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THE 18TH-CENTURY TRADITIONS OF REPRESENTATION IN A NEW AGE OF REVOLUTION

History Politics in the Swedish and Finnish Parliaments, 1917−1919

What happened to shared historical experiences in the discursive processes of constitutional reform in Sweden and Finland? This article examines the use of 18th-century history in early 20th-century politics. Building on a long-term survey of Swedish and Finnish estate and parliamentary debates, it analyses the political implications of differing national historiographies in the two successor states of the 18th-century Swedish realm, focusing on how the ancient past and collective (and often selective) memories of the Age of Absolutism, the Age of Liberty and the Gustavian Age were used by parliamentarians in constitutional argumentation. The analysis demonstrates how the Finnish polity continued to be profoundly influenced by these 18th-century constitutions even after the Russian Revolution, while Sweden took the post-French Revolution constitution of 1809 as its point of departure. In both countries, interpretations of the long 18th century were ideologically motivated in an age of the parliamentarization of government and the democratization of the representative system. This leads us to a discussion of the history-political significance of the common and differing understandings of representative government in the two interconnected countries.

Keywords: constitutional history, representative government, parliament, history politics, Sweden, Finland, 18th century, 20th century
The contradictory legacies of the 18th-century constitutions

The Swedish constitution, which had included elements of representation since medieval times, experienced major transformations in the long 18th century, moving from an absolutist to an estate-dominated system around 1720, thence to an increasingly absolutist system after 1772 and finally towards an emerging constitutional monarchy from 1809 onwards. In 1809, as a consequence of the Napoleonic Wars, the long tradition of representative government was divided into two branches, the Swedish and the Finnish, which automatically led to differentiation in what could be called history politics¹, i.e. the academic and/or ideological use of interpretations of the past in political arguments.

This article examines the significance of the common 18th-century constitutional heritage in the dynamic discursive processes of constitutional reform in early 20th-century Sweden and Finland, a formative period for modern parliamentary democracy in both countries. The continuous connection between the Swedish and Finnish legal traditions, political semantics and political cultures after 1809 – and the status of the Finnish state as a descendant of early modern Sweden – have recently been emphasized by several Swedish and Finnish historians.² But how was this connection viewed in a period of constitutional ferment which has previously mainly been studied by political historians focusing on events or legal historians interested in constitutional alternatives rather than on the use of history-political arguments in the context of these entangled parliamentary debates?³

In constitutional and parliamentary history, rather limited attention has been paid internationally to 18th-century Sweden, which in the Age of Liberty (1719–1772) turned into a nominal monarchy ruled by the four estates (the Nobility, the Clergy, the Burghers and, importantly, the Peasantry) not unlike the British, Dutch and Polish ‘free’ representative
governments. The Diet (Riksdag) had not only a legislative and supervisory role but also possessed some executive powers as well. A system of accountability of the councillors of the realm to the Diet has sometimes been seen as an early form of parliamentarism.\(^4\) Finland, as part of Sweden, was fully integrated into this representative system.

In Swedish historiography, the role played by the estates as forerunners of ‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘representative democracy’ in an almost revolutionary sense has been emphasized.\(^5\) Finnish historiography has been rather more cautious in its conclusions about the democratic nature of the Age of Liberty.\(^6\) In a wider European context, a breakthrough of representative democracy in a post-revolutionary sense by 1770 would seem unlikely. Comparative studies suggest that Swedish conceptions of the political system remained rather typical of ancien régime ‘free states’.\(^7\) The Swedish system of the Age of Liberty constituted an ‘autocracy of the estates’,\(^8\) ‘a republican monarchy’ or an aristocratic republic but not a representative democracy.\(^9\) Nevertheless, together with the Gustavian monarchical order it left a significant legacy for the successor states. Discursive appeals to the people by all major political groups by 1770 had provided a native source for discourse on political liberty. Even the Gustavian, increasingly absolutist, monarchy appealed to the people to legitimate its position, playing the Nobles and the lower estates against one another.\(^10\) The practices of representation and the legitimation of monarchical power with such references to its popular basis helped to create the notion of a uniquely free Swedish or Finnish peasant aware of his political rights.\(^11\)

The early modern Swedish polity was divided by international events at a moment when a reactionary discourse on the consequences of the French Revolution was dominant. The loss of Finland caused the overthrow of the autocratic Gustav IV Adolph in Sweden. In the new constitution of 1809, the role of the Swedish Diet increased but in terms of executive power, the spirit of the duality of government remained strong.\(^12\) In Finland, the
Gustavian polity was merely reformulated to serve the needs of the new ruler. Tsar Alexander I used a diet to legitimate the transfer of power, promising ‘the representatives of the people’ to retain the old constitution, within which a strong monarchy was combined with the legitimating function of the estates.\textsuperscript{13} The Finnish version of constitutional monarchy, still regulated by the imperial prerogative, began to develop only after Alexander II summoned the Diet of 1863.

Swedish and Finnish political cultures already differed in some respects in 1809: while popular participation in the political process was valued in both countries, references to the original sovereignty of the people were more outspoken at the Diet in Stockholm than at the Diet in Borgå in Finland.\textsuperscript{14} In Finland, where the preservation of the Swedish legal system and representative government were used to defend a special status within the multicultural Russian Empire, any change was rejected. A bicameral parliament was introduced in Sweden in 1865, but the admiration of the German (even Prussian which did not include universal male suffrage like the Reich) monarchical model by the Swedish right postponed the introduction of universal suffrage until 1918. In Finland, universal suffrage and a unicameral parliament were introduced in 1906 in connection with a revolution in Russia, but no full democracy or parliamentarism was obtained. Parliamentarism would be introduced in both countries in 1917, later than in Norway and Denmark.

In what follows, the uses of history politics in Swedish and Finnish parliamentary debates on constitutional reform in 1917–1919 – a period of revolution, parliamentarization and democratization – will be analysed. An analysis of concurrent constitutional debates from two politically, judicially, culturally and linguistically interconnected countries with interwoven histories reveals shared trajectories in political cultures but also divergences arising from different national contexts and ideological motivations.\textsuperscript{15} This analysis focuses on Swedish debates about extending the suffrage in local and parliamentary elections and
Finnish debates on the proper constitution for an independent country, both located in the period between March 1917 and June 1919.

**Continuities in Swedish constitutional history after the Russian March Revolution**

Many leading Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians of the late 1910s had a background in academic fields such as history, political science and law, which contributed to the practice of making connections between the constitutional past and the present – although these were often initiated by their political opponents rather than by the scholars themselves. Many politically active historians had recently contributed to public debates on 18th-century constitutions. Two political scientists, Prof. Pontus Fahlbeck and Dr Fredrik Lagerroth, had interpreted the Swedish tradition of ‘parliamentarism’ from opposite, ideologically coloured, points of view.

The conservative Fahlbeck opposed universal suffrage and supported the constitution of 1809, in which the monarchy and the First Chamber balanced the potential radicalism of the Second Chamber, thus healing the aberrations of the Age of Liberty and the Gustavian Age. This native version of ‘limited democracy’ and dualistic ‘parliamentarism’ based on a division of power was preferable to the ‘oligarchic’, ‘unhistorical’ and ‘un-Swedish’ British, Norwegian and Danish versions.\(^{16}\)

The leftist (in an early 20th-century sense, including both Liberals and Socialists) Fredrik Lagerroth, by contrast, characterized the history of the Swedish constitution since the Viking Age as a struggle between autocracy and constitutionalism. Torgny the Lawspeaker (Lagman) had already been an ideal Swedish parliamentarian in the 11th century.\(^{17}\) Sweden’s constitution had since the 17th century been based on ‘popular representation’ and had seen ‘a modern parliamentary regime’ developing towards ‘popular
sovereignty’ and ‘democracy’ in the Age of Liberty. This ‘highly developed parliamentarism of the Swedish people’ had been destroyed by Gustav III.

