Paul-Erik Korvela, Kari Palonen & Anna Björk (eds.)

THE POLITICS OF WORLD POLITICS

[SoPhi]
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On August 21st 2015 Pekka Korhonen, Professor of World Politics at the University of Jyväskylä, reaches the age of 60 years. In order to celebrate the event and pay homage to Pekka’s career, this collection of articles was edited. Keeping in mind Pekka’s research interests in world politics and other forms of political science, the book is aptly named “The Politics of World Politics”. One part of the Jyväskylä profile is to avoid a strict dividing line between different ‘subfields’ in the study of politics, and also the PhD theses supervised by Pekka would not elsewhere always be counted to world politics or international relations. The interest in rhetoric, languages, concepts and narratives is part of the Jyväskylä profile, but Pekka’s own and inimitable colour enriches this profile to an important direction.

Pekka’s MA thesis on Hans Morgenthau (1983) deconstructs a lot of the textbook view on Morgenthau, which is no mere caricature but completely misleading for those who know Morgenthau’s early work in international law in German and French. Johan Galtung was the next author Pekka was studying in his licentiate thesis. In Galtung’s work, in the early study on Gandhi’s political ethics and Galtung’s work on Japan and China in the 1970s we can also detect the origins of the ‘Asian turn’ of Pekka Korhonen’s work, based on 2-year scholarship to Japan from 1987 to 1989. With his 1992 dissertation, in revised form published by Routledge in 1994 and the follow-up work on pacific romances (1998), Pekka created the groundwork for his later internationally recognised research profile, the appointment to professor at the University
of Jyväskylä (from January 2004) and numerous research visits above all in Japan and China.

The book includes contributions from his colleagues within the confines of world politics, Asian studies and political theory, all very broadly understood. Despite of belonging to the Festschrift-genre, this collection of articles is a genuine contribution to the debates of world politics, its limitations, boundaries and theories. Given Pekka’s interest in Asia and geopolitics, the collection also includes articles addressing these topics.

As has been common in Jyväskylä political science, politics in this collection is considered an aspect in lieu of a strictly defined sector. Therefore the articles address a wide variety of issues that can be considered relevant to world politics – even the very notions of ”world” and ”politics” are scrutinized in the articles, and emphasis is also given to translating of concepts and naming of practices.

In Helsinki and Berlin,

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I
Introduction

Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) saw the roots of war deep in the historical development of the humankind, social and intellectual structures of national societies, the nature of state, and inter-state relations. For him, wars have to be accounted primarily by the deep cultural, economic and technological forces that shape social action. More specifically, the risk of war increases when the demands of the economy and the resistance of the old political structures collide. The risk is particularly acute when the economic and technological advance have strengthened the autocratic state which has not yet, however, been pushed to the road of political and administrative reforms.

Much of the responsibility for warfare has, in Veblen’s view, to be attributed to the predatory to dynastic State. Veblen contrasts two social types, the predatory and the peaceful, which are manifested, respectively, in aggressive behavior and the workmanship and economic efficiency. He considers these two main social types successive phases of human development from the barbarian to the industrialized society. Obvi-
ously these societies are on different levels of economic development, but they can also be distinguished by the extent to which predatory and peaceful instincts prevail in society. Veblen was influenced to various degrees by biological, technological, and material factors, which were close to Marxist thinking. He can hardly be regarded as Marxist, however, but rather an institutional and evolutionary thinker. As opposed to the supporters of utilitarian and deductive methods, Veblen was both in his personal behavior and intellectual thinking a determined anti-conservative who emphasized the staying power of social institutions. He saw the world in which big business and imperialism was taking over peaceful interests. Veblen regarded, however, capitalism and patriotism as neutral institutions which could evolve both in predatory or benign directions (Tilman 1993: xvii-xviii; Hodgson 1998).

Veblen was not the only scholar who considered the growing momentum of war in the turn of the 20th century as the clash between archaic social and political structures of society and the demands of technological and commercial forces, i.e. capitalism. The capitalist mode of production, especially financial capitalism, favored peace rather than war, while traditional social and political structures, i.e. remnants of feudalism, harbored expansive and aggressive instincts. Under such pressures the navy and air force were liberal and internationalist in their orientation, while the army retained in its ideology many of its feudalist roots as expressed in the dominance of the agricultural elites, such as the Junkers in Germany, in the army leadership. These elites were empowered, without shedding their ideological roots, by the products of new destructive and expansive technologies, such as railroads and telecommunication as well as modern artillery, submarines and dreadnoughts. The old ideologies prevailed in society which had vastly more destructive forces at their disposal and were, at the same time, opposed by emerging anti-system forces such as the working-class movement (Väyrynen 1988 and the literature quoted there).

The evolutionary aspect probably came to Veblen from his teacher at Yale, William Graham Sumner, whose work in the 1880s and 1890s paved way to the rise of sociology as an academic discipline. Veblen was no systematic scholar, but deeply influenced by the trends of time, but always opposed to political and academic orthodoxies. He was in-
fluenced by Herbert Spencer’s biologism, but criticized the conservative use of his thinking. Veblen, fluent in French and German, wrote reviews of several seminal European works of socialism and was briefly attracted by the Soviet endeavors in the turn of the 1920’s, but never converted to them. He also read widely Immanuel Kant and Max Weber, but was critical of many tenets of their thinking; in particular considering Kant to lack realism in his oeuvres. If we want to characterize in Veblen in some manner, he can be considered a Social Democrat who always emphasized the value of individual agents who were embedded deep biological and technological forces.

There are controversial accounts on Veblen’s life which are made possible by his nomadism from one university to another (studies at Johns Hopkins, Yale and Cornell, and then teaching positions, mostly temporary, at Chicago, Stanford, Missouri, and the New School of Social Research. The alleged reason for this nomadism were genuine and complex difficulties in his two marriages which the Victorian morality of the American universities of the time did not tolerate. Things were further complicated by the struggles in the emerging discipline of economics and Veblen’s own inaccessible personality. Dorfman (1966 [1934]), provides the standard and critical interpretation of Veblen’s life, while Jorgensen & Jorgensen (1999) show a much better understanding of Veblen’s personal and social difficulties. There are even efforts to bury Veblen’s ideas by arguing, for instance, that his dichotomies of business and industry as well as pecuniary and technological criteria were false (Reisman 2012). It has to be realized that Veblen’s nomadism was as much due to prevailing orthodoxies in the American academe which made not only his personal idiosyncracies unpalatable, but also the unconventional nature of his concepts and methods look deviant from the mainstream. Partly has Veblen to thank for his well-known conservative mentors, such as J. Lawrence Laughlin and John Bates Clark, who realized his brilliance. Veblen stresses the need of the human species to continuously adapt themselves – by means of variation, selection, and survival – to natural and social environments. For this purpose, man has to use industriously his pivotal resources, i.e. intelligence, workmanship, and institution-building (Tilman 1996: 59–62).

Veblen evolutionary perspective was based on Sumner, who postu-
lated that human beings are engaged in a continuing struggle for resources ("competition of life") which gives rise both to violence and the need to organize them into social collectivities, i.e. "war forms larger social units and produces states". War has, thus, a key role in the human evolution and provides, because of its wasteful nature, an account for the slowness of that evolution. To get rid of the wasteful practices of war and militarism, societies have to industrialize. In other words, "a peaceful society must be industrial because it must produce instead of plundering ... the industrial type of society is the opposite of the militant type" (Sumner 1911: the quotations are on pp. 9, 15, 28). This view resembles Morris's distinction between productive and unproductive wars in which the former builds up empires and the latter plunders resources. The productive wars lead to the formation of Leviathans which assures more peaceful life for its citizens (Morris 2014). Such a view was not, of course, entirely new; as Raymond Aron (1958) has shown, the idea about the incompatible nature of military and industrial societies can be traced back to at least Saint-Simon and Comte. Veblen stresses the wasteful nature of military spending which becomes, during the wartime, an alternative to the wasteful "conspicuous consumption" which he considered superfluous lifestyle of the rich (Veblen 1939: 244-46).

Usually, evolutionary and dialectical thinking are considered antithetical to each other. Yet, Veblen seems to be able to hold both of these views. Despite his explicit commitment to biological evolutionism as a model for social development, his theory of social change is in many respects dialectical in nature. In addition, the penchant for evolutionary thinking did not mean that Veblen would have seen the human being as a passive agent of history. To the contrary, he condemned such views in classical economics as "hedonism" and spoke for the importance of the individual self-realization (and especially of the emancipation of women). Only by being an active social agent, the individual can acquire technical knowledge and skills without which economic development is not possible; money and profit alone were inadequate to this task. The variation in social institutions was influenced more by the stage of development achieved than the existence of several divergent historical processes that converged in a particular institution (Pagano 2000: 109-11).
Veblen’s theory of social change is both material and dialectical, but it is not dialectical materialism in the Marxist mold. It is a materialistic theory in the sense that all development, from hunting through agriculture to industry, has had a technological basis which, in turn, interacts with the existing institutions of society. The dialectical in Veblen’s theoretical system means that social transformation grows out of the contradiction between the social requirements of new technologies and the staying power of existing institutions. He also assigns political values to these key forces of social and economic change; technology tends to be progressive and institutions conservative defenders of the vested interests (Dente 1977: 7-9).

Among the social institutions, property rights play the key role. For Veblen, the inviolability of private property is not only a legal category, but a social and moral phenomenon created by capitalism and protected by the state. Private property is an institution that confers not only money, but also social status and reputation to the wealthy. In other words, conspicuous consumption and the “possession of wealth has become the basis of commonplace reputability and of a blameless social standing” (Veblen 1975:29). The emphasis on social rather than economic factors means, as Paul Sweezy has noted, that Veblen’s theory of capitalism is political, not economic (Sweezy 1958: 188–89).

Private property is obviously meaningless if it is not associated with the accumulation of capital which puts the wealthy apart from the rest; not only by the amount of the money, but also their distinct, wasteful lifestyle. Conspicuous consumption is, in turn, linked up with the “pecuniary culture” which relies on the business system based on profit rather than innovation and production. The latter culture is, to use Veblen’s words, characterized by “workmanship”. To understand the centrality of the tension between the pecuniary and workmanship activities, one has to take the historical aspect of social and economic change seriously. Veblen’s theory of history distinguishes four main stages of development; i.e., peaceful savage community, the predatory hunting culture, small-scale industrialization (handicraft), and the era of machine industry. In the savage state, the technology of human communities is
so rudimentary that people do not have energy to fight and, therefore, they have to cooperate with each other to earn their living. In the predatory phase, tools are developed to such an extent that people can produce goods beyond their own needs.

The expansion of handicraft production makes society again more peaceful and this trend continues with the transition to the machine production. Obviously, societies are not completely peaceful, but the primacy of the profit motive pushes their members to cooperate in order to maximize their pecuniary gains. In Veblen’s theory, the beginnings of capitalism can be traced to the handicraft era instead of feudalism (Marx) or religious beliefs (Weber). In the handicraft phase of development, individualistic craft workers broke out of the guild system and other feudal obligations, and created a new class of entrepreneurs. However, their work was too labor-intensive and lacked the economies of scale which made it necessary to introduce machinery and result, thus, in the transition to the era of machine production (Diggins 1999: 86-94; Seckle 1975: 63-67).

Veblen put a strong emphasis on the progressive nature of industrial and technological development which was stimulated and sustained by the “workmanship”. This concept does not refer only to material productivity or technical skills, but it has also a social and cultural dimension; workmanship is an “instinct” that is imbued with a purpose, a habit of getting things done. In this sense, workmanship is based on teleological action that has become a goal as such; “efficient use of the means at hand and adequate management of the resources available for the purposes of life is itself an end of endeavor”. To produce ratification, workmanship must be directed, though, to “proximate rather than ulterior ends” (Veblen 1914).

The workmanship emerged with the small-scale industrialization and was carried over to the phase of machine production. Veblen sees industry, and its workmanship, in positive terms, contrasting it with business and the “pecuniary economy”. Industry creates new skills and social values, while the pecuniary economy is engaged in speculation and profit-making without being concerned with the long-term wealth of the society. In today’s words, the pecuniary economy is a “casino capitalism”, while workmanship refers to productivity and competitiveness.
In Veblens’ writings, the dichotomy between business and industry is of central importance and, at the same time, a key element in his dialectical thinking. No wonder that those critical of the Veblenian scheme have repeatedly assailed the theoretical and empirical validity of this distinction (Tilman 1992; Reisman 2012).

Business tries to dominate industry in the effort to control the conditions and operations of the market and, thus, maximize profits. This is not necessarily in the interest of the broader community that “is best served by a facile and uninterrupted interplay of various processes which make up the industrial system”. On the other hand, the “pecuniary interests” are not necessarily “best served by an unbroken maintenance of the industrial balance”. In fact, for the business people, gain may come “from a given disturbance of the system.” If industrial activities are managed primarily with the market, other than production and technology in mind, the business interests become separated from those of the community. Thus, business may profit from restrictive market practices, while industry suffers from them. In other words, pecuniary business is not necessarily good for the economic efficiency and production (Veblen 1978: 27-30, 186-92; see also Dente 1977: 64-70).

Veblen is not opposed to economic centralization as such; he sees one part of it as a natural consequence of the technological development and speaks approvingly of the “captains of industry”. The problem for Veblen is that the original industrial leadership has “passed into alien hands”, namely those of a businessman. Business managers became absentee owners and started to control the production with only the price and profit in mind. On the other hand, the original, “good” captains of industry “fell to second rank, became lieutenants” (Veblen 1923).

The distinction between business and industry is closely related to that made between institutions and technology; among the former, those of the private property and profit dominate, while the latter is a product of the “machine process”. In the era of handicraft industry, individual producer could still be a successful businessman without hampering progress, but with the rise of giant conglomerates and global markets this ceased to be the case. As a result, the “continually changing and advancing industrial technology came to be incompatible with the static business institutions” (Friday 1968: 22). The business class became
more conservative and retained predatory properties and practices. This point is an example of Veblen’s general theory on the conservation of archaic traits in which factors over the previous historical phases are carried over to the contemporary era (Veblen 1975: 229-31; see also Dente 1977: 32-35).

Veblen’s thinking is not easy to categorize due to its complexity and several internal inconsistencies. He has been often characterized as a progressive and even radical thinker. To prove this, Veblen’s permissive attitude towards the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and active involvement in radical politics during World War I have been cited as evidence (Jorgensen & Jorgensen 1999: 157). On the other hand, Veblen was skeptical of all received wisdom and adopted even a technocratic view of the economy in his emphasis on industrialization, “workmanship”, and the role of engineers in the economy.

The technocratic elitism of Veblen is most visible in his *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921) in which he advocates the establishment of a kind of republic of the engineers that would rule nation in a rational manner and spread the instinct of workmanship to the society. This suggestion has received ample criticism for being undemocratic or impossible to implement. It has been also regarded as a call for a contra-revolution in which the Marxian class struggle is replaced by the rule of a technocratic elite. More fruitfully, Veblen’s argument can be considered an extension of his more general view that technological and industrial development has a measure of *Eigendynamik* which would, in due time, lead to the power of experts and which would curtail the dominance of the pecuniary business interests ultimately undermining the productive basis and morale of the society (Gould 1966; Tilman 1996: 168-77).

**Theory of War and Peace**

For Veblen, war was rooted in the predatory behavior of social entities which have access to surplus resources that can be converted into weapons and other instruments of expansion. In his historical scheme there are three peaceful phases of development, i.e., savagery, handicraft industrialization, and machine industrialization. On the other, predatory
hunting culture and, at least to some extent, pecuniary business culture are inclined to expansion and aggression. Though Veblen is unclear on this point, he seems to think that predatory culture was consolidated by feudalism into more stable political structures which were, in turn, transformed into dynastic states. In other words, the dynastic nature of states can be traced back to feudal establishments which were “of predatory origin and of irresponsible character” (Veblen 1998: 9).

This statement is a part of Veblen’s more general view; with the rise of the nation state, the allegiance of people shifted from sub-national loyalties to the national sovereign. In so doing, “the sense of national solidarity and of feudal loyalty and service have coalesced, to bring this people to that climax of patriotic devotion” (Veblen 1998: 98-99)

Veblen is unequivocal in his argument that states, and especially dynastic states, are the prime culprits of warfare; “state-making was a competitive enterprise of war and politics, in which the rival princely or dynastic establishments, all and several, each sought its own advantage at the cost of any whom it might concern”. Veblen does not have a nice word to say about the dynastic statesmen, whose game is of “force and fraud” and whose relations are characterized by an “all-pervading spirit of enmity and distrust” (Veblen 1923: 22-24). He is convinced that the dynastic states strive for “imperial dominion”; for them “no cost is too high so long as ultimate success attends the imperial enterprise” (Veblen 1998: 82-83). In other words, feudal and dynastic forces in society are not only prepared in principle, but also committed in practice to promote their own interests and manage their mutual relations by the constant use of military force.

The social instinct for war did not end, however, with the democratization of society. The common people had been pervaded by the military spirit which assured their allegiance to the dynastic rulers. These habits were carried over also to the new democratic era in which the doctrine of national integrity was one of the key elements. Instead of being a benevolent phenomenon, the “national integrity of hate, mischief and distrust has been ground into to the texture of civilized life ...and carried over intact and unabated into the ideals of the democratic commonwealth”. As a result, the “democratic corporations of national statesmen continue to carry on the traffic of war and politics on the
same lines and by the use of the same means and methods as the dynastic statesmen of the era of state-making” (Veblen 1923: 25).

Veblen’s dark view of the democratic corporations does not mean, though, that he would consider democracy per se as a cause of war. This role of a culprit belongs rather to the profit-driven business which has made sure that “a constitutional government is also a business government”. This is due to the fact that the parliamentary process does not question the primacy of business interests, such as the freedom of contract and private property. To the contrary, democratic government means the “representation of business interests” and is, therefore, “under the surveillance of business interests” (Veblen 1978: 284-87).

However, business interests cannot retain their primacy for long if the state is involved in a “protracted warlike endeavor” as it means a shift from “business advantage to dynastic ascendancy and courtly honor”. As a result, “business interests fall to the position of fiscal ways and means” (Veblen 1978: 299-301). This means the emergence of nationalistic and militaristic alliance between business and dynastic state of which the latter will emerge as the winner. For business, a protracted involvement in the war economy may be disastrous as its capacity to compete in the open market is diminished. Thus, whatever peaceful potential business has, disappears in its acquiescence in the expansive habits of the dynastic state. At the end of the road there is the collapse of capitalism either because of the socialist revolution or the suffocation by nationalistic militarism (Veblen 1978: 292-93; Friday 1968: 33-37).

Veblen is very clear about the aggressive nature of dynastic political units and considers the main threat of war to come from those states that have not yet started or completed the constitutional transition. As people have no natural inclination to fight, they “by easy neglect drift into peaceable habits of thought, and some come habitually to think of human relations, even of international relations, in terms of peace, if not of amity”. On the other hand, the ruling elite, especially the dynastic one, does not distinguish between public conduct and private interests; for this elite “patriotism, piracy and prerogative converge to a common issue” (Veblen 1939: 60). Common people, on the other hand, tend to be peaceful, although they lack the necessary independence and resources to change the elite’s penchant for aggression.
Veblen equivocates about the impact of international trade on peace and war. In the end, he tends to see trade as a peace-producing factor, but only after a state has established by war adequate conditions for its lucrative conduct. War is needed to pacify barbarians and revise the peace terms with the contending states in order to make trade more profitable (Veblen 1978: 296). To promote trade by military means, one has to acquire weapons which easily leads to a more intense military competition. Such a rivalry is based on cumulative character of arms races and focuses on the comparative size of armies and arsenals. Another destabilizing phenomenon before World War I was the shift of technology to favor offense at the expense of defense (Veblen 1978: 297-99; Veblen 1998: 17-18, 25-27).

Veblen has a theory of war in which states and state-making play a key role. This was not, of course, a novel idea, but authors like Werner Sombart had developed a similar line of analysis. It is even less novel today, when there is an ample literature on the role of war in state-making. It has been shown, both by historical and statistical research, how state-making was a bloody process which involved both political and military struggles among contending political units. The preparations for war forced political clans to collect taxes, recruit troops, and procure weapons which all called for a more centralized political unit, the state, that often was dynastic in nature (e.g., Jaggers 1992). These scholars corroborate the macro-historical argument about the military origins of state that Veblen developed for a hundred years ago; yet none of them makes any reference to his work.

Veblen also has a certain tendency to attribute war to capitalism, but not in any simple manner. Business is attracted to war as it could improve access to the markets and increase profitability. Capitalism is not, however, directly a cause of war, but because it was subordinated to the institutional legacy of the dynastic state. Business becomes a handmaiden of the aggressiveness and expansionism of such state and may have to operate even against its own economic interests. In essence, Veblen agrees with Joseph A. Schumpeter that imperialism and war result from atavistic political forces that have been carried over from feudalism to the early 20th century state. (Schumpeter 1951; see also Väyrynen 2000).

A comparative study of the theories of imperialism by Schumpet-
er and Veblen suggests that while there are similarities between them, there are also major differences. Schumpeter’s rational mode of analysis is contrasted by Veblen’s social view which puts emphasis on the impact of imperialism on the “common man”. Schumpeter considers that the grip of the atavistic imperial interests on business is waning, while Veblen stresses more strongly the staying power of the dynastic politics. As we have seen, he considers the merger between dynastic and capitalist interests quite possible and even likely. So, in Veblen’s view, imperialism has a brighter future, but, unlike Lenin and Luxemburg, he conceptualizes it largely as a political phenomenon supported by the business interests and presumably opposed by the industry (Cramer & Leathers 1993).

Thus, even if people are peaceful by their inclination, the state leaders has any number of means, from propaganda to coercion, to promote a militaristic mind set among them. In fact, militarism is a pervasive feature of dynastic states and it is not alien to democratic states, either. Veblen did not believe in the ability of the public opinion to stop the war; in effect, that opinion may make it even more likely. In any case, when war, even an aggressive one, threatens to break out, the government can count on the patriotic support of the citizens (who have a tendency to make the political and military leaders popular heros). Yet, people gain materially very little, if anything at all, from their undivided loyalty to the rulers and their policy of military and economic expansion. In that sense, they are cheated by the political leaders (Veblen 1998: 22–23; Veblen 1923: 36–38).

Veblen has a theory of war, but does he have a theory of peace? To begin with; he is adamant that states can never establish a permanent peace, but an armistice at best. A more permanent peace “will have to come about irrespective of governmental management” (Veblen 1998: 7). He does not develop that argument further, but focuses almost exclusively on the role of states in the search for peace. Veblen’s favorite idea is the “peace of neutrals” in which such states adopt a tolerant attitude towards other similar nations, a sort of security community, which is sustainable as long as the neutral nations can maintain their “national prestige” (Veblen 1998: 107, 178–232).

Dynastic states are always expansionist; the only question is when
they strike, where, and how? Veblen is convinced that territorial and economic expansion is a part of the DNA of the dynastic states; “as lies in the nature of the dynastic State, imperial dominion, in the ambitions of both, is beyond price; so that no cost is too high so long as ultimate success attends the imperial enterprise” (Veblen 1998: 82-83). The big problem is whether the league of neutral states can exist as a peace-building factor in the presence of expansionist dynastic states. Veblen’s answer is very tentative. He thinks that in some circumstances, peaceful defensive states may survive even if there are aggressive states in the international system. Ultimately, there are only two alternatives; submission to the dominance of the dynastic states or their elimination (Veblen 1998: 83-84).

In many respects, Veblen is a cynical thinker in the best Machtpolitik tradition. This is reflected strongly in his views on peace which is, most of the time, only a prelude to the next war; in fact, most of the wars are fought in the name of preserving peace. The precarious nature of peace has been inherited, in his view, from the feudal era in which war had an intermittent and ritual character. Veblen does not have any favorite solution to maintain peace; in his time, he regarded balance of power as obsolete and scorned the Angellian view that wars have become economically counterproductive. True, there are peaceful and defensive nations in the world, but aggressive dynastic states push also them to acquire weapons and thus participate in the arms race (Veblen 1998: 72-73, 77-80, 299-303).

Veblen’s theory of war suggests that any peace plan is facing an uphill struggle: “among civilized peoples only those nations can be counted on consistently to keep the peace who are so feeble or otherwise so placed as to be cut off from hope of national gain” (Veblen 1998: 78). In other words, states are kept at bay in their external relations only by the lack of resources or of opportunities. Because of this, wars are usually fought between major powers which can be divided into two categories; “those which may safely be counted on spontaneously to take the offensive, and those which will fight on provocation” (Veblen 1998: 79). This distinction reflects a deeper dichotomy between two different value systems; “impersonal commonwealth” and “dynastic ascendancy of which the latter can easily “engineer” wars of aggression, such as the
German attack on France in 1870-71 and the Boer War in South Africa (Veblen 1998: 105-106).

Another potential factor of peace for Veblen is the modern industry and technology which installs the ethic of workmanship and productivity in economic life. Machine industry, and cultural growth related to it, gives rise to a skeptical, materialistic, and unpatriotic mode of thinking, while business people think in conventional and conservative terms dictated to them by the primacy of the market and property. Moreover, the difference between the business and industrial classes seems to be widening as machine industry undermines the natural-rights tenets of business capitalism. These liberal rights cannot be reinstated by war and coercion; therefore, because of the prevalence of Machtpolitik, “business principles cannot win in the long run”. Even if an effort is made to maintain the primacy of the market-oriented capitalism, the a gradual shift is taking place from business interests to warlike and dynastic interests. The eventual outcome, though undesirable, is not clouded by uncertainty; it will be the “rehabilitation of the ancient patriotic animosity and dynastic loyalty” (Veblen 1978: 317-2,375-76, 394-95).

Veblen appears to be saying that the business class has betrayed its original ideals and become an instrument of national politics, an ally of the dynastic state. Patriotism is the glue that holds business and state together, while the military establishment creates a disciplinary system, underpinned by schools and press, which keeps the population in line. Veblen notes that the initial motive of the old dynastic and modern warlike policies are different, but their social and political consequences tend to be similar. His harsh judgement is that “habituation to a warlike, predatory scheme of life is the strongest disciplinary factor that can be brought to counteract the vulgarization of modern life wrought by peaceful industry and the machine process, and to rehabilitate the decaying sense of status and differential dignity” (Veblen 1978: 391-93).

This statement is not unlike those views, primarily in Germany, that consider war a way of purifying Volksseele and restoring in that way its vitality.

Over time, Veblen grew increasingly pessimistic about the ability of modern industry to pave way to a permanent peace. Yet, Veblen did not quite accept the argument, proposed by his follower, Lewis Murnford,
that mass industrial production was a close ally of militarization. According to this view, war is both the instrument of the ruling class to create the state, but it also fosters innovation, standardizes production, and reorganizes factories (Mumford 1963: 85-96). Yet, Veblen had to accept that business was taking over industry which could not be treated in isolation; now, “the complex of nations and of international relations is a single, not a twofold one”. In this new condition, it has become “impossible for any community to stand peaceably outside of the great complex of nations” (Veblen 1978: 305-306).

In the early 20th century, industry had been losing its peaceful capabilities due to the rise of protectionism, which has been converted into imperialism that is “dynastic politics under a new name”. The rulers were using trade to promote their expansive military aims which were supposed to serve, in turn, the mercantile economic interests and did not benefit the “common man” (Veblen 1923: 35). In Veblen’s opinion there was hardly any doubt that trade followed the flag rather than the other way around.

Those who have seen in Veblen mostly a Marxist radical, have made much of his short love affair with the October revolution in Russia. Yet, one should not overemphasize the depth of his commitment. In Veblen’s view, Bolshevism is also a simplistic doctrine that is easy to propagate and learn by the ordinary people who have nothing to lose in the revolution. Veblen’s interest in Bolshevism was probably due to their commitments to abolish private property, the mainstay of the business class, and initially play down the Russian nationalism. This attitude is reflected in his comment that “Bolshevism is a menace” as it threatens the vested interests and “aims to carry democracy and majority rule over into the domain of industry”; in that sense, it is also a menace to private property. This comment helps to understand why Veblen decided to see the political and military moves of the Bolsheviks as subordinate to their economic program which, he thought, was making progress. In short, Bolsheviks were interesting because they intended to create an alternative to the capitalist society (Veblen 1934a). Though Veblen had political blind spots, he realized that Bolshevism was also an ideological menace. For this reason, they prompted the Western powers to build up their military capabilities. Such a prowess fosters popular patriotism and
obedience and, in that way, props up capitalism based on absentee ownership. This reaction was instrumental as it helped to revive previous political allegiances that helped the business class to stave off the spread of Bolshevism (Veblen 1934b; see also Friday 1968: 44-45).

Over time, Veblen, as most other prominent scholars, acquired a tendency to interpret other theories and doctrines in the light of his own ideas. Thus the Bolshevik revolution was for him a huge effort to “discard the absentee ownership”. That the Bolsheviks also displaced democracy was no major problem as parliaments have, in any case, turned out to be ineffective in curtailing the power of vested interests. Using this benchmark, Veblen makes a distinction between the Socialists, who have wanted to maintain many of the key features of the “Old Order”, and Bolsheviks who are demolishing its institutions. Veblen’s sympathy was obviously on the Bolshevik side. In this context, it has been noted that, for Veblen, Bolshevism was “another name for the industrial republic” which was his key intellectual and political preoccupation (Dorfman 1966: 420-21).

In addition to the factors mentioned above, Veblen must have been attracted to the technocratic aspect of the Bolshevik revolution which made, in his lifetime, a transition towards the planned economy and forced the massive production of machinery for the needs of agriculture and industry. The new Soviet system encouraged workmanship and productivity and gave an opportunity for engineers to rise to the top of the political power. As we know from the later history of the Soviet Union, it developed into a sort of technocratic democracy, but went on to crush all classes, including engineers, which threatened to challenge the party elite. Veblen’s blindness to the realities of the Soviet Union has been explained by the fact that he never “developed a theory of politics or power” (Diggins 1999: 194-96, 201-204; see also Diggins 1978: 204-206).

**Imperial Powers**

As has been noted above, Veblen made a strict distinction between predatory states and industrial states. The former were ruled by dynastic, ex-
pansive interests which lusted to wage war with other states, while the latter were developing a rational, peaceful approach toward the world. In his work on imperial powers Veblen was an early comparativist, making a clear distinction between Germany and Japan on the one hand and Britain and, to a lesser degree, France on the other in the effort to juxtapose their historical paths of development.

In the British development, a key factor was both the early cultural development and industrial revolution compared with the continental Europe, especially Germany. The critical difference was in the pace of development; the British had time to adjust to new machine production, while in Germany the transition was much more abrupt. Obviously, Veblen’s comparative approach was rudimentary, but yet his analysis bears interesting resemblance to the work by Barrington Moore (who also makes a couple of passing references to Veblen; see Moore 1966). The preliminary nature of Veblen’s comparative approach is seen in the fact that he failed to consider several countries, perhaps especially Italy, which had potential relevance for his main theses about the relationship between industrial and political development (Diggins 1999: 196-201).

Germany

Veblen published his major work on Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution in 1915. Its prescience is shown by the reissue of the book, of all the years, in 1939 just before the start of a new war (Henry Wallace was, by the way, one of its reviewers). At the very outset, Veblen dismisses any racial explanations of the German development and policies by noting that its population is not ethnically any different from those of the neighboring countries. Instead of race, there is a national history, a “national trait”, that helps to account for the rise of the German culture and institutions (Veblen 1998: 90-91). Therefore, any explanations of the German development must be sought from its political, economic, and social history. In so doing, Veblen traces the German development through various phases of his historical scheme; from the savage economy to industrial capitalism.

Among the Germans, Veblen found a “spirit of subordination and “surviving feudalistic animus of fealty and subservience” that under-
pinned the dynastic ambitions of the ruling classes. To some extent, this animus has been a source of strength for the German state, but it may have, on the other hand, also restrained innovation and progress. Politically, Veblen is critical of the German system, although the book is generally written in a neutral language. The critical tone is evident in the statement that this “spirit of subservient alacrity on which the Prussian system of administrative efficiency rests is beneath the human dignity of a free man; that is a spirit of a subject, not of a citizen”. Such a national mentality is “except for dynastic uses a defect and delinquency” (Veblen 1939: 60–61, 70). Comments of this type indicate that Veblen considered the German imperialism to be an instinct rather than a rational policy; it grew out of the dynastic ambitions rather than served any specific policy goals or the interests of the populace (Semmel 1993: 125–26).

Veblen puts in his analyses a premium on technological advance which “enforces a larger scale of industry and trade, as well as a larger and more expensive equipment and strategy in the art of war”. In addition, technology and industry force the dynastic state to expand territorially and reorganize its administration as its own territorial scale becomes inadequate (Veblen 1939: 78–79). While economic development strengthens the state and its capacity to pursue expansionist policies, war also props up the state; “the experience of war induces a warlike frame of mind, and the pursuit of war, being an exercise in the following of one’s leader and execution of arbitrary orders, induces an animus of enthusiastic subservience and unquestioning obedience to authority. What is a “military organisation in war is a servile organisation in peace” (Veblen 1939: 81–82). If the peacetime industrial organization was undemocratic, wartime industry was doubly so.

In Veblen’s analysis, the roots of the dynastic state in Germany can be traced back to Frederick the Great. He integrated the state, the army, and the landowning estate into a coherent political bloc which inherited its military tradition from mediaeval militarism. The strength of this bloc can be, in part, explained by the fact that Prussia (or Germany) experienced never before World War I a successful political revolution. The rapid expansion of the German industry in the second half of the 19th century augmented further the political and military reach of the
dynastic state run by the Prussian Junkers. Over a short term, the rapid appropriation of technology may leave the society and culture unaltered, but, over a long term, such consequences cannot be avoided.

The nature of the Prussian/German dynastic state is centralized and personalistic, and sovereignty rests with the emperor. The prevalence of such a political rule in the industrial society is problematic; “personal dominion is essentially incongruous with the logic and perspective of the modern culture, and is therefore systematically incompatible with its ascendancy”. Because of this structural tension, the “warlike-dynastic diversion ...is presumably of a transient nature”. The dilemma is that the dynastic state cannot get along without the machine industry, but is, at the same time, undermined by its economic and cultural effects (Veblen 1939: 269-71). For this reason changes must come as Germany’s dynamic-capitalist development is racing both against time, i.e. against herself, and other nations (Ozveren 2000: 161-66; see also Veblen 1939: 261-62)

Veblen’s analysis of Germany represents, in fact, a much broader tradition to interpret its politics. From Eckart Kehr’s Primat der Innenpolitik on it has been pointed out that the German way of war reflected its capitalist industrial development and its relationship with the nature of the political rule in the country. In Germany, the Industriestaat and political Herrschaft stood in a complex and conflictual relationship to each other. The social frictions between have been considered by many as a chief cause of World War I and, subsequently, the rise of Hitler (for a discussion of the pertinent literature, see Väyrynen 1988).

Inspired by both Veblen and Schumpeter, Arno Mayer has generalized the economic-political dilemma to account for the European politics before World War I in which military offensiveness, propped up by the new industrial might, became the policy of landed, autocratic elites to compete with their counterparts in other countries and, at the same time, dope the rising social classes by patriotism (Mayer 1981). In fact, his work is a good example of the use of Veblen’s dialectical and dynamic method to account for the domestic roots of external war and aggression.

Earlier on, I referred to Veblen’s comparison between the British and German experiences. His conclusion is that the British industrial tran-
sition was easier as it had more time to mature and, in the absence of major wars, the country was able to put it roots down. In this process, the geopolitical isolation of Britain was obviously important, and perhaps even decisive. In addition, “the collapse of autocracy and the decay of coercive surveillance” helped to create a liberal political atmosphere in which a material economic order and innovation prospered. On the other hand, the “German enterprise has had to make its way under the competition of other industrial countries” and in compressed time scale (Veblen 1939: 97-101, 111-12). The latter argument resembles, of course, Friedrich List’s well-known analysis in which the unification and protection of the German economy was advocated in reference to the dominance of the British economic power and free-trade ideology (it has to be noted, though, that Veblen nowhere refers to List).

On the other hand, Veblen liked to speak of the disadvantages faced by the first comer. So, also in the British case, “they are paying the penalty for having been thrown into the lead and so having shown the way”. In fact, Veblen was critical of Britain because of its increasingly wasteful consumption patterns and irrational patriotism fostered by the Boer War which he regarded as an expression of the remnants of the dynastic state in Britain. Contrary to List, Veblen sees the British dilemma to produce benefits for Germany as its companies can learn from the British technological experience and exploit especially its immaterial technical knowledge (Veblen 1939: 132-33; see also Semmel 1993: 122-24).

On the other hand, Veblen also suggests that the British have not been self-reliant at all in developing technology; to the contrary, they have lavishly borrowed from the continental Europe. This has been taken by some to suggest that Veblen underestimates the role of Britain as the cradle of the industrial revolution. However, it would be more appropriate to consider this conclusion as a reflection of Veblen’s more general point that technology spreads rather easily across national borders to benefit all rising powers; even protective policies are unable to arrest it within national borders. Much like many theorists of globalization, Veblen wrote in 1918 that “the modern industrial system is worldwide, and the modern technological knowledge is no respecter of national frontiers” (Veblen 1934e: 385). In effect, any effort to prevent
the flow of technical knowledge across the borders would not be only futile, but also harmful for the development of national economies.

*Japan*

Along with Germany, Veblen considered Japan a paradigmatic example of the dynastic state. In fact, he applied the methodology of Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution rather directly to the Japanese case (see Dorfman 1966: 347-49). He also saw parallels between the economic rise of these two countries, mostly by learning the use of the Western technology in a surprisingly short time. Not unlike Britain, Japan has also borrowed from its continental neighbors, especially China. Veblen treats Japan as an “ordinary nation” and does not attribute any role to racial factors in its political and economic development. Japan was in the early 20th century handicapped in one respect, however. It did not have a market-oriented business organization without which no emerging country could continue to prosper.

Therefore the commercial integration of Japan in the world economy was a *sine qua non* for its further growth. On the other hand, such a course would undermine “that ‘Spirit of Old Japan’ that still is the chief asset of the state as a warlike power”. The aggressiveness of Japan is derived from the historical tradition and strength of its dynastic state to which the economy has been historically subjected. On the other hand, without its industrialization the state would not have access to resources needed in the pursuit of political and military expansion (Veblen 1934).

Veblen stresses the political importance of Japan’s economic and social transition in a manner that gives a hint of his more general theory of war and peace. The introduction of industrial enterprise and business capitalism enhances economic efficiency, but, at the same time, it also undermines the traditional culture and society. The main risk of war lies at the intersection of the decline of the dynastic governmental order and the rise of commercial capitalism as the latter still continues to serve expansive and aggressive political ends. In a somewhat convoluted language, Veblen formulates the matter in the following manner; “It is the present high efficiency of the Japanese, an efficiency which may be formulated as an exceptionally wide margin between cost of
production and output of military force, it is that makes Japan formidable in the eyes of her Western competitors for imperial honors, and in substance it is this on which the Japanese masters of political intrigue rest their sanguine hopes of empire” (Veblen 1934c: 255,264-66). More specifically, Veblen suggests that the approach of the intersection of the dynastic-cum-industrial efficiency means that “Japan must strike, if at all, within the effective lifetime of the generation that is now coming to maturity” (Veblen 1934c: 266). This view has some resemblance of Charles Doran’s theory of power cycles as incubators of war between major powers.

It has been often pointed out that Veblen’s analysis of Germany and Japan was prescient and he even foresaw the coming of Pearl Harbor. This is obviously an exaggeration. It is true that Veblen was on the right track in exploring the “unstable compound” of the dynastic political rule and the rise of modern capitalism. It also seems to be historically correct to suggest that the combination of autocratic politics and rapid technological development create a risky political combination. However, Veblen did not realize how long the decline of the dynastic politics can take despite of the profound economic transformation; in Japan, the “unstable compound” has lasted until these days. Neither was Veblen able to foresee the World War II alliance between two dynastic powers, Germany and Japan (Veblen 1934f; see also Diggins 1978: 202-203).

**Conclusion**

Thorstein Veblen was an academic critic of capitalism, especially of the American variant. He saw in it many institutional and ceremonial legacies of the past. In contrast to pecuniary interests he favored technology and production; industry ahead of market. In a similar fashion, he considered the dynastic state to be a remnant of the feudal era from which the penchant for war and the demand of political allegiance by the people were inherited. Under the dual influence of capitalism and autocracy, people were confined to a straitjacket which can be removed only by moving boldly to a new industrial society which would be ruled by fair technocratic and elitist principles. The simultaneous stress on the
emancipation of people and the rationality of industrial technocracy makes an odd combination which is simply one of the many intellectual mysteries of Veblen.

Veblen saw the roots of war in the historical development of the humankind and, more recently, in the rise of the dynastic, absolutist state. The situation was made more risky by the expansion of industrial arts which, when subordinated to the state, provided it with new means of war fighting. Over the long run, industry has a civilizing and peace-promoting effect, but before this stage is achieved, one has to go through a perilous process of transition. In fact, there is an inflection point in which the continuing power of the dynastic state, before its inevitable decline, and the availability of the industrial instruments of war create a political opportunity to start a successful military strike. Veblen uses Germany and Japan to illustrate this problem.

Veblen prefers peace to war, but saw only limited opportunities to achieve it. Neither democracy nor trade were adequate to produce a stable peace. A coalition of peaceful, neutral states might be helpful, but even it was unable to assure peace. Ultimately, only the destruction of dynastic states would lead the humankind to a peaceful future. This could perhaps be achieved gradually by the strengthening of the rational impact of the industry and technocratic elite, but, over time, even this road started to look for Veblen less passable.

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Based on the world system analysis I constructed already 1986 in a report edited by Pekka Korhonen the table about world system power cycles below (Käkönen 1986, 91).

Now it is clear that the last bottom phase coincides with the end of the Cold War and it would be possible to add into the bottom of the last column the end of the socialist block. It also seems to be evident that the Euro-centric, Trans-Atlantic world goes to history. However, the emerging world is not necessarily Pacific-centric but rather Asia-Pacific-centric. It is also not clear that we are facing a new US hegemony cycle (USA II), although immediately after the end of the Cold War the USA was the sole super power and there was a short unipolar phase.

In the world system analysis school, Boswell and Chase Dunn (2000, 201-2) have presented that in the early 2000s the relative power of the USA will continue to decline although it will remain as a dominant power. According to them, the period 2020 – 2040 will see intensive
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
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<td>Low</td>
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<td>1507-1530</td>
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<td>Spain/</td>
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<td>1581-1592</td>
<td>New low</td>
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<td>First colonial era and commercial expansion</td>
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<td>1593-1606</td>
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<td>Emergence of capitalist system</td>
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economic competition and there is potential even for a major war. In the 2050s a new international order will be agreed upon and that will be institutionalised in 2050 – 2080. Simultaneously the new leading power will become a new hegemon. Boswell and Chase-Dunn give two options, the USA or China (ibid., 217). Another possibility is that there will be a shared hegemony by the USA and another core state (ibid., 219). In this respect the world would remained the early 16th century (ibid., 244) when the hegemony was divided between Spain and Portugal.

In this article the understanding of the change of the existing power cycle is based on world system analysis. But in understanding the possible change of the leading power, the theory is combined with the so called Power Transition theory originally developed by Organski in the late 1950s. According to power transition theory, the international order is hierarchical and on the top of the power pyramid is the dominant power which aims to maintain the existing situation. Maintaining the status quo is understandable since it advances the preferences of the leading power and its allies (Tammen et al. 2000, 6, 9, 102, 182).

In the hierarchic system, there always are powers which are dissatisfied with their position in the hierarchy as well as with non-existing benefits. Often dissatisfied states are also ascending powers which have an interest to challenge the status quo. Dissatisfied powers seek to create alliances in order to improve their position in the hierarchy or even to establish a new order that would be based on the values of dissatisfied states. The latter option increases the likelihood of a war in the system.
However, power transition can also occur peacefully in cases in which the challenger can be integrated into the existing order and its values. (ibid. 9, 11, 26.7, 182)

In the context of the world system analysis, as well as power transition theory, it is possible to argue that in the international order there is an ongoing process in which the dominant power - either alone or in alliances - will maintain its position as a leading power or the challenging power will take over the dominant position. According to the power transition theory the challenger to the US dominance can come only from Asia. The only potential challenging powers are China and India. (ibid. 19, 113) In case China and India rise as satisfied states, the power transition can be a peaceful one. However, whether the power transition is violent or peaceful, Asia emerges as the centre stage in world politics and on the top of the power pyramid there will be an Asian power. (ibid. 42, 193)

**Changing world**

The rise of China and India in the late 20th and early 21st century has forced many scholars to look east and to analyse the world from US – Asia perspective across the Pacific Ocean. In several occasions it has already become conventional wisdom to argue that the gravity of world politics has moved to Asia where major actors (India and China) are, in addition to the USA. (Global Trends 2030 2012; Zakaria 2008; Kupchan 2012; Tharoor 2012; Jacques 2012). Also happening in Asia, Japan’s military profile is gradually growing simultaneously with the so called US ”Pivot Asia or Rebalancing Asia” policy which has transferred the US strategic weight from Europe to Asia, especially East Asia, as launched in 2011 (Pant 2010, 77; Muni & Chadha 2014).

It is most likely that through the first half of the first century of this millennium the USA will be the dominant power, although its leadership is challenged (Global Trends 2030 2012; Zakaria 2008; Boswell & Chase-Dunn ibid., 201-2). Still, it is hard to deny that the economic performance of Asia is a crucial factor in the world economy. Therefore it is possible to agree with Andre Gunder Frank who predicted already
in the end of the past millennium that the new millennium will be the Asian one (Frank 1998). Indian scholar Niraj Kumar has a similar vision about the future world (Kumar 2014). Therefore it is possible to argue that the basis for the future world order will be constructed in Asia.

Already Global Trends 2025 report (2008) predicted that in 2025, in addition to the USA, China and India will be the major global players. As ancient civilizations China and India are regaining their position as leading world powers after a few centuries of Western dominance (Kavalski 2010, 133; Acharya & Buzan 2010, 226; Kornegay 2013, 1). It has been estimated that, according to the current economic trends, China will pass the US economy latest in 2025. Simultaneously India will become the third biggest economy in the world. In 2030 the share of Asia in global GDP will already be 40 per cent and in 2050 it will be over 50 per cent (Acharya 2014, 30).

In spite of the rise of India, China will be for years to come the only potential challenger to the USA in world politics and economy (Tammen et al. ibid., 153). China is already now a major actor in Asian as well as in global economy (Pant ibid., 42). While the role of Asia is growing it is important for the USA to establish for itself a central position in the forthcoming Asian power structure. However, the USA might need an Asian ally to balance the growing Chinese influence (Tammen et al. ibid., 181; Gupta & Shrivastav 2014, 23; Singh 2014a, 60). After the USA and India signed an agreement on cooperation in nuclear technology, India has emerged as a potential US ally in Asia. This option was mentioned also in comments related to Obama’s visit in India’s Republic Day early 2015 (see for instance Ranjan 2015).

In addition to what has been said above there are also other factors which have increased the weight of Asia in world politics. At least for the next 30 years oil will have a central role in world energy production (Smith 2011). In 2025 Middle East still produce about 70 per cent about the oil consumed in the world. Therefore China and India are keen to have their share of those resources while the US influence in the Middle East is in decline and Chinese influence is increasing in the region. In any case, the increasing need of energy in China and India will increase stress in the international oil markets.

The core of the US “Pivot Asia” policy is in the East Asia and in
the Indian Ocean. One consequence of this new US policy has been US interest in withdrawing gradually from the Middle East -- unless ISIS and emergencies in Yemen force the US to stay there. The declining role of the Middle East in the US politics is partly due to sand oil plus shale gas and oil resources in the USA. Those deployable resources have already made the USA a leading gas producer and in 2017 also oil producer in the world. By 2035 the USA is expected to be energy self-sufficient (Agarwal & Pradhan 2014, 91). In fact already now after 50 years the USA has become again gas and oil exporter (Kumar 2014, 23). This change might cause Asianisation of the Asian energy markets and instead of dollar as the currency in energy markets the trade might be in Asian currencies (ibid., 25).

Already now Asian economic growth is seen as a factor to save the market economy and sustainable economic growth. But the continuous growth also creates threats which have global consequences. Air pollution, plus the contamination of soil and water are already serious problems in China and India today. China already is the biggest producer of greenhouse gases and the role of India in intensifying climate change is increasing. Climate and environmental changes will force tens of millions of people in Asia to migrate during this century. Simultaneously in spite of the economic growth 2/3 of world poor people live in Asia. Therefore environmentally unsustainable economic growth, corruption, and religious-ethnic tensions together will create a serious threat to Asian economic and political development.

In Asia we find the breeding ground for international terrorism and crime. These are also factors which have brought Asia into the core of world politics, as is the fact that nuclear weapon proliferation is also likely in Asia (Kavalski ibid., 79). In Asia the most optimistic expectations and pessimistic visions are interconnected. Fundamentalist sects of Islam feed global terrorism here, as well. Therefore Asia has been the major theatre in the fight against terrorism and that again has increased social tensions in the region. Together with Islamic fundamentalism, we face also rising Hindu fundamentalism and therefore Asia is the region where clash of civilizations predicted by Huntington could become a reality between Muslims and Hindus (see for instance Madan 1998).

In addition to possible increasing US presence, the Asian future is
also defined by the competition or even conflict between China and India. In the official rhetoric China – India relation is supposed to be good or even excellent and the fact is that cooperation between these two giants is increasing. However, under the surface there are tensions if not a conflict in China – India relations. Both countries aim for a leading position in Asian power politics (Pant ibid., 147; Panda 2012, 32). At the moment, China is ahead of India and therefore India might need to rely on the US support to the extent that according to some experts independent Indian foreign policy is already threatened. Worry about independent Indian policy is often present indirectly when Indian politicians as well as scholars stress that intensifying US – India relations do not mean any kind of an alliance and Indian foreign policy is still based on Indian preferences (see for instance Gautam 2014, 75).

The increasing role of Asia in world politics means that also non-Asian powers have a stake in the region. In addition to strong US presence, the EU wants to strengthen its role in Asia, too. Therefore the EU has tried to develop its own Asian politics and it has already now bilateral partnership agreements with almost every Asian state. However, EU’s problem is that it has not been able to demonstrate itself as a relevant actor in Asia (see for instance Panda ibid., 43). Instead of the EU as an actor, the UK, France, and Germany are understood to be relevant actors, in addition to the USA (Fox & Godement 2009). The EU instead is not seen as a rising power and the less that the EU speaks with one voice, the less influence it will have in world politics (Johnston 2013, 60-1).

From an Indian perspective, the EU is an economic actor but its prestige in Asia is not enough to balance the growing Chinese influence (Cameron 2009, 217). On the other hand China has drawn the EU into endless dialogues about democracy, good governance, and human rights (Fox & Godement ibid.). And because China is economically important for the EU, the EU is willing to interpret continuing discussions as a symptom of its own successful Asian policy. But the fact is that – at least for China and India – the USA is the only relevant non-Asian power in Asia. Without a well-defined Asian policy, the EU will be marginalized in Asian as well as in global politics (see for instance Jacques ibid., 457-8).
In order to try to figure out the emerging possible international order, we have to understand how the Asian order is being developed – now by the policies of Asian powers after the five hundred years exception (Muni 2014, 3; Mishra 2014a, 151). In this respect the development of China – India relations is in a key position. As indicated above in official rhetoric, as well as in trade, there is positive development and the official Indian rhetoric has talked about Chindia as a base for the new Asian millennium. The reality is less romantic. For instance Chinese and Indian leaders talk about mutual cooperation while simultaneously China presents territorial claims over an Indian state Arunachal Pradesh (Singh 2014b, 121).

One determining factor in the development of future Asian and global order is a China – India power struggle. As it is manifested today in various areas, a China – India alliance looks less likely (Tammen et al. ibid., 77). The issue is largely about influence in Asia and further in the global system, but it is also about clashes in bilateral relations. One of the unsolved problems is the border conflict that in 1962 escalated into the only war in China – India relations for 3 000 years. Another essential factor increasing tension in bilateral relations is the need of both countries to secure a sustainable supply of energy for their growing economies (Pardesi & Ganguly 2009, 116). Moreover, the distribution of Himalayan and Tibetan water resources causes increasing tension in China – India bilateral relations. Currently the potential water conflict is connected to Brahmaputra River (Bhattacharya 2014).

New Indian Prime Minister Modi’s first state visits implicate something about the current state of India – China relations. Modi has already visited the USA, Japan, Australia and several ASEAN countries as well as many Indian Ocean island states. But the visit to China had to wait for the last weeks of Modi’s first year in power. China is also concerned that in the context of Modi’s visit to the USA in the autumn 2014, the US – India joint statement for the first time referred to the South China Sea – which China sees to be a historical part of China. (Mishra 2014b)

When we think about the possible new international order, it is interesting to understand that Chinese leadership no longer sees China just as an Asian power but as a global power. For the Chinese leadership,
the USA is the only power with which to compare China as a global actor (Chan 2014, 174). It is even possible to argue that China wants to construct a China centric international order in a situation where the USA is involved in its own skirmishes in the Islamic world and the economic role of Japan is in decline (Malik 2009, 166). According to Chinese understanding, China will replace the USA as a leading power although China is not ready yet for a great power role (Zhao 2013, 120-1; Chan ibid., 176). Due to its rise, China is becoming a factor -- causing turbulence in Asian as well as in the global order. Despite this, China’s continuous economic growth as well as the leading role of the Chinese communist party require stability of the international system and maybe Chinese dominance in Asia.

From the Chinese ambitious perspective, India is just a South Asian regional power and China aims to limit the Indian influence into that region. Therefore China wants to strengthen its own influence in the Indian periphery or neighbourhood. A central factor in Chinese strategy is the so called ‘String of Pearls’ policy, which aims to encircle India by increasing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean region. From an Indian perspective, the Chinese initiative for maritime Silk Road is closely connected to this strategy (Sakhuja 2014). Already now China has a commercial as well as military stronghold in several Indian Ocean ports like Gwadar in Pakistan, Coco Island in Burma, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka (Pant ibid., 55).

The partition of the British India into India and Pakistan created between two new states a conflict that remains unresolved. Every now and then the conflict has escalated in to a war – the latest one was in 1999 over a mountain top in Kargill. China has supported Pakistan and therefore India – Pakistan conflict has a connection to China – India conflict. This is one of the factors how China has been able to keep India busy in South Asia. Also the Tibet issue has affected India – China relations. This situation has not been improved, although India has recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In fact, the situation has gotten worse since through 2000 China has deployed missiles and military forces in Tibet which has made Tibet into a de facto Chinese military base (ibid., 9). Tibet has an important role in Chinese India policy.

As with China, India too has global interests which are connected to
mythical Indian greatness. Many Indian politicians as well as scholars refer to the glorious past in a way that India has a great future. The idea of Indian greatness is visible in the symbols of the Indian national flag. In the middle of the flag there is the wheel of Dharma, what is connected to emperor Asoka, who ruled the Mauryan empire when it was largest and its cultural influence stretched from eastern Mediterranean to South-East Asia in 272 – 232 BC (Thapaar 2012). Because of India’s past it is supposedly destined to have a central role in constructing the post-Cold War Asian and global international order (Kavalski ibid., 22). One aspect of India’s greater role is that Indian Ocean has to be Mare India.

Indian dominance in the Indian Ocean region is important goal due to Indian energy security. Indian energy is transported across the Indian Ocean. Another aspect of the policy of great India is to establish a military role in Central Asia where India already has a military base in Tadzhikistan and is militarily present in Iran and Afghanistan (Fair 2009, 135). In re-establishing the ancient Indian greatness the expectations of Hindu nationalists are now loaded on BJP regime and PM Narendra Modi (see for instance Sahoo 2014; Chellaney 2014).

To reach an Asian and global great power position India needs the US support. India needs the USA to block China’s rise into a dominant position in Asia as well as in the Indian Ocean region (Pant ibid., 147). Although India advances its own interests in adapting its position as a US partner it is possible that India already now has become a factor that offers for the USA the option for its second hegemonic cycle. In any case, the Obama administration has understood that the USA is not able to maintain its dominant position without partners. Also, the power transition theory claims that it is in the US interest to increase cooperation with India and bring India into the community of satisfied states (Tammen et al. ibid., 181).

From the US perspective India, as a democratic state, could function in Asia as a factor for stability (Pant 2008, 22). While connecting the Indian Ocean with a concept ”Indo-Pacific” into Pivot Asia strategy the USA aims for more intensive cooperation between the four democracies, India, Japan, Australia, and the USA (Parmar 2014, 134). India is also in a position to counter the instability created by the fundamentalist Islam in Asia. In a wider sense India’s role in the US strategy is to
prevent China’s unilateral rise into a dominant position in Asia (Muni 2014, 6, 9). Therefore the USA has an interest in supporting the increasing role of India in Central and South-East Asia, Indian Ocean as well as in South China Sea, which China understands as an anti-China policy (Tellis & Mirski 2013, 8; Zhao ibid, 117).

While the USA and India are getting closer to each other, the USA has encouraged Japan to intensify relations with India and Australia (Pant 2010, 79). In this sense it is interesting that PM Modi has visited already both Japan and Australia. China is worried about a potential alliance of democratic states (the USA, Japan, Australia and India) in Asia-Pacific (Pant 2008, 53). China reads all signs about a potential alliance as a challenge to its own interests in become a leading Asian and global power. As such, China is not worried about Japan or India, but a democratic alliance is a more realistic option than China, India, and Russia triangle which could challenge the US dominant position in the international order.

Chinese interest for a leading position in Asia forms a threat to Russia although China and Russia closely cooperate in Central Asia in the context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The potential Chinese threat could bring Russia and Japan closer to each other but at the moment Russia and China are intensifying their cooperation due to the consequences of the Ukraine crises. Another kind of an option in Asia is that – for the USA – Russia could be more important partner than its European partners (Pant ibid., 57). According to power transition theory, the USA needs Russia to maintain its dominant position (Tammen et al. ibid., 34). In this sense the India, Japan, and Russia axis could be balancing factor in Asian security while the role of Europe is being marginalised.

Already in the 1990s, Brzezinski warned the North Atlantic Alliance not to let the Eurasian core states, Russia and China, get closer to each other and possibly even to become allies (Kumar ibid, 78). Also, the power transition theory warns that a China – Russia alliance would become a problem at least in the case that those states would be excluded from the Western cooperation. Therefore NATO’s eastern expansion without Russia creates a security dilemma for the existing stability and order (Tammen et al. ibid., 135-6). Ukrainian crises and the Western
management of the crises have supported Putin’s Eurasian policy and transferred Russia into an Asian state (Kumar ibid., 142-3). Simulta-
ously China – Russia relations have developed from partnership to-
wards an alliance.

In strengthening its own position in Asia and in countering increas-
ing Chinese influence India is engaged in cooperation with states like Iran and Israel. In fact Israel already was for a while India’s main arms producer and Israel trains Indian Special Forces in fighting terrorism (Pant 2008, 16). Simultaneously, India trains Iranian Special Forces and needs Iranian oil and gas to secure its energy needs – although India’s close relations with Iran might endanger relations with the USA. On the other hand, the US Iranian policy is changing and the USA might need a new partner in the changing Middle East theatre. Use of force in Iraq and Afghanistan has not brought sustainable solutions and sanc-
tions on Iran have failed. In facing the ISIS threat, the best option in the Middle East is to find a diplomatic solution in the Iranian problem (see for instance Friedman 2015).

The China – India competition is one of the factors which support militarisation and armament in Asian and Pacific post-Cold War tran-
sition. On the other hand, regional stability is a common Chinese and Indian interest since that is a precondition for their continuous eco-
nomic growth and human security in both countries. Therefore it is possible to assume that both countries would have an interest to act in the context of existing international institutions and strengthen inter-
national cooperation. Conversely, there is no reason to deny that both countries are also keen to change the international order to serve bet-
ter their interests.

From the perspective of the world system analysis as well as power transition theory it is evident that existing international order always serves the interests of the leading powers. The order never is neutral and is not based on any universal values. Therefore the USA hardly acts al-
truistically in trying to maintain the existing order (Jacques ibid., 484). The US-centric international order is nothing more than the Western international community where the Western values are established as universal values and whose world history is written as its own history. The problem here is that due to emerging states the world is no more
the world of the West. (ibid. 560) Another problem is that the existing hegemonic order is eroding and there is no new order available (Pietterse 2011, 27).

As the challengers of the USA, both China and India have understood that they are not yet able to take the leadership, and will not be for a while (Tellis & Mirski ibid., 11). Therefore for instance China momentarily supports the existing order although it is not satisfied with it and its own role in that order as a challenger -- at least in Asia and the Pacific Ocean region (Gungwu 2008, 22; Evans 2010, 51; Muni 2014, 10). China is the power that wants to have a new status quo (Tammen et al. ibid., 193). In spite of a hundred years of humiliation, the Chinese have always understood themselves as a great power or rather as a civilizational power whose natural role is to be the centre of the world (Jacques ibid., 533). Therefore China is not ready to function according to the norms imposed by others (Hongying 2010, 214). Out of the dissatisfied powers, at least China is the one who is willing to provide for the world new norms and values based on its own history and traditions as well to take the role of the reformer of the international order (Acharya ibid., 75; Wei 2013, 39).

The Chinese power elite strongly believes that China has a central role in the transition to a new international order. It is in Chinese interest to create an order that reflects Chinese interests (Gungwu & Yongnian 2008, 6-7). Although China would be the only state that really wants to change the existing order it is less likely that it is easy to integrate any of the emerging states into existing order without reforming it first (Acharya ibid., 48). In addition to China, India also has an interest to modify the existing order to serve better Indian needs and interests which are not necessarily identical with those of the US (Tellis & Mirski ibid., 5).

