 Domestic Resource Mobilization by Social Movement Organizations in Latin America
A Case Study of the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights of Brazil

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Domestic Resource Mobilization by Social Movement Organizations in Latin America: The Case of the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights of Brazil.

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this Master’s thesis is to study the feasibility and sustainability of mobilizing domestic resources to advance social movement causes in Latin America. The question is based on the understanding that Social Movement Organizations (SMO) can mobilize the resources –funds and labor- of domestic elite instances in order to favor their beneficiary bases. The thesis proposes a Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) approach and addresses various theoretical and practical concerns regarding the qualitative impact of that conception in the work of Social Movement Organizations. The specific focus of is centered on resource mobilization strategies and initiatives conducted by the SMO Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights of Brazil.

The theoretical framework of this thesis is constructed upon the academic debate among different authors in the field of social movements; within this field of knowledge, the specific research areas of resource mobilization and public policy outcomes of social movements are of particular interest. This seeks to provide a pertinent conceptual structure for the analysis of the resource mobilization strategy implemented by the case study. Complementarily, literature focused on the foreign aid regime and its impact in the resource mobilization initiatives carried on by SMOs in Latin America is utilized to provide a historical context to the concept of DRM.

The case study material of this research consists of documents produced by the Abrinq Foundation in which it describes and evaluates its programs, projects and institutional vision; policy documents published by the federal Executive of Brazil, accounting for compromises made within the framework of Abrinq Foundation’s programs; and interviews conceded by representative members of the Abrinq Foundation to different Brazilian media outlets.

The analysis of Abrinq Foundation’s programs provides a moderately positive perspective regarding the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach by SMOs in Latin America.

Keywords: resource mobilization, Domestic Resource Mobilization, Social Movement Organization, foreign aid.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS:

CMCDA   Municipal Council of Children’s and Adolescents Rights
CONANDA National Council for Children’s and Adolescents Rights
CSO     Civil Society Organization
DRM     Domestic Resource Mobilization
ECA     Children and Adolescents Statute
HIPC    Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IBGE    Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IDA     International Development Association
IFI     International Financial Institution
ILO     International Labor Organization
IMF     International Monetary Fund
MDG     Millennium Development Goals
NGO     Non – Governmental Organization
PRS     Poverty Reduction Strategies
PRSP    Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RM      Resource Mobilization
SAP     Structural Adjustment Program
SM      Social Movement
SMO     Social Movement Organization
UN      United Nations
UNICEF  United Nation Children’s Fund
USAID   United States Agency for International Development
US      United States
WFFC    World Fit for Children
WB      World Bank
ODA     Official Development Assistance
OECD    Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
1. INTRODUCTION

The earliest academic impulse driving the thesis’ author towards a then obscure conception of Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) was tracked by a perspective of transformation: recent literature advances the idea of mobilizing domestic political and economic instances, and the resources these possess, in order to conduct philanthropic initiatives in Latin American countries and diminish the dependence of social movements and Social Movement Organizations (SMO)\(^1\) in decreasing foreign resources. The acknowledgement of this trend incited the search for comprehensive approaches that could frame a still uncertain research topic on resource mobilization by social movements in Latin America. Nevertheless, a detailed examination of the available material found an evident dispersion of concerns and terminologies that drifted away from integral perspectives: philanthropy, corporate responsibility, lobbying, volunteering, intersectoral alliances etc; all elements belonging to a new perspective in Latin America’s non-profit practice but somehow loosely related to each other and missing a cohesive conceptual reference. How to account for the novel domestic scenarios in resource mobilization and its effects in the outcomes of social movements?

This project starts off from the idea that a regularized interaction between SMOs, State institutions and economic elites is important for the advancement of social movement causes. The socially transformative capacities of the State and the funds and influence of wealthy sectors could and ought to play a major role in addressing the multifaceted social problematic facing Latin America’s countries and societies. The concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) comprises this thought, as it encapsulates the initiatives SMOs conduct in order to obtain larger commitments from domestic actors in the public and private sectors to the civil and social rights causes of social movements.

Historically, social movements in Latin America have not privileged institutional channels for the advancement of movement agendas. The preference of regular ‘political activity’ (Reed 1999) mechanisms -litigation, the ballot- or other forms of interlocution with actors in the

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\(^1\) SMOs are organizations belonging to a specific social movement and sharing its basic concerns and causes (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The social movement and the cause of civil rights are, for instance, constituted by different SMOs that work to advance the cause.
political system was undermined, before democratic transitions, by authoritarian and/or populist regimes, opposed or negligent to the civil and social rights causes of social movements. Although cooptation by the State has been common—to placate major social unrest—persecution and marginalization marked the environment of organized social movement action. In the other hand, the virtual inexistence of non-religious philanthropy attested to the marginal status of social movements in the region. Charity allocations of funds and labor, carried on by Latin Americas’ wealthiest sectors of society, were rarely destined to social movements which upheld perceived ‘subversive’ causes, such as labor or women’s rights. The Catholic Church and other religious organizations concentrated such contributions.

As a response to political and financial marginalization, social movements and their organized manifestations, the Social Movement Organizations, have resorted to two main expedients: first, public protest with a tendency to radicalization and violent organized action\(^2\); second, the appeal to foreign financial and political instances to sustain their operations, make demands visible and gain domestic legitimacy. The mainstream financial and political domestic institutions of Latin America’s societies were, forcibly, circumvented by social movements in the search for allies or partners to advance their causes.

Nevertheless, the political and financial contexts in which SMOs operate have significantly changed in the last 20 years: transitions to democratic rule in Latin America, beginning in the late 70s and still consolidating, have opened new spaces for social participation within juristic or institutional frameworks, including the basic but nonetheless fundamental legalization of NGOs and SMOs in various of the region’s countries (Thompson 2002). Several social organizations seemed to have taken advantage of this situation, consistently approaching the State to engage with it in different kinds of partnerships and other forms of dialogue, in order to carry out social development initiatives. Domestic philanthropy, in the other hand, is experiencing a noticeable surge, partially explained by the relative estrangement of social causes from ideological dogmas but also by the modernization of productive and industrial sectors in the region.

\(^2\) For instance, the transformation of peasant and indigenous movements in Colombia in Guerrilla organizations; the radicalization of opposition groups in the southern cone of South America and their transformation into urban militias (Wickham-Crowley 1994)
The conditions seem given for SMOs operating in Latin America to sought the alignment of the State and of domestic economic elites, within institutional means, to their causes: the fact that foreign aid allocations, both to States and Third Sector organizations, show a downward trend regarding Latin America adds to this assertion. Nonetheless, SMOs continue to heavily rely on foreign organizations and States and in the resources these provide. A preference for non-institutional action is also perceivable, at least in the case of prominent SMOs such as the Movement of Landless Workers (MTST) of Brazil, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador or the Piquetero Movement in Argentina (Contesse 2004).

The case study of the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights, a Brazilian SMO, is presented in order to illustrate, fundamentally, if an approach to State institutions and domestic philanthropy is feasible and sustainable in Latin America: this is, if SMOs in the region can advance their causes through the regular mobilization of domestic political and financial instances instead of focusing in foreign processes or mere protest and public demonstrations. The approach is denominated Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) -being the fundamental objective of SMOs to mobilize and channel the resources of the State and the wealthy sectors of society to its cause.

To this end, the project begins by presenting the regime under which resource mobilization has been conducted by SMOs in Latin America, as well as by contextualizing the origins of and perspectives for a DRM approach in the region (2). The idea is to illustrate the accountability exchanges to which SMOs are bound to when appealing to foreign resources; to identify the practical concerns that gave origin to the idea of DRM and finally to underline how the specific transformations occurred in the region in the last 20 years serve the purpose of prioritizing domestic resources to advance social movement causes. Next, elements from the Resource Mobilization theories of social movements are utilized to frame and define the notion of Domestic Resource Mobilization; the concept of social movements and Social Movement Organizations; and the notion of social movement’s consequences –namely its impact on public policy- to account for movement’s cause advancement (3).

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3 Reed (1999) presents the ‘regular’ mechanisms of social protest, such as voting; these are contrasted by other authors with the irregular mechanisms such as strikes or public demonstrations (Contesse 2004).
The categories and theses extracted from the Resource Mobilization theories serve the analysis of this project’s case study, the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights (4); its definition as an SMO belonging to the larger infancy’s rights movements and the feasibility and sustainability of the DRM approach it has implemented during its 17 years of existence. Categories drawn from different academic works define the notion of social movement’s cause advancement, serving as theoretical indicators, outside of Abrinq Foundation’s self-assessments, of the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach in Brazil. Finally, based on the analysis of the Foundation’s work, contrasts are drawn regarding the resource mobilization processes privileged by SMOs and NGOs in Latin America -mainly, those responding to the principles and conditionality schemes of the foreign aid regime. The actors, resources and decision making processes that a DRM approach -as Abrinq Foundation implements it- engages are put into perspective with those traditionally mobilized by SMOs and NGOs in the region. Conclusions aim at be reached regarding the inclusiveness and reaches of both approaches.

The project argues for a complementary approach to resource mobilization that also takes into account domestic resources in Latin America; foreign resources are still fundamental for the work of SMOs in the region and they cannot and will not be disregarded even if new horizons display for DRM. Nonetheless, it is argued that the possibility of mobilizing domestic resources open up spaces for autonomous action for SMOs and engages larger segments of national societies and States in social movement causes.
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION

This project’s main research question is the following: in Latin America, is it feasible and sustainable to advance social movement causes\textsuperscript{4} through the mobilization of domestic resources\textsuperscript{5}? A response is attempted through the case study analysis of the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights, a Brazilian Social Movement organization (SMO). The Abrinq Foundation mobilizes domestic resources to advance a social movement cause, the enforcement of the civil and social rights of its beneficiary\textsuperscript{6} base, the children of Brazil. Two categories are presented: mobilization of State’s resources\textsuperscript{7} and mobilization of entrepreneurial sectors’ resources\textsuperscript{8}. Regarding the former category, the role of Abrinq Foundation in influencing public policy processes is examined and its achievements in this area are framed within theoretical elaborations on the consequences (and successes) of social movements. The idea is to equal the advancement of the social movement cause –Brazilian infancy’s rights- to its level of inclusion in public policies. The second category illustrates the possibility of mobilizing domestic entrepreneurial sectors around social movement agendas. The analysis of the specific programs that the Abrinq Foundation set up for each category, provides elements for a response to the questions of feasibility and sustainability of DRM in Latin America.

A secondary question contrasts the accountability and conditionality frameworks prompted by the DRM approach and those upheld by foreign aid. Does a privilege for DRM or foreign aid have any qualitative impact in the outcomes of philanthropic and non-profit activities? This thesis reviews the accountability schemes between donors, recipients and other actors with interests or obligations at stake, regarding social movement causes and proposes a response.

\textsuperscript{4} Social movement causes cover a broad range of concerns, from environmental issues to human rights. They are constituted by a series of demands articulated by social movements and SMOs.

\textsuperscript{5} Resources in this project equal to labor and funds utilized to carry out charitable or non-profit work. The concept could encompass others such as know-how, infrastructure, logistics etc but these are ultimately explained or determined by the former two. The adjective ‘domestic’ implies that such resources exist and are made available within a delimited national context.

\textsuperscript{6} The beneficiaries are segments of population that are, in a direct manner, positively affected by the action of an SMO or a set of SMOs (McCarthy & Zald 1977)

\textsuperscript{7} State’s resources, in the context of this thesis, are equal to labor, funds and infrastructures allocated by State institutions to children-welfare projects and programs. The Abrinq Foundation seeks to mobilize these resources through influencing children’s public policy implementation.

\textsuperscript{8} Business sectors’ resources are equal to labor, funds and infrastructures allocated by companies and other type of for-profit organizations to children-welfare project and programs.
1.2 THE ARGUMENT

Through the mobilization of domestic resources and institutionalized and regular interactions with State institutions and wealthy sectors of society, it is feasible and sustainable to advance social movement causes in Latin America. Public institutions and officials are now subject to electoral processes, constitutional mandates and increasing accountability mechanisms. The SMOs are legalized and to larger extents legitimized in public opinion. Economic elites and the productive sector are faced with public debate around their ‘social responsibility’ role in highly unequal contexts. This trend makes wealthy segments of population prone to assign resources for philanthropic initiatives. The conceptual premises of the Resource Mobilization theories of social movements indicates that State’s alignment to a social movement cause and the mobilization of the large resources of wealthy segments of population are key factors for the success of a social movement. If a scenario of reduced or heavily conditioned foreign aid flows is also considered, it is arguable that the current is an appropriate conjuncture for a DRM approach. The aforementioned assumptions and concepts are contrasted through the presentation of the case study analysis of the SMO Abrinq Foundation of Brazil in order to provide elements to respond the questions of feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach by SMOs in Latin America.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

This Master’s thesis is based on the utilization of qualitative methods of research and data analysis. Literature review and content analysis are the implemented methods, selected based on a previous assessment regarding its suitableness to generate knowledge from the available sources of information. The formal structure of the thesis is divided in two parts: firstly, a background and theoretical section, which presents and analyses the contextual information and the conceptual categories of the project and secondly, a case study section, which presents and analyses the collected information on the specific study subject.
The literature review is implemented in the theoretical and contextual components of the research, encompassed by chapters (2) and (3). ‘A literature review is an account of what has been published on a topic by accredited scholars and researchers and its purpose is to convey to the reader what knowledge and ideas have been established on a topic, and what their strengths and weaknesses are’ (Taylor & Procter 2007). In chapter 2 the main characteristics of the foreign aid regime as well as its impact in the work of SMOs in Latin America is revised taking into account different academic works on the subjects. The scholarly debate on the foreign aid regime is connected to academic and practical concerns originated in the notion of Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM). In chapter 3 the concepts of Resource Mobilization, social movements and Social Movement Organizations (SMO) are presented and analyzed through various academic perspectives, mainly those provided by authors and studies belonging to the Resource Mobilization theories of social movements. Standing out among these are McCarthy & Zald’s Resource Mobilization and Social Movements, from which key conceptual definitions are drawn.

In sub chapter 3.1 the theoretical definition of Resource Mobilization lends its structure to the concept of DRM and organizes the description of its actors, resources and agendas in the context of this thesis. In sub chapter 3.2 the concepts of social movement and SMO are utilized to apprehend the case study within the research field of social movements. The studies concerned with qualitative indicators to measure the advancement of a social movement cause or the consequences and outcomes of social movements are also reviewed in order to provide a theoretical framework to the analysis of the case study’s performance on the implementation of a DRM approach. Among the reviewed works stand out Gamson’s The Strategy of Social Protest Giugni’s Was it worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements and Schumaker’s Policy Responsiveness to Protest-Group Demands.

The case study section of the thesis is composed by chapter 4 and consists of the analysis of several documents published by the Abrinq Foundation of Children Rights as well as of a group of interviews conceded by representative staff members and other relevant figures such as the President of the Republic to different Brazilian media outlets. Policy reports produced by State institutions such as the Presidency of The Republic of Brazil are also presented in the
cases in which these are framed within the policy component of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach. Content analysis is privileged as a ‘[…] valid method for making specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its source’ (Krippendorff 1980); the content analysis of the second-hand material aims at understanding the basic characteristics of Abrinq Foundation’s work and institutional objectives, its historical origins and the programs and projects it implements, which are defined in this thesis as being part of a Domestic Resource Mobilization approach. The latter inference bear the larger proportion of content analysis and interpretation as the Abrinq Foundation does not explicitly define its overall strategy as a DRM approach; nor does it frame its work within broader academic debates concerning the mobilization of domestic or foreign resources. In that sense a significant effort is put in relieving the pertinence of the Foundation’s institutional vision and performance to the concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization. Sub chapter 4.2 specifically addresses the connection between Abrinq Foundation’s activities and the concept of DRM.

Sub chapters 4.3 and 4.4 describe and analyze the programs and projects that comprise the DRM approach of the Abrinq Foundation. For this purpose, various publications produced by the latter in a time span of 10 years (1997-2007) reviewing its work in 17 years of activities are used as the fundamental reference. The documents contain specific and general descriptions of the programs and projects; state the objectives aimed at with their implementation and present evaluation of performance and results. Two primordial research tasks were assumed here: firstly, a synthesizing effort to present a coherent description of the historic development of each program, as well as of the gradual evolution of the priorities and emphases of the Foundation. Secondly, an analytical labor was carried out in order to understand the assumptions that informed the overall path of action chosen by the Abrinq Foundation and its preference for what this thesis denominates Domestic Resource Mobilization. For the latter analytical task interviews conducted by different media outsets with top ranking members and ex-members of the organization are also interpreted and quoted, whenever the addressed subjects are descriptive or analytical of the Foundation’s institutional vision of resource mobilization.
Sub chapter 4.5 addresses the primary research question of this project: whether a DRM approach by SMOs is feasible and sustainable in Brazil to further advance arguments regarding its feasibility and sustainability in Latin America. For this purpose, the results presented in the different program evaluations carried out by the Abrinq Foundation are analyzed as well as interpreted the different perspectives on the projections of a DRM approach in Brazil, provided by the aforementioned interviewees. The question of the feasibility and sustainability of the DRM approach is furthered with the analysis of the Foundation’s *cause advancement* and *policy incorporation* in sub chapters 4.6 and 4.7. The former theoretical categories, first presented in chapter 3, are shortly revisited and complemented by the individual perspectives provided by the interviewees. In both sub chapters, the degree in which the case study accomplished the advancement of its cause, through its incorporation in policy agendas, is regarded as an indicator of the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach in Brazil.

Finally sub chapter 4.8 deals with the secondary question, regarding the accountability processes privileged by a DRM approach and those prompted by resource mobilization initiatives that appeal to foreign resources, as it has been the case for SMOs in Latin America. The partial conclusions provided by the case study analysis are accounted for and put forward for the argumentation.

### 1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

The bibliographical sources utilized in this thesis can be divided in three different categories: the literature describing the presented theoretical concepts, the literature describing and analyzing the case study and the literature providing background and context for the conceptual discussion and the case study analysis.

With regard to the first category, it is worth mentioning that the literature on social movements is considerably large and complex, covering a wide array of subjects and contexts. Nevertheless, within the study of social movements it is possible to distinguish a body of work denominated as the Resource Mobilization theory or theories (Jenkins 1983) which defines the concept of resources and its role in the work of social movements. The project constructed a significant portion of its theoretical framework based on the elaborations of this group of

The literature on the consequences of social movements is part of a different area of research in the study of social movements; it provides conceptual categories for the analysis of Abrinq Foundation’s cause advancement. The studies covering this subject present different perspectives from which to analyze the levels of success or cause advancement of social movements: among them the impact of the latter in the elaboration and implementation of public policies by the State. This is a crucial argument for this thesis since the influence of a social movement or a movement organization in public policies generates the mobilization of State’s resources—funds and labor—to its cause or beneficiary base, through policy implementation. The reviewed literature includes Amenta, Carruthers & Zylan (1992) Cadena-Roa & Puga (2005) Gamson (1990) Giugni (1998) Oliver (1989) and Schumaker (1975).

The literature constituting the case study analysis of the project can be divided in three groups based on its origin and characteristics: first the documents produced by the Abrinq Foundation of Brazil containing the description, diagnosis and evaluation of its programs and projects as well as its institutional vision. The material was obtained through access to Abrinq Foundation’s web-based resources and it is characterized by its considerable quantity and length; the documents are thorough and generous in the description of the Foundation’s program implementation and in that sense they are a rich source of information for the research. The literature comprises Abrinq Foundation’s activities since its creation in 1990 up until 2007 and the first document dates from 1997, a fact that explains its voluminous nature. The conduction of such an extensive review was necessary in order to apprehend the evolution of the Foundation’s DRM approach.

The second source of literature in the case study analysis is found in policy documents produced by State institutions, namely by the Presidency of the Republic of Brazil. The Abrinq Foundation runs a program called the ‘Children-Friendly President Program’ in which it commits the Presidency of the Republic with a series of policy implementation and evaluation goals regarding infancy in Brazil. Among the commitments, the elaboration of periodical policy reports and its devolution to the Foundation stand out. The reports are part of the case study analysis and provide an important parameter in order to grasp the level of cause advancement achieved by the Abrinq Foundation. They are available through Brazilian Presidency’s web-based resources.

The third bibliographical component of the study case analysis is formed by a series of interviews conceded by representatives of the Abrinq Foundation; a single interview conceded by a Brazilian public policy expert and a single interview conceded by the President of the Republic to various Brazilian media outlets. The first set of interviews provided a valuable insight on Abrinq Foundation’s self-perception and clarified its institutional objectives and vision; it constituted a fundamental source of information to assimilate the work of the Foundation to the concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization. The interview conceded by the President of the Republic, focused on the specific issue of public policies for children in Brazil.
also provided a valuable insight on a Governmental perspective regarding the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach in the country.

It is important to mention that a majority proportion of the reviewed literature for the case study analysis was available only in the Portuguese language. The thesis’ author mother tongue is Spanish and his knowledge of Portuguese, before undertaking the research, was very rudimentary. Although evident similarities are appreciable between the two languages, it is also true that their structure and vocabulary widely varies. This imposed a challenge to the mere understanding of the texts, not to mention the more complex tasks of content analysis. The translation of most of the quoted fragments as well as the elaboration of ideas based on the literature, from Portuguese to English, also added difficulty to the task. The solution found by the author was to carefully review every document, underlining the most cryptic passages for a further and more thorough revision. In order to carry out the latter, an appeal to Portuguese-English and Portuguese-Spanish dictionaries, as well as the author’s own Spanish proficiency were determinant. At a more advanced stage of the research, the author noticed how he had acquainted with most of the terminology used in the documents, as well as grasped ideas and references that had escaped him before.

Finally, different sources were referenced in order to construct a political and economic context for the concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization in the broader context of Latin America. Various reports produced by renowned institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program provided useful information regarding the economic and financial situation of Latin America as well as depicted its political scenarios. The knowledge drawn from these resources is crucial to understand the projection of a DRM approach from the specific context of Brazil to the larger Latin American scenario. The reports argue for relative homogeneity in the political and economic aspects of Latin America’s countries, with respect to democratic rule and middle-income levels; as the review of the Resource Mobilization theories suggests, both elements are crucial for the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach.
2. BACKGROUND

2.1 THE ORIGINS OF DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

The appeal to domestic resources is a relatively unknown expedient for social movements and non-governmental organizations working in Latin America. The fact that philanthropy has been historically insignificant in the region might attest to this trend (David Rockefeller Centre 1999). It is possible to argue that bibliographical elaborations on the subject of Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) respond to two relatively recent areas of concern: first, a reduction of foreign aid flows to certain areas of the world and the irruption of ‘beyond-aid’ scenarios (Aldaba et al 2000); and second, a critical evaluation of the role and impact of foreign aid in developing countries and the necessity to explore alternatives to its preeminence (Sogge 2002). An increased academic effort to materialize a conceptual definition of Domestic Resource Mobilization appears as a logical choice for both perspectives, as well as for non-profit sector organizations seeking revenue diversification and operational autonomy.

Regarding the first theme, the concern is mainly financial and the concept of ‘resources’ is reduced in available literature to income and revenue. In Latin America, NGOs and Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) are facing increasing financial constraints to sustain their operations and implement their objectives (Aldaba et al 2000; Smilie and Helmich 1993). Bibliography suggests that the non-profit sector in Latin America relies heavily in two main income sources: national governments and private foreign funding (Aldaba et al 2000; Villaboas et al 2004). Official aid allocations or ODA transfers⁹ are decreasing as a general trend as well as multilateral funding to Latin American countries (Vos et al 2007). Advancement towards this so-called ‘beyond-aid’ scenario has led civil society organizations to reformulate their fundraising strategies assigning domestic resources a larger role; it has also served as a backdrop for a new literature wave on revenue diversification strategies for NGOs (Holloway 2001; Fowler 2000)

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⁹ Official Development Assistance (ODA) constitutes the official aid transfers from members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to developing countries (OECD http://www.oecd.org)
Regarding the second theme, there is a larger critique of foreign aid and the search for domestic alternatives starts off from different premises. Beyond concerns for diminished aid scenarios, the effects of the foreign aid regime on developing countries’ political autonomy, horizontal accountability, economic solvency and, at large, its apparent ‘failure’ to deliver results are central preoccupations of numerous organizations and scholars (Sogge 2002). The dependence of Latin America’s SMOs and NGOs on foreign funding frames them within conditionality schemes that impose foreign over domestic perspectives and agendas (Reality of Aid Report 2004). The Domestic Resource Mobilization approach proposed in this project, through the case study of a Latin American SMO, the Abrinq Foundation of Brazil, constitutes an alternative to foreign aid dependency, in the realm of non-profit and charity work. Nonetheless, the aid regime is still as the incumbent ruler of philanthropy in the region (The Reality of Aid Report 2004). In order to contextualize the responses to its enthronement, it is pertinent to first understand what the foreign aid regime is exactly about; the principles that informs it; the actors that compose it and the effects it has in the work of SMOs in Latin America.

2.2 THE FOREIGN AID REGIME

2.2.1 Motives & Actors

‘[...] is the pattern of aid flows dictated by political and strategic considerations which have little to do with rewarding good policies and helping the more efficient and less corrupt regimes in developing countries?’ (Alesina & Dollar 1998. 3) Several studies have concluded that the pattern of aid giving is mainly dictated by political and strategic considerations. Whereas there might be a minority of donors that respond to certain notion of “correctness” in international relations – such as the Nordic countries, The Netherlands and Canada, which compose a non-conforming aid sub-regime traditionally focused on civil rights promotion and poverty issues (Sogge 2002. 40) – there is a substantially larger portion of aid initiatives and mechanisms that respond to political and geo strategic calculations. Aid as an instrument of foreign policy: it assists in widening geo political spheres of influence, undermining recipient’s political autonomy and consequently reducing its maneuvering space vis a vis foreign ideas and
capital. Aid’s role in foreign policy and in deepening recipient’s dependency and vulnerability towards foreign financial assaults can be traced back to fairly well-known colonial or neo colonial doctrines (Sogge 2002; Groff 1999)

On the other hand, major multi lateral aid institutions advance bi lateral donor’s interests. The Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) implemented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), example given, condition the issuing of new loans or the attainment of lower interest rates in existing loans to policy changes in recipient countries. These often include profound and far-reaching transformations such as: cutting social expenditures or ‘austerity’ measures; trade liberalization, namely lifting import and export restrictions; opening of domestic stock markets; balancing budgets and not overspending; removing price controls and state subsidies; privatization, or divestiture of all or part of state-owned enterprises and enhancing the rights of foreign investors vis-a-vis national laws, among others (Townson University 1998).

These measures have demonstrated to empower foreign capital and financial system in aid recipient countries as well as to weaken State’s institutions; besides the obvious economic benefit that this carries for the strongest economies –the main bilateral aid providers– as they expand markets and fuel their national productions (Sogge 2002. 73) there are significant political implications as the recipient, following the same upward line of obligations to multi lateral aid institutions, finds itself rendering accounts of performance to single aid powers. It should be noticed that a number of bi lateral donor agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) also require reform measures along the lines of those prescribed in the SAPs and in a broader context those contained in the infamous conceptual body of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Sogge 2002. 73).

