

Miikka Pyykkönen – Niina Simanainen – Sakarias Sokka (eds)

What about Cultural Policy?

Interdisciplinary Perspectives
on Culture and Politics

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– Sakarias Sokka (eds.)

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Kustantaja ja myynti:
Minerva Kustannus Oy
Lastenkodinkuja 1 A, 00180 Helsinki
Viitaniementie 13, 40720 Jyväskylä
kustannus@minervakustannus.fi

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Foreword

Miikka Pyykkönen, Niina Simanainen & Sakarias Sokka

PROFESSOR ANITA KANGAS celebrated her 60th birthday on March 2, 2009. We could not think of a better way to celebrate Anita's distinguished career as a researcher, teacher and developer of Cultural Policy than with this volume, which is, above all, a cultural policy text book. It is also aimed at researchers and professionals of the cultural fields, and for all those interested in culture and politics.

Professor Anita Kangas is the Director of the Unit for Cultural Policy Studies at the University of Jyväskylä. Her professorship, established in 1996, was the first professorship in the field of Cultural Policy in the Nordic countries. Anita developed and directed the interdisciplinary Cultural Management Programme in 1991–2000. In 2000, she launched the Master's Programme in Cultural Policy, and the Doctoral Programme in Cultural Policy followed shortly after that. Both the Master's Programme and the Doctoral Programme in Cultural Policy have been – and still are today – unique in Finland.

Anita Kangas' main research interests have included local and regional cultural policies and planning, theory and history of cultural policy, cultural policies in the European Union, culture and the civil society/third sector, culture and technology and the role of women in cultural life. Indeed, many of these themes are also discussed in the articles of this book. Anita has published widely on cultural policy and cultural politics, cultural theory and action research methodology, and she has established and managed several research projects on cultural policy.

Between 1986 and 1991, Anita Kangas served as the chair of the Arts Council of Central Finland. In 1992–1997, she was the vice chair of the Arts Council of Finland and a member of the Consultative Board for Popular Science and Committee of Media Arts. Anita has been consulted by numerous Finnish local and regional authorities on cultural policy and cultural planning. Since 2002 she has been the chair of the Advisory Board of the Foundation for Cultural Policy Research (CUPORE) and the Regional Cultural Foundation for Central Finland (Finnish Cultural Foundation). Anita Kangas is currently the dean at the Faculty of Social Sciences, and she is a member of various boards and committees of the University. She is also a docent at the University of Joensuu, Finland.

With this Festschrift, we wish to congratulate Anita and celebrate her outstanding career as a developer of cultural political research and education in Finland, as well as her significant role in shaping cultural policies both in national and international contexts. We wish to thank all the authors of this publication, the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, CUPORE (Foundation for Cultural Policy Research), and Tuija Modinos for proofreading the articles.

Introduction

– O Culture, Where Art Thou?

Miikka Pyykkönen, Niina Simanainen, Sakarias Sokka

CULTURAL POLICY AS A DISCIPLINE AND A POLICY SECTOR

POLICY, AS A CONCEPT, refers to the “regularizing aspects of politics” that [as an outcome of contingent action; cf. ‘politicizing’ and ‘politicking’] imply the coordination of acts, and measure and regulate the inclusion and exclusion of activities (see Palonen 2003). When the concrete, regularizing aspect of organizing things and acts is indicated by policy, ‘culture’, as an abstract concept, has to be reified in some sense for analyzing it on that same level. This, in short, seems to be the first theoretical challenge in cultural policy research.

Esa Pirnes (2008, 40) has stated that the late 18th and early 19th centuries (in Western societies) witnessed a rebirth of the concept of culture. Due to modernization process, nature and man were ever more frequently seen as separate entities, a new secular world view was propagated, and ‘culture’ was adapted to new contents. In Raymond Williams’ (1988, 88) words: “[c]ulture as an independent noun, an abstract process or the product of such process, is not important before IC18 and is not common before mC19.”

During the 19th century – in addition to the development of the broader definition, which meant attaching ‘culture’ to the level of the collective development (e.g., Daniel 1993, 74)¹ – it became commonplace

to identify 'culture' with art and poetry. This was due to thinkers such as, e.g., Schiller, Wordsworth and Coleridge. As a consequence, art as the most advanced level of the 'culture', indicating the societal evolution, was seen produced by remarkable individuals. To "understand" the creative, sentimental characteristic of aesthetics, many upbringing capabilities were longed for from the receivers of art, too (Pirnes 2008, 40–65).

In a great deal of the cultural policy research and other studies observing the political aspects of culture, culture has been approached from within the national framework. This is quite understandable, whereas, for long, the policies under scrutiny were also limited to the national framework, and international effects were not significant or they were not recognized as such. Also, the regional and local policy institutions and activities were mainly seen as somewhat subordinate to the centralized national policy, both in policies and in research (Häyrynen 2005, 135–145).

This joint descending of the nation state and culture led to the homogenization on an ideological level. The mushrooming of the printed material was important here: the idea of the nation under the umbrella of one culture disseminated to all strata through novels, travelogues, ethnographies, newspapers, population studies and education. The dissemination of national culture was concealed in symbols, many of which were also pieces of art (national flags, songs, paintings, literature, etc.). Although the people inhabiting a particular territory did not actually know each other, they shared the feeling of belonging to the same group through sharing the same symbols, language, conceptual maps, and other cultural features (Andersson 1982; Hobsbawm 1990; Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983).

The above mentioned framework relates to the development in which cultural policy was strictly connected to the formation of the nation-state and the civilization of its citizens in many European countries – for example, in the Nordic countries – in the late 19th century and during the first half of the 20th century. Organized forms of culture brought together diverse elements of the societies. This required the existence of apparatuses and experts securing the "correct realization" and the "right

direction” of culture. However, this did not mean quelling the artists, their organizations or other actors, who practiced cultural activities in the sphere of civil society and had functioned as the backbones of the state centralization, but a new kind of regulation and selective resourcing of their activities. In most of the Nordic countries this “nationalization of the culture” took place through the state subsidy system for the arts, arts institutions such as national galleries, museums and theaters, and education (E.g. Duelund 2003; Frenander 2005; Mangset 1995; Sokka & Kangas 2006). In this edition, Peter Duelund compares, in this respect, the development that has taken place within the Nordic countries. He underlines the role of the public sphere in the overall development of national policy lines. Annika Waenerberg, on her behalf, asks how national the national contents of art actually are, using the case of Finnish art history as an example. She thus acknowledges the international influences behind the construction of national ideals in the 19th century – and, correspondingly, behind the construction of art collections as an outcome of a chosen policy.

WINDS OF CHANGE

In the late 19th century, thinkers such as Matthew Arnold could merge earlier discussions into one, producing a cultural view for monitoring the development of the “society” as a whole. Thereby culture, and arts as the highest level of it, became an active tool that could be assisted by public (nation state’s) institutions to (re)produce the society on an ever higher level. According to Pirnes (2008), the development of the use of ‘culture’ did not reach much beyond this before the 1950s. Then figures such as Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams and E. P. Thompson (among others²) started to criticize the uses of the concept during the last 90 years or so. To surpass these (by then rather static and hegemonic) uses, Williams began to ask questions like “how should the social be organized and what would the role of both culture and cultural actors be in it?”,

and answered by the notion of solidarity. Hence, the border between highbrow and popular (lowbrow) culture began – that is, at least for some observers – to seem awkward, and the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of cultural products could be understood as something produced by the *societal* evaluation of qualifications. Taking part in ‘culture’ became a matter of recognition and the acknowledgement of the diversity of the participants (See Pirnes 2008, 25, 65–102, 122). This kind of viewpoint was, later, to become the base for adding *critical* in front of the phrase “cultural policy research”. Besides the British school of cultural studies, described above, also many other, mainly European, theorists (e.g., Althusser, Gramsci, Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, Barthes) have been important for the further development of critical analysis (Thompson 2001, 599).

For decades, the formation of cultural policy (as public sector policy) in Western societies did proceed along the narrower path, defined by focusing on arts. Of course, the national cultural policies have produced their own peculiarities, as Mangset and de Jong show in this edition, but only after awakening to the critical questions, fuelled by the weakening of the hegemonic position of the high-culture norms, did cultural policy undergo a change: as a consequence, emphasis on cultural access and participation, questions of multiculturalism and cultural diversity and the recognition of local and community cultural values have arisen both within cultural policy research, and – although, perhaps to a lesser extent – within the practiced cultural policy (Ahponen & Kangas 2004). Lewis and Miller (2003, 2) point out that this kind of critical approach to cultural policy relies, obviously, on the understanding of the development of cultural policies, but requires also disciplined imagining of possible alternatives. Yet, besides acknowledging the influence of previous theorizations and imagining alternatives, there are also other, more concrete reasons for new approaches.

Ahponen and Kangas (2004, 246) state that “cultural policy is connected to all the major issues of our society: economic stratification, race relations, education, and community development.” Therefore, it is not surprising that national cultural policies based on a (Western) “orthodox, elevated, notion of culture” (cf. Lewis & Miller 2003, 3) have faced

difficulties of legitimation since the changes after WW II: e.g., the “fall of highbrow snobbery as a status marker” and the expansion of popular culture (Peterson 1997; see also Alasuutari’s article in this edition) and – on a global scale – the retraction of imperialism (see Ward 2005) have had consequences for policy level, too. In this light, it is not surprising that since the 1960s the broad (more anthropological) definition of ‘culture’ has made its way to the administrative policy formulations (see Pirnes 2008). In research, these “new” questions that influence cultural policy have to be met by taking *both* the cultural differentiations and distinctions *and* social power structures that influence inequalities (e.g. policies as organizing practices) into consideration. The latter has not been the strong point of cultural studies, and requires the recognition of social political issues in connection to cultural politics, as Ahponen (2004, 238) has stated.

Also, the significance of the local and regional has been quite recently raised to the centre of the cultural policy and its research. Although the ‘local’ has always been strongly present in the practical dimension of the culture as activities of the local people and groupings, on the policy level, it was absorbed into the project of nation building through the centralized administrative systems and the state – municipality/region -relations; public support and subsidy for the arts meant reciprocally that cultural products were understood as the commodities of the nation. The new policy orientation was triggered by the trend, which is generally known as the democratization of culture, and according to which the cultural policy should pay attention to the availability of culture and cultural services from the perspective of all the social groups, including those living in regions and localities that could be defined as peripheries (about Finland see e.g. Kangas 1999, 159–167, Häyrynen 2005, 112–113). The golden age of this orientation was the 1960s in most of the European countries. This indicates how cultural policy follows the overall development of wider social and economic trends. After all, this was the time of the Welfare State construction in most parts of Europe. After this turn to democratization, also the researchers of culture and cultural policy started to focus on regions and localities more than be-

fore – one of the fields, where Anita Kangas has been the forerunner in Finnish cultural policy research (see Kangas 1988).

Soon after the “democratization trend”, a new orientation arose from the problematizations of the democratization of culture. It is called “cultural democracy”.³ As Kangas (2004a, 24) states, cultural democracy implies that policies should be formulated in relation to the cultural needs of the population in their everyday lives (art according to the people’s own conception) instead of formulating it in relation to extraneous aesthetic standards. Proponents of the cultural democracy claimed that there were shadows of colonialism in the democratization of culture, as its aim was to disseminate particular national culture and make cultural values available to all. Thus, for instance, cultural minorities faced an institutionalized lack of respect for their cultures and values. Moreover, the cultural democracy embodies a spatial dimension in itself: minority cultures often position themselves in particular localities – especially in the case of indigenous minorities – and their struggles to maintain their cultures and values are local struggles par excellence (E.g. Hall 1971; Häyrynen 2005, 114–117). In this volume, Pirkkoliisa Ahponen discusses the possibilities of cultural democracy. Interestingly, she raises the question of the role of civil society fundamental for the open and democratic functioning of cultural policy. Martti Siisiäinen, in turn, demonstrates the importance of civil society organizations for cultural representations. Here, one can understand the organizations of civil society taking part in policy formulations as a counterpart or a companion of public institutions.

Besides civil society, logics and the actors of markets have proven to be significant for cultural policy (e.g., McGuigan 2004, 33–61). In this edition, Joop de Jong demarcates the relation between state subsidies and markets. As Mangset (2008a) has pointed out, “[t]he social history of the arts usually tells a story about institutional differentiation processes during early modernity, when the arts were separated/sorted out as an autonomous field.” According to post-modern theories, during the last 20-30 years there has been a de-differentiation -processes going on. Whether this is true or false in the case of arts field can be disputed,

but at least the question has been discerned as a relevant one, marking a change in perspectives, compatible with the changes in the society that cultural policy has had to confront. Whether one talks of “cultural democracy” (e.g. Kangas 2004a) or of the “enrichment of cultural structure” (see Lewis & Miller 2003, 4–5), in the end it seems to be a question of how to consider the relationship between the traditional hierarchies of art funding (cf. “top-down” approaches) and the more broadly defined popular culture (“bottom-up”). This brings us to representations: the question of *who decides what, and how, should be represented in public* is a very valid one in cultural policy and strongly connected to how culture is being administrated within a named society. In this edition, Mangset scrutinizes this question through a comparison of different national arms length models in subsidizing the arts. Indeed, without a practical policy orientation in research it would be difficult to analyze the established political practices through which politics have an impact on culture (McGuigan 2003, 29).

THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

Interestingly, the “localization” of the cultural policy and its research took place at about the same time as the first big steps of its internationalization. In this new dimension, UNESCO is of special importance. UNESCO’s round table meeting in Monaco in 1967 started the series of intergovernmental conferences, where the position of culture in global human development and wellbeing was considered. In these conferences, UNESCO took a “postcolonial stance” and declared that culture is one of the key resources of the developing countries and that the cultural rights of the developing nations and groups should be recognized internationally. UNESCO’s emphasis on cultural rights and diversity became ever more pronounced in the decades to come. In 1995, the World Decade for Cultural Development was launched by the United Nations and the UNESCO introduced a final report *Our Creative Diversity*. In 1997 its

European contribution *In From the Margins* was created by an expert group of the Council of Europe. What is central in both of these reports is not only cultural democracy or the democratization of culture, but their emphasis on the idea of culture as a basis of societal development at all levels. This holistic view also created a necessity to expand the concept of cultural policy (Hoggart 1978; Kangas 2004a, 30; Pirnes 2008, 168–201, 235–241; Unesco 1969).

UNESCO is not the only actor in the internationalization development. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the role of the European Union and its bodies, such as European Council, European Commission and European Parliament, has been highly significant in this process. Article 128 (now article 151) in the so called Treaty of Maastricht was the first major reach towards culture, as it emphasized the cultural dimension in the EU policies. It also brought the significance of the arts and the European and national cultural heritage into the focus of the discussion on European culture. From the perspective of cultural policy, the most significant bodies of the EU are the European Commission's branch for Education and culture, and its sub-branch The Education, Audiovisual and Culture Agency Executive Agency (EACEA). Various EU-committees, such as the Committee of the Regions, are of great importance, too. Lately, culture has been most visibly exposed in the cultural programmes of the EU. Culture 2000, Culture Programme (2007–2013) and 2008 as the European year of intercultural dialogue have highlighted the meaning of culture both as a (European) way of life and its more or less artistic expressions. What has been most important in the programmes is the attempt to find common cultural values, significations and identities for the European nation states in the name of European integration, and the differences between the nation states in the name of national self-identifications and particularities (DG EAC 2008; Ratzenböck 1998; Sassatelli 2006).

The internationalization of the cultural policy creates a basis for a new kind of research, in which comparisons of the national policy models, observations of the role of culture for the developing countries, evaluations of “high” and “low” forms of culture in international framework,

calculations of importance of cultural industries as part of the international trade, and analysis of the transnational agreements, organizations and regulations are just few of the main research schemes. According to Kangas (2004a, 36; 1999, 176), if a new consensus on the national cultural policy's arguments were to be sought, it would most likely be based on the emphasis on sustainable development and civil society (see also Kangas 2002a). Here, the internationalization is perceived – from diverse angles – in several articles, including Pertti Alasuutari's, Sari Karttunen's and Geir Vestheim's texts.

Traditionally, the connection of place and culture has been strong in cultural policies. However, this connection has been recently challenged from several perspectives and for several reasons in the policy fields, as well as in research. As pointed out, the recognition of the cultural diversity is a kind of a basis of the European unity. However, the recognition of minority and immigrant cultures has remained relatively weak. Tony Bennett (2001) and his colleagues raised awareness of the lack of recognition of minority cultures in their well-known report called "Differing diversities: Cultural policy and cultural diversity". Bennett claims that the increase of immigrant communities has placed a crucial challenge to European cultural policies. According to Bennett and companions, cultural policies cannot be based on the national cultures and cultural homogeneity anymore in any field or sense, but they need to be sensitive to diversity by paying attention to the minority cultures and cultural hybridisation, i.e. "unlearn" away from the thought that cultural identities and signifying systems are something fixed, permanent and unmixed. Hence, policy makers and interest groups need to figure out ways of securing the cultural rights of the minorities through policy solutions. In this book, Dorte Skot-Hansen grasps this theme and calls for a policy model, which takes cultural diversity as its linchpin. According to her, we need a multitude of cultural institutions and activities, which can serve the multiple needs of the groups, but "with respect for the individual institutions and the multifarious characteristics and requirements of cultural expressions".

Stuart Hall (1995) states that the connection between culture and place is irreversibly blurred, because of the global migration, information floods, and the time/space condensation these things cause. This particular discourse of cultural studies is present in the present volume, too. Marja Järvelä notes that culture lies in the core of building resilient communities, correlating to the living environments and local creativity in managing everyday life. Jenny Johannisson states that cultural policy and cultural policy research have had a strikingly “placeless” character. Local, regional, national and global practices and discourses of cultural policy interconnect and shape each other. Therefore, according to Johannisson, the cultural policy discourse, for example, in a particular Swedish municipality (Gothenburg) can be used as a tool for studying cultural policy in other places (and in other processes). In this way, culture or cultural policy is detached from the traditional view according to which culture or cultural policy becomes identical with a specific place or region.

In general, also art policy and art organizations have become more and more international in their scope, especially from the 1990s onwards. This development can be traced as a part of the larger societal tendency for – and discourses towards – internationalization and globalization. This trend has been further fuelled by technological development, enabling new (digital) forms of art and networks among artists, other cultural actors and consumers of culture. Saara Taalas’ analysis on the organization of consumption in a copyrighted economy exemplifies contemporary phenomena at the intersection of the arts/culture, economy, technology and ethics. In much of the recent discussion on authorship, authorship is considered more fragmented than before. New media authorship, for instance, has brought along new creative actors that are not necessarily regarded as artists in the traditional sense but, for example, as “content producers”, programmers, engineers or fans (see Taalas’ article). This challenges definitions of the artist / author, the author’s rights and the role of individual artists in the process of art production. It also brings new audiences and consumers who can be seen as part of the creative outcome.

The connection of economics with the arts and cultural sector has been strongly recognized in the field of culture, especially from the 1990s onwards. It has also been seen both as a threat and a possibility in various cultural policy documents (see e.g. *In From the Margins*, 1997). As Towse (2001, 41) emphasises, the policies for the global industries in the information age deviate from the type of cultural policy that has been concerned with state subsidy to the traditional arts from the mid- to late twentieth century. What we now need is multi-faceted policies that are at the same time “national and global; micro and macroeconomic, protectionist and free trade” (Towse 2001, 41).

If culture is as multidimensional, unfixed and confusing entity as the above suggests, what, then, is the principal logic or rationality of cultural policy? Can it be formulated from a certain kind of understanding of culture, and seen as a sub-system among the other systems, as it is sometimes perceived in ‘Luhmanian’ approaches? Or should it be formulated with reference to all the heterogeneous elements that it covers? In his article Risto Eräsaari argues that cultural policy “has to describe itself as a range of practices and assemblages obeying the idea of some sort of polyphonic complexity of cultural voices”. Cultural policy can and must not be reduced to the “simple” notions of creativity or to the fixed features, which can be managed as easily as possible. According to Eräsaari, cultural policy research needs to shift its focus from the large collective spheres to the contextual formation and function of sub-groups, practices, discourses and ideas. If we take these premises as our starting point for thinking about cultural policy and its implementation, what then happens to cultural policy: can there be a discipline called cultural policy or does it fracture under different disciplines as sub-branches? Next, we will observe the disciplinary identification of the cultural policy through looking at its basic concepts and their relation to the wider discourses of social and political sciences.

DISCIPLINING CULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH?

Ahponen (2004) has scrutinized the question of traditional theory (understood critically in a Horkheimerian way), critical theory, and cultural studies, as frameworks for research, each contributing to the questions that research can grasp at. She has categorized traditional theory as a field presenting “a scientific abstraction as an activity, which closely suits the division of labor in society”, whereas in critical theory the typical questions of traditional theory are presented as controversial, problematic and normatively structured (ibid. 223–224). Indeed, a *critical* understanding of societal structures and abstract definition processes has been of uppermost importance to unveiling power and hierarchies embedded in questions of culture. Acknowledging this, cultural studies have been influenced by critical theory, and correspondingly, the development of critical cultural policy research owes to these both (e.g., Lewis & Miller 2003, 7–8; McGuigan 2003, 27).

In cultural studies the scope of research has been broader than that of critical theory, which has been defined as more elitist, narrowing the culture down to the arts and assuming critical stand to oppose social power and to resist the governance of society, which becomes manifested by the alienating effects of (reproduceable) “instrumental mass products” favored by popular culture. Instead, in cultural studies there has been a keen interest in demonstrating how (more) popular forms of culture (than arts) represent the power and in showing how culture is expressed as a matter of institutional practices, administrative routines and spatial arrangements – and, in turn, how people’s participation in culture can demonstrate a process of signification and creative production of meanings on the part of the receivers.

In short, critical theory can be described as more exclusive in its stance than cultural studies in its inclusiveness, even though they both are concerned with questions of power and culture. However, as Ahponen (2004, 234) points out, it is precisely the question of aesthetical appreciations, which has been in the core of critical theory, and becomes appar-

ent also when we talk of cultural *policy*: “aesthetic qualifications, based on the taste and subjective meanings, are always used for legitimating the ‘highness’ and ‘lowness’ of culture”. This question of qualifications exposes a dilemma between exclusive and inclusive views (cf. policy as something that, among other things, regulates the inclusion and exclusion of activities). Ahponen (ibid.; see also McGuigan 1996, 1) proposes the promotion of the objectiveness of the criteria used for evaluating how appropriate certain forms of culture should be to be elevated in a society: “criteria should be made objective enough – at least when democratic principles are followed in the public field of cultural power”. This is also a question of participation, which cannot be answered solely on a discursive level of analysis. In this edition, Michael Quine offers an example of the empirical approach in evaluating participation in culture.

Analyzing the possibilities and limits of cultural studies has been an integral part of the development of critical cultural policy research. Lewis and Miller (2003, 5) have defined cultural policy “as the missing agenda of cultural studies.” They also refer to Stuart Cunningham’s (1992) statement, according to which critical stance and cultural policy should interact. Later on, Cunningham (2003, 19) has referred to the “...increasing series of calls to introduce a policy orientation into cultural studies...” and called further for the appreciation of the coordinated impact of economics, administrative law, cultural history, entertainment financing, government and parliament procedures, and so on, on the development of cultural policy. He has gone as far as to note that “[c]ritical policy research ... implies more, rather than less, critical understanding than is found in the traditions of cultural criticism developed exclusively within humanities-based disciplines ...” (Cunningham 2003, 21). From the 1990s onwards, there has also been other, self-reliant, criticism within cultural studies. Garnham (1995) criticized cultural studies of focusing too much on consumption and reception, which in his view has resulted in exaggerating the freedom of consumption in everyday life (see Thompson 2001, 600). Grossberg (e.g., 2005) has groped for new kinds of approaches for a more careful understanding of the cultural changes that are undisputedly coupled to politics and economy, and Baetens (2005)

has argued for giving technology, history, and law a stronger presence in the agenda of cultural studies. In this edition, we bring together diverse views that together resonate with the cry for awareness of the multitude of the impacts that form institutionalized cultural policies.

Jim McGuigan (2003, 24), referring to Raymond Williams (1981), has stated that if one wishes to pair off culture and policy, culture should be understood neither as ‘arts’ nor as ‘a whole way of life’, but as a realized signifying system⁴. The advantage in such an understanding of culture is that it makes possible to unite ‘culture’ with ‘policy’⁵ in a way that is broad enough, and yet, not too overemphasizing, making it possible to dissect cultural policy in a critical way and allowing for a critical analysis of the role of policy instruments in cultural democracy and representation. This way, the contest of defining cultural contents *and* of administrating them becomes the focus of cultural policy research. In our minds, research analyzing such questions can be carried out on a variety of levels and with the use of a variety of theoretical frameworks (e.g., Foucaudian or Habermasian view could both be useful; cf., McGuigan 1996; 2003), depending on the question at hand. Combining applied and critical discourses and being interdisciplinary at the same time, which is typical of cultural policy research (cf. Scullion & García 2005, 124), makes this not an easy task – requiring the acknowledgment of, e.g., the ontological presumptions embedded in interdisciplinary approaches (cf. Gray 2008) – but not an impossible one.

DEFINING CULTURE IN THE NEVERLAND

The structure of this book responds to the present “trend discussions” of the cultural policy research. The articles of the book also contribute to these discussions by grasping the current topics, conceptual multi-ingredient and the basic thematic nature of cultural policy research. As this book indicates, the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural policy’ have various interpretations and meanings. Ahponen and Kangas (2004, 20)

have stated that cultural policy and the ways to talk about it should, indeed, be understood as polyphonic, and there is no need to find a total consensus. The authors of this volume highlight the concepts of culture and cultural policy through varying theoretical and thematic orientations, empirical findings and contextual backgrounds. The articles exemplify the diverse and interdisciplinary nature of cultural policy research and bring together several areas of cultural policy research that are of great current interest.

The first section of the book is called “Contemporary Questions in Cultural Policy”. The three articles of the section discuss the rationales of cultural policy – both on the abstract level and on the level of policies – and its key concepts and the discourses and phenomena these concepts relate to. The themes and discussions of the articles show how the relationship of cultural policy to the other policy sectors and social scientific disciplines is both close and continuously reformed. In this framework of problematization, the question whether the culture and the arts are autonomous societal spheres or subordinate to other elements and sets of apparatuses, such as economy, is of great interest, as are the questions concerning the relation of culture and power, and social stratum of the society.

The texts of the second section, called “Beyond the National Limits of the Cultural Policy”, take the discussions opened in the first section to a more practical level and include the perspectives of the national borders and globalization within them. The articles seek answers, for instance, to the following questions: What happens to the comprehensions of art and culture in the ongoing global modernization process? How do the global cultural trends and flows of material and immaterial products change the premises and practices of national cultural policies? What is the role of nationalism in the different contexts of culture and cultural policy?

Our third section clings to one of the most popular present discussions of cultural policy: the meaning of place for and in culture. The authors of this section approach the relation of space and culture from different perspectives, showing how multifarious this issue is. The ar-

ticles in this section deal with the relation of the different spatial levels – global, national, regional and local – in cultural policy, and observe how local spaces and localities are becoming more emphasized again in cultural discourses in the developing societies, and ask “Whose city?”, cross-observing the three major sub-fields of the present cultural policy: creativity, cultural planning and arts policy.

Section “Cultural production, organization and consumption” opens a window to the world of collective cultural action and its recent trends. First of all, this takes place in the sense of voluntary associations and their representation of the cultural group interests. Secondly, the position of fans and the relation of the fans/followers and artists/producers is reconsidered through analyzing artistic productions that use new media and information technology. The third aspect of the section is based on the attender research and clarifies the recent development of the number and characteristics of the theatre-goers in England.

The final section of the book focuses on the present questions of arts policy and authorship. First of all, the section includes comparative analysis of the implementation of the arm’s length principle in the U.K. and the Nordic countries, and the observation of the relation of free market principles and the “statist” cultural conduct in the Netherlands. The last article concentrates more on the artists and artistic production than on the administration: it analyzes how the international relations and residence-visits of Finnish artists have influenced their professionalism, identity and incomes.

As one might depict from the articles of this book, many features of the contemporary discussions on cultural policy indicate a “schizophrenic” general attitude towards culture: Both researchers and (some) policy-makers seem to aim at freeing culture from the strict predefinitions and boundaries. The intention is to leave the definition of culture open enough for including different forms of expressions and human action and thinking within it. In other words, the spirit seems to be in favor of understanding culture as everything and everything as culture, at least potentially – depending on the context and case. The “struggle” here is against the old polarizations of culture into high vs. low, mainstream vs.

sub, and way of life vs. arts. Hence, one might argue, that cultural policy actors are eager for anti-essentialist, hybrid categorizations of culture. Some even suggest that we should abandon the term culture as a research concept for good, because of its essentialist, over-differentiating, and “othering” nature (e.g. Abu-Lughod 1991; Philips 2007). At the same time, there is a somewhat melancholic expectation of clearer cultural categorizations and definitions of the “grand term” in the discussions. However “old-fashioned” and passé the fixed definitions are considered to be in this “post-modern era”, researchers and policy-makers still want to create something stable with which they can grasp the phenomena and things they want to call culture.

Cultural policy needs a more open definition of culture than mere arts or high arts or civilization, and it needs a more open definition of policy than mere action of the administrative institutions and organizations. But it can not lean on the “anything goes” or “everything is culture” discourses, because it would somehow lose its essence, feeling and founding rationality. The result of this paradoxical speculation might come close to Williams’ (1981, 184) well-known definition, according to which culture is a “realized signifying system”. When it is publically realized, and thus reproduced in the social interaction of the groups and individuals in particular socio-historical context, it is also political, and demands for politicizing, politicking, polity and policy. The definition of culture must not be, and it certainly can not ever be, fixed once and for all, but it needs particular criteria to be recognizable, understandable and approachable. Then, the field is open for contextual categorizations, constructions and deconstructions, which are all more or less empirical questions for the researchers. This is exactly what this volume is about: a debate on the grand ideas on culture, policy and politics and an opening for a view to the multitude of the themes and practices cultural policy research deals with.

Endnotes

- 1 Since the 1760s '*Kultur*' was popularized and its content became wider in definition than before in Germany. A similar process happened with the newish concept of 'civilization' in France, Great-Britain and in the USA. Since the first decade of the 19th century, there might have been some alterations in the use of these concepts and, indeed, they were politicized, but their contents reached the widest definitions already by 1815. (See Fisch 1992, 705.) In the broadening of '*Kultur*', Herder's thinking was influential. According to Thompson (2001, 595), the ideas of German thinkers were transposed into England via Thomas Carlyle and they influenced such figures as William Morris and John Ruskin. Pirnes (2008) does not mention Morris or Ruskin in his analyses.
- 2 Parallel developments were, e.g., the formation of the Annales -school within French historiography in the 1950s and, in the 1960s, symbolic ethnology within anthropology (Daniel 1993, 82, 89–91) and the development of the sociology of culture – which, to be noted, is not same thing as 'cultural sociology' (see Graig 2008, 12). Also, Frankfurt School (Adorno & Horheimer) has to be mentioned here.
- 3 Interestingly, here, this was also the time the "linguistic turn" took place in humanities and social sciences.
- 4 Culture as a realized signifying system *is not* equal to the "culture as the whole way of life" -definition (see Williams 1981, 207–208).
- 5 McGuigan (1996, 7) states, that policy should be understood more broadly than as "ostensibly practical operations that are merely administrated and policed by governmental officials" (cf. Palonen's (2003), understanding of the diverse aspects of 'politics'). For example, civil society organs and private corporations may form policies of their own, that have cultural political connotations.

1

Contemporary
Questions in Cultural
Policy Research

1.1

The Autonomy of Culture and the Arts: From the Early Bourgeois Era to Late Modern “Runaway World”

Geir Vestheim

INTRODUCTION

THE TITLE OF THIS ARTICLE suggests two opposite historical developments: On the one hand a slow, linear process in the development of the autonomy of culture and the arts – referring to the Western, modern, industrialised, liberal, capitalistic and bourgeois world since the American and French revolutions in the 18th century to the present day; on the other hand, the image of a sudden crisis, of dramatic changes, and – for some – even the downfall of that same world, characterised by Anthony Giddens (2002) as a “runaway world”. The strong social force which, according to many social theorists, undermines the modern civilisations and their ideas and concepts of linear historical development, nation building, social progress, and increases freedom and welfare etc. has been coined ‘globalisation’. Globalisation – in economic, political, social and cultural respects – is, according to Giddens, “reshaping our lives”.¹

This makes it necessary for us to reconsider many classical political and cultural issues. One such issue is the question of autonomy of culture and the arts. However, since this question has been debated for

nearly two hundred years, it does not suffice to look at the contemporary conditions alone. Therefore, I shall discuss the present situation with a broad reference to its historical roots.

The main purpose of this article is to analyse and discuss theoretically how the idea and practices of culture and the arts as an autonomous social sphere have developed historically, and how they today are affected by the structural changes in technology, economy, social behaviours, politics and culture that industrialised countries have undergone during the last decades.²

SOME BASIC CONCEPTS

As indicated in the title of this article the focus of the present study is 'the autonomy of culture and the arts'. The concept of 'autonomy' will be discussed in the next sections of this article, but what does 'culture and the arts' mean here? I shall explain this by presenting a definition and a discussion of the concept of *the cultural field*, most often associated with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and his research on the role of culture and arts in modern class societies. However, I shall approach the issue from an empirical angle:

By cultural field I mean an area of social activities, services, productions, distributions, mediations and consumptions called 'cultural'. The 'cultural' in our context comprises the arts, the cultural heritages, the media and the voluntary, idealistic popular associations. The cultural field also includes public support to cultural production, distribution, mediation and consumption in the form of money, organisation, information and normative policy making. This means that products (artefacts), services and activities which are politically and normatively defined as 'cultural' are subject to ideological, political and economic interest from the part of a political system (on state, regional or local level). Within the total political system we may discern a specific and delimited subsystem which I call 'the cultural policy system' (see also

Mangset 1992) – as we may find subsystems for health policy, school and education policy, transport policy, foreign policy, etc.

The core of the cultural field rests with the production, distribution, mediation and consumption of cultural artefacts and services. The cultural policy system is there to promote cultural development, which means that cultural policy is not an end in itself. The principal function of cultural policy is to support certain forms of culture to make it flourish and to make it accessible to the citizens. Supporting a "good" cause, to the benefit of the citizens as active and recipient publics, is the ultimate and legitimate motive for having a public cultural policy.

The making of cultural policy is secondary to cultural work, creation and mediation. Cultural policy does not exist until a political and economic system intervenes directly and actively in the production and reception of culture. Such interventions may be economic, administrative or ideological/normative. Cultural policy – and the issue of autonomy and/or dependency for culture and the arts – emerges from the relationship between interests and parties, and these parties may, for example, be named as A, B, and C, and they together form the triangle of cultural policy:

A: *The cultural policy system*, consisting of an elected body of representatives (national level: parliaments), a ministry responsible for cultural matters (often but not always named ministry of culture) with its agencies and its eventual arm's length bodies. The so called arm's length bodies are agencies that are kept at an arm's length distance from the politicians in a ministry to prevent political censoring of individual decisions concerning applications for economic support from single persons or organisations. Decisions of the arm's length bodies are supposed to be taken by experts and professional bureaucrats on grounds that are politically independent of the parliament and the ministry. But still, they are accountable to the ministry for their budget and for following the principal guidelines decided for by the politicians. It is often a disputed question how independent the arm's length bodies are, in practice.

I also consider the private economic system and the private market a part of the cultural policy system. The market may have strong power and

an impact on the cultural sector and private market interests, experiencing a neo-liberal and global marketization wave, have a growing influence in our time. Besides, we have organisations for specific cultural interests, working alone or in partnership with public agencies and/or business interests. Voluntary and idealistic organisations also try to influence the cultural production and mediation as well, as do non-government foundations and organisations. All these institutions and organisations and their single spokesmen and agents may influence cultural producers and mediators. In the Nordic countries the public cultural policy system plays a dominant role, whereas, for example, in the US private business companies and foundations exert more influence on the cultural sector than public bodies and agencies. The means and instruments at hand are money, tax reductions, organisation, ideologies/norms, information, regulations and for public bodies also legislation. The cultural sector, however, is regulated by few laws as compared to, for example, the health or educational sectors.

B: *Cultural producers, distributors and mediators* may be single individuals (for example artists, critics, academic experts/professionals, curators, librarians, publishers, etc.), institutions (such as museums, theatres, concert halls, publishing houses, etc.), idealistic or voluntary organisations (like popular adult education associations, leisure clubs for young people, etc.) or private companies and industries such as, for example, the cultural industries.

C: *Publics, users and consumers* are heterogeneous groups of citizens, but may for the purpose of simplification, be divided into two main categories: 1) The real publics, i.e. the publics that actually participate in cultural life as readers, listeners, onlookers or other forms of cultural activities, and 2) the potential publics, i.e. the groups or individuals that cultural politicians want to transform into real publics. Access and participation are the ultimate goal of a publics oriented cultural policy. After all, cultural policy in democratic countries essentially deals with turning potential publics into real publics.

The question of autonomy is always a question of someone's autonomy *in relation to* that of someone else. It is a question of power,

influence, dependence and its opposites. From the point of view of cultural producers, distributors and mediators, autonomy deals primarily with their relationship to the political and economic system, i.e. with the relationship between A and B. The core issue is how dependent or independent they are or wish to be *vis à vis* the political and economic system. One might say that cultural producers, distributors and mediators seek to be free *from* influence from the political and economic power. But at the same time, a democratic political system can guarantee and secure their freedom *to* autonomous decisions and behaviour. Thus, autonomy may be defined negatively as freedom *from* as well as positively as freedom *to*.

The question of autonomy may also be relevant in the relationship between producers/distributors and publics/consumers, i.e. between B and C. In market terms, the publics may use 'force' against cultural producers and mediators through their preferences on the market so that cultural production must be adapted to market demands and the tastes of the publics. On the other hand, market demands and tastes of publics are strongly influenced by producers and mediators – eventually in cooperation with public agencies through cultural policy. By supporting certain forms of cultural production cultural politicians also influence certain tastes with the publics.

In public debates on autonomy the interests of publics are very seldom spoken about. More often, the publics are described as passive recipients. At the same time, it is an outstanding objective in cultural policy to promote active and self-confident publics and audiences. The image of the passive and receiving audience, however, seems to survive. The focus of public debates about autonomy concentrates on the relationship between agents and structures representing interests with parties A and B.

Interest analysis demonstrates that the production, distribution and mediation of culture and the arts are deeply influenced by complex structural interests and mechanisms: they are directly and indirectly subject to political influence by public cultural policy. Private economic interests influence culture and the arts through national and international

markets. Scientific and technical developments, especially within IT, have a strong impact on culture and the arts as well. Professional interest organisations and educational institutions are also active players in the power struggle in the cultural field. And last but not least – often the media set the agenda even here, which means that they define what exists or does not exist at all.

The autonomy issue is often in one way or another connected with *tensions* because of conflicts of interests and power. In some cases the tension may be political of nature, in other cases economic, or it may be a blend of both. But it could also be about defining tastes. Strife for autonomy stands in opposition to forces such as discipline, conformity, obedience, subordination. In principle the possibilities are unlimited.

‘AUTONOMY’ – THE KEY CONCEPT

Since the concept ‘autonomy’ is at the centre of this paper there is need to analyse and define the concept from historical as well as contemporary angles. The concept ‘autonomy’ has its origin in the antique political tradition of the Greek city states, where it designated the single city state’s right to be governed according to its own laws. Autonomy in this context therefore meant political self-government. The legitimacy of the ruling principles and laws should come from the city itself and not from other city states. In the 17th century autonomy was a concept used in scientific and political struggle to liberate reason from religious power, to establish an independent intellectual sphere for secular science and political philosophy. The early schism between religion and the cultivation of reason represented the beginning of the differentiation process, which became so typical of Western societies.

The pursuit of autonomy, understood as self-government and independence not only in politics but also in the arts, has been visible on different levels for a long time. It might be useful to make an analytical distinction between personal autonomy and independence on the

one hand, and institutional autonomy on the other. Personal autonomy would, then, mean individuals' capacity to make informed decisions according to their own will and desires, independent of, or even contrary, to the other's opinions. Related concepts would be 'self-direction', 'self-reliance' and 'self-confidence'. Institutional autonomy, thus, refers to the capacity of a state, a region, an organisation or an institution to make decisions based on its own laws, rules, norms and ideals, etc., immune from the arbitrary exercise of authority by external power holders. Both forms of autonomy are context-bound and consequently, any form of autonomy tends to be relative, i.e. it can only be practised in relation to other agents or to structural restraints on autonomous actions. Structural restraints on autonomous decisions and actions may be moral, political, ideological, economic, etc. They may be legitimate or illegitimate. The point is: Autonomy is never exercised in a social or cultural vacuum, but in concrete social and historical contexts.

The philosophical and aesthetic aspects of the concept were developed by Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Judgement* (1790/2003), where he claimed a sphere of autonomy for the arts and asserted that the arts have no Christian moral purposes outside themselves. Art was defined as 'purposiveness without a purpose', i.e. art's value should only be judged by the yardstick of aesthetic categories. Kant's writings on aesthetics were a major influence on the debates concerning the emancipation of the arts from moral preoccupation and practical finalities, and in the 19th century interpretations of Kant's aesthetics laid the ground for the *l'art pour l'art* movement. The 'art for art's sake' movement, Belfiore and Bennett (2007) argue, was partly due to popularisations and even distortions of Kant's writings. Cultural intermediaries like Madame de Staël (1766-1817) diffused the idea of Kant's separation of the aesthetic and the moral, which later in the 19th century led to the rejection of any kind of educational and humanising functions for the art. The *l'art pour l'art* aesthetics, with its pioneer representative, the French poet Charles Baudelaire, became the forerunner of literary modernism, which with formal experiments and rebellious ideas tried to emancipate the writer and literature from established aesthetic norms and political influence.

THE IDEA OF THE AUTONOMOUS ARTIST AND THE LIBERAL STATE

The question if – or to what degree – artists and other professional cultural workers (and scientists) and their institutions are independent or unbound in relation to political and ideological influence, economic power or religious norms and morals, has – as mentioned before – been asked in Western societies for two hundred years. According to Western secular and liberal political ideas, the production, distribution and mediation of the arts have been expected to be free from, and independent of, external pressure from powerful individuals, groups or institutions. The autonomous position of the arts and sciences became, so to say, an indicator of whether a society could be classified as democratic or not. Artists, cultural workers and scientists came to embody some of the basic and bearing principles of liberal democracy: The freedom of expression, the idea of the original, individual and creative human being, free from superstition and religious restraints – following merely the logics of Reason in pursuit of universalistic Truth.

In the 19th century the basic conditions for cultural and artistic creation were radically changed. From being economically and socially protected – but also dominated - by royal and private patrons and benefactors under the regime of autocracy and mercantilism, artistic and cultural creators were now thrown into an anonymous market where art became a ware on the free market like other wares. The artist was emancipated from his dependent position as a *protégé* of a charitable master, but the new freedom had its price: The new master could no longer be identified as a single person playing the role of a patron; he was replaced by a new economic and political system: the constitutional liberal state and the capitalistic market. Being an artist became a riskier project, not least economically and materially. The social and economic security of the feudal and paternalistic system of the autocratic epoch disappeared, never to return.

The primary function of the liberal state was to guarantee the political, judicial and economic rights of the citizen, first of all to protect private property, but also to secure the freedom of expression. The market held sway over the material and economic success of individual artists. There was an appalling resemblance between the artist and the entrepreneur in business life: They were both acting as free individuals, independent of the state, and they both had to create original products, which the market was willing to buy. Together they constituted the incarnation of the foremost virtues of the liberal citizen – they were bearers of the economic, material, political and intellectual freedoms that constituted the liberal state.

Under liberalism as an ideology and capitalism as an economic system, culture and the arts were established as a specific social sphere, and already in the first decades after 1850 one may, with Pierre Bourdieu (1992), speak about different cultural and artistic fields. By creating different and autonomous cultural fields in economic and aesthetic terms, artists also tried to protect themselves against the powerful influence of the market forces, forces that had one principal aim - namely to maximise the profit. Through the *l'art pour l'art* aesthetic artists wanted to distance themselves not only from market dominance but also from politics and ordinary life. The denial of the economic aspect of artistic work (in Bourdieu's terms *économie déniée* or *économie à envers*) became a device for artists pursuing an elite position within the artistic field. The denial of the economic became a constituting element in the conception of pure, autonomous and sacred art.

The denial of the economic as an attitude appears quite paradoxical and non-logical, since the arts as a field of production historically became part of the private market. How could it be possible to deny the economy in aesthetic arguments and terms, and at the same time remain materially dependent on that same economy? It can only be explained by some fundamental mechanisms of the liberal state and the capitalist market. The keywords here are *tolerance* and *flexibility*: The built-in principle of tolerance in the liberal state and the capitalistic system made it possible for liberalism and capitalism to survive

with internal conflicts and antagonisms, which was impossible under autocracy and mercantilism. Liberalism and capitalism appeared to be more flexible than any other political and economic system, and the built-in tolerance principle opened up for a political and economic system that could transform any social, political or cultural phenomenon – the arts included – into a ware on the free market. When art became an integrated part of the market, its potential power as a threat against the liberal state and the bourgeois class was neutralised. This meant, for example, that revolutionary or strongly oppositional art could become a market success and at the same time legitimise the liberal tolerance of the bourgeois state. For this mechanism to function it is necessary for the horizon of tolerance to be wide.

The differentiation process within liberal democracy and capitalism gave space to specific social fields of arts and cultural activities. To a certain extent, these specialised fields and sub-fields could develop intrinsic logics and values without ending up in fundamental and structural conflicts with the values and ruling principles of the superior political and economic system. One can even argue that the interest in and tolerance for the original and the specific from the part of the liberal state and market liberalism came to encourage anti-establishment and rebellious art works by letting them circulate on the free market where they were politically neutralised. The liberal, free and autonomous artist could be *potentially* dangerous – but he or she could never be *really* dangerous.

Let us turn from the individual artist to the cultural institutions. The social role and function of the cultural institutions developed parallel with the role of the artist. The conception of pure and autonomous art was transferred to cultural institutions that grew up during the second half of the 19th century. Like single artists, institutions should also be independent and autonomous – and even in this case we can notice a major paradox: During the age of nation-building the arts, culture and their institutions were acclaimed by politicians who saw their significance for social integration, national identity and prestige. At the same time as they considered culture and the arts useful instruments in a political project, the liberal wing of politicians and leading civil servants claimed

the arts and culture to be free. On the one hand, they built systems for the state support of national culture and its institutions on the other hand, they declared it independent of state power.

This paradoxical situation continued under the social democratic welfare state during the 20th century. Even now, the arts and culture were presumed to be autonomous, but at the same time one frequent argument was that they were the cornerstones in building democracy and creating intellectual resources for the individual citizen. A persistent question arises repeatedly: How can the arts and culture be autonomous and free, if they are also tools for achieving general political and economic aims?

DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY IN THE CULTURAL FIELD AS AN EMPIRICAL ARENA³

How then, from an empirical point of view, do the agents of the cultural field understand and argue for the idea of autonomy and independence? The perception and understanding of autonomy varies between different groups of agents in the cultural field. Among them, professional artists and their interest organisations are the ones most eager to claim autonomy for their work. They tend to see the arts and culture as synonymous concepts. Their defence of the autonomy of the arts is often formulated with reference to the principles of freedom of expression and democracy, to the idea of art as an intrinsic value (art for art's sake) and to the argument that original creativity in the arts is dependent on free working conditions. Within that perspective, the arts represent a specific and autonomous sphere of values and knowledge. Close to this concept of autonomy is the idealistic view of the arts as a transcendental sphere of timeless values, the arts as something "higher".

Moving from the field of arts and artists to the institutions that mediate and distribute culture and cultural heritage, the claim for autonomy has other impacts. Institutions such as libraries, museums and archives

are the core institutions for democracy, and professional experts in such institutions claim their competence to be independent of political and economic interests. They even argue for professional self-determination by referring to the freedom of expression and the freedom of information. They consider themselves free and neutral providers of information and culture, and their relative autonomy is supposed to be for the benefit of the citizens. This may create tension between the claim for professional autonomy and the fact that they are politically bound democratic public agencies, supposed to implement public cultural policy.

To the media, autonomy concerns freedom of expression, which in modern democratic societies is protected by constitutions. The independence and autonomy of the media is crucial for upholding democracy. But in what sense is it possible for the media to be independent of political and economic interests, since they are frequently accused of being the spokesmen for those exact interests? Or: How democratic is it, if the media that is “too autonomous” set the political agenda themselves, and thereby restrain constitutional, political-democratic processes and democratically elected assemblies? How can we balance constitutional support for the autonomy of the media with the democratic expectations inured in public service?

Artists, professional cultural workers of different kinds, journalists and scientists have long since been classified as *the intellectuals*. Intellectuals have been positively valued as persons representing independent thinking and freedom from the orthodoxies of established institutions (e.g. Bennett 2006). This heroic image of the intellectual can also be found in Edward W. Said’s writings (1996). Said sees the intellectual as an oppositional person, one whose duty it is to “raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments and corporations, and whose *raison d’être* is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug”.

The view of the intellectual as a voice against injustice, a rebel against repression and abuse of power, a sovereign critic of the establishment, rests with the myth or role of the intellectual as artist, cultural worker

or scientist. To play the role as a public critic the intellectual is supposed to be autonomous and independent of mind – regardless of ideologies, political systems, institutions and religious beliefs.

However, the autonomous intellectuals of our time are seldom “outsiders”; on the contrary, they are usually “insiders”, working in institutions and organisations such as universities, museums, libraries, publishing houses, theatres, concert halls, newspaper companies, television and radio corporations, etc. Since, as Oliver Bennett (2006, 121) puts it, intellectuals “have always been socially situated and viewed the world through the prism of their own experiences”, this is not any less the case today. The intellectual’s move from the independent and outside positions to the alliance with powerful institutional organisations is also one of Edward Said’s (1996) concerns. Is it possible to hold an autonomous and critical stance and be loyal to powerful institutions at the same time? Said sees this as a problematic position and argues that it is only the exile-immigrant and the amateur who can uphold the traditional role of the intellectual as a free critic.

I do not believe that Said is right, because being a real amateur in the modern world means working outside the structures of influence and power. An amateur may easily be put aside, since amateurism lacks intellectual authority and weight. Power holders need not pay attention to the amateur since the amateur does not dispose of power instruments. The amateurs may speak freely and frankly, but their professional counterparts can ignore them – and the professionals are not punished for it. So the pure amateur cannot be the guarantor of intellectual autonomy.

THE EU PERSPECTIVE – A CONTRADICTIONARY VISION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS?

In the following I shall leave the national level of cultural policy, and discuss the issue of autonomy and independence in an international context. The case to be scrutinised below is the cultural policy in the

European Union. If artists, cultural workers, intellectuals and their organisations and institutions are facing complicated challenges on the national level, what conditions do they have to cope with, in their struggle for independence within the European Union? The European Union is an over-national organisation with increasing power in most policy areas, even in the cultural field.

The cultural policy of the EU may be characterised as *Realpolitik*: In recent decades culture and the arts have also been put on the agenda in the European Union. Article 151 of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which is the legal basis for the European Community actions in the cultural field, states that “the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common heritage to the fore”.⁴ The same article explicitly requires the European Council to “adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”. The EU has, formally and by arguing for cultural diversity, put restrictions on itself vis à vis the member states, as far as legal and regulatory cultural policy measures are concerned.

Some years later the EU launched its first cultural framework programme Culture 2000, and today this programme has been replaced by a new Culture programme 2007–2013. The objectives of those programmes are to promote cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue, to use culture as a catalyst for creativity and also to make culture a key component in international relations of the European Union. The cultural sector is supposed to stimulate creativity, which in the next turn is expected to result in more jobs and economic development. The European Commission wants to strengthen common European values and heritage. European support to culture shall also contribute to enhancing Europe’s economic position and competitiveness in the world. Culture is even expected to be an integrated aspect in other policy areas, such as education, youth policies, citizenship programmes, structural policies, rural development policies, audiovisual and technology policies and research policies.⁵

The EU policy for culture seems to articulate two partly contradictory positions: On the one hand, the EU supports and strengthens the autonomy of national, regional and local cultural policies, but on the other hand, culture is regarded as a crucial instrument in EU endeavours to create a European identity. What is a European identity? Is it something qualitatively new, which is not inherent in the existing European cultures on the national, regional or local level? Is it an idea of a synthesis of the existing cultures, but on a 'higher' level? If European identity is prioritized politically, some other identities must presumably be rolled back on the agenda. Which ones?

Culture is declared a vital component in the work of making Europe flourish economically and socially in a world dominated by a globally oriented, competitive capitalism. This conflict between having a culture, which is independent of the premises of the cultural professionals, artists and institutions themselves, contra having a culture that is defined by political bodies and external economic interests, is visible in most European countries, both inside and outside the EU. It can be easily documented and identified by studying cultural policy documents of many European countries issued in the last 15–20 years. Studies on trends and structural developments in culture as an economic field of production also verify this emerging conflict of interests.

A basic question arises: Is it possible and/or desirable that EU institutions construct "new" identities by means of political and economic actions? Is it evident that the EU instrumental approach to culture is consistent with the idea of freedom of culture and the arts? In political rhetoric on an abstract level it is possible to construct harmony and consistency, even if there may be deep antagonisms in the empirical world that the policies are directed to. But it is doubtful whether it is possible in the empirical world.

It seems paradoxical that an increased interest in culture does not automatically place culture and the arts in a more powerful and independent position. Is it because culture becomes the tool, and not the hand that uses the tool? It is therefore necessary to analyse and understand how an increased "external" interest in culture affects the conditions

for cultural production and distribution. My hypothesis is that since the basic conditions for cultural production, distribution, mediation and consumption are undergoing radical change, the traditional idea of cultural and artistic autonomy is challenged.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES AFFECT THE AUTONOMY OF CULTURE AND THE ARTS

In the 1960s findings of sociological research indicated that the strategy to disseminate culture that was taken up in the two first decades after World War II, commonly named the ‘democratisation of culture’, had failed. This was well documented, for example, in Sweden (Swedner 1965) and France (Poirrier 2000). Despite social reforms, material progress for large groups of the populations, higher wages, reduced working hours, and increased leisure time, the audience visiting the traditional cultural institutions had not changed much: It was the well-off, well-educated middle and upper classes that attended the theatres, concert halls and opera houses, and who visited the art museums and read the “good” books. The growing consumer capacity of the working class was wrested towards the international, and primarily American, cultural industry.

New initiatives were taken both at the national and the international level in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, commonly described as ‘new cultural policy’. The concept of culture was extended to include not only the fine arts, but also amateur culture, popular culture, sports and other forms of leisure activities. Regional and local traditions were emphasized.

In the 1980s new liberalistic winds blew also through the cultural sector, touching cultural policy makers, who looked for new ways of legitimising the public support of culture. Public policy documents, not least at the regional and local level, argued that public support for culture was an investment that would pay off in terms of economic surplus, crea-

tive population, new businesses and more work places. Market concepts became part of public debates on the role of culture.

In the late 1990s the economist perspective was complemented by ideas of culture as a means of counteracting social exclusion, and of improving the quality of communities in terms of four indicators: health, crime, employment and education (Belfiore 2002). But while new ways of reasoning about culture and its functions arose, former ways of thinking did not disappear completely. They were rolled back to give space for new and actually more legitimate arguments and discourses (McGuigan 2004, 35–60).

However, there is no such thing as a non-instrumental cultural policy. Policy is by definition instrumental by nature. When power holders make a field of social activities and products subject to political action, these activities become «instruments» or means in the sense that all political actions aim at having certain predetermined effects on citizens. The question is what sorts of effects are expected and what sorts of arguments are used.

Today, many social theorists claim that from the 1970s onwards a deep structural shift has become gradually discernable in the industrialised countries. One can argue that the developments in technique, economy, knowledge and science, social structures, ideology and politics gave rise to a structural change that represents an epochal shift that can be compared to the 19th century's transition from an agricultural to an industrial society. Frequently used concepts to describe the structural changes of our time include the IT revolution, globalisation, liberalisation, individualisation, deregulation, commercialisation, de-hierarchisation of values, de-institutionalisation, etc.

In several of his works, sociologist Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991, 2002) has described and analysed the social conditions of contemporary times, which he refers to, in one of his books, as the 'runaway world'. Enlightenment philosophers and rational intellectuals and social theorists following that tradition believed for a long time that social world could be planned and predicted by means of rational reason, science and rational social theories. They believed in social justice and more equal

access to material production, they predicted the growth of (Western) civilisation, and believed in a world which would become less risky for ordinary people to live in. When superstition and religion had been replaced by reason and humanism, human beings would be able to control and create a better world.

However, despite material, technical and social progress in some parts of the world, we have, Giddens says, ended up in a world with extreme threats. One of them is fundamentalism in its different shapes - religious, nationalist or ethnic fundamentalism. Giddens (2002, xiv) claims that “religious fundamentalists want to roll back modernity”. Whether they are American Christian right-wing or Islamic movements, fundamentalists are against the emancipation of women, they want to protect traditional family patterns, and, Giddens (ibid.) continues, they are “antagonistic to democracy, the very principles of which depend upon universal rights”. And the world has not become any safer: “We face risk situations that no one in previous history has had to confront – of which global warming is only one” (Giddens 2002, 3). He also mentions September 11, 2001 (9/11) and the reactions after it as an example of the risky political situation that the world is in. The American campaign and invasion of Iraq, the Afghanistan war and the persisting conflict in the Middle East are other examples, as well as many regional conflicts and wars around the world.

The crises of late modern times, whether they are economic, ecological, social, political or cultural, are, in some way or other, inherent in the development of modernity. Modernity is understood as an encompassing historical project of human behaviours, modes and institutions established first in post-feudal Europe, “but which in the twentieth century increasingly have become world-historical in their impact” (Giddens 1991, 15). Modernity is usually identified by a combination of indicators including an advanced technical and industrial capacity (from 1800 onwards), capitalistic organisation of the economy and material production, well developed and strong nation states, strong and influential organisations as political agents (capital and labour organisations), nation-wide and even international institutions (political, cultural, so-

cial), scientifically-based knowledge and educational systems, and last but not least: Secular «grand narratives» in the form of philosophical and political ideologies (such as conservatism, liberalism and socialism, and even fascism and Soviet communism). From one angle the modern world has been characterised by dynamism, continuity and progress, but from another it also implies contrary movements – discontinuity, the breaking, fragmentation and the disembedding of social values and institutions.

Modern information technology and communication systems have, to a large extent, separated the traditional connection between space and time. Geographical situatedness carries less meaning for social behaviours and life styles; thus, space and place as determining factors – institutionally expressed above all by the nation state – have been weakened, but not eliminated. Giddens (1991, 17) writes that the emptying of time and space “is crucial for the second major influence on modernity’s dynamism, the disembedding of social institutions”. It means that social relations and behaviours are being ‘lifted out’ of local contexts and are becoming more abstract, more general and more universalised.

