The Diaspora – Conflict – Peace – Nexus: A Literature Review

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March 2009
The authors would like to thank all of the research partners of the DIASPEACE project, especially Dr. Cindy Horst, Dr. Pekka Virtanen, Bettina Conrad and Prof. Liisa Laakso, who provided comments on the draft of the literature review at the DIASPEACE kick-off seminar, held in Brussels from 5.-6.5.2008. The authors would especially like to thank two reviewers: Dr. Miikka Pyykkönen and Prof. John Oucho for their detailed comments.

DIASPEACE Working Papers are published by the research project Diasporas for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potential of Long-distance Diaspora Involvement in Conflict Settings. Case Studies from the Horn of Africa (DIASPEACE), which is a three-year research project funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme. The project seeks to generate policy-relevant, evidence-based knowledge on how exiled populations from conflict regions play into the dynamics of conflict and peace in their countries of origin. It has an empirical focus on diaspora networks operating in Europe, which extend their transnational activities to the Horn of Africa. The project is coordinated by the University of Jyväskylä involving six partners from Europe and two from the Horn of Africa and will conduct field research in both Europe and Africa. All published papers have been refereed by at least two experts in the field.

WEB: www.diaspeace.org
ISSN: 1798-1689
Abstract

This paper seeks to offer a comprehensive literature review on the role and contribution of diasporas to conflicts and peace building. By scanning the existing literature on the conflict – migration nexus and identifying gaps within this literature, this review will thereby serve as the starting point for analysis in the DIASPEACE project. First, the review will provide a general overview of diasporas and conflicts, and will then move on to discuss the various risks faced by diasporas in conflict situations. In this section, the ‘New Wars’ debate will be examined through empirical examples of how diasporas contribute to conflicts in their respective country of origin; the factors influencing their involvement; and, the potential ‘import’ of conflict to their host country. Several case studies of diaspora groups originating from the Horn of Africa will be provided to examine opportunities for diasporas to contribute to peace building as well as their role in conflict dynamics. Finally, suggestions and directions for future research will be identified in order to fill gaps within the existing literature.
Introduction

In recent years, the diaspora – peace – conflict nexus has developed into an area of key research interest, particularly within conflict - and diaspora studies. This is an emerging field of study, but one which remains largely underdeveloped.¹ According to the related literature, the debate on diaspora and conflict can be divided into three categories. First, migrants or diasporas can be perceived as agents for promoting peace and development. The second and opposing conceptualization is that these two groups can have a negative or even destructive impact. The third argument is that they can simultaneously be ‘peace-makers’ and ‘peace-breakers’. Much of the existing literature tends to concentrate on the negative aspects and influences exerted by diasporas on conflict situations. For instance, according to the authors of the ‘New Wars’ and various other researchers focusing on the political economy of civil wars, diasporas have the potential to further the risk of conflict perpetuation and recurrence. Similarly, the migration – security nexus has been touched upon in the related literature, but the latter has mainly portrayed migrants as being security risks for Western countries. The debate on the ‘securitisation’ of migrants has most notably emerged since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (see for example Faist 2005).

These two discourses have generated a substantial interest in diaspora studies as they “open up new points of investigation into nationalism, but at the same time demanding [that we] rethink belonging within a global context” (Axel 2002, 411). In recent years, research on conflict and migration has shifted beyond the mere notion that conflicts ‘produce’ migrants to the relationship between diaspora groups and their impact on conflicts, as well as

¹ However, research projects examining the link between migration and conflict (focusing mostly on economic aspects and remittances) have been carried out in recent years, see for example: The UK Economic and Social Research Council funded project “Transformation of War Economies”, refer to: http://www.research.plymouth.ac.uk/twe/mainframe.html; Research Consortium on Remittances in Conflict and Crises (RCRCC), refer to: http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isim/pages/RCRCC.html; Project on Global Migration and Transnational Politics at George Mason University, refer to the working papers: http://cgs.gmu.edu/publications/wpgs.html (Terrence Lyons is Co-director of this project); PRIO in Oslo in the project "Transnational and International Facets of Civil War" has touched upon the issue of diasporas and conflicts (Kristian Berg Harpviken and Cindy Horst), refer to: www.prio.no. In May 2007, a conference on "Diasporas and their involvement in peace processes" was held in Uppsala as part of the Swedish Network of Peace, Conflict and Development Research (formed in 2005 and funded by a grant from Sida/SAREC).
to the remittances they send to, and the political influences they continue to have in, their country of origin.

Nevertheless, there is still a paucity of research on this area, including systemically collected empirical data, in-depth analysis on the dynamics of diasporas and the nature of the conflict in the country of origin and theoretical conceptualisations that could explain the complexity of the field. The book edited by Hazel Smith and Paul Stares presents empirical case studies from various locations around the world that highlight the complexity of the diaspora phenomenon. Their main claim is that diasporas can be both peace-makers and peace-wreckers, sometimes even at “one and the same time” (Smith and Stares 2007, ix). Moreover, prior to making any claims about the impact of diasporas on any given conflict situation, it is essential to understand the historical context, interests and efforts of the diaspora group in question, as well as their organisational structure and the general background behind the conflict. This requires focusing not only on the capacities of the diaspora, but also on the broader political opportunity structures within the country of origin and the country of settlement that might influence mobilisation and engagements of diaspora groups (Smith 2007, 8-9).

The existing literature about the role of diasporas in conflicts is mainly based on qualitative empirical data and/or a historical analysis of diaspora groups’ engagement in conflicts. Often, the empirical data consist of interviews with diaspora members. Case studies of specific communities such as the Kurds, Tamils and Eritreans, for instance, have been carried out. However, generally, these data are not collected systematically and are not representative.

Even though much of the literature is based on qualitative data, some research has also been based on quantitative analysis. For example, World Bank researcher Paul Collier (2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) carried out a widely cited statistical analysis of the role of diasporas in conflict resolution. According to Collier’s research findings, diasporas are risk factors. One generally needs to adopt a critical approach to research commissioned by institutions such as the World Bank or the ministries of certain states as they may have their own biases and presuppositions that affect the research findings and results.

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2 Political opportunity structures (POS) refer to specific political environments that affect collective actions, participation and mobilisation (see for example Natali 2007, 196-197).
Several studies have also been undertaken to explore the potential of diasporas to contribute to peace building efforts. These studies have identified several ‘action spheres’ in which diasporas might exert a positive influence, namely in the political, economic and social spheres. Although several concrete examples of transnational peace-building activities have been put forth, their actual impact on the conflict situation remains less than clear. Even contributions intended to contribute to peace, could in practice have the opposite effect. The existing literature to a large extent relies on speculations and hypotheses to assess the impacts, which may be due to a lack of systematically collected data from both the country of origin and host country location of the diaspora members. One of the key research questions becomes: how do the activities carried out by diaspora groups in the name of conflict resolution and peace building actually affect the dynamics of conflict and peace? This question can perhaps only be addressed by drawing on extensive data, including interviews with both local community and diaspora members.

1. Diasporas and conflicts

The concept of ‘diaspora’ has traditionally been connected to the dispersal of Jews, thereby carrying with it a strong connotation of suffering, loss and return. Over time, the concept has also become used to describe other dispersed groups, and from the 1990s onwards, has particularly gained popularity in the field of cultural studies and social sciences. In recent years, the concept has entered the realm of policy making and there has been a growing interest in diasporas as potential agents of development and peace building. The African Union, for example, considers diasporas to be the sixth region of Africa.

Theoretical definitions of diasporas within the existing literature are extensive and vary widely. Earlier definitions focus more on forcible dispersion and the myth of return (Safran 1990; 1999). Definitions made in the field of cultural studies particularly approach the notion of diaspora as a type of consciousness, with an emphasis on their hybrid identities (Clifford 1994; Hall 1990). In recent years, the focus has shifted from the more limited definitions of who should be considered as part of diasporas, to take into account the complex processes of mobilisation and the heterogeneous nature of diaspora groups (Werbner 2002; Kleist 2007). Overall, even though the definitions may vary, ‘diaspora’ as a concept tends to
build on three common criteria: dispersal; settlement in multiple locations; and, the idea of a ‘homeland’ (Wahlbeck 2002).

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in examining the roles and contributions of diasporas to their country of origin. As Demmers points out, the reasons for this interest stem from the “rise of new patterns of conflict, the rapid rise of war refugees; the increase speed of communication and mobility and the increased production of cultural and political boundaries” (Demmers 2002, 86). Due to an increased level of global interconnectedness through cheap modes of transportation and communication, diaspora groups are also more than ever before able to build strong links between their country of origin and their host country. Thus, nowadays, diasporas are said to be a ‘fax time’ away from relatives in their original homeland, with modern technologies making it easier than ever to keep in touch. The diasporas’ commitment to maintaining contact with relatives in their original homeland can manifest itself in the form of regular phone calls or letters and/or establishing and maintaining diaspora organisations and networks dedicated to keeping homeland relations alive and well.

Appadurai notes that ‘the homeland’ lying in the symbolic centre of diaspora groups is in fact an invention, produced by the imagination of people living precisely outside of their ‘homeland’ (1990, 11). This may be especially true in the case of members of ‘conflict generated diasporas’, i.e. those who originate from violent settings, but are not necessarily recognised as refugees according to international law. These members have not necessarily fled their home country because of conflict, but the conflict in their country of origin plays a central role in the development of their (transnational) identity. It also serves as a focal point for mobilisation and networking in the country of settlement. (Lyons 2007, 542; Lyons 2006, 2.)

According to Bercovitch, “the best way to conceive of the role of diasporas in conflict is to think of the various phases or stages of a conflict (conflict emergence, continuation, escalation, termination and post-conflict reconstruction) and then to evaluate the possible role diaspora may play in each phase” (2007, 26-37). The existing literature features both positive and negative perceptions about the impact of diaspora groups on conflict resolution. However, the assessment of whether the impact is positive or negative very much depends on who is making the judgement call. As Østergaard-Nielsen points out,
“irresponsible long distance nationalists for some are freedom fighters for others” (2006, 2). Moreover, the concept of peace is problematic in and of itself; “all arguably want peace, but the major question is in what terms” (Smith 2007, 10). In addition, because of the complex nature of any given conflict, even noble intentions of promoting peace do not always translate into a positive outcome (Orjuela 2006).

