

**CHINA'S RHETORIC and SOFT POWER towards the PORTUGUESE-
SPEAKING COUNTRIES: the case of Angola**

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China's Rhetoric and Soft Power towards the Portuguese-speaking countries: the case of Angola

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Abstract

The thesis analyses China's foreign policy towards the Portuguese-speaking countries, particularly the case of Angola.

The People's Republic of China has been putting great emphasis on the relations with other developing countries. The eight Portuguese-speaking countries, Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor-Leste constitute a group with a population of around 250 million people, a vast wealth of natural resources and potential for gaining economic and political importance in the near future.

The way China frames its rhetorical communication and establishes relationships must be understood to provide a perspective on its foreign policy. Political communication involves a ritual with a rhetor, a message and an audience. This phenomenon and the resulting interaction need to be approached from a political perspective in order to understand the dynamics of communication and power.

The theoretical framework consists of using rhetorical criticism to analyse the speeches made by the Chinese and Angolan representatives at the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao) in 2003 and 2006 as well as China's African Policy official document.

Roderick P. Hart and Sonja K. Foss describe models that serve as guides for rhetorical criticism. One of the most useful models to perform a rhetorical analysis is Kenneth Burke's dramatisitic theory and its concepts: the pentad, hierarchy, identification, and the guilt, purification and redemption cycle.

As for the power component, Chinese diplomacy is using what is labelled in the specialized terminology as soft power. It focus more on the power of attraction and it is a term devised in 1990 by Professor Joseph S. Nye.

It is thought-provoking to analyse how political argumentation is constructed to present political messages. In this thesis, Chinese rhetoric and its soft power actions will be explored to understand the relationship with Angola. Thus, rhetorical criticism and soft power provide a framework to analyse which aspects are either emphasised or neglected in the official rhetoric. These tools are essential to understand what has happened and what is happening. In addition, one might be able to gain a wider knowledge on the role that China can play vis-à-vis the other developing countries: a development partner, an economic competitor or a coloniser.

Key words: China, Angola, Portuguese-speaking countries, Forum Macao, economic and trade cooperation, development, soft power, rhetoric.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Argument

This thesis analyses China's foreign policy towards the developing world from 2003 to 2006, namely the Portuguese-speaking countries and Africa, with a particular focus on Angola. The selection of this timeframe has the following reasons: the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (hereafter referred to as Forum Macao) was held in October 2003; the second Ministerial Conference of Forum Macao was held in September 2006; during each of these Conferences, an Action Plan¹ for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries was signed; and, finally, in January 2006, the Chinese government issued a relevant policy document, China's African Policy. Relations between China and the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP - Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa) have of course continued after 2006, but I am interested in the early phase of this systematic interaction.

The underlying argument of this thesis is that China intends to gain international influence, both economically and politically, through the use of soft power in its relations with developing countries. The rationale behind it is that, if the developed, Westernised countries already have their own established development philosophies, the developing world is a breeding ground for new development philosophies and new economic development policies while being more receptive towards accepting a new economic and political model from a "partner" country, that experimented the same development path and is willing, politically and economically, to share its experience.

The thesis could be useful to assess a different development partnership model: a switch from a developed-developing countries relation to a developing-developing, i.e. a South-South development partnership and how this serves both China and its partner countries. It also provides some insights on which countries are prone to have an increased economic and implicit political influence in the world's affairs in the next years and ascertain which role China could

¹ In 2003, the Plano de Acção para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial, and in 2006 the Plano de Acção para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial (2007-2009), respectively. According to the Instituto de Promoção do Comércio e do Investimento de Macau (Institute for Promotion of Trade and Investment of Macau - IPIM), between 2003 and 2006, trade between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries more than tripled to a total of 34 billion dollars in late 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.ipim.gov.mo/pt/ccpsc/index.htm>.

play vis-à-vis the other developing countries: a development partner, an economic competitor or a coloniser².

In the last decades, China has become one of the main players of the international system and its relevance became impossible to ignore at the global stage. The rise of the “sleeping giant” of the People’s Republic of China is one of the most relevant international events, from both political and economic points of view. Politically, China is a unique combination of policy practices. While on the economic side there is some similarity with the Western system manifested through a reasonable degree of openness towards market policies, on the political side the system is much more rigid. On the other hand, China experienced in the last decades an ongoing process of economic reform, growth and openness that allowed it to become one of the main players on the international scene. Its booming economy, supported by the large pool of human resources, and strong economic policy propelled China on the podium as the second largest world economy³, ahead of economic giants such as Japan or Germany or political powers such as Russia. The unique combination of this political system and economic model makes China a challenging case study for the international community.

Fig. 1: Map of territories where Portuguese is an official language⁴



² Chris Alden, *China in Africa*, London, Zed Books, 2007.

³ World Bank, *China Overview*, 2014. Retrieved from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.

⁴ Instituto Camões. Green refers to territories where Portuguese is an official language. Numbers in blue refer to Portuguese-based creole languages. Retrieved from <http://cvc.instituto-camoes.pt/hlp/geografia/>.

Table 1: Data from China and the Portuguese-speaking countries⁵

Country	Subject	Units	Scale	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Angola	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	12.863	18.249	28.234	41.789	60.449
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	820.102	1,130.339	1,698.983	2,445.403	3,443.400
	Population	Persons	Millions	15.685	16.145	16.618	17.089	17.555
	Area	(Km2)	Units	1,246,700				
	HDI	Rank		160th	161st	162nd		143rd
Brazil	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	552.383	663.734	882.044	1,089.255	1,366.853
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	3,090.407	3,664.892	4,809.845	5,869.968	7,284.367
	Population	Persons	Millions	78.741	181.106	183.383	185.564	187.642
	Area	(Km2)	Units	8,514,877				
	HDI	Rank		63rd	69th	70th		75th
Cabo Verde	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	0.891	1.023	1.090	1.238	1.516
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	1,908.977	2,159.232	2,278.165	2,568.954	3,134.461
	Population	Persons	Millions	0.467	0.474	0.479	0.482	0.484
	Area	(Km2)	Units	4,033				
	HDI	Rank		105th	106th	102nd		121st
China	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	1,640.961	1,931.646	2,256.919	2,712.917	3,494.235
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	1,269.828	1,486.019	1,726.054	2,063.871	2,644.563
	Population	Persons	Millions	1,292.270	1,299.880	1,307.560	1,314.480	1,321.290
	Area	(Km2)	Units	9,596,961				
	HDI	Rank		85th	81st	81st		92nd
Guinea-Bissau	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	0.466	0.523	0.574	0.579	0.692
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	354.673	390.314	419.573	414.947	485.690
	Population	Persons	Millions	1.315	1.341	1.368	1.395	1.424
	Area	(Km2)	Units	36,125				
	HDI	Rank		172nd	173rd	175th		173rd
Mozambique	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	4.666	5.698	6.579	7.215	8.121
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	234.795	278.783	313.108	334.216	366.288
	Population	Persons	Millions	9.873	20.439	21.010	21.587	22.171
	Area	(Km2)	Units	801,59				
	HDI	Rank		168th	168th	172nd		172nd
Portugal	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	162.242	185.641	192.181	201.978	232.075
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	5,538.789	17,676.765	18,217.210	19,082.704	21,876.669
	Population	Persons	Millions	10.441	10.502	10.549	10.584	10.608
	Area	(Km2)	Units	92,09				
	HDI	Rank		27th	28th	29th		34th
São Tomé and Príncipe	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	0.101	0.111	0.123	0.135	0.144
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	707.579	758.088	827.416	889.870	931.456
	Population	Persons	Millions	0.143	0.146	0.149	0.152	0.155
	Area	(Km2)	Units	964				
	HDI	Rank		126th	127th	123rd		131st
Timor-Leste	GDP	U.S. dollars	Billions	0.489	1.079	1.801	2.824	2.965
	GDP per capita	U.S. dollars	Units	522.595	1,133.797	1,857.960	2,855.324	2,934.320
	Population	Persons	Millions	0.936	0.952	0.970	0.989	1.010
	Area	(Km2)	Units	14,874				
	HDI	Rank		140th	142nd	150th		162nd

⁵ International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2014. Gross Domestic Product in current prices. GDP per capita based on current currency exchange rate. Shaded cells indicate IMF staff estimates. Source for the Human Development Index (HDI) was the *UN Human Development Report* (2005, 2006, 2007-8 and 2009).

In this development process, the Chinese leaders have put great emphasis on the relations with developing countries. Among these, it is interesting to analyse China's relation with the Portuguese-speaking countries, whose population nearly reaches 250 million people. This group includes Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe in Africa, Brazil in South America, Timor-Leste in Southeast Asia and Portugal in Europe. An intense diplomatic effort has been conducted by the Chinese government to build strong relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries. The effort has been targeted to enhance the political, economic and cultural relations.

Particularly important have been the triangular flows between China, Brazil and Angola. These two are the Portuguese-speaking countries with the largest territories (Brazil is the 5th and Angola is the 23rd in the world), they possess valuable deposits of natural resources, necessary for China's economic development and can act as important players in consolidating China's global influence. According to the World Bank, Brazil is considered the world's seventh biggest economy⁶ and it is the largest country of Latin America.

After the end of the civil war in 2002, Angola became one of the most successful economies in sub-Saharan Africa, and in the first semester of 2006, Angola surpassed Saudi Arabia as China's main oil supplier, according to Campos and Vines⁷. They further add (2008:1) that when Wen Jiabao, Chinese Premier, made his seven-nation African tour and visited Angola in June 2006, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos described bilateral relations as being "mutually advantageous" partnerships that were "pragmatic" and had no "political preconditions." In the period ranging from 1998 to 2007, the Angolan economy has registered high real GDP growth rates, with an annual average of 10.2 percent.⁸ For instance, in the five years after the 2003 Forum Macao, Angola experienced a double digit GDP growth rate⁹, and its vast stock of natural resources endow the country with a continuous potential for growth and development. China sees the complementarity at the economic level and the mutual political support derived from this model of cooperation based on economy, trade and investment, as well as non-interference.

⁶ World Bank, *Brazil Overview 2014*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview>.

⁷ Indira Campos and Alex Vines, "Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership", Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., March 2008, p. 12.

⁸ Economist Intelligence Unit, *Angola: Country Profile*, London, The Economist, 2008, p. 12.

⁹ IMF figures for GDP percentual growth are the following: 2004 with 11.2%; 2005 with 20.6%; 2006 with 20.8%; 2007 with 22.6%; and 2008 with 13.8%.

1.2. Why Angola

As stated above, Angola is the largest African country in this group and the one that has received much of China's attention in Africa to the point that it has become its largest oil supplier and its main African trading partner.

China's foreign policy stretches wide and it is necessary to understand the Chinese-Angolan relationship in the broad framework of China's engagement with the developing countries, with the African countries and with the Portuguese-speaking countries. Angola's development after the end of the civil war occurs in a multipolar world, with considerable changes in the economic and political frameworks after the 9/11 event. At the same time, the lifting of UN sanctions opened the road for investment in the diamonds and oil industries of the country. Being an oil-rich country, Angola has benefited from the Chinese growing interest in Africa and its two-tier approach of securing energy and diplomatic support, emphasising non-intervention as opposed to Western preconditions. In 2004, one year after the first Forum Macao, Angola was already the main source of China's imports from Africa.

Fig. 2: China's most important African trading partners.¹⁰

**China's most important African trading partners, 2004
(by imports)**

<i>China's imports from Africa</i>	<i>In US dollars (millions)</i>	<i>In percent</i>
Angola	3,422.63	27.4
South Africa	2,567.96	20.6
Sudan	1,678.60	13.4
Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville)	1,224.74	9.8
Equatorial Guinea	787.96	6.3
Gabon	415.39	3.3
Nigeria	372.91	3.0
Algeria	216.11	1.7
Morocco	208.69	1.7
Chad	148.73	1.2
Total	11,043.72	88.4

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics*, Washington, D.C., May 2005.

¹⁰ Denis Tull, "China's Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 44, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 465.

The seemingly beneficial arrangement between China and Angola can fall in what Denis Tull (2006 :468-470) described as *petro-diplomacy*, in which there is a strong interconnection between politics, economic diplomacy and energy security. Moreover, it follows China's strategy of exploring *niche markets*, where there is great economic potential, space to compete and opportunities to gain a foothold.

Hence, there are several factors explaining this recent intensification of exchanges. On the economic side, China's continuing growth has led to an increase in the demand for raw materials and at the same time the need to search markets on which to sell its industrial products. The political reasons lie with the need to gain influence and gather support from these developing countries in its quest for gaining international influence. China has therefore increased its foreign direct investment, favoured the establishment of credit lines, given extensive debt reliefs and promoted development and humanitarian aid towards many developing countries, such as Angola. In conducting its foreign policy, China took an active role on the international scene and to this end it has been very active in the participation in multilateral forums where its developing partners, such as Angola, are involved. Angola is present in two of these forums: the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao).

FOCAC, established in 2000, is defined as a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue, and where principles such as cooperation, equality and mutual benefit can be pursued and lead to development.

The Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries is composed of China and seven Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal and Timor-Leste). The first Forum Macao took place in 2003 and it is held in the Special Administrative Region of Macao (settled by the Portuguese in 1557) every three years. Hence, China's approach towards Angola is present in two main axes: Angola as part of the African continent and Angola as part of the Portuguese-speaking countries.

This thesis will follow a reverse triangle analysis: on one side, it will consider the tools of influence, here, the soft power through rhetoric and its power of influence in order to provide the toolbox of analysis of the Chinese rhetoric and policy framework; on the other side, China's programmatic approach towards the Portuguese-speaking countries and Africa through discourse

analysis of the Forum Macao's speeches, and the first China's African Policy document issued in 2006. At the bottom of this triangle would be Angola, part of both the African and the Portuguese-speaking groups, hence, double targeted by China.

The timeframe followed would be from 2003, when the first Ministerial Conference took place in Macao between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries and 2006, when the second Ministerial Conference of the Forum Macao was held and also when China's African Policy document was presented. In analysing the China-Angola relationship, this timeframe has an increased significance: the civil war ended in Angola in April 2002¹¹ and the UN Security Council lifted sanctions against Angola in December 2002¹², just before the first Forum Macao.

In 2006, Wen Jiabao was the first Chinese Prime Minister to make an official visit to Angola since the founding of the People's Republic of China. During that visit, the two leaders agreed that "bilateral cooperation within the framework of the China and Portuguese-speaking Countries Economic Cooperation Forum (Macao) would be deepened"¹³.

In addition to establishing the theoretical framework and the tools for analysis, the main documents analysed are the speech of Ms. Wu Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council of China during the first Forum Macao and China's African Policy. In addition to that, in the last chapter, the Angolan-Chinese relation will be assessed based on economic and political data that supports their partnership and their public rhetoric, namely, speeches of Chinese and Angolan leaders from which one can draw conclusions on the public nature of the Angolan-Chinese relation and potential future developments.

1.3. Methodology

As stated, this thesis envisages analysing China's quest for influence in the developing world, namely in the Portuguese-speaking countries, by studying its rhetoric and the tools used to influence and build a circle of soft power in order to pursue its broader political and economic

¹¹ Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola - UNITA) died in February 2002. A ceasefire agreement was signed in April 2002 between UNITA and the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola - MPLA).

¹² Global Policy Forum. Retrieved from <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/angola.html>.

¹³ Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China, China and Angola Joint Communiqué regarding the June 2006 high-level visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Angola, 26 September 2006. Retrieved from http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zt_chinaportuguese/lanmub/200609/20060903270808.html.

interests. A special attention will be given to the role and the use of rhetoric in world affairs, then to the tools, such as forums, that China created in order to promote its rhetoric and then, the analysis of China's political agenda will be pursued, on the background offered by the international forums created for this purpose. The research material is constituted by elements of the Chinese discourse towards their development partners at Forum Macao and the development policy strategy directed at all the African partners (China's African Policy) in 2006, with the aim of assessing how the relationship between the above mentioned partners is being shaped, perceived and what would be the future implications of it. The methods used in this assessment would be the rhetorical analysis of the discourse and the qualitative analysis of the policy documents, strengthened by the theoretical evaluation of the context and supported by the work of previous analysts, before resuming the assessment of the China-Angola relation.

To better understand the context, a short introduction that would be further developed in the thesis is considered necessary.

The Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries is composed of China and seven Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Timor-Leste and Portugal). The first Forum took place in 2003 and it is held every three years in Macao. An analysis of the Forum Macao policy and meanings would be superfluous without understanding the symbolical value of Macao as an outpost of political influence and economic trade. The port of Macao was lent to Portugal by China in the 16th century.¹⁴ Portugal, in full economic expansion, gradually extended its administrative power over Macao, and established there one of the most prosperous and long-lived overseas territories. After nearly 5 centuries of Portuguese rule, Macao's sovereignty was transferred back to China in 1999, with the status of Special Administrative Region (SAR)¹⁵. Having a forum with Portuguese-speaking countries in a former Portuguese colony, symbol of economic prosperity, could imply both the prosperity that China can bring to the countries involved and an historical revivalism of cultural and linguistic ties, coming from a successful developing country.

The speech of Ms. Wu Yi in the first Forum Macao is analysed to provide an overview of China's political and economic intentions regarding the Portuguese-speaking countries. The

¹⁴ Fernando Correia de Oliveira, *500 anos de contactos luso-chineses*, Lisboa, Público & Fundação Oriente, 1998. The author synthesizes the history of Macao and describes the historical bridges between China and Portugal.

¹⁵ For the Basic Law of SAR Macao, please consult <http://bo.io.gov.mo/BO/i/1999/leibasica/index.asp>.

language and the symbols used may signify a different direction and approach from China's side compared to the West and it is meant to attract potential economic and political partners. The discourse of Ms. Wu Yi is considered very important due to her high-level status and because it sets the scene for more solid partnerships.

In January 2006, within the lines of FOCAC, Beijing issued its first public policy document concerning the African Continent, **China's African Policy**, which can be considered a sign that China was deeply committed to engage with African countries. Moreover, it also confirmed that economic diplomacy was deemed relevant by the Chinese leaders. This policy document is structured into six parts, each outlining priorities and expectations that China may have. The first part refers to Africa's position and role; the second, China's relations with Africa; the third talks about China's African Policy; the fourth is about enhancing all-round cooperation between China and Africa; the fifth envisages the Forum China-Africa and the sixth discusses China's relations with African regional organisations. So it appears that China's engagement seems to be multi-level and complex, approaching all levels of cooperation and diplomacy towards Africa and approaching the African partners not only on a bilateral basis, but establishing joint partnerships with the regional organisations. By analysing this policy document, one expects to reach a deep and broad understanding of China's engagement in Africa and where Angola fits in this puzzle.

Given the complexity of both the foreign and development policies dimension, this thesis recognises its limitations in terms of timeframe envisaged and the access to political sources. This thesis constitutes a modest contribution towards assessing new development partnerships and models as well as their perception and promotion in the global diplomatic scenario.

The theoretical framework will be presented and the theoretical tools will be enumerated, followed by the rhetorical analysis of the speech of Ms. Wu Yi and the qualitative analysis of the 2006 policy document, before proceeding into the analysis of the China-Africa development partnership and the effects of rhetoric and soft power in the relation with Africa and Angola.

“Did the United States ask for dominion over a single nation in Europe? No. Soft power came in the Marshall Plan.”¹⁶

2. Theoretical Framework: from *Soft Power* to the *Power of Rhetoric*

2.1. *Soft Power*

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has been changing at a much faster pace and globalisation, the quest for resources, international trade, and transnational threats increase the interactions between countries. One of the most significant transformations of the international political scene since the 1990s has been the evolution from a bipolar to a multipolar international system. The two political and military giants, the United States and the Russian Federation, have seen the emergence of multiple poles of evolving power, in a quest for changing the world’s hierarchy and gaining political influence. With the traditional balance of power broken, the Western world still maintained the United States as a front-runner of democracy and economic and cultural power, while possessing a unique military capacity, thus maintaining the power to influence international affairs in the traditional way. Adding to the traditional definition of power, i.e. hard power, the world has seen the emergence of another concept, soft power, coined by Harvard Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in his 1990 book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. While the US was still the dominant world power, there were some fears about the decline of American power. Nye recognized the challenges emerging from the transformation of power and the importance of soft power, i.e. "getting others to want what you want"¹⁷.

Hard power could be termed as command and coercion or the ability to force another actor to act in the way you want. According to Nye¹⁸, there are three major ways to exert power and to achieve a goal: one is to threaten with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want, or at least have that impression, an approach more cost effective and less damaging than the coercion. This is *soft*

¹⁶ Colin Powell at the 2003 World Economic Forum, Davos. Preface of Nye, Joseph S., *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004.

¹⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York, Basic Books, 1990, p. 188.

¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004, pp. 1-6.

power. It is broadly applied to describe the ability of an actor to influence another actor's behaviour through attraction, or moral authority, rather than hard power, meaning the ability to influence an actor's behaviour in such a way that they do something otherwise they would not do.

There are numerous examples of soft power globally and its ability to reach intended goals. Nye (2004:2) gives a very expressive one in the way Catholicism works: the loyal Catholics do not follow the Pope's teaching because they fear his army, but because they trust and respect his moral authority. Politically, *soft power* arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, policies and emulating examples of success in order to gain the ability to shape one's preferences (Nye 2004:5). If in medieval times, Machiavelli believed that the prince should better be feared than loved, in the current state of affairs, in the eyes of Nye, it is better to be both. The power of seduction should complement hard power, to ensure an easier path to reach the objectives of the seducer. Soft power and its use are difficult to understand by some leaders, but it can be used effectively by others. Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, stated that "the real key is not how many enemies do I kill, but how many allies do I grow"¹⁹, because, in the end, in order to ensure a smooth control over international affairs, a leader cannot go against the widely accepted normative and moral system, under penalty of losing respect and leadership. Hence, in order for a global leader to ensure a strong and continuous supremacy, it has to build on the soft power concept and the opportunities that it offers.

