NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES WITHIN THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT HEGEMONY
A Case Study of the Post-2015 Consultations in Tanzania

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National development discourses within the global development hegemony: A case study of the post-2015 consultations in Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

This study appears at a time when the new global post-2015 development agenda is being formed. In contrast to previous global development frameworks, we are now facing a universal agenda that sees development as a shared concern between the global North and South. Moreover, the new agenda is supposed to respond to many of the fallbacks of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), the lack of voice for ordinary people in particular.

This research examines how the concept of development is constructed in national policy consultations and how such constructions resonate with global development hegemony. It draws attention to the fact that development discourses are built, maintained and rearranged in local contexts. The data is based on Tanzanian consultations, namely one national and seven zonal post-2015 consultation reports gathered by the Tanzanian President’s Office Planning Commission in 2012.

The methodological foundation of the research is based on critical discourse analysis, which draws particular attention to discreet belief systems and the role of power in the text. The data analysis identified five discourses: participatory neoliberalism, patriotism, self-help, spirit of ujamaa and good governance. The methodological framework applied here specifically emphasizes the role of institutions and identities in the formation and reproduction of discourses. Moreover, the data analysis looks into the argumentation and legitimation strategies behind the discourses.

The findings suggest that Tanzanian development is based on a neoliberal regime coupled with a mixture of cultural and political elements of past and present. The hegemonic understanding of development is affected by the country's unique socialist history, the prevailing national policies, as well as Tanzania’s global identity as a Least Developed Country (LDC). The desired development is legitimized with individual moral responsibility towards community and nation. Transformative traces were found in reference to narrow participation space. Yet, the findings suggest that although Tanzanians are disappointed with the heavily politicized and corrupted governance system, the familiarity of the past also unites the nation in front of global changes. Overall, the Tanzanian development discourses reinforce the neoliberal model of development where structural economic changes are placed above more multifaceted people-centered views.

Key words: post-2015 agenda, development hegemony, transformation, critical discourse analysis
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Index of Abbreviations
BRN  Big Results Now
CCM  Chama cha Mapiduzi
CDA  Critical Discourse Analysis
CSO  Civil Society Organization
DAC  Development Assistance Committee
EPTA  Extended Programme of Technical Assistance
ERP  Economy Recovery Programme
ESRF  Economic and Social Research Foundation
FYDP  Five Year Development Plan
IFIs  International Financial Institutions
IMF  International Monetary Fund
ILO  International Labour Organization
LDC  Least Developed Country
LGA  Local Government Authority
LTTP  Long-Term Perspective Plan
MDG  Millenium Development Goal
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NIEO  New International Economic Order
NSGRP  National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OWG  Open Working Group
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNFED</td>
<td>Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development</td>
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<td>TACOSODE</td>
<td>Tanzanian Council for Social Development</td>
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<td>TANGO</td>
<td>Tanzanian Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>TANU</td>
<td>Tanganyika African Nation Union</td>
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<td>TDV 2025</td>
<td>Tanzanian Development Vision 2025</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background and purpose of the study

Since the year 2000 the global development agenda has been shaped by a set of eight development goals that are to be attained by 2015. These targets, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), were agreed upon in the UN General Assembly with a historically wide support from both donor and recipient countries. They sought to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat common diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development. The historical setting for the formation of MDGs can be traced back to the beginning of 1990s, when the amount of foreign aid was decreasing. Development was argued having lost a decade for structural adjustment policies after the cold war had ended. The attitude towards global development policies and summits was generally pessimistic. However, the extensive criticism towards the ineffective structural adjustment policies brought poverty reduction back to the global arenas in an effort to find a globally effective roadmap for inclusive development. Although the developing world had undergone a vast economic development, poverty and inequality had persisted. It was realized that national economic growth did not automatically lead to well-being for ordinary people. Against this background the global support for the MDGs was understandable. They were simple, easy to comprehend and went from a narrow growth-centred model to a wider understanding of equitable and sustainable well-being.

Although not binding by law, the Millennium Development Goals have guided the global aid regime with a relatively large unity. Still, the formation of the MDGs is not as straightforward as the goals themselves. The Millennium Development Goals were formed in a process that had multiple actors and interests. The policy choices made were affected by a complex interdependence. Although policy is often presented as a clear linear-rational outcome, policy formation is an ongoing and incremental process of negotiation and bargaining with no clear phases or precise end. (Hulme 2008, 3.)
Since coming into effect, the MDGs have attracted divergent opinions. They have been both praised and criticized. In general, global political commitment to MDGs as an overall policy objective has been strong. Until 2012 the yearly MDG report of the UN stated that meeting the goals is challenging but possible by the 2015 deadline if only aid levels remain high. UN statements on achieving the MDGs have repeatedly underlined the importance of global partnership (MDG 8), especially sustained financing, for achieving the set targets. (UN News Centre 2012.) Simultaneously MDG 8 has remained as the most intangible of the goals, which has provoked different interpretations of such partnership by donors and the developing world.

As the MDGs’ ‘expiry date’ draws closer, there is an increasing discontent with the current aid system. A special advisor to the UN Secretary-General on MDGs and a well-known economist, Jeffrey Sachs, has up to recent years promoted the effectiveness of the goals. Yet he has later admitted that many countries will not be able to meet the targets by 2015. According to Sachs, this is to large degree due to rich countries’ inability to keep their financial promises. (Sachs 2012.) One of Sachs’ critics, William Easterly, has pointed out that there are contradictory statements, also within the UN documents, that create a tangled, messy picture of what in fact is effective and what is not. He talks of the bipolarity of “aid does work already and will work in the future but aid is also not working”, which also leads to confused statements by the aid organizations themselves. (Easterly 2008, 15.) Typically both Sachs and the official UN documents on the MDGs have maintained an assumption that technical means and abundant financing can eradicate poverty and consequently, that it is mainly the poor South that needs to develop. Yet as 2015 has drawn closer and the targets are in many aspects yet to be achieved, a call for a universal responsibility to change our understanding of development, a global responsibility to develop, has strengthened.

Some believe that the MDGs have value in their political and public nature but should be modified and improved, especially to better respond to locally variable situations. In this line of thought, they have been criticized for weak ownership of developing countries, and focusing more on economic governance than on democratic and participatory processes (see for example Easterly 2008; Fukuda-Parr 2008). Following the ownership criticism, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), originally intended to help recipients meet the MDGs and increase country ownership, have been accused for concentrating on lack of
growth instead of the underlying cause, lack of voice (Fukuda-Parr 2008, 17.) At the more radical end of the global development agenda discussion are those who see the MDGs as a pure distracting trick, drawing attention away from the more fundamental global power structures and dynamics and the increased levels of inequality. (see for example Antrobus 2005.)

Compared to the situation in 2000, when the MDGs, were established, dramatic economic and political changes have taken place nationally and globally. Meanwhile, the new post-2015 framework is expected to reflect international processes (such as the MDG experience and the Rio+20 outcomes), support regional initiatives and align with national and local realities as well as economic, environmental, social and political priorities. Especially discussion of planetary boundaries has guided the new development thinking. Yet there are vast differences in how sustainable development is defined. Another dominant trend arising to the global agenda is the strengthened role of business and thus new partnership structures for development cooperation. Whether corporate sustainability could deliver truly sustainable development or respond to the rising levels of inequality is debatable.

Currently it looks likely that the SDG and MDG tracks will be integrated into a single process leading to one universal development framework, but this and other options are still to be negotiated in the intergovernmental negotiation process during 2015. Some Southern countries like Brazil have been opposing the integration. Especially the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) including Tanzania has expressed resistance. The merging of the two tracks presents several dilemmas on both the process and the framework itself, as well as questions concerning resourcing and complementarity. Whose voices will be listened to? Where will the resources come from? How to ensure synergy between the new development framework and domestic developmental agendas? To what extent will the national civil society consultations be acknowledged on the global agenda? Will the new agenda manage to provide transformative narratives and thus tackle underlying structures and causes of development?

That being said, in addition to the question over whether the MDGs are going to be fulfilled in time, the more popular question is, whether they actually ever captured the main purpose – expanding the development narrative beyond the narrow growth paradigm.
The main message of key donors, think-tanks and media has been that poverty has been reduced. However, this argumentation is based on the hegemonic economic growth view. Not only has inequality increased but also dimensions to measure human well-being and justify its progress expose the inequitable nature of the development paradigm. As Vandermoortele (2011) states, “The poverty debate has been dollarized and the MDG discourse has been donorized”. Thus, the key criticism towards the MDGs and the post-2015 agenda is directed towards the inequitable progress on global level and the intact nature of neoliberal policy approach.

This thesis appears at a time when the amount of debates and suggestions for a renewed global development agenda could not be more extensive. Yet, earlier research shows clearly that the actors on the national and local level, especially in the South, still feel very much neglected from the global discussion (e.g. Vandermoortele 2011; Fukuda-Parr 2011). If the global development hegemony is to change, the discourse of the MDGs will have to change too. Even where there is potential for more recognition for the power and influence of the developing South there are questions about how this converts into genuine shifts in attitudes, assumptions and power (Financial Times 2013; McEwan & Mawdsley 2012).

The starting point for the post-2015 agenda is that it aims to be more inclusive than the MDGs were. This involves also emphasizing participation already in the formulation process. The new agenda should include civil society, private sector and academia, which were to a large extent excluded from the MDGs creation. The new agenda also seeks to reflect on recent changes in development realm by providing a new understanding of development as a global responsibility, in which there no longer exists division between developed and developing. The old North / South divide has lost its relevance since the millennium. For example, 70 percent of the world’s poor live in middle income countries and climate change affects all, most drastically the global South (Sumner 2012, 7). The holistic approach to post 2015 agenda has been put into practice for example in the multiple thematic, country and regional level consultations including Tanzania. Thus, the process aims to step away from the technocratic nature of the MDGs and be responsive to those most affected by poverty and inequality.

The motivation for this thesis lies in hearing and understanding the Southern voices in relation to the global discussion. Whether contradictory or in line with the hegemonic
views, the national voices of developing nations are valuable and should not be left unnoticed. Their understanding of for example the nature of poverty, the necessity to address economic imbalances or the importance of social infrastructure is not known well enough nor heard enough in those tables were the development discussions take place and are renewed. This again forms a threat on repeating the exact mistakes that the MDGs have been blamed for. Although realizing its very limited position within the global debate, this thesis on its part aims at unraveling the content of local discussions that often disappear under the global motivation to define a globally applicable development agenda. Thus, ultimately this research makes a statement of the importance of a locally grounded development discussion as a driver and building block for any kind of globally agreed development agenda.

1.2. Defining the research questions

The overall purpose of the thesis is to understand how national development circumstances shape Tanzanian post-2015 development views and how this Tanzanian discussion is situated within the global hegemonic development dialogue. The objective is to discover through what kind of discourses development is constructed in the national post-2015 consultation reports and whether they sustain a specific hegemonic view of development.

The post-2015 development narratives in Tanzania will be examined through the following two questions:

1. Through what kind of discourses development is constructed in the national post-2015 discussion in Tanzania?

2. To what extent these discourses sustain hegemonic or provide transformative development views?

Data and national views are limited to one national and seven zonal post-2015 consultation reports gathered by the Tanzanian President’s Office Planning Commission in 2012. The consultations were financed by the UNDP and consulted persons consisted of local governmental officers, civil society representatives and vulnerable groups. The national
report was formed on the basis of the zonal consultations.

1.3. Central concepts

Theoretically I will observe emerging discourses specifically in relation to development ideology and place them within a view of power as hegemony.¹ I make particularly use of the neo-Gramscian theory that emerged in 1980s in the work of Robert Cox (Morton 2007, 111). Unlike in traditional international relations theory, which discusses hegemony only as a dimension of dominance based on the economic and military capabilities of states, (see for example Keohane 1984; Waltz 1979) neo-Gramscian view broadens the concept of hegemony to pay attention to social orders in a global scene. Thus hegemony is understood more in terms of world order and historical change rather than developing a static theory of politics as in traditional IR theory. Patterns of production relations (also other than the traditional economic ones i.e. production of knowledge, social relations, morals and institutions) are fundamental for understanding the operation of hegemony. They explain changing power relations within and across states and can inform how a specific world order has come to place. By outlining these production relations one might also be able to explain how they undergo transformation. (Morton 2007, 111.)

In contesting hegemony, transformation is a central concept. For Gramsci transformation was a way of gaining hegemony for the hitherto subalterns, in his case the proletariat. Academics such as Cox (1996) and Gill (2008) were among the first representatives of a new wave of scholars in the field of Neo-Gramscianism. They reconceptualized the concept of power. Rather than viewing the world through a lens of static power relations they questioned the static state of the political and social relations and institutions and asked what class forces may have the potential to transform the hegemony. (Worth 2011, 374.) Transformative features in a society explicitly or implicitly challenge the mainstream and respond critically to current assumptions. The subjectively produced reality consists of institutional, moral and ideological context that affect thoughts and actions (Morton 2011, 1)

¹ The historical premises of the theory of hegemony are in Antonio Gramsci’s writings, mainly the Prison Notebooks and his prison letters of passive revolution and uneven political economy. Gramsci reflected on the rise of Fascism and the crisis of capitalism in the early 20th Century. Yet, there exists no clear definition for the Gramscian concept of hegemony. The concept has been under a continual evolution since its origin and it takes different forms depending on the situation. Inputs to the concept include for example Marx, the Italian socialists, the early international socialist movement, Machiavelli and his linguistic studies and Gramsci’s own social reality (Boothman 2011, 66).
Transformation in this thesis, is embedded in asking what specific views of development are present and why and whether some aspects of transformation that have potential of transforming the prevailing patterns can be identified in the documents. Due to the nature of the empirical data, discussion on transformation in this study concentrates on changes in ideas and ideology rather than to the material structure of development architecture although ideas are often manifested in the material structures.

Academia often explains the current global hegemony as Euro- or Westcentrism. It is also described as the neoliberal ‘common-sense’, which is being globally institutionalized and administered through a set of institutions such as the UN and the international financial institutions. (e.g. Nederveen 2000, Rist 1997, Worth 2011). It provides a collective image of world order, which thus articulates and justifies specific interests as general interests. (Morton 2007, 113). Or, as Fairclough states, it is about “constructing alliances and integrating rather than plainly dominating subordinate groups, through recognition and ideological means, to gain their approval” (Fairclough 1992, 92). Hegemony consists of leadership and internalized coherence and reaches all spheres of society. In terms of space for participation, it is argued that the current hegemonic model of development consists of narrowing the social basis of popular participation to the world order of disciplinary neoliberalism (Morton 2011, 158). Literature dealing with neoliberalism in post-socialist reform has often used the term quite loosely. Neoliberalism is often defined purely as hostility towards the state and affinity to the markets. (Collier 2011, 135.) Yet, contextual reflection should not be forgotten. Rather than claiming that neoliberalism is opposed to welfare provision or accepts only a minimalistic state, my perspective to neoliberalism in this study is not critical per se. The absolute value of this study is not to pinpoint to failures of neoliberalism. I rather deploy the term in order to construct a historical and conceptual outline of Tanzanian context and therefore to understand the hegemonic framework of which my data findings are an integral part.

Relations of power may be affected, rebuilt and sustained by both theoretical and empirical discursive practices (Fairclough 1992, 91). This thesis understands hegemony of international development policy as being constructed both through theoretically informed concepts (such as participation or good governance) and through empirically constructed definitions such as the Tanzanians’ post-2015 agenda consultations, which this research is based on. Therefore, to narrow down this relatively vast concept, I will discuss hegemony
limited to hegemonic and transformative discourses present in the Tanzanian national post-2015 consultation reports. Nevertheless, I understand that development hegemony is maintained through a complex interconnectedness of states, international institutions, private sector and civil society. Because this research is limited to a specific fraction of those hegemonic relations it seeks to avoid generalizations and structural reductionism. When it comes to discussing the development discourses’ potential to carry transformative ideas into Tanzanian development policy or change the participation space of citizens, I am thus limited to providing only speculative comments.

The concept of civil society is in this study looked through post-structural approach that emphasizes the transformative potential of social movements. At the conceptual level I refer to the Gramscian understanding; civil society is an arena in which hegemonic ideas are built and contested. It is thus treated more broadly than in terms of associations. (Mitlin, Hickey & Bebbington 2006, 10.) The Gramscian view of hegemony argues that civil society is often represented by elite instead of authentic voices from the ground. For my study a fundamental step is therefore to clarify whose ideas the reports represent: the hegemonic views of the elite that more easily gain voice and representation in both international and national development policy arenas or divergent views that reveal how the majority experiences everyday life. However, categorizing development into business as usual or transformative as such is not my presumption for the analysis. In reality the different positions taken include elements of a varying degree of change and this is important to keep in mind when conducting and interpreting the data. It is often in minor ‘cracks’ of the text where change may be spotted.

In the context of my study, hegemony is defined as stemming from both Tanzanian post-socialist identity and global development orthodoxy, namely neoliberalism and the legacy of the MDGs. Both of these aspects, Tanzanian context and global context, maintain and construct specific development ideology and impact on how the consulted persons define development. By constructing a specific role of civil society they either support the mainstream view or challenge it. Yet, as mentioned, this study moves beyond criticism of neoliberalism. Gramscian transformation views development as a process of social change rather than as a chain of specific interventions (such as the Washington Consensus\(^2\)).

\(^2\) The Washington Consensus originally refers to a standard set of neoliberal policies (e.g. trade liberalization of foreign direct investments, large-scale privatization of public institutions and fiscal policy discipline)
aspects pay attention to the messiness and contingencies of everyday (political) life and social relations and thus ultimately rethink development from citizens’ perspective. Policy founded on (and serving) civil society, is the transformative aspect that the UN failed to fulfill when formulating the MDGs. It thus failed to break the current undemocratic representation of civil society on defining their development. Whether this will change on the global post-2015 agenda will remain to be seen but some judgments can be made based on the consultation process. The true potential of civil society to change development discourse is a too comprehensive topic to discuss in a Master’s thesis but such transformative shades will be touched upon in the conclusions.

As noted, the viewpoint of power as hegemony is disclosed with critical discourse analysis. Hence, based on the logic of critical discourse analysis of the selected position papers, I will look what are the different development discourses being manifested and how these national viewpoints are situated in relation to the UN post-2015 agenda. Naturally, the proposed study cannot address all aspects of local development discourses. Instead this study is limited to what kind of discourses emerge from the Tanzanian consultation reports, how the reports discuss development and how this resonates with the global discussion on the post-2015 agenda.

1.4. Structure of the study

In order to analyze the position papers and discover specific discourses, I will first review the historical development theories and build a contemporary understanding of development in chapter 2. Following the development framework, I will introduce the post-2015 agenda in chapter 3 and discuss how the post-2015 process is likely to maintain or reform the current global development hegemony. In chapter 4 I then move on to the national context of Tanzania and explain the cultural and political factors affecting current Tanzanian reflections on development. Chapter 5 lays out the methodological foundation of my research. I introduce critical discourse analysis and explain its application for my data analysis. In chapter 6 I will then answer to my research questions by 1) identifying the Tanzanian post-2015 discourses based on the consultation reports and 2) discussing

being imposed to developing nations by the Washington-based international financial institutions (namely the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department) in the beginning of 1990s. The policies further increased the economic crisis in the developing nations. (Steger & Roy, 2010, 98.)
hegemonic struggles and possible transformative aspects present in the discourses. Chapter 7 looks how the post-2015 consultation process carried out in Tanzania positions itself within the global discussion and what kind of implications it might bear for both national and global policy context. To conclude I will discuss limitations and ethical dilemmas present in my study and provide ideas for future research.
2. DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK: CHANGING HEGEMONIES IN THE HISTORY OF THEORY AND POLICY

As the research is laid on understanding how Tanzanian post-2015 development discourses relate to the prevailing global development agenda, it is important to first deal with development theory and policy in their historical context. In resonance with the neo-Gramscian viewpoint on the current world order and on the post-2015 context, global development is hereby understood as an ever-evolving entity. The purpose here is not to represent a complete picture of the current global development framework but rather pinpoint some specific changes, what I call here flows of transformation in development theory. Current development hegemony is thus seen as a consequence of its historical developments. The theories introduced here as representing transformational shifts in development have been selected based on their wide consensus among academia. I have especially utilized critical theories of development covered by scholars such as Rist (1997), Martinussen (1997) and Peet and Hartwick (2009). In order to move the focus of pure capitalist criticism towards the meaningfulness of hegemony and dialectics of transformation, I have also utilized critical theories of Nederveen (1998) and Fukuda-Parr (2011).

Development theories play an important role in setting frames for global development policy and governance. Likewise, reality of development affects the way development theories evolve. This is why it is important to understand how specific development theories are formed, what is their contribution for development policy and reports and in which ways these theories, and ultimately the policy too, reflect the reality, which they are to serve and support. When looking at the effects of development theories to policy formation and practice, it is important to comprehend that development policy and practical development work are most often a sum of nuances from different theories rather than a reflection of a specific major development theory. Similarly, although this chapter refers to a few specific theories, they too are a collection of multiple adaptations and tones. Understanding this opens possibilities for the researcher to see beyond the visible text under research, leaving room for a more inclusive analysis of the theoretical background of
The different theories of development are often discussed in a rather chronological order by looking at the shifts in development paradigms. When defining a development paradigm, Nederveen (1998, 344) notes that rather than claiming a new paradigm it might be fruitful to think, is it in fact tenable and politically reasonable to make such a division between alternative and mainstream paradigms. A development paradigm is commonly understood as a specific development trend or the mainstream theoretical position but all the same, alternative development has become less distinct from conventional development discourse and the present is always rather an ‘in between’ condition. Current trends of the global plutocracy of Anglo-American capitalism, the emerging markets gaining power and the turn from North-South to East-South relations suggest that it is more fruitful to discuss the present as an evolving organism, that is, as a hegemonic ideology of ‘global rebalancing’ than as a distinct paradigm. (Nederveen 1998, 344; Nederveen 2000, 27.) Where the word paradigm is used, it is to describe different trends or perspectives (structuralism, culturalism, poststructuralism) in development thinking, not the scientific shifts of paradigms as in Thomas Kuhn’s writings (Barker 2004). The premise of this thesis too is that paradigm in social sciences (and here in development theories specifically) is more flexible than in natural sciences and should be seen first and for most as something constantly evolving. Thus, rather than attempting to justify a specific paradigm, this research explores the hegemonic changes underway - the state of rebalancing. However a common method is to divide theories of development into theories of economic growth and modernization, theories of dependency and theories of alternative and social development (e.g. Nederveen 2000, Peet & Hartwick 2009, Rist 1997). I will place these theories of development in the context of changing hegemony and Westcentrism. Thus each theory of development can be viewed as representing or challenging a specific hegemony (Nederveen 2011; Rist 1997).

