (Kiljunen, Pehkonen & Hoikka 1986; Kiljunen 1988; Kiljunen 1992). In Äänekoski the opposition to the facility varied between 59% and 63% (Tietoykkönen 1994 & Kouluinäen yläaste 1994). The proportion of those who were in favour of the construction of the facility in local communities varied from 8 to 18 percent.

In the United States attitudes have been quite similar to those in Finland and in other countries with nuclear power plants. In the three regions (Deaf Smith county in Texas, Hanford in Washington and Yucca mountain in Nevada) in which the construction of nuclear waste facilities was being considered, almost everywhere the majority of residents said no to nuclear waste (Dunlap et al. 1993; Brody & Fleishman 1993; Mushkatel et al. 1993; Kranich et al. 1993). For instance, in Texas 71 per cent (n=340) of the residents of Panhandle did not want to give permission for the construction of a nuclear waste facility in their county. Benford, Moore and Williams (1993) note that in Nevada’s Boyd district, 71 per cent of people living near the chosen site of a low level radioactive waste facility were “very concerned” or “extremely concerned” about the plans. In the whole state of Nevada the percentage was 65 (n=1802). In fact, the Nevada residents are so concerned about the plans that they estimate the high-level nuclear waste facility as even more dangerous than the testing site of nuclear weapons in their state.

The surprising result was that those communities in Washington and Nevada which were located close to the siting place were quite supportive of the plans. In 1987, 46 per cent (n=658) of the people in Hanford’s Tri-Cities were in favour of the construction and almost the same percentage were against it. (Dunlap et al. 1993, 141). Small commu-
nities, Beatty and Valley, in Nevada exhibited even more favourable attitudes (Krannich, Little & Cramer 1993, 273). This is not so surprising when we know that those communities are what have been termed “nuclear oases”. In a “nuclear oasis”, the nuclear industry has given the livelihood for the residents for decades and therefore the attitudes there are different from those in other places.

Generally speaking, the recent results by social scientists have been very similar. It is very difficult to find a place for a nuclear waste facility because of the strong opposition (Slovic et al. 1991, 1604-1605; Vari et al. 1991, 84; Benford et al. 1993, 36-41). The conclusion has been that the only possible places are communities where the nuclear industry has established its position and given work for the residents. (Rosa, Dunlap & Kraft 1993, 310-318; van der Pligt 1992, 81).

The roots of the negative attitudes

Where do these negative attitudes stem from? Ultimately, people are afraid of new nuclear accidents, which could release radioactive material in the atmosphere and subject them to radiation. At the same time the probability of accidents is increasing, because hundreds of nuclear reactors produce more radioactive waste every day. These by-products of nuclear industry could be dangerous and lethal.

As the previously discussed material shows, citizens’ attitudes are quite stable and changes occur fairly slowly. This means that people’s attitudes are linked to general social questions and are based on wider value perspectives (van der Pligt 1992, 57). In addition to the physical characters of radioactive material and the biological consequences of radiation, it is important to analyze the social dimensions of the matter. Slovic et al. (1993) have sorted out four very different kinds of approach to negative nuclear attitudes. They have found studies which 1) emphasize the historical roots of nuclear fears, 2) point out that nuclear industry neglected the planning of waste management for decades, 3) stress the consequences and images of nuclear weapons, and 4) theorize about the issues from the viewpoint of new risks (like Beck 1992).

The first explanation traces the historical roots of the fear of nuclear power. It assumes that nuclear power has been historically constructed as a source of energy which has inner contradictions and a
bipolar structure of hopeful and fearful images. On the one hand, it
contains the promise of an eternal Golden Age; nuclear power has
been conceptualized as a cornucopia of endless prosperity. On the
other hand, these promises of wealth have a dark side. Nuclear tech-
nology has a capacity for destruction. Weart (1988) has shown in his
historical analysis that our fears and hopes connected with nuclear en-
ergy are deeply rooted in our social and cultural consciousness. Mod-
ern thinking about nuclear energy employs imagery that can be traced
back to a time preceding the discovery of radioactivity. Our ways of
dealing with nuclear issues are based on different kinds of beliefs and
symbols, which have been gathered together for centuries around the
concept of “transmutation”. Weart describes how in the early decades
of the twentieth century cultural fragments clustered around nuclear
energy and how people started to vaguely associate radioactivity “with
uncanny rays that brought hideous death or miraculous new life; with
mad scientists and their ambiguous monsters; with cosmic secrets of
death and life; with a future of Golden Age, perhaps reached only
through an apocalypse; and with weapons great enough to destroy the
world, except perhaps for a few survivors.” Weart’s thesis is that nu-
clear energy has become a symbolic representation of a magical trans-
mutation of society and the individual.

For Slovic and his colleagues, the bipolar structure of the concept
of transmutation is not enough to explain these strong images linked
with nuclear power. The destructive potential of nuclear power has
modern points of reference as well: the images of atomic destruction
stem from Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Slovic et al. 1991, 1606). Despite
the fact that civil nuclear industry has desperately tried to keep the
civilian and military use of nuclear technology separate, the public and
the media handle these things together. This is quite understandable in
some countries, like France and Russia, where nuclear policy covers
both civilian and military issues. For instance, the used nuclear fuel
produced by nuclear power stations can be enriched into plutonium,
which the nuclear weapon industry has used. The second explanation
therefore emphasizes the interconnection between civil and military
nuclear industry.

The third approach is based more on social theory, especially on
theories of risk society (Slovic et al. 1993). Ulrich Beck has pointed out
that modern society is characterized by new kinds of risk that repre-
sent something unique in the history of humankind. Pollution and poison have made our societies risk societies, where there are not only conventional forms of destruction, like natural catastrophes and industrial accidents, but also accidents which transcend all boundaries. Accidents and pollution can no longer be restricted to some geographical areas or temporal moments. Radioactivity, for instance, will spread in the atmosphere to faraway places, and changes in individuals’ genetic inheritance can take place over several generations.

The fourth factor affecting people’s attitudes, and which some researchers regard as especially important, is negligence in nuclear waste management during previous decades. As late as the 1990s there have been cases, which have shown negligences of earlier decades in nuclear waste management. During the Cold War the military industry was very secret business, and only a narrow political and military elite was aware of what was going on in the field of nuclear industry. On both sides of the iron curtain, the superpowers managed nuclear waste in their own ways about which the average citizen had no knowledge. Furthermore, for decades it was unclear for nuclear engineers for how long high-level nuclear material should be controlled, what shape the disposal system should take, or what safety standards should be adhered to. As Bruhèze (1992) has shown, when analysing the historical development of nuclear waste management in the United States, these kind of questions were not dealt with during the period 1945–1960, when the issue was bureaucratized and technologized. The same kind of development has also been documented in Great Britain, where the nuclear power industry was able to define the issue as unproblematic and stabilize the definitions of nuclear power for more than twenty years (Kemp, O’Riordan & Purdue 1986, 12). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the media have reported about the situation in the former closed nuclear cities and communities, where the officials are nowadays, if possible, even more helpless to deal with nuclear waste, due to lack of resources.

It was not until the second half of the 1970s that international consensus on what to do to nuclear waste began to develop. The consensus developed gradually as the scientific research and technical planning progressed, but it could not prevent suspicious thoughts from spreading (Berkhout 1991, 36). Nor were people in charge of waste management able to present unambiguous views to the mistrustful
public. For instance, as late as the first half of the 1980s officials and representatives of nuclear industry in Britain gave only vague and incoherent instructions on how to deal with nuclear waste (Kemp et al. 1986).

The trajectory into a global problem

These approaches help us to understand the fears of nuclear power we share today, but they are quite limited and work on very different levels. When we ask “How did something happen?”, we also need to ask: “Who did what? How did they do it? And how did they manage to do what they did?” Therefore, I will, with the help of Gamson and Modigliani (1989), sketch out a wider framework for analysing attitudes to nuclear waste.

As the investigation of nuclear debate has shown, the characteristic feature of this mode of energy is internationality. The nuclear industry has become a global cultural field of its own, which is partly independent, but which can change when the world around it changes. Gamson and Modigliani have used the concept “nuclear culture” to show that this issue of culture has its own references, symbols, metaphors, meaningful events, ways of talking, and stabilized patterns. We can think of it as constant cultural field which gives interpretations and meanings to important events. Inside the nuclear culture different elements are gathered together in tight packages, which Gamson and Modigliani have termed interpretative packages. These packages are shaped during discussions. As Figure 1 indicates, cultural resonance, supporters of interpretations and media practices are the most important factors shaping the interpretative packages.

This means that supporters of interpretations cannot be sure that their interpretations will live on and develop in the way they would wish. Interpretative packages can be transformed quite considerably from the original meanings of the supporters. As the discussion above has shown, the beginning of the 1970s were the time of positive interpretation of nuclear power, but the previous decades had left a fertile ground for negative interpretations to grow up. During the cold war nuclear weapons were developed, produced and tested. At the same time the civilian use of nuclear reactors made rapid progress. New
reactors started to produce electricity for industry and for the well-being of citizens. In the shadow of this process the amount of nuclear waste increased, but the discussion about what to do with it was frozen. At the turn of the 1970s negative interpretations gained momentum, because of the strengthening environmental, peace and anti-nuclear movements. These movements questioned the development of the nuclear industry by pointing out the neglect of waste management and reactor safety standards. Several events within the international nuclear industry provided the movements with opportunities for criticism. For instance, the nuclear accidents in 1979 and in 1986, the newly flamed international nuclear arms race at the beginning of the 1980s, and finally the revelations of the military’s poor waste management after the cold war both in the West and the East could be used to promote negative interpretative packages. It wasn’t surprising, then, that the 1980s witnessed the domination of negative interpretative packages among the majority of people, and in the core of the packages was the question of nuclear waste. (Rucht 1990, Brand, Büsler & Rucht 1984; Hasegawa 1994; Tammilehto 1994).

The trajectory of nuclear waste into a global problem has followed a similar route. It has become a social problem in three phases. In the
first phase the awareness of nuclear waste grew little by little during the 1970s, and by the late 1970s or perhaps early 1980s it had become one of the most important environmental concerns among the public. In the third phase the public became aware of nuclear waste problems, and this awareness was a durable feature of their concerns, partially determining their overall attitudes towards nuclear energy. (Rosa & Freudenburg 1993, 46).

The trajectory of these two interpretative packages parallels the process of modernization of western societies. After the Second World War, western countries industrialized rapidly and the horrors of the war were put aside. During this historical period, the positive interpretative package towards industrialization and nuclearization dominated, and the result was the expansion of the nuclear industry. As modernization went further, people became aware of the negative byproducts of mass production and consumption. In a society characterized by the role of scientific and technological innovation, by large organizations managing change, by a social hierarchy based upon knowledge, and so on, historical agents emerged to question this kind of development. As Touraine has pointed out with his concept of historicity, mankind has a capacity to produce its own transformation, which is at the same time activity and self-consciousness, result of knowledge, and a cultural model. It is quite obvious that the alliance of environmental, anti-nuclear and peace movements were actors in a field of historical action aiming at the collective reappropriation of historicity, at the society’s mode of self-production (Touraine 1977, 345-346). The question was: what is the direction in which modernity is transforming itself?

The confrontations between pro- and anti-nuclear actors were struggles over the direction of modernity. This means that by studying the antagonism to nuclear power we are, as a matter of fact, studying different visions of modern society. In the core of the struggle is on the one hand a highly technologized and centralized mode of modernization and on the other an ecologically more sensitive and decentralized mode of modernization (cf. Eder 1993).
Note

1 This article is based on a paper presented at the “Environment and Society”, International and Interdisciplinary Symposium on Social Science Research on the Environment, October 5-6, 1995, Tampere, Finland, and on a Finnish article: “Kuinka ydinvoimasta tuli globaali ongelma?” which was published in the journal *Alue ja Ympäristö*, vol. 25, No.1, 1996. 18-36.

References


Matti Nieminen

Bystanders, Bureaucrats and Local Bigwigs

Discourses of democracy and environmental values in Finnish parliamentary debate on Land-Use Legislation Reform

Land-use legislation includes norms of planning; for example planning building and recreation areas. To put it simply, it is the main instrument in deciding where and what kind of building is allowed and, where and on what grounds building should be prohibited. In Nordic countries with an old tradition of public access to the countryside, land-use planning has an exceptionally great importance. It affects everybody, and its consequences are thus much more far-reaching compared to, for example legislation on nature conservation. Due to the overall environmentalization of recent years (see Buttel 1992; Eder 1996) and the emphasis placed on environmental viewpoints in all planning, land-use legislation has become a decisive means of implementing the commonly-accepted principle of sustainable development. This means in practice that all decisions involving environmental change must undergo a vetting process that takes into account not only the ‘conventional’ economic, but also the ecological viewpoints. Along with these demands there has also been a strong emphasis on increasing close-range democracy in land-use planning. This means that according to the principle of subsidiarity, the status of ‘ordinary’ peo-
ple in land-use planning should be strengthened so that they will be able to participate in, and even control, the land-use policy in the area where they live.

The law concerning land-use planning in Finland, the Planning and Building Act, was passed in 1958. Although there were dozens of partial reforms made to the law, the basis of Finnish land-use legislation remained the same for over 40 years. Several attempts were made to achieve a general reform of the legislation, and to bring it more in line with contemporary conditions; but not until this year did any of the Governments’ proposals go through Parliament. The reasons for this have been mainly political. Private land ownership has had a very high juridical and cultural status in Finland; and since all legislative reform proposals have included restrictions in landowners’ rights, certain interest groups and parties from the political right and centre have succeeded in rejecting the reform proposals.