It is vital, in any attempt to gauge whether diasporas exacerbate or prevent conflict, to take into account the heterogeneous nature of diaspora groups. Having a common history and language, or belonging to the same ethnicity, does not necessarily make for a homogeneous community with a common purpose or goal (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006, 2). Therefore, rather than automatically considering the diaspora to be united, it is more useful to view diasporas as moral and political communities that can in certain contexts be mobilised towards certain common goals (See Kleist 2007; Werbner 2002; Axel 2004).

Many of the examples in the literature related to the migration and conflict nexus are drawn from diasporas originating from Ireland, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Serbia, Sri Lanka and Latin America. The majority of this literature is focused on minority militants, such as the Tamils, Kurds and Irish. Very little has been written about diaspora groups originating from Africa, particularly on those groups that fled the civil wars that broke out in the late 1980s - early 1990s. (See for example Mohamoud 2006, 1.)

It is therefore important to examine the link between these African diaspora groups and the conflicts in their home region. This is due to the fact that domestic conflicts have not only been regionalised, but they have also become internationalised through, for example, the activities of diaspora groups. This has been the case, for instance, in conflicts based in the Horn of Africa (Ibid., 3).

1.1. Diasporas facilitating conflict

1.1.1. ‘New Wars’ and diasporas

As noted by the existing literature about the ‘New Wars’

3 The ‘New Wars’ concept will from hereon after be referred to as the New Wars, without the quotation marks.

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conflict have taken a new direction. According to the New Wars hypothesis, the dynamics of war have changed, resulting in an influx of refugees and other migrants. The debate over whether there is anything ‘new’ about the so called New Wars rests on two main propositions. The first is put forth by proponents of the New Wars concept (Duffield 1998, Newman 2004, Kaldor 2001), who argue that there is a correlation between the end of the Cold War and the civil, ethnic and religious wars that have emerged since that time. According to this view, the boundaries and patterns of war have shifted, and the New Wars “are distinct in significant ways from earlier forms of conflict” (Newman 2004, 173). Meanwhile, the second proposition maintains that civil, religious and ethnic wars existed during the Cold War and that there is nothing “unique about the post-Cold War period” (Berdal 2003, 483).

According to proponents of the New Wars concept, there were great expectations that the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the iron curtain would lead to a sharp decline in conflict. However, nearly two decades later, any such expectations have been shattered. New types of wars have emerged, and outbreaks of civil, religious and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, Russia and elsewhere have resulted in an upsurge of refugees and migrants. According to Duffield (2002), these New Wars can be seen “as a form of non-territorial network war that works through and around states.” Additionally, “instead of conventional armies, the [N]ew [W]ars typically oppose and ally the transborder resource networks of state incumbents, social groups, diasporas and strongmen” (Duffield 2002, 14). Finally, as Duffield notes, there have been changes in the “main protagonists and units of analysis of war, the motives of protagonists, the spatial context, technological means of violence the social, material and human impact of conflict, political economy and social structure of conflict” (2002, 174).

However, opponents maintain that there is nothing new about the so-called ‘New Wars.’ According to Berdal, for instance, the “relationship between the momentous transformation brought about [by] industrialization and the long-term prospects for war and peace was a prominent theme of political and sociological thought in the nineteenth-century in Europe” (Berdal 2003, 477). Berdal’s fundamental bottom line is that the perceived increase in post-Cold War tensions is not necessarily testament to an actual increase in conflict. Meanwhile, there are others who argue that what has changed is not the type of conflict – from interstate to intrastate wars – so much as the patterns of conflict. Overall,
even proponents of the New Wars concept concur that, in present-day conflicts, “warring parties are often regarded as pursuing sectarian economic or ethnic interests rather than universalistic political motives,” and that many of the features of present-day wars, including widespread violence against civilian populations and gross human rights violations, are no different than in the past (Duffield 2002, 118). Ultimately, the main differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars may to some extent derive from the emergence of a new theoretical framework, which recognises the complexity of conflicts. This is not to claim that actual differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars do not exist, but that the differences may not ultimately be that drastic.

Despite the various positions assumed by scholars in the so-called New Wars debate, there is a general consensus that the scholarly interest in modern-day wars would not have made similar headlines during the Cold War era. Rather, these wars might have been classified as the ‘internal affairs’ of another state (Berdal 2003, 483). The main differentiation is one which points to the complexity and the changing nature of the post-Cold War era: refugees crossing international borders as a direct result of modern-day wars. Migrants who have fled from conflicts are now residents and citizens of other countries. Meanwhile, while residing in the host country, these migrants retain strong and established links with their country of origin. It is within this context that researchers have increasingly focused on the relationships between diaspora groups and conflicts in their respective country of origin.

Proponents of the New Wars concept, such as Kaldor (2001) and Duffield (2002), argue that diasporas bear a strong influence on conflicts in the post-Cold War era. The strong ties between diasporas and their original homelands have given rise to the ‘transnationalisation’ of domestic wars. This means that warring parties have access to several cross-border networks, such as diasporas and shadow economies, which can facilitate the illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and other valuable supplies including diamonds. These support mechanisms can only be maintained through the resort to continued violence, “so that war logic is built into the functioning of the economy” (Kaldor 2001, 9; see also Duffield 2002; Byman et al. 2001).

Kaldor (2001) and Duffield (2002) suggest that the support offered by diaspora members to warring parties can either be direct in the form of material support (e.g. money
and arms) or indirect (e.g. the misuse of remittances sent to families by the warring parties for military purposes, through taxation or extortion). According to Kaldor (2001, 102-3), the latter kind of appropriation can be undertaken through check points and roadblocks controlled by warlords or insurgent groups. Diasporas may also be directly or indirectly involved in illegal trade and money laundering activities that support warring parties, and through which resources for continued conflicts can be allocated (Duffield 2002).

1.1.2. Diasporas contributing to conflict

There are several ways in which diasporas can become engaged in the conflict in their country of origin, namely through economic, political and military means. In addition to supplying financial resources, diasporas may also serve to generate ideas, know how, skills and techniques (Kaldor 2001, 7; 85). In recent years, what has generated substantial scholarly debate has been the supposed financial contributions made by diaspora members to their homeland (e.g. in the form of remittances), as well as their political connections and influences both in their home and host countries. More specifically, the lack of proper supervision and control over remittances has become a major concern, mainly due to the perceived fact that immigrant remittances could be used for funding wars or even terrorist activities.

The financial contributions of diaspora members to opposition groups are thought to be significant. Nobody knows the exact figures worldwide, but estimates such as “tens of millions of dollars annually” have been thrown around. It has also been claimed that the support of diasporas to insurgencies has probably surpassed that of the state (Byman et al. 2001, 3; Adamson 2002). As noted by Brinkerhoff, the potential for diaspora members to “raise money to support continuing warfare, promote public opinion and international interventions in support of their cause” (2006, 27) has increased over time and diaspora groups may now be less inclined to accept political compromises aimed at ending the conflict.

According to a widely cited World Bank study, the chances for prolonged or recurring conflict are greater in a country with a significant diaspora in the United States compared to countries without such a diaspora. The report claims “that countries which ended a civil war five years ago and which had an unusually large diaspora based in the USA, had a
36% chance of conflict recurring, as opposed to a 6% chance in countries with an unusually small diaspora” (Collier 2000, 6). According to Collier’s report, what makes diaspora a risk factor for conflict perpetuation is the greater financial capacity that they carry compared to those staying in the country of origin. Also, their remittances have the potential to be channelled to insurgents and terrorist groups (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 575, about the economy of civil wars; see also Ballentine 2003; Collinson 2003).

However, Collier’s position has not been without its critics. Collier’s hypothesis that “diasporas activities [i.e. remittances] tend to be conflict-increasing [rather] than contributing to constructive conflict transformation… cannot be sustained” (Zunzer 2004, 27). Zunzer points out that diaspora remittances are sent on a “family-to-family member level.” According to Zunzer, instead of increasing the conflict as Collier claims, remittances sent to poorer and more socially disadvantaged members of society can in fact play a constructive role. Challenging Collier’s assertion, Zunzer argues that remittances sent to families living in a region or country experiencing what he calls ‘multiple latent conflicts,’ such as the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, “[can] make a positive contribution to the stabilization and transformation of the social or class conflict of the economically disadvantaged” (Zunzer 2004, 28). The remittances sent to insurgents or terrorist groups may in fact be insignificant compared to the sums of money directed towards rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Collier can also been criticised for the methodology that he used to carry out the study, particularly the sampling and theoretical basis as well as the relevance of indicators that he applied. Collier’s arguments are based on economic correlations calculated from quantitative aggregate data at the global level, but correlation analysis cannot provide a causal explanation about social, economic or political phenomena. Moreover, most of the correlations may reflect mutual or inversed causality or multi-causal relationships in which the supposed cause may be a secondary factor or co-variable. Collier bases this correlation analysis on simplified economic theory, which assumes that societies consist of people seeking to maximise benefits (i.e. which, in Collier’s analysis, would seem to be short or medium term material gains). Furthermore, the historical and socio-political contexts have not been taken into proper consideration in the examples that he provides.

Another criticism of Collier’s work is the fact that the author makes broad references to civil wars globally, but relies on indicators of diaspora members living only in
the United States. Naturally, significant diaspora communities exist outside of the US. Also, the concept of civil war is difficult to define. Setting the limit at 1,000 battle-related deaths is rather arbitrary, for instance, since such figures have different significances in different contexts. Additionally, the reliability of data on civil war casualties should be questioned.