Most likely China is the key actor in constructing the possible new international order. China aims for that within existing international regimes as well as by constructing new institutions like BRICS, although BRICS became an institution by Russian initiative in 2009. For China, BRICS is a means to pressure the USA. (Panda ibid., 37, 51; Jacques ibid., 485) In addition to China, other BRICS members are also dissatisfied on the existing order and therefore for the BRICS
community BRICS is a means to transform it (Bohler-Muller & Kornegay 2013, xxvi). Therefore BRICS has a potential to be a bloc that challenges the post Second World War international order and shapes the architecture of 21st century international politics (Thakur 2013, 189; Cooper & Flemes 2013, 953). It does not necessarily do this in cooperation with the West but rather against the West (Kornegay & Bohler-Muller 2013, 436).

However, the problem of BRICS is its diversity and its member’s vital relations with the West. BRICS has been able to present strong anti-Western statements although most of the member states have strong relations with the USA and Europe (Panda ibid., 46). It is not at all evident that Brazil or India are keen to challenge together with China the US leadership in the international order (Olivier 2013, 409). Out of all BRICS countries India might be the most Western oriented what is to be found also in PM Modi’s policy. For India BRICS is basically a means to achieve a more equitable international order rather than to change the entire order. (Panda ibid., 91-2, 94) Therefore in case the ability of BRICS to function as a means for transition depends on China–India cooperation, it is not really a reliable institution for a transforming the international order (Panda ibid., 12, 33).

**Theoretical challenges in a changing world**

The existing IR theories can explain and make sense in understanding the transition of the current international order as in fact it has been done above. Explicitly, above have been used both world system analyses as well as power transition theory in interpreting current changes. Implicitly, it is possible to find also the influence of classical geopolitics as well as political realism. However, it has to be understood that the changing world presents a challenge to existing theories because the theories are based on the Western tradition of enlightenment and modernisation. The theories basically offer a Western approach to the international order and it is hard to call those theories universal IR theories.

It is relatively easy to agree on Kal Holsti’s old conclusion that IR most likely is the most American social science (Holsti 1987). Waever
has demonstrated the existing IR reality in his analysis based on several leading international IR journals. An overwhelming majority of the articles were written by American scholars. Only few journals made an exception in the way that there were also articles from several European authors. (Waever 1998) Major IR theory and study books as well as readers are written basically by American scholars (Guzzini 2007, 24).

In 2012 John Hobson presented a dark picture about the Euro-centricism in IR theories in his substantial study about IR theories (Hobson 2012). Hobson’s conclusion is that, at least up to now all IR theories, even the so-called critical ones, are based on narrow European and trans-Atlantic historical experience. In the construction of IR theories, civilizations older than those of Europe have been neglected or it has been assumed that in non-European cultures there is nothing to give for understanding international politics. Pijl goes even further in his study about the substance of IR theories. According to him the various IR theories have been constructed to justify the leading position of the West and specifically that of the USA in the international system (Pijl 2014). The idea of IR theories is to legitimise existing international order.

In a way it is understandable that it has been the Western perspective which has dominated the theoretical understanding of international politics. According to the English School, since early 16th century the modern international system has been a Western (European) construction (Buzan & Little 2010). Through the last 400 years Europe has been a kind of a centre for wars and innovations as well as the producer of welfare. Therefore it is understandable that IR theories are based on that historical experience. (Kang 2003, 57) In a Gramscian sense it is possible to say that the Western interpretations have taken for themselves a hegemonic position in studying international politics (Acharya & Buzan ibid., 17). Also, the norms and values of the international society are based on Western philosophical traditions. Even the UN value system relies basically on the European traditions.

Parallel to the dominant position of the European powers modern IR theories emerged as a part of other modern social sciences. The scholars in the centre of the system used concepts and theories familiar to themselves in trying to understand and explain the international
The same theories were transferred into the analysis of the non-European and the whole international system. However, for instance the Asian political economy, history, culture and demography is and has been different and the Asian system has not functioned the same way as the European nation-State system. (Kang ibid, 58)

What we understand in practise as well as in theories as an international system is understandable only through western values and power politics. Therefore, it is understandable that already in the 1980s Gerrit W. Gong argued that one major criteria for a membership in the so-called international institutions was a kind of Westernization and adaptation of Western values (Gong 1984). In this respect for instance during the presidency of George W. Bush non-Westernized, so called non-democratic and non-modernized states were excluded from the so-called international community and made into international pariah.

Implicitly the concept of international community refers to Westernization and harmonization and this interpretation can be found in various theories of globalization, or for instance in Fukuyama’s prediction of the end of history after the end of the Cold War. This is a common Euro-American perception what has roped the subjectivity from Asia (Chen 2010, 215). Therefore Asia has not been able to develop on its own conditions. The rise of Asia has awaked the Asian self-consciousness. Therefore it is likely that Asian societies in the future will rely on their own traditions in their development and instead of one version of modernization there is going to be various forms of modernity (Jacques ibid., 562). Also Acharya assumes that emerging states will develop versions of modernity different than the Western modernity (Acharya ibid., 50).

The West has to begin to understand that for instance India is its own civilization what has created its own understanding about the world (Malhotra 2013, 4). Also, China is its own civilization that has more than 3000 years’ history to think about the world in its own way (Cox 2010, 5). It is less likely that while modernizing China and India would abandon their own intellectual traditions. From a wider Asian perspective, the tradition is not the opposition to modernity but is a part of it and that produces diverse manifestations of modernity (Chen ibid., 244). This approach as such differs from Western way of understanding
the world. For instance in the Indian Vedanta tradition unity or universalism does not refer to harmonization of the world but singularity appears in various forms which then form the cosmos in an endless plurality (Malhotra ibid., 39).

In the classic Confucian tradition we find the same understanding than in Vedanta in the form that plurality can be harmony. Therefore the opposition to harmony is not chaos but unity or homogeny (Jacques ibid., 379), which are Western social values. Neither in Indian Dharmic tradition chaos is a negative thing but a source of creativity and dynamics (Malhotra ibid., 8). In the Dharmic tradition it is not possible to find any absolute other since every other is the same as self (ibid. 138). This means that difference will become accepted and within one civilization there can be several systems (Jacques ibid., 378). Therefore in the Chinese tradition it is a necessity to find a balance between opposite poles (Cox ibid., 6-7). These traditions make it understandable that both India and China seeks acceptance in the international system as they are without transferring themselves into westernized societies.

The end of the Cold War closed the world with which the modern IR theories were associated. The modern IR studies in a way rely on Morgenthau’s ‘Politics among Nations’ which was published 1948 in the time of the beginning of the Cold War. After the Cold War economic globalisation has undermined the state-centric international system what has resulted in a situation in which no state, not even the USA, is sovereign in the strict sense of the concept. The USA is economically dependent on many other states and without partners the USA is not anymore able to maintain its dominant position in the international system. (Zakaria ibid.)

It is likely that through the first half of this century the USA will remain as a defining factor in the international politics. But it is also evident that the role of at least China and India will grow in the changing international system (Global Trends 2025 ibid.; Tammen et al. ibid.). China and India together represent some 2.5 billion people and it is hard to imagine that these two countries would not have any interest in constructing the future international order. However, it is less evident that in the arising international politics the possible impact of China and India is taken properly into consideration.
In the Western imagination it seems to be clear that one day the economic growth will transform China and India into Western societies and they will adapt into the existing international society and to its rules of behaviour – although at the moment they are dissatisfied states. It is also assumed that scholars in both countries will integrate into Western IR paradigms and adapt the Western theories in analysing international politics. Therefore the question of what those ancient civilizations can bring into the IR theories and political praxis has not been asked.

Until now IR studies in China and India have basically been based upon Western approaches (Acharya & Buzan ibid.). The Indian national annual IR convention 2013 handbook clearly demonstrates this. Most of the workshops as well as individual papers represent typical Western perspectives (Hand Book 2013). However, there seems to be a difference in Western and Eastern (Asian) orientation. In analysing Chinese and Indian political leadership’s interpretations of world politics (as well as scholarly IR studies major theoretical approaches such analysis relies upon), there remains a focus upon political realism and classical geopolitics (see for instance Hand Book ibid.). One leading Chinese IR scholar, Xuetong has emphasized especially the role of political realism in studying and understanding international politics (Lu 2011, 229-251).

In a way it is understandable that these two power-centric approaches have a central role in China and India. The Indian classic Kautilya as well as Chinese classic Sun Tzu are connected to power politics even in the West. While these two national interest and power centric theories dominate IR studies in two emerging states, in the West international politics is interpreted in the context of so called critical and post-modern IR theories. This difference means that IR research in the West and East constructs two different images about the current world. Because images or world views guide political actions, there is a danger that the West does not understand the East and vice versa.

However, a bigger theoretical challenge might be that both China and India will bring elements from Hindu and Confucian traditions into construction of IR theories as well as building the future international order. In building the Euro-centric trans-Atlantic and Westphal-
ian international order both China and India were disconnected from their own intellectual roots. According to Acharya and Buzan, the return to their own roots is not just possible but there already are claims to do it (Acharya & Buzan ibid., 229). The transition from colonial to post-colonial intellectual activity is possible only through de-colonization of mind and building on own culture (Chen ibid., xi, 66).

In 1998 Indian philosopher Sardar claimed that non-European cultures have to define themselves by using concepts and categories which are true to themselves (see Behera 2010, 108). This means construction of visions about the future – as well as founding actions for the future – upon their own traditional world views. In a way Nehru already understood that a change of attitude is a necessity in India’s development. According to him, authentic Indians will lead the country and the role of ancient Indian culture will became a factor in future development of the country (Zakaria ibid., 152). Strong signals about the realization of Nehru’s prophesy are visible already in the first year of PM Modi’s BJP governance. For instance, some BJP leaders have claimed for Hindu centric history writing and abandoning Western, Marxist and Nehru-vian Indian history writing.

Growing economies and increasing political influence will further improve the self-confidence of China and India (see for instance Yongnian 2010, 318). They will increasingly rely on their own traditional values and bring elements from their historical worldviews into constructing the changing international order. Therefore, the Western expectation that economic growth will transform China and India one day into modern Western societies which share the Western values might be too optimistic. Neither will they be satisfied within the international order that is based on Western interests and values. Thus, globalization has to be understood as diversification rather than unification. The Indian concept uni-verse reflects well this situation since it means many in one (Malhotra ibid., 350).

In China, some IR scholars have already claimed that China needs its own IR theory that supports the construction of an international order which serves Chinese needs. This claim is based on the idea that existing IR theories serve US interests (Quin 2010, 40). In a wider sense, this has to be understood in the way that in IR theory construc-
tion it is necessary to go beyond national perspectives. It is also a necessity to construct an IR theory that could be called post-Western or post-Westphalian IR or maybe an international theory on international politics.

In China, the attempt to construct a Chinese School in studying international politics is currently concentrated around the concept of *tinaxia* and the historical Chinese international order (all under the heaven). The base of the Chinese worldview was the hierarchic and anti-equality social order was understood to be a natural order. This social order was extended into relations with non-Chinese societies (Yongnian 2010, 301-2; Feng 2010, 78). The system was based on Chinese cultural superiority and economic power which both attracted non-Chinese powers. The pre-condition to get into the China centric system was to admit Chinese dominance. (Feng ibid., 78; Yongnian ibid., 302-4, 309; Kang ibid., 66-7) States which joined the system paid a tribute to China and made an annual ritual visit to the Chinese emperor (Yongnian ibid., 302-3). Otherwise the states maintained their sovereignty and they could have their own wars and even challenge Chinese power, but never deny the system’s China centrism (Yongnian ibid., 309; Womack 2010, 118; Xiao 2010, 103).

In the historical Chinese international order, China never had ambitions beyond its borders (Xiao ibid., 102). The aim of the system, first of all, was to guarantee Chinese security when states within the system defended themselves against external threats (ibid. 103). China provided stability for the system and there was barely any need for wars within the system. However, temporal Chinese weakness could cause chaos in the system (Kang ibid., 66-7). In a historical sense, China was not an expansionist state although the tianxia system could expand (Evans ibid., 49). The historical Chinese expansion is possible to understand as the unification of China rather than occupation of new territories (Jacques ibid, 229). On the other hand, Chinese historical memory has made invaders Chinese as soon as they had taken the power in the empire (ibid. 300).

In India there also have been interests to build IR theories on own traditions like on Kautilya’s Arthashastra or on Indian historical experience (see for instance Vivekanandan 2011). This is demonstrated in fresh
studies on Arthashastra and in studies on current international politics which are theoretically based on Kautilya’s approaches (see for instance More 2014; Kumar 2013). Getting back to its own intellectual traditions was present also in the above mentioned Indian national convention in 2013. Several workshops in that convention dealt with historical Indian and South Asia international relations or their own intellectual traditions in studying international politics (Hand Book ibid.).

Chinese and Indian historical developments differ from the European development on what the IR theories are mainly based. Within the European civilization a nation state system emerged, but within Chinese and Indian civilizations the civilizational states emerged (see Hui, 2005). For Indian civilization, it was also characteristic that there never was such expansionism that would have required in a European sense such a construction of history that would have justified the occupation of the rest of the world due to superior culture (Malhotra ibid., 68). Even the Sanscritization of Asia happened without occupation, domination, and destroying local identities (ibid. 245).

To conclude

It is possible that the international system is changing so that our traditional theories do not recognise it anymore. In any case the transition presents a challenge for the theories and studying international politics. One thing is that maybe the post-modern Europe is currently a less interesting object of the study than is Asia – where the new international order is emerging. Theories have to reflect the Asian processes which will most likely define the future of the international system.

This article has mainly emphasized political and economic aspects of this paradigm change. The potential consequences of climate and environmental changes have been left out from this evaluation. However, those changes caused by human activities will have a major impact on the whole international system already during the next 40 years (Smith ibid.). They present their own challenge for studying international relations. They can also undermine the rise of China and India into any kind of leading position in the future international order.
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For the Western world ordering, mobility and power can be said to form a nexus.

This article examines the meanings inherent in the disruptions and shocks of Western mobility systems. More specifically, I will examine the brief volcanic ash episode of the later April 2010 that briefly closed much of the European airspace. Since power and mobility are highly interchangeable terms in the canon of Western modernity, such episodes are easily used to signify declining power and loss of strategic
leadership. Although Europe is often experiencing direct political crises and shocks, air mobility shocks are increasingly embodied signifiers of power and of one’s political position for modern Westerners (e.g. Lawrence 2004, 230).

It is telling that much of the political imaginary of global mobility has been lately developed in the U.S.. Commenting on Frank Norris’ (1901) epic novel, The Octopus, Eperjesi (2004, 59) states that “by seeing America as an empire on the move, Norris sanctified not only the nation’s status as carrier of world history but, more importantly, its actions and entanglements in the world beyond its borders.” Norris’ work portrays the continuation of the American ‘destiny’ beyond its territory and the Western frontier. Eperjesi’s criticism echoes Daileda’s (2008, 225) conclusion concerning America on the move: “Transportation in all its modes embodies the uniquely American ideal of Manifest Destiny”. Moreover, Daileda (2008, 225) points out the exceptionality of air travel vis a vis the emergent more expansive notions of the ‘final’ frontier. The expansion of the horizon, the final frontier, was not a so much a physical barrier but a function of making power as movable as possible and, in practice, engineering various technologies of mobility to solve the obstacles for the emergence of truly mobile form of global power. This logic of U.S - yet also European - power on the move led to the establishment of a relatively de-territorial, de-centralized, and networked hegemonic structures (Hardt and Negri 2001, xi-xiii, 160). However, the emergent power political context is not static: Instead it consists of a dynamic flow where nodal points are flexible and may move - This ‘floating power’ is best embodied in the air carrier battle groups (Friedman 1988, 384).

This article seeks to shed light on the wider entanglements of the contemporary air-mobility with the dynamics of the world power on the move. This mobility-power nexus is then used to make sense of the volcanic ash saga(s) of April 2010. The main argument is that the closure of the European airspace and the apparent leadership problems can
be read as indications of Europe’s changing position. As the world order is increasingly according to the hub and spoke dynamic, Europe is no longer the hub. It is argued that this anxiety of power slipping away was reflected in the travel narratives of the volcanic cloud episode.

As people flow, power is on the move and finds its expressive language in the varying tempos of the mobile bodies. The humming regularity of the national, regional, and global aeromobility systems is often used to constitute and signify the power of the ‘movers’ in the global politics. The opposite is equally expressive: The regular disturbances in the hub and spoke dynamic translate into lack or decreasing power. Moreover, these aeromobility specificities are about people making sense of their regional and global surroundings. Their expressive language is about the respective people trying out their narrower and wider political embodiments and learning to mediate between them: The answers to the question “Who am ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’ and ‘they’ among the wider gallery of figures?” are embedded in the kinesthetics of people and in flows of power, ascending upwards and slipping downwards. The expressive language of this power-mobility nexus finds its parallel in choreographies of today’s hip-hop dance, where artists tend to “obsess over fast and furious [...] power-moves” (Sengupta 1999). Power-moves are dance’s most impressive, stirring, and provoking elements, which are further accentuated by putting power-moves into various contrasting combinations. Furthermore, such smoothly flowing kinesthetic assemblage of bodies can be related related to the characteristics of successful political movement and leadership: E.g. “for protest to succeed, it must produce a feeling of moving ahead; it must force people to take notice...” (Rustin 1976, 42). This aspect of embodied power-moves is vital when one wants to shed light into how and why aeromobility dynamics is so entangled with the trajectories of power politics. I will examine aeromobility’s political contours during the volcanic ash cloud saga because it can be read as having had an impact on the status of European embodiments of various people. As such, the event revealed expressive
feels, visions, and touches of Europe to come and Europe lost, as well as judgements of Europe in the world and within itself.

**Hub and Spoke as an Embodied Cultural Model**

If nothing else, ‘hub and spoke’ is an abstract designation of a multi-faceted embodied transportation experience.\(^2\) Its power related modality is especially vital for getting a fuller grip on how it is used to symbolize architectures of global power. Recent developments in thought on culture, cognition, and body have re-challenged the behavioral, mechanistic, and simplified assumption concerning knowledge and learning (e.g. Zerubavel 1997; DiMaggio 2002; Ignatow 2007). A common feature has been the questioning of the *amodal* knowledge paradigm (e.g. Barsalou 1999). Amodal knowledge refers to an ideology that holds abstract topologies - systems, structures, knowledge trees, or, more aptly, hub and spokes - to be the purest form of knowledge and believes them to be fundamental to any secure problem-solving and decision making. The need to expand beyond such amodal schemas has been noted, for example, by the research approach based on so called *cultural models*, which are positioned as embodied intermediaries that fuse abstract thinking with perceptual motor and sensory experiences (Ignatow 2007, 124). These proposition-scenarios capture the core relationships between the key objects and contain emotionally charged ‘image schemas’ of the possible interactions between the primary objects (e.g. D’Andrade 1987; Lakoff and Kövecses 1987). One might expect that the kinesthetic cultural models making sense of (de)accelerations and stabilities are especially suited to shed light on the nexus of aeromobility and power. This kinaesthetic approach turns hub and spoke model into a multidimensional model where the sensory and emotional meanings easily interact with the political signifiers of the abstract architecture.

The most well-known example of the hub and spoke as a political model involves the U.S. imagery of the Pacific security system after the WWII. The model became popularly known as the hub and spoke alliance structure in the 80s. It meant that U.S. (the hub) maintained a system of bilateral security arrangements with individual Pacific rim
states (spokes) without a strong multilateral regime (e.g. Baker 1991-92; Pyle 2007, 225). Similar to a system of airplane routing all the arrangements were supposed to converge in a U.S. ‘hub’. From an embodied perspective, one important reason for the rise of the hub and spoke as an IR cultural model was that those innovating and experimenting with extensive notions such as ‘the Pacific security architecture’ were among the foremost frequent fliers. Experts, university professors, decision-makers, and politicians were all among the global elite able to have lived and prospered through the existence of the hub and spoke-based aeromobility dynamic. For them, the system’s physicality was embodied knowledge: It seemed to reveal something worthy and significant with a single self-evident schematic. The memories of the resurgence of U.S. global role during the so called Reagan Revolution in the 80’s parallel the rise in the symbolic power of the hub and spoke mobility: Although the hub and spoke system emerged already in 1950’s, it gained wide societal visibility through the wave of deregulation that hit the airline industry in early 1980s.

Moving beyond the commonplace abstract models of the security studies, airports and their networks may be seen as kinesthetic, mobile, contexts (e.g. Urry 2008). Knox et al. (2007, 265) calls airports ‘spaces of flows’ that emphasizes temporal qualities such as process, speed, improvisation, and flexibility over more spatial notions of space and networks. Castells (1996, 412) defined flow as the “purposeful, repetitive, programmable, sequence of exchange and interaction between physically disjointed positions held by social actors”. It may be argued that the qualitatively different velocities, accelerations, and decelerations bring a necessary kinesthetic element to the understanding of flow-like phenomena. On the one hand, it seems that Castells’ remark concerning the primary sequential character of the flow is quite correct: The aeromobility flows contain step-by-step and stop-and-go types of patterns. Accordingly, it may be assumed that the experiences with different types of events while in the aeromobility flow are constituted through a contrasting succession of accents. They ‘punctuate’ the flow into meaningful totalities giving its narrativity its full stops, commas, questions marks, exclamation marks, and so on: A taxi drive into the airport, check-in, passing the security check, rushing to gate, entering
the plane, take-off, and so on.

One the other hand, every like is not the same. The engrossing accents can frame other disparate and merely coincidental events. These confluences lead to heightened sense that something meaningful is taking place and being revealed. The epistemology of these moments is based on the power of revelatory experiences to show and demonstrate at once that a particular state of affairs prevails. This is connected with what Latour (1988) calls a “theatre of proof” and Goffman (1974) denotes as a “frame”. My central hypothesis is that, for a cosmopolitan citizen, the events connected with modern aeromobility dynamic provides one of the foremost conditions under which ‘we’ think power becomes real, authority is recognized, and knowledge is shown to be true. The modern aviopolis itself can be said to be based on such revelatory epistemology: For example, the aeromobility is said to be in a constant reactive mode of experiencing different types of “shocks”. This state has been referred to as ‘constant-shock syndrome’: “There is no doubt that the public has become highly sensitized to risk, both real and perceived. Besides the passengers, the airport itself has emerged as a dynamic context of continual reflexivity, self-monitoring, and self-repair (Knox et al. 2007, 266). The rhythmic pulse of the flow is such that, besides producing a sense of sequential monotony, it brings forth sometimes violent consonances within the broader contours of social interaction. Airlines are vulnerable to world economic (e.g. 2008 recession) and geo-political events (e.g. 9/11) as well as to pandemics (e.g. SARS), natural catastrophes (e.g. the ash cloud episode), and accidents (e.g. the crash of the plane carrying the Polish political elite or the Malesian plane dissapearing over the Pacific or being shotdown over Ukraine) (Thomas 2003, 30).

Besides experiencing and generating constant shocks, airports are revelatory contexts because they are geared towards the detection of deviance. Airports work in finding out the true intentions of people through placing them into an emotional regime centering on suspicion, security, and trust. In this way, individuals and people are invented and given their air-identities through highly specific technologies of international self (Salter 2008, 246; Kirman et al. 2010, 3). However, the airport as a machine type of image has to be qualified. It can be argued
that the airport is constructed to offer spaces for spontaneous experimentation that *tends* - instead of determining - to produce certain affect (Adey 2008; Urry 2003; Deleuze 1988). The experimentation with different interpellative subject positions and corresponding political embodiment at the aeromobility ‘playpens’ produces predictable yet not determined results due to the inherent logics of the aviapolis. This logic is combinatorial because the lived-life experimentation at the aviapolis is made meaningful and illustrative by the existence of different ways of combining and mediating. This combinatorial play is about how the ‘legos’ of this aeromobility playpen can be arranged and combined and how they cannot. Moreover, this logic – of ‘mine’, ‘yours’, ‘ours’, and ‘theirs’ political embodiments can be re-combined and, thus, re-constituted with wider and narrower political bodies – has a relatively established cultural history.

The claim that aeromobility’s political imagery is connected with that of global security has received scant research attention (Salter 2008, 245). Recently, the specifics of securing the air traffic flow has been linked to other aspects of the global security and world politics: “Air flights are centrally significant microstructures within the performances involved in the global order” (Urry 2009, 32). Adey et al. (2007, 780) express a similar vision: “Indeed ... it has been argued the air transport industry provides one of the most highly visible articulations of power”. Urry (2009, 34) drawing from Hardt and Negri’s (2000) empire argument and Aaltola’s (2005) hub and spoke analogy implies that aeromobility is based on “a dynamic and flexible systemic structure articulated horizontally across the globe”. This dynamic and flexible framework is connected with the existing mode of hegemonic governance (Hardt and Negri 2000, 13–14; Aaltola 2005, 268). Aeromobility system may be approached as a beacon of modern, liberal, and cosmopolitan ideals of diffused power. However, airports are also seen as representing the contemporary totalitarian power (e.g. Agamben 1998, 123; Dillon and Reid 2000, 117). It seems that airports are central yet polysemous cultural signifiers.

It follows that the hub and spoke imagery can be approached as an embodied cultural model through which many understand the global life; and what is meant by global security and power (e.g. Crang 2002,
Next, we need to consider the more specific characteristics and repercussions of the hub and spoke model. Knox et al. (2007, 267) point out how the aviopolis imageries include many dystopian elements from diseases, terrorists, drug-traffickers, human smugglers, to distraught anxious passengers of different kind. Exemplifying this genre of declinism, Kaplan (1993), in his widely influential declinist essay, *The Coming Anarchy*, reads signs of things to come from the state of Western and African mobility networks. The Kaplanian world atlas is composed of “cities and suburbs in an environment that has been mastered”. This he contrasts with the state of airports in the Third World from where he see a wave of “criminal anarchy” spreading. His epistemic claims for knowledge is based on often repeated narratives of white-men’s adventures in deadly dark corners of the world (Dunn 2004, 483). Namely, Kaplan’s way of mediating between the African landscape and his Western readers is not based on emphatic favoring of the local and the sensual. His detached aerial view of the ground bellow seemingly permits him to grasp the politically significant contrasts and patterns between combinations of scenes. All these, he makes relevant as part of an overall emotional scene of fear of the imminent chaos spreading from the Third World. This fear of flight – i.e. suspicion of people on a flight and people fleeing – seems to stem from what an international airport symbolizes: Airport is a symbol of nearly limitless access to distant locations” (Weiss 2001, 124). Its Kaplanian symbolic antitode is, thus, confinement of people to the contours of their territory (e.g. Dalby, 1996, 472). Declinist dystopias are usually calls for complete reform or, in this case, restoration of a more warrior-minded Western imperialism as a mode of secure political control (e.g. Kaplan 2002).

The hub and spoke imagery has also a strong liberal version. While referring to Aaltola’s (2005) hub and spoke analogy, Ikenberry (2009, 85) illustrates how airtraffic system is often read as the microcosm of emerging global order: Ikenberry draws an explicit parallel from the changing global power hierarchy to the aviopolis were each “major power centers (airlines) have their own distinct and competing hub and spoke system”. The change into a hub and spoke pattern is what Ikenberry indicates might be happening to the global hierarchy of power.
Ikenberry makes a distinction between a more unipolar hub and spoke arrangement and a multilateralist situation where actors coordinate their actions based on mutually agreed upon and shared rules and principles. Earlier Pax Americana hub and spoke relationship were clearly more unilateralist: One hub makes the decisions and expects others - i.e. spokes - to follow the suit (Ikenberry 2006, 241, 248). In his later 2009 analogy, hub and spoke is considerably more “fragmented” and with multiple competing hubs and partially overlapping major and minor spokes. Ikenberry’s world vision sees major power - i.e. China and U.S. - as airlines who run their competing yet partially overlapping and co-existing hub and spoke systems.

Interpreting Ash Cloud Travel Sagas

The official Member State and EU documents of the ash cloud incident stressed the need to “handle” the situation. Namely, they frame the situation as an immediate call for increased coordination and leadership. Consequently, the attempts to demonstrate political leadership was perhaps the central concern of the ash saga. Against this measure, EU and its leaders appeared to be running to catch up with events rather than directing them. For example, in order to demonstrate decisive and preemptive action, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government announced on April 19, 2010 “plans to help repatriate Britons stranded overseas following the grounding of air traffic”.

The plan was to use navy ships among other options to help stranded British nationals, thus setting off WWII comparisons in the European media. While working to assure people of its effective leadership, the statement also reminded people that the act of grounding the flights was based on concern over the passenger safety. The expression of caution over the situation entangled with expressions of leadership.

The statement by the Spanish Minister of Public Works, Jose Blanco, on the behalf the Spanish EU Presidency (April 19, 2010) declared that the European transport officials should deal with the situation “diligently” while “preserving safety”. The press release was accompanied by an image of chaos at a European airport. The Spanish Secretary of
State for the EU, Diego López Garrido, assured on (April 18, 2010) that “we will work towards the progressive opening of European airspace as conditions become favourable, as well as coordinating actions and decisions on a European level.” The emphasis was on coordination of actions of a myriad of national and regional authorities. When asked if there had been an “excessive” reaction from European authorities in imposing restrictions on European air spaces, the Commissioner Siim Kallas responded that “the principle of precaution and safety is the principle that must be followed... it should be consolidated at the European level ... Safety is the main priority and it must not be compromised”. Also this press release had an image of clearly frustrated passengers waiting for flights to resume. The delay in coordination was turned into a diligent but also hectic effort to create coordination and effective leadership over the European airspace. This fits well into the common crisis-as-an-opportunity discourse within the EU.

After several days of delay, the European authorities started lifting the air traffic restrictions by changing the zero-tolerance policy of volcanic ash into a clear-cut and European wide system of restriction. This change in policy was again interpreted as a sign of non-leadership as the initial flight standards were changed under pressure from several business lobbies. Furthermore, the initial drastic measures seemed now too hasty and even absurd. To make matters appear even messier, the media widely reported on April 19, 2010 that the head of the International airline association (IATA) has criticized Europe’s closing of its airspace. IATA’s head, Giovanni Bisignani, said: “This is a European embarrassment and ... a European mess... The decision that Europe has made is with no risk assessment, no consultation, no co-ordination, no leadership”. This message of ‘no leadership’ was echoed by global media: E.g. The Australian headlined “EU leaders slammed on volcano ash response” The disarray at the European and global airports was seen as reflecting the state of affairs at the level of political authorities. This political context of lack of leadership coupled with difficulties of mobility produced a very specific gallery of figures at the level of individual travelogues.

The most common embodied cultural figure of the volcanic ash travelogues was a heroic adventurer dashing across European landscape.
The figure of these stories was a figure embodying the sentiments of innovation, initiative, and leadership. This protagonist embodied leadership that was deemed lacking at the local, national, and European levels. While the empty European airspace hyperbolized the vacuum at the leadership-level, it also produced subjectivities who were able to do what was required to reach their destinations. At the same time, it should be noted, their stories interpellated a range of stranded figures. These lesser subjectivities were described as hopeless, enraged, tired, and is disarray. The opposing, antagonistic figure, was one of marked indifference: This figure’s indifference and lack of will left people wondering aimlessly at airports and cities. This antagonist figure was embodied, for example, by an airport official, politician, national decision making body, or the European Union.

Travelogues offer an indispensable window into embodied aspects of different people(s) as they moved across Europe in an improvised and experimental manner because of the overall disruption. For example, Spiegel reports on April 16, 2010 that Chancellor Angela Merkel’s return from a U.S. visit was significantly hampered by the flight restrictions: “Originally scheduled to land in Berlin at 1:30 p.m. local time, her flight was diverted to the Portuguese capital Lisbon where she is set to spend the night before continuing her journey”. Reuters on April 17, 2010 gives further details of the Chancellor’s ordeal: “She has already spent more than 36 hours trying to get back to Berlin from San Francisco and on the latest leg, Merkel is heading north from Rome to Bolzano, in northeast Italy, in an armored limousine. An entourage of some 60 officials and reporters are following close behind in a bus. It is unclear what Merkel will do from Bolzano, said frenzied officials, who have been improvising each stage of the chancellor’s odyssey. Bolzano is on the main highway between Italy, Austria and Germany.... Her priorities were to gradually get as close to Berlin as possible, to avoid any danger and to keep the group of people she was traveling with together, said officials.” The expressed emotion of communal unity in the caravan is notable even here as it echoes Gordon Brow’s desire to bring the stranded Brits back home. There is much emphasis on the security aspect of this strange road-bound journey back to Berlin. The culturally laden notion of an adventurous ‘odyssey’ is used, highlighting however
the necessity for an armored car. Furthermore, the moving caravan of journalists and officials headed by Merkel reminded her of “a school adventure trip”. School adventure trip was an embodied cultural model: Learning something new while engaging in a common social trip to a new context. She portrayed herself as the ‘teacher’ of this trip who guards her students by trying to keep them together.

Merkel further highlighted her ability to “take things as they come”, to improvise solutions and to find serendipitous added-value in her trip. This accentuated further the crisis-as-opportunity discourse. She, for example, emphasized that the long route back to Germany had allowed her to meet many European leaders along the way. In the numerous news stories Merkel used her trip to highlight her role as the “climate chancellor” because of her “active leadership” role in efforts to stop global warming. This disparate connection was made, for instance, though expressing how relaxed the “atmosphere” was during the trip. Merkel’s polysemous message tried to angle her in a positive way on multiple fronts. The expressed emotions and implied nuances interacted with and constituted political embodiments at multiple levels: Her long trip from U.S. back to Berlin mediated between the national, European, and transatlantic embodiments. At the same time her reference to “atmosphere” and “climate” brought about global imageries.

Besides the high governmental representatives, different forums were full of “ordinary” people’s ash cloud narratives. The following example indicates a stereotypic form of the-initiative-taking-heroic leadership-discourse. A person by the name ‘Brad’ posted his travel experience during the volcanic ash event on the New York Times blog about the matter.9 He begins his story by pointing out that he was on urgent need to travel because of an important family matter: “Thursday: My efficient travel agent got me the last seat on a flight to Munich... I took a car at 4:45 from Manhattan to Newark, arriving uncharacteristically early to ensure I could get on the plane. Distraught travelers seemed to wander the jammed airport aimlessly.” Notice the emotional contrast expressed in the sequence efficient-uncharacteristically-distraught-aimlessly. It interpellates two opposite subjectivities; surviving leader and aimless follower. This same scene of clever Brad moving forward while others were left behind is the major theme of the whole narra-
tive. Brad caught his flight and arrived in Munich to find out that the whole German airspace was to be closed at noon. After hours of frustrating waits in lines to report lost luggage, and get train tickets, Brad managed to “persuade” a ticket agent to nose out train tickets where they had already been sold out for customers before. Then, after “racing” to reach the Munich Central Station, many were “kicked off” the train because of a “overflow” of passengers: “I survived the cull...” After this ‘survival of the fittest’ –scene, his next plan was to rent a car for a drive to Gothenburg, Sweden. The mobility thus continued from Hamburg airport: “Racing 100 miles/hr on the autobahn we reached the Puttgarden Ferry to Denmark with a few minutes to spare. We drove across Denmark through the night, finding our way around a slew of unmarked motorway detours and got to the Sweden ferry at Helsingör ... Ignoring Swedish speed limits ... we raced the last 140 miles and sailed into Gothenburg at 6:00 am, early enough to catch a shower and an hour’s sleep before showing up at our event at 9:00, among the first family members to arrive.” He ended his story by proclaiming: “... I’ll recover lost sleep knowing I fulfilled a commitment against daunting odds.” The story’s daunting problems and their innovative solutions find their emotional parallel in Brad’s clear proudness and dutifulness over mission accomplished. Brad’s story’s frenzied and determinate dash to the determinate goal contrasts sharply with Angela Merkel’s relaxed ‘school trip’ type of atmosphere. However, both stories express types of leadership: One more single-mindedly goal-driven, the other more improvisatory.

It seems that Brad’s subject position constitutes a major figure of the ash cloud incident. This figure is an extreme road-warrior, a professional citizen of the aviopolis in crisis. Moreover, the figure is multi-mobile and does not get stuck in airports or hotels but blows ahead aided by a sense of duty and rewarded by honor over duty fulfilled. At the same site, Alias “Philadelphia” quickly responded Brad’s story by pointing out Brad’s actions as reckless and disorderly: “I am sure that the thousands of people reading your long post are impressed mostly by the lives you put in danger by ‘ignoring’ European speeds limits (100 miles per hour? really?), the friends and travel agents you bent out of order all the way along your way for this Swedish trip...whose urgent purpose, other than
‘family event’ that you were ‘committed’ to you never reveal.” Repeating the oft-mentioned aviopolis to world politics -analogy, Philadelphia ends up equating Brad’s behavior with overall American recklessness in the world: “Boy do you make Americans look egotistical, brother!” Two other responses to Brad’s story from aliases “Caraschotch” and “Xrocker” point out Brad’s ingenious movement, his honor for his family commitment, and how spirited people like Brad could travel to any place, at anytime. These two responses indicate that getting stuck and stranded at the airports or hotels during the episode was an expression of a particular type of ineptitude resulting from inflexible rule-obedient behavior: These response seem to put value on demonstrations of strong leadership.

The crisis ended when the European Union, following an extraordinary teleconference meeting of transport ministers on May 4, decided to discontinue the strict volcanic ash policy and agreed on the lifting of restrictions over much of European airspace. After the meeting Siim Kallas, Commissioner responsible for transport, issued a statement admitting that similar situation will happen again, “so we need to be faster and more flexible in our response”. The meeting called for increased coordination and unified leadership structure. It admitted that the crisis “exposed structural weaknesses in the ability of different European transport modes to substitute for each other.” This flow insecurity should be remedied by identifying and fixing major “bottlenecks” between different modes of pan-European mobility framework. Thus, it is clear that at the end of the ash cloud saga, the European authorities tried to demonstrate that what they had failed so far. Flexible and ad-hoc leadership who can rise rapidly to face the unexpected challenge. On the other hand, the crisis-as-opportunity discourse was also clearly at play. The meeting of transportation ministers on May 4 agreed to fast track the Single European Sky initiative, which will integrate national airspace policies into one coordinated package: “No one can prevent a volcano eruption or other kinds of natural disaster. But we can build strong pan-European transport systems, so that different modes can ease the pressure when a crisis occurs. The status quo is not good enough”.
Conclusion

It is clear that the Ash cloud saga highlighted the nagging pre-existing suspicions that the Union lacks power as it is commonly measured. The sense was left that the whole episode was unnecessary. However, the Union’s power should be evaluated on its own terms although it clearly fits some characteristics of a classical definition of power (e.g. Moravcsik, 2009; Manners 2010; Hamilton 2008). Many analyses of the EU’s foreign policy tend to pay particular attention to the Union as an exporter of norms and as an inter-regionalistic model for democratic governance (e.g. Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; Manners 2002; Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002; Nicolaïdis 2004). From this perspective, the power of EU stems from the ability to use persuasion and attraction as a means of legitimacy and influence (e.g. Manners 2009). However, the interpretation of these internal dynamics is often hard and confusing: If the outside world cannot figure out what is going on with the Union, how can they model or reproduce it? On the contrary, the ash cloud incident provided a highly readable visual theater of lack of leadership and of mismanagement. The uncritical assumption - i.e. that the rest of the world should follow the European model - is one of the curiosities of the European debate, and can be seen by other as a reflection of its lost imperial past (e.g. Mayer 2008; Nicolaïdis 2004; Sjursen 2006). In many cases, the rest of the world does not care or, they treat Europe as a curiosity rather than a model to follow. This curious bemusement over the ash cloud saga signals a shift to an increasingly less Eurocentric world and to a combinatorial logic where Europe is increasingly a spoke instead of present or future day hub. For the Europeans themselves, the volcanic ash cloud episode could become a signifier of wider political embodiments of the “self”. Briefly, the aeromobility dynamic failed to mediate between individual ‘Europeans’ and Europe as a sagacious political body. The consonances with other concurrent circulations of political signifiers - e.g. economic turbulence hitting Europe, Greek problems, and Swine Flu - accented the more established meanings of the aeromobility halt: Disarray, lack of leadership, and political failure.
Notes

1 Kaplan (2005, 53) calls aircraft carriers as “the supreme icon of American wealth and power, the aircraft carrier” and Horowitz (2010, 65) declares that “short of the atomic bomb, nothing signifies the power of a great nation like ... a fleet of aircraft carriers”.

2 The tight conceptual bridge between hegemonic or imperial governance structures and hub and spoke political architecture is often made in the research literature (e.g. Motryl 1999; Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Kelly 2007; Smith 2005). For example, Phillips (2005, 3) sees a distinctly “hub and spoke” set of regionalist arrangements in the Americas has allowed the U.S. to “capture control of the governance agenda and to ensure that the regional economic regime takes a form consistent with U.S. interest and preferences”.


5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8629127.stm


7 http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,689470,00.html

8 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63G1FH20100417


References


THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EMMANUEL GOLDSSTEIN: GEORGE ORWELL AND NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR

Emmanuel Goldstein is a mystic figure, the Enemy of the People, in George Orwell’s dystopia Nineteen Eighty-Four. Already in the first chapter Orwell depicts a propagandistic two-minutes hate, a daily based ritual on telescreen. Although the Programmes of the Two Minutes Hate varied, Goldstein played the role of the principal figure. Goldstein was labelled as ”renegade and backslider who once, long ago had been one of the leading figures of the Party and then had engaged in counter-revolutionary activities, had been condemned to death and had mystically escaped and disappeared” (13). On the telescreen Goldstein was linked to marching enemy troops of Eurasia and conspiracy. It was rumoured that he is alive, maybe even in Oceania. Moreover, they rumoured that Goldstein’s heresies were authored in the book, a forbidden book without a title.

This essay concentrates mostly on Goldstein’s book in Orwell’s novel and its views on world politics. It is been said that Communist leaders took it as a blueprint of how to run their domains behind the Iron Curtain, whilst dissidents were amazed of his depiction, as Orwell had never
visited Eastern Europe (Bowker 2003, 421). Even the leading figures, the Big Brother – a heavy black moustaches and ruggedly handsome features – and Emmanuel Goldstein – ”Jewish face”, goatee beard and spectacles – are very easy to recognise Stalin and Trotsky.

For an Eastern Europe scholar there are several practical reasons in the background to write this essay: If we take biographer Gordon Bowker’s words seriously, it means also that Orwell’s paradigm has somehow dominated Eastern European historiography and politics. Even my own dissertation begins with a quotation from George Orwell (Nyyssönen 1999, 11). Moreover, on a personal level, I have started my academic studies in Jyväskylä in 1984. Paying a visit to Plaça de George Orwell in Barcelona is a also surprising experience, as the square is under surveillance by the CCTV (Nyyssönen 2004). Furthermore, when arriving in novel’s Airstrip One i.e. London from Heathrow, a passenger notices, how the train is controlled by security cameras, too. Now the only difference to the novel is that a person is publicly warned of being under surveillance.

Thus, George Orwell’s legacy has survived historical events and speaks us today (Bowker 2003, 421). His legacy is enormous even in the 21st Century, as the Big Brother may follow you by the ”telescreen”, listen to your phone or register your consumer habits or emails (Taylor, 2008, 298). In 2013 it was revealed, how NSA had secretly monitoring and stored global Internet traffic, including emails and phone call data. According to Paul Krugman Americans should expect that the government is monitoring them, but now the surveillance state has perhaps gone too far (Krugman 2013).

Thus, Orwell’s context is the Soviet totalitarianism but the dystopia itself is universal, and therefore so popular. I easily may join to Noam Chomsky’s thought that for ”those who stubbornly seek freedom around the world, there can be no more urgent task than to come to understand the mechanisms and practices of indoctrination. These are easy to perceive in the totalitarian societies, much less so in the propaganda system to which we are subjected and in which all too often we serve as unwilling or unwitting instruments.” (Chomsky 1988).

On the basis of Orwell we may find many intellectual discussions, which are turned upside down in his dystopia. For a senior scholar Or-
well’s reading is still a breath taking experience: it would need a book from each topics of the novel. Thus, what remains to be studied? As a political scientist I could raise particularly three topics: politics of memory, international system and the idea of Newspeak. All these are more or less linked together, and, therefore I am concentrating mostly on two particular chapters of the book here i.e. on the banned book by Emmanuel Goldstein, and the appendix, which depicts Orwell’s idea of Newspeak. In this case the main focus is the world order and boundaries depicted by George Orwell, and its relations to IR theories. Particular attention is paid in naming and the role of war in politics. In the end I will discuss Finland in 1984.

### Popular Culture and World Politics

When studying power of popular culture, one thought-provoking idea comes from young Hayden White. In his 1966 article *Burden of History* White claimed that sometimes art represents reality better than numerous studies of history (White 1978). To some extent this is a dangerous claim, as the question is still about fiction. However, I claim that popular culture’s great innovation is that it gives a model of thought to locate oneself in the world. Popular culture probably simplifies things, but who says that all actors or decision makers take the complexity of reality into consideration? From a pragmatist point of view decision makers do not have all information available, and former experiences, perceptions, even misperceptions matter. According to Robert Jervis people tend to accept information, which somehow resonates with their former experiences (Jervis 1976). Indeed, like Winston Smith formulated it: "The best books are those that tell you what you know already" (208).

In *Harry Potter and the Study of World Politics* Iver B. Neumann and Daniel H. Nexon study the nexus between popular culture and world politics. Popular entertainment takes the form of second-order representations, which are often neglected by theorists, although for many they are often more significant sources of knowledge. According to the editors of the volume, there are four types of reading popular
culture: politics and popular culture, as mirror, as data and as constitutive. (Neumann & Nexon 2006, 1-8). On the first level we may be interested in for example the fact that after the NSA scandal book sales of the Nineteen Eighty-Four rose rapidly (George Orwell’s). Secondly, when considering popular culture as mirror, our focus is in a medium of inspiration and teaching. My case, i.e. finding political science theories, has similarities to this approach. Thirdly, as data popular culture reveals dominant norms, ideas, identities of beliefs. Finally, as constitutive, popular culture questions the distinction between first and second order representations. Popular culture may itself constitute beliefs, and shape first-order representations. Its role is interactive with other representations of political life (ibid., 10-15).

No doubt George Orwell’s dystopia has enriched popular culture in many ways, starting from Big Brother and Newspeak – one of the less known innovation was *memoryhole*, a nickname for a slit disposal for waste paper. We cannot forget even the idea how the book was political and had political aims *per se*. In the long run the novel has increased political reading skills, and seeing the world through Orwellian spectacles. Therefore it is showing the power of satire and its impact on political thought. Teaching and banning will be clarified in the next chapter, whilst on the data level Orwell’s aim was to avoid certain dominant norms or ideas. Finally the constitutive category is the most interesting here: Communist blueprint was already mentioned in the beginning. Here the focus is most on the mixture of fact and fiction, not only how fiction became fact, but first of all, how facts became fiction.

**Among the Most Banned and Influential Books**

Jonathan Green identifies Nineteen Eighty-Four as one of ”those books that have been most often censored” (cit. Karolides et al. 1999, 122). It is somehow common knowledge that the Eastern Block did not tolerate Orwell’s masterpiece (cf. Hämäläinen 2011). However, more surprising is, when we find out, how it was one of the most censored books in US schools, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. More often the censorship claims surrounded the immorality of the novel, sex and politics mat-
tered. Indeed Winston Smith having sex with Julia was, according to the book, a conscious crime against the Party’s control of sexuality. Another reason for banning was the book’s “communism” and Communist ties: In a 1966 survey a principal considered the book showing communism in a favourable light. Mere existence of the Soviet Union threatened the US and its democratic ideals. (cit. Karolides et al. 1999, 120-123) – thus, popular culture played a role of the mirror, but did not represent the expected reality of the Other.

At the same time the novel belongs one of the most influential in the world. According to Gordon Bowker the ”rhetoric of politics has been changed by Orwell’s writing. Modern readers of his books are made more aware of ease with which politicians can pervert language” (Bowker 2003, xii-xiii). ”Propagandists, advertisers, publicists and spin-doctors were his sworn enemies. As long as the idea of democracy survives Orwell’s message can only live on and the term ‘Orwellian’ remain a warning cry” (ibid., 433). Moreover, Andrew Taylor has rated the book among the 50 most influential ”that change the world” (Taylor 2008). Here change means first of all that book have enriched people’s experiences, and their world-views. It has changed their worlds, or more properly their perceptions of the world. According to Taylor, Orwell aimed to write against totalitarianism for the sake of democratic socialism.

Eric Blair’s personal history was combined to experiences in India and Britain, even in Eton College, before becoming a policeman in Burma. In 1933 Blair published his first novel Down and Out in Paris and London by a pseudonym George Orwell. Moreover Orwell worked as a teacher before joining the Spanish Civil War in December 1936. In Spain his breath taking experiences included the Barcelona May Days, when the Communist factions, Stalinists and Trotskyites fought against each other. The POUM was labelled as Trotskyist organisation supporting Fascists and outlawed. The trial of the leaders of the POUM and of Orwell (in his absence) took place in Barcelona in October and November 1938. Observing events from French Morocco, Orwell considered them only a by-product of the Trotskyist trials with lies circulated in the Communist press.

Between August 1941 and September 1943 Orwell worked full-time
in the BBC’s Eastern Service, in which he supervised cultural broadcasts to India and counter propaganda from Nazi Germany. According to Bowker (2003, xii-xiii), Orwell’s involvement with bureaucracy and propaganda at the BBC gave him ‘Newspeak’, ’The Ministry of Truth’ and ‘Room 101’. In April 1944 *Animal Farm* was ready for publication, but after a few refusals the book was finally published in August 1945. In 1947 he worked on *Nineteen Eighty-Four* until he ended to a hospital because of tuberculosis. In July 1948 Orwell was able to return to work and by December he had finished the manuscript of his most influential novel.

In Eastern Europe particularly the years 1947 and 1948 are seen as turning points ending to 1949, when several Communist dominated people’s democracies were established. No doubt the Cold War benefited Orwell’s reputation. Even the name Winston Smith referred both to ”ordinary” Smith and Churchill. In his electoral campaign of 1945 Churchill had stated that his opponents in the Labour might establish a form of Gestapo to impose socialism in Britain. At that time Labour won and this formed the intellectual background for Orwell’s later activity. However, for the CIA backed Congress for Cultural Freedom both *Animal Farm* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* were valuable Cold War ammunitions. The two last novels soon became anti-Communist defenders of capitalism opposed even to the democratic socialism (Bowker 2003, 421-422). In 1980 political scientist Bernard Crick published a more balanced biography, ”the most exhaustive bibliography to date” (ibid., 425; cf. Crick 1992). In 1974 Crick had started the work with the help of Orwell’s second wife, who in the end aimed to ban its publication.

In general, George Orwell had personal experiences of both being a victim and a perpetrator: In Britain a file ”Eric A. Blair, alias George Orwell” was sent to Scotland Yard reporting how he was working for the socialist papers in Paris. Moreover, security services followed him in Britain, like in 1936 and 1942. On the other hand, Orwell collected a list for security forces in 1949. There he named journalists, writers and public persons, who were crypto-Communists or party supporters and therefore not reliable for propaganda work (Taylor 2008, 299–300).

According to biographer Gordon Bowker, Orwell was ”a flawed hu-
man being, full of contradictions and strange tensions – a faithful and gentle friend, yet a man with a poor attitude towards women, an enemy of state tortures with his own streak of sadistic violence, a champion of human decency yet a secret philanderer, a man with an ambiguous attitude towards Jews and homosexuals” (Bowker 2003, 427). When his betrayal blew up in 1993 – thus revealing suspected crypto-Communists and fellow travellers, he was blamed acting against his own principles of free thought. Basically his critics could not share his views that Russians were threatening the West in 1949 like they had done in Eastern Europe. Orwell had tolerated censorship at the BBC, and considered it would be wrong to leave enemy’s supporters to be employed by a (labor) government agency designed to resist (ibid. 428-429).

Orwell, Mackinder, Brzezinski

The structure of the book is interesting as until the second half there are neither proper explanations nor many references to space and place. This is done on purpose, I think, to depict the role of the state in ‘the Orwellian world’, as ”nothing was illegal, since there were no longer any laws” (8). In fact not many places were named in addition to Malabar front in India (57), or cities like New York and London. The novel takes place in the latter, the chief city of the Airstrip One, the third most populated province of Oceania.

Goldstein’s forbidden book ”The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism” and particularly its third chapter ”War is Peace” are keys to understand its perceptions of world politics. After the nuclear war of the 1950s there had been a great purge in the 1960s, and in 1970 only the Big Brother was in charge. Oceania’s, Eurasia’s and Eastasia’s constantly changing alliances and antagonisms are one of the most crucial doctrines of the book.

”The frontiers between the three super-states are in some places arbitrary, and in others they fluctuate according to the fortunes of war, but in general they follow geographical lines. Eurasia comprises the whole of the northern part of European and Asiatic
land-mass, from Portugal to the Bering strait. Oceania comprises the Americas, the Atlantic Islands including the British isles, Australasia and the southern portion of Africa. Eastasia, smaller than the others and with a less definite western frontier, comprises China and the countries to the south of it, the Japanese islands and a large but fluctuating portion of Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet. The frontiers of Eurasia flow back and forth between the basin of the Congo and the Northern shore of the Mediterranean, the islands of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are constantly being captured” (193-195).

The concept of Eurasia and its boundaries with Eastasia are the most interesting ones here (from naming, cf. Korhonen 2010). With the absorption of Europe by Russia and the British Empire by the United States Eurasia and Oceania were effectively in being. The third, Eastasia emerged later, after another decade of confused fighting (193). Thus, one border of Eurasia was in British Channel, which reflected horizon of expectation in the later 1940s that France could fall into the hands of Communists. On the other hand ”Eurasian” Spain and Portugal’s Estado Novo were ruled by right-wing dictatorships.

I estimate it highly possible that Orwell knew Halford Mackinder’s Heartland theory from 1919. The theory was highly popular in the reconstruction and re-bordering the post WWI Europe (found also in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s book, see 1997, 38; Sengupta 2009). What Mackinder had called in 1904 the “pivot area”, he subsequently called the “heartland” by 1919 (Hee 1998). At least there are similarities in rhetorical approaches:

Orwell has similarly constructed his maximum, this time dealing with the past: "'Who controls the past', ran the Part slogan, 'controls the future: who controls the present controls the past'" (37). For Orwell it is the "control" that matters – indeed the idea that trust is good, but control is better, is usually linked to Lenin.

"Whichever power controls equatorial Africa, or the countries of Middle East, or Southern India, or the Indonesian Archipelago, disposes also of the bodies of scores or hundreds of millions of ill-paid and hard-working coolies." (195).

Control and Eurasia are present in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s "Eurasian chessboard”, which he discussed in his book Grand Chessboard (1997). The purpose of the book, dedicated to his students to "help them to shape tomorrow’s world”, was a formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geo-strategy (1997, xiv). In the book he presented a map, a circle from Northern Kazakhstan down to Arabian Peninsula, and from India to Turkey, which he called "The Global Zone of Percolating Violence” (1997, 53). In the book there were generalizations like

“Ever since the continents started interacting politically, some five hundred years ago, Eurasia has been the center of world power. A power that dominates Eurasia would control two of the
world’s three most advanced and economically productive regions. A mere glance at the map also suggests that control over Eurasia would almost automatically entail Africa’s subordination, rendering the Western Hemisphere and Oceania (Australia) geopolitically peripheral to the world’s central continent.” (1997, xiii, 31).

When using Google (”Orwell map”) to trace maps, the Eurasia seems to comprise also Turkey and the Caucasus, sometimes even the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia. However, a straight line from Portugal to Bering straits could exclude these as well. Nevertheless, what is striking in those internet maps, as in Brezinski’s views, is the idea that the disputed area refers more or less to Islam, and labels Islam as a battlefield between three super-states.

Eastasian borders are even more obscure, as ”countries to the south of it” might include Vietnam or even Indonesia. To some extend Orwell is controversial as soon he writes that the dispute area is ”Between the
frontiers of the super-states, and not permanently in the possessions of any of them, there lies a rough quadrilateral with its corners in Tangier, Brazzaville, Darwin and Hong Kong” (194-195). All these disputed territories contain valuable minerals, raw material and a ”bottomless reserve of cheap labour.” We may add that, when Orwell wrote his novel, there were many Western colonials in the area waiting for their subsequent independence.

”War is Peace”

Emmanuel Goldstein’s alias Orwell’s world is multipolar and without interdependency. According to Goldstein, Eurasia, Eastasia and Oceania, the three superpowers had been in constant war the recent 25 years. After a few hundred bombs were dropped in industrial centres of European Russia, West-Europe and the US, the nature of war had changed. Contrary to earlier desperate, annihilating struggle, the question was about ”warfare of limited aims between combatants who are unable to destroy each other, have no material cause for fighting, and are not divided by any genuine ideological difference” (193). Nature of war had changed, now it touches only a small amount of specialists. In centres of civilizations war was nothing more than continuous shortage of consumption goods. Airstrip One and London had their share from the war by rocket bombs – easily to be imagined bombardments of London in 1940 and V2 rockets a few years later.

All these three super-states were not enough strong to win their enemy, not even in an alliance with another. To some extent Orwell’s multi-polarity predicted Cold War and China’s strengthening positions. A particular drama was played in the late 1960s, when relations between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated, and US President Nixon stated to play his diplomacy. Basically Goldstein’s Eurasia could have occupied Britain as Oceania moved its border to Rhine or Vistula. However, this would have violated the principle of cultural integrity, although never formulated: millions of new inhabitants had either to be exterminated or assimilated (204). As contacts to foreigners were limited, balancing was a problem for all three super-states. In practice
the three were similar in many respects: "Everywhere there is the same pyramidal structure, the same worship of a semi-divine leader, the same economy existing by and for continuous warfare." (205). Thus, cultural integrity is a balancer, and constrains world hegemony. Markets can be global but cultural nationalism remains a dominant element.

As war become something natural, and state of nature, it ceased to be dangerous (ibid., 206). The causes for war seemed not be that much in evil human beings, as classical realists claimed, or, like in the neo-realist claim, in the anarchic international system. As their social systems were closed, there was no former competition of raw materials. Instead the third classic cause for war, I think was the most common: wars were needed because of domestic reasons to maintain the state. "War it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair" (ibid., 207). Another state was needed as an enemy, as a significant Other, and other kind of interdependency was not known. The world order resembled more "cold war" than "cold peace" if we think, for example Israel and Egypt being an example of the latter since the late 1970s.

In Oceania the most difficult thing was to remember, whether Eurasia or Eastasia was the current enemy. Power was linked to history: those, who could prove the logic of their previous actions in relation to the present, had the power. 'Lines' mattered, and the past had to be in congruence with the present. For example, the Big Brother had predicted in his speech that the South Indian front would remain quiet instead of North Africa, but precisely the opposite happened. Thus, Winston Smith needed to rewrite the speech "in such a way as to make him predict the thing that had actually happened." At its best Orwell is, when he depicts rapid political changes i.e. to maintain the same hostile structure but to change the name only. This verbal acrobatics takes place even in the middle of a sentence in one political speech; only the name of the enemy state was changed (188-189). Winston Smith’s own solution was to start a diary, which was a *thoughtcrime* as such. Although writing the diary was no illegal, it was certainly punishable by death or forced-labour camp (8). The world was more primitive than fifty years ago; Goldstein concluded his ‘samizdat’.
Language, Memory and Change

In Orwell’s dystopia already the question of ontology is thought provoking. There is not only the traditional subject-object distinction, but a third element as well: a collective singular. Maurice Halbwachs had published his books in collective memory in 1925 and 1941. There he basically argued, how, contrary to historiography, the present mattered in defining collective memory. On the basis of Marxist ground, social position defined social consciousness i.e. a worker had a working class consciousness. Thus, in Nineteen Eighty-Four the party was the third element. The truth was not ”in here” or ”out there” but defined by the collective singular. If we explain this in a positive way, even Reinhart Koselleck (1979) briefly discusses collectives, like political generations. Moreover, in constructivism the starting point lies in socialization i.e. we will share many common and collective ideas. However, Orwell’s brilliant contribution is to link all this to present political power and authority – who has the right to tell the truth. If 2+2 is 5, then it is so. ”Day by the day and almost minute by minute the past was brought up to date” (42).

In the book Winston’s diary represent a kind of counter-memory, in this case between an individual and the system. Smith even devoted his diary ”to a time when truth exists and what is done cannot be undone” (30). Here we easily see implications to the Soviet society in general, in which the most political discussions were said to take place in the kitchen, or to dissidents, who aimed to develop ”living in truth” or ”antipolitics”. It might be even Orwell from who this sharp distinction between the ”truth” and ”lie” originated – we represent the ”truth”, the others are ”politicking”. However, as Hayden White (1987) argued, content of the form matters: narrative is a construction, but its details can be revealed if they are untrue.

Nevertheless, George Orwell was in fact interested in language and archive far earlier than Foucault or the linguistic turn. For example, before 2011 nobody knew jytky in Finland, a metaphor, which condensed the True Finns landslide electoral victory. For Orwell the crucial idea was to combine language, memory and political change. In the novel Orwell noted a trend, how politicians aim to leave their mark on lan-
guage also by naming and renaming things. Thus, the change is completed only, when the language will be altered. According to the last sentence of the book: "It was chiefly in order to allow time for the preliminary work of translation that the final adaption of Newspeak had been fixed for so late as 2050.” Although the revolution had taken place in the 1950s, horizon of expectation comprised ca. 100 years (this in fact is more than the expected mantra of the democratic transition in Eastern Europe in the 1990s: 6 months for political institutions, 6 years for the economy and 60 years to change the people).

As we know on the basis of Koselleck, this kind of horizons tend to move in the course of time. In the novel the year 1984 was in the midst of political transition, and only specialists could use Newspeak: ”The leading articles in the Times were written in it but this was a tour de force which could only be carried out by a specialis.” (312). At the same time language was the last remnant of the past. ”When Oldspeak had been once and for all superseded, the last link with the past would have been severed” (324). Theoretically, by using renewed language people could still remember original meanings of words, but within a couple of generation this danger would vanish.

"A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language would no more know that equal had once had the secondary meaning of ‘politically equal’, or that free had once meant ‘intellectually free’, than, for instance, a person who had never heard of chess would be aware of the secondary meaning attaching to queen or rook” (ibid.).