The multi lateral banks, basically the most important players of the Aid industry -alongside with the United States- besides all the disadvantageous and crippling conditions that they impose in recipient’s economies and States, do not merely transfer the resources but lend them, and at very unfair and exploitative interests rates. In 1999 ‘[…] lower income countries had paid to creditors almost five times more than what they received in aid grants’ (Sogge 2002.
Reformist efforts so far have not proved themselves sufficient to hold these interests accountable or to truly empower recipient countries and societies in the aid regime. Besides all the catch phrases made for foreign aid, there might be a truthful claim for it: ‘Perhaps the safest generalization to make is that foreign aid, when used alone or in combination with other policy instruments, has a unique ability to allow the donor to demonstrate compassion while simultaneously pursuing a variety of other objectives’ (Arase 1995. 13)

2.2.2 Principles

It is relevant to evoke that the ethical-rhetorical principle of foreign aid is to assist and help those in need; to show concern, compassion and solidarity in all levels for whomever might require these due to long-standing or juncture grievances of any order. Some authors even point out the fundamentally humanitarian motivation of foreign aid: “[…] the essential causes (of foreign aid) lay in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles of the donor countries, and in their implicit belief that only on the basis of a just international order in which all States had a chance to do well was peace and prosperity possible” (Lumsdaine 1993. 30) Nevertheless, a significant academic current underlines how the notions of aid, assistance, collaboration, humanitarianism, in international politics, all the same whilst seemingly emanating from merely altruistic manifestations of modern Western societies and States, are deeply embedded in their most concrete utilitarian impulses and strategic agendas.

Now, these agendas influence and are shaped too by power and domination discourses and are regulated by certain principles and implicit or explicit rules. Regarding the former, it has been already mentioned how Aid has sustained imperial and colonialist discourses making them appear as patronage or apprenticeship enterprises. Aid has been a key notion in the construction of a wider discourse of development that has legitimized domination:

‘The construction of discourse under conditions of unequal power […] entails specific constructions of the colonial / Third World subject in/through discourses in ways that allows the exercise of power over it’ (Escobar 1995. 9) ‘[…] the development discourse is governed by the same principles (of the
colonial discourse): it has created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World’ (Ibid. 9).

In the specific context of the aid regime, many cases of recipient initiatives set up to afford some control over aid have been consistently blocked: the creation of the UN Fund for Economic Development was proposed by some recipient countries in the late fifties, with the idea of setting up a soft – loan bank for developing countries. The proposal was met with the opposition of the World Bank, which succeeded in its sabotage; later, the latter mainstreamed the idea with the setting up of its own soft – loan mechanism, the International Development Association (IDA) for the world’s poorest countries (Sogge 2002. 68). Other Southern ideas such as the Lagos Plan of Action, the Final Act of Lagos, the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programs and the proposal to create the Asian Monetary Fund have been bluntly opposed to by the aid establishment (Sogge 2002. 68).

*Box 1: The six specific principles rule the foreign aid regime*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Negotiation:</strong></th>
<th>there is none or minimum. The donor has almost total precedence over aid’s provision.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aid in relation to other flows:</strong></td>
<td>the donors use aid to promote or deter trade flows and investment capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relations among official donors:</strong></td>
<td>they should not compete or promote rival economic paradigms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relations between official donors and civil society:</strong></td>
<td>interaction is limited to organizations sharing donor’s ideas and methods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditionality:</strong></td>
<td>the recipient countries should plead commitment to donor’s policy instructions and demonstrate reform results in order to be considered for aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aid and Debt:</strong></td>
<td>recipient countries should meet debt repayments for continued aid eligibility.</td>
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(Sogge 2002. 60-61)
2.2.3 Domestic Impact

Foreign aid’s impact at the domestic level is multifaceted and far-reaching; besides the potential positive impact of successful projects supported by foreign funds and expertise, there is a vast array of consequences oppositely at work regarding one of aid’s rhetorical purposes since its patronage époques: to foster recipient’s self-reliance and capacities to carry on without donor intervention. There are many reasons for this, among them aid’s role in advancing donor power agendas and the concurrent action of subordinated Southern elites. Nonetheless, it has not been mentioned how the aid regime itself is fundamentally grounded in an expansionist dynamic that disregard interruption or phase-out: both donor and recipient aid establishments have to ‘Move the Money’ to sustain bureaucratic livelihoods, power enclaves and basically a whole public service industry based upon a continuing and increased flow of foreign resources (Sogge 2002. 89-90). Aid’s success then appears to be irrelevant, as well as its failure. What truly matters is the ability to keep the funds flowing, even if that requires made-up project results, a privilege for action, spending and short – term outcomes instead of focus on learning and long term planning. Reflection and criticism are marginalized, as well as recipient’s initiatives to diminish aid-independency, because these are threats to the regime’s existence.

‘Countries that were self–sufficient in food crops at the end of World War II –many of them even exported food to industrialized nations- became net food importers throughout the development era. Hunger similarly grew as the capacity of countries to produce the food necessary to feed themselves contracted under the pressure to produce cash crops (and) accept cheap food from the West […]’ (Escobar 1995. 104). Aid, as part of a larger development discourse and practice, seriously undermines the coping mechanisms set in place by its targeted societies. In an economic dimension, aid basically produces a ‘drain of public revenues, as priority goes to debt repayment and the running costs of aid-financed investments (and a) reduced tax effort and reduced revenue self–reliance’ (Sogge 2002. 100) In a political dimension, aid debilitates an accountable interaction among citizens, civil society organizations and national governments in various areas of public policy formulation and implementation -such as poverty eradication (Hermele 2005). Aid-dependency weakens and de legitimizes the pursuit of serious tax policies by governments or DRM strategies by NGOs and
SMOs. Resource mobilization is left to invisible, closed and unaccountable decision-making schemes when foreign aid is in command or has a powerful say. Government’s responsibilities begin to reside upwards in the aid chain and it begins to lose negotiation powers regarding trade, investment and many other sovereign interests (Sogge, 2002. 101) and a comfortable, expecting position is often assumed by skeptical Southern citizenries as the option that offers the least resistance.

2.3 FOREIGN AID AND SMOs IN LATIN AMERICA

In the specific case of Latin America, the notion of conditionality appears to be decisive to explain, not only the aid allocation schemes that are in place among States and foreign donor institutions, but also those which SMOs privilege and are involved in. The relationship between foreign donors and the SMOs or NGOs in the period before democratic transitions and worldwide market liberalization had very different contours compared to the current one: the main multilateral donors (The World Bank; the International Monetary Fund) focused their resources on State-driven aid and structural State reform and minimized emphasis on poverty reduction issues, a trend that has been recently changing\(^{10}\). This limited the access of SMOs working on rights-oriented issues to multilateral resources (Villaboas et al 2004). Consequently, private aid transfers, mainly from Northern to Latin American SMOs (including within the latter concept Northern SMOs working in the region) dominated the non-profit resource mobilization scene (Villaboas et al 2004) The conditions attached to private North-Latin America aid allocations, in the SMO context, were not as stringent as the ones imposed by multilateral or bilateral donors on States and Governments: SMOs had a relatively broad maneuvering room to access foreign resources based on own problem assessments and agenda definitions (The Reality of Aid Report 2004)) The situation has substantially changed. SMOs operating in Latin America mobilize resources from a varied array of foreign institutions and organizations and, increasingly, from domestic instances. SMOs are increasingly subject to Northern conditionality, imposed by now accessible multilateral institutions\(^{11}\) or by Northern

\(^{10}\) Bonsdorff & Voipio (2005)
\(^{11}\) Bonsdorff & Voipio (2005) and Hermele (2004) analyze the recent shift of World Bank’s programs towards poverty reduction and civil society participation.
SMOs. Three main transformations have modified the scenario: worldwide market reforms, decreasing or re allocated aid resources and democratic transitions. The first issue is basically referred to the expansion of free market and business logics into non-profit terrain and its effect on North – South SMO cooperation:

‘[Northern SMOs] institutional imperatives of growth, size, and market share tend to outweigh the developmental imperatives of partnership and cooperation, especially in winning contracts for the provision of humanitarian assistance, which are central to the continued survival of most international NGOs in their current form (Edwards 1996). These contracts pay for the infrastructure of the organization as a whole, but reduce the amount of room for maneuver in the agency’s strategic choices. NGOs tend to import the philosophy of the market uncritically, treating development as a commodity, measuring market share as success, and equating being professional in their work with being businesslike […]’ (Edwards 1999. 29)

Northern SMOs have had to subject to the toughened rules and conditions of national aid agencies –their foremost donors- in an environment of marketplace competition and stagnant private donations (Edwards 1999. 30) The retrenchment of the State due to neoliberal market reform might partially explain shrinking national aid budgets. This has driven SMOs to look for different instances from where to mobilize resources, namely multilateral aid institutions, and the consequent acceptance of their conditions. These new terms are translated to Southern and Latin American NGOs which, in order to access the resources, have to comply with a large set of third –hand foreign-imposed terms. On the other hand, market reforms might have also triggered a general trend towards non-concessionary forms of international cooperation. The status and position of aid in international relations is being speedily replaced by free-trade and investment agreements (Edwards 1999b) a trend that also explains a ‘widespread decline in official aid budgets’ (Edwards 1999. 26) The concentration of concessionary or subsidized resources to priority areas –namely Africa and some Asian countries- by bi lateral and multilateral donors has also affected Latin American States and

12 ‘[Northern SMOs] frequently adopted the viewpoint of the World Bank and other official agencies. As a result, they took on projects of a more social-assistance nature, or spearheaded massive humanitarian aid programs in situations of social emergency, in order to obtain funding. In that sense, an instrumental rationale has been consolidating itself in the North regarding the fight against poverty[…] (Reality Of Aid Report, 2004)
13 Evidence pointing out to decreasing foreign aid global flows is also found in: (Edwards, Hulme, & Wallace 1999); (World Bank 1998); (Aldaba et al 2000); (Smillie and Helmich 1993)
SMOs (Vos et al 2007) Nonetheless the latter seem to benefit from another kind of aid reallocations:

‘Increasingly, however, aid is flowing directly to NGOs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America rather than passing through traditional northern NGO intermediaries [this trend] has been accelerated by the desire of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies to decentralize their operations, and by increasing question marks about the value added by northern NGOs in the transfer of funds […] Because the use of northern intermediaries raises the transactions costs of aid delivery, why pay their overheads when the money could be channeled more cost-effectively directly to the South?’ (Edwards 1999. 27)

The preference of donor agencies for direct funding of Southern SMOs –avoiding Northern intermediation- is informed by a growing trust on the latter’s built capacity and leading expertise (Edwards 1999. 27) In Latin America, the escalation of organized social movement action (Kaimowitz 1992) and the availability for non-profits of professional resources (qualified labor, for instance) with the advent of democracy could explain this shift. Now, this appears as a positive development but it could actually diminish the financial and programmatic autonomy of Latin American SMOs. Beyond the traditional resource intermediation Northern SMOs provided -filled up with conditions and preeminent foreign agendas- direct access to multilateral and bilateral donor’s resources favors the collusion of Latin American SMOs with foreign aid regime’s motives, principles and larger conditionality schemes.

‘When foreign aid conditions were discussed in the 1970s, they usually referred mainly to adjustment programs from multilateral financial organizations, or related to donor governments imposing aid, with commercial and political strings attached, on Southern governments. More recently however, this policy of conditions has also become a frequent practice in official and private international cooperation processes involving Southern NGOs and SMOs, despite the proclaimed right to ‘ownership’ that official donors attribute to the South, and the discourse on South-North partnership insisted upon by Northern NGOs and foundations’ (Valderrama 2001. 3) Latin American SMOs do not avoid this new trend: a recent research carried out among SMOs in the region (Reality of Aid Report 2004) showed how conditionality has imposed itself upon partnership and cooperation:
‘[…] the results of this study were that conditionality is mostly imposed in three areas:

a. Agendas and priority issues;
b. Location focus;
c. Programming, monitoring and evaluation and accountability systems […]’

(Reality of Aid Report 2004. 3)

Regarding the first issues, the consulted sources –SMOs in Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Perú (Reality of Aid Report 2004. 4) argued that foreign-designed agendas were often imposed, without further discussion, by international donors. Priorities within these agendas are also set from the outside, being certain themes –such as gender equality or environmental protection- first on the list (Reality of Aid report 2004. 4) Moreover, the parameters to be followed in order to address these agendas are also largely responding to foreign terms of engagement (Valderrama 2001. 7) The issue of location or geo-political emphasis of operations falls within the same sphere of pre-set priorities. Also, conditions are added to the thematic impositions. They regard to project planning, monitoring and evaluation:

‘[…] one of the areas in which northern NGOs impose conditionality more forcefully is in requirements of a formal nature: forms; planning; monitoring and evaluation - PME - systems; accountability; indicators; etc. In Guatemala, the Programming Monitoring-Evaluation system induced from the North has proven to contribute positively to sorting out project management. The problem is that it has been imposed as a universal model and the only planning tool. The logical frame does not adequately contemplate what the project means to the community. There is the added inconvenience that the planning system offers little flexibility in adapting it to specific contexts, which often change.’ (Reality of Aid report 2004. 8)

The new emphasis on administration, quantifiable results, short-termed project-oriented funding and ‘[…] the disappearance of the concept of programs and the return of that of contracts […]’ (Reality of Aid Report 2004. 8) has not only resulted in weakening the independence of Latin American and Southern SMOs in general; it has affected an adequate regard of their local expertise and reality assessment. Now, what is perhaps ultimately significant is that this trend deviates time, resources and focus from those which cooperation is supposed to assist- the poor and excluded. The accountability processes run, once more, upward to invisible instances strange to local realities. ‘[…] unlike in the past when there were
attempts to establish a dialog on agendas and forms of cooperation, decisions are now increasingly made in the North with the message to “take it or leave it”, implying a philosophy of “those who pay call the shots.” […]’ (Valderrama 2001. 3)

2.4 PERSPECTIVES FOR A DRM APPROACH IN LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, could an approach to resource mobilization that usufurts the national economic, political and public opinion environments in which the SMOs are embedded, avoid or at least diminish the preeminence of foreign conditions and agendas. It could also attribute broader autonomy to SMOs and engage traditionally negligent (and influential) domestic actors in social movement causes. A common sense idea, apparently: but if the exercise of political power and the social and civil rights situation in Latin America are taken into account, it might claim a relative novelty.

Authoritarianism, often materialized in military rule, swept through Latin America since the 1960s. This generated a transition from a populist, corporatist style to a period of brutal repression of societal organizations working for civil, social and political rights. (Landim & Thompson 1997. 345) During this period human rights were violated in a systematic manner. Towards the end of the 1970s, an important group of Latin American countries were still governed by authoritarian regimes. Exceptions could be found in the Andean region, where Colombia stands out for its democratic stability in spite of a long lasting armed conflict; Venezuela, which witnessed the withdrawal of the military from civil government since the end of the 1950s and Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador which made the transition away from military rule in the early to mid 1970s. Nevertheless, the Southern cone of the continent experienced the transitions between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and Central American countries gave way to the resolution of their high-intensity internal conflicts during the early 1990s (UNDP 2004 78-79)

The SMOs working for human rights in Latin America were –and still are to a lesser degree in certain countries- consistently sabotaged, marginalized, persecuted or plainly illegalized by authoritarian rulers. Mobilization of domestic political, economic and public opinion instances
for a social movement cause was bluntly out of the question, when powerful sectors fundamentally antagonized the SMOs and their agendas (and perhaps any alterations to the status-quo). The transition to democracy and radical economic liberalization in Latin America since the 1980s are factors that have drastically widened the range of action for SMOs and, effectively, the so-called Third Sector is blooming in the region (Sorj and De Oliveira. Ed 2007).

The electoral aspects of a democratic political system have been sufficiently observed by Latin American countries during the period 1990-2002 fulfilling the minimum, operational–level requisites of democracy (UNDP, 2004): elected public authorities; universal suffrage; free and fair elections; the right to contest for public office; freedom of expression; access to pluralist information; freedom of association; respect for mandates; a territory that clearly defines the voting demos (Dahl 1971). With all the limitations these categories present in practice, they represent a major advance for the region and constitute an adequate institutional environment for further reform (Sen. 1999) Electoral citizenship shows acceptable levels in Latin America. The problems arise when the region’s accomplishments in the field of civil and social citizenships are analyzed. Indicators present a very negative picture in that regard especially concerning the set of rights constituting the latter (UNDP, 2004). ‘For the first time in history, an entire developing region with profoundly unequal societies is, in its entirety, organized politically under democratic governments. Thus a new and unprecedented situation has emerged in Latin America: the coexistence of democracy, poverty and inequality’ (UNDP 2004, 39) The concurrence of democracy, poverty and inequality is frequent in other regions but unique in this context if it is taken into account that Latin America has a high level of poverty and the highest level of inequality in the world (UNDP, 2004). A contradictory picture of Latin America emerges then, where democratic electoral rights and mechanisms are enforced and functioning at acceptable levels but civil and social rights are largely unattended by the State.

The SMOs are now legalized and to larger extents legitimized in public opinion. State’s shrinking welfare role has multiplied their opportunities as basic services providers. Public institutions and officials are now subject to electoral processes, constitutional mandates and
increasing accountability mechanisms. Therefore the mobilization potential of State’s resources for the SMOs’ social agendas is concrete. Also, economic elites and productive sectors are faced with public debate around their ‘social responsibility’ role. This trend makes wealthy segments of population prone to assign resources for philanthropic initiatives. If a scenario of reduced or heavily conditioned foreign aid flows is also considered, it is arguably that the current is an appropriate conjuncture for a DRM approach. Now, the political environment for advancing social movement causes at a domestic level is certainly improving but, could SMOs sustain their operations with domestic resources? Are not Latin America’s financially poor countries? The categorization made by the World Bank based on *per-capita* income indicators might illustrate the point

The stratification of countries based in *per-capita* annual income was first established by the World Bank (WB) to classify world economies based on their lending capabilities. In the latest update, these categories were constituted as follows: low income, US$905 or less; lower middle income, US$906 - US$3,595; upper middle income, US$3,596 - US$11,115; and high income, US$11,116 or more (WB 2007). These categories -not the ciphers or figures- do not respond to cross-sector and cross-country data analysis regarding international purchasing standards of primary goods and services, although at least there is a broad consensus in the revised literature as to which are the levels of income attached to worldwide poverty and extreme poverty (DFID 2004; ODI 2004; WB(1) 2007 ). Basically, income and countries are categorized by the World Bank as both are contrasted with internal criteria regarding debt-repayment capabilities or creditworthiness (IDA 2001) of potential loan recipients. Thus an annual *per-capita* national income of US$905, example given, does not qualifies a country as low-income because its inhabitants cannot access to certain basic goods and services – that might as well be the case- but as it does not matches minimum debt-repayment safeguards in order for the World Bank to authorize issuing or reissuing loans.

The starting number for loan eligibility is US$1065 *per-capita* income in 2006 (WB 2007): within less than that figure fall all economies eligible for IDA (International Development Association, a dependence of the World Bank) lending, which is characterized for its mainly concessional and interest-free terms (WB 2007). Starting at that figure and plus, all the
countries with sufficient resources to duly respond to creditors are included. Middle income
countries are within this ‘eligible’ lending category for the main multilateral bank and foremost
actor of the aid regime, the World Bank. This might not by itself be sufficient to characterize
these countries’ wealth but at least indicates that resources exist there sufficiently as to be
compromised for mediate financial transactions that, eventually, might double its original
figure (Sogge 2002). All Latin American countries fall within the categorizations of lower or
upper middle-income countries, according to the World Bank (WB 2007). Also, reports point
out to a significant increase of (concentrated) wealth in the region for 2007 – a 23.2% rise in
individuals holding more than 1 million in financial assets (World Wealth Report 2007).

Several Latin American SMOs seem to have seized the new political and financial scenarios,
succeeding in mobilizing their constituencies, large sectors of public opinion and the media
and accomplishing certain social and civil rights gains.\textsuperscript{14} The Abrinq Foundation for Children
Rights, the project’s case study, could or not be counted among these: the analysis of its DRM
approach provides answers regarding the feasibility and sustainability of mobilizing domestic
resources to advance social movement causes. The Foundation seeks to influence public
policies and engage business sectors of Brazilian society in the children’s cause: foreign
resources are not targeted. It is explored how this choice and the specificities of the
Foundation’s approach, affect its autonomy in defining agendas and acting upon them. Also,
the question of donor accountability is addressed: the strategies that the Abrinq Foundation
utilizes in order to draw deeper and continuous commitments from sectors that have legal and
moral obligations with the Brazilian infancy.

The case study is framed within theoretical elaborations found in the Resource Mobilization
theories of social movements. The theories define two minimums for social movements and
SMOs to carry out resource mobilization: State’s tolerance or favorability to the social
movement cause and the existence of discretionary resources in society. Also, the Resource
Mobilization theories prescribe the active quest for such favorability and discretionary
resources, as the soundest strategy to advance a social movement cause. Measures of success

\textsuperscript{14} The most notorious being the indigenous movements in the Andean countries which, trough large
manifestations and marches, have managed to deeply influence electoral outcomes and have played a crucial role
in recent institutional crises (Sorj and De Oliveira Ed 2007.150-206)
of a social movement causes are found in studies dealing with the consequences of social movements: to these, a parameter of a movement’s success could be found in its level of penetration in public policies. The former concepts and hypotheses are contrasted against the specific case study of the Abrinq Foundation; previous to that, a full discussion on the theories is provided.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 THE CONCEPT OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

Resource mobilization is defined as the series of strategies and initiatives carried out by Social Movement Organizations in order to channel resources for the advancement of social movement causes\textsuperscript{15} (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The concept of resources is equaled to funds and labor drawn from third parties to the SMOs or to the causes the SMOs are advancing\textsuperscript{16} (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The analysis is framed by theoretical premises present in a series of studies, often receiving the name of Resource Mobilization (RM) theories. One of the fundamental arguments of the RM theories is that mobilization of key political (State institutions) economic (entrepreneurial sectors) and media instances is instrumental for SMO’s cause advancement. Thus an \textit{elitist} approach to social activism is privileged. Popular protest and massive demonstrations -and other types of mobilizations aiming to generate changes in \textit{status quo}s- might not render concrete results if they are not endorsed by a ‘normalized’ interaction between vanguard social organizations and political and economic establishments (Jenkins 1983; Kitschelt 1986) On the other hand, RM theories claim that ‘grievances’\textsuperscript{17} in a given society are not direct determinants of social mobilization: what is rather decisive is organized and rational action to \textit{mobilize} these grievances. For the RM theories, the first and crucial condition for organized social action is the control and mobilization of resources:

‘Although similar organizations vary tremendously in the efficiency with which they translate resources into action […] the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization […] In any case, resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is possible’ (McCarthy & Zald 1977. 1221

\textsuperscript{15} The advancement of a social movement cause implies the response to a determined demand from instances with jurisdiction or competences to attend them. In order to exemplify the a domestic approach to resource mobilization, this project presents the case of the SMO Abrinq Foundation, which works in advancing the social movement cause of children in Brazil.

\textsuperscript{16} In this project, the concept of resources is limited to funds and labor allocated to the social movement cause of children in Brazil, though the SMO Abrinq Foundation, by the Brazilian State and by domestic businesses, companies and other for-profit organizations.

\textsuperscript{17} In this context, a grievance is a complaint about a (real or imaginary) \textit{collective} wrong that causes resentment and is grounds for collective action (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977)
The second condition for resource mobilization is the existence of ‘discretionary’ resources in society; ‘surplus’ resources -labor and funds- not strictly committed to subsistence schemes. Moderately high income levels allow these resources to exist and be engaged in leisure activities, sumptuary spending and philanthropic initiatives. Basically, a distinction is made between mass and elite resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977)) ‘Mass’ are those resources the general population, including the beneficiary group of the SMOs -workers, ethnic minorities, children- dispose of which can be engaged in social movement action. ‘Elite’ resources are those that wealthy sectors of the population and the State possess. For an SMO it is fundamental to have a legitimate access to both kinds of resources. Nonetheless, mass resources are scarcer and, partially because of this, grossly engaged in self-interest and survival schemes. Elite resources have a higher discretional dimension which makes them more accessible for SMOs. The effective mobilization of elite resources directly shapes the advancement of SMOs’ causes and the representation in the polity of the population groups it represents:

‘To the extent to which social movement’s beneficiary adherents lack resources, SMO support, if it can be mobilized, is likely to become heavily dependent upon conscience constituents […]It is only when resources can be garnered from conscience adherents that viable SMOs can be fielded to shape and represent the preferences of [its] collectivities’ (MacCarthy & Zald 1977. 1222)

The second condition for resource mobilization is the favorability of the State to a social movement cause or to the organizations upholding it, the SMOs (McCarthy & Zald 1977)

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18 Private resources contributed for the advancement of social movement causes can be regarded as philanthropic. The SMOs aim at these resources and compete with other sectors –the entertainment industries, for example- for their mobilization (McCarthy & Zald, 1977)

19 Besides the mass and elite resources, the cadre resources are also distinguished. The cadre resource pool is composed by the administrative and operational staff of an SMO (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) RM theory gives a very important role to detailed organizational arrangements, motivation and leadership within social organizations. The present project limits is debate span to RM theory’s principles regarding control of external resources.

20 McCarthy & Zald denominated individuals and organizations part of the mass resource pool as adherents –sympathizers of the SMO or larger social movement cause that do not provide resources- and beneficiary- directly or indirectly benefited by SMO action. The elite sectors providing resources are denominated conscience constituents (Ibid, )
resource mobilization options of an SMO are affected by competition with other SMOs and the
entertainment, leisure and other industries to where discretionary resources are allocated
(McCarthy & Zald 1977; Zald & Ash 1987)) Nonetheless the major external determinant of
resource mobilization is the maneuvering margin allowed by the political regime and the State:

‘A SMOs’ potential for resource mobilization is also affected by authorities and the delegated agents of
social control […] While authorities and agents of control groups do not typically become constituents
of SMOs, their ability to frustrate (normally termed social control) or to enable resource mobilization
are of crucial importance. Their action affects the readiness of bystanders, adherents, and constituents to
alter their own status and commitment. And they themselves may become adherents and constituents
[…] (MacCarthy & Zald 1977, 1222)

Are these conditions present in Latin America and in the specific context of the SMO Abrinq
Foundation of Brazil? Income indicators in Latin America and other wealth measurements
underline the existence of financial resources in the region, heavily concentrated in minority
segments of population (World Wealth Report 2007) On the other hand, and making an
interpretation of the RM theories, it is possible to argument that democratic regimes tend to
favor or tolerate social movement causes; or at least more than other political regimes. The
transition to democracy in Latin America, taking place since the end of the 1970s, shows a
partial consolidation of political citizenship and relative institutional stability (UNDP 2004).
This configures a minimum scenario for resource mobilization and SMO activism. The ‘non-
profit’ boom in the region might attest to this trend. (Balbis 2001)

3.1.1 Domestic Resource Mobilization

Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) refers to resource mobilization processes carried out
within delimited national, regional, provincial, municipal and community levels. It differs from
mere resource mobilization as it focuses its span to resources made available at any intra-
societal dimension in modern Nation-States. For this research, the domestic context of resource
mobilization is relevant for as it marks contrasts with resource mobilization processes largely
dealt with in academia (basically those inherent to the foreign aid regime), in one hand; in the
other, as part of further claims contained in this project about the feasibility and sustainability of DRM by SMOs in Latin American countries.

In Latin America, SMOs have traditionally resorted to foreign resources, provided by international SMOs, NGOs, multilateral organizations, foreign States and individuals (Villaboas et al 2004) Historically, domestic political and economic instances have been bypassed. Why? SMOs have been historically marginalized and persecuted in the region by the authoritarian regimes and also the economic elites supporting them (Landim & Thompson 1997). The appeal to mainstream political and economic resources by SMOs was thus heavily constrained. Public authorities and economic elites in non-democratic regimes were negligent or antagonistic of social movement causes, if these were compromised with social and political change. This complicated or simply impeded mobilizing the resources that these instances control and that could be channeled by the SMOs, a fact that partially explained a heavy reliance of Latin American SMOs in foreign aid (Grugel 2000; Aldaba et al 2000) A relatively recent transition to democracy in the region improves the chances to mobilize enclave establishment resources.

A theoretical distinction between processes that privilege domestic over foreign resources is pertinent as reliance in foreign resources to address national affairs should be an ad hoc expedient or, at best, a complementary and transitory strategy (Sogge 2002). Also, the dependence on foreign resources frame SMOs within conditionality schemes over which they have little or no control (Reality of Aid Report 2004; Valderrama 2001) Stressing the domestic specificity of resource mobilization implies an allusion to previously ‘unengaged’ domestic resources and actors and also to a traditional inclination to foreign resources.