The impact of contributions made by diasporas may vary according to the conflict phase, i.e. whether the conflict is emerging, escalating or terminating. In 2006, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom undertook another statistical analysis on the role of diasporas in contributing to conflict recurrence in post conflict countries. Their findings suggest that:

[A]t least superficially, one might expect that larger diasporas proxy more severe conflicts which in turn might have higher risks of conflict reversion. In fact, we find that diasporas significantly reduce post-conflict risks and this result seems less likely to be a spurious consequence of endogeneity. The result is somewhat surprising since diasporas tend to be a source of finance for politically more extreme organizations. The effect is quite large, doubling the diaspora reduces risk from 40% to 32.8%. (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2006, 12).

There are many examples of both contemporary and older conflicts where the warring parties seek external support and diaspora groups become actively involved in providing and mobilising support for the groups engaged in the conflict. A classic case is the support of the Irish community in the United States for the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In addition to their financial support, several Irish American pressure groups have played an important role in lobbying the US Government on issues concerning Northern Ireland (Adamson 2002).

In addition to the Irish American example, several case studies point to Tamil diaspora involvement in the conflict in Sri Lanka between the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Government. The LTTE view the Tamil diaspora as an excellent source of funding for their struggle and have developed a complex web of networks

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4 Again in this study, the researchers only examined diasporas in the USA. The research was supported by the New Security Challenges Programme of the Economic and Social Research Council and by the Political Institutions, Development and Domestic Civil Peace Programme of the Government of Norway and the World Bank.

5 The researchers looked at 68 post-conflict episodes, out of which 31 had reverted back to war within the decade. They benchmarked the average risk of conflict reversion within the decade at 40%. The authors do not, however, indicate in which ways diasporas might help to reduce the risk of conflict recurrence.

to force remittances from Tamil diasporas worldwide (La 2004). La (2004) has documented cases where LTTE associates in Canada have coerced members, businesses and charities of the Tamil diaspora, into helping fund the LTTE struggle. They have often done this by “questioning or even threatening the safety of a reluctant donor’s relatives in Sri Lanka” (La 2004, 381). According to La, LTTE coercive practices mean that the host countries indirectly contribute to the perpetuation of the Sri Lankan conflict “[through the transfer of] resources from the host state to fuel a destructive war in sending states” (La 2004, 379).

Furthermore, sending remittances is a “kinship obligation towards their family members at home” (Fuglerud 2001, 204), and the refusal to participate in ‘forced remittances’ may put loved ones at risk. As a result, Tamil diaspora continue to provide substantial resources for Tamil Tiger insurgents. As Wayland (2004, 424, in Horst 2007) argues, due to increased political freedom, Tamil diaspora are better positioned to facilitate access to financial resources and advanced communication networks in their respective country of settlement. Tamil diaspora thereby have the potential to engage in prolonged insurgency by supporting Tamil efforts (Wayland 2004, 417, in Horst 2007).

Byman et al. (2001, 43) also argue that the channels through which the LTTE have managed to gauge support from the diaspora – namely through propaganda and finance generation – are rather unique in their own right. Front organisations have been established in several Western countries to politically support the LTTE (ibid., 44). LTTE groups have also been active in establishing internet sites. The United States has labeled LTTE as a terrorist group and other countries including Canada and the UK have set measures to prohibit the support of insurgent movements such as the LTTE (ibid., 48). However, many other countries have not taken similar measures and in general, Byman et al. (2001, 106) claim that it is relatively easy for insurgent support movements to operate in democratic Western countries even if the Governments oppose these same movements.7

Similar to the LTTE, Kurdish diaspora communities continue to play a central role in the development of the Kurdish homeland (Kurdistan). The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is the main insurgent group fighting the Turkish Government for an independent Kurdistan. Based on the findings of research exploring the links between the Kurdish

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diaspora (mainly the PKK) and the conflict, the Kurds in the diaspora are highly politicised (see for example Wahlbeck 1999). The funding of the PKK, for instance, has stemmed mainly from two sources: Kurd migrants living in Europe (particularly in Germany because of its large Kurd population) and more importantly, through criminal activities such as human and drug trafficking (Radu 2001).  

However, the Kurd diaspora is a heterogeneous body of individuals, for example originating from different states, namely Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Although there has been a strong sense of Pan-Kurdish nationalism, there are different diasporic organisations with widely differing strategies on how to approach the Kurdish cause in the Iraq war, for instance. (Natali 2007, 202-210). Østergaard-Nielsen (2006, 4) notes that among PKK supporters, there are organisations that have a peaceful and pluralist stance on the Kurdish issue. Moreover, some Kurdish networks have changed their means and objectives to become more peaceful over the years. This is merely one example amongst many that counters the argument that diasporas only assume hard line positions vis-à-vis conflict in their country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006, 4).  

Similarly, Croatians living overseas assumed an active role in the quest for an independent Croatia. Funds were raised within the diaspora for the struggle for Independence, and later the diaspora also became involved in spearheading public relation campaigns in their respective host countries for the recognition of the new state (Skrbis 2007, 232-233). According to Skrbis, “[t]he support for military efforts of war was in the service of asserting and maintaining Independence. Independence, however, was achieved through military victory; hence the diaspora was interested in victory that would bring peace rather than in peace per se” (Ibid., 235).  

Likewise, in the late 1970s, the Cambodian diaspora offered support, including financial resources, for the struggles against the Khmer Rouge regime, and later for the struggles against Viet Nam’s occupation of the country (Um 2007, 253-254).  

Financial support is not the only way for diasporas to engage in conflicts. Lobbying for their cause in the country of settlement or in the international arena has also

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8 For more about the PKK, see Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK,” Orbis 45:1 (Winter 2001).  
been an important vehicle for political activism. A classic example of the influential lobbying role of diasporas is the case of Jews in the USA, where they have lobbied to the US Government for the support of the Israeli army (Sheffer 2007).

The Armenian diaspora have also been very active in lobbying to host country governments; attempting to influence the media in the host country so that their cause might be “represented in a favourable light”; and, “appeal[ing] to supranational organisations such as the United Nations, or engagement with NGOs” (Tööloylan 2007, 107-108; Mooradian 2004, 7; refer to Tööloylan 2006 for further details on the Armenian case). However, as previously discussed, the Armenian diaspora do not always act homogeneously. The Armenian diaspora have lobbied for genocide recognition and have helped to bring to the fore the key issues surrounding the conflict in Nagorno Karabagh. However, as Tööloylan observes, since different Armenian communities and organisations have not acted monolithically, it is very difficult to assess the actual impact of the diaspora on the Karabagh conflict (Tööloylan 2007, 114).

There are several examples within the Latin American context of diaspora engaging in conflict in the country of origin. For example, the El Salvadorian diaspora in the USA supported the “Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional” (FMLN) during the civil war (1979-1992) (see Landolt et. al 1999). Cubans in the United States are generally known for their anti-Castro stance. Some segments of the Cuban diaspora that strongly oppose Castro’s regime, have found “a common cause with the US States Department,” thereby gaining substantial support from the US Government (Grugel and Kippin 2007, 158; 167).

Diaspora members are generally thought to remain physically a part from the actual conflict zone, and contribute from a distance via financial and political means. However, diasporas may also play a hand at mobilising military forces transnationally. It has been claimed that this mobilisation often occurs between neighbouring countries, in some cases within the context of refugee camps. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), for instance, mobilised resources through the financial support of and recruitment from, the Albanian migrant community. They also participated in military training camps in Albania (see Byman et al. 2001). Another example of refugees serving as combatants is the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established in the 1960s. From its initial base in Jordan, the PLO
engaged in clashes with Israeli forces and thereby threatened the security of Jordan (Saleyhan and Gleditsch 2004, 11). The Taliban was also formed by Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Byman et al. 2001, 62). In certain cases, members of the wider diaspora have returned to their country of origin to assume a combat or military role. For example, according to media reports, some individuals from the wider Somali diaspora have previously joined the Union of the Islamic Courts in Somalia (see Horst 2007).

However, even if diaspora support for conflicts has increased or intensified over time, one should not neglect the role of states in providing resources for conflicts. According to Byman et al., state support for insurgent groups remains significant. States can also offer a wider range of services and support to insurgent movements compared to diasporas, including military training, safe havens, sophisticated weapons and diplomatic support (2001, xiv; 59).10

1.1.3. Factors influencing the diaspora groups’ contribution to conflict in their country of origin

Several factors have been identified as influencing the diaspora groups’ contribution to conflict situations. It has been argued that diasporas maintain rather romanticised views of their countries and communities of origin and “may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging” (Collier 2000, 14). It has also been asserted that diasporas are more wealthy than those remaining in the country of origin and do not have to directly face the consequences of renewed conflict (ibid.). Diaspora groups have also been described as 'alienated,' playing out their own fantasies and frustrations without necessarily having a grasp of the situation on the field.

It has also been claimed that those groups whose identities tend to be centred around statelessness and marginalisation, are often soft targets for mobilisation and are likely to support national liberation movements in their communities of origin (Sheffer 2007, 68; see also Sheffer 2003). Sheffer (2003) distinguishes between state-linked and stateless

10 The report combines a broad survey of major insurgencies that have been active since 1991 (although some of them were already active earlier). The report also provides more qualitative analysis of “several of the most important insurgent movements” in order to gauge the level of external support for insurgencies. All the insurgent groups included in the review “have inflicted in excess of 1 000 deaths per conflict.” (Byman et al. 2001, 6.)
diasporas and claims that these adopt different strategies towards their involvement in the “homeland”. Stateless diasporas are more likely to choose rather radical approaches such as “irredentist or separatist strategies”, which seek “to establish an independent state in a diaspora’s former historical homeland” (Sheffer 2003, 170). Meanwhile, state-linked diasporas are more likely to adopt “the communal strategy,” a more moderate approach using nonviolent means to “achieve a secure and respected existence within host countries” (ibid., 172). Examples of diaspora groups that have sought their own state sovereignty and which have mobilised around this quest include: the Kurds from Iran, Iraq and Turkey; the Oromo people; the Tamils from Sri Lanka; Palestinians; the Armenians and the Croats (before 1991). The vast majority of case studies discussing diasporas’ negative role in conflicts refer to one of these groups and their struggle for an independent state.