2.1. Development as a multifaceted concept

It could be said that there are as many definitions for development as there are development practitioners. Development theories reflect the political positions of their supporters, the places where they develop and can be principally, for example, economic,
sociological, anthropological, historical or geographic. Development has a twofold character; a physical reality that shows what it does or has done and a ‘state of mind’ that represents the development intention. As Cowen & Shenton (1996) put it, “it is through a deliberate decision-making capacity of the mind that policies are chosen to pursue some stated goals of development”. Hence, there is no one development theory on what development is. Development is often perceived in a positive light, as a desirable and progressive process. This encompasses the idea that development is a process in continuous evolution. Generally development can be defined as the method used by people and their institutions to pursue a better or more ideal society. In more practical terms, development may entail economic transformation that leads to more equal and increased living standards for all, equal access to education and health care and other social objectives. These changes in the improvements of living standards can also be divided theoretically into immanent and imminent development. The former refers to the processes of structural, political and economic change while the latter to the implemented development projects, that is, intended development aid. (Cowen & Shenton 1996, 408.)

As noted in Chapter 1, the general opinion among development scholars and development policy has changed from purely economic perspective to a more comprehensive emphasis of the multifaceted nature of development. Poverty is increasingly seen as not only lack of resources but as lack of access and lack of human rights (e.g. Peet & Hartwick 2009; Servaes 2008). Consequently, this has generated different kind of development instruments, notably moving away from GDP as the main indicator of development to frame of reference for both economic and social development, and more recently environmental development. For the purpose of my research I view the different theories in the context of changing relations in power and hegemony. Each development theory can be seen to represent hegemony or challenge the prevailing hegemony. Viewing the history of development theories depicts thus also this change. The following sub-chapters will give an overview of the dominant shifts in development thinking since the World War II. The chapter then proceeds to a discussion of the globally influential development models, the economic and human development approaches, from which the MDGs derive.
2.2. Modernizing development

The end of the Second World War saw the emergence of new development thinking, which was driven by a Eurocentric model of state-directed modernization of the ‘new nations’. Theories of economic growth and modern development were dominant. It was thought that development is most of all a mechanical process, in which the Western rationalism and Western institutions are spread across the globe in order to overcome underdevelopment. The post-World War II period combined naturalism with rationalism, creating a partly biological, partly cultural and partly sociological theory of modernization. It divided the world into centers of modern progress and peripheries of traditional backwardness. Although its premise was to criticize the narrow concentration of neoclassical economics, modernization theory too had its vantage point in spreading the supremacy of the West to other parts of the world. (Peet & Hartwick 2009, 104.) Moreover, the view on development was still dominantly economic-centered, seeing development as a linear, evolutionary process making a clear cut between the rich as the modern and the poor as the traditional (Servaes 2008, 17). President Harry Truman initiated the more extensive use of the concept ‘modern development age’ in his well-known speech in 1949 where he stated that “the objective of developed nations was to lift underdeveloped areas from their primitive, handicap state to industrial richness” (Truman Library 2014). This was the first time the term underdeveloped was also used in such a widely addressed context (Rist, 1997).

The United Nations was born into this era and was consequently carrying the modernization theory as a guiding compass of its vision and operations. The call for economic aid and technical assistance became the building block for the UN as well. Thus, in the beginning its development efforts consisted mainly of technical assistance and support for public administration through the extended programme of technical assistance (EPTA) and through the creation of a special UN Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The UNs support for development was in line with the World Bank on macroeconomic growth and modernization theory. The UN was set up to maintain peace, human rights and development. However, in practice the primary goals of development were mainly economic; industrialization, commodity exports and stabilization tactics. Also, whether the perspective was economic or sociological, the mission of modernization
theory was first and foremost to build a modern industrial society. (Joshi & O’Dell 2013, 254.)

2.3. Post-development theories

The era of early post-developmentalistism, between 1960s and 1980s, was dominated by Marxist and neo-Marxist theories that were born in contrast to the modernization theories. They positioned every historical event within a larger system, the world capitalist system. These theories aimed for a systematic theory of social totalities and left little space for unexplained. These structural theories saw development first and foremost as a way to transform societies. (Peet & Hartwick 2009, 197.)

The Neo-Marxist theories gave two different objectives for development. Dependency theory that was initiated in Latin America, criticized the structural position of developing nations in relation to the ‘modernized’ countries. It argued that the development depends more on the global system than on the countries’ internal structures. It was argued that underdeveloped countries were part of the world system in such a way that naturally created a division to cores at the expense of peripheries. The classic division of labor sprang from the colonial times - division between core and periphery, developed and developing, industrial and agro-mineral economies (Roberts & Hite, 2000, 12.) In the 1970s as international firms started to invest in low-wage countries a new category rose, the semiperiphery, which was a periphery in relation to the core (exporting raw materials, adopting its cultural styles) and a core in relation to the periphery (exporting finished products, setting cultural standards). It was argued at the time, that this three-way division of world system would create a more balanced power structure. Dependency theory argued that only dissociation from the world market could provide independence for the developing nations. (Nederveen 2011, 24.)

Another branch of neo-Marxist theories focused on the internal conditions of Third World countries. These theories stressed that Third World countries had to develop based on their own preconditions and resources. Some argued that capitalism should be allowed to spread openly for a certain period and this would create the material preconditions for socialism. This approach reminded of modernization theory in the sense that it imitated industrialized
countries and capitalism - however only as a medium goal on the road to socialism. Others argued that countries should dismiss the world economy and simultaneously introduce some forms of socialism such as state-controlled and centrally planned economy as an initial move towards wider socialism. Some scholars were more interested in the social classes and the state in Third World countries with specific reference to the context of each country. Many considered socialism as the best end result but recognized that a revolutionary transformation was not on the agenda of most developing nations. They thus focused on more realistic development scenarios such as democratization of politics, decentralization of decision-making and generation of co-operatives. Central to all neo-Marxist theories was a powerful state, general empowerment of the people through local self-government and a more equal distribution of development benefits. (Martinussen 1997, 39-40.)

In the 1970s the dependency theorists gained stronger support and people in the industrialized countries were increasingly supporting the Third World countries to tackle the causes of underdevelopment instead of focusing on the effects only. With time the emphasis shifted from one-sided focus on economic factors and copying industrial countries towards a more holistic perspective. Development was increasingly defined as the capacity to make and implement decisions. This capacity-building approach to development was seen as an effort to decrease ethnocentrism. In 1974 the UN, through a leading influence of some developing nations, issued a Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Although influenced by the capacity-building approach, the declaration mostly dealt with economic growth, expansion of world trade and increased aid and was thus not very different from the concepts that had dominated previous development discourses. (Rist 1997, 140-169.)

The critical thought towards modernization theory turned to post-structural and post-developmentalist views towards the 1980s. The holistic explanations were abandoned and history was seen more as discontinuities that could not be systemized into a structural simplicity. Criticism moved from pure judgment of capitalism towards poststructural criticism of the whole concept of modern development. Development and modern reason was increasingly seen as a strategy for modern power and social control. Reason was seen as a historical and regional form of thought. Thus for post-developmentalists the whole concept of development reflects Western-Northern hegemony. Post-development theorists
conceive that development theory is firmly attached to an underlying political and economical ideology. Development projects are therefore socially constructed according to western interests and western understanding of development. It also encompasses extreme dissatisfaction with business-as-usual and standard development rhetoric and practice and by core, underlines that development does not work as it is. (Nederveen 1998, 360.)

Despite of the different stressing points of the westcentric modernization theories and dependency theories, these contradictory schools still shared many same assumptions of the developing world. The core meaning of development in both theories was economic growth through national accumulation. Both theories often assumed the South and its people as a homogeneous entity. Both also had an unconditional belief in the concept of progress and saw that it was the role of the state to realize this progress. Influenced by alternative development thinking criticism of the assumed homogeneity of the Third World strengthened towards 1990s. Scholars such as Foucault insisted that the whole discourse of modernism needed a deconstruction since the western concept of development was built on false consciousness. Post-modern and anti-development theories gained wider popularity when scholars such as Wolfgang Sachs (1992) declared in The Development Dictionary that the western development language is present not only in official declarations but also in grassroots conversations. Grass-root organizations were warned of having a false perception of development, which was also encouraged by western-controlled media and its images of underdevelopment. It was felt that no progress had been made after the President Truman’s speech, which had led to development being controlled by a discourse of interventionism of the North and self-pity in the South. Consequently, the whole existence of development research as an academic field was questioned. It was also noted, that the concept of development had been an ideological weapon in the East-West conflict and was thus becoming outdated. At the same time the gap between rich and poor had widened reinforcing the view on development as a failed concept altogether. (Schuurman 2000, 8-9.)

Although radical declarations at the time, Sach’s critical points of development carried similar discourses of development and progress than before. Concepts such as poverty, equality, production and standard of living were reinforcing the ideological western worldview. Also more radical writings on abandoning Eurocentrism or cultural relativism underlined this ideology. For example the term ‘risk society’ introduced by Ulrich Beck,
declared that it is useless to plan because unintended consequences are increasingly part of modern society. This approach diminishes the value of human agency and also overlooks that most societies in developing world have never known anything other than a risk society. (Schuurman 2000, 11.)

Following the critical post-development theories, the development field was introduced to a new buzzword called globalization in 1990s. Theories of globalization often shared a belief of the diminishing role of nation states in cultural, political and economic spheres. Globalization theories argued that politically international organizations create and sustain sovereignty and institutionalized power of states. Also economically the state was seen to loose its power to privatization and global financial markets. Attention was given to neoliberalism, seen as a combination of inter-related processes influencing the state and institutional policy for its favor. Some even argued (Gill 2008, 123) that the contemporary world order only reflects a new form of constitutionalism – one that recognizes the supremacy of disciplinary neoliberalism and market civilization as the only viable method of governance. This view was supported by studies of the neoliberalistic reconstruction of developing world within the governance of the UN system. (Rupert 2000, 133.)

**2.4. Contemporary development views**

Without going into detail with the various different alternative approaches to development, it is worthwhile to discuss them since mainstream development has gradually moved away from the economic-centered view towards a more *people-centered approach* and the effect of alternative development thinking on the UN development agenda has been considerable from 1990s onwards.

Alternative approaches are generally more normative than mainstream theories. They are thus concerned with not only the causal relationships but also with what kind of development is preferable, specifically according to various social groups and the civil society. Structuralist approaches such as dependency theory emphasize macroeconomic change whereas alternative development is more interested in agency and people’s capacity to bring about social change. There are specifically two main categories within alternative development: people-centered and participatory/civil society practices. The first
one rejects economic growth as an end goal in itself and looks towards goals of welfare and human development. The second type is more focused on civil society and considers the strengthening of local communities as both a means to promote human well-being and as an end in itself. (Martinussen 2004, 289, 291.) The modern conceptions of civil society are central to neo-Gramscian view. They comprehend civil society as a more complex and powerful concept than all that is outside the domain of the state. They concentrate more on the shared notions of social relations, state-civil society complexes and social forces that have power to reinforce transformations in forms of state or world order. (Morton 2007, 114-115.)

Alternative development approach developed simultaneously with the dependency paradigm. Towards 1970s alternative development approaches started to stand out from mainstream development and research findings underlined social inequality in contrast to purely economic-centered views. Particularly Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation’s report ‘What Now, Another Development’ affected on the popularization of alternative views. The report was concerned with ‘endogenous and self-reliant development’ and ‘harmony with the environment’. Whether the report was meant to distinguish between mainstream and alternative development or not, it generated a variety of alternative development approaches in the coming years such as anti-capitalism, green thinking and feminism. (Nederveen 1998, 346.) In the mid-1970s also the formulation of basic needs strategy by the International Labor Organization (ILO) directed attention to the fact that economic growth alone did not generate employment or increase incomes of the poor. Generally these basic needs encompass need for food, shelter and other necessities, access to public services such as sanitation, health and education and thirdly, access to participate in and influence on decision making. Several international organizations have included this approach in their strategies although often additional to their fundamentally growth-oriented strategies. (Martinussen 2004, 298.)

Ever since the alternative development approaches caught wider attention it has been questioned whether they share the same goals as mainstream development, only using different means. Even when the end goals are more normative, alternative development models have been criticized for lacking a clear theoretical position. Towards 21st century the discussion on alternative development and the antidevelopment cluster of theories was seen as only another form of Eurocentric paternalism. It was claimed that theories that do
not solve the problem of material scarcity have no practical value. Dissatisfaction with business-as-usual and standard development rhetoric and practice as well as disappointment with alternative development drove many to think so. (Munck & O’Hearn 1999, 203.) One may also ask, whether it is necessary or politically sensible to make a division between mainstream and alternative development. Development is becoming ever more multipolar in terms of division of economic growth and market dynamism as well as global power balance. Simultaneously, the boundaries between conventional and alternative development are mingled. (McEwan & Mawdsley 2012, 1185.) Starting from 1990s the division between alternative and mainstream was rather between human development and structural adjustment, between the UN and the Washington consensus. In many respects the alternative development approaches resemble post-developmentalism in the sense that they easily simplify mainstream development as a homogenous unit. As Nederveen notes, to discuss alternative development only as a narrative of anti-capitalism is not fruitful. This opposition may prevent one from seeing how mainstream and alternative shape and redefine each other’s. (Nederveen 1998, 345.) This view is central also in this research as the aim is not to create a dualistic division between mainstream and alternative discourses but rather study dialectics of transformation as they appear.

Table 1. Overview of Development Approaches (based on author’s summary of Chapter 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Hegemonic approach</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-&lt;&gt;</td>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td>Economic growth, state-directed modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-&lt;&gt;</td>
<td>Dependency, Neo-Marxism</td>
<td>Third World nationalism, capacity building, powerful state, socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-&lt;&gt;</td>
<td>Alternative development</td>
<td>Basic-needs approach, civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-&lt;&gt;</td>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Economic growth, structural adjustment programs, privatization, globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-&lt;&gt;</td>
<td>Human development</td>
<td>Social and community development, capabilities, entitlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-&lt;&gt;</td>
<td>Millenium Development Goals Sustainable Development Goals</td>
<td>Economic growth, social and environmental responsibility, human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-2015 agenda</td>
<td>Transformative, participatory, sustainable?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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</tbody>
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As the table 1 depicts, clearly, the field of development studies has gone through a substantial change. Yet, apparent traces of the main approaches of modernization theory, dependency theory and post-developmentalistism are present in today’s development discourses - the mainstream strand of development thought still conceptualizes development as a linear process of economic transformation, social modernization and technological progress. Even though well-being is the ultimate goal, it is assumed that economic growth is the necessary condition for achieving this. (Fukuda-Parr 2011, 124.) The UN of the 21st century aligns itself with this thinking. This prevailing hegemony as well as the post-2015 agenda’s potential to bring about transformative change will be discussed in the next chapter.
3. UNITED NATION’S ROLE IN THE CONTINUATION OF DEVELOPMENT HEGEMONY

As noted earlier, this research studies the current global development within the neo-Gramscian framework. This framework views the UN development agendas (MDGs and the formation of the post-2015 agenda) as the central pieces of global development hegemony. In the 1980s, two radically different approaches to development came to the fore simultaneously. These two main approaches to development, economic-centered and human development approach, have guided the UN development processes to date while alternative development and dependency theories have been endorsed mainly by CSOs and academia. While indications on human and sustainable development are increasingly common on the UN agenda, the core message of its development processes have up to date laid heavily on economic progress. The post-2015 agenda also acts as a bellwether for what will be emphasized on national development agendas in coming years.

Based on neo-Gramscian theory I contend that the role of the UN for development is at root ideological. Thus, ideological perspectives shape also the discourse on the MDGs. When discussing the ideological basis of the UN, it is worthwhile to consider whose values and criteria are discussed. After all there are states discussing diplomatic decisions on one hand, and the leadership and stuff of the Secretariat on the other hand. Formally also specialized agencies such as the World Bank Group, the IMF and the ILO are part of the UN system. Also the work of the UN can be divided into two broader categories: economic and social development and peace and security, the concentration here being on the former. There have always been large differences in the views and concerns of the UN member states embodied in their differing political systems and economic and social situation. Differences between industrial and developing countries (Group of 77) strengthening from 1970s and between the Western block and the Soviet block during the Cold War have polarized the UN to distinct corners. Often the discussion of the UN is centered on its ability to influence international policy-making. It is even more important however to understand the ideological role of the UN as creating certain interests. According to various scholars generating ideas may be the most important legacy of the UN. Still ideas and ideologies have largely been left out of analyses in international relations. (Emmerij, Jolly & Weiss 2005; Joshi & O’Dell 2013, 253.)
The ideology of the UN represents both normative and causal beliefs that influence its developing partners’ attitudes and actions. Normative ideas are broad, general beliefs that define what the world should look like. Causal ideas are more tangible and operational in nature, depicting what strategy will lead to a desired result. (Emmerij et al. 2005, 214) A normative idea is for example the UNs call for ending global hunger. Causal ideas may take operational forms for example in the UNs target for official development assistance to reach the level of 0,7 percent of national income. In short, all of the different entities and contradicting values make it theoretically unfeasible to position the UN entity within a unified ideology. Generalizations on a specific UN identity are not fruitful as such, yet the founding approaches behind the MDGs and the post-2015 process are shaped by certain normative ideas that bear consequences for the future development agenda. These will be shortly discussed in the following sub-chapters in order to define what the UN hegemony consists of.

### 3.1 Economic-centered approach

The driving theoretical political basis for development today is founded on the principals of neoliberal orthodoxy. According to neoliberalism development equals to economic growth and is achieved through structural reform, deregulation, liberalization and privatization. Despite different perspectives to development, the economic-oriented approach that has continued from modernization theory to dependency theory to present neoliberalism, has sustained its hegemony. Human and sustainable development with concepts such as ‘sustainability’, ‘social safety nets’ and ‘greater participation’ have established a solid position but have nevertheless failed in renewing the development agenda. (Peet & Hartwick 2009, 277-278.)

The framework for a globalized financial structure was created after the Second World War in order to boost global trade (the World Trade Organisation), to help crisis lending (the International Monetary Fund) and to channel development aid (the World Bank). Most African and Latin American countries faced major economic crises in the 1970s initiated by the oil price crisis, the debt crisis and the collapse in the commodity prices. By 1980s many developing nations were heavily indebted. Macroeconomic stabilization became
important and was soon combined with a liberalization agenda. To ensure that the borrowed money will be spent in accordance with the goals set for the loans, IMF and the World Bank implemented the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that included heavy policy changes as conditions for receiving new loans. These were designed with the goal of confirming debtor countries’ credit-worthiness. The theoretical basis of SAPs was based on neoliberalism and became known as the Washington Consensus. Development policies were based on free internal and external market paradigm, where state’s role was minimized. Development strategies that relied on government intervention were deemed according to the argument that they lead to economic stagnation because government officials would allocate resources based on personal interest instead of efficiency. The liberalization was part of a global trend that drove neoliberalism and globalization as the best political philosophy. (Fukuda-Parr 2011, 124-125; Peet & Hartwick 2009, 87.) Following the SAP’s the World Bank adopted Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that emphasized more country-driven strategies with a wider participation. Yet the PRSPs have also been blamed for creating aid conditionality for example in terms of the specific good governance discourse that they promote. This is further discussed in chapter 3.2.

The neo-Gramscian view on hegemony points out that the contemporary world order is placed on the cornerstones of economic dominance of neoliberalism and political dominance of globalization Morton 2007, 124). The contemporary world order is seen as one in which foundations of neoliberalism are sustained through inter-related processes that shape both state and institutional policy in such an extent that leave no room for challenging views. The move to global markets and global institutions has created new social and structural orders supported by elite interaction, which again, following the hegemonic logic, has led to shared consensus on the nature of development among business, state officials and international organizations (Worth 2011, 377-378.) According to Schuurman (2009, 834) the MDGs have been instrumental in guiding development research towards neoliberal discourses further away from critical theory. Although the notion of progress has not dominated the 21st century development debate as during modernization, alternative views have failed to reform the paradigm-theory-practice chain in a similarly broad accepted manner as the concept of economic progress has. (Schuurman 2000, 16.)

In theory, neo-liberal structural adjustment policies lay on the assumption that austerity
measures such as devaluation of currencies, the deregulation of markets and the reduction of state bureaucracies will lead to long-term gains (Steger & Roy 2010, 10). Yet, local evidence has shown the opposite. A number of scholars have argued that neoliberal economic policies increase the vulnerability of the poor and marginalized, especially women, children and the elderly. Third World countries are at higher risk of being negatively exposed to global capitalism without other concrete options due to their generally fragile local governments and weak role of civil society. Nation building should generally include a phase of welfare state building that provides a safety net for those citizens in need but many developing nations are in danger of passing this central phase. Exposure to neoliberal policies without political and economic safety nets in place can thus compound inequality in many aspects. (Schuurman 2000, 18.) A study on the neoliberal policies’ effect on Tanzanian health sector shows that instead of expected price decreases in the health sector, the privatization of health services has increased prices. Consequently, the poorest are unable to treat themselves because they lack the money to cover the costs. This bears also consequences for the social structure such as erosion of social cohesion. However, privatization practices such as these were not meant to be implemented alone but in conjunction with safety nets such as social security systems, third-party insurance schemes and sickness funds, which in the case of Tanzania have not yet taken place. (Kamat 2008, 373.)

The UN took a notable stand on neoliberalism when United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published a report titled “The Global Economic Crisis: Systematic Failures and Multilateral Remedies”. The report points out that market fundamentalism during the last two decades has failed in large extent. Aside from neglecting neoliberalism as such the report suggests solutions such as strengthened government-private sector cooperation to stimulate economic growth. (UNCTAD 2009.) Also the newest Trade and Development Series report by UNCTAD shows criticism towards the power of finance capital and developing countries’ heavily export-oriented growth model. The report underlines that developing countries should review their development strategies that have been too dependent on exports for growth and dismissed the critical role of public sector for development (UNCTAD 2013b). Rather than being a static theory-to-practice compound, UNCTAD signals that neoliberalism has many varieties that have shown to be very adaptable to specific social contexts. Yet some scholars argue that although free market fundamentalism has been globally abandoned, the
second pillar of neoliberalism, free trade, has been reaffirmed by political and economic elites globally, creating an era of controlled capitalism (Steger & Roy 2010, 137).

As Nederveen (2011) writes, even if the hegemonic capacity is not as it used to be, the habits of hegemony remain. Multipolarity may be a given by now, but the terms of multipolarity are still based on western dominance. Econonomic equilibrium models have often been proven to fail in national economics generally and thus they apply even less in the global economy. The basis for the world economy functions exactly because of the imbalances such as triangular trade, relations between developing and developed countries and unequal exchange between manufactured goods exporters and suppliers of raw materials. Nederveen argues, that we have not seen a point in history yet when there would have been a global economic equilibrium. (Nederveen 2011, 30.) Also Financial Times (2009) has commented on the relatively little changes of the Bretton Woods system. The global governance has, up to recent years, been acclaimed to equal the BW institutions.