Orwell had added an appendix in the book to clarify the principles of Newspeak. Even if for example conceptual history links conceptual and social change, here the particular Newspeak is the key for manoeuvring political change, thus, language completes the change. Contrary to other languages Newspeak was almost the only one, which vocabulary was diminishing in the course of time. A new dictionary was power, and the ”final” vocabulary was currently in the making. The forthcoming 11th print was to be the definitive edition and the language in its final shape (53). Language determined thought, as Newspeak was not
only providing a medium of expression of Ingsoc, ”but to make all other modes of thought impossible” (312).

The purpose was not to extend but to diminish the range of thought by cutting the choice of words into a minimum (313). On one hand they invented neologisms, but first of all eliminated undesirable words and unorthodox meanings. From this point of view, I think, the process gave birth to a kind of ”command language” and political liturgy – a skill not only in command economies, but also for every party soldier and politician.

”The greatest difficulty facing the compilers of the Newspeak Dictionary was not to invent new words, but, having invented them, to make sure what they meant: to make sure, that is to say, what ranges of words they cancelled by their existence.” (318).

There were three categories in Newspeak: A, B and C. The first category, A vocabulary, was created for everyday life, impossible for literary, political or philosophical use. ”It was intended only to express simple, purposive thoughts, usually involving concrete objects or physical action” (314). It was striking, how it was possible to change meanings by affixes like un- or plus- and doubleplus-. Politics of language politics took place, when someone had to decide, whether, for example, the word dark should become unlight or light replaced by undark.

Thus, Newspeak contained batteries of words covered by a single comprehensive term, which I consider as politics of synonym i.e. which words can be considered as synonyms. From ideological point of view none of the words in the B vocabulary was neutral but a euphemism: joycamp or Ministry of Peace meant the exact opposite. It seems that these words were kind of generalisations, as for example concepts of liberty and equality had vanished and contained in the single term crimethink. Evidently language did not reflect reality but like a tool constructed it, far from being neutral mode of communication. Moreover, the words were to ”impose a desirable mental attitude upon the person using them” (316). In the present I have the word ”challenge” in mind: it seems that our future has narrowed to this neo-liberalist concept, which stresses positive and personal approach in dealing with
the uncertainty instead of difficulties, problems or structural obstacles (Nyyssönen 2012).

Moreover, all these words were compound words welded together in an easy pronounceable form (317). For example *goodthink*, referred to orthodoxy and inflected as *goodthinking*, *goodthinkful*, *goodthinker*, etc. First and foremost, pronunciation mattered: easy to pronounce indicated their derivation. ”The intention was to make speech, and especially speech as nearly as possible independent of consciousness” (321). In the end language will resemble *duckspeak*, meaning ”to quack like a duck”, which, even the form *doubleplusgood duckspeaker*, was a warm and valued compliment (322). In the 1980s parole it still had two meanings: ”Applied to an opponent, it is abuse, applied to someone you agree with, it is a praise” (57).

Easily pronounced words led to politics of abbreviations in the B vocabulary. Orwell gives examples: Winston Smith’s work place *Recdep* was the Records Department in the Ministry of Truth *Minitrue*, Fiction Department was *Ficdep*, as the Tele-programmes department *Teldeped*. Although abbreviations, like Nazi, Gestapo or Comintern, were used earlier, too, now the usage was conscious (from Nazi rhetoric, see Littell 2008, 549-551). Here Orwell makes an interesting point: ”abbreviating a name one narrowed and subtly altered its meaning” (320). For example Communist International call up a picture of universal human brotherhood, red flags, Karl Marx and the Paris Commune, whilst Comintern suggest ”merely a tightly-knit organisation and a well-defined body of doctrine” (321). To be honest, this kind of politics is quite a lot: for the present reader there is no difference at all. Or is the EU something less than the European Union? Or maybe, like in Robert Michels and his iron law of oligarchy, USA, UN, SPD, etc. are something mere institutions compared to their ideas to which these institutions were founded.

The C vocabulary completed the two others and consisted only technical and scientific words. Only a few of them were used in everyday life or politics. Specialists find their words enlisted there and normally did not know much about other disciplines. Word for Science had ceased to exist, as Ingsoc had sufficiently covered it.

At the same time the idea of Newspeak meant that domestic lan-
guages were narrowed and minimised. Basically Orwell seems to share
the idea how nation is dying without language, and rich vocabulary re-
fects rich ability of thought. However, this is more problematic, if we
think collapsed Empires and their dominant languages. In the cases like
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, Czech and Slovakia or Croatia and Serbia
language has been a project to promote nationalist thought in cases, in
which the dominant language has been already very close to each oth-
er. De facto language and the birth of a nation is quite a conservative
idea, as we have countries like the US or India, which are nations and
still use ”English”. As a fictive Doctor Voss argued in Jonathan Littell’s
*Les Bienveintalles*, blood transmits proneness to heart disease but not
defection i.e. (national) character. Nevertheless, language, as a mediator
of culture, can have an impact on thought and behaviour (Littell 2008,
266–267). There is no particular need to defend ”rally-English” (Finn-
ish formula drivers abroad) but to remind, how contradictory perfect
US English, spoken by a sharp dressed Balkan politician, might sound.
Language can be domesticated but not copied.

In Finland in 1984

Journalist Unto Hämäläinen has written a book about politics in Fin-
land in 1984 i.e. in the year of the Orwellian dystopia. Although his
interpretation is quite a journalist one, full of ”turning points”, it still
reveals something. For example, in 1984 OECD estimated that only in
Japan economy grew faster than in Finland. The expression ‘the North-
ern Japan’ originates in *Suomen Kuvalehti* (Finnish Pictorial Maga-
was also the year, when Finland started to take a distance from its post-
war political system. Personally I have traced many changes in Finland
to year 1987, when the new ”red-blue coalition” claimed to represent
new political culture (Nyyssönen 2006). Nevertheless, it is easy to agree
with Juhani Suomi or, like Unto Hämäläinen, that 1984 represented a
kind of stagnation in world politics before new openings of the Gor-
bachev era (cf. Suomi 2005; Suomi 2006).

Concerning George Orwell and his forthcoming anniversary of
1984, a current discussion in Finland was surprisingly small. This is Hämäläinen’s conclusion on the basis of newspapers he studied from the years 1983 and 1984. In the media discussion the Soviet Union (sic) was mentioned, but only in passing. If the Soviet Union was mentioned in the Orwellian context, it was also stressed that these phenomena existed in the West, too (Hämäläinen 2011, 12). Moreover, the book itself was partly censored: Already in 1950 the translator Oiva Talvitie had suggested that in the end there was a part, which could be delicate in foreign policy. The translation without references to the Soviet Union, was published, altogether in nine editions, also in 1984. The first ”uncensored” was published in 1999 by translator Raija Mattila – this time by the support of the European Commission. (ibid., 13, 136).

For Hämäläinen Finland was a safe country in general, but had characteristics, which were typical for Orwell’s book. Finns neither eagerly mentioned these nor even perceived them. The most distressing was fear of war, a constant topic in politics (Hämäläinen 2011, 13).

A debate of J.K. Paasikivi’s diaries fits loosely to this category. Paasikivi’s archives were opened in May 1984, and the files of 1944 were to be opened in the same autumn. However, the current government, led by the Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa, prolonged the secrecy of the most important foreign policy documents for ten years (Hämäläinen 2011, 31). Moreover, the Paasikivi diaries were closed for the public for 25 years by the request of President Kekkonen. The First Secretary Konstantin Chernenko had messaged to President Koivisto and wished not to publish the diaries, or at least their publication should be postponed. The Soviets wished to win time so that both sides could fade out the concept Paasikivi-Kekkonen line from political speeches and to substitute it either by the Kekkonen or Koivisto line. One option was to buy the rights of the diaries by the state, and not to publish them. Paasikivi’s family was not eager to make compromises, and finally publishing house WSOY released them in 1985 and 1986. Before publishing President Koivisto sent a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, in which he explained the details. (ibid., 33).

Thus, although Winston Smith’s handprint of constant falsification is missing, a tendency to update history with the current foreign policy line existed. Another phenomenon of history politics was the fear of the
archive: suddenly a document can appear in the public, which is questioning the former policy line: in Kremlin many archives are still closed.

Unto Hämäläinen discuss also peace movements, Finnish army and the politico-military relations with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan and Grenada among other topics had defined the international agenda, as the Soviet and US leaders had not met in five years. In 1984 British Jane’s International Defence estimated that Finnish troops in Southern Finland were to stop, not Nato troops, but the Soviet attack (Hämäläinen 1984, 98). Particularly new military technology, like cruise missiles, raised speculations on potential consultations with the Soviet Union. Hämäläinen’s thought provoking conclusion was that he did not and even now does not know, whether the Finnish army would have fought with the Soviet Union or the US, had such an ultimate choice emerged (ibid., 103).

My own personal memory comes from the Spring 1984 and is controversial as well. In military practices in Lapland I listened officers, who unofficially chatted with each other i.e. how to react when the man with a "Budjonovka" emerges. On the other hand one, but only one, sergeant spoke about the US nigger, which is popping up from the bushes. This is because we have the FCMA, the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance – YYA, as the famous abbreviation is in Finnish.

Notes

1 However, I cannot remember, whether I have met Pekka Korhonen before his early 1985 lectures or his departure to Japan. Moreover, the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four belonged to our list of classics in our second year seminar, klassikkoseminaari.

Sources


Since the turn of the 21st century, Russia has started a persistent comeback to the number of great powers, or at least it tries to attain to a position of a regional power within Eurasia. This aspiration is not often taken seriously among the other powers; it has been openly belittled or made as a subject of ridicule. It seems as if the considerations of Halford Mackinder for a hundred years ago about the changing role of land power in geopolitics would have been forgotten. As a geographer, Mackinder paid attention to the characteristics of the Eurasian continent stating that the vast areas of nine million square miles (more than twice the area of Europe) “have no available water-ways to the ocean, but, on the other hand, except in the subarctic forest, are very generally favourable to the mobility of horsemen and camelmen”.

Mackinder sees a modernising Russia to replace the Mongol Empire: “Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey,
on Persia, on India, and on China, replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppemen” (Ibid., 434). Having said that, he is enthusiastic about the role of railways in Eurasia, although he has to admit that “the Trans-Siberian railway is still a single and precarious line of communication”. He can be criticised for saying that “the century will not be old before all Asia is covered with railways”, since the Far East had to wait more than half a century before the single Trans-Siberian railway was complemented by additional lines.

The purpose of this article is to examine the prerequisites of contemporary geopolitics and the great power programmes of Russia and into some extent of China. What are the methods used by these states to achieve and retain a position of dominance over others in the 21st century? The development of railway networks is no more a satisfactory answer to the question, although it still has some significance in trans-continental transportation. Is the answer in ideology? Have expansionist states formed an ideology to support their expansion? If yes, what would it be? Today, the term *imperialism* is seldom mentioned as a guideline of the great power aspirations, but if it is not the guideline, what then is?

Or do we face with expansionism at all? Perhaps the question is about the emergence of an empire, which conquers new territories in the relevant regions in order to raise its own status above that of the rivals. Therefore, the attention must be focused in the role of territory in the Eurasian context and in the meaning of ethnic factors in collecting a tribal, linguistic and/or religious front against different nations. Besides, the core of the empire is in the specific mission of its nation ahead or above the others, and possibly also in the historical past, which may consist of real or imagined elements, such as historical homeland, common historical memory, holy centres, or victories, collapses and purgatories.

All the above mentioned elements are part of geopolitics in the very concrete and traditional sense of the term. In a debate article, published shortly after the annexation of Crimea, Mead regards that in the 1990s westerners had expected ‘old-fashioned geopolitics’ to go away, because they fundamentally misread what the collapse of the Soviet Union meant: they thought geopolitics itself had simply disappeared. But the
obsolescence of hard power has appeared to be viable. Mead overestimates the achievements of Russia in 2014 when saying that Putin has stopped the NATO expansion “dead in its tracks”. In addition to this, Putin has, as Mead describes, “dismembered Georgia, brought Armenia into his orbit, tightened his hold on Crimea, and, with his Ukrainian adventure, dealt the West an unpleasant and humiliating surprise”. In a commentary to Mead’s article, Ikenberry replies that even though Putin is winning some small battles, he is losing the war. “Russia is not on the rise; to the contrary, it is experiencing one of the greatest geopolitical contractions of any major power in the modern era.”

**Geopolitics – allowed only for empires?**

Geopolitics is a key factor to the existence of an empire. Empires are compared according to their size, capacity, ethnic diversity and invasions, and no one seems to complain if (when) their domestic division of power is very uneven. The basic idea of any empire is actually the expanse and territorial conquest.

A common way of thought insists that geopolitics leans on territory. The prefix geo should indicate it. Geopolitics has something to do with maps and borders. Classical geopolitics estimated the performance of nations by counting such qualities as the land mass, water areas, climate, population, natural resources, and industrial development, just to mention few of Sachaklian’s systematic list from the beginning of the Cold War. – Some western writers, mainly with a military background, continued to defend classical geopolitics with border, land masses and industrial capacities. True, in Russia, fuel and power are essential factors of maintenance, and pipelines soon became symbols of their new geopolitics.

In the 21st century, different interpretations can be heard, such as the conception of Hardt and Negri, which insists that while the sovereign state “is predicated upon a logic of territorialisation, the transversal flows of Empire are de-territorialising”. The first of their five characteristics of an empire is respectively the “borderless nature of imperial rule”. When so understood, empire is more a metaphysical en-
tity that unites the community into a nation in a Herderian sense. De-territorialisation has for more than two decades been one of the key concepts in the vocabulary of critical geopolitics, and through it Ó Tuathail and Luke refer to the globalising culture, manufacturing and trade. This is a new type of world order, which profoundly differs from that of the Cold War. After the circumnavigation through American non-conservative and environmentalist views and the market areas of American and multinational companies they come to a conclusion that fits Eurasian current developments, too: instead of deterritorialisation, the goal of American foreign policy is flexible reterritorialisation, and outside the home ground, the American power must track down and pacify the “wild” threats or police this kind of regions and protect the national interest.

To sum up, geopolitics has got some immaterial characteristics, like attitude, will or ability to implement some operation, or choice of words in speeches; discourses, rhetoric in the broad sense of the word – and this is what the school of critical geopolitics has claimed for over twenty years. But at the same time, it is further helpless with territorial issues. And it is astonishing how carelessly the immaterial way of thought in geopolitics has been ignored by the mainstream commentators.

The role of great powers in the international relations and international law is contradictory: they have laid the foundation of the United Nations (charter and organs), but when needed, they reserve themselves a right to interpret the common norms according to their current interests.

Let us move from geopolitics as a concept to the Eurasianist element that is closely linked with it. Great states with large territory have used geopolitics in different ways over time. Especially Russia has written and rewritten its foreign policy doctrines relatively often. Seemingly it has been compelled to correct both the content of the documents and their style of writing.

*Ex oriente lux – Eastphalia complementing Westphalia?*

In 2009 *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* organised a symposium on
the emerging *Eastphalia* model in Asia. U.S. and Asian researchers and experts discussed the impact of the growth of Asia in international relations and asked, if the rise of Asia predicts the emergence of an *Eastphalian* world order to replace the contemporary Westphalian one. The concept of *Eastphalia* attempts to “capture the potential for Asian countries to reshape international politics, which have been long dominated by the influence, interests, and ideas of the West, in ways that reflect Asian power, principles, and practices more clearly”\(^{11}\) and to steer the growth potential and influence of the Asian countries to bring about something new into the principles of international policy. Lo Chang-fa crystallised the Chinese approach to be the same as the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which Zhou Enlai declared in 1954 in the Afro–Asian Bandung Conference:

1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful coexistence\(^{12}\)

In its entirety, Lo’s presentation seems more a government communiqué than a symposium paper: the five principles not only originate in the 1950s, but they also seem to breathe the 1950s, if not 1940s. The third principle means that the states cannot interfere even in internal wars or grave human rights violations in other states. Modern human interventions would not be justified on these principles. Another paper giver in the conference, Tom Ginsburg, questioned the superiority of Eastphalia to its predecessor, but in his view, the greatest conceptual innovation of Asian states in international law in the past several decades has been a regressive one, namely the idea that “Asian values” offered an alternative to liberal universalism. He needles about how Asians say to value order over freedom, the group over the individual, and economic development over political liberties, but those who tell us so are usually representatives of authoritarian countries.\(^{13}\) Consistently, China regards any criticism, targeted to its action in Tibet and Xinjiang, as an international interference into its sovereignty.
China can be regarded as an empire because of its imperial past and imperial behaviour even today. Its aspirations of a control over Eurasia have been preserved as before. But how could one define an empire in our post-modern times? And can the Russian Federation be regarded as an empire? Saull notes that not all empires are alike, which makes it impossible to analytically deploy the term. The existence of vertical structures is one regular characteristics of the empire, while equality and autonomy may be in difficulties. An empire tends to use force to maintain the imperial rule, but according to Spruyt some carrots are also essential, such as the provision of public goods accessible and beneficial to at least local elites in the peripheries. An empire also stands on hegemony over other actors, and thus fixed stable borders are not good if they want to expand their sphere of influence. The possibility of expansion depends on the region and the point of time. For all empires, any enlargement turns out to be impossible. Since the foundation of the United Nations, most nations have had an impression that the times of occupations belongs to history, but during all the 70 years, great powers have used any opportunity to grow their influence. The latest link in this chain is the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014.

An empire could be defined as Saull does it, as a boundless form of political space characterized by political and economic relations of hierarchy and exploitation of a periphery by a core. The constitutive aspects such as vertical structures, exploitation of peripheries by the centre, and expansion may be latent or manifest across time.

Authority, command, ethnicity

Centeno and Enriquez suggest that the Latin term *imperium* would refer to the authority, command and domination, and the usage has not changed over the centuries. They argue, however, in my view, wrongly that all the countries of Europe have originated as empires, but all empires have not transformed to nation states. This is also contrary to Arendt’s vision of a multi-national state (*Vielvölkerstaat*), in which the citizens’ channel of influence to government decisions on human rights is missing, while in the nation-state, such a channel basically works. It contradicts also Kumar’s point of view, according to which nations and empires are seen as competitors, even enemies.
Centeno and Enriquez acknowledge that the multinational nature of empires makes them inevitably different from nation states in their pure form, but rather in the context that the cultural and institutional fragmentation of an empire, together with its large area demand heavy management, and this may easily lead to excessive bureaucracy and inefficiency. More straightforward: these characteristics generate excessive, obsolete bureaucracy, which *per definitionem* is ineffective.

The relationship between the empire and its subordinates or citizens is symbolized by the great and beloved leader, who of course resides in the capital city, and therefore empires seek to raise the status of the capital to correspond with the prestige of the great-power itself (Moscow, Beijing, Washington DC, Vienna, Berlin, but also e.g. Astana).

Ethnicity is often faded out from greatpowerness, because the most important issue is the subordinates’ mental experience that they belong to a large territorial and political community. At the same time, an empire maintains structural inequality between the centre and the periphery. In the case of Russia, this would mean that the status of the two capitals is raised, but peripheries remain peripheries – despite the fact that some of them get along pretty well using the income of the utilization of their energy and raw material resources. The resource wealth of the peripheries seeks to drain to the centre in the hope of rapid progress.

Laruelle has collected the elements of Russian Eurasianism through its main representatives. Ethnohistorian Lev Gumilëv is the eminent philosopher who uses ethnicity as the key factor of the rise of nations. His term *ethnogenesis* is a combining element that allows him to move not only over centuries but even over the millennia of the development of European, Asian, and Eurasian civilisations. Passionarity is closely connected with the ethnogenesis, since it is the primus motor of the rise of human (ethnic) communities and serves the link between social communities and humans as biological organisms. When, or better to say if the spark of passion starts to glow, it blows some extraordinary spirit to a human community.

In Gumilëv’s thought, passionarity is always an anomaly with respect to the common development of mankind and it is also “an anomaly in relation to the social form of the motion of matter.” This special talent
is connected with the biological being of every individual, and when a large number of individuals in a certain ethnic group bring their talent into the common use, this opens the possibility for the rise above other ethnoi. Needless to say that the vertical structures (ethnos, sub-ethnos, super-ethnos) are different among different nations. Passionarity is temporal, which has the consequence that nations are formed, they develop and rise, reach the zenith of their orbit and gradually degenerate until they finally die out. In the background Gumilëv seeks the answer to the future of the Russian ethnos: will it flourish or is it already degenerating.

After Gumilëv, Laruelle moves to read Aleksandr S. Panarin, the philosopher of history who has been regarded as one of the leading figures of Russian conservatism. He has specialised in the study of civilisations, and on this basis tries to understand how empires are (were) erected and how a Neo-Eurasianist thought can represent the plurality of history. The third representative of the (Neo-) Eurasianist trend is Aleksandr Dugin, the nationalist-minded ultra-conservative thinker that reads and reproduces the classics of geopolitics and transfers them to fit contemporary Russia. As a philosopher Dugin is questionable, although he soon became one of the founders of nation-building in the re-emerging great power called the Russian Federation. Dugin first sucked arguments from the text books of classical geopolitics but, after getting the sparkle of Orthodoxism, soon developed a personal approach to geopolitics that places Russian culture on the top of a long historical chain, which starts from prehistoric Turan and moves on through Kievan Rus’, the Mongol occupation, Muscovy, imperial Russia and to the Soviet geopolitics, and from there he moves to describe the geopolitics of Yeltsin’s Russia. The whole story is finally crowned by a description of ”Phenomenon Putin”. For this very reason, Dugin is not interpreted more in this context. Laruelle’s scholarly work instead, is a good starting point for reading and interpreting classical Russian geopolitical thinkers (such as Berdyayev or Danilevsky) and some contemporary philosophers. The limited scope of this article, however, does not allow to continue it here.

Two more attempts to define empire must be taken. For Zielonka, imperium means a great actor with a global military, economic and dip-
lomatic influence. It must have means to influence other formally sov-
ereign or autonomous actors and persuade them to accept its actions. 
The management of peripheries draws its legitimacy from the imperial 
civilizing mission, or through vocation. Similarly, the U.S. have tended 
to set up wars far away from home, and it is easy to motivate the use of 
force by pleading of the war on terrorism or export of democracy. EU has 
gradually expanded its control by a clever use of the gradual condition-
ality of membership, and offering a variety of take-it-or-leave-it pack-
ages, such as the Copenhagen criteria, and rather abstract European values. 
Russia maintains military bases in South Ossetia, Belarus, Transdnistria, 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It regards them as its peripheries,, and here 
Russian and European conceptions of peripheries collide. China and 
Russia are wary of interfering in each other’s affairs, because they have 
their own troublemakers who might confuse the status quo: Russia has 
Chechnya and Dagestan, China respectively Tibet and Xinjiang. 

These examples prove that Russian leaders regard themselves as mas-
ters in their own peripheries, but they will face intensifying competi-
tion from the part of other powers in the areas that just a while ago 
belonged exclusively to their sphere of interests.

We now followed some American scholars and Russian thinkers 
when trying to find a workable definition to the concept of empire. As 
often in this kind of circumstances, also here the diversity of concep-
tions may cause confusion, because organisatory form of states are very 
diverse. Geoffrey Parker’s conception of the interconnection of geopol-
itics, geography and empire may help a little.

*There is nothing to be done about geography?*

Parker’s book from 1988 starts by noting that the attempts by certain 
states to achieve and retain a position of dominance over others has 
become a constant feature in the history of world politics. “One of 
the most important expressions of this has been territorial – the urge 
to secure control over large areas and so to establish empires of over-
whelming size and power.” Often the state is ruled by a strong leader 
who just got a grasp of power. He represents the point of view that spe-
cifically geographical aspects of the phenomenon of territorial domi-
nance have received too little attention. He pleads of the geopolitical structures of the states that have attained positions of dominance. The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union are examined in order to find if dominant state characteristics have determined their behaviour.30

In Parker’s heuristic model, the ‘geopolitical surface’ possesses two particularly unstable characteristics: 1) Since the states use to behave as if they were permanent phenomena, they tightly resist all changes which might be disadvantageous to them; 2) When the orders periodically erupt, some states may, taking advantage of the disruption, attempt to change the system in order to promote their own interests. Instead of seeking to achieve peaceful change, they take risk and try to compel their own, better model instead.31

In this respect, Russia and China are different. In China, Beijing has been the capital “for ever”, i.e. since 1115 or so, but during many decades parallel with some other city (Nanjing, Shenyang). Russian nationalists find a cause of headache in their history of capitals: the Vikings established Kiev as their capital, and only the Mongol invasion in the 13th century offered some minor duchies almost a thousand kilometres away an opportunity to grow in wealth, and as a result of this change Moscow strengthened and became the capital of a new state of Muscovy. But was Muscovy then the same state as the Kievan Rus, that is a factor that divides Russians in two camps.

In Parker’s model, the immense geographical size stimulated the expansionist spirit which urged and later obliged the Tsars to penetrate eastwards and southwards. Although this expansionist spirit differed from the American phrase “Go west, young man, and grow up with the country”, the common feature in both was the pioneer spirit and the feeling of supremacy, both of which belong to Parker’s list of characteristics of dominant states or challengers. Thus, it was even logical that Russia through this expansionism achieved of a dominant position.32

The conclusion of Parker on the ideological basis of the dominant power of Russia does not hit the nail completely; he claims that since in the East European plateau the states did not have fixed borders, the policy of pan-Slavism was an attempt to collect their “own” people together in order to obtain the ethnic unity, but it never worked as a tool for the rulers to rule a large multi-ethnic empire.33
Russian Eurasianist tradition

Since Russia feels not to be physically limited within its borders, the geopolitical debates have extended to cover the whole continent of Eurasia – again, one could say. The newest concrete outcome of the implementation of the geopolitical programme is the foundation of the Eurasian Economic Union that commenced in the beginning of 2015.

The Eurasianist way of thought has been an important school since the 1830s, but it must be emphasized that it has not been the only school of geopolitics that has run the debates over Russian space. More academic attempts were many, in which the international role of Russia was analysed in a more neutral way.

In his geopolitical survey, Trenin remarks that Russians, when talking about Eurasia, usually refer to the post-Soviet space, but on the other hand, the newest integration project of Moscow was named the Eurasian Union. Western-minded observers in Russia and west see Russian Eurasianism always to represent an antithesis to westernism, and to the west itself.

Trenin apparently points to the new conservative imperial-minded thinkers and myth-makers, who lean on the Eurasian school as their seat back. Thinkers like Trubetskoj, Savicky, Danilevsky and Gumilëv try to find a specific way of existence for Russia, which not only differs from the western way of thought but also is better, higher developed and more spiritual. Savicky first turned the role of the Golden Horde from negative, almost satanist, to positive, like a saviour: when Russian historiography painted the Mongol occupation in dark colours, Savicky regarded it as a factor that helped Russia to gain its geopolitical independence and to maintain its spiritual independence from the aggressive Roman-Germanic world.

From this perspective Trenin emphasises that to understand the New Eurasia, traditional concepts should be reconsidered. Europe and Asia, he says, have lived separate lives. While Europe was constructed in a lengthy process into a community, first under the auspices of the Roman Empire, then under the banner of Christianity, and later in the Westphalian system of nation states, Asia, by contrast, has never had a unified community. But in the Asian part of Eurasia, traditionally there
were several special worlds: East Asian world around China, South Asian world in Hindustan, and finally Islamic world in the southwest. Trenin therefore calls the Russian-Soviet territory “small Eurasia”, which is just a part of a huge, but more and more solid continent, and in this territory ”we shall see events to come that will determine the pattern of the 21st century”. Navigation in this new geopolitical context requires extensive continental thinking.

An authoritarian state develops the ”vertical of power”, and instead of peaceful cohabitation with other peaceful nation states it starts to enlarge its territory by different means. Aubakirova, who in her marvelous article collects the essential elements of Eurasianism, accentuates that in Eurasia, the states evolved under conditions of extensive spatial perspectives, which gave rise to a particular practice of conflict resolution: not by seeking a compromise with the government (as in Europe), but by an intervention to the periphery or beyond the state borders. Secondly, what is common between Eurasian states is a large ”military-administrative component” of their history, largely explaining the originality of attitudes about the state. Hence, it is no doubt that the supreme subject of government who has been vested by the maximum amount of powers is surrounded by moral and legal atmosphere behaves like a patriarch and is respected as a patriarch.

So, in the Eurasian model(s) of government, not formal law but the spirit is important: eidos, the idea of the state defines its functional characteristics. This can be seen in the works of numerous Slavophiles who have tried to define the Russian Idea. Ul’chenko, too, emphasizes the state-centered and ”patriarch-centered” structure of Eurasianism and claims that at least in her country, Kazakhstan, the main duty of Eurasianism is to develop a state identity (instead of ethnic, regional or other identities) and pave way to a wider integration across the continent – the Eurasian Union. This kind of a union is one opportunity, but there are some others, too. Union-building is fashionable in our times.

**Geopolitics and Russia in the 21st century**

What is essential in contemporary Russian state-building: is it mod-
ernisation of economy and administration, strengthening of military capacity, diversification of energy-dependent economy, or development of soft power in Eurasia? Busygina and Okunev\textsuperscript{38} survey world literature and conclude that geopolitics is not dead but as a discipline needs thorough reconsideration in Russia, as this has been made in the west. Secondly, this rethinking should not be just by polishing old nostalgic concepts with their simplistic explanations, and not simply by renaming phenomena.

The main issue, which the authors want to pose in the debate is the existence of a specific research niche for geopolitics in an interdisciplinary field that could build bridges between disciplines. They believe that the niche is to be found by examining the influence of territorial space to the international relations. In this way it could combine the approaches of political science, geography and history.

The method used by Busygina and Okunev is interdisciplinary. They ask what can be studied in a geopolitical analysis and suggest a set of independent variables, in which geopolitics is based.\textsuperscript{39} From classical geography they lade qualities as location, neighbours, size, configuration, some structural issues like centre–periphery relations, urbanisation or interregional disparities, as well as human and social factors such as centralisation and infrastructure. The key dependent variables for geopolitics would be e.g. national and global priorities, geopolitical strategies or place and role in the geopolitical world order.

The authors do not apply their model to the characteristics and resources of Russia nor any other state. They apparently want to avoid to discuss practical consequences; perhaps this is why the article was published in the section of theoretical political science. One essential question for elaboration would be if Russia develops soft power or trusts in hard iron only. Apparently Russia has been able to achieve advantages by showing and using power, but probably some soft forms of power would be more fruitful.

What prevents us from applying this method and run a playful stress testing, since they are in fashion now? I put the independent variables in the table as such, then in the next column I try to characterise and objectify the field in my own words. Finally, I develop an imperative to each case in the way that I think some geostratege of the Kremlin.
would say, within the framework of the dependent variables. So, the imperatives are imagined, not my own opinions nor recommendations.

**Table:** From explanation in geopolitics to practical imperatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Characterisation</th>
<th>Imperative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Location of territory, neighbours</td>
<td>Continental, from Arctic to subtropical zones. Neighbours: diverse, many of them unfriendly, near-abroad in special role</td>
<td>Conquerable from west, not from east. Show power to neighbours. Keep up deterrence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nature of borders</td>
<td>Versatile. Natural borders on the coasts only.</td>
<td>Invest in border guards and surveillance technologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Anthropogenic properties: centralization, development, urbanisation</td>
<td>Capital city is natural centre of empire. State-led capitalism, lack of initiative and high tech. Urban populace 74 %</td>
<td>Maintain the centralised control of anything. Invest in Skolkovo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Physical composition of territory: relief, water, soil, climate, natural resources</td>
<td>Russia has everything, but location and harsh climate cause problems.</td>
<td>Equip technique that works in cold climate and long distances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Anthropogenic composition of territory: economic areas, infra</td>
<td>Empire divided to 8 economic areas. Infrastructure in viable condition. Long distances.</td>
<td>Keep control of economy, do not open borders too much.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Configuration of elements: centre–periphery relations, interregional disparities, asymmetry</td>
<td>Centre is centre, periphery is periphery. Regional cleavages are levelled by the central government.</td>
<td>Russia needs a strong leader who can steer the ship even in a storm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Evolution of territorial structure: formation of state, territorial strategies, change of borders</td>
<td>Territory divided to 85 subjects. Development of European Russia more important. Empire amends borders every now and then, when needed.</td>
<td>Develop centralisation but keep autonomy as a camouflage for the outer world. Expand territory when possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Sovereign territory: internal, external</td>
<td>Political regime works well in all circumstances.</td>
<td>Russia needs a skilful captain of the ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final outcome</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Empire</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Goals of the Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century**

China’s foreign policy has adopted the role of securitizing the energy and raw material supplies for Chinese industries. It has five main dimensions. First, investments in railways, other infrastructure and mining in Sub-Saharan Africa and secondly the scientific and military presence
in the Arctic ocean both tend to guarantee the interests of Chinese industry. Third, investments in clearance and cultivation of grain and soya in South America tend to solve the nutrition of the huge population. Fourth, oil prospecting and production first in Venezuela, now in Siberia seek to gain energy where it is possible and profitable, thus strengthening what is called energy nationalism. So China has become dependent on the safety of the far sea transportation routes, in which African piracy has caused a lot of troubles. So, the shift of coastal defence to the defence of far blue seas has become the fifth element of Chinese foreign policy strategy. Only after this, the territorial disputes concern small areas but gain visibility in the international community.

The dispute of the uninhabited Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands is practically the only context where China has tried to mark its borders in order to enlarge its acknowledged territory at the expense of Japan. In addition to that, China has urged Indian state-owned companies to cease their gas and oil prospecting in the South and East China Seas close to the disputed Spratly Islands and claimed sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent territories.

China has for some years prepared for the use of the northern sea route for cargo transport, whenever the sea will be more free from ice. Alexeeva and Lassarre note that in the Chinese scientific publications, a shift of tone has recently taken place, as the ecology-related topics have given way to topics related to the role that the region could play in China’s geostrategic interests. Xie correctly points out that the appearance of numerous Chinese state-owned firms have entered into deals to explore the Arctic waters for mineral and hydrocarbon deposits. This might be the real motive of China to equip its navy for great and powerful icebreakers. The ecological research expeditions probably remain a camouflage operation for hiding the interests in purchasing oil, not so for the Russian economic zone, but in Canadian northern regions. Leaning on the Norwegian sources, Alexeeva and Lassarre conclude that China would be developing a well-defined strategy to further its interests in the region. Thus it will probably do everything in its power to legitimise its growing presence in the region and make its northern strategy a part of its global development program. Necessarily the question is not of a conflict with the “genuinely Arctic” states,
but China has attributed significant importance to its energy partnership with Russia. This partnership could also ease Russia to start extracting the rich gas and oil resources especially in the Yamal peninsula, when the resources in Volga-Ural Petroleum and Gas Province are gradually running dry, after having been in use more than 70 years. In March 2013 China signed a deal with Russia that allows it to search oil and gas fields in the Barents Sea.

A FAO report from 2012 includes interesting data about the role of fishing for China’s economy and for the nutrition of its population. According to the FAO, Asia accounted for two-thirds of total human consumption of fish, with 85.4 million tonnes, of which 42.8 million tonnes was consumed outside China. Since the appetite is good, China has been responsible for most of the increase in world per capita fish consumption, when its share in world fish production grew from 7 percent in 1961 to 35 percent in 2010. But China and other Asian countries are not only consumers and importers of seafood; they also produce it. FAO counts that Asia produced as much as 89 per cent of world aquaculture production in 2010, and China alone more than 60 per cent of the global production.

When the Arctic Ocean will be the transportation route and the gas and oil reserve are utilized, it will be interesting to see if Russia and China will follow the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or not. Cheng poses also this question and since China is not the only newcomer to have its say on Arctic issues (at least India, Japan and South Korea have become active, but also smaller maritime states such as Singapore), he sees China to be compelled to follow the UNCLOS as well as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), even if there is no effective multilateral organ for the governance and conflict settlement in the Arctic. In 2013 the Arctic Council granted the observer state status to China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and South Korea; this decision can also bind the non-Arctic observers to the action style of the eight Arctic member states.

Some kind of cooperation between Russia and China is going on in Siberia. It is best marked by the cooperation contract between Russia’s state-owned Rosneft with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), announced in October 2013. It will probably accelerate
China’s penetration to the sparsely settled Far East and ease its productive investments on the Russian soil. The Chinese economy has been boosting, but its growth rate is now slackening, and at the same time Russian economy goes down and is under threat to stagnate, which is largely regarded as a consequence of the lacking diversification to the advantage of other branches than oil and gas. Chang, too, sees that Russian economic weakness is driving Putin to cooperation with China. Chinese foreign policy is thus based on very practical elements. The current grand strategy of China — “hide one’s talents, bide one’s time, and seek concrete achievements” (taoguan yanghui, yousuo zuowei) — is not highly ideological nor emotional, but very pragmatic.

Above, in the discussion of Eastphalia, a question was left open, whether this model would weaken the traditional conception of sovereignty. The merits of Asian states in developing apt action models are discouraging. When large and middle-sized Asian states have been unable to form a consolidated block, due to differing interests, then this kind of a modest and pragmatic strategy might serve well. The role of ASEAN has been emphasized, because not China nor India have been able or willing to take the lead.

Let us imagine that Russia could construct a Russia-centered Eurasian order. Could it get any acceptance to it? Probably not now, because of its behaviour in the Ukraine. But if Russia and China together could hide their talents and silently bide their time in order to establish a joint Eurasian order, the situation would be more favourable. It would still remain a daydream to get remarkable support from within Eurasia or from the west. It seems that Asian countries cannot form any credible and stable power block although many authors speak so. The advantage of Russia are its energy resources, but even if in classical geopolitics this factor would be highly valued, one cannot anticipate that Russia only by its energy resources could rise to the leader of a regional block, not even together with China.

Imperialism as a real alternative?

Nowadays no power – except China, perhaps – wants to call itself em-
pire. Instead, they speak of great powers. Russia is no exception: it uses and supports patriotism and accepts considerably brisk nationalism in its territory, on the condition that nationalism supports the order and symbols of the empire. And it will support the state as long as the government finances its activities. In fact, there is no lack of this kind of movements but on the contrary, Kremlin must repeatedly hold down too hot rioters before they go too far. The bronze soldier issue in Tallinn, 2007, is a good example of this phenomenon.

Kumar draws interesting parallels between nation-state nationalism and imperial nations, insisting that the identity of imperial nations is result of converting. The imperialists may feel as nationalists feel of their nation: it is their empire that is something different, special or unique. The empire has a mission, raison d’être. Pagden puts it in a different way saying that late Aristotelians referred to empire by the term τέλεια κοινότητα, or perfecta communitas, which means something that has capacity to produce the necessities of life. Among classics, Hobson saw empire as a very positive, developing factor. The new imperialism that began since 1870 should have overcome shortsighted Machiavellian greed, which the unified Germany represented through Realpolitik. In addition, new imperialism must serve both the interests of the mother country and that of colonies. Hobson also anticipated that Russian expansion, even if it was done in a more natural order than the expansion of the new imperialism, will before long surely clash with western goals toward Asia.

Russia has obviously decided to adopt new imperial policy, which raises the prestige by real and symbolic indicators, and which makes citizens commit the essence of the empire, and indeed where power will be displayed and sometimes used, contradictory to the principles of international law and norms. Without belittling democracy and civil rights that Russia has implemented to some extent and in its own way, I would say that the empire is more incompatible form of substance than the traditional nation-state. Russia has a mission, raison d’etre. One can find shelf metres and gigabytes of writing about the Russian Idea since the 1830s.

Since Russia did not possess actual colonies (Siberia is not considered as such), it was easy to adopt Realpolitik from Germany. Russia is
no advocate of free trade, but instead it wants to organize trade and especially the energy supplies by the bilateral agreements. Nord Stream is a good example of this, as well as the southern pipeline project that was stopped by Putin in December 2014.

The global leadership of one centre, anticipated by Hardt and Negri, fits Russia badly. The country still imagines to define its *Sonderweg*, and it is more compatible with the classical 19th century imperialist policy with deserts, mountain ranges, maps, and raw material resources in a more important role than immaterial production. Over the wide Eurasia, its economic means have led to positive results, but it can not compete with the US dominance in South and Southeast Asia.

Perhaps the approach of the British *new imperialism* of the 1870s would fit contemporary Russia. It could support and raise its prestige by the means of soft expansive foreign policy. Moscow could *mutatis mutandis* lean on Disraeli’s imperial policy of the 1870s, the goal of which was simply ”to uphold the empire of England”. Britain’s ultimate goal was global dominance, and to symbolise this, Disraeli’s cabinet in 1876 made Queen Victoria the Empress of India.

Could this model be applied to Russia? The problem od Russia, indeed, is that they do not have a queen.

Notes

1. Mackinder 1904, 431.
3. Ibid, 75.
5. See Koivisto 2001, 292.
10. See e.g. Ó Tuathail & Agnew 1992.
12. Zhang 2007, 513; 519. For the opinion of their serviceability, see Lo
2010, 17.
13 Ginsburg 2010, 30 and 33.
14 Spruyt, quoted in Saull 2008, 312.
15 Ibid.
16 Centeno & Enriquez 2010, 345.
17 Arendt 2013, 313–314.
18 Kumar 2010, 119.
19 Centeno & Enriquez 2010, 347.
20 In the 1990s, Russian government used the slogan *It sounds super to be a Russian citizen, byt’ rossiyanin – zvuchit gordo*. The current British equivalent is a quote from the times of war: *Keep calm and carry on*. It is not so patriotic nor attractive.
21 Laruelle 2008.
22 Gumilëv 2013, 150.
24 Laruelle, ibid., 90–93.
26 Of *mission civilisatrice*, see Zielonka 2012, 507–508.
27 See Zielonka 2012, 509.
28 Ibid., 516.
29 Parker 1988, viii.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 3.
32 Ibid., 76.
33 Ibid., 92.
34 Trenin 2013.
35 Ibid.
36 Aubakirova 2014.
37 Ul’chenko 2014.
38 Busygina and Okunev 2014.
39 Ibid., 116–117.
40 For energy nationalism, see e.g. Rainwater 2013.
41 Rainwater 2013, 66.
42 Blank 2014, 26–27.
43 Alexeeva & Lassarre 2014, 62.
44 Xie 2015, 61.
46 Russia’s oldest oil...
47 Reardon 2013.
48 FAO 2012, 3.
49 Ibid., 4-5.
50 Ibid, 8
53 Ibid., 22.
55 See Acharya 2011; Taylor 2011; Morrison 2014; Ivanov 2010; Vinogradov 2010; Brutents 2011; Salin 2013.
56 See Бюджетные деньги «Ночных Волков» 2015: the blog of Aleksei Navalny claims that the Russian government has used 56 million roubles to support the biker gang Night Wolves.
57 Kumar 2010, 142.
58 Ibid., 130.
59 Pagden 2005, 32.
60 Hobson 1902, 11.
61 Ibid., 33.

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This article analyses the public foreign policy argumentation of United States’ President George Bush’s European foreign policy during his presidency from January 1989 to January 1992. In this paper, I use the form President Bush when I am writing about George Herbert Walker Bush.

According to Kari Palonen and Hilkka Summa the research of argumentation can stress either the rhetorical side when it closely resembles the research of imageries and other rhetorical tools as a source of credibility, or it can be a more formal approach of evaluating the competence of arguments (Palonen & Summa 1996, p. 11). This paper uses mostly the formal approach. Bush’s arguments have been mainly evaluated in light of
the context of world politics of the late 1980s and early 1990s, and analysis of the stylistic devices of speeches is in a secondary role.

The approach to political argumentation used is closely related to the insights of the British historian and political theorist Quentin Skinner that text, and the time the text has been produced, are in a symbiotic relation to each other. He also considers that the meaning of social actions have to be seen from the point of view of the agents performing them (Skinner 1996, pp. 6–8; Skinner 1985, p. 6; Skinner 1988b, p. 246, Palonen 2003, p. 143). According to Skinner, the meaning of the political aspect is the intentionality of the agents of the past. This intentionality is best seen in the contextual nature of past politics. For instance, the past agents produced certain texts with certain messages that were meaningful in the social context of the then contemporary world. In other words, they were only able to use messages that were understood in the social context of a certain era (Skinner 1988a, pp. 63–64). Understanding the social context of the past is thus the key in the evaluation of political messages in a way that gives justice to the past.

This paper is based on my previous doctoral dissertation (Jumppanen 2009) United with the United States – George Bush’s foreign policy towards Europe 1989–1993, which was published in the series of the University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research in 2009. The empirical study was based on President Bush’s public speeches concerning the United States’ relations with Europe in 1989–1993. The results of the dissertation suggested that Bush Administration’s European foreign policy was based on three main argumentation strategies that were all meant to legitimize the role of the United States as a European power at the Cold War’s end.

The first argumentation strategy highlighted the role of the United States as the descendant and the historical savior of Europe. The second strategy consisted of the geopolitical redefinitions of Europe, which were derived from apparent American political possibilities. Regions, such as most of the former Warsaw Pact countries, were included in the American sphere of interest, because they were seen as gains by the Bush Administration. The third strategy consisted of threats. Threats were important for legitimizing the continued military presence of the United States in Europe as well as renewing the joint western military commitments in the form of NATO.
Within this article I am focusing on the first main argumentative strategy based on historical identity building between the United States and European countries. The main research question of this article is: what kind of historical argumentation did President Bush use in his public speeches to legitimize American foreign policy towards Europe at the ending of the Cold War and its aftermath during 1989–1992?

This paper shows, that in the American relations with Western European countries, historical argumentation stemmed its power over the four decades of the Cold War during which the United States had closely integrated with Western Europe both militarily and culturally. In its relations with Eastern European countries the Bush Administration emphasized the meaning of common historical roots and values beyond the Cold War times, while simultaneously welcoming the Eastern Europeans to join the American led “New world order”. To gain support of Americans for its European foreign policy Bush Administration resorted to the images of American exceptionalism underlining the role of the United States as a historical savior of Europe in two World Wars and the Cold War. The case of independence seeking Soviet Republics was different as Bush Administration supported the Soviet Central Government in Moscow until late summer 1991. President Bush used historical argumentation that warned of the dangers of nationalism to lower the expectations of the citizens and politicians of Soviet Republics that sought American support for their cause. Only after the failed communist party hard-liners coup of August 1991, which revealed that the Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse (Wallander 2003, p. 153) Bush Administration changed its line.

Within this article, the usage of the concept Europe is nominalistic. It is not bound to any definitions that include or exclude specific geographic and cultural areas. I am not trying to define the borders of Europe anew, but rather trying to show how the concepts to describe the world we live in are relative social constructions that change over the course of history. The meaning of Europe is analyzed from the point of view of the Bush Administration’s rhetorical usages of the name. This argumentative process was closely connected with American interests in Europe, as the usage of the name Europe was always inspired politically by the purpose of portraying the United States as a European power.
The history of the relations of the United States and Europe became increasingly important at the Cold War’s end in the Bush Administration’s European foreign policy. The Bush Administration used the common history of the United States and Western Europe to strengthen the common identity of the West in the face of the eroding Soviet threat. Pictures of the common past were also used to encourage Eastern European countries in their path to sovereignty. The events and the eras selected by the Bush Administration’s foreign policy argumentation were carefully chosen to portray how closely and positively entangled the history of the United States and Europe was.

The Common History of the West

To convince the skeptical Western European audience (Cox & Hurst 2002, p. 131) of the benefits of the existence of NATO at the end of the Cold War the Bush Administration highlighted the historical period of peace that the transatlantic alliance had offered to Europe:

We must recall that the generation coming into its own in America and Western Europe is heir to gifts greater than those bestowed to any generation in history: peace, freedom, and prosperity. This inheritance is possible because 40 years ago the nations of the West joined in that noble, common cause called NATO. And first, there was the vision, the concept of free peoples in North America and Europe working to protect their values. And second, there was the practical sharing of risks and burdens, and a realistic recognition of Soviet expansionism. And finally, there was the determination to look beyond old animosities. The NATO alliance did nothing less than provide a way for Western Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries, to begin an era of reconciliation and restoration. It has been, in fact, a second Renaissance of Europe. (Bush, George. Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany. May 31, 1989. Speech)
President Bush delivered this speech in Mainz in the Federal Republic of Germany May 31, 1989. Mainz’s speech has been considered as a remarkable cornerstone of Bush’s Administration’s European foreign policy as it was the first time President Bush stated that the United States would not oppose the German reunification if it took place (Beschloss & Talbott 1993, 81; Cox & Hurst 2002, p. 132). To put this speech in its proper context it is, nevertheless, worth remembering that at that time, the support of German reunification did not seem to be an actual matter. Of the four occupying powers the Soviets, French and British opposed the idea of reunification (Beschloss & Talbott 1993, p. 82). The Bush Administration was also skeptical about the positiveness of the reunification and did not believe that it would take place soon (Bush & Scowcroft 1998, pp. 186–187; Bush 1998, p. 187; Scowcroft 1998, pp. 188–189). In Bush’s speech, the geopolitical reality of the Cold War was thus still clearly present. President Bush arranged the NATO countries under the concepts of the West and Western Europe, as his Administration still evaluated Soviet actions in Cold War terms (David 1996, p. 211). Even though Bush was pointing out his encouraging words to a German audience, he did not mention the concept of Central Europe, which would have referred to a special German dimension in Europe (Forsberg 2000, p. 150). Throughout the 1980s, the concept of Mitteleuropa was actively used in the political life of German Federal Republic, both among conservative and leftist circles to promote various specifically German foreign policy agendas (Delanty 1995, pp. 138–139). From the point of view of the Bush Administration, the idea of Central Europe as special dimension was not worth mentioning, as the Federal Republic of Germany had securely been a member of Western civilization since the aftermath of the Second World War (Jackson 2006, p. ix). In addition, the fact that West Germans identified themselves most of all with the idea of West and West–Europe instead of Mitteleuropa (Ekman 2001, p. 226), made Bush’s usage of language completely legitimate.

President Bush’s argument that NATO had provided a way for Western Europe to heal centuries old rivalries showed an interesting view of history. Basically, Bush stated that Western Europe was centuries’ old, and its history had been characterized by internal rivalries. Howev-
er, actually the concept of Western Europe in the sense Bush used it was very modern and made for American needs during the Cold War to name the part of Europe under their sphere of influence (Delanty 1995, p. 122). According to Marko Lehti, the idea of Western Europe had actually seen its birth in the late 18th century as the power center of Europe had shifted there from the Mediterranean (Lehti 2003, pp. 114-115). Simultaneously Eastern Europe saw its birth represented as the barbaric periphery of the continent (Lehti 2003, p. 115). President Bush could thus base his definition of Western Europe on the earlier interpretations made by the Western Europeans themselves (Ibid.). In Bush’s new narrative of the history of Western Europe, the history had shown how lucky the Western Europeans had actually been to gain peace after the Americans had come to stay in Europe after the Second World War.

In simple terms, Bush implied that the Western Europeans have historically been unable to live in peace with each other, but that the formation of NATO based on the free will of the free peoples of Europe and the United States to resist together the Soviet Union had changed this state of affairs and made possible the second renaissance of Europe. Interestingly, President Bush argued that NATO had made possible a second renaissance of Europe during the Cold War, despite the fact that half of Europe had been under the Soviet rule. President Bush was thus using the word “Europe” as a synonym for Western Europe, a usage that was typical of official American foreign policy rhetoric of the Cold War (Delanty 1995, p. 115). The fact that President Bush gave Americans credit for the new Western European renaissance was not a coincidental choice of an analogous metaphor. According to Delanty, Europe had become politically neutral in the foreign policy discourse of the United States after the Second World War (Delanty 1995, p. 116). This political neutralism meant that Americans had to rethink their foreign policy towards Europe from 1945 onwards. In the Cold War years, the United States then constructed the idea of the West together with its European allies so successfully that Western Europe and the United States were said to represent the same western culture (Jackson 2006, p. vii). This was the core of Bush’s second European renaissance.

In his Mainz speech on May 25, 1989 President Bush, however, avoided highlighting American supremacy. In its early 1989 context,
President Bush’s picture of NATO as an inheritance to future generations underlined the cautious undertone of his administration in proclaiming the Cold War over (McEvoy-Levy 2001, pp. 47-48; Scowcroft 1995, p. 55). It was meant to convince the Western European allies (Bush & Scowcroft 1998, p. 14) that NATO was still worth keeping in readiness. There were no guarantees that the Cold War was going to end, and even if it did some day, the military organization of the West would still be worth carrying on.

Earlier Cultural and Historical Ties with Europe

The Cold War constructs such as NATO and the idea of the Western community formed the base of the Bush Administration’s argumentation showing the importance of continued co-operation between Western Europe and the United States. Nevertheless, longer cultural and historical ties between the United States and Western Europe were also emphasized and these special ties were used as arguments while complimenting reformative Eastern European leaders or the representatives of neutral countries.

In the case of Great Britain, a key Western European state and a nuclear power, the shared cultural and historical roots were evident as the 13 colonies that formed the United States in their declaration of independence 1776 had been part of the British Kingdom. In the context of 20th century the United States and Great Britain had also find their mutual interests in the face of German aggression, and President Bush could emphasize the meaning of this special bond or partnership in leadership between the two English speaking powers to compliment the British:

And Winston Churchill was America’s first such partner in leadership really, when we were challenged together by war. And true, the challenge of today is a different one than Churchill and Roosevelt felt at the time, but it is one that really asks no less of us. (Bush, George. Toast at a Dinner Hosted by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in London. June 1, 1989. Speech)
In the example above, President Bush compared the allied leadership between the United States and Britain in the Second World War with the contemporary Cold War setting, where the meaning of this special bond was as important but its nature was somewhat different. This was meant to imply that the special bond of the Anglo-American world was still needed.

What came to meeting the representatives of France that was the other of the two Western European nuclear powers, there was no possibility to compliment the meaning of France as special friend in leadership during 20th century. The French had caused a lot of trouble to American foreign policy during the Cold War by actively resisting the American dominance of NATO and at the end of the Cold War the French were eager in building European solutions to replace NATO (Baker 1995, p. 233; Rey 2004, pp. 58-59). Nevertheless, the role of France in the earlier history of the United States had been more positive:

Well, first, let me just say what a pleasure it was having President Mitterrand and Madame Mitterrand as our guests in Maine. We’ve just come from the commencement of Boston University. And nothing better symbolizes the strength of the friendship and the common values which we share -- which our two nations share -- and which really the President celebrated with us 8 years ago, when he came to Yorktown, celebrating the 200th anniversary of that battle. (Bush, George. News Conference with President Mitterrand of France, May 21, 1989. Speech.)

In his comments, President Bush complimented his French guests by highlighting the importance of French help in the American War of independence. Bush did this by referring to central places of the American Independence struggle his French guests had been visiting with their American hosts in past 8 years. First Bush mentioned Boston, best known for the Boston Tea Party of 1773, during the American independence movement and its activation. Then Bush turned his attention towards the Battle of Yorktown another turning point in American history where the British were utterly defeated by the Americans and
French in 1781, which marked the successful end to the American War of Independence (Bee 2006, p. 31, p. 35). Bush was thus complimenting his guests by underlining the meaning of France for the very existence of the United States itself.

In the case of Eastern European countries that were on their way to reform their society such as Poland Bush Administration also emphasized the meaning of ties that go beyond the Cold War times:

You know, we Americans are not mildly sympathetic spectators of events in Poland. We are bound to Poland by a very special bond: a bond of blood, of culture, and shared values. And so, it is only natural that as dramatic change comes to Poland we share the aspirations and excitement of the Polish people. (Bush, George. Remarks to Citizens in Hamtramck, Michigan. April 17, 1989. Speech.)

When speaking about Poland President Bush emphasized the meaning of Polish “blood”, “culture” and “shared values”. These ties are connected to the great number of Polish immigrants that came to the United States in late 19th century and early 20th century (Radzilowski 2007, pp. 60-61, p. 67), and have been important in forming the Polish community within the United States. The shared values also referred to the internal reforms of Communist Poland that had started to look towards the West and the United States in reforming its society.

While meeting the representatives of small neutral European countries such as Sweden or Finland President Bush could use the older cultural and historical roots (Bush, George. Remarks at the Departure Ceremony for Prime Minister Carl Bildt of Sweden. February 20, 1992. Speech.; Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Following Discussions with President Mauno Koivisto of Finland. May 7, 1991. Speech). The events of the more recent times were impossible to use as in the context of Cold War, in which the world had been divided between East and West, neutral countries were considered somewhat suspicious as they refused chose their camp.

As democratic peoples, Finns and Americans share many special bonds of friendship. Finns have long added to the American experi-
ence. Mr. President, your countrymen were among the first to settle in this country 350 years ago, establishing new lives in the Delaware River Valley. Over a century later, John Morton, a Finnish-American delegate to our Continental Congress, cast the deciding vote for our Declaration of Independence. (Bush, George. Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Following Discussions with President Mauno Koivisto of Finland. May 7, 1991. Speech)

President Bush’s words to Finnish President Mauno Koivisto highlighted the meaning of democracy for both countries and the historical contribution of the people of Finnish origin to the independency of the United States. From the Finnish point of view, the highlighting of the democratic nature of the Finnish society by the President of the United States must have been important as during the Cold War years Finland had often been accused of being under the control of the Soviet Union instead of being truly neutral and independent country where democracy flourished, a claim which in the official canon of the Finnish foreign policy of the time was strongly rejected (Dutton 2008, pp. 307-308, p.311).

By underlining historical ties between Americans and various European nationalities from the very beginning of the birth of the United States President Bush constructed the fate of Europe and the United States as unavoidably together. Displaying the common history and values was not restricted merely to the examples above, but Bush emphasized these ties to virtually every European country during his presidency (Bush, George. Advance Text of Remarks upon a Departure for Europe. July 9, 1989. Speech.; Remarks to the Students and Faculty at Karl Marx University in Budabest. July 12, 1989. Speech.; Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Election of Vaclav Havel as President of Czechoslovakia. December 29, 1989. Speech). The main idea behind highlighting historical and cultural ties was of course to legitimize the continuation of co-operation between the United States and the Western European countries to the distant future, and to create a warm atmosphere while establishing diplomatic ties to the re-forming Eastern European countries (Bush, George. Remarks to Students and Faculty at Karl Marx University in Budabest. July 12, 1989. Speech.; Fitzwater,
Marlin. Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Election of Va-

If we take a closer look at President Bush’s way of portraying the his-
tory of the United States and European countries as a narrative of cul-
tural proximity, historical ties, and common interests, we can easily see
that this view of history was suitably built for the need of contemporary
foreign policy. Actual state level relations between the United States and
European powers had been far from close until American participation
in the World Wars (Hunt 1994, p. 9). Nevertheless, as seen from Presi-
dent Bush’s arguments about the common history of the United States
and European countries the President of the United States can always
gain extra leverage to legitimize American foreign policy by appealing
to the “melting pot” argument, the common population base shared
with the rest of the world. This argument can be used to legitimize
United States’ foreign policy in any part of the world as the President
of the United States can portray himself to have common interests with
people living in the ancestral homes of European (Bush, George. Re-
Speech), African (National Security Directive 75 American Policy to-
ward Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990’s. 23 December 1992, p. 2) and
Asian (Bush, George. Remarks at the Asian-Pacific American heritage
pot argument makes the United States the most suitable leader of the
world. This argument can be also used to convert foreign policy into
domestic policy, especially in racial issues. For instance, one justifi-
cation for the Operation Restore Hope – the military intervention in Som-
ia started in late 1992 by the Bush Administration – was ostensively to
respect the interests of African-American community in Sub-Saharan
Africa (National Security Directive 75 American Policy toward Sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1990’s. 23 December 1992, p. 2). The common
population base argument, however, also formed problems for the Bush
Administration. The Baltic independence struggle of 1989-1991, for
instance, activated Americans of Baltic origin, which put pressure to
bear on the Bush Administration to do more to support the independ-
This lobbying by the Baltic interests groups gave the Bush Administra-
tion bad publicity and undermined the credibility of its foreign policy (Bush 1998, p. 207).

*American Exceptionalism – The Historical Role of the United States as Savior of Europe*

Common origins were not, however, the only way to show similarity of interests in the Bush Administration’s European foreign policy. Its historical appeal was based on the level of ideals as well. Ideals of liberty for example could be portrayed as a common possession of the French and the Americans (Bush, George. Advance Text of Remarks upon Departure for Europe. July 9, 1989. Speech). The argument of a common history of ideals that President Bush used was not always about the common values shared between the United States and European countries. It was also about the idea of America as something exceptional in motion. According to Trevor B. McCrisken, the idea of American exceptionalism considers the United States to be the re-incarnation of the ultimate values shared by the whole of humankind (Mccrisken 2003, 11). In the argumentation of Bush, the idea of America appeared as a force that had positively affected the lives of Europeans (Bush George. Remarks to Residents of Leiden, the Netherlands. July 17, 1989. Speech. ; Remarks at the University of South Carolina Commencement Ceremony in Columbia. May 12, 1990. Speech. ; Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union. January 31, 1990. Speech). In Bush’s speeches to European audiences, the idea of America worked through ideals like democracy and freedom (Bush, George. Remarks to the Polish National Assembly in Warsaw. July 10, 1989. Speech. ; Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session with the Magazine Publishers of America. July 17, 1990. Speech. ; Remarks at the University of South Carolina Commencement Ceremony in Columbia. May 12, 1990. Speech. ; Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. April 9, 1992. Speech). In a way, Bush’s rhetoric portrayed the United States as something far greater than just a nation state among others; it was an exceptional land where great secular and spiritual might were united into a single entity with no match in the whole world (Bush, George. Inaugural Address. January 20, 1989.
Speech. Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters. January 29, 1990. Speech. Remarks at the Liberty University Commencement Ceremony in Lynchburg, Virginia. May 12, 1990. Speech. According to McCrisken, showing moral supremacy in foreign policy is a typical strait of American exceptionalism, whereby the United States is a morally superior and unique actor, which was originally born to oppose the tyranny and moral decay of Europe and to foster the common values of humanity (Mccrisken 2003, pp. 8-11). Domestically, this myth is an effective tool of foreign policy argumentation as the citizens of the United States are eager to believe it (Mccrisken 2003, p. 5).