In 1994-1995 the Finnish Government made an unsuccessful attempt to get through Parliament a major land-use reform that would have given a higher status to environmental sustainability and local administration in land-use planning. The reform would have been a link in the long chain of decentralizing reforms in Finnish legislation and administration in the last decade. The Government’s proposal aroused conflicting views. It was argued that the reform was, despite the original goal, unsatisfactory from both democratic and environmental viewpoints. The reform would have increased the power of local councils & local government and certain interest groups (especially landowners) and the power of building companies and other entrepreneurs; instead of giving power to local people. It was feared that this would lead to a strong emphasis on economic values at the expense of for example environmental and social values in land-use planning. So the main issue in public discussion of the reform had to do with participation and power in land-use planning. The right-wing government’s urge to get the conservative reform through was due to predictions of the victory of left-wing parties in the approaching general election. Although the opponents of the law mainly belonged to the parties of the Opposition, the dispute over the law reform to some extent crossed party-lines, as there were also right-wing politicians who opposed the proposal regardless of the official, supportive opinions of their parties.
The research design

This article is based on an analysis of 27 parliamentary speeches given in the session of the Finnish parliament held in December 1994. This debate, described in the media as a “quarrel”, was the decisive parliamentary proceeding concerning the reform that should have come into force in 1995. The study is based on a constructionist approach to the subject. The discourses of democracy and environmental values in a parliamentary debate on the reform are examined. Specific attention is given to the relationship between the State, local councils & administrations, and citizens, as envisaged in members of parliament’s argumentation supporting or opposing the reform proposal, and providing for how different characterizations of the state, local councils & administrations and citizens could be strategically used to legitimize possible legal and administrative actions. Further, the implications of competing interpretations of the principles of close-range democracy and environmental sustainability are examined.

The broad theoretical and methodological approach to social problems, known as social constructionism (or constructivism) (see e.g. Mauss 1992) claims that reality is constructed in the course of social interaction. It either excludes the ‘objective’ basis of problems and issues as irrelevant (so-called ‘strict’ constructionism) or uses the ‘objective’ content as a context for the socially constructed reality under examination (contextual constructionism). Constructionism is an effective approach in studying political discourse. The idea of people constructing the world through subjective definitions and interpretations is a functional starting-point for the analysis of the processes of political argumentation and decision-making. The researcher’s task is to reveal the logic, the method and the hidden presuppositions in the texts politicians produce. The social relevance of this kind of analysis is that by its means the researcher can offer people the means of evaluating the real content of political opinions, expressions and ideologies so often obscured by political rhetoric.

Discourse analysis is a term that covers an extremely wide range of approaches and methods. As adapted for use in sociology it can be considered a constructionistic approach, since it focuses on the processes of giving meaning, and on the ideative constructs through which reality is understood. Donati (1992, 142) says the following about po-
litical discourse analysis: “[It] is an instrument for studying the ways in which political reality is ‘framed’ through discourse and therefore the way people come to understand it. It does so by tracing the development and change of the ideative constructs which conflict for the de

inition of the nature of political objects”. The research process, according to Donati, thus centres on the reconstruction of the frames which are used in talking and reasoning about an issue. Actually what Donati does not consider here is that in discourse analysis the things left outside talking and reasoning are as important as those being said. This means that revealing the (concealed) implications behind the claims or definitions is a crucial part of discourse analysis.

What Bowers and Iwi (1993, 357) have said about discursive construction of society in their study on the concept of society suits well also in illuminating the basic idea of this article: “Discursively constructing society is an important and flexible rhetorical resource for identifying responsibilities, characterizing social actors and groups, prais

ing and blaming, criticizing conventional knowledge or accepting it, legitimating courses of action or political strategies, and for promoting the factuality of otherwise contestable claims”. What was said here is to a great extent what is at the core of this article. The parliament debate is analyzed with means of frame analysis; a theoretical approach originally presented by Erving Goffman (1974). As a method Klaus Eder (1992) considers frame analysis to be the first analytical stage of discourse analysis. There are several variations of frame analysis, the version used here is to a great extent adapted from Anssi Peräkylä (1990). According to Peräkylä (1990, 141) frames are the instruments of constructing reality and the ways of combining different frames are the methods of constructing reality.

The main question asked in this article is: How did the politicians discursively ‘frame’ the field of Finnish land-use policy, its actors and its practices? Such an enquiry necessarily involves, to some extent, a re-examination of Finnish society in toto, since the definitions made by politicians convey to actors (more or less) permanent substantial characteristics that go beyond the specific issue of land-use policy.

It would be completely naïve to accept the constructions made by politicians as ‘clean’ expressions of what they ‘really’ think. From the constructionistic viewpoint, wondering if politicians mean what they say is irrelevant. The speech of politicians is – naturally – political
speech. It is first of all strategically rational. It does not aim at the best possible description or analysis of the issue, but is rather based on marketing one truth and one reality. According to Murray Edelman (1988, 10) “[in politics] The very concept of fact becomes irrelevant, because every meaningful political object and person is an interpretation that reflects and perpetuates an ideology”. The essence of political speech is unavoidably in persuasive defending of one’s own interpretation and undermining support for contesting interpretations (Pekonen 1991, 55). Although the question “do politicians believe in what they say or not” is here irrelevant, it is essential in a critical analysis to evaluate the claims made concerning the ‘truth’ of the texts being analyzed (see Fairclough 1997, 26-27). In the final section of this article I will consider the validity of the ‘realities’ which Finnish politicians constructed in the debate.

The starting point for this article is the fact that both sides, the supporters (mainly parties from the right and centre) and the opponents (mainly left-wing and the greens) of the legislation reform proposal, claimed in their discussion to be concerned for close-range democracy and the environment. So one could say that there was no problem in defining the issue in question; it was to bring Finnish land-use policy closer to ordinary people and to make sure that environmental values would not be threatened by careless, irresponsible building. But as so often, the claimed consensus over the goals did not lead to a trouble-free passage of legislation, but to a difficult and severe confrontation.

In this article I will first describe the qualities of the main actors involved, which according to the debaters were at issue. Then I will describe the various interpretations of Finnish land-use practice, through models based on the debaters’ characterizations of the actors and their relationships. Finally, I will analyze the strategic use of these constructions in the debate.

The actors in the field of land-use planning

There could be found certain characteristics or qualities that the debaters used in evaluating the State, local councils & administrations and citizens involved in land-use planning. The state and the local bodies were
evaluated using the following criteria:

– Integration: the ability to integrate the different viewpoints of the law in planning and decision making.
– Neutrality: the ability to take into account the needs of everyone in planning and decision-making.
– Expertise: the ability to gain and use a many-sided ‘know-how’ in land-use planning.
– Openness: the ability to plan and decide openly and communicatively, and to give and receive information.

Citizens were characterized using the following criteria:

– Willingness to participate
– Expertise: the ability to follow and participate in land-use planning.
– Consensus: level of collective orientation in land-use planning.

When the views of the two opposing groups are analyzed more closely, it becomes clear that there are two different interpretations of the situation in Finnish land-use planning before, and two models predicting the situation after, the proposed reform. These models, which I have constructed from the argumentation of the debaters, include categorizable interpretations of the relationship between the State, local councils & administrations and citizens.

Figure 1a. The situation before the reform according to its opponents.
According to this interpretation local councils & administrations make decisions that are harmful to those citizens who don’t have any juridically or economically specific interests concerning land-use in a municipality (non-landowners, children, old people etc.). Their position in local land-use planning is that of bystanders. The chances of landowners and other ‘interest-owners’ getting their way is much better because the various local bodies are likely all to share the same, mainly economic, interests and orientations; and in most municipalities landowners and entrepreneurs are strongly represented in the local council and in other local bodies.

The meaning of the State is important in two ways. On the one hand, it acts as a legitimate supervisor of local land-use planning. On the other hand, it serves as a means of securing the ‘weak’ interests and values of the ‘bystanders’ at local level. So in this model the State acts as a ‘big brother’; a sustainer of the common good and the protector of ‘the weak’; an institution that comes to the rescue whenever action against undemocratic and unreliable local councils & administrations are needed. The State’s ability to maintain the common good (as distinct from local specific interests) is based on its assumed neutrality, its independence of specific interests, and the high level expertise the state officials have.

*Figure 1b The situation before the reform according to the politicians supporting the reform proposal.*

In this model the State is a ‘superior’ authority that unjustifiably limits both the citizens’ and the local administrators’ freedom of action in land-use planning. A strong argument against State power is its alleged
lack of the local expertise demanded in land-use planning. Communication between the State and local bodies, as well as citizens, is basically one-way communication, the relationship is undemocratic and lacking in interaction; whereas the relationship between local administrators and citizens is efficient, interactive and democratic. Democracy is seen to be based on the citizens’ ability to choose the members of local councils. Officials in state organizations, on the other hand, are not selected by citizens, but by other officials and politicians at State level. This, according to the supporters of the reform, means that the State level is not based on democracy, and thus in principle lacks the legitimacy that administrators at the local level have. Since the members of local councils are representatives of, and responsible to, local people and elected (and possibly re-elected) by them, they are also efficiently controlled by them. But this makes no practical difference since the “faceless State bureaucrats” have the final word in land-use planning. So in this model the State is seen as a menace that prevents the carrying out of a democratic land-use policy and efforts at local level to secure economic, social or environmental development.

These two models were the starting point for evaluating the reform. The reform would have meant that municipalities would have independently decided on land-use in their area. The State would have been left with the status of executor in national projects (mainly deciding on the use of State-owned land).

The situation after the proposed reform was modelled in the ways described in Figures 2a and 2b.

Figure 2a. The situation after the reform according to the opponents.

STATE

LOCAL COUNCILS & ADMINISTRATION

CITIZEN "Interest-owner"

CITIZEN "Bystander"
According to this interpretation, the situation after the reform will be thoroughly undemocratic. The power accumulated by the local councils & administrations would strengthen the relationship between local administrators and ‘interest-owners’ which would inevitably mean that bystander citizens would have far fewer opportunities to participate in planning and decision-making than they had before the reform. Since the State would have no administrative or juridical means of intervening in local issues, it would have no say in decision-making, and no way of controlling municipalities. This would mean that the bystander-citizens would lose their previous means of participating in local planning through the state, and that they would be at the mercy of local councils & administrations and interest-owners.

*Figure 2b. The situation after the reform according to the supporters.*

In this model a citizen is normally ‘invisible’ and comes forward only when the local authority does something illegal. So when everything goes well, the citizen is a ‘happy object’; and only in problematic situations an active subject. This interpretation implies that local authorities make decisions independently, but following the wish of the citizens. Although the State has a certain status as a controller of the local level, it isn’t normally needed; because decisions made locally are, according to this view, always better than those made in State cabinets, even when national interests are concerned. This interpretation raises the question of how the needs and wishes of the local citizens come to the knowledge of local councils & administrations. It was
argued in the debate that the local authorities carry out land-use planning solely according to the wishes of local people. The model, however, indicates that they will participate only afterwards, and even then only in cases where things have gone wrong.

These models indicate that there have been two major points at issue in constructing the reform debate: the State’s role as a controller of land-use planning and the existence of competing interests in land-use planning.

**Reality of land-use planning framed by the opponents of the proposal**

The arguments employed by the opponents of the proposal centre round the discursive frame that may be termed the ‘conflicts of interests frame’. The decisive feature in land-use practices and its problems is said to be the existence and diversity of competing interests. As the Minister for the Environment, Sirpa Pietikäinen, said in the debate:

“Our want to build on their land, others want their neighbourhood to remain unbuilt, some want to develop the municipality in one way and some in another. Some want to profit from their property, some want efficient building; some want to invest in building, compete with neighbouring municipalities, some want to give greater weight to ecological considerations in land use, some want to maintain old cultural traditions in treating landscapes.”

There is a conflict of interest between citizens, and between municipalities and citizens, as well as between the State and municipalities. As the competing interests are irreconcilable with each other, and treated differently in planning and decision-making it is impossible even in principle to reach a full consensus in land-use policy. The main issue in land-use policy is thus the need to reconcile different interests and needs as democratically and efficiently as possible. A crucial feature in the conflict of interest frame is the question of power. Power, when constructed within this frame, is connected with certain interests that are implicitly present in certain positions (e.g. land ownership) and are
‘automatically’ absent from certain other positions (‘bystander-citizenship’). This power is maintained by “secret contracts” made in the town hall behind closed doors. The power of a municipality is thus the power of being able to acknowledge some interests and to ignore others. The merit of the conflict of interests frame, which makes contradictions and conflicts a ‘normal’ feature at all levels of society, is that it efficiently models the complexity, and the conflict-ridden nature of society.

Another constructive frame present in the opponents’ interpretations was the ‘civil democracy frame’. Opponents of the proposal used it to define the social and political area where citizens can participate in land-use planning, or at least to some extent control it. It is impossible for ‘bystanders’ to participate directly; so the only means for them to participate is through the State. The civil democracy frame also includes the ideal of equality. As not all people have the resources needed for participation and planning, it is necessary that the system works in a way that also serves those needs and interests that aren’t personally articulated. This brings up the question of trust. Citizens must be able to trust that those responsible for planning will pay attention to the needs of all citizens equally. The only institution that can ensure this will happen is the State. Local administrators can not be trusted because of their specific local interests, and their close associations with landowners and entrepreneurs.