### 3.2. Human development approach

As a criticism to the neoliberal approach a new perspective emerged in 1980s to question the link between economic growth and human welfare. The motivation to look beyond economic development was driven by the failures of national and global policies to respond to increasing levels of poverty and inequality. Economic-centered approaches were criticized for neglecting the actual purpose of development, improving human lives. Conventional growth-centered approaches were accused for having only instrumental value. The counter approach known as ‘Human Development’ or ‘Capability Approach’ (HDCA) emphasizes the intrinsic value of development goals and asks the question: What are people actually able to do and to be? Thus, the importance of growth is only instrumental to achieve the expansion of capabilities. Central to the approach is the well-being of people and their individual choice of freedom. Accordingly, well-functioning societies should provide their citizens a set of opportunities, substantial freedoms, to choose from. The approach is based on Amartya Sen’s writings such as his widely known publication ‘Development as Freedom’ that present capability framework as the best frame to define and compare the quality of life. The approach offers a consistent philosophical framework for thinking about the full variety of development challenges starting with the
basic question of how development should be defined. (Fukuda-Parr 2011, 123-124.) Initially the human development school concentrated on three dimensions: the opportunity to lead a long and healthy life; the opportunity to acquire knowledge and the opportunity to access essential resources for a decent standard of living. Later on aspects such as sustainability, gender equality and political freedom have also been added. Regarding growth the HDCA strategy shares the policy elements of neoliberal approaches. (Martinussen 2007, 303.)

In terms of development policy, Human development is historically linked to the UNDP’s Human Development Reports (HDRs). These annual reports launched by Mahbud ul Haq in 1990, apply capability approach to evaluating development performance. HDRs have since described development as ‘the enlargement of people’s choices’ and inspired capability-based studies of well-being across the world. (Nussbaum 2011, 17.)

Mahbub ul-Haq expressed the vision as follows:

*The basic purpose of development is to enlarge people's choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and can change over time. The objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives.*

(Mahbub ul-Haq in UNDP 2013a.)

Similarly Helen Clark (cited in UNDP 2013a) has pointed out that “the human development approach has profoundly affected an entire generation of policy-makers and development specialists around the world, both within UNDP and elsewhere in the system”. By the mid-1990s human development had become the major discourse of policy debates about development, poverty and inequality. Complementary approaches such as sustainable livelihoods, human rights and participation also emphasized the purpose of people as agents of development. These people-centered approaches were instrumental in the advocacy against the mainstream policies of liberalization. (Fukuda-Parr 2011, 126.) The ideology has been clearly present in UNDP’s reports since 1990’s such as the report “Globalization with a human face” (UNDP 2013a) that pointed to the distorted shift toward liberalization and market-driven development on the cost of the impacts this has on human development and growing inequality. (Rupert 2000, 149).
In many ways the MDGs were the outcome of critics of neo-liberalism loosely grouped around the idea of human development. Disapproval of the structural adjustment programs together with globalization criticism created a good platform for strengthening the human development in relation to the dominating neoliberal approach. The gained consensus on the MDGs reflected a considerable change in acknowledging poverty and development as a multidimensional concept that defines them as much more than income. Yet arguments of MDG’s being only a neoliberal gimmick are also strong in the academia. The mainly neoliberal criticism that surrounds the MDGs and the post-2015 debate draws its justification from the fact that the same actors that once promoted SAPs in the 1980s where influential in forming the MDGs in the 1990s. This connection has led many critics to claim that in reality, the MDGs are only ‘a veil of neoliberal initiatives’, since they have failed to challenge the Washington consensus and were formed among a very restricted number of influential actors. (Peet 2009.) Also the lack of discussion of rising inequality levels on the MDG agenda has been seen as a consequence of their neoliberal origin. In this line of thought, it has been argued that human development may be used to hide profoundly economic ambitions by preventing popular political mobilization and thus disabling a potentially transformative social movement - a passive revolution as Antonio Gramsci referred to it (Rupert 2000, 149).

Already in 1996 the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) had published its own international development goals, which were based on various other UN conferences such as Rio de Janeiro in 1992 on the environment and Vienna in 1993 on human rights. This list of goals by the OECD/DAC was formulated among a small number of rich nations and was not an act of the global community as such. In that sense there was a clear shift away from a broader rights-based approach to a narrower reflection of development focusing mostly on absolute features of some key measurable aspects of poverty. This frame played a key role in the formulation of the broader range of goals that became known as the MDGs. As a consequence of the Millenium Summit and in cooperation with the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF, the UN adopted the Millenium Declaration with its eight MDGs in 2000. Clearly, a wider shift from the one-dimensional economic growth to a more comprehensive multidimensional understanding on development has not taken a shift from policy to practice. Also the methodology of planning, management, monitoring and evaluation is blamed of being based on the same foundations as those used when development projects were more focused on infrastructure and fulfilling the basic needs of
‘targeted’ beneficiaries. (Ferrero & Salvador Zepeda 2014, 29).

Moreover, even though the MDGs promote global human development they have been accused for a lack of adaptability. The discourse on MDGs, as most of the debate on development, is shaped by ideologies that characteristically produce oversimplifications of reality. The MDGs have gained popularity not least because they are simple to comprehend, carry good intentions that are difficult to disagree with and are hence engaging. The (political) engagement of international community and national governments has been strong, yet their accountability is limited because poor countries and poor people were not given voice when formulating the goals. Fundamentally the MDGs carry a donor-centric world-view, which is outdated especially regarding the role that access to markets and access to technology have come to play for developing countries in comparison to foreign aid. There has been an underlying belief that the best practices of the MDGs can be copied to all nations regardless of what challenges local circumstances carry especially dismissing the specific circumstances of LDCs. Thus, the belief in the automatic trickle down effect of economic growth has not elevated investments in social sectors and reached the poor equally. The MDGs have thus largely failed in their strategic purpose of changing the development orthodoxy. This orthodoxy is based on the assumption that MDGs are achievable if only economic growth is rapid, foreign aid is generous and governance is good. Essentially then, also human development is fundamentally about growth, aid and governance. The fact that political processes and social changes shape economic outcomes has to a large extent been dismissed. (Nayyar 2013, 373-374.)

The differing views on development ideology behind the MDGs cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of power in development cooperation. An understanding of the aspects of power reflects the choices and challenges involved in the changing relations between donors and recipient governments as well as between governments and civil society. Development cooperation is not only about policy but also about politics. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that gives more scope to recipient country governments to set their own priorities for development is built on development partners’ understanding that they are part of a political process. Yet, international development community has tended to take authority and consensus as givens. The idea that there is a negotiated order between equal partners is shown in how development partners have
expected a naturally positive response to their call for good governance or loyalty to MDGs. In this sense power for donors has indicated often a capacity or ability rather than a relationship. (Hyden 2008, 260.)

Good governance is a contested concept that has gained considerable attention during the past decade. In academia good governance is often understood as state’s capacity to deliver effective governance for development. It generally comprises of multi-party politics, a free and independent civil society, media and judiciary, enabling environment for free market, respect for the rule of law and the decentralization of government. Both the World Bank’s Development Framework and the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness have stressed the term and it has been seen as a keystone in meeting the MDGs. Also most international development agencies think it is a precondition for development. Consequently, development financing is often tight to enhancing local governance. Failing to meet defined targets of good governance is likely to affect aid flows negatively. (Mercer 2003, 747.)

Yet, the meaning of good governance varies from context to another. In some countries it has been used as a discourse to introduce liberal democratic reforms, in others it has worked as a discourse employed by the ruling elite to defend against liberal reforms. Therefore good governance can refer to neoliberalism, basic human development or universal human rights, depending on how governance that is ‘good’ is understood in a specific context. The term is easily used as a political tool to justify choices of development policy. The World Bank as the main financer of the MDGs has emphasized the importance of good governance especially for economic growth and poverty reduction. It perceives good governance as something that strengthens private market-led growth. It has also been argued that the World Bank uses good governance to justify a minimal-government paradigm. A study has shown that there exists a mutually reinforcing relationship between state capacity and the attainment of the MDGs. Investment in state capacity can improve the MDGs. Yet the World Bank’s stance on good governance is based on “limited role of government that protects private property from predation by the state”. Historically the elite of developing nations has also tended to resist government’s efforts to allocate more resources for sub-ordinate groups. Yet meeting the MDGs and sustaining services for the poor requires a permanent revenue source. This is especially important in areas where private businesses lack a motivation to develop communities.
when there is no profit. (Joshi 2011, 339-341.) It is contradictory that good governance as improving state capacity is causal to meeting the MDGs, yet the World Bank has not emphasized the strengthening of state capacity and revenue collection in its measures of good governance. As a powerful financing and lending institution it has influence on how good governance is perceived on the UN agenda and consequently on the post-2015 agenda. This may have produced certain pre-defined understandings of the concept also in the Tanzanian post-2015 consultations.

3.3. Post-2015 agenda and the significance of regional consultations

“The debates on the post-2015 agenda offer the opportunity to reconsider development in light of the new realities and to overcome the old and often still paternalistic approaches of development policy.” (Jens Martens, 2014)

The above comment by the head of the Global Policy Forum, Jens Martens, depicts the aspirations of the global CSO community to have a post-2015 agenda that is transformatively different from any development policies seen this far. This means an agenda with common but differentiated responsibilities and a true ownership by the civil society. Yet, the CSO community still faces the inevitable fact that in the end the final agenda will be decided by national governments. Therefore, the UN’s role as a state forum and an ideological lighthouse is very timely now that the process of post-2015 is turning towards inter-governmental negotiations.

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has initiated several processes to feed into the new agenda. These have included the establishment of a UN System Task Team to support the UN-system wide preparations, launch of a High Level Panel of Eminent Persons, appointment of a special advisor and various thematic and national consultations. The task team gathers together views of multiple UN agencies and international organizations. In 2012 it published a report “Realizing the Future we want for all”, which outlines four key dimensions of inclusive economic and social development, environmental sustainability and peace and security (UN System Task Team 2012). In 2013 the team published a more specified report “A Renewed Global Partnership for Development”, which provides a
potential format for the new agenda. Generally the report sees the MDGs as a foundation for the post-2015 agenda. It focuses on universality and a global mutual accountability. It thus puts emphasis on the most neglected MDG, the global partnership for development. (UN System Task Team 2013.)

The High Level Panel of Eminent Persons has also provided guidance for the process. The panel consists of 27 representatives of private sector, academia, civil society and local authorities. In 2013 the panel released a report “A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development”. The report concentrates on five “transformational shifts” 1) Leave no one behind, 2) Put sustainable development at the core, 3) Transform economies for jobs and inclusive growth, 4) Build peace and effective, open and accountable institutions for all and 5) Forge a new global partnership. The report combines environmental and development agendas holistically and has been thanked for boldness by civil society members in discussing for example universality of development and a need to increase transparency and regulation of global trade. Yet, CSOs have pointed out that the report fails to tackle structural causes of poverty and does not provide a truly transformational option for the prevailing global development agenda. By viewing rapid and sustained growth as a solution rather than as part of the problem the report reinforces a business-as-usual view. Accordingly, CSOs have claimed that the report is naïve in terms of trade-offs needed to achieve sustainability. (Beyond 2015 2014a.)

The nature of development aid partnerships has changed considerably during the 21st Century as a consequence of the increased influence of private sector. Considering the decreasing role of ODA and the stronger presence of Southern actors in the international development scene it is understandable that private sector is gaining a larger role on the post-2015 agenda. Different UN forums have underlined growing importance of private sector for the new development agenda. The emerging development partners change the development architecture considerably especially when it comes to moving from ‘foreign aid’ to ‘development cooperation’. The latter is preferred by many new southern development actors and often refers to a wider set of development partnerships such as

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3 The role of private sector for sustainability and development has been discussed on several UN occasions such as the fourth high-level forum on aid effectiveness held in Busan 2011 and most notably the UN Global Compact Leaders Summit in 2013. Also governments explicitly recognized the role of businesses at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012.
trade, investments and geopolitical interests. (McEwan & Mawdsley 2012, 1188.) There is an ongoing debate over whether the current aid architecture can change sufficiently to accommodate the new alternative actors and perspectives. To date more specific suggestions on private sector’s contributions are yet to be delivered.

The rise of BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has influenced also Tanzanian development dynamics. Especially China’s strong presence in Tanzania shows that aid no longer determines the country’s development as before, since foreign trade and foreign direct investments in the country have risen considerably. Generally, corporate responsibility has been a globally popular theme for post-2015 agenda and according to a development policy officer of Kepa ry, it has also risen as one of Tanzanian civil society’s focus points in addition to other accountability issues such as tax justice and climate justice. (Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 4.)

Clearly the new agenda is being formed under a very different development climate than the MDGs were. The parallel sustainable development goal (SDG) agenda has added a notable dimension to the post-2015 debate. The institutional framework behind the SDGs is build on the Rio 1992 Earth Summit and its follow-up events in Johannesburg in 2002 and the Rio+20 conference in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. The main outcome of the latter was a set of ‘sustainable development goals’, which are to be coherent with and integrated into the post-MDG agenda. The SDGs are being proposed as a solution to the issues of climate change and biodiversity and thus fill sustainability gaps of the MDGs. The open working group’s final meeting and proposal was given in July 2014 in which a ‘Proposal of the Open Working Group for Sustainable Development Goals’ was adopted. It includes 17 sustainable development goals, which is considerably more than the eight MDGs. As such the SDGs have been accused for including too many aspects without proper advice on how to realize them. The global civil society campaign Beyond2015 has delivered reaction papers to the OWG’s draft documents urging the members of the OWG to raise the ambition of the targets by including clear quantification and timelines to avoid the mistakes of the MDGs as being too vague. The OWG’s documents have also been criticized for deleting references of planetary boundaries indicating that climate change is not being considered seriously enough. (Beyond2015 2014b.) Also, key development partners such as the USA, China and the World Bank have expressed many reservations of an SDG-based post-2015 track. Also the group of LDCs including Tanzania has shown
disapproval of combining SDGs with MDGs on the new agenda. (Evans & Steven 2012). Some argue that merging the two agendas would challenge the “right to develop” of the poorer nations. There are fears among the LDCs of new conditionalities and a wave of protectionism leading to rising inequalities if the two tracks are merged. (Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 5.)

The merging of the two tracks has several dilemmas. The longstanding questions of rights, responsibilities and capacities between North-South power relations culminate on the SDG agenda. Especially the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and its interpretation for the post-2015 agenda has been under discussion. (Finland’s Futures Research Centre 2013.) In some policy papers it is expected that developing countries have an opportunity to jump-start their transition to green economy (i.e. leapfrogging) due to their low-carbon profile and rich natural capital, while industrialized countries have an infrastructural lock-in on polluting technologies (UNEP 2014). These facts have raised new fears of how the common but differentiated responsibilities will be articulated on the final agenda.

Financing the new development agenda has also provoked heavy discussion. At the same time with global ODA flows decreasing, the pressure for developing nations to utilize their own resources more effectively is increasing. In Tanzania the pressure falls especially upon the natural resources sector and its recent discoveries of oil, gas and minerals. The new indicators for measuring sustainability (MDG7) and global partnership (MDG8) are yet to be decided and there are fears that these goals’ reliability will be left as open as on the MDG agenda. (Kepa 2014; Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 4.)

Generally speaking and also on the basis of the African regional consultations, demands for local adaptability and wider participation regarding the consultation process have dominated the discussion (Brolan, Lee, Kim & Hill 2014, 2.) First, there is a call for structural flexibility at the national level, thus generating space for contextualized post-2015 targets. Secondly, inequality both between and within countries should be acknowledged in the creation of goals and the assessment of outcomes. Thirdly, the new framework should provide also means instead of focusing on ends yet leave specific policies to be decided on the country level. Overall, these issues share a common call for more flexibility and freedom for national governments to formulate the policies with
specific reference to space and time. (Nayyar 2013, 374, 378.) The suggestions raised by African stakeholders during the regional and national post-2015 consultations emphasized particularly a structural economic transformation and national ownership in order to leave behind the donor-centric view. In terms of financing the new agenda, stakeholders notified the decreased yet important role of ODA and viewed domestic resource mobilization critically important. To ensure that global partnerships are mutually important the stakeholders mentioned for example promoting public-private partnerships, South-South cooperation and a fairer trading regime. (Armah 2013, 115, 121.)

The UN Secretary General will next combine all the consultations and suggestions published thus far to a synthesis report. The report will function as a kick-start for the intergovernmental negotiations. Despite the vast amount of consultations and suggestions made for the agenda by different stakeholders, states have the authority to determine how the post-2015 agenda will further evolve until the adoption of the final agenda in September 2015. Although states can consider the UN thematic and other consultations in their deliberations they are not bound to them. This far, the process has been notably more participatory than the MDGs’ creation was. The engagement of multiple actors such as stronger presence of civil society, the Global South and the private sector have the potential to push for a more dynamic and innovative agenda than the UN has previously seen. (Brolan et al. 2014, 7.)

That being said, the post-2015 process’ attempt to establish a truly participatory and equal development agenda has also been criticized throughout the consultation processes by various organizations. To address the failure of MDG8, developing a global partnership for development, the High-level Panel calls for a new global partnership that would gather different stakeholders such as private sector and multilateral institutions around the same table. The process has been criticized to fail in this regard if it does not consider the new dynamics between the old Western donors and the new donors such as China and India. Already a potential deadlock is manifested in G77’s (the UN grouping of developing nations) relative disengagement with the post-2015 discussion. (Hingorani 2013.) It remains unclear how the new agenda will in practice answer to the “equity”, “solidarity” and “shared responsibilities in accordance with capabilities” that the report by High-level Panel of Eminent Persons calls for. (High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons 2013).
To conclude, the global development policy discussion has intensified as the time for intergovernmental negotiations draws closer. There is no clear picture yet how all the different voices will be listened to and concretized on the final agenda. Much is decided in 2015 including the frame for development financing. As mentioned, it is unclear how the vast consultations will be utilized and which suggestions of the CSO community will be considered relevant for the final agenda. Even if the thematic or national consultations are not included for the post-2015 framework as such, they can deliver relevant and practical results also for national development policies. National consultations are also likely to empower civil societies and NGOs to further consider and redirect their role in national development schemes. The following chapter will discuss how development is conceptualized in a yet heavily aid-dependent nation, Tanzania. Before moving on to the present situation, it is first appropriate to dive into Tanzania’s historical development context. After all, it has paved the way for the country’s current development scheme including the development policy aspirations beyond 2015.
4. FROM UJAMAA TO PRESENT: REPRESENTATIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA

Tanzania is ranked on place 152 out of 187 countries in the UN’s 2013 Human Development Index. Between 1990 and 2012 Tanzania’s HDI has risen from 0,353 to 0,476. According to Human Development Report’s Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which identifies deprivation dimensions in the same household in health, education and standard of living, 65,6 percent of the population lived in multidimensional poverty in 2010. The country’s MPI value, 0.332, is the share of the population that is multidimensionally poor adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations. (UNDP 2013b)

The present situation in Tanzania is an intensification of its complex colonial and post-colonial history. Although the country has lived through a variety of development experiments it has managed to develop a relatively stable democratic governance and national identity without major conflicts. Tanzania’s three distinctive generations of development strategies from ‘neocolonial’ of the early independence period to the ‘socialist’ developments of the 1970s to the ‘neoliberal and export oriented’ development of 1980s and 1990s have shaped the country but have yet failed to bring about expected results (Ewald 2013, 96).

The UN recognizes Tanzania among the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which is a category of states that face high disadvantages in their development process due to structural, historical and geographical reasons. The 2013 LDC report published by UNCTAD underlines that LDCs should have a greater policy emphasis on job creation as their central development objective. UNCTAD believes that poverty reduction, inclusive growth and sustainable development should be the primary goals for LDCs. (UNCTAD 2013.) Sustainability is discussed only in the context of economic growth through employment generation, which confirms the relatively narrow focus of the UN’s development apparatus to this day.

Tanzania is among the most aid-dependent countries in the world with general budget support (GBS) estimated to cover approximately 20 percent of total budget expenditure (40% of total foreign assistance) although the proportion of GBS of all aid funding has
been decreasing since 2010 (Kepa Tanzania 2011, 1). Yet, also locally sourced funds have increased dramatically, outperforming the increase in aid. However, efficiency of public expenditure remains low and there are poor service delivery outcomes especially in agricultural sector and poor’s access to social services. (Overseas Development Institute 2005, 4.)

Ewald (2013) divides the developments of Tanzanian post-colonial model into seven major phases: 1) towards modernization in 1961-1967, 2) the era of the Arusha Declaration in 1967-1973, 3) the development of the authoritarian and socialist model in 1973-1978, 4) the following breakdown of the statist model in 1979-1984, 5) the era of structural adjustment in 1983-1992, 6) the multiparty system without economic growth and loose implementation of neoliberal reforms in 1992-2000 and 7) the multiparty system, economic growth and improved implementation of neoliberal reforms in 2000-2010. In short, the stages in aid relationships until the MDGs could also be summarized to phases of surplus and self-reliance until 1978, a period of deficits and dependency 1979-1985 and a period of dependency and structural adjustment programs in 1986-1995.

Evidently, the roots of Tanzania’s intensified political, economic and social challenges are deep in its history. Introducing the complexity of Tanzania’s pre- and post-colonial history at length does not serve the purpose of this research but its various development phases provide a requisite context for my analysis. Thus, the objective of the following chapters is to highlight some of the main institutional, structural and political legacies that have led to the constraints and opportunities Tanzania now faces on its development agenda. This context feeds into the following analysis.

**4.1. Tanzanian socialism**

Towards the 1970s, the government of Tanzania started developing a number of radical reforms aimed at introducing a special African form of socialism in the country. Tanzanian socialist development strategy was based on rural development, self-reliance and ujamaa values such as hard work. Tanzania’s head of state, Julius Nyerere, announced in 1973 that the entire peasant population should move into so-called ‘ujamaa’ villages by the end of 1976. The villagization process was initially undertaken as a voluntary development
project but the move into villages became obligatory after 1973. By 1980 around 90 percent of the population lived in villages. A framework of village government was fundamental to the formation of African socialism. Together with the ruling political party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), Nyerere aimed at discovering an indigenous form of African socialism by referring with socialism to ujamaa, translated as ‘familyhood’. (Green 2010, 17.) Nyerere saw Tanzanian socialism as a pre-existing “attitude of mind”:

“The same socialist attitude of mind which in the tribal days gave to every individual the security that comes of belonging to a widely extended family must be preserved within the still wider society of the nation...Our first step therefore must be to re-educate ourselves; to regain our former attitude of mind.” (cited in Green 2010, 31).

Nyerere considered that care for one another can only be guaranteed if people view each other as brothers and sisters or as members of the same family. Thus for Nyerere, socialist institutions are important but cannot attain socialism unless people in those institutions and organizations act in the spirit of brotherhood and care for one another. For him, socialism or Marxism legitimices class conflicts and therefore Ujamaa in terms of familyhood or brotherhood was uniquely opposed to both capitalism and scientific socialism. (Cornelli 2012, 24-25.) Although Nyerere and TANU based their theories on democracy and participation, they were predominantly authoritarian and the small civil society was gradually undermined. At the same time, as the government institutions politicized, the division between the party, state apparatuses and the government blurred. (Ewald 2013, 101.)