Both soft and hard power have the same purpose: achieving a goal, but they differ in the approach as the latter would use command, coercion, and inducement through force, payments, bribes and sanctions, while the former would set the focus on agenda setting, attraction and co-optation through institutions, values, culture and policies. The English historian and diplomat E.H. Carr (Nye 2004:8) classified international power in three categories: military, economic and power over opinion. While all three elements are important for a global leader, economic power and the power over opinion have the largest weight because in the global society of nations, as in a human society, it is important what other states perceive as this does influence their willingness to create or maintain a relationship.

¹⁹ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, PublicAffairs, 2004, p. ix.

China seemed to understand this philosophy and after its economic revamp it is attempting to build on its own example of development in order to attract allies. Because the Western model has already a long tradition on playing the power of attraction game, which with some states, is about to fade, China is trying to put forward a different approach, coming not from an authoritative power, but from a more advanced student, in order to attract to its side the developing countries in Africa and the Portuguese-speaking countries. China's actions and its quest for global influence could, to some extent, also be described in terms of imperialism, or the control or influence that is applied formally or informally, directly or indirectly, politically or economically. The political reasons are the desire for power, prestige, security, and diplomatic advantages vis-à-vis other states. The economic reasons are the need to expand its economy by acquiring raw materials, by finding export markets and by investing capital, with the expectancy of high returns on investment. Here rhetorical criticism is useful to discern how Chinese rhetoric envisages the relation with other developing countries and dismisses neo-colonialism.

Joshua Kurlantzick²⁰ defined China's action in a very basic and alluring way, a charm offensive to describe how China's soft power is transforming the world. It is an interesting juxtaposition of terms: while *charm* means "the power or quality of delighting, attracting, or fascinating others"²¹, offensive is a term that defines an overly aggressive, attacking action, being associated with the military world. Hence, China's soft power advancement could be seen as a camouflaged quest for an increased role in the international system, especially after 9/11, when the popularity of the United States started to decrease in certain parts of the world and Tiananmen Square was forgotten in the memory of the international actors.

In its charm offensive, one of China's main tools is cultural diplomacy, meant to shape a new image of China to the world and whose objectives are to make public China's assertions beyond its borders, to form a new, desirable image and to rebut the negative assertions about the country, to improve relations with neighbours and to exert influence on other's countries policy decisions. By putting at the core of its advancement the concept of *peaceful development*, China is trying to promote the idea that its rising should not be perceived as a threat, but more a subtle, cultural influence of a development partner, as pointed out by Kurlantzick (60-65) and substantiated in the example of the eleven nation performance tour titled "Voyage of Chinese

²⁰ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm Offensive, How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007.

²¹ Oxford online dictionary. Retrieved from <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/charm?q=charm>.

Culture to Africa”, to display Chinese culture to the African continent and promote dialogue and strengthen ties.

Another relevant tool is economic diplomacy, which consists of foreign direct investment, clearing the path for Chinese multinationals to access emerging markets, building infrastructure, and providing easier access to development aid.

The exchanges between China and Africa increased by over 250 percent between 2001 and 2005, turning China into Africa’s third largest trading partner, after the United States and France (Kurlantzick :83-94).

Hence, these elements of soft power are effectively used to reach China’s policy goals. Soft power theory provides an interesting approach to the study of the political and economic cooperation between China, the Portuguese-speaking countries and Africa. One of the underlying factors of approach is how it is presented and justified on the world stage. Thus, this theory provides a framework to analyse which aspects are either emphasised or neglected in the official rhetoric. It is difficult to understand a country’s position in the world’s affairs without paying close attention to its official discourse and rhetoric.

2.2. Discourse as a soft power tool

In the following analysis, rhetorical criticism and the study of words and symbols used by people to give meaning to their communication has an important role. According to Hart²², political statements and documents use language to “help people narrow their choices among specifiable, if not specified, policy options”. Rhetoric is then closely associated with power and persuasion as messages intend to influence people's actions. Rhetoric is also a crucial element to reach objectives because communication is an essential part of human civilization. Here, the relationship between Chinese rhetoric and its soft power actions, and how they are used to influence and to gain leverage in pursuing an economic policy, which has some types of similarities with Western imperialism, will be explored by using Kenneth Burke and Roderick P. Hart’s works on rhetorical analysis. Some elements are crucial when a person or an actor is trying to communicate: the **context** in which the communication is taking place, **how** the communication is made or transmitted and what is the **message** and its embedded meaning.

²² Roderick P. Hart, *Modern Rhetorical Criticism*, Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown, 1990, p. 2.

2.2.1. Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism

Rhetoric, in the broadest sense, can be defined as “the study of writing or speaking as a means of communication or persuasion; skill in effective use of speech or insincere or grandiloquent language; verbal communication; discourse”.²³ Rhetoric is then closely associated with power and persuasion, as the messages intend to influence people's actions. Hart (9) adds that rhetoric “uses common ideas, conventional language and specific information to change listener's feelings and behaviours”. The rhetor, especially in the political arena, presents specific policy options to its audience by describing possibilities and probabilities that serve as a guide to the audience’s response. There is always a purpose when a rhetor tells a story. Notwithstanding some negative connotations, rhetoric is above all defined as the human use of symbols to communicate, which includes three dimensions: humans as the creators of rhetoric; symbols as the medium for rhetoric; and communication as the purpose for rhetoric.

Foss²⁴ stated that in human communication, symbols are vital as a medium for rhetoric as they represent something else by virtue of “relationship, association or convention”. Whereas signs have a direct connection to the object they stand for, symbols have an indirect connection because the association is a product of human construction. For instance, if a person sees snow and ice she knows that this signifies cold temperatures. There is a direct relationship between the terms. Based on this, it can be assumed that, in promoting its soft and peaceful rising, China would make an extensive use of the power of symbols in order to transmit a message to its partners.

Rhetoric does encompass a wide range of symbols. These might appear in several forms, such as verbal and nonverbal, discursive and non-discursive. Rhetoric is both inclusive and useful as it refers to the “interpretability of puns as well as tropes, to a performative uncertainty as well as to a joking wordplay”.²⁵ A speech, a painting, a play, a statue are examples of meaningful symbols. For example, the American flag with its stars and stripes symbolizes a whole country and has a special *evocative power* arousing an assortment of contradictory feelings depending on the type of audience (Hart :168).

²³ Merriam Webster. Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rhetoric?show=0&t=1400957677>.

²⁴ Sonja K. Foss, *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice*, Long Grove, Illinois, Waveland Pr, 2004, p. 4.

²⁵ Clayton Koelb, “The story in the image: Rhetoric and Narrative Invention”, *Modern Fiction Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, Autumn 1987, p. 519.

Rhetoric can be used to bring about change in behaviours, attitudes and situations as well as reaching out to other people. By engaging in rhetoric, people convey their perspective on reality. Hart (9) states that every rhetorical task involves five basic moves: (1) language, especially in the form of symbols, is preferred; (2) the rhetor must be seen as a helper; (3) the rhetor must convince the audience that decisions should be taken; (4) the rhetor must narrow a set of options to be made even if (5), he does not present the specific details.

Moreover, a rhetorical message will have three distinct features: delineations of the good, resonance for a particular audience and clearly implied policy recommendations. All these will be followed in analysing the Chinese rhetoric and policy action as a soft power tool. The mentioned characteristics and features will add up to the functions of rhetoric, which are to unburden, to distract, to enlarge, to name, to empower, and to elongate (Hart :19-28). Rhetoric allows rhetors to give names to ideas and objects. Labelling is then a natural human characteristic because we need to attribute meanings, variable in certain cases, to the surrounding world. Naming allows people to have a degree of comfort with new ideas. Uncomfortable events or concepts can become widely acceptable by renaming with a soft touch, as in the example of wars, in which terms as freedom or independence appease the destruction and loss of lives.

The technique of rhetoric empowers because it is flexible enough to allow multiple truths and multiple options, giving the rhetor the option to present its actions according to its needs. Thus rhetoric is more abundant where there is more fertile ground for interaction and exchange. It gives people the power to express themselves and to invite discussions for change. With flexibility comes adaptability because a rhetor has to adapt to the environment and to the passage of time, if he wants his ideas to have an impact in the world. Thus, the stronger the rhetoric is, the stronger the social power of ideas. Moreover, the selection of bits and pieces of the past and transporting them into the present, creates a new perspective of the future, and for China and its partners, this has to look bright.

A rhetorical critic examines the arguments to reach a judgement about peoples' motives:

“Rhetorical criticism is an interpretive practice in which a class of phenomena is identified as rhetorical and judgement is rendered as to the properties and moral implications of those phenomena. The key term here is

judgement, inasmuch as the critic seeks to make sense of the object not simply by describing its several features, but ultimately with reference to the critics own set of beliefs, values, and commitments.”²⁶

In this case, China’s way of marketing its policies through its peaceful development policy promoted under the umbrella of its foreign policy is a way to reinforce this system of judgement. The discourse, reinforced by action, or commitments, as it will be seen in the next chapters, has the objective of establishing the rhetor’s credibility.

When analysing a phenomenon, such as China’s soft power propagated through cultural diplomacy and peaceful economic development, the critic should isolate, describe, classify, interpret and then evaluate the power of the symbols presented. By performing rhetorical criticism, the critic produces an explicit knowledge about implicit facts. Through perception, analysis and comparison, he is able to provide views about the motive behind the rhetoric. The use of a theoretical framework that allows for the study of language and the underlying motives is of fundamental importance.

2.2.2. Dramatism and Hierarchy

Along these lines, Kenneth Burke viewed rhetoric as the "complex relationships among aesthetics, politics, language and social organisation" (Hart :341). He advanced the classical concept of the term, based on the study of persuasive speech and texts, into a system that would enable us to analyse different types of language in multiple areas such as politics, religion and business. Burke was interested in understanding the *reasons* behind human action, a central aspect in his studies, especially in the political arena. For Burke, analysing the drama of the political discourse was considered one of the crucial elements of the critical rhetoric. In his 1945 work, *A Grammar of Motives*, Burke presents his vast arguments regarding dramatism and starts by asking "What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?"²⁷. Searching for the answer to Burke’s question allows us to analyse how people portray their perception of the world in a narrative drama.

We can infer from Burke that drama, perceived in a general sense, can be applied to all aspects of human life, not only the artistic shape, such as society and politics, where the

²⁶ Stephen Browne, "Rhetorical Criticism and the Challenges of Bilateral Argument", *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2007, p. 114.

²⁷ Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, New York, Prentice Hall, 1945, p. xv.

emotions, anxieties, fears and ambitions are present. Burke's dramatic forms are for instance **identification, language clusters, hierarchy and transcendence.**

In basic terms, identification deals with association to some common characteristics, language clusters are sets of terms that intensify the message being given, hierarchy revolves around different levels in the human categorisation of the world and finally transcendence provides answers to the questions of hierarchy.

2.2.2.1. Hierarchy

Brock (1990) states that, for Burke, the dramatic process comprises "elements of hierarchy; acceptance and rejection; and guilt, purification, and redemption"²⁸.

First, the intricacies of the definition of hierarchy must be clarified. Rueckert (1982) makes an extensive description of Burke's concept of hierarchy:

"In the most general sense, hierarchy is any kind of order; but more accurately, it is any kind of graded, value-charged structure in terms of which things, words, people, acts, and ideas are ranked. Any hierarchy is simultaneously unifying and divisive in so far as it orders the whole by ranking according to some value-system and in so far as the ranking is a division into different classes of being. All hierarchies have inherent in them a progressive form, which comes from the nature of language itself: the upward movement from lower to higher and the downward movement from higher to lower. Thus, any hierarchy generates for those who participate in it what Burke calls the "hierarchic motive:" on the one hand people are goaded by the desire to mount the hierarchy, either through action or possession; and on the other hand people are goaded by the threat of descending the hierarchy, again either by action or possession, but also by failure to act or inability to possess certain things."²⁹

Hence, it is natural to assume that China will reach towards its partners by using dramatic elements through a language that would be able to transmit explicit and implicit symbols and reasons that would determine both the sympathy and the desire of the target public to be associated with it. However, there are several layers in this hierarchy, which is structured around socio-economic and political power. Hierarchical positions can be defined through quantitative (for instance, age or wealth) or qualitative terms (for instance, intelligence or knowledge). By

²⁸ Bernard L. Brock, Robert Lee Scott and James W. Chesebro, *Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth-century Perspective*, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1990, p. 185.

²⁹ William Rueckert, *Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1982, pp. 131-132.

ordering these elements according to different levels, hierarchic positions are established, according to Burke, as follows:

“The hierarchic principle itself [...] is embodied in the mere process of growth, which is synonymous with the class divisions of youth and age, stronger and weaker, male and female, or the stages of learning, from apprentice to journeyman to master. [...] Though hierarchy is exclusive, the principle of hierarchy is not; all ranks can *share in it alike*. But: It includes also the entelechial tendency, the treatment of the *top* or culminating *stage* as the *image* that best represents the entire *idea*. This leads to *mystifications* that cloak the state of division, since the *universal* principle of the hierarchy also happens to be the principle by which the most distinguished rank in the hierarchy enjoys, in the realm of worldly property, its special privileges. Hence, the turn from courtship to ill will, with ironic intermediate grades.”³⁰

Therefore, China, in its rhetoric, is expected to go for an “all or nothing” approach, by putting forward policies and programmes impossible to refuse and by depicting its solutions in a pragmatic way, in which a potential partner could not refuse its offer. The degree of power that is possessed dictates the nature of the relationships between individuals or the actors of international society. The acceptance of an organisational structure is defined by Brock (185) as the “bureaucratization of hierarchy” in the sense that this is a process with multiple levels and divisions. The establishment of a sense of authority then leads to the consolidation of a social hierarchy in which order will prevail until the *status quo* is altered. This happened after the fall of the Iron Curtain and after 9/11. The continuous changes in the international environment alter the international hierarchy, increasing the influence of some countries in detriment of other countries. There have been long talks about the reform of the United Nations and other international organisations in order to better reflect the current political, economic and demographic realities. Here, China learned how to take advantage of the relative decline of the United State’s soft power and capitalized on a new model: the peaceful development, because the concepts of acceptance and rejection are related to the prevalence of a hierarchical order insofar as people react positively or negatively to their situation. Language, as seen before, allows humans to express this reaction in symbolic terms either by accepting or rejecting their hierarchical ranks. It is by language that humans generate a sense of negative that justifies their rejection of their status or of the hierarchical structure, in a more extreme attitude.

³⁰ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969, p. 141.

2.2.2.2 Guilt, purification and redemption

The effects of the acceptance or rejection of the hierarchy are signalled in the concepts of **guilt, purification** and **redemption** (Brock :185-192). *Guilt* is an inherent feeling in human nature because the use of language generates abstract concepts and judgements as well as the attribution of value to objects, actions and behaviours. Humans then create orders that reflect different hierarchic classifications derived from these ideal values. Consequently, guilt arises from rejection as people feel that the rules in the hierarchy are too demanding, that they are overwhelmed by their situation and that there are obstacles or limitations to their progression and aspirations, such as burdensome development aid. According to Brock (185), the recognition that people are unable to cope with all the impositions derived from the hierarchies of their social groups and institutions, like international standards and the current state of affairs, renders the countries in this position with a feeling of "eternal guilt". This feeling of guilt that the developing countries experience for not being at the top of the hierarchy could be relieved by a friendly and peaceful development partner such as China. Apart from this guilt originating in the position of the individual regarding the hierarchy, there is another point of origin for eternal guilt in the hierarchical structure. Its essence presupposes inequalities based on the divisions of power and authority. Arising from these differences is a sense of mystery as groups regard each other by hierarchical lenses. Compounding on this mystery, there is also the natural ambition of people to have more and to go higher. Due to this hierarchical nature, it is conceivable that a considerable part, sometimes even the majority, of these positions is inherited, notwithstanding the ascending movements arising from personal success or the descending movements arising from personal failure. Evidently those on the lower echelons aspire to climb the ladders of the hierarchy or to transform the nature of the hierarchy. Thus, inequalities generate guilt on both the high and low echelons of the hierarchy. China and the other developing countries are trying to alter the hierarchical position, and thus a partnership could be mutually beneficial.

With guilt also comes a tremendous weight, so people try to annul it and seek redemption. In the same way as language allows for the emergence of hierarchy and guilt, it also provides the means for redemption in symbolic terms. In order to undergo *purification* there are two ways, *mortification* or *victimage*. The former involves self-sacrifice (internal) whilst the latter resorts to the scapegoating of an external source that is the origin of guilt, which, in this

case, is associated to the former colonisers. Along these lines, the rejection of hierarchy implies the existence of dissatisfaction and the desire to seek improvement. Brock (376) states that "in every political order there are those who are alienated and who seek change within the hierarchy". It is then natural that they will form collectives and use a rhetoric that appeals to unity, change and improvement, which are expected to be noticed from China's rhetoric.

Purification occurs when taking action to alleviate the guilt, and *redemption* will be achieved after attempts are made for the correction of wrongness and the re-establishment of morality, which is in this case taking the path of peaceful development promoted by China.

2.2.2.3 The motive

As mentioned, Burke's theory of **dramatism** has its foundations in the concept of **motive**: what drives people to act in a certain way, the stake of the drama play. In the same time, his research dealt as well with the fundamental distinction between the motion of objects and the action of humans, ascertaining the implications of attributing motives to humans. One of the consequences of this distinction between motion and action is that we do consider that humans act rather than merely moving. Foss (383-384) adds that action is related with the "neurological aspect of the human being" favouring the "ability to acquire language or a symbol system", and that for action to occur there should be three conditions: choice, purpose and motion.

Through language and symbols, humans make choices with a specific purpose and then move towards practical execution.

The political agenda or aims of the rhetor also shape its description of reality and its presentation of a narrative. In its narrative, the rhetor will resort to several facts whose degree of suitability will influence the effective power of the narrative. The adherence of people to the rhetor's narrative implies the acceptance of the drama and of the rhetor's motives.

In the following chapters, one can see the rhetor's motives and how they are accepted by the audience, constituted by African and/or Portuguese-speaking countries. Thus, to understand rhetoric it is crucial to perceive the context in which the speaker produced the message and its public or hidden agenda. Here, the context and the message are analysed, interpreted and tentatively criticised through a simple, yet thorough method of analysis - Burke's Pentad.

2.2.2.3.1 *Burke's Pentad*

The **pentad** is a practical instrument that allows for the investigation of the rhetors' motives as presented through rhetoric. It assumes the inquisitive modern form of a more ancient literary probe, as Burke acknowledges:

"I actually quoted the formula that would later be the basis of the pentad (or hexad); namely, the mediaeval Latin hexameter: quis (who), quid (what), ubi (where), quibus auxiliis (by what means), cur (why), quomodo (how), quando (when)."³¹

For this investigation, Burke (1945:xv) defined five terms which would be applied in the analysis to extract motives from the symbolic language used by the rhetor: *the act, scene, agent, agency, purpose*.

Furthermore, Burke (1945:xxii) compares the pentad of terms to a hand in the sense that the fingers, albeit distinct, have a common point at the palm of the hand. This connection is clearer when the terms are analysed considering their mutual relations or ratios (Burke 1945:3-15). The study of the ratios involves the analysis of the relations between the terms.

The ratios include combinations of *scene-act, scene-agent, scene-agency, scene-purpose, act-purpose, act-agent, act-agency, agent-purpose, agent-agency, and agency-purpose*. Although these constitute ten ratios, by reversing the position of the terms since they are in pairs, one will account for twenty pairs. These relations between the terms were defined by Burke (1945:15) as "*principles of determination*" which can be more or less intense depending whether a term has a greater influence on the others. The degree of influence depends on determined assumptions about the inherent nature of one term and the consequent *terministic relationships* (Burke 1945:78). Past experiences, cultural notions and stereotypes are factors that play a role in the naming of the terms of the pentad as well as ascertaining the established terministic relationships. It follows from here that we accept as logical and natural that certain agents perform certain acts in certain scenes through certain agencies to achieve certain purposes. Burke went further and stated that the dominant term will reflect the rhetor's perspective of the

³¹ Kenneth Burke, "Questions and Answers about the Pentad", *College Composition and Communication*, Vol. 19, December 1978, p. 332.

situation. According to Brock (188), Burke assigned the dominance of a term with a different philosophical view:

“If, for example, act is featured as the dominant term, the corresponding philosophy is realism, the doctrine that universal principles are more real than the objects we sense through our senses. If scene is featured, the corresponding philosophy is materialism, the system that regards all facts and reality as explainable in terms of physical laws. If agent is featured, idealism is the corresponding philosophy. This is the system that views the mind or spirit as each person experiences it as fundamentally real. If the featured term is agency, the corresponding philosophy is pragmatism, the means necessary to attain a goal. If purpose is featured, the corresponding philosophy is mysticism; the element of unity is emphasized to the point that individuality disappears.”

By ascertaining the dominant term and the correspondent philosophical school, the critic is closer to finding the motive that compels the rhetor. Furthermore, since the dominant term corresponds to the rhetor’s specific view of reality it also provides the rhetor’s solutions to deal with the situation.

2.2.2.3.2 Imagery

The power of imagery is substantial as it shares the same root as imagination. Hart (217-218) adds that “imagery increases the range of things that can be said and, more fundamentally, the range of things that can be thought”. The metaphor, one of the categories of imagery, is one example of how images can be used to produce associations between things and ideas. In a simple way, as derived from Lakoff and Johnson³², metaphors are names and symbols which represent something and allow it to stand for something else and have a significant impact on the way people perceive things, their relation to the world and everyday’s realities.

Lakoff and Johnson (4) stated that the concept of metaphor is not just a matter pertaining to the poetic or linguistic fields:

“[...] metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. The

³² G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1980, p. 4.

concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intellect. [...]. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people.

Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.”

