CONTESTING FAMILY IN FINNISH AND CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Abstract
Adopting a governmentality perspective, this article explores the multi-conceptuality of family in Finnish and Canadian immigration and refugee policy domains by analyzing official and political discourse. Contestation is found to typically manifest as conflict between Western ‘nuclear’ and non-Western ‘extended’ understandings of family. We argue that family is persistent in immigration and refugee policies of both countries because it continues to be thought of as an effective tool for biopolitical governance of national populations. A closer reading of the contestation over family also reveals competing neoliberal and neoconservative governmental rationalities situated within broader integration assemblages.

Keywords
Canada • Finland • family • immigration • governmentality

1 Introduction
The concept of ‘family’ in the immigration and refugee policies of Finland and Canada is contested among officials and various stakeholders. In Finland existing family reunification policy, and its conceptualization of family, has been recently problematized from various directions. Most visible have been cases where family members of residing migrants received negative asylum or resident application decisions. The problematization of policy also coalesced in Finnish parliamentary debates in Autumn 2010 on renewal of legislation pertaining to integration of immigrants and reception of asylum seekers (L 493/1999; new law: L 1386/2010). From across the political spectrum it has been argued that integration of persons gaining residence through family reunification has been less successful compared with other immigrants. Critics also argue that the old system of family reunification in Finland is too costly and open to abuse by persons not defined as family of immigrants, and that ‘extended’ family (e.g., parents and grandparents) therefore should not be recognized in such policies.

In Canada, family class immigration and refugee reunification policy also has been problematized. This is evident beginning in the early 1990s with elimination of the ‘Assisted Relative’ class and has more recently come to the fore following the federal Immigration Minister’s announcement in February 2011 that target levels of ‘immediate’ (or nuclear) family (i.e., a permanent resident applicant, their spouse or conjugal partner, and children) immigrants are to increase while target levels of extended family (i.e., sponsorship of permanent residents’ parents and grandparents) are to decrease. To the extent that Canadian policy has recognized extended family in the past, emphasis is shifting more towards the nuclear family form.

Drawing on concepts from the governmentality literature, in this article we explore family in immigration and refugee policy in Finland and Canada. We compare Finland and Canada because both are Western immigrant-receiving countries where the nuclear family is dominant, although Finland’s immigration policies are somewhat less developed compared with Canada’s, which has a longer history of receiving large numbers of immigrants. Nonetheless, these countries also share the guiding principles of multiculturalism policy. Saukkonen (2006), for instance, has argued that Finland is the European country with an immigrant policy closest to an...
integration-oriented multiculturalism that has been the Canadian model for almost three decades.

In an era said to be increasingly influenced by neoliberalism’s valorization of the enterprising, self-supporting individual (Rose 1992; Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006), the very persistence of a family designation in immigration and refugee policies seems peculiar from the outset. Neither the governmental role of family nor why it is recognized in these policies is self-evident, thus encouraging empirical inquiry into the anticipated governmental roles of family. This policy domain is especially a fertile ground to unearth insights about family as a biopolitical instrument of population (see Dean 2010; Foucault 2007) and as an element of integration assemblages. To this end we ask several questions consonant with a governmentality perspective: How is family represented in immigration and refugee policy in Finland and Canada? How is family being problematized and contested? How is family seen as an instrument of government and what rationalities can be discerned shaping family and ultimately populations in these policies?

Through our empirical examination of legal, programmatic, and other relevant texts we discover that in both Finland and Canada contestation over family typically manifests as conflict between Western nuclear and non-Western extended understandings. In both countries this distinction is found to center on ‘from where newcomers have migrated’ and ‘through what means.’ Asylum seekers and refugees – who are primarily from non-Western countries – are permitted to be accompanied by their nuclear family, while other immigrants are allowed to be accompanied by their extended family. In both countries there is a distinguishable move towards further limiting family to the nuclear form. However, we argue that a closer reading of the contestation over family in the two countries reveals that family persists in policies because it continues to be thought of as an effective tool for biopolitical governance of national populations and that two governmental rationalities – neoliberal and neconservative formulations – can be discerned anticipating the family’s role. This article contributes to the governmentality literature by lending further insight into how family figures in immigration and refugee policy as a governmental tool and by illuminating the governmental rationalities that shape family within broader integration assemblages.