It is hard to evaluate whether the myth of American exceptionalism affect the decision making of the Bush Administration, or if it was just a convenient argumentative tool in his foreign policy. As a former diplomat and CIA official, President Bush seems to have understood the problems of arrogant rhetoric highlighting American greatness. For instance, Bush forewarned Gorbachev during the presidential election campaign of 1988 that he would say things that could upset the Soviets to please his audience, and thus his sayings during the elections should not be taken too seriously (Bush & Scowcroft 1998, p. 5). In his memoirs, Bush has however underlined his personal belief in American exceptionalism by stating that the United States has a moral obligation to lead the world in the post-Cold War world (Bush 1998, pp. 565-566). According to Palonen, in the sphere of political words of truth and words of untruth are mixed and speaking of one’s true intentions becomes as encrypted as the most complex rhetorical diversion (Palonen 1988, p. 32). The actual stance of President Bush to the myth of American exceptionalism will remain unknown and only his usage of it in his public speeches and texts remains certain.

In the foreign policy rhetoric of President Bush, the United States appeared as the sole savior of Europe. Most of all, the United States had saved Europe from itself. To prevent this from happening again American presence within Europe was going to be needed in the future:

Twice in the first half of this century Europe was the scene of world war, and twice Americans fought in Europe for the sake of peace and
freedom. Today Europe is enjoying a period of unparalleled prosperity and uninterrupted peace, longer than it has known in the modern age, and NATO has made the difference. And the alliance will prove every bit as important to American and European security in the decade ahead. (Bush, George. Remarks upon Departure for Europe. May 26, 1989. Speech)

President Bush gave his remarks on May 26, 1989 in Washington before his departure for Europe. At that time, relations between the United States and Western Europe were challenged by Chairman Gorbachev’s foreign policy initiatives in arms reductions, which made the cautious Bush Administration look timid about ending the Cold War (Bush & Scowcroft 1998, p. 71). The purpose of President Bush’s trip to Europe was most of all to participate in a NATO meeting on May 28 in Brussels and in taking from Gorbachev the initiative in arms reduction with a fresh proposal, convincing the Western Europeans of the United States’ capability to lead the transatlantic defense community (Scowcroft 1998, p. 81). In President Bush’s argumentation, Americans had fought twice for the sake of peace and freedom in Europe, as if the United States had had only moral interests in participating in the wars. By emphasizing the unselfish nature of the American war effort and the way American led NATO had brought a long peace to Europe, President Bush emphasized the moral superiority of the United States and thus legitimized the role of the United States as the dominant power in Europe. The strong idealistic undertone of the Bush Administration’s view of history tells much about its contemporary American audience and its view of the world. Obviously in 1989, the majority of Americans wanted to believe that their country was the morally superior guarantor of world peace, which was only reluctantly forced to participate in world’s conflicts in the 20th century (Bacevich 2002, pp. 7-8). The Bush Administration’s version of 20th century European history in itself would have been inadequate for convincing Americans of the importance of keeping the United States committed to NATO and Europe. According to William Appleman-Williams, Andrew Bacevich, and Chalmers Johnson the purpose of the United States’ foreign policy is to build and maintain an empire and the moral veil is needed to disguise
this project from the American public (Appleman-Williams 1972, p. 485; Bacevich 2002, p. 45; Johnson 2004, pp. 1-3, p. 191). For instance, American participation in the World Wars was strongly connected to the economic and hegemonic interests of the United States (Bacevich 2002, pp. 11-15; Berger 1972, pp. 294-296). Also the Bush Administration’s worry of the future of NATO at the Cold War’s end was mostly about the fear of losing the dominant position in Europe in case Europeans gave up the ideal of an Atlantic community in face of the diminishing Soviet threat (Bacevich 2002, p. 57, p. 102).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a third American rescue mission of Europe was added to the Bush Administration’s story of the 20th century transatlantic relations. In President Bush’s rhetoric, the United States had saved Europe and the world from the scourge of communism, which justified continuing American leadership of the post–Cold War world:

From the days after World War II, when fragile European democracies were threatened by Stalin’s expansionism, to the last days of the cold war, as our foes became fragile democracies themselves, American leadership has been indispensable. No one person deserves credit for this. America does. It has been achieved because of what we as a people stand for and what we are made of.

Yes, we answered the call, and we triumphed, but today we are summoned again. This time we are called not to wage a war, hot or cold, but to win the democratic peace, not for half a world as before but for people the world over. The end of the cold war, you see, has placed in our hands a unique opportunity to see the principles for which America has stood for two centuries, democracy, free enterprise, and the rule of law, spread more widely than ever before in human history. (Bush, George. Remarks at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. December 15, 1992. Speech)

Bush gave these remarks on December 15, 1992. He had lost the presidential election at the beginning of November 1992 to Democratic Party candidate Bill Clinton. In light of the electoral defeat, President Bush was concentrating on creating a positive image of his presiden-
cy for future generations. According to Richard Neustadt, when appraising the legacy of a president of the United States it is often asked what were the American positions in the world that were affected by the president’s diplomacy (Neustadt 1990, p. 167). In building his own legacy, President Bush presented foreign policy achievements such as ending the Cold War, to be his greatest achievements (Bush 1998, pp. 564-565). In his remarks, President Bush was not however speaking directly on behalf of his own achievements as the President of the United States. He was speaking about the achievements of America and the importance of its values for the whole world. By highlighting the importance of the nation, Bush was able to underline the continuity in the American foreign policy beyond his presidency and simultaneously to attach himself to the historical continuity of the American presidents (McEvoy-Levy 2001, pp. 56-57). Again, the theme of American moral supremacy was shown in the rhetoric of President Bush. The United States had been victorious in the Second World War and in the Cold War and both times it had made its former enemies into its allies after its victory. During the Cold War, the United States had led “half a world” and after it “the world” had become the legitimate reign of the Americans. President Bush’s tale about the American rise to the world leadership shows how the Soviet Union and the United States had both used the existence of each other to legitimize their rule of the world during the Cold War (McEvoy-Levy 2001, p. 53). The importance of mutual recognition of the superpower status was seen for example during mutual discussions of superpower leaders on May 30-31, 1990, as President Gorbachev and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze had asked for American recognition for their policies to convince the Soviet citizens of the power of their nation (Beschloss & Talbott 1993, pp. 218-219, p. 223). The existence of the third world, or neutral countries, was not meaningful in this discourse of power as the superpowers arranged the whole world into their dominions. President Bush did not often speak about these countries in the Post-Cold War era either as it was more appealing to portray the whole world as a single American dominion (Bush, George. Remarks at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. December 15, 1992. Speech).

The end of the Cold War was portrayed as the brightest victory of
American ideals and principles by the Bush Administration. As this victory was achieved in the home of the earlier rulers of the world, the Europeans, it underlined the totality of American power.

*Chicken Kiev Speech – Using Historical Argumentation to Lower the Expectations of Independence Movements of Soviet Republics in 1991*

In the Bush Administration’s foreign policy of 1989-1991, one of the most difficult questions was how to react to the independence seeking Soviet Republics, as the American foreign policy leadership wanted to keep the Soviet Union together (McEvoy-Levy 2001, p. 97). This meant that the inclusion of these countries in Europe or new Europe, as Eastern Europe was also described, was not portrayed as an option as long as the Soviet Union existed.

One culmination point in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy towards the sovereignty seeking Soviet republics was the famous “Chicken Kiev Speech”¹, which President Bush held in the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Ukraine in Kiev August 1, 1991. At the time of Bush’s speech, Ukrainians wanted to proclaim independency and were enthusiastically waiting that the President of the United States would show support for their cause (Beschloss & Talbott 1993, p. 417). President Bush’s speech on the Ukrainian capital caused a shock when against all expectations he warned his listeners of the dangers of seeking independence by the following lines that later were extensively quoted by the press (Scowcroft 1998, pp. 515-516):

> But freedom cannot survive if we let despots flourish or permit seemingly minor restrictions to multiply until they form chains, until they form shackles. Later today, I’ll visit the monument at Babi Yar -- a somber reminder, a solemn reminder, of what happens when people fail to hold back the horrible tide of intolerance and tyranny.

> Yet freedom is not the same as independence. Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred. We will sup-

Bush argued that independence does not necessarily mean freedom but can lead to “local despotism” and “suicidal nationalism based on ethnic hatred”. In the context of Ukrainian independence movement, President Bush’s words were easily interpreted as an insult, implying that the Ukrainians were just establishing local despotism based on suicidal nationalism, and Americans would not help them because this had nothing to do with democracy. To make his point, Bush even pictured the German massacre of Jews in Babi Yar ravine near the Ukrainian capital Kiev to be “a somber reminder” of what could happen if intolerance and tyranny were not resisted. Although Bush probably only tried to make an example of the dangers of nationalism and intolerance in general, the mentioning of Babi Yar was a very bad usage of a past event as a political argument. Ukrainians had collaborated openly with Germans in the genocide of Jews in Ukraine (Morgan Lower 2007, p. 3, p. 6). Ukrainians had also participated in the Babi Yar massacre that took the lives of 50 000 of Kiev’s 100 000 Jews in less than two months between September and October 1941 (Morgan Lower 2007, p. 3). Ukrainians had also actively participated in the other mass killing of Jews all around the country (Morgan Lower 2007, p. 5). By using the Babi Yar as an example of acts against freedom and then claiming that “freedom is not the same as independence”, Bush combined a painful and contradictory event in Ukrainian history with the contemporary political situation. Bush’s independence seeking audience interpreted this combination as the ultimate insult.

Generally, Bush’s message was understood to mean supporting the Soviet central government against Ukrainian independence (Beschloss & Talbott 1993, p. 418). This interpretation seems likely, as the Bush Administration avoided to the last meddling in the internal matters of the Soviet Union (Bush 1998, p. 500; Scowcroft 1998, p. 499; Beschloss & Talbott 1993, p. 418), and underlined its support of the Soviet central government until the Communist Party hardliners coup in late August 1991, which crumbled the credibility of the Gorbachev Administration.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union that led to Ukrainian independence, the Bush Administration flip-flopped in its Ukrainian foreign policy and called Ukraine a democratic and free European country (Bush, George. Joint Declaration with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine. May 6, 1992. Speech). The complete change from the horror image of “local despotism” to democracy was part of the Bush Administration’s policy aimed at the de-nuclearization of former Soviet Republics except Russia (Baker 1995, p. 658; McEvoy-Levy 2001, p. 97; Bush, George. Joint Declaration with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine. May 6, 1992. Speech). When the Soviet central government was gone, the only way to affect new countries was through good bilateral relations.

Conclusions

Bush Administration pictured the historical role of the United States in Europe in extremely positive terms in its foreign policy argumentation. In President Bush’s grand narrative of the history of transatlantic relations, Western Europe and the United States had shared the same ideals and enemies and had been able to prevent serious internal strife within the West for 40 years. The future would look as bright if this practice was continued. Bush reminded constantly in his speeches how the United States had saved Europe three times during the 20th century. He proclaimed time after time
that there were no guarantees for peace in Europe or in the whole world if
the United States withdrew from Europe and thus it was in the common
interests of both Europeans and Americans that the United States would
remain a European power after the end of the Cold War.

While visiting European countries, President Bush also portrayed
the history of the United States and Europe as positively entangled. In
Bush’s argumentation, the ties of blood and culture were binding, as
many Americans were descendants of European immigrants. Europe-
ans and Americans shared the same western values: democracy, market
economy and appreciation of freedom. This praise of European hosts
was first and foremost meant as a compliment, but it was also meant to
soften the image of the unquestionable leadership of the United States.
Emphasizing the common roots and values was thus polity rhetoric that
took place under the framework of the American leadership of Europe.
The key message was that it did not matter who was the leader as all
belonged to the same community, which had common goals.

In its relations with Eastern European countries the Bush Admin-
istration emphasized the meaning of common historical roots beyond
the Cold War times, while simultaneously welcoming the Eastern Eu-
ropeans to join the American led “New world order”. The situation for
Soviet Republics looking a way out from the Soviet Union was differ-
ent and it seemed that for them “freedom was not the same as inde-
pendence”. After the collapse of Soviet Union, historical justifications
to reduce separatist movements were not needed anymore. American
interests were best served by openly supporting the nation building of
the former Soviet Republics. In Bush Administration’s foreign policy
rhetoric countries like Ukraine were then warmly welcomed to be part
of American defined Europe.

The past events of shared American and European history gave Pres-
ident Bush a solid base to form political argumentation according to
different European audiences. The historical examples and narratives
were carefully selected to support the needs of American foreign pol-
icy. Sometimes the selection of historical arguments failed like it did
in Kiev on August 1991. On the other hand, the situation the Bush
Administration faced was extremely turbulent and considering the re-
sults of his foreign policy, Bush’s legacy should not be underestimated,
though its public justification was not always smooth.
It is also worth noticing that the Bush Administration actually had a clear grand strategy that guided his policies throughout most of the years 1989-1993, unlike several scholars have argued (Joffe 1995, p. 94; Bacevich 2002, p. IX, David 1996, p. 213; Huntington 1997, p. 31). The central flaw in the grand strategy critique, like that of David’s claim that Bush’s foreign policy was conducted on an ad hoc basis of “putting out of fires” without a coherent “long-range vision” (David 1996, p. 213), or that of Huntington, who portrays the Bush Administration’s new world order as a mere example of fruitless euphoria over the ending of the Cold War (Huntington 1997, p. 31) is that they both silent on the point that the Bush Administration had actually to choose between the option of giving space for the birth of multipolar world order (Hummel 2000, pp. 12-14), and the keeping of American involvement high in the post-Cold War world. The former would have meant strong American focus on domestic economy that was in a ruinous state due to the military spending of the Reagan years and the recession at hand (Miller 1990, p. 316; LaFeber 1994, pp. 158-159; Beschloss & Talbott 1993, p. 474), whereas the latter meant keeping up the American Cold War commitments as well making military interventions despite the weak state of the economy (Hoff 1994, p. 221; LaFeber 1994, p. 162). In the Bush Administration’s European foreign policy argumentation, this selection between the grand strategies was seen in President Bush’s refusal to say that the United States should withdraw from Europe or from anywhere else in the world. However, it is reasonable to ask was there actually any other choice? The United States had such global level economic, military and political commitments at the Cold War’s end that simply withdrawing from the world would have been extremely difficult to execute. This decision can be of course questioned by asking if the Bush Administration did this to maintain the American empire, like Andrew Bacevich and Chalmers Johnson have claimed (Bacevich 2002, pp. 2-4; Johnson 2004, p. 1). This point of view, however, tends to ignore the fact that many European governments asked the United States to stay and solve their security problems at the end of the Cold War. Also many Americans accepted the idea that the United States was destined to lead the world. This role of the United States as the leader that other nations can lean on was clearly highlighted in the Western European
willingness to keep American led NATO intact, or in the Eastern Euro-
pean and independence seeking Soviet Republics’ eagerness to get
American support for their emerging societies. What this means is that
the role of the United States’ was legitimate in Europe at the Cold War’s
end as Europeans wanted rather to be united with the United States
than taking the risk of going alone into the post-Cold War world. In
this context Bush Administration’s argumentation of the common his-
tory of Europe and the United States was a useful rhetorical tool.

Notes

1 New York Times columnist William Safire used the term to de-
scribe Bush’s foreign policy, which he saw as overcautious and sid-
ing with the forces of status quo. Bush took this criticism very per-
sonally and was severely stung by it. Beschloss & Talbott 1993, 418.
Bush must have been somewhat insulted as he only mentions in his
memoirs that he spoke to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, but not
what kind of fiasco his speech was. Scowcroft tries to explain that
the speech was largely misunderstood. Bush 1998, 515; Scowcroft
1998, 515-516.

2 The quotation of the speech is the same that Scowcroft said has
been misinterpreted severely. Scowcroft 1998, 515-516.

3 In addition to Jews, also communists, partisans, Russians, Ukrain-
ians, Poles and many others who were considered to resist the Nazi
ideology were killed in Babi Yar. Morgan Lower 2007, 2.


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The aim of this article is to scrutinize how a linguistically sensitive approach to the study of international relations or world politics (the terms are here used interchangeably) could provide some fertile ground for studies conducted broadly within that subject area. More specifically, the article explores why this approach has not been very popular in the study of international relations. The discipline of IR, its name notwithstanding, has never been really international, but on the contrary has operated on Western born concepts without really acknowledging their historical contingencies and their possible incommensurability with practices and phenomena from other cultures and languages.

The main argument of the article is that a more linguistically sensitive approach would be needed, one that would take into account the conceptual history of certain key terms and their various conceptual
changes with translations and different contexts. While various conceptual histories have been written and the history of concepts style of approach is occasionally used in the study of politics in a given country, a more wider perspective for the study of migration, translation and universalization of certain concepts would be needed. It should be noted here that the aim of the article is not to find some subaltern, marginalized "challengers" to the now hegemonic concepts but to emphasize the historical contingency of all concepts and to show that political disputes are often mainly disputes about the meaning of terms and concepts - including names. There are no right and proper meanings of key terms like "democracy", "sovereignty" etc. but they are essentially contested concepts, whose meanings change over time and in the process some connotations strengthen while others wither away. The article also briefly discusses some of the possible dangers and caveats of studying world politics through conceptual analysis. The dangers are especially apparent when the scholar might read history backwards and assume a false teleology in the development that has lead to present key concepts. Another question is, for instance, whether or not there are any non-Western conceptions of politics to be found at all.

**Why do we need to study the history of concepts in order to understand international relations?**

In order to highlight the need to study the history of concepts, various conceptual changes and translations in world politics, we may start with a couple of small examples. In the Gospel of Luke (2:1) there is a passage that in King James Version reads as follows: "And it came to pass in those days, that there went out a decree from Caesar Augustus that all the world should be taxed". Depending on the translation, in more modern versions we find that it was not really that the whole world should be taxed, only the Roman Empire. Furthermore, some translations say that the issue was not about taxing at all, but about a census carried in the nation. Sometimes the act itself is taxing, sometimes enrolment, sometimes census. Depending on the translation, the scope of the act is either the whole world, the inhabited world, the Roman Em-
pire, or the nation. Now, understandably, taxing the whole world and having a census carried out in the empire are two completely different things. Similar ambivalence is quite normal in translations, but sometimes it leads to gross mistakes. Sigmund Freud, for instance, based his psychoanalytical study of Leonardo da Vinci (Freud 1910) on a translation error. The fulcrum of Freud’s analysis is a childhood memory of da Vinci’s, in which Leonardo reported that he saw a vulture in his cradle. Yet, in reality da Vinci did not say anything about vultures, it was only the German translation Freud was using that had replaced da Vinci’s *nibbio* with *Geier*, thus changing the bird in question from a normal hawk to a vulture (Aaron & Clouse 1982). Hence, Freud’s analysis of the role of vulture in Egyptian art, its asexuality, and corresponding implications of Leonardo’s homosexuality, are all in vain because of a single translation error. Similarly, it was rather common to depict Moses as having horns in Christian art until the Renaissance, because the original word that was used to describe him in the Exodus, a halo of authority above his head, was mistranslated as meaning actual horns. Hence for example Michelangelo’s famous statue of Moses in Santa Croce in Florence has horns.

Now, it should be rather clear that mistranslations change the matter discussed and may lead to gross mistakes (like Freud’s). But also ”correct” translations change meanings because some connotations carry with the translations while others do not. The Hebrew word for authority is close to the word for horns (karen/keren) and it was rather common to depict pre-Christian leaders with horns. Consequently, Moses with horns might not be such a mistranslation at all. The aforementioned examples are perhaps not that significant from the perspective of world politics, but we can still stay with the Bible for a brief moment in order to understand why there has been a certain reluctance to the diversity of languages and ambivalence thus produced in political theory and international relations.

The existence of different languages was for a long time viewed as a given condition, immutable with only human powers. There was Biblical authority for linguistic diversity, as it was considered a punishment from God to sinful people who built the tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9). According to the Bible, God scrambled languages in order to
prevent humankind from being unified. St. Augustine asserted that the world is a dangerous place precisely because people cannot communicate with each other. In his view, a man understands better his dog than a foreigner, and this condition is derivative of the aforementioned punishment from God (De civitate Dei, XIX, 7). The old Christian view of linguistic diversity as a given condition of the human world may have inhibited some theorists of earlier periods from addressing the issue of language in depth, but this was not the reason why the modern discipline of IR has shunned away from the topic. Instead, reasons for this negligence are found elsewhere, perhaps in its desire to be “scientific” and produce objective laws regardless of circumstances.

The very birth of IR as an academic discipline was partly motivated by the Behavioralist agenda of producing “objective”, universal and undisputed knowledge about the world in order to help political decision-making and agenda setting in foreign policy. In this sense, the explicit recognition of plurality of views and lack of unanimity on the meaning of basic concepts would have been simply counterproductive and undermined the discipline’s aspirations to produce scientific laws of its own and to offer them as advice to political decision-makers. Thus, instead of joining hands with, say, history or linguistics in order to better understand different perspectives to the international system and its central institutions and concepts like the state, war, sovereignty etc., international relations turned more to the study of allegedly immutable patterns of human behaviour. In the process of finding objective laws and universal patterns, linguistic diversity was totally neglected.

To give an easy textbook example, Morgenthau’s “Politics Among Nations” (1948) is often portrayed as arguing that there are objective laws in politics to be found because they are based on immutable human nature and behaviour, and the central concepts of politics like interest are universal categories unaffected by time and place. It is of course easy to criticize Morgenthau and the realists for this and that and in reality Morgenthau’s views were indeed more complicated than this (see Korhonen 1983), but this negligence was also more widespread and manifested itself also in the writings of those theorists we today regard as more historically sensitive. As noted, ambiguity and affirmation of differences were not in vogue in these early projects of constructing
universally valid scientific theories. Many central questions, even the “international theory” itself (meaning the political theory of international relations), were originally discarded because there could not be scientific unanimity about moral questions. It was precisely this ousting of moral questions that angered Martin Wight, one of the founders of the English School of IR, and thus paved way for a more historically oriented research agenda. But even the so-called English school was rather sloppy linguistically, and the comparisons Wight made between different states-systems were in fact anachronistic as they tried to find the “same” phenomena from different times, cultures and contexts (Wight 1977). Also his eponymous “three traditions” were instruments of classification and gave emphasis to theory rather than historical accuracy (Wight 1991). The English school made a distinction between “history” and ”theory” and for example Hedley Bull argued that one should pay more attention to theory and attempt to tease out categories that will illuminate the founding and changing elements of international reality which included states systems, international society, great powers, diplomacy, war, balance of power etc. (Vigezzi 2005, 48).

Of course, since Morgenthau and Wight a number of more linguistically sensitive approaches to the study of IR have emerged. Many of the structuralist and post-modernist approaches, as well as the whole social constructivist perspective more or less emphasize the power of language. Given that the vocabulary of politics is more normative than descriptive, we can not assume that there is a unanimous understanding of ”interest”, for example. Hence, we can not find the right way to use concepts like national interest. Instead, what we can study are different conceptualizations of national interest, what kind of actions have been justified in the name of national interest etc. (Kratochwil 1982). This kind of orientation in IR research gets its inspiration more from the philosophy of language rather than from positivist assumptions about politics or human behaviour and from this perspective we also need to study related and preceding concepts, in the case of national interest also, say, the concept of reason of state (ibid.). However, it is curious that unlike in many other social sciences that have undergone the so-called ”linguistic turn” after which they have concentrated more on language, concepts, rhetoric etc., the discipline of IR in some sense has not made that turn, although there are exceptions, of course.
Why should we study the language and concepts of international relations? First answer would be that language indeed forms a kind of community between its users and in this sense resolves one of the oldest disputes of IR. One might argue that international relations pose a challenge for social science because critical social inquiry has to assume a community, shared norms, language, traditions etc. which according to the old Realist adage are precisely the attributes that the international sphere is devoid of (see Ashley 1987). Instead of presuming an immutable reality and eternal laws of human behaviour, critical social inquiry proceeds from the perspective that reality is socially constructed and that human observations are based on shared understandings produced by historical processes, which thus are mutable and contingent. This is in stark contrast with the early Realists who argued that international relations take place not in a system but on an arena which is devoid of any shared norms or goals. If we accept the idea that international sphere is not a community but an arena, we can not do social science related to it because social science would need to posit some sort of community as its object of study. This is all the more pressing question in the era of globalization, when more and more policies are allegedly international in origin and the divide between external and domestic politics is blurred. If these policies initiate not in the political system but in the international sphere, then we could not study them as they originate in non-community. The object of critical social inquiry would thus only be an epiphenomenon (Ashley 1987). It is more fruitful to assume that international relations indeed take place in a community, and that language is one of the defining features of this community. Even though there might not be shared values and norms might occasionally be broken, there is something shared and this is language. Although we understand concepts differently and different languages produce somewhat different worldviews, language and concepts also homogenize practices and processes. Therefore it is also a very important field of study.

Secondly, we may argue that the vocabulary of political theory can not be transferred as such to describe international relations precisely because the international sphere is a different kind of community. Hedley Bull’s (1966) warnings about domestic analogy should be mentioned in this respect. He argued that for example anarchy is a term that
has different meaning in these two different spheres. In some sense, international anarchy describes the sphere of international relations quite well, because there is no greater authority than that of the states and in relation to each other, states are in a kind of anarchy. Yet, this anarchy between states is different from the anarchy which would allegedly follow the collapse of authority within the state. Anarchy within the state means the lack of authority, disorder and chaos. In the international sphere, it means only the absence of greater authority than that of the states, but total chaos or disorder has not ensued. As already Bull noted, we can not transfer concepts from one context to another. In any case, we would need to meticulously study the conceptual apparatus of the international sphere rather than just project the concepts of political theory to an inter-state level. The use of this kind of analogies also stresses the intellectual debt of IR to political theory and makes it only a kind of untidy fringe of political theory rather than a discipline of its own, as Martin Wight (1966) noted.

Thirdly, we may argue that the study of various transformations, translations and conceptual changes taking place in the vocabulary of international relations are important for the purposes of more accurate history if not for any other reason. Many readings of classics and other authors from past eras and different historical contexts are anachronistic and translations only add to the confusion (see Burke & Richter 2012). To give a few examples, classics like Sun Tzu or Machiavelli are often read as classics of strategy even though neither of them knew the term. More significantly, even if the past authors did have the same concepts, they quite often attached different meanings to those concepts. Studying these different conceptual changes within the same concept would be of utmost importance in understanding for example the development of the state, or sovereignty.

How to study the history of concepts in IR?

First of all, we must be careful not to accept the present situation and present concepts as some sort of telos of previous eras and thinkers. It is tempting to construct kind of backward histories in which for example
the "story of democracy" is presented as inevitably leading to the present forms of democracy, but the development was far from inevitable and the present situation was not the aim of past theorists of democracy. This kind of genealogical study of concepts gives undue importance to present key concepts and dismisses those concepts that lost the battle somewhere along the course. This can also be a form of historical myopia because we do not know what concepts may be rehabilitated in the future. Democracy, for example, was dormant for almost two thousand years before actualizing again. Similarly, we do not know what concepts will be central hundred years from now. Also, if we were to write a genealogical history in which we present how we have arrived to the present concept of sovereignty, for instance, we would need to know what sovereignty means, i.e. what is the present concept of sovereignty. This is not an easy question, as the concept of sovereignty has at least four different meanings in present usage (Krasner 1999), and then there is of course the difference between popular sovereignty and state sovereignty, both with their own respective histories. It would also be incumbent on us to study why the concept of sovereignty was ignored for a long time and why it then became important in certain contexts (Onuf 1991). In international relations the concept of sovereignty was preceded by the practice and institution of friendship between states, and the conceptual history of these developments has received attention only recently (Roshchin 2006).

Some of the above is true for the concept of the state as well. First of all, it is a very different concept with different connotations in different languages. It is also based on very different traditions of political theory in different countries, up to a point that the state in Great Britain does not really have much in common with the state in Finland or the state in China. Only as units of the states-system they have certain similarities. So from the viewpoint of linguistically sensitive and conceptually oriented study of world politics the case is not a straightforward path from pre-modern conceptions of the state to modern concept, but a much more complicated issue. Given that the state is so central to international relations, it provides a good example with which to illuminate the method purported in this article.
Hedley Bull’s aforementioned warnings about the domestic analogy also contained the idea that we should not project the European-born concepts to other cultures. There is a tendency to think that for example the modern state is a European creation and the present states-system is only the Westphalian states-system writ large, meaning that more states have been created and then joined to the Westphalian system which originally included only about thirty states. Yet this kind of autogenesis of the state in Europe is a myth. As for example Giovanni Arrighi (2008) has argued, in East Asia only The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia are European creations. Other states in the region, like China, Japan, Thailand, and Cambodia are older than any of the European so-called nation-states. We may also note that Korea has never been colonized by any European nation. Thailand / Siam has never been colonized by any other state. Consequently, they had some sort of “international relations” between them, perhaps even a “states-system” prior to the Westphalian system. They also had domestic ways to conceptualize sovereignty and similar ideas.

The existing states in the Westphalian system are truly different, although the system itself equates them as its components. Even inside the Western European culture there are huge differences: the British, for example, have a totally different conception of the state compared to the Italians and the Germans. In the liberal tradition (UK and US), the state is seen first and foremost as the guarantor of individual rights, and its birth is attributed to an imaginary social contract made in order to protect those rights and the security of its citizens. In contrast, in Germany and Italy the liberal tradition has never held sway in the same sense and the prevalent doctrine has not been the one of natural law and contract theories but the more Hegelian conception where the state is in some sense bigger than its individual parts, giving it priority over the aspirations of the individual. In contrast to both of these conceptions, in many Asian states the emphasis is on the societal harmony which means that it is not so important if some small groups of individuals occasionally suffer injustice if it is good for the whole society. So the whole philosophy on which the state is based is different, and they are similar “states” only as units of the states-system or homonymous practices.
Henry Kissinger (1994, 807-808) has noted that in fact the present states-system includes at least three different types of states calling themselves nations while sharing few attributes of the nation-states historic development. One category are the ethnic splinters of disintegrating empires, like the ones born from the disintegration of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. According to Kissinger, they are propelled by age old quest for identity and their aim is to increase their power with little regard to cosmopolitan concerns. The other category is formed by those post-colonial nations whose nationhood consists of little more than borders drawn by colonial authorities. They often resist the status quo and are troubled by separatism and civil conflicts. Thirdly, there are the continental-type states like India, China and United States, composed of polyglot national identities, languages, religions etc., representing something Europe might have evolved to without religious wars. Anyway, they all are states in the states-system and their inherent differences melt into the air when they are treated as units of the system. Even though as parts of the international states-system the inherent differences of the units tend to wither away, there are also competing views of the system itself. The recent rise of China has brought to the fore the ancient Chinese tributary system or Tien-hsia, which according to some is what China is aspiring after. But in general the structural perspectives to international relations, like those of Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane, tend to dismiss differences and changes in units, which means that historical sensitivity, linguistic diversity etc. are giving way to over-arching and supra-historical structures in the discipline (see Walker 1989).

Kalevi Holsti (2004) has noted that on one end of the spectrum, realists such as Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin insist that the “texture” of international relations remains essentially the same regardless of historical context or of the properties of the units that constitute the system, while at the other end, constructivists insist that identities, and therefore interests, are constantly redefined through social interaction. But curiously, Holsti observes, regardless of the ubiquity of change and its centrality to theories of IR, the field is largely bereft of serious analysis of the nature and sources of change. (ibid., xii) His book on institutional change in international politics is an attempt to remedy this situation and analyse the centrality of changes in IR. Yet, surprisingly, his analy-
sis does not accentuate conceptual changes although he alludes to the post-modernist perspective on IR according to which traditional analytic concepts act as a sort of ontological blinders rather than as aids to understanding in IR (ibid., 2-3). The argument goes that the traditional concepts are not very well suited to describe the present situation where all kinds of changes are taking place. Concepts prove resilient even though the subject matter changes. For example the concept of war is more or less obsolete nowadays, as it used to describe inter-state conflicts. Inter-state war is waning from the international system, maybe disappearing totally, but the vocabulary of war continues and the new conflicts are called ”new wars” (Kaldor 1999) even though they have not much in common with the inter-state wars. In some sense, new wars are harking back to the era preceding the birth of modern states, when warfare was not the monopoly of the state (Korvela 2010).

Promising perspectives for more conceptually oriented IR

Against the backdrop of the birth-context of the discipline it is perhaps not surprising why it adopted Western or Anglo-American concerns and why it more or less universalized the European-born political developments as the telos of more primitive societies everywhere. But it certainly does not explain why the discipline still remains rather provincial in this respect. In some sense, the discipline has never been really international but on the contrary has operated on Anglo-American concepts and concerns up to this day (see Smith 2000). The attempts to find ”the other IR” are relatively recent (Tickner & Waever 2009; Acharya & Buzan 2010). Curiously, for example in anthropology the need for a Copernican revolution in terms of unhinging the centrality of Western concerns and concepts has been noted much earlier (see for example Clastres 2007, originally published in the 1970’s).

The problem is in some sense embedded in the very notion of politics. Also in political theory a more inclusive approach has emerged, its representatives calling it comparative political theory. Its proponents are arguing for a re-focusing of political theory on more wider and
global dilemmas instead of its traditional focus on Western-born topics and canon of Western classics. But it is inherently problematic to try to find some non-Western conceptions of politics and to parade them as critique of Western conceptions because this would keep the non-Western conceptualizations as underdog and treat them as responses in a debate that is already framed and dominated by the Western concerns (see Bashir 2013). Therefore, in the modern era there might not be any “untold stories” of perfectly preserved understandings of politics that are uncontaminated by the West, only laying dormant somewhere to be discovered by comparative political theorists. Theorists like Gandhi, Syed Qutb et alia who are occasionally elevated as the tutelary heroes of non-Western understandings of politics were in fact educated in the West and do not really represent any alternative uncontaminated by the West, as Bashir notes (ibid., 5). Therefore, any search for alternatives should be begun from pre-modern eras when the West did not dominate the world. Anyway, some scholars like Weber (1919) saw politics as such as an exclusively Western phenomenon, so it is debatable can we find “politics” or “international relations” elsewhere. Bashir tries to move beyond the mere “convenient plurality” produced by the CPT’s affirmation of non-Western theories of politics and to tackle the question why would the conception of “the political” produced by Western modernity and discipline of political science be universal. One could of course add that there might indeed be no “Western conception of the political” at all. Also the West has very different traditions of thought in this respect. Even the very question of universality is also a somewhat Western concern, derivative of the Medieval dispute between nominalism and realism (see Jullien 2010).

So the question is, what should be the aim or point of studying different conceptualizations, competing concepts and different translations? The aim as such can not be to resist “Western hegemony” or give a voice to marginalized groups, because that would be a political project, not the aim of science. Our search for non-Western conceptions of politics or international relations might be totally in vain, because it is debatable whether or not there exist such things at all. However, if we take seriously the leading idea of social constructivism – that language creates world rather than neutrally describes it – we must conclude that
different languages create different and sometimes untranslatable or incommensurable perspectives. Therefore we need to meticulously study the words and concepts used. Pekka Korhonen has done research like this already in 1990, when he compared the three different families of words for power in different languages (Korhonen 1990). His analysis is focused on the V-family, M-family and P-family of power, with their own respective conceptual histories and etymologies. So the traditional analysis of ”four faces of power” (see Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974; Digeser 1992) is not enough in order to understand different conceptions of power: we must also look at the different dimensions of power in different languages. Korhonen’s analysis hints to the possibility that for instance the users of Gewalt or puissance easily equate the use of power with violence, whereas for example the users of Macht or makt associate it with influencing others (Korhonen 1990, 105). In some languages the word for power is connected with physical force, in some others with hierarchical power etc. It is clear that these differences have implications also on the level of actual politics. In this sense, the study of international relations should also water at hitherto little used oases like the study of linguistics. For instance the works of Anna Wierzbicka might prove congenial in this respect (see Wierzbicka 1997). Too often in the study of international relations texts are not read as political moves in their birth-context, but on the contrary the emphasis is on some sort of institutional developments and their presumed philosophical roots (see Wallin 2007, 370).

**Conclusion**

There is no reality ”out there” that is not affected by the use of language. In some sense, words and things are inseparable. This view was deemed ”primitive” by for example Sir James Frazer, who in his ”The Golden Bough” argued that the primitive, unable to differentiate between words and things, sometimes conceals his true name because he fears that sorcerers might make evil use of it, and also keeps the true names of his gods secret, lest other gods or men might learn to conjure with them (Frazer 1993, 260). Frazer also argued that various practices
of tabooing certain names, names of kings or deceased for example, leads to a constant transformation of language when some words cannot be used anymore and new ones have to be devised to described the phenomena or object, whose previous denominator has been tabooed. From the viewpoint of social constructivism, this is not such a primitive view at all. Words and things are quite often, if not always, inseparable, but the content of the words might still change over time.

Words and concepts are like containers, which can sometimes be filled with different attributes: hence for example the names "West" or "Asia" refer to something that does not exist outside language, but their content varies over time (Korhonen 2008, 128). Using the metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson, Korhonen remarks that these containers can be filled with almost unlimited number of attributes, but which attributes are included and which ones excluded is always a political process (ibid.). Concepts like "the West" are explicitly political and constructed, but also more "natural" concepts are constructed similarly. The continents, for instance, are culturally produced categories and their boundaries could also be drawn otherwise (Lewis & Wigen 1997). We may also add that words and concepts create illusory stability in the world. To borrow and modify de Saussure’s example, the seven o’clock train from Helsinki to Tampere is never the same train, even though it is referred to with a definitive article, THE seven o’clock train. On different days the locomotive can be different, there can be different amount of cars in the train, the passengers are different, the staff or the train are different etc. So there is nothing "same" in the train on different days (apart from the route or the schedule, which could also be different on different days although they usually are not). Only language equates the trains and creates stability in the world which is in constant change. If we want to understand the world and its changes, we must understand and study the role language plays in this change.

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Do social sciences such as International Relations (IR) matter? What makes a social scientific study relevant? Why should we study this problem rather than another one? There are two possible answers, theoretical and practical, and they are closely interwoven. While social sciences cannot produce cumulative knowledge about universal regularities or causal laws that could be used in increasingly efficient societal engineering, they do try to answer questions about generic reasons, conditions, causes, contingencies and ends of geo-historical processes.

Every question has a set of presuppositions. When put together the layered presuppositions of a question form a broad background theory, giving rise to a characteristic set of problems and possible plausible answers to them. Particular questions are thus part and parcel of wider problematics. A relevant social scientific study tries to shed new light on a pertinent problematic by developing original arguments, typically in response to an aporetic situation. An aporia is a group of contentions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent. The things we are inclined to maintain, or are maintained in the relevant literature, issue in contradiction (see Rescher 2006, 17-26). For instance, one may
simultaneously believe that a Kantian “culture of anarchy” means freedom from violence and that it involves a collective security system, i.e. preparations for organised violence against any potential deviant state (For a discussion about this aporia and whether the Kantian “culture of anarchy” means overcoming the international problematic, see Wendt 199, 307-8).

From a practical point of view, essential questions include: (i) where are we going?, (ii) how should we evaluate a phenomenon or development?, and (iii) what should be done? (Flyvberg 2001, 60). These on the whole normative matters also provide reasons why a theoretically oriented problematic is important. For instance, in the immediate aftermath of WWI, at the time when the academic discipline of International Relations (IR) was established, the most important problem was: what were the causes of the Great War, and what could be done to prevent anything similar from ever occurring again? Typically these two questions were posed in terms of empiricist and Kantian assumptions concerning the nature of man and society and the role of law and various mechanisms such as balance of power in sustaining peace and order (Patomäki 2002, 21-41). The underlying concern was practical, the discourse at least partly theoretical.

The original problem of explaining the Great War and preventing anything similar re-occurring remains important in the early 21st century, in spite of changing world historical contexts and manifold shifts in the metatheoretical background assumptions. But over the years we have also seen a rapid multiplication of problematics in an overall cultural context in which scepticism has prevailed about the possibility of making reasonable claims about values and ends. Within closed groups of insider researchers everyone may be convinced of the importance of what they are doing (i.e. reproducing a specific problematic), but overall IR and related fields have seen increasing fragmentation continuing for decades.¹ It has become increasingly difficult to make overall assessments of what is relevant and what is not.

The role of values is widely recognised in social scientific research, but values are characteristically seen as subjectivist or lacking proper grounding. This account of the role of values has further contributed to fragmentation. In this paper I develop the contrastive idea that when
arguments about values and ends are seen as reasonable and falsifiable, and in many ways intertwined with factual claims, we can revive the sense of relevance and importance (Sayer 2012, 23-58 and 246-52). Argumentation about values and ends is part and parcel what we do in the study of world politics and world economy and other social sciences, although improvement in this regard is clearly possible.

A key thread of IR has focussed on questions about evolving relations of dependence and interdependence in the world system or world society or global political economy as a whole. Since the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, much research has focussed on globalisation and evolution of global governance. Both are processes with potentially far-reaching transformative consequences. I try to show how and why these studies are both important in relation to the original problematic of IR and in their own right, in relation to emerging concerns that reflect those of everyday lives across the planet.

Moreover, in this paper I explicate the critical, evaluative and creative logic of social sciences in its entirety, in the concrete contexts of discussing (i) the causes and consequences of globalisation, and especially financial globalisation as an important case; (ii) the complex and changing dialectics of crises – often spawned by oscillations in the amount of economic activity, with various amplitudes and wave periods – wars and learning in bringing about changes in global governance; and (iii) the emerging forms of agency and institutions that may actively contribute to bringing about elements of a world political community or world statehood.

In these three interrelated contexts the critical, evaluative and creative logic of social sciences attend also to the question whether emergent institutions and forms of community can overcome the original IR problem. The ensuing question is, however, are the implied claims about values and ends acceptable and reasonable?

**The Kantian problematic**

The modern international problematic was articulated by Immanuel Kant, who projected the consequences of human learning into the fu-
ture. Kant argued that the abolition of war is the condition for human progress and the fostering of moral reason. And yet, the development of the human capacity to use technical reason, together with new institutional possibilities such as financial markets and public debt, make ever more destructive wars possible. Therefore Kant can be said to have anticipated, even if only somewhat elusively, the possibility of a modern industrial war and beyond that, something akin to nuclear war. Thus Kant advocated an international social contract by state-leaders to avoid a situation where “perpetual peace [would] occur only in the vast graveyard of humanity as a whole” (1983, 110). Kant’s witty allusion to the “vast graveyard” was a warning about a future possibility.

Kant forged a number of eighteenth-century conceptions into an acute social problem of war and peace among states. He argued that neither natural law nor balance of power provides a basis for peaceful order in Europe. Kant thought the problem of war can and should be overcome by an arrangement of a “league of nations”, rule of law, republicanism and free trade. Most importantly, and unlike his Enlightenment predecessors preoccupied with lasting peace, he developed an abstract account of possible future historical path that might lead to the formation of a league of nations.⁴

After the WWI, the Kantian problematic in its various guises was institutionalised as an academic discipline. The standard story is that Political Realists countered Kant’s criticism of balance of power: wise diplomacy and prudentially organised and used military power are the best guarantees of peace. While this characterisation may portray the attitude of some conservative Realists such as Henry Kissinger, Kenneth Waltz or John Mearsheimer, classical Political Realists of the mid-20th century made a systematic case for global reforms that could create the conditions for a world political community and thereby possibly also for a world state (Scheuerman 2011). The underlying practical concern was about the development of military technology and especially nuclear weapons – roughly in line with Kant’s anxieties about the future though not always sharing Kant’s liberal hopes and ambiguous optimism.
Globalisation and the international problematic

Is a transformation of the system or society of states towards something more peaceful, and perhaps also in some other ways better, possible? Is that kind of transformation already happening? Is interstate war becoming obsolete and if yes, why? May something else be replacing it, such as increasingly large-scale civil wars? Are the actually occurring developments – where exactly are we going now? – really desirable? What should be done more than two centuries after Kant’s blueprint for perpetual peace?

The late 20th century and early 21st century theorists of functional cooperation, interdependence, security community, globalisation, and global governance and government have contested many if not all background assumptions of the institutionally conservative Realism. Political economists have in turn criticised the inherent economic Liberalism of post-Kantian approaches (e.g. the assumption that free trade is beneficial in the long run and as such sufficient or conducive to lasting peace). Most accounts of peace, war and world community have been challenged also on ontological and epistemological grounds. In what sense do states, balances of power, or regimes of co-operation exist? What is knowledge, and in what ways can we acquire knowledge about global pasts, presents and futures?

Since the late 1980s, questions about post-Kantian transformative possibilities have often been framed under the label of globalisation. Economic globalisation includes trade, production, migration and finance, and there are other dimensions to globalisation as well. Globalisation may be taken to suggest that the rise of the nation-state is finally coming to an end, and that a transformation towards a “post-Westphalian system” has become. How should we evaluate that transformation? Is it acceptable or even desirable? If it is not, are there ways of making globalisation more reasonable? Can we talk about world community, global justice and democracy, or democratic global Keynesianism? What is the rational direction of world history?

Globalization means reducing the significance of the constraints of distance and time on social organization and interaction. It also means strengthening causal (inter)dependence on the actions of distant others;
and involves emerging planetary forms of social imaginary. Waves of globalization have been followed by times of deglobalization, which can perhaps be seen as alternations around a complex trend.

Sceptics have maintained with some plausibility that in many regards the pre-WWI world was more globalized than the late 20th century world, despite the current post-WWII wave of regionalisations and globalizations gaining expanding ground.

The re-emergence of global finance, after the collapse of the 1930s and closure of the 1940s, however, is a case that even the sceptics find difficult to deny (Hirst and Thompson 1999, 2002-2009). The re-rise of global finance is a result of conscious policies of de- and re-regulation, emerging opportunities, new technological facilities and subsequent self-reinforcing developments. A state’s powers to impose taxes (e.g. income taxes started to become common from the late 19th century onwards) and regulations are limited to a particular territorial area, whereas in liberalised world economy companies, financial institutions, and individuals can quite easily transfer activities and assets elsewhere. The structural power of transnational capital vis-à-vis the state has supported a multi-faceted process of financialisation, which in turn has contributed to increasing structural dependency of states on transnational capital (See Gill and Law 1993, 93-124).

Especially since the 1970s the trend has been toward deregulation and liberalisation of entry (Bruner and Carr 2007, 120; UNCTAD 2009). Once the movement towards this direction started, small and apparently inconsequential choices begin to mount up and reinforce each other (see Patomäki 2008, 124-145). And so the pace of financial deregulation picked up during the 1980s and 1990s, and became worldwide in scope.

An index of openness shows that restrictions on financial transactions have almost completely disappeared in industrialised countries by the late 1990s and decreased in the global south (Quinn 1997, 531-551). The global stagnation that started with the financial crisis of 2007-9 is yet to reverse these trends, although many states and the EU have responded also in terms of some re-regulation of financial activities.

The social relations of the system of globalising financial markets are causally powerful: they empower actors positioned in these structures with transformative capacity. The collective outcomes of their interde-
pendent actions may be typically unintended, yet no less causally efficacious. To the contrary, they have far-reaching causal consequences. A key indicator of these powers – and a source of aporia for the Liberal theory – is the consequences of the volatility and instability of global finance. Since the late 1970s, sudden fluctuations and turns in the financial markets have affected most regions of the world. Three-quarters of IMF member countries have experienced significant banking sector problems in this time – many of them full-fledged crises. Currency crises have been similarly pervasive, affecting perhaps as many as hundred countries since 1975. Global finance matters.

Of the 200 or so financial crises since the late 1970s, the most far-reaching ones have occurred in the past 15 years. Following the Mexican (1994–1995) crisis and its repercussions, the world has been further alarmed by the Asian crisis (1997) – which spread to Russia and Brazil (1998) – and the Dot-com bust (2001). The global financial crisis that began in late 2007 has been more central and serious than any of the previous ones. Beginning with the sub-prime mortgage crises and subsequent failures of large financial institutions in the United States and elsewhere, the crisis developed into a global credit crisis, deflation and reductions in international trade. The functioning of the global financial system, the 2008-9 crisis, and the 2010-11 euro crisis have been closely connected to each other. So much so that the euro crisis is in effect the second phase of the global crisis and consequent epic recession (Rasmus 2010; Patomäki 2013).

The task of critical social sciences: the case of global finance

The most evident task of social sciences is to explain significant processes and developments and their outcomes. For instance, what explains the re-emergence of global finance; what drives the process of financialisation? How should we explain cycles of financial boom-and-bust and their widening causal scope and effects? To what extent have these developments changed, or are changing, relations of dependence and power? Do states need to cede or change the meaning of sover-
eighty to tackle global collective action problems? Do the consequent changes – if they in fact occur – amount to a global transformation from a state-based system to something different? Where exactly are we going from here, assuming either that these developments continue or that the prevailing contradictions will result in new directions? How should we evaluate these developments and their outcomes? In what ways might they be irreversible? What should be done, and by whom?

Social sciences can help to answer these questions, at first by way of negative critique. Social actions and practices are both material and meaningful. Agency is embodied and grounded on structures of language and various assumptions, understandings and claims about the world. A large part of this knowledge is practical and taken for granted by the actors, rather than propositional and referential, but it also involves explicit systems of knowledge.

A key point of social sciences is to produce explanatory knowledge. This knowledge makes references to the knowledge circulated within practices. From this it follows that truth-claims and social scientific explanations have normative and political implications. Negative critique stems simply from producing truth-claims that depart from those circulated and prevalent within social practices. If an explanation (theory) is more true (explains and illuminates better) than the understandings circulated within practices; and if we also can explain the circulation and reproduction of the latter; a negative evaluation applies then also to those structures, mechanisms and processes that nurture false understandings. That is, acceptance of some theory entails a series of negative evaluations of competing accounts and theories.7

For instance, suppose that a standard textbook form of neoclassical economics is the main source of ideas serving to justify and reinforce “free market” practices and institutions in the global financial sphere (and elsewhere). This theory cannot quite explain cycles of financial boom-and-bust and the widening scope of their causal effects, nor can it give an adequate account of relations of structural power that condition the policies of states. An alternative political economy theory, say a combination of post-Keynesian and post-Marxian concepts and claims, explains and illuminates these phenomena better.8 The theory alleging that current institutional arrangements in global finance are efficient and stable is thus false in non-trivial ways.
Yet the neoclassical textbook misconception can be argued to be necessary for the reproduction of the profitable financial practices and related power relations, also because they serve to reinforce the socio-historically constituted interests of particular actors (financial investors, wealthy individuals, tax havens, corporations using transfer pricing to avoid taxes, some major states such as the US and UK, etc). This two-fold explanatory argument makes a \textit{prima facie} case for transformative action directed at removing or changing the relevant parts of structures, mechanisms and processes that co-explain the circulation of the “free market” canon in practices, but it does not establish any \textit{telos} for this change. What is to be done?

To know what is to be done one must first ask what is good and how to achieve it. Social practices and systems can be evaluated from a number of normative standpoints. Apart from efficiency and stability (which are only conditionally good), these include fairness, justice, rights, democracy, human flourishing and ecological well-being. None of these is necessarily derivable from explanations (Sayer 2000, 156). Moreover, what is good is also informed by wider background concerns, which in the case of global finance are likely to be closely linked to the international problematic. For instance, if one has accepted the classical Realist and cosmopolitan aim of partaking in the construction of a world political community, then a reasonable response to the problems posed – and falsities sustained – by global finance are likely to involve the establishment of new \textit{global} rules, norms, principles and institutional arrangements.

Consider for example James Tobin’s proposal for a currency transaction tax (CTT). A tax would curb the excessive intercurrency mobility of private financial capital. According to Tobin, a tax is required because governments are not capable of adjusting to massive movements of funds across foreign exchanges, without real hardship such as unemployment and without significant sacrifice of the objectives of national economic policy. Tobin was also concerned about the future of democracy and wanted to increase the autonomy of domestic policy-makers. As a Keynesian economist and citizen of a particular country (the US), Tobin overlooked the international problematic and wider considerations of good and how to achieve it.
From a world political perspective, however, a globally organised CTT can be envisaged as setting an example of post-sovereign global regulation and taxation that can be applied also in other fields. We may be inclined to immediate doubt or objections on practical grounds. A global organization, however, can be created by a coalition of the willing; no general consensus in any specific context such as the EU or OECD is required. There are several good normative reasons for the CTT, each with its specific practical and institutional implications. A global CTT can raise funds for various global purposes; but it can also be seen as an innovative response to the calls for justice and democratic emancipation in a world dominated by globalising finance. The CTT is of course only a possible and partial remedy to the ills caused by global finance, and only one among many different global democracy initiatives. But the CTT could, depending on how it will be realized, bring about some of the desired or needed outcomes. It can be thus said to constitute a potential step of emancipation in the sense of “the transition from an unwanted, unnecessary and oppressive situation to a wanted and/or needed and empowering or more flourishing situation” (Bhashar 1994, 253).

To show that the CTT is a concrete eutopia (a good future possibility) and thus within the domain of the real, it is necessary to tackle the technical details of the tax, including also in terms of past experiences of financial taxes, which sometimes have been easily evaded by investors. Counterfactual reasoning about the possible effects of an altered context can be based also on historical examples and knowledge about the way financial transactions have been organised (for instance, through automatized systems of net settlement). It is also necessary to show that it may be politically possible to achieve the CTT, also in light of critical power analysis.

Thus a key point is that a two-tier CTT can be established by a grouping of countries, following the example of the two institutional success stories of the 1990s, namely the establishment of the ban on landmines and international criminal court. With careful planning, the tax can be collected satisfactorily well and efficiently also in a non-universal system (this idea was originally developed in Patomäki 2001 hs.5-7; and later turned into a draft treaty in Patomäki & Lievys 2002).
In this vision, the participating countries would sign a treaty estab-
lishing a democratic CTT organisation governing the tax.

Can it happen again? On the continuing relevance of the international problematic

A basic question informing our normative reflections is: where is it that we seem to be heading? More specifically, we may also ask whether a catastrophe that is constitutive of the IR problematic happen again? There are at least two important senses in which we can ask whether the tragedy of the 20th century can happen again. First, is the contemporary neoliberal era in some essential regards similar to the era of 1870-1914? Is it possible and perhaps even likely that something similar to the Great War could happen also in the era of nuclear weapons? Second, shifting the geo-historical analogy somewhat, we may also ask whether the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression could happen again, possibly with causal effects at least in some ways similar to the developments of the 1930s? (Minsky 1982). Both questions are simultaneously about where we are heading and at the heart of the international problematic. Can we overcome this problematic theoretically and practically? Can we illuminate the multiple and layered conditions of lasting peace in the 21st century and beyond?

Before proceeding any further, we should first ask why we should expect a major military catastrophe to be possible in the 21st century among the leading states? There seems to be a long and sweeping megatrend of declining violence in human affairs, requiring explanation and possibly indicating where we are heading in the future. This is a result of a heightened sensitivity to violence and of the growth of internal and external methods for the control of aggression (Curr 1981, 295). Both can be understood in terms of collective moral learning (for instance Habermas 1979; Kolberg 1981), aided by formal education and, more recently, by longer, healthier and often wealthier lives across the planet. There is also an internal relationship between democracy and peaceful ways of resolving conflicts (Keane 2004). Attempts to apply and establish principles of democracy in world politics tend to work
for the emergence of a global security community, characterised by absence of violence (Patomäki 2003, 365–8).

The aporia is that although there may be potential for a global security community, and thereby also for a world political community, the international problematic continues to be relevant at least in the early part of the 21st century. Liberal, Keynesian and Marxian political economists have tried to uncover the underlying but changing geo-economic causes of conflicts between classes, nations and states. Hypotheses derived from these theories should be set against the background of Norman Angell’s classic argument that territorial conquest is economically futile in a complex, interdependent and industrialised world economy and that even a war with fairly limited and non-territorial aims has been becoming excessively expensive.¹¹

The Angellian negative connection is complicated by the facts (i) that costs for states can be profits for specific companies and (ii) that military spending can induce economic growth. For these and other reasons, the high costs are not sufficient to prevent limited wars or escalation of conflicts. It remains possible to imagine circumstances in which even nuclear weapons could be used (Wagar 1999, 104–125; Rosenbaum 2011). It is thus important to study how those circumstances might come about. Most importantly from a practical point of view, what should be done to prevent the conditions from occurring?

The point is not to look for exactly similar geo-historical episodes or sequences, but for comparable structural liabilities and tendencies that may yield in some ways analogical outcomes in a new context, albeit in a non-deterministic way. Moreover, what is needed is a causal analysis of the existing structures and on-going processes, on which scenarios of possible futures can be built.¹² The task is formidable as there are such a number of potentially relevant layers of structures, forms of agency and mechanisms that could be important. Historical analogies may be partial at best, but they can play a role – at least at the first stage of a research process – in identifying the relevant layers of agency, structures and mechanisms. Some of the characteristic dependencies, mechanisms and contradictions may also endure across two or more different geo-historical eras. And emergent forms of agency and structures can be analysed too, and assessed in terms of their potential and actual causal powers.
For instance, John Maynard Keynes’ pamphlet *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* was published in late 1919, in which he sharply criticized the vengeful tactics of the Allies, especially the French, and their fear of a German resurgence. Keynes’ main economic argument was that European political economy is characterized by interdependence: the Great War was a European civil war, and no part of Europe stands to gain by striving for the economic ruin of any other part. This remains an insight also in the contemporary era. Now, after Keynes had developed the notion of efficient demand in the 1930s, he argued further that the formation of overall efficient demand must be seen from the standpoint of all actors and countries at once.\(^{13}\) Generalizability of perspectives is the basis of morality and, applied on world scale, part and parcel of global Keynesianism. In this way advances in moral understandings and politico-economic theory can go hand in hand.

Accordingly, the focus of global security scenarios should be on the dialectics between political economy contradictions and crises; limited or world wars, whether actual or potential; and the potential rise of transformative movements that could respond to the problems and contradictions of the global political economy in terms of collective learning, and by building new global institutions. In other words, political economy contradictions and crises can lead to the escalation of conflicts and even wars. Novel actors may rise and systems of governance or government be created in response to all of these (contradictions, crises, acute conflicts, wars). Again theoretical understandings and practical concerns are closely interwoven. Economic theories, theories of self-other relations, theories of securitisation and conflict transformation etc, are the basis of scenarios of possible and likely futures.

Scenarios are essentially narratives about possible and likely futures, the point of which is to enable better actions. Once we know possible and likely developments, we can ask how we should evaluate them and what should be done? A scenario as an anticipation can fail in two senses: (i) it can fail to shape actions / history in the intended way, including the possibility of an initially implausible anticipation of a non-desirable possibility becoming self-fulfilling; (ii) it can be wrong in terms of creating an expectation about an outcome that does not occur (as anticipated in claims such as ”if we do (or someone does) X, or if we refrain
from doing X, an outcome O is likely on conditions \{a,b,c\}”). The assessment of failure in both senses is complicated and interpretative, as anticipations are conditional and probabilistic and may even become self-fulfilling in unintended ways, but nonetheless without adequacy in the action-conditional sense scenarios would have no point (For a methodology of revising our scenarios and probability estimates on the basis of new evidence and geo-historical experiences, see Patomäki 2010a).

**Globalisation of democratic political agency: towards a world political community?**

The dialectics of contradictions, conflicts, crises, learning and transformative actions may fashion a basis for world political community. Hans Morgenthau defined a world community as a community of at least partly shared moral standards and political judgements and multiple but convergent political actions (Morgenthau 1960, 522-4). During the Cold War such sentiments did not seem widespread, but as Morgenthau favoured a world state, he put his hope on functionalist cooperation and education. In the longer run, he argued, these may gradually create the basis for a global political community.

What Morgenthau did not systematically explore was the interactions between new forms of political agency and new global institutional arrangements, and how those interactions could shape prevailing moral sentiments and ethico-political judgements. This is a key area of research in world politics. A fairly standard early 2000s argument would go along the following lines. For any strategy of global democratisation to succeed, new political forces must emerge, i.e. there must be a strong transnational movement for global transformations.

The World Social Forum (WSF) process stands out as a new major space created by and for the emergent global civil society. The WSF process has been mostly independent of any state. In a relatively short time (since its establishment in 2001), it has contributed to the global capacity of civil society to generate new projects and alliances. The further empowerment of the democratic elements of the global civil so-
ciety, especially via the WSF process, would seem to be a pivotal component in a strategy for global democratisation. In the first few years of 2000s, it seemed possible for many that the WSF itself may develop into an actor (Our – and especially my – assessment of the WSF was changing as a matter of couple of years from 2001-2 to 2004. Cf. Patomäki & Teivainen, 2004a, ch.6; 2004b, 145-154).

Transnational public sphere has existed in some sense has existed at least since the mid-19th century. It is also true that a new kind of reflexively political global civil society emerged in the last quarter of the 20th century. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and networks have limited agendas and legitimacy and, without the support of states, limited means to realize changes. Although the WSF may seem a party of opinion in its self-definition of being against neoliberal globalisation, imperialism, and violence, in more positive ideological terms it remains a rather incoherent collection of diverse actors.

In itself the World Social Forum is expressed as a mere open space. An inclusive and open space may be good for various purposes and also necessary for many public gatherings and conferences, but it cannot involve common, directional agency. Despite contrary hopes, an open space may fail to generate, encourage or trigger the formation of collective transformative agency.

This suggests new areas of theoretical research and practical action. First, from a practical-normative perspective, there is arguably a quest for new forms of agency such as a world political party. Various historical predecessors of global political parties, real and imagined, provide conceptual resources, useful experiences for envisaging the structure, and function of possible planetary party-formations.

H.G. Wells’s “open conspiracy” is a particularly important future-oriented left-democratic vision (Wells 2002, orig. 1933). Transformative political agency presupposes a shared programme, based on common elements of a wider and deeper world-view, and willingness to engage in processes of collective will-formation through democratic procedures. We can learn from previous practical and theoretical attempts and their failures. All social experiments are context-bound (In this spirit, I respond to the criticism of existing parties and cultivate the critical-
pluralist ethos of global civil society in terms of democratic party-formation, Patomäki, 2011, 81-102).

In the absence of adequately democratic global institutions, however, the question is what a non-state global political actor, possibly assuming the form of a political party, could do to further common visions and aims of its members? To what extent does state sovereignty continue to exclude other forms of world political agency in the 21st century? How to transform democratically social practices and systems that are not democratic in the required sense? From the viewpoint of transnational transformative movements, and especially those interested in establishing global party-formations, this is a practical aporia to which there may be different responses.