In current research, parliamentarism is seen as having developed gradually through a transnational discursive process which started in the 18th century. Lagerroth’s tendency to view the Age of Liberty in excessively modern terms was rejected by many academics as subjective or ‘unhistorical’ already in the 1910s. But after Lagerroth received a professorship in 1929, his works created an historiographical tradition that interpreted the Swedish regime as the most advanced political culture in 18th-century Europe.

Many politically active, often conservative, historians ignored Lagerroth’s account, but it nevertheless contributed to an ideologically divided constitutional debate in both Sweden and Finland. Harald Hjärne and Sam Clason considered the corrupt party power of the Age of Liberty to be a demonstration of the fatal consequences of parliamentarism as advocated by contemporary Social Democrats and Liberals. Clason made an attempt to rehabilitate Gustav IV Adolph. Liberals – including Nils Edén, Professor of History at the Uppsala University and chairman of the Constitutional Committee, who would head a Liberal-Social Democratic parliamentary government in October 1917 – were not enthusiastic about Lagerroth’s narrative either. Even if Edén defended parliamentarism as reconcilable with the Swedish tradition, he regarded the ruling diet of the mid-18th-century kind as counterproductive; but he also criticised the Gustavian constitution for rejecting the native tradition, which had recognized the rights of the people.

Several Social Democrats, both moderate and radical, gladly popularized Lagerroth’s teleological liberal history as an ideological resource supporting their alternative interpretations of the national past which viewed social democracy as essentially Swedish since times immemorial. When the Riksdag, after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution,
was debating the long-postponed reform that would have replaced unequal suffrage based on forty classes of voters with universal suffrage including women. Hjalmar Branting, the chairman of the Social Democrats, who due to his old connections to Russian radicals was inspired by the revolution, pointed out connections between medieval Germanic assemblies and democracy as practised in the 1910s. Evidence could be found on the walls of the Second Chamber, which was decorated with frescos painted by Axel Törneman in 1913 documenting the representative and democratic past of Sweden. They depicted Torgny the Lawspeaker’s speech to King Olof Skötkonung at a ting in Uppsala around 1000 and Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson leading a peasant revolt which had led to the recognition of the political rights of the Peasant Estate in 1435. Ideas about an ancient Swedish tradition of parliamentary government were thus imparted through the historical paintings typical of national romanticism. Evidence could also be found in contemporary historiography, which interpreted the tings as the beginning of Nordic popular self-government and 15th-century meetings as the start of representative government. The same figures from the past had been used by the Right to oppose universal suffrage and parliamentarism and by the Liberals to glorify the Riksdag, and Branting himself had been one of the initiators of the paintings. Branting’s point in March 1917 was that in Sweden ‘the original parliamentary power had always been in the hands of the people themselves’ and that the relationship between the will of the people and the Riksdag should be reinforced by adopting the instrument of referendum.

The leftists went further in drawing parallels between the distant past and the troubles of 1917. Ivar Vennerström complained how the labouring people were still forbidden to demonstrate ‘in this country, which has been revered as the place of the origin of liberty on earth’. He contrasted this with Torgny the Lawspeaker’s ‘good old times’, when a representative of the people spoke about liberty to his ruler, advising him on how to govern
Carl Lindhagen, the Mayor of Stockholm and chairman of the radical socialist Zimmerwald International, who had hosted Lenin at a Stockholm meeting earlier in 1917, viewed the current constitution as one for the right only, not for all Swedish people, and contrasted it with ‘the democratic inheritance of the Swedish constitution’ as represented by the left. This leftist view of Sweden as a democracy of ancient origin gave the concept both a socialist and a nationalist content. Even if they were unlikely to persuade the right, such arguments verged on a bourgeois interpretation of the national past.

Liberal reformists argued for the immediate extension of the rights of the people in accordance with Swedish traditions of representative government. According to Nils Edén, the Swedes could not stay within the confines of ‘relative popular freedom’ in an era of democratization as they had ‘since times immemorial been one of the freest peoples in Europe’. Mauritz Hellberg complained that the excessively obedient Swedes were still striving for civil liberty despite the customary reference to Sweden as ‘the place of the origin of freedom on earth’.

Conservative academics were provoked when Erik Palmstierna, an internationally oriented Social Democrat, accused Karl Hildebrant, a docent in 16th-century history, and Harald Hjärne, a former Professor of History at Uppsala University, of perverting history to legitimate the current constitutional situation. He suggested that such historians were ignoring the rights of the people in favour of capital and thereby running the risk of a revolution. A reform, in contrast, would correspond with what ‘has since old times been a good Swedish tradition’. Hildebrandt responded by insisting that Sweden already possessed a constitution that ‘has been much more democratic than those in most other European countries, and within this constitutional frame it has been possible […] to take the development further in an increasingly democratic direction’.
A rather more popular conservative argument built on the traditional concept of the common people and more particularly the peasantry (allmogen) as an alternative to the potentially revolutionary concept of the people (folket). Erik Räf of the Peasant and Bourgeois Party, a major land-owner, emphasized the historical importance of ‘the common people’ in comparison with ‘the Swedish people’ in a Social Democratic sense: ‘the Swedish common people has liberated Sweden a number of times, whereas the Swedish people in inverted commas has never done anything corresponding to the great deeds of the Swedish common people.’ The common people had always passed laws in Sweden, and universal suffrage was hence not needed. All the major participants in the debate thus used history-political arguments to either advocate or oppose the reform.

Was the Age of Liberty being restored in Finland in 1917?

In Finland, the shared constitutional tradition was politicized with much more dramatic consequences. Views as to where the supreme power should be located after the fall of the imperial throne in March 1917 were divided. The bourgeois parties, concerned about the first socialist parliamentary majority in world history (elected in 1916), wished to retain the political initiative in the hands of the government, whereas the Social Democrats, because of their majority, favoured parliamentary sovereignty, even though many socialists did not regard parliament as the forum through which their ideal society would be created; working in parliament was only a temporary phase to subvert the bourgeois order which that institution supported. Encouraged by the Russian Bolsheviks and backed by many native centrists, the Social Democrats aimed at transferring sovereignty to parliament with the Power Act of July 1917.
For many Finnish conservatives, such a reform stood for the rejection of the constitutional tradition and the reintroduction of the pernicious Age of Liberty. Kaarle Rantakari, an agitator of the Finnish Party with a Social Democrat background, emphasized that the Finns had for nearly a thousand years remained loyal to a constitutional order based on the duality of the monarchy and a representative assembly. Artturi Virkkunen, an associate professor of Finnish, Russian and Nordic history and a Schools Board inspector, insisted on the maintenance of this heritage. The conservative doubts were supported by the interpretations of 18th-century constitutions taught at schools: in the party strife of the Age of Liberty, ‘the people's own trustees thus let their country down’, whereas the restoration of royal power by the ‘brilliant’ Gustav III had saved the realm from destruction. Rantakari argued that the Power Act would restore ‘the state of our country when it was connected with Sweden during the so-called Age of Liberty, that is, the tyranny of parliament’ or ‘parliamentary absolutism’. That age had demonstrated how difficult it was for parliament to function satisfactorily without strong executive power. In 1768, the pseudo-monarch (Adolph Frederick) had ceased to cooperate with the estates, which had made manifest the impossibility of placing the executive power in the hands of parliament. The estates had been forced to ask the king to resume his duties, and Rantakari foresaw that this would happen again.