The literature concerned with non-profit work in developing countries basically equals DRM with fundraising and the quest for financial self-sustainability: in a scenario of toughened foreign aid conditionality for SMOs (Edwards 1999; Villaboas et al 2004) overall decrease of
foreign aid transfers\textsuperscript{21} (Edwards 1999; Aldaba et al 2000) and aid reallocations affecting Latin America specifically (Vos et al 2007) the search for domestic resources by SMOs appears among various strategies and tactics to revenue diversification. The same could be stated about DRM by national governments in developing countries, a large subject in literature, dealing mostly with macroeconomic reform to strengthen public treasuries and diminish foreign aid dependency (Vos et al 2007).

The DRM approach presented in this thesis, based in the case study of the SMO Abrinq Foundation of Brazil, broadens the scope and meaning of DRM in the field of social, non-governmental organizations working in Latin America. Financial resources −and the organizational stability they could bring about if properly utilized− are fundamental yet not sufficient to guarantee SMOs’ cause advancement. The debate should not be centered in the scarcity of foreign resources but in the necessity to involve domestic actors and their resources in a broader manner. A wide spectrum of political, economic and human resources outside of the SMOs’ organizational structure need to be ‘aligned’ with and mobilized in favor of the SMOs’ objectives. It is evident for social organizations worldwide that, in a democratic regime, it is important to have access to domestic political decision-making instances and productive sector’s resources. Latin America’s authoritarian regimes curtailed such access; but as democratic transition occurs, the focus of resource mobilization is still largely limited to fundraising, moreover, foreign-bound fundraising\textsuperscript{22} (Valderrama 2001). The Abrinq Foundation’s seized the new opportunities of democracy, making the engagement of the Brazilian State and wealthy sectors to the social movement cause of children, the core concern of its DRM approach.

\textsuperscript{21} Edwards (1999) sustains, nonetheless, that parallel to a decrease in general aid allocations by Northern donors a trend towards increased direct aid transfer to NGOs in the South is perceivable. This project gives a role to conditionality over aid decrease as an explanatory variable of DRM recent trend.

\textsuperscript{22} A new trend is, nonetheless, noticeable. Numerous international organizations dedicated to support DRM in developing world’s Third Sectors have been created in the last 20 years: Two of them, widely recognized and with an important summoning ability are: The Resource Alliance, \url{http://www.resource-alliance.org} and Ashoka Foundation, \url{http://www.ashoka.org}
3.1.2 Resources, Actors and Agendas of DRM

The resources with which the DRM is mainly concerned are those characterized by a relative allocation flexibility, this is, a discretionary dimension. Wealthy individuals, corporations, industries, financial systems and State institutions are among the instances that dispose of ‘larger resource pools’ that can be engaged in social movement causes. The media is another very important actor/resource, serving as a catalyst or instigator of larger elite resource allocation to social movements and SMOs. The beneficiaries of the SMO action and the SMOs themselves represent the last two actors of DRM.

For this project’s case study, the State institutions of major concern are two, crucially involved with public policy processes: the municipal Mayoralties and the Presidency of the Republic. The latter’s jurisdiction over policymaking, and the political will that drives it, is mobilized or influenced by the Abrinq Foundation. In Latin American countries, all under democratic, Presidential regimes at the present time, the institutions of Congress and the Presidency are the foremost actors in policymaking. Local governments are also very important actors of Latin America’s and Brazil’s ‘decentralized’ politics (Tulchin and Selee 2000) and a significant component of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach. The Foundation’s core objective is to prioritize the inclusion of children and adolescents agendas in public policy; through that expedient, more State resources –public budget, public infrastructure, public official’s labor and expertise- would be allocated to the Foundation’s beneficiary (the children of Brazil) in the form of private or public-run programs.

The wealthy sectors and individuals are rising in the region, as well as the dimensions of wealth and its concentration.\(^{23}\) The panorama in this regard is not completely uniform and there are definite differences between big economies such as the Brazilian and other rather small like

\(^{23}\) ‘Latin America continued to add to its High Net Worth Individuals (HNW) population (individuals with 1 million dollars in financial assets or more) with Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Chile leading the way. Real GDP growth in the region was 4.8% in 2006, reflecting China’s growing demand for local commodities as well as its mounting direct investments in the region, which accounted for roughly 16% of all foreign direct investment there by 2006 up from 2.9% in 2000 […] Latin America’s HNWI population grew faster than the global average, expanding by 10.2 in 2006 up from 9.7% in 2005. Wealth in the region grew by 23.2% in 2006 […] 5% of the population owned 80% of the wealth by 2006 (World Wealth Report 2007. 2)
Central America’s. Notwithstanding, it is possible to argue that every Latin American country has a wealthy elite of which more resources can be exacted for social and civil rights causes: philanthropic allocations show a very poor record in the region\(^{24}\) (World Wealth Report 2007; Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies 1999) The case of Abrinq Foundation exemplifies the mobilization of these resources.

The beneficiaries are segments of population that are, in a direct manner, positively affected by the action of an SMO or a set of SMOs. They constitute SMOs’ social reason. The children of Brazil benefited from the programs Abrinq Foundation runs and coordinates fall within this category. In a broader perspective, the beneficiary of a positive change in children’s rights enforcement is society as a whole, but RM theories maintains a clear distinction in this regard for methodological reasons (McCarthy & Zald 1977)

For RM theories a ‘progressive’ agenda is fundamental to engage a more varied array of sectors in resource mobilization. (McCarthy & Zald 1977) Non-democratic SMOs are left out of the analysis as these organizations could not appeal to open, all-inclusive resource mobilization strategies but to specific interest-group, lobbying schemes\(^{25}\). To the extent in which democratic regimes have consolidated in Latin American countries –in an electoral dimension at least – social and civil rights agendas have gained legitimacy, support and legal backgrounds. This is a key condition for a broadened resource mobilization approach by SMOs.

### 3.2 THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Specialized literature in the field of social movements and collective action is extraordinarily abundant, varied and in many cases methodologically and theoretically sophisticated. It covers

\(^{24}\) The World Wealth Report 2007, a study of the world's richest investors by Capgemini and Merrill Lynch, found that Latin America's wealthy devote only 3 percent of their financial assets to charitable donations. Comparatively, Asian tycoons donate 12 percent of their money, the Middle Eastern rich 8 percent, Americans 8 percent and Europeans 5 percent.

\(^{25}\) For example, pro-gun associations in the United States considerably concentrate resource mobilization to policymaking *lobbying*: nonetheless these initiatives are conducted with an important degree of secrecy and intense resource allocation and could not appeal to majority sectors in favor of gun control (Sugarmann 1989)
a broad thematic and chronological span. Notwithstanding, a definition of social movements is privileged in this work, derived from the RM theories: social movements are, more than organizations per se, social themes and causes, ideas around which manifold organizations are set and act upon in civil society. Profit or direct quests for public office are not motives of action; societal transformations are mostly sought after, although ‘personal change’ organizations are often included in the definition of social movements (Jenkins 1983) The organizations working in the realm of Civil Society receive different denominations depending on their legal statuses, social reasons, financing and other defining categories. The organizations matter of attention in this project are denominated here as Social Movement Organizations (SMO) A SMO ‘[…] is a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a Social Movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals’ (McCarthy & Zald 1977. 1218) Social organizations are attached in this definition to the societal or individual transformations a social movement endorses: similar organizational concepts, such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) or Civil Society Organizations (CSO) extend the analysis to forms of association that are not necessarily concerned with societal or individual transformations. The Social Movement Organization (SMO) objective of the study case, Abrinq Foundation of Brazil, belongs to the international social movement that observes and enforces the rights of the children.

A social movement approach is privileged in this research. Why not focus instead on State-led DRM processes? National States are still the largest, strongest and most legitimate actors in world politics, despite its receding welfare role, blurring of private and public power instances and the emergence of powerful transnational non-state actors. Moreover and closely related to this thesis topic, a very large and undergoing global initiative pointing out to integrally achieve social rights goals– to halve worldwide poverty by 2015- has among its tasks an important resource mobilization-by-governments component. The UN Millennium Project, set out to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, regards DRM by governments as a fundamental action to ensure feasibility and guarantee sustainability of the poverty reduction effort, alongside with international funding. (UN Millennium Project 2006) DRM by national

26 ‘[…] during the last twenty years, the analysis of social movements and collective action has evolved until transforming itself into an autonomous theoretical and research field in Social Sciences, just as the quantity and quality of works increases and improves’ (Melucci 1999)
governments is a current topic and even more so in the context of Latin America, as a recent shift on aid allocation towards sub Saharan Africa, which now receives 40% of total development assistance, up from 25% in 1999, left them in a less favourable position for further lending, assistance and debt-relief (Vos et al 2007. 1-3).

Domestic Resource Mobilization in the context of social movements, as it is presented in this work, does not intends to engage in comparative analysis vis-à-vis DRM by governments nor further adequacy claims. The idea of an improved resource mobilization capacity by national States in developing countries cannot represent anything but a highly desirable policy - dependent upon sound macroeconomic measures and reforms (Vos et al 2007) and complemented by transparent public administration practices. DRM by SMOs might perhaps only aspire to become a complementary action for larger societal and State democratic processes. It should be noticed, too, that not all social movements are in favour of the advancement of social and civil rights and might as well resist it. A social movement context is privileged in this project precisely as innovative democratic initiatives are more likely to emanate from and find a reflexive environment in Civil Society to influence political and economic establishments. The history of social movements demonstrates the fundamental role of Civil Society mobilization in generating social, economic and political transformations.

This project’s case study, The Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights, illustrates how SMOs in Latin America can mobilize the resources of the State and economic elites, to advance civil and social and rights goals. Although formal democratic change has taken place in the region in the last 20 years -significantly improving the political rights the populations exert- inequality and poverty remain intact or have worsened (World Bank 2003) The social and civil rights situation is critic in many aspects and has not paired the advances in the electoral dimension of democracy. Political and economic elites are not naturally inclined to favour social and civil rights advancement, as they are not inclined towards major transformations that might disturb a status quo of which they are main beneficiaries. One of the roles of SMOs in Latin America is to underline fundamental civil and social rights issues, make them visible and push them into the public agenda. The work of the Abrinq Foundation is located within this context.
3.2.1 Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)

In the Social Movements an *organized sector* can be differentiated from a *non–organized sector*. Both sectors combine in sustained actions that tend to reach a general common objective: provoke or resist social change with a determined orientation. Notwithstanding, social movements cannot be reduced to single Social Movement Organizations nor equalled to a unitary set of non-organized actions but are the result of the combination of planned and orchestrated SMO actions with other spontaneous actions that organizations could or would not directly vindicate. Nonetheless, even if such actions are not prepared or claimed by SMOs, for the general public they are part of the movement, speak of it and describe it (Cadena-Roa & Puga 2005) Thus, the *non–organized* sector of social movements is formed by various public and non–coordinated spontaneous actions (Oliver 1989) that favour oppose or remain unaware of SMOs’ strategic actions.

It can be stated that the larger the social movements are, the broadest the scope and number of the SMOs involved in them. (Cadena-Roa & Puga 2005) The feminist, ecologist and democratization movements, for instance, consist of numerous SMOs with a wide–ranging set of objectives, action *repertoires*, socio-economic origins, regarding members, adherents and constituents (McCarthy & Zald 1977); and with particular embeddings within larger society, institutions and government. As social movements do not possess unified directions and diverse SMOs coexist within them, combined with spontaneous actions, the consequences or impact they generate cannot be considered as the result of a strict goal–oriented and rational organizational performance. Social movements are not unified, particular actors with shared means, ends and values.

On the other hand, the organized sector of social movements is composed by differentiated and autonomous organizational units: by SMOs individually possessing specific objectives and internal procedures to define them and achieve them (Cadena-Roa & Puga 2005; Zald and Ash 1987; McCarthy & Zald 1977) This project is interested in the latter, the organized manifestation of social movements and it does so because it allows it to analyze conscious, planned and goal oriented efforts aiming to –in this specific research– advance social change.
Only in this rational context are resource mobilization and Domestic Resource Mobilization initiatives possible and conceptually pertinent: as means of organized action for social transformations.

3.2.2 Theoretical Approaches to Resource Mobilization

A long-standing resource mobilization theoretical tradition has widely delved in social movement analysis. It emerged as a theoretical reaction to traditional definitions of social movements and collective behaviour that emphasized a natural link between increasing/decreasing societal grievances and consequent levels of mobilization and social movement formation. The latter thesis mainly emanated from various traditional theories in social movement analysis—traditional meant for studies dated before the 1960s social movement boom—among them the relative deprivation theory, mass society theory and collective behaviour theory. These were fundamentally concerned with sudden increases in short-term individual grievances created by ‘structural strains’ or rapid social change (Gusfield 1968) as explanatory of the emergence and formation of social movements.

Also denominated ‘breakdown’ theories (Useem 1998) they explained social movement performance as an extension of more elementary forms of collective action (Jenkins 1983) that required minimum organized forms and/or institutionalized actions. As a shared assumption, these theories argued that ‘[…] movement participation was relatively rare, discontents were transitory, movement and institutionalized actions were sharply distinct and movement actors were arational if not outright irrational.’ (Jenkins, 1983. 528) This assertion was supported by Olson’s (1965) famous challenge: individuals will rarely engage in initiatives that deliver collective goods if they have to bear the costs of action and transactional benefits are far from sight.

RM theories, on the other hand, consider that grievances are relatively constant and their incidence in social mobilization is proportional to their status as conflict sources within social institutions (Jenkins 1983) and a population’s central political processes instead of expressing momentarily heightened and diffuse strains and discontents within it. (Tilly 1978; in Jenkins
1983) Grievances have a secondary role in RM theories; their role in social mobilization and social movement formation is at a certain extent overtaken by the availability of resources, organizational capabilities and political effectiveness of key social actors to turn discontent into action. Turner & Killian (1972) recognized as representatives of the ‘collective behaviour’ school, made up an extreme antonymous vision of their own perspective in order to undermine RM theories’ postulates: ‘[…] there is always enough discontent in society to supply the grass-root support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group’ (Turner & Killian 1972. 251) Ironically, this was later vindicated by two of the most prominent authors of the ‘entrepreneurial’ approach to resource mobilization, McCarthy & Zald (1977) and furthered as they asserted that: ‘[…] grievances and discontent may be defined, created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations’ (Ibid.1215). Other authors within this same tradition may take distance from such affirmation and put a major stress in changes in power relations, structural conflicts of interests (Jenkins 1983) or political processes, in order to underline the role of institutional variables and minimize the importance of contingent grievances in social movement formation.

Notwithstanding, what RM theories’ authors agree upon is that control of resources and an adequate degree of institutionalized and organized action is fundamental for the advancement of social movement causes. The resources are basically legitimacy, money, facilities and labour (McCarthy & Zald 1977) and in order to have access to them there should be a rational, goal–oriented structure to mobilize them -in this case the SMOs- and a dialectical connection of the latter with sectors in society and State that might hold them sufficiently. Thus resources should exist in society at a certain level so that they could be mobilized, regardless of their monopolization by elite groups: and whatever makes these resources prone to mobilization is their discretionary character:

‘By discretionary resources we mean time and money which can easily be reallocated, the opposite of fixed and enduring commitments of time and money. In any society the SMS (Social Movement Sectors) must compete with other sectors and industries for the resources of the population. For most of the population the allocation of resources to SMOs is of lower priority than allocation to basic material needs such as food and shelter. It is well known that the proportion of income going to food and shelter
is higher for low-income families, while the proportion of income going to savings and recreation increases among high-income families (Samuelson 1964). The SMOs compete for resources with entertainment, voluntary associations, and organized religion and politics.’ (McCarthy & Zald 1977. 1224)

The resource mobilization approach associates the concept of discretionary resources to income levels in a given society, affirming that ‘there is cross-sectional evidence that the higher the income the larger the average gift to charitable activities and the greater the proportion of total income given’. (McCarthy & Zald 1977 quoting: Morgan, Dye, and Hybels 1975; U.S. Treasury Department 1965) This theoretical boundary is utilized to demonstrate the possibility of a DRM approach by SMOs in Latin America: the characterization of most of the region’s countries as middle-income economies points out to a minimum fulfillment of this premise, one that leaves room for a DRM approach (World Bank 2006) Also wealth, although not equally distributed, in on the rise in the region (World Wealth report 2007) Nonetheless, the existence of discretionary resources is not the only condition for resource mobilization. RM theories suggest that ‘structural conduciveness’ (Smelser 1963) factors influence the allocation of resources by individuals and organizations to social movements and, at the end, to SMOs:

‘[…]. Means of communication, transportation, political freedoms, and the extent of repression by agents of social control, all of which may affect the costs for any individual or organization allocating resources to the SMS, serve as constraints on or facilitators of the use of resources for social movement purposes’ (McCarthy & Zald 1977. 1225)

The political and constitutional rights environment is fundamental, among the structural conditions; and if they affect the allocation of general individual income, they also affect the compromise of institutional, State and productive sectors resources to the social movement causes. The discretionary character of these resources depends heavily upon the political regime and constitutional order. The State resources of an authoritarian regime are not available for social movements as they are in a democratic regime. This is why, in the interpretation provided in this work, democracy is also a condition of an integral RM approach; in the context of Latin America it is a condition for a DRM approach.

27 In the specific context of State’s resources, their availability for a social movement cause.
RM theories underline the fundamental role of mobilizing mainstream or elite political and economic resources by SMOs as a means to incorporate social movement agendas in political systems (Cadena-Roa & Puga 2005) and to achieve financial sustainability. Regarding the former theme, the idea is to achieve public policy changes that advance the social movement cause, through interaction with political power-yielding instances in society. Regarding the latter, the mobilization of wealthy sectors is fundamental for the accomplishment of SMOs’ goals, as these are a function of 'resource control.' (McCarthy & Zald 1977) The DRM approach of the Abrinq Foundation embodies both perceptions: through influencing public policies, its formulation and implementation, the Foundation seeks to channel more of the State’s resources to its beneficiary and cause, the children of Brazil. By doing this, it also aims at prompting policy solutions to infancy’s problematic, beyond project-focused charity. On the other hand, the mobilization of entrepreneurial sectors allows the Foundation to keep a constant flow of domestic resources to its programs and projects.

The incidence of entrepreneurial sectors in the overall advancement of a social movement cause is relative: how to account for the role of philanthropy, for instance, in the reduction of child mortality in Brazil or in the enforcement of indigenous rights in Colombia, to name random examples? In the case of the Abrinq Foundation, the mobilization of wealthy sectors could determine to a certain extent the feasibility and sustainability of the DRM approach but could not account for cause advancement. Oppositely, the incorporation of social movement causes in public policies is an indicator of cause advancement and the accomplishment of gains for the movement’s beneficiary, according to a group of studies dealing with the consequences of social movements. The policy component of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach is thus further framed within studies dealing with the consequences of social movements. Three categories are presented, based on the previous: incorporation, institutionalization and appropriation of social movement and social movement causes by public policy.
3.2.3 Incorporation, Institutionalization and Appropriation

Public policies could be considered as resource by themselves but more than that, they are mechanisms that unleash State’s resources in a given direction: bureaucracy, infrastructure, legitimacy and budget; among others. SMOs can appeal to such resources by engaging in the policymaking and policy implementation processes. Thus, the degree of inclusion of social movement causes in public policy agendas might speak of a SMOs’ success in channeling State resources to its beneficiary. If this premise is accepted, how is it possible to account for the levels of interlocution of a SMO in the making and implementation of public policies? In a theoretical level, this locates our analysis within the study of the consequences of social movements.

To attribute specific consequences to social movements is a complex task: social change (or opposition towards it) does not occur solely as a consequence of the activities of social movements but it is also informed by the actions of opponents and allies and larger socio-economic, cultural and political global or local processes. Merton (1936) argued that deliberate social action brings about desired and not-desired, predicted and not-predicted consequences. This is, some of the consequences of social movements do not result from their express intentions but are unpredicted and not anticipated. There are immediate, mediate and long-term effects; direct and indirect impacts and tangible (a law enactment, public policy implementation, the creation of institutions in charge of enforcing rights) and relatively intangible (ecological consciousness, plurality of social life, gender sensitiveness) consequences of social movement actions. This research, among other questions, limits its interest in encountering general conceptual milestones to frame its case study’s impact on policymaking. Existing literature provides illustrative categorizations.

According to Giugni (1998) one of the most influential studies on the consequences of social movements was Gamson’s *The Structure of Social Protest* (1990). This author constructed a bi dimensioned theory of social movement outcomes in the context of organized social protest: “[…] the acceptance of a challenging group by its antagonists as a valid spokesman for a legitimate set of interests, and the gain of new advantages by the group’s beneficiary during the
challenge and its aftermath” (Giugni 1998. 382). Blending in these two dimensions, the author defined four possible outcomes of a social protest challenge: full response; preemption; co-optation and collapse. (Gamson 1990). Social movement positive outcomes are considered as gains in its visibility and legitimization as an actor in the polity, in one hand; in the other, as it manages to advance its goals or those of its constituency -mainly through influencing policy and policy makers. Amenta et al (1992) elaborates on Gamson’s theory defining three levels of success for movements: the lowest, which is limited to the achievement of recognition from opponents or the state without winning specific goal or constituency–related benefits. This is what Gamson calls ‘co-optation’. ‘At the highest level the challenger transforms itself into a member of the polity; that is, process of government or interactions with opponents routinely favor the group’ (Amenta et al 1992. 310). Social movement’s interests are taken into account by legislation and by official instances to enforce it and the issues are then removed from political debate (Amenta et al 1992). Transformation –membership status in the polity—accounts here for Gamson’s ‘full response’. At the middle levels fall gains in policies that aid movements and groups within it. Influencing specific decisions by decision–makers and trends in public opinion or simply keeping the issues at stake into the political agenda, movement’s activism might generate anticipated action by the State in the form of legislative or ameliorative measures: this is what Gamson calls ‘preemption’ later tagged by Amenta et al (1992) as ‘concessions’ caused by the activism of movements.

Schumaker (1975) articulated five categories of policy ‘responsiveness’ to social movement demands. The author defines the latter concept as ‘[…] the relationship between the manifest or explicitly articulated demands of a protest group and the corresponding actions of the political system which is the target of the protest group demands’ (Schumaker 1975. 494) ‘Access responsiveness’ is the first criteria and indicates the willingness of authorities to open up for and engage in dialogue with the protest-group or SMO. Access does not automatically equal to policy making action. If a demand is placed on the agenda in the political system an ‘agenda responsiveness’ criteria emerges; if it passes into law or specific pacts ‘policy responsiveness’ is attained as actors within the political system […] adopt legislation or policy congruent with the manifest demands of protest groups’ (Schumaker 1975. 494) ‘[…] if measures are taken to ensure that the legislation is fully enforced then a fourth type of
responsiveness is attained: output responsiveness’ (Ibid. 495). Finally, if the grievance upon which the demand was initially based is alleviated, ‘impact responsiveness’ indicates the degree to which this occurs.

**Fig. 1: Levels of Success for Social Movements.**

![Levels of Success for Social Movements](image)

Fig. 1.—Levels of success for social movements

(Amenta et al 1992. 311)

Elements of the aforementioned studies are utilized in order to construct a pertinent framework for Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach. Also, this could serve as a base for the analysis of DRM by SMOs in Latin America and its impact on policymaking and policy implementation. Elements found in Giugni et al (1999) and Cadena–Roa & Puga (2005) are also privileged. The idea is to argue for a two-leveled dimension of social movement consequences in political regimes or systems: incorporation and transformation (Giugni 1998; Amenta et al 1992; Giugni et al 1999; Giugni et al 1998; Cadena–Roa & Puga 2005). *Incorporation* is referred to when a social movement, parts of it and/or of its demands are channeled by the political system or by current institutional arrangements without altering the basic rules of the system. Incorporation can lead to *institutionalization*, when movements participate in a stable manner in institutional politics or *appropriation* when movement demands are integrated to public policies or to legislation without an explicit inclusion of the movement in the system. *Transformation*
supposes changes in the social and political structures of society as a result of power transferences that alter power relations within that society. Revolutions are the most radical form of transformation but social movements also produce institutional changes that imply power transferences, although far from being dramatic or radical. Finally, *democratization* occurs when a power transition modifies rights and obligations between States and its citizens, a process that often implies the previously enunciated concepts of incorporation and transformation (Giugni 1998; Amenta et al 1992; Giugni et al 1999; Giugni et al 1998; Cadena–Roa and Puga, 2005).

The latter dimensions could be equaled to Schumaker’s (1975) ‘output responsiveness’ which is of great use regarding the specific context of Latin America and the study case presented in this project, as basic social legislation might be relatively common but not the will and/or capacity to enforce it. The SMO which this project is concerned with, the Abrinq Foundation - basically aims at influencing public policies to obtain recognition, protection and parity before the law of children in Brazil, enforcing social, economic, political and cultural rights (already contemplated in Brazilian Constitution). In this regard, it is a pro democratic and *transformative* Social Movement Organization, as it promotes the inclusion of politically marginalized groups, introduce new rights, broaden the democratic basement in which democracy rests and procure establishing safeguards to citizen rights when faced against arbitrary actions carried out by governments or powerful groups (Cadena-Roa & Puga 2005)

Nonetheless, the case study analysis of Abrinq Foundation is limited to its role in the *incorporation, institutionalization* and *appropriation* of Brazilian infancy’s cause by national and municipal public policies. It would be a major overstatement to attribute a single SMO with a major role in social *transformations* and *democratization*. Through the analysis of its programs and projects, it is possible to argue, at best, for Abrinq Foundation’s major role in the *appropriation* of infancy’s cause by a specific instance of policymaking (the municipal level in the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’)

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28 The Abrinq Foundation set up two specific programs to incorporate, monitor and evaluate public policies on children: the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ at the Federal or national level and the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ at the municipal level. Both programs are described and analyzed in chapter 4.
Although it is clear that it is very difficult to assign clear-cut continuums between organized social movement action and specific societal and political transformations, this project sets out from the premise, proposed by several social movement theorists, that this is possible to a minimum degree, through public policy analysis (Gamson 1990; Schumaker 1975) Nonetheless, another question arises: more than the analysis of the children’s social movement in Brazil, this project focuses on the role of a specific Social Movement Organization, The Abrinq Foundation, in advancing the cause of poor and marginalized children in Brazil. The reviewed theory focuses on the larger role and impact of social movements, as compounded by multiple SMOs and diverse actors. How to account for the specific contribution of a single SMO in influencing public policy? A characteristic of Abrinq Foundation might facilitate this task: basically, the fact that influencing public policies is, explicitly, one of its major objectives; and programs with clearly defined goals are in place to achieve it. Within the realm of such programs, its rules and specific objectives is the Abrinq Foundation’s level of influence in public policy contrasted against. This project insists in the ideal character of the analytical categories (incorporation, institutionalization and appropriation) and limits its use as theoretical guidelines for its study case analysis. More than outermost societal reaches, the three categories illuminate specific DRM initiatives in which the SMO Abrinq Foundation of Brazil had and has a demonstrable participation and leadership.
4. THE DRM APPROACH OF ABRINQ FOUNDATION OF BRAZIL

4.1 THE ABRINQ FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN RIGHTS

The Abrinq Foundation for Children and Adolescents Rights is a Brazilian Non-Governmental, non-profit, civil society organization, categorized by this project as a Social Movement Organization (SMO), taking into account its membership in the infancy’s social movement. The Foundation was created in 1990 by a group of business entrepreneurs of the Brazilian Toy industry, with the fundamental purpose of advancing and enforcing the rights of poor and marginalized children in Brazil. The basic idea of the Foundation in its beginnings, which later evolved into a comprehensive approach, was to mobilize the commitment and resources of key sectors of Brazilian society -namely businesses and companies- and the State, in order to achieve its objectives. The origins and footing of the Foundation in Brazilian industrial circles might have influenced its relatively rapid positioning in political and public opinion scenarios. This project rests its analysis on Abrinq Foundation’s entrepreneurial and State-targeted resource mobilization initiatives, framing them within the concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization.