The already existing international regimes, or systems of regional and global governance, provide sites for a public sphere and non-state political actions, as do elements of global media. The *raison d’être* of the party must lie, however, in furthering transformations and various new institutional forms in which the planetary public realm can be organised. A world political party would thus advocate transforming global institutions and creating new ones, fully aware that only states can create international law in today’s world. From this point of view it may be concluded that it, or at least its members, should also contest state power through elections. Obviously it would also participate in newly formed global institutions. All these possibilities open up a number of political theoretical and practical problems.

The dialectics of agency and structures work also the other way around. New global-democratic organisations are likely to raise interest in participating in world political processes. Michael Saward has argued that mechanisms of democratic governance can be temporal or permanent, non-governmental or governmental (the latter in different senses of the term). (Saward 2002, 32-46). For instance, many special UN conferences are typical informal but governmental mechanisms. Deliberative forums and systems of complex accountability could combine different possibilities. Global courts and parliament would fall within the category of permanent and governmental mechanisms, as would a global currency transaction tax organisation. The more seems to be at stake in shaping the functioning of a mechanism, the more cosmo-po-
political activities are likely to seem relevant, although the relationship is bound to be complex and contextual and depend on the precise contours of agency and knowledge of actors.

Conclusions

Social sciences matter because they are part of geo-historical processes. From within, they have potential to shape those processes towards the better, while recognizing that every factual and normative claim is fallible, and that they must assume a dialogical relationship with others. Theory and practice must be consistent, and not only in theory but also in practice, although various aporias will of course persist.

It is the task of critical social sciences to make a contribution to understanding, explaining and criticising existing realities and imagining and developing alternative possibilities. We can also anticipate the possibilities opened up by particular actions, policies, reforms or structural changes, including possibilities that may be self-reinforcing or cumulative. However, there are multiple other real future possibilities than those working for the good and human flourishing. Moreover, it is entirely possible that a transformative endeavour in the hope of a better world may involve false beliefs, illusions and contradictions. Upon attempted realisation, ideas about better future possibilities may turn out more dystopian than eutopian. In the absence of systematic social scientific critique, the hope for a better world can all too easily be harnessed to serve particular interests, bringing about dystopian effects.

There are thus always good reasons for further research. When deciding what problems to study, we should give adequate room for both theoretical and practical considerations. A relevant social scientific study tries to shed new light on a theoretical problematic by developing original arguments, typically in response to an aporetic situation. A key problem is that quite often the deliberations of a particular school of thought change over time through ever finer refinement. Scholars address issues that have evolved from issues that emerged in the previous rounds of discussions, and so on, sometimes wondering off into mere technicalities and “losing all sight of that crucial guiding thread of rele-
vance needed to preserve a connection with the fundamental questions that gave the whole process its start” (Rescher 2006, 88). Also for this reason we should always bear in mind the three main practical questions: (i) where are we going in real geo-history?; (ii) how should we evaluate the most relevant and important developments and outcomes?; and (iii) what should be done?.

Notes

1 Kalevi Holsti (1985) was talking about a dividing discipline already in the 1980s. Current major textbooks, journals and ISA conferences testify to the exploded and fragmented multiplicity of concerns, topics and approaches (the frequent inclusion of country-based area studies further diffuses the field of IR).

2 Please note that I am using the term falsifiability in the inclusive sense of openness to criticism from a variety of possible directions, capable of refuting or qualifying the initial claim. This is wider than the Popperian notion of falsification according to which a theory must be incompatible with possible empirical observations, often understood in terms of strict laboratory experiments or standard statistical methods. The Popperian reading is often take to imply that science is about empirical regularities; for criticism of this kind of empiricism in natural and social sciences, see Bhaskar (1978) and (1979).

3 There is a strand of sociological theory that argues that in one form or another a world or global state already exists, that various structures and elements of the world political system have consolidated into a form which represents some form of statehood. See Albert, Harste, Jørgensen and Patomäki 2012, 145-156.

4 Basically this was a theory of brute learning from the expensive preparations for war and from the devastating consequences of war itself. See Kant’s 1784 ‘Idea for a Universal History’ his 1793 ‘May be True in Theory, But Is of no Practical Use’ in Kant 1983.

5 I am deliberately using a rather standard way of framing this question, although it is clear that there has never been any “Westphalian
system”. European states only gradually developed the capacity to administer their territories; and such things as rules of diplomacy were codified only in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. The rise of the nation-state and “traditional sovereignty” is a 19th and especially 20th century phenomenon, and it has occurred simultaneously with various waves of globalisation. See e.g. Osiander 2001, 251–87; Teschke, 2009; Glanville, 2013, 79–90.

6 David Held and Anthony McGrew have outlined these three distinct meanings of “globalisation”. Globalisation is a meta-level concept; it does not explain anything in itself, but only the conditions of possibility of explanations based on meanings, mechanisms and processes that function instantaneously or speedily across wide spatial scales. Held 2000, p.3; Rosenberg, 2000).

7 Bhaskar, 1986), 176–86. In After International Relations I have argued (Patomäki 2002, 152–158) that the logic of negative critique is not naturalistic, for truth is a normative notion (a regulative metaphor of correspondence). All truth-claims are subject to epistemological relativism. Negative critique must thus assume a dialogical relation to those criticised, and mutual learning must be possible. Also strategic political action must be non-violent and keep the dialogue open, because all truth-judgements are fallible.

8 Different syntheses are possible and plausible, and there is no space here to make a sustained argument for any particular version of this theory. First, what matters here is the logic of negative critique and explanatory emancipation. Second, substantial arguments in their favour can be found elsewhere, see e.g. Minsky 2008); Rasmus 2010; Patomäki 2001, chs 1-3; Patomäki, 2010, 67-84; and Patomäki 2013, chs 2-3.

9 The term “utopia” is misleading, however, as it means, literally, “a place nowhere”. The correct counterpart of dystopia is eutopia. A concrete eutopia is a plausible possible future world, the contingent realisation of which requires purposeful transformative actions.

10 This is an important research area in its own right, very relevant both theoretically and practically. While the evidence from earlier times is often fragmented and indicative, and while the standard interpretation of the last few decades remains contested among peace
and conflict researchers, overall the evidence for a drastic – though spatio-temporally uneven – decline in the course of at least the last 600 years is strong. Recent key texts include Goldstein 2011; Pinker, , 2011; Muchembled, 2012; Gohdes and Price, 2012, d Lacina and Gleditsch, 2012.

11 Economists have estimated that the total cost for wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is at least $3.2-4 trillion. This is significantly more than the annual GDP of many of the richest countries in the world, such as Germany or the UK. Angell, 2000 [orig. published 1909]); Lutz and Crawford, “Costs of War Project”, with summary available at http://costofwar.org/article/economic-cost-summary (accessed 23 June 2013).

12 In Patomäki I explore the partial analogy to the pre-WWI developments, and in Patomäki 2013 chs 7-8, I discuss the potential for a partial repetition of some of the 1930s happenings. Historical episodes are always contextual and never repeats itself without at least some variations.

13 The globalist vision is clearer in Keynes writing of the 1940s, and especially in his plans for a new international economic order, than it was in his 1936 General Theory, though it was recognised also in the latter. For a good account of the development of Keynes’s thinking about war, peace and world politics, see Maxwell, 2006.

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Sakari Hänninen

WHAT IS THE “WORLD” IN WORLD POLITICS

Before the World

Jyväskylä political science has never been in the mainstream, but rather in the sidestream. Such a view, however, may conceal a perspectivist illusion. For decades there has been no mainstream in political science. This is a fortunate state of affairs, and, it has made it possible for a great variety of different approaches in political science to flourish. Jyväskylä political science has made the best out of this development and now exemplifies an original thought collective of individual scholars. Pekka Korhonen is an outstanding member of this collective characterized by an innovative intellectual style of reasoning and reading. At the same time, Pekka Korhonen has retained his highly personal scholarly habitus both in terms of research and teaching.

Pekka Korhonen was appointed as professor of political science at the University of Jyväskylä, Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, in 2004. His chair was not in traditional international politics or International Relations Theory but World Politics. Taking into account Pekka’s research interests e.g. in conceptual history of Asia, Asian and Pacific integration, relations between Asia and Europe, politics of East-
Asia and cartography it seems more than appropriate that his professorship is in World Politics. However, even though International Politics or International Relations Theory has never been represented at the University of Jyväskylä, it is still a question of great relevance to think more closely and carefully what does this move to world politics actually stand for.

In his great book *After the Globe, before the World* R.B.J. Walker has incisively unfolded and carefully pointed out in detail difficulties inherent in the ambitions and attempts to move from a politics of the international to a politics of the world. He is definitely right in emphasizing that we have “to pay far greater attention to what goes on at the boundaries, borders and limits of a politics orchestrated *within* the international that simultaneously imagines the possibility and impossibility of a move *across* the boundaries, borders and limits distinguishing itself from some world beyond.” (Walker 2010, 2-3) The crucial point to reckon is that the politically relevant operations of limiting, bordering and bounding cannot be reduced to simple practices of drawing thin lines of separation (Walker 2010, 3, 6, 11, 12) since, here, it is a question of perplexing, complex and manifold mappings (in time-space). Far “greater attention to boundaries, borders and limits as complex sites, moments and practices of political engagement” (Walker 2010, 11) must be, therefore, paid not only within international politics and the inter-zone between international politics and world politics but also in every step towards world politics whatever the starting point.

R.B.J. Walker’s book has been widely discussed and commented, also by scholars in Finland. In his insightful reading of *After the Globe, Before the World* Sergei Prozorov gives due credit to Rob Walker for having profoundly disclosed the limits of IR so that “one will never reach world politics if one begins from the international”. (Prozorov 2011, 287). Right after acknowledging this conclusion, Prozorov, however, suggests that if we find a better starting point, there opens up an access to the ontological dimension of “World”. He argues that Walker is able to prove his point since “there is no such thing as ‘international ontology’ because…it is strictly ontic, historically specific phenomenon”. (Prozorov 2011, 288) By approaching the “World” in this ontological dimension, Prozorov claims, we are also able to come to terms with this historical contingency. (Prozorov 2011, 288) In his article *What is*
Prozorov challenges the claim that we are always destined to stay ‘before’ the world, as he interprets Walker’s argument. Since he admits that “Walker explicitly locate(s) the question of world politics on the level of ontology”, he must have a different kind of ontology in mind than the “scientific ontology” – pertaining to particular beings – ascribed to Walker by him. (Prozorov 2013, 104 - 105) By following in the footsteps of (early) Martin Heidegger and Alain Badiou the argument of Prozorov’s article occupies the level of “formal ontology” where the universal problem of Being (being qua being) is addressed. It is at this ontological level where the “World” in world politics can be also approached and named in terms of the phenomenological ontology of Heidegger and the set-theoretical ontology of Badiou. (Prozorov 2013, 106-107) In doing so Prozorov asks if the concept of the world (or rather “World”) should be understood as the whole of beings, as a limited totality of beings or as the void of being. Prozorov dismisses the first two alternatives as either being logically inconsistent (the world as ‘everything’) or as inconsequential for the discourse on world politics (the world as ‘something’), so he ends up with the conclusion that the ‘World” is the void of being (the world as ‘nothing’). (Prozorov 2013, 106)

Rather than Prozorov’s claims about why the World cannot be ontologically conceived either as “everything” or “something”, the argument that the “World” can be understood as ‘nothing’ deserves closer attention. This argument must be understood in terms of the difference made between the World and worlds – as has been already implied in previous formulations. Accordingly, there is an infinity of infinite worlds which appear in this World seen as the clearing (Lichtung) or the openness of Being. No doubt Prozorov echoes here Heidegger but, as a matter of fact, he is much more loyal and faithful to Badiou’s set-theoretically conceived ontological message which claims that the only immediate being is the void so that “(w)ithout the void, there is no
world”. (Badiou 2009, 114; see also Prozorov 2013, 115) In this way the World as nothingness is understood as a pure affirmation, as the void of Dasein’s existential possibilities (Prozorov 2013, 111–112) so that worlds are positively created or generated from this nothingness – perhaps reminding of some arguments that quantum mechanics can produce a universe out of nothing. Prozorov claims that, even if Heidegger and Badiou actually do agree about the Nothing itself, for Badiou “the void is not merely the clearing of being but literally its building block, so that whatever appears in the world ultimately depends on the void for its being”. (Prozorov 2013, 115) Understood set-theoretically the nothingness or void is naturally the empty set (Ø), the beginning and end of ontology, and the ontological condition of possibility for the proliferation of being as inconsistent multiplicity. (Prozorov 2013, 116–117)

After having outlined the World as void or nothing, as he understands Badiou to have also done, Prozorov asks himself what kind of political conclusions we can draw from such an ontological analysis. He asks specifically “Is There a Politics of the World?” The first conclusion he draws from the concept of the World as void is that the contingency of every world has to be affirmed “insofar as the transcendental order that conditions its appearance has no foundation in being”. (Prozorov 2013, 117) If the affirmation of contingency is the principal ontological message, there surely cannot be then any Politics of the World so that the World as void prescribes politically nothing or anything. (Prozorov 2013, 117–118) Does this then lead to radical pluralism, absolute indifference or even nihilism? Prozorov thinks that there is another alternative connected with the displacement of the politics of identity. As the World as void first comes to appearance within this world, all existential identitarian predicates are released (Gelassenheit) and the thus subtracted being (multiplicity) is as it is in the absence of any identification of what it is. (Prozorov 2013, 118) At this point, Prozorov could have clarified that in this way the Aristotelian identity logic is overcome and especially the lazy thinking in terms of the “Is” of Identity (see Korzybski 2000) is left behind. But that would be another interesting story.
Infinite truth and finite knowledge

In making sense of the “World” in world politics Prozorov seems to take Alain Badiou and his set-theoretical ontology at face value – in a manner that is not so uncommon in this genre. Even if his analysis and conclusions are eloquently presented, the badiouan premises of his thinking should be made more explicit and should be carefully disentangled. These premises are crucially connected with Badiou’s proposition to treat set-theory (mathematics) as ontology. In this short encomium to Pekka Korhonen it is only possible to make some fragmentary comments on this fundamental topic which, in this context, falls in the domain of mathematics of science and not only philosophy of mathematics as is usually understood. In other words, if we are to consider what and how set-theoretically (mathematically) framed ontology can contribute to understanding world politics, we should also address and answer the question on how mathematics can be applied in this positive field. I know that Alain Badiou himself has questioned the philosophical credentials of “practicing mathematicians” – as he calls them – but this may be just a symptom of the unhappy dialogue between these partners in spite of Badiou’s own mathematical credentials. The problem may lie somewhere else than what Badiou points out, not in the relation of mathematics to philosophy but to positive science, just as the best of mathematicians are fully aware of this.

It would be of great value and use for all interpreters of the human world, and especially for those justifying or rationalizing their arguments in mathematical format, to pay careful attention to what outstanding “practicing mathematicians” have said about (the conditions of possibility for) how mathematics can be applied in positive fields. I shall just quote one of them, Jacob T. Schwartz who writes: “The literal-mindedness of mathematics thus makes it essential, if mathematics is to be appropriately used in science that the assumptions, upon which mathematics is to elaborate, be correctly chosen from a larger point of view, invisible to mathematics itself. The single-mindedness of mathematics reinforces this conclusion. Mathematics is able to deal successfully only with the simplest of situations, more precisely, with a complex situation only to the extent that rare good fortune makes this complex
situation hinge upon a few dominant simple factors. Beyond the well-traversed path, mathematics loses its bearings in a jungle of unnamed special functions and impenetrable combinatorial particularities. Thus, the mathematical technique can only reach far if it starts from a point close to the simple essentials of a problem which has simple essentials. That form of wisdom which is the opposite of single-mindedness, the ability to keep many threads in hand, to draw for an argument from many disparate sources, is quite foreign to mathematicians. This inability accounts for much of the difficulty which mathematics experiences in attempting to penetrate social sciences.” (Schwartz 1986, 21-22)

Without doubt Badiou would consider this statement of Schwartz to miss the main point of his own argument in *Being and Event*. The ultimate aim taken and the promise given in this work is not to produce positive knowledge of any particular concrete situation or even provide tools for such concrete analysis, in spite of many exemplary historical illustrations of his arguments, but to offer nothing less than eternal philosophical truth as it is unconcealed, and not just discovered, in mathematical set-theory as ontology. It is the *being* of truth which concerns him here (Badiou 2007, 333) and not just *veridical* knowledge: “the true has a chance of being distinguishable from the veridical when it is infinite. A truth (if it exists) must be an infinite part of the situation, because for every finite part one can always say that it has already been discerned and classified by knowledge.” (Badiou 2007, 333) It is precisely the ultimate goal and effort taken by Badiou in his *Being and Event* to absolutely evince *fidelity* to ontologically understood philosophical truth (opened up as a genuine chance moment of an event) and to provide a *generic procedure* for transilluminating and forcing truth as the being-multiple. (Badiou 2007, 232-239, 335-339) This is anything but an easy task as can be readily seen in *Being and Event* which must be meticulously studied in order to be able to follow its intellectual style of philosophical reasoning and set-theoretically demanding form of presentation.

**The theory of the pure multiple**

Even if my aim, here, is not to disentangle knots of Badiou’s reasoning...
or uncover checkpoints of his mind map, it is necessary to penetrate the ultimate premises of his thinking as these are also pivotal in appraising or judging Prozorov’s world political solution leaning on his interpretation of Badiou. In this way it is also possible to come to terms with Rob Walker’s germane demand that by far greater attention has to be paid to boundaries, borders and limits as complex sites of political dynamics – and the dilemma Prozorov may face in this respect in line with Badiou. The crucial dividing line proceeds between the finite and the infinite. In his Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können Immanuel Kant characterizes the passing from time to eternity not just as a boundary (die Schranke) keeping things (spatially) apart but as the limit (Grenze) expressing a genuine discontinuity. (Kant 1783, 142 – Kant: KGS IV, 352) As Tagliapietra explains (Tagliapietra 2010, 17-36), Kant reasons that thinking about the end of time (in eternity) actually leads to a genuine void of reflection, to ‘a total thoughtlessness (gänzliche Gedankenlosigkeit)’ at the “edge of an abyss”. (Kant 1794, 221, 227; Kant VIII, 327, 334) In contrast to Kant, who would identify ‘nothing’ with apeiron or void of reflection, Badiou is willing to and claims to be able to cross the limit into eternity and infinity, without any doubt or hesitation. This is the ultimate and fundamental crossing over taken by Badiou – and echoed by Prozorov.

Before thinking over the significance or the effect of Badiou’s (and Prozorov’s) crossing over the limit to eternity or infinity, a word or two has to be said about Badiou’s ontology in general. At the outset, Badiou makes clear that his problem is not that of foundations. (Badiou 2007, 14) By reminding that there is no transcendentally given foundation in being Badiou emphasizes his un-foundedational starting point as the empty set, the beginning and end of ontology. Therefore, he starts with an axiomatic decision: that of the non-being of one. (Badiou 2007, 31) This decision is, or at least is meant to be, an expression and demonstration of materialism and a real and effective challenge to onto-theological arguments, which, according to Heidegger, make thinking metaphysically dependent on the supremely-being, the One. (Badiou 2007, 143) Ontology for Badiou is not a theory of the One, but the theory of the void, of the pure multiple, and, the theory of the pure multiple is set-theory. In this fashion, mathematics as set-theory is understood as
ontology. And it is in set-theory that we can proceed from the void to a multiple, as a multiple of multiples, by counting. For this reason we can also declare that even though the one is not, it can exist as operation. Therefore, even if there is no one, there is the count-as-one: the one as such is not, it is always a result of a count, the effect of a structure. (Badiou 2007, 24, 90)

Badiou argues that ontology can only count the void, ‘nothing’. (Badiou 2007, 58) Besides naming and forcing counting is the most crucial set-theoretical procedure in Badiou’s ontology, and, ‘nothing’ is the operation of the count so that ontology can only count the void as existent. (Badiou 2007, 55) This idea is explicated by Badiou as follows: “Given that ontology is the theory of the pure multiple, what exactly could be composed by means of its presentative axiom system? What existent is seized upon by the Ideas of the multiple whose axioms institute the legislating action upon the multiple qua multiple? Certainly not the one, which is not. Every multiple is composed of multiples. This is the first ontological law. But where to start? What is the absolutely original existential position, the first count, if it cannot be a first one? There is no question about it: the ‘first’ presented multiplicity without concept has to be a multiple of nothing, because if it was a multiple of something, that something would then be in the position of the one. And it is necessary, thereafter, that the axiomatic rule solely authorizes compositions on the basis of this multiple nothing, which is to say on the basis of the void.” (Badiou 2007, 57-58)

Badiou argues that the “first” presented multiplicity without concept is the multiple of nothing, the void. This formulation brings to mind Jacob Schwartz’s earlier comment that “mathematics loses its bearings in a jungle of unnamed special functions”. Isn’t this the dilemma also here where we are dealing with the multiple of nothing without concept. Badiou is quite aware of this question, and there is a difference between concept and name. He emphasizes that “(t)he absolutely initial point of being for ontology is the name of the void.” (Badiou 2007, 151) But what is the name of the void? We already know that it has been called the multiple. Badiou explicates why: “Naming the void as multiple is the only solution left by not being able to name it as one, given that ontology sets out as its major principle the following: the one is not, but
any structure, even the axiomatic structure of ontology, establishes that there are uniquely ones and multiples – even when, as in this case, it is in order to annul the being of the one.” (Badiou 2007, 59) However, there is the further problem, since “[t]he name cannot indicate that the void is this or that. The act of nomination, being a-specific consumes itself, indicating nothing other than the unpresentable as such.” (Badiou 2007, 59) So what kind of a name is this name of the void? Badiou answers this question by reminding that side by side with naming the generic procedure for exposing truth depends on forcing: “In ontology, however, the unpresentable occurs within the presentative forcing which disposes it as the nothing from which everything proceeds.” (Badiou 2007, 59) Therefore, Badiou cannot but conclude: “The consequence is that the name of the void is a pure proper name, which indicates itself…” (Badiou 2007, 59)

**Actual infinity of infinities**

At this point we have reached – and I use “we” on purpose – the point where the plausibility of Badiou’s set-theoretical ontology can be taken up and this is ultimately connected with his crossing over the limit to eternity and infinity. Even if he claims that my problem is not that of foundations, the critical question concerns the first premises of his undertaking. He could naturally answer that since ontology, or, in his case metaontology, has to do with the prereflective sources of our activity (cif. Rosen 2013, 202) rather than with reflection, there is no need to try to explicate any foundations for subjective activity, since the subject is only an effect of the opening of (the truth of) being. But, in that case, would it not be a question of the play or game of unconscious forces? (cif. Rosen 2013, 110) And would it be possible to connect this with Badiou’s pivotal starting point that “mathematics, far from being a game without object, draws the exceptional severity of its law from being bound to support the discourse of ontology.” (Badiou 2007, 5) Badiou is, here, emphasizing his difference to David Hilbert and other mathematicians, who approach set-theory purely as a formal mathematical game and not as ontology. Unfortunately he does not, though, think or elaborate more closely what would it mean to say that mathematics as
ontology or in the service of ontology is a game. Who is here playing what, when, where and how? Is it God who is playing with us? Can Badiou (Prozorov) avoid this question if he claims to cross the limit to eternity or infinity as he does?

Badiou states that where the count-as-one fails, stands God. (Badiou 2007, 41) Does this mean that God can then be found at the beginning, in the void. There are many scholars who have interpreted Badiou in this fashion as a hidden theologian. (Reynhout 2011; Depootere 2009; Phelps 2013) This is an important but complex question and should be more critically examined. If Badiou concludes that the void can only be nominated by a proper name, should this be the name “God”, the only genuinely proper name. Badiou would certainly object by claiming that this conclusion only exemplifies the logic of the One, but here we are dealing with the pure multiple. Badiou’s outspoken and definite goal, both politically and philosophically, is to “get rid of God” (the One) and overcome onto-theology, and this can be also understood as his materialist program. In order to succeed in this, Badiou is willing and ready to defeat the opponent on its own (metaphysical) ground, and this is the reason why we could and should ask if, or to what an extent, he can be indirectly trapped by this “grounding attempt”. If this were the case, then Badiou could be claimed to have ended up in a kind of “negative theology”. (Rosen 2013, 120) And to decide if this is the case, it is necessary to examine and think carefully how he crosses the limit from finity to infinity.

In thinking about infinity we could begin with the Greeks and particularly Anaximander (who spoke of infinity – apeiron – as unlimited), and so Badiou begins too. However, it suffices, here, to remember that Badiou agrees with Aristotle that there is an intrinsic connection between the void and infinity. (Badiou 2007, 73) If God is then identified with the infinite, as has been traditionally done since the ancient times, then, the God could be connected also with the void. However, since Badiou is determined to dethrone God (e.g. in contrast to Aristotle), he must also understand and explicate infinity differently. Therefore, in contrast to Aristotle who talked about potential infinity, Badiou thinks that infinity can be actual. In this way, he thinks that “the radicality of any thesis on the infinite does not – paradoxically – concern God but rather Nature.” (Badiou 2007, 143)
The displacement of God (the potential Almighty) by Nature (the real) in the thinking about infinity is a move that Badiou accredits to mathematicians of our modern times, and, in this vein, he declares that “the mathematical ontologization of the infinite separates it absolutely from the one, which is not. If pure multiples are what must be recognized as infinite, it is ruled out that there be some one-infinity. There will necessarily be some infinite multiples. But what is more profound still is that there is no longer any guarantee that we will be able to recognize a simple concept of the infinite-multiple, for if such a concept were legitimate, the multiple appropriate to it would, in some manner, be supreme, being no ‘less multiple’ than others.” (Badiou 2007, 145) Therefore, “(t) ontologization of infinite, besides abolishing the one-infinite, also abolishes the unicity of infinity; what it proposes is the vertigo of an infinity of infinities distinguishable within their common opposition to infinite.” (Badiou 2007, 145-146)

We can only end up with the conclusion that there cannot be just one infinity, but an infinity of infinities, or even an infinity of infinities of infinities, just like mathematicians in the footsteps of Cantor have come to recognize also understanding that there is no end to crossing these limits – but perhaps madness. The first step taken by Cantor, into the continuum of infinities, was to distinguish actual infinity from potential infinity (∞) and connect it with the sort of infinity that contains all of the natural counting numbers (Clegg 2003, 158-159) and to call it aleph-zero opening up the road to transfinite numbers. Following this line of reasoning Badiou states that “this proper name (of aleph zero) convokes, in the form of a multiple, the first existence supposed by the decision concerning the infinity of being.” (Badiou 2007, 158) It could be, thus, claimed that Badiou contrasts (classical) infinity with (natural) transfinity which has a background in the limit ordinals of nature, even though, we cannot make the concept of infinity and that of the limit ordinal coincide. (Badiou 2007, 156-157) The definition of infinity is established upon this border: an ordinal is infinite if it is aleph-zero or if aleph-zero belongs to it. (Badiou 2007, 158) All this thinking about actual infinity and transfinity is an absolute expression of crossing over limits, and the dangers (personal sacrifices) involved in that endeavor. However, in a peculiar fashion it is characteristic of Badiou, the prophet,
that he seems to be quite immune to all these dangers and sacrifices.

It is pivotal to note that Badiou turns Kant’s argument (nominations) upside down by stating that “(t)he passage from the pure limit (Grenze) to the frontier (Schranke) forms the resource of an infinity directly required by the point of being.” (Badiou 2007, 162) This means that if the limit is understood as determined at the same as its non-being, then it can be called a frontier. This reversal of Kant means that we should move from statics to dynamics and to understanding how that which is absent (nothing, void) makes a difference in a (natural) situation and makes transformation and change intelligible as taking place at the frontier: “On one side of this gap, it is clearly it, the thing, which is one, and thus limited by what is not it. There we have the static result of marking, Grenze, limit. But on the other side of the gap, the one of the thing is not its being, the thing in in itself is other than itself. This is Schranke, its frontier. But the frontier is a dynamic result of the marking, because the thing, necessarily, passes beyond its frontier. In fact, the frontier is the non-being through which the limit occurs. Yet the thing is. Its being is accomplished by the crossing of non-being, which is to say by passing through the frontier. The profound root of this movement is that the one, if it marks being in itself, is surpassed by the being that it marks.” (Badiou 2007, 162-163)

The move from statics to dynamics is also a move from Kant to Hegel. It is, therefore, not surprising that Badiou makes these moves in the chapter titled “Hegel”. He credits Hegel for possessing a profound intuition on infinity, but because Hegel wants at any price to make the count-as-one to be a law of being consisting also in having the frontier to be passed beyond, he makes it into a duty. While for his own subtractive ontology infinity is a decision (of ontology), he claims, for Hegel it is a law. (Badiou 2007, 163) From the point of view of decision, actual infinity is a name or a proper name, and, what’s wrong with Hegel’s approach to infinity is how he names it, it’s the nomination that doesn’t work in Hegel. Besides, Badiou claims that Hegel fails to intervene on number. (Badiou 2007, 163, 169) The reason why Hegel does not intervene on number, as Badiou wishes, may be that he avoids talking about the point of being, as Badiou does, since already for Hegel – and for Heidegger much more so – time has no point-like-character seen
in a continuum. (cif. Rosen 2013, 138, 140, 163, 176, 187) Therefore, it would have been most welcome if Badiou had further cleared what he actually means by his critical comment on Hegel: “Mathematics occurs here as discontinuity within the dialectic.” (Badiou 2007, 169) The reason why Badiou actually cannot enter into this discontinuous dynamics is that it is not Becoming but Being only that is really worth his attention. This is also the reason why we can doubt if he could ever leave onto-theology altogether behind. And, it is also the reason why the “World” never opened up to him, but only worlds.

The Ghost of onto-theology

Badiou writes that Georg Cantor is essentially a theologian working in the folly of trying to save God. (Badiou 2007, 42-43) However, he leaves this issue at that. This is strange when we take into account that his own set-theoretical tools are primarily borrowed from Cantor and his followers such as Paul Cohen. In his religious conviction Cantor was rather the rule than an exception among mathematicians who have strongly developed and influenced set-theory. Kurt Gödel e.g. wrote an ontological proof of God’s existence (Gödel 2008) and the Moscow school mathematicians, above all Pavel Florensky and Nikolai Luzin, worshipped the name of God, just as they profoundly developed “naming” in set-theory. (Graham and Kantor 2009) All of them, and many others, have developed set-theoretical mathematics to glorify God as is so well illustrated by the names Cantor gave to different infinities. Cantor gave the name *alpha* (*aleph-zero*) to actual infinity and he gave the name *omega* (*Ω*) to a different aspect of infinity. (Clegg 2003, 165) These names naturally come from the Bible:

“‘I am the Alpha and the Omega’, says the Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come…” (Bible)

Badiou does not himself glorify God, but, quite on the contrary, wants to annul this onto-theological folly and illusion. But for that he
uses the same set-theoretical tools than those who worship the One. Therefore, there are a number of critical questions about his onto-theological commitments waiting for an answer or some clarification. This is necessary especially for the reason that he treats set-theory (mathematics) as ontology. In this short text I shall only take up a few of the most important ones related to the topic.

First of all, even if potential infinity is displaced by actual infinity (of Nature), how does this move guarantee that onto-theology is left behind for good?

Secondly, if (multiples of) something or anything, or even everything (but not as totality) come out of (pure multiple of) nothing by counting, how does this then differ from the classical onto-theological idea of *creatio ex nihilo*, i.e. from what Leibniz said: *Omnibus ex nihil ducendis sufficit unum* (One has all from nothing made)?

Thirdly, if the truth of being as chance (contingency of laws of nature) is eventually unconcealed or opened up to a subject, who is thus only an effect of the event, then how does this fidelity to the truth of being differ from religious belief and revelation, i.e. from St Paul, who is given by Badiou as an example?

Fourthly, if inclusion and belongingness are the only two relations between multiples that Badiou’s set-theoretical ontology distinguishes and takes into account, then how does this procedure (count-as-one) differ from the pastoral power-logic of God’s shepherds?

Fiftly, if “philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into existence the unknown that is only waiting for us because we are waiting for it” (Badiou: 2012, 65), then how does this devotion and rationality differ from the practice of Moscow name worshippers?

Sixthly, if the problem of continuum brings to light paradoxes (between a multiple and the set of its parts) in set-theory or obstacles intrinsic to this kind of mathematical thought, then why is it necessary to construct a pure theory of nothing and save continuity point-like-wise instead of taking these paradoxes seriously as symptoms of discontinuity?

Seventhly, if the true ethos (ethics) should guide individuals to distinguish themselves from their finite animal nature and to become free
subjects by becoming immortal (Badiou 2001, 132) with the singular use of mathematics (Smith 2006, 134-135) and especially with the help of Axiom of Choice understood as guaranteeing human freedom as recognition of chance, then would it not be indispensable to answer adequately critics (also among set-theorists) of Axiom of Choice and give good reasons why this Axiom would be valid and acceptable?

Eightly, if one, in his folly, tries to save God by positioning the one as the non-being of multiple being with the effect of prohibiting paradoxical multiples such as infinite multiples which are real but cannot be given any simple concept, then should it not be somehow explained why this kind of meta-ontology of infinite multiples could not be congruient with the onto-theology of polytheism?

These are only some examples of the possible questions that could and should be addressed to Badiou and to those few followers of him who are up to this. After all, the most crucial question comparable to Jacob Schwartz’s doubts and the one articulated by some other practicing mathematicians, such as Ricardo Nirenberg (Nirenberg and Nirenberg 2011, 583-614), queries whether there is some or any sense in this kind of philosophical (ontological) practice of making truthful, though not factual or veridical, claims about our being-in-the-world based solely on a selective reading of set-theory, which as such cannot warrant this kind of worldly advice. From this perspective, such claims often seem to be nothing more than a priori philosophical maxims which have been exemplified by carefully selected illustrations, or the other way round.

However, it should be carefully kept in mind that Badiou makes a clear distinction between Nature and world, and even more so with history – “I will term historical what is thus determined as the opposite of nature” (Badiou 2007, 174) – and, accordingly, when he promotes the eternal truth of being, he is speaking from the point of view of actual infinity (nature) but not that of the world. This is made clear by Badiou: "(t)his thesis of the infinity of nature is moreover only superficially a thesis concerning the world – or the Universe. For ‘world’ can still be conceived as a being-of-the-one, and as such, as shown by Kant in the cosmological antinomy, it merely constitutes an illusory impasse...What must therefore be understood is that the infinity of nature only designates the infinity of the One-world imaginarily. Its real
sense – since the one is not – concerns the pure multiple, which is to say presentation.” (Badiou 2007, 144) In other words, Badiou seems to make it clear that we should not talk about the World, as it would constitute only an illusory or imaginary impasse, but only about worlds as (non-pure) multiples.

My conclusion is that we cannot speak about “World” as nothing, void (empty set) and even less as vacuum in a badiouan sense already since Badiou himself never talks about “World” but only about worlds. I am quite sure that Pekka Korhonen would not do that either. So finally I try to get there where Pekka as a locally proud and conscious thinker, a cosmopolitan scholar of worlds has already been and where the Idea of World can have a sense but quite another meaning than nothing or even being.

World as Becoming

In his Being and Event Badiou mentions world, as one of worlds, now and then but always in passing. But when he switches perspective from ontological to logical then worlds become the topos of his thinking (Badiou 2006, 145) since then the thinking thinks the process how being becomes located, as it always is-somewhere. (Hallward 2008, 104) Badiou takes worlds as topos of (his) thinking in his Logics of Worlds (Badiou 2009) which examines this topic along others (existence, object, relation) which were excluded by the ontological orientation of Being and Event. (Hallward 2008, 103) It should be also kept in mind as Meillassoux does (Meillassoux 2011, 5) that Badiou understands “world” in the most general sense like an epoch, a moment of artistic history, a battle, a culture, etc. There is, however, no need here to go and get into this highly topical discussion. I shall just shortly take up the crucial question linked to Badiou’s dilemma concerning the links and mediations between the ontological and ontic domains, between Being and Event and Logics of Worlds, and, between set theory and category theory/topos theory, which could and should be seen as a more advanced mathematical alternative to set theory. Badiou, however, does not consider it as an alternative but rather as a “subcontractor” to set theory, and, this deci-
sion – perhaps necessary for him – is the source of the many difficulties traceable in the mode how he applies categorically oriented topos theory in his *Logics of Worlds*, as is outstandingly pointed out by the young mathematician Antti Veilahti (Veilahti 2013).

Antti Veilahti’s main point in his critical survey of Badiou’s topos theoretical analysis is that while Badiou claims (in *Being and Event*) that ontologically understood eternal truth is a “generic procedure”, then in *Logics of Worlds* his topos theoretical formalism, however, turns out to be confined only to a limited, set-theoretically bounded branch of locales. (Veilahti 2013, 1-41) Badiou might answer to this mathematically valid critique philosophically that “the definition of evental sites is *local*, whilst the definition of natural situations is *global*” (Badiou 2007, 176), and, that as abnormal multiples on the edge of the void, these evental sites, thus, play a crucial role in the revelation of truth. This answer would be still problematic and symptomatic indicating that Badiou constantly crosses over boundaries and limits at will turning especially problematic at crossing over the limit (Kant) or frontier (Badiou) from eternity to finity and finity to eternity.

Practically all, and they are many, critical points made by Veilahti on Badiou’s use of categorically oriented topos theory are linked to the arbitrary crossing over boundaries and limits, such as:

“Rather than following Kant in not crossing the boundary, Badiou grounds this synthetic unity (of objects – SH) specifically in the ‘quasi-split’ atomic consistence of the objects that, as such an intervention, is the opposite of the synthetic category of unity. That is precisely where his confused philosophical ‘analytics’ most strikingly fails.” (Veilahti 2013, 12)

“Category theory is a general tendency of mathematics moving away from the question of content and consistence towards the problem of compositions – the art of not crossing the limit of what they absolutely ‘consist of’ but by approaching objects in more relative, categorical terms…(but)… Badiou is reluctant to give up the ‘Platonist’ perspective of set-theory.” (Veilahti 2013, 16)

“Badiou thus rather violently crosses that Kantian limit when enforcing the set-theoretic premise of local topos theory. Given his en-
forced condition any generality of the arguments Badiou could hold against (post-)structuralist diagrammatics is thus mathematically falsified in advance.” (Veilahti 2013, 31)

After all, the ultimate reason for all these difficulties, and the necessity of crossing over boundaries and limits and frontiers at will, is the ontologically interpreted necessity of set-theoretical reductionism. I think that this will to reduce (e.g. relations to objects) is due to the anxiety over movement, change, transformation, and in this anxiety, Badiou is a follower of not only Plato but Parmenides and Zeno. Therefore, in order to find “a line of flight by the middle” – as Badiou characterizes Deleuze’s will to act (Badiou 2000) – it is good to take, once more, a look at Plato’s dialogue *Kratylos* (Platon 1999) and, there, especially Socrates’ comments on Heraclitus.

“Socrates: Heraclitus is supposed to say that ‘all things are in motion and nothing at rest’; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that ‘you cannot go into the same water twice’”

After having made this comment Socrates later comes back to it by pointing out the difficulties if adopting the stance of Heraclitus.

“Socrates: Nor can we reasonably say, Kratylos, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to abide to exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be known. But if the knowing subject and that which is known exist ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not think that they resemble a process or a flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heraclitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names…”
There is little doubt – in the light of his notion of eternal truth and his trust on the power of names – about the choice Badiou made in his situation. By following Parmenides rather than Heraclitus Badiou has lost sight of World not so much as an opening or clearing (Lichtung) where worlds appear and being-in-the-world can be illuminated but as the dynamic field of forces intensified by Lightning which makes everything change and transform in motion, i.e. seen not as Being but as Becoming. Pekka Korhonen, who is so at home in Asian cultures and knows profoundly also Chinese classical thinking such as Taoism and Confucianism, undoubtedly understands too well what I am talking about. When I was in a nearly similar situation than he is now almost twenty years ago, fortunately not turning sixty but fifty, he wrote to my Festschrift an essay about “Why we are here” from a post-modern perspective. In that essay he wrote some interesting words about neo-Confucianism as a philosophy which argues in relation to World by describing how in this philosophy an individual person conceives himself as an energy sheaf (as in topos theory) who is dynamically (in his life-time as Aion) situated in a network of networks of other individuals, and, thereby, develops himself as a person. (Korhonen 1998, 208)

If I had to choose between Parmenides and Heraclitus, I would have no difficulty with this decision. On the other hand, Prozorov has chosen Parmenides by choosing Badiou. He reasons that he has also chosen Heidegger so that it is possible to parallel Badiou’s notion of World as void and nothing with Heidegger’s notion of World as clearing and opening. If his reading of Badiou seems to be somewhat overdone, as I have tried to unveil, it could be even more so about Heidegger, especially on condition that we read Heidegger’s later texts. It is well known to Badiou’s readers that he has put Heidegger’s later texts aside, since he thought that they represented the kind of one-sided poetico-natural orientation which he wanted to, not totally overturn, but surpass with another disposition in which the matheme interrupts the poem. As a matter of fact, he claims that in their original (Ursprunglich) thinking the Greeks did exactly so, but here his reference is to Parmenides and Plato. (Badiou 2007, 125-126) Heidegger would have undoubtedly disagreed with Badiou, since his retreat to the dawn of western thinking
and poetic orientation (i.e. to the initial stage of Greek thought) is a sign of an effort to find a way toward *andersfängliches Denken* (thought of the other beginning). (Cristin 1998, 17)

If we distinguish three distinct phases in Heidegger's thought – as has been done by Renato Cristin (Cristin 1998, 5) – then such texts as *Vom Wesen des Grundes* and *Sein und Zeit* belong to the first, phenomenological period of the 1920s, while e.g. the writings on *Nietzsche* from the years 1939-1941 (except chapter VII) belong to the second phase running from 1936 to 1942. The third and last phase is most interesting and important from the point of view of this topic, since his texts on Heraclitus belong to this phase starting from *Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1943 und Sommersemester 1944* (Heidegger 1979) and culminating in the *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67* with Eugen Fink. (Heidegger and Fink 1979) Heidegger's texts on Heraclitus, and especially the Heraclitus Seminar, are really important to our topic since these texts can be argued to offer an alternative interpretation and a more fertile opening to “World” than has been so far discussed when it has been equated with eternal Being. From this alternative Heraclitean perspective “World” must be seen as expressing constant flux, motion, transformation, conflict, movement so that it could be argued, as Heidegger does, that “World worlds”. (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 110)

The profound idea, that “World worlds”, is an expression of the thoroughly dynamic character how entities come-forth-to-appearance as dynamic multiplicities and manifold opposites and related relations, in the same sense, how Heraclitus talks about productive fire or world-forming lightning. (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 6-7, 16, 85, 104) Heidegger and Fink emphasize that this coming-to-forth-to-appearance is neither *creatio*, nor *illuminatio* nor constitution but just like we must understand how fire is productive in a sense still unknown to us. (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 110) Even if World as a playground for constant transformations and a domain for manifold relations between singular relationships ultimately represents an enigma to us, and expresses a boundary of the thinkable, we can still approach it as an entirety of entities. World is everything, but this does not mean that we could call it totality or whole. World as ‘everything’ is plural and this implies quintessential relatedness, just like a Borgesian library is. No concept
of bounded allness, no concept of set can characterize World as quintessence and as entirety of manifold opposites. World is not “the all” as entirety of entities. (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 4-5, 20, 28-29, 86, 104, 107)

Not only “World worlds” but it can be argued – as Eugen Fink and Kostas Axelos have done (Fink 1957; Axelos 1977; Axelos 1980) – that “World plays us”. This idea originates from the Fragments of Heraclitus where he writes that “Lifetime is a child at play, moving pieces in a game. Kingship belongs to the child.” (Heraclitus 2001, 71) The idea that “World plays us” not only implies that we have to remember every moment that we cannot escape movement, change and transformation in everything that is but also that in approaching the enigma of World we succeed only by solving puzzles and riddles with which World plays with us. Another method of getting closer to the enigma of World could be by dramatization, as suggested and developed by Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze 1967). This enigma of World which we confront every day in-being-in-a-world can be approached both from the perspective of lifeworld and lifetime (in the meaning of Aion) as is evident from the way Heidegger and Fink talk about it in different terms such as world-time, world-fire, world-day, world-relatedness, world-relationship, world-movement. (Heidegger and Fink 1979, 20, 57-58, 82, 95, 109) The commentary on this thoughtful discussion has to be, though, left for another time and place. Let me just, in the end, write down a few idiosyncratic maxims to suggest how to approach World which is always already here in our worlds never the same.

- Nothing takes place outside World, anything takes place of World and something always takes place in World, as World is everything that is not all.
- World brings and keeps everything together by opening up to anything.
- Only worlds can be measured, not World.
- Even immediacy is mediated in World.
- All of us are of World and live in some world.
- We should always be anticipating that World takes us by surprise to be surprised.
• World is the circuit of time-allowing time.
• World stares at you by looking away.
• World is virtually infinite and actually finite.
• World is (w)hole.

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THE DEVIL’S MOUNTAIN

Thomas Hobbes on the History of English Civil Wars

Introduction

If in time, as in place, there were degrees of high and low, I verily believe that the highest of time would be that which passed between the years of 1640 and 1660. For he that thence, as from the Devil’s mountain, should have looked upon the world and observed the actions of men, especially in England, might have had a prospect of all kinds of injustice, and all kinds of folly, that the world could afford, and how they were produced by their *dams* hypocrisy and self-conceit, whereof the one is double iniquity, and the other double folly. (Hobbes 1990, 1.)

Hobbes completed the manuscript of his version of the history of the English Civil Wars - named later as Behemoth or the Long parliament - around 1668. At the time he was almost eighty years old (born
1588, died 1679) with a “shaking palsy”, that is terribly shaking hands, but he still had an exceptionally sharp intelligence. (Martinich 2007, 333-357). When the manuscript was completed Hobbes offered it to the publisher William Crooke. In a letter dated 19 June 1679 (Hobbes 2005, 771) Hobbes tells with obvious frustration that the King – his own former student of mathematics Charles II – had refused to give his authorization for the printing:

I would fain have published my Dialogue of the Civil Wars of England, long ago; and to that end I presented it to his Majesty; and some days after, when I thought he had read it, I humbly besought him to let me print it; but his Majesty (though he heard me gratefully, yet he) flatly refused to have it published. Therefore I brought away the Book, and gave you to leave to take a Copy of it; which when you had done, I gave Original to an honourable and learned Friend, who about a year after died. The King knows better, and is more concerned in publishing of Books than I am: Therefore I dare not to venture to appear in the business, lest it should offend him. Therefore I pray you not to meddle in the business. Rather than to be thought any way to further or countenance the printing, I would be content to lose twenty times the value of what you can expect to gain by it, & - I pray do not take it ill; it may be I may live to send you somewhat else as vendible as that; And without offence, I rest your Very humble Servant

Thomas Hobbes.

Chatsworth, June 19, 1679.

The book was, however, published in 1679 under the title The History of the Civil Wars of England. The printing was unauthorized by both Hobbes and the King. From Hobbes’s letter we can read that he truly hopes that the publisher William Crooke would not print Behemoth. In a letter dated 31 July 1679 (Hobbes 2005, 772) Hobbes repeats his promise that if he has any unpublished manuscripts, he will leave them all to William Crooke – a sign of Hobbes having probably felt he might be dying soon. It appears that Hobbes was very worried about publishing the book without King’s permission, yet he also seems to be deep-
ly sorry for not being able to offer William Crooke something worth publishing.

In a letter dated 28 August 1679 (Hobbes 2005, 772-773) Hobbes informs that his book on the Civil War is now published abroad – most probably in the Netherlands. He also tells his friend and biographer John Aubrey (1626-1697) how he is unhappy on this occasion, since the King had not given his license for publication. An interesting tension concerning the publication of Behemoth emerges in Hobbes’s letters. On the one hand, he seems to understand the worth of his book for the publisher. There is no doubt that the book with this title and with Hobbes’s name would sell relatively well. But on the other hand, he seems to be afraid of the impact an unauthorized print might have on the King. Hobbes certainly had a reason to be worried: after all, King Charles II had provided him with a little pension, which was very important for his wellbeing (Martinich 2007, 333-357). In an undated letter to the King (Hobbes 2005, 774-775) Hobbes gently asks if the King would renew his privy purse and give order to his Majesty’s officers to start paying the pension again. It is unclear whether the King had ended the payment of the pension as a penalty for publishing the book without his authorization. However, it is evident that The History of English Civil Wars was not a book supported by the King and Hobbes may have been in trouble for having had it published abroad without authorization.

This article examines certain basic elements in Hobbes’s history of the English Civil Wars³, which caused such anxiety in the King and his counselors. In other words, I try to place Behemoth in context and show its relation to some events of the English Civil Wars and to Hobbes’s own life. There are three major themes in Behemoth: the role of religion, the case of universities, and military matters. In this article I take a closer look on two closely linked cases: universities and religion. By doing so my aim is to open up the political side of Hobbes’s historical work, which also reaches to faraway places, foreign lands and unknown cultures. What kind of political understanding was Hobbes constructing when he wrote the history? By analysing the two cases I try to provide examples of the ways in which Hobbes constructed his arguments and I try to simultaneously show how Hobbes was effectively doing politics.
of the past in order to support his own political views and his own political theory. This reading of *Behemoth* offers new ways of understanding Hobbes’s ways of doing politics in writing the History of English Civil Wars, and his intentions to have an effect on the political life in England.

**Behemoth in its Context**

It is difficult to describe *Behemoth* in relation to the coeval general knowledge or opinion concerning the events of the Civil Wars, yet it is obvious that his *History of English Civil Wars* is not as reliable as some other contemporary histories concerning the same events. Hobbes does not directly reflect on or criticize any other histories of the English Civil Wars and it is possible that he did not even have one at hand. Generally, Hobbes follows the way of writing history in 15th, 16th and 17th centuries: it is more important to report recent events than really dig the archives or find true and reliable sources. In this sense, all history written in the early modern times was more or less political, with no outspoken aim or methodological ground for objectivity. Apparently Hobbes’s work aims to reveal something about the wars and it includes several highly controversial opinions and interpretations of the events.

Hobbes lived in exile for the whole period of the Civil Wars. After disappointing efforts to get to the parliament’s House of Commons in January 1640, he wrote and circulated widely a manuscript of his first full political work, *The Elements of Law* (or *Human Nature and De Corpore Politico*). The Epistle Dedicatory is dated 9 May 1640, four days after the dissolution of the Short Parliament. (Hobbes 1999a, Epistle Dedicatory.) After this depressing episode he never participated to daily politics again, but instead concentrated on writing the political theory. (Martinich 2007, 121-122.) Being a defender of royalist politics, it is unsurprising that his guidebook for strong sovereignty was read as a form of political propaganda and Hobbes had every reason to be afraid for his life. (Martinich 2007, 121-122.) According to his biographer John Aubrey, without King’s decision of breaking the Short Parliament Hobbes’ life would have been in immediate danger. (Aubrey 1996, 150.)
The Short Parliament (13.4.-5.5.1640) was a project of King Charles I to gain money for the so-called Bishops’ Wars that he fought in Scotland in 1639 and 1640 against Presbyterian bishops. The bottom line in these wars was the King’s authority over church politics. The King wanted to appoint the bishops, whereas thePresbyterians stood for an election system that would give political power to the Presbyterian Church instead of the Anglican Church and its head, the King of England. The King, however, failed in his efforts and dissolved the Short Parliament, which was in fact the first parliament in England for eleven years. The Short Parliament was clearly the King’s own project to raise money for war, and this might have given a reason for Hobbes, supported by the royalist Cavendish family who employed him, to take part in the Parliament and support the King’s politics. (Braddick, 2009; Martinich 2007, 121-122.)

It seems that the Short Parliament was a true political opening and the King’s supporters believed that the parliament might be a solution to the King’s problems in raising money to wage war against the Presbyterians. Thus, looking at the situation from the royalist side, the end of the Short Parliament could not have been much worse. It gave several reasons for the republicans or “democratic men” to accuse the King of short sighted politics and to demand a new and real parliament that would be more than the King’s conspiracy against the new bourgeoisie class that cooperated closely with the Presbyterians. (Braddick 2009.)

The political atmosphere following the dissolution of the Short Parliament was very tense and the Royalists soon realized that in the future they were not self-evidently on the winners’ side. The Kings position was now publicly criticized and many Royalists started to have strong doubts about their own safety. It is not clear what kind of a threat there actually existed, but Hobbes however drew his own conclusions and boarded a boat to France. He soon found his way to Paris where he settled for the next ten years. Hobbes already had a very wide network of professional and other relationships in Paris, since he had lived and studied there several times before, and he was familiar with the French language and customs. (Martinich 2007; Reik 1977, 81-86.)

In Paris Hobbes resumed work on political theory. The result was the masterpiece *De Cive*, a Latin text concerning the matters dealt with
in *The Elements of Law*, but now in an even more political manner. *De Cive* was published in 1642 at the outbreak of the first English Civil War. This time Hobbes left out all reflections concerning human nature and moved towards the politics of Christian commonwealth, which included criticism of the Catholic Church and Presbyterian politics. In *De Cive* Hobbes tries to show that the church and the commonwealth are practically one and the same and that the matters of church should be bent under the command of the political sovereign.\(^6\) For a long time *De Cive* was the most celebrated and best-known book by Hobbes, and it was used especially in the continent as a basic source of legitimating the king’s power. (Reik 1977, 81-86; Skinner 1966.)

After *De Cive* Hobbes continued working with political themes, which certainly were actual at the time. The result of the long work was *Leviathan* in 1651, which was later to be acknowledged as his main work. The time he was not working with the manuscript was spent on studying and teaching. At the end of his exile he was asked to teach mathematics to the young Charles II who was later to become the king. In 1647 Hobbes fell ill and almost died. In his biography Hobbes says that even at the worst moments of sickness, he would not take any other religion than that of the Church of England. His close friend and colleague Marin Mersenne tried to persuade him to take the religion of the Roman Church but Hobbes denied it. (Hobbes 1999b, 248-249.) This shows how loyal Hobbes was to the King and to the Church of England.\(^7\) However, the publication of *Leviathan* collapsed Hobbes’s reputation in both France and England. He was accused of being an atheist, an anti-royalist and of course, of being a royalist. He was attacked by Catholics, but also by members of the Anglican Church. After *Leviathan* Hobbes never enjoyed the full trust of the Crown again. (Collins 2005, 115-158; Skinner 1966.)

In light of these details about his life in the 1640s it is possible to understand Hobbes’s own position during the English Civil Wars. He was relatively old (53 years) when the war broke out and had a reputation of being a somewhat difficult intellect with quite strange and sometimes conservative opinions. He was a royalist and supported in his political theory the absolute power of sovereignty.\(^8\) However, his theory of sovereign power was not ordinary, but instead offered something radi-
cally new. In practice his political philosophy suggested the leadership of a strong monarch, but in theory he built a totally new kind of idea concerning the political order with the legitimation of the sovereign power coming from the people (demos) in the form of a social contract, not from God or any other outward or transcendental source (i.e., for example the pope). (Jakonen 2013, 99-126.)

As was stated above, Hobbes criticized the power of the church inside the commonwealth so heavily that many of his contemporaries thought of him as an atheist. This formed a major problem for Hobbes, since his political doctrine was mostly denied because of his anti-religious views. His basic argument is very simple: religion is a powerful political force and a political tool and it should be guided carefully under the sovereign’s control. In fact, his viewpoint resembles the one of Machiavelli. (Collins 2005, 115-158; Korvela 2006.) However, it seems that his true political view was to defend the Anglican Church, yet the reason for this was that he saw how the Anglican Church could be bent under the sovereign’s command. All the other religious groups and churches of that age wanted to free themselves from the sovereign’s leash and obtain religious (and political) liberty.

Now, coming to Behemoth, which was written in 1668 after a long silence on political questions, we must first of all note that religion plays a major role in it. Of course, Hobbes goes through the principal events of the wars (1642-1651), but the book is not a chronological history in the contemporary sense. From the viewpoint of modern historiography there are many lacks and errors in Hobbes’s story, and in some cases Hobbes makes very strong interpretations. The lack of sources is another problem. Some sources are listed, for example the books by Diodorus Siculus, but there are no references to primary sources concerning the events of the Civil Wars, although many laws, parliament declarations and other official papers are mentioned. It is unclear who were the persons Hobbes consulted on the matters pertaining to the civil war, but it seems that the memoirs originate mainly from royalist sources.

Behemoth is divided into four different dialogues between characters A and B. It is possible that the reason for writing in a dialogic form was not so much inspired by Plato, who was followed and copied by many renaissance and early modern writers, but more by the fear of
being judged because of ones opinions. Hence, instead of writing and claiming things “directly”, dialogue allowed the exposition of all sorts of questions and answers, but also makes it rather difficult to say which of the opinions are those of Hobbes. Dialogue is therefore not only a rhetorical form of writing but also enables a free elaboration of ideas in the text. In dialogue it is possible to discuss controversial matters and many critical arguments against the Republicans and Presbyterians, for example, can be made.

For these reasons Behemoth is more like a politicized juridical case study concerning the reasons and actors behind the Civil Wars, not an objective history as such. Thus, if we read Behemoth as a kind of a trial, we notice that the structure of the book is constructed in a way that enables it to show who represented the opposite sides in the “case” of the Civil Wars, what were the true reasons and motives for the Civil Wars, and who were the Good and who were the Bad. Hobbes goes to great lengths to build up cases like this. It also includes extensive philosophical deliberation on the meaning of history and historical events. He makes excursions to history, for example to the history of the English Church, history of the university system in England, history of the King’s army and so on. He also deliberates on such distant matters as the role of religion and priests in ancient empires and in one case on the pope’s relation to South American Indian kings. Thus, Hobbes’s explanation of the reasons that led to the English Civil Wars is rather comprehensive. Besides this, his explanation includes not just a number of historical reasons but also reasons related to world politics and international political actors, such as the Church of Rome. Thus he reconsiders the meaning of international relations to domestic politics in England.

After the English Civil Wars ended in 1651, Hobbes came back to England fearing that the French Catholic fundamentalists were threatening his life because of Leviathan, which included a very controversial part called Of The Kingdom of Darkness that concerned the Catholic religion and scholastic philosophy. Back in England the 63-year-old Hobbes found himself to be a political writer whose ideas were questioned by both sides of the war and both sides of the La Manche. Some royalists thought that Leviathan was too republican since the absolute sovereignty of the monarch was not clearly enough stated in the book. Leviathan,
as well as other works of Hobbes, supported the idea of three possible legal forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy). This was easily interpreted as a republican argument. On the other hand, most of the republican actors knew that Hobbes was a royalist and his effort was to support a reformation of monarchy, which he also defended cleverly at the end of *Behemoth*. However, all royalist views were naturally condemned in the aftermath of the Civil Wars with the establishment of the Commonwealth of England on the 19th of May in 1649.

**The Case of Universities and Ministers’ Power**

Although only 200 pages in length, *Behemoth* is a relatively large work and it treats a wide variety of questions related to the English Civil Wars. Considering the topic of the book, the case of universities may at first sight seem a little bit strange, but Hobbes manages to draw a clear picture of university as a “Trojan horse” and one of the main reasons behind the English Civil Wars.

In the beginning of *Behemoth* (Hobbes 1990, 2-4.) Hobbes makes a distinction between different sects that had an impact on the development of the Civil Wars. These “seducers” were:

1) Ministers of Christ (Presbyterians).
2) Papists.
3) Different religious sects that claimed to have a liberty of religion, such as Independents, Anabaptists, Fifth-monarchy-men, Quakers, and Adamites: “And these were the enemies which arose against his Majesty from the private interpretation of the Scripture, exposed to every man’s scanning in his mother-tongue.” (Hobbes 1990, 3.)
4) “Men of the better sort”: educated men who believed in classical writers that named democracy as liberty and monarchy as tyranny. Most of these men were at the House of Commons and had been educated in the Universities.
5) Large cities like London (trade towns) that imitated the example of Low Countries in their rebellion against Spain.
6) Poor people who had “able bodies, but saw no means how
honestly to get their bread” (Hobbes 1990, 4). These people were ready to fight for money.

7) Ignorant men who didn’t know their rights and duties towards the King.

Now, considering the relationship of the university to these seven groups, it was of particular importance for two of them: the ministers of church (clergy) and the educated men, that is the aristocrats and the bourgeoisie who had had been schooled at the university.

Hobbes had criticized the role of the clergy already in *De Cive* and *Leviathan*. In *Leviathan* the main reason for the “Kingdom of Darkness” caused by the Catholics is the wrong interpretation and use of the *Bible*. Hobbes goes to great lengths in the book three of *Leviathan*, “Of a Christian Commonwealth”, to explain the real meaning of certain crucial parts of the *Bible* and of Christian faith. This critique is aimed principally against the Catholics and the Presbyterian ministers, but also against other religious sects Hobbes mentions in the beginning of *Behe- moth*. One can also find in *Leviathan* a more fundamental critique of the relationship between religion and the university. This critique is practically a critique of scholastic philosophy in which Christianity merged with Aristotelian philosophy – a combination Hobbes deeply hated.

For Hobbes scholastic philosophy is a collection of stupid intellectual mistakes and intellectual hubris, common sense misunderstandings, and pagan beliefs mixed with Christian mysticism. Scholastics also sustain Aristotelian, seemingly wrong ideas regarding physics and metaphysics. This leads the scholastic epistemology and ontology to wild speculations that manifest in incomprehensible concepts such as an “incorporeal body”, which Hobbes studied in Chapter XLVI of *Lev ia-than* called “Of Darkness from vain philosophy, and fabulous traditions”. (See Hobbes 1999, 441-457.)

However, scholastic philosophy is not only a harmless esoteric form of philosophy. It also has serious impacts on society. Its impact derives mainly from the fact that the scholastics occupy the highest positions in the university system and hence all the ministers, members of the clergy, officers and civil servants working for the King and the State are educated, which for Hobbes means more or less indoctrination, accord-
ing to the scholastic doctrines. This provides the society with a kind of an elite that shares a common understanding of certain religious and philosophical ideas. Finally, all this has a fatal effect on the State government. (Hobbes 1999, 441-457.)