The third frame present in the opponents’ argumentation was the ‘environmental frame’. It was used in three ways. It identified and analyzed the dangers stemming from the specific interests represented by local administrators and interest-owners; their pursuits, if realized, would lead to a deterioration of the environment. As a right-wing opponent of the reform put it:

“Let’s say that a big company is planning a factory in a small rural town and would like to build it on a site that is ecologically valuable and vulnerable. Which do you think is the more attractive alternative to the local authority, getting the jobs and the money, or preserving the non-profitable ecological values?”

Another way of using the environmental frame in argumentation against the reform proposal was to use it in creating legitimation for the assumed interests of the ‘bystanders’. As expressed by Minister Pietikäinen:
“Everyone who lives – whether rich or poor; a landowner or not; a man or a woman; young or old; smart or simple; a child or handicapped – must have the same right to their environment, to its safety, beauty and functionality.”

In the argumentation of the opponents, the ‘bystanders’ were interpreted as representing above all the environmental viewpoint in land-use planning. This means, in practice, that strengthening the position of the bystanders would inevitably lead to a strengthening of environmental values in land use.

The third function of the ‘environmental frame’ was to bring up the needs and interests of “those who can not speak”; meaning the future generations, and all animals living in and vegetation growing in the country now and in the future.

So to some extent the environmental frame brought out the viewpoints (most of all the ecological viewpoints related to biocentric values) that aren’t reconcilable with any ‘human’ interests. Since these values were said to be represented by those citizens having least power, the bystanders, it is logical that giving more power to them would lead to an ecologically more sustainable land-use policy. In the present situation, where local-level land-use planning is based on the coalition of interest-owners and local administrators, the only way of ensuring that the bystanders’ interests and thus ecological values, get a hearing is by keeping the State’s position in land-use policy strong.

All three frames that the opponents used in constructing the problematic nature of land-use planning reveal the ideological and positional gap that exists between the coalition of local authorities and interest-owners, and the bystanders.

**Reality of land-use planning framed by the supporters of the proposal**

The essential point in the argumentation of the supporters of the proposal was a strong critique of the present situation in Finnish land-use administration. The reform was legitimated chiefly by this critique. The primary means employed for this was the use of a discursive frame
that can be called the ‘bureaucracy frame’. It is a very useful frame, in view of the trend towards decentralization that has been so popular in Finland since the eighties. Delegating power to the local level has been a policy that has to some extent become a question of principle more than a question of efficiency. In promoting the bureaucracy frame, the nation’s history was used as a point of comparison. This was achieved with the aid of rhetoric that looked back to Finland’s position in the 19th century and early 20th century, when the country was still a part of the Russian empire. The supporters suggested that in a modern society State control is unnecessary, that it “has czarist features” and that it is also a relic of the 1960s and the 1970s, when centralized social planning with detailed legislation and strict State control was the keyword in all social policy in Finland. By using the bureaucracy frame, the supporters were able to argue that it is the structures of authority, and the conventions connected to them that cause the problems in land-use planning. Finland has an outdated system of administration, that should be demolished in order to achieve a more democratic and ecologically sound society, they argued. One rhetorical weapon they used with the bureaucracy frame was to draw parallels between the practices in the old communist countries and the alleged centralized land-use policy in Finland. For example, Finnish suburbs built in the 1970s were referred to as planned “in the spirit of East German architecture”. All the negative features in the history of land-use planning in Finland were interpreted as the State’s fault.

The bureaucracy frame was used in constructing a very strict hierarchical relationship between the State and the local level. Defining the situation as bureaucratic meant undermining the rationality and legitimacy of the State’s actions. The bureaucracy frame used in the argumentation of the supporters brought out only the negative features connected with the concept of bureaucracy, such as inefficiency, arbitrariness, and being a closed, undemocratic system (see Fagence 1977, 181; Page 1985). The power maintained by a bureaucratic system manifests itself, according to the supporters, in complicating and delaying the projects planned at the local level; a sort of ‘preventing the natural order’ of things. In other words, the power used by the State was seen as power characterized by passivity, regression, and irrationality. This was not seen as an intentional feature of the State – in fact, the State was in theory seen to share the interests of its citizens in land-use
planning – it just seems to be the case, according to the supporters, that once power is in the hands of the State officials, things become unsatisfactory and complicated.

The effect of the bureaucratic frame was doubled when this was linked with another discursive frame in the argumentation of the supporters. This frame, that may be called ‘the civil democracy frame’ supplied further legitimation for demands for a radical decrease in the State’s authority in land-use planning. In the core of this frame was the question of openness in planning and decision-making. The state, insofar as seen as a bureaucracy, was interpreted to be a closed system with an arbitrary, undemocratic line of action. As one right-wing member of parliament put it:

“How do we know who makes the final decisions at the state level? Those who argue for the old centralized system want to keep the final decision-making in the hands of a single state official. With just one signature written behind a locked door in an administration building, a decision made at a public meeting of a local council – the members of which are democratically elected by the citizens – can be rejected. I see no way of defending this kind of idea of democracy today.”

The opponents of the reform proposal interpreted the chances of obtaining full consensus over land-use planning as nonexistent, due to the conflicting, irreconcilable interests present at all levels of society. The proposal’s supporters, on the other hand, claimed this consensus already existed in municipalities. According to them, it is only the bureaucratic character of the State authority that causes problems. The supporters presented civil democracy as an absolute value. But they did not explain the goals that the citizens have in land-use planning. This absence of goals was connected to one somewhat surprising point in the argumentation of the supporters; they completely left out of their interpretations all speculations concerning the possibility of contrasting interests in land-use planning. In other words, their discursive framing of Finnish land-use practices made no use of the conflict of interests frame that was so essential in the interpretations of the opponents. Since the councils and other local bodies were seen as acting solely as the executives of the needs and wishes of the citizens,
there could be no conflict of goals between them and these citizens. The will of the citizens is their will, was the view of the supporters. What this viewpoint implies is, that the local citizens form a homogenous group, a collective, that has one shared goal and one shared opinion about everything. This astounding implication was maintained in the speeches of the supporters by sticking strictly to concepts like “citizens”, “ordinary people” and “local people” when referring to everyone living in the various municipalities. So in the supporters’ argumentation there were no landowners, children, old people, entrepreneurs, environmentalists or speculators, as with the argumentation of the opponents, but a faceless mass with one collective mind and will.

The lack of the conflict of interests frame in the discourse of the supporters, and the implications following from this, legitimate a complete transfer of power from the state to the local level in land-use planning. If the various local bodies, the citizens, and the State all have basically the same goals, there is no reason for not delegating power to the local level, as this obviously means more simple and efficient administration which, according to the supporters’ view, leads automatically to better land-use planning. The power and the responsibility can without hesitation be given to the local level. This view is based on a combination of the bureaucratic frame and the civil democracy frame.

The absence of the conflict of interests frame raises the question: why do there nevertheless exist conflicts in Finnish land-use planning? How can there be disputes when everyone thinks the same way? The supporters reply by using the bureaucratic frame. Finnish land-use practices have been problematic because of the thoroughly unsatisfying, slow and arbitrary bureaucratic conventions deeply rooted in the State’s action. In other words, the conflicts have had nothing to do with conflicting interests, but the problems (disputes, bad planning, degraded environment etc.) have all been results of the poor, inefficient administration carried out by the State. The State authority has been the obstacle preventing the rational, good planning that citizens in reality want, and it has made possible the misuse of land (who the actors behind these misuses have been, was not explained).

The use of the bureaucratic frame naturally suggests the view that the quality of land-use planning improves when decisions are made quickly and with ease. This view, of course, is possible only in the
absence of the conflict of interests frame. The opponents of the reform proposal, on the other hand, by using their discursive tools, argued that getting a quick and easy decision isn’t necessarily a good thing when it comes to land-use planning. Due to the diversity of interests, and the importance of the environmental viewpoint and the ecological facts, it is in most cases necessary to actually slow down the decision-making and ensure that everything will be finally done in the most rational, democratic, and environmentally sustainable way.

What then about the discourse of environmental values among the supporters? To put it simply, such discursive framing did not exist in their argumentation. This was due to their unarticulated, but nonetheless implicit view that all problems, including environmental and ecological problems, will be solved once power has been transferred from the State to the local level.

Discussion

The democratic discourse that appears in the argumentation of the supporters of the reform proposal portrays a society that is both from the layman’s viewpoint, and according to several researchers’ reports (see e.g. Sairinen 1994; Kettunen 1996; Konttinen & Litmanen 1996) far from the Finnish reality. Any regular reader of Finnish newspapers could confirm that disputes over local land-use planning are extremely common, and in most cases very difficult to solve in a way that would please all concerned. And according to Rannikko (1994, 16-17), most environmental conflicts in Finland actually have been local conflicts. According to the supporters’ argumentation, however, municipalities are places characterized by understanding and happiness, where the romantic slogan “One for all and all for one” is everyday reality. In fact, the presuppositions behind the ‘shared interests discourse’ call for a society that is either a utopia or a dystopia rather than a western democracy: everybody shares the same interests, the same opinions, and the same goals in land-use planning; and conflicts are unknown or overlooked, or at least they are seen only as dysfunctional, complicating phenomena.

The reasons for bringing this discourse into use are obvious: on the political level, to please voters on the political Right and centre; and on the substantial level, to create a system where local interests and views
by-pass the national goals and put an end to “State interference”. The ideal of local self-government is very strong in Finland at the moment. In many areas the power previously maintained by the State has been transferred to the municipalities; this has happened for example in schooling and the health services. As a principle, delegating power from the State to the local level is in many ways desirable in the field of land-use policy too. But increased power also means increased responsibility which – according to the opinion shared by many – local councils & administrations would at the moment probably be incapable of handling in their land-use policy. At least it has been proved by researchers (e.g. Konttinen & Litmanen 1996) that there is a great deal of variation in the ability and willingness of municipalities to carry out open, democratic, and ecologically sustainable land-use policy. So even if there were to be municipalities that might measure up to the expectations proclaimed by the supporters, there are certainly also municipalities that lack the requirements needed for the level of independence the supporters would like all municipalities to have. This is obviously the case both with the question of close-range democracy and with regard to environmental sustainability.

What then about the opponents of the proposal? What was the motive for their resisting the proposal? One can say that their strategic interpretation of Finnish society when it comes to land-use policy was probably closer to reality than that of their opponents. They acknowledged the ever-present possibility of conflicts, and the contrasting interests involved in Finnish land-use practices. But on the other hand, they probably over-emphasized the environmental consciousness of the bystander citizens. There is no evidence for their claims that the bystanders would without exception, give preference to ecological and environmental considerations over economic ones. According to surveys (Tulokas 1990; Järvikoski & Kemppainen 1991; Sairinen 1996; Tanskanen 1997) landowners and entrepreneurs do prefer economic values to ecological values more often than other Finns, but the difference in preferences is clearly not so dramatic as the opponents of the proposal have suggested (see also Jokinen 1995, 111). Age, the size and location of one’s hometown, and level and field of education are also factors that seem to affect one’s views on environmental issues. The opponents also underrated the citizens’ ability to protest and to express their views collectively. It is, however, quite common that ‘ordi-
nary people’ mobilize a local protest movement to oppose a plan they find environmentally unsound (see e.g. Konttinen 1994a & 1994b; Litmanen 1994; Rannikko 1996).

The opponents of the reform emphasized the status of the State, which gave the supporters a chance to use the bureaucratic frame as a strong weapon against their views. This emphasis on the State must, however, be understood as a strategy deployed to counter the supporters’ over-optimistic view of the capability and sincerity of local councils & administrations in planning. The decisive difference of opinion between the supporters and the opponents was not basically about the status of State as much as about the targeting of power, if this was given to the municipalities. If the supporters’ interpretation were to be accepted, there would be no problem in giving all the power to local authorities, because their only task is to obey the citizens and make plans and decisions according to their wishes. This interpretation is possible by avoiding the use of the conflict of interests frame and sticking to the idea of an all-round local consensus. The opponents, on the other hand, were of the opinion that if power was not to be given directly to all citizens, it should not be given to the local level at all; since if all the power was concentrated in the municipalities it would, according to their view, be in the hands of the local power elite, and not the citizens.

The latest proposal for land-use legislation reform in Finland was presented to the parliament in the Autumn of 1998. The controversial issues were again, the questions of the State’s status and the reliability of local councils & administrations. This time, however, the left-wing parties and the Greens were in the government, and the views expressed in the parliamentary debate and the media suggested from the beginning that the new proposal had a better chance of going through the parliament than the previous one. This also happened, and the new Land-Use legislation will come to force in the beginning of year 2000. The new law quite obviously places greater emphasis on ecological values, and adopts a more realistic approach to close range democracy than the rejected 1994-1995 proposal did.

The odds are, that changes in the State – local level-relationship will occur in many fields of Finnish administration. In many cases this can be justified; there are many social problems that can undisputedly be best handled at the local level rather than by the State machinery. Envi-
ronmental issues, however, present a complex of problems that can not be solved at one level only. Ecological problems more and more often make demands for co-operation that cross national frontiers, let alone municipal boundaries. The universal, global nature of environmental issues also demands stronger democracy and equality. The right to a good environment is realized through the principle of sustainable development becoming a new universal human right. The problem is, however, that despite manifestos and international agreements, environmental issues are in many ways as yet unestablished in administration and in public policies. And culturally too, ecological viewpoints (and practices especially) are not (yet?) as well established among people as they apparently should be. As various Finnish surveys (e.g. Uusitalo 1986, 1991) have shown, although people’s attitudes towards environmental ideas are very positive, they quite often behave in a way described as “free-riderism”. They don’t live up to their attitudes but wish that others would do ‘the hard part’ (live more ecologically) so that they may benefit.