One characteristic worth mentioning is the position of knowledge. In the modern, and especially in the late modern era, all forms of knowledge can be questioned. The principle of radical doubt has been institutionalised, and as a consequence all knowledge takes the form of a hypothesis, and all claims of truth can be revised or abandoned (Giddens 1991, 3). Edgar Morin (1987, 149–150) asserts that radical doubt, the questioning of all ideas and values, even those of religion, is typical of the intellectual tradition of Western Europe, which has been pervaded by scientific reason. Every idea bears the germ of its opposite. One consequence of this situation is the absence of absolute or universal truths, and truth claims are context bound, relative and subject to disagreement and clashing interests.

The concept often used for characterising all these changes is globalisation. Globalisation, made possible by a revolution in communications, is a process defined as a high level of time-space distancing, in which “local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles

away and vice versa” (Giddens 1990, 64). It affects all aspects of the social – economy, material production and distribution, institutions, values, culture, politics, etc. Internationalisation today is not necessarily a result of mediation via nation states, it may happen here and now in different and distant parts of the world, simultaneously. But globalisation is historically inherently connected with the expansion of Western (first of all American and European) modernity all over the world, and the foremost ‘instruments’ have been the building of powerful nation states (colonial powers), capitalist production systems, colonialism, and a superior industrial technology. In these terms, globalisation is the latest phase of a long-term development.

Manuel Castells (1996 and 1998b) argues that the complex interaction between societal forms and technical developments may cause deep historical changes. The combination of the capitalistic forms of production and new communication technologies, which were originally triggered by American military interests under the Cold War, became the basis for the Internet. Informationalism and capitalism developed into two sides of the same coin. Capitalist ways of production, neo-liberalistic ideology and the revolution of information technology seem to have conquered the world. What discerns the late modern information age from industrialism is that knowledge, information, culture and symbolic communication have become more vital sources of productivity than ever before.

The total victory of global capitalism, neo-liberalism and information technologies impacts all fields of social activities, and cultural production, mediation and consumption are no exceptions.

CONCLUSIONS

First, in a political climate of deregulation and weakened and eroding state power, corporate intervention in cultural production and publicly financed cultural institutions is increasing. In the future, commercial

agents are likely to have considerable power in determining how cultural events are programmed, constructed and organized. As Austin Harrington (2004) argues, the new economic elites who invest in the cultural sector are very different from the earlier rich industrialists and landed gentry, who legitimated their wealth through charitable donations. They are not well educated middle-class people, employed by the state or working as civil servants: “The new elites are commercial elites, most often composed of executives in the media and entertainment industries. In contrast to traditional gentlemanly elites, the new commercial elites have a greater interest in the short-term convertibility of cultural capital back into economic capital” (Harrington 2004, 202–203). The boundaries between money and arts are blurring, it is difficult to distinguish between money and culture as the bearers of value. Businesses are aestheticised and aesthetic productions are commercialised.

Second tendency, which may have an impact on artistic and other forms of cultural production, is the new type of instrumentality introduced in cultural policies. Cultural policy is by definition instrumental, and has always been informed and guided by ideas of societal aims beyond culture or art itself. But in line with recent ideological shifts in direction of short-time utility, cultural policies on state as well as on regional and local level are today motivated with reference to economic growth, regional development, increased employment, attractiveness of places and regions, etc. And lately, cultural investments have been argued to be good means of counteracting health problems, social exclusion, criminality and other forms of social problems. The “old” instrumental aims of cultural policy, such as education and personal growth, enlightenment, aesthetic cultivation and preparation for democratic participation are still there, but have to a certain degree been pulled back by arguments from the economic and social policy fields.

The third tendency of great importance for culture and the arts is the neo-liberal deregulation of public organisation and administration. The New Public Management model introduced in ministries, departments, agencies and institutions makes the public sector more corporate-like in its management style, economic reasoning and not least, in rhetoric.

A deregulated and decentralised public sector means new challenges for the arts and culture since, at least in the Nordic countries, the arts and culture have until lately been and still are a public domain. If public intervention is reduced and reorganised, the arts and cultural field must look for other ways to survive. The market seems to be the alternative.

And finally, the fourth tendency is the increased power of the media. Media publicity has importance for cultural producers and mediators not only in the economic sense, but also in terms of aesthetic value and cultural political legitimacy. The media are in a position to set the agenda for discussions about culture, to define what is out and what is in, to create and reject tastes, to categorize and judge cultural expressions and forms. Commercially based media are primarily bound to market laws, not to public service policy, and in the long run this will probably have consequences for the development of culture and the arts.

My final conclusion is that the conditions of late modernity described and analysed above have an impact on the imagined and real autonomy of the arts and culture. Modernity's normative idea of the arts and culture as a free zone, independent of money, politics, religious morality and instrumental reason is still relevant, but the question is whether the artistic and cultural struggle for independence is merely changing in some of its *modes* or whether something *qualitatively new* is happening. The decades ahead of us will probably give an answer to that question.

Endnotes

- 1 The globalisation process will be dealt with more thoroughly in the section of this article entitled *Structural Changes Affect the Autonomy of Culture and the Arts*.
- 2 The question of the autonomy of culture and the arts is a research topic that has been discussed in workshops among a group of 14 researchers from 7 universities in Sweden for more than one year. The idea is to launch an extensive research programme on this subject. My paper has largely been developed in this academic context and I am grateful to my colleagues for critical comments and constructive ideas about this significant and complicated issue. Of course I am alone responsible for the text presented here.
- 3 This section is inspired by ideas formulated by a Swedish colleague, professor Svante Beckman, Linköping University.

- 4 Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 151.
- 5 See, for example, the European Commission's brochure *A Community of Cultures. The European Union and the Arts* (2002), European Communities, Luxembourg; and information on the Europeans Commission's website <http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-development/>, especially documents 397, 399, 405. Downloaded 2008-04-28.

1.2

Representations and Logics of Cultural Policy

Risto Eräsaari

“Thanks to an arrangement which is like the symbol of all perception, each one feels himself to be the centre of the theatre”

Marcel Proust

INTRODUCTION: THE COORDINATES

THE “CULTURAL BACKGROUND” against which modern answers are developed – sometimes referred to as the “cultural program” of civilization – is often seen (conceptualized) as something with an important influence that always has to be taken into account in comparative studies, but also as something that escapes conscious human action. Culture is something one has, but cannot choose, a silent language an unintended outcome of the multiplicity of actors and the multiplexity of signals. Being able to live together in the world requires culture, but – even if that is accepted as a cultural fact – culture is not allowed to show us “direct representation” or to become “the symbol of all perception” (Proust). It only provides us with “partial connections” and with “distributed representations”. In the midst of them, it is impossible not to become confronted with diversity and ambiguity, and not to find oneself within different sorts of interpenetrating zones and recognition spaces.¹ This is a cultural fact, but

cultural fact does not specify the road to take. It gives birth to epistemic and cognitive problematique and interpretation task for thinkers such as social scientists. But it also slips in the *dialogues with oneself* (Mead) and *horizons of our minds* (Zerubavel) that, as soon as we turn our heads, inevitably widen and become our *dynamic confrontation with the world* (Thévenot) and then, *conversations with society* (Archer).

Within the contemporary processual understanding of the world, the role of the concept of culture is many-faceted. Anthropologists think that today the concept “culture” raises more questions than it solves, and that “culture language” is in disrepute, but in all possible fields and categories the concept is – both understood as civilization for the noun and as cultural for the adjective – in active (even if not necessarily in intelligible) use. One peculiar use of the concept seems to have a persistent conceptual career from Herder via Hoggart to the harmonization of life spheres. This takes place when the vitality of people’s culture and the banal homogenization of life and the colonization of its culture by culture industries are contrasted. This is expanded beyond literary conceptions to understand the conceptualization of culture as a whole way of life that encompasses modes of sensibility, values and practices, as well as artifacts.

When dealing with the problematiques of cultural policy – which is the focus of this article – we also have to introduce societal structures within the context of which the understanding of “culture” needs special semantic *devices*. The concept of social differentiation refers to the structural differentiation of society, to its division to different spheres of action (economy, law, politics, science, art, religion etc.), each following their own specific logic. Neither “culture” nor “cultural policy” does seem to fit in this picture illustrating societal systems. Instead of making a subsystem of its own, “cultural policy” is thought to describe the values and principles which regulate or guide *any* entity involved in cultural affairs. We also tend to think that cultural policy describes – or prescribes – resources and potentials of common good, which are utilized in cultural policy, but should also be taken into account beyond cultural policy. As a meta-concept it is used in governing and coordinating, in

decision making and regulation, in evaluation and diagnosis. This already should be understood as a warning, suggesting that the knowledge forms that are dealt with vary enormously. Furthermore, as an organization cultural policy seems to be (or have been) in constant need of a “center”, (general or upper principles directed towards a center as a paradigm of ‘cultural virtue’), and a “top” (a hierarchically structural order vulnerable to structural decisions). For reasons of its internal structure and nature of societal task, cultural policy, however, more and more has to avoid imagining about and speaking in favor of this apex or peak, and instead has to describe itself as a range of practices and assemblages obeying the idea of some sort of *polyphonic complexity of cultural voices*.

The difficulties of understanding what is occurring in highly differentiated societies are linked to the fact that decisions have to be made and coordination has to be constructed at the intersection of action spheres of different kinds, each following their own kind of logic and rationality, so that what is rational in respect of one sphere, may be incommensurable in other spheres of action, and can even have unexpected side-effects on them (Eräsaari, Hyrkäs, Kangas et al. 2008). There are analyses on the division of labor, as well as on differentiated values spheres, social circles and action fields that can be applied to different aspects of cultural policy. But experts of cultural policy also need to locate the presence of society in different contexts and different orders of action. This, in turn, makes recognizing the disparate criteria of relevance of the different sub-systems unavoidable, when it comes to the subject matter of action and interaction, to the criteria of inclusion and exclusion within the action spheres of societal communication and participation, and to the dynamic criteria defining the time perspectives of different contexts as the focus.

The way in which art is presented and represented in cultural policy is manifold. The media and information technologies are at work in art life and the contemporary sphere of art. But the system of art, the field of art, the art world or the institution of art as endeavors to grasp the entirety of the sphere of art have no clear (explicable) formal rules, no division of labor and no formal hierarchy (Sevänen 2008). Rather, the art of and in society ought to be grasped as communication that

offers an angle different from the conventional regimes of regulation and coordination: art mediates perceptions, images and representations of the world to receivers and researchers, art critics present comments on work of art.²

The modern systems of art and culture are, then, not formal and fixed in the sense the other subsystems are. They include voluntary elements that have an effect on the rationales of inclusion and exclusion in art, but whose new organizational shape lacks clear conceptualization. It has also been pointed out that cultural policy has been reformulated in such a way that it no longer points to art's specific rationality, but *either* follows a mixture of general welfare and market-based principles *or* has become a re-defined "cultural dimension" with a high status in knowledge economy. Next, the three internal modes of cultural policy will be specified.

MODES OF CULTURAL POLICY

The guiding background motivation for the attempted interpretation of the three logics of cultural policy, which will be discussed next, is the quite rapid emergence of qualitatively new elements – new genres of culture and burgeoning fields of art – within contemporary cultural policy. Their understanding stems from the potential judgments about the policy agreements, definitions and brandings (Barry, Born & Weszkalnys 2008, 38–40). I am especially interested in the potential embracing of conceptual frameworks, and the orientations they seem to bring. We have to bear in mind that individualist-rationalist thinkers would arrive at decisions about the common by the *aggregation of preferences*. The aggregation of cultural elements for decision is a view from above at the cultural population. These thinkers "have no view of social relations between the individuals, except those revealed by statistics". Collectivist-interpretivist thinkers, on the other hand, work within interpretative frameworks and this establishes policies around the critical moments of

common frameworks (Wagner 2008, 35; Boltanski & Thévenot 1999). On the side of those, for whom cultural policy ought to be generative and enabling, it appears as the repository of a collective responsibility and civic epistemology. On the other side are those, who see such styles of modeling as inherently conventional; they appear as holding patterns of inquiry that cannot imagine alternatives to the current regime.

WELFARE STATE'S CULTURAL POLICY

Administrative approach is a simplified expression for the art life and cultural policies practiced within national cultures of the advanced welfare states. The decision making of cultural policy followed the items and coordinates of planning activities, collective expertise and rationally constructed expectations of welfare democracy that in itself was seen to become the modern expression of cultural needs in society. (Ahponen 1991.) Interpenetration between cultural and other systems was allowed. The incommensurability of their different rationales did not bother too much, because collective administrative decisions were taken both high above and with indifference towards them. Certain nationalist considerations and goals, as well as the stability of the welfare state fostered and represented the process of de-differentiation. Even if there was tension between the ideals of culture and the problems involved in their realization, the “democratic” cultural policy institutions could rely on the institutionalized frames of cultural policy. On the other hand, the institutionalization of cultural policies meant certain loss in terms of the symbolic function of culture. This was also noticed in the open realm: the expanding modern culture was recognized as “a representations challenge” of and for cultural policy, expressing the idea that modern culture ought to be “cultivated as representation” (ibid., 287).

Art's civilizing mission had to be left autonomous, and it was the duty of the state to protect the autonomy against any heavy-handed use of art. It was felt that the capability of offering meaningful services

to citizens was not legitimate and culturally ‘sound’ without the “democratization of culture”, in other words, without implementing the channels and networks that make art products available to the whole population according to egalitarian principles and special social rights of the citizen. This included the activation of the citizen’s own professional and lay cultural activities and projects, thus making the project of cultural policy not to land very far from cultural education. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the welfare state assumed the existence of relational selves throughout society, whereas the contemporary “welfare society” assumes individualized styles of autonomous selves.

Defining and stabilizing cultural hegemony does not merely require the ability to annihilate one’s nearest competitors, and it is not just a matter of state policy, economic resources and technological frames. It is made of different stuff. This is because “cultures develop on the basis of widespread borrowing, adaptation, imitation, and are endlessly redefined” (Sassoon 2002, 113). In so far as culture is also a productive activity, the instruments at the state’s disposal were conventional: subsidies, protectionism, quotas. Sooner or later the ideas of “accurate representation” and “real legitimatization” of the cultural world needed to be abandoned, because there just exists no way of verifying the relation between the art world and cultural policy thoughts about the art world other than, again, by the use of thought. But – as Anita Kangas (2004a, see 29) writes – even if cultural policy has, against the ideas presented above, become “more instrumental”, cultural policy still aims at “the promotion of artistic creativity and making it easier for people to access art activities”, but, in addition, cultural policy “defines art by means of art world and competent audiences”.

CULTURAL POLICY A’LA CIVIC HUMANA

What is striking across a range of fields is the stress – already visible within regulating cultural policies through the collective welfare strategies

– placed by researchers of the cultural field on conceiving and justifying cultural policy, not only in terms of instrumental logic or the logic of accountability or a logic of innovation, but – and this is decisive – in terms of a self-understanding, self-reflection or even an ‘ontological’ logic of cultural policy. There are obviously many reasons behind the efforts of taking into account the critical capacities of the cultural agent – institutional or lay (Thévenot 2007b). One obvious reason is the exhaustion and overwhelm of etatist orientation and tradition. I will illustrate this case through a recent Ph.D thesis (Pirnes 2008) in cultural policy. In it, the critical capacity or the ‘ontological’ element is defined as “a broad concept of culture”, by which we *neither* mean a better insight into the experiences and the interpretations of the culture field or productive culture *nor* a more active representation of the performance of cultural consultation, but a special challenge of the cultural and political ethos.

The broad concept of culture has been adopted in the hope of achieving both identity and legitimacy for cultural policy. Broadness means here qualities found in theories and documents. But it also means certain *cultural eigenvalue* that is approached through a semiotic and phenomenological reading of culture based on the signification and intentionality of life worlds and social practices. Thus, it is a different construction compared to Hoggart’s and Williams’ idea of culture as a whole-way-of-life. But still, there is the danger of landing in the desert of cultural life or at the margins of cultural policy. The author will, however, try to escape this trap through positioning his conclusions in a manner “to attach cultural policy to the meaning-based ... way of understanding the concept of culture”, thinking and hoping that this would give cultural policy the possibility “to keep the promises which have been made in the broad concept discourse”. To find out what he means by this promise, we must take a look at the way the existential and social concept of culture is discussed and how it is finally identified as a target that ought to be turned into the “*meta-tasks* of politicization of culture” (Pirnes 2008, 251–258).

The meta-tasks are formulated as a set of theses aiming at *conditio humana*, and they are formulated in a defensive manner, as if a kind of

philosophical critique of the systemic big world that holds its rehearsal in the small world. The first one expresses the use of *critical reason*, the second the right to create *meaning* and communicate meanings freely in society, the third the formation of *identity*, the fourth the place of creative *self-narratives*, and the fifth the emergence of *life-world meanings* into the system world as the *conditio humana* of cultural policy, or critical conditions of the politics of creation. These well-thought theses remind the reader of the Kantian notion of the end of immaturity, the exit of the human being from self-incurred immaturity and the celebration of reason. Reason, meaning, identity, narrative and life world are the conducting concepts of Enlightenment thinking.

POLYPHONIC ORGANIZATION'S CULTURAL VOICES

The traditional distance between works of art and their receivers, between the art works and their daily objects, and even between 'culture' and 'market', is disappearing along the development of multiculturalism and within the plural contexts and intersections of action, as well as in the different ways it appears within new incommensurabilities and the burgeoning of modern technology and popular art genres. This is not merely a question of audiences, markets, brands and aesthetics, but also a question of cultural policy, and, as will be shortly noticed, of cultural management. On the vertical dimension this appears as the fragmentation of dichotomies, such as art versus popular culture, high versus low culture, art versus entertainment, serious versus light culture. In a convincing way this has been experienced in all the main fields of art, not only within genres such as literature, theatre, opera, painting, sculpture, architecture and classical music, but also in design, fashion, films, radio and television programs and tape recordings (Sevänen 2008, 96).

The transformations have also affected the collegiality and the canonicity of cultural policy. Quite simply, professional collegiality has become more differentiated in terms of tastes, audiences, aesthetics and attitudes

towards trading zones and the generalized commercialization of art. They have an effect on the processes whereby “classical” repertoires – and the schools, fronts and rationales behind them – become modified from opera to contemporary music and from literature to design. What seems clear is that the possibility or the feasibility of the canonization of the works of art clearly diminishes in the present day cultural policy. This, in turn, opens up the realm of new institutionalization that as a term suits best operas in specific locations, projects of translocal and - national art, media representations of cities, imaginative forms of economic penetrations of the realm of cultural production, and experts of cultural projects. Thus, there are not merely major transformations within the “cultural logic” itself, but also a tendency of growing tolerance towards ‘cultures of resistance’, ‘militant particularism’ and even certain fundamentalist tendencies of post-secular conditions.

In addition to this, there is the explicit tendency to bring the spheres of art and economic life to each other, but this results in an unavoidably complicated difficulty of incommensurability in trying to coordinate – and in some respects even to interpret (Hyrkäs 2008) – the interaction between publics (audiences) and markets (expectations), and trying to get hold of the explicit specialisms of ‘these days’ managerialized practices. Art councils, art schools, national broadcasting companies and new cultural enterprises, just to mention a few examples, have created imaginative combinations of commercial and consciously artistic goals, including tendencies of the culturalization of material production (brands, virtualization, design, communication as an immediate production factor, fictivization of money and the meta-money of options). As a consequence, ‘cultural issues’ become potential obstacles to implementing knowledge management.

Next, I will turn to the epistemic (or ‘ontological’) problematique, an orientation in each of the practices towards effecting epistemological transformation in the objects, – both in the historical development of cultural need and taste, and in the new construction of the art world and audiences – that came out in every mode of cultural policy.

EPISTEMIC PROBLEMATIQUES OF CULTURAL LOGICS

As far as the idea of *cultural welfare policy* is concerned, it is clear that sooner or later the ways in which cultures and the art worlds develop will be closely observed. Cultural democracy implied the idea that “policies should not be formulated in relation to extraneous aesthetic standards”, but in relation to “the cultural needs of the population in their everyday lives”, in other words “arts according to the people’s own conception” (Kangas 2004a, 24–25). As there are neither uniform nor unambiguous cultural needs or people’s conceptions, cultural policy governing apparatus has had to develop *second order* cultural policies that, however, inevitably grow complex, both in terms of knowledge and in terms of management (see Smith & Jenks 2006).

The dilemma does not show itself merely in terms of cold frames, such as the questions of power and privileges but – and I should say especially – in terms of hot substances such as experience and the interpretation of art and culture – the quality of culture and art. Issues such as “negotiated values”, “virtual cultures”, “media representations”, “effects of evaluation and comparison” make it necessary to avoid simple instrumental concepts and set up the requirement to actively develop an *expanded* concept of cultural policy. The result is the emphasis on epistemic and interpretative approach between cultural analysis and cultural policy, including the reflection on the historical formation of agencies, frames, organizations and the fields at the roots of cultural policy (see Sokka & Kangas 2007). In the wider sense this interpretative emphasis “begs the question about that which is variable in modernity and how change in modernity occurs”. Not only should we take up the questions of how to formulate politics and govern life in common, how to establish valid knowledge and how to guarantee one’s own law or authority, but it is just as important to explicate the relevance that “the experience of significant historical moments constitutes the background against which specific answers to those questions are elaborated” (Wagner 2008, 2–3).

Interpretation of the *broad concept of culture* and especially the “tuning” or the practical “signification” of the broad conception with the help of meta-tasks in the Enlightenment spirit seem to raise two questions, the first one concerning the cultural and epistemic standard of Enlightenment thinking, and the second one the very epistemic level of the meta-tasks. As far as the first one is concerned, it is safe to say that the Enlightenment knowledge standard, and the standard paving way for the celebration of culture as common good gave rise to new thinking about reason, meaning, identity, narrative orientation, and the life world (added to the model by Edmund Husserl and Jürgen Habermas) does not seem self-evident. All this was, however, created under special conditions. Within the Enlightenment atmosphere, there were attacks on several fronts: its narrowness (for accepting something as knowledge) was protested against, its empirical adequacy was under suspicion and the realm of belief was not found broad enough, and hence, also its doctrine of warranted belief, of the process of epistemology and of propositionality (Campbell et al. 2007). Secondly, within the standard model, the knower is an individual, and the shift to the collective was feared, because of indoctrination by authority and persuasion by social and political pressures. Together these two aspects mean that the forms of knowledge and belief most eagerly omitted from the standard model are those with traction in the world. For us, this is the factor and the context that is potentially able to explain “the significance of shifting from substantive to active participles, from *knowledge* and *belief* to *knowing* and *believing*” (ibid., 448). In addition to this, we can recognize its effects on intentionality, on the more or less free play of representations and on the bringing about of new ground. Some Enlightenment knowledge ideas remain relevant also in our context, but the turn towards “knowing” and “believing” call forth the view that the real and the non-real, the objective and the personal may really evolve side by side, thus suggesting and reminding us of the possibility that the difference between them is – as T.S. Eliot nicely formulated it – “one of practical convenience and varies every moment”.

An excellent example linked to the *polyphonic voices of art* is present in the novel ways in which the different art contexts and their new regulatory ideals—and eventually the functional structure of culture in society—show themselves in the burgeoning field of art-science. As an intentional category for artists, institutions and funding bodies, it has as its environment a “heterogeneous space of overlapping interdisciplines thrown up at the intersection of the arts, sciences and technologies, including practices such as new media and digital art, interactive art and immersive art, bio-art and wet art, just as these domains abut on adjacent interdisciplines from robotics, informatics, artificial and embodied intelligence to tissue engineering and systems biology” (see Barry, Born & Weszkalnys 2008, 38). These are activities with yet little codification, and activities coming with emergent practices without visible integrating mechanism, but they clearly do not only have an effect on the differentiated audiences’ notions of what art and culture is or can be, but also develop through their work a *new argumentation technique* for them. Instead of the broad cultural policies or broad cultural development, this seems to open up an incommensurable space for the peculiarities of cultural propagation. This is a space for learning, for teaching, for orientations taking place through imitation, communication and memory (Sperber & Claidière 2006). It may be embedded in wider transformations such as those from epistemology to cognitive or ontology (where what is *known* is simultaneously being *made*) and from morality to evaluation and performance. It is also a space for the incommensurability of cultural currency: the good and bad selling of art, the threatening effects of commercial forms on art and, for example, the alternative agencies trying to minimize economic pressures, as well as the mechanisms of belonging become questionable.

REPRESENTATION OF CULTURAL POLICY

Cultural policy does not compile or occur in an independent subsystem that would have its own rationale, but it is surrounded by diverse codes and media, structuring and safeguarding its functional place. The energies drawn from research and development, from innovation and tailored market strategies can in the present society become understood in these terms. Before the above, cultural policy was mainly understood and represented in terms of the integrative society that was regulated by the ideals of a 'general' society, where the individual agent is a political and moral person, surrounded by community and the sharedness of culture.

In the embrace of the integrated cultural policy, the challenges for self-identity and the 'representation challenge' of cultural policy started to emerge. On the one hand, the critical recognition of culture suffered from the parallel explosion and the eventual implosion of cultural studies, where 'culture' behaved 'differently' and escaped almost all modeling efforts. On the other hand, the representation challenge was experienced as primary. It was thought that cultural policy realities ought to be represented to enable us to see what the action realm of cultural policy consists of. Namely, it is the creation of the socio-cultural reality through the act(s) of representation that makes the reality for cultural policy modeling possible (Ankersmit 2002). One way of recognizing (achieving) the availability of this realm is the earlier discussed move, suggested by Esa Pirnes (2008), from the sober reality of cultural policy to the study of the modes of the enlightened condition of cultural policy as the tasks of 'meta-representation' of cultural policy.

The distance from these 'meta-representations' to the causal mechanisms of synchronic, to the symbolic capacities and to the representation structures can be thought only through learning new ways of seeing things and most probably only partially. All this, in other words, takes time and calls for new ideas. On the other hand, the elements that *cannot be represented* or appear often as under-represented (unmarked qualities,

ideas without a clear forms, styles and ways of thinking etc.) appear as an impediment for the effort or the project, because within cultural policy the matters that have not yet reached representational thresholds, such as promising projects, epoch-making ideas that must be kept secret etc., do not make an exception, but are ordinary. The same remark about the value of the implicit ought to be made about unmarked spaces: extreme types, deviants and militants. They make a strength but in one way or another stay outside the realm of cultural representation.

As a matter of fact, the paradox of representation proves exceptionally productive and profitable for the recognition of both critical moments and the modes of common good in cultural policy, where one almost always has to live with the fact that representations are based on representations. Perhaps cultural policy's intermediary schemes of pondering and deliberation, as well as its specialism of expertise that works on an already filtered basis, have to face it, too. This is, however, not a new thing. Cultural and social dimensions are generally conceptualized as that which escapes conscious human action. Thus, they also "pose constraints to collective self-determination. Or, in other words, answers to the epistemic *problematique*, in terms of valid knowledge about the social and cultural world, limit the range of possible interpretations of the political *problematique*"; thus, all in all, "epistemic *problematique* asks for the creation of valid knowledge by means of human intellectual self-determination" (Wagner 2008, 22, 233).

A fine way of illustrating the spirit of this is offered by Antoine Hennion's (2001) exciting sociology of music, where he is arguing for the interactive nature of the music-society-nexus by focusing on the attachment and taste of the *connoisseur* (see also Looseley 2006).³ There is no cultural impact, no effect, no event, if there is no attachment. Thus, the active aesthetic experiences of the music users reveal creative manoeuvres and a specific register of existence that is always a situation, an unpredictable event and a performance. To be able to trace the mediation, one has to include the discourse in its various forms – the discourse of composers, musicians, critics, musicologists, cultural intermediaries, the institutions (pointing directly to cultural policy).

CONCLUSION

In addition to the discussion of the logics of cultural policy, the rationales of welfare, *civitas humana* and polyphonic organization, I have identified a deeper (epistemic) logic and a deeper orientation apparent in different cultural policy practices in each of the three cases that are bending towards effecting the “ontological transformation” in the objects and relations of collective cultural guidance. By this I point to the potential for invention in those practices – as against the equation of cultural policy with mere *shuttling* between the daily compromises of public policy, and as against blurring the substance (*eigenvalue*) of culture. These three cases can also be termed as the logics of “universalism”, “innovation” and “management”. The classification is at the same time aimed at showing the limitations of those accounts of cultural policy the contexts have revealed (cf. the ‘challenge’, the ‘meta-task’ and the ‘cultural voices’). Moreover these empowering rationales also seem to point at the unrepresented or unrepresentable qualities of culture, thus indicating the impact of the mechanism of meta-representations or the ‘illumination’ of representation. As a matter of fact, cultural policy has in different ways been guided by the (deeper; epistemic) idea that it needs to break down barriers, and that it also should be prepared to a greater interaction between different spheres and subsystems. Discussing these trends and the experiences about them will also hopefully heighten awareness of what is inventive in the present burgeoning cultural logic of cultural management (cross-cultural competence, organizational meanings, manageable knowledge, diversity management).

Within the welfare state frame, the embeddings of cultural policy – through the democratization principle – was to deliver the real possibility of inclusion into the institutions and services of art to the population, following, as far as possible, the people’s own conception. The logic was made in opposition to pure aesthetic (belletristic) formats, as well as the use of contextually wrong, that is, ethically wrong or politically non-justified devices (power, money). The experiences of the welfare

state practices led quickly to a deeper understanding of providing and utilizing welfare, namely to critical consciousness about bureaucracy, legitimacy, culture and communication. The practical reform, the routine and the political rationalization went another way, as is well known. No wonder that the so called cultural democracy also became challenged by a more dynamic concept of the cultural sphere, drawing on both the intellectual (humanistic) traditions and the democratic (political) ideals. On the one hand, the meaningfulness of cultural policy, and on the other hand, the background motivation of it, were brought up as conceptual devices for enabling the rectifying of the logic. The reason for that was, at least primarily, not the ambiguity or complexity of the culture concept as such, but rather, the new urgent demands of fastness and efficiency in combining the cultural and the political. In terms of knowledge, this meant that information must be made useful, if it is to inform policy and facilitate enactment.

As far as the plural nature of cultural voices is concerned, it at once seems to mean the disappearance of the canonized mode of collective cultural policy, and the adoption of a specific kind of information and disciplinary principles through implementing a knowledge management strategy. The first aspect has already been named as “the new position of cultural policy”, emphasizing “multiplicity” and tolerating “the co-existence of contradictory repertoires” (Kangas 2004a, 29–30, 36). The second aspect carries the characteristics of accountability *neither* comparable to the welfare model (accountability to rational plans and professions) *nor* to cultural democracy (accountability to cultural and political reason). Both of these two, of course, underpin new complicated challenges, the biggest challenge of all being the so called “culture and change management”. But, in practice these demanding challenges of *Zeitdiagnose* are swept under the carpet of knowledge management.

Managers are like researchers, producing primary information in the field. According to *knowledge management*, it is created by persons in engagement with the world and thus with one another. ‘Knowledge creation’ is the phrase used. Cultural policy knowledge is seen as able to communicate anything (dealing with the plurality of projects) to anyone

(stakeholders). But anyone familiar with the ‘question of cultural policy’ knows or has to know that the question of how to create the right culture for knowledge sharing, or the right knowledge for culture sharing, in other words, for distribution and consumption, is for obvious reasons both ignored and silenced.

The need for management is generated, when people become conscious of specific kinds of information belonging to specific domains that are produced “off-stage”, tailored for “organizational success” and witnessed as the “representations of desired ends” (Strathern 2006, 193, 195). Management may be about the order of wealth, but the emphasis is on *strategy* and goals. Under a management regime the cultural policy expertise is likely to have a strategy-based *representational* status. The expert will namely be called on as though he represented the discipline as a whole; he will speak as a representative of the discipline; and the sign the expert advice brings about, becomes a yardstick for the scheme. This remarkable change has an important effect on the whole condition of presence. Compared to the quite robust ‘socio-political frame’ and the idealized ‘frame of the human condition of living together in the world’, the realm of multicultural voices has a special representational status. In its reality, we must be prepared to confront unexpected repercussion, conditional arrangement, boomerang-effects of policy measures and decisions and intervention of mechanisms of cognitive coordination. In the long run, strategy – neither socio-cultural nor cultural-political strategy – ceases to be a true ‘reality test’ for our dynamic confrontation with the world and the need for justification, to use the confidence based vocabulary of Laurent Thévenot (see Boltanski & Thévenot 1999; Thévenot 2007a; 2007b).

The British *art-science* field that emerged in the 1990s in response to the varieties of funding schemes, resisted assertively art’s instrumental function: it is caught up “in a nexus of developments stemming from conceptualism’s refusal of notions of autonomous art and its foregrounding of art’s social embeddedness, including art as social research, art that probes mediation and publicity, and art that engages the politics of science and technology” (Barry 2008, 32). Therefore, a multiplicity

of accountabilities is evident in its practices: registers of legitimation, regulation and control, performance, explicit representation as well as radical and militant ones. Its genesis in conceptual art, art and technology movements, and the absorbed debates around computational and bio sciences and technologies is full of something that in earlier cultural life might have been termed as experimental. After achieving a status like that there can be no return to representational challenges or to deeper concepts of culture, at least in the conventional meaning of those terms. Instead of these ‘challenges’ we are, I think, invited to see “wild negotiations” – negotiations of objectivity, of the primacy of the visual, of arts’ commodity form and the philosophy of art’s autonomy.

Two multifaceted trends seem especially important to discuss. One is the opposition between the implicit forms of knowledge for ideas and the formal knowledge required for scientific validity. The second one is the variety of formats in which the experienced environment as reality is grasped, and in which cognitive transactions, social interaction and decisional coordination are defined. The *first* one could be conceived of as the achievement of a world or a language of *emergences* that revives us with a new qualification that cannot be abandoned. Otherwise the situation would become entirely unclear. The new trend may even in some important sense naturalize the “global order as if it were a well-oiled machine periodically disrupted by unpredictable, outside events” (Calhoun 2004, 394). To be able to understand the contextual feasibility of emergent chances we may surely need to shift our focus from the collective spheres of ‘public space’ and ‘public opinion’ to qualitatively complex assemblages, such as ‘*publics*’ seen as entities produced by the self-organizing circulation of action, and ‘*audiences*’ constituted by performative practices and meta-linguistic ideas in a specified context. The *second* implication is the preoccupation with internal problematique, which means responding to broader conditions of cultural production and art’s normative spirit, and will perhaps stress the polyphonic organization and the relevance of non-repressive tolerance.

Endnotes

- 1 Recognition space is not about supporting substantive local or sub-group understanding, but simply refers to the admissibility of such claims in the cultural policy framework.
- 2 As described by Niklas Luhmann in his "*Die Kunst der Gesellschaft*" (The Art of Society), see Sevänen, op.cit., 321.
- 3 Hennion (2001, 2) sees music as a specific "listening format", i.e. as "something transitory, not as a given but as a 'new arrival', a relatively irreducible present: it happens, it passes – despite people's efforts to pin it down and bring it into line with more 'authentic' norms".

1.3

Perspectives for Cultural Political Research: Keywords from Participation through Creativity and Alienation to Self-expression and Competition

Pirkkoliisa Ahponen

INTRODUCTION

IN PRINCIPLE, two perspectives, civilian and institutional, can be differentiated in cultural political studies. In practice these perspectives are intertwined. To understand the ways of progressing cultural democracy we need conceptual analysis on how to approach culture from the point of view of civil society and as an institutional system.

To begin with, a distinction is made between the terms ‘politics of culture’ and ‘cultural policy’. Politics of culture refers to the sphere of civil society, whereas cultural policy functions in the institutional field of affairs. In any case, the basis for a political approach to culture lies in the civil interests of free individuals. When people join together, the representative or institutional mechanisms start to structure the field of cultural policy. The focus of cultural political research can be put on the right of individuals to create, express and receive cultural products freely

and spontaneously or on institutional responsibilities in the development of the society by cultural means. When emphasising the political construction of the field of culture by means of civil activities and the representative interests of the members of society, specific roles are reserved for both of these cultural political perspectives. When evaluating the cultural political state of affairs in a certain democratic society, we refer to the term cultural policy in connection with the institutional view, whereas the term politics of culture is seen appropriate for discussing civic affairs based on creative freedom.

New political duties were addressed to culture during the welfare state period in Finland. This article outlines cultural political research perspectives as starting from this era. The democratisation of culture and cultural democracy became the key words for the favoured development of the society. How has the cultural political research evaluated the progress of democracy? Which models are followed, when the state of cultural democracy is defined? The principal task can be defined by quoting David Held's (2006, 261) discussion on the appeal of democracy. Democracy champions to bestow the "legitimacy on political decisions when they adhere to proper principles, rules and mechanisms of participation, representation and accountability". But the development of culture also contains an inherent tendency to progress qualifications by competitive means, included in the ways of expressing creativity and its products. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the principles, rules and mechanisms as the necessary elements of cultural democracy can be tied to each other so that the cultural contents of the cultural policy or the politics of culture can be preserved meaningful.

The present article is constructed by discussing the cultural political key words in the context of cultural democracy, and it proceeds from participation to the use of self-expression values in the new society of innovations.¹ The theoretical framework owes much to the current discourse on alienation, the roots of which are in Critical Theory. As a point of departure, culture is considered as something that emerges from meaningful practices. Participation is a necessary element for organising creativity for the use of society. It is understandable that civic purposes require active

citizens. Creative artists, animators and promoters are valuable for the cultural society. The promotion of culture parallels with representation as a strategy of organising cultural practices valuable in the field of cultural capital. As soon as civil responsibilities are taken under the cultivating care of the public power, it becomes important to define the kinds of arts that are worth supporting. As soon as individual creativity is seen profitable, the market principles begin to rule the ordering of values.

Promotional culture (Wernick 1991) fertilises professional practices, replacing amateur activities by expertise. The evaluation criteria for professional qualifications are formed by means of accountability, and competitive elements are increasingly taken into consideration in the cultural political field of action. The larger the cultural political field is considered, as governed by the public power, the more it is also ruled by competitive means, although the freedom of creativity is the defining principle in the background of ordering qualifications. This is why questions such as “why creative economy demands cultural contents” and “how culture is formatted in the service of media technology” are worth discussing in this context. The question still remains whether this progress contains democratic elements and, at least, how cultural democracy – and research on it – is used for legitimising this development. Another side of this complex is that techno-culture includes instrumental tendencies towards meaninglessness, passivity and alienation, if the missing cultural contents are replaced by the beauty of form, easy entertainment and pure consumerism. Self-expression values, propagated by culturalism, are good denominators of creative instrumentalism although – and because – culturally meaningful terms such as identity, subjectivity and devotion are used for guaranteeing the cultural core of the politics of culture.

PARTICIPATION

Cultural policy includes both civilizing and democratizing aims, and contains continuous tensions between bottom-up and top-down orienta-

tions. These tensions have an impact on the ways of structuring cultural practices and academic studies. Hierarchical and horizontal approaches are applied, when cultural policy is structured through ascending or descending categories, and seen either from a narrow or a large perspective. The narrow definition refers to the distinctive cultural characters of individuals or specific qualifications of unique products of arts, whereas culture as its largest covers everything that has symbolic meaning in the society. Culture is present in every signifying practice, to refer to the way in which Raymond Williams (1983, 208–213) formulates his large concept of culture in a democratic tune, suggesting that culture means the wholeness of the way of life. Williams emphasises the social organisation of culture in processes in which meanings and values become activated in practice. From this point of view the contents of culture are formed, transformed and preserved only through meaningful practices, because meanings are inherently present in arts and lifestyles, as Esa Pirnes (2008, 252–253, 268, 281) concludes his fresh evaluation on the tasks of cultural policy. He strives to define cultural policy as extensively as possible, to cover the transactions between creative and regulative practices for progressing cultural society. The principal task for the developers of democratic cultural policy is to organise the citizens' possibilities of participating in the creation of culture, as well as in maintaining cultural properties. The cultural contents of life-qualities result from having pleasure through the participants' engagement and involvement in cultural actions.

The democratic public power aims at the enlargement of the institutional field of cultural political actions in order to cover the civilizing activities of every decent citizen. The civilizing aspect is taken to institutional use by means of public power, when everyman's possibilities of being creative and active are supported. The far-sighted idea, included in cultural democratization, is that creative activity is the best way of contributing to the cultural construction of society. The precondition for full participation is that the representatives of every social group and even those living in distant localities far from capital regions have equal access to culture. However, according to a self-evident fact, in Finland

as well as in the rest of Europe until 1960s or even to 1970s, cultural political measures were implemented by following the narrow conceptualization of culture as arts. Established artists were supported, because they were “*primus inter pares*” in the institutional field of arts, which was defined as the “arts world” by Howard Becker (1984). Core activities were emphasised as cultural qualifications and the gifted producers of art specialised in making authentic art products in their restricted fields, which were worth public support. The area of cultural political functions was not, however, strictly defined inside the closed boundaries of arts, because the continuous renewing of ways of expressing cultural creativity was considered necessary for the development of art values.

In the field of arts, open to new qualities, also new art forms can be gradually legitimised as qualified and valued. Specific principles are followed, when defining whether the status of the representatives of arts is worth good reputation. Among these criteria are professional demands and the recognition of colleagues, but also the self-assessment of those regarding themselves as artists because of their own creative capacity. Instrumental measures such as income are also taken into consideration. These criteria were evaluated in the Status of the Artists -project which was carried out by the Arts Council of Finland in 1985–1996 (see Karttunen 2002; Heikkinen 2007). Sari Karttunen (1998a, 8) remarks how professionalism is increasingly emphasised in combining the definition criteria. Even though internal calling and self-respect may suffice for being an artist as such, externally imposed standards of judgement are used for determining who is professional enough. Although finding trustworthy objective standards is complicated, the measurements of qualities are favoured in valuing artistic work, and also when voluntary activities and amateur practices are taken into institutional concern. The civic aspect is recognised strategically important to progressing the partnership in civil society, and civic responsibilities have to be calculated as equal by the public administration, to find the qualifications worth state support. The inclusive strategy, characteristic in the development of the institutional cultural policy, is reasoned by these means (see Cultural Policy in Finland 1995, 38–43).

The structure of society and its cultural atmosphere have changed rapidly since the 1960s. The changes of living conditions and ways of life influenced the demands on renewing the cultural political field of action. Cultural institutions were reformed to better articulate the cultural and social needs of people in the welfare state. During this phase the new cultural policy was mainly reasoned by considering arts and artists as a resource for national economic and social development. When the process of institutionalisation by democratic means continued, the importance of ensuring the members of society equal access to cultural services was emphasised more than earlier (Cultural Policy in Finland 1995, 55). It became strategically significant for the executors of cultural policy to find out what kinds of public services were demanded by people, and further, how people themselves participated in cultural activities, progressing this way the development of civil society.

PROMOTION

The promotion of cultural activities suited well the needs to see how the ways people's lives were culturally composed in local areas, communities and villages. It was thought that improvements in the possibilities of receiving professionally ordered cultural services helped people both to consume culture and to participate actively in cultural affairs in their own settlements, associations and voluntary organisations. Action research was seen as a strategy of evaluating the situation where it made sense to build a bridge between the everyday lives of people and the use of institutional resources for implementing cultural practices. Anita Kangas (1988) gives a good example of this orientation. She was involved in an experimental pilot project aimed at developing and analysing the improvements of the organisation of cultural affairs in municipalities. Her tasks also included encouraging ordinary people to participate in cultural activities, and improving the living conditions by these means in local areas, especially in rural villages (Kangas 1988, 261). Kangas

not only observed cultural practices, but also participated in them and implemented new activities in joint work with special animators in a certain region. The project was planned and carried through in connection with the cultural administration reform. The expertise of Kangas was utilised extensively later, when the practices were developed from this ground, and also when the results of experiments were evaluated both on the national level and in the international co-operations in the contexts of Unesco and the Council of Europe.

The promotion of arts constructed the “milestones in the development of the ‘modern’ cultural policy in Finland”, as the authors of the National Report on Cultural Policy in Finland (1995, 57) say when writing this report for the evaluative purposes of the Council of Europe. The institutional field of cultural policy was enlarged by democratising means, which covered the national and regional support for professional artists. When cultural policy was progressed further, special regional artists as well as municipal cultural officials were employed to animate cultural practices. Those animators had official positions, with regular salaries, within the publicly organised cultural field. They arranged local services and responded to political demands made by the decision makers, but they also animated activities for cultural amateurs, and encouraged creativity this way. According to one idea, a mediating link can be built between the public and the private sphere by means of participation. People initiate, as Kangas (2004a, 82) remarks, cultural functions when they gather together to participate in associations. Practices, supported publicly for fulfilling those initiations, then become governed by the experts and transferred under the domain of welfare state responsibilities. The other alternative is to co-operate with private money and allow business-oriented principles be applied in the management of cultural production, distribution and reception. In such a case, people participate more as customers than as citizens and fellow-artists, even though pleasure can still be the principle for appealing to people to increase the consumption of culture. Pleasure is the *primus motor* motivating both cultural meaningfulness and economic demand. Both sides of the pleasure principle are interestingly entangled in the cultural approach called culturalism.

CREATIVITY AND COMPETITIVENESS

The changing cultural definitions are discussed continuously in the cultural political field. Especially since the 1980s culturalism, based on the ideas of Williams, became a popular way of studying cultural meanings through individual creativity, subjectivism, interactions, discursive practices and identity politics (see e.g. Barker 2004). Cultural studies began on the grass-root level, and considered culture merely a pleasure for anybody, able to enjoy anything. The reception of cultural products was emphasised. This way individualism turned to support the consumers' ideology. Pop art celebrates inside this "art world" by producing its iconography from the everyday world, where all experience is art, but art-experience becomes formatted as highly technical (high-tech) constructs by the means of media. Therefore, it is recognised, as Bell (1979, 72, 91, 96) remarked, when interpreting this change already in the 1970s, as cult of experience which is modified by the mobilisation of the time-machine to the manipulated use of self-consciousness. Kangas (2004a, 28) refers aptly to Zygmunt Bauman's (1990, 204) notion that privatized things are no longer thought as common and individualised duties are no longer thought as social. Kangas (ibid.) further remarks, how the consumer's attitude makes life characteristically individual in the current society. Everyday culture is now increasingly seen as a mediator for the society of entertainment through advertisements and consultation. According to this promotional strategy, it can be argued that culture is used as a good instrument for propagating economic acceleration and social cohesion, because the aspect of qualification is included in artistic culture. Cultural capital means the accumulation of valuable distinctions, evaluated according to preferences, based on good taste. The principal aspect is how distinctions are mediated in defining the status of membership among those who participate in social gatherings.

The political view of art as critical counterforce against socially dominant power structure – the basic idea of Critical Theory – is increasingly replaced by an affirmative valuation of cultural innovations. Social cohe-

sion (social capital) is demanded for avoiding social inertia, which slows down the economic development. Proper social investments serve to increase social capital and help to reach political consensus by affirmative means. Even culturally sustainable development is demonstrated as valuable, because this economy-driven functional system has to sustain as democratic (In from the Margins 1997, 30–32). Social cohesion is argued to enhance democracy inside society. But as much as economic development is reasoned by the means of competitiveness, it still includes elements towards increasing inequality inside the new, culturally justified class societies. The ways of increasing the production, mediation and consumption of culture in service of democratising policy have progressed also a new type of governance, when the welfare regime was transformed or “translated” to the neo-liberal rule (see Rose 2006, 50–51). The tension between the public and the private domains is not solved, and therefore, the unsolved questions are continually the same as described by Bell (1979, 279). He saw it difficult to progress common purposes by retaining individual means of fulfilling them. He asked also, whether individual needs can be met by common means in any other way than by subjecting them to the rule of certain competitive interests.

CONSUMING CREATIVITY

Individual freedom, creativity and cultural self-expression are keywords for the liberal culture of the current world in which we are, as Nikolas Rose (2006, 62) states, governed through freedom. Creativity fertilises culture as the basic human property, which makes life meaningful and valuable. Our creative capacity to act by producing innovations enforces us to learn new skills and to improve our consciousness. Rose (2006, 275) remarks how the creative naming of problems, procedures, strategies and technologies stimulates new practices. Creativity is reasoned this way in the current society merely as a capacity to make, use and sell innovations, which are needed for increasing intensive productivity

for commercial purposes. Paradoxically, this kind of power of freedom liberates humans by subjecting them to the compulsion of life-procedural rules, which “promote oppression in the guise of emancipation” (Bauman 1997, 208). Active citizens participate, because they are committed to the securitization of their habitat through residential watch programmes in self-governing neighbour communities (Rose 2006, 249). Free consumers are oppressed by the “velvet-dependency”, which according to Bauman (see Cantell & Pedersen 1992, 142) means that people actively seek and willingly choose seductive proposals from the experts of manipulative transactions of commercialized culture. On the other hand, experts need creative initiatives to design proper products in popular forms for ordinary people. Tempting creativity can be used as an instrument for propagating alienation in the guise of freedom.

Creativity also makes increasing consumption valuable. The owners of creatively processed products appreciate qualifications, because of the specificity of self-expression. Cultural skilfulness is important in competitive economy, even more important when competitiveness is utilised in the learning society, where knowledge-based industry is promoted by propagating innovations. When discussing post-industrialism and cultural materialism, Bell (1974) and Williams (1983) emphasised expressive and performative skills which are modified to symbolic products, to be increasingly consumed. It is also present where self-expression is the key word for arguing for the increasing importance of post-material values in the era of “silent revolution” (Inglehart (1977), which means the pursuit of freedom as the positive denominator of democracy.

Several analysts of the rise of network society in the information age, like Manuel Castells (1999; see also Castells & Himanen 2002), Ronald Inglehart (e.g. Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel (2005b) and Richard Florida (2002; 2005), have seen Finland as a good example of how creative economy has been applied with a political model of welfare democracy in a country, which became modernised quickly by making successful technological inventions. The good results of the Finnish education system have suited well the construction of knowledge-

intensive society. The development goes hand in hand with the change of the ideological atmosphere.

The criteria of the welfare state strategy were achieved relatively late, but rapidly in Finland, and then the scope of public affairs in social and cultural issues became large (Kangas 2004a, 25). Universalism and equalisation of cultural services were the principles of the “Nordic model”. The turn from the activation of amateur practices within the large reach of culture to the strategies of utilising technology in the service of cultural industry was a strategic change in the institutional cultural policy. Content creation had to become effective to progress enterprise culture (In from the margins 1997, 58–60, 111–115). The economic perspective to cultural policy has increasingly been taken into consideration since the 1980s, and calculations on the profitability of cultural events have become popular, opening the way for thinking culture as business, managed by market transactions (see Myerscough 1988). Culture was no longer reasoned merely as the “art world”, or creativity that produces meanings to be consumed as symbolic products by the receptive audience. Cultural policy was not legitimised by qualifications which give us pleasure, increase social welfare and make cultural capital valuable. Now the focus was turned on creativity that can be utilised as profitable, when measured by economic success. Cultural values were seen as supplied and demanded like any other industrial product; produced, marketed, distributed and consumed. At the turn of the millennium several cultural political studies in Finland and elsewhere aimed at evaluating the importance of cultural events largely, even by taking the economic utilities into consideration. Culture was seen as a crucial factor in urban and regional development, because the symbolic production influences in the identity-construction, and image designs are increasingly used for making communities attractive (see e.g. Ilmonen 1998; Cantell 1999). If cultural imago or reputation is bad, the community adopts the loser’s strategy, according to Florida (2002, 303), because of being “trapped in its past”.

The vision of creative economy was made popular by Florida (2002) in his interpretation of the new creative class becoming able to organise

and mobilise talent by changing its orientation towards openness to new ideas, profitable as innovations. Creative capacities are demanded for gaining economic success. The growth of quality is measured by high incomes in “creative centres”. Florida points out that people who belong to the creative class are situated to creative centres to make creative economic outcomes; simply to enjoy and earn more than the practitioners of the traditional occupations.

According to Florida (*ibid.*), the success of creative people lies in three “critical factors”, namely technology, talent and tolerance. If economic values are the basis for all social relations and cultural innovations, then all values, relations and products are understood exchangeable. Then everything that is valuable is sold and bought at the markets for the price offered and demanded by the commercial partners. The volume of economic, social and cultural exchange is defined according to the commitments agreed on by the partners, as far as the rules of the fair play are followed.

Florida’s “post-cultural”² view is in accordance with the neo-liberal alliance between economy and culture. The driving force of the new cultural economy is the innovative creativity, which is consciously used for combining technology to talent. But what is the role of tolerance as one of these “critical factors”? It seems to refer to the role of social relations and ways of interacting, when creativity is used.

Our interactions can be motivated by altruistic or egoistic principles. When somebody needs care, the question is whether the care is given voluntarily in the meaning of being for the other (see Bauman 1993). Interactions, which aim at competition for improving one’s self-sufficient position, happen at the price of the loss of the fellow-fighter. Thus, tolerance decreases social inertia so that social cohesion can increase and social capital can accumulate. Sociality mediates cultural creativity at the markets and helps the accumulation of economic values. In the calculation of the properties of the creative class, it is important that the members of this class are talented enough to “create meaningful new forms” (Florida 2002, 68), to solve complex problems and, this way, to make inventions which can bring about new industries from computer

graphics to digital music and animation, because anyone could now own a computer and create new artistic forms with the help of this technique. This entrepreneur ideology was internalised in the new work ethics, and celebrated in the cultivation of creativity (see *ibid.*, 207–211). Interestingly, Florida speaks about cultural *forms* and, indeed, the *content creation* for a given format has become a crucial task for artists as content producers in the age of media technology (see e.g. Simanainen 2004, 171–186). The shift towards technologically creative culture was taken into official care in the programs and procedures of the Ministry of Education, especially in the beginning of the 2000s.

CONTENT CREATION IN SERVICE OF ALIENATION

Putting the “three T:s” together inevitably requires creative attitudes and even more self-conscious deeds. Consciousness was, indeed, an important aspect for the (young) Marxist utopia on what class revolution demands from its subjects, in other words, from the members of the working class, who have to struggle by using their conscious potential to overcome unbearable life-conditions. But consciousness had also a dark side in Marxian theory, and that is why I see the relation between creativity and alienation comparable to how culture can be turned into ideology. “False consciousness” is a key word for understanding the Marxian definition of the concept of ideology. As Marx and Engels said in their *German Ideology* (1846), the ruling ideas of a certain epoch are “ideal expressions of the dominant material relations”. Dominant thinkers of the class are conceived of as ideologists, who “make the formation of the illusions of the class”. According to Marx, the creativity of people is included in processes in which they use their intelligent capacities to work with specific material in order to change an *idea* innovatively to a materialised product. In this sense, there is nothing new in the post-cultural way of arguing for the cultural economy and creativity as the intensifying factor for new economic development. It is worth remem-

bering how (young) Marx stated that a sense of alienation is demanded from the subordinated subjects to start a critically creative process toward the self-fulfilment of an independent individual. A specific demand for improving the unsatisfactory life-situation fertilises our creativity and makes us consciously ready to take the innovative capacity into use to find creative possibilities from the material we have around us.

Technological innovations launched the industrial revolution and increased the growth of international economy. Workforce had to move to seek opportunities to work for wages and they had to change their ways of life to match up with their changed conditions. Consumption habits were also developed and balanced with the new life-situations. To succeed in their working career people had to develop their talent and to adopt cultural values compatible with their social status. This way they had to give up a unique, fixed cultural and social identity and they had to adopt flexible capacities for new identity-constructions. The more movable the social life became the more tolerance was demanded towards people who were met in daily affairs. Together with the tolerant capacity – to see others from above – the skills of making social choices to decide who would be the favourable partners were also developed. When democratic politics includes these elements, participation, membership and shareholders' attitudes are increasingly stressed.

CULTURAL DEMOCRACY FROM ABOVE AND FROM BELOW

Creativity, when connected with the aspect of qualification, allows people to use their individual capacities in the richest ways and to contribute to the production of cultural values which are maintained by the human community and cumulated to cultural capital. At least this is the principal utopia for defending human civilisations as understood in Pierre Bourdieu's (1992) terms. Cultural capital is valued for identifying certain civilisations on the grounds of what is characteristic to the creativity of the most qualified representatives of that society.

The existence of cultural capital can be interpreted as progressing cultural democracy. Democratization from above includes ideological aspects in the production, and maintaining cultural values such as creativity, talent, or self-expression. No wonder that the innovative capacities of representatives of the upper class (avant-garde elite) are seen important to progress by the public power. This means, further, an increasing pressure to take more and more manipulative elements into use in the public opinion formation. The “velvet” methods for working on public opinions go hand in hand with the enlargement of publicity; in Hannah Arendt’s (1958, 38–47) terms, with the extended institutional social order. This process tends to lead to conformism and sweep out spontaneous activities inside democratic communities. It also makes understandable why regulating “hidden” and soft means of censorship governmentally is increasingly entangled in effective ways with the “open” atmosphere (or transparent panopticon) of media publicity (cf. McGuigan 1996, 154–158). Ideology is always present in the processes of socialization, which according to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1989) includes internalization, objectification and externalization of social relations. This way the “bridge” between the actors and structure is built as socially constructed, so that the interaction is modeled by the structural power.

The starting point for the cultural democracy “from below” is cultural expression of the individual self. In other words, creative capacity is demanded from everyone to have meaningful experiences and change, as Arendt (1958, 6–8) says, labor to work. Creativity is the material for producing human artifacts and, further, for turning artifacts into political actions. Then we can say that life is *vita activa*. To be political, action demands interaction, in other words communication, which according to Arendt (1958, 177) is stimulated by the presence of those whom we wish to join. Political actors are expected to pronounce opinions in open forums, to know who will form the companies. Spontaneous speaking acts reveal the unique and personal identities of the partners, but also their capacity to respond to the needs of the others. Lonely voices, even self-expressive, belong to politically marginal figures.

Democratic development, to be effective, demands that both open possibilities for the use of self-expression capacities of the individuals and representative arguments, measured through political institutions, are well structured and largely accepted by people. It is a crucial question how to become a creative and self-expressive person, in other words, how the creativity of people is initiated, fertilized and worked as a social artifact. A probable answer implicates the importance of open possibilities of cultural learning for everybody. It means, further, that an emphasis is put on socially equal opportunities for good human education; not only tolerant, but broadminded atmosphere which decreases possibilities for social discrimination. This way also alienating experiences may be diminished. This is the idea into which cultural animation practices are based. Those ideas have been revived in socio-cultural experiments when artists go on the streets, to hospitals, old people's homes etc., but as Kangas (2003, 70–71) remarks, we do not have too many good examples in Finland on how social work meets arts. When thinking culturally sustainable development, we have to progress people's aesthetic competences for self-expression *together with* ways of decreasing social discrimination and poor life-conditions. This way, the role of self-expression becomes cultural politically specific. What has it got to do with equality and cultural democracy?

COMPETITIVENESS, SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES AND DEMOCRACY

World-wide comparisons are made to show how well democracy is progressed by relating the political indicators with “self-expression values” (see Inglehart & Welzel 2005) or cultural expression capacities in the virtual network society (Castells 1999). At the beginning of the 21st century Finland also seems to be a specifically interesting country, when measured in democratic terms included in the comparative statistics of world values. The case of Finland is ranked relatively high, when self-

expression values are calculated in accordance with effective democracy, which marks well progressed modernization. The position of Finland is topmost high, when the level of effective democracy is related to the level of formal democracy, which means representative institutions. It is generally agreed that Finland has developed quickly into a country labeled by good socio-economic conditions and well-respected legislation without corruption. Now Finland has also improved her status in terms of competitiveness. The last mentioned aspect, preferably linked to creativity and a capacity to progress innovations, is quite complicated, when considered in relation to democracy. It is, however, an interesting additional element when agreeing with Inglehart's and Baker's (2000, 19–21) statement that good economic and social development support cultural democracy's prevalence. When the living conditions are safe, people have growing concerns for thinking about the meaning and purpose of life, and self-expression values, religious values as included, become central aspects in their existence as Inglehart and Baker predict.