The concept of self-reliance was central to ujamaa ideology. It was formally expressed in the Arusha Declaration, TANU’s policy on Socialism and Self Reliance in 1967. As there were no indigenous social forms in place that corresponded to this ideology of collaboration such traditional forms had to be created by the state. By 1968 all major means of production were nationalized. As the state was in control of the economy and TANU acquired a leading role in the state, the same elite controlled both the state apparatus and the party. This emerged a growing class, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie that was interested in further expanding the state. Village became a category that was to be self-contained unit of production, consumption and governance. Nyerere saw village as the
engine of development. Although villagization in Tanzania had negative consequences for agricultural development and political repression it restructured governance successfully. Villages were expected to take an active role in bringing about rural development. They were both agents and objects of governance with centrally appointed governors and officials of the ruling party. The structure of village governance with own governments, sub-committees under the authority of a charperson is still applied in a modified form in rural Tanzania. Even after the village enterprises and collectivism in large extent ceased, the positions of the chairperson and the leaders of 10-house blocks, balozis, continued as an essential part of the governance structure. (Green 2012, 23-24, Ewald 2013, 102.)

Although TANU created consensus across the institutional apparatus, its idea of development was centered on nationalism and modernization. Under the nationalist movement, and later the post-colonial state, cultural, ethnic and social minorities as well as certain ways of making a living were undermined. This meant that for instance many pastoralist groups such as the Maasai were pushed away from their lands by agriculturalists or due to enlargements of conservation areas, wildlife parks and state farms. Also the forced movement of pastoralists into the ujamaa villages further undermined their livelihood. The relationship between indigenous religions and nationalism has not been studied extensively but many religious practitioners did not take part in politics or considered TANU as a threat to their indigenous order. On the other hand, TANU politicians were described as showing embarrassment when discussing indigenous leaders. (Havnevik & Aida 2010, 23.) Yet, by connecting traditional values and cultures of reciprocity and redistribution with the modernization approach, TANU managed to provide some cohesion and prevent strong opposition. (ibid., 24.)

Self-reliance was built on different requirements that were to bring about development to Tanzanians without risking their freedom and independence. This was based on requirements such as dependence on local workforce and resources; dependence on own land rather than private investments or loans to fight poverty. Therefore, the use of local resources and manpower, a proper understanding of money as not a source but an outcome of development, agriculture, hard work and intelligence were the cornerstones of development based on self-reliance. To reach these goals, the government launched also an education policy that changed schools into communities that ‘fostered the social goals of living together and working together for the common good’. (Cornelli 2012, 44, 50.) The
Arusha Declaration carried the idea that the rural people did not possess the capacity to promote self-reliance in practice but had to be taught its meaning. In this sense Nyerere promoted a hierarchical top down development approach although he actively combined it with the emphasis of equality. Yet, Nyerere represented a ‘father of the nation’ for Tanzania, whose philosophy was successfully translated into policies. The popularity of Nyerere was on some extent based on the fact that he was considered ‘clean’ from acquiring his wealth through corruptive acts. He thus created an important moral example for especially younger generations. Interestingly, following Nyerere’s death in 1999 and the decay of the moral example he had represented, corruption in high government circles seemed to increase from 2000 onwards. (Havnevik & Aida 2010, 19, 37.)

During the 1970s the statist model, the concentration of political, economic and social activity around the state, was well institutionalized. Civil society organizations such as trade unions, peasant organizations and women’s organizations were also incorporated into the system. As a result, people were comprehensively eliminated from controlling the government. Still, the ujamaa project gained support from the international aid community. The emphasis of Nyerere’s policy on basic needs satisfaction was sympathized and supported by the donor community especially among the social democratic governments of Nordic countries. Having been oriented towards Western nations such as Britain, the US and Germany during its early independence, Tanzania’s foreign policy changed more critical towards the West under the rule of Nyerere. This was especially due to West’s negative stand on sanctions against apartheid in South Africa, motivation to preserve partnership with East Germany and receive development aid from China and other communist countries. (ibid., 41-42.) The socialist era lasted formally only from Arusha Declaration in 1967 to 1982 when the National Economic and Survival Programme (NESP) was formed. Yet, with the failure of the socialist model in the 1980s and exportation of neoliberalism in 1980s and 1990s there is a renewed interest to some of the objectives and strategies of African socialism in present Tanzania. (Ewald 2013, 96, 103.)

4.2. Adjustment to neoliberal policies

Towards 1980s the conditions for statist development altered dramatically due to the recession in world economy. Especially the collapse of East African Community in 1977,
the participation of Tanzania in war against Uganda’s ruler Idi Amin in 1978-79 and the international oil price shock in 1979 together with decreased demand for raw materials created a dramatic balance of payment deficit. The state was unable to facilitate the promised social services or provide economic and agricultural support services for the declining agricultural production. There was no growth in the production sector and the growing budget deficit together with government fiscal and monetary policies resulted in inflation. Having started with policy of self-reliance Tanzania became drastically depended on international aid during 1980s. Simultaneously global development assistance took a shift to neo-liberal thinking that saw market as the engine for development. The IMF and the World Bank became Tanzania’s largest financers although the country had avoided them systematically until then. In the leadership of Nyerere’s successor, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the government gradually met the terms of IMF conditionality and its neoliberal economic policies under an intensive policy evaluation between the government, the state bureaucracy including foreign experts, and with different social groups in the society. Meanwhile, the donor community increased the external pressure by treating the IMF conditionality terms as a necessity for further cooperation. In 1986 Tanzania thus approved an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) that included the usual IMF conditions with some adjustments to Tanzanian context. The statist model was replaced by market-based development strategy, which the donor community welcomed positively. However, budgetary deficit continued and was covered with increasing amounts of aid. (Ewald 2013, 106.)

In the beginning of the 1990s Tanzanian economic situation worsened and donors’ budgets were predetermined no matter how well Tanzania performed on the aid conditionalities. Tanzania was among the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that had sustained its adjustment efforts with external aid support and was called the ‘successful adjuster’ and the ‘donor darling’ by many in the international aid community such as the World Bank. Tanzania was reported performing better than any other African country in terms of change in macroeconomic policies and GDP growth. The country was marked as being on track on a number of factors such as reform in the trade and exchange regime, large-scale privatization and retrenchment of the public service. Yet the changes in production did not manage to bring significant improvements for the wellbeing of its citizens. Arguments on who was to blame for the ineffective methods and poor aid results grew between donors and the Government of Tanzania. At the same time the country was undertaking major
changes in its political system, having its first multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections. Professor Gerald Helleiner was appointed to look at the situation with an independent group of experts from perspectives of aid effectiveness, global trends in aid flows and macroeconomic performance. The Helleiner report stated for example that a dual transformation of political and economic systems simultaneously, when tried elsewhere in the world, has proven highly challenging. The report argued also that donors had initiated most of the policy changes with limited policy guidance from the Government of Tanzania. Based on the report higher priority was given to the dialogue between the government and donors. (Helleiner et al. 1995, 6; Havnevik & Aida 2010, 208.)

During the presidency of Benjamin Mkapa (1995-2005) the discipline in the state finances and macroeconomic management strengthened clearly and stabilized the economy. Mkapa established a commission to look at the corruption issue immediately after being elected. Yet, the attitude towards corruption changed during his reign from a clear anti-corruption stance to a turnaround stating that citizens are responsible for finding proof of corruption instead of government officials having to prove their innocence. Based on a corruption study in Tanzania in the 1990s and 2000s, corruption does not necessarily prevent economic growth. Yet, lack of poverty reduction, high levels of development assistance, and weak social security can as structural features increase corruption. Corruption also most often protects old social power relations and is thus likely to prevent transformational processes such as true multi-party democratization. The former single political party, Chama cha Mapiduzi (CCM), retained its dominance during Mkapa’s presidency. It showed intensified dominance towards the 21st century and has since retained a one-party supportive legislation. (ibid. 271.)

**4.3 Kikwete era and the consistent spirit of ujamaa –transition to what?**

During the 21st century, many Tanzanians and international observers have expected the country’s opposition parties gradually develop stronger. Yet, the opposition has appeared even weaker than during the first multiparty elections in 1995. In 2005 Jakaya Kikwete was elected as Tanzania’s current president emerging from the lines of CCM as expected. Also the party itself secured 98 percent of mainland parliamentary constituencies. According to an ethnographic study on the political rhetoric in Tanzania at the time
There was no doubt among citizens that Kikwete would be elected president after he was nominated as the presidential candidate of CCM. According to citizens interviewed during the elections, Tanzanians are slow to change. They see CCM as their political father that brought independence to the nation and are thus grateful for it. (Phillips 2010, 109-110.)

The party has successfully re-framed itself for the present multiparty system without a serious opposition threat to its Nyerere-influenced politics. Although leadership by business elite contradicts the party’s past egalitarian ideology, today’s CCM comprises mainly of business elite who support the party financially. Other members include majority of state bureaucrats, police and military, traditional village leaders who incorporated to Ujamaa leadership in the past and an extensive mix of civil society members. (Phillips 2010, 116-117.)

Political liberalization was assumed to open spaces for widened participation and also to disseminate power to a number of institutions. Yet, processes of political liberalization and democratization have taken place within a constitutional and legal framework that ensures same politicians continue holding office. (Liviga 2011, 25.) Both economic and political power lies in large extent in the hands of CCM. Although Tanzania is a formal democracy opposition parties have not managed to break the power of CCM in the past. The strongest opposition to CCM lies in the hands of three parties, the Civic United Front, Chadema and the Tanzania Labor Party. All parties, including CCM, declare to represent the poor and marginalized and drive for ‘development’, revealing little from parties’ real agendas. CCM is highly popular in Tanzania yet this is to some extent credited to the current electoral formula, which gives the party a disproportioned dominance in relation to the number of votes it receives. It is expected that the CCM and its presidential candidate will lose some votes in the October 2015 elections but will remain in power (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2014.) According to a recent study (Hoffman 2013, 2), development partners and the civil society increasingly acknowledge the challenge of poor governance for Tanzania. Because political power has been concentrated in the executive branch of CCM, policy reform in Tanzania is inclined to be top down and often serves directly the external demands of donors. The executive branch is not accountable to the parliament or the judiciary. Local governments operate mainly to implement executive branch policy statements. Consequently it is difficult to point a clear line between the state and the ruling
party, which gives CCM the opportunity to control civil service and large parts of the private sector. (Hoffman 2013, 3.)

In a study on the unintended outcomes of economic and political liberalization in Tanzania, Liviga (2011) argues that the process of policy-making, both formulation and implementation, in Tanzania is dominated by external influences, neoliberalism in particular. Donors and foreign investment control the policy process and therefore also determine the direction of development. Claims of promoting local ownership are debatable when development partners finance about 40 percent of the recurrent budget and 60 percent of the capital budget. The state should defend the interests of the masses, yet according to Liviga, Tanzania has become the flag bearer of neoliberalism that represents local elite, not the public or nationalism. It is questionable whether under such circumstances of neoliberal policy, the state can in fact empower its citizens and represent a neutral authority. (Liviga 2011, 8-9)

From a number of examples a conclusion could be drawn that CCM preserves a distinct hegemonic political narrative that is instrumental for its longstanding popularity. Consequently, political questions have become cultural ones, sustaining social cohesion through the spirit of Ujamaa. The political rhetoric is built especially around paternalism. In his speech in Dar es Salaam in 2013 Mkapa referred to Nyerere as a visionary, dedicated and committed leader. Mkapa spoke of the importance of vision stating that Nyerere had a vision because he knew what kind of a country he wanted to build. Mkapa also stated that these policies helped to keep the country together, following a people-oriented political outfit, which endorsed primarily unity among the people. In conclusion Mkapa argued that although the one party system has been criticized, it also helped to strengthen the unity among Tanzanians. (The Citizen 2013a.) Mkapa’s speech underlines the Tanzanian political narrative, in which dominant relations in economy and politics, even if experienced unjust, make the world understandable and maintain general public’s call for coherence. During Kikwete’s election campaign, CCM marketed values of submission and gratitude. According to an ethnographic study of the campaign (Phillips 2010), supporters of CCM perceived the party strongly paternal. The idea that CCM represents a father who is naturally taking care of its children breaks political and socioeconomic disparities and produces a feeling of historical continuity even during a strong political or economic transformation. (Phillips 2010, 113-114.)
Central to the narrative of paternalism are the concept of age and eldership. Supporters of CCM often draw on generational stereotypes such as ‘Who do you want to lead you? Your father or his teenage sons?’. Opposition parties are described as exploitative and as a group of violent youth. Age and eldership are strong cultural concepts in Tanzania that determine and organize people and relations. They are thus natural concepts to justify also political rule in the country. Although the status of old age has seen a decline in recent years as youthful attributes such as education and innovation have become more popular, the symbolic power of age remains respectable. To legitimize their political power, Kikwete and CCM refer to themselves with both attributes depending on the context. (Phillips 2010, 117.)

During the 21st century minerals such as gold and gemstones have replaced agriculture as the main export-earning sector. Havnevik & Aida (2010) note, that this change in the composition of exports within natural resource sectors is as such not very transformational. Yet, it is noteworthy, that external owners, both individuals and firms, largely dominate these fast growing sectors such as mining and tourism. These developments may increase inequalities. Many Tanzanians feel that foreign companies benefit from openhanded tax exemptions while local companies are not offered similar support. This might explain why recent aggregate growth has neither decreased poverty nor increased local livelihoods. Mining, tourism, construction and services are mentioned as government’s priorities for example in the Five Year Development Plan. Yet they can offer only a limited amount of employment opportunities. (Finland’s Future Research Centre 2013, 83.) The foreign investments have made it more difficult for Tanzanians to control the incomes these sectors generate. In addition, the growing dependence of export sector on mining and tourism has made Tanzania more vulnerable to changes in global markets. (Havnevik & Aida 2010, 268.)

4.4. Between past and present - civil society and citizenship after socialism

Regarding the institutional context in Tanzania it is noteworthy to consider the relatively
weak role of its civil society. Having distinctively suffered during the socialist era until the 1980s Tanzanian civil society, both CSOs and social arena at large have up to today been unable to take a strong position in the institutional sphere.

Green (2010, 16) defines governance as a relation between different levels of government and its recognized institutions that actively involves ordinary citizens to situate themselves to government and power. Yet, Tanzanian government has been reluctant in involving the civil society in policy processes. Direct budget support has not changed the attitude of government officials towards the valuable contributions civil society representatives have to offer. Since Tanzanian governance has officially moved from central to decentralized governance, the culture of post-socialist setting cannot be disregarded because it significantly modifies the models of governing. Yet, the content of the transition and the adjustments in CCM have led to an exceptional synthesis of old and new forms of governance. State’s relation with rural communities reminds the socialist period. Next to this model particularly international organizations have taken a role of post-socialist promotion through CSOs. (Green 2010, 16.) As part of the neoliberal change, the CSO sector has become a service creator for the government. This agency was previously assumed for district officials and representatives of village governments, which still continue to represent government positions and CCM positions, in the village. Because of the aspects of business and politics in development relations it is difficult to clearly separate NGOs, civil society, private businesses and government representatives from each other. (Green 2012, 310-311.)

During the change from socialism towards more neoliberal governance the culture of Tanzanian governance and the political relationships between tiers of government have not changed much in practice. It is debatable whether the village governance has been democratized or not. Local governments continue to be seen as representing the next higher-up level of government and essentially implementing national government’s development vision. Local policies are still directed from top to bottom. Village is seen as a unit of development action and responsibility. This naturally strengthens inequality in professional relations between districts and villages, district staff and village residents and between agents and subjects of development. Also government officials still differentiate themselves from peasants as responsible for telling them how to develop because ‘they don’t know anything’. (Green 2010, 26, 29.)
When discussing citizens as ‘target populations’ of state-driven development it is easy to forget that active citizenship and disempowerment may operate hand in hand. It is important to separate the development policy driven normative assumptions of citizenship from the empirical every day political life. Although paternalistic regimes such as Tanzanian, bear negative consequences for empowerment one should not forget the multiple ways of how ordinary citizens work within civil society and state spaces. Discussing citizenship as clientelism distracts from seeing strategies of survival and well-being, which in a developing country context are built on multiple strategic relationships. For an outsider such relationships may seem to create dependency and disempowerment if one views them in the light of liberal individualist conceptions of citizenship. Yet for locals they can provide access to vital resources. The link between citizens and the state in a Third World setting does not often go hand in hand with the democratic models of participation that donors and NGOs promote. Citizens can simultaneously act as target populations for state-led development as well as active agents of clientelistic political relations. (Robins et al 2008, 1075.)

As discussed in chapter 3.2., neoliberal shift in governance is present in the promotion of the global ‘good governance’ agenda in which the civil society plays an integral role. The certain definition of good governance on the agendas of the World Bank and the MDGs is likely to produce pre-defined understandings for Tanzanian governance. In neoliberal representation governance is about apolitical management needed to support national strategies for poverty reduction. For example, the attempt to develop autonomous local organizations between the state and the people was built on the belief that democratic transition would happen naturally if only certain technical support was given to grassroots as promoted in poverty reduction strategy papers. This outlook was typical among development practitioners in many post-socialist development interventions and still prevails to some extent. The content of this technical support is referred to with ‘capacity building’. It serves the expectations of international development institutions and ensures the channeling of development funds. It also upholds the old dependency structure where citizens have needs to be fulfilled by the government rather than rights to be acclaimed by it. This particular culture of governance typically also concerns itself more with adherence to forms and specific practices rather than concern with content. Organizing offices in a particular manner and holding on to the particular rituals, she writes, is key to the
constitution of governance as modalities of power in Tanzania. Such practices also maintain the national order founded on the idea that village is the basic building block of planned development and thus an object of governance. (Green 2010, 17-20.)

For realizing how the neoliberal policies have shaped the societal sphere that Tanzanian citizens live in, it is also essential to pay attention to the certain cultural balancing between past and present. Kamat (2008) has studied how the residents of Mbande, a community close to Dar es Salaam, articulate their understanding of the effects of neoliberal policies in their everyday lives. Their narratives are an infusion of nostalgic remembrance of the socialist past and a melancholic view of the present. Remembering the past is a jointly social and cultural process that is more reconstructive than simply reproductive. When people talk of their experiences, past events are reconstructed with current understanding, the present is explained in light of the reconstructed past and both generate expectations of the future. Nostalgia is a way to respond to the ongoing changes and discontinuity in the society in order to live with present struggles. Kamat (ibid.) found nostalgic discourses of social solidarity of Tanzania’s socialist past. This nostalgia includes loss of community values, loss of respect for elderly people in the post-socialist era and a change in reciprocal exchange and mutual assistance on the community level. The transition from the Ujamaa socialism to privatization had intensified social and economic inequalities and feelings of deprivation in the community. Especially the elderly discussed the old time when government used to genuinely care for its citizens. This was linked to loss of social cohesion. (Kamat ibid, 361-364.) Yet, younger generations discussed the past in a different light especially the ones self-employed. Young people saw that there now exists political and economic opportunities followed by the government’s decision to ease its socialist ideology. They represented a neoliberal worldview that offers opportunities for those who work hard. Although in reality the Ujamaa-policies were controversial and included large-scale failures, majority of the people Kamat studied felt that social cohesion, support and people’s trustworthiness had since diminished. (ibid, 368, 372.) However, it needs to be noted that this is not to suggest that life for ordinary people would have been better than it is present-day Tanzania. As Kamat (ibid, 376) notes, today the problem is not anymore the availability of essential commodities but more the lack of purchasing power to access them.

According to a recent study on Tanzanians’ confidence towards different authorities in the country it was further confirmed that Tanzanians trust religious leaders, their own
community, themselves and their relatives. Yet trust towards formal institutions, politicians and the central and local level government continues to stay low. The research by Twaweza is notable since it is the first countrywide enquiry that concentrates on ordinary citizens’ perceptions. The study informs that although Tanzanians are often held as passive in societal advocacy they are active on community level. Self-confidence and feeling of being able to change things are strong among the citizens, which is especially important for empowerment. As the study states, the difficulty with empowerment is not the attitude as such but the fact that official channels for influencing the present state of development are not used. When citizens face issues that do not function they come up with solutions outside the official sphere. (Twaweza 2014.)

4.5. Tanzanian development policy context for the post-2015 consultations

The present Tanzanian policy context is a colorful collection of national and international development strategies. The most important framework and policy document guiding Tanzanian development is the Tanzanian Development Vision 2025 (TDV 2025), which was created after the move to multiparty politics in 1992. TDV 2025 was financially assisted and encouraged by donors and came to being after the publication of the Helleiner report. The main message of the TDV 2025 is that Tanzania should move from a low-income country into a middle-income country by 2025. The time frame has however been seen unrealistic. (Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 30)

In the 21st Century Tanzanian development agenda has been shaped by multiple policy processes such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2000-2003 and the following National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) known also as MKUKUTA I in 2005-2009 and MKUKUTA II (NSGRP II) in 2010-2015. The MKUKUTA I s have focused on economic growth, poverty reduction, improving the standard of living and social welfare, good governance and accountability. MKUKUTA II is also a tool for realizing TDV 2025, the MDGs and to a large extent the ruling party’s election manifesto. (Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 32.) In addition, there are two more recent initiatives, the Five Year Development Plan 2011-2016 (FYDP) and Big Results Now (BRN) initiated in 2013, which are described as more targeted plans in
assisting the implementation of development policy. They were developed in order to better respond to the changing markets and technological development in global economy as well as domestic socio-economic demands. (Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness 2013.)

Donors, primarily the World Bank and the IMF, have heavily directed the Tanzanian PRSP process. The PRSP is seen as the policy foundation for the implementation of the MDGs in Tanzania although not explicitly mentioned in the PRSP. Compared to the SAPs in the 1980s, the PRSP has been more focused on social and non-income characteristics of development. Its emphasis on human development can thus be seen arising from the MDGs. The multiple national development strategies have led to a lack of coherence and focus. For example, the five-year development plans that were created to implement the Vision 2025 were only initiated in 2009. Yet, compared to the donor-led PRSP and the Tanzanian response in the form of MKUKUTAs, the FYDP directing the BRN process has been viewed as more fully Tanzanian. Whether the BRN is Tanzanian in the sense of being planned by the government or being recognized by the wider public is debatable, however. According to civil society members the process is quite unknown. (Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 34.) The BRN follows the Malaysian growth model by focusing on a few key sectors (energy and natural gas; agriculture; water; transport; education and mobilization of resources) with time and performance based indicators. The strategy formation has largely taken place behind closed doors. It is unclear how the strategy will relate to other development policies, who will claim ownership of it and whether it may once again change the current national development priorities. There also exist critical concerns of whether it is appropriate to borrow a context-specific model from abroad and assume it will work as such in another environment.4

The MDGs have been well integrated into Tanzanian policies through the MKUKUTAs. Also MDGs monitoring and evaluation has been done through the MKUKUTA monitoring system (MMS). The system directs also the work of Ministries Departments and Agencies and Local Government Authorities. The overall framework is coordinated by the

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4 Critical voices of Tanzanian media have questioned whether the expected ‘big results’ will reach the ordinary citizens without first dealing with eliminating corruption and crime. It has also been claimed that the first priority should be responding to social ills, which the BRS does not tackle. All in all, it has been questioned what makes the BRN framework uniquely better than previous plans in responding to citizens’ needs. (The Citizen 2013b; Tanzania Daily News 2013)
President’s Office. In technical terms several coordination challenges of MDGs have been mentioned on all of the governmental levels such as inefficient skills, resource constraints and lack of standardized data. (Wangwe & Charle 2010, 4.) Also, there has been confusion about which one of the national policies has priority in implementing the MDGs as they fit to different policies. Especially the FYDP and its relation to the other national policies and to the MDGs has been confusing for the civil society. (Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 34.) The ongoing development processes are a mixture of global and national influence, which makes it challenging to claim to which extent they serve the public interest. This has been supported by empirical data. In civil society consultations carried out by the Finland’s Future Research Centre in Tanzania in 2013, citizens felt that their lived realities and the development they envisioned was not acknowledged in national dialogues. In addition, it was articulated that the global view on what majority of poor want did not meet with the kind of development they themselves visualize.

