

Lauri Siisiäinen

# Foucault's Voices

## Toward the Political Genealogy of the Auditory-Sonorous



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the Auditory-Sonorous

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Lauri Siisiäinen

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"I took a piece of paper, I shaped it into a very tight roll, one end of which I applied to the precordial region and putting the ear to the other end, I was as much surprised as satisfied to hear the heart beats in a manner much more clearly and distinctly than I had by immediate application of the ear...From that moment on, I presumed that this medium could become a utile method, and applicable not only to the study of the heart beats, but furthermore to the study of all the movements that can produce noise in the thoracic cavity, and consequently to the exploration of breathing, of voice, of rattle and perhaps even of the fluctuation of a liquid poured out in the pleurae or the pericardia." (René Laënnec, from *De l'auscultation médiate ou traité du diagnostic des maladies de poumons et du coeur, fondé principalement sur ce nouveau moyen d'exploration I*)

"...You are not convinced? You want absolute proof that what you hear comes from within you, not from outside?" ...But perhaps you have never been so close of losing everything as you are now, when you think you have everything in your grip. The responsibility of conceiving the palace in its every detail, of containing it in your mind, subjects you to an exhausting strain. The obstinacy on which power is based is never so fragile as in the moment of its triumph." (Italo Calvino, from *A King Listens*)

"but the real beauty, that is, for me, a musical phrase, a piece of music that I do not understand, something of which I cannot say anything. I have this idea -maybe it is arrogant or presumptuous - that I could say something about any one of the greatest paintings in the world. And that is the reason why they are not absolutely beautiful." (Michel Foucault, in a discussion with Stephen Riggins)

## ABSTRACT

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Tiivistelmä

Diss.

Michel Foucault (1926-1984) is not really known as a thinker of music, or more generally, as a thinker of the voice, of the sound, of audition and listening. Often, one comes up with the portrait of Foucault as a visualist of some sort, one who either was not interested in the other sensory modalities, or at least, did not have much, if anything, to say about them. However, in this study I attempt to argue against this portrait. The aim is to bring to the fore the occurrence of the theme of the voice, sound and audition in various occasions and contexts, as we follow the course of Foucault's intellectual history. Furthermore, the aim is to show that it is not just any sort of occurrences that we are dealing with, but ones in which the *auditory-sonorous* becomes related integrally to some of the most pertinent political issues in Foucault's thought in its different periods from the 1960's until his death: the modes of power, governance and resistance. The particular emphasis is on the published *Collège de France* - lectures, as well as on the various minor texts, such as essays, lectures, discussions and interviews.

The method, or perhaps a more apt term would be the *orientation-* and *strategy of reading* endorsed in the study is to discover, to tease out, and also to further elaborate on the potentialities of considering the politics of the auditory-sonorous. Hence the study is not limited only to Foucault's explicit statements on the issue, but also attempts to bring to the fore certain points, where the said potentiality is more of the implicit, inarticulate quality, in order to ponder, how this could be further elaborated. Throughout all the readings of Foucault presented in the study, across all the different contexts and issues touched upon, the idea of the auditory-sonorous as the *locus of struggles* is emphasized and defended, that is, struggles about our ears and about our voices, struggles pertaining to the formation and organization of our sensory perception as such.

Keywords: Michel Foucault, audition, sound/voice, listening, political theory

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Although the field of my study is political science or political theory, its theme has certain convergences with musicology or with musical analysis more generally speaking. Hence, I have considered interdisciplinary cooperation to be of particular importance in progress of this study. For these reasons especially, I would like to express my gratitude to Eero Tarasti, who has for many years been the “nodal point” between my work and musicology. As the other reviewer of my thesis, he offered the much needed musicological perspective also during the finishing period of the work.

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of independence, unruliness and enjoyment of life, *Unschuldigkeit* in the best of sense.

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## INTRODUCTION

Michel Foucault (1926-1984) is not really known as a thinker of music, or more generally, as a thinker of the voice, of the sound, of audition and listening. Often, one comes up with the portrait of Foucault as a visualist of some sort, one who either was not interested in the other sensory modalities, or at least, did not have much, if anything, to say about them. However, in this study I attempt to argue against this portrait. The aim is to bring to the fore the occurrence of the theme of the voice, sound and audition in various occasions and contexts, as we follow the course of Foucault's intellectual history. Furthermore, the aim is to show that it is not just any sort of occurrences that we are dealing with, but ones in which the *auditory-sonorous* becomes related integrally to some of the most pertinent political issues in Foucault's thought in its different periods: the modes of power, governance and resistance. The particular emphasis is on the published *Collège de France* - lectures, as well as on the various minor texts, such as essays, lectures, discussions and interviews collected in the volumes of *Dits et écrits*, which are used as the standard reference to the former in the study.<sup>1</sup>

The method, or perhaps a more apt term would be the *orientation-* and *strategy of reading* endorsed in the study is to discover, to tease out, and also to further elaborate on the potentialities of considering the politics of the auditory-sonorous. Hence the study is not limited only to Foucault's explicit statements on the issue, but also attempts to bring to the fore certain points, where the said potentiality is more of the implicit, inarticulate quality, in order to ponder, how this could be further elaborated. In the course of the discussions, to find assistance in this task, the readings of Foucault's works are related to the readings of various other texts as well. These include various philosophical-theoretical discussions on the philosophy- and political theory of sound, voice, music and listening, as well as certain pieces of literature, such as Italo Calvino and Franz Kafka. On some occasions, especially on the issue of surveillance, the reading of Foucault takes more the tone of a critical dialogue with his thought.

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<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise stated (see *References*), the English translations are mine.

On other occasions, it is more about discovering how some of the openings that Foucault outlines could be developed more explicitly, more thoroughly, in the direction of the political thinking of the auditory-sonorous. The aim is to show that Foucault did have a point to argue on the auditory-sonorous issue, and that there is even more potentiality in his thinking to be noticed here. Furthermore, it is also my intention to point out, how all this has relevant convergences with various discussions in political theory and political philosophy, even contemporary ones, on this theme.

The very first Chapter deals explicitly with the criticism targeted against Foucault regarding the issue of the *politics of the senses* or *-sensorium*, and above all the alleged overemphasis on vision and visuality with the parallel undervaluation, or even complete omission, of the contribution of other modalities of senses - and perception, the auditory-sonorous in particular, in Foucault's analyses of power. This is done, first, by re-reading one of Foucault's early works, in which the role of audition and sound comes up in a somewhat problematic way (*Birth of the Clinic [Naissance de la clinique]*). The general framework here is the one that occupied Foucault's attention in this work, and in other works as well during the period in the 1960's: *medicalization*, the formation of clinical-medical knowledge and, what is most important here, the formation of what is called *clinical perception*, in all of their extensive implications.

It is to be noticed, that the issue of clinical perception and medicalization is also one that recurred throughout Foucault's subsequent intellectual history, throughout the variety of the interests and orientations of his thought. Thus, it is not only the reasons of chronology, but also the enduring significance of the problematics of medicalization in Foucault's thought, which suggest that we begin with the re-reading of Foucault's work on this theme from the 1960's. The aim is to show, that already in the 1960's analyses of medicalization, we can discover the seminal articulation of the question concerning audition and sound (the auditory-sonorous), and more specifically, the question concerning their *political role*, first of all, their articulation with strategies and practices of power and knowledge; here, most centrally the clinical-medical perception and the medical(ized) practices in all of their far-reaching effects.

However, in the first Chapter, it is also argued that in order to form an adequate account of the sense given to the auditory-sonorous in the framework of Foucault's 1960's thought on medicalization, and also in his thought taken more broadly, it is insufficient to focus exclusively on *Birth of the Clinic*, or, in Foucault's later thought, exclusively on his work on the *Panopticon*. The problem of the criticism targeted on Foucault, on his alleged "ontological" bias of vision and concomitant neglect of the role of sound, voice and audition, is precisely that it bases the argumentation on such a restricted reading. Here, the aim is to provide a more extensive view on the issue, which by the same token also means presenting a challenge to the "auditory criticism" targeted against Foucault. This is done, primarily, by presenting a reading of an essay by Foucault from the same period as *Birth of the Clinic*, titled *Message or Noise?*

[*Message ou bruit?*], in which Foucault deals explicitly and in detail with the issue of *clinical-medical auscultation*. The essay is a brief and rather unnoticed one, which is, however, not a reason to ignore it, or to downplay its importance. From the basis of the reading, I argue that there actually is an essential disjuncture to be noticed – but unfortunately left unnoticed by the criticism – in Foucault’s thought (to be found in this very period), on the question concerning the role of audition and sound in the formation of the clinical perception, and consequently, in the related medicalization of politics. Alongside the texts of Foucault, throughout the discussion in the first Chapter, a central point of reference is the work of René Laënnec, a seminal figure in the development of modern medicine, and especially of the methods, instruments and techniques of modern *medical-mediate auscultation* in the early 19th Century.

As already stated, I argue that its brevity and neglected status notwithstanding, *Message or Noise?* is a significant text that deserves to be noticed in the massive corpus of Foucault’s work. This is the case, because in the essay, as I attempt to show, Foucault actually *does* set out to (re-)examine in a detailed, critical fashion the role of the auditory and the sonorous, now focusing precisely on their susceptibility of being articulated into the formations of modern, medicalized power- and knowledge. Furthermore, the attempt is to show that Foucault actually *does* consider the auditory-sonorous to have made even a decisive contribution to one of the key turning points not only in the history of medical knowledge, but also in the development of modern forms of power; that the ear, audition, listening and sound not only *could be*, but actually *were* central in bringing the *living body* (precisely the “life”, the “living” of the body) into the reach of empirical knowledge and, as the result, that they were central in the “opening up” of the living body to operations of intervention, and to politics.

It is my intention to prove the significance of precisely the former idea, brought to the fore at first through the reading of *Message or Noise?*. It is significant, firstly, in its manner of challenging, or at least questioning the absoluteness of the account of Foucault as a thinker, who over-emphasizes the political role of visual perception, the eye and the gaze, and who concomitantly downplays or even totally ignores, in a sense de-politicizes, audition and listening in his analyses of power already in his work of the 1960’s, but also in his thought more generally speaking. Secondly, the reading of *Message or Noise?* is significant, because it could challenge the portrait of Foucault as a thinker, who rather uncritically adopts the dichotomous setting, which has been quite influential in the history of Western philosophy and political theory up until various contemporary discussions, of the “audio” juxtaposed with the “visual”, of the “ear” juxtaposed with the “eye”. In this setting, the ear is determined in a strong, somewhat ontological sense as being essentially temporal, whereas the eye is taken as being essentially objective-spatial; the ear is understood as somehow “innocent” and transcending the domain of rationality, knowledge and power, whereas the eye is characterized as being *the* sensory modality of knowledge and power. As I will strive to point out, what we *can* discover in



Foucault's thought, through the reading of *Message or Noise?* and the elaboration of its central arguments, is *not* an endorsement of this dichotomous setting, but instead a challenge to it. The relevance of this challenge even surpasses the limits of Foucault-interpretation.

The politicization of the dichotomous setting means simply to ask the question, whether the ear and audition, far from being "innocent", far from being irrelevant to, and far from transcending the formations and practices of knowledge and power, in fact can be and are intertwined with the functioning of the former. The challenge is to make us think of something like the *politics of the ear*, the *politics of audition*, and the *politics of listening*, in which what is at stake are the captures, the instrumentalizations, the configurations and transfigurations, the changing regimentations, organizations, dis-organizations and re-organizations of auditory perception. The case of Laënnec is highly significant precisely because it offers us a historical exemplar, the analysis of which almost demands one to raise such questions concerning the politics of the ear. Taken together, Laënnec's historical case and Foucault's related 1960's-essay seem to work in the direction of *politicizing our ears*, that is, of inviting us to think of audition, our ears and activities of listening as a *locus of struggle* ("struggle over our ears") taking place between practices of power and various modes of resistance, a struggle whose importance cannot just be denied or neglected, at least not in a self-evident, *quasi a priori* manner. This is where, as I will try to show, the relevance, and the challenge, of this discussion exceeds the limits of the debates revolving around Foucault-interpretation, and extends into 20th Century and contemporary political theory and political philosophy also much more broadly.

The basic idea, presented in the first Chapter, of the politics of the ear, politics of audition, politics of listening and politics of the sound is decisive for the further orientation of the study at hand. What will be examined in a variety of contexts and from different angles is whether the idea of the politics of the ear and politics of sound is only a curiosity of the one brief and neglected 1960's essay, or whether, on the contrary, the idea re-appears and also has significance in Foucault's subsequent thought in different contexts, as we follow the course of his intellectual history. The thesis that is formulated, and that will be defended throughout the study is that there *are* various significant cases in Foucault's later thought, until his final lectures during the early 1980's, where we can notice the recurrence of the problematics of the politics of the auditory-sonorous. On the other hand, it is argued as well that there are other occasions, in which Foucault either denies or remains silent on the political role of the auditory-sonorous, despite the fact that there are serious reasons, and rather obvious evidence at hand, which would appear to require him to take the issue into re-consideration, or at least to acknowledge its relevance. In such cases, my further aim is also to ponder, if there still are points where, even in spite of Foucault's own neglect or silence, it would be possible, and reasonable, to elaborate his thinking into the direction of the political genealogy of the auditory-sonorous.

Thus, I am arguing that Foucault's thinking has inconsistencies and discontinuities, when it comes to his engagements with, and omissions of, the theme of the politics of audition and sound, hence this theme cannot be taken as a unified center, around which Foucault's work revolves. Quite to the contrary: as it is the case already in the first Chapter, so also in the further progress of the study, the objective is to bring to the fore not only the continuities and recurrences, but just as much the discrepancies, which are to be discovered in Foucault's approach to the politics of the auditory-sonorous. Neither do I suggest that Foucault's work would be somehow "immune" to criticism in this respect. This constitutes the central point of Chapter 2, in which the issue of *surveillance*, centered on Foucault's influential analyses of the *Panopticon* in the 1970's, is taken under scrutiny. The problem that will be discussed is Foucault's omission, on grounds that remain quite obscure, of the consideration concerning the potentialities and the importance of the auditory-sonorous, when it comes to its instrumentalization and use by this modern, general scheme of surveillance called the Panopticon. This question is considered in detail by Jeremy Bentham in his late 18th Century writings on the Panopticon, which are the central reference of Foucault as well. As discussed in the first Chapter, it appears almost as though the space that opened to consider the politics of audition, with its articulations of power and knowledge, became enclosed again.

Still, instead of merely pointing out such a disjuncture in Foucault's thinking, and instead of just presenting a critique of his interpretation of Panopticon, which has already been done before (see Chapter 2), in accordance with the general method, or strategy of reading orienting this study as a whole, my further question will be, whether, if one was to return to the already-examined-idea of the politics of audition and sound, how could such a visually biased concept of surveillance be problematized, and how could it be developed into a direction, which would perhaps remain faithful to the seminal idea in the first Chapter. In a sense, this endeavor means to "read Foucault against Foucault". The question that follows will be, then, how to think of the outlines for a political genealogy, which focuses firstly on the nexus between the surveillance and the auditory-sonorous, and secondly on the resistance encountered by this auditory-sonorous surveillance, that is: on the conflict taking place "over" and "inside" our ears, on the conflict taking place inside the auditory-sonorous as such. To find assistance in this task, I will propose a reading of a short story by Italo Calvino the English title of which is *A King Listens*.

Chapter 3 continues the journey forwards in the history of Foucault's thought, the next step, then, is Foucault's work on the concept of *governmentality*, from the turn of the 1970's- and -80's. The topic of Chapter 3 is to see, whether there are any points of convergence between the general problematics of the politics of sound and audition and Foucault's genealogies of *governmentality* and forms of *political reason or -rationality* (*reason of state, liberalism* and *neo-liberalism*). I will argue that there is indeed such a convergence

to be found: the determination of *noise* as a governmental/political problem, and its status as a site of confrontation. In this Chapter, the discussion goes beyond Foucault's explicit remarks, and continues to further tease out the potentiality to be found on the issue, and shows how this could be "actualized", how it could be elaborated further in an explicit fashion, in order to proceed more into the direction of the political genealogy of the auditory-sonorous, even when that is not the direction chosen by Foucault himself. As in the previous Chapter, this attempt is made through recourse to a piece of literature; this time, it is a short story written by Franz Kafka, *The Burrow*.

In Chapter 4, it is time to approach the final period in Foucault's thought, preceding his death in 1984. Here the framework is quite different from the one's that have been dealt with so far: now it is Foucault's relation of friendship with French composer-conductor Pierre Boulez, as this becomes articulated in Foucault's work, and in his dialogue with Boulez from the period, but later in some of Boulez's writings as well. It is in this framework, that we encounter the issue of listening, and also the *issue of music*, treated in a very explicit manner. It is the idea of friendship itself, which will be central here: the way in which Foucault understands *friendship of music*, *musical friendship* or *friendship in music* in terms of the *bare or naked [à nu] encounter*, *bare or naked living- or being-with*, as a relation of fundamental *sharing*; the way in which he understands the political sense of this musical friendship, the *politics of friendship*, in terms of resistance. But also, the question is posed, whether there are any traces left by the encounter with Foucault's political thinking in Boulez's musical analyses. I will suggest that such influence could be found, first of all, in Boulez's application of the concept of *dispositif* in his analyses of music.

In this context, the idea of the politics of listening is taken into explicit re-examination. What comes forth, through the reading of the discussion between Foucault and Boulez, is the conflict between modalities of listening. Hence the "conflict over our ears" is revisited, also in terms of *asceticism*. Above all, what is central is the antagonism between two modalities, and the two related asceticisms, of listening: the *schematicizing* and the *de-schematicizing*: the latter one being at work in friendship as well as in the events of contemporary music of certain kind. The concept of schematicizing listening takes us back from the context of Western art music to the earlier themes of the study, since it has similarities with the "regimes" of surveying-listening and clinical-medical auscultation discussed in the previous Chapters.

In Chapter 5, the emphasis remains in Foucault's late work from the early 1980's. His general themes of that period are the *care for the self*, *subjectivation*, the *techniques- and exercises of the self*, the *ethics- and aesthetics of the self*. Rather than trying to present an overview of Foucault's thought on these issues, the intention is to focus on the manner in which the issue of the voice and sound occurs inside the more general framework of Foucault's thinking in this period. The setting, where this happens, is characterized by confrontation, by struggle. In this setting, it is the voice, taken as *phonē*, as the *bare voice* in its sonority, in its non-discursive, non-speaking existence, which is determined as the central

*enemy* of the mode of asceticism, with all its exercises-, techniques- and equipment- of the self, that is needed for the tasks of *resistance*, that is, in order to make oneself courageous, unyielding, and thus “unruly”, impermeable to various attempts of governance. This resistant asceticism, according to Foucault’s analyses, has its privileged, if not the only, “medium” in the exercises of discourse, of *logos*: the philosophical mode of living, philosophy as care for the self. Resistance is most centrally about *arming oneself* with reasonable discourse, arming oneself with *logoi*. In opposition to this, the bare voice appears to fall on the side of the practices of power, of the governance, in which the seductive, affective force of the voice, and of musical art, is used to shape each individual as well as the community as a whole. In this respect, certain Ancient Greek ideas of education [*paideia*] appear to offer something like the “prototype”.

However, the argument set forth in Chapter 5 does not end there. We should notice that just as we cannot conclude from Foucault’s analysis on the philosophical practices of discourse, that the essence of discourse or speech as such could be determined to be “resistant” or protective of “autonomy” (which sounds absurd), we cannot conclude that either the bare voice, or the musical art as such would be essentially nothing but the medium of affective domination. The fact that Foucault himself did not believe this to be the case is already evident, as we keep in mind the discussion from Chapter 4 on the modalities of listening and the politics of friendship, with all of Foucault’s emphasis on their resistant potentiality.

What will be proposed instead is a reading in which the treatment of *phonē* and *logos*, in the political terms of resistance, is detached from the tendency to search for fundamental dichotomies, or for essential ontological hierarchies of different “media” and different materials. In the reading of Foucault suggested, it is the practical and strategic *situation*, the *moment*, the *occasion* and the *chance* (*kairos*), which is taken to be primary for the understanding of the relation between the voice/sound and speech, as well as the relation between the respective practices of music and philosophy. Thus, both of these are included in the “toolbox” of the techniques and equipment of resistance, to use Foucault’s own term which Foucault assembles from the variety of sources and materials. In this political toolbox, and according to the requirements of the appropriate occasion (*kairos*), there is equal room and application for the *phonē* and *logos*, for the musical- and for the philosophical practices/exercises, equally for the ones of disarming/exposing oneself and for the ones of arming oneself with discourse. From this angle, there is no pertinent hierarchy between the two, just as there is no permanent, final choice between two mutually exclusive alternatives of either *phonē* or *logos*, either music or philosophy. There is just the issue of practical priority or urgency, related to *kairos*.

In Chapter 6 we approach the end of this study and the time of Foucault’s death. We will see that the issue of the auditory-sonorous, and the question of its political sense, never ceased to interest Foucault. This comes to the fore through the reading of his final lectures at *Collège de France* devoted to the issue

of *parrēsia* (“true-speaking”, “franc-speaking”), which forms the essential task in the last Chapter. Most importantly, it is in these lectures that Foucault, in an explicit and quite thorough fashion, tackles the issue of *multitude* or *multiplicity*, the *crowd* and the *mass* in their relation to the voice. This does not mean, of course, that these issues were wholly absent in Foucault’s earlier work. The intention is to show, how Foucault develops the conception of a mode of *parrēsia* which is essentially vocal, sonorous and auditory, taking place through the voice, through the “bare voice”, devoid of speech, just as much as it is devoid of neat musical articulation. As Foucault himself puts it: it is a mode of *parrēsia* taking place through the *noise* or the *cry*. Furthermore, this particular mode of *parrēsia* has a political sense that is vitally important: it is the *collective parrēsia*, one that is only generated by the multitude of mortals, from the *in-betweenness* of the multitude. Moreover, it is also a resistant and rebellious *parrēsia* coming to challenge, firstly, the arbitrary sovereignty, and secondly, the exclusive discursive game of the governing *logoi* of citizenship, the discourse-game which determines the form of life and the form of experience called *political* in the restricted sense. Here, Foucault’s explicit reference is a tragedy of Euripides, *Ion*, although just as ever, what he develops is his own line of political thinking, in this case the *genealogy of the politics as game and as experience*.

This is the course taken in the study at hand: going from medical auscultation to friendship; passing through the institutions and practices of Occidental art music, in order to trace the political sense of the auditory-sonorous, and the potentiality for further elaborations on this theme, to be found in Foucault’s thinking.

# 1 FROM THE EMPIRE OF THE GAZE TO NOISY BODIES (FOUCAULT AND LAËNNEC)

## 1.1 Birth of the Clinic under the “Dominant Sign of the Visible”

The epistemological difference between the eye and the ear, sight and hearing, visual- and auditory perception/experience or gaze and listening, in all its historical-, ethical- and political significance, is a much discussed and debated issue in the field of contemporary political theory as taken in a broad sense. To begin with, the debate revolving around the primacy of vision in Occidental culture, in philosophy, science and politics as well, and around the concomitant downplay of the other senses, especially audition, has been persistent in the post-World-War II- cultural- and political theory and also before. While some have defended the pre-eminence of vision as the necessary condition of civilization, historical progress and autonomy, from nature and from authority, various other theorists have argued that the inevitable downside of Occidental *ocularcentrism* is the increasing social domination generated by the distant, objectifying, reifying and “freezing” gaze, and the suppression or oblivion of the affective, participatory and temporal capacities of audition. However, both sides appear to share one presupposition in common: the eye and the ear, vision and audition can be distinguished or juxtaposed, in their political significance also, in terms of their unique natures, including their intrinsic capacities, powers, “functions”, and limitations. As we will see, this presupposition has been adopted by a number of divergent contemporary thinkers.

Subsequently, the essentialist, trans-historical and reductive character of the juxtaposition between “audio” and “visual” has become the target of various critical interventions. Firstly, the theoretical reduction of vision, and the “visual”, to the objectifying and dominating gaze has been disputed, suggesting instead a more pluralistic approach, affirmative of the historical and cultural multiplicity of heterogeneous *scopic regimes*, of visual cultures with their divergent ethical and political potentialities. More recently, the demand for the

acknowledgement of historicity and plurality has been extended also to the ear, audition and *auditory culture(s)*. First of all, in auditory perception this has meant the recognition of the fundamental changes, transfigurations and metamorphoses of the ear, hearing and listening as they become articulated into different cultural or discursive forms, or into different “regimes”. In political terms, this has meant the emphasis on the multiple potential articulations between auditory perception and different modalities of political action, including use of power with its rationalities, knowledge(s), arts and techniques.

Among the many that have been re-read and reevaluated in this context are the writings of Michel Foucault. Various critics have labeled him as “one of” the anti-visual, or “*iconoclast*”, thinkers, who tend to reduce the political potentialities of sight and visual culture to the operation of the objectifying, surveying and dominating gaze. This gaze is also variously referred to as the *clinical/medical gaze*, and the *Panopticon* (see Jay 1988; Jay 1989; Jay 1994, 6-7, 1-26, 381-416, 587-595; Jay 1996; Flynn 1993; Bal 1993). I will return to these critical statements later.

The tone of the discussion has been critical as well, when it comes to Foucault’s attitude towards hearing and auditory perception. It seems that he was hardly at all interested in the “ear” (unlike various other contemporary French thinkers). When Foucault did mention the auditory experience, above all in his *Birth of the Clinic*, he has been accused of reducing it in rather essentialist terms to the inherently non-objectifying and non-spatial “other” of vision and, consequently, of the supposedly visually biased forms of modern knowledge and power. The critics have argued that Foucault’s adoption of this reductive-essentialist conception of audition leads him to neglect its various political uses, and its historical role in the development of modern forms of power most importantly. The criticism’s conclusion is severe: that Foucault quite uncritically adopts the conventional, transhistorical binary opposition of “audio” and “visual”. Or, even if he does admit the plurality of vision and visuality, he still reduces the ear and audition in conventional, essentialist terms to the “other” of sight, and assumes that modern power-knowledge, including surveillance, discipline, normalization, and bio-power, *by necessity* is in the last instance *power of the gaze*, one in which audition can really have *no* actual, independent significance, i.e. no role irreducible to the gaze (see Schmidt 2003; Schafer 2003; Sterne 2003). This particular line of criticism will be at focus later in this Chapter.

In this Chapter, the specific “case” that will be discussed in detail is anything but irrelevant for Foucault: the role of *auscultation* in the birth of the modern clinic, in the formation of *clinical perception/experience* and, finally, in the concomitant *medicalization* of modern society and -politics. My central argument is that, contrary to what appears at first and what is claimed by the line of criticism already referred to, Foucault does *not* just simply and exclusively reduce the clinical mode of experience, together with the related medicalization, to the operation and dissemination of the clinical/medical gaze. Even if Foucault does give some reason for this sort of criticism, especially in

*Birth of the Clinic*, I argue that this is not the whole picture. I attempt to show that there is in fact an *ambivalence* that has not been noticed in the recent criticism of Foucault's thought when it comes to the role of audition. This ambivalence becomes manifest, if we make a "comparative" reading, focusing on the question of audition, between two of Foucault's texts: *Birth of the Clinic* (1963) and a brief essay titled *Message or Noise? (Message ou bruit?)* (1966). Only a few years separate the writing of the two texts, and while both deal with the status of sensory perception in the development of clinical medicine, I try to point out that there is yet an all-the-more interesting and central *disjuncture* between these texts, one that has to do precisely with their manner of dealing with the significance of auditory perception and listening.

In reading *Message or Noise?* I try to show that Foucault *does* in fact have an interesting and original focus on the capture and articulation of auditory perception, through the specific practice-, art- and technique of *listening*, into the clinical form of knowledge and -practice. In this text, in opposition to the argument of *Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault gives audition an independent, irreducible significance at the central turning point in the development of modern knowledge and power. In this way, the picture of Foucault as just "one of the thinkers" who equate power with sight and ignore, diminish or totally deny the role of the "ear" and audition, especially as it comes to modern discipline, surveillance and normalization, turns out to be problematic.

To put it in more fundamental terms, what turns out to be just as problematic is the labeling of Foucault as someone who uncritically adopts the conventional idea of the essential, de-politicized, pre-political and transhistorical "audio-visual"- juxtaposition. My argument is simply that in *Message or Noise?* - again in opposition to *Birth of the Clinic* - we *can* find precisely an account of auditory perception and practice of listening, which challenges the dichotomous setting of "audio" versus "visual". The point in reading *Message or Noise?* is to show that Foucault actually does present a conception of auditory perception that is both historical and political: that Foucault does show us how auditory experience is exposed to thorough historical change as a result of strategic captures, articulations and different manners of use, all implicated in relations of power and knowledge. Through all of this, we ought to remember, that Foucault did this before the recent interest in the historical study of auditory cultures. Unfortunately, the analysis of audition and listening presented in *Message or Noise?*, together with its discrepancy with *Birth of the Clinic* on this matter, has not been (at least to my knowledge) noticed in the recent (critical) re-readings of Foucault mentioned above.

Furthermore, there is even more importance to Foucault's brief essay, in its analysis of audition, than its challenging the picture of Foucault already referred to. Instead of presenting the "ear" and audition as the "Other" of Occidental rationality and modern power, which is quite a common tendency in contemporary political theory, in the essay Foucault takes the relation of audition to modern rationalities, knowledge(s) and techniques of power to be a



*dynamic* issue of differential articulations and uses. It is only in the historical-political sense, as an effect of articulations, that it makes sense to speak of auditory perception or –experience as a faculty with determinate functions, capacities and limitations distinguishing it from vision. Not even “temporality” and affectivity can be taken in a self-evident and de-politicized manner as properties that would reveal us as the true nature of auditory experience. Instead of locating the origin of modern power in vision and instead of setting audition mystically “beyond” modern power, Foucault shows us that there indeed can be and actually has been such a thing as modern auditory knowledge and modern auditory power.

I believe that what actually makes Foucault’s analysis of medical auscultation in *Message or Noise?* more important than it might first seem, is precisely the manner in which it manages to challenge the juxtaposition of “audio” and “visual”, together with one of the central implications of this for political thought: the totalizing theoretical assumption of the fundamental ocularcentrism of the modern form(s) and apparatuses of power, and the concomitant equally totalizing assumption of the marginality or insignificance of auditory perception/experience (of the “ear”) in and for the modern modalities of power. It will become apparent that this idea of juxtaposition, the assumption that modern power is *deaf* so to speak, and that in the end it only has eyes but no ears, still figures today as a more or less articulate, self-evident framework or “habit” of thought in discussions dealing with the issues of “auditory culture” and the “politics of music”. This means that Foucault’s challenge still has critical potentiality and a radical edge to it, giving it significance for political thought and –analysis, which also transcends the field of Foucault-interpretation and “Foucault studies” in the limited sense.

If we follow Foucault’s suggestion and consider his work as a *tool-box* waiting to be used in different situations and in concrete struggles, then the reading I am presenting can be understood as an attempt to find some *new possibilities for using* Foucault’s concepts as political-analytical tools. Instead of fixing the use of well-known concepts such as “discipline”, “surveillance”, “normalization”, “power-knowledge”, “medicalization” or “bio-power” exclusively on the criticism of gaze, they could perhaps just as well be used in critical-political analyses of *auditory/sonorous* arts-, techniques- and practices of power- and governing. I hope to be able to show that Foucault’s thought can offer useful tools not only for those who struggle against the power of the eye, gaze and images, but also for those whose struggles are targeted at the power of the ear, listening and sound. There, I believe, is the actual political and contemporary relevance of Foucault’s analysis of medical auscultation, as bizarre or marginal as the issue might seem at first.

The discussion begins from Foucault’s seminal study on the birth of the modern clinic (*Birth of the Clinic*, published in 1963) and the discursive formation of modern *anatomic-clinical medicine*. Before considering in more detail Foucault’s approach to audition, a brief review of the more general context of this text is in order. First, by clinical medicine Foucault means the

discursive formation that finally prioritized sensory perception and empirical observation, in the determinate form of *clinical experience*, and *perception (l'expérience clinique)* as the basis of medical knowledge. According to Foucault, this marked a crucial turning point in the history of Western medicine (Foucault 2005, v-xv), for it meant nothing less than “opening up of the *concrete individual (l'individu concret)*, for the first time in Western history, to the language of rationality (ibid., xi; my emphasis).” In this manner, medical knowledge finally broke “the old Aristotelian prohibition: one could finally impose on *an individual* a discourse with a scientific structure (ibid., x; my emphasis).” This meant a central change in the domain of scientific knowledge and truth: “The *object* of discourse can just as well be a *subject*, without the figures of objectivity being changed however (ibid., x).”

Through the priority given to clinical experience, something was brought into the reach of medical truth and knowledge, which had remained hidden until then: the *individual human body* in all its irreducible uniqueness or *singularity*. From then on, the truth of the individual body – comprising its *singular quality (la qualité singulière)*, its *impalpable color*, its *unique and transitory form (la forme unique et transitoire)* – became the privileged object of the medical practice of examination, diagnosis, making the distinction between *normal* and *pathological*, and intervention (Foucault 2005, x). Now, medical knowledge and -intervention were re-organized from the basis of this clinical experience, from the basis of grasping the *living body* in its singularity (ibid., v-xv, 107-109).

As we know, the issue of medical knowledge and *medicalization* of modern society, meaning the integration of politics, power and medical knowledge, (Foucault 2005, 29-37) remained central also in Foucault's subsequent genealogies of *discipline*, *normation/normalization* and *bio-politics*. *Medical perception*, in observation, surveillance, discrimination and intervention, maintains its significance for Foucault in his analyses of the modern modalities of power-knowledge, which function by integrating the individualizing and “globalizing” levels of control, i.e. the taking charge of the individual body and of the population, of the organism and of biological processes (cf. Foucault 1997, 219-226; Foucault 2001a, 717-718 ; Foucault 2001b, 190, 373-374, 450, 521, 727-736, 1049-1050). This then is the general context, in which Foucault comes across the issue of auditory perception.

Among those whom Foucault (2005, 166-176) discusses in *Birth of the Clinic*, he focuses on the works of *René Laënnec* (1781-1826), a French doctor considered to be one of the key figures in the development of modern medicine, and also known as the inventor of the modern *stethoscope* (in 1816) and the related specific method, art and technique of *mediate auscultation (l'auscultation médiate)*, i.e. the doctor's art of listening to the body of an individual patient by the mediation of the stethoscope. Foucault recognizes that auditory perception in fact did have some role to play in the birth of clinical medicine. He notices that clinical perception and -experience, this new “individualizing” basis of medical knowledge, was in fact constituted as *sensory triangulation (la triangulation sensorielle)*, meaning that the body of the patient was examined and

brought into knowledge not only by the doctor's gaze, but also by his/her ear and hearing, together with the help of touching with the fingers (the tactile-haptic perception).

However, when it comes to the role of audition in the sensorial triangle of clinical experience, Foucault's argumentation takes quite an interesting turn:

But one must not lose sight of *the essential*. The tactile and auditory dimensions did not purely and simply come to be added to the domain of vision. The sensorial triangulation indispensable to anatomo-clinical perception remains *under the dominant sign of the visible (sous le signe dominant du visible)*: firstly, because this multi-sensorial perception is nothing but a manner of anticipating that *triumph of the gaze (ce triomphe du regard)*, which will be *the autopsy; the ear and hand are nothing but temporary substitute organs (des organes provisoires de remplacement) anticipating for the death to render to the truth the luminous presence of the visible (la présence lumineuse du visible)*...And above all, the alterations discovered by anatomy concern 'the shape, the size, the position and the direction' of organs or their tissues...that is, *spatial data (des données spatiales) that belong by right of origin (par droit d'origine) to the gaze.* (Foucault 2005, 168-169; my emphasis)

As is clear in this passage, Foucault argues that one *should not* let the appearance of the sensorial triangulation lead to any illusions about the *equality* between the three senses at play there. Even if touch and audition *have* a role in the formation of clinical perception, it is actually limited to their function as vision's temporary substitutes or "representatives", ones that in the end are reducible to visual experience. In other words, Foucault's strong thesis is that in the formation of clinical perception, in the first opening of the individual body to medical knowledge and -intervention, touch and audition *did not* have any irreducible, indispensable or autonomous significance, that sort of significance being reserved for the gaze and visual experience only. Instead, the only place left for audition was a position of dependency and submission - a subservient position - *under the dominant sign of the visible*.

The passage quoted also shows that in Foucault's understanding, the *truth* constituted in the clinical-medical discourse was still determined, in a rather classical sense, utterly by the interrelated terms of *visibility, luminosity* and *presence*. In practice this is accomplished only in the opening of the *dead corps* in autopsy. This means that auditory perception, hearing and the ear, as such *did not* strictly speaking participate directly to the medical truth and knowledge, the truth of health/pathology, and normality/abnormality of an individual body. The clinical-medical truth was constituted, in the fundamental sense, by the visible presence of the body to the gaze, *not* to auditory experience. The only possible "legitimate" contribution of audition to the formation of truth in the clinical discourse was that of a subservient instrument or a temporary, dispensable substitute for the vision, one that itself did not strictly speaking take part in the *truth as such*, characterized in terms of the "luminous presence". In the end the fate of audition in the clinical form of knowledge, as well as in the medicalization of interhuman relations, was to become extinguished in the true goal and fulfillment of medical examination: in the *final triumph of the gaze*, the grasping of the visible truth, where auditory experience no longer has anything to contribute. Thus, the *sensory hierarchy* organizing the triangle

becomes quite clearly stated: audition remains firmly submitted under the pre-eminence of vision. In the hierarchic setting, the fate of audition is to become subjugated under, and in the end extinguished in and by the dominant sign of the visible.

## 1.2 The “Right-of-Origin”- Argument and the Empire of the Gaze

There is one turn in particular in Foucault’s argumentation on the role of audition in clinical experience that becomes articulate in the quotation already discussed which needs special emphasis here. As the quotation shows, Foucault presents an argument concerning what belongs *by right of origin* (*par droit d’origine*) to vision and *not* to hearing. The capacity to collect *spatial facts* or *spatial data* (*des données spatiales*), the capacity to discover *spatial objects*, are capacities that belong “by right of origin” to vision, not to audition. When it comes to the anatomo-clinical perception and –experience, and to the further medical/medicalized practices of intervention, this means that the capacity to *locate* “the being of the disease with its causes and effects in a three-dimensional space” (Foucault 2005, xiv-xv; my emphasis), as well as the capacity to grasp “the shape, the size, the position and the direction of organs or their tissues” (Foucault 2005, 169; my emphasis), are also considered to be the unique (“by-right-of-origin”-) capacities of vision. In other words, the central functions and forms determining the clinical experience belong by right of origin to sight, not to hearing. It is in this irreparable lack, in the incapacity to form *spatial-objective* experience, that we find the actual reason why audition *did not* and *cannot* make an “equal” or symmetrical, irreducible, autonomous and indispensable contribution to clinical-medical knowledge (and, as it seems logical, to *any* form of knowledge at all determined by the spatial-objective form.), but can only act as a temporary, subservient, dispensable substitute operating under the dominance of vision. Also, we should notice, that although auditory perception is defined by non-spatiality, Foucault does not argue that auditory perception would be defined by *temporality*. Only the *lack, the incapacity* of spatiality becomes the defining characteristic of audition distinguishing it from vision essentially.

The reader should notice that Foucault does *not* in fact develop this *right-of-origin* –argument by any reference to the corpus of historical documents he otherwise uses in the study, such as the writings of Laënnec and others. The argument is *not* actually presented as an interpretation of the historical sources at all. It is Michel Foucault himself, who argues here on the right-of-origin: the difference between vision and audition. It is Foucault himself, who states the difference, the juxtaposition of “audio” and “visual”, in terms of the unique capacity of vision and the essential *incapacity* of audition, when it comes to spatial-objective experience. Foucault’s argument might come as a surprise, for it is hardly *archaeological*, in the sense that Foucault gives to this term, in

character: It is not about the *historical conditions of possibility*, that is, about the difference in capacity/incapacity/function between vision and audition in the context of a specific historical formation. To argue what vision can and what audition cannot do by right of origin, means to argue on the *conditions of possibility as such*, on the *trans-historical* limits of experience and on the trans-historical difference between faculties in the strong, transcendental sense. This would mean the presupposition of the subject – the subject of perception – as being anterior to and transcending the level of history.<sup>2</sup>

It is by relying on the idea of audition as the essentially non-spatial and non-objective/objectifying sense, as opposed to the spatial-objective capacities of vision, not on the basis of historical analysis, that Foucault can *deny the possibility itself* of audition's equal/indispensable/autonomous contribution to, and significance for the birth of the clinic, and argue for the necessity of audition's reduction and subjugation under the domination of the gaze. If this is the case, how can one avoid reaching the conclusion that in presenting the right-of-origin- argument, Foucault commits himself to what he first of all consistently set out to dismantle in his archaeologies and subsequently in his genealogies: the conception of the *subject* as the possessor of different faculties with a given, trans-historical coherence and a permanent structure?

As we know, the formation of the clinical experience, making the individual subject/body into the object of medical knowledge and intervention, is a thoroughly political event for Foucault. This is the case already in *Birth of the Clinic*. The birth of the clinical experience, by its bringing to knowledge and truth the normality/pathology of the individual/singular living body, was intrinsically interrelated to the development of the modern form of power and politics characterized by the *medicalization*. It is through the development of the clinical experience that the exercise of this modern form of power, surveying and taking charge of the health/normality of each singular living body and of

<sup>2</sup> In 20th Century Occidental philosophy, the argument on the fundamental difference between sight/visual experience (as essentially spatial-objective) and hearing/auditory experience (as temporal-affective) is perhaps most familiar from *phenomenological* tradition (cf. Hans Jonas's seminal essay 1954; cf. also Burrows 1980; Muldoon 1996; Kerszberg 1999, 169-194). An interesting and perhaps surprising case in the post World War II philosophy seems to be Peter F. Strawson's (1993, 59-86) *Individuals: an Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. Strawson attempts to integrate the juxtaposition into the traditional problematics of analytical philosophy. To consider one of the more current versions of the "audio-visual" juxtaposition, take Wolfgang Welsch's work *Undoing Aesthetics* (Welsch 1997, 150-168), which defines vision by the terms "enduring", "distancing", "inaffectuality", "individuality" and audition by the contrary terms "the disappearing", "insistency", "passibility" and "society". To be sure, the historical trajectory of this strong sight/hearing- difference can be traced back much further. In the late 19th Century Henri Bergson presents a strong argument on the juxtaposition between vision (as objectifying, spatial, quantitative, distant) and audition as the medium of "participatory", "sympathetic", resonating intuitive contact between singulars, as the medium of non-chronological, non-punctual, non-spatial and non-quantitative *duration (durée)* (cf. for instance Bergson 1993, 64-65, 75, 78, 89-90, 93, 122, 128-129, 142-144, 170, 173-174; Bergson 1996, 102-104, 163-167, 181-182, 196). Going much further still, some have discovered the conception of hearing, voice and music as the privileged medium of pure time, movement and sympathy between "abstract" or "empty" subjectivities above all already in Hegel (cf. Mallet 1999, 515-547; Cohen-Levinas 2005, 101-121).

the social body as a whole, took a decisive step forwards. In his later works as well, Foucault recurrently comes back to the formation of clinical-medical perception, -observation and -surveillance, still giving these a central political significance in the modern disciplinary-, normative- and bio-political *dispositives*. In its operation, the medical power meant the traversal and penetration of the whole social space by the clinical perception and -experience. Thus, the issue of “audio-visual” difference, their right-of-origin- juxtaposition, is a deeply political issue as well (Foucault 2005, 30-31, 35-36).

Inasmuch as Foucault argues, as we have seen, that audition is, by right of origin, without any independent, irreducible significance in the formation of clinical experience, and remains firmly submitted under the dominant sign of the visible, it follows that audition *cannot* have any political significance in the medicalized form of power- and politics either. In the last instance, the meaning of medicalization is brought back to the circulation of the *medical gaze* (*le regard médical*). It is the gaze, not audition, which exercises “in the entire space, all the time, a mobile and differentiated *surveillance*” (Foucault 2005, 30-31; my emphasis). Foucault concludes his analysis of medicalized power/politics in rather categorical terms, well in line with the right-of-origin-argument: “the gaze that sees is a gaze that dominates (*le regard qui voit est un regard qui domine*)”, making the modern society as such the “*empire of the gaze without partition* (*l’empire sans cloison du regard*).” (ibid., 38; my emphasis)

To be sure, the medicalization of politics and power is an issue that never lost its relevance for Foucault. Hence *perception* retains its importance also in Foucault’s later analyses of “medical thought” and of the modern society of discipline, norm and normalization. Yet, even when Foucault does briefly mention the practice of listening, he seems unwilling to compromise his account on the “ocularity” of modern power-knowledge. One only needs to think of Foucault’s recurrent use of, and the centrality given to such well-known terms as the *Panopticon*, the *eye of the power* (*l’œil du pouvoir*), *transparence*, *light*, *illumination* (*la lumière*, *l’illumination*) and various others, all highlighting, though in different periods of development and in various frameworks, the *visual/optical* basis of the modern disciplinary- and normalizing apparatuses of power.<sup>3</sup> Neither does Foucault appear to show any interest in granting audition any further role in the development of these modern forms of power.

<sup>3</sup> In addition, Foucault uses certain visual figures, such as *theatre*, *scene*, and *spectacle* to characterize what, according to his own testimony, always interested him: the *history of truth* as such (Foucault 2001b, 571-572). And when it comes to characterizing the activity of the *specific intellectual* (*l’intellectuel spécifique*) – that is, of Foucault himself as well – he often does this in visual terms: “By the little gesture, which consists of *displacing the gaze* (*à déplacer le regard*), he makes visible what is visible (*rend visible ce qui est visible*), makes appear what is so close, so immediate, so intimately related to us that as a result *we don’t see it*.” (ibid., 594 ; my emphasis) Interestingly, far from setting his own genealogical thinking in a simple opposition to the medical gaze, Foucault actually considers genealogy to be a sort of *gazing*, which in fact has more similarity with the medical gaze than with the activity of philosophical-metaphysical thinking (theoretical contemplation) in its traditional Occidental sense. Just like the medical gaze, the *genealogical gaze* strives “to *diagnose and tell the difference* (*diagnostiquer et dire la différence*).” (Foucault 2001a, 1017; my emphasis)

Although he does not explicitly repeat the right-of-origin argument, it seems as if Foucault never explicitly disputes, challenges or contradicts this argument either (cf. Foucault 1979, 187, 200; Foucault 2001a, 718, 741; Foucault 2001b, 190, 373-374; Foucault 2003, 71, 75-79, 103-104, 248, 300-301). Yet, this does not mean that Foucault's thinking would lack potentiality to be discovered and elaborated in these respects. This issue will come up in the following Chapters.

### 1.3 Auditory Criticism of Foucault

This raises the question: When it comes to the issue of audition in its difference to vision, the "audio-visual" juxtaposition, to Foucault's "right-of-origin"-denial of the possibility of audition's equal/indispensable contribution to the medicalized form of power, can Foucault himself really avoid the "very serious default" of political thought, of which he accuses academic *Marxism*: "That of supposing, fundamentally, that the *human subject* (*le sujet humain*), the *subject of consciousness* (*le sujet de connaissance*), and the forms of the consciousness themselves are in a certain way *beforehand and definitively given* (*donnés préalablement et définitivement*); that the economic, social and political conditions of existence do nothing more than *depose or imprint themselves in that definitively given subject* (*ne font plus que se déposer ou s'imprimer dans ce sujet définitivement donné*." (Foucault 2001a, 1406; my emphasis) How should we understand the statement of "right-of-origin"- difference between vision and audition, as well as the consequent strong denial/reduction of audition's political significance, if not precisely as the sort of reasoning that begins from the idea of the subject as given and permanent, from the idea of the differential order of perception/experience as the anterior and transcendent point of origin for power? When it comes to Foucault's manner of juxtaposing vision and audition, it appears that power really is something that only becomes deposited upon this already existing, already given subjective structure, instead of *producing* it. It is difficult to comprehend, how the right-of-origin argument could be reconciled either with Foucault's archaeological or genealogical project.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The emphasis on the essential relation between modern power, capitalist production and the objectifying, locating, dividing and "quantifying" capacities of vision appears to be common to Foucault and certain Marxist theorists from Georg Lukàcs (1971, especially 89-90), to Guy Debord (1999, especially 17, 110). In the post World-War II social- and political theory, the juxtaposition of visual- and auditory perception, which gave birth to two fundamentally different types of communal relations, has been elaborated extensively in the "media-anthropology" of Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan. In this binary setting, the auditory community is understood as a contingent, open and "horizontal" network of interdependencies, relating anyone with anyone else, whereas the community of vision is a "vertical" and exclusive one, based on individualization, distance, hierarchy, territoriality, organization of different tasks and functions etc. The visual community is, in others words, a *disciplinary society* (brought to perfection in Occidental modernity) (cf. Carpenter et al. 1959, 26-27; McLuhan 1967, 14-32, 45, 56-57, 63-71; McLuhan and Fiore 1967, 44-45, 48, 50, 61, 68, 111; McLuhan 1989, 35-70). Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1986, 22, 34, 53) find inspiration in Carpenter-McLuhan's concept of

To return to René Laënnec, if we take his work as a historical document on the birth of the clinic and clinical-medical knowledge, which is what Foucault intends to do, from this basis it is difficult to see how one could come to a conclusion on the insignificance of audition and its reduction or submission under the domination of vision. In Laënnec's treatise on *mediate auscultation*, it is rather difficult to find anything referring to such a submission or downplay of auditory perception. On the contrary, Laënnec takes *auditory signs*, auditory perception and the related technique of mediate auscultation to be the *primary*, and in many cases the only, *indispensable* and *independent* medium for the opening up of a living individual body, in all its interior dynamism and mobility, to medical knowledge and practices of cure. When Laënnec characterizes this *auditory opening* of the living body/individual/subject to medical truth, there seems to be no submission, not even any need for a reference to vision. Laënnec's central argument is that audition, in the practice of medical/mediate auscultation, should be and indeed can be rationalized in its own right: it can be used independently as a medium of medical knowledge about the health/illness, normality/pathology, without needing any complementation from visual experience, and without being submitted to a relation of temporary substitution. When it comes to the generation of "spatial data", far from arguing that it belongs exclusively to the capacities of sight, Laënnec stresses that the ear and hearing can very effectively be articulated into the generation of such data: the *localization* of the disease inside the body (Laënnec 1819a, xxxiiij-xxxviiij, 1-2, 4-8, 8-10, 12-14, 89, 95-100, 118-119, 129-133; Laënnec 1819b, 206, 210-211, 270-273). If we follow Laënnec's account of the practice of mediate auscultation, the formation of clinical experience and knowledge *transgresses* the juxtaposition between "audio" and "visual" of the non-spatial and spatial perception/experience.

Similarly, when we read Laënnec's *Treatise*, Foucault's reference to the importance of the autopsy as a testimony to the final triumph of the gaze in the clinical-medical truth appears to be somewhat problematic. If for Laënnec the essential relation between the autopsy, gaze and the visible truth, or the truth defined by visibility, testifies to anything, it testifies that vision is more apt to grasp the *dead corps*, not the living one, whereas audition is the sensory medium most apt to reach the truth of the *living individual body*. The truth of the living body, the most valuable truth setting the standard for modern medicine, is not revealed to the gaze in the "luminous presence of the visible", but in and through the *careful listening* to the *invisible, ephemeral audible signs* of the living body's *dynamics, movements* and *forces* (Laënnec 1819b, 206, 210-211, 270-273; cf. Sterne 2003, 127). This is contrary to what Foucault argues.

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*auditory space*, in their reflections on the "desert", "smooth space" and "nomadic space". Lately, the conceptual difference between visual - and auditory spaces has also been applied to more concrete, case-specific research in popular music culture(s). (cf. for instance Henriques 2003, 451-481).



If there is a hierarchic triangle in Laënnec, it is under the dominant sign of the *audible*, not the visible. Reading Laënnec's *Treatise* gives all the more reason to believe that Foucault's right-of-origin downplay of the contribution of audition to the clinical-medical discourse follows from his own theoretical commitment, the essential juxtaposition of the eye and the ear, which he is not ready to question, even when the historical sources clearly would encourage this. As we have seen, this transhistorical remainder appears to be quite evident in Foucault's *Birth of the Clinic*. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that Foucault has recently become the target of severe criticism, when it comes to dealing with the history and politics of vision and audition.

The most central points of the criticism against Foucault require a brief summary. Foucault has been accused of reducing the sense of vision, visibility and the eye to the dominating/surveying gaze, and of ignoring the multiple possibilities of *different visual-scopic regimes* with their divergent subversive, equalizing and democratic potentialities. The criticism has ended up classifying Foucault as yet another representative of the 20th Century French *iconoclastic* theoretical discourse<sup>5</sup> (see above all Jay 1988; Jay 1989; Jay 1994, 6-7, 1-26, 381-416, 587-595; Jay 1996; Flynn 1993; Bal 1993). However, this does not mean that these critics would necessarily show any intention to dispute the reduction of the sense of *audition* to the "irrational sense" or to grant it any more historical-political significance.<sup>6</sup> Lately, Foucault's approach to auditory perception has become a subject of parallel critical discussion especially among researchers specialized in the analysis of *auditory culture*. Among these latter critics is Jonathan Sterne, one of whose cases is the development of medical auscultation. Sterne, through his perceptive studies on the development of modern techniques/technologies of listening, has argued that Foucault's categorical (by-right- of -origin) reduction of the significance of auscultation in *Birth of the Clinic* is a consequence of Foucault's adoption of the idea of an inherent, and insurmountable difference separating vision from hearing (image from sound); an idea having its roots deep in the tradition of Christian onto-theology, in the

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<sup>5</sup> The picture of Foucault as an "iconoclastic" thinker, showing fundamental hostility to vision, is itself somewhat problematic. After all, Foucault states that a sort of diagnostic gaze operates in his own historical-critical thought (as we already noticed). Furthermore, in visual arts Foucault finds such modes of vision and seeing, which deviate from the objectifying-surveying gaze (see for example the analysis of *Duane Michals'* photography in Foucault 2001b, 1062-1069; cf. Whitehall 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Admittedly, Martin Jay *does* present a critical statement on what he calls the "encomium of hearing", being concomitant of the hostility to vision. In this manner, Jay apparently intends to challenge the reductive "demonization" of sight and visibility as inherently *nothing but* objectifying, distant, freezing, dominating, excluding and discriminating, and the concomitant appraisal of hearing as inherently inter-subjective/dialogical, temporal, open and ethical. However, what Jay *does not* really challenge is the conception of Occidental rationality, truth and knowledge, and of the related modes of politics- and power, as fundamentally visual. He also does not challenge the theoretical denial, downplay or reduction of the role of the ear and hearing in the accounts of modern knowledge and power. The narrative of modern power-knowledge still revolves around vision, leaving little if any role for audition. Jay's somewhat vague statement is that "sight may indeed be complicitous with power" (Jay 1989, 309-312; Jay 1994, 24-25).

juxtaposition between the *dead letter* and the *living Word of God*<sup>7</sup> (Sterne 2003, 14-19, 127-128). Furthermore, other critics have pointed out Foucault's devaluation, or even complete denial, of the importance of the *auditory function* in Jeremy Bentham's elaborations on the scheme of the *panoptical* apparatus (cf. Schmidt 2003; Schafer 2003; for more on this issue, see Chapter 2 below). The conclusion of this criticism seems to be quite severe: when it comes to the history of our ears and to understanding audition politically, there is not much to learn from Foucault.

#### 1.4 Under the Dominant Sign of the Audible: Noisy Bodies and The Power of Listening in Message or Noise?

In spite of the justifiable criticism leveled against Foucault, the issue is not simple. There is actually more to Foucault's approach to audition, and to its role in clinical medicine, than the right-of-origin juxtaposition with vision and the categorical denial/reduction of its significance. This will be shown through a detailed reading of a short essay of Foucault titled *Message or Noise? (Message ou bruit?)*, a text which has not received attention. It was originally published in 1966, only three years after *Birth of the Clinic*, as a contribution to a colloquy dealing with the questions of *medical thinking*. What makes this text, in all its brevity, particularly relevant, is that Foucault presents a conception of the role of auditory perception in the formation of clinical medicine that departs quite radically from the right-of-origin- argument.

In *Message or Noise?* Foucault begins the discussion by stating that the analysis of medical practice should not operate in terms of positivist theory, but much rather in terms borrowed from language analysis or information processing (*les traitements de l'information*). The generation of medical knowledge, the practice of medical examination/diagnosis, is most aptly to be characterized as interpretation of a *pathological message (un message pathologique)* emitted by a body (Foucault 2001a, 585-586, 588). Considered by itself, there is nothing particularly interesting in this statement. In fact, it seems to just state the self-evident. However, what *is* interesting and even comes as a surprise is Foucault's manner of depicting the specific quality of the pathological messages and the related method and technique of interpretation which is the production of medical knowledge. Foucault insists that the messages indicating the health or illness, the normality or abnormality of a living body are above all *auditory*, not visual in character. At the same time, to be sure, he warns us not to let the terms "message" and "interpretation" lead to any "humanistic" illusions about a dialogical relation between doctor and patient. Literally speaking, the body

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<sup>7</sup> According to Sterne, in this juxtaposition (having various contemporary variations as well), vision is defined by a litany of terms such as directionality, perspectivism, exteriority, distance, objectivity, atrophy, death, rationality and spatiality, whereas hearing is characterized as spherical, immersive, passive, interior, subjective, living, affective and temporal (Sterne 2003, 15).

does not send messages, for this would require the existence of a code of signification and act of expression in the body, that is, in nature itself. The normality or abnormality, health or pathology of a body only *makes noise* (*faire du bruit*). This means that the *auditory starting point* of the medical practice is hearing the *primordial noise* (*le bruit primordial*) or the *non-silence of the organs* (*le non-silence des organes*). It is left for the medical practice to do the rest: to construct a message to be de-coded and interpreted out of the material provided by the primordial noise (Foucault 2001a, 585-586).

Foucault insists that in accordance with its own norms clinical practice cannot resort to an expressive voice (the patient's narration, a doctor-patient – dialogue etc.), neither can it resort to any ideas such as the “subject of experience” or –“emotion”, “person”, “soul” or “human being”. The medical practice is not dealing with the “body”, if this is taken as a definite, visible object being present to the observer, an object ready to show “what it is” (its “nature”, its truth) without obstructions and resistance, in other words, as a transparent object offering and opening itself to representation and to understanding, just waiting to be examined, classified, known and diagnosed. What clinical medicine takes as the “object” it is dealing with, and its manner of approaching it, cannot be grasped by a simplistic account of observation, representation and knowing. Foucault, in a somewhat ironic tenor, depicts the practice of clinical medicine in the following manner: “To be sure, in his practice the doctor is not dealing with a sick person, but neither with somebody who suffers and most *certainly not, thank God, with a ‘human being’* (*un être humain*). He is dealing neither with the body, nor with the soul, nor with the two at once, nor with their mixture. *He is dealing with the noise* (*il a affaire à du bruit*). *Through this noise, he must hear the elements of a message.*” (Foucault 2001a, 587; my emphasis). In this way Foucault suggests that the starting point of the clinical practice, the actual “object” it can grasp, offering the way to medical knowledge regarding the normality/abnormality of an individual body is nothing but the *primordial noise* as such. Might this not mean that the “object” of the clinical practice is not a visible object at all? The “object” is the sound of the body, taken in its sonorous qualities, or, the body which the medical practice is dealing with is actually sonorous/auditory, not visual.

Regarding the norms regulating the practice of medical interpretation of bodily sounds, Foucault emphasizes that it is not enough to just *hear* the primordial noise of the body. The examining doctor must *know how to listen* to the body in a determinate manner. *Listening* (*l'écoute*), understood as an activity with its own rationality, with its own art and technique, now occupies a central, even primary position in Foucault's analysis of the generation of clinical-medical knowledge. The practice of listening in question is *auscultation*, even though Foucault does not use the term here. Auscultation is regulated by a normative *must* (*il faut*), extending to the entire process of auditory perception, to the entire manner of using the ears. Foucault means that in order to grasp the elements of a pathological message through the primordial noise of the body, in order to *deal with* the noise, one must do nothing less than eliminate the noise:

“In order to hear it (i.e. the message, L.S.), he (the doctor, L.S.) *must eliminate the noise* (*il faut qu’il élimine le bruit*), *shut the ears* (*qu’il se bouche les oreilles*) from everything that is not an element of the message.” (Foucault 2001a, 587; my emphasis). As the result, the bodily sounds cease to be only meaningless and chaotic, and instead are turned into something meaningful: the pathological message is identified.

To succeed in this task, the clinical listener should perform three basic operations distinguished by Foucault: firstly, exclude the noises considered to be impertinent; secondly, define the “characters” that permit the recognition of the elements of the message and *individualize* them and; thirdly, set the rules of substitution allowing the translation of the message, to decode its meaning of malady or health (Foucault 2001a, 586). To become articulated into the generation of clinical knowledge, auditory perception must learn and be trained to perform the task of analytic *discrimination*, not to remain indiscriminately open to just any sounds. In this way, the invisible *auditory/sonorous object* becomes determined, individualized and distinguished through the practice of listening to its sonorous qualities. Auditory perception can become objective and objectifying, and hence “scientific”, in this sense, without any need to be subsumed to vision.

This time, in Foucault’s account of the clinical practice of listening, there are no traces at all of any intention to reduce the clinical experience to the gaze, to reduce the role of auditory perception to that of a temporary substitute, or to submit audition under the domination of the vision/visible. Foucault shows no intention to deny the independent, irreducible significance of the auditory experience in the formation of clinical-anatomical knowledge, and, it follows, in the related medicalization of politics. Foucault quite clearly argues that the ear and audition *can* well be, and actually have been, articulated into the rational practice of clinical medicine through clinical auscultation, and have their place in the practice of clinical knowledge, -examination, -surveillance and -intervention *without* the help or “supplementation” of vision. Foucault also points out that medical knowledge, and the medicalized control of population for that matter, cannot afford to wait for the noise to cease, for the “silence of death” to arrive, in which case the medical intervention would come too late (Foucault 2001a, 587).

In Foucault’s analysis of clinical practice in *Message or Noise?*, there is no reference to vision, much less anything like the “dominant sign of the visible” that figured so centrally in *Birth of the Clinic*. In Foucault’s account, the clinical interpretation at least ideally leads from the sign to the signification, from a symptom to the diagnosis, and appears to proceed quite independently and “self-sufficiently” in auditory terms. There is no lack in audition, one that would need vision to fill it.

When reading Foucault’s essay, it is important to keep in mind that he is focusing on the significance of audition in the *modern clinical* medical practice, in the formation of the *modern* clinical experience, not in pre-modern, or the *Hippocratic*, medicine (Foucault 2001a, 586). It is the modern clinical experience,

intrinsically related to modern control over the life of both individuals and populations, which is put under the *dominant sign of the audible*, rather than of the visible. In this way, Foucault means that auditory perception, or the “ear”, does not transcend the historical changes taking place in the forms of knowledge and power. Auditory perception and –experience are not taken as permanent, trans-historical and de-politicized givens. Instead, auditory perception has its integral role, through different articulations, in the history of knowledge and power.

The conclusion to draw from Foucault’s essay appears to be that audition *can* go through, and has gone through, transfigurations in the different articulations with different forms of knowledge and power. There are no forms, functions, capacities or limits of auditory experience here, not even temporality or the lack of spatial form, which can be taken as transcending the historical events and the strategies operating therein. In the brief text, Foucault manages to call into question the still widely accepted theoretical idea of audition as a “faculty” with a trans-historical nature defined by the properties mentioned above. , As Foucault shows in this essay, audition was integrated into the norms of analyses, discrimination and individualization or “rationalization” through the articulation with the modern clinical knowledge and medicalized form of politics. The reverse side of this argument is to dispute the commonly held theoretical presupposition of the unimportance or uselessness of audition for the modern, scientific apparatuses of power. Through the analysis of clinical listening, Foucault shows us that this is not the case: modern power needs auditory perception and it needs ears, not only eyes.<sup>8</sup>

Even though Foucault does not mentioned René Laënnec’s name in *Message or Noise?*, it is difficult to avoid the impression that Foucault is actually presenting a re-reading of Laënnec, one that diverges quite significantly from

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<sup>8</sup> Much later, in the *Collège de France*-lectures of the early 1980’s, which will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 5, Foucault returns to the *art of listening*. Although the context is quite different, the art and technique of listening in *ancient Stoic philosophy*, it is interesting to compare these with *Message or Noise?* In his reading of Stoic and pseudo-Stoic texts, Foucault stresses that in Stoicism audition, in difference to the other senses, was believed to be fundamentally both *pathētikos* (*passive*) and *logikos* (*receptive to logos*): both helplessly open to exterior affections and influences (penetration, affecting, possessing, enchanting both the soul and body), and also the pre-eminent sense for *learning logos* by receiving it, by letting it penetrate and take root in the soul, thus leading to the *subjectivation* of the truth spoken. Yet, we should also notice Foucault’s emphasis that in Stoicism, the practice and art of listening was taken as something that could and should be shaped, transfigured, perfected, exercised and learnt. The ideal Stoic listener should in fact be both passively receptive and open, *as well as* perfectly attentive/focused (Foucault 2001c, 317-322). The Stoic good listener should know, practice and learn how to listen *attentively* and *silently*, how to actively direct, fix and concentrate his listening to the *logos* transported by the speech of the teacher, how to discriminate, and how to exclude the surrounding sounds that are irrelevant or harmful. Here, as in *Message or Noise?*, it is a question of the rationalization, or *asceticism of listening* with the purpose of detaching the ear and audition more and more perfectly from their innate (but harmful) vulnerability, from their defenseless openness to just any outside affections. Of course, this is not to deny or to overlook in any way the vast differences between the Stoic “philosophical therapy” and modern medicine (Foucault 2001c, 323-334, 481; cf. Foucault 2001b, 1178-1184).

the one found in *Birth of the Clinic*. It seems as if Foucault has noticed Laënnec's strong thesis on the primacy of auditory signs and the practice of auscultation as the privileged way to reach the *living, interior and invisible truth* of the *singular body* in all its idiosyncrasies. It seems as if Foucault recognizes how Laënnec defines the clinical truth – the truth of the body as a *dynamic field* of *interior movements, fluctuations, impulsions, beatings, palpitations, pulsations, energy and force* – as irreducibly auditory, as opposed to the *dead object* grasped by the gaze (Laënnec 1819a, xxij, 1-2, 4-8, 14, 96-100, 129-133; Laënnec 1819b, 206, 210-211, 270-273). In this way, we could say that Laënnec's modern, clinical encomium of the powers of hearing still pays homage to at least one ancient mythical setting: the ear as the organ of life, the eye as the organ of death.<sup>9</sup>

Foucault's account of clinical listening, presented in *Message or Noise?*, is also very well in line with Laënnec's 19th Century *Treatise*, when it comes to its manner of emphasizing that the specific *art or technique* of listening at stake is one of discrimination, of making distinctions: an art that can be learned, practiced and perfected without any "supplementation" needed from vision (Laënnec 1819a, xxxiiij-xxxviii, 8-10, 12-14, 89, 95, 118-119; Laënnec 1819b, 270). Another central point, where Foucault appears to echo Laënnec's *Treatise*, is the stress on the difference between the ancient "Hippocratic" mode of listening (*immediate auscultation*, as Laënnec calls it) and the modern, rationalized and *technologically mediated* form of auscultation (Laënnec 1819a, 6-8, 10-13 ; Laënnec 1819b, 117-126, 206-208, 210-212, 277). The rationalization of the modern mode of auscultation means becoming more and more sensitive to, more and more acutely perceptive of even the slightest alterations in the *sonorous qualities* of the noises emitted by the body (its *rhythm, timbre, intensity and resonance*), but also in its *silences*. The modern practice of clinical listening is more and more capable of distinguishing these sonorous qualities, of recognizing them as *auditory signs* containing valuable knowledge about the normality/abnormality of the living body, of its interior movements, forces, dynamics and so on (Laënnec 1819b, 206, 611, 215-216, 267-273; Laënnec 1819a, 8, 89, 111).