In Behemoth Hobbes repeats his critique against the scholastics and religion, but now even more drastically. In this short paragraph he outlines his position in a vivid manner:

But certainly a university is an excellent servant to the clergy; and the clergy, if it be not carefully looked to (by their dissensions in doctrines and by the advantage to publish their dissensions), is an excellent means to divide a kingdom into factions.

B. But seeing there is no place in this part of the world, where philosophy and other human sciences are not highly valued; where can they be learned better than in the Universities?

A. What other sciences? Do divines comprehend all civil and moral philosophy within their divinity? (Hobbes 1990, 148.)

Hobbes sees that the political outcome of the philosophy studied in universities is the fragmentation of society and the formation of different kinds of sects. He sees that the university education does not create a common understanding of basic principles (of for example laws and moral philosophy) that are necessary for keeping order and peace in the society, but what it creates instead is just more or less confusion. In Leviathan Hobbes writes:

And the divines, and such others as make show of learning, derive their knowledge from the universities, and from schools of law, or from the books, which by men, eminent in those schools and universities, have been published. It is therefore manifest, that the instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of youth in the universities. (Hobbes 1999, 228.)

Hence, Hobbes gives a very important role for the universities in commonwealth. Almost all the wrongs concerning the civil order could be corrected by teaching the youth properly.
This kind of critique is in fact familiar for us from the very first lines of his first political work. In the Epistle Dedicatory of *The Elements of Law* Hobbes makes a distinction between dogmatic sciences that derive from passion and lead to a controversy, and mathematical sciences that derive from reason and lead to common understanding without controversies. (Hobbes 1999b, 19-20.) In Hobbes’s view the first one represents the scholastic philosophy, which every university in Britain followed in his time. The other one represents a new geometrical philosophy, which factually means Hobbes’s own philosophy, although most of his important contemporaries and colleagues such as René Descartes (1596-1650), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) also utilised same kind of a geometrical or scientific method.

### The Political History of Universities

The basic claim against the universities is quite clear: Hobbes accuses them of teaching scholastic philosophy that creates false opinions, false knowledge and wrong political behaviour. But what was Hobbes’s interpretation of the historical development of universities? In *Behemoth* he answers this by constructing a short history of the university system in Europe and in England. Through this history it also becomes clear that Hobbes saw universities as the pope’s political conspiracy to influence England’s domestic politics.

Hobbes sees that most of the people who organize and agitate people to mutiny against the King have a university background. The majority of the people, the common people, do not have any idea of scholastics or philosophy. Instead, they have learned their critique of the King (or so Hobbes sees it) from the sermons of the wicked clergy and from the schools where unwise teachers teach them the ideas of democracy and the freedom of the will. This leads him to ask who educate people in the universities. (Hobbes 1990, 54-59.)

Even though Hobbes had a sort of an enlightenment attitude, he never totally believed in the power of the ordinary man or the multitude, quite the contrary. Hobbes sees that the multitude of men cannot
learn the right doctrines of civil science and they cannot have the right kind of guidance in civil life insofar as the university is in the hands of the pope’s henchmen. All authority of knowledge derives from the universities. This is why Hobbes states that the “Universities have been to this nation, as the wooden horse was to the Trojans.” (Hobbes 1990, 40.) This is not a light accusation, since Hobbes thinks that from the beginning the universities have been nothing else than a conspiracy to exert Papal power over the domestic politics of England and of other countries:

B: What was the Pope’s design in setting up the Universities?
A: What other design was he like to have, but (what you heard before) the advancement of his own authority in the countries where the Universities were erected? There they learned to dispute for him, and with unintelligible distinctions to blind men’s eyes, whilst they encroached upon the right of kings. And it was an evident argument of that design, that they fell in hand with the work so quickly. (Hobbes 1990, 40.)

Hobbes situates the beginning of the universities in the reign of Charles the Great / Charlemagne (724-814). He sees that the letter sent by the Pope to Charlemagne (Hobbes has no evidence though) advising him to establish the first universities to have been the starting point. Soon after this two universities were erected, one in Paris and another in Oxford. Hobbes says (wrongly in the light of our present knowledge) that the first rector of the university of Paris was Peter Lombard (c.1100-1160) who was followed by John Scot of Duns (Duns Scotus, 1266-1308). According to Hobbes these men were “two of the most egregious blockheads in the world, so obscure and senseless are their writings”. (Hobbes 1990, 41.) In Hobbes’s understanding the only end of scholastic philosophy was to confuse common people and in this way keep the multitude separated from knowledge and power. In a sense, the role of universities was to brainwash all the capable men to believe and understand the doctrines of Catholic religion and in this way to support and maintain the temporal power of the pope:
From the Universities also it was, that all preachers proceeded, and were poured out into city and country, to terrify people into and absolute obedience to the Pope’s canons and commands, which, for fear of weakening kings and princes too much, they durst not yet call laws. (Hobbes 1990, 41.)

Thus, the first task of the university was to educate clergy and civil servants in a Catholic manner, that is, to be loyal to the Church of Rome, which produced a particular mode of power to the whole country that was directed mainly towards common people.

Another task was to influence the “men of better sort” (Hobbes 1990, 3) who had their education in the universities. However, the effects of scholastic learning were sometimes something else than what was intended. When the philosophy of Aristotle was mingled with Christian dogmatism, all of his moral and political doctrines came to the universities in the slipstream of the scholastic interpretation of Aristotelian logic, physics and metaphysics. This meant that the ideas of democracy and ideas of mixed governments also gained support among schooled men. In reality Aristotle was only one of the authors whose texts included some sort of an analysis of democracy and usually these parts of his philosophy were not taught in the universities. However, like today, also in the 17th century the young university students were reading all kinds of texts in secret. Most of these texts represent something that we nowadays call classical humanism. Hobbes saw that the majority of the so-called humanistic canon was dangerous, whether it was read in secret or taught by the school-divines. The most dangerous thing in reading the classical texts was that the students did not understand those texts as historical warnings concerning the ills of certain political forms, especially democracy, but more or less as an inspiration for their own rebellious politics. One could say that Hobbes was worried about the radicalization of the youth in universities.

Thus, Hobbes sees that the worst the men of intelligence and power could do was to imitate historical forms of governments. Hobbes writes about this several times in his political works and he clearly seems to have a somewhat ambivalent relation to the humanistic canon that was the main source of historical knowledge concerning the politics. On
the one hand, he had translated Thucydides’ *The History of Peloponnesian Warre* in 1629 and after that a short version of Aristotle’s *Rhetorics*, while on the other hand he is very sceptical about the usefulness of the philosophical and historical writings of Cicero, Plato, Aristotle etc. Again, Hobbes seems to think that history and philosophy are very powerful tools, which should not be liberally handed to ignorant or stupid men who cannot use them responsibly. The case of the philosophical and humanistic canon is similar to the case of religion and the English translation of the *Bible*: People interpret them without proper knowledge of the fundamental laws of civil society (that is, without knowledge of Hobbes’s own *scientia civilis*) and hence they end up using these powerful tools to promote their own interests, not the interest of the State. (Hobbes 1990, 54-59.)

Aristotelian philosophy was also profitable for many clergymen in their everyday practice. Interestingly, Hobbes seems to think that the clergy did not truly believe in this philosophy, but they used it since it gave them certain benefits in the administration of the common people. As was mentioned above, Christian mysticism combined with Aristotelian philosophy formed not only a kind of new philosophy, but also new policies and forms of power. According to Hobbes the time between the 9th and 12th centuries brought to England all possible forms of the pope’s power: it manifested itself in art, philosophy, architecture etc. Among these “mundane” forms of power, the clergy also used a sort of magical power with the tricks and hoaxes such as turning bread into flesh, wine into blood, giving salvation of sins and condemning people to eternal damnation. In Hobbes’s view all this was possible due to the malpractice and misled interpretations of Aristotelian philosophy. (Hobbes 1990, 39-44.)

These questions bring us to another case where Hobbes uses even older history and his knowledge of the cultures in different parts of the world to explain the forms of power that the Catholic Church, the Presbyterian ministers and the university had in England before the Civil Wars. Hobbes states that philosophy and religion are similar powers and have traditionally meant almost the same thing. He gives a couple of historical examples to explain how power elites were formed in past societies. The first case is the (Celtic) druids in Brittany and France.
In this case Hobbes has actual sources for his claims, for example the writings of Cesar and Strabo, and of course Diodorus Siculus, whose writings he most often relies on. In Siculus’s writings the druids have a special place in the society and they actually govern the multitude with different skills, such as augury, inspection of the bowels of sacrificed beasts, prophecy etc. Hobbes compares druids to the Pythagorean philosophers and says that they do not have the right conception of natural philosophy, but they govern people even though their philosophy is wrong. (Hobbes 1990, 90-95.)

This is also the case with the Magi of Persia, who were mostly astronomers and used their knowledge to explain the relations of the king’s power and the movements of the sky. This position as men of science gained them an important position in the society. Again, from the writings of Diodorus Siculus comes the example of Egypt, where priests were of the highest rank in society and possessed unquestionable power. Almost all civil matters were instructed and authorized by the priests in Egypt. The situation was similar in the commonwealth of Jews, where Chaldeans were a special political sect. Philosophy, interpretation of dreams etc. were inherited skills amongst the Chaldeans. This is also why they gained such a special place in the Jewish commonwealth. Finally Hobbes gives examples from India and comments on the political structure of Ethiopians. The position of the priests in these societies was powerful. Priests and philosophers had different kinds of privileges, but they were also attacked when the power and the government were questioned. (Hobbes 1990, 90-95.)

The conclusion Hobbes draws from the examples concerning the power of the intellectual and educated elite in historical societies all over the world and in the English society before the Civil Wars is a bit surprising and of course, due to the dialogic form, divided. One solution, offered in the dialogue by A, was to kill all the wicked priests before they spread bad ideas about the democracy amongst people. By killing about 1000 Presbyterian priests the massacre of 100 000 people in England, Ireland and Scotland could have been avoided. (Hobbes 1990, 95.) The other solution, offered by B, was a university reform. By taking the university into the hands of the state and by guiding and disciplining it directly, it would be possible to change its course and thus
affect the whole society. This latter solution was peaceful, but it also meant long and profound work in the fields of science and education, that is a true university reform. (Hobbes 1990, 54-59; Jakonen 2013, 171-178.)

Conclusions

As is widely known, Hobbes did not write any major political theory after returning to England in 1651. It may have been a wise solution since his life and position in English society was no longer self-evident. Hobbes however continued writing and in fact most of his philosophical corpus is written in the 1650s and 60s. He wrote mainly on mathematics, physics, metaphysics, philosophical methods and on religion and theology. Yet, he also wrote two political works of similar nature. Both *A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England* and *Behemoth* try to scrutinize for one final time Hobbes’s own political theses in relation to the English Common Law system and the English Civil Wars. Both of these works are good examples of theory politics and also on the politics of past.

It is interesting to ask why Hobbes wanted to once again write about these matters, now in a more concrete and “empirical” manner. One possible answer is that the political space after the reformation of monarchy in 1660 and the ending of the Commonwealth of England gave Hobbes a chance to influence the new political atmosphere. After the reformation of monarchy, the self-evident leadership of the Anglican Church had however ended. Protestants got the leading position in the society, which did not please Hobbes. In fact, the same liberty of religion that according to Hobbes had caused the Civil Wars was at stake again and, as we can read from John Locke’s *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Hobbes’s idea of “one sovereign, one church” was neither supported nor even possible in England after 1660. (Locke 2006). Maybe Hobbes wanted once more to open his basic critique against the liberty of thought and especially against the liberty of action, interpretation of the *Bible* and philosophy for discussion. He seems to have thought that his political theory was complete and it was now also backed by a scie-
entific, ontological, epistemological and anthropological theory, which Hobbes had spent the 1650s and 60s writing. What his political theory as a whole demanded was a historical case to prove that his vision of politics was right, and it seems that the Case of the English Civil War provided just the proof he wanted.

Another important thing is that Hobbes may have seen the position of the King (Charles II) as difficult and that he wanted to strengthen the King’s power and authority with his writings. This gives us a reason to claim that Hobbes’s last political works, especially *Behemoth*, was no less “political” or normative in its contents and aims than his earlier works on political theory. This could also explain why the King denied the printing of *Behemoth*, since Hobbes’s actually tried to support and justify his own political ideas by telling the history of the English Civil Wars. Thus, by looking at *Behemoth* in a wider context, it is quite easy to see that its printing was not allowed because it repeated the same arguments that were already condemned in England. Hobbes’s arguments were like fuel to the flames and the King knew this. Maybe he just did not want to start another useless debate on the King’s position and go to the “trial” discussions concerning rights and wrongs of the Civil War. After all, the King’s position had been restored and the Civil Wars were already history.

Hobbes’s idea in the writing of *Behemoth* was to go through several cases of the English Civil Wars and analyse the causes that led to the war in the first place. His aim also was, for sure, to defend the King’s (Charles the First) position in war and to judge with evidence the execution of Charles on 30 January 1649. But on the other hand, Hobbes’s own theory did not comply thoroughly with the ideas of King Charles I about the sovereignty, since Charles supported the idea of the Divine Right of Kings. This may also have been a reason for the King’s denial to publish the book. It would have led to a debate on the relationship between the King and the Church, or better, between the King (or even political sovereign) and Religion – and it would have been a long and difficult discussion.

It seems clear that Hobbes’s own position in *Behemoth* resembles that of the *Leviathan*. In the frontispiece of the *Leviathan* a giant man on a hill is looking towards a peaceful city, an image we may easily suggest to
be equal to the “devil’s mountain”\textsuperscript{15} position Hobbes uses in \textit{Behemoth}. The position of \textit{Leviathan} is at the same time a philosophical standpoint and, to an even larger extent, a political standpoint. In \textit{Behemoth} Hobbes, for one last time, makes a clear statement that his own political vision and his own political doctrine, which he named as the first real \textit{scientia civilis}, is the only realistic view in light of history and the events of the English Civil War. It might be needless to say, but the events of the Civil Wars shaped Hobbes’s political theory and we can in fact see little changes in his arguments from \textit{The Elements of Law} to \textit{Leviathan}. However, it seems that Hobbes was not ready to change his views again after the reformation of monarchy. \textit{Behemoth} almost stubbornly defends the position of \textit{Leviathan}, that is, it sees that the real cause of English Civil Wars the lack of obedient citizens, who would understand their duties as subjects of the sovereign power.

Hobbes is definitely doing a sort of politics of the past in his \textit{History of English Civil War}. First of all, he calls the readers to remember all the key events of the Civil Wars. To give deeper meaning for these crucial memories, he then constructs a sort of historical trial where he deliberates the reasons behind the Civil Wars and ends up to write short histories or narrations that explain the historical backgrounds of the university, the church and the army. In his other works he usually defends his arguments with a sort of genealogy and etymology mixed up with philosophical deliberation. In \textit{Behemoth} his method of choice is instead history and narration. Unlike in his other works, Hobbes also uses a lot of examples from foreign lands and faraway cultures. This creates and interesting method of comparing recent events in one’s own society to historical events abroad. Hobbes definitely saw something universal in between these singular events.

Thus, Hobbes constructs histories for basic institutions of the society such as the university and the church. His argument is that readers should never forget, for example, that the university was originally a tool to erect papal power in England. The aim of the historical work is to reveal the political interest behind certain institutions and to show how to return the power to the king. From this basis he asks readers to rethink their opinions and positions in their contemporary (1668) situation. It also seems that Hobbes wanted to remind British noblemen,
the King and other reading public that he wrote a major political work that could have solved all the political debates and misunderstandings. If people in England were only to take the position of the Devil’s mountain, that is, if they would read *Leviathan*, they would find a reasonable way to solve political problems. Eventually, this did not happen and soon the Glorious Revolution began to take shape.

**Notes**

1. It is possible that Hobbes was suffering from Parkinson’s disease.
3. I use here the plural “English Civil Wars” for the reason that these events consisted of three separate wars. The events are also called simply as English Civil War, yet the contemporary historiography prefers nowadays the plural form. See Braddick 2009 and Worden 2010.
5. The best and most comprehensive study on *Behemoth* as historiography can be found from Nicolas Dubos’s book *Thomas Hobbes et l’histoire*, which includes profound readings of Hobbes’s views and uses of history in his other works as well.
6. See especially the last part of the *De Cive* titled *Religion* and chapter XVII *On the Kingdom of God by the new Agreement* where Hobbes very clearly states that: “And the man or assembly which holds sovereign power is the head of both the commonwealth and the Church; for a *Christian Church* and a *Christian commonwealth* are one and the same thing.” (Hobbes 2003, 233.)
8. The difference between sovereignty and the sovereign is crucial for Hobbes. See Jakonen 2013, 110-126.
9 For the meaning and etymology of the word “minister” see Hobbes 1999, 356-357.

10 Here Hobbes is a bit obscure, but it seems that Hobbes didn’t know historical facts at all. The University of Paris was established sometime between 1160-1170. The University of Oxford was established in the 11th century. Yet on the other hand Hobbes is right in his claim, since the first universities were established in 9th century at Constantinople and in Salermo.

11 In another context, but in very clear words, Hobbes writes that ”The end of knowledge is power”. (Hobbes 2005b, 7.)

12 Hobbes writes a short history of the philosophy of nature in his *Decameron Physiologicum*. In this history he refers to same sources as in *Behemoth* and the text can be seen as complementary history to the one provided in *Behemoth*. (Hobbes 2005e, 71-82.)

13 See *English Works VI*.


15 “Devils mountain” has connotations to older political philosophy, for example to Aristote’s examples in *Politics*, but at the same time it might be also part of Hobbes’s own personal life, since he visited at English Countryside and Hills. He wrote a poem that explains the wonders of the Hills and one of the wonders is a cave named as “Devil’s arse”. (Martinich 2007, 69-76.) See also Dubot (2014, 342-348) who states that with the term Devil’s mountain Hobbes wanted to follow the style of Thucydide and state that this war was the greatest war at the time. Thus, the devil’s mountain refers to the diabolic moment and the high point of history, which could be resolved with the right kind of political philosophy. In Hobbes’s time the biblical beast Leviathan was many times understood as the Devil.

**Bibliography**


This essay deals with the readings of colonialism and race-thinking of Hannah Arendt and Edward W. Said. I argue that these readings share a few important methodological and contextual choices. Firstly, while Arendt analyses the emergence of Western colonialism by means of representative examples, such as the “imperial character” of Benjamin Disraeli in the case of India and Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* in the case of Africa, Said searches for significant details from Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park*, Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness* and other masterpieces of Western literature. Secondly, while Arendt analyses elements of colonialism (and consequently of totalitarianism) by means of significant political anomalies in the Western political history, Said reads Western political history “contrapuntally” attempting to play an alternative melody next to the prevailing heavily biased version of it. Thirdly, contextually, both of the authors focus on Africa, the Middle East and India, i.e. on the most important sites of British colonial history.

It is my thesis that Hannah Arendt’s original and insightful reading of colonialism also suffers from a strong, albeit unintentional, Western bias which is reflected, for instance, in her views of black Africans as “sav-
ages” and incompetent of reaching political independence and master political self-determination. I suggest that Edward Said’s reflections of orientalism, imperialism and culture offer a fruitful contrapuntal perspective for rereading Arendt’s critique of colonialism in such a way that its biases may be revealed without missing its politically significant insights.

In addition to antisemitism and racism, colonialism constitutes, for Arendt, one of the most important background elements of Nazi totalitarianism. She deals with it in her first opus magnum, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (OT), which first appeared in 1951, and which transformed Arendt from a Zionist activist and critic to a political essayist and theorist. In my reading, OT is a long and verbose narrative of the emergence of historical and political elements that “chryllalized” into Nazi totalitarianism. In other words, it is a story that tells of the events that led to the occurrence and appearance of Nazi totalitarianism. Arendt never attempted to write an exhaustive study of the causes of totalitarianism. She believed that in history and politics, there are neither causal explanations nor causal relations. Instead, she preferred to tell exemplary or significant stories aiming at understanding people’s actions and deeds in such a way that the historical and political significance of these deeds could be judged and their political meaning could be passed to future generations (Arendt 1965/1994,3).

In this framework, Arendt attempts to think through and read politically the European political history of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. She identifies three processes of politicization that turned out to be decisive factors to the emergence of Nazism. These are the transformation of ancient religious hatred of the Jews into modern political antisemitism; the transformation of early race-thinking into modern political racism; and the transformation of the old journey-of-exploration-type colonialism into ruthless modern political imperialism. It is Arendt’s contention that put together, these three processes of politicization constituted a new political situation in which the emergence of Nazi totalitarianism became possible.

In this essay, I will first shortly discuss a few of the most important characteristics of Arendt’s reading of the birth of imperialism in the second part of OT. I will then focus on Arendt’s reading of the birth of
race-thinking in Africa. I argue that this reading is decisive if we attempt to understand the way in which Arendt’s interpretation of colonialism is racially biased. Next I will discuss Edward Said’s contrapuntal reading of Joseph Conrad’s novelette *Heart of Darkness*. Finally, I will argue that the comparison of Arendt’s and Said’s readings of the “Dark Continent” reveal that Arendt’s Western racial bias hinders her from recognizing that native Africans might have had a political history and tradition of their own, which does not necessarily follow Western patterns of economic and political development.

**Thinking through imperialism with Hannah Arendt**

The three decades from 1884 to 1914 separate the nineteenth century, which ended with the scramble for Africa and the birth of the pan-movements, from the twentieth, which began with the First World War. This is the period of Imperialism, with its stagnant quiet in Europe and breath-taking developments in Asia and Africa. Some of the fundamental aspects of this time appear so close to totalitarian phenomena of the twentieth century that it may be justifiable to consider the whole period a preparatory stage for coming catastrophes (Arendt 1951/1979, 123).²

In Arendt’s view, in the apparently stagnant quiet of Europe, there happened something that turned out to be decisive for the further development of capitalism and imperialism. She argues that the most important European event of this imperialist period was the political emancipation of bourgeoisie. Until this period, the bourgeoisie had stayed out of the political realm being satisfied with economic pre-eminence without aspiring to political rule.³ However, towards the end of the 19th century the nation state proved unfit to constitute a political framework for further growth of capitalist economy. Capitalism is a system of production that cannot survive without growth and growth is always intertwined with expansion (Arendt 1951/1979, 123).

In this new situation it dawned to the bourgeoisie that it had to get beyond the political body of nation state if it wanted to enlarge eco-
onomic production and ensure its own influence and power worldwide. Paradoxically, the bourgeoisie first had to acquire political emancipation in the framework of nation state in order to be able to enlarge and increase economic production and power beyond the borders of nation states. In other words, this was a period during which economics began to get hold on politics in an ever increasing amount. Arendt argues that imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist countries came up against national limitations to its economic expansion. In short, the bourgeoisie turned to politics out of economic necessity (Arendt 1951/1979, 126).

In addition to growth and expansion, another aspect of strengthening supremacy of economics over politics is competition. Arendt argues that originally, competition, like expansion, was not a political principal at all, but instead, had its origin in the economic realm. In its initial stages imperialism could still be described as a struggle of competing empires. The liberals of the 19th century believed that competition and markets would automatically follow their own predetermined patterns and laws and set their own stabilizing limits. However, by the end of the century it had become obvious that such patterns and limits did not exist. On the contrary, competition needed political power just as badly for control and restraint as expansion (Arendt 1951/1979, 126).

Arendt argues that what imperialists actually needed and wanted was expansion of their political power without a foundation of a body politic. In Europe the businessmen were confronted with a new kind of situation characterized by the overproduction of capital and the emergence of “superfluous” money, which could no longer find productive investments within the national borders. In this situation, the export of capital into new colonies started as an emergency measure. However, it soon became a permanent feature of economic system protected by export of power. More precisely, new capitalist investments into colonies were supported and protected by political power. This new expansion of power became a permanent process which had no end or aim but itself. Thus, the notion of unlimited expansion brought about the aimless accumulation of power, and made the foundation of new political bodies not only unnecessary but also structurally impossible (Arendt 1951/1979, 137).
Arendt argues that power became the essence of political action and the centre of political thought when it was separated from the political community which it should have served; the paradox lies in the fact that this new moving force of capitalist politics – expansionist power politics – is not based on the notion of acting for the sake of political community. It does not recognize the ideal of common good of the community and its members but, instead, it is based on harsh competition between different actors. In this new political environment, power became the only content of politics and expansion became its only aim. By the same token the bourgeoisie, which had so long been excluded from government by the nation state and by their own lack of interest in public affairs, was politically emancipated by imperialism. Without explicitly referring to Marx, Arendt claims that imperialism must be considered the first stage of the political rule of bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism (Arendt 1951/1979, 138-139; cf. Hobbsawm 1987).

It was characteristic of the political rule of bourgeoisie that it succeeded in transforming certain new modern values or political principles for its own purposes. The most important of these was the concept of progress: it was born during the era of Enlightenment originally aiming at political liberty and freedom. However, by the end of the 19th century almost nothing was left of this bold conception as progress was associated with the process of never-ending accumulation of power and capital (Arendt 1951/1979, 143). The bourgeoisie understood that only by means of an ideology of expansion-is-everything, and only with a corresponding power-accumulating process, it would be possible to keep the capitalist production in motion (Arendt 1951/1979, 144).

It is important to see that the core of Arendt's interpretation of imperialism lies in her understanding of the fate of the political. The rise of imperialism led to the defeat of a political way of understanding politics. Politics as acting for the sake of political community gave way to a new conception of politics based on fierce competition and rivalry. The aim of capitalist politics is not to share the common world in freedom and equality, but instead, to conquer and govern as large piece of this world as possible for one's own private purposes of maximizing economic profit. In Arendt's view, this new understanding of economically
oriented politics gave way to national socialist conception of world supremacy. At the core of national socialist conception of politics there is race instead of economic growth and profit. However, what it shares with the capitalist enterprise is the role of expansion. More precisely, national socialism was a very imperialist doctrine as far as it attempted to start a never-ending process of expansion of *Lebensraum* and political supremacy of the Aryan people. Nevertheless, imperialism as such is not Nazism. A few connecting components are needed, the most important of which is racism, on which I will focus next.

**Race-thinking and racism**

It is well known that race-thinking and racism were not invented by the Nazis. Race-thinking had its roots deep in the 18th century and it emerged in all Western countries during the 19th century. Arendt argues that race-thinking has an important connection to colonialism. It was born along with colonial conquests and the concomitant development of modern human sciences as the colonialists needed a justification for their furious conquests, ruthless rule and enslavement of native people. Consequently, racism became the powerful ideology of all imperialistic policies. More precisely, it was only when traditional colonialism transformed into outright imperialism that race-thinking was politicized into modern political racism, which turned out to be a very powerful ideological weapon in the hands of both imperialists and national socialists (Arendt 1951/1979, 158-159).

Arendt argues that actually, the discovery of race as a principle of body politic was originally made in the “Dark Continent” of Africa:

> Race was the emergency explanation of human beings whom no European or civilized man could understand and whose humanity so frightened and humiliated the immigrants that they no longer cared to belong to the same human species. Race was the Boers’ answer to the overwhelming *monstrosity* of Africa – a whole continent populated and overpopulated by *savages* … (Arendt 1951/1979, 185)⁴
This paragraph is enough to show that Arendt herself was not free from a good amount of race-thinking, Western bias or orientalist gaze. It is not the only paragraph which leaves the present-day reader somewhat embarrassed with her characterizations of native Africans. Paradoxically, however, the same sections and paragraphs that seem to be full of biased statements of the inhumanity or primitiveness of native Africans also include the most insightful aspects of Arendt’s account of the birth of race-thinking.

In OT, there is a sub-chapter entitled *The Phantom World of the Dark Continent*, which reveals that Arendt’s Western bias is profoundly political and cultural by its character. In this chapter she argues that the gold rush to South Africa turned a new page in the history of the production of gold. Since ancient times it had been the business of adventurers, gamblers, and criminals, i.e. of “elements outside the pale of normal sane society”, but now in South Africa, the luck-hunters were not distinctly outside of civilized society. On the contrary, they constituted a by-product of this society, an inevitable residue of the capitalist system. Among “the Bohemians of the four continents” who came rushing down to the Cape, there still were a number of old-style adventurers. However, what distinguished them from old-style adventurers was the fact that these men had not stepped voluntarily out of society. They had been, instead, spat out by it becoming its victims. They were nothing of their own making, they were not individuals like the old adventures, but instead, they were shadows of events with which they had nothing to do. Expelled from a world with accepted social values, they had been thrown back upon themselves and still had nothing to fall back upon (Arendt 1951/1979, 189).

Arendt writes that the world of native savages was a perfect setting for these men who had escaped the reality of civilization. Under a merciless sun, surrounded by an entirely hostile nature, they were confronted with human beings who “living without the future of a purpose and the past of an accomplishment”, remained to these imperialist adventurers as incomprehensible as the “inmates of a madhouse”. Arendt quotes Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, which provides, in my view, a key to Arendt’s interpretation of the imperialist invasion of South Africa:
The prehistoric man was cursing us, praying to us, welcoming us – who could tell? We were cut off from the comprehension of our surroundings; we glided past like phantoms, wondering and secretly appalled, as sane men would be, before an enthusiastic outbreak in a madhouse. We could not understand because we were too far and could not remember, because we were traveling in the night of first ages, of those ages that are gone leaving hardly a sign – and no memories. The earth seemed unearthly … and the men … No, they were not inhuman. Well, you know, that was the worst of it – this suspicion of their not being inhuman. It would come slowly to one. They howled and leaped, and spun, and made horrid faces; but what thrilled you was just the thought of their humanity – like yours – the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate uproar. (Arendt 1951/1979, 190)

Arendt argues that the astonishment of these European adventurers in front of African tribes would not have necessarily led to the birth of systematic race-thinking without an encounter with the Boers, who descended from Dutch settlers at the Cape in the middle of the seventeenth century. Arendt suggests that the response of the superfluous men, i.e. the imperialist adventurers, was largely determined by the response of these settlers who were the only European group that ever had to live in a world of “black savages” (Arendt 1951/1979, 191).

Arendt argues that the Boers were never able to forget their first horrible fright before a species of men whom human pride and the sense of human dignity could not allow them to accept as fellow-men. The fright of something like oneself – which under no circumstances ought to be like oneself – remained at the basis of slavery and became the basis for a race society (Arendt 1951/1979, 192). Of course, the quote above does not give enough proof for Arendt’s racism. It could simply be understood as a description of what Boers and adventurers thought and felt when they first met native Africans. Arendt certainly did not share the Boers’ atavistic fear of the “savage Negro”. Nevertheless, she links the meaning of the word race to the confrontation with “prehistoric tribes”: 
The word ‘race’ has a precise meaning only when and where peoples are confronted with such tribes of which they have no historical record and which do not know any history of their own. Whether these represent ‘prehistoric man,’ the accidentally surviving specimens of the first forms of human life on earth, or whether they are the ‘posthistoric’ survivors of some unknown disaster which ended a civilization we do not know … At any rate, races in this sense were found only in regions where nature was particularly hostile. (Arendt 1951/1979, 192)

It is as if for Arendt, the Europeans were human beings “in general” while primitive tribes constituted “races”. However, the core of Arendt’s Western bias is not the color of a skin, but instead, a firm belief in the supremacy of a Western type of culture and civilization. She is convinced that only a certain level of human civilization can render the human life really human and as such worth living:

What made them different from other human beings was not at all the color of their skin but the fact that they behaved like a part of nature, that they treated nature as their undisputed master, that they had not created a human world, a human reality, and that therefore nature had remained, in all its majesty, the only overwhelming reality – compared to which they appeared to be phantoms, unreal and ghostlike. They were, as it were, “natural” human beings who lacked the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, so that when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder. (Arendt 1951/1979, 192)

Thus, what native Africans lacked, in Arendt’s view, was a political world, a human reality. The quote reveals two aspects of Arendt’s thinking. First, for her, one of the necessary conditions of human life is the existence of a human world as a common world of politics and culture in the Western sense of these terms. Second, as far as native Africans seemed to lack a human world they inevitably represented a lower level of human life. What, then, made Arendt believe that native Africans lacked a human world? As far as I can see, she did not find in an Afri-
can village such Western characteristics of a “well developed” culture and civilization as literary culture, modern architecture, and technology.

In addition, and most disturbingly, she suggests that the senseless massacre of native tribes on the Dark Continent somehow keeps with the traditions of these tribes themselves arguing that extermination of hostile tribes had been the rule in all African native wars. Since discipline and military organization by themselves cannot establish a political body, these destructions remained unrecorded episodes in an unreal, incomprehensible process which cannot be, according to Arendt, accepted by man and therefore are not remembered by human history. In other words, Arendt seems to suggest that great African tribes like Zulus were not politically developed enough to be able to establish a people or a nation of Zulus, i.e. to found a political organization of their own (Arendt 1951/1979, 192-193).

Even worse, Arendt argues that when the Boers, the first colonialists, arrived in South Africa, they did not have to enslave native Africans as the natives voluntarily recognized the Boers as a higher form of tribal leadership, a kind of natural deity to which one has to submit. Consequently, the divine role which the Boers adopted was as much imposed by their black slaves as assumed freely by themselves (Arendt 1951/1979, 193). In other words, Arendt seems to suggest that native Africans were politically and culturally so ignorant and even stupid that they were not able to defend themselves politically.

However, in my view, these biased reflections of Arendt’s do not undo the importance and sharpness of her analysis of the birth of race-thinking and racism. Besides, they may be of great help for us when we try to understand the political mentality and mindset of colonialists and imperialists, for that was, after all, also Arendt’s intention. Trying to understand the pre-imperialist mindset of the Boers, she comes to the following conclusion:

Racism as a ruling device was used in this society of whites and blacks before imperialism exploited it as a major political idea. Its basis, and its excuse, were still experience itself, a horrifying experience of something alien beyond imagination or comprehension; it was tempting indeed simply to declare that these were not human beings.
Since, however, despite all ideological explanations the men stubbornly insisted on retaining their human features, the ‘white men’ could not but reconsider their own humanity and decide that they themselves were more than human and obviously chosen by God to be the gods of black men. (Arendt 1951/1979, 195)

What was at stake, in Arendt’s view, was not only an atavistic fear of alien black race but also the need for political justification of conquest, enslavement of natives and their massacres. As the humanness of these people could not be entirely denied, the Boers had to raise their own level of humanness and declare themselves to be a people chosen by God to govern native Africans. Western colonialists and imperialists adopted similar kinds of logics of justification also elsewhere even if they did not always resort to the rhetoric of chosenness.

The development of South Africa’s race society had a far-reaching boomerang effect on the behavior of European peoples and totalitarian governments. Arendt argues that South Africa’s race society taught that profit motives are not holy and can be overruled, that societies can function according to principles other than economic, and that such circumstances may favor those who under conditions of rationalized production and capitalist system would belong to the underprivileged. South Africa’s race society taught that through sheer violence an underprivileged group could create a class lower than itself, that for this purpose it did not even need a revolution but could band together with groups of the ruling classes (Arendt 1951/1979, 206).

Arendt argues that African colonial possessions became a kind of laboratory test of transformation of the people into a horde applied later by the Nazi elite in their policy of extermination of Jews and other “lower races”. In South Africa the Nazis saw with their own eyes how peoples could be converted into races and how one might push one’s own people into the position of master race (Arendt 1951/1979, 206).

**Contrapuntal reading of Edward Said**

In a sense, for Arendt, racism seems to be a function of imperialism,
an ideology that colonialists and imperialists needed in order to justify economic expansion and hunt for profit. Edward W. Said goes further than this and argues that neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. In his view, both imperialism and colonialism are supported and even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination (Said 1993/1994, 8). He argues that there was a commitment to them over and above profit that allowed decent men and women to accept the notion that distant territories and their native peoples should be subjugated, and think of the *imperium* as a protracted, almost metaphysical obligation to rule subordinate, inferior, or less advanced peoples (Said 1993/1994, 10).

Said argues that this commitment was created by cultural indoctrination, most importantly by the 19th century British novel. He believes that the novel was the aesthetic object, which was immensely important in the formation of imperial attitudes, references, and experiences. For Said stories are at the heart of what explorers and novelists say about strange regions of the world. The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, constitutes one of the main connections between culture and imperialism (Said 1993/1994, xii-xiii).

In this context, Joseph Conrad has a special position. Said argues that in the English literature, Conrad is the most important precursor of the Western views of the Third World. Conrad writes as a man whose Western view of the non-Western world is so ingrained as to blind him to other histories, other cultures, other aspirations. All he can see is a world totally dominated by the Atlantic West. However, in Said’s view, there was a certain ambiguity in Conrad’s world view. On the one hand, he was a progressive anti-imperialist when it came to rendering fearlessly and pessimistically the self-confirming, self-deluding corruption of overseas domination. On the other hand, he was a deeply reactionary imperialist when it came to conceding that Africa and South America could ever have had an independent history or culture. In Conrad’s view, the outlying regions of the world have no life, history, or culture to speak of, no independence or integrity worth representing without the West. On the contrary, these regions are unutterably corrupt, degen-

Among Conrad’s novels there is one that rises above the others because of its special ambiguity. This is *Heart of Darkness*, which is very important also for Arendt, as we saw above. In Said’s view, this novel points to a rebellious step it does not really ever take but which the present-day reader is able to identify. When Marlow tells his story of Kurtz on the deck of a boat, anchored in the Thames at the sunset, what is at stake is imperial mastery of white Europeans over black Africans and their ivory, civilization over the primitive Dark Continent. The ambiguity of the novel lies in the fact that by accentuating the discrepancy between the official “idea” of empire and the remarkably disorienting actuality of Africa, Marlow unsettles the reader’s sense not only of the very idea of empire but of reality itself. At the end of the novel the darkness seems to be the same in London and in Africa (Said 1993/1994, 33).

Said argues that Conrad’s genius allowed him to realize that the world of empire and supremacy over Dark Continent is something that needs to be reproduced once and again. He realized that the *mission civilisatrice* may be fulfilled in two alternative ways: there are both benevolent and cruel schemes to bring light to the dark places. More importantly, Conrad realized that the dark world also had to be acknowledged as independent. In Said’s view Conrad is ahead of his time in understanding that what the Western invaders call “the darkness” has an autonomy of its own, and can reinvade and reclaim what imperialism had taken for its own. Nevertheless, Marlow and Kurtz are also creatures of their time and cannot take the next step, which would be to recognize that what they saw as a non-European “darkness” was in fact a non-European world resisting imperialism (Said 1993/1994, 33). More precisely, Conrad’s tragic limitation is that even though he could see that on one level imperialism was essentially pure dominance, he could not then conclude that imperialism had to end so that natives could lead lives free from European domination (Said 1993/1994, 34). In other words, Conrad’s impasse lies in the fact that there is no use looking for other non-imperialist alternatives; the system has simply eliminated them and made them unthinkable. The circularity, the perfect closure of the whole thing is not only aesthetically but also mentally unassailable (Said 1993/1994, 26). Conrad’s realization is that if, like narrative,
imperialism has monopolized the entire system of representation, your self-consciousness as an outsider can allow you actively to comprehend how the machine works without comprehending how to stop it working (Said 1993/1994, 27). In the end, Conrad fails to adopt an alternative, contrapuntal perspective to Africa. He is not able to think through and interpret together experiences that are discrepant, each with its particular agenda and pace of development, its own internal formations, its internal coherence and system of external relationships, all of them co-existing and interacting with other (Said 1993/1994, 36).

However, what was not possible for Conrad in the end of the 19th century, is possible for us in the beginning of the 21st century. We are able to grasp the lost promise of Conrad's novel and develop a new reading strategy for approaching Western literature. Said calls this strategy a contrapuntal reading:

As we look back at the cultural archive, we begin to reread it not univocally but contrapuntally, with a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts. In the counterpoint of Western classical music, various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given to any particular one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an organized interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or formal principle outside the work. (Said 1993/1994, 59-60)

The strategy of contrapuntal reading does not aim at a harmonious and reconciling view of Western imperialism. It means, instead, that Western cultural forms can be taken out of the autonomous enclosures in which they have been protected, and placed, instead, in the dynamic global environment created by imperialism. Imperialism itself is revised as an ongoing contest between north and south, metropolis and periphery, white and native. Imperialism may be considered as a process occurring as part of the metropolitan culture, which at times acknowledges, at other times obscures the sustained business of the empire itself. The important question is how the national British, French and Ameri-
can cultures maintained hegemony over the peripheries. How within them was consent gained and continuously consolidated for the distant rule of native peoples and territories? (Said 1993/1994, 59)

**Conclusion**

What distinguishes the views of Said and Arendt from each other is that Arendt is not able to read the promise of recognition out of Conrad’s novel and recognize any autonomy for the African mindset and political culture. Neither is she able to grasp that strange behavior of natives in Africa might be an expression of resistance against invaders instead of a sign of primitive culture. She argues, instead, that the only way out of the jungle for the savages is to follow the Western pattern of capitalist development. The Africans need to become wage-laborers and join the working-class movement, i.e. follow the steps of the Western working class (Arendt 1951/1979, 195). This means that Arendt’s point of reference is always in the West. She is not able to conceive the non-European world as being composed by independent cultures with their own history and politics.

Nevertheless, Arendt’s interpretation of South Africa as a political laboratory of race-thinking, which proved to be very useful for the Nazis, remains sharp and insightful to this day. Arendt’s analysis of the Boers shows in a very concrete way how race-thinking and racial hierarchies may be developed into mythical and quasi religious extremes that do not lean on empirical facts in order to be generally believed and shared. As we know very well today, race-thinking did not remain a curiosity of Boers and Nazis, but instead, became one of the most powerful and generally shared quasi scientific truths until the second half of the 20th century in the Western countries.

To conclude I will argue that if one wants to think through the elements of totalitarianism with Hannah Arendt one has to understand from what point of view she approached these elements. I argue that Arendt always looked at human events and phenomena in terms of Western political tradition. She believed that in order to become fully human, human existence needed a commonly shared world, political
culture and reality in the Western sense of these terms. This is why from her point of view it was possible and justifiable to define native Africans as being savages who lived outside of culture, history, and politics.

Paradoxically, it is precisely this deeply political stance to the human world that produces a heavy racial bias to Arendt’s thinking. Even if *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is one of the most profound critiques of the tradition of Western political thought and history, this tradition still constitutes for Arendt the paradigm to which all the other political cultures should be compared. Yet, I would like to suggest, in the spirit of Edward Said, that her unintentional orientalist biases do not undo her extremely sharp and brilliant critique of Western political history and culture. Reading her texts contrapuntally with Edward Said’s critique of Western orientalism may add significantly to our understanding of the Western mindset and politics in the era of imperialism.

Notes

1 Another good example of Arendt’s racial bias is her view of Palestinian people as a backward tribe, which is not able to develop its own country politically and that is why the Jews should be entrusted with the political leadership of Palestine. See Arendt 2007.

2 Arendt’s interpretation of the period of imperialism comes very close to Eric Hobsbawm’s (1987) view of the age of Empire.

3 Thomas Mann’s *Buddenbrooks* (1901) is a fascinating description of the development and change of mentality of bourgeoisie after the turbulent year of 1848. Even if it tells a story of a merchant family in northern Germany, it shares with Arendt an attempt to tell the story of modernization and politicization of bourgeoisie.

4 Prints in bold are mine.

5 Prints in bold are mine.

References

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
When Pekka Korhonen was writing his MA thesis, he detected that Hans Morgenthau, besides his German dissertation and numerous books in English, also has written a small book and articles in French. He started learning French to a degree that enabled him to understand them (see Korhonen 1983, on the German and French Morgenthau, Palonen 1990, 145-148).

The politics of translations is one of the old common interests between us. When asked to write “on demand”, I am always inclined to write on Max Weber. This piece contributes to the politics of translations through analysing two French translations of Politik als Beruf. I know Politik als Beruf (Weber 1919) by heart since having once written my commentary on it (Palonen 2002).

The book was translated into French by Julien Freund in 1959 (including a preface by Raymond Aron) and by Catherine Colliot-Thélène in 2003. Both editions include also Wissenschaft als Beruf. How do Freund’s and Colliot-Thélène’s translations express the changing understanding of Weber’s work and of his views on politics during the forty-four years between the translations?

Julien Freund was my main local academic interlocutor, when I lived
in Strasbourg in 1986/87 for a sabbatical year of Academy of Finland. We then spoke rather on Carl Schmitt and Jean-Paul Sartre (Palonen 1990 and 1992) – I turned into a weberologist slightly later. Catherine Colliot-Thélène is a major figures among contemporary weberologists. She invited me to participate in her conference in Rennes and its edited volume (Palonen 2014)

The politics of Weber translations

*Politik als Beruf* was a originally held in a lecture series on certain *Berufe*, organised by a anti-corporatist student organisation of Freistudenten in Munich on 28 January 1919. Kurt Eisner, the leader Bavarian revolution in November 1918, was still caretaker premier of the Freistaat, although his USPD had heavily lost the Landtag elections earlier in the month. When *Politik als Beruf* was published in July 1919, the political situation in Bavaria had completely changed: Eisner was murdered at the end of February, the Anarchist and Communist phases of Räterepublik ruled in April and early May and were followed by a bloody ‘white’ reaction (see the Nachwort of Schluchter, 1992).

The multi-lingual style of writing is another common interest between Pekka Korhonen and myself. In this piece I operate with three languages, none of which is my native language. When presenting the translations from German to French in English I shall use the original formulations of both Weber and the translators as much as possible.

Reinhart Koselleck once presented a programmatic thesis: “Jede Übersetzung in je eigene Gegenwart impliziert eine Begriffsgeschichte” (Koselleck 2006, 10). In this sense we need translation already between past and present in the same ‘natural’ language. Every mediating operation between contexts can be regarded as a translation, and the contexts can be languages, historical times, political cultures, types of regime or whatsoever.

Translations of classical texts from one language another offer us a special case of mediating between different contexts in time and space. In every translation both the original context and the translation context are present, and the rhetoric of translations differs regarding how
the two contexts are presented (see Burke & Richter eds. 2012). The problem how to translate always arises. Here I am analysing the conceptual shifts involved in the translators.

Max Weber is notoriously difficult to translate. All weberologists know well that older English translations of Weber’s *œuvre* are severely misleading and the character, context and quality of the Weber translations into English is widely discussed (see Ghosh 2002 and Tribe 2012). Jens Borchert (2007) has written an extensive and excellent comment on the Hans Gerth’s translation of *Politik als Beruf* from 1947.

Weber replied to one of the critics of his *Protestantische Ethik*: “Was der ‘übliche Sinn’ des ‘kapitalistischen Geistes’ ist, kümmert mich nicht” (Weber 1910, 176). In other words, we must understand that Max Weber uses his central concepts in a personal way, without always making it explicit, how radically and in which respect his use of a concept differs from the ordinary scholarly or everyday vocabulary. This poses greater challenges to the translation of Weber than what is the case with many other scholars.

By comparing French translations we realise that an important shift has been taken place in the understanding of Weber thought and writings. During interval between Freund’s and Colliot-Thélène’s translations of marks the genre has changed. Freund’s translation was a quite amateurish enterprise as compared with Colliot-Thélène’s, which corresponds to the degree of professionalisation that Weber studies have undergone. This remark is no judgment of the quality but rather a contextualisation of their criteria. Below I discuss the translator’s strategies to deal with the contextual divide between Weber and themselves and how this has been projected into the translations of Weber’s key political concepts.

Julien Freund (1921-1993) was a well-known French philosopher and sociologist. He was an ancient résistant and schoolteacher of philosophy before defending his massive dissertation *L’essence du politique* at Sorbonne in 1965 for Raymond Aron. Soon afterwards Freund became professor of sociology at the University of Strasbourg.

In 1958 Freund found Carl Schmitt’s *Der Begriff des Politischen* in the university library and was fascinated of the book without knowing anything of its author – before Paul Ricœur informed him of Schmitt’s
Nazi commitment (posterior to the 1932 edition of *Der Begriff des Politischen*). Nonetheless, Freund met Schmitt and wrote among others the preface to the edition of *La notion du politique. Théorie du partisan* (Freund 1972 and the autobiography Freund 1981). This close link to Schmitt partly isolated him in the French academic world of the time (see Taguieff 2008).

Later Freund published three books on Weber (1966, 1969, 1990, but in order to avoid anachronism, I don’t quote these writings in the analysis of the translation. My old interpretation emphasises Freund’s Aristotelian and anti-Weberian tone in speaking of ‘essence the political’ (Palonen 1990, 116-123).

The volume *Le savant et le politique*, introduced by Aron, was published by Plon in 1959, before Freund’s academic career. I quote it from the 1963 edition, including a note that the translation was “revisée par Eugène Fleischmann et Eric de Dampierre”. I refer to the text as ”Weber 1959”.

Catherine Colliot-Thélène is professor of philosophy at the Université de Rennes 1. She is a specialist on German political philosophy: besides other things she has published four books (1990b, 1992, 2001, 2006) and numerous articles on Weber in French, German and English. I neither use these works here.

For Colliot-Thélène the work of Max Weber is no longer a rare specialty. Since the 1980s the Weber scholarships also in France has risen spectacularly (for example Raynard 1987, Bouretz 1996 and Vincent 1998). Colliot-Thélène wrote already in 1990 the introduction to the translation Weber’s Freiburg inaugural lecture *Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik* (1895) and criticised Wolfgang J. Mommsen’s nationalist interpretation (1959). In the “Remerciement” of the *Beruf* translation of 2003 Colliot-Thélène thanks Yves Sintomer to have made the initiative of a new translation and “me l’a suggerée et m’a convaincu de son utilité” (Weber 2003, 5).

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**On the introductions and editions**

Max Weber is an extraordinary multi-faceted scholar, an exponent of
the older German academia with flexible disciplinary borders. Weber has, outside Germany, only risen into the first rank thinkers in the recent decades. His work is much better known and understood in the present century than it was in the 1950s.

Raymond Aron (1905–1983) was a major agent in the German-orientation of the French intellectuals of the 1930s. With his introduction to German sociology (1935) and two academic theses on philosophy of history (1938a, 1938b), Aron was an early scholar of Weber’s theories of history, knowledge and politics, and he defended Weber’s legacy in post-war France (Hirschhorn 1988, 109-135). In the Fifth Republic Aron was a liberal supporter of de Gaulle. His critique of Weber’s (and Sartre’s) defence of conflict and choice illustrates how also he retained something of an Aristotelian belief in universal reason (see Palonen 1990, 108–111).

Aron’s Introduction is a general presentation of Weber’s thought. He does not mention the historical context of Weber’s Munich lecture and its publication. Aron identifies the adherents of Gesinnungsethik as pacifists and revolutionaries and discusses their status in political debates of his own time (Weber 1959, 24–26). He comments on the two types of professional politicians, which Weber called “living off politics” and “living for politics”. He refers to the party discipline as a hindrance to political engagement of professors (ibid. 28), hinting to Weber’s own unsuccessful candidacy for Deutsche Demokratische Partei in the January 1919 Reichstag elections. Aron characterises Weber as “une sorte de nostalgie de la politique, comme si la ultime fin de sa pensée aurait dû être la participation à l’action” (ibid. 7), who eventually demanded too much of the politicians – “hommes politiques” – in modern democracies (ibid. 29).

In other words, Aron judges Weber by criteria of his own time and assumes them be familiar to the readers. He does not treat Weber’s lecture as a speech act in its own political-cum-intellectual context. Aron’s cautious defence of Weber against Leo Strauss’s accusation for nihilism does not allude at all to Politik als Beruf. In short, Aron’s Introduction can be read as a rhetorical move in the debates of its time of publication than as an independent contribution to the Weber scholarship. In so far it is partly analogical to Gerth’s and Mills’s 1947 edition in the United States (see Borchert 2007, 45-48).
In contrast, Colliot-Thélène presents the actual context of Weber’s Munich lectures and mentions Weber’s initial reluctance to speak on ”Politik als Beruf” (Weber 2003, 63-65, 113-115). The Préface begins by a reference to ”deux texts célèbres” (ibid. 9) that illustrates how Weber’s lectures had become much better known to the French academic audience in 2003 than in 1959. She continues by mentioning the Freund translation with a respect: ”On ne justifiera pas la traduction nouvelle par les défauts de la traduction d’hier.” (ibid.).

The decisive ground for making a new translation is for her that the knowledge of Weber’s work is more precise than in 1959 (ibid.). Colliot-Thélène refers to the Max-Weber-Gesamtausgabe (MWG) and to the editorial difficulties around Weber’s work (ibid.). Mommsen and Schluchter had edited Beruf lectures of the Gesamtausgabe in 1992. Also the French translations have been revised with greater demands of precision to Weber’s key concepts: ”que la charge conceptuelle d’un certain nombre de termes clés … est mieux appréciée” (ibid. 9-10).

Referring to Weber, Colliot-Thélène emphasises how translations are doomed to be outdated (ibid. 10). Freund did not justify his translation, but Colliot-Thélène makes explicit her criteria and strategies for retranslating the Beruf lectures: ”On attend aujourd’hui plus de précision conceptuelle qu’il y a trente ans, on exige en général aussi des textes plus respectueux de nuances de l’original (ibid.). She admits that Freund’s translation might be more elegant, but she wants to make the French readers capable to understand both Weber’s style and thought: ”un texte qui rende très exactement compte de la manière wébérienne, nette et extrêmement nuancée, soucieuse de laisser entendre toutes des réserves dont doit s’accompagner chaque affirmation un peu carrée et un peu péremptoire” (ibid.)

To these remarks we can add Colliot-Thélène’s comments on the style that resembles Weber’s work on the Israeli prophets written just before the Beruf lectures (ibid. 12-17) and its link to Weber’s passionate defence of the vocation of both scholars and politicians (ibid. 17-21). Her subtitles referring to Politik als Beruf concern the monopoly of legitimate violence: the chapter contains an interesting interpretation of Weber’s non-teleological concept of the state related to his view on legal history (ibid. 36-39) – to Weber’s ”nationalism” (for a critique
see Palonen 2001) – to Weber’s two ethics and to the contrast between politician and the official as well as to a quote from Wilhelm Hennis on Weber as ”the last real classical political thinker” (ibid. 57-59).

The comparison between Aron’s Introduction and Colliot-Thélène’s Préface (with her editorial notes) illustrates their different purposes in translation. The interpretations presented in the Préface also refer to the Weber scholarship after Freund’s translation. In the 1950s Aron and Freund were rare academic readers of Weber, who wanted to make his thought familiar to the French audience without the need of any precise knowledge of Weber’s text, work and time. Colliot-Thélène acts in an academic environment, in which Weber is a well-recognised classic, and professional French translations of his other works exist. As a weberologist she wants to mediate the approaches and results of international Weber scholarship to the French readers in order to make them better capable to read themselves Weber’s writings as contributions to the debates of his own time.

Freund does not discuss Weber’s use of the concepts and their political contexts, whereas comments on them are a crucial part of Colliot-Thélène’s edition. This alludes to the different expectations of readers: Freund is tacitly assuming that the text is self-sufficient, whereas Colliot-Thélène regards the knowledge of the original context as indispensable for the reading classics in a competent manner (à la Skinner 1969). Colliot-Thélène’s annotations, referring to historical events, persons, implicit allusions in the text and in other writings on Weber, are thorough and valuable for professional Weber scholars. I did not know that Weber was mistaken in thinking that Francis Schnadhorst, the organiser of the Birmingham Caucus, was a Protestant pastor (Weber 2003, note 1 on p. 167).

**Translation of Beruf**

I restrict my discussion here to the translation of concepts (see Ghosh 2002 and Tribe 2012 on translation as a ‘conceptual act’). The first move concerns the title of Weber’s booklet. *Politik als Beruf* is not easy to translate. Freund’s French title is: *Le métier et la vocation d’homme poli-

The root of the problem is Weber’s ambiguous notion *Beruf*. Perhaps Weber’s famous interpretation of Martin Luther’s double concept *Beruf* in *Protestantische Ethik* (see footnotes 38-41 in Weber 1904/05) was already behind the lecture series of the *Freistudenten*. In French or English there is no single word for the ‘Lutheran’ concept of *Beruf*: “Vocation” is only referring, with James Bryce (1889) and Weber (already Weber 1905) to living “for politics” (*für die Politik*), leaving out the living “off politics” (*von der Politik*), although more than half of the lecture deals with the profession. Both French translations use the double expression, although Freund’s *métier* refers rather to the artisan of politics, whereas Colliot-Thélène’s translation recognises that the professionalisation of politicians in Weber’s time no longer was a craftsmanship but a full-time employment as a politician (see Palonen 2002, 23-24; Borchert 2007, 63-67; Borchert 2003).

Colliot-Thélène recognises that *Beruf* must be translated “selon le cas: profession ou vocation, parfois profession-vocation” (Colliot-Thélène 2003, 22). She mentions Weber’s expression ”Politiker kraft des ‘Beru-fes’ in des Wortes eigentlicher Bedeutung” (Weber 1919, 38) and refers to Weber’s passage “von ‘Berufspolitikern’ in einem zweiten Sinn, die … in den Dienst von politischen Herren traten” (ibid. 41). These two cases illustrate the alternative translations: “Le terme ‘vocation’ s’impose à l’evidence dans la première occurrence, tandis que le second sens est explicitement celui de la ‘profession’ au sens le plus banal du terme (le métier)” (Colliot-Thélène 2003, 23). This also corresponds to the distinction between “l’éthique du fonctionnaire et l’éthique du véritable politique” (ibid.). She regards Weber’s formula on German *Berufspolitiker ohne Beruf* (Weber 1919, 72) as an ironic, but notices that her French translation “hommes politiques professionnels dépourvus de vocation” loses the ironic tone (Colliot-Thélène 2003, 23; Weber 2003, 180). In
all three respects Freund uses expressions that make the very same point, in the last case by the formula “des ‘politiciens de métier’ sans vocation” (Weber 1959, 104, 108, 159).

**Translation of *Politik***

Weber poses a simple question. “Was verstehen wir unter Politik?” (Weber 1919, 35) Indeed, *Politik als Beruf* contains several quasi-definitions of what is meant by “politics” or “political association” (*politischer Verband*) or what makes of someone a “politician”. An answer to his initial question he gives in several steps, referring to different aspects of the concepts from the first to the last page.


Weber’s best known quasi-definition deals with the qualification of the activity of politics. “‘Politik’ würde für uns also heißen: Streben nach Machtanteil oder nach der Beeinflussung der Machtverteilung” (Weber 1919, 36), or in a short form: “Wer Politik treibt, erstrebt Macht” (ibid.) For it Freund offers this interpretation: “Nous entendrons par politique l’ensemble des efforts que l’on fait en vue de participer à pouvoir or d’influencer la répartition du pouvoir” … “Tout homme qui fait de la politique aspire au pouvoir” (Weber 1959, 101). Colliot-Thélène formulates the same passage as follows: “La ‘politique’ signifierait pour nous le fait de chercher à participer au pouvoir ou à influer sur sa répartition” … “Quelconque fait de politique aspire au pouvoir.” (Weber 2003, 119)

Can we consider “faire d’efforts”, “chercher” and “aspirer” as synonymous activities? Neither of the translators uses in the first sentence “aspirer” for *Streben*, is the key concept to Weber’s point, namely that to strive for power is already to change the existing state of affairs (see
Palonen 2002, 34-36). The only remarkable difference is that for Freund uses the masculine form (*homme politique*) for the person who strives for power, Colliot-Thélène does not.

On the last page of *Politik als Beruf* we find another famous formula: “Politik bedeutet ein starkes langsames Bohren von harten Brettern mit Leidenschaft und Augenmaß zugleich” (Weber 1919, 88). The translations differ in their interpretations of this metaphor. “La politique consiste en une effort tenace et énergique pour tarauder les planches de bois dur. Cet effort exige à la fois de la passion et du coup d’œil,” is Freund’s formulation (Weber 1959, 185). Colliot-Thélène’s proposal is: “La politique consiste à creuser avec force et lenteur des planches dures, elle exige à la fois la passion et le coup d’œil” (Weber 2003, 226). The difference here is stylistic rather than conceptual, giving the impression that Colliot-Thélène prefers a more concise and minimalist style than Freund. Both uses the same translation for the key Weberian notions of *Leidenschaft* (passion) and *Augenmaß* (coup d’œil).

**Macht – puissance or pouvoir?**

In a key passage, moving from the historical types of professional politicians to the politician living for politics, Weber ask about the joy – “innere Freuden” – that politics might bring to a person and replies “Nun sie gewährt zunächst: Machtgefühl” (Weber 1919, 73). Here we detect an interesting difference in French: Freund translates *Machtgefühl* with “le sentiment de puissance” (Weber 1959, 162), Colliot-Thélène uses “un sentiment de pouvoir” (Weber 2003, 182). They use different alternative of the two French words for *Macht*, *puissance* tracking back to the Latin *potestas*, *pouvoir* to *potentia*. Can we draw some consequences of this difference for the understanding Weber’s views on power and politics?

Indeed, if we look at the following pages related to the *ethos* of the politician, we can notice that although Freund and Colliot-Thélène make use of both *pouvoir* and *puissance*, they do that with a systematic difference: Colliot-Thélène uses *pouvoir* in many of those places in which Freund tends to use *puissance*. I take as example Weber’s the cen-
tral passage opposing the ideal types of the politician and the official.


The translations are remarkably different. Freund’s is as follows:

Il en va tout autrement chez l’homme politique. Le désir du pouvoir est pour lui un moyen inévitable. L’»instinct de puissance» – comme l’on dit couramment – est en fait une de ses qualités normales. Aussi le péché contre le Saint-Esprit de sa vocation consiste-t-il dans un désir de puissance [Machtstreben] sans objectif qui, au lieu de se mettre exclusivement au service d’une «cause», n’est que prétexte à griserie personnelle. … D’un côté, le refus de se mettre en service d’une cause le conduit à rechercher l’apparence et l’éclat du pouvoir au lieu du pouvoir réel ; de l’autre côté, l’absence du sens de l responsabilité le conduit à ne jouir que du pouvoir lui-même, sans aucun but positif. En effet, bien que, ou plutôt parce que la puissance est le moyen inévitable de la politique et qu’en conséquence le désir du pouvoir est une de ses forces motrices, il ne peut y avoir de caricature plus
ruineuse de la politique que cette matamore qui joue avec le pouvoir à la manière d’un parvenu, ou encore Narcisse vaniteux de son pouvoir, bref tout adorateur du pouvoir comme tel. Certes le simple politicien de puissance [Machtpolitiker], a qui l’on porte aussi chez nous un culte plein de ferveur, peut faire grand effet, mais tout cela se perd dans la vide et l’absurde. (Weber 1959, 165).