2 Governmentality and the family

This article adopts a governmentality perspective inspired by Michel Foucault’s later writings and lectures (see, among others, Dean 2010; Foucault 1991, 2007; Lippert & Stenson 2010; Rose 1999; Rose, O’Malley & Valverde 2006). In this perspective, government refers to the ‘conduct of conduct’ and is broadly defined as ‘any attempt to control or manage any known object’ (Hunt & Wickham 1994:78). A major concern of this corpus of work has been to identify the governmental discourses or ‘rationalities’ that shape the governance of populations within and through myriad programs. Rationalities refer to widely shared discourses that give reasons for governmental actions. They are transferable from one societal context to another, but in every context they have their own moral forms, epistemological characters, idiomatic form, and telos (Rose 1999: 24–28). In this perspective ‘program’ refers to imagined projects, designs, or schemes of varying scope and ambition for organizing and administering social conduct and that assert knowledge of particular domains (Gordon 1980: 248). Specific tools or ‘technologies’ (see Dean 2010: 196–98; Lippert 2010), of which family is one vital but neglected example, come to be assembled within specific programs, that is, they become enlisted in broader assemblages of governance.

Foucault himself focused upon the transformation of family from self-governing unit within sovereign rule to a biopolitical understanding of family as an instrument of the art of government of the population. From the mid-eighteenth century the family has been an instrument through which governmental campaigns of marriage, public health, and education have taken place. Since then to a great extent family has translated individual interests to interests of population as a governable totality (Foucault 1991, 2007: 104–5). Family is not only an element within population in Foucault’s writings, but an important element of the so-called normalizing power that educates members about virtue, promptness, economic responsibility, and self-control. The rationality of normalization comes from both strengthening and maintaining the vitality of population and morality of men, women and children (Foucault 1985:141–83, 1986:145–85; see also e.g., Yesilova 2009). Family can thus be seen as an instrument through which immigration, individuals, population, culture and economy are governed. Following Foucault’s lead, the chief claim of governmentality theorists has been that family was largely supplanted by the population concept. As Hunt and Wickham (1994: 77) described this development:

By addressing population, governments were able to target each individual, as part of the population; the family as the unit of the nation was now clearly insufficient. . . The family was still an important instrument of government, but it was now secondary to the master concept of population.

But what kind of family and how can family be an instrument or technology of government? Although several scholars have examined immigration and refugee policy and practices using a governmentality conceptual ‘tool-kit’ (e.g., Lippert 2006; Pratt 2005; Pyykkönen 2007; Walters 2002), there has been only limited attention paid to integration in place of what might be termed ‘border practices’. We believe both are important and indeed may be more interrelated and overlapping than previous work has implied. Moreover, while a few governmentality-informed works have begun to discern or discuss the presence of plural rationalities in particular domains, including neoconservatism (O’Malley 2001; Park & Lippert 2008: 197; see also Larner 2000 below), there has been a neglect of the role of family in relation to these sometimes competing
rationalities. The general dearth of attention to family in governmentality work (but see Ashenden 1996; Rajas, this issue) and closely related scholarship is somewhat surprising given Foucault’s comments above but also since Donzelot’s (1979) ground-breaking Policing of Families and early work of Rose (1985; 1987) identified the family as a key locus of governance in relation to ‘the social’ (usually used to refer to what is understood as Welfare State arrangements), both of which inspired of what is now a voluminous body of work.

In an instructive exception to the tendency to overlook family as a contemporary instrument of government in this literature, Larner (2000) discerns neconervative and neoliberal conceptions of the family in policy discourses in New Zealand. Larner analyses the New Zealand government’s ill-fated effort to instill a code of conduct for families and individuals. In particular, Larner argues the code is ‘a hybrid assemblage marked by both neoliberal and conservative rationalities’ (Larner 2000: 261) that has implications for understanding the governmental role of family relations. Larner (2000: 256) writes:

...Family provides a nexus for the articulation of neoliberal and neoconservative formulations... Yet while both neoliberalism and neconervatism are hostile to social welfarism and mobilize the family as a solution to ‘state dependency,’ each is premised on a different understanding of the concept. ... Neoliberalism aims to revalue women’s place within the family, particularly as mothers. ... Neoliberalism, by contrast, no longer requires women to enter a sexual contract and sees familial relationships as a matter of ‘lifestyle choice’.

Larner elaborates further: ‘Neoconservatism re-inscribes the traditional sexual division of labor, placing women back in the home. Neoliberalism privileges paid work, but at the same time domestic work and childcare once again disappear’ (Larner 2000: 262). Exceptions like this aside, overlooked in the governmentality literature are representations of family as an instrument of governing the population within and through policy domains – such as immigration and refugee policy – and which are constituted by particular rationalities of government. Larner’s distinction is vital and we invoke it later in this article in analyzing features of Canadian and Finnish immigrant and refugee family policies.