When it comes to Finland, one basic question in environmentally grounded projects has been, and still is, the question of the status of private land owning. Is interfering in the use of private property in the name of environmental well-being undemocratic, or even communist, policy? Or is the aforementioned universal right of everybody (and every animal’s right, as more and more often is said) to a good environment something that should always take precedence over private interests? This is a basic question in the case of land-use planning too, and it should be answered, not only by State officials, politicians and landowners themselves, but also by those people that can be described as ‘bystanders’. If Finnish land-use policy comes down to the level of close-range democracy it has been lacking for decades, the bystanders will have a better chance to be heard.

Notes


References


THE FORMATION OF A POWER RELATIONSHIP IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT

Introduction

In this article I analyze an environmental conflict from the point of view of the formation of a power relationship between the main actors. The empirical case here is the conflict that broke out in Central Finland in the town of Äänekoski at the beginning of the 1980s. The conflict, which was to gain a lot of publicity, became the greatest environmental conflict in the region thus far. It was triggered by Metsä-Botnia Ltd’s (a forestry company) decision to dismantle its old pulp mills and construct a new one with higher production capacity. The people living in the neighbourhood of lake Päijänne below Äänekoski, having for decades suffered from polluted water, started to demand stricter limits to the factory’s effluent emissions and effective waste water purification techniques. At the empirical level my aim is to answer to the question how the local inhabitants were able to challenge the definitions made by the forestry company. At the theoretical level I aim to unite the factors of micro and macro levels and to construct a theory that explains and makes it possible to understand the formation of power relations in environmental conflicts.
Metsä-Botnia Ltd’s pulp mills were the biggest polluters of Lake Päijänne, Finland’s second largest waterway (124 kilometres long). Although there were also other pulp mills situated on the northern shores of lake Päijänne, Metsä-Botnia’s pulp mills were estimated as having the greatest impact on the pollution of the waterway. However, there were factors that made it very difficult for the local people to get through their demands concerning stricter purification methods. Metsä-Botnia’s field – the wood-processing industry – had been considered the backbone of Finnish economy from the beginning of this century on, and the company employed 1,600 people of the town’s 11,000 inhabitants, which made it very influential in the region. In fact, the wood-processing industry had had a great influence on the development of Äänekoski from the beginning of this century on (Auer, 1971). Furthermore, the company marketed its project as an environmental protection investment of the decade, claiming it was going to make a great improvement in terms of the purification of the waterway. The company had expertise in the area of purification technology, on which the local people targeted their demands. Besides, the Water Rights Court process to which the project was submitted did not promise good to the local people, because earlier the Court had always interpreted the Water Law to the industry’s advantage. Thus, in this three-year conflict the important question becomes: how was it possible for the local people to successfully challenge and transcend the definitions put forward by the company’s representatives?

One of the central questions in the area of social movement research is the question of power and success (see Johnston & Klandermans 1995, 21). In this study I aim to suggest an all-inclusive approach to the research on the success of collective action, combining recent themes in the studies of social movements, like framing, collective identity and opportunity structures. I will also suggest some new aspects to the analysis of collective action and its power.

The concept of power

Central to my study is the analysis of power. Foucault’s concept of power offers a starting point to this analysis. First, according to Foucault, power is an essential part of all social existence. Power is
omnipresent; it is produced at every point and in every relationship in society (Foucault 1976, 122) – also in conflict situations. Second, for Foucault, power appears as complex strategic circumstances in specific societies (Foucault 1976, 123). Thus, examining power in conflicts is particularly interesting, because in such situations two or more opposite strategies appear. The concept of a strategy can be understood on the one hand as a totality of those means whose aim is to exert power effectively as well as to maintain it, on the other hand as a suitable strategy in the sense that power relations constitute action in relation to others’ actual or potential action (Varis 1989, 96: Foucault 1982). Third, examining the formation of power relations is interesting because power has always some consequences (see Latour 1986, 264; Law 1992, 381). Its consequences appear either as changes or as the stability of different elements of social order (see Strauss 1978). In conflicts, the formation of power relations can be connected with the right to define a problem and a solution to it (see Lidskog 1994, 103; Litmanen 1994; Eyerman and Jamison 1991).

Foucault’s idea that power is produced at every point and in every social relation is linked to constructivism: power relations are created during social struggles: they are either reproduced or transformed in such situations. Power can be understood as a process which strengthens or subverts existing power relations through ceaseless struggles and confrontations (Foucault 1984, 92-93). Common to power relations is instability and change; they appear at different levels and in different forms in society, and they produce unequal relations. According to Foucault, the term ‘power’ points to the relation between individuals or groups. However, this does not mean that power is simply a relation between different parties. Rather, it is a question of the way in which certain acts form others; of action in relation to actual or potential action (Varis 1989, 68-69). Foucault thus does not reduce power to individuals, groups or social structures, but sees it as a strategic phenomenon (Foucault 1976, 123.) In that way Foucault aims to go beyond the traditional division, made in the studies of power, into individualistic and structural theories of power.

Another theorist whose ideas of power I borrow is Bruno Latour. According to Latour, the notion of power could be abandoned partly because the amount of power exerted varies not according to the power someone has, but instead according to the number of other people
who enter into the constellation. For example, the power of a dictator should be explained by the number and action of people who obey him. The dictator’s power diminishes and increases in accordance with others’ actions. Thus, the term ‘power’ becomes less and less useful when power increases or diminishes. If the term power is used at all, it has to be used in the sense of a consequence, not of a cause (Latour 1986, 265). For example, the power of science is an effect of associations that constitute a successful combination of elements of the natural and social world (Latour 1987, 141). Latour’s concept of power leads us to the study of networks – to the “sociology of translation”, or the study of actor networks.

The “sociology of translation”

The sociology of translation, also called the actor-network theory, has been developed in the field of the sociology of science by Michel Callon. The central idea in this approach is based on Bruno Latour’s idea that power is a function of associations/alliances. In the sociology of translation the analyst follows the actors’ attempts to enter into alliances, to establish themselves as spokespersons, and to displace other actors – that is, the way in which they use power.

Obviously, the word ‘translation’ is not used here in its normal meaning, but in a Callonian sense. It refers to attempts to persuade others to side with oneself. In accordance with the sociology of translation, the actor tries to translate his/her interests into those of the other parties (persuasion). Translation includes rhetorical moves, negotiations, acts of persuasion, etc. The researcher doing the analysis is also making translations of the acts and intentions of his/her empirical subjects. Thus, a translation is also a scientific construct: one made by the analyst of the actor’s discourses.

The “sociology of translation” consists of four moments which can overlap: problematisation, interessement, enrolment, and the mobilization of allies (Callon, 1986). I will briefly describe each of them.

1. Problematisation, or how to become indispensable: In the phase of problematisation, a particular actor is trying to build a network of relations and become indispensable to the other relevant actors.
Problematisation describes the dual movement which includes the defi-
nition of the nature of a given issue or problem in terms of an existing
solution (that is available to a particular actor) and the definition of the
identities of actors. If the actor is able to put forward a solution in
which the interests of different actors coincide (an “obligatory passage
point”), then he or she becomes indispensable to the other actors and
has good chances of succeeding in establishing him/herself as a
spokesperson in the network he/she has built. By defining the nature
of the issue and the identities of different actors, the actor builds a
network of relations.

2. Interessement, or how to lock the other actors in the proposed roles:
Interessement consists of different processes by which the actor tries
to lock others in the roles proposed for them in the problematisation
phase. This entails an attempt to prevent the emergence of alternative
definitions and solutions. The actor tries to prevent the other actors
from siding with competitive translations.

3. Enrolment, or how to define and coordinate roles: Enrolment consists
in multilateral negotiations between different actors. These trials of
strength include persuasions, threats and appeals. With the help of
these the actor tries to define the roles of others.

4. The mobilization of allies: A successful translation presupposes that
the actor is able to secure his/her authority to speak and act on behalf
of the other actors. In other words, actors have to make sure that the
allies are behind them and will not betray them. Thus, the strength of
the actor ultimately derives from the power of the network on which
he/she can lean.

These moments can overlap: different elements may be present in a
single translation attempt. The translation usually fails, because the other
actors do not accept the definitions of the problem and the proposed
identities.

The sociology of translation is an actor-centered approach which
aims to transcend the actor–structure as well as nature–society divi-
sion by incorporating these to one actor network. It has been criticized
for neglecting larger structures and for concentrating on the micro
level (Shrum 1988, 403). Although the sociology of translation does not have recourse to determining background structures, it does not deny the existence of these structures. The sociology of translation takes into consideration only those structures that are activated during the conflict; it is thus oriented mainly to the micro level. In order to correct this bias, I will next introduce the “negotiated order” approach. Before that, however, let us have a look at actors, intermediaries and networks.

**Actor, intermediary and network**

In the theory of actor networks, the actor can be an individual, a collective actor or an association of people and non-humans (see Callon 1991, 140). In the theory of techno-economic networks, Michel Callon introduces the term ‘intermediary’. Actors define each other through intermediaries that they are able to put into circulation (ibid. 135.) An intermediary can be anything that ‘passes through’ the actors and define their relationship (ibid. 134.) As an example one can mention a product through which the consumer and producer are set in a relationship. When considering the formation of a power relationship in a conflict, all those things and people with the help of which the actor can define him/herself and the others and which help the actor to establish him/herself as a spokesperson are intermediaries. According to Callon, intermediaries can be texts, scientific articles, technical equipments, people, knowledge, skills, contracts, and money in its different forms (ibid. 135). Very small changes can transform intermediaries into actors as well as actors into intermediaries. When one group is considered an actor, one examines what intermediaries it puts into circulation and what kind of actor networks it shapes. When the group is regarded as an intermediary, it is treated as a part of a network – the part that is put into circulation.

The actor and the intermediaries form a network. An actor network is understood very broadly in the sociology of translation. Usually, as in studies of collective action, the heterogenous actors are considered to range from single individuals to loosely structured grass-roots groups to organized bureaucracies (see Diani 1992, 107). In this respect the sociology of translation brings a new dimension to the concepts of
actor and network; it also includes natural entities as well as structural factors as part of an actor and a network, not only humans and organizations. For example, opportunity structures may be included in an actor network if these are activated by the actors during the conflict (see page 14). Also, plants and animals, which belong to the natural world, can be included in actor networks; they can serve as an especially important resource to environmental movements in conflict situations (see Klandermans 1988, 185: Boender 1985). John Law (1992, 381) has put forward the idea that the task of sociology would be to describe heterogenous networks and examine the consequences of these networks. That is what I aim to do in this study.

I have made a distinction between networks of relation and actor networks. This division follows Tilly’s distinction between potential and real networks (see Tilly 1984). In my study the networks of relation represent potential networks that are formed on the basis of actors’ definitions, while an actor network represents a real network on which the actor can lean and from which it gets its power. Thus, a very important question arises from this division: What are the mechanisms that help transform potential networks into real networks? I will return to this issue in the context of analysing the empirical case (page 20).

Conflict as a process of strategic interaction

Conflict can be examined as a process of interaction. The dynamics and the result of a conflict are tied to the procedures chosen by both the challenger and the challenged, that is, to strategic interaction between the parties (Oberschall 1988, 45). Strategies are shaped both in interaction with the opponent as well as in interaction with movement members and the movement’s allies (cf. Eyerman and Jamison 1991, 57). Also, the interaction with the larger structural context (such as the political system) defines those opportunities and limits within which the collective actor with its strategies is formed (see Melucci 1995, 52; Tarrow 1994, 89).

Because it is important to take into consideration the larger structural setting in analysing conflicts (also at the micro level) and because the sociology of translation has been criticised for neglecting back-
ground structures, I introduce the negotiated order paradigm that can be used to compensate for the shortages of the sociology of translation.

The negotiated order paradigm developed by Anselm Strauss puts a heavy emphasis on negotiations. Negotiations are one of the most common phenomena in the interaction between people, but social scientists have neglected them in their analysis (Strauss 1978). Structuralists have understood negotiations as a peripheral explicatory force of change in social order and the result of a larger structural factors. The interactionists have also lost sight of the negotiation process. The negotiated order paradigm is an attempt to bridge the gap between structuralist and interactionist approaches (Strauss 1978, 101, 249). In the negotiated order paradigm, structures are conceived both as preconditions of negotiations and as an effect of negotiations (this resembles Giddens’ theory of double structuration (Giddens 1979, 69).

The negotiated order paradigm distinguishes between the structural context and the negotiation context. The former constitutes the larger setting for the negotiations and includes historical, political and cultural factors as well as legislation. The negotiation context includes issues that influence negotiations immediately. These are the negotiated issues, the negotiating parties, their mutual relations, and the legitimate boundaries of the negotiated issues as well as alternative possibilities to action. These structural factors influence what kind of means are conceived as possible or impossible in specific situations. For example, negotiations are seen as presupposing exchange between parties. Exchange in turn presupposes that parties to the conflict have something worth exchanging. If the parties are in unequal positions so that the weaker one does not have anything to offer in order to form a relation of exchange, there are no opportunities for negotiations (see Oberschall 1988, 45).