Social Democrat members regarded it as unhelpful to apply examples derived from ‘the struggles of the ancient Swedish Hat and Cap parties’ to the entirely different situation of 1917. Frans Rantanen saw such historical parallels as reflecting the prevalent ‘fear of the assumption of power by democracy’. Instead, employing a Marxist vocabulary, he suggested that the mid-18th-century crisis had been caused by the inability of the estates, or ‘classes’, to reconcile their ‘class interests’ and that the bourgeois circles had then, too, propagated ‘bloody class hatred’. The experience of the rule of the estates provided no evidence
against the creation of ‘the parliamentary democracy or the democracy of the Social Democratic labourers’ (these being the same thing), which were based on much wider popular elements than the _ancien régime_ estates. Indeed, the system he envisioned might not need to concern the bourgeoisie at all.\(^{54}\)

The Power Act was passed on 18 July by a majority in parliament. However, the Russian provisional government never promulgated the law, parliamentary sovereignty was not yet established and the Social Democrats lost their majority in a new election in September. Some of them began to turn from parliamentary to revolutionary reform, encouraged by the Russian Bolsheviks.

The Gustavian constitution in an independent republic

As the newly elected parliament began to debate the organization of the supreme power in the aftermath of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution in early November 1917, the bourgeois majority took the Gustavian constitution as the self-evident point of departure. Even if regarded as outdated, its loose formulations had been effectively used to defend Finnish autonomy under the Russians, and it now continued to be interpreted flexibly to legitimate decisions that the majority considered necessary in circumstances in which separation from Russia seemed inevitable. Interpretations of the proper applications of the constitution were highly divergent among the bourgeois parties as well: some wanted to observe it literally, others would have allowed the parliamentary majority to act as they saw best.\(^{55}\)

The strictest observance of the original paragraph was demanded by the traditionally constitutionalist Swedish Party. According to Ernst Estlander, a professor of law, the constitution obliged ‘the Estates of the Realm’ – or the institution representing the people – to safeguard and defend the liberty of the country by electing a separate new body to execute
the supreme power. It would be ‘against the spirit of our constitution’ if parliament reserved any of that power for itself. R.A. Wrede, a former professor of civil and Roman law as well as the former chairman of the Department of Justice of the Senate, rejected any extension of parliamentary powers: parliament should maintain and possibly develop the Swedish law but not violate it. Also for Kyösti Haataja (Finnish Party), a lawyer by education, the constitution prescribed the maintenance of a separate supreme power.

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Onni Talas of the Young Finns, an associate professor of administrative law, interpreted Article 38 differently: it was up to parliament to decide whether it would assume the executive power itself or award it to some separate body. Gustaf Arokallio, a Liberal clergyman, insisted not unlike the left in Sweden that the principle that all power originated in the people was ‘the deepest foundation of the Swedish-Finnish constitutional order’. While history had seen attempts to bypass this principle, it had ‘finally always been recognized’. A major precedent was to be found in the decision of the Swedish Diet to legislate a new constitution in 1809 independently of the Crown. Hence, strengthening the role of parliament seemed to be a further expression of the old principle of popular sovereignty. However, some Young Finns such as Antti Mikkola, a lawyer, disagreed about the desirability of parliamentarization because of the experiences of the Age of Liberty: a governing parliament was the worst possible political arrangement and would endanger the liberties of individuals and the people as a whole.

The Agrarians – most openly followers of the 19th-century Fennoman movement which had advanced the status of the Finnish language and the common people in relation to Swedishness and upper classes – were critical of what they regarded as the selective legalism of the conservative lawyers. Artur Wuorimaa saw them as attempting to retain their bureaucratic power with appeals to a constitution that had already been bypassed by parliament when it had transferred power in spring to a new government in accordance with
the Swedish precedent of 1809. Agrarian radicalism was legitimated by their leader, Santeri Alkio, who suggested that after a long dominance of foreign principles it was finally time to introduce Finnish ones.

The Social Democrats were critical of any application of 18th-century Swedish constitutions. Bitterness over the repudiation of their Power Act made them question the legality of the entire procedure. Jussi Kujala, a self-educated socialist agitator, saw the policies of the right as being directed against the real power of the people and based on the denial of a democratic trajectory in Swedish-Finnish history. Kujala argued that there had been an element of democracy in the Swedish realm ever since the 12th century. King Christopher’s Law of 1442 had contained democratic elements, but in the early modern period, the Noble and the Clerical estates had deliberately removed all democracy. The rule of the estates in the Age of Liberty had been ‘a kind of democracy applicable to those circumstances, though not such democracy as we mean by democracy today’. Democracy had ancient roots, but the Nobility had turned into ‘a class of exploiters’, claiming to represent the people but actually exercising class power, in other words ‘democracy in a bourgeois sense’. The bourgeoisie had also made appeals to the power of the people in a dishonest way to exploit other groups in connection with the Swedish change of regime after the abdication of Gustav IV Adolph. Kujala, an illegitimate son of a former senator of justice and a maidservant, had grown up in an atmosphere of class hatred and now challenged the professors of law with an alternative Marxist narrative.

Some Social Democrats regarded the Swedish tradition as originally democratic but undermined by the bourgeoisie in order to advance their class interests; it was therefore no longer applicable or worthy of respect. Yrjö Sirola, a primary school teacher, who would later regret the failure to launch an armed revolution in autumn 1917, attacked the bourgeoisie for their defence of centralized governmental power as created by Gustavian
In the programme of the government of P.E. Svinhufvud, which would issue the Declaration of Independence on 6 December 1917, the bourgeois parties agreed on formulating a new democratic constitution extending parliamentary powers beyond those awarded by the Gustavian constitution. By the time of its publication, accusations between the right and the left about who was being more treasonous in contacts with external powers were becoming widespread. Oswald Kairamo (Finnish Party) suggested that Finnish socialists had rejected ‘the law of the country and the inherited practices of the people’, giving up parliamentary means of reform in favour of Bolshevist revolutionary fervour. Minister of Justice Onni Talas and K.J. Ståhlberg, a professor of administrative law, spoke for historical continuity in the formulation of a republican constitution, whereas the socialist opposition accused the government of an inability to cooperate with the Russian Bolshevik government. The parliamentary process had failed to solve the problems of the country, including the constitutional question, and the country was to experience a political division of the worst kind, a civil war.

In this war, the White army, backed by German forces, saw itself as fighting for the established political order threatened by the Red Guards, supported by the Bolshevik troops of the Russian army. The Swedish right sympathized with the White army, but the Swedish Liberal-Social Democratic government was unwilling to intervene. The right wished to see Finland remain a state in which Swedish law and culture prevailed, a part of Scandinavia and Western civilization. In their rhetoric, ‘the Finnish people have stood, and stand at this
moment, closer to us than any other people.' The Finns were connected with Sweden by the common tradition of peasant involvement in politics. However, Sweden maintained its neutrality and only indirectly supported the Whites. The Swedish Social Democrat leaders emphasized their more moderate approach to parliamentarism, which distinguished them from Finnish socialist extremism.

A Gustavian polity in the aftermath of the Civil War

The White army captured Helsinki in April 1918, crushing the Red rebellion and expelling most socialist MPs from parliament. When the bourgeois government brought a proposal for a new monarchical constitution to this Rump Parliament in June 1918, Prime Minister Juho Kusti Paasikivi (Finnish Party) presented it as maintaining the ancient monarchical constitution but decreasing the royal prerogative in favour of parliament and the people.