The influence of traditional donors on the newer development plans such as the FYDP and the BRN has been more limited than previously. The BRN is an example of Tanzania’s growing interest to look for new kinds of development partnerships and view East Asia as a modern development model. Government ownership has strengthened and traditional donors’ role diminished but the limited consultations and prioritizing difficulties can be seen as further confusing and limiting other stakeholders’, not least the civil society’s, ownership of the development processes. According to a study among development partners operating in Dar es Salaam, the Paris Declaration has created a situation where development partners are less aware of national policy priorities. Their understanding of which policies are planned and implemented has diminished as has a view on what is happening on the ground where local partners work. Also their ability to supervise controversial matters such as corruption among high-level officials has weakened as it is up to the Tanzanian politicians to define the level of information they share. (Hyden 2008, 272.)

On top of the different policy processes, Tanzania is at the moment forming a new constitution. A draft constitution was published in 2013 with a three-tiered government that comprises of separate administrations for the mainland and Zanzibar in addition to an umbrella unity government. The draft has received positive feedback especially in terms of increasing women’s political participation rights. The process to approve the constitution
The development policy context in which the post-2015 consultations took place is therefore confusing and rouses questions across stakeholders. There have been questions over the extent and representativeness of the consultation process as well as the civil society’s capacity to follow the process. (Finland Futures Research Centre 2013, 39.) In addition to the national consultations dealt with in this study parallel consultations were carried out by NGOs such as Tanzania Association of Non Governmental Organizations (TANGO). These consultations concentrated solely on the views of for example the youth, private sector or higher learning institutions. However, in this study the focus is on the regional consultations, which draw a more balanced overall view of different stakeholders. They focus more generally on Tanzanians, whether CSO members, governmental officials or representatives of the most vulnerable. The limitations of this framing will be discussed in the conclusions.
5. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS METHODOLOGY

In this chapter I explain the methodology of the study and describe what critical discourse analysis means specifically in the context of this research. Firstly, I introduce critical discourse analysis as the methodological foundation. I will then form a methodological framework to guide the analysis. Although the analysis is inductive, this general framework functions as a heuristic tool to structure my understanding of discourse. Finally, before moving on to the analysis, I introduce the case reports, actors behind them and the nature of the consultation process the reports are based on.

5.1. Introduction to critical discourse analysis

Discourse analysis is not a uniform, established research methodology but rather a broad methodological framework that helps to describe various kinds of language-related questions, socially grounded language and theoretical presumptions. It can be based on either linguistic or social perspective. In linguistic research the focus is on the use of the language, whereas social research studies the language in order to understand phenomena beyond the visible text. However, language is always simultaneously a linguistic, discursive and social system. Beyond exchanging information, language serves many other functions such as informing of human affiliation with cultures, social groups and institutions. The world finds meaning differently depending on the context and time. As a discourse researcher, I am thus not interested in what is true or false but rather what issues are dominant or in the marginal and why. (Gee 1999, 11.)

It is also important to note, that discourse as a concept is not unambiguous and cannot be defined comprehensively. It can vary from a limited speech act to a Foucauldian view of historically formulated discourses\(^5\). A researcher has to make a deliberate choice between the methods of analysis and justify her chosen method of giving meaning for the text.

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\(^5\) Foucault is particularly known for his studies of the relationship between power and knowledge and how the former has been used to control and define the latter. His critical theory is especially cited when criticizing more traditional forms of discourse analysis as failing to acknowledge the political implications of discourse. Foucault sees discourses to have a constructive nature. Discourses rebuild and change parts of a society such as social identity, social relationships, knowledge, beliefs and conceptual frameworks. (Fairclough 1992, 39-40)
This thesis approaches the text specifically from a social point of view, in which social structure and relations are in focus. A sociological perspective, and specifically its ideological premise, is central to the formation of the specific discourses identified in the Tanzanian post-2015 reports. This premise also recognizes role of power relationships, and their political implications, as specific elements of these discourses. Therefore, I have further limited the methodology to critical discourse analysis (CDA). It pays particular attention to the critical, socially binded meanings behind the text and is specifically suitable when the focus is in understanding how relations of power and ideologies shape discourse. The origins of critical discourse analysis are on the other hand within Western Marxism (brought to attention in the twentieth century mainly by Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althuser and the Frankfurt School) and on the other hand in Michel Foucault’s work on discourse.6

I have defined CDA through a number of theorists without emphasizing a specific school of thought. I find it more fruitful for the analysis to bring up a number of points such as historical perspective, discourse as change and recontextualization than to follow a strictly specified approach. My philosophical perspective to CDA is primarily hermeneutic, meaning that it is only possible to know the meaning of an act or statement within the context of the discourse from which it originates. It is important to understand, how language is used to structure the discourse on the post-2015 agenda but this is possible only within the context (economic, political, cultural, social) of the global and national post-2015 discussion. Thus, the point of departure for the analysis is more on ideational and interpersonal level than on textual. By studying the meanings behind the seeable, it is possible to see how underlying power structures might have affected these consulted views and following policy statements and how these are seen to either restrain or assist in bringing about (transformative) change.

Both discourse analysis and CDA have been criticized for the concept’s vague nature.

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6 Compared to other forms of Marxism, Western Marxism has given more attention to cultural dimensions of societies. It emphasises that capitalist social relations are founded and sustained largely in culture and hence in ideology, not just in economics. (Van Dijk 1997, 260.) The term critical is especially associated with Frankfurt School of Philosophy that originates from Marxist thought. It argues that critical science must be self-reflexive and consider the historical context in which linguistic and social interactions take place.
Discourse has been used in varied contexts without clearly defining its meaning for the specific occasion. Also the lack of clear framing between text and discourse has invoked criticism. Because CDA is more of an ideological interpretation than a method of analysis it has been blamed for creating interpretations that are based on ideological commitments or preconceptions rather than ‘pure’ analysis. Yet, researcher’s views are always influenced by foreknowledge and individual methods of forming discourses. Also, the CDA principles require open-endedness of results. (Wodak & Meyer 2001, 15)

Although subjectivity is always present to some degree, self-reflexivity should guide every researcher throughout the process. The values and beliefs researcher carries with her, inevitably affect the way one sees the data and draws meaning from the data. Personally I consider my critical views as not purely a limit but also a driver for choosing this research topic. I am aware of how a subjective view cannot be erased totally from looking at the data and I realize the effect this may have on my analysis. However, I also consider that my subjectivity, based on both the particular academic education I have received and my internship experiences in the Permanent Mission of Finland to the UN in New York and at the Tanzanian Council for Social Development (TACOSODE) office in Dar es Salaam in 2012, assist to recognize possible preconceptions I may have. These experiences may also help to take note of certain nuances of transformative change that I might otherwise disregard. In this respect, subjectivity can also be viewed as a strength. After all, as Peshkin (1993, 23) wisely puts it: “If all researchers were alike, we would tell the same story…about the same phenomena. By virtue of story I tell the story I am moved to tell. Reserve my subjectivity and I do not become value-free participant observer merely an empty-headed one.“

5.2. Context specificity

As mentioned, context is a central concept for discourse analysis. Context provides a tool to analyze and interpret the use of language. It is a multilayered concept that can refer to varying kinds of phenomena such as interaction, operational environment or social space. Widely put, context includes all those factors that influence the construction of meaning and enable and define its use and interpretation. Language always reflects context specific socially bounded views of the issue in hand, not purely personal choices of the language
Since the construction of meaning is context specific, discourse analysis acknowledges that the meaning of words is not stable. Words have changing meanings created for and adapted to a specific context. Gee (1999, 42) uses the terms ‘situated meanings’ and ‘cultural modes’ to outline this context specificity of discourses. By ‘situated’ he refers to locally grounded in actual practices and experiences. For example when people are given the task to form a meaning for the concept of a ‘poor person’, as in the consultation papers, participants construct a pattern that is socio-culturally and historically bounded. These patterns are connected to ordinary Tanzanians’ daily experiences. In the analysis, I thus pay attention to how specific social and cultural experiences may have shaped people’s perceptions of terms such as participation or governance. Naturally, the recontextualization of such concepts into Tanzanian policy papers is likely to produce altered definitions and applications than what Tanzanian grassroots referred to in the first place. This issue will be tackled in the analysis.

5.3. Social change and recontextualization

Although Foucault’s ideas have received extensive acknowledgement in the academia, some of the later developers of critical discourse analysis have also pointed to critical fallbacks of his theory. Fairclough (1992) notes that Foucault failed to acknowledge the way in which discourse contributes both to the reproduction and to the transformation of societies. This duality is for central importance in CDA. Fairclough argues that Foucault places too much emphasis on the subject as being only an effect of discursive formation. This thought does not leave enough space for active social agency - social subjects are capable of reshaping and restructuring those discursive formations that they are themselves part of. Therefore discursive practice is constitutive in two ways; it contributes to reproducing society (social identity, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) as it is, yet it also contributes to transforming society. Social change occurs through interconnections between existing structures and the strategies of social agents and agencies to sustain or transform structures. As a result of selecting and retaining certain
strategies (through hegemonic struggle) certain strategies are then operationalized across social fields and materialized in the physical world. (Fairclough 1992, 37, 45, 65.)

Although the division between non-critical and critical approaches is not absolute, critical discourse analysis is more oriented to studying the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and knowledge systems. (Fairclough 1992, 12, 26.) Critical discourse analysts place particular emphasis on viewing discourse as a political and ideological practice (see for example Fairclough 1992, Gee 1999, Wodak & Chilton 2005). In doing so, CDA places discourse within a view of power as hegemony and sees the changes in power relations fundamentally as a hegemonic struggle. The concept of hegemony, having its roots in Gramscian framework, provides a tool to view (discursive) change in relation to the historical changes in power relations. As mentioned in chapter 1, hegemony refers to leadership and domination in the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society through constructing alliances and integrating rather than dominating. (Fairclough 1992, 92.)

The relationship between dominance and discourse becomes evident when drawing attention to how different social groups are able to participate in the (common and public) discourse formation and how this might create inequality in the society. (Pynnönen 2013, 30.) In Tanzanian policy context, I find it important to understand how the material and discursive nature of development has been formed (and re-defined) in relation to Tanzanian post-socialist development and who possesses the authority to define it. Also, it is important to pay attention to the arguments by which official development discourses are justified as commonly shared and as serving the best interest of the nation.

Whether a certain discourse is seen as an entry point for social change can be studied through questions such as how and where did discourses emerge, how and where did they achieve hegemonic status, how extensively have they been recontextualized and to what extent have they been operationalized. Recontextualization is a central category when social change is studied through discourse analysis. It means the movement of practices, strategies and discourses from one context to another. Fairclough has studied the relationship between recontextualization and social change in his research on post-communist countries. A set of strategies compete over, which one (or more of them) may achieve dominance or hegemony to be implemented. This dissemination of a hegemonic
strategy and its recontextualization in new countries took place in the form of ‘transition’, which was the dominant strategy for changing the national economies of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In this way, neo-liberalism was the strategy for a new ‘fix’ and transition can be seen as the specific recontextualization of this neoliberal strategy in the post-communist countries. The IMF’s and World Bank’s structural adjustment package, Washington Consensus, is an example of a new ‘fix’, a dominant strategy for withdrawing from strong regulation and liberalizing finance and trade. These strategies are embedded within a narrative of an imaginary change, which draws upon a set of particular discourses. (Fairclough, Giuseppina, Ardizzone 2007, 14, 29.) This recontextualization in the context of East European transition policy, finds parallel meanings also in Tanzanian context. Both the Washington Consensus and the following MDGs can be observed in the light of recontextualizing neoliberal ideology into Tanzanian post-socialist economy.

5.4. Identity, Institutions and Legitimacy

Moving downwards from the wider perspective of discourses within ideologies, discourses also construct identities and social relations: understanding of oneself, others and relationships between agents. According to CDA, identities are not given but rather find form and boundaries through language. Identities are built and challenged through discourses in the social frames that surround people. CDA explains how discourses dominate and build identities in such a way that they become self-evident or stereotyped. These identities may then restrict and guide individuals and their possibilities in their social surrounding. Thereby, discourse operates as a manner of social control through the creation of identities. (Ainsworth & Hardy 2004 in Pynnönen 2013, 19.) In my research, I view the possibilities and restrictions of identities mostly in relation to post-socialist context. People define identities of a poor person or a beneficiary in a specific manner stemming from the social frames in which they live. I will also observe Tanzania’s national identity as an LDC and a donor darling; by treating the consultation documents as policy papers with specific commitments to global development policy, the structure and content of the documents may open up new avenues for understanding the discourses. Identity may also be defined by what an individual or group does not have instead of defining it through existing attributes. This self-separation from others thus maintains specific social discourses.
When discussing the creation of identities, one has to simultaneously take notice of two other social constructions; institutions and legitimacy. The construction of identity takes place within specific institutions and legitimacy. One legitimizes certain discourses with specific argumentation strategies, which then entitle what is conceived as eligible. Argumentation can be based on for example rationalization, moral or authority. When argumentation is based on authority, one may refer to tradition, law or a common course of action. Rationalization means referring to advantages of a specific action whereas moral argumentation appeals to values such as altruism or feelings such as fear. Legitimization thus works through confirming the audience through these different strategies. Consequently some issues rise as positive, ethical and necessary, whereas others appear in a more negative light and may even end up being regarded as harmful or morally suspicious. (Pynnönen 2013, 21.)

CSA emphasizes meanings and ideologies that create, sustain and reproduce institutions. Discourses enable certain structures of thinking and action, which may take a normative role. When this normative role becomes strong enough, certain behaviour may be institutionalized and maintain social control. Discourses thus produce institutions (both concrete and intangible) that limit and define action. For example, message in a text may become a fact that prevents options to be seen. This may happen especially when other simultaneous discourses are not strong enough to provide competing meaning. The legitimacy and power of specific texts is also dependent on who created the texts and how central this role is in the institutional sphere. (Phillips, Lawrence & Hardy 2004, 643.) Therefore, the influence of the financer (UNDP) and the coordinator the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) of the consultations automatically influence the consultation process. How this is observable in the form and content of the reports will be discussed further in the analysis.

In development assistance it is common for donors to perceive power embedded mostly in formal institutions. This is reflected in much of the diplomatic and political reporting from African countries. Diplomats and other officials from donor countries often interact mostly with formal structures of government. For development measures to be successful it is crucial to better understand the role informal institutions play in shaping power structures and to fully recognize their effects in policy making and reporting. Informal institutions
often operate flexibly with formal institutions and cause unexpected effect on performance. Development aid resources assigned for policies may thus be used for other purposes. Yet, informal institutions are not chaotic or destructive as typically pictured. For example clientelism may seem malign but this view often ignores the fact that clientelist relations are based on the principle of reciprocity. Thus, clientelism may in fact bring accountability into the institution, not the opposite. As Hyden (2008, 266) states, “informal institutions in Africa are not primarily the creations of evil or autocratic minds but a natural product of the fragmentary nature of the prevailing economic system and the absence of social differentiation - and stratification - that has given rise to formal institutions in other regions of the world”. Informal institutions should not be dismissed or kept as backward in policy making if policies are ought to be successfully integrated into the society. (Hyden 2008, 267.) In regard to my analysis, what aspects of the society the policy consultations (choose to) ignore tell about how power operates as much as what is being said.

As this chapter has pointed out, text, language and power may communicate on different levels such as identity, social relations and the wider social context which involves ideology as well as knowledge and belief system. It is generally assumed that society and its structures are locally produced by its members. Yet, this local production in interaction is possible only when members have at least to some extent shared social representations such as knowledge and ideologies. Therefore an interesting question arises about the extent to which social representations are shared among the government, civil society and the UN and how these enable or hinder development consultations to reach from the local level to the national and ultimately feed into the UN process. Therefore micro and macro dimensions of society are integrated in multiple ways. Although the main reasons and aims of CDA are often the macrosocial dimensions of society, they can only be observed and analyzed in locally generated practices and specific situations. The interplay between identity, social relations and the wider social, political, cultural and institutional context depicts a certain picture of the world and produces discursive practices (Van Dijk 2009, 80).
All in all, critical discourse analysis tackles with a wide range of aspects in a society (see picture 1). In this research, the focus of the critical discourse analysis is particularly on the institutional context and identity. The institutional context represents concrete and intangible state-society formations and their influence on the discourses of development that I find. These relations are promoted in Tanzania through neoliberal policies and yet they are confronted in practice by particular post-socialist and post-colonial socio-cultural representations of development. Identity of Tanzanians and Tanzania as a nation will be discussed especially in relation to its recontextualization from one-party socialist era to present portrayals.
5.5 Description of the data

As part of the process to define the post-2015 Development Agenda that is based on civil society consultations, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) prepared a proposal to facilitate consultations in over 50 countries including Tanzania. The Tanzanian process was co-led by the United Nations Tanzania Country Office and the Government of Tanzania through the Ministry of Finance and the President’s Office Planning Commission. The purpose of these consultations was to stimulate discussion nationally and thus feed local and national views into the global process of “the future we want”. It was also stated that the consultation should amplify the voices of the poor, vulnerable and other marginalized and gather inputs useful for implementing The Tanzania Long-Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) and the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUZA II). The consultations were managed by the ESRF, which operates under the President’s Office Planning Commission. ESRF states that the stakeholders involved in the consultations included representatives from public sector, private sector, civil society, higher learning and research institutions, media, youth and women’s groups, people with disability, children and development partners. On paper, the process thus aimed for high representativeness of all sectors, which would enable grassroots voices to be heard. (Economic and Social Research Foundation 2012.) The data for this study is narrowed down to the seven zonal post-2015 consultation reports covering all regions of the Mainland (See table 2 for a comprehensive list of reports analyzed).

Table 2. Post MDG Development Agenda Consultation Reports on CSOs, LGAs and vulnerable groups by ESRF

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<td>Central Zone Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lake Zone Report</td>
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The zonal reports are based on consultations among local government authorities (from regional, district, ward and village level) (LGAs), civil society organizations (CSOs) and beneficiaries. Lists of participants in the zonal reports revealed that the proportion of beneficiaries, that is, villagers and vulnerable people, was relatively low compared to the number of participants representing LGAs and CSOs in each zonal consultation. This was noticed also by participants for example in the Northern Zone, who worried that the consultation was not representative enough and suggested that similar workshops in the future should be convened at lower levels such as villages where the unrepresented majority lives (Northern Zone, 16). The reports were also each differently composed. Thus, it was difficult to point out which arguments were presented by each stakeholder group. In order to increase consistency of the views, I decided to include to the analysis a synthesis report of the six regional reports. This National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report on CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups sums up the zonal consultations’ results and in addition includes a separate summary of three consultations carried out among vulnerable groups (elderly, women and young women, children). Some of the reports included translations in Swahili, pictures of the consultation setting and lists of participants. Some were more compact in nature and only presented condensed results in boxes. Accordingly, the number of pages does not automatically correlate with the time spent analyzing them as some involved material that could not be analyzed.

The consultations were structured around group discussions. Participants were organized in three or four groups (LGAs, CSOs, beneficiaries) in each zone. Each consultation discussed a same set of leading questions (what? why? who? how? when?) regarding the post-2015 agenda. Questions were such as ‘What are qualities of a poor person?, What will be needed for future generation to live well in this country or community?, What are the main reasons and why some people do not live well in this country or community?, What can be done to help in achieving decent life? Who are the actors and which institutions need to do something to achieve this?, What do these actors need to do?, By when do we want to achieve this?. Finally each group presented their findings and recommendations for
the post-2015 agenda.

5.6 Analysis of the data

Apthorpe (1996) uses the term emancipatory reading to depict how a critical discourse researcher aims at ‘dispelling the discursive hold of a text’. Argumentation used in development policy documents is not only policy-driving but also policy-driven. Thus the descriptive statements given are subordinate to the discursive reality in which they operate. This in mind, I linked the reading of the case reports to the theoretically informed arguments that I have presented in the literature review. The development framework and the definition for development hegemony discussed in chapter 2 as well as Tanzanian historical and social context guided my coding and interpretation of the data. I will present the identified discourses in the following chapter.

Pynnönen (2013, 31) notes that the level of analysis in discourse analysis can be categorized into textual, interpretive and critical. Without going into detail with these categories it is useful to regard that CDA can be both interpretive and critical. Critical discourse analysis has its premise in producing a critical address in relation to the hegemonic social order and its premise is in subordination (Wodak & Meyer 2001, 9). My premise for the analysis was critical from the beginning. Considering the context in which the data has been produced, the complex linkages between neoliberal present and Tanzanian socialistic history, it became clear that also critical perspectives are necessary in order to recognize local discourses and their connection to the post-2015 development hegemony. My identification of themes started by reading through the reports with a special focus on spotting ideological attributes. From the beginning it became clear that next to the usual ‘policy talk’ the papers informed of a specific post-socialist reality. For example ujamaa spirit was raised time after again and in all the reports. Before identifying specific discourses however, I color-coded the reports’ content based on for example how they discussed the role of institutions (e.g. elements of power and trust) and the role of community (responsible for local development or pure implementer of government policies). I also paid close attention to neoliberal versus protective policy arguments. This way I had a dialogue with my theoretical framework of institutions, identity and social change. I continued to re-read the reports with a simultaneous reflection on the historical
context and aimed to recognize discursive practices that sustain, legitimize or challenge certain ‘production patterns’. I drew connections of e.g. how weak policies were seen to lead to weak accountability, which again was connected to corruption, which was linked to decay in moral. Such connections showed how specific thought patterns were legitimized and generalized. I then started writing down categories such as social cohesion and nationalism for which I then found more evidence from the documents as I read through them again and again. Building and naming the discourses was based on these categories. I went through the text again to see whether the themes I had spotted were in reality dominant. This confirming of the text helped me to finally piece together specific discourses as it became clear that certain themes were repeated. For example, patriotic statements were utilized when arguing for both restoration of social values and for strengthening individual entrepreneurship. Therefore patriotism as a concept required further analysis and finally turned into one of the main discourses.