In the existing literature, diasporas are indeed sometimes depicted as being far removed from the reality of the conflict situation, and as thereby assuming a more hard-line and antagonistic stance. According to Skrbis (1997), diasporas can play a key role in supporting extremist groups. It has been claimed that they engage in what is termed as ‘virtual conflict’, meaning that they experience the conflict through the internet, telephone and television. Thus, the dynamics of their engagement in the conflict situation differ vastly from the realities faced by those remaining in the country of origin (Demmers 2002, 94). Similarly, Anderson (1992) posits that diasporas may more readily become involved in the hard-line politics of their country of origin, given that they neither face the direct consequences of the war nor are they accountable for any irresponsible political activities. Anderson has developed the widely known concept of ‘long distance nationalism’, describing nationalist diaspora politics as follows:

[W]hile technically a citizen on the state in which he comfortably lives, but to which he may feel little attachment, he finds it tempting to play identity politics by participating (via propaganda, money, weapons, any way but voting) in the conflicts of his imagined Heimat – now only fax time away. But this citizenshipless participation is inevitably non-responsible – our hero will not have to answer for, or pay the price of, the long-distance politics he undertakes. (Anderson 1992, 13).

Sorenson echoes similar concerns that diasporas are “particularly fertile breeding grounds for the social construction of nationalist mythologies” (1996, 443). This is
because diaspora groups do not face the direct consequences of the conflict; they obtain much of their information 'second-hand'; their motivation is affected by the conditions in the host country; and, their quest for a sovereign, independent state derives from nostalgic and idealised feelings towards the country of origin, as well as from their experiences of being part of a minority group in their country of settlement (Cf. Conrad 2006b).

Diaspora groups that become active in homeland conflicts may also become more radical over time. The Kosovan diaspora, for example, is said to have radicalised over the years. Initially, the diaspora provided support to the moderate LDK party (headed by Ibrahim Rugova), but as the conflict intensified and the rebellion grew, the diaspora began to increasingly support the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Simultaneously, Albanians from Western European countries started to join the insurgency (Human Rights Watch 2001). The key question here becomes, whether the actions of diasporas are reactive or proactive vis-à-vis the conflict in their country of origin. Often, political changes in the country of origin and new developments in the conflict may lead diaspora members to adopt different stances and to take action accordingly.

It is often argued that migrants are likely to feel a ‘genuine sympathy’ for their relatives staying in conflict ridden areas. Migrants may feel guilty at the thought of being safe whilst their relatives are suffering (Byman et al. 2001, 55). Such feelings may motivate diaspora members to engage in ‘virtual conflicts’ or even participate in or mobilise forces for the ‘real conflict’ (Demmers 2002, 95). Rebel movements may also seek to capitalise on these feelings of guilt and sympathy in an attempt to lobby for more support from the diaspora (Byman et al. 2001, 55). After all, as noted by Werbner, diasporas have a free hand to “endorse and actively support ethnicist, nationalistic and exclusionary movements” (2002, 120). Diaspora support for insurgent movements may also be a direct result of coercion from the movements’ overseas representatives, as has been reported to be the case among Tamils (see above).

However, not all diasporas are involved in conflicts taking place in their country of origin. The Columbian diaspora in the United States are a case in point. This diaspora have been described as reluctant to take part in the ongoing conflict in Columbia and

\[11\] For example, a substantial number of Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora returned to Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 to participate in the conflict. In doing so, they crossed the border between virtual and real conflict (Demmers 2002, 95).
there is no evidence to suggest this group has supported the conflicting parties. According to Bouvier (2007, 136-140), this could be because warring parties in Columbia have sufficient resources (e.g. through drug trafficking and kidnappings) and have less of a need for outside support.

However, Bouvier (2007, 138-141; 147) argues that there is a number of other reasons why the Columbian diaspora have been reluctant to take part in homeland issues. First, a large proportion of Columbians living in the USA live there illegally and this makes it difficult to “advocate or organise as a community” (ibid. 139). The second reason would appear to be the “complex nature of the Columbian conflict and the behaviour of the armed actors which have limited the diasporas ability to agree upon and articulate a plan for action” (ibid.). Third, “because Columbian[s] often fled the violence at home or left under threat of kidnapping or persecution, many simply want to leave behind the conflict and begin a new life” (ibid. 139-140). Moreover, Colombians have little confidence in the political and economic institutions in their country of origin and lack a “sense of shared identity as a diaspora community” due to various cleavages amongst them. Finally, the Columbian diaspora tend to be characterised by a stereotype of drug trafficking and the fear of labels may prevent individuals from taking part in domestic matters (Ibid., 140-141). Nevertheless, Bouvier (2007, 141-147) states that there are signs of increasing Colombian diaspora involvement in home country matters, both in the economic and political sphere.

1.1.4. Diasporas 'importing' conflicts

It has been claimed that refugees have the potential to import conflicts to their respective country of settlement and thereby facilitate instability in the host region. Some scholars maintain that, by engaging in international crime or terrorist activities, diasporas are guilty of broadening the conflict (Sheffer 1994; Weiner 1995). An example of 'imported' conflict is the so called “cafe wars” where rival Algerian groups clashed in France during the Algerian war. These clashes resulted in an estimated 5,000 Algerian fatalities. In addition, refugees settling in neighbouring countries could pose a security risk by supporting domestic opposition groups. Somali refugees in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, for instance, are reported to have supported ethnic Somali separatists. Refugee settlements in poor neighbouring countries may also contribute to the clash between local and refugee communities over the scarcity of
resources (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2004, 8).

Prominent to the discourse in the West, particularly since the aftermath of 9/11, has been the view that diasporas are dangerous insofar as they bring with them the ‘homeland conflict’ and thereby threaten the social cohesion of those countries where they eventually settle. Diaspora groups have particularly come under the close scrutiny of Western Governments (Cheran 2003, 8), which generally view migration as a national security threat. From the security standpoint, it has been argued that increased mobility has made it possible for terrorists, drug traffickers and criminals to gain entry into Western countries. The attacks of September 2001 are often used as the prime example of how migration and security are intertwined. Overall, it is precisely on this type of Western rhetoric that the vast majority of literature on the securitisation of migration is based (see more Faist 2005).

As Adamson argues, concerns about migration have now “moved to the top of the international security agenda” (2006, 165). Migration studies has become an area of key interest among not only scholars and researchers, but also a wide range of stakeholders including politicians, police forces, armies, social services, border patrols and custom officers as well as secret services, private corporations and the general public (Bigo 2002, 63).

### 1.2. Possibilities and opportunities for diasporas to contribute to peace building

The authors of the New Wars and those examining the political economy of civil war have mainly provided a negative account of the role of migrants in conflicts. However, a more nuanced way of exploring the complexity of this field is required. Comparatively speaking, this literature review suggests that a growing proportion of research is now beginning to challenge traditional conceptualisations that “reduce migrants as war mongerers” (Leroy and Mohan 2003, 612). In recent years, a broader view has begun to emerge vis-à-vis the link between diasporas and conflicts. This type of literature emphasises the possibilities for diasporas to contribute to conflict resolution and peace building.
Although the existing literature acknowledges the potentially negative role that diaspora can play in conflict situations, there is also a growing recognition of the need to critically examine this traditional view. The latter tends to exclusively view diasporas as dangerous and to associate them and their networks with illegal activities and terrorism. The central premise of the emerging debate on diasporas is to seek an objective and balanced view of their roles. This requires recognising not only the negative impacts of diaspora groups on conflict situations but also their potential to contribution to peace building.

The remittances sent by diasporas to their relatives in their country of origin has cited as one of the positive examples of diaspora involvement. In the existing literature, ever-more attention is being diverted to the increasingly powerful role of such remittances in post-conflict development. It has been suggested that “remittances have the potential to be harnessed for the reconstruction and development of societies recovering from the distress of war or economic collapse” (Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002, 27). As argued by Leroy and Mohan (2003, 612), rather than equating diasporas with illegality, the focus should be on undertaking a nuanced analysis of activities in which diasporas are engaged and the concrete impact of these on the homeland.

However, some have questioned the real impact of diasporas in transforming the outcomes of conflicts. It has also been suggested that, although resources provided by diasporas could be crucial in “upsetting the existing balance of economic, political and military power in their homeland… the role of states remains vital as well” (Wayland 2004, in Horst, 2007, 7). Others have argued that diaspora groups who have previously supported warring parties in the conflict may begin to contribute positively in the post-conflict phase. According to Skrbis (2007, 234), diaspora groups that have been highly politicised during the conflict may reverse their agenda in the post conflict reconstruction phase towards less politicised pursuits, as has been the case of the Croatians. The Bosnian diaspora are an

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12 For example, the Bush administration has claimed that the Al-Barakaat offices (one of the xawilaad companies used by Somalis) have links with Al-Qaida and therefore closed the offices of Al-Barakaat in 2001. Later on, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates gave UN investigators access to Al-Barakaat’s records, which contained over 17,000 pages of documentation. “The result: The FBI could not substantiate any links between al-Barakaat and terrorism, the 9/11 commission stated.” (Ottaway 2004).
example of a group that has been active in both the conflict and the post conflict reconstruction phase.\footnote{For more about Bosnians and reconstruction, see Kent, Gregory (2006) Organised diaspora networks and homeland peacebuilding: the Bosnian world diaspora network as a potential development actor. Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 6, Issue 3 October 2006 , pages 449 – 469.}

Ultimately, the claim that diasporas support warring parties through remittances should not be underestimated, but it should also be considered with caution insofar as very little is known about the actual amounts, scope, or impact of the support. Generally speaking, there is a paucity of evidence to gauge the extent to which remittances protract civil wars; how much money is channelled towards conflict perpetuation activities; and who the real recipients are. According to the literature review, remittances are often underreported and much of the remittances flowing to conflict areas are transmitted through informal channels\footnote{The Xawilaad system in Somalia is a money transfer system currently working worldwide. It is informal in the sense that it is not under Government control, but currently xawilaad companies are working openly and many companies within the system are working towards formalising their activities (much due to accusations for links to terrorism after 9/11). (Hansen 2004, 13.)} (Collinson 2003).