The Swedish-speaking right remained uncompromising advocates of the Gustavian tradition. R.A. Wrede insisted that Finland possessed a monarchical constitution as formulated by the Form of Government of 1772 and the Act of Union and Security of 1789. A people who had lived under a monarchy for 700 years could not reject monarchy and establish a republic, more particularly so as Finland belonged to the Germanic cultural world and the constitutional rules of 'Germanic cultured societies' hence applied: ‘Whatever culture exists in Finland is in practice completely of Germanic origin, mostly Swedish.’ Referring to the Swedish constitutional lawyer, Carl-Axel Reuterskiöld, a conservative opponent of parliamentarism and democracy, Wrede argued that the fundamental principles of Sweden being a kingdom and having a Riksdag were unchangeable and remained directly applicable to Finland. According to Emil Schybergson, the safest option was to cherish the monarchical constitution in an updated form unless Finland wanted to go back to constantly
changing constitutions. Such a dedication to the Gustavian tradition was more than pure conservatism; it arose from concerns about the future of the Swedish-speaking minority in a parliamentary democracy with Finnish-speaking and potentially socialist majorities. The monarchy would be an antidote retaining social order and protecting the rights of the minority.

The Finnish Party was an equally fervent defender of the monarchical Finnish-Swedish constitutional tradition and tried to win the Agrarian republicans over to its side. According to Wäinö Valkama, a primary school teacher, the history of Finns under Swedish kings demonstrated how the monarchy, long before the invention of democracy, had defended the rights of the people and especially of the Peasant Estate against the higher orders: The representatives of the Finnish people had addressed their complaints to the king and received his protection, and the peasants had fought for their king abroad and in the Clubs War (1596–1597) to counter the abuses of the nobles. Artturi Virkkunen described how the Swedish people had gained great fame fighting for their king in the Thirty Years’ War and how the Finns, too, had benefited from reforms and the teaching of literacy. For Oswald Kairamo, monarchical power was an immemorial domestic institution whereas republicanism had been imported into the country by socialist agitators.

The liberal Young Finns remained divided: many viewed the monarchy as a stabilizing institution but wished for a ‘democratic’ constitutional revision. Professor E.N. Setälä suggested that the Finns could very well live with their old constitution for another century by developing it in a more democratic direction. The republicans of the party, K.J. Ståhlberg among them, drew on a different historiography. Ståhlberg, who was the chairman of the Preparatory Constitutional Committee in 1917, rejected the monarchical constitution of 1772 as outdated for any type of polity. Its regulations on the election of the king were no longer applicable to an independent republic. This suggestion caused Ernst Estlander,
another leading constitutional lawyer, to criticize Ståhlberg for questioning the very foundation of Finnish opposition to Russian oppression.89

The republican Agrarians based their opposition to a monarchical constitution on a more Fennoman interpretation of the national past. Santeri Haapanen, the editor of Savon Sanomat, argued against what he saw as the defence of an autocratic constitution despite the opposition of the peasants and the excluded Social Democrats.90 Santeri Alkio considered that the Swedish kings had treated the Finns as a mere vassal people. What was valuable in Scandinavian political traditions was not the monarchy but democracy (kansanvalta) which ‘has always throughout history been recognized by Scandinavian regimes and forms of government’. Scandinavian countries had been successful just because ‘in these countries the people have had more power than in any other European country’.91 Several farmers voiced opinions that did not share the notion of Swedish peasant liberty as an argument for monarchy: According to Pekka Saarelainen, the Swedish monarchy had oppressed the people, democracy and Finnishness by bureaucratic means, allowing ‘the torture, maltreatment and heavy taxation of the peasantry of our country’. The Swedish monarchy had sent its agents to crush with extreme violence the ‘fight for freedom’ of the Finnish peasantry in the Clubs War. Such experiences had made the Finnish commoners abhor monarchy and call for a democratic republic, for which they had also fought in the Civil War.92 Eero Hahl added that the Swedish kings had only needed peasants to pay taxes and to raise soldiers, and had bypassed the Peasant Estate in important affairs of state.93

Such republican views among the farmers provoked Erkki Kaila (Finnish Party), a professor of theology, to insist that only Russian bureaucrats and socialists had previously dared to condemn the constitution of 1772.94 The bourgeois victors of the Civil War were deeply divided over their interpretations of the past under Swedish rule at the time of the dispute over the constitution: the Swedish and Finnish Parties looked back at a glorious
tradition on which they thought the Finnish monarchy should be built, while the Agrarians rejected it as a tool for oppressing the common people, whose rights should be recognized in a new democratic republic.

The application of the constitution of 1772 in the election of a King of Finland

By 8 August 1918, after failing to agree on a new monarchical constitution, the Rump Parliament debated on the applicability of Article 38 of the constitution of 1772 to the election of a new royal family for Finland. K.J. Ståhlberg insisted again that the Swedish constitution had lost much of its validity in 1809 and that it should therefore finally be repealed. Even within the Swedish Party, Otto Åkesson found no evidence of Finland having been an independent kingdom: its constitution had been legislated for another monarchy and was invalid in the contemporary circumstances.

R.A. Wrede, with the authority of a former rector of the University of Helsinki, set out to clarify this obfuscation: the constitution of 1772 was entirely valid – it was just as if ‘the joint [realm of] Sweden-Finland’ had been in 1809 separated into two independent states. The constitution had provided the foundation for Finnish autonomy and independence. Ernst Estlander maintained that the constitution had been confirmed by Alexander I without reservation, which meant that the common monarchical constitution had remained in force in Finland. Once the union with Russia had ceased, Finland had become a sovereign state with a complete monarchical constitution.

The Agrarians rejected such interpretations as tendentious. Artur Wuorimaa saw no legal grounds for embarking on the election of a king. Parliament had not applied the said article in December 1917 when assuming supreme power but had referred to the precedent of the Swedish coup of 1809. Santeri Alkio wondered how it was possible that the
monarchists were attempting to re-establish an outdated constitution in an era that was one of republics. According to Matti Paasivuori, the only attending Social Democrat, the paragraph had been ‘dead for 110 years and had now been resurrected’ as a result of a violent coup by the right.

Such views caused R.A. Wrede to lose his temper and suggest that the republicans were plotting against the established order just as in the Gustavian Era. J.K. Paasikivi, the prime minister, insisted that the constitution of 1772 had been endorsed by the Russian emperors in 1809 and in 1863 and had never been repealed. Lauri Ingman, the Leader of the Finnish Party, drew attention to the fact that the rights of the Finns had been defended against Russian oppression on the basis of this law. Tekla Hultin (Young Finns) claimed that Article 38 had been applied since the abdication of Nicholas II, when the supreme power in Finnish domestic affairs had been transferred to Finnish institutions. In 1809, the Swedish Riksdag had also assumed power on the basis of this article. Such Swedish precedents were directly applicable because of the long common tradition of the two countries: ever since the election of King Haakon of Norway as King of Sweden in 1362, Finland had been represented like any Swedish region, and the Finns now had a unique chance to hold such an election in an independent realm. Hultin was echoing the accounts of the unique political liberty of the Swedes and Finns that were taught at school.