In English the term ‘negotiations’ can mean many things: making compromises, trading off, exchanging and bargaining. In the negotiated order paradigm, negotiations are understood as an attempt to achieve an agreement between different parties. Negotiations are also distinguished from other modes of action, like persuasion, manipulation and threats. Thus, negotiations are understood quite narrowly in the negotiated order paradigm, although it stresses that the other modes of action are closely intertwined with negotiations. Because a conflict situation always
includes manipulation, persuasion, threats, etc., which are used in order to create power relations and establish oneself as a spokesperson in a conflict, we need to have a broader view of negotiation. We can compensate for the narrow notion of negotiations in the negotiated order paradigm with a broader concept used in the sociology of translation – i.e., translation (according to Callon and Latour 1982, 279, by translation is meant negotiations, intrigues, calculations, manipulations, acts of persuasion, and violence). Similarly, the shortages of the sociology of translation concerning the lack of attention to background structures is replaced by the examination of the structural and negotiation context in accordance with negotiated order paradigm.

The negotiated order paradigm stresses the idea that negotiations should be analyzed in relation to different elements of social order. By social order is referred to the sum of wide structural settings, its elements belonging to power relations, political and economic structures, legislation, etc. The point of view of the negotiated order paradigm is that negotiations rarely lead to changes in the structural context. Only repeated negotiations combined with other modes of action can lead to changes in the structural context. Instead, negotiations may more often lead to changes in the negotiation context.

By combining the negotiated order paradigm and the sociology of translation we can compensate for the shortages which these theories would have separately when analyzing the formation of power relationships in conflict situations. The negotiated order paradigm, the sociology of translation and Foucault’s concept of power form the frame of reference of this work. These three approaches can be easily connected to each other, yet each of them brings some new aspects to the analysis.

Research setting and the data

I have chosen as the targets of analysis two opposite groups of actors whose relationship seemed very unequal – the forestry company and the local inhabitants. I concentrate on the struggle between these main actors. There were also other parties involved in the conflict; they are introduced into the analysis as targets of the persuasion and manipulation by the main actors – as intermediaries and part of the networks.
The formation of a power relationship in an environmental conflict

Therefore, the meaning of other actors need not be excluded, although I will concentrate on the main actors.

Newspaper articles from the years 1982-1985 (350 in all), certain official documents, and interviews of the local inhabitants serve as the data. The analysis is qualitative: it has been made by reading and interpreting the data by adapting the analytical framework of the sociology of translation, discourse analysis and the negotiated order paradigm.

**Legislation**

The Water Law, which had come into force in 1962, defined the roles of the parties to the conflict and their possibilities of action. According to the Water Law, a project which could have a large environmental impact would have to be submitted to the Water Rights Court. Consequently, Metsä-Botnia had to make an emissions licence application to the Water Rights Court. In the application process only those people who were regarded as parties concerned (like people who owned a lakeside plot or earned their living from fishing) had the possibility to make a reminder and demands. Thus, the law effectively limited the number of parties concerned as well as their mutual relations and opportunities of action.

What made the situation even worse to the local people was not only the fact that only few of them owned a lakeside plot, but also the fact that the prevailing interpretation of the Water Law favoured the industry. In the law it was clearly mentioned that the emission licence would not be granted if a project would deteriorate a region’s living circumstances, if it would have large impacts on nature, and if it would endanger general health. However, the Water Law also mentions some possibilities to deviate from this principle. According to the law, the licence could be granted if the benefits of construction (e.g. employment) are greater than its negative effects. In many cases the Water Rights Court had used this possibility in interpreting the law. The general cultural industry optimistic atmosphere at the beginning of the 1970s as well as the wood-processing industry’s strong position in economic life had been conducive to a particular interpretation. Thus, the interpretation of the Water Law made it difficult for the local people to get their strict demands through.
Competitive translation attempts: 
the environmental protection of the decade, 
or destruction of a million people’s drinking water?

The phases of the conflict can be classified as follows: 1) Everyman’s Water Meeting, 2) the discussion of emission limits and bleaching techniques, 3) a large fish kill, 4) the founding of the Clean Lake Päijänne movement, 5) the act of inspection and the decision of the Water Rights Court, and 6) the oral hearing ordered by the Supreme Administrative Court and the resolution of the conflict.

Next I will briefly describe the attempts of the company to construct a network of relations and establish itself as the spokesperson in the conflict.

Figure 1. The first translation in accordance with “Problematisation”.

The company’s attempts to establish itself as the spokesperson in the conflict can be classified as follows: 1) the “We are in the same boat” discourse, 2) the “divide and rule” discourse and 3) the hegemony discourse. The “we are in the same boat” discourse was produced by emphasizing the similar situation between the parties to the conflict: the company emphasized that the polluted water concerned everyone and that the goals of all parties were similar: curbing the emissions and maintaining employment. By this the company tried to create solidarity between the parties. Besides the common problem and goals, the
company emphasized the necessity of cooperation between different actors: no one could achieve its goal without accepting the plans to construct a new pulp mill. The “divide and rule” discourse was based on the company’s attempt to assign different roles to the parties in the water question: environmental authorities were defined as a cooperative partner of the company in the question of the definitions of the emission limits; the local inhabitants were displaced in discussions concerning emissions and bleaching techniques as non-legitimate producers of knowledge, i.e. as lay people; The company tried to convince Pääkaupunkiseudun Vesi Ltd (a company that uses the water of Päijänne for the consumption of the people living in the capital region) of the adequacy of the purification techniques. By emphasizing the factors that made the parties separate the company tried to hinder the possible emergence of alliances between these parties. In the hegemony discourse, the company made use of the system of difference. It brought forward its cognitive authority as well as its important role in producing the community’s well-being as a representative of the industrial branch that was perceived as an engine of Finnish economy. The expert discourse can be seen as a part of this hegemony discourse. By pointing both to the cognitive and economic differences in relation to other parties, the company tried to legitimate its position as a solver of the water issue. Briefly, the management of the company attempted to strengthen its position of authority and autonomy in the conflict by pointing out the necessity to cooperate (“we are in the same boat”); by emphasizing the different roles and action capacities of the parties to the conflict (“divide and rule”); and by asserting its cognitive authority and position as a producer of well-being (“hegemony” discourse). In this way the company constructed its networks of relations and position as a spokesperson.

The local people’s strategies to challenge the company’s attempt to establish itself as a spokesperson

The local inhabitants struggled against the company’s “we are in the same boat” discourse by emphasizing their role as a spokespersons of people who suffered personally from the effluent emissions. In this way the local residents distinguished themselves from other consumers/
users of the water, such as industry. By establishing themselves as a spokesperson of negatively affected people (100,000–150,000), the local residents distinguished themselves and those on behalf of whom they were talking from the company’s translation and their demands for cooperation (figure 2).

Figure 2. The first translation made by the local inhabitants

The “divide and rule” discourse of the company included the setting of clear limits to the action of the local inhabitants. The local inhabitants tried to compensate for their marginalized position imposed by the company first by increasing the number of possible alliances. Future generations were introduced as moral rationales for water protection, as were the inhabitants of the capital region (about 1 million people), whose drinking water was taken from Lake Päijänne. This extension of spatial and temporal dimensions increased the number of interested parties, in addition to extending the scope of pollution. It was important for the local people to transcend the local level by showing that people were adversely affected not only in the periphery but in the capital region as well. By means of these definitions they were able to widen their network of relations and thereby increase their influence. However, extending the number of interested parties was not enough, because the conflict had been led to a technical and scientific arena. Thus an
important question becomes: how were the local people able to get rid of the marginalized position and lay person’s identity imposed by the company?

**Opportunity structures as intermediaries**

In this struggle over the formation of power relationships, which was crucial to the dynamics and resolution of the conflict, elements from different levels were intertwined. Thus, examining the formation of power relations requires not only analysis of the symbolic struggle but also analysis of the heterogenous elements that are involved in this symbolic struggle. Next I will briefly examine how the local residents made use of different elements to challenge the definitions made by the company and strengthened their position in the conflict. Because I aim to bind opportunity structures as well as intermediaries together, I want to emphasize that not all opportunity structures can be regarded as intermediaries. Only those opportunity structures that are activated in actors’ translations can be incorporated into their actor network (see Callon 1986: Law 1986). Therefore, opportunity structures can be divided in a) resources that actors can actively make use of: these are treated as intermediaries and are thus part of the actor network; b) resources that actors utilize passively: these are opportunities that actors do not clearly articulate or make use of. These latter opportunities can be applied to the examination as preconditions of action in accordance with the negotiated order paradigm.

*The breakdown of the hegemonic position of the wood-processing industry in Finnish economy*

The hegemonic position of the wood-processing industry in Finnish economy derives from the 1920s and 1930s. At that time the wood-processing industry began to be perceived as the engine of national well-being and economic life. The mythology around the slogan “Finland lives from forests” was created. The peasant class which ruled the state and the wood-processing industry entered into alliances. The
peasant class (agricultural population) found the possibility to strengthen its own economic position as well as the state’s economic condition with the help of the wood industry. Similarly, the wood-processing industry was willing to strengthen and improve its conditions of action. Thus, the silent understanding between the wood industry and the peasant class about the preconditions of uniting the nation and the prerequisites of national existence was created. As a consequence of that alliance, the state began to support strongly the wood industry by improving the forest administration, by promoting forest research, by building water power, and by facilitating the exports of the wood-processing industry with the aid of foreign exchange policy (Donner-Amnell 1991.)

The significance of the wood-processing industry becomes obvious when one looks at the export rates. From the beginning of this century until the 1960s, the share of the wood industry was 60-90% from the total exports. After that its share has steadily decreased, so that it is now about 40%, the same as that of the metal industry. From the turn of this century the wood industry has been a very centralized, capital-intensive branch with relatively weak employing capacity (at present it accounts for only 5% of the labour force in Finland) (Ibid., 286.)

It is possible to distinguish different phases in the combination of the power elite of the wood industry as well as in the external settings of the forest sector. The periods of the power forestry economics can be dated to the years 1957-1974. The leading idea of that time was the dynamic progress of the wood industry. The political representatives of the forest owners and the industrial labour joined to support the new idea of dynamic progress. (Ibid.)

Dynamic progress meant making use of fertilizers, mechanized felling, increasing energy production, etc. The whole forest nature was subjected to power forestry economics. The consequences of the dynamic project were criticised publicly. The lost employment opportunities in the countryside, due to mechanized cutting, extensive group cutting, and the water polluted by the emissions of the wood-processing industry were targets of criticism. However, the position of the forest sector was not threatened. The wood industry prospered, and the harmful effects it caused manifested themselves in the periphery – from its point of view (Ibid.)
The criticism could not have possibilities to spread widely. That was because of the sheltered position of the wood industry, which in turn was due to the coalition between it and society. Forest companies had controlled from the beginning of this century the Finnish company structure and economic life. Because of the wood industry’s hegemonic position in the economy, it had attracted political parties on its side. The Finnish state adopted a hegemonic strategy of maintaining the economic competitive power of industry. That explains the fact that even though the wood industry was a big polluter, the environmental issues were brushed aside. In short, the hegemonic position of the economic structure as well as the stability of the political culture delayed the transposition of environmental questions into social questions (see Konttinen 1995.)

However, the period after the power forestry economics uncovered the weakness of the forest sector. Earlier the success of the wood industry and the “Finland lives from forests” mythology had hindered people from seeing the problems and inner controversies of the wood industry. The forest sector’s crisis took place in 1974-1986. The decisive event was the oil crisis. It stopped the tempo of investment. The crisis of the forest sector made room for other production branches, whose export share had been increasing rapidly. Among the economic power elite there arose criticism against the wood industry. Thus, the hegemonic position of the wood-processing industry was broken in the economy and the industry partly because of external factors but also because of the inner controversies of the power elite of the forest sector (To the forest sector elite belong the wood industry and forest owners. Other parties that are connected to the forest sector, like trade unions and the state administration have been regarded as allies of the wood industry). For example, the wood trade between forest owners and the wood industry became more difficult, the trade union criticised the reorganization and modernization of the forest companies, while the companies claimed that the state gave little support to them. The forest sector’s social relations fell into a crisis. (Donner-Amnell, op. cit.) This encouraged the emergence of criticism elsewhere in society as well.
The breakthrough of environmentalism

Consciousness of environmental problems rose sharply in Finland at the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. Characteristic of this period was the emergence of environmental protests, which erupted almost at the same time. According to Konttinen (1995), the protests had been “dammed up” for long. Finnish political parties had rejected the demands of environmental movements for long because they were regarded as being in conflict with the hegemonic strategy of supporting the prerequisites of economic competitiveness. When the new opportunity structures emerged, the dam could break down. One of the conflicts of that transition period was the waterway conflict in Äänekoski.

I will examine some opportunities that the local people were able to utilize as intermediaries. Opportunity structures can be divided in four dimensions: 1) Opening up of access to participation; 2) shifts in ruling alignments; 3) the availability of influential allies and 4) cleavages within and among elites (Tarrow 1994, 85.)