Formal democracy cannot be equated with genuine effective democracy. Although it is easy to agree with this conviction of Inglehart & Welzel (2005), it seems problematic whether institutional democratic values could exist even in the "most authoritarian societies". One should at least ask how the contents of these values are changed by means of manufacturing consent to serve the authoritarian purposes so that the meaningfulness of cultural values is purified instrumental, and therefore emptied of the contents. This way values become manipulative and useful for ideologically alienating "hidden" purposes. Cultural indicators, named as existence values and self-expression values, are abstract enough for evaluative mappings of the state of democracy.

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) conclude, by using illustrative examples, that democratic institutions do not automatically conduce to democratic culture, at least as far as the stage of democracy is indicated by terms of self-expression values adopted in a certain society. Castells (1999, 471) sees worldwide networks as instruments for a capitalist economy, which is based on innovations in global "decentralized concentration", inside which also culture is endlessly deconstructed and reconstructed. Espe-

cially conditions being so, we have to insist on the argument that democratic institutions necessarily result from the actions and are maintained by active people, who use their creative capacity to keep democracy alive. Therefore it is, however, also questionable whether it is enough for democracy if the political elite respect and reflect people's rights. Producing genuine democratic values in a large and open civil society requires citizen activities, which allow and demand political participation. The meaningfulness of self-expression values is tested, when we can be certain that alienating experiences have decreased and people feel that they are handled in social institutions according to the rules of fair play.

The effectiveness of democratic development demands both creditable political institutions and open possibilities for people to use their self-expression capacities. The democratic system has to be well structured and largely accepted. One crucial question is how to become a self-expressive person, in other words, how the creativity of everybody is initiated and fertilized. The answer implicates open possibilities of learning culture. An emphasis has to be put on socially equal opportunities for good human education, good access to information and knowledge, and the fertilization of motivation to life-long learning. An open atmosphere enhances movable identities so that self-development has enough space; this is a precondition for becoming a full citizen. We have to be ready to see backwards and understand the narrowness of earlier cultural political perspectives.

We need good living conditions to develop our capacities and competences freely as active citizens in acts that are meaningful to ourselves and the fellow-people. Bauman (1998, 70) reminds us, however, about the problems of the society of free consumers. Even falling into underclass is an exercise of freedom. If curbing one's freedom is impermissible, what to do with people who use their freedom to abridge other people's freedom by making their life intolerable?

LEARNING CULTURE OR MAPPING DEMOCRACY?

Our artistic qualities are not equal, and certain qualities are valued more than others when indicators for the democratic development of societies are evaluated. That is why it is so difficult to calculate cultural values and even more difficult to make confident cross-national comparisons in terms of the existence-values and self-expression values by setting them in the reliable socio-economic and political contexts. The construction of this kind of a research-set in a reliable way is even more complicated a task now in the current era of preferred postmodern values, than it was when habitual traditions were socially maintained in communities and living standards were measured by ordering the priorities of the existence-values.

In the present global situation we should also skeptically ask whether it is still reasonable to evaluate the degree of cultural democracy of the nations by mapping states, class-formations or identity-groups. It is also common to rank intelligence or educational results inside national, regional or local boundaries. Nationalism as an ideology is, however, more questionable than earlier. In the multicultural world it may become equally or even more important to observe world-wide differences included in the self-expressive values of differently positioned groups such as young and old generations, females and males, or rich and poor people (well-to-do and bad-off persons). This can make sense at least as far as these divisions are both intra- and internationally structured, and contain political opinion formation of group-members such as the newcomers and the old citizens in certain countries. This way the ideological consequences of culturally categorical group formations can be discussed publicly. Therefore, it is important, from the cultural political point of view, to implement legal rights that guarantee the access to the self-expression of cultural values to all citizen groups and, especially, to the minorities in certain communities. This discourse has already started in cultural political studies (see e.g. Pyykkönen 2007) and will continue, because it is a crucial issue concerning our future. It is also one of the

human lessons that not everything has to be tolerated in the name of everybody's right to self-expression. But it is important for the development of democracy to allow possibilities for the most discriminated people - because of their poorness and serious sickness related to poor conditions - to improve their life-situations so that the positive circle of creativity and cultural learning can be started. Advancing democracy requires open access to education, guarantees of human working conditions, and progress of equality in its multi-facet forms, across the national borders and class-divisions.

Discourses on identity politics need revisions. Cultural values are classified and typified according to the fixed identities that they represent. When displaced, diasporic and tribe-like identity formations are often nostalgically lengthened. National ideologies are used as measuring contexts. On the other side hybrid identities, cyborg-like, or other kinds of "humachines" – to use an expression of Mark Poster (2005, 103) are flexibly constructed for performative cultural designs. The design of the combined interface of humans and machines aims to bypass physically determined identities by technological means. Those constructions seem to propagate radical politics, because they transmit increasingly immaterial communality without physical borders. That kind of transparent surface may illustrate radical identity-formation, but as easily manipulated the 'flying identities' can be used for both disciplinary and purely commercial purposes so that creative economy can flourish in the name of hedonism, exhibitionism, bohemian culture and sensation-making. According to Florida (2005b, 28), the new economy prefers to inhabit spaces for competitive advances, the innovation being that the creative energy can be cohesively accelerated to serve economic growth. It can be reasoned either by individual or by communal criteria, but the effective use of cultural or social capital as the neo-liberal is the target of the current affairs. We are still trying to find a democratic way of dealing with culture without being captivated by conservatism or escaping to liberalism.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Human creativity can be understood as the ultimate source of economic growth. I have argued, however, that if creativity serves qualifications in innovative production to intensify economic competition, it becomes an instrument for increasing egoism and unequal social development. Its meaningfulness is pushed away and alienating processes are implicated in social affairs. Therefore, it is extremely important to ask why we participate in cultural processes and do we contribute to equal access to creative society in our productive works. Ultimately, the ideal perspective for cultural political research is to progress the global humanity so that our understanding on what is good for our common existence and the subjective meaningfulness of life increases.

At least we need more wisdom to understand and develop the means by which the values of humanity can be defended. I see the value of creative work included in this aspect. It gives us cultural ingredients to be used in our prism-like figurations to continue discussion on the politics of culture. We need those figurations for dealing with alienating experiences, or with anti-cultural non-values, which can fertilize only narrow attitudes and violent behavior. To find solutions for softening the conflicts caused by prejudices addressed to the self-expression values of “the others” we need culturally valuable indicators. But as critical researchers we also need to make conscious choices. Will we use our creative energy for accelerating economic competitiveness in the name of cultural liberalism, and this way increase the ideological alienation of the others? Do we like to represent those conservatives, who defend fixed cultural identities in the gated communities inside strictly differentiated and separated boundaries? Can we find our own creative paths to enjoy culture as meaningful art, even to do our best for defending cultural rights of the unfairly mistreated and therefore discriminated minorities? We need to participate in sustainable ways which, in the words of Kangas (2004a, 34) lead to the “soft development thinking”, by advancing the

meaningfulness of social life and economy, necessary for being together and continuing the life.

Endnotes

- 1 This article was constructed on basis of papers presented first at The Interim Conference of Alienation Theory and Research -group as a joint venture with the IIS (International Institute of Sociology) in Stockholm, 5–9 July 2005, in the session on Rethinking alienation: New directions of theory and research, and further at *Sosiaalipolitiikan päivät*, Tampere. A part of this article was modified from a comment to professor Ronald Inglehart at *Kulttuuripolitiikan tutkimuksen päivät*, Jyväskylä 8.–9.11.2004.
- 2 I use the term post-cultural to refer to an instrumental orientation, which adopts elements from post-modernism and culturalism to see culture as symbolic (or post-material) utility. The contents of culture form an alibi for the economic accumulation of values.

2

Beyond the National Limits of Cultural Policy?

2.1

Art and Cultural Policy in the World Culture of the Moderns

Pertti Alasuutari

A MAJOR PART of sociological research focuses on studying and theorizing “modernity,” a new institutional order of society that first began to take its shape in Europe, but nowadays refers to practically any corner on the globe, perhaps some isolated tribal groups notwithstanding. Since all nations want to be called part of the modern world, from the viewpoint of an imagined anthropologist coming from outer space, the globe is populated by a single tribe who call themselves Moderns. Such a description by an imagined observer from the outer space is quite close to the picture which the so-called world polity theory (Boli and Thomas 1999; Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer et al. 1997) has constructed about this civilization. According to Lechner and Boli (2005, 6), the world culture, the culture of world society, comprises norms and knowledge shared across state boundaries, rooted in the nineteenth-century Western culture, but since globalized, carried by the infrastructure of world society, and expressed in the multiple ways in which particular groups relate to universal ideals. In more concrete terms, the proponents of this theory use the concept of world culture to refer to a plethora of world models, according to which nation-states are organized. These models comprise both ideals, such as equality and freedom of speech, and institutions, such as a government and educational system. As a whole, the world

polity is composed of formally independent units, often referred to as nation-states, but put together essentially out of the same elements, they are like replicas of each other. For instance, every nation, officially recognized by the United Nations, has a flag and a national anthem, which represents the 19th and 20th century European musical tradition. Moreover, within this institutional framework human beings are, as citizens of a country, conceived of within the same categories. As Meyer et al. put it, if an unknown society were “discovered” on a previously unknown island, one of the changes that would occur would be that “the population would be counted and classified in ways specified by the world census models” (Meyer et al. 1997, 145–46).

Research related to the world polity theory has focused particularly on the central role of the international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), such as environmental organizations, human rights groups, and professional science organizations, in the formation of world models. In this article I am, however, interested in the category of art and the institution known as cultural policy in the world culture; a topic that has not been touched on within the world culture framework. To put it shortly, the first question I shall address is why states promote and subsidize the production and consumption of art and other cultural products. As many-sided and difficult as this question is, the answer has bearings on the next question, which is whether, and in what ways, public arts spending changes in contemporary advanced economies.

From the viewpoint of the world polity theory, a worthwhile answer to the question why states subsidize art would be to say that it is simply because the patronizing high culture is a European tradition. Because the world culture, the nation-state system as its key founding principle, originates in Europe, all polities that wish to join world society copy the institutional structure of European nation-states. In this line of thought one resists the idea that state art spending is somehow functional for the states in the world culture. Indeed, in the new institutionalism (Brinton and Nee 1998; Powell and DiMaggio 1991a), from which the world polity theory stems, there has been criticism against “optimistic functionalism” within which one automatically assumes that institutions

exist because they have beneficial consequences. Instead, in the new institutionalism one stresses the notion that institutions may persist even when they serve no-one's interests and that they are the end products of random variation, selection, and retention, rather than individual foresight (Powell and DiMaggio 1991b, 4). Stressing merely the randomness of the institution of art and the public support of cultural production would mean that not much more could be said about the future of cultural policy. One could equally well argue that art and high culture will vanish as a useless remnant of the past, or that they will persist as a random trait to which governments and citizens are habituated.

However, let me suggest that a form of "weak functionalism" is more in place, when discussing the present and future of public arts spending. I totally agree that contemporary advanced economies must not be seen as utterly or increasingly rational social systems, in which the key institutions exist because and only as far as they serve a function in the system. However, the jumble of randomly formed, in themselves irrational elements that comprise the world culture are typically made use of by the actors in various ways, and thus acquire a more or less functional position in the whole, thus making radical changes quite difficult. This means that one needs to analyze carefully how and why, on the one hand, actors use institutions for various functions, and how they as subjects are formed by them, on the other.

To address the question about the present and future of cultural policy, I will first discuss different "weak functions" that art as an institution serves in the world culture. Based on that, I will then try to predict how cultural policy is changing.

THE NATION-STATE AND ART PATRONAGE

Let us begin by reiterating what was suggested above about the European origins of the institutions that have formed the world culture. Therefore, it is no wonder that the cultural institutions, forms of art and aesthetic

principles that prevailed in Europe during the past centuries, became international along with the globalization of the world culture. On the other hand, a closer look at how the national elites build and promote certain art institutions shows that they serve certain functions within the world culture, with the nation-state ideology as its founding principle.

The idea that the world consists of separate nations, which have established their own state if they have been given the freedom to do so, is a key feature of the world culture. These regionally bound polities called the nation-states are like clans of which the tribe of Moderns consists. The formation of nation-states means enacting the world models that the proponents of the world polity theory talk about. Since the world culture, including the nation-state ideology, originated in Europe, it is hardly surprising that nation-states throughout the world represent themselves by the same standards adopted from Europe. Consider, for instance, state symbols: all countries are expected to have an official national flag that can be hoisted and that (usually) has the same proportions. And then there is the national hymn: on all continents and in all cultural spheres, the intonation and arrangement of most hymns follow the classical European music heritage. For instance, there are several African states, whose national hymn is *Finlandia* by Sibelius. The purpose of national symbols and cultural products is to give an expression to the culture that is thought to be distinctive of the particular country, but at the same time that distinctiveness should be conveyed in a manner that stands up to international scrutiny.

Consider the Central Asian state of Uzbekistan, which gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 (see Adams 1999). Formed into a socialist republic of various nomadic tribes, during the Soviet era the cultural policy was basically derived from European ideas of romantic nationalism: each nation was seen as a culture that could be identified and separated from a group of others on the basis of distinctive customs, songs, dances and cultural products on display in museums. Independence meant that the socialist past was erased and Islam was reinstated, but fairly little changed in the cultural policy. Like during the Soviet regime, the Ministry of Culture continued deciding on all grants awarded

to the performing arts and issuing guidelines for production. The main change was a sort of scale upgrading. In cultural galas, previously the high international standard of the socialist community was displayed by performances of the Moscow opera and ballet theatre institutions, and folk music performances by groups from different socialist republics expressed the uniqueness of the family of nations. Now the modernity of the nation was expressed through performances of the national classical art institutions located in the capitol, Tashkent, while folk culture from the different areas of Uzbekistan portrayed regional color.

In other words, following the world models originating in Europe, the cultural policy of Uzbekistan both during and after the Soviet regime has promoted two forms of performing arts. First, with the means of folkloristic arts, such as folk dances, the political elite have constructed an image of the nation which, according to the nation-state ideology, has established the state of Uzbekistan. This large genre of arts, referred to as folklore or popular culture, is aimed at giving “regional color” to the nation in question, perhaps even to present it as somewhat exotic, although in the case of Uzbekistan the folk dances representing the people and culture had been standardized and professionalized during a month of rehearsals (Adams 1999, 367). Second, the modern art institutions are established by the nation-state to emphasize that the people in question is a modern nation among nations. Performing classical pieces of music and ballet theatre, Uzbekistan’s art institutions want to convey to the international community that they are a highly skilled and civilized nation, not an underdeveloped country isolated from the rest of the world.

Uzbekistan is a singular case, but it is easy to see that the overall configuration of institutional forms is the same throughout the globe. Wherever a new region is organized into a polity that wants to join the world society as a sovereign state, the same processes will be commenced. The state will spend on products of popular culture on the one hand, and high-brow art, on the other. In the next sections I will therefore discuss these two forms of culture spending in more detail.

CULTURE AND NATION

When a new nation-state is justified to the international community and promoted within the planned territory, one of the first tasks will be to ascertain that the population within its borders is not merely a haphazard collection of different groups of people trapped inside the bounded territory, but truly forms a single nation and is thus entitled to forming a nation-state. Such a need to prove that the population forms a nation stems both from internal and external reasons. If the leaders of a polity under formation are unable to convince the population that they belong together and are better off as a separate nation, the state formation can only be carried out by force and the threat of violence, which is much more risky and unstable than the political project having the support of the population. Therefore, the political elite typically resort to the past, which is constructed to show the long history that the nation has as a community and as a culture with its own characteristic features. This is where folklore and popular culture come to play.

For instance, consider the rise of Finnish nationalism. From the outset, the nationalist movement was intertwined with a process that Finnish folklorist Pertti J. Anttonen calls *folklorization*, “the collecting and naming of cultural phenomena as folklore and putting them on display as collections of such” (Anttonen 2003, 57). The landmark achievement in this project was *Kalevala*, the Finnish ‘national epic’, compiled by medical doctor and folklorist Elias Lönnrot from the sung poems he collected in Karelia and from poems he himself wrote to give the book a story line. The work attracted international attention and played a significant part in the rising popularity of nationalist sentiments, which culminated in the establishment of Finnish independence in 1917 (Austerlitz 2000, 185; Wilson 1976). For instance, among the cultural elite, *Kalevala* inspired a national romantic movement known as Karelianism, which was expressed, for example, in the paintings of Akseli Gallen-Kallela and in the music of Jean Sibelius.

The attempt to prove that the members of the nation are a culturally homogeneous group may not always be the best strategy. A nation-state is more often than not internally heterogeneous to the extent that by not acknowledging it, the leaders might take the risk of the population splitting into different fractions, for instance, along ethnic or religious fault lines. This is why nationhood projects often emphasize diversity within the nation, rather than suppress it. For instance, the German nationhood project, started when the work of political unification had been completed in 1871, faced the problem of Germany remaining a patchwork of regions with different histories and traditions. Consequently, the idea of the German nation was built on the principle of the acceptance and cherishing of regional diversity. As Alon Confino (1997) puts it, Germans imagined the nation as an extension of the *Heimat*, the local place.

Instead of allowing heterogeneity as a reaction to the initial state of affairs, a nationhood project may also entail the promotion and intentional design of cultural diversity. The case of Uzbekistan discussed above is a case in point. The nationhood project copied from the Soviet era included an emphasis on regional and ethnic differences at the outset. On the other hand, the way heterogeneity is allowed to be expressed is carefully planned and restricted to the area of arts. As Laura Adams puts it, when discussing the program of the Independence Day spectacle:

Even though many of Uzbekistan's regions are based on arbitrary administrative boundaries, they are each expected to present a three-minute program that expresses their own regional character, just as each Soviet republic was expected to develop and express its own 'national' culture. However, in the end the definition of what is and isn't appropriate regional color is determined by Tashkent directors and Orgkom members, just as the final say on Soviet national cultures was had by ethnographers and officials in Moscow (Adams 1999, 368).

As the example of Uzbekistan shows, permitting or actively promoting cultural diversity does not necessarily mean that the state has a loose hold of different population groups or regions of the country. On the contrary, the active policy of multiculturalism may be a means to prevent internal tensions and to channel them to harmless forms. Besides, although regional differences may be celebrated e.g. in the form of regional folklore, folk costumes and folk dances, it does not have to mean that the nation welcomes foreigners with open arms. The German nationhood project (Confino 1997) is a prime example: regional differences are its prime element, but like many other European nation-states, Germany's citizenship policy is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, i.e. nationality acquired by descent or blood (Cesarani and Fulbrook 1996).

In this respect, at the other end of a continuum are nation-states that extend the idea of ethnic, religious and cultural heterogeneity of the nation also to outsiders. In the nationhood projects of such states one attempts to define the nation strictly on political grounds. Consequently, the citizenship policy of such countries is based on the principle of *jus soli*—that is, nationality is derived from the place of birth. The United States of America and France are examples of this. For instance, a child born in the United States, of foreign parents, becomes American even if he or she has not lived in the country nor been educated there. The French citizenship policy also subscribes to the principle of *jus soli*. In France, citizenship and nationality are inclusive of all who accept the principles of the Revolution and French culture. Children born in France, of foreign parents, acquire citizenship, provided they are educated in France.

Unlike in Uzbekistan, in the U.S. and French cases cultural diversity has hardly any regional dimension. The list of different ethnic or other minorities is primarily a result of immigration and political campaigns of the groups in question, to get their voices heard. The role of the state is mainly restricted to listing the groups that have acquired a minority status as a result of a political process. In their nationhood projects, both countries apply the “melting pot” idea (Gleason 1964; Hollinger 2003), which means that the national leadership trusts immigrants to be assimilated with their compatriots, no matter what their religious or

ethnic background is. Consequently, the state does not have an interest or active role in subsidizing folkloristic cultural production.

However, this does not mean that art does not have any role in constructing such a multiethnic nation. On the contrary, via the media and the culture industry popular culture has a significant role in defining the nation and the reality it lives in (see e.g. Angus and Jhally 1989). Therefore, it is also naturally an object of government regulation, albeit not in the form of state sponsorship. For instance, in the United States, the media is regulated following a libertarian notion, according to which there should be minimal central government involvement in the day-to-day operations of media organizations. The First Amendment of the constitution, as a point of departure, prohibits government from abridging the freedom of speech or the press. The underlying assumption is that absent government interference will enable a free and diverse “marketplace of ideas” to flourish. However, because radio and television are considered a technically “scarce” resource, government regulation is justified by the attempt to establish the structures and facilitate the conditions that would permit a free and diverse marketplace of ideas (Horwitz 1991). Thus, broadcasting is regulated particularly by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), formed by the Communications Act of 1934 (McKenzie 2005).

The government regulation of electronic media and popular culture, coupled with industry-wide self-censorship and self-regulation, which aim at avoiding government interference, are an important means by which a multiethnic nation is constructed. Through these mechanisms the nation defines its moral standards, such as what is considered (in)decent, (un)patriotic, or tasteless (e.g. Carr 1992). They also contribute to the defining of the ethnic, sexual or other minorities, whose citizenship rights must be protected, and to the notions of how they can or should be portrayed in the public sphere (see e.g. Inniss and Feagin 1995).

SCIENCE, ART, AND NEWNESS

While the function of government support or the regulation of popular art forms is primarily to construct the nation, one of the functions of spending on highbrow art is to enhance the members' pride of the nation. For instance, in an Australian survey 94.8 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the argument, "The success of Australian [. . .] [artists] etc. gives people a sense of pride in Australian achievement" (Throsby and Withers 1983). Highbrow art is, in other words, considered an area, in which progress is made and new things achieved. In this sense, art can be related to sports, in which nations also compete with each other and citizens feel proud, if their compatriot wins.

Excelling in the field of art is, however, seen in a somewhat different light. Regional states do not only compete for pride, but also for material gains, such as economic success and the wellbeing of the population as a whole. It is believed that humanity makes progress all the time, particularly due to the development of science and technology. To be successful in making inventions, according to this line of thought, it is thus in the interest of the state to increase the innovativeness and creativity of the population. This is where art comes to play. As it is formulated by cultural economists, it is believed that art has *innovative value*: "The practice of the arts makes an essential contribution to the development of *creative thinking* in a society, to the improvements in the capacity for critical evaluation and to the creation of aesthetic standards that ultimately affect most individuals positively" (Frey 2003, 113).

When considered as an empirical argument, it is hard to prove that art indeed has such innovative value, i.e. that populations in those regional states that spend more on art are more innovative. It is, however, quite obvious that in modernity newness is seen positively, because it is associated with improvement (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Urban 2001), and this attitude is crystallized in the modern notion of high culture. According to it, cultural products that deserve to be treated as art, should not repeat old forms or conventions, but should create something new.

This idea behind high-class art is well expressed by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Adorno and Horkheimer 1986). Because high-quality art needs to go beyond previous art, its relationship to style is problematic, whereas “inferior works” are bad, because they imitate the existing art (Ibid., 131). Thus, according to this interpretation, the esteem of art conveys our respect for innovativeness. That is why art has, from the 19th century onward, been used as a means of behavior modification, as an instrument capable of “lifting” the cultural level of the population (Bennett 1995; Miller and Yúdice 2002). Consequently, the taste for art and popular culture also functions as a means, by which people are classified in and aspire for higher positions within the social hierarchy (see e.g. Bourdieu 1984).

THE PUBLIC SUPPORT

Public expenditure on the arts can thus be seen as a subtle means of governance. According to Michel Foucault, such “governmentality” (Foucault 1991) is typical of modern governance; it is a method by which the leadership of regional states attempts to influence the comportment of the population through acting upon their hopes, desires or milieu (Dean 1999; Inda 2005). Such a form of government is somewhat problematic, in the sense that in democratic states government is supposed to represent the will of the people. As Ian Hunter and Denise Meredyth put it, it raises “the question of how the state can form the political will of its citizens, while remaining the expression of this will” (Hunter and Meredyth 2000, 73). However, in actual fact all states do it; it is the part and parcel of not only cultural policy in a narrow sense, but the function of the whole education system. Yet, it is of course interesting to ask why the citizens approve of public art patronage as a form of public education. The question is particularly intriguing because, on the average, highbrow art represents the taste of upper-level salaried employees, not the general public (Bennett et al. 1999; Liikkanen et al. 2006). In

that sense e.g. public spending on symphony orchestras, theatre and opera can be seen as subsidizing the activities of the wealthiest part of the population in particular, whereas the cultural events, more in favor of the general public, receive much less support.

One obvious reason for the political support of public spending on art is that the general public has internalized the idea that serious art has an uplifting effect. Thus the general respect for art stems from its role as symbolizing our belief in progress. Art expresses our internalized duty to continuously develop ourselves (Alasuutari 2006a). In this sense, the modern attitude toward art can be seen as a civic religion. The concept of civic religion refers to the building of the national state and its connection with religion, and to how some special themes, such as temperance (Gusfield 1996, Sulkunen 1990) or civil resistance during wartime (Gundle 2000) will express the citizens' religious feelings. Thus, civic religion refers to the mundane forms that religiousness gets among the people. In this context I do not refer to official religions, such as Christianity. Instead, I mean the sacred values that are manifested in the culture and respected by the people generally, irrespective of whether the people consider the respect for the matters in question as an expression of their religiousness or spirituality. In this sense, the meaning of religion is close to Emile Durkheim's definition, according to which a difference is made in all religions between the sacred and the profane (Durkheim 1995). Art is sacred within the distinction made between high and low culture, between art and popular (or mass) culture.

Defending the state subsidy of art or public service broadcasting does not even seem to be dependent on whether the individual in question consumes high quality cultural products. In my recent study (Alasuutari 2006b), based on qualitative interviews in which the informants were asked about their everyday media use and their views and opinions on media policy issues, the interviewees took a favorable view on the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE, and its public service broadcasting policy, irrespective of their current viewing habits. In part, the defense of public service broadcasting production can be explained by the individual's desire to secure the diversity of television programs. Furthermore, the

support for public service broadcasting policy among the interviewees is explained by this being compatible with the great value commonly attached to individual self-development. The interviewees' talk conveys the underlying idea that the time spent watching television should be spent on doing something more useful, or they could watch quality programs which support their self-development. Therefore, people are favorable to high-quality cultural production and express a respect for it (see also Alasuutari 1992; Hagen 1992, 1994a, b).

Popular support for public art expenditure can also be seen as something motivated by the individuals' hopes of upward mobility. This is because taste and social hierarchy are intertwined: those higher up in the social ladder represent highbrow taste (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu et al. 1990). Thus, upwardly mobile people admire and imitate highbrow taste and try to develop a taste for it.

CHANGES IN GOVERNANCE AND MENTALITY

As shown in the previous sections, art and popular culture have not acquired their present position in national states simply because world culture originates in Europe, where the institution of art was developed. Instead, art, and more broadly, the highbrow lowbrow distinction, is functionally intertwined with the culture of the moderns. This is why certain developmental trends in advanced economies can be expected to have bearings on public arts spending.

Most importantly, following world models, during recent decades the advanced economies have implemented a regime change from a Keynesian regime to a neoliberal "market regime." With the publication of the McCracken report (1977), Keynesian demand management was rejected for fuelling inflationary expectation, and the welfare state was seen as an obstacle to growth (Deacon et al. 1997). Although advanced economies have certainly not totally complied with the OECD recommendations, from the late 1970s onwards fundamental reforms in line

with them have been made. In OECD countries, many sectors of public administration have begun to move from resource governance to market governance, and real markets or quasi markets have assumed an ever greater significance. In this sense, we could talk about a market regime. This has also meant that, for instance, the subject position of several civil servants has been changed into service workers, and in many areas citizens have been turned into clients or customers.

The neoliberal turn has also affected the field of cultural policy. For instance, privatization and the deregulation of broadcasting have changed the conditions of cultural production and art institutions. In addition, new developments in communication technology since the 1980s, such as VCRs, cable channels, satellite dishes and digital television, have turned state control over electronic mass communication into nonsense. These changes have affected notions of the general public. For instance, the state control of audiovisual production has dwindled very rapidly, and as a consequence, there is now less the state can do to promote high culture or to restrict what is regarded as a harmful content. The markets of cultural products and communication in general are increasingly based on demand and supply. Countries that used to subscribe strongly to the idea of high culture as a tool of popular education are now in a new situation: If the producers are to retain even partial control of the audiovisual production markets, the people involved in cultural production have to make compromises. The old way of understanding the role of art has to give way; artists will have to listen to the audience and find out what their preferences are. Consequently, there seems to be a shift from elite centered arts policy toward consumer- and citizen-centered cultural policy (Alasuutari 2001). In a similar vein, George Yúdice (2003) has argued that public art expenditure is increasingly justified by it being a resource for both sociopolitical and economic amelioration.

Related to these changes, it has been argued that the highbrow-lowbrow distinction is increasingly questioned, played with, or simply a thing of the past (e.g. Häyrynen 2006; McGuigan 2004; Pirnes 2008). For instance, postmodernist art is commonly characterized by its conflation of the distinction between high and low culture, through the use

of industrial materials and pop culture imagery (Jencks 1987). Yet, it is premature to announce the death of the high-low distinction. In its broad sense, the concept is used any time one form of cultural production or activity is prioritized over another in cultural policy decisions, whether the criterion is artistic quality, the preservation of cultural tradition, sociopolitical and economic amelioration or, say, empowerment. Besides, people continue to express their more or less class-based style and identity by discourses with which they express their taste for different cultural products, even though such likings seem to have changed during recent decades.

Recent research suggests that in advanced market economies, there is a shift from snob to omnivore taste (Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1992), which indicates that the link between class and taste as formulated by Pierre Bourdieu (1984) is getting outdated. According to Peterson and Kern's (1996) study, between 1982 and 1992 there was a significant increase in the number of lowbrow musical genres that the respondents of the two surveys chose from a list of different musical genres. In addition, those who also chose highbrow genres were more omnivorous regarding lowbrow genres than others. According to their interpretation, the increasing omnivorousness is related to economic globalization, which means that at least the business elite needs to be more tolerant and open to cultural differences. "As highbrow snobbishness fits the needs of the earlier entrepreneurial upper-middle class there also seems to be an elective affinity between today's new business-administrative class and omnivorousness" (Peterson and Kern 1996, 906).

Other studies have also found increasing omnivorousness. For instance, DiMaggio and Mukhtar's (2004) study about the changes in the United States shows that there is a change in the position of different arts genres within cultural capital and an ongoing attrition in the audience for many of the arts, and the younger cohorts' attendance rates have fallen for most high-culture performing-arts attendance activities. Similarly, in their study on the United States, Friedland and colleagues (Friedland et al. 2007) found many parallels to the observations made by Bourdieu about the 1960s French society, but they also report on

differences consistent with the concept of omnivorousness. The association between omnivorousness and education has also been discovered in many European countries, such as the United Kingdom (Warde et al. 1999), the Netherlands (van Eijck 2001) Spain (Lizardo 2005) and Finland (Alasuutari 2009).

However, it is questionable whether omnivorousness is a new phenomenon, or whether there ever were the stereotypical snob cultural elite. As early as in the late 1950s, Erik Allardt and his colleagues showed that leisure activities have a cumulative nature: individuals with high participation in given leisure activity are more likely to be active in other activities than individuals with low participation (Allardt et al. 1958). Furthermore, they showed that the same goes for intellectual activity. For instance, reading immoral or “intellectually low” books or magazines such as comics, does not hamper interest in more valuable literature. Rather, “interest in any given kind of books or magazines would be likely to increase, not decrease, with interest in other kinds of books or magazines” (Allardt et al. 1958, 171).

Thus, it may well be that there is a flaw in Bourdieu’s theory. On the basis of her analysis of the 1993 General Social Survey, Bethany Bryson (1996) argues that, contrary to Bourdieu’s (1984) prediction, musical exclusiveness decreases with education. Similarly, Bonnie H. Erickson (1996) criticizes Bourdieu for treating high-status culture as generally valid cultural capital, and thus neglecting social networks and class relations at work. According to her, particularly in the private sector, knowledge about and familiarity with many cultural products and phenomena other than those of high-status culture is useful. More generally, the omnivorousness thesis forces us to ask, whether it is too simplistic to assume that the social hierarchy of a society corresponds with a set of “taste cultures” (Gans 1999), or “class habituses” and whether it would be better to conceive of life-style and taste as context-bound constructions, so that the higher people are in the social hierarchy, the better able and equipped they are to discuss different topics, adjust to different social and cultural milieus, and to be truly interested in and appreciative of different genres of culture.

It may be that snobs have always been rare cases, and that highly educated people have been more tolerant toward different genres of art than people with less education, but on the other hand, one cannot merely assume that everything stays the same. In any case, it is clear that in contemporary world culture, governance works more through affecting the citizens' worldview, attitudes and taste than through coercion, and that is why art and culture will remain an important area of public policy and politics.

2.2

Our Kindred Nations: On Public Sphere and the Paradigms of Nationalism in Nordic Cultural Policy

Peter Duelund

AFTER SEVERAL YEARS of preparation, the comprehensive comparative project *Nordic Cultural Policy in Transition* was launched during a conference at the University of Jyväskylä in September 1998. The very purpose of the project was to render an all round description of the dilemmas and challenges in cultural policy in a changing and globalised world. The project paid special attention to the period after 1960. Sixty scholars from the five Nordic countries and elsewhere participated in its realization. Among them was professor Anita Kangas, who should describe and analyse the overall aims, measures and developing trends of Cultural Policy in Finland.¹ With the inspiring Jyväskylä -conference in memory, my article revisit the national dimension in the Nordic cultural policy that was underestimated in the comparative Nordic study published in *The Nordic Cultural Model* (Duelund 2003).

My text will draw attention to an important issue in researching cultural policy: How has cultural policy in the Nordic countries historically been displayed to improve the development of our kindred

nations? How to cope with this new direction in cultural policy studies theoretically and empirically?

IDENTITIES IN THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHIES

In a limited perspective, cultural policies appear as tools for the administration of the arts. In a broader sense, cultural policy deals with the class of interests, history of ideas, institutional struggles and power relations in the production and circulation of symbolic meanings in society (McGuigan 1996, 1).

If we choose this broad definition of cultural policy, the national dimension in researching cultural policy is of extreme relevance, according to the present development and cultural challenges all over the world.

In the *representative public sphere* of pre-modern European societies kings, bishops, princes and other profane and religious leaders dominated the production and the circulation of symbolic meaning in society as power symbols displayed "in front of" the people (Duelund 2003, 482). The ecclesiastical and profane power elite in pre-modern Europe strove to legitimize their secular and religious power by producing and circulating symbolic artifacts around themselves.

Thus, the monumental symbolic manifestations of the representative public sphere in the 18th century Denmark include the erection of Frederiksstadten, the Royal quarter in Copenhagen, and the reorganization of The Royal Academy for the Arts with its architecture and art works designed to glorify the King and the absolute state (Engberg 2005, vol. 1, 87–118; Solhjell 2006, vol. 1, 66–126).

Furthermore, art and culture were used to strengthen the influence of the absolute monarchy abroad. In its foreign affairs policies, the Royal Danish Court of the 18th century sought to establish the Dano-Norwegian kingdom as a European Kulturstaat of international caliber. It was never intended that the sun should shine on the famous court of Versailles only (Duelund 2003, 482).

The state support to the aesthetic expressions and monumental symbolism in Sweden can also be traced back to the representative public sphere of the 18th century. E.g. the absolute Swedish Kings, such as Gustav III, who was greatly influenced by Enlightenment thinking, were interested in the arts as a modern phenomenon of a public cultural and political sphere.

However, just like other Swedish monarchs, he supported the production and circulation of cultural symbolic manifestations in society primarily in order to legitimize his absolute power over the population. Together with the Lutheran church, which had centralized the control over the population's piety and abolished expressions of popular cultural such as music and dance, the Royal Court could be described as the cultural core of the representative Swedish public sphere (Larsson 2003, 182–187).

Most importantly, cultural policy under the absolute monarchs in Denmark and Sweden was *elitist but cosmopolitan* compared to the new bourgeois culture that emerged from the increasingly influential merchant and civil servant class in the Nordic Countries around the middle of the eighteenth century. The political and cultural elites in *the bourgeoisie public sphere* turned against the cosmopolitan orientation of Absolutist cultural policy and replaced it by means of public cultural policy with a *national* conceptualization of space and identity.

The “young” Nordic national states, such as Norway (constituted 1905), Finland (constituted 1919) and Iceland (constituted 1945) have not historically, to the same degree, developed a representative public sphere of their own, which could be replaced and reconstructed in the optic of national identity by means of private cultural institutions and a public cultural policy. This is in part due to their constitutional dependence on the “old” nations—Denmark and Sweden—and, in Finland's case, also on its status as a Grand Duchy, a part of the Russian Empire in the “long” 19th century.

But, as we shall see, it did not prevent especially Norway and Finland from building up national cultural institutions with the overall aim to construct a national identity by means of a privately and publicly

organized cultural policy (Hodne 2002; Duelund 2003; Gudmundsson 2003; Dahl & Helseth 2006; Sokka 2005; Solhjell 2006; Sokka & Kangas 2007).

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN THE BOURGEOIS PUBLIC SPHERE

In the classical liberal self understanding and ideal model of the bourgeois cultural public sphere, as described and analyzed by the German social and cultural philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1989 [1962]), the cultural sphere was conceptualized as the field of market based private organized cultural institutions with the overall purpose to produce and circulate aesthetic and symbolic meaning in society. Art was set free of the divine and legitimizing role of the representative feudal power structure and precipitated as a special field – a special rationality – in the modern society. Market economy and an open public sphere broke away the production of the symbolic meanings in society from the absolute patronage of the feudal époque of Europe (Villada 1996).

The socio- cultural precondition for the establishment of the bourgeois public sphere was the new types of social and cultural public spaces integrated in the everyday life of the citizens, such as the French *les salons*, the English *coffee houses* or the German *Tischgesellschaften*.

The very meanings of the public cultural sphere were to create a space for the production and the circulation of symbolic meaning in a society governed by a free market economy. Opposing the top down process of the representative public sphere, the liberal bourgeois public sphere in its ideal self-understanding was conceptualized as a bottom-up cultural process as the basic of cultural education, enlightenment and a public political debate based on the individual and collective experiences of the citizens. In its ideal model the cultural public sphere, where the new societal space were free, equal citizens in the 18th and 19th century Europe constituted themselves to a reading, listening and reasoning public.

Beside the informal arenas for public discourse and exchange of experiences, privately organized and financed cultural institutions, such as public theatres, concert halls, museums for art and heritage, constituted the social prerequisite for the bourgeois public sphere.

The very idea was the social, cultural and political education of the individual citizens in the new liberal democracies inspired by the enlightenment philosophy. But the public bourgeois sphere became also a part of the political constructions of nationalism, national states and national identities in modern Europe, by picking up the symbolic meanings of the arts.

How have national state building and national belonging by means of cultural policies historically been displayed in the modernization processes of the Nordic countries?

THE NATIONAL DIMENSION IN NORDIC CULTURAL POLICY – HISTORICALLY

In general, the appearance of a bourgeois cultural public sphere took place later in the Nordic countries, and to a high degree in other forms than in the continental countries in the rest of Europe (Duelund 2003, 482). Furthermore, the distinctive differences between the forms of impact of bourgeois public spheres on public cultural policies in the Nordic Countries can be identified due to the socio-cultural and geo-political conditions.

Denmark

The Danish tradition of cultural policy has been, according to Sven Nilsson (2002), dominated by relatively more liberal attitudes due to a stronger bourgeois merchant class position in the historical construction of the Danish national state, compared to Sweden. This has implied dif-

ferences also in the contemporary Danish and Swedish cultural policy positions after post war II.

One example is the estimating of the effects of the “commercial cultural industries” and its “negative” influence on social life. Indeed, this was a crucial topic that preoccupied the legitimation of public cultural policy in all Nordic countries very seriously during the 1960s and 1970s (Duelund 1982). But in the Swedish debate the commercial culture industry was regarded as a major obstacle in developing an authentic and democratic cultural policy.

On the other hand, the national dimension has had greater influence on contemporary Danish cultural policy, because of the efficient national identity construction initiated by the elite and the agents of national liberalism during the 19th century (Duelund 2003, 482). This national dimension engaged middle and bourgeois citizens dominated by the upcoming liberal merchant, turned against the cosmopolitan orientation of cultural policy displayed in the representative public sphere of the absolute Monarchy.

The national construction of identity was the basic value in the liberal public cultural policy of national romanticism during the first half of the 19th century. Other identities such as the cosmopolitan were excluded. These nationalistic tendencies in Danish culture and cultural policies were encouraged, when Denmark lost Norway to Sweden in 1814 and later on even more after the loss of *Schleswig-Holstein* in 1864.

Furthermore, the politically motivated constructions of national identity in Danish cultural policy during the 19th century were produced and improved by the Danish priest and poet N. F. S. Grundtvig, who conceptualized national identity and Danishness in ethnic and religious terms. Grundtvig was inspired by the German romantic founder of the philosophy on popular national identity, Johann Gottfried Herder. According to Herder, all people have their own culture and popular spirit (*Volksgeist*), which finds expression in the nation. Herder defined culture as a common identity, as a mental amalgamation of folk and nation (Duelund 2003, 20).

As far as Herder was concerned, the enlightenment philosophy and its concepts of the highest stage of culture are examples of European arrogance and ethnocentricity. Europe has turned its own culture into a measuring stick for the whole of humanity, he asserted.

Ironically, the nationalism in Danish cultural policy during the long 19th century was inspired by the *Volksgeist*-philosophy, developed south of Denmark as a part of the German national state building process. Nationalism in Denmark can historically be, according to the theories of Eric Hobsbawm (1992), interpreted as a long cultural fight of a small nation to manifest itself as a monocultural identity, united by the challenges caused by the construction of the dominating big national states in Europe in the 18th century.

Herder's perception of culture is relevant for understanding some of the challenges confronting Nordic cultural policy today. It played a significant role, especially in Danish national Romanticism. N. F. S. Grundtvig refined it in his view of one nation, one language; one identity which has exerted major influence on the way Danish cultural policy has developed.²

For a variety of reasons, Danish cultural policies have been characterized by a soft, but widespread nationalistic tone since the loss of external territories, the emergence of the bourgeois cultural public sphere and popular Grundtvigianism of the landowners in the 19th century. The Danish national-liberal bourgeoisie and middle class was extremely nationalistic in mentality, in spite of the cultural policy rhetoric on enlightenment and liberal universalism.

This is historically important for understanding the strong national dimension in Danish cultural policy especially since 2001.

Sweden

Compared to Denmark, the influence of the representative public sphere on the formations and implementation of public cultural policy has been longer and stronger. In fact, the Swedish representative public sphere

played an important cultural role right up to the 1920s, when the Social Democratic Party took over and conquered the political dominance and regulation of the public cultural sphere.

It is characteristic of the modern formation of Swedish cultural policy that this transformation of the representative public sphere to welfare based cultural policy, formed according to the political ideas of the Social Democratic Party, largely occurred without a historical intermezzo dominated by an influential liberal bourgeois class.

According to Tor Larsson, this was because of the close connections between the powerful rural nobility in Sweden and the court in Stockholm during “the long 19th century” (Larsson 2003, 182–194). The urban bourgeois class attempted to create a liberal cultural public sphere in Stockholm and the larger cities from the middle of the 19th century. But their powerbase was too weak to decisively influence the formation of modern Sweden.

Thus, the liberal bourgeois class became culturally assimilated with the ecclesiastic and feudal aristocracy as far as their views on a centralized partly absolute state were concerned. The Social Democrats adopted much the same perspective after the Second World War, when they constructed the welfare state and formulated the “new” cultural policy in 1974. This policy was created in a symbiosis between the aristocratic traditions of the representative public sphere and the egalitarian goals of the Swedish Social Democrats.

The close relations between aristocratic cosmopolitanism and Social Democratic internationalism probably explain why Swedish cultural policy has been, and in 2009 continues to be, less nationalistic in its orientation than, for instance, its Danish counterpart.

Norway

Civil servants and intellectuals have, to a higher degree than a national aristocracy or a trade based bourgeoisie, played a huge historical role in

the national construction of modern Norwegian cultural policy (Dulund 2003, 483).

However, this does not imply that the formal political dependency of Denmark and later on Sweden prevented Norway, inspired by both the enlightenment philosophy and national-romanticism in Europe, from establishing national cultural institutions to promote the development of national identities during the 19th century (Hodne 2002; Dahl & Helseth 2006, 15–124; Solhjell 2006, vol. I-II).

A widespread field of national cultural institutions was established as a part of the Norwegian nation-building process on private and public basis during the entire 19th century. The Royal Norwegian Art School was established in 1818, the National Gallery in 1836, The National Scene of Theatre in Bergen in 1876, the Sandvig Collection in 1887, the Norwegian Folklore Archives in 1894, as well as the Norwegian National Theatre in Oslo in 1899.

In spite of the constitutional ties to the Swedish crown, it was legitimately possible to create and promote an independent Norwegian identity and for Norway to appear as an independent cultural nation to the outside world.

However, this constructing process of national identity and a national Norwegian public sphere during the 19th century was largely carried out by civil servants and intellectuals, who were more heavily influenced by Danish aristocratic cosmopolitan thinking than by the national ideas born with the establishment of bourgeois cultural sphere.

Probably this is one of the reasons, why the cultural policy debates in Norway anno 2009 are, to a high degree, dominated by a multicultural approach to cultural policy?

Finland

Looking at the development of public cultural policy in Finland Anita Kangas has analyzed the country's changing cultural policy in the context of three major historical shifts, spanning from the long nation state build-

ing process (1860–1960) through the welfare state based cultural policy (1960–1990) to the competitiveness society and, to a large degree, an economic motivated cultural policy (1990–) (Kangas 1999; 2004c).

Following the conquest of Finland by Czar Alexander I, the country's new status was established as a semi-autonomous Grand Duchy, formally recognized at the Diet of Porvoo in March 1809. Despite this constitutional dependency, Finland was able to produce and develop cultural institutions in the 19th century with the purpose to construct and consolidate a national language, identity and a feeling of Finnishness.

In fact, also a proper and influential national cultural public sphere emerged in Finland during the 19th century. In a similar manner to Norway, it was possible to construct a national cultural public sphere with a widespread field of private and public cultural institutions. Finnish authorities developed (or were required to develop) instruments for subsidizing culture. In this process (together with art societies and cultural associations) the intellectuals played an active role in the national construction of the interaction between the political elite and its cultural foundation in civil society (Sokka & Kangas 2006, 116–136).

During the first part of the century, the elite in society with interests in the arts and its role in the construction of national identities were formed primarily of Swedish speaking intellectuals (e.g. university experts, civil servants). At the end of the century, Finnish speaking intellectuals and artist of both language groups dominated the national constructions process of Finnishness and of a Finnish coherent national identity (Sokka 2005).

A huge contribution to Finnish national identity was submitted by Elias Lönnrot with the Finnish national epos *Kalevala* (1835, 1849), based on folk poetry collected while walking in the countryside and the comprehensive collection of solitary poets *Kantelar* (1840). Lönnrot's *Finsk-svensk ordbog* (Finnish-Swedish Dictionary) (1867–80) created the basis for the development of a modern Finnish written language.

Also at that time a Finnish philosopher, publicist and politician, Johan Vilhelm Snellmann, began to politicize in rational humanistic terms the idea of a Finnish nation and to translate the sense of Finnishness

into a political program with the same national cultural basis as the one formed in the romanticized terms of Runeberg and Lönnrot.

The State Archives of Finland, renamed in 1869, had roots going back to 1817, when the first archivist was appointed by the Senate. The Decree on the Protection of Ancients Monuments was issued in 1883. The Archaeological Bureau was founded during the following years. The first cultural associations were established in the 1830s and the 1840s. Many of these privately organized cultural institutions paved the way for the state organized public cultural institutions after Finland's constitution as an autonomous national state in 1917. The Finnish Literature Society has promoted Finnish oral tradition, the Finnish language and literature since 1831.

A purely artistic association, the Finnish Arts Society, was founded in 1846 by a group of civil servants, university teachers, bourgeoisie and officers of that time – all of whom belonged to the Swedish speaking elite (Sokka 2005). The first regular state subsidies for individual artists were granted in 1863 as an initiative by the Finnish Arts Society.

The first regular state subsidies were granted already in 1856 to the Swedish Theatre. The Finnish Theatre had to wait until 1878. In 1865 an expertise board was set up for the purpose of awarding the State Prize in Literature. The State Art Boards for visual arts, music, architecture, drama and literature were regularized in 1918 (Sokka 2005, 116–124; Sokka & Kangas 2006, 130–131).

During the two last decades of the 19th century, the subsidies for art quadrupled; artists and their works were now appreciated as an important element for the construction and consolidation of Finnish national identity (Sokka & Kangas 2006, 128).

Activities of civic cultural associations started to be integrated into public state institutions. This was carried out by nominating expert committees for the purpose of granting stipends and prizes according to standards suitable for the state.

From the 1880s on, the first generation of intellectuals who spoke Finnish as their mother tongue grew increasingly. As a consequence, diverse ethnic Finnish citizens obtained a position in the cultural and

political public sphere, from where it was possible to create and consolidate the *national* ideals. The Finnish intellectuals, active in the national movement, were of upper class origin. They projected their own conception of the “people” as unified national culture and population, which could provide support and legitimation for the constitution of an autonomous Finnish national state (Sokka & Kangas 2007).

The ideology of nationalism was not only gaining ground among the Finnish intelligentsia. It was also in the interests of the Russians to cut the ties of the Finnish society to its Swedish associations in the early 19th century. To Russians it seemed like a good idea to allow the Finnish language to develop at the expense of the Swedish. For the elite—civil servants and intellectuals—it was also wise to turn to Finnishness instead of looking back to Sweden (Sokka & Kangas 2006, 122).

Because intellectuals are capable of constructing ideas and ideologies, they have had a central role in the nation state building process in all countries and cultures and in the formation of cultural policy. But in Finland it seems to be particularly obvious.

Iceland

Iceland is one of the smallest societies in the world that maintains an autonomous state, economy, and national culture. Certainly, this is due to the country’s geographical isolation, independent language and cherished cultural heritage. But the autonomy was not ensured until the establishment of the country’s independence in 1918, and the formation of the independent republic in 1944.

The historical development of culture and cultural politics has been visibly influenced by endeavors to gain autonomy. But at the same time, the cultural field has been highly influenced by the knowledge that autonomy is dependent on interchanges with other cultures, probably even more so than with larger countries.

Increasingly, the Icelandic cultural policy has come to resemble that of the neighboring countries. But still, Iceland maintains its own spe-

cific guidelines of cultural policy and identity (Gudmundsson 2003, 114–116).

During 800-900, the first settlers arrived in Iceland. They were mainly Norwegian and Irish. But the Nordic culture became the predominant one. Earlier than anywhere else, Nordic poetry and tales were written down and preserved. Thus, Iceland became the birth-place of some of the greatest Medieval European literature, the Sagas and the scriptures of Snorri Sturluson.

During the following 500 years, the level of this cultural production plummeted to a minimum. Among the contributing factors were the deteriorating climate (the habitability of Iceland was a subject of great debate), the weakened social elite, and the declining independence of the church, which was fully reached with the reformation in 1550.

In spite of this cultural regression, the Icelandic language remained, not only as a spoken language, but also as a written one. Danish translations of the Bible were used in Norway and on the Faroe islands. But Iceland obtained its own translation, primarily due to their advanced written language. The Icelandic language was further developed with the publishing of Christian as well as secular literature during the centuries that followed.

Particularly during the 1600s and 1700s, the representative public sphere of Iceland was characterized by a specific alliance between the (Danish) king, favored merchants, and the few hundred wealthy farmers, who formed the local elite.

From the 1840s, an Icelandic political public sphere was being formed, with the endeavors towards establishing home rule and eventually independence. A number of the central figures were part of the budding intelligentsia, based in Copenhagen. Some of these were national romanticists, who glorified the agricultural society. Others combined a strong Icelandic self-esteem with the sense of modernity, and strove to form alliances with merchants and liberal farmers (Gudmundsson 2003, 115).

With this political background, Icelandic national culture and identity were formed during the 1800s, constituting an important part in

the making of independent Icelandic political platforms. The close connections between the Icelandic and the Old Nordic cultures significantly eased the process of creating a strong, national identity.

Virtually all Icelanders were able to read the old texts, since the written language had not changed much. Furthermore, most of the texts had been written down in Iceland. Some Icelanders were even able to trace their lineage back to the landnamsmen and the heroes of the sagas.

Serious efforts ensured the rooting out of a great part of the Danifications from the Icelandic language. The transmitted Icelandic language was revitalized through the introduction of new words. This consequent language policy has rendered it possible to create Icelandic words for new phenomena and concepts. And it still exists as an important part, maybe the most important part, of public Icelandic cultural policy with the overall aim to promote and protect political autonomy and national identity. This achievement has served as a model for more or less successful attempts to implement language cultural policies in other nation-building countries around the world.

Towards the end of the 19th century a middle class engendered a cultural public sphere with printed newspapers, theatres, concert halls and literary salons. Due to the commercial relations, an increasing cultural influence came from the Nordic countries, England in particular, and on a lesser scale, from Germany and France.

The National Museum of Iceland was established in 1863, based on the initiative of private persons, who endeavored to strengthen the national identity. In much the same way, a civil servant established the Icelandic art gallery in 1885 with the intention of giving young Icelanders an incentive to become artists. By creating Icelandic national art, it was the very hope that the young artists would be participants in the effort of the political independence movement.

However, the development of Icelandic visual arts would last decades, and so, the museum was not to purchase an Icelandic painting until 1915. Whereas the theatre successfully became a part of the Icelandic identity, mainly due to the language factor, neither fields of music nor visual arts was able to cut corners in a similar fashion.

However, the promotion of Icelandic language and the production and circulation of art and culture was still primarily built on import. For example, the first dramatic societies who commenced their continuous work around year 1870, took great pride in performing in Icelandic. But most often, Danish translations were used. Gradually poets and authors ventured to do the writing themselves, on Icelandic themes (Gudmundsson 2003, 116).

Thus, the national bourgeois movement in Iceland, dominated by government officials, businessmen and merchants, formed a cultural public sphere.

These institutions, however, did not play a decisive role in formulating an autonomous national Icelandic cultural policy before the country became independent in 1945. The long dependency on Denmark and the total isolation from Denmark under WWII enhanced the wishes to build up a distinctive national identity.

In the construction of national identity and national belonging in Iceland, literature and language, in particular, have played a huge role in producing and circulating national symbolic meaning in society.

THE NATIONAL DIMENSION IN CONTEMPORARY NORDIC CULTURAL POLICY

The Nordic story of identity construction by means of the arts and cultural institutions is convincing in the light of the huge role cultural policy has played and still plays in the process of modernization and nation state building.

Public and private cultural policy in the Nordic countries has been used for constructing a popular sense of national belonging, a common feeling of national identity and of national monocultural public spheres.

In fact, it was this liberal bourgeois conceptualization of the role of arts and symbolic meaning in society that gave birth to the *new cul-*

tural policy in the post war Nordic welfare state, formed by the Social Democratic political philosophy. What did not succeed in the bourgeois liberal market model, should be realized within the market regulating philosophy of the well-fare based Social Democratic version of cultural policy in modern societies governed by law (Duelund 2003, 18).

The overall ideology, and aims of the public organized art policy in the Nordic welfare societies since the 1960s, has been to secure that the authentic experiences of the citizens through the arts and other symbolic expressions could be produced and circulated without the distorting or colonizing political and economic supremacy.

Arts funding in a wider sense is not a new phenomenon. What is new in the cultural policy configuration in welfare states in Nordic and European countries and post World War II is that they, as patron states, attempt to assume responsibility for drawing up a cultural policy that has a declared democratic objective, i.e. a policy based on the intrinsic value and freedom of the production and the circulation of the arts in the society without interferences and pressure by political or economic medias.

Furthermore, welfare based public cultural policies should mean widespread building and financing of cultural institutions, which, with subsidized admissions, should make it possible for all citizens to acquire aesthetic experience, knowledge and inspiration independent of social class, gender, economic income, ethnic origin, religious beliefs etc., and be based on the idea that art should be for all.

The objectives and means used by the governments in the European well-fare states have varied according to the historical and social context in which the particular cultural policy has been drawn up. But the overall aims have been to realize the golden visions of the Enlightenment and *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, which the French Revolution tried to bring into being legislatively, politically and culturally.

However, the nation- building process inherent in the enlightenment project and the national dimension in the cultural policies, implemented for realizing the overall aims, has until recent years not been focused on

as an important issue in researching cultural policy. This is also the case in the Nordic Countries.

Nevertheless, the various policies have also served national ambitions – implicit or explicit. The national dimension in cultural policy is today, with different signatures, a huge item in cultural policy debates not only in the Nordic countries but all over Europe, as well as in international bodies such as EU and UNESCO.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

Different paths have led to our kindred nations. How to cope with studies on the national dimension in cultural policy theoretically and empirically? Which theories on nationalism are adequate approaches for studying the origin of nations and the different forms of identity displayed?

In recent years, three dominating but different paradigms have been displayed in nationalism theory: *the primordial, the modern and the ethno-symbolic paradigm* (Smith 2001).

As an approach for analyzing the historical role of cultural policy in the nation-building process in the Nordic countries, my approach, among others, has been the classical work of Jürgen Habermas *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Habermas 1962). The book was published in Norwegian in 1969 and had, as a part of *New Critical Theory*, a huge influence on the Nordic Faculties of Humanity and Social Sciences in the 1970s and 1980s.

Habermas does not focus explicitly on the nation dimension of cultural policy in his path-breaking work. His historical analyses of the idea and role of art, culture and cultural institutions in the liberal state and its transformation can be interpreted and displayed as a part of the modern paradigm of nationalism theory.

In the *modern* paradigm, the conjunction of identity and national belonging are viewed as a historical, social and political construction

resulting from either the industrial need for coherence (Gellner 1983, 1987), from technological and language innovations (Andersson 1993), from the fight among big nations and the survival of small nations against the big (Hobsbawm 1992) or from the manipulations of political elites to build up, maintain and consolidate their own power (Breuilly 1993).

In modern research on identity, perceptions of identity and nationalism are seen as relative phenomena that may be abandoned, changed or constructed by constitutional means such as cultural policies. Modern research on the questions of identity and nationhood is therefore primarily concerned with the formation of identity perceptions in historical and modern societies *and* with the various implications resulting from the different cultural policies in this formation process.

As far as I can see, the modern paradigms of nationalism theories, including the theories of culture and the public sphere displayed as a framework for analyzing the nation-state building processes in the Nordic countries above, seem to be a valid and promising approach in researching the national dimension of cultural policy.