Despite the protests and boycott of the election by the republicans and the evident fall of the German army by the end of September, the monarchist majority elected Friedrich Karl, the brother-in-law of Kaiser Wilhelm, King of Finland on 9 October 1918. When parliament reconvened on 5 November 1918, Finland had a pro-German regent, a German king who had never visited the country and a Swedish constitution dating back to 1772, the validity of which was far from generally recognized. All this had to be rethought when the
German monarchy fell on 9 November and the Western parliamentary democracies won the Great War.\textsuperscript{110}

**Historical arguments in connection with the breakthrough of democratic suffrage in Sweden**

In Sweden, too, the king and the right conceded the necessity of a suffrage reform only after the fall of the German imperial throne.\textsuperscript{111} In connected parliamentary debates, interpretations of the past were used both to persuade the right to give up resistance or to re-enforce their anti-reformist arguments. Two teleological interpretations, reformist and conservative, of the national past continued to coexist, just as in Finland.

Liberal reformists emphasized the Swedish tradition of liberty. The internationally oriented banker Knut Wallenberg (Independent), a former foreign minister, saw the proposed reform as an integral part of the glorious national history.\textsuperscript{112} Raoul Hamilton (Liberal), the Deputy Speaker of the Second Chamber, tried to persuade the Conservatives and to vindicate Liberal ideals by representing the reform as an advance of ‘the immemorial, law-bound liberty of the Swedish people’, endorsing a formulation in the constitution of 1772 but combining it with the ‘liberty, equality and brotherhood’ of the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{113} Edward Alkman (Liberal) found a parallel in 1809: royal autocracy had been abolished then, and so in 1918 would the oligarchic power of a few citizens be terminated.\textsuperscript{114}

Majority Social Democrats, with their future-oriented ideology and conviction that the final breakthrough of reform was at hand, mostly avoided historical arguments in this context. Leftists such as Ivar Vennerström, instead recalled the progress of Swedish history as a democratic and parliamentary teleological narrative leading to the proposed reform: democracy had been increased in 1809, extended in 1865 and 1907, and would take a
decisive step in 1918.\textsuperscript{115} According to Fabian Månsson, the suffrage reform would restore to the common people (including the peasantry, many of whom were sceptical) democracy that they had enjoyed before the Thirty Years’ War.\textsuperscript{116}

Individual rightist members suggested that they were rethinking their approach to the reform. Karl Johan Ekman (National Party) recognized that ‘a culture of one thousand years, a social order of a thousand years, is going to its grave in these days’.\textsuperscript{117} While political power in the days of estate representation had been based on land ownership and since 1866 on property, it would from 1918 be more equally distributed.\textsuperscript{118} Edvard Lithander (Right), who had strong personal connections with both Britain and Germany and was an advocate of the spirit of liberty of the old Goths within the association \textit{Götiska Samfundet}, declared that there had been a ‘freeborn class of common people’ in Sweden ‘for thousands [sic] of years’ and that this tradition distinguished Sweden from countries where revolutions had only occurred in the late 1910s.\textsuperscript{119} Interestingly, Lithander’s historical narrative had elements in common with that of the far left: Lithander emphasized continuity, while the leftists lamented breaks in the progress of popular government.

Many conservative academics of the National Party viewed the introduction of universal suffrage as a major break with the Swedish political tradition. The ultra-conservative Ernst Trygger – a professor of law and former rector of Uppsala University – saw the extension of democratization as endangering the social order formed by hundreds of years of organic development.\textsuperscript{120} August Bellinder, who had examined constitutional development in France and England in his doctoral dissertation (1872), insisted that Sweden, with ‘her immemorial popular liberty’, had enjoyed democracy when German and French peasants had still been bound to their masters.\textsuperscript{121} Harald Hjärne, a retired professor of history, recognized the need to abolish the two lower estates but doubted whether the Social Democrats would be able to create a new estate or class power to their liking. Instead, he
foresaw a future with an unbalanced constitution. Professor Sam Clason, the state archivist, wanted to keep the bicameral system as a safeguard in case the Swedish people decided to go for the reform. Even this sympathizer of the Gustavian Age saw the reform as justified in the light of the long tradition of popular participation, which points to certain rethinking of the national past.

Non-academic conservatives saw no reason for reconsidering their stance. Lieutenant General Herman Wrangel, while recognizing the transformation of the tradition of representation to democracy, urged Sweden to retain its old liberty in the face of an excessive yoke of equality. For the ultra-conservative land-owner and administrator, Carl von Mentzer, the reform stood for the replacement of the glorious Swedish flag of Gustav Adolph with the red flag. Conservatives also sometimes claimed that the constitution of 1809 was the invaluable property of the people, which parliament had no right to reject. Conservative farmers complained that the common people, who had loyally sacrificed themselves for the king in the past, were being ignored. As in Finland, the tradition of peasant involvement produced both reformist and traditionalist arguments.

This opposition did not prevent both chambers from passing the suffrage reform in December 1918 and from approving it in another session in June 1919. In the final debates, Mauritz Hellberg (Liberal) drew attention to a development that had not been foreseen when the constitution of 1809 was formulated. It had originally been intended to prevent a renewal of the aberrations of the Age of Liberty, in which the representative institution nominated ministers, while now such a regulation was no longer needed as parliamentarism had been achieved (in 1917) without touching the original formulation. This development was questioned by Sam Clason who saw it as diverging from the will of the formulators of the constitution who had been wisely aware of the risks of appealing to the people after the fashion of the Age of Liberty. He regarded the constitution of 1809 as an advanced
version of the Gustavian constitution, which had brought such excesses to an end. As much of it should be retained as possible. And indeed, much of it would be retained until 1974.

Arguments based on the 18th-century constitutional alternatives began to lose their credibility once universal suffrage had been introduced. During the ascendancy of the Social Democrats, both academic and public discourse continued to view the long native tradition of representative government as a progress towards Swedish democracy in its 20th-century sense. The evolution of Swedish representative government was in some respects unique, but the popularity of this narrative is also explained by the need to construct a positive national identity and by the influential position which Fredrik Lagerroth gained in Swedish academia. The interpretations of the reformist leftists of the early 20th century gained ground in the mainstream discourse in Sweden, but simplifying teleologies were mostly avoided in academic research, though some interpretations of the Sweden of the Age of Liberty as being ahead of its time did appear. Swedish scholarly interpretations of the 18th-century representative system continue to differ from those made by Finnish scholars, evidently because of the different national historical experiences against which the common inheritance has been evaluated. The Finnish case provides an alternative, and equally valid, historical narrative, but it, too, has been affected by nationalist and ideological uses of the past.

**The Gustavian heritage modified for a republic**

In spring 1919, new elections were held in Finland, in which the republicans gained an overwhelming majority and the socialists returned to parliament. Even though the era of the constitution of 1772 was drawing to a close, elements of the Swedish-Finnish tradition were retained in the new republican constitution ratified in July 1919, which would then constitute
the foundation of the Finnish republic until 2000 and beyond. In debates on the constitution, there were still numerous references to the Age of Liberty and the Gustavian Age, concerning questions such as safeguarding the Lutheran fundamental values of the political community, the necessity for a strong head of state in the mould of Gustav Wasa, the protection of private property as awarded by Gustav III, parliamentarism leading to a new Age of Liberty, a thousand-year-old tradition of ‘democracy’ in Sweden and Finland, and the need to have parliamentary oversight of bureaucracy.

The application of the constitution of 1772 to electing a new king had discredited the Gustavian constitution in the eyes of the republicans and increased their readiness to break with the Swedish past and to prosecute the monarchists. Former monarchists might emphasize the constitutionality of the measure in the circumstances of autumn 1918. Rafael Erich (National Coalition), a professor of constitutional law, recognized that the constitution of 1772 had in some respects become outdated after the introduction of a democratic parliament and rather emphasised the Swedish precedent of 1809 with the estates agreeing on a new constitution and electing a new ruler as the model.