The parallels between Laënnec's treatise and Foucault's analysis in *Message or Noise* are worthy of being examined in some detail. Right from the beginning, Laënnec emphasizes that the individual, singular body/subject

<sup>9</sup> When it comes to ancient Greek culture, the myth of the all-freezing *Medusan gaze* is generally known, as is also the idea of the ear, hearing and sound as the medium of action, movement and affect (see Aristotle 1957, 418b-421a, 422a, 437a; cf. also Cohen-Levinas 2005, 101-114). The importance of sound and hearing in the myth and cult of Dionysus – and its relevance in Foucault's thought – will be considered in the final Chapter of this study. In the Hebrew- and Christian traditions (for all the significant differences between the two), there have always been *iconoclastic* strains relating the eye, gaze, vision and visual image fundamentally with pagan spectacles and the dead objects of idolatry, whereas the ear and voice have been understood as the privileged medium of the *Living Word of God*, the *Call* etc. (see for instance Revault d'Allonnes 1984, 37, 42, 69-70, 73; Blumenberg 1993, 30-63; Pickstock 2003, 243-278; for a recent attempt to articulate this theme into the psychoanalytic discourse, see Amselek 2006, 17, 50-55, 110-113, 143-145, 155, 253-256, 269-270, 280, 284, 298-299, 300-303, 308-313, 315- 317, 319). Of course, for instance the myth of the *evil eye* appears well beyond the theological-philosophical traditions mentioned above.

really is the object of medical practice. Letting the body appear and show itself clearly in empirical experience and, correspondingly, doing away with anything that hides or obstructs it, most importantly with the abstract concepts of classification and theoretical preconceptions, is the normative basis of medical knowledge and -truth: "First of all, in transporting the pathological anatomy into practical medicine, one must...not believe that the mere exact knowledge of the malady's siege and species could dispense with studying its proper genie and its indications in the reigning epidemic and in the *idiosyncrasy of the subject (l'idiocynrasie du sujet)*." (Laënnec 1819a, xxij; my emphasis)

Moreover, the object of medical practice, diagnosis and cure is the individual body as *living*, or the *life* of the individual body, not the dead corpse opened up by autopsy. This means that medical knowledge and truth should not stop at the body's exterior surface. Instead, the imperative to reveal the truth of the individual body as a living organism means that it should be apprehended first of all as a dynamic field of interior *movements, fluctuations, impulsions, beatings, palpitations, pulsations, energy and force*, rather than as a solid and stable, or dead, object. The legitimate medical discourse should in fact operate in terms of time, movement, dynamism and force, ones indicating differential degrees of speed, rhythm, or lack of it, and intensity, rather than in terms of permanence, or as the metaphysical term puts it "becoming" not "being". It is in these terms that the medical truth, making the difference between normality and pathology, must be formulated. It is certainly noteworthy that Laënnec really does not give *visual perception* much significance in medical practice. Laënnec also finds the use of touch and "percussion" by fingers quite unreliable. He seems to think that it is during *autopsy* that the eyes are needed more than anything: in the knowledge and truth of the *dead* corpse, not of the living body, not in the interventions to the living body, not in the interventions into life (Laënnec 1819a, 1-2, 4-8, 14, 96-100, 129-133; Laënnec 1819b, 206, 210-211, 270-273; see also Sterne 2003, 127).

In the following, Laënnec describes his invention, i.e. the idea of the modern stethoscope and of the related art of auscultation : "I took a piece of paper, I shaped it into a very tight roll, one end of which I applied to the precordial region (*la region précordiale*) and putting the ear to the other end, *I was as much surprised as satisfied to hear the heart beats in a manner much more clearly and distinctly than I had by immediate application of the ear...*From that moment on, I presumed that this medium could become a utile method, and applicable not only *to the study of the heart beats, but furthermore to the study of all the movements that can produce noise in the thoracic cavity (dans la cavité de la poitrine)*, and consequently *to the exploration of breathing, of voice, of rattle (du râle) and perhaps even of the fluctuation of a liquid poured out in the pleurae or the pericardia.*" (Laënnec 1819a, 8; my emphasis)

In other words, Laënnec saw the significance of his new invention, the method, technique and instrument, precisely in the superior capacity to reveal the individual body's invisible, living forces and movements, to remain sensitive to their differences and alterations, their regularities and irregularities. Fundamentally, the ear and hearing now became integrated into the modern

pathological-anatomical language. To use Foucault's terms, only this integration made it possible to open up the individual body to empirical knowledge and to the language of rationality. The advantage of the new technique, not only in comparison to techniques of vision and touch, but also to older techniques of *immediate* auscultation, was precisely in its sensitivity, accuracy and reliability when recognizing the interior bodily movements, to hearing more *distinctly* than before the *noises* brought about by fluctuations and other invisible movements of the body. The auditory signs obtained by the new technique were clearer, certain, precise and easier to de-code than the ones engendered by other known methods. Also, the use of the new instrument allowed listening to focus more punctually than before on what is significant, to better discriminate and exclude any ambient noise, which prevents a precise diagnosis. This made mediate auscultation, when practiced by a doctor with appropriate training, the best available technique for identifying even the slightest degrees of abnormality in the dynamics of a living organism and, correspondingly, for discovering pathologies when they began. Above all it is through audition that the living body can be opened to intervention at the right moment, at an early enough period in the development of its abnormality (Laënnec 1819a, 6-8, 10-13; Laënnec 1819b, 117-126, 206-208, 210-212, 277).

As a central part of his invention, Laënnec set out to develop a whole taxonomy of auditory indexes, a sort of auditory semiotics of the living body (Laënnec 1819a, 8-9, 12-13; see Sterne 2003, 118-125, 128-136). One of the most important classes of auditory signs in Laënnec's taxonomy is *rhythm*: different rhythms signify, or *make audible*, the body's inner movements and forces through the relational order of durations, the temporal succession either regular or irregular, normal or abnormal (Laënnec 1819b, 215-216). Another central class of auditory signs is the one of *timbre*. As the following example shows, for all his emphasis on clarity, exactitude and unambiguousness, Laënnec resorts to metaphors, which appear to us somewhat comical, when articulating his perceptions on different timbres indicating health or illness: "a noise more shrill (*éclatant*) and similar to ...that of a whip, or of a dog's lapping (*d'un chien qui lape*) announces the contraction of the vestibules (*la contraction des oreillettes*)." (*ibid.*, 217) On another occasion, he compares the sign of the ossification to the "murmur of satisfaction made by cats, when one strokes them with the hand (*les flatte de la main*)" (*ibid.*, 313).

Other auditory-diagnostic terms used by Laënnec are banging (*claquement*), rattle (*râle*), clear (*clair*), brusque, hollow (*sourd*), noisy (*bruyant*), sonorous (*sonore*), trembling (*tremblant*), shaky (*chevrotant*). Besides being alert to various rhythms and timbres mentioned above, a doctor also should be sensitive to differences in intensity and resonance as well as to the possible absence of sound. All of these are given their place in the auditory taxonomy of the living body (Laënnec 1819a, 8, 89, 111; Laënnec 1819b, 206, 211, 267-273). Sometimes, the terminological problems, which Laënnec encounters in his recurrent use of metaphors, in the difficulties to articulate his auditory experiences, appear to be more similar to the common problems in the genre of



musical criticism<sup>10</sup> than to the issues one would usually associate with medical discourse. As to the character of Laënnec's diagnostic signs, especially in case of rhythm, he appears to think that these are not merely, to use C.S. Peirce's well-known term, indexes of the body's health or illness but have in addition a mimetic relation to the body. The auditory qualities (that Laënnec tried to characterize by the metaphors), their order, their regularity or irregularity make heard, i.e. refer by similarity (not by mere coexistence or accompaniment) to the corresponding states of the body's movements and forces, thus revealing the normality or abnormality in the mimetic fashion.<sup>11</sup>

It is evident that Laënnec believed mediate auscultation to be a practice or an activity with its own *technique* and *art* as well. In this art, progress could be made by *focusing* better and better on the sounds with significance and excluding the irrelevant/insignificant ones, the ambient noise in general, with the help of the best possible technology of listening (see Sterne 2003, 99-160). The art and technique of listening is one of distinguishing and identifying in the most subtle and precise manner the auditory units of signification, such as different timbres and rhythms, thus leading finally to the diagnostic interpretation. In practice, this meant resorting to the metaphorical imagination. In addition, the doctor should learn how to *spatialize* the bodily sounds in a determinate manner: how to *locate* or *emplace* the sound heard, indicating the internal movements, into determinate regions and points in the body, in this or that organ and so forth, to evaluate their respective places of origin. It should be stressed that this localization, "territorialization", or formation of an experience with a characteristically spatial form, is done by audition, in and by auditory perception, in the activity of listening, without any need to be "accomplished" by vision (Laënnec 1819a, 8-10, 12-13, 89, 95, 118-119; Laënnec 1819b, 270). Laënnec also suggests that this technique of listening could and should be taught, trained and institutionalized in the modern hospital. Not even the ears and the functioning of the sense of hearing may be allowed to stay in a "state of nature", but should be rationalized by education, in order to teach them ever more accuracy, provide greater capacity of discriminating, of locating and making distinctions, thus making them into an appropriate medium of the modern science of life (Laënnec 1819a, xxxiiij-xxxviiij, 12-14, 118-119).

The significance of Laënnec's *Treatise* should not be underestimated. Firstly, from the perspective of the modern medicalized control of life, Laënnec's work has shown that hearing was *not* reduced to the archaic, irrational, indefensible, vulnerable and at most useless one among the senses when in comparison to sight. Likewise *noise* was *not* reduced to being a cause of

<sup>10</sup> To compare, Roland Barthes (1982, 236-237, 247) has argued that the poverty of musical criticism and of musical commentary in general, which is their resorting to adjectives or epithets ("the poorest of linguistic categories", "the most facile, the most trivial of forms"), has its reason in the fact that "it is very difficult to conjoin the language, which is of the order of the general, and the music, which is of the order of the difference (*différence*)." (Barthes 1982, 247)

<sup>11</sup> Surprisingly, this *mimetic* character is not reflected by Jonathan Sterne in his thorough study on Laënnec (see Sterne 2003).

pathologies, a threat to the health, productivity and efficiency of modern society. Laënnec's *Treatise*, together with Foucault's *Message or Noise?* reminds us that noise has *also* been taken by the medicalized power-knowledge as a central medium to grasp the *truth* of the pathologies of the living body. In other words, it is a *political* medium of knowledge, intervention, regulation and normalization of the life of individual bodies as well as of the body of population.<sup>12</sup> Secondly, related to the first point, the importance of the treatise is in its showing that in the clinical-medical-governmental discourse of the period there was actually *no* consensus over the pre-eminence of vision as *the* faculty of medical knowledge and, consequently, of the modern form of rational control over human life. As we have seen, Laënnec argued that vision is the sense intimately related rather to the signs and knowledge of death, than to those of life.

### 1.5 Politicizing our Ears: the Significance of Message or Noise?

The disjuncture between Foucault's two texts discussed above in detail, *Birth of the Clinic* and *Message or Noise?*, is evident, as is also the ambivalence in Foucault's thought, when it comes to the relation of auditory perception, clinical-medical knowledge and medical power. The significance of *Message or Noise?* is that it challenges, and invites us to revise the judgment passed in the current "auditory criticism" on Foucault which was discussed here. The criticism accuses him of adopting the conventional, trans-historical binary setting of "eye vs. ear", and of consequently ignoring, denying, reducing or downplaying the role of auditory perception/experience in the development of modern forms of knowledge and power. However, in *Message or Noise?* Foucault shows no intention to deny the significance of audition in the formation of clinical experience, or to submit it under the "dominant sign of the visible". Instead, auditory experience is given a central role in the opening of the living individual body to knowledge and control. Furthermore, there is nothing similar to the right-of-origin- argument of *Birth of the Clinic*: audition is *not* defined by any list of inherent or (quasi)transcendental forms, functions, capacities, limitations, incapacities or lack(s). On the contrary, the point of the whole essay is to suggest that auditory experience as such has been modified in the historical birth of the clinic. Foucault shows in his essay how audition was *made into* a discriminative and, apparently, also spatializing (emplacing, localizing), instrument of knowledge and control by which he echoed Laënnec's *Treatise*.

The Foucault of *Message or Noise?* does nothing less than dispute the right-of-origin argument, as well as any other variant of the "audio-visual"

<sup>12</sup> On the governmental discourse and -practice of *noise-abatement* in the late 19th- and early 20th Century, see Baron (1982); Bijsterveld (2001); Schwartz (2003); Thompson (2004, 115-146). On the relation of this theme to Foucault's thought, see Chapter 3 below.

juxtaposition, which defines vision as inherently rational, objectifying, spatial and dominating, and audition as inherently irrational, non-objectifying, non-spatial, and non-controlling. By the same token, what becomes disputed is the idea of the “subject of power” – or “politics”, structured by this vision-audition juxtaposition. In all, Foucault invites us to critically re-evaluate his own earlier thesis: to consider whether we really live only in “the empire of the gaze” and not in the “empire of listening”. It is precisely in this manner of *politicizing auditory perception*, in *politicizing our ears* that we find the real far-reaching, even groundbreaking significance of *Message or Noise?* This discovery makes the ignorance of it in recent discussions all-the-more unfortunate. The Foucault of *Message or Noise?* considers audition an essentially *political issue*, that is, an effect of strategic interventions, articulations, regulations and productive practices and, consequently, also irreducibly open to dispute, conflict, struggle, innovation, and transfiguration in subversive practices also.

For some reason, Foucault did not return to these reflections on the significance of audition in modern medical power. As will be shown in the progress of this study, however, he did return to the issue of audition- and listening in other contexts. This being the case, the political significance of the analysis presented in *Message or Noise?* is left mostly implicit. Above, I have attempted to tease out this political significance. In this respect, the essay appears to be quite an exceptional, even unique text in Foucault’s *œuvre*. To put it in genealogical terms, the emergence of audition in the formation of modern scientific knowledge and power, and the emergence of *Message or Noise?* in Foucault’s thought both seem like singular, unpredictable *events*. In a sense, both disrupt the search for continuity, whether in the ocularcentric narrative of modernity, or in Foucault’s intellectual history (cf. Foucault 2001c, 1004-1024).<sup>13</sup>

To conclude, if there is one thing in particular to be learned from Foucault’s essay *Message or Noise?*, the relevance of which perhaps exceeds the discussions of political theory, it would be a more critical approach to the popular “encomiums” of hearing and listening. These “encomiums” often have

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<sup>13</sup> Already at this point in the study, we should notice the relation of Foucault’s argumentation– with its tensions as well as its convergences –with one prominent strain in contemporary French political philosophy, which deals with the issue of sound, voice and auditory perception, a strain inspired by the thought of Jacques Derrida. Above all, I am referring to the recent thought of Jean-Luc Nancy, although there are others that could be mentioned here as well. To present the point as briefly as possible, according to the central thesis, there is on one hand an essentially violent form of politics, intimately related to the objectifying *gaze* and *visual surveillance*. In contrast to this, we have the mode of politics generated by *sound* or *voice* as *sonority* – resonance, vibration, undulation, contagion, self-reference and self-difference – together with the modality of *listening* sensitive to this sonority (Nancy’s term for this is *methexis*). In fact, the sonority-listening now becomes very proximate (if not identical) to *writing* in Derrida’s sense. Sonority and listening give birth to the political relation (and “community”) constituted by the *mutual opening up* between *singularities*. In the strong, ontological sense, it is argued that the sonorous-auditory modality of politics is constituted as the *resonating-together* of free singulars, free from the domination of the gaze (Nancy 1999, 161-179; Nancy 2002, 15, 17, 21-22, 25-27, 30-45, 52, 54-58, 69, 78-80; cf. Mallet 1999; Szendy 1999). The relation of this to Foucault’s thinking will be discussed in more detail in the final Chapter.

a rather primitivist and exotic, even a colonialist tone <sup>14</sup>, which puts their hope on the “authentic”, “innocent” and “liberating” nature of listening and voice, coming to save us from the “evil eye” and false images (“If only we knew how to listen...”). <sup>15</sup> Instead of remaining within the confines of the “eye vs. ear” – juxtaposition, Foucault in his fashion encourages us to adopt a more critical, more tactically “self-conscious” and more “situational”, or to put it simply, more *political* approach towards the ear. This basic orientation is the one that will be discussed and further elaborated, in a variety of contexts, in the course of this study.

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<sup>14</sup> The media-theory of Marshall McLuhan appears to be particularly vulnerable to this criticism in its manner of relating the auditory media in such a strong sense to the “Orient”, to “Africa within”, to the “magical world”, to “tribal cultures” and so on (see McLuhan 1967, 14-32, 45, 56-57, 63-71; McLuhan and Fiore 1967, 44-45, 48, 50, 61, 68; McLuhan 1989, 35-70). For a criticism of McLuhan’s auditory exoticism and primitivism, see Schmidt (2003).

<sup>15</sup> Occasionally, this polarization of the “evil eye” and the “good (emancipating, equal, democratic, pluralistic etc.) ear” comes up also in recent discussions on auditory cultures, as the following quotation shows: “Racism is a discourse of power that thinks with its eyes. The idea of race...is a categorical mode of thinking that anchors human difference in The Visible. Variations in humankind are organized into color-coded containers of identity...Put simply, you can’t segregate the airwaves – sounds move, they escape, they carry...Thinking with sound and music may offer the opportunity for thinking through issues of inclusion, coexistence and multicultural in a more humane way and allow us to think through what a multicultural landscape might sound like in the age of information and global interdependency.” (Bull and Back 2003, 14-15)

## 2 FROM PANOPTIC TO PANACOUSTIC/PANAUDITORY

### 2.1 Bentham's Tubes

Continuing in Foucault's intellectual history, the next occurrence of the auditory-sonorous, is found in the 1970's genealogical works. It is in his analysis of the *Panopticon*, the model presented by British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1787 of the *inspection house* containing a general scheme or principle of surveillance, to be applied to any institutions, to any establishment, and to any multitude of humans. Bentham's title for his invention explains that it is not about the design of one particular institution, but indeed, about the general model of surveillance-power to be applied in the variety of contexts ("*Panopticon: or the Inspection-House: Containing the Idea of a New Principle of Construction Applicable to Any Sort of Establishment, in which Persons of Any Description are to Be Kept Under Inspection; and in particular to Penitentiary-Houses, Prisons, Houses of Industry, Work-Houses, Poor-Houses, Lazarettos, Manufactories, Hospitals, Mad-Houses, and Schools: with a Plan of Management Adapted to the Principle: in a Series of Letters*"). The most basic features of Bentham's design are: the generalized, continuous surveillance, the invisible visibility, the illusion of being constantly seen (see Bentham 1995; cf. especially Foucault 1979, 205-209; Foucault 1997, 215; Foucault 1999, 41-43; Foucault 2003, 77). In the following, the intention is to focus on an issue, which is the role of audition and sound, firstly, in Bentham's original design, and secondly, in Foucault's interpretation of it.

In Bentham's text listening has its role, its function, and its machination in the scheme of the inspection house:

To save the troublesome exertion of voice that might otherwise be necessary, and to prevent one prisoner from knowing that the inspector was occupied by another prisoner at a distance, a small tin tube might reach from each cell to the inspector's lodge, passing across the area, and so in at the side of the correspondent window of the lodge. By means of this implement, the slightest whisper of the one might be heard by the other, especially if he had proper notice to apply his ear to the

tube...With regard to *instruction*, in cases where it cannot be duly given without the instructor's being close to the work, or without setting his hand to it by way of example before the learner's face, the instructor must indeed here as elsewhere, shift his station as often as there is occasion to visit different workmen; unless he calls the workmen to him, which in some of the instances to which this sort of building is applicable, such as that of imprisoned felons, could not so well be. But in all cases where directions, given verbally and at a distance, are sufficient, these tubes will be found of use. They will save, on the one hand, the exertion of voice it would require, on the part of the instructor, to communicate instruction to the workmen without quitting his central station in the lodge; and, on the other, the confusion which would ensue if different instructors or persons in the lodge were calling to the cells at the same time. And, in the case of hospitals, the quiet that may be insured by this little contrivance, trifling as it may seem at first sight, affords an additional advantage... (Bentham 1995, Letter II)

There are various functions given to the *tin tubes*, and to the event of sound-emission and -reception, as the sounds are conducted through this apparatus. Firstly, there is the effect in the *economy of the use of power*, in the economy of the voice, in the *vocal economy*: to minimize the vocal effort required, the effort of physical displacement, and the number of inspectors needed in order to give effective commands. These economical effects would be brought about by the means of the acoustic-auditory innovation, that is, the amplification and the omnidirectional conduct of voice through the network of tubes. As a result, a whisper should and could be enough to issue an effective command, when conducted through the acoustic apparatus into the ears of the plurality of subjects under command.

Secondly, the use of voice, through its being connected into the acoustic apparatus, is calculated to generate what could be called the *illusion of omnipresence* of the inspector. Extending the reach of the voice across greater distance and into every direction within hearing of every subject, and with the minimum of temporal delay, emancipates the inspector and his *vocal appearance* as much as possible from the limits of the body, from the limits of space (emplacement, distance, proximity, physical displacement) and time (the non-simultaneity, the deferral and delay). Through the acoustic apparatus, instead of being occupied exclusively and optionally only with one particular subject or a group of subjects at a time, it becomes possible to deal with all of them irrespective of their locations, without displacement and without delay, proximating the ideal of full simultaneity. The *panacoustic* or *panauditory* apparatus<sup>16</sup> allows the inspector to appear, through the voice, everywhere at the same time, thus producing an *acoustic or auditory illusion*, rather than a visual/optic one, of a superhuman being. To use Paul Virilio's terms, the vocal machine designed by Bentham is a machine of speed and lightness, appropriating the speed of sound to eliminate the gravity of the body together with spatio-temporal distance, a machine of detachment from the physical-geographical space, a machine tending towards the "real-timeness" of the simultaneous "now" (see for instance Virilio 1998; Virilio 2003a).

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<sup>16</sup> *Panacoustic* is the term used by Peter Szendy (2007, 32-39), whereas *panauditory* is my own addition here.

Finally, there is the function of *individualizing voices*, and of the commands issued via the tubes. It is through the network of acoustic channels, that the voices are kept separate, or purified so to speak, so as not to lose their distinctness, so as to prevent their crossing, to prevent their sharing with- and taking part in each other (*methexis*). The channeling apparatus is to ensure that voices do not interrupt each other and that they do not hinder, through distractions, the reception and following. In such case, the voices would lose their individuality, forming a mass or a crowd instead (the issue of the *sonorous mass* or *-crowd* will be examined below, especially in Chapters 4 and 6). In their manner the sound-conducts also work to minimize the noise in the disciplinary institutions, and to guarantee the silence, the calmness, in which commands function as effectively as possible. When conducted through the apparatus, the commands “hit” their determinate addressees as efficiently as possible, without deviating from their course, without spreading and ending up in the “ear” of a wrong subject.

One point, which Bentham emphasizes, is distinguishing his design of the modern apparatus of surveillance from the ancient listening-apparatus called the *Ear of Dionysius* (named according to the tyrant of Sicily, located in Syracuse and possibly used as a prison), a grotto with special sound-conducting qualities allowing an inspector to hear all the sounds made inside (see Schafer 2003; Schmidt 2003). The difference, according to Bentham, is to be found in the respective objects or objectives. Unlike Dionysius’s ear, the primary objective of the Panopticon is not spying, or the detection of secrets (eavesdropping), but instead, goes further into the preventive control of activities, into the normation/reglementation of the individuals’ conduct, which is produced precisely by the means of the experience, or illusion of the omnipresent, all-apprehending constant surveillance. The experience or illusion, which is supposed to produce the normating/reglementary or disciplinary effect, as already suggested, is panauditory as well, not only panoptic in its character:

I hope no critic of more learning than candour will do an inspection-house so much injustice as to compare it to *Dionysius' ear*. The object of that contrivance was, to know what prisoners said without their suspecting any such thing. The object of the inspection principle is directly the reverse: it is to make them not only *suspect*, but be *assured*, that whatever they do is known, even though that should not be the case. Detection is the object of the first: *prevention*, that of the latter. In the former case the ruling person is a spy; in the latter he is a monitor. (Bentham 1995, letter XXI; Foucault briefly mentions the Ear of Dionysius, albeit in a somewhat different context, pointing out that what it does not do is productively entice subjects to speak, see Foucault 2001b, 251)

The difference between spying or eavesdropping, and preventive reglementation, of course, is a significant one. However, this does not mean that in Bentham’s scheme the ear, audition and the practice and art of listening did not have any function in the practice of surveillance, or in the observation and gathering knowledge. In the following passage, Bentham clarifies how the tubes also have this function:

Complaints from the sick might be received the instant the cause of the complaint, real or imaginary, occurred...Here the use of the tin *speaking-tubes* would be seen again, in the means they would afford to the patient, though he were equal to no more than a whisper, of conveying to the lodge the most immediate notice of his wants, and receiving answers in a tone equally unproductive of disturbance... (Bentham 1995, letter XX)

Hence, the transmission-reception of commands and the generation of the auditory appearance of omnipresence are not the only functions of the tubes in Bentham's scheme. In addition, the tubes also are designed to function in the other direction: the conduct of voices is supposed to provide acute knowledge about the individuals under inspection, about their wishes, needs, and the changing conditions of their pathology (cf. the discussion of medical auscultation in the first Chapter). The economical advantage expected from the acoustic apparatus does not only apply to the functioning of commands and instructions, but also to the practicing of observation. The faintest whisper, hardly audible otherwise, coming from the inmates should – when conducted through the tubes – become heard by the inspector. Through its being thus mediated and heard, the mere whisper, the mere inconspicuous sound, is enough to provide knowledge, and to allow an intervention to take place. Like the command, this *acoustic/auditory generation of knowledge* is accomplished in the simultaneity of the moment, immediately, so that any change in the conditions is detected without any temporal delay. Besides, we can think that the individualization of the voices, their keeping separate, also has significance for providing individualizing knowledge, knowledge about the condition of each individual without confusion. Despite Bentham's statement of the difference between the Panopticon and the Ear of Dionysius, there is still more in common than he was willing to admit between the archaic formation and the modern apparatus of surveillance. Finally, in Bentham's inspection-principle, the function of *noise-abatement*, taking care of the silence and eradicating disturbances, is also extended to the process of knowledge-production through the panauditory design.

Thus, in addition to the issuing of commands, the sound-transmission-system also provides an instrument of observation, of the formation of empirical knowledge about the individuals; also this takes advantage of the speed, of the omni-directionality, and of the independence from location/distance/displacement. Through the auditory apparatus, it is also the production of alert and acute knowledge of the subjects under inspection, which becomes maximally emancipated from the limits of space-and time. The continuous surveillance, of each and every person, of each and every place and location immediately, *at once*, regardless of obstacles, without gaps or delays, or the fantasy of such perfect surveillance, could be characterized in terms of the acoustic/auditory. It is the panauditory fantasy of being constantly heard by the all-hearing ear, in constant audibility, and of being addressed by a commanding or reproaching voice, which cannot be escaped and from which nothing can be hidden.



Turning from Bentham's design for audition and sound, to Foucault's analysis of the Panopticon, we should notice that while Foucault acknowledges the fact that the tin-tubes figure in Bentham's scheme, he only briefly mentions this fact without really giving it any relevance, or even stopping to ponder the possible significance of this. Michelle Perrot points out the issue in a discussion in 1977; however, it was an initiative to which Foucault does not respond (Foucault 2001b, 197-198; to compare, we can find reflections on the relation of hearing, listening and surveillance in Barthes, although not explicitly referring to Bentham [see Barthes 1982, 217-220]). When it comes to Foucault's explicit grounds for his omission of the issue of audition, all we find is a footnote in *Discipline and Punish*, in which he mentions that Bentham later expressed some hesitations about the usefulness of the tin tubes:

In his first version of the *Panopticon*, Bentham had also imagined an acoustic surveillance, operated by means of pipes leading from the cells to the central tower. In the *Postscript* he abandons the idea, perhaps because he could not introduce into it the principle of dissymmetry and prevent the prisoners from hearing the inspector as well as the inspector hearing them. (Foucault 1979, 317 note 3)

However, the fact still remains that in his original design Bentham reflected on the uses of the ear, audition and listening, and their related technologies, in detail. It also remains the case that even if Bentham might have also had some hesitations later, the design of the acoustic/auditory surveillance had already been made and presented in its details, so that it already constituted a part not only of Bentham's work, but also a part of the history of the strategies and technologies of surveillance. We cannot assume that a posterior remark could retroactively erase the significance, the effect into the forms of power by the invention already made and presented. Such an assumption is anachronistic, and is not consistent with Foucault's overt, genealogical approach to historical analysis (see Foucault 2001a, 1004-1024). Thus, there is not a convincing ground for the omission.

From the basis of reading Bentham's text, it is difficult to see why the principle of dissymmetry could not function in the acoustic system of surveillance, as if this was impossible for some reason. Why is it, that the apparatus of listening, its machinery, its technologies must be, as if inevitably or by some *a priori* necessity, symmetrical, in opposition to the visual-optic system? After Bentham there are other examples of techniques of dissymmetrical listening used in surveillance (cf. Szendy 2007, 32-39). Is the "symmetry-thesis" an assumption of Foucault himself ("perhaps because he [Bentham, L.S.] could not introduce into it the principle of dissymmetry...")? The reference to the actual historical-textual analysis remains obscure. In these respects, it is reminiscent of the "right-of-origin-argument" discussed in Chapter one, having a similarly quasi-*a priori*, trans-historical character.

What comes to the fore in Foucault's treatment of the panoptic principle of surveillance, as well as its different applications from the school to the prison, is the strong, even exclusive emphasis on vision, visibility, the eye and the gaze. Essentially, the idea of surveillance comes back to the figure of the *eye of the*

power (*l'œil du pouvoir*) (see especially Foucault 2001b, 190-207). For Foucault, the Panopticon is a *gaze machine*, which inverts the logic of the “spectacular” power at work the pre-modern form of sovereignty: inside the panopticism everyone is seen, but does not see, in the realm of *invisible visibility*<sup>17</sup> (Foucault 1979, especially 187, 200; Foucault 2001b, 190-207).

Foucault argues that the basic function of the gaze-machine is the production and maintenance of “individuality”, in the interplay of seeing and visibility, with the spatial operations of locating, emplacing and distributing bodies in an enclosable, segmented, immobile space. By inserting each and every body in a fixed place, the diffused “masses” or “crowds” are replaced by the plurality of distinctive individuals that can be simultaneously observed as a whole, as well as counted and classified (Foucault 1979, 143, 151-152, 170, 187, 195-197, 200-203, 216-217; Foucault 2001b, 190-207).

There is a great variety of texts where the centrality of the vision and visibility is articulated in Foucault’s *œuvre*. Among these texts is one in which the terms are perhaps particularly fundamental and exclusive. It is *only the optics, the sun, the light, the illumination*, it is *only the effect of the optics*, which are at play in the Panopticon, in the general form of modern surveillance-power:

*Panopticon* means two things; it means that all is seen all the time (*que tout est vu tout le temps*), but it means also that *all the power which is exercised is never anything but an effect of optics (tout le pouvoir qui s'exerce n'est jamais qu'un effet d'optique)...* This power is rather of the order of the sun (*ce pouvoir est plutôt de l'ordre du soleil*), of the perpetual light (*de la perpétuelle lumière*), it is the immaterial illumination (*il est l'illumination non matérielle*) which is shed indifferently on all the people on which it is exercised (*qui porte indifféremment sur tous les gens sur lesquels il s'exerce*). (Foucault 2003, 79; my emphasis)

Such a fundamental, even exclusive emphasis on the gaze, and the absence of other sensory modalities, can leave the impression that there is an underlying presumption at work, according to which vision has a “nature”, an “essence” determining its functionality in a trans-historical, and pre-political sense, and distinguishing vision as a faculty from the other senses, especially from

<sup>17</sup> Foucault’s argument on the centrality of the invisible visibility in the functioning of modern modes of power can be read as critical statement towards Guy Debord’s diagnosis according to which the modern society is essentially a *society of the spectacle*. Nevertheless, just like Debord’s “spectacle”, so also Foucault’s Panopticon is a form of power that is fundamentally visual/optic in nature, the logic of which appears to give no significant function to other modes of sensory perception. In both cases there is a rather conventional (conventional in the history of Western philosophy) conception of vision, its capacities and limitations. Vision is understood as the essentially and uniquely objectifying and spatial/spatializing faculty, one that perceives objects as distinctive as well as simultaneous, each one juxtaposed in space and inserted at its “proper” place, location and position. Concomitantly, in political terms, vision is determined as the faculty that individualizes, divides, segments, separates and isolates. For both Debord and Foucault, vision is the faculty of calculation, of quantity and quantification. It is the distance, non-affective neutrality and directional attentiveness, which make vision the privileged sense of both the spectacle and disciplinary surveillance (cf. Debord 1999, 17, 110; Foucault 1979, 143-144, 151-152, 177, 187, 195-197, 200-203, 214, 217; Foucault 2001b, 190-207). However, as already noticed, there are also occasions, on which Foucault challenges such a reductive idea of vision.

audition (cf. the right-of-origin- argument examined in Chapter one). This would be a presumption that contradicts Foucault's genealogical approach.<sup>18</sup> This problem has been noticed by various critics in different contexts, although, as was shown in the first Chapter, this is not all that Foucault had to say on the issue of audition in its relation to knowledge and power (see Howes 2005; Law 2005; Sterne 2003, 14-19, 127-128; Schmidt 2003; Schafer 2003; Jay 1988 307-326; Jay 1989 175-205; Jay 1994 6-7, 1-26, 381-416, 587-595; Jay 1996, 1-15; Flynn 1993, 273-286; Bal 1993, 379-405).

However, Bentham's original text explains that the "inspection house" was also designed to be a "listening machine", and that it did have a *panauditory* function. Thus, what is contested is the conception of vision as the fundamental, unique and necessary sense of surveillance, and the exclusion of audition from the function of surveillance, the *a priori* gesture of denial that audition even *could* have any contribution there. The affirmation of the positive role of audition in the apparatus of surveillance necessitates questioning the basic setting of *audio-visual dualism* itself. This is just what Foucault does himself on another occasion, in the essay *Message or Noise?*, as we have already noticed. What has to be challenged is the binary setting itself, where vision is determined as the necessary origin and principle of the spatializing-individualizing power, while audition is excluded essentially from this. Such a challenge also means, as it did in the framework of medicalization in the first Chapter, turning the attention to the analysis of the strategic articulations, uses, instrumentalizations and machinations of audition, in the dispositives of surveillance.

To further clarify the meaning of auditory politics of surveillance – one that calls into question the dichotomous setting (with its political sense), I suggest we turn to a piece of fictive literature, and read it in relation to the problematics underlined above in this Chapter. The text is Italo Calvino's short story titled *A King Listens*. In my reading I focus on one particular issue: the *politics of listening*. But why choose to read this particular text, then? The story is a text with utmost relevance as a contribution to various theoretical discussions dealing with the crossroads of sensorium, perception, audiovisual media and politics. The story especially illustrates how to proceed into thinking of the political genealogy of the auditory-sonorous, now in the framework of surveillance. This means going further into the direction opened by Foucault's *Message or Noise?* (see Chapter 1), but left unexplored in his thinking of the Panopticon.

Before going to the story, however, a few words about the meaning of the audio-visual dualism are still in order here. As an ontological framework, the binary juxtaposition of "audio" and "visual" is taken as the apolitical (and pre-political) origin and foundation of politics, as if the dichotomy itself was

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<sup>18</sup> To compare, the thesis on the essential role of vision (seeing, looking and contemplation) in the commodification of the labor-force in capitalist production, in bringing about the spatialization and quantification of the living force, has found support in Marxist theory not only with Debord, but also in the work of Georg Lukács [1971, 89-90]).

“safely” beyond dispute, conflict and history. It has become all too easy to suppose *a priori* that the auditory medium of communication would be politically “innocent” due to its supposedly dialogical, participatory, temporal, unique and authentic nature. In interpretations of history, adoption of this ontological framework has led to neglect concerning the concrete significance of the auditory medium for various, central modern rationalities, strategies, techniques and practices of power. It is worth noticing, that the audio-visual dualism in question is a discourse that has found either explicit or implicit support from a wide variety of intellectuals coming from divergent traditions and holding views that are heterogeneous, even antagonistic in other respects, ranging from phenomenology to post- structuralism and even analytic. Some of these supportive intellectuals endorse the frame of thought in spite of their own explicit criticism of the “foundationalist” traditions of Occidental philosophy and political thought. The following shows how Calvino’s story both questions these fundamental presuppositions and presents an alternative way of understanding “politics of listening”.<sup>19</sup>

## 2.2 A Story of Listening and Failed Interpretation

Throughout the story, Calvino consistently uses the second person singular pronoun, which makes it difficult for the reader to remain detached from the position of the surveying king depicted, and encourages the reader to take the position. The story is about surveillance, about the *surveying subject of perception as such*, written from the perspective of this subject, not only about the king in the restricted, literary sense. From the beginning of the story, it is evident that hearing, not vision, is taken as the “regal” and sovereign sense, and also is the sense used pre-eminently for *surveying* among the senses. Correspondingly, the ear is depicted as the organ with perhaps most significance in the king’s body as a whole. The reason for this soon becomes clear. First of all, the king, maybe more than anyone else, is fixed to one particular place in the palace, at the center of the regime. Besides, the king must keep his own body in the paralyzed, “regal” posture without showing any need for movement, which would compromise the authority of his solemn, unmoving appearance. The king must remain at the centre, unmoving:

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<sup>19</sup> A reading of Calvino’s story is also presented by Adriana Cavarero in her recent work (see Cavarero 2005, 1-7), a reading oriented by the central ideas of Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy (“uniqueness”, “plurality”, “who” as opposed to “what” etc.), or by Cavarero’s interpretation of Arendt. The reading of the story presented in the following has a somewhat different orientation from that of Cavarero’s: my aim is *not* to tease out (from Calvino’s text) a juxtaposition between, on one hand, the “artificial”, “de-personalized”, “noisy”, “de-humanized”, “false”, “dead”, and on the other hand, the “genuine”, “personal”, “human”, “true” and “living” voices and modes of auditory perception. Instead, my intention is to bring to the fore in the story the intertwinement, *both inevitable and problematic*, of the acoustic-auditory-sonorous with surveillance.

In short, everything is foreordained to spare you any movement whatsoever. *You would have nothing to gain by moving, and everything to lose.* A king is denoted by the fact that he is sitting on the throne, wearing the crown, holding the scepter. Now that these attributes are yours, you had better not be separated from them even for a moment. (Calvino 1988, 35; my emphasis)

To remain at the centre, and to survey from the centre into the surroundings without the slightest movement, all the king can do, really, is listen. The activity of seeing, of gazing, of optic surveillance, would require some movement in the body. In fact, the king himself has become an ear, has become all-ear, almost nothing but a gigantic ear, which is connected to and continuing in the palace, which is also a gigantic ear:

The palace is all whorls, lobes: *it is a great ear*, whose anatomy and architecture trade names and functions: pavilions, ducts, shells, labyrinths. You are crouched at the bottom, in the innermost zone of the palace-ear, of your own ear, the *palace is the ear of the king*. (Calvino 1988, 38; my emphasis)

The story is also quite explicit, when it comes to the particular manner of listening, the listening activity, which is practiced by the gigantic ear. It is worth noticing that the king does *not* just simply *hear* the sounds coming from the surrounding space, from the atmosphere. He would not be satisfied in being only a passive receptor for the multiple acoustic vibrations and flows of sound. Instead, it is essential that the king's listening is characterized in terms of activity, or to be more precise, a political activity, a practice of governance (Calvino 1988, 37-38). Although, in the story, the subject's audition is depicted by terms such as openness, contingency, non-selectivity and immersion, this is in no way meant to define audition, and the ear, as essentially in-active. Paradoxical as it may seem, listening is the kind of activity which works by integrating and articulating the ear and audition, in all their apparent passivity, contingency, and non-selectivity, into rationalities, strategies, techniques, arts and technologies of power.

At first, the story emphasizes that the king's activity of listening, together with the related art and technique, is one of *individualizing* and *distinguishing* sounds, brought to such perfection that the king is able to differentiate even the most confused and ephemeral sounds. The story also clarifies that this art of making distinctions is inseparable from a certain activity and art of *spatialization*. The sovereign ear *listens actively* in its performing the spatializing operations of *locating*, *localization* or *emplacement* at determinate points in space. The ear evaluates the distance, the direction and the *place of the origin* of the sounds which constitute the whole space-time, the whole environment of the king's daily life. Furthermore, the activity of listening in question is also a *quantifying* or *measuring* one, which takes the time of sounds, including their durations and pauses, into the grasp of measuring-quantitative observation and knowledge:

For you the days are a succession of sounds, some distinct, some almost imperceptible; *you have learned to distinguish them, to evaluate their provenance and their distance; you know their order, you know how long the pauses last: you are already*

awaiting every resonance or creak or clink that is about to reach your tympanum; you anticipate it in your imagination; if it is late in being produced, you grow impatient (Calvino 1988, 37-38; my emphasis) ...*locating every shuffle, every cough at a point in space*, imagining walls around each acoustical sign, ceilings, pavements, giving form to the void in which the sounds spread and to the obstacles they encounter... The palace is a construction of sounds that expands one moment and contracts the next, tightens like a tangle of chains. *You can move through it, guided by the echoes, localizing creaks, clangs, curses, pursuing breaths, rustles, grumbles, gurgles.* (ibid., 42-43; my emphasis)

In the story, the activity of listening, and the formation of the auditory experience generated through it, take on properties related essentially to vision and excluded from auditory experience in the framework of the audio-visual ontology already discussed. The auditory experiences in the story include: the capacity to individualize and distinguish, the spatializing capacity to localize auditory/sonorous events as determinate objects, the capacity to stabilize the movement and to make them appear simultaneously, the capacity to territorialize or enclose. In the story, the activity of listening *pursues or traces* the sounds back to their origins, to the circumstances of their emission, and in this fashion in a sense seeks a "sufficient reason" for their existence. Listening is an activity that is both spatializing and spatialized in a specific sense of the terms. It both localizes each sound at its distinct and discrete place or point, separated by definite distances, and it also localizes or emplaces itself, which means that it begins to move in the geometrical space of solid points and fixed distances, taking its definite direction from one point to the next, projecting itself unto its object and grasping it, instead of waiting to be seized and penetrated by an event<sup>20</sup> (Calvino 1988, 38, 42-43).

This account of listening is quite similar to that of medical auscultation presented in the first Chapter. Similar to medical auscultation, the activity of listening described in Calvino's story includes quite centrally *interpretation*. It is an activity, the function of which is to turn the confused auditory material into distinctive, definite signs. In the story, listening is *indexical*: the king's activity of listening becomes a persistent attempt to trace the sounds back to their cause/source/origin located at some specific point in the surrounding space. Every sound and silence moves through the communication channels of the king's body that has become the great ear, and is taken as an index of either the *security* of the territory, that is, obedience to the command, to the rule, to the planning, which emplace and divide movements, fixe their intervals and punctuate the displacement from one point to the next. Alternatively, a sound can be an index of *danger* and *threat*, i.e. disobedience, rebellion and revolution:

*If the sounds are repeated in the customary order, at the proper intervals, you can be reassured, your reign is in no danger: for the moment, for this hour, for this day still* (Calvino 1988, 37; my emphasis)... Your anxiety is not allayed, until the thread of hearing is knotted again, until the weft of thoroughly familiar sounds is mended at

<sup>20</sup> The tendency to understand the powers mentioned above as unique, inherent properties of vision (and vision only) is particularly explicit in the "phenomenology of the senses" (see especially Jonas 1954; cf. Schafer 1985; Kerszberg 1999).

the place where a gap seemed to have opened (ibid., 38)...STOP raving. *Everything heard moving in the palace corresponds precisely to the rules you have laid down...The situation is in your grip; nothing eludes your will or your control.* Even the frog that croaks in the basin, even the uproar of the children playing blind-man's-buff, even the old chamberlain's sprawl down the stairs: *everything corresponds to your plan, everything has been thought out by you, decided, pondered before it became audible to your ear. Not even a fly buzzes here if you do not wish it.* (ibid., 45; my emphasis)

The indexical listening, in its attempt of discovering the sense or meaning (the cause/source/origin) of sound, is persistent, albeit its success remains uncertain. Even the most familiar, predictable and regularly ordered sounds could be signs of a *coup d'état* already made. The indexical listening cannot but end and remain in ambivalence. No certainty can be reached, whether the very same sounds, the connections between sounds, the orders of sounds following one another, their regularities, their pauses, are really indexes of security, or on the contrary, indexes of threat and danger:

From the faintest clue you can derive an augury of your fate...*Perhaps the threat comes more from the silences than from the sounds...Perhaps danger lurks in regularity itself...*The regular unfolding of palace life is a sign that the coup has taken place, a new king sits on a new throne, your sentence has been pronounced and it is so irrevocable that there is no need to carry it out in a hurry... (Calvino 1988, 44-45; my emphasis)

In its indexical orientation the story's account of listening is similar to what Roland Barthes (1982, 217-220) calls the *alert* (*alerte*), which is exercised by a *centre of surveillance* (*centre de surveillance*), in service of defending the security of a territory against potential enemies. Barthes stresses that the ear and audition, not the eye and sight, seem to be the privileged "organ" for the task of the simultaneous, constant and all-penetrating surveillance of an entire territory, for catching and reporting every passing index of danger in any corner of the territory. For Barthes as well, the listening in question is understood as an activity of selection, one that is set in a relation of tension with the (supposedly) immersive, contingent and non-discriminatory openness of the ear and audition. In this way, a challenge is issued against the optically biased account of the territorial, as well as emplacing/locating surveillance, against the idea of such power being essentially and necessarily *panoptic*. To reiterate: the ear, audition and listening were shown to have their positive function in Jeremy Bentham's design of the scheme of the inspection house (see the first part of this Chapter above).

Returning to Calvino's story, the king's listening, in its surveying activity, is not reduced to the "quasi-animalistic" grasping of indexes *à la* Barthes. Instead, Calvino's story shows how the listening activity of the king can never really be satisfied in any one modality of interpretation, or in any one genre of auditory signs. Instead, the sovereign listening is in a constant, restless movement of transference from one modality and genre to the next. When the attempt of indexical determination ends up in ambivalence, indecision and anxiety (the very same sound could be either an index of security or threat) the listener, far from giving up the hope for the "sense", is already shifting to another modality of interpretative listening: *deciphering* (*déchiffrement*, in

Barthes's typology). According to Barthes, what happens is that listening first becomes an activity of capturing and understanding signs in the strict sense, an activity operating with signifying codes (Barthes 1982, 217, 220-223). What remains in Calvino's story, is the obsession of the listening-surveying subject to discover the sense, the meaning, the message, which *must* be there in the sounds, and for the interpretation of which there *must* be a code to be applied:

From every shard of sound you continue to gather signals, information, clues, as if in this city all those who play or sing or put on disks wanted only to transmit precise, unequivocal messages to you. (Calvino 1988, 51; my emphasis)

For this sort of listening, there is no such thing as mere noise, or bare sound, but only potential communication: obscure messages that must be clarified, codes waiting to be solved. The surveying listener is metamorphosed into a kind of listening hermeneutician, trying to turn the sounds heard into phonetic units of signification, forming letters, words, sentences and stories:

For a dialogue you must know the language. A series of raps, one after the other, a pause, then more, isolated raps: *can these signals be translated into a code? Is someone forming letters, words? Does someone want to communicate with you, does he have urgent things to say to you?* Try the simplest key: one rap, a; two raps, b....if the raps follow one another with regularity they must form a word, a sentence....*And now you would already like to impose on the bare drip of sounds your desire for reassuring words: 'Your Majesty...we...your loyal subjects...will foil all plots...long life...'* Is this what they are saying to you? *Is this what you manage to decipher, trying to apply all conceivable codes?* No, nothing of the sort comes out. If anything, the message that emerges is entirely different, more on the order of: 'Bastard dog usurper...vengeance...you will be overthrown...'. (Calvino 1988, 46-47; my emphasis)

The attempt to listen to sounds as speech, and to decipher their meaning through the codes of speech, turns out to be disappointing as well. The listening king can attain no certainty, and cannot decide, whether the sounds form a sentence with a reassuring sense, or have the opposite meaning, becoming a threat to his position and even to his life. The attempt to listen, and to understand the sounds as if they were speech, leads again to *aporia*. The king is obsessed with finding the unequivocal meaning of what he hears. When one attempt to find meaning fails, the listening king turns to another semiotic system, and to the application of yet another type of code, in order to finally attain the clarity and certainty of meaning. If he is not dealing with speech, the sounds could perhaps form a musical phrase with signification, or if not, then perhaps a message encrypted in yet some other type of language:

Or try Morse, make an effort to distinguish short sounds and long sounds...At times it seems to you that the transmitted message has a rhythm, as in a musical phrase: this would also prove a wish to attract your attention, to communicate, to speak to you....But this is not enough for you... (Calvino 1988, 46-47)

The relentless effort of the unsuccessful attempts at interpretation continues from one sign-system and code to another. As the attempts to listen to the auditory signs, to decipher them, to interpret them with all possible codes fail



one after another, the option left would be to give up the search for communication, and instead return once again to the indexical mode of listening, which already has failed once:

Calm down. Perhaps it is all your imagination. Only chance combines the letters and words in this way. Perhaps these are not even signals: it could be the slamming of a door in a draft, or a child bouncing his ball, or someone hammering nails...Words without meaning, after all. Only your imagination imposes raving words on those formless reverberations. (Calvino 1988, 47)

### 2.3 Surveillance Immersed in Sound

Following the basic principles of the binary setting, which has been called the audio-visual dualism, it is precisely the eye with its linear-perspectival vision, which is taken as the origin of surveillance. Vision is presumed to be similar to the condition of possibility for the form of politics characterized by the operations of individualization, localization, territorialization, quantification and calculation. Sometimes, this supposition is taken as far as claiming that only linear-perspectival vision, the distant peering at the world through a window, is responsible for the “geometrization of man”, which involves the analytical decomposition of the body with all its movements and turns them into objects of measurement and rational intervention (cf. Romanyshyn 1989, 47-48, 76-77, 100-101, 114-115, 144-145). In this setting, hearing is characterized by the utter lack of such capacities. This lack means that in hearing, one should find the necessary limit of human power. In theological terms this is: as *hearing beings* people remain *obedient* to the authoritative call, by which humans are accosted and seized. Hearing thus comes to signify the limit of subjective freedom, of the freedom of choice.<sup>21</sup>

Calvino’s story, presented in 2.2, in its fashion challenges such presuppositions of the binary setting. As it has appeared, in the depiction of the king’s activity of listening, the lack of a linear-central perspective does occur in deed, but in a manner which *does not* reduce this lack to the negation, to the utmost limit of the king’s power. On the contrary, the surveying listening, this modality of the politics of listening and political listening, is portrayed as an activity, which *strategically seizes* and *appropriates* precisely such “limitations” or “in-capacities”, as the non-perspectival lack of a fixed “point of view”, the contingent openness to events, the indiscriminate and defenseless exposure, the omni-directional and immersive lack of exclusive focus. What is central in the story and central for the political theory of the auditory-sonorous, is precisely the characterization of the activity of listening as a political activity, as the

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<sup>21</sup> In 20th Century German Philosophy, a thesis of this kind has sometimes been related to etymological speculations. Martin Heidegger (1979, 244-246), Hans Blumenberg (1993) and Hannah Arendt (1978, 112) have speculated on the etymological proximities in German between *to hear* (*hören*), *to listen* (*hören*) and words such as *to obey* (*gehören*), *to belong to somebody* (*gehören*), *obedient* (*gehorsam*).

practice of power, which works by turning the “limitations” or “incapacities” of perception into “resources” of power.

When characterized as turning weakness into strength,, the political activity of listening, of surveying listening, has a certain sense of paradox to it. What allows the surveying subject, the subject of knowledge and intervention, to maintain his proper place and posture, to remain immobile at the centre, is the appropriation of the “placelessness”, of the *atopic*, omnidirectional and immersive quality of the perception. The rational use of the sensitivity to perceive the temporality and dynamics of events, movements and actions is what permits the perfect stagnation of the “inspector”, and the simultaneous surveillance (“all at once”) of the entire surrounding space, thus eliminating the temporal deferral or delay to the utmost. This picture of the continuous, simultaneous *pan-auditory* or *pan-acoustic* surveillance of an environment is already familiar from Bentham’s inspection-house. The listening exercised in Calvino’s story does not remain in a state of passivity in relation to the acoustic-auditory environment. In the strategy, in the art of listening, the next step that follows is the discrimination; the individualization and the spatializing operations, including emplacement, localization, and punctualization; the objectivation; and the interpretation. What takes place, in the end, is the turning of the weaknesses into strengths, for it is precisely the “powerlessness” of the ear, of the auditory perception, which is turned into the resource of surveying knowledge and power.

This is how the story explores the issue of how the ear and audition can be “politicized” in their becoming articulated into the rationalities, strategies and practices of power and knowledge. In this way, Calvino’s story can be understood as an elaboration on the political genealogy of the auditory-sonorous, on the political genealogy of listening, proceeding further from where Foucault remains silent in his explicit analyses on the panoptic surveillance.

The panauditory surveillance in *A King Listens* is not without its obstacles, or without resistance, ones that are immanent to the practice of listening itself. When it is taken to perfection, the king’s use of his ears, or himself as the gigantic ear, in his strategy of hearing everything, threatens to immerse him in the ambient space so totally that he completely loses his sense of place, and his sense of the difference between inside and outside as such. In the quest for pan-auditory omnipresence, the king himself is in danger of becoming disconnected from places, from the spatial coordinates of locations in a fundamental manner, in a sort of hyper-auralization of the surveying subject:

In an unknown part of this body, a menace is lurking, your death is already stationed there; *the signals that reach you warn you perhaps of a danger buried in your own interior*” (Calvino 1988, 43; my emphasis)...*You are not convinced? You want absolute proof that what you hear comes from within you, not from outside?*” (ibid., 49; my emphasis) “...*Are you no longer able to tell the uproar outside from that inside the palace? Perhaps there is no longer an inside and an outside...*” (ibid., 59; my emphasis)

In the relentless effort to listen to each and every sound, the result is that the body of the king loses its solidity, its weight, as well as its determinate figure

and coherence. Being really devoted to panauditory listening, the body, and even the person of the inspector spreads out, or is dispersed into the environment, becoming just like the sounds:

*The body seated askew on the throne is no longer yours, you have been deprived of its use ever since the crown encircled your head; now your person is spread out through this dark, alien residence that speaks to you in riddles. (Calvino 1988, 43; my emphasis)*

The perfection of surveillance and the total loss of power, the dispersal of the surveying subject as such, are indeed very proximate, the two sides of the same coin. The question is posed in the story, whether the incessant quest to know and to grasp everything, to hear everything continuously, immediately, in every detail, is in the end a self-destructive endeavor, inevitably turning against itself, and bringing about its own defeat, even if this is just in order for it to begin anew:

*But perhaps you have never been so close of losing everything as you are now, when you think you have everything in your grip. The responsibility of conceiving the palace in its every detail, of containing it in your mind, subjects you to an exhausting strain. The obstinacy on which power is based is never so fragile as in the moment of its triumph. (Calvino 1988, 45; my emphasis)*

## 3 THE GOVERNMENTALITY OF SOUND

### 3.1 The Governmentality of Noise-Abatement

Following the course of Foucault's intellectual history, the next step is his work from the late 1970's, which is perhaps most known for the introduction of the concept of *governmentality* (*la gouvernementalité*). This concept determines the framework of this Chapter. As in the previous Chapters, there will be no general treatment of this much-discussed idea of Foucault's.<sup>22</sup> Instead, focus will be on the potentiality (explicit as well as implicit) of the concept of governmentality when considering the issue of the sonorous-auditory. It is above all the issue of *noise*, the non-speaking as well as non-musical sound that comes to the centre.

What also comes to the centre is that although, as it has already been shown, one of the central insights in Foucault's thought points out of the role of the sonorous-auditory in modern dispositives of power (the rationalized use of our ears), this does not empty the potentiality of Foucault's thought in regard to the politics of the sound and hearing. In this Chapter, what is explored is the determination of noise as a *political problem*, as a *threat* and *danger* to be fought

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<sup>22</sup> Cf.: "When it comes to the study of the 'governmentality' (*quant à l'étude de la gouvernementalité*), it responded to a double-objectif: do the necessary critique of the current conceptions of the 'power' ...to analyze it on the contrary as a domain of strategic relations between individuals or groups (*un domaine de relations stratégiques entre des individus ou des groupes*) - relations having at stake the conduct of the other or others (*relations qui ont pour enjeu la conduite de l'autre ou des autres*), and which have recourse...to diverse procedures and techniques (*et qui ont recours...à des procédures et techniques diverses*)" (Foucault 2001b, 1033)...Can we speak of something like a 'governmentality', which would be to the state what the techniques of segregation were to the psychiatry, what the techniques of discipline were to the penal system, what the biopolitics were to the medical institutions? (Foucault 2004a, 124)...if we understand by governmentality a strategic field of power-relations, in what is mobile, transformable, reversible in them (*si on entend par gouvernementalité un champ stratégique de relations du pouvoir, dans ce qu'elles ont de mobile, de transformable, de réversible*)..." (Foucault 2001c, 241)

against, in the framework of modern governmentalities, as Foucault understands the latter.

In modern political thought, there is a tenet in which noise has been considered a threatening force, not only to the sovereign state, but also to its counter-part, the organized and coherent, unified *people*, which the noise threatens to dissolve. Edmund Burke, in the second half of the 18th Century, depicts the threatening nature of noise, and relates it precisely to the rise of *crowds, multitudes and masses*:

Excessive loudness alone is sufficient to overpower the soul, to suspend its action, and to fill it with terror. The noise of vast cataracts, raging storms, thunder, or artillery, awakes a great and awful sensation on the mind, though we can observe no nicety or artifice in those sorts of music. The shouting of multitudes has a similar effect; and, by the sole strength of the sound, so amazes and confounds the imagination, that, in this staggering and hurry of the mind, the best-established tempers can scarcely forbear being born down, and joining in the common cry, and common resolution of the crowd. (Burke 1958, 82)

It is the noise, the sound in which the animal and the human, and even the forces of nature in general are mixed, which is taken as the serious threat to the political order. It is through the noisy sound of this sort, that the multitudes both “express” themselves, and spread, in a *contagious* manner, making all join in their *common cry* and *shouting*. The common cry expresses only their lack of coherence, their lack of individual identity and common identity. This is just as depicted in the ancient Greek myths of *Dionysus Bromius (the Clamor King)* and his followers, an issue which will come into focus in the last Chapter of this study. Thus even the most tempered and reasonable, the well-established and solid in their mental constitution, loose their minds to the staggering, hurrying, yet resolute movement of the multitude.

In his analysis on the genealogy of the *modern governmentality*, of the metamorphoses of the state and sovereignty, primarily in the form of *reason of state (raison d’État)*, Foucault explicitly takes up the issue of noise. Stressing how noise, in the discursive formation of the reason of state, was classified as a central sign of disobedience, as an alarming signal of seditions and revolts threatening the force of the state as such, he says: “The sea swells up in secret ...and it is precisely this signalism, this semiotics of the revolt, which must be established (*la mer s’enfle secrètement ...et c’est précisément cette signalétique, cette sémiotique de la révolte qu’il faut établir*). In a period of peace, how can one locate the possibility of sedition in the process of forming (*en période de calme, comment est-ce que l’on peut repérer la possibilité d’une sédition en train de se former*)? Among the signs are noises (*des bruits*)...which begin to circulate (*qui commencent à circuler*) ....” (Foucault 2004a, 273)

The issue of sound, of noise more specifically, does not fade away, or loose its political significance, in the history of governmentality. In fact, it was during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, that the classification of noise as a political-governmental problem became better established in the industrialized European states and in the United States of America as well. Noise was classified not only as a signal or symptom of the problems, but even more

importantly, as the cause of the most serious problems. Thus noise was a serious problem, against which individuals, as well as the population as a whole should be defended by taking appropriate governmental actions of intervention, especially inside the urban city spaces. The existence of noise should be minimized, or better yet, terminated from the realm of the society altogether. The governmental “utopia” became the purification of modern society from the dangerous noise, which is simultaneously one of the inevitable side-products of work, of production, of industrialization and of urbanization (for the history of noise-abatement, see Baron 1982; Bijsterveld 2001; Schwartz 2003; Thompson 2004, especially 115-146).

From this starting point, the industrialized and urbanized Western states elaborated and put into practice various *policies of noise abatement*, and what could be called the *police of noise abatement*. The *policies of noise abatement* soon became significant in the governance over modern city spaces, over the living-environments of populations, as a significant part of the governmental project of *public hygiene*. With these *policies of noise abatement* in place, increasingly systematic, rationalized state- interventions were made into the *sonorous- or acoustic environment* of the cities, into what could be called in 2010- terms the *city-soundscape*. In this way, inside the general framework of the stately government of public hygiene, the birth of *sonorous public hygiene* was realized in the policies and the police of noise-abatement. As the interventions of the police, police-interventions generally, so also the intervention of the sound-police or the noise-police is made by the means of reglementations, prohibitions, and prescriptions (“do not make noise”, “keep silent”) and through the related use of disciplinary techniques. Together, these interventions were supposed to eliminate the problem, the danger of noise, by reglementing the *individuals’* sound-producing activities, by disciplining the *individuals’* sound-making and sound-emissions, *silencing* the city space, or at least certain parts of it, favoring the silent use of visual signs and modes of communication where possible to replace auditory-sonorous ones. The general forms of the police-intervention applied here had been, to be sure, established already alongside the development of *raison d’État*.<sup>23</sup> Not only the practices and

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<sup>23</sup> Cf.: “...in fact the police (*la police*) does not know and did not know in the 17th and 18th Century but only one form, one mode of action and intervention...Well, the reglement, the prescription, the prohibition, the order (*le règlement, l’ordonnance, l’interdiction, la consigne*). It is on the reglementary mode that the police intervenes (*c’est sur le mode réglementaire que la police intervient*)...One is in a world of the indeterminate reglement, of the perpetually renewed reglement, of the more and more detailed reglement (*on est dans un monde du règlement indéfini, du règlement perpétuellement renouvelé, du règlement de plus en plus détaillé*)...One is in the world of the reglement, one is in the world of the discipline (*on est dans le monde de la discipline*). This is to say that one must indeed notice that great proliferation of local and regional disciplines that one could witness from the end of the 16th Century until the 18th Century inside the workshops, inside the schools, in the army, this proliferation stands out from the background of a tentative of general disciplinarization (*se détache sur le fond d’une tentative de disciplinarisation générale*), of general reglementation of the individuals and of the territory of the kingdom (*de réglementation générale des individus et du territoire du royaume*), in the form of a police that would have an essentially urban model (*un modèle essentiellement urbain*). To

technologies of noise-abatement, but also the political rationality of the framework in which noise was defined as an urgent problem, and still is in 2010, is in accordance with the general strategic principles of *raison d'État*: the calculation of the means to maintain and increase the resources of the state, its forces, its wealth, including the productivity and the health of the population. It is in this calculative matrix, that noise was defined as a serious problem for the state (see Baron 1982; Bijsterveld 2001; Schwartz 2003; Thompson 2004, especially 115-146).

The discourses in which these governmental policies were elaborated and justified, and the political rationality behind the noise-abatement, were typically a conglomerate of medical, psychological, economist and social-scientific forms of knowledge. Looking at the modern determinations of the medical-, psychological-, social-, economic-, and political threat of noise, behind the scientific language is still the list of qualities, which appear to refer to one ancient idea, that of *methexis*: *participation* and *sharing*, *(inter-)penetration*, *merging* and *contagion* now taking place between what *should* remain separate, between individuals, between self- and other, subject and object, "us" and "them", inside and outside, "here" and "there" (see Baron 1982; Bijsterveld 2001; Schwartz 2003; Thompson 2004, especially 115-146). This idea of *methexis* will recur in the following Chapters in several different contexts, so that its meaning will also gradually become clearer.

When it comes directly to the sphere of economic production, noise poses a threat, because it causes the *distraction* of the worker from the performance of the proper, assigned task, by the way of sharing and taking-part- in another's activities and leads to not minding one's own business, but the other's business as well. This sort of contagion and merging between the lines or trajectories of activities, between the series or sequences of performances, and between their performers, means nothing less than a *blurring* and *collapse of the division of tasks*, of the functional organization of the forces of labor and production. According to such calculations, the consequences of *blurring* include the lowering of the level of productivity. In turn this possible lowering of productivity justifies the urgency of the operations of noise-abatement at workshops, factories and other working-environments. The former determination of an economic threat also refers to the medical-psychological mode of knowledge. In the medical-psychological discourse noise was classified as a serious *threat to the mental health*, as a cause of *abnormalities*, of *personality disorders*, of *neuroses* in particular. It is above all through the ear, through the audition, through their *helpless* and *defenseless openness*, that an individual is *exposed* permanently to the bombardment by the flows of sound spreading and merging with one another, exposed to movements, impulses, forces, affects, ones that are continuously permeating and gradually threatening to dissolve the limit between the self- and the other, between interiority and exteriority. At the worst, noise could

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make the city into a sort of quasi-monastery (*faire de la ville une sorte de quasi-couvent*) and of the kingdom a sort of quasi-city, that is indeed it, the sort of great disciplinary dream (*de grand rêve disciplinaire*) which is found in the background of the police (*qui se trouve à l'arrière-fond de la police*).” (Foucault 2004a, 348)

cause the dissolution of the coherent individual personality permanently. Since the late 19th- and early 20th Century, these have been some of the most pertinent, most influential lines of the political-governmental reasoning that defined noise as a serious problem to be abated by means of systematic interventions, regulation and policing by the state <sup>24</sup> (see Baron 1982; Bijsterveld 2001; Schwartz 2003; Thompson 2004, especially 115-146).