Also the third paradigm of nationalism, *ethno-symbolism*, which has been introduced by British scholar Anthony D. Smith (Smith 1991, 1995, 2001) during the recent years, seems to be a reliable and useful theoretical approach and method in analyzing the *specific* nature of identity formation in nation-state building processes.

With reference to the historical description of historical identity formation process, further research could, for example, be initiated on the impact of Grundtvig's poems or the music of Carl Nielsen on the construction process of Danishness, older Royal Court theatres' meaning for the absolute royal power and the feudal social structure in Sweden, the significance of the huge contribution to Finnish national identity by Elias Lönnrot with the Finnish national epos *Kalevala*, the implications of the dramas performed by Norwegian National Theatre and the Norwegian Art Collections for the formation of Norwegian identity, the Sagas and the scriptures of Snorri Sturluson rub off on the birth of Iceland as a nation etc.

Also, the widespread issues in the new cultural policies since the 1960s could be focused on. For example, the relationship between art and national identity could be investigated by looking at how it has been understood, expressed and reflected in the Arts Councils policy towards the arts in the Nordic and European countries over the period 1946–2009.

In the paradigm of ethno-symbolism, developed by Anthony D. Smith, recollections, values, emotions, myths, rituals, symbols, stories etc. are seen as having an independent and irreversible significance for the construction of national identities and the feeling of national belonging. National and ethnic *emotions* are viewed as the expressions of authentic experiences and perceptions, a cultural background knowledge which may be influenced in various ways, but which cannot be disregarded, reinterpreted or totally changed by outside conditions, such as cultural policies.

The ethno-symbolic approach is not primordial in the sense that feelings of national identity are interpreted as natural phenomena. On the contrary, national identity is both a historical construct and an outcome of myths and symbols acquired by a people through generations via aesthetic artifacts.

Thus, national identities may be subject to reinterpretation and change. Therefore, ethno-symbolic research on identity and nationalism stresses the importance of collecting, investigating and analyzing the specific influences of the production and circulation of symbolic meanings in society on value- and identity formation. The ethno-symbolic approach is interested in analyzing the effects of changes from the outside, such as the implications of specific cultural policies for the national identity and the feeling of a given population in a complex whole, but without reducing symbolic expressions to specific premises, such as cultural policies or artistic production. Thus, the ambition of the ethno-symbolic position is to describe and analyze identity and the feeling of national belonging in the scope of the complex exchange relations between system and the life world.

According to the *primordial* paradigm, nations are conceived as genetic and natural communities that always have and always will exist (Geertz 1973; Armstrong 1982; Stack 1986; Grosby 1995). In the primordial position human and social identity may be influenced in various ways. But fundamentally, a collective identity such as nationhood cannot be transformed by means of cultural policies or other strategic media, such as cultural policy.

Nations are conceived of as natural born phenomena, implying a universal distinction between “us” and “them”, which will always exist independent of constitutions, legal systems and cultural policies. Historically, the primordial position bases its views on a genetic definition of race. However, in modern primordial theories, race is usually replaced by the concept of ethnicity, where the descent of man is not seen as genetically but culturally conditioned.

On the face the primordial paradigm seems to be a huge and up to date approach for studying cultural policies and its implications for the formation of identity and nationhood. In recent years the production and circulations of primordial and fundamentalist symbols and meanings have been revitalized in the media and cultural policies all over the world, often as a self-deference against globalization, migration, religious polarizations, loss of identity etc.

Certainly, the widespread primordial cultural policy manifestations and public argumentations build on xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and religious fundamentalism; potentially, racism etc. might imply catastrophic human and societal consequences, Hitler’s Nazi Germany in memory.

But, on closer inspection, is the primordial paradigm a valid and reliable explanation on the huge and widespread primordial argumentation on identity and neo-nationalism all over the world to day?

I doubt that! For why should it be necessary in cultural policy to promote, improve and consolidate national identity and nationhood, if it is a natural born phenomenon, which has always existed and always will exist? Is it not an epistemological and ontological self-contradiction in terms? The recent debate on the Danish Cultural Canon, launched by the Danish Government in 2005, is a brilliant example of this contradic-

tion. Certainly not an exhaustively answer, but maybe a valid illustration of the question.

The Danish cultural Minister Brian Mikkelsen stated in a speech to the Conservatives National Congress on June 25, 2005 just after the initiation of the Danish Cultural Canon project, following the reflections on nation, identity and democracy:

A medieval Muslim culture has, in our home, never been as valid as the Danish culture, which has grown on the old Danish soil, placed between Skagen [Northern part of Denmark] and Gedser [Southern part of Denmark], between Dueodde [Eastern part of Denmark] and Blåvandshug [Western part of Denmark] ... The Danish cultural heritage enriches one's life and intensifies our identity as Danish citizens in a time dominated by globalization and migration. Cultural rearmament is the strongest vaccine against non-democratic movements in society.

Furthermore, the Minister blew the trumpet to battle against multi-cultural ideologies. In general, the speech was dominated by a warlike rhetoric. The Minister made it clear that there were several battles to fight. The front of the battle was to combat parallel societies, in which minorities practice medieval norms and non democratic thoughts.

In April 2005, Cultural Minister Brian Mikkelsen appointed 7 canon committees, corresponding to the 7 main art forms within the Danish Ministry of Culture's remit: literature, music, performing arts, film, architecture, visual arts, design and crafts. The Danish Cultural Canon was published and circulated by the Ministry in 2006–2007. The Danish cultural canon is, according to the official presentation by the Ministry, a collection and presentation of the greatest, most important works of Denmark's cultural heritage. The explicit intention was:

- To serve as a compass, showing the directions and milestones in Denmark's long and complex cultural history.
- To serve as a platform for discussion and debate.

- To provide us with reference points and the awareness of what is special about Danes and Denmark in an ever more globalised world.
- To strengthen the sense of community by showing the key parts of our common historical possessions.

[Further information is available on: www.kum.dk/kulturkanon/english]

Certainly, the motivation behind the Danish Cultural Canon was argued in primordial terms. But is this a reliable explanation of the project? Is an interpretation in terms of modern constructivism as displayed by, i.e. Breully, not a more valid explanation? Is it not, in fact, a brilliant contemporary cultural policy case of the political elites' manipulations of nationhood, aimed at building up, maintaining and consolidating their own power?

Is the present feeling of Danishness a manipulated construction caused by Grundtvigianism and national romanticism, or the strong influence of Danish bourgeois social class on Danish cultural policy in the 19th century?

Is it more valid to analyze and interpret the Danish Cultural Canon in the optic of ethno-symbolism as authentic feelings in the Danish population caused by the loss of Norway in 1814 and *Slesvig-Holstein* in 1864?

The case of the Danish Cultural Canon is a brilliant example for demonstrating how important it is to work out valid and reliable theories and methods for research, which can be used for identifying the real ideas, origins and implications of national identity policy in a given society or network.

So, to conclude: If cultural policy research wants to build up valid and useful knowledge on our kindred nations, there is much to do in the future: Both the modern and ethno-symbolic paradigms seem to promise outlets for this huge challenge in researching cultural policy.

One starting point for conducting *comparative empirical studies* on the issue in the future is to work out reliable, *operational categories and*

methods to describe, analyze and reflect on the concrete manifestations in public cultural policies.

- How can we identify which paradigms of nationalism and identity are latent or explicitly formulated in public cultural policies in the Nordic countries and other national states in and outside Europe? What is rhetoric and reality?
- Which paradigm of identity is displayed in international cooperation, such as cultural policies in the EU, UNESCO and the Council of Europe?
- How to reflect on alternatives to the existing paradigms of nationalism and the potentials of contemporary arts?

Endnotes

- 1 The study was carried out between 1998 and 2004 with cultural sociologist Peter Duelund, University of Copenhagen, the head of the Nordic Cultural Institute as the director of research. It proposes a comprehensive analysis of the cultural policies in Denmark, Island, Norway, Sweden, Finland, plus in the autonomous 'small Nordic countries' -Greenland, The Faeroe Islands, the Åland Islands and the Sami Area. The major results of the report may be consulted in Duelund, P. (ed.) (2003) *The Nordic Cultural Model*, Nordic Cultural Institute, Copenhagen.

Other publications of the study: Forchhammer, Jette (ed.). 2001. *Færosk Kulturpolitik ved indgangen til et nyt århundrede*. Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute (in Danish). Gaski, Harald, and Kappfjell, Lena. 2002. *Samisk Kultur i Norden – en perspektiverende rapport*. Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute (in Norwegian with Saamic summary). Lönnblad, Jan-Ole. 2002. *Åländsk Kulturpolitik – vid millennieskiftet*. Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute (in Swedish). Heikkinen, Merja. 2003. *The Nordic Model of Promoting Artistic Creativity*. Helsinki: Centralkommissionen för Konst (in English). The books can be ordered via the Nordic Cultural Institute's web site: www.nordiskkulturinstitut.dk. Books can also be ordered via bookstores. Distributor for bookstores is: DBK-bog-distribution Email: salg@dbk-bogdistribution.dk.

- 2 Grundtvig's paradigm of nationalism afforded especially the Danish landowning class, whose political power had increased in step with its economic muscle, the opportunity to revitalise the otherwise practically moribund rural culture. The rural liberal culture they sought to promote was not a counterculture in opposition to bourgeois culture. In fact, it was more of a parallel culture, separate from the culture of the bourgeoisie, albeit allegedly with the same objective, i.e. to promote national sentiments and symbolic expressions (Engberg 2001).

2.3

How German Is Finnish Art? The Definition of the ‘National’ and the Gaps of Art History¹

Annika Waenerberg

IN THE TITLE “How German is Finnish art?” some readers might track a contortion of the title of Werner Hofmann’s polemic pamphlet, *Wie deutsch ist die deutsche Kunst? Eine Streitschrift*, a study from 1999, which in turn can be seen as a continuation of the topic on the Germans and their art (*Die Deutschen und ihre Kunst*) by Hans Belting from 1992. In his pamphlet, Hofmann presented the question “How German is German Art?” Here a parallel title to Hofmann’s pamphlet would of course be “How Finnish is Finnish art?” Again, turning the parallel, the title of Hofmann’s pamphlet could be “How Italian is German Art?”, referring to one central chapter in Germany’s search for itself in Italy (“Germania sucht sich in Italia”: Hofmann 1999, 70–87). By the willful twist from “how German is German Art” to “how German is Finnish Art”, a variant is produced that emphasizes the factor of influence. In the present day, and in many respects, ‘influence’ carries, methodologically, a label of passivity or stagnation, not attractive enough to generate fresh analyses; but the expression “how German is Finnish Art” may open up a new perspective on the problem, as it can be seen both as parallel and as influence.

There is, however, no intention to show a detailed parallel between the comments in Hofmann's pamphlet and this article. It is the title that makes the main connection between them, indicating the general argument that the 'national' in art can be made or defined according to imported models. Those models and their function, however, differ from each other due to changing ideals and different historical situations in the respective countries. As concerns art, since Albrecht Dürer (1471–1528), and more intensively again from the second half of the end of the 18th century, artists and writers from Germany were searching Italy for models for art and were then, or in some cases much later, defined as German or national. Dürer, for instance, was labelled as a German artist by Joachim von Sandrart (1606–88), Johann Heinrich Merck (1741–91) and Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749–1832) (Hutchison 2000, 8–11). As regards Finland, during the first half of the 19th century – the period discussed in this article – ideals adapted from German philosophy and aesthetics were used to promote art and cultural life, and to define the 'national' in art. Therefore the artists of the second half of the 19th century already had a mission or task to create 'national art' when they left their country for Paris or Italy to work.

How and in what kind of research tradition questions are formulated can be crucial to scientific output; the understanding of central terms depends a lot on the research environment and the approach. Terms such as *Deutschtum* or 'Germanness' and 'Finnishness' often more or less implicitly include the term 'nation', and vice versa, although the definitions 'German' and 'Finnish' find validity even without the connotation of the 'national'. 'Nation', in turn, often involves 'homeland', 'fatherland' or 'Patria'. All of these terms, however, form their own field of connotations, and the limits and overlaps of terms are often made clear only by examples and comparison. The terms 'Germanness' and 'Finnishness' can be connected for instance with language, ethnicity or nation. In addition, the research field varies because of historical factors: history connects and separates. Furthermore, in questions concerning the 'national' in art, both the history of art and art life, as well as political history, are to be taken into account. As Daniel A. Segal and Richard

Handler point out: “The best way to understand nations and nationalism is to abandon the practice of using these terms to delimit a discrete subject of social scientific inquiry. The analysis of the culture of nationalism thus displaces its very subject matter” (Segal & Handler 2006, 65).

Even if the emergences of professional art traditions in Germany and Finland are viewed as different from the perspective of the history of art, from the perspective of political history they can both be characterized by a struggle for national unity or national independence during the course of the 19th century. Germany has, not just once, but in both 1870 and 1989, undergone the process from fragmentation to unity; Finland, on the other hand, has gone from being exploited by the Swedish kingdom to gaining an autonomous position in the Russian Empire in 1808–1809 and, in turn in 1917, on to independence.

The history of a nation is always inclined to get a noble origin attached to it. Germany was seeking its origin in ancient Rome and the great past of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, while Finland was looking for the roots of the nation in folk poetry. In Germany,



Figure 1: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Bust in bronze from 1872 by the German sculptor Gustav Blaeser (1813–1874) of the Berlin School. The Campus of the Humboldt University, Dorotheenstraße, Berlin. Foto: Manuel Vélez Cea 2009.

historical heroes dominated to a greater extent, whereas in Finland the mythical ones were brought to the fore. It can even be claimed that the nation of Finland was built on a mythical past – mythical in its concrete meaning. Germany looked to its primary affinity with Italy and the classic culture of Rome and Greece. According to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), the poems of Homer were much more familiar to the Germans than their *Nibelungenlied*, and this was the case even with non-educated people (Hegel 1990, 353). Finland forged an affinity with the mythical past of folk poetry, which for a long time remained more alien to educated Finns themselves, due to linguistic practice: the language of the educated Finns was Swedish, not Finnish.

Despite an abundance of literature on Finnish national art, the ‘national’ in art, whether to maintain or to dismantle the myth, has to a great extent still kept its interpretation as something self-evidently understood. This article is an attempt to open up one aspect of this self-evidence in the art of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Historical research points out how the Finnish nation was constructed by the educated, predominantly Swedish speaking layer of the Finnish population during the 19th century. In order for this objective to be attained, art that illustrated to the people their country and the nation was preferred. This was accomplished by landscape images and landscape descriptions that were produced under a strong German influence.

In spite of this, many factors have contributed to the fact that both German art and art history in Germany have gained little attention. The notion of ‘nation’ in National Socialism produced a perversion that has little in common with the patriotic and national freedom struggles of the 19th century. Yet this connotation of political history led to the situation where Germany was much less taken into account in art-historical research in Finland – a lack that has been felt until recent times. Cultural cooperation was also diminished, and the number of pupils and students choosing the German language as a study subject decreased – which was also due to the growing dominance of English. As is well-known, Paris had dominated as the centre of modernism from the 19th century to the Second World War: other centres were therefore pushed

into the shadows, a phenomenon that can be generally observed in the art research of Europe. The relation of modernist painting in Turku to the modernists in Helsinki in the beginning of the 20th Century is a Finnish example of this. The critics in Helsinki mockingly called the modernist artist group in Turku *Münchner* – “Munich people”, leaving Turku modernism, and above all its background in Munich, nearly unexplored (Waenerberg 2006, 23–27).

German “facets” have been integrated, however, into the very history of art history. It concerns, above all, the Hegelian nature of art history – not only in Finland, but elsewhere as well. Art history has been seen in its general origins as a German discipline, emerging primarily through the writings of Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68) within the institutional background of the philosophy of Hegel. Or, as Beat Wyss has shown in *Hegel’s Art History and the Critique of Modernity*, published in its German original *Trauer der Vollendung. Zur Geburt der Kulturkritik* in 1985, art history suffers from Hegelianism (Wyss 1997, 12–16). According to Hegel, there are different stages of releasing or revealing the absolute spirit in the history of nations. The revelation of the spirit takes place through art, art being a kind of final device on the way to complete revelation; then the spirit can move freely without boundaries. This would mean, that even art will become unnecessary when the spirit has set itself in total freedom – which it apparently has still to do, in spite of Hegel and the later questions regarding the end of art history and the end of art, presented by Hans Belting and Arthur Danto in 1983 and 1984 (Belting 1983; Danto 1984). So it seems that, judging from the amount of art still produced around us, instead of a revelatory process in this larger frame, a liberating act has been going on inside the field of art (cf. Wyss 1997, 351), during which in the 19th century ideas or concepts were seen capable of constituting final works of art. For Hegel the idea of art as development and the idea of art as an end are of equal importance. Both ideas have been followed in art history, even if some art historians and philosophers have tried to leave the seat for the idea of development vacant. But, as Donald Preziosi points out in his *Brain of the Earth’s Body. Art, Museums, and the Phantasms of Modernity*, the main

perspectives of art history, both formalist and contextualist, still follow Hegelian thought by construing works as largely reflective of wider or deeper changes (Preziosi 2003, 21–22).

Following the argument that Western art history can still be seen as taking a Hegelian stance, the field of art history and art institutions in Finland are just one crumb in the whole pie. From a Finnish perspective there is, however, a historical background to this, which enforced the Hegelian base in comparison to other countries, especially in matters of the ‘national’ and in the arts and cultural life.

Soon after Hegel’s death in 1831, the Hegelian school was divided into factions such as right, moderate right, moderate left, and radical left. Depending on whether the questions were about religion and metaphysics, or state and society, or both, these words (right, left, moderate, and radical) of course acquired different meanings. Later in the 20th century, three main wings were usually discerned: a theistic right wing, identified with the idea of God and God as a keeper of the world; a radical left wing, Lassalle and Marx being the most known representatives; and a centre, identified with persons like the Hegelian philosopher Karl Ludwig Michelet (1801–93) and Johan Vilhelm Snellman, a Finnish philosopher and statesman (1806–81). Michelet and Snellman were close in their thinking, but Michelet regarded both Snellman and himself to be members of the left centre wing, “des linken Centrum” (Manninen 1992, 688) whereas Snellman considered Michelet to belong to the most radical left wing of Hegelians² (Snellman 1993, 154). What did this mean to Snellman? Snellman wrote his remarks on Michelet after meeting him in Berlin in 1840–41. Michelet deserved, according to Snellman, “[...] in the present conditions of Berlin the highest praise for loving the truth, being not afraid of people, and being free of subsidiary motives”³ (Snellman 1993, 154; Manninen 1992; cf. Väyrynen 2007, 56–57).

Hegelianism did not remain very strong in the different academic schools of philosophy in Germany, but it was taken up in some other countries, for instance Italy and the countries of Scandinavia, and also to some extent in Russia, France, England, and America. Finland, a country between Sweden and Russia, did not follow either the Swed-

ish or the Russian reception and application of Hegel's philosophy. In Sweden earlier Romantic philosophy provided the main stream, whereas Hegelianism never achieved as strong a position as it did in Finland (cf. Manninen 1992, 686–689). In Russia there emerged a radical left group of Hegelians at the University of Moscow. In the 1840s the Hegelians were seen as a threat to the Greek orthodox faith, and the group was fought by means of academic administration and censorship: the education programme in philosophy was reduced, and it was forbidden to mention Hegel or German philosophy in the newspapers. The University of Moscow remained the site of “secret” (or underground) Hegelianism in Russia (Wolff 1971).

In Finland, Hegelianism already began to develop into a main stream of academic philosophy in the 1820s, but the most important single figure in this process was Snellman. In 1835 he defended his dissertation on the absolute system of Hegelian philosophy. Then he began to teach this at the University in Helsinki, but – Finland then being a part of the Russian Empire – Snellman's aims became suspect, and his lectures on the academic university and freedom were cancelled. So he travelled in 1839 to Sweden and continued from there to Germany, Austria and Switzerland in 1840–41. The following year he published *Versuch einer spekulativen Entwicklung der Idee der Persönlichkeit*, trying to solve (no less than) the speculative problem of the personality of God and immortality of the human soul. There he criticized other Hegelians for not having defined personality, when they were trying to define the personality of God. In the same year of 1842 Snellman published *Läran om staten* (a study of the state), where he, supported by Hegel's idea of the nation, argued that a state is created by the national spirit, born in the nation through historical development, and guiding the deeds of the individual. Finally Snellman, who had found work in Finland as a rector in a secondary school and as a newspaper man, was appointed professor at the University of Helsinki to lecture in philosophy, theory of the state, psychology and pedagogy, in the years 1856–63. Hegelianism remained, even if also criticized by Snellman himself (Väyrynen 2007),

in the mainstream of philosophy into the 1860s, which was quite late compared with other countries.

With his various activities inside and outside the university, Snellman ruled thinking in the country. Above all he could put his thoughts into action in society. He was active in the same way as the Young Hegelians in Berlin, who had good connections with the Prussian cultural ministry, occupied several professorships, and had strong allegiances to the Prussian project of state reform (Giesen 1998, 109). But Snellman's writings reached all levels of society, not only the highest ones – which were nevertheless also educated by him and his writings. In 1844, Snellman was editing the only Finnish-language newspaper of its time in Finland, called *The Friend of the Peasant (Maamiehen ystävä)*; on the side he was running another one in Swedish, his own mother language, called *Saima*, referring to the biggest lake in the Eastern Finnish lake region. And when Hegel concentrated on the leaders in the process of the revelation of the world spirit, Snellman argued that small nations also had a role in the development of the historical spirit.

To be a Finn was a matter of decision: let us decide to be Finns, and let us act accordingly. This was the general idea behind Snellman's thoughts on national feeling. The previous phase of the 'national', emerging from Herder's romantic interest in German folk literature and folk character around 1800, had its roots in the unconsciously inherited qualities that produced *Heimatgefühl*, or patriotic love of one's home region or of one's own country. For Snellman, this was not conscious, or active enough (Snellman 1993, 23). The most sublime task of a citizen was to be consciously active in raising national spirit to help bring the mental life of the nation into bloom. Not vague feeling, nor an unconscious passion, but a clear idea was to govern the deed.

Snellman found no general national consciousness in Germany (Snellman, 1993, 23). For him no Finnish nation existed, either: the Swedish speaking educated class had no national culture, the language of the nation and the living national literature being the most important carriers of the culture. One state could have many languages, but one nation could have only one language. The other way around, the Finn-

ish-speaking class with its oral tradition had no education and hence no possibility of promoting its traditions into a living, contemporary national culture. This oral Finnish tradition – something that Herder would have regarded as national culture – had, for Snellman, yet to become the living, contemporary national culture of a nation. It was mainly Snellman's achievement to bring these two classes, the educated Swedish-speaking class and the uneducated Finnish-speaking class, together. Education in general, writing in Finnish, and the acceptance of the Finnish language as an official language for education were for him the most important ways to achieve a union.

Art history in the Hegelian era concentrated on connoisseurship and collecting, while the creative and critical side – thinking – was the philosopher's task (Wyss 1997, 15–16). This means that actual art and art history were both seen as mere consequences of philosophical thought, of putting it into action. An illustrious example of this was the art gallery in *Altes Museum* in Berlin, planned by Karl Friedrich Schinkel and constructed in 1823–30, where the ground floor housed sculpture from the Antique and the second floor international paintings. Paintings were divided into 14 different quality classes – even if classes 10–14 never were shown, and every purchase needed to be justified in terms of the quality, position and importance of the works in the collection (Rönkkö 1999, 108–9) – following Hegelian thought but usually not questioning it. According to the research of Elisabeth Ziemer, Heinrich Gustav Hotho (1802–73) was the Hegelian art historian, art critic and philosopher, who – while also delivering answers to questions of quality, position and importance of the works in the collection—was at the same time trying to grasp the wider panorama of the past art historically and philosophically (Ziemer 1994, 78–81, 208, 254–256).

The art historian as the curator and connoisseur of an art collection, realizing a common philosophy or ideology of collecting, became an innate feature of the art museum institution. This was also apparent in numerous discussions in the Finnish art museum field when curators were worried about the short resources for filling gaps in collections. In the beginning of the 1990s, when an economic low put an end to

purchasing art altogether, and partly because of the provocations of Belting and Danto, the worry over actually filling gaps finally changed into amazed questioning of why we are filling gaps. More profound answers were not sought, not even in the first dissertation on Finnish art museums, published in 1999, which made a notion of the gap phenomenon (Rönkkö 1999, 23), to which the main reaction in the art museum field was an astonished awakening to our own complicity. But Hegel was yet too far away from the daily museum management and the daily wish to make ideal museums.

There were no art museums in Finland when Snellman left for Germany in 1840. He made preparations for his journey doing annotations from the *Handbuch der Geschichte der Malerei seit Constantin des Grossen bis auf die neuere Zeit*, the first handbook of Western painting in its historical context by Franz Kugler (1803–58) (Snellman 1992). Snellman systematically visited universities and art museums in Munich, Berlin, Dresden and Vienna. In his travel notations of 1840–41, published in Swedish in 1842, in German in 1984 and in Finnish in 2001, he recorded several detailed notions on art and the structure of the museums themselves (Snellman 1993, 84–101; Snellman 1984, 230–264; Snellman 2001, 177–209). Also five catalogues with his initials and short notes in the margins, purchased from art collections in Munich, Berlin, Dresden and Vienna, bear witness to these observations (in the library collection of the University of Jyväskylä; Waenerberg 2006, 3). Snellman regarded the *Alte Pinakothek* in Munich, designed by Leo von Klenze and constructed in 1822–36, as the best place in Germany for a beginner who wanted to grasp art history through one's own observations. This was because the items of sculpture and painting in the collections were both organized in a historical chronological order and there were fewer links missing than elsewhere. According to Snellman, the painting gallery in the *Altes Museum* in Berlin could in this respect be the only one competing with Munich – or maybe it could even be considered prior to Munich, because there were more paintings from the oldest Italian schools there. As regards sculpture, the Glyptothek in Munich, also designed by Leo von Klenze and constructed in 1816–30, was far better than Berlin, both in

organization and in the art historical importance of the collection. The painting galleries in Vienna and Dresden were not at all apt as historical study objects for Snellman; Vienna because of the incompleteness of the collection, Dresden because of the disordered hanging. (Snellman 1993, 84–85; Waenerberg 2006, 3–5) The buildings planned by Gottfried Semper for these two collections came into being later.

As Susanna Pettersson assumes, it was probably a result of Snellman's journey that his writings in the newspaper *Saima* energetically spoke for arranging a national collection of art for all the people in Finland, instead art lotteries for private people, planned and organized by the Finnish Fine Arts Association (Pettersson 2008, 82).

This is an illustrious example for Snellman's cultural strategy for building up a united and coherent Finnish nation-state. The key ingredient in this process was twofold: the educational level of the Finnish-speaking majority had to be improved, while the Swedish-speaking citizens had to become enthusiastic promoters of the Finnish-speaking national culture in every field. Most important in this respect were the newly-founded institutions of art and culture, above all the Society for Finnish Literature in 1831 (even today the most important cultural publisher in Finland), the Finnish Fine Arts Society in 1846, with a Drawing School in 1848, the Society for Finnish Artists in 1864, the Finnish Antiquarian Society in 1870, and the Finnish Society for Crafts and Design in 1875, also with a School. Societies with the epithet 'Finnish' were numerous in every field of culture and economy. These private societies were integrated for purposes of serving the Finnish nation and national culture (Sokka 2005, 14–17), the educated class being small and consisting of people educated at the University of Helsinki. Later, the societies were supported by the senate budget, and instead of privatization, which had been going on different levels, several of them were integrated into the official state structure – the latest integration being the Finnish National Gallery in 1990. What became official was already unofficially in place; as state institutions they now received a budget instead of support.

Also system for supporting Finnish artists was built by the societies and by the senate – the senate having a support system for artists since the

1860s. The senate ordered buildings, monuments, and works of art, and gave grants for education and travels (Sokka 2005, 40–41, 47–48). Not so much has actually changed here since those times: Now the Central Art Committee is commissioning art, giving grants and pensions, and individuals from the largest museums and art organizations sit in this Committee. Governmental money is also dealt out to local artists by smaller, provincial committees, and is often the only support available to artists, except – somehow paradoxically – unemployment insurance, which of course also comes from the state. Nowadays unemployed artists can also be given commissions to do some work for official buildings or collections.

Since the days of Snellman the nation-state and public societies, later foundations, have been the main supporter of art and artists. This does not mean political control in the same way as in totalitarian states; rather, a more unperceived unifying effect on the art scene and on the



Figure 2: Johan Vilhelm Snellman. Monument in bronze from 1916 by the Finnish sculptor Emil Wikström (1864–1942). The Snellman Square in front the Bank of Finland. Foto: Annika Waenerberg 2009.

official art collections derived from the authority of the people who are integrated into the publicly sponsored system of sharing and commissioning. The art museums also have thrived on this unifying effect; they receive support from the state and belong to a central advisory system – the National Board of Antiquities being the highest level of cultural history museums and the National Gallery the highest level of art museums. Many a time in the past 20th Century the National Gallery also exercised a kind of privilege of making first choices in regional and provincial exhibitions. On the other hand, regional museums followed the example of the National Gallery in their purchasing, their actions functioning more like an unwritten law. The smaller art museums showed the tendency to form similar collections as the main art museum of the country – only with larger gaps in their collections.

According to Hegel history was one's own only when it was the history of one's own nation: "Das Geschichtliche ist nur dann das Unsrige, wenn es der Nation angehört, der wir angehören, [...]" (Hegel 1990, 352). Art was there to make the history comprehensible. Works of art should be understandable, native, living, and present for the public. According to Hegel there was no use for art if people could not understand it. Art was made for the citizens' sake, not for the sake of a small elite clique to have sophisticated discussions. Works of art should be understood without profound study and scholarship, and be directly understandable and enjoyable, because art was meant for the whole nation:

In dieser Beziehung haben wir uns klarzumachen, dass Kunstwerke nicht für das Studium und die Gelehrsamkeit zu verfertigen sind, sondern daß sie ohne diesen Umweg weitläufiger entlegener Kenntnisse unmittelbar durch sich selber verständlich und genießbar sein müssen. Denn die Kunst ist nicht für einen kleinen abgeschlossenen Kreis weniger vorzugsweise Gebildeter, sondern für die Nation im großen und ganzen da
(Hegel 1990, 353).

In 19th century Finland most people had hardly seen any academic art, and they thought that making art or reading novels was a waste of time, or even a sin. Most Finns were peasants with only tiny fields to make their living. The climate was hard, and a great part of Finland suffered regularly from famines for years throughout the 19th century. So it was a constant struggle for the majority to keep themselves alive. In this kind of situation it was not so easy to demand an art that could satisfy all people of a nation – the educated and the non-educated alike. If Hegel is to be trusted, the national literature was equally alien to the educated and non-educated German citizens (Hegel 1990, 353). The situation in Finland was different. In the Finnish woods, above all in the Eastern part of the country, the old mythological songs or runes were still sung in the 19th century. Now the educated had to become familiar with them and learn to appreciate them. Public orders and competitions encouraged artists to take hold of subjects from the ancient oral tradition of folk poetry – works of this kind were representing the genre of history painting.

The bringing together of the Finnish-speaking majority with a civilized minority that travelled abroad constantly and dealt with art and culture is a curious process of the 19th century, in which the students of the university– who wanted to be acquainted with their own country, its people and its language, and the collectors of the oral culture, the songs of *Kalevala* from 1835 and other folklore – were followed by poets and pictorial artists who became fascinated by the beauties in their own country and folk character, mainly in the hilly lake region of the middle, north and eastern parts of the country. The timing was good: Parisian interest in the Northern regions and wilderness in the 1880s and 1890s supported this effort. In Paris, the interest in peasant and fisherman life in Bretagne and Normandy fused with an interest in Finnish peasant characters. The professional interest of the artists coincided with the ideological interests of the nation. On the whole, it was literally like going abroad in one's own country, the Swedish-speaking being the most enthusiastic *fennomans*, that is, supporters of the Finnish speaking culture. (Lukkarinen & Waenerberg 2004) It was only the period after

1900 that witnessed more Finnish-speaking art students with more modest backgrounds coming into the art school (Jämsänen 2005, 66–77).

In addition to the heroic stories in the national epic *Kalevala* and the lyric songs of *Kanteletar*, Finns also needed a visual image of Finland, and not only of their imagined Finnish past – for a part used as a substitute for great deeds never committed. Here, too, it was more or less a question of a consciously ruled decision, steered by the idea of the nation: in a geographically diverse Finland the midland landscape was given priority as a topic instead of the sea region. The poet Runeberg saw the hilly lake region as the only landscape in harmony with religious, poetic and meditative feelings, the seaside being for more active minds. The picture given by Finns of themselves in various descriptions of the 18th and 19th century coincided with the Runebergian landscape: the Finns were seen as religious and meditative, and their language was seen as poetic—in more critical terms that could mean meek, and slow in mind and motion. Through Zachris Topelius, another major literary educator, this ideal midland landscape was populated by corresponding human figures. It was an image of an idyll; a sunny Sunday morning, where – standing on a high hill – the landscape of lakes, forests and some houses could be quietly looked at and admired. At the same time, the more dramatically romantic scenery was moving into an offside position, as this more serene image was introduced through the press and publications. When Werner Holmberg (1830–60), a talented Finnish landscape painter, studied in Düsseldorf beginning in 1853, his first pictures done in Düsseldorf were far too emotional for the public image of Finland; the serenity and calmness of the landscapes of the brothers von Wright, idyllic scenes showing man and nature united under a good rule, or, as one would say in Italian, a *buon governo*, became the model. (Lukkarinen & Waenerberg 2004, 282)

Snellman's election and descriptions of the German landscape suggest that he recognized the need of national image education. The landscapes he admired most on his way from Kiel to Munich, were not images of grand and gloomy wilderness, no contemplative religious pictures either, but scenes of a cheerfully wild (or natural) and at the same time vivid

and cultivated countryside, with man controlling and taking care of the environment for the benefit of citizens⁴ (eg. Snellman 1993, 62).

Anyway, one can say that Finnish people of the 19th century were united by the same image of their own country. Later, shortly before 1900, wilderness as the topic for the Finland-image became current; only the hills, water and coniferous forests remained from the idyllic basic pattern of the countryside (Lukkarinen & Waenerberg 2004, 256–268). In spite of the fact that Finland today is an industrialized country that has produced a lot of high technology, the same image is still highly active and vivid – the image of Finnish summer cottages by a lake being one striking example.

The characteristics of the landscape of the midland lake region became the ideal for the Finnish landscape image par excellence. It was a matter of idealisation, where different landscapes or landscape pictures were just individual manifestations of the same idea (Waenerberg 2001). This idealised image seems to refer as much or even more to Hegel's concept of national art than to the previous, more Romantic Herderian notion of national landscape. This could also have something to do with Snellman, who rejected – what he thought to be – the Goethean wor-

Figure 3: The Last Judgment (1836–40). Altar fresco by the German Nazarene painter Peter Cornelius (1783–1867). *Ludwigskirche*, the Catholic Parish and University Church St. Louis (1829–44), Munich. Courtesy of Bildarchiv Foto Marburg.



ship of form, a naturalism that does not acknowledge the absolute value of spirit⁵ (Snellman 1993, 72). Snellman regarded the idealist style of the Nazarenes as being in union with the deeper spirit of the German civilization. Above all he admired the altar painting of the *Last Judgment* (1836–40) by Peter Cornelius (1783–1867) in *Ludwigskirche*, the Catholic Parish and University Church St. Louis in Munich.

Hegel had taken a critical stand on the Nazarenes (Wyss 1997, 121), and Snellman, even if he was looking at the painting of Cornelius with growing enthusiasm (Snellman 1993, 71–72), had also some difficulty to explain its relationship with the Catholic past. Even if the Nazarenes were fetching their motifs from the past, religious above all, in this case Snellman regarded it as a wish to fill art with living spirit, not to worship the past as such. The spirit, however, had not yet wholly perceived the generation of the present time, or become general consciousness. And in this kind of situation, when content was sought in the past, the spirit of which is borrowed, without connection to the artist's life in the present, the harmony and the clarity of form are still missing.⁶ (Snellman 1993, 72).

This notion has yet not been taken into consideration, when reading the numerous trials and lamentations of the artists of the end of the 19th century in search for the art of their own time, with one word: for their being *zeitgemäß* (up to date or modern). Hegelianism's role has to be considered in this connection also, and even more, because this particular generation of artists did not discuss Hegel, even though their fathers were devoted Hegelians and Snellmanians. There was a continuity of ideas without recognizing the source of the ideas.

Even if national culture and art, that is, the process of its creation, has often been an issue for scholarly and popular writings and discussions in Finland, the philosophical background of their relationship has not yet been much investigated. This must have to do with the phenomenon that – following the comment by Preziosi (2003, 21–22) – broader social and political functions have been guiding contemporary art history into a contextualist direction. This has much been the case in Finnish art writing – it being largely a documentation of the cherishing of a unified

national character through art and art institutions, done also for broader public – in the way Snellman did.

One might yet ask why Hegelianism played such an important role in the Finnish society in the 19th century in the first place. Snellman was clear-headed, decisive and idealistic, but that cannot be the whole reason. Snellman, following Hegel, put a strong emphasis on the aspect of freedom. According to his study of the state, citizens should be free to serve their country – to do one's duty for one's own country was equal to freedom. This aspect of freedom opened up the possibility of fighting the bureaucracy and the hegemony of the Russian government in a legal way – something that also developed consciousness of one's own Finnish nation.

Endnotes

- 1 The article is based on a guest lecture given at the University of Boulder and papers for international conferences in Montreal, Helsinki and Munich. Special thanks for comments are directed to Claire Farago and Donald Preziosi. Part of the work has been financed by the Academy of Finland.
- 2 Orig. "Han [Michelet] föres bland Hegels efterföljare till den yttersta venstra sidan [...]"
- 3 Orig. "[...] – under närvarande förhållanden i Berlin det största loford för sanningskärelek utan människofruktan och biafsigter."
- 4 Orig. "Jag önskade, jag kunde göra för läsaren åskådligt, huru fridfullt lifvet är i dessa dalar, just genom det hvimlande, men stilla och fredliga bestyret i den sköna omgivningen."
- 5 Orig. "Jag menar [...] en naturalism öfverhufvud, som icke erkänner andens absoluta värde. En sådan blott formförgudning har genom Göthe i Tyskland blifvit modern, och det är i min tanke emot den, som den nya tyska målareskolan arbetar."
- 6 Orig. "Att den till den del vändt sig till katolicismen och medeltidens religiösa lif, synes icke vara ett blott bemödande att härma de äldre Tyskarnes sträfvanen eller måleriets italienska mästare, utan framgå ur ett inre tvång att fylla kompositionen med lefvande anda. Denna åter finnes icke i det närvarande, emedan andens försöning med sig sjelf, dess medvetande om det oändligas närvaro i dess egen ändliga tillvaro, i nutidens nyskapade former, ännu icke genomträngt släktet, blifvit ett allmänt medvetande. Vid ett sådant förhållande, då innehållet sökes från en förfluten tid, hvars anda äfven hos konstnären blir en lånad, utan sammanhang med hans lif i det närvarande, måste äfven harmonien och formen saknas."

3

Access and Participation
in Cultural Space

3.1

Reclaiming Space as a Meaningful Place

Marja Järvelä

INTRODUCTION

MARC AUGÉ (2000, 42–43) refers to anthropological place as understood by the ethnologist and those he talks about. Anthropological place is occupied by indigenous inhabitants who perform a variety of cultural practices. They establish a local social order that they persistently shape according to their own intentions and tradition. According to this conception, local creativity is based on the idea that the indigenous people hold, in a way, a justifiable claim to access and possess a particular place. As to the mind set of the indigenous people themselves, Augé argues that they actually perceive themselves once having discovered the place and, therefore, claim to have genuine right to direct its destination.

Indeed, throughout human history cultural creativity has been associated with places. Presently, archeological research strives to associate historical artifacts, such as pottery, to wider traditions of local communication through working on the premise that ceramic style is communicative when it comes to local group identities (Pikirayi 2007, 288). Local places, however, have always boundaries to be crossed. Moreover, crossing boundaries has also been the most important source of creativity, while communication across boundaries multiplies the options and

effects of the eventual crossings. Therefore, one can argue that a local ownership of a place may lead to reinforcing boundaries and the constant surveying of the forces of local non-recognition in such a way that the consequent nonintervention to the place may reduce its power of creativity in the face of externally emerging cultural influences (Gupta & Ferguson 1992).

Hence, human cultures always need to find resolution to create a balance between tradition and innovation. This even applies to places as settled localities. According to Haila (1995, 28–29), a basic characteristic of human existence is activity, the creation of a place and living environment of one's own. However, this happens in a given space and time, conditioned by nature on the one hand, and by history, on the other. He goes on arguing that, for example, urbanization never led to a universally codified urban system. Kervanto-Nevanlinna (1996) goes further by proposing that even today cities are structured to meet the cultural practices of the local inhabitants. Obviously, these cultural practices may change since mobility across urban places is often high. Nevertheless, even built forms of the city can be perceived, according to Kervanto-Nevanlinna, in the light of people “living” the city.

Manuel Castells (1996, 423) defines place in terms of its physical contiguity: “a place is a locale whose form, function and meaning are self-contained within the boundaries of physical contiguity”. Consequently, places are not necessarily communities, and yet, they may contribute to community building, presuming that people living in these places do interact among themselves and with their daily physical environment. Castells also argues, referring to the peculiar example of Tokio, that urban development is not a predetermined process, even in the case of “global city”, since the impacts of both globalization and localization may appear simultaneously by means of physical restructuring and image-making (ibid.425-428). Thus, according to his understanding, “people still live in places” and urban modernization is not a “one way street” as regards the development of the urban living environment.

This article addresses the problem of living environment in the framework of the meaningful place and the indefinite space. Thus, instead of

social space, indefinite space is understood here in more neutral terms of physical entity (such as relating it to Euclidean/non-Euclidean surfaces, see Harvey 1973, 29).¹ Indeed, space has been defined in many ways and, obviously, different disciplines tend to hold on to their own definitions. As regards living environment, the contribution to defining space, by Henri Lefebvre, has been among the most cited. His starting point has been to differentiate between natural or absolute space and the space whose significance is socially produced (Lefebvre 1991). Thus, indefinite space can here serve as an abstraction, referring simultaneously to infinite spaces, that are, however, of geometrical or natural order.

Making spaces culturally significant requires human activity to enter the scene. Whenever and where ever this happens, spatial forms and social orders will be produced and reproduced. As culture and cultural policy have been attached to meaningful places (e.g. villages, urban districts, cities, nations) rather than to indefinite space, it is important to ask in what ways our conceptions of place based culture should be reformulated in the era of intensified globalization characterized by multiplied mobilities and, thus, ever increasing prospects for creative cultural crossings of boundaries. However, this era is also full of ambiguities, such as the simultaneous threats and risks on both immediate living environment and even the more global environment, resulting from the successful appropriation of the indefinite space by human culture.

The article is structured as follows: Firstly, it asks how place might feature as an appropriation of space for living environment. Before the more sophisticated cultural representations entered the scene, the place-based character of culture would be mostly associated to the anthropological home-stead principle of human activity (see Järvelä 2007). Secondly, the deconstruction of the anthropological place will be discussed. Thirdly, the concepts of supermodernity and non-places are introduced so as to illustrate the intensified and multiplied mobilities of the present era. Fourthly, the issue of place-based identities is introduced in order to reflect on its meaningfulness, from the point of view of local association and cultural creativity today. Finally, some concluding remarks are made concerning the ambiguity of human culture with regard to the

presently ongoing deterritorialization of culture, and the consequent urgency to restore local creativity and reclaim meaningful places to serve as pacemakers for promoting community resilience.

PLACE AS A LIVING ENVIRONMENT

As people live within a space it becomes a meaningful place for them. Firstly, it becomes their living environment, giving them a sense of shelter and security. Even very mobile people tend to create particular diaspora cultures on the basis of memories of having “once” lived in a meaningful place. During the recent era of globalization it has sometimes even been referred to as “a world of diaspora”, to underline a generalized condition of homelessness inherent to recent trends of the deterritorialization of ways of life, and to global cultural flows (e.g. Gupta & Ferguson 1992). However, at the other extreme, environmental sociologists have identified NIMBY (Not in my back yard) groupings that seem to survey their meaningful places against all interventions, especially those considered harmful to the living environment (see e.g. Castells 1998a, 62; Mertig et al 2002, 470–471).

Secondly, space as a meaningful place organizes individual identities, which can be perceived as a major source of all activity, turning materials and symbols into cultural items and artifacts. Then, a meaningful place refers e.g. to the space people share through different fabricated items. From this vantage point, Hannah Arendt cites the very basic example of a table situated between those that associate around it, creating thus a mutually shared space to start conversation (Arendt 1983, 92). However, in a critical perspective spaces such as urban living environment today tend to be reinvented and, furthermore, become overwhelmingly commodified through market dynamics, which entails the real possibility of a dilution and a blurring of “organic” local culture (Kilmartin 2002, 172).

Thirdly, ownership and access to places become a particularly challenging socio-political issue in the phase of “supermodernity” (Augé

2000, 31). Amidst multiple mobilities, it is important to set legitimate norms about who has the right to claim place based properties, the use of infrastructure and other services. Peaceful resolutions most often demand the recognition of collective identities, most often connected to place based citizenship and mobilizations (Castells 1998a).

Fourthly, following the era of supermodernity emerges the need to adapt to climate change. Thus, mitigating climate change and other eventual risks on living environments displays a new challenge for building resilient communities (Berkes et al. 2003; Järvelä 2008; Järvelä 2007) that further sets high demands on cultural practices of both the individuals and the communities. Communities will, thus, need to cope with a variety of sustainability issues, such as the demand for eco-efficient energy supply, effective public transit and the recycling of consumed materials (Bulkeley & Betsill 2003). In this sense, the cycle of development seems to round up. Local people need to rejoin their efforts to build a more resilient “cultural machine” to restore their local creativity in managing their everyday lives (Tidball & Krasny 2007). This is particularly important in order to avoid the eventual subjugation of local cultural practices on to the “mega machine” (cf. Jamison 2006; Morin 2001) of global standardization of environmental and socio-political mitigation.

DECONSTRUCTING ANTHROPOLOGICAL PLACE

Hence, cultural activity has traditionally been understood as something connected to places. Considering particularities of organizing space, cultural activities can be related to place based production of artifacts, consuming varieties of items, reproducing cultural identities and performing arts. It is common to refer to these performances as “Roman” culture, “Bavarian” culture or as “Finnish” culture. This is how belongingness to a homeland is associated to local inhabitants in an unproblematic way. However, the overwhelming current mobilities of people and populations urges us to revisit the seemingly unproblematic distinctiveness

of spaces and the isomorphism of space, place and culture (Gupta & Ferguson 1992, 7).

New cultural forms or social orders induced by the increasing mobilities may be perceived as leading not only to cultural play of diasporas, but also to the local plurality of cultures, hybrid cultures and even to “multiculturalism” (Gupta & Ferguson 1992, 7; Järvelä & Rinne 2004; Allen & Cars 2001). As a consequence, it is ever more difficult to identify who “we” are as people connected to a particular place, since people as inhabitants of a place tend to have a great variety of spatial backgrounds. Moreover, it may be troublesome to identify the people, who beyond all disputes belong to a location, since many of them may be mobile on a weekly or even on a daily basis (e.g. due to lengthy commuting between home and work), and thus may individually hold quite complex and extensive daily mobility repertoires (e.g. Popenoe & Michelson 2002).

One further element of deconstruction related to the local identity is the increasing virtual aspect of human communication. People may individually choose to cross many spatial boundaries – and even assemble in situated groups – for purposes of virtual communication. Hence, they may prefer to communicate with distant companions and even to isolate themselves from the people at their closest circuits (e.g. Taipale 2007). New technological appliances, such as mobile phones and personal computers, enable people to control individually their presence in spaces and even to cocoon where ever they go, against the surrounding action, including cultural activities (see e.g. Mäenpää 2001). This raises the question whether spaces as meaningful places simply tend to disperse dramatically and, perhaps, become more and more individually encapsulated, leaving only meager space for local cultural activity, especially the kind of activity that aims at building a distinctive local living environment.

SUPERMODERNITY

Several authors have highlighted the problem of place turning into ubiquitous space, along with complex individual mobilities, higher stages of modernization and the subsequent difficulty of making sense of spaces as meaningful places (Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Urry 2007; Augé 2000, 85–86). Nevertheless, one may argue that modernization and urbanization bring cultural diversity and ambiguity to places, and thus novel complexity to be experienced in regard to spatial socio-cultural relationships. However, they also bring along even higher expectations and demands concerning the quality of cultural representations in the neighborhoods, e.g. concerning the architecture of apartment houses, zoning, the quality of public buildings, and cultural and other public services (e.g. Michelson & van Vliet 2002, 81).

Thus, a meaningful place gains some of its meaning increasingly through its connection to a particular milieu. A highly developed urban area may be considered a part of a wider urban system, an urban milieu, as perceived by urban planners. Yet, the local inhabitants of a district may identify the milieu as an extension of their private space, sometimes, perhaps, even colliding with the planners' conception of the urban milieu (Burke 1968; Hajer 2003). In that way, in the supermodern urban space, even the borderline between private and public space can be seen as something frequently contested. However, at best this borderline remains quite flexible, creating simultaneously new opportunities for particular cultural activities and performance (e.g. spaces for skating, pavement artists or flea market). In any case, most urban encounters tend to be associated with ideas of particular situatedness of the social relationships (see Beauregard 2003; Öhman & Simonsen 2003). This quality of urban encounter, however, does not necessarily imply that meeting people in urban milieu would be less meaningful than meeting them in traditional places. Rather, it means that urban sociability is being basically redefined. This is happening in the intensively selected encounters by individuals

and by situated groups that can be identified as actors in a more global setting of local incitements.

Thus, spaces have different meanings and the access to meaningful places comprises different claims. Some places are genuinely spaces for transit, whereas others have their core meaning in terms of “home” or “workshop”. According to Augé (2000, 111–113), the spaces of transit actually feature as non-places. Non-places are nodes of supermodernity, where people are constantly entering and leaving without building elements of organic society. Non-places deal with people as customers that are passing through without leaving culturally consequential traces of their cultural activity. Nevertheless, non-places are extremely important nodes in organizing the urban flows and fluency of daily mobilities and, moreover, they tend to be quite vulnerable places in terms of the risk of perturbation or even terrorism. On the other hand, “home” and “workshop” are perceived as less risky spaces for human activity by most people, since they are still bound to connect individuals to the local organic society, where meaningful cultural activity, in the sense of building living environment, can be performed.

Supermodernity – or postmodernism, as many prefer to call this historical era – entails a paradox of opening a potentially increasingly variegated scene for social action and mobilities and, yet, the society within the limits of community seems to lose much of its organic capacity to provide meaningful places for local cultural activity (e.g. Kilmartin 2002, 172). Consequently, those in pursuit of locally organized cultural activity often have to reclaim access to particular locations in order to build a spatial scene for their meaningful action.

Furthermore, it is not at all clear, where these sites of local cultural activity could be invented. Or what kind of interventions into urban life they would imply. Most probably an emerging site of cultural activity could be located somewhere between “home” and “workshop”, giving the actors the choice of re-inventing home and making an extended “living room” as one of the meaningful places. Or else, citizens might extend the “workshop” or the “factory” into a place, providing cultural services especially to those parties somehow entitled to that social space.

The most challenging alternative might be to invade a non-place, and turn it into a meaningful place, a corner for local cultural activity. In any case, spatial perspective leaves us with many alternatives, including the “street” (e.g. Cohen 1993). Hence, there is possibly a horizon, even beyond supermodernity that would take us back to creating space as meaningful place through reconstructing living environments and cultural activities performed in some of these premises.

DEFENDING IDENTITIES ATTACHED TO PLACES

In historical perspective claiming space as a meaningful place implies the recognition of local social identities. Traditionally, these tend to incite many controversies concerning e.g. the issue of the “insiders” and the “outsiders” in regard to spatially defined areas. Most often the critical concern is whether the “insiders” can be defined in terms of familiarity and “purity of local origin”. In such a case, local actors highlighting the purity of local origin can be perceived as conservative voices, whose main interest is in defending the frontiers. From a critical perspective, these manifestations belong to actors who are bound to find themselves “spatially incarcerated” (Gupta & Ferguson 1992, 17; see also Hajer 1996, 264).

However, in a world with multiplied channels of interaction and complex settings of social mobilities, only exceptionally remote local communities, if any, may remain without external impacts. Therefore, it is more up to the point to ask what relationships do modify local identities, than to ask whether the community should defend its own particularity against external influence. Hence, regarding social identities the relevant question about local identities is this: On what basis can local identities be justified and recognized today?

According to Castells, identity can be defined as people’s source of meaning and experience (Castells 1998a, 6). In search of social actors’ identities, Castells stresses the importance of the process by which the

construction of meaning is laid, on the basis of a cultural attribute, and given priority over others. Thus, identities organize society in terms of meanings for the actors themselves, whereas norms are structured by the institutions and negotiated in order to influence activity, while organizing space so as to create a meaningful place. Yet, how could this happen in present urban environments? This is a vital question, when trying to grasp the present horizon of urban development, cultural activity and participation beyond supermodernity.

Instead of focusing on individual identities, Castells (1998a, 60–61) explores social mobilizations that are likely to generate, over time, a sense of belonging, and in this way promote territorial identities through the clustering of social action in local communities. He specifically refers to urban movements, addressing “real issues of our time”, such as urban demands on living conditions and collective consumption; the affirmation of local cultural identity; and the conquest of local political autonomy and citizen participation. Urban mobilizations can be very variegated, and yet, according to Castells, they tend to result in one common feature, namely producing “meaning” not only for the participants of these movements, but even for the community at large. This meaning is then reproduced as a collective memory of the locality. Therefore, in this contemporary sociological understanding, it is not exhaustively decisive who “owns” the land or the territory in the traditional anthropological sense, but rather, who is entitled to claiming the territory as a space to be constituted into a meaningful place.

Obviously, even today the processes of constructing new social identities by “intervention” into traditionally inhabited territories may not take place without controversies. However, modern communities usually have functioning institutional structures to deal with these controversies. The extent to which, then, local meaning can be confirmed and shared by local inhabitants, depends very much on how efficiently local communities succeed in opening channels for participation within the institutions, where local norms can be conciliated with new reclaimed identities (c.f. Fukuyama 2006).

As to the generalized aim of producing meaning to be shared in relation to a particular locality – a place – it is important to sensitize communities to the most relevant alternatives available in the present situation. This vantage point is becoming more urgent, the more deeply the “mega machine” starts to impose mitigation procedures on the milieu that might set local creativity at risk (Morin 2001). Depending on the particular resources and vulnerabilities of the territory, communities have different capacities to respond to the general trends of mitigation in the face of urgencies brought about by the threats on living environment. Thus, in some cases, it makes all the difference how the local physical infrastructure is managed (Järvelä&Rinne 2004), whereas in another locality the affirmation of local cultural identity through the animation of local cultural performance may be the first priority (e.g. Zukin 1989). From the practical public policy point of view, actions of indicating the channels of real socio-political impacts are crucial. Considering the endorsement of peaceful resolution, these actions should preferably be based on an intensive dialogue with local inhabitants, a process where place is made meaningful, i.e. a space to be shared and negotiated as a sustainable living environment.

CONCLUSION

Organizing the living environment has always been at the core of human cultural activity. However, place based cultural formations have been dispersed and deconstructed through modern development, the technological advancement of communication and high physical and cultural mobilities. Castells (1996, 403) argues that urban space is increasingly differentiated in social terms, while being functionally inter-related beyond physical contiguity, and this entails the consequence of the separation between symbolic meaning and the social appropriation. Simultaneously, human cultures have, nevertheless, been sensitized to

the problems of displacement, the loss of belongingness and the sense of community.

While cultural activity for building living environment beyond immediate “home” and “workshop” has been dispersed and privatized during the urbanization and long-term modernization, supermodernity seems to culminate this tendency of multiplied deterritorializations. However, it is highly questionable, whether supermodern societies can solve the problem of anonymous space, and of the sense of homelessness, when facing future risks on the living environment and the simultaneous estrangement from local community. Adapting to climate change is the most conspicuous challenge urging us to revisit the basic driving forces of creating and managing local communities.

With regard to the building of sustainable living environment, hence, stepping beyond the global standardization of cultural activity and the other impacts of the megamachine of supermodernity perhaps requires the re-localization of cultural activity in the future. To cite Edgar Morin, the megamachine of development should be transformed into a metamachine, characterized by increased auto-organisation and auto-production (Morin 2001, 230–231). From this perspective, cultural activity, aimed at animating and promoting the space we live in into meaningful place, is of crucial importance. This alternative development presupposes the recognition of local identities and building new channels for cultural activity. Mobilization and participation, based on collective identities, may steer urban communities towards more resilient future – beyond the non-places of supermodernity.

Endnotes

- 1 Social space as a concept of social theory is at the focus of many current debates. In addition to the idea of space of flows, introduced by Castells (1998a), one can refer e.g. to social field or social space as introduced by Pierre Bourdieu, or to Michel Foucault's theorizing on “Heterotopia” (1984), and overall on the problem of power relations in social space. These important contributions to social theory, however, will not be discussed in this article.

3.2

A Sense of Place? Tracing a Spatial Approach to Cultural Policy¹

Jenny Johannisson

INTRODUCTION

WHEN I WAS WORKING on my doctoral dissertation on cultural policy (re)construction processes in the City of Göteborg, Sweden, I was struck by the rather “placeless” character of both cultural policy and cultural policy research². Research on cultural policy has, perhaps unsurprisingly, followed the same line of development that cultural policy has followed: geographically, its focus has been nation-states (that is, national spaces and national government policies), and different artistic fields (that is, artistic spaces in relation to national government policies). The notion of globalization processes, here understood as parallel processes of internationalization and decentralization of political-administrative organization (cf., e.g., Johansson 2000; Mitchell 2003), has contributed to the disruption of this focus on national and artistic spaces; to showing that “place matters” also in cultural policy. Globalization is a heavily (over)theorized concept, and I will here provide only a brief summary of what I consider some of the most important common assumptions concerning the consequences of globalization for democratic political-administrative organization.

Firstly, globalization is considered a set of processes rather than a specific state that is either achieved or not. Secondly, local, regional and transnational levels of government are becoming more self-sufficient agents, at the expense of the nation-state (Hettne 1994, 1996; Jerneck 2000). Of course, this does not mean that the nation-state is becoming extinct; on the contrary, the nation-state is still the primary setting for policy-making (Smith 2001). But how the national level of government relates to other levels of government—local, regional, international—is becoming increasingly decisive for how policy-making is enacted. Thirdly, there is a strong shift of interest to aspects of the symbolic production that is involved in all social practices, be they economic, political or everyday life in kind (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). Today, this is usually referred to as the culturalization of society (cf., e.g., Fornäs et al. 2007; Skot-Hansen 1999a). Finally, like British cultural policy researcher Jim McGuigan (2004) points out, in late modern Western societies a neo-liberal account of globalization tends to dominate; an account where globalization refers to a substitution of political power for global market interests. So, while the notion of globalization could – and should – be criticized for its universalistic and often deterministic assumptions, the fact still remains that globalization is the most prevalent account of spatial (re)organization in the Western world today. Therefore, I think that different accounts of globalization have an important role to play also in cultural policy research. On the one hand, globalization processes can be seen as an expression of what McGuigan describes as “the rise of market reasoning within the public cultural sector during the recent period of neo-liberal hegemony” (McGuigan 2004, 35), that is, “place” has become yet another commodity to be sold on a global market. On the other hand, globalization processes can be related to democratic movements arguing that policy-making should move closer to the citizens, activities and places it concerns, thereby introducing local and regional levels of government as important agents in the political-administrative organization.