The foundational myth of the Abrinq Foundation, insisted upon in its official reports and informal recounts by its members, might assist in illustrating the situation of Brazilian children at the beginning of the 1990s -when the Foundation was created- and the level of awareness of Brazilian elite sectors with respect to it: in 1989 the then chairman of the Brazilian Toy Manufacturers’ Association (Associacao Brasileira dos Fabricantes de Brinquedos ABRINQ) Oded Grajew, ‘[…] read the 1989 edition of UNICEF’s annual flagship report, The State of the World’s Children. The report’s shocking indicators on the health and education levels of Brazil’s children deeply touched the businessman’ (Dos Santos 1996). The same year, Grajew organized a meeting with 200 representatives of the Brazilian Toy industry to present UNICEF’s report. After hearing the presentation on the situation of Brazil’s children, ABRINQ decided to create, within the association itself, a Board for the Defense of Children’s Rights.
(Raufflet & Gurgel 2007) The belief was that ‘responsibility does not lie with the government alone, but with society as a whole’ (Abrinq Foundation 1997) The Board of Rights thus began to function, carrying out a series of initiatives during its first, and only, year of existence:

‘The publication and promotion of the book ‘The Child and the Youth in the Brazilian Constitution’, sponsored by Brazil’s three leading paper manufacturers; printing the Universal Declaration of Children’s Rights on toy packages and in magazines and comic books for children and youth, with the support of Editora Abril, Brazil’s largest publisher; printing the ‘Salt and Sugar Home Remedy’ (a recipe against infant dehydration) on 10 million supermarket bags (the project had the support of the leading Brazilian supermarket chain at the time) and launching a campaign to promote knowledge of children’s rights among schoolchildren, through a partnership between the Ministry of Education and Culture and UNICEF’ (Raufflet & Gurgel 2007.122)

‘The Board wanted to avoid a charity-oriented philosophy. It proceeded as a group of entrepreneurs committed to thinking about, and bringing people together around children’s problems’ (Raufflet and Gurgel 2007.122) In 1990, the Board evaluated its work up until that point and decided to create a Foundation that would be administratively separated from the Toy Manufacturers Association. On February 13, 1990, the Abrinq Foundation for Children’s and Adolescents Rights (Fundaçao Abrinq pelos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente) was born (Abrinq Foundation 1997)

Since its creation, the Abrinq Foundation has devised numerous initiatives, programs and project as well as partnerships with private and public actors to develop them. An initial focus in mobilizing entrepreneurial sectors was later complemented with the conception and implementation of a strategy to influence public policies, cooperate with the Brazilian State and account for the latter’s commitment with children rights. On the entrepreneurial sector’s mobilization component, two programs stand out: the ‘Our Children Program’ (Programa Nossas Crianças) and the ‘Children Friendly Company Program’29 (Programa Empresa Amiga da Criança) In 1993 the Foundation launched the ‘Our-Children Program’ which consists in bridging funds and expertise from businesses and entrepreneurs to fund and qualify

29 Both programs constitute the base for the analysis of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach, in its business sector component.
professional child-care institutions working in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area. The program marked a watershed for the Foundation, as it expanded its focus on awareness-raising about the situation of children in Brazil to the role of facilitator or mediator of resources (Abrinq Foundation 1997; Raufflet & Gurgel 2007) In 1995 the Foundation launched the ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’ amidst a revived debate in Brazil on the issue of child-labor (Abrinq Foundation 1997). The program draws specific compromises, from Brazilian and international companies operating in Brazil, on the issue of child-labor eradication and other issues concerning the welfare of worker’s children and young workers’ rights. The compromises are evaluated by the Foundation, stimulating fulfillment through the awarding of a ‘Children-Friendly Seal’ which can be used in product-packaging (Abrinq Foundation 1997; 2007b)

In 1996 the Abrinq Foundation started to materialize the public policy component of its resource mobilization approach, with the launching of the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ (Programa Prefeito Amigo da Criança) (Abrinq Foundation 2003). The program commits and supports (as well as evaluates and monitors) the implementation by municipal administrations of public policies focused in the improvement of children and adolescents livelihoods (Abrinq Foundation 2004) The ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ (Projeto Presidente Amigo da Criança) was launched during 1998’s Presidential elections and its main purpose its to commit the administration of the President of the Republic with the implementation of public policies in favor of children and adolescents at the national (federal) level30 (Abrinq Foundation 2003)

Other resource mobilization initiatives managed by Abrinq Foundation are worth mentioning: the ‘Lively Library Program’ (Programa Biblioteca Viva) launched in 1995 in partnership with the Citigroup Foundation, implements libraries in public hospitals, schools and other community organizations in low-rent areas, providing quality books and reading mediation by qualified professionals (Abrinq Foundation 2007); the ‘Adopt a Smile Program’ (Programa Adotei um Sorriso) launched in 1996 in partnership with different dental healthcare

30 The Children-Friendly Mayor Program and the Children-Friendly President Project, together with the ‘Eye on the Children’s Budget Program’ constitute the base for the analysis of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach, in its public policy component.
organizations, originally aiming at engaging professionals and organizations from the dental healthcare sector to provide regular gratuitous attention to poor children, it recently has expanded its focus to other professional sectors (Abrinq Foundation 2007); the ‘Young Entrepreneurship and Micro-Credit Program’ (Empreendedorismo Juvenil e Micro-Credito) launched in 1996 in partnership with the Citigroup Foundation, offers qualification and micro-credit to young entrepreneurs to develop business plans; the ‘Digital Garage Program’ (Programa Garagem Digital) launched in 2001 in partnership with the Hewlett-Packard Brazil, promotes the digital inclusion of children in low-rent areas in order to contribute to their educational process and future labor opportunities (Abrinq Foundation 2007)

The Abrinq Foundation’s institutional mission is to ‘promote the defense of rights and the exercise of citizenship of children and adolescents in Brazil’ (Abrinq Foundation 2007) Its vision: ‘(a country where) children and adolescents are recognized as subjects of their own histories and enjoying the rights of living in dignity and freedom, healthy, properly nurtured, educated, with access to leisure and sport spaces, to culture and to professionalism’ (Abrinq Foundation 2007) The responsible of change: ‘Family, Government and society, through the action of informed, mobilized, actively participant and compromised adults, assume the task of guaranteeing rights to children and adolescents, in order for them to become plentifully capacitated for life, always defying imposed limits’ (Abrinq Foundation 2007)

The Abrinq Foundation is financially sustained in its operational costs by private individuals and organizations, among which ABRINQ stands out. The administrative body of the Foundation is composed by an Administrative Council, formed by entrepreneurs from different productive sectors; an Advocacy Council, formed by specialists in the area of infancy and adolescence, in charge of prompting a debate around issues related to the defense of rights and a Fiscal Council, responsible for the financial and accountancy duties (Abrinq Foundation 2007).

4.1.1 The Situation of Children in Brazil

It is important to grasp the magnitude of infancy’s problematic in Brazil to contextualize the work of Abrinq Foundation within the children’s social movement. As one of the main
strategies of the Foundation is to prioritize children agendas in public policy, its accomplishments in this area could be rightly weighed if contrasted with the critical situation of children in the early 90s, when the Foundation was created. The current statistics are not yet satisfactory but show decreasing trends in several areas such as child-labor and child-mortality (IBGE 2002) which might be explained by a general awakening to the 90s’ crisis. The ciphers for that period denote not only State’s criminal negligence but depict a larger insensibility of wealthy, professional and middle-class population segments on the subject.

By several accounts, the situation of children in Brazil towards the end of the 1980s was the most critical in history (Hilbig 2001; IBGE 1991) The document that surprised and awed Abrinq Foundation’s founders, the 1989 ‘State of the World’s Children’ report by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided a sinister picture if children’s situation in Brazil. According to the report, of 41 million children in that country aged 17 and younger, 25 million had no access to play, education, regular meals, housing or adequate hygiene, and were often subject to physical and mental violence. 350,000 children aged 5 and younger died every year due to easily avoidable conditions. Also by 1989, 4 million Brazilians under 14 were working (IBGE 1991), making Brazil, in absolute numbers, a leader in child labor in Latin America – only Haiti and Guatemala had more children in the labor force (Raufflet & Gurgel 2007; Hilbig 2001) By 1990, 18 million children aged 7 to 17 years old were illiterate and 4 children were murdered every day in Brazilian cities (Hilbig 2001) In 1991, a Commission of Enquiry (CPI) of the Brazilian National Congress estimated that between 1988 and 1990, 4661 young people under the age of 17 had been murdered (Pinheiro 2004). ‘In February 1992, charges were pressed against more than 100 people in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, mostly off-duty police and security agents hired by private companies to “clean up” the cities (of street-children’ (Raufflet & Gurgel 2007.120) According to Bejzman (1998) who quotes an World Health Organization report, in 1993 10 million children were living on Brazilian streets.

4.1.2 Brazil in Context

Brazil is the largest country in South America, occupying about half of the total surface area of the continent. It is bordered by Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, French Guyana, and the Atlantic
Ocean on the east; by Uruguay on the south, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Peru on the west; and by Colombia on the north-west. Brazil is a federal and constitutional republic (the extant constitution goes back to 5 October 1988). It comprises 26 states plus the district capital, Brasilia. The capital was formerly Rio de Janeiro, but Brasilia was built in the interior and became the new capital in 1960 in order to establish a balance. The legislative body, the Congress comprises the Senate (81 senators elected for a term of 8 years, and the House of Deputies, 513 members elected for a term of four years). The number of deputies from each state is in proportion to the state's population. Each of the twenty-six states has its own administration with loosely defined powers compared to those of the federal government.

In 2007, with a population of more than 169 million (IBGE 2007) Brazil’s is the leading Latin American economy (World Bank 2003). This first, world-class Brazil could be represented by the states of Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, which ‘[…] if they stood alone, would be numbered among the richest 45 nations on earth […]’ The state of Sao Paulo has a gross national product (GNP) larger than Argentina’s, and Sao Paulo City is a megalopolis with a […] vibrant cultural, financial and business life’ (Maxwell 2000). The other Brazil is a nation estimated at more than 40 million people living on less than US$50 a month, deprived of the most basic services, including sewers and potable water (Raufflet & Gurgel 2007.119). ‘The most impoverished 20% of the population receive 2% of the nation’s wealth, while the richest 20% receive 60%’ (Maxwell 2000), appalling numbers that qualify the country as having one of the worst income distributions in the world (Clements 1997). In this poor Brazil, ‘[…] festering shantytowns surround the large urban areas and Rio’s favelas are notorious for crime and violence’ (Maxwell 2000).

4.2 ABRINQ FOUNDATION’S DRM APPROACH

During its first 8 years of existence, from 1990 to 1998, the Abrinq Foundation defined two main lines of action -the mobilization of the Brazilian entrepreneurial sector in favor of children-focused initiatives and influencing public policy, as a mean to unleash State’s resources to the cause of children and adolescents (Abrinq Foundation 1997; 2003) The resource mobilization theories, in this project’s perspective, provide a significant conceptual framework for Abrinq Foundation’s work. RM theories sustain that engagement and alignment
of *elite* resources, meaning labor and funds in possession of wealthy segments of society and the State, to and with a social movement cause is a determinant factor for its success; and for the goal advancement of the organizations that conforms it, the SMOs. Other scholars, not necessarily linked to the resource mobilization theory but enmeshed in the analysis of social movement’s consequences (Giugni 1998) agree upon the idea that degrees of influence on policymaking adds to the transformational –or merely ameliorative- reaches of social movements. A correspondence between RM theories and Abrinq’s premises for action thus exists.

This project emphasizes the *domestic* character of the resource mobilization approach by SMOs in Latin America, such as Abrinq, given a traditional appeal to foreign financial and political resources. The foundation has an absolute focus on the mobilization and engagement of domestic actors in its cause. The premise is that domestic *discretionary* resources, although unequally distributed, exist in Brazilian society and can be aligned with social movement causes, such as children rights. Oded Grajew, one of the founders of Abrinq Foundation and its first president, synthesized its institutional vision in the first public account of the Foundation’s activities:

‘Our country has enormous resources, financial and material; knowledge, competence, goodwill and sensitivity in many individuals; civil society organizations committed to human rights; and corporations increasingly aware of their social responsibilities. Our proposal was to channel these resources to areas where they are lacking and to connect and organize networks and associations supporting our causes’ (Abrinq Foundation 1997. 7).

Abrinq Foundation’s approach to resource mobilization is based on a fundamental premise: to prioritize the enforcement of existing legislation on children, and channel infrastructures, knowledge, labor forces, funds and other resources from the private and public sectors, to the benefit of poor children and adolescents in Brazil. The Foundation does not mobilize resources for itself, to capture them and consequently run programs and projects: it engages capacities that are already set into place to pursue diverse goals –in the case of businesses, production and profit; or addressing misplaced priorities –State’s social public policy; in favor of its cause. The objective is to generate commitments that could be fulfilled within and from the same
spheres of expertise, infrastructure capacity and political reach in which the aforementioned sectors are embedded.

The Foundation limits itself first to design and promote the compromises among willing private organizations and companies, candidates to public offices and public officials; make them concrete in the form of ‘signed agreements’ and programs; and further on to monitor and evaluate participant’s performance, providing expertise and consultancy. With the partial exception of one program\(^{31}\), third parties, not Abrinq Foundation, make use of the resources at their reach, to autonomously conduct children-focused initiatives. Thus, Abrinq Foundation does not aim at appropriating resources to filter them through its bureaucracy for the execution of projects: the ‘filtering’ it actually carries out refers to the terms and quality indicators it demands from those participating –including municipal Mayors and multinational companies- in order to be included and continue in the programs. Setting the agenda and imposing conditions sounds like actions a fund provider, a donor, might impose. The case here is that the only resource Abrinq Foundation provides to program participants, besides public policy expertise, training and networking, is a certification of ‘Children Friendliness’, for those that fulfill compromises and met the specified conditions.

The Domestic Resource Mobilization processes Abrinq Foundation carries out somehow comprises the core of its overall activity. Resource mobilization is what the Foundation does and it is an end in itself. It propels investments from powerful and wealthy sectors to its beneficiary that go beyond mere funding and charity allocations. Socially transformative mechanisms –public policies- and the influential role and abundant resources of entrepreneurial sectors are attuned to service Brazilian poorest children.

What does Brazil’s Abrinq Foundation’s activity, from 1990 to 2006, tells about the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach by SMOs in Latin America? Do discretionary resources exist and can they be mobilized and sustain SMO operations? Also, can a DRM approach

\(^{31}\) The ‘Our Children Program’, in which Abrinq Foundation receives donations from individuals and companies with the express compromise of investing its totality in child-care institutions –no administrative spending in-between. The initiative is further reviewed in Sub Chapter 4.3.1
affect the foreign or national-bound conditionality schemes imposed by donors upon SMOs in the region? The contextual and theoretical frameworks provide milestones to understand where the answers to these questions might be pointing at. Also, argued for certain common trends and characteristics of Latin American countries (recent transitions to democracy, middle-income levels) that might lend a broader scope to Abrinq’s immediate context. The questions are addressed having as a base for analysis the description of Brazil’s Abrinq Foundations main programs and projects. Consequently and to facilitate the presentation, a simple division is made between the programs that specialize in mobilizing productive, business and entrepreneurial sectors and those that aim at influencing public policy.

### 4.3 MOBILIZATION OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SECTORS

The original and main objective of Abrinq Foundation was to engage entrepreneurial, industrial and in general wealthy Brazilian sectors in a new type of philanthropic activism.

‘[…] the Foundation focused its actions since its beginning on mobilizing and generating participation of society rather than aiding children directly (in nursery schools and other institutions, for instance). This way, since its establishment, Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights positioned itself as an “articulating” entity, able to provide a positive intermediation between those who need the resources, means, and knowledge and those who have them’. (Wilheim 2003. 4)

In its first eight years of operation since 1989, Abrinq Foundation contrasted the novel approach in opposition to traditional forms of assistance–oriented charity and defined its effort towards mobilizing the Government, influencing public policy and promoting philanthropy among entrepreneurial sectors as ‘Political Action’

‘[…] besides actions circumscribed to the political sphere (legislative and government bodies, etc) […] the Foundation defines Political Action as the mobilization and organization of social forces—particularly the business sector—in projects that act in depth on the causes of children’s problems. Thus, it seeks to distinguish its work from mere solicitation, such as the nineteenth century

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32 Wilheim, Ana Maria was the Executive Supervisor of the Abrinq Foundation. Extract from an interview conceded to the online bulletin of the W.K.Kellog Foundation (3/1/2003).
philanthropic charity, which is capable of solving only superficial effects of inequality’. (Abrinq Foundation 1997. 5)

The emphasis in business and entrepreneurial mobilization was denominated Political Action, because it implied an important amount of political proselytism of the children’s cause by Abrinq, not only among entrepreneurs but in Brazilian society at large:

‘[…] the situation in Brazil in 1990 was that the level of awareness about the situation of children was very, very low and actually more than that, children were considered to be a threat, especially children from the low-income bracket. They were considered to be a threat to society. So very commonly people in society would believe that children should be beaten on or should go to jail because of things that they did wrong in the streets. So this was one of the first things that the Abrinq Foundation did, to change the level of awareness of the society to the situation itself, by showing the numbers and the need for solutions that would take into consideration the rights of the children. The children were no longer objects, but they were subjects of rights and they had to be respected in that sense’ (Mattar33 2003)

The entrepreneurial sectors were also strange to deeper commitments in terms of social change, letting alone the fact that business philanthropy was and is not a significant phenomenon in Brazil and Latin America (David Rockefeller Center 1999). Oded Grajew, currently the president of the ETHOS Institute of Social Responsibility affirmed that:

‘In 1990, when Abrinq Foundation was founded, the idea of linking the private sector to social projects was so rare in Brazil that I was doubtful about its feasibility. I recurred to UNICEF’s expertise in order to asses whether the whole thing made sense. It was very difficult to find companies carrying out social investments. Up until that moment, companies’ roles were limited to generate profit, offer employment and pay taxes […] social investments were government’s responsibility […] it was very difficult to explain why a determined entrepreneurial sector was concerned with children (as Abrinq originated in the Toy manufacturers’ sector). It caused fright. I remember a journalist making a report on the Foundation asking me what was really behind that social ‘scheme’. Nobody believed. It was difficult because it was not part of Business culture in the country’ (Grajew34 2003. 1)

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33 Mattar, Helio was President of the Abrinq Foundation from 2001 until 2003. Extract from an interview conceded to the online bulletin of the W.K.Kellog Foundation (3/12003)
34 Grajew, Oded was the first President and co-founder of the Abrinq Foundation. His term lasted from 1990 until 2001. Extract from an interview conceded to the Istóe Dinheiro Review (25/92003)
Abrinq Foundation attributed a political character to its entrepreneurial mobilization strategies based on the idea that wealthy sectors should be actors of transformations beyond charity. The Foundation’s ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’ might illustrate this pretension. The program mobilizes national and international companies in Brazil to forbid child-labor in their operations and enforce child-labor free production processes among their suppliers among other measures that promote employees’ children welfare and young employees proper working conditions -following Constitutional provisions. Abrinq Foundation provides consultancy to interested and participant companies and carries out the evaluation process, accordingly to set of indicators elaborated by its experts. The companies that comply with the indicators are awarded a ‘Children-Friendly Seal’ that can be used in advertising and in product packaging, a trademark that informs consumer’s choices between companies that are and are not aware of the use of children labor in their production processes. This approach expands companies’ roles from potential donors or fund providers to actors of the children’s social movement, providing solutions and prompting significant changes within their sphere of action.

Since 1996, Abrinq Foundation evolved from generating awareness on children’s situation in Brazil to engage and articulate businesses and companies with children-focused projects. In all but one case –the ‘Our Children Program’- the foundation does not manages third parties’ financial or other types of resources directly: it promotes, channels, monitors and evaluates its flow from participating businesses and companies to public and private organizations working with children or to the children directly, providing public policy expertise and advocacy, management, logistics and administrative chores. Thus, Abrinq Foundation is not subject to donor-imposed conditions of any sort. To illustrate the ‘articulating’ approach privileged by the Foundation, it is important to commence a more detailed description of its programs regarding entrepreneurial sector’s mobilization. The analysis will be concentrated in two emblematic programs –the ‘Our Children’ and the ‘Children-Friendly Company’ programs.

Footnote: Formally denouncing non-abiding suppliers to the authorities and terminating contracts (Abrinq Foundation 2003)
4.3.1 Our Children Program (Programa Nossas Crianças)

In 1992 the Our Children Program was launched by Abrinq Foundation. It marked a transformation in the Foundation’s emphasis on resource mobilization, as it expanded its focus from generating awareness on children’s situation in Brazil to articulate companies operating in Brazil with specific children-focused projects. The program confirmed, in practice, the emphasis on business or entrepreneurial mobilization as a priority, through the establishment of long-term partnerships with businesses, companies and corporations, partnerships that would become the hallmark of the Abrinq Foundation:

‘The project solved an age-old problem for people who want to help: which institution to trust, and how to make sure that contributions are being channeled to those who need them. Out of this project model – on one side, individuals and corporations willing to help with the resources to do so but not knowing how; and on the other side, trustworthy institutions in need of funds but without the expertise to raise them – came a new role for the Foundation: that of facilitator, able to bridge the gap between the two groups’. (Raufflet & Gurgel 2007.6)

A new fundraising role, although limited to this program, was thus also assumed. The main idea and objective of the ‘Our Children’ program was to identify and select institutions that provide direct assistance to children (nursery schools, youth centers, and shelters), conduct a media campaign encouraging the adherence of companies and/or individuals to the program and utilize the monthly contributions made by the latter to finance the assistance to new children in these institutions. The foundation performs as a bridge between donors and child care and development institutions. This system was called "financial adoption":

‘1) The role of each contribution (from individuals or corporations) is to fund, every month, the assistance to a child, who may thus be financially "adopted";
2) The Foundation’s duty is to set up the communication and fundraising systems and to select qualified institutions to receive the funds, guaranteeing:

a) The full application of the funds raised to the assistance of children (without diversions to administrative or other spending) and
b) An increase in the number of children assisted and an improvement in the quality of this assistance’.
The W. K. Kellogg Foundation and Lew, Lara, Propeg advertising agency were the initial partners; the former sustained the program’s logistics and the latter designed an advertising campaign were a movie commercial —in which an executive begs for money in the street instead of the usual street-children— was produced having a considerable impact (Abrinq Foundation 1997). The media campaign was possible due to the collaboration of different radio and TV organizations that granted gratuitous spots for the adverts. Five months before the media campaign was launched, in September 1993, the fundraising campaign was started, resulting in the collection of EUR$4,400 in its first three months, a cipher that permitted starting the sponsorship of 146 children attended by institutions in the Sao Paulo area (Abrinq Foundation 1997). The project also received the support of Credicard, a Brazilian credit card operator, which made its 100,000 clients’ database available for the program to sent correspondences encouraging adhesion to the project (Abrinq Foundation 1997). ‘The final unexpected result was achieving, in ten months, twice the projected number of child assistance for the second year, that is, close to 2,000 assisted children’ (Abrinq Foundation 1997. 18)

In 1995 the program, parallel to its efforts in bridging businesses and individuals with child support institutions, moved towards quality improvement and capacity building objectives. The monitoring of involved institutions –regarding spending and investment of funds and children care- was strengthened and this led to an awareness of the need to improve staff’s knowledge and capacity. Consequently, from 1996 onwards, a two-year initiative was started in association with São Paulo’s branch of the National Commerce Service (Sevico Nacional do Comercio SENAC) and Vitae–Support for Culture, Education and Social Promotion (Vitae Apoio a Cultura, Educacao e Promocao Social): the Our Children Project Technical-Management and Capacity-Building Program. (Abrinq Foundation 1997)

‘[…] Phase I of the project consisted of sensitization of the staff to, not only focus on the "emergency" aspect, but also on the quality of the assistance provided to the children. During 1997, Phase II of the Capacity-Building Programs—Improvement of Management and Service Quality—started yielding good results. The institutions started creating their own programs, with quality-oriented services,
progressing in their own fundraising, and overcoming the old charitable tone’ (Abrinq Foundation 1997. 19)

In the other hand, the ‘Our Children Network’ ( Rede Nossas Criancas) formed in 1997, created a proper communication environment for all organizations involved in the program. Also in 1997, the project allowed the financial adoption of 2,438 children, helping another 11,504 in 43 institutions. (Abrinq Foundation 1997).

Up to 2007 the Our Children program maintains its basic features and objectives. Its main two focuses, mobilizing companies and individuals to support children care institutions and strengthening the latter’s capacities and professionalism. A significant quantitative jump regarding benefited infants was noticeable from 1997 to 2002 (from 11,504 to 35,506 children). The 2007 cipher is 42,280 benefited children attended in 23 municipalities of the Great São Paulo area by 135 child-care institutions (Abrinq Foundation 2007). Participant companies have ranged from 100 to 120; individual contributors around 1,000; financially adopted children 2,000 to 2,500 and yearly fund allocations from EUR$780,000 to EUR$975,000 (Abrinq Foundation 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006). An evaluation of the program’s results and functioning is undergoing (Abrinq Foundation 2006).

4.3.2 Children Friendly Company Program (Programa Empresa Amiga da Criança)

According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica IBGE) by 1991, 4 million Brazilians aged less than 14 years old were laboring,36 out of an overall estimated population of 169 million.37 The Brazilian Constitution forbid work for children under 14 years old up until 1998 when a Constitutional amendment bill was passed, raising the age limit to 16 (Presidencia da Republica 1998).

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37 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica IBGE. National Census 2000
In this context, Abrinq Foundation launched in 1995 an initiative against child labor: the Children Friendly Company Program (Programa Empresa Amiga da Criança PEAC) with the financial support of Safra Bank and the institutional backing of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and UNICEF. The initial outline of the program was simple: to grant a ‘Children Friendly Seal’ to those companies that would commit not to employ child labor; promote among their suppliers practices forbidding child labor and support actions in favor of children, for example, setting up nursery schools for their worker’s children and/or the promotion of educational, health and sports initiatives in the communities where they are based (Abrinq Foundation 1997). The seal can be used in product packages, advertising and merchandising, certifying to consumers that the company does not employ child labor and contributes to improve children’s livelihoods in Brazil. The Abrinq Foundation manages a ‘quality certification’ process which evaluates company’s commitments and investments- as well as provides advocacy and expertise- but in any case operate initiatives directly. The companies are authorized to use the Children Friendly Company Seal after passing the program’s ‘technical screening’, that is, after verification of compliance to Constitutional law forbidding child labor and of actions in favor of children. The verification process is carried out together with a set of public officials, union leaders and social organizations, based on the information provided by participant companies (Abrinq Foundation 1997; Raufflet & Gurgel 2007).