Therefore it is to be understood that metaphors result from thought as the whole human conceptual system is organised through the use of metaphorical structures. In the same way, metaphors do stimulate our behaviour as they allow the transposition of concepts into thoughts and actions. The way we understand and experience things from the physical world is also connected to the metaphorical concepts. The use of metaphors is closely linked to these metaphorical concepts whose nature influences the actions undertaken by people, as Lakoff and Johnson (158) point out:

“In all aspects of life, not just in politics or in love, we define our reality in terms of metaphors and then proceed to act on the basis of the metaphors. We draw inferences, set goals, make commitments, and execute plans, all on the basis of how we in part structure our experience, consciously and unconsciously, by means of metaphor.”

Lakoff and Johnson indicated several functions that a metaphor performs, and Hart (219-220) summarised them:

- 1) *Metaphors selectively highlight ideas*: a metaphor allows the rhetor to focus on one aspect of a concept which is relevant to him, to his culture or to the context. On the other hand, the highlighting can lead to hiding, which refers to neglecting other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with the nature of that metaphor.
- 2) *Metaphors are often generative*: metaphors provide another view of things by putting them in another perspective and eliciting different meanings.
- 3) *Metaphors often mask ideas and values*: they include in their conceptual framework certain ideas and values that are culturally determined, but that also relate to the individual's experience. As these images get ingrained in a culture, their implied meaning becomes almost imperceptible for the users.
- 4) *Metaphors have entailments*: that is to say that not only metaphors have certain meanings but can also imply other things. One of the most pressing examples comes from Lakoff

and Johnson (9) with the time is money metaphor, which entails that time is a limited resource and therefore another entailment suggests that time is a valuable commodity. The entailments associated with images can usually lead to an understanding of the views behind people's actions.

In order to study metaphors, Hart (220) suggests a systematic analysis. There are recurrent patterns and themes in the use of metaphors that can be classified as coherent. Lakoff and Johnson (7) argue that to understand the systematicity of metaphors it is necessary to observe the systematic relationship between metaphorical expressions and metaphorical concepts. The way this relationship materializes in metaphorical linguistic expressions tells us something about the very nature of the metaphorical concepts as well as the underlying structure of our own activities. In terms of critical probes, Hart (220) asks the following questions:

1. What families of metaphors reside in the text?
2. Are they internally consistent?
3. What is their cumulative effect?

In order to reply to these questions, it is necessary to perform a systematic analysis of the type of metaphors that appear in (1) the speeches made by the Chinese and Angolan leaders during the 2003 Ministerial Conference of the Forum Macao, and the 2003 Action Plan; (2) the speeches made by the Chinese and Angolan leaders during the 2006 Ministerial Conference of the Forum Macao, and the 2006 Action Plan; and (3) the 2006 China's African Policy.

Table 2: Metaphors used in the speeches of Chinese and Angolan leaders at the 2003 and 2006 Ministerial Conferences of Forum Macao; the 2003 and 2006 Action Plans of Forum Macao; and China’s African Policy.

	Home	Pearl	Platform	Bridge	Propulsor	Harvest	Cultivation	Engine	Foundations	Road	Freeway	
<i>2003</i>												
Wu Yi	2	1	1	1	1							6
Edmund Ho			1	1								2
An Min			4			1						5
Chen Jian			1									1
Domingos Hossi								1				1
Action Plan			2									2
<i>2006</i>												
Hua Jianmin			1	1		2	2					6
Edmund Ho			3	1								4
Bo Xilai		1	7	2							1	11
Joaquim Muafumba									1			1
Action Plan			3	1					1			5
China’s African Policy												
			1							4		5
	2	2	24	7	1	3	2	1	2	4	1	<u>49</u>

The immediate inference from the table allows for a categorisation of metaphors. The images presented in the table are generally equated with Macao, the Forum Macao and the subsequent economic and trade cooperation³³.

Hart (220:221) alludes to the importance of ascertaining the families of metaphors in order to understand the thematic most relevant for the rhetor. As will be proved in the following parts, in the table above, apart from “pearl” which belongs to the natural order, all the other metaphors belong to the socio-political order. Even the ones more associated to the natural order, “cultivation” and “harvest”, require human action and effort to occur. While Hart found Osborn’s system as very helpful because it included eleven general categories, he made reference to other families that the critic could very well identify in specific texts such as mechanistic metaphors. In fact, all the ten metaphors included in the socio-political order can be somehow associated with mechanic processes. A more specific designation would include them in construction or engineering metaphors. The images allude to something that requires work, that is built or designed by man and involves the use of machines or something that is the result of human ingenuity.

A closer look at its traditional meanings reveals:

1. The home as a place of safety and comfort;
2. The pearl which is precious and of high-value;
3. The platform where work can be performed;
4. The bridge which provides a way across and increases connections;
5. The propulsor that drives forward;
6. The harvest which allows for gathering the fruits of labour;
7. The cultivation which precedes growth;
8. The engine that converts energy into motion;
9. The foundations as the layer providing a solid base;
10. The road which leads to a destination;
11. The freeway which allows long-distance journeys at high speed;

Taking into account Lakoff and Johnson’s (236) experientialist perspective which characterises the metaphor as “a matter of imaginative rationality “, we can grasp the depth of these images by virtue of their translation of experiences that are structured in the physical

³³ The exceptions are in China’s African Policy in which “platform” refers to FOCAC and “road” is associated with development.

world into the socio-political order. They are not just images representing things that exist in the physical world as they will also represent development in the minds of people.

Metaphors go beyond language as they influence our conceptual structure. Lakoff and Johnson (235-236) argued that there is also an aesthetic experience related to metaphors as they delve into the natural dimensions of how we experience things, namely our senses and the inputs we get in terms of “colour, shape, texture, sound”. Metaphors then involve dimensions of concepts, language and aesthetics. According to Hart (221), these patterns identify the “speaker’s general mental habits and the audience’s perceived motivational bases”.

In this case, it seems safe to say that these mental habits and motivational bases are congruent with the aspirations of those involved in the cooperation process. China has witnessed an incredible surge in the construction of infrastructures in the last decades motivated by high rates of economic growth, whose pace is of course necessary to maintain. The other developing countries have also been immersed in the same trend or have real aspirations to achieve a similar level. All of these images project a reality that is coherent with China’s foreign policy. It delves into a reality of construction, growth and development that is associated with the vehicles of beneficial cooperation i.e. the *forums*. Moreover, China is perceived as a role model in terms of growth that is quite attractive to the audience. Even the images used by the Angolan representatives (engine and foundations) are coherent with the ones used by the Chinese representatives. Thus, cooperation with China does portray pictures of mutual benefit through the chosen images.

Regarding the functions performed by metaphors, it is possible to draw some conclusions. These images clearly highlight ideas of construction, growth and development. On the other hand, they omit the consequences to the environment and ecosystem arising from human action. Cooperation with China doesn't generate ideas of inertia, but of a forward motion to achieve development. The Chinese model with its emphasis on hard work and long-term goals is *masked* in the ideas and values transmitted by these images. Not only do these images entail meanings related to their traditional physical expression, but they also imply that they are part of the path to development. The images provide the grounds for mutual understanding as meaning is being negotiated by ascertaining commonalities in past or present terms and bridging into the future. The metaphors that were chosen are appropriate for their communicational purpose as they use concepts from one domain of experience to highlight experiences into a different domain. In doing so, a shared vision of the future is being established among the interested parties in the cooperation process. One of the intended

results, as described by Lakoff and Johnson (232-233) is the creation of *rapport* as these metaphors highlight and give coherence to past experiences, the present activities, the dreams, hopes and goals.

In continuity with the central ideas of the theory of symbolic action (guilt-purification-redemption), the images employed are consentaneous with the rhetoric of rebirth. According to Rueckert (97), through rhetoric a “ritual of cure” can take place in which the rhetor can purge his guilt, tension or anxiety. On the same note, rhetoric allows for a ritual of rebirth in which the rhetor, through symbolic identification, can accomplish changes of identity. This empowerment process of the rhetor is aided by a rhetoric that Rueckert (97) classifies as a "from-to" affair, through which the rhetor moves from “burdened to unburdened, from problem to solution, from guilt to expiation”.

Purification and redemption involve processes associated with a symbolic rebirth. The guilt, tension or anxiety arising from being labelled as developing and for coexisting in an unequal international system need to be purged. Actions need to be taken in order to break the cycle of underdevelopment (**the problem**) to which the forums (**the solution**) represent the driving force for change. Hence, **cooperation**, whose goal is to achieve **development and prosperity**, provides the **mechanism for purification**. The images not only relate to the construction of infrastructures, but also symbolize in itself an advanced stage of development. This rhetoric filled with images of construction represents this appeal for change as these infrastructures not only change the physical world, but also symbolize the improvement of the *status* of these countries. A rebirth through a change of identity from *developing* to *developed* is a very powerful motivation and the rhetoric provides hope and solutions for this redemption. After building the imagery, a very important element is to bring the audience to identify with the rhetor.

2.2.2.3.3. Identification and Languag

Another very important component of dramatism is the concept of identification, which Burke developed in his 1950 work, *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Burke went beyond the definition of persuasion as a method of strong push towards agreement to devise a more soft way of inducing cooperation:

"All told, persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest of advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social etiquette, education, and the sermon, to a "pure" form that delights in the process of appeal itself alone, without ulterior purpose. And identification ranges from the politician

who, addressing an audience of farmers, says, "I was a farm boy myself", through the mysteries of social status, to the mystic's devout identification with the source of all being."³⁴

Identification in a Burkean sense reaches into commonalities in terms of values, experiences and aspirations. In fact, for Burke (1969:41) identification intermingles with his own definition of rhetoric as "the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or induce actions in other human agents". Identification is then an ancillary instrument at the service of the rhetor that is used to create feelings of identity, whether by shared existence and history or by current interests, in order to generate a rapport with the audience. Since the notion of identification revolves around shared values and objectives, it is closely related with consubstantiality as Burke (1969:20) describes:

"A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so."

According to Brock (187), the "speakers' language will reveal the substance out of which they expect to identify with their listeners" and so by substance, Burke is referring to the beliefs, values and characteristics of the audience. Consubstantiality then materializes in the form of a shared substance in the sense of identification by common goals. Thus, the power of rhetoric is demonstrated when distinct people or groups, which apparently are very different, can become consubstantial with others and make alliances. Burke (1969:22) adds that "identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division" and "identification is compensatory to division".

As in a coin there are heads and tails, the other face of identification is division because there is always us and them. Burke (1969:45) then establishes that rhetoric involves us in matters of socialisation and faction, as individuals can be in a state of separation, then brought together by association and simultaneously become separated from another group. Individuality and freewill allow the appearance of different ways of assimilating and processing information which lead to different perceptions of reality and attitudes.

Therefore, it is logical to assume that identification and division are intrinsic to human nature and these factors are progressive due to the hierarchic structure of society and social positions.

³⁴ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969, p. xiv.

As social beings, humans have a natural tendency to associate in groups in which there are common values, interests, experiences and aims. Identification is then a *sine qua non* condition for the formation of groups. This process includes several stages such as: the naming and description of characteristics pertaining to things or people; the association into groups or alienation of them according to specific commonalities or differences, respectively; and the culminating stage of reaching consubstantiality with others. Rhetoric is more essential in the second stage since it is at this point that persuasion is enacted and choices are made. Language is an instrument that allows humans to form and shape attitudes and therefore it is crucial for identification. When moving towards identification, the rhetor uses a specific rhetorical language to establish a close rapport with the audience through “identification of interests” as described by Burke (1969:46):

“As for the relation between "identification" and "persuasion": we might well keep it in mind that a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his act of persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker's interest; and the speaker draws on the identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his audience.”

The main intent of the rhetor is to assert commonalities between both parties so that consubstantiality is reached. To do so, a framework that underlines shared characteristics must be established, as it will be seen from the policy paper and the discourse analysis. Before proceeding to the analysis of China’s rhetoric towards the Portuguese-speaking countries and African states, a brief overview will be given to the “stage-setting”, namely, the means through which China wants to cooperate with other countries.

2.3 The First Step: China and the Creation of International Forums

In the last decade of the 20th century, China became increasingly involved in the international system in political, diplomatic and economic terms. Contrary to the post-WWII decades in which the emphasis was on a pro-socialist, anti-imperialist ideology, China's message to the developing countries now consists in a more pragmatic approach focused on ***trade, energy and political cooperation***. The developing world has become a strategic target of China's foreign policy. In this sense, China created the necessary contexts in which it could engage with the envisaged partners.

Of particularly importance to China is the African continent, which encompasses a high number of developing countries. To enhance the relations and the cooperation with the

African countries, a Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)³⁵ was created, with the active involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the definition and implementation of foreign policy initiatives towards Africa. FOCAC is defined as “*a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective consultation and dialogue*” where principles such as cooperation, equality and mutual benefit can be pursued and lead to development.³⁶ The first Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, hosted by President Jiang Zemin in 2000, gathered in Beijing more than 80 Ministers from China and from 44 African countries. The second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC was held in 2003, in Addis Ababa, with 70 Ministers from China and from 44 African countries. Three years later, in the third Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, President Hu Jintao received 41 heads of state or government and senior officials of 48 African countries in Beijing.

Another important group of countries in China’s foreign policy consists of the Portuguese-speaking countries³⁷, out of which four of them also participate in FOCAC. It was in 1513 that Portuguese explorers first arrived in China. As mentioned earlier, there is an important symbolic attachment to Macao, which has a resonance in the group of the Portuguese-speaking countries. The group of Portuguese-speaking countries encompasses Angola, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor-Leste. The Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao) is composed of China and seven Portuguese-speaking countries (São Tomé and Príncipe³⁸ is the exception). The first Ministerial Conference took place in Macao in 2003 and the second Ministerial Conference was held in 2006. Significant progresses have occurred in bilateral and multilateral relations since the creation of Forum Macao, the most obvious of them being visible in economic trade flows.

These forums have been used by China as a means and as stages to deliver its rhetoric and to generate identification and a common imagery with the target countries. In the following two chapters, China’s rhetoric will be viewed through the framework presented above, first, by analysing the rhetoric directed to the Portuguese-speaking countries at Forum Macao 2003 and its Action Plan, second, by a critical assessment of China’s African Policy and lastly, by focalising China’s policy towards Angola.

³⁵ Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Retrieved from <http://www.focac.org/eng/>.

³⁶ Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. Retrieved from <http://www.focac.org/eng/gylt/ltjj/t157576.htm>.

³⁷ The population of the Portuguese-speaking countries is estimated at around 250 million people.

³⁸ It maintains official relations with Taiwan and it is not a member of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries.

3. The Quest for Global Influence: Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries

3.1. Setting the Stage, Reversing the Game: Creating Forum Macao

The historical significance of Macao for both China and the Portuguese-speaking world has been briefly mentioned in the previous chapters. In building its global influence, an important component of China's foreign policy is to fulfil its nationalistic aims by restoring to its sovereignty territories that once were under its influence. Besides the current issues with Taiwan, in the recent past this has happened with Hong Kong in 1997 and with Macao in 1999. The Chinese and Portuguese governments signed the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao in Beijing on 13 April 1987, which signalled the return of Macao to full Chinese sovereignty on 20 December 1999. With the status of Special Administrative Region, Macao had the privilege to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, considering the fact that the Chinese government is responsible for the territory's defence and foreign affairs, consonant with the adoption of the policy of "*one country, two systems*",³⁹ and may represent the winds of change of China's traditional approach to international politics.

Macao occupies a small area on the western side of the Pearl River Delta and has around half a million inhabitants. Of these, 120,000 are Portuguese citizens, with only 10,000 of Portuguese descent and another 3,000 originating from Portugal. This is the result of a nearly five centuries old relationship that established Macao as the first European permanent settlement in China as well as the last European territory in Asia. In December 2002, after a meeting with President Jiang Zemin, the first Chief Executive of Macao, Edmund Ho Hau Wah, declared that an economic forum between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries would enable Macao to act as a development platform between the participants in addition to promoting economic development in the region. His rhetoric consisted of "taking advantage of the historical links" and pointing out that "cooperating with the Portuguese-speaking countries means investing in our own characteristics".⁴⁰ It came as no surprise that Macao was chosen as the official venue of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between

³⁹ US Library of Congress, "Nationalism, Country Studies, China". Retrieved from <http://countrystudies.us/china/124.htm>.

⁴⁰ "China apóia Macau no relacionamento com países da CPLP", *Notícias Lusófonas*, 11 December 2002. Retrieved from <http://www.noticiaslusofonas.com/view.php?load=arcview&article=597&catogory=news>.

China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao). Macao once had a major role in the relations between Portugal and China and it is again at the centre of international relations by being the connecting platform between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries. This liaison role that Macao has been performing heightens its importance in the Chinese foreign policy at the economic and geo-strategic levels. Moisés Fernandes, director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Lisbon, confirmed this view by stating “while Macao is not a financial centre with the international dimension of Hong Kong, by acting as a platform between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries, through the forum, it reinforces its political weight at the internal and external levels”.⁴¹ Hence, Macao offered the chance to continue a historical partnership, and to exploit a common and familiar scene with the role, this time, to serve as a platform from which China could promote its peaceful development towards the developing Portuguese-speaking countries.

3.2. “Promoting a New Cooperation, Writing a New Chapter”

Ms. Wu Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, started her speech on “*Promoting a new cooperation, writing a new chapter*”⁴², at the first Ministerial Conference of the 2003 Forum Macao, by giving a warmth welcome, on behalf of the Chinese government, to all the friends that came to participate in the Forum organised in the beautiful city of Macao. She continues by mentioning the historical ties and the permanent economic and cultural links that unite Macao and the Portuguese-speaking countries. In her words, the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum assumes a special meaning and marks a new stage in the role of Macao as a bridge that promotes the links between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries. The warm welcome to this group of friends in a place meant to act as a bridge is more meaningful as she continues to build the common imaginary.

The rhetor plays a crucial role in conveying the motives through rhetoric and the act of speaking is to be considered an important action as the rhetor both “says something and does something” (Hart:60). The rhetor, by virtue of its role, chooses its audience, the

⁴¹ “Macau reforça autonomia ao servir de plataforma entre China e lusofonia”, *Agência Lusa*, 8 September 2008. Retrieved from <http://timor-online.blogspot.ch/2008/09/macau-refora-autonomia-ao-servir-de.html>.

⁴² The speeches of the 2003 and 2006 Ministerial Conferences of Forum Macao were available in Chinese and Portuguese. In this thesis, the original quotations are presented in Portuguese and a translation into English, by the author, is presented in a footnote.

location, the moment and the duration of the speech. These factors already contain in themselves plenty of meaning as they reflect some important decisions made by the rhetor.

It is of paramount importance that such a high-level politician such as Ms. Wu Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, makes the inaugural speech at the official banquet of the first Forum Macao.

She studied at the Beijing Petroleum Institute, where she majored in oil refinery engineering and graduated in 1962, having worked in the petrochemical sector for over two decades⁴³. From 1991-1998, she served at high levels in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and then headed the Ministry of International Trade and Economic Cooperation. She played a critical role in the negotiations for China's entry into the World Trade Organization. In March 2003, she was appointed Vice Premier of the State Council of China, making her the most powerful woman in China. In April 2003, she was also appointed Minister of Health and her determination in dealing with the SARS crisis earned her considerable praise. *Forbes* magazine considered her the second most powerful woman in the world in 2004, 2005 and 2007 and the third most powerful in 2006,⁴⁴ and she is respectfully known as China's Iron Lady.

The relevance of Forum Macao to China is clearly visible in the fact that Ms. Wu Yi is the highest Chinese representative at the Ministerial Conference. She is an experienced negotiator of trade agreements and her professional background in the oil industry, particularly taking into account Angola's vast reserves, makes her the most adequate person to address this audience.

3.2.1 Building a Common Imagery: Responding to Common Challenges

Rhetorical acts have a performative character and include "implicit messages" as described by Hart (61):

1) The speaker feels that something is wrong: people feel the need to speak in order to deal with a situation or problems that need to be corrected.

⁴³ Ms. Wu Yi joined the Communist Party the same year she graduated, and worked as a technician at the Lanzhou Oil Refinery. In 1965, she became a technician at the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, Production and Technology Department. Two years later, she worked at the Beijing Dongfang Hong Refinery where she went from technician to deputy director. From 1983-1988, she was deputy general manager of the Yanshan Petrochemical Corporation.

Retrieved from <http://chineseculture.about.com/od/thechinesegovernment/p/WuYi.htm>.

⁴⁴ The 100 Most Powerful Women, *Forbes*, 30 August 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/11/GGD7.html>.

2) The speaker is not yet desperate: people that use rhetoric feel that there is an opportunity to change the status quo.

The speech uses specific vocabulary with the intent of establishing a common link. She starts by depicting the dynamics of international environment:

“Hoje em dia, com o desenvolvimento aprofundado da globalização económica e as rápidas mudanças tecnológicas, os contactos económicos e comerciais entre os diversos países tornam-se cada vez mais estreitos; os mercados mais abertos; e mais acelerada a circulação de capitais, tecnologia e pessoal qualificado a nível mundial. A cooperação regional em desenvolvimento proporciona-nos a oportunidade inédita para promover prosperidade e o desenvolvimento comum.”⁴⁵

The words that Ms. Wu Yi uses are meant to bring the participants in the context and to build a common imaginary. Hart (66) defines lexicon as "words that are unique to a group or individual and that have special rhetorical power" besides "setting people apart". The warmth welcoming to a beautiful city where all these friends are reunited forms a feeling of union between the speaker and the audience. The setting of this Conference, the beautiful city of Macao, is a place where Portuguese language has been spoken for more than four centuries and where the West met the East attaching Macao to a unique kind of history of its own. Therefore, Macao is a physical location that takes a special social and rhetorical significance (Hart:53). The speaker, by using verbs in the first person, conveys a level of familiarity towards the audience. A group of friends stands apart from other people because they have something in common. This group is reminded of this by the reference to their common history and to their economic and cultural links that have been permanent and long lasting. Stability and closeness has been the trademark of these relationships and make any difficult episodes seem vain and lost in time. The role of Macao is metaphorically described by comparing it to a bridge. By travelling great distances to come to this common meeting point, the participants must at least have some willingness to cross the bridge, communicate and establish a relationship. Henceforth, as Hart (49) implied “simply agreeing to become part of an audience can constitute a major social statement”.