Yet, identifying and naming the specific discourses was tricky, as it appeared that many of the themes I found recurring in the text were overlapping. Drawing lines between them was difficult. I found both socialist ideological statements and neoliberal arguments, which made it demanding to create a clear picture of which direction the hegemonic development was pointing to. I first felt paradoxical to try and combine them but then felt they in fact supported each other and defined an authentically Tanzanian ideology. As a result I created one main discourse for which I had found enough robust arguments. This further helped me to group all the other discourses under one ideological umbrella and separate them from one another. One of the leading factors for me to understand and name the main discourse was my previous knowledge of the changes in Tanzanian development context, especially the increased role of private sector for development. I also spotted general post-colonial concerns in the reports such as the fear towards foreign investors and land-grabbing. What made these concerns specifically Tanzanian however, was the manner in which such concerns were connected to (post-)socialist values and to lack of social cohesion. I thus realized that participation and ethics were seen as fundamental for the certain desired privatization of development to succeed. This paved the way to my main discourse, participatory neoliberalism. The next chapter presents the content of the main discourse and its four sub-discourses, which illustrate the above mentioned paradoxes and yet also depict the special connections between them.
6. DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES IN THE TANZANIAN POST-2015 REPORTS

In this chapter I present the findings of my analysis and describe the discourses I have identified in the data. After a careful analysis, I have named one main discourse, participatory neoliberalism, which according to my interpretation includes four sub-discourses, each portraying different perspectives of the main discourse. The sub-discourses include self-help, spirit of ujamaa, patriotism and good governance. In what follows I describe these discourses in detail and provide direct quotes of the reports to illustrate my interpretation. All of the sub-discourses have overlapping characters and carry similar ideology. For example, patriotism includes conservation of indigenous values, which is also a determining character for the spirit of ujamaa discourse. Also these similarities and differences are presented in the analysis. After having identified the discourses I have analyzed possible transformative aspects of these discourses regarding Tanzania’s future development. By doing this I have contrasted Tanzanian development discourses with the global development hegemony. These changes are discussed in chapter 6.7. and further elaborated in the conclusions.

The reports manifested a variety of divergent statements of how development is understood and what is “desired development”. There was no one prevailing understanding of development yet it was mostly described with technical attributes such as increased agricultural productivity or improved supply of clean water. The statements made in all of the reports shared a common need for change regarding especially health sector, education, agricultural development, fight against corruption and environmental protection. There were also differing opinions on who are the change agents in bringing about this development in Tanzania. The responsibility was generally not granted to a single institution or group of people but was stated as everyone’s liability. Despite the lack of a single understanding of development the most prominent element linked to it was its economic aspect. This could be seen as deriving from the hegemonic conception of development founded on an economic-centered model (as presented in chapter 2 and 3). Yet, the reports mentioned also a selection of intangible development attributes such as peace and tranquility, moral ethics, social values, nationalism and responsible citizenship. Especially these intangible attributes opened up spaces for my critical interpretation as
they include traces of a particular sociopolitical and historical background of Tanzania and are often also overlapping with global development processes. Consequently, I distinguished participatory neoliberalism as the broader discourse in all of the reports either clearly visible in the statements or as a collection of more discreet allusions.

6.1 Development as participatory neoliberalism

Tanzanian (post)socialist ideology is a cohesion founded on specific notions of participation and the current hegemonic neoliberal development ideology. I have combined the two ends in order to depict the mixed discursive space in Tanzania. Participatory neoliberalism represents a discourse of market-based development combined with development as a common, yet strongly individual responsibility. The discourse could be seen as a compromise to respond to the heavy criticism towards neoliberalism that fieldwork-based evidence of Tanzanian grassroots has shown in recent years (see for example Caplan 2007; Green 2010). Considering the heavy emphasis on citizens’ responsibility primarily to community and nation I argue that participatory neoliberalism represents an attempt to establish a stronger neoliberal driven order in Tanzania’s development policy while simultaneously holding on to the ‘lost values’, the spirit of Ujamaa, in order to echo citizens’ views. This might also serve as an effective compromise bringing the grassroots views and the more economic-driven service provider (government and CSOs) positions around the same table. In addition to the longing for the past, the sovereignty and authority of Tanzania to determine its own development path has strengthened. Thus, participatory neoliberalism offers a discourse that responds to both sentiments; potentiated patriotism on the one hand and urge for a more open and globally integrated economy on the other.

A need to fundamentally increase participation and bring forth views of the grassroots was emphasized across the reports. The National Post MDG’s Development Agenda Consultation Report thus states, “Participation and inclusiveness – has hitherto remained elusive but need stronger positive mind of policy makers and implementers.” Such comments revealed differences in the stakeholders’ responses. The consulted groups were asked in each zonal consultation whether they felt the gap between those who live well and those who do not is increasing or decreasing. In the Lake Zone the local government
authorities and civil society organizations believed the gap was decreasing whereas the representatives of the lowest class of population, that is, small-holder farmers and livestock keepers, felt the inequality gap was increasing. Thus, the beneficiaries had the opposite perception from that of service providers. Yet, in other zones the different stakeholders’ responses were mostly uniform, pointing to the increased inequality levels in the country. For example, a comment of Eastern Zone exemplifies that particularly the civil society representatives saw the increased inequality as an important part of the poverty discussion.

Another concern came from Mr. Severine from the CSOs who was skeptical of the economic growth while poverty increases. Mr. Mutalemwa attributed that situation to a number of economic sectors that are not directly related to daily life of common people, e.g. mining, gas and tourism.... He also had the view that the growing economy is controlled by a few hands.  

This also connects the discussion to both the global and national criticism of negative consequences of neoliberalism. In its present form, it is seen harmful among the ordinary citizens who have experienced the recent developments to lead towards inequality even where poverty has decreased. The comment also highlights the certain disappointment towards corruption. Economic growth and particularly investments in natural resource sector are not seen harmful as such but the distribution of profits has not added to equality. This again is attributed to politicized governance structures. Such criticism will be further elaborated under the discourse of good governance.

The concept of participation was however often connected to individual responsibility rather than to the theoretical concept of participation that stresses an enabling environment. Although participation was cited often, it was coupled with self-development, self-reliance and other mostly individual attributes. It seems that participation is not understood as a transformative concept that would stem authentically from the civil society. The comments indicate that change for better is possible only if everyone fulfills his or her obligation. More than anything, change was built on individual commitment. Consequently, the understanding of participation stays on a rather normative level of how things ought to be.

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7 Eastern Zone, 7-8
Thus policy does not reach practice.

Participation, as framed by the consultations, also rather reproduces the post-socialist logic, in which development policy responds to civil society’s criticism of the lack of inclusiveness by handing the responsibility to deliver development to the citizens instead of the state. Because the participants of the consultations represent all levels of the society, the reports are thus able to state that the consultations have been inclusive. Yet the local government authorities, followed by civil society representatives, formed the majority of respondents. It is questionable whether consultations dominated by middle-income earners can offer a representative sample of the population. This is further discussed in the conclusions.

Typical to the discourse of participatory neoliberalism is balancing between past, present and future. Some mentioned outdated cultural practices as one of the main barriers for development. Its content was not discussed further. In contrast others brought up the necessity to protect Tanzanian traditions. Also the whole discussion of protecting traditional ethics, yet enhancing markets and developing entrepreneurship balances between tradition and modern. Green (2000, 78) notes that in Eastern African context lack of development does not mean a determination of things ‘traditional’ in contrast to the ‘modern’. Being modern is also a status more than a way of living or a radically different production strategy. Similarly to Green’s discussion of Tanzania’s modern-traditional confluence, the consultations indicate that tradition is closer to a specific status, rather than to a specific manner of living or a range of practices. Consequently, in the discourse of participatory neoliberalism being modern and traditional are not conflicting. The respondents’ discussion of preserving the Kiswahili language and cultural practices of Ujamaa ideology were not contradicting with neoliberal ideology such as the desired presence of international financial institutions in the country or the economic development and increased domestic participation in mineral extraction. However, traditional elements in governance, namely hierarchical representation and status, were seen as limiting villagers’ participation opportunities. It seems that those parts of the socialist history that do not carry a negative political connotation were seen still relevant whereas especially in

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8 Central Zone, 18
9 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report, 42
10 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report, 48
the good governance discourse it became clear that the old habit of political representation on all levels of governance was outdated and harmful. The terms traditional and modern are thus context-dependent and can complement each other’s. They respond to the globalized environment by navigating between different belief systems. Participatory neoliberalism is a way of relating to the changing development climate in a context-specific, culturally bounded manner.

6.2. Development as patriotism

When asked what aspects of community life are important to safeguard in order to people live well in Tanzania, patriotism was explicitly mentioned repeatedly. The discourse of patriotism was built on concepts such as good social values, participation and indigenous rights. Words such as peace, stronger national pride and tranquility were mentioned in the same context. The ruling party has played a significant part in creating this Tanzanian identity. CCM has primarily worked as the creator of national identity rather than only interpreting national values, which would be the case in an actual multi-party regime.

Patriotism was mentioned as a solution to 1) the unequal position of majority of Tanzanians in relation to public leaders, 2) to Tanzania’s unequal position in international market and 3) low level of participation and a general decay of moral among the citizens. Participation was understood as a responsibility of every individual to involve oneself in the development of the nation. It was thus principally a question of national interest.

“…response in the participation in development programmes in villages is an example of patriotism, it also is reflected on the relationship between the finances disbuted by the government and the quality of the project (value for money) is left out to be desired.”

The role of international institutions was stressed as not leading but supporting the achievement of national development aspirations. The UN and other agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and financial institutions were expected to provide financial assistance. “It was maintained that international organizations (mainly IMF and World Bank) should assist development

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11 Eastern Zone Report, 10; Southern Zone, 12; Northern Zone, 9.
12 Eastern Zone Report, 16
without posing unfavourable conditions to the country.”

All in all comments that referred to the role of the UN institutions were few. Although the consultations were organized as part of the global post-2015 consultation, the comments indicated that Tanzanians held the upcoming post-2015 agenda primarily national and did not seem to regard its connections to the global agenda very relevant.

The neoliberal shift in governance that has altered the relationship between the government and civil society has clearly resulted in a modified understanding of participation as well. The context in which civil society now operates consists increasingly of linkages to private market and competed projects of development. As discussed in 4.4 civil society has increasingly taken the role of service provider. Seemingly, the participants connected patriotism to a hope of restoring participation to the old context of social cohesion and altruistic cooperation between villagers. Participants discussed of wrong expectations that citizens have towards government and donors as service providers. Patriotism was framed as a strategy to restore the responsibility of Tanzanians of their own development.

“During discussions with stakeholders there was still an overall perception that most Tanzanians have negative development mindset attitudes, which need seriously addressing. They pointed several examples of negative mindset, including: a dependency syndrome whereby citizens expect everything to be provided by the government, political leaders and/or by donors, instead of working hard and cherishing self-reliance; lack of seriousness, commitment and accountability at work; and some people desiring to develop and move out of poverty through ‘shortcuts’.”

The transformation from socialist to a post-socialist governance was built on technical support and the concept of capacity building, which rather than empowering the grassroots created new dependencies between citizens and the government (see chapter 4.4.). As the comment above shows, participants still find development to consist of distorted relations of dependency of the centre and of donors. It seems that citizens still see themselves as objects rather than subjects of development. The references to laziness and self-interest can also be seen as a consequence of the forgotten role of civil society during the government’s adjustments to neoliberal policies in 1990s. Since the governance structure has not

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13 National Post MDG’s Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, 29
14 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, 42
promoted participation spaces for citizens it has reinforced the idea of villages (and its citizens) as objects of planned development rather than rights bearers and active members of the society. The role of citizenship is further elaborated under the discourse of good governance.

Economic independence was among the most important aspects of patriotism for the participants. All in all, the current trade system was seen unfavorable and competition unfair. Trade system was blamed unjust in terms of international investments in Tanzania, foreign trade relations, and regional market opportunities that discriminate especially smallholder farmers. The gap between those who live well and those who don’t was also justified as “increasing mainly due of capitalist system of economy”\textsuperscript{15}. Those who criticized neoliberalism, based their argumentation principally on growing inequality, which was seen as a consequence of free trade system and selfishness of especially public leaders to use common resources equally.

\begin{flushright}
“Unfavourable trade system, which does not encourage fair competition...Misuse of national resources.”\textsuperscript{16}
“The gap (between those who live well and those who do not) is growing due to the following reasons: Non adherence to leadership codes and ethics, the effects of free market which have limited the role of the state in socio-economic affairs.”\textsuperscript{17}
\end{flushright}

The comments signaled that development of (international) enterprises has brought few local benefits to majority of Tanzanians although entrepreneurship development on grassroots level was considered highly important. Patriotism was seen as an answer to the unfavorable consequences of such acts. Aminzade (2003, 50) argues that neoliberal economic policies have encouraged and even popularized negative feelings towards foreign investors and foreigners in Tanzania.

Consequently, there were many comments on foreign violation of Tanzanian’s trade. The reports showed signs of disappointment regarding international trade policy. Comments such as “lack of a policy protecting local products”\textsuperscript{18} outlined that the market system was seen as inadequate. In general the comments were in favor of free trade policies and

\textsuperscript{15} Western Zone, 10
\textsuperscript{16} Southern Zone, 9
\textsuperscript{17} Lake Zone, 10
\textsuperscript{18} Central Zone, 13
integration with the global economy but carried a connotation that Tanzania had failed to stand up to its national pride and native moral. Due to this it has exposed itself to the negative effects of capitalism and globalization. It was generally believed that Tanzania with its vast natural resources had every possibility to develop to a wealthier nation if only its citizens acknowledged the opportunities the country has to offer and thus take development to their own hands.

“**Ignorance on the part of the society to use available opportunities and national resources for their own development...they had the view that financial institutions have unfriendly policies for people with low income giving an example of where one has to pay back the loan on weekly basis.**”

The main responsibility of these failures was appointed to Tanzanian society and Tanzanian individuals. Generally the responsibility to safeguard adherence to ethical policies was appointed to Tanzanian government. The role of private businesses was rather to provide access to market, not to guard responsibility. Despite the critical comments towards financial institutions, participants generally hoped for continuing future involvement of international development agencies and institutions such as IMF and the World Bank. Reports mentioned especially (international) financial institutions’ role in giving better access to loans for small entrepreneurs.

“**Financial institutions should provide loans with low interest rate; civil society should have basket/social fund (mfuko wa jamii); religious institutions should have social funds (mfuko ya jamii) and to insist on ethical conduct; for political institutions to monitor the implementation of policies.**”

Protection and responsible use of natural resources was also a popular statement that can be connected to patriotism. The statements argued that self-sufficiency in terms of natural resources such as minerals is important in order to develop sustainably and reach economic independence. In connection to this also “traditional way of managing the environment” was brought up. This was not explained further but could be linked to both social and environmental responsibility aspects. Respondents also connected poor management of

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19 Eastern Zone Report, 9
20 Eastern Zone, 11
21 Western Zone, 9
22 Southern Highlands Region, 19
natural resources to foreign privatization. For example, when asked “what are the main reasons why some people do not live well in this country or community?”, the participants of Northern Zone mentioned “Privatization of land to foreign investors, resulting into poor and landless indigenous people who ultimately become mere labourers.”

Although the poor protection of natural resources was mostly linked to international investments, regional inequality in allocation of natural resources was also brought up: “Unequal distribution of resources eg, sources of natural gas in Southern Zone”

The aspect to protect Tanzanian land and other natural resources from foreign exploitation was most likely so clearly present also because it has been a popular topic of news during recent years regarding whole Africa’s vast natural resources. The discourse of patriotism could thus also serve the purpose of shared understanding on claiming back what was lost during the post-socialist structural adjustment policies and massive privatization. This “selling the country”, as it is often referred to (Caplan 2007, 682), appears as a shared feeling to which sentiments of patriotism seem to provide a cure. “Learning from country’s experience” highlights the attitude of doing things differently than during the past post-socialist years. The call for patriotism might also offer something familiar to return to when the socio-economic changes have been so rapid since the 1990s. Recovering from the rapid cultural changes might presume reviving individual identity based on socialism, which still feels natural and safe for many who lived through the ujamaa era.

Ideological arguments of patriotism centered around a shared longing for the past and a moral duty for the nation. “Making Tanzanians proud to be Tanzanians” portrays well the essence of this. For example, the statement “…people were no longer proud of serving their nation honestly” includes a connotation of civic duty and the lost past. Everyone was expected to fulfill his or her national responsibility. This national duty was also connected to indigenous unity. Cultural patriotism was represented with comments on cherishing Tanzanian traditional values and preserving the Kiswahili language. Other concepts that were mentioned several times in relation to nation building were peace and harmony. In my understanding they referred to personal character. Tanzanians are generally known for their calm attitude towards life, which is here also used for reinforcing

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23 Northern Zone, 9  
24 Southern Zone, 10  
25 Western Zone, 11  
26 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, 18  
27 Northern Zone, 8; Central Zone, 18
the discourse of patriotism.

Aminzade (2003) argues in his research on indigenization in post-socialist Tanzania that neoliberal economic policies of the post-socialist period fostered racial and anti-foreign hostility. Yet the ruling CCM was successful in redefining national identity away from race to a land-based definition that contrasts citizens and foreigners (Aminzade 2003, 46). In the consultations too, indigenization is framed with the rhetoric of citizenship rather than race. Cultural conservation is also an essential part of the spirit of ujamaa discourse. As is typical for nation building, these discourses both reinforce national unity by contrasting the nation to certain otherness, here represented by foreign privatization.

6.3 Development as self-help

Most of the statements stressed Tanzanian individual’s role as a change initiator, which provides a basis for the discourse of self-help. This is linked to the call for a more active individual stance towards development. Participants’ comments reflected the idea that if everyone as an individual takes responsibility of the nation’s development, things will change for better. Quoting a statement from Western Zone, “if everyone in his/ her capacity acts responsibly, we shall reach where we want to go, we should be activists of development in all aspects…, it is possible.”

Central to the discourse of self-help is the attitude of hardworking, which is strongly present in the reports. The failure to maintain this attitude is attributed to individuals rather than to government. There seems to prevail a perception that Tanzania’s positive development is only conditional of the citizens’ attitudes.

“If all Tanzanians decide to work hard with the main aim of getting out of poverty by effectively utilizing all the available resources and opportunities; avoid complaints while not doing anything; move away from the “blame game” and looking for excuses for someone’s poverty and hardships; in doing all these, we shall achieve the desired targets.”

“We Tanzanians are not aggressive in our own matters of development. The ones expected to bring about development are not performing their duties as anticipated; so many excuses…We need to change; this should

28 Western Zone, 3
29 Regional Commissioner of Mbeya, Southern Highland Region Report, 2
be the beginning of a strategy to use the opportunities available in the country for the development of our nation.”

“Inculcating a hardworking culture” was also mentioned as an answer to the question of how to achieve decent life. Other reports stated that “People have to work hard among the wananchi (=the ordinary people)” and “young men and women should be encouraged to work hard”. This kind of energy was often contrasted with laziness. Selfishness and laziness (especially of young people) were seen as the main barriers of fulfilling the individual responsibility.

“Young men and women as the active group of the population and the ones expected to bring about development are not performing their duties as anticipated; so many excuses. They spend most of their time not working or on unproductive activities…this custom cannot take the nation anywhere.”

“Build ethical infrastructure and patriotism among youths; good education that provide skills among youths for them to understand the environment (i.e. education for self-reliance).”

Also comments “young men spend most of their time on non-productive activities such as drug abuse” and “social/group behaviour such as substance abuse, drunkards during the day, youths running away from rural to urban areas” depict the general impression of the comments that there exists the darker side of life, which has to be abolished under the way of true development. Yet there were no solutions given for the social problems other than the attitude of self-help. Participants did not acknowledge the government institutions’ role in answering to the social problems. Individual problems were seen as individually solved. Consequently, discussion of for example the possible mitigating role of education system to social problems was lacking. Inability to change was connected especially to laziness and the effect of the current troubled times. The certain black-and-white thinking on development in this context was evident. The comments pictured a harsh attitude towards social problems such as drinking and unemployment. The data seemed to reflect the idea that social problems in general are an indication of the nation’s development failure.

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30 Western Zone, 3
31 Southern Zone, 12
32 Eastern Zone, 13
33 Western Zone, 9
34 Western Zone, 3
35 Eastern Zone, 13
36 Southern Highlands Region, 20
Discussion that would regard them as a natural part of a society, developed or developing, was lacking. This was further confirmed by the reports’ emphasis of *change of mindset* as an important factor for solving the problem of poverty. This change of mindset is discussed further under the discourse of spirit of Ujamaa.

Caplan (2007, 690) discusses how in post-socialist Tanzania the rhetoric of equality is replaced by rhetoric of empowerment. Similarly the reports reflect a move from communal to individualistic values and hence individual responsibility. It seems that individual responsibility is seen as the best pathway to reach national common interests as well. This could also serve as a method of the government to hand more responsibilities to private businesses, investors and NGOs and diminish its role and responsibility as a change agent and service provider.

Since local government officials formed a majority of the consulted persons in some of the zones and together with CSO representatives formed majority of all respondents, the reports could be seen as representing especially governmental views on development and thus hiding the general views of beneficiaries. Green (2000, 78) notes that Tanzanian government has tried shifting the responsibility of development to rural communities for a long time. Rural populations consider that the state is responsible for development, yet government has promoted ideology of self-help and ‘kujitolea’ (give yourself out) in terms of local projects and financial contributions. (Green 2000, 78.) The fact that underdevelopment is blamed for laziness or cultural factors portray the state in a light of progress to which rural citizens are incapable of responding. Rather than looking at the local resource constraints, development in self-help discourse is attributed to locals who are portrayed as already possessing everything needed to develop. Contradictory statements in the national report support this. It mentions, “Not all actors in the sector, especially small farmers, are well placed in capitalizing on the opportunities.” In a sense the discourse thus supports small farmers. Yet on the same page, the national report states that “…enhancing the role of private sector to spur agricultural growth is important in order to increase investments” and that “interventions have to be prioritized”\(^37\). The following development solutions given are solely technical attributes such as improving agricultural technology to reduce generic risks. The main challenges of smallholder

\(^{37}\) National Post-MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: On CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, xii
farmers, which are linked especially to institutional layout of the agricultural sector, are dismissed. This points to the difficulty of the disadvantaged to meaningfully influence their development when the underlying causes for their unequal opportunities to participate are not discussed. It seems paradoxical that citizens are given to understand that the problem of underdevelopment is mostly in their inability to respond to the given opportunities when in reality these given opportunities are situated within a pre-determined and by offset unjust development ideology.

In self-help discourse, the reports emphasized citizen’s responsibility to demand and be aware of one’s rights: “All members of the society should start to be accountable – and should play their part to demand for their rights and participate fully in the socio-economic-political processes in their respective areas.”

Inadequate self-awareness was understood as a barrier for claiming one’s economic and political rights. Especially CSOs were granted the role of awareness-raising. They were seen as a kind of watchdog to guard that citizens realize their responsibilities and rights to act also in political arenas. Some comments even mandated CSOs a role to define the right political direction for Tanzania: “CSOs should encourage people to vote for the right candidates/leaders.”