Even if the constitution of 1919 significantly redefined the Finnish polity, it was still built on common historical experiences. For Emil Hästbacka, a conservative from the Swedish People’s Party, Swedish history demonstrated how strong leaders such as Gustav Wasa and L.A. Mannerheim (whose surname was the same as that of the current Finnish regent) in 1809 had been able save the nation from disaster by turning a divided community into an organic entity. Hästbacka’s analogy suggested a direct continuity between Swedish and Finnish national histories, defended early-modern forms of government and noble families and championed ‘the conception of old justice regarding the rights and liberties of the common people’ (odalmannafriheten) as guaranteed by Gustav III in 1789.
Several Swedish-speaking representatives continued to argue against extended parliamentarism. Hjalmar Procopé saw 18th-century history as an argument against excessive parliamentary power: ‘A despotism of many heads’ would lead to the weakening and dissolution of the political community just as in the Age of Liberty, if not indeed to a Polish Diet and the destruction of the polity.\textsuperscript{139} Axel Palmgren, the leader of the employers’ association, was in favour of maintaining the division of power as formulated by Gustav III to save the country from ‘the misgovernment of the so-called Age of Liberty’.\textsuperscript{140} In the aftermath of the Civil War, the representatives of the Swedish People’s Party wished to preserve the constitution of 1772 in order to secure the rights of the linguistic minority and would not support a republican constitution without concessions over language policy. Swedish-speaking civil servants had relied on the continuance of the Gustavian order, assuming that the Finnish-speaking majority shared their respect for it. A republican (socialist) coup giving all sovereignty to parliament in the spirit of the Power Act of 1917,\textsuperscript{141} the Civil War and even the republican constitutional proposal of summer 1919 appeared to them as a restoration of the detested Age of Liberty.

Doubts about excessive republicanism and parliamentarism also remained strong in the National Coalition Party (the former Finnish Party). The professors in the party wished the new constitution to be built on the basis of the polity of 1772 with a strong head of state balancing parliament.\textsuperscript{142} Theodor Homén, a professor of physics, insisted that both the reign of Charles XII and the rule of ‘parliament’ in the Age of Liberty had led to disasters from which the Gustavian constitution had saved the realm.\textsuperscript{143} For Hugo Suolahti, a professor of German philology and Vice-Rector of the University of Helsinki, Swedish and Polish 18th-century history demonstrated the consequences of concentrating ‘the governmental power of parties’ in parliament.\textsuperscript{144} Even Rafael Erich, a leading constitutional lawyer, spoke with some nostalgia about the flexibility of the old Swedish constitutions: the Swedish
constitution of 1809 had allowed for different representative institutions and the loosely formulated constitution of 1772 had served Finnish interests under Russian rule. It had even been successfully combined with a democratic parliament since 1906.145

There were fewer arguments appealing to the democratic roots of the Swedish tradition in Finland than in Sweden; many Finns rather viewed the past in a Fennoman spirit. Väinö Voionmaa, a Social Democrat professor of Nordic history, suggested that democracy had grown organically in Finland just as in other Nordic countries – and even before the Swedish conquest: ‘quietly together with the thousand-year-old development of this nation’. The unicameral parliament of the people, too, was a result of a thousand years of historical evolution, which made it more legitimate than the political power of the higher classes.146 Voionmaa’s history book for elementary schools (published in 1916) had presented the preservation of the ancient peasant liberty as practised in the tings as an essential characteristic of Swedish and Finnish societies. Voionmaa even recognized the role of the Diet and the political parties of the Age of Liberty in establishing the political influence of the people and creating a continuous parliamentary tradition.147 In parliament, Voionmaa combined this historiographical approach with Marxist theory, albeit nationalizing the history of democracy in a way that left little room for a socialist revolution as the way to democracy. Hannes Ryömä, the compromise-seeking editor of Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, reinterpreted the controversial Article 38 creatively to imply the principle that ‘the organization of the use of supreme executive power belongs to the representative institution of the people’.148 Parliamentary democracy built on the constitutional heritage thereby found an historical justification in Social Democratic discourse in Finland just as in Sweden.

Historical arguments for the further parliamentarization of government were heard among Liberals, too. When E.N. Setälä (National Coalition) opposed the practice of allowing the minutes of the government to be inspected by the Constitutional Committee – a
procedure that originated in the Age of Liberty and was included in the Swedish constitution of 1809. Georg Schauman, a Swedish-speaking leftist Liberal disagreed, speaking in favour of the parliamentary scrutiny of autocratic bureaucracy. For Schauman, the constitution of the Age of Liberty, which he had studied in his doctoral dissertation, was part of the invaluable heritage from Finland’s union with Sweden and should not be ‘partly unfairly declared a heresy.’ For Schauman, Anders Chydenius was ‘a forerunner of modern democracy in Sweden and Finland’, although the age as a whole did not constitute a model that Finnish legislators should follow.

The Agrarians remained ready to re-evaluate the tradition and to introduce a parliamentary republic. Juho Niukkanen suggested that the aim of the defenders of the Gustavian constitution was to prevent the strengthening of the power of the parliament and the introduction of ministerial responsibility. Pekka Saarelainen rejected suggestions that the Finns would not respect a new constitution, pointing out that the constitution of 1772 had actually been a result of a coup within the Swedish government and was not, unlike the proposed new constitution, based on the Finnish people’s conception of justice. Such a view broke with the Gustavian tradition, questioning its legitimacy and emphasizing the fact that the sovereignty of the people would be realized in the new polity. This came close to the Social Democratic view that reactionary minority power based on early-modern constitutions had become irreconcilable with the advance of political and economic development.

The history-political dispute became particularly heated when the articles of the constitution regarding Swedish and Finnish as national languages were debated by Swedish- and Finnish-speaking nationalists. The Swedish People’s Party was campaigning to establish the status of Swedish as one of the two ‘national’ languages of Finland and for monolingual Swedish institutions for Swedish-speaking areas. Some Agrarians responded with extreme
Fennoman interpretations of Finnish history, suggesting in the words of Antti Juutilainen that ‘the unnatural dominance of the Swedes will sooner or later be crushed, and the Finnish elements of the population will be awarded their rights’. Others considered that Finns and Swedes had lived together for 700 years and had grown to share the same political values. Niilo Liakka argued that the Finns viewed Swedish civilization with sympathy and found in Scandinavia the ideological model that would help them to advance politically. Finland and the Scandinavian countries were the only ones in which the peasantry had come to play a major role in politics. The Swedish-speaking minority, too, had a role in maintaining this link with Scandinavia provided that it understood the joint interests of the two language groups. The progressive Bruno Sarlin developed this line of thought further, emphasizing the historical role of Finns as the defenders of the values of Western civilization – values which had been adopted from Sweden and were constantly threatened by Russia. Such a view summarized much of the self-understanding of Finland, which would be politically dominated by the White victors of the Civil War in the years to come. The republican teleological understanding of the national past, ready to break with the monarchical tradition, emerged victorious in the Finnish constitutional struggle, but it, too, continued to associate itself with the early-modern Swedish traditions of representative government.

**Conclusion**

I have compared the political use of references to Sweden’s and Finland’s common historical experience during the transition to democratic and parliamentary government in the late 1910s. I have shown how the discourse on the rights of the people in the Age of Liberty and the Gustavian Era had constituted a common heritage to which the parliamentary and academic elites of Sweden and Finland – who shared many basic conceptions of the national
past but disagreed on interpretations – continued to appeal in the early 20th century.
Understandings of the different 18th-century constitutions became politicized among all political groups in both parliaments.