According to Mohamoud (2006) and Zunzer (2004), the amount of remittances sent by diaspora members that could be used in conflict perpetuation is relatively small. In his study of “Mobilizing African Diaspora for the Promotion of Peace in Africa”\footnote{The study was commissioned by the Netherland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Diasporas from the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa living in the Netherlands were included in the study and empirical data was collected by interviewing 20 African diaspora organisations and institutions and scholars on the subject in the Netherlands and supplemented by the data collected from the UK. This study, which is a policy paper in nature, is one of the very few studies carried out about the diaspora – conflict nexus on the Horn of Africa diaspora.}, for example, suggests that it is very unlikely for individual remittances sent to conflict ridden areas to be allocated towards warring efforts. This is because, for many families, remittances are the only source of income to meet their daily and basic needs. However, others have counter-argued that warring parties could manipulate private remittances through taxation or extortion for their warring purposes.

Generally speaking, the collection of remittances can be classified into two categories. The first type of remittance is the one sent by individuals to their families and relatives to meet basic monthly needs. The second form of remittance is the ‘collective remittance’, referring to funds allocated to meet particular community needs.\footnote{See the definition of different forms of remittances, for example in Goldring, Luin (2004) Family and Collective Remittances to Mexico. A Multi-dimensional Typology. Development and Change 35(4): 799–840.} This latter
type of funding can be collected purely on a voluntary basis, for example for development purposes. However, 'collective remittances' can also be collected through the use of force (see La (2004) and his definition of 'forced remittances'). Therefore, collective remittances might be more easily misused and directed towards conflict continuation, although more research is required to assess the extent to which this might be the case (see for example Mohamoud 2006). In general, there is a paucity of literature concerning collective remittances and their potential impact on development and/or conflict.

Overall, in many conflict ridden areas, the remittances sent by diasporas serve “vital humanitarian functions” (Berdal 2005). In countries where civil wars have hindered access to livelihood opportunities and basic public services, remittances are often the only source of income. Moreover, the ways in which diasporas influence conflict dynamics is very context specific and the impact can change over the course of the conflict and through changes to political contexts as well (see for example Berdal 2005, 694-695).

Negative claims about diasporas often fail to take into account the diversity of diaspora groups. Mohamoud (2006, 5) suggests that, while often the most visible, diaspora members engaging in extremist activities are generally a part of a minority and not representative of the broader group. Nevertheless, a key issue for consideration is that diasporas are "stratified by class, caste, education, occupation, religious affiliation, cultural interests, urban or rural background" (Werbner 1999, 24). Therefore, they cannot be labelled as one homogenous body of diaspora members who work towards the same political goal in the common homeland. This is simply because diasporas “do not have a single stand” (Sökefeld 2006, 280; see also Zunzer 2004, 26). Due to significant political differences and cleavages, the heterogeneity of diaspora groups generally has to be taken into account in any analysis undertaken in the field. As Sökefeld notes:

The assumption of a shared identity that unites people living dispersed in transnational space thereby becomes the central defining feature of diasporas. Rejecting ideas of migrants’ natural rootedness and belonging to places of origin, I argued that diaspora identity and the imagination of a diaspora community is also an outcome of mobilization processes. The development of diaspora identity is not simply a natural and inevitable result of migration but a historical contingency that frequently develops out of mobilization in response to specific critical events. Diaspora is thus firmly historicized. It is not an issue of naturally felt roots but of specific political circumstances that suggest the mobilization of a transnational imagined community. The focus on mobilization in the formation of diasporas effectively counters essentializing
Divisions among diaspora groups are sometimes based on previous, homeland-related barriers; sometimes new cleavages develop in exile; or, divisions may exist between diaspora groups and those remaining in the country of origin. It is therefore fundamental to distinguish between the different groups that comprise the diaspora and to examine how these groups relate to the issues and policies of their homeland (Horst 2007, 8). In some cases, members of a diaspora group belonging to the same socio-political class or sharing the same religious affiliation may support and/or mobilise different actors in the conflict in their country of origin. Moreover, within the context of refugee-generating conflicts, personal memories and experiences, coupled with second-hand information about the conditions under which their relatives back home are living, may shape and hamper diasporas’ ability to respond to domestic issues in a peaceful manner.

Gender is also another key issue to be taken into consideration in the process of diaspora disaggregation. Al-Ali notes that much of the existing literature “continues to be gender blind” (2007, 39; 42; 58). Therefore, more emphasis needs to be placed on examining “the ways in which women and men are positioned differently in terms of prevailing gender ideologies and relations within the country of residence and the country of origin.” It is important to take into account the gender dimension in any analysis of diasporas and to view women not only “as victims but also as agents” (Ibid.).

It has also been suggested that, when a refugee has to flee his/her homeland because of civil war, the time of flight may be an important factor in determining to which group the refugee belongs (Spear 2006, 4). Therefore, new groups and cleavages may develop in exile, and refugees may change their approaches towards the country of origin over time. With this in mind, it is advisable to adopt a more cautious approach that avoids generalising diaspora into one distinct or fixed group.

The vast majority of the existing literature emphasises diaspora nationalism, particularly in its extreme forms. However, it is important to distinguish between different causes rather than clump all situations under the general umbrella clause of nationalism. Concepts and discourses should allow distinctions to be made between networks such as Al Qaida and groups that “are engaged in legitimate struggles of self determination” (Cheran
At the same time, it should be noted that not all wars are fought for the Independence of a specific state and not all diasporas engage in struggles for sovereignty (see Sheffer’s (2003) distinction between stateless and state-linked diasporas). Therefore, it is vital to carefully analyse the nature of the conflict, its actors and stakeholders and their aspirations within any study of the diaspora and conflict nexus.

Meanwhile, the issue of power has not been sufficiently addressed in the existing literature, which tends to over-emphasise the role of diasporas in providing resources to warring parties. Within this type of analysis, diaspora are broken down into quantitative measures and power is generally viewed as a coercive “threat power” (see Boulding 1989, 25). This conceptualisation also undermines the social and political capital that migrants possess, by over-emphasising their provision of material resources in conflict situations.

As much as diasporas have resources to supply for warring parties, they also have social capital that could be used for peace building purposes in fragmented or divided societies. As Wayland points out, people “who migrate from a close[d] society to an open society are able to capitalise on newfound freedoms to publish, organise and accumulate financial resources to an extent that was impossible in the homeland” (2004, 417, in Horst 2007, 3). New settings in the country of settlement may have an impact on mono dimensional identities. For example, Tamils in the diaspora have developed multiple hybridises and identities and do not necessarily identify themselves solely as Tamils (Cheran 2003, 12-13). Shain and Barth (2003, 450) furthermore suggest that diasporas have the potential to act as critical agents of social change. Diaspora groups can serve “to act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host societies and to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy” (Shain and Barth, 2003, 450: see also Naim 2002, 95).

Similarly, as observed by Landolt et al. (1999, 292), "established structures of domination and exploitation are contested, altered and reconstructed” in transnational social fields. The latter can provide a platform for new forms of collaboration and unification across class and political divisions (ibid., 312). New forms of collaboration as well as new ideas, values and norms - also called ‘social remittances’

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17 Peggy Levitt has coined the term 'social remittances' to designate the immaterial transfers of migrants. She defines them as "the local level, migration driven form of cultural diffusion... which consist the ideas, behaviours and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities" (1998, 926-7).
change. But what kind of impact these social remittances actually have in the country of origin and how the local population views the norms, values and ideas coming from the diaspora, remains to be seen.

Despite this, diasporas have the potential to contribute to conflict resolution, peace building and reconstruction because they have access to Western donor/government agencies (see for example Lyons 2004). Additionally, the heterogeneous nature of diasporas can be used constructively to achieve conflict resolution. However, the key questions then become: which different groups do diasporas consist of; how can they facilitate dialogue between contesting groups in the country of origin; and, how should Western agencies engage with these diaspora groups?

According to the research findings about Kurdish organisations by Emanuelsson (2005, in Østergaard-Nielsen 2006, 13), it would appear easiest to engage the most moderate organisations that are in close contact with civil society in the country of origin in peace-building efforts. In her study on Kurdish political networks in Germany, Østergaard-Nielsen (2006, 13) suggests that many associations, in addition to coordinating activities to promote Kurdish Independence, have shifted their goals towards human rights and democracy promotion in Turkey. Due to this shift, “they were increasingly invited to participate in the German political arena as can be validated by a marked rise in the number of meetings with mainstream policy-makers and increased co-operation with various NGOs who previously kept at a distance.” In turn, this has encouraged other associations to seek more moderate and comprising means and goals. The author suggests that, in some cases, the radicalisation of diaspora groups has its roots in their sense of marginalisation in the host country. (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006, 12.)

The need for increased communication and dialogue with diaspora communities is another point emphasised by researchers within the existing literature. The latter argue that promoting dialogue within and among diaspora groups could help these groups to become more active and constructive in the peace building process. However, it remains unclear whether and to what extent such processes of dialogue can have a concrete impact on

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conflict-generating structures and circumstances (Lyons 2004, 18).  

Nevertheless, as noted by Tölölyan (2002), some diaspora communities have access or links to key media companies, which could be crucial for mobilising and promoting constructive dialogue in the country of origin. Also, various other ‘channels’ exist that could help to actively engage diasporas in processes of conflict resolution and promoting peace. These include civic oriented activities, such as community development activities and business investments; direct political involvement in the country of origin; and, finally, advocacy and lobbying activities. The opportunities as well as the risks regarding each of these activities are discussed below, with reference to the existing literature in this field.