Creating a precedent for upcoming versions, the awarding of the seal was followed by a campaign in Brazil’s most important magazines, newspapers, radio and TV stations, recommending consumers to give preference to the products bearing the Children Friendly seal (Abrinq Foundation 1997) The purpose of this is to create a "market environment" that will contribute to the eradication of child labor (Abrinq Foundation 1997) In 1996, the Children Friendly Company Program had six regional launchings; in 1997, the number of certified Children Friendly Companies reached 902, benefiting more than 360,000 children (Abrinq Foundation 1997)

‘In 1997, the seal grew both in the number of certified companies and, specially, in its scope— being translated into English and Spanish to be used on export products. Thus, the Seal also became a sales
facilitator for countries with progressive social laws that import Brazilian products’ (Abrinq Foundation 1997)

In 1998 a Constitutional amendment bill raising the age minimum for workers from 14 years old to 16 years old was approved by the Brazilian Congress. The amendment also forbids hazardous and insalubrious chores, as well as night shifts, to workers under 18 years old. In 2000 the ‘Apprenticeship Law’ (Lei de Aprendizagem Presidencia da Republica 2000) was approved by Congress, through which adolescents between 14 and 18 years old were allowed to work for companies as apprentices or trainees. Taking into account the developments in the field of public policy and the positive impact of the program, Abrinq Foundation decides to broaden its scope. In 2001 the Children Friendly Company program was restructured, extending the range of action and compromises to several others that go beyond fighting to eradicate child labor. Basically, the new compromises refer to actions companies can carry out with employees, suppliers and communities where they operate, and are resumed in 10 specific commitments. Also, the terms in which companies could get involved with the program were specified and refined. The 10 commitments or compromises are:

1. Say no to child labor, refusing to employ minors under 16 years old, excepting apprentices from 14 years old onwards.
2. Respect young workers, refusing to employ minors under 18 years old in hazardous, insalubrious and nocturnal activities
3. Alert suppliers, through a contractual clause or other instruments, that a verified charge of child labor is motive for interrupting the commercial relationship.
4. Provide nursery schools or nursery school subsidies for workers’ children.
5. Make sure that workers register their children under 18 years old in the basic education cycle and carry out actions to stimulate attendance to school.
6. Stimulate and assist expectant workers to conduct pre-natal examinations and advise all workers about the importance of this measure.
7. Stimulate breastfeeding, providing conditions for workers to breastfeed their children up until 6 months.
8. Advise and assist workers in obtaining birth certificates for their children.
9. Conduct social investments in children and adolescents compatible with the financial and logistic reach of the company, in compliance with Abrinq Foundation’s criteria.
10. Contribute to the Funds for Children and Adolescents Rights\(^{38}\) with the equivalent of 1% of owed income tax, accordingly with company’s taxable profit.

(Abrinq Foundation 2007)

The program’s reform of 2001 and the substantial increase of participant companies also brought a series of important changes regarding the evaluation and monitoring tasks carried out by the Abrinq Foundation. Compromise fulfillment was evaluated, as usual, based on documentation presented by the participant companies; the issue of child-labor forbiddance, nonetheless, always required special monitoring by the Foundation, due to its complexity. It was extremely resource and time-consuming, as it included not only participant companies but also supply-chains. It was thus agreed upon that companies themselves would conduct and present an evaluation document to the Foundation (Abrinq Foundation 2007b). ‘The companies were put in charge of monitoring its suppliers and laborers and, upon verified complaint (of child-labor practices) participation (of companies in the program) would be ended. Due to the program’s public recognition, the image damages (to the companies) would be considerable’ (Abrinq Foundation 2007b. 56). Another significant change was that the social investments indicated in compromise 9, would have to be availed by a percentage of the companies’ gross turnover (Abrinq Foundation 2007b. 56)

To promote the new terms of engagement with the Children Friendly Company program among companies in Brazil, Abrinq Foundation produced and distributed a document explaining in an accessible manner specific fiscal benefits of taking children and adolescent agendas into account. The first publication, issued in 2002, was titled ‘Fiscal Incentives Benefiting Children and Adolescents’ (Incentivos Fiscais en Beneficio de Criancas e do Adolescentes). The Children and Adolescent Statute (Estatuto Crianca e Adolescente ECA) establishes the possibility of deducting from natural and juristic person’s income tax obligations, the equivalent amount of money contributions made to municipal, state and Federal Funds for Children and Adolescent Rights. Natural persons can allocate 6% of their tax

\(^{38}\) The Municipal, Federal and State Funds for Children and Adolescent Rights correspond to respective Councils for Children and Adolescent Rights (Conselhos dos Direitos da Crianca e do Adolescente) which are the public instances in charge of the formulation, implementation and control of children’s public policies in Brazil (Abrinq Foundation 2005b)
obligations and juristic persons 1% (Abrinq Foundation 2002). The document focuses on explaining the required steps to be eligible for tax exemptions and the positive implication this would have in civil society’s monitoring and participation in official budgetary executions.

By 2002, 587 corporations and companies participated in the program, investing more than EUR$24 million in health, education, social assistance and other projects for children and youth (Abrinq Foundation 2003, 32). In 2004, 1,041 companies participated in the Children Friendly Company program and allocated R$388 million (EUR$150.34 million) for social projects and actions for the benefit of children and adolescents. Another R$19.4 millions (EUR$7.52 million) were destined to the Funds for Children and Adolescent rights. Abrinq Foundation’s calculations indicate that 14,338,652 children and adolescents in Brazil benefited with the investments, a 137% raise compared to 2003 ciphers (8.2 million) (Abrinq Foundation 2004b).

Besides mobilization of new Children Friendly Companies the program launched, in 2003 and jointly with the Ethos Institute of Companies and Social Responsibility (Instituto Ethos de Empresas e Responsabilidade Social), a campaign to promote the Apprenticeship Law (Lei de Aprendizagem No 10.097) which allows companies to employ adolescents between 14 and 18 years old as apprentices. The objective of the campaign was to generate awareness among entrepreneurs about the importance of applying the law. The campaign was designed, free of charge, by the advertising agency McCann-Ericsson and consisted of TV, radio and printed media adverts championed by TV adolescent actors. Support material was also produced, including the publishing and distribution among companies of the document ‘Apprenticeship Law: Social Responsibility in the Professional Formation of Adolescents’ (Lei de Aprendizagem: Responsabilidade Social Na Formacao Profissional do Adolescente’). The document synthesizes successful experiences of companies that employed adolescent apprentices, explains in detail Brazilian legislation regarding children and adolescent protection and provides a step-by-step guide for companies to employ apprentices (Abrinq Foundation 2004b).
In 2006, the program underwent an assessment process in order to expand its focus, improve its evaluation and monitoring phases and increase its visibility (Abrinq Foundation 2006). According to the Foundation, the program’s ciphers reached a high mark in 2006: R$ 551, 7 million (EUR$ 216,1 million) were invested during that year by the ‘Children-Friendly Companies’ for social projects and actions for the benefit of children and adolescents and R$ 73,3 million (EUR$ 28,5 million) for the Municipal Funds for Children Rights. The number of indirectly benefited children reached the number of 34.7 million (Abrinq Foundation 2006).

The numbers and results of the program as well as the rising credibility of the Foundation attracted new companies that were willing to contribute in different areas. ‘[…] the Foundation began to attract all sorts of groups, organizations and international agencies who wanted to set up programs for needy children and youth using the Foundation’s network and know-how’(Raufflet & Gurgel 2007) This was the case for the ‘Adote um Sorriso’ (Adopt-a-Smile) Project. In 1996, a group of fifteen dentists approached the Abrinq Foundation to offer free treatment to children and adolescents supported by social service organizations involved in the Foundation’s programs. The role of the Foundation was, again, to channel third parties’ resources and goodwill to the cause of children, lending his trademark and networks. By 2002, 20,324 children in 185 organizations had been assisted, and the volunteer dentists’ network had 3220 members (Abrinq Foundation 2003. 7).

The Digital Garage program is another example of a successful program implemented with the Foundation’s assistance. The idea came from Hewlett-Packard Brazil who wanted to develop, with the Foundation, a project to support the inclusion of Brazilian youth in the digital revolution. Offering computers equipped with the latest software, the first Digital Garage in 1998 attracted 120 young people, who mastered basic applications, learning to operate Windows, Dreamweaver and Photoshop (Raufflet & Gurgel 2007). Hewlett-Packard provides the technology and financial costs and the Abrinq Foundation evaluates and monitors the program, provides a pedagogic methodology and systematizes the experience for its subsequent dissemination (Abrinq Foundation 2007). In 2002, the Digital Garage Project won the International Annual Corporate Conscience Award in the Innovative Partnership category (Abrinq Foundation 2003. 11; Raufflet & Gurgel 2007. 8).
4.3.3 The Preference for Entrepreneurial Resources

After revising Abrinq Foundation’s programs focused in mobilizing entrepreneurial sectors, it is valid to question the Foundation’s emphasis. Simply put, why is this type of resource mobilization privileged? And second, beyond activism and campaigns, what moves private and for-profit entities to engage in social investments? Regarding the first question, a very simple answer is provided by the leaders of Abrinq Foundation:

‘The entrepreneurial sector is powerful; plentiful of financial resources and knowledge and information infra-structures […] a part of these resources have to be mobilized for community investment. Brazil is not a poor country but it is unjust. You have, in one hand, concentration and in the other, shortage of resources. What we are trying to do is to open channels so resources can flow from where they are concentrated to where they are lacking’ (Grajew 1997. 5)

For the Abrinq Foundation, it is common sense to look for resources where they are more abundant and surplus or, to put it in resource mobilization theories’ words, where they are bound to posses a discretionary character. Mass resources or resources in time, funds, labor etc mobilized from the general population are more uncertain and unstable, as they are largely committed to subsistence schemes (McCarthy & Zald 1977). In strictly utilitarian terms, the former argument explains part of the Foundation’s emphases –the other being influencing public policies- in resource mobilization. There also are, nonetheless, political and moral grounds for such a preference going beyond the former argument. The political consideration addresses the relatively new democratic scenario in the country and the new role of economic elites in it:

‘Companies had a traditional role in society and were focused in production of goods and services; because Brazil experienced a long period under dictatorship and authoritarian rule. Democracy is a recent reality and the country had to rapidly adapt to it. Advancing from a representative type of democracy, towards a type of democracy which is practiced in developed countries; this is participative democracy, where everyone, including companies, is responsible for the general welfare of society, is not an easy task. What we are talking about here is the advance of democratic power. Today

39 Extract from an interview conceded by Oded Grajew to the Sem Fronteiras Review (October 1997).
entrepreneurs are increasingly aware of their social role […] but there is still a long way to go to match what is being done in Europe and the USA⁴⁰ (Grajew 2001)

Consequently, one of the Foundation’s roles is to relieve the new political obligations that entrepreneurs have regarding larger society, with the advent of democracy. Also, there is a historical moral debt of the elites with Brazilian children and the majorities in general, which Abrinq Foundation identifies and, regardless of stressing it or not in its campaigns, informs its focus on resource mobilization:

‘If a Martian descends upon the Earth today and gets to know Brazil, he will give a zero mark to its elite. In Brazil wealth, diversity and potential abounds and still there is such social degradation […] the (old) elite ‘desisted’ of Brazil at a given time in history; it desisted of a societal project and sheltered in the ‘run for your lives’ attitude. It did not work for an organized and solidarity-based society. It rather adopted its own State, with private health, education, transport, prevision, justice and security services, constituting a State within a State that forgot the idea of Nation⁴¹ (Grajew 2000)

Clearly, a broadened involvement of economic elites with social agendas could be stimulated. But other elements, beyond moral acknowledgements, also drive companies and wealthy sectors in Brazil towards ‘social responsibility’; basically, the latter’s added value to market competitiveness and social prestige. Also, recognition of the rapid deterioration of living conditions of Brazilian population and the implicit threat that poses to the overall Establishment⁴². The aforementioned elements are further explored and analyzed in Sub Chapter 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and assist in explaining how and why a DRM approach is feasible and sustainable.

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⁴⁰ Extract from an interview conceded by Oded Grajew to the Shopping Centers magazine (June 2001).
⁴¹ Extract from an interview conceded to the Istoé Online Review (20/12/2000)
⁴² ‘The main motivation (of companies and wealthy sector and individuals) to act, unhappily, is the growth of social problems. It is difficult for any company or citizen not to do something. The violence has spread in such a fashion that it is hard not to see it (Grajew 2004).
4.4 MOBILIZATION OF STATE’S RESOURCES: INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

In its first two years of activity since its creation in 1990, Abrinq Foundation’s focused in generating awareness regarding the critical situation of millions of children and adolescents in Brazil, at all levels of society and Government. The strategy, which was denominated ‘Political Action’, prioritized the sensitization of entrepreneurial sectors with regard to children’s situation in the country. Through general media and communication campaigns, as well as through direct work with entrepreneurial sectors, Abrinq Foundation developed this task. In 1992 the Foundation’s activities extended from awareness-raising to articulation and managerial chores, with the launching of the ‘Our Children’ program.

A similar evolution occurred with the idea of mobilizing State institutions around its Constitutional obligations regarding children and adolescents. In its first five years of activity Abrinq Foundation carried out a series of awareness raising campaigns and public demonstrations to exert pressure for a deeper commitment of the Federal Government in the children’s situation. As these initiatives were developed, a progress towards more elaborated forms of partnership and accountability between the Abrinq Foundation and the Brazilian State consolidated.

In 1995, and based on data collected by the Foundation since 1992, it was concluded that the products which use the largest proportion of child labor in their production processes -coal and alcohol- were purchased by large Brazilian and multinational corporations such as car manufacturers and Petrobrás (the State–owned oil and energy company); and were part of their production chain (Abrinq Foundation 1997). Making a tactical use of undergoing negotiations between the Congress and the alcohol and sugar mills owners on the renewal of the National Alcohol Program, Pro Alcohol, the Abrinq Foundation carried out a campaign with the slogan: ‘National Shame: Pro-Alcohol finances Child Labor.’ Its purpose was to exert pressure on Congress to grant tax benefits only to those alcohol and sugar producers committed to the elimination of child labor (Abrinq Foundation 1997). Congresspersons and civil society organizations joined the campaign and, on March 20, 1996, a demonstration was held in the
Congressional precinct and in front of the Palácio do Planalto, seat of the Presidency of the Republic. In April 1996, the Bandeirantes Pact was signed in the presence of the state (provincial) Governor, where official representatives of the alcohol manufacturers committed themselves not to buy sugarcane from planters who hire child labor in the fields. The pact’s name was derived from the seat of São Paulo’s State Government, the Bandeirantes Palace, where it was signed (Abrinq Foundation 1997).

The mobilization and visibility process started by the Abrinq Foundation transcended the Provincial scene and led the Federal Government to implement measures regarding its approach to child labor. A series of negotiations, which included Abrinq Foundation as a representative of the Third Sector, resulted in the signing of three important commitments in September 1996, during a ceremony held in the Federal Capital with the President of the Republic, Ministers, Congresspersons, and Governors:

- National Protocol for the Eradication of Child Labor in Brazil, signed by the President, Ministers, 12 Governors, congresspersons, business and labor organizations, and the Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights.
- Term of Agreement by the Ministries of Justice, Labor, Education, Social Welfare, and Industry and Trade for the concerted action against child labor in the sugar-alcohol industry.
- Regulation of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism decreeing that the funds from the Social Welfare Plan for the sugar-alcohol industry have as a priority application—second only to the medical assistance to workers—the actions for the elimination of child labor.

(Abrinq Foundation 1997)

Also in 1996 and partially based on the model of the ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’, the Foundation launched the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ (Programa Prefeito Amigo da Criança) which aimed at engaging candidates to municipal Mayoralities, during the 1996 municipal election campaign, with specific, public compromises regarding elaboration and implementation of policies for children and adolescents. The relative success of this initiative at convoking candidates; and the aforementioned awareness-raising campaign which culminated with the signature of pacts and agreements between the private and public sector in
Brazil, taught Abrinq Foundation about the possibility of influencing public policy and mobilizing the commitment of the State from a SMO perspective. This is, that without the kind of influence powerful *lobbies* and interests exert on policymakers and enforcers, an organization belonging to a social movement could generate a certain degree of change—or at least mobilization towards change. This was a decisive moment for Abrinq Foundation, informing a renovated emphasis on public policy and a search for more elaborated partnerships with the Brazilian State.

After prompting specific public commitments from candidates for Mayoral elections in 1996, the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ carried out a quality certification process with elected Mayors, monitoring and providing expertise in how to fulfill the compromises made in the campaign trail on children and adolescents issues. The process was based on the model of the ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’ and, as the latter, awarded a Seal (plus a symbolic diploma for the best performance) to children-committed municipal administrations.

In 1998, a similar approach was taken with the Presidential elections, urging candidates to sign a document containing a series of commitments regarding public policy implementation to improve the critical situation of Brazilian children. The initiative was called the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ and was ensued by a similar evaluation and feedback process carried out by Abrinq Foundation. Both programs, together with the ‘Eye-on-the Children Budget Project’ (Projeto de Olho Orcamento Criança) which provides a methodology to local authorities and SMOs to understand and access to Federal government’s budgetary provisions for children and adolescents—constitute the pillars of the Foundation’s mobilization of State’s resources. The three initiatives are hereto forth reviewed.

### 4.4.1 The Children Friendly Mayor Program (Programa Prefeito Amigo da Criança e do Adolescente)

During the 1996 municipal elections in Brazil, the Abrinq Foundation presented a ‘Children’s Mayor Guide’ (Guia Prefeito Criança) to all candidates involved in the electoral contest. The guide contained a series of policy elaboration, implementation and evaluation guidelines
regarding children and adolescents rights, for the future mayors of Brazilian cities (period 1997-2000). The ‘Children’s Mayor Project’ (Projeto Prefeito Criança) was thus started in its first version, engaging 821 elected Mayors to participate in periodical encounters with Abrinq Foundation, in which they would receive policy advocacy and technical support to carry out actions in favor of children and adolescents. Among the input provided by Abrinq was the ‘Children and Adolescent Map’ (Mapa da Criança e do Adolescente) a methodology which enables municipal administrations to scan the overall situations, in terms of basic social and civil rights, of children and adolescents in Brazil’s municipalities. Designed to register the advances in policy implementation, yearly, until 2000, the map consisted of a general inquisition of municipal policies on education, health, social assistance, social participation, and public budget; vision of the future; challenging goals and action plans.

In 1999 Abrinq Foundation awarded the Children’s Mayor Award to five municipalities that stood out in the evaluation and implementation of children rights’ policies, following the methodologies and advocacy provided in the framework of the Children’s Mayor Project. Five more municipalities were awarded in 2000. The purpose of the award, which does not consist of specific returns to municipalities in terms of funding from Abrinq Foundation, is to provide public recognition to local administrations for their labor in favor of children, a fact that, besides being within city offices’ mandates, might generate positive compensations in terms of private investing and international cooperation funding (Abrinq 2004).

For the 2000 municipal elections and the 2001-2004 municipal administration period, the program -renamed as ‘The Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ (Programa Prefeito Amigo da Criança)- was reorganized and given a more formal and orderly structure by Abrinq Foundation. The electoral and executive phases were clearly distinguished. Regarding the former, it was framed within a new ‘Electoral Platform’ concept, launched in 2000. The platform consisted, firstly, of a ‘Children’s Mayor Campaign’ (Campanha Prefeito Criança) constituted by a series of specific strategies to stimulate a connection between voter’s choices and the public compromise of candidates on children rights agendas (Ministerio Publico 2000). The Campaign’s slogan, ‘only vote for candidates that have a children and adolescent project’

43 The main public policy and technical recommendations were synthesized in a document, ‘The Children’s Mayor Guide’ (Guia Prefeito Crianca), which was delivered to all participant municipalities (Abrinq 2007)
(‘Só vote em candidato que tem projeto para a criança e o adolescente’) spearheaded a media mobilization initiative that included radio and television spots, a website and a distribution of diverse promotional material (Revista Educacao 2000) It also included the setting up of municipal committees, composed by NGOs and governmental institutions working for children and adolescent rights, which task was to promote debates with candidates and electors around the issue at stake and mobilize local media (Ministerio Publico 2000) Secondly, the Electoral Platform included a Platform Compromise (Compromisso do Plataforma) containing general commitments in children’s public policy candidates had to adhere while in campaign, to fulfill once in office –in order to enter the Children Friendly Mayor Program. The Platform Compromise also included specific commitments regarding the inclusion of children and adolescent issues in the electoral debates of the candidates (Abrinq Foundation 2004d)

The executive phase of the Children-Friendly Mayor program –this is, the concrete work with municipal administration and their executive component, the Mayoralties- was also restructured into three cycles that ordered the progression of implementation and evaluation through each one of its three years (2001-2004) The ‘Children Friendly Mayor Seal’ (Selo Prefeito Amigo da Criança) was also created, in addition to the Children Friendly Mayor Award which is given at the end of the mandate, in order to certificate the progresses of municipalities in every cycle⁴⁴. The Children- Friendly Mayor Network (Rede Prefeito Amigo da Criança) was set up, gathering the municipal administrations that sign the Term of Compromise and are willing to take part in the program. Its main task is to congregate municipalities, SMOs and Governmental institutions working with children and adolescents, in periodical reunions to analyze the program’s progress, increasing the flow of knowledge and specific case experiences. It also consists of training seminars, periodical bulletins and a website, all run by Abrinq Foundation (Abrinq Foundation 2004)

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⁴⁴ The Children Friendly Mayor Seal is awarded in its first phase, to the municipalities that succeed in assessing the situation of children and adolescents as well as the policies in place at their districts, following the program’s methodology. The second phase of the Seal awards municipalities that have elaborated programs and projects in favor of children and adolescents. The third and definitive awarding is conceded to municipalities that have successfully implemented project and programs and goes together with the awarding of the Children Friendly Mayor Award (Abrinq Foundation 2004)
The first cycle of the Children-Friendly Mayor program, from June 2001 to June 2002, started once elected mayors, previously committed or not in the electoral stage, took office and received the ‘Term of Commitment Children-Friendly Mayor’ (Termo de Compromisso Prefeito Amigo da Criança’) which contained specific implementation, monitoring, policy advocacy and evaluation objectives to be achieved by the Abrinq Foundation and municipal administrations, towards the end of the mayoral mandate. The commitments covered a wide spectrum of health, education, social assistance and leisure and sports mandates for children, strictly complying with the ‘Children and Adolescents Statute’ (Estatuto do Criança e Adolescente ECA). Along with the Term of Commitment, a ‘Children Friendly Mayor Guide’ was distributed—in every of the three cycles—in order to facilitate the understanding of the program. Upon return of the signed document to the Foundation, municipalities were registered into the program: out of the 5,561 Brazilian municipalities—its total number—to which the Term of Commitment was sent, 1,542 adhered and were registered for the first cycle (Abrinq Foundation 2004). The registered municipalities thus received the ‘Children and Adolescent Map 2001: Children Friendly Mayor Indicators’ (Mapa da Criança e Adolescente 2001: Indicadores Prefeito Amigo da Criança) which contained various forms to be filled by municipal administrations, in which they had to characterize the situation of children and adolescents in their jurisdiction, through specified social indicators; present the goals and desired results in health, social assistance, education, culture, leisure and sports; and describe the action plans for their administrations (Abrinq Foundation 2005c).

Municipalities that filled the Map and returned it to Abrinq Foundation received a document—containing recommendations and policy advocacy elaborated by the Foundation’s policy specialists—and were awarded the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Seal’ in its first phase. Out of 1,542 municipalities that signed the Term of Commitment, 668 (43.3%) elaborated and returned the Children and Adolescents Map 2001. Finally, 654 municipalities were certified with the Children-Friendly Mayor Seal, an award that formalized their status as members of the Network. The events were widely promoted in local and national media by Abrinq Foundation. Also, the web pages of the awarded municipalities were launched in the Network’s website.

45 After signing an ‘Adherence Letter’ (Carta de Adesão) to the Term, candidates formalized the commitment (Abrinq Foundation 2004)
Regional seminars were held, in which experts from Abrinq Foundation and other organizations provided training in participative strategic planning to the municipalities taking part in the program (Abrinq Foundation 2005c).

The second cycle began in January 2002 and ended in July 2003. It consisted of the distribution by Abrinq Foundation of the Children and Adolescent Map 2002, which allowed municipal administrations to register, in a descriptive manner, the program and projects, as well as the budgetary allocations it was implementing in order to achieve the goals previously defined. The Map was filled and sent back to Abrinq Foundation by 499 (32.4%) of the 654 Friendly Mayor Network municipalities. Based on the Map’s characterizations, Abrinq Foundation provided technical recommendations and support, in documents sent to all participants as well as through training seminars organized by the Network. The Maps analyses provided Abrinq with elements to certify 193 (12.6%) out of the 499 municipalities with the second phase of the Children Friendly Mayor Seal (Abrinq Foundation 2005c).

The third and final cycle started in August 2003 and ended in June 2004. The Children and Adolescent Map 2003 was distributed among the municipalities. It inquired for the results and performance of implemented programs for children and adolescents, including budgetary allocations (Abrinq Foundation 2005c). Out of 193 municipalities, 188 returned a filled Map. Based on the Map’s analysis, the public policy team of Abrinq Foundation returned its indications, as well as the Friendly Mayor Network organized seminars to exchange experiences and provide public policy training to municipalities (Abrinq Foundation 2005c). 126 of the 188 municipalities that returned the Map to the Abrinq Foundation were certified with the definitive version of the Children Mayor Friendly Seal and with the Children Friendly Mayor Award, both of which allow them to utilize the icons of the Program for promotional campaigns (Abrinq Foundation 2004; 2005c).

In its current version, period 2005-2008, the Children Friendly Mayor program gives continuity to the electoral and public policy intervention features developed in the 2001-2004 version. In 2005, 2,263 municipalities adhered to the Term of Commitment of which 1,155 (20% of Brazilian municipalities) returned the Children-Friendly Mayor Map 2005-2006. 842
of the responding municipalities were awarded with the first phase of the Children-Friendly Mayor Seal and provided with public policy advocacy and training by Abrinq Foundation (Abrinq Foundation 2006b).

Various innovations stand out, nonetheless: first, the program was aligned with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the World Fit for Children (WFFC) goals and indicators for 2015 (Abrinq Foundation 2007). Previously, the normative framework was based upon elements present in the Brazilian Children and Adolescents Statute (ECA) and the Brazilian Constitution. As the Brazilian Government adhered to the MDGs and the WFFC commitments, in 2000 and 2002 respectively, Abrinq Foundation decided to include the program within these frameworks.

Two other relevant developments are worth mentioning. First, the introduction of an additional condition for municipalities to participate in the program: the setting up, installation and proper functioning, by municipalities and Mayors, of the Municipal Councils of Children and Adolescents Rights (Conselho Municipal dos Direitos da Crianças e do Adolescente CMCDA) and Tutelary Councils for Children and Adolescents (Conselho Tutelar). Both figures are contemplated in the Brazil’s Children and Adolescent Statute (ECA) and have among their responsibilities to formulate, deliberate and control public policy for children and adolescents (Abrinq Foundation 2005b). The councils and funds are constituted by municipal administration’s authorities and civil society organizations. Also, Abrinq Foundation and other partners in the Children-Friendly Mayor Program proposed the creation of a Municipal Evaluation and Monitoring Comission (Comissão Municipal de Avaliação e Acompanhamento) under the supervision of the CMCDA, which expands the participation on the public policy realm to other governmental instances –such as the office of the Public Attorney (Ministerio Publico) the judiciary and legislative systems at the municipal levels and as well as other non-governmental organizations (Abrinq 2007) The municipalities that did not succeed in installing the CMCDA six months after the deadline to adhere to the program -July 2005 – were not considered in the awarding of the first phase of the Children Friendly Mayor Seal (Abrinq Foundation 2005d)
4.4.2 The Children–Friendly President Project (Projeto Presidente Amigo da Criança e do Adolescente)

At the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Children, in 2002, Brazil and the other country members pledged to improve the livelihoods of children and adolescents in Brazil and throughout the world. The commitments established at this meeting were set forth in the form of a set of goals and targets in the areas of Education, Health, Protection and HIV/AIDS, in a document entitled A World Fit for Children (WFFC). Upon signing this document, the Brazilian State accepted a commitment before the people of Brazil and of the world, to bring about a series of changes in the lives of children and adolescents (Abrinq Foundation 2004b)

As a consequence of wide mobilization, instigated by the Abrinq Foundation, during the 2002 election campaign, the four main contenders for the Presidency of the Republic pledged to fulfill the WFFC Goals and to make children and adolescents the top priority of Brazilian public policies, signing the ‘Children-Friendly President Term of Commitment’ (Termo de Compromisso Presidente Amigo da Criança) (Abrinq Foundation 2004c). The document, elaborated by Abrinq Foundation with the institutional backing of UNICEF, aligned with the goals proposed by the WFFC agreement –Promoting Healthy Lives; Providing Quality Education; Protecting Against Abuse, Exploitation and Violence and Combating HIV and AIDS- and added specific compromises regarding the setting up of a Plan of Action, budgetary allocations and accountability obligations. (Abrinq Foundation 2004c)

The term of commitment was the base for the constitution of the Children-Friendly President Project. After the election, the elected President, Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva, confirmed his intention to fulfill the WFFC Goals and reiterated his pledge to strive to improve the livelihoods of children and adolescents. He also promised that the Government would ensure transparency in all its actions; that it would provide support for the development of a monitoring and evaluation system; that no spending cuts would be imposed upon funding earmarked for children and adolescents; and that a Plan of Action would be drawn up,
involving public debate and approval of the National Council of Children and Adolescents’ Rights\textsuperscript{46} (CONANDA) in the first year of his administration (Abrinq Foundation 2004c)

In 2002, various organizations in Brazil, with the leadership and financial sponsorship of Abrinq Foundation (Presidencia da República Federativa do Brasil 2003) came together to form the Children-Friendly Monitoring Network (Rede de Monitoramento Amiga da Criança-denominated henceforward as Friendly Network) with a view to accompanying the Government’s progress in fulfilling the Terms of Commitment. Among the activities that the Friendly Network has been pursuing are the establishment of baseline indicators to base its assessments as to whether Brazil will manage to achieve the –intermediate- goals proposed for 2015 (and the set of intermediate goals for 2010) and, in the event that such projections indicate that they will not be achieved, to make recommendations for assuring their achievement. Several consultations between the Friendly Network and Government representatives ensued in order to draw a Presidential Plan of Action (Abrinq Foundation 2007c)

In Brazil, in December 2003, at the 5th National Conference on Children’s and Adolescent’s Rights, held by the National Council for Children’s and Adolescent’s Rights (CONANDA), the Brazilian Government presented a Plan of Action for the 2004-2007 period entitled the Children-Friendly President Plan (Plano Presidente Amigo da Criança e do Adolescente – PPAC), describing its proposed strategies and policies for achieving the WFFC Goals. The PPAC comprises a set of governmental programs and actions, contained in the Government’s Multi-year Action Plan, that fulfill the following criteria: they contribute toward the fulfillment of the Term of Commitment; and / or are complementary to its programs and actions.