3 Previous research on family in immigrant integration

There is of course a long tradition of studying families in the context of immigrant integration in Europe and North America (see e.g., Gordon 1964; Jaakkola 1991; Rex & Tomlinson 1979). Classic and functionalist immigration research has focused upon the social networks that families offer to individuals; the role of families in maintaining ‘original cultures’; and how families contribute to adaptation to the host country and its culture (see also Menjivar 2000). Presently a major research focus is on understanding family among non-European immigrants living in host societies; use of extended family in transnational connections and for resettlement (e.g., Amuedo-Dorantes & Mundra 2007); how families transmit cultural ideas and values between generations; and the role of families in individual newcomers’ psychological well-being (see e.g., Peltola 2009; Phinney et al 2000). There are, however, relatively few studies exploring immigrant families as part of integration assemblages (but see Dahlstedt 2009).

Much previous research above tends to be realist, taking family as a self-evident social institution (but see Boyd 1989, 1994), leaving little allowance for the constitutive role of discourse. The familial is often seen as a ‘variable’ or ‘factor’ to be considered in determining integration or settlement ‘outcomes’ rather than as constituted through discourse as part of an historical assemblage and to be studied accordingly. Indeed, in drawing on Foucault’s thought and assumptions about power-knowledge, we would be remiss not to underscore that the knowledge represented by this research above is itself an element of integration assemblages that permit family to be thought about and ‘instrumentalized’ in efficient ways in this domain of governance. More to the point, however, is that the existence of family reunification and family class immigration in Finnish and Canadian policies, respectively, and allowances on the basis of family in the first instance tend to be taken for granted in previous research. As a result, largely omitted are what we suggest are crucial questions about whether and how family is contested and especially what is at stake governmentally, including whether and how governmental rationalities provide for and shape family in immigration and refugee policy domains and in relation to the broader governance of Finnish and Canadian populations. To begin to address these questions, in the next section we discuss how family is currently defined in Finnish and Canadian immigration and refugee policies and laws. This is followed by sections detailing how family is being problematized and contested in both countries.

4 Family in Finnish and Canadian immigration and refugee policy

Finland has no particular Act defining family. Rather, its definition derives from legislation regulating marriage/partnerships, taxation, supplementary benefits, fatherhood/motherhood, responsibilities towards children, and wealth inheritance. Family in Finnish immigration and refugee policy is legally defined as a nuclear family and a basic societal unit with legal rights and responsibilities consisting of two adults living together and possibly minor children whom are either biological offspring or for whom at least one adult has legal custody (see L 301/2004, §37). The Foreigner’s Act excludes other relatives from the family sphere. This is evident in the regulations concerning family reunification, which is an official path to migration status in Finland. The right of family reunification extends to persons
with residence for marriage partners or biological children only. This approach is used almost without exception when non-European migrants bring family members to Finland. Relatives other than spouses or children can have family reunification permission only in exceptional cases. European Union (EU)-citizens are an exception as they can be accompanied by children under twenty-one years old and by their parents and grandparents. All immigrant groups except asylum seekers are entitled to automatically receive public family reunification support. However, the Ministry of Interior has in many cases adopted the ‘Swedish model’ and paid travel costs of nuclear family members of asylum seekers who have received residence permits.

In Canada two definitions of family are included in immigration and refugee policy. The first is for family class immigration (e.g., sponsorship), which includes spouses/common law/conjugal partners, dependent children, parents, grandparents, or where the sponsor is without relatives in Canada, one relative by blood or adoption (see IRPA, 2001, Reg., 1(2) and Reg. 117). The second definition of family is used to determine who can accompany immigrants/refugees into Canada when they obtain permanent residence (i.e., who counts as accompanying family members). This definition of family is narrower and includes: (a) spouses/common law partners; (b) dependent children; and (c) dependent grandchildren (see IRPA, 2001, Reg., 1(3)). It applies to persons who receive permanent residence due to recognition as refugees (see IRPA, 2001, Regs., 139–51) and those persons immigrating to Canada as skilled workers, business persons, and family class immigrants. Recently proposed legislation regarding human smuggling would result in changes to this arrangement. In particular, those deemed to arrive in Canada via ‘smugglers’ and who are recognized as refugees would no longer receive permanent resident status for five years, and would therefore be ineligible to sponsor family members as family class immigrants (it also seems likely they would be unable to obtain permanent resident status for non-accompanying family members (i.e., s.141) for five years, though at this early stage this remains unclear). Compared with Finland, definitions of family in Canadian policy, therefore, are (more) extended for immigrants in that they include grandparents but for refugees are similarly limited to the nuclear family. Both countries’ policies define family differently depending on from where or through what means persons arrive as newcomers.