1.2.1. Civic oriented activities

Today, there is a widespread recognition of the growing potential of involving diaspora and other civil society members to positively contribute to conflict resolution (Cochrane 2007, 19; Orjuela 2006, 6). It is also widely acknowledged that civil society has an essential role to play in sustaining peace and democracy. However, civil society is often viewed either as an internal (e.g. local/ indigenous NGOs) or as an external (e.g. external/ international NGOs) phenomenon. Not much attention has thereby been diverted to the peace building role of organisations that span across the boundaries of internal and external civil society actors. (Cochrane 2007, 21.)

While there are empirical examples of civic oriented activities in the existing literature, as Cochrane suggests, the study of diasporas remains an aspect of civil society that is “large but frequently unrecognized” (ibid. 19). More research is clearly needed on this issue. Civic oriented action refers to non political activities, such as community

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21 “Political” in this context refers to direct political activities such as voting and involvement in political parties, government institutions, or other political institutions. The question of “what is political” is relevant here. The distinction between civic oriented activities (e.g. development and relief work) and direct political
development and business investments. Cochrane defines the role of civil society as one that ties “grass-roots communities with countries to their political elites and help[s] to build mutually reinforcing dynamics that will strengthen political negotiations or peace settlements” (Cochrane 2007, 19). Cochrane’s definition highlights the importance of civic and development oriented activities to conflict resolution and peace building, which remains a largely unexplored field.

As Mohamoud asserts, conflicts occur not only for political reasons, but also for many other reasons including poverty, grievances and competition over scarce resources (Mohamoud 2005, 10). Civil society members can also play an important role in addressing some of these other issues. Many migrants consider themselves as “natural allies of civil society,” rather than as belonging to the political sphere of their country of origin. Indeed, this point highlights the importance of strengthening diasporas and other civil society activities in addressing conflict in the country of origin. The grassroots level is central to building lasting peace and it is therefore vital to assess the potential of diasporas to contribute to grassroots level activism.

For example, Sri Lankan diaspora groups and networks have been a key actor among the NGOs working in Sri Lanka and among donors seeking ways to support civil society activities. However, Cheran (2003, 17) points out that, like in many other countries, civil society in Sri Lanka is very divided and fractured, consisting of distinct groups such as the Tamils, Sinhala and Muslims. The widely differing degrees of power, resources and levels of articulation, coupled with the very low levels of communication between the various groups, should be taken into consideration in future research in this field.

Private remittances have been identified as a very important source of income, especially in conflict torn areas, due to a lack or even an absence of economic opportunities, functioning structures and/ or social welfare. Remittances and development projects can offer “alternatives to the war economy” (Orjuela 2006, 6) by making individuals less reliant on warring parties. Development and humanitarian aid projects by diaspora organisations can

22 Such as the Tamil Information Centre (TIC) in London, Tamil Rehabilitation Organizations in Europe and North America and Tamil Eelam Development Organization (TEEDOR) in Canada.
help to bring services to areas where access might otherwise be denied. This service provision is not, however, the only important role played by diaspora organisations. By setting up an association in the country of settlement and then establishing a branch in the hometown/area in the country of origin, the diaspora transfers organisational know-how and skills of financial management and administration to the homeland. Moreover, diaspora members engaged in civil society associations in their country of origin serve to instill “a collective and civic minded mentality” among the local population (Mohamoud 2005, 37).

The transfer of skills and know-how from diaspora members is important in countries/areas where much of the educated population has left (Cheran 2003). In some cases, individuals from the diaspora return to the country of origin to assume key roles in governments, businesses, academia and other socially and politically important positions.

Furthermore, investments and trade initiatives by the diaspora can affect significant change during the post war reconstruction phase (Orjuela 2006; Mohamoud 2005, 45). These can serve as catalysts for promoting peace, since the causes of conflict are not only political, but may also be rooted in materialistic or economic reasons. Development initiatives by the diaspora have the potential to promote peace, although it should be emphasised that they are unlikely to change structures in which inequalities are deeply embedded. Moreover, development projects can offer a platform for dialogue whereby conflicting interests are translated into common needs. This would help to foster trust in peace processes among local populations by giving people hope about their future (Orjuela 2006, 16-17).

There is, however, a lack of comprehensive analysis on how civic oriented activities can contribute to conflict resolution, prevention and peace building. Development is “a double-edged sword” that can support peace building, but which can also aggravate conflicts (Orjuela 2006)\textsuperscript{23}. Development initiatives may create new disputes and disagreements, exacerbate inequalities and therefore generate further distrust and frustrations. This might particularly be the case before processes of conflict transformation and

\textsuperscript{23} Orjuela’s research project entitled ‘Long-distance reconciliation? Nationalism and peacebuilding in the diaspora’ is funded by the Swedish Research Council. It is based on secondary sources as well as on interviews with diaspora members (conducted in Sri Lanka in 2005 and 2006), analysis of media/internet sources, as well as observation of/ participation in diaspora activities and informal conversations with persons in/from the diaspora (in the UK, Norway, Sweden and Sri Lanka, 2003-2006).
reconciliation have been completed, and/or if the initiatives are misused by the warring parties. In the worst case scenario, if economic development is prioritised over political solutions to the conflict, tensions may recur or even worsen. As a result, the warring parties could have more resources to be used for deployment than before the intervention. Furthermore, if the conflict is not sufficiently addressed in the planning stages of the project, development-oriented efforts may be hindered if the conflict re-ignites. (Orjuela 2006, 15; Mohamoud 2005, 34.) Therefore, the risks and stakes remain high if the “the cart for development is placed before the conflict resolution horse” (Sriskandarajah 2003).

1.2.2. Direct political involvement of diaspora groups

There are examples within the existing literature of how diasporas directly participate in political processes, particularly during the reconstruction phase. However, the literature concerning the political involvement of diasporas in conflict resolution activities is limited, and further research is required in the field (Horst 2007, 8).

It should first be noted that political involvement in conflict ridden areas poses certain risks. For example, within the Somalian context, there has been an absence of an effective and legitimate central Government. Diaspora involvement in domestic politics could therefore easily reinforce divisive politics via warring parties and this could in turn compromise the neutrality of the diaspora (Mohamoud 2005, 47).

Therefore, it has been argued that diasporas can be more efficient in promoting peace if they avoid becoming too deeply involved in the domestic political arena (Mohamoud 2005, 7). If development is a double edged sword, then particularly problematic could be the direct political involvement of diaspora members. Nevertheless, there are areas in which diaspora could play an important role. The benefits of diaspora political involvement could include, for example, the transfer of new political practices and ideas to promising leaders and authorities in the country of origin. New ideas, perspectives and identifications could have developed from the migrants’ experiences and encounters with different social and political systems. These changed perspectives could be used productively in the political processes of the homeland.

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24 Direct political involvement in this context refer to participation to party politics, government institutions, liaising with leaders, voting and peace negotiations.
There are also a number of examples in which diaspora groups have been active in political processes. In the case of El Salvador, new political and social actors emerged from the diaspora after the end of the civil war. These were ordinary people who had not previously participated in domestic political life, but who developed an interest in politics and had the opportunity to take part in the process during their exile. “[T]he migration was inherently politicized [during the civil war in El Salvador]” (Landolt et al. 1999). The relationship between migrants in the United States and the Government of El Salvador was negligible at best, and in practice, the only way to become involved in ‘homeland’ matters was through the “Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional” (FMLN). Since the signing of the 1992 Peace Accord, “ideological polarization has grown less stark and political spaces are now more openly contested. In this less polarized environment, a panoply of new transnational political voices has begun to emerge.” Also, possibilities have opened up to become involved outside the traditional political sphere, and new actors have emerged at the grass roots level. According to Landolt, these new actors are “committed to a transnational social justice and community development agenda that embodied the distinct vision of the Salvadoran migrant citizenry.” (Landolt et al. 1999, 295-297; 304.)

As the previous example suggests, diasporas can offer a new, alternative voice in national affairs during the post-conflict phase. However, whether this voice is loud enough to be publicly heard and to enable diaspora members to take part in national political processes, depends on the willingness of the new Government to listen (Landolt et al. 1999, 296). This is likely to happen if the diaspora has helped the new Government rise to power. Even when diaspora groups do not themselves participate in the political process, they can offer their expertise to peace negotiations as facilitators and mediators between the conflicting parties (Mohamoud 2005, 7).

The country of origin may allow its diaspora members to vote in its elections. Even if they do not have the right to vote, diaspora members may still be able to strongly influence the voting decisions of people living in the country of origin25 (Itzigsohn et al. 1999, 328-9). For instance, much of the formal politics has been dominated by diaspora returnees in Iraq, where diaspora members have reportedly played an important “role[] in promoting the strategy of ‘regime change’” (Kent 2005, 13). According to Mohamoud (2005,

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25 However, this may not be easy in politically instable contexts, where voters might be forced to vote in a certain way.
the diasporas’ involvement in the politics of the country of origin is most likely to lead to negative consequences if they support rival groups and do not encourage reconciliation. If diaspora members support violent rebel groups, for instance, they can contribute to perpetuating violence by helping the warlords stay in power.

1.2.3. Advocacy and lobbying role of diasporas

Diasporas hold advocacy and lobbying powers to bring issues concerning their respective country of origin onto the international agenda. Successful lobbying can have positive impacts on conflict resolution, although there is a paucity of research on the link between the two. Lobbying and advocacy may take different forms, such as raising awareness of the situation in the country of origin by disseminating information; organising demonstrations for more specific causes; and, promoting public education and relations (Horst 2007, 6). Often, the lobbying takes place in the host country, but in some cases, diaspora members have also managed to network with international agencies (see for example Horst 2007, 6). Indeed, diasporas are invaluable information sources to Western agencies as they often provide up-to-date information on the human rights and conflict situation (Mohamoud 2005, 34). In the existing literature, the Kurds are cited as one of the diaspora groups that have succeeded in lobbying for their cause (see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), whereas Bosnians and Eritreans have been less successful in their lobbying attempts (Al-Ali et al. 2001).