In total, the Presidential Plan earmarks resources amounting to roughly R$ 56 billion (approximately EUR$ 200 million) over the four-year period, and identifies 16 challenges the

\textsuperscript{46} CONANDA is an inter-sector council composed by different NGOs and State institutions engaged in the defense and promotion of children rights. It was instituted in 1991 as a result of the new Statute for Children and Adolescents approved by Congress in 1990. Its main task is to regulate children rights policies at the Federal levels and it is administratively attached to the Special Secretariat of Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic (Presidencia da República Federativa do Brasil 2007) Abrinq Foundation is a member and other organizations that would later constitute the Child Friendly Monitoring Network also participate (Abrinq 2004c).
Government proposes to meet. It points to over 200 actions to be carried out over the period. On December 1st, 2003, a Presidential Decree created the Management Committee of the Children Friendly President’s Plan of Action, which was given the responsibility of monitoring and supporting implementation of actions targeted at fulfilling the goals of the Plan -under coordination of the Special Secretariat for Human Rights of the Presidency of the Republic- and of opening the possibility for civil society organizations to participate in its deliberations.

After the presentation of the Presidential Plan of Action, the Friendly Network set out to elaborate its evaluation. The analysis was mainly based upon the Friendly Network’s interpretation of available data on the situation of children and adolescents in Brazil within the perspective of the WFFC goals; and the public policies and governmental initiatives in place regarding children and adolescent rights (Abrinq Foundation 2004c; 2007c) The idea was to begin a monitoring process that would render Government fulfillment of its compromises accountable and also generate recommendations and proposals -based on thorough data analysis- from the SMOs involved in the Friendly Network. (Abrinq Foundation 2004c; 2007c) The first monitoring report was presented in 2004 and its findings and recommendations – including the inclusion of indicators for the evaluation of Government’s actions that were not included in the PPAC- discussed with the Presidential Management Committee of the PPAC in two meetings in 2005. Apparently, the discussions rendered little results. (Abrinq Foundation 2007c)

The Abrinq Foundation and the Children-Friendly Network elaborated a report in 2007, based on the annual reports delivered by the Presidential Committee where the actions to implement the PPAC were described. In this document, a thorough examination of Government’s actions is provided as well as detailed recommendations, prognosis and study case analyses regarding the PPAC and its role in the accomplishment of the WFFC intermediate goals for 2010. The general conclusions reached by the Friendly Network are not very positive or encouraging. A

47 Other bodies, aside from the Secretariat of Human Rights, with seats on the Committee are: the Ministries of Justice; Education; Health; National Integration; Labor and Employment; Planning, Budget and Management; Cities; Social Development and Combating Hunger; aside from the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and the CONANDA. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) also participates in the Committee in an advisory capacity (Abrinq 2004)
significant absence of data sources or its unreliability is pointed out as the first obstacle for an objective accountability of Governmental actions. Slow allocation of budgetary obligations – agreed upon in the 2002 Term of Agreement; policy formulation and implementation emphasizing quantitative coverage objectives negligent of quality indicators; insufficient planning and implementation of equity policies, in order to address structurally-geographically and ethnically-marginalized populations in the country and finally an evident deficit in terms of inter-Governmental articulation to provide a systematic and more efficient approach to policy implementation. (Abrinq 2007c)

In 2006 Presidential elections were held in Brazil. Abrinq Foundation, with the financial partnerships of the International Labor Organization (ILO), Save The Children UK, UNICEF and the Brazilian Forum of Hotel Operators (FOHB) and with the participation of the organizations composing the Friendly Network, launched the ‘Term of Commitment Children-Friendly President-Mandate 2007-2010’ (Termo de Compromisso Presidente Amigo da Criança–Gestão 2007-2010). The four main Presidential candidates –Luiz Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva (incumbent), Geraldo Alkmin, Cristovam Buarque and Heloísa Helena signed the document assuming a public commitment with the fulfillment of the goals therein specified (Abrinq 2006b).

The new Term of Commitment specifies the compromises in health, education, child and adolescent integral protection that were present in the first version of the program; it interprets the information provided by the Government in the annual reports presented in 2006 and the consequent policy document published by Abrinq Foundation in 2007. The Term of Commitment also includes compromises regarding the process of elaboration of the new PPAC for the 2007-2010 period; the adoption by the Federal Government of a methodology developed by the Abrinq Foundation for accounting official budgetary allocations to children; and punctual initiatives on the part of the Government to facilitate monitoring and evaluation by civil society organizations (Abrinq Foundation 2007)
4.4.3 Eye on the Children’s Budget Project (Projeto de Olho no Orcamento Criança)

The Eye on the Children’s Budget Project began in 1992 when two Brazilian NGOS, the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada FAE) and the Foundation of Assistance to Students (Fundacao de Assistência ao Estudante) with the support of UNICEF, proposed a methodology to identify actions and budgetary resources assigned by the Federal Government of Brazil to enforce Brazilian infancy’s rights (Orcamento Crianca 2007). The Federal Constitution of 1988, in its 227th article and the Children and Adolescent Statute (Estatuto do Criança e do Adolescente ECA) from 1990, in its 4th article, establish that children and adolescents are the absolute priority of family, society and State. The Statute even assigns a preferential place to children and adolescents rights in the formulation and execution of social public policy (Abrinq Foundation 2005e) The goal of the proposed methodology and the program is to evaluate to which extent the Federal Government, in its budgetary provisions, acts upon the priority given to children and adolescents by the Brazilian Constitution and Federal law (Abrinq Foundation 2005e) In 1996 the Institute of Socio Economic Studies (Instituto de Estudos Socioeconomicos INESC) joined the program and in 2003, the Abrinq Foundation (Orcamento Crianca 2007).

Although the Abrinq Foundation has not been part of the program since its inception, it constitutes one of its three major partners –along with INESC and UNICEF- and has taken an active part in its current development. The latest methodology developed by the program –The Children Budget Methodology (Metodologia do Orcamento Criança e Adolescente) was shaped to constitute a tool for civil society organizations and local level authorities to understand Federal, state and municipal budgetary provisions to enforce children and adolescents rights and to act upon this knowledge (Abrinq Foundation 2005e). The Eye on the Children’s Budget Project has evolved, from an initiative to hold Governments accountable in a public denouncing manner to an actual policy evaluation methodology that has served as a common ground for an informed civil society–Government dialogue on children issues.
‘[...] the public budget process in Brazil does not allow a direct identification of mandatory public policy compromises, neither a sound monitoring of performance. This is explained partially by its technical-legal nature and its immersion in a political culture with little regard for accountability processes […] (the OCA methodology) allows civil society to penetrate budget’s obscurity and scrutinize it, bringing out to light the reality of public spending regarding populations from 0 to 18 years of age in cities, states and the Federal level. As a result of applying the OCA, communities and civil society organizations will gather crucial knowledge to organize their action’ (Abrinq Foundation 2005e. 7-8)

In a document published in 2005, the Eye on the Budget Project thoroughly explains the OCA methodology and instructs interested social organizations about its implementation48. Besides being instrumental in the conception of OCA, Abrinq Foundation and several partner organizations have been pioneers in its utilization. In the Children-Friendly Network’s first two documents –which evaluated the PPAC reports produced by the Government, it served the analysis of budgetary compromises made by the Government and informed the observations and recommendations issued by Abrinq Foundation (Abrinq Foundation 2005e). In the current version (2005-2008) of the Children Friendly Mayor Program, Abrinq Foundation is requiring from municipalities engaged in its first cycle to utilize the OCA in order to present an account of budgetary previsions for children at the municipal level. Those municipalities that fail to return a special form elaborated for this purpose (by October 22 2007) will not be considered for the second phase of the Children Friendly Mayor Seal. (Abrinq Foundation 2007).

4.4.4 The Preference for State’s Resources

The resource mobilization theory accounts for the fundamental role of State’s favorability or opposition in the performance of social movements and the organizations within it. (McCarthy & Zald 1977) This affirmation implies, basically, that State’ agency has a determinant role in the changes or ameliorations the social movement seeks for its beneficiary. As with the idea of mobilizing entrepreneurial sectors, Abrinq Foundation recognizes the decisive character of the

48 The document is divided in six chapters: Know the Public Budget on Children and Adolescents; Understand Public Budget; How to Obtain Data on Public Budget on Children and Adolescents; How to Calculate the Public Budget on Children and Adolescents (Two chapters) and How to Analyze the Public Budget on Children and Adolescents (Abrinq Foundation 2005e)
State in its strife to improve the livelihoods of children in Brazil. Oded Grajew comments on the principles that drives the Foundation’s emphasis on influencing public policies and mobilizing State institutions:

‘No exemplary action of any non-governmental organization will have the power to positively change Brazilian reality if it is not made concrete in public policies that prioritize social issues, since only the State has the scale and universality to accomplish such a task. It always has been and always will be that way in any country in the world’ (Abrinq Foundation, 2003, p. 17) ‘[…] Donations and participation of Brazilian companies should be part of a broader project, based on ethical principles and values, which contributes for the constitution of an economically and socially sustainable scenario […] an important part of this process is to demand coherent public policies and avoid assistance-driven practices that are limited to collect foodstuffs, clothing and money donations’ (Grajew 2004)

The Foundation has mobilized the political will and the commitment of potential and incumbent public officials and consequently, the pool of resources the latter are in control of: the funds, the labor and bureaucratic force, the logistics and infrastructure. It has also carried out evaluations and developed a methodology for non-governmental actors and public officials to act upon the analysis of Federal budgetary provisions for children. The influence on policymaking and policy implementation by Abrinq Foundation is the vehicle that aligns these resources to its beneficiary, the marginalized children of Brazil. In that regard, influencing public policy equals to the mobilization of State’s resources, in the context of this project. Nonetheless, and repeating the question made regarding entrepreneurial resource mobilization, beyond a strictly utilitarian consideration, what drives Abrinq Foundation to align State’s resources in order to advance its cause? In an interview conceded in 1997, Abrinq Foundation’s co-founder and President at the time, Oded Grajew, was questioned regarding the true impact of an ‘entrepreneurial’ emphasis in a mobilization for children rights:

‘(Revista Sem Fronteiras): Is not there a risk to overlook, let’s say, the structural causes of this (Brazilian children’s) deplorable situation?

49 Extract from an interview conceded to the Carreira e Sucesso Newsletter (20/10/2004).
We have always attempted to act upon causes and effects (of children’s situation). Regarding the effects, for example, promoting support to children with immediate necessities: whoever is hungry wants to eat. Nonetheless, we are also acting upon the causes that, continuing with the example, drive children to hunger. In that regard we insist upon the necessity of changing public policies, in order to assign a priority to social questions. When I speak of children, I am speaking about everything: health, employment (for the parents), education, basic sanitation, public budget […] If you don’t question the causes, you will keep drying off the floor while the roof is open, leaky. We don’t do assistance-focused projects. Our projects always privilege the development of children’s citizenship (Grajew 1997. 5).

The Abrinq Foundation fundamentally attributes the capacity of crystallizing transcendental, structural social change to the sphere of the State and its instruments of social regulation, such as public policy; also, it implicitly affirms that the ‘structural causes’ and responsibilities of children’s marginalization—and other serious problems in society—are ultimately originated in that very same State sphere. The first assessment speaks out of a privilege for policy change and engagement of State’s resources beyond a mere calculation of resource availability. Abrinq Foundation understands and aims at channeling to its cause, the legitimacy, inclusiveness and reach of State’s action; its (potential) transformative role, for example, as an organizer of wealth distribution and redistribution in society. The second assessment addresses State’s preeminent role in creating ‘deplorable’ social realities. Ladislau Dowbor, a credited Brazilian authority on social public policy comments on this:

‘The United Nations (UN) and The World Bank (WB) qualify Brazilian social policies as regressive. Instead of helping the poorest, they promote investments that end up benefiting the richest segments of population. The gross spending in education, for example, is not invested in basic education but in Federal universities, where the richest study. With healthcare is the same: instead of investing in basic and preventive healthcare, public policies privilege hospital-treatment healthcare, an emphasis that only interests the ‘illness industry’, with the big companies of hospital equipment supplying at the forefront. Brazil spends close to a quarter of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in social investments, if we sum up private and public services. Notwithstanding this high ciphers, the results are shameful and do not

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50 Extract from an interview conceded by Oded Grajew to the Sem Fronteiras Review (October 1997).
meet the needs. The World Bank sent a technical mission to Brazil to understand how was possible to obtain such meager social results with such an elevated spending’ (Dowbor\textsuperscript{51} 2007).

One of the tasks of Abrinq Foundation is to influence and shape the priorities of public policy in Brazil, to make them address the necessities of poorest children. Now, this is objective appears feasible in relatively recent historic momentum. In the expanded conception elaborated in this work, State resources, besides being considerably large, acquire a \textit{discretionary} character to social movements in a democratic regime: they are bound to be committed to social change agendas by civil society mobilization. In an authoritarian regime, as the one prevailing in Brazil up until the mid 1980s, State commitment to social agendas could not be equally mobilized: the mechanisms of policymaking were monopolized by a close-knit ruling circle, namely the Executive; Congress was subdued to the latter’s will and the media subjected to censorship. Abrinq Foundation recognized the new scenarios for civil society organized action, and together with numerous NGOs and SMOs demanded renovated social public policy vows to the Brazilian State. The political resources exist in Brazil –and in a larger context, in Latin America, with the advent of democracy: the issue at stake for the Abrinq Foundation is to redefine the priorities and the will that drives their elaboration and implementation.

4.5 DRM: FEASIBILITY AND SUSTAINABILITY

The main characteristics of the domestic resource mobilization initiatives conduced by the Abrinq Foundation in Brazil were described and partially analyzed in the immediately previous pages. The purpose henceforward is to broaden the analysis and punctually address the questions structuring this project: First, is a DRM approach carried out by Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) feasible and sustainable in Latin America? The issues of feasibility and sustainability refer to the existence of domestic resources –funds, labor, knowledge, infrastructure- and its availability to social movement causes. The mobilization of domestic entrepreneurial sectors and State resources by Abrinq Foundation in Brazil lends elements for the analysis. Regarding the advancement of social movement causes, concepts presented in the

\textsuperscript{51} Dowbor, Ladislau is currently an Associate Professor in the Catholic University of Sao Paulo and the Methodist University of Sao Paulo; from 1980 to 1981, Dowbor worked as a consultant for the Secretary General of the United Nations in the Political Affairs area. Extract from an interview conceded to the Cidadania e- online newsletter of the Fundaçao Banco do Brasil, Sao Paulo (10/12/2007)
theoretical framework frame the analysis: according with the reviewed literature, incidence in public policies is, although imperfect and relative a measurement, an indicator of social movements cause advancement (or ‘successes’); an indicator of the (potentially) transformative impact of social movements in society\textsuperscript{52} (Giugni 1998). Abrinq Foundation’s preference for influencing policymaking and public policy implementation processes might illustrate how the social causes at stake, in this case children and adolescent rights, could be advanced and amplified through the State.

The issues of feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach are intrinsic to the notions of ‘resource control’ and State’s disposition towards social movements (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy & Zald 1977). The resource mobilization theories propose that in order to advance their causes, social movements should devise organized ways to control and channel resources -funds, labor, knowledge, infrastructure- to favor their beneficiary base, relying less in spontaneous action and protest (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy & Zald 1977). In order to control and channel resources, these have first to exist and be reachable by social movements, this is, possess a ‘discretionary’ character: this would be a first measure of feasibility. The ability of SMOs to conduct resource mobilization and the response of those sectors ‘holding’ the resources determines the sustainability aspect (Zald & Ash 1987). Finally, both the feasibility and sustainability of resource mobilization is significantly determined by State’s favorability or antagonism –and all the intermediate categories- to the social movement cause (McCarthy & Zald 1977). The analysis of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach is structured by the latter theoretical elaborations.

4.5.1 Feasibility

The Abrinq Foundation insists, in its internal and public documents, about the feasibility of mobilizing the resources of Brazilian society, without further adjournments or mediations, to generate social change. The resources exist and moreover, in the Foundation’s perspective, just moderate amounts could generate significant transformations:

\textsuperscript{52} Transformative in an institutional and not in a revolutionary sense, this is, within a given political regime and system and abiding by its rules (Cadena-Roa & Puga 2005)
‘[…] in the beginning we would say, “It’s possible to solve.” That was the phrase that we used. It is possible to solve problems in an efficient way, with low amounts of money and a very, very high response. And that showed to society that that was possible to be done. Society thought that this could only be done with enormous amounts of money and enormous effort and with very low response\(^53\) (Mattar 2003).

‘[…] I am convinced of a couple of arguments. First: to resolve the social problems of Brazil and the world, there is no lack of resources. Second: everybody knows what has to be done. The problem is called ’political will\(^54\)’ (Grajew 2003).

The question is that social agendas, in this case children and adolescents rights, are not a priority among Brazilian entrepreneurial sectors –the virtual absence of philanthropy in the region (David Rockefeller Center 1999) and the strangeness to corporate responsibility met by the Foundation in its beginnings might back such an assumption- not to the Brazilian State. In 1997, Oded Grajew was addresses about his opinion about governmental performances on children’s situation:

[…] I don’t think that the Government wants to harm the children, but I do believe that they are not a priority. I can mention a case: in a public event against child labor, the President (of the Republic) said that he was going to impulse a Constitutional amendment definitely forbidding child labor between 12 and 14 years old […] until today, nothing has happened and the reform remains in a drawer\(^55\). If the Government had the same drive in approving that amendment than it had in approving the (Presidential) reelection amendment, things would be different. Thus, through his actions, the Government is demonstrating that children are not a priority. Governments that compromised with the children’s cause, regardless of being right or left-oriented, changed in a not very extended period of time the situation of children, considerably lowering children mortality and school-evasion

(Revista Sem Fronteiras): Could you mention an example?

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\(^{53}\) Extract from an interview conceded by Helio Mattar to the online bulletin of the W.K.Kellog Foundation (3/12/2003)

\(^{54}\) Extract from an interview conceded by Oded Grajew to the Istoé Dinheiro Review (25/9/2003)

\(^{55}\) The amendment was passed by Congress in December 1998 (Presidencia Da Republica Federativa do Brasil, 1998).
There is the case of the government of the Ceará state (province) which has accomplished, in four years, a 35% reduction in child mortality. In the city of Icapuí, in that same state, the Mayor’s office decided to enroll 100% of the infant and adolescent population in school, and it was accomplished. There are several cities in Brazil in which every child goes to school [...] it all depends enormously in political will and competent government (Grajew 1997)

The current President of Brazil adheres to the idea that solutions to Brazilian social problems passes by political willingness beyond resource availability. In a collective interview given to journalists taking part in the ‘Children-Friendly Journalist Program’, and referring to the Government’s role in finding solutions to children and adolescents situation, Luiz Inacio ‘Lula’ Da Silva affirms:

‘I confess to you that money will never be a problem, because as you detect that any given policy should be pursued, you also determine appropriations in the budget. The Government and the Congress have powers to shorten spending in a given area and increase it in another. It is perfectly possible’ (Presidencia da República 2004)

A document from the Brazilian Ministry of Labor points out, regarding the issue of child-labor:

‘(Brazil lacks in) [...] a clear political decision and a real compromise of all social sectors to define this problem as a priority. If public opinion would be convinced that child-labor is intolerable, the human, material and financial resources that are necessary to resolve the problem would be mobilized’ (Ministerio do Trabalho 2004)

The sufficient resources to generate social changes, and specifically improve the situation of children do exist in the domestic context of Brazil: that is the conclusion reached by

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56 Extract from an interview conceded by Oded Grajew to the Sem Fronteiras Review (October 1997).
57 The program involves newspapers and broadcasters in Brazil to voluntary provide coverage of children’s situation; demand accountability on the Government and amplify successful initiatives. It was started by Abrinq Foundation in cooperation with ANDI-Children’s Rights Press Agency. ‘On October 10, 1997, just before Children’s Day, the project secured an exclusive interview by Children-Friendly Journalists with the President of the Republic. It was the first time a Brazilian President devoted more than two hours to publicly discuss children’s problems. The project earned great visibility with this event. That year, 65 press professionals were committed to this project.’ (Abrinq 1997. 26) The collective interview with the incumbent President has become a tradition, being held in 2004 for the second time. Currently, the project is run by ANDI in partnership with UNICEF (ANDI 2007)
Governmental instances; and a social organization, Abrinq Foundation, relying in that fact in order to carry out its work. Now, beyond merely existing, can they be mobilized, prioritized by a Social Movement Organization to attain its objectives? Has Abrinq Foundation managed to draw them from entrepreneurial and State spheres to its cause? The analysis of the Foundation’s main programs, provide elements to inform a conclusion

For the ‘Our Children Program’ and ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’ the Foundation has prompted the participation of more than 1,000 companies and up to 2,500 individuals that invested a combined number of–approximately–EUR$ 246 million in the 2006 period (Abrinq Foundation 2006b). This cipher amounts to the fund allocations to child-care institutions and the social investments the program promotes and it does not account for the resources in time, labor, marketing and infrastructure the companies have invested. To name some examples, Wal-Mart Brazil, a participant in the ‘Our Children Program’ and the ‘Children Friendly Company Program’ besides the fixed quotas it invest in the latter; the fulfillment of child-labor prohibitions and the employment of young apprentices, disposes of its stores all over the country to promote the participation of consumers in the programs, through diverse marketing strategies. Wal-Mart encourages suppliers and business associates to financially adopt participant children (children attended by the child-care institutions the ‘Our Children Program’ assists) and destines a percentage of its national sales in one day of every year to the ‘Our Children Program’. It is also a direct financial partner of Abrinq Foundation’s operative and administrative duties (Abrinq Foundation 2007; Wal-Mart Brazil 2007).

Another interesting example is Unicard, a Brazilian credit card operator (a domestic version of Visa or Mastercard) which, adding to its participation in the ‘Our Children’ program as a contributor, provided its 100,000 clients database and opened a space in its client post mail notifications to ‘Our Children’ advertisement (Abrinq Foundation 1997) In 2003, impelled by Abrinq Foundation, McCann-Eriksson, an advertising agency, voluntarily designed a campaign to impulse the new Apprenticeship Law, within the ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’ (Abrinq Foundation 2004b) Earlier in 1993, the Lew, Lara, Propeg advertising agency provided a similar voluntary support in the launching of the ‘Our Children Program’. An appeal to the voluntary and gratuitous assistance of different advertising, TV, radio and printed
media organizations is a constant in the Foundation’s communications strategy (Abrinq Foundation 1997; 2004b)

The issue of whether entrepreneurial resources and ‘awoken’ philanthropy are sufficient trends for a truthful social transformation in Brazil is beyond this thesis’ concern. It also seems to be out of Abrinq Foundation’s understanding of the Brazilian situation: its spokespersons and public documents insist on the supplementary role of entrepreneurial, and other societal resources, to public policies and State action. The present project and the Foundation’s argument is that, even though it might not address the ‘structural’ social problems of Brazil, entrepreneurial mobilization can be carried out, contrary to the tradition; that domestic resources exist; and that the newly mobilized resources can help in advancing the causes of Social Movement Organizations, such as Abrinq Foundation. The idea contrasts the philanthropy and corporate responsibility trends of Latin America (World Wealth Report 2007) but mostly, the way in which SMOs and NGOs in the region conduct resource mobilization based on foreign resources (Valderrama 2001; Reality of Aid Report 2004)

4.5.2 Sustainability

Democracy in Latin America is incipient, incomplete and full of profound paradoxes and Brazil is not an exception in the region (UNDP 2004). The fact that elections are now held regularly and there is a certain improvement in the field of political rights does not guarantee by itself a drive towards social inclusion, either led by political and economic ruling sectors or by an impoverished and disarticulated majority population. What would really move the entrepreneurial sectors and the States to engage, integrally and in a sustainable fashion, in social projects? The answer to the first question could be found in a mixture of public relations, competition and true goodwill, going often under the name of ‘corporate responsibility’:

‘[…] corporate responsibility is, today, the only path for profit and sustainability of businesses in the long term. The biggest patrimony of businesses today is its credibility. That credibility can be constructed, for example, based on respect for the human rights of workers; preservation of the
environment; and care for good practices of corporate governance\(^{58}\) (Grajew 2005) Corporate responsibility has become a success and risk factor. To the extent in which companies conduct socially responsible enterprises, they will count on more compromised workers. At the same time, consumers take these matters increasingly into account […] In Europe, Danone carried out a massive and radical sacking of employees and there was an immediate reaction of consumers, which threatened sabotage on its products. The reaction was not caused by the sackings per se but by the brute manner in which they were conducted\(^ {59}\) (Grajew 2001)

Regarding the Brazilian case:

[…] In the a recent survey, 72\% of Brazilian consumers judge whether a company is good or bad based on corporate responsibility items: working conditions, business ethics and care for the environment. Is the highest percentage in the world, today; the United States is under us […] Regarding the role companies should fulfill in society, 22\% of Brazilian consumers affirm that besides paying taxes and generating employment, they must contribute in other ways to ‘develop society’ […] Now, one of the lowest percentages in the world appears when Brazilian consumers are asked whether they reward or punish (with consumption choices) companies by its corporate responsibility compromise: just 22 \% of Brazilian consumers said to have punished or rewarded companies based on that item, in the last year. The number for the United States is 49\% […] it is necessary to transform compromise in action\(^{60}\) (Mattar 2002)

In a recent document, Abrinq Foundation analyzes the role of the ‘Seal’ it awards to companies within the ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’ and the implication it has in terms of entrepreneurial engagement with the cause of children, from the perspective of corporate responsibility:

‘It is true that certain kind of seals and other certifications that could influence consumer’s choices were already implemented in the United States, in some European countries and India. In those countries, notwithstanding, the seal was given to a product; what the ‘Children-Friendly Company’ program contributed with was the recognition of companies, seen in a broader societal context, within a set of relations with clients, suppliers, workers and communities. The ‘Seal strategy’ is based on the growth of

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\(^{58}\) Extract from an interview conceded by Oded Grajew to the GV-executivo Review (2005)

\(^{59}\) Extract from an interview conceded by Oded Grajew to the Shopping Centers magazine (June 2001)

\(^{60}\) Extract from an interview conceded by Helio Mattar to the Educaçao Review (January 2002)
social marketing as an added value in a highly specialized and ever more competitive market; also, a qualification of consumption patterns arises from a growing conscious in society of the importance of human, labor and citizenship rights and other variables that were previously considered as external to the products [...]’ (Abrinq Foundation 2007)

Companies have to be aware of the new realities of entrepreneurial culture as doing oppositely increasingly risks its overall performance. According to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, corporations qualified as socially responsible had a 15% percent higher growth when compared to those corporations evaluated by the Standard & Poors 500 index, strictly focusing on traditional financial criteria (Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes 2007)) In order to make its DRM effort sustainable, one of the tasks of Abrinq Foundation in Brazil is to generate a ‘socially responsible market environment’ (Abrinq Foundation 1997) not only by promoting children-friendly practices among companies but also prompting the positioning of ‘children-friendliness’ as an added value in the market (as an example, the ‘Children-Friendly Seal’ awarded to companies). The latter trend would solidify, beyond Abrinq Foundation and other social organizations’ activism, the continuous compromise of entrepreneurial sectors with Brazilian infancy.