In the cultural policy field, both the market-oriented and the democracy-oriented rationale can be traced in, for example, the increased

interest shown in culture as a tool in urban regeneration and place marketing (cf. Stevenson 2004). Cultural planning is a policy tool that is often applied in these contexts. Several cultural policy researchers (cf., e.g. Belfiore & Bennett 2008; Kaare Nielsen 2006; Langsted 2003; McGuigan 2004; Stevenson 2004) have been right to criticize the market-oriented rationale and its often simplistic views of the relation between public subsidy of the arts and its economic and social impact; views that tend to motivate cultural planning as a cultural policy strategy. But while warning against increased marketizing in cultural policy, McGuigan simultaneously argues that Franco Bianchini, one of the most prominent representatives of a cultural planning perspective (cf., e.g., Bianchini 1993), is primarily interested in creating a democratic alternative to market-oriented city planning, in adding “... cultural rights to T. H. Marshall’s trio of civil, political and social rights” (McGuigan 1999, 107). In addition, I would like to argue that the notions of urban regeneration, place marketing and cultural planning have contributed to the highlighting of the importance of place in both cultural policy and cultural policy research. In this article, I will introduce the approach that I am using in my own research on Swedish local and regional cultural policies, for the purpose of making place a significant empirical category and the space/place dimension a significant theoretical tool of analysis. Firstly, I will develop my statement of cultural policy and cultural policy research as being placeless a bit further. Secondly, I will introduce theoretical conceptions of the space/place dimension which I find fruitful in relation to local and regional cultural policies. Finally, I will discuss the implications of a space/place-sensitive approach for research on local and regional cultural policies.

THE SPACES AND PLACES OF CULTURAL POLICY

In my doctoral dissertation (Johannisson 2006), I explored the use of different cultural policy discourses in cultural policy (re)construction in

the City of Göteborg, Sweden, during the 1990s. Theoretically, I thus strived to make a contribution to the growing body of cultural policy research informed – in very different ways – by discourse theory (cf., e.g., Bennett 1998, 2003; McGuigan 1996, 2004; Miller & Yúdice 2002; Volkerling 1996). Using a neo-pragmatist, discourse-oriented approach inspired mainly by the works of American philosopher Richard Rorty (1979, 2000), French philosopher Michel Foucault (1991, 1994) and American political scientist Frank Fischer (2003), I studied statements³ put forward in documents and interviews in relation to the shaping of both new visions for and a new organization of the municipality's cultural policy. The statements were produced mainly by agents at the local level of government, but statements by agents on the national and international levels were also included⁴. The discourses used in this process of (re)construction were identified by relating the statements by cultural policy agents to statements put forward in research-based literature on cultural policy or closely related areas. Policy making is thus understood as defined by Fischer, namely as: "... a constant discursive struggle over the definitions of problems, the boundaries of categories used to describe them, the criteria for their classification and assessment, and the meanings of ideals that guide particular actions" (Fischer 2003, 60).

The analysis resulted in the identification of three cultural policy discourses, summarized in the chart.

While strongly emphasizing that discourses cannot be separated from the specific articulations – in this case statements in the cultural policy (re)construction process in Göteborg – which manifest the discourses, I still regard them as useful tools of analysis also in relation to my ongoing research project on regional cultural policies in Sweden⁵. The discourses should be considered a working tool, and their deployment could and should result in modifications of the discourses described above. My main point is that since the discourses also include research-based literature, founded on cultural policy practice and quite influential in cultural policy development in Sweden and elsewhere, they can be used in the study of cultural policy in other places and other processes than those of a specific Swedish municipality in the 1990s. In the following,

I will therefore briefly introduce the three discourses, tuning in on their theoretical inspirations rather than their specific and empirical articulations in Göteborg.

THE QUALITY DISCOURSE

To identify a discourse is to identify a specific set of rules according to which specific categorizations – distinctions – are made (cf. Bartelsen 1993, 62). When categorizing the sets of rules at play in Swedish local cultural policy, I am greatly indebted to Danish cultural policy researcher Dorte Skot-Hansen. In a seminal article (Skot-Hansen 1999b), she describes three main rationales that have guided Nordic – and, to a certain extent, also other West European – cultural policies since the

	THE QUALITY DISCOURSE	THE WELFARE DISCOURSE	THE ALLIANCE DISCOURSE
Aim	Professional, artistic quality	Broaden participation in cultural activities and create a good living environment	Sustainable development (financially and living environment)
Concept of culture	Aesthetic	Anthropological (group-oriented) and aesthetic	Anthropological (individual-oriented) and aesthetic
Concept of place/space	Artistic, universal space	National space	Glocal places
Rationale	Humanistic	Sociological	Market-oriented
Model of governance	Profession-oriented patron model	Legal-bureaucratic architect model	Network-oriented architect- and patron model

Chart 1: Summary of the discourses used by institutional agents in the cultural policy (re)construction process in Göteborg 1991–1998 (Johannisson 2006, 239).

1930s. Skot-Hansen labels these the humanistic rationale, the sociological rationale and the instrumental rationale. The aim of cultural policy within the humanistic rationale is to further the citizens' progress towards *Bildung* by subsidizing professional artistic activities of high quality. The main instrument of cultural policy is to spread artistic excellence to as many citizens as possible, that is, the role of the state is to “democratize Culture” (Skot-Hansen 1999). The humanistic rationale, employed by the Swedish government agencies especially in the formation of cultural policy between the 1930s and 1960s, is based on a sector-oriented and aesthetic concept of culture (cf. Vestheim 1997, 34, Vestheim 2001). It provides the quality discourse with its central moments, a discourse which transcends the specific places where cultural policies are enacted in favor of the specific quality criteria set up in an artistic, universal space. When related to the organization of public cultural policy agents, the quality discourse includes what Swedish political scientist Bo Rothstein (2001) labels a profession-oriented model. This is a model in which professional interests in a specific policy field are allowed a great deal of influence concerning the questions of what cultural policy should be and how it should be organized. In the case of cultural policy, this primarily implies the artists and the art mediators, and in Sweden, as well as in the other Nordic countries, the degree of corporatism in the cultural policy field is quite high (cf. Mangset 1995; Mangset et al. 2008). In the quality discourse, this profession-oriented model of governance is related to what Canadian cultural economists Harry Hillman Chartrand and Claire McCaughey (1989) have labeled a patron model. The patron model, often exemplified with British cultural policy, stipulates that there should be an “arm’s length” between artistic activities and the state. I would therefore argue that the patron model is primarily an arts policy instrument, rather than a welfare policy instrument – the latter being a central moment of the welfare discourse which I will now turn to.

THE WELFARE DISCOURSE

The welfare discourse includes the sociological rationale, which Skot-Hansen (1999b) presents as an important addition to – but certainly not a replacement of – the humanistic rationale in Nordic cultural policies from the 1970s and onwards. The aim of the sociological rationale, when applied in cultural policy is to liberate the citizens, that is, to provide the citizens with possibilities of engaging in cultural activities on their own terms, rather than being the (passive) recipients of professional artistic activities. The main policy instrument of the sociological rationale is, therefore, “cultural democracy”, where democracy refers both to a broader, anthropological concept of culture, and to a potentially broader number of people allowed to engage in cultural and artistic activities. In the welfare discourse, the sociological rationale is applied in relation to groups rather than individuals – in Swedish cultural policy this is expressed in the priority given to what is considered “marginalized groups”, such as children, people with other than Swedish ethnicities, and people with physical or mental impairments. Due to its universalistic welfare moment, the welfare discourse, like the quality discourse, tends to be rather placeless, relating instead to national space and national cultural policy, that is, where welfare policy is discursively positioned in Sweden. The model of governance related to the welfare discourse is what Rothstein (2001) labels a legal-bureaucratic one, that is, a model based on the traditional Weberian notion of a strict division between decision-making politicians and neutral, implementing civil servants. In this model cultural policy is a policy field among others, and its utmost aim is to contribute to the overall welfare of the citizens. This model presupposes a strong state, which does not always keep an arm’s length in its interventions in the cultural field, but rather plays the role of the architect pointed out by Hillman Chartrand and McCaughey (1989). The Nordic countries are often given as examples of the architect model (cf. Vestheim 1995). They have also been portrayed, by Mangset et al. (2008, 2), as a combination of “the French Ministry of Culture model

and the British ‘arm’s length’ model”, that is, as a combination of the quality discourse and the welfare discourse.

THE ALLIANCE DISCOURSE

In opposition to the rather placeless character of the quality discourse and the welfare discourse, place is a central moment in the alliance discourse. In the alliance discourse, the inherent instrumentalism of all political practices – including cultural policy – becomes an overt tool in furthering the aim of sustainable development, both in a narrow economic sense and in a broader sense, alluding to the general living environment of the citizens. The alliance discourse does not hide the “double technique” that Swedish cultural policy has made use of since its formal establishment in the 1970s, that is, to simultaneously claim the autonomy of the arts in relation to the political-administrative organization and the positive role of culture in the local, regional and national development. It is based on the rationale that Skot-Hansen (1999b) labels instrumentalist, thereby illustrating the turn that Swedish and Nordic cultural policies took in the 1980s towards market-oriented arguments for public intervention in the cultural field. To illustrate the fact that all cultural policy is instrumental (cf. Franzén 2002; Vestheim 2008), in the sense that in all cases cultural policy is about promoting culture in order to reach objectives beyond culture itself – whether the objective be that of facilitating the citizens’ access to culture, promoting freedom of speech, or urban regeneration – I label the rationale at play in the alliance discourse “market-oriented” rather than merely instrumentalist. It is this obvious (re)turn of cultural policy to the market’s way of working that is specific for the use made of culture in the alliance discourse. Like the welfare discourse, the alliance discourse is tied up to an anthropological concept of culture, but in the alliance discourse this concept is directed at the individual rather than at the groups. Cultural policy is about facilitating the fulfillment of individual preferences and lifestyles in a global setting, where everything

has become “culturalized” (Skot-Hansen 1999), not about helping the marginalized groups to take part in a predetermined range of activities. And to further individual lifestyles, cultural policy has to be grounded in what makes a specific place unique regarding cultural resources.

As the label indicates, the alliance discourse is about creating and using the networks that policymaking is in this discourse based on (cf. Beck 1994; Halonen 2005; Rothstein 2001); networks that transcend both the political-administrative organization and professional bodies and extend to all agents involved in shaping a place. Traditional distinctions and borders – between public interests and market interests, between professional and non-professional activities and between high and low culture – are contested and give way to partly new power hierarchies. In my study on the cultural policy (re)construction in Göteborg, the empirical political practices that the quality discourse is used for underpinning is arts policy, while cultural policy is mainly based on the welfare discourse. In Göteborg the alliance discourse is used, when promoting new perspectives in cultural policy; for example, in the shape of what has come to be known as cultural planning. The alliance discourse thus puts place into cultural policy⁶, both as a commodity to be sold on a global market, and as an aesthetic and cultural artefact to be shaped, reproduced and transformed by those who live there (cf. Stevenson 2004, 122). In my study on Göteborg, the place was a city; in my ongoing research project, the place is the region. In both cases, a city or a region is not understood as something given or static, but something that is continuously shaped, reproduced and transformed in social interaction between a wide range of different agents. As British political scientist Louise Fawcett (2005, 24) puts it: “a simple territorial definition might not take us very far – we need to refine regions to incorporate commonality, interaction and the possibility of cooperation”. I find her definition of region as “units or ‘zones’ based on groups, states or territories, whose members share some identifiable traits” (ibid.) a useful starting point for exploring regional cultural policy in Sweden. In my ongoing research, I am interested in exploring how regions are created as “zones” through statements given

by cultural policy agents. I will now develop this theoretical approach to the space/place dimension in cultural policy a bit further.

PLACES AS ZONES: A RELATIONAL APPROACH

There are basically three reasons why Fawcett's definition of a region works well with the discourse-oriented, neo-pragmatist approach I apply in my research. Firstly, while Fawcett wants to transcend a mere territorial definition of region, the definition still rests on the notion of geographical territoriality, that is, the fundamentally physical and material character of the places where people live their lives. Secondly, the definition shows how territoriality is based on a specific notion of a common identity, shared between the members who occupy the territory⁷. Thirdly, and most importantly, the definition points to how both territoriality and identity are shaped through social interaction. Researchers in geography and urban studies have contributed to the development of a deeper understanding of how social relations shape, sustain and transform spaces and places against the backdrop of globalization processes. In my own research I have been particularly inspired by British geographer Doreen Massey and American urban theorist Michael Peter Smith. In the following, I will outline a theoretical conception of the space/place dimension as outlined by these researchers.

THE SPATIAL AS "SOCIAL RELATIONS STRETCHED OUT"

Cultural policy researchers have hitherto paid little attention to local and regional cultural policies, although Professor Anita Kangas, the recipient of this festschrift, is one of the important exceptions to this rule (cf., e.g., Kangas, Mangset & Onsér-Franzén 1994; Kangas & Onsér-Franzén 1996). Smith argues that local places are not considered relevant in the

market-oriented account of globalization, which he believes to be the dominant one today, since this account works with a binary opposition between the local and the global:

The global-local duality rests on a false opposition that equates the local with a cultural place of stasis, ontological meaning and personal identity (i.e. the 'place') and the global as the site of dynamic change, the decentering of meaning, and the fragmentation/homogenization of culture (i.e. the 'space' of global capitalism) (Smith 2001, 157).

Within this account, place is thus associated with the concrete and stable, while the global is associated with the abstract and flexible. But, as Massey has pointed out: "Those who conflate the local with the concrete ... are confusing geographical scale with processes of abstraction in thought" (Massey 1999, 129). The local is not simple and easy to interpret, while the global is complex and difficult to analyze; instead, all levels on the spatial scale are of equal dignity. Above all, they should not be studied in isolation, since they contribute to shaping each other (Jarneck 2000, 22; Smith 2001, 19, 59). Both Massey and Smith show how research on globalization processes can transcend the market-oriented account which tends to dominate today, in favor of a critical perspective on the modern project of enlightenment: "... one of the most productive mobilisations of the term 'globalisation' has been in its use, in particular by 'post-colonial' theorists, in the re-telling of the classic story of modernity" (Massey 1999, 10). Such a critical perspective on globalization could thus contribute to questioning the traditional Western view on history. According to Massey, this traditional view gives priority to time over space: "... time is the nodal point, the privileged signifier" (Massey 1994, 257). Space has been explained in terms of given and closed entities, as stasis. Places, that is, material manifestations of space, are considered to generate internally the qualities that are considered to make them unique in relation to other places. From the traditional viewpoint, culture becomes identical with a specific place. It is this traditional view

on the relation between space, place, identity and culture which is put to use in “the neo-liberal hegemony” referred to in the introduction. Here, globalization is first and foremost about the globalization of capital, where the only places that can be real players are the major cities of the world, such as New York, London and Tokyo (Sassen 1991, cf. also Florida 2005a). As I also showed in the introduction, the cultural policy research community has proven very able in providing a critique against this increased marketizing in cultural policy, but less able in providing alternatives to the “global-local duality”.

Massey provides the following, alternative view on how the space/place dimension could be theoretically and empirically understood:

This would imagine the spatial as the sphere of juxtaposition, or co-existence, of distinct narratives, as the product of power-filled social relations; it would be a view of space which tries to emphasize both its social construction and its necessarily power-filled nature. Within that context, ‘places’ may be imagined as particular articulations of these social relations, including local relations ‘within’ the place and those many connections which stretch way beyond it. And all of these embedded in complex, layered histories. This is place as open, porous, hybrid – this is place as meeting place!... where specificity (local uniqueness, a sense of place) derives not from some mythical internal roots nor from history as a relative isolation – now to be disrupted by globalization – but precisely from the absolute particularity of the mixture of influences found together there (Massey 1999, 21).

To Massey, space is the product of social interaction: “... the spatial is social relations ‘stretched out’” (Massey 1994, 2). Since social interaction is inherently relational, dynamic and never completed, the same goes for space. As pointed out in the quote above, from this viewpoint place is understood as a “particular articulation of social relations” (cf. Massey 1994). This is a point that has been made by other approaches informed by poststructuralist theories on identity and language (cf. Andersson

2006). From such a perspective, just as identities and words do not carry any objective or essential meaning, the meaning of the space/place dimension is constantly negotiated in social interaction. An equally important point that Massey makes is that space/place is not only a product of social interaction, but that space/place simultaneously contributes to the shaping of social relations. In sum, Massey provides a spatial approach that is based on relations: between people, between spatial scales, between narratives and between space and time. In cultural policy and cultural policy research this perspective is paralleled by an increasingly influential view, according to which the focus lies not on the interaction between cultures as separate entities, but on the specific cultural expressions that result from this interaction. Skot-Hansen (2003) has described this as an increased interest in the hybridization that characterizes cultural expressions, and, I would like to add, the places where these expressions are enacted. In my view, this is a perspective which is oriented towards sustaining and developing democracy: it is about making as many voices as possible heard. These democratic implications could also be said to answer the important questions of why place should matter more in cultural policy, and why the space/place dimension should be highlighted as a theoretical category in cultural policy research. In the final section of this article, I will discuss the implications of the approach for research on local and regional cultural policies.

CULTURAL POLICY: FILLING A PLACE WITH MEANING

In my ongoing comparative study of cultural policy in two Swedish regions, I am currently working with developing further the analytical framework applied in my study on the cultural policy (re)construction in Göteborg. My study on Göteborg showed how a new vision for, and a new organization of, the city's cultural policy were shaped in relation to cultural policy visions, and cultural policy organization on the other levels of government, that is, the regional, the national and the interna-

tional levels. It also showed that while there seemed to be a consensus amongst agents on all these different levels of government on what the visions (objectives) of cultural policy should be, the agents had divergent and conflicting views on what kind of organization, on which level of the government could best ensure the fulfillment of this vision. The issue of the political-administrative (re)organization of cultural policy therefore became an important instigator for my ongoing study on regional cultural policy. With reference to my experiences from both studies, I would argue that a space/place-sensitive approach to local and regional cultural policies has to provide adequate theoretical and empirical accounts of at least the following aspects: (1) globalization; (2) the agents involved in cultural policy construction and the techniques through which this construction takes place; (3) the zones where cultural policy is enacted. I will conclude this article with some brief remarks on these aspects.

GLOBALIZATION REVISITED

I have already discussed different accounts of globalization in the introduction; here, I only wish to provide a few additional comments. I have argued that it is interesting to explore globalization, as one of the most dominant narratives of late modernity, in relation to cultural policy. How is the narrative of globalization dealt with in cultural policy and cultural policy research, that is, what specific stories about space and place is this narrative used for underpinning? But I also believe that globalization should be explored in a more material empirical sense. In my own research, I work with a definition of globalization processes as parallel processes of internationalization and decentralization. In social sciences, most notably in political science, internationalization is usually separated from transnationalization and globalization. In this context, internationalization refers to the increased interaction across national borders between public government agencies, while transnationalization refers to the increased interaction across national borders between

bodies that go beyond public agents, that is, agents in the private and third sectors. Together, internationalization and transnationalization constitute globalization (Jönsson 2001, 193). Another way of expressing a similar distinction is to separate political globalization from economic and cultural globalization.

When exploring the political-administrative organization of Swedish local and regional cultural policies, I thus empirically focus on the expressions of internationalization, that is, political globalization. In my ongoing and future research, though, I think it is very important to explore also the relations between internationalization and transnationalization, that is, the relations between different kinds of globalization (cf. Smith 2001). This is not least evident when combining the notion of internationalization with that of decentralization. Japanese cultural policy researcher Nobuko Kawashima (1997) has in her seminal article made a distinction between three different kinds of decentralization in the cultural policy field: economic, cultural and political. Again, in my research I primarily explore political decentralization, that is, how national governments increasingly grant power over cultural policy decision-making and implementation to regional and local governments. But again, I think it is also important to explore how different kinds of decentralization interlock and sometimes clash. For example, I think that Kawashima's definition of cultural decentralization as the dissemination of the arts to a broader spectrum of the citizens could be questioned because of its one-sided focus on a traditional, aesthetic concept of culture. Political decentralization can potentially imply that other definitions of culture come into play in local and regional settings. This being said, I believe that fruitful analytical tools for exploring empirical expressions of globalization have already been developed in cultural policy research and elsewhere, ready to be used in studies of local and regional cultural policies.

COMMUNITIES OF JUSTIFICATION AND DIFFERENCE-ENGINES

Another theme that has already been well developed in cultural policy research is that of identifying which agents primarily contribute to the shaping of cultural policy, including the questions of how they go about it. A number of different approaches with different epistemological underpinnings can be identified, but here I will only introduce a perspective which I think works well with the discourse-oriented, neo-pragmatist approach I use in my own research. In this approach, discourse is considered not merely a governing structure in a specific field, but also a tool that can be actively used by the agents constituting the field. I use Rorty's (2000) concept of community of justification to explore which agents use what discourses as tools in local and regional cultural policies. To Rorty (1979), justification is a fundamentally communicative and relational practice, and its utmost aim is to shape, sustain and transform the rules (discourses) governing a specific set of social practices. Community of justification thus refers to the agents allowed to negotiate these rules and thereby the social practice itself.

It is important to note that a specific field, such as cultural policy, is shaped through several sets of social practices. Thus, every field contains several communities of justification. In my research so far, I have only explored the community of public agents working explicitly with cultural policy at the local, regional, national and international levels of government. In my view, it is very important to map out how this community relates to other communities in the cultural policy field, for example, how it relates to what could be labeled an artistic community of justification. I would also like to point out that a community of justification includes agents on different spatial scales, and the relations between these agents should be at the forefront of a space/place-sensitive approach to cultural policy. But I also believe that in order for the research not to lose sight of the very specific and material conditions that separate one spatial scale from another, it is usually more realistic

to focus on one singular spatial scale at a time. Finally, in cultural policy research there is a need to understand better not only which agents are accepted as members of the cultural policy community, but also which agents are excluded. As Volkerling (1996, 191) states, politics is an "... essentially discursive process of differentiation", where public agents in the cultural policy field can be understood as "difference-engines" (ibid.); engines that have a unique position in the power relations of cultural policy. But they are certainly not the only agents which have—or should have—influence over shaping cultural policy. The narrative of globalization processes contributes to underscoring this point, by making power relations between different agents on different spatial scales visible.

THE ZONES OF CULTURAL POLICY

It is in order to make the spatial scales of cultural policy visible and hence, empirically researchable that I find Fawcett's concept of zone fruitful, since it embraces material, geographical and territorial aspects, as well as the discursively negotiated aspects concerning the identity of a specific territory. As Massey notes:

All attempts to institute horizons, to establish boundaries, to secure the identity of places, can ... therefore be seen as to be attempts to stabilize the meaning of particular envelopes of space-time. They are attempts to get to grips with the unutterable mobility and contingency of space-time (Massey 1994, 5).

I would like to understand the concept of zone as a way of illustrating how these attempts are expressed in the (re)organization of local and regional cultural policies.

When exploring local and regional cultural policies I think the concept of zone should also be put in relation to the concept of multi-level governance, developed in political science. Swedish political scientist

Jon Pierre (2001) uses policy-making in the city of Göteborg as an example, when he states that policy-making in the city is the result of negotiations between policy-makers at five different levels: the city district committees, the municipality, the Region Västra Götaland, the Swedish national government, and the European Union. In my study on the cultural policy (re)construction in Göteborg, I could show how the relations between these different levels were important in shaping the city's cultural policy, albeit in different ways. For example, while the conflicts between the city district committees and the municipal board of culture were of a very manifest and material kind and concerned the distribution of power over cultural policy within the city, the conflicts between the city and the national government were of an equally manifest kind, although they were expressed more in terms of symbolic negotiations than concrete decision-making. In a similar manner, the Region *Västra Götaland* was by the city treated as a threat, while at the same time it was used as a tool in arguing for increased decentralization in the aforementioned negotiations with the national government. The European Union was the only agent that was portrayed solely as an asset by the city. I believe that by analyzing the levels as zones, we can enable a more complex and multilayered analysis of the networks of power in the community of cultural policy.

Finally, although Fawcett only refers to the region (of mainly the transnational kind) as an empirical expression of a zone, I think the concept could also be used for understanding the notion of a city or a nation. Actually, Smith argues for an approach to urban settings that is very similar to the arguments put forth by both Massey and Fawcett:

Since human agency operates at many spatial scales, and is not restricted to 'local' territorial or socio-cultural formations, the very concept of the 'urban' requires re-conceptualization as a social space that is a crossroads or meeting ground for the interplay of diverse localizing practices of national, transnational, and even global-scale actors, as these wider networks of meaning, power,

and social practice come into contact with more locally configured networks, practices, and identities (Smith 2001, 127).

In this quote, I think that Smith provides an excellent summary of how a space/place-sensitive approach to cultural policy can enrich cultural policy research. Firstly, he contributes to showing that the community of cultural policy consists of agents on several spatial scales, and, secondly, he shows how different places on different spatial scales can only be filled with meaning when put in relation to each other. And, finally, he makes evident how every place (or zone) and every narrative (such as that of globalization) are historical constructs, created by people in social interaction, and thus open to contestation.

Endnotes

- 1 A draft of this article was presented at *Cultural Policy Research: Conceptual, Spatial and Temporal Approaches*, a research colloquium arranged by professor Anita Kangas in Jyväskylä, November 6-8, 2008. I want to thank Katriina Soini and Pasi Saukonen for providing insightful and valuable comments on my presentation.
- 2 “Cultural policy” and “cultural policy research” are here understood in a narrow sense, that is, as public measures in the cultural field, and, respectively, research done on those measures.
- 3 “Statement” is henceforth defined as a linguistic utterance that makes a claim on having some authoritative force, in the Foucauldian sense of being classified as “in the true” (Mills 1997, 61).
- 4 As a whole, the empirical material consisted of cultural policy statements put forward by agents in the political-administrative organization in Göteborg and on other levels of government during the period 1991–1998. The agents included were primarily of the institutional kind and were mainly situated in Göteborg: the municipal council, the municipal executive board, the cultural affairs committee, the 21 city district committees, and adherent administrations. In addition, institutional agents on the national level were represented by the Swedish parliament, the Swedish government and the Swedish National Council for Cultural Affairs, but also by the committees responsible for Swedish Government Official Reports. Finally, institutional agents on the international level were included in the form of reports by Unesco, the European Union and the Council of Europe. In total, 117 public documents were analysed and six interviews with key cultural politicians and administrators in the City of Göteborg were conducted.

- 5 The project – *Changes in the Geography of Cultural Policy* – is financed by the Swedish Arts Council and consists of a comparative study of cultural policy in Region Västra Götaland and Region Skåne, two results of experiments with regionalization that since the 1990s have been carried out in Sweden. Two projects in the cultural field in two different municipalities – one in each region – constitute the case studies. The projects are both financed by the European Union (Interreg IIIA), thereby introducing the relation between the local and the international in the study. The study includes both policy documents and interviews with key policy agents, on the local, regional and national levels of government. The overall research question is directed at regional identity construction, while the more operative research questions are directed at identifying and analyzing alliances and conflicts between different levels of government in the cultural policy field, as well as between cultural policy and other policy fields. The project runs between 2007 and 2009. For a presentation of the study, see Johannisson (2008).
- 6 With this observation, I do not wish to imply that the space/place dimension has never before been a relevant empirical and/or theoretical category in cultural policy and cultural policy research. As I have shown above, both the quality discourse and the welfare discourse work with highly specific notions of artistic and national spaces. In addition, cultural policy subfields (such as, e.g., museum policy) have in Sweden worked with place-sensitive approaches which the discourses introduced above do not make justice. Still, my point is that these specific notions of spaces and places have not been sufficiently scrutinized in cultural policy and cultural policy research. Furthermore, it could be argued that a discourse-oriented approach in itself could be criticized for being placeless, tuning in on linguistic and abstract structures rather than the more material character of social practices (cf. Massey 1994, 13). However, for mainly two reasons I still believe that a discourse-oriented approach is fruitful in my research on local and regional cultural policies; firstly, a discourse-oriented approach has the potential to make visible the linguistically mediated power hierarchies that permeate all social practices, and, secondly, when combined with a more practice-oriented approach (such as the neo-pragmatist one), a discourse-oriented approach has the potential to make visible how social practices are constructed in a dialogue between structural dependency and individual agency.
- 7 This point has, of course, also been made in relation to nation-states, perhaps most notably by Benedict Anderson (1991), when he expresses the relation between nation and identity in terms of “imagined communities”. In the cultural policy research field, the role that cultural policy has played/plays in the construction of nations and nationality has also been quite extensively explored (cf., e.g. Bennett 2001, and, in a Swedish context, cf. Bohman 1997, 2001; Harding 2007).

3.3

Whose City? Planning for Creativity and Cultural Diversity

Dorte Skot-Hansen

THE CITY AS A STAGE FOR CULTURAL DIVERSITY

IN *THE CULTURES OF CITIES* (1995) Sharon Zukin asks: Whose culture? Whose city? In her analysis of the symbolic economy of cities, as it finds its expression in the public space, she differentiates between negotiations taking place on the micro level and the power struggles enacted on the macro level between global and local cultures, public steering and privatization, social diversity and homogeneity. In that connection she writes:

People with economic and political power have the greatest opportunity to shape public culture by controlling the building of the city's public space in stone and concrete. Yet, public space is inherently democratic. The question of who can occupy public space, and so define an image of the city, is open ended. (Zukin 1995, 11)

Although, according to Zukin, there still is room for negotiation, she can see the danger in that since the 1970s the public space has increasingly been defined on the macro level, and culture has become an instrument

for developmental strategies of local town councils and their business partners. Earlier cultural institutions were created by economic surplus, but now these cultural institutions are aimed at attracting business as well as the creative class. This way, the social and cultural diversity of cities is challenged, and we face the question of who is to define their everyday life and image.

In this article I will discuss how three different planning models relate to creativity and cultural diversity, not only in the public space, but also in the cultural offers of the cities, and their cultural activities as such. Zukin’s question: *Whose culture? Whose city?* is raised in relation to three different models for the planning of culture and the arts. First, a model for the planning of creative cities based on the creative class’ need for fun and flow, next the cultural planning model that seeks to include diverse lifestyles and subcultures. And finally, these are seen in relation to the more traditional sector based cultural policy as such. The three models are summed up in the following model: **THE CREATIVE CITY**

3 Models of Planning

<u>Creative Cities</u> - a la Florida	<u>Cultural Planning</u> - planning with culture	<u>Arts Policy</u> - planning for the arts
Cities as global competitors	City as a local space - geografical	City as an art-scene – sector based
Planning fun and flow for the creative class	Planning for diverse lifestyles and sub-cultures	Planning for “creative moments”
Culture as experience	Broad, anthropological definition of culture	Narrow, humanistic definition of culture
Creativity as economic capital	Creativity as a local resource	Creativity as aesthetic experiments with intrinsic value
Culture-led economic strategy based on the 3 T’s	Strategic use of culture in community development	Strategic development of the arts and their audience

– PLANNING FOR THE CREATIVE CLASS

Creativity is what drives every dynamic, modern economy. The communities that attract and keep smart, creative, diverse people are the ones that invest their public dollars astutely. The right strategy can give the economy added zip. Strategic investments in things like public art galleries, libraries and green spaces for Sunday picnics and kid's soccer games help make a city the kind of luminous, liveable place that everyone wants to call home (Halifax Regional Municipality Economic Development Strategy 2005–2010).

The city of Halifax in Canada has understood today's mantra: if a city is to experience an economic upswing, it must attract and retain the "smart, creative and diverse people". Halifax is just one of many cities currently aiming to become a "cool" city that is hip and young.

American economist Richard Florida has exerted an enormous influence on urban development in the new millennium through his best-selling book *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002). Florida is just one of many people who talk about creative cities, but his version is particularly appealing, partly because his theory has an almost perfect aesthetic form with its three T's – Tolerance, Talent and Technology – which provides an easily comprehensible and almost formulaic description of what cities need to do to achieve economic success, and partly because he underpins his theory with copious empirical research, particularly the many indices by which cities and regions can be ranked in terms of their tolerance (measured in relation to the proportion of homosexuals, artists and foreigners in the population), talent (measured by the number of persons with university degrees) and technology (the presence of hi-tech industry and innovation). These factors are combined to form the Creativity Index, which allows all regions and towns in the USA to be compared with a single yardstick. The book has been closely studied by

business executives, trend planners, local politicians and social scientists, and the theory has become a hit.

Richard Florida's concept of creative cities has spread like a wildfire within urban planning, and the three T's have become the new mantra of development for regions as well as cities. His main thesis is that economic growth occurs mainly in cities which are tolerant, diverse and open towards creativity, and he claims that it is the place, rather than the work, which provides the principal attraction. The sequence is, first, tolerance and talent – then technology. Silicon Valley arose in San Francisco because the city had been the home of the Beat Generation since as long ago as the nineteen-fifties, and had been the focus of the Summer of Love in the sixties. The presence of the hippies and the gays in turn attracted new, creative citizens; according to Florida, San Francisco was a tolerant, creative and culturally diverse place long before it became the hub for new hi-tech companies and industries.

Although Florida's emphasis on tolerance may seem positive, the problem in using diversity and tolerance as the parameters of development is that they are entirely undefined. In purely practical terms they can be measured only in terms of the proportion of gays, bohemians and what he calls 'the Melting Pot Index'; what tolerance really means in the final analysis, and how it comes to expression in everyday life, is not discussed. As a result, 'tolerance' becomes an undemanding backdrop against which the creative class can express itself on the basis of a kind of colourful, multicultural staging, in which the visibility of gays, artists and ethnic groups provides local colour and can be used to reaffirm the creative class's view of itself as tolerant. When the mayor of San Francisco, together with his family, heads up the Gay Parade every year in an open-top car, it is hopefully an expression of genuine tolerance, but it is also part of an image strategy for the city, which has learned to market its differentness.

The idea that tolerance should be encouraged in order to attract the new creative classes has at any rate given new life to the debate on urban development, as we can read at a Norwegian website for cultural planning, Kryss:

Creative people are mobile and cosmopolitan. They seek urban qualities and use the city spaces as their most important leisure areas ... Homosexuals and singles are groups which are particularly associated with the creative city and its forms of life. Tolerance and openness are consequently significant economic forces. (www.kryss.no)

CONTESTING CITIES

The idea of ‘the power of place’ has also made its mark here. The enthusiasm for this ‘soft’ model for the development of urban infrastructure, rather than a purely economics-based strategy, can be seen as an example of the culturisation of urban planning that has taken place over the past thirty years. Whereas Danish cities in the fifties and sixties – with Holstebro as an exception (Skot-Hansen 1999a) – tended to concentrate on stimulating economic growth by creating favourable conditions for trade and industry by planning pedestrian streets and industrial parks, planning in the eighties and nineties came to focus on the (re-)establishment of city centres and the extension of high-profile waterfront areas which offer new combinations of consumption and experience.

With the de-industrialisation of the cities, a form of trend planning arose, predicated on the need of all cities to continually compete with each other to present the most attractive qualities in terms of business, tourism, culture and experiences, via flagship and specialisation strategies which seek to shore up a fragile economy via investment in cultural buildings, or via hyped individual events. This trend has become further refined in the new millennium, when the idea of “just add culture and stir” has become the recipe for success. As the cultural planner Graeme Evans says in his book *Cultural Planning: an urban renaissance?* “The symbolic and political economies of culture have arguably never been so interlinked” (Evans 2001, 2).

At the same time, urban planning is becoming increasingly centred on establishing cities as experiencescapes, which are seen as a space in the interface between tourism, economy and culture. The Swedish tourism researcher Tom O'Dell does not only see these interfaces as fun and flow:

[...] experiencescapes can also be places in which the local and global are entwined and where power relations are played out, political interests are materialized, cultural identities contested and dreams are redefined. This is important to bear in mind, because to a large extent, the offerings of these experiencescapes are as elusive as they are intangible, even though their cultural, economic and political consequences are real (O'Dell 2005, 18–19).

The result of this may be a fantasy city in which the entire city becomes a theme park. Today, more or less all multinational entertainment companies have development teams which evaluate, plan and initiate 'urban entertainment destination' projects. This occurs on the basis of synergies between the entertainment and development industries, as expressed in concepts such as shoppertainment, which combines shopping and entertainment in new ways, eatertainment, in which food is consumed in restaurants with special themes, and edutainment, where "learning is fun". But what happens to the cultural diversity in the themed city? John Hannigan, the author of the book *Fantasy City – Pleasure and profit in the post-modern metropolis* (1998) asks:

Are we prepared to overlook the cultural diversity in the community in favour of pre-packaged corporate entertainment destination? Will there be room for leisure activities other than those which can be branded, licensed, franchised and rolled out on a global scale? And, finally, are we prepared to designate our inner cities no-go zones except for the heavily fortified themed attractions which welcome a constant flow of tourists embarked

on leisure safaris into the depths of the post-modern metropolis?
(Hannigan 1998, 200.)

This development has only escalated in the new millennium. Experience has become a focal point in the experience economy and marketing. Commodities are fused with emotions in what is labelled experience economy and has the capitalisation of emotions and experiences as its purpose. The way in which the experience economy capitalises on the need for experiences presents new challenges to the cities. Regardless of whether one designates these new experience cities as experiencescapes or a fantasy city, the crux of the matter is that they marginalize the actual inhabitants and create stereotypical images of the characteristics of the place (Skot-Hansen, 2008).

Here it can be said that Florida takes a more subtle approach to the confluence between culture, lifestyle and the economy by talking about the importance of creative capital as a prerequisite for growth – i.e. that it is a question of investing in urban environments, not merely for tourists, but also for the creative class: that third of the population “who create economic value through their creative work” (Florida 2002, 68). This class encompasses artists, designers, architects and others who create visible and durable expressions, as well as a much larger group who are involved in creative problem-solving within technology development, the financial world, medicine, etc. This group of people is, in general, a major consumer of cultural activities, but they have tastes which differ from those of the former, more elitist bourgeoisie with regard to the kind of cultural attractions they seek. They are not especially interested in cultural institutions in the form of high-profile art galleries or operas. They prefer to wander around an urban district characterised by cafés, galleries, bookshops, shops, cinemas and theatres, preferably in new hybrid forms, and are eclectic in the sense that they are happy to combine many different forms of cultural expression. The creative class wishes to play a part in defining the place in which they live, through a continual dynamic process, and at the same time they wish to strengthen their own identities as creative individuals. Culture for them is not an offer, but a lifestyle.

When Florida describes the lifestyle of this class in such picturesque and enthusiastic terms, he paints a picture of an almost rarefied café latte-consuming group's need for experiences and consumption driven by impulse and pleasure. He does not mention the more distinctive differences in lifestyle, and consequently, more differentiated needs for expression, that must despite everything exist within a group that encompasses around a third of the population. But the main problem, in my opinion, lies in the fact that power relations, in terms of the relationships between the various classes or social strata in the city, are by and large absent from Florida's perspective. That which is good for the creative class is assumed to be good for all, and scant attention is paid to the risk that supporting the needs of this class may in many cases undermine the needs of others – such as the need for reasonable housing rents or means of cultural expression. Not everyone drinks latte at brunch.

If we nonetheless – for the sake of argument – choose to believe in Florida's fundamental theory based on the three T's, we may ask whether any city can become a creative city. Which is the chicken, and which is the egg? If it is true that tolerance comes first, then the major question is whether you can plan "the tolerant city". Is it a matter of attracting (even more) gays, artists and ethnic groups? Or is it a question of encouraging openness, possibilities and diversity more generally? Here, Florida's planning for diversity may be too superficial, with the risk of resulting in the development of "Voodoo Cities", in which the post-modern facade functions like a carnival mask to conceal an underlying decay (Harvey 1988).

CULTURAL PLANNING – PLANNING FOR LIFESTYLES AND SUBGROUPS

The approach to urban development known as cultural planning takes a far greater account of the diversity that flourishes in the city. What first and foremost characterises the geographically defined cultural planning

is an anthropological approach to culture, in which culture is defined as "a whole way of life" that unfolds in a limited area, which can be a (major) city, an urban district or a local community. Cultural planning can be seen as an opposite or a challenge to the more limited cultural policy planning that is concerned with a fairly narrow concept of art and culture. As one of the heralds of cultural planning, Colin Mercer, formerly a professor of cultural policies and now a private cultural consultant, states in polemic terms: "It cannot be generated from the self-satisfied and enclosed position which holds that art is good for the people and the community" (Mercer 2005, 2). Or as urban sociologist Franco Bianchini states less aggressively in the article "Cultural Planning in Post-Industrial Societies":

We need to understand the difference between cultural planning and cultural policy. Traditional cultural policies which are about the development of cultural activities in theatre, in literature, in dance, in cinema and so on, will continue to exist and they are important. And we need specialists who nurture creativity in all these different sectors, who know the audiences, who develop interesting events and who nurture creativity in all these interesting events and who nurture institutions working in this field. But probably we need the addition of the cultural planner as a new figure in policy making (Bianchini 2004, 21).

Whereas we here in the Nordic countries have traditionally operated with an understanding of cultural policies as a discipline that has been implemented on the basis of more or less clearly defined cultural political objectives, and within a fairly narrow and well defined space, cultural planning is about a broader integration of the arts and other cultural expressions as part of a revitalisation process of city life. In this model the main emphasis is placed on the strengthening of cultural pluralism by creating opportunities for all the segments of local society. Cultural planning can be seen as an opening towards a more 'democratic' cultural policy, in the sense that it builds on the intrinsic resources of local com-

munities and their need for a more value and quality oriented cultural policy, and in this way it encourages greater cultural diversity.

Internationally, there has been a long standing boom of interest for this type of cultural planning. The roots of the concept of cultural planning can be traced all the way back to the USA in the late 1970s, when the first Ph.D. in cultural planning was written. Even so, it is usually referred back to England in the late 1980s where, according to Bianchini, it should be seen as a response to the problematic use of cultural policies for urban renewal, economic growth and town-marketing. Here great iconographic prestige projects in city centres were intended to attract tourists, re-brand cities and create an international profile. Often this was at the expense of resources for local areas that were left desolate and out of bounds (Bianchini 2004). Glasgow, apparently highly successful as a European Cultural Capital in 1990, may serve as an example. Today it is one of the cities in Europe that has the greatest gap between the rich and healthy minorities, and the increasingly poor, ailing and stigmatised population. This type of socio-economic development is one of the many problems that European cities struggle against. The concept of cultural planning – ideally seen – seeks to create cities that include all lifestyles and the needs of all groups.

But what is cultural planning? In a general sense, cultural planning is about the broad integration of art and cultural expression as part of the revitalisation of city life. According to the definition offered by British cultural consultant Colin Mercer, it is also a development tool, inasmuch as “cultural planning is the strategic and integral use of cultural resources in community development.” (Mercer 2002, 172) In this context, cultural resources refer to anything that contributes to the culture of a particular place or people. This can be abstract or concrete; British cultural consultant Lis Ghilardi defines cultural resources as “anything that contributes to the culture of a particular place or people. It may be something tangible, e.g. a heritage building, or it may be intangible – a feeling of place” (Ghilardi 2003). Cultural planning is strategic in the sense that it should be seen as part of a larger strategy for urban development. It must take place in collaboration with physical planning,

financial and industrial development goals, and with leisure, housing development and public works. Cultural planning is integrated in the sense that it is integrated into other political processes. In other words, it is not merely something which is added as the final layer of a political process, like a kind of a finish. On the role of the cultural planner, Colin Mercer writes:

So cultural planners must be there and make themselves heard from the very beginning. At the first whiff of a town or a strategic plan, at the first sign of a new residential or commercial development, at the first signal of a new local industry development strategy. ... they must persuade public and private sector authorities, on behalf of communities—and with their support and sanction—that these are the structures and the rituals and the sites of our local life, that you are planning. This is why cultural planning must be integral to other planning processes and not appended as an afterthought (Mercer 2005, 2).

To implement such a broadly-based cultural policy requires extensive quantitative and qualitative cultural mapping as the background for formulating an actual cultural strategy. Colin Mercer describes the principles for such work in his book *Towards Cultural Citizenship: Tools for Cultural Policy and Development* (2002, 165–77):

Quantitative

- Population profile
- Ethnic groups
- Art-related workplaces
- Cultural industries profile
- Cultural facilities and institutions
- Natural and built cultural heritage
- Tourism and leisure profile
- Quality of life profile

Qualitative

- Sense of place
- Cultural attitudes
- Artistic expression and their stories
- Accessibility and obstacles
- Lifestyle and subcultures

Besides this analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the city or a region, the city's players are involved via hearings, workshops, vision conferences and other involvement processes, against which background a genuine local cultural strategy can be formulated that includes a vision and a short-term and long-term strategic plan. As we can see, the tools required as a foundation for an "ideal" process of cultural planning, such as it has been described by the professional – and commercial – cultural consultants, are simultaneously highly abstract and highly demanding. As a result, it can be hard to find specific examples of cultural planning which live up to all these requirements at one and the same time. Consequently, as Franco Bianchini points out, it has been difficult to implement the strategy in the long term:

[...] the idea of cultural planning is an idea which is difficult to communicate, it is quite subtle, quite complex and it needs examples ... it has been revealed to be often connected with the work and the enthusiasm of particular individuals, politicians and policy makers, and as soon as these politicians or policy makers have lost power, the whole strategy has tended to collapse, has tended to revert to a much more traditional, cultural form-based sector of vertical functional strategy, so it is not an easy idea to implement (Bianchini 2004, 13).

CULTURAL PLANNING AS A TOOL FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

At first sight, cultural planning is far less likely to employ culture as a development factor than the Florida model, although here, too, critics claim that there is a tendency to use culture as an economic and social lever, especially in England and Australia.

As an extension of culturally based revitalisation of cities and strategies for cultural industries in the 1990s, the Labour government, as part of their Third Way policy, encouraged local authorities to develop cultural strategies that involve a broad cultural spectrum and build on social inclusion. In 1999 the Department for Culture, Media and Sport published *Local Cultural Strategies Draft Guidance for Local Authorities in England*, which obliged all local authorities to work out a cultural strategy to "help policy makers to focus on the needs, demands, and aspirations of the community". This development can be seen to reflect that the cultural political rationale in England, according to cultural policy researcher Eleanor Belfiore, at the turn of the millennium shifted from an economic to a social rationale, in that culture is not merely intended to stimulate economic growth, but also to solve the problem of social exclusion. In its English version, the model of cultural planning has largely turned instrumental in regard to economic and social development and, generally speaking, these days it would be hard to consider English cultural policies without taking into account their practical merits (Belfiori 2002).

One researcher, highly critical of the cultural planning trend, is cultural researcher Deborah Stevenson. She has conducted an in depth analysis of cultural planning as it has been practiced in Australia. According to her, Australia has been the second "hot spot" for cultural planning, greatly inspired by developments in Great Britain and influenced by "a global network of experts who actively promoted cultural planning to Australian governments and arts organisations" (Stevenson 2005, 38). Here the notion that cultural planning should be in the centre of local

steering processes was first "sold" to governmental arts organisations and administrators, and later to local politicians as an innovative way of solving problems within a wide range of cultural, economic, social and urban development areas. The promotion of cultural planning, according to Stevenson, was extremely successful. E.g., all local town councils in New South Wales were intended to work out cultural plans in 2004, and here the Ministry of Arts has developed a set of cultural planning guidelines in order to encourage the integration of cultural planning into the local government management planning process. Her critical remarks focus particularly on the use of a broad cultural concept:

"... cultural planning is expected to be about almost anything and relevant to almost everything. This definitional breadth often results in a chasm between the positioning of cultural planning as concerned with the social, economic, creative, and urban issues on the one hand, and the spheres in which it actually operates, on the other hand – the arts, cultural industries, and heritage ... only when planners adopt a cohesive and rigorous understanding of culture as something, rather than everything, will cultural planning emerge as an effective and relevant policy for local creative endeavour" (Stevenson 2005, 46).

Hence, her critique is based on the fact that existing plans largely move within a fairly narrow cultural field, such as the arts, cultural industry and the cultural heritage while, at the same time, seeking to solve practically all problems relating to life in the cities: "Central here is the use of cultural planning as a tool for achieving social inclusion and citizenship – aims that are imagined principally in terms of economic accumulation" (Stevenson 2004, 119). In this way cultural planning is used as a process of civilisation, linked to political and administrative objectives, and not as a dynamic, flexible and situational process. Her thorough analysis of the diverse agendas and plus-words in the Australian and English use of the concept of cultural planning clearly shows that there is a need for more clearly defined strategic thinking. Otherwise cultural planning may

turn into a purely instrumental tool for social and economic development rather than cultural development.

SEEKING NEW MODELS

Does this mean we should retreat to a more narrow humanistic definition of culture which views art and culture as forms of “enlightenment” expressed in a more traditional sector planning process? And how can cultural diversity be ensured in a planning process which most often is founded in a universalistic (read: Western) concept of quality and where the arms-length principle often results in exclusion instead of inclusion? And where the strategic development of audience more often deals with the inclusion of minorities into the mainstream rather than developing cultural institutions who reflect cultural diversity? However, when it functions best, it also supports free expression of art and provides space for aesthetic experiments, innovation and challenges, and it basically sees creativity and art as experiences with intrinsic value (Skot-Hansen 2005).

My point is that neither the Creative Cities approach, with its reliance on the creative class, nor the geographically-defined lifestyle approach of cultural planning, nor the narrower sectoral approach of cultural policy planning are sufficient by themselves to ensure the development of creative and diverse cities. The challenge lies in mobilising the city’s own resources, instead of mindlessly copying models and concepts which have been developed elsewhere. We require reflective cultural planning which at one and the same time takes into account various lifestyle differences and the need of art for free spaces and dialogue, and which on a general level treats art and culture as a resource for personal development, rather than a strategic tool for the development of cities in short-term competition.

We must consequently find a new model in which artistic, cultural, ethnic and social differences are reflected and made visible in the urban

spaces and cultural offers, with cultural diversity as the linchpin. In this context, cultural diversity does not mean that all cultural attractions must be for everyone, but rather that a multitude of cultural institutions and activities must be available which are capable of meeting the many needs, including the need for concentration and challenge. This will require conscious planning for culture, in the sense that the more established artistic and cultural institutions must be secured, with respect for their professionalism and scope. The more network-reliant and volatile growth layers must have arenas for expression. Ethnic, social and sub-cultural expressions must be given room and visibility in the urban scene. There must be 'something for everyone', but with respect for the individual cultural institutions and the multifarious characteristics and requirements of cultural expression.

The better the possibilities available to all citizens to participate in the planning and organisation of the city's cultural life, and to participate in a multitude of cultural and artistic offers, and to express themselves aesthetically and culturally, the more dynamic, complex and experientially rich the city stage will become, both for the city's own citizens and for visitors. Such diversity can be strengthened via:

Diversity in organisation – organising artistic and cultural attractions under various different auspices, such as the public sector, private and voluntary organisations, and via partnerships and networks between these.

Diversity of cultural events – ensuring that a diverse range of artistic and aesthetic experiences come to expression in many different genres and styles, within many media, and on many levels, including those that are more challenging and complex.

Diversity of voices – ensuring that art and cultural events are stamped by both global and local expression, and that cultural, social and ethnic groups and subcultures are given the opportunity to express themselves and be heard.

4

Cultural Production,
Organization and
Consumption

4.1

New Voluntary Associations and the Representation of Interests

Martti Siisiäinen

IN THE PRESENT article new Finnish voluntary associations are examined as (re)presentations of interests. Empirical data concerns mainly associations in the city of Jyväskylä. The article draws heavily on the results of the “Third sector and innovations in Jyväskylä” research project (c.f. Siisiäinen (ed.) 2002; Hänninen & Kangas & Siisiäinen (eds.) 2003; Siisiäinen 2009a). My main interests in this article are the examination of the *differentia specifica* of new associations, the similarities and differences between old and new associations. The term “new” refers to associations established since the 1980s, whose “prototype” can be characterized as temporary, non-hierarchical, recreational and individualist in contrast to the “old” associations, 25 years of age or more. I also ask what conclusions can be drawn from this analysis concerning the changes in the structure of organized interests in the Finnish society. One sub-question concerns the role of voluntary associations in the changing system of hegemony or governance that has been in full swing since the 1980s.

The question of representation is in many respects central in association research. First, associations are born to “represent” potential interests which can be contrasted to the ideas of American theories of sociological pluralism – as well as to the dominating Putnamian theorizations of social capital – defining organized interests as the only “true interests”

(see Siisiäinen 1986; 2003a). Second, in Finland association members name their association, at the latest when it is registered. Naming can be understood as an act of representation. The phenomenon represented by the association and referred by its interest is made familiar and known by naming it on the basis of the more or less clearly structured linguistic system consisting of the totality of association names.

A voluntary association can be defined as a voluntary grouping of at least three persons based on a common interest of its members. Associations are (in principle) independent of the state and do not try to gain economic profit. The majority of the members of the association are attached to it by ties of voluntariness and not by ties of paid work (Sills 1968; Siisiäinen 1986). Associations are born from interactions between (potential) members, in processes which create the idea of a common interest of the interacting individuals. Associations are resultants of communication/decision making between the potential members. These interactions have specific preconditions defining different probabilities and chances of success for association discourses that are tied to various kinds of interests (Siisiäinen 1986).

By adopting concepts of systems theory the formation of an association can be described as a development of an autopoietic system. At the first phase, the potential members start the process of communication through which they mobilize their common interest (c.f. Luhmann 2000). The communication takes place through common decision making in which some of the possible differences or discourse elements are mobilized to an association interest (Siisiäinen 2009b; c.f. Luhmann 2000; Hellman 1996). At this phase, the first part of the process of interest representation is realized. An association is thereby born as a system of interest representation, offering a “code” of social exchange to its members, and in this way a possibility of communal interaction (c.f. Moscovici 2000). In the process of association formation, the members mobilize through their mutual communication the actual association interest from among the interest potentials offered by their interest position (*Interessenlage*) (see Weber 1976; Siisiäinen 2009b).

At the second phase of the establishment, the association identity – more or less fixed, real, or imaginary – is named and categorized as unambiguously as possible. In this process various aspects of the field of voluntary associations function as faces of reflection. In the creation of association identity the (real or imagined) association history also has to be considered. The naming of the association is a point of crystallization of this representation, in Finland at the latest when the decision about the registration of the association is made. In this chain, adapting Serge Moscovici’s social psychological theorizations to associations, “strange” elements of the actor’s interest position (*Interessenlage*) are transformed to association interests and identities. Thereafter, they will be anchored and reduced “to ordinary categories and images, to set them in a familiar context”, in this case in the linguistic system consisting of the totality of association names. Through these abstract values, ideologies or identity elements can be turned “into something concrete, to transfer something that is in the mind to something existing in the physical world” (Moscovici 2000, 42). In this way voluntary associations and their naming




FIGURE 1. Registration of New Voluntary Associations in Jyväskylä 1920–2002.

are means of making compatible “the world in which we live and the world of thought” (Bachelard in Moscovici 2000, 41).

The naming of associations has an institutional basis regulated in a narrow sense by the Register of Associations and the Law on Associations, and more generally by the institutional structures of the field of cultural production (see Bourdieu 1997). The Register of Associations is the authorized institution of association naming. But, as a rule, the naming acts are regulated by more general linguistic and cultural rules. This is the way by which voluntary associations have been connected closely to the development of cultural hegemony in various phases in Finnish history, and this is also the cultural background against which the “rebellious” movements and associations must reflect their own symbolic practices.

From this perspective, the Register of Associations established in 1919 offers a unique opportunity to examine systematically the development of the organized and officialized representations of the interests and changes of the naming of associations and the system of association names across a period of almost a hundred years. In this article, I have to confine myself to the analysis of some aspects of this large field, especially the specific characteristics of the new associations as contrasted to the old, traditional voluntary organizations.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN JYVÄSKYLÄ

Finland has a unique register of associations containing data of all registrations of new voluntary associations after 1919 (The law on associations in 1919). Since then, more than 170 000 new associations have been registered in Finland. The history of voluntary associations in Finland, however, dates back to the beginning of the 19th Century, but the mass base for the modern system of mass association was created at the end of the 19th Century and during the first years of the 20th Century (see

Stenius 1987; Alapuro et al. (ed.) 1987; Siisiäinen 1990). The 1990 law on associations, slightly reforming the old 1919 law, states: “A registered association can obtain property and make commitments and act as competent in court”. Registration makes an association a legal subject. The association thereby gains a legal and legitimate status, and will be respected by the state or the municipal authorities more than the unregistered associations. However, at the same time the creation of an association subject through the act of registration is a symbol of the birth of an association as an object of the political system, a subject adjusting its working to the rules of the game (see Siisiäinen 1986). With no exceptions, all large social movements have also let themselves be registered. This makes The Finnish register of associations an exceptionally valuable source of information – even though a formal one – on the creation of new organized interests in Finland, and their historical development.

At the beginning of 2009 Jyväskylä is a town of almost 130 000 inhabitants. Jyväskylä was one of the main centres of the Finnish nationalist movements, especially in the 19th Century. Many schools and educational institutions tinge the cultural field of the town and their influence can also be discerned in its occupational structure. Since 1920 altogether 2196 associations have been registered in the town. As in Finland in general (see Siisiäinen 2009c), there are no signs of a general crisis of organized social capital in Jyväskylä. On the contrary, more new associations have appeared during the last seven years than ever before in such a short time. During the record breaking year of 1997 almost twice as many new associations were registered as during the earlier record years in the 1970s and 1980s (see Siisiäinen (ed.) 2002).

Table 1 helps us to identify the changes in the emphasis of the types of associational activities during the past decades. It reveals that significant differences between various decades exist. The most dynamic decades are the 1990s (over fifty new associations per year in average), 1970s and 1980s (almost 40 associations per year). Periods of vivid formation of associations have often coalesced with cycles of protest. Protesting movements, on their part, have often highlighted and represented the

interests of social classes or class fractions. After the 1918 Civil War the cycle of protest raised up the interests of various bourgeois groups that backed up the winning side of the war. The 1930s and the 1940s were times dominated by (ultra)rightist organizing and economic-professional associations. The second part of the 1940s and the 1970s were periods of strong leftist movements and associations launched to a large extent by these movements. The late 1970s and the early 1980s were years lightly coloured by greenish values, a time of “a silent revolution” in the history of Finnish collective action. However, through all of these periods of protest, the long developmental line characterized by associational accumulation and differentiation continued to proceed.