This is relevant when studying the nexus of governmentality and modern political reason, on one hand, and the sensorium, the differentiations and divisions brought to bear on the senses, the different modes of sensory perception- and experience on the other hand. The threatening potential is located in the “natural qualities”, that is, in the very inherent constitution of the faculty of auditory perception, and of the sensory medium of sound as such, independently of the question of specific “content”. This determination of the inherently dangerous character of the sensory modality of sound-audition, as the locus of exposure to the dangers of abnormality, and to pathologies of various sorts, is something that cannot easily be found when it comes to other modes of sensory perception and -media. In the framework of the modern political-“state” reason, noise generated by sounds and auditory perception was considered to be, in the most direct and evident manner, politically dangerous, because it is not only the signal, but also the cause of *mass-revolts* (see Baron 1982; Bijsterveld 2001; Schwartz 2003; Thompson 2004, especially 115-146).

Because this study follows the chronology of Foucault’s thinking, rather than the chronology of the historical themes discussed, the interpretation of ancient Greek mythology will come to the fore not earlier than the final Chapter. Yet there is the persistent recurrence of a mythical setting: of the antagonism between noise and noise-making (*bromos, bremein*) and the existence and maintenance of the political community, in the developments of modern governmentality and inside modern political reason, still pertinent even in today’s modes of governance. In accordance with the mythical model, the government believes itself to be confronted by the lethal threat, posed by noise, by the spreading-contagion of *madness* through noise, making all those infected

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<sup>24</sup> Compare this to Arthur Schopenhauer (generally known for his philosophy of music) – in his short text titled *On Fuss and Noise (Über Lärm und Geräusch)* (from 1851) who expresses his concern over the noises of the modernizing city. For him, the problem of noise is, in the last instance, the problem of the thinking elite, of those who do the *brain work* or *mental work (Kopfarbeit)*. The noises, which are most disturbing for the brain work, are precisely ones produced by the lower classes, those doing the manual labor (Schopenhauer is especially annoyed by the sound of cracking whips). Furthermore, Schopenhauer suspected that the noise-making of the common people might well be intentional, an act of revenge of a kind, or subversion perhaps, against the ruling and thinking classes standing above them. Correspondingly, the lower classes themselves did not appear to be bothered at all by the noise they produced. The fact that they were not troubled by the noise was matched by their remaining indifferent to poetry, to art works and to higher, “spiritual” affects in general. The noise they created was all the more threatening for the upper class: it could shatter the concentration of all the forces of the mind to one point, required by the brainwork (Schopenhauer 1908, 678-682).



leave their proper places, their assigned tasks, their fixed identities, thus impairing or even totally paralyzing the indispensable functions of the community, the indispensable forces/resources of the state (see the final Chapter).

### 3.2 Homo œconomicus and the Threat of Noise: Kafka's The Burrow and the Liberalist Politics of the Sensorium

However, the problem of noise, which is supposedly generated in the spreading and merging of sounds and in the open, indiscriminate exposure of the ear, as well as the dangerousness of noise, is not defined only inside the framework of *raison d'État*, or inside the forms of governance following the logic of the reason of state, i.e. the calculation of the forces of the state, of their maintenance and increase, and intervention by means of the police, by means of the detailed regulations of everyday life.

Following Foucault consistently when considering the genealogy of the modern forms of governmentality, the next question is: what happens to the problem of noise, to the definition and treatment of the dangerous potentiality of sound, when turning from the reason of state to the framework of *liberalism*? The aim is not to present a general overview of Foucault's thought on liberalism. Instead, as it was above with *raison d'État*, the aim is to ask whether and how certain themes, coming to the fore in Foucault's analysis of the *liberalist governmentality*, relate to the issue of perception, of the modalities of sensory perception, and above all to sound and auditory perception. Are there certain points in Foucault's genealogy of the liberalist governmentality, through the elaboration of which insights can be gained into the issue of the *liberalist politics of the sensorium*? The liberalist politics of the sensorium refers to the manner in which the *subject of liberalism*, the *free individual*, is constituted as *subject of perception*, and is formed as subject of sensory experience of determinate kind. The emphasis is on the fate of auditory perception and – experience, or the fate of the “ear” in liberalism, in the constitution of the liberalist subject. In his analysis, Foucault covers both the framework of the classical liberalism of the 18th- and 19th- Centuries, and the 20th Century forms of German and American *ordo-* and *neo-liberalism*.

One of the central points in Foucault's analysis, one that should also come into particular focus here, is the conception *homo œconomicus*, the conception of the economical man, economical subject, economical agent, and the centrality of this conception of subject for the liberalist form of governance, for the liberalist art- and techniques of government. The development of the concept of *homo œconomicus* proceeds from the utility-maximizing subject and the subject of exchange, of the classical liberalism of the 18th- and 19th Century, to the calculating entrepreneur-subject, the subject as the *entrepreneur of oneself* and of one's proper capacities defined as “human capital” in the post- world-war-II -

neo-liberalism.<sup>25</sup> What remains central, through all the changes in the concept, is the determination of the subject in terms of the formal rationality, as means-ends-calculation, offering the strategic principle of choices and conduct.<sup>26</sup>

The second point, emphasized especially in American neo-liberalism, is one in which the issue of perception comes up. In his analysis of the elaboration of the concept of *homo œconomicus* in the neo-liberalist discourse, Foucault points out that the economical subject is determined not only by the procedures of the calculative reasoning, but also in “positive” terms as the subject of apprehension. It is the subject facing and *perceiving the reality* as it is, that is, perceiving the reality objectively, as well as accepting the objective reality as the milieu of activities. *Homo œconomicus* is not only the subject of means-ends-calculation, but also the subject of *sensitivity*, sensitivity in perceiving the modification in the milieu of conduct, and sensitivity in responding to the variations perceived, responding to them in a systematic manner:

...The *homo œconomicus* is the one who accepts the reality (*celui qui accepte la réalité*). The rational conduct, that is all conduct that is sensitive to modifications in the variables of the milieu (*toute conduite qui est sensible à des modifications dans les variables du milieu*) and that responds to them in a non-aleatory manner, hence in systematic manner, and the economics will thus be able to define itself as the science of the systematicism of the responses to the variables of the milieu (*et l'économie va donc pouvoir se définir comme la science de la systematicité des réponses aux variables du milieu*). (Foucault 2004b, 273)

The central determinations of the economical subject are: making choices and orienting its conduct according to calculative reason, being sensitive in perceiving, accepting, and responding systematically to the “reality” and its modifications. In Foucault’s analysis, these determinations of *homo œconomicus* are central to understanding the functioning of the liberalist and neo-liberalist form of government, its rationality- and art of government, and the

<sup>25</sup> “...*homo œconomicus* as partner of the exchange (*comme partenaire de l'échange*), theory of utility beginning from a problematics of the needs (*théorie de l'utilité à partir d'une problématique des besoins*): that is what characterizes the classic conception of the *homo œconomicus*...In neo-liberalism... *homo œconomicus*...it is an entrepreneur and an entrepreneur of oneself (*un entrepreneur de lui-même*)...being in oneself one’s proper capital (*étant à lui-même son propre capital*), being for oneself one’s proper producer (*étant pour lui-même son propre producteur*), being for oneself the source of [one’s] incomes (*étant pour lui-même la source de [ses] revenus*)...The consumer (*l'homme de la consommation*), inasmuch as he consumes, is a producer. What does he produce? Well, he produces very simply his own satisfaction (*sa propre satisfaction*).” (Foucault 2004b, 232)

<sup>26</sup> “This problem of the *homo œconomicus* and its applicability...this generalization of the grid *homo œconomicus* to domains that are not immediately and directly economical...maybe the object of the economical analysis must be identified to all finalized conduct (*toute conduite finalisée*) that implies, broadly, a strategic choice of means, ways and instruments (*un choix stratégique de moyens, de voies et d'instruments*): in short, identification of the object of the economical analysis with all rational conduct (*toute conduite rationnelle*)... Rational conduct as that which consists in using formal reasoning (*un raisonnement formel*), is it not an economical conduct in the sense in which it was just defined, in other words: optimal allocation of rare resources to alternative ends (*allocation optimale de ressources rares à des fins alternatives*).” (Foucault 2004b, 272)

characteristic techniques it has introduced, that is, the techniques of *environmental (environnementale) governance* (Foucault 2004b, 264-265).

The rational economical subject is precisely the *surface of contact*, or the *interface* between the individual human being and the power, the surface where the liberalist mode of governance takes hold of the individuals. The constitution of the human being as an economical subject in the model of *homo œconomicus*, as pertaining to the self-relation of the individual, to the rational self-government, means their becoming eminently governable, eminently susceptible to the environmental type of intervention. This type of intervention works by means of *modifying the milieu* of the rational actors, instead of intervening directly upon the individuals themselves. The environmental governance has its central “resource”, the guarantee and condition of its effectiveness, precisely in the sensitivity of the subject, in the sensitive responsiveness of the subject to the modification in the milieu. The environmental governance, which is liberalist governance *par excellence*, has its essential correlative in the constitution of *homo œconomicus* not only as a formally-rational/calculating subject, but also as the sensitive and sensory subject; as the subject of perception that perceives accurately and accepts the empirical milieu of its activity, in all its variations:

the *homo œconomicus*, means, the one who accepts the reality (*celui qui accepte la réalité*) or who responds systematically to the modifications in the variables of the milieu (*ou qui répond systématiquement aux modifications dans les variables du milieu*), this *homo œconomicus* appears precisely as the one who is easily influenced (*apparaît justement comme ce qui est maniable*), the one who is going to respond systematically to the systematic modifications that will be introduced artificially inside the milieu. The *homo œconomicus*, is the one who is eminently governable (*l'homo œconomicus, c'est celui qui est éminemment gouvernable*). From intangible partner of the laissez-faire, the *homo œconomicus* appears now as the correlative of a governmentality that is going to act upon the milieu and modify systematically the variables of the milieu (*de partenaire intangible du laissez-faire, l'homo œconomicus apparaît maintenant comme le corrélatif d'une gouvernementalité qui va agir sur le milieu et modifier systématiquement les variables du milieu*).<sup>27</sup> (Foucault 2004b, 274-275)

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. also: “that through which the individual is going to become governmentalizable (*gouvernementalisable*), that through which it is going to be possible to have a hold over him (*avoir prise sur lui*), that is inasmuch as, and only inasmuch as he is *homo œconomicus*. This means that the surface of contact between the individual and the power that is exercised upon him (*la surface de contact entre l'individu et le pouvoir qui s'exerce sur lui*), and consequently the principle of adjusting of the power on the individual (*le principe par conséquent de régulation du pouvoir sur l'individu*), is going to be nothing but this sort of grid of the *homo œconomicus* (*cette espèce de grille de l'homo œconomicus*). The *homo œconomicus* is the interface of the government and the individual (*l'interface du gouvernement et de l'individu*). (Foucault 2004b, 258)... Now it is not at all about adjusting the government on the rationality of the sovereign individual who can say ‘I am the State (*moi, l'État*)’, [but] on the rationality of those who are governed, those who are governed as economic subjects (*en tant que sujets économiques*)... That is what, it seems to me, characterizes the liberal rationality (*la rationalité libérale*): how to adjust the government, the art of governing, how to [ground] [*fonder*] the principle of rationalization of the art of governing upon the rational behavior of those who are governed (*le principe de rationalisation de l'art de gouverner sur le comportement rationnel de ceux qui sont gouvernés*).” (ibid., 316)

Hence, it can be argued that it is absolutely central for the functioning of liberalist governance, and this point is explicitly stressed in the framework of neo-liberalism, that the economic subject, *homo œconomicus*, is formed as the *subject of senses and sensitivity*, and is a subject determined by its modes of *receptivity, reactivity* and *responsiveness* to the variables in its environment. Furthermore, *homo œconomicus* must evidence a calculative-rational activity. Whether dealing with the neo-liberalist subject (the entrepreneur of oneself, -of human capital), or with the subject of classical liberalism (the subject of utility-maximization, -of ownership, - of exchange), the capacity to perceive, and to react according to the environment is assumed. This suggests a number of questions. How is this liberalist perceptivity, sensuality and sensitivity determined? In other words, what is the *sensorium of homo œconomicus*, and what it is not, what does it exclude? Is there differentiation of the modalities of perception, of different senses in this framework, and how are the different senses qualified and organized, in the constitution of the economical subject? And finally, most centrally, what is the place of the ear, audition and sound inside the grid of *homo œconomicus*?

Foucault's analysis does not proceed in the direction that will address these questions directly. However, through the reading of Foucault's genealogy of liberalism, the question is a pertinent one, and calls for further elaboration. To consider this issue in more detail suggests our turning to one particular text, which does not belong to the corpus of liberalism, and does not explicitly deal with the issue of liberalism. The passage is in Immanuel Kant's *Third Critique*, where Kant presents some remarks on the peculiar qualities of sound and the sense of hearing, and on the art of sound, music. Furthermore, in this passage, what is explicitly reflected is the problematic, even conflictual relation between auditory perception and sound on one hand, and *individual freedom* or *individual liberty* on the other hand. Here, in Kant's text, liberty is understood above all in terms of privacy, of private space, of the sphere of detachment, of distance, of separation, of intactness and inviolability established and maintained by an individual. The issue of liberty is the question of establishing and maintaining an empty space around the individual, providing security from the influence of others. The private space surrounding the individual is also the space of the liberty of *enjoyment*, of the freedom of enjoying and having pleasure according to one's own choice, without being bothered or interrupted by anybody and anything, and without having to share one's enjoyment of one's choice with anyone or without having to share, or take part in the enjoyment of any other without one's choice.

To go further still, it could be said, that the privacy of the private space is also what determines the liberty of private ownership, including the liberty of using one's property, of consuming it in privacy, that is, separately and in separation. From the same basis as separation, distance, and the detachment of private space around the individual, also emanate the liberty of transactions, of contracts in general, all of which belong to the basic liberties of liberalism. Despite its brevity, Kant's remarks manage to bring into the focus how these

liberties are set in a rather antagonistic relation to the nexus of sound and auditory perception:

*Moreover, music has a certain lack of urbanity about it. For, depending mainly on the character of its instruments, it extends its influence (on the neighborhood) farther than people wish, and so, as it were, imposes itself on others and hence impairs the freedom of those outside of the musical party. The arts that address themselves to the eye do not do this; for if we wish to keep out their impressions, we need merely turn our eyes away. The situation here is almost the same as with the enjoyment [Ergötzung] produced by an odor that spreads far. Someone who pulls his perfumed handkerchief from his pocket gives all those next to and around him a treat whether they want it or not, and compels them, if they want to breathe, to enjoy [genießen] at the same time, which is also why this habit has gone out of fashion. (Kant 1987, §53; my emphasis)*

Why is sound, then, so inimical to freedom (and so non-urban)? What is it exactly in sound and audition as such, in their constitution as a modality of sensory perception and experience, that so impairs, weakens or endangers freedom? Albeit the passage cited above is a brief one, it still manages to state in quite clear terms, what it is in sound and auditory perception that is especially dangerous to human freedom. Evidently, the danger is to be found in the nature of sound as an *event*, as movement, one that *spreads*, one that extends its influence regardless of the will, regardless of the intentions, regardless, and often contrary to, the calculations, the reasoning, the decisions and choices of the agents, both of those who emit the sound and those who receive it, including those who cannot help receiving it. The sound is, inherently, transition and transgression of the borderlines, from the inside to the outside, from one to the other(s), in-between, crossing the lines contingently, beyond the governance and calculation of any agent. What is at issue, is sound's nature as movement, escaping from the grasp, from control, and from direction, as well as its *imposing* itself *indiscriminately*, regardless of the attempts to partition and exclusion. Sound penetrates into the ears, into *any* ears, in spite of the will, in spite of the choice and decision of the subject. The question is of the voice, or the sound of whom- or whatever, imposing itself upon whomever, in *anonymity*, without qualifications, indifferently from the question "who".

With such characterizations, there also comes the obvious juxtaposition with vision, and the perception of visual phenomena, which are apparently much more susceptible to being governed by the will, much more compatible with the liberty of the subject, when it comes to the direction of attention, to the distancing or coming closer, to the free decision in the discrimination, in the inclusion-exclusion of the perception: "the arts that address themselves to the eye do not do this; for if we wish to keep out their impressions, we need merely to turn our eyes away". In the visual arts and other visual phenomena there is a susceptibility to being seized upon at will and governed by the subject: directed, placed, enclosed; hidden or covered according to the subject's whim; partitioned, owned; as something "proper" and as something made into "property".

Interestingly, the qualities of sound and hearing, ones that make it dangerous to freedom, are also the ones that relate it to the olfactory perception

and sensation. Both sound and the smell spread and transmit themselves beyond control, from the inside to the outside and, so to speak, make themselves perceived, that is, compel the helpless subject to perceive them, by entering inevitably and irrespectively of the subject's will through the breathing, or through the indiscriminate exposure to sounds, brought about by the openness of the ear and hearing. In this transition from the inside to the outside, and again from the outside to the inside, the sonorous-aural nexus is constantly relating bodies to each other, is relentlessly generating contacts between bodies, is taking place beyond the will of individuals, as well as being beyond rational control, beyond planning and calculation. Referring again to Kant, sound spreads, and its' contingent imposing itself does not only relate bodies to each other, does not only generate contacts between alien, anonymous bodies in the limited sense, but also *between minds, between souls*. What is most significant, and apparently most perilous to freedom, is the contingent spreading and imposing of pleasures and enjoyments, through the "non-urban" media of sound and smell. Through sound, enjoyments *become shared* between a plurality of persons, amongst a multitude. Or, to put it still more specifically, sound *makes us share, take and give part, participate*, contingently, inevitably, and compellingly, in our pleasures and our enjoyments. Via audition, through the ear, the other intrudes into my enjoyment. In this way, the sensory modality of audition is an offence against, a violation of the pure interiority and individuality of enjoyment. Sound and audition as such resist the ownership over enjoyments; they resist the properness and the property-form of enjoyments.

A sound as such is already enough to compromise, to violate the liberty of ownership, the sort of sovereign liberty of the owner to decide over his property. Both sound and the ear essentially threaten to take away the liberty of being alone, of being in detachment and separation, inside the empty private space, with one's possessions. Sound, audition, and the ear as such, in their constitution as sensory medium, threaten to take away the liberty of being able to enjoy being alone, without interruptions and intrusions, they threaten to take away the liberty of not having to share one's enjoyment with anybody or anything else, of not having to give away any part of one's possession, and of one's satisfactions, one's gratifications, without choosing to. Furthermore, by the contingent as well as compulsive relating, associating, establishing contacts, sharing and -participation between anonymous strangers, it can be also argued that sound and audition are, at their very basis, violations against the liberty of contract, against the *contractual* model of founding inter-subjective relations. Sound-audition is essentially non-contractual. In line with the logic of this juxtaposition, vision is the *contractual sense*, the sensory mode of contractual relationships par excellence (of the distance, calculation and choice at their origin). In opposition to this, the auditory-sonorous mode appears to be a violation against these basic liberties, the sensory modality of sharing, giving, taking-part, and of giving- and-taking-away. It is the modality of the transference of property and "properness" contingently, regardless of the

reasoning and choices of any of the subjects involved in the nexus. Through sound and the ear, the strange, the alien, intrudes and interrupts privacy, in the manner of a parasite, an uninvited guest, or a thief. This is how the issue of sound's spreading, its resonance and echoing, are now becoming problematic in the framework of liberalist governance.<sup>28</sup>

To return explicitly to Foucault's genealogy of liberalism once again, there is still one point, which needs to be examined in detail, one that relates to the issue of audition and sound, as is shown in the following. This is Foucault's reflection on the significance of the liberalist *culture of danger*:

It can be said that after all the slogan of the liberalism (*la devise du libéralisme*), is 'to live dangerously (*vivre dangereusement*)', which means that the individuals are perpetually put into situations of danger, or rather they are conditioned to experience their situation, their life, their present, their future as being carriers of danger (*ils sont conditionnés à éprouver leur situation, leur vie, leur présent, leur avenir comme étant porteurs de danger*). And it is this sort of *stimulus of the danger* (*cette espèce de stimulus du danger*) that is going to be, I believe, one of the major implications of liberalism. The whole education of danger, the whole *culture of danger* appears (*toute une éducation du danger, toute une culture du danger apparaît*) indeed in the 19th Century, which is very different from those great dreams or those great menaces of the Apocalypse such as plague (*la peste*), death, war by which the political and cosmological imagination of the Middle Ages, of the 17th Century still, fed itself (*dont l'imagination politique et cosmologique du Moyen Âge, du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle encore, s'alimentait*). The disappearance of the horsemen of the Apocalypse (*disparition des cavaliers de l'Apocalypse*) and, on the contrary, the appearance, emergence, and invasion of the everyday dangers (*des dangers quotidiens*), everyday dangers perpetually animated, reactualized, put into circulation (*perpétuellement animés, réactualisés, mis en circulation*) by what could be called the political culture of danger (*la culture politique du danger*) in the 19th Century and which has a whole series of aspects. Whether it is, for example, the campaign at the beginning of the 19th Century for the savings associations (*sur les caisses d'épargne*); you see the appearance of the detective novels (*l'apparition de la littérature policière*) and of the journalistic interest in the crime beginning from the middle of the 19th Century; you see all the campaigns concerning sickness and hygiene; take a look also at all that takes place around sexuality and the fear of the degeneration (*la crainte de la dégénérescence*): degeneration of the individual, of the family, of the race, of the human species. Finally, from everywhere you see this stimulation of the fear of the danger (*cette stimulation de la crainte du danger*) which is so to speak the condition, the inner psychological and cultural correlative of the liberalism (*le corrélatif psychologique et culturel interne, du libéralisme*). *There is no liberalism without the culture of danger* (*pas de libéralisme sans culture du danger*). (Foucault 2004b, 68; my emphasis)

The liberalist culture of danger, which is the politically- and/or psychologically produced and conditioned awareness of dangers by each individual subject, is a central part in the liberalist turning away from the grand programs of the collective, public protection of the population *à la raison d'État*. The liberalist political, psycho-political, culture of danger produces and maintains a general awareness of the dangers of everyday life, and works to stimulate, to activate each individual subject in his/her own private, rational activities of self-protection, self-defense, and self-insurance instead of expecting these to come from the public power, or from the collectivity. It is not just any sort of

<sup>28</sup> Points to some extent similar are also presented by Blumenberg (1993), Jonas (1954); Burrows (1980); Quignard (1996); Mallet (2002).

sensitivity and experience of danger, and not just any sort of indeterminate affect of fear which the liberalist culture of danger favors and maintains. It is a determinate kind of fear, one that leads to, or is supposed to lead to, and is supposed to be intrinsically related to the rational determination, the recognition and identification of the dangers, of the risks. The liberalistic fear is the fear in the mode of the rational risk-awareness, which is supposed to lead the subject to the *emplacement or localization* of the dangers in his/her life in space and time, to set the dangers in determinate coordinates, to draw a map of them, to detect their causes: where, when, who, what, and how. The liberalist culture of danger is one of the objectivation of danger, of the making of the dangers into determinate objects of perception and knowledge. In this manner, what is expected to take place, is the individualized submission of the dangers under calculations, concerning the possible means and techniques to prevent, eliminate or minimize the dangers, to establish and execute plans of self-defense and self-preservation of one's own life, health, productivity, property, and of one's capital. The fear produced by the liberalist culture of danger is this rational sort of fear, a rationalizing fear, a calculative fear, a fear stimulating risk-calculation and activities of prevention/elimination/minimization of risks by each individual. It is in opposition to the "irrational", overwhelming and "passivating" Apocalyptic fear. In Foucault's account the origins of this political culture of danger are in the 19th Century liberalism. However, this culture is continued, maintains its centrality, and is perhaps even heightened in the 20th Century tenets of the neo-liberalism, in its model of the individual subject as *enterprise* (Foucault 2004b, 149-155, 228-258).

The preceding presentation of the central constituents of what Foucault calls the liberalist political culture of danger, has the recurring question of the sensorium, specifically, the sensorium of danger, or the sensorium of risk; the sensorium determined by the liberalist culture of danger. The subject of liberalism, the point of reference of liberalist governmentality, i.e. *homo oeconomicus* the calculative agent of the economy, the calculative agent of interest, the agent-enterprise, is also to be produced, to be conditioned and determined as the *subject of perception* of definite kind, one that uses and is supposed to be using his/her faculties of perception to retain an adequate experience, an adequate sensitivity, an adequate state of alertness for the constant dangers confronting him/her, threatening his/her life, his/her own productive capacity, his/her own "human capital", and his/her property. *Homo oeconomicus*, determined as the subject of perception, as a perceptive subject, should use his/her perceptive capacities, his/her senses, effectively for the objectivation, for the localization, as well as for the estimation and calculation of dangers, and then, for the launching of an effective self-protective, self-defensive, or self-pre-emptive activities against the dangers detected. To elaborate on Foucault's terms, one could ask what the faculties of perception and the modes of experience are that are mobilized in and by the constitution of *homo oeconomicus* for these purposes, which modalities are favored, which ones are not favored by the liberalist culture of danger? How could the liberalist-



political culture of danger as a *sensory culture*, *sensory culture of danger*, and as a political culture of the senses be characterized? What sort of differences, what sort of partitions does it induce on the sensorium, are these made in terms of equality, or does it produce a hierarchic setting of the senses? How could liberalist governance as governance over the sensorium, over the senses be characterized? Of course, the special focus is on the fate of audition, on the fate of the ear, in the liberalist and neo-liberalist governmentality. These questions come up, and are relevant in Foucault's genealogy of liberalism, despite the fact that Foucault himself does not offer a more detailed, explicit answer to them.

There is one text in particular, which, if read against this background, offers a vivid depiction of what takes place, from the perspective of the economically calculating subject, in its attempt to survey, emplace, calculate and defend oneself against dangers, in the subject's relation to the auditory mode of perception, in its relation to sound. The text in question is not one of Foucault's, and neither does it belong to the corpus of liberalist economical-political thought. The text is a short story by Franz Kafka, titled *The Burrow* (*Der Bau*).<sup>29</sup> The character in the story is an unidentified creature, perhaps it is a mole. The creature is building and inhabiting an underground burrow, or rather a complex of different kinds of caves, rooms, passages and corridors. What really comes to the fore in the story, is the depiction of the mentality of the creature, which is possessive and hyper-calculative: the creature is relentlessly making calculations concerning its property, the things it possesses, in order to keep and maintain it, to stock it adequately, to increase, and above all, to prevent the loss of property by any possible cause, to protect and defend the property against all possible dangers. The constant calculation, the constant planning of the most effective defensive measures, to be prepared for any possible danger, is the real *raison d'être* of the architectural design, and of the laborious building-work of the whole spatial complex. Essentially, the creature must have an *overview*, a *surveying*, *englobing*, *global look* upon the space and upon the possessions stored therein:

In this castle-place I assemble my stores (*auf diesem Burgplatz sammle ich meine Vorräte*), everything that I capture inside the Burrow over and above my current needs (*alles, was ich über meine augenblicklichen Bedürfnisse hinaus innerhalb des Baus erjage*), and everything that I bring along from my huntings outside (*und alles, was ich von meinen Jagden außer dem Hause mitbringe*), I pile up here (*häufe ich hier auf*). The place is so great, that stores for half a year do not fill it (*der Platz ist so groß, daß ihm Vorräte für ein halbes Jahr nicht füllen*). Consequently, I can really spread them out, walk around among them (*infolgedessen kann ich sie wohl ausbreiten, zwischen ihnen herumgehen*), play with them, rejoice their plenty and their different odors (*mit ihnen spielen, mich an der Menge und an den verschiedenen Gerüchen freuen*), and always have an accurate overview upon what is available (*und immer einen genauen Überblick über das Vorhandene haben*). Then, as well, I can always make reassignments and, corresponding to the season, make the necessary pre-calculations and hunting plans for the future (*ich kann dann auch immer Neuordnungen vornehmen und, entsprechend der Jahreszeit, die nötigen Vorausberechnungen und Jagdpläne machen*)...The continual

<sup>29</sup> This story is briefly discussed by Dolar (2006, 166-167) and analyzed in more detail by Szendy (2007, 73-79). However, the reading presented here goes to a slightly different direction, in relating the story most centrally to the problematics of *homo oeconomicus* and the genealogy of liberalist governmentality.

preoccupation with defensive preparations brings it about (*die häufige Beschäftigung mit Verteidigungsvorbereitungen bringt es mit sich*), that my views concerning the making use of the burrow for such goals change or develop, albeit within narrow limits (*daß meine Ansichten hinsichtlich der Ausnutzung des Baus für solche Zwecke sich ändern oder entwickeln, in kleinem Rahmen allerdings*). (Kafka 1994-2007)

The primary concern of the creature in the story is to keep the private space, the space-property empty. The creature feels safe only knowing that only itself, and its possessions, are surrounded by the empty space, by the hermetically enclosed space. The “knowledge”, the perception of the emptiness, and of the perfect tranquility of privacy is provided above all by the ear and audition, or more exactly, by the *absence of auditory perception*, by the absence of sound, and the perception of this absence. To feel safe, to know that it is safe, the creature needs *silence, stillness*:

But the most beautiful thing about my burrow is its stillness. Of course, that is deceitful (*das schönste an meinem Bau ist aber seine Stille. Freilich, sie ist trügerisch*). All of a sudden at once it can be interrupted and all is finished. For the moment, however, it is still here (*plötzlich einmal kann sie unterbrochen werden und alles ist zu Ende. Vorläufig aber ist sie noch da*). For hours I can creep around my corridors and hear nothing (*stundenlang kann ich durch meine Gänge schleichen und höre nichts*)...There I sleep the sweet sleep of peace, of appeased desire, of achieved goal of possessing a house (*dort schlafe ich den süßen Schlaf des Friedens, des beruhigten Verlangens, des erreichten Zieles des Hausbesitzes*). I do not know whether it is a habit that still persists from former days, or whether the dangers of this house of mine too are still strong enough to awaken me (*ich weiß nicht, ob es eine Gewohnheit aus alten Zeiten ist oder ob doch die Gefahren auch dieses Hauses stark genug sind, mich zu wecken*): regularly every now and then I start up out of deep sleep and listen, listen into the stillness which reigns here unchanged day and night, smile feeling reassured and sink with loosened limbs into still deeper sleep... (*regelmäßig von Zeit zu Zeit schrecke ich auf aus tiefem Schlaf und lausche, lausche in die Stille, die hier unverändert herrscht bei Tag und Nacht, lächle beruhigt und sinke mit gelösten Gliedern in noch tieferen Schlaf*)

Poor homeless wanderers on roads, in woods, at the best having crawled for warmth into a heap of leaves or a pack of their comrades, delivered to all the perditions of heaven and earth! (*arme Wanderer ohne Haus, auf Landstraßen, in Wäldern, bestenfalls verkrochen in einen Blätterhaufen oder in einem Rudel der Genossen, ausgeliefert allem Verderben des Himmels und der Erde*). I lie here in a place secured on every side – there are more than fifty such places in my burrow (*ich liege hier auf einem allseits gesicherten Platz - mehr als fünfzig solcher Art gibt es in meinem Bau*) ....Your house is protected, enclosed into itself. You live in peace, warm, well nourished, master, sole master over a variety of corridors and places (*dein Haus ist geschützt, in sich abgeschlossen. Du lebst in Frieden, warm, gut genährt, Herr, alleiniger Herr über eine Vielzahl von Gängen und Plätzen*)...And the small places, each familiar to me, each distinguished clearly by me with my eyes shut in spite of their complete similarity already by the curve of the walls, they surround me peacefully and warmly, like no nest surrounds its bird. And all, all still and empty (*und die kleinen Plätze, jeder mir wohlbekannt, jeder trotz völliger Gleichheit von mir mit geschlossenen Augen schon nach dem Schwung der Wände deutlich unterschieden, sie umfassen mich friedlich und warm, wie kein Nest seinen Vogel umfängt. Und alles, alles still und leer*)...I and the burrow belong so much together, that I could settle down here comfortably, comfortably in spite of all my fear (*ich und der Bau gehören so zusammen, daß ich ruhig, ruhig bei aller meiner Angst, mich hier niederlassen könnte*)... (Kafka 1994-2007)

*Silence, as the absence of sound, as the absence of auditory perception, as hearing nothing, in the mind of the master-owner, indicates the emptiness, the absence of movement, the absence of activity, the absence of intrusions inside the*

private space. It is only this stillness, which tells that the property and one's continuing ownership over it are secured. Silence provides the economic subject with certainty that it in a sovereign manner disposes over the property, and over the use of this property, that it can consume it freely to satisfy its desires, to enjoy the things it owns, without having to share with anyone, without anyone threatening to take it away. Only the stillness indicates that this state of privacy is unquestioned. Then, suddenly, there is the turning point in the story, a point at which everything changes. This is the moment, when an unexpected sound, a noise is heard. The noise itself is already an intruder, intruding from the outside into the private space, disturbing and interrupting the free enjoyment of the individual over his possessions. This point was already reflected in reference to Kant. Logically, then, the next phase in the calculation of the subject is *noise-abatement*, a private activity of noise-abatement:

...for a hissing hardly audible in itself awakens me (*denn ein an sich kaum hörbares Zischen weckt mich*)... I shall, listening sharply to the walls of my corridor, first have to detect the location of the disturbance through experimental excavations, and only then will I be able to eliminate the noise (*ich werde, genau horchend an den Wänden meines Ganges, durch Versuchsgrabungen den Ort der Störung erst feststellen müssen und dann erst das Geräusch beseitigen können*)... Then there would be no noises in the walls, no insolent excavations up till the place itself, then the peace would be guaranteed there and I would be its guard (*dann gäbe es keine Geräusche in den Wänden, keine frechen Grabungen bis an den Platz heran, dann wäre dort der Friede gewährleistet und ich wäre sein Wächter*); then I would not have to auscultate with reluctance to the excavations of the small people, but with delight to something that now totally escapes me: the murmur of the silence in the castle-place (*nicht die Grabungen des kleinen Volkes hätte ich mit Widerwillen zu behorchen, sondern mit Entzücken, etwas, was mir jetzt völlig entgeht: das Rauschen der Stille auf dem Burgplatz*). (Kafka 1994-1007)

Kafka's hyper-calculating creature is the consistently rational economic subject: it does what every *homo oeconomicus* should do in this situation. The creature attempts to *emplace* and *locate* the sound as such, to find its definite trajectory, proceeding from one point to the next, to *beacon the sound*, to determine and mark its direction. The spatialization operations of listening have already been encountered, first in the *medical auscultation* (Laënnec in the first Chapter), and then in the discussion of the *panauditory surveillance*, including the listening king (in Chapter 2). In Chapter four, these spatializing operations will come to the focus in the *musical context* of Foucault's friendship with Pierre Boulez. In Kafka's story *The Burrow*, by tracing the sound's trajectory, the rational subject hopes to be able to locate and deal with the origin of the sound, the intruder, or the leak, the hole, the malfunction in the spatial construction, which is causing the sound which is the *index* of danger. The rational subject, thus, must resort to an activity of listening, in which these spatializing operations mentioned can be accomplished. In fact, the subject can do nothing but listen, nothing but listen as carefully and attentively as possible to locate the sound, to locate its place of origin, to estimate its distance, and to trace its trajectory.

The calculating subject, *à la homo oeconomicus*, is now the *listening subject*, whose private property, and own life, depend upon his *ability-* and *art of listening*. These are ones that the creature has been exercising for a long time,

perfecting the accuracy, and the sharpness of distinction-making. Self-protection and self-defense, extending to ownership as well are central constituents in what Foucault called the liberalist culture of danger. In Kafka's story, self-protection and self-defense are now dependent on the accuracy, and on the sensitivity of the ear. In this manner, if there is a hierarchy of the modes of sensory perception, organized by the calculative reasoning, the primacy is demonstratively given to listening instead of the gaze, to audition instead of vision, to the auditory-sonorous instead of optic-visual mode of perception. When the intruder is seen, if it will be seen, it will already be too late. The enemy must be located through its sounds without waiting for it to become visible, it must be located, before it shows itself, by means of listening: listening that seems to conform to the calculative-rational model of *homo oeconomicus*, listening as surveillance, listening as risk-calculation or risk-management, listening as technique of the individual self-defense, self-protection etc. However, as the story proceeds, it becomes clear that things are not as simple as this, that the endeavor of calculative listening is anything but easy, anything but certain of its success. Albeit the creature of the Burrow is quite self-confident at first, it soon runs into difficulties in its listening-activity:

As I have great practice in investigations of this kind, it will probably not take long and I can begin with it immediately; there are other jobs, admittedly, but this is the most urgent one, it must be silent in my corridors (*da ich große Übung in solchen Untersuchungen habe, wird es wohl nicht lange dauern und ich kann gleich damit beginnen, es liegen zwar noch andere Arbeiten vor, aber diese ist die dringendste, es soll still sein in meinen Gängen*)...I start the investigation, but I do not manage to find the place where one should intervene, I do make a few excavations, but only at random; naturally that has no result (*ich beginne die Untersuchung, aber es gelingt mir nicht, die Stelle, wo man eingreifen müßte, zu finden, ich mache zwar einige Grabungen, aber nur aufs Geratewohl; natürlich ergibt sich so nichts*) ...I do not come at all nearer to the place where the noise is, it resounds always unchanged, in a thin sound, with regular pauses, now like hissing, but then like piping (*ich komme gar nicht dem Ort des Geräusches näher, immer unverändert dünn klingt es in regelmäßigen Pausen, einmal wie Zischen, einmal aber wie Pfeifen*) ...Now I listen to the walls of the castle-place, and where I listen, high and low, to the walls or to the ground, to the entrances or inside, everywhere, everywhere the same noise (*ich horche jetzt die Wände des Burgplatzes ab, und wo ich horche, hoch und tief, an den Wänden oder am Boden, an den Eingängen oder im Innern, überall, überall das gleiche Geräusch*)...

... I must go further with my search (*ich muß weiter suchen*)...In such situations it is usually the technical problem that attracts me, for example, following the noise, which my ear has the skill to distinguish in all its subtleties...I represent to myself the cause, and now I am on fire to verify, whether the reality corresponds to that (*bei solchen Gelegenheiten ist es gewöhnlich das technische Problem, das mich lockt, ich stelle mir zum Beispiel nach dem Geräusch, das mein Ohr in allen seinen Feinheiten zu unterscheiden die Eignung hat...die Veranlassung vor, und nun drängt es mich nachzuprüfen, ob die Wirklichkeit dem entspricht*). With good reason, for as long as a localization has not taken place here, I cannot feel safe either (*mit gutem Grund, denn solange hier eine Feststellung nicht erfolgt ist, kann ich mich auch nicht sicher fühlen*)...And even a noise such as that is by no means an unimportant matter, regarded from that angle (*und gar ein solches Geräusch, das ist in dieser Hinsicht eine gar nicht unwichtige Angelegenheit*). But whether important or unimportant, I find nothing, no matter how much I search, or rather I find too much (*aber wichtig oder unwichtig, wie sehr ich auch suche, ich finde nichts, oder vielmehr ich finde zuviel*). This had to happen just in my favorite place, I think (*gerade auf meinem Lieblingsplatz mußte dies geschehen, denke ich*)...but soon I stop smiling, for indeed, the same hissing is here too (*höre aber bald zu lächeln auf, denn wahrhaftig, das gleiche Zischen gibt es auch hier*)... (Kafka 1994-2007)

Even the most attentive and systematic, the most carefully exercised, sort of listening cannot succeed in the urgent task, that is, the spatial operation of emplacement or location, and beaconing of the noise. Despite the listener's effort, the auditory perception, even with the help of vision, does not relate the sound to any place at all, to any delimited region even, or to any delimited sector of the space. The listening cannot determine the sound in terms of spatial coordinates of points, fixed intervals, and clear-cut lines. Neither can the listener determine the location, or the direction of the sound, in the relative terms of *nearer* or *farther*. The perception of the sound's movement, its activity, its taking-place, evades the determinacy of place, and univocal direction. The "right place" and "right direction" of the sound cannot be found, having the result that the investigation itself has no *proper place* of beginning. The question of the right location, and the direction to proceed remain unresolved, remain undecided, so that the investigation can only begin *at random*, at a random place and into a random direction, with no certainty of knowledge at all, if it is to begin at all.

The noise, and the threat related to the noise, intrudes in the same manner from everywhere and into everywhere, inside and through all the parts and partitions of the spatial complex. There is an activity, an event, and dynamics at play, one that penetrates through the enclosures of the private space, but one that appears to penetrate equally into and through each and every division of the space. Anywhere the owner of the burrow goes, the noise is already there, it has already intruded there, encountering the owner again and again. The noise spreads, the danger spreads, the enemy spreads, so that there is no partition of the space that would be safe, no partition or segment that would remain intact. Yet, although the noise-intruder is encountered everywhere, it is never apprehended fully and totally as present, it is never seized *hic et nunc* in this or that location, in this or that room. Although the noise is encountered everywhere, although the danger is encountered everywhere, nothing is really found, that is, no present, no identifiable cause, no origin, no determinate object or agent, into which the sound and the threat could be traced back. Here or there, this or that direction, this or that region, in both of these, and yet in neither of these, always remaining undecided and unresolved between the alternative spatial coordinates.

The most serious threat facing the creature of the burrow, as depicted by Kafka, is that there is nothing that would, really, *face it*, that there is nothing that the creature could encounter as an object placed in-front-of, across determinate distance. The real threat is that the noise is encountered *everywhere and in no-place*, only in its evasive transition and transgression in-between the places and rooms, in its penetration and spreading from one to the other. What the story depicts is the listening subject's becoming *immersed* in the sound, instead of facing it as an object in space. The listening subject's immersion allows no fixed, centered, linear perspective relating the perceiving subject to an object perceived; it is an immersion in which the sound does not occupy a space, no longer has a position in space, but generates the space itself, or *is* the space itself. For the

calculating subject of possession and of defense, the creature in its burrow, this means it is immersed in danger, it is being immersed or absorbed in and by the enemy, while the latter no longer allows itself to be objectified at all. Hence, the intruder does not intrude by occupying, by emplacing itself inside the private space, but instead it intrudes by immersing and absorbing the inhabitant, that is, it intrudes by becoming-space, by spatializing or spacing, by surrounding the subject instead of facing it. This is one way of reading Kafka's depiction on the undecidability, the *aporia* to which the calculating subject, the subject of ownership, is exposed in its encounter with the noise. The ultimate, *real threat and danger* in the story, turns out to be the fact that the sound, the threat and danger it carries, are placeless and in-placeable, unlocateable, *atopic*.<sup>30</sup>

However, that the danger is *atópos*, this is precisely something the calculating creature *cannot* and *must not* accept, for to accept it would mean to accept the fundamental failure of its basic attempt to calculate, to accept the ultimate limit of its calculating reason. Furthermore, it would have to accept the existence of dangers and risks surpassing the very possibility, the very field of the rational risk-management as such. It would mean to give up the very attempt to take care of, to defend and protect oneself and one's property. In terms of Foucault, this would be a departure from the liberalist culture of danger, a return to the Apocalyptic, "archaic", irrational, passive, and overwhelming experience of danger and terror, represented by the immersive, auditory-sonorous sense of danger. All this would be a radical deviation from the most basic norm and normativity of the liberalist individual subject, from its constitution in the model of *homo oeconomicus*. The calculating creature has to face and deal with all these serious problems in its confrontation with sound and auditory perception, in its confrontation with its own ears. To maintain its identity determined in terms of *homo oeconomicus*, the hyper-calculative creature in Kafka's story, the subject must renew its attempt to localize and beacon the noise. After a failure, the investigation must be re-enacted again and again, until the sound is finally localized, until it is without doubt located at its proper place, at its proper position, at its determinate distance, so that further measures, plans and strategies can be made on its account. Hopefully, then, the danger would finally be eliminated, and the secure state of emptiness, tranquility and silence of the private space, the intactness of the property and ownership, will be returned once again. The alternation of failures and new efforts becomes an unending process, kept going by the possessive-calculating obsession of the subject, its economical obsession, and its ever new confrontations with the un-locatable sound.

As the attempt to emplace and locate the noise runs into difficulties, so does also the related, more extensive but equally obsessive attempt to *identify* the nature of the sound, and consequently, its cause, that is, to reveal the nature

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<sup>30</sup> To be noticed, this is already long before the introduction of the conception of the immersive *acoustic-auditory space* by Edmund Carpenter and Marshall McLuhan, beginning from the 1950's (cf. Edmund Carpenter et al. 1959, 26-27; McLuhan 1967, 14-32, 45, 56-57, 63-71; McLuhan and Fiore 1967, 44-45, 48, 50, 61, 68, 111; McLuhan 1989, 35-70).

of the threat. This should be done in terms of certain knowledge, *not* mere theoretical, *a priori* assumptions, hypotheses or speculations, but certainty based on the revelation of the cause in empirical observation:

But it is this very remaining-the-same of the noise in every location that disturbs me most, for it cannot be made to consist with my original hypothesis (*aber gerade dieses Gleichbleiben an allen Orten stört mich am meisten, denn es läßt sich mit meiner ursprünglichen Annahme nicht in Übereinstimmung bringen*)...There still remains the possibility that there were two noise-centers, that up to now I had been listening only at a good distance from the two centers, and that while I came closer to the one center, its noises increased, but as a result of the decrease of the noises of the other centre, the overall result remained always approximately the same for the ear (*es bestand doch die Möglichkeit, daß es zwei Geräuschzentren gab, daß ich bis jetzt nur weit von den Zentren gehorcht hatte und daß, wenn ich mich dem einen Zentrum näherte, zwar seine Geräusche zunahmten, aber infolge Abnehmens der Geräusche des anderen Zentrums das Gesamtergebnis für das Ohr immer ein annähernd gleiches blieb*). I almost already believed, when I listened accurately, that I could recognize, if only very unclearly, differences of clang, which conformed to the new hypothesis. In any case I had to extend the experimental area much farther than I had done until now (*fast glaubte ich schon, wenn ich genau hinhorchte, Klangunterschiede, die der neuen Annahme entsprachen, wenn auch nur sehr undeutlich, zu erkennen. jedenfalls mußte ich das Versuchsgebiet viel weiter ausdehnen, als ich es bisher getan hatte*)....

... Hence I descend the passage downwards all the way to the castle-place and begin to listen there. – Strange, the same noise here too (*ich gehe deshalb den Gang abwärts bis zum Burgplatz und beginne dort zu horchen. – Sonderbar, das gleiche Geräusch auch hier*). Now, it is a noise produced by the excavations of any sort of negligible animals, who have disgracefully exploited the time of my absence (*nun, es ist ein Geräusch, erzeugt durch die Grabungen irgendwelcher nichtiger Tiere, die die Zeit meiner Abwesenheit in infamer Weise ausgenützt haben*)...But perhaps, this thought creeps into my mind as well, I am dealing here with an animal that I do not know yet. That would be possible (*aber vielleicht, auch dieser Gedanke schleicht sich mir ein, handelt es sich hier um ein Tier, das ich noch nicht kenne. Möglich wäre es*)...But it surely would not be a single animal, it would have to be a great flock that had suddenly fallen into my territory, a great flock of small animals (*aber es wäre ja nicht ein einzelnes Tier, es müßte eine große Herde sein, die plötzlich in mein Gebiet eingefallen wäre, eine große Herde kleiner Tiere*)...Do I have perhaps a new certain view about the cause of the noise? (*habe ich etwa eine neue bestimmte Meinung über die Ursache des Geräusches?*)...

... then one cannot indeed make any *a priori* assumptions at all, and one must wait until one maybe finds the cause, or it shows itself (*dann läßt sich von vornherein wohl gar nichts annehmen und man muß warten, bis man die Ursache vielleicht findet oder sie selbst sich zeigt*)... the force of imagination will not stay still, and I actually keep on believing – it is useless to deny it to myself – that the hissing originates from an animal, and not at all from many and small, but from a single big one (*die Einbildungskraft will nicht stillstehen und ich halte tatsächlich dabei zu glauben – es ist zwecklos, sich das selbst abzuleugnen –, das Zischen stamme von einem Tier und zwar nicht von vielen und kleinen, sondern von einem einzigen großen*)...dangerous beyond all possibilities of representation (*über alle Vorstellbarkeit hinaus gefährlich*)...I merely assume that the beast, by which I do not at all want to claim that it knows about me, is encircling me, it has probably drawn several circles around my burrow already, since I observed it (*ich nehme nur an, daß das Tier, wobei ich gar nicht behaupten will, daß es von mir weiß, mich einkreist, wohl einige Kreise hat es schon um meinen Bau gezogen, seit ich es beobachte*). (Kafka 1994-2007)

Thus, what takes place, when the relentless *will to know* of the creature confronts the sound it hears: further *aporias*. There is already the *aporia* as to the quantity of the sound, as well as to the quantity and size of the intruders, of the enemies: no certainty, no decision, no solution can be reached whether there is one or many sounds, and whether there is one gigantic intruder or a multitude of

small ones, a great beast or a swarm of tiny insects. The obsession to know, to attain the truth about the sound, agitates a relentless generation of ever new hypotheses, as well as ever new attempts to verify these, always turning out to be unsuccessful. The result of the endeavors is always only the indecision, the uncertainty or hesitation as to the truth or falsity of an assumption. The creature, in its encounter with the noise, is unable to verify or falsify any of its hypotheses, one or the other, but is instead taken into an oscillation back-and-forth between the mutually exclusive presumptions on the intruder's "species", its shape and form (perhaps it "is encircling me"). The more attentively the subject tries to listen to the noise, the more uncertain, more insecure it becomes.

Finally, there is no rest or security at all, only the obsessive attempt to know, to attain the truth concerning the sound, the noise, and its leading to the *aporias*. This occupies all the time, and all the forces of the creature, making it impossible for it to focus on anything else at all. It cannot perform its usual daily tasks, all that it actually should be doing as *homo oeconomicus*, to take care of its property. Instead, the subject is totally occupied by the unsuccessful attempt to grasp, to apprehend the sound with the hypotheses, and by the elaboration of alternative, ever more grandiose and laborious plans to attain the certain knowledge and truth about the noise. These are plans that always turn out to be unsuccessful, efforts that turn out to be only so much time and energy wasted. With the repeated failures to grasp the intruder comes the doubt, whether the whole spatial construction has been built in vain, incapable of offering any security and defense:

... now I can neither wonder, nor look around, nor rest (*ich kann jetzt weder wandern, noch umherschauen, noch ruhen*)...I will now alter my methods. I shall construct a regular and big trench in the direction of the noise and not cease from constructing before, independently of all theories, I find the real cause of the noise. Then I shall eradicate it, if that is within my power (*ich werde nun meine Methode ändern. Ich werde in der Richtung zum Geräusch hin einen regelrechten großen Graben bauen und nicht früher zu graben aufhören, bis ich, unabhängig von allen Theorien, die wirkliche Ursache des Geräusches finde. Dann werde ich sie beseitigen, wenn es in meiner Kraft ist*)...The noise seems to have become louder, not much louder, of course, here it is always only a matter of the subtlest differences- but still a little louder, enough for the ear to recognize it clearly. And this growing-louder appears like a coming-nearer; still much more clearly that you hear the becoming louder, you literally see the step that brings it closer to you. You leap back from the wall, you try to survey at one glance all the possible consequences that this discovery will bring with it. You feel as if you had never really organized the burrow for defence against an attack (*das Geräusch scheint stärker geworden, nicht viel stärker natürlich, hier handelt es sich immer nur um feinste Unterschiede, aber ein wenig stärker doch, deutlich dem Ohre erkennbar. Und dieses Stärkerwerden scheint ein Näherkommen, noch viel deutlicher als man das Stärkerwerden hört, sieht man förmlich den Schritt, mit dem es näher kommt. Man springt von der Wand zurück, man sucht mit einem Blick alle Möglichkeiten zu übersehen, welche diese Entdeckung zur Folge haben wird. Man hat das Gefühl, als hätte man den Bau niemals eigentlich zur Verteidigung gegen einen Angriff eingerichtet*)... (Kafka 1994-2007)

The perception of the increasing volume of the noise only brings the menacing sense of the approaching of the danger, still without offering any knowledge about what it is, where it is exactly, how close it is, and from which direction it is coming. The noise is more threatening because it remains alien and unknown.



It is a stranger, an uninvited guest entering into the space of privacy while remaining radically anonymous; while not revealing its identity it is moving around and making one aware of its movement in the private space without “telling” who or what it is, or even where it is exactly, *hic et nunc*. The noise is a stranger that has already entered, that has already intruded, before allowing the owner, the master of the house and property to ask for its name, and to recognize it. The noise, as is depicted in the story, is a stranger arriving, and having-already-arrived, having-already-entered unexpectedly, before and irrespective of permission, without waiting for anything like of a contract, or a granting of rights to take place first.<sup>31</sup> There is the immersive, absorptive, all-penetrating quality of the intrusion. By the end of Kafka’s story, the sound leads the creature into an *aporia*, in which the very elementary difference between the proper and the im-proper, the basic determination of property and the relation of ownership as such becomes uncertain and un-decidable. Perhaps, the creature begins to question itself, wondering if, in reality, it has been (without knowing it) inside someone else’s burrow all the time, asking if perhaps it has itself intruded inside the private space of someone else, violating someone else’s property, being itself the parasite, the thief, whom the other, the real owner, has been all the time observing, listening to, trying to locate, detect, seize, and eliminate. This is the final and the most essential *aporia* in Kafka’s tale, one that most fundamentally interrupts the existence of the calculating *homo oeconomicus*:

...Now, I can not have expected such an opponent. But apart from its peculiarities, what happens now is still only something that I actually would have had to fear always, something against which I should have always made preparations: someone arrives (*nun, einen solchen Gegner habe ich nicht erwarten können. Aber abgesehen von seinen Eigentümlichkeiten ereignet sich jetzt doch nur etwas, was ich eigentlich immer zu befürchten gehabt hätte, etwas, wogegen ich hätte immer Vorbereitungen treffen sollen: Es kommt jemand heran!*)...Perhaps I am in an alien burrow, I thought, and now the owner is burrowing his way toward me (*Vielleicht bin ich in einem fremden Bau, dachte ich, und der Besitzer gräbt sich jetzt an mich heran*) ...But perhaps the beast is digging in its own burrow, then I can not even dream of an agreement. Even if it should be such a peculiar beast that its burrow would tolerate a neighbor, my burrow does not tolerate a neighbor, at least it does not tolerate an audible neighbor (*aber vielleicht gräbt das Tier in seinem eigenen Bau, dann kann ich von einer Verständigung nicht einmal träumen. Selbst wenn es ein so sonderbares Tier wäre, daß sein Bau eine Nachbarschaft vertragen würde, mein Bau verträgt sie nicht, zumindest eine hörbare Nachbarschaft verträgt er nicht*). (Kafka 1994-2007)

The creature of Kafka’s *Burrow*, if considered as the representative of the economical subject, of *homo oeconomicus*, is obligated and stimulated by its very constitution, by its very economic calculability, into a constant hypersensitivity, hyper-sensuality, hyper-responsiveness, and hyper-reactivity, in its perception of its environment, of its milieu, of its habitat, of every movement, and of the slightest variation taking place therein. In the encounter of the creature with its own ears, with the noises it hears, the very obsession of calculation, finally,

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<sup>31</sup> This reading comes close to the problematics of *hospitality*, as it is discussed in Derrida (2000).

drives the creature into a state, where it comes to the very borders of its form of existence as the economic subject. The more it listens, the more sensitive it becomes. The more carefully it attempts to take care of its property, the more it becomes passive, irrational, and loses its mastery over its property and over itself. The sensitivity, required and encouraged by the very constitution of *homo oeconomicus*, leads to the dissolution of *homo oeconomicus*, and this happens “with the help” of the ear. Consequently, the problem of the ear, the problem of audition, the problem of sound, as underlined through reading Kafka’s story, are also problems of the liberalist governance and perhaps of neo-liberalist governance in particular. The utmost maximization of the milieu-sensitivity and milieu-responsiveness, the optimization of the risk-sensitivity of the economical subject produces a creature who is *all ears*. However, this *listening creature* is one in whom the hyper-sensitivity turns into *in-sensitivity*, the hyper-reactivity and hyper-responsiveness turn into an incapacity to respond or react. Hence, through the very perfection of *homo oeconomicus*, a creature is born which is no longer *homo oeconomicus*, a creature that can no longer be governed by the liberalist-environmental modes of control. In Kafka’s story *The Burrow*, the locus of this vulnerability is to be found in the ear.

## 4 MUSIC AND THE POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP (FOUCAULT AND BOULEZ)

### 4.1 Friendship of Music, Friendship without a Word

Chapters one, two and three brought to the fore some central occurrences, as well as the potentialities for further elaboration, to be discovered in Foucault's political thought on the issues of the voice, sound, and noise. This Chapter considers Foucault's relation to music, to music as an art-form, and to the musical practices in the broad sense including: composition, performance, and listening.

The discussion begins with a passage from a text (from 1982) of Foucault's, titled *Pierre Boulez, the Pierced Screen* (*Pierre Boulez, l'écran traversé*). It is a text devoted to Foucault's personal friend, the renowned composer-conductor Pierre Boulez. The text is one of the few, in which Foucault approaches music in an explicit manner:

You ask me, what it was to have caught a glimpse, by chance and the privilege of a friendship encountered (*vous me demandez, ce que ça a été d'avoir aperçu, par le hasard et le privilège d'une amitié rencontrée*), a little bit of what was happening in the music (*un peu de ce qui se passait dans la musique*), almost thirty years ago. I was only a passer-by taken over by the affection, a certain trouble, of the curiosity, the strange feeling of taking part in that of which I was hardly capable of being the contemporary (*je n'étais là qu'un passant retenu par l'affection, un certain trouble, de la curiosité, le sentiment étrange d'assister à ce dont je n'étais guère capable d'être le contemporain*). It was a chance: the music was then deserted by the discourses from the exterior (*c'était une chance: la musique était alors désertée par les discours de l'extérieur*)...The painting, in that time, was enticing one to speak (*la peinture, en ce temps, portait à parler*); at least, the aesthetics, the philosophy, the reflection, the taste (*la réflexion, le goût*) – and the politics, if I remember correctly (*et la politique, si j'ai bonne mémoire*) – felt the right to say something about it (*se sentaient-ils le droit d'en dire quelque chose*)...The silence, however, was protecting the music (*le silence, cependant, protégeait la musique*), preserving its insolence (*préservant son insolence*)...No more now than then, I am not capable of speaking about the music (*pas plus qu'alors je ne suis capable de parler de la musique*)...The things are perhaps better that way: if I had had around me something from which to understand this experience, maybe I would not have found there anything but an occasion to repatriate it there where it did not have its place (*les choses sont peut-être mieux ainsi: aurais-je eu autour de moi de quoi comprendre cette expérience, je n'y aurais peut-être trouvé qu'une*

*occasion de la rapatrier là où elle n'avait pas son lieu*). (Foucault 2001b, 1038; my emphasis)

Before beginning the discussion on the text, consider another citation, for its central point converges with the former. This is from an interview or discussion of Foucault with Stephen Riggins (1983):

Stephen Riggins: “- One often quotes the remark of Romain Rolland, according to which the French romantics were visualists (*les romantiques français étaient des visuels*), for whom music was nothing but a noise (*pour lesquels la musique n'était qu'un bruit*)...Are you also a representative of this characteristic of the French culture underlined by Rolland (*êtes-vous aussi un représentant de ce trait de la culture française qu'a souligné Rolland*)?”

Foucault: - Yes, that is certain. Of course, the French culture does not accord any place to music or, if it does accord one to it, it is a negligible place (*bien entendu, la culture française n'accorde aucune place à la musique ou, si elle lui en accorde une, c'est une place négligeable*). But it is true that music has played an important role in my personal life (*mais il est de fait que la musique a joué un rôle important dans ma vie personnelle*). The first friend that I had when I was twenty, was a musician (*le premier ami que j'ai eu, quand j'avais vingt ans, était musicien*). Later, I had another friend, who was a composer (*un autre ami qui était compositeur*), and who is dead now. Because of him, I know the whole generation of Boulez. That was a very important experience for me. Firstly, because it has put me in contact with a type of art that, for me, was truly enigmatic (*d'abord, parce cela m'a mis en contact avec un type d'art qui, pour moi, était vraiment énigmatique*). I did not have, and have never had, any competence in that domain (*je n'avais, et n'ai toujours, aucune compétence dans ce domaine*). But I was capable of feeling the beauty in something that was very enigmatic to me (*mais j'étais capable de ressentir la beauté dans quelque chose qui m'était très énigmatique*). There are certain works of Bach and Webern that delight me (*il y a certaines œuvres de Bach et de Webern qui me réjouissent*), but the real beauty, that is, for me, a musical phrase, a piece of music that I do not understand, something of which I cannot say anything (*mais la vraie beauté, c'est, pour moi, une phrase musicale, un morceau de musique que je ne comprends pas, quelque chose dont je ne peux rien dire*). I have this idea –maybe it is arrogant or presumptuous (*peut-être est-elle arrogante ou présomptueuse*) – that I could say something about any one of the greatest paintings in the world (*qu je pourrais dire quelque chose sur n'importe lequel des plus grands tableaux du monde*). And that is the reason why they are not absolutely beautiful (*et c'est la raison pour laquelle ils ne sont pas absolument beaux*).” (Foucault 2001b, 1353-1354; my emphasis)<sup>32</sup>

Unlike Deleuze, who speaks and writes rather extensively on music, and on Boulez in particular, in Foucault's reflections there is an approach, an attitude, an encounter with music, which is very different: it is characterized by exteriority, strangeness, the enigmatic, the incapacity to speak. Simultaneously, the intensity and the thorough impact of the encounter is obvious. Foucault's

<sup>32</sup> There are two other published texts, one actually is a discussion, in which Foucault deals with issues related to music, having their reference to Boulez as well, to Boulez's conducting of Wagner's *Ring* (*The Scene of the Philosophy* [La scène de la philosophie], Foucault 2001b, 591-592; *The Imagination of the 19th Century* [L'imagination du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle], *ibid.*, 930-942). In these texts, Foucault only presents some remarks mostly on Wagner (on Wagner's situation in the ideological-and philosophical context of the 19th Century), on the general structure of *Gesamtkunstwerk*, on his historical significance, and on the particularities of Boulez's interpretation. However, on the issues of Foucault's personal approach, attitude and relation to music (and to Boulez), what he felt to be special in this relation, what it is about, what it is not about, these two texts seem to tell much less, than the ones discussed in this Chapter.

friendship (*l'amitié*), maybe his love also, of music, is only possible in the non-understanding, in the non-comprehending and non-apprehending, in his not grasping, not bringing to knowledge, not knowing and in the inability to make sense of music. Not being-able-to say anything about music, and affirming this incapacity, thus also affirming the interruption, the caesura brought by the listening to music, in one's own speaking and signifying practices, also in one's subjectivity or selfhood constituted in these signifying practices. Affirming this disruption, and also respecting it, appreciating it to the utmost – the condition for the relation of friendship as such would be in listening to music, or listening to music would be, perhaps, the relation of friendship *par excellence*.

Foucault notices that these are the conditions for what he takes to be the experience, the feeling of absolute beauty, a beauty that he could only experience through music, by his encountering the limits of his powers of understanding- and speech. It is precisely due to the distance, in the sense of remaining strange and unknown, remaining non-apprehended, remaining out of touch, and due to the respect for this distance, that the friendship with music can be born. Music, as a friend, is loved and respected in its insolent refusal to be understood, and precisely due to this very insolence one runs into the limits of one's capacities. Yet simultaneously and just as a friend, music is the most proximate and the most intimate in another sense. That is, it is proximate and intimate in the sense of one's becoming affected, as much as troubled, of becoming exposed to the other, to the music, to a friend. It is all this, which is at issue in Foucault's reflections. Music and friendship, the experience of absolute beauty, all understood in terms of intimacy only made possible by the utmost distance.

In another text, or actually a dialogue between Foucault and Boulez, published with the title Michel Foucault/Pierre Boulez: Contemporary music and the public (Michel Foucault/Pierre Boulez. *La musique contemporaine et le public*) (1983), it is explicit, that what is at stake is not anything like listening in general, but a mode of listening of certain kind, which has a special relation with friendship, and with absolute beauty (see above). The following, in the course of the discussion, is Foucault's manner of explicating, what this mode of listening is about:

Hence the fact that *each audition gives itself like an event to which the auditor attends (de là le fait que chaque audition se donne comme un événement auquel l'auditeur assiste), and which he must accept (et qu'il doit accepter). He does not have the points of reference that allow him to expect it and recognize it (il n'a pas le repères qui lui permettent de l'attendre et de le reconnaître). He listens to the event producing itself (il l'écoute se produire). And there, it is a mode of attention which is very difficult (et c'est là un mode d'attention très difficile), and in contradiction with the familiar (et qui est en contradiction avec les familiarités)... This unique situation, contemporary music owes it to its writing as such (cette situation singulière, la musique contemporaine la doit à son écriture même). In that sense, it is required (en ce sens, elle est voulue). It is not a music that would seek to be familiar (ce n'est pas une musique qui chercherait à être familière); it is made to keep its force (elle est faite pour garder son tranchant)... one cannot come back to it like to an object (on ne peut pas y revenir comme à un objet). It always makes an irruption at the borders (elle fait irruption toujours aux frontières).* (Boulez and Foucault 2001, 1313; my emphasis)

The passage has a number of significant points. The mode of listening, the audition generated, is an *event*, and what is listened to, what is heard, is an event: the arrival, the *arrival of the new*, or the “novelty” itself as arrival. Furthermore, the newness in the listening means, that the arrival is unexpected, that it really happens in the manner of an irruption, or interruption, in other words, as the movement of entering into the interior, in which a border is transgressed, and in which an intrusion is made. Entering into listening to music does not offer itself to the listening subject’s fore-sight at all, and is thus beyond the listening subject’s control, beyond any permission, any granting or denying the “right” to enter, and is also beyond any agreements of the contractual type. Above all, the irruption of the event, the irruption of the arrival of the new that is listened to in this mode of listening, is a subversion *against the familiar*, against the familiarity as such, and against the most basic conditions of the formation of familiarity (*familiarization*), of the becoming- and making-familiar as such. As Foucault argues, the event of music, and the parallel arrival-in-listening, is such that it is ultimately lacking, and ultimately *does not* allow itself to be set upon the pre-given *points of reference*, pre-given points of coordinates for the listening, or schemes of listening whether of tonal or atonal type, with the help of which the musical event could be made expectable or calculated, with the help of which it could be *recognized, identified*, determined in its self-identity and distinguished from others, and as a result become something familiar and known. The lack of given coordinates, the lack of given points of reference means that the arrival of the musical event, and its becoming-heard, defy the attempt to *emplace*, to posit it as a distinctive-self-identical (musical) object occupying a discreet location and position in space, being “there”, in-front-of the observing subject, alongside other such distinctive (musical) objects. If it was turned into such an object, music would offer itself for knowing, for contemplation, as something to which the subject could return, while it is waiting and remaining at the depository.

However, as Foucault emphasizes, this is precisely *not* the case in the sort of listening he is characterizing, or in the related modality of the musical event. What is at issue, is the arrival as such, the arrival and passing away, the arrival that is also a passing-away, the mere and bare arrival, which is wholly without any thing (any subject, any object) arriving, which is totally without offering us any present being at all that could be grasped and held, that could be recognized, identified, distinguished/individualized, known, and made familiar. This is the real thorough sense of Foucault’s argument as it is presented above.

In addition to this, there are still further points in the passage quoted that need to be discussed in more detail. Foucault notices that the event of music, and the corresponding event of audition, is something that demands to be accepted. The irruptive arrival is something to which the listener must attend, in which the listener must take part, without being able to calculate it, or to control its course, or to even, at the very elementary level, to recognize or identify it as an object, to make it familiar and known. Instead, what remains is

the taking-part, the participation in the event, precisely *through* the withdrawal of identification/recognition/knowing. Furthermore, in this context, to speak of the listening to music, of listening as an activity, as a practice of certain kind, is also to speak of the *willing exposure*, of the *willing opening out* and *remaining open* of the subject to the arrival of the unexpected. It is to speak of the cultivation, in oneself, of the alertness, of the receptivity, of the flexibility to take part in the arrival of the new, to participate in the incalculable self-production of the event.

The dialogue also appears to imply an idea of the cultivation and perfection of this listening ability. What is implied is an outline of something like a specific modality of *musical care for the self*, and also of an *asceticism of listening*, oriented precisely by the alertness/exposure to the musical-audition-event. This mode of listening-asceticism would also have the exercises for the perfection of the alertness, for the perfection of one's exposure to, and expectation of the unexpected, the irruption of the incalculable, and the becoming interrupted by the arrival. These would be the ascetic exercises, also, for the participation in the unexpected arrival, in other words, the rational/systematic practices of *self-government* aiming for the more and more perfect attending to the self-production of the event, ultimately beyond the calculation, and beyond the control of the subject.

What is at play is a modality of attention, of alertness, of attentiveness, which is essentially different from the focus fixating itself upon an object, one that is at the service of the distinction-recognizing-identifying, of making-known, and of making-familiar, which is the sort of attention belonging to observation and surveillance. In opposition to the surveillance-attention, the musical alertness, as it is characterized by Foucault and Boulez above, is first of all alertness to the non-objectified, to the un-recognized, to the unidentified, to the new, to the unknown of the arrival-passage. In this way, the sense of the mode of listening, which has been intimately related to friendship, is becoming more definite.<sup>33</sup>

However, this mode of listening is, certainly, not the only one, and by no means is it meant to offer an account of the faculty of listening, audition, or their principles of functioning. As has already been implied through the various demarcations stating what this mode of listening *is not*, the modality of listening, of friendship, of the event, is set in a relation of tension, even antagonism, with another modality of listening. This other modality has its own kind of music as well, with which it is intrinsically interwoven. This is the *schematic* and *schematicizing* mode of listening. The negative form of its central constituents has already been presented above. The listening, which is objectifying or quasi-objectifying, apprehends the music as a musical object

<sup>33</sup> To compare, from the same period as the discussion of Boulez and Foucault (the beginning of the 1980's), there is another case, in which Foucault explicitly deals with the *art-* and also the *asceticism of listening*. This occurs in the *Collège de France-* lectures *The Hermeneutics of the Subject (L'Herméneutique du sujet)* 1981-1982. Here, the actual context is Foucault's interpretation of the significance of listening in Stoic philosophy. However, there, the question is not about music, not about musical listening (and not about the voice), but about the *subjectivation of logos* (see Foucault 2001c, 317-321, 323-334, 481).

emplaced at its determinate location and position, facing or being in front of the subject. This listening operates from the basis of, and with the help of pre-given points of reference, pre-given and fixed coordinates, through which, in accordance to which, it attempts to emplace, locate and turn the musical event into an object, which is present, appearing and showing itself. The schematic/schematicizing listening works to distinguish, to divide, to separate and to recognize/identify. The following is Boulez's formulation of the point, one that Foucault appears to agree with:

The judgement and the taste are prisoners of categories, of pre-established schemes to which one refers at any cost (*le jugement et le goût sont prisonniers de catégories, de schémas préétablis auxquels on se réfère coûte que coûte*)...In the Classical and Romantic music...there are schemes, that are obeyed (*dans la musique classique et romantique...il y a des schémas auxquels on obéit*), which can be followed independently of the work itself (*que l'on peut suivre indépendamment de l'œuvre elle-même*), or rather, which the work has the obligation to manifest (*ou plutôt que l'œuvre a pour obligation de manifester*). The movements of a symphony are defined in their form and their character (*les mouvements d'une symphonie sont définis dans leur forme et dans leur caractère*), even in their rhythmical life (*dans leur vie rythmique même*); they are distinctive from one another (*ils sont distincts les uns des autres*), the most of the time really separated by a cut (*la plupart du temps réellement séparés par une coupure*), sometimes related by a transition that can be emplaced (*quelquefois liés par une transition que l'on peut repérer*). The vocabulary itself is based on 'classified' accords, the well-named (*le vocabulaire lui-même est fondé sur des accords 'classés', les bien-nommés*)...The schemes - of vocabulary, of form - that have been evacuated from the music called serious (*les schémas - de vocabulaire, de forme - qui ont été évacués de la musique dite sérieuse*), have taken refuge in certain popular forms (*se sont réfugiés dans certaines formes populaires*)...There, one still creates according to the genres, according to accepted typologies (*là, on crée encore selon les genres, selon des typologies admises*)...There, it is a paradox of our time that the played or sung protest is transmitted by the means of an eminently retrievable vocabulary (*c'est là un paradoxe de notre temps que la protestation jouée ou chantée se transmette au moyen d'un vocabulaire éminemment récupérable*)... (Boulez and Foucault 2001, 1311- 1313; my emphasis)<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Cf. the following, where Foucault reflects on what he believes to be the "quantitative mechanism" at play in the becoming-schematic of listening: "I have the impression that a lot of the elements which are destined to give access to music have the effect of impoverishing the relation that we have with it (*j'ai l'impression que beaucoup des éléments qui sont destinés à donner accès à la musique ont pour effet d'appauvrir le rapport qu'on a avec elle*). There is a quantitative mechanism at play (*il y a un mécanisme quantitatif qui joue*). A certain scarcity of the relation to the music could preserve a receptivity of the listening (*une certaine rareté du rapport à la musique pourrait préserver une disponibilité de l'écoute*), and something like a flexibility of audition (*et comme une souplesse de l'audition*). But, the more frequent that relation (radio, records, cassettes), the more familiarities are created (*mais, plus ce rapport est fréquent [radio, disques, cassettes], plus des familiarités se créent*); habits crystallize (*des habitudes se cristallisent*); the most frequent becomes the most acceptable (*le plus fréquent devient le plus acceptable*), and soon the only receivable (*et bientôt le seul recevable*)...inscribes the limits of a well-defined capacity of audition (*creuse les limites d'une capacité bien définie d'audition*), delimits more and more a scheme of listening (*cerne de plus en plus un schéma d'écoute*)...Thus...all that multiplies the contact of the public with the music risks rendering more difficult the perception of the new (*ainsi...tout ce qui multiplie le contact avec la musique risque de rendre plus difficile la perception du nouveau*)...We must not make access to music more scarce, but its frequentation less devoted to the habits and to familiarities (*il ne faut pas rendre l'accès à la musique plus rare, mais sa fréquentation moins vouée aux habitudes et aux familiarités*)." (Boulez and Foucault 2001, 1309)



The music thus objectified, in its distinction-self-identity, also allows the subject to come back to it. It permits or “waits for” the further *classification*, the further *naming* of its distinctive elements. The schematicizing listening proceeds in the direction of the more and more perfect *familiarizing*, of making the music familiar – *always already identified, always already recognized, always already familiar to begin with* – never really new, never really irruptive, never really an “arrival”. Thus, this sort of listening works to reduce the music of its eventuality, of the singularity. This is listening with a *reassuring* function. Furthermore, it could also be said, that this is precisely listening, which operates according to the logics of *surveillance* (the issue of surveillance was at the centre in Chapter 2). Correspondingly, these same constituent features can also be found at work in the schematic, schematicized mode of music.

To understand the point of the Boulez–Foucault- dialogue, the actual target of their criticism must be noticed. First of all, the schematicization can be, and historically has been, at work not only in the popular music-culture, but just as much in what is commonly referred to as (Occidental) art music. The schematicization of the musical practices, of the musical event, with listening included is the real target of the criticism. It is just as much the problem of the Austro-German tradition of Classical-Romantic music, as it is the problem of the different genres of popular music. Furthermore, as nothing points to the contrary in the dialogue, the schematicization is not the problem, exclusively, of tonal music. The tonal system is not the only one susceptible of generating pre-given, “re-assuring” schemes, that come to compromise the singularity of the musical event, and of listening. We are given no reason to believe, that there could not be atonal schemes, for instance the system of 12 tones, serialism, that are set in the same kind of antagonism with the singularity-event, and that function in the same re-assuring manner (this issue is re-examined below, in 4.2. and 4.3., in the framework of Boulez’s musical analyses).

What is most important to notice, is that in the critical arguments of Boulez and Foucault, it is *not* the *work, das Werk, opus, l’œuvre*, as an autonomous, self-sufficient, organic, self-enclosed, coherent totality, which is referred to, and which is taken as the standard of the critique. In fact, this Romantic and post-Romantic idea of the “work” can come into tension, into antagonism with the singularity of the musical event, and be understood in the sense already discussed.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> This means that we ought to be careful not to assimilate the arguments of Boulez and Foucault, in spite of some apparent convergences, to Theodor Adorno’s well-known criticism of popular music, or “light music”. Briefly, at the centre in Adorno’s critical sociology of music is *not* the singularity of the event, the event of music-audition as such (in the sense in which this has been characterized above, as the non-objectified, the placeless, the un-identified, the un-recognized, the un-known, the non-schematicized arrival etc.), but precisely the aesthetic value of *organicity*– the organic form, the organic totality, the organic unity and coherence of the *work (das Werk, opus, l’œuvre)*. For Adorno, the musical work-organism (or the lack of it) is taken as the basis for the demarcation between serious music, and the light/popular music (including jazz), and for the criticism of the latter for its “decadence” (see Adorno 1986; cf. Boissière 2002). To be sure, the concept of the musical work as an organic whole (or as an organism), and the setting of this concept as the central standard for

Correspondingly, when the term *serious music* is used in the dialogue, what is meant is *not* Occidental art music, defined in the common historical-institutional sense. What is meant by the term is not the music of “works” or, at least, the “work” is not central for the definition. What is meant by the “serious”, above all, is the sort of musical practice, and in all of its phases from the composition and performance to listening, where the cultivation of the event, in its singularity, is decisive. The opposition is between the *serious* and the *schematic-schematicizing-reassuring*:

*Progressively, these reassuring elements have disappeared from the 'serious' music (progressivement, ces éléments rassurants ont disparu de la musique 'sérieuse')...The works have had tendency to become singular events, which have their antecedents admittedly (les œuvres ont eu tendance à devenir des événements singuliers qui ont certes leurs antécédents), but are irreducible to some conducting scheme accepted, a priori, by all, something which creates, certainly, a handicap for the immediate comprehension (mais sont irréductibles à quelque schéma conducteur admis, a priori, par tous, ce qui crée, certainement, un handicap pour la compréhension immédiate). (Boulez and Foucault 2001, 1312; my emphasis)*

This constellation of musical tension and antagonism, as it appears in the dialogue, is not without its convergences with certain other central themes that occupied Foucault’s attention during the same period, the years preceding his death, albeit in another context. This refers to his final *Collège de France*-lectures. Though these will be examined in detail in the last Chapter, a couple of remarks concerning the convergences mentioned are in order here. The convergences can be found in the idea of the *bare voice*, the *cry of the multitude* or the *crowd of mortals* relating to the ancient mythical depictions of the “noisy” musical practice of Marsyas and Dionysus, also associated with certain instruments (*aulos*, the cymbal, the timbrel). What comes to the centre in the characterization of the crowd’s bare voice in the lectures is precisely its quality as an irruptive, interruptive event, being emitted unexpectedly to each and everyone, happening *without place*, and thus also most fundamentally subverting the claims of distinction/recognition/identification. The similarities with the idea of serious/contemporary music, as it has been presented above, are rather clear. In the lectures, the bare voice, the noise of the crowd comes to confront the music of Apollo sung and played with *kithara* or the *lyre*, which, in turn, has its parallels with the conception of schematicized music. In the last Chapter, the

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musical criticism (and also for cultural criticism much more extensively), has its historical roots in the Austro-German musical culture, aesthetics, and philosophy, going much further back than Adorno, above all to the Romanticism of the later half of the 18th Century. During the first half of the 20th Century, the aesthetic vocabulary –centred on the concept of “organic work” – and the related line of criticism was anything but rare among German-speaking intellectuals. Besides Adorno, there were various others, who had heterogeneous political as well as aesthetic views in other respects (Arnold Schönberg and Wilhelm Furtwängler, to name two prominent ones; the line of argumentation occurs, in a variety of contexts, through Furtwängler 1954 and Schönberg 1975). However, the discussion of Boulez and Foucault does not really fit into this tradition, and into this framework of aesthetic discourse (at least, not in any self-evident manner, and not without some rather significant reservations).

discussion will show how the *bare voice* comes to radically interrupt both the game of *sovereignty*, as well as the game played by citizens-subjects with *the governing logoi*. To return to the actual theme of this Chapter, similar issues are encountered in a different context: in the contemporary musical event and in the event of musical listening, one that belongs most intimately together with the relation of *friendship*.

This is not the only occasion on which Foucault reflects on the concept of *friendship*, and on which the concept is given a sense that coheres well with what has been said of the musical friendship above. Again, the text in question is a discussion (from 1981) published with the title *Of the Friendship as Mode of Life* (*De l'amitié comme mode de vie*). Here, the central theme of the discussion is not music, but another deeply personal issue, one that is, compared to music, much more generally related to Foucault, that is, homosexuality:

...a question of existence (*une question d'existence*): how is it possible for human beings to be together (*comment est-il possible pour des hommes d'être ensemble*), to live together (*de vivre ensemble*), to share their time (*de partager leur temps*), their meals (*leurs repas*), their room (*leur chambre*), their leisures (*leurs loisirs*), their sorrows (*leurs chagrins*), their knowledge (*leur savoir*), their confidences (*leurs confidences*)? What is that, *being among humans* (*qu'est-ce qu c'est que ça, être entre hommes*), naked (*à nu*), out of institutional relations (*hors de relations institutionnelles*), of family (*de famille*), of profession (*de profession*), of obliged companionship (*de camaraderie obligée*)? It is a desire, an anxiety, a *desire-anxiety* (*c'est un désir, une inquiétude, un désir-inquiétude*)... *They are, the one facing the other, unarmed* (*ils sont l'un en face de l'autre sans arme*), without conventional words (*sans mots convenus*), without anything reassuring them about the direction of the movement carrying them toward each other (*sans rien qui les rassure sur le sens du mouvement qui les porte l'un vers l'autre*). They have to invent from A to Z a relation still without form (*ils ont à inventer de A à Z une relation encore sans forme*), and which is the friendship (*et qui est l'amitié*)... (Foucault 2001b, 983; my emphasis)

As can be noticed, this is again yet another context, in which the idea of *methexis*, though without the word being mentioned, recurs. What comes to the centre is *sharing*, or *taking part* (*partager*), sharing as well as *becoming-shared*, taking but also *giving part*. It is this sort of event and relation, one that has been called *methexic*, which is presented as being constitutive of friendship. Furthermore, what is meant by the sharing-in-friendship is *not* the type of sharing that is limited to this or that particular thing, or to this or that particular quality or property, or to this or that part or section of one's, and the other's, existence and life: the visible and public as opposed to the invisible, private and intimate. Rather, the sense in which Foucault appears to speak of the sharing and taking-part here is something more fundamental than the former. It is not only about sharing the meal, or even about sharing the space. Most importantly, what takes place is *sharing between individuals*, *sharing between their individualities* as such, or between their interiorities. As Foucault states, the being-with at issue is about sharing leisure, sharing sorrows, also sharing knowledge and confidence. Even more fundamentally, the sharing that constitutes the being-with is characterized as *sharing the time(s)*. Altogether, the characterization of sharing given by Foucault here, points to an event and a relation that traverse the existence(s) as such. *The question of existence*, of the

being-together or being-with, is also the question of sharing, of the *existential sharing*, of the existing-together as sharing between each other, or even as *sharing between the existence(s)*, as sharing each other. The question is about a mode of *living-together* understood in terms of *sharing between the lives*.

This would mean that friendship as such, because it is constituted by this mode of sharing-being-with, or by this sharing-living-with, is also primarily defined by the dynamics of opening-out towards the other, as well as by an *interpenetration* – or *piercing* taking place in-between individuals (Foucault's essay dedicated to Boulez was titled *Pierre Boulez, the Pierced Screen*). What takes place in this relational event and movement of friendship is also an event of de-individualization. In Foucault's reflection, friendship comes to the fore as a dynamic relation, a relation of movement, a relational movement, that is, the movement of one towards the other and vice versa, a movement of coming-closer and of becoming intimate even to the utmost extent of sharing the other and becoming shared by the other, to the extent of taking part in the other, and being taken part of by the other, through becoming *exposed* to the other's taking-part, through becoming *unarmed* for the sharing-with and becoming-shared.<sup>36</sup>

Yet, this movement of friendship, Foucault's depiction of his friendship with music and musicians, with Boulez especially, does not mean the elimination of *distance in toto*. A distance of a kind belongs to friendship irreducibly, and is generated precisely by what Foucault calls the *nakedness* or *bareness* of encountering the other in friendship. The "withness" and "togetherness" in question is naked, as it comes out, precisely in the sense of being stripped of the determinations of pre-given institutional forms, frameworks or schemes, such as family, profession, and established obligation. The encounter in friendship is stripped of the availability of conventional words, of the pre-given discourse-framework, of discursive form, inside which the other and the encounter-with could be given a fixed signification. This point was emphasized in Foucault's depiction of his friendship with music as being essentially *without words*. To pass beyond all such given forms and frameworks, where the identity of the self, of the other and of the relation could be fixed means the *loss of proximity*, if proximity is understood now in terms of "meaningfulness", as proximity brought by the knowledge ("who or what are you"), or as the proximity of "being-familiar-with".

Concomitantly, the encounter, the movement of the encounter looses the reassuring proximity of the pre-given schemes determining the direction and trajectory of the encounter beforehand, the kind of proximity that comes back to the predictability and security of the future of the relation. Above all, the naked encounter is evacuated of the sort of proximity that would mean the opening of

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<sup>36</sup> Although terms such as being-with- or being-together are used here, and although Foucault uses them in the passage quoted, the point is *not* to argue that Foucault would here be making some sort of implicit adoption of Heidegger's concept of *Mitsein*. Such a hypothesis is anything but self-evident, anything but unproblematic, and in need of a strong, detailed argumentation to support it. However, the issue is much too broad to be examined here, and would go beyond the scope of this study.

the other as an object to be seized upon, to be controlled, to be possessed, and to be used as an instrument.

Is friendship, in the sense in which Foucault is outlining here, a relation of encounter, which defies the framework of the dispositives of *power-knowledge* as such? Maybe it is. Or, maybe friendship has its own modes of power as well, ones that function according to a logic that is essentially different from the more generally known dispositives. In either case, following Foucault on the issue, friendship is a relation characterized by movement, one in which the “toward” is also irreducibly an “away from”, in which coming-closer is also irreducibly distancing. Friendship is a relation having its own mode of desire, and eventually *pleasure* as well, but a mode which is *not* desire for knowledge, or desire to seize, to use the other, to keep the other available in the proximity of one’s grasp. Instead, the desire of belonging to the relation of friendship is a desire that is inseparable from *anxiety*. It is a *desire-anxiety*, in which the friend’s remaining-unknown, uncertain, and distant, as well as one’s own exposure, one’s own remaining-unarmed for the incalculable encounter, for the event of sharing/becoming-shared, is turned into something to be desired, into a source of pleasure.

The relation between friendship and power might not be clear. However, what *does* become clear is the *problematic* and *dangerous*, and more importantly, *politically problematic/dangerous* quality of friendship. As Foucault points out, there is what seems to be an inevitable tension and confrontation between the relation of friendship, and the governmentalities. The latter includes the political rationalities, as well as the related practices of governmental intervention, which holds, apparently, both for the scheme of the reason of state and biopolitics, as well as for the various mixtures of the two. According to Foucault, what makes homosexuality, not so much being- as *becoming-homosexual*, as a mode of life politically problematic to modern forms of governance, is precisely its susceptibility to open *zones of virtuality*, i.e. zones of possibilities for the creation, for the invention of multiple, unexpected and unfinished movements of encounter and conjunction, in other words, new modes of togetherness and being-with, in line with the characterization of friendship offered above. Moreover, the other side of the problem, which makes it even more difficult, is that the modern forms of governance cannot help favoring and calling forth the generation of friendship, as well as love, which are also the very relations that most seriously threaten to disrupt its functioning:

But that individuals begin to love one another, there is the problem (*mais que des individus commencent à s’aimer, voilà le problème*). The institution is bluffed (*l’institution est prise à contre-pied*); affective intensities traverse it (*des intensités affectives la traversent*), they both make it hold and disrupt it at the same time (*à la fois elles la font tenir et la perturbent*): take a look at the army, the love between men is there constantly called forth and felt ashamed of (*regardez l’armée, l’amour entre hommes y est sans cesse appelé et honni*). The institutional codes cannot validate these relations with multiple intensities (*les codes institutionnels ne peuvent valider ces relations aux intensités multiples*), with variable colours (*aux couleurs variables*), with imperceptible movements (*aux mouvements imperceptibles*), with changing forms (*aux formes qui*

*changent*). These relations, which make short circuit (*ces relations qui font court-circuit*) and which introduce love where there should be the law, the rule or the habit (*et qui introduisent l'amour là où il devrait y avoir la loi, la règle ou l'habitude*). (Foucault 2001b, 983)

This shows that the issue of friendship is also a central political issue for Foucault. It is not at all an irrelevant one. Furthermore, for Foucault music, listening to music, and listening to musicians, has a special relation of proximity with friendship. On the basis of Foucault's reflections on his relation to music, musicians, and to Boulez in particular, this evoked the question of whether listening to music was for Foucault something like *friendship par excellence*. If this is the case, then it can also be said that the "serious listening" to the "serious music", as Foucault presents these concepts above, offers the case *par excellence* of the bare or naked encounter, of the bare or naked being-with or being-together. It would be listening that testifies to the occurrence of what Foucault means by the *becoming-unarmed* and *becoming-exposed* to each-other in the disruption of speech, in the disruption of the established, given codes/conventions of signification that re-assuringly determine the identity of the other and the encounter with the other. Listening provides the paradigmatic example of the opening-out between individuals that characterizes friendship, the opening-out between individual existences, which deploys the existential sharing and being-shared, the existential taking-part and being-taken-part. Listening to music, the *sharing of time(s)*, the times of the listener and the times of music, may be the most fundamental sense of sharing, which is constitutive of friendship.

Against the background of these more general reflections on the concept of friendship, it would not be too difficult to understand, why music is given such a privileged place as the art of friendship. The central quality, by which Foucault characterized music, or certain modes of music, was the *insolence* of music, that is, the resistance of music to the attempt to interpret, to understand, or to know. Foucault discussed his confrontation of this resistance in himself, in his experiences of listening. This insolence-resistance can be further specified by relating it to the disruptive arriving and passing away of music, the arrival which is also a passing/disappearing, one that always becomes *both too near* (always already taking-part-in and coming to share, always already transgressing and entering into the interior without asking permission), *and much too distant* (passing away too early, without waiting). The insolence of music could refer to the music's constant being in-transition, to its open, unfinished differing from itself. Through its disruptive arrival, music insolently confronts the attempt to understand and know. Most of all, it is through this disruptive arrival that music most insolently resists the operations of individualization (the division into fixed, distinctive, separate units), *and* against the attempt to totalize (to gather together into one). Thus, just like friendship, music is insolent against the basic strategies of the form of political-governmental reason, which follows the principle of *omnes et singulatim* (see Foucault 2001b, 953-980). Insolence in this sense would, also, be what makes it possible to have friendship: friendship between the mutually insolent and

insulting ones; friends precisely *because of* the insolence; made possible and maintained by the insolence, and made *politically dangerous* because of the insolence.

Foucault's reflections outline the concept of friendship. Central to this idea is the condition of distance. The condition of distance includes keeping-distance and revering-the distance, together with the concomitant lack of the "common", except for the common quality of this lack itself. This is turned into intimacy and *vice versa*. It is here that Foucault's reflections converge with the analysis of friendship found much later in the work of Jacques Derrida. In the following, Derrida presents such a conception of friendship through his reading of the theme of friendship in Nietzsche:

'Good friendship' certainly supposes a certain air, a certain tinge (*Anstrich*) of intimacy, but one 'without actual and genuine intimacy'. It commands that we abstain 'wisely', 'prudently' (*weislich*), from all confusion, all permutation between the singularities of you and me. This is the announcement of the community without community of thinkers to come (Derrida 1997, 62) ...This 'disappropriation' [*dépropriation*] would undoubtedly beckon to this other 'love' whose true name, says Nietzsche in conclusion, whose 'just name' is *friendship*...let us recall that this little two-page treatise on love denounces, in sum, the *right to property*...its target is the very value of proximity, the neighbour's proximity as the ruse of the proper and of appropriation. The gesture confirms the warning accompanying the discourse on 'good friendship': not to give in to proximity or identification, to the fusion or the permutation of you and me. But, rather to place, maintain or keep an infinite distance within 'good friendship' (*ibid.*, 64-65)...Community without community, friendship without the community...We have here, in any case, friends seeking mutual recognition without knowing each other. (*ibid.*, 42)

As it was in Foucault's discussion on friendship above, for Derrida distance is taken in the sense of renunciation of the *proximity of knowing*, the proximity of identifying the other or identifying *with* the other. Distance means the renunciation of the proximity of appropriation, of the seizing, taking hold of, of making and keeping "at hand", disposable, usable, to be owned, as "proper" and as property. All this notwithstanding, friendship is not totally without sharing. There is a mode of sharing in friendship, but one that can only mean the sharing in solitude, or sharing of the solitude, sharing in which, to rephrase Nietzsche, solitude turns into joy, to the joy "with" and "together", *Mitfreude*. This joy "with", joy with the other(s) in solitude, is detached from the mode of pleasure brought by the familiarity/knowledge/identification, by appropriation, and by the fusion. This is not very far from Foucault's anxiety-desire, or anxiety-pleasure, the modes of desire and pleasure of friendship, apparently, opposing the ones generated through the dispositives of power-knowledge (see above):

(...*Mitfreude* and not *Mitleiden*, joy among friends, shared enjoyment [*jouissance*] and not shared suffering?) What are we doing and who are we, we who are calling you to share, to participate and to resemble? We are first of all, as friends, the friends of solitude, and we are calling on you to share what cannot be shared: solitude... Therefore, without a horizon of recognition. Without a familial bond, without proximity, without *oikeiôtês*. (Derrida 1997, 35)

In other words, in Derrida's account, as with Foucault, the centrality of the distance characterizing the relation of friendship, the suspension of proximity, meaning in particular the suspension of *oikeiôtēs* –suspension of the bonds formed on the model of kinship, family and familiarity, and the suspension of the claims of the “proper” and property – does not mean that friendship did not have its mode of *exposure*, its mode of opening-out, and also its mode of sharing. The utmost distance, the withdrawal of identification and knowledge, the withdrawal of familiarity, whether this is posed in terms of individuality, or in terms of the “common”, actually does turn into a mode of intimacy, to a mode of “together” and “with”, which is just as radically detached both from the relation of distinctive-self-identical individuals, as well as from the fusion into one. The “infinite distance”, the distance which is also uncanniness, is necessarily also a mode of intimacy, a mode of proximity, or “other proximity”, which is just as uncanny, just as troubling and unsettling. The “infinite distance” is the full, unconditional exposure to the arrival, to the entering from the outside, generating the most fundamental kind of sharing, in which even one's proper body as such, the interior space as such, and one's proper place become shared, become contaminated by the outside, by the im-proper. Then, what takes place is *methexis*: the sharing, the contagion, the participation and taking-part, which could also be called *resonance*, between the inside and the outside. The sharing in friendship, and the uncanny mode of proximity that belongs to it, hence, is an *atopic* dynamic, a becoming *placeless*, in the contagion-resonance between places, between the interior and the exterior. Friendship, understood in terms of the existential sharing-between, which is the sharing of space, or the sharing between spaces, sharing between places, in the dynamics of becoming-atopic. Here, again, there is a noteworthy convergence with the earlier discussion on Foucault's idea of friendship:

...a friend, having more than one place [twin bodies], would never have a place of his own. He could never count on the sleep or nourishment of the economic intimacy of some home. The body of the friend, his body proper, could always become the body of the other. This other body could live in his body proper like a guest, a visitor, a traveler, a temporary occupant. Friendship would be *unheimlich*. How would *unheimlich*, *uncanny*, translate into Greek? Why not translate it by *atōpos*: outside all place or placeless, without family or familiarity, outside of self, expatriate, extraordinary, extravagant, absurd or mad, weird, unsuitable, strange, but also a stranger to? (Derrida 1997, 177-178)

To continue the comparison, as with Foucault's characterizations, Derrida claims it is *silence* that is set even as the condition for the relation of friendship; the silence, which does *not* mean sound-lessness, which would be the absence of sound, the absence of the sonorous-acoustic-auditory, the absence of voice, but rather *speechlessness*, not-speaking and the not-saying about the friendship, or about friends. It is the evacuation of speech, of words, through the affirmation and respect of the not-speaking, in which the possibility for the friendship is opened. In the following passage, the silence (the not-speaking, the interruption of speech) also opens the possibilities to the voice, to sound, to the sonority of the non-speaking voice, and to listening to these. Friendship is,



significantly, generated in and by silence, as well as the non-speaking (*aphonic*) voice, the sound, the resounding without words, the listening to these, while both silence and the aphonic voice are indistinguishable from one another:

Friendship does not keep silence, it is preserved by silence...Asceticism, *kenosis*, knowledge of how to evacuate words to gain breathing space for friendship...Speech ruins friendship; it corrupts by speaking, degrades, belittles...'*Silentium*. One should not talk (*reden*) about one's friends: otherwise one will talk away the feeling of friendship (*sonst verredet man sich das Gefühl der Freundschaft*)... How can you be together to bear witness to secrecy, separation, singularity?...This '*miteinander Schweigen*' can always come to ruin our ontological assurances, our common sense, our concept of the concept, the One of the common that has always commanded our thought as well as our politics of friendship...What is keeping silent? Keeping silent among friends, *unter Freunden*, in the rupture (*im Scheiden*), in the interruption that substitutes, as it must (for in silence, everything must be possible), testimony for know-how, faith for the test, 'fidence' for demonstration, the *perhaps* for certainty, the other for the same, friendship for calculation, etc. (Derrida 1997, 53-55)... Each time the quality, the modality, of the 'keeping quiet together' eludes a common measure. Here, we have just apprehended the moment when the keeping silent of compassion broke into laughter, into a resounding laughter but without a word, still silent, aphonic in the sonority of its break into laughter, into the hysterical laughter of rejoicing among friends. (*ibid.*, 57)

Silence, the disruption of speech, the suspension of signification, and the detachment of the relation to the other from the framework of fixed signification, was also something very central for Foucault's understanding of friendship. In Derrida's passage cited above, the importance of silence, for the generation of friendship, is more specifically in its leaving room for the voice, for the sound, in its *sonority*. Silence enables *listening* to the voice in its sonority, the kind of listening, the kind of being-with in listening, in which friendship can be born. To continue this line of thinking: is it by listening in particular, that the conditions of friendship, the infinite distance and infinite proximity, the uncanny distance and uncanny proximity can be brought about; is it listening in particular, where the *atopic sharing*, between the inside and the outside, between "my home" and "his/her home", occurs; is it listening in particular, where the unconditional exposure to the arrival and entrance, of the bare voice or of the "contemporary music", finds its way in; is it listening in particular, where *hospitality*, the *unconditional hospitality* takes place (cf. Derrida 2000).<sup>37</sup> This is like Foucault's "serious listening to serious music", or listening to the "bare voices" of laughter, listening-friendship and listening-hospitality, where

<sup>37</sup> Cf.: "Listening is to allow the coming of that which *arrives* (*écouter c'est laisser venir ce qui arrive*), without being able to expect it, to *see* it coming, to *foresee* it (*sans pouvoir l'anticiper, le voir venir, le prévoir*). Listening, it is always to expose oneself to the breaking and entering of the *event* (*écouter c'est toujours s'exposer à l'effraction de l'événement*), of that which occurs without making an announcement of itself (*de ce qui survient sans se faire annoncer*), which thwarts all calculation (*qui déjoue tout calcul*), which cannot but surprise (*qui ne peut que surprendre*), take (*prendre*), to fall upon (*tomber sur*)...by surprise (*par surprise*)...The listening implicates a quasi-unconditional 'hospitality' (*l'écoute implique une 'hospitalité' quasi inconditionnelle*), arrival of the other into me (*arrivée de l'autre en moi*), 'my home' becomes 'her home' of the other (*le 'chez moi' devant le 'chez soi' de l'autre*). And that is why the listening can be terribly anguishing (*et c'est pourquoi l'écoute peut être terriblement angoissante*)."<sup>7</sup> (Mallet 2002, 50)

desire, pleasure, enjoyment and rejoicing-together intertwine with the anxiety of separation (cf. Foucault's *anxiety-desire*), where the ultimate proximity can no longer be separated from the infinite distance.

Furthermore, the thought of Derrida and Foucault converges on one central point which is the significance of *asceticism* for the formation of friendship, and, more specifically, the significance of the *asceticism of listening*. In Derrida's passage cited above, the mode of asceticism is also given a name – *kenosis*: it is the asceticism, exercising oneself, to become perfect in one's ability to *silence oneself*, in one's ability to *keep silent*. As already said, the ability to keep silent should be understood as the ability to *evacuate words*, to *give up the speech*. By practicing silence in this manner, one is also exercising oneself in listening, which means that one exercises oneself to become increasingly open, increasingly perceptive, increasingly sensitive, increasingly attentive to the voice, to the *aphonic voice*, to the *sonority* of the voice (to the *bare voice*), to the voice which does *not*, articulate itself into determined, distinctive, fixed units of signification. One has to exercise oneself in the silence, in order to make oneself ever more able to perceive the aphonic voice in its irruption, in its arrival as such. As it comes together with *kenosis*, the asceticism of listening aims to do precisely this by exercising the evacuation of the framework and the functioning of speech from the listening, or, even more strongly, by exercising the evacuation of the *reassuring schemes* (the functioning of schematicization) in general from the listening. This draws a parallel to the discussion of Foucault and Boulez above. In short, it is a modality of asceticism, which works to evacuate, or to empty out, the listening from all that could turn the arrival into an object: which would become distinguished, recognized, identified, classified, familiarized, to be made into property.

In the two modes of asceticism, firstly, the asceticism of the serious listening and the bare encounter (Foucault and Boulez), and then, secondly, the *kenosis* (Derrida), the self-exercise of listening and silence, the evacuation of speech, comes together inseparably with the self-exercise of friendship as a specific mode of living- or being-with, -together, or -amongst. Common to both of these modes of asceticism is a certain deep sense of paradox to them. What is at play in them is the exercising of oneself in the waiting for and expectation of the event, in its intrusive and interrupting arrival. In other words, what is at play is the exercising of oneself in the *waiting for*, and in the *expectation of, the absolutely unexpected*. The paradox of this asceticism is to be found in the striving to prepare oneself for what cannot be prepared for, for the arrival-intrusion. The asceticism at question is about *preparing oneself to be unprepared*, that is, preparing oneself to encounter the arrival *without pre-paration* or *pre-caution*, which means, preparing oneself to *welcome* and to *offer hospitality* to the arrival without attempting to reduce it of the singularity thus renouncing the question of identity, and renouncing the claims of any *contractual arrangements*.

Furthermore, the naked/bare encounter in which friendship is generated means taking-part in the arrival, just as much as being-taken-part by the arrival. Correspondingly, the related mode of asceticism has the sense of preparing

oneself for becoming- exposed to the arrival, to the participation/taking-part. It is asceticism, in which one is exercising oneself in the exposure to the inter-penetration, or the inter-piercing (*"the pierced screen"*), taking place in the encounter; asceticism of the insurmountable distancing by the renouncement of the claims of familiarity and property, but one that is also the asceticism of the ultimate coming-closer, in the sharing and becoming shared, to the extent of sharing-between the lives, -existences and -times as Foucault said. It is possible to speak, in such case, of the *asceticism of the event*, one that is also *asceticism of exposure*, *asceticism of unarming*, renouncement of the reassuring schemes, to borrow Foucault's expression again, and it is the asceticism of participation/sharing as well, i.e. *methexic asceticism*.

This seems to be a rather peculiar kind of asceticism when considered in the context of Foucault's more generally known analyses of asceticism, and the *care for the self* (*le souci de soi*): as discussed above, it is ascetic renouncement, which is done to *unarm* (instead of arming) oneself, which is done to *expose* oneself to the event, to take part and share the arrival, instead of making oneself more and more resistant to events.<sup>38</sup> By this peculiar character, by exercising listening *and* friendship, this asceticism is also given its political sense: it is a *dangerous* mode of asceticism, dangerous because it *subverts* most radically against the governmental reason of *omnes et singulatim*, just as much as it subverts, in Derrida's terms, the reduction of the politics into the familial model (*oikeiôtês*), and into relations of property.

Reading Foucault's personal meditations on his encounter with music, and with Boulez in particular, makes one wonder whether there would be a parallel occasion to be found, one in which a recognized, and even to a certain extent a canonized philosopher, or a thinker, would confess his/her utmost incapacity to understand music, and especially, one singular composer/musician, encountering the limits of his/her conceptually reflective, discursive thinking, – and even more importantly, affirming this incapacity, experiencing it as the source of the strongest kind of affection, respect and love for the music, thus also expressing the deepest gratitude for music, precisely for its power to make the thinker encounter the limit of his/her thinking. I believe that such confessions are somewhat rare in the canon of Occidental philosophers. Nevertheless, there is one that suggests itself, for its convergence with what has been said of Foucault so far. It is Søren Kierkegaard's encounter with Mozart, with his listening to Mozart's music (*Don Giovanni* in particular):

And I will beseech Mozart to forgive me that his music did not inspire me to great deeds but made me a fool who, because of him, lost the little sense I had and now in quiet sadness usually passes the time humming something I do not understand, and like a ghost prowls night and day around something I cannot enter. Immortal

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<sup>38</sup> To compare, it is precisely the task of *arming* oneself, in order to become more and more *hard*, *unyielding* and *resistant* to the intrusion, penetration, and entrance-into-oneself by events, which comes to the centre in Foucault's various analyses on asceticism and care for the self. For instance, this is one of the most recurrent themes throughout Foucault (2001c). This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 below.

Mozart! You to whom I owe everything – to whom I owe that I lost my mind, that my soul was astounded, that I was terrified at the core of my being – you to whom I owe that I did not go through life without encountering something that could shake me... (Kierkegaard 1987, 49)...I am convinced that if Mozart ever became entirely comprehensible to me, he would then become completely incomprehensible to me. (ibid., 61; cf. Mallet 2005)

In Kierkegaard's encounter with Mozart, and in Foucault's encounter with Boulez, all the differences notwithstanding, the convergences are there to be noticed. In both cases, there is a philosopher, a thinker, expressing his deepest gratitude for music, for the event of music, and for the event of musical listening; gratitude, however, for nothing less or more than by its arrival *irrupting and interrupting, calling into question, and for showing the ultimate limits* of the activity, and of the form of life, of the form of existence, of the form of subjectivity of the philosopher, which revolves around the devotion to the idea or the concept, contemplation, conceptual grasping- comprehension, understanding, knowing, and argumentation. It is for offering them the experience of this fundamental irruption/interruption – being astonished, shaken, terrified, in the incapacity to comprehend, indeed, being-made-into-a-fool, by the *ultimate distance*, by the insolent distance, which is at the same time *excessive proximity*, that both of the thinkers in these two exceptional cases, Foucault and Kierkegaard, express their gratitude, their friendship, and their love, for music (for Boulez, for Mozart).

However, there is still something that Foucault *is* willing to say, not about music in general, and not about Boulez's music in particular, but on the mode of influence, of the trace, of the effect, of the resonance, he has felt coming from Boulez, resonance from Boulez to Foucault, of Boulez in Foucault, of Boulez in Foucault's thought. The locus of the effect, the locus of the contact, which Foucault is also willing to articulate, does not lack significance. It is to be found in the relation to history, in the historical approach, and in the manner of practicing historical analysis. The trace, the effect, about which Foucault is willing to say something, comes from Boulez's relation to history, which is at play in his practice of musical analysis, in his treatment of the musical works of the past, analysis which is not at all, however, exterior to the music, to the musical practice itself. It is neither theoretical reflection, nor technical know-how, but instead forms an integral part of the latter. Instead of taking a "classicist"- or "monumentalizing", to borrow the term from Nietzsche's treatise on the different approaches to history, or an archaizing approach, Boulez's approach could be characterized as *polemical, challenging, mobilizing and transformative*:

I believe that his objectif, in this attention to the history, was to act so that nothing there remains fixed, neither the present nor the past (*je crois que son objectif, dans cette attention à l'histoire, c'était de faire en sorte que rien n'y demeure fixe, ni le présent ni le passé*). He wanted them both to be in perpetual movement the one in relation to the other (*il les voulait tous deux en perpétuel mouvement l'un par rapport à l'autre*)...One saw being born through this practice a relation to the history which neglected the accumulations and made fun of the totalities: its law, it was the simultaneous double transformation of the past and the present by the movement which detaches from the

one and from the other through the elaboration of the other and the one (*on voyait naître à travers cette pratique un rapport à l'histoire qui négligeait les cumuls et se moquait des totalités: sa loi, c'était la double transformation simultanée du passé et du présent par le mouvement qui détache de l'un et de l'autre à travers l'élaboration de l'autre et de l'un*). (Foucault 2001b, 1040-1041)

Central in Foucault's reflection on Boulez's approach to history, and his practicing of historical analysis is Boulez's manner of "historically" dismantling the constants and totalities. What Boulez's practice of historical analysis does is to mobilize the history, to set both the past and the present into a movement in relation to each other, and to keep this movement going, so that neither the present nor the past is allowed to become stabilized, fixed, or reified as a totality, as an object that would subsist independently and separately from the other. Historical analysis, or historical thinking, in this sense, is not dealing with the past or the present as if they were objects, but instead with the movement, with the transition from the one to the other and back, with the inter-acting and inter-influencing of the one upon the other, the one in relation to the other and vice versa, relation in which the one always destabilizes the other. This is also the movement of historical thinking, of historical thinking as thinking of movement, as well as thinking-in-movement.

It is not difficult to notice convergences to Foucault's own genealogical approach to history: the history of the present, in which the fixity and necessity of the present condition is challenged, the present is opened to dispute and to change, through turning towards the past, through the elaboration of the past in terms of an event. This is an event that includes the still unfinished movement of the present emerging, of its being born through the dynamics of encounters, of the relations between forces. Is not the genealogical attitude and practice about mobilizing and keeping up the incessant, destabilizing movement and interaction between the present and the past? (cf. *Nietzsche, the Genealogy, the History [Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire]*, Foucault 2001a, 1004-1024). This is not the occasion to deal with the characteristics of Foucault's genealogical approach in more detail. It is interesting that it is Boulez, his musical analysis and musical practice, not Nietzsche or any other philosopher or historian, who is nominated as the source of influence in the challenging, polemical, potentiality-opening practice of historical analysis, as we noticed. The resonance of Boulez, and of music, is in this senses at play in the genealogies of Foucault, a sort of genealogical resonance, a resonance launching further resonances, further de-stabilizing movement of interaction, contagion, and penetration between the present and the past. This would be one manner of understanding the musicality of genealogy, of the practicing of genealogy, without reducing it to "speaking about music".

## 4.2 Localization, Beaconing, Globalization: the Dispositif, Musical Discipline and the Docility of Sound

The friendship, expressed by Foucault, the resonance, the influence, the effect, the traces of Boulez, of his musical analysis and- practice in Foucault's thinking, through Foucault's listening to music, through his listening to Boulez in particular, occurring without any pretension to speak of music, to understand music. Thus, one question in particular is evoked: what is Boulez's side in the relation? In such a case is it possible to discover, in a parallel manner, traces, resonances, influences of Foucault in Boulez, ones that are not formed in the manner of speaking about, understanding, or presenting an interpretation of Foucault's thought, not even in the manner of an explicit application of it. Are there, in Boulez's analyses of music, parallel resonances from Foucault's thought, resonances in which Boulez does not need to speak about Foucault at all, or even mention his name (friends should not speak about each other), ones in which he remains silent about Foucault, but where the impact of the latter is still noticeable.

Below, the focus is on one point, in which such resonances can be perceived: Boulez's use of the concept of *dispositif* (*le dispositif*), without explicit reference to Foucault, and his elaboration of the concept of *musical dispositif*: analysis of the musical practice, and of the music as such in terms of practices, practices of intervention, having their strategies, and being oriented by certain rationalities and forms of knowledge. What comes to the foreground is the functioning of the dispositives in the demarcation between music and non-music itself, as well as the resistances these operations encounter, and the struggles that ensue.<sup>39</sup> What comes to be central in the analysis of music, in terms of the musical dispositives, is the spatial-temporal logic at work in the intervention, as well as their favored modes of perception-apprehension and the modes of seizing and grasping at play. The concept of musical dispositif

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<sup>39</sup> Cf. again: "I said that the dispositif (*le dispositif*) was of essentially strategic nature (*de nature essentiellement stratégique*), which supposes that at stake here is a certain manipulation of force-relations (*qu'il s'agit là d'une certaine manipulation de rapports de forces*), a rational and planned intervention into these force-relations (*d'une intervention rationnelle et concertée dans ces rapport de forces*), either in order to develop them into such direction, or to block them, or to stabilize them, to use them (*soit pour les développer dans telle direction, soit pour les bloquer, ou pour les stabiliser, les utiliser*). The dispositif is thus always inscribed inside a game of power (*un jeu de pouvoir*), but always also bound to one or various limits of knowledge (*mais toujours lié aussi à une ou à des bornes de savoir*), which are born from it, but just as much condition it (*qui en naissent mais, tout autant, le conditionnent*). That is it, the dispositif: strategies of force-relations supporting types of knowledge, and supported by the latter (*des stratégies de rapports de forces supportant des types de savoir, et supportés par eux*). In *The Order of Things* (*Les Mots et les choses*), while wanting to do a history of the episteme (*une histoire de l'épistémè*), I stayed in a dead-end (*une impasse*). Now, what I would like to do, is to show that what I call dispositif is a much more general case of the episteme. Or rather that the episteme is a specifically discursive dispositif (*ou plutôt que l'épistémè, c'est un dispositif spécifiquement discursif*), in difference to the dispositif which is discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more heterogeneous (*ses éléments étant beaucoup plus hétérogènes*)." (Foucault 2001b, 300-301)

means, that there is an intervention that is reflective, or rational in the broad sense, and *intervention into sound*, into the multitude of sounds, into the acoustic and sonorous bodies of sounds and their relations, intervention by which a *musical texture* is constituted out of the materiality of the sound, out of the bodies of sounds (in accordance with Foucault), by seizing them, by organizing the sonorous/acoustic bodies, developing them in a particular direction, blocking their movement, stabilizing them, using them, attaching them to a particular musical function, according to a determinate musical language with its determinate functional- and hierarchic structure, and with its codes of signification.

In this sense, the *dispositif* is at work in the musical practice. The *dispositif* ranges from composing to performing, playing and listening. What is at stake in this working of the *dispositif*, in all of the phases of musical practice, as Boulez states, is to *immaterialize* or *dematerialize* (*dématérialiser*) the sound, the sonorous/acoustic body, meaning that it no longer is a bare acoustic-sonorous event, no longer is only a material-concrete sound, but instead becomes pinned down to the codes of musical meaning, and made into a functionally determined element in the musical language. This intervention of the *dispositif* into the sonorous/acoustic body can be met with a varying degree of facility or docility, and with a varying degree of resistance from the materiality and concreteness of the sound, their multitude and their relations. Thus, what issues is a conflict, or struggle, with a varying degree of intensity, between the musical *dispositif* and the materiality of the sound, the material and concrete multitude of sounds (the acoustic, the sonorous). Hence, the resonance of Foucault's political thinking in the musical analysis of Boulez is noticeable.<sup>40</sup>

Indeed, perhaps in difference to other arts, especially visual-optic arts, Boulez explicitly makes the point that what appears to be characteristic of music is the conflicting relation between the practices of seizing, grasping, apprehending, gathering-together, and the resistance coming from the acoustic/sonorous materiality. The very attempt to reflect on music, to conceive its form as a whole, becomes *irritated* (as opposed to being supported or facilitated) by the materiality of music, by the temporality qualifying the acoustic/sonorous materiality. The attempt to grasp is irritated by the non-simultaneity of the sound, by the sound's disappearance always being too soon, and by the consequent bringing about a deference in the attempt of comprehending:

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<sup>40</sup> Cf.: "I call abstract relations those which can really be *immaterialized* (*j'appelle rapports abstraits ceux que l'on peut véritablement dématérialiser*), concrete relations (*rapports concrets*) those which are, properly speaking, inseparable from the material (*inséparables du matériau*). Could we say that the former obey a hierarchy and that the latter escape it? Sometimes the problem is as simple as that. A perfect accord by piano is the most evident example of a musical object easily seized (*d'un objet musical facilement saisissable*), instantly immaterialized (*instantanément dématérialisé*), that we stick immediately to a hierarchy, to an ensemble of functions (*que l'on accroche immédiatement à une hiérarchie, à un ensemble de fonctions*). Hierarchy and ensemble of functions do not need to be expressed: they are there underlying (*sous-jacent*)..." (Boulez 2005a, 422-423)

Whereas in facing the painting (*face au tableau*), the time of reflection is proper to the one who looks (*le temps de réflexion est propre à celui qui regarde*), mastered by him (*maîtrisé par lui*), and facilitates correspondingly the perception of the painting, the time of reflection, in music, may on the contrary be irritated by the dependence in which one finds oneself in relation to the time of execution (*être irritée par la dépendance où l'on se trouve par rapport au temps d'exécution*). (Boulez 1989, 108; my emphasis)

To be sure, in Boulez's analysis, the use of the concept of *dispositif* is not limited to modern music or to the classic, - romantic - or the 20th Century music. Furthermore, it is noticeable that the use of the concept does not carry any evaluations, as to the aesthetic quality of the music. Already polyphonic music has its dispositives, *polyphonic dispositives*. In the following, Boulez draws attention to the significance of a *dispositif* in the music of Johann Sebastian Bach:

Even with Bach, one can encounter certain dispositives (*certaines dispositifs*) that are as much optic as auditive (*autant optiques qu'auditifs*) and I would say that, in certain canons, there is almost more food for the eye than for the ear (*il y a presque plus de nourriture pour l'œil que pour l'oreille*). Not that the music is not beautiful, but the symmetries are much more directly perceived by the eye than by the ear (*sont beaucoup plus directement perçues par l'œil que par l'oreille*). If one looks at a retrograde counterpoint (*un contrepoint rétrograde*), the eye apprehends rapidly the line going from A to Z, then the one going from Z to A, it embraces simultaneously all the intervals (*il embrasse simultanément tous les intervalles*). This is much more difficult in listening, because the memory enregisters inside the dimension of the time (*cela est beaucoup plus difficile à l'écoute parce que la mémoire enregistre dans la dimension du temps*): the eye can read from right to left, the ear cannot listen against the time (*l'œil peut lire de droite à gauche, l'oreille ne peut écouter contre le temps*). (Boulez 1989, 97-98)

So, what is it that characterizes the *dispositif* of polyphony, the *polyphonic dispositif*, as it is analyzed by Boulez above, how does it work? First, what is at play are certain operations of spatialization: the voices are each given a distinctive line, one that is determined by the fixed points of coordinates, the distances, the intervals between the points, the line of the voice proceeding from one point/location/place to the next, and into a univocally determined direction (from A to Z). Thus, the musical space in question, the space of music in question, is a sonorous space, which is *striated* (*strié*), divided, made discontinuous, constituted by the network of the fixed points and the distances/intervals between. This is the fundamental significance of the *spatializing intervention*, brought about by the musical *dispositif*. Boulez also has particular terms for these spatializing operations: *emplacement* or *localization* (*repérer, repérage*) and *beaconing* (*baliser, balisage*). In the axis of time, these interventions produce the *pulse*, they give a pulse and pulse-based rhythm to time, thus generating a musical time which in a way is analogous to the striated space and is both measurable (isomorphic to the chronometric time) and directional.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>41</sup> "If I have stretched out on the principle of the chess board (*si je me suis étendu sur le principe de l'échiquier*) this is because it is of great importance in music ... What matters is to localize time (*ce qui importe c'est de repérer le temps*): the time is localized through a pulsation (*il se repère par une pulsation*), in other words through what is generally called the rhythm (*le rythme*). A pulsation, whether it is regular or irregular



There are also other noticeable central characteristics in the analysis of the polyphonic dispositif above. The objective of the intervention is the taking care of, the production and maintenance of the *individualization*, of the distinctiveness and self-identity of each voice, of each melodic line in the musical texture. This individualization is brought about through the distinctive *contours* and *trajectories*, followed by each voice, from one point to the next, formed on the basis set by the spatio-temporal coordinates (locations, directions) of the pulsated-striated musical time-space.

In addition to this, the polyphonic dispositif is also a *dispositif of globalization, of global apprehension*. This means that the interventions into the multitude of sounds, ranging from the practice of composing to the performance and listening, aim at constituting each voice, each line of melody “globally”, which means as a whole or as a totality. The contour, the trajectory, the figure, of each individual voice-line, should be formed so that it appears as a whole, is present as a whole, is present simultaneously in the full clarity, without gaps or fractures, and without the lack or insufficiency caused by the temporal deference and the disappearance/escape of the acoustic/sonorous material. Then, the objectif of globalization extends further to the determination of the relation between the individualized voices. What should be equally “global”, equally “whole”, equally encompassing, is the determination, the apprehension of the type of *counterpoint* determining the derivation of one line from another, the relation of symmetry between the voice-lines: the simple imitation, simple canon, retrograde inversion from A to Z and from Z to A, to the most complex counterpoint relations in the fugue. Finally, the “globality” is produced in the constitution of the structured, global, coherent whole of the entire polyphonic texture of music. Again, to borrow the terminology of Foucault, it can be said that in Boulez’s analysis, the dispositif of polyphony is both one of totalization (or globalization) and individualization, thus it functions in an analogous manner to the governmental rationality, or the political reason of *omnes et singulatim*: the political reason of separation, of keeping individual lines separate, taking care of their distinction-identification,

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(régulière ou irrégulière), helps to measure the time (*aide à mesurer le temps*) like the module of the space (*le module de l'espace*) allows to conceive the distance, but it is also this module of the time (*ce module du temps*) through which one manages to make the time directive (*par lequel on parvient à rendre le temps directif*)...From then on, one organizes the time in the same manner in which one organizes the space (*dès lors on organise le temps de la même façon que l'on organise l'espace*)... (Boulez 1989, 79-86) Cf.: To estimate an interval, the temperament (*le tempérament*) – choice of the standard (*choix de l'étalon*) – will be a precious help, it ‘striates’ (*il ‘striaera’*), all in all, the surface (*la surface*), the sonorous space (*l'espace sonore*), and gives to the perception – even far from the total consciousness – the means to localize itself effectively (*les moyens de se repérer utilement*)” (Boulez 2005b, 95-96)... For we shall distinguish likewise two categories in the musical time (*le temps musical*): the pulsated time (*le temps pulsé*)...and the amorphous time (*le temps amorphe*). Inside the pulsated time, the structures of the duration (*les structures de la durée*) refer to the chronometric time according to an emplacement (*se réfèrent au temps chronométrique en fonction d'un repérage*), to a beaconing (*d'un balisage*) – we could say- regular or irregular, but systematic (*régulier ou irrégulier, mais systématique*)...The amorphous time does not refer to the chronometric time except in a global fashion (*que d'une façon globale*)...” (ibid., 100-101)

as well as the prevention of the *methexic* movement of crossing, exchange, displacement, merging and contagion between the voices, while also relating and gathering together these separate lines into a coherent totality (Boulez 2005a, 448-449, 452-453; cf. Foucault 2001b, 953-980):

When we study the counterpoint and write exercises more or less canonical, more or less fugue-like (*plus ou moins canoniques, plus ou moins fugués*), even strict canons or fugues of school (*des fugues d'école*), the first recommendation is attached to... the independence of the voices (*l'indépendance des voix*); the second advises not to exit except exceptionally of the middle register of each voice (*du registre moyen de chaque voix*); the third, to resort as little as possible to the crossing of voice (*au croisement de voix*) – the voices being thus inversed (*inversées*) in relation to their habitual position... To what, finally, do all these rules of school come back to... Simply, to preserving the identity of each line and to facilitating their identification by the eventual auditor (*simplement à préserver l'identité de chaque ligne et à faciliter leur identification par l'auditeur éventuel*): independence of the voices, admittedly, but for each of them inside a carefully preserved and beaconsed space (*indépendance des voix, certes, mais à l'intérieur, pour chacune d'entre elles, d'un espace soigneusement préservé et balisé*). From this school-counterpoint to the reality of the works (*à la réalité des œuvres*) there has been indeed transgression, but *these laws of identification (ces lois d'identification)* remain so strong, so present, that for a long time they were preserved as an essential given of the writing (*comme une donnée essentielle de l'écriture*)... (Boulez 2005a, 452; my emphasis)

As Boulez characterizes the dispositif of polyphony, it is primarily an *optic* or *visual* and not an auditory, sonorous or acoustic one. The rationality, the knowledge, orienting the strategic intervention into the multitude of sounds is oriented by language with a *visual-optic* bias. Indeed, the basic terminology of the polyphonic dispositif, as brought to the centre by Boulez, appears to be imbued with tropes of optic-visual character: contour, line, trajectory, the geometrical symmetries, inversions and so on. Although Boulez does not mention Henri Bergson, Bergson's thought provides a predecessor for the sort of critical analyses of the production of the musical space-time, intending to show how such established, seemingly unproblematic concepts of the Occidental tradition such as tone, note, scale, line, figure, the measurable and countable *tempo* and *rhythm* as such, are not in fact sonorous or auditory tropes, but instead originate in the visual/optic realm, or alternatively, in the *tactile-haptic*, or both. In the quasi-visual space of music, the definite pitches function as discrete points, as the basic coordinates for localization, and the differences between the tones are correspondingly defined as fixed intervals or measurable distances between the absolute pitch-points. This means also that sound, which is really nothing but *pure quality (qualité pure)*, becomes fixed into identity-distinction, objectified and *quantified* through this visual-spatial or tactile-haptic mediation (Bergson 1993, 33-34, 63-65).

However, we should not take the comparison too far. Although Boulez does, admittedly, speak of the difference, and even contrast, between the optic-visual and auditory-sonorous, this does not mean that he would necessarily understand the difference in the trans-historical sense. We cannot conclude that Boulez would endorse the setting of audio-visual dualism. At the least, it is legitimate to read Boulez's statements in a different manner, as ones dealing with the limitations, differences and organizations of the sensorium in a

particular historical situation or context. It is the regimes of audition, and the regimes of listening in this sense, with their limitations and possibilities, which a composer, or any musician in general ought to acknowledge. The musician ought to acknowledge what the listening audience (consisting of human beings, not of dolphins or bats for instance), at least in this historical context, most likely can or cannot hear.

With the former reservations in mind, one can notice how, following both Bergson and Boulez as well, these ideas have been elaborated most notably by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, see for instance 260-266). Deleuze and Guattari, in this case, would speak of *transcendence* in music, of music grounded on the striation, in which the punctual system is brought from the outside to bear on the multitude of sonorous events. Bergson continues his reflection by stating, that the habitual modality of musical listening, is also imbued with the parallel visualizing-spatializing- operations. Listening “has acquired the habit of absorbing visual images (*a pris l’habitude de s’imprégner d’images visuelles*). Thus, when listening to a melody, through this visualizing-spatializing modality of listening “we have a tendency to divide it and to give ourselves the representation, instead of the uninterrupted continuity of the melody a juxtaposition of distinct notes (*au lieu de la continuité ininterrompue de la mélodie, une juxtaposition de notes distinctes*)” or “the discontinuous series (*la série discontinue*).” This is possible, because “we thus listen to the melody through the vision” (*nous écoutons alors la mélodie à travers la vision*)” (Bergson 1996, 164). “If we cut it up into distinct notes (*si nous la découpons en notes distinctes*), into so many “befores” and “afters” (*autant d’‘avant’ et d’‘après’*), this means that we are mixing spatial images into it (*que nous y mêlons des images spatiales*) and impregnating the succession with simultaneity (*et que nous imprégnons la succession de simultanéité*): in the space, and in the space only, is there neat distinction of parts, mutually excluding each other (*dans l’espace, et dans l’espace seulement, il y a distinction nette de parties extérieures les unes aux autres*).” (ibid.,166)

The similarities and the resonances appear to be particularly evident between the *musical dispositif* as it has been depicted above, and Foucault’s seminal analyses of the modern *dispositif of disciplinary power*. What comes to the fore in both, is the relentless attempt to individualize, identify and separate bodies and voice-bodies, as well as the *spatial operations of localization, beaconing and alignment*, organizing the movement of bodies or voices into determinate series, following distinct points of coordinates, and divisible in distinctive phases. Furthermore, in both, the *dispositif* is characterized as an *optic* or *visual* one, attempting to bring the bodies (the forces, and the movements) into a field of *visibility, luminosity and clarity*, as *objects under surveillance*, ones that are open to identification, classification, quantification etc.:

...in the 17th- and 18th Centuries, we saw the appearance of techniques of power (*des techniques de pouvoir*) that were essentially centered on the body, on the individual body (*qui étaient essentiellement centrées sur le corps, sur le corps individuel*). They were all these procedures by which was assured the spatial distribution of the individual bodies (*c’étaient toutes ces procédures par lesquelles on assurait la distribution*

*spatiale des corps individuels*) (their separation, their alignment, their being put into series and into surveillance [*leur séparation, leur alignement, leur mise en série et en surveillance*]) and the organization, around these individual bodies, of a whole field of visibility (*et l'organisation, autour de ces corps individuels, de tout un champ de visibilité*). They were also these techniques, by which the bodies were taken charge of (*ces techniques par lesquelles on prenait en charge ces corps*), one attempted to increase their useful force by the exercise, the taming, etc. (*on essayait de majorer leur force utile par l'exercice, le dressage, etc.*). (Foucault 1997, 215)

To be sure, as Boulez's analysis of the musical dispositives argues, and as seen in Foucault's characterization of disciplinary power also, it is the determinate *spatial operations* of *emplacement and localization* through which the individualization takes place, and which form an irreducible element of the disciplinary dispositif. It is individualization *through* the spatial fixation in emplacement/localization, individualization through the fixation upon spatial coordinates, and through the juxtaposition of one individual, or one distinctive element of any kind, aside the other in the coordinated space, and then all-together as gathered in the common space, wherein each one is visible separately, and all-together visible as a totality at once and simultaneously. This is the basic scheme of the *Panopticon*. In the conflict that issues, there is on one side the disciplinary operation of individualization-emplacement-juxtaposition, and on the other side, the multiplicity, the mass, or the crowd, generating the noise as well as generated through the noise, by the spreading of sound, by all the horizontal movements of contagion, merging, confusion and in-betweenness.<sup>42</sup>

These central features, constitutive of the disciplinary dispositif, of disciplinary dispositives in all their variety, should also be kept in mind to relate the *normalization* and the *norm*, the differentiation between the *normal* and the *abnormal*, and the normalizing practices of intervention, to the framework of disciplinary power. This speaks of *disciplinary normalization* or *normation* as a determinate mode of normalizing power and distinguishes it from the form of normalization that takes place in the *biopolitical regulation* of the processes of the population:

The discipline normalizes (*la discipline normalise*)...Still, one must well specify what the disciplinary normalization (*la normalisation disciplinaire*), in its specificity, consists of...The discipline, of course, analyzes, decomposes (*analyse, décompose*), decomposes the individuals, the places, the times, the gestures, the acts, the operations. It decomposes them into elements that are sufficient to perceive them on one hand, and to modify them on the other. That is it, that famous disciplinary control pattern (*ce fameux quadrillage disciplinaire*), which attempts to establish the minimal elements of perception, and sufficient elements of modification (*les éléments minimaux de perception et suffisants de modification*). Secondly, the discipline classifies the elements

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<sup>42</sup> "... So the spatial coordinates (*les coordonnées spatiales*) have there a very clear-cut individualizing function (*une fonction individualisante très nette*)... inside a system like that, one is never dealing with a mass, with a group or even, to say the truth, with a multiplicity (*on n'a jamais affaire à une masse, à un groupe ou même, à dire vrai, à une multiplicité*); one is never dealing with anything except individuals (*on n'a jamais affaire qu'à des individus*)...order is always addressed only to individuals, and that the order is always only received by individuals placed alongside one another (*l'ordre n'est jamais reçu que par des individus placés les uns à côté des autres*)." (Foucault 2003, 77)

thus localized (*la discipline classe les éléments ainsi repérés*) in function of determined objectives (*en fonction d'objectifs déterminés*). Which ones are the best gestures to do in order to obtain such result: which one is the best gesture to do in order to load one's rifle (*pour charger son fusil*), which one is the best position to take (*quelle est la meilleure position à prendre*)? Which ones are the workers most apt to such task (*les ouvriers les plus aptes à telle tâche*), the children most apt to obtain such result (*les enfants les plus aptes à obtenir tel résultat*)? Thirdly, the discipline establishes the sequences or the coordinations that are optimal (*les séquences ou les coordinations qui sont optimales*): how to connect the gestures with one another (*comment enchaîner les gestes les uns avec les autres*), how to divide the soldiers for a manœuvre (*comment répartir les soldats pour une manœuvre*)...Fourthly, the discipline fixes the processes of progressive taming (training) and permanent control (*fixe les procédés de dressage progressif et de contrôle permanent*)...The disciplinary normalization consists in posing first a model, an optimal model (*un modèle optimal*) which is constructed in function of a certain result, and the operation of the disciplinary normalization consist in trying to render the people, the gestures, the acts, conformative to that model (*conformes à ce modèle*) the normal being precisely that which is capable of conforming to that norm (*le normal étant précisément ce qui est capable de se conformer à cette norme*) and the abnormal, that which is not capable of that (*et l'anormal, ce qui n'en est pas capable*)...This primary character of the norm in relation to the normal...it is because of that that *I would rather like to say, about what happens in the disciplinary techniques, that it is more a matter of normation than of a normalization (qu'il s'agit plus d'une normation que d'une normalisation)*. (Foucault 2004a, 59; my emphasis)

In these characterizations of disciplinary power and of disciplinary normalization/normation, the central terms have been: individualization, separation, spatial emplacement, localization, permanent visibility, alignment, the decomposition or division into distinctive elements, the taming, serialization or sequentialization of movements, gestures, activities, of performances, of bodies. The individualizing power works in two directions simultaneously: the identification and constitution of individuals out of the multitude of gestures, discourses and desires; and the analytical decomposition of individuals into the minimal spatio-temporal elements of "optimal" serialization and sequentialization (see above all Foucault 1997, 27). As seen in the reading of Boulez (above), this characterization applies to logic, to the framework of rationality, and to the practices, to the techniques and procedures of taking control over the *body of sound*, over the *sonority* and *acousticity* of sound, by the *musical dispositif* in the production of *musical texture* already operative in polyphonic music. On the one hand, there is the general analysis of the disciplinary dispositif, and of the disciplinary normation of bodies; and on the other hand, there is the more specific analysis of the historically and morphologically parallel musical dispositif, pertaining to the *musical normation* of voice and sound, to taming their sonorous and acoustic bodies. The *musical normation* relates to the sound's movement, its resonance, its echoes, its duration, its changes of pitch and tenor. This dispositif of *musical discipline*, of musical normation, taking charge of the sonorous-acoustic- bodies, forms the demarcation between musically adequate and inadequate (noise). On one hand, there is the general problematics of the *docility of bodies*; on the other hand there is the musical problematics of the *docility of the voice*, of the *docility of the sound*, *docility of the sonorous*, *docility of the acoustic*.

As seen in the examination of the musical dispositif through Boulez, a central serialization is operative in the axis of time, in the temporal organization

of voices. This is also the case when it comes to the more general picture of the functioning of the disciplinary dispositif. Equally essential in both is the *quantification of time*, the setting of bodies and forces, as well as voices and sounds, into the quantified time. Both in the disciplinary charge over bodies, and in the musical charge over voices already discussed, it is above all the *pulse* and *tempo* which matter, and which are the central categories of the quantified, measurable duration, through which time is given its punctual coordinates, its fixed intervals. In an isomorphic manner, the musical dispositif, and the disciplinary organization of bodies work at the temporal axis by organizing the rhythm of voices and bodies, on the basis provided by the elementary coordinates of the pulse. Examples of the organization of bodies can be found in various modes of industrialized work, and in the modes of the military drill. The organization of “performances” – vocal, sonorous and other sorts of performances – are assimilated into the order of measurable durations, which is supposed to be followed by the series of displacements and rests, from one location-point to the next, in the deployment of the musical texture, or in the deployment of the bodily forces in the grasp of disciplinary power. Both in music, and in the disciplinary dispositif at the general level, all the activities, all the discharges of force, all the movements, are given an *obligatory rhythm*, accomplishing on the temporal axis the *division into calculable, measurable units*<sup>43</sup> (Foucault 1979, 143, 151-152, 170, 187, 195-197, 200-203, 216-217).

### 4.3 The Power of the Series and the Subversion of the Concrete Sound

In Boulez’s analysis, *dodecaphony* is seen as perhaps the most proximate predecessor for the polyphonic dispositif., in terms of the strong, even absolute basic claims to punctual location/beaconing, identification/recognition, and the consequent struggle to tame the concrete materiality of sound, to take care of the distinctive separation, and to prevent the taking place of the *methexis* between voices, between sounds. This is specifically the *dodecaphony* of the Viennese school of the early 20th Century and refers to *twelve-tone method* of composition and especially to the rigorous formulations by Schönberg and Webern. This means that dodecaphony, and the subsequent developments in rigorous Serialism, also inherit the fragilities, the vulnerabilities, and the problems already related to the polyphonic dispositif. These similarities in the control over the sound do *not* deny that there are various significant differences

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<sup>43</sup> “...it is rather a collective and obligatory rhythm, imposed from the outside; it is a ‘programme’; it assures the elaboration of the act itself; it controls its development and its stages from the inside...A sort of anatomo-chronological schema of behaviour is defined. The act is broken down into its elements; the position of the body, limbs, articulations is defined: to each movement are assigned a direction, an aptitude, a duration; their order of succession is prescribed. Time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power.” (Foucault 1979, 151-152)

between the two. Such a denial would be absurd due to the historical fact that in Bach's lifetime, the concept of the *work*, *opus*, *das Werk*, *l'œuvre*, in the modern sense of the concept, was not yet available. Still, the similarities, in the control of sound including: identification; separation; locating; and beaconing that Boulez noticed, are worth consideration. In the dodecaphonic system, the initial line of twelve tones is posed as the ultimate foundation for the unity of the musical texture. The distinctiveness and identity of the twelve tones, their successive order in the series, and the absolute identity of the intervals in the series, their permanence and fixity, are set as the basis for the whole musical texture. From the absolute, immutable identity of the series of the 12 tones, and the intervals, follows the equally absolute identification of the multiple derivations elaborated from the series, the recognition of all the possible inversions, reflections etc., and their becoming related back to the centre, back to the series. All these operations of deduction, derivation, and backward reference, of which the dodecaphonic music ideally is supposed to consist, and which govern over its entire musical texture, are operations executing the *authority of the series as such*, its authority as the *centre-cellule*, which is supposed to give the unity and coherence to the whole musical texture, behind its apparent diversity, behind all the dissonances. Boulez keeps stressing that the authority of the centre, the functioning of the series as the unifying centre in music, is ultimately based on the absolute identity, on the permanence of the intervals, which means also, the absolute fixity and stability of the punctual order of location and beaconing:

...the whole work will depend entirely upon this sequence (...*toute l'œuvre va dépendre entièrement de cette séquence*), that all the ideas, the real themes, will be derived from it, the principle of the uniqueness, of the absolute reference, being considered as the very foundation of the work (*que toutes les idées, les thèmes réels, en seront dérivés, le principe de l'unicité, de la référence absolue, étant considéré comme le fondement même de l'œuvre*). The two principal bases of this conception are thus: absolute identity of an interval (*identité absolue d'un intervalle*), whatever its position in the register is...and above all remains identifiable beyond those different appearances (*et surtout reste identifiable au-delà de ces apparences différentes*); unity of the work obtained by the obligatory reference to a same matrix (*unité de l'œuvre obtenue par la référence obligée à une même matrice*)... (Boulez 2005a, 362-363)<sup>44</sup>

In the last instance, the dodecaphonic dispositif receives its orientation from the generation, preservation and safeguarding of the unity, of the coherence of the *musical work* (*das Werk*, *opus*) after the surrender of tonality. This orientation occurs beyond and against the disruptive effects of the multiplicity of sounds, as well as against the variety of the events of musical performance. In this sense, it is possible to speak of the accomplishment of the Romantic ideal of *Werktreue*, the homage to the authority of the work-totality. It is the oneness and permanence of the twelve-tone-series, its order of intervals in their absolutely fixed identity, which forms the stable, permanent centre at the basis of the

<sup>44</sup> Cf.: "There is no reason in physics or aesthetics that could force a musician to use tonality in order to represent his idea. The only question is whether one can attain formal unity and self-sufficiency without using tonality...one must simply use a new and strong enough cohesive force to bring all that happens to a common denominator." (Schönberg 1975, 262)

musical texture, providing the whole musical work its unity, gathering the texture together. From the unchanging centre, the whole work emanates through deductions, through derivations. Every element in the texture owes its origin, and relates back again to the centre:

For someone who consults the explicative texts of Schönberg, it is evident that the evolution of his language is based on the *desire to unify the work as strongly, as inevitably as possible (que l'évolution de son langage est basée sur le désir d'unifier l'œuvre aussi fortement, aussi inévitablement que possible)*, by means of a very tight system of themes and motives (*au moyen d'un système très serré de thèmes et de motifs*) which irrigates the texture, hugs it, gives it its *raison d'être*, its coherence and its diversity (*qui irrigue la texture, l'enserme, lui donne sa raison d'être, sa cohérence et sa diversité*). His thought reposes essentially on the deduction; nothing surprising, consequently, that in an absolute desire to join unity and diversity (*que dans un désir absolu de joindre unité et diversité*), he wants to make themes and motives derive from one central cellule (*il veut faire dériver thèmes et motifs d'une cellule centrale*). (Boulez 2005a, 367; my emphasis)<sup>45</sup>

In Boulez's analysis, dispositif of twelve-tones is connected to the earlier polyphonic dispositif on the optic-visual bias. Boulez rather sarcastically remarks that a sort of *visual gymnastics* is actually required in order to accomplish the deductions and derivations. The apprehension of the identity of the series, and of the themes and motives derived from it, their returning back to the series, calls for this visual gymnastic. The inevitable tendency of the musical texture, when it is taken as sonorous and auditory, as texture of sounds, of the multiple sonorous events is to distance, to separate itself from the centre and to become "autonomous" from its influence. The sounds, in their arriving-evaporating multitude are quite disobedient, quite disrespectful to the authority of the series, to its claims to be the sovereign centre governing the musical texture. To maintain the authority of the series, its unifying and coherence-giving power, the attachment of each event back to the series, is to increasingly estrange music from the perception, at least, from auditory perception, from listening, to the benefit of the visual gymnastics:

Do the multiple deductions really reveal the entity of departure (*est-ce que les déductions multiples révèlent réellement l'entité de départ*)? Or do they become...more or less autonomous (*plus ou moins autonomes*), and do they separate themselves from the original matrix to that point (*et s'écartent-elles à ce point de la matrice originale*) of not

<sup>45</sup> Indeed, when it comes to the view of the utmost authority of the work, its determining position over and against the claims of interpretation, performance, audience, and the listening to music, the following, somewhat bitter remark by Schönberg himself is appropriate (from 1926): "If you can do something pure, you will be able to do it tonally or atonally; but those who think impurely – that is to say, those who do what anyone can...They will certainly shout us down, we who give ear to our destiny; and they will surely be heard, soon and in full measure, by those who are in favour of everything ambiguous but against everything genuine. If we address ourselves to those people, it is only out of acoustical necessity, since a literally empty concert hall sounds even worse than one full of 'empty people' " (Schönberg 1975, 264; cf. Szendy 2001). For more general discussions on the history of the modern concepts of musical work, and *Werktreue*, see Goehr (2002) and DeNora (1995). For a recent presentation of the idea of the self-sufficient musical work (the work, which in the end is the only "subject" of music, *work listening to itself*), in reference to Schönberg, see Nicolas (1997) and Nicolas (2000).



being able to attach themselves to that source without a visual gymnastics (*sans une gymnastique visuelle*) which no longer has very much to do with the perception? ...the conscious attachment (*le rattachement conscient*) will not be made without an operation out of context (*sans une opération hors contexte*), and one will hardly experience the need for this totally artificial attachment. (Boulez 2005a, 365)

Boulez's conclusion on the serial dispositif appears to be, that it is ultimately a *theoretical* dispositif. The basic claim for the absolute identity and identification of intervals, is a theoretical claim. The materialization, the *incorporation* of intervals, their being carried into sound, as well as into the events and practices of performance and listening, brings about the loss of this absolute identity. It brings about a sort of differing from themselves of the intervals, their deviation-from themselves, their becoming-other from themselves. The incorporation or the *sonorization*, which is the only manner of real existence outside the theoretical abstraction, of the interval means its loss of permanence, its destabilization, the loss of the fixed self-identity required by the serial system.<sup>46</sup> Consequently it is in this manner that the very possibility of the work, as an organic, unified, self-sufficient and coherent totality, becomes threatened. It can only be realized as a theoretical demand, in a kind of return to Pythagorism, to the purity of relations in pure reason or intellect, without the contamination of the sensual-material. It is this purified, theoretical orientation of the dispositif, in its attempt to generate and maintain the authority of the centre, which confronts the multitude of sounds, in their centrifugal mobility:

The interval in itself does not exist except incorporated (*l'intervalle en soi n'existe qu'incorporé*). But the series wanted first of all to give it a generative function as *absolute* (or *la série voulait avant tout lui donner une fonction génératrice en tant qu'absolu*). This interval of minor third in an abstract reduction (*cet intervalle de tierce mineure dans une réduction abstraite*), that is what was going to be able to transpose itself to any degree...But all these incorporations of the interval struggle against the very notion of the recognition of identity (or *toutes ces incorporations de l'intervalle luttent contre la notion même de la reconnaissance d'identité*)... Theoretical existence and real existence of an interval, that is what Schönberg's method essentially stumbled on, what made it fragile (*existence théorique et existence réelle d'un intervalle, c'est sur quoi la méthode de Schoenberg a essentiellement buté, ce par quoi elle a été fragilisée*). (Boulez 2005a, 365-366)

In the following reflections of Schönberg (from 1924), the emphasis is on the control over sound, a control coming into the multitude of sounds, into their movements. There is also a sort of strange hostility against the primitive, "childish" mobility of the sounds, their tendency to escape out of reach, out of grasp. Also evident is the centrality of the determinate spatializations, emphasized already, in the setting of determinate direction (beaconing) and the division of the event temporally into the pulsative, measured succession, as the effect of the domination coming from then outside:

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<sup>46</sup> The term *sonorization*, meaning destabilization, loss of solidity, the becoming evanescent of the form, of the figure, in what could also be characterized as the victory of the *aesthetics of disappearance* over the *aesthetics of appearance*, has been introduced by Paul Virilio (2003b, 69-96).

For it must be apparent, in view of what I have just said, that one must...use force on nature, on the material – sounds: that one must force them to keep to a direction and succession laid down by us. One has to force nature...otherwise we can either not grasp it or else, if one lets the sounds run as they please, it remains a children's game...Every more developed game comes about because the course of nature is modified by a force from outside. (Schönberg 1975, 253)

Although the analyses, discussed above, have focused on polyphony and the 20th Century atonal modernism, the control of sound by the location-beaconing is at work also in homophonous and tonal music, in the generation of accords, their determination, their identification, the fixation of their constitution in intervals. Furthermore, although the operation of musical dispositives has been examined in the context of the “art music”, it is possible to ask, whether the 20th Century popular music really has been significantly different in this respect, that is, when it comes to the control over sound operating through the *location- beaconing -identification*, in the *striation* of the musical space-time. Following this trail of analysis, the workings of the dispositif can be also traced into the development of musical instruments, the disciplinary training of musicians, the development of the concert-acoustics and, finally, to the training of the “proper” art of musical listening. All these practices can be related to the strategic orientation towards the ever more perfect and punctual localization and beaconing, more and more clear and unambiguous identification, accomplished through the more and more developed *taming (apprivoiser)* or *submission (soumettre)* of the sound's material, concrete existence. As mentioned, in the context of modern art music, it is the *clavier*, which comes to represent the most abstract, the most theoretical, the most “immaterial”, the most tamed and taming (the most “civilized”) instrument. In this sense, it is the follower of *kithara*, the ancient Greek mythical instrument representing rationality, civilization, clarity, punctuality and controlled articulation (for details, see the final Chapter). These would be the instruments, which bring to perfection the *grasping* and *seizure* of sound, its fixation and its attachment to a code, to a language and vocabulary, thus making it a determinate element belonging to a functional- hierarchic structure<sup>47</sup> (Boulez 2005b, 100-101, 104; Boulez 1989, 97-98; Boulez 2005a, 422-423).

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<sup>47</sup> “A perfect accord by piano (*un accord parfait au piano*) is the most evident example of a musical object easily seized (*d'un objet musical facilement saisissable*), instantly immaterialized (*instantanément dématérialisé*), that we stick immediately to a hierarchy, to an ensemble of functions (*que l'on accroche immédiatement à une hiérarchie, à un ensemble de fonctions*). Hierarchy and ensemble of functions do not need to be expressed: they are there underlying (*sous-jacent*)...Of course, this classified object is presented to me with the timbre of the piano (*avec le timbre du piano*), but heard in isolation, it is not its timbre which matters to me, but its constitution (*mais sa constitution*): I perceive it globally or analyze it (*je le perçois globalement ou je l'analyse*) without any longer taking account for its presentation.” (Boulez 2005a, 423) To compare, in a study titled *Phantom Limbs. Musical Bodies (Membres fantômes. Des corps musiciens)* Peter Szendy (2002) speaks of *musical organology (l'organologie musicale)* to emphasize the manner in which Western music the constant invention, production, elaboration and organization of bodies, of the attachments between bodies, of bodies within bodies, while one of the central motives in this production of musical bodies has been the attempt to submit and assimilate the body of sound,

However, all the technical development notwithstanding, the musical dispositives remain fragile and vulnerable in their encounter with the concreteness of sound, with sound in its multiple, material existence. The generation of a musical texture can quite easily lead, in a manner that could be called “counter-final”, to a situation in which the texture turns against the dispositif which has created it. The mere *density* of the polyphonic texture can bring about the failure in the separation, individualization and identification of the voices. The great number of real voices can make the voices of the polyphony difficult, if not altogether impossible to *seize*, in other words, it can instigate the *flight* of the multitude of real voices out of the “theoretical” grasp of the dispositif, out of the attempt to attach the voices to the hierarchies and functionalities of the language. On the other hand, there are also polyphonies having only four voices, but in which the ‘tricks’ of counterpoint generate an interaction between the moving voices, which successfully defies the operations of locating and emplacement. When the theoretical, pre-eminently visual-optic, design of the counterpoint is “realized” or brought into the real existence of sounds as well as to the audition, it can *amalgamate* (*amalgamer*) voices more than organize them. The amalgamation makes it difficult to dissociate the conduct of the voices and difficult to decide between the one and the many. As a result, it becomes more and more difficult to perceive the identity of each voice. The imitation, the following of one voice by another, which is the most elementary mode of counterpoint, easily turns into *methexis*: into the *anonymization* of the voices (*l’anonymisation des voix*). The voices cross each other in their movements, so that they no longer exclude each other, no longer remain in isolation, no longer offer themselves to individualization and “naming”, but instead begin to merge, to penetrate one another, to *resonate* with and *infect* one another out of control, so that they participate with or “share” one another in their movements (Boulez 2005a, 441, 446-449, 453).

In this manner, polyphony does not remain in the grip of the theoretical dispositif, but instead becomes polyphonic in quite another sense. *Poly-phonia*, literally speaking, is multitude of voices, defying both the attempt of individualization/identification, as well as that of “totalization” or “globalization” (the gathering of the individuals into one totality). Indeed, the etymology and conceptual history of the word *fugue* appears to point to this direction. Marie-Louise Mallet, makes this point in the following:

*Fuga*, in Latin, is the flight, the evasion, the fast running, the disappearance, the exile as well (*la fuite, l'évasion, la course rapide, la disparition, l'exil aussi*)... Finally, the ancestors of the classical fugue were called *ricercare* in Italy, *fantasia* in Spain, *fancy* in England, *fantaisie, recherche* in France. The flight, the chase, the fantasia, the search, so many manners of naming the opening of the possibles, the uncertainty, the incalculable, the unpredictable coming of the future (*l'ouverture des possibles, l'incertitude, l'incalculable, l'imprévisible venue de l'à-venir*), the ‘perhaps’, the ‘dangerous perhaps’, the ‘insatiable perhaps’, which ‘starts up perhaps the only possible thinking of the event (*qui engage peut-être la seule pensée possible de l'événement*)’, which calls for ‘another thought of the possible’... (Mallet 2004, 535-536)

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sound’s materiality, more and more perfectly to the abstract, “theoretical” and “linguistic” structures of music.

As it has already been implied, this concrete, or “real” polyphony is the material, sonorous and auditory polyphony, the multitude of voices, as opposed to the “theoretical” polyphony, and polyphony as the *dispositif*. This “real” polyphony is without *opus*, without the *work*, as the voices constantly escape from the reach of both the globalizing/totalizing, and the individualizing operations. The multitude of voices, in flight from the governing *dispositif* of *omnes et singulatim*, is in flight from the grip of a “virtuoso” musician, as well as from the listener, and from the organic totality of the work.

In homophonous music, the basic elements of the harmonious language, the *accords*, are determined on the basis of the fixed, “punctual”, striated, spatio-temporal coordinates of the tones and intervals. However, as Boulez is careful to point out, already in 19th Century music, which usually falls in the general category of “romanticism”, the intentional, compositional generation of disruptions into the functioning of musical language and “signification” can be discovered. These disruptions are generated when the concrete sound in its “bare” materiality as an acoustic event defying identification interrupts the deployment of the tonal language. To put it in more radical terms, non-musical sound, as defined according to the established norms of musical language, i.e. noise, is brought inside music; or inversely, music is brought inside the non-musical sound, into noise. According to Boulez, one of the very first cases of such self-conscious introduction of concrete sounds into music took place more than one hundred years before the well-known introduction of *concrete music* (*la musique concrète*) by Pierre Schaefer (see for instance Kahn 2001, 109-112). This pioneering example can be found in Hector Berlioz’s *La symphonie fantastique*, from 1831. The example shows that such a concretization or materialization of music can be quite easily realized by means of orchestration, by using the traditional repertoire of instruments, here by the use of the contrabasses, whereby a sort of “overcrowding” of the low register is generated:

What does Berlioz want or, at least, what do we suppose of his intentions? He wants to obtain a result that approaches the noise (*qui se rapproche du bruit*), a sort of indistinct, muted sound (*une sorte de son indistinct, sourd*); for this, the sounds must contradict each other (*que les sons se contredisent*), because inside this low register (*dans ce registre grave*), a crowded disposition (*une disposition serrée*) goes, indeed, against the clarity of enunciation (*contre la clarté de l'énonciation*)...The acoustic function surpasses here the function of the element of the vocabulary (*la fonction élément du vocabulaire*). Berlioz has, as one of the first, utilized in such a conscious fashion these properly acoustic values...It is to believe that every musician lives this dichotomy between the general functions of the language (*cette dichotomie entre les fonctions générales du langage*) and the acoustic objects (*les objets acoustiques*) which he creates from such functions, or in spite of them. (Boulez 2005a, 427; my emphasis)

By this rather simple-appearing turn in the orchestration, Berlioz starts an interpenetration between music and noise, as well as between language and the concrete-acoustic sound, creating an event of sounds, which moves on this very borderline of “in-between”. In the event of disruption, it is the indistinct sound, the sound that successfully escapes the operation of identification by its overwhelming, irreducible materiality, which gains the upper hand. The

unidentified and non-located, atopic, sound is brought to prevail over the organization of music as discourse, over the hierarchic order of determinate positions, and functions. Inside the musical texture is the disruptive victory of *phōnē*, of the bare sound or bare voice, over *logos*. It is the victory of the indistinct material event of sound over the articulate signifying voice. It is the *crowd, the excessively crowded, packed, and dense multitude of sounds*, which is the “agent” of the disruption. In the *sonorous, or acoustic crowd*, what takes place, according to Boulez’s analysis, is a sort of mutual contradicting, a disagreement, a strife, a mutual disputing or refutation (*contredire*) between the sounds. The result is that the sounds “mask” one another, they prevent, or safeguard one another from being seized, from becoming located and identified. The crowded density of the sounds poses an effective resistance against the demands of clarity of determinate signification, and in the last instance, against the claims of knowledge and truth, defined in terms of the clarity of presence.

Through these analyses various struggles can be identified. These struggles include: the ancient mythical struggle between Marsyas and Apollo; between *aulos* together with the percussive instruments against *kithara*; the conflict between the noisy, indeterminate, concrete, material-remaining sound-generation and the punctual, civilized, controlled, abstract and theoretical dispositif of music (again, see the final Chapter). These struggles are re-enacted at the heart of modern Occidental art-music, in the various phases of the musical practice. Indeed, it is possible to detect tendencies in modern music, in which Marsyas and his related instruments are introduced inside the realm of music, and are given independence. They are no longer submitted under the “civilized” instruments, instruments which in their turn work to *submit* and *tame* the sound, to seize and fix it into the coordinates of location and beaconing, and under the determinacy of the matrix of identity-distinction-globalization:

...the percussive instruments which, before, hardly had right of residence (*droit de cité*)...have taken an infinitely bigger importance, not only as means of articulation, as tools destined to underline the text entrusted to instruments more submitted and more tamed (*plus soumis et plus apprivoisés*), but as a distinctive category having its proper signification. I speak, of course, of *instruments with ‘indeterminate’ sounds* (*des instruments à sons ‘indéterminés’*), the claviers entering into the category of hierarchized instruments (*des instruments hiérarchisés*). (Boulez 2005a, 439; my emphasis)

Another manner of stating the point is to say that the non-hierarchic instruments, generating sounds that resist their attachment, their emplacement into a hierarchic setting, are given an independence from the hierarchic and hierarchy-producing instruments. In a paradoxical manner, the mythical instruments of the mountains and forests, not of the city, the *methexic* instruments, ones that threaten the fundamental order of distinction and identity, most seriously between man and animal, are now claiming and even granted their right of residence, the right to occupy the political space of the city, one from which they had been fundamentally excluded, driven to exile.

Through the reading of Boulez, the attempt to “solve” the conflict into the final victory of theoretical order over the concrete-material sound, with all its problems, has been represented by the 20th Century dodecaphonic project, as well as the further development of the Serialism in their most rigorous forms. It is noticeable that there is also another attempt to solve the conflict present in the 20th Century music. This alternative could be taken as the direct opposite of the former although in its rationality and logic it is actually parallel. This would be what Boulez calls the *nihilist* alternative, one in which the demand is made for a sort of total “emancipation” of the sound from language, basically from all sort of coding and structuring, from any sort of organization, shaping, forming or figuring whatsoever. The most influential and best known advocate of this “solution” has been John Cage. In this “emancipation” of sound, there is a demand for a kind of “purity” and “purification”, as well as the negative logic of prohibition and exclusion. It is the absolute of sound, and the new “categorical imperative” of “*let sounds be themselves*” à la John Cage, in the name of which language, or meaning in general, and even the desire or hope for these, are denied. Also, the imperative of the total emancipation of the sound, implies the exclusion, or the annihilation of the “subject”, “self” or “agency” of the composer, the performer, and the listener as well. This annihilation of expression in general leaves only the “absoluticized” flow of “sound in itself”, which has now in this manner taken the place of the romantic notion of the organic, self-sufficient and absolute work of art, just as the obedience to the authority of the sound has replaced the obedience to the work demanded by the imperatives of *Werktreue* (Boulez 2005a, 439; cf. Kahn 2001, 161-199; Goehr 2002, 260-265 ; Dyson 1992).

As it has perhaps already become obvious, Boulez endorses neither one of the former attempts to solve the ancient conflict between Apollo and Marsyas. These are attempts which follow the negative, “juridical” logic of prohibition and which demand a purification in a sort of “absolutism”. The “alternative” proposed by Boulez, is *not* to attempt to solve the conflict at all. Instead, music could be approached by the affirmation and maintenance of the open and further elaboration of the conflict. Music itself can be taken as what takes place “in-between”, in the disjuncture, split, and conflict between language and sound, between *logos* and *phōnē*, in their unresolved mutual “irritation”, as this irritation or strife itself. Paradoxically, it is in this very in-coherence, instability and ambivalence that the only “identity” of music as an art-form is found. The experience of the event of conflict, between language and sound, between the musical form and the acoustic-sonorous materiality, comes to the fore even when listening to a piece of music, which has been heard before, or even one that has been studied beforehand by reading the score (in a way, it is comforting to think that not even Boulez himself could surpass these limits of listening). The tension and confrontation is there between the opposition produced by the acoustic-sonorous materiality, and the activity of listening as found in the desire to localize and emplace, to beacon, to distinguish and identify, and to globalize:

When we deal with a work of classical music (*une œuvre de musique classique*) with which the auditor has a great familiarity (*avec laquelle l'auditeur possède une grande familiarité*), it is still not possible for him to globalize it inside the time and at every instant (*de la globaliser dans le temps et à chaque instant*). The points of reference he can have (*les repères qu'il peut avoir*) are separated, in the audition, by an incompressible lapse of time (*sont séparés, à l'audition, par un laps de temps incompressible*). They appeal to a retroactive memory (*ils font appel à une mémoire rétroactive*) which launches a sort of virtual globalization (*qui déclenche une sorte de globalisation virtuelle*), and they allow a wholly temporary reconstitution (*et permettent une reconstitution toute provisoire*) that cancels itself or modifies itself due to another point of reference (*qui s'annule ou se modifie grâce à un autre repère*). The auditor goes thus from reconstitution to reconstitution (*l'auditeur va ainsi de reconstitution en reconstitution*); the thorough knowledge of the work (*la connaissance approfondie de l'œuvre*) helps the continuity of these sporadic reconstitutions (*facilite la continuité de ces reconstitutions sporadiques*). (Boulez 1989, 116; my emphasis)

What results from the strife, from the irritation, as Boulez depicts it, is the *becoming-sporadic*, the *sporadization* of the listening activity, and of the experience generated in the listening as well. The desire and attempt to reach global presence, by gathering together the musical texture into simultaneous presence or into a plenitude appearing as a whole in clarity, and the parallel attempt to distinguish/individualize/identify (*omnes et singulatim*), cannot avoid resorting to the memory. Through memory and through the anticipation of what is yet to arrive in the deployment of music, the attempt is made to gather-together, to generate a "virtual globalization" of the music, "virtual" in difference from the real, incessantly on-going, passing and arriving, unstoppable, irreversible and always incomplete event of sound. By memory and anticipation, a reconstitution can be generated of the piece of music, meaning a virtual or imaginary picture of the "whole".<sup>48</sup> However, the reconstitution itself becomes disturbed, troubled or *irritated* (to use Boulez's expression again) by the event of the sound, by its incessant arriving and fading away, by its constant arrival only to disappear, by its arrival-disappearance. The reconstitution of the imaginary or virtual "musical whole" is not final. It is only a temporary reconstitution, something to be cancelled, called into question, by the irruption of the sonorous event. The virtuality means that the "work" reconstructed in the listening is only one possibility among the multiplicity of others, one possible and by no means necessary, by no means the final, "globalization" of music. This reconstitution cannot but begin anew, replacing one interrupted, sporadic, cancelled, rejected reconstitution by a new one, one attempted localization and beaconing of the object by the next one and so on. In this manner, each and every listening multiplies the music listened to, so that there never is a musical form, a line, or a figure in the singular, but always in the plural. Every form, every work, becomes a plurality of virtual works, in the arrival and departure of the sporadic, fragmented, imaginary "partial works". To reiterate, this means

<sup>48</sup> "The reconstitution of the work in its globality is an imaginary reconstitution (*la reconstitution de l'œuvre dans sa globalité est une reconstitution imaginaire*). One never has a real view of a musical work, the perception of which is always partial (*on n'a jamais de vue réelle d'une œuvre musicale, dont la perception est toujours partielle*). The synthesis cannot be done except afterwards, virtually (*la synthèse ne peut se faire qu'après, virtuellement*)." (Boulez 1989, 86-87)

that it is neither the absolute sound as Cage defined it, nor the organic or formal/structural oneness of the *opus*. This would be the kernel of “musical experience”, and of musical practice in general, in Boulez’s analysis (Boulez 1989, 86-87, 107-108).

It appears to be the general condition of music, that “we have at the same time the geometry and the deviation of the geometry, the principle and the transgression of the principle (*on a en même temps la géométrie et la déviation de la géométrie, le principe et la transgression du principe*)” (the most proximate parallel of which, in visual arts, could be perhaps found in the paintings of Paul Klee) (Boulez 1989, 126-127). In musical practice and in a musical event, the musician just as much as the listener, are brought to testify, to re-experience, and even to re-enact themselves, the mythical conflict between Apollo and Marsyas, between *kithara* and *aulos*, as well as between *logos* and *phōnē*, between the articulate, “speaking” and signifying voice and the bare, indeterminate noise-voice, between the political space- and political life of the city, and what is fundamentally excluded from its realm, that is, the animals, forests, and mountains.

In this Chapter, the central aim has been to investigate the significance of music for Foucault, and, secondly the potentiality of using Foucault’s thought to further elaborate concepts in the field of musical analysis, especially the concept of *dispositif*. This has been accomplished by focusing on the relation between Foucault and his friend Pierre Boulez in their dialogue, their homage to each other, and also through the inarticulate influences to be discovered. We began from Foucault’s reflections on the *insolence* of music, the resistance of music to being understood, known and spoken about, by its excessive distance and proximity. In turn this gave rise to what Foucault called his personal experience of *absolute beauty*. In listening to music, in the silence brought about by the insolence, what is generated is what Foucault called the “bare-” or “naked encounter”, a specific modality of living/being- with/together, one that is also fundamental for Foucault’s understanding of the sense of friendship.

In Foucault’s personal reflections, and again in the dialogue with Boulez, there has been a setting that is conflictual: the singularity of the musical event, in its arrival, in its intrusion, in its placelessness (*atópos*), against the schematicization; and, somewhat correspondingly, the bare being-with/together of friendship against the political-governmental reason- and -interventions *à la omnes et singulatim*. Furthermore, when turning to Boulez’s analyses of musical practices to see if there were any traces of Foucault’s thought, another conflictual setting, or another formulation for such a setting, came into focus: the sound, the acoustic-sonorous multiplicity of sound in its concreteness, in its materiality, the sound as *atópos*, set against the dispositives of music (thus in a sort of continuation of the ancient tension between *phōnē* and *logos*).

In reading Boulez’s musical analyses, with focus on his use of the concept of *dispositif*, we could perhaps revisit the earlier theme, namely, the criticism of the schematicized music and schematicized listening, which was set forth in the



dialogue by Foucault and Boulez. The question to pose is: what is the real motive for the criticism of, and for the resistance to schematicization and, correspondingly, what is the actual aim of the related, *de-schematicizing* modes of asceticism that were already discussed previously? On the basis of the reading of Boulez, it is tempting to conclude that the aim is *not* to purify the musical practices and listening from schemes altogether, or from the intervening-functioning of the musical *dispositives*. This would be the nihilist project, which is just as absolutist, just as exclusive, and in a sense just as violent, as the project of full schematicization. In other words, there is *no* imperative, *no* law of purification or emancipation of the sound that would be motivating the criticism, the resistance and the asceticism of de-schematicization in music, in listening, or in friendship. Resistance to schematicization, as exercised in the asceticism of listening and in musical asceticism more generally, although working by the means of *emptying out* the practices (from speech, from the familiarizing schemes), *does not*, and is *not supposed* to end up in anything like accomplished purification or “emancipation” of the “sound as such”, or the “natural sound” (from speech, from musical language(s), from all the dispositives organizing the practices of music etc.).

However, this does not mean, that there was no reason, and no aim for the resistance to schematicization, and for the related mode of asceticism. Perhaps the reason and aim is discovered in what appears to be the only principle or imperative that has already come out in the course of the discussion: not to give in to the desire to resolve the conflict between concrete sound and schematicization in the absolutist manner i.e. through the full schematicization or the nihilism of the emancipated sound. The resistance and the related musical asceticism target the *prevention of such a resolution* of the tension, they target the *prevention of the closure* of the conflict which divides the musical practices, and, as it appears, which divides friendship as well. Musical asceticism, and the asceticism of friendship, would find their orientation in the maintaining-open of the conflict, of the irritation, of the irruption and interruption, of the sporadization relentlessly taking place in confrontation of the two “adversaries”. Asceticism would mean to exercise oneself in the affirmation, in the re-enactment and re-starting of this confrontation, which also means, to exercise oneself to accept the fact that listening, in its harking for a clear, fixed, global, and distinctive meaning, *must* fail in its attempt, *must* become irrupted and interrupted, *must* become sporadicized. It must begin anew, only to be thwarted anew. The musical asceticism, and the asceticism of friendship, would mean exercising oneself in remaining at the borderline, divided, split, pierced by the conflict without end, without closure. Like the *pierced screen*.

## 5 TERRORIZED BY SOUND? – CARE FOR THE SELF, TERROR AND THE SONOROUS ART

### 5.1 Fear and Terror, the Adversary of the Aesthetics of Existence

The main focus of the first three Chapters was Foucault's work from the 1960's and 1970's. Following the course of Foucault's intellectual history the period of the early 1980's, the years preceding his death, was discussed in Chapter 4, and continues in this Chapter, as well as in the final one. It was during this period that the seminal concepts Foucault was elaborating were the *care for the self* (*le souci de soi*), *art of living* (*tekhnē tou biou, un art de vivre*) and *aesthetics of existence* (*l'esthétique de l'existence*). The question is whether there is any role given to the sonorous- and the auditory in this conceptual framework. This Chapter shows how, in the context mentioned above, Foucault also tackles the question of the particular significance of sound, voice, sonority, audition and auditory effects, the *sonorous art*, and their relation to *logos* (discourse, speech, linguistic signification etc.), as well as the position of these both in the ethics-and aesthetics of existence and, finally, in the related practices of resistance. This is contrary to the picture of Foucault as a thinker not much interested in the issue of audition and the sound. Here also are the polemic issues of *terror* and *fear* and, *courage* and *audacity* which occupy a central political significance for Foucault, and relate to the issue of the senses- and perception.

Rather than evaluate the accuracy of Foucault's reading of the corpus of late- ancient Greco-Roman philosophy, above all Stoic, Cynic and Epicurean (for the criticism of Foucault's interpretation, targeted among other things on his tendency to *aestheticize*, see a review essay by Pierre Hadot [1992]),<sup>49</sup> the aim

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. the following statement of Foucault (from 1979), in which he calls his intellectual practice, and his textual "genre", *historical fiction*, highlighting its *effective* orientation: "Quite simply, I am not a historian (*je ne suis tout bonnement pas historien*). And I am not a novelist (*et je ne suis pas romancier*). I practice a sort of historical fiction (*je pratique une sorte de fiction historique*). In a certain way, I know very well that what I say is not true (*d'une certaine manière, je sais très bien que ce que je dis n'est pas vrai*)...I know very well that what I have done is, from a historical point of view, partial,

is to show how Foucault, using the corpus of late ancient philosophy, presents an interesting conception on the significance of terror and fear as the adversary (if not the most central adversary) of the ethics-and aesthetics of existence, and as central target of resistance and struggle. *Fear and terror* become an urgent political issue, a relevant one also in Foucault's own contemporary situation.<sup>50</sup>

It is clear that Foucault considers the overcoming and prevention of terror or fear to be of utmost importance in the *art of living*, in the *care for the self*. Actually, it is a central, if not the most central aim and task of "philosophizing", i.e. of the practicing of philosophical discourse and philosophical thinking, of philosophy understood as art of living. Philosophical "knowing" is supposed to help humans overcome fear and terror, and to protect human beings (or the human soul) from these states: "it is a matter, says Demetrius, of knowing that a human being has very little to fear in other human beings, that he has nothing to fear in Gods...that he must know that 'death generates no anguish and terminates plenty'." (Foucault 2001c, 226)

Of course, the actual content of philosophical knowledge and truth can be quite variable. Whether it concerns human beings, nature (as *phusilogia* does), or Gods, what is expected from this truth and knowledge is *protection from fear and terror*, in other words, *courage* in face of all the possible dangers, hardships, sufferings, loss and lack, even death, whether they are of human or non-human origin.

Why then is the extermination of the "cure" of fear and terror such an important task, and what is the actual significance of truth and knowledge in this task? Before delving into an answer to this question, it is necessary to consider a summary of the central points in Foucault's conception of aesthetics of existence and art of living, that provide the reasons for his taking fear and terror as such serious adversaries.

Foucault is particularly interested in ancient Greco-Roman philosophy (especially the late ancient) because of the significance of practicing philosophy, of the philosophical way of life, as an *art of living*, in other words, as a set of arts, techniques, equipment and exercises having life or existence as such as its

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exaggerated (*je sais très bien que ce que j'ai fait est, d'un point de vue historique, partial, exagéré*). Perhaps I ignored certain elements that would contradict me (*peut-être que j'ai ignoré certains éléments qui me contrediraient*). But my book had an effect on the manner in which people perceive the madness (*mais mon livre a eu un effet sur la manière dont les gens perçoivent la folie*). And, thus, my book and the thesis I develop there have a truth inside today's reality (*et, donc, mon livre et la thèse que j'y développe ont une vérité dans la réalité d'aujourd'hui*)...I hope that the truth of my books is in the future (*j'espère que la vérité de mes livres est dans l'avenir*)."<sup>50</sup> (Foucault 2001b, 805)

<sup>50</sup> Of course, one could be easily lead into biographical speculations on this matter: either to search in Foucault's biography for the "key" to understand his writings on suffering, fear and terror, or to look in his literary work for the key to understand his biography. I am referring to the well-known (and much discussed) issue of Foucault's inclination for sadomasochism, and to the fact that he (most probably) already knew he was mortally ill, when he was conducting the studies on ethics and aesthetics of existence, with all their emphasis on the exercises in facing (courageously, with serenity) the inevitable suffering, pain and death. However, I do not intend to follow this line of biographical reading, which easily can take a somewhat reductive tone.

object, but, as an object to be formed, shaped and modified, rather than as an object to be theoretically contemplated. More specifically, this means that for Foucault the primary task of philosophy is to give a *form* (*forma, une forme*) to life or existence. Philosophy in this sense is an art of creating and shaping a manner or- way of existing, a style of life or a form of life. The task is to make one's life into a work (*une œuvre*) that is beautiful and good (*belle et bonne*), to *make oneself into an art object* (*l'objet d'art*) or a *work of art*. In this sense there is no significant difference here between "good" and "beautiful". This is the kernel of Foucault's idea of the unity of *ethics*, as self-relation, self-government, care for the self; and the *aesthetics of existence*, the creation of self as a work of art (Foucault 2001c, 405-406; Foucault 2001b, 1221-1222, 1430, 1443).

Foucault emphasizes that the *liberty of artistic creation*, "the liberty and choice (*la liberté et le choix*) of the one who uses his *tekhne*" or "this liberty of the subject (*cette liberté du sujet*)", is nothing less than a necessary condition for the aesthetical-ethical creation of self. The aesthetic-ethical liberty of self-creation and self-government is given quite a specific and a rather demanding sense. Foucault equates liberty with *self-sufficiency, autarchy*, with radical independence or autonomy in the self-creation/self-government, both of the choices and decisions, and of the actual practice/activity of creation (Foucault 2001c, 230-231, 405-406; Foucault 2001b, 1442). It is beyond the scope of this study to present any extensive treatment of the idea of freedom and liberty in Foucault's late thought. Nevertheless, that the briefest mention is that although Foucault emphasizes the importance of *liberty of choice* as the condition of ethics and aesthetics, he still distances this idea from any *Existentialist* readings. Foucault stresses that what distinguishes his own account from that of Sartre, is the role given to authenticity, to the adequacy of the subject with itself, to the claim of adequacy in self-consciousness, by the latter. Foucault argues that while Sartre attempts to set authenticity as the foundation of freedom, Foucault himself understands authenticity as one historical modality of self-relation among others, one that actually has no constitutive role in his own view of the creative liberty. In this sense, according to Foucault, his conception of artistic self-creation and liberty/freedom as an *invention of the self*, is closer to Nietzsche than to Sartre (see Foucault 2001b, 1211-1212, 1436-1437; see also Nehamas 2000, 157-188).<sup>51</sup>

*Liberty* in this sense is for Foucault the *ontological condition of ethics and aesthetics*, whereas ethics and aesthetics are the *reflective form* taken by this liberty. Perhaps there is no need to even stress that the liberty Foucault is talking about, the autonomy and self-sufficiency of self-creation and self-government, is liberty without any determinate content. It is indeterminate

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<sup>51</sup> However, it seems not at all evident, whether Nietzsche actually did not endorse any hopes and positive claims of authenticity, as truthfulness in respect to the singularity of a person, as immediate and truthful self-expression of affects, pathos, will, intensities of force etc. Above all, such positive claims of authenticity can be found in Nietzsche's recurrent reflections on music's superior capacities of affective communication, and on his striving for this sort of musicality in his own aphoristic style of writing (on this point, see for instance Nietzsche 1950, §296; Nietzsche 1974, 25/385; Nietzsche 1969a [*Ecce Homo, Warum ich so gute Bücher Schreibe*] §4).

liberty and does not mean the actualization of, or reconciliation with some pre-given law, essence, nature, identity, foundation or origin of the human being either universally or particularly. Liberty, as autonomy of artistic creation and “invention” of the self, must be taken in a rather literal sense. In the end the highest value of the reflective use of this liberty, the care for the self, is the protection, perfection and practicing of this indeterminate, artistic liberty. The *care for the self*, so it seems, becomes somewhat equal to the *care for the liberty* (*le souci de la liberté*)<sup>52</sup> (Foucault 2001b, 1531-1533).

Inimical to this liberty and, consequently, to the possibility of the aesthetics of existence as such, are all the various states of passivity and dependence, i.e. different modalities of “being acted upon”, of being affected, moved, influenced, “permeated”, overpowered and governed, by a power, action or event of some kind. Here, Foucault’s primary target is not the effect or impact on the individual physical body, but rather the threat to the active/creative, ethical and aesthetical liberty of the subject. If an event of some kind is allowed to permeate and overpower the subject, to influence and govern the choices, decisions and actions, the result is a state of passivity and dependency, where liberty, the central condition of ethics and aesthetics, is annihilated. It is important to notice that Foucault considers not only negative influences such as prevention, constraint, and limitation, but also “positive” modes of influence such as stimulation, enticement, attraction, excitement, encouragement, solicitation. Either type of influence can lead to passivity and, hence, are inimical to liberty. Consequently, the art of living and care for the self, to protect liberty in order to create the self as a work of art, implies, or becomes inseparable from, a continuous and irreconcilable *struggle* (*une lutte*) of the subject against being intruded on, or permeated and overpowered by various actions or events, whether in positive or negative manners<sup>53</sup> (Foucault 2001c, 230-231, 306-308, 450).

To protect liberty, we need to perform specific sorts of activities, having their own arts, techniques and equipment. Foucault believes that we need *philosophical discourse* or *logos*, as such *equipment of protection* and *preparation* (*paraskeuē*). What this discursive protection/preparation does is *arm* us sufficiently in order to win the constant struggle against the threats to liberty, to make possible our successful resistance to being influenced, affected and

<sup>52</sup> Gilles Deleuze points out that it is a serious (although common) error to believe that in his later work Foucault resurrected the idea of the subject (as person, as a form of identity and so on), he had earlier attempted to dismantle in his archaeological and genealogical studies. Instead, one should notice that when Foucault speaks of *subjectivation* and free self-government, what he actually means is a *relation of force to itself*, or a *fold of force*, an *open event* in which the force turns upon itself, inflicts itself, always taking care of the indeterminate openness of its creative/active/aesthetic capacity, preventing the enclosure of this (see Deleuze 1995, 92-118).

<sup>53</sup> Here, Foucault does appear to argue that the use of power as such – any relation of becoming affected, acted upon, influenced, directed etc. – is to be taken as the “adversary” of liberty. However, we should not forget that “liberty” is now given the strong and demanding sense: the autonomy, independence and self-sufficiency of self-government and self-creation. As we know, if we take “liberty” or “freedom” in some other sense, Foucault recurrently stresses that these should not be understood as a negation of power, but rather as power’s products, effects and resources.

overpowered (Foucault 2001c, 230-231). With this *agonistic* character of philosophical discourse and the philosophical art of living in mind, Foucault can call the person engaged in this discourse, an *athlete of the ancient spirituality*, who is constantly engaged in “a struggle, struggle in which his adversary is all that may emerge from the exterior world: the event (*une lutte, lutte dans laquelle il a pour adversaire tout ce qui peut se présenter venant du monde extérieur: l'événement*). The ancient athlete is an athlete of the event (*l'athlète ancien est un athlète de l'événement*).” (ibid., 306-308) In this struggle, so it seems, there is no other sort of equipment that can really help (at least not one mentioned by Foucault here), except *logos*, except the practice of philosophical discourse.

Without this discursive equipment, the human being remains vulnerable, unprotected and unprepared, for the affective, intrusive and overpowering tendency of events, to becoming deprived of liberty. This returns to the explicit issue of *terror* and *fear*. Foucault names the events of hardship, suffering and loss, together with their counterparts, pleasure and satisfaction as forming the most serious threat and “test” to ethical-aesthetical liberty. As a result, the preparation for these kinds of events, for our confrontation with them, needs special attention and effort. The discursive equipment mentioned above are, perhaps more than anything else, needed to protect liberty and ethical/aesthetical self-mastery, from becoming affected, intruded, permeated, troubled, overwhelmed and overpowered by hardships and sufferings:

This human being does not have at his disposal the *discourse-aid* (*le discours-secours*), the *discourse-recourse* (*le discours-recours*), which would allow him to react as he must, not to let himself be troubled, to remain master of himself. And, in default of this equipment, he is going to be in a way amenable to the event (*perméable à l'événement*). This event is going to enter inside his soul (*va entrer dans son l'âme*), troubling it (*la troubler*), affecting it (*l'affecter*) etc. Hence, he will find himself in state of passivity (*en état de passivité*) in respect to this event. So, *one must prepare oneself for the events that arrive, one must prepare oneself for the hardships* (*se préparer aux maux*). (Foucault 2001c, 450; my emphasis)

As it has already been discussed, the actual threat to the freedom of the ethical-aesthetical activity is found in confrontation with events of hardship, with accidents of various kinds, in the reaction to these. To prevent becoming seized and overwhelmed, it is necessary to prepare oneself by the discursive equipment.<sup>54</sup>

To give names for these states of passivity and non-freedom, in which the subject becomes intruded upon by a hardship, they are *fear* and *terror*. In the last instance, the real, most serious adversaries of liberty, of the possibilities of ethics and aesthetics, are fear and terror. In the last instance the discursive equipment (*logos*, philosophical truth and knowledge) of preparation, are indispensable, because they offer liberty protection by overcoming fear and terror:

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<sup>54</sup> Confrontation with death, preparation to encounter it with serenity, without losing self-mastery, is important (see Foucault 2001b, 1536).

...It would be the knowledge of nature, of *phusis*...also in so far as it is susceptible of transforming the subject (*de transformer le sujet*) (who was, in face of nature, in face of what one had been taught about the Gods and the things of the world, totally filled with fears and terrors [*tout rempli de craintes et de terreurs*]) into a free subject (*en un sujet libre*), a subject who will discover in himself the possibility and resource of his inalterable and perfectly tranquil pleasure. (Foucault 2001c, 231)

## 5.2 Resistance, Terror and Courage

The issue of fear and terror, and their enmity to the very basic conditions of the aesthetics of existence as Foucault understands these in his late thought, is a relevant one to him. Moreover, the central, political consequence Foucault draws from the irreconcilable antagonism between the ethical-aesthetical liberty, and fear and terror is: the task of taking care of and protecting liberty is intrinsically related to, even inseparable from, the practice of resistance to fear and terror. Absence of fear and terror, of the inclination to these, in other words courage, intrepidity, audacity, unruliness or stubbornness, is fostered by the appropriate discursive equipment and exercises. They are states in which the subject becomes “impermeable” and “unyielding”, incapable of being seized and overwhelmed. In this manner courage, the absence of fear and terror, is a state that protects autarchy, liberty of self-government and artistic self-creation, against various attempts to influence and govern us:

*Phusiologia* gives the individual an audacity (*hardiesse*), a courage, a sort of intrepidity allowing him to confront not only the multiple beliefs (*les croyances multiples*) that someone has wanted to impose on them, but equally the dangers of life and the authority of those who want to order him about. Absence of fear (*absence de peur*), audacity, a sort of stubbornness (*sorte de rétivité*), unruliness (*fringance*) if you will: that’s what *phusiologia* will give to the individual who learns it... Secondly, these individuals will become *autarkeis*. (Foucault 2001c, 230-231)

This quotation shows that courage (absence of fear), and the related discursive equipment, are given a political significance: they allow the resistance of *authority and orders*, different attempts to govern us. Furthermore and contrary to what might be supposed, the significance of fighting fear and terror is not limited to resistance to violence, or against the modes of power operating through a threat of violence. The exercises and equipment of overcoming terror occupy a more central, more extensive significance for the practices of resistance, even for the ones targeted against forms of power or -governance, which do not operate by a reference to violence, but instead in *positive-productive* ways: by enticing, stimulating, soliciting etc. <sup>55</sup> As the quotation

<sup>55</sup> On another occasion, also in the early 80’s, Foucault makes a rather strong conceptual juxtaposition between power and violence. Power (in opposition to violence) is not defined by the renunciation or extermination of possibilities of action, but is, instead, an action upon action, or an action upon the open possibilities of action: “In fact, what defines a relation of power (*une relation de pouvoir*), is a mode of action that does not affect others directly and immediately, but that affects their proper action (*leur action propre*). An action upon action (*une action sur l’action*), upon eventual or actual,

above already shows, courage allows the resistance to and successful struggle against what Foucault calls the *imposition of beliefs*. Although Foucault does not, on this occasion, specify what sort of relation, influence, or rhetorical persuasion, he means by this, it is evident that it is a relation of positive/productive power. It is evident that to be able to resist power, what is needed is the absence of fear and terror and, consequently, the appropriate discursive equipment.

The imposition of beliefs is a practice and technique, which can be, and historically speaking has been, significant in the functioning of those productive/positive, both individualizing and totalizing forms of power, on which Foucault has focused some of his most influential genealogical analyses. This refers particularly to Foucault's studies on the power of fixing an individual to his/her "*proper identity*" (*la propre identité*) and *pastoral power* (*le pouvoir pastoral*), operating through the obligations and stimulations to self-examination, self-consciousness and speaking the truth about oneself (see Foucault 2001b, 953-980, 1046-1051, 1614-1632). It should be remembered that it is not only sovereign power that operates by means of terror. In the modern context, *normalization* functions by invoking, maintaining and by internalizing an aptitude for terror and fear, as well as for the resulting aversion and hostility, in face of the individuals, acts, motives, desires, temptations and modes of pleasure, which are classified as abnormal, socially dangerous, perverse, pathological, subversive etc., whether these are discovered in oneself or in others.<sup>56</sup>

There is reason to see protection from fear and terror as a central task in resistance to modern, disciplinary/normalizing power. If this is the case, does it mean that the protection from fear and terror, and the related, indispensable discursive equipment of "counter knowledge" and "counter truth", are similar to the general conditions of resistance and struggle, as various and heterogeneous as the contexts, situations, targets, and agents of the struggles might be in other respects? Although this conclusion is not articulated by Foucault, it seems rather difficult to avoid it, when following the line of argumentation presented above.

It is clear that Foucault's interest in the ethics- and aesthetics of self, in the philosophical art of living, and in the political sense of these, is rather far from a strictly contextualist approach to history, the history of philosophy, cultural history, or to the history of ideas- or -concepts. He never attempts to hide the fact either that his study's disposition, its problematic, its choices of focus, might be conditioned by his contemporary situation, or by certain political

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future or present actions ...To govern (*gouverner*), in this sense, is to structure the others' eventual field of action." (Foucault 2001b, 1055-1056)

<sup>56</sup> The discourse of normalization "is the discourse organizing itself not only around the field of perversity (*autour du champ de la perversité*), but equally around the problem of the social danger (*du problème du danger social*): which is to say, that it will be also the discourse of fear (*le discours de la peur*), a discourse, the function of which will be to detect the danger and oppose itself to it. So, it is a discourse of fear and a discourse of moralization, it is an infantile discourse (*un discours enfantin*)." (Foucault 1999, 33)



issues he considers urgent. The reflection on the aesthetics- and ethics- of living, on the techniques of self, on the equipment to overcome terror, is such an urgent task (although Foucault was not always very optimistic about the actual prospects of this) "...if it is true after all that there is no other point, the first and ultimate, of resistance to political power, except in the relation of self to self". (Foucault 2001c, 241) According to Foucault's diagnosis of the contemporary situation, the struggle against *the submission of the subjectivity (la soumission de la subjectivité)* is the most urgent one. Thus, it is understandable that the resistance is situated in the relation of self to self. Correspondingly, it is understandable, why the (re)discovery and elaboration of practices-, techniques- and equipment of self, in particular, becomes such an urgent political task for Foucault (Foucault 2001b, 1047-1051).

Thus, Foucault's analysis of the art of living is able to approach the question of resistance in terms more specific than before; to tackle the issue of the constitution of the resistant subject(s); or of the resistant subjectivation, even at the level of its arts, techniques and equipment. It is precisely the necessity of protection from fear and terror, as well as the exercises and equipment indispensable for this, which occupy a major significance in Foucault's thought on the matter.

### 5.3 Sonorous Art and the Threat of Sound

Having examined Foucault's basic juxtaposition between fear/terror and aesthetics, ethics and resistance, it is possible to turn to the second question: What is the particular role of the ear(s), sound, audition, sonorous art and music in this constellation? This question will occupy this section of the Chapter clearly demonstrating that Foucault does tackle the issue of auditory perception and sound.

When it comes to reading Foucault's late studies on the art of living, on ethics- and ethics of existence, the importance of discursive practices, -techniques and -equipment has been, in various cases emphasized. However, the issue of different "materialities" of media, the *body of discourse*, the related different perceptual/sensory qualities (visual, auditory etc.), and the distinctive *arts and techniques of sensory effects*, has not been sufficiently considered in this context. Perhaps it has been assumed that the emphasis of Foucault's discussion on the techniques, practices and equipment of self, is the meaning-content or "message" of discourse, taken as somewhat independent and abstracted from the sensory/perceptual specificities of media. Hence, the resistant subjectivation, the politics of fostering courage and terminating terror, would be reducible to the level of linguistic signification, to meaning-generation, communication, interpretation etc. Somewhat paradoxically, then, the aesthetics and ethics of existence becomes an aesthetics indifferent and neutral to the question of sensation, sensorium, and differences in the materials. In this case,

is there any reason to even speak of “aesthetics” anymore? (see for instance Nehamas 2000, 157-188).<sup>57</sup>

Yet the case is not quite as simple as that. Foucault begins to reflect on the significance of sound, when he is reflecting on the relation between the art of living, and *paideia*, which is (somewhat roughly) the Greek word for *education*:

This *paideia*, it is what one notices among people, who are, as the translation says, ‘verbal artists (*des artistes du verbe*)’. It is, to put it exactly: *phōnēs ergastikous*. *Ergastikoi*, they are the artisans, the workers, that is to say, people who work not at all for themselves, but to sell and make profit. And what is the object, on which these *ergastikoi* work? It is *phōnē*, in other words, *speech in so far as it makes noise (la parole en tant qu’elle fait du bruit)*, but not in so far as it is *logos* or the reason (*mais non pas en tant quelle [sic!]est le logos ou la raison*). They are, I would say, the ‘makers of words (*les faiseurs de mots*)’. They are the people who fabricate, to sell them, *a certain number of effects that are bound to the sonority of words (un certain nombre d’effets qui sont liés à la sonorité des mots)*, instead of being people who work for themselves at the level of *logos (au niveau du logos)*, which is to say, of the rational frame of the discourse (*de l’armature rationnelle du discours*). So, one has *paideia*, defined...as that which is the object itself of these artisans of the verbal noise (*de ces artisans du bruit verbal*). (Foucault 2001c, 229; my emphasis)

Notice that Foucault is constructing a juxtaposition in this passage. On one side, there is the art of living, the care for the self and the ethical/aesthetical liberty, with their indispensable discursive equipment (*logoi*) of preparation and protection, of fighting terror and fostering courage. In the first part of the Chapter, the meaning of these was examined in some detail. On the other side of the juxtaposition, there is the constellation formed by *paideia*, the *art* as well as the *artists- or artisans of verbal noise*, that is, art and artists of the *sonority* of speech, and of the *sonorous and auditory effects*, as separate from semantics, from linguistic signification and content of discourse. Between these two poles, there seems to be a relation of conflict.

Consider the latter side of the juxtaposition. It will clarify what actually is at stake in the antagonism between the two. First, as Foucault points out, there is the intertwinement of *paideia* and *sound*, *sonorous/auditory effects*, the art of sonority and of the *sonorous/auditory effects*. In his analysis, by equating the *sonority* with *noise*, as forming the specific object of the artisans’ skill, and also the instrument or equipment of the dubitable education, Foucault highlights the juxtaposition between the two poles. There is the *sonorous/auditory event* of voice or sound as such, without signification, with all the *sonorous/auditory qualities* (such as its timbre, tone, melisma, rhythm, volume) in all their richness and variety on one hand. On the other hand, there is *logos* or meaningful discourse, in which the voice has been submitted to and conditioned by the demands of linguistic signification.

Foucault proposes that the *sonorous art*, or the art of noise, is the art of mastering sound or voice, in all the rich variety of their *sonorous qualities* and,

<sup>57</sup> Bennett (1996) briefly speculates, whether Foucault’s techniques of self might have a special proximity with the “hand”, but the grounds for this statement remain somewhat scarce. Of course, one reason for regarding these issues to be unimportant for Foucault, might be the fact that they have been so closely related to phenomenological philosophy.

consequently, mastering the equally rich variety of auditory effects on the listener. He suggests that mastery cannot be satisfied in just fulfilling of the basic needs of linguistic signification, clarity in the articulation of understandable speech. Hence, Foucault can be understood as equating the art of sonority with the art of non-meaning, or at least, of linguistic non-meaning, namely: with the art of noise.

Foucault does not specify further his meaning of the *sonority* of voice or sound, or what sort of sonorous qualities he actually believes form the definite object of mastery of the artists/artisans of noise. Perhaps *sonority* for Foucault is the rather common sense of the term and includes qualities such as volume, timbre, pitch, inflection, melody, rhythm, resonance, attack and so on. If this is the case, then what Foucault calls the art of sonority approximates music, and vocal music in particular. Similarly, he does not specify either the quality of the auditory effects produced by this art and its artists. All that Foucault specifies is that sonority, its art and its effects, is separate from and irreducible to *logos*, meaningful speech, linguistic communication, rational argumentation, and, consequently, the philosophical art of living.

How, then, should the auditory/sonorous effects produced by the artists of noise be understood, and what reason is there to establish such a strong linkage between these effects and *paideia*, and juxtapose them with the philosophical care for the self? Recalling that Foucault is particularly interested in ancient Greco-Roman philosophy because he saw its significance in the practice of philosophy, the philosophical way of life, as an *art of living* (see section 5.1). Perhaps the best known and most seminal depiction of ancient Greek *paideia*, in which the significance of sound and music is prominent, is found in various dialogues of Plato. Curiously enough, however, when Foucault explicitly analyses the sense of *paideia* in the Platonic dialogues, he does not take up the question of music, or the question of voice, sound, or of sonority. Instead Foucault concentrates, in more general terms, on the significance of the Socratic imperative (*know yourself/connais-toi toi-même/gnōthi seauton*). Only, when it comes to the Pythagorean tradition, does Foucault briefly mention the fact that music actually had importance as a technique of purification (Foucault 2001c, 43-76).

When Foucault *does* explicitly discuss *sonorous paideia* (the art of noise etc.), juxtaposing this with the aesthetic-ethical art of living, he does not indicate his actual historical referent. Is this reason to presume that Foucault's discussion on Greek *paideia* (examined above), in which he gives the sonorous techniques such a central role, should exclude the reflection on musical *paideia* found in Plato's dialogues? The dialogues are a textual source appropriate to clarifying the meaning of the sonorous/musical *paideia*, its techniques and effects. It is necessary to briefly recount some of the central features of the Platonic depiction, in order to understand Foucault's confrontation with *paideia*, and the juxtaposition made between the *art of noise* (of sonorous/auditory effects) and the art/ethics/aesthetics of living/existence.

## 5.4 Paideia, Music and the Sonorous Art of Government

It is known, that in numerous dialogues Plato explores the reasons for the unique, superior educative power of music, or specifically of *mousikē*, a category including poetry together with music. Plato depicts the role of *mousikē* in the formation of citizens with a virtuous character (in education and therapy). These ideas on the powers of music continued to receive support after Plato and found strong support in the Roman philosophy of imperial Rome. This gives all the more reason to make a brief excursus into the discussion on musical *paideia* in Plato's dialogues.

To begin with, the forms of rhythm and harmony, in so far as they take the *sonorous* mode in music, in so far as they are actualized in the organization of the relations between sounds, of the temporal durations of sounds, of differences in pitch, have an incomparable capacity to enter and penetrate, and produce an immediate, inescapable effect on the soul, more specifically its irrational, non- and pre-linguistic and affective parts, which are the *appetites* and *thumos* (the "spirited" part of the soul). The belief in this superior power of music is well in line with the characterization of the nature of sound and the sense of hearing, which emphasizes the dynamic nature of sound (as a blow) entering through the ears, and the passivity of audition (a state of being moved) as vibration produced by sound, which spreads and makes resonate both the body and soul<sup>58</sup> (Plato *The Republic*, 401; *Timaeus*, 67b-c; see also Cohen-Levinas 2005, 101-114).

With the affective movements, the sonorous movements of music have a unique *mimetic* relationship. Sounds and sonorous forms, modes and rhythms, offer the most immediate (un-mediated by language) imitative presentation/expression of affects and different economies of affects, that is of different *characters* [*ethos*]. Moreover, the Dorian and Phrygian modes imitate the character appropriate for a citizen of *polis*<sup>59</sup> (see Plato *The Republic*, 398e, 399a-c; *Laches*, 188d 2-8).

<sup>58</sup> Of course, a heterogeneous variety of thinkers after Plato have presented accounts emphasizing the nature of the "auditory medium" (and, consequently, of music too), as the privileged sensory medium of movement, force, time, action, dynamism etc. Aristotle is quite explicit on this point, arguing for the unique capacity of hearing to perceive pure movement, the manifestation of action as such – through sound – without relating these to any body-object (see Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 418b-421a, 422a, 437a). In modern Western philosophy as well diverse thinkers from Hegel to Nietzsche, to Bergson and philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, have presented somewhat parallel ideas on this matter.

<sup>59</sup> Even though the *Dorian mode* imitates the *thumos* of a warrior in battle, it is a harmonious order expressing reasonable courage and anger, not chaotic violence or foolhardiness. Phrygian mode imitates the discrete and temperate affects suitable for peaceful conditions and prosperous living. Plato understands *rhythm* (*rhuthmos*) as the order of movement, which connects differences of velocity into a relationship of concord and symmetry (Plato *Symposium*, 187; *Philebus*, 17d). The two rhythms appropriate (and necessary) for the virtuous character are the rhythm of the *war dance* (*pyrrhikhe*), and the rhythm of a more peaceful dance called *emmeleia* (Plato, *Laws*, 814e-816d). Similar point about the usefulness of this war dance is later argued also by Aristides Quintilianus, in relation to Roman army (*De musica*, Book I,

In the very same process of mimesis, music also penetrates, grasps, possesses, and leaves its trace on the soul by inspiring or arousing affective movement. However, the effect of music, the mimetic trace left on the soul of the one who hears it, is not limited to a fleeting emotional impression. Instead, a relation of *sympathy* is generated, where the affective movements respond, are assimilated, and begin to “resonate” in accordance with the model provided by music. Plato explains that this leads to the harmonization of the affective movements and to the harmonization of the soul with itself. In this way, musical sound functions as an instrument of “correction”, curing the soul by regularizing and harmonizing the irregularities and discords (“pathologies”, “vices”) of affective movements. In turn this means that the alternations, “timing”, variations in intensity and speed of the appetites and *thumos* are gradually ordered in concord with the music. This is how music, and apparently *only music*, is able to shape the character of the listener by the music’s own lasting mimetic trace or stamp. For these reasons, music was regarded, in ancient Greek and Roman culture, as an indispensable instrument of *paideia* (Plato *The Republic*, 377, 395d, 398e, 399a-c, 529a-531d, 424c; *Symposium*, 187; *Philebus*, 17d; *Laches*, 188d 2-8; *Timaeus*, 47 d-e, 88c; *Laws*, 660, 664a, 812c-813a).

Needless to say, *paideia* and consequently music occupy a unique significance for the constitution and preservation of *polis*, because music alone is the instrument capable of producing, shaping and organizing the irrational (appetitive/affective) character of each individual citizen, and by the same token, of ordering the whole of community. Music is indispensable, because it is capable of “rationalizing the irrational”, of making each individual not only obey, but to love, praise and rejoice over the law and justice, and hate and avert what is illegal and unjust. Music is able to accomplish this by governing the irrational, even before the awakening of understanding or reason (before the capacity to *logos*). Music extends the law into the very basic constitution of the pre-linguistic, pre-rational, in modern terms un-conscious character or personality, into the affective dispositions and habits. From the same reasons, Plato also mentions the dangers of wrong kind of music (Plato *Laws*, 653-654, 665a, 672-673, 790c-791a).<sup>60</sup>

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Chapters 13-14, Book II, Chapter 6). By the virtuous rhythms, the “fastness” of quick temper or warlikeness, and the “slowness”, meaning calmness or peacefulness, are organized in a relationship of balance in the souls of citizens (and in the order of the city’s distinctive parts) (Plato *Statesman*, 306-311; on the discussions on the political and other significances of dance and rhythm, in Plato and in ancient Greek culture more generally, see for example Sachs 1963, 239; Anderson 1966, 101-102 and Winkler 1985; Benveniste 1971). When it comes to the question of musical instruments, appropriate for education are the string instruments (*kithara*, *lyre*), due to their superior punctuality in pitch and their limited capacity in variation (in tone, mode, tenor, character) (Plato *The Republic*, 399d-e; see also Burkert 1985, 224-225; Landels 2001, 24-26, 150-162).

<sup>60</sup> This interrelation of law, education and the superior rhetorical power of music (*rhythm*, *rhuthmos* in particular), actualized in the shaping of the irrational according to a culturally dominant, general *type*, is given a central status in one of the seminal studies dealing with the ancient Greek idea and culture of *paideia*. The study is the one conducted by Werner Jaeger, first published in the late 1930’s (see Jaeger 1936, 2-

## 5.5 Modern Elaborations of the Ancient Model: Sonorous Techniques of Fear and Terror

In *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* -lecture Foucault explicitly discusses the significance of sonorous art in *paideia*. In this lecture he does not specify what he means by the sonorous/auditory effect, or how these are related to the practices of education. However, this does not mean that Foucault was ignorant or uninterested in the sense of *paideia* as government of affects. In fact just the reverse is true, given that on another occasion (a discussion from 1977), Foucault points out the significance of Plato's dialogues in their presenting a description of rational technologies of power for the *positive/productive non-repressive control of the irrational instincts, drives, impulses, and affects*:

Secondly, is it so sure that the goal of these rational technologies of power is the repression of the instincts (*la répression des instincts*)? Could one not say, on the contrary, that it is well often a manner of stimulating them (*une manière de les stimuler*), of exciting them (*de les exciter*) by irritating them (*en les irritant*), by tormenting them (*en les tourmentant*), in order to lead them where one wants to (*pour les mener là où l'on veut*), by making them function in such and such manner (*en les faisant fonctionner de telle ou telle manière*)? (Foucault 2001b, 396)

Thus Foucault's depiction of the "Platonic" techniques or rational technologies of power, used for taking charge of the irrational in a non-repressive, positive and productive manner, relates to some of the most central points in Foucault's genealogical analyses of modern forms of power. The significance of these technologies, to situate them in the framework of Foucault's thought, is anything but a curiosity of ancient political thought. The description of these technologies that stimulate, direct, organize, instrumentalize and "functionalize" drives, desires and instincts, produce aptitudes and dispositions, and by these means take care of the usefulness and productivity of the irrational, is in line with Foucault's account of the basic manner of working of the disciplinary apparatus. There is also at least one concrete affinity between the Platonic account of mimetic *paideia* and Foucault's conception of modern discipline: discipline makes the individual's forces, capacities, and energies useful and productive, by shaping and organizing the manner or aptitude of their *orientation in time*, the manner in which their activity unfolds in the temporal axis, by making them internalize (teaching them) an *obligatory rhythm*, a model or pattern, which divides movements into punctual series of discrete, calculable units, assigns them a definite direction and prescribes their order of

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13, 18, 174-175; Jaeger 1959, 3-11). As already mentioned, these ideas of the uniquely active/dynamic/living nature of sound (in comparison to visual figures or mere *logos* as such), and of the resulting mimetic capacity of music to shape the character, giving music a political significance –ranging from education and therapy to the art of war – were still endorsed and further specified much later, in the philosophy of Rome (for instance in Neo-Platonist thought) (see above all Aristides Quintilianus, *De musica*, Book I, Chapters 13-14, Book II, Chapters 4, 6, 18).

succession <sup>61</sup> (see Foucault 1979, 143, 151-152, 170, 187, 195-197, 200-203, 216-217; Foucault 2001a, 1486-1490).

The further developments of the ancient “prototype” of *paideia*, the *political technologies of the irrational* would appear to be particularly functional for the normalizing or normating mode of modern power. Foucault suggests that normation/normalization aims at the correction and regularization of the individual, ensuring a socially non-dangerous or morally virtuous individual. Foucault sees normalization occurring at the level of actual behavior, but more essentially, at the level of virtualities, of potential behavior and capacities. The control aims at detecting and correcting tendencies, inclinations, motives, attitudes and habits. The detection and correction is to defend society from the abnormality and the dangers found in the individual’s affects. Foucault gives special attention to the direction and organization, and to the lack of direction and pathological disequilibrium, of the economy of the irrational, pre-cognitive, pre-linguistic, and involuntary processes. What is important is the intrinsic energies or forces the spontaneous dynamics of appetites, instincts, impulses, drives and desires, as well as the quality and formation of the pre-rational, pre-linguistic character/personality. The rational technologies of the irrational are of particular use if normalization is to be successful <sup>62</sup> (see Foucault 1999, 23-24, 46, 84-86, 119-147; Foucault 2001a, 1461, 1471, 1474, 1482; Foucault 2001b, 452-464). To summarize, *paideia* is like the prototype for the modes of power, including the strategies, the rational techniques/technologies, which aim at intervening, regulating and normalizing the irrational, at shaping and organizing the economy of affects/drives/instincts/desires etc., according to a given model, and in order to make them follow a rule.

Foucault also insists that fear and terror have a significant role in normalization. The force of a norm, and of law made to function as a norm, the effectiveness of guaranteeing compliance, and correspondingly, the difficulty of *resistance* or *subversion*, partly rests on the affects of *terror* and *fear*. This is not, however, the fear and terror of sovereign violence, or the fear of punishment. Instead, the force of the norm rests on the fear, terror and aversion woken by the abnormal, the criminal, the pathological, by subversive behavior, motives, desires and temptations. This fear occurs without need for an exterior threat of

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<sup>61</sup> Foucault’s self-proclaimed philosophical “exemplar”, Nietzsche, is far more explicit on his belief in the special mimetic/affective power of music, giving a special importance to rhythm. For Nietzsche, the *ancient rhythm* is the form par excellence, which orders a multitude of affects into the coherent form of *character (ethos)*, governs and even eliminates them if needed, and organizes them into relations of harmony and balance. In this sense, the ancient rhythm is both aesthetical and moral (Nietzsche 1973, §290, 303, 317; Nietzsche 1972b [A Letter to Carl Fuchs, N:o 248]).

<sup>62</sup> Foucault also makes the interesting point, that *family* is in fact a *cellule of sovereignty*, functioning inside the modern disciplinary (panoptic) society, one that is *indispensable* for the very functioning of disciplinary apparatuses, first, because only the familial-sovereign power is capable of fixing an individual, by *obligation*, to the disciplinary apparatuses and, secondly, because it is the necessary “exchanger, the point of junction, which assures the passage from one disciplinary system to the other, from one dispositif to the other (*l’échangeur, le point de jonction qui assure le passage d’un système disciplinaire à l’autre, d’un dispositif à l’autre*).” (Foucault 2003, 80-85)

punishment or sanction. The rational technologies of the irrational are the ones used to provide the norm with this “motivating” force. This “motivating” force occurs in two ways: by directing and fixing the affects of pleasure, and the appetite for pleasure on what is normal (what conforms to the norm); and by fixing the affects of suffering/displeasure as well as terror, fear, and aversion on what is abnormal/criminal (see Foucault 1999, 33). A vivid example is the scene from Stanley Kubrick’s film *Clockwork Orange*, in which the monstrously violent, psychopathic criminal antihero is “cured” by means of various technologies operating on his instinctual economy, by making him (automatically) feel suffering and, as a result, fear, terror and aversion upon any criminal desire or temptation.

If *paideia* is akin to the archetype of the power over the irrational, as Foucault presents it, it is no wonder that he should construct the juxtaposition of: the ethics/aesthetics of existence with its techniques of self and *discursive equipment* (*logoi*); and the *paideia* with its arts and techniques of the irrational, the art of noise and sonorous/auditory effects. As has been emphasized, the equipment of true discourse is needed to *protect a person from terror and fear*, and, by these means, to make the agent resistant against various attempts to govern. This equipment is needed to protect the ethical/aesthetical liberty of self-government and self-creation. In opposition to these discursive equipment, *paideia* and its sonorous arts, techniques/technologies, seem to have a role in the use of power that aims at affecting and subjecting individuals indisputably to the rule, by turning the rule into the organizing form of character, of the most fundamental personal dispositions. Foucault could not be much more explicit than this: “...So, the function of *physiologia* is to *paraskeuein*, to give the soul the equipment necessary for its combat (*son combat*), for its objective and for its victory. As such, it is opposed to *paideia* (*en soi elle s’oppose à la paideia*)” (Foucault 2001c, 230).

When it comes to true courage, to the *absence of terror*, understood as distance and “indifference” protecting our liberty in the face of both suffering and pleasure, the sonorous techniques seem to have nothing positive to offer. The sonorous techniques in rhetoric or music can only stimulate, direct, organize and shape human aptitude for pleasure and suffering, and the related aptitudes of *fear and terror*, thus in the end maintaining or even enhancing an individual’s dependence on these affects. As has been shown, rather than with the discursive protection, or care for the self, it is with *paideia* that Foucault so strongly relates the *art of sonority*, the *art of noise* and the *production of sonorous/auditory effects*. As opposed to this, sonority is *not* given any positive function in the formation/protection of liberty, in overcoming fear and terror, and in the *resistant subjectivation*. Hence, it appears that sonorous art, music included, has a role to play in the *art of governing others*, *not in the aesthetics of existence*, and in the *care for the self*.

The continuity Foucault describes between *paideia* and modern discipline/normalization/normation can be found at the general level of objects, goals and strategies in the control of irrational. Moreover, it is possible



to speak of modern elaboration/variation of the ancient model of *paideia* in the specific technologies of power at use in this “positive” control of desires/instincts. This control may refer to the use of music, or of sonorous techniques of power, in modern discipline and normalization, although, Foucault himself does not argue this point explicitly. There are various historical examples of the significance of musical/sonorous techniques of affective control, even surpassing the significance of linguistic- and visual techniques, in different phases in the development of modern forms of power. These examples referred to could be considered significant, at least in the light of Foucault’s genealogies.

Among these examples are the significance of music in the history of the *art of war* and *military discipline*, with the strong, explicit homage paid to the ancient examples.<sup>63</sup> There is also the French Revolution and the explicit attempt of the Jacobin government to return to the Greek- and Roman models on the use of certain musical modes, rhythms and instruments in order to form and maintain a passionately patriotic, militant, self-sacrificial and law-respecting citizenry of the new republic of France<sup>64</sup> (see Johnson 1995, 116-153). Or, forward in history, there is the modern psychological/psychiatric discourse- and practice of music, and in particular rhythm and volume, which has been given significance as an instrument of mimetically controlling the normality and abnormality defined in terms of the order of durations, dynamics and intensities of brain-functions (see for example Condon 1986, 55-57, 58-75; Evans 1986, 266-273; Rider & Eagle 1986, 229-242). It seems that the ancient musical *paideia* is not perhaps so alien after all.

All of these continuities in the sonorous/musical technologies of discipline and normalization should be considered despite the fact that Foucault himself does not explicate such similarities between *paideia* and modern discipline/normalization, at least not when it comes to the role of sonorous techniques in these. In the majority of Foucault’s analyses of discipline and normalization (see especially Chapter 2 above), his focus is strongly on the *visual/optic (panoptic)* or discursive techniques, which makes him vulnerable to accusations of visual overemphasis, and of ignorance on the possibilities and historical role of other techniques of power, and the use of other sensory modalities.<sup>65</sup> However, as it has been seen regarding *paideia*, the power over the

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<sup>63</sup> An interesting discussion, in the context of Renaissance political thought, on the lasting significance of musical rhythm and modes (in accordance to the ancient models) for organizing the movements of an army, as well as for “raising its spirit”, can be found in Niccolò Machiavelli (1989, 621).

<sup>64</sup> In the post-revolutionary France, and still throughout the 19th Century, quite fully in line with the views of ancient Greek authorities, *deaf* people (unlike the blind), due to their lack of hearing, were considered impossible to educate, and consequently categorically excluded from the status of citizens (on this issue, see Mirzoeff 1995, 65-70, 97-100).

<sup>65</sup> For the examples of the strong visual emphasis in Foucault’s genealogies of modern power (see Foucault 1979, 187, 200; Foucault 2001b, 190, 197-198, 373-374; Foucault 2003, 71, 75-79, 103-104, 248, 300-301; Foucault 1999, 41-44). For the various critical arguments, accusing Foucault either of a reductive account of vision, or of his neglect of the role of other audition (see Howes 2005; Law 2005; Sterne 2003, 14-19, 127-128;

irrational, Foucault does acknowledge the central significance of the art of sound, sonority, and sonorous/auditory effects, although, admittedly, his explicit discussion on this point remains limited to the historical context of ancient Greco-Roman culture.

## 5.6 Philosophers Terrorized by Sound?

From the preceding discussion it is apparent that Foucault actually *does* acknowledge the possibility, as well as the actual historical role, of *sonorous (and also musical) power*. On this basis, the charge of Foucault's ignorance of the political potential and significance of sonority (and music) may be too harsh and unconditional. If so this requires a revision of the established portrait of Foucault as a thinker with an exclusively visual or linguistic focus, who denies or ignores the political potentiality of the use of sound, sonority, auditory perception and music, as well as the historical significance of these. Thus, the possibilities opened for *sonorous genealogies*, of genealogies of music, are only waiting to be actualized.

Yet another problematic issue comes to the fore in reading Foucault's analysis of the strong enmity between the philosophical care for the self and the sonorous art. Foucault's approach to the sphere of sonority and audition (as shown above) appears to have a rather strong sense of "suspiciousness" to it. The art, technology and equipment of sound and voice, music and auditory effect (and also rhetoric, in so far as it deals with auditory effects), seem to be suitable only to subjecting us to the affective economy. They make one remain slave to pleasure, suffering and appetite and, most importantly, slave to *fear and terror*. For Foucault, fear and terror, and the technologies and instruments of producing these, are rather fundamental in the functioning of power (also the disciplinary and normalizing modes), in guaranteeing conformity. Fear and terror are perhaps the most serious adversaries of the *ethical/aesthetical liberty of self-government, of the creation of self as a work of art*. Consequently, *protection from terror* is also an urgent, if not the most central, task, if we intend to take care of this liberty, to open possibilities for resistance. The sonorous/auditory technologies cannot help us in "taking care of ourselves". In Foucault analysis, the latter task appears to be reserved exclusively to the discursive equipment of *philosophical logos*.

Does this not imply that sonority and audition are characterized by a list of "functions" including political functions, which themselves are *not* understood as politically constituted or historically changeable, but instead as something like pre-politically given, inherent, and invariable? Is this not the case, when Foucault is referring to the presupposition of the unique passivity,

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Schmidt 2003; Schafer 2003; Jay 1988 307-326; Jay 1989 175-205; Jay 1994 6-7, 1-26, 381-416, 587-595; Jay 1996, 1-15; Flynn 1993, 273-286 ; Bal 1993, 379-405).

receptivity and affectivity of audition, and the unique dynamism and mimetic power of sound and music in the control of the irrational?

This approach has, certainly, been an influential one throughout the history of Occidental philosophy, variations of it ranging from Plato and Aristotle to divergent modern philosophers, such as Hegel, Nietzsche and Bergson, all the way to phenomenology, certain strains in Marxist theory, and even to certain thinkers labeled as post-structuralist (this issue has already been discussed in the preceding Chapters). The adoption of this idea has also led to *fear and terror* being a common reaction of the philosophical tradition to audition, sound and music, to fear and terror about the threat posed by music to subjectivity, to liberty, to self-mastery, and to the possibilities of autonomous political action. The latter have been fundamentally related to *logos*, speech, linguistic signification, argumentation etc. Is it not curious that, contrary to his own basic orientation, Foucault should rather uncritically succumb to this fundamental, ontological, idea of the threat, fear and terror of sound and music, without attempting to politicize it, or to reflect on the possibilities of different political uses of music, sound, sonority and audition? This occasion, late in Foucault thought, appears to be another *right-of-origin-argument* which first occurred in Foucault's work in the 1960's (see Chapter I). However, it should be remembered how Foucault's thinking can also refute the right-of-origin-argument (see again Chapter I). The context of his late thought makes it still more evident that Foucault's approach to the issue of audition and sound is by no means coherent, which was the premise from the beginning.

This section is a comparison with Chapter 4, which dealt with Foucault's thoughts on the issue *musical listening* in its intertwinement with friendship, and this, especially, in the context of Foucault's relationship with Pierre Boulez. There appears to be an interesting tension, or even a discrepancy, between the central argument put forth in Chapter 4 and what has been argued in this Chapter.

Chapter 4 presented the idea of *the asceticism of listening*, of musical listening, one that was called *serious* by Foucault and Boulez in their dialogue. Most centrally, this mode of asceticism was about resisting speech, *resisting logos*, and about working to *disarm* the self from the reassuring and familiarizing schemes. In this manner, as it was emphasized, this asceticism works to expose oneself for an event, for the unexpected arrival, for the intrusion and for the interruption, which characterize music, or, more specifically, certain varieties of music, of contemporary music, but also the friend, the friend in his/her singularity. Through this asceticism, the exercises of self upon self *in disarming the self*, opened the experience of *absolute beauty*, as Foucault called it. This characterization offered the kernel to understand what the *asceticism of friendship* is about. Thus, an *asceticism with a political sense*, *asceticism of resistance* which is also *aesthetics of resistance* (the absolute beauty), is set in a relation of conflict with the political/governmental rationality, and with the practices of intervention working according to the logic of *omnes et singulatim*.

Quite evidently, the argument that has been put forth in the course of Chapter 5 appears to refute the one from Chapter 4. The care for the self, the aesthetics-ethics of the self and of -existence, the modes of asceticism belonging to this, the exercises- and techniques of the self etc., have all been characterized in rather strong, even categorical, terms as being practices of *logos*, and more specifically, as practices centered around the *philosophical truth-speaking* or *truth-saying*, around the *philosophical mode of parrêsia*. This proceeds further to the *subjectivation of the logos*, to the subjectivation of the truth-speaking which appeared to be a central, if not *the* central, thesis in Foucault's reading of late-ancient philosophy on the theme of courage and resistance to terror, a thesis that extends its political relevance to the context of Foucault's contemporary situation. Furthermore, the resistant subjectivation was depicted in terms of the fundamental opposition *to events*, the exercising of oneself in the struggle against events (like an "*athlete of events*"), in order to make oneself increasingly *harder*, more *unyielding*, more *impenetrable*, more *immune* in the face of intrusions, in the face of the arrival of events. As was stressed, the philosophical asceticism, the *arming of oneself with logos*, through the subjectivation of *logos*, is needed for the former purpose. One ought to arm oneself with *logos*, one ought to equip oneself with *logos*, and one ought to subjectivate *logos* in order to become impenetrable in the face of events.

It should be clear that the idea of the subjectivation of *logos* really is central for Foucault's elaborations of the care for the self, and of the modality of resistant subjectivation, the formation of the resistant subject(s). Notice the pervasive, extensive sense given by Foucault to this subjectivation. It means the turning of the truth-discourse, the truth-speaking- or truth-saying into the *manner of being of the subject* as such, that is, turning of the discourse into something that really *determines* the being-subject, so that it is the *logos* that really structures, that really directs, in the manner of a *pilot*, the relation-to-self, the choices, the decisions and finally the actions, which constitute the being-subject as such. In this extensive sense it is necessary to understand the asceticism revolving around *logos*. It is asceticism of discourse, discursive asceticism, consisting of exercises of re-enunciation, re-pronunciation, re-writing and re-reading also. The repetition of phrases aims to generate a memory, an *active* or *acting memory*, in which the phrases actually direct by their *commands* the agency as such, extending their direction from the reflection and deliberation, from the decisions, all the way even to the orientation of the *bodily functions* (the "*muscles and nerves*"). The asceticism strives, through all the repetitive exercises of memorization, for the perfect *incorporation* of *logos*, for the perfectly inclusive incorporation of the truth-saying. This appears to be a mode of discursive formation of the subject of the most pervasive sort, the subject who is, as ought to be kept in mind, the resistant, subversive, unruly and courageous subject. To really equip and "*arm*" oneself with *logos*, to really make the *logos* into an effective equipment of resistance, in Foucault's sense, requires one to practice the subjectivation of the *logos*, as the result of which having the *logos* at hand, and being had/possessed by the *logos*, using the discourse and

being used by the discourse, speaking-the-truth and being-spoken by the truth-saying, come together:

...this equipment with which one must equip oneself (*cet équipement dont on doit se doter*)...is constituted by *logoi* (by discourses) (*est constitué par des logoi [des discours]*)...The good athlete (*le bon athlète*), who has the sufficient *paraskeuē*...it is the one who has...filed into himself, implanted into himself (*fiché en lui, implanté en lui*)...phrases effectively pronounced (*des phrases effectivement prononcées*), phrases he has effectively heard or read (*des phrases qu'il a effectivement entendues ou lues [sic!]*), phrases he has himself embedded into himself in the spirit (*des phrases qu'il s'est incrustées lui-même dans l'esprit*), by repeating them (*en les répétant*), repeating them inside his memory by everyday exercises (*les répétant dans sa mémoire par des exercices quotidiens*)...the athlete is the one who equips himself thus with phrases effectively heard or read (*l'athlète est celui qui se dote donc de phrases effectivement entendues ou lues*), effectively recollected by him (*par lui effectivement remémorées*), repronounced (*reprononcées*), written and rewritten (*écrites et réécrites*) (Foucault 2001c, 308)

...the *logos* must be there: fortress, citadel elevated on its height (*forteresse, citadelle perchée sur sa hauteur*) and towards which one withdraws (*et vers laquelle on se replie*). One withdraws upon oneself (*on se replie sur soi-même*), on oneself inasmuch as one is *logos* (*sur soi-même en tant qu'on est logos*). And it is there that one finds the possibility to ward off the event (*et c'est là que l'on trouve la possibilité de repousser l'événement*), to cease being...the weaker one (*de cesser d'être...le plus faible*) in relation to it, to be able to prevail at last (*de pouvoir enfin l'emporter*) (ibid., 310)

...In reality, everyone must have this equipment at hand (*il faut en réalité que chacun ait cet équipement sous la main*)...which is to say that one must have it so to speak almost inside the muscles (*c'est-à-dire qu'il faut l'avoir en quelque sorte presque dans les muscles*)...so that it can become integrated into the individual and command his action (*pour qu'il puisse venir s'intégrer à l'individu et commander son action*), and belong, so to say, to his muscles and nerves (*et faire partie en quelque sorte de ses muscles et de ses nerfs*): that is why one will have to beforehand, as preparation in the *askēsis* (*à titre de préparation dans l'askēsis*), do all those exercises of recollection (*faire tous ces exercices de remémoration*)...But when the event will take place (*mais lorsque l'événement se produira*), at that moment the *logos* must, at that point, have become the subject of action itself (*il faut à ce moment-là, que le logos soit, à ce point, devenu le sujet d'action lui-même*), the subject of action itself must have become *logos* at that point (*que le sujet d'action lui-même soit à ce point devenu logos*)...The *askēsis*, it is what allows the truth-saying... to be set up as manner of being of the subject (*l'askēsis, c'est ce qui permet que le dire-vrai...se constitue comme manière d'être du sujet*). The *askēsis* makes the truth-saying into a mode of being of the subject (*l'askēsis fait du dire-vrai un mode d'être du sujet*). (ibid., 311-312; cf. Foucault 2001b, 1172-1184)

It is in this framework that Foucault uses the figure of the *interior voice* (*la voix intérieure*) in a specific sense, in reference to the philosophical asceticism of *logos*. To put it simply, one formulation of the *telos* of the *logos*-asceticism is to say that it is to generate, maintain and strengthen this interior voice. When the *logos* is effectively subjectivated the birth of such an interior voice should be witnessed. It should be noticed that this interior voice is defined in terms of speech, of discourse. It is, essentially, for Foucault, the truth-speaking and truth-saying voice that is under consideration. Or, what comes to mean the same here, we are dealing with the rational or reasonable voice, with the voice of reason even, which issues the commands, and thus directs the activities in the manner of the "good pilot", and by such means *offers protection, "arms" the*

*self*, makes the self resistant, impenetrable, unyielding etc. <sup>66</sup> (Foucault 2001b, 1172-1184; Foucault 2001c, 310).

Most centrally, the interior voice *is not just a voice* in abstract, without further determinations. It is not the *bare voice*, and it is most certainly not *noise*. It is not characterized, primarily and essentially, by the *sonorous* or *auditory* qualities at all. What, apparently, *does* characterize the interior voice primarily and essentially, is its functional role, its subservience and its instrumentality in respect to the *sense* or *meaning* of speech, which is the truth and the prescriptive-commanding content. In more concrete terms, the interior voice, or the interiorized voice, is determined by its functionality, by its instrumental efficiency for the teaching, reception, memorization, recollection, enunciation, re-enunciation and re-actualization. The interior voice is the point of reference for all the practices and exercises of repetition by which the truth, and the protective prescriptions become effectively subjectivated (“implanted”, “embedded” etc.). Only if, and only to the extent that it forms, and *is formed* through articulation so as to generate, and re-generate, implant, re-actualize meaningful, reasonable, true, prescriptive *phrases*, is the voice given a status as the interior voice, in the asceticism of preparation and protection, which makes the care for the self. The auditory-sonorous qualities of the voice as such, or the voice as an auditory-sonorous event, as detached and taken independently from the functional requirements mentioned, *does not* have any legitimate role, but is either insignificant, or at worst harmful, having an obstructive effect from the standpoint of the care for the self <sup>67</sup> (Foucault 2001b, 1172-1184; Foucault 2001c, 310).

As already mentioned, it was in a very explicit manner that Foucault treated the relation of conflict between the philosophical asceticism of *logos*, and the penetrating, affective power of the *voice* (*phōnē*), and the *art of sonority* using this power (*paideia*). *Paideia* was taken as something like the prototype of such

<sup>66</sup> In the following reflection on the idea of the *interior voice*, its significance for the protection and care, as well as its relation to the particular sort of memory – the active, commanding memory – is stressed. So is also the fact that the interior voice really is defined by the true discourse, by the reasonable speech, by *logoi*: “One must indeed understand that what is at issue here is indeed something else than a simple recollection that one would recall when need be (*il faut bien comprendre qu’il s’agit là de bien autre chose que d’un simple souvenir, qu’on rappellerait le cas échéant*)...a medicine (*pharmakon*) that we must be equipped with (*un médicament [pharmakon] dont nous devons être munis*) in order to ward off all the vicissitudes of the existence (*pour parer à toutes les vicissitudes de l’existence*)...as an interior voice that makes itself heard by itself (*comme une voix intérieure qui se fait entendre d’elle-même*)...they [i.e. the true discourses, L.S.] must be in us like a ‘master whose voice is enough to quell the scolding of the dogs’ (*il faut qu’ils soient en nous comme ‘un maître dont la voix suffit à apaiser le grondement des chiens’*)...a gradation of this genre, going from the instrument one has at one’s disposal to the automatics of the discourse (*une gradation de ce genre, allant de l’instrument dont on dispose à l’automatisme du discours*)...” (Foucault 2001b, 1179-1180)

<sup>67</sup> Recently, Jean Allouch (2007, especially 39) suggests that in the manner of the self-transformation, but one that takes place only *through the relation to other*, a transformation which is *not* really about the attainment of the self-consciousness or self-knowledge, which is not really about the determination of identity, there might be in fact more parallels between Foucault’s account of the philosophical care for the self, and the practices of psychoanalyses, than what is perhaps noticed in general.

musical- and sonorous power, one that takes charge over the affective-appetitive irrational. Thus initially, there is a diametrical opposition (term by term) between the scheme of the philosophical care for the self (the aesthetic-ethical-political) and the asceticism of friendship, as it intertwines with the asceticism of serious music, and of serious listening. What makes the discrepancy even more striking is the fact that both the presentation of the mode of the philosophical care for the self, as well as the idea of friendship and serious listening date from the same period in Foucault's *œuvre* (the early 1980's).

However, Foucault's "musical asceticism", as discussed in conjunction with Boulez (Chapter 4), had a precise sense: the exercises in the art of "serious listening", which included exercises in the exposure of oneself to the unknown arrival, and exercises in the sharing and participation between the interiority and the exteriority even between individual lives. This is far from *paideia*, or the further elaborations of this "prototype". It is far from the *affective-normalizing- or normating* dispositif of power, in which the individual soul and the communal whole are molded and shaped together, by taking charge of the "irrational" by means of musical-sonorous techniques. It can be said that the "serious musical asceticism" *à la* Foucault and Boulez, is *not* such a form of individualizing-totalizing-characterizing power. In fact, the asceticism of the serious music, and the asceticism of friendship can be characterized as being asceticisms of *methexis* – of *sharing, giving- and taking-part "in-between"*. Thus they are significantly different from the reglementing, normating, character-fixating dispositif of the type of *paideia*. Foucault's criticism targeting *paideia* and his suspiciousness concerning its adequacy for the purposes of the resistant care for the self should *not* be understood in such a categorical sense as targeted against music as such. This conclusion suggests itself when comparing the two discussions (from the early 1980's) more carefully.

If the suspiciousness shown against *paideia* and the subsequent elaborations of its model does not categorically apply to music, and to the "serious contemporary music" in particular, then the question still remains open, as to what the relation is between the asceticism of "serious music/friendship", and the philosophical asceticism of *logos*. Admittedly, they appear to be incompatible when their constituent features are depicted and compared. However, the starting point and orientation of Foucault's analysis is: the *pragmatics* of the care for the self and subject-formation, in their articulation with the *discursive pragmatics* of truth-speaking/saying (*parrësia*), and then further, with the *political* strategies and practices of both governance and resistance.

It is from the standpoint of pragmatics, of tactics, strategies, and effective practices that the philosophical mode of *parrësia* and related asceticism of *logos* come into focus for Foucault in the first place. This means that the question: whether or not to "philosophize"; whether or not to take on the protective/preparing practices of *logos*; whether or not to turn to the philosophical art and asceticism of discourse, is formulated in pragmatic-

tactical- or strategic terms instead of resorting to metaphysical or normative arguments on the “proper” or the “highest form of life” etc.. It is a pragmatic question, as to which modality of speech, which modality of discourse, which mode of activity, one should or should not take up. Pragmatics also raises the question of whether to decide to speak or *not to speak at all*, but *remain silent*. This actually leads to the central question concerning the relation of philosophy to politics, which can be given a pragmatic reformulation: as to whether to launch a particular mode of discursive *intervention* that comes from *outside of politics proper*, outside the game of governance-resistance, without coinciding with it, remaining different from the political rationality, but still *acting in relation to and upon the politics*, and having its *effect on politics* by the way of directing the subject-formation, the self-relation, the self-government; or whether instead, to decide to withdraw, to abstain from such an intervention (Foucault 2008, especially 205-224, 263-274).

These questions and the related decisions are fundamental ones for the practice of philosophy, for philosophy as *pragma/pragmata* (practices, exercises) and *ergon* (the activity, the work [*le travail*], the task or the job [*la tâche*]). The work and exercises are centred on the discourse (*logos*), but through them the discourse should become *more than only discourse* (more than only *logos*), meaning that the discourse ought to *become reality* through the work/exercises, that it ought to become *real*. Philosophy should make itself *real*, it should turn its own discourse into reality, make its discourse into something *more than only discourse*, in what Foucault calls the *real of the philosophy* [*le réel de la philosophie*]). And, this “real”, this becoming real, this becoming “more than only *logos*”, is to be understood in terms of the *effect* taken by the *logos*, the effect of the discourse upon the *subjectivation*, the pervasive effect brought about, when the *logos* becomes “implanted” to the extent of forming the self-relation, of directing and structuring the self-governance (Foucault 2008, 201-225).

The pragmatic questions, considerations and decisions on the philosophical practices cannot be brought back to, or resolved by theoretical contemplation. They are of an irreducibly *concrete* nature, having to do with the perception, evaluation and judgment of the concrete, temporal, arriving-passing, and changing situations. Foucault emphasizes that *kairos* is at the centre of such philosophical considerations and decisions. To Foucault *kairos* is: the *occasion, appropriate moment, opportunity or chance*. It is the apprehension, recognition and seizing of the occasion, which is central for the orientation of the practicing of philosophy.<sup>68</sup> For Foucault, the paradigmatic example of this

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<sup>68</sup> This is not the occasion to attempt to present a general overview on the concept of *kairos*. What is important to notice is that in general the concept (in the sense of the right moment, occasion, chance, opportunity) is not related to the practicing of philosophy, or to the philosophical mode of life, especially in the sense in which the latter are discussed in Plato’s dialogues. Instead, *kairos* is generally considered to be central for the art and practice of rhetoric, especially in ancient Greek Sophism (Protagoras, Gorgias). The occasion, the right moment, and its perception, its “sense”, its evaluation, its seizure are considered essential for the persuasive speech, and for the relation between the rhetor and audience (see for instance Carter 1988; Scenters-Zapico 1993). Thus, the radical point in Foucault’s argument is to assert that, in fact,



centrality of *kairos* can be found in the reflections of Plato on his own relationship with politics (in the *Seventh Letter*): considerations, firstly, on his reasons to abstain from intervention in the political life in Athens (his *keeping silent* in Athens), and then, to attempt to intervene into the governance of Sicily in the role of the advisor of the ruler (his speaking in Sicily). Plato's decision and activity can appear inconsistent or unreasonable, if considered in the abstract terms of theory. Yet, they appear consistent and reasonable, when understood as oriented by *kairos*, the arriving and passing appropriate moment of philosophical *logos-ergon-pragma* which Plato believed to be absent in Athens, but available in Sicily, although eventually the adventure in Sicily did not succeed:

...Considerations, if you will, from the side of the situation (*du côté de la conjoncture*), of what he precisely calls the *kairos* (the occasion [*l'occasion*])...At no moment had he considered that something like a *kairos*, an occasion occurred (*à aucun moment il n'avait considéré que quelque chose comme un kairos, comme une occasion se présentait*). But here, in Sicily, now there is something like an occasion that arises (*or ici, en Sicile, voilà que quelque chose comme une occasion se présente*). It is the accession of a new monarch (*c'est l'avènement d'un nouveau monarque*), it is the youth of that character (*c'est la jeunesse de ce personnage*)... (Foucault 2008, 206)

In fact, the *kairos* of the philosophical intervention occurs rarely, which makes it all the more important for the philosopher to be able to apprehend and seize the occasion. It could be said that most of the time the occasion for the philosophical practice of *logos*, in which *logos* is supposed to "become real" in the specific, demanding sense discussed above, is absent as it was absent for Plato in Athens. Most of the time, the occasion, or the lack of it, requires the philosopher to keep silent. Foucault's reflections on this lead to one question in particular, especially, when his reflections are read in conjunction with the discussion with Boulez, and also, with Foucault's remarks on music, listening and friendship from the same period (Chapter 4): is it possible to think of the *kairos* in a more fundamental sense as an occasion for *silence*, for *keeping silent*? Following Foucault's discussion, is there an occasion requiring one to keep silent, and which means, in the radical sense, that it requires one to *evacuate*, to *interrupt*, to *give up* or *put an end to the speech*? Foucault's reflections on music, serious listening and friendship testified to the importance of such occasions of radical silence, radical non-speaking. Foucault considered such occasions of profound silence to be highly significant, because they are the occasions also for the *bare encounter*, for the *bare being-or living-with*, in other words, they are the

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*kairos* really *does* have central significance for the practicing of the philosophical speech, and for the intervention into politics taking place through the true *logos* (exemplified by Plato's action in Sicily), through the philosophical mode of *parrèsia*, through its becoming subjectivated, and by its becoming thus the "pilot" of self-government. In fact, due to its more demanding quality, the opportunity for the philosophical speech-intervention arrives more rarely than the occasion for rhetorical, simply persuasive speech. Consequently, it is even more crucial for the philosopher, than it is for the sophist or for the rhetor in general, to be able to perceive and seize the *kairos* of philosophical intervention, as it is so very rarely encountered at all.

*occasions for friendship*. The latter is in political terms opposed to the individualizing-totalizing reason of *omnes et singulatim*.

Perhaps it can be asserted that all the ethical-, aesthetic- and political significance of the philosophical practices of *logos* notwithstanding, Foucault still thinks that they cannot transcend the limitations set by time (and “timing”), by the arrival and departure of *kairos*. Under the conditions of the temporal limitations, it appears that Foucault’s analyses of the philosophical discourse-practices are *not* supposed to offer an exhaustive account of what constitutes the adequate, or the most valuable form of life (*the “good life”*). Neither should Foucault’s examinations of the philosophical practices (of the discursive preparation-protection, of the discursive “arming”) be read as if they offered an exhaustive view of the ethical-political-aesthetic practices (exercises, techniques, instruments, equipment) that are appropriate for resistance, although some of the strong formulations Foucault used can prompt such a reading, especially if they are read in isolation.

As important as the whole complex of philosophical-discursive practices might be for Foucault, not only historically, but also in his own contemporary political situation, this still does not mean that he would deny the importance and the *kairos*, of other sorts of practices, and other sorts of techniques, ones that *do not* revolve around the subjectivation of *logos*, but have other “materials” instead. These other practices, with their techniques, equipment and instruments would have their *kairos* as well, as the philosophical practices have theirs. There are occasions, the urgent moments to give up, to interrupt the speech, to interrupt one’s co-existence with *logos*, to interrupt the use and possession of *logos* at hand, and also to interrupt one’s being directed by *logos* one’s *being spoken by* the truth-saying, the subjectivated truth-discourse, the *protective interior pilot* (see above). The emphasis on the centrality of the philosophical practices of care, exercised essentially through the attachment to *logos*, should not overlook that they are not the only ones that Foucault considers important aesthetically, ethically and politically for the practices and art of resistance.

The occasions of silence, of non-speech, set certain demands for the asceticism as well. One name that has already been suggested for this is *kenosis*, meaning the asceticism in which one exercises oneself in silence, in keeping silent, in non-speaking, in the interruption of speech, in the “evacuation of words”. In Chapter 4, this asceticism was characterized as that of *de-schematicization*, the exercising of oneself, as Foucault said, *not* in order to arm, but in order to *disarm oneself*, to disarm oneself of the re-assuring functioning of language, and of the recognizing-identifying-familiarizing schemes. As was noticed, this asceticism is about preparing oneself for what cannot be prepared for, and even more specifically, it is about preparing oneself to *receive*, to *welcome*, or to show *hospitality* in the manner of *being unprepared* for the arrival of the new and unexpected, the singular, the unrecognized-unfamiliar, without asking it to give up its intrusiveness.

This paradoxical asceticism of preparing to be unprepared, the *asceticism of unpreparation* belongs together with both the serious listening to music, and the bare encounter in which friendship is generated. *Neither* of these two is of the order of *paideia* i.e. the process of taking charge over the “irrational” to form the character of the individual- and community alike. Instead, both in the musical listening at issue, and in the bare encounter of friendship, what is generated is an exposure of oneself to the dynamics of sharing, interpenetration, contagion, participation and *resonance* taking place *between* individuals, between different types of characters, between distinctive tasks and functions, between different species etc., between what has been separated, and between what should be kept separate by the means of rational governance through education, through *paideia*. In spite of the essential differences that have been mentioned between the philosophical nexus of *logos-pragma-ergon*, and the asceticism of silence in listening to music and in friendship, these two still have something in common, which is quite essential as well: their relation of resistance and struggle with the individualizing-totalizing modalities of governance, which also means, with the musical practices of character-formation of the type of *paideia*.

What I have suggested is that in order to form a sufficiently comprehensive account of Foucault’s thought on the aesthetics-, ethics- and politics of the self and of existence, his analyses of the philosophical practices of *parrēsia* and discursive asceticism should *not* receive *exclusive* focus. In addition to the former, Foucault’s reflections from the same period in which he deals in a more intimate, partly auto-biographical fashion with the themes of friendship and contemporary music should also be read to establish the connection. On the basis of such a reading, I have argued, it becomes clear that in Foucault’s account, the resistant or subversive nexus of the aesthetics-ethics-politics of the self, including the practices, exercises, arts and equipment of the self, is *not* reducible to the *discursive* practices of care, having their exemplar in the philosophical practices of *logos*-subjectivation. A central implication of this is that Foucault’s aesthetical-ethical-political resistance is *not* reducible to the apparent hostility shown by the philosophical practices of discourse against the auditory-sonorous, non-discursive events of the voice, sound and music. It has been pointed out that in this aesthetical-ethical-political nexus, the asceticism of silence (*kenosis*) *also* has its irreducible role in the sense of non-speaking and de-schematicization, the asceticism of non-preparation, of the welcoming exposure to the arriving events, of the sharing- and taking part “in-between”, ones that are needed in the “serious listening” to music, as well as in the “bare being-and-living-with”, which constitutes friendship.

In conclusion, the reading I have suggested seems to be in line with the *tool-box*- figure, something like a “manual” of different arts, exercises and equipment of resistance, a manual of different aesthetical-ethical-political practices of the self. In this tool-box, the equipment and exercises provided are *not* either or, but *both* those of discourse (those of *logos*) *and* of the non-discursive listening, of the auditory-sonorous, and of the musical event. The aesthetical-ethical-political tool-box consists of both techniques and instruments

of *arming and disarming, preparation and un-preparation, of protection and exposure* in the encounter with arriving, penetrating events. Instead of just retaining the “theoretical” juxtaposition between the two (between *logos* and *phōnē*), the *pragmatic* relation of the differentiation and also the conjunction between the two ought to be noticed. What is essential for the resistant practices, is acknowledging and seizing the *kairos*, the occasion either to arm or to disarm oneself, to resort either to the philosophical practices of *logos*, or to the practices of listening to the voice, to the music, to the friend. To apply this differentiation-conjunction to the concept of the aesthetics of the self, it is possible to speak firstly of the *aesthetics of knowledge, aesthetics of truth-saying, or the aesthetics of philosophy*, and secondly of the *aesthetics of musical listening, or the aesthetics of friendship*. These two irreducibly different aesthetical-ethical-political modalities both have their own occasions, and they are both integrated in the practices of resistance.

Although the point is not put forth by Foucault explicitly, it is not at all difficult to see how such a practical conjunction of the philosophical practices of *logos*, and the practices of musical listening and friendship could work out. At least, one way to characterize the logic of this would be the following: To be able to exercise one’s exposure to friendship, or one’s exposure to the arrival-intrusion of musical events in listening, one *also* needs, on appropriate occasions, to exercise oneself to become unyielding to various attempts to seize, to enter, to mold, to educate, to convince, to incorporate and establish schemes, to individualize etc. In order to be able to disarm and unprepare oneself (in music, in friendship), one also has to arm, protect and prepare oneself, a task for which the philosophical practices of discourse are needed. Though this conclusion is not explicitly stated by Foucault himself, it is a plausible one given the basis of the reading provided on the two modes of asceticism. Considering Foucault’s biography as well as his autobiographical reflections, is it not arguable that this is what he actually did: to differentiate and to connect, as the *kairos* arrives, the philosophical asceticism of the arming *logos*, and the self-disarming, self-exposure to the events of friendship and music?

## 6 CROWD-VOICES

### 6.1 Mass, Crowd, Noise and Methexis (Preliminary Observations)

The final Chapter of this study considers the one central issue left. It is one that has already been touched upon. It is the issue of the *bare voice*, that is the non-speaking voice, and one that is even at the borderline of the musical and non-musical. What will be examined in detail is the role of the bare voice in the formation of *multitudes*, *crowds* and *masses*. The argument that comes to the fore is actually continuing, and also offering further evidence, to what has already been stated: That although Foucault was perceptive of the *potentialities* of *sonorous-auditory power*, and *sonorous-auditory governance*, this *does not* mean that he would have, in the end, simply reduced the political sense, the political potentiality of the voice and the “ear” to being nothing but instruments of power and governance. In the preceding Chapters 4 and 5, the *serious contemporary music* (Foucault and Boulez) has been treated as a mode of resistance. In this final Chapter, it will be emphasized that it is also the bare voice, in Foucault’s thought, which has the potentiality of resistance to it, as it is intertwined with the multitudes, crowds and masses.

This study has followed the chronology of Foucault’s intellectual history. The beginning of this Chapter will make an exception to this general orientation, and take a step back to Foucault’s thought in the 1970’s. This will present the manner in which the idea of the bare voice and the multitude-crowd-mass occurred then, and notice how its treatment was left somewhat implicit. It will be against this background that the focus will return to the period of the early 1980’s to Foucault’s final lectures at *Collège de France*. In this manner the significance of the last lectures becomes more understandable, as they re-visit the issue, but in a very explicit, detailed and quite extensive manner, so that no doubt is left concerning its significance to Foucault.

When Foucault depicts the *masses*, *crowds*, *swarms* or the *multitudes*, he does so without making any real systematic, conceptual distinction between them. There are certain recurrent auditory and sonorous tropes in his

description, and more specifically, the trope of *noise*, or the *howling*, that is a voice without speech and without musical-vocal articulation. The noise, the howling of the masses, their emission of a non-discursive and non-musical voice, comes to the fore in relation to certain other qualities which characterize the formation of the mass, the crowd, and the multitude: the *centrifugal* and *diffuse mobility*, the movement in which bodies and forces spread, in which they come into contact with one another, in which they generate multiple horizontal conjunctions with each other without mediation, without direction from above, or from a center of any kind. Foucault makes it clear that these horizontal contacts and conjunctions between bodies are of the sort that bring about a *merging*, a *mingling* or *confusion* between bodies, and have no respect for individualizing limits and distances, or for the claims of counting, of quantity, of number. These horizontal contacts and conjunctions differentiate one from the other(s) without their ever becoming one, however, for the mass-multitude is still a multitude, a non-individualized multitude. It is the horizontal, centrifugal, and diffuse movement together with the extreme, excessive coagulation and compactness, the utmost becoming-dense, through which the non-individualized multitude, the mass or the crowd is generated. There is a relation of conflict, a non-reconciled struggle, between the formation of masses on one hand, and the *disciplinary power* on the other, that is the form of power that individualizes, and through the individualization takes care of the usefulness and productivity of bodies, of forces. It is in the formation of masses, *dangerous* and *useless* from the angle of disciplinary power, that Foucault recognizes the role of sound, of the non-discursive and non-musical voice (the bare voice), the noise, the howling:

One must eliminate the effects of imprecise distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation (Foucault 1979, 143)...it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units. It 'trains' the moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements - small, separate cells, organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segments. Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise (ibid., 170)... bodies mingling together without respect ...The plague as a form, at once real and imaginary, of disorder had as its medical and political correlative discipline. Behind the disciplinary mechanism can be read the haunting memory of 'contagions', of the plague, of rebellions, crimes, vagabondage, desertions, people who appear and disappear, live and die in disorder (ibid., 197-198)... to avoid those *compact, swarming, howling masses* ...The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and replaced by a collection of separated individualities. From the point of view of the guardian, it is replaced by a multiplicity that can be numbered and supervised; from the point of view of the inmates, by a sequestered and observed solitude...(ibid., 200-201; my emphasis) ...one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique...It could reduce the inefficiency of mass phenomena: reduce what, in a multiplicity, makes it much less manageable than a unity; reduce what is opposed to the use of each of its elements and of their sum; reduce everything that may counter the advantages of number. That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions...it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes

to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions – anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions. (ibid., 218-219)

That is not the only occasion in which Foucault, in his 1970's work, notices the centrality of voice and sound in the formation of multitudes, and hence, also the conflictual relation between the sound/voice and the disciplinary power of individualization. *Noise and chatter*, but also *chanson*, emissions, spreading and reception of sounds belong to these horizontal relations, through which the multitudes are generated. Consequently, according to Foucault's seminal thesis formalized in the *Panopticon* (which was examined in Chapter 2) in the dispositif of disciplinary power the auditory and sonorous connections or conjunctions, the auditory and sonorous dynamics of generating horizontal relations, are classified as *dangerous*. In the variety of the "applications" of the modern disciplinary-panoptic institutions, apparatuses, and techniques (from the school to the prison), the attempt is made to eliminate the horizontal dynamics of the auditory-sonorous conjunctions, ones through which the "useless" and "dangerous", non-individualized multitudes are born:

... if they are patients, there is no danger of contagion...if they are school-children, there is no copying, *no noise, no chatter*, no waste of time (Foucault 1979, 200-201; my emphasis)... All the collective phenomena (*tous les phénomènes collectifs*), all the phenomena of multiplicity (*tous les phénomènes de multiplicité*) find themselves in this way totally abolished. And, as Bentham says with satisfaction, in the schools, there will be no longer 'copying' (*de 'copiage'*), which is the debut of the immorality (*le début de l'immoralité*); in the workshops there will be no longer collective distraction (*dans les ateliers, il n'y aura plus de distraction collective*), songs, strikes (*de chansons, de grèves*); in the prisons, no longer complicity (*dans les prisons, plus de complicité*); and in the mental asylums (*dans les asiles pour les malades mentaux*), no longer those phenomena of collective irritation, imitation, etc. (*plus de ces phénomènes d'irritation collective, d'imitation, etc.*). You see there, how all this network of group communications (*comment tout ce réseau des communications de groupe*), all these collective phenomena, which are perceived...as being just as well the medical contagion (*la contagion médicale*) as the moral diffusion of the bad (*la diffusion morale du mal*), all those phenomena will find themselves entirely broken by the system of the panoptic (*par le système du panoptique, entièrement brisés*). (Foucault 2003, 77; my emphasis)

The voice and sound, again, are depicted as being among the "dangerous" horizontal relations generating a multiplicity. They are among the dynamic relations characterized by the *spreading, diffusion and contagion* from one to another, that is, between individuals. These mobile relations of spreading and contagion, as seen in the citation, can also be understood in terms of *mimesis*: imitation, copying between school-children, collective irritations, and criminal complicity. What takes place in all of these, what takes place through *noise, chatter and chanson* as well, is a movement of transgression as well as *transition* between individuals, from one to another as well as *in-between* one and the other. Contagion means not only a medical contagion in the limited sense. A contagion can be between the individualities as such, so that what occurs is a diffusion, a merging, a mingling, a confusion between them. The confusion can be between individuals' mental states, between their affects (the becoming-collective of irritation), between their characters, between their virtues and their

vices (their “goodness” and “badness”), between their positions, between their places, between their tasks, between their performances etc. What takes place is a movement in which the individuals *share with each other* what should (according to the logic of disciplinary individualization) be separate and divided, in which (ultimately) they *share each other*, share each other’s individualities, becoming non-individualized. Sound and its hearing, the noise, the chatter etc., belong to this type of relations of non-individualization. Especially, the role of contagion and diffusion happening in and through sound is evident in the case of the *collective distractions*: the uncontrolled spreading of sounds and their uncontrolled becoming heard brings about a sharing, a confusion between different assignments that is in opposition to the division and concentration in the disciplinary organization of force. This is a *circle of danger*, one in which sound and audition have their prominent part to play: the diffusion, the contagion, the imitation, the transition in-between, the sharing instigate immorality, which then launches further movements of contagion. It is these horizontal movements, this network of conjunctions, which the disciplinary apparatuses are relentlessly attempting to eliminate, are relentlessly attempting to break up. It appears that sound and audition, the *auditory-sonorous medium* (in Foucault’s depictions presented above), occupy a special significance in the generation of the dangerous, undisciplined network of relations. In this sense the conflict with sound, the conflict with noise, and the strategy of *noise-abatement* (see Chapter 3) is not only a particular application of disciplinary power, but belongs to the logic of the functioning of disciplinary power.

Thus, in Foucault’s account of the contribution of sound-hearing to the generation of masses/crowds/multiplicities, as seen in their relation of tension with discipline, the issue of *mimesis* has arisen. This is the *mimesis* in sound as well as through sound. This is *not*, however, *mimesis* understood as the controlled productive/poietic practice of faithful copies of an authoritative (“vertical”) original model, but instead *mimesis* as the movement of transition, diffusion, sharing, penetration, affection and impression, of plasticity, malleability, and impressionability between individuals. This is *mimesis* as contagion, as *non-individualizing mimesis*, happening at the horizontal plane. It could be argued that in his genealogies of modern disciplinary-panoptic power, Foucault comes across the very central issue in the canon of Western philosophy from Plato to Heidegger at least on the dangerous, threatening complicity of *mimesis* and music, *mimesis* and the material element of sound which is dangerous to the constitution of the political community (the city, the state) as such, and set in a fundamental tension with the con-figuration and self-representation of the community (through myth, through national-political-art).<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Cf.: “According to a very old, very profound, and very solid equivalence – perhaps indestructible – it is a *feminine* art, destined for women or for the feminine part of men. It is a *hysterical* art, in every sense. And for this reason, essentially, music is hysteria...Here hysteria, or the aesthetic state, is to be understood as the height of passivity, that is to say as the height of plasticity, malleability, impressionability. As pure ‘materiality,’ if we prefer, according to – again – a very old equivalence (*materia*



Albeit Foucault does not, on the occasions discussed above, offer more detailed analysis on this issue, there is no reason to ignore it either. The one point of reference, suggesting itself most obviously, would be found in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. However, perhaps a somewhat less obvious, and in that sense more interesting, parallel could be the contemporary French thought focused on the concept of *mimesis*, and on the “applicability” of the concept to the understanding of sound, sonority, aural-audible perception, the ear, and listening. One quite recent work deals with this issue in detail. The work is Jean-Luc Nancy’s *Listening (À l’écoute)*. Albeit coming from a different angle, Nancy’s work reflects in a detailed, systematic fashion the points already presented above. Nancy’s work relates to Foucault’s observations on the complicity of sound and audition with the horizontal, conjunctive dynamics of contagion, spreading, dissolution, distraction, and the complicity in the formation of crowds, masses and multitudes, which appears to make sound into an enemy of disciplinary power in all the variety of its applications.

In fact, the central conceptual intervention made by Nancy, is to introduce the concept of *methexis*, and to suggest the use this concept, instead of speaking simply of *mimesis*, in order to emphasize the importance of the dynamics of *sharing, participation, taking-part-in, penetration, and contagion* for the constitution of the sonorous and the auditory, sound, hearing, and listening. The idea of *methexis* has already been mentioned in a variety of contexts throughout the discussion of the chronology of Foucault’s *œuvre*. Thus the relevance of the idea in Foucault’s thinking has already been shown, despite the fact he does not use the actual term as such. Now, finally, with the help of Nancy, I would like to present a brief explicit reflection of the concept: “Or again in other terms, the visual would be tendentially mimetic, and the sonorous tendentially methexic (*le visuel serait tendanciellement mimétique, et le sonore tendanciellement méthexique*) (in other words in the order of the participation, of the sharing or of the contagion) (*dans l’ordre de la participation, du partage ou de la contagion*).” (Nancy 2002, 27; for an earlier version, see Nancy 2000)<sup>70</sup>

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/ *mater*, which...is also anchored in the Aristotelian – if not more ancient – determination of femininity or the essence of the feminine.” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1994, 105-106)

<sup>70</sup> The concept of *methexis* figures in Platonic philosophy. However, in Nancy’s elaboration of the concept, what it means is *not* the vertical participation of material-sensual beings in the transcendent idea (determining the being of the former), but the *horizontal* movement of participation, taking place just as much between material entities themselves, as well as between ideas, concepts, perceptions etc. If one was to search for an Ancient model for the horizontal, dynamic *methexis* between bodies, perhaps more could be found in Christian theology, in the ideas of the Body of Christ, the *Eucharist*, the formation of the Church: “In the body of Christ, as Paul explains it to the Corinthians (I Corinthians 12: 4-31), the many are joined into one, but the body continues to consist of many members, each of which is different and not simply interchangeable...The members are not ‘separate but equal,’ but rather participate in each other, such that ‘If one member suffers, all suffer together with it ; if one member is honored, all rejoice together with it’(12: 26.) (Cavanaugh 2003, 184)...Participation in God and in one another is a threat to the formal mechanism of contract, which assumes that we are *essentially* individuals (ibid., 193)...In the Eucharist, we receive the gift of Christ not as mere passive recipients, but by being incorporated into the gift itself, the Body of Christ. As members of the Body, we then

It is important to notice, what the real significance of the concept of *methexis* is: it is not a particular quality of sound, but instead, what constitutes sound as such. In Nancy's account, sound, in its most elementary, simple and minimal modes, is only *methexis*. Sound as such is only the movement of transition and spreading, taking place as an *(inter-)penetration*, or contagion, between one element and the other, between the inside and the outside, between points, between locations, or in temporal terms, between one instant and the next. The sounding of the sound, the *sonority*, is this *methexic* movement, this *methexic* dynamics of relations. Being only the relational movement of penetration, contagion, sharing and participation "in-between", means that sound is also always difference, or is *differing*, that it is only a constant becoming -different -from itself, or a constant changing of itself. This dynamic nexus of *methexis*, that is the dynamics of participation-sharing -(inter-)penetration-contagion-spreading-differing, is what the familiar concept of *resonance* captures. Hence, Nancy's point is that sound should be understood in its most elementary, and its simplest modes of existence *not* as a simple object (appearing, present *hic et nunc*), but always already as resonance, as re-sonating and re-sounding, repeating itself (or coming back to itself) as well as becoming different from itself. Sound has a present, a sonorous present, only if it is the present in resonance, the instant brought to the mobile relation of penetration-differing, the point brought to the resonance, and thus losing its ideal punctuality<sup>71</sup>:

...The sound does not have a hidden face, it is entirely in front of behind (*le son n'a pas de face cachée, il est tout devant derrière*) and outside inside (*dehors dedans*), sense above below (*sens dessus dessous*) in relation to the most general logic of the presence as appearing (*la présence comme paraître*), as phenomenality or as manifestation and, thus, as visible face of a presence subsisting in itself. Something of the theoretical and intentional scheme modeled on the optics staggers here (*quelque chose du schème théorique et intentionnel réglé sur l'optique y vacille*)... (Nancy 2002, 32-33) In the terms I use here, I would say that the 'living present' resonates, or that it is itself resonance, and nothing else (*le 'présent vivant' résonne, ou qu'il est lui-même résonance est n'est que cela*): resonance of the instances or of the stances of the instant, one inside the other (*résonance l'une dans l'autre des instances ou des stances de l'instant*)... (ibid., 41) neither lets itself be objectified, nor projected in-front-of (*ne se laisse pas objectiver ni projeter au-devant*)...a coming and passing (*un venir et un passer*), a spreading itself out (*un s'étendre*) and a penetrating (*un pénétrer*). The sound, essentially, descends and expands (*provient et se dilate*), or differs from itself and transfers itself (*se diffère et se transfère*). Its' present is thus no longer the instant of the philosophical-scientific time (*son présent n'est donc pas non plus l'instant du temps philosophico-scientifique*), the point of zero dimension (*le point de dimension nulle*)...no longer that of the simple succession (corollary of the negative instant [*corollaire de l'instant négatif*]). (ibid., 31-32)<sup>72</sup>

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become nourishment for others (ibid.,195) ...The body of Jesus Christ, the body of God, is permeable, transcorporeal, transpositional. Within it all other bodies are situated and given their significance. We are all permeable, transcorporeal and transpositional" (Ward 2003, 176). A similar reading is also argued throughout the work in Pickstock (1998).

<sup>71</sup> Rather similar examination of sound and listening can be found in Mallet (1999) and Mallet (2002).

<sup>72</sup> Although Henri Bergson is not mentioned by Nancy, I believe there are some rather evident parallels to be noticed with Bergson's analyses of the nature of sound, and

Besides bringing the concepts of *methexis* and *resonance* to the fore, there is another turn in Nancy's argumentation, one that needs to be noticed. When sound is, fundamentally, understood as *methexis* and resonance, this also has consequences for our thinking and re-thinking of the relation between sound and language, or more specifically, between sound and the sign, and between sound (*le son*) and sense (*le sens*). Far from leading to any juxtaposition between the sound, or the voice, and sign, the sound and the signifier, there is instead a special sort of proximity between them. However, the proximity does not mean, that sound or the voice would be the material basis of the symbolic order. Nor is proximity found in anything like the language providing the sense of sound. Instead, the proximity is the one between *reference and resonance*, firstly in the movement of reference constituting the sense, the sign and the signifier, and secondly in the movement of resonance constituting the sound. There is no pertinent distinction between the movement of reference in the sign, and the resonance of sound. The sign and sound, the reference and resonance are both just as strongly resistant to the (metaphysical) claim of meaning, or the signified as the stable, fixated plenitude of presence:

But what can be the space common to the sense (*au sens*) and to the sound (*au son*)? The sense consists in a reference (*le sens consiste dans un renvoi*). It is even made of a totality of references (*d'une totalité de renvois*): of a sign to something, of a state of affairs to a value, of a subject to another subject or to itself, all simultaneously. The sound is no less made of reference (*le son n'est pas moins fait de renvois*) it propagates itself in space (*il se propage dans l'espace*) where it resounds (*où il retentit*) while resounding 'in me' (*tout en retentissant 'en moi'*), as they say... (Nancy 2002, 21-22)

To treat the 'pure resonance' (*traiter la 'pure résonance'*) not only as the condition but as the dispatching (*l'envoi*) itself and the opening (*l'ouverture*) of the sense, as over-sense (*oultre-sens*) or sense that passes out of the signification (*sens qui passe outre la signification*) ... (ibid., 59)

[P]erhaps the sense must not be satisfied in making sense (or in being *logos*), but furthermore resonates (*peut-être faut-il que le sens ne se contente pas de faire sense [ou d'être logos], mais en outre résonne*) ... (ibid., 19) [S]ense in the nascent state (*sens à l'état naissant*), in the state of reference (*à l'état de renvoi*) for which is not given the end of this reference (the concept, the idea, the information) (*pour lequel n'est pas donnée la fin de ce renvoi [le concept, l'idée, l'information]*), and thus in the state of reference without end (*à l'état de renvoi sans fin*), as an echo which relaunches itself (*comme un écho qui se relance lui-même*) and which is nothing but this relaunching (*et qui n'est rien que cette relance*). (ibid., 52)

Thus, if speaking of the materiality, as well as sensuality of language, in the infinite movement of reference, this materiality-sensuality appears to have a special proximity with sound, with the sonority, with the echoing, re-sounding and resonance. Thus the resonating-referring sound, in its proximity with the movement of the signifier, is something radically different from the model of the meaningful speaking voice of *phono/logo-centricism*, the *voice of metaphysics*, fixated by the task of safeguarding the "meaning" as presence (see Chapter 6.3. below). Moreover, resonance and *methexis* constitute not only the existence of

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the auditory (see Bergson 1993, 78, 64-65, 75, 78, 89-90, 93, 122, 128-129, 170, 173-174 ; Bergson 1996, 163-167). The ideas of quantitative and qualitative multitudes have been later further elaborated, most notably, by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

the sound as such. They also offer the key to understand aural perception and listening:

Listening, is to enter into this spatiality by which, *at the same time*, I am penetrated (*écouter, c'est entrer dans cette spatialité par laquelle, en même temps, je suis pénétré*): for it opens itself in me just as much as around me (*car elle s'ouvre en moi tout autant qu'autour de moi*), and from me just as much as towards me (*et de moi tout autant que vers moi*): it opens me in myself as much as on the outside (*elle m'ouvre en moi autant qu'au dehors*)...To be listening (*être à l'écoute*) is to be *at the same time* outside and inside (*c'est être en même temps au dehors et au dedans*), to be open from the outside and from the inside (*être ouvert du dehors et du dedans*), thus from the one to the other, and from the one in the other (*de l'un à l'autre donc et de l'un en l'autre*)...the sharing of an inside/outside (*le partage d'un dedans/dehors*), division and participation, disconnection and contagion (*division et participation, déconnexion et contagion*)... (Nancy 2002, 33)

Listening is a peculiar sort of activity, an activity at the very borderline of the usual conception of activity, as opposed to "passivity". Listening is an affirmation to the taking part, to participation in the sonority, in the resonance of sound. Listening is an affirmation of the listener, of the listening subject, in the event of listening, to being exposed to the outside, affirmation to the contagion, affirmation to the being penetrated. In listening, the listener shares as well as becomes shared, it participates as well as becomes participated. The listener is, thus, taken, is carried away into the methexic movement of contagion. The listener participates in the very movement taking place between the inside and the outside, participates in the undecided resonance and vibration, in the unfinished interpenetration and contagion between the inside and the outside, which at the most elementary level constitutes the sound as such. The listener, the listening subject resonates, but not with an object, not with an agent either. The listener resonates with nothing but the very movement of resonance itself. Similarly, the listener participates only in the movement of participation. The listener shares nothing but the event of sharing, and is penetrated only by the movement of penetrating, not by object, or a thing, or an agent. In terms of contagion, listening is contagion by nothing except the very movement of contagion itself. Listening is exposure to the exposure itself, *methexis of methexis*.

Nancy's work provides one recent and detailed analysis which can elaborate further the ideas already encountered in Foucault's thought: the proximity of sound and listening to the horizontal movements of contagion, diffusion and confusion, taking place between individuals, between bodies and between the spatial coordinates of inside and outside, between places, positions, locations, between points etc. It is this movement of *methexis*, or the *resonance* happening horizontally in-between individualities, through which multitudes, masses or crowds are formed, and which brings about a fundamental obstacle, a resistance to the basic functioning of disciplinary power. The resistance is often manifest in collective distractions, the collective spreading of irritations, the spreading of criminal complicities, the confusion between assignments, tasks, functions, performances etc.

However, it should also be kept in mind what has consistently been stressed throughout the study. Foucault's thinking is also different from Nancy's regarding the idea of *methexis*. To Foucault *methexis* is *not at all* meant to capture the "nature" or the "essence" of sound and audition as such, in juxtaposition with vision. *Nor* is the idea of the multitude-crowd-mass meant to capture anything like *the* political sense of the sonorous-auditory as such. Instead, the former should be taken as only *one particular* modality or "regime" of the sonorous-auditory, and only *one particular* manner in which the sonorous-auditory can become articulated into *one particular sort of political practice*. Besides this, there are a plurality of other possibilities, that is, a plurality of other modalities and regimes of the sonorous-auditory, and a plurality of other political articulations, indeed, *both* into the dispositives of power-knowledge including their objectifying forms (cf. especially the discussion on *medical auscultation* in the first Chapter), *as well as* into resistance(s) as noted in the serious musical listening and the formation of the multitudes.

If it makes sense to speak of *the* politics of sound and audition in this context it is perhaps only if "*the* politics of sound and audition" is understood to mean the *struggle over our ears*, one taking place between the different seizures and captures, the different strategies and articulations, which all form and deform, organize, dis-organize and re-organize our auditory perception and our emissions of voice/sound. The politics of the sonorous-auditory, the struggle over our ears, struggle pertains to the very basic constitution of the sonorous-auditory faculty including the formation of its organs and its material medium. Far from being a question of marginal importance, the issue of the auditory-sonorous politics, the struggle over our ears, belongs intrinsically together with the *struggle over our living bodies* and over the *life of populations*, whether this is in the framework of medicalization, disciplinary surveillance, the reason of state or the liberalist- and neo-liberalist governance. It is this basic background that should be kept in mind when approaching the more specific issue of the relation of the sound and audition to the formation of multitudes, crowds and masses.

## 6.2 Parrēsia, the Voice and the Noise

Admittedly, in the preceding cases from Foucault's work in the 1970's, the sound, and the noise are only briefly mentioned, and their actual role in the formation of crowds, masses, or multitudes, and thus their resistant potentiality is left somewhat implicit. However, Foucault takes on the issue of voice, and the issue of noise, as well as the issue of the ear, in a more explicit, detailed, and extensive manner in his last lectures given at *Collège de France* (1982-1983) titled *The Government of Self and of the Others* (*Le gouvernement de soi et des autres*). In these there is no longer any doubt about the centrality of the theme of the sound and voice, as this becomes explicitly emphasized. Also the issue of the voice is

an explicitly political issue for Foucault, which he is ready to acknowledge. The underlying current in this study of Foucault's thought has been to contest those interpretations in which Foucault is portrayed as a thinker who ignores the political significance of the voice and hearing. Thus, these lectures require a sufficiently comprehensive discussion.

The general context in which the issue of voice, the political issue of voice, really comes into focus is the central theme of the lectures, the *parrēsia*. In Foucault's translation the *parrēsia* means the practice of *truth-speaking*, *truth-saying* (*dire-vrai*) or *speaking-frankly* (*franc-parler*) in its different forms. It includes the relation of these to governing, to government of self, and also to the government of others, first in the framework of *polis*, and subsequently, also of the state. One of the most important texts for Foucault in this series of lectures, one through which he elaborates the idea of the different modes of *parrēsia*, is Euripides' tragedy *Ion*. First, there is the *political parrēsia* in the limited sense, that is, the political speech or political discourse in the strict sense, meaning the *logos*, through which the *polis*, the city is governed. Second, there is the religious authority, the superior power and knowledge of the God, here Apollo who is represented and who communicates to the humans through the medium of the enigmatic signs of the oracle. The central tension of the tragedy is born, as the divine truth would reveal that the character Ion is the secret, illegitimate son of Apollo himself and the mortal woman Creuse. This truth is needed in order for Ion to be granted the citizenship of Athens, and thus, offered access to participate in the political discourse proper, in the political *parrēsia*, through which the city of Athens is governed. There is tension because Apollo refuses to tell the truth, wants to prevent the truth from becoming revealed, for the reason that he himself has committed a crime, an injustice, a shameful act, which would be revealed with the truth.

It is also through Foucault's reading of the tragedy, that the third form of the truth and truth-saying is introduced. This third mode is fundamentally different from both the political discourse, the political form of *parrēsia* in the limited sense, and from the oracle:

*Blasphemous confession (l'aveu blasphématoire), incriminating confession pronounced against Apollo (l'aveu accusateur prononcé contre Apollon)... This is to say that, in order to pass from the secrecy of the oracular God refusing to speak, to the true discourse (au discours vrai), which will ground for Ion the possibility to use the parrēsia in Athens, the necessary discovery of the truth (la nécessaire découverte de la vérité) will pass through a singular moment, very different in its structure, in its function, in its organization, in its discursive practice, from the oracle and the political discourse (de l'oracle et du discours politique)...the public confession (l'aveu public). (Foucault 2008, 102; my emphasis)*

The third form of truth-emission is *confession*, but a somewhat extraordinary kind of confession. First it is characterized by the fact that it is public, publically emitted. Second, as the citation reveals, this confession is not one that would serve the function of revealing the crimes, or the temptations, of the subject to the religious authority: it is not a confession which would manifest the obedience of the believer to the authority. In opposition to this, the confession

taking place is an act of *blasphemy*, a *blasphemous confession*, in other words, it is an act of resistance and rebellion against the religious authority, it is disobedience against God, against the divine power and its representatives. Clearly, in this sense, this new mode of truth and truth-saying introduced in the tragedy is generated in a situation of conflict or struggle. Yet, the conflict started by the blasphemous confession, as it comes from the outside of the city's government, and outside of the governing *logos*, is not the political *agon* properly speaking. It is not the *agonistic play* or *game* (*jeu agonistique*) between *logoi*, the game played between speakers and their speeches, between arguments, between persuasions etc.<sup>73</sup> (Foucault 2008, 98)

Foucault states that what he considers to be important and fundamental, is *the issue of the voice*, the *theme of the voice is absolutely fundamental*. There is a confrontation, a conflict taking place between voices. On one side, there is the voice of the God, the voice of the authority that refuses to speak, the secretive and reticent voice, the voice that has become silent in this sense, a voice that cannot be trusted any longer. Against this on the other side, the voice of the mortals is emitted, the voice of the public and blasphemous confession, which comes to challenge the reticent voice of the authority:

Finally thirdly, it is evident that we rediscover, throughout the piece, *the problem of the voice* (*le problème de la voix*). *This theme of the voice...this theme is absolutely fundamental...* This voice...well, this voice which is the God's voice (*la voix du dieu*), Euripides [asks whether] one can rely on it, or whether the men, the human beings, the mortals – the woman (*la femme*), in this case, must not raise, against the silent voice of the God (*contre la voix silencieuse du dieu*) who does not recognize his proper paternity, her own voice (*sa voix à elle*). (Foucault 2008, 116; my emphasis)

Foucault underlines that the theme of the voice is absolutely fundamental, specifically it is fundamental in the conflict between these two voices: between the voice of the divine authority; and the voice of the mortal subjects. The former voice is one in which come together the reticent, secretive, and silent oracle, and *the song, the song of indifference* from the side of the divine authority, the song manifesting his indifference towards the multitude of mortals, towards

<sup>73</sup> Cf. the following analysis of the form of the political speech, the political-governing *logos* and *parrësia*: "It is a speech that will exercise the power inside the frame of the city (*c'est une parole qui exercera le pouvoir dans le cadre de la cité*), but of course in non-tyrannical conditions, which is to say, in leaving the liberty of others speeches (*en laissant la liberté des autres paroles*), the liberty of those who also want to be in the first rank (*être au premier rang*), and can be in the first rank of this sort of agonistic play (*dans cette sorte de jeu agonistique*) characteristic of the political life (*la vie politique*), in Greece and above all in Athens...To appropriate this *parrësia* in the frame of the city, what is it, if not precisely...to manipulate, to handle at the same time (*manipuler, traiter à la fois*), to deal with the *logos* and the *polis* at the same time (*avoir affaire à la fois au logos et à la polis*)? To appropriate the *logos* inside the *polis* (*faire jouer le logos dans la polis*) – *logos* in the sense of true speech (*au sens de parole vraie*), reasonable speech, speech that persuades, speech that can confront with other speeches, and which will not gain victory except from the weight of its truth and from the efficiency of its persuasion (*qui ne vaincra que du poids de sa vérité et de l'efficiency de sa persuasion*) – , to appropriate this true, reasonable, agonistic speech, this speech of discussion (*cette parole de discussion*) inside the field of the *polis* (*dans le champ de la polis*), that is what the *parrësia* consists of." (Foucault 2008, 98)

their sufferings and towards their desires. This voice, which is both silent and reticent, as well as a *singing voice*, does not say or reveal anything. It does not communicate anything, except this very gesture of indifference, the very refusal to answer, the refusal to tell what the mortal subjects would need to know. Against this, comes the latter voice, the voice of the mortals. This voice is no longer song, neither is it speech. The voice coming from the side of the mortals to challenge, to oppose the indifferent authority, is the *cry*, the *noise*, the *bare voice* emitted without articulation:

...opposite to this song-oracle (*en face de ce chant-oracle*), this indifferent song and this reticent oracle (*ce chant indifférent et cet oracle réticent*), what will come from the side of the humans, while not being any longer the song...what is it that will rise from the side of the humans? *It is not the song, it is going to be the cry (ce n'est pas le chant, ça va être le cri): the cry against the oracle that refuses to say the truth, against the song of the God which is indifference, carelessness (désinvolture), a voice rises (une voix s'élève). A voice again. You see, it is always the voice that is at issue (c'est toujours de la voix qu'il s'agit), but it is the voice of the woman (la voix de la femme) which, against the joyful song (contre le chant joyeux), will raise the cry of the pain and of the recrimination (le cri de la douleur et de la récrimination), and which, against the reticence of the oracle, is going to proceed to the brutal and public utterance of the truth (va procéder à l'énoncé brutal et public de la vérité). Against the song, tears (contre le chant, des pleurs); against the reticent oracle, the formulation of the truth as such, of the brute truth (la formulation de la vérité même, de la vérité brute).* (Foucault 2008, 117; my emphasis)

The voice of the mortals, the blasphemous voice, rising against the authority of the God is the bare voice, the cry, and the noise. It is the voice (*phōnē*) which is not speech, but which is not musically articulated, shaped, formed, or controlled either. The voice of the mortals is the bare and "brute voice", in which the *brute truth* is brought about, the brute truth against the will of the divine ruler, which is also an act of recrimination, an accusation against the ruler for the injustice he has committed. There are also further aspects in the remarkable passages where Foucault presents the detailed account of Euripides, in which the constitution of this peculiar modality of truth is reflected. Foucault emphasizes the specific manner in which the truth, and the emission of the truth in the voice, is actually generated in and by the *plurality* or *multitude* of humans, by the *crowd*, and only by the multitude, amongst and in the middle of the multitude, which means, *not* by any single, determinate subject or agent, neither human nor divine <sup>74</sup>:

the process of disclosure of the truth (*le processus de dévoilement de la vérité*), the procedure of the alethurgy (*la procédure de l'alethurgie*) will not have a principal agent,

<sup>74</sup> Despite the introduction of the terminology – of *alētheia*, *disclosure* etc.– we should be cautious not to take too far the associations here, ones leading towards Heidegger. Following Foucault's analysis further, we notice that what he has in mind with the "third" mode of the truth – different from the divine oracle, as well as from the *logos* of the free citizens – is also something quite divergent from the Heideggerian event of disclosure. As Heidegger is careful to emphasize, his genuine hearing (*das Hören*) is essentially a matter of *logos-legein*, taking place in silence, stillness, and soundlessness (*das Lautlose*), not a matter of the ear, of the sound, of the noise, of the sonority, of the aurality. To mention two works, in which this comes to the fore quite explicitly, see Heidegger (1979, 243-249 259-260, 266, 333, 352, 364, 382-383) and Heidegger 1997 (70-71, 75, 99-100).



will not have a central actor...but it will appear (*mais elle se fera jour*), as it were, in spite of everyone (*malgré tout le monde*), in spite of the God, in spite of the characters (*malgré le dieu, malgré les personnages*). Or in any case it is not so much that the characters will attempt to clear the truth (*dégager la vérité*) – there is no contractor in this work of the truth (*il n'y a pas de maître d'œuvre dans ce travail de la vérité*) – , it is the shock of the passions (*le choc des passions*) of the different characters, the ones in relation to the others...it is this shock of the passions that will explode at a given moment the truth (*qui va faire éclater à un moment donné la vérité*), without contractor, without will to search for this truth (*sans volonté de chercher cette vérité*), without anybody starting an inquiry and leading it till the end (*sans quelqu'un entreprenant l'enquête et la menant jusqu'au bout*)... we have a plurality of characters (*une pluralité de personnages*) who confront one another (*qui s'affrontent les uns aux autres*) from out of their passions. And it is from the shock, from the flash of those passions (*de l'éclair de ces passions*) that will be born, so to speak, without their much wanting it, between them (*entre eux*) the truth... (Foucault 2008, 107-108; my emphasis)

Despite the fact that it may be called confession, the point in the preceding passage is that the truth, and the emission of the truth-voice, is only generated by the plurality, or by the multitude, so that there is no central agent or subject. The truth and its peculiar mode of *parrēsia*, bare voice or the cry, come from the middle, from the density of the multitude. Although the voice may come through the mouth of one of the persons involved, in the case of Euripides' tragedy this is the woman Creuse, Foucault strongly emphasizes that the production of this truth has no agent, no subject, so that it comes out *in spite of* each individual subject, out of the control of each. Moreover, it is *in-between* (*entre*) of the "members" of the multitude, that the truth, and the voice carrying it are born. Only when the voice comes from the in-between, from the middle of the plurality, not having any determinate, distinctive agent, not relating back to any particular person is it justified to say that the truth and the voice of this truth in question are *radically anonymous*. In fact, the truth-voice is born in the interrelations, in the mobile interactions between the actors. It is the encounters between *passions*, the *shock of passions*, which give birth to the voice-truth, one that is essentially not under the control of any actor, one that could not have been planned or calculated by anyone, not even a divine agent. The unexpected, sudden, and uncontrolled quality is attested to by Foucault's characterizing of the truth in terms of *shock, flash* and *explosion*.<sup>75</sup>

In other words, the truth and its voice are not and cannot be the *property* of anyone. Notice the weight of the terms Foucault uses here: truth being born *without will*, without will to truth, without will to know, without will to knowledge. What is encountered here, according to Foucault, is the mode of truth, the event and practice of truth-generation and -emission appearing to be significantly different from those forms of truth-discourse that contribute to the governing, to the functioning of the dispositives of power-knowledge as they have been analyzed by Foucault in a variety of contexts. In opposition to the former, in this analysis of the *tragic truth*, and the *tragedy of truth-saying* or *truth-emission*, Foucault sets forth a mode of truth that is *non-individual* as well as *non-*

<sup>75</sup> There are certain interesting similarities between this characterization of the sensations, the sensorium of the crowd (the density, the touches, the anonymity of contacts, the noise) and the ones to be found throughout Elias Canetti's seminal work *Crowds and Power* (Canetti 1984; see also Malabou 2004).

*totalizing*: the anonymous truth of the multitude, only coming from the middle, from the in-between, in the unexpected shock or explosion engendered by the contingent encounter of passions.

In this manner, it becomes evident that the significance of the observations made by Foucault in his last lectures, concerning this in-between-, or *shared* mode of truth and *parrēsia*, is not limited to the reading of Euripides' tragedy, but extends to some of the most central recurrent political themes of Foucault's thought, and also of political thought, political theory, political philosophy more generally, that is, the relations between power, governing, resistance, discourse and truth. Furthermore, Foucault shows that the medium of the anonymous, non-controlled truth is not *logos*, not speech, not the enigmatic signs of the oracle, but instead *the cry, the bare voice, the phōnē, the noise, the vocal emission*. The medium of the anonymous, non-controlled truth is a sound generated without linguistic articulation, a sound without words. This sound is generated inside the density of the multitude, inside the density of the crowd, in and through the mobile interactions of various quality, in the collisions, and in the shock of the encounters and contacts between their passions, in exactly the same sense as the truth it proclaims, both being without any central agent, without a subject who could seize these, or who could take them into possession. It is only in passage and transition in-between, shared by the multitude, and sounding in the sharing between the individualities, but never possessed by anyone that the non-individualized and non-totalized voice works as the real medium of the blasphemous, subversive *parrēsia* discussed here. It is the truth taking place through a voice without will, without will to speak or will to know. Truth is the voice emitted and spreading without being controlled by the intentions of the speaking subject. It is the voice, which is just as much without any definite place or location of origin, but always only in the transition, in the in-betweenness, in the passage from one to the other.

Following Foucault's analysis in this manner shows the proximity to the familiar theme of the *methexis*, of the *methexic* quality of voice and sound, of the *resonance* as the movement of sharing and participation, contagion also, only in-between, in-the-middle. Is it not this methexic voice, which now takes the upper hand in the *parrēsia*, as the voice of truth, as the cry of truth, as the noise of truth, over and against *logos*, and against the silent ruler, the silent sovereign? Is it not the bare voice, the sound emitted and spreading without being directed by an agent, intruding and interrupting in the manner of a sudden unexpected shock or explosion, the sound that is really anonymous, belonging to nobody, which is now made into the privileged medium for the disclosure of truth? I think we have already seen that these elements are present in Foucault's analysis.

The conflictual quality of the voice, of the cry, of the truth it proclaims, has already been mentioned. It is against Apollo, or against the divine authority, against the ruler, who has committed an injustice against the subjects and who tries to hide, that the voice is emitted. As already noticed, in Foucault's reading of the classical text it is the arrogance of the divine authority, the indifference to

the sufferings of mortals, the *irresponsibility* for his acts of injustice upon his subjects that is epitomized not only by Apollo's silence and the reticent, ambiguous and cryptic signs of the oracle, but also by the *self-indulgent, self-absorbed practice of music*. Here, the music is music of the superiority, of the rising above the mortals, across the insurmountable distance and out of reach, untouchable and hidden, of the divine ruler. It is the music of self-sufficiency and independence from the mortals, in a sort of fulfilled narcissistic fantasy.<sup>76</sup> This is what is at stake in the God's song and his playing of the *lyre*:

*'And you, you play the lyre (et toi, tu joues de la lyre) and do nothing but sing your paeans (et ne fais que chanter tes péans)' (Foucault 2008, 118)...it is evident, that...the song and the oracle are on the same side (le chant et l'oracle sont du même côté). The God is the God of the oracle, but of a rather reticent oracle. He is also the God of the song, and this song is equally so to speak modulated, its value, its signification is modified: it is not the song of gratitude of the human beings with regard to the Gods (ce n'est pas le chant de reconnaissance des hommes à l'égard des dieux). In this song, it is not the human beings who sing the God (qui chantent le dieu), it is the God who sings, who sings for himself, in the indifference to the humans (dans l'indifférence aux hommes), in the indifference to the misfortunes of the humans which he himself has provoked (dans l'indifférence aux malheurs des hommes qu'il a lui-même provoqués) [sic!]. It is the song of the carelessness of the God (le chant de la désinvolture du dieu), much more than the song of gratitude of the humans. So, song and oracle will be grouped together, and their relation is understood as the oracle, conscious of his proper injustice, does not dare say the things to the end (n'ose pas dire les choses jusqu'au bout), and coats himself, dresses himself so to speak in this song (et il s'enrobe, il s'habille en quelque sorte de ce chant), with this song of the indifference with regard to the care for the humans (de ce chant de l'indifférence à l'égard du souci des humains) (ibid., 117)...Thus, all is reversed here. Anyhow, the song passes from the side of the God (le chant passe du côté du dieu), becomes the song of indifference (devient le chant d'indifférence)... (ibid., 119; my emphasis)*

In the passage above, there are various points that need to be examined. What now comes to the fore in Foucault's interpretation of the tragedy is the role of a particular musical instrument, i.e. the *lyre*, and the music generated by the playing of the lyre, as having a part to play in Apollo's power, and more specifically, having its role in his indifferent, careless, and irresponsible sovereignty over the mortals. Foucault himself explicitly states that he considers the issue of voice to be absolutely central for his understanding of Euripides's tragedy. Thus, the question suggests itself concerning the role of the particular instrument, the lyre, which is a string-instrument, and the music played with this instrument together with the song their role in the constellation emphasized by Foucault: the relation between the sovereignty, the irresponsible

<sup>76</sup> Cf. the following characterization of the narcissism of the voice and hearing, of the *vocal narcissism*, and the *acoustic mirror*, by Mladen Dolar: "There is a rudimentary form of narcissism attached to the voice which is difficult to delineate, since it seems to lack any outside support. It is the first 'self-referring' or 'self-reflective' move which appears as pure auto-affection at the closest to oneself, an auto-affection which is not re-flection, since it appears to lack a screen that would return the voice, a pure immediacy where one is both the sender and the receiver without leaving one's pure interiority. In a deceptive self-transparency, one coincides in both roles without a gap and with no need of any exterior mediation. We could call this an acoustic mirror, as it were...without any external mirroring support." (Dolar 2006, 39-40; cf. Pratt 2002 )

and indifferent power of Apollo over the mortals, his claims of superiority, and the multitude of the mortals suffering the consequences of his power.

Foucault points out the a music of indifference, a music of carelessness, a music of irresponsibility, a music of self-enjoyment, a particular musical practice, art and *tekhne*, with its own instruments as well, is at play in the *relation of the sovereign-ruler-God to himself*. Essentially, as Foucault says, Apollo sings and plays for himself and listens to himself singing and playing. Hence, this is a *musical art, - technique- and practice of the self* of certain kind. It is music at work in the subjectivation, in the production and formation of the self by itself, in its self-relation. Furthermore, this *musical subjectivation* is one in which Apollo is forming himself as sovereign subject, but *not* as a good and just ruler. On the contrary: the musical art-, practice- and technique of the self here is one in which Apollo is generating himself as a bad sovereign subject: as a fully irresponsible, indifferent, careless ruler. It is in this practice-and techniques of the self, that the particular sort of music, the singing of the *paean*s, and the playing of the lyre in particular, has its central function. This is a central point to be noticed, not only because it occurs rather unexpectedly in Foucault's lecture, but also because it is significant in the more general context of the problematics of the (self-)formation of the ruler-subject, and music as art-, technique- and practice of the self.

### 6.3 Apollo versus Marsyas (Revisiting the Mythical Struggle)

In order to clarify the functioning of this musical subjectivation, its nexus of art-technique-practice-instrument of the self, it would be helpful to take a closer look at the character of the particular musical instrument, the lyre. The questions are: what sort of music does the lyre produce; what kind of instrument is it; and is there a reason, why this instrument is given a role in the generation of the music of indifference and carelessness.

Besides the lyre, there is another instrument that is generally related to Apollo in mythology. It is another string instrument called *kithara*. In fact, the lyre and *kithara* have certain common qualities that appear to be quite relevant here. Lyre and *kithara*, in comparison to other instruments of Greek antiquity, could be characterized as the ones offering the maximal power over, the maximal control of the sound. It could be formulated that these instruments allow the most perfect *taming* and *subjection* of the sound in its material existence, its movements, its resonance, its vibration, its pitch, its inflection etc. Their superior capacity, especially in comparison to wind-instruments, in the punctual control of the pitch can be seen in the case of the modern guitar as well. The lyre and the *kithara* are the musical instruments, which allow the musician-subject a position of superiority akin to sovereignty in relation to the sound, the body of the sound, which is thus made as perfectly docile as possible. It is through these string-instruments, more than any others, that the

sound can be seized and kept in seizure, so that it follows as obediently and accurately as possible the commands of the sovereign musician. It is by these means that the sound is made to follow without hesitation, without resistance, without disruptions, and without the slightest deviation from the command of the God-musician. In temporal terms, it is to follow the command immediately even at the very moment the command is given, or merely thought about. Obedience occurs without delay and without deference. The practices, the technique and the art of lyre and *kithara* are those of the absolute power over the moving body of the sound, and also the ones making this body stay in the absolute docility under the will of the sovereign. In relating these observations back to Foucault's reading of *Ion*, it is quite understandable, why and how it is precisely the lyre that figures as the instrument played by Apollo: by playing the lyre, Apollo produces for himself a sense, an experience, a self-knowledge or a fantasy, an encouragement and certainty of his sovereign power, of his superiority over, and of the unquestioned obedience from the mortal subjects (Landels 2001, 47-68, 148-162; Rowell 1979a; Rowell 1979b; Rowell 1988).

A couple of remarks are needed concerning the specific manner in which the musical power, the control over sound functions in the practice of the lyre- and *kithara*-playing. The key terms, to characterize this control, are *punctuality* and *point*, and the closely related *purity* and *clarity*. Lyre and *kithara* are instruments allowing an ideally high degree of control in the accurate, punctual determination of pitch, in other words, the production of a pure sound, the purification of sound. This musical control, operating on sound, can be characterized as a practice of *localizing*, *locating* or *emplacing* of the sounds inside the "musical space" constituted on the basis of the solid, distinct and discrete tones modelled according to the *fixed*, *solid points* of classical Geometry. What is at work is a *spatialization* of a determinate kind: *localization* of sound, the *beaconing* of it, giving it a definite direction of movement, so as to form a distinctive series or a sequence out of it. The *spatialization* channels the sound into a distinctive melodic trajectory, into an individualized melodic line, constituted in the proceeding from one determinate tone-point to another, across fixed intervals. In terms of temporality, in the control of musical time, the basic matrix is similar: *pulse*, *beat* and *blow* set the basis for the temporal *punctuation* and *punctualization* of music, establishing the temporal coordinate-points on the basis of which the rhythmical measure, and the rhythmical forms are constructed (Rowell 1979a; Rowell 1979b; Rowell 1988; Landels 2001, 24-26, 148-162; Pickstock 2003; in Chapter 4, these issues were discussed in the context of Foucault's friendship with Boulez).<sup>77</sup>

<sup>77</sup> The following remark by Lewis Rowell (a scholar of the history of ancient musical thought) compares the ancient Greek musical vocabulary with that of ancient India: "The Greeks, under the influence of a more physical/spatial view of rhythm, spoke of notes and beats as *semeia* (a geometer's *points*) and apparently thought of music in much the same way that they did of geometry and astronomy, as a nexus of lines and points (Rowell 1979b, 99)...In the theory of Greek music the *semeia* are the points that mark the extremities of musical figures, a dancer's pose, the extremity of a gesture, speech syllables. Both Aristides and Aristoxenus clearly thought of single musical tones and single minimal time units as "points." And music, as a discipline,

By these same operations of control, the sound is individualized as clearly and distinctly as possible, it is divided into units that can be related and gathered together according to determinate proportions while still remaining distinctive all the time. Through control, sound is individualized and gathered together, without there taking place the *methexic* movement of sharing-participation-contagion-between sounds, without the sounds' forming a mass or a crowd. This is how harmony is brought to bear on the sound. The Greek god Apollo favors the two string-instrument and this appears to be in accordance to the geometrical and astronomic rational basis of ancient Greek music: a manner of thinking about music, from the elementary pitch to the complex musical forms, in the spatial terms of points, a manner that cannot be, at least not unproblematically, transferred to other ancient musical cultures (for instance India) (Rowell 1979a; Rowell 1979b; Rowell 1988; Landels 2001, 24-26, 148-162; Pickstock 2003; cf. the discussion on Foucault and Pierre Boulez above in Chapter 4).

This raises the issue of the spatial coordination of bodies, of individualizing power that is practiced through the spatializing operations of emplacement, location, beaconing, serialization/sequentialization that is so central in Foucault's analyses of disciplinary power, but also in his genealogies of governmentality, of *raison d'État*, and of the reglementary- and police-functions of the state (cf. Foucault 2004a, 348). In relation to musical power, this spatialization is a rational and planned *intervention into sound*, into their relations, into their movements, into their transitions, and into their inflections. The intervention into sound is exercised in order to develop sounds into such and such direction, to block them, to stabilize them, to use them for such and such assignment, to attach them to this or that "value" in a functional form or system. Characterized in these terms, it is appropriate to call what is in question here a *musical dispositif* (cf. again Chapter 4).

It has already been noted, that what comes to the centre in Foucault's reading of Euripides's *Ion*, is a confrontation between two very different voices. First, there is the musical dispositif of the spatializing-individualizing power, exemplified by Apollo's sovereign lyre-playing, and his singing of *paeans* for himself, the self-performance of self-enjoyment and self-worship, constituting a *musical subjectivation*, along with the accompanying musical instruments, arts and techniques of self, in which Apollo forms himself as the sovereign subject of absolute superiority, of absolute power, of indifference, carelessness and irresponsibility towards the mortal subjects. Second, Apollo's musical subjectivation is confronted by *the noise*, the *cry of parrēsia* – the *parrēsia* of the voice, but of the *bare voice* without *logos*, *parrēsia* without veridiction, but also without a musical dispositif at work, without musical articulation, without musical art, without musical technique, and without musical organization. It is the non-verbal, as well as non-musical noise. It is the *cry* that is a *blasphemous, collective parrēsia*, a *noise-voice of rebellion* against Apollo, a *noise-voice of*

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was related to geometry and astronomy, all of which could be represented by a network of lines and points." (ibid., 102)

*subversion* against his claims, and against his musical production of himself as the possessor of the absolute (irresponsible, above and indifferent to all claims of law and justice) power over the mortals.

In Greek mythology this conflict that Foucault emphasized is not the only one in which Apollo's music, as his *kithara*- or lyre-playing and his singing, runs into a confrontation with noise or sound that is neither discursive nor musical, or the musicality of which is highly questionable at least. This time, Apollo's musical practice, his musical dispositif, comes into a confrontation with another instrument, a particularly *noisy instrument*. This noisy instrument is *aulos*<sup>78</sup>, an ancient wind instrument. It is important to know that the sound of *aulos* relates to noise, or that it is noisy: it ultimately lacks and defies both *logos*, as well as the beauty and harmony, the concord of music. There is the simple fact that the activity of playing *aulos* quite obviously prevents or suspends speech as well as singing, by occupying the mouth of whoever plays it. It is an instrument, the sound of which is at the very borderline of noise and music, an instrument emitting a sound that to a great degree lacks the clear articulation, the accuracy, the punctual determination, the distinctive division, the individualization and the harmonization of units, the essential characteristics of the power of the lyre and *kithara*, of the control over sound attained by means of the latter two instruments. Similarly, the creature that plays *aulos*, and who challenges Apollo, is a noisy, boisterous creature as well: Marsyas the satyr, a follower of Dionysus. In this manner, the conflict between the noise-music of the satyr Marsyas and the controlled, articulate music of Apollo, the conflict between *aulos* and *kithara*, is also a struggle between instrumental music and accompanied vocal music (music having *logos*). Finally, it is a struggle between an alien (of Phrygian descent) and a properly Hellenic God, between their cults and their related sorts of music (the story ends in violence, in the flaying of Marsyas)<sup>79</sup> (Landels 2001, 24-26, 148-162).

A depiction of the centrality of noise, of the noisemaking, and of the contagious spreading of noise, in the myth of Dionysus and his cult can be found in another of Euripides' tragedies in *The Bacchanals*. The cries, the shouting (compare with the blasphemous *parrësia* of Foucault), together with the noisy sounds of *auloi* make the soundscape of worship. The significance of noise is already there in the epithet of the God himself, the *Clamor-King*, or *Bromius*, meaning *noisy* or *boisterous*, related to *bremein* (to roar) and *bromos* (loud noise).

<sup>78</sup> *Aulos* is often translated as flute, even though this translation appears to have its problems. Firstly, *aulos* is composed of two pipes (not one). The sound of *aulos* is characterized by qualities such as *shrill, blaring and booming*, qualities that hardly remind one of the sound of the flute (see Landels 2001, 24-26).

<sup>79</sup> The conflict also figures in Plato's dialogues: "The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said." (Plato *The Republic*, 399e). Moreover, the proximity of the sound of *aulos* to non-musical noises, such as the noises of animals, other noises of nature, or the non-intended noises produced through human activities, is already insinuated in the dialogue: "As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hall, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes; pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow like a cock..." (ibid., 397a-b)

The noise of the noisy God is his first call, coming from outside the *polis*, which *infects* the auditor with the ecstasy, with the madness, and turns human beings into the followers of the God. The noise is highly contagious: the noise-call of Bromius is echoed and answered by the multitude of followers, *thiasos* (satyrs and woman-Bacchantes, or *Maenads* leaving their homes and running to the mountains and forests), by their noisemaking, their joining in the noise of their God by their shouting and crying, but also by their making use of the particularly noisy instruments, the sacred instruments of the cult: blowing of *aulos* (the *Phrygian flute*), but also crashing the *timbrels* or *cymbals*, another Oriental (Phrygian) instrument. The whole mountain, where the worshippers roam, is filled with the in-articulate, non-discursive, as well as non-musical noises<sup>80</sup> (Otto 1960, 85-87; Burkert 2001, 223-225). Unfortunately, Foucault does not deal with *The Bacchanals* in his lectures.

There are certain significant points that relate Foucault's reflection on the blasphemous, rebellious voice, the non-discursive, non-musical, crying and noisy *parrēsia*, and the depictions to be found on the sound of the *aulos* as the other sonorous-acoustic event that comes to a confrontation with Apollo's musical practice and musical dispositive. It is the *non-controlled quality* of the rebellious sounds, of their birth and emission, as well as of the sound's existence, its sounding and re-sounding, the modifications of its quality, its inflections, its resonance that is particularly significant. The cry of *parrēsia*, quite like the sound of *aulos*, in their birth and emission as well as their whole existence, their taking-place as such, are characterized by their defiance of control, the will of any agent, thus, also by their defying the rational art, or *tekhne* of music and of rhetoric as well.

This may be the significant difference, and perhaps also the key to understanding the real character of the conflict between these emissions of the noise- sound, noise-voice, or the bare voice; and the musical dispositive exemplified by Apollo's mastery of the string-instruments, and the resulting mastery over the sound's existence as a whole. On one side, there is the

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<sup>80</sup> "...CHORUS: ...-O Bacchus' vassals, High-tossed let the wild wands swing: One dancing-band shall be all the land When, led by the Clamour-king, His revel-rout fills the hills - the hills Where thy women abide till he come Whom the Vine-god chasing, in frenzy racing, Hunted from shuttle and loom. O cavern that rang when Curetès sang, O bower of the Babe Zeus' birth, glancing Where the Corybants, dancing with helm-crests Through the dark halls under the earth, This timbrel found whose hide-stretched round We smite, and its Bacchanal mirth They blent with the cry ringing sweet and high From the flutes of the Phrygian land, And its thunder, soaring o'er revel-shouts' roaring, They gave unto Rhea's hand; But the gift passed on from the Mother, was won By the madding Satyr-band; And to Semele's child gave the woodfolk wild The homage he holdeth dear, When to feet white-flashing the timbrels clashing Are wedded in each third year. O trance of rapture, when, reeling aside From the Bacchanal rout o'er the mountains flying... (Euripides 1979, 110-140) "DIONYSUS: Women, my revel-rout, from alien homes To share my rest and my wayfaring brought Uplift the cymbals to the Phrygian towns Native, great Mother Rhea's device and mine, And smite them, compassing yon royal halls Of Pentheus, so that Cadmu's town may see. I to Cithaeron's glens will go, where bide My Bacchanals, and join the dances there. Enter CHORUS, waving the thyrsus-wands, and clashing their timbrels." (ibid., 50-70)



perfected taming and subjection of the material-sensory, or the concrete, sonorous-acoustic existence of the sound, and its turning into the property of the sovereign musician, to the immediate, accurate and punctual obedience to the sovereign will on the basis of the punctuality of the spatio-temporal coordinates of music. On the other side, in the crying of the crowd-*parrēsia*, and the noisy sound of *aulos*, there occurs the sonorous-acoustic sound-event in defiance of such attempts to mastery.<sup>81</sup>

It is no exaggeration to say that *aulos*, its' practice of playing and its sound, can be characterized by certain lack of control, by the limited degree of power over the sound, especially in comparison to the string-instruments. There is a certain irreducible remainder of *inaccuracy* and *impurity* in the sound of *aulos*, which makes it all the more understandable why it was so centrally related to noise (and to the noisy cult of Dionysus) in the variety of mythical narrations. The inaccuracy, the non-punctuality and the impurity could be understood in terms of the incessant change of the sound of *aulos*, its constant being in transition, its constant being on the move, so that it is always in the impure, non-punctual in-betweenness: never punctually, never accurately or purely "in" or "at", never hitting the pure tone, never hitting the mark but always bypassing it. The sound of *aulos* would be always gliding into the in-between of the coordinates of purity that are set by the musical system. Never hitting accurately the point, or the mark, but always deviating, *aulos* is always also in deviance from the will, and from the command of the player who can never play it accurately. In its very movement, the sound remains resistant to the attempts of localization or emplacement, and to the attempts to determine the direction, the trajectory, or the line of melody. It is never quite accurately emplaced or directed, as the musician would wish, but instead always deviates into the inaccuracy, to the in-betweenness of the sound's concrete, sonorous and acoustic event (Landels 2001, 24-26, 148-162; Rowell 1979a; Rowell 1979b; Rowell 1988).

On the other hand, *aulos* is the instrument capable of modulations and changes, that is, of transitions (in the timbre, in the volume), as well as of transitions between different musical modes, between harmonies, thus generating conjunctions, connections, transitions between these, producing overlaps and mixtures between what should remain separate.<sup>82</sup> This characteristic inaccuracy, the deviance of the uncontrolled transition, the mixture and confusion in music, has its echo in the generation of parallel

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<sup>81</sup> We should also notice that this manner of understanding the conflict between Apollo's vocal music and noise, between the self-gratifying musical voice of the ruler and the rebellious noise-voice of the multitude or crowd of subjects, the incriminating cry, the cry of justice emitted by the suffering victims of the ruler's indifference, is not really similar to the manner in which young Nietzsche portrayed the relation between the Apollonic and Dionysian forms of art (cf. especially Nietzsche 1972a, throughout the work).

<sup>82</sup> Cf.: "- But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them into our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the pan harmonic music is only an imitation of the flute? - Clearly not." (Plato *The Republic*, 399d).

mixtures or confusions: i.e. “bad”, “degenerate”, “perverse” *methexis, contagions*, that occur between different kinds of movements of the soul, between different kinds of *characters (ethos)*, and finally between different species- and forms of life (Landels 2001, 24-26, 148-162; Rowell 1979a; Rowell 1979b; Rowell 1988).<sup>83</sup>

In this manner, *aulos* seems to be a rather peculiar instrument, among ancient Greek musical instruments that are known, an instrument of noise. As an instrument it was a non-instrumental instrument, an instrument of non-instrumentality, an instrument of defying the very claims of instrumentality. The playing of *aulos* caused the detaching of sound, the emission, the very taking-place of sound from the grasp of instrumentalization. It was an instrument of giving birth to an essentially non-instrumental event of sound that was beyond the attempt to seize, to appropriate, to direct, to use; an instrument of the loss of power, a characteristically non-sovereign instrument, an instrument of non-sovereignty (in difference to lyre and *kithara*, the instruments of Apollo’s power). Finally, *aulos* could also be characterized as an instrument that subverts the basic constitution of the Greek musical space, with its grounding on the solid points of co-ordinates.

The very birth of the instrument is already a story of repulsion, horror, and rejection provoked by *aulos*. The reaction is provoked with the very God who begins to play the instrument (*Athena*) by the loss of beauty, the loss of the coherence and the harmony of her face, of her appearance as reflected in the mirror-image offered by the river, caused by the very event of playing the instrument. The following is a recent re-telling of the story, told by the French author Pascal Quignard:

It is Athena, who invents the flute. She manufactures the first flute (in Greek *aulos*, in Latin *tibia*) to imitate the cries (*les cris*) she had heard breaking out of the throat of the bird-snakes with golden wings (*s’échapper du gosier des oiseaux-serpents aux ailes d’or*) in the defense against wild boar (*aux défenses de sanglier*)...The silene (*le silène*) Marsyas represents to Athena that her mouth was distended (*la bouche distendue*), swollen cheeks (*les joues gonflées*), bulging eyes (*les yeux exorbités*), while she imitated the chant of the Gorgon by blowing into her *tibiae* (*en soufflant dans ses tibiae*). Marsyas shouts at Athena: ‘Let go of the flute. Abandon that mask (*ce masque*), which deranges your jaws (*qui désordonne tes mâchoires*) and this chant that terrifies (*ce chant qui épouvante*).’ But Athena will not listen to him. One day, in Phrygia, while the Goddess was playing on the bank of a river, she caught sight of her reflection in the water. That image of an occupied mouth frightens her (*cette image d’une bouche occupée l’effraya*). Immediately, she throws her flute far away from herself amongst

<sup>83</sup> In Plato’s *Laws*, we find the following warning on the dangers of mixtures and confusions in music, and in poetry, which is also a warning on the *danger of noise*: “Muses themselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the gestures and songs of women; nor after combining the melodies with the gestures of freemen would they add on the rhythms of slaves and men of the baser sort; nor, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, would they assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and so make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, ‘are ripe for true pleasure’ ...The experienced see all this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc ... all this sort of thing, which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish noise ...” (Plato *Laws*, 669c-669e)

the reeds of the shore. She flees (*elle s'enfuit*). So Marsyas picks up the flute abandoned by the Goddess. (Quignard 1996, 15-16)<sup>84</sup>

It is the deformation, the distortion of Athena's beauty, of the integrity and harmony of the features of her appearance, caused by the very effort of playing *aulos*, which evokes the reaction of horror, disgust and rejection of the instrument. So, it could be said, that the physical event of playing (or trying to play) *aulos*, has an effect which in this way echoes the distortion and impurity of its noisy sound. Even the powerful Goddess, as she makes the mistake of beginning to play the strange instrument, cannot help becoming exposed to the movement of de-formation, taking place in her own appearance. Athena perceives the becoming-strange of her own appearance as it is reflected in the mirror image (instead of offering the God what she expected, that is, the gratifying affirmation of her beauty). In this way, already in the myth of the nascence, there is an obscene and blasphemous quality to *aulos*, bringing about hostility from, and confrontation with the properly Greek Gods (first Athena and then Apollo), and the adoption of the instrument by the devotees of the noisy, Oriental cult (Marsyas and Dionysus Bromius).

It has already appeared, that in the analysis Foucault presents on the blasphemous, subversive *parrēsia*, the *noise-parrēsia* (without *logos*, without music) coming to challenge Apollo's absolute power, there are qualities that relate to the depiction of *aulos* offered above. The cry of *parrēsia* is emitted from the crowd of mortals, from their multitude, without being proper to, or property of any agent. It is emitted and sounds like the sound of an *aulos* without really belonging to anyone, without its' being governed by any will at all. It does not have any *maître d'œuvre*. It is a sound being emitted collectively, but without being in the control of any agent, of any person involved, a sound only sounding from the midst of the multitude, beyond the control of each agent. It is far from offering a medium of self-worship or self-enjoyment, far from offering a medium for the (self-)production of the sense of supreme power and superiority. It is unlike Apollo's arrogant musical practice, or even self-expression (unlike the "usual" confession). The collective noise-voice of *parrēsia*, which is close in proximity to the noisy sound of an *aulos*, escapes both the control of each individual agent and of the community as a whole. The collectivity of the voice does not mean there is a common- or general will behind the voice. Instead, the voice is born and sounds only by and from the encounters, the contacts, the multiple interactions, the horizontal conjunctions and connections *in-between* (*entre*) the agents, without being the properly possessed or appropriated voice of anyone either individually or collectively.

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<sup>84</sup> Cf.: "Athena, it seems, was playing the aulos, and caught sight of her reflection in 'some river or other' and, being shocked by the distortion of her features which the effort caused, threw the instrument away and vowed never to touch it again. Plutarch quotes a couple of lines of unknown authorship, in which someone (presumably Marsyas) says to Athena: 'Your appearance is unseemly; let go of the auloi, take up your equipment (*hopla*) and make your cheeks decent'...(*hopla* would normally mean her shield and spear...)." (Landels 2001, 155)

Both the cry of the blasphemous *parrēsia*, and the noisy sound of *aulos*, are sounding without there being any command that could control the resonance, the timbre, the inflection, the *tempo* etc. This fundamental lack of control, the unexpected and incalculable sounding of the noisy *parrēsia*, gave Foucault the reason to compare the arriving of it to an *explosion* or *shock*, coming from the in-betweenness of the crowd, its contacts and conjunctions. In *aulos*, there is something like the paradoxical, non-instrumental instrument, of such an unexpected explosion, or shock of sound, the instrument also, perhaps, of the blasphemous *parrēsia*, of the noise-*parrēsia* having its real descent in the midst of the crowd, or the multitude.

Foucault emphasizes the significance of this conflictual difference in sounds. Against this background, the difference and this conflictual relation between the crying noise of the collective- crowd- *parrēsia*, and Apollo's musical (self-)practice of indifferent superiority, becomes all the more comprehensible. Inside what was called the musical dispositif of Apollo, there is the sound that is subjected, tamed in its movements, and made into the property of the sovereign. This is *sound tamed, domesticated* as fully as possible, as perfectly as possible reduced of any remainder of resistance, deviance, of the unexpected, of temporal deference, of inaccuracy and non-punctuality in its acoustic-sonorous, inflecting, resonating and spreading body. The sound is seized and made docile, so that it faithfully follows every desire, every wish of the musician. The ideal is the *perfect docility* of the sound, accomplished through the mastery of the instrument, perfect in the sense of the immediate following of the wishes and will of the subject, to accurately and punctually locate, emplace and direct the sound in space and time: upwards, downwards, along a particular trajectory, in this or that *tempo*, at this or that moment, taking such and such a rhythmic value. The power to tame the sound so perfectly, into such a perfect docility, that it appears as if the sound was not exterior at all, as if it belonged (in a quasi-organic manner) to the subject, as if it was part of him, of his interiority.

Depicted as a practitioner of such a perfected *art and technique of taming the sound*, of *making the sound docile*, Apollo could be characterized as a *virtuoso*.<sup>85</sup> As has already been stressed, this virtuoso-subject, in Foucault's lectures, is set

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<sup>85</sup> To compare, very much the same qualities come to the fore in Peter Szendy's analysis of the idea of *virtuosity*, and the *virtuoso*, appearing in the letters of Franz Liszt, one of the most famous musical virtuosos known in the history Western art music: "Liszt said it better than anyone else, this dream of the tamer having dialogue with the unknown *x* in order to domesticate it (*ce rêve du dompteur dialoguant avec l'x inconnu pour l'apprivoiser*); and the piano became from that moment on for him a docile means of transportation to colonize the *terra incognita* and its disturbing strangeness (*et le piano devenait dès lors pour lui un moyen de transport docile pour coloniser la terra incognita et son inquiétante étrangeté*)...The virtuosity here is nothing other than a theatre of the domestication (*la virtuosité n'est ici rien d'autre qu'un théâtre de la domestication*): reinstalling, after the struggle and the conquest, the 'I' in its mastery (*réinstallant, après le combat et la conquête, le 'je' dans sa maîtrise*). Therefrom, the body of the virtuoso does not exit as recomposed, but simply as glorified (*le corps du virtuose n'en sort pas recomposé, mais simplement glorifié*). It is him, 'I', who prints his victorious stamp upon the material which he informs or moulds (*c'est lui, 'je', qui imprime son sceau victorieux sur la matière qu'il informe ou insuffle*)..." (Szendy 2002, 13-14)

against the *brute*, non-technical noise-emission of the collective *parrēsia* and of *aulos*-playing in which each individual can only take part in the event of the sound.

As Foucault emphasizes, this sort of music produced by Apollo has its actual function *not* in communication, and *not* in offering the truth to the mortals. This is precisely what the musical practice in question here *does not* do. The God sings and plays only *for himself*, not for the others. For himself, he performs the *paean*s, *songs of glorification*, triumph and gratitude, and thus practices his own self-gratitude, a sort of self-worship, in the circle of performing and hearing, hearing his own voice, hearing his own playing without disruptions, and without becoming exposed to any exteriority at all. It is in this manner that it can be said that music functions as the medium for the God's *self-sufficiency*, for his *self-indulgence*, for his *self-worship*, for the God's entertaining himself and giving pleasure to himself without regard for others, and without needing others, his mortal subjects. In other words, the music is the medium of his self-enjoyment by his playing for himself in the circle of self-satisfaction. In the self-sufficiency, in the full interiority of the self-satisfaction and self-enjoyment, in the performing-hearing-oneself, the God would be perfectly superior to the mortals, perfectly independent of his subjects, out of their reach, untouchable, indifferent to their claims, their complaints, their wishes.

As also comes to the fore in Foucault's interpretation, music has a second function as well. The second function is implicated by the first one: the *indifference* of Apollo for the sufferings of the mortals, his indifference for their questions, for their desire to know the truth. Through the sound and musical playing, the God actually refuses to answer, refuses to reveal the truth of himself, of his own acts of injustice. The singing and playing of the lyre is the arrogant gesture of the God, in his refusal to take any responsibility for his actions, for the sufferings he has caused. The music is the *mask*, which hides and which protects his distance, his pre-eminence above the mortals, out of their reach, in the carelessness and irresponsibility of his self-sufficient enjoyment.

These two interrelated functions of Apollo's music, are noticed by Foucault in his reading of Euripides' tragedy: first, the music the God plays for himself offers the medium for the self-sufficiency of self-enjoyment, for self-worship; and second, music hides and masks the God from the mortals, thus perfecting his distance, his superiority, his being above the law, above the claims of justice, above responsibility to inferiors. The fulfillment of Apollo's power, of his force and his sovereignty, as well as his indifferent sense of absolute superiority, as it is depicted through the reading offered by Foucault, is brought about in a process of *auto-affection*: in the impression and fantasy of immediacy, produced by the emission and *hearing of one's own voice*, or playing the lyre and hearing its sound, one that is in the absolute submission and proximity to one's own will, as if it really was one's own, following one's every wish, without distancing or delaying from the intentions of the subject.

In this way, Foucault's last lectures approach the seminal theme of the work of Jacques Derrida, the relation between voice and auto-affectation, the *phono-* and *logo-centricism* in the history of Occidental Philosophy, as the kernel of the metaphysical form of thought, of the metaphysical discourse, from Plato to Husserl and even beyond.<sup>86</sup> The basic metaphysical idea and ideal is that of self-presence of the subject, of self-consciousness as self-presence, able to apprehend itself *immediately*, that is, without any passage or detour through an exterior mediation, by a signifier, in the pure simultaneity of the "now" of the present moment, in other words, without any temporal deferral, and without any spatial distancing taking place in the self-relation. In the ideally auto-affective self-relation, neither space nor time is allowed that would deviate from or compromise the simultaneity and the absolute proximity of the self to itself, in the pure *hic et nunc*.

The voice and hearing seem to offer the ideal medium and the *sensory root* for the formation of the auto-affective experience, or the auto-affective fantasy. The voice remains in the maximal proximity and subjection to the self uttering it, and in the simultaneity of the "now" of the act of utterance (especially compared to writing), so that the illusion is created, that the voice is not an exterior and material signifier at all, as if the mediation of the signifier was effaced in the simultaneous and non-distanced emission and hearing of the voice. It is as though the voice belonged to, and never departed from, the ideal, interior realm of the consciousness, or "spirit", as though in the voice, the spirit really were in immediate contact with itself. It is this core-experience, or the core-illusion of metaphysics, which is rooted in, and supported by the voice and audition ("the voice is the consciousness"). This is also what offers the reason for the metaphysical privileging of the speaking voice as the locus of meaning (and the concomitant suspiciousness to writing), the kernel of the *logo-phono-centricism*.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> This is not to deny or ignore that in other respects, there are central points of disagreements between Foucault and Derrida. One of these has to do with their reading of Plato, especially, as it comes to the sense of the suspiciousness towards writing shown by Plato. Foucault takes up this issue in his final lectures (see Foucault 2008, 226-238).

<sup>87</sup> See the following passages, from Derrida's early work, in which we can find perhaps the most articulate, seminal formulations of the point: "The voice is heard (understood) – that undoubtedly is what is called conscience (*sic!* the French word *la conscience* also means *consciousness*, which would appear to be a more adequate translation here) – closest to the self as the absolute effacement of the signifier: pure auto-affectation that necessarily has the form of time which doesn't borrow from outside of itself, in the world or in 'reality', any accessory signifier, any substance of expression foreign to its own spontaneity. It is the unique experience of the signified producing itself spontaneously from within the self...(Derrida 1976, 20)...the subject can hear/understand herself or speak to herself (*le sujet peut s'entendre ou se parler*), let herself be affected by the signifier she produces without any detour through the instance of exteriority (*se laisser affecter par le signifiant qu'il produit sans aucun détour par l'instance de l'extériorité*), of the world, or of the improper in general (*du monde, ou du non-propre en général*) ...That is why it is experienced as absolutely pure auto-affectation, inside a proximity to self that would be nothing else but the absolute reduction of the space in general (*c'est pourquoi elle est vécue comme auto-affectation absolument pure, dans une proximité à soi qui ne serait autre que la réduction absolue de l'espace en général*)...This auto-affectation is undoubtedly the possibility of what is

These are some of the better known and reviewed parts of Derrida's thought on the issue of the voice, perhaps in his *œuvre* as a whole. However, a more careful reading shows Derrida's argument on the issue of voice and hearing to be more complex. A more careful reading also shows there is a more significant, more pertinent convergences between Derrida's deconstruction of the voice, and the various interpretations of the conflictual setting that have been discussed so far including the variation found in Foucault's lecture courses on the confrontation between Apollo's musical practice and the "bare voice". In the following passage, the specific context is the deconstructive reading of Husserl's philosophy of meaning and sign. Nevertheless, the real significance of Derrida's argument is more generally extensive and pertains to the role of the voice in the metaphysical form of thought- and discourse. The passage is highly significant, for Derrida quite explicitly asserts that the relation of metaphysical thinking to the voice is anything but simple, that the privileging of the voice is anything but unproblematic, anything but unreserved. Indeed, it is *not phônē*, if this is understood as the bare voice, as voice in its materiality and sensory qualities, the voice as sonorous and auditory, which is the privileged medium of signification in metaphysics. The *phônē* of phonocentrism is not the sonorous, acoustic, concrete and material *phônē*, in the sense that the concept has been given so far. The sense-making, "living voice" privileged by phonocentrism, the voice that is essentially related to *logos*, to the ideally meaningful speech, is something to be distinguished from the material, acoustic, concrete, sonorous voice and sound:

The necessary privilege of the *phônē* (*la phonè*) that is implicated by the entire history of the metaphysics... it is not in the sonorous substance (*à la substance sonore*) or in the physical voice (*à la voix physique*), in the body of the voice in the world (*au corps de la voix dans le monde*) that he (i.e. Husserl, L.S.) will recognize an affinity of origin with the *logos* in general, but in the phenomenological voice (*à la voix phénoménologique*), in the voice in its transcendental flesh (*à la voix dans sa chair transcendente*), in the breath (*au souffle*), in the intentional animation (*à l'animation intentionnelle*), which transforms the body of the word (*le corps du mot*) into flesh (*en chair*), which makes a *Leib* out of the *Körper*, a *geistige Leiblichkeit*. The phenomenological voice would be

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called the *subjectivity* or the *for-itself* (*cette auto-affection est sans doute la possibilité de ce qu'on appelle la subjectivité ou le pour-soi*)...no consciousness is possible without the voice (*aucune conscience n'est possible sans la voix*). The voice is the consciousness (*la voix est la conscience*) (Derrida 2005a, 88-89)...a medium that preserves at once both the *presence of the object* in front of the intuition and the *self-presence*, the absolute proximity of the acts to themselves (*un médium qui préserve à la fois la présence de l'objet devant l'intuition et la présence à soi, la proximité absolue des actes à eux-mêmes*) ...The voice is the name of that element. The voice hears/understands itself (*la voix est le nom de cet élément. La voix s'entend*). The phonic signs...are 'heard/understood' by the subject uttering them in the absolute proximity of their present (*les signes phoniques ...sont 'entendus' du sujet qui les profère dans la proximité absolue de leur présent*). The subject does not need to pass outside herself to be immediately affected by her activity of expression (*le sujet n'a pas à passer hors de soi pour être immédiatement affecté par son activité d'expression*). My words are 'alive' because they do not seem to leave me (*mes paroles sont 'vives' parce qu'elles semblent ne pas me quitter*): not to fall outside me, outside my breath, into a visible distance (*ne pas tomber hors de moi, hors de mon souffle, dans un éloignement visible*); not ceasing to belong to me, being available to me, 'without accessory' (*ne pas cesser de m'appartenir, d'être à ma disposition, 'sans accessoire'*). (ibid., 85)

this spiritual flesh (*cette chair spirituelle*) that continues to speak and be self-present (*de parler et d'être présente à soi*) – to hear/understand itself (*de s'entendre*) – in the absence of the world. (Derrida 2005a, 15-16)

There is not one voice, but at least two different voices at play. First, there is the *sonorous substance*, the material or *physical voice*, the *body of the voice in the world*. As Derrida states, this is *not* the voice that is privileged by metaphysics, not the voice of phonocentricism. Second, there is the phenomenological voice, which is also the voice of metaphysics more generally speaking, which is to be distinguished from the material, sonorous, “worldly” voice. The spiritual flesh, transcendental flesh, the breath, intentionally animated, defined also by its being-present, or being-self-present, distinguished from the sonorous, bodily voice. The phenomenological voice, the voice of metaphysics, which is above all the voice of the auto-affective experience- and fantasy, is a mysterious phenomenon indeed. What makes it so mysterious, is not only the fact that it is not the material-sonorous-worldly voice at all, but also the fact that it erases, or destroys its own body, its own material and sensory existence immediately, at the very moment when it is uttered. The voice, the speaking voice, the living voice carrying the living word, *logos*, voice which is animated, made living only by the reduction, by the erasure, by the annihilation of the body of the voice, of the sonority of the voice:

This immediate presence is due to the fact that the phenomenological ‘body’ of the signifier (*le ‘corps’ phénoménologique du signifiant*) appears to erase itself (*s’effacer*) at the same moment, when it is produced. It appears to belong already to the element of ideality. It reduces itself phenomenologically, transforming into pure transparency (*en pure diaphanéité*) the worldly opacity of its body (*l’opacité mondaine de son corps*). This erasure of the sensuous body (*cet effacement du corps sensible et de son extériorité*) is for the consciousness the form itself of the immediate presence of the signified (*la forme même de la présence immédiate du signifié*). (Derrida 2005a, 86)

The annihilation of the sonority, of the bodily and sensory existence of the voice, is the essential demand set by metaphysics on the voice, and it is only in this manner that the voice that has been reduced of its body, of its sonority, of its physicality, is then privileged by the discourse of logo-phonocentricism. The ideal, signifying activity of utterance, of expression, of speech, would mean the reduction of the sonority, acousticity and materiality of the voice, or it means the silencing of the voice. It is only by this erasure, or reduction of the sonority, of the concrete materiality, that the voice can be subjected to the immediacy of auto-affectation, determined by the simultaneity of the present moment – the *point-like “now”* – as well as by the annihilation of spatial distance. I believe that this interpretation of Derrida on the matter is justified<sup>88</sup>. These points have

<sup>88</sup> In one of his last works, dedicated to Jean-Luc Nancy, Derrida presents a systematic elaboration on the issue of the senses, of the sensory roots of the language of Occidental philosophy, of its privileged sensory tropes, and its sensory hierarchies. Now, far from suggesting that the aural and sonorous are privileged, he strives to show, that it is above all *touch*, the *tactile-haptic* perception, that has been given a pre-eminence throughout the history of philosophy, even surpassing vision and the ocular: “...in Husserl, as in Plato and so many others, the authority of the ‘eidetic’ figure and of optical intuitionism, the implicit philosophy of the gaze – as



been duly noticed, emphasized and further elaborated in recent interpretations and discussion on Derrida's thought, focused on the issue of the voice (Poizat 2002 and Mallet 2002). However, they have not been noticed by the critics, who somewhat hastily accuse Derrida of a reductive-essentialist account of voice and aurality<sup>89</sup>.

What is the fate of that which is erased by the *logocentrist* safeguarding of meaning, of signification? What is the fate of the worldly voice, the body of the voice, the sonority of the voice? There appears to be an alliance, or a complicity, although perhaps an unexpected one, between sound and writing. The alliance or complicity is between sound as the resonating, sonorous body; and writing as the constant movement of the signifier in its materiality, and in its exteriority. The following is Jean-Luc Nancy's argument of the point:

'To write' (*écrire*) ...that is nothing other than to make resonate (*faire résonner*) the sense beyond the signification (*le sens au-delà de la signification*), or beyond itself (*ou au-delà de lui-même*). It is to *vocalise* (*c'est vocaliser*) a sense that claimed, for a classical thought, to rest deaf and mute (*rester sourd et muet*) (Nancy, 2002, 67)... The writing (*l'écriture*) is also, very literally and up to the value of an 'archae-writing' (*et jusque dans la valeur d'une archi-écriture*), a voice that resonates (*une voix qui résonne*). (ibid., 69)

In this fashion, we have encountered the theme of the *de-materialization* or *immaterialization of sound and voice*, the *taming* or *subjection* of sound, striving to attach sound or voice into a functional-hierarchic, or organic system, and thus to turn it into a signifying element functioning inside such a system. What is perhaps more unexpected, is to discover the appearance of the issue in the thought of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. In the dematerialization is produced the ideal "living speech", the meaningful *logos* of metaphysics, occupying the now-point (*hic et nunc*) of the present moment, as well as the punctually controlled (localized and beacons) music, having its proper instruments and techniques exemplified by the *lyre* and *kithara*, the mythical instruments played by Apollo himself, the instruments by which the sound is seized and attached to the maximal proximity of the sovereign musician, to

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paradoxical as this may appear - always and necessarily *fulfills itself*, firmly and incessantly strengthens and confirms itself, in an intuition factually filled-in and in the hyperbole of continuistic haptocenteredness. Hence, in each instance, touching is no longer just one sense among others, since it conditions them all and is coextensive with them (Derrida 2005b, 161-162)... certainly there is the well-known hegemony of eidetics, as *figure* or *aspect*, and therefore as visible form exposed to a disembodied, incorporeal look. But this supremacy itself does not obey the eye except to the extent that a haptical intuitionism comes to fulfill it, fill it, and still the intentional movement of desire, as a desire for presence... Shall we say of philosophy in general that it is obediently under the thumb of the finger and the eye?" (ibid., 121)... Rather, we endeavour to identify an intuitionism constitutive of philosophy itself, of the gesture of thought that consists in philosophizing - and even of the idealization process that consists of retaining the sense of touch within sight so as to ensure for the glancing eye the fullness of immediate presence required by every ontology or metaphysics... But then, by touching on it by way of a figure, *psuchē* really touches (*haptetai*) upon truth." (ibid., 120).

<sup>89</sup> Of the different representatives of this line of criticism (see Pickstock 1998, xiii, 4-6, 115-116; Cavarero 2002; Cavarero 2005, especially 213-241; Dolar 2006, 42).

follow his will obediently. These reductions of the sonorous body of the voice and sound mean the silence, or the silencing of the voice and sound: both the *logos* of metaphysics (Derrida); and the self-sufficient, cryptic and arrogant musical play of the divine ruler Apollo (in Foucault's analysis), are silent in their way.

#### 6.4 Becoming All Ear: Subversive Noise

The function of the silencing of the sonorous body of the voice and sound, and of the silenced, dematerialized voice, also has something in common in both of the analyses: they offer the medium for the experience, or the illusion of auto-affection, of the self-sufficiency of the subject. This is the case in the constitution of the subject of metaphysics, or the subject of philosophy (as analyzed by Derrida) in the auto-affection of the immediate self-consciousness. It is the case also in the production of the indifferent and arrogant self-sufficiency, the perfect self-enjoyment of Apollo (as emphasized by Foucault in his interpretation of Euripides' tragedy). In both of these cases, the voice and sound function as the medium for the production of subjectivity, but only after having gone through the operations of de-materialization, de-sonorization, and silencing.

Another central theme is the tension, and the conflict taking place in the confrontation of governing, or government, including its rationalities, techniques and practices; and sound, in its concrete materiality. There a *subversive potentiality* related to the sound, to the voice, one that makes it threatening, from the point of view of the government and governing. To return to the reading of Foucault's lecture, the singing and lyre-playing of Apollo is challenged by the bare voice, by the cry, by the noise. As was mentioned, Foucault explicitly states how central he considers the issue of the voice to be in his understanding of Euripides' tragedy, but also at the more general level, in his analysis of the different modes of *parrësia*, truth-speaking or truth-utterance, and their political senses. In the crying and shouting, emitted by the plurality of people, the subversive potentiality is most evidently at play: indeed, as Foucault himself said, what takes place is a *blasphemous* event. The noise emitted, without speech and without music, subverts the rule of Apollo, and is uttered against his cruel and arbitrary use of power, a sort of divine despotism or tyranny. In this situation, the noise of the humans, the bare voice which is born in the multitude of humans, comes to challenge the self-sufficient music, as well as the reticent oracle of the God. In the following citation Foucault presents, the blasphemous cry, the blasphemous noise of resistance is emitted directly to Apollo's *ear*, (again from Foucault's lecture on Euripides's *Ion*):

And you, you play the lyre and do nothing but sing your paeans! Hey! It is you that I call (*ohé! c'est toi que j'appelle*)...*That this cry that I utter arrives in your ear (que ce cri que je pousse arrive à ton oreille)*! (Foucault 2008, 113; my emphasis)

So, the cry is emitted directly into the ear of mighty Apollo, of the ruler who has withdrawn into what appears to be total superiority, total indifference and absolute untouchability. Although the cry originates from Creuse, a woman and hence excluded from the citizenry of Athens, Foucault stresses that, in reality, the voice and the truth it carries, come from the midst, from the middle, from the *in-between* (*entre*) of the multitude, of the crowd of people. The shouting, the crying, and the truth belong together with the cry, and take place without the will, without an actual subject of utterance. It is truth and voice emitted without a speaking subject, an anonymous voice and anonymous truth (these central points of Foucault's analysis were discussed above in this Chapter). In Foucault's interpretation importance is given to the voice as such, the cry or shouting, while the only verbal utterance may be the mere statement of the fact of shouting or crying as such:

*I will shout, I will proclaim, I will address you and I will proclaim my complaint to your ears (je clamerai, je proclamerai, je m'adresserai à toi et je proclamerai ma plainte à tes oreilles). And hence the God, who should be the God that speaks, the God who should be the God-mouth, becomes the God-ear, God-ear that one addresses (le dieu qui devrait être le dieu-bouche, devient le dieu-oreille, le dieu-oreille auquel on s'adresse).* (Foucault 2008, 119; my emphasis)

The passage quoted above is noteworthy, for the figures Foucault uses: the setting of power and resistance is the setting in which the *mouth*, the *ear* and the *voice* are all related. The God, Apollo, in his authority, should be the God-mouth, and also the God-voice, the mouth- and the voice of authority. As it has been emphasized, the mouth- and the voice of the God have become the medium of his auto-affection, when the voice emitted by the sovereign mouth is received by the God himself, by his ears, in the perfect self-sufficient circle, without any irruptions or distractions by other voices or sounds, by voices coming from the outside. Apollo, Apollo's ears only hear his own voice – a voice that is only for his own enjoyment, which does not “say”, does not communicate, does not give anything to anyone else. The God has withdrawn into this perfect *oral-* and *aural circuit*, from the mouth to the ear, maintaining his state of indifference and superiority.

Or, so Apollo appears to believe. The formulations are Foucault's own, not ones borrowed from Euripide's text. According to Foucault's presentation of the scene, the event of resistance takes place. In this event, the cry, or the shouting comes to interrupt the auto-affective oral-aural play of Apollo: the brute, abrupt, bare voice, the noise-voice of the cry, bringing forth the abrupt truth (the abrupt *parrêsia*, without *logos*, and without a subject of utterance). In spite of his desire, and his attempt to remain in the auto-affective circuit, not even mighty Apollo is able to prevent the noise from entering into his ear. Not even Apollo can exclude this voice, or prevent its unexpected, explosive and shocking intrusion. Through the ears, through the audition, the powerful ruler, one who believed himself to be untouchable and perfectly self-sufficient, *becomes open, opens out* against his will, finding himself in a situation, where he cannot discriminate, choose or decide what to hear or not hear. In Foucault's

depiction, the figure of the ear is given the most central role, as the “locus” through which the most powerful ruler becomes exposed and vulnerable to the arrival from the exterior of the contingent movements of voices. Through the ear, the unknown, the anonymous, and the improper comes to interrupt the pretension of self-sufficiency, and of absolute superiority of the ruler.

Foucault says that this course taken by the story is the inversion of the ordinary, of the expected setting: the God who *should* be the *God-mouth* (*le dieu-bouche*), becomes the *God-ear* (*le dieu-oreille*). The God who should be the self-sufficient (self-relating, spontaneous, auto-affective) voice, is turned into an *ear*. To further elaborate the ear-figure that Foucault gives, the arrogant and indifferent ruler now becomes “all ear”, that is, an open ear: It is definitely an ear that cannot avoid hearing the voices of anonymous others, of the multitude without identity, the voices of who- and whatever, the sound’s of the exterior. The significance of the ear-figure in Foucault’s analysis of the situation, of the ruler being turned into an ear, is his becoming exposed to the noise of his subjects, of the crowd of his inferiors, to the noise which is not in fact even generated by any determinate subject or agent at all. The figure of the ear, in Foucault’s lecture, is the figure of the ruler becoming exposed and vulnerable to the abruptness, to the *flash* and *explosion*, to the *shock* of this voice, to an *aural shock* generated in the in-between of the plurality, unexpectedly and without anyone being able to control it, as it was, when passions come into contact and interact with each other in unpredictable ways, all this happening in the density of the crowd. This is the anonymous cry of the crowd, its shock, which even the powerful God-ruler cannot avoid hearing, the cry that is able to challenge and knock over the religious authority, represented by the secretive, reticent and silent oracle:

...and, from the side of the humans, the speech [becomes] speech by which the oracle is knocked over ([*devient*] *parole par laquelle on bouscule l’oracle*). And at the very moment when he remains silent, there where he does not speak (*où il se taire, là où il ne parle pas*), one addresses him with a cry (*on lui adresse un cri*). (Foucault 2008, 119; my emphasis)

What actually takes place in the scene, as Foucault presents it, is the overturning of the conventional, expected setting: now, it is the God, the immortal, mighty, pre-eminent Apollo, who *is called* by the mortal subjects. Although the voice comes through Creuse, the voice itself is not generated by any subject or agent, but instead comes from the *multitude*, from the *crowd of the mortals*. The God is becoming a God-ear, who cannot avoid hearing the noise-call, who cannot ignore or escape it, who is no longer able to remain above and indifferent to the complaints of the mortals. Apollo’s indifference and self-enjoyment of his *virtuoso* musical practice, of his *paeans* and his lyre, are pierced from the exterior by the arrival of the noise of the mortal multitude. The auto-affective singing-playing of the self by itself, becomes brutally interrupted by the brute noise, by the cry of the brute collective *parrèsia*.

Reading the scene portrayed by Foucault of Apollo’s becoming-a-great-ear, yet another scene in particular suggests itself in which the ear plays a parallel central role. This other scene is from Nietzsche and is not one that deals

with the Apollonic-Dionysian difference. Instead it is one from the later Nietzsche, from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Also sprach Zarathustra*). In this scene we encounter a strange creature called the *inverse cripple* (*umgekehrte Krüppel*). He is a human being, or at least, there was a time when he *was* a human being, but he has turned into nothing but a *gigantic ear*. Again, as in the setting Foucault presents, Nietzsche's scene includes the becoming-ear, the growth of the hearing-organ until it is as big as man, brings about the concomitant loss of force and power, a weakening, and a shrinkage of everything else in the being:

...for there are human beings who lack everything, except one thing of which they have too much – human beings who are nothing but a big eye or a big mouth or a big belly or anything at all that is big. Inverse cripples (*umgekehrte Krüppel*) I call them. And when I came out of my solitude and crossed over this bridge for the first time I did not trust my eyes and looked and looked again, and said at last, 'An ear! An ear as big as man!' I looked still more closely – and indeed, underneath the ear something was moving, something pitifully small and wretched and slender. And, no doubt of it, the tremendous ear was attached to a small, thin stalk –but this stalk was a human being! If one used a magnifying glass one could even recognize a tiny envious face; also, that a bloated little soul was dangling from the stalk. The people, however, told me that this great ear was not only a human being, but a great one, a genius. But I never believed the people when they spoke of great men; and I maintained my belief that it was an inverse cripple who has too little of everything and too much of one thing. (Nietzsche, 1930 [*Also sprach Zarathustra*], "Von der Erlösung")

To compare, in Foucault's lecture, Apollo's becoming an ear, the becoming all ear, is also a kind of becoming "crippled", that is, the loss of the self-sufficiency, of the sovereignty of power, a becoming vulnerable. It is the downward movement, in which Apollo is forced to descend from his height to the level of his subjects, to give up his pretension of absolute superiority, as well as give up his secrecy and concealment. This is the real disruptive and even violent effect of the voice. In Foucault's account, furthermore, the further sense of this disruptive event is that it is an *event of justice*, of judiciary interpellation and questioning, of recrimination that places the divine ruler into a position of responsibility. He is put in this position by his subjects for the sufferings he has caused them:

...the cry of the complaint (*le cri de la plainte*), the cry of the recrimination (*le cri de la récrimination*). This is how, I believe, this first general theme of the voice modulates in the text... And thus, the God of the oracle finds himself, by the cry of the woman, *juridically questioned* (*par le cri de la femme, juridiquement interpellé*) (Foucault 2008, 119; my emphasis)...In the *parrēsia*...as if it was a real anti-irony, the one who says the truth throws the truth in the face of this interlocutor (*jette la vérité à la face de cet interlocuteur*), a truth so violent, so abrupt, said in so sharp and so definitive a fashion (*une vérité si violente, si abrupte, dite d'une façon si tranchante et si définitive*)... (ibid., 54)

There is the *parrēsia*, which is the vocal emission, the cry of the complaint, the noise without words and without musical articulation, in which the recrimination of the sovereign is put into action. This event of voice and hearing (the ruler's becoming an ear) is an act of justice, the occurrence of justice. It takes place outside the city, outside the realm of the positive, written law and the institutions of the city. In this event of justice, it is the ruler, the sovereign,

who attempts to set himself above justice, above responsibility, above the condition of having-to-answer to anyone for his use of power, who is accused. The noise, the cry of incrimination, of complaint, exploding from the midst of the multitude of the ruler's subjects, is one that the ruler, becoming all ear, can no longer ignore, can no longer shut off (Foucault 2008, 134-135, 140).

This is the real abruptness, the violence even, the straightforwardly disruptive effect of this voice. This voice has nothing ironic about it. It is the voice that has an inevitable claim of justice, running against the sovereign's claims of absolute power. In the end, the truth concerning Apollo's injustice is revealed, and is spoken by God (albeit uttered in this case by Athena rather than by Apollo directly). Nevertheless, it is the truth concerning Apollo's guilt, the truth through which the justice is then actualized in the revelation of the true descent of Ion, as the secret son of Creuse and Apollo, so that Ion is granted his rightful status amongst the citizens of Athens, and also his share in the government of the city. The most significant event is the remarkable subversion, the effective and victorious subversion, of the crowd of the subjects by means of their bare voice, their cry, their shouting, their noise, and the clamor. Foucault insists that it is this voice which *snatches from* (*arracher à*) the silent ruler, takes or pulls from the ruler even against his will, the confession of the injustice he has committed against his subject. The bare voice (*phōnē*) of the multitude, exploding unexpectedly, in the manner of a shock, without will, and possessed by no agent, only coming from the in-between, in reality anonymously, is able to oblige the ruler to answer for his acts of power, and also results in the correction of the injustices committed, as the justice is finally brought to bear, as everyone is given the due share that belongs to her (Foucault 2008, 134-135, 140).

Foucault's *judiciary parrēsia* has been characterized as the *parrēsia* of the bare voice, of *phōnē*. His *judiciary parrēsia* is fundamentally different not only from the cryptic symbols of the oracle and from the related self-sufficient, auto-affective musical play (see above). Evidently the *parrēsia* of the bare voice is different from the *political discourse*, from *political speech*, from *political parrēsia* in the strict sense. However, there is more to Foucault's analysis, than the simple statement of the difference between *logos* and *phōnē*, between speech and the non-speaking voice. More interesting than the simple difference between these two, is the manner in which Foucault proceeds to specify the quality of the relation between political speech and bare voice, between political *parrēsia* and judiciary *parrēsia*. What is at stake in this discussion, is nothing less than Foucault's analysis on the genealogy of the formation of the *political man*, or the *political human being* (*l'homme politique*), or the *political form of life*. In the foreground of this genealogy of the political man is not only speech and *logos* as such, but also their relation, their encounter and confrontation with *phōnē*.

Evidently the basic starting point for Foucault's genealogy of the political man is the centrality of *logos*, of speech, together with governance, the activity of governing the city, or later the state, in the formation and determination of the political form of living. Governing through *logos*, governing through speech,

taking part in the activity of governing through possessing and using *logos*, this is the basic determination of the political man. Historically, Foucault's focus is on the variety of classical texts preceding Aristotle: Polybius, Thucydides and Euripides, but it is predominantly Foucault's own thought, Foucault's voice that emerges through the readings of the various texts:

...you see that a certain number of qualities is evoked as belonging to the one who is the political man (*l'homme politique*)...: he knows how to distinguish the public interest (*l'intérêt public*), he knows how to express his thinking by the speech (*il sait exprimer sa pensée par la parole*). He is the *parrēsiast* (*le parrēsiaste*) inasmuch as he is keeper of the true discourse (*détenteur du discours vrai*) and as he exercises this true discourse in order to direct the city (*pour diriger la cité*) ...it is very well for the political man (*l'homme politique*) to know where the good is (*où est le bien*), but he must still say it exactly (*exactement le dire*), and show it clearly to his co-citizens (*et le faire voir clairement à ses concitoyens*), in other words, have the courage to say it (*avoir le courage de le dire*), even if it displeases, and have the capacity to display it inside a *logos* (*l'exposer dans un logos*), inside a discourse sufficiently persuasive (*suffisamment persuasif*) for the citizens to obey it (*pour que les citoyens y obéissent*) and support it (*et s'y rallient*).” (Foucault 2008, 163; my emphasis)... *this government of the polis through the logos (ce gouvernement de la polis par le logos)*... (*ibid.*, 107; my emphasis)... *a certain manner of exercising the power by the saying, and by the truth-saying (d'exercer le pouvoir par le dire, et par le dire-vrai)*. It is this, the political *parrēsia* (*c'est cela la parrēsia politique*) (*ibid.*, 141-142; my emphasis)

Central to the determination of the political man is the practice of true speech, of saying the truth courageously, persuasively, but without flattery, so the auditors are convinced of the truth enunciated. It is this practice of speaking the truth that influences the government in order to direct the city or the state. This is the central determination in Foucault's analysis of the political practice, and of qualities given to the political man's capacities and activities. In this outline of the genealogy of politics, Foucault elaborates other concepts as well, such as: the *political game* or *play* (*le jeu politique*), a mode of activity having its rules and norms; the concept of *politics as experience*, or as *field of experience* (*champ d'expérience*), regulated and delimited by rules and norms. In all of these concepts, it is *logos*, *truth-saying*, *parrēsia*, which occupy the centre in what Foucault calls now *the genealogy of the politics as game and as experience (la généalogie de la politique comme jeu et comme expérience)*.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>90</sup> “...the problem of the political game (*du jeu politique*), of its rules (*de ses règles*), of its instruments, of the individual as such who exercises it. It is the problem of the politics – I was going to say as experience (*comme expérience*), in other words, of the politics understood as a certain practice (*de la politique entendue comme une certaine pratique*), having to obey certain rules, indexed in a certain manner to the truth (*indexées d'une certaine manière à la vérité*), and which implies, from the part of the one who plays this game, a certain form of relation to oneself and to others (*une certaine forme de rapport à lui-même et aux autres*)...the exercise of the political game, and of the political game as field of experience (*du jeu politique comme champ d'expérience*) with its rules and its normativity (*sa normativité*), as experience, inasmuch as this political game is indexed to the truth-saying (*au dire-vrai*) ...That is it, the politics (*c'est cela la politique*), and it seems to me that the problem of the politics (of its rationality, of its relation to the truth, of the person who plays it), one sees it being born around this question of the *parrēsia* ...what could be called, if you will, ‘the genealogy of the politics as game and as experience (*la généalogie de la politique comme jeu et comme expérience*)’.” (Foucault 2008, 146-147)

In this outline of Foucault's genealogy as it is presented in the lecture, there is one central determination, one normative delimitation in particular regulating the political form of speech, the political discourse, the political *parrësia* and the field of political experience and the political game as such. This is of special interest, because it is through this particular normative delimitation that a relation of confrontation, of conflict, is inevitable between the political field of experience, the political game, and the formation of the political man on one hand, and the voice, the bare voice, as it has been characterized on the other hand. This delimitation, of the political *parrësia*, is the one having to do with the *identification* and *naming* of the speaker, of the speaking subject.

As Foucault recurrently emphasizes in his analysis, the political discourse is "not only the discourse of the political rationality (*le discours de la rationalité politique*), the true discourse (*le discours vrai*), but a discourse which he (i.e. the speaker, L.S.) claims so to speak for himself (*qu'il réclame en quelque sorte pour lui-même*), to which he identifies himself (*auquel il s'identifie*). Or rather he uses a discourse inside which he characterizes himself as the one who actually uses, in his personal name (*en son nom personnel*)...this discourse of truth (*ce discours de vérité*). He is well and truly, throughout his political career, the subject who says this truth (*le sujet qui dit cette vérité*) (Foucault 2008, 160)...[A] discourse of truth which is theirs personally and to which they identify themselves...(ibid., 161)...[S]peech that claims to say the truth and speech in which equally the one who says the truth ...identifies himself indeed as the enunciator (*s'identifie comme l'énonciateur*) of that true proposition, or of those true propositions (*de cette proposition, ou de ces propositions vraies*)." (ibid.,176)

Here is the normative claim of identification: the showing-appearing by the speaking subject, the showing-of-self as the speaker to his/her audience, meaning the identification of the speech as his/her speech, as speech uttered by this particular subject, by this particular person, not by any other. As Foucault explicitly formulates it, the speaker makes a personal, individual claim for his/her speech, for his/her discourse, thus establishing a relation of attachment, a proximity, a *belonging-together* between him/her-self, represented as he/she is by *hi/hers personal proper name*, and the speech he/she utters. Furthermore, this identification, this *belonging-together* of words and the speaking subject, this attachment must be a continuous and permanent one, without disruptions or gaps, so that the words the subject has enounced continuously keep on belonging to him/her, so that they can at least be retroactively brought back to the subject again. In the functioning of this discursive game, the central question as well as the normative claim is all the time "*who*": who spoke; who said; who argued etc. The linkage between discourse and subject must be unbroken, essentially allowing *no anonymity* in the discourse, allowing nothing like the impersonal, free-floating discourse, allowing nothing like the *becoming homeless* of speech. Inside the discursive game of political *parrësia*, the utterances *must* belong to someone, to an identified someone, and only to this determinate someone in particular, without ambiguities, without overlaps, without confusions, without sharing in-between,



and without contagions. To use the terms as analyzed here by Foucault and familiar from other contexts: the game of political discourse is a game which quite strictly forbids and excludes *methexis* from the speech, between *logoi*. The question is, also, of the individual responsibility for the discourse, of the *responsibilization* established in a continuous manner, of the subject for his words. In a somewhat mythical manner, the perfect accomplishment of these claims is exemplified by the stories of the great speeches of Pericles in the assembly of Athenian citizens.

These normative demands of identification of the speaker belong to the structure of the political discourse, of the political form of *parrësia*. The normative demands of identification of the speaker are among its central structural delimitations, and are ones that should be noticed in the genealogy of the political man, of the political game, and of the political field of experience. This genealogy provides additional extensions of these normative claims in the formation of the subject, in subjectivity and subjectivation, in the determination of the *self-relation* of the political man, of the *political subject* as *speaking subject* of certain kind. The mode of this self-relation is determined most centrally by the norm of identification. The self-relation takes the form of *a pact*, a contract made by the speaking subject with him/herself, in which the speaker commits himself/herself, *binds himself/herself* to the speech: to the utterance, its content, and to the act of enunciation, thus also taking the responsibility for these:

...I believe there is, in the interior of the parresiastic utterance (*à l'intérieur de l'énoncé parrésiastique*), something which could be called a pact (*un pacte*): *the pact of the speaking subject with himself* (*le pacte du sujet parlant avec lui-même*). Pact having itself two levels: the level of the act of enunciation (*de l'acte d'énonciation*) and then [the one], implicit or explicit, *by which the subject binds himself to the utterance he just said* (*par lequel le sujet se lie à l'énoncé qu'il vient de dire*), *but binds himself also to the enunciation* (*mais se lie aussi à l'énonciation*). And in this, the pact is double. On one hand the subject says in the *parrësia*: Here is the truth. He says that he really thinks this truth (*il dit qu'il pense effectivement cette vérité*), and thus he binds himself to the utterance and to the content of the utterance (*au contenu de l'énoncé*). But he makes a pact as well here as he says: I am the one who said this truth; thus I bind myself to the enunciation and I take the risk of all of its consequences (*je me lie donc à l'énonciation et je prends le risque de toutes ses conséquences*). The *parrësia* [includes] thus the utterance of the truth (*l'énoncé de la vérité*), then, above this utterance (*au-dessus de cet énoncé*), an implicit element that could be called *the parresiastic pact of the subject to himself* (*le pacte parrésiastique du sujet à lui-même*), *by which he binds himself both to the content of the utterance* (*au contenu de l'énoncé*) *and to the very act of the utterance* (*à l'acte même de l'énoncé*)... (Foucault 2008, 62; my emphasis)

These are not the only passages in the lecture where Foucault emphasizes the significance of this norm of identification while he analyses the genealogy of the formation of the political discourse, of the political form of experience, and of the political man. This emphasis is also significant when considering the kind of relation between the political form of experience, the political *parrësia*, and the *judiciary* mode of *parrësia*, one that has no speech, no *logos*, but only the voice, only *phônē* (discussed in detail above). The difference between these two is a fundamental one. On one hand, there is the radical *anonymity of the voice*, and of the incriminating truth it carries, emitted from the midst of the multitude, in the

unexpected shock or explosion, without will, without an identifiable agent or subject governing the voice, only by the “in-betweenness” of the contacts, being *shared by the many*, but *not possessed* by anyone. Although Foucault does not use the term *methexis*, it is appropriate to characterize the bare voice, the cry, the noise of the multitude, and also of the strange mode of *parrēsia* it puts into action. On the other hand, there is the political experience, the political game, the political *parrēsia*, determined most centrally by the principle of distinction, individualization and identification. Most apparently, there is a relation of irreconcilable opposition between the two.

Thus the genealogical analysis which Foucault started on the political experience, the field of political experience, the formation of the political man, and the citizen- subject, becomes what could be called *genealogy of the sensorium*. The *genealogy of the sensorium* is the genealogy of the normative regulations, organizations, differentiations and hierarchizations of different modalities of sensory perception. Most apparently, the focus turns to the difference between the political experience and the voice, between the form of the political experience, and the auditory experience of the voice in its sonority, in its anonymity (see above). There is a confrontation between political experience and voice that appears irreconcilable.

The real anonymity, generated in the density of the crowd, means that what contacts and touches an individual, cannot only be *whoever*, but *whatever*, suspending even the distinction of *who* and *what*, of human and non-human, of animate and inanimate; suspending the fundamental distinction constituting the *political*, and demarcating it from the apolitical, in political philosophy from Aristotle to Arendt. Indeed, as Arendt stresses in her conception, the *political-public sphere* is fundamentally constituted by the *distances*, through which the sphere relates but also separates: it relates only while maintaining the distance and the distinctness between those who are thus related. The political-public realm actually *prevents* the becoming-too-proximate, it prevents the loss of distance and distinction between the persons encountering each-other. The public sphere, as the “table” between the persons, prevents the persons from touching each other; it prevents their coming into *con-tact*: only the table is tangible, and it must be so, in order to prevent the touching between the ones it relates and separates. Contact and touch entail the loss of the separating and gathering. The loss of the solid table is, in Arendt’s vocabulary as well, what constitutes the *mass*, the fundamental adversary of the Arendtian idea of the political, idea in which we can still perhaps discover traces of the *phobia of touch*, which might be related to the *phobia of noise*:

The public realm gathers us together and yet prevents us falling over each other. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to separate them...see the table vanish from their midst, so that two persons sitting opposite each other were no longer separated but also would be entirely unrelated to each other by anything tangible. (Arendt 1958, 52-53)

Foucault also provides a carefully detailed explanation of the quality of the confrontation between the two modes of experience, between political discourse and voice, which is also the confrontation between the two forms of *parrësia*, the political- and the judiciary. The voice, the cry, the noise (as already discussed), is that of the multitude, of the crowd, of those who are excluded from the citizenry. It is the *cry of the powerless* (*le cri de l'impuissant*), of those who are excluded from the government of the city or the state, and from the discourse-game through which the government takes place. The judiciary practice, or judiciary event of *parrësia* is one in which those excluded from the government, the powerless, refuse to accept the state of exclusion as such. Through the voice, the excluded ones turn against their government, through the voice they *accuse* the government of an injustice it has committed. The voice is an event of resistance, or subversion, coming from the outside to challenge the governmental play of *logoi*. By the same token, it is the *claim for justice* coming from the exterior to challenge, and to interrupt the on-going deployment of the game of political discourse:

Secondly, one notices a second practice, which is related to a situation of injustice (*une situation d'injustice*), and which, far from being the right exercised by the powerful on his co-citizens in order to guide them (*loin d'être le droit exercé par le puissant sur ses concitoyens pour les guider*), is on the contrary the cry of the powerless (*le cri de l'impuissant*) against the one who abuses his own force (*contre celui qui abuse de sa propre force*). This, which is not [named] *parrësia* in the text (i.e. Euripides' *Ion*, L.S.), but later on will be, this is what could be called the judiciary *parrësia* (*c'est ce qu'on pourrait appeler la parrësia judiciaire*). (Foucault 2008, 141-142; my emphasis)

The voice, the cry of the powerless as Foucault characterizes it, is the practice of resistance arising from the side of the multitude of those excluded from the government. It is the practice which takes place without subject, without any controlling agent, without directing will also, by the sheer explosion and shock of passions-in-interaction. It is the cry of the powerless, but still a very powerful cry, a powerful voice, or the *voice of counter-power*: the powerless. Perhaps it would be more adequate to say it is the cry of the ones who were supposed to be, who were thought to be powerless, as excluded from the political-governmental game of *logoi*, but who are able to interrupt the functioning of the government. However, as Foucault explains, it is not only a momentary interruption, which is the real effect of the bare voice, of the cry of the powerless upon the government. Foucault's conclusion is that the effect of this voice, the effect of the *clamor* of the powerless, of the excluded (compare with Dionysus as the *clamor King*) is to bring about a thorough, fundamental change in the formation and functioning of the political sphere. Thus the effect of the cry is in the discursive game of the government itself. The clamor, the *loud and confused, inarticulate noise* intruding from the outside, is able to change the mode of the government as such. It is this noise of the powerless which can give, withhold or remove, in other words found (*fonder*) the power, the surplus of power, which is needed for a person to be able to participate in the practice of government, in the political game of *logoi*, through which the government takes

place. It is the bare voice, the noise, which in this manner decides upon the government, and even surpasses religious authority in this:

...through the clamor (*la clameur*) of the human truth-saying (*du dire-vrai humain*)... (Foucault 2008, 135)...necessarily, it is the cry of the humans that snatches from the silent God the discourse which will found precisely the power of speaking (*le cri des hommes qui arrache au dieu silencieux le discours qui va fonder justement le pouvoir de parler*) (ibid., 140) ...the very centre of the piece, it is this discourse of the powerless victim of the injustice who turns towards the powerful (*ce discours de la victime impuissante de l'injustice qui se tourne vers le puissant*)...The surplus of power (*le plus-de-pouvoir*) which is necessary for Ion in order for him to be able to rule the city as it should be (*pour qu'il puisse comme il faut diriger la cité*), this surplus of power, it is not the God, it is not the authority of the God, it is not the oracular truth, that will found it (*qui va le fonder*). But what will allow it, through the shock of the passions, to appear, that will be this discourse of truth, this discourse of *parrêsia* in another sense which is almost the inverse discourse (*discours presque inverse*): [that] of the weaker one addressed to the stronger one (*[celui] du plus faible adressé au plus fort*)... (ibid.,126; my emphasis)

To reiterate: "... necessarily, it is the cry of the humans that snatches from the silent God the discourse which will found precisely the power of speaking". What is most significant, is the matter in which Foucault's political genealogy of *parrêsia* turns into a political genealogy of voice(s), or political genealogy of noise: into the analysis of the nexus between the noise, the crowd or the multitude, and the confrontation of the former with the polis, with the government of the polis, not only in terms of their exclusion, but also their subversive intrusion back into the space of polis. This is the fundamental effect of the intrusion of the noise, and the intrusion of the excluded multitude, or the crowd in the polis, in the constitution of its citizenry, in the functioning of its government, and the discursive game of the governing logoi: the game of the political-governmental reason.<sup>91</sup>

## 6.5 Thiasos and the City

The starting point for this analysis of Foucault was his reading of Euripides's tragedy *Ion*. In order to provide further context to Foucault's reflections, and to bring out their significance, it suffices to consider the mythological framework in Euripides's other tragedy. *The Bacchanals*. As mentioned earlier in this

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Giorgio Agamben's formulation, referring explicitly to Aristotle's *Politics*, but dealing also much more generally with the constitution (and demarcation) of the "political", of the political form of life, in the tradition of Occidental political philosophy: "It is not by chance, then, that a passage of the *Politics* situates the proper place of the *polis* in the transition from voice to language. The link between bare life and politics is the same link that the metaphysical definition of man as 'the living being who has language' seeks in the relation between *phōnē* and *logos* (Agamben 1998, 7)...The question 'In what way does the living being have language?' corresponds exactly to the question 'In what way does bare life dwell in the *polis*?' The living being has *logos* by taking away and conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in the *polis* by letting its own bare life be excluded, as an exception, within it." (ibid., 8)

Chapter, the *noise* or *clamor*, the *noise-making*, and the formation of the cult of the *noisy God*, of the *clamor-King* (*Dionysus Bromius*) are central themes in *The Bacchanals*. The noise of the calling of Dionysus gives birth to *thiasos*, the multitude of followers consisting of women and satyrs. *Thiasos* spreads in the manner of an infection, contagiously, as more and more women receive the call and become mobilized, become Bacchantes or Maenads taking part in the multitude-in-movement. Worship of this God can only mean participation in the moving multitude, this worship is an event that happens in and through taking part in the movement-multitude, thus without having any enclosed space, or even a sacred place or site. Here is an apparent difference in comparison to the properly Greek Gods. It is also worth noticing the epithets of *thiasos* of Bacchantes and satyrs: *swarm*, *pack* or *revel rout* (cf. Plato *Laws*, 672c, 790d-e, 815c-816d; see Burkert 2001 160-167; Detienne 1989, 52-64; Kerényi 1996, 52; Sachs 1960, 151-155; Weege 1976, 61-65, 69-74; Winkler 1985).

The use of such epithets can be understood as underlining the difference between the multitude of the *thiasos* from *dēmos*, that is, from the community of the citizens of the city-state. They can also be taken as stressing the detachment of the *thiasos* from the organization of *polis*, as well as from that of *oikos*: the "swarming" of the women, the movement of their multitude, their multitude-in-movement, their running to the mountains and forests, outside of the city-space and outside the private space of the home and domestic work. Thus, in becoming Bacchantes, in becoming a swarm-multitude-in-movement, the women are detaching themselves from the hold of the city's governance, and from the power that is at play in domestic life. The *mobilization by the noise*, spreading in the manner of contagion amongst the women, by the call of the *bromos* of *Bromius*, then the incessant re-enactment, the re-emission and the re-sounding of the noise-call by the noisemaking by the *thiasos*, the revel rout (the crying, the shouting, the roaring, the noise of *auloi*, the banging of cymbals and timbrels, mixing with the sounds of nature) in its' movement of escape, mobilizes this movement-multitude to escape from the city, to break loose from the government of the public as well as the private spheres <sup>92</sup> (cf. Plato *Laws*,

<sup>92</sup> "...CHORUS: ...-O Bacchus' vassals, High-tossed let the wild wands swing: One dancing-band shall be all the land When, led by the Clamour-king, His revel-rout fills the hills - the hills Where thy women abide till he come Whom the Vine-god chasing, in frenzy racing, Hunted from shuttle and loom. O cavern that rang when Curetès sang, O bower of the Babe Zeus' birth, glancing Where the Corybants, dancing with helm-crests Through the dark halls under the earth, This timbrel found whose hide-stretched round We smite, and its Bacchanal mirth They blent with the cry ringing sweet and high From the flutes of the Phrygian land, And its thunder, soaring o'er revel-shouts' roaring, They gave unto Rhea's hand; But the gift passed on from the Mother, was won By the madding Satyr-band; And to Semele's child gave the woodfolk wild The homage he holdeth dear, When to feet white-flashing the timbrels clashing Are wedded in each third year. O trance of rapture, when, reeling aside From the Bacchanal rout o'er the mountains flying,...(Euripides 1979, 110-140) "DIONYSUS: Women, my revel-rout, from alien homes To share my rest and my wayfaring brought Uplift the cymbals to the Phrygian towns Native, great Mother Rhea's device and mine, And smite them, compassing yon royal halls Of Pentheus, so that Cadmus's town may see. I to Cithaeron's glens will go, where bide My Bacchanals, and join the dances there. Enter CHORUS, waving the thyrsus-wands, and clashing their timbrels." (ibid., 50-70)

672c, 790d-e, 815c-816d; see Burkert 2001 160-167 ; Detienne 1989, 52-64; Kerényi 1996, 52; Sachs 1960, 151-155; Weege 1976, 61-65, 69-74; Winkler 1985).

This shows that Foucault is indeed very right in stressing the fundamental significance of the theme of the voice. Foucault's analysis of the voice, the political genealogy of the voice he begins to develop in his final lectures, through his reading of Euripides, elaborates on this setting of mythological significance: the conflict between the noise and the government of the city, the noise of the multitude, the noise contagiously mobilizing the multitude, the crowd or the mass in their difference to *dēmos*. In Foucault's analysis this is the *collective parrēsia*, taking place through the emission of the cry from the midst and from the in-betweenness (*entre*) of the multitude, without any agent having control over the acoustic-sonorous event. Also, in Foucault's account it is this event of the noise, which has the effect of bringing a sudden, unexpected, and even shocking disruption not only of the sovereignty (Apollo), but also, disruption of the political game of the city's government. This is the disruption of the game of *logoi*, the discursive game of political-governmental argument and reasoning, the agonistic game played by the limited, exclusive plurality of the citizens. It is not the voice of the people, of *dēmos*, but the noise of the crowd, the *noise of the powerless*, which turns into such a disruptive, subversive counter-power. In Foucault's reading this is a purely mortal voice, a mortal emission. However, there is a mythological framework as well, depicted in Euripides's tragedies, where there is also a God and a cult (foreign, of non-Greek descent) having an intimate relation with the noise of the multitudes, and with the unexpected mobilization of crowds and masses to confront the city, its sovereign ruler as well as the *dēmos* of the recognized (on the basis of their birth) citizens.

The characterization of the noise, of the noisiness of the sound, the collective cry of *parrēsia* as well as the sound of *aulos* in terms of their inaccuracy, their non-punctuality, their irreducible in-betweenness, their *atopic* nature has been dealt with. This atopic nature of the noise-voice gives rise to the conflict with the musical practice of the sovereign as represented by Apollo in Foucault's analysis, but also with the discursive game, the agonistic game of the governing *logoi* played by the citizens of *polis* (see above). Furthermore, the not-having-a proper place or location, the non-punctuality, the not-having-a-univocal directionality, also means the sound's *not being proper to, not being property of and not being possessed* by any subject, any agent (speaker, musician), but instead the sound's being radically *im-proper*. In this manner, the noise, the cry emitted by the multitude, emitted in and by the in-betweenness, has an *anonymous nature*. The noises are emitted without there being any determinate agent or any will at all behind the sound, one that would be in control of the sound, and one that could offer the origin to which the sound could be traced back. This is the central point made by Foucault in his characterization of the collective crowd-*parrēsia*. Noise is *atopic, anonymous and methexic sound*.

These qualities of the noise (the cries, the shouts, the roaring, the sound of *aulos*, of cymbals, of timbrels), can also be found, more generally, in the

incessant movements constituting the multitude, as coming to the centre in the depictions of the *thiasos* of Dionysus-votaries. The movement of the multitude, in its intimacy with the noise, is of such quality that it subverts the governance of movements, which takes place in the city: against the organization of the movements of sound, and more generally, the movement of humans, of their souls as well as their bodies in terms of the determinacy of locations, places, and directions, in terms of discrete series of phases, of their trajectory, and of the rhythmical measure. This model of governing movement, as it was already previously argued, can be found at work in the *taming of the voice* and sound so as to turn it into the docile instrument of the self-sufficient musical game of the sovereign musician-subject (cf. Apollo the "virtuoso") (cf. Plato *Laws*, 672c, 790d-e, 815c-816d; see Burkert 2001 160-167; Detienne 1989, 52-64; Detienne 2003, 92-101; Kerényi 1996, 52; Sachs 1960, 151-155; Weege 1976, 61-65, 69-74; Winkler 1985).

This taming of the voice- and sound is at play in the agonistic game, the game of *logoi* of speaking citizen-subjects, in the determination of the political form of experience of the political man, where the demand for the identification-distinction of the speaking voices, and their continuous attachment to their proper, distinctive speaking citizen-subject is constitutive, as Foucault noticed. The model of movement-governance had its role in the organization of the bodies, of their forces, of their displacements in the sphere of *oikos*, in work and production. This scheme of the organization of movements comes rather close to scheme of the disciplinary, or reglementary ordering of the movement of bodies, their forces, their gestures into sequences and series, as Foucault analyzed it in the variety of contexts. In opposition to this, in the depictions to be found on the nature of the movements of Bacchants, there is the *sudden leap* or *jump* that happens unpredictably and for no apparent reason with no justification, no apparent *telos*. This sudden movement occurs without being articulated into a series of distinctive phases. The movement of Bacchants appears to be devoid of a trajectory that could be determined by the punctuality of locations, positions, and directions occupied. Instead, the movement is depicted as restless, as undecided or ambivalent in its direction and proceeding, it does not hit the point (compare with the sound of *aulos*), and is just as much lacking a calculable rhythmic measure (cf. Plato *Laws*, 672c, 790d-e, 815c-816d; see Burkert 2001 160-167; Detienne 1989, 52-64; Detienne 2003, 92-101; Kerényi 1996, 52; Sachs 1960, 151-155; Weege 1976, 61-65, 69-74; Winkler 1985).

The anonymity of the noise, one that is constitutive also of the multitude mobilized in and by the noise has a variety of manifestations, a variety of events in which the operations of naming and identification are brought to a failure. These are apparent both in the crowd's emission of the cry-*parrēsia* in Foucault's account, and the mythical accounts of the *thiasos*. In the formation of the *thiasos*, the becoming anonymous, the loss of name and distinctive identity takes place already in a sort of confusion and mixing between the God and the votaries, which is rather unique among the Greek Gods, and is manifested by the fact that both the God and the votaries can be called by one common name

(*Bacchus*), without identification and distinction-making of one and the other. Infected through the noise, this is the ecstasy of the cult as the movement of anonymization, the loss of name, the loss of distinction and identity. Furthermore, the *mixture, the sharing* of the qualities of the human and animal is apparent in the human/bull-figure of Dionysus himself; it is reflected again in the human/goat- satyrs. In Euripides's *The Bacchanals* the woman-Bacchantes have an uncanny communion with wild animals, the relation of care, maternal love and affectionate tenderness for the animals, which replace human children. This is a relation of intimacy and loss of distance, where the human life seems to take part in- and share the animal life. Finally, there is the mixture and ambivalence of the male and the female qualities that are habitually associated with one or the other gender in the character of Dionysus itself, but also in the aggressive, warrior-like conduct of the *Maenads*, carrying the *thyrsus*- wands and violently refusing the attempts (of the city's government) to suppress their cult <sup>93</sup> (cf. Plato *Laws*, 672c, 790d-e, 815c-816d; see Burkert 2001, 160-167; Detienne 1989, 52-64; Kerényi 1996, 52; Sachs 1960, 151-155; Weege 1976, 61-65, 69-74; Winkler 1985).

At the most fundamental level, Dionysus is the God perhaps most intimately related to the *bare life*, to *zoē*, having one of its eminent symbols in the *snake*: "The snake is a phenomenon of life, in which the association of life with coldness, slipperiness, mobility, and often deadly peril, makes a highly ambivalent impression. Among the Minoans and the Greeks, women celebrants carried snakes in their hands". (Kerényi 1996, 61) Dionysus is thus characterized as the deity of *zoē*, life as such or life in general, or in the terms of Giorgio Agamben the *bare life*. This characterizes life as endless and indestructible. A bare life lacks determinate character or form, is without distinctive attributes, and hence indescribable as opposed to *bios*, the characterized life, or the life-form offering itself to depiction in bio-graphy. From this angle, the movement of Dionysian ecstasy, the movement called forth by the noise (*Bromius, bremein, bromos*), spreading and infecting through the noise, is once again reflected in the coiling and re-coiling of the snake (as well as the ivy), constantly coming back to itself, relating to itself, yet incessantly becoming different, changing, in-transition, and slipping out of reach. This mobility is mobility without character, the movement taking place beyond character and characteristics. It is "characteristic" of *zoē*, but also of the noisy sound (like the sound of *aulos*), the sound that is just as much ungraspable,

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<sup>93</sup> "HERDMAN: ... "When fell our horned kine's lowing on her ear. They, dashing from their eyelids rosy sleep, Sprang up...Young wives, old matrons, maidens yet unwed. First down their shoulders let they stream their hair : Then looped they up their fawnskins, - they whose bands Had fallen loose, - and girt the dappled fells while. Round them with snakes that licked their cheeks the Some, cradling fawns or wolf-cubs in their arms, Gave to the wild things of their own white milk, - Young mothers they, who had left their babes...(Euripides 1979, 690-710) ...HERDMAN: ...At the appointed time They waved the thyrsus for the revel-rites, With one voice calling Iacchus, the Clamour-king, Zeus' seed. The hills, the wild things all, were thrilled With ecstasy..." (ibid., 720-730)



slippery, and out of the grasp of identification (Kerényi 1996, xxxi-xxxvii, 61, 64, 95; Otto 1960, 85-87; Burkert 2001, 160-167; Detienne 2003, 92-101).

In *The Bacchanals*, the central struggle takes place between Pentheus, the king of Thebes, and the cult of Dionysus. The struggle ends in Pentheus' being killed by the Bacchantes, including his own mother. The confrontation can be characterized in more general "impersonal" terms, as the one between the noise and the city (its government, its order, its coherence, its prosperity and its strength against its enemies). From the point of view of the city, the conflict between the two genres of "music", incarnated in the difference between the instruments (*aulos* versus *kithara* or the *lyre*) must be settled in favor of Apollo and his instruments, and to the defeat of Marsyas and his noisy instrument, the uncontrolled, non-instrumental instrument (as suggested above): "-The preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said." (Plato *The Republic*, 399e)<sup>94</sup> To compare, Foucault's

<sup>94</sup> The very initial rejection of *aulos* by Athena can also be read from this angle. A few of the most pre-eminent features of Athena should be briefly discussed, in order to offer an adequate background for interpreting the story about the invention of *aulos*. Most importantly, she is the deity of *polis* (her epithets are *Polias* and *Poliouchos*), of the interior unity, order and prosperity of the city, but also of the citadel, that is, of the fortress protecting the city against its enemies, and of the army guaranteeing its victory in war. Athena with her temple, more than any other deity, occupies the place at the very centre of the city (not only in Athens, named after her, but also in Argos, Sparta, Gortyn, Lindos, Larisa in Thessaly, and even in Homer's Troy, the enemy of Athens in *Iliad*). In addition to the interior order and the art of war, there is a third special role of Athena, one that is also central for the existence of *polis*: she is also the "economic" deity of the arts and practices of handicraft and carpentry, of the production of various sorts of goods indispensable for the life of city. Whether in the realm of the public life of the city, its governance and war-fare, or in the economic sphere of production, Athena is above all characterized by the attributes of reasonable self-control, a sort of practical reason or rationality (in the wide sense), or by the force of civilization. The practical wisdom can mean here the reasonable capacity to govern, the tactical art of war, the art of organizing (to divide roles, tasks, functions among citizens as well as workers), the capacity to establish discipline into the city-life and into war-fare. In all of these realms of activity, it is the practical wisdom and self-control, which appear to be the special characteristics of Athena: in her character, we can see something like the perfect exemplar of the necessary interconnection of self-government, and the capacity to govern others, to govern the city adequately, the very basic conditions of the successive existence of the *polis* as such (Burkert 2001, 139-141). "What unites these divergent spheres of competence is not an elemental force, but the force of civilization: the just division of roles among women, craftsmen, and warriors and the organizational wisdom which achieves this. It is not the wild olive of Olympia but cultivated tree which is the gift of Athena. Poseidon violently sires the horse, Athena bridles it and builds the chariot; Poseidon excites the waves, Athena builds the ship; Hermes may multiply the flocks, Athena teaches the use of wool. Even in war Athena is no exponent of derring-do - this is captured in the figure of Ares - but cultivates the war-dance, tactics, and discipline: when Odysseus, crafty and self-controlled as he is, persuades the Achaeans to join battle in spite of their war-weariness, then this is the work of Athena (ibid., 141)...especially the work of women at spindle and loom. Athena *Ergane* is inventor and patroness of wool-working, of the glorious handicrafts which constitute such an important part of domestic property and pride; she even works the spindle herself...Athena is also the goddess of carpenters: she invented the chariot as well as the bridle for the horse, she built the first ship, and she helped construct the Wooden Horse" (ibid.; weaving, *royal weaving* is also a key-figure in Plato's *Statesman*, for the depiction of the nature of the art of the statesman, and the art of governing the city, see Plato *Statesman*, 306-311; the significance of this figure has later been stressed at

reading of *Ion* is centred on the conflict between the noise, the anonymous, *methexic* cry of the multitude, and the formation of the political experience in the agonistic game of discourse, of speech, of governing *logoi* played by the assembly of citizens. It is a game constituted by the demand of identification-distinction between the speakers, of the properness and property-likeness of the speaking voices, the attachment and tracing back of voices to their origins in this or that citizen-subject.

Foucault is claiming that it is through the clamor, through the in-articulate noise, that the power of speech is established. Here it means the political power of using *logos*, and taking part in the government exercised through the use of *logos*. It is the noise which establishes the capacity for speech, *phōnē* that establishes and determines *logos*. It is the a-political or pre-political, aural-sonorous mode of experience, which establishes the political-discursive form of experience. It is the explosion of the truth in the noise, generated by the shock of passions, without will and without subject of enunciation, the radically anonymous voice, which establishes the political experience determined by identification (of *who* spoke) and the use of personal-proper names. These ideas are not only significant for the interpretation of Foucault's *œuvre*, of his political thought, but most essentially, they are important for the understanding of the politics of senses, of the sensorium, and especially, for analyzing the relations between voice, and the sonorous-aural perception on one hand, and the power-resistance setting on the other hand.

The issue of the crowd, its special proximity with sound and audition, with noise, and its relation of antagonism with government and governing, has been recurring in various contexts so far: already in the mythical depictions of the confrontation between the noise-making God and his followers with the city and the power of the king; then, at the heart of Occidental art-music as such, in the confrontation of music (the demarcations of music and non-music) with the materiality and concreteness of sound (see the discussion on Boulez in Chapter 4). The re-reading of Foucault has elaborated and shown that, in opposition to the way he is often portrayed, Foucault did have a point to make regarding the voice, sound, noise, ear, and the auditory perception. Furthermore, Foucault's treatment of the issue of the sonorous-aural situates it at the kernel of the central political problematics occupying his attention: the relations between *parrēsia*, government, resistance, multiplicities, crowds and masses. I believe the evidence provided is sufficient to show that Foucault's emphasis on the issue of the politics of perception was not exclusively on vision, gaze, light and luminosity: he did not downplay the political significance (and the significance for challenging the established form of the "political game") of other sensory modalities, at least that of audition and sound.

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least by Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 475-477). So, it is the Goddess of reasonable government, of self- and other, who rejects *aulos*, the non-controlled, non-punctual, noisy instrument.

## CONCLUSION

In the course of this study, we have followed Foucault's intellectual history with the span of some 20 years, from the 1960's until the years preceding his death. Considering all the themes touched upon and their historical contexts, the span has been much more extensive than twenty years. This reflects the variety found in Foucault's thought. Throughout the varying contexts, the basic argument set forth and defended is that Foucault actually had various significant points to make on the issue of *voice, sound* and our "ears", more specifically, on the *politics of the auditory and the sonorous*. This I have attempted to show by following chronologically (although not without certain exceptions) the line of Foucault's thinking. Throughout the discussion of different periods and contexts of Foucault's *œuvre*, contested from several angles, is the picture of Foucault as a reductivist thinker, as a visualist or ocularcentrist whose approach to politics (power as well as resistance) was exclusively focused on vision and visuality, to the detriment of the role of other varieties of sensuality and perception, especially auditory perception, the voice/sound and music.

Against this image, I have attempted to show that Foucault was interested in the auditory-sonorous which does occupy a central role in Foucault's thought. Moreover, through the evidence provided by the reading of a variety of Foucault's works from the different periods, it has been suggested that the occurrence of the issue of audition and voice/sound is not irrelevant in nature, that it is not one that a reader of Foucault could neglect. Instead, it has been shown that the auditory-sonorous has its role in Foucault's developing some of the most significant themes of his thought, and some of his most seminal political concepts, ranging from *medicalization* to *governmentalities*, to Foucault's friendship and dialogue with Pierre Boulez, then further to the *care for the self*, and finally to his last analyses on *parrësia* and the genealogy of *politics as a game* and *experience*. In all of these contexts, the issue of sound, voice and hearing appears in such a manner that there are no grounds to deny their importance in Foucault's thinking.

Another central argument that has gone through this study is potentiality to be discovered in Foucault's thinking on the politics of the auditory-sonorous

that was left rather implicitly, or without elaboration by Foucault himself. The aim in this study has also been to tease out the potentiality of this sort, and to show how it could be further articulated and elaborated. This has been done, above all, in the form of a critical dialogue with Foucault's thought. In some parts of the study the criticism targeted on Foucault's thought has been emphasized where he *does* neglect the political role of audition and sound on occasions. Thus, the account given of Foucault's thought in this respect is by no means one of full coherence, and it does not claim to be so. I have attempted to show that Foucault's thinking is *not* fully continuous in its acknowledging or omitting the role of the auditory-sonorous. While recognizing the occurrence of such discontinuities, it can still be shown that we *can* discover in Foucault's work a certain *coherent strain* of thinking of the politics of the auditory-sonorous, one that needs to be reconstructed and elaborated further.

Criticism of Foucault came to the fore in the first Chapter, where the focus was on Foucault's work from the 1960's, and thematically, on the birth of the modern clinical medicine and the *medicalization of politics*. There, in *Birth of the Clinic* Foucault presents what was called the *right-of-origin-argument*, which meant his denying rather categorically the independent, irreducible significance of audition in the clinical medical practice. Foucault insists, even if there is no basis for this in his historical material (in the treatises of René Laënnec, above all), even if this is incompatible with his basic archaeological- and genealogical approach, that the clinical experience was *necessarily* constituted under the dominant sign of the visible, and that the whole clinical-medical practice together with its political effects should *necessarily* be, in the end, reducible to the operation of the gaze.

The core of the right-of-origin argument, and the target of the criticism against Foucault on this point, was its defining audition as a faculty of perception *essentially lacking* the capacity of *spatial-objective form*. Behind such an argument would be Foucault's adoption of the strong, trans-historical theoretical juxtaposition between vision and audition: the "audio-visual" dichotomy. The right-of-origin argument also means that Foucault would actually commit himself to the strong idea of the subject of perception and -experience, one that precedes and transcends the level of political practices, of political struggles, and sets the *apolitical* and *prepolitical ground* for the former.

However, after this I suggested that these attacks on Foucault's position might still be too hasty, too categorical, and in need of serious reconsideration and revision. This argument was based on my reading of Foucault's essay titled *Message or Noise?*, published a few years after *Birth of the Clinic*, and left unnoticed in the recent discussions dealing with the issue of "audio" and "visual" in Foucault's thought. In my reading, the emphasis has been on how the essay diverges in significant respects from the right-of-origin-argument of *Birth of the Clinic*, even to the extent of radically challenging it. There is a central *disjuncture* that should be noticed here. In *Message or Noise?* Foucault presents an analysis of the modern clinical medical practice, in which audition and sound, auscultation of the auditory-pathological signs of the body, are given a

central, even pre-eminent role in the formation of knowledge and orientation of the medical intervention taking charge of the living body. In this sense, one could also say that Foucault presents a more apt re-reading of Laënnec on this issue. There is no reduction, on theoretical grounds, of audition under the dominance of the gaze, but instead an argument for its autonomous, indispensable significance in the seminal phase in the development of clinical medicine and medical control of living bodies.

The other central point in my reading of *Message or Noise?* is that in the essay Foucault shows how auditory perception, and the “ear”, as it was “captured” and articulated into the clinical-medical practice, went through a change, or a transfiguration pertaining to its forms, functions, capacities, powers and limitations. In the articulation into clinical medicine, auditory perception and the ear were made into rational, discriminating, analytical organs and instruments of medical knowledge and intervention/control. In this manner, far from adopting the theoretical juxtaposition of “audio” and “visual”, Foucault does nothing less than detaches himself from, and issues a challenge to this theoretical setting. This strong juxtaposition has been quite influential in the history of Occidental philosophy. We can already find its germs in Plato and Aristotle, and its further developments in the thought of modern philosophers as heterogeneous as Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Bergson. The setting reappears during the 20th Century, perhaps most notably in phenomenological and Existentialist philosophy. Furthermore, in both the post World-War II- philosophy as well as social- and political theory, we can find variations of the setting in certain strains of Marxist theory (such as Guy Debord), in the media theory of Marshall McLuhan, and even in thinking generally labeled as post-structuralist (for instance Jean-Luc Nancy).

Against this background, the real significance of Foucault’s insight became evident. Already in *Message or Noise?*, but also after that, we are offered is a *more politicized approach*: one that takes auditory perception as something to be modified and transfigured in different articulations and strategic captures by different modalities of power-knowledge, but also by subversive practices. The readings of Foucault presented in the study offer an approach, which considers the formation of audition to be a political issue, a significant locus of struggles between modes of power and resistance. Not even the “lack of spatiality”, “non-objectivity” or “temporality” can be taken as “properties” of audition that would transcend the historical-political level of the struggles, indeed, they are only something that emerges contingently in these struggles.

The key idea reconstructed from Foucault’s thought, first in the archaeology of medical knowledge, and then further in the context of the genealogical analyses of politics (of power, governance and resistance), can be called *struggle over our ears*. To take auditory perception and experience as essentially contested, as being penetrated by this struggle, means that there is *no* reason to believe that the auditory/aural experience would, as though inherently and self-evidently, be the medium for the liquidation of the modern rational subject, or that it would offer an “antidote” against the grip of scientific

power-knowledge. The approach that has been teased out through the reading of Foucault, means that we should *not* just assume in theory, in a *quasi a priori* fashion that auditory experience is given to us as the mysterious origin of transgression, resistance and subversion.

In Chapter 2, the focus was on the issue of *surveillance* and in particular on the model of the *Panopticon*: firstly, what came to the fore was Foucault's somewhat problematic fashion of downplaying the contribution of listening to the apparatus of surveillance (to be found in Jeremy Bentham's original design of the inspection house). Then, I proceeded to ponder how listening can be articulated in the functioning of surveillance, but also what sort of "immanent" problems this articulation encounters. This was done with the help of reading a piece of literature: Italo Calvino's story of the *listening king*. This reading aimed to show how the idea of *pan-auditory power* could be elaborated, one that would follow further on the central insight provided already in *Message or Noise?*, although this path was not taken by Foucault himself.

In Chapter 3, the aim was to reveal the convergences which could be further elaborated between the issues of sound and auditory perception and Foucault's analyses on *governmentality*. One such convergence was located in the endeavor to understand the collision of the modern state with noise, the determination of noise as a central political problem, and the establishment of the extensive stately policies of noise-abatement. Then the focus was turned to Foucault's genealogy of liberalism and especially neo-liberalism, as a form of "environmental" governance functioning through the constitution of the rational *economic subject* (*homo œconomicus*). The question was about the role of the senses, and of modes of perception in the formation of the *homo œconomicus*: the constitution, the organization of the *homo œconomicus* as a determinate *sensory subject*, or *subject of perception*. To continue further in this direction, another piece of literature was read and set in a conjunction with Foucault's genealogy of the *homo œconomicus*: a short story of Franz Kafka's titled *The Burrow*, depicting the life of a hyper-calculative, hyper-possessive, hyper-defensive creature habiting an under-ground spatial construction. Through this conjunction between the readings of the two divergent texts, a thought-experiment was introduced, concerning the manner in which the auditory perception and sound (the use of the ears, the practice and the art of listening) can be articulated. This articulation in the formation of the *homo œconomicus*, and consequently in the functioning of the neo-liberalist governance itself, is not without certain problems also. In the end, through the reading of the two texts "side by side", what emerged approached an analysis of the *neo-liberalist politics of the sensorium* with its *aporias*, which were finally calling into question the very basis of its constitution, the very constitution of the economical-calculative subject.

In Chapter 4, the focus was on Foucault's relation with music. The specific context was the friendship of Foucault and Pierre Boulez. This showed that despite the fact that music did not belong to the topics most extensively discussed by Foucault, its importance should not be hastily overlooked either.

Instead, it came about that Foucault's relation to music can actually be understood in accordance with a certain idea of friendship, as a relation that is constituted through the suspension of knowledge, and by the suspension of speech as such. The friendship with music, and Foucault's friendship with Boulez, *could not* be a relation to an object to be spoken about, an object to be known or understood. However, this does not mean that such a friendship would be unimportant or indifferent. On the contrary, friendship in this sense is a relation in which the utmost distance, the silence of not speaking about, the remaining-unknown, equals utmost proximity or intimacy. This was the kernel of Foucault's friendship with music, and of his approach to listening to music as friendship *par excellence* culminating in the experience of absolute beauty disruptive of speech, bringing the subject to encounter the limits of the signifying capacities. Furthermore, the line of influence going from Foucault's political genealogies to Boulez's musical analyses, through the elaboration of certain political concepts of Foucault's into *musical concepts* was shown: the importance of the concept of *musical dispositif* (the spatio-temporal, strategic intervention into the *bodies of sound*, into the *sonorous bodies*) as it is elaborated by Boulez in his analyses of musical works, and of musical practices taken broadly.

Perhaps, as it was suggested, there is after all potential in Foucault's thought, in his political concept, to be applied also into the field of musical analysis, to the analysis of the conflict over the sound and our manners of listening in the field of Occidental art music as well. Foucault's thought could be applied (as the tool-box) to bring to the fore the conflictual *character of the musical practices themselves*, ranging from composition to performance and listening, and to the character of musical instruments.

In Chapter 5, the more critical stance towards Foucault's thought, which was explicitly present in Chapter two, reappears. We dealt with Foucault's later thought revolving around the themes of the *ethics and aesthetics of the self*, and the *care of the self*. When Foucault deals with the practices- and techniques of the self needed for resisting fear and terror, he appears to endorse a rather limited, rather reductive conception of the *sonorous art*, or the *art of noise*, and their ethical-political potentialities. So, once again, Foucault seems to endorse, or leave his argumentation vulnerable for criticism on this point, a static and transhistorical account of the sensorium, of the subject of perception, of the distinctions and divisions between the senses, of audition and vision especially. Yet, this is not the final word on the matter. Instead, I suggested that if we do not read Foucault's take on the dangers of the sonorous art, in the framework of the care for the self, in isolation, but together with the basic arguments of Chapter 4, we end up with a different account. This was, again, a more pragmatic and "situational" account of the relation between the philosophical practices of *logos*, and the musical practices, account in which the concept of *kairos* was central.

In Chapter 6, the significance in Foucault's final lectures was emphasized. These lectures covered the theme of the *bare voice*: the non-discursive as well as

non-musical voice in its proximity to the formation of multitudes, crowds, and masses, as well as to the practices of resistance, to the confrontation and struggle taking place between the multitudes and the dispositives of power attempting to seize and appropriate the former. To characterize more specifically the interface between the formation of multitudes/multiplicities/crowds/masses, and the voice, I suggested the use of the concept of *methexis*: the horizontal movement of sharing, participation and contagion. This brought to focus the idea of the resistant voice, relating to the unique modality of *collective parrēsia*, the collective emission of truth without speech, the *subversive truth* only generated from the midst of the crowd or the multitude; a vocal and sonorous truth only generated from the “in-betweenness” of the conjunctions and contacts forming the multitude; truth of the bare voice, truth of the noise, emitted and spreading in the manner of a shock or explosion, i.e. unexpectedly and without originating or coming back to any “will-to-speak”, or to any determinate agent at all. *Due to* this essential “improperness”, this auditory-sonorous truth-emission can effectively become a practice of resistance and counter-power, one that is capable of interrupting and bringing about a thorough change both in the sovereignty of the God (in the sovereignty of divine-religious descent), as well as in the discursive game, the game of governing *logoi* played by the citizens of the *polis*.

Throughout all these readings, across all the different contexts and issues touched upon, the idea of the auditory-sonorous as the locus of struggles has been emphasized and defended. These struggles are about our ears and about our voices, struggles pertaining to the formation and organization of our sensory perception as such. What has been offered in this study are ways to conceptualize these struggles. I have shown that the struggle over our ears and voices is by no means a trivial issue, or a mere idiosyncrasy of Foucault’s thinking. Instead, it is has a most significant part, one that ought to be duly noticed in the basic struggle over our bodies, over our lives, and over our being as subjects. There is, I believe, significance to these ideas, which surpasses the issues of Foucault-interpretation, the challenging of the picture of Foucault as a visualist. It seems that the tools for the genealogical analyses of auditory- and sonorous politics are there to be used, are waiting to be further elaborated and applied to different contexts and situations. In this study, I hope to have opened some new areas for such applications, the final proof of which can only be given by the future.



## TIIVISTELMÄ

Ranskalainen Michel Foucault (1926-1984) lukeutuu 1900-luvun merkittävimpiin länsimaisiin ajattelijoihin. Foucault tunnetaan erityisesti vallankäytön ja hallitsemisen muotoja tarkastelevista analyyseista, joiden historialliset ja kulttuuriset kontekstit ulottuvat juutalaiskristillisen teologian perinteestä ja antiikin Kreikan filosofiasta aina toisen maailmansodan jälkeiseen uusliberalismiin. Tässä tutkimuksessa näkökulma, josta Foucault'n ajattelua lähestytään, on aistien politiikka ja – poliittisuus. Eräs läpi Foucault'n ajattelun vaiheiden, teemojen ja kontekstien kulkeva juonne on näköhavainnon ja katseen poliittisen merkityksen korostaminen erityisesti osana vallankäyttöä, mutta myös vastarintaa. Tunnetuimpia tässä suhteessa lienevät kliinis-lääketieteellistä katsetta ja *panoptista* tarkkailua koskevat analyysit.

Toisaalta, juuri aistien poliittisuuden näkökulmasta Foucault'n ajattelua on myös arvosteltu kahdestakin eri syystä: yhtäältä, Foucault'n käsitystä "silmästä" ja "visuaalisesta" on syytetty reduktiivisuudesta ja "historiattomuudesta"; ja toisaalta, Foucaultia on kritisoitu yhtä lailla reduktiivisesta ja epähistoriallisesta muiden aistien ja muiden havaintomuotojen, ennen kaikkea *auditorissonorisen* (*kuulon, kuuntelemisen ja äänen*) roolin sivuuttamisesta kyseenalaisin perustein, jopa silloin kun Foucault'n itsensä käyttämä lähdemateriaali antaisi aiheita juuri päinvastaisiin johtopäätöksiin. Foucaultia on pidetty "visualistina", jonka ajattelu ei tarjoa juurikaan lähtökohtia kuulon ja äänen tai musiikin poliittisuuden ymmärtämiseen.

Tämä kritiikki, sen esiin nostamat kysymykset ja sen oikeutuksen arviointi, on keskeisessä osassa myös tässä tutkimuksessa. Kiistämättä Foucault'n tuotannosta (kenties varsinkin sen yleisimmin luetuimmista ja laajimmin tunnetuista osista) voidaan löytää perusteita edellä esitetylle käsitykselle. Tämä tutkimus pyrkii kuitenkin kyseenalaistamaan mainitun Foucault'n ajattelusta luodun kuvan kattavuuden ja aukottomuuden. Erityisesti Foucault'n *Collège de France*ssa pitämät luennot, sekä hänen monet vähäisemmälle huomiolle jääneet tekstinsä (esseet, esitelmät, keskustelut ja haastattelut) luovat toisenlaisen kuvan Foucault'sta ajattelijana, jolle kuulo, kuunteleminen ja ääni olivat tärkeä poliittinen kysymys. Ensiksi, tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, kuinka auditoris-sonorinen ja sen poliittisuus, tarkemmin sanottuna sen *kiistanalaisuus* (vallan ja vastarinnan välissä) on teema, jota Foucault eksplisiittisesti tarkasteli ja jota hän piti tärkeänä intellektuaalihistoriansa eri vaiheissa. Toiseksi, tutkimuksessa tuodaan esiin Foucault'n ajattelusta löytyviä, mutta "käyttämättä jääneitä" mahdollisuuksia kuulon, kuuntelemisen ja äänen poliittisen teorian kehittämiseen. Näissä kohdin myös tutkitaan, kuinka näitä mahdollisuuksia voitaisiin eksplisiittisesti kehittää kohti auditoris-sonorisen poliittista genealogiaa.

Foucault tarkasteli kuulon, kuuntelemisen ja äänen poliittista merkitystä jo 1960-luvulla lääketieteellisen tiedon arkeologiaa ja medikalisaatiota käsittelevissä tutkimuksissaan. Seurattaessa Foucault'n ajattelun historiaa eteenpäin, "ääni" ja "korva" esiintyvät myös 1970-luvun kurinpidon geneologioissa, sekä

1970-luvun lopun *hallinnoimisen (gouvernementalite)* analyyseissa. Edelleen, teema tulee esiin 1980-luvun alussa Foucault'n kehitellessä *itsestä-huolehtimisen, olemassaolon estetiikan, askeesin ja minä-tekniikoiden* ideoita. Musiikin merkitys puolestaan on kiistaton Foucault'n ja säveltäjä-kapellimestari Pierre Boulez'n välisissä keskusteluissa. Vielä viimeisissä luennoissaan Foucault nostaa esiin äänen ja kuulemisen pyrkien osoittamaan niiden olennaisen poliittisen merkityksen, niiden kiistanalaisuuden, ehkäpä eksplisiittisemmin kuin koskaan aiemmin. Kaiken kaikkiaan, Foucault näyttäytyy ajattelijana, jolle kuuloon, kuuntelemiseen ja ääneen kytkeytyvät strategiat, taidot, tekniikat ja teknologiat; muodot ja rajoitukset, sekä niitä koskevat kiistat ja konfliktit ovat keskeisessä asemassa kamppailuissa, joissa kysymys on ruumiiden, elämän ja subjektiviteetin hallinnasta.

Läpi Foucault'n ajattelun monien kontekstien ja teemojen voidaan löytää lähtökohta kuulon ja äänen poliittisuuden ymmärtämiseen tavalla, joka irrottautuu "silmän" ja "korvan" perustavan eron ja vastakkainasettelun asetelmasta ("silmiä" rationaalisena, objektiivisena/objektivoivana ja aktiivisena; "korva" affektiivisena, temporaalisena ja passiivisena). Tällä asetelmalla on ollut varsin huomattava asema länsimaisen filosofian ja poliittisen ajattelun historiassa, ja se on edelleen 1900-luvulla ja nykyäänkin saanut kannatusta yli teoreettisten perinteiden ja koulukuntien rajojen. Foucault'n tulkinnan avulla asetelma on mahdollista kyseenalaistaa ja "asettaa liikkeeseen". Tässä on löydettävissä Foucault'n merkitys äänen ja kuulemisen, mutta myös laajemmin aistien poliittisuuden ymmärtämiselle.

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