⁴⁵ Speech of Ms. Wu Yi at the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao), 12 October 2003.

“Nowadays, with the further development of economic globalisation and rapid technological changes, economic and commercial contacts between countries become increasingly narrow; markets become more open; and there is a faster circulation of capital, technology and skilled personnel worldwide. Regional cooperation in development gives us the unique opportunity to promote common development and prosperity”.

A style described as Human Interest (Hart:168) is used to captivate the audience. This style is characterised by making references to people (*with you, friends, ministers, businessmen, representatives*) that are inclusive in the sense of group membership.

Ms. Wu Yi then stresses that cooperation "gives us a unique opportunity to promote common prosperity and development" and with the fast pace of global developments, the best way to benefit would be through a strong partnership. The agenda of the Forum has been built around these values that have attached to them an almost compulsory adherence. Cooperation, prosperity and development are terms that encompass a wider meaning to mankind as they ultimately have the intention of leading to a greater good. Furthermore, the participants are reminded that the Forum is an instrument of regional cooperation that provides a unique opportunity to reach common values and goals, unique opportunities depicted in positive terms associated with blessings, sacrifice and obedience⁴⁶ as China gradually builds its influence.

The concept of *hierarchy* in the economic development has been marked by disequilibrium between different countries and territories. A description of the relationship between rhetoric and hierarchy is given through George Lakoff's metaphor of "Maturity is Industrialisation":

"The Maturity is Industrialisation metaphor has sometimes been combined with the "Strict Father" family model, where strict parents dictate what is right and wrong, instil discipline and punish children when they do wrong. Correspondingly, the industrialised nations dictate to the developing and non-industrialised nations what is right and wrong about how they should run their economies; they instil financial discipline (through the International Monetary Fund and World Bank); and they financially punish the developing and non-industrialised nations when those nations do not do as they are told (for their own good, of course). It has become natural to think of Third World nations, via this metaphor, as recalcitrant children."⁴⁷

Ms. Wu Yi stresses that because of the differences between North and South in terms of economic development and political influence, the South has been a victim of the globalisation process:

⁴⁶ Changing Minds, *Ultimate Terms*. Retrieved from http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/ultimate_terms.htm.

⁴⁷ George Lakoff, "Metaphorical Thought in Foreign Policy - Why Strategic Framing Matters", The Frameworks Institute, December 1999, p. 11.

“Devido ao desequilíbrio do desenvolvimento económico entre os diversos países e territórios do mundo, principalmente a diferença que se verifica no desenvolvimento do Norte e do Sul, alguns países em vias de desenvolvimento sentem a pressão da concorrência do exterior e sofrem profundamente o impacto causado pela agitação económica. De entre os países de língua portuguesa que participam neste Fórum, alguns são do sistema económico em desenvolvimento, mas isto não prejudica a nossa cooperação económica recíproca. O estudo conjunto da forma de como se reforçar o intercâmbio e cooperação nas áreas económica e comercial entre a China e os países lusófonos, bem como reforçar e prosperar a economia do Continente Chinês, da RAEM e dos países lusófonos não só constituem necessidades que devemos satisfazer para fazer face aos desafios como também são aspectos importantes que este Fórum enfrenta.”⁴⁸

Ms. Wu Yi implies that this established hierarchy can be altered, if the Portuguese-speaking countries are willing to implement a strong partnership with China. The representatives of this group of countries understand what the speaker is alluding to when using the words “pressure”, “impact”, and “agitation”. They know that their countries are the ones that suffer the most in this unbalanced state of affairs of the current international system. These words establish group identification by setting apart different types divided between North and South. The use of imagery is very strong due to the concepts being associated with North and South. The former stands for the developed countries, often with an imperialist and aggressive past, while the latter refers to the developing countries, with a history of oppression by the imperialist powers. Antithesis as a figure of speech involving a contradiction of ideas seems to be associated with the images surrounding North and South. These contradictory images do reinforce the group separation described by the speaker. The speaker cannot be exclusively the “*prophet of doom*” or “*the carrier of bad news*”. In order to elicit support from the audience, the speaker does have to remind them of the injustice imposed upon them, but an alternative must be presented that serves as a path to justice. The rhetor carries a message of hope and to counteract the threats of disequilibrium and

⁴⁸ Speech of Ms. Wu Yi at the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao), 12 October 2003. “Due to the imbalance of economic development among countries and territories of the world, especially the difference that exists in the development of the North and South, some developing countries feel the pressure of competition from abroad and are deeply affected by the unrest caused by economic turmoil. Among the Portuguese-speaking countries participating in this forum, some of them belong to the developing economic system, but this will not affect our mutual economic cooperation. The joint study on how to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the economic and trade areas between China and Portuguese-speaking countries, as well as strengthen and prosper the economy of Mainland China, Macao SAR and Portuguese-speaking countries are not only needs that we must meet to address the challenges, but they are also important aspects that this forum is faced with.”

difference, China proposes working together to reinforce the other positive terms, *cooperation* and *prosperity*, which the Forum has adopted as its goals.

3.2.2 Introducing the Rhetoric: a New Chapter

Completing the imaginary and the identification picture, Ms. Wu Yi introduces the Chinese position in foreign affairs:

“A China defende sempre a política de boa convivência e de boa parceria com os países vizinhos, reforçando a boa vizinhança e cooperação económica e comercial com todos os países do mundo, incluindo os países de língua portuguesa. É, pois, o Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa uma acção concreta para desenvolvimento deste tipo de relações amistosas e de cooperação económica.”⁴⁹

The Chinese foreign policy is described as highly benign and benevolent as its neighbourhood, economic and commercial cooperation policies are endowed with goodness. There is an upbeat and optimistic tone here confirmed by the triple repetition of the word "good", so the audience can feel reassured of China's intentions. China's foreign policy is portrayed as revolving more on soft power, such as maintaining good relationships, than making use of hard power, such as military and economic strength.

In what concerns relationships, the Chinese have a reputation for emphasising cooperation and "avoiding conflict due to their expectation that direct expressions of conflict would damage the relationship and the greater value they place in having good relationships".⁵⁰ It is then found that deep core values and norms hinder Chinese preference for conflict and orientate their penchant for cooperation. Hence their predilection for face-saving strategies, not using direct language, flexibility and that inclination for long-term perspectives that brands them as being very patient. It is also a good strategy in the case that things are not working exactly as expected, making an implicit and suggestive vocabulary more adequate than a direct one. The importance that a society places on the individual and

⁴⁹ Speech of Ms. Wu Yi at the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao), 12 October 2003.

“China always defends a policy of good relationships and partnerships with neighbouring countries, aiming at reinforcing good neighbourhood and economic and trade cooperation with all the countries in the world, including the Portuguese-speaking countries. The Forum is indeed a concrete action for the development of this type of friendly relations and economic cooperation.”

⁵⁰ Raymond A. Friedman and Shu-Cheng Chi, “Explaining the Chinese Preference for Conflict Avoiding: an Exploration of Five Alternative Models”, IACM 15th Annual Conference, 2002, p. 2. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID304605_code020320140.pdf?abstractid=304605&mirid=1.

its position vis-à-vis the others also influence the group relationships as argued by James W. Neuliep:

“Horizontal collectivism is the cultural orientation where the individual sees the self as a member of an in-group whose members are similar to one another. The self is interdependent and the same as the self of others. Equality is expected and practiced within this orientation. China is probably a good example of horizontal collectivism.”⁵¹

It then appears clear that as equality and interdependence are core values of the Chinese culture, concepts such as group harmony, social order and collective interests play a major role in maintaining the Confucian principles of harmony, justice and unity.

Moreover, Hsu states "that the very concept of person in Chinese culture (“ren”) is not of an individual person, but of the individual’s transactions with his fellow human beings”.⁵² Indeed, a culture that emphasises the collective interest and relationships with others while avoiding conflict is consequently more prone to accept conformity positions. Hence social norms and rules would justify Chinese propensity to uphold cooperation as the most effective means to use in negotiations. A culture that underlines the individual and favours direct approaches to negotiations should be more prone to sometimes neglect soft power. On the other hand, China’s soft power radiates goodness that embraces all the countries in the world, particularly the members of Forum Macao.

3.3 China as Development Partner

To act through a concrete tool, supported by the Chinese government, and to develop friendly relations and economic cooperation with the aim of benefiting all the participants, Ms. Wu Yi then adopts a more personal tone reinforcing the common goals of development and prosperity:

“Creio que os senhores ministros dos países participantes e senhores representantes são capazes de aproveitar plenamente a oportunidade proporcionada por este Fórum, para trocar ideias sobre as matérias relevantes que se verificam no desenvolvimento económico da China e dos países e territórios

⁵¹ James W. Neuliep, *Intercultural Communication: A Contextual Approach*, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 58.

⁵² F.L.K Hsu, “A hypothesis on kinship and culture”, in F.L.K. Hsu (ed.), *Kinship and Culture*, Chicago: Aldine, 1971, p. 29.

de Língua Portuguesa, procurando vias de cooperação, tendo como objectivo realizar o objectivo comum de desenvolvimento e prosperidade.”⁵³

Ms. Wu Yi also makes a forecast of the future by putting forward a desirable image to which partner countries are attracted to. While emphasising China’s internal transformations, she makes confident predictions about the future declaring that in the next two decades, China will grow fast and build a society with a "wealthy middle class", benefiting also the countries and companies that have contacts with China. Ms. Wu Yi also states that, compared with 2000, China’s GDP will double in 2020, reaching US\$4 trillion⁵⁴. Moreover, she stresses the commitment of the Chinese leaders to a long term relationship:

“O Governo Chinês irá manter a continuidade e estabilidade da política económica, impulsionando a reforma e abertura, cumprindo seriamente os compromissos assumidos com o ingresso na Organização Mundial do Comércio, e promovendo dum forma activa a cooperação internacional multidireccional, em múltiplas áreas e com mais profundidade. A China vai reforçar e estreitar as relações de cooperação económica e comercial com os Países de Língua Portuguesa.”⁵⁵

In the speech, there is a natural tendency to point out the historical and cultural contacts between the participants of Forum Macao. Therefore, Macao is the centrepiece around which the power of attraction is built and a common bridge is laid:

"Macao tem mantido um permanente intercâmbio cultural e económico com os países de língua portuguesa".

"Creio que se sentem em casa em Macau, um local que possui características chinesas e portuguesas".⁵⁶

⁵³ Speech of Ms. Wu Yi at the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao), 12 October 2003.

"I believe that ministers of the participating countries and representatives are able to take full advantage of the opportunity of this forum to exchange ideas on relevant matters that arise in the economic development of China and the Portuguese-speaking countries and territories, seeking cooperation avenues, aiming to achieve the common objective of development and prosperity."

⁵⁴ In fact, China's GDP surpassed that figure already in 2008 by reaching US\$4.52 trillion.

<http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/GDP#2008>.

⁵⁵ Speech of Ms. Wu Yi at the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao), 12 October 2003.

"The Chinese government will maintain the continuity and stability of economic policy, promoting the reform and opening up, seriously fulfilling its commitments towards the World Trade Organization, and promoting in an active way a multi-directional international cooperation in multiple areas and in more depth. China will enhance and strengthen the relations of economic and trade cooperation with the Portuguese-speaking countries."

⁵⁶ Speech of Ms. Wu Yi at the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries (Forum Macao), 12 October 2003.

"Macao has maintained permanent cultural and economic exchanges with the Portuguese-speaking countries..."
"I believe that you feel at home in Macao, a place that possesses Chinese and Portuguese characteristics."

An increased economic cooperation and a stronger partnership will result in mutual benefits for all the participants, at the political and economic levels.

3.4. A Realistic, Forward Looking Image

A parallelism is drawn between the development of China and the world itself. They are both interconnected and only by actively participating in international cooperation can the Chinese way of development be diffused to other countries. As such, if the developing countries of the world want to emulate the Chinese development model it is necessary that they give emphasis to international cooperation. On its behalf, the Chinese government uses a style of certainty to reassure that it will keep on doing what is necessary and will respect its international commitments to promote a wider degree of international cooperation.

After historical narrations, hard-pressing facts and implanting the idea of mutual benefit in the mind of the participants, Ms. Wu Yi appeals to the symbol, Macao, which is described as one of China's "pearls". Since the return of Macao to the "Motherland", the Central Government has acted in strict compliance with the law, putting into practice the guiding principles of "one country, two systems", "administration by local residents" and a "high degree of autonomy". The socio-economic system of Macao remains unchanged, without the interference of the Central Government in the matters of the competence of the Government of the Special Administrative Region of Macao. In practical terms, the rights and freedoms of the Macanese citizens are protected by law, proving that China respects the agreements it signs. Ms. Wu Yi is pleased to see that under the orientation of the chief executive of Macao, Edmund Ho Hau Wah, the individualities from the multiple sectors of Macao, in the quality of "home owners" are actively participating in the social affairs of Macao. The narrative lines of the speech return to the present reality of Macao. What does Macao represent to China?

The audience learns that Macao is one of China's "pearls". It is true that geographically speaking Macao is located in the Pearl River Delta making it obvious to draw an association with a pearl than with another precious stone. The symbolism of this metaphor lies in the value of Macao as a "pearl". It is precious to China, despite its small territory and population, acting as a bridge through which China can make considerable capital gains due to its investment potential.

In a more visual perspective, when people think about the word "pearl", most likely, their mind will be drawn to the basic origin of a pearl (the oyster). This would seem to make perfect sense to a Chinese nationalist since symbolically Macao would be the precious, delicate pearl and China the strong, protective oyster. In continuity with the previous metaphor, Ms. Wu Yi uses another powerful symbol such as the "Motherland". The "Motherland" is a noble and majestic concept and elicits strong emotions and values - *union, allegiance, devotion, duty, and sacrifice* - by narrating a common history, culture and language of a specific group of people. The return of Macao (pearl) to China has had a profound meaning for the Chinese national psyche. This image employed by the speaker although flattering as it is to Macao also has another effective meaning for Chinese foreign policy. The other developing countries present at the Forum do understand and relate to this experience of temporarily ceding sovereignty over their land to another country, albeit time is healing the wounds between the participants.

Ms. Wu Yi also reaffirms China's peaceful intentions by using expressions such as "high degree of autonomy", "non-interference" and "equality". This has been a constant and recurrent feature in the rhetoric of Chinese foreign policy as these are values and symbols that China wants to inculcate in the minds of the participants. Ms. Wu Yi clearly corroborates the belief in these principles by using the example of Macao, stating that the Macanese are able to govern well their region. A reference and parallel to Hong Kong is done after the extensive description and praise of Macao. In a recent date prior to the speech, the Chinese Government has signed an agreement for closer economic and commercial cooperation with Hong Kong. Ms. Wu Yi states that the same type of agreement will be signed with Macao very soon. These agreements will necessarily favour a closer connection between Hong Kong, Macao and China and consequently reinforce the economic links between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries. She believes that the Forum and the Chinese-Macanese future agreement will result in a more important role of Macao in the Chinese-lusophone⁵⁷ economic and commercial relations. She then concludes her intervention by giving a more personal tone to the speech.

On her final note, Ms. Wu Yi directly addresses the participants and tells them she knows that they are comfortable in Macao because Macao is a blend of both worlds and feels like home to the lusophone people. The final remark is the most bonding experience of all

⁵⁷ Portuguese-speaking. Luso derives from Lusitania, an ancient Roman province in the Iberian Peninsula, corresponding to modern Portugal. Retrieved from <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/lusophone>.

between high representatives: a toast to the Forum's success, the best future for Macao and for everybody's health. The speeches of other officials, such as the Vice-Minister of Commerce on topics such as economic cooperation and entrepreneurship, resonate with the statements of Ms. Wu Yi in her speech. Therefore, it can be inferred that the concept of peaceful cooperation is the basis for China's approach to a common development strategy.

3.5. Forum Macao through the Lenses of the Pentad

The Pentad and its objectives have been described in the second chapter. The identification of the five terms of the pentad is the first task to be accomplished when analysing the artifact: the written form of the speech that Ms. Wu Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council, gave at the dinner of the first Ministerial Conference of the Forum Macao on October 2003.

Following on Burke's definition of the pentadic terms, they shall be named as follows:

1. *The Act* as the Ministerial Conference.
2. *The Scene* as Macao, a historical meeting point between China and the Portuguese-speaking world.
3. *The Agent* as the Government Representatives from the Chinese and Portuguese-speaking countries. High-level representatives, mostly from the Ministries responsible for Economic and Trade affairs, acted on behalf of their respective countries in this first Ministerial Conference of the Forum Macao. It could also be possible to name the Chinese representatives as agents, as initiators, and the other countries' representatives as co-agents.
4. *The Agency* as Forum Macao, an instrument for Chinese diplomatic cooperation. This modality of diplomatic cooperation - multilateral forums - has been a driving force behind Chinese foreign policy in recent times.
5. *The Purpose* as the Increase of the Economic and Trade Cooperation.

This act of labelling of the terms of the pentad leads to the following description that provides the answers to the pentadic questions:

Through the Forum Macao, **the agency**, government representatives from China and the Portuguese-speaking countries, **the agents**, participated in a Ministerial Conference, **the act**, in Macao, **the scene**, in order to increase their countries' economic and trade cooperation, **the purpose**.

After completing the task of naming the pentadic terms, the following step is to analyse the relations between the terms and ascertain the dominant one. One could note that, the **agency**, or very simple, *the how to do it*, is the distinct element of the situation. Everything happens because of and around the Forum Macao. The scope of the action is intended to be on a multilateral basis, notwithstanding subsequent bilateral agreements that could arise between the participants. The Forum Macao is much more than a one-time summit to deal with a situation. It has the structural organisation, albeit small, of a multilateral body in which high-level representatives gather to pursue a specific purpose with the support of a Permanent Secretariat headquartered in Macao. This shows the level of importance and the investment made in this particular type of instrument.

According to Burke, when the dominant term is Agency the corresponding philosophical school is pragmatism.⁵⁸ The interpretation of pragmatism as defined in the Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology is:

“The doctrine that the whole ‘meaning’ of a conception expresses itself in its practical consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experiences to be expected, if the conception be true; [...]”⁵⁹

Pragmatists argue that our perception of reality is based on our own experience. It is strongly connected to an empiricist view in which knowledge is verifiable by experience, due to their close boundaries. Since reality and experience are so interconnected, context would play a defining role in the formation of knowledge. Ideas would be judged context-wise by their effects and impact on the situation or environment. The practical effects of ideas and acts are to be the factors upon which their validity or truth would be measured. Pragmatism is then a philosophy that stresses action over reflection. This underlies the adoption of pragmatism when agency is ruled out to be the dominant term in rhetoric. Burke (1945:277) supported this notion because "according to [William] James, the pragmatist evaluates a doctrine by its ‘consequences,’ by what it is ‘good for,’ by the ‘the difference it will make to you and me,’

⁵⁸ The term has its origins in the work developed by Charles S. Peirce after 1868. Early renowned proponents were William James and John Dewey. The former is labelled as the most important figure of this school while the latter went to Japan and China in 1919 to spread the pragmatic doctrine. Pragmatism was predominant in American thought in the first decades of the 20th century.

⁵⁹ Henrik Rydenfelt, Meaning and Pragmatism, James on the Pragmatic Consequences of Belief, Helsinki, May 2008, p. 4. Retrieved from <http://www.nordprag.org/papers/Rydenfelt%20-%20Meaning%20and%20Pragmatism.pdf>.

or by its ‘functions,’ or by asking whether it ‘works satisfactorily’ . . . (that is, its function as a means in satisfying desires)".

The Forum Macao and its experiential consequences result from the diplomatic conduct adopted by the Chinese in accordance with their beliefs on international diplomatic cooperation. In **political terms**, the preference for a policy or course of action over others would be clarified in practical terms by ascertaining the practical consequences of this selection. The value of rhetoric is to be judged by the emotions it can stir in the audience and measured by the reactions it can cause. The focus on the agency and its particular set of characteristics can lead us to debate a “*Chinese way*” vis-à-vis the “*Western way*”. The former is certainly more action based and with fewer conditions attached in its policies. Pragmatism in some aspects does resemble a “*philosophy of business*”. It could be possible to say that the Chinese have mimicked this stance into their foreign policy as could be inferred from Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhou Wenzhong statement:

“Business is business. We try to separate politics from business... You [the West] have tried to impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on these [African] countries, which are not ready for it. We are also against embargoes, which you have tried to use against us.”⁶⁰

3.6. Message, Images and Meaning: Soft Power in Forum Macao and Its Practical Effects

In 2003, the preference for a policy based on a concrete course of action had been indeed materialized in practical terms through the Action Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation adopted at the Ministerial Conference of Forum Macao, where the partners emphasized the high potential for development and the need for a partnership based on mutual trust, equality, reciprocity and other diversified forms of cooperation and sharing of interests.⁶¹ The Action Plan was built on several pillars covering almost all the aspects of international exchanges and cooperation, giving China a favourable position as partner.

⁶⁰ Princeton Lyman, “China's Rising Role in Africa, Council on Foreign Relations”, July 2005. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436#_edn3.