5 Problematizing family in Finland and Canada

In the background of the recent problematization of family in Finland are earlier shifts in principles of Finnish immigration policy. The latest Finnish Immigration Policy Program (Työministeriö 2006) shifted its main focus to an intake of immigrants based on labor market needs. What has also influenced demands for restrictions of family reunification and for more intensive regulation are growing negative perceptions of immigration among the ‘great public’ and their expression in mass media. Recent cases have placed family reunification in the public eye. The most visible have been the so-called ‘grandma cases’ in which the residence applications of two grandmothers of former asylum seekers from Egypt and of a Russian ‘marriage migrant’, respectively, were repeatedly denied by Finnish Immigration authorities (e.g., Helsingin Sanomat 2010a). A Lutheran parish gave sanctuary for the Russian grandma and an Orthodox convent for the Egyptian and they enjoyed wide support from media and civic organizations. Both eventually received residence after a lengthy and arduous processes.

At stake in these cases are different conceptions of family. Finnish immigration authorities did not recognize the grandmothers as family of immigrants. For their part, the grandmothers’ supporters argued that immigrant families are always extended, especially in the case of non-European immigrants, and permanent residence should be granted on this basis (e.g., Helsingin Sanomat 2010b). Representatives of the Evangelist Lutheran Church and of civil society organizations demanded that family needed redefinition in the Foreigner’s Act. Finland’s Immigration Minister rejected these demands (Uusi Suomi 2010). Similar manifestations of conflict over definitions have occurred in family reunification cases involving adolescent asylum seekers, where youth were nephews or nieces rather than children of immigrants and were not defined as family according to Finland’s Foreigner’s Act (L 301/2004: §37).

In Finland, the volume of applications for family reunification among asylum seekers and the number of positive decisions decreased clearly in 2011. The new immigration legislation reduced travel support for reunified family members, other than for ‘quota refugees’, and increased the required limits of income from persons applying to have their family members join them in Finland (L 1386/2010). What this means in practice is a step towards stricter family policy and a reduction of family to its nuclear form. The rationale for this turn is that economic reunification of extended family is seen as expensive to the state and most people coming through this reunification process are deemed to be less economically productive. The rationale draws on biopolitical notions by underlining and redefining the knowledge, patterns, and skills thought to be important from the perspectives of immigration and citizenship.

However, one must recognize that the renewal of Finland’s immigration legislation has not been without controversy stemming from administrators and politicians. The report of the Ministry of Interior in October 2010 remarks that there is no need to change the family reunification policy, but the previous government of Finland recommended that travel costs should be compensated only for family members of quota refugees. As noted, this proposal was also formally taken up in the new immigration legislation (L. 1386/2010, §86). Another often-lodged criticism is that since the Finnish legal provision for family reunification is mostly unique in Europe, Finland, along with Sweden, are unjustly deviating from policies of other EU
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In this context accompanying family members of asylum seek-
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Of particular interest in this 1998 excerpt, and a point we return
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countries (Helsingin Sanomat 2010c). Finnish refugee and immigra-
tion policy depends on EU regulations and decisions on immigration
and border affairs. The European Council directive (2003/86/EY)
on EU and non-EU citizens’ right to family reunification regulates
governmental and juridical practices. This directive defines family
similar to existing Finnish immigration legislation as parents and
their biological or adopted children. This directive allows member
states to define details of their reunification policies in relation to
security, health, income, housing, inhabitation and integration
requirements. The EC directive asserts that ‘the entry and stay of
a family member can be dismissed due to reasons related to public
order, national security or public health’. EU directives and admin-
istrative decisions have a major discursive influence on debates
over who is a suitable subject of family class immigration to Finland.
These directives and, for instance, the Schengen agreement (see
Walters 2002) that regulates movement of people to and within the
EU, favour movement of EU citizens over non-Europeans and their
extended families. This especially influences justifications of family
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In support of the notion of ‘extended family’ in 2005 the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Volpe remarked that ‘in many cultures, these parents and grandparents are essential childcare providers and supports, and their presence in the country will dramatically improve, for some immigrants, their situation in this country.’ This accompanied a declaration that an additional 12,000 (more than the existing 6,000) parents and grandparents would be permitted to be sponsored and an increase of some $72 million (CDN) to cover processing costs and integration once parents or grandparents arrived in Canada in 2005 and 2006 (Volpe 2005). This program would be short-lived due to the federal Liberal minority government’s replacement with a Conservative minority government in the May 2006 election.