A central tendency during the last few decades has been the dramatic decrease of the proportion of the economic and party-political associations since the 1970s, whereas the proportion of recreational associations

Type of association	1920-1929		1930-1939		1940-1949		1950-1959		1960-1969		1970-1979		1980-1989		1990-1994		1995-2001		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Party-political	15	17	6	9	23	17	22	13	29	11	106	27	48	13	13	7	6	1	268	13
Profession & economic	25	29	30	45	42	30	54	32	89	34	116	30	83	22	24	14	73	16	536	25
Social welfare & health	6	7	3	5	10	7	18	11	21	8	27	7	34	9	26	15	45	10	190	9
Culture	8	9	8	12	19	14	30	18	42	16	46	12	75	20	32	18	111	24	371	17
Sports	8	9	11	16	15	11	13	8	17	6	24	6	54	14	35	20	101	22	278	13
Other hobbies	11	13	3	5	11	8	16	10	38	14	48	12	45	12	27	15	78	17	277	13
Religion & world view	6	7	2	3	-	-	2	1	4	2	5	1	5	1	8	5	15	3	47	2
War & peace	2	2	2	3	7	5	5	3	11	4	1	0,3	7	2	-	-	5	1	40	2
International	-	-	-	-	4	3	5	3	2	1	2	1	11	3	5	3	7	2	36	2
Other	6	7	2	3	8	6	4	2	13	5	12	3	20	5	8	5	16	4	89	4
Sum	87	100	67	100	139	100	169	100	266	100	387	100	382	100	178	100	457	100	2132	100

TABLE 1. The Registration of Different Types of Voluntary Associations in Jyväskylä 1920–2001.

has been growing: more than 60 per cent of the new associations after the mid-1990s are cultural associations, sports clubs or other associations for leisure hobbies. On the national level, their proportion is even higher (70 % of all). Thus, it is justified to call the turn of the Millennium the time of cultural and recreational associations.

OLD AND NEW ASSOCIATIONS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS

Various periods in the development of Finnish voluntary associations can be described by analysing the relationship of the associations established during the time in question to certain central issues: (a) associations as representations of social class; (b) choice of the organization model (or template) and the stand toward the prevailing hierarchic four-level model (village or quarter association, municipal association, province organization, national central alliance of union); (c) development of specificist vs. generalist orientation of the association; (d) principles of naming the association. Through the analysis of the role of these four factors in old and new associations some of the most important changes can be depicted in the data put to use in this article. I will first examine how the above mentioned four factors or phenomena appear in the old associations (association established before the 1980s). Thereafter, I will investigate in which way - if in any - their influence can be discovered among the new associations which are represented in this closer scrutiny by the associations, established during the record breaking year of 1997.

ASSOCIATIONS AS REPRESENTATIONS OF SOCIAL CLASS

Cycles of protest have laid bare social tensions in society, which has been reflected in many ways in the development of Finnish associations.

During the Russian rule, in the 19th century the nodal points of social tensions and forms of their manifestation were framed as cultural, language, identity and social problems. However, economic factors can be discovered hiding in the background, such as the interests of the Finnish export industry concerning Russian internal market or changes in the structures of livelihood and class. On their part, the first Finnish mass organizations functioned as a pre-phase for the “proper” political consciousness formation and the centralized organizing of social classes at the beginning of the 20th century (c.f. Sulkunen 1986). In connection with the general strike in 1905, class interests were crystallized in an unforeseen way and started to penetrate – at least in official programs – through various lines of associational activities: parties, political organizations of women, youth, children, professional associations and trade unions, cultural, educational and temperance associations, sports clubs etc. were all, to some extent, connected to the main class movement.

Acting in this associational world was of collective and social nature which – in an ideal, typical case at least – required a comprehensive participation and tended to develop strong association ties. In the 1918 Civil War these association potentials (or association capital) were realized by both sides; in the war and after the war several associations were built into a “camp situation” between the White and the Red Finland. Between the two world wars, the basis for the Social Democratic, Communist, Rural Union (the Centre) and Conservative ideological-political subcultures was created. Three of the first mentioned built their organizations according to the four level -model described earlier, whereas the conservative subculture exploited, more than its political competitors, officially “non-political” structures in “bourgeois hegemonic” institutions. Among these, the most central role was played by academic organizations, cultural associations and many hobby associations such as sports associations. These organizational subcultures were still alive and well in the 1970s (c.f. Uusitalo 1985), but have evenly faded out since then.

Manifestations of this weakening of subcultures can be seen in the incapability of political parties to get new young members, to renew their practices, as well as in the exiguity of new political associations

during the last fifteen years. It seems that the point of saturation for old political organizations has already been passed, but it is too early to say what the new substitutive collective for politics might look like. It seems that the concept of politics has been too narrow in most political (science) studies. This holds true both for studies on political participation and for association development. For example, social and apolitical participation of youngsters seems to take part mostly via associations and movements outside formal or conventional politics, both in traditional associations and movements, and in the alternative ways of organizing, such as the Internet communities. In many of these new forms the borderlines between culture and politics, as well as consumption and politics are blurred, and new kinds of hybrids are being formed.

Only a very small part of the new associations established around the turn of the Millennium can be included in the category of “class organizations”. Risto Alapuro has argued that it is typical of Finnish voluntary organizations to reflect and represent directly what is happening in social structures instead of producing that reality (as is the case in France) (Alapuro 2005). There are, no doubt, differences between the French and the Finnish ways of acting collectively and organizationally, but Finnish associations have also been – besides reflecting economic or other kinds of structures and interests – participating in symbolic and political struggles “about classes”, and more generally, about group formation, i.e. struggles about the principles and categorizations of inequality and social differences and thereby about the principles of becoming actual, acting groups instead of remaining mere “classes on paper” (see Bourdieu 1985; Siisiäinen 1986). Social classes or groups do not exist distinct from their representations. Social movements, religious sects and churches, political parties and voluntary associations can be used in the processes whereby “potential groups” can become “actual groups” (or classes) by creating symbolically and culturally collective identities and symbolical frames of categorization for them. For example, the working class is neither an economically determined “objective aggregate” nor “a subjective magic reality”, but “a mystical totality” based on a huge amount of theoretical and practical work of invention, reproduced by

practical and imaginative efforts (Bourdieu 1985, 217). The same holds true for other kinds of collectivities, such as the church or the people (c.f. Liikanen 1995).

Alapuro's observations about the differences between the Finnish and French ways of representing interests in associations is, no doubt, in the right ballpark, but is somewhat over-exaggerating and should be complemented by the analysis of the relationships between associations, the state and the production of social classes. As Alapuro notices, France is still in many respects a class society in comparison with many other European countries. Therefore, it would be important to examine associations both from the perspective of class representation and from the perspective of class production. The importance of voluntary associations in the representation of classes and strata can easily be proved: movements and associations represent, i.e. participate in the transforming of symbolic and the political making of potential differences into actual groups (see Bourdieu 1996; Siisiäinen 1986).

The development of the Finnish welfare state and the relatively open state system is – to a large extent – a result of interactive co-impacts of the actions of social movements, voluntary associations and other groupings. In France – if we are to believe Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. Bourdieu 1979; 1996; Bourdieu & Passeron 1977) school and academic institutions based on inequalities and the system of cultural class distinctions reproduce (have reproduced) accentuated borderlines between various classes, and have produced clearly distinguishable class groupings. In Finland probably the most important mediator of the class reproduction – from the 1960s to the 1990s emasculation – has been the welfare state. The equalization of the Finnish society, and through it, the lowering of class borders, has been to a great extent a consequence of the actions of the welfare state as an agent in the distribution of the classes (c.f. Poulantzas 1978). The Finnish welfare state, on its part, has been a result of the actions of various political organizations, social movements and voluntary associations that are mainly understood by Alapuro (2005) (only) as representing or reflecting social structures. In this respect, the globalization and tendencies towards the dismantling of the Finnish

welfare state have changed the situation in such a way that it is not easy to detect similar “class effects” by new association to those described above, concerning older associations (associations → welfare state → class distribution).

Strong cycles of protest producing a plethora of new voluntary associations can be interpreted both as an effort to represent creaking and changing class structures and to construct new ones. In the new social movements and voluntary associations of the 1970s/1980s (partly based on the preliminary work done by the movements of the 1960s) the struggle was more about the new class formation, especially about the new middle classes or the nodal points of their formation (see Laclau & Mouffe 1985). In principle, this is a corresponding symbolic and political work to that concerning the class structures of developing Finnish industrial structures in the 19th century, carried through by the movements and associations.

The members’ social ties to the associations of the turn of the Millennium are, in general, weak and touch only a small part of the members’ whole actorhood. Older idea-typical associations were communities of co-production (of common goods), whereas many of the new associations are more like “ego-projects” or modes of associational (co-)consumption. The importance of collectivities or intermediating sub-cultures, expressing or reflecting social or class structures (for example, comprehensive associations), has diminished in comparison with some competing interpreters of social structures (the media, the world of commodity-aesthetics, the Internet etc.). It is often dubious to speak about “collective” association or movement identities in the same way as before in connection with associations established earlier. However, it is most probably still a question of collective identities, but only in the sense of identities of a different, more fragmented and “thinner” type. The new associations may have a much smaller part in the struggles about the nodal points of class formation or in interpreting the nature of inequalities collectively in comparison to the influence of the media, commercial culture and new kinds of networks.

REGISTERED ASSOCIATIONS AND THE HIERARCHIC MULTI-LAYERED ORGANIZATION MODEL

The traditional Finnish model of mass-organization has been built on the basis of a registered association. A registered association has constituted an effective filter between citizens' actions and societal subsystem, especially the political system. Finland, as far as I know, is the only country with an all-embracing register of associations. A registered association is a legal subject which – to some extent at least – is committed to the social rules of the game, but which, on the other hand, is therefore entitled to require a certain kind of status to itself. In this relationship we are dealing with inter-organizational social capital concerning mutual cognition and recognition, giving and accepting recognition. The tie of registration concerns almost all associations – especially the old ones – even those purporting to turn the whole system upside down. All large mass movements have adapted their activities to the four layered organization model, tying village or neighborhood associations to national central unions of federations. All ideological-political subcultures have used this model in their successful efforts to cover the whole country with their associational network. But the same model has been the basis of all major folk movements (*kansanliikkeet*) as well: youth movements (*Nuorisoseuraliike*), women's movements (*Marttaseurat*), children's associations (Scouts, 4H-associations), many cultural associations, workers' and "bourgeois" sports movement etc. This has been the core component in the development of the state-centered character of Finnish collective action, and it forms one of the cornerstones in the Finnish corporate polity regime.

The institution of the registered association has preserved its strong position even among the new associations. This holds true even of the new immigrants' associations that were studied in Jyväskylä: if you want to be taken seriously as a negotiation partner, if you want to own property, collect money, get subsidies or to hire premises from the city, you have to register your voluntary group as an association (see Pyykkönen 2003;

Siisiäinen 2003b). However, a great part of the new associations do not take the registration very seriously anymore: very often the association is registered only for the purpose of organizing hobbies with the state or receiving municipal assistance or being able to play floor ball with student colleagues etc.

The attitude towards the implementation of the hierarchic centralized model in one's own organization distinguishes the new from the old associations: in our Jyväskylä survey 90 % of the associations established before the 1990s belonged to some central organization, whereas only 40 % of those registered after the mid 90s were central union members (which can also be regarded as quite a high proportion). Memberships in central organizations are fewer in cultural associations and among other hobby associations, whose proportion has been on the upgrade lately. New associations also more often say that they have invented the association idea themselves – and not borrowed it from the central movement or organization – with the exception of new sports associations.

A decrease in the associations' state-centeredness is a parallel tendency with the loosening of hierarchic multi-layered administrative structures described above. The Finnish model of system integration has been based on the close relationship between voluntary associations and the state (or the municipality), and on the communicative relationship between critical movements and the political subsystem. Social movements are born out of the mobilization of the experienced consequences of social crises (c.f. Hellman 1996). In Finland, all major social movements have after some transition period been transformed into formal voluntary associations capable of communicating with the state. After World War II the state has been able, through its relatively open structures, to integrate movements which have accepted the rules of the game (the Communist movement in the 1960s, the Greens in the 1990s, the populist "*Vennamolaisuus*"-movement step by step). Many folk movements or cultural movements have started as association movements, either as reactions to cultural crises or as proactive projects for social integration or cultural innovation. These association movements have been involved in the

building of corporatist structures and policies on various sub-fields of the Finnish neo-corporatist system.

In the 1990s the mutually reinforcing mechanisms between the critical movements and the birth of new associations have been almost totally broken. New, relatively weak and small movements have not – with the exception of 250 associations of the jobless' movement – been able (or willing) to produce any noteworthy number of new associations, which is a new proof about the loosening of the civil society - state relationship in Finland. For example, in 2005 the Friends of Earth had altogether 11 working associations in Finland. With a few exceptions, such as the World Social Forum, these new associations or movements have not been able to challenge the dominant political system in a consequential way.

If we take the above mentioned tendencies together (the loosening of the traditional multi-layered model locality – municipality – province – nation (– EU/globe), the weakening of the close relations between the associations and the state, the partial disappearance of the mediating role of registered associations in the communication between protest movements and the state), we can draw two conclusions describing two sides of the same coin: (1) the ability of the political subsystem (and also the state) to integrate protesters and the discontent (or the potential powers of change) with the assistance of registered associations has declined; (2) the reverse side of this development is that the chain of influence of localities – also in the peripheries – on the centers of decision-making has been badly damaged. All traditional folk movements tried to politicize the “people”, to translate it into a political force and use it as a means to their own ends. They were used for controlling, for building corporatist structures of governance and for taming protests. But this process was, to some extent, reciprocal. It also opened possibilities for various localities to exert some influence in the centre, for example, in the parliament. The four organizational levels of political and folk movements were also chains of influence from the social and peripheral grass root levels to the national centers of power. At present, this possibility seems to be disappearing, as the folk movement model has collapsed or is collapsing, and the mediating role of voluntary associations in politics

has been occupied by new agents such as the media, the Internet, market actors or their hybrids.

GENERAL VS. SPECIFIC ASSOCIATIONS

There are many factors in present society that tend to differentiate interest structures and thereby also their associational representations. The tendency of the dispersion of class and occupational structures combined with the tendency of globalization has been reflected and experienced in many new ways in the sphere of social “superstructures”. A major tendency has been the increase of the (often small) very specific, one-function associations at the expense of the (often bigger) multi-task associations acting on several social fields. The same tendency is visible inside various types of associations: for example, generalist sports clubs are giving way to clubs concentrating on one type of sports only, and to miscellaneous associations giving possibilities to small groups with very different kinds of interests in exercising. In general, there are now tenths or even hundreds of various sub-sorts inside many types of hobbies (e.g. kennels clubs for cats or dogs, martial sports, music, cars, healing skills etc.). Internationalization has strengthened this differentiation.

The tendency towards accelerating specialization is intertwined in the way in which the system of voluntary associations grows and changes. The national statistics of association registrations (see the Register of Associations, in: Siisiäinen 2009c) – in addition to what has been said about Jyväskylä above – show that the increase in the establishment of new associations comes from associations of cultural, sports and other hobbies: 70 % of new associations during the last ten years have been associations of that kind. A significant part in this increase can be explained by the division of multi-task associations (culture, sports etc.) into numerous specific one-task associations. This tendency goes hand in hand with the smaller memberships in new associations.

In research on organization populations it has become widely accepted to think that in a turbulent, quickly and unforeseeably changing world the choice of the general organization model (and not putting all the eggs in the same basket) would be the safest strategy (see Hannan & Freeman 1977). Specificism, a far-going specialization is the most economic and thereby the most successful strategy in the competition between organizations in stable circumstances and environments. In the recent turbulence new associations have most often selected the way of specialization (or specificism). Even though the consequences of these kinds of choices can only be seen after a time lag, it may be a good guess that the mass deaths of currently new associations might be likely in the future. Many of the new associations have not originally been established (or there has been no need to establish) to last forever or even for a decade, they have not been thought to be the guardians of big, life-long interests. On the contrary, they are often thought to be temporary, remain small, based on weak ties and partial interests and on light commitments. Their social strength is concealed in their numerousness, in the mass and in the total effect based on it. In this respect, the adaptation of the concept of the market and the metaphor of consumption to the interpretations of the world of new associations may well be arguable.

In the association market an individualized association consumer chooses the alternative that fits in her/his ego-project. Many of the market selections, for example, of new sports or food or wine culture, are spread through processes of international diffusion. Many hobby clubs have gained their original ideas directly from the commercial market or from the world of advertisement (e.g. car clubs, fan clubs etc.). The internationalization may, on the one hand, speed up the withering away of some hobby associations of national origin (e.g. national sports or traditional cuisine), on the other hand, it can give more possibilities to small minorities in various countries to put their forces together and get organized. In this way, many scattered and broken minorities have been able, on their part, to increase the plurality of associations through their internationally networked associations. However, it must be kept in mind that the development of the system of associations is not a one-

way process without competing trends and currents. For example, in the field of cultural associations the fastest growing sub-categories are the art associations and societies (almost half of all cultural associations after the turn of the century) (The Register of Associations 2008).

THE NAMING OF ASSOCIATIONS

The individualization and the specialization of associational activities have changed profoundly also the naming practices of voluntary associations. The main trend goes from names representing collective identities towards names as “logos” or signs for ways or styles of life. A registered association as a plain “sign” is just an organized way of realizing the common interests of the association’s members (about the concepts of sign and symbol, see Opp de Hipt 1987). Many names of associations just state the type of activity as their “sign”: Jyväskylä Weightlifters (est. 1960) refers to an association making the hobby of weightlifting possible. Jyväskylä Firemen is a trade union furthering the interests of its members in a conventional way. A name as a symbol contains a representation of a “fact”, it includes interpretation. A symbol refers, often evoking emotions, to something which is not present, thereby making the testing of the truthfulness of the reference impossible. A lingual, vocal or visual signal – for example, a name or a logo of an association – is understood as a *sign* if the target of its reference (the signified) and the means of the signification (the signifier) belong to the same cultural or symbolic system (for example, ice bandy as one representative of sports). A signal becomes a *symbol* when it and the object it refers to belong to different cultural contexts (e.g. Lions Club Jyväskylä-Jyvä or Men’s Choir Crickets) (see Opp de Hipt 1987; Firth 1973; Gusfield & Michalowicz 1984; Leach 1976; Lindkvist 1989; Pekonen 1991; Richter 1985; Pirola 1985; Siisiäinen 1992). If associations are submitted to cultural examination, the importance of the symbolic becomes more stressed. In this way, social movements, religious communities and voluntary associations are among

the most important agents in the turning individual subjects into acting groups by forming collective identities with the assistance of symbols.

In the formation of associational identities names play a central role, both as signs and as symbols (c.f. Bourdieu 1980; Siisiäinen 1988; 1992). The naming of an association separates it from other associations – probably bunches it together with similar associations – in a linguistic system consisting of the names of the associations. The naming individualizes the object phenomenon and assists in the building of associational collective. Naming the group in question defines both itself and its difference from others (or the mutual similarity) (see Palonen 1990; Pekonen 1991, 10-18). The goal or idea of the association, as understood by the members, describes its relationship with the surrounding society. The name of the association is the public sign and/or symbol and the outmost inducement (and filter) to the membership of the association.

In the next section I will first examine the name languages of associations and the raw citations that appear in these names. Second, I will investigate the symbolic of the names. And, third, I will study the presence of the names of social groups or positions or ideological symbols in associational names.

The first general conclusion on the names of the annual varve of 1997 is their internationalization. The number of English names for associations has increased: their proportion was 2 % in 1960-1979, in 1980-1994 it was already 6 %, and between 1995 and 2001 it rose to 12 % of all associations. The proportion of Swedish names remained all the time one per cent. It is interesting that the proportion of other languages, unidentified languages and different kinds of acronyms rose to 7 % of all names at the turn of the century. On the other hand, in 1997 alone six associations by or for immigrants with a Finnish name were registered. More than one fourth of the names contain raw citations, acronyms included (e.g. Team Scarabee; Ladies' Circle-27 Jyväskylä). The internationalization of the names is connected with the specialization development: associations for specific hobbies usually have specific and exact names. In the field of sports names also describe the transition

from generalist to specific clubs that specialize in one (or to few) sport only (see Piirola op.cit.; Ojanen 1992).

A second characteristic, coalescent with the previous one, is the declining number of names that can be used for many purposes or have their origins in proverbs or puns. In the registrations of 1997 a few names belong to this category, (*MaMBA Markkinointimestarit ry*, *Hengen Viljelijät HeVi ry* (cultural association) and sports clubs *Jyväskylän Kyky ry*), all utilizing the fact that the words can be used in many senses or that the acronym has different meanings in spoken language. Also, natural symbols or names of natural phenomena or names with references to national cultural heritage have become rare (cf. Piirola op.cit.). A few names with positive traditional referents or metaphors include the names of the scouts' organizations (*Katajaiset ry*, the Junipers and *Tomerat ry*, the Bustlings). Modern names with humoristic colouring include those for sports clubs (*Mäki-Matin Mahtiankat*, Mighty Ducks of Mäki-Matti or *Kampuksen Dynamo*) and only exceptions among various other fields. Nowadays, there are only a few names containing sonoric terms. Traditional names borrowed from national proverbs that were quite common in the earlier decades seem to have disappeared.

Ten per cent of the names refer to a section of a social class or a professional category (Finland's Cuppers). Only very seldom the names refer to the class or stratum position (Association for the support of entrepreneurs; Associations of the beef producers of Central Finland). References to large social classes have disappeared totally. The only name reminiscent of a kind of (comic) class distinction is Ladies Circle-27, an annex to the primary men's organization. Ideological names have also almost disappeared from the repertoire of names, with the only exception of a lonely local branch of the Communist Party registered in 1998. Also, names referring to position (see Palonen 1990) have disappeared, except for one new comer, *Jyväskylän Keskustaseura* (Association of the Centre).

Naming is, no doubt, still of political nature, but the changes in the name types adapted tell us that the relationship between voluntary associations and the political system has changed, and that voluntary

associations take part in the communication and decision making of the political system in a “thinner” and more specific way than before. The question of what is the role of the new associations and other forms of collective action in the struggle of present and future nodal points of class formation still awaits researchers.

CONCLUSION

Most of the changes in the Finnish organized collective action can be brought forth by studying associational life in Jyväskylä. The collective nature of associations is one of the receding features in the hobby associations of individualized actors. Dispersed class and stratum structures in association, with impacts from international factors, tend to disentangle voluntary associations from old structural connections and interest representations. In the new struggles about classes, associations compete with new interpreters of interests (e.g. consumption industry and powers of commodity aesthetics; the Internet; the new media) for the nodal points of class formation (see Przeworski 1977; Laclau & Mouffe 1985). A new textual system of the totality of voluntary associations is taking shape. Old linguistic subcultures and dimensions of meaning no longer catch the plurality of the changes in the new naming.

The situation caused by the new association forming is in many ways challenging, both to the political system, the associations and association research. The detachment of new associations from the (neo)corporatist structures causes legitimation or hegemony problems to the political and to the municipal system, and creates a need to seek alternative channels of legitimation (for example, governmental and municipal effort to develop new forms of citizen participation on various levels of the political system, e.g. e-portals). Various kinds of associations have played central roles in the governance or hegemony until the last decades of the 20th century (see e.g. Kangas 2004a; 2004b; Dean 2007; Siisiäinen 1986). It is important to ask, what voluntary associations are needed for

in the developing new system of governance, in which the weigh point seems to be moving from “governance at close range” to “governance at a distance” (see Rose 1999). In the governance at a distance the focus is on the individual as an entrepreneur of her/his life. To the entrepreneur of her/his own life association activity might express itself as consumption, individual or ego-projects, as an action requiring an investment of a small part of one’s actorhood or personality only in the action. Thereby, the relationship between the association and its members might begin to resemble that of a customer and the service producer, or consumer and producer. It might not be possible anymore to build mechanisms of legitimation of late-modern hegemony or governance on the basis of those kinds of associations. It might also turn out that associational activities like those in the new associations, not to speak about the Internet “communities”, are not capable of creating generalized trust or inter-group or inter-class solidarity indispensable the reproduction of the hegemony or the system of governance.

Community Guidelines

Welcome to WRECK A MOVIE: a place where you can be the future of film. If you are someone with a great film idea, someone who wants to participate in real film productions or even a fan who wants a unique experience, this is the place you can make your dreams happen.

Trust is central to collaboration for anything. We want WRECK A MOVIE to remain a place where people work together and can build trust among each other so film projects of all types get done and seen. This trust starts with us in offering a transparency in our own work that encourages people to have fun in filmmaking. If you have any questions or comments, please do complete our feedback form so we can answer your questions and make WRECK A MOVIE better.

The next thing we need is you to know how this community works. So here are few guidelines and reminders that will help us keep WRECK A MOVIE a place people want to come and create.

OWN WHAT YOU POST: Posts of copyrighted material that you do not have rights to, is prohibited. If you create a production, provide a shot or make a comment make sure you have the rights to the content. If you see something suspicious, feel free to flag it or report it (Reporting Procedure).

OUR COMMUNITY VALUES USE OF REAL NAMES: We can't make you use your real name but AV production and creative art in general are tied with a special attention to copyright, trust and transparency. Use your real names so you can earn the trust of fellow filmmakers and be given proper credit for things you contribute and create.

THE PRODUCTION LEADER IS A FRIENDLY DICTATOR: The best collaborative productions have someone who will make the final decisions when required. WRECK A MOVIE this power has been given to the Production Leader and Assistant Leaders. The service is designed to make it easy to get input and listen to people from all over the world making the production better. But in the end, decisions must be made to make things go forward. If you are a member of a production, trust your Production Leader the visionary of your project and don't take rejection personally. If you are a Production Leader, be sure to both listen and make clear and final decisions.

YOU ARE SHARING FEELY: Productions in WRECK A MOVIE are set up by Productions Leaders with the understanding they have full legal rights to represent the AV production, develop ideas and make decisions on its development, production and licensing. Users participating in productions recognize that Productions may commercially use all materials and ideas submitted to the production royalty-free unless otherwise agreed with the Production Leader or terms specified in the chosen license type of the Production.

YOU DON'T HAVE TO USE IT: When someone gives a Shot or comment, the Production Leader is under no obligation to use it. Users may submit the same or similar shots to other productions as long as there is no written agreement prohibiting the further use of the content. Both Producers and Users should understand this when collaborating.

FUN AND RESPECT: Filmmaking is fun and most of the people in our community are passionate about what they are doing. Try to respect those passions. Although you might not agree embrace differences that collaborative communities will bring to the productions. This respect does NOT keep us from having strong opinions and comments so suck it up if someone is giving you some good but harsh feedback. You might learn something.

MAKE NEW FRIENDS: Cross production pollination is highly encouraged. Participate on lots of projects, join Wreck Rooms, make new Wreck Rooms and find individuals that share your interests. Who knows what kinds of films you will end up making together.

WRECK THE MOLD: Do stuff that no one has ever thought of because the Internet makes it possible.

INVITE YOUR FRIENDS: There is space for everyone here. Everyone has something they can contribute to film from cool name ideas to graphic design and film editing. Even small contributions feel great and add to the strength of your production's community.

Be the Future of Film!

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Figure 1. <http://www.wreckamovie.com/guidelines> (Last accessed 8 May 2008)

4.2

Notes on Fan Organization – Organization of Consumption in Copyrighted Economy

Saara Taalas

PROLOQUE

WHEN THE DEDICATED science fiction fans in Tampere, Finland, released the first feature length (45mins) science fiction parody film for free downloading in 1997, *Star Wreck 5* started out on its road toward becoming a legendary project. The parody was produced solely by a small group of fans, and it was made possible by a network of hundreds of enthusiastic volunteers. The project took a decade to complete with no budget. It was followed by *Star Wreck: In the Pirkinning* as a derivative feature length film with quality special effects. The original fans involved in the production now operate their production company Energia Productions that is behind their next community produced, parody science fiction film project—this time a commercial one—*Iron Sky*, whose first teaser trailer was released at the beginning of May 2008. *Iron Sky* is another fan community dependent production that is accomplished on an Internet based platform www.wreckamovie.com that was created during the production of *Star Wreck* series. This story is somewhat parallel to the European based, community produced *Big Bugs Bunny* animation

film, released as a feature film in April 2008, and on DVD in May the same year. *BBB* was the second film produced by an open code software *Blender* fans and enthusiasts, as an open film product under creative commons license peach.blender.org. The idea of this kind of collaboration is to create a community of enthusiast and “amateurs” through the passion of engaging in organising fan production. Both projects share the thought that not only products such as fan films, animations, and games are produced, but also platforms and organising practices are created in the process of making.

The beginning of this century has witnessed a growing interest in the immaterial resources of organization, and more particularly, in immaterial property as a source of future wealth, employment, and prosperity in economy. The discussion on creative economy has moved creative works from the fringes of economy – from the fields of cultural practices and media audiences – to one of the main areas of theorizing knowledge work, organising activity, and innovation. The user generated innovation of not only the content, but the organization of the production and the means for it, offers interesting points of departures to these developments. It also proposes challenges to the policy discussion on cultural and media production, the primacy of formal and professional organization for innovation on creative content and work, and the role of copyright and related rights ownership to the creation of wealth in the creative economy of the future.

FANS AND FOLLOWERS: ORGANIZATION OF CONSUMPTION AND THE USER CENTRIC INNOVATION

Science fiction and fantastic literature has recently attracted interest within organization study. Much like writing within literary and cultural studies, reading in the organization studies has been directed towards new forms of organization and the technologies of its realisation. Most notably, the efforts to analyze the connection of a specific literary genre

to the area of organizations have centered on the question of organization studies as science fiction, and on the parallel reading of the narrative properties of science writing and science fiction literature (i.e. Parker, Higgins, Lightfoot & Smith 1999; Higgins, Smith, Parker & Lightfoot 2001). A recent effort presents science fiction as an alternative way of organising the present and the future through utopias and fantastic ways of portraying the conditions of present societies and the technologies they are produced with (Parker 2002). What has been given less attention in most of this writing is an important aspect of science fiction consumption. The writers do not pay much attention to the obvious, namely the activities of fans and the followers themselves. Though most of the academic writers express a particular fandom for the genre, this is excluded from the analysis or passed haphazardly as a “being boys of certain age” -thing (Parker et al. 1999, 584). Organization analysts rather shamefully admit that the project of the parallel reading of science fiction and organization studies is at least partly like “pandering to juvenile obsessions”, which in a way seems to hint that they feel a need to excuse their project to make a claim for the seriousness of their undertaking (Higgins 2001, 2). One reason for this might be that the content of science fiction literature is one of the most prominent genres within today’s popular culture, and the mundane sphere of the fans and the followers that engage with the media genre, organising the activities that make the consumption of such content possible, is less interesting than the content itself. After all, “despite the projections of science fiction within the present, the consumption of SF remains conveniently presented as an escape from the mundanity of everyday life” (Higgins 2001, 2).

I make a claim that this fan activity with its structures and practices is of much interest to the organization scholarship. A study of fandom is a theoretical project, but it is also about political representation in a study of organization and economies in connection to the market economy system: “It is a statement against the double standards of cultural judgement and the bourgeois fear of popular culture” (Sandvoss 2005, 3). To voice the fans and the followers brings a marginalised group of dressing-up-in-silly-costumes -kind of people into the discus-

sion on the profound organization of markets and consumption with importance. There is nothing juvenile – or indeed, gender specifically boyish – about the organization created by the fans, quite the contrary. The fandom and the activities of the fans and the followers within this particular genre of literature, and the generated cross media usage, is of utmost importance when considering the activity involved in innovation platforms and the formation of local and spatial economy. Although the everyday exchanges among the fans are largely non-monetary, they have monetary implications in the world, where science fiction and fantastic literature content is a commonplace in most mass media formats and forms of entertainment. The organization of exchanges between the fans constitute an organization largely outside managerial control, mostly not monetary, which has been, to a great extent, an excluded area of economic organization in most serious analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to revisit the merging contemporary complexities of cultural organization practices and the consumption of science fiction as an enlightening case for exploring the changes for the future in the market economy. The relationship has been largely left for the (post-)modern cultural studies and the sociology of fan activities and communities; in addition, for the studies on audiences within humanities, social sciences, and marketing. Cultural products enter a process from ‘discovery’ through sponsorship into the publics’ attention in a specific market place before they are available for sale and consumption (e.g. Hirsh 1972). The traditional view of the organization of the production of cultural goods is very much the organization of this function. However, it is increasingly difficult to tell apart the product from its delivery channels, methods and the consumption of these products. Further, the commodification of cultural production that lies in the centre of these organising practices of economic value, adds to the discussion on the transition and translation of cultural goods to the market.

It is the symbolic content of cultural commodities that their economic value owes most to, not the tangible nature of production or produce (Lash & Urry 1994; Lull 2001). However, in the post-industrial marketplace the production of novel uses, communities, and identities

for consumption as entertainment and symbolic value form an integral part in their organization. This part is not simply in the hands of large corporations and media firms. The communities of fans and followers form an important part in the making, while this involvement is far from being a straightforward affair (i.e. Parker 2002; Sandvoss 2005). The organization of economic value in the processes of producing symbolic content is not connected solely to their monetary value in the market. It is also becoming increasingly apparent that organising, related to communities consuming such commodities has the ability to produce identity value for people engaging in the production practices (Warde 1991; Jenkins 1992; Fiske 1992; Knights & Morgan 1993; Abercrombie & Longhurst 1998; Lull 2001; Kozinez 2002; Sandvoss 2005). Fan organising practices, including the production of fan fiction, Internet sites, and production platforms, as well as the consumption of fanzines, make sense in the organization processes themselves and not solely in the context of mass market consumption.

Connecting consumption and organization draws from two perspectives. The production practices of media genres are often inseparable from the consumption of the products in forms of fan community activities, and even more so in the related media products. Science fiction and fantasy, as a media genre, has become a commonplace, or even a necessary ingredient for most fiction films and TV-series. This genre has become a resource for the organization of a consumption experience, not a simple end in itself. Similarly, consumption is an important social practice, in which the consumption of cultural goods for satisfaction and enjoyment has been rendered to complicated socio-cultural system of wants and needs (Baudrillard 1970/1998). Both of these approaches emphasise consumption in a context that implies organization practices. The first, emphasising the traditional role of organising in producing use value in the market, the second is stressing the exchange value produced by organising as performing an important role in the constitution of wants and the fabrication of needs. In both these roles, the fan activities play an increasingly important role in our society, mediating between mainstream popular culture media products and the rise of consumption cultures.

This persuasive aspect of science fiction genre has already been shown to have had an impact on how we perceive the technological discoveries, corporate activity and our futures in the writing on organization studies and popular media texts (e.g. Corbett 1995; Disch 1998).

Organising is here referred to as a process of ordering activity in a way that consists of making sure that an appropriate set of people and objects arrive in an appropriate place at an appropriate time (Latour 1997). This organising is embedded in social processes, but is even more culturally profound process than this (Granovetter 1985). The organization is not merely production within a society, but also a cultural production of local and spatial social, cultural, and economic practices (Godelier 1971). This reading originates in the contextual practices that control the rules of exchange in local and spatial economies that are only partially monetary in nature. These organising practices take the form of mundane exchanges and entrepreneurship: local and spatial communities grounded in everyday exchanges (Rehn & Taalas 2004). Two important concepts need to be defined here in connection with the organization. The first is production process. Production process is a social process of utilising natural, social, and cultural resources. Local production practices are particular production processes used in a particular society and cultural group. The production process here, therefore, not only refers to the production of the organizational end product, good or service. It also refers to employing cultural practices for engaging in fandom or fan activities in the forms of peer exchanges and in the forms of fan production facilities like *Wreck a Movie*.

Another central concept is local economy. Here, it is assessed as something resulting from the local and spatial social relations that in a particular place and time make the production processes (Godelier 1984/1987). The use of the concept draws mainly from cultural anthropology, and not primarily from economics. Fan activities are realised in a culturally embedded social setting, where the production processes and the organization of resources are linked to the market economy, entrepreneurial activity, selling and buying of goods and services, and where the markets are commonly linked to the monetary forms of transactions. Fandom

organization is therefore a tangled web of consumption, production, recycling and re-making of products and production. This organization work edges closer to post original production, implying much more complicated relationship between the consumption and production as simple monetary transactions. Further, while peer production in the Internet produces embedded, organized entities themselves, the producers getting involved in the activity take part in consuming what they produce. While organising an Internet fan activity in the scale of films and animations, the practices contribute to the construction of a tangible hyper-reality for consumption (echoing Boudrillard 1970/1998). Not merely identities are constructed in the organising practices of such super-cultures (Lull 2001). The communities of fandom play a central role in the construction of the exchange and use value of cultural goods (Knights & Morgan 1993) and local economy, resulting from the local and spatial social relations that in a particular place and time organize the production processes (Godelier 1984/1987).

CULTURAL ORGANIZATION AND CONSUMPTION

This analysis of fandom production derives from the consumption cultures in the fields of arts, entertainment, and cultural industries (e.g. Jenkins 1992; du Gay 1996; du Gay & Pryke 2002). This paper draws from previous research on exploration on how modern media business products and the organization of market goods production are closely entangled with cultural practices and communities (e.g. Fiske 1992; Lury 1996; Allen 2002; Thrift 2002; Kozinets 2002; Rehn & Taalas 2004; Hirsjärvi 2006; Taalas 2006).

The relationship between consumption, organization, and cultural production has been established for quite some time. There are strong links between consumption and organization, which have been rather understudied from the point of view of the organization theory. It has long been acknowledged that the market value of goods and services is

socially constructed (e.g. Schumpeter 1909). However, organizations play a major role in the constitution of the exchange values of their products, constituting the usefulness of commodities, but also contributing greatly to the identity construction of the consumers (Knights & Morgan 1993). Knights and Morgan (1993) expand on Warde's (1991) idea on the relationship between production and consumption by exploring the organizations' role in the interplay. Knights and Morgan build their argument on Warde's three characteristics of commodities – use, exchange, and identity values – by introducing the organizational involvement in the constitution of the different values. The characteristics are interconnected in cyclical stages between the production and the enjoyment of goods and services.

Following Knights and Morgan, the organization of exchange value is accessed here through the way the organizations construct exchange values as an idea of monetary value to a commodity. Particularly noteworthy is the construction of the social understanding of price as constructed by the organization process. Here, it is not treated as something that is created as a response by the market outside the organization, but rather as a historical process of commodification within the process. This process involves the dissolution of non-commodity institutions, such as those based on communal forms of sociability, e.g. kinship, friendship and locality, as well as those founded in collective organizations of neighbourly help and storytelling. However, it is also a process that involves the state in terms of sustaining social relations related to ownership, and the forms and uses of capital. In the case of *Wreck a Movie*, the commodification is linked to the sacrifice of such economic entities as personal copyrights and related rights for the common good of the community, “to be the future of the film”. In this respect, the roots of commodification and organization run deep into our common history and to the long processes that form the basis of the market economy and the roles of concepts such as authorship and ideas of sacrifices for common purpose. Much of this has previously been overlooked in organizational analysis in the market economy setting. However, these processes of commodification link the organizations to wider issues concerning cultural production in general,

and the constitution of present and future economies in the postindustrial market place. The commodification processes are ongoing, while accruing local and spatial forms. It is notable that legal practices such as the rise of copyright regimes have been following the commodification process marking the transition of cultural production of literature from the public domain to the market economy and private ownership over time (e.g. Hemmungs Wirtén 2004, 2008).

The use value created by organization becomes apparent by analysis of how the commodities are becoming constituted as 'useful'. The purpose is to illustrate how and for what purpose the product or service is actually used for in the fan organization. Fandom is always several different audiences that use science fiction related fan activity differently (Taalas & Hirsjärvi 2008). The roles in the fan organization are mapped out through linking webs of exchanges between the different users and the differentiated organizational activities that are local and spatial - consumers, fans, cultists, enthusiasts, and petty producers (Abercrombie & Longhurst 1998; Taalas & Hirsjärvi 2008). There is always a variety of uses organized simultaneously. In the production and organization of mass media products for consumption, only very limited uses are considered 'useful' by the formal organizations i.e. can be exchanged for money in mass markets. However, the usefulness of the products does not limit itself to the intended uses only. The organization of science fiction fans and followers constitute 'needs' and 'use-values' of their own making that are often parallel, alternative, and even subversive (Taalas & Hirsjärvi 2008). This dynamic would cast a whole new light to marketing endeavours: It might thus be that the heavy consumers and fans are the ones who produce ideas of novel uses that are later picked up by large corporations, rather than the other way around. If this is the case, organising practices such as *Wreck a Movie* might be the future of film making; not so much as a technological application but rather in the spirit and practices of its realisation. Should that be a correct prediction it might just have the long term potential to bring down some of the existing industries with their current organizational practices.

Lately, the organization of identity value has been studied more conclusively within the organizational setting (see, for example, Hatch & Schultz 2004). However, the study has largely concentrated on the formal organizations with formal membership that is mostly work-related. Leisure activities and organised cultural production has been left for cultural studies; ethnographers and sociologists, who focus on the forms of culture sharing groups. The problem of such division is that the value creation inside the formal organization is very difficult to tell apart in any permanent way from the organization of such identity value outside the formal organizations. The use, exchange and identity value creation are closely connected to the dynamics of organising, rather than the formal outcomes of the organization. Further, organizations consume and use certain specialists and specialized knowledge work as commodities in their making. In this respect, formal organizations are consumers of complex knowledge work, while organising commodities for consumption. This dynamic does not limit itself to the confines of formal organizations. Organization contributes to the enforcing of the social identities of consumers and consumption in all its forms. In more simple terms, while fans and followers engage in practices in *Wreck the Movie*, they also develop expertise that gains value in these same practices. This contributes greatly to the development of the novel identity values of the fans and the followers (e.g. Bacon-Smith 1992; Jenkins 1995; Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998; Sandvoss 2005; Hirsjärvi 2009).

RAPTURES IN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

Changes in the economic context have raised questions about the place of intellectual rights systems, such as copyright regimes in the value creation. For instance, arguments regarding profit-sharing and compensation have recently been flaring up in the discussions regarding the place of intellectual property in a media-saturated world. Arguably, changes in our understandings of copyright regimes pose a challenge to the value-

network in affected industries (Taalas & Rehn 2007). This question, thus, problematizes the very basis of the economy, and therefore deals with the question of how such issues can be fruitfully conceptualized, and how our theorization of copyright system as a part of the value-production can be developed. Ownership, as business logic, has traditionally been seen as one of the cornerstones of the economy as we know it. However, this might be an overly simplified view on the makeup of the economy. In an economy, where immaterial production increases in value, there may well be a change in thinking, from control and rights as the fundamental form of value-logic that businesses can capitalize on towards an emphasis on access and open communities of innovation (cf. Taalas & Rehn 2007). The organization of practices of participatory networks, such as the fans and the enthusiasts, does not only produce new or novel uses, but also contributes to a change in the way value is produced and organized in the contemporary markets. Simultaneously, some of the organization processes are clearly linked to recycling and re-use of existing creative contents that are protected by immaterial property systems.

The nature of the market is changing, and issues related to ownership, materiality, and the after production of uses produced by consumer communities become increasingly important. The production and distribution in arts, sports and popular culture need a complex network of organizations and organizing by active audiences to make the production of such goods and services possible, but also to provide the basis for the process of their realization (Thrift 2002). This networked nature of the markets is nothing new, and relates closely to the concept of markets as a culturally produced and sustained system. This aspect is now increasingly being explored from the perspectives of cultural economics, management and organization, and cultural studies.

To illuminate the shift in the markets, this paper considers the copyright economy dynamics as an example. Here copyright is considered as an economy -related phenomena, rather than a simply legal entity. It may provide avenues for exploring value creation that builds on markets that are not purely based on concepts of ownership and control, but on the diverse uses and communities of consumption (cf. Lessig 2004,

2008). Communities such as *Wreck a Movie* enables expect the waving of immaterial rights for the common good as a tool to turn the fan based activity into exchanges of fan organizations and to construct kinds of local hybrid economies (cf. Yang 2000; Lessig 2008), where everyday life becomes a combination of economic exchanges in the market society by day, and fan activity with its symbolic exchanges of fan activities in the free time. In this way, fan activities come in close proximity to the digital gift economies (cf. Rehn 2001, 2004). Such economies give control and ownership their own particular readings between market and exchange economies in local practices.

Interpreting fan organization as an example of organization in hybrid economy is supported by much research in communication and media studies regarding mass production and consumption. An example of this is the treatise of authorship in connection to ownership. During the era after the claim (Barthes 1977) that the mass culture has replaced popular culture's originality with mass production, causing the author to dissolve into oblivion, a theoretical concept of authorship has gained strength in close relationship to ownership in the context of market economy. The question of authorship has returned to discussions on art, culture and media produce. It has already been an important concern during the different phases of modernity, but now the concept faces new paradoxes between the interest in authoring and the ownership of the produce. On the one hand, the changes in the means of production of creative works challenge the status of the author, authorship and ownership in new ways. And on the other hand, the key difference of authorship and ownership centres on the necessity of an active audience. When, the receiving audience is a necessity for the concept of authorship, the ownership is geared towards earnings logics in the market economy exchanges. In the contexts of the market economy the two concepts merge, which profoundly influences the nature of authorship (cf. Hemmungs Wirtén 2004). The ownership/authorship merger in the area of creative works has historically increased the authorship's emphasis as a private property originator, moving the focus away from the cultural practices in arts and media that are based on communal production and consumption

as closely networked activities. In this sense, the digital gift economies and the waving of immaterial rights can be read as a reintroduction of such communal practices for innovative processes.

Parallel to the changes in authorship, the knowledge work by fan communities and intellectual capital created gradually shifts the discussion of the nature of ownership in the context of creative and media markets by challenging the earnings logics to accommodate innovation and new content uses and formats, blurring the terms of control and earnings logics of creative and media industry actors (cf. Taalas & Rehn 2007). This can be seen in the discussion relating to copyright and terms of use. The increasing use of creative works in forms of platforms and concepts turns consumers into active audiences in the market economy, and once again calls to question the roles of the originators and the producers of uses in communal practices. It puts the discussion on the ownership and the authorship very much back on the agenda. This dynamic is particularly apparent in media production, where emphasis on user produced content increases, turning the publishing business models into republishing and the reshuffling of derivative works of the existing cultural and media contents. The users' commitment to such organization is questionable, if the ownership and the authorship of the material is granted automatically to the owners of such digital environments (good example of this is the discussion on Facebook activity and contents). This is tied directly to the issue of control over the creative works in hybrid economies that are becoming increasingly copyrighted economies. Such development calls for negotiation in the markets, whether they be market or exchange economies. In the case of *Wreck a Movie* the question is solved by the explicit embrace of concepts such as the community governed markets of protected works within the network for the common good, making room for communal responsibility for a shared future, instead of holding on to ownership of one end product. This practice comes close to the organizing of those markets, where ownerships are norm – rather than legally – based and upheld by the social control of exchanges (Fauchart & von Hippel 2008). Naturally such arrangements are based and upheld by exchanges made in a network of trust. In these

cases the ownership comes closer to the parenting rights, which do not entitle to the ownership of the offspring, but give a temporal custody in the development of the community practice and production, a share in the making of the future.

It is difficult to see avenues of return to the traditional clear-cut definitions of the relationship between the author and her work, the ownership and the control of the use of copyrighted works. Such considerations lead to discussions on the role of intellectual authorship/ownership in cultural production. The economic activity related to amateurs, hobbyist, enthusiasts and fans in the digitalized markets of cultural and media production, contribute to an alternative organization of the production of novel uses and voluntary community activity. In this organization the intellectual property rights are given varying interpretations, and the role of organization in different economies is seen differently (cf. Lessig 2008). The study of organization of consumption in the markets economy suggests that in a hybrid economy that is partially market and partially exchange-governed, there are more than one set of rules for exchanges, ownership and control. On the one hand, the intellectual property rights are waived in the name of innovation, and community goals in order to take the markets production practices into new directions. On the other hand, the social norms and honor systems can be exercised as parallel control systems, replacing the primacy for legal regimes. These kinds of market dynamics changes would impact policy making in many ways.

ORGANIZATION OF CONSUMPTION IN THE COPYRIGHTED MARKETS – SOME SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR CULTURAL POLICY DISCOURSE

In the digital era the control of the use value of media production is no longer solely exercised by the large companies, but ultimately in the hands of the consumers. For example, creating a fandom through the

influence of media and marketing only seems to be hard, if not impossible (Nikunen 2005). At the same time, the active followership seems to become a necessity for the consumption of cultural and media products such as formats and experience services. An organization enacted by the fans and the followers produces multiple use values, as well as new uses corresponding to alternative, novel needs. This has also implications for the identity value. It would be far too limiting to assume that such organization would be easily influenced by corporate marketing communication related to the identity value creation. Popular culture fans' usage of media commodities and production practices varies greatly and the identity work is rich and complex. At the same time, the use of media products is wide and the active followers are heavy volume media consumers (Suoninen 2003). The various use and identity values that are out of reach of business organizations explain, however, why fans and followers have remained outside the formal marketing efforts, and in this respect are of little interest to the media companies. They simply cannot be used in any mechanical way for pushing products to the markets. The formal organizations are not the only one's finding the dynamics problematic. The dynamic relationship between production and consumption challenges also the idea of 'the audience' as it has been traditionally presented rather passive within audience studies (Ang 1991; Sandvoss 2005; Hirsjärvi 2009).

In the contemporary discussion on cultural policy these issues have been addressed in limited ways only. The policy discourse seems to have moved effortlessly from the traditional ideas, embracing a wide community access to culture as public service only a few decades ago, to the embrace of strong private ownership of cultures goods and the primacy of intellectual property rights, copyright and related rights for providing stronger financial independence for cultural institution and individuals (see, for example, Kangas 2002b). Analytical reviews of the effects of this shift have been produced by commentators pointing out the uneasiness in such a move (Kangas 2002b; Jürisson 2007). In this paper, I join with these commentators in pointing out some contemporary movements in the post-industrial markets that highlight the complexity of the dy-

namics between the ownership, authorship, and parenting innovation in cultural organization, and their connection to the organization of local economies. No interpretation can be simple when it comes to such profound issues involved.

I would like to highlight some strategic difficulties for the cultural policy discourse in three areas of consideration. The first is related to the relationship of cultural policy discourse and copyright regimes, and the global challenges of legitimation. The second area of concern is the changing roles of the formal cultural organizations and institutions. The third consideration raises the question of the aesthetics involved.

Firstly, from an organization theorist point of view, it seems clear that the emphasis of intellectual property ownership as the basis of the economy of culture does change the role of cultural policy considerably. The approach replaces some of cultural policy's traditional functions rooted in national or local identity work, public access, and communal ownership in forms of followership. These cultural practices are replaced partly with the functions of the copyright regimes and the market economy logics on the production, and attempts to developed hybrid economies on the consumption side. Here, the copyright regime is referred to as a boundary condition, not mainly as the copyright law but as the systems and institutions, that are made possible by the intellectual property legislation. On a global scale the intellectual property regimes raise questions related to the colonialistic tendencies, the rightful ownership of cultural practices and heritage, and the feministic critique of the gender bias in the intellectual property control (Hemmungs Wirtén 2004). Many of these issues have not been considered from the cultural policy perspective.

Secondly, the role of the cultural institutions as the owners or the guardians of intellectual property in forms of heritage, arts, and culture objects and goods becomes also problematic in the copyrighted economy. While managerialistic tendencies turn cultural institutions into utilitarian beneficiaries of the property in their custody, their road as public service providers seems to become closer to an end. It is therefore poignant to ask, as many scholars in this volume do, what is the place, space, and

indeed, purpose of the cultural institutions and policy in the future. From an organization theorist point of view, perhaps cultural institution will need to find alternative organizing practices that would allow them to become, once again, “professional fans” in their fields, enabling them to find the links for engaging their active audiences.

Finally, the shift in cultural policy discourse from wide public access to copyright economy proposes aesthetic aspects that are of importance. While publishing creative works in forms of platforms, concepts, digital platforms and portals, and user centric innovation processes has become commonplace in many parts of the contemporary economy, aesthetics created by mixing, matching, mash up making, sampling, rodding, tuning, pimping, and bundling is doomed unimportant by insistence on the primacy of ownership concepts that are rooted in the industrial era of production (cf. Taalas & Rehn 2007; Lessig 2008).

An alternative organization that has powerful innovative qualities, such as a fan organization, is largely left to the fringes of innovation systems, if not ignored completely. Understanding the value creation of copyrighted goods requires that the social dynamics of innovation in the markets by the consumer-producer-users will have to be acknowledged and recognized: not as part of the traditional production system, but as integral part of the organization of value in the markets. In hybrid economies of media and cultural consumption, this might even mean alternative organization. It just might be the future, providing a reinterpretation of the nature of organization and its place in cultural production. In this sense, the innovation’s entanglement with cultural practices and the organization of uses, exchange and identity values created need to be analyzed further to understand their dynamic properties in the era when the content and the organization of consumption have become one of the technological drivers in market economy.

4.3

How Many People Go to the Theatre? A Challenge for Evidence-Based Policy-Making

Michael Quine

SOUND POLICY-MAKING in the cultural sector, just as much as in other sectors, should depend on clear thought, allied to sound evidence: *prior* evidence from which to infer policy solutions, and *subsequent* evidence with which to test how far the decisions and actions have delivered what was intended. However, there are many aspects of the cultural sector in which there is no robust evidence base. Sometimes this is because no-one has yet thought to collect the data, often acting instead simply on instinct. Sometimes it is because the evidence, the data, is hard to find and collect—national statistical systems, for instance, tend not to place much focus on many sub-areas within the cultural sector. As an example, it is not easy to identify ‘cultural employment’ because of the separation between, on the one hand, those who are employed in culture jobs (actors, musicians, choreographers) and, on the other hand, those who work in the cultural sector but not in ‘culture jobs’ (ticket office staff, for instance). And sometimes, indeed frequently, linguistic issues overtake the others, because of different approaches to defining terms.

The fact is that few countries have a robust system for collecting relevant and complete data: and even when a system is relatively robust

and consistent, it is not the same from one country to another, so that informed comparisons can not be made. And yet this kind of information, properly gained and analyzed, is of importance to policy-makers at all levels.

This paper addresses the theme of definitions, using ‘the theatre’ as just one element within the wider cultural sector. It draws on fact-finding and analysis carried out by the writer over a period of some 20 years in the UK, as well as research projects carried out by him for the Scottish Arts Council and (with a colleague) for the Arts Council of England.

It aims to identify the most significant issues and challenges rather than Simple to present robust data. It starts off by setting what seems to be a very Simple and straightforward question, and shows how complicated the simplest question can be. It is the simplest questions that are often the hardest to answer, and this paper, addressing applied rather than abstract or theoretical research, sets out to identify and develop some of the realities that come into play in seeking valid answers to this one.

It will become clear that without clarification of all the implications, policy decisions and subsequent actions can not be soundly based.

THE “SIMPLE” QUESTION

How many people go to the theatre ‘these days’? That is the kind of question which in large measure underpins the information needs of arts managers, funding specialists, politicians, sociologists, economists and many more besides. And it seems as though it ought to be susceptible to a ready answer or at least set of answers.

The question is important for a number of reasons. Audiences might be increasing, or reducing, in number, and to the extent that public (state) or private (sponsorship or personally donated) money is helping the sector, changes in audience numbers are likely to be relevant in terms of justifying that investment. At the same time, policy-makers will need to have in mind the audience-mix in terms of, for instance, age, gender,

ethnicity, and more mechanical elements such as the distance which attenders are willing to travel, not least for particular kinds of work.

Whether audience numbers are going up or down, *revenues* from customers may be changing. However much public support there may be, theatre needs to earn money. Ticket revenue for the sector as a whole might be changing: a fall could indicate, for instance, a sector in overall decline, in need of remedial action at state or local level. It is not simply revenue for the sector as a whole which has to be counted: in any particular theatre, ticket revenue per head will have implications directly for managers and producers, and what happens in one theatre or region may have follow-on consequences elsewhere. Even if audience *numbers* are holding steady, if people are less willing or able to pay, then there may be greater need to make up the financial difference, in order to compensate, through the funding system.

What it is that people go to see is very likely to vary over time—for instance, the deep drama giving way to the lightweight musical, perhaps in step with economic recession; and along with all these, there may be a significance in terms of the type of person who goes (social class or status) and of course how often s/he goes (is attendance a regular part of normal domestic life, or an annual ‘treat?’). There may also be a significance in terms of new (= first-time) attenders.

Managers and policy-makers also need to know something about *why* people go to theatre: all sorts of instrumentalist claims are increasingly made, but how do we know that they are being met?

A further insight into audience behaviour can be gained from comparing changes in ticket prices and yields against inflation overall in the economy, and an indicator of this kind can suggest something about the significance of theatre attendance in society’s overall consumption patterns.

Internationally, there is real interest in knowing how subsidy and revenue patterns are and may be changing in different countries, and international benchmarks, even if not targets for others to aim for, can offer useful guidance to politicians and/or welcome ammunition for practitioners.

AN EVIDENCE BASE

The factual source material for this paper is a multi-year analysis which has been carried out since 1990 for the Theatrical Management Association (TMA), based in London. This is the management organization of some 350 members, theatre producers and building operators throughout the UK *but outside the West End of London*.

Other analyses are undertaken in the UK. The West End theatres and producers (the Society of London Theatre – SOLT) collect and analyze their own data, but this deals with just for 40 or so theatres in London’s West End. There is a third management body, addressing the needs of small-scale touring companies, and this is the Independent Theatre Council (ITC): it collects data annually by a survey of its membership but this is not as thorough an approach as that of the TMA (which collects data monthly) and SOLT (which collects it weekly).

One might ask why any or all of these sector-bodies need to collect the audience information in which, surely, the funding system itself ought to be particularly interested. The fact is – and was when the SOLT and later the TMA procedures started – that a public funding system tends to be closely interested only in what it is funding, and then largely only to the extent that questions of value for money come to the fore.

Expanding on this, in 2001 the present writer with Charles Bishop carried out an exploratory project for the Arts Council of England (ACE). Its purpose was “to identify sources and information about theatre provision throughout England, so that the ACE can determine how to proceed towards a full theatres mapping project” (Quine & Bishop 2001). The report was divided into four sections, of which

[t]he most tangible is a substantial list of theatres with identifiers concerned with geography, size, and type of work. Beyond this, a section reports on sources of information, and a further section expands on this, describing and discussing the effectiveness of these sources, and raising questions of definition; a fourth section makes

recommendations for the development of a full database, testing elements of one database model against one geographic area.

In passing, the report noted that this exploratory project “encouraged an interchange between those various departments which were, as a result, and apparently for the first time, able to exchange information and ideas”.

One might wonder why it was that the Arts Council did not already have a full picture of theatre provision: partial justification has been attempted above.

Away from the subsidised sector, independent un-funded theatres and companies as well as a commercial profit-seeking sector tend to carry no particular interest for the public funding system: more, they are not responsible to it, so feel no need to make regular returns of data other than to their immediate stakeholders, though they might in the most general of show-off marketing terms explain annually, and proudly, that “we attracted over 250,000 visitors last year”.

Even so, did they? Probably not. The issue here is between the number of tickets sold, on the one hand, and the number of visitors who bought them. 250,000 tickets sold may sound fine, but does it represent 125,000 ticket buyers (each buying two) coming one time each, or something like 21,000 buyers each coming as a pair 6 times. In the first case, if no-one is returning, then how long till the market is saturated? In the second, how long till the available relevant and appropriate repertoire has been exhausted?

