Hybrid Practices Meet Nation State Language Policies: Transcarpathia in the 20th Century and Today

1 Introduction

One of the famous anecdotes on the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and its successor states goes as follows: “A visitor, encountering one of the oldest local inhabitants, asks about his life. The reply: ‘I was born in Austria-Hungary, I went to school in Czechoslovakia, I did my army service in Horthy’s Hungary, followed by a spell in prison in the USSR. Now I am ending my days in independent Ukraine.’ The visitor expresses surprise at how much of the world the old man has seen. ‘But no!’, he responds, ‘I’ve never left this village!’” (Butt 2002: 155). The village lies in Transcarpathia, today a part of Ukraine, which is the focus of this article.

![Map of Ukraine showing Transcarpathia](https://www.naturalearthdata.com)

**Figure 1:** Current Transcarpathia in Ukraine (map created by István D. Molnár, source: www.naturalearthdata.com)

Geographically the territory with a current population of nearly 1.2 million inhabitants borders on the Carpathian Mountains from North-East, and partly the river Tisza from the
South. Thus the varying names, according to whether we view the region from the West/South (Subcarpathia), or as officially today, from the North/East (Transcarpathia).

The aim of this article is to describe and explain long term local and wider language policy processes in the region in order to understand their present trajectories. Our approach is that of a critical study of language policy (e.g. Shohamy 2006). The whirlwinds of European history have been accompanied by changes in language policy, with the status of minority and majority languages changing with each switch of state affiliation. Even the definition of what counted as a language and what was defined as a dialect among the Slavic varieties changed according to which entity ruled the region. Table 1 shows that during the 20th century the present-day Transcarpathian region belonged to several different states: the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and finally to Ukraine.

Table 1: Political status of the region between 1867 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State affiliation</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name of the region</th>
<th>Status of the region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy</td>
<td>1867–1918</td>
<td>Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa, Máramaros counties</td>
<td>Four counties of the Hungarian Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Republic of Hungary and the Hungarian Soviet Republic (HSR)</td>
<td>1918–1919</td>
<td>Ruska Craina (1918 Dec. 25); Hucul Republic (Гуцульська Республіка) (1919 Jan. 8)</td>
<td>The autonomy of Ruska Craina inside the HSR existed only in theory. The Hucul Republic referred to the eastern part of the HSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak Republic</td>
<td>1919–1938</td>
<td>Podkarpatska Rus</td>
<td>Autonomy was not implemented in practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Czech-Slovak Republic</td>
<td>1938–1939</td>
<td>Podkarpatska Rus, (Подкарпатська Русь)</td>
<td>An autonomous territory within the federal Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpathian Ukraine</td>
<td>Mar. 14–15, 1939</td>
<td>Carpathian Ukraine (Карпатська Україна)</td>
<td>Declared independence, however it was not recognized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Kingdom</td>
<td>1939–1944</td>
<td>Subcarpathian Province (Карпатальяй Kormányzóság)</td>
<td>The territory was ruled by a “temporary” governor (Rusyn autonomy was not realized).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcarpathian Ukraine</td>
<td>Nov. 26, 1944 – Jan. 22, 1946</td>
<td>Transcarpathian Ukraine (Закарпатська Україна)</td>
<td>A temporary state without international recognition created by the Soviet Union prior to joining the USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union</td>
<td>1946–1991</td>
<td>Transcarpathian Oblast (Закарпатська область)</td>
<td>An administrative region within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>From 1991</td>
<td>Transcarpathian Oblast (Закарпатська область)</td>
<td>An administrative region within the independent Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The region’s identity as the westernmost part of sovereign Ukraine is still in the making.

Since 1991, there have also been significant changes in language policy in Ukraine in
general, which have greatly affected administration and education in Transcarpathia. We contextualize and interpret the contemporary language situation and language policy on the basis of current sociolinguistic theory (e.g. Pavlenko 2008; Blommaert 2010; Pennycook 2012) and the region’s place in Europe, the Post-Soviet space, Ukraine, and East-Central Europe. Contemporary linguistic practices and policies will be discussed also from the viewpoint of the changing Linguistic Landscape, where language is “not just in the heads of the people”, but a vital “part of the physical environment” (Pennycook 2012: 26). A further focus is on education, an arena where those in authority can turn ideology into practice or negotiate, demand, and introduce alternative language policies, and hence turn practice into ideology (Shohamy 2006: 76). The following map (Figure 2) shows the division of present Transcarpathia according to the different linguistic groups, as recorded in the Ukrainian 2001 census.

Figure 2: Map of Transcarpathia according to mother tongue in the 2001 census (created by István D. Molnár; sources: Vdovenko 2007; www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/notice/news.php?type=2&id1=21)
Transcarpathia as a whole has a Slavic majority and the South-Western strip has a Hungarian majority. The eastern parts have a concentration of Romanian villages bordering Romania. There are still a dwindling number of Germans left in Transcarpathia as well. Even though Rusyn was not one of the language options in the 2001 census, it is notable that some inhabitants nevertheless insisted on citing it as their “mother tongue”.

In the Hungarian Kingdom, Subcarpathia was a North-Eastern periphery, characterized by (what was then called) a Rusyn peasantry. During the division of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after World War One, the Rusyn, represented mainly by Western emigrants, strived for an independent state as well. However, due to developments in the neighboring regions (annexations of other Rusyn regions to Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia), the small number of Rusyns, and relatively weak national aspirations, Czechoslovakia was seen by influential Rusyn emigrants to be the best fit for a foster state for the Subcarpathian region (e.g. Butt 2002: 162). An almost homogenous Hungarian-speaking Western swath was annexed to Czechoslovakia together with the Rusyn parts on account of access to the plains, the Tisza river, and the railroad connection (e.g. Kamuszella 2012: 661). This strip was briefly returned to Hungary proper between 1938 and 1944, the rest being a World War Two Hungarian province. The fate of Subcarpathia was finally decided by the victorious Soviets, who moved it from Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1946. At that relatively late point in European history, the Rusyns were turned into Ukrainians and their language was downgraded to the status of a dialect of the Ukrainian language. With regards to the Rusyn, Ukraine continued the Soviet policy until 2012 when it included Rusyn among its recognized minority languages, at least formally.