The Irish diaspora have not only been actively involved in the conflict, but have also worked towards achieving peace. Several NGOs formed by Irish Americans in the USA have “pursued a non violent agenda” and have helped to convince the IRA to adopt more peaceful measures. For example, Irish diaspora members acted as mediators between the IRA and the Clinton administration in securing the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 (Cochrane 2007, 25-27).

It is important to bear in mind that, although diasporas have the potential to contribute to conflict resolution and peace building, they are not the only actors involved and

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27 This claim concerns mainly the new Eritrean diaspora, as the older diaspora that left the country between about 1970 and 1990 have been mobilised successfully by the EPLF.
the burden cannot be placed solely on them. Their resources are not sufficient to entirely transform or solve conflicts, and the role of states and international agencies remains crucial (Wayland 2004, 425-6 in Horst 2007, 7). Diasporas, however, can function as important collaborative partners to states, international agencies, regional organisations and NGOs in conflict resolution situations if they are sufficiently empowered. According to Zunzer, the extent to which diaspora communities can be empowered to proactively work towards peace depends on the following factors: organisational structures and their geographical locations; living conditions and legal status in the country of settlement; political attitudes towards the country of origin, its conflict, and shared identity; “common ground vs. unbridgeable differences”; motivation and resources for constructive engagement in the country of origin; and, contact to key political actors both in the country of origin and in the country of settlement (2004, 42).

When the diaspora group has sufficient resources for funding insurgencies in the country of origin, the group also holds sufficient power to directly lobby or pressure the insurgent movement itself. As Fair observes, even if the Tamil diaspora have actively supported conflict in Sri Lanka, they have also been an important factor “in bringing about the ceasefire agreement in 2002”.28 After 9/11, the Tamil diaspora became concerned that the world would equate the Tamil struggle with terrorism. The Tamils therefore encouraged the LTTE to abandon the military struggle and pursue a more diplomatic and political solution for their cause. (Fair 2007, 187-188.)29

2. The diaspora – conflict – peace nexus – examples from the Horn of Africa

2.1. Eritrea

It is well documented in the existing literature that the diaspora played a vital role in the

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28 Although there were also other factors involved and thus it is difficult to gauge what the actual influence of diaspora was.
29 Fair bases her arguments on empirical data that consists of “discussions with officials in the US Government, the Sri Lankan Government and representatives from multilateral organisations (The World Bank and Asian Development Bank)” (Fair 2007, 186).
Ethiopian civil war leading to the Independence of Eritrea. The links between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the diaspora date as far as 1961 (Tobacco and Poidimani 2001; Hepner 2004; Bernal 2004). The diaspora has provided substantial support to the EPLF in its struggle for an independent Eritrean state. The EPLF systematically developed a network of diaspora members and mobilised refugees for the struggle (Al-Ali et al. 2001, 586).

Al-Ali, Black and Koser (2001b) provide a useful analysis in their conceptualisation of ‘the limits of transnationalism’. They argue that there is a “historical development of transnational mobilization for armed struggles,” and give clear “accounts of wartime collections for the Eritrea Peoples’s Liberation Front (EPLF)” by the Eritrean diaspora (ibid., 586):

When I lived in Tripoli during the 1970s, we had regular meetings for all the Eritrean refugees. We all used to give money- even the school children. My understanding is that the money was sent from Tripoli to an EPLF bank in Bologna, then used to buy medicine, weapons, books- you name it- for the fighters. (ibid., 586.)

After Eritrea gained Independence, the diaspora was invited to participate in drafting a referendum and later in drafting and ratifying the constitution (Koser 2007; Bernal 2004). In addition, since the end of the struggle for Independence in 1991, the Eritrean State has asked the diaspora to contribute two per cent of their monthly income to the Eritrean Government (Tekie 2005). This is not compulsory but, according to Koser (2007, 245), most considered it a duty. At a minimum, this was the case until 2001-2002, when political rifts started to divide the diaspora (Conrad 2005). There was a request to increase the contributions during the time of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict (Koser 2007, 245; Radtke 2005).

However, Eritrean diaspora involvement in the 1998-2000 war was not limited to financial contributions. Diaspora Eritreans were heavily involved in lobbying (e.g. demonstrations in various European and North American cities) for the Eritrean side. They became especially active on the Internet, where Eritrean websites such as dehai.org effectively took over the role of speaking on behalf of the Eritrean Government (Smidt 2000 and 2001; Conrad 2005, 2006a; Bernal 2004, 2005).

30 In Eritrea this is actually seen as a tax. It is not inforcible of course, but non-payment leads to negative sanctions, e.g. for purchasing land in Eritrea or re-newing one’s Eritrean identity papers it is mandatory to have paid this “tax”.

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Even though the Eritrean Government has managed to effectively engage its diaspora to take part in homeland matters, the Eritrean diaspora do not constitute a homogeneous community. After the Ethio-Eritrean conflict, a significant distinction emerged between opponents and supporters of the Eritrean Government (Conrad 2005, 2006a). The heterogeneous nature of the diaspora becomes even more complex when acknowledging the fact that the opposition has traditionally been divided into different groups who base their various viewpoints on regionalism, politics and religion (Conrad 2005; Koser 2007, 250). In fact, Eritrean diaspora groups are reported to have encountered difficulties in intervening in any way that is not approved or controlled by the Eritrean Government (Conrad 2005, 2006a; Hepner 2004, 2007). Additional distinctions exist between Muslims and Christians and according to Koser (2007, 250) “the Muslims have perceived the Eritrean community structure in the UK as being dominated by Christians” (Koser 2007, 250). Christians are further divided into Orthodox believers who constitute the majority, and smaller communities of Catholic, Protestant and a growing number of charismatic churches. The latter are generally viewed with a deep sense of suspicion both in Eritrea and within the diaspora. (Conrad 2005.)

In recent years, there has also been an increased influx of Eritrean refugees to the major countries of settlement, notably Germany and the UK, but also to other European countries. These mostly young Eritreans form yet another group that is distinct from the 'mainstream diaspora'. Having fled post-independent Eritrea because of human rights abuses, war, open-ended military service and/or poor chances of earning a living, they are often viewed as traitors by the more nationalist sections of the established Eritrean diaspora who had left the region during the Independence war. (Conrad 2005; Hepner 2007.)

However, some of these newcomers have founded civic organisations that advocate for human rights, democratic participation and rule of law in their home country (refer to Mussie Ephrem and Semere Kesete 2004; EMHDR, n.d.). Many of them are transnationally linked with similar groups in other European countries, North America, Africa and other parts of the world, and also actively seek to cooperate with local, national or transnational NGOs and human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International (Hepner 2007). They have also made efforts to directly address and mobilise EU authorities and European national governments for their cause (e.g. through demonstrations, petitions and participation in related events such as the “German Protestant Kirchentag” (nationwide

2.2. Ethiopia

Recently, the Ethiopian Government has undertaken initiatives to de-politicise the diaspora through a new “Master plan on Diaspora Engagement”. This includes the deployment of new ambassadors who are responsible for forming links with diaspora members and establishing governmental departments dedicated to diaspora engagement.

In Ethiopia, both the Government and the opposition have sought support from the diaspora. Delegations from Ethiopia have been sent to the United States to brief Ethiopian communities. The internet and other media outlets have also been used to promote political agendas. (Lyons 2004.) Lyons (2007, 537) claims that since official embassies have assumed a pro-active stance towards diaspora members, those groups supporting the Government have not felt a strong need to establish diaspora media or organisations, which are generally common among those diaspora members who support the opposition.

According to Lyons (2006, 14-15), the diaspora have been effective in the areas of fund raising and political lobbying. They have, for example, used the internet to organise demonstrations and to lobby members of the State Department, US Congress and World Bank. Even though the diaspora community is diverse, “the most influential voices are harshly critical of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and strongly supportive of the imprisoned the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) opposition leaders.” These leaders are considered to be extremist by the Ethiopian Government. (Ibid.)

Members of the Ethiopian diaspora tend to support diverse causes. For some Ethiopians, the homeland continues to include Eritrea. Many Oromos regard the state of

31 For example “when splits within the core EPRDF group known as the Tigray People’s Liberation Front erupted in March 2001, both factions immediately sent high level delegations to the United States to influence how the diaspora understood the intraparty conflict and to build support for their respective factions. “ For more, refer to: “Ethiopia: Diaspora Unconvinced and Angry,” Indian Ocean Newsletter no. 953 (9 June 2001).
Ethiopia as an empire where the northern groups of Amharas and Tigreans dominate the South, and therefore some Oromos argue they have the right to their own state (Lyons 2004, 14-17). The nationalist movement Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), created in 1974, still has a support base in the diaspora, and much of the Oromo identity and nationalism have been developed and strengthened within the diaspora. In addition to building long distance nationalistic feelings and a sense of Oromos identity, some diaspora members have returned to take part in what they call “national service with OLF” (Sorenson 1996, 443).

Ethiopian diaspora groups, in particularly diaspora leaders of opposition, played an important role in the 2005 elections. Key diaspora leaders supported the participation of the opposition in the elections and that “was a necessary condition for the competitive elections of May 2005” (Lyons 2006, 33). After the elections, diaspora members were an important factor contributing to the decision of the CUD party to boycott the parliament and “exact a price from those political leaders who chose to participate.” The EPRDF claimed that diaspora members were ‘extremists,’ and that leading members in the diaspora were “responsible for much of the political crisis” and “blocked access within Ethiopia to opposition blogs based abroad.” (Lyons 2007, 544.) Lyons argues that since many in the diaspora “framed the conflicts categorically and have supported the most militant, uncompromising leaders back home”, they have” the capacity to make conflict resolution more difficult and the conflict more protracted” (2007, 539).

2.3. Somalia

The Somali diaspora are perhaps one of the most widely studied diaspora communities in the West. They are the subject of a number of past and present research studies, ranging from migration (Gundel, 2002), refugees and remittances (Horst and Van Hear, 2002), and the role of diasporas in civil war, peace-building and development (Menkhaus 2006; Horst, 2007).