DEFINITIONS OF THEATRE

It ought to be too obvious to rehearse, but we should note that there are various conceptions of “theatre”. Theatre managers know what they are managing: but do the audiences know, differentiate or care? We can consider a number of variations quite apart from the “classic” profes-

sional company in a fully-professional traditional theatre. As examples: a performance of a play by an amateur group in a school hall or a sports & leisure centre temporarily transformed for theatre by bringing in all the appropriate tiered seating, lighting and other technical equipment: a performance by a fully professional company in the same building: a grassy arena in a public park used, by amateurs or by professionals, for maybe two weeks a year?

So should the categorization include only fully-equipped buildings, built as and dedicated to use as a space for the presentation of performances, and of a style which often also celebrates itself as a theatre: or should it include also spaces built for another purpose but converted (with greater or lesser success) for theatre use, buildings intended for multiple cultural uses (an arts centre); or what about a performance, perhaps, of small scale opera in an appropriate part of, say, a museum?

Or a concert hall adapted for a Christmas season (contrary to all the architect's intentions¹) into a space for classical ballet such as the *Nutcracker*? Other examples noted in Britain included spaces, covered or not, into which an entire touring structure can be fitted—such as the Royal Exchange tent²; and a small group of theatre companies which create promenade theatre in public recreation parks, moving the audience round the park for different parts of the production—while the audience certainly feels it is seeing theatre, and the performing company knows it is making theatre, the park would hardly appear in any directory of theatres.

We could go on down this route at considerable length, but – given space restrictions – it may be appropriate to add simply one more: there is in Britain at least a tendency to put theatre work into 'found spaces' – spaces neither designed for nor previously used for performances, maybe derelict factories, hostels for the homeless, and in recent times a bedroom in the former hotel in London's St Pancras station or the platform of a disused Underground station.

Definition of terms, as ever, provides constant challenges and difficulties in the interpretation and creation of any listings.

Once the issue is resolved of what a theatre should be taken to be, the next issue is what happens there. The word *theatre* covers many things, and different usages lead to the reporting of different realities. It can be drama theatre, but can also include dance, opera, and musical: it can be direct, presented, performance, but might also include participatory work. The well-made and traditional style of ‘play’ is increasingly giving way to multi-media work, British theatre buildings are increasingly presenting stand-up comedy, and the phenomenon of Live Art further confuses, one might say, confounds, any attempts at clear description.

Live Art is now recognized as one of the most vital and influential of creative spaces in the UK. Live Art is a research engine, driven by artists who are working across forms, contexts and spaces to open up new artistic models, new languages for the representation of ideas and new strategies for intervening in the public sphere.

Influenced at one extreme by late 20th century Performance Art methodologies where fine artists, in a rejection of objects and markets, turned to their body as the site and material of their practice, and at the other by enquiries where artists broke the traditions of the circumstance and expectations of theatre, a diverse range of practitioners in the 21st century – from those working in dance, film and video, to performance writing, socio-political activism and the emerging languages of the digital age – continue to be excited by the possibilities of the live event (Live Art Development Agency).

FINDING THE FIGURES: A PARTICULAR CASE

When the TMA started its ongoing audience data collection and analysis in 1990, many of the questions raised above were addressed almost by default. The survey was to be limited to those buildings and producers

which were members of the Association: and its primary purpose was to inform the membership rather than any external body or funding agency or system.

For all that, the information gathered could be used for the good of the sector in a number of ways. In the first place, these theatres and companies generated considerable amounts of tax (value added tax: VAT) on ticket sales: it seemed important to be able to draw links between this tax revenue and levels of public subsidy³

Beyond that, with good information about audience trends, the Association could trumpet its successes and seek to make an even better case for sponsorship and/or public support. This information could be related on the one hand to audience numbers; on the other to, say, a commitment to particular kinds of work. As an example, work for children and young people generates lower ticket yields than work for solely adult audiences but does not necessarily cost less to produce: how is this to be compensated, and on what basis is the difference in revenue-needs to be made up?

Internally then, at the level of the individual theatres, programme-planning and pricing strategies would be informed by evidence from other theatres, whether in similar or in dissimilar population centres. But these elements – programme-planning and pricing decisions – are also closely linked to the nature of external policy-making realities, and it is easy to see how a circular relationship can be set up.

An early decision was taken that the count would be of the number of tickets sold, along with the ticket revenues achieved. While this is not of itself a measure of the ‘reach’ of the theatre into its community – that would be better done by counting individual visitors rather than just footfall – the technology did not exist to do anything else. Even now, with advanced ticket-selling computing technology, at best the systems are limited to tracking ticket *buyers*, ignoring those who come with them or for whom the tickets are bought. From the start, therefore, the procedure had to abandon any hope of measuring the role of theatre in a community, or the number of repeat visits, let alone the number of unique visitors in a period of time.

The next challenge was to find a way to describe the type of work being seen. The Arts Council⁴ was of course collecting audience data from its own 'clients', the theatres it funded, maybe 100 from a theatre portfolio of around 400⁵ in the country. Its purpose in the collection was accountability upwards to government and in the creation of some kind of benchmarks to assist in the periodic evaluation of its clients, rather than outwards towards them, so its own data collection did nothing to create benchmarks which would be useful to the industry itself. It had a short list of categories, types of work: they included Drama, Shakespeare, Ayckbourn (a particularly popular and prolific playwright then as now), as well as Dance and Opera.

The TMA determined to refine this and came up with a list of 13 categories of work. These were:

- Modern Drama *as compared with*
- Classic Drama
- Comedy
- Dance
- Children's work
- Thriller
- Shakespeare
- Dance
- Opera
- Traditional Musical
- Modern Musical
- Revue, *and*
- Other (*anything which did not fit the previous categories*)

Looking back, it is easy to see that these were very broad categorizations, and indeed after the initial three years the list was refined and developed. A relevant justification was that it was considered necessary to keep the procedure as simple and straightforward as possible. This data collection was a wholly new process, with no sanction for any who did not submit figures, and it could easily have been seen as an intrusion on individual theatres' autonomy. There was no compulsion on theatre managers to

make returns of the data: the more troublesome the task was, not least in deciding how to identify a piece of work, the less likely they might be to bother with it at all.

But even that simple set of labels contained its own challenges. At first sight, it might look clear, if lightweight. But Shakespeare wrote “A Comedy of Errors” and other pieces which can be properly described as ‘Comedy’ as well as ‘Shakespeare’; the theatre’s marketing department might well be selling a Shakespeare comedy as ‘popular, entertaining, rib-tickling comedy’ to the general public, as ‘educational’ to school, university and ‘serious’ audiences, and even as ‘academically ground-breaking’ to Shakespeare devotees. Then, at what point does a Musical migrate from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’, a piece of ‘modern drama’ become a modern ‘classic’. “Waiting for Godot” comes to mind in that context. And there are more than a few nineteenth century classics which are still seen as simple thriller tales.

The solution to this range of problems was a somewhat uneasy compromise: on the one hand, it is the theatre managers who know best how they promoted a particular piece in their theatre, whether as classic, as thriller, as comedy, and their own statement could serve in many cases – especially where a piece had been significantly adapted from its original creation. On the other hand, certain pieces of work just attracted different classification from different managers on grounds of, one might say, not knowing any better: and this certainly turned out to be the case where it was not the manager but the ticket office clerk who made the return. A clear example here was that “Waiting for Godot” or plays by George Bernard Shaw were variously described as British, and as Irish (European): for cases like this a simple addition to the computer programming would over-ride in a standardized way whatever the data-delivering theatre suggested.

The research activity was undertaken in the first instance for a period of three years. This would be enough time to determine whether managers would a) make the returns, and b) find the information useful; and to make decisions about developments and changes.

The analysis and the results did turn out to be welcomed, and after the three years some changes, developments, were made to the categorizations. The changes made then (in 1993) were to remain unchanged until a further change (addition) in 2006.

There are now 31 categories of work identified. They are shown below, and the refinement of the listing has made it necessary to be more dogmatic about consistency: the computer data-checking program is consistently updated.

Few would argue now that the present categorizations are particularly good, let alone perfect. But they retain the merit that they are for the most part understood by those sending in data, and that they are compatible over time. This means that longitudinal assessment is easily done, and changes over time can be identified: if it were not, then

Type of show	Type of show
Comedy (<i>but not stand-up</i>)	Shakespeare
Modern Musical <i>as compared with ...</i>	Thriller
Traditional Musical – Sandy Wilson, the American 'greats'	Other – anything which fits no other code
Revue/one-person/stand-up	British Drama up to 1956 (<i>pre</i> 'Look back in Anger')
Opera/Operetta	Other-European drama up to about 1956
Gilbert & Sullivan	Non-European Drama up to about 1956
Dance – classical ballet	British Drama 1956 – 1979
Dance – contemporary	Other-European Drama 1956 – 1979
Dance – folk/ethnic	Non-European Drama 1956 – 1979
Children's show	British Drama 1980 –2000
Children's show (with educational content., esp. of school or broad syllabus interest)	Other-European Drama 1980 – 2000
Family show	Non-European Drama 1980 –2000
Pantomime	British Drama written since 2000
Classic British play but not Shakespeare – "classic" = with broad status of educational (school) set text	Other-European Drama written since 2000
Classic other-European play	Non-European Drama written since 2000
Classic non-European play	

one of the purposes of the data collection would be denied. There's a well-established Irish joke: "Can you tell me the best way to get to Conemara?" "Ah, that's a difficult journey. If I were you, I'd want to start from somewhere else." Reviewing the present situation with this dataset, the present writer feels rather the same.

A typology of theatre work is one thing, creating its own problems. When they are resolved, then surely the number elements are easy to handle. However, that was – and is – not the case. In terms of numbers, it is important to be clear about what information is required.

The aggregate raw number of tickets sold is a first step, but it is only a step. There are many reasons why that raw number might not tell anything useful, especially over a period of time: different seasons have more, or less, theatre activity; in different years some theatres may open, or be closed, thus affecting any judgment in relation to raw numbers.

What seemed important from the start was to add to the raw number of tickets sold, the number of tickets offered for sale, the 'capacity'. From that, a calculation could be made of the proportion of available tickets actually sold: changes in this figure are likely to be more significant than changes in the raw number of tickets sold. But: how many seats does a theatre have? A theatre with tiers has a varied set of capacities: it might offer only ground floor (stalls: parterre) and circle for certain productions (a total of 500); add in an upper circle for shows it expected to be more popular; and add in a gallery for the most popular manifestations, taking capacity to 920. So what is the 'capacity' to be quoted? The 500 figure ("but this was a minority interest production and we never expected to sell more than 500 tickets per night") or the 920 figure, because that is the physical capacity of the building? At one level, this might not be such an important issue: but if a manager has inherited, so to speak, a building much larger than seems appropriate for today's patterns of usage, the s/he should surely not be pilloried (punished: considered ineffective) for only ever selling, say, 30% of available tickets.

Having settled an approach to counting tickets available and sold, the research project seemed to be on track. But then marketing strategies and tactics upset things as they developed. "Twofers"—two tickets

sold for the price of one—have become an increasingly popular way of promoting shows at quiet times. Is that to be represented in the ticketing computer as two tickets sold at half price each? Or as one ticket sold and one given away free? Whichever of those is selected will have an impact on any overall “number of tickets sold” figure. And in the latter case, the case of the ticket given away free, a complimentary ticket, does that label indicate a ticket given away in desperation in order to create at least a few people in the auditorium; or tickets willingly given to the Press and to other official guests (not people coming of their own free choice); or tickets genuinely sold though at a deep discount? So here the approaches taken by the ticketing software companies were not always providing the information required by this survey⁶.

The same principle – to assess the proportion of available tickets sold – applies to ticket revenues. How much did ticket sales generate, what was the potential, and what proportion of the potential was achieved? The two usually differ because of the effect of discounts⁷ such as student prices, reductions for the unemployed, and of course any propensity for customers to opt *against* the highest prices and *for* the lower price ranges. In the UK the difference tends to be around 6% across the board: thus, if 65% of available tickets are sold, one might expect to have achieved about 59% of cash capacity. In the calendar year 2007, 60% of available tickets were sold, and 54% of available ticket revenue was achieved.

These proportions do of course vary considerably from one type of work to another: table I, below, indicates that where 69% of tickets for a ‘traditional musical’ may be sold, and 67% of tickets for work for children and families, 52% are sold for ‘modern drama’.

The figures for the TMA membership for the year to March 2008 are shown in Table 1 (there are more-detailed breakdowns but this outlines the reality). It shows, perhaps surprisingly, that the greatest number of performances (as much as a third of all work) were of work for children and young people (including the seasonal Christmas show) which also achieved the lowest average per-ticket yield, with 67% of tickets sold and 57% of potential revenue achieved. It also suggests that audiences of

‘traditional musical’ may be particularly price sensitive – 73% of tickets sold yet only 54% of overall ticket value achieved.

As a statistic for use by a manager, so far so good. It tells him/her the raw numbers, as well as the extent to which the show may have met its targets. But it is still far from competent for an overall assessment of trends. Even aggregated over a region or a country, it suffers from all the problems of a single photographic snapshot in that it lacks a context.

But that table, being a snapshot, may be likely to hide any underlying reality. External circumstances – bad weather, transport strikes, for instance – may have taken one year out of normal patterns: in addition, in the context of overall regional or national figures, individual theatres or companies may have been closed, perhaps for refurbishment over an extended time.

For those reasons, while the detail shown in Table 1 is strictly correct, interpretation is aided by a longer-term view, and the TMA expects a longitudinal analysis. At present this runs over a constantly updated period of 8 years, and in order to wipe out any in-year fluctuations a rolling three year average is used. The outcome of this is shown as Table 2.

The advantage of Table 2 is that trends can be seen, whether in numbers or in revenues, and the most surprising thing is that over all the years covered, there has been no significant change in the proportion of tickets sold (always at around 59%) or the proportion of potential ticket revenue achieved (always at around 53%): this, in spite of developments and enhanced skills in arts marketing, the development of competing activity, notably home-based and focused on the internet and on computer gaming.

The addition of a measure of inflation begins to address a theme raised above – the extent to which theatre going may be related to other consumer activity. The present table certainly shows that ticket yields have been rising at a rate faster than inflation as measured by the Retail Price Index (RPI – all items). Over recent years, British inflation has been at a rate lower than 3%, yet the table shows that ticket yields have always exceeded that. The table shows that the average ticket yield has risen from £12.45 some 5 years ago to £15.48 in the most recent

period, where it would have been a full £1.00 less if it had increased in line with inflation.

This might seem not to be a significant factor, since the money value is not particularly great: however, in earlier years there was a much greater difference, and ticket yields and asking prices were racing ahead of inflation, giving rise to some fear that theatre-going might be moving from being a relatively normal activity to something seen – on the basis of price – as much more of a discretionary and (almost) luxury item of expenditure. There was some debate in this context. Funding (for those theatres which receive public funding) is in part intended to help keep prices down so that few are prevented by price from going to theatre: yet theatres ‘get away with’ price increases above inflation levels.

This raises a fascinating issue. It has been recognized for many years that theatre is, in general, attended by the well-off and the well-educated, not to mention the older generations. By those, that is, who can afford it. And increasingly in Britain, as they are de-developed and modernized, theatres are creating restaurants which play to the up-market in terms both of price and of style. Yet the funding system is aiming at other groups.

The Department for Culture, Media and Sport has set the Arts Council certain targets: most recently it has had to “increase significantly [the] take-up of arts opportunities by new users aged 20 and above from priority groups” – these priority groups being in a certain sense the disadvantaged: the disabled, the socially excluded, and those from Black and Minority Ethnic groups. The Arts Councils’ client organizations have had to bear those targets in mind, though over the period of the most recent target-setting (2003–2006), “there is no evidence of any statistically significant change since the baseline in participation or attendance by any of the priority groups”. (Arts Council England 2007.)

The target included more than theatre, and the present writer is not making a definitive association between any of those three priority groups and any (in)ability to pay. But observation of theatre developments and theatre audiences does readily suggest that while they are still targeting young people as audiences, not least through schools and colleges,

theatres are not afraid of inviting high spend with the combination of tickets and the offer of drinks and food at prices well up to and often, now, above what might be called high street prices.

It seems to be becoming a ‘lifestyle thing’. While around 40% of adults attend “any performance in a theatre” in a year, what they see ranges widely, as discussed above: only about 30% attend Plays, and only a small proportion attend more than one time a year. This suggests that while theatre attendance might well be a habit, it is a habit that is affordable at that rate even if prices and associated costs rise, which begs the question of new, replacement or different audiences. It seems fair to suggest that this is just one of the issues which cultural policy makers need to address: and for which they need accurate and consistent data on which to base actions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This short paper has sought to address some of the challenges which arise in trying to arrive at an answer to what seems to be a simple question. It has identified a number of definitional issues and, along with them, a number of issues of approach to using what might appear at first sight to be uncontroversial statistics. It has done that along with some reference to the realities of finding and using data from theatres in

This table deals with the year of 52 weeks up till late April 2008

Type of work	No of perfs.	Paid attendance	Ticket sales value	Average ticket offer price	Average ticket yield	% tickets sold	% ticket value achieved
A: modern drama	4528	1 053 530	£15 024 362	£16.39	£14.26	52	45
B: comedy	1385	462 530	£6 852 521	£21.27	£14.82	51	36
C: modern musical	1776	1 191 969	£24 986 768	£22.03	£20.96	62	59
D: traditional musical	335	256 248	£4 205 368	£21.94	£16.41	69	52
E: revue/variety/one person	308	130 770	£2 191 529	£16.90	£16.76	67	66
F: opera/operaetta (incl. G&S)	335	189 055	£4 526 882	£24.42	£23.94	55	54
G: dance	839	519 595	£10 490 378	£21.59	£20.19	57	53
H: children/family work	5730	2 288 905	£28 977 648	£14.88	£12.66	67	57
I: classic play	1867	779 282	£13 539 874	£19.14	£17.37	61	56
J: thriller	433	153 614	£2 403 749	£16.74	£15.65	44	41
K: other work not classified above	623	204 228	£3 134 491	£15.79	£15.35	59	57
Totals	18159	7 229 726	£116 333 570	£18.31	£16.09	60	53

Source: Michael Quine: data collection for Theatrical Management Association: unpublished

Table 1

TMA AUDIENCE DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS						
KEY INDICATORS OVER EIGHT YEARS: 52 weeks of years to end-April (+/- 3 days) in each case						
Three-year moving averages taking the arithmetic average of the 52 weeks in the three years shown in each column						
	2000-2003	2001-2004	2002-2005	2003-2006	2004-2007	2005-2008
No of perfs	21 043	19 984	18 708	18 844	19 947	19 676
<i>Change year on year</i>		-5,0%	-6,4%	0,7%	5,9%	-1,4%
No of tickets sold	7 826 900	7 453 219	6 974 978	7 141 568	7 588 684	7 822 714
<i>Change year on year</i>		-4,8%	-6,4%	2,4%	6,3%	3,1%
Tickets offered for sale	13 360 513	12 660 343	11 784 594	12 078 696	12 854 540	13 188 560
<i>Change, year on year</i>		-5,2%	-6,9%	2,5%	6,4%	2,6%
Percentage of tickets sold	58,6	58,9	59,2	59,1	59,0	59,3
Value of tickets sold	£97 611 974	£96 520 873	£94 138 161	£100 480 744	£112 864 916	£121 568 311
<i>Change year on year</i>		-1,1%	-2,5%	6,7%	12,3%	7,7%
Value of tickets offered for sale	£186 478 292	£183 362 961	£177 828 030	£188 102 854	£210 520 210	£227 139 106
<i>Change year on year</i>		-1,7%	-3,0%	5,8%	11,9%	7,9%
Percentage of cash value achieved	52,3	52,6	52,9	53,4	53,6	53,5
Average no of tickets sold per performance	372	373	373	379	380	398
Average number of tickets offered per perf.	635	634	630	641	644	670
Average ticket yield	£12,47	£12,95	£13,50	£14,07	£14,87	£15,54
INDEX, taking year 1 as 100		104	108	113	119	125
<i>Change year on year</i>		3,8%	4,2%	4,2%	5,7%	4,5%
If the yield had risen in line with the All-Items RPI, it would have been:		£12,73	£13,07	£13,49	£13,83	£14,31
Average ticket price on offer	£13,96	£14,48	£15,09	£15,57	£16,38	£17,22
INDEX, taking year 1 as 100		104	108	112	117	123
<i>Change year on year</i>		3,6%	4,0%	3,1%	4,9%	4,9%
Average 'discount' from offer price	10,6%	10,6%	10,6%	9,7%	9,2%	9,8%

Table 2

the UK. The initial starting point was “how many people go to theatre in a year”: the paper suggests that it is impracticable to identify a direct answer to that question, and that a next-best single answer comes from an assessment of ticket buying and therefore of foot-fall in to theatre spaces. This can be allied with analyses of surveys of the population as a whole, enquiring (albeit from sample surveys) how often – if at all – people visit theatre. Bringing the two together can do a great deal to reach towards a useful answer to the question: an answer which should be valuable to theatre managers and others in the sector, just as much to an arts support and funding system. An answer, too, which begins to have value for the policy-maker. And while there may be weaknesses in the methodology, it must be acknowledged that continuity allows the effects of policy decisions and actions to be monitored and measured.

Endnotes

- 1 This was the case for the Royal Festival Hall in London, whose auditorium was designed for use only as concert hall and conference venue.
- 2 In Manchester, the Royal Exchange Theatre is a 700-seat steel and glass capsule, theatre in the round, occupying the centre of the city’s magnificent former Cotton Exchange. In 1996 a massive bomb laid waste to the city centre, the Royal Exchange became unusable, and the theatre company procured a large-scale tent structure in which they could and did carry on their work both under cover and in open spaces.
- 3 Exemption from VAT now applies to admission charges to theatre, music or dance performances of a cultural nature. The exemption applies to non-profit organizations, which are not permitted to distribute any surpluses of profits and must retain them for their own purposes and activities. However, the organization must be managed and administered on a voluntary basis by persons who have no direct or indirect financial interest in its activities, so this Cultural Exemption does not apply to for-profit theatre.
- 4 Arts Council of Great Britain, at that time: the national arts funding and support organization, at arm’s length from government. Now there are separate Arts Councils for England, Scotland and Wales, and while they are technically independent of government the arm has come down to about finger-length.
- 5 These figures were uncertain: the Arts Council had at that time no corporate knowledge of how many theatres existed: see the discussion above.

- 6 At the time of writing, Arts Council England allying with the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) is launching a free-tickets scheme for 19 – 26 year olds. This is to be a two year incentive scheme, aiming at potential audiences who would normally drift away from theatre attendance (or never have found it). One of the issues raised in the planning is how these tickets should be treated in accounting and reporting terms. Free? Complimentary? “Awarded”?
- 7 The present writer is hostile to the word “discount”, but uses it here because of its common usage. “Discount” or “Concession” seems to imply a certain kindness, or gesture of support. The reality is that it is usually an “incentive” price, seeking to persuade the attender to do something s/he would not otherwise have done and thereby to create a habit. Thus: students are not necessarily of themselves a desirable audience: but if they gain the habit, then they might continue it in after life.

5

Arts Policy and
Authorship Today

5.1

The Arm's Length Principle and the Art Funding System: A Comparative Approach

Per Mangset

INTRODUCTION

CULTURAL POLITICIANS, cultural workers and cultural policy researchers in many countries often refer to “the arm’s length principle” as one of the fundamental pillars of the cultural policy of their country (Chartrand/McCaughey 1989; Duelund 2003; Quinn 1997). But if we take a closer look, we see that they understand this principle in quite different ways, dependent on different national and cultural contexts. It also appears that there is no general agreement concerning what fields of cultural policy the principle should cover. However, there seems to be a minimum consensus, according to which the arm’s length principle is instituted in cultural policy in order to defend the cultural field, and especially the arts field, against improper political intervention. The selection and allocation of artists and artistic projects for public funding should be carried out primarily according to artistic quality criteria. The arm’s length principle is also usually supposed to imply that a relatively independent and artistically competent “arts council”, or some other “arm’s length body”, is established to take care of the allocation of

public subsidies to the arts community. Consequently, the arm's length principle is considered a cultural policy instrument for defending artistic autonomy. It is supposed to defend the arts against the kind of political abuse that was historically related to the fascist and the communist political traditions.

The arm's length principle may also be understood as a more general principle for the organisation of public policy. It should guarantee a proper division of power within several fields of policy in democratic states. In this article, however, I will discuss the arm's length principle merely in relation to arts policy. But even in this limited policy field the arm's length principle is interpreted differently by cultural politicians, cultural workers and cultural policy researchers in different national and cultural contexts. There is, for instance, a great international variety of institutions called "arts councils" or "arm's length bodies". Their autonomy, in relation to the government, varies considerably both between and within countries. Different spokesmen for the arm's length principle seem to have quite different ideas about what is the proper line of demarcation between political intervention and artistic autonomy. There is also a great deal of variation concerning the area of cultural policy, to which the principle is considered relevant, e.g. whether it should cover quite a broad or a rather narrow cultural policy sector. Opinions on whether "political influence" is understood in a strictly formal and limited way as the influence by formal public authorities (ministries, parliament, etc.) or whether it should also include political influence in a wider sense, for instance by cultural employer's associations and artist unions, also vary to a great degree. Some cultural politicians also seem to understand the arm's length principle as a mere formal organisational principle: they consider all delegation of responsibility for some part of the arts funding system to an institution outside the government to reflect the arm's length principle, even if the arm's length body has very little autonomy. Despite all these different interpretations all the spokesmen for the arm's length principle tend to celebrate the principle as a fundamental and general principle of cultural policy.

We can draw three preliminary conclusions from this: (1) from an analytical perspective, it is more appropriate to consider the arm's length principle a multi-dimensional continuum than an absolute principle. Thus the "arm's length" between arts and politics may be both rather long and quite short. And it may include several aspects or dimensions of political influence; (2) The arm's length principle is frequently used rhetorically by cultural politicians and cultural workers to strengthen the legitimacy of national cultural policy. It appears that this concept may serve as a rhetorical tool in different contexts even when it does not cover the same political reality; (3) While politicians tend to use the arm's length principle as a normative concept, (some) researchers would prefer to use it analytically for describing and explaining social structures and relations. Some confusion about the concept may be caused by this.

In this article I intend to describe and analyse the main aspects of how the arm's length principle has been interpreted and applied, or not applied, in the cultural policy of selected countries, primarily England (UK) and Norway. I will also take a sidelong glance at France and to the other Nordic countries. The arm's length principle, and the respective arm's length bodies, will be situated and discussed in relation to the institutionalisation of cultural policy in these countries after World War II.¹

THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE ARM'S LENGTH PRINCIPLE

The arm's length principle is sometimes understood as a general principle that is supposed to permeate all aspects of cultural policy, both a) the arm's length body's allocation of funds to individual artists and artist groups, and b) all other kinds of support to the arts community, for instance, substantial public subsidies to performing arts institutions. In the latter case the arm's length principle might imply that public authorities should refrain from imposing explicit performance indicators

upon arts institutions. Such new public management intervention into arts institutions might be considered a political violation of the arm's length principle. The same may be said about the appointment by the government of board members in publicly subsidised theatres, orchestras and art museums, if these members – directly or indirectly – intervene into artistic decisions.

In a narrower sense the arm's length principle is often related to specific parts of the art funding system, i.e. to those institutions that have been established after World War II in many countries at an arm's length from the government to allocate public support to the arts projects of individual artists and artist groups. In the British tradition such arm's length bodies were originally called QUANGOs (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations). In some countries arm's length bodies also fund big cultural institutions; many do not. My analysis here will concentrate on the arm's length body part of the arts funding system.

Political influence upon the arts funding system can, of course, take many different forms: it may be formal or informal; it may be legal, economic or based upon political and bureaucratic control of information. Even if the government has few and weak formal ways of influencing the arm's length body, there may be a community of interests and/or of taste between the political elite and the members of the arm's length body, which gives the political elite considerable real influence. A comprehensive study of the arm's length principle in relation to the arts funding system should take this plurality of potential political influences into consideration. Here, I have had to limit myself to discussing a few aspects of the relation only.

THE ARM'S LENGTH PRINCIPLE IN BRITISH CULTURAL POLICY

The Establishment of the Arts Council

British cultural policy is usually considered the prototype of an arm's length based cultural policy (Chartrand/McCaughey 1989). The Arts Council of Great Britain (the ACGB) was established just after World War II in 1946. To a certain degree, it continued the cultural work started by "the Council for Encouragement of Music and the Arts" (CEMA) during the war (White 1975; Hutchison 1982). But while CEMA had a broad socio-cultural and cultural democratic profile, the ACGB gave priority to fine art and high quality ("few but roses") only. The creation of the ACGB made it clear that Great Britain, although reluctantly, should really have a national cultural policy. The British government should take a certain responsibility for the arts. But it should still intervene as little as possible. Thus, policy researcher Anthony Beck (1992, 139) described the traditional British attitude to cultural policy in this way:

British government has always resisted the establishment of a Ministry of Culture.² There is a fundamental conviction that art and politics must never mix. It is disastrous for both. Artists must be autonomous to produce true art, but government cannot resist the temptation to control art and ultimately transform it into monolithic "state art", with Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin always cited as examples. Thus British government, because it is liberal and democratic government, should never have a cultural policy.

The establishment of an arts council at an arm's length from the government was considered the appropriate answer to these problems: it served the honourable cause of defending the autonomy of the arts; it also served as an excuse for establishing merely a minimum level of public cultural policy. The arm's length principle should, indeed, not prevent

the government from deciding the total amount of support to the arts. But the government should not decide *which* artists, *which* artist groups or *which* specific projects were to get support. The Arts Council should instead make independent evaluations and judgments on this, based on artistic quality criteria. The Council itself should be composed of independent and incorruptible personalities with a high personal standing and preferably with good knowledge about the arts. They should not represent specific organised interests in cultural life. According to another policy researcher, F. F. Ridley (1987, 237), “[m]embers are chosen for their personal standing in public life or the arts, not as nominees of other organisations”. The Council should be appointed by the government; but it was supposed – at least in principle – to allocate resources independently from political instructions or organised pressure groups. A series of expert panels and individual advisors were established to assist the Council. The members should (unlike their Nordic counterparts) be unpaid, certainly in order to secure impartiality.

***The Members of the Arts Council:
Elitism, Networks or Political Correctness***

The British (and later the English) Arts Council has been exposed to harsh and continuous criticism during its whole existence. According to the most frequent academic criticism, the Arts Council is not really independent from the government (Hutchison 1982; Williams 1989 [1979]; Pick 1991; Quinn 1997). Based on her analysis of the development of the relation between the government and the Arts Council from 1946 to 1997, Quinn (1997, 128) concludes that “... the government has become increasingly proximate to this arts council”. She discovers increasing “intimacy” rather than stable “distance” between the two. Thus, the autonomy of the Council, and indirectly, the autonomy of the arts, had gradually been reduced, according to her.

Several scholars have criticised the Arts Council for being too elitist. Others may have agreed that the Council *is* really elitist, but without

regretting it. It has also been claimed that an arts funding system, in which members of the arts community allocate financial support to their own colleagues, implies that “select groups of mice were given a lot of responsibility for distributing the cheese”, i.e. that the arm’s length principle in this context contributes to a partial distribution of public funds (Hutchison 1982, 27).

According to Ridley (1987, 236), there has been a “network of personal relations” between the members of the Council and powerful political circles. Hutchison (1982, 32) has also maintained that “from the first time there have been important links [from the Arts Council] into Government”. The links between the Government, the Arts Council and important cultural institutions were “forged [already] in the heat of the wartime” (*ibid.*). These links were often based on personal networks through school, family and business. Hutchison saw this as a symptom of oligarchy.

One of the founding fathers of academic “cultural studies”, and a former vice-president of the Council, Richard Hoggart, also asserted that the appointment of the members to the Council was more due to their affiliation to “a quite small, upper bourgeois ‘cultivated’ in-group” than to their knowledge on the fields of work of the Council (Hutchison 1982, 39). Their close relations to the political elite implied that the idea of an “arm’s length” between politics and art became illusive. Another cultural studies pioneer and former Council member, Raymond Williams, also criticised the ties between the Council and the political elite. He pointed at the fact that the government was in full control of the appointment of the members and the decisions about the budget of the Council. Therefore, there was no “arm’s length”, but rather a “wrist’s length” between the government and the Council (Williams 1989 [1979]).

Anthony Beck (1992, 141–42) shared these pessimistic considerations about the lack of a real arm’s length between politics and the arts. Primarily, the government controlled the Arts Council, because it was they who granted their money, and “... in practice (s)he who pays the piper calls the tune”. Secondly, the government also controlled the appointment of the board members and the employment of the most

important officials of the Council. Who did they choose? Beck (1992, 142) maintained that: "They choose safe, respectable, members of the national and regional establishments whose tastes and values will be within the parameters of ministerial tolerance. Thus, the management bodies share the cultural attitudes of the political establishment."

Empirical evidence on such statements, however, is uncertain. A previous Arts Council officer indeed agreed that "a bunch of middle class white men" had dominated the Council in the earlier days; but now it was not true anymore (interview 1995). Because of the political upheavals during the 1960s and the 1970s such elitist and ethnocentric representation was no more acceptable in the 1990s. Political authorities had become more conscious about the need for a broader social representation in the Council. During the 1980s and the 1990s the government became increasingly aware of the need for representation provided by the members of ethnic minorities, women, people with physical handicaps, etc. in the Council. Thus "political correctness" seemed to replace traditional elitism within the arts funding system, according to this informant. A couple of other Arts Council informants also claimed that the Council and its panels now reflected quite broad political and social background (interviews 1995).

Is there, then, a strong empirical support for the hypothesis according to which the British government controls the Arts Council in a very direct and specific way, i.e. that the British version of the arm's length principle is a travesty? Quinn (1997) has certainly made some significant points: the Arts Council members are appointed by the government; the Council is funded by the government; it is also accountable to the government for how the funds are used; finally, the staff appointments to the Arts Council have to be approved by the government. All these points may indicate that the Arts Council is quite dependent on the government. But they are primarily indications; they do not offer more solid empirical evidence.

It is, of course, also possible that members appointed by the government act quite independently, when they decide about the allocation of support to cultural life. If we, as researchers, are going to substantiate or

falsify that the Arts Council is merely the loyal flunkey of the government, we need stronger empirical evidence. Quinn and other scholars, who have contemplated on these problems, are more convincing as eloquent polemicists than as systematic empirical researchers.

Some of the interviews I carried out in the mid-1990s pointed at another direction compared to the statements of the critical scholars. The interviews offer some alternative indications, but certainly no definite conclusions. An official from the Department of National Heritage, for instance, denied firmly that the Arts Council was extremely loyal to the government (interview 1995). The Arts Council did “[not] at all [function] as an agent of government”, he said (not surprisingly). It has also been claimed, however, that during the 1990s the Council was not independent in reality, because the Head of the Council at that time was a former conservative minister. An Arts Council official retorted that the former minister’s conservative background was counterbalanced by a great variety of political opinions within the Council as a whole. But according to Quinn (1997, 142), such problems permeate the whole organisation: “Successive Conservative governments during the 1980s ... installed political allies in top positions and dotted them throughout the Arts Council structure”. The allegation is still not strongly substantiated empirically.

Political Control through Statutory Schemes?

Quinn (1997, 137) seems to consider it a problem, and a potential violation of the arm’s length principle, that British political authorities are “leaving decisions on funding susceptible to the tastes of the Arts Council members”. The Royal Charter (1967) “did not introduce criteria prospective members would be expected to satisfy”. From her point of view, the “absence of criteria” (from government to the members) puts the arm’s length principle at risk. I would rather see this from an opposite angle: if the government avoids formulating specific criteria and leaves

the decisions to the Arts Council members' tastes, it should correspond very well with the arm's length principle.

Thus, it is interesting to notice that the British government has not established any system of specified and statutory state grants to individual artists, similar to those developed in the Nordic countries (see later). If political authorities establish quite specified support schemes, they, of course, also limit the freedom of action of the arm's length body that has got the responsibility of administering the schemes. But several British informants maintain that such schemes remind them too much of social policy: "The Arts Council does not fund individuals at all ... It is not in the British way to subsidise individuals," said one of my Arts Council-informants (interview 1995). "The Arts Council has not wanted to see itself as an extension of the Social Security System", said another Arts Council official (interview 1995). Thus, British cultural policy has avoided establishing specific, politically directed support schemes that restrict the Art's Councils autonomy: "Britain does not like statutory schemes", said an Art's Council official (interview 1995).

Interest Group Influence and the Arm's Length Principle

In the British cultural policy tradition the arm's length principle also implies that one should, as far as possible, avoid interest groups in cultural life influencing the allocation of support to artists and art projects directly. Members of the Arts Council and its Panels should not represent specific interest groups. Several attempts, however, have been made during the history of the Arts Council to introduce some interest group representation into the arts funding system. In 1948–49 the British actors' trade union, EQUITY, argued for a more formalised interest group representation into the Arts Council. They wanted "the Drama panel [to] include a proportion of members elected by theatrical organisations and responsible for those organisations" (Hutchison 1982, 362–37). But EQUITY's proposal failed. Almost twenty years later (1966–67) the artist organisations brought up the issue again. They asked for "a study of

how performing artists (including theatre directors) can be more fully and directly represented on the Arts Council and on its Panels” (ibid, 37). The Arts Council itself still refused to establish such a corporatist structure. Primarily, it argued that the arts world was in reality already well represented in council and panels. Secondly, it considered that formal representation would break with the fundamental principles of the Arts Council. It stated that:

[...] individuals to act as representatives of outside associations ... would entail a fundamental departure from a principle which the Council has hitherto adopted in its own appointments, and which has been followed by successive Ministers in making appointments to the Council—that members should be free from any ties to the appointing bodies (Hutchison 1982, 37).

The State Secretary for Education and Science at that time (also responsible for the arts) totally agreed. But another Minister for the Arts, Hugh Jenkins, brought up the issue again in the 1970s, without success. He was even criticised for confusing syndicalism and democracy.

This refusal to establish corporatist relations between the arm’s length body and the government seems to have subsisted in Britain. Interest group representation is considered to violate the arm’s length principle, probably for two reasons: (1) in a wider sense, also artist unions (not just the government) are “political actors”; a broad conception of the arm’s length principle implies that there should be an arm’s length also between such political actors and the arts (i.e. the allocation of support to the arts). (2) When artist unions are involved in the selection and evaluation of applications for grants, there are good reasons to believe that even some other criteria than “artistic quality” (e.g. seniority, welfare considerations, geography, membership of artist unions) will have an impact on the decisions.

The general conclusion must be that there are weak links between artist organisations and the arts funding system in Britain. But perhaps the artist unions have other ways of influencing the Arts Council, for

instance, through informal negotiations, consultations and lobbying? It would be naïve to believe that such influence (most often quite legitimately) did not take place. It should also be mentioned that since long the artist unions have been invited by the Arts Council to *propose* (but not select) members, for instance to the Drama panel. But if some artist union members were subsequently appointed, they should enter the panel on their own behalf, not as union representatives: “They are not there representing us”, said the director of EQUITY (interview 1995). And the director of the Drama division in the Arts Council firmly denied that the artist unions had any influence whatsoever upon the work of the Drama panel: “Unions are not involved at all ... Not even informally ... We don’t negotiate with the unions at all” (interview 1995). When an officer of the arts in the Ministry of Heritage was asked a similar question, i.e. whether the Ministry had much contact with the arts world and its organisations, he was quite chocked: “Good Lord, no! We do not!” He gave the following reason: “It is the arm’s length principle. We leave the artistic matters to the Arts Council. We have no money other than the money that we give to the Arts Council. As artistic policy is a matter for the Arts Council, then *that* is the point of contact”.

A Limited Part of the Arts Funding System

So it seems as if important spokespersons, both for the Ministry and in the Arts Council, *believe* that the arm’s length principle is really at work in Britain today (or at least that it *was* until the mid-1990s). It seems as if the arm’s length principle still dominates, at least on a discursive level. But this is of course not the whole story.

Firstly, there may be a serious case of “false consciousness” or “misrecognition” at work: there may be strong ties and influences between the arts and politics that important social actors deny or do not recognise themselves. Secondly, it is possible that there is really an arm’s length between politics and the arts in Britain, but merely in a very limited part of the arts policy field. An ideal type arm’s length policy would imply

that *all* support to the arts in Britain was allocated by an independent arm's length body. But this is far from the case. The British government has subsidised plenty of important arts institutions directly, without any detour through the Arts Council, throughout the whole post-war period (Ridley 1987; Bennett 1991). A substantial part of the state cultural budget has, for decades, been channelled more directly from the government to the arts community, firstly through the Office for Arts and Libraries (OAL), secondly through the ministry of culture (DNH 1992; MCMS 1997). Since the early 1990s, New Public Management principles have also invaded British cultural policy, not least the relation between the government and the arts institutions. The introduction of specific performance objectives and evaluations into cultural policy and administration of course also contributes to the limits between the arm's length between politics and the arts.

The Ideal Type British Model of an Arm's Length body

Therefore, discussion on the range and strength of the arm's length principle in British cultural policy has to continue without a definite conclusion. But the discussion seems to have some kind of an ideal type vision of the arm's length principle as a point of reference. In this ideal type arm's length arts funding system:

- 1) All allocation of public support to the arts should be carried out by independent personalities with artistic competence, appointed for a limited time period.
- 2) These personalities should be as independent as possible from political instructions.
- 3) They should not be appointed by, or dependent on, artist unions or other interest groups in the cultural field.
- 4) The arm's length body should not be obliged by very specific statutory, politically decided support schemes.
- 5) The arm's length body should instead have substantial freedom to allocate their funds within the framework of their budget.

- 6) The allocation of support should happen only and solely on the basis of artistic quality criteria and not, for instance, on welfare or equity criteria.
- 7) The allocation of support should be impartial, i.e. it should not be characterised by nepotism and/or clientelism.
Such an ideal type arm's length body does not, of course, exist in any direct and concrete shape anywhere. But it may exist as an efficient rhetoric reality.

THE ABSENCE OF AN ARM'S LENGTH IN FRENCH CULTURAL POLICY

What influence has the arm's length principle had on the cultural policies of other European countries? French cultural politicians seldom, if ever, refer to the "arm's length principle". In a very general sense, however, they would probably approve of it. Thus, Quinn (1997, 128) refers to a statement by the first French minister of culture, André Malraux (1959–69): the government's role in the arts should be "to support without influencing". But this very general and cautious support of the arm's length principle is contradicted by several other pieces of evidence on French cultural policy. There is a strong tradition in French cultural policy, according to which both ministers of culture (especially Malraux and Lang) and presidents (especially Pompidou and Mitterand) intervene quite directly into the arts field, often making explicit decisions with substantial artistic implications (Looseley 1995).³ Thus, several French informants have characterised French cultural policy as "monarchic" (Mangset 2008a). Some ministers of culture and some presidents have intervened so actively and directly into the arts field, that they can be compared to the absolute monarchs known from the French history. The ministry of culture can intervene quite directly into the artistic priorities of performing arts institutions, for instance, into the program priorities of subsidised theatres. Thus, the Council of Europe – in an

evaluation from the late 1980s – has described French cultural policy in the following way:

It is the Minister of Culture who, in a sovereign way, selects and launches projects according to the budget allocated to him by the government. This system has its advantages: new initiatives can be adopted without too much time-wasting discussion and launched all the more forcefully in that they have the backing of the government. One accepts without problems in France that there are close links between cultural policy and policy in a broader sense. Other countries in Europe believe it is wiser to separate cultural activities and politics; they resort to independent councils whose job it is to interpret and implement cultural policy. France has no lack of advisory bodies in cultural fields, but no experienced panel of experts is consulted on general cultural policy issues ... (Conseil de l'Europe 1988: 51–52).⁴

Informants in the French cultural life that I interviewed some years ago did not bother much about state intervention into the arts field. A theatre director told that he was employed by the state, formally by the President, for a limited time based on a specific artistic project or programme. The appointment appeared almost as a personal agreement between the Minister of Culture and theatre director (i.e. between the Patron and the Artist). This reflects a very close relationship between the arts and politics. Several French informants also explained that the heads of theatres normally had to leave office when there was a change of minister of culture: “Every political change creates change in these professions” (i.e. the artistic and the economic directors of theatres), said the director of an employee association in the performing arts (interview 1994). “Usually, when a minister is replaced, one also replaces the theatre directors”, said a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Culture (interview 1994).

There is not much more to say about the arm's length principle in French cultural policy.

ARM'S LENGTH PRINCIPLE AND NON-DEPARTMENTAL PUBLIC BODIES IN NORDIC CULTURAL POLICY

General Aspects of the Nordic Arts Funding Systems

The cultural policies of all the Nordic countries⁵ are situated in an intermediary position between the ideal type British and the ideal type French model. In all four countries the responsibility in the arts funding system is divided between relatively “heavy” interventionist ministries of culture (or a ministry of education with a strong cultural division⁶) and some kind of non-departmental public body (NDPB) that allocates support to arts projects and artists. All four countries have got some public body that they prefer to call “arts council” when they are translating into English. The Danish, Norwegian and Swedish arts funding systems also include some other NDPBs in addition to the “arts council”, that at least sometimes are considered to be at “an arm’s length” from the governments. Thus, Danish researcher Peter Duelund (2003, 547) concludes that in the Nordic countries the arts in general are supported “according to an administrative model, which implies that the support is allocated by competent panels appointed for a term of years at an arm’s length from relevant political bodies”. He also maintains that “artistic quality is the only and most important criterion for allocating support” in these countries (ibid.).

But if we take a closer look at the Nordic arts funding systems, it appears quite clearly that this is an idealistic over-generalisation. The artistic autonomy of these bodies varies considerably. Some of the NDPBs in the Nordic arts funding systems can hardly be called arm’s length bodies in any reasonable sense of the word. At least they are not arm’s length bodies in the ideal type British sense described above. They have, for instance, been delegated responsibility to administer statutory support schemes designed and controlled by political authorities only. These schemes leave limited autonomy to the so-called arm’s length body. They are often designed to support individual artists, and typically characterised

by some kind of trade union and welfare state rhetoric (e.g. “guaranteed income”, “working grant”, “state income guarantee”). Several arm’s length bodies also differ from the ideal type British model by being strongly influenced by artist unions, cultural employer organisations or other interest organisations in cultural life. They reflect the general corporatist traditions that characterise many policy fields in the Nordic countries (Esping-Andersen 1999; Bennich-Björkman 1991).

Norway: Arm’s Length and Corporatism

Arts Council Norway (*Norsk kulturråd*) is probably *the* Nordic art funding body that has most in common with the ideal type British Arts Council, described above. Arts Council Norway was established in 1965, mainly as an instrument for the defence of Norwegian fiction literature against the alleged threat from Americanised popular culture (Øye 1980). Because Norway has strong traditional cultural and political relations with the UK, one might expect that the creation of Arts Council Norway was strongly influenced by the British example, and that the arm’s length principle was explicitly mentioned in its original mandate. But there are no traces of this in the available sources (Fjeldstad, unpublished). Nevertheless, already from the start Arts Council Norway gained considerable autonomy from political authorities to prioritise within the framework of its annual budget (the Norwegian Cultural Fund). It was especially supposed to initiate and support new and innovative artistic projects, i.e. creativity and experiments within the arts field. It was expected to support creative projects rather than individual artists. The Council and its panels were to allocate support independently, primarily according to artistic quality criteria.

Nine out of 13 Council-members were, and still are, appointed by the Ministry of Culture, primarily on the basis of their cultural or artistic competence and merits. The Ministry has rarely been criticised for “political appointments”. But two out of the nine are appointed after a proposal made by the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities.

These members tend to prioritise local and regional policy values. The remaining four (out of the 13) Council members are appointed by the Parliament on a representative political basis. They certainly tend to introduce political values and concerns into the discussions of the Council. However, because this is rather a kind of honorary appointment, offered often to elderly politicians or other personalities, these four members may act rather independently from the political parties that appointed them. The composition of the Council is therefore quite mixed. However, in general it seems as if the Council has had a majority of relatively independent personalities with a strong basis in cultural life and a strong loyalty to professional and innovative art.

No Council member, except the two members proposed by the Local and Regional Association, are appointed as representatives of any interest group or organisation in cultural life. Arts Council Norway has also, like most other arts councils, quite an elaborate structure of “panels” to advise or to decide on the allocation of support to arts projects within their specific sub-fields. In general, the members of those panels are not appointed by interest organisations either. Thus, the corporatist political tradition mentioned above is not generally reflected in the structure of the Arts Council. The literary field is an exception, in several ways. In this field the Arts Council is less independent from political and corporatist influence. It administers some quite specific statutory support schemes on behalf of the government (Purchasing Programmes for Literature). The literary panels also have a more corporatist representation than other panels: different interest groups and organisations in the literary field are represented. Thus, the arm’s length principle is quite weak in the literary division of the Arts Council.

During the last 10–15 years the whole Arts Council Norway has also taken some significant steps away from the ideal type British arm’s length model. Subsequent Norwegian governments, particularly those led by the social-democrats, have tried to strengthen the political control of the Council. They have favoured an active cultural policy, where political authorities intervene more directly into the arts field at the expense of the autonomy of the Arts Council. Thus, a previous social-democrat Min-

ister of Culture, Åse Kleveland (1990–96), seriously considered closing down the whole Council, when preparing a green paper about cultural policy in the early 1990s. In a preliminary internal note to the green paper (1992) she declared that Norway could not have *two* ministries of culture (i.e. both the Ministry and the Arts Council):

If one day the Arts Council starts to live a life of its own, without being the extended arm of the Ministry of Culture, then the original intentions of the Council are watered down to the extent that one has to ask the fundamental question about the Council's [future] role and existence [legitimacy].

The idea of the Arts Council as an “extended arm of the government” certainly reflects an inverted conception of the arm’s length principle!

Since the mid-1990s, and especially since 2000, the arm’s length between the political world and the Arts Council has been shortened. Firstly, the Ministry has delegated the administration of support to 58 specific institutions and projects⁷ to the Arts Council Norway. The support to all these institutions and projects is politically decided in detail by the Ministry and/or the Parliament, with little leeway for qualitative evaluation and modification by the Council (Simonsen 2005). With this delegation the Arts Council increased its total budget by about 1/3. But this additional 1/3 was, and is, administered without any arm’s length whatsoever; the political and artistic priorities were totally in the hands of the political authorities. The present Minister of Culture, Trond Giske, has also limited the freedom of action of the Council in relation to the traditional, more independent part of its budget, by giving strict budgetary limits and instructions on the allocation of support to the different fields of arts and culture. In addition, the Ministry has initiated an administrative merger between the Arts Council Norway and two other non-departmental public bodies.⁸ This new and enlarged “Arts Council” appears as a more hybrid public body than the old Arts Council. The arm’s length between the political authorities and the Council has become shorter. The political style of the present minister has also more

in common with the French monarchic and interventionist tradition than with the British arm's length tradition.

“The Government Grants and Guaranteed Income for Artists” (*Statens kunstnerstipend* (SK)) is the second most important non-departmental public body within the Norwegian arts funding system. Some might argue that this is also an arm's length body, and in a very formal way it is true: the Ministry has delegated the administration of several very specific and politically designed, support schemes to the SK. These are all more or less welfare oriented support schemes that are intended to support individual artists. The SK has a Council appointed partly by the Ministry (3 members) and partly by artist unions (2 members). There are a series of sub-panels (24 in 2007) for each separate artistic sub-field, which evaluate and select among the applications for guaranteed incomes and grants. The sub-panels are all appointed by artist unions. They usually have the final say as far as the decision of the artistic quality of the applications is concerned. The superior council does little more than checks the legality of decisions. The SK therefore has limited autonomy, both in relation to government and artist unions. It is a corporatist, rather than an arm's length body.

This kind of corporatist structure, with evaluation committees appointed by artist unions, was more frequent in Norwegian (and Nordic) cultural life before. But during the last decades the political legitimacy of corporatism has certainly been declining both in Norway and in other Nordic countries: does it further partiality and oligarchy? Is it opposed to democratic and liberal political values? Thus, corporatist structures in cultural life have gradually been dismantled. The previous centre-right government has also tried to dissolve the corporatist structure of the SK, but the actual centre-left government chose to maintain it (KKD 2003; Stortinget 2004). The arts funding system may, however, turn to another direction because of a public committee that has recently evaluated the whole structure (Løken 2008). It proposes to strengthen and specify the arm's length principle within quite a distinct and relatively limited part of the arts funding system. It also proposes to reduce the corporatist and welfare aspects of the arts funding system, by removing both the

guaranteed minimum income and the artist organisation appointment of the SK panels.

Arm's Length in Other Nordic Countries

Sweden has a “double structure” in this field that is relatively similar to the Norwegian arts funding system. The Swedish Arts Council (*Statens kulturråd*) was established in 1974; the Swedish Arts Grants Committee (*Konstnärsnämnden*) was established in 1976. But the arm's length between the government and the arts council has traditionally been shorter in Sweden than in Norway (Vestheim 2003; Mangset 2008). The Swedish Arts Council is more like a directorate that administers support schemes on behalf of the Ministry. The Swedish Arts Council also differs from its Norwegian counterpart by being responsible for a substantial support to the running costs of several performing arts institutions. Its organisation is roughly similar to that of the Arts Council Norway, however, in the sense that the council is appointed by the government and that it does not have any corporatist panel structure. On the other hand, there were strong corporatist relations in Sweden between the artist unions and the ministry during the 1970s and the 1980s. KLYS – the Swedish Joint Committee for Artistic and Literary Professionals – in this period had regular negotiations with the ministry about the government's cultural budget each autumn (Mangset 2008b). However, these institutionalised negotiations faded out in the early 1990s.

The Swedish Arts Grants Committee administers several statutory support schemes on behalf of the government, more or less like its Norwegian counterpart, the SK. During the 1970s and the 1980s there were also strong corporatist links between the artist unions and the Swedish Arts Grants Committee. A former head of KLYS even thought that the artist union representatives in this committee were “obliged to implement our policy” (interview 1995). However, the legitimacy of such corporatist structures was seriously questioned from the beginning of the 1990s onwards. Several spokesmen both for cultural policy and for

the arts community felt that it could result in nepotism and clientelism (interviews 1995). The artist union's right to appoint panel members was subsequently abolished. Corporatist structures were also weakened or abolished in the other fields of Swedish cultural policy.

The *Danish* arts funding system has traditionally been more fragmented than the arts funding systems of the other Nordic countries. Denmark has since long had separate so-called arm's length bodies, responsible for each specific arts field, i.e. for music, literature, visual art and theatre (Bache 2003). However, in 2003 a new joint structure, the Danish Arts Council (*Kunstrådet*), was established. The Danish arts funding system is characterised by a mixture of a) government appointment and b) artist union appointment of councils and panel members. Thus, they have more or less the same hybrid mixture of arm's length, political interventionism and corporatism as all the Nordic countries.

However, the Danes (arts field representatives, cultural politicians and researchers) tend to present their version of corporatism as something *nobler* than corporatist structures elsewhere (Duelund 1995; Bache 2003). They like to call it "self-administration" rather than corporatism. Thus, the head of the Danish Council for Artists declared some years ago that:

The Danish tradition for self-administration dates far back in time and should not be mixed up with the arm's length principle ... What is good with the self-administration model is that the arts community itself takes part in the allocation of support to the arts. In the arm's length model members are appointed directly by politicians and don't therefore represent the arts community (Jeppesen 2002: 86).

According to Peter Duelund's idealistic version, "[s]elf-administration has its roots in the freedom tradition that characterises the organisation of Danish society that was established by the 'folk-high schools',⁹ the cooperative movement and the labour movement during the breakthrough of the modern society at the end of the last century" [i.e. the end of the

19th century] (Duelund 1995: 55). I would prefer to situate these strong relations between interest groups and public bodies as typical cases of a more general Nordic corporatist tradition.

The Arts Council of *Finland* (*Taiteen keskustoimikunta* *Centralkommissionen för konst*), finally, is far from the British ideal type model of an arts council. It is rather the Finnish counterpart to the Norwegian “Government Grants and Guaranteed Income for Artists” (SK) and the Swedish Arts Grants Committee. All three administer relatively similar, politically designed statutory support schemes to individual artists (Heikkinen 2003). All three are, or have been, organised with strong corporatist relations to artist unions. Thus, it may seem as if the arm’s length principle is weaker in Finnish cultural policy than in the other Nordic countries.

CONCLUSIONS

This article should be considered a preliminary report from a project, with a need for additional updated empirical research, especially on the development after the mid-1990s. Therefore, I will draw mere preliminary conclusions here:

- 1) From an analytical point of view, it is more fruitful to consider the arm’s length principle a dimension than an absolute principle. In all the countries that I have studied the arm’s length principle has to be balanced in relation to the needs for legitimate political intervention.
- 2) It is not possible to distinguish absolutely between political decisions and artistic decisions in the arts funding systems. Cultural policy decisions will frequently influence and limit artistic autonomy.
- 3) Appointment by the government of members of arm’s length bodies does not necessarily imply strong governmental control of these bodies. There is a need for more specific studies on the

- relation between the political and the artistic field to gain a clear picture of the potential dominance relation.
- 4) In all the countries that I have studied the arm's length principle is applied merely in a limited way and on limited parts of the arts funding system.
 - 5) Among the countries studied, the UK (England) is still the country where the arm's length between the government and the arts funding system is the strongest, and where the arm's length principle has the strongest rhetorical impact. In a comparative historical perspective, the arm's length principle does not seem to have eroded in Britain as much as several British scholars have claimed. This was at least the situation until the mid-1990s.
 - 6) The focus on the arm's length principle in Britain has its historical roots in a liberal and puritan political tradition that has traditionally been sceptical about political interventions to the arts and to an active cultural policy ("God help the minister that meddles with art", Prime Minister Lord Melbourne, 1835).
 - 7) The French disregard of the arm's length principle has its historical roots in a centralist political tradition and in a tradition of the absolute monarchies that accepts that political leaders (presidents, ministers of culture) intervene quite actively and directly into the arts field.
 - 8) In all the Nordic countries, strong social-democrat and corporatist traditions have contributed to the weakening of the impact of the arm's length principle.
 - 9) However, in all the Nordic countries the corporatist tradition is, for the time being, on the defensive and will probably gradually be dismantled in artist policy.
 - 10) In all the Nordic countries, a system of statutory schemes, designed by political authorities to support individual artists, contribute to the limiting of the impact of the arm's length principle. Political authorities in the Nordic countries do not seem to be willing to soften up these schemes and to give much more autonomy to the arm's length bodies.

11) In all countries the government's willingness to develop an active cultural policy contributes to the limiting of the impact of the arm's length principle. Thus, the relevance of the arm's length principle may be insulated into quite a limited area of the arts funding systems in the future.