⁶¹ Within the framework of the 2003 Action Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation, there has been since 2004, on an annual and rotating basis, a Meeting of Entrepreneurs for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking Countries. It aims to promote trade relations and other forms of partnerships, and to improve the relationship between chambers of commerce and business associations in order to boost economic relations between the members of Forum Macao. It is organised by the national export promotion agencies (EPAs):

- Agência Cabo-Verdiana de Promoção de Investimento e Exportações (CI)
- Agência de Promoção de Exportações do Brasil (APEX)
- AICEP Portugal

First, on intergovernmental cooperation, by aiming at an increase in the bilateral exchanges with the purpose of strengthening the economic partnership. Second, by promoting an increase in the volume of trade and facilitating commercial exchanges between multinational companies, market access and exchange of information about products and trade data, as well as encouraging cooperation on technical standards. Third, in the areas of investment and business cooperation, provisions had been made regarding the improvement of the legal framework for an easier access for investment and the protection of investment, and the creation of joint venture or equity companies. Agriculture⁶² and fisheries are regarded here as a way to fight against poverty and hunger, and China is ready to support infrastructure projects, machinery production and technology transfer. Another field envisaged was cooperation in construction engineering and infrastructure, as well as the management of natural resources. The developing lusophone countries, such as Angola, have a comparative advantage and possess natural resources that are vital for China's economic development.

In addition, China considers that human resources training has not only the potential to increase cooperation, but also to create an environment of friendship and mutual cultural understanding at personal levels, which would facilitate future cooperation. As a follow-up mechanism, the Ministers agreed on the creation of a Permanent Secretariat in Macao that would guarantee the required logistic and financial support as well as the necessary liaison for the implementation of the initiatives and projects related to the Forum.⁶³

In conclusion, in Ms. Wu Yi's speech, the audience learns what Macao and the Forum Macao represent to China. Indeed the meaning of Macao to China is symbolized by a pearl

-
- Câmara do Comércio e Indústria de Angola (CCIA)
 - Conselho de Promoção Internacional da China (CCPIT)
 - Direcção de Promoção de Investimento Privado da Guiné-Bissau (DPIP)
 - Instituto de Promoção do Comércio e Investimento de Macau (IPIM)
 - Instituto para a Promoção de Exportações (IPEX-Moçambique)
 - TradeInvest Timor-Leste.

⁶² This is an important area for the whole of Africa and for the PALOP (African Portuguese-speaking countries), as confirmed in December 2003, when Joaquim Chissano, the President of Mozambique and African Union chairperson, spoke at the opening ceremony of the Second Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum. He stated that "agriculture is seen in Africa as the sector that can ensure food security, eradicate poverty and improve people's livelihood" and "I, therefore, invite the people and government of China to support, under NEPAD, the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program.

"China invited to play role for African development within NEPAD", *People's Daily Online*, 16 December 2003. Retrieved from http://english.people.com.cn/200312/16/eng20031216_130484.shtml.

⁶³ The Permanent Secretariat has a Support Cabinet that facilitates investment in Macao and in China by providing information and supporting commercial exhibitions, conferences as well as managing high-level political and business contacts in the participating countries. The Permanent Secretariat, under the leadership of a General Secretary, articulates with the ambassadors in Beijing and with the Ministry of Economy of each member state. Retrieved from <http://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/pt/2003.asp>.

and a bridge and the role of the Forum Macao is symbolized by a propulsor. A clear and explicit message is delivered through the use of metaphors and through the role of Macao. Macao has undoubtedly an enormous capacity for growth and development, as do the developing countries participating in the Forum Macao. By being a place that represents a meeting point to so many countries, the potential as a bridge is surely vast. Nonetheless, this potential needs to be nurtured and guided in order to reach its maximum outcome. Herein lays the propulsor, Forum Macao, whose function is to allow the forward movement of the participating countries. The propulsor is a mechanic device constructed by the integration of several components whose interaction allows the fulfilment of its objective: promoting peaceful development for the benefit of all the partners. Therefore, Forum Macao is also a pragmatic entity that relies on specified processes to reach a predetermined purpose. Unequivocally Umberto Eco notes that we "frequently ignore the most ingenious and vigorous of Aristotle's conclusions, that the metaphor is not only a means of delight but also, and above all, a tool of cognition"⁶⁴ which acts as a beacon of light through images.

Further qualitative and quantitative research and analysis would be necessary to understand how much China and each partner benefits from this partnership, but the general conclusion is that China, through rhetoric and practical tools such as the Action Plans, managed to act on the scene through its agents, by using the multilateral forums as agencies in order to reach its purpose: gaining economic and political influence in the developing world, promoting a new development paradigm, the peaceful development, and paving the way to an increased role in international affairs.

⁶⁴ Umberto Eco, *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 100.

4. Reaching out to Africa: China's African Policy advanced through the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

4.1. China, the Road to a Country, Two Systems: Building the Picture

Two dates are critical in the role reversal of China's foreign policy: 1989 and 1993. The former represents a troubled period in Chinese society when protests against authoritarianism and in favour of economic liberalisation and democratic reform, culminated in the Tiananmen Square June Fourth Incident. The military actions taken to counter the protest propelled a wave of international outcry, particularly in the Western world. The backlash in the international community was evident in the imposition of economic sanctions and one of the remaining consequences is a European Union and United States embargo on weapons sales to China. A fear of an economic slowdown and of political isolation prompted China to take counter-measures to avoid the Western blockade. China was in dire need of finding partners to prevent being contained by non-allies.

In 1993, China stopped being self-sufficient in oil and started its period of escalating dependence on foreign oil. China became the world's second largest consumer of oil behind the U.S. in 2003 and the world's second largest importer of oil after the U.S. and in front of Japan.⁶⁵ In order to maintain its high growth rates and feed its industrial complex, China needs to have access to energy sources. As the Middle East, which possesses the majority of the world's oil reserves, has been a market traditionally dominated by American and European companies, China has sought after other sources of *black gold*. Africa, and many of the Portuguese-speaking countries, has vast natural resources, a high potential for trade, investment and development. For instance, Angola, according to a World Bank⁶⁶ study, had at the beginning of 2005 oil reserves estimated at 8.8 billion barrels, representing four times more than in 1995 and accounting for 0.75 percent of world reserves, or 1.9 percent of reserves outside the Middle East. Hence, "an unprecedented need for resources is driving China's foreign policy".⁶⁷ Indeed, changes are noticed in the supply patterns: in 2006, Angola became China's main supplier of oil and African oil makes about one-third of Chinese

⁶⁵ Erica S. Downs and Jeffery A. Bader, "Oil Hungry China Belongs at the Big Table" September 8, 2006, The Brookings Institution. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2006/09/08china-bader>.

⁶⁶ World Bank, *Angola: Oil, Broad-Based Growth, and Equity*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007, p. 41. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6759>.

⁶⁷ Chris Alden, Daniel Large, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), *China Returns to Africa: A rising Power and a Continent Embrace*, London, Hurst and Company, 2009, p. 7.

imports. Energy security, raw materials and commodities are then key drivers for China's approach to African countries. African countries are receptive to Chinese political and economic deals as they have been responsible for the recent high growth rates of the African economies. China, through its rhetoric of solidarity and mutual support appears as a development partner of the African countries. To give credibility to this role and identify itself with the other developing countries, the Chinese use the shared history of colonial domination and national liberation movements, which sounds appealing to countries that repelled their former colonial masters. This anti-colonial approach dates back to the Bandung Conference of 1955 and it is coupled with an anti-hegemonic and anti-imperialism rhetoric that appeals to a respectful and fair “*South-South cooperation*” dynamic that contrasts with the unequal hegemonic “*North-South relationship*”. African leaders welcome the Chinese rhetoric and increased attention as it acts as a counterweight to Western countries and international organisations that present cooperation policies based on the compliance of certain principles. China’s policy towards Africa will be analysed through the 2006 programmatic document.

4.2. Analysing China’s African Policy: The use of Symbols, Imagery and Identification

In January 2006, Beijing issued its first public document concerning the African Continent - **China’s African Policy**⁶⁸ - a sign that China is deeply committed to enhance its relations with African countries. It also shows the relevance of economic diplomacy for the Chinese leaders. The document points to, in its foreword, to some main aspects of the Chinese foreign policy:

“China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world”.

China presents itself as the largest developing country in the world, therefore identifying itself with the plight of fellow African developing countries. Here Burke’s principle of identification is at work and this group of countries has embedded a shared substance. By stating that its foreign policy is independent, China stands apart from the Western powers and this removes some suspicions of another neo-colonialist power, hence, the tendency noted in

⁶⁸ China’s African Policy. Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-01/12/content_156509.htm.

the approach towards the Portuguese-speaking countries is noted here as well. It is netted here the concept of division, the “ironic counterpart” to identification, as Burke (1969:23) put it. China strongly reasserts the importance of the *Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence*, which were first established in a joint agreement between China and India in 1954. Since then, these principles have been presented as essential to the implementation of Chinese foreign policy. The Five Principles consist on the *mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence*⁶⁹.

Peace, cooperation and development are keywords in the presentation of the Chinese foreign policy to the world. Other countries are reassured that China defends and promotes equality, that it is not a threat and will not consider the use of force or other means to disrupt the sovereignty of other states:

“The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances. By this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.”

This paragraph stresses the importance of Africa in what concerns world peace and development. This is appealing to African countries in the sense that it elevates their role and neglects the discourse that presents Africa as a lost continent, a burden on Western aid donors or a continent for which there is no hope. It also highlights the past relations between China and Africa by remembering the friendliness of previous contacts and transmitting the idea of continuity in the future. Moreover, it is stated that this is a long-term relationship with mutual benefits, not just a short-term connection due to the current economic or political conjuncture. China attempts to establish mutual confidence with its envisaged partners and to strengthen the existing cooperation. As in the case of the Portuguese-speaking countries, the “new circumstances” are brought forward and the picture of China as a partner, willing to promote economic development in a new stage is built in the common imaginary.

⁶⁹ “Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence”, *Xinhua Online*, 14 June 2004. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-06/14/content_1525423.htm.

4.2.1. Interest in Africa: the Motive

According to Drazen Pehar, “historical analogies are a variety of metaphorical expressions that use an image of the past to shed some light on present or future affairs of mostly political concern”.⁷⁰ This supports the definition of an identity through an historical narrative by contrasting the shackles of colonial past with the development that freedom can bring. Along these lines, China states that:

“Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development. After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.”

This expression can be an implicit image of what the former colonisers did to Africa and an attempt to blame them for the situation they have created in the continent. It seems to corroborate Rueckert’s (66) argument that “because all men are naturally "guilty"”, Burke believes that all poetry acts as mode of "purification" and an "expiatory strategy". China presents Africa as a continent that throughout history has experienced suffering, attested by Rueckert’s (98) statement that “in almost every purification there is victimage of some kind”. In this whole redemption process, Brock (186) adds that “victimage is the purging of guilt through a scapegoat that symbolizes society's guilt”. Africa has been a victim of colonialism and apartheid, and Western powers, in the side of division, have their imprint as scapegoats in this historic process, but despite all the troubles experienced, Africa still had the power to emancipate and purify itself from these oppressive regimes and it is on the path of development, China being there as a partner to help in the redemption process.

As can be seen in the first part of China’s African Policy, on **Africa’s Position and Role**, strong adjectives are used to characterise Africa, which point out, in a positive tone, why China is interested in Africa: *vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and a potential for development*. Additionally, the references to a struggle against colonialism and the achievement of freedom can be seen as praises to Africa’s recent history and African peoples’ victories as well as associating these with China’s similar past experiences with Western powers. The history of Africa is associated with long years of struggle, the land and natural resources of Africa are linked to colonialism and apartheid, and finally development

⁷⁰ Drazen Pehar, “Historical Rhetoric and Diplomacy - An Uneasy Cohabitation”, in *Language and Diplomacy* (eds. Kurbalija, Johan, and Hannah Slavik), Msida, Malta-DiploFoundation, 2001, p. 117.

is related to independence and emancipation. By making an association between colonialism and Africa's chronic underdevelopment, China sets itself apart from the former colonisers and attempts to gain a moral advantage over Western powers. It is a powerful weapon at the disposal of the Chinese to fend off some Western criticism of China's policies, especially by touching the sensitive topics such as colonial conquests, wars and settlements, slavery and unfair trade, in order to build on the commonalities in terms of values, experiences and aspirations to reach its goal: gain access to Africa's resources, markets and gain political allies.

4.2.2 The Power of Like-minded Nations: Building an Image of Self-Identification

In the second part, **China's Relations with Africa**, China further identifies itself with Africa:

“Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathised with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship. [...] For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions. Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development - these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.”

China uses the rhetorical technique of association to bring forward identification, by employing vocabulary that binds together China's and Africa's history, alludes to their similarities and describes events and processes experienced by both parties. Thus, these ideas and events so dear to both sides are linked together by sharing these common historical experiences and almost unifying them. Furthermore, the description of shared experiences is deepened by showing how strong and beneficial these experiences have been. The last sentence is marked by the repetition of common concepts that have previously been stated in the text. Repetition can be defined as a “major rhetorical strategy for producing emphasis, clarity, amplification, or emotional effect”⁷¹. Repetition leads to familiarity and comfort, and

⁷¹ Gideon O. Burton, “The Forest of Rhetoric”, Brigham Young University, 2007. Retrieved from <http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/silva.htm>.

people tend to remember familiar ideas or concepts. A pattern of intensification⁷² can be used in a simple model of persuasion. In this persuasion model, the pattern of intensification generally is noted by the use of repetition and association. By using these rhetorical techniques, certain elements in China's (the persuader) message (China's guiding principles) can become more important, clear and attractive to the audience (African countries).

4.2.3. Detaching from an Old Hierarchic System: Towards a New Strategic Partnership

In the third part, referring to **China's African Policy**, China announces a:

“New type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange”.

These same values have been emphasized in the cooperation with the Portuguese-speaking countries, giving a consistency to the peaceful development policy that China is engaging in. The principles on which China is basing its objectives are:

- a. “Sincerity, friendship and equality. [...]
- b. Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavour for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.
- c. Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.
- d. Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.”

China is offering not only economic support to Africa, but also political support in international forums in order to give more attention to the burning issues of African countries. While China is an important international player in these forums, the African countries have the advantage of numbers: they are dozens, and as Gingrich said, it is more

⁷² Changing Minds, “Rank's Intensity/Downplay Schema”. Retrieved from http://changingminds.org/techniques/general/overall/rank_schema.htm.

important the number of allies one has. By having allies in both camps of African and Portuguese-speaking countries, noting here the increasing economic and political influence of Brazil, the Latin American powerhouse, as well as Angola and Mozambique on a regional level, China can obtain more support in pursuing its own political agenda, as follows:

“The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organisations. The Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one China principle”.

Hence, as in the case of Hong Kong and Macao, the new nationalistic target is fixed: the one China principle and the isolation of Taiwan, in order to bring it into compliance and abide to China's rule. For this, broad international support is needed. Building on the speech from Macao, where the former colony is eulogised for its progress, Taiwan is *demonised* for not taking the path of peaceful development with China and it is isolated. While waving the carrot, the will to develop a sustainable partnership in all areas, China is also waving the stick of political and economic isolation in the case of a refusal. The one China principle, which is one of the great internal political aims of China, is stated as a pre-condition for relations between China and the African countries.

The associative vocabulary and how this can serve China from both the economic and political points of view is obvious. For example, China's external policy is also focused on the international isolation of Taiwan in order to strive for reunification. Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, lost its United Nations seat to China (People's Republic of China) in 1971. Many African countries (nine since 1994, four of these since 2003)⁷³ have ceased their official recognition of Taipei in favour of Beijing. South Africa did so in 1998, and in a sweeping move since October 2005, Senegal, Chad and Malawi followed through reducing to four the number of African countries (Burkina Faso, Gambia, Swaziland and São Tomé and Príncipe)⁷⁴ with formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. African countries (53 states) constitute a large proportion of the members of the United Nations (193 members) and China

⁷³ Thomas M. Skypek, “The Great Game in Africa”, *The Weekly Standard*, 9 October 2008. Retrieved from <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/673xzig.asp?pg=2>.

⁷⁴ “MOFA dismisses speculation on plan for Taiwan Africa group”, *The China Post*, 2 September 2008. Retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2008/09/02/172825/MOFA-dismisses.htm>.

clearly states that there will be mutual political support in the pursuit of their aspirations, but without mentioning any clear circumstance.

Nonetheless, a new strategic partnership is envisaged. Once again, political equality and mutual trust are emphasised and there is a plus factor in the form of economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. Economic relations are better described through the expression of win-win cooperation providing mutual benefits. Moreover, culture is brought to the surface as both sides want to go beyond mere trade and discover each other's cultures. There is a strong initiative to make associations and connections through the use of similar vocabulary, by emphasising positive concepts such as *respect, support, promote, mutual, common prosperity, development, cooperation*, which inculcate the fact that China's African Policy is meant to be a success and the ones partnering in it would ensure immense benefits for their countries.

4.2.4 The Carrot Salad: Building the Power of Attraction at All Levels

In the fourth part, **Enhancing all-round Cooperation between China and Africa**, the four main areas of cooperation are highlighted: *politics, economy, education, science, culture, health and social aspects, peace and security*, hence, trying to address all the important areas for a developing country.

In the **political** field, the measures covered involve high-level visits, exchanges between legislative bodies, political parties and local governments, consultation mechanisms, cooperation in international affairs, as mentioned:

“China will [...] coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. [...] China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN play a greater role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.”

By standing for non-interference in national sovereignty and internal affairs, China once again distances itself (division) from the Western powers that defend the breach of sovereignty to prompt humanitarian intervention or that uphold the imposition of sanctions in less democracy-friendly states. This position is very appealing to countries that China has

been supporting as for instance Sudan and Zimbabwe. It has been said that China as well as the African states are interested in having a more active UN in the international system and a new international political and economic order. The anti-hegemonic position of China is the basis for this stance as the U.S. has been the only world power since the fall of the bipolar system at the end of the 20th century. In terms of hierarchy, it is common for the less powerful states to ally against the stronger one in order to have a balance of power. Recalling Thucydides, “you made that alliance, not against your friends, but against the enemies that might attack you”⁷⁵, one ascertains that among the factors that forge a strong alliance is the fear of being dominated by the stronger state and the desire of acquiring a higher degree of power and ascend in the world’s hierarchical system.

In the **economic** area, initiatives are described in the areas of trade, investment, financial cooperation, agriculture, infrastructure, resources, tourism, debt reduction and relief, economic assistance and multilateral cooperation.

Concerning **trade**:

“The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese market and fulfil its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries... [...] When conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional organisations.”

The text is not very clear and explicit about the effective measures that will be taken to increase the Chinese quota market for African commodities. Neither does it specify which goods will receive duty-free privileges. In the same type of affirmations, it mentions the willingness to negotiate Free Trade Agreements as soon as the conditions are fit, but the standards to judge the ripeness of the conditions are not mentioned. Concomitantly, there also seems to be a vagueness regarding timeframes to implement these measures. It can be considered from here that China uses these privileges as “carrots” to reward the “friendly” and “mutually respecting” states, in other words, those who comply, a message which is camouflaged in careful wording, but with clear implications.

In what concerns **investment**:

"The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end."

⁷⁵ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Digireads.com, 2009, p. 224. Retrieved from books.google.ch/books?isbn=1596258160.

Due to some specific factors of Africa's history, climate, geography, dispersion of the population, there is a great need to invest in infrastructures to prompt economic and human development. There is willingness on the part of the Chinese leaders to:

“Step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects.”

One of the main advantages of the African continent is its wealth in terms of natural resources, commodities and raw materials. Moreover, China is also very interested in getting access to these resources and it is to no surprise that the Chinese government:

“Encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a whole.”

It is still vividly fresh in the memory of Africans, the plunder of their continent's wealth to serve Western interests. Consequently, and to avoid bringing back unpleasant memories that could instil distrust in African minds, leading them to make historical comparisons with the Western states, China needs to distance itself from this insatiable quest and reassure Africans that the exploration will be rational and that the gains will be mutual in order to lead both sides into the path of sustainable development. Some of the larger Chinese companies investing in Africa differ from their Western counterparts in the fact that they have a *strong political mandate*, as Alden (2007:3) put it, and financial state support which allows these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest and make business in locations where profitability is highly uncertain and risk and instability are certain.

In this case, it is stated that "African countries are welcome to make investment in China", but there are doubts that these developing countries have the ability or the will to invest in a remote market. Nevertheless, it is also referred that "the two sides should work together to create a favourable environment for investment and cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides." The question that may arise here is who is having the lion's share in this agreement. From a brief analysis of national

capacities, the sheer size of China seems to tip the scale to the East, but Chinese rhetoric emphasises mutual benefits. Furthermore, the text leaves out crucial issues for Africa and China, such as the rights and interests of African or Chinese workers and the environmental protection standards and measures that investments should respect. Taking into account that Chinese companies are not bound, as are Western companies, to strict corporate governance regulations or control by oversight agencies, a close look should be taken to the areas of environmental protection and labour policies, and what will it mean in terms of Africa's development, and whether the power of attraction, soft and sweet at the beginning, will turn into an unequal situation with some traces of imperialism.

Regarding **debt reduction and relief**, China stands:

“Ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries with a view to seek solution to, or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the international community, developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.”

The Chinese leaders are ready to discuss solutions or in some cases to reduce the debts of African countries. This certainly passes as a display of goodwill and understanding of the difficulties endured by the populations of indebted nations. Furthermore, China promises to seek the active cooperation of the Western developed countries in this particular matter that is a threat to growth and development, not to mention human wellbeing. In this particular issue, China has not only proved that it can *talk the talk*, but also that it can *walk the walk*, as it can be inferred by the cancellation of a US\$1.27 billion debt of thirty-one African countries⁷⁶ announced at the second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in Addis Ababa in 2003, hence, setting a precedent as mediator for Africa vis-à-vis the Western world.