This article is based on the one hand on long term research by Csernicskó, who is a local inhabitant of Transcarpathia. On the other hand, it is based on readings and several visits to the region by Laihonen, a Finnish researcher competent in Hungarian, and especially
on the one-month fieldwork carried out by him in two villages in November 2012. During this fieldwork Laihonen carried out forty interviews in Hungarian and took approximately one thousand photos. The interviews were settled through a local Hungarian contact at people’s homes. The informants were easy to find and they were very talkative. Most of the informants were Hungarians according to local categories, but four Rusyn or Ukrainian informants and two Roma families were interviewed as well.

Csernicskó is based in the Hungarian ethnic region and Laihonen carried out similar fieldwork in Hungarian enclaves in Slovakia and Romania in 2011 and 2012. Therefore, our study may be biased towards a Hungarian perspective. However, Csernicskó has also worked on Ukrainian as a second language as well as on Rusyn and Roma issues. Furthermore, the focus of Laihonen’s work has been on multilingualism and on the comparative angle. Our data takes the form of interviews, photography, and texts from various sources and ranges from language laws, “the most powerful devices used in democratic states” (Shohamy 2006: 60), to graffiti, perhaps the least “official” form of language display (e.g. Pennycook 2010).

In a groundbreaking article on the language situation in Post-Soviet space, Pavlenko (2008) has described the sociolinguistic situation and research on different countries. We heed her call for cooperation between local and Western scholars (p. 277). Furthermore, we take her Post-Soviet perspective further by investigating a special historical region rather than focusing on the state level. Transcarpathia is a special case that has remained largely unknown and essentially invisible for sociolinguistics. It is peculiar, for instance, that Pavlenko (2008, 2009, 2011, 2013) in her works often deals with different Ukrainian regions and cities, yet Transcarpathia is never mentioned. This may be regarded as evidence that Transcarpathia does not fit the general models of explanation of the Post-Soviet
space, or Ukraine. Our goal is thus to provide an autonomous and updated account and discourse analysis of the linguistic situation in Transcarpathia.

As Shohamy (2006) has argued, language policy is based on language ideologies of individuals and groups who typically have political, social, and economic goals. Pavlenko (2008: 300) in turn has established that in Post-Soviet space, language policies have served the interests of the (changing) dominant ethnic and political groups. Finally, Pavlenko (2008, 2011) sees the linguistic situation in the Post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, as a typical post-colonial linguistic regime since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, even though nation building in other parts of Ukraine is to a certain extent a case of promoting the local majority or “national” language, (e.g. Pavlenko 2011), Butt (2002: 175) has stressed that “Transcarpathia simply does not fit into a Europe of nation-states”. That is, neither the idea of the Western world’s development through nationalist modernization towards post-nationalism and globalized economy (Heller 2011) nor the postcolonial perspective (Pavlenko 2008) work in our case. Instead, in the everyday life of mobile (Pennycook 2012) Transcarpathians as well as accidental tourists in Transcarpathia, ironies and paradoxes around language repertoires, standardization, and heteroglossia come to the fore, especially in the current context of globalization (see Blommaert 2010). Such unexpected linguistic practices or “pre-nationalist” and “non-purist” ideologies still found in Europe are important since they “are tied to the possibilities of critical thought” (Pennycook 2012: 29); that is, they offer a chance to see how certain categories (such as languages) have transparently remained in their original diverse forms, or at least are still clearly “in the making”.

2 Complex historical perspectives

The proportional number of different ethnicities in the 20th century censuses in Transcarpathia demonstrates how these have developed over time; at the same time, it shows
how certain ethnicities have been defined or recognized in different periods in accordance with the requirements of different censuses. A critical stance on the numbers and categories of censuses has already been established (e.g. Moore, Pietikäinen & Blommaert 2010). However, Transcarpathia presents an extreme case illustration of how crude and relative census information can be. Figure 3 visualizes the changes in numbers and census categories.

Figure 3: Census results according to nationality/ethnicity in Transcarpathia (see Csernicskó 2013: 19 for sources)

The Slavic population of Transcarpathia was defined as Rusyn until the end of World War 2. After that, their ethnicity was redefined as Ukrainian. This move is the origin of much present controversy over the Rusyn question. For instance, Kuzio’s (2005) critical stance towards the “revival” of Rusyn leans on censuses which show that Rusyns, decisively for Kuzio, have not “revived”. However, in the same article, the author describes how the “Ukrainian academics
planning the 2001 census] refused to acknowledge that Rusyns are a nationality distinct from Ukrainians” (p. 8). Russians appear first in the Soviet period (1946-1991) in significant numbers. The Jewish population in turn was long counted among the Hungarians, and many were Hungarian first-language speakers (see Magocsi 2005). In Subcarpathia the Holocaust was carried out by Hungary, with some towns ironically losing their Hungarian-speaking majority as a result. The memory of the Subcarpathian Jewry is visible in Jewish cemeteries, now taken care of by local inhabitants in most cities (with support from Jewish organizations in the US), which have tiny communities of elderly Jews as well.

In general, the groups representing state communities or related sub-ethnicities have grown in number during their period of dominance. For instance, the number of Slovaks was highest during the Czechoslovak reign (1920-1938). Beyond the typical tendency of claiming the dominant ethnic identity, this was partly thanks to the Czechoslovak colonies established in the Hungarian enclave. Most of the now Ukrainian villages near the Hungarian border have their roots in these interwar Slavic colonies.