Reflecting the problematization of family in immigration and refugee policy is a February 2011 government proclamation announcing reductions in intake levels of family class immigrants, including extended family members, while levels of so-called economic (business and independent) immigrants, partially based on labor market needs, would be maintained. This garnered considerable media attention across Canada. Major urban newspapers such as Toronto’s Globe and Mail and Vancouver’s Sun published editorials, mostly in support of the announced changes (Globe and Mail 2011). The February 2011 announcement by the Conservative Immigration Minister, whose party has been since elected to a parliamentary majority government, is a further move towards the nuclear family and given this recent electoral outcome one which is unlikely to be reversed for several years. As in Finland, contestation over the family definition is also seen earlier in relation to several prominent cases, including those involving family members facing deportation and who had exhausted most appeals and were forced to request sanctuary from churches (see Lippert 2006).

The rationales in Finland and Canada for why current policies are deemed problematic differ somewhat. For example, human capital discourse has been more influential in Canada than in Finland or in the EU. In the Finnish context a similar idea has been represented in discussions of the positive labor market effects of the families, but the value of extended families has clearly lost out to individuals active in labor markets. However, both countries are heading in the same direction, that is, away from recognition of extended and towards nuclear family. In both contexts this development clearly relates to the general ‘economization’ of immigration that entails favouring labor market immigrants over migration of refugees and extended families. Thus, immigration policy is increasingly thought to properly aim for cost-effectiveness and not the well-being of the elderly, children or adults comprising extended families.

An example of the rapprochement of Canadian and Finnish policy discourses is a seminar on future approaches of Finnish migration policy organized by the Migration Department of the Ministry of Interior and Finnish Immigration Service held in May 2011 in Turku, Finland. One of the keynote speakers in this seminar for immigration professionals was Howard Duncan from the International arm of the Metropolis Project, Ottawa, Canada. He presented and praised the present Canadian immigration policy model (Duncan 2011). Duncan’s speech and newspaper interviews emphasized that immigration should be economically beneficial for receiving countries and their citizens and markets, and warned Finland about the risks of humanitarian migration. One risk, according to Duncan, is that humanitarian refugees, ‘protected’ by the Welfare State, fail to integrate into mainstream culture and labor markets. Another is that the mainstream population will become alienated from immigration policies and immigrants. Duncan’s speech and interviews suggested economic values be held over humanitarian values when it comes to selecting immigrants and that Western ‘easy-to-integrate’ immigrants and nuclear families be given preference over extended families.

### 6 Contestation

These basic trends identified above that involve a shift increasingly away from family reunification and within family designations, increasingly towards nuclear family, are contested. This is because the sense of extended family is strong among non-Western immigrants, and because humanitarian discourses on immigration demand a verification of this nuclear family-centered view. In both countries the contestation over family is found at a number of political, legal and administrative sites. Although governmental discourse on immigrant families increasingly favours the nuclear family, cross tendencies and new academic and administrative definitions of family remain apparent. According to recent Finnish sociological research, ‘nuclear-familyization’ has been a trend in society for almost six decades, after Welfare State provisions started to develop (e.g., Utrio 1997). However, scholars are not unanimous about dimensions of family development; many also focus on to other family models, for instance, ‘rainbow families’, ecological communities, and indeed ‘family cultures’ of immigrants. These progressive demands relate to the liberal understanding of the primary nature of individual rights in relation to family: every individual has a right to choose how to define family for themselves (Forsberg 1994; Jallinoja 2000). This non-unanimity is evident in administrative fields where nascent understandings of family and its members have gained ground and new programs targeting families have appeared. As well, it is seen in the fact that both Finland and Canada have come to recognize same-sex partners for immigration purposes (LaViolette 2004: 972–3).

International (e.g., United Nations 1948), EU-level (European Council 1950), and national human and civil rights regulations often challenge political decisions and administrative practices favouring nuclear family and related reunification in both countries too. This kind of ‘self-reflexive battle for good governance’ (cf. Dean 2010: 179) usually takes place in the courts. For Finland, on the EU-level
this is usually the Court of Justice of the European Communities or when the human rights ombudsman of EU demands changes to the EU’s or member states’ actions. There are several cases, for instance, where European Parliament has instituted proceedings against the above directive and its implementation by claiming they offend basic rights to family life. However, in all cases the Court of Justice has rejected the action. At the national level in both Finland and Canada human and citizen rights clash with the national laws and administrative decisions on family reunification in district courts and appeal courts. Complaints at different court levels usually take place after applications for family reunification are denied and applicants and family members or supporters believe basic rights have been violated.