In the area of **economic assistance**, China understands that business is business and it “will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached”, hence, giving the African leaders a leeway of how to spend the assistance money and a larger degree of freedom than the one offered by the West. The prerogative of having no political or social accountability regarding economic assistance is well accepted by most African elites. For instance in 2004, Angola, one of Africa's fast-growth nations, held negotiation talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure financing for rebuilding the country's war devastated infrastructures. However, the IMF, in its

⁷⁶ Chris Alden, *China in Africa*, London, Zed Books, 2007, p. 31.

anti-corruption stance, insisted on transparency and accountability measures to ensure that the money would be spent efficiently in projects that would promote economic growth as well as human development. The loan was eventually discarded by Angolan authorities as soon as China presented a better offer. The Export-Import Bank (EximBank) of China is a state bank with competency in export and overseas investment financing, and acts as the long arm of the state in low-interest loans. The US\$2 billion loan, with the possibility of extension up to US\$6 billion, came at low interest rates and an extended payback period, with a clause stating that 70 percent of the construction projects would be given to Chinese companies, and no conditions for accountability. This might have sounded as music to the ears of Angolan leaders, as Kurlantzick (174) pointed out that "*China's policies jibe with their own disdain at Westerners telling them what to do*". The EximBank loan was appealing to Angolan leaders, but maybe not so much for Angolan businesses and workers. Attracting political leaders and giving them more favourable loan conditions with less accountability on the spending of resources can also be considered a strategy to gain power over the target countries elites, which in the end would facilitate the insertion of China's economic and political interest in these countries' political and economic agenda and shape their preferences in a very subtle way.

Concerning **multilateral cooperation**, China is once again reasserting its commitment to cooperate with African countries and organisations for the defence of their interests. It could be plausible that China wants to appear as the leader of developing countries as it proclaims to:

"Promote South-South cooperation, push forward the establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices of developing countries heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries and international organisations to support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium Development Goals in Africa."

The concept of "South-South cooperation" has become increasingly popular since the late 1990s. The notion encourages developing nations to use each other's best practices to overcome their development challenges since their ideas and experiences might be more adequate to their specific stages of development. In May 2004, during an official visit to Beijing, the President of Brazil, Lula da Silva said "we want a partnership that integrates our

economies and serves as a paradigm for South-South cooperation."⁷⁷ This strategic partnership between these two *juggernauts* can have a great impact in the international system, at the economic and political levels.

In the fields of **education, science, culture, health and social aspects**, there is a wide reference to ten sectors such as cooperation in human resources development and education, science and technology cooperation, cultural exchanges, medical and health cooperation, media cooperation, administrative cooperation, consular cooperation, people-to-people exchange, environmental cooperation, disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance. China can make use of cooperation programmes that will definitively have a positive impact in its image across Africa.

In **human resources development and education**, the training of personnel has always been a proof of goodwill and China wants to take an active role in human resources development and training of the African population. In order to achieve these capacity-building objectives the:

“exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides.”

It is estimated that by 2004, 15,000 African students had studied in China.⁷⁸ By 2008, the Chinese government had doubled the number of scholarships awarded to Africa to 4,000 students per year.⁷⁹ In 2004, according to Kurlantzick (174), regarding the teaching of Chinese language abroad, China began emulating the concept of the British Council and the Alliance Française by creating the Confucius Institute, a Chinese language and culture school, and providing funds for the first year of teaching. By October 2008, there were 271 Confucius Institutes in 77 countries and regions, allowing for the provision of courses to nearly 100,000 people, according to the Chinese Ministry of Education. The Chinese Government had planned to create 21 Confucius Institutes in 13 African countries, and by

⁷⁷ Larry Rother, “China Widens Economic Role in Latin America”, *The New York Times*, 20 November 2004, Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/20/international/asia/20china.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0.

⁷⁸ Jean Christophe Servant, “China's trade safari in Africa”, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 2005. Retrieved from <http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11/chinafrica>.

⁷⁹ “Africa: China Doubles its Scholarships for African Students”, 25 August 2008. Retrieved from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200808250817.html>.

2008 ten of these Institutes were already functioning⁸⁰. This constitutes a very effective form of Chinese soft power, as these students have been immersed into the world of the Middle Kingdom, have experienced its culture, language, lifestyle, and have learned its history, habits, and traditions. The African students in China, upon returning to Africa and due to their friendships and networking, might probably bring some advantages or preferential treatment to China in political and economic terms.

Another visible aspect of Chinese soft power is the **health sector**. Since 1963, when the historical leader Mao Zedong started to dispatch "*angels in white*"⁸¹ to Africa, it is estimated that nearly 15,000 Chinese health professionals have been active in 47 African countries treating around 170 million patients and giving training to 3,000 junior and middle-ranked doctors and hundreds of thousands of public health workers⁸². In the beginning of 2007, China had around 950 health personnel in 36 African countries and planned to devote US\$37 million to fight malaria⁸³. The Chinese effort in health cooperation has yielded a good public image in Africa and earned the appreciation of the African people and leaders.

With a deep association to soft power is the sector of **disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance**, in which China has committed to:

"Actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the fields of disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid [...]."

China has provided US\$ 200,000 to combat drought in the Horn of Africa in 1999 and by February 2008, China's assistance to the Darfur region was estimated at US\$11 million. China also had plans to develop a similar institution as the US Peace Corps, and the first 300 Chinese young volunteers were expected to be sent to Africa in 2009.⁸⁴ In terms of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, China still maintains a different approach to its Western counterparts.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ "Confucius Institutes help promote exchange, co-op between China and African countries, educators", *Xinhuanet.com*, 7 October 2008. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/07/content_10160650.htm.

⁸¹ Scott Zhou, "China as Africa's Angel in White", *Asia Times Online*, 3 November 2006. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HK03Cb04.html.

⁸² "Chinese Medics in Africa", 10 December 2003. Retrieved from <http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82039.htm>.

⁸³ Liu Li, "Medical aid to Africa focuses on malaria", *China Daily*, 2 January 2007. Retrieved from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/01/content_798163.htm.

⁸⁴ Chris Alden, *China in Africa*, London, Zed Books, 2007, p. 27.

⁸⁵ For instance, Liu Guijin, the Chinese government special representative for Darfur, stated that:

In the fields of **peace and security**, there is reference to military cooperation, conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations, judicial and police cooperation, non-traditional security areas. In a continent where country borders seem to have been carved resorting to tools such as a ruler and a carpenter square, there are many fault lines in the ethnic, linguistic and religious aspects, which in the realm of human nature have been causes for conflict and war. Africa has frequently experienced episodes of unrest and violence, which have occasionally spilled over to neighbouring countries. Therefore, it is to no surprise that there has been a high demand for weapons, ammunitions, military vehicles and specialised military personnel. According to Alden (2007:25), in 2003, China's arms trade to Africa totalled US\$1.3 billion and it was estimated that China accounted for 6-7 per cent of arms supplied to Africa. Concern over the sale of arms to governments with poor human rights and good governance records such as Liberia, Zimbabwe and Sudan has emerged among Western civil society, international organisations and NGOs. They claim that Chinese arms sales are fuelling violence and supporting despotic elites that underpin the safety of their own people. Notwithstanding, China isn't alone in the weapons supply to less democratic regimes in Africa and some Western countries make more profit than China. Still, the fact that China hasn't signed any multilateral agreements governing arms sales renders Western criticism valid.

Beijing's policy regarding international arms sales revolves around three principles⁸⁶: 1) it should support the legitimate self-defence needs of the recipient; 2) the arms trade should not jeopardise regional or international peace and stability; and 3) the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries is to be upheld. Nevertheless, there could be a contradiction between the principle of non-interference and the sales of arms to regimes that are considered either repressive or autocratic because this trade is supporting the continuation of their leaders and contributing to the silencing of national opposition. The question that occurs here, on this chessboard, is what could be the consequences for China if/when these regimes lose power.

"We have never, and will never in the future, attach any kind of political conditions to these aid and development projects, because we think that providing assistance is just for the benefit of the people, it is not for political purposes, not for showing off to the outside world."

"Chinese envoy: China to provide more humanitarian aid to Darfur", *Xinhuanet.com*, 26 February 2008. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/26/content_7669108.htm.

⁸⁶ Ian Taylor, "Arms Sales to Africa: Beijing's Reputation at Risk", *China Brief*, Volume: 7 Issue: 7, The Jamestown Foundation, May 2007.

In the area of **conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations**, China:

“Supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organisations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.”

Chinese rhetoric once again supports multilateral efforts to solve conflicts and achieve peace. Nonetheless, China has been less willing to follow its Western counterparts in sanctions against Sudan and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, as China is becoming an important actor in the international system, its foreign policy has evolved into a more complex approach that ensures the safety of its foreign investments and diaspora. A responsible power needs to maintain a clean image and China had to ponder whether there could be serious harm to its image due to a growing perception of inaction regarding some dramatic conflicts. Facing the possibility of tensions in its economic relations with the Western powers and trying to appease their criticism, the Chinese government approved in mid-2006 a package of US\$3.5 million to support an African Union peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region⁸⁷. China seems to have acknowledged that non-interference does have its limitations and interference in the name of peacekeeping can bring a positive view and numerous benefits.⁸⁸

In the fifth part, **Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Its Follow-up Actions**, it is stated that in order to fulfil the pragmatic cooperation between both parties, China:

“Stands ready to work with African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans [...] and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD.”

Therefore, China is ready to ensure continuity and credibility to its actions by actively engaging with the local and regional organisations in order to reach the above mentioned goals.

⁸⁷ Chris Alden, *China in Africa*, London, Zed Books, 2007, p. 26.

⁸⁸ Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting With Pariahs?”, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008. Retrieved from <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63045/stephanie-kleine-ahlbrandt-and-andrew-small/chinas-new-dictatorship-diplomacy>.

In the last part, **China's Relations with African Regional Organisations**, the friendly cooperation with the African Union (AU) in a wide range of fields is stressed and China maintains its willingness to provide assistance to the AU.

For instance, in December 2003, Joaquim Chissano, then President of Mozambique and AU chairman, stated that “the Sino-African cooperation on the basis of South-South cooperation will gain further development in the coming years, which will do good to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) program”⁸⁹, a recent economic development program of the African Union. Three years later, in September 2006, he confirmed China's commitment to Africa by saying that “when NEPAD was asking for help with infrastructure, China came as an answer to that appeal. We want China to come.”⁹⁰

The positive role of Africa's sub-regional organisations in the defence and promotion of a continuous development and integration in the political and economic areas is also recognized.

4.3. Identification, Imaginary, Hierarchy: The Power to Act and to Attract

The Chinese currently possess the ability to get the job done without imposing demanding conditions. To counter Western criticisms of neglecting good governance and human rights, China assumes a rhetoric stance based on the principles of “*mutual respect*” and “*concern for diversity*”, which rule its “*non-interference*” policy. Although China comes with the image of a country that has adopted successful policies for development, there isn't the reassurance that this model could have the same effects in Africa. Can the African countries reverse the curse that seems to haunt the resource-abundant nations? The effect of Chinese non-interference on sensitive issues such as corruption, governance and human rights is one of the main challenges to the emergence of a strong African civil society.

In **China's African Policy**, the scope of *identification* is wider leading to a more general historical approach:

⁸⁹ “Sino-African Cooperation of Great Prospect: AU Chairman”, *Xinhua*, 15 December 2003. Retrieved from http://china.org.cn/features/china-africa/2003-12/15/content_1082435.htm.

⁹⁰ In the beginning of 2006, China's Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) announced an investment of US\$2.3bn in a new hydroelectric power plant in Mozambique.

Mr. Chissano further clarified the division between Europe and China by stating “(But) China wanted all countries to come (to its China-Africa Summit). China's policy on investing in Africa is discussed with people on the continent.” “Chissano: Welcome China”, *News 24*, 18 September 2006. Retrieved from <http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Chissano-Welcome-China-20060918>.

“China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathised with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship”.

There have been close political ties and bilateral contacts throughout History and:

“Bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions”.

Hence, the partnership should be cultivated and deepened according to the common values of “sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development”.

Therefore, there is a win-win situation because:

“Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange.”

Again, China re-emphasises its different view of development partnership. The previous rhetorical examples show that identification occurs through common historical experiences, a common background, common challenges and common objectives. The rhetor seeks to portray all the commonalities between himself and the audience. This method of alignment leads to an overlap of substance which ultimately establishes a state of consubstantiality, as Burke (1969:20-23) pointed out. By sharing substances, identification becomes more relevant and a sense of identity is prone to arise. Consubstantiality is important for the creation of a sense of community between the rhetor and the audience, either through shared characteristics or aspirations. Rhetoric does play an important role in the pattern of identification generated in these artifacts as we analyse the rhetor and the audience. It thus seem that, according to Burke (1969:21), the need to identify with another emerged out of division because people are born and live as biological separate entities and communication allowed the possibility to overcome separateness and reach a state where identification and the shared substance could be attained.

The audience of the Forum consists of representatives from several distinct parts of the globe with all its intrinsic characteristics, but with centuries-old links. The intended audience for China's African Policy would seem apparently less heterogeneous as they share an African identity despite the multiple differences of the continent. Yet, what otherwise would be distinct entities are brought together by means of a symbolic language that emphasises commonalities pertaining to the socio-political hierarchy. In fact, hierarchy also plays a significant role in identification as can be inferred by China identifying itself as the "*largest developing country in the world*" and by division as when the North is scapegoated as the antagonist. Therefore, transformation occurs and identification takes place laying the foundations for unity into the group.

5. A Two-sided example: Angola in China's Soft Power Circle

So far, we have seen China's foreign policy towards the developing world through the example of its rhetoric supported by pragmatic policy approaches for Portuguese-speaking countries and African countries. Angola is a country part of both groups: while located in Africa, Angola is also a Portuguese-speaking country. Given the high concentration of resources, its access to maritime routes and the new political context, Angola presents itself as a flourishing place for investment and business. The example of Angola will be treated at the bottom of the reverse triangle analysis, by providing an analysis of Angola's history with Portugal, position in Africa and resources, China's engagement with the country, the rhetorical receptivity of the Angolan leaders to China's policy reflected in the Angolan representatives' speeches in the Forum Macao and lastly, possible ways forward.

5.1 Angola, After a Troubled History, the Potential for Development

The Republic of Angola is the largest of the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP - Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa).

The history of the contacts between Portugal and Angola, whose name derives from a royal dynasty of the Mbundu people, dates back to the first travels of the Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão who reached the estuary of the Congo river in 1484⁹¹. It was the beginning of a series of contacts involving the native populations and foreign merchants, missionaries and soldiers. Although prolonged, this type of colonial project in Africa didn't reach a high level of intensity. This is visible in the fact that in the period from 1796 to 1830, direct trade between Portugal and its African colonies never surpassed more than 3 percent of the total Portuguese colonial trade⁹².

Until 1885, the Portuguese presence was mostly felt in the coastal areas because this African region was important in the triangular trade with Portugal and Brazil. In the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), Africa was divided⁹³ among the European powers giving the boost

⁹¹ Mário António Oliveira, "Angola", in *Dicionário Ilustrado da História de Portugal*, vol. I, Lisboa, Publicações Alfa, 1990, p. 40.

⁹² José Vicente Serrão, "Império Colonial Português", in *Dicionário Ilustrado da História de Portugal*, vol. I, Lisboa, Publicações Alfa, 1990, p. 326.

⁹³ The Portuguese use the expression "régua e esquadro" to characterise this division. It is so because the divisions seem to have been made with a ruler and a L-square taking into account geometric figures whilst neglecting ethnicity, language, culture and other local factors.

to a more effective occupation of the territory. In fact, it can be said that until the late 19th century there was only colonialism and Portuguese colonisation started afterwards with settlements in some parts of the territory.

Portugal had ambitions to unify all the territories between the coasts of Angola and Mozambique (the “mapa cor-de-rosa”⁹⁴ of 1886), but it was faced with England’s opposition due to its interests in the region⁹⁵. The British Ultimatum (1890) and the Luso-British Treaty (1891), despite annulling the initial Portuguese plans, managed to establish Portuguese sovereignty over vast swathes of the region’s territories and provided the international recognition and stabilisation of borders so useful to the relaunch of a colonial project, mostly forgotten since the early 19th century. Due to the treaties signed after the Berlin Conference, Angola retained a territorial extension wider than its initial scope, including the exclave on the north of the river Zaire, Cabinda, currently a major oil production territory.

It can be considered that Portugal only took a modern colonialist position after 1912 following the nomination of Norton de Matos as General-Governor of Angola. It is in this period, coinciding with the first Republican (1910-1926) experience in Portugal, that civilian authorities replace military authorities in the required economic, political and administrative structures of the territory. From this period onwards, Portuguese immigration flows to Africa registered a major increase⁹⁶. This obviously led to social tensions between the new arrivals and the natives as competition for jobs and economic opportunities increased with the upper hand pending to the Portuguese, first in the public sector and after the mid-20th century in the private sector⁹⁷.

As elsewhere during the 20th century, feelings of autonomy and nationalism were on the rise. At first they were growing mostly among the educated local elite, the so-called “assimilados” which were the first to feel a loss of social importance as the Portuguese immigrants took their place in administrative positions. In the 1950s the Portuguese were

⁹⁴ Maria Ângelo Branco, “Mapa Cor-de-Rosa”, in *Dicionário Ilustrado da História de Portugal*, vol. I, Lisboa, Publicações Alfa, 1990, p. 431.

⁹⁵ Portugal signed conventions with France and Germany in which these powers supported the Portuguese plan to claim the territories (modern Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe) between Angola and Mozambique. This was consolidated in the “pink map” of 1886, which collided with Cecil Rhodes’ project of connecting the Cape to Cairo, therefore raising England’s strong objection.

⁹⁶ It is estimated that around 305,000 Portuguese left Angola and returned to Portugal by the time of independence. These are the official figures published in the 1981 General Population Census, only taking into account the “retornados” to Portugal although many others chose other countries instead of the metropolis. A broader study about the “retornados” from the colonies was developed by a Sociology Professor at ISCTE, Lisbon: Pires, Rui Pena, “Migrações e Integração: Teoria e Aplicações à Sociedade Portuguesa”, Celta Editora, 2003.

⁹⁷ David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola & Mozambique*, Trenton, Africa World Press, 1992, pp. 20-22.

controlling the trade and transport businesses which further aggravated the feelings of anti-colonialism, this time mostly in the rural areas.

In the late 1950s, most European countries had agreed to concede independence to their African colonies. However, Portugal still clung to its overseas provinces⁹⁸ for multiple reasons. David Birmingham (1992 :34-35) points to the economic and political differences between Portugal and the other European colonial powers:

“The major contrast was the immature nature of Portuguese capitalism, and the weakness of its industrial base. Portugal was in no position to create a neo-colonial partnership with its colonies, had it given them independence in 1960.”

“The prospect of independence for the African colonies threatened the survival of Europe’s longest running dictatorship. [...] Imperialism was a key propaganda weapon in justifying the survival of a regime [...]”

Nonetheless, violent rebellion erupted in 1961 in the Northeast and in the capital Luanda. A long conflict between Angolan nationalists and the Portuguese military then ensued. As political methods were not effective against a dictatorial regime, this liberation struggle used guerrilla warfare to achieve its goals.

Meanwhile, Portugal also faced internal dissatisfaction with the socio-political situation of the country, which culminated in the fall of the dictatorship in April 1974. Portugal then initiated conversations with three Angolan parties – Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) – which signalled the end of the colonial war⁹⁹. After trying an unsuccessful tri-party solution for the government of Angola, civil war erupted in April 1975. The three liberation movements had distinct differences in terms of the ethnicity of its followers, their geographical coverage and also ideological affiliations¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁸ After the constitutional revision of 1951 the colonies were designated as “províncias ultramarinas”. The slogan “do Minho a Timor” was used to magnify the importance of an empire that stretched from the North of Portugal to parts of Africa and Asia.

⁹⁹ Cease-fire agreements were signed with the three liberation movements: UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in June 1974, then in October with the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

¹⁰⁰ Tyrone L. Groh, “War on the Cheap? Assessing the costs and benefits of Proxy War”, PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 2010, p. 107.

The MPLA included the Mbundu of central Angola and the creoles of the Luanda urban area, comprising more or less 26% of the population. The FNLA included the Bakongo living close to Zaire and comprised around 17% of the population.

The MPLA took the power and proclaimed the independence of the Popular Republic of Angola in November 1975 after securing Luanda. Since the beginning of the nationalist struggle, the three liberation movements received support from various foreign sources although with several degrees of intensity, range and secrecy that varied across the years. The intervention of foreign powers was obviously more noticeable after the loss of sovereignty by the Portuguese¹⁰¹.

During the Cold War, rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was mostly dealt in an indirect way to avoid an open and damaging confrontation. The events in Angola were consentaneous with the concept of proxy war, defined by Tyrone L. Groh (2010:4) as an “intervening state providing support to a local actor engaging in an armed conflict to influence a target state’s affairs”. Angola’s geographic position and its wealth in natural resources proved to be catalysts for the intervention of foreign actors as described by Groh (2010:13):

Intervening State	Proxy	Year	Secrecy
USSR	MPLA	1964	Overt
China	FNLA	1973	Overt
U.S.	FNLA	1974	Covert
South Africa	UNITA	1975	Overt
U.S.	UNITA	1985	Covert

It is then natural to assume that this conflict was nurtured by foreign interests, both regional and global and its ideological and strategic importance was paramount to its continuation.¹⁰²

5.1.1 China and Angola’s Liberation

In the Cold War period, China’s policy towards Africa was based on an ideological strategy. China had obvious ideological quarrels with the West and after 1956 started to

The UNITA included the Ovimbundu that lived mostly in southern Angola and the highlands, comprising nearly 38% of the population.

¹⁰¹ Three foreign armies were present in Angola: Zaire to support FNLA; South Africa to support UNITA; Cuba to support MPLA. As for the major powers, the USSR backed the MPLA, driving away support from the U.S. and China (due to the Sino-Soviet split). FNLA received some support from the U.S. and China. UNITA was the most self-sufficient movement, receiving some ideological support from China as its leader Jonas Savimbi underwent military and ideological training in China, where he encountered Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and proclaimed to represent black peasants. As the FNLA stopped its armed struggle in 1976, the U.S. also provided UNITA some support to counterbalance the MPLA.