What is now called Transcarpathia was and still is a dominated region, a tiny periphery (see Pietikäinen & Holmes 2013) of imperiums and states. Consider for instance the geographical distances to the “imperial” and “national” capitals, where the decisions on the region and its language policies were made: Vienna (555 km), Budapest (330 km), Prague (720 km), Moscow (1600 km), and Kyiv (820 km). This confirms Pujolar’s (2013: 58) generalization that it is typical for historical linguistic minorities in Europe to occupy regions which are distant from economic and political centres. The capitals to the West – Vienna, Budapest and Prague – have meanwhile lost their historical minorities, replaced relatively recently with what May (2012: 89) calls the “modern urban migrants” typical of large Western cities.
Though peripheries often have the potential to shift in accordance with changes in perspective (Pietikäinen & Holmes 2013), Butt (2002: 157) summarizes the economic perspective on Transcarpathia as follows: “[I]t has always been the most remote, inaccessible, economically backward region of whatever state it has belonged to.” Budapest, Prague and Kyiv have all promised autonomy for the region, typically around historical turning points (1918-9, 1938-40, 1991-2), but none have put it into practice. For Budapest and Prague, the region with a Rusyn majority was an Eastern “annex”, whereas for Moscow and Kyiv it was the most Western point of dominance; that is, the “European” part of Ukraine, as some accounts (e.g. Butt 2002) refer to it. This is still symbolized today, for instance, by the use of a non-official different time-zone from Kyiv, which typically is a source of some confusion for visitors to Transcarpathia. In Figure 4, the opening hours of a café are given as ‘7.00-23.00 local time/ 8.00-24.00 Kyiv time’.

**Figure 4**: Café opening hours in Ukrainian: local and Kyiv time-zones on display (photo by Csernicskő)
In everyday life, local time is in use, while larger institutions (e.g. banks), state offices, border crossings, trains, and schools use the official “Kyiv time”.

The government centres have both used Transcarpathia as a resource (e.g. through mining) as well as bringing some “national” investments to the region: the Czech government built bridges and town centres during their rule, and the Soviet regime established the first university in the region. However, it is still too early to point to a contribution by Ukraine. Among other issues, the development of the roads and other infrastructure has been neglected by Ukraine and there is now a significant contrast between Transcarpathia and its Western neighbours (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania) that was not there in the Soviet period (cf. Jóźwiak 2013).

Next, we take a historical perspective of the approximate statuses of different languages during different eras following a modified model of Kloss’ (1967: 15) classification (1 = state language… 6 = not recognized).

Table 2: The status of major languages used in Transcarpathia/Subcarpathia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Rusyn</th>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>(Czecho)slovak</th>
<th>Romanian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Czech-Slovak Republic (1938–1939)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpathian Ukraine (1939)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian Kingdom (1938/39–1944)</td>
<td>2 (Province)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet Union (1945–1991)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine (1991-2012)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 (from 1989)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The adjusted categories of Kloss (1967: 15) denominate the following characterizations of the language:

1 Official language country-wide.

2 The official language of a larger regional unit.

3 Minority language use permitted as the language of instruction in public education etc., but no official status.

4 Tolerance towards the language in the private sphere.

5 Prohibition of the language.

6 Language status not recognized (e.g. official status of a “dialect”).

The basic adjustment to these categories is that Kloss (1967) did not consider the possibility of not recognizing a ‘language’ on the basis that it is defined as a dialect of another language. This possibility is more typical than we might think (e.g. Fishman & Garcia 2010-2011). The Rusyn vernacular is spoken by the majority of the population, and it has been (re-)recognized as a language by several states including Slovakia, Serbia, Hungary, and Poland (e.g. Magocsi 1995) as well as in principle by Ukraine in its new law on languages in 2012, which will be discussed later. However, in 1945 the Soviet regime declared Rusyn ethnicity and language as a sub-group of the Ukrainian nation and the Slavic vernaculars spoken in Transcarpathia as dialects of Ukrainian. According to Kuzio (2005: 3), one of the major justifications for the westward expansion of the Soviet Union was that such regions as Transcarpathia included large “Ukrainian” ethnic majorities, which were consistent with the Ukrainian nationalists’ claims. Thus, in Kuzio’s words (2005: 3): “the Communists hailed the ‘unification’ of Transcarpathia, as well as other regions of western Ukraine, with Soviet Ukraine in World War II as a major Soviet achievement”. The independent Ukraine found this solution even more convenient and fitting to the nation building scheme. At the same time, most ‘potential’ Rusyns in Transcarpathia have internalized the idea that Rusyn is a
dialect of Ukrainian. For instance, during fieldwork in 2012, despite being helped by locals to find “Rusyns”, Laihonen was unable to find a single informant that would state otherwise. In Kuzio’s critical (2005: 4) view, there may have been several changes in national and ethnic identity affiliation among the Slavic population of Transcarpathia in the 20th century. At the same time, Magocsi (1995) has stressed that a Post-Soviet Rusyn ethnolinguistic revival in Transcarpathia would be a natural cause of action in the context of revival of minorities throughout Europe. This stance is also followed by Butt (2002), who bases her view on local activists found in Rusyn civil associations. European institutions have supported the recognition of the independent Rusyn identity since the 1990s (Trier 1999).

According to Kushko (2007: 128): “because of its hybrid nature, Rusyn has the potential to serve as a link between different Slavic languages”. However, historical and political distance between Transcarpathia and the Ukrainian heartlands (West and Central Ukraine) is considerable. In brief, political rather than linguistic factors support or hinder the development of Rusyn towards the status of a widely perceived or imagined independent language again.

While the Rusyns were the last minority to turn against Greater Hungary, they also faced nationalizing measures by Hungarians towards the end of the 19th century that mobilized their very small elite to develop their own institutions and to fight for the use of their own language in local administration, education, media, and culture (e.g. Kuzio 2005). In principle, there were Rusyn schools in the Hungarian Kingdom and Czechoslovakia; however, the Church Slavonic and ‘Russified’ forms of Rusyn literacy were in use as much as local vernaculars.

Since the formerly common written language, Church Slavonic, slowly became defunct in the 19th century (see Rusinko 1996), the development of a common language for written use took three directions among the Rusyn: 1) the development of a Rusyn standard
Based on local dialects and Church Slavonic; 2) the use of Russian, which has an established standard and prestigious literary tradition; and 3) the development of a standard based on dialects in central Ukraine, which are much closer to Rusyn dialects than Russian (e.g. Kushko 2007). All these solutions had supporters among the Rusyn intellectuals. For instance, the most famous leader of the Rusyns, Augustin Voloshyn (1874–1945), first promoted the autonomous status of a Rusyn language and later (from 1920) turned to support the Ukrainian standpoint (Csernicskó, 2013). Among the distant centres, Hungary supported the autonomous Rusyn language. The Prague regime, which had barely any speakers of the state language in the area, in turn declared that the “language of the local people” should be used. In practice, however, in elevated (official, educational) contexts the nearest standardized “Lesser-Russian” language, that is Ukrainian in Galicia (Poland), was promoted instead of standardizing Rusyn or using Russian. In the Soviet Union, the Slavic vernaculars became a part of the Ukrainian language and Russian was the official language and the language of interethnic communication.