Opening up access to participation

The opening of the political field for environmental questions at the end of the 1970s connected with the breakdown of the hegemonic position of the wood-processing industry and the changes in the cultural climate from the industry-centeredness, economic growth optimistic views to more critical views of these, as well as with the breakthrough of environmentalism. The movements of the initial stage of environmentalism resulted in the birth of the Green movement, which made the breakthrough into the national consciousness in 1983 (Brog 1991, 186; Siisiäinen 1992). These early movements promoted and speeded up the establishment of the Ministry of the Environment, thereby paving the way to a better consideration of environmental issues at the political level as well (see Järvikoski 1991, 175.) Many parties adopted environment-friendly attitude. The first movements of environmentalism created opportunities for later movements. This was evident also in the case of the Päijänne movement.
The media

The first environmental movements had awakened the interest of the media in environmental issues and protests. Through the interest of the media there opened up better opportunities for local inhabitants to struggle against the company. With the help of the media, the inhabitant could compensate for their weak position in the legal process (see page 9). The role of the media was emphasized in the formation of consensus and in carrying the message of the movement forward. The media also had a great impact on framing the action. For example, the expression “water protection issue of the century” was an utterance of a journalist that the local people adapted for their translations. Thus, the journalists helped local people frame the issue. But what was the most important here was the fact that, through their own experience, the local residents (two of them had earlier been freelance journalists) could actively make use of the media. They had knowledge about journalists’ work and principles; and they knew how to awaken, and maintain, the interest of the media. In social movements, media strategies are usually applied to bringing forth and emphasizing dramatic issues in order to increase the number of participants (see Tarrow 1994, 128). In this case, too, the local people were able to make contacts with the representatives of the media. With the help of some journalists, the residents were able to disseminate their point of view to the public. Thus, public discourse and the media became a significant resource and intermediary for the residents.

The general cultural climate

The general cultural climate had changed from optimistic views of the 1960s and the 1970s (concerning industry and progressive economic growth) to more pessimistic views due to the oil crisis and the economic depression that followed it. The issues that were connected with the quality of life were emphasized. According to Gamson (1988, 219), the central part of the symbolic struggle consists of a process of creating special meanings. In this symbolic interaction the meanings which are used have to be resonant with the cultural climate. The residents utilized the life quality framework, which was favoured by the general cultural climate as well as general concern about the environment as their intermediary. The local people extended the concept of well-
being to mean more than just prosperity determined by economic factors, it was conceived to mean also the quality of life, clean water and clean nature. Thus, the company could not be seen as a producer of well-being in a wider sense. In this way the local people were able to question the company’s identity as a producer of well-being. Thus, the residents could make use the cultural climate as well as general concern about the environment as their intermediaries.

But neither the breakdown of the hegemonic position of the wood-processing industry nor the crisis of the forest sector were manifested in the translations of the local people; instead, their criticism leaned on general modernization critique, of which the quality of life is the best example.

**A shift in ruling alignments**

Changes in ruling alignments meant a more positive attitude of political parties to environmental issues and to the environmental movements advocating them. This was also reflected in a stricter interpretation of the Water Law. The interpretations had gradually become stricter by the end of the 1970s as regards the emissions licence applications of the industry. The shift was visible also in the action of the water district’s authorities as well. The pressure of change was increased by the general modernization criticism, by environmental movements’ powerful criticism directed to environmental authorities, and by the positive attitude of the press to environmental issues (Konttinen 1994, 97). Furthermore, the increased knowledge about the poisonous emissions of the wood-processing industry and their possible effects on nature and human beings were of a nature to impact on the attitudes of environmental authorities of water districts. Not a minor fact was the breakthrough of purification techniques that took place at the same time as the construction plans of the company. When earlier the environmental authorities had been regarded as allies of the industry, by the turn of the 1980s many of them were able to more openly criticize the emissions of the industry.

A shift in ruling alignments is evident in the case of Äänekoski. The local residents could take advantage of the opportunities that the changes in environmental authorities’ attitude gave them. The inhabit-
The formation of a power relationship in an environmental conflict

...ants got support from the engineers of their own and another water district. Especially knowledge about the emission levels of the company’s pulp mill in Kaskinen, which the company had praised as clean and marketed as a model for the new mill of Äänekoski, but which had in reality exceeded its emission limits, became a significant intermediary in the conflict. With the help of the documents of Kaskinen (which the local people had got from the environmental authorities in another district), the residents were able to question the company’s technological expertise as well as its role as a spokesperson of environmental protection. Because the residents succeeded in uncovering the concealed facts in the case of Kaskinen, they threw a shadow of distrust over the company’s definitions. At the same the residents increased their own credibility and widened the limits of action that the company had imposed on them as a marginalized actor. Thus, the knowledge the residents got from the environmental authorities of the water districts served as a significant intermediary for them.

The availability of influential allies

The fish kill

Natural elements, as well, can serve as influential allies. A dramatic fish kill happened in the end of the 1982, a year after the company’s announcement to dismantle its old pulp mills and construct a new one. Thousands of dead fish were found 30 kilometres below the factory. The company emphatically denied that acceptable wastewater limits had been exceeded. Why was the fish kill an important intermediary to the residents in this struggle? First, with the help of the fish kill the residents could increase and maintain the interest of the media as well as to get their voices heard. They were able to make use of the fish kill as a media strategy (cf. Tarrow 1994, 128). Second, the company’s attempts to marginalize the residents in discussions on effluent limits as well as the bleaching methods could be shown to be untenable. The issue was so serious that nobody, not even the natural elements, could be displaced. The fish kill legitimated the residents’ right to establish themselves as a spokesperson for the environment (and not only for the negatively affected people). Third, with the help of the event, the
residents were able to challenge the company’s role of spokesperson in the conflict. The fish kill pre-empted the company’s definitions concerning the “environmental investment of the decade” based on the great improvement in the BOD 7 level (biological oxygen demand). Because it was poisonous chlorine emissions, and not the BOD 7 load, that turned out to be the reason for the fish kill, the improvements reported by the company were shown to be insufficient. With the help of the fish kill, the residents could emphasize the importance of limiting the emissions of poisonous chlorine compounds.

As influential allies can be regarded especially those who had knowledge about the condition of the water, about the damage caused by factory emissions and knowledge about the bleaching methods, in other words, the experts. Especially when talking about the experts as intermediaries, their visibility and concrete support became essential. Although the residents had got indispensable help from the beginning of the conflict on from one Swedish expert on bleaching methods and the BOD 7 load, they could not borrow his authority in the conflict because this expert wanted to remain a secret assistant for the local people. Because the local people did not have a legitimate authority to present knowledge from a technical field where they had been defined as lay persons by the representatives of the company, it was important for them to use publicly the authority of experts.

Not until the winter of 1983, at the meeting dealing with the conservation of the waters of northern Päijänne, arranged by the nature conservation district of Central Finland, the local inhabitants were able to enter into alliances with experts visibly. In that meeting the Clean Lake Päijänne movement was founded by the suggestion of a couple of local inhabitants who were present. The fish kill served as an impulse to the founding of the movement as well as to the suggestion of a petition of citizens for the cleaning of lake Päijänne. Present at the meeting were environmental authorities and the leading researchers of the condition of the water of Päijänne; they were hydrologists from the university of Jyväskylä as well as a limnologist of Pääkaupunkiseudun Vesi Ltd. From this moment on the inhabitants could get the cognitive authority by leaning on the researchers’ reports and their support. The visibility of the expert intermediary made it possible to widen the identity of local inhabitants’ actor network from the layperson’s identity to expert identity. In other words, they could get rid of their
layperson status. Thus, the limits of action imposed by the company were widened especially in the area of scientific knowledge concerning the condition of water as well as in the technical field thanks to environmental authorities.

The formation of networks and power relations in the conflict

It is interesting to realize how couple of local inhabitant were able to form gradually an expanding network of relation. First by persuading the negatively affected people by the waterway to their side, then defining future generations and the capital region's inhabitants as their partners, and finally by incorporating also elements of the natural world as well as experts and environmental authorities to their network of relation. The next figure (3) points out the expanding translations of the inhabitants as well as the necessary combination of the natural and the social world elements.

Figure 3. The network of relation (= potential network)
From a potential network to a real actor network

It is easy to incorporate elements of any kind to a network of relations, because this happen by the help of definitions. It is more difficult to keep these different parties in their places and roles imposed by the actors (here the local people), in other words, it is more difficult to transform a network of relation into a real actor network, and make it durable. Next I will briefly describe the factors and mechanisms that helped local people to create a real actor network.

The transforming of the network of relation into a real actor network is important because actors get their power to act from it. An actor network consists of those allies on behalf of whom the actor can speak and from whom the actor gets support, on the other hand, of those resources that the actor can make use of in order to attempt to establish itself as a spokesperson. The local inhabitants were able to create a real actor network from the potential network. Their right to speak on behalf of others was based on the following factors. First, the local people succeeded in collecting a petition of 140 000 citizens. The petition served as a mechanism by the help of which the local inhabitants could incorporate the negatively affected people in a concrete way and visibly to their supporters. Thus, the public support was not anymore based only on local people’s definitions, but on a concrete support got through petition. The petition of citizens gave the right to the local people to represent these 140 000 people in the struggle.

In their actor network could be included also the capital region’s inhabitants. Pääkaupunkiseudun Vesi Ltd’s (a representative of the capital region’s inhabitants) support to the local people through expert knowledge and through participating in the Clean Lake Päijänne movement gave to the local people the right to speak also on behalf of these capital region’s inhabitants. Besides, the expert statements about the reasons for the fish kill legitimated the inhabitants’ position as spokespersons of silent entities of the natural world. Finally, the environmental authorities’ and researchers’ participation in the Clean Lake Päijänne Movement as well as their concrete support to the local inhabitants gave them the right to represent also these experts.

Central mechanisms that led to a successful petition and as a whole
to the local inhabitants’ right to represent other parties were connected with the making use of the media and the possibility to profile themselves on the experts. The general cultural climate and the breakthrough of environmentalism were also factors that the local people could actively utilize in their translations. On the other hand the translations with persuasions, appealing to authorities as well as challenging the company’s statements were factors with the help of which the network of relation could be transformed into a concrete actor network.

Figure 4. The mechanisms that legitimated the local people to represent these parties.

Because actor networks are understood widely, they can consist of elements of micro and macro level that are activated during the struggle. Thus the residents’ actor network looks like follows (figure 5). These elements form a chain, by the help of which one can understand and explain from where the local inhabitants got their power.
The movement and its success

The conflict ended in the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in 1985. The local people had succeeded in getting through their strict demands concerning BOD 7 load (biological oxygen demand) and hazardous chlorine compounds. The company was obliged to given an account of poisonous chlorine emissions that were led to the waterway, and to apply for an emissions licence application for these compounds to the water rights court in two years. In addition to this, the company had to reduce also the phosphorus loads as well as lignine loads. The people in the movement thought that they had won the struggle. The new factory started to operate in the spring of 1985.

The conflict had also long term effects. The strict emissions licence to Metsä-Botnia’s new pulp mill led also to stricter emission licences to the whole wood-processing industry. Even though it is not easy to prove the particular movement’s impact for example on legislation,
especially in the context of protest cycles, because other mediating factors have to be taken into consideration, I argue that in this case the movement speeded up the reformation of the Water Law. As an indication of the influence of the Clean Lake Päijänne movement one can mention that two movement members were taken with the preparation of the Water Law.

The formation of a power relation meant in this case the fact, that the company, that was perceived as superior in many ways, for example in the field of purification techniques, fell during the struggle into a position of defendant and in contrast, the local people who were in a weaker position at the beginning of the conflict were able to get a dominant position in it. The company lost the role of spokesperson to the local inhabitants through the expansion of local people’s actor network. Unfortunately, I cannot present here the reasons that led to the unsuccessful formation of the company’s actor network. The formation of power relation meant also that the definition of the local inhabitants’ concerning “the most important environmental question of this century” won the company’s definition concerning “the environmental investment of the decade”.

Was the movement’s success a result of general turbulence (cf. Piven & Cloward 1979, xxii) (of which one can mention the breakthrough of environmentalism, protest cycles as well as opening up the political field to environmental issues) rather than a result of strategies and numbers of actors that were mobilized? It seems to me that both factors were significant to the movement’s success. The opportunity structures can be seen as necessary but not adequate preconditions to a successful action. But, I argue that structures can not be regarded merely as preconditions to action but also as intermediaries that are utilized in action. This emphasis leads us to neostructuralism. The fact that structures can be perceived as a continuous state of articulation led to the examination of how the local people were able to make use both the cultural and political opportunity structures as their intermediaries. Thus I am willing to stress the local inhabitants’ active role in achieving the success. On the basis of this case I argue, that the ability to make use of opportunity structures is an essential aspect of successful action.

This case was a concrete example of social constructivism in the sense, that the movement and its success consisted of heterogenous elements and were formed in interaction with internal and external
factors (cf. Tarrow 1994, 153: Melucci 1995, 43). The Clean Lake Pääjänne movement and its success was neither a result of atomised individuals and their actions alone nor a result of changes at the macro level. Instead the formation of movement as well as its success was a process like phenomenon: from a potential network of relation created by the definitions of local inhabitants was gradually formed by the help of persuasive techniques and opportunity structures a real actor network – the Clean Lake Pääjänne Movement. This actor network consisted of humans, opportunity structures as well as elements of the natural world.

The fish kill was one important factor in the network from which the Clean Lake Pääjänne movement got its power. Possibly in most of the environmental movements idea to widen the concept of actor network is needed, because in many cases incorporating the entities of the natural world as well as dramatic events to movements’ network has increased the credibility of the movement (cf. Klandermans 1988: Boender 1985) as well as its influence. Expanding the actor network to include also elements of nature is closely connected with the question of representation. Who has the right to represent elements of the natural world? In order to get the legitimate right to speak on behalf of nature, the movements need experts as mediators. Here we come close to Beck’s formulations (Beck 1992). In the conflict in question the local inhabitants were able to establish themselves as a spokesperson of conditions of the water.

Even though, the Clean Lake Pääjänne Movement acted on the strategic area – on the field of wood-processing industry – that was perceived as an engine of Finnish economy, it was able to mobilize influential allies to its side (cf. Kriesi 1995, 96).