These research studies present two main analytical observations about the role of Somali diaspora groups. First, the latter are able and capable of mobilising resources for warring parties in Somalia by acting as fundraisers for clans militias. Menkhaus (2006)\textsuperscript{32};

\textsuperscript{32} The report of K. Menkhaus (2006) as a Background paper to the Expert Forum on ‘Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora’ in Toronto, Canada, 19-20 October 2006 did not include any
UNDP 2001, 132) has documented cases where, at times of inter-clan fighting, Somalis in the
diaspora are pressured by local clan representatives to support their clan. The author notes
that this practice has been on the decline since the early 1990s, although it still remains a
present-day concern.

According to a study conducted by Mohamoud (2005) in which 20 diaspora
organisations were interviewed, similar patterns were found. The study findings suggest that
some individuals might be perceived as opportunistic as they donate funds to faction leaders
and militia in order to buy themselves favours. This is in the hope that they might obtain a
position in a future Somali Government when the faction leader that they are currently
supporting becomes a president or minister. (Mohamoud 2005, 8.) The various motives
behind the support of militia and warring parties are not, however, very well documented
within the existing literature. The support could be due to the fact, for example, that diaspora
members do not have up-to-date information about the conflict situation and, when they do
actually become involved in homeland politics, this only furthers the chaos. It could also be
because diaspora members are frustrated about the failure of ongoing peace negotiations, and
may have become disillusioned with the use of democratic means to achieve peace over time
(Ibid., 31).

The second observation is that diaspora members are able to act as promoters of
peace, good governance and development. The role of diasporas in both peace building and
conflict perpetuation is central to the case of Somalia, not least because many of the political
elite in the Abdullahi Yusuf government have previously been diaspora members (Menkhaus
2006). Additionally, diaspora members constitute a large portion of both the current Sheikh
Sharifi Sheikh Ahmed’s government and the Somali parliament. It has also been reported that
the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) recruited some of its leaders from the diaspora (see Bell
2006). Similarly, diaspora members comprise a sizeable and influential proportion of the
current opposition, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Eritrea.

Additionally, Somali diaspora have also been active in undertaking peace
building initiatives, which have played an important and effective role. The expertise and
knowledge of diaspora members have been used to mediate in national reconciliation

mention about the empirical data. Therefore, it can be assumed that claims and arguments in this report were
based on the secondary data and for example some of the claims were based on the newspaper articles and thus
claims presented in this paper have to be considered cautiously.
conferences and workshops around the country. Some of the more practical examples where members of the Somali diaspora have been actively engaged include organising two peace-building workshops between 2007 and 2008 on the “role of religion and conflict transformation.” These were held in Hargeisa and attended by prominent Somali religious scholars, traditional leaders and female representatives from all over the country.  

It should be acknowledged that Somaliland diaspora have provided vital support to the Somali National Movement (SNM) which was established in London in 1981. The SNM has received substantial support in the form of funding, medicine and other supplies during their struggle against Siad Barre’s regime. Nevertheless, the role of Somaliland diaspora has shifted from conflict perpetuation to nation building. For example, the diaspora have contributed to reconciliation and peace-building in Somaliland since early 1990s by establishing forums such as the Somaliland Peace Committee; carrying out a range of development projects; making significant investments in Somaliland; and, actively engaging in the political realm (Bradbury 2008, 174-179; Hansen 2004, 9; see also Lindley 2006). In fact, within the political realm, Somaliland diaspora have been a part and parcel of the political process and reconstruction efforts in the country (Horst 2007, 6). The Justice and Development Party (UCID), which is currently the third largest party in Somaliland, was established by the Somaliland diaspora and is locally known as the diaspora party.

The activities of Somali diaspora have also included social remittances and lobbying. Key Somali diaspora groups in the West, such as the Somali Canadian Diaspora Alliance (SCDA), Somali American Peace Council (SAPC) and Somali Diaspora Network (SDN) have heavily lobbied their respective governments for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and for an increase in humanitarian aid. In addition to their lobbying activities, diaspora members have both formally and informally collected money to meet humanitarian and development needs. For instance, Somali diaspora in Scandinavia have launched an initiative to collect 5-20 Euros per month to support development programs in different parts of Somalia.

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33 Based on unpublished data collected for ongoing research on “Islamic Conflict Resolution and the Role of Religion in Peacemaking” by Mahdi Abdile
34 Based on unpublished interviews collected on the “Role of Somali Diaspora in peace-building” by Mahdi Abdile
35 Ibid.
Diaspora Somalis have also been active in shaping the political debate back home by writing articles, as well as launching and contributing to newspapers, TV channels, radio stations and email distribution lists. They also have set up businesses that cross clan and regional lines. This can be crucial to building trust and developing better communication between communities (Menkhaus, 2006).

The downfall, however, is that diaspora members are not direct stakeholders of the activities that they undertake. As they have foreign passports, diaspora members can easily ‘walk away’ from any difficulties that they might face (ibid.). Furthermore, clans and political divisions make it difficult for diaspora members to become meaningful players. Deep divisions, for instance, have recently emerged between the supporters of the Transitional Federal Government and those who support the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). It is claimed that the Somali diaspora have welcomed the rise of the ICU and provided them with substantial funds and expertise. Some members are even reported to have joined the ICU militia (Farah 2006; Bell 2006).

However, according to Menkhaus, diaspora support for the ICU has more to do with anti-Ethiopian and proto-nationalist sentiment than it does with any support for the establishment of an Islamic state (Menkhaus 2006). According to a study by Horst and Gaas (2008, 11) on Somalis in Norway and their transnational political engagement, diaspora support at the national level (e.g. through actors such as the TFG and ICU) is often more ideological than it is material. When remittances are sent for political purposes, they are often directed at the sub-clan level since “the impact of sending money to this lower level is much more likely to be felt by family members than when the money is sent to overarching political actors like ICU and TFG” (ibid., 17). Remittances directed at the clan level are designed not only to support warring purposes, but also to support reconciliation processes between clans (ibid., 18-19).

Ibid.
36 This was the report to the Peace & Reconciliation Unit, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The study was based on empirical data, which consisted of “semi-structured individual interviews, key informant interviews, informal group discussions and participant observation. The fieldwork was conducted between September and December 2007 through interviews with 20 Somali respondents in Oslo and 8 in East Africa. 5 Norwegian key informants working in or with the MFA were interviewed as well. For the selection of Somali respondents, multiple snowball sampling and purposive selections were deployed.” (Horst and Gaas 2008, 7).
The Ethiopian invasion and the subsequent presence of Ethiopian troops on Somali soil were seen by some within the diaspora as a conspiracy to humiliate Muslims. Internet websites and popular Somali cafeteria discussions suggest that some Somali diaspora members have taken a more hard-line nationalistic stance on the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. Additionally, US support for the Ethiopian action and the lack of criticism from the European Union is seen as an indication of support for Ethiopia. As a result, anti-western feelings are strong among the diaspora and the ICU has capitalised on this popular uproar to actively engage the Somali diaspora.

3. Suggestions for Further Research

After an extensive scan of the literature on the diaspora - conflict nexus, it seems that there are plenty of research gaps to be filled. There are several issues and questions that the DIASPEACE project should take into account in its research on the role of Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian diasporas in the dynamics of peace and conflict in their respective areas of origin.

First, there is a clear need for systematically collected data that includes the attitudes of both diaspora members and the local people in the country of origin, and particularly the relationship between the two. Second, there is a need for a more nuanced analysis in which the conflict context and dynamics, political opportunity structures and the nature of the diaspora are sufficiently taken into account. In any analysis on the link between conflicts and diasporas, one should overcome the black and white dichotomy of diasporas as supporting either conflict or peace, as the processes are more complex and dynamic than this simplistic view would suggest. Instead of discussing whether diasporas support conflict or peace, it would appear to be more useful to discuss how diasporas affect/influence the actual conflict transformation process.

One of the issues in the current literature on the conflict - diaspora nexus, is that the level of analysis is not always clear. This may be due to a lack of systematically collected data.

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38 Based on unpublished data collected by Mahdi Abdile.
data. It is therefore important to define the level of analysis, whether at the individual, societal or organisational level and to look at how these levels interact.

The DIASPEACE project will therefore concentrate on the transnational activities of diaspora groups, with a focus on collective actions. The activities of these diaspora organisations should be studied in multiple locations; in various countries of settlement and in various countries of origin in the Horn of Africa. Below are some more detailed issues that should be taken into account when carrying out the research in the countries of origin, as well as in the countries of settlement.

Countries of settlement
One of the key challenges is to find out how and with what methods, will the project be able to disaggregate the different groups that comprise diasporas. How to examine which causes they support and through which means and methods? Several questions arise in relation to this issue.
- How can we find ways to disaggregate the ‘diaspora’ concept in order to understand the contributions of different elements within these groups (Horst 2007, 9)?

- How can we analyse the complex and ever changing mobilisation processes towards different causes and how can we assess their impact?

Moreover, other questions to be taken into account include:
- What are the links between integration in the host country and conflict resolution activities?

- The continuity in terms of diasporas’ engagement to the country of origin – what can we find out about the involvement of the so called second generation?

- How do host countries monitor, or engage/ collaborate/ restrict the activities of diaspora organisations/ associations and networks?

- How are the activities of diaspora groups gendered? What is the role of women in conflict transformation?
Countries of origin

After identifying the organisations, their mandates and their methods of operation, the task is to find out what kind of impact these activities actually have on conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa. The challenge is to find methods and approaches that enable us to research the impact more systematically, so that the analysis can transcend beyond the realm of mere speculations. Some questions to be taken into account in analysing the impact of diaspora activities in the Horn of Africa could, for example, include:

- What are the power relations between local and transnational actors in a context of civil war? (Horst 2007, 9). What is the relationship between diaspora members and local needs? Do locals view diaspora members as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’? How are their views perceived? How do locals view the fact that diaspora members can always leave if the situation gets bad?

- What is the impact of civic oriented activities by the diaspora on conflict transformation? What would be the best ways/ methods to study this phenomenon?
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