Lawyers representing family members of the ‘grandmas’ and supporting civil society organizations took the rejection of their residence applications to all court levels in Finland. Even Finland’s president appealed for these individuals during proceedings. However, the decision of immigration authorities remained and the right to extended family was denied. In Canada, similar cases have made their way to Federal Court proceedings (see CCR 2008) and have been publicly supported by a range of opposition members of parliament (MPs) or lower level political authorities. These cases have also involved ‘humanitarian and compassionate’ applications to the Minister of Immigration for status with varying success (LaViolette 2004; Lippert 2006; CCR 2008). Part of the challenge stems from inside the apparatuses of reflexive government and juridical institutions focused on human and civil rights, which question existing family definitions. Some political parties, like the Green Party and the Left Alliance in Finland and the New Democrats and Liberals in Canada have also visibly campaigned for the extended family conception to some degree. In Canada, for example, contestation over the February 2011 announcement mentioned earlier gained further prominence when its reversal became a plank in the election platform of the federal Liberal Party. The Conservative government’s policy announcement entered the only nationally-televised (English) federal leaders’ debate of the recent 2011 federal election campaign through assertions by Liberal Party leader, Michael Ignatieff. 5

In public debate and practical contexts of organizing family relations of immigrants the major challengers to the dominant perception in Finland are refugee rights organizations, such as Suomen Pakolaisapury, Pakolaisneuvonta, Amnesty International Finland, Red Cross Finland, Evangelist Lutheran Church and its particular parishes, Free Movement Network, and other civil society organizations. Their discourse on families is unanimous on the point that refugees and immigrants should have a right to extended family in accordance with the international human and civil rights regulations, and for humanitarian reasons. Leading human and refugee rights organizations state:

Fast and equitable family reunification promotes integration. Many family members of refugees living in Finland live in extremely bad and dangerous conditions. Care about the family members and long-lasting family reunification process make integration more difficult and cause psychic problems. Too strict definition of family member lead also to the inhuman situations. If, for instance, some family member becomes eighteen during the application process the family reunification does not necessarily succeed. Grandparents do not belong to family according to the law. The prerequisites of family reunification have continuously been restricted by making the start of application process harder and increasing payments. … We demand that in the next government platform the prerequisites of family reunification are not restricted anymore. Instead the application process must be fastened so that the integration of immigrants intensifies. (Suomen Pakolaisapu [Finnish Refugee Council] et al. 2011)

In Canada the Canadian Council for Refugees (the longest-standing and most prominent refugee advocacy umbrella organization), from at least 1995 onward, has made family reunification for refugees a priority (e.g., CCR 1995, 2007). In a major 1995 report this organization remarked that family reunification should thus be seen not only as something that is done for the private benefit of the individuals concerned; it also serves an extremely important functional role in helping those involved become financially independent and able to contribute in a positive way to the Canadian economy and the general good of the communities in which they live (CCR 1995: 19).

Extended family is also recognized:

In the more traditional societies from which many refugees come … it is the extended family that serves as the basic unit for purposes of social organization. Grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins may all play an important part in the care and nurture of children. In some societies grandparents play the most important role in raising children, leaving the parents free to work and earn the money needed to support the extended family (CCR 1995: 49).

Taken together these discourses deem family to be a basic source of financial support and psychological well-being of individual migrants. There is much agreement that the family is an instrument of emotional and psychological security and that this contributes to economic security. As one Finnish commentator noted: ‘The presence of family increases the commitment to work and society’ (Työministeriö 2006: 4). Thus, the family is thought to work through the immigrant and refugee self and the family’s absence will lead to problems in this sphere and in integration and population processes more broadly: ‘the stress caused by separation from the family made it extremely difficult for them to concentrate on acquiring new language and job skills that would
enable them to become financially independent’ (CCR 1995: 18). Family is where social and cultural normalization of the newcomer should take place. It is deemed to be the primary site from which the fundamental part of the socialization process commences. The success of the formation of family is evaluated through how – as a functional basic unit – it manages to enlist its members into the host society: drafting children to education and wives to education and labor markets, while promoting the individual migrant’s commitment to work life.

Yet almost never entering policy debates is whether family should be considered in selecting and encouraging newcomers to integrate into Finnish and Canadian societies at all. There is virtually no suggestion from state or civil society actors that individuals should immigrate without accompanying dependents or other family members. Contestation is about how family should be defined, not whether family should become part of integration assemblages. This rarely stated fact about this discourse in both countries is significant because it raises the question of why family might be present in policy in the first instance. Although family discourses stemming from immigration authorities and legislation and that of civil society actors tend to differ remarkably on how to define family, there is a significant like-mindedness on the role of the family in the integration of immigrants: families – no matter whether nuclear, extended, ‘rainbow’ or otherwise – are assigned a vital role when successful integration is discussed.