¹⁰² By 1989, with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the proxy war had lost its importance in the world stage. Cuba and South Africa had agreed to withdraw their military personnel. Nevertheless the armed struggle between the MPLA and UNITA only stopped in 2002.

diverge from the Soviet Union's revisionist stance in the interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Chinese policy was based, according to Peter Van Ness, in an analysis of "domestic and international political affairs within a conceptual framework of "contradictions", which is based on the theory of dialectical materialism as interpreted by Mao Tse-Tung."¹⁰³ This dialectics took into account a system in which human and natural factors influenced the progress of the world and pushed forward its motion by a process of addressing and solving the adjacent contradictions. Ness (1970: 26-27) states that official Chinese analysis emphasised four major fundamental contradictions, defined as socialist vs. imperialist camps, proletariat vs. bourgeoisie, oppressed nations vs. imperialism and intra-imperialist countries.

The quest of the so-called Third World became the principal contradiction after P'eng Chen, member of the Chinese Communist Party's Political Bureau and Secretariat, gave a speech in May 1965 stating that the anti-imperialist struggle was "the most prominent and most acute of all the fundamental contradictions and is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world."¹⁰⁴ This struggle was then considered the most crucial one for revolutionary change and directed the focus of Chinese foreign policy.

A new framework emerged from this principal contradiction in which not only was the conflict against Western imperialism self-evident, but also the dispute with Soviet hegemony and its modern revisionist stance became more pronounced.

The Chinese regarded themselves as the true Marxist-Leninists and the genuine revolutionaries that would push forward the battle against imperialism. The marks of colonialism and imperialism were still present in Africa and there was plenty of fertile soil for the Chinese ideological struggle. Imperialism, according to Lenin, was the "highest stage of capitalism" and Africa and its people had for long felt its effects. The continuous search for profit by the owners of capital led to a forceful exploitation of the human and natural resources of Africa. Lenin's view was influential either for the internal revolution led by Mao Tse-Tung and for China's external policy, most notably in its approach towards Africa. Jackson (389) adds that in the formulation of their foreign policy, the Chinese took into account two different views, namely a world view which has a general scope and is related to the "principal contradiction" and a regional view which delves into the specificity of the African situation. These views are not necessarily exclusive and even co-exist in a rotating pattern. China's motivations for the support of African independence not only stem from a

¹⁰³ Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1970, p. 25.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

sincere feeling of comradeship, but also from a desire to gain influence with African states and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as well as to a vested interest in competition against the two blocs leading the bipolar world.

China saw itself as a member of the Third World and naturally it identified itself with the liberation movements that were gaining momentum in Africa's struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung clearly states this view:

“The people who have triumphed in their own revolution should help those still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty.”¹⁰⁵

So was the case in Angola where China gave support to all three liberation movements depending on its strategic perception of the global and regional situation. Indeed, China's position went through multiple stages of support and commitment throughout the whole period of independence and civil war¹⁰⁶.

1) At the onset of the liberation struggle (1961-63) the emphasis was in an anti-colonialism stance and the support was mostly rhetorical with no strong preference, although there seemed to be a slight inclination towards the MPLA which received economic, and perhaps military, support from China. This stage was simultaneously marked by traces of a world view focused on anti-imperialism and a regional view which took into account African public opinion and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

2) From 1963 to 1969, the Sino-Soviet split became the decisive factor in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy. This period, coinciding with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, was characterised by the predominance of more or less radical ideological considerations. Internal dissensions in the MPLA led the OAU to recognize the FNLA in July 1963. Moreover, as the MPLA was backed by the Soviet Union, China distanced itself and became closer to the FNLA. However this connection was merely temporary as China encountered difficulties in getting access to FNLA bases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 1964, Jonas Savimbi split with the FNLA and in 1966 he officially established UNITA. In these years, there were frequent and more intense contacts with China.

¹⁰⁵ Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World foreign policy: the case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93", *The China Quarterly*, No. 142, June 1995, p. 388.

¹⁰⁶ Jackson (1995) divides Chinese policy towards Angola into nine phases in the period ranging from 1961 to 1993. In this thesis, the most significant ones will be discussed.

According to Ness (28), in September 1965, Defence Minister Lin Piao put an emphasis in the contrast urban vs. rural:

"Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called the "cities of the world", then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the "rural areas of the world".

It is no wonder then that the MPLA, being more associated with a pro-Soviet, educated urban elite, was neglected in favour of a more rural, peasant-friendly UNITA whom in turn was described as a Maoist-oriented movement who sought to defend the interests of the popular masses of the countryside by seeking inspiration on the Chinese Revolution. Nevertheless, it seems that the level of material support didn't reach UNITA's expectations.

The trend in this period, which was marked by the Cultural Revolution, shows that the Chinese preference was more focused on radical groups. It was the result of an ongoing change from a regional view into a world view in which the Sino-Soviet split took its toll in the decisions of whom to support.

3) In the early 1970s, as tensions grew between China and the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership decided to adopt a more realist diplomatic strategy to counter its powerful neighbour. Relations with the U.S. changed as Kissinger and Nixon visited Beijing. China was admitted to the UN Security Council in the autumn of 1971, which according to Jackson (400-401) is not at all disconnected to the improvement, either by establishment or re-establishment, of diplomatic relations with 15 African states.

Leaving radicalism aside, the Chinese briefly turned to the MPLA as it was officially recognized by the OAU in 1971. As the movement faced internal difficulties China's attention in late 1973 went to the FNLA, which had been once again legitimized by the OAU and gathered support from Zaire and Tanzania. Concerns about the preferences of African states were taken into account and this clearly demonstrates the priority given to a regional view in the execution of Chinese foreign policy from 1970-73.

4) The period from 1974-76 is marked by the end of the colonial war against the Portuguese and the early phase of independence. The anti-colonialism struggle had ended, but there was another concern regarding the destiny of the newly independent state of Angola. The expansion of Soviet hegemony led the main aim of Chinese foreign policy to be the curtailment of its influence. Once again a world view took precedence in this period. It was a critical point in the future relations with Angola as the absence of the colonial power made decisions harder and exacerbated foreign intervention in the country.

The Chinese were faced with multiple dilemmas¹⁰⁷, especially after the departure of the Portuguese, and opted for a policy of discretion. While the possibilities for direct support of the MPLA were obviously scarce in face of its strong relations with the Soviet Union, there was room for overtures of understanding towards the FNLA and UNITA as a way to avoid Soviet predominance. Notwithstanding, in the public arena, China recognized the three liberation movements and was, like most African states, in favour of peaceful strategies such as a coalition government. It was a matter of adopting a form of neutrality that publicly didn't compromise China with a specific party while allowing for indirect support against the Soviet Union.

In the end, there was a divergence between China's position and the outcome of the civil war as it was Moscow's ally, the MPLA, which harnessed power from 1975 onwards. After the military victory of the MPLA, China resorted to public criticism of foreign military intervention as a method of creating embarrassment to the Soviet Union in Africa. Nevertheless, the fact that China didn't recognize the MPLA as the sole legitimate party brought considerable strains to their future relationship.

5) The unfavourable course of events of the preceding period and the end of the Cultural Revolution led China to reassess its foreign policy after 1976. This dictated a *rapprochement* towards the Western world and a different approach to the international system. A new era started in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping whose policies emphasised modernisation and economic development. To pursue this path, ideology had to be replaced by pragmatism and therefore China's contacts with the West took precedence over the developing world.

China turned to the West to strengthen its internal structure through active policies to attract foreign direct investment that would lead to great changes in its economic situation. The almost chronic economic and political problems of Africa also drove away Chinese interest in the continent. Angola was no exception and Chinese attention to its internal situation withered away and a distant position took hold. Initial reluctance from China to recognize Angola's independence lasted until January 1983, when China and Angola established diplomatic relations¹⁰⁸. In June 1984, the first trade agreement was signed

¹⁰⁷ Jackson (1995:388) describes the Chinese dilemma as: "should China follow its policy of tit-for-tat opposition to Soviet expansion world-wide, even if it meant allying with the racist government of South Africa? Or should it follow the opinions of its fellow Third World nations in Africa, even if it led to a Soviet bloc advance?"

¹⁰⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Angola. Retrieved from <http://wcm.fmprc.gov.cn/pub/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2914/2915/t16465.htm>.

between the two states during a visit of the Angolan Foreign Trade Minister to China. The Chinese reciprocated by sending a trade delegation to Luanda in December 1985, but things were moving at a relaxed pace as pointed out by Campos and Vines (3) since it was only in 1988 that a Joint Economic and Trade Commission was created. The negative effects of the post-independence events in China-Angola relations were slowly being cleared and President José Eduardo dos Santos made an official visit to Beijing in October 1988.

Nevertheless, China was less driven by ideology and more focused on its internal economic development. In spite of some sporadic regional views, the most preponderant factor for Chinese policy-makers was a world view in the form of fights against colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. The end of both the Cold War and the bipolar system on account of the dismemberment of the Soviet Union had reduced the importance of the ideological world views that were once deemed relevant for China foreign policy. On that account, Africa's level of importance in the international system suffered a considerable reduction. It was only in the late 1990s that the environment became friendlier and trade flows reached reasonable levels.

With the end of the civil war in 2002, following the death of UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi, the ghost from China's past support could be forgotten. A new trend could be initiated in which economic cooperation was at the heart of the relationship.

The post civil war period was focused on rebuilding the infrastructure and the economy of the country, which had been severely damaged. International organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, were involved in the reconstruction process and had been granted funds for the development of the country. A cause of occasional clashes between the West and the Angolan elites was the lack of transparency in the management of public money. Western countries and international organisations have pushed for greater transparency in the management of oil revenues to encourage the Angolan government to focus more on humanitarian and social action.¹⁰⁹ For instance, on the Falcone's affair regarding the restructuring of Angola's debt to Russia, several Swiss bank accounts were frozen in 2002, and in 2005, Switzerland and Angola signed an agreement, allowing for the repatriation of US\$21 million to be used in humanitarian projects in Angola.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Edward George, "Recent History (Angola)", *Africa South of the Sahara 2010*, Iain Frame (Ed.), London, Routledge, 2009, p. 79.

¹¹⁰ "Switzerland returns money to Angola", *Swiss Info*, 1 November 2005. Retrieved from <http://origin.swissinfo.ch/eng/switzerland-returns-money-to-angola/4821176>.

5.1.2 Post war development needs

Angola has a strategic importance¹¹¹, with access to the Atlantic Ocean, and borders with the DRC, Zambia and Namibia, countries also rich in natural resources.

Fig. 3: Angola's strategic location



Map No. 3727 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
August 2008

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Source: UN Cartographic Section, Map of Angola, August 2008, No. 3727 Rev. 4.

¹¹¹ Cabinda, an exclave, borders the Republic of the Congo to the north, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the south. Angola has a coastline of 1650 km.

After the 2002 ceasefire agreement, Angola experienced an economic boom resulting from foreign direct investment, increased oil production, and an increasing volume of Chinese financial support aiming at transforming the country's rudimentary infrastructure.¹¹² In 2002, oil accounted for 45 percent of Angola's GDP and for 90 percent of the government's revenues¹¹³. In order to improve the economic structure of Angola, there were talks with the IMF for an economic monitoring programme, but these weren't very effective as relations with the IMF have alternated between periods of constructive engagement and open hostility due to a divergence of opinion regarding the stabilisation of the economy, and a decrease in the IMF's influence arising from high oil prices and rapidly increasing oil production, leading to a more independent Angolan position.¹¹⁴

An IMF mission to Angola in February 2002 noted the unwillingness of the Angolan government to disclose information about the management of oil revenues, and in a September 2003 report, the IMF noted that little or no action had been taken to address the structural problems of the economy, increase transparency and reduce poverty.¹¹⁵ In 2007, the Angolan government formally called off talks with the IMF on a new monitoring arrangement, insisting that the country had its "home-grown" economic reform programme, to ensure macroeconomic stability, economic growth and poverty reduction¹¹⁶. In spite of a general economic revamp, many sectors are in need of reform and investment. One of the main sectors that were affected during the war was **agriculture**.¹¹⁷ From a potential 35m ha of arable land, only 5m ha are cultivated¹¹⁸, mostly due to the effects of the war such as depopulation of the rural areas and landmines. In November 2012, Angola and China signed a cooperation agreement for the construction of an agricultural research center in Mazozo near Luanda. The Secretary of State for Agriculture, Amaro Tati, and the Chinese Vice-

¹¹² Edward George, "Recent History (Angola)", *Africa South of the Sahara 2010*, Iain Frame (Ed.), London, Routledge, 2009, p. 79.

¹¹³ Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 56.

¹¹⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit, *Angola: Country Profile*, London, The Economist, 2008, p. 18.

¹¹⁵ Edward George, "Recent History (Angola)", *Africa South of the Sahara 2010*, Iain Frame (Ed.), London, Routledge, 2009, p. 81.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹¹⁷ Before the devastating 27 year-long civil war, Angola was the world's fourth largest coffee producer, with production of around 200,000 tonnes. "Empresas de Angola, Brasil e Vietnam associam-se para cultivar café em Angola", *MacauHub*, 17 July 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/pt/2012/07/17/empresas-de-angola-brasil-e-vietname-associam-se-para-cultivar-cafe-em-angola/>.

¹¹⁸ This was the situation in 2013, 11 years after the end of the civil war as mentioned by the State Secretary for Agriculture, José Amaro Tati. "Angola tem uma superfície cultivável de cerca de 35 milhões de hectares", *Agência Angola Press*, 18 November 2013. Retrieved from http://www.portalangop.co.ao/angola/pt_pt/noticias/economia/2013/10/47/Angola-tem-uma-superficie-cultivavel-cerca-milhoes-hectares.1faed3c8-bfac-41b6-8162-c18d99701479.html.

Minister of Commerce, Li Jinzao, signed the agreement, intended to promote the cultivation of rice and wheat in different regions of Angola¹¹⁹. The importance of this sector cannot be denied if one considers the long term security of a country and its ability to effectively reduce poverty. Another important sector concerns **diamonds**, as Angola's diamond industry is regaining its strength. In 2004, reported diamond exports totalled US\$ 763 million, and Angola was the world's fourth largest producer of rough diamonds in terms of value, representing nearly 12 percent of the world's market.¹²⁰ In order to have an efficient exploitation of natural resources, Angola needs to develop its **industry, transportation and communications** sectors, and Alden (2007:67) indicated that the EximBank loan had a clause giving 70 percent of construction contracts to Chinese firms.

Concerning trade and foreign payments, in 2008, Angola's main export commodity was crude petroleum, around US\$65 billion dollars, totalling 96.7 percent of the total export earnings, directed mostly to China, the main buyer, with 33.5 percent, followed by the United States, with 27.3 percent and South Africa, with 9.9 percent. The main source of imports in the same year was Portugal with 19.4 percent, China with 14.8 percent and the United States with 12.4 percent.¹²¹

5.2. China's benevolence: new contexts, ongoing partnership

Since the end of the civil war in 2002, China's relation with Angola shifted from defence and security based, towards an economic one.¹²² The increased political activity allowed the relation between Angola and China to rapidly progress. China's assistance after 2002 had been mainly focused in building infrastructure, telecommunication projects and agro-business, sectors in which Angola had an urgent need for assistance. China Construction Bank and China EximBank provided the first funding for infrastructure development in 2002.¹²³ The peak of their relation was in 2004, when China and Angola agreed to a US\$2 billion oil-backed credit line from China's Eximbank for infrastructure projects, repayable in

¹¹⁹ "Pesquisa agrícola tem apoio chinês", *Jornal de Angola*, 6 November 2012. Retrieved from http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/economia/pesquisa_agricola_tem_apoio_chines.

¹²⁰ World Bank, *Angola: Oil, Broad-Based Growth, and Equity*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007, pp. 68-69. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6759>.

¹²¹ Edward George, "Recent History (Angola)", *Africa South of the Sahara 2010*, Iain Frame (Ed.), London, Routledge, 2009, p. 89.

¹²² Indira Campos and Alex Vines, "Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership", Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., March 2008, p. 3.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

17 years and with 17 years grace period, which extended up to US\$4.5 billion.¹²⁴ Coincidentally or not, this happened after the first Forum Macao in 2003, when China put forward its peaceful development policy.

5.3 Angola's receptivity: the rhetoric of acceptance

During the first Forum Macao in 2003, China presented, through its representatives, a very attractive rhetoric, in which it described itself as a friend with a common history and values, that experienced on its own a rough path of development and was willing and able to share its experience. The Action Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation adopted at the Ministerial Conference of Forum Macao included all the economic areas relevant for Angola's development.

The context of acceptance was also significant: after the end of the civil war in 2002 and the clash with the IMF, the Chinese found the perfect moment to put forward an accessible development strategy and a beneficial development partnership: a country newly entered in the international scene after a prolonged civil war, rich in oil and diamonds, and needing to be reconstructed.

Angola seemed to be one of the countries very receptive to China's rhetoric, as it was shamed by the West, and going through a process of guilt and victimage for not being able to align to international standards and receiving international criticism for its lack of transparency. As such, it was willing to join China in reversing the current hierarchy and engaging in the peaceful development path, accepting values such as equality, mutual respect, solidarity and non-interference.

5.3.1 The common image of the world and working towards common goals

During the 2003 Forum Macao, Angola was represented by the Minister of Commerce, who gave three speeches: opening ceremony, Ministerial Conference and closing ceremony. At the opening ceremony, the Angolan Minister of Commerce, Domingos Victorino Hossi, introduced the context: he states that the Ministerial Conference of Forum Macao comes at a very important moment for Angola, after the signature in April 2002 of the Memorandum of Understanding to the Lusaka Protocol that ended a 27 years war period that caused the degradation of infrastructure and undermined the economy and social fabric,

¹²⁴ Edward George, "Recent History (Angola)", Africa South of the Sahara 2010, Iain Frame (Ed.), London, Routledge, 2009, p. 89.

affecting Angola's development strategy. He declared that Angola was, at that point, in a position to:

“repensar a estratégia de desenvolvimento e redefinir a participação de Angola na economia internacional, buscando condições e mecanismos que permitam uma integração rápida e efectiva de Angola no sistema comercial mundial.”¹²⁵

Searching for an effective inclusion into the world's economy and dealing with the challenges posed by globalisation are major concerns for the government and Angola was willing to consider a system that was suitable to reduce imbalances within the international economy, which is marked by the weak competitiveness of African countries. As globalisation is inevitable, the developing countries should reflect on the course of action that would bring them the best benefits. Based on this, the development strategy proposed at the Forum Macao seems optimal to lay the foundations for sustained growth. The Minister of Commerce goes further in acknowledging that globalisation carries contradictions:

“Se tem contribuído em muitos casos, para o crescimento económico através do aumento das trocas comerciais, do acesso mais fácil ao capital e da difusão dos princípios da economia de mercado, tem por outro lado, aprofundado a clivagem entre os Países ricos e os Países pobres, contribuindo para a marginalização e exclusão de muitos, dada a necessidade de uma abordagem mais ampla, sobre os aspectos que devem fomentar o desenvolvimento, particularmente os Países membros da CPLP - Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, e com estes, a República Popular da China e a Região Administrativa Especial de Macau.”¹²⁶

The other side of identification, division, is stressed as the rift between rich and poor countries is increasing, contributing to the marginalisation and the exclusion of many in the hierarchy of the international system, thus giving solid reasons for a strong partnership

¹²⁵ Speech of His Excellency, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Domingos Victorino Hossi, at the opening ceremony of Forum Macao 2003.

“rethink the development strategy and redefine the participation of Angola in the international economy, seeking conditions and mechanisms that allow the rapid and effective integration of Angola in the global trading system”.

¹²⁶ Speech of His Excellency, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Domingos Victorino Hossi at the opening ceremony of Forum Macao 2003.

“On one hand, it has in many cases contributed to economic growth through increased trade, easier access to capital and the diffusion of the principles of the market economy, but on the other hand it has deepened the rift between the rich countries and the poor countries contributing to the marginalization and exclusion of many, given the need for a broader approach, on the aspects that should foster the development, in particular of the member states of the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries), and with these, the People's Republic of China and Macao Special Administrative Region.”

between the Portuguese-speaking countries and China within the framework of Forum Macao. The Minister also has a pragmatic view of Forum Macao, the agency, as he considers that it not only has a major economic role to play, but it also is a forum for sharing knowledge and to enhance cooperation regarding the mutual interests of its member countries:

“Reitero aqui uma vez mais que é sempre oportuna e bem vinda esta iniciativa, num mundo cada vez mais integrado, onde a cooperação deverá desempenhar papel de importância maior, não apenas como espaço institucional de relações económicas, mas fundamentalmente enquanto instrumento de partilha essencial de conhecimentos e de comunhão de interesses, face ao enorme potencial humano e material que os nossos Países detêm.”¹²⁷

From the speech of the Minister of Commerce of Angola, the following *leitmotifs* can be noticed: the concerns about the development of the country post civil war, the challenges posed by globalisation, the issue of hierarchy and inequality in the international system, the fear to be left behind and the strong desire to integrate and benefit from the international trade system and the global economy.

By analysing this speech through the lenses of rhetorical criticism, it is possible to find evidence of the stages of Angola’s guilt and victimage due to international criticism, which triggers the desire to reject the current hierarchy and to seek a new one. China, through its political and economic policies and its will to contribute towards partnerships among equals and peaceful development is seen as an important partner. China displayed benevolence, while the West shamed Angola and made public accusations of lack of transparency by criticising Angola’s internal policies.

Hence, it is expected that China will benefit from Angola’s benevolence in sharing its resources and granting China a larger access to its internal market and by creating a favourable investment environment for Chinese companies. In fact, Chinese companies have gained a relevant foothold in the construction, telecommunications, commerce, energy and mining sectors.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Speech of His Excellency, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Domingos Victorino Hossi, at the opening ceremony of Forum Macao 2003.