Colliot-Thélène’s formulation is this one:

Il en va tout autrement chez l’homme politique. L’aspiration au pouvoir est pour lui un moyen inévitable avec lequel il travaille. L ’instinct du pouvoir », comme on a l’habitude de s’exprimer, appartient par conséquent dans les faits à ses qualités normales. Mais le péché contre l’esprit de sa profession commence là où cette aspiration au pouvoir cesse d’être ordonnée à une cause (unsachlich) or où elle devient un motif de griserie personnelle, au lieu de fonctionner exclusivement au service de la « cause ». … Faute d’engagement pour une cause (seine Unsachlichkeit), il est tenté de rechercher l’apparence brillante du pouvoir plutôt que le pouvoir réel, et faute de sentiment de responsabilité, de jouir du pouvoir simplement pour lui-même, sans but substantiel. Car bien que, où plutôt précisément parce que le pouvoir est le moyen inévitable de la politique, et l’aspiration au pouvoir par conséquent l’une des forces motrices de toute politique, il n’y a pas de distorsion plus nocive de la force politique que l’attitude du parvenu qui fait du pouvoir un motif de vantardise et qui se complait au vanité dans le sentiment du pouvoir, ou, de façon générale, toute adoration du pouvoir simplement pour lui-même. Celui qui n’est rien d’autre qu’un « politicien épris de puissance » (Machtpolitiker), une figure qu’un culte pratiqué avec zèle cherche chez nous aussi a transfigurer, peut faire forte impression, mais son action s’exerce en fait dans le vide et est dépouvrue de sens. (Weber 2003, 184-185).

Freund translates Macht-related concepts four times out of twelve with puissance, otherwise with pouvoir, whereas Colliot-Thélène uses puissance only in the context of Machtpolitik, referring rather to the everyday usage of time, to which Weber connects the limit-situation of his
own use of *Macht*, namely the search for power for the cause of itself. We could think the French *pouvoir* is closer to the Weberian nominalistic view of *Macht* as a *Chance*-concept (esp. Weber 1922, 28, cp. Palonen 2002, 37-40). In contrast, *puissance* is either more like a quasi-natural force or a constellation of power shares, which Weber uses in notions such as *Welstmächte* (Weber 1916) or which he nominalistically builds up as *Ordnungen und Mächte* on the types of constellation of chances in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Weber 1922, see Palonen 2010).

In this sense Freund’s uses of *puissance* does not cope well with the *Chance* character of Weber’s concept of power, although Freund himself later emphasises the methodological role of *Chance* (Freund 1990, esp. 95-96). Again Colliot-Thélène’s translation focuses on the conceptual precision, whereas Freund’s is more intuitive and based on what appeared to him as good French. Also in other respects, for example in Weber’s specific notions *Sache* and *Sachlichkeit* (see also her remarks in Weber 2003, 22), Colliot-Thélène gives the priority to conceptual precision and respects Weber’s specific nuances and reservations. This is part of addressing the book to an academic audience which already is assumed to know a lot of Weber’s work. In contrast, Freund’s translation was addressed to a general public interested in politics and wanting know more about the profession and vocation of politicians, without considering so much that the author was just Max Weber.

**Final remarks**

Max Weber insists on the “eternal youth” of all historical disciplines of research (Weber 1904, 205). This idea might also be applied to the translations of his work. The point of the eternal youth thesis insists on the continuous process of reinterpretation of concepts – *Umbildung der Begriffe* (ibid. 207).

In this sense, we cannot characterise the shift from Freund’s to Colliot-Thélène’s translation as improvement: both are rather a part of the debate on the interpretation of Weber’s work. I already proposed a metaphor for the difference: Freund’s translation belongs to the amateur league, whereas Colliot-Thélène’s plays in the scholarly professional’s
league. It does not make much sense to emphasise that professionals are better than amateurs. The point is, rather, that these two illustrate some aspects of where the distinction between amateurs and professionals consists in the genre of translating classics of political thought.

We can also use Koselleck’s distinction between Aufschreibung, Fortschreibung and Umschreibung of history (in Koselleck 2000). The first stage consists of the registration of the sources themselves, the second of the accumulation of historical understanding, and the third level offers a reinterpretation of history. For Koselleck professional historiography begins only with Umschreibung. In this sense we could interpret Freund’s translation of Politik als Beruf to belong to the Fortschreibung, whereas Colliot-Thélène’s translation is the first move of Umschreibung. Future French translators of Politik als Beruf must of course mention both translations, but only Colliot-Thélène’s work is an indispensable as a reference with their own translation must be compared.

Note

1 An earlier version of a paper was presented by the European Science Foundation Explorative Workshop The Geopolitics of Ideas organised by Niilo Kauppi in Strasbourg, 2–5 November 2011

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Regional integration: a distinguished concept for peace

When the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and Finnish Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen met in Helsinki on October 12, 2012, news broke that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2012 had been awarded to the European Union. The Norwegian Nobel Committee stated as motivation for its decision that the “union and its forerunners [had] for over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.” (Nobel Committee 2012)

The Committee referred to the “successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights” during the process of European integration, encompassing the reconciliation between France and Germany, the democratization of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the democratic transition of former socialist countries in Eastern European and the settlement of “many ethnically-based national con-
licts”, especially in Southeast Europe. The Committee was well aware that the EU was “currently undergoing grave economic difficulties and considerable social unrest”. Nevertheless, it seemed convinced that the “stabilizing part played by the EU has helped to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace.”

The decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee was not met with unanimous acclaim, for it came in a time of crisis for the European integration project. The ambitious project of the Constitutional Treaty had been rejected by popular vote in France and the Netherlands, two of the founding members of the European Union. Ratification of the subsequent Lisbon Treaty as well had turned out to be a tedious process. Armed forces from member states of the self-styled “civilian power” Europe had not only been sent abroad as peacekeepers, but also as combat troops to fight wars in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, Iraq and North Africa. Most importantly, the global financial crisis had triggered a “Euro crisis” combining economic troubles and social unrest with declining solidarity and rising Euroscepticism.

Nevertheless, the Nobel Peace Prize for the European Union meant that European experiences constituted the prototypical “peace through regional integration” strategy and that other regions should learn from Europe. For example, shortly after the announcement of the Nobel Committee on Oct. 12, 2012, Hans Dietmar Schweisgut, EU Ambassador to Japan, stated:

“... The founding fathers of the EU firmly believed that reconciliation and the upholding of common values such as democracy and human rights were the keys to securing lasting peace and prosperity – not solely for one nation, but for an entire region. Sixty years later, they have been proven right. ... It is my firm belief that the European project can be a model and an inspiration for regional integration and cooperation in other regions of the world: an example of how vision, determination and a commitment to mutual peace and prosperity can help transcend narrow-minded nationalistic tendencies.” (Delegation of the European Union to Japan 2012)

Against this background, it is the purpose of this article to discuss
“peace through regional integration”. Although for a long time (Western) Europe has been treated as the “default approach” (Kivimäki 2014: ix) to peace in international relations theory and peace research, Europe is not the only reference point of this discussion any more. Most prominently East Asia has been studied as another seemingly successful case for “peace through regional integration”. For example, Solingen (2007) argues that a decline of militarized conflict and a rise in intraregional cooperation has replaced earlier patterns of inter-state war and militarized conflict in East Asia. Weismann (2012) starts his study from the premise of an “East Asian Peace”. Bellamy (2014) documents the “decline of mass atrocities in East Asia”. Kivimäki specifies “the phenomenon of East Asian Peace”, based on the observation “that the annual number of battle deaths in East Asia has declined by 95 percent after 1979, compared to the annual level of battle deaths from 1946 to 1979. “He stresses that “[a]ny approach in peace research that values life, and has a problem with the violent ending of life, must acknowledge the value of this sudden development.” (Kivimäki 2014: 31)

In the remaining part of this article I will first discuss the meaning of the basic concepts. What constitutes a “region”? What should be regarded as “integration”? And most importantly: What concept of “peace” will be used as yardstick to assess the respective experiences with regional integration? After the discussion of the key concepts, three paths to peace will be discussed in relation to regional integration: overcoming distrust by building security communities, fostering the mutual benefit of market interaction by integrating economies and constructing identities based on normative perceptions. The article concludes that the idea of Europe as a global integration model should be replaced by the idea of the “varieties of integration”.

**Region - Integration - Peace**

**Constructing regions**

Obviously, the definition of the “region” is a crucial element of regional integration and thus also of processes of peace building. Current dis-
Discussions about “regionalism” and “peace through regional integration” usually start from the assumption that nation-states constitute the basic units of political action. If some nation-states associate, macro-regions emerge and war-prone anarchy between them can be overcome. However, this concept of the macro-region is as ambivalent as the concept of the nation-state. To be sure, the concept of “nation-state” differentiates the modern state from pre-modern city states, imperial states, or feudal states. However, the concept of “nation-state” is not clear about what constitutes the “nation” which ultimately legitimates the nation-state. In an ideal-typical way, nation-states can be built either on a social contract among citizens, who share common interests and agree on common rules, or on imagined communities (Anderson 1983), mythical concepts of ethnicity to separate the “we” from the “other”. Likewise, macro-regions can be based on interests, such as collective security, free trade, or functional cooperation, or they can be based on quasi-natural identities, like geographical “continents” or Huntington’s (1996) “civilizations”.

To be sure, regions such as “Europe” or “East Asia” do not refer to fixed and seemingly natural units. They are socially and historically constructed and in continuous processes of redefinition. For example, in 1947 the United Nations established the “Economic Commission for Europe” (UNECE), bringing together countries located in Western and Eastern Europe, South-East Europe, the USSR and North America. Its major aim has been to promote pan-European economic integration. However, during the Cold War serious integration was limited to “Western Europe” and the term “West” did not refer to geography but to political ideology. “Western Europe” signified an autonomous region separate both from the US and the USSR. In the 1970s, the pan-European concept of the region was revitalized in the CSCE process, defining security for a region from Vancouver to Vladivostok. With the end of the Cold War, “Western Europe” expanded into the former East and South-East and the “European Union” became the dominant organization for the region. In 2011, the termination of the “Western European Union”, a separate military alliance predating the establishment of NATO, definitively symbolized the end of “Western Europe”.

Likewise, “East Asian” integration is a relatively recent concept. Dur-
During the 1950s the term “Far East” was in common use. For example, the regional economic commission of the United Nations was named “Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East” (ECAFE). However, the terms “Asia” and “Far East” were closely linked to colonialism and (British) imperialism and became obsolescent after decolonization. In 1974 the United Nations renamed ECAFE “Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific” (ESCAP). The new name of “Asia-Pacific” symbolized the reorientation of the regional perspective away from Europe and towards transpacific relations with the United States. Japan very much welcomed the new concept, because since the Meiji era there had been an ongoing debate whether Japan should be regarded as part of “Asia” or as member of the “West”, separate from “underdeveloped” Asia. With the rapid economic rise of the Asian “tigers”, and later of China, another redefinition of the region took place with many regional concepts competing with each other. It seems that the concept of “East Asia” consisting of ASEAN plus Japan, China and South Korea has now become the “nucleus” of “Asian institutional maps” (Korhonen 2013: 110). However, there continues to be some reservation about “East Asia”, as Kivimäki argues:

“In East Asia, the basic setting has been that China, the mightiest regional power, has promoted regionalism that excludes non-Asian powers (mainly the US, but also Australia and New Zealand). … The central role of ASEAN in East Asian regionalism has been a reason for many ASEAN countries to support the Chinese exclusive concept of East Asian regionalism, while those ASEAN countries most threatened by China, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, also have a motive to support the Japanese, inclusive concept of Asia-Pacific region.” (Kivimäki 2014: 5-6)

**Dimensions of integration**

In this context, “regional integration” is a political concept, not a description of intensifying, or intensified, economic, social, or cultural interactions. The now classical studies of regional integration strongly
linked “integration” to some sort of “peace”. Karl Deutsch referred to integration as

“The attainment, within a territory, of a sense of ‘community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, ‘for a long time’, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population.” (Deutsch 2006: 69)

Deutsch was searching for the reasons under which “peace through integration” happens, but he did not go into the details how “peace through integration” works. Ernst Haas, another prominent scholar of political integration, emphasized the role of political elites and defined “political integration” as

“The process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.” (Haas 2006: 114)

He thus specified Deutsch’s “sense of community” as loyalty shift among political elites towards the integration framework.

For many decades there has been a related debate about regional integration among economists. According to liberal economics free trade on a global market would be the best possible framework for international economic relations. Regional economic integration is the second-best solution for improving economic efficiency. There were two waves of regional economic integration after World War II. The first wave happened in the 1950s and 1960s and a new wave of economic regionalism started in the late 1980s. The first wave focused on the development of national industries which benefit from access to larger regional markets. Regional integration of the first wave was primarily an inward-looking project, frequently adopted by developing countries after decolonization. The second wave occurred when negotiations about global economic liberalization in the GATT Uruguay round were stalled.

The economic debate came to dominate regional integration re-
search. In Europe research focused on the European Economic Community which the 1992 Maastricht Treaty transformed into the present European Union. The other “European” integration processes, such as the Council of Europe, the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or the admittedly dormant Western European Union, came into disregard in integration studies. In East Asia as well, integration studies focused on ASEAN primarily from the perspective of economic integration, neglecting its political and security dimension.

For a comparative discussion of regional integration experiences it is important to take the depth of integration into account, i.e. the degree of sovereignty the elites of a nation-state are willing to transfer to the regional community. Different degrees of security, economic and political integration can be distinguished, ranging from regular political exchanges, free trade zones, and common security arrangements to supranational institutions, economic unions or integrated military alliances. As for the economic dimension, five different stages of economic integration can be distinguished according to Balassa’s (1961) classical model: a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union and complete economic integration. Whereas in a free trade area only the removal of barriers to trade, i.e. negative integration, takes place, in the subsequent stages positive integration is required. The members of a customs union pool their external economic policies. In order to facilitate the free flow of all production factors in a common market, many internal rules have to be harmonized. Common economic, financial, monetary and social policies become essential in an economic union.

Although economic integration features prominently in the current literature, the discussion of regional integration should not be limited to that. A World Bank report on trade blocs states that security was a crucial motivation for regional integration processes:

“The political impetus to European and Southern Cone integration was thus based on the belief that increasing trade would reduce the risk of intraregional conflict. Similar motives are found in the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) …” (World Bank 2000: 13).
The perspective of peace

The Norwegian Nobel Committee referred to “peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights” when it explained its decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union. The concept of peace used here is a positive one, i.e. peace is more than the end of major inter-state wars. It includes reconciliation, democracy and human rights, i.e. elements of what has been attributed to a “stable peace” which Kenneth Boulding has defined as “a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of any of the people involved.” (Boulding 1978: 13)

Johan Galtung’s definition of peace is more ambitious. According to Galtung, peace is the absence of both personal and structural violence (Galtung 1969: 183), where “violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realization” (Galtung 1969: 168). He links peace to the historically possible realization of human live, an idea as inspiring as it is challenging. It has often been criticized to be unfit for empirical research. However, as Pekka Korhonen rightly argues, Galtung’s definition of peace “cannot be brought to reality through research and communication of findings, but through action” (Korhonen 1990: 109). In discussing the experiences of “peace through regional integration” Galtung’s definition of peace seems to be useful for assessing to what degree regional integration is inspired and motivated by the mission to realize the historically possible, i.e. to minimize both direct-personal and indirect-structural violence.

Kivimäki’s concept of peace seems to be somewhere between Boulding’s and Galtung’s. According to him

“[p]eace is a state of matters where conflicts do not violently threaten human life. Fear of violence is a problem, but the focus here is not psychology of fear, but the rational reason for it: I am interested in whether people should fear for their lives, and thus I am not looking at how many conflicts there are, but whether human beings should be afraid, whether their lives really are threatened. East Asian peace means that they, in general, should no longer be afraid, as the
number of lives taken by the violence of war has declined dramatically after 1979. This normative starting point in the preservation of lives against the violence of wars determines the definition of peace as a state of matters where lives are not lost in conflicts. The interest in the survival of concrete human beings places the focus on battle deaths, instead of regime survival, number of conflicts, stability or something else…” (Kivimäki 2014:1)

He elaborates on this concept when he refers to Cambodia. He states that “from a “human-centered political point of view” one “cannot consider Pol Pot’s stable rule in Cambodia as peace regardless how safe it was for the state”. Therefore one has to include “repressive authoritarian violence into the conceptual category of threats to peace” (Kivimäki 2014:3).

“Peace through regional integration” in Europe and East Asia Building security communities

Deutsch (1957) defines a “security community” as a region in which war or other kinds of large-scale use of violence has become very unlikely or even unthinkable. Deutsch proposes to primarily build security communities in a pluralistic way and leave some degree of autonomy to the member states. He identifies two conditions for pluralistic security communities: first, that the community has effective institutionalized structures of communication and responsiveness to each others’ needs and interests, and, second, that there are basically compatible values in regard to security policies.

A security community developed very early in Western Europe. In 1948, when the Cold War began, the European allies of World War II - UK, France and the Benelux countries - concluded the Treaty of Brussels, which contained a mutual defense clause. When the United States established NATO one year later, the Brussels Treaty became obsolete. Unlike the Brussels Treaty, NATO established an integrated military structure, which later even included the sharing of nuclear deterrence. The French government, however, continued to work for an autono-
ous security community. In 1950, French foreign minister Robert Schuman proposed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Its explicit aim was to prevent further war between France and Germany by pooling and denationalizing those economic resources which were regarded as essential for arms production. The ECSC started in 1952 as a joint organization of France, Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy. The ECSC eventually led the way to today’s European Union. The ambitious project of expanding the ECSC to a European Defense Community with integrated military forces and a European Political Community failed in 1954. Instead, the Brussels Treaty was revitalized and transformed into the Western European Union (WEU), adding Germany and Italy to its original members. The main task of the WEU was to supervise the rearmament of Germany, preventing any unilateral temptations of Germany by firmly integrating German military forces into Western alliances.

The European security community was confined to Western Europe until it started to expand to pan-European dimensions with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1975 and the subsequent Helsinki process. Although CSCE arms control talks hardly progressed until the end of the Cold War, the CSCE process reduced tensions among the participants and laid the foundations for a security community by fostering economic cooperation and humanitarian improvements. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990 formally ended the Cold War in Europe and turned the CSCE into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The European Union, founded by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, was to include a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With the CFSP the EU member states did not only seek to strengthen their internal security community, but also wanted to contribute to UN peacekeeping. They absorbed the Western European Union, were heavily engaged in pacifying the Balkan wars and in 2003 started peacekeeping missions under the EU flag. Although the European Union can be regarded as a well established security community, a pan-European security community failed to materialize because of occasional warfare in the former socialist part of Europe.
Unlike Europe, East Asia records a history of major wars and mass atrocities after the end of World War II. However, this period seems to have ended after the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war. Since then the region has remained free of major hostilities, despite occasional tensions and low-level internal armed struggles. A regional security community emerged in the “ASEAN way”. This is an approach to deal with conflicts in a non-offensive way allowing all parties concerned to save the face. However, ASEAN was not the obvious candidate for regional security building. It was founded in 1967 in an era of struggles and revolutions, of interventions and border clashes. Functional cooperation was slow and initiatives for neutrality were contested (Acharya 2008). The political elites of ASEAN member states decided to stay together exactly because they felt threatened, be it by the neo-colonialism of the West, the revolutionary aggression of the East or divisive forces from within. ASEAN strictly rejected interference into domestic affairs and thus criticized Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979. In 1994 ASEAN established a Regional Forum (ARF) to foster confidence-building measures and preventive diplomacy in the wider region. Kivimäki (2014) characterizes the principle of non-interference as ARF’s commonly accepted rule, facilitating the evolution of a security community among regional political elites.

Another important condition for the establishment of an East Asian security community has been China’s contributions to regional security. Whereas in much of the Western political discourse China is perceived as a threat to East Asia security, the People’s Republic of China effectively has been supportive of the ARF, the nuclear talks with North Korea, and military confidence-building measures and cooperation in Central Asia in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SIPRI analyst Gill (2004) concedes that China’s security policy is based on multilateralism which Chinese leaders see as an effective strategy to strengthen China’s security, contain US influence and reassure its neighbors. However, there are at least two issues to be worried about in terms of the East Asian security community. First, relations with Taiwan have constantly been regarded as internal affairs by the People’s Republic of China and excluded from the ARF. Second, Chinese experts expect that the pivotal role of ASEAN in security
According to neo-functionalism, regional integration basically depends on economic rationality, i.e. the material advantages by participating in regional integration (Rosamond 2000). Regional integration can entail two types of material advantages: first, it will increase economic interdependence and generate growth. Second, it will help to solve problems which individual states cannot deal with alone. Both reasons make regional integration appear as a rational strategy. However, rational actors tend to be egoistic and favor short-term benefits. Rational egoistic actors also tend to shy away from major changes of the status quo because of the transaction costs involved and because of the unpredictability of the outcome of these processes.

In the more recent literature about conflict transformation a related argument was raised. The prospect of economic integration could transform the strategies of the parties to the conflict. Economic integration could distract their attention away from divisive issues. As Kivimäki contends,

“[r]egardless of the severity of disputes, positive interdependence can make them look smaller in comparison with the common interests of development. … Another strand of research emphasizes the type of economic development and says that contract-intensive development typical of “advanced capitalism” appears to cause peace ….” (Kivimäki 2014: 25)

In the case of regional economic integration, visionary political elites and dedicated technocrats of the European supranational institutions started to build economic interdependence. The European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 established the blueprint for further regional integration. It paved the way to the Treaties of Rome of 1957, estab-
lishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Community (EURATOM). The institutions of the three communities merged in the 1960s. However, economic integration got stuck when intergovernmentalism gained the upper hand over the visionaries in the 1960s and 1970s, although the community expanded by the accession of new members and started to regulate monetary policies in the so-called European currency snake after the break down of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates. In the 1980s, regional integration got a boost by the internal market project, which became finalized with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This treaty also started the process of the completion of European monetary union in 1999.

An important feature of European economic integration is its flexible architecture, with the Eurozone as its core, the Economic Union as second circle, the European Economic Area including the remaining EFTA countries as third circle and the string of associated economies as the outer circle. This can be regarded as an advantage and as a disadvantage for “peace through regional integration”. It provides for the flexible integration of national economies according to domestic politics as well as their economic conditions. With a series of programs, measures and funds the EU helps national economies to meet the conditions for membership in the respective circles. On the other hand, there are concerns that differentiated integration will not be a temporary stage after which the members would have caught up with the pioneers. Rather, it could rigidify into a two-class system of privileged insiders and excluded bystanders.

In East Asia, the process of regional economic integration started much later. Before the 1990s deep development gaps in the region, the lack of integration of China into the global trade regime and the resistance of the US and Japan to regionalism prevented regional economic integration in East Asia (Korhonen 1994). However, with the stagnation of global negotiations and the new dynamics of regional integration in Europe and in other regions, Japan, Australia and the United States initiated the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 1989. Its main task was to promote free trade in the area. One of its major achievements was the integration of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong into Trans-Pacific and global trade regimes. Later, APEC promoted a process of
further liberalization of East Asian and Trans-Pacific trade via a network of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements among APEC members, including the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 triggered a change of perceptions and integration initiatives. Deeply disappointed by the lack of support from the US and Europe during this crisis, the East Asian and ASEAN countries established an independent regional financial protection mechanism starting with the Chiang Mai Initiative. The success of this initiative encouraged them to institutionalize the ASEAN Plus Three forum (APT) in 1999. Generally, regional economic integration in East Asia continue to be marked by informal networks and “soft regionalism”, quite unlike the European model of establishing powerful supranational institutions.

The November 2012 ASEAN summit launched the ambitious project of an ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). This is a proposal for a complex free trade agreement between ASEAN and ASEAN’s FTA partners, i.e. the People’s Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Sanchita Basu Das comments that

“RCEP … would be guided by the ‘ASEAN way’ where objectives and commitments would be driven by a consensus decision process. RCEP is likely to be more accommodative to the development differences of the member countries, thus providing flexibility and adjusting mechanisms in reaching the common end-goals. In addition to liberalizing trade in goods, services, and investment, it will pay more attention to physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity, narrow development gaps and be built to respond to new developments, such as the emerging international production networks.” (Basu Das 2014: 32)

Normative perceptions

Social constructivism adds another perspective to regional integration studies. According to social constructivism integration processes can be
reduced neither to national security concerns nor to economic interests. It is argued that a regional community needs to be constructed by common values and identities. This can be done via generalizable and inclusive values such as democracy or human rights, or via exclusionary identities based on ethno-nationalist or religious polarization. Interestingly, in both cases regional integration is de-linked from the level of states and governments and oriented towards the level of civil society. In this perspective, civil society becomes both an important promoter of and a crucial target for regional integration.

The Council of Europe (CoE) embodies the normative idea of Europe. The origins of the CoE can be found in the long history of the European idea and date back to the European movement of the 1940s. It was founded in 1949 as a community of democratic countries of Europe. After successive rounds of enlargement it now brings together almost all European states, including the micro-states, with the exception of Belarus and the Vatican, both nondemocratic countries, and Kosovo, whose independence is still being disputed. CoE Membership is based on respect for human rights, most prominently the European Convention on Human Rights, with the European Court of Human Rights overseeing its implementation by the member states. Besides the protection of human rights, the CoE is promoting cooperation between European countries regarding legal standards, democratic development, the rule of law and cultural co-operation.

The CoE successfully promoted human rights as common European norms. Whereas the European Convention on Human Right is based on universally recognized rights, Europe distinguishes itself from other democracies by some specific normative positions. Most prominently Europeans strongly advocate the abolition of the death penalty, which became a precondition for membership in the CoE. This sets Europe apart from the United States and Japan which still practice it. Moreover, Europe led the campaign for universal international criminal justice under the jurisdiction of a new International Criminal Court (ICC). Here, the European Union took the lead to campaign for the establishment of the ICC convention and to counter attempts by the US government to conclude bilateral immunity agreements with member-states of the ICC convention which would have undermined its cred-
ibility. The strongly normative self-perception of European Union is by the popular concept of “normative power Europe” (Manners 2002). The concept of Europe as a normative power advocating human rights has been contested unsuccessfully by alternative concepts. For example, the EU treaties stipulate that only “European countries” are eligible for membership. This provision points to a seemingly natural and fixed geographical understanding of Europe. Turkish membership in the EU has partly been disputed in European public discourses because of its non-European culture. On the other hand, Cyprus, which the United Nations classifies as Asian, was admitted to the European Union without much hesitation. After all, attempts to define Europe as Christian or as principal heir to ancient Greek civilization, has not found much support.

The dominant, human rights based self-perception of European integration conforms to Galtung’s concept of peace, because it comprises both the direct and the structural dimensions of violence. However, to portray Europe as civilized can induce Europeans to portray the non-Europe as barbaric, and sometimes this has been used to justify the violent conversion of the “barbarians” to Europe’s norms. Moreover, CoE membership did not always guarantee security from military intervention by other CoE members: Turkey invaded Cyprus, and Russia invaded Georgia and the Ukraine. Thus the contribution of Europe’s human-rights identity to peace is ambivalent.

Regional identity in East Asia integration is less ambitious. In the literature there is a consensus that East Asian integration is based on the so-called “ASEAN way”. Kivimäki refers to “face-saving” as the cultural element of this concept, meaning the “intent on saving face and seeking a solution that is dignified for all. The ASEAN Way of terminating conflicts [is] now common in the entire East Asia….” (Kivimäki 2014:7) Face-saving includes the willingness to end a conflict without a “victory”, instead seeking accommodation with the weaker actor. The other feature is the ending of populist, popular mobilizations of conflicts. Instead, efforts are made “to focus on things that united rather on things that divide.” (Kivimäki 2014: 132). Moreover governments do not want to lose face by recognizing rebels; instead they “try to satisfy the needs of the constituencies of these rebels.” (Kivimäki 2014:
Likewise, external mediation or arbitration is not welcomed in the case of conflicts where the government is a conflicting party (Kivimäki 2014: 132).

In a more general way the “Asian way” can be translated into “statism”, which denominates the respect for state sovereignty and for the predominant role of the state bureaucracy to guide economic, social and political affairs. In Western liberal political discourses, the East Asian “statism” is frequently misperceived as Confucian values, collectivist ideology, or populist nationalism. However, as Senghaas (2003: 141, 142) pointed out, East Asian “statism” could alternatively be regarded as a corollary of successful socioeconomic development. The challenge, then, is to utilize the positive energies of developmentalist statism without stirring chauvinist sentiments.

“Peace through regional integration” in Europe and East Asia

By and large both Europe and East Asia demonstrate “peace through regional integration”. However, their experiences are quite different. From a liberal perspective it is tempting to say that East Asian experiences are temporary, transitional features and that there will be a convergence with Europe in the future. However, there is no reason to regard Europe as the norm and East Asia as the exception for “peace through regional integration”. As has been mentioned above, there are elements of Europe’s experiences which should make us aware of the ambiguities and contradictions of the pacifying effect of its regional integration.

Likewise, I do not agree with Kivimäki who acknowledges “peace through regional integration” in East Asia, but treats it as a unique case:

“The fact is that most of East Asia has started to cherish economic development and to respect sovereignty and military non-interference simultaneously and has stopped focusing on divisive issues aiming instead at face-saving in their diplomacy. These similarities … do not extend beyond East Asia (certainly not to the Pacific or to South
Asia)…” (Kivimäki’s 2014: 6).

If East Asian experiences are linked to the struggle for development, there is no reason not to expect that other development regions could follow a similar way.

The “varieties of capitalism” concept might provide us with a better understanding of the documented experiences. This concept goes back to a book under the same title edited by political economists Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (Hall & Soskice 2001). The authors idealtypically distinguish two types of capitalist economies: liberal market economies like the United States, the United Kingdom or Australia, and coordinated market economies like Germany, Japan, France or Sweden. Neither one type is the best, but both have their respective advantages and disadvantages. For example, liberal market economies are more flexible and can generate higher short-term profits. Coordinated market economies, on the other hand, cherish long-term investments and are more robust in terms of crisis. It is suggestive to distinguish varieties of “peace through regional integration” in a similar way, without privileging one of the experiences. If both contribute to the reduction of violence, both should be welcomed.

If this is accepted, the Nobel Peace Prize should have gone to both varieties of “peace through regional integration” and not only to the European Union. Of course, this would have raised the question of who should have accepted the Nobel Prize on behalf of East Asia – but for now this answer can be left to another paper.

Note

1 Korhonen (1997) convincingly reconstructs the historical process of demarcating Europe from Asia.

Bibliography


All web source as of June 28, 2015.
The concept of partnerships is prominent in the rhetoric of European Union external relations. It features both in EU politicians’ high-level diplomatic speeches and in practical protocols for the civil servants. While a “common sense” concept that is easy to understand, partnership is also a very packed one. In the EU rhetoric its content is comprehensive, going beyond specific policy areas and concrete cooperation like trade relations to normative and ideological aspects. Most importantly the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, that introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EU, stipulated that a human rights clause was to be included in all EU agreements with third parties. Subsequently political principles such as democracy, rule of law and good governance became an integral part of EU’s external relations.

In the EU external relations partnership thus refers to various and potentially contradictory principles. The concept defines simultaneously EU’s sphere of influence and otherness – or as expressed in the above quotation of Mogherini: the EU is in Asia (“we are here”), but Asia is
distinct from the EU (“we are not part”). Such rhetoric, of course, is neither novel nor radical in international relations. However, it is intrinsically different from power politics discourses of block-building or allies vs. enemies. As argued by Frances Tomlinson, partnership “suggests a cooperative alternative to the traditional characterization of relationships among the actors involved as competitive, adversarial or hierarchical” (Tomlinson, 2005: 1169).

In order to understand the dynamics and working of partnership in EU-Asia relations it is useful to look at its meanings more in detail, as well as the themes that are emphasised in the scholarly analysis of those relations.

**The concept of partnership**

Partnership, of course, is not solely an international relations concept. Wikipedia gives one generic definition: “A partnership is an arrangement where parties, known as partners, agree to cooperate to advance their mutual interests” (Wikipedia, 2015). This definition entails three criteria that are relevant for our purpose here and open up the concept in the EU-Asia context. The first obvious precondition for a partnership to be possible is a distinct identity. Companies, governments, NGOs, local authorities, research institutes and multilateral organizations are typical examples. Asia, no doubt, has a distinct identity. It has a name (Korhonen, 2015).

Secondly partnership refers to action and actorness. This entails formally or informally defined responsibilities, rights and obligations. International agreements or memoranda or even a dialogue like the above-mentioned 14th Asia Security Summit (the so called Shangri-La Dialogue) where Mogherini spoke, can make responsibilities, rights and obligations explicit. At the same time it is good to note that the understanding of the content of any particular agreement or dialogue might diverge among the parties and even within one party, and that the circumstances providing their wider context also evolve. The wider the setting and the more heterogeneous the partners, the more likely it is that views about its content diverge and change over time. (Laakso 2007a.)
Thirdly partnership points towards interests, free will and a mutually beneficial cooperation. It is an inherently positive concept, a “good thing” relating to the idealistic character of partnership (see Tomlinson, 2005). However, although the initial decision to engage in a partnership may be voluntary, once an agreement has been taken, it becomes an obligation. Besides, sometimes governments, for instance, have virtually no possibilities to remain outside international cooperation frameworks like the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund, IMF.

Furthermore although partnerships are not enforced relations, they do not necessarily entail equality (Abrahamssen, 2004). Partnership is a common concept in development cooperation or humanitarian assistance, for instance, even though these are based on asymmetric power relations of donors and recipients (see Fowler, 1998: 140) or government agencies and refugee organizations (Tomlinson, 2005). There are several examples of international cooperation, in development, humanitarian, security, environmental and economic fields, where partners are brought together by a discourse of needs and necessity and occasionally also emergency.

Within this framework, the EU’s partnership rhetoric with regard to a geographical region like Asia is particularly interesting. Asia is not an actor or even a group of actors comparable to the EU. It does not have legal competence to conduct dialogue or make agreements as one actor. Thus the mere act of naming Asia as a partner, cannot determine or even tell very much of the form of EU’s relations with it. However, what the rhetoric proves is that it is possible to imagine Asia in such a way. Why is the EU so eager to do so?

**Evolution of the EU approach**

In the context of Cold War rivalry, the European discourse of partnership characterised the relations between European powers and their ex-colonies. This stemmed from the European associationism and referred to the extension of European integration to countries under European colonial power in the Treaty of Rome (1957) (Grilli, 1993: 2-11, 40). Associationism continued in the Yaoundé Conventions (1963 and
1969) even after independence, and then in the Lomé Conventions (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000), which brings together 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific states and the EU. Most of Asia, and the big Asian powers in particular, are outside of this framework.

However, after the end of the Cold War the EU began to emphasise comprehensive partnership in its relations with wider Asia, too. The very first EU strategy paper on Asia noted that the EU “should seek to develop its political dialogue with Asia and should look for ways to associate Asia more and more in the management of international affairs, working towards a partnership of equals capable of playing a constructive and stabilising role in the world” (European Commission, 1994: 8-9). The update of the EU strategy paper in 2001 brought partnership even to its title: “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership”, and promoted a pro-active role for the EU in Asian regional cooperation (European Commission, 2001: 17). The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN, encompassing Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC, i.e. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) were emphasised in the subsequent “Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-country Programmes in Asia for 2005-2006” (European Commission, 2004).

In 1996 the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was established to enhance relations and co-operation between the EU, ASEAN and individual Asian countries including the big powers China, India and Russia. In 2014 its membership reached 54. Although impressive in size, ASEM does not appear to be a very significant player in world politics or a central forum for policy making. However, as Pekka Korhonen notes, “ASEM has systematically tried to construct a deep structure for the interaction, including various ministerial meetings, business leader meetings, and meetings of civil society organization representatives” (Korhonen, 2015). Such activities, in fact, reflect very much what the official EU rhetoric refers to with the concept of partners. At a concrete level the question is about a multi-stakeholder activity in a multi-level context, which as such is regarded valuable – and which simply is not so
easy to grasp with such concepts as “governments”, “states” or even the more imprecise “countries”.

ASEM provides a forum for formal and informal inter-regional interaction. The global security issues and terrorism have pushed it into deepened political dialogue. Already ASEM IV in 2002 held a session under the heading “Dialogue on Cultures and Civilizations” emphasizing the importance of respect for the equal dignity of all civilizations. Since then “Interfaith dialogue”, ”Iran”, ”Korean peninsula”, ”UN reform” and “WTO” among others have appeared as topics in ASEM summits (Pelkmans & Hu, 2014: 10).

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 introduced the concept of “strategic partnerships” to be developed with partners “who share [EU’s] goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support” (European Council, 2003: 14). ESS explicitly mentioned Russia, China, India and Japan. Later also South Korea was added to that category in Asia. Russia has become the first partner to be dropped from the list of strategic partners. This happened in 2014 after the EU imposed sanctions against Russia over the crisis in Ukraine.

**Understanding of EU-Asia relations**

Literature on EU-Asia relations, the form and content of the EU-Asia partnership, has grown rapidly since late 1990s. Interestingly enough, the focus is not so much on traditionally central questions of world politics, i.e. trade relations or military co-operation, but on epistemic and cultural dimensions, “deep structure of the interaction” as defined by Korhonen. Perhaps there is not so much to be theorised or analysed about the trading power of China vis-à-vis EU, for instance. More interesting is the comprehensiveness of EU-China strategic partnership including international challenges such as climate change and global economy governance.

Researchers have paid attention to the normative power of the EU, its attempts to promote human rights and democracy in the world. Asia, in fact, has become the empirical testing ground for the normative power hypothesis of Ian Manners (Manners, 2002). In addition to
a comparative perspective looking at the performance of the EU along with other powers and their interaction in Asia (see Kavalski, 2012; Tocci & Manners, 2008; Wang, 2012), the limits of normative power with regard to China’s internal politics in particular have been emphasised (examples include Balducci, 2010; Song, 2010; Shen, 2012; Pan, 2012). Several studies have also looked at Asian perceptions and understanding of the normative power EU (Chaban & Holland, 2014; Stumbaum, 2012; Wang, 2009).

With regard to strategic partners in Asia, researchers have noted the lack of common criteria for being chosen a strategic partner and of clear objectives behind this kind of categorizations. Susanne Gratius quotes European Council President Hermann van Rompuy in 2010: “we have strategic partners, now we need a strategy” (Gratius, 2011: 2). Although shared values are stated to be essential, trade and economic interests have dominated the partnership with China for instance. The concept itself is so inclusive that it seems to allow ad hocery selection of the partners and incoherence in their treatment. (Sautenet, 2012.)

Secondly research has concentrated on the EU as a model for regional integration and its eagerness to negotiate with other regional groupings, which can be referred to as “interregionalism” or “regionalism” (Rüland, 2010; Laakso, 2006: 161). This, of course, is related to the normative power EU. European integration in accordance with the hegemonic European interpretation cannot be separated from the history of Europe’s democratization and its functionality for peaceful relations. And indeed, the EU has been eager to promote its own model of regional integration elsewhere in the world, the idea that integration should be based on common markets and mutual economic benefits, and that the instruments utilised should be purely civilian. Karl Deutsch grasped this by formulating his concept of the “security community”: the creation of a group of states where war had become inconceivable because all the members of the group agreed that force no longer needed to be used to resolve disputes amongst themselves (Deutsch, 1957).

Regional integration with intensive economic cooperation seems to correlate with peaceful relations also in Asia. Although there are political disputes between the member states of ASEAN, there has been no war between them since the organization was established in 1967. The
link between economic cooperation, common interests and peace has been constantly emphasised (Acharya, 2001; Kivimäki, 2001). However, while the EU sets normative issues, human rights and good governance as criteria for membership, ASEAN notes “the Asian way”, the principle of non-interference, as condition for regional co-operation. The principle has been explicitly upheld in the ASEAN Charter. Some observers have noted that “the Asian way” was a direct response to European conditionalities on human rights and democracy in Asia after the end of the Cold War. Jürgen Rüland has argued that precisely because a “counter-project” to European pressure, this principle has been functional for the strengthening of the regional cohesion and identity (Rüland, 2010: 1278). In this way interregional relations can evolve by sharpening differences between the regions, although an obvious goal of the EU has been the opposite, i.e. propagation of its own model.

It was not before the ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2003 and the subsequent Vientiane Action Programme (VAP, 2004-2010) that democracy was acknowledged as one of the ASEAN norms (Wang, 2012). At the fourteenth ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in 2003 the EU welcomed ASEAN’s “comprehensive way” to approach democracy. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was inaugurated in 2009. However, many observers have noted that this has been weakly institutionalised (see Wiessala, 2004: 6; Wahyuningrum, 2014). Selectivity has been characteristic to the ASEAN’s adoption of EU-style institutions and AICHR in particular has not been regarded as an institutional copy from Europe (Jetschke & Murray, 2012: 176).

Ambivalence

Promotion of human rights has remained a concern in the EU-ASEAN cooperation and central in the scholarly approaches to that co-operation. Much referred is Acharya’s theory of localization as a process of “the active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and prac-
The views and behaviour of local actors help understand why certain norms advocated by the EU are diffused or accepted in one place but rejected in another. In other words, norm adaptation is accompanied by localization. As a consequence, the EU strategy to promote its norms in some instances and not in others has been described as "demand-oriented" and "issue-specific" (Maier-Knapp, 2014).

EU’s contribution to regional integration with mixed record of normative outcomes includes also SAARC. South Asia has no human rights mechanism, although the EU has supported the integration process there from the beginning. EU has also assisted the preparation for a Pacific Free Trade Area. It has even been suggested that “the EU may provide a possible model for future relations between mainland China and Taiwan” (Johansson, 2007: 70).

Important has also been Central Asia, where human rights and democratization have been priorities along various initiatives for regional integration. The EU supported the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) and the Tacis Programme, which covered 12 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). The main aim of Tacis was to facilitate the transition from socialist to liberal market oriented economies. In 2003, the EU Council appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus in order to assist in the political transitions, and a Special Representative for Central Asia was appointed in 2006. The EU Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia was established in 2008. Central Asia of course is close to the EU neighbourhood region, “neighbours of neighbours”. It is good to note that, unlike in the process of integration within the EU itself, there cannot be membership criteria for states wishing to belong to the EU neighbourhood.

In 2015 the EU made an attempt to become more concrete in its relations with Asia by “a partnership with a strategic purpose”, which is “[n]ot just vague ideas on increased cooperation” (European Commission, 2015). In the case of ASEAN this includes an increase in the EU assistance and cooperation on preventive diplomacy, for instance. The EU seems to respond to the lack of expected results in Asia by intensifying its co-operation.
Conclusions

The concept of partnership gives substance to EU external relations and its identity. For researchers, the EU-Asia partnership stands out as an important testing ground to look at the EU’s normative power. The findings, however, point towards ambivalence. EU’s attempts to conduct political dialogue on human rights, in particular, have not been very successful. On the other hand the EU has made progress in supporting Asian regionalism.

The first difficulty for any straightforward assessment of the EU’s role is precisely here. The “Asian way”, emphasising the principle of non-interference in civil and political rights, can be seen as a response to the values of the EU. An important element in the cohesion and identity for ASEAN might arise from a distinction vis-à-vis the EU model rather than its diffusion.

Secondly partnership is such a wide concept that it effectively justifies different arrangements and focus areas with different partners or contexts. What are then essential are the opportunities for “deep structure for the interaction”. Partnership is a convenient term to cover such interaction of both private and public spheres ranging from local to regional levels and including crosscutting connections between them.

Coping with ambivalence is also unavoidable in any attempts to solve global problems. EU needs partners. Partnership building is a modus operandi for it. In the final analysis implementation of partnership in EU external relations might involve elements that are normative, but it certainly is always pragmatic.

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Eero Palmujoki

HOW DIFFERENT IS ASIA? GLOBAL TRADE RULES AND ASEAN REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS

Introduction

This paper seeks to address what extent do trade rules applied in East Asian regional trade agreements differ from those of the West. It also addresses how these rules are related to globally accepted rules under the WTO system. The Western politicians and European Union (EU) trade bureaucrats, including some Finnish decision-makers, have emphasized the need to create new trade rules in transatlantic trade negotiations before the trade rules of the rest, particularly East Asia, could globally prevail. What are the trade rules offered by Asia? The previously mentioned argument implicitly refers to the idea that the Asian rules somehow would be worrisome, uncivilized and backward. This coincides with what Pekka Korhonen calls commonplace, “a rhetorical element which does not need definitions”. Accordingly, the audience would think that Asian trade rules would be qualitatively weak, “unfair” to the West and dictated by the Asian economic powers, primarily Chi-
na. In this essay, I will examine how trade rules constitute global trade in the WTO context and then compare regional arrangements made or being negotiated between East Asian countries.

Despite China participates in many regional trade arrangements, the most active player in trade issues and adapting common trade rules in Asia has been ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Therefore, the following examination is based on the trade arrangements of ASEAN, which has played a pivotal role in East Asian in trade issues.

When the EU politicians and trade officers have been more or less implicit both on the alternatives to the transatlantic trade pact and on its trade rules, referring to Asia as a commonplace, the academic discourse on regional trade pacts has been more precise. Some studies, however, seem to demonize East Asian trade arrangements. This is due to close proximity of the research of IR to ongoing political processes. The ongoing bilateral and regional trade negotiations, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and several bilateral negotiations have put multilateral trade system under the WTO into question as well as create the impression of an emerging power struggle between geopolitical and economic power blocks and emphasize East-West division in trade issues. The geopolitical aspect is due to the different composition of the members in these trade negotiations: while the United States (US) plays a central role in the TTIP, the RCEP is an ASEAN initiative in which the US does not participate. Because the US is active in the TTP but does not participate in the RCEP, which China is involved in, geopolitical division into East-West economic power spheres is justified.

In these power-oriented studies two perspectives have been presented. These perspectives can be seen to be separated from each other or interwoven. First, the Asian countries will make a fundamental policy choice, economic and geopolitical, when joining either the TPP or the RCEP. According to this realist perspective, the issue is not how much the trade arrangement will increase trade, but whose rules will prevail and who will lead international trade. The question is, first, on power transition or its preservation. Will the US take the initiative with the TPP and force China and India to follow its rules of world trade, or will
the Asian countries join the RCEP, giving China a strong position to define future global trade rules?

The second perspective may be interwoven with the first. The basic argument is that the TPP (together with the TTIP) and the RCEP are qualitatively different. Accordingly, the TPP is “a high quality” trade treaty that binds the trade partners to change their trading practices, when the RCEP is a blanket agreement with a weak binding force. The “high quality” in the case of the TPP refers to the fact that it delves deeper into the new issues of the WTO, namely in the trade of services, intellectual property rights, investments and government procurements than exists in current WTO rules. This would raise trade to a new level and, when linked to the first perspective, restore the dominance of trade governance to the US and the EU.

When contemplating the relationship between the rules presented in the Asian regional trade arrangements and the WTO rules, this paper’s approach is slightly different to power-based explanations on regional trade arrangements. As a last resort, the question is, what kinds of trade rules define international society? I examine how the development of the trade regulations have played out in an international society where no single state or power can set the rules. This situation – the absence of sovereign authority – is called anarchical among the English School of international relations (ES) scholars. Anarchical refers here to the basic quality of international relations, which means that order is created without authority, but not to the system without social order. However, the nature of international anarchy is a characterization of order without authority and a complex, rule-laden order based on different established practices – fundamental institutions – that in international society shapes international organizations and regional arrangements. My argument is that the international trade rules are constituted in established international practices. Power policy is always included in the negotiations and takes advantage of trade rules, but the rules are not created for the purposes of power politics. The rules are based on the established practices – fundamental institutions of international society with their particular definitions for trade. In the issues of global trade regulation, the institutions I examine are sovereignty, equity, market and development.
The establishment of the WTO and the role of Asian countries

The Asian countries, excluding socialist countries (China, North Korea and Indochinese countries) took part in the predecessor to the WTO, the GATT negotiation system, since its establishment after the Second World War. However, their roles were minor in that the GATT negotiations focused on customs reductions and removing technical barriers on the trade of goods but excluded the trade of agricultural and textile products. Trade liberalization under the GATT system supported “embedded liberalism,” which was based on the trade system between Keynesian states, where the government controls the economy, including foreign trade and investment.7 The starting point was state sovereignty and the equity between trading states. Equity in the state-to-state relations was expressed by the norm of reciprocity. In multilateral settings reciprocity stands out in the principles of most favored nations (MFN), which provides that all the countries receive equal treatment: if one country agrees with another country on mutual customs reductions, it has to agree with similar treatments of the countries in the GATT system.8

Multilateral reciprocity, provided by the MFN principle, did not fit into the domestic policies of developing countries. Many new developing countries, which tried to develop their industry and economy, were not eager to actively take part in common customs reductions. Instead, they promoted non-reciprocity and preferential treatment in order to develop their industrial and agricultural sectors. This policy was particularly characteristic of India, and many other Asian GATT members followed this policy.9

The newly industrialized East Asian countries (NICs) did not follow Indian policy. Their economic policies were bound to export sectors which added global reduction of customs levels. The adoption of the MFN principle was crucial to them. As for other developing countries, the trade of two important sectors, textile and agriculture, were closed from the GATT negotiations. However, the development of economic globalization, including foreign investments and finance, and the growing importance of research and development, called for new practices
for international trade. The situation where the developed countries attempted to renew the trade rules, the textile-producing countries and the exporters of agricultural products got an opportunity to put pressure on the developed countries. In order for developing countries to negotiate for new trade rules, the developed countries have to accept textile and agricultural products into global trade liberalization and to the GATT/WTO system.\(^\text{10}\)

New trade rules were developed during the last GATT Uruguay Negotiations Round (1986–94). In these negotiations the role of the ASEAN countries was crucial. In late 1970s the ASEAN countries already had started to diverge from the common protective trade policy of developing countries by focusing, following the NIC countries, on their export sectors. During the Uruguay Round, this policy clearly stood out. The ASEAN countries had a strong interest in getting the trade of textiles and agricultural products into the trade negotiation system. Therefore, the ASEAN countries allied with Australia, New Zealand and other big agricultural producers creating a bloc called the Cairns Group, which promoted the liberation of agricultural and textile products. In order to push the EU to accept the liberation of agricultural products for trade, the Cairns Group allied with the US and accepted new trade norms.\(^\text{11}\)

Therefore, during the GATT Uruguay Round the ASEAN countries represented themselves as the defenders of trade liberation and urged other developing countries to give up their defensive posture against economic globalization. The ASEAN countries supported the MFN principle as a general starting point for trade liberation.

However, different principles were adopted with the new trade rules, which were accepted after the Uruguay Round in the WTO agreement. The General Agreement on Trade on Services (GATS) emphasizes the principle of national treatment (NT), which had been introduced in the GATT 1947 III article. The GATT 1947’s main principle was that imported goods already cleared through customs are treated as domestically produced goods. In this context, NT was used to prevent technical barriers of trade. However, in the context of GATS, the principle of NT offers unlimited markets for international service providers, such as commercial banks, insurance companies, and health enter-
prises, thus forming a potential threat against national policies of public services.

A new norm in the GATT context emerged when the Uruguay Round agreed on the Treaty on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In TRIPS, private property rights appeared for the first time as a norm in the GATT/WTO system. This norm was not a central issue but a possibility of developing countries to produce products with patents in other (developed) countries. The issue was particularly difficult for emerging ASEAN countries, which had skilled labor but not resources for research and development. Moreover, TRIPS called for great changes to the legislation and administration of many developing countries as many of them lacked patent law. In the end, however, both GATS and TRIPS were accepted with several general and national provisions, exceptions and moderations.

The fourth institution constituting the WTO rules is development. In order to get the least developed countries, which did not benefit as much as the others on trade liberation into the WTO system, the developed countries had to make concessions to provide non-reciprocity and special treatment to the least developed countries (LDC). Other measures that joined trade and development were also part of the WTO system. Thus, several aspects sustained by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) were realized in the WTO treaty.

The WTO rules, trade disputes and East Asian countries

When accepting the WTO agreement, the WTO members acknowledged four fundamental institutions that define trade relations between the states: Sovereignty, equity, market and development. China, which became a member of the trade organization in December 2001, has conducted its trade policy according to the frames of these institutions and adopted the rules and procedures of the WTO, including the dispute settlement mechanisms (DSM). The subsequent development of the trade organization and the trade disputes in the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms indicated that the Asian countries (the ASE-
AN countries, together with China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, or Chinese Taipei) take full advantage of the organization in promoting their trade interests. These countries have defended their trade interests against the EU and the US and has used the WTO DSM in their mutual disputes. Most cases where the Asian countries offered complaints against developed Western countries (the EU, the US and Canada) were cases in which the developed countries used anti-dumping measures and other barriers of trade against their exports.

Interestingly enough, and the opposite situation, the Asian countries were respondents and the “West” was the complainant concerned mostly with the trade of goods. The biggest share of these dispute cases refers to traditional trade dispute issues. Traditional trade issues were created by institutions of sovereignty and equity and defined by the principles of reciprocity and the MFN. The new trade rules were based more on market norms, particularly to NT and intellectual property rights. The argument that the new rules (TRIPS, GATS and government procurements) have created a major conflict between the trade relations between two country groups is relatively weak in light of the WTO disputes. Therefore, the dispute cases suggest that both Asian and Western countries took advantage of established GATT rules on the trade of goods, which were based on the norms of reciprocity and the MFN principle, transparency, and the ban of technical barriers of exports. (See table 1.)

Table 1. Trade disputes in the WTO between “East” and “West” (January 1995 – April 2015)

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However, the setting presented as a division of two geopolitical blocs in the above table is misleading. It does not fit to the comprehensive picture, which the WTO disputes comprise. First of all, one should ask whether the division of the trade issues in the WTO DSM context is adequate. Although in the context of 492 total disputes (06.05.2015) since the establishment of the WTO, where the “East-West” disputes make up over 25 percent of all the WTO disputes, the “East” does not refer to the whole bloc but in most cases to a single respondent or complainant country. Since 2001 China has had 39 disputes with Western countries, but, for example, between 1995 and 2014, the EU has had 63 disputes only with the US and Canada has had 20 disputes with the US. Most of the disputes concerning new issues have been between the US and other developed countries and few have been between developed and developing countries. From the 61 WTO disputes concerning new issues (TRIPS, GATS and government procurement) the “East-West” division only includes nine disputes. Therefore, the trade disputes in the WTO do not support, in any meaningful way, the world divided in geo-economic blocs operating under different rules. The “East-West” trade bloc refers more to a political construction and is not supported with actual trade policies of the countries. In summary, it seems obvious that the emerging Asian countries have benefited from the global trade system and established trade rules similar to the developed countries.

This was not only due to the solutions of dispute cases but also to the subsequent interpretations of the new trade rules. When China, for example, became a member of the WTO, it got several national provisions to the GATS. Moreover, after a pivotal TRIPS dispute over the right to produce cheap drugs in developing countries, the strict interpretation of intellectual property rights started to crumble and the first amendment of a WTO treaty was made. The amendment helped not only Asian countries but also other emerging countries to produce drugs under patent protection. The amendment releases strict patent protection for important drugs in the case of national health and for production in and trade between developing countries. The interpretation of the TRIPS amendment led to the first and only WTO TRIPS dispute—where developing countries (India and Brazil) were claimants and the developed countries (the EU) respondents—and ended in a solution, which can be considered as a victory for developing countries.
The ASEAN regional trade arrangements and the regional comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP) plan

The regional trade agreements pertaining to transatlantic or Asian and Pacific trade are closely connected to the WTO and its agreements. On one hand, the activities around regional arrangements are used to boost the WTO or negotiations or used for “forum-shopping” in order to find a more suitable forum for country’s trade interest than the WTO. WTO agreements constitute more or less regional trade agreements. Therefore, whether the agreements are made to boost the development of global trade system or for forum-shopping, they have taken a place in the context of the WTO.

During the last decade ASEAN has negotiated and signed five regional trade agreements: ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP), ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (AKFTA), ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, and ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA). The structure of the agreements may differ, but three are quite similar: ACFTA, AJCEP and AKFTA. They consist of the WTO items, trade of goods, services, intellectual property rights and investments and include provisions for differentiated treatment of the poor ASEAN countries Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. In the ASEAN FTA with Australia and New Zealand the content was mainly the same but did not include differentiated treatment of the poor ASEAN countries. Compared to other ASEAN FTAs, the FTA with India is still a skeleton as it deals only with the trade of goods.

Obviously, the focus in the ASEAN FTAs is on trade of goods. The agreements reduce regional customs levels and remove technical barriers of trade. In the trade of goods, agreements have limited trade effects as some sectors, particularly agriculture, have several restrictions. The agreements do not aim to deepen the intellectual property rights regime in the region beyond the WTO TRIPS. In that sense, they can be seen as “low quality” FTAs if compared to goals given to TTIP and TTP. They, however, include the GATS Plus principle, which suggests that liberalization commitments on services under the ASEAN FTAs would
be considerably higher than under WTO GATS. Moreover, the FTAs, excluding the ASEAN-Indian FTA, include agreements on investments with the protection of investments against expropriation and nationalization following the formula of similar agreements made between developed countries. They also include dispute settlement mechanisms between investors and national governments and give a possibility for an arbitral process “under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (italics original),” the issue which has garnered major criticism against the TTIP draft on both sides of the Atlantic.

Although the ASEAN FTAs may have limited trade effects, the argument that the Asian trade rules differ globally or with those the US and EU apply in their negotiations is misleading. The differences stand out in the attempt to harmonize standards, particularly those concerning the environment and labor. How significant they will be is still open for debate. The emphasis in ASEAN FTAs may be different with TTIP and TPP underway in intellectual property rights and probably in the trade of services, but their content does not differ from general rules established in international treaties. ACTA, AJCEP and AKFTA differ from TTIP and TPP with their emphasis on development by using differentiated treatment toward the poor ASEAN member states. In summary, the ASEAN FTAs are based on the established institution of global trade set forth in the general rules of the WTO.

When ASEAN has solved its regional trade arrangement with several FTAs, why have the ASEAN countries initiated RCEP? The power-based explanations are inclined to see RCEP in the broader context of a geo-economic power struggle despite China and India not having initiated the negotiations. From a geopolitical standpoint, by taking part of TTP and RCEP the ASEAN countries may seek ASEAN’s traditional aim to neutralize the role of economic powers in the region by participating both in the US-operated negotiations and those with Asian powers. However, a plausible rationale behind RCEP could be that the ASEAN countries try to solve what is called a “noodle bowl” problem. The term refers to the fact that the content of the specific commitments of the agreements varies, and they include or exclude different sectors and involve different kinds of tariff reductions. As men-
tioned above, the FTA with India, together with limited sectors in the trade of goods, does not include intellectual property rights, services and investments, and with the Australia and New Zealand FTAs, differentiated treatment. Regionally, this has created a mélange of incompatible and overlapping trade agreements in Asia, which is compared to a bowl of tangled noodles.  

What would be the final content of the RCEP be if it were signed? Would it contain all the items included to the ASEAN FTAs with China, Japan and Korea, and how deep would the commitments go? It would be limited in its scope if India is included, as India was unable to include many items and sectors to the trade of goods and not mention WTO Plus items in trade liberalization. The labor and environmental standards are beyond the scope of RCEP negotiations on which Japan, Korea and the rich ASEAN countries would be ready to negotiate.

**Conclusion: trade rules and trade interests**

The original questions of this paper were how the trade rules negotiated among the Asian countries differ from transatlantic negotiations and TPP and what the relationships of Asian agreements are to the WTO rules. The answer to the first question is open so far as the transatlantic FTA and TPP are signed. The questions under negotiation mostly are the same that exist in the ASEAN FTA including WTO Plus and investment agreements. There even seems to be a similar trend to go deeper in the liberation of services and for the investment treaty to include similar dispute settlement mechanisms, which is sketched into transatlantic treaty and TPP. Including labor and environmental standards, government procurement and further regulations in intellectual property set transatlantic negotiations apart from RCEP’s negotiation agenda, but this does not suggest that rules are different.

With respect to the WTO rules, the ASEAN FTAs and RCEP are WTO consistent. The items and trade principles strictly follow the regulative context of the WTO and fundamental international institutions behind them. Through the WTO principles the ASEAN FTAs and RCEP negotiations constitute the international trade system and
society. By no means are they changing trade rules or shaking up the trade system.

Although the aims of the RCEP are more modest than the transatlantic TTIP, the trade rules are the same. Different are the goals of the countries taking part in negotiations. The differences in trade goals stand out in relief particularly when paying attention to TPP and RCEP negotiations: those ASEAN countries most oriented toward global trade take part in both negotiation processes. Australia and New Zealand, which want to maintain Asian markets, are acting the same.

Notes

1 Korhonen 2012, 100.
2 Hicks and Kim 2012; Wilson 2015.
3 Hamanaka 2014; Panda 2014.
4 Ibid.
5 Hicks and Kim 2012; Wilson 2015.
6 Bull 1977; Buzan 2004; Buzan 2014; Schouenborg 2014.
7 Ruggie 1982.
8 Snyder 1940; Keohane 1986.
10 Ricupero 1998.
11 Narlikar 2003, 128-54.
13 WTO.
14 ACFTA, Agreement of Investments, Article 14, Paragraph 4b.
15 Fukunaga 2014; Das and Jagtiani 2014.
17 Palit 2014.