7 Neoconservative and neoliberal family

The contestation described above is partially governmental in character, that is, it is about what kind of family will have a role in immigrant integration assemblages and therefore in the biopolitical enhancement of the broader population. A closer look begins to reveal what kind of governmental rationalities shape this policy. Family in immigration and refugee policy seems to lie at the nexus of at least two governmental rationalities, both biopolitical in character. One feature relevant to the governmental role of family and political support for extended family in immigration discourse is its close link to domestic work and childcare (or normalization of the young). In encouraging rather than restricting immigration of parents and grandparents and in recognizing extended family, as in Larner’s (2000) analysis noted earlier, one sees how neoliberal constructions of family may articulate with neoconservative formulations.

In Canada the 2011 announcement of reduction in the numbers of family reunification met with serious opposition from MPs in opposition parties, and from civil society groups, especially those closely associated with integration. For example, the former Liberal Minister of Immigration Volpe, cited earlier, at this point an opposition MP, remarked about the 2011 changes: ‘The Conservatives tell families to be responsible for their own childcare when parents go to work [upon gaining power in 2006 the Conservative government refused to fund childcare through federal means and instead promoted a traditional, neoconservative understanding of family that imagines one parent remaining at home], but the fact is new Canadians entering the workforce often rely on parents and grandparents for childcare and help around the home. They are taking away a necessary support system.’ Similarly, following this decision the head of the major Chinese immigrant settlement organization in Vancouver (S.U.C.C.E.S.S.) remarked: ‘Traditionally for Asian Immigrants, the reunion with grandparents is very important. Parents rely on them for childcare and our community looks after grandparents. They are not a financial burden’ (Fournier 2011). Thus, extended family is invoked as other than a ‘financial burden’, making family valuable primarily in replacing the need for state funding. This emphasis on care giving is repeated in the major report on family noted above where the CCR recommended recognizing extended family in the case of intimate caregivers

. . . would be desirable if present policy were relaxed to permit key care givers to be included in the core [i.e., nuclear] family unit that is eligible for expedited reunification.

But even here numerical limits were recognized: ‘. . . but common sense must be exercised to ensure that such flexibility does not enlarge exponentially the number of people eligible for expedited landing in the family class’ (CCR 1995: 51).

Similar overlap in rationalities and discourses exist in Finnish policy and civil society debates. The MPs and opposition members – except for the nationalistic-populist party (’The Finns’) and some Right-wing MPs – usually stood against the government’s family policy plans in relation to renewal of the Integration Law in 2010. However, many Social Democratic Party MPs took a stand similar to the government’s: ‘family’ in immigration policies should be understood as nuclear. As mentioned earlier, cost-effective labor market immigration has a dominant position in Finnish policy and political discourses. This direction is a hybrid of neoconservative and neoliberal rationalities because although it favours the nuclear family model and highlights the primary nature of the traditional Finnish values and the security of society, individuals and families, and sometimes even the bloodline principle of citizenship, it does so not primarily for the family itself, but for the working capacity and productivity of each individual and of the whole population through each individual. And although human rights-oriented civil society actors, parishes, churches and some Left-wing and Green politicians point to refugees’ right to extended family, they often use statements and justifications consistent with neoliberalism that emphasize capacities of the individual, as in the Canadian case. Extended family is needed to help those of working age participate in working life by attending to children at home.

Neoconservative conceptions privilege the traditional sexual division of labor in the family, with women remaining in unpaid domestic work at home. Failure to extend family to grandparents is consonant in many cases with encouraging women to remain at
home. Neoliberal conceptions, however, presume parents (or conjugal partners) have paid employment outside the home, in which case extended family members become a means of allowing this to happen, in that they potentially remove the need for significant federal state funding for childcare. The neoliberal conception allows for deployment of extended family to the extent that grandparents or other relatives such as uncles and aunts will be enlisted to provide domestic childcare, thus permitting parents to engage in paid work outside home (as commentators have articulated).