Now, is it possible to engage the State in lasting commitments to address Brazilian infancy’s problematic? The depth of Brazilian State’s historical negligence to infancy attributes validity to the question. The answer, in Abrinq Foundation’s terms, starts from the Constitutional and legal obligations of the State and the role of social organizations in public accountability. As an example, the Children and Adolescents Statute (Estatuto Criança e Adolescente ECA) establishes a prioritization of budget appropriations to advance specific goals in health, education and special protection for children. The mandates are specific, even to the point of conferring budgetary precedence to infancy-oriented investments. The legal tools exist and the Foundation’s role, together with various social organizations, is to enforce their implementation. The ‘Children-Friendly Mayor’ and the ‘Children-Friendly President’ programs and the ‘Eye on the Children Budget’ project basically seek to materialize State obligations. Regarding this situation and the latter project, Rubens Naves, former president of the Abrinq Foundation, commented:
[... when it comes to carry out a budgetary rearrangement (by Congress, the Executive and Municipal administrations) and reallocate funds, the first sacrificed are social investments, including those destined to infants [...]. Abrinq Foundation has a project called ‘Eye on the Children Budget’ which addresses the rambling nature of the public budget, in order to understand it and enforce compliance with infancy’s precedence, individualize budgets for specific programs and create a culture of accountability on public budget’s allocations [...] we are not only speaking about the Executive but also of municipalities which enounce in their budgets, for example, the construction of a given number of nursery schools, and don’t fulfill the compromise; (with the project) citizens, social organizations and even the Attorney’s Office (Ministerio Publico) itself, would then have the knowledge and tools to approach the Judiciary and make those compromises effective’ (Naves 61, 2004)

A substantial part of the Foundation’s DRM approach relies in leading or collaborating in societal actions aimed at rendering the State accountable for its Constitutional obligations. The approach in this regard is sustainable to the extent in which Governments’ costs of refusing or withdrawing from public compromises are higher than those carrying fulfillment. Following the resource mobilization theory, the crucial value in the calculation is not the grievances that a hypothetic non-fulfillment would carry to society, but the degree in which social organizations succeed in mobilizing and relieving such grievances in the polity (Jenkins 1983). In 2004, the Brazilian Government announced that it would reduce in 45% percent a special budgetary feature of its Child-Labor Eradication Program (Programa de Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil PETI), which contemplated after-school leisure and learning activities for more than 800,000 children (Reporter Social 2004). Diverse social organizations reacted to the announcement, among them Abrinq Foundation, which claimed the fundamental role of the program’s feature in avoiding child-labor, as it focused in after school activities (Reporter Social 2004). Rubens Naves, then president of the Foundation, expressed certain confidence in the withdrawal of the proposal by the Government:

‘(Reporter Social): [...] what drives you to such optimism? (Regarding Government’s withdrawal of the announced budgetary cut)

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61 Naves, Rubens was President of the Abrinq Foundation from 2003 to 2005. Extract from an interview conceded to the Reporter Social news agency (22/3/2004)
The pressure of public opinion based on the compromises made by the Government at the national and international level. First motive: (for optimism) the Brazilian State compromise in the UN. In the World Fit For Children Summit, the objectives that were later incorporated to the ‘Children Friendly President Project’ were agreed upon. One of them is the fight against child-labor, especially the most harmful types. There is a signed compromise (referred to the UN agreement and the Children Friendly President Project) of the Brazilian State toward attaining those objectives for 2010. That’s the first motive. The second is that the President reiterated the commitment last year (2003) at the ILO (International Labor Organization) forum. These are public compromises, then (its negligence) would carry a very large discredit, first to the Brazilian State, to Brazil as a whole and to the Government of ‘Lula’ (Luiz Inacio Da Silva). I think that the damages would be so many and so significant to the image of the President of the Republic, that he would reconsider the decision. That is why I think that international and national compromises, made before Brazilian public opinion, will be respected. (Naves 2004)

The cut was at the end removed from the Federal Budget presented to Congress in 2004 (Abrinq Foundation 2007) Nonetheless and regardless of what this specific development might manifest, there is an apparent trend in Brazil towards public accountability, both in the official and in the private sectors (Dagnino 2004) On the other hand, it is tempting to attribute, in a democratic regime, an irreversible tendency to gains in societal influence over State’s performance, based on the enduring character of 21st century’s Western social movement gains –such as the 1960’s civil rights movement in the USA. Is it politically and morally viable to move back to racial segregation in the United States or in South Africa, or to ‘loosen’ equality before the law? Progressive laws and legislations abound in Latin America, and still reality speaks for itself, so the simile might not be valid but: can Governments, even within a precarious democratic regimes, back away from programs in which it provides, for example, gratuitous lunches to poor school children in public schools? At what costs? The undisputable ‘correction’ of the children’s movement causes might difficult a retrenchment of State’s compromises: nonetheless, other welfare or social inclusion initiatives could arguably generate the same effect. There is of course the ever pending threat of authoritarianism and the consequent withdrawal of social policy gains; the reinforcement of clientele politics; and/or of

62 Extract from an interview conceded to the Reporter Social news agency (22/3/2004)
mere repression. Latin America has a particular rich tradition in this regard: the installation of rather excessively powerful Executive authorities in some of the region’s countries might attest to a recent past (Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe). The broader national political processes encompass the answers to the questions of State’s response to social demands; its impact and sustainability. It would be at least naive to limit the analysis to social movement’s action.

Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that, in a relatively stable and consolidating democratic environment, the gains of social movements in influencing public policy and generating public accountability processes would increasingly hinder negligent Governmental performances. For a considerable part of its 17 years of operation, the Abrinq Foundation and the networks to which it belongs have progressively drawn Brazilian authorities to dialogue and accountability schemes regarding infancy in Brazil.

4.6 ABRINQ FOUNDATION’S CAUSE ADVANCEMENT

How to measure the impact and advancement of a given social movement cause, to register the fulfillment of the needs and/or demands of a movement’s beneficiary base? To the extent in which the accomplishments of the Abrinq Foundation, regarding its beneficiary base, could be grasped through a theoretical category outside of its performance self-assessments, it would be possible to provide certain elements for the analysis of the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach. Nonetheless, two aspects limit the analysis: first, the complex range of variables, outside of a social movement’s and a SMO’s direct sphere of action that might affect the concretion of the social demands it advances. Second, the perspective through which the fulfillment of a social demand is observed. Addressing this questions, various scholars (Schumaker 1975; Gamson 1990; Giugni 1998) have attempted answers based on a ‘policy responsiveness’ criteria, limiting the notion of a movement’s cause success to the degree in which political systems and public policies incorporate and/or attend the social demands -and the social movement that uphold them. The approach narrows down the analysis to the intervening processes and actors of policymaking in social movement-related issues; for
instance, social security, voting rights, gender equality and, for the specific theme of this project’s case study, the special rights of children and adolescents.

The question of healthcare provision in the United States could be illustrative: a social movement is compounded by organizations (SMOs) representing millions of individuals lacking access to healthcare or grieved by malpractices of the healthcare system; the social movement’s fundamental demand or cause is the implementation of gratuitous universal healthcare or increased subsidized healthcare provision by the Government at different levels. A private healthcare industry, upon which the current system is founded, might oppose alterations to an advantageous status quo. Various state-level and Federal-level Governmental institutions in charge of policymaking and policy implementation are located at the crossroads of both set of interests –representing the public interest- and might champion, oppose or neglect the demands. Political parties and different for-profit and non-profit organizations indirectly concerned with the social movement cause also align with either stands. The reviewed works on the consequences of social movements would analyze how the different aforementioned actors interact, influencing public policy and measure levels of policy response to such influence.

For instance, Schumaker (1975) proposes five categories of policy responsiveness to social movement demands: access responsiveness; agenda responsiveness; policy responsiveness; output responsiveness and impact responsiveness. The social movement’s success, as a cause more than as a set of organizations, is thus apprehended by its reflection on social public policy. In this project, elements of various studies on the consequences of social movements are condensed and framed within three categories: incorporation, institutionalization and appropriation. The labor of the Abrinq Foundation in incorporating the cause of infancy in the political system and transforming public policy priorities to address infancy needs is thus revised. It is important, nonetheless, to remark that the larger children’s or infancy social movement is not considered thoroughly: this project focuses in the impacts and influences in public policies, unleashed and/or run by a Social Movement Organization (SMO) Abrinq Foundation of Brazil. Consequently, the analysis limits any elaboration regarding Abrinq Foundation’s impact on public policy to a consideration of the initiatives it has developed in
order to, precisely, influence policymaking and policy implementation -namely the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ and the ‘Children-Friendly President Project.’ The conceptual categories regarding social movement consequences, mainly utilized by its authors to encompass a broader analysis of social movements’ performances, are brought up in this project as theoretical guidelines to a specific case study.

4.7 ABRINQ FOUNDATION’S INCORPORATION

Incorporation is referred to when a social movement, parts of it and/or of its demands are channeled by the political system or by current institutional arrangements without altering the basic rules of the system. Incorporation can lead to institutionalization, when movements participate in a stable manner in institutional politics or appropriation when movement demands are integrated to public policies or to legislation (Giugni, 1998; Amenta et al, 1992; Giugni et al, 1999; Giugni et al, 1998; Cadena–Roa and Puga, 2005) It is possible to assimilate the concept of incorporation with Gamson’s (1990) co-optation, which stands for the formal recognition of the social movement and its demands by the State without concrete gains for the movement’s beneficiary; institutionalization to Schumaker’s (1975) agenda responsiveness when social movement or SMO demands are regularly placed in the agendas of political systems; and appropriation to Amenta’s (1992) concessions when social movement activism influences anticipated action by the State in the form of legislative or policy measures. All the aforementioned categories aim at synthesizing the degrees in which social movements influence public policies and at the same time account for social movement ‘successes’.

Has the Abrinq Foundation influenced policy incorporation for infancy’s cause in Brazil? The first elements for an analysis might be found in the Foundation’s participation and signature of the inter-sector pacts to eradicate child labor: in 1995 it took part in broad mobilizations by different actors in the private and public sectors; and continuing its early communications strategy to relieve the problematic of child labor in Brazil, launched a media campaign (‘National Shame: Pro-Alcohol finances Child Labor’) and coordinated protest rallies in order to denounce the utilization of child-labor in the sugar-alcohol industry. The mobilization resulted in the signature of the Bandeirantes Pact in 1996, whereby representatives of the alcohol manufacturers committed themselves not to buy sugarcane from planters who hire
child-labor in the fields (Abrinq Foundation 1997) The Federal Government was impelled to act as well and opened up for dialogue on the issue of child labor. In the ensuing negotiations, also in 1996, Abrinq Foundation acted as the representative of the infancy social movement in Brazil and consequently the signature of its representative appeared in a final document denominated ‘The National Protocol for the Eradication of Child Labor in Brazil’ together with those of the President of the Republic, Ministers of the Cabinet, 12 Governors, Congresspersons, business and labor organizations (Abrinq a History) The Protocol organizes a series of child-labor eradication initiatives to which signing actors commit. For the specific case of the Federal Government the Protocol framed a Term of Agreement by the Ministries of Justice, Labor, Education, Social Welfare, and Industry and Trade for the concerted action against child labor in the sugar-alcohol industry and a regulation of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism decreeing that the funds from the Social Welfare Plan for the sugar-alcohol industry have as a priority, conduction of initiatives for the elimination of child labor (Abrinq Foundation 1997)

The participation of the Abrinq Foundation in direct negotiations with Government and Congressional authorities; as well as its part on issuing an officially sanctioned protocol, were both occurrences bound to be framed within the concept of *incorporation* or *co-optation*: they imply the recognition of the SMO by policymakers and in a broader sense, a further recognition of the children’s social movement in Brazil. The interlocution with State institutions that led to the Child Labor Eradication Protocol signature marked and symbolized the introduction of Abrinq Foundation as an actor in the political system, 6 years since its creation; likewise, in this particular case, the reception and validation of its demands and those of the children’s social movement, by Brazil’s mainstream political institutions, did not signify an immediate or direct gain to the Foundation’s beneficiary. The translation of agreements into palpable benefits to Brazilian children was subject to the compromise and drive of the signatory actors. In this case the concept of incorporation might also encompass *institutionalization* or *agenda responsiveness* as the State, in the form of the Government, included the demand within its list of tasks. On the other hand, the agreement upon a protocol – an explorative, goodwill phase of policymaking- on child-labor eradication as late as 1996, whereas the problematic affects Brazil’s infancy since colonial times, might be an eloquent
indicator of the degree in which children rights was an incorporated issue in the political system. Of course, legislation to provide special protection to children and adolescents was already in place\(^{63}\), providing the legal framework for many of the social movement demands: the question, as it was pointed out by Abrinq Foundation’s leaders, was the lacking political will to transform such legal mandates into public policies.

At the early stages of an ongoing, significant yet incomplete, process of children rights’ improvement in Brazil (ILO 2006) Abrinq Foundation was an important actor in making the problems visible and reaching out to diverse sectors of Brazilian society to attend them. This was the case of the social and political mobilizations against child-labor in the 90s, in which the Foundation took part, along with several national and international organizations. Yet it was at that time rather limited to divulgation and awareness-raising, an emphasis that proved successful but did not account for the full-blown policy change programs it currently runs. Based on the latter, the analysis of Abrinq Foundation’s demand incorporation is best carried out. Nonetheless and before heading in that direction, it could be illustrative to finish up with the story-arc of the child-labor eradication issue in Brazil.

Official statistics point out towards significant trend changes on child-labor: the National Survey of Sampled Households (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios) carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística IBGE) showed that in 2003 5.1 million children and adolescents from 5 to 17 years old were working in Brazil, with 1.3 million ranging from 5 to 13 years old. Ten years before, in 1993, 7.8 million children and adolescents from 5 to 17 years old worked in Brazil. In a decade 2.7 million children were removed from the labor market (IBGE 2003). The International Labor Organization (ILO) has praised Brazil’s accomplishments in the last 10 years, underlining the significant and unprecedented decline in child-labor occurred in that period (ILO 2006) The changes would not have taken place in such a magnitude if the Brazilian State had not assigned a relative priority to child-labor eradication in that period. Given that much less was done before in that regard by Governments in Brazil (Raufflet & Gurgel 2007) it is arguable that the noticeable mobilization of national and international actors

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\(^{63}\) The Children and Adolescents Statute was approved by Congress in 1990.
with a stake in children’s rights\textsuperscript{64} had a major role in engaging State’s compromise and resources to child-labor eradication.

4.7.1 Incorporation at the Municipal Level of Public Policy

The ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’, started in 1996 by the Abrinq Foundation, basically aimed at incorporating the cause of children at the municipal level of public policy. Legal mandates exist for Mayors to develop autonomous initiatives in favor of Brazilian infancy: the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 instituted the decentralization of policy initiative, strengthened by an increase in fiscal resources for the states and municipalities, at the expense of direct and indirect taxes formerly collected by the Federal Government (Dagnino 2004). The Children and Adolescents Statute of 1990 also provides Mayoralties with legal tools and obligations to address diverse aspects of children’s welfare. The question for the Abrinq Foundation, far from participating in already visited partnership schemes -whereby SMOs and/or NGOs and the public sector would share responsibilities in specific social projects- was to transform such legal mandates into municipal public policies. As part of its approach, the Foundation avoids running children-welfare projects itself; instead, it prompts a public policy response by the State.

The ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ consists of three basic steps that correspond with the policy responsiveness categories utilized in this project: First, a process of incorporation of the demands in the policy agendas of municipal administrations; and the recognition of Abrinq Foundation as a legitimate interlocutor on the issue of children rights. The process starts as early as the electoral campaign for municipal Mayoralties, when candidates are invited to commit with an (Electoral) ‘Platform Compromise’ containing specific policy compromises on infancy issues -to be fulfilled if elected. Besides a direct approach to each one of them, the candidates are moved to adhere by a parallel campaign carried out by the Foundation with the general public, in which the idea is to stimulate a connection between voter’s choices and the public compromise of candidates on children rights agendas (Ministerio Publico 2000) The

\textsuperscript{64} For instance, the UNICEF and the ILO are often quoted in literature as crucial awareness-raising agents (quote); the 90’s boom of infancy-rights SMOs in Brazil (Abrinq Foundation 1997) exerted pressure in the State as well as engaged with it in various project partnerships.
campaign, carried out under the slogan ‘only vote for candidates that have a children and adolescent project’ (‘Só vote em candidato que tem projeto para a criança e o adolescente’) is conducted through gratuitous television and radio spots and other marketing means as well as was backed by voluntary municipal committees in charge of promoting the debate at the local level. (Ministerio Publico 2000)

The signatory candidates’ compromise to the following actions if elected:

‘Carry out a detailed diagnose of infancy’s situation in their municipalities, that includes the construction of indicators and prioritization of problems; elaborate a plan of action defining programs, projects and activities, defining objectives and budgetary provisions, to be delivered by the first year of the Mayoralty period; strengthening of the Municipal Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents, as well as the municipal health, education and social assistance councils; create and strengthen the Municipal Tutelary Councils, created by the Children and Adolescents Statute and in charge of its application.’ (Abrinq Foundation 2007)

Once elected candidates sit in office and regardless of their previous adherence to the Platform Compromise, they receive the ‘Term of Commitment Children Friendly Mayor’ (Termo de Compromissso Prefeito Amigo da Crianca’) elaborated and distributed by Abrinq Foundation. This document contains specific implementation, monitoring, policy advocacy and evaluation objectives to be achieved by the municipal administrations –with the supervision of Abrinq Foundation- towards the end of the Mayoral mandate. The signature and devolution of the Term of Commitment by incumbent Mayors basically amounts to a declaration of compliance with the conditions –exclusively set by the Foundation- therein specified. In that regard, the response of 1,542 elected Mayors in the second version of the program (2001-2004) and 2,263 for its current version (2005-2008) out of 5,561 Brazilian municipalities is bound to be interpreted as an indicator of demand incorporation and SMO interlocution. The fact that the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ has been in functioning for three successive Mayoralty periods, with growing numbers -up until the current participation of 30% of Brazilian municipalities in its first phase- could be also regarded as a measurement of institutionalization or agenda responsiveness; this is, the regularized presence of the demands and the SMO in public policy agendas.
The main question is nonetheless whether Abrinq Foundation’s demands, which are paradoxically no other than those contained in the Brazilian Constitution and the Children and Adolescents Statute, are appropriated by the municipal authorities. This is, if the compromises, which per se represent a major accomplishment, are translated into municipal plans, programs and projects and if the latter are implemented and carried out. In order to materialize concrete policies, the Foundation elaborates and distributes the ‘Children and Adolescents Map’ which aimed at diagnosing, evaluating and monitoring the progress of Mayoralties regarding the ‘Term of Commitment’. The Mayoralties that sign the Term Of Commitment, receive at the beginning of the three-year Mayoral period the ‘Children and Adolescent Map: Children Friendly Mayor Indicators’ consisting of various forms where the situation of children and adolescents in their jurisdiction has to be evaluated, through specified social indicators; also, the goals and desired results in health, social assistance, education, culture, leisure and sports; and the action plans to accomplish them, have to be included. The Mayoralties that fill the Map and return it to Abrinq Foundation receive a document with recommendations and policy advocacy elaborated by the Foundation’s policy specialists.

In the second year of the Mayoral period the second version of the Map is sent to the responding administrations, in which the latter register, in a descriptive manner, the program and projects, as well as the budgetary allocations it was implementing in order to achieve the goals previously defined; the foundation again provides recommendations and assistance to fulfill the objectives. For the third year of the Mayoral period, a third version of the Map is sent to respondents of the last version, in which they are inquired for the results and performance of the implemented programs, including budgetary allocations. In the second version of the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ (2001-2004) out of 1,542 Mayoralties that signed the ‘Term of Commitment’, 668 returned the first version of the Map, of which 652 were approved by the Foundation; 499 returned the second version, of which 193 passed and 188 returned the third version, of which 126 were finally selected. For the current version of the program (2005-2008) out of 2,263 Mayoralties that first signed the ‘Term of Commitment’, 1,155 returned the first Children and Adolescents Map.
The ‘Mapping’ processes within the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ configures the *appropriation* of infancy’s cause by municipal administrations: this is, the response by the State to the demands of an SMO and the movement to which it belongs, in the form of public policies. The extent in which the appropriation trend is representative is open for debate and it is not a matter of concern in this project: the fundamental issue is whether a SMO can influence public policies and through that advance the demands of its beneficiary base. To a larger or lesser degree, Abrinq Foundation’s ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ has accomplished such objectives. The programs and projects described by the Mayoralties in the Maps improve the livelihoods of real, marginalized Brazilian infants:

‘In Camaragibe, a municipality surrounding the city of Recife, 68 out of 1,000 children died in the first year since birth, a decade ago (1992). The cipher, once half the Brazilian median, was reduced in 84% according to the latest study (2002) In Belem, the number of sauntering children in the open-roof garbage disposal facilities of the city, was drastically reduced due to an improvement of their nutritional intake. It was also reduced by hundreds the number of street-children in Betim, in Minas Gerais, as well as the vaccination coverage increased in Icapui and the rate of school-evasion dropped by a third in Porto Alegre […] The common denominator of these municipalities is their participation, since 1997, in the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ […] The municipalities that fulfilled the program’s conditions, in its first version (1997-2000) halved children mortality and broadened school attendance by one fourth’ (Revista Veja Online 2002)

The role of the Abrinq Foundation, after pushing to include the children’s agenda, is to guarantee that the municipal initiatives generate improvements not as a charity intervention but as part of a broader municipal policy; to promote the appropriation and not the mere ‘attention’ of the children’s problematic by the local authorities. The Foundation induces and guides the implementation of a comprehensive public policy for children at the local level: one that responds to an organized evaluation, monitoring and accountability process. Perhaps the numbers of the final respondents are not significant enough as to argue for a transformative impact of the Foundation’s work on its beneficiary. This project has been careful not to advance an argument in that direction: it limits to characterize Abrinq Foundation’s role within the boundaries of policy *incorporation, institutionalization* and *appropriation*. The important fact is, notwithstanding, that it has designed an approach to generate an incorporation trend that
could, in the long term, translate into transformative achievements. In doing this, the ‘Children-
Friendly Mayor Program’ encompasses much of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach: the
alignment of domestic resources to its causes, not to its administrative manifestation; the
capture of resources that are obliged in diverse legal and moral forms to the needs of its
beneficiary. It has also proven that with the existing domestic political resources, in the form of
the municipal administrations and its infrastructure, expertise and labor; and financial
resources, in the context of the very limited social budgetary allocations of a middle-income
country, it is possible to produce significant improvements for marginalized segments of
population.

4.7.2 Incorporation at the National Level of Public Policy

The ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ was set up by the Abrinq Foundation in 2002, with
the fundamental objective of influencing children policies at the Federal Executive level. The
program was created after the experience of the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ and draws
from it its core philosophy and approach. A similar strategy is developed, projected to the
national level: firstly, an electoral phase is carried out, through which Presidential candidates
are invited to participate in the program by signing a public compromise on general and
specific issues of infancy’s policy; meanwhile a parallel campaign is developed by the
Foundation and voluntary partners, in order to inform the electorate of the signatory
candidates.

Secondly, an executive phase, which starts when the elected candidate seats in the Presidential
office, is focused in enforcing the ‘Term of Commitment’ signed in the electoral campaign.
The latter should be ratified by the President and once this occurs, the program officially starts.
Basically, the ‘Term of Commitment’ contains actions related to infancy’s public policy to be
carried out by the President and its Ministerial Cabinet\textsuperscript{65}: elaboration and return of a diagnosis
and evaluation of infancy’s situation in the country; a plan of action and a relation of former
and current public policies implemented at the national level, within the first year of the

\textsuperscript{65} As it was mentioned in the description of the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ the actions described in the
‘Term of Commitment’ correspond with the goals to which the Brazilian State adhered to in 2000, during the
World Fit For Children Summit
mandate; the implementation of programs, projects and appropriation of budgetary resources to develop them, based on the former evaluation and the input of the Foundation (and the Children-Friendly Monitoring Network, composed by NGOs and SMOs taking also part in the program) and finally, the presentation of the performance and results of the implemented initiatives.

In its two versions (2002-2006 and the current, 2007-2010) all the Presidential candidates signed the electoral compromise document as well as the elected candidate, in either occasions incumbent President Luiz Inacio ‘Lula’ Da Silva, ratified it once in office (Abrinq Foundation 2004c; 2007c). Again it is possible to frame both occurrences as symbolic of a (further) incorporation of the infancy cause and of the Abrinq Foundation by the political system. The demands of the social movement were co-opted by the State and shaped in the form of a (potential) institutional response. The Executive power responded in the two versions of the program, beyond the formal agreement, to the demands regarding the elaboration of diagnosis and evaluation of the situation of infancy in Brazil. Also, it responded to the compromise regarding the drafting of a Plan of Action, in order to address the former diagnosis. In 2003, the Government presented the Children Friendly President Plan (Plano Presidente Amigo da Criança e do Adolescente – PPAC) to the Abrinq Foundation and the Children Friendly Network. In the document, the Government made a diagnosis of the situation of children and adolescents in Brazil, accordingly with official statistics; accounted for the programs and policies that were in place and outlined strategies and policies for fulfilling the ‘Term of Commitment’ (Abrinq 2004c). In total, the plan earmarks resources amounting to roughly R$ 56 billion (Approximately EUR$ 200 million) over the four-year period, and identifies 16 challenges the Government proposes to meet. It points to over 200 actions to be carried out over the period.

The same year, a Presidential Decree created the Management Committee of the Children Friendly President’s Plan of Action, responsible for monitoring and supporting implementation of actions targeted at fulfilling the goals of the Plan (Abrinq 2004c). The responses could be framed within the concept of institutionalization as the Government set up mechanisms –such as the Management Committee- that guarantee a minimum continuity of the issues in the
public agenda. The drafting of a plan recognizing the problem, through its evaluation; and the enunciation of policy actions, backed by specific budgetary allocations, also indicate a drive towards generating an institutional response. Now, among the compromises made by the Federal Government was the elaboration of annual reports presenting its main actions and results in the implementation of the PPAC (Abrinq Foundation 2007c):

‘In practice that was not what happened. The process advancement proved that Government and civil society organizations *tempos* are, in the best hypothesis, different. Not only investments in terms of qualification of indicators were not accomplished, or will not produce the desired effects; the annual reports (Relatórios de Acompanhamento) of the PPAC promised by the Federal Government were delayed, compromising a more fruitful dialogue for the improvement of public policies. As an example, the annual report for 2005, referring Government actions in 2004, was only presented in April 2006 not having, as a consequence, any effect in the improvement of Governmental actions in 2005 and 2006. The annual report for 2005, promised for the first trimester of 2006, was only delivered in June […]’ (Abrinq Foundation 2007. 8)

Consequently, the Abrinq Foundation and the Friendly Network set out to analyze the information provided by the Federal Government corresponding for its actions in 2004 and 2005 in a report published only until 2007 (Abrinq Foundation 2007). The input provided in the latter did not impact the results of the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ in its first version, and had to inform the developments of its second version, as a new President –the re-elected Luiz Inacio Da Silva- entered office in 2007. However damaging unpunctuality was for the program’s objectives, the Government fulfilled the promise of drafting an Action Plan, although not within the first year of the Presidential term as it had also committed to, but until December 2003. It also returned two annual reports accounting for the rest of the four-year mandate Abrinq Foundation 2004c). This could be perceived as a positive record in a country and region where public accountability is not an important phenomenon.