Endnotes

- 1 This article is part of a broader research project on the institutionalization of cultural policy in post-war Western Europe (Mangset 2008). The project is based on a variety of empirical material and sources, i.e. secondary analysis of research literature, available administrative internet sources – and 55 qualitative interviews with informants in the cultural field in Britain, France and Sweden during the 1990s (1994–95). I have also taken advantage of periods of participatory observation in Arts Council Norway (1994–99).
- 2 Regarded as a prevision, Beck's statement was not quite successful. The first British "ministry of culture" – the Department of National Heritage – was established the same year as this article was published (1992) [Author's footnote].
- 3 For instance, Pompidou's intervention into establish the Pompidou centre, Mitterand's choice of a Japanese architect (Pei) to design the Pyramid in Louvre.
- 4 Translated from French by P. M.
- 5 In this context, "the Nordic countries" are, for pragmatic reasons, limited to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Island, the Faeroe Islands and Greenland are not explicitly included in my study.
- 6 As in Finland.
- 7 Permanent festivals, theatre groups, musical institutions etc. – many quite small and local ones –, often made permanent after intensive local political pressure and lobbying.
- 8 "The Government Grants and Guaranteed Income for Artists" (see below) and "the Audio and Visual Fund".
- 9 "Folk-high school" (folkehøjskole) is a particular Nordic kind of college without exams, developed by popular and democratic movements from the late 19th century and onwards.

5.2

Art and Artists: Free Market or Government Subsidies? The Case of the Netherlands¹

Joop de Jong

INTRODUCTION

EVERY SPRING Maastricht hosts The European Fine Art Fair (TEFAF). TEFAF is generally recognized as the world's most important art fair. The estimated value of all objects exhibited and offered for sale there is an astonishing one billion Euros. This event provides a great opportunity for my students to reflect on the issue of state or market in the arts in general and on Dutch arts policy and its effects in particular. This essay focuses on these topics. It starts with a general introduction to the issue of state or market in the arts. The second part describes the development of cultural policy in general, and arts policy in the Netherlands in particular. The third and last part analyses arts policy's practice and its results.

For many years, at the beginning of the first meeting of their art and cultural policy courses, I have asked my students to define 'art' and 'artist', before moving on to other issues. I suggest that in academia you must always define your key notions first. Thus, the students as a group are invited to give a common or joint answer to the following questions:

what is art and what is it not? What qualities or properties are essential for artists and works of art? What is artistic quality? How can we know who is a good artist and what is good art? Does high market price correspond with high quality in the arts? And last, but not least: who decides or who should decide on these questions?

And every year the students fail to agree. As a group or a collective they are unable to come up with common definitions. No shared or collective criteria can be agreed upon, and no general agreement concerning the relation between market prices and artistic values can be reached. What is left after the first meeting seems to be subjectivity, instead of the desired degree of objectivity: highly personal ideas, opinions, tastes, preferences and prejudices. Many students feel upset about this. It should not be like this, it should be more objective, more scientific.

But is it upsetting? In a society where each individual determines what is and is not valuable concerning art – although individual artistic preferences and personal tastes are always influenced by others – this is a much smaller problem than in societies in which the choices made of art and artists are more collective.

Here I would like to make the connection between key questions about art and artists, and issues and debates concerning cultural policy. The existence of a government's arts policy is not self-evident. A society can choose to have one, but it can also decide against having arts policy as an explicit sector within public administration.

The two key concepts in this essay are state and market. When many choices are left to the individual, the market will play a bigger role, also with respect to art. The device of the so-called free market is to “let each individual pay for the things he or she values, but not force anybody to pay for things he or she does not value at all”. The term ‘individual’ can be replaced by consumer, citizen or public. When a society or a collective decides – through politics – to make the arts not entirely or not at all dependent on individual or private choices, the state claims a bigger role. The state will try to correct the market through public policy – which can be characterized as state intervention or state meddling. Because the free market, according to politicians, has such undesirable, negative

effects, and creates such problems, interference by the government is necessary. Public policy is always, by nature, an attempt to intervene, to get involved, to correct and/or supplement the market.

Public policy means using public or tax payer's money in an attempt to reach certain collective goals. Good government requires a clear definition of choices and policy aims, and a sound and convincing argumentation. The government must legitimize its policy. Why does the government want to intervene? For what reason is arts policy necessary, to solve or control problems, and which ones? Nowadays more emphasis is put on the accountability of the government than in the past. Today's citizens are thought to be more critical. They might demand proof that public funds are well spent. Is a particular policy effective and efficient? Have the previously formulated policy goals and targets been reached, and to what extent (effectiveness)? If so, what did it cost and how long did it take to reach the aims (efficiency)?

Analysing public policy always requires researching its aims, the tools or means necessary for reaching the goals, the results or effects – the desired ones, but also the undesired and unforeseen effects – and their efficiency. If the results or effects cannot be measured, or even worse, if the aims and effects have been formulated in a manner that makes measuring or evaluation impossible, accountability becomes extremely problematic. This means that the government cannot prove that public money has been well spent and that this particular policy has actually worked. Many people find this hard to accept, from a modern government.

Let us return to the issue of state intervention and the market. According to economic theory – which in general favours the market more than state intervention – the free market has some acknowledged problems or failures (see Grampp 1989; Frey & Pommerehne 1989; Frey 2000; Grauwe 1990; Heilbrun & Gray 1993; Netzer 1993), which leads economists to consider a certain role for the state. What are these problems?²

Public goods are the first case, for example, traffic lights or the dikes protecting us from the sea. They provide a kind of collective service indi-

viduals cannot and will not easily provide for the public. The definition of public goods implies that the artefacts can be enjoyed collectively only and that no one can be excluded from their benefits. For these reasons the state can request and use public funding for public goods. Art, however, does not meet the criteria of public goods. And because of this, the argument of public goods is not convincing to economists, for legitimizing arts policy. At the same time, many economists consider cultural heritage, such as an old cathedral or a great work of art from the past, public goods. Public support for the conservation of cultural heritage is in fact quite strong, or at least much stronger than that for supporting contemporary art.

New products provide the second case. Understandably there is no immediate market for completely new and unknown products. The demand for these products has to develop, and a market must be found or be developed, which will take some time. Companies and entrepreneurs are familiar with this problem. They will set aside or borrow money to cover the initial losses tied to new products. Expensive marketing campaigns are often launched to limit these losses by generating quick demand for the new product. For new and/or experimental artists, however, this problem is much bigger than for most companies. Unlike companies, many artists have no financial reserve, nor can they give a security deposit to a bank, which is necessary for getting a loan. Without support the artist's new art will probably not survive. New art and artists need help to find a market. This help can be private, provided by an art dealer, a sponsor or a patron. Or, the support can be given by the state. Even many conventional economists will agree that the problems new art and artists face can be a reason for government support. However, this support has to be limited in time and limited to new art and artists only - merely temporary means for creating something new and finding buyers for it. Economists call this kind of support *seed money*.

The third case is the problem of inequality and inequity. Because of their wealth the rich can have and enjoy more and 'better' art than poor people and people with limited income. Because of this, they have more influence on the arts and on the reputation of artists. Some claim

that the art market is not merely dominated, but actually ruled by the artistic taste of the rich—that art is often elitist.

The government should prevent too much inequality. Many politicians and professionals from the subsidized art world favour equity arguments. State intervention is necessary for guaranteeing a fair degree of equity. Art should be accessible and available to all. This seems very considerate, but raises tricky questions. What is a fair degree? Is this really necessary? Most societies accept great inequalities when it comes to other goods and services such as cars, clothes, food, housing, holidays, etc. Does equity imply all art? How can this be achieved?

A minority amongst economists, including Arjo Klamer (see 1996), the chair of the Economics of Art and Culture at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, finds it hard to accept that art is an artefact or service like any other. Klamer claims that on a personal level art as activity and art as experience has value that cannot be measured in money. However, as part of an exchange or a transaction, art can and must be measured in terms of money. An exchange requires pricing the art work, assessing the equivalent value in money.

Society's choice for more or less state or market in general, and for more or less state involvement in the arts, is not primarily determined by its wealth as many people think. Particularly in the USA, the UK and Japan, contemporary art is left to the market much more than, for example, in the Netherlands and in the Scandinavian countries. The national wealth in these countries is nonetheless comparable. In a very poor country such as Senegal under president Senghor, a friend of Picasso and other artists, 25 % of the national budget was spent on art and culture (see Harney 2004). The same goes for cultural consumption, as is clearly demonstrated in the 2007 edition of Eurostat cultural statistics (Cultural Statistics Eurostat Pocketbooks 2007, 126).³ Households in the Netherlands, Germany and the Scandinavian countries spend more on culture, in both absolute and relative terms, than, for instance, households in France and Italy, countries with comparable consumption expenditure per household.

The substance of cultural policy documents and the art budget per inhabitant are good indicators of the measure of state involvement. As pointed out before, this is primarily a political, collective choice reflecting and reproducing dominant beliefs and ideals; you may call them values and norms concerning the desired role of the state and the roles of the individual and the market. It also reflects trust or distrust in artists, in their professional and commercial competences, and in the art market.⁴

CULTURAL POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS⁵

For a long time cultural policy, as it is known today, did not exist in the Netherlands, nor was it present in the neighbouring countries. A thriving art market existed in the Dutch Republic, supported by many rich and powerful regents. However, they acted primarily as individual patrons and art collectors, notwithstanding the fact that local governments did commission works of art on a modest scale. Government involvement in culture and the arts strongly increased during the short period of French rule and occupation (1795–1813) because of the ideal of creating a unified nation state.

However, this did not last long. In the 1830s a conservative-liberal perspective on the role of the government concerning the arts became stronger. The government should not judge, control, support or meddle with the arts. The arts should be left to private initiative and the market. Because of this, the Netherlands has a long tradition of government aloofness from the arts. Till the early-twentieth century, the arts were almost exclusively the responsibility of engaged citizens. Many of those citizens belonged to the bourgeoisie, and cherished the nationalistic hope of a culturally well-educated and united population.

Dutch arts policy and government support for the arts are quite recent phenomena, not much older than half a century. This required general acceptance of the idea that the state does bear responsibility

for arts and culture, and a conviction that the state has enough money to do so. The latter had much to do with economic development, the former with other factors. Since the 1960s, the Netherlands has had the highest level of state expenditure on arts and culture. An abundance of specific art subsidies and art funds exists. Table 1 presents a few figures over the last half-century.

The budget for culture, excluding expenditure on media, is about 0.7 % of the total national budget. As a comparison, all national, provincial and local governments in the Netherlands together spend more than 1 billion Euros on sports annually. These figures show the sharp increase in public spending on culture and they demonstrate the trend of decentralisation or devolution of funds and responsibilities. Decentralisation should bring decisions concerning art and culture closer to the citizens. Yet, there is always the risk that the national choice between buying new jet fighters and spending on art will be replaced by local choices between new lampposts and art.

Direct ministry expenditure on the arts amounted to 20 % of the ministry's total expenditure on culture in 2007: 333 million Euros out of a total of 1,658 billion Euros.⁷ The ministry's budget for visual arts, architecture and design alone was 46 million Euros. Subsidized art funds, provincial and municipal budgets add tens of millions for the same purpose.⁸ An inevitably rough estimate is a total budget of approximately

	State		Municipalities		Provinces		Total
	M €	%	M €	%	M €	%	
1950	5		-		-		-
1975	240	40	35	6	320	54	595
2000	595*		195		1210		2000
2004	805**	30	205	8	1655	62	2665***

* 830 million Euros higher when including expenditure on media (public broadcasting)

** 865 million Euros higher, when including expenditure on media

*** Almost 1 billion Euros higher, when including spending on media

Table 1: Government expenditure on culture (in millions of Euros)⁶:

80–100 million Euros. As pointed out, a far bigger part of the budget for culture, about 1 billion Euros, goes to public broadcasting, despite the fact that the link between public television and arts and culture is often rather weak.

What these figures do not tell us are the different policy perspectives. The major parties in the national parliament have more or less similar views on the role of the state concerning arts and culture. The different policy perspectives primarily reflect developments within society. What were the key principles and aims of Dutch cultural policy after the Second World War? Beauty was central to arts policy between the Second World War and the 1960s (Oosterbaan Martinius 1990). The arts, the fine arts, should counterbalance the spread of mass culture, thought to be cheap and ugly, in a society in danger of losing its moral and cultural roots. The elites of the protestant, Roman Catholic, socialist and liberal pillars, which still dominated the Netherlands at that time, feared the advancing mass culture, and united in its rejection.

During the 1960s and 1970s welfare and social relevance perspectives became dominant. Being creative was good for everybody, and art, critical art in particular, could help to stimulate the much desired cultural and social change, experimentation and innovation. Because of the rise in national income, due to the exploitation of rich natural gas fields, there was plenty of money.

Quality and professionalism (re)gained importance in the 1980s and 1990s. The economic recession and the growing national debt forced the government to re-examine the role of the state in general. But there were other reasons as well for rethinking arts policy in particular. Looking back, many felt that arts policy had turned into social policy—social security and relief work for thousands of artists without work, 3800 in 1983 to be precise (Cultural Policy in The Netherlands 2006, 118).⁹

Critics of this new trend in arts policy, however, warned against the risk that arts policy would now become instrumental for economic policy. No longer art for art's sake, or arts policy as social policy, but arts policy and the arts to make a country, region or town more attractive to tourists, investors, the creative class and creative industries (positive

external effects). In this context the hype around Richard Florida's books on the creative class and creative cities should be mentioned (Florida 2002; 2005a; 2005b). His ideas have led many local and regional policy makers to increase the arts budgets, although Richard Florida does not refer to artists in his analysis of creative work, and despite the fact that there is no hard evidence that arts subsidies have a positive effect on the presence of creative industries in an urban setting (Klink & Witteloostuijn 2009, 102–105).

So the question remains whether the stronger emphasis on professionalism and cultural entrepreneurship was the result of a genuine desire to improve the artistic quality or primarily a way of decreasing the need for public spending on the arts, and attracting tourists and investors.

The most recent policy document: *Kunst van leven. Hoofdlijnen van cultuurbeleid (Art for Life's Sake: main perspectives of cultural policy)* mentions four reasons for the Dutch government's support for arts and culture, two of which have been explored above: the public goods argument, the positive external effects argument, the merit goods argument and the conservation argument.¹⁰ A merit good is something people should consume more of than they actually do, because they do not know (yet), or do not recognize how good it is for them. The government claims to possess superior judgment of the merit of (subsidized) art than individual citizens. The government and its advisors have better taste, although this is, of course, not expressed as such in the document. The conservation argument is not explained by referring to cultural heritage, but by saying that it might be important to conserve for future generations works of art, which perhaps do not arouse interest now. Some authors call this the Vincent-van-Gogh argument, because this artist is now world famous, but was not recognized during his lifetime. However, the case of Van Gogh actually proves that his art was not lost for the future, notwithstanding the fact that he did receive state support. Another problem with this argument is the sheer number of artists who do not arouse interest now. The number of potential Van Goghs amongst them can only be infinitesimally small. In this light, is it efficient to support them all?

The *Art for Life's Sake* policy paper mentions the following three main targets: excellence, innovation and participation. Previous documents had the same goals, more or less; however, they were less explicit. Two years earlier the previous national policy document also defined the goals as follows: to protect and, if necessary, to promote diversity of supply and participation, independence from disproportionate pressure from the market, and protection against meddling with the content of art by government agencies.

In the current paper the policy aims are elaborated according to four themes. The first one is excellence, focussing on the coaching and development of (top) talent, but also on strengthening the bonds between public broadcasting and the cultural sector. The second theme is innovation and e-culture; the third one is participation – promoting cultural outreach. The fourth theme, “a more beautiful Netherlands”, is about architectural policy and the modernization of conservation policy.

One distinctive characteristic of Dutch cultural policy is the combining of and the compromise between two conflicting goals. Let me give two sets of notions and terms, which have been important in cultural policy documents for many years. They have been, and still are, used for legitimizing policy choices.

On the one hand: artistic quality, selection, excellence, distinction, distancing from the taste of the masses, non-commercial, requiring expertise, not easy, high culture, professionalism, new and experimental, not demand-driven.

On the other hand: representation, diversity, searching new and young audiences, accessible, visitor numbers, participation, social and cultural outreach, geographic spread, easy, entertainment, low or popular culture, alliances with the market, demand-driven.

Of course some aims can be related to both sets. Goals such as internationalization, cultural entrepreneurship, although many think this fits better into the second set, and cultural education, form yet another important policy issue. However, the crucial question, with respect to cultural education, is: what art and culture will be taught! Will this include art and culture the students are already familiar with, or art and

culture which might be new and challenging to them? Are they allowed to follow their individual choices, or will it be a collective choice made for them by the educators?

Representation, outreach and spread have both social and geographic meanings: art for all social groups and art for all parts of the country. Recently, the meaning of ethnic diversity has been added to the above questions. Whether this still is arts policy or in fact integration policy is a question that has also been raised. In relation to this I would like to mention social inclusion, social cohesion, good citizenship and identity formation. Dutch politicians have recently added these items to the already long list of presupposed positive effects of cultural policy.

The ideal of disseminating or spreading culture is old and lives on under different names. In the 18th and 19th centuries it was the so-called “civilization offensive” of the bourgeoisie. The core of this ideal is and was the promotion of middle-class values, life-styles and modes of behaviour. It implied the democratisation of culture, of good or high culture, to be more precise. Culture should not be limited to the bourgeoisie only; the lower classes should enjoy and embrace it as well. In the late 1960s, in addition to the democratisation of culture, an element of cultural democracy was introduced in cultural policy. The adherents of the idea of cultural democracy claimed that, in principal, all cultures and artistic expressions have equal value. Cultural policy should reflect this. It should represent diversity. Cultural studies and postmodernism strengthened this opinion.

The fundamental tension between the two clusters of policy perspectives and goals, between quality and diversity or representation, is one of the central topics in the debate on the principles of cultural policy.

POLICY PRACTICE AND ITS EFFECTS

This debate is also on policy practice and its effects. Let us start with practice. Arts policy-making and implementation are separated in the

Netherlands. The adoption of the so-called 'arm's length' principle provides committees of independent experts with influence. These experts select and give advice based on sound and clear criteria and definitions of quality with complete freedom. Is this the case? Perhaps not; criticism concerning conflicting interests and inner circles is constant. Some decisions have been taken to court. Are these committees really independent? All the members are appointed by the government. In principal, how can we know and decide whether their judgment is superior to that of the public and the market? Do we accept their expertise as superior? I will come back to the advisory committee system. It is, however, beyond question that the Netherlands has a great variety of art subsidies accompanied by what many see as bureaucracy.

Let us move on to effects and efficiency. Cultural policy has been very successful with respect to the geographic spread of culture and the increase in the supply of arts and culture. We have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of museums, theatres, and cultural centres. But many government funds have been used for structural support for the existing and well known art venues, companies and orchestras, and for public broadcasting. According to economic theory, art subsidies should be used for helping new art and artists, and only for a limited period of time.

Furthermore, higher income groups, in particular, benefit from many subsidies indirectly, because they make up a large segment of the audience of heavily subsidized arts and art institutions. This is also contrary to conventional economic theory with regard to subsidies and the political equity argument for state support, supposed to help the lower income groups to enjoy art.

Even the ministry acknowledges that the important policy goal, social spread, has not materialized (Cultural Policy in The Netherlands 2006, 38). The supply of arts and culture grew faster than the demand for it, and (subsidized) art audiences have become even more exclusive socially than in the past. For instance, the supply of subsidized performing arts has increased by 80 percent between 1975 and 2002, while the demand decreased by 30 percent (Klink 2005). This development is also due to

the fading or blurring of the traditional cultural consensus and cultural canon, and the rise of democratic ideals and ideologies concerning education and upbringing, giving youngsters a right to form their preferences about art. And because of this, many members of the higher classes have become cultural omnivores, consuming high and low culture, instead of just high culture.¹¹

Finally, the question remains whether Dutch arts policy has resulted in more and also better art. Art critic Riki Simons and many others, including directors of public art funds, such as Lex ter Braak and Gitta Luiten, postulate that Dutch arts policy is bad for contemporary art and its market in the Netherlands (Braak, Luiten, Neef et al. 2007; Simons 1997; 2002). The adopted policy has focused – and still does – too much on art production and increasing supply, which is unfortunately a fragmented supply without focus. The system of advisory boards of professional experts, who do not risk personal money and reputation by their choices, judging artistic quality based on group consensus, is being held responsible for the production of a lot of mediocre art. This so-called state art is mainly exhibited and bought by likewise subsidized art museums and art institutions. This resembles supply and demand, but it is largely hidden from the public test through the arts market. Many contemporary art works are tested in a subsidized “quasi market”. According to Ruth Towse (1996, 97–98), a prominent art economist from Rotterdam, and many others, this alternative for the “real” market test results in “paternalism and snobbery” and in people’s evaluation of themselves as artists instead of valuation as artist by the public.

The gap between society and contemporary art, and between the Netherlands and the international art world, attributed to this particular form of arts policy, is even more serious. Dutch arts policy and its subsidies made it possible for many beginners to become professional artists. Thanks to public support, many of them can live and work as artists. At the same time, however, government support marginalized these artists and confined their work to museums. This art and these artists often fail to win public recognition. Subsidies have freed artists from the need to communicate with people, who seek art as an experi-

ence, and have taken one reason to invest in art as a sign of committal from art-lovers.¹²

The weak relationship between art producers and art-lovers has negative effects on the valuation of the arts. The artistic production of subsidized artists has often limited market value. According to a survey of National Statistics (Kunstenaars in Nederland) in 2007, there were about 7000 professional visual artists in the Netherlands (Jenje-Heijdel & Haar 2007).¹³ One out of three visual artists earned less than 10,000 Euros in 2005, two out of three less than 30,000 Euros, including all sources of income and not merely from art, but also from selling their art on the market! These figures support the claims by David Throsby, a well known Australian cultural economist, and many others like Marc Blaug; according to them, there is a structural high unemployment or chronic over-supply of artists (Throsby 1994; Blaug 2001). Many artists do not work or create art for money's sake: above all, they want to produce art.

Many people believe that Dutch arts policy has negative effects on the market for contemporary art. Because of state support it is less urgent for artists to show their work to the public to find buyers, and communicate with them. Because the production costs are paid for by the government, it is less urgent for the artists to secure the support of galleries, private collectors and sponsors, which results in artificially low prices.

Low prices, in turn, do affect the income and turnover of galleries, which tend to be rather low in the Netherlands. Most internationally successful Dutch artists leave their Dutch galleries and go to galleries abroad, which are believed to be willing and able to provide more financial advances and to pay the production costs (Luiten 2007, 24).

As mentioned before, every year tens of millions of Euros of subsidies are available for visual artists in the Netherlands. The “real” market for Dutch contemporary art in the Netherlands is almost certainly smaller, and perhaps much smaller (less than a third) according to the 2008 TEFAF survey on the international art market and the above-mentioned 2007 National Statistics survey on Dutch artists (McAndrew 2008). This makes it easy to understand why so many artists direct themselves

to the state and apply for government subsidies. In the short run, this is beneficial for them, but probably not in the long run, as I hope to have demonstrated.

However, we can never know what the Dutch art world would have been without public support. Thus, nobody can give absolute proof that he or she is right. The Netherlands has had decades of rather strong state involvement in the arts, which is something that cannot be altered. In the end, “being right” remains a problematic notion, because you first have to agree on what “being right” means, and how you can decide on it. And this requires returning to the very first questions of this essay: what is art, what is good art, who is an artist, what is the value of art? Who decides: the individual, the public, the market or the advisory committees and the government? Then, we largely come back, again, to individual and public convictions and choices.

The only thing researchers can do is to analyse and demonstrate which presuppositions these convictions and choices are based on, and try to assess and explain the efficiency or inefficiency, and the desired and undesired effects of a particular arts policy. But in the end, in a democracy, there is the freedom to choose in favour of any policy, even when researchers are critical about the effects of any given policy.

Endnotes

- 1 This article is a revision of the lecture given during The European Fine Art Fair 08 (Maastricht, 11 and 14 March 2008). For more information on The European Fine Art Foundation: see www.tefaf.com.
- 2 In addition to the three ‘problems’ of the workings of the market described in this essay, Ruth Towse (1996, 103) Indeed, information plays a crucial role in the art market and in the artists’ labour markets. It is also important to keep in mind that the market does not give moral judgments and is not synonymous with political democracy.
- 3 In the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Denmark, the share of the average annual cultural expenditure as percentage of the total expenditure on consumption per household was between 5.2% and 5.8% in 1999. The EU-15 average was 4.5%; in France it was 4.2% and in Italy only 2.4%. In the six countries mentioned here

- the total consumption expenditure amounted between 24,081 and 29,255 Euros. For Finland the 1999 figures are 5.1% of 21,571 Euros.
- 4 Some authors, including Janneke Wesseling regard the system of individual art subsidies as a sign of trust in Dutch art and artists. She considers the present criticism on arts policy in the Netherlands an indication of a lack of trust. NRC Handelsblad, 8 February 2008.
 - 5 For the history and development of cultural policy in the Netherlands see Pots (2000); *Cultural Policy in The Netherlands* (2003, 75; 2006).
 - 6 *Cultural Policy in The Netherlands* (2003, 75; 2006, 62); *Cultuurbeleid in Nederland* (2002, 83). According to the ministry's website the budget for 2009 is 917 million Euros.
 - 7 In 2007 the national government's direct expenditure on visual arts and architecture amounted to 46 million Euros. Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en wetenschappen (2008, 144). The budget for 2009 is about 430 million Euros, including almost 150 million Euros of the combined budgets of the eight *Fondsen* or Funds.
 - 8 The annual budget of the Netherlands Foundation for Visual Arts, Design and Architecture (Fonds voor Beeldende Kunsten, Vormgeving en Design) for visual artists is about 15 million Euros.
 - 9 In 1960 only 200 artists benefited from this scheme.
 - 10 Published on 22 June 2007. www.cultuursubsidie.nl/download%20OCW/Kunst%20van%20Leven%20printversie.pdf
 - 11 On "cultural omnivorisation" see Huysmans, Broek & Haan (2005, 107-108).
 - 12 This point is made by, for instance, Arjo Klamer (1996).
 - 13 Based on the figures in chart 8 on page 29 a rough and for that reason questionable calculation of the total earnings of all Dutch professional visual artists amounts to approximately 120 million Euros. In case this is a more or less correct estimation, and if we assume that most of the government budgets for visual artists (in total close to 100 million Euros) find their way to those artists, this would mean that the "real market" for the work of Dutch visual artists is indeed quite small compared to the "subsidized market". For a thorough analysis of monetary and non-monetary rewards in the arts, see Abbing (2002).

5.3

Internationalisation Shapes the Peripheral Practitioner: the Case of Young Visual Artists in Finland

Sari Karttunen

STUDY OF ENTRANTS TO THE GLOBAL SCENE

The article introduces the main findings of an interview-based study ‘Young artists on the threshold of internationalisation’ (Karttunen 2009). It looks into the latest developments in the role and identity of Finnish visual artists, focusing on the effects of the increasing international intercourse since the 1990s. The question is how transformations in the operational environment of Finnish artists affect their professional image and identity as well as their finances. To gain indication of future trends in the occupation the study is empirically targeted at the youngest generation of artists.

Visual artists are here defined broadly to include not only painters and sculptors but also photographic, media, video, performance, community and environmental artists. ‘Young’ is understood as aged 35 years or less. The target population is identified as artists who come from Finland, or are currently based there, and who have also made some headway on the global art scene. All types of visual arts activity taking

place at international level are taken into account, from celebrated art fairs to grass root community actions.

The study was instigated at the Arts Council of Finland, the Research Unit of which specialises in the situation of artists. The Ministry of Education, under which the Arts Council functions, launched a project on cultural exports in 2004, and released a special strategy for cultural exports in 2007. In visual art, the key issue is whether exports might improve the economic welfare and future of artists.

In the Arts Council studies, visual artists emerge as one of the artist groups that face considerable social and economic problems (Hautala 1973; Karttunen 1988; Rensujeff 2003). They are in constant need of government support, either in the form of grants for the creation of their art or as social benefits for survival. Despite weak prospects, the number of visual artists has grown rapidly since the 1980s. Visual artists today are highly educated, but in their case training has an exceptionally weak impact on earnings. In 2000, the year of the latest study, their median income remained the lowest (EUR 15,800) among all Finnish artists (EUR 23,500 for all artists) (Rensujeff 2003, 28, 124).

TOWARDS GREATER VISIBILITY AND INTEGRATION

Finland has been famous for classical music, architecture and design, but not so much for its painting or sculpture. Until lately, only works from the 'Golden Age' of Finnish art, around the turn of the 20th century, have received any wider recognition internationally. At the turn of the millennium, Finnish contemporary art eventually made a leap forward along with the other Nordic countries. International art commentators went as far as to describe this breakthrough as a 'miracle'. In line with Finland's image as a modern, technologically advanced country, photography and video art in particular started to gain critical acclaim.

In 2001, a landmark was achieved when seven Finnish artists were chosen by curator Harald Szeemann to participate in the 49th Venice

Biennial Art Exhibition. Currently the highest ranking artist is film maker and photographer Eija-Liisa Ahtila (b. 1959) whose merits include the Venice Biennial Honourable mention (1999), the first Vincent Award for Contemporary Art in Europe (2000), and the Artes Mundi, one of the world's biggest visual arts prizes (2006). In 2007, Ahtila ranked 197 on the Artfacts.net list containing more than 112 000 artist names. She was also mentioned in the 2005 edition of 'Art Now', a directory of 136 top international contemporary artists (Grosenick 2005).

The growing international recognition of Finnish visual art has not come without major individual and collective efforts. In 1992, the Finnish Fund for Art Exchange FRAME was established to promote the export of visual art by organising exhibitions and awarding grants. Today it also invites foreign curators to come and see Finnish artists and their works. In 2004, FRAME launched a biannual art magazine 'Framework'. Even though it is financed mainly by the state, FRAME functions autonomously, and it has gained respect in the art world both at home and abroad.

Finland's membership of the European Union facilitated cultural exchange from the mid-1990s onwards. Student and teacher exchange programmes have been used extensively, and the requirement to involve several member countries in project applications has boosted networking among art organisations. European integration has enabled artists and works of art to cross borders without difficulty. In 1998, the opening of The Museum of Contemporary Art 'Kiasma' in Helsinki further advanced the position of Finnish artists and other actors on international platforms.

Finnish artists have made beneficial stylistic and rhetorical choices to gain attention in the international art world. These choices have been based on an intimate knowledge of contemporary art and its theories, often gained through lengthy studies in several art schools, and good language skills and periods of stay abroad that have given access to vital networks. It is not a question of naïve artists discovered by curators in the remote Lappish forests and peat lands. Admittedly photo artist Esko Männikkö, who was the first among his peers to make an international

breakthrough in the mid-1990s, appears to fit this image. He has no formal training in art or photography, and he still lives in his native Northern Finland. Eija-Liisa Ahtila, on the other hand, is currently working towards a Doctor of Art degree at the Helsinki Academy of Fine Art. She has also studied art and film-making in London and Los Angeles.

The progression of Finnish art can be seen as part of a broader development, the recent spread of the formerly Western-centred world of contemporary art (e.g., Bydler 2004; Quemin 2006; Stallabrass 2006). International art events now take place all over the world, and new young artists, or entire 'schools' even, are sought after in every corner of the globe. From this viewpoint, Finland is just another periphery that the international star curators have dug out on their journeys of exploration, and our artists are in danger of being abandoned just like any other former prodigies. They are now facing the challenge of putting their name and career on firmer standing internationally.

We are currently witnessing the first generation of Finnish artists who operate extensively on the international level. That is of course not to say that Finnish art life remained isolated until the 1990s. People, artworks and influences have travelled to and fro for centuries; Western art is essentially an international phenomenon. It would be more accurate to talk about the current situation as a new type of internationalisation or integration. People in the Finnish art world themselves consider increased equality to signify a new phase in internationalisation. They feel to be finally more or less on a level with those coming from other countries. Some of them have already been accepted into the inner circles and function as bridge-builders themselves. Art exchange is no longer about compiling pompous touring exhibitions of the best examples of Finnish art, but rather about responding to less ceremonious invitations from abroad, built upon common themes instead of national representation.

There is currently a two-way flow of artworks and people between Finland and the outside world. Most importantly, an increasing number of foreign art students, artists, critics and curators come to visit the country every year. A few Finnish artists, the above-mentioned Eija-Liisa

Ahtila in particular, are even considered to be internationally influential. Finnish artists may not occupy any leading positions in contemporary art yet, or constantly break auction records like their Chinese colleagues, but they are starting to make their presence known on the art scene, especially in Europe.

THEORETICAL STARTING POINTS AND HYPOTHESES

The writings of Pierre Bourdieu on the peculiar, reversed economy of art as well as the theory of professions and the sociology of art, in particular their intersection dealing with art occupations, are the main pillars for the framework of my study (see e.g. Bourdieu 1993; Freidson 1986; Zol-lars and Cantor 1993). Current discussion on the creative class and the new work culture as well as atypical labour and ‘precarisation’ is used as a heuristic to draw parallels between artists and other occupations (e.g. Menger 2001 and 2002; Florida 2002; Sennett 1998). Globalisation and nomadisation of working life are also relevant themes in the study (e.g. Bauman 1998).

My basic hypothesis is that increasing internationalisation will result in Finnish artists going through a change both individually and collectively. Other major trends in late modern society and post-Fordist working life also have an effect here. In relative terms, we might presume that artists are becoming more ‘normal’ or ‘typical’. Art has been an anomalous occupation to begin with, and now other jobs are showing similar risky features. Artists carry out intermittent work entailing projects and commissions, and their economic situation is variable and precarious. The whole life of artists is subordinate to work, and they need to develop their personal skills and identities constantly (see Karttunen 2007).

At the same time, successful artists increasingly resemble other highly skilled specialists when it comes to the level of incomes and job image. They need to stick to contracts and deadlines, and they have to maintain portfolios of their achievements just as people in other expert fields do.

Artists may also be found among the top professionals – the nomadic elites – that travel and work around the world; star contemporary artists may earn millions during their lifetime.

In Finland, I believe the changes in incomes and identity to be more evident in the case of young artists, especially those who are building up an international career. Among their older colleagues, ‘charismatic ideology’ demanding a strict separation between art and commerce still has a tight grip. As in the other Nordic countries, it has been facilitated by relatively ample government funding for artists. The fact that Finnish artists have, up to now, been minor actors on the global art scene accentuates the difference between generations. As the operating environment expands, the method of gaining legitimacy among the narrow range of one’s peers through anti-economic behaviour will lose its significance. More efficient, yet sufficiently discrete, strategies are needed for gaining planetary visibility.

Internationalisation is bound to boost professionalization among visual artists in Finland. They are not only becoming more middle-class and bourgeois as regards their values, living standards and appearance, but their special ‘aura’ is also waning. The occupation is turning secular in the Weberian sense. For a section of Finnish artists, professionalization may advance also in the strict sense that they might actually start earning their living from art (cf. Freidson 1986, 435). International mobility and visibility may also have polarising effects on the earnings and career paths of visual artists; thus far social and economic discrepancies between them have been small in cross-national comparison.

On the other hand, we might expect a certain level of de-professionalization to happen in the sense that the power to define good art and legitimate artists could shift from peers (artists’ associations with tight membership criteria and corporatist national councils for art that distribute government grants) to new types of gatekeepers (art exchange bodies, international curators and critics, leading galleries). As a result the ‘principles of hierarchisation’ in Finnish visual art will change (cf. Bourdieu 1993, 38). Nonetheless, the domestic-oriented system may well

continue to exist and serve artists whose major occupational interests remain within the national borders.

In his study of Norwegian art students, Per Mangset's (2003, 2004) main question was how strongly young artists are guided by charismatic ideology, an integral notion of which is that one is born ('called') to be an artist. According to the romantic conception, money plays no part in producing art, and compromises are not made for the sake of reputation or riches. Pierre Bourdieu (1993) says that the production of 'high' art is based on a systematic inversion of the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies. The rules of the regular economy though apply for the bread and butter work by which artists finance their living and production of art. Hans Abbing (2002) calls this special combination a 'dual economy'.

Per Mangset (2004) observed several alternative roles available to young artists today in addition to the charismatic one. In line with Hans Abbing (2002), he made a distinction between the 'artist-researcher', the 'artist-craftsman', the 'post-modern artist' and the 'artist-entertainer'. New types of artists emerge that deny or ignore borders between different fields of art and between art and other sectors in society. To them, art does not involve a special mystery, but is a profession or business like any other, making the dual economy model redundant.

In empirical studies of Finnish artists conducted at the turn of the 1990s, the obligation to make economic sacrifices was still very strong, especially in the case of young visual artists (Erkkilä and Vesanen 1989) and the emerging group of photographic artists (Karttunen 1993, 1998b). From time to time, the odd young artist declared commercial interests, but they were seeking publicity rather than expressing their deepest identity.

Internationalisation started to increase radically and to take new forms after the mid-1990s, but I believe that it is only recently that its effects have started showing more permanently and widely in the identities and images of emerging artists. Integration might eventually revolutionise the structures and practices in the domestic field of art, as mentioned. It may strengthen some types of artist while making others

weaker. It is to be expected that Bohemian artists are being replaced by other types of image builders, who have a better chance of succeeding in global competition. Not all artists will, of course, adjust themselves to the streamlined type, but insist on restoring the social role of art.

In the case of Finland, visual artists must make considerable changes in their occupational practices as a result of internationalisation. They need to adapt themselves to new types of employment and financing arrangements and to the completely different role that is expected of the artist on the global scene. At present, they are to a great extent dependent on the state and other grant-givers for the continuation of their practice; and, of course, they themselves finance their artistic work through second jobs¹.

The art market is quite underdeveloped in Finland, and the majority of art galleries are incapable of functioning internationally (e.g., Jyrämä 2002; Anhava 2007). Art galleries started to internationalise in the late 1980s, during the 'boom' years, but the recession in the early 1990s hit them severely, causing many of them to go bankrupt. In fear of economic disaster, most private galleries in Finland expect artists to pay rent for exhibition space, in addition to which a small commission is levied on sales.

In a country where sales of art remain low, state grants are essential in the production of art, especially 'artist grants' that resemble salaries for a period up to five years. State grants are distributed by the National Council for Visual Art, whose members are nominated from people suggested by art institutions and artists' associations. The overall system may be described as corporatist, and it has been quite powerful in influencing who is given legitimacy as an artist and the financial chances to produce art. It is my presumption that internationalisation now threatens the basis of this system with the introduction of new gatekeepers, new operating models and new methods of financing artistic work.

DATA AND METHODS

Straightforward comparison is the central method used in the study. It is conducted between the 15 cases interviewed for the purpose, and also against the findings of previous studies in Finland and elsewhere. Surveys on the status of visual artists carried out within the arts administration in the early-1970s and mid-1980s provide domestic longitudinal data (Hautala 1973; Karttunen 1988). Kaija Rensujeff's (2003) afore mentioned study provides the most recent information on the conditions of visual artists and also situates them within the whole corps of artists. Per Mangset's project (2003; 2004) in Norway offers the possibility to make cross-country comparisons (see also Røyseng et al. 2007).

The study project as a whole combines several types of data and methods: documents and registers, exhibition catalogues, press articles, and interviews. The topic was first approached indirectly through two sub-studies based on secondary data (Karttunen 2005, 2006). The first one pertained to artists who had applied for and received travel and residence allowances from the Arts Council of Finland in the first half of the 2000's. The second sub-study dealt with the educational careers of visual artists at home and abroad by age, gender and specialisation. The data were taken from the registers published by The Artists' Association of Finland.

The interviews with young artists were started only after the theme frame had been specified on the basis of background data and analyses. Between December 2005 and June 2006, a total of 15 interviews were conducted. The interviewees were born between 1969 and 1981 and were thus between 25 and 36 years of age at the time of the interview. Nine were women and six were men, the percentage of women (60%) being slightly lower than it was among all visual artists of the same age group (67%). Thirteen of the interviewees spoke Finnish, one Swedish and one English as their mother tongue.

All but one interviewee were born and also raised in Finland; all 14 had studied art in Finland, and ten had studied abroad as well. One

interviewee was an immigrant who had come to Finland in his twenties after having gained an MFA in his home country. Three interviewees were living abroad, and one shared her time between Finland and another European country. One interviewee had just come back after spending five years abroad where she had originally gone for further studies and remained for personal reasons. Several interviewees had a foreign spouse or partner.

All interviewees had taken an MA degree in art or were just about to complete their studies. Some of them were already preparing for a doctoral degree in art or carrying out further studies in art history, film studies, or criticism. The majority were using several media in their artworks; most often photography, video and installation, but also painting and drawing. Two interviewees were specialising in site-specific art making use of any appropriate media. One artist was involved mostly with sculpture, one with computer art, and one with painting.

The interviewees did not represent a random sample of young Finnish artists, but were selected for the specific purposes of the study. To cover a wide variety of international mobility and artistic activity the following types of artists were sought after:

- who had studied abroad
- who had made use of foreign residencies
- who had exhibited widely or worked abroad for lengthy periods, either on foreign assignments or on their own initiative
- who manifested different geographical interests
- who came from different schools in Finland and who represented various types of media
- who held different ideas of the role of the artist in society and who expressed different opinions on the relationship between art and commerce
- who preferred different venues and modes of functioning on the international level
- who had become celebrities as well as those who avoided the limelight

- who seemed to advance methodically on their international career path as well as those who rather seemed to drift
- who were critical of the global art world system as well as those who seemed well-adjusted with everything.

Names of potential interviewees were collected from art reviews, newspapers, FRAME and Arts Council registers. Informants were also contacted, and the interviewees themselves were asked for further names. The set of interviewees was not chosen all at once, but the list was modified on the basis of interviews conducted. Needless to say, as the sample was targeted, the findings of the study cannot be generalised to apply to the entire generation of young artists in Finland. The intention here is to explore the emerging artist types and developments in the job, no matter what their frequency is at the moment.

The interviews were a mixture of the semi-structured and the theme type. They were carried out with the help of a questionnaire form which contained both structured and open questions (64 in all). The questions dealt with training and occupational activity with an emphasis on the international dimension. The initial difficulties of artistic careers and the possible downsides of success were also addressed. The questions were formulated on the basis of the research interests and the theoretical framework, bearing in mind comparability with the afore-mentioned Finnish and foreign studies.

Even though a questionnaire form was used, the order of questions depended on which direction the discussion took with each interviewee. Moreover, a few extra questions were tailored for each artist based on material found in their curriculum vitae, interviews and articles in art journals, newspapers, art books and exhibition catalogues, and the grant registries of the Arts Council. The interviews lasted from two to three-and-a-half hours; all were recorded and transcribed word by word.

INCOME SOURCES AND IDEOLOGIES

One of the central aims of the study was to find out whether the increased mobility and visibility of Finnish artists on the international scene shows in their earnings. In terms of both economic behaviour and success, there emerged a clear difference between gallery-based artists and those working on their own or with varying partners in collaboration. In part it is also a question of different ideological make-ups. Galleries are not particularly interested in people who specialise in urban or community art or transient social actions which do not necessarily generate any saleable objects; neither are these artists always too keen on dealers.

Ideology may though be justifiably sacrificed up to a limit for the sake of realizing further art work. As mentioned, many of the interviewees specialise in photography, video or other 'new media' which are not cheap forms of art. Video artists may need to hire 20–30 persons for their productions and to raise funds amounting to several hundred of thousands of euro. For these artists, commercial galleries that offer production support are a godsend, and selected sponsors could also be accepted.

Ten out of the 15 interviewees were represented by one or more foreign galleries, though none had a written contract. Sales were equally divided between the gallery and the artist as is the international practice. The initiative for joining a gallery usually came from the owner after the artist had participated in a major exhibition. An enthusiastic private collector had occasionally recommended an artist to a gallery.

Several gallery-based interviewees made a point of declaring not being against commerce in art. They saw it as part and parcel of the job that the outcomes were commodities to be sold and bought. For them galleries were indispensable as intermediaries, or as scapegoats. Artists did not wish to take part in putting a price on or selling works of art. Many of them do not even want to know who the buyer is if it is not a major public museum or private collection. One interviewee said that if artists started to worry about sales and buyers, it would ruin their art.

Many artists received both psychological and economic support from their foreign galleries. These provided financial support for the production of new works, which surprised the interviewees as this was not the habit in Finland. Two of them, however, refused to accept this offer, wishing to maintain their independence. Artists usually had a close relationship with the gallery owner or a liaison person with whom they could talk about their art and their career plans.

Some 'manipulative' galleries nevertheless wished to control the form or the content of artwork; for instance, new colour schemes or experiments with new media were not always welcomed (cf. Rosenberg & Fliegel 1970, 475). The artists themselves were well aware of the dilemma of, on the one hand, the importance of being recognisable when launching and establishing new names, and on the other, the hazard of being too repetitive. They understood the fact that galleries need something that can be sold in order to survive themselves. Video artists, for instance, usually agreed to produce stills from their films.

Some video artists managed to sell reasonably well abroad, while others hardly sold anything at all. At the domestic level, sales of video art remain still very low. Similarly, media or computer art is bought by museums and private collectors abroad, but seldom at home. Photography is sold mostly abroad, while painting finds buyers at home as well, but the overall sales hardly cover the cost of living and expenses after the gallery takes its half and the taxman a further share.

Overall, money was not talked about much in the interviews except in the pragmatic sense of financing living and expenses; money was essentially a means to make more art. One of the interviewees, however, did express a wish to become rich by art. For this prototype radical young man, it was a question of challenging the myth rather than having this as an actual plan. In my interpretation, the charismatic definition of art had more importance to him than to most of his fellow interviewees.

Artists specializing in site-specific actions are often invited to participate in biennials and other art events, another means of financing their art work. Therefore, it is vital for these artists to gain visibility and make themselves known to curators who design the programmes and choose

the participants. Some biennials offer residencies lasting several months, endowed with a cost-of-living and material allowance. Residencies often function on a project basis as well, and some young artists apply for one residency after another, thus having no need for a permanent abode. Special residency grants are also available in Finland. Some residencies are based on invitations only and may include a considerable grant. The best programmes help artists to connect with the local artists and art institutions, which may lead to job opportunities in the future.

To make ends meet, artists often carry out arts-related jobs and even jobs which have nothing to do with the arts (e.g., Rensujeff 2003). Several interviewees were teaching art, though it was usually a question of odd lectures or workshops; nobody had a full-time teaching job at the time of the interview. Some artists acted as curators for exhibitions and wrote reviews for art journals. They had also been employed as guides in museums and assistants in galleries. Some carried out applied artistic work as well, such as graphic design or commercial photography.

As a rule of thumb, where any of the interviewees, irrespective of media, had sales amounting to any considerable figure, the majority of them came from abroad. All in all, only a few of the interviewees had sales on a continuous basis totalling an amount that would allow them to survive without the aid of grants or second jobs. Their incomes varied greatly from one year to another. At the time of the interviews, grants guaranteed a basic income for many of the interviewees. All 15 of them were actually receiving some grant in the year of interview. International merits improved their chances of gaining grants.

PROFESSIONALISM WITH A CHARISMATIC FLAVOUR

The most successful interviewees were already masters at managing their schedules, often assisted by their galleries. The sudden burst of invitations had been troublesome before they learned to say 'no'. One of the interviewees had counted that she had had more than 160 travel days

during the most hectic year after her international breakthrough. Artists who need to install their works themselves each time they are shown have little time to produce new works, and if they have nothing new to offer, interest in them will drop quickly. This is another dilemma for internationally successful young artists.

The interviewees talked about their life and work in the same way that any professional people would. They were passionate about their work, yet quite realistic about their prospects. The interviewees had also become professional in the sense that they had learned, often through mistakes, how to behave in international surroundings: how to dress for openings, how to hold speeches, how to give interviews and how to socialise. In most cases, their language skills had been extensive to start with, and had become even better through continuous practice.

At the end of the day, the most important thing for the interviewees was their work, and they actually continuously fought for the opportunity to concentrate on it. They had to find a way of financing their work without having to take on second jobs which would reduce the time and energy left for art. Therefore they respected the galleries that not only helped them cover production costs but also handled many time-consuming tasks that might also be hard or even disagreeable for artists themselves, such as taking care of public relations, negotiating the details of museum exhibitions and biennial participations, packaging and sending art works to new destinations and updating CVs. The most successful artists had also found it worthwhile to employ a bookkeeper.

When asked specifically about the criteria for a professional artist, most interviewees ticked 'self-identity' and 'quality of work'. The time spent producing art and sustained practice were also popular choices, while hardly anyone voted for training, recognition by critics or membership in an artists' organisation. Thus, the most objective criteria of a professional used in other fields were discarded; instead, artists share such criteria as experience, identity and ethics with other professions. The ultimate charismatic criterion 'gift' nevertheless received very little support from the interviewees.

The interviewees did not specifically cultivate 'disinterested' strategies, but were all the same careful when making choices between venues and job opportunities not to endanger legitimacy. Image was an important consideration for them; some of them even talked about the artist as a 'brand'. The more experience they had, the more selective they became: there was no sense in wasting time and energy on second-rate events. Rather than help to strengthen their image, these events could actually damage it. They had also learned to be selective when writing up their CV.

The interviewees were work-oriented people on the whole. They were disciplined and worked long hours; with a deadline approaching, they might toil round the clock. Several of them mentioned that their schedules were so tight that unruly drinking and taking drugs would be disastrous. Many avoided all non-art-related activities as best they could and tried to find a peaceful work environment. Being abroad meant that they were detached from their everyday surroundings, including social ties. They might suffer from loneliness, but they could focus on their work 100 per cent. Many chose to abandon opportunities for networking with the locals.

Many interviewees defined success as the ability to carry on with their artistic work, and they also valued the opportunity to participate in high-quality exhibitions and work with people they respected. Being invited to exhibitions with artists whom they regarded as the best in contemporary art and being represented by the same galleries were humbling experiences for these young artists. They knew that the threshold was much higher on the international level and the competition tougher than in Finland, so there would be a greater chance of being dropped out. They also realised that they had only a few years to establish their name.

The interviewees did not admit that they had become tougher when functioning on the international level, but they had lost their innocence quickly. One interviewee had felt at first that she was badly taken advantage of by gallery-owners and curators, but soon she understood that the rule of the game was reciprocal exploitation. The artists had also learned to take hard critique as part and parcel of the profession. To prevent envy,

they were though careful not to boast about their triumphs to their fellow artists in Finland. They understood the importance of a small circle of friends and advisers whose opinion they could trust.

Contrary to my original assumptions, only a few artists had chosen to lead a lonesome life that would seem to suit career building and mobility best; instead, most saw family as an important counterbalance to their hectic career and also as a resource. Two of the male interviewees already had children, and two women were pregnant at the time of the interview. Women artists now want to have it all, one of them said. Their economic situations were relatively solid considering their vocation, and having a family made them even more realistic about their financial matters. Most of the spouses were artists themselves or in other liberal professions and so could help in child care more flexibly than ordinary salaried workers.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE JOB AND ITS HOLDERS

Based on the interview data, various changes are happening in the role and finances of artists in Finland. Thanks to increased internationalisation, new career opportunities are opening up for Finnish artists. These often require that artists agree to new types of financial arrangements and respective alterations in their job and their occupational image. International galleries, which differ from the domestic ones in many respects, have a crucial role in the transformation of the Finnish artist. Most importantly, they are able to reach so many and such affluent buyers that some artists may soon be able to start living on sales alone. Major galleries provide financial support for the artists' new productions, which would not happen in Finland; they also tend to form long-standing personal relationships with their house artists whose career they guide, or even manipulate.

In addition to gallery-based practitioners, artists specialising in site-specific art and temporary projects could be discerned as a separate

type among the interviewees. Critical of the harsh art business, they took distance from the established gallery system. Instead they received commissions from foreign residencies, biennials and public art agencies. Contrary to my assumptions, these artists admitted an interest in finding a suitably minded gallery owner to promote their work and bring in some money as well.

The concept of ‘dual economy’ introduced by Hans Abbing (2002) did not come particularly useful here, since only a few of these artists had to rely on bread and butter jobs as they were mostly financed by grants and sales. The young interviewees did not make use of the strategy of proving artistic integrity through economic sacrifices, which has been habitual in Finland. Instead, they were building up legitimacy through the process of selecting venues, invitations and co-workers. Many of them saw the international art world as their primary audience instead of their domestic colleagues and other gatekeepers at home. Nevertheless, the home scene could not be abandoned, as most interviewees still depended on national financing for the continuation of their artistic work and their international mobility as well.

The interviewed young artists tended to be professional, disillusioned and pragmatic people for the most part, and the mental and economic pressures of their career were currently high. I found it surprising to discover how fast the interviewees had adapted to their new operating environment, as only the youngest of them had any training in international matters at art school. The idea of having a gallery and exhibitions abroad and participating in major fairs and biennials was not common in Finland some 10–15 years ago. Back then, Finnish artists were still firmly oriented to the domestic art world, although study trips and other visits abroad were considered important or even crucial for artistic development.

Based on the 15 cases that I studied in depth I would say that the charismatic ideology of art as delineated by Pierre Bourdieu (1993) has not totally lost its validity among the emerging practitioners. The division between art and economy—or autonomy and heteronomy—exists for the young artists, but they are negotiating the boundary. The recent

Norwegian study of art graduates came to a similar conclusion: the charismatic myth has not been discarded, but it is being reconstructed and re-interpreted to accord with the changed context (Røyseng et al. 2007, 11).

In my study, which focused on people working internationally, the need for flexibility became apparent when dealing with gallery owners and curators who could provide young artists with visibility, finances and access to networks. For the interviewees, internationalisation meant an increase in job opportunities and earnings, but also a variable loss in occupational autonomy. In the future, if they are able to establish their name and fame, they may win more independence from these gatekeepers. Young practitioners themselves expect that their earnings will increase and stabilize if they work hard and persistently cultivate their own unique artistry. They stick heavily to certain elements of the charismatic conception, while they also pragmatically admit the need to be connected and promoted.

Endnotes

- 1 In 2000, 44 per cent of visual artists received some sort of grant; 59 per cent had worked in arts-related jobs, typically teaching, and 23 per cent in completely non-artistic jobs. On average, art income formed one third of the gross income of visual artists; more than one in four had no income from arts work at all. (Rensujeff 2003, 52, 73.)

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Notes on Authors

Professor *Pirkkoliisa Ahponen*, PhD, works at the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Joensuu, Finland. Her research interests have covered ways of life -studies, qualitative methodologies and theoretical approaches to modern and postmodern societies. After having concentrated on comparative evaluations of institutional cultural policy she turned to studying the politics of culture, socio-cultural border-crossings, social exclusion, alienation, and social- cultural marginalities. The questions her research currently focuses on include global problems of cultural citizenship.

Pertti Alasuutari, PhD, is Academy Professor at the University of Tampere, Finland. He is the editor of the *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, and has published widely on social theory, cultural and media studies, and social research methodology. His current research focuses on the role of knowledge production in global governance. His books include *Researching Culture: Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies* (Sage, 1995), *An Invitation to Social Research* (Sage 1998), *Rethinking the Media Audience* (Sage 1999), and *Social Theory and Human Reality* (Sage 2004).

Peter Duelund, born 1945, is a cultural sociologist and an Assistant Professor in Modern Culture, at the Department of Arts and Cultural Studies, University of Copenhagen. He is also the director of the Nordic Cultural Institute. For several years, he has been a senior adviser to the Nordic Council of Ministers in cultural policy. Peter Duelund has published 17 books on Danish, Nordic and European cultural policy.

Risto Eräsaari is a professor of social policy at the University of Helsinki and a docent of cultural policy at the University of Jyväskylä. His studies focus on social theory (*Gesellschaftstheorie*), historical studies on the justification of social orders, and the contingencies of *Zeitgeist*. His recent research themes include the effects of differentiation and the forms of new knowledge.

Jenny Johannisson, Ph.D., works as a researcher and a lecturer at the Swedish School of Library and Information Science, Borås, Sweden. Her main research interests concern local and regional cultural policy against the backdrop of globalization processes. Currently, she is the leader of a research project financed by The Swedish Arts Council, exploring the relation between culture, space/place and identity in Swedish regional and local cultural policies. Johannisson is vice chair of SweCult (Swedish Cultural Policy Research Observatory), Linköping University, and member of the scientific committee of ICCPR (International Conference on Cultural Policy Research).

Joop de Jong (1956) has studied history and art history at the Utrecht University, where he received his PhD in 1985. At present, he is an associate professor and the vice-dean of Education in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, the Netherlands. He is also the director of the MA in Arts and Heritage: Policy, Management and Education. His main research interests are: cultural policy, cultural participation, cultural heritage and dealing with the past.

Professor, Ph.D. *Marja Järvelä* is the Head of Social and Public Policy Unit at the Department of Social Sciences, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. For several years, she has studied questions of sustainable development both in urban and rural landscapes by leading several academic research projects. Methodologically, she has taken on the challenge of combining some basic ideas of ethnography with action research strategy. Her main case studies have been carried out in Europe, Africa, Asia and Russia.

Sari Karttunen, Ph.D, is a Senior Researcher in cultural statistics at the Statistics Finland and a docent in cultural policy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. Artistic occupations and the sociology of the visual arts are her main research interests. She also works on the methodology for collections and analyses of data on cultural policy. Her current project concerns cultural policy indicators.

Per Mangset (born 1944) is a professor of cultural studies/cultural policy at the Telemark University College and a researcher at the Telemark Research Institute. Mangset has published several books, articles and reports about cultural policy, sociology of art and sports policy. He was one of the initiators of the International Conference on Cultural Policy Research (ICCP), the Scientific Committee of which he currently coordinates. He is also a member of the Editorial Board of the *International Journal of Cultural Policy Research*.

Michael Quine was the chief executive of several British regional theatres before joining the Department of Cultural Policy & Management at City University London. He is a jury-member for the European Cultural Policy Research Award; he was the vice president of ENCATC for 6 years; and he has taught widely in Europe and further afield.

Martti Siisiäinen is a professor of sociology at the Department of Social Sciences, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He has published widely on topics such as social movements, voluntary associations, sociological pluralism and corporatism, social capital and solidarity. He has led several research projects. He is currently working in the “Resources, locality and life course” research project, which deals with the mutual relationships between economic, cultural and social capital.

Dorte Skot-Hansen is a cultural sociologist and the head of the Centre for Cultural Policy Studies, Royal School of Library and Information Science, Copenhagen. Her fields of research include cultural policy, library policy, cultural diversity, cultural planning, and experience economy.

Her latest publications are “The City as a Scene - Cultural Planning in Experience Society” (in Danish 2007) and “The Museum in the Danish Experience Economy - when Enlightenment becomes an Experience” (in Danish 2008).

Professor, Dr. *Saara L. Taalas* is the Chair of Media Business and the Head of Media Futures Network in the Turku School of Economics in Finland. She holds visiting professorships in management at the Universities of Jyväskylä and Oulu in Finland, and a senior lectureship in organization theory at the Lund University in Sweden. Her research interests focus on the boundary conditions of organizing and management in cultural and media economy. Her work has been published in journals such as *Entrepreneurship and Regional Development*, and *Management and Organizational History*.

Geir Vestheim is a professor at the Swedish School of Library and Information Sciences, University of Borås, Sweden. In his publications on the field of cultural policy research, he has focused on cultural institutions and democracy.

Professor, Ph.D. *Annika Waenerberg* is the Head of the Art History Unit at the Department of Art and Culture Studies, University of Jyväskylä, Finland. Her main research interests have been the concept of the organic in art, national landscape and the artists' travels. In her most recent academic projects she has taken on the challenge of methodological interaction with cultural policy and cognitive science. She is a member of the Finnish Academy of Science and Letters.