The different statuses of languages have been reflected in languages taught and used at schools: the states have made efforts to make the privileged language the general medium of teaching. Modernization and general education reached Subcarpathia towards the end of 19th century, along with the Hungarization process in the Hungarian Kingdom. In the Rusyn-medium schools this meant that the so called ‘patriotic subjects’ (geography, history, and citizenship) were obligatorily taught in Hungarian, and skills such as singing and sports were often taught in Hungarian as well (Berecz 2013). Languages of instruction in history have been Hungarian, Slavic languages (Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, ‘Czechoslovak’), Romanian, Hebrew, Yiddish, and German. Table 3 indicates the statuses of different languages in education.

**Table 3: Languages in education in the region during the 20th century**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Languages of Obligatory taught</th>
<th>Obligatory taught</th>
<th>Languages taught as</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Hungarian as a minority language has been used as language of instruction throughout the 20th century. In the Czech era, Czech-medium schools were established in Subcarpathia and the “Czechoslovak” language was taught in high schools as a compulsory subject.

Interestingly enough, in the Hungarian elementary schools during this period, Rusyn was taught as a compulsory second language, not as the state language.

As Pavlenko (2011: 39) emphasizes, the Soviet Union never made Russian the sole language of education; rather, it made possible “instruction in the native language” of the historical minorities. For instance, in Hungarian schools only the subject ‘patriotic education’ had to be taught in Russian. In the Soviet Union this subject covered military skills for boys and auxiliary skills for girls. In addition, Csernicskó recalls that, attendance reporting at the beginning of Physical Education classes had to be done in Russian, at least on the occasion of a school inspection. That is, where basic education was concerned, in comparison to minority languages in Western Europe, Hungarian as a minority language could be used relatively widely in Transcarpathia during the Soviet period.

More languages have been used as the medium of instruction in elementary schools (and private schools) than in (state) high schools. For instance, in the Monarchy era, Rusyn, Romanian, German, Yiddish, and Hebrew were not used as languages of instruction
for the region’s public high schools. Until 1946 foreign languages were taught only in high schools. A standardized form of Rusyn was never widely accepted, and thus written materials in the vernacular varied from school to school and from teacher to teacher wherever it was used in education before 1945.

After 1945 Rusyn was no longer taught in Transcarpathia; however, Russian became a compulsory language. This being said, local vernaculars did not disappear altogether from the schools. To begin with, in the early Soviet years, there was a lack of competent teachers of Russian. In addition, according to Fedinec (1999: 48), the local Slavic vernaculars “containing Czech, Hungarian and German expressions” were blamed for the difficulties experienced by the Transcarpathian population when learning Russian. In the 1950’s there were Soviet campaigns in some Ukrainian-medium schools to ‘purify’ the language of the pupils by getting rid of such Transcarpathian idioms.

3 Present (1991–) perspectives

In 1991, Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union. The new state of Ukraine, including Transcarpathia, has faced deep economic trouble and ethnolinguistic and political division due to the largely ‘Russian’ East and ‘Ukrainian’ West. Transcarpathia has remained an oddity, not taking part in the “Russians to Ukrainians” project and dispute. In the periods of political turmoil in Kyiv, the waves seldom reach Transcarpathia, and when they do they are typically depicted by the local population as “imported” conflicts (e.g. from Lviv).

Transcarpathia experienced the economic catastrophe that the collapse of the Soviet Union meant for Ukraine. In the 1990s Transcarpathians witnessed the change from ruble-based economy to barter trade and the use of foreign currencies. In 1996 hryvnia was introduced, but still today houses and cars are priced and paid in dollars or euros. People in Transcarpathia, especially in the Hungarian settlements, have made their living from the
resources offered by the Western border. Most of the people interviewed by Laihonen have worked in Hungary (or further west) and have been involved in some form of border trade, such as taking gasoline and cigarettes to the West and bringing food and Western products to Transcarpathia. Driving people to the West and back has also been a popular business, since public transportation across the border has been restricted and cumbersome.

Observing language practices in the field and interviewing local inhabitants, it appears that among the Slavic languages there is a sort of diglossia, with Ukrainian (and at times Russian) used in elevated contexts, and a local code employed in everyday interaction. The Rusyn language/dialects are used by the younger generations as well. This was evidenced by an American voluntary worker, who had learnt Ukrainian in the US and in Lviv (Galicia). The volunteer was teaching English in a Ukrainian-medium school, where she mentioned having grave difficulties understanding the local Ukrainian spoken by schoolchildren and was happy that she had found a host family that had moved into Transcarpathia from Central Ukraine and spoke “clean” Ukrainian. In a similar manner, in interviews and other sources (e.g. Kushko 2007), the lingua franca for everyday communication is described as a Rusyn-Russian-Ukrainian (including Hungarian contact phenomena) variety. This local code differs to a great extent from standard Ukrainian, which is being taught in schools and used for written administration.

3.1 Ukrainian as state language

Since 1989, Ukrainian has been the only state language in Transcarpathia. The transition from Russian to Ukrainian has been gradual in Ukraine. For instance, one of the interviewees remembered that he was doing his military service in 1994 when the language of command changed from Russian to Ukrainian. The knowledge of the three major languages recorded in the censuses of 1989 and 2001 indicate that knowledge of Russian (or the willingness to
claim such) has dwindled swiftly. Figure 5 shows the changes in knowledge of Russian, Ukrainian, and Hungarian in Transcarpathia.