This is connected with social constructivism in that the movement and its identity was continuously in a process of formation. To find this out presupposes exploring the conflict step by step. The fact that the local inhabitants who were in a weaker position at the beginning of the struggle were able to get the dominant position, needs to be explained and analyzed. With the help of the actor network theory we can capture the process that leads to the formation of power relationships. In the conflict in question the meaning of intermediaries was significant for local people in changing of their identity and action limits: The fish kill and media strategies helped mobilize people in ac-
tion, profiling themselves on the experts contributed to the success of the petition of citizens, the petition linked a large number of negatively affected people to the supporters of the Clean Lake Päijänne movement. By the help of this kind of chain consisted of heterogeneous elements we can understand the formation of power relations in environmental conflicts. This case shows that with the help of favourable opportunities and actors active translations even surprising results can be achieved.

Note

1 The article is based on a paper presented at the 2nd European Conference on Social Movements, in Vitoria, Spain, 2nd -5th of October 1996.

References


Matti Nieminen

WHAT LAND? WHAT NATURE? WHAT THREAT?

The controversy over Finnish shorelines

Introduction

Among the issues concerning forestry, the question of shoreline protection has been a central one in Finnish environmental politics since the early 60’s. Unlike other European countries, Finland has had no juridical restrictions on building on shorelines. The landowner’s right to dispersed settlement allows him/her to build 4-5 buildings per kilometre of shoreline. The Finnish use of shorelines has been considered non-ecological and wasteful. (Nordberg 1992 & 1994). The issue is of exceptional importance as Finland has almost 200 000 lakes, and a long coastline, and there are already more than 400 000 summer cottages situated on shorelines in a country of only 5 million inhabitants. The shorelines are mostly owned by private farmer-landowners. Building on shorelines and selling or renting out cottages has been a way of getting extra income for many Finnish farmers during the last three decades. It is presumed that Finland’s EU membership will increase European interest in purchasing Finnish shorelines.

The article looks at the controversy that was created between Finnish landowners and environmental authorities by the Government’s
decision in principle to launch a national programme for the protection of shorelines. The programme will save 5% of the most valuable Finnish shorelines from building. The programme offers landowners three options: 1) the owner sells the land to the state; 2) the state pays the landowner compensation for not building on the shoreline, or 3) the landowner exchanges the land to a state-owned land situated elsewhere. The programme aroused anger among landowners and their organizations. Almost 5,000 landowners complained about the programme to the state, and the programme was also taken to the European Court of Human Rights (Niemin, 1994). The situation between the authorities and the landowners is still difficult, seven years after the programme was first launched.

The controversy which began in 1990, and can be described as one of the longest-lasting and most difficult single environmental conflicts in Finland, has been portrayed by the media as being largely a money issue. However, a frame-analytical examination of interview and press-material (Niemin 1994; 1996a; 1996b) indicates that the conflict has, in fact, largely boiled down to differing views of the environment, and to different interpretations of the meaning of private land and its ownership. These features of the conflict have been blurred in public discussion mainly because the Finnish landowners’ organizations have, in order to get more support for their opposition, represented the issue as an economic one rather than one of cultural and traditional values; which is what the interviews with landowners indicate it to a great extent be.

In my article I will try to provide some explanation of the conflict. Why did the economic interpretation of the controversy become the prevailing one in public discussion? Why did not the ‘lifeworld’ aspects, that according to my study were a crucial factor in the opposition the programme ran into, gain public attention?

As for example the Finnish sociologist Pertti Rannikko (1996, 68) has argued, environmental conflicts usually include cognitive, value-based, and interest-based dimensions. These dimensions, however, are not all accorded equal importance and legitimacy in public discussion and in negotiations. It seems that representing a conflict as an economic one is the typical practice in Finland. Opposing economic to ecological values is a strategy that both the so-called industrialists and the environmentalists take as their starting point when engaging in a
conflict. For this there are obvious reasons; the non-profit-making values of the environment and nature can easily be contrasted with the alleged egoistic, cold moneymaking philosophy of companies and private capitalists. Seen from this viewpoint, protecting nature is something unselfish, ‘pure’ and responsible. On the other hand, the conflict between economic and environmental values can easily be presented as a choice between realism and romanticism. Economic considerations, especially when presented as vitally connected with the national economy, can be portrayed as necessary for employment and for the maintenance of social security and the well-being of all citizens. Seen from this point of view, the ‘ecological conscience’ emphasized by environmentalists appears as irrational romanticism that the nation can not afford. One could say that contrasting money and nature in environmental issues has, at least in Finland, to a great extent become an established drama, a play in which actors use old clichés and oversimplified arguments, and in which real communication is never achieved.

In this paper I will concentrate on the viewpoints of the two most essential parties in the controversy, the environmental authorities and the private landowners. The emphasis of the study will be on elucidating the two factors that are at the core of the controversy: private land and its ownership, and nature; as they have appeared in public discussion, in official documents, and in interviews with 18 farmers owning protected areas of land in Central Finland.

Private land and its ownership

In the interviews, several farmers owning protected areas of shoreline interpreted the meaning of private land very strictly in terms of its intrinsic value and the right to control it. Private land was valued for its biographical and family meaning as well as for its significance as a means of identifying oneself in society. To most interviewees, both the past and the future were present when considering private land. On one hand, the land seems to represent the work of one’s ancestors, while on the other hand it represents the possibility of ‘keeping the family tradition’ alive in the future, as the future generations will take over the land and keep the estate prosperous. The 18 farmers interviewed can
be categorized in four groups according to the way they oriented themselves to the ownership and use of private land.

Table 1. The interviewees’ orientations to the ownership and use of private land, and their attitude towards shoreline protection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Instrumental attitude towards private land and its ownership</th>
<th>Appreciation of traditions, self-determination and land’s intrinsic value</th>
<th>Attitude towards shoreline protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business-oriented landowners 2</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambivalent landowners 2</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>±</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent landowners 3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditionalists 11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = positive  
0 = neutral  
– = negative

The business-oriented landowners opposed the programme because they considered the monetary compensation paid for their land to be too small. The ambivalent landowners valued family ties, and the traditions of private ownership and self-determination but were, however, prepared to sell their land to the State for a reasonable price. The indifferent landowners lacked both the traditional and the business oriented attitudes. The traditionalists shared a strong emotional tie to private land. They were strongly opposed to selling land or exchanging it for State land, and they completely opposed to any idea of negotiating with the authorities.

Almost 2/3 of the farmers interviewed had a traditional and emotional relationship to their land. They considered the Government’s
programme to insult their basic values, symbolized by the land.

The existence of the category ‘business-oriented landowners’ does not mean that those excluded from this category lack a business-like orientation to their occupation. On the contrary, some of the most traditional landowners were among the most modern farmers. They had made big investments in modernizing their farms, and had adopted new, innovative methods of farming. As landowners they were traditionalists, as farmers they were modernists. Thus, they might be said to have two different identities. This division of identities has to do with the structural changes that have taken place in Finnish society over the last few decades.

Social and technological development and changes in Finnish agricultural policy have led to a demand for the rationalization of Finnish agriculture (e.g. Jokinen 1995). The change has been rapid, and it has forced thousands of farmers either to modernize their farms or to give up their occupation. Rational planning is also manifested by new innovations (specialized cultivation, organic farming etc.) that have been adopted to keep the Finnish countryside alive. The traditional methods and practices have given way to cost-benefit calculations and long-term rationalization. Forestry, which brings a considerable income to most Finnish farmers, has also undergone a change during the last few decades. The big companies dictate when and what seedlings will be planted, and they also have a monopoly in collecting, transporting, marketing and pricing the timber. This has led to a situation where the owners of the forests are merely the owners and suppliers of raw material. To sum it up; both in the field of agriculture and in forestry, a farmer has become an entrepreneur, a link in the market chain. This rationalization process has made it necessary to detach both farming and agriculture from their traditional roots, and to adopt a more business-like approach to the source of livelihood.

When one considers the way in which farmers reacted to the programme for the protection of shorelines (as well as to other, smaller conservation programmes) one comes to the conclusion that the institution of land ownership in Finland has not developed in the same instrumentally rational direction as farming and forestry have. Although the occupation of farmer has lost much of its traditional character, the opposition to the compulsory application of nature conservation measures to private land has shown that many of the values associated with
traditional rural culture are still very much alive in the Finnish countryside. The attitude towards occupation has changed, but the farmer’s relation to his essential capital, land, still involves strong emotional and traditional ties. This ambivalence is clearly expressed in the comment of one of the farmers interviewed: “As a landowner the programme insults me, as a farmer it doesn’t.” It is a question of two different but simultaneous identities, and two models of reality made up on the basis of these identities. As a modern, profit-minding farmer, the interviewee did not find the programme insulting, but when interpreting the programme through the traditionally oriented landowner’s identity, he found the programme a severe insult.

One factor that has helped the maintenance of the traditional land ownership has been the juridical stability of private ownership in Finland (Kultalahti, 1990). It is so strongly protected in legislation that the state’s ability to restrict it has been rather weak. Parties from the political right and centre have openly declared that the citizen’s right to the private ownership of land is one of the basic rights that must not be violated. This has lead to a situation where, for example a law to prevent building on shorelines has never gone through the parliament. The private ownership of land has to a great extent been beyond the reach of the State authorities.

Routines confronted with incontestable values

Why, then was the controversy over Finnish shorelines so strongly identified as an economic issue in public discussion? Max Weber’s theory of social action provides a possible answer to this question. According to Weber, there are two forms of social action that can be considered as ‘truly’ rational: Instrumentally rational (Zweckrational) and value-rational (Wertrational) action. As Weber (1978, 23) says: “Instrumentally rational action is determined by expectations as to the behaviour of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends”. About value-rationality Weber (pp. 23-24) writes that it is “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects or success”.

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He claims (p. 25) that value-rational action always involves “commands” or “demands” that bind the actor. Weber also states that the more value-rational the action is the more ‘irrational’ it appears from the perspective of instrumental rationality.

The goals of shoreline protection were, according to Ministry of the Environment, maintaining the biodiversity of the ecological systems along shorelines and preserving areas of ‘original’ shoreline-nature for future generations. The ecological need for protection was to a great extent based on a biocentric view of nature’s intrinsic value. This view took the question of shoreline protection into the realm of ethics and gave the argumentation and legitimation of action a value-rational content. And the ‘anthropocentric’ need for shoreline protection; the right of future generations to ‘original’ shorelines, also had an ethical, value-rational emphasis. In both cases the need for protection came from ‘outside’ and presented the actors with a moral obligation to act in a certain way.

Because of the value-rational interpretation of the need for a programme it has been difficult to demonstrate that the goals of the programme are misplaced and that the programme is thus unnecessary. The arguments for the necessity of the programme have to a great extent been unassailable because of their biocentric nature. It would be absurd to claim that, for example, a loon does not need ‘free’ unbuilt shorelines. Similarly, the anthropocentric argumentation for the need for shoreline protection is quite incontestable. It would be useless to argue against the programme by claiming that we do not know whether the future generations will value unbuilt shorelines or not (see Ollikainen 1992; Vilkka 1994). Landowners, and also their organizations did, in fact, argue against the programme by claiming that it applied only to those landowners who had kept their shorelines in ‘natural’ state and that these owners were now being punished for their ecological concern. This argumentation, however, has been easily refuted. If the landowners are as ecologically conscious as they claim to be, the programme would not harm them in any way. On the contrary, they would now get a reward from the State merely for continuing to live as before and not building on their shorelines.

The explanation for this somewhat absurd situation can be found in the traditional emphasis put on land ownership and the control of private land. The landowners can not accept the idea that the State will
officially protect the land they have already ‘protected’. The State’s action is regarded as interventionist and as violating the principle of private ownership. The interviewees resorted to some of the expressions used when talking about crime and war when they discussed the State’s actions: the shorelines were being “robbed”, “taken away”, “stolen” and “invaded”. In these interpretations of reality, the landowners saw themselves as mere puppets of the State, and not as free agents.

The attitude to the land ownership here termed ‘traditional’ can particularly be considered as routinized maintenance of one’s own “ontological security” (Giddens 1991, 35-69). It is used for expressing and maintaining the coherence of one’s world view and identity. This coherence is constantly put to the test in modern society, where tradition has lost its status as the base of legitimation. According to Giddens the identity of the individual is based on his ability to keep alive a specific biographical life story. Such comments as “I’ve walked on this land since I was a little kid, so of course it has a special meaning for me” reveal the importance of one’s life story in the way one experiences and evaluates private land. The landowners here referred to as traditionalists expressed in their interviews a strong urge to resist the disintegration of routines. They felt it to be of vital importance to hold on to the identity symbolized by the land. For a traditionalist, giving up these routines would mean an identity crisis.

**Traditional values in the clutches of administrative logic**

The planning of an instrumental measure – for example, a measure designed to protect the environment – does not in itself involve assigning values. It is only concerned with the effectiveness of the measure in realizing the goal that has been assigned. The planning of the protection programme was based on choices between alternatives designed to lead to the essential value-rational goal: the protection of the shorelines for animals and plants, and for future human generations.