Bibliography


Joseph Y. S. Cheng

CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL STATES: MULTI-LEVEL DIPLOMACY IN A DIVIDED ARAB WORLD

Introduction and Historical Background

The significant developments in the Arab world since the “Arab Spring” have prompted the Chinese authorities to improve their understanding of the complexities of the Arab world and especially the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states.¹ Like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the “Colour Revolutions”, Chinese leaders are concerned with developments and trends such as the “Arab Spring” which may threaten the survival and the monopoly of political power of the Party regime. The “Arab Spring” highlights the new significance of the Middle East and North Africa to China. The former is more than just a source of energy supply, political developments there may have an impact on those in China, at least China’s official think tanks have to examine the relevant implications and the lessons to be drawn.
The fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya and the recent Syrian crisis forced Chinese leaders to become more involved in the Middle East and North Africa to better protect Chinese interests; at the same time, in pursuit of China’s major power status, China intends to assume a role in the region to avoid being marginalized in the competition for influence among major powers in the region. In both crises, China’s veto in the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council enabled China to influence the situations, and Chinese leaders were forced to consider China’s principles and positions regarding interventions. China’s influence has presented it new challenges.

The GCC was and remains important to China because of oil. Saudi Arabia is obviously a key player in the Arab world; and the GCC states because of their wealth have significant influence in the region. As economic ties between China and the GCC states are expected to grow, and as China intends to play an increasingly important role in the region, it will certainly accord a high priority to its relations with the GCC states, exploiting the bilateral relationship to enhance China’s influence in the region. The latter appreciate China’s significant role in global affairs, and they too want to enhance their strategic manoeuvrability through limiting the U.S.’s predominant role, improving relations with China therefore becomes an attractive option.

This article intends to examine China’s relations with the GCC states which are not yet well researched. China’s approach is multi-level: it maintains diplomatic relations with individual GCC states; it initiated formal mechanisms of regular meetings with the GCC in 1990; and it also established the China-Arab States Co-operation Forum in 2004, and the Arab League represents its 22 members in this forum. Student exchanges and Confucius Institutes are the usual aspects of people-to-people diplomacy. On August 14, 2012, U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman and Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhai Jun launched the inaugural round of U.S.-China Middle East Dialogue in Beijing. Hence China’s approach to the GCC states also includes its dialogue with other major powers and its participation in important multilateral conferences on regional affairs.

China’s approach to the GCC states demands the maintenance of a delicate balance. China wants to avoid a confrontation with the U.S.
while limiting its regional hegemony; it intends to uphold its foreign policy principles while enhancing its appeal to various groups of countries in the region; and it plans to expand its economic interests and influence and cultivate a good international image. But in the complex major power competition and regional rivalries, fulfilling all these objectives becomes a serious challenge while the Chinese authorities are still trying to better understand the region.

This multi-level diplomacy calls for close co-ordination between the various levels of foreign policy-making and policy-implementation, and apparently China’s official think-tank experts acknowledge that this has been a weakness. The establishment of the National Security Commission in January 2014 chaired by President Xi Jinping is generally praised as an important step to strengthen this co-ordination. Better co-ordination is also needed among various policy systems including foreign affairs, national security and the military intelligence, commerce, etc. For example, establishing a good community image on the part of the major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may require some guidance from the ministry of commerce which is in charge of the foreign aid programmes as well as the ministry of foreign affairs.

The GCC states present an interesting case study of this multi-level diplomacy at work. They had not been accorded a high priority within China’s foreign policy framework before, but their importance has been increasingly appreciated. Conflicts of interests for China are many, and maintaining a balance is obviously challenging. Crises frequently occur in the region and China’s role and its articulation of its positions often come under close scrutiny by Western media, thus affecting China’s image as a responsible major power.

Before the era of economic reforms and opening to the external world which began at the very end of 1978, China’s Third World policy was guided by its general principles defined by its ideology and world view. In the context of the Sino-Soviet breakup in 1960-63 and the subsequent competition in the Third World among revolutionary movements, Soviet penetration in the Middle East was probably the most important factor in China’s relations with the GCC states.5

In 1971, China established relations with Kuwait which then supported its entry into the U.N. In 1978, China established diplomatic
relations with Oman, probably with an implicit pledge not to support
the latter’s rebel group as in the 1960s. In the 1980s, in line with China’s
modernization diplomacy, i.e., exploiting China’s diplomatic work and
foreign relations to serve its objective of modernization6 it established
diplomatic relations with the UAE in 1984, Qatar in 1988 and Bahrain
in 1989. Saudi Arabia was the last among the GCC states to establish
formal ties with China in 1990, unaffected by the Tiananmen Incident
in the year before.

In view of the setback in relations with the West because of the do-
mestic turmoil, China was eager to secure diplomatic achievements in
the Third World then. It was said that diplomatic relations with Saudi
Arabia would facilitate Chinese Muslims to attend the Hajj, sending Is-
lamic scholars to participate in Islamic conferences abroad, dispatching
trade delegations to Riyadh, and even selling missiles to the country.7

In 1993, China became a net oil importer, and energy security nat-
urally became an important factor in China-GCC states relations. In
June-July that year, then Chinese deputy premier Li Lanqing toured all
six GCC states and Iran and the obvious policy objective was to secure
a supply of oil.8 In these years, China’s approach to the Gulf did not re-
veal a well-defined strategic pattern or a coherent regional policy well
defined and well articulated within its foreign policy framework. For
example, Oman rather suddenly emerged as an important source of oil
imports, which continued to increase after 1995, and by 1997, China
became the third largest market for Oman’s oil exports.9

China’s labour-intensive products were eager to find new markets.
Since the 1990s, the UAE has become the most important location for
China’s manufactured products to be re-exported to the neighbouring
countries. The UAE’s imports from China rapidly increased from US
$2.1 billion in 2000 to about US $24 billion in 2008. The basic trade
pattern has been clear-cut; China imports oil, natural gas and chemi-
cal products from the GCC states, and exports garments, textile fabrics,
electronic and telecommunication equipment to them.

China’s Arab-world experts often examine the strategic configura-
tion in the Gulf region within a framework of five periods: in 1949-
1958, the region was dominated by pro-Western monarchies; in 1958–
1979, the revolution in Iraq brought a confrontation between the
radical republic and conservative monarchies based on ideological con-
tradictions; in 1979-1990, the Islamic revolution in Iran brought back the tradi-
tional confrontation between the Arab states and Persia based on national-
religious schisms; in 1990-2001, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq produced a tri-
angular structure among Iran, Iraq and the GCC states premised on political and strategic conflicts; and from 2001 till now, the September 11 Incident renewed the enmity between the Sun-
nis and the Shiites, and religious contradiction has become the domi-
nant contradiction.

In line with the above strategic configuration, China’s Gulf policy may be divided into the following stages: in 1958-1967, it focussed on Iraq because of the regime’s ideological position and revolutionary ori-
entations in the context of the Cold War; in 1967-1971, it focussed on the revolutionary movements in the Gulf region during a period of extreme radicalization of Chinese foreign policy; in 1971-1979, it centred on the broad united front against the expansion of Soviet imperialism in the context of the strategic triangle symbolized by the Nixon visit to China; in 1979-1990, China was much absorbed by the Iran-Iraq war and in fact it was a major arms supplier to both sides; in 1990-2001, Iran tended to be the focus of China’s attention in the region; and from 2001 till now, Saudi Arab and Iran have become the twin pillars of Chi-
na’s approach to the Gulf.10

China’s interests in the Gulf region have been evolving too; and in the twenty-first century they cover geopolitical interests, economic and trade interests, energy security interests and non-traditional security inter-
ests. Regarding the former, the basic considerations are: recognition of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China; the maintenance of friendly relations with all countries in the region; promotion of multi-polarity in the region thus ensuring China’s regional interests; and co-ordination of China’s Gulf policy with the broad goals of supporting China’s modernization and the enhancement of China’s international status and influence. Obviously, the latter two have become much more significant in the recent decade.
Oil and Economic Interests

Oil is naturally a very important factor in the relations between China and the GCC states. The latter now export more oil to Asia than to Europe and North America combined. About two-thirds of GCC states’ oil exports are channeled to Asia. OPEC data reveals that the GCC states produced about 13 million barrels of crude oil each day in 2012, and they provided China with 36% of its oil imports, with Saudi Arabia being the top supplier satisfying 20% of China’s oil import demand. Other East Asian countries are also heavily dependent of oil from the GCC states (see Table 1); hence the latter not only consider China’s importance, but that of Asia as a whole.

Table 1: Major Asian Countries’ Crude Oil Imports from GCC States and Saudi Arabia, 2012 in million barrels/ day


China | India | Japan | South Korea
--- | --- | --- | ---
Mb/d | % | Mb/d | % | Mb/d | % | Mb/d | %
World | 5.44 | 100% | 3.76 | 100% | 3.60 | 100% | 2.60 | 100%
GCC States | 1.88 | 35% | 1.56 | 42% | 2.73 | 76% | 1.77 | 68%
Saudi Arabia | 1.08 | 20% | 0.67 | 18% | 1.19 | 33% | 0.86 | 33%

China’s oil demand is expected to continue to grow (see Table 2), rising to 15.5mb/d in 2030 and 17.5mb/d in 2040. China will eventually be importing around 10-12mb/d, roughly 70-80% of its future oil consumption. India’s oil consumption similarly will expand rapidly, rising from 3.2mb/d in 2011 to 6.8mb/d in 2040, eventually will be importing around 5-6mb/d, about 90% of its future petroleum needs (see Table 2). On the other hand, Japan’s oil needs have been in decline since
2005 and the trend will continue; while those of South Korea will rise moderately till 2035 and then decrease. In view of the technological breakthroughs in the exploitation of shale gas and oil, oil imports of the U.S. will drop sharply in the future and it may even become self-sufficient in terms of energy resources. Hence the oil trade between China and the GCC states will become increasingly significant.

Table 2: World Oil Consumption* (Selected regions, 2011–2040, in million barrels/ day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2035</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>Annual Growth 2011–2040</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD Europe</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Includes crude oil and lease condensates natural gas plant liquids.

Natural gas is also an important item in the trade between China and the GCC states. Japan, South Korea, China and India accounted for two thirds of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand in 2012. In the longer term, however, North American producers may become keen competitors for the GCC states in Asia, especially after the widening of the Panama Canal. Australia too has a number of LNG export projects under development and it may surpass Qatar by 2020.

East and South Asia will continue to diversify their sources of LNG imports to North America, Australia and East Africa. Shale gas production in the U.S. is expected to expand very rapidly; and China is developing its coal-to-olefin technology Iraq is expected to exploit its gas to enhance its petro-chemicals industry and this would likely offer some competition to Saudi Arabia and other GCC states.
The potential of expanding the trade and investment flows between China and the GCC states can best be appreciated if one examines the respective sizes of the two economies and their recent achievements. China has become the second largest economy in the world in 2010; it surpassed Germany as the largest exporter in 2009, and leapfrogged the U.S. to become the world’s biggest trading power in 2012. By mid-2013, China’s foreign exchange reserves amounted to US $3.56 trillion, the largest in the world; and China’s economy as a percentage of nominal global GDP reached 11.5% in 2012.15 It is projected to overtake the U.S. as the largest economy by 2017 in terms of purchasing power parity and by 2027 in market exchange rate terms.16

Although less noticeable, the GCC states are fast becoming a significant trading bloc with a total trade of more than US $1.4 trillion in 2012. Their GDP exceeded US $1.5 trillion in the same year, ranking twelfth globally. Together their exports reached US $934 billion in 2012, ranking fourth in the world; while their imports amounted to US $484.2 billion ranking ninth in the world.17 The combined foreign assets of GCC governments, state institutions and banking systems were estimated over US $2.2 trillion at the end of 2012 and projected to rise to US $2.5 trillion at the end of 2013.18 Overall trade between China and the GCC states rose from US$6 billion in 2002 to US$92 billion in 2010. According to Mekinsey &Co., trade could rise to US$350-550 billion by 2020.19
Table 3: Trade Between China and the GCC States, 1998-2012 (US $ billion)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Trade Between China and GCC States</th>
<th>China’s Imports from the GCC States</th>
<th>China’s Exports to GCC States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Growth Rate %</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>42.47</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>18.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>46.01</td>
<td>8.34</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>101.23</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>64.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>97.57</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>56.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>115.67</td>
<td>18.56</td>
<td>60.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>168.75</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>87.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>247.31</td>
<td>46.55</td>
<td>142.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>337.57</td>
<td>36.49</td>
<td>199.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>449.49</td>
<td>33.15</td>
<td>265.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>580.2</td>
<td>29.08</td>
<td>302.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>923.12</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>537.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>679.18</td>
<td>-26.42</td>
<td>366.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>925.26</td>
<td>36.22</td>
<td>564.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1337.13</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>868.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1551.12</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>1007.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4. Trade between China and the individual GCC States 2002–2012 (US $ million).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>57.92</td>
<td>51.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>83.15</td>
<td>52.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>120.57</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>68.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>283.92</td>
<td>64.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>384.69</td>
<td>102.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>655.07</td>
<td>131.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>475.26</td>
<td>211.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>799.50</td>
<td>251.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>880.01</td>
<td>325.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1202.78</td>
<td>348.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oman</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>60.18</td>
<td>1446.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>81.96</td>
<td>1985.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>111.02</td>
<td>4278.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>190.99</td>
<td>4138.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>339.54</td>
<td>6129.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>547.56</td>
<td>6722.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>794.51</td>
<td>11626.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>747.50</td>
<td>5411.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>944.50</td>
<td>9779.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>998.18</td>
<td>14876.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1811.58</td>
<td>16975.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1671.54</td>
<td>3435.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2146.8</td>
<td>5172.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2775.46</td>
<td>7522.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3824.42</td>
<td>12245.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5055.83</td>
<td>15084.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7807.82</td>
<td>17559.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10823.46</td>
<td>31022.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8977.45</td>
<td>23570.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10366.44</td>
<td>32829.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14849.71</td>
<td>49467.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>18452.35</td>
<td>54861.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is natural that the GCC states adopt a “Look East” policy; they see the writing on China’s Great Wall and they realize that it is important to cultivate good relations with China. In the past two decades, the share of the U.S. and the European Union in the GCC states’ trade dropped from 40% to 21% in 2012; and China’s share rose from less than 2% in 1992 to 10.6% in 2012 (see also Table 3 and 4). In the same period, India’s share increased from 3% to 10.7%. In almost every aspect, India is a keen competitor for China in the Gulf region.

Both China and the GCC states perceive their economic links from a long-term strategic perspective. A large population of Arab businessmen has settled down in Yiwu, Zhejiang in China, where most goods exported to the Gulf region are produced; and an estimated 200,000 Chinese reside in the UAE. Recently Saudi Arabia has been increasing its natural gas production to reduce its domestic demand for oil; it has indicated that it will then be able to increase its oil exports to China, thus overcoming the resistance from the Western oil companies which have already planned their sales destinations. The UAE also attempts to enhance its status as a stable energy supplier through constructing the Fujairah pipeline by a Chinese enterprise bypassing the risky Strait of Hormuz, despite the fact that the pipeline’s capacity is limited and the UAE’s energy exports to China are small. In 2009, a 25-year agreement to provide five million tons of LNG per year was reached between Qatargas and the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) and PetroChina. This created a long-term interdependence reflecting in the words of CNOOC President Fu Chengyu the “great complementarities” between the two countries as “China can guarantee a long-term reliable market for Qatar, while Qatar can be a stable supplier for the Chinese market.”

In the context of the substantial rise in capital investment and joint ventures between China and the GCC states in the recent decade, a mutual upstream-downstream interdependence has formed as the GCC states invest in Chinese oil refining and petrochemical industries and China invests in oil exploration and production in the GCC states. Similar to the Kuwait-China Investment Company established in 2005, the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) also drew up a strategic “China plan” intended to create strong supply partnerships
and joint ventures that can meet China’s rapidly-growing demand. Duba, in particular, has developed into a regional financial centre, in stiff competition with Qatar and Bahrain, serving the European and East Asian exchanges. Ideationally, Dubai, Bahrain and Kuwait have all looked toward, and applied, elements of, the “East Asian model” in their development plans.

Examples of the mutual upstream-downstream interdependence mentioned above attract considerable international media attention. Saudi Arabia opened part of its domestic oil and gas upstream market for Chinese investment, facilitating Sinopec’s participation in two new major natural gas exploration/development projects in Rub al-Khali. Saudi Arabia also invested in the Chinese downstream sector in refineries in Qingdao, Shandong and petrochemical plants in Fujian.

Given the vast wealth of the GCC states, they look for investment opportunities beyond the energy sector too. When Sheikh Mohammed, the Vice-President of the UAE and the ruler of Dubai, visited Beijing and Shanghai in April 2008, several deals were concluded. Emaar signed a memorandum of understanding with a government agency, the Shanghai China-News Enterprises Development Limited, to explore mixed-used property and infrastructure development in the Chinese cities. Etisalat reached an agreement with Huawei Technologies, China’s biggest telecom-equipment maker.

In addition to product exports, the Middle East is a huge service export market for China’s construction telecommunication, and finance industries. Contract services by construction firms are a particularly important segment of these services. In 2011, China’s construction services in the Middle East were US $21 billion. China’s 2011 top construction service markets in the Middle East were Saudi Arabia (US $4.4 billion), Algeria (US $4.1 billion), Iran (US $2.2 billion), the UAE (US $1.9 billion), and Iraq (US $1.8 billion).

The expansion of China’s middle class will boost tourism, which will be supported by the expansion of routes to Asia by the big three airlines in the Gulf: Emirates; Etihad; and Qatar Airways. The UAE’s inclusion on China’s list of “approved destinations” since 2007 has resulted in significant Chinese tourism to the country, and other GCC states are likely to seek similar status, particularly Qatar, in time for the 2022 foot-
ball World Cup. It was estimated that around 50 million tourists from China travelled abroad in 2009. This figure was expected to more than double in the next five years; and the GCC states hope to benefit from this trend.32

China’s economic ties with the GCC states are not without problems. Yang Honglin, a former ambassador to Iraq, discussed the difficulties of China’s major oil firms in the Gulf region. He believed that Western governments still attempted to obstruct their overseas expansion as they perceived this as an erosion of their traditional oil interests. Western media were also critical of Chinese enterprises overseas for their neglect of corporate social responsibility in the local context. As a result Chinese corporations’ merger and acquisition activities abroad often encountered severe obstacles.33

Yang admitted that Chinese enterprises did not have a good understanding of the international energy market, especially its rules of the game and the related laws and regulations. He indicated that the Chinese enterprises concerned often failed to establish good connections with the senior officials of the oil-producing countries, and did not perform satisfactory feasibility studies in the early stage. Improper competition, illegal business practices, and bad internal management were not uncommon.

There are also occasional academic research papers and media reports exposing the problems in the China–GCC states’ economic ties. In general, there is some disappointment with the relatively slow development of the bilateral non-oil trade, especially in textiles, apparel, shoes, travelling bags, etc. In many cases, Chinese enterprises consider local labourers “lazy”, and they import labour from China to the extent of violating local stipulations demanding the employment of 51% local labour. As most projects have been taken up by large state-owned enterprises, the latter tend to rely too much on governmental ties and not market competitiveness; cost accounting and foreign exchange risks are often neglected. Although occasional large investment projects have attracted much media attention, from 2003 to 2009, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flow from Arab countries only increased from 0.17% to 0.27% of the total, with the bulk coming from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Similarly China’s FDI in the Arab world stayed at 1% of
its total in the same period, concentrating on the oil-producing countries. There is obviously much room for improvement in view of the substantial foreign exchange reserves of both sides.\textsuperscript{34}

In 2004, China established an export products distribution and channeling centre in Dubai, the largest of its kind then, with over two thousand outlets from more than twenty provinces in China. Bureaucratic management and low-quality staff apparently caused problems. Rapid and inconsistent changes in business strategies and weak bargaining with the local authorities were also disappointing. In the end, the centre concentrated on low-quality labour intensive products, with a low profit margin depending solely on large amounts of sales.\textsuperscript{35}

**China’s Broad Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region**

Top-level visits by the leaders of both sides are perhaps a good indicator of the increasing importance of the bilateral relationship. Former President Hu Jintao visited Riyadh for the first time in 2006, and the two countries reached consensus in establishing “strategic friendly relations”. Then Vice-President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia in June 2008 and signed the “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and Saudi Arabia on Strengthening Co-operation and Strategic Friendly Relations”. In January 2009, former President Hu Jintao made another trip to Riyadh, his second in three years. During this second visit, the two leaders placed their close contacts in the context of “reforming the global financial institutions”; and King Abdullah pledged to work together on an ambitious plan to draft and adopt new rules and measures to confront the challenges of the international financial system as well as to co-ordinate with China in the lead up to the April 2009 G-20 summit.\textsuperscript{36} Then Kuwaiti Prime Minister and now Emir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah visited China in July 2004 during which the two sides affirmed their interest and desire to significantly expand their relationship. The Kuwaiti prime minister stated that the purpose of the visit was to enhance the pragmatic co-operation between the two sides at governmental, non-governmental and enterprise levels, and he expressed the hope that China would encourage Chinese businesses to participate
in the economic projects of Kuwait and the Gulf region.

A more important signal was the fact that on his first trip after ascending the throne in Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah visited Asia in 2006 and included China in his itinerary. It was actually the first trip by a Saudi ruler to China since the two sides established diplomatic relations in 1990. Other important visitors from the GCC states to China have included the Prime Minister of the UAE and ruler of Dubai Shaikh Mohammad Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum in 2007, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the State of Qatar Shaikh Hamad Bin Jassim Al-Thani in 2008, and Saudi Crown Prince and Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud also in 2008. During the latter visit, two pacts for boosting co-operation and strategic relations were signed.\textsuperscript{37}

GCC Secretary-General Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah had also expressed his hope that both sides would accelerate the process of negotiations on the establishment of a China-GCC free trade area and work for its early completion. He further expressed his wish to see the launch of a bilateral strategic dialogue mechanism as soon as possible which would comprehensively enhance the relations between the two sides.\textsuperscript{38}

China fits into the development and diplomatic strategies of the GCC states to diversify their international ties and to reduce their dependence on the U.S. and other Western powers, a typical balance-of-power or hedging strategy. In the foreseeable future, China’s value as a strategic partner for the GCC states will remain secondary. China’s tendency to play both sides of the line in order to protect its economic arrangements and to keep its options open is a fact that the GCC states will not ignore. Ultimately they still have to depend on the U.S. as a protector. China’s policy of behaving as a ”benign power with global reach” has its inadequacies especially in view of its limited military projection capabilities in the region at this stage.\textsuperscript{39}

China’s diplomatic style appeals to the GCC states, however, because of its traditional non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and its highly respect for their sovereignty. But China cannot replace the U.S. in the eyes of the GCC states which also understand that China does not have the capability nor the intention to challenge the U.S. in the region. China’s role is therefore only secondary.
The GCC states are uncomfortable with China’s close economic and military ties with Iran given the former’s strong suspicions against Tehran. Sinopec acquired a 50% share in Iran’s Yadavaran oil field; and in 2004, it concluded a deal estimated to be between US $70-100 billion to buy Iranian crude oil and natural oil over 30 years. Economic co-operation between China and Iran has covered power plants, cement factories, shipping lines and arms sales which are worrying from the GCC states’ point of view. The latter believe that China, Russia and North Korea have been the main sources of assistance in Iran’s ballistic missile programmes.

As China is perceived to be playing both sides of the line to protect its economic interests and arrangements in the Gulf region, and to keep its options open while trying to maximize its influence, the GCC states realize that they still need the U.S. for its security. The Syrian crisis since March 2011 and China’s approach to the crisis reaffirm the above perception. While this perception remains an important obstacle to the deepening of strategic co-operation between China and the GCC states, the latter have not been seriously disappointed with China and the crisis has not led to significant setbacks in their bilateral ties. The acceptance of the U.S.-Russia agreement in September 2013 by the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to surrender his chemical weapons to international control and the on-going international negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme with some recent progress mean that China’s relations with the GCC states have managed to avoid serious challenges and hard choices.

While China may pretend to be a “benign power with global reach”, the limitations of its Gulf policy have been gradually exposed. It may choose to avoid risks and restrict its commitments at this stage, considering that time is on its side. Luo Yu an, a People’s Liberation Army strategist known for his hawkish views, argues that “the Middle East strategy of China is to keep the balance of diverse forces while that of the U.S. is to control oil and the regional situation through military might and democratization”, and that while “China attempts to stabilize the Gulf situation”, it “pursues self-balance inside the region”.

Luo Yu an, however, considers that the Gulf region is “at the forefront of China’s struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism” as
“the extremist forces of Islamism based in the Gulf expanded its influence into Central Asia”, threatening the security and stability of China’s western region. Following the Chinese authorities’ crackdown on the Uighur riots in Xinjiang in 1997, Saudi clerics called upon Riyadh to help Chinese Muslims financially and diplomatically. Similar unrest in 2009 also generated resentment in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia may find it increasingly difficult to remain silent on human rights abuses against the Muslim minority in China.

While the governments of the GCC states and their Chinese counterpart are concerned with the spread of the Arab Spring, their bilateral ties may strengthen because of their common interest and their opposition to the American attempts to promote democratization globally. But these ties among authoritarian regimes do not have the support of the people in the long term; and domestic political instability and regime changes may affect their ties dramatically.

China’s diplomatic instruments adopted in its approach to the GCC states reflect its significance accorded to the relationship, the level of its commitments and the mechanisms it has been developing in its more pro-active diplomatic efforts. The China–Arab States Co-operation Forum (CASCF) was established in 2004, following the precedent of the Forum on China–Africa Co-operation established in 2000. In the CASCF, through the co-ordination of the Arab League, the Arab states actively negotiate for the inclusion of collective projects involving multiple Arab countries, for example, railway projects, nuclear power plants, and Dead Sea initiatives. The forum meets every two years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014) at the ministerial level, focusing on economic co-operation in trade, investment, infrastructure, and economic security.

In June 2014, the sixth ministerial meeting of the China–Arab States Co-operation Forum was held in Beijing. It was attended by the prime ministers of Kuwait and twenty ministers from the Arab states. Three documents including the “Beijing Declaration”, the “Action Plan for 2014 to 2016” and the “Development Plan for 2014–2024” were signed. China proposed a comprehensive co-operation strategy, known as 1+2+3. One refers to energy co-operation; two refers to improving trade and investment; and three refers to co-operation in new sec-
tors including nuclear energy, aerospace technology and new energy. China also promised to help in areas like infrastructure construction and job creation. China set a target of increasing bilateral trade from US$240 billion in 2013 to US$600 billion in ten years; similarly, it pledged to expand non-financial investment in Arab states from US$10 billion in 2013 to US$600 billion in the coming decade.  

In President’s Xi Jinping’s speech at the conference’s opening ceremony, he highlighted the building of “One Belt One Road”, i.e., the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, with the emphasis on infrastructure and trade networks. President Xi also presented his concepts of integrating the development of China closely with that of the Arab states to form a “community of common interests” and a “community of common destiny”.

Chinese leaders articulate that the foundations of political and economic co-operation are China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence), South-South co-operation, the One China Principle, and support for Arab political causes (especially regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict). China seeks international support in an era of multi-polarity, and it utilizes the forum to gain that support. The forum is also exploited as a platform to promote co-operation in the areas of environmental protection, cultural exchange, media, tourism, sports, legislative interaction and building party-to-party ties.

The first special envoy appointed by Beijing was the Middle East Issues Special Envoy appointed in 2002, in response to some Arab states’ appeal to China to assume a more active role in the region. Though China maintains a very good relationship with Israel, its historical support for the Palestinians and its veto in the U.N. Security Council have facilitated its mediating role in the Arab-Israeli conflict seen as the core of the problems in the Middle East. Apparently Chinese leaders consider that China is uniquely placed to serve as liaison and peacemaker among the parties to the dispute because it maintains good relations with all of them. The special envoys appointed have all been seasoned diplomats with deep experience in the Middle East: Wang Shijie (2002-
2006), Sun Bigan (2006-2009), Wu Sike (2009-September 2014) and Gong Xiaosheng (September 2014 – present). China’s peacemaking efforts so far, however, have been far from impressive. China apparently wants to see a resolution of the Israel/Palestine conflicts as this would likely reduce the influence of the U.S. in the region, but Chinese leaders have not demonstrated a strategy and substantial resources committed to such efforts.

China believes that its most important mission is to encourage the parties in dispute to negotiate. China’s specific position on the Middle East issue was stated in its 2003 Five Point Proposal. Basically, China supports the “road map” approach, peaceful negotiations, an end to violence, an independent Palestinian state, the establishment of an international supervisory mechanism, the land for peace principle as a basis for negotiations, negotiations with Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, and greater involvement of the international community in the peace process. In many press statements China has made clear that part of its “land for peace” concept is that the borders should be negotiated to pre-1967 lines, the Golan Heights should be returned to Syria, and Jerusalem should be the capital of Palestine.

Since 2002, China’s position has been quite consistent. While these fundamental tenets have been well received by the Arab states, Beijing obviously lacks the carrots and sticks to exert pressure on the parties concerned to come to agreement. Its veto at the U.N. Security Council seems to be the only effective diplomatic weapon, but it is extremely rarely exercised alone.

In 1996, China established its first strategic partnership with Russia which was considered a special long-term arrangement symbolizing close co-operation but short of an alliance and not directed against any third country. However, as more and more strategic partnerships have been established, their significance has been in decline. In the Middle East, China now enjoys a strategic partnership with Egypt (1999), Saudi Arabia (1999), Algeria (2004), Turkey (2010), and the UAE (2012). These strategic partnerships do not seem to have rich contents.

In July 2004, the finance ministers of the six GCC states visited Beijing where they concluded a “Framework Agreement on Economic, Trade, Investment and Technological Co-operation” with China and
agreed to negotiate a China-GCC free trade zone covering goods, services, and investment. Between 2004 and 2012, six rounds of negotiations were held. When then Premier Wen Jiabao visited Riyadh in January 2012, he and the Secretary General of the GCC Abdullatif al-Zayani agreed to speed up the negotiations. The negotiations took part in the context of the GCC states’ objective of achieving economic diversification, but progress so far appears to be limited, both sides probably have not accorded a high priority to the bilateral free trade zone.

China’s Image, Appeal and Soft Power in the Middle East

As China–Arab relations develop in the past two decades, it is often considered that the “rise of China” has an appeal among the Arab elite and intellectuals. China has the potential to balance against the U.S.; and its economic success and modernization model may generate positive perceptions about the country and its authoritarian political culture. China has not been tainted by imperialism and colonialism; it claims to be a part of the Third World and has usually been in support of the Non-aligned Movement; and its Oriental heritage may contribute to a positive assessment too.

The Arab elite in general desires a transformation in its region’s existing geopolitical situation, and the support of a non-traditional emerging power not associated with the status quo powers, namely, the U.S. and Israel, is welcome. China’s relatively active cultural diplomacy, its emphasis on its unique historical and religious links with the Arab world, and its discourse of its “peaceful rise”, though far from being able to make a significant impact, should also generate a favourable reception. The most important appeal of China is related to the Arab world’s desire to escape from unipolar hegemony; and as the European Union and Russia have failed to provide a credible check on American influence in the Middle East, China is seen as the only credible alternative.

Despite these assumptions, as observed by Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi, Arab public opinion towards China, since 2008 has not been very
positive. According to the Pew survey’s dataset of 2010, 54% of the respondents in Egypt, 71% in Jordan, and 54% in Lebanon reported that they believed China’s economic growth had an overall positive impact on their national economies. By contrast, when asked if growing Chinese military power constituted a net gain for their countries, the numbers were largely reversed: 55% of the respondents in Egypt, 56% of those in Jordan, and 57% of those in Lebanon described it as negative.

In an early 2005 survey conducted by the Arab American Institute, it was revealed that 15% of the Egyptians, 38% of the Moroccans, 26% of the Jordanians, 25% of the Lebanese and 41% of the Saudis polled showed unfavourable opinions about China. In a subsequent poll conducted by the same institute in 2011, Arab attitudes towards China became even less favourable and more polarized. 43% of the Egyptians, 40% of the Moroccans, 44% of the Jordanians, 29% of the Lebanese, and 66% of the Saudis surveyed indicated unfavourable impressions of China. The latter survey was actually completed in the first half of 2011 before the emergence of the Syrian uprising, the subsequent condemnation of the vetoes in the U.N. Security Council by China and Russia by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, and the mobilization of the latter countries for the cause.

According to Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi’s observations, the media commentary as a whole in Saudi Arabia in recent years has revealed new trends of skepticism and pessimism about China. These trends are based on Western criticisms such as its poor human rights record and the authoritarian nature of the Party regime, old Cold War perceptions of Communist China in the country, and new negative observations like the unsatisfactory quality of Chinese products, the Uighur riots in Xinjiang and the Chinese vetoes concerning the Syrian issue at the U.N. Security Council. Similar trends apparently can be found in the media of other GCC states.

As the media in the region tend to follow the official lines, independent and sophisticated analyses are few. The Chinese authorities have also made no attempt to influence the local media to improve China’s image among the local population. As long as the regional governments have 20 intention to give up the cultivation of good relations with China, regional media reports on China are expected to be largely positive. But a
better understanding of China would require a lot of local efforts which should be forthcoming slowly as local think tanks and academics begin to study China seriously; and their counterparts in China are ready to offer support for such efforts.

Chinese officials and scholars have been quite ready to admit the inadequacies in communications between China and the Arab world, but the response tends to emphasize strengthening propaganda efforts rather than genuine understanding. Qian Xiaoqian, then deputy head of the State Council Information Office, attended the Forum of China–Arab Co-operation in Media in April 2008 and frankly stated: “Compared with other aspects of China–Arab relations, especially the polity and economy states, the communion of media between China and Arabia lag. There are only a few reports about the development of Chinese–Arabic relations, reflecting the positive and significant changes in various sides of people’s lives. The news about history, culture and even the travel industries both in China and Arabic countries remains infrequent as well. This does nothing but baffle the sense of understanding between Chinese and Arabs.”

Another scholar, Liu Xinlu, offers detailed observations on these inadequacies. In the first place, China only publishes one magazine Jinri Zhongguo (China Today) in the Arabic language, published and distributed in Egypt. This magazine has no commercial sales network outside Egypt, hence its impact on the Arab world and the GCC states is limited. Further, international radio broadcast by China Radio International in the Arabic language actually started in the 1960s; but its impact has been in decline since the 1990s because of keen competition from satellite television which has become increasingly common among Arab countries. Worse still, this broadcast is still transmitted by short waves, and the reception is inconvenient and often of a low quality.

The neglect of the Arab world was also reflected in the establishment of the Confucius Institutes. In early 2013, there were only seven Confucius Institutes, one Confucius classroom and one Confucius Broadcast classroom in the twenty-two Arab countries, about 1% of the total. In the autumn of 2014, in the GCC states, there were only two Confucius Institutes in the UAE and one in Bahrain. Since the establishment of the Forum of China–Arab Co-operation, many contracts have been
concluded on the translation and publication of books from China in the Arabic language, but implementation is unsatisfactory. In view of the Arab resentment against the suppression of the riots in Xinjiang in 2009, there has been no explanation of China’s position available in the Arabic language. The only publications on Xinjiang in the Arabic language are the literature on the investment policy in Xinjiang.

According to the Zogby International poll in 2010, only 2% of the respondents were willing to consider China as an option for overseas studies; China was second last in terms of popularity and just above Russia which only managed to attract 1% of the respondents.61 Eight tertiary institutions from China participated in the Dubai International Education Exhibition in May 2010, and obviously few Arab students were interested in them.

These public statements probably mean that the Chinese authorities are now well aware of the inadequacies and are ready to make further efforts as they better appreciate the significance of the Arab world in Chinese diplomacy. In the author’s interviews with China’s Arab experts at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Beijing University in December 2013, they were ready to admit that China’s Gulf policy had been encountering serious challenges as China’s involvement in the region had been deepening and yet it could not achieve breakthroughs while the U.S. and the Western countries still dominated the region.

Though many Arab governments have appealed to the Chinese leadership to assume a more significant role in the Middle East, the Arab public in recent years have expressed some dissatisfaction with China’s foreign policy in the region. China’s experts are aware that simply stressing China’s lack of selfish interests, its eagerness to promote negotiations and its offer of peace proposals may not be enough; and it becomes easily trapped in a predicament of being “accepted by all parties, but failed to satisfy any party”.62 China certainly has not been perceived as a country exerting significant influence in the Middle East.

There is also a certain “China threat” perception among the GCC states.63 They are concerned whether the history of the relations between the Arab world and the Western countries would be repeated in those between the Arab world and China. The threat has been perceived in these ways. China imports energy from the GCC states and
exports manufactured products to them, this trade pattern may constitute neo-colonialism. Further, in view of the weak industrial base in the GCC states, the infl ow of Chinese manufactured products may threaten the development of local industries. Finally, some Chinese enterprises operating in the Gulf region often violent local laws on labour, environmental protection, etc., generating a bad image. Some devout Muslims in the GCC states also worry that China’s socialist culture may present a threat to the local Islamic culture, and resent the suppression of the Muslims in China by the Chinese authorities.

In the social arena, there is some resentment too against the “ugly Chinese” phenomena. As more Chinese move to the GCC states to settle or engage in economic activities, devout Muslims dislike some of their behavior involving drinking, prostitution, careless dressing habits, etc. as disrespect for the local culture.64

Chinese leaders’ concern about the “Arab Spring” has been in the general context of the maintenance of the Party regime’s monopoly of political power. Their usual position articulated in the international community has been non-interferences in another country’s domestic affairs. In the Munich Security Policy Conference held in early February 2012, U.S. Senator John McCain stated clearly that the U.S. subscribed to a set of values and principles, and that the “Arab Spring” should arrive at China. Beijing’s deputy foreign minister, Zhang Zhijun stressed that the idea of the “Arab Spring” appearing in China was only an illusion. Zhang quoted an opinion survey by a Western Agency indicating that over 70% of the people in China were satisfied with the government, and in fact China ranked ahead of all the countries polled.65

In commenting on the Ukrainian situation in February 2014, Chinese media quoted Nikolay Surkov, as associate professor of the State Moscow Institute of International Relations, in comparing the political developments in Kiev with the “Arab Spring”. Surkov perceived the basic similarity of ordinary people going to the streets to oppose corruption, suppression of their rights and poverty. He believed that the protesters against Viktor Yanukovych had carefully studied the successful experiences of their counterparts in the “Arab Spring”. He also explained why the Russian foreign ministry has issued a warning against the dangers of the extremists coming to power.66
Some sources reported the discussions of the Party Central Leadership Group on National Security on policy measures to deal with the challenges of the China version of the “Arab Spring”. A study reflected certain optimism indicating that five significant domestic factors contributing to the “Arab Spring” revolutions did not exist in China, i.e. the high percentage of young population, multi-party system, media freedom, freedom of registration for civil society groups, and easy access for foreign non-governmental organizations. (NGOs)

A different view from the Central Party School argued that the phenomenon of many grassroots high school students abandoning the university entrance examination was a serious hidden problem. This view led to the ministry of education being included in the Party Central Leadership Group and the termination of further expansion of student recruitment by China’s tertiary institutions. It was also observed that unemployment youth had almost doubled in the past year and more in China’s small cities to the tune of over 30 million; meanwhile, in the second half of 2011, robberies rose by 170% involving mainly unemployed young people. The bankruptcy danger of China’s social security programmes was also highlighted as a potential danger.

Xinjiang and Tibet remain problem ideas, and are often perceived as platforms for “Western anti-China forces” to induce an “Arab Spring” in China. The Chinese authorities noted that in March 2012, 1,200 cities and towns in Germany hoisted the flag of the Tibetan government in exile to commemorate the uprising in Tibet in 1959 led by the Dalai Lama. Regarding Xinjiang, Chinese leaders have been stepping up their co-operation with members of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization to strengthen domestic stability in Central Asia.

**Conclusion**

China’s approach towards the GCC states is an interesting case study as it reflects the challenges of China’s foreign policy in its emergence as a major power. When China’s involvement in global affairs remained limited, it could easily hold on to its principles. But when its involvement deepens, and expectations of the concerned parties rise, Chinese lead-
ers realize that a declaration of abstract principles is far from adequate, though they still want to demonstrate that they maintain a principled foreign policy line. As these principles are in accord with China’s interests and their implementation would contribute to China’s image-building.

China’s policy towards the GCC states has to be defined in a complex regional context with plenty of local rivalries and serious major power competition. Chinese leaders obviously intend to maintain a balance among several interests which sometimes may be in conflict: a) uphold China’s foreign policy principles with an emphasis on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs; b) maintain a peaceful international environment so as to enable China to pursue its modernization and catch up with the most advanced countries in the world; c) maintain a peaceful regional environment in line with the above and to protect China’s regional interests; d) allow China to preserve good relations with all countries in the region; and e) avoid a major confrontation with the U.S. while limiting its regional hegemony and promoting regional as well as global multipolarity. On this basis, China seeks to strengthen economic ties with the GCC states to enhance its energy security and serve its economic development needs.

In view of its limited power projection capability and the desire to restrict its commitment of resources and reduce risks, the Chinese authorities have developed several policy mechanisms which have proved to be relatively cost-effective. China’s basic positions on the core issues and conflicts in the region have been well received by the GCC states and their neighbours, but it has neither the carrots nor the sticks to exert adequate pressure on the parties concerned to arrive at its desired outcomes. Hence Chinese leaders are aware that it is not perceived as a committed and influential actor in the region.

China’s status and relative influence in the region, however, have been much helped by the following three factors: a) China’s substantial and expanding trade with the GCC states; b) the latter’s welcome of China to assume a more significant role in the region to hedge against the U.S. and enhance their diplomatic manoeuvrability; and c) the inhibitions of the U.S. to intervene militarily in the region like a surgical
strike to punish Syria for its use of chemical weapons or one to wipe out Iran’s nuclear facilities. Though China’s positions on Syria and Iran are not favoured by the GCC states, under such circumstances, China’s regional peace proposals and its role at the U.N. and other relevant international conferences may have more impact.

China’s implementation of multi-level diplomacy in the Gulf region is especially challenging because of several factors. In the first place, the Arab League has many serious disputes among its members, and the deliberations in the China-Arab States Co-operation Forum is not as smooth as those in the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. China’s respective approaches to Syria, Iran and the Israel-Palestine conflict often create difficulties in its relations with the GCC states. The U.S.-China Middle East Dialogue has limited impact because in contrast to issues in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. does not yet recognize China as a significant player in the region. People-to-people diplomacy too has to overcome many cultural barriers.

Time is probably on China’s side, and this expectation serves to strengthen China’s regional influence too. Meanwhile, Chinese leaders are learning to cope with their intention to enhance China’s role in the Gulf region which will involve increasingly significant Chinese interests, and to manage international and regional expectations. There seems to be a readiness to admit their relative inexperience and inadequacy, at least on the part of the official think-tank experts.

Notes

1 The Gulf Co-operation Council was formed on May 25, 1981 and currently has six members: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
2 The annual Gulf Research Meetings held at Cambridge University offer very useful background materials.
3 The Arab League is the oldest functioning regional organization and was formed in March 1945. At present it has 21 members: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Syria has recently been ex-
pelled from the organization.


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25 Qatar, China in 25-year Gas Deal,” The Peninsula (Doha), (March 8, 2009).


30 Zhang Mei, “China’s Interests in the Gulf-Beyond Economic Relations?”, Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, Perspectives 004, (November 2009), p. 10.


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37 See Abdulaziz Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil Risks and Rewards”, in Abdulaziz Sager and Geoffrey Kemp (eds.), *China’s Growing Role In the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond*, (Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Washington, D.C., USA: Gulf Research Center and The Nixon Center, 2010), p. 15.

38 Ibid., p. 16.


41 Luo Yuan, “China’s Strategic Interests in the Gulf and the Trilateral Relations among China, the U.S. and Arab Countries”, in Abdulaziz Sager and Geoffrey Kemp (eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 29.


43 Aida M.Yehia Salah El Din, “The causes of the Egyptian youth’s participa-


46 See “Xinhua: Egypt Welcomes China’s Active Role in Mideast Peace Process” Beijing Xinhua in English, (November 7, 2002); and “Syrian Vice President Discusses Mideast Situation With Visiting PRC Envoy 10 Nov”, Xinhua Hong Kong Service, (November 10, 2002).


48 For a discussion on China’s strategic partnerships, see Evan S. Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification, (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2009), pp. 82–89.


50 “China, GCC agree to accelerate FTA negotiations”, China Daily (Beijing), (January 16, 2012), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012ngcforum/2012-01/16/content_15972616.htm


55 Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi, op.cit., pp.5–6.
And overall do you think that China’s growing military power is a good thing or a bad thing for our country? (Survey: Spring 2011, Spring 2010, Spring 2008, Spring 2007)

Turning to China, overall do you think that China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country? (Survey: Spring 2011, Spring 2010, Spring 2008, Spring 2007, Spring 2005)

For the Pew survey dataset, see http://www.pewglobal.org/

For the Arab American Institute public opinion survey data:
(Attitudes of Arabs 2005) http://aai.3cdn.net/f82a26b554af8f607d_g6m-6bej0w.pdf


Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi, opcit., p.11.


“Shishi Fenxi: Alabo Zhichun yi Manyan zhi Jifu (Current Affairs Analysis: Arab Spring Has Spread to Kiev)”, Toushi Eluosi (Seeing Through Russia),
Introduction

It is thanks to Professor Pekka Korhonen that the Asian Studies in Political Science at the University of Jyväskylä are widely known around the world. His research interests in world politics and Asian studies, especially East Asian politics, had attracted me to know more about the university’s political science unit. Therefore, through his research interests (prospective) researchers with Asian focus and/or from Asia would seek more information in the university’s profile. Thus, when I finally became a doctoral student in the University of Jyväskylä, I was happy that Prof. Pekka Korhonen became one of my doctoral thesis supervisors.

My research is supervised by both Prof. Kari Palonen and Prof. Pekka Korhonen. Prof. Palonen (henceforth, Kari) is an expert in parliamentary studies, with a European perspective, and Prof. Pekka Korhonen (henceforth, Pekka) is an experienced scholar in world politics, especially in Asia, with Japan or East Asia as his specialty. My research focus-
es on Indonesian parliament and its politics, thus I thought, would be fruitful under their guidance, with the strong parliamentary ideals based on the European perspective and Asian specialty. To my surprise, many colleagues at the department expressed their concerns when knowing that these two distinguished professors would be my supervisors. The concern of my colleagues revolved around whether the strong views (and probably insistence) of two professors might leave me in a difficult position to accommodate different views in my research. I appreciated my colleagues’ concern, but at that time, I was confident. I knew that my research would be much better under the guidance of two supervisors, instead of one.

Probably being an Indonesian, I am familiar with the situation. There is one famous Indonesian remark, “rowing between two rocks” (mengayuh di antara dua karang), of Indonesia was being adaptive to two world’s super power, which reminded me of my situation. I knew I would be fine. Now in the latest stage of my doctoral research, I can certify that - despite of my colleagues’ sympathy - their concern was not proved to be true, and I am glad my thesis turns out to be as I planned it would be.

I admit that I had to face a double challenge in my research - my non-academic background and different academic tradition - which I had discussed earlier in a festschrift article for Kari (Adiputri, 2015). However, to certain extents, especially in the context of Asian studies and cultures, Pekka understood my situation better and also helped me to get through those challenges. In this paper, I want to show how Pekka has contributed much in my research: Pekka has tremendously helped and guided me in finishing my doctoral research. I think, in general, Pekka has developed the profile for research in Asian studies in the university. In showing this, I will discuss my research first, then Pekka’s contribution in the research and the prospect of research in Asian Studies through Pekka’s expertise.

Research on the Indonesian parliament

My research discusses the political culture in the Indonesian parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), through analyzing its parliamenta-
ry procedure and debates of bills related to the country’s regional parlia-
ments, the **Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah** (DPRDs), in the timeframe
of 1999 - 2009. Addressing the political culture inside the DPR, I stud-
i ed parliamentary minutes and legislative procedures and analyzed the
language used in parliamentary debates. Five laws on regional parlia-
ments (under two different type of laws: *Susduk* and *Pemda* laws) dur-
ing a timeframe of one important decade was analyzed. This includes
three of parliamentary periods: DPR in 1999; in 1999 - 2004; and in

In my study, I analyze the Indonesian concepts of parliament, at both
the national and regional levels. I argue that the distinctive features of
the parliaments have been shaped by Indonesian political culture and
by its legislative process. The Indonesian political culture has revolved
around Dutch colonialism, Javanese tribalism, Islam and its military tra-
dition and combination of these display high influence of authoritarian
style in politics. In the parliament, distinctive features of Indonesian par-
liamentary culture are: the forum-style of parliament; the seeking of an
acceptable compromise in the deliberation process; legislation based on
discussion; and different parliamentary features and traditions that shape
the vague concept of the regional parliaments. This only confirms that
the parliamentary procedure in the DPR is still influenced by the legacy
of the previous authoritarian regimes, especially in the legislative process.

In this research, I try to combine the focus of parliamentary proce-
dure that Kari’s group members usually focus on. Combining this focus
with the recent trend of studying Indonesian politics – democratization
process and local/regional governance, I hope the research contributes
to show on an interesting political relationship between governments of
the national and regional levels, through the parliamentary lens.

The use of parliamentary minutes as research material in the study,
another distinctive style of Kari’s group members, also brings novelty in
Indonesian studies. In fact, in studying the parliamentary debates care-
fully, I was able to map out the legislative process inside the DPR and
understand the parliamentary procedure of the DPR better. The re-
search emphasizes how the political culture of parliament played a sig-
nificant role in the forms the democratization process took, as seen for
the law-making for the regional parliaments.
As seen here, my research discusses the parliamentary institutions, both at the national and regional levels, in Indonesia. Thus, the parliamentary expert, such as Kari, is suitable to supervise my thesis. However, under the context of Indonesia, and Asia in general, Pekka’s expertise is needed. Pekka gave useful feedback on how to structure the thesis, and detailed the information on Japan’s role during the independence period in Indonesia, a detail that I think only Pekka knew due to his East Asian specialty.

**Pekka contribution in my research**

Pekka’s support in my research is essential in many ways. I was a (former) parliamentary staff when I started my doctoral study in the University of Jyväskylä. With my non-academic background, I did not know how to start an academic research in the first place. I visited libraries, joined many basic courses (even Finnish language courses), and participated in many academic discussions and conferences, but I still did not know how to start up a “proper” research. I had a research proposal, but I did not think I wrote it with a comprehensive view on the topic. Here, Pekka helped me. We discussed the initial idea of my research and he advised me to take a look at the books used by students of political science at the University of Jyväskylä, as a start. Reading references for students (even for a bachelor degree) provided me general views of what students in our unit did, I understand more about the “Jyväskylä’s style”, which its emphasis on rhetoric, conceptual history and political theory.

Pekka also gave constructive comments in papers that I wrote. Pekka reminded me to always refer to my doctoral research so my (conference) papers later on would be useful for part of my chapters. I was grateful to Pekka, who structured my research into focusing only on three periods of parliaments. This division enabled me to focus on certain period: the period’s political contributions, events, legislative procedure and I integrate his idea into my dissertation.

Pekka also offered me to teach a lecture. It was an obligation for a doctoral student to teach, under the contract of the Academy of Finland, in which I was a member, but he assured me (despite a huge effort
to prepare a lecture) that teaching would be useful for me to construct my research too. I agreed to Pekka’s offer. I knew that I lacked of academic experience and I thought at that time that teaching would develop my research, at least I will read and compile the references needed for both the research and the lecture. I prepared my lecture on Indonesian politics for an introductory level. Then, when I had an opportunity for a research visit to Leiden in 2010, it was for collecting references for both doctoral research and lecture preparation.

Teaching turned out to be a stimulating academic activity for me. Not only I shared what I know about Indonesian politics, students also got benefits from the lecture. I became more confident in my research topic, as students also gave encouraging feedback. In one of the feedback that I received, the student wrote that the lecture was interesting because it was delivered by a native speaker who shared pictures and videos from the local sources, instead only an English-version source. The success of the lecture opened an opportunity to have the lecture online so many students from the universities in Finland - and not only for the University of Jyväskylä - may participate in the lecture. The lecture was supported by the University Network for Asian Studies, based in the University of Turku, and it ran for 3 consecutive semesters in 2011 – 2012, after the normal live lecture. I prepared the lecture into an online format and it was a new experience again in organising the lecture: video-taping, shortening the lecture material, and organising virtual availability for certain time. The number of students also increased double, as lecture participants came from all over Finland, and not only students from the University of Jyväskylä.

In one of the lectures, I also shared my research topic and received a useful feedback from students. Pekka also participated in one lecture, it was on the topic of Indonesian election. After the lecture, I received useful comment to add more theoretical background from Pekka, but he also appreciate the short video clip about one election campaign in Indonesia. We both agreed that students would grasp better with pictures and videos, instead only by slides provided by a lecturer. Actually, I learned this style of providing links to videos and pictures related to the lecture’s topic from Pekka’s lectures. Thus, it is interesting to know that Pekka appreciated this too.
I was also lucky to be part of the Doctoral School of Contemporary Asian Studies (DAS), where Pekka was also a board member. Every semester, the DAS group would meet at certain city around Finland in which students presented their latest paper or chapter and the board members gave comments on students’ presentation. These meetings were really helpful for me to move forward with my research and also to provide opportunities to visit different cities in Finland. Moreover, the students also had stronger connection due to the similarity in Asian research, a peer-support that still continues even if the project already finished in 2013.

Pekka also is the one who concerned with the English in my papers and thesis. Sometimes, he expressed this in a straight forward manner, which made me feel terrible as if I did not know any good English at all. But, I know that Pekka was right and he only wanted me to write the paper in correct English, which I still need to learn a lot. I knew that his criticism was not personal and only for helping to clarify my arguments better, and due to this, I needed to ask a friend to read my paper before I sent it to Pekka. I tried to express Indonesian concepts in English and being in Finnish environment, I do not much opportunity to practice using English except in my research work. Because of this, the argument becomes not clear in English. I certainly need to practice (writing) more and should not feel discouraged with this weakness. Thanks to Pekka, I noticed my weakness in English and am trying to overcome it, which certainly needs more time for improving.

Apart from such academic support, Pekka also helped me adjusting better in Finland and getting used to the Finnish way of life. Few months before my doctoral studies started, when I had a chance to visit Finland, Pekka offered me to stay at his beautiful country-side home. I stayed with his family and learned how a Finnish family lives, which had enabled me to survive better living in Finland. I learned about Finland for the first time from this initial visit. I learned from Pekka and his friendly family members how Finnish people have their breakfast - with either porridge, bread or sour cream with honey - which all were foreign to an Indonesian like me. I also experienced sauna and its rituals for the first time.

Pekka also took me to the local supermarket and I learned how simple things as shopping were different from my tradition back home. In Indonesia, especially in a big supermarket, there is always someone to
put the groceries to the plastic bags after paying. The plastic bags are also offered for free (it was part of the supermarket’s services). In contrast, here in Finland, customer has to do it all independently, like measuring the vegetables and fruits, put the groceries in their own grocery bags/baskets, and pay the plastic bag if they don’t bring their own. I also realized that in Finland, most instructions are only in Finnish and Swedish. Apparently, only knowing English was not enough, so at that time, when I did not have any knowledge of either these two languages, I was grateful to know from Pekka about certain ingredients that I could not eat, like the term ‘pork’ in Finnish, since I do not eat pork. I noted down all the terms that I needed to know and these all turned out to be fruitful when I start my life in Finland afterwards.

**Prospect of Asian research under Pekka’s influence**

Being non-Finnish researcher studying Asia in the University of Jyväskylä, I could not help feeling alone and being aside from the rest of the group members whose research was on Europe or Western (parliamentary) politics. However, with Pekka being there in the unit, I know that Asian studies have always had a place in the department. Sometimes it was unusual to study about Indonesia in Finland in the university that is not known for Indonesian or Southeast Asian studies. Pekka understood my situation, referring his research experience in Japan. Despite the “loneliness” in Finland, I know that I have expanded my scope of knowledge, by combining research on Indonesian (Asian) studies, parliamentary studies and Europeanisms. At the same time, I also developed a special bond with the Finnish academic circle.

I think with Pekka in the unit of political science, the university in general will provide a stimulating environment for Asian studies in Finland. Pekka offers expertise in Asian studies for students, and he also understands a different culture that an Asian student needs to face when living in Finland, as my example above shows. Students who come from Asia add internationalization value for the university, but they need more support to adapt and to integrate their lives in the new country, with different cultural and academic traditions. The university ideally must have someone who may address this challenge, which is beyond
an administrative support. Pekka has such quality, having experiences himself living in Asia, being a foreigner in a new environment and understanding Asian cultures better. I know that I get many benefits of having Pekka as my supervisor. Pekka definitely is also a valuable asset for the University, especially regarding the Asian studies.

In early 2009, I had an opportunity to see one of Pekka’s online lectures on the concept of Asia. It was an interesting lecture of Asian politics. I was fascinated by a clear presentation, combined with statistical numbers, maps, and links to videos related to the countries. Pekka is an expert in finding interesting information from the online sources and the lecture becomes lively and interesting. If a student interested in Asian studies participated in this lecture, it was no wonder that she/he would be inspired by many interesting issues presented from countries in Asia: cultural and social plurality; variety of languages, religions, historical background; and wide range of contemporary issues as governance, globalization, economy, politics etc. Pekka also speaks Japanese and Chinese, besides many European languages, and this gives him more chances to access local references, instead of relying only English sources, for example. He advised me also on this: to always check the original resources, preferably in the original language, if possible.

I think Pekka had always compared Europe and Asia in his research: how the idea and concept developed in Europe and Asia are different yet relate to each other. For example, an idea of the difference between concept of integration in Europe and in the Asian Pacific area. Pekka wrote more than 20 years ago that:

European integration has proceeded as institutional integration and its history can be written as a process of distinct decisions and agreements leading to various institutional structures. The integration process taking place in the Asian Pacific area, on the other hand, has been mainly functional, characterized by slowly deepening cooperation between economies - rather than states - in various fields, accompanied by a continuous process of discussion among various professionals, which has only occasionally come into the spotlight at the state level6 (Korhonen, 1994: 2).
For me, it is an interesting quotation and it shows that different tradition, or political culture, always exists between Europe and Asia. Pekka's interest in different conceptual meaning between Europe and Asia is illuminating. I understand this, as being an Asian living in Europe, I always feel the sense of difference but could not point out exactly on the difference.

As researchers, our task is to understand and to explain the situation (or the event, the tradition) without judging it with a prescribed “formula”. Pekka has shown that being an European citizen interested in Asia (or world politics), it is essential to be in the country that he studied: learning the language, and even living for some times there. This is an example that a future student might like to follow in order to build a certain country expertise. And nowadays, there are so many opportunities for study-exchange from Europe to Asia and vice versa, and in the future, I hope the difference between two continents can be understood by two different cultures bridged together. Somehow, topics of different traditions and political culture become my main interest in the research.

While Pekka’s contribution in my research is tremendous, I think, Pekka also continues to offer specific specialty in the department, and in the University of Jyväskylä. His research projects funded by the Academy of Finland (see website of Korhonen): The East and the Idea of Europe; Asia as a Name; The Concept of World Politics: and recently on East-West Conceptual Contestations, have spoken for themselves that Asian studies remain to be important in the University of Jyväskylä and it is a significant profile in itself. Asian studies need to be settled in a strong research place, and Pekka shows that he is able to offer this.

Pekka’s recent research project, East-West Conceptual Contestations (Academy of Finland funded research project 2015-2018), for example, offers a research on “conceptualizations of the structure and functioning of the world in East Asia and the West” (Korhonen, website). It is clear from this project, or throughout his projects, that Pekka tries to research the link between Asia and Europe, seeing from “Western concepts”. Actually, while Pekka’s research offers ideas from Western concept, there is another research opportunity from another end, from Eastern (or Asian) concepts. It will be fruitful in the future research to
address relationship between Asia and Europe, from Eastern or Asian concepts, even including Asian researcher to enrich the ideas.

Pekka’s special emphasis on “China, Japan, the Koreas and Southeast Asia” suggests broader area studies of Asia, a total of 17 countries already and this broad areas will offer interesting research site to study “political and world political theory, rhetorical and narrative theory, and conceptual history”, which is suitable for Pekka’s main fields of interests. The opportunities are vast and may build certain profile of Asian studies in Finland. With the idea of merging the faculties in the University of Jyväskylä (where social sciences will merge with humanities), the prospect of Asian Studies can also be enhanced to be a big and stronger unit in the future. I am sure that with Pekka, Asian studies in the University of Jyväskylä will continue to prevail.

Conclusion

Pekka offers a good asset for the University of Jyväskylä, especially for the Department of Social Sciences, the unit of political science, to upgrade its profile in Asian Studies. As I show above, Pekka Korhonen has given tremendous support in my research and I think I can be a living example in the university how his support has developed my research and my life in Finland positively, especially in understanding Asian tradition in better way in Finnish surrounding. I thank Pekka for his tremendous support in my research and wish him more successful endeavour in the future.

Notes

1 For Asians, like me, addressing professor by only their first name and without using their title is considered rude. Although they asked me to call their first names, it took me a while to call both my supervisors in such as style. Later, after living in Finland for quite some time, I understand how this equality reflects from its society, among other social values that are different from Asian culture.
It was a famous saying, stated by the first vice president of Indonesia, Moh. Hatta. He stated it in his speech in 1948 to describe Indonesian situation in 1940s in the context of Cold War between communist and liberalist. Indonesia, Hatta advised, should practice free and active foreign policy, impartial and did not support one block over the other, meaning did not support neither the United States nor the Soviet Union at that time. This policy was later adopted to be the Indonesian foreign policy.

Susduk is abbreviated from the term Susunan dan Kedudukan, a routine law enacted in the every period of Indonesian parliament on the Structural Organization of Representative Institution. Likewise, Pemda is an abbreviation from Pemerintahan Daerah, the law on Regional Governance, which regulated regional affairs.

‘Ritual’ here means the sequence to exercise sauna: taking a bath, sitting quietly inside in a hot smoky room, pouring water into the hot stones if necessary, going outside if feel too hot, taking another shower, and coming inside the sauna room again. Then when finished, cleaning your body in shower, and relaxing, sometimes by drinking cold soda or alcoholic drinks.

Indonesian studies are usually became research focus in America, Australia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, or in some universities in Germany or Denmark (where Nordic Institute of Asian Studies/NIAS situated). When I participated conferences for Indonesian studies, most participants would inquire more on my being in Finland.

References


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