**Figure 5**: The ratio of speakers/non-speakers of Ukrainian, Hungarian, and Russian in Transcarpathia on the bases of the 1989 and 2001 censuses (see Csernicskó 2013: 35 for sources)

On the basis of the 2001 census Ukrainian is clearly the most widely spoken language in Transcarpathia: 83% of the population speaks it (more than one million people). However, 17 per cent of the Subcarpathian population (more than 200,000 people) claimed not to speak Ukrainian at all. Most of these people are Hungarian first-language speakers, though in other surveys (see Csernicskó, 2013:479) it has been shown that most Hungarians claim to know both how to read and write either Russian or Ukrainian or both. The prestige of Russian has dwindled: even though the middle-aged generation in general stated in interviews that they speak Russian, the census no longer documents this. The number of Ukrainian speakers as
reported in the census (2001) is growing, which is typical for the dominant group. However, according to research by Csernicskó, Hungarian has higher prestige now than in the Soviet era. Considering how many Hungarians have moved to Hungary, it is remarkable that the ratio of Hungarian speakers has grown according to the last two censuses (1989 and 2001).

In the case of Transcarpathia, the post-Soviet “monolingual turn” (Pavlenko 2013: 266), that is, the idea of a monolingual state regime, is new. For example, until 1995 the banknotes in Transcarpathia were multilingual. The Austro-Hungarian krone displayed ten languages (German, Hungarian, Czech, Polish, Croatian, Slovene, Serbian, Italian, Rusyn, and Romanian), the Czechoslovak koruna had four (“Czechoslovak”, Rusyn, German, and Hungarian), the Hungarian pengő seven (Hungarian, German, Slovak, Croatian, Romanian, Serbian, and Rusyn), and the Soviet ruble 15 languages (not including Hungarian nor Rusyn, since they were not official languages of the Soviet Republics). In comparison to other European states, it is remarkable that in present-day Ukraine monolingual banknotes were introduced in the form of the Ukrainian hryvnia (see Figure 6).

**Figure 6:** Monolingual Ukrainian hryvnia (photo by Csernicskó)

The co-existence of different languages and ethnicities has included the long term co-existence of different writing systems as well. The Latin alphabet has been used by
Hungarians, Czech, Germans, and Slovaks, the Cyrillic alphabet by Rusyn, Ukrainian, and Russian speakers, and the Hebrew alphabet by Jews. Cyrillic and Latin are still widely in use, whereas Hebrew is now seen mainly in Jewish cemeteries and memorial statues. The relationships between the writing systems provide a further example of changes in language policy. For instance, in international maps using the Latin alphabet, names were previously transcribed on the basis of Russian but are now transcribed on the basis of Ukrainian (see Beregszászi 1995/1996). So the Hungarian town of Beregszász can be found in Soviet era maps as Beregovo, whereas Google Maps now displays it as Berehove. Also the official form of personal names was previously recorded according to Russian form and transliteration e.g. in passports, whereas now it follows Ukrainian forms. For instance, the Hungarian name Köszeghy Elemér was first recorded as Элемыр Кевсеғи, but from 1996 in official documents, it was ‘re-transliterated’ to the forms of Елемир Кевсегі and Elemyr Kevsehi.

In Transcarpathia, Russian first-language speakers, consisting of internal immigrants such as Soviet nomenclature and technical experts (e.g. in mining and higher education), have made up only 5 per cent of the population at most. However, language policy in Transcarpathia has been characterized by the fact that since 1989 such issues in Ukraine more generally have been burdened by the relationship between Ukrainian and Russian. Even more than the Baltic states, Ukraine inherited large Russian-speaking regions and numbers of Russian speakers, who formerly benefitted from Russian being the official language of the Soviet Union (e.g. Pavlenko 2008). Since the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, several efforts have been made to drive Russian out of the public sphere and educational institutions (Taranenko 2007). These measures to make Ukraine a monolingual European nation state have met with some support among West European experts. The idea has been that national cohesion in the society can be achieved only if all inhabitants learn the official language, a situation that can be attained only if the state language is given preference in
education and administration (Besters-Dilger 2009). Bowring (2014), in turn assumes that most inhabitants of Ukraine are bilingual and can easily learn and use Ukrainian, which is most likely true for the Russian-speaking population. However, according to Laihonen’s interviews and Csernicskó’s experience in Higher Education, for the Hungarian-speaking population it takes tremendous effort and many fail to reach the required level (e.g. the matriculation exam). The experts of the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* have been a major exception among Western commentators, stressing that minorities should be consulted and provided with language rights according to their needs (see *Application…* 2014: 9).

For the Hungarian elite in Transcarpathia the goal of becoming a romantic nation state is seen as a general threat to the maintenance of the Hungarian language and should be replaced by thinking based on the importance of linguistic diversity and the right to use one’s own language (Csernicskó, 2013). Some Hungarians are now putting their children into Ukrainian-medium schools for the same reasons their parents’ generation put children into Russian-medium institutions in the Soviet period. The need to learn Ukrainian has been recognized more generally as well; Hungarian educational institutions in Transcarpathia have put much effort into enhancing the teaching of Ukrainian in Hungarian schools in order to avoid 1) an increase in the “educational migration” of Hungarians to Hungary; and 2) even greater numbers of Hungarian children enrolling in Ukrainian medium of instruction schools. However, these efforts have failed in practical terms due to the 2008 requirement that all entrants to all fields of study in Ukraine should take the same exams in Ukrainian language and literature (for details, see Csernicskó, 2011).

In interviews conducted during fieldwork, Hungarian high school students see a choice between staying in Transcarpathia (Ukraine) if they achieve an adequate score on the matriculation exam in Ukrainian language and literature or going to Hungary for a college or
university degree. Like work-based migration, education-based migration has been experienced by most of the Hungarian families interviewed.

3.2 The 2012 Ukrainian law ‘on the principles of state language policy’

In 2012 a new law for Ukraine ‘on the principles of state language policy’ was accepted.¹ While establishing that ‘the State language of Ukraine is Ukrainian’ (Article 6), it gave the ‘regional or national minority languages’ wide rights of use. Such rights were granted in administrative territorial units where at least ten per cent of the population had chosen a given minority language as their first language in the 2001 census. According to the law, regional minority languages should have equal status with the state language in counties, towns, and municipalities where they were spoken by ten per cent of the population. In such areas, the administrative bodies should use, protect, and develop these minority languages. It is notable that for the Transcarpathian case the Rusyn language was included among the list of minority languages. Figure 7 indicates such territorial units where speakers of minority languages reached ten per cent in the 2001 census.