In Canadian and Finnish immigration and refugee policy, the question of differences between the two rationalities only rarely touches explicitly upon domestic work and gender roles. More often explicitly mentioned is the role of family in enhancing individual integration into labor markets and the dominant culture. Both rationalities expressed in the policy discourses are hostile to welfarism and state paternalism while linking nuclear family to the economy. They emphasize the significance of family ties for individuals’ integration. Both rationalities oppose extended family to the extent that this form does not explicitly develop the desired entrepreneurial spirit of individual immigrants. However, there are differences in emphasis. Neoconservative discourse, although opposing the ‘Leftist state paternalism’ in the form of gratuitous social services, advocates a strong state role in controlling the forms of immigrant families at the borders. This is manifest in statements about family in relation to national security: extended family is a potential risk as it makes easier for people to enter the country through fraudulent means. The main risk seems to be that these people “can leave without services supporting integration and thus head to exclusion” (Valtioneuvosto 2008: 58), which, in addition, can lead to radicalization. In Canada, provisions to confront this supposed risk were implemented in the 2001 Act (e.g., Reg., 117(9)(d) that created the ‘excluded family members’ category) (see CCR 2008) and fuelled the widespread use of DNA identification (Baldassi 2007). Neoliberal rationality emphasizes the relatively free role of the nuclear family for the individual self-conduct it is thought to make possible. Thus, the neoliberal conception of family also allows for same-sex parents of children (Larner 2000: 256–7), which as noted earlier is recognized in Finnish and Canadian policy. This is consistent with the liberal notion of choosing one’s own definition of family and contrasts with the neoconservative formulation of a traditional heterosexual nuclear family.

8 Conclusions

There are similar patterns of definition and contestation over family in policies of Finland and Canada. In Finland the core of the dispute over family reunification lies in differing conceptions of family between refugees (mainly from Africa, but also the Middle-East and Russia) and the Finnish Refugee Administration. The former conceptualize family as extended, consisting of father, mother, children, grandparents, and sometimes cousins of children and siblings of the mother or father. The latter defines it in accordance with the nuclear family concept. These two are in conflict when decisions about the residence permits of family members are made. A similar dispute is evident in Canada, with nuclear family being juxtaposed to extended family. The right to family in both countries tends to be limited for non-European and non-North American ‘others’ for economic reasons.

In refugee and immigration policies in Finland and Canada the family is anticipated to integrate individuals from ‘other cultures’ into working life or educational pursuits. The value of family is to create capacities through which individual migrants can cope in a political culture of liberalism and nationalism. Both neoconservative and neoliberal rationalities show a disdain for state-funded services and suggest that – mainly nuclear – families are needed for raising the productivity of individuals and ultimately maintaining national populations. Extended families with elderly or other persons that are typically deemed ‘non-productive’, especially through human capital knowledge, are more and more seen as a financial burden to the state, except to the extent that they will provide free care to children from nuclear family units along with emotional labor, therefore freeing both parents to engage the paid labor market without burdening the state.

There are two other similarities in Finnish and Canadian discourses about the family and in how it is being contested that are worth underscoring. First, although Finland accepts a smaller absolute number of family members compared with Canada (which has had ‘family class’ immigration for a long period), the relative restrictions and nature of the contestations are remarkably similar. In both, the argument for extended family as governmental is debated by political parties and otherwise is present in political discourse (such as a federal leaders’ debate during an election period). Second, the contestation over family is not only political but governmental in both countries. In other words, family is recognized and touted not only for its inherent value in traditional politics, but also because family is in some way governmental and thus serves biopolitical aims. Our closer reading of this contestation, and to some extent of the shifts in immigration and refugee policy occurring in both countries, is suggestive of the presence of two governmental rationalities: one neoliberal, one neocconservative. Family therefore lies deeply embedded at the crossroads of two rationalities within the complex integration assemblages of both Finland and Canada. One implication of this analysis is that any serious effort to halt or reverse more restrictive immigration and refugee policy trends noted above and to establish more progressive policies consistent with alternative governmental rationalities in these countries will first require coming to terms with the complexity of family in relation to integration, its varied roles and types, and the formidable intellectual challenge this complexity represents.
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Notes

1. Most governmentality studies are case studies. Our comparative approach seeks to discern similarities in two countries between governmental discourses on the family. For this effort we collected and analyzed a wide variety of legal, programmatic, and media texts pertaining to immigration and refugee admission and integration in Canada and Finland.

2. There is a third definition relevant to refugees for purposes of the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States that is beyond the scope of this article but which nonetheless underscores the fact that, like Finland’s policies in relation to the EU, Canada’s policies are also subject to external influences and agreements pertaining to migration control, in this case the policies of the United States.

3. A quota refugee is ‘[a] person whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has granted refugee status and who has been granted an entry permit within the budgeted limit of the refugee quota’ http://www.migri.fi/netcomm/content.asp?path=2761&language=EN&LQ Accessed June 5, 2011.

4. A similar, albeit less significant external pressure stems from Canada’s Safe Third Country agreement with the United States, which encourages Canada and the U.S. to ‘harmonize’ refugee policies.

5. Liberal and Conservative federal political parties are the largest in Canada and the only parties to have formed government in Canada’s parliamentary system since confederation in 1867.

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