A “then and now” contradiction, typical to the ujamaa nostalgia, was strongly present in the self-help discourse. This is also related to the concept of age; mostly young people were blamed for laziness and failure to carry their burden of the shared responsibility. “Anti-work spirit among the youths” and “Train young people to be accountable” depicted that young people had not managed to take the individual responsibility granted to them. This is closely related to the Spirit of Ujamaa discourse covered under the following subchapter.

Economic responsibility was understood as a combination of government’s incentives and individuals’ actions. A comment “Individuals need to work hard in order to increase production” carries the assumption that productivity is about hard work. Yet reducing inflation and increase of prices for basic needs and agricultural equipment was granted to

38 Southern Highlands Region, 5
39 Southern Highlands Region, 5
40 Lake Zone, 17
41 Western Zone, 9
42 Lake Zone, 16
government’s responsibility. Also comments that education system should focus on self-employment and self-reliance support the view that responsibility to cover economic needs belongs at foremost to individuals rather than to private businesses or governments.43

Both LGA-groups and CSO-groups highlighted hard working and individual responsibility as attributes of development although these words appeared slightly more often in LGA comments than in CSO representatives’ comments. This could indicate government officials’ stronger emphasis on citizens’ responsibility in contrast to CSOs stronger emphasis on government’s responsibility. Yet the comments in general portrayed a picture of an active citizen who should by nature be willing to participate in social, economic and political arenas. The current donor preoccupations stress active citizenship and community participation. Problematic with this donor-driven idea is that it takes as self-evident that people want to participate due to altruistic motivations. Yet, majority of Tanzanians, the rural poor, have multiple motives to participate that are often linked foremost to desperate needs rather than responsibility to the state or community (Robins et al 2008, 1078.) The model of liberal democracy as understood in Western politics cannot be contextualized as such to Tanzanian post-socialist setting. In doing so, this discourse limits from seeing the politics of everyday, the multiple ways of how people take part in the local arenas and exercise their voice. To behave like a citizen, means a different thing for a rural poor than an urban middle-class representative. The comments raised to the consultation reports did not discuss other arenas than direct politics for (political) participation and active citizenship and thus duplicate a biased understanding of participation and citizenship. For example patron relationships and networks in informal sector cover multiple modes of participation that if acknowledged, could expand the discussion of development considerably.

6.4. “Unlike in the past” - Development as spirit of Ujamaa

“A significant decline in social values in society has been observed. During discussions with stakeholders, the prevailing view that the current Tanzanian society is characterized by many ills, such as selfishness, lack of forbearance and adherence to the rule of law, poor accountability and integrity. A moral decay is wide spread, even at

43 Southern Highland Region, 20; Southern Zone, 10
The discourse of spirit of Ujamaa could be described as a romanticized view of Tanzania’s socialist past. These kinds of comments referred to ideological attributes of development that draw their justification of Nyerere’s politics and African socialism and are thus highly politically biased. According to the abandonment of traditional values mentioned in the comment above the nation has experienced a general decay in moral which is seen as a major restriction for Tanzania’s future development. The romanticized past is powerfully contrasted with the brutally painted present. The National Post MDG’s Development Agenda Consultation Report lists lack of moral ethics and social values among the major impoverishing factors that came out during the consultations. The spirit of Ujamaa discourse was strong among all the consulted groups and throughout the reports.

This discourse is constructed on ideal elements of development that ultimately miss a concrete road map to the desired state. Aspired transformation stands for attitude of self-development, culture of hard-working, helpful social values, moral ethics, community development, self-confidence, commitment and spirit of self-reliance. The spirit of Ujamaa is closely related to the other discourses, which all emphasize “Making Tanzanians proud to be Tanzanians”. However, for this discourse the emphasis is especially on a past-present contradiction, in order to “regain the former attitude of mind” that Nyerere emphasized.

As is typical to the socialist-flavored argumentation of the reports, many of the reasons are built on nostalgia. As discussed previously, nostalgia is a kind of safety net for people to live with the present moment where changes are difficult to predict and development is more like a chain of discontinuities than a linear transformation. The respondents talked about loss of social values, which can be connected to loss of sense of community and loss of social cohesion. Discourse of spirit of Ujamaa longs for a past that is a reconstruction of past versus present rather than an account of the real past. The discourse also makes a statement that the transition to privatization and individual values have created an environment where corruption has intensified and short-cuts to development are popular. A return to the old spirit of Ujamaa would thus bring back the mutual responsibility although as described in chapter 4 corruption was flourishing extensively during the CCM socialism.

44 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, xi
The unequal development of Tanzania was connected to state’s diminished role in the economy. Inequality was stated to be “increasing mainly due of capitalist system of economy.”45 The consequences of this included for example ‘privatization of land to foreign investors resulting into poor and landless indigenous people who ultimately become mere labourers.’46 Rights (or the lack of them) of the indigenous people were mentioned in connection to privatization, selfishness and lack of patriotism. Rather than blaming the government for the neoliberal changes, the criticism was appointed more towards current economic system, or in other comments, individuals’ greed or lack of civic education. Some participants perceived the global economy and free trade as the main cause for rising inequality, which had consequently diminished government’s service provision. In the foreword of the National Post MDGs’ Agenda Consultation Report it is stated:

“The salaried group or people with assured income are pitted against small-scale farmers, pastoralists, small-scale fishermen and petty traders. The pointers to factors fueling inequality were the effects of free trade system, which has limited the state intervention in facilitating access to basic services such as health and education. Under the latter, for example, it was pointed out that the policy of establishing privately owned schools and the public schools (PEDP and SEDP) has widened inequality. Indeed there was yerning for the Arusha Declaration.47”

The consequences of neoliberal free trade system were seen particularly harmful for the poor. This thinking was linked to negative effects of globalization. As the following comment shows, the poor were in some statements pictured as drifting objects in the global economic change, who passively respond to economic changes taking place in their local environment and seem to have no chance to actively influence these changes.

“They also thought of globalization where the use of telephones has made people to use their money unproductively, the use of ATM has made it easy for people to take and use their money and the charges involved etc. they had the view that even financial institution have unfriendly policies for people with low income giving an example of where one has to pay back the loan on weakly basis.”48

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45 Western Zone, 10
46 Northern Zone, 9
47 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, vi
48 Eastern Zone, 9
Consequently, in addition to globalization bringing about negative development, also the citizens themselves were portrayed as unaware of their best interests. Globalized economy and increased technology were perceived as positive if only people received education on how to live with them.

“If people were told in advance the costs involved in owning a mobile phone, few people would buy one on the reasons that they are costly to manage and thus causing more poverty.”

Spirit of Ujamaa discourse includes traces of seeing the poor as passive, uneducated and incapable of protecting themselves from the distorted economy. The government’s role is pictured as strongly paternal. In this portrayal the government operates as an institutional moral example for citizens’ behaviour. In the midst of the changes in global development climate and global economy, the government can provide a solid anchor to turn to, a promoter of right kind of development. Also comments of “proper raising of children at family level” and “civic education is insufficient to raise self-esteem among the youth” promote a patronizing way of thinking of the poor, which is typical to the Ujamaa-ideology. These comments also underline the meaning of age for the discourse. Laziness and ignorance are attributes more often related to young people and to modern life.

This ideology gives a moral example for citizens, yet, as the following statements shows the responsibility of development lays particularly on individual transformation of mindset.

“The negative developmental mindset was frequently mentioned in the workshops, and has also been mentioned in various national policy frameworks such as the TDV 2025 document. During discussions with stakeholders there was still an overall perception that most Tanzanians have negative development mindset attitudes, which need seriously addressing. They pointed several examples of negative mindset, including: a dependency syndrome whereby citizens expect everything to be provided by the government, political leaders and/or by donors, instead of working hard and cherishing self-reliance; lack of seriousness, commitment and accountability at work; and some people desiring to develop and move out of poverty through ‘shortcuts’.”

49 Eastern Zone, 12
50 Southern Highlands Region, 19
51 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, 26
52 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups,
The comment above portrays government as trying to do its best while citizens settle for complaining. The transformation constructed in the spirit of Ujamaa -discourse emphasizes personal commitment of Tanzanians to adopt a new kind of culture where they as citizens carry the main responsibility of their own development and of the country’s development. On one hand, the lack of moral ethics is discussed extensively in the context of current society and Tanzanians seem to perceive that their current leaders eat national resources. Yet this corruption is linked more to individuals rather than to government as a corrupted institution as such. Politicians were accused for making great promises to the people that were never fulfilled. This was considered as further increasing the negative mindset among citizens. Corruption and taking short-cuts to development bore an underlying idea of individuality as a negative concept. Also, when government was to blame, its failures were in some part explained with individuals’ flight from responsibility.

“Instead of being instilled to work hard to achieve their development, people have adopted a culture of waiting for the politicians to fulfill their election promises.”

As discussed in 4.3, it is difficult to clearly point out the line between the state and the ruling party. To which extent this is seeable in the responses of the participants’ stays unclear yet the discourse of spirit of Ujamaa is strongly related to CCM’s ideology. Also, as further discussed under 6.7. the need for a transformative mindset and return to traditional values is stated in the national development plans, which logically influences the topic gaining such high priority also in the post-2015 consultations. Because political and cultural spheres mix in this ideology, it could be that arguments supporting the spirit of Ujamaa -discourse are part of larger political rhetoric that aims at building social cohesion among Tanzanians and thus ensuring the party leadership. Although the political orientation of the participants is not stated it is obvious that especially the LGA-representatives have connections to CCM that affect their discursive formations and accordingly reflect in their responses.

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53 National Post MDG’s Development Agenda Consultation Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, 43
6.5. Development as good governance

“A question was raised by the Consultant that good governance was one of the issues which featured high in the groups presentation (almost all groups). However, as was made clear in one of the presentations, that good governance is a broad concept, which encompasses transparency, leadership, accountability, among others.”

Good governance was mentioned in many of the reports as one of the most important attributes of development. Similar to its definition in international development policy, it was explained as state’s capacity to deliver development and was connected to for example transparency, leadership, appropriate and equitable use of public resources, corruption and service provision. Especially comments on leadership and anti-corruption played an indispensable role in defining good governance. Also moral decay was once again brought up in this context.

“Participants argued that leadership plays a significant role on good governance. Participants recommended that: the management must be accountable; there must be strict laws and good machinery that will ensure that the laws in place are adhered to by those in power or the leadership/management. All leaders must adhere to the laws, whoever does not; he/she must be legally responsible for failing to stick on the laws.”

“As a result of weak policies, the society suffers from weak accountability framework and enforcement, leading to widespread corruption practices, decay in moral and ethics.”

Good governance is one of the most well known hegemonic concepts in international development policy as discussed in 3.2. It is a concept often separated from politics in order to discuss democracy as an absolute value in itself and dissociate development assistance from political aspirations. Yet in development policy it is often linked to a neoliberal understanding of regime where civil society and representatives of national and international capital collaborate neutrally in synergy (Schuurman 2000, 16). This neutrality is an essential element of good governance in its hegemonic understanding. The familiarity of good governance in international development policy such as the Paris Declaration and

54 Western Zone, 15
55 Western Zone, 15
56 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, 24
the following MDG process might also have driven it to the top of the consultation topics. Good governance is a familiar concept that is easy to relate to whether as a representative of government, private sector or the civil society. Also the neutral manner in which good governance is framed in international development policy makes it an easy topic to discuss in the midst of Tanzanian highly politicized and corrupted governance structure.

However, the term is not as self-explanatory as it first seems. The discourse of good governance reflects several aspects. It communicates with the internationally recognized discourse of good governance and the expectations of donors. Yet, particularly when discussed by the civil society representatives, it indicated a strong disappointment towards the current political system in Tanzania and is built on distinct Tanzanian representations of governance.

As mentioned in the previous discourses, there were differences in who was to take leadership of Tanzania’s development. Compared to a larger consensus across the consulted groups in the other discourses, there were however considerable differences between the LGA and the CSO responses in terms of how good governance was framed. CSO representatives attributed much of the failures of current state of development to irresponsible leaders on both central and local level of governance. Also shortage of capacity to monitor the finances was mentioned as part of the problem:

“Regions be given more power to supervise LGAs because most of the money is used wrongly in development plans” 57
“The same people who are preaching about rule of law, there are the same people to break the laws.” 58

The previous comments are examples of the many comments of corruption given in the reports. They indicate a strengthened political resistance towards corruption and current political leadership. “Greed for wealth involving decision makers and bureaucrats” 59 was to be tackled with a stronger national pride and therefore adherence to rule of law. The lack of rule of law maintains obscure private ownership and provides an attractive framework to operate for those with economic and political power. I discuss the role of good governance further in chapter 6.5.

57 Eastern Zone Report, 4
58 Western Zone, 22
59 Lake Zone, 10; Central Zone, 15
There seems to prevail a disappointment towards the long-standing corruption and mistrust towards the governance. The corruptive activities were also connected to political aims. CSOs raised the issue of political interference in several comments and wanted to make a clear distinction between political objectives and development policy. This separation was surprisingly strong; instead of discussing democratic politics as an element of good governance, the civil society participants framed national policies fully outside of national politics:

“Good governance, having long-term plans, end corruption, the government to set priorities to reduce expenses, to differentiate national policies from party policies.”

“National policies should be implemented and not be more politicized; investments should be allowed on condition that it benefits the indigenous.”

In addition, when the civil society participants were asked about the aspects that needed to be protected, they further emphasized governance as separate from political participation: “specialists should not be allowed to enter into politics”. They saw that development policy should and could be implemented neutrally and kept pure from any political connotations. This separation is understandable considering the disappointments towards the corrupted governance structure and the political reach of CCM associated with it. As discussed in chapter 4, cultural practices and political power structures are still very much present in daily lives of Tanzanian communities. The party regime reaches many parts of the society and political affiliations of local governmental officers are acknowledged among the citizens. They thus have a reason to feel that policies are defined outside of their influence. However, denying politics from the discourse creates an unrealistic image of governance by ignoring aspects that direct individuals’ behaviour and decision-making; decisions are always based on socio-culturally and politically informed knowledge and belief systems. The fact that politics is brought up at all could however also be a sign of change in the openness and interest towards political discussion. Typical to socialist period, Tanzanians have not extensively challenged the political demands coming from above and political discussion has been low or absent. This is also related to the dependency syndrome discussed in 6.2. Also elite caption of political representation has

60 Southern Highlands Region, 19
61 Eastern Zone, 9
62 Southern Highlands Region, 19
rather driven ordinary people away from political arenas because of fighting against it has not led to notable changes (Hoffman 2013, 8). Arguing for the complete separation of politics and governance might be a sign of increased civil interest towards politics and development policy.

The neoliberal shift and its effect on governance aroused differing opinions. An example of conflicting views in success and failures of governance came up in Western Zone’s consultation where participants raised the issue of why health care services are not provided as required.

“Attached to the issue of governance, a clarification was sought as to why in some places health care services are not provided as required. For example patients are told that medications are not available in the health facilities thus get them from pharmacies. There were mixed feelings from the participants. Some of the participants contributed by saying that this problem cannot be solved until when there will be equal distribution of income across groups. Others were of the opinion that this problem is associated with increase of use of health facilities in recent years. This is due to the fact that knowledge of use of modern or professional treatment has increased among the people.”

As the text above shows, some interpreted the increase in prices as a failure of governance to strive for equality and some saw this as a natural effect of improved health services. This data example supports the view of conflicting reactions to present structure of governance. It is directly linked to the neoliberal shift in Tanzanian health policy. It could be argued that services are in place but access to them has not been ensured. During socialism healthcare was free for users although the level of facilities cannot be compared to present. With neoliberal policies the state has withdrawn from many social sectors particularly from healthcare, which is consequently still largely managed by donor community (Caplan 2007, 681, 687). For villagers privatization has thus had direct effects on for example (in)equality of health rights.

The LGAs discussed governance mostly as an apolitical term, typical to the predominant global framing. They saw leadership primarily as a family and societal responsibility. For example, when the participants were asked what should be done to enable future generations to live well, the LGA representatives’ responses did not directly acknowledge

63 Western Zone, 15-16
politics:

“Good governance, to make tangible and progressive plans that focus on priorities that caters across all members of the society... Proper raising of children at family level, good leadership within the society, strong supervision and administration of the set policies.”

As the comment shows, LGAs did not define good governance in purely technical terms either. They rather saw good governance equivalent to good leadership, which was to be spread to all levels of the society, starting from proper values on household level. This communes with the ujamaa spirit and moral responsibility of individuals as shown in the previous discourses. Instead of linking good governance to a responsible and accountable government per se, the LGAs thus understood it more broadly as a societal and individual responsibility outside of the state’s control. Denying politics’ effect on governance and seeing it purely as ‘administration of set policies’ does not depict the reality considering the continuing influence of CCM on all levels of the post-socialist Tanzania. However, this can also refer to the post-socialist capacity building mentioned in 6.2. and the government’s quest for disseminating responsibility to the community level.

Another aspect in this regard is the shortage of discussion on governance understood as citizens’ capacity to affect governance. A recent study shows that Tanzania scores weakly on measures of capacity of citizens’ to affect policy processes such as citizens’ budget or access to information law (Hoffman 2013, 6). Consequently citizens often look for channels of influence elsewhere than in official sphere as was discussed in chapter 4.4. It might be that LGAs avoid the topic on purpose or that good governance is simply not understood in a holistic manner that would include increasing citizens’ participation rights in policy making. Capacity building seems to be regarded mostly as technical assistance. Articulating clearly what improvements governance should undergo is missing in both LGA and CSO comments. This might also be a consequence of the top-down tradition, which has led to Tanzanians rather agreeing to demands from above than challenging them. Participation opportunities outside the official sphere and ‘politics of everyday’ as a channel of influence are not considered in this discourse. Power, or the lack of it, is not acknowledged. This reasserts the normative model of democracy as promoted by the UN and Tanzanian government.

64 Southern Highlands Region, 19
The post-socialist culture that still bears a strong respect for hierarchy is most likely also among the reasons for some of the citizens to feel that those who implement policies must first have political roles through which they may then be given the responsibility to influence policy implementation. Green (2010, 29) states that rather than purely organizing resources, local governance in post-socialist Tanzania is about articulating hierarchical relations. Status can still be regarded as a significant thing per se.

“Another Severine Mtitu was of the view that the people do not complain of their problems because the village and ward executives behave like semi-gods in their areas and instead, when the DC or RC comes that’s when the problems are aired out. The executives call themselves governors, presidents of wards and villages therefore the people can not ask anything.”

When looking below the surface, the Tanzanian good governance discourse is not only criticism towards national politics and corruption. As the theory underlined, state’s capacity in a post-socialist context is often understood more as the representation of government authority as such than as development operations’ effectiveness. Consultation comments seemed to support this view.

6.6. Hegemonic struggles and transformative aspects in the Tanzanian post-2015 discourses

To proceed in my analysis this chapter answers to my second research question: “to what extent the discourses sustain hegemonic or provide transformative development views?”. Returning to my theoretical background, my definition for hegemony is based on theoretical constructions of scholars such as Nederveen (2000), Rist (1997) and Worth (2011). They describe the current global development hegemony as the neoliberal ‘common-sense’, which is institutionalized in a number of organizations. With this neoliberal development ideology I have in this study specifically referred to its manifestation in the UN, the only truly global normative forum for development. The current hegemonic worldview thus produces and maintains a specific image of development driven by a growth-centered model. Also the space for citizens’ participation

65 Eastern Zone, 23
is prominently narrowed to the world order of neoliberalism and therefore civil society’s priorities and participation in policy formulation have not been fulfilled on any previous global development agenda. Therefore, I have looked whether the consultations in Tanzania replicate the current hegemonic worldview or provide new insights that can genuinely be considered as transformative and participatory both ideologically and in terms of how they regard the role of civil society. Also the global development discussion on the need to move away from poverty talk to inequality talk is closely linked to the participation discussion and its transformative potential.

I have mainly concentrated on elements of change in ideals and ideology. This has been an informed choice due to the nature of the data. The reports and the consulted persons have not defined development in a detailed or methodical manner. This is typical to the nature of policy papers. They serve rather as a wish list for desired development than a detailed roadmap of how to get to the preferred finish line.

Before discussing transformative potential, I have first strived to clarify whose ideas the consultation reports stand for: hegemonic views of the elite or holistic views that reveal realities of everyday life of the majority and the disadvantaged. Based on the fact that civil society representatives and vulnerable groups formed a minority of the consulted groups while local government authorities dominated all zonal consultations, it is obvious that the responses do not represent a balanced view of the society. Because of the LGA dominance, it is likely that at least some of these chosen participants hold a somewhat significant position in their community. One cannot therefore regard their position and connections in the community as separate from their statements. Personal, economic and political positions in the local sphere naturally affect participants’ comments. This follows the hegemonic logic where policy papers present governmental positions as general views. Also the fact that the consultations have been based on invitation directly creates inequalities. Such invitation-based consultations are likely to produce informative rather than genuinely transformative discourses. In addition, although the UN has financially supported the creation of the reports, they have been collected by the ESRF and thus represent and serve the policy-making of Tanzania. It is thus questionable whether other discourses may even come to fore and contest hegemonic belief systems if the consultation reports serve directly the policy-making of the government of Tanzania. Hegemonic discourses are likely to appear first in the discussion and guide what issues come to mind.
and are held as justifiable especially if the consulted persons are aware of prevailing national and international development agendas.

The responses included criticism of neoliberal structure of the economy such as globalization and international trade system but also comments supporting neoliberalism such as demand for individual responsibility and empowering the private sector. Critical comments were also directed towards corrupted governance and general lack of accountability on both individual and governmental level. This indicates that regardless of the unbalanced representation of all groups, the consultations have taken place under a seemingly open atmosphere and have provoked lively and fairly critical discussions on the failures and right tracks of development. That being said, I believe that the political ideology is more dominant in the reports than what it would be were the representation of LGAs lower.

When interpreting the data, I looked both the explicit and implicit use of transformation. The direct references to transformation discussed mainly three issues: technological transformation, economic transformation and “transformative mindset”. The former two concepts refer to increasing investments, developing Tanzania’s infrastructure and modernizing trade markets. Through these Tanzania wishes to align itself with the global economy. This transformation thus represents a purely economic change. The comments of transformative mindset hold the idea that finding the right track for development is dependant on renewing communities’ value basis, thus referring to the ujamaa ideology. Both of these conceptions of transformation are therefore very different from that of my theoretical definition. A truly transformative change is something that challenges the prevailing order, stems from the civil society and aims for an inclusive change. The consultations’ demand for transformative mindset is not related to citizens’ participation space and is not therefore a statement for social change. Having defined the explicit use of transformation, I concentrated to more discreet references. I specifically looked how the identified discourses build, maintain or challenge identities and institutions. I also looked for differences between the identified discourses; whether some stressed neoliberalism and the UN policy basis more and whether Tanzanian socialism was more prominent in others. In addition, the framing of citizenship and participation outside a truly enabling environment was an issue I paid attention to when assessing the level or space of transformation.
The discourse of *patriotism* based its argumentation on national pride, indigenous rights, and a responsibility to save the nation. It appealed to individuals’ moral duty. This morality was emphasized throughout the discourses. In one comment for example, villages were described as exercising patriotism when participating in development programs and using the state-given finances responsibly. This indicates that at least according to government officials, responsibility of national development belongs first and foremost to individual and village levels. The discourse reflected a thought that villagers owe their involvement in development to the nation. The discourse also included a general disappointment towards international financial institutions and their ignorant treatment of Tanzania in global economic policies. Similarly, this poor treatment extended to Tanzanian natural resources, which were seen as internationally exploited and privatized without a fair negotiation or compensation to the indigenous. As mentioned earlier, Tanzanian nationality has been formed on the basis of national politics, not the other way round. The patriotism discourse still calls for a restored national pride of the good old socialist times. The concept of participation understood as citizens’ responsibility to the nation, has not changed remarkably at least among the consulted Tanzanians. Thus, also the discourse of patriotism rather reinforces than challenges Tanzanians’ identity as being built on highly political connotations.