Defences of the established order by conservative professors were challenged especially by leftist lay interpreters of the past but also by some academically educated socialists and liberals. Owing to the presence of academics and the essentially historical motivation of all ideologies, the political use of history was common – and also reasonably informed.

When the constitution of the Age of Liberty was demolished by Gustav III and his own monarchical constitution then replaced in connection with the Swedish ‘revolution’ of 1809, what really mattered in Sweden was the constitution of 1809, the loose formulations of which opened the way for a gradual constitutional evolution. The victory of the reformists in 1918, after a lengthy struggle, also entailed the victory of their teleological conception of Swedish parliamentary history over conservative doubts about parliamentarism. Fredrik Lagerroth’s nationalistic interpretation of a thousand years of popular government, which culminated in what he called ‘the parliamentarism of the Age of Liberty’, was adopted by the left (and especially the far left) in both Sweden and Finland. Socialists called for the restoration of the alleged ancient democracy, which the right seemed to be opposing just as the nobility had traditionally done; their discourse contained Marxist vocabulary referring to the class struggle, but it was nationalistic rather than universalistic. Under the Social Democrat hegemony, the leftist interpretation would predominate in Sweden. In Finland, the situation was different. The diversification in history politics in the late 1910s is one of the reasons for the continuing differences in Swedish and Finnish popular and academic understandings of the common past.
In Finland, a late 18th-century Gustavian constitution, which had secured the autonomy of the country under Russian rule, remained in force until 1919. The constitutional debate focused on either maintaining much of that constitution or rethinking the polity as a whole – though both alternatives still referred to the joint Swedish-Finnish tradition. Two ideologically motivated historical narratives, one emphasizing the common experiences of Swedes and Finns and the other concentrating on the experiences of a separate Finnish nation, coexisted – and continued to coexist and to have political consequences in Finnish language policy debates, for instance.161

In both countries, the conservatives mostly rejected claims about historical progress towards parliamentary sovereignty: while recognizing traditions of popular representation, they denounced what they saw as breaks with the tradition. In Finland, both the Finnish and the Swedish Parties loathed the Age of Liberty, wished to maintain as much of the constitution of 1772 as possible and to that end turned to extremely legalistic, even tendentious, interpretations. Some Finnish Liberals also had doubts about the extension of parliamentarism (which differed from Liberals in Sweden) and appealed to a monarchical tradition that had existed since 1362, but they were generally ready to accept a democratic reinterpretation of the constitution. The Finnish Agrarians (more leftist than the Swedish peasant parties), building on a Fennoman interpretation of history that was critical of the Swedish monarchy but associating themselves with the Swedish (or rather Scandinavian) tradition of popular government and democracy,162 spoke in favour of what they saw as the restoration of the sovereignty of the people that had been violated by the Gustavian constitution. Towards the end of 1917, the rejection of all aspects of the Gustavian order became loud among the Finnish far left, but their defeat in the Civil War meant that not all of that tradition was rejected.
Discourse-oriented constitutional history suggests that it is not only the Swedish language but also interwoven constitutional and legal discourses that unite Finland with Sweden. The alternative (and far from counterfactual) narratives of Swedish and Finnish constitutional traditions also demonstrate the considerable potential of the political use of history in parliamentary debates related to decision-making on constitutions. It is indispensable to be aware of and to problematize the influence of ideological factors and contingent political interests on our interpretations of the past. Without a basic knowledge of the history of one’s country and an awareness of alternative, politically motivated interpretations of it, citizens become easier targets for politically motivated attempts to present national history in ways that serve the contingent interests of some particular group. In the absence of more diversified conceptions of the past, politicians and citizens may also be happy to motivate their political views by appealing to popular history or personal experience or to adopt presentist views that break with the past. Democratic societies need a pluralistic teaching of history in order to inculcate the needed historical awareness in their citizens and politicians. Such an education does not remove the potential of history politics – which will always exist – but it supports historically informed rather than purely ideological uses of political arguments based on references to the past.

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*Riksdagens protokoll vid … riksmötet …. Andra kammaren* (AK) [Record of the Swedish parliament, Second Chamber]. Stockholm: Riksdagen, 1867–1948.

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Notes

1 For the German background of the term *Geschichtspolitik* see Torsti, “Historiapoliittikaan tutkimaan,” 62.


7 Ihalainen, *Agents of the People*.


Ihalainen, “La Finlande de 1809” on a Finnish-Swedish Peasant appeal in 1809 to a thousand years of peasant participation.

Sundin, 1809, 159–228.

Ihalainen, “La Finlande de 1809”; see also Ihalainen, “From a Despised French Word.”

Ihalainen and Sundin, “Continuity and Change.”

See also Ihalainen, “From a Despised French Word.”

Fahlbeck, Regeringsformen i historisk belysning, 22, 26–29, 37; Fahlbeck, Engelsk parlamentarism contra svensk, 5–6; Pettersson, Politisk vetenskap, 161, 170; Jakobsen and Kurunmäki, “The Formation of Parliamentarism.” I would like to thank my research assistant Ville Häkkinen for his help in consulting this background literature.

Stjernquist, “Fredrik Lagerroth”; for more up-to-date interpretation, see Wolff, “Legitimising Privilege.”

Lagerroth, Frihetstidens författning, 322, 326, 690, 711; Lagerroth, “Frihetstidens maktägande ständer.” Vol. 5/1, 148, 179, 212; Lagerroth, Levande och dött.


Stjernquist, Tvåkammartiden.

Fahlbeck, “Frihetstidens politiska idéer,” 326–8, 330, 335; Fahlbeck, Engelsk parlamentarism contra svensk, 11.


Larsson, “Sam Clason,” 349–54. Similar highly critical views of the political weakness caused by the constitution of the Age of Liberty and the restoration of royal power by Gustav III were to be found in schoolbooks used in both Sweden and Finland. See Pallin and


26 Linderborg, *Socialdemokraterna skriver historia*, 269, 482.

27 Skoglund, *Vita mössor*, 62.


30 AK, 21 March 1917, 33:45.

31 AK, 5 June 1917, 72:15–16.

32 Ibid., 72:57.

33 AK, 7 June 1917, 75:30.

34 Rudolf Kjellén (National Party), a conservative political scientist who held the prestigious Skyttean Professorship in Rhetoric and Politics at Uppsala University, even if critical of parliamentarism, held a positive view of Lagerroth’s dissertation and placed the rise of peasant influence at the time of Engelbrekt, seeing it as a recognition of peasant contributions to the defence of Sweden. See Lagerroth, *Konung och adel*, 9, for a reference to this; Stjernquist, *Tvåkammardagen*; Linderborg, *Socialdemokraterna skriver historia*, 482–3; Pettersson, *Politisk vetenskap*, 208.

35 AK, 5 June 1917, 72:20.

36 AK, 14 April 1917, 32:22–3.

37 All biographical details are based on *Tvåkammarriks dagen*.

In a review, Hjärne had criticized the claim that the medieval peasantry had played a key role in the national movement and rejected exaggerated interpretations of popular sovereignty. Björk “Harald Hjärne,” 252.

AK, 14 April 1917, 41:53, 55.

Ibid., 41:66.

Ibid., 41:69.

AK, 5 June 1917, 72:30.


See Jörke and Llanque, “Parliamentarism and Democracy” on German socialist political theory.

VP, 17 July 1917, 1024. Moving from the Social Democrats to the Finnish Party was logical in the sense that the latter was not only conservative but also social reformist and in favour of the advancement of the Finnish language.

Ibid., 1053.


Ibid.; *Eduskunta-mielivalta* ignored all conceptual distinctions between estate assemblies and modern parliaments.