Notwithstanding, it would be problematic to qualify the accomplishments of the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ within the categorizations of policy responsiveness, beyond the concepts of *incorporation* and *institutionalization*. The concept of *appropriation* describes a response by the State to social movement demands in the form of public policies,
understanding the latter concept in its full cycle: evaluation, elaboration and implementation. The program has advanced in the first two elements but lacks in the third. Firstly, the report elaborated by the Foundation and the Friendly Network in 2007, underlines the absence of reliable data sources in the two annual reports presented by the Government: the presence of general observations without backing empirical data seems constant (Abrinq Foundation 2007c). This problem somehow disarticulates the accountability task the Foundation seeks to carry out, before it could start. Also, the Government’s annual reports denote a series of faltbacks in the implementation of the PPAC: a slow allocation of budgetary obligations agreed upon in the 2002 Term of Agreement; policy formulation emphasizing quantitative coverage objectives and negligent of qualitative indicators; insufficient planning and implementation of equity policies, in order to address structurally -geographically and ethnically- marginalized populations in the country and finally an evident deficit in terms of inter-Governmental articulation to provide a systematic and more efficient approach to policy implementation. (Abrinq Foundation 2007c)

The ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ currently advances in its second version (from which comprehensive data is not yet available). The drafting of a new Plan of Action by the Government is undergoing, under the compromise of accounting for its elaboration the 2002-2006 experience and feedback provided by the Abrinq Foundation and the Friendly Network. The Plan of Action was accorded to be delivered in June 2007 but by July 2007 it had not been. The Government’s annual report for 2006 had not been published either to that point (Abrinq Foundation 2007).

It is evident that the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ has not been as successful in its implementation as the Mayor Program; its main goal, to achieve the prioritization of infancy’s needs in Brazilian national social policy, has not been advanced to the point of incorporation as it was the case for several Mayoralties and municipalities. The programs and projects are yet to be seen, as well as a proper official evaluation of the children’s problematic. A comprehensive public policy is still in its early formation stages. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning that the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ faces different and more complex challenges: the Brazilian State, in its Federal component, is enormous and slow-moving
machinery with a low response rate to social demands (Serna de la Garza 2007). The problems of inter sector coordination –among Ministries and between those and the official entities controlled by the Executive, for instance- are pointed out in the Foundation’s reports as causal of slow progress (Abrinq Foundation 2004c; 2007c). These issues seem to surpass the sphere of ‘political will’ to characterize an endemic incapacity of the State to generate prompt responses to social demands. Also, a sound Federal policy response to a centennial and intricate problematic, embedded in larger economic and social inequality schemes, could not be expected within a four or eight year time-span. On the other hand, the incentives set up by the Foundation in the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ function to a certain extent due to a healthy competition among participant Mayoralties, as the program’s process allows successful initiatives to be recognized at the national level -thus providing access to wider political platforms to Mayors; and broader resource pools to municipalities, in the form of international cooperation resources, to name a couple of advantages.

The ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ cannot promote such process – materialized through the awarding of the ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Seal’ in the case of successful municipal initiatives- due to the obvious unity in Executive ruling. It limits itself to run a public accountability process of Executive’s compromises with Brazilian infancy: in the short term, it aims at making non-fulfillment too costly for Brazilian Governments; in the long term, to consolidate a public policy located within the top State priorities. The incorporation of infancy’s right into comprehensive public policies appears feasible in the future, but that is an occurrence that depends on a vast array of variables, not only on Abrinq Foundation’s drive or the overall children’s movement. So far, accomplishments are significant, as much as they are simple in appearance. The level of interlocution between Government and SMOs on infancy’s issues is just unprecedented, as well as the incipient measures the former has taken to draft an integral policy for children –the Children Plan of Action (PPAC), for instance. So far, the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’ has achieved a lower level of policy response than its predecessor and inspirer, the Friendly Mayor Program: it has nonetheless signaled, together with the latter, the pertinence of carrying out policy-change strategies, in the context of social movements.
4.8 DRM AND FOREIGN AID IN THE SMO CONTEXT

The principles and motives of the foreign aid regime, as well as its impacts in developing countries, have been analyzed in the second chapter of this project. Based on the reviewed literature, a general conclusion was reached for each one of the aforementioned aspects: first, the motives of aid are occasionally humanitarian and consistently strategic; second, its principles enthrone donors’ agendas and relegate the perspective of aid-recipients; and third, it might obstruct autonomous responses to domestic issues in developing countries, generating cycles of dependency, for instance, in the form of debt repayment or foreign grant-seeking. On the other hand, different authors and organizations endorse the regime, its necessity and altruistic dynamic (Lumsdaine 1990) as well as underline its results.

Regardless of all the evidence against or in favor of foreign aid, a single idea is shared, at least rhetorically, by most of its actors and commentators: be it in its most sporadic forms -relief for natural or humanitarian calamities; assistance for post-war reconstruction- or in its institutionalized manifestations -Overseas Development Assistance from industrialized to developing countries and World Bank’s lending, for instance- foreign aid is meant to constitute a transitory regime. It represents an extraordinary intervention of foreign actors in national agendas. In an ideal world-scenario, foreign aid would be a finite phenomenon: every country and society should be able to subsist and develop its potentials autonomously; to address its problems and attend its people’s demands in an independent manner. The initiatives aimed at encountering non-assisted paths to ‘development’ or at least at diminishing aid’s prevalence, mostly at the recipient end of aid, are thus relevant and significant. In the context of this project, an example of such initiatives is found in the Domestic Resource Mobilization work of Abринq Foundation in Brazil.

In Latin America, Non-Governmental Organizations with a non-profit character, centered mostly in human rights and environmental issues –receiving multiple denominations and referred to here as Social Movement Organizations, SMOs- have developed dependence on foreign financial resources and through it, a relative subjection to foreign agendas and accountability schemes (Valderrama 2001; Reality of Aid Report 2004) A series of
requirements are imposed on SMOs by foreign donors, in order to be able to access funding. The requirements, which together embody a conditionality framework, usually focus on ‘[..] agenda priority issues; location focus (of projects and programs); programming, monitoring and evaluation and accountability systems […]’ (Reality of Aid Report 2004: 3) The evident opposition of authoritarian governments and economic elites to status-quo transformations, materialized among other occurrences in the persecution of human rights advocates, might have explained a preference of Latin American SMOs for resource mobilization initiatives targeting foreign resources. Domestic resources –including State’s resources and business’ sector resources- were somehow ‘blocked’ for social movement causes. Elements were provided in this project to analyze whether such conditions have changed, with the advent of democracy and the partial consolidation of citizenship rights. Also, the question of (financial) resource availability or affluence in the region was explored, taking into account that it is a precondition of DRM in accordance with the Resource Mobilization theories. Is a different resource mobilization paradigm possible for SMOs in Latin America? Are there alternatives that allow more autonomy to SMOs and larger participation of domestic societies in setting up social change agendas?

The DRM approach incarnated by the Abrinq Foundation of Brazil might offer some concrete answers to these questions. The Abrinq Foundation does not seek an increased, sincerer partnership or improved dialogue with foreign donors, as it seem to be the case and latest reform trend in the aid industry (Valderrama 2001) It aims at mobilizing key domestic resources and political instances that might advance the demands of its beneficiary base, the children of Brazil. Advancing social movement demands within the immediate societal and political borders where they are issued, prioritizing the engagement of domestic actors, might appear as a self-evident necessity for SMOs worldwide but, concretely, how does a preference for domestic resources translate into autonomous agendas and wider participation of civil society sectors in social movement causes?

The Abrinq Foundation focuses in two main strategies for Domestic Resource Mobilization: the mobilization of business and entrepreneurial resources and the mobilizations of State’s resources. Regarding the former, the concept of resource mobilization covers funds, infrastructure, labor and expertise drawn from companies and other organizations of Brazilian
economic sectors and channeled to specific program and projects in favor of children. The concept also goes beyond a mere resource allocation process and implies a deeper involvement of these sectors in infancy’s cause. Regarding the latter strategy, the concept of resources encompasses funds, infrastructure, labor, expertise and legal tools that can be drawn from the State and channeled to the cause of children, through influencing public policies. The mobilization of State’s resources is mediated by the social movement’s participation and monitoring of children’s policies.

The core idea of the Foundation in resource mobilization is that it should limit its role as a recipient of funds; as a direct spender and as a provider of services. It facilitates the transfer of resources from wealthy sectors and individuals to professional child-welfare organization in need of them, providing qualification to the latter (the case of the ‘Our Children Program’); engages companies with a stronger commitment in child-labor eradication, involving them in qualification processes that evaluate child labor free production chains, worker’s children welfare and apprenticeship opportunities for young workers (The ‘Children-Friendly Company Program’); promotes the inclusion of pre-natal, health, education, special protection and leisure children rights in the agendas of municipal and federal administrations; evaluates and accounts for their transformation into implemented public policies (The ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ and the ‘Children-Friendly President Project’). The Abrinq Foundation limits the direct reception of funds which could be compromised in specific projects: it focuses in the engagement of third parties –namely, the Brazilian State and the domestic business sector- and the mobilization of their commitment, prompting a response within the latter’s spheres of action, infrastructures and expertise.

The Foundation avoids the direct execution of resources: it mobilizes voluntary time, expertise and logistics, limiting its expenditures to administrative and policy advocacy obligations. Consequently, it has to provide for its own staff and other bureaucratic costs, but the programs in themselves are run and sponsored by third parties. The ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ case could illustrate this: it aims at giving a priority treatment to children rights in policy agendas at the municipal level; its objective is to mobilize State’s resources, through influencing public policies. To achieve this, the Foundation mobilizes the voluntary contributions of the Ford Foundation and The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, to cover
paperwork, advertisement and external consultancy expenditures; also, part of the technical and advocacy input is gratuitously provided by the UNICEF and the Pastoral Commission for Children, associated to the Catholic Church of Brazil (Revista Veja Online 2002) Thus, the Abrinq Foundation mobilizes, engages and monitors the commitments of different actors, limiting itself to play a coordination and leadership role.

The mobilization of domestic resources is not a guarantee of autonomy for SMOs in any context where it might be feasible: they could be as subjected to conditionality schemes imposed by donors at the national level than by foreign ones. The domestic origin of resources, and of the entities that hold them, is not an intrinsic advantage of a DRM approach. States and governments could subject, and they do, different Non-Governmental and Social Movement Organizations appealing for resources to official terms of engagement and even to certain government or party propaganda schemes (for the specific context of Latin America, Aldaba 2000) Companies or philanthropic organizations might impose certain conditions and limit the maneuver space of funded social organizations, in accordance to their internal priorities.

In this project the specificities of Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach make a significant difference regarding agenda, strategy and priority autonomies. The Foundation does not apply for national or international grants and it does not bid for government contracts, as it is not a service provider or project executioner in the traditional sense (reception of government resources, in a direct form, is forbidden by the Foundation’s statutes, Abrinq 2003). It runs a quality-certification process to which project ‘donors’, this is, the Brazilian State, companies and wealthy individuals, submit themselves to, accepting the Foundation’s conditions and terms of engagement. For instance, the ‘Children-Friendly Seals’ are awarded to municipal Mayors and national companies carrying out specific pro-children actions, unilaterally prescribed by the Abrinq Foundation and accepted by the former actors through signed compromises. The Foundation administers an evaluation process of compromise-fulfillment – in partnership with other social organizations- and provides technical support. It is the ultimate prerogative of Abrinq Foundation to decide, based on its evaluation method, the continuity of program’s participants, as well as the Seal-awarding. Oppositely to the aid regime’s practices and principles, those providing the resources to run the projects and programs are the subjects of conditionality frameworks.
The Abrinq Foundation prompts the concurrence of very important and influential actors, including the President of the Republic, to programs and projects in which it has a preponderant role, together with other SMOs, in the definition of action agendas and objectives; the setting of priorities within them and in the evaluation of performances and continuity. If it is also considered that an important part of the aforementioned prerogatives is directed at influencing municipal and Federal public policies on children, with certain achievements in both areas, the boundaries of what is regarded as SMOs’ autonomy might acquire new dimensions. How is that powerful instances of Brazilian mainstream politics and economics submit themselves to conditionality schemes issued by a Social Movement Organizations? Is the infancy cause such a strong lobby in Brazil?

A response to the questions might pass by the costs in which these powerful instances might incur if disdaining or discrediting a visible and credible SMO such as the Abrinq Foundation, which also posses an interesting communications record (Abrinq Foundation 1997; 2003) and supports and uncontestable noble cause such as the rights of children in Brazil. Also, and besides an always probable genuine social drive, there are potential gains for the political and economic elites: broader electoral platforms, in the case of the ‘Children-Friendly Mayors’; the validation of social records, in the case of the ‘Children-Friendly President’; and the use of ‘children friendliness’ as a marketing asset by companies. When the mechanisms of the ‘Horizontal Accountability’ (O’Donnell 2004) the check-and-balances of democratic societies are unleashed, a series of interest’s combinations result in overall gains for the citizens. The Abrinq Foundation aims at being one factor in the catalysis of such accountability trends and an advocate of infancy’s interests in Brazil.

An increased visibility and accountability of donor-recipient exchanges is possible in domestic scenarios. Those providing resources for social movement causes, out of moral or legal obligations, are subjected by domestic accountability mechanisms, such as the Constitution, in the case of the State; or the media and consumer preferences, in the case of business sectors. Bottom-top accountability mechanisms are inexistent in the foreign aid regime (Sogge 2002). In a domestic context, given basic conditions -fundamentally, a democratic regime- the aforementioned obligations are enforceable. The Abrinq Foundation recognizes this potential and acts upon it, aiming at holding elite sectors accountable for infancy’s situation in Brazil; its
work has achieved, if not utopian societal transformations, valuable gains for its beneficiary through an innovative, low-cost domestic approach. Finally, and regardless of substantial differences among Latin America’s societies, States, and SMOs sectors, this project put forward arguments to sustain a relative concurrence in the minimum requisites for a DRM approach in the region. The Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach is hypothetically feasible outside of Brazil and it would also be highly desirable.
5. CONCLUSIONS

The elaboration of this Master’s thesis was confronted with significant constraints regarding the availability of previous literature in the subject of Domestic Resource Mobilization and with the complexity of the intertwining processes it describes and analyzes. The concept of Domestic Resource Mobilization is not used in the reviewed literature in the comprehensive sense attempted by this thesis but rather in a limited form, narrowing its reach to the issues of fundraising and revenue diversification by SMOs. Virtually, no particular or inclusive academic debate was found by the research on the topic of Domestic Resource Mobilization beyond financial preoccupations. In this regard, the possibility of enriching the thesis and its findings with previous academic studies or models of DRM was considerably affected. On the other hand, and arguably as a result of such conceptual vacuum, it is one of this thesis’ objectives to propose a comprehensive DRM by social movements in Latin America; the research seeks to construct a DRM concept based on the framework provided by the Resource Mobilization theories and on the specific experience of the case study, the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights. Nonetheless, the relatively broad nature of the conclusions and observations presented throughout this thesis, might be partially explained by the state of the art of DRM in literature dealing with NGO/SMOs’ practice. Beyond this fact and taking into account that relevant literature avoids the kind of integral approach privileged in this project, it is believed and that this thesis offers a novel and pertinent analysis to the question of resource mobilization in the field of social movements and contributes with a global perspective to the issues of philanthropy and SMO work in Latin America.

The programs and projects implemented by the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights of Brazil and its overall institutional mission and vision were purposely framed within the conceptual focus of the Resource Mobilization theories of social movements: as a result, a DRM approach is constructed and presented for further academic discussion. This set the basis to address the main research question of this thesis, regarding the feasibility and sustainability of mobilizing domestic resources to advance social movement causes in Latin America. In general terms, it is believed that the DRM approach of the Abrinq Foundation, carried on during its 17 years of existence, demonstrated that it is feasible and sustainable to engage the
political and economic elites of Brazil, and the resources these dispose of, in deeper commitments regarding social movement causes -which very often in Latin America represent the interests of truly dispossessed segments of population. The arguments to sustain such assertion are encountered in the case study analysis: firstly and regarding the mobilization of entrepreneurial sectors and resources, the Foundation shows a pertinent record both in the number of engaged companies, businesses and individuals as well as in the ciphers of the fund allocations provided by the latter. Nonetheless, the parameters of feasibility and sustainability in the proposed DRM approach are not limited to amounts of mobilized resources but is rather interested in the possibility of aligning these wealthy sectors to a social movement cause: the Abrinq Foundation sustains an important portion of its programs and projects in the direct involvement, through voluntary labor, infrastructure, expertise and funds of wealthy segments of Brazilian society in the cause of children and adolescents. In the context of the DRM approach proposed in this thesis, a hypothetical appeal to foreign resources is not an imperative: the Foundation demonstrates that it is not only feasible to mobilize domestic resources but also a sufficient and qualitatively superior expedient.

Secondly and regarding the mobilization of State institutions and resources, the engagement by the Abrinq Foundation of municipal and federal executive instances of the Brazilian government in the infancy’s social movement, through specific public policy commitments, demonstrated the feasibility of appealing to State’s resources in Brazil to advance social movement causes. The role of the Abrinq Foundation in the elaboration and implementation of public policies in favor on Brazilian infancy is thus considered as a component of the DRM approach. The understanding of resource mobilization in this case, in the framework of the proposed DRM approach, is of an indirect nature: the influence over policymaking unleashes the resources of the State, namely funds, labor and infrastructure, and channels them to the particular social movement cause.

The issue of the sustainability that a DRM approach can provide to the advancement of social movement causes is more problematic and difficult to address, in the sense that the continuity of the commitments obtained from the entrepreneurial and State sectors are to a certain extent beyond the DRM effort. Different perspectives were provided, mainly drawn from Abrinq
Foundation’s members and ex-members personal views on the projections and sustainability of the approach. The consensus is that the approach is sustainable due to cost-benefit calculations that would discourage previously committed resources and actors from retrenching and would also stimulate new resources to flow to the social movement cause. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that in this aspect the research failed to provide more reliable elements for the analysis.

It is believed that the most valuable interpretations regarding the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach are provided through the policy responsiveness analyses of social movement causes. Based on conceptions found in literature addressing the consequences and outcomes of social movements, the policy component of the Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach –assimilated in this thesis to its overall State-resource mobilization- was interpreted and the results presented. Following the literature, the notions of incorporation, institutionalization and appropriation of social movement causes by policy agendas and public policies are utilized as indicators of the degree of advancement of a movement’s cause; this is, that the extent in which a social demand is addressed or ‘solved’ can be measured through the levels of response of the State through public policies. Taking into account this conception, the public policy programs and projects of the Abrinq Foundation were analyzed: The ‘Children-Friendly Mayor Program’ and the ‘Children-Friendly President Program’ showed mixed results during its implementation; it is argued that the former accomplished, although partially, the appropriation of the infancy’s movement cause at the municipal level of State public policy and the latter, the institutionalization of the infancy’s movement cause at the federal Executive level of public policy. The analysis illustrates the feasibility of conducting a DRM approach in the sense that the appropriation and institutionalization of movement causes was possible; the sustainability is understood by the visibility, continuity and mandatory character that public policies assign to social agendas.

Beyond the perceived positive outcomes, it is important to underline a major shortcoming regarding the response to the thesis’ main research question: although it is believed that the research was successful in providing a balanced and fruitful analysis on the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach in the specific context of Brazil and through the punctual
case study of the Abrinq Foundation for Children Rights, the projection of the DRM approach to the larger Latin American scenario in this thesis lacks a more systematic approach. The background chapter (2) argues for the possibility of extending this approach to other national contexts in the region, due to the relatively homogenous political and economic settings prevailing throughout the region; in the following chapters it is remarked how the theoretical premises and the case study align to the replicability of the approach beyond Brazilian political and economic contexts. Nevertheless, the conclusions in this regard are rather broad and relying in a conjectural analysis. The limited span of a Master’s thesis as well as the author’s inexperience in conducting academic research might have added to this outcome. Thus, the author was continuously faced with the dilemma of reducing this thesis’ scope to the Brazilian scenario; nonetheless, the persistence on the Latin American context derives from a drive to attribute the DRM approach with a broader range of pertinence that could serve as the basis for further research on the subject. It is hoped that the thorough analysis of the Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach contributes with a valid academic perspective to the question of resource mobilization by SMOs in Latin America.

The secondary question of this thesis addresses the possibility of establishing a contrast between the resource mobilization processes privileged by the DRM approach hereby presented and those prompted by the foreign aid regime, in the field of Social Movement Organizations. The main issue is to consider the accountability schemes imposed on the SMOs by donors or resource providers in both scenarios. The DRM approach of the Abrinq Foundation demonstrates how a reliance on domestic resources can improve the possibility of assuming autonomous and financially sustainable social movement endeavors, diminishing the need to appeal to heavily conditioned foreign resource allocations. Furthermore, the approach implemented by the Foundation generates accountability trends in an opposite direction to what characterizes foreign aid: instead of a series donor-imposed requisites for the obtention and investment of resources, the DRM approach subjects domestic donors to accountability processes in which these have to respond for the proper application of contributions. Also, the DRM approach demonstrates that powerful and influential segments of domestic societies, relegated by resource mobilization approaches that privilege the obtention of foreign resources, can be engaged in social movement causes; and that such expedient is advantageous in the
sense that a proper addressing of social problematics necessarily passes through the broader involvement of the citizenships where these are staged. In a general perspective, it is believed that this thesis provided sufficient evidence and analysis not only on the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach in Brazil, with valid implications for the Latin American context, but also regarding its qualitatively beneficial character in the perspective of SMO practice and the advancement of social movement causes.

Regarding the pertinence of the methodology utilized to conduct the research, it is relevant to present a series of conclusions. The referred research methods can be divided in two: a literature review of the pertinent theoretical material and a content analysis of the case study material. About the first method, it must be said that it served the purpose of providing a broad academic perspective to the issue of resource mobilization by social movements. The conceptual framework drawn from the Resource Mobilization theories made the analysis possible to a significant extent, since relevant literature on the issue of DRM, from an integral and not merely financial perspective, escaped the author’s attention. The Resource Mobilization theories of social movements lent the fundamental conceptual categories utilized to frame the analysis of the Abrinq Foundation’s DRM approach: the issue of resource control as a function of organized social movement action; the focus on elite resources as a determinant of the feasibility and sustainability of social movement action and finally the necessity to align the regular support of the State, in the best of scenarios, to social movement causes in order to ensure its advancement. On the latter issue, a social movement’s cause advancement, the contribution of literature dealing with the consequences and outcomes of social movements was crucial. The assimilation of the notion of cause advancement to the degree in which social movement agendas influence public policies, allowed the research to present the results of the case study in public policy elaboration and implementation as an achievement indicator; and through that, to argue for the feasibility and sustainability of a DRM approach in Latin America.

On the other hand, the content analysis of the case study material is mainly carried out by accessing to a voluminous and very detailed collection of documents produced by the Abrinq Foundation during its 17 years of existence. Complementarily, policy documents produced by
the Presidency of the Republic of Brazil and a series of interviews conceded by members and ex-members of the Foundation and gathered from different printed and online Brazilian media outlets provided an important source of information and expert perspectives both on the issue of Domestic Resource Mobilization in Brazil—as it is interpreted by this thesis- and on the role and experiences of the Abrinq Foundation in conducting it. It must be noted that the three perspectives were put together for the analysis of one of the Foundation’s programs, the ‘Children-Friendly President Program’, to describe the program and its implementation as well as to account for the level of incorporation of the infancy’s cause and the Abrinq Foundation itself, in the federal level of public policy. In this case it was possible to contrast the three different perspectives on the development of a specific aspect of the DRM approach: the Foundation’s institutional perspective, the Brazilian State’s, in the form of the Presidency of the Republic and the individual analysis of those directly involved in the implementation of the program.

For the analysis of the rest of the Foundation’s DRM initiatives, and due to the lack of substantial material produced by the third actors and instances—namely private companies and municipal administrations—participating in the Foundation’s programs, the analysis relied on the institutional documents published by the Abrinq Foundation and on the expert perspectives captured by the aforementioned interviews. This could be considered as a deficiency but it is also argued that the material bearing the largest portion of the case study analysis, the documents produced by the Abrinq Foundation, is of a very high quality and characterized by a considerable focus on detail, overall processes and program evaluation. It would have been impossible to conduct this research without accessing such rich and abundant source of knowledge. Nonetheless, it is also true that an empirical data collection would have significantly refined the results of the inquiry; taking this into account, the possibility of referencing multiple interviews conceded by members of the Foundation to different printed and online reviews in a certain way seeks to fill a vacuum left by the lack of empirical material, providing important insight and expert understanding of the subjects at stake. The visibility and renown of the Abrinq Foundation in Brazil, due to its pioneering approach to resource mobilization in the Brazilian context, aides this project in the sense that it generates a broad
media coverage which makes available numerous journalistic articles on its programs and performance.

Finally, an overall conclusion must be presented regarding the replicability potential of a DRM approach in Latin America. Strictly following the conceptual premises of the Resource Mobilization theories, the minimum conditions exist in the region for the implementation of a DRM approach by social movements: first, the existence of discretionary or elite resources, possessed by wealthy segments of population that concentrate the highest proportion of gross national incomes; and second, the incumbency of political regimes that in the least positive scenario, would tolerate social movement activism; this is, the democratic systems that are in a consolidating in Latin America.

The case study of the Abrinq Foundation demonstrated that it is possible to engage both wealthy sectors and the State to social movement causes: the challenges the Foundation faced in its early years were enormous: as it was described in chapter 4, the situation of children in Brazil was dramatic at the beginning of the 1990s, just recently after the end of the military regime in the late 1980s, when the Foundation and several other SMOs were created. Millions of poor Brazilian children and adolescents were not only ignored by the Brazilian State and society but also considered as a public threat: death squads operated in cities as Sao Paulo to ‘cleanse’ the streets off of homeless infants; the ciphers of child mortality, labor, illiteracy and other indicators were absolutely shocking. The children of Brazil, as a public policy and societal concern, were overwhelmingly ignored and marginalized. Without attempting to attribute a major role to the Abrinq Foundation in transformative trends, it is important to notice that just 10 years after that critical scenario was denounced by several national and international organizations, the Foundation had managed to draw specific policy commitments by the Brazilian State, in programs and projects carrying its institutional signature as well as engaged a significant number of companies and other for-profit organizations in the infancy’s social movement cause. If a social movement in Brazil, the most unequal country in the world in terms of income distribution, managed to commit elite instances that were negligent to such a criminal extent to its cause in a relatively short period of time, why could not this approach be fruitful in other Latin American countries facing similar but perhaps less marked and critical
humanitarian problematics? Any attempt to thoroughly respond this question based on the reviewed theoretical and contextual premises indicating an enabling environment in the region, would border the realm of speculation. Nonetheless, it is believed that one of the major contributions and accomplishments of this Master’s thesis is the elaboration of a comprehensive and ingenious DRM approach for SMOs in Latin America and its presentation for further academic discussion.
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