There are basically two contrasting lines of action in making administrative decisions: the communicative way and the bureaucratic way. The communicative way seeks for open co-operation between all par-
ties involved, and it requires a mutual understanding of the ‘reality’ in question. The bureaucratic, centralized way can be implemented without paying attention to the differing constructions of reality. The authorities acting in a bureaucratic way can keep to their own interpretations of reality or, more often, to the interpretations that are embedded in legislation and in the administration routines. If the administrators aim at finding a quick, easy and cheap process, it is obvious that the bureaucratic way is, at least in the short term, the more favourable. The communicative model of decision-making in shoreline protection would have required that the traditional and emotional aspects of land ownership be considered as a crucial starting-point of the programme. However, as the logic of administrators is based on efficiency and on scientific expertise, communicative decision-making would conflict with the instrumentally-oriented conventions adopted by the bureaucratic administration system. Over the issue of shoreline protection, landowners found themselves faced with an instrumentally-oriented logic.

The methods used to carry out the programme were chosen with the instrumentally-oriented and business-oriented landowners in mind. The presupposition was that farmers value their position as landowners only for reasons of economics, and that for this reason private land and its control can easily be compensated for with money or with exchange land (see Berge 1988, 8-10). The Ministry of the Environment acted on the assumption that Finnish shorelines are in danger and must be officially protected, and it was also assumed that private land was of merely economic value to landowners. Although the Ministry did also emphasize anthropocentric values (the future generations’ right to unbuilt shores) in its argumentation for the programme, the biocentric viewpoints were the decisive ones in launching the programme.

Jürgen Habermas (1987, 318-331) has written about the colonization of the lifeworld; meaning that the areas of instrumentally (or strategically) rational action, such as the economy and the administration, use the means that fit in with their logic, while ignoring the conventions and logic of the communicative lifeworld. The logic of the “system” forces the lifeworld to adopt its ‘alien’ logic. The strategic rationality of the administration system is clearly seen in the ways the authorities believe the landowners to think of their land. The colonization of the lifeworld is even more evident when the meanings that landowners associate with private land are compared to those of the
authorities. If landowners swallow their pride and begin to negotiate with the authorities, they will have to do business in terms of the things that are understandable to the instrumentally-oriented logic of the administrators. The landowners who value and try to maintain their cultural and subjective identity are, when confronted with the logic of the bureaucracy, forced to sell their culturally and biographically meaningful land to the state; or else to give up its full control; or else to exchange it for ‘ahistorical’ state-owned land.

The carrying out of the programme begins with a landowner’s initiative. He must contact the authorities and express willingness to start the negotiation. And this procedure too, runs counter to the traditional values of many landowners. A situation in which a landowner is compelled to do business with the ‘enemy’ is in many cases considered too humiliating. The landowner who has an urge to maintain his independence feels that he has been degraded to a status of an object. Submitting to this position would be completely in contrast with the traditional ideal of self-reliance so highly valued by many landowners. It would be giving up the corner-stone of one’s identity and way of life.

The meaning of private land can be examined in the light of the concepts ‘holy’ and ‘profane’. One interviewee crystallized this with a telling remark: “As long as the land is my own, it is holy, but once it is owned by the state I’ll shit on it!” One phenomenon that clearly indicated the division between holy and profane was the ‘revenge cuttings’ of the shoreline forests during the period when the details of the protection programme were released but the programme had not yet been confirmed by the government. Several interviewees said that the shoreline forests had traditionally been handled with more care than other forests, but when the news of the coming protection reached landowners, they in many cases cut down all the trees from shorelines. One interviewee spoke as follows: “My grand-dad told me not to cut them trees and that’s what I told my daughter, but now nothing stops me from cutting them all down, let them put me in jail if they like!” By destroying the well-kept shoreline forests, the landowners denied their subjective value. With this ‘tactics of burnt land’ the holy was degraded to the profane, and the injustice of the state was revenged.

The landowner organizations, certain political parties and about one hundred municipalities viewed the programme as an economic threat to the countryside. Several interviewees were also of the opinion that
the programme would cause economic problems for farmers, but none of them could name anyone who had suffered or would suffer from the programme. In public discussion, too, farmers have argued against the programme on purely economical grounds, and without resorting to the traditional and emotional arguments. It is, of course, possible that the farmers who have expressed their views in public belonged to the category of business-oriented landowners, but this still does not explain why traditional and emotional arguments were completely missing from public debate.

One explanation for this phenomenon could be the ‘problem of incomparable rationalities’ (Kantola 1989). It has obviously been very difficult for landowners to find powerful arguments to support their opposition to the programme. They have felt that family ties, emotions associated with the private ownership of land, or the traditional ideal of self-determination are not powerful enough as arguments, or that they do not provide rational grounds for challenging the status and expertise of the state authorities. The problem has been: how to build your argumentation on the basis of value-rational family ties and the need for self-determination when confronted with a bureaucratic institution that is acting in an instrumentally rational way and claims to be representing the common good and ecological values. Another reason why the traditional landowners’ opinions have not reached the authorities is that they have been frankly unwilling to enter into negotiations with the ‘land-robbers’ of the State. For all these reasons public argumentation has been based on economic considerations and the identity of the landowner as a farmer; rather than on the traditional and emotional views associated with his identity as a landowner. One reason for the landowner identity’s remaining in the private sphere and the farmer identity’s getting public attention was the way the powerful farmer’s organization The Central Union of Agricultural and Forest Producers (MTK) represented the issue in its statements. The organization took on the role of the mouthpiece of all landowners; it organized campaigns and petitions against the programme, and helped landowners make official complaints about it. MTK represented the controversy over the programme as primarily an economic issue. The representatives of the MTK painted a sad picture of tomorrow’s countryside, where wildlife is doing well, but people have been forced to move to the towns. Basically, the MTK shared the instrumentally rational
thinking that was informing the actions of authorities. In the MTK’s view, that soon became the ‘official’ view of the farmers, the controversy was mainly about money, not about the traditions and emotions connected to private land.

What nature are we protecting?

Beside the question of different views of the meaning of private land, there is one obvious reason for the controversy over the protection of shorelines in Finland. This is the difference that exists in the way people understand the relationship between man and nature; and in the way nature is valued (Tamminen 1980). In the view of farmers, man is the caretaker and controller of nature; and nature’s value to him is primarily instrumental. This relationship to nature means in practice that even land that is not used for cultivation must, in the farmer’s opinion, carry the mark of ‘human fingerprints’. It must look well cared-for and controlled. Fallen trees and bushes, that according to environmentalists add value to the shoreline are a disgrace to a farmer; they are not nature left ‘natural’ but nature that is not being taken care of properly, unsatisfactory landscape. (Nieminen 1994, 98-104).

Whereas Ministry of the Environment stressed the importance of ecosystems and the factor of biodiversity in the areas covered by the programme, the landowners, from their vantage-point of anthropocentric control over the environment and emphasis on the aesthetic, considered the protection of these areas unnecessary, as in their opinion, the only way of keeping the shorelines ‘in good condition’, i.e. aesthetically pleasing to the farmer’s eye, is to let the landowners control the land. From these different interpretations of ‘good nature’ it followed that both the environmental authorities and the farmers regarded themselves as ‘shoreline protectors’ although they in fact were ‘protecting’ completely different aspects, or concepts, of nature. This is not only the case in shoreline protection. In a Finnish study of the environmental attitudes of Finnish farmers, 80 % of the interviewees claimed that the traditional farming is the best possible environment protection (Tauriainen & Tauriala 1991, 52). It was also difficult for farmers to understand the threat to nature that building on shorelines would cause. People owning summer cottages on shorelines usually
take care of their piece of land in a way that pleases the eye of a farmer, so in this respect the built-up and well-kept shoreline is in the farmers’ opinion still ‘good nature’. This is also to a great extent due to the fact that most farmers do not seem to make a distinction between a cultured landscape and a natural landscape. According to the interviews, and on the basis of public discussion, farmers are quite unable to adopt the biocentric or ecological viewpoint. Their anthropocentric relation to nature is based on human needs and values.

Although even the most traditional farmers do appreciate wildlife and are concerned for its well-being, their viewpoints are very closely connected to their own environment and especially to the land that they control. It gives a farmer joy to have birds singing and elk roaming in his own forest and to have clean water in his own lake. To put it simply, for a farmer nature is private; whereas for an environmentalist or an administrator carrying out nature conservation, it is public or universal.

One factor that adds to the shaping of farmers’ environmental consciousness is the centre-periphery contradiction. As the economic and societal importance of agriculture has rapidly decreased, feelings of suspicion and even despair have increased in the countryside (Tamminen 1980). Many farmers, especially now that Finland has joined the EU, feel that their means of livelihood and way of life is in danger. The suspicion felt in the periphery is mostly directed towards State policies, the environmental policy included. The centre-periphery contradiction becomes evident in landowners’ reactions to the goal-setting of the shoreline protection programme. The concept of nature that Ministry of the Environment adopts in its programme is incomprehensible to farmers. Farmers do not understand nature in terms of ecosystems and biodiversity. For them, nature is something they have adopted in the socialization process, and in their daily experiences and actions. They re-envisage their conception of nature every day as they take care of their farms and their surroundings. A situation in which the criteria for ‘good nature’ are officially defined from the centre, and protected by an official programme arouses anger among those living in the periphery. “We do not come to anybody’s living-room and tell them how it should be decorated!”, as one interviewee expressed it.
Will there be peace on Finnish shorelines?

The programme for the protection of shorelines has now been implemented for eight years, and there is still no sign of mutual understanding between the authorities and the landowners. In fact, the situation has recently become worse, as Finland is preparing its plan for the European Union’s protection network Natura 2000, that is also concerned with ecologically valuable shorelines. For the business-oriented landowners who share the environmental authorities’ instrumentally rational relationship to private land, the main problems are caused by the inadequate resources and the slow-moving timetable for carrying out the programme. When it comes to the traditional landowners the problem goes much deeper. None of the ways of carrying out the programme is good from their perspective. Selling the land to the State runs contrary to family traditions. The compensation option, where the ownership remains but the right to use the land is restricted, is in contradiction with the ideal of self-determination. And the main problem with the exchange option was expressed like this in an interview: “Where can you find as good land as your own land? Nowhere!”

Before they could approve the programme, traditional landowners would have to radically change either the way they see man’s relationship to nature or the way they see land ownership. The traditional landowner’s perceived relationship to nature should no longer be based on the control and care-taking of nature, but instead should stretch beyond the subjective experience. This might enable him to adopt a more biocentric or ‘universal’ view of nature and its organisms, so that the ecological viewpoints that are at the core of nature conservation could be recognized as necessary and valuable. In other words, the farmer-landowner’s conception of nature should change, it should come closer to that of the environmental authorities and the ecologists.

The second, and at the moment more likely change required in the world view of farmer-landowners, is a change in their attitude to private land. The traditional relation to private land and land ownership may in the near future have to make way for a more instrumental attitude. The traditionally oriented landowners may, because of the growing demands for rationalization and efficiency, have to give up the traditional values connected to their land. As business-like thinking will in
all probability spread among those willing to stay in the countryside, the landowner may be forced to consider his land as an instrument for maintaining his livelihood and way of life. Private land will, in that case, lose its intrinsic value to its owner, and will be seen as a means of ensuring continuity and not as a goal in itself. In other words the value-rationally oriented landowner’s identity must give way to a more instrumental-rational identity.

As members of society, traditional landowners naturally face the same cultural changes as the rest of their fellow citizens. As several theorists (e.g. Ziehe 1991; Giddens 1991 & 1994; Beck 1994) have argued, the traditional patterns and models of action are rapidly losing their status in a (post)modern/post-traditional society. The collisions of the “old and the new reality” (Sairinen 1996, 27) are inevitable and confusing; and they force individuals to reflect on their actions and re-define their former experiences, routines and lines of action. Life becomes an individual project in which the personal consideration of goals, resources and limitations are a constant factor and decisions can not automatically be legitimated from the outlines of the past.

There are also pressures for the environmental authorities to change: there is clearly a need for a more communicative and pluralistic orientation and for a greater effort to identify and deal with the various cultural and social contents involved in environmental issues. The Finnish Ministry of the Environment’s policy in shoreline protection had a very centralized and non-communicative character, and undoubtedly this policy was in itself one reason for landowners’ negative attitudes to shoreline protection.

Note

1 The article is based on a paper presented at the ISA 14th World Congress of Sociology in Montreal, Canada on the 31th of July 1998; and on an article published in the Finnish journal Sociologia Vol. 33,4/1996.
References


Andrew C. Sparkes & Martti Silvennoinen (eds.)

Talking Bodies

Men’s Narratives of the Body and Sport

This book contains stories which are experienced and written by ten white, middle-class, academic men and one woman from Australia, Finland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the USA. What is it that brings authors separated by such long distances together to write stories? Why have these stories been told?

All are based on autobiographical narratives stemming from the authors’ own experiences or from their interpretations of stories told by other men. Many of the story-tellers are ex-athletes, so to speak, able-bodied men. But, what happens when this feeling of masculinity begins to change or even disappear? What does it mean when a familiar body becomes troublesome, disruptive, alien, or even anguished?

This book opens an interesting and fresh avenue in the ‘city’ of gender studies. It is a rather unusual book in the field of social science – unusual in a positive sense. The book can be recommended to students and teachers working in fields engaged, whether practically or theoretically, with the living body.


The 1990s has been a decade in which Finnish social work research has blossomed. The research has been searching for its identity in “the age of uncertainty”, and has constructed the conditions for its development. It has not settled for merely observing occurrences, rather it has begun to de- and reconstruct its own subjects of research. It possesses characteristically strong aspirations, which aim at locating the specificity of the professional, interactive, as well as social and ethical aspects of social work.

This book offers an representative sample of social work research in Finland, which is specifically aimed at an international audience. The book illustrates the development and application of the research methodological solutions and innovations of ten social work researchers. In addition, it includes a chapter analysing the methodological tensions in current research.


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