VP, 17 July 1917, 1021; For *eduskuntayksinvaltius*, see the preceding note.

VP, 10 July 1917, 896.

Konrad Lehtimäki, Ibid. 909; Lehtimäki, VP, 17 July 1917, 1032.


Ibid., 1029.

VP, 8 November 1917, 33.
56 VP, 15 November 1917, 130.

57 Ibid., 28–9; VP, 15 November 1917, 127; see also Jansson, Rikssprängningen, 114.

58 VP, 15 November 1917, 132.

59 Ibid., 128.

60 Ibid., 129.

61 Ibid., 145.

62 Ibid., 133.

63 VP, 8 November 1917, 23.

64 Oskari Tokoi, VP, 9 November 1917, 48.

65 VP, 15 November 1917, 138. Kujala was responding at the end of his sentence to an interjection from the left directed against his previous suggestion. See Forrström, Suomen historian oppikirja, 11.

66 VP, 15 November 1917, 138; see Forrström, Suomen historian oppikirja, 65, 69 on the betrayal of the people by their representatives and especially the nobility.

67 VP, 15 November 1917, 138.

68 VP, 10 November 1917, 74.

69 Ibid., 81.

70 VP, 5 December 1917, 353.

71 VP, 24 November 1917, 182.

72 Ibid., 185.

73 VP, 6 December 1917, 367, 370.

74 Arvid Lindman, AK, 20 February 1918, 16:28–9, 33.

75 Ibid., 16:30; Ibid., 16:34: frändefolk, systerlandet. Also: broderland (brother country), Raoul Hamilton, Ibid., 16:46, and broderfolk (brother people), David Norman, Ibid., 16:48.

76 Ibid., 16:64.

78 VP, 12 June 1917, 1244.

79 VP, 12 June 1918, 1252; 13 June 1918, 1313; 12 July 1918, 1649.

80 VP, 12 July 1918, 1649, 1652; see also Wrede, “Parlamentaarinen järjestelmä,” 12.

81 VP, 12 June 1917, 1262.

82 VP, 13 June 1917, 1288.

83 Ibid., 1303–4.

84 VP, 7 August 1918, 1826.

85 Juho Snellman, VP, 7 August 1918, 1845.

86 Ibid., 1827, 1829–30.

87 VP, 12 June 1917, 1248; 12 July 1918, 1666–7.

88 VP, 7 August 1918, 1851.

89 Ibid., 1853.

90 VP, 12 June 1917, 1260.

91 Ibid., 1255.

92 VP, 13 June 1917, 1315–16.

93 VP, 7 August 1918, 1843–4.

94 Ibid., 1850–1.

95 VP, 8 August 1918, 1860, also 1872.

96 Ibid., 1861; 9 October 1918, 109.

97 VP, 8 August 1918, 1863.

98 VP, 9 August 1918, 1881–2; also Artur Lagerlöf (Finnish), Ibid., 1883.

99 VP, 8 August 1918, 1865; 9 August 1918, 1879–80; also 9 October 1918, 112; also Juho Kokko, 8 August 1918, 1866.
100 VP, 4 October 1918, 24, 28; also 9 October 1918, 109; also Antti Rentola, 4 October 1918, 28–9.

101 VP, 8 October 1918, 72; 9 October 1918, 100.

102 VP, 4 October 1918, 35.

103 VP, 9 October 1918, 96–7.

104 VP, 8 August 1918, 1872; 9 August 1918, 1877–8.

105 VP, 8 August 1918, 1866–7; 8 October 1918, 63–4.

106 VP, 9 August 1918, 1891.


108 VP, 9 October 1918, 122.


111 Olsson, *Den svenska högerns anpassning*, 302.

112 FK, 17 December 1918, 10:40.

113 AK, 17 December 1918, 17:34.

114 FK, 17 December 1918, 10:62.

115 AK, 26 November 1918, 9:18; 17 December 1918, 17:70.

116 AK, 17 December 1918, 18:25–26; On Månsson’s idealisation of *ting*, see Linderborg, *Socialdemokraterna skriver historia*, 316.

117 FK, 26 November 1918, 5:45.

118 FK, 17 December 1918, 11:3.

119 AK, 17 December 1918, 10:40.

120 FK, 17 December 1918, 10:15.

121 Ibid., 10:41.
122 Ibid., 11:9–10.

123 Ibid., 10:60; Larsson, “Sam Clason,” 315.

124 Ibid., 10:28.

125 Ibid., 10:31–32.

126 Adolf Lindgren, Ibid., 11:14.

127 Alexis Hammarström (National), Ibid., 10:57; Richard Hermelin (National), Ibid., 10:77.


129 Ibid., 53:34.

130 Linderborg, Socialdemokraterna skriver historia; Kurunmäki and Strang, Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy; Friberg, Demokrati bortom politiken. On contemporary schoolbooks, see Villstrand and Östman, “Amnorlundagörandets olidliga läthet,” 240.

131 Metcalf, “Hattar och mössor;” Nordin, Ett fattigt men fritt folk; Hallberg, Ages of Liberty; Winton, Frihetstidens politiska praktik; Lindberg, Den antika skevheten.

132 Villstrand, Valtakunnanos, 260.

133 Finnish-speaking ultra-conservatives, in particular, emphasized the need to maintain an uncompromised religious unity as stipulated in the first article of the Form of Government of 1772: Lutheran uniformity since the Convention of Uppsala (1593) had taught obedience to the law and formed the basis for the growth of a national conscience. For Finnish nationalists, it was easier to accept the identity-creating potential of the Lutheran Church than the Swedish political system as such. Wilhelmi Malmivaara, VP, 4 June 1919, 794; Ilmi Hallstén, Ibid., 795; Frans Kärki, 14 June 1919, 888; Ihalainen, Protestant Nations Redefined.

134 Väinö Tanner, VP, 25 April 1919, 136, 140. Also Hannes Ryömä, Ibid., 141, and Antti Juutilainen, Ibid., 143.

135 Paavo Virkkunen, Ibid., 138.
136 Ibid., 143; 24 May 1919, 523.
137 VP, 2 June 1919, 639–40; See also Frans Kärki, 14 June 1919, 887.
138 VP, 18 June 1919, 970.
139 VP, 2 June 1919, 648.
140 VP, 14 June 1919, 890.
141 Rafael Colliander, Ibid., 919–20.
142 E.N. Setälä, Ibid., 896.
143 VP, 14 June 1919, 912.
144 VP, 21 June 1919, 1020.
145 Ibid., 1024.
146 VP, 24 May 1919, 517; Lähteenmäki, Väinö Voionmaa, 99, 110.
147 Yrjö-Koskinen and Voionmaa, Suomen historia, 17, 20–1, 140; Voionmaa, Valtioelämän perusteet, 48.
148 VP, 24 May 1919, 508.
149 Ibid., 502–3.
150 Ibid., 536; 4 June 1919, 747.
151 VP, 14 June 1919, 894.
152 Ibid., 895; The construction of Chydenius as a ‘democrat’ still continues in Finnish and Swedish historiography.
153 VP, 4 June 1919, 744; Lagerroth, Konung och adel, 14, complains about this.
154 VP, 14 June 1919, 908.
155 Anton Kotonen, Ibid., 923.
156 VP, 4 June 1919, 762.
157 Artur Wuorimaa, Ibid., 763.
158 Ibid., 772.


Even today, two interpretations of the common past with Sweden continue to find support among Finns, as is demonstrated by the debate provoked by the TV series ‘Finland is Swedish’ in 2013.

Ihalainen, Saarinen, Nikula and Pöyhönen, “Aika kielipolitiikassa.”