“I reiterate here again that this initiative is always timely and welcome, in an increasingly integrated world, where cooperation should play a greater role, not only as an institutional space of economic relations, but mainly as a tool for sharing essential knowledge and shared interests, given the enormous human and material potential that our countries hold.”

¹²⁸ Economist Intelligence Unit, Angola: Country Profile, London, The Economist, 2008, p. 10.

In his final speech, given at the closing ceremony, Minister Victorino Hossi started by thanking China for its warm hospitality and stated that, during the forum, they have established, in a unique way, a framework for deepening the economic ties between the countries. While referring to the cooperation agreement approved at the 2003 Forum Macao, the first Action Plan for Economic and Trade Cooperation, he stated:

“Do acordo de cooperação económica e comercial que assumimos e assinámos, resultam princípios e valores que nortearão a acção da nossa relação, que criou desde já um quadro novo para o desenvolvimento de uma parceria estratégica, sendo necessário encontrar formas concretas e inovadoras de investimento e financiamento, para projectos de desenvolvimento coerente e integrado que permitam que tenhamos crescimento, estabilização e um bom funcionamento das nossas economias e que todos os nossos países possam participar activamente na regulação da economia mundial.”¹²⁹

The Minister refers the importance of the Action Plan to develop a strategic partnership, and once again takes a pragmatic stance by stressing the need for concrete ways of obtaining financing and investment to achieve economic growth and efficiency. Moreover, he also draws attention to the private sector, which he considers the “engine” for economic development, and to trade, an instrument to be used by businessmen to increase their interaction. He envisages a more active participation in the world’s economy, and the whole idea implies that together, they can be stronger and can change the rules of the game, created by the developed countries, and disprove the idea that they aren’t able to take a seat in the front row in the decision-making processes.

After the signature of the Action Plan of the 2003 Forum Macao, Beijing issued in 2006 its first official China’s African Policy. For Angola, being included in these two settings was a good indicator that the country could benefit from the reinforcement of China’s development policy. The trend was positive in the hiatus between the Ministerial Conferences of Forum Macao as in 2004 Angola’s GDP growth rate was 11.2 percent and in 2005 it was 20.6 percent. In this context, the second Forum Macao came as a validation of the China-Angola partnership.

¹²⁹ Speech of His Excellency, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Domingos Victorino Hossi at the closing ceremony of Forum Macao 2003.

"From the economic and trade cooperation agreement we signed, there are principles and values that guide the actions of our relationship, which already has created a new framework for the development of a strategic partnership, being necessary to find practical and innovative ways of investing and financing in coherent and integrated development projects which pave the way for growth, stabilization and the proper functioning of our economies and allow that all our countries can actively participate in the regulation of the world economy."

In the speech given at the 2006 Forum Macao, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Joaquim Icuma Mufamba, refers to the historical friendship and cooperation ties that bonded China and Angola for decades and envisages for a solidification of this relationship:

"O Plano de Acção assinado em 2003 e consequentemente a cooperação desenvolvida no quadro dos programas aprovados no período de 2004 a 2006, deverão inspirar uma reflexão mais aprofundada, e continuar a reforçar os alicerces do modelo de cooperação adoptado [...] Uma cooperação criativa de longo prazo e voltada não apenas para interesses imediatistas realiza-se necessariamente a partir daquilo que executamos com determinação e que planeamos com rigor e realismo."¹³⁰

Within the framework of the programmes derived from the 2003 Action Plan, the Minister notes the importance of reinforcing the foundations of the partnership, while stressing the long term panorama of the cooperation.

From the speech, it can be noticed a change of tone from the Angolan side, expressing more confidence, in what the future holds as well as in the partnership with China and its benefits. He started by stating that the second forum is taking place during a special time for the Angolan people, a time in which peace is being consolidated and Angola is working towards economic progress, with the purpose of rapidly integrating itself into the world economic system. The discourse is an analysis of Angola's evolution since 2003: he notes the great macroeconomic performance, the decrease of inflation from 300 percent in 2002 to an expected rate of 15 percent in 2006, and a forecast of up to 18 percent for GDP growth. Nonetheless, the Minister indicates a pressing challenge:

"O Governo da República de Angola enfrenta agora o desafio de fazer com que este rápido crescimento, baseado na exportação do petróleo, conduza a um desenvolvimento que beneficie efectivamente o conjunto da sua população. Para alcançarmos estes objectivos, necessitaremos sempre do apoio da Comunidade Internacional, e aqui, podemos reconhecer e destacar, a captação de investimentos através da República Popular da China em particular, e de outros Países em geral."¹³¹

¹³⁰ Speech of His Excellency, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Joaquim Icuma Muafumba at the opening ceremony of Forum Macao 2006.

"The Action Plan signed in 2003 and consequently the cooperation developed within the framework of the programs approved in the period 2004-2006, should inspire further reflection, and continue to strengthen the foundations of the cooperation model adopted."

"A creative long-term cooperation, focused not only in the immediate interests, takes place necessarily from what we do with determination and from what we plan with accuracy and realism."

¹³¹ Speech of His Excellency, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Joaquim Icuma Muafumba at the opening ceremony of Forum Macao 2006.

"The Government of the Republic of Angola now faces the challenge of turning this rapid growth, based on oil exports, into a development model that benefits effectively the whole of its population. To achieve these

Angola's government faces the political and social challenge of ensuring that oil revenues are streamlined into a development model for the benefit of the entire Angolan population. In this quest, the Minister notes the support from China and the role of Chinese investment. He praises the positive contribution of Forum Macao to Angola's development, but notices at the same time that there are still structural economic problems to overcome. The importance of private investors is also underlined and references are made to private investment law, tax incentives, dividends and legal guarantees. The Minister of Commerce makes a thorough analysis of Angola and presents its advantages:

“Angola é um dos países com maior potencial de desenvolvimento em África. Extrai mais de um milhão de barris de petróleo por dia e tem reservas estimadas em 12 mil milhões de barris. Também tem diamantes, 3 milhões de hectares de terra fértil, uma das maiores reservas de água de África, grande capacidade de produção de energia eléctrica, pesca e muitos minerais nobres.”¹³²

This description of Angola's vast wealth of natural resources, which includes oil, diamonds and noble minerals, among others, is very appealing for a country like China, which requires large quantities of energy and minerals for its bulging industrial sector. In order to effectively exploit these resources for the benefit of all, Angola needs investment. A special focus is directed towards private investment, which Angola considers indispensable for sectoral development. Hence, the long term objectives of Angola are directed towards the fundamental re-ordering of competitiveness and industry creation at the national level, and a full integration in the South African Development Community (SADC) to join a market of over 200 million consumers, at the regional level.

The future focus would be on the development of the primary sectors of the economy including agriculture, livestock and fisheries, and their subsequent integration with manufacturing, supported by small and medium sized enterprises. After the restatement of Angola's richness and development potential, the Minister thanks the government of the Special Administrative Region of Macao, which through the Permanent Secretariat of Forum Macao, has been fundamental in enhancing the symbolic connection and the cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries.

objectives, we will always need the support of the international community, and here we can recognize and highlight, the attraction of investment by China in particular, and other countries in general."

¹³² Speech of His Excellency, the Minister of Commerce of Angola, Joaquim Icuma Muafumba at the opening ceremony of Forum Macao 2006.

"Angola is one of the countries with the greatest potential for development in Africa. It extracts more than a million barrels of oil per day and has reserves estimated at 12 billion barrels. It also has diamonds, 3 million hectares of fertile land, one of the greatest water reserves in Africa, large capacity for generation of electricity, fishing and many noble minerals."

In the closing speech, the Minister of Commerce of Angola expressed Angola's support for the new Action Plan 2007-2009, which is, in its structure, an extension of the 2003 Plan. As well, he is putting forward the issue of opening a Luanda-Beijing airline, to support the commercial relations and the contacts between Angolan and Chinese businessmen. In addition, he stresses bluntly the extraordinary dimension that the Angolan-Chinese cooperation has reached:

“E também temos que frisar neste encontro, e dar a conhecer que Angola é hoje o primeiro país exportador de petróleo para a República Popular da China, ultrapassando a Arábia Saudita.”

In a couple of years Angola has become China's main oil supplier, a remarkable fact giving support to China's pragmatic approach and the concrete success of Forum Macao, the agency. Finally, he expresses his gratitude for Angola's inclusion in the concerns of the People's Republic of China, and the commitment of both countries for a successful and sustainable development.

The aforementioned facts give the idea that Angola is indeed trying to change the hierarchy in the international system, and has big ambitions. These ambitions require capital investment, and thus China is seen as a partner that can bring investment and be the front runner of Angola in making the connection with the international economic scene. As can be seen, China is particularly interested in investing in Angola and the Minister's speech resonates with the Chinese rhetoric at the 2003 Forum Macao and with China's African Policy 2006 in the sense that China puts forward ideas and Angola makes an adequate assessment and displays a tacit agreement. Identification also occurs due to the fact that both countries have a shared experience of international criticism.

The People's Republic of China, established in 1949, was shunned by the West for many years because of its communist ideology, even at the highest international level having only been admitted to the UN and its Security Council in 1971¹³³. Angola, after the end of colonialism experienced a violent and long civil war in which many foreign powers intervened. Following the end of the conflict, the government of Angola was criticised for not adhering to internationally recognized good practices, and since then, Angola is trying to

¹³³ The Republic of China (ROC-Taiwan), with the support of the United States, and led by Chiang Kai-shek retained the Chinese seat in the UN as well as its permanent seat in the UN Security Council from 1949 until 1971, when the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 2758. Sigrid Winkler, "Taiwan's UN Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be", Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis, No. 9, The Brookings Institution, June 2012. Retrieved from <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/06/20-taiwan-un-winkler>.

implement sustainable development policies in order to join the global trade network and gain regional influence.

On the geopolitical level, following its continuous ascendancy to the top two African oil producers, Angola also became the second sub-Saharan country to join the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)¹³⁴. The stability of the country has enhanced its oil production to the point that during the Niger Delta crisis of 2009, Angola became the largest African oil producer.¹³⁵ In addition, Angola wants to assert its status of regional power in the Central African region and over the other lusophone African countries (PALOP), making its way into a balance of power situation traditionally dominated by Nigeria and South Africa.¹³⁶ Both China and Angola have resources and development potential, and in this case, China has more experience, and the interest and the desire to contribute towards Angola's development. The rhetors use the same language clusters: peaceful and sustainable development, friendship, trust, respect, common goals, and they both have an interest to alter the current hierarchy as China wants to gain more international influence, both economic and political, and Angola wants to reappear in the international scene. Angola needs a strong partner after the civil war experience and China needs to solidify its partnerships and gain access to new markets and resources.

Finally, we could take a look at a comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between the African policy of the EU and China.

China's pragmatic approach and the fact that Angola has temporarily become the main supplier of oil to China, surpassing Saudi Arabia, the traditional ally of the United States, can imply that preferences are being set and soft power, rhetoric, and the *pentadic agency* (Forum Macao) achieved their purpose: to center China at the core of the developing world and to build its political and economic influence on a new development model.

¹³⁴ Angola facts and figures, Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Retrieved from http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm.

¹³⁵ Gaspar Andre, "The Management of Angolan Oil Revenues: Are there any chances to change the "resources curse"? University of Dundee, 2013, p. 5. Retrieved from http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/March_2013/Angola%20Oil%20Revenues%20and%20Resource%20Curse.pdf.

¹³⁶ Economist Intelligence Unit, Angola: Country Profile, London, The Economist, 2008, p. 11.

Fig. 4: European Union and China: African policy¹³⁷

European Union	China
1. Background/starting point for cooperation	
bound by history (colonialism) and strong partnership	similar historical experiences (e.g. struggle for national liberation)
strong trade links (esp. export from Africa to Europe)	bilateral trade and economic cooperation
comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for relations	consultation and cooperation in international affairs
geographically close	
2. Aims and objectives of cooperation	
security	contribution to peace and stability
sustainable development	development
prosperity	common prosperity
overcome fragmentation, promote integration	
achievement of MDGs, poverty alleviation	
good governance/political reform	
3. Principles of cooperation	
equality	equality
	sincerity
solidarity	friendship
African ownership and responsibility	mutual benefit
mutual accountability	reciprocity, mutual support and close coordination
	learning from each other and seeking common development
partnership based on international law and human rights	non-interference in each other's internal affairs
	willingness to accommodate/accept the 'one China' principle
subsidiarity	
dialogue	

It is then self-evident that ideological motives have been replaced by political and economic factors in the shaping of Chinese foreign policy towards the developing countries. The internal events of 1989 and 1993 have compelled China to engage in a more proactive foreign policy. Soft power, in the form of political and diplomatic charming, trade deals and investment, debt forgiveness, and aid packages proved to be a successful strategy for the fulfilment of Chinese objectives.

In the complex debate on China's engagement with Africa, opposing sides present their pros and cons to ascertain the advantages and disadvantages of this reinvigorated relationship. One of the most sound voices to analyse this debate has been Professor Fantu

¹³⁷ European Commission, "Similarities and differences in EU's and China's African policies", 23 March 2007. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/documents/presentations/presentation_23_03_2007_en.pdf.

Cheru, Research Director at the Nordic Africa Institute, who has made an examination from the lenses of a “genuine partnership or a marriage of convenience”. Professor Cheru has summarized the positive views on this relationship¹³⁸:

- a) The instructive value of China’s development experience for Africa: China provides a role model in terms of economic transformation.
- b) Complementarity of Chinese investment to African needs: China is addressing basic infrastructure needs of the African countries.
- c) Chinese portray Africa in a positive tone. China promotes the idea that China is a continent full of opportunities.

On the other hand, negative views take form in the following critics:

- a) Chinese Support to Undemocratic African Regimes: China maintains relations with regimes that don't uphold human rights and democracy.
- b) Disregard to environmentally sustainable forms of resource extraction: China doesn't promote the sustainable exploitation of natural resources.
- c) Poor Labour Practices by Chinese companies: Chinese businesses don't promote decent work practices.
- d) Dumping of Cheap Chinese goods in African Markets: Cheap Chinese products have caused harm to some African industries.

Therefore, in the midst of this exuberant *charm offensive* led by China, Professor Cheru has an objective view of China’s intense courting of African countries:

“One conclusion however is that China is not very different from the West in how they operate in Africa. They are neither better nor worse than the West.”¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Fantu Cheru, “China and Africa: Genuine Partnership or a Marriage of Convenience?”, in Africa in search of alternatives: Nordic Africa Institute Annual Report 2008, The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2009, pp. 6-7. Retrieved from www.nai.uu.se/AnnualReport2008.pdf.

¹³⁹ Christian Palme, “China and India in Africa – Neither better nor worse than the West”, The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, September 7 2010. Retrieved from <http://www.nai.uu.se/news/articles/china-india-article/>.

6. Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis was to analyse China's foreign policy from 2003 to 2006 towards the Portuguese-speaking countries, with a focus on Angola. The underlying argument was that China intends to gain international influence, both economically and politically, through a soft power strategy and accompanying rhetoric. The rationale behind it is that, if the developed, Westernised countries already have their own established development philosophies, the developing world is a breeding ground for new development philosophies, new economic development policies and is more receptive towards accepting a new economic and political model from a **partner** country, that experienced a similar development path and is willing, politically and economically, to share its experience. The thesis tries to assess how a different development partnership model, mostly of a South-South nature is structured and how is the relationship between the partners presented in terms of soft power and rhetoric.

From the second chapter of this thesis, one can see how China is using the elements of soft power and the power of rhetoric in order to attract its partners, by using specific elements such as putting forward a common history, common experiences, values, and images that would bring China and the Portuguese-speaking countries closer. China created its scenes: Forum Macao, to reach out to the Portuguese-speaking countries and FOCAC, to reach out to the African countries. Together, these clusters constitute one of the largest, if not the largest, groups of developing countries and present numerous possibilities for resource exploration, investment and opening new markets, which would highly benefit the partner countries.

In the third chapter, China's rhetoric towards the Portuguese-speaking countries is presented, by analysing speeches made during the Ministerial Conferences of Forum Macao as well as the subsequent Action Plans adopted in this framework. Besides its friendly rhetoric and presenting all the elements required by the developing countries, China came up with concrete actions and solutions (forums and Action Plans) to back its official foreign policy. The approval of the Action Plans during the Ministerial Conferences of Forum Macao in 2003 and 2006 consolidated the cooperation between China and the Portuguese-speaking countries, and increased China's soft power. Addressing all the areas in which the participating countries needed concrete initiatives, implies a deep and thorough analysis of these countries' economies and political situation as well as a high degree of strategic planning.

In the fourth chapter, China's African Policy was analysed taking into account its structure and the aspects that would be of interest to the African countries. It could be seen that China tried to cover all these areas, by extending its presence from economy to politics, from education to health, from culture to humanitarian action. By deeply embedding its business and culture in a partner's country economic and political system, China aims at building an effective partnership and ensure a long and productive alliance with the partner country, creating strong ties and putting its economic power to use.

By using in its rhetoric the historical experiences of colonialism, the sufferance endured by the partner countries during these years and the challenges with which they are confronted nowadays in the globalisation era, China is trying to create identification and division: not a coloniser, but a partner.

China isn't a teacher, but a more advanced student, with more resources and the ability to share its experiences. It adheres to a non-intervention policy and intends to promote peaceful development.

In the last chapter, the example of Angola, a country part of both groups, showed a more comprehensive example of the concrete action that China undertook towards a partner country, the way in which China created the relationship, the rhetoric and soft power that were used, and the outcomes achieved. By analysing briefly the relation between China and Angola, and how it developed in the context of the 2003 and 2006 Forum Macao and China's African Policy, it is not a surprise to find out that economic and trade relations have grown exponentially to the point that Angola became China's main oil supplier.

While the West was trying to impose a certain degree of compliance to Angola, China presented itself as a development partner using a rhetoric that emphasised commonalities and proposing a type of cooperation that would be mutually beneficial and based on non-interference. The rhetorical analysis indicates that the narrative clearly envisaged the creation of a partnership based on mutual respect in which partners would complement one another.

To conclude, it can be stated that the use of rhetoric and soft power in order to secure international alliances and partnerships, at the economic and political levels, is a *modus operandi* that has worked well for China in pursuing its foreign policy in a very pragmatic approach. Is China putting forward a new development pattern?

It is at least presented in a way that is adequate for China's circumstances and if one makes a comparison between, for example, the EU and China's African Policy discourse, one can notice that, the EU has a different approach towards African countries. While the EU frames its approach on historical ties, although derived from colonialism, China is basing its

discourse on the similar historical experience of struggle for national liberation, hence the like mindedness and the creation of a similar imaginary. While the EU is focusing on a global policy for Africa, the Chinese rhetoric is focused on economic and trade cooperation. This more pragmatic approach to the creation of partnerships may bring more benefits on the long term than a general framework and a policy of “one size fits all”, especially if one considers the broad diversity of the African continent. In China’s approach, consultation and cooperation in international affairs is an important issue, stressing commonalities, non-interference and not mentioning sanctions. It is not conditionality free, as it asks for adherence to the “one China policy”, but it doesn’t interfere in the internal politics of its partners. China’s rhetorical approach seems to conveniently address the needs of its partners, framing a situation of mutual support at the political and economic levels.

Concerning the aims and objectives for cooperation, the milder pragmatic approach of China can be noticed. Stemming from Lakoff’s line of thought, one can infer the hierarchical and paternalistic approach of the EU, which is trying to promote integration, good governance and political reform. In spite of its good intentions, one can notice the sensitivity of African countries in what concerns political reform, especially taking into account the colonial history. In terms of objectives, China chose to avoid any sensitive topics and to put forward concepts that are important to the partners it is trying to attract, by using soft power and embedding its aims in broad and flexible concepts, such as contribution to peace and stability, development and common prosperity.

The principles of cooperation are also framed differently as China is using a specific vocabulary with terms such as equality, sincerity, friendship and mutual benefit in order to consolidate its relationships, with an emphasis placed in non-interference in internal affairs, while the EU puts forward concepts related to mutual accountability, international law and human rights, that at this stage would seem more of the same Western interventionist stance African countries have experienced, which could generate painful memories in the example of Angola. In the EU’s approach, it would seem that the current hierarchical *status quo* in international affairs is being reinforced and isn’t evolving towards a more egalitarian one.

While stating the non-interference principle, China is basing its peaceful development partnership on the willingness to accommodate to the “one China policy”, therefore, legitimising the assumption that China is using its soft power embedded in its rhetoric and peaceful development principle to reach its political goals of assuming sovereignty over lost territories.

It is clear that perception, public opinion and action backed rhetoric matters on the international scene as power perceived is power achieved. In this case, the occasional vagueness of Chinese rhetoric and the broadness of its development principles are sometimes more beneficial on the long run, as it has the ability to accommodate changes. As well, treating partners from a position of equality is also important, as it opens more doors and ensures mutual support. In the case of China, it seems that the developing countries from the Portuguese-speaking world and Africa, Angola belonging to both, made, for the time being, a choice to accept China's rhetorical stance and acknowledge its soft power.

Further research is, of course, needed to further document in quantitative and qualitative terms the benefit of these development partnerships that China created and to prove their win-win nature, but a clear point is that through its economic approach, the soft power *carrots* as described by Nye, consisting of foreign direct investment, infrastructure building, direct credit lines, and a rhetoric of identification, China is gaining ground and influence over the developing countries, which, once deeper embedded, would be very difficult to recover by the Western world. Burke's assertion that identification and division are two sides of the same coin does seem to resonate with China's rhetoric. Finally, regarding the hypothesis of China's role in Africa as a development partner, an economic competitor or a coloniser, it clearly seems that Chinese rhetoric and soft power are undoubtedly geared towards presenting China as a development partner, a genuine proponent of South-South cooperation and solidarity.

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