Also the discourse of *self-help* based its argumentation on loyalty to the community, individual responsibility and dignity. Moral and authority were used for legitimizing also this discourse. Along with community values, self-help emphasized citizens’ self-initiative and individual hard work somewhat more than the other discourses. Neoliberal hegemony was thus stronger in this discourse than in the others. Engaging oneself in entrepreneurship was justified with national responsibility, thus overlapping with the argumentation used for the other discourses. The comments of self-help discourse reflect a social change, which is related to change of mindset and citizens’ empowerment. It is therefore highly slanted towards neoliberal understanding of individuality and the economic responsibility of individuals and communities. It also reinforces Nyerere’s ideology of villages being themselves responsible for their development. Social differentiation and equality were pictured more as individual choices rather than governmental acts. It seems paradoxical that success was seen as primarily individual act that did not have much to do with sharing the success for common good and yet failure was linked primarily to social problems.
affectioning the success/failure of the whole nation. Those doing well were not responsible for the nation to the same extent than were those who did not succeed. Yet, as I argued in chapter 4.5., studies have shown that ordinary people consider the government more responsible for its citizens’ situation than what official statements often reveal. Similarly their lived realities do not often meet with what is being said or written in national dialogues. I argue that the discourse of self-help is biased towards national ideology and that not many of the poor would relate to the kind of development it represents. This is also supported by previous research on government’s different perceptions on its responsibilities and state of development in oppose to grassroots’ experiences of everyday life.

Compared to the other discourses, socialist past was strongest in the discourse of spirit of ujamaa. It seemed to provide a moral framework that guided the moral self-development of present. This ujamaa spirit that offered leadership for the nation and safeguarded Tanzanian moral values shows how discourses integrate people for a defined common good. The shared feeling of a moral gap might indicate Tanzanians questioning their identity as a nation and as individuals. Moral personhood has lived rapid changes from ujamaa times to present, which can cause confusion for both individual and national identity. Spirit of ujamaa provides national cohesion that can be justified as especially important now that the new development agenda is being formulated. Possibly as a consequence of failures in meeting the MDGs on time, it was felt even stronger that a shared vision based on traditional values was essential for any new development agenda to succeed. The spirit of ujamaa discourse offers a way to recontextualize neoliberal policy in Tanzanian economy and politics. Therefore, cultural and political spheres are still heavily constructed on socialist values even if neoliberal values lead economic decision-making.

The discourse of good governance showed more signs of transformative potential of the civil society. Differences in the answers between LGAs and CSO representatives were more distinct than in the other discourses. LGAs seemed to understand governance as serving apolitical interests of the society and responding to resource needs. In global development policy, governance is often framed as purely rational management needed to support national strategies for poverty reduction. This logic was used in the consultations too. Some of the reports mentioned that the opening speeches by Guest of Honors or Regional Commissioners urged the participants to abandon political talk and concentrate
on the issue at hand. In the Southern Zone, the opening speaker insisted that “the workshop is not a political forum; therefore criticizing and blaming the government or any political party wouldn’t save the purpose of the workshop”. This might at first seem like a logical and acceptable tactic to boost a fruitful discussion among participants. Yet, it is a very straightforward separation of politics from development as if they would serve different purposes. Consequently, this carries the assumption that it is possible, and desirable, to bring about development outside the political realm. My theoretical background also supports this; regional politicians still pertinently separate politics from development and of civil society’s contribution. Turning a blind eye towards political aspects of governance might hinder from getting to the root causes of corruption. Yet this certain vagueness of good governance is most likely one of the reasons for its popularity. In corrupted governance structures it may have potential to be politically accepted only when it is not coupled with specific definition by the civil society.

The CSO comments discussed the connection of politics and corruption and thus provided transformative aspects to the discourse. They mentioned the grand corruption scandals of recent past. The National Post MDG’s Development Agenda Consultation Report stated, “there were feelings that actions taken so far have not been sufficient”. CSOs constructed an image of governance, in which citizens are not merely targets but also actors of development. They are pictured as not only contractors of existing governance structures but also as change initiators. According to research CCM is slowly challenged by other parties especially CHADEMA (Hoffman 2013, 7). Even though the discourses I have identified are heavily biased towards a specific post-socialist ideology and its by-products such as symbolic power and top-down governance, especially the discourse of good governance indicates a growing potential of the opposition to challenge the prevailing.

The implementation of the post-2015 agenda will show whether these signs of strengthening civil society can really turn into practical changes in national development. This applies to the overall transformation of the ideological basis. Uncovering the mechanisms by which the current hegemonic order is sustained presupposes change in both the possibilities that the government offers and in the motivation of the civil society to strengthen political advocacy towards the current system.

In terms of increasing inclusion, the consultations did not provide clear signs of going
beyond the MDGs and responding to its fallbacks. The reports mostly related civil society to citizens’ actions in the formal economic sphere. Yet comments on informal sector were few and did not discuss its vast potential for the nation’s economic development. The reports mentioned the need to transform informal sector to a formal one but did not argue how. Yet, the informal sector is estimated to contribute as much as 48 percent of Tanzania’s GDP (IPP Media 2013). Mentioning it on such a vague level does not indicate of a clear will to actively tackle the issue. The troubles with inclusion regarding the development agenda are however discussed fairly openly in the national report. It admits the general lack of grassroots consultations regarding Tanzanian policy formulation. Such an acknowledgement is a positive starting point for any further policy discussion on inclusion.

“Participation and inclusiveness remain elusive despite the efforts under MDG era: Even though there is acknowledgement that something is being done (by the Government), participation of the local people has remained weak. Several policies and interventions which have bearing on the communities have been decided without involving people at the grassroots.”

How do the identified discourses then align with the global post-2015 discussion? As mentioned in the discourse of patriotism, the national consultations did not seem to regard the new agenda’s connection to the global post-2015 agenda very relevant. Also Tanzania’s identities as a donor darling and an LDC were not mentioned among the consulted even though they can deliberately affect how Tanzanians discuss development and how they understand terms such as participation and empowerment. This might indicate of the change in national development policies, which have already for some time been directed towards ‘modern’ understanding of development partnerships, namely the financial and geopolitical involvement of rising economies such as China and the heavily industrial aspirations.

The transformative potential of the national consultation reports is centered on similar aspirations that global civil society reflects. For quite some time the global civil society has

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66 National Post MDGs’ Development Agenda Consultations Report: CSOs, LGAs and Vulnerable Groups, 25
demanded for a change to the prevailing development policy. It has stressed a need to move away from poverty talk to inequality talk. The core of the global agenda should be based on shared responsibilities, sustainability, equality and participatory approach. Equality and participation were considered central for Tanzania even though they rise from different ‘situated meanings’ and cultural understandings than what international development policy promotes. Skepticism towards economic growth that has not been realized in better living conditions for the grassroots echoed the inequality concerns of the ordinary people. Global emphasis on sustainability and structural changes were to a large extent missing from the Tanzanian discourses. Even if sustainability was mentioned economic growth had more importance. If the new global agenda is to tackle causes instead of symptoms of poverty and inequality the discussion on national levels should give significantly more attention for structural inequalities.

6.7. Conclusions in regard to the identified discourses

The following table summarizes the discourses that I have identified in the data. Alongside their content I have added a column that shows how the discourses have been constructed, that is, what are argumentation and legitimization based on. The last column depicts hegemonic and transformative shades found in each of the discourses.

Table 3. Overview of the development discourses identified in the reports

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Identified Discourses</th>
<th>Content of the Discourse</th>
<th>Construction of the Discourse</th>
<th>Hegemonic and transformative elements</th>
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<td>Participatory neoliberalism (main discourse)</td>
<td>Integrating market-based development with specific national attributes: participation as an individual commitment, balance between past, present</td>
<td>Context-bound argumentation Building consent on traditional values: importance of past political elements such as status and national</td>
<td>Change seen mostly as neoliberal transformation; call for a more inclusive economic development, participation understood as a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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and future, “sorting the wheat from the chaff”

| Self-help | Individuals as change initiators  
| Hard working culture  
| Individual responsibility | Argumentation based on loyalty to the community, communal individualism and dignity. | Change for better predominantly an individual initiative, the discourse reflects mostly the ideology of official statements, yet Tanzanians can easily relate to the socialist tradition of self-help |

| Patriotism | Ensuring ownership of the development agenda by Tanzanians  
| Tanzania as a powerful and naturally rich; protecting national resources  
| Developing as one  
| Unity and harmony | Appeals to national pride, feelings of belonging, indigenous rights, saving the country  
| Collective identity maintained through patriotism | Transforming the economic development to benefit the nation, gathering the fruits of neoliberalism. |

| Spirit of ujamaa | Regaining traditional social values.  
| Spirit of ujamaa as a cure for the ‘ills’ of the society | Promoting celebrated past in contrast to present hardships of global neoliberalism and individualism. | Strong socialist connotations, social(istic) cohesion as a safety belt towards global changes. |

| Good governance | Different aspects between LGAs and CSO representatives. | A well-known policy concept; appeals to donors and investors, | Strongest signs of authentic voices of the grassroots compared |
A blend of technical, apolitical and ideological aspects. Responds to a normative model of democracy promoted by the UN. Traditional governance structure appreciates authority over effectiveness. Will to tackle corruption and bring about political change also strong.

moral responsibility to develop as expected by the donor community. Legitimization also based on moral: calling for a clear separation between politics and governance, notion of moral decay.

to the other discourses: criticism towards current political and corruptive governance structure. Yet, also echoes the normative understanding of good governance → complies with the international hegemony of development policy. No critical reflections of the empowerment of civil society.

The main discourse, participatory neoliberalism, holds attributes from the past socialist period and the still ongoing neoliberal change. The main discourse includes a strong sense of individual responsibility yet also a longing for community, which is why participation is a central concept when constructing the present base for development. The following sub-discourses, self-help, patriotism, spirit of ujamaa and good governance open up the shared feelings of holding to the traditions while embracing the future development opportunities such as taking advantage of Tanzania’s vast natural resources. The table depicts that most of the attributes used for constructing and validating the discourses are based on moral. A shared responsibility towards Tanzania’s development is strong. The argumentation is therefore highly ideological. In regard to the transformative elements, the table depicts that strongest elements of change stemming from the grassroots can be spotted in the discourse of good governance. Also as mentioned, inclusion of the civil society was not brought under a critical discussion.
7. CONCLUSIONS

The principal aim of my thesis was to understand how Tanzanian development discourses are built and how they resonate with the global post-2015 movement. This chapter summarizes, how hegemonic development theories echoed in the identified discourses. I will also give thought to the significance of these national post-2015 consultations within the global post-2015 process. Finally, I discuss some of the limitations for the study and provide ideas for further research.

7.1. Traces of global development theories in Tanzanian discourses

The chapters 2 and 3 introduced the hegemonic ideologies behind the global development policy. As I argued in chapter 2, this study attempts to point to certain changes in development discourses rather than to justify a specific paradigm. For example Nederveen (2011) argues that development is under a constant evolution driven by national and global circumstances. Many of the current global concerns in development are therefore naturally reflected in national discussions such as in the Tanzanian case. The Tanzanian discourses frame a national strategy for achieving the desired development. Such a strategy is built on participating in the present neoliberal regime accompanied with specific Tanzanian indigenous and socialist values. Even though traditional donor relationships are not dismissed, Tanzanians expect fast economic change to be generated domestically through national assets (including intangibles such as the ideological basis laid out in the discourses). Also the new development partnerships and public-private relations play a crucial role in this search for fast growth.

Tanzanian discourses do not perceive the country as passively dependent of the world economy but rather highlight the national capacity of Tanzania to make independent decisions regarding its development. Although such active mentality is desirable, it does not reinforce a people-centered approach towards development but rather follows the structuralist approach introduced in chapter 2.3. It continues to see economic development as the end rather than a mean, which emphasizes macroeconomic change over ordinary people’s capacity as the basis for development.
There are also traces of the basic-needs approach in the discourses. The consultation reports discussed basic needs such as shelter, food security and education. This too however, reinforces a paternalistic approach to development by not widening the discussion to enablement and participation. Such elements are centrally very conventional in terms of focusing on needs rather than capabilities, economic growth rather than well-being. This again brings the understanding of citizenship under critical discussion. Tanzanian discourses are built on a somewhat differing argumentation but none of them explicitly discuss civil society’s participation in a proactive manner. Although the discourses acknowledge inequality alongside poverty, one could ask; how is pro-poor growth achieved if civil society is not considered more extensively? The needed re-distribution of growth cannot be tackled with ‘a transformative mindset’, national pride, and normative approach to good governance only.

The reports mention the need to increase foreign aid and investments but they simultaneously discuss the need to foster national ownership and national values. These two ends could be held as counter-hegemonic, but they may even help to sustain the existing hegemony as they attempt to create a spirit of inclusiveness among the nation. Ruling by consent is part of hegemonic logic and this ideological inclusiveness maintains such consent while promising fast economic advancements.

At the heart, the discourses continue to emphasize development as a rational and linear process driven by economic concerns. Entrepreneurial identities were strong throughout the identified discourses. The familiar past of the ujamaa brotherhood was coupled with an attraction towards a new transformative ‘developed society’, which was based on heavy industrialization. Consequently, the present realities in Tanzania are discussed as a mixture of hardships and possibilities. Development is a fusion of past and present, individualism and collectivism, national and global. All in all, the discourse of participatory neoliberalism aligns itself well with the global model that offers normative and attractive views on development but is in practice driven by economic growth. I argue that this is part of a global move towards individual empowerment and the role of private businesses in development. The traditional understanding of development cooperation is under a fundamental reform.
7.2. Weight of the national consultations in drafting the global post-2015 agenda

Placing the national consultations into a larger frame, it has to be questioned what is the worth of their result for national policy implementation and for the global post 2015 agenda. The governmental motivations behind such policy consultations are certainly numerous. The Tanzanian national report mentioned openly that the key factors raised in the consultations should be “attractive to international assistance”. This indicates that some of the issues brought into discussion are likely to respond only to pre-determined global expectations of “right development”. Such comments might be unintentional as is typical to discursive formations. It is likely for example that the existing knowledge of the MDGs among the consulted has affected the results and produced the needs-based comments. Considering the multifaceted policy map in Tanzania it can also be argued that government officers desire results that align with the pre-existing policies. This might explain to some extent why the consultation results were heavily biased towards the ujamaa ideology, which is already strongly present in the MKUKUTAs. Had the consultations produced more opposing ideals, their usefulness for influencing national policies might not be valued to the same extent.

That being said, the dynamics of national and international development policy are complex and so the true worth of the post-2015 agenda in shaping national development plans is still a mystery. International policy agreements are always a consensus between many different views and the ownership of such policies varies from one country to another. The global post-2015 agenda may break development policy’s hegemonic composition and treat the concept of development more holistically than previously but the global agenda’s implementation will be carried out on national and local level. As mentioned in the introduction, there are confusing statements even in the different UN policy documents that make it difficult to define how global policies are to be localized. The ideal image of a linear policy process hardly ever depicts reality.

As discussed in chapter 2, alternative approaches to development are often more normative than mainstream views. For a global development agenda such an approach is desirable as such since it may raise new thinking into wider knowledge. On the downside, a normative
development agenda opens possibilities for multiple interpretations. For example the
danger in ‘shared but differentiated’ responsibilities is that such an agenda leaves ‘desired
development’ for everyone’s contextual determination. Also sustainability goals are then
easily left for ‘someone else’s responsibility’ without a timeline or measurable value. This
would merely repeat the weakness of MDGs. To what extent such a normative agenda will
lead to action on national agendas depends also on the financial decisions made in the
International Conference on Financing for Development in 2015.

Moreover, the new kind of development privatization calls into question, who is legitimate
to determine sustainable development. Many developing nations, including the official
statements of Tanzania, have responded negatively to development discourses based on
anything else other than economic growth. Environmental sustainability is an added bonus,
but does not fit in with the heavily industrial ideals that Tanzania aims for. The previous
development partner-directed and government-driven development policies may turn into
private sector –driven initiatives. This would lack the civil society’s voice and substantial
improvements for the disadvantaged.

It is vital to remember that civil society’s empowerment is primarily a localized challenge.
As discussed in chapter 4.5, Tanzanian policy environment is currently quite confusing for
ordinary citizens in particular. Adding yet another development strategy to the
government’s already limited ability to implement and monitor the existing plans will be
unbearable and could foster the lack of focus in Tanzanian policy implementation. That is
why the needed domestication of the post-2015 agenda should be realized through the
existing national plans. The discourses would align well with the Five Year Development
Plan, for example, which aims to shift Tanzania from an agricultural-based to an industry-
based economy. The MDGs have been implemented through the MKUKUTA, which has
enabled a high commitment of governmental structures in the process and thus increased
national ownership of the UN initiated process. Even if the MKUKUTAs are politically
biased they have been acclaimed for being truly Tanzanian in contrast to previous
development policies. Unless the UN succeeds in providing true ownership of this global
project to national governments and civil societies, the post-2015 process is in danger of
being regarded as secondary in relation to the national plans. The moral basis of the
ujamaa spirit could create consent and help to localize the post-2015 agenda. Once again,
however, this is unlikely to happen unless the well-being of ordinary people is taken
seriously and placed as the ultimate goal to which all economic advancements play only an instrumental role.

The role of the private sector has constantly grown but its actual implications for the global post-2015 agenda are yet unknown. It is possible that the new agenda will provide innovative development connections between the private and public sector that may treat developing nations more equally with their development partners than previously. Yet, there is a danger that inclusiveness will be left aside when such cutting edge development partnerships are centered on economic development. The new development realities are increasingly formed outside the traditional donor-recipient trajectory and the ODA is viewed as only one option for revenue generation. Locals’ disappointment towards Tanzanian governance to deliver development might have further reinforced grassroots’ support for the government to look at partnerships outside the traditional donor influence. Locals might feel that since the government has been unable to tackle the growing inequality levels despite of the massive amounts of foreign aid it has channeled, the new partnerships could provide a window of opportunity. It seems traditional partners such as the UN institutions are traditionally held as most eligible for financing development especially in the soft sectors such as social services. In carrying out its main vision, Tanzania looks for partners outside this traditional development scene. After all, such new partnerships do not conflict with Tanzanian national policies or try to include policy conditionalities. Tanzania may thus seek to deliver its transformative vision based on its own ideology. In addition the revenue possibilities of Tanzanian national industries such as mining reaffirms its vision of becoming a middle-income country by 2025. Again, the national development vision is a separate entity from the views of the civil society. The crucial question is not how to domesticate the post-2015 framework but how to resonate with people’s everyday narratives and genuinely transform the understanding of participation on practical level.

7.3. Limitations of the study, ethical dilemmas and suggestions for future research

There are limitations with regard to the data selected and the methodology applied. The fact that the majority of consulted persons do not represent an average Tanzanian
economically seems to be the most notable limitation for interpreting the consultation reports. Any holistic claims made are most likely to be somewhat biased towards governmental views. The realization of this vagueness and power relations has been present throughout my analysis. The majority of the reports do not give the participant’s background details and none define the basis on which the participants were invited for the consultation. In many respects the views between the main three consulted groups LGAs, CSOs and the vulnerable groups/beneficiaries were consistent. It was not feasible however to make meaningful comparisons between the groups’ answers since for example Central Zone, Southern Zone and Eastern Zone consultations had divided the groups to LGAs on regional level, LGAs on district, ward and village level and CSOs and lacked the representation of vulnerable groups/beneficiaries. In addition, Southern Highland Regions had not clearly stated how the groups had been formed. The politics of CCM have traditionally gained also wide support among the most disadvantaged particularly in rural areas. This makes it difficult to estimate the representativeness of the data especially in terms of political differences.

Another ethical concern is that the analysis of this study is based on policy documents rather than authentic interviews. To what extent is it then possible to acclaim that the analyzed consultation documents truly bring forth the opinions of people, whether government officials or ordinary citizens? Can such documents serve as relevant examples of national or local cultures and to what extent generalizations can be made? Distinguishing between donor rhetoric, policy rhetoric, national politics talk and ordinary people’s experiences bears a substantive dilemma. Reflecting upon literature, for example recent articles of Kamat (2008), Caplan (2007) and Robins et al. (2008) are in line with my findings. Being based on ethnographic research, such articles speak genuinely on behalf of the vulnerable and voiceless. This study makes a valid contribution in showing that also policy analysis can meaningfully add on to such empirical research. Critical discourse analysis has given me the opportunity to understand the cultural, historical and political meanings that people’s discursive practices are built upon. I have thereby shown how people’s assessments of reality and development are strongly built on pre-existing discourses. Accordingly, the results of this thesis have pointed out that there exists contradictory understandings of development depending on one’s status, the institutional sphere one is involved in, and also the level to which one is able to meaningfully participate in the political discussions. With discourse analysis, I have also sought to move
outside the one-sided view of citizens as sole recipients of the hegemonic macro-level policies surrounding them.

Finally, this study invokes several areas for further empirical research. As discussed earlier, more attention should be given to a contextual understanding of citizens’ everyday lives. Further research especially among vulnerable groups and locals could show how valid the transformative aspects I have identified in this study are. Also, more research is needed on how to develop consultations’ authenticity and ensure that the voices used to represent the voiceless are in fact accurate. It could also be interesting to compare the differing views between local government officers, CSO representatives, and vulnerable groups further. Such comparative analysis could bring forth clearer differences in experienced realities of the locals. Considering the highly politicized governance structures in Tanzania a comparative study could also shed light on the experienced power relations and political inequalities.

Throughout my research, I was constantly faced with the dilemma of how the consultations will feed into actual policies and practices on national level; how to ensure that the vast amount of work being put to the country consultations will be concretized? The chains from policy consultations to policy implementation are to some extent always unmanageable. Also, the rotation back from global policies to local realities evokes interesting areas for further study. Policymaking is more reproductive than reproducing and it would be fascinating to compare how the post-2015 policies will be recontextualized into different country frameworks. Returning back to the main criticism behind global policy processes, it is important to stay focused on whether policies succeed to extend citizen’s participation space. All stakeholders seem to be pleased that for the first time in history we are facing a truly universal development agenda. Yet, for ‘the views of the people’ to imply genuine change is still a rocky road ahead. In the end, many of these concerns come down to political will, and whether or not governments’ will uphold their commitment to internalize a holistic approach to development.
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