¹ We are quoting the English translation of the law available at: www.r-u.org.ua/akt/2078-news.html
In the Transcarpathian Oblast (region) as a whole, Hungarians make up 13 per cent of the population and thus the county administration should use Hungarian as an official language as well. Furthermore, Hungarian should be an official language (together with Ukrainian) in the administration of four districts, six cities and 104 villages. Other Transcarpathian minorities reach the threshold only in smaller administrative units. Romanians pass the threshold in ten such units. Russian speakers are present as a qualifying minority in three cities, and Slovak speakers in one municipality. German speakers reach the ten per cent threshold in two administrative units. Also, the Romani language should now be used in two municipalities. Even more important to note is that in principle the Rusyn language should now be an official language of two districts (four villages).
The implementation of the 2012 Language Act in Transcarpathia has not been automatic. In the case of Hungarian and Romanian, some city and municipal councils have taken action to implement the new act. Municipalities where Hungarians are in the majority used Hungarian widely in administration prior to 2012 as well. However, the act enabled a wider range of bilingual official documents in such places and more bilingual signs and services in those villages and towns where Hungarians form the minority. According to Csernicskó, who is following the process on the spot, in the case of the Romani language and, what is more, Rusyn, no effort has been made to put the act into practice.

The act was supported by the Eastern, “pro-Russian” regions; most Western “pro-Ukrainian” regions of Ukraine openly oppose the Act and have not put it into force. During the revolution of 2014 the Act was cancelled, but then restored once more. Finally, the act has brought no relief to the most burning question for Hungarians in respect of education. Article 20 of the Act ensures the right to use the minority languages as languages of instruction for all subjects, except “Ukrainian language and literature”. It is notable that “Ukrainian language and literature” has to be tested in Ukrainian (Article 20, 9.). This indicates that the basic principle is that whatever the language of teaching and learning, Ukrainian should be mastered and tested at native level through the matriculation exam.

4 Comparisons and dimensions

4.1 East, West, and local vernaculars as a resource

Lonely Planet advertises Transcarpathia for travellers as follows: “[It is] a melting pot of Hungarian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Roma cultures and has a fascinating social mix. It’s also the home of Ukraine’s best red wines and most impenetrable dialects” (Introducing Transcarpathia 2014). Postcards from the Hungarian Kingdom show images of “Ruthenian peasants” on the streets of Munkács (Ukr.: Mukachevo) (e.g. Csernicskó 2013: 68–69). In
other words, the multilingual and multi-ethnic nature of Sub/Transcarpathia has been recognized as a resource. Furthermore, as the “most impenetrable dialects” indicate, the commodification of the Rusyn language/dialects occurs. Such a Lonely Planet passage invites the tourist, presumably in command of some Slavic language, to entertain linguistic encounters as a part of the tourist experience (cf. Pietikäinen 2013).

A Rusyn movement has been present since Ukraine’s independence (1991) in politics, expert discourses, and cultural life. For example, in 2011 there were nine registered Rusyn organizations in Transcarpathia (Guzinec and Moca 2011: 65–77). However, local, regional, or Rusyn literacy has become visible only in recent years. The local linguistic perspective has been made visible especially on the Internet through the showing of hybrid multilingual practices and the local Slavic repertoire. For instance, there is a project named Наша фаітта (‘Our kind’), which has uploaded videos on YouTube (e.g. www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajFKJq-XoPg). These videos are narrated in the local Slavic dialects or Rusyn language. The characters represent local stereotypes such as Roma beggars, Hungarians who barely speak Ukrainian, and tourists putting on airs in standard Ukrainian or Russian. The first part has the title ‘Welcome to Закарпаття’ indicating hybridity in writing systems and in language as a basic identifying characteristic of the region. Whatever the status of Rusyn, local observers agree that the local Slavic vernacular has attained new prestige since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 together with the rise of a distinct Transcarpathian identity typically presented on the Internet (e.g. www.kolyba.org.ua).

4.2 Globalization in Transcarpathia

In Sociolinguistics of globalization Blommaert (2010) stresses the importance of investigating sociolinguistic scales and the mobility of linguistic resources and repertoires. In Transcarpathia, there have been changes in national and European political frames; however,
their penetration into the local level of language use has been moderate. As we can see, the state has been an important player in Transcarpathia, for example in the field of education. However, the state centres have been too far apart culturally, linguistically, and geographically. That is, the linguistic unification and homogeneity characteristic of nation building and modernization in Western Europe have not been brought about. Ukrainian nationalism has been a marginal, “imported”, and very recent phenomenon in Transcarpathia. According to Butt (2002: 156), the lack of nationalism in general has safeguarded Transcarpathia from local inter-ethnic tensions and conflict so typical for other parts of Eastern-Central Europe. That is, Transcarpathians have traditionally taken the stance of “live and let live” and have not been concerned about residing in a political limbo (Butt 2002).

Flows of migration and travel in general have changed their main direction from East to West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The spread of English is also evident in Transcarpathia as a major sign of globalization. Global “McDonaldization” (Blommaert 2010: 24), that is, the spread of apparently uniform (Western) phenomena, is surprisingly absent in the economy of Transcarpathia; for instance, there is no McDonald’s in the region. However, the spread of English, typically in youth culture, has reached Transcarpathia. In elementary schools, English is now learnt from grade one. There are also native teachers dispatched by American and British organizations in the majority (Ukrainian-medium) schools, especially in the few urban elite high schools. However, as Blommaert (e.g. 2010: 24–25) emphasizes, global English adjusts to the local histories of different linguistic resources in the local repertoires. A Transcarpathian example is witnessed in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Graffiti on the bus stop of a border town in Transcarpathia (photo by Laihonen)

The depicted bus stop is used by border guards, who are typically young conscripts from other parts of Ukraine. The main language of graffiti on the bus stop is Russian; however, there are some advertisements in Hungarian, which is the language of everyday interaction in the border town itself, and the above text in English, as well as some tags. *Puncs not death in cosino!* points to the Russian form of transcription for the name of the town, now officially *Koson’* (from Ukrainian: Косонь, Hungarian: Kaszony). Further, it shows a truncated repertoire (Blommaert 2010: 103) of English literacy consisting of only a few imitations of popular expressions (e.g. *Puncs, death*). According to Pavlenko (2009: 258), in the post-Soviet space knowledge of Russian as a functional lingua franca still supersedes English, whereas English is now the lingua franca in the symbolic realm. That is, English is a language of high prestige. As Pavlenko (2009: 258) has already pointed out, similarly to this graffiti, English in local (non-standard) forms with little clear informational content is often used also in commercial advertising for display purposes. According to our experience, English is very rarely of any help in getting by; rather, knowledge of Ukrainian, Russian, or Hungarian is needed in Transcarpathia.
English has been spread by the US and Western Europe in the region. In the villages where Laihonen carried out fieldwork, it was mentioned as the language of communication with Western charity organizations typically working among the Roma. English has also been taught to the border guards, and included in the linguistic landscape of the border stations, even though the border guards still appeared to be more confident in Hungarian and Russian in 2012. The European Football Championship, organized in 2012 in Ukraine, was an event that generated some signs in English (e.g. along the main roads).

Among the Soviet-educated, and in the cultural sphere, Russian is still holding its place to a certain extent. Russian music is quite popular among middle-aged and older people. Contact with other parts of Ukraine were rare; it was often mentioned that work, study, and travel in the East – common in Soviet times (see also Butt 2002: 157) – have now been replaced by work and study in the West.

4.3 The Hungarian language in Transcarpathia today

The majority of Hungarians in Transcarpathia live in villages and towns, where Hungarians form the local majority (for details, see Csernicskó, 2005: 96-97). The South-Western swath of Transcarpathia can be considered as a Hungarian enclave. This area on the eastern bank of the Tisza river has approximately 120,000 Hungarian-speaking inhabitants out of the total of 150,000 Transcarpathian Hungarian speakers recorded in the 2001 census. The enclave is much smaller in geographical size and number of Hungarians than regions in (Southern) Slovakia and (Central) Romania where Hungarians form the majority.

Some ethnolinguistic perplexities regarding Hungarians also exist. To begin with, most of the Roma in Transcarpathia speak Hungarian as their first language; only a minority of the Roma speak a Romani language or Ukrainian (Braun, Csernicskó & Molnár 2010: 24–25). The Roma are supported by Western religious and charity organizations, which
has resulted in some linguistic paradoxes too. In one of the towns that Laihonen visited, there
was a special school for Roma children financed by a Western European organization. Even
though the Roma spoke hardly any Ukrainian, a special Ukrainian-medium elementary school
was established. Those Roma children that continued their education after this school
attended the Hungarian school. However, in another town, there was a Roma ‘camp’ (an area
separated with walls from the rest of the town), adjoined by a Hungarian-medium school for
the Roma children. The school received support from Hungary and displayed the Ukrainian,
Hungarian, and Roma flags at the entrance of the institution.

In bilingual (Hungarian-Slavic) settlements, there is evidence that Hungarian
has still retained its prestige: “We can speak both Hungarian and Ukrainian”, one Hungarian
youngster boasted in an interview. This competence indicates that Hungarians are more
socially mobile. Beyond occasional work in Hungary and trans-border trade as a major source
of living, people also prefer to use the healthcare services in Hungary. For instance,
informants for Laihonen often mentioned that giving birth in Hungary is a sign of being
middle-class. For local needs and for errands in Hungary, local Ukrainian/Rusyn inhabitants
often acquire Hungarian, at least in villages and towns where Hungarian speakers live. We
can find signs with Hungarian expressions also in Cyrillic texts, such as in Figure 9.
The Hungarian word *Ezermester* (Езермештер) ‘handyman’ used as a business name indicates that the shop sells building materials imported from Hungary, which, according to Csernicskó’s local knowledge signals that they should be of good quality. This term is not incorporated in the local Slavic language, and according to Csernicskó, it is most likely perceived as a name without a meaning by those who do not speak Hungarian. Other Hungarian expressions are used both in business signs and in the local Slavic vernacular. For example, *bolt* ‘shop’ in the form of Бовт (bovt) has been registered in descriptions of the local Slavic dialects/the Rusyn language.

The ethnolinguistic Hungarian nation was constructed mainly in the 19th century together with the standard variety of Hungarian. At that time, present Transcarpathia was part of four counties of the Hungarian Kingdom. Geographically, the region was relatively lucky in terms of the Hungarian standardization, since the dialects that were chosen as the basis of the modern written Hungarian were close to the dialects spoken in the area. However, since 1920 the Hungarian standard has evolved mainly on the basis of language use.
among Budapest intellectual circles, while the use of Hungarian dialect and dialectal features have been generally stigmatized, especially during the socialist period (1948–1989). This has resulted in a general tendency of dialect loss in Hungary, whereas in the Hungarian minority regions of Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine for example, dialect features have been maintained to a greater extent. Furthermore, due to the fact that Hungarian remained the official language only in Hungary, various administrative terms have been borrowed from Slavic languages in Transcarpathia. In Hungary, along with dialectal expressions, such “hybrid” contact forms, or simply different linguistic practices, are typically frowned upon, and since the growth of mobility in the post-Soviet era, discourses on how some Hungarians from Transcarpathia feel out of place in Hungary have become common (e.g. Csernicskó, 2003). Figure 10 displays an example of a Hungarian dialectal expression.

Figure 10: ‘Beware the dog is bad’ in a dialectal form. A Hungarian majority village in Transcarpathia. (Photo by Laihonen)

The modern standard meaning for *hamis* is ‘fake’ or ‘false’. However, the meaning ‘bad’ or ‘unreliable’ is still widely used among Hungarians in Romania and eastern parts of Slovakia, and it is also still known in some North-East regions in Hungary. In Romania or Slovakia, beware of the dog signs in Hungarian are often manufactured, thus the word *hamis* is
replaced with *harapós* ‘[the dog] bites’ in writing. In Transcarpathia, manufactured ‘beware of the dog’ signs can be found only in Russian, thus the local Hungarian norm is to use *hamis* in the meaning of ‘bad’ in writing as well. However, in Hungary town dwellers find it rather amusing, erroneous (e.g. *Hamis kutyák… 2012*), or even primitive. This brings into question the polycentricity and mobility (Blommaert 2010: 39–41) of Hungarian registers. That is, is the Hungarian written register the sole property of metropolitan circles? At least for these types of signs, there seem to be clearly different orders of normativity (Blommaert 2010: 40) in Transcarpathia and in Hungary (for a discussion of Hungarian as a pluricentric language, see Lanstyák 1995).

The local Hungarians have primarily targeted Hungarians from Hungary as sources of heritage tourism. For Hungarian heritage tourists, there are some culturally significant destinations in Transcarpathia such as the Verecke pass, the mythical place of “homecoming” of the Hungarians to Central Europe around 896. As of recently, Ukrainians have also discovered the Hungarian enclave; in Ukrainian tourism, practiced by the new upper class, the Hungarian swath has become a popular destination, conceptualized as culturally Hungarian but still part of Ukraine, where you can still get served in Ukrainian (or Russian). As a result, the locals are afraid that jobs in tourism will go to others, due to their lack of Ukrainian language skills.

As a new phenomenon, Ukrainians from the east are even investing in tourist sites found in the Hungarian enclave. They regard the Hungarian image as a resource, as we can see in the thermal bath depicted in Figure 11, 200 meters from the Hungarian border.
Figure 11: ‘Íváncsó estates, thermal bath’ in Hungarian. A Hungarian majority village in Transcarpathia. (Photo by Laihonen)

This tourist instalment was originally an open air spa during the Soviet period, with a sanatorium next to it. Now a Ukrainian family from the east has invested in it and built a luxuriant bath with several Hungarian symbols, such as statues of Hungarian kings and paintings of Hungarian national events as well as Hungarian folk motifs. The texts in connection to such images are in Hungarian only. The more symbolic the sign, the more likely it is to be in Hungarian only. Most of the functional texts are bilingual, Ukrainian and Hungarian. Some of them are in English and Ukrainian (e.g. Caution!, Relax zone), whereas the menus in the Japanese tea house and official signs on the constituents of the thermal water are only in Ukrainian. That is, the more functional or official, the more likely it is to be in Ukrainian only.

Here we can notice a global mix: the use of English in a place where the customers come from the East, combined with the decision to put a Japanese tea house in a Hungarian spa, together with bars and grills serving traditional Hungarian dishes. This indicates that the spa, as Pujolar (2013: 70) has expressed in relation to Welsh heritage tourism, is negotiating an “aesthetic balance between providing local flavour and catering to
the needs of contemporary customers”. In our case, it means building the image of a Western instalment, symbolized by the use of Hungarian emblems and language with some English and Japanese mixed in. At the same time, however, the Ukrainian tourist is assured that all this is available without having to go to the trouble of crossing the Schengen border and without having to cope with a non-Slavic language.

Among local Hungarians, however, the main text on the tower of the building and above the main entrance, Iváncsó birtok (‘Iváncsó estates’), is seen as a sign of bad taste and putting on airs. It is common knowledge that the investor was not a Hungarian, imitating the habit of bygone Hungarian nobles who possessed birtok (‘estates’), and combining it with a Slavic name (Iván + csó) makes it a cultural and linguistic hybrid, rendering it kitsch in the eyes of local Hungarians. On top of that, it is a spa, not an estate, so the sign is clearly a misnomer as far as the locals are concerned. In this manner, the Hungarian linguistic identity has become commodified and the question asked by Pujolar (2013: 71): “[W]ho has the right to represent local culture [and language] and how?” has been posed by the Hungarians in Transcarpathia as well.

5 Conclusions

Is Transcarpathia a place forgotten somewhere in the East European nowhere, residing in political, cultural, and economic limbo? Most discourses on Transcarpathia have taken a different stance. In the pro-Rusyn discourses Transcarpathia forms the heartlands of Ruthenia. However, among the masses in Transcarpathia, Rusyn sentiments are less alive than they are among the emigrants or small number of activists. That is, the local Slavic people have more or less internalized the idea that Rusyn is a sub-ethnicity and dialect of Ukrainian and to claim otherwise is often deemed a sign of undesirable separatism or foreign influence. From the point of view of the state, as long as the majority of Transcarpathians
claim Ukrainian nationality, there is no need to “remember” the region. In economic terms, tourism might present a new opportunity, especially now (2014) that Ukraine has lost its former major domestic tourist destination, Crimea.

From the West, the recognition and the revival of the indigenous Rusyn identity is supported along with general minority rights. At the same time, the post-Soviet monolingual turn of administration and education towards the enhanced hegemony of Ukrainian is endorsed by the West, which has a hard time understanding the complexities or controversies “so exciting to Central Europe and so difficult for Western Europe to follow” (Macartney 1938, cited in Butt 2002: 159) such as the Hungarian-speaking Roma in Transcarpathia. Western economic or cultural support (e.g. the teaching of English for Ukrainians, charity work among the Roma) typically presupposes a nation state established with assimilated minorities and is uneasy when facing the complexities of Transcarpathia. Russian is becoming marginal among the youth; however, it is still present in many ways as a functional lingua franca, though it has lost its prestige to English.

The Hungarians of Transcarpathia perceive themselves to be even more distant from Kyiv than their Slavic neighbours. In particular, the residents of the region next to the Hungarian border imagine their villages as a splinter of Hungary proper and try to make the “fuzzy” (cf. Butt 2002) post-Soviet East-West border a resource. At the same time, the local Hungarians possess multilingual repertoires, and there are complexities in their repertoire of Hungarian registers. Furthermore, Hungarian language is practiced by non-Hungarians in traditional bilingual settings and in new, unexpected places and ways.

To conclude, Transcarpathia presents a historical case of enduring “pre-nationalism”, and linguistic pragmatism. It is similar to emerging new situations in Western Europe, where people “focus meaningfully and in a non-random way on specific arrangements of resources in a repertoire that is fundamentally ‘hybridized’, multiscalar and
shot through with relatively unpredictable and unstable patterns of stratified indexical orderliness.” (Blommaert 2013: 614). It remains to be seen whether Transcarpathia can avoid the monolingual turn underway in the Post-Soviet space